SUMMARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION Office of Inspector General Case # 11-0225 (Chief Constantine Andrews) December 4, 2015 This report consists of a summary of the evidence set out in a separate “Chronology of Events,” all relevant investigative materials, an index of the investigative materials, and the Office of Inspector General’s (O1G’s) analysis of those'materials. I. INTRODUCTION AND Rerorr ForMAT ‘An OIG investigation has established that Chicago Police Department (CPD) Chief Constantine “Dean” Andrews violated CPD rules and regulations in the course of his participation in and supervision of the CPD investigation of the homicide of David Koschman. Accoidiiigly, and as detailed below, OIG recommends that CPD impose discipline up to and including discharge against Chief Andrews, commensutate with the gravity of his violations, past disciplinary and work history, department standards, and any other relevant considerations. The ditached Cliroitology of Events details the facts relevant to the Koschman investigatin with citation to all supporting evidence. Tliis evideiice includes that obtained by the Office’ of Spetial Proseciitor (OSP) and the special ‘grand jury and disclosed 19 OIG by order of the Circuit Court Sf Cok Couinty' for uige in’ this administrative investigation: ‘Al grand jury matetidl reniains ‘subject to ‘a ‘protective order.’ The ‘eviderice also includes Additional investigative ififerials dnd stateménis obtained by OIG following the release ‘Of the Repoit of thé Speclil Prosecutér, Dan K. WeBb. Diié to thé length of the Chronology, a conplete simthary of the evidence is not repeated here, and is cited with reference to the Chronology (Ciro. ) ~ throughout. | a Poe i TL BAckérovnn . . : AO” Suminaty of CPD'S Investigation 6 thie Koschniaa Homitide " At -apptoxishately"3:15 ati.on Aptil 25, 2004, David Koschimian, “Stott Allen, James Copéhiiil, David Fratis! and’ Shatin Hageline (dic “Kosehrisan gtlip”) were’ walking ‘westwartl on Division Street when they encountered Richard J. Vanecko, Craig Denham, atid Kevin and Bridget McCarthy (the “Vanecko group”) on the south sideyalk at approximately 43 West Division Street iit Chicago. (Chron. 9.) A verbal altercation ensued. (Chton:'§ 9.) Duting that verbul ‘altéroation, Vanecko forgibly struck ‘Koichman in’ the face causiiig Koschiniin to ‘fall straight back and hit his head on the pavement, (Chron.'{] 9.) Kochrian was iimediatély taken to the hospital, where he died 11 days later 6f his injuries. (Chron. $9.13, 77.) " Puisuaiit to the protective brdet; grand jury materials may be used by O1G, the Mayor of the City of Chicago au his designees, the CPD Superintendent and his designees, employees of the City of Chicago Departnient of Lav directly involved in the implementation of disciplinary proceedings, CPD employees against whom disciplinary action is, sought (the “subjects”, and the subjects” counsel (collectively, the “authorized persons”), solely in connection with the prosecution and defense of any disciplinary proceedings arising out of O1G's investigation, and for no other pixpose, and in connection with no other proceeditg, without further order of the Cireuit Court of Cook County.December 4, 201 At the scene of the incident, the responding officer, Edwin Tremore, took initial crime scene investigatory steps while also facilitating the call for immediate medical attention for the seriously injured Koschman. (Chron. #{} 11-12.) Tremore interviewed Kevin McCarthy, Hageline, and one bystander witness at the scene. (Chron. ff 14, 18.) In calling for a “records division number” (RD number), Tremore mistakenly classified the incident as a simple battery when the circumstances at the scene were more appropriately classified as the more serious offense of aggravated battery. (Chron. {¥ 23-24.) This misclassification resulted in a delayed field investigation. (Chron. ‘f] 28-29.) No detectives were called to the scene in the immediate aftermath of the incident. (Chron. {{j 28-29.).CPD therefore did not conduct a canyass or secure all witnesses and evidence immediately following the incident. (Chiron. $¥ 28-29.) Later that. morning, Area.3 Violent Crimes Sergeant Robest O"Leary assigned, Second Watch Area,3 Détectives Rita O'Leary and Robert, Clemens to follow upon the, case, despite, kriowing that both detectives, were. scheduled for three-week furloughs statting two -days later, (Chron. ¥f 31, 34) The only tasks Dets. O*Leary and Clemens performed before leaving! on furlough were to interview two witnesses and check on Koschmian’s condition on April 25, 2004. (Chron. 42,-45, 52.)- The detectives’ identified, six additional. witnesses, but did no’;contact them, (Chron. $60.) GPD performed no, fither investigative ‘work for the 13xday petiod from, Aptil 26; 2004:,t0 May 9, 2004, that inode 12; days while Dets,,O"Lepry, and, Clemens’ were “furlough. (cn ‘71 509-70,.79,) Although, at the, time, Lt, Denis, Walsh hag 8 Ha Li Ligstenant ‘in the, 18th.District where the crime ogeurred, he was not on duty on, April 25,2004, and, accordidg, 16 CBD eens he i ae ceil pes aot ons th gat Kosetinan : investigation. (Chops, 130.) ; is : Three days after Koschman’s death on May 6, 2004, CPD, likely Sgt. O’Leary, assed ‘Area 3 Homicide Detectives Ronald Yaweer and Anthony Giralamo to the inyestigation, (Chron: 179.) As with CPD personnel who preceded them in connection with the mitten Deis: Yawger and Giralamo fajjed, tg, gqnduct a canvass tg identify, additional witnesses or identify and secure available video footage Bey altercation. (Chrer 61-62. ‘Rte, did'the déiectives take any ep 2 prsue phone records for the indiyiduals inyolyed, which the grand jury, investigation eas on “Ipveal to ‘contain perme jnformation {ie d have, been used i nial aivace the vestigation. (Chron. WEA4=15) ph May,20, 2004, Det. Yawger inducted a: Uden Sik the pale members of the Vanecko- ee. infeluding, Vanecko himself: (Chron. ] Wy) ‘None of the witnesses to. the lineup definitively. identified’ Vanecko. as Koschman’s.assailant. (Chron: 120.)-Althoygh Det, Yaweer consulied with-Assisiant State's Attorney Darren O'Brien about the case, CPD never ‘onal presented the case to the Siate’s Attorey’s Felony Review Unit for a charging'décision. (Chron. $9 127, 142.) Yawger did not submit a concluding Casé Supplementary Report (CSR) until November 10,,2004, nearly six months after he performed his last investigative action in the case. (Chron. 157.) In the firial CSR; Det. Yawiger ‘concluded that the identity of the offender could not be detéimined, notwithstanding all the évidence pointing t0 Vanecko. (Chron. J 158.) Craig Denham and the McCarihys stated they were not the ones who hit Koschman, and the Koschman Page 2 of 30(OIG Case ti 11-0225 (Chief Andrews) December 4, 2015 friends informed police that the largest male of the group struck Koschman. (Chron. #f 105, 124.) The largest and tallest person of the group was Vanecko. (Chron. 261.) In the final report, Det. Yawger further concluded that Koschman was the aggressor, and the offender acted in self- defense. (Chron. 4-158.) However, Yawger reached this conclusion without attempting to interview Vanecko or his attorney and despite the fact that members of the Koschman group flatly denied that Koschman was the aggressor (contrary to Yawger’s interview notes, which conflicted not merely with the recollections of the members of the Koschman group, but also with aspects of the recollections of bystander witnesses). (Chron. ff 89-91, 158.) Det. Yawger's decision to forgo identifying Vanecko as the likely offender meant that Vanecko's name would not appear in CPD records as a suspect. Additionally, because Area 3 detectives allowed the case to remain open, CPD’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) unit, as a matter of practice, would not publicly release the case file in response to FOIA requests filed by the Chicago Sun-Times and Chicago Tribune over the next seven years. (Chron. 404.) ‘The Koschman case remained open, unworked, and untracked by Area 3 from November 2004 until Jamiary 2011. (Chron. #¥ 160-167.) ; On Janiiary 6, 201', the Chicago Sun-Times submitted a FOIA request to CPD seeking thé Kosehman homicide file. (Chron. { 163.) In response, Lt. Denis Walsh and other Area 3 staff, at the direction of Coimander Gary Yamashiroya, searched for—but were unable ta locate—the coinpleté ofigitial homicide case file. (Chron. $] 168, 175-76.) Although Aréa 3\staff did locate a set of photocopies of certain CSRs and had access to reports maintained in CPD’s electronic case management system, the detectives’ original General Progress Reports (GPRs), Crime, Scene Processing Reports, and hospital records from 2004 were missing frém the photocopied file. (Chron. $f 175-81, 203.) , _,, Prompted by the. FOJA. request, and after a review of the available reports from 2004, seijor CBD. commaiid ‘peisonnel ordered that {he Koschman homicide be fully reinvestigated. (Chron, {9 182:83; 186,):Depyty Chief of Detectives Dean Andrews petsonally reviewed the available ‘case file miaterials and concluded that thé Area 3 detectives had’ not gathered key information. ((Chron."f] 183.) Dgp.. Chief Andrews reassigned the investigation front Area} to Area 5 to avpid any appearasice of. impropriety and instructed Area,5 personnel, specifically, Detectives James Gilger and Nicholas Spanos, ‘Sergeant Sam Cirone, and Commander Joseph Salemie, to conduct a full reinvestigation of the case, (Chron. $f 186-87.) However, the Area 5” peréonnel did’ got pursue the investigative steps necessary to constitute a full reinvestigation, (Chron. $9.206223.) Among othe: things, they failed to, perform critiéal investigative tasks, failed to present the case to the State’s Attorney for a charging decision, and on March 1, 2011, misclassified the final disposition by closirig the case as cleared exceptionally without making an. arrest. (Chron, 280-86.) Under highly suspicious circumstances, months later, on, June 29, 2011, Lt. Walsh reported Having found the missing original Koschman homicide file. (Chron. 4 341,) As purportedly fourd by Lt. Walsh, the long-missing original case file contained most but not all original investigative records, (Chron. { 341.) According to Walsh, he found the case file among the other Area 3 homicide files, a location that had been previously searched. (Chron. { 341.) ‘When found, the case file material was contained in a blue binder that was visually distinguished Page 3 of 30UG Case # 11-0225 (Chief Andrews) and distinct from the other homicide case files maintained by Area 3, all of which were kept in white binders. (Chron. 341.) Rather than immediately reporting the discovery of the partial case file to Internal Affairs (IAD), Walsh waited for three weeks to do so, despite the fact that the file had been the subject of an intensive search and was related to a case receiving intensive public scrutiny. (Chrof. 361.) Moreover, during these three weeks, without permission or any legitimate reason to do so, Walsh removed the partial original file from CPD premises and maintained it at his personal residence. (Chron. {| 343.) After Walsh did report the disappearance arid reappearance of the original case file, [AD initiated an investigation. (Chron. {9 382-87.) However, the assigned LAD investigator closed the investigation as not sustained after taking, only one investigative step—an interview of Walsh, (Chron. ff 386-87.) During this interview, Lt. Walsh failed to disclose significant defails related to the disappearance and reappearance of the case file. (Chron. §{} 384-85.) In Devember 201 1, approximately ten months after CPD, concluded its “reinvestigation” and closed the casé as cleared exceptionally with no arrest or charges, Koschian’s mother filed n with the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate her son's death. (Chron. 