SUMMARY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

Office of Inspector General Case # 11-0225

December 4, 2015 (Lt. Denis Walsh)

This report consists of a summary of the evidence set out in a separate “Chronology of
Events,” all relevant investigative materials, an index of the investigative materials, and the
Office of Inspector General’s (OIG’s) analysis of those materials.

I. INTRODUCTION AND REPORT FORMAT

An OIG investigation has established that Chicago Police Department (CPD) Lieutenant
Denis Walsh violated CPD rules and regulations in the course of his involvement in CPD’s
investigation of the homicide of David Koschman. Accordingly, and as detailed below, OIG
recommends that CPD discharge Lieutenant Walsh and refer him for placement on the ineligible
for rehire list maintained by the Department of Human Resources.

The attached Chronology of Events details the facts relevant to the Koschman
investigation with citation to all supporting evidence. This evidence includes that obtained by the
Office of Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the special grand jury and disclosed to OIG by order of
the Circuit Court of Cook County for use in this administrative investigation. All grand jury
material remains subject to a protective order.1 The evidence also includes additional
investigative materials and statements obtained by OIG following the release of the Report of the
Special Prosecutor, Dan K. Webb. Due to the length of the Chronology, a complete summary of
the evidence is not repeated here, and is cited with reference to the Chronology (Chron. ¶)
throughout.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Summary of CPD’s Investigation of the Koschman Homicide

At approximately 3:15 a.m. on April 25, 2004, David Koschman, Scott Allen, James
Copeland, David Francis, and Shaun Hageline (the “Koschman group”) were walking westward
on Division Street when they encountered Richard J. Vanecko, Craig Denham, and Kevin and
Bridget McCarthy (the “Vanecko group”) on the south sidewalk at approximately 43 West
Division Street in Chicago. (Chron. ¶ 9.) A verbal altercation ensued. (Chron. ¶ 9.) During that
verbal altercation, Vanecko forcibly struck Koschman in the face causing Koschman to fall
straight back and hit his head on the pavement. (Chron. ¶ 9.) Koschman was immediately taken
to the hospital, where he died 11 days later of his injuries. (Chron. ¶¶ 13, 77.)

1
Pursuant to the protective order, grand jury materials may be used by OIG, the Mayor of the City of Chicago and
his designees, the CPD Superintendent and his designees, employees of the City of Chicago Department of Law
directly involved in the implementation of disciplinary proceedings, CPD employees against whom disciplinary
action is sought (the “subjects”), and the subjects’ counsel (collectively, the “authorized persons”), solely in
connection with the prosecution and defense of any disciplinary proceedings arising out of OIG’s investigation, and
for no other purpose, and in connection with no other proceeding, without further order of the Circuit Court of Cook
County.
OIG Case # 11-0255 (Lt. Walsh) December 4, 2015

At the scene of the incident, the responding officer, Edwin Tremore, took initial crime
scene investigatory steps while also facilitating the call for immediate medical attention for the
seriously injured Koschman. (Chron. ¶¶ 11-12.) Tremore interviewed Kevin McCarthy,
Hageline, and one bystander witness at the scene. (Chron. ¶¶ 14, 18.) In calling for a “records
division number” (RD number), Tremore mistakenly classified the incident as a simple battery
when the circumstances at the scene were more appropriately classified as the more serious
offense of aggravated battery. (Chron. ¶¶ 23-24.) This misclassification resulted in a delayed
field investigation. (Chron. ¶¶ 28-29.) No detectives were called to the scene in the immediate
aftermath of the incident. (Chron. ¶¶ 28-29.) CPD therefore did not conduct a canvass or secure
all witnesses and evidence immediately following the incident. (Chron. ¶¶ 28-29.)

Later that morning, Area 3 Violent Crimes Sergeant Robert O’Leary assigned Second
Watch Area 3 Detectives Rita O’Leary and Robert Clemens to follow up on the case, despite
knowing that both detectives were scheduled for three-week furloughs starting two days later.
(Chron. ¶¶ 31, 34.) The only tasks Dets. O’Leary and Clemens performed before leaving on
furlough were to interview two witnesses and check on Koschman’s condition on April 25, 2004.
(Chron. ¶¶ 42, 45, 52.). The detectives identified six additional witnesses but did not contact
them. (Chron. ¶ 60.) CPD performed no further investigative work for the 13-day period from
April 26, 2004, to May 9, 2004, that included 12 days while Dets. O’Leary and Clemens were
out on furlough. (Chron. ¶¶ 509-70, 79.) Although, at the time, Lt. Denis Walsh was a Field
Lieutenant in the 18th District where the crime occurred, he was not on duty on April 25, 2004,
and, according to CPD records, he had no official involvement in the initial Koschman
investigation. (Chron. ¶ 30.)

