SPOUSES ZALAMEA vs. CA and TRANSWORLD AIRLINES, INC.

FACTS:
1. Spouses Zalamea and their daughter purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of
respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. (TWA) for a flight from New York to Los Angeles.
 The tickets of the spouses were purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter
was a full fare ticket. All three tickets represented confirmed reservations.
2. Once in New York, however, they found that their flight back to Manila was overbooked, as a result
of which they had to be wait-listed.
3. Out of those waitlisted, the ones with full-fare tickets were preferred.
4. Thus, only Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was able to get on
board; while his wife and daughter had to wait for the next flight.
5. However, it turned out this next flight was likewise overbooked, forcing the Zamaleas to purchase
tickets from another airline.
6. Petitioners filed an action for damages before the RTC Makati over TransWorld Airlines, Inc.'s
because of its refusal to accommodate them in TWA Flight 007 departing from New York to Los
Angeles on June 6, 1984 despite possession of confirmed tickets.
7. Advocating petitioner's position, the trial court categorically ruled that respondent TransWorld
Airlines (TWA) breached its contract of carriage with petitioners and that said breach was
"characterized by bad faith."
8. On appeal, however, the appellate court found that while there was a breach of contract on
respondent TWA's part, there was neither fraud nor bad faith because under the Code of Federal
Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board of the United States of America it is allowed to overbook
flights.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in accepting the finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US
Code of Federal Regulations and in holding that there was no fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA ?

RULING:
The CA was in error. There was fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA when it did not allow Mrs. Zalamea
and her daughter to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets. The US law or
regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved.

Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the court take judicial notice of them. Like any other
fact, they must be alleged and proved.

Written law may be evidenced by: 1) an official publication thereof or 2) by a copy attested by the
officers having legal custody of the record, or 3) by his deputy and accompanied with a certificate that
such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul-
general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Phil.
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.

Here, TWA relied solely on the testimony of its customer service agent in her deposition that the Code
of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautic Board allows overbooking. Aside from said statement, no
official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, the CA’s finding that overbooking is
specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.
"Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to the case
at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of the place
where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are residents
and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Since the
tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law."

People vs. Monleon

FACTS:
the trial court convicted Monleon of parricide. In this appeal, his counsel de oficio the trial court erred in
giving credence to Monleon's confession, the affidavit of his son, Marciano (Exh. E), and the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses, Clemencia Bongo-Monleon, Epifania Bongo, Perfecto Bongo, and the NBI
medico-legal officer, Doctor Ceferino Cunanan; in treating the alleged declarations of Concordia Bongo
to Clemencia's husband as part of the res gestae and in rejecting the testimonies of Monleon and his
two children, Marciano and Felicisima.

The crucial fact in this case is that Monleon feloniously assaulted his wife in the evening of June 1, 1970
by choking her, bashing her head against a post and kicking her in the abdomen. He did not use any
weapon but the acts of physical violence which he inflicted on her produced internal complications
which caused her to vomit blood the next day and eventually snuffed out her life.

The corpus delicti or the fact of the commission of the crime of which Concordia Bongo was the victim
was established by the prosecution witnesses, Clemencia Bongo-Monleon and Epifania Bongo. Hence,
Monleon's extrajudicial confession (Exh. C) was corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti (Sec. 3,
Rule 133 and sec. 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court).

The trial court said that it took pains to observe the demeanor on the witness stand of the mayor
Epifania, and Clemencia, who all testified for the prosecution, and appellant Monleon himself. It was
convinced that the confession "was voluntarily executed by the accused."

Appellant's counsel de oficio contends that there are discrepancies between Monleon's confession and
the version given by the prosecution witnesses, Epifania and Clemencia. Those two witnesses testified
that Concordia died at eleven o'clock in the morning while Monleon in his confession declared that his
wife died at one o'clock in the afternoon. Another discrepancy is that according to prosecution
witnesses Monleon was not present when his wife died but according to the confession, he was with her
when she breathed her last. Counsel de oficio also points out that the confession was supposed to have
been thumbmarked on June 16, 1970 and then sworn to before the mayor two days later or on June 18
but, according to Lieutenant Bongo, he investigated Monleon in the early morning of June 18 and his
confession was executed at that time.ISSUE:

RULING:

Appellant's counsel argues that the trial court erred in admitting Marciano Monleon's affidavit which
was written in the Cebuano dialect (Exh. E) and which was not accompanied with the corresponding
translation. That confession is well-taken.

The trial court erred in admitting that affidavit over the objection of appellant's counsel because section
34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that documents written in an unofficial language shall not be
admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English, Spanish or the national
language "To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such
translation prepared before trial" (See. 34).

Salison vs. People

FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
Appellant, however, maintains that said written statement, which was reduced into writing by witness
Patricia Alcoseba and purporting to be a dying declaration, is inadmissible as evidence since it was in the
Cebuano regional language and was not accompanied with a translation in English or Pilipino.

While Rule 132, Sec. 33 renders documents unaccompanied by the official translation as inadmissible, in
the interest of justice, the prohibition should not apply in this case since Salison failed to object to the
document’s admissibility.

What further strengthens the case of the prosecution was the declaration of Valmoria, made and signed
by him right after the incident, as to who were responsible for the injuries he sustained. Appellant,
however, maintains that said written statement, which was reduced into writing by witness Patricia
Alcoseba and purporting to be a dying declaration, is inadmissible as evidence since it was in the
Cebuano regional language and was not accompanied with a translation in English or Pilipino.

However, as correctly observed by the Solicitor General:

The records do not disclose that the defense offered any objection to the admission of the declaration.
Thus, the defense waived whatever infirmity the document had at the time of its submission as
evidence. The declaration can be translated into English or Pilipino as it is already admitted in evidence
and forms part of the record. 24

Also, while such statement was given, as in the nature of things they are generally in oral form, they are
not thereby rendered inadmissible as they may even be communicated by means of signs. If the
declarations have thereafter been reduced to writing and signed by the declarant, the writing is
generally held to be the best evidence, and it must be produced. 25

More than once, this Court has taken into consideration documents written in a Philippine dialect,
unaccompanied by the required translation but which had been admitted in evidence without objection
by the accused.26 In those instances, the Court merely ordered official translations to be made. It is true
that Section 33, Rule 132 of the revised Rules of Court now prohibits the admission of such document in
an unofficial language but we believe that in the interest of justice, such injunction should not be taken
literally here, especially since no objection thereto was interposed by appellant, aside from the fact that
appellant, the concerned parties and the judicial authorities or personnel concerned appeared to be
familiar with or knowledgeable of Cebuano in which the document was written. There was, therefore,
no prejudice caused to appellant and no reversible error was committed by that lapse of the trial court.

Also, the written declaration was duly presented during the trial and the person who reduced the
victim's declaration into writing was thoroughly questioned by the court and the prosecutor, and cross-
examined by the defense counsel. The witness was able to explain and discuss what was written in the
declaration and how she came to prepare the same. Significantly, everything written in that declaration
of the victim was confirmed by the Government's eyewitnesses. Appellant's argument regarding the
inadmissibility of the declaration on a mere technicality would mean the loss of a vital piece of evidence
that could yield the true facts and give retributive justice in the murder of Valmoria.