4,443.) The Court granted Mis. Koschman’s petition and appoiited Dai K: Webb a5 tlie Special Prosecutor. (Chiron. 446.) An investigation led by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), in which OIG participated as the investigative partner, ensued: (Chiton. § 446), “Yrdeedaral Buekgroiund , 1. OSP Special Grand Jury Investigation, Indictment, and' Conviction 23, 2012; Cook County Cincuit Coui bb, former UES. Attomiey forthe Northen Di special, rosecutey to investigate’ Koschmin’s dest, (Chron. | 446.). The judge ordered the 5p lal prosecutor to investigate wheter criminal chaiiaes should be brought against’ tion with the 2004 hong idewof Koschimari.atid. 2 ‘Staie’s'Attoniey’s # (CCSAO) acted inte idence, fltmtish false‘evidence, and generally’ impede. the investigation into Koschiian’: "§ death. . (Chan 4.446.) Judge Toomin’ Geiemaes O10" investigative Body to.assist thie OSP'in its criitiial “investigation. (Chion.'4] 446.) ‘The OSP.collécted ‘evidence ‘under. the Auspicés of a. speci grand jury empaneled by the Citeuit Court. Based on that investigation, the OSP sought and obtained’ the conviction of Richaid J. Vanecko for’ involuntary matislaughter. (Chion. 49 449-50.) Vanecko pleaded guilty: on January'31, 2014. (Chron. $450.) The; OSP considered, ' but did not seek, criminal charges against several members of CPD. (Chron. $451.) On February 4, 2014, the OSP'issued a public report summarizing its investigation, its evidence, and its analysis"of, among other things, CPD's responses to Koschman’s death (die OSP Repoit). (Cron. { 451.) ‘The issuance of the OSP Report and the OSP?s declination of further criminal charges effectively brought its work, which was limited to eriminal prosecution, Page 4 of 30OIG Case # 11-0225 (Chief Andrews) December 4, 2015 to a close. The OSP's work did not (and could not) consider or foreclose the question of administrative disciplinary action by the City against any City employees.” On February 3, 2014, the Circuit Court authorized the OSP to disclose materials obtained through the Special Grand’ Jury, including the identities of subpoenaed witnesses, witness testimony, and the nature and content of documents and physical evidence obtained through the Special Grand Jury investigation, to OIG to be used in connection with its investigation into potential violations of City administrative rules and regulations. (Chron. 451.) 2. OIG’s Administrative Investigation @) CPD Superintendent's Authorization of Investigation of Allegations Older than Five Years and Referral of Investigation to OIG By letter dated July 24, 2014, OIG proposed to CPD Superintendent Garry McCarthy that OIG, and not CPD's Bureau of Internal Affairs (commonly, known as TAD), conduct and conclude any further, disciplinary investigation relating to CPD’s administration of the Koschman. investigation because, among other reasons, IAD had both actual and apparent conflict-of interest issues with respect to the disciplinary investigation, including LAD’s prior investigation into maiters investigated by the OSP. (Chron. { 452.) , On August, 8, 2014, “Superintendent McCarthy responded by authorizing, OIG to investigate “any and ail complaints or allegations arising. from, the above mentioned matter [The Death of David. Koschman. (OIG ease No. 11-0225)],even if any of the alleged, mise ‘concerning the incident or event occurred more than five, years prior to the. date the comp allegation became known to the Department.”* (Chron. 4 453.) by IPRA Affidavit Override 7 Gn Atigust 29,2014, OIG tequested an override affidavit from IPRA. In support of ifs, request for an override affidavit, OIG provided IPRA nearly 2,000 pages of materials, including, the OSP Report, statementsimade to.the OSP and its:investigators, and all prior statements of the subject police officers. (Chron. {| 454.) ear aeeeaanra 2 OSP also did not address issues of civil liability: On March 24, 2014, Nanci Koschman sued the City of Chicago, Cook County, and various other named defendant (inchiding a5 relevant here, Constantine Andrey): Kosch v. City of Chicago et al, Case No. 14-cy-02041 (N.D. IIL). On March 29, 2015, the City and Koschman settled Kea cRhaaa' clstns apainat the City and the CPD officers who wore named defendants. The City agreéd to pay Nanci Koschman $250,000. On Septcinber 11, 2015, the Cook ‘County ‘State's ‘Attorney agreed to a $50,000 MMilsment with Nanci Koschman, resolving Koschman’s claims agaist the remaining defendants: the County, Anita ‘Atvarce, Dan Kink, Richard Devine, and Darren O'Brien. See Kaschman v. Ci of Chicago eta, Case No. 14-3090 incr), > Applicable CBAs require the Superintendent to authorize a disciplinary investigation of conduct occurring more than five years prior Page 5 of 301G Case # 11-0 December 4, On September, 26, 2014, IPRA Chief Administrator Scott Ando issued an override affidavit. Chief Ando attested that he had reviewed the documents provided and “determined that there exists sufficient objective and verifiable evidence such that the continued administrative investigation of the allegations of misconduct in all matters relating to the death of David Koschman is necessary and appropriate” for ten CPD members who were then actively employed by the department. (Cron. {| 455.) On the basis of this affidavit, OIG served each of the subject officers with the requisite riotice of allegations aid interviewed the officers as required by applicable CBAs and CPD policies. (Chron. § 455.) ©) OIG Interview of Chief Andrews On November 20, 2014, OIG provided Chief Andrews with a Notification of Interview, Notification of Allegations, and copies of prior statements: a copy of the transcript from his December 15, 2011 interview with OIG investigators and copies of documents related to his January 30, 2013 interview conducted by the OSP. (Chron, § 455.) On: Deceniber 29, 2014, OIG inivestigatots'interviéwed Chief Andrews’ nudér oath nfter informing hini of his administrative advigements orally anid in wtiting. He provided oral'sind writfen ‘ackaidtwletigement” of ‘Kis understanding Of those “advistinents. The iniciview was recetiled by a cette couit reporter, Chief Aitdréws Ws'accoinpanied by his attorney, Thokils Needham. (Chron. ¥ 455.) Décliniber 29, 2014; OIG interview, Chief Andrews objected-to'O1G coniucting the invéstigatibn: anu iis use’ of the affidavit override, provedure, He objeatédt fp OIG's use of dciitidts! and statéineiis: generated bby the’ OSP. He’ d jevations in the | Notifidation of Allegations lack ‘specific (Chon, assy E er On February 26, 2015, OIG served Chief Andrews with a revised, more specific Notification of Allegations and provided him the opportunity ‘to appear for another interview should he have ay further information to provide. Chief Andrews declined the opportunity to appa. ikon: 45 5 - i ‘ ¥ "d Griedatice anid Arbitrdtionire: Affidavit Overtide Prodédure t On October 28, 2014, the Policemen’s Benevolent & Protective Association (PB&PA) Unit 156A filed Grievance Number SGT 14-023, arguing that OIG’s administrative investigation of’ Sergeants Mills and Cirone was in violation of the CBA because OIG is ineligible to invoke the affidavit overtide procedure: having not been explicitly permitted todo so: in the CBA! On Octaber 29, 2014, the PB&PA’ Uiiit'156B: filed’ Grievance Number LTS-14-004 on behalf of Lt, Walsh, with sitnilat complaints. Oi December 22, 2014, CPD deriied both grievances, and the ‘matters went {9 arbitration. An arbitration hearing was held on June 1, 2015. The arbitéator issued the award on August 28, 2015, and.a clarifying, letter on September 2, 2015, finding the O1G’s investigation could continise so long as OIG made a good faith effort to obtain an affidavit from Special Prosecutor Dan Webb. Such affidavit was obtained on September 23, 2015. (Chron. 9455.) Page 6 of 30OUG Case W 11-0225 (Chief Andrews) December 4, 2015 c Constantine “Dean” Andrews Employment History Dean Andrews has worked for CPD since July 1990 when he started as a Police Officer. In April 1996, Andrews was promoted to Sergeant. In December 1999, Andrews was promoted to Lieutenant. From September 2002 to May 2007, Andrews served as a Commander and, from May 2007 to December 2008, Assistant Deputy Superintendent, Andrews served as Deputy Chief of Detectives from December 2008 to June 2013, when he was assigned as Deputy Chief of Patrol. On October 15, 2015, Andrews was appointed Chief of the Bureau of Detectives. TIL APPLICABLE RULES, REGULATIONS, AND Law* A CPD Rules & Regulations (effective January 12, 2011) “The CPD Rules and Regulations set out the standards of conduct, departmental goals and duties of mémbers. Goals of the Departnient include, among others, the enforcement of all laws and ordinances, the arrest of law violators, assembly of competent evidence of the alleged violation, and promotion of respect and cooperation of all citizens for the law and those swomn to enforce it. Goals, of Department. members include, maintenance of the highest standards of integrity and ethics and excellence in the performance of duty. . ee Aiticle V 6f the “Rulés and Regulstidns 8f the Chicago Police Departinént,” sets foith specifically prohibited acts a8 the'CPD Rules of Conduct (the CPD Riles. In pertinedt pat, thie CPD Rules include the following prohibitions: Rule2 Any action or conduct which impedes the Department's efforts to achieve its * ~ policy and goal’ or brinigs discredit upois the Department. Rule3 ‘Any failure to promote the Department's efforts to implement its policy or a accomplish its goals. > ae : 7 . Rule 6 Disobedience of an order of ditective, whether written or oral. ©! Rule 11 —_Incompetency or ineffieiéno¥ in'the performance of dut): Rule 22 “Failure to report to:the Department any:violation of Risles and Regulations:or any other improper conduct which is contrary to the policy, orders.or directives of the Department. ve cai > * Selected CPD Onders (OIG_Add’l_004542-O1G_Add’|_005133); DDSO 07-05 Treament of Witnesses (eff. April 12, 2007) (CPDIG30S7), DDSO 96-5 Uniform Crime Reporting Related Directives (eff. Nov. 7, 1996) (Ch1)002822); DDSO 97-12 Detéctive Division Comniaiders and Supervisory Personnel Related Dircetives (ett Sune 2, 1997} (CPDOV29S1), DDSO 97-3 Detective Division Headquarters Command (eff. May 12, 1997) (€PD002862); DDSO 97-7 Procedures Required of Detectives (ef. May 12, 1997) (CPD002908); CPD Rules and Regulations (eff: Jan. 12, 2011) (O1G_Add’l_005497-01G_Adé'_ 005516). Page 7 of 30(OIG Case # 11-0225 (Chief Andrews) December 4, 2015 B. CPD General Orders Relevant provisions of CPD’s General Orders in effect at the time of the conduct at issue are set forth below. 