Three days after Koschman’s death on May 6, 2004, CPD, likely Sgt. O’Leary, assigned
Area 3 Homicide Detectives Ronald Yawger and Anthony Giralamo to the investigation. (Chron.
¶ 79.) As with CPD personnel who preceded them in connection with the matter, Dets. Yawger
and Giralamo failed to conduct a canvass to identify additional witnesses or identify and secure
available video footage of the altercation. (Chron. ¶¶ 61-62.) Neither did the detectives take any
steps to pursue phone records for the individuals involved, which the grand jury investigation
years later would reveal to contain critical information that could have been used to materially
advance the investigation. (Chron. ¶¶ 114-15.)

On May 20, 2004, Det. Yawger conducted a lineup with the male members of the
Vanecko group, including Vanecko himself. (Chron. ¶ 117.) None of the witnesses to the lineup
definitively identified Vanecko as Koschman’s assailant. (Chron. ¶ 120.) Although Det. Yawger
consulted with Assistant State’s Attorney Darren O’Brien about the case, CPD never formally
presented the case to the State’s Attorney’s Felony Review Unit for a charging decision. (Chron.
¶¶ 127, 142.) Yawger did not submit a concluding Case Supplementary Report (CSR) until
November 10, 2004, nearly six months after he performed his last investigative action in the
case. (Chron. ¶ 157.)

In the final CSR, Det. Yawger concluded that the identity of the offender could not be
determined, notwithstanding all the evidence pointing to Vanecko. (Chron. ¶ 158.) Craig
Denham and the McCarthys stated they were not the ones who hit Koschman, and the Koschman
friends informed police that the largest male of the group struck Koschman. (Chron. ¶¶ 105,

Page 2 of 20
OIG Case # 11-0255 (Lt. Walsh) December 4, 2015

124.) The largest and tallest person of the group was Vanecko. (Chron. ¶ 261.) In the final report,
Det. Yawger further concluded that Koschman was the aggressor, and the offender acted in self-
defense. (Chron. ¶ 158.) However, Yawger reached this conclusion without attempting to
interview Vanecko or his attorney and despite the fact that members of the Koschman group
flatly denied that Koschman was the aggressor (contrary to Yawger’s interview notes, which
conflicted not merely with the recollections of the members of the Koschman group, but also
with aspects of the recollections of bystander witnesses). (Chron. ¶¶ 89-91, 158.) Det. Yawger’s
decision to forgo identifying Vanecko as the likely offender meant that Vanecko’s name would
not appear in CPD records as a suspect. Additionally, because Area 3 detectives allowed the case
to remain open, CPD’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) unit, as a matter of practice, would
not publicly release the case file in response to FOIA requests filed by the Chicago Sun-Times
and Chicago Tribune over the next seven years. (Chron. ¶ 404.)

The Koschman case remained open, unworked, and untracked by Area 3 from November
2004 until January 2011. (Chron. ¶¶ 160-167.)

On January 6, 2011, the Chicago Sun-Times submitted a FOIA request to CPD seeking
the Koschman homicide file. (Chron. ¶ 163.) In response, Lt. Denis Walsh and other Area 3 staff,
at the direction of Commander Gary Yamashiroya, searched for—but were unable to locate—the
complete original homicide case file. (Chron. ¶¶ 168, 175-76.) Although Area 3 staff did locate a
set of photocopies of certain CSRs and had access to reports maintained in CPD’s electronic case
management system, the detectives’ original General Progress Reports (GPRs), Crime Scene
Processing Reports, and hospital records from 2004 were missing from the photocopied file.
(Chron. ¶¶ 175-81, 203.)