1. G08-01-02 Allegations of Misconduct ~ Specific Responsibilities (eff. May 24, 2001 to March 17, 2013). G08-01-02(1D(A)): Duty to Report Misconduet - Members who have knowledge of circumstances relating to a complaint will Submit an individual written report to a supervisor before reporting off duty on the day the member. becomes aware of the investigation. The report will include the CR number and all facts relating to the incident known or reported to the member, The supervisor will forward one copy of any such report or document, without unnecessary delay, diteotly to either the Independent Police Review Authority or the, Internal Affairs Division. A igtter of transmitial ot cover report is not required when stich reports or documents are forwarded, Gos-01-02¢H(B)2): Obligation of Supervisors re: Misconduct - When misconduct is observed or a complaint relative to misconduct is reééived by siipérvisory or command’ personnel, they will, inifiate acomplete and comprehensive investigation in accordance with this and other directives without looking to higher autherity fpr such-action. . q CPD Detective Division Special Orders 1. DDSO97-3 Detective Division Headquarters Command (eff. May 12, 1997) DDSO_97-3(1H(A)(1): Responsibilities of Chief of Detective Division - It is the responsibility of the Chief of the Detective Division to . . + (ensure high quelity oriminal investigation: + G) dizect, coordinate, and contol investigative activity through inspections and follow. ups by command and'supervisory personnel of the division; + ® ensure that frequent and peitetrating audits are condiicted by division command and | > supervisory personnel tovenstire timely and accurate-erime reporting dnd excellence | investigations; » chat © (@iavestigate charges of inadequacy against any section, unit, of individual; * (6) maintain discipline throughout the Division, require strict enforcement of Department rules and regulations, Division Special Orders and ensure exemplary performance and conduct by members of the Division. DDSO 97-3(11)(C-D): Deputy Chief Has Same Responsibilities as Chief - Within their respeetive commands, the deputy chiefs have the same résponsibilities as the chief. They have authority consistent with their, responsibilities. Teir mission is to maintain an effective, highly trained, motivated: force. of detectives within their groups. To accomplish division goals, the deputy chiefs will: Page 8 of 30O1G Case # 11-0225 (Chief Andrews) December 4, 2015 © (1) Provide leadership, direction, training, counseling, and motivation for subordinate command members. (3) evaluate the performance of command and supervisory personnel to ensure that effective managerial practices are utilized, © © alert subordinate command personnel of deficiencies in report writing within their commands + (12) maintain a well disciplined force. + (18) review and approve closed justifiable homicide cases and exceptionally cleared homicides, ensuring compliance with Division, IUCR and UCR standards. 2. DDSO 97-12 Detective Division Commanders and Supervisory Personnel Related Directives (eff. June 2, 1997) DDSO 97-12(1)(A): Exempt Area/Section Commanders, General responsibility - Detective Division Exempt Commanders will exercise the authority of the Chief of Detectives within their respective commands. Their actions and decisions are subject to review by their deputy chief and the, chief, Commanders »will be, responsible for the operating efficiency of their areas or sections, and the successful investigations of crimes which fall within their purview. DDSO 97-12(11)(B): Duties of exempt area/section commanders ~ In addition to duties specified in other orders, exempt commanders will: (1) focus the: efforts-of subordinate personnel on the successful investigation and solution of . criminal inejdents; .. , “ wi 3) document proficient and deficient actions by supervisors assigned to their commands in order to achieve unit objectives and maintain morale. shite hey 9 (13) maintain the acguracy and integrity of the case reporting system. within their commands. DDSO-:97-12()(A): Area:and Section, Sergeants, General responsibilities - Sergeants are résponsible, to:theit versight licutenant and.will exercise their: authority in,their absence. Sergeants .are’ the “first: line-of supervision. They ,will direct, investigative. and. admjnistrative activity within the oversight unit, and are accountable, for the conduct of their. subordinates. They will pay special attention to the training needs of personnel under their supervision. They will stimulate competent performance by their subordinates and will maintain a high’ level. of discipline. They will constantly evaluate the effectiveness of their subordinates. DDSO 97-12(V)(B):. General duties of area and section sergeants > This section lists out the specific duties of sergeants, including the following relevaint duties: «review, evaluate, and assign.case reports received for field investigation. «monitor the progress of cases assigned for investigation and frequently review case status to keep detective assignments current and to avoid delinquencies in reporting. = review field investigation Supplementary Reports for completeness .and accuracy. Sergeants will ensure that: © detectives have made every effort to identify and arrest the offenders in suspended cases and in cleared/open cases. Page 9 of 30(OIG Case # 11-0225 (Chief Andrews) December 4, 2015 (© the current crime classification is correct and that a copy of the original case report is submitted with the Supplementary Report ©. the current status and disposition are correct. © the report meets division standards, UCR and IUCR Guidelines. © after their review, they certify that the reports are complete and accurate by signing the approval box of Supplementary Reports and the received by box of General Progress Reports. © ‘they forward the approved Supplementary Reports to the Command Office for additional review. * review other reports and forms submitted by subordinates and approve them only when they are néat, accurate, and complete. «review assistant state’s attorneys’ fejections of felony charges to’ascertain the reasons for the rejections and determine if additional investigative effort is warranted to obtain approval 6f the ‘charges. If not’tHey-will-appfaisé the area field eutenant ot exeiipt area “ coitiniander of the citcuiiistances of the’case and’ ask for guidaice: 3. . -DDSO 97-7 Procedures Required of Detectives (eff. May 12, 1997) : Funetion of a Detective ~ This Special Order outlines the objectives of + Detectives are'a-select’ grouji'of Departiient members ‘who are given the task"of investigating crimes reported to the Department. The objectives of theif investigative efforts are to determine if a crime actually occurred, gather evidence Of the?Gtime, ‘idéntify-and’ arrest -the person(s)’ responsible for’ étinainal atts, recover stolen property, and aid the prosecution of the airéstee. " : Detectives ‘ill diligently investigate all wisés!they #ebeive for follow-up. Their investigation must be thorough, careful and objective. They must keep in mind ‘that, réphrdléss of theit peréeption'of'the seriousness /of thie, crinie, fo“the Vieiitn the eveit was probably a shocking, lingering experieige.’As in any contact ‘with: ‘the public, deteétives ‘will be ¢dunledus and consideritei it spesel and. ‘maniier ‘whet! interviewing victims and witnesses. : pps 97-11): DDSO 97-7(1V): Conducting a Field Investigation - This Special Order notes that “a detective functions with'consitierable autonomy. However:-cértain investigative procedites must be accomplished in each follow-up investigation. In every-case received for field investigation the assigned detective will” coniplete the following steps,as-relevanthére: ‘+ Interview the complainant without delay; Canvass to identify witnesses + Locate, secure and evaluate any evidence at the crime scene + Determine whether to request a forensic investigator or evidence technician * Obiain and review the Crime Scene Processing Report Page 10 of 30(OIG Case t 11-0225 (Chief Andrews) December 4, 2015 + Determine where recovered evidence is being processed © Analyze all information already obtained to determine additional necessary steps to identify the offender * Pursue all investigative leads + Verify the crime reporting classification is correct «Prepare a Supplementary Report, recording all substantive information DDSO 97-7 (VII): Reporting the Results of an Investigation - This provision sets out the standards for detectives’ supplementary reports and specifically requires the report to be accurate, truthful, and include sufficient information'to support the outcome: The Supplementary Report will provide adequate information as required by UCR and TUCR guidelines to support the outcome (cleared, unfounded, suspended, closed non-criminal, or reclassified) of the investigation. DDSO 97-7 (VIII(C).. ‘The narrative must include a complete and: concise summary of all important facts. The information provided must be sufficient to explain and support the classification-and any action taken by the detective. DDSO.97-1(VII)(D)(2\bb). Reports.are: a: reflection ofi the, entire department, diyision, unit and author. The. acegunt: of the, incident will be thorough,,accurate and, understandable, The - probability of solution and conviction depends, greatly upon the, truthfulness and thoroughness of, the investigation, and, reports submitted. The reporting. detective, and the approving supervisor will be held accountable. DSO 97-7(VIIN(DYA). 4. DDSO 07-05 Treatment of Witnesses (eff. April 12, 2007) DDSO 07-05(V)(C): Responsibilities of Homicide Detectives — “Detectives investigating crimes will ensure the, integrity-of the investigation, including the integrity. of the witness’s accounts and statements, to the extent reasonably:possible.” +; a 5. DDSO 96-5 Uniform Crime Reporting Related Directives (eff:|Nov. 7, ; 1996). “iy DDSO 96-5: Definition of Exceptional Clearances - This Special Order sets out the definition and requirements for any ease closed as cleared exceptionally and provides additional guidance regarding the requirements: : ‘An exceptional clearance is the solving of a criminal offense when the offender was. not arrested, was,not charged, or was not tured over to the court for prosecution due to unusual circumstances, Detectives must identify the offender, exhaust all investigative leads, and do everything possible to clear a case by arrest, before exceptionally clearing the case. DDSO 96-5(V)(A). Page 11 of 30cember P O1G Case # 11 (Chief Andrews) According to the UCR Handbook, a detective can clear cases exceptionally, if cach of the following questions are answered “yes.” 1. Has the investigation established the identity of the offender? 2, Is theie enough information to support an arrest, charge, and tuming over 10 the court for prosecutién? fo 3, Is the exact location of the’ offender known so that he could be taken into custody now? Is there Some reason, ‘outside law enforcement control ‘that precludes arresting, charging, and'proseouting the offender? DDSO 96-5(V)(B) Detectives must list in their Supplementary Report the facts that support their devision to-cxceptionally clear acase. DDSO 96-5(V)(D) Supérvigors willl not approve lin exeeptiohally cleared'cuse if there is insufficient information to support an arzest. DDSO 96-5(V)(D)2)(e). Bar to Proscoution . . . In murder investigations, if the Felony Review Unit has rejeéted chtges against the offendst, the:detective wilt list 49 thie Supplementary Repgrt the retsns-for the rejection and the fatts which support the arrest of the offender. The’ detgdtive will teginest: sh: exceptiénal clearance’ for the case, Approval-for exceptionally cleared homicide cases is the respdnsibility of the area commander: ‘and’ the “appropriate. field’ group’ depity “chief DPSO ~96- SMD). 