Prompted by the FOIA request, and after a review of the available reports from 2004,
senior CPD command personnel ordered that the Koschman homicide be fully reinvestigated.
(Chron. ¶¶ 182-83, 186.) Deputy Chief of Detectives Dean Andrews personally reviewed the
available case file materials and concluded that the Area 3 detectives had not gathered key
information. (Chron. ¶ 183.) Dep. Chief Andrews reassigned the investigation from Area 3 to
Area 5 to avoid any appearance of impropriety and instructed Area 5 personnel, specifically,
Detectives James Gilger and Nicholas Spanos, Sergeant Sam Cirone, and Commander Joseph
Salemme, to conduct a full reinvestigation of the case. (Chron. ¶¶ 186-87.) However, the Area 5
personnel did not pursue the investigative steps necessary to constitute a full reinvestigation.
(Chron. ¶¶ 206-23.) Among other things, they failed to perform critical investigative tasks, failed
to present the case to the State’s Attorney for a charging decision, and on March 1, 2011,
misclassified the final disposition by closing the case as cleared exceptionally without making an
arrest. (Chron. ¶¶ 280-86.)

Under highly suspicious circumstances, months later, on June 29, 2011, Lt. Walsh
reported having found the missing original Koschman homicide file. (Chron. ¶ 341.) As
purportedly found by Lt. Walsh, the long-missing original case file contained most but not all
original investigative records. (Chron. ¶ 341.) According to Walsh, he found the case file among
the other Area 3 homicide files, a location that had been previously searched. (Chron. ¶ 341.)
When found, the case file material was contained in a blue binder that was visually distinguished
and distinct from the other homicide case files maintained by Area 3, all of which were kept in

Page 3 of 20
OIG Case # 11-0255 (Lt. Walsh) December 4, 2015

white binders. (Chron. ¶ 341.) Rather than immediately reporting the discovery of the partial
case file to Internal Affairs (IAD), Walsh waited for three weeks to do so, despite the fact that
the file had been the subject of an intensive search and was related to a case receiving intensive
public scrutiny. (Chron. ¶ 361.) Moreover, during these three weeks, without permission or any
legitimate reason to do so, Walsh removed the partial original file from CPD premises and
maintained it at his personal residence. (Chron. ¶ 343.)

After Walsh did report the disappearance and reappearance of the original case file, IAD
initiated an investigation. (Chron. ¶¶ 382-87.) However, the assigned IAD investigator closed the
investigation as not sustained after taking only one investigative step—an interview of Walsh.
(Chron. ¶¶ 386-87.) During this interview, Lt. Walsh failed to disclose significant details related
to the disappearance and reappearance of the case file. (Chron. ¶¶ 384-85.)

In December 2011, approximately ten months after CPD concluded its “reinvestigation”
and closed the case as cleared exceptionally with no arrest or charges, Koschman’s mother filed
a petition with the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking the appointment of a special prosecutor
to investigate her son’s death. (Chron. ¶ 443.) The Court granted Mrs. Koschman’s petition and
appointed Dan K. Webb as the Special Prosecutor. (Chron. ¶ 446.) An investigation led by the
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), in which OIG participated as the investigative partner,
ensued. (Chron. ¶ 446.)

B. Procedural Background

1. OSP Special Grand Jury Investigation, Indictment, and Conviction

On April 23, 2012, Cook County Circuit Court Judge Michael P. Toomin appointed Dan
K. Webb, former U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois and Chairman of Winston &
Strawn LLP, as special prosecutor to investigate Koschman’s death. (Chron. ¶ 446.) The judge
ordered the special prosecutor to investigate whether criminal charges should be brought against
anyone in connection with the 2004 homicide of Koschman and whether employees of CPD and
the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office (CCSAO) acted intentionally to suppress and conceal
evidence, furnish false evidence, and generally impede the investigation into Koschman’s death.
(Chron. ¶ 446.) Judge Toomin designated OIG as the investigative body to assist the OSP in its
criminal investigation. (Chron. ¶ 446.) The OSP collected evidence under the auspices of a
special grand jury empaneled by the Circuit Court. Based on that investigation, the OSP sought
and obtained the conviction of Richard J. Vanecko for involuntary manslaughter. (Chron.
¶¶ 449-50.) Vanecko pleaded guilty on January 31, 2014. (Chron. ¶ 450.) The OSP considered,
but did not seek, criminal charges against several members of CPD. (Chron. ¶ 451.)