6. DDSOP Chepier 18: invesgnive Files (et. 1992 to May 9, 2011) ‘DDSOP Chipteb18 ‘This!Staridard,Optrating Proceiit Sets-ont' the Detective Division policies regarding investigative file maintenatice: Ch. 18.28) Investigative Bile‘ Control Card'~“The Investigative File Control card is a Department form which documents the tempdrdry removal of investigative files from the file repository.” ‘Chir 18.3(A)(1) Responsibilities and Procedures ~ “The Detéctive Division unit commanding officers will ensure that: the unit’s RD numerical. sequenée file and: investigative file case folders are properly maintained.” Ch, 18.4(A)(2) File Retention — “Homicide file retention schedule: The Violent Crimies Units will file homicide-cases separate from gther-cases. During the first period of each yeat the homicide files will be reviewed to determine their retention period. Page 12 of 30O1G Case H 11-0225 (Chief Andrews) December 4, 2015 In cleared open homicide cases and in uncleared homicide cases the investigative file case folder will be maintained in the unit for ten years and then sent to the Records Division for permanent retention.” IV. ANALYSIS The OIG disciplinary investigation established that Chief Andrews violated multiple CPD Rules and Department orders in the course of his participation and supervision of the 2011 reinvestigation of the Koschman homicide. The Koschman homicide investigation sat open and unworked for seven years, when the media brought the still open case to CPD's attention in January 2011. (Chron. §¥ 163-67.) Chief Andrews’s review of available records from the 2004 investigation revealed that the 2004 investigation was not thorough and had failed (o identify the offender. (Chron. {¥ 183-84.) Chief Andrews ordered that the case be reassigned away from ‘Arca 3 to Area 5 and filly reinvestigated to avoid any appeatancé of impropricty, particularly in light of the allegations of improper, preferential treatment for the Mayor's nephew, the prime suspitet int the case. (Chron. ff 186, 196.) Despite Departmental concems about the appearance of impropriety, the increased scrutiny of the case by senior CPD leadership as well as the public, and the obvious shortcomings of the 2004 investigation, Chief Andrews failed to ensure his subérdinatés \perforined a thoroiigh and objéctive investigation ‘nd’ directly violated’ siultiple CPD Riles and orders while supervising the Koschman homicide investigation. As a Deputy Chief of the Detective Division, Andrews had a duty to direct a high quality investigation that’ complied’ with all Department tules arid regulations, and’ Division “Special Orders. See DDSO 97-30I)(C), (I)@). Chief Andiéws itipropétly approved ‘the closuré of the case as cleared exceptionally, failed to ensure the detectives sought a charging decision from the CCSAO Felony Review Unit, failed ‘to ensure that’ the detectives completed all required investigative steps, and failed-to ensure the detectives drafted a truthful, complete and objective closing CSR. A$ a’ consequence of these failures, Chief Andrews ptovided ot created the appearance of preferential treatment for Vanecko. ChicfAndréws further violated CPD Rules and orders by failing to report to IAD or the CPD FOIA Unit that the original Koschman homicide filé was missing. In addition, Chief Andrews improperly céndicted official CPD business using his personal email account. Lastly, Chief Andrew's provided evasive or misleading statements to OIG. All of these violations, detailed below, raise serious questions about Chief Andrews’s judgrnént arid ability to perform his duties as a CPD chief of detectives. A. Improper Approval to Close Case as Cleared Exceptionally Chief Andtews improperly approved the detectives’ recommendation that thé Koschman homidide investigation be clased as clearéd exceptionally when the case did not meet the express critétia set forth in DDSO 96-5. Accordingly, Chief Andrews violated: * Rille 6: disobedience of an order of directive, namely, DSO 97-3(11)(C\(18), which provides that deputy chiefS must review and approve exceptionally cleared homicides, ensuring compliance with Division, IUCR, and UCR standards, and DDSO96-5(V), which provides the requirements for an exceptional clearance; Page 13 of 30OIG Case # 11.0225 (Chief Andrews) December 4, 2015 + Rule 2: any action. or conduct which impedes the Department’s efforts to achieve its policy and goals or brings discredit upon the Department; and + Rule I1: incompetency in the performance of duty. DDSO 96-5(V)(A) defines an “exceptional clearance” as “the solving of a criminal offense when the offender was not arrested, was not charged, or was not tured over to the court for prosecution due to unusual circumstances.” (Chron. /287.) The special order requires that in any exceptional clearance, “[dJetectives must identify the offender, exhaust all investigative leads, and do everything possible to clear a case by arrest before exceptionally clearing the case.” (Chron, 1287.) , Chief Andrews, however, approved the detectives’ recommendation that the case be cleared exceptionally despite the fact that they did not exhaust all investigative leads (see below), and there wexe not reasons outside law enforcement control precluding the arrest; charge, and prosecution of Vanccka,. or alternatively, according, to the detectives, there, was not sufficient information to support Vanecko’s arrest, charge, and. taming over to a court for prosecution, (Chron, 9274; 291, 297-298.) ©. PSO .96:5(V) cleatiy sets dut the sejuirements for classifying the closing of'a case aé “cleaved exceptionally,” including that, detectives exhaust all investigative leads and show. that four requirements (hereinafter “Requirements 1-4”) are met: ”Accondinig fo the UCR Higndbogly ation ai Jeger UC iii di Ji, . Has thejinvestigation established the identity of the offerider? 2. . “Is there-enough information to suppoxt an arrest, chiki, and menijig. over’ ° to the.court:for prosecution? vi 1s the, pact location’ of the offender known so that he Could be talen into” custody. now? 4,18 thefe some reason outside, law enforcement control that, precludes arresting, charging, and prosecuting the Stender? DDSO 96-5(V)(B). (Chron, $288.) ‘The order further states that if the reason outside law enforcement contro} is a bar to prosecution in a murder investigation, and “the Felony Review Unit has rejected charges against the offender, the detective will list jn the Supplementary Report the reasons.for the rejection and the facts which support the arrest of the offender.” DDSO 96-5(V)(D)(4)(a)(2). (Chron. ¥ 289.) Moreover, DDSO 96-5(V)(D)@2)(@) specifically provides that “[s}upervisors will not approve an exceptionally cleared case if there is insufficient information to Support an arrest.” Chief Andrews was clearly aware that the criteria for closing a case as, cleared exceptionally had not been met. The detectives and Sgt. Cirone presented the view that there was Page 14 of 30OIG Case # 11-0225 (Chief Andrews) December , 2015 not probable cause to arrest Vanecko, and acknowledged there was not enough information to support Vanecko’s “arrest, charge and turning over to the court for prosecution” as required under Requirement 2. (Chron. $f] 291-94.) Detective Gilger further admitted that there was no bar to prosecution of Vanecko, and thus no reason outside law enforcement control that precluded arresting, charging, and prosecuting the offender, as required under Requirement 4 (Chron. 4 292.) Chief Andrews, however, asserted that Vanecko’s “valid defénse of self-defense” constituted “reason outside law enforcement control that precludes arresting, charging and prosecuting the offender.” (Chron, { 295.) But self-defense is a legal affirmative defense, and Chief Andrews made this determination without ever presenting the case to the CCSAO’s Felony Review Unit for a prosecutor’s legal evaluation of the evidence to determine if the conclusion was appropriate. (Chron: { 280, 284.) The detectives in 2004 asked CCSAO for an advice only. (Chron. { 141-43.) Chief Andrews thus’ approved the closing of the case as cleared exceptionally without ever formally presenting the case to the Felony Review Unit for an official charging decision to establish a bar to prosecution. Accordingly, there was no bar to prosecution and no reason outside law enforcement control precluding the artest, charge, and prosecution of the offender as required to close the case as cleared exceptionally. B., Failure to'Pursue a Chaiging Decision from CCSAO Chief ‘Andrews failed to ensure that the detectives under ‘his. supérvision sought @ ing decision from the ‘CCSAO Felony Revigw Unit in the Koschman ‘homicide f Andrews thereby violated: |’) ‘+ ‘Rule 6; disobedience of an, order or directive, namely, DDSO 97-3(1I)(C), which’ specifically provides that deputy chiefs have the same responsibilities as the chiel, which includes ensuring high quality criminal investigations and requiring strict enforcement of Department rules and regulations, and Division Special Orders; and DDSO 97-3(11)(D), which requires that deputy chiefs eyqluate, the performapce,of supervisory persorinel to crisure effective management, + Rule 3:,any failure, to. promote the Department’s efforts to implement. its policy or accomplish its goals, including the goals of arrest of, aw. violators and excellence jn the performance of duty; and +. Rule 1}: incompetency in the performance of duty, ’ | According.to,the detectives, they did not sock charges, from CCSAO because they had “no new. information” and believed they lacked probable cause to arrest, Vanecko. (Chron. 4281.) Chief Andrews, supported this view, but largely: asserted, that CPD, kept CCSAO informed of the findings of the reinvestigation and therefore had no obligation to make a formal request for, a charging decision. (Chron. j 284.) Chief Andrews believed that Chief Byme provided CCSAO First Deputy Boliker with copies of the 2011 reinvestigation reports, and thus, CCSAO could have made the decision to charge on its own. (Chiron. ¥ 284.) Chief Andrews asserted that State’s Attorney Alvarez’s statements to the media indicated she was well aware of the case, (Chron. | 284.) Because CCSAO did not contact CPD about filing charges, Page 15 of 30OIG Case # 11-0225 (Chief Andrews) December 4, 2015 Chief Andrews presumed CCSAO was declining to charge the case and closed the case. (Chron. 9284.) Chief Andrews’s explanations for not formally contacting CCSAO’s Felony Review Unit for a charging decision are unpersuasive given the new findings of the 2011 reinvestigition. The detectives’ determination that Vanecko was the offender and that he punched, rather than pushed, Koschman, would have been relevant to any charging decision. (Chron. ¥ 264-66.) Moreover, the detectives reached the legal conclusion that Vanecko acted in self-defense without presenting the case to the CCSAQ for a prosecutor's legal evaluation of the evidence to determifie if the conclusion was appropriate. (Chron. f] 280-81.) Having finally identified Vanecko as the offender in 2011, the detectives’ failure to present the case to the Felony Review . Unit further deprived CCSAO of the opportunity to dpen discussion with’ Vanecko, through counsel, to specifically address the question of self-defense. In 2004, detectives asked CCSAO Felony Review for “an advice” only, and in 2011, Dets. Gilger and Spanos failed to contact Felony Review at all. Thus, CPD never asked CCSAO for a formal charging decision in the Koschman case. (Chron. {ff 141-42, 280.) While Chief Andrews asserted that CCSAO was aware of the developments in the case, he acknowledged that the detectives. did not produce reports to the Felony Review Unit or request a charging decision. (Chron: "{"384.) Rathet, Chief Aiidrews merély ‘relied on State’s Attomey Anita Alvarez’s statements to the media as an indication that CCSAO was aware of the investigative {indhigs and was declining t0 charge Vanecko. (Chrot.-] 284) However, State's Attomey: Alvatez. had ‘not yet conménted to ‘the'médih about tle réinvestigation by ihe ‘time, Chief Andrews closed the case. (Chron. #¥ 306-08, 311.) Morcover; the State's Atfomnéy*s oWwil stafements were under-informed, given that CPD had failed to inform CCSAO that the original cagg. file Was missing of that the ‘detectives lid, in, fact, not conduetéd'& full feiitvestigation, cofnpletd: lL avesigntve steps, or drafted a truthful, Conipleié; and accurate concludijig CSR. (Chiro; $731 ) 417.) : cen een oe ee ‘Tailare to Kusure Detectives Conpleied! Required Investigative Stépé ‘Chie Andres fait propiriltely Stipervise: Coniniander'Saletime, Set. Cirdnie, aiid Dele, Gilget anid Spanos itt violation of: + Rule 6: disobedience of an order or dirdctive, hiainely, DIDSO'97-3(H(C), which requires that deputy chiefs ensure the quality of criminal investigations and strictly enforce Department rules and’ regulations, and DDSO 97-3(L1)(D), which requites that deputy ‘chiefs evaluate the performance of’ supervisory “persoanel to ensure effective’ management, maintain a, well-diseiplinéd force, and to review reports of noteworthy cases; $ * Rule 3: any failure to prométe’ the Department’s efforts to implement its policy oF ‘ecomplish its goals, including the goals of arrest of law violators, assembling competent evidence of the allegéd violation, and excellence in the performance of duty; and + Rule 11: incompetency in the perforrhance of duty. Page 16 of 30OIG Case # 11-0225 (Chief Andrews) December , 2015 Chief Andrews, by his own account, was the driver of the reinvestigation, He reviewed the 2004 reports and determined that critical investigative steps had been missed. (Chron. 47 183-84.) Chief Andrews therefore directed Area 5 to conduct a full reinvestigation. (Chron. 4197.) However, as a result of Chief Andrews’s lax supervision, Detectives Gilger and Spanos failed to complete some of the most basic, required investigative steps, including a canvass and the pursuit of all relevant, material, and reasonable investigative leads. (Chron. ¥ 274.) Specifically, as detailed below, while working under Chief Andrews’s supervision, Dets. Gilger and Spanos violated Rule 6 (disobedience of an order or directive ~ DDSO .97-7, requiring detectives to conduct a canvass and purse all investigative leads), Rule 3 (failure to promote the Department's efforts to accomplish its goals, including the goals of arrest of law violators, assembling competent evidence of the alleged violation, and excellence in the performance of duty); and Rule 11 (incompetency in the performance of duty). Additionally, under Chief Andrew's supervision, Cmdr. Salemme and Sgt. Cirone failed to supervise the detectives in violation of CPD Rules and orders. 1. Failure to. Requiré a Canvass of the Scene ‘Under Chief Andtews's lax supervision, Dets. Gilger and Spanos failed to canvass the scone for witnesses or additional evidence as required by DDSO.97-7. DDSO 97-701V) requires the assigned. detective in every case received for field investigation'to conduct a canvass of the area in ap effort to identify witnesses, In their OIG interviews, both detectives asserted that they conducted.a canvass by driving past the scene of the incident and looking for exterior video (Chron. $¥,275-76.) However, the detectives admit that they did not attempt to speak to individuals at the nearby businesses to identify possible witnesses or dletermine whether any Video evidence remained available. (Chron. $4 275-76.) Thus, the detectives’ drive through the area, without any effort to speak, to, individuals at the nearby businesses,,did. not gonstitute a canvass. 1 Hi ‘Moreover, the detéctives did not document this purported canvass-in,a general progress regort (GPR) oF case supplemental report (CSR), (Chron. W¥ 275-76.) Cmdr. Salemne reported that had, the detectives conducted a canvass, it should have been, documented. in a. OPI and inoluged in the,CSR. (Chron, 4-278.) The fact that the, detectives did pot, document the drive through the area farther, suggests that they did not consider the activity to be a canvass. (Chron 1274) The lack of a.canvass is additionally troubling because it was clear from the 2004 case reports that the 2004 detectives, also failed to canvass. (Chron. 9,21, 61.) As a sesult of ‘Andtews's insufficient supervision, no canvass was ever conducted by CPD in the, Koschman homicide case. |. :2. Failure to Require Pursuit of All Reasonable Investigative Leads Chief Andrews failed to require that the detectives he supervised pursued all reasonable investigative leads as required by DSO 97-7: Detedtives under Chief Andrews’s supervision did not seek telephone records of individuals involved in the incident, including those of RJ Vanecko, Kevin McCarthy, Bridget McCarthy, or Craig Denham. (Chron. 275-76.) The detectives assumed that no records would Page 17 of 30OIG Case # 11-0225 (Chie Andrews) December 4, 2015 be available in 2011. (Chron. $f] 275-76.) However, the detectives made no attempt to obtain the records or confitm their assumption that the records were no longer available. Moreover, their assumption was wrong. In 2012, OSP sought and successfully obtained relevant telephone records from 2004, including Bridget McCarthy’s cell phone records showing she placed a call to Vanecko immediately after the incident. (Chron. 17.) This was direct evidence that Vanecko had phone contact with the MeCarthys after the incident during which he may have made statements about what had occurred. Had the detectives obtained these fecords, they would have known to have asked the McCarthys about this phone conversation. The 2004 detectives failed to obtain these records, and, under Chief Andrews's supervision, the detectives in 2011 repeated this failure Detectives under Chief Andrews's supervision did not ask Vanecko’s friend) Craig Denham, obvious and relevant questions about where he and the rest of the Vanecko group went afier the incident and what statements, if any, Vanecko may have made about the ificident (Chron. 1] 275-76.) Unlike the McCarthys, Denham voluntarily spoke to-the detectives and would have been a logical source of information about where ‘they Went and what was said. (Chron. § 223.) The detectives’ limited and incomplete questioning of Denham is clear from the GPRs arid the concluding CSR. (Chron. {9:223, 236.) The 2004 detectives failed’ to’ask such obviauis and relevant questions, and Dets. Gilger and Spanos’simply'tettaced the prior Heteétives” steps. As 4 result, il was not until 2012, Before thé special. grand jury; that the. McCaithys revealed that ‘immediately after ‘the ineident, the. Vanecko. grotip’ reconvened: at thé Pepper Canister, Bitby thei, coild nok recall what was discussed. (Chron;*¥48:) Detectives accordifily failed to'seck key'pietes of evidetice, Aamely, possible statements by the subject spelbaiday afier'apd about the inéident, inéluding possible, ‘oteents against interest. Detectives under ‘Dep. Chief Andrews’s ‘supervision, didnot attempt (& identify or interview any additional individuals who attended the engagement party where Vanecko. had been before the incident in order to obtain possible statements by percipient witnesses or Vateeko.” (Chron ¥Y':275:76.) | The detectives also:did not attempt to inte-view,-Megan MeDoaild, who Kevii, MoCarthy i ‘identified im 2004-as the'petson:le ahd his wife were on their way'to meet af Butely McGuite’s ‘bar 6m Division Stre¢t at, the time “of tie incident. (Chiron. 9275-716) Melionald ind otter thisd: parties Were possible sources &f additional inforination, inghiding possible statements 'by’pereipient’ilnesses or Variecko. about the incident in the inibrvenidg-years. Det. Oilgct stated that lie did tiot consider interviewinigs McDoriak’ because she was not at the scene. (Chron: ¥ 275.)'And actording to Det. Spatios, hé'and Det. Gilger did nét atlenipt fo interview those in attendatiée atthe engagement party simply because they were not direct witnesses. (Chron. $276.) Detectives under Chief Andrews’s supervision did not speak with or interview Officer Edwin Tremore or any of the detectives who worked on the 2004 Koschman investigation (Chron. {¥ 30, 198, 275-76.) The responding officer and original detectives were obvious sources of valuable information regarding the case, including their impressions of witnesses, opinions and additional steps that may not have been documented in the remaining case files. Their knowledge was particularly rélevant given the fact that the original case file, including detectives’ GPRs, were missing. With respect to Officer Tremore and Detectives O°Leary and Clemens, all three were still working in the department at the time of the reinvestigation, yet Page 18 of 30OIG Case 11-0225 (Chief Andrews) December 4,2015 Dets. Gilger and Spanos did not contact them. (Chron. $f 30-31.) With respect to Detective ‘Yawger, the primary detective in 2004, Det. Gilger explained that he believed he was insiructed not to contact him—and that someone else would contact Yawger instead. (Chron. { 198.) None of the other meeting attendants support Det. Gilger’s statement on this point. (Chron. {fj 199- 201.) While others recalled that Walsh was going to reach out to Yawger, the detectives never followed up with Walsh or anyone else to ensure that Yawger had been contacted or to find out what he had to say. Instead, the detectives closed the case without hearing from any of the 2004 detectives. (Chron. ff] 275-76.) Moreover, Chief Andrews reported that he expected Det. Gilger to contact Yawger, but Chief Andrews never confirmed that Gilger completed this step before closing the case. (Chron. 