On February 4, 2014, the OSP issued a public report summarizing its investigation, its
evidence, and its analysis of, among other things, CPD’s responses to Koschman’s death (the
OSP Report). (Chron. ¶ 451.) The issuance of the OSP Report and the OSP’s declination of
further criminal charges effectively brought its work, which was limited to criminal prosecution,

Page 4 of 20
OIG Case # 11-0255 (Lt. Walsh) December 4, 2015

to a close. The OSP’s work did not (and could not) consider or foreclose the question of
administrative disciplinary action by the City against any City employees.2

On February 3, 2014, the Circuit Court authorized the OSP to disclose materials obtained
through the Special Grand Jury, including the identities of subpoenaed witnesses, witness
testimony, and the nature and content of documents and physical evidence obtained through the
Special Grand Jury investigation, to OIG to be used in connection with its investigation into
potential violations of City administrative rules and regulations. (Chron. ¶ 451.)

2. OIG’s Administrative Investigation

a) CPD Superintendent’s Authorization of Investigation of

Allegations Older than Five Years and Referral of Investigation to
OIG

By letter dated July 24, 2014, OIG proposed to CPD Superintendent Garry McCarthy that
OIG, and not CPD’s Bureau of Internal Affairs (commonly known as IAD), conduct and
conclude any further disciplinary investigation relating to CPD’s administration of the
Koschman investigation because, among other reasons, IAD had both actual and apparent
conflict-of-interest issues with respect to the disciplinary investigation, including IAD’s prior
investigation into matters investigated by the OSP. (Chron. ¶ 452.)

On August 8, 2014, Superintendent McCarthy responded by authorizing OIG to

investigate “any and all complaints or allegations arising from the above mentioned matter [The
Death of David Koschman (OIG case No. 11-0225)] even if any of the alleged misconduct
concerning the incident or event occurred more than five years prior to the date the complaint or
allegation became known to the Department.”3 (Chron. ¶ 453.)

b) IPRA Affidavit Override

On August 29, 2014, OIG requested an override affidavit from IPRA. In support of its
request for an override affidavit, OIG provided IPRA nearly 2,000 pages of materials, including
the OSP Report, statements made to the OSP and its investigators, and all prior statements of the
subject police officers. (Chron. ¶ 454.)

On September 26, 2014, IPRA Chief Administrator Scott Ando issued an override
affidavit. Chief Ando attested that he had reviewed the documents provided and “determined that

2
OSP also did not address issues of civil liability. On March 24, 2014, Nanci Koschman sued the City of Chicago,
Cook County, and various other named defendants (including as relevant here, Denis Walsh). Koschman v. City of
Chicago et al., Case No. 14-cv-02041 (N.D. Ill.). On March 29, 2015, the City and Koschman settled Koschman’s
claims against the City and the CPD officers who were named defendants. The City agreed to pay Nanci Koschman
$250,000. On September 11, 2015, the Cook County State’s Attorney agreed to a $50,000 settlement with Nanci
Koschman, resolving Koschman’s claims against the remaining defendants: the County, Anita Alvarez, Dan Kirk,
Richard Devine, and Darren O’Brien. See Koschman v. City of Chicago et al., Case No. 14-3090 (7th Cir.).
3
Applicable CBAs require the Superintendent to authorize a disciplinary investigation of conduct occurring more
than five years prior.

Page 5 of 20
OIG Case # 11-0255 (Lt. Walsh) December 4, 2015

there exists sufficient objective and verifiable evidence such that the continued administrative
investigation of the allegations of misconduct in all matters relating to the death of David
Koschman is necessary and appropriate” for ten CPD members who were then actively
employed by the department. (Chron. ¶ 455.) On the basis of this affidavit, OIG served each of
the subject officers with the requisite notice of allegations and interviewed the officers as
required by applicable CBAs and CPD policies. (Chron. ¶ 455.)

c) OIG Interview of Lt. Walsh

Pursuant to Section 6.1 of the applicable CBA, on October 15, 2014, OIG provided
Lt. Walsh with a Notification of Interview, Notification of Allegations, and copies of documents
related to his August 14, 2013 interview with the OSP. (Chron. ¶ 455.)