4 199, 275-76.) Chief Andrews characterized these various investigative steps not taken by Gilger and Spanos as unreasonable or unnecessary, and asserted that, although the investigation was urider his command, he was not responsible for day-to-day investigative stepS and strategies. (Chron 1275) Based on his review of the closing CSR in 2011, Chief Andrews believed ‘that the investigation was “very thorough, very complete and completely impartial” and did not identify any additional investigative steps that should have been taken. (Chron. $279.) Nevertheless, it is clear that, under Chief Andrews's command, tli¢ detectives, Sergeant Cirone, and Commander Salemme, violated departmental orders. by failing to conduct all required investigative’ steps, including carivassing the scene and pursuing obviotis and, televant investigative leads. Chief Andrews specifically, directed his subordinates to fully reinvestigate the Koschmah homicide, yet failed to ‘ensure they did’so. ‘Under Chief Andrews’s command, Saleiine and Cirone allowed the detectives to skip’ steps and ignoré léad8, citing the 1Ength of time that Ned passed since the iheldent or assuiting that the éfforis would have tio evident valié. (Chron. f].274, 277-78.) Chief Andrews’s poor supervision of the Keschmai homicide investigation thus vidlated his supervisory obligations under CPD Rules and orders arid reflects incompelénce in the performance of his duties, . “ . * Failtixe t0 Unduire Detectives Drafted a Truthful, Complete, and Objective Concluding Case'Supplemental Report’) : ° ui # ‘Under Chief Anndrews’s supervision, Dets. Gilger and Spanos failed to draft a truthful, coniplete, and objective concluding CSR, and Comatfiander Salemme and Sgt. Cironé failed appropriately supervise the detectives to, ensure they produced an accurate report. Agcordingly, |” Chief Andrews violated: ( © Rule 6: disobedience of an ofder or direetive, namely, DDSO 97-3¢11)(B), (C), which requires the Deputy Chief to ensure high quality criminal investigations, require strict enforcement of the Department’s Rules and orders, and review the closure of cases cleared exceptionally to ensure compliance with Division, IUCR, and UCR standards; and DDSO 97-7(VII1)(D)(4), which provides that the approving supervisor is accountable for ensuring reports are thorough, accurate, and understandable; and + Rule 3: any failure to promote the Department's efforts to implement its policy or ‘accomplish its goals, including maintenance of the highest standards of integrity. Page 19 of 30OIG Case # 11-0225 (Chief Andrews) As the supervising Deputy Chief, Andrews was responsible under DDSO 97-3(II) for ensuring high quality criminal investigations, requiring strict enforcement of the Department’s Rules and orders, and reviewing the closure of cases cleared exceptionally to ensure compliance with Division, IUCR and UCR standards. Yet under Chief Andrews’s supervision, his subordinates committed multiple violations of Departmental Rules and orders in the drafting of the CSR. Moreover, Chief Andrews took a particularly active role in the Koschman investigation, placing himself in a direct supervisory role and thereby obligating himself to ensure the investigation and concluding CSR met all professional and departmental standards. As a general matter, supervisory responsibility becomes more attenuated with cach level up the chain of command, and higher ranking command staff must be able to rely on the professionalism and accuracy of detectives, drafting the reports. Yet, here, Chief Andrews, by his own, account, was the driver of this réinyestigation, reviewing the 2004 reports and concluding additional investigative steps were iigeded, directing a full reinvestigation, and finally, actively participating in the editing of the flawed. concluding CSR. (Chron. ff] 183-84, 186, 241-50.) Chief Andrews thereby placed himself in a position of even greaier responsibility to ensure the concluding CSR. was accurate and complete. ; Chict Andres was directly and actively involved in the editing of the detectives’ final oe and fled to ensure the reyisions he sequésted were truthful in violation of, DSO, 97- CrUNDX, DPSO 97-7evIN)(DY(A) spesifically provides that reports “are a reflection of the epartment, division, unit and author and jmust-be thorough, accurate and under: and les that the “approving sy jwwill be held atcountable™. As tevealed bY email and mses cords, dling the late pene before the, report Was submitted for finial approval, ws. worked, closely with Sgt. Girone vin personal cindil, phone, and ext, to review. two “Corrections” to the closing CSR: (Chion. #:249-45.) e-and Det. Gilgér were together when Sgt. Cirone sent an email to Chief Andrews"s personalemail account proposing two corrections” to the closing, CSR. (Chron, 4, 247.) Tl ion of Bet ges meeitg vith ASA Darcy O'Bien “charges were not warranted ‘because of seli-delense' and’ (3)'a coifeluding paragraph which ale sipibynl a po quote, to Kogchman, which supported the conclusion that, Vanecko had acted F-defensé, (Chron. 242.) This, sont paragraph also recommended that the case, be oleae “cleared exceptionally.” (Chron. 242.) Chief Andiews was required to review and approve the desighation of cleared exceptionally. (Chron. 4 297:) Chief Andrews is therefgre accountable for the drafting of a closing CSR that is false and misleading in five respects as described below. 1... | Inclusion of a False Quote Attributed to Koschman_ Fitsi, the concluding CSR iatludes a purported verbatim statement placed in quotes that was attributed to Koschman, despite tli fact that there was no suppoct for this quote—neither for the wording of the statement nor ‘its attribtition to Koschman—in any of the 2004 or 2011 reports. (Chron. $f] 263, 268-69:) Thé report's conclusion states: Page 20 of 30OIG Case it 11-0225 (Chief Andrews) December 4,2015 R/Ds concluded that David KOSCHMAN, having yelled, ‘Fuck you! I'll kick your ass!” by breaking away from his group of friends and aggressively going after VANECKO was clearly the assailant in this incident. These aggressive actions caused VANECKO to take action and defend himself.” (Chron. 263.) None of the detectives’ GPRs include any quote from any witness with the language, “Fuck you!” The GPR for Allen’s interview states only that “everyone started arguing and yelling ‘screw you.” (Chron. 215.) According to Detectives Gilger and Spanos, they believe it was appropriate to attribute the statement to Koschman because the witnesses reported that’others were also swearing. (Chron. | 269.) However, as described above, Gilger’s GPR from the Allen interview records only that “everyone started arguing and yelling ‘screw you.” (emphasis added) (Chron. §215:) The second portion of the quoté that the GPR attributed to Koschman, “I'll kick your ass!”, was purportedly based on statements made by Kevin McCarthy in 2004 as recorded in Detective Yawger’s GPR summary of the interview. (Chron. 111.) However, while Yawger’s GPR documented that the statement was made, it did not reflect that the statement was specifically attributed to Koschman. (Chron. {| 111.) Rather, Yawger’s GPR. feads, “Mg. MeCariby states that at this ‘time the primary kid (Koschmian) and another kid were still swearing, calling himself, Craig, and Richard namés, and saying things like, ‘I'll kick your ass’, etc.” (Chron. { 111.) Moreover, Dets. Gilger and Spanos ineluded the statement and attributed it to Koschman in their concluding CSR despite the fact that McCarthy had twice lied to detectives before giving his statement to Yawger. (Chron. qf 267, 14, 47.) {The detectives" mischaracterization of the language and its attribution made Koschman appear to be the agaressor thereby making thie theory of self-defense on’ the pait, of Vanecko more plausible, ‘The false. quote, along with the rest of the CSR's eonélusion Explaining that Vaneeko ‘acted in self-defense, was the product of a last-minute, Inte-night “editing Session condhicted’ by Det, Gilger ‘anid Sgt. Cirone, using Set Cirone’s personal, email accounl to comimunicaté ‘with Chief Andrews and’ Commiatider Salerinie the night before the report was submitted for final approval. (Chron. $f 242-47.) The lack of supporting evidente and the questionable circumstances by which the false quote entered the repost suggest a concerted effort to manufacture, support ‘for the finding of self-defense and’ the closure of thé ‘case’ without charges. The inclasion, of a false statement in the concluding CSR is a grave violition of the detectives’ and Sgt. Cirone’s obligations under CPD Rules and Detective Division orders to draft a truthful, complete, and objective report aid constitutes a false written report under Rule 14. Chief Andrews, having actively engaged in the review and editing process for this particular portion of the CSR, bears responsibility failing to ensire the revisions he requested were truthful 2. Failure to Provide An Objective Account of the Evidence Second, the detectives failed to ensure the concluding CSR provided an objective account of the evidence by omitting a witness account of the events that was in direct conflict with the detectives’ view of the case. Specifically, the concluding CSR makes no mention that, according to witness Scott Allen, a member of the Koschman group, had stated the people in the Vanecko group were the aggressors. (Chron. $9 215, 261, 263, 272.) The concluding CSR states, “R/Ds Page 21 of 30(OIG Case i 11-0225 (Chief Andrews) December 4, 2015 concluded that David KOSCHMAN, having yelled, ‘Fuck you! I'll kick your ass!” by breaking away from his group of friends and aggressively going after VANECKO was clearly the assailant in this incident. These aggressive actions caused VANECKO to take action and defend himself.” (Chron. 263.) In contrast however, Det. Gilger’s GPR notes from the Allen interview show that Allen stated that, after the initial bump, “everyone started arguing and yelling ‘screw you” and that the people in the other group were “the aggressors.” (Chron. § 215.) Det. Gilger’s GPR of the Allen interview also states that Koschman “was in the thick of the argument and was also yelling.” (Chron. 215.) Nowhere in the concluding narrative, however, do the detectives acknowledge that Allen described the Vanecko group as “the aggressors” or explain why they discounted Allen’s account of the events. (Chron. $f 261, 263, 272.) The circumstances surrounding the late-night drafting of the CSR’s conclusion suggest that the detectives and their supervisors were not focused on ensuring an accurate and objective report, rather, they were intent on justifying their ultimate conclusion of self-defense. (Chron. §] 241-52.) Before the special grand jury, Det. Gilger acknowledged that the failure to account for Allen’s description of the Vanecko group as the aggiessors’ was an omission of important evideiie. (Chron. ‘| 272.) By. not addressing. the conflicting account, the detectives mischaracterized the evidence in a way that supported their ultimate conchision, provided an incomplete account and analysis, and. producéd a report that, at minimum, does not appear objeptive, 3., "Inclusion of a False Statemgnt Regarding, {he Initial Delay in the 2004 Investigation “Thiel, ihe ig CSR iniclulfes 4 Statement thal, before Koscluiian’s deall, “{e}fforts were being made t9 interview ‘the additional witnesses that; were at the Scene of the incident,” dzpite he the fact that he had no evidentiary basis for thi ( falsity. There 5 i between when Dels. G*Leaty and’ Clemens finished their pyeluhing ‘work and-left dn furlough and Koschinian’s death, chron. $f 59:70.) : a (Ch a 4 273.) This s staterpent, "Det Giggs alo witedgl' wat ho as “guessing” that the 2004 deletes ict tosking for plone niiinbers and that he did not kxiow, what was: ‘dene in the 2004 investigation. (Chron, 1273.) Set. Cifone also did not know the basis for Gilger's stateént. (Chon, 273.) The detectives’ inclusion of this statemerit’ was an attemt to explain away the obvious lack, of investigative ‘activity in the days leading up to Koschman's death, erroneously suggesting’ that detectives dontinued working on the casé rather thai letting it sit after the initial detectives went on furlough. (Chron. $4 59-70.) Accordingly, the detectives included’ another false statement in the concluding CSR, further undermining the averall credibility and objectivity of the report. 4. Inclusion of an Informal Conversation ‘with Assistant State’s ‘Attorney O’Brien Fourth, the concluding CSR includes a description of Det. Gilger’s conversation with ASA Darren O"Bried that gives the false impression that the case was formally presented to the CCSAO Felony Review Unit for a charging decision in 2011. Specifically, the report states that Page 22 of 30OIG Case # 11-0225 (Chief Andrews) December 4, 2015 Det. Gilger “spoke with ASA Darren O'Brien at the Cook County courthouse” and informed O’Brien of the reinvestigation and the “current progress of the investigation. ASA O’Brien stated he was consulted by Area 3 Detectives on possible charges, but after the consultation between his office and the police department, it was agreed that charges were not warranted because the actions of the offender constituted an act of self-defense.” (Chron. {| 242, 280.) The description of the conversation with O'Brien does not specify that O’Brien met with Area 3 detectives in 2004 and not 2011 and does not make clear that Det. Gilger did not present O’Brien with any reports from the 2011 investigation. As described by Det. Gilger, his 2011 meeting with O”Brien was, in fact, a brief, chance encounter in the hallway of the CCSAO offices. (Chron. § 209.) Moreover, at the time of the meeting, O’Brien was no longer in the Felony Review Unit. (Chron. 4209.) ‘The concluding CSR’s misleading reference to Gilger’s 2011 chance meeting with O”Brien was also the result of the late-night editing session between’ Det. Gilger, Sgt. Cirone, and Chief Andrews. (Chron.-{{ 242.) This content was included as “Correction #1” in Set Ciront’s email to Chief Andrews ‘and Salemme the night before the report was submitted. (Chios. § 242,) Chief Andrews reported’ that he had asked Gilger to include the conversation itt the CSR after noticing its absence in ani earlier draft.\(Chion. ¥ 250.) Gilger believed thiat Sat Ciroilé asked him to’ include the ‘éhcduntér atid that Chief Andrews'wai not involved in the drafting.’ (Chron. ‘252: Nevertheless,'thése circumstances Strongly siggest that the tisleadiiig portiayal of thie O'Brien meeting Wwa8 fiitended 'to support the report's reconiméndatioi to close the case as cléated exceptionally, which would have required’ the ‘existence of a bar to ' proseeution and an explanation of the Felony Review Unit's reasons (if ‘iny) for rejectinig che soe i " ‘ 5. “Bailiité to “Document the Missing Homicide File ‘and Missing ‘ Felony Review File moe . Fifth, the detedtives did Hot meinorialide inary GPR or report prdpared between January. 13, 201't,, the date of the reassignment meeting, ‘and March'1, 2011,"when the'téinvestization was" closed as cleared exceptionally, that the original 2004 Koschinan' homicide file’ twas missing or that the 2004 Cook County State’s Attorney Felony. Review Folder.was also missing. (Chron. 1274-75.) Without the original file, detétives 'did not liave abcess to several key docuinents including original GPRs, Crime Scene Processing Reports, or hospital records. (Chron."{ 203.) ‘Phe detectives Were required ‘to’ réView, at a minimum, the Crime Scetie Processing Reports, under’ DSO 97-7(1V). However, Chief Andrews, permitted the detectives to close the investigation ‘without reviewing these records or éven documenting in the concluding CSR that this important case documentation was missing. Accordingly, the concluding CSR, which Chief Andrews directly helped draft, was not thorough or complete. rE. Providing or Créating the Appearance of Preferential Treatment Chief Andrews violated CPD Rules arid orders by providing or creating the appearance of preferential treatment for Vanecko. Chief Anidrews’s approval of the improper recommendation to close the case as cleared exceptionally, his failure to ensure detectives formally contacted the State’s Attorney’s Office for a charging decision, his failure to supervise his subordinates to Page 23 of 30(OIG Case # 11-0225 (Chief Andrews) December 4, 2015 ensure they completed all required steps to investigate the Koschman homicide, and his failure to ensure the detectives drafted a truthful and objective CSR, each had the effect of giving favorable treatment and creating an appearance of preferential treatment for Vanecko, the Mayor's nephew. Accordingly, Chief Andrews’s actions violated: + Rule 6; disobedience of any written order, namely, DDSO 97-3(1(C), (LNB), holding deputy chiefs responsible for ensuring high quality criminal investigations and requiring strict enforcement of Department rules and regulations, Division Special Orders and ensuring exemplary performance by Division members; * Rule 2: any actions that impede the Department's efforts to implement its policy or accomplish its goals, including the departmental goals of integrity and promoting respect for the Jaw and those sworn to enforce it; and * Rule 11: incompetency in the performarice of duty. iln each instanee of atiseonduct; Chief Andrews’s actions served to, advance the ultimate conclusion. that Vaniecko acted in self-defense. and-that.he wottld not be arrested or charged. Chief: Andrews's saisepiiduct ‘Was partioularly, egregious in, light pf an glready heightened congem within CPD-—and the general: public—-about an, appearance of impropriety with respect to an open homicide, case jnvolvii the' Mayor's nephew. (Chron. $4 15-54, 163, 182-83, 186, 196.),The. appearance of preferential treattient is futher amplified by other indieia of favorable treatment for-the: Maneoko. group: by the detectives under Chief Andrews’s supervision: First, Defs, Gilger and Sqanos did not ask Craig Denham, Kevin McCarthy, ‘or. Bridget McCarthy, all. frionds of Vanecko; to subinit to polygraphs as-he did with the Koschman’ group. (Cliron, 4222: 23, 274-76.) And second, Dets. Gilger and Spanos did not seek grand jury subpoenas to compel siatements under, oath from Kevip: McCarthy, Bridget MeCarthy,-or Craig Denham, each of. wliom the detectives believed to be untruthful: (Chron. f].274-76,) The detectivés denied that they intended to provide any preferential treatment to the Vaneeko group but, nevertheless, the ultimate, effect. of. the, misconduct, .both,in isolation and. taken. together, served to create the appearance of prefertitial. trealment “for Vanécko,., a knowh ave of ,the “highest-ranking elected official in the City. of Chicago, : : 1 » Bailureto Report the Missing # ite PAD * Chit! Adres jolted CPD Rultes ind dx ing to initiate an IAD investigation, report, or-¢risure that anyane else repofted, apparent miscor iol toa supervisor er IAD, when, in January: 2011, he leamed that the original, Koschman, homicide, file was missing. Specifically, Chief Andjews violated: : ma * Rule 22: failure to report to the Department any violation of Rules and Regulations or any other improper. conduot, which is,contrary. ta the,nolicy, orders or directives of the Department; * Rule..6: disobedience of an order or directive, namely, GO8-01-02(I)(A\(S),, which specifically requires members to. report cixgumstances, relating to a complaint of misconduct to a,supervisor the same day he learns the information so the information may be forwarded to IAD or IPRA, a5 appropriate,, and GO09-01-02(1)(B), which imposes greater responsibility on supervisory personnel, such as Chief Andrews, to Page 24 of 30OIG Case W 11-0225 (Chief Andrews) December 4, 2015 initiate an investigation of misconduct, without looking to higher authority for such action; Rule 3: any failure to promote the Department's efforts to implement its policy or accomplish its goals, including maintenance of the highest standards of integrity and ethics and excellence in the performance of duty. General Order 08-01-02(11)(B) further joses greater responsibility on supervisory personnel, such as Chief Andrews, to fate an investigation of misconduct, without looking to higher authority for such action. Chief Andrews first leamed in early January 2011 that Area 3 personnel could not locate the file: it was not appropriately stored with other open homicide files and no records indicated who had removed it. (Chron. $f 175-76.) In light of the intense public interest in the case, the fact that the original homicide file was missing was clear indication of a violation of CPD Rule 41, which prohibits “removing any Department record or information conceming police matters except at provided by Department orders.” (Chron. J 150-54, 163,.169-75.) More specifically, the missing file indicated a. violation of DDSOP Chapter 18,,.which required commanding officers to ensure proper maintenance of the files, including the storage’ of uncleared homicide files in the unit and the documentation of any file removal with an, Investigative File, Control card.:(Chron. $169.) Fe ' 1. The missing file was not indicative of just a technical-rule violation; rather, the.case, was the subject of media attention and allegations of preferential treatment for.the-Mayor's nephew: (Chron, $f 150-54, 163-67.), The fact that tho original, inyestigative.file’ was missing was of even greater significance in light of the surrounding circumstances and should Kave further triggered a + heighteried awareness of possible officer miscoriduct that, warranted reporting to, IAD: Chief ‘Andrews asserted that it is the “past practice” of CPD, that whien files sarc determined tobe missing, officers do not obtain complaint: numbers with IAD. unless, there. is reason to believe there'is‘an act of wrongdoing. (Chron., 205.) But as:detailed; above, the: missing; file was indicative of wrongdoing: violation of. Rule 41 and DDSOP, Chapter-18..What’s more, ‘CPD Rules and General Order do-not limit the duty to report to only. intentional misconduct. Chief ‘Andrews had a duty.to report-any:miseonduct: in order to, initiate an investigation, yet he never made any report or initiated an investigation regarding the missing file and simply allowed his detectives to conduct the-reinvestigation awittiout key CPD révords from the initial investigation. ‘As explained below, Chief Andrews’s failure to report the missing file had multiple and substantial institutional éonsequénees: " Leet G Failure to Report the Missing File to the CPD FOIA Unit Chief Andrews further failed-to make’a notification: or ensure that anyone else made a notification to the FOLA Unit that the ériginal Koschman homivide file-was missing arid the only available file of relevant case materials was not the complete, original homicide: file. Chief ‘Andrews thereby violated: «° Ruile 3: any failure to promote the Department’s efforts to. implement its policy or accomplish its goals. Departmental goals include enforcement of all laws and the Page 25 of 30(OIG Case # 11-0225 (Chief Andrews) December 4, 2015 promotion of respect for the law, which includes the Illinois Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). As Deputy Chief of the Detective Division, Chief Andrews had a responsibility to ensure his division personnel fully complied with their obligationis to respond to the FOLA request with all relevant information, including the fact that Area 3 pérsonnel could not, in fact, locate the requigsted materials. Chief Andrews reported that he saw no reason to report the missing file to the FOIA unit because he believed that CPD was only obligated to provide any resporisive documents that it had in its possession. (Chron. §] 205.) Nevertheless, Chief Andrews was aware that the FOIA unit wotild be responding to the request without having first reviewed the original file and without full’ infrmation regarding the, materials it received. (Chron. $f 165, 175-76, 178-79) Chief Andrews’s failuré to report the missing file to IAD or the CPD FOIA unit had significant, multiple. consequences for CPD, which as: result, responded to numerous file requésts om the basis.of incomplete information angl produced, to the State’s Attorney and OIG, what it érroneously implied tobe ithe: coniplete file.