On December 31, 2014, Lt. Walsh sent a letter objecting that the allegations outlined in
the Notification of Allegations lack specificity. Lt. Walsh also complained that he had not been
provided with the OSP investigators’ notes from his 2013 interview. (Chron. ¶ 455.)

On January 5, 2015, OIG investigators interviewed Lt. Walsh under oath after informing
him of his administrative advisements orally and in writing. Lt. Walsh indicated that he
understood the advisements orally and in writing. The interview was recorded by a certified
court reporter. Lt. Walsh was accompanied by his attorney, Daniel Herbert. At the interview
renewed his previous objections and for the first time, objected to OIG’s authority to conduct the
investigation. Without waiving any of his objections, Lt. Walsh answered all questions posed by
OIG. (Chron. ¶ 455.)

On February 26, 2015, OIG served Lt. Walsh with a revised, more specific Notification
of Allegations and provided him the opportunity to appear for another interview should he have
any further information to provide. Lt. Walsh declined the opportunity to appear. (Chron. ¶ 455.)

d) Grievance and Arbitration re: Affidavit Override Procedure

On October 28, 2014, the Policemen’s Benevolent & Protective Association (PB&PA)
Unit 156A filed Grievance Number SGT 14-023, arguing that OIG’s administrative investigation
of Sergeants Mills and Cirone was in violation of the CBA because OIG is ineligible to invoke
the affidavit override procedure having not been explicitly permitted to do so in the CBA. On
October 29, 2014, the PB&PA Unit 156B filed Grievance Number LTS-14-004 on behalf of
Lt. Walsh, with similar complaints. On December 22, 2014, CPD denied both grievances, and
the matters went to arbitration. An arbitration hearing was held on June 1, 2015. The arbitrator
issued the award on August 28, 2015, and a clarifying letter on September 2, 2015, finding the
OIG’s investigation could continue so long as OIG made a good faith effort to obtain an affidavit
from Special Prosecutor Dan Webb. Such affidavit was obtained on September 23, 2015. (Chron.
¶ 455.)

Page 6 of 20
OIG Case # 11-0255 (Lt. Walsh) December 4, 2015

C. Denis Walsh Employment History

Denis Walsh has worked for CPD since June 1986 when he started as a Police Officer. In
March 1992, Walsh was assigned as a Detective, and in August 1998, Walsh was promoted to
Sergeant. In December 2003, Walsh was promoted to Lieutenant and assigned to the 18th
District. On November 30, 2008, Lt. Walsh was detailed to Area 3 (now Detective Area North)
and was permanently assigned there on April 29, 2010. Lt. Walsh is a member of the PB&PA,
Unit 156-Lieutenants.

III. APPLICABLE RULES, REGULATIONS, AND LAW4

A. CPD Rules & Regulations (effective January 12, 2011)

The CPD Rules and Regulations set out the standards of conduct, departmental goals and
duties of members. Goals of the Department include, among others, the enforcement of all laws
and ordinances, the arrest of law violators, assembly of competent evidence of the alleged
violation, and promotion of respect and cooperation of all citizens for the law and those sworn to
enforce it. Goals of Department members include maintenance of the highest standards of
integrity and ethics and excellence in the performance of duty.

Article V of the “Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Police Department,” sets forth
specifically prohibited acts as the CPD Rules of Conduct (the CPD Rules). In pertinent part, the
CPD Rules include the following prohibitions:

Rule 2 Any action or conduct which impedes the Department’s efforts to achieve its
policy and goals or brings discredit upon the Department.

Rule 3 Any failure to promote the Department’s efforts to implement its policy or
accomplish its goals.

Rule 6 Disobedience of an order or directive, whether written or oral.

Rule 11 Incompetency or inefficiency in the performance of duty.

Rule 22 Failure to report to the Department any violation of Rules and Regulations or any
other improper conduct which is contrary to the policy, orders or directives of the
Department.

Rule 41 Disseminating, releasing, altering, defacing or removing any Department record

or information concerning police matters except as provided by Department
orders.

4
Selected CPD Orders, (OIG_Add’l_004542-OIG_Add’l_005133); CPD Rules and Regulations (eff. Jan. 12, 2011)
(OIG_Add’l_005497-OIG_Add’l_005516).

Page 7 of 20
OIG Case # 11-0255 (Lt. Walsh) December 4, 2015

B. CPD General Orders

Relevant provisions of CPD’s General Orders in effect at the time of the conduct at issue
are set forth below.

1. G08-01-02 Allegations of Misconduct – Specific Responsibilities (eff.

May 24, 2001 to March 17, 2013).

G08-01-02(II)(A)(5): Duty to Report Misconduct - Members who have knowledge of

circumstances relating to a complaint will submit an individual written report to a supervisor
before reporting off duty on the day the member becomes aware of the investigation. The report
will include the CR number and all facts relating to the incident known or reported to the
member. The supervisor will forward one copy of any such report or document, without
unnecessary delay, directly to either the Independent Police Review Authority or the Internal
Affairs Division. A letter of transmittal or cover report is not required when such reports or
documents are forwarded.

G08-01-02(II)(B)(2): Obligation of Supervisors re: Misconduct - When misconduct is

observed or a complaint relative to misconduct is received by supervisory or command
personnel, they will initiate a complete and comprehensive investigation in accordance with this
and other directives without looking to higher authority for such action.

C. CPD Detective Division Special Orders

1. Detective Division Standard Operating Procedure Chapter 18:

Investigative Files (eff. 1992 to May 9, 2011)

DDSOP Chapter 18 – This Standard Operating Procedure sets out the Detective
Division policies regarding investigative file maintenance:

Ch. 18.2(F) Investigative File Control Card – “The Investigative File Control
card is a Department form which documents the temporary removal of
investigative files from the file repository.”

Ch. 18.3(A)(1) Responsibilities and Procedures – “The Detective Division unit

commanding officers will ensure that: the unit’s RD numerical sequence file and
investigative file case folders are properly maintained.”

Ch. 18.4(A)(2) File Retention – “Homicide file retention schedule: The Violent
Crimes Units will file homicide cases separate from other cases. During the first
period of each year the homicide files will be reviewed to determine their
retention period.
...
In cleared open homicide cases and in uncleared homicide cases the investigative
file case folder will be maintained in the unit for ten years and then sent to the
Records Division for permanent retention.”

Page 8 of 20
OIG Case # 11-0255 (Lt. Walsh) December 4, 2015

2. DDSO 11-01 and Addenda: Investigative Files (Eff. May 9, 2011)

(Rescinded DDSOP Chapter 18)

DDSO 11-01(IV)(B) – General Requirements: The Investigative File Control will

be used when removing a Felony Investigative File from its repository. By
signing the Investigative File Control, the member is assuming responsibility for
its contents and will not relinquish it to any other member without documenting
such transfer on the Investigative File Control.

DDSO 11-01-04(II)(A)(2) Investigative File Storage: Homicide Investigative

Files - Will be reviewed every year on the anniversary date of the homicide and
retained according to the following schedule:
a. Cleared/Closed cases will be forwarded to the Records Division upon receipt
of a final court disposition.
b. Cleared/Open, Exceptionally Cleared/Open, or Open cases will be maintained
in the unit until they are Cleared/Closed. The file will be maintained and
stored in an organized secure manner in the Detective Division unit. When it
is determined that storage at the unit is limited, files will be forwarded to the
Records Division.

IV. ANALYSIS

The OIG disciplinary investigation established that Lt. Walsh, the Area 3 Violent Crimes
Lieutenant during the Koschman reinvestigation, violated multiple CPD Rules and Department
orders in the course of his involvement in the Koschman homicide investigation. The Koschman
homicide case remained open, unworked, and untracked by Area 3 from November 2004 until
January 2011. (Chron. ¶¶ 163-67.) Once the media brought the case to CPD’s attention, a review
of available records from the 2004 investigation revealed that the 2004 investigation was not
thorough and had failed to identify the offender. (Chron. ¶ 183.) Deputy Chief of Detectives
Dean Andrews ordered that the case be reassigned away from Area 3 to a different Area and
fully reinvestigated to avoid any appearance of impropriety, particularly in light of the
allegations of improper, preferential treatment for the Mayor’s nephew, the prime suspect in the
case. (Chron. ¶¶ 186-87.)

Despite Departmental concerns about the appearance of impropriety, the increased

scrutiny of the case by senior CPD leadership as well as the public, and the obvious
shortcomings of the 2004 investigation, Lt. Walsh displayed a lack of professionalism and
disregard for CPD rules and orders during the 2011 reinvestigation. First, although he claims to
have advised his chain of command, Lt. Walsh failed to report or ensure that anyone else
reported to IAD, that the original Area 3 homicide file had gone missing, a clear violation of
CPD orders regarding the storage and maintenance of homicide files. See CPD G08-01-
02(II)(B); DDSOP Ch. 18; CPD Rules 3, 6, 22, 41. (Chron. ¶ 205.) Lt. Walsh also failed to
ensure that the CPD FOIA office was notified that the original file was missing. (Chron. ¶ 205.)
However, an even greater concern is the fact that Lt. Walsh failed to timely report his later
discovery of the missing Koschman homicide file. (Chron. ¶ 361.) Additionally, when Lt. Walsh

Page 9 of 20
OIG Case # 11-0255 (Lt. Walsh) December 4, 2015

finally made the report, he omitted material facts about his discovery of the missing case file,
including the presence of a purported witness to his discovery, as well as the additional discovery
of Detective Yawger’s “working file.” (Chron. ¶ 380.) Moreover, Lt. Walsh omitted material
facts when interviewed by IAD during the official investigation related to the missing and
rediscovered case file. (Chron. ¶¶ 384-85.) Lt. Walsh’s failure to cooperate with the IAD
investigation directly undermined his obligations as a supervising officer within the Department.
See G08-01-02; CPD Rules 2, 6, 11, 22.

Lt. Walsh further violated CPD Rules and orders by removing the recently re-discovered
original Koschman homicide case file from the CPD Area 3 headquarters and temporarily storing
the file in a safe at his residence. See DDSO 11-01, CPD Rules 2, 6, 41. (Chron. ¶ 343.)
Lt. Walsh had no legitimate work purpose for removing the file from the CPD facility as it was a
closed case. Lt. Walsh further engaged in email communications regarding the Koschman
homicide that bring discredit on the Department, joking with Commander Yamashiroya about
the missing file and Vanecko’s relationship to the Mayor. See CPD Rule 2. (Chron. ¶¶ 188-92.)
Finally, Lt. Walsh engaged in actions that impeded Departmental goals in violation of CPD Rule
2 by remaining involved in the investigation despite CPD’s efforts and the express directive of a
superior, Dep. Chief of Detectives Andrews, to have the reinvestigation conducted by personnel
not involved in or responsible for the 2004 investigation. (Chron. ¶¶ 186-87.)

These violations, individually and collectively, as detailed below, as well his explanations
to OIG regarding his conduct underlying the violations, raise serious questions about Lt. Walsh’s
ability to exercise sound judgment in the performance of his duties as a CPD Lieutenant.

A. Failure to Properly Report the Missing File to IAD

Lt. Walsh violated CPD Rules and orders by failing to initiate an IAD investigation and
failing to report, or ensure that anyone else reported, apparent misconduct. More specifically,
Lt. Walsh failed to report that the original Koschman homicide file had gone missing. By this
omission, Lt. Walsh violated:

 Rule 22: failure to report to the Department any violation of Rules and Regulations or
any other improper conduct which is contrary to the policy, orders or directives of the
Department;
 Rule 6: disobedience of an order or directive, namely, General Order 08-01-
02(II)(A)(5) which specifically requires members to report circumstances relating to a
complaint of misconduct to a supervisor the same day he learns the information so the
information may be forwarded to IAD or IPRA, as appropriate, and General Order
08-01-02(II)(B) which further imposes greater responsibility on supervisory
personnel, such as Lt. Walsh, to initiate an investigation of misconduct, without
looking to higher authority for such action;
 Rule 3: any failure to promote the Department’s efforts to implement its policy or
accomplish its goals; and
 Rule 11: incompetency in the performance of duty.

Page 10 of 20
OIG Case # 11-0255 (Lt. Walsh) December 4, 2015

Lt. Walsh violated these provisions at at least two junctures: the first, following the initial
search of the file in response to the Sun-Times FOIA request, when Lt. Walsh (and others
determined it to be missing), and the second, nearly six months later when he purportedly found
the original file that had conspicuously reappeared in manifestly suspicious circumstances.