-In fact, CPD FOIA: officer Rory O'Brien reported he'did riot tearn that the'original file was missing «itil July 2011, well after CPD. had responded t6 the vérious FOIA requests for the Koschman investigative file. (Chron. $f] 359, 422-23, 428, 441.) And, as a consequence, O’Brien and other CPD FOIA officers responded to the! Stai-fimes FOIA’ ton-the basis of inacpurate information. Similarly; CPD tendered whatit implied to be the complete original-file to the Cook County State’s Attomey, who, in'tam tenidéred it to the “linoty: State: Police, iicoriettly repiesdnting it'as the complete-file. (Chiron. ‘YE310/316-17,) CPD also reg genet to: 016" ‘s request Fonaiplinyestgative 4 file by téndering;an inéerhplete copy dies etn bd t0ot ther origi or that “the! original ‘was missing. (Chton. 94/321, 33.)rh BD agatin s Sched fir theorigindl file ta Apriland May 2011 in resporise to O1G's eave for kettain ‘original materials ‘at’ were, not: present in \CPD"s: first tender of photdedpied uel ca felaitd tothe Koschinan iavestigatibn: (Chron. {ff 325-31.) Chief Andrews’s' reporting’ that ‘the prigindl file was’ missing. viphld: have avoided this entire string! of productiénis made utiles the implied pretense that CPD possessed the ofiginal file and that its toriders in response to off requests were of eopies of theoriginal fle, we HL “trainin af Otiiciar CPD Bases ‘Usitig Persouial ‘Erhail On February 27, dour; Chief Andrés conducted.-cfficial. CPD business ‘through unofficial, unsecured channels—his personal email account—regaiding the reinvestigation of the Koschman homicide. ‘The use of personal email:accounts undermines the ability of CPD to retain those emails as public records as requiired tinder the Minois Local Records Act, 50 Ill. Comp. Stat:.205/1.e# seq: Inaddition, personal email;accounts used.on personal computers or devices do not have ‘the .scourity required: for the. conduct of official CPD business. Accordingly, Chief Andrews violated: ! ' + Rule 2: any action or conduct which impedes the Department’s efforts to achieve its policy and goals or brings discredit upon the Department; departmental goals include the enforcement of all laws anid ordinances, including the Local Records Act. Page 26 of 30OIG Case ¥ 11-0225 (Chief Andrews) December 4, 2015 Specifically, on February 27, 2011, at 9:54 p.m., Cirone sent an email from his personal email address to Chief Andrews’s personal email address and Salemme’s CPD email address. (Chron. § 242.) In that email, Cirone sent two “corrections” to Gilger and Spanos’s concluding CSR, including the description of Gilger’s conversation with ASA O°Brien and the concluding paragraph recommending that the case be classified as closed/cleared exceptionally. (Chron. $242.) Between 9:55 and 10:25 p.m. that night, Cirone and Chief Andrews exchanged 10 telephone calls and text messages. (Chron. $¥ 244-45.) At 10:22 p.m., and again several hours later, in the early morning of February 28, 2011, Cirone sent emails from his, personal email account to Chief Andrews’s personal email account, with just the concluding paragraph to the report. (Chron. $f 244-45.) At 10:25 p.m. Chief Andrews responded to Cirone, “Very nicely done.” (Chron. § 245.) According to Cirone, he sent edits to the final CSR to Chief Andrews because the approval of a commander was required to designate the case as cleared exceptionally. (Chron, {246 Cirone’s only explanation for his use of a personal eniail account for these communications was that it was probably the account fie had open at the time. (Chron. { 247.) According to Cirone, he sent the emails to Chief Andrews’s personal account becatise that was the email address he had associated with Chief Andrews in Cirone’s personal email account. (Chron. 247.) According to Chief Andrews, at the time, there. was no CPD policy prohibiting the'use of personal email accounts for communications related to official CPD business. (Chron. ‘{ 249.) Although Chief Andrews was unsure why Cirone sent the email to his personal email address, he acknowledged that he received the emai] as part of his official duties in reviewing the report. (Chron. $249.) Chief Andrews noted that CPD did riot issue personal communication devices to detectives, so many used their personal phones and communication devices to condyet official CPD business. (Chron. ] 249.) Nevertheless, CPD is required to store and retain for Specified periods of time all, public records used to conduct public business. These official emails, particularly. emails éxchanged exclusively between petsonal accounts, are’not captured by CPD's seryér, and make storage and fetrieval by CPD all but impossible, Moreover, the use of unoflic channels to discuss official business creates the appeararice of an atfempt to conceal the communications and shield them from any external review or possible FOIA request. L, Evasive or Misleading Statements to O1G In the course of O1G's official! investigation, Chief Andiéws was not forthcoming and thereby violated: =, Rule 2; any action or conduct which imperles the Department’s efforts to achieve its policy and goals or brings discredit upon the Department. Specifically, during his first OIG interview on December 15, 2011, Chief Andrews gave evasive or misleading statements’ by.denying his involvement in the decision to close the Koschman case as cleared exceptionally and denying knowledge of who approved the case disposition. Chief Andrews’s own statements (0 the OSP on January 13, 2013, and additional documentary evidence of Chief Andrews’s involvement in the closing of the case establish that Page 27 of 30OG Case # 11-0225 (Chief Andrews) December 4, 2015 he was minimizing his involvement and at a minimum was not sufficiently forthcoming with OIG investigators, Detective Division Special Order 96-5 (DDSO 96-5) dictates that the area commander and field group deputy chief must approve the designation of the closing of a horriicide case as cleared exceptionally. (Chron. | 297.) However, in his December 15, 2011 interview, Chief Andrews disclaimed responsibility for or involvement jn the decision to close the case, even though he “concurred” with the cleared exceptionally designation: A: First of all, Dean Andrews does not make those decisions [regarding whether to close the case]. Detectives make those decisions. Q Which decision? A. Whether to close a case, not close a case. The disposition of the case is made by the detective. and it’s approved by a sergeanit, Q. So in this case, the reinvestigation of the David Koschmati case, the decision to close the case, was made by who? “AL It Was made by the detéetive, along with’ the ‘supervisor approving. I don't kmow which supervisor approved it. Q. Did you play any role, active role, in the investigation in 2011 of the David Koschman case? Did you go out on iiterviews,'did you — A. No! : eeetren Q. Okay. Did You ieview drafts, supplemental repeits? * ‘A. No, not that I remember. I réad approveil reports as.they came through. i (Chron: 4398)" a ‘in onast, as’ reflected ‘in the. Januaty’-13,'2043 "Kroll ‘Mernoriigdum tf Interview, Chief Andrews.acknowledged to OSP i igators that as deptity chief, he was the only person authorized to approve the designation of cleared exceptionally for Uie closing of the KoSchman investigation; and he dig.so.:(Chron. 4.29 . “ 7 During 2 2014 OIG interview, when asked pbout, his conflicting statements, Chief Andrews asserted that his answers were “tiuthful'to'the best of siy'técollection . . . iti both 2011 and today [2014],” and commented that “If -- at the time, if Tdidn’t remember, it would be accurate.” “(Chron. $300.) Chief Andréws dtfered firttier explaniition: “[tJo this day T don’t remember if I read the entire report in both parts at the same time or not... . We're asking questions about specific small instances that ate part of everyday business years later.” (Chron. 1300.) Chief Andrews asserted that his statements regarding thé closing of the case were not inaccurate or inconsistent and distingitished between the inilial decision to close a cast and the decision to approve that closure as cleared exceptionally: ‘The detective always makes the initial decision. There’s a multi-step approval process. it’s not final on an exceptionally cleared-hoinicide vintil the deputy chief approves it Page 28 of 30OIG Case # 11-0225 (Chief Andrews) December 4, 2015 It could be reversed anywhere — at any step along the way. . .. But once it gets an exceptionally cleared recommendation or exceptionally cleared status the final approval must be -- before it’s scored that way for crime reporting purposes must be the area deputy chief. (Chron. $300.) Chief Andrews clearly minimized his involvement in the closing of the case before OIG investigators in 2011. His first OIG interview occurred just nine months after he approved the closing of the case as cleared exceptionally when his memory was mostly likely to have been fresher than it was over one year later when interviewed by the OSP. Nevertheless, in 2011, Chief Andrews denied that he had any active involvement in the review of the supplemental reports or the decision to close the ease. (Chron. ] 299.) These initial denials were further contradicted by Chief Andrews’s multiple calls, texts, and emails with Cirone regarding the two corrections to the closing supplemental report the night of February 27, 2011, just two days before the case was olosed. (Chron. {ff 242-45.) In fact, Chief Andrews ultimately admitted that his involvement with the “corrections” email was part of his official review and approval of the supplemental report. (Chron. § 249.) Chief Andrews’s evasive or misleading statements reflect an unwillingness to provide full, complete, and forthright answers in the course of an official investigation. His conduct reflects poor judgment for a high ranking CPD commander and brings discredit on the department. “VY. CONCLUSION O1G’s investigation established that Chief Andrews violated multiple CPD Rules, General Orders, and Detective Division Special Orders in the course of his supervision of the Koschman homicide investigation. These violations raise setious concems regarding Chief Andrews’s judgment, integrity, objectivity, and competence to perform his role as CPD’s Deputy Chief of Detectives. Accordingly, OIG recommends that CPD impose discipline up to and including discharge against Chief Andrews, commensurate with the gravity of his violations, past disciplinary and work history, department standards, and any other relevant considerations. VI. CPD Rue Viorations Rule2 Any action or conduct which itapedes the Department's efforts to achieve its policy and goals or brings discredit upon the Department. Rule 3 Any failure to promote the Department’s efforts to implement its policy or accomplish its goals. . Rule 6 Disobedience of an order or directive, whether written or oral. Rule U1 Incompetency or inefficiency in the performance of duty. Page 29 of 30O1G Case # 11-0225 (Chief Andrews) December 4, 2015 Rule22 Failure to report to the Department any violation of Rules and Regulations or any other improper conduct which is contrary to the policy, orders or directives of the Department. Page 30 of 30