1. January 2011 Failure to Report Missing File

Lt. Walsh told the OSP that he conducted a search for the file in January 2011, at the
direction of his superior, Area 3 Commander Gary Yamashiroya. (Chron. ¶ 175-). Lt. Walsh said
he searched for the Koschman file where Area 3 homicide files were supposed to be maintained,
including the shelves, cabinets, and a storage room known as the “telephone room.” (Chron.
¶ 175.) Lt. Walsh purports to have further enlisted others to search for the file, but it was
ultimately deemed missing. (Chron. ¶ 175.) Lt. Walsh was further aware that Yamashiroya found
a file containing photocopied documentation related to the Koschman investigation (the
“Credenza File”). (Chron. ¶ 177-79.) However, the Credenza File did not include copies of
original GPRs. (Chron. ¶ 179.) Lt. Walsh therefore was aware that the Credenza File was not the
original homicide case file.

The fact that the original homicide file was missing, that Area 3 personnel did not find
the file where homicide files were regularly stored, and that there was no inventory record to
account for the file, was a clear indication of a potential violation of CPD Rule 41, which
prohibits “removing any Department record or information concerning police matters except at
provided by Department orders.” (Chron. ¶¶ 169, 174-76.) In addition, the fact that the file was
missing was evidence of a violation of DDSOP Ch. 18, which required commanding officers to
ensure proper maintenance of the files, including the storage of uncleared homicide files in the
unit and the documentation of any file removal with an Investigative File Control card. (Chron.
¶ 169.) Moreover, the unavailability of the file was not indicative of just a technical rule
violation. Rather, because the case was the subject of media attention and allegations of
preferential treatment for the Mayor’s nephew, the probability that the file had gone missing as a
result of misconduct as opposed to mere negligence was even greater. (Chron. ¶¶ 150-54, 163-
67.)

Lt. Walsh explained that he did not report either to IAD or to CPD’s FOIA unit that the
case file was missing in January 2011 because, at that time, he had no indication the file was
missing due to misconduct. (Chron. ¶ 205.) Lt. Walsh acknowledged that he “arguably” should
have obtained a CR number when he first determined that the file was missing, but asserted that
no CPD policy requires a CR number for a missing file and noted that there are other missing
files that everybody in CPD knows are missing and no CR number has been obtained. (Chron.
¶ 363.) In other words, according to Lt. Walsh, (1) in the absence of an express, specific rule, to
govern a specific situation, he has no obligation to act, (even in circumstances under which
Lt. Walsh, by his own loose standard conceded was “arguably” indicated), and (2) the disregard
of others to meet their responsibilities excuses his own failure. Such rationalizations reflect
poorly on the department and raise fundamental questions of judgment and fitness, especially for
so experienced and senior an officer. Regardless of these rationalizations, the CPD Rules and
General Order do not limit the duty to report to only intentional misconduct. Lt. Walsh had a
clear duty to report any misconduct, yet he failed to initiate an investigation with IAD, as

Page 11 of 20
OIG Case # 11-0255 (Lt. Walsh) December 4, 2015

required under the General Orders applying to supervisors. And while he noted that he reported
the missing file to his chain of command, he did not meet his own supervisory obligation to
ensure the initiation of a complete and comprehensive investigation or ensure that anyone else
made a report to IAD , as required by G08-01-02(II)(B)(2). As explained below, Walsh’s failure
to report the missing file had multiple and substantial institutional consequences.

2. June 2011 Failure to Timely Report Discovery of Missing File

Although Lt. Walsh reported his discovery of the long-missing original file to IAD, he
manifestly failed to do so in a timely manner. According to Lt. Walsh, on June 29, 2011, he
found the “Blue Binder file,” containing most but not all original Koschman homicide
investigative records. (Chron. ¶ 341.) Lt. Walsh observed the Blue Binder file conspicuously
displayed on a shelf that had previously been searched at Area 3. (Chron. ¶ 341.) While
Lt. Walsh reported the discovery to Cmdr. Yamashiroya and Chief Byrne that same night, he
again failed to initiate an investigation of obvious misconduct, nor did he ensure that his
superiors reported the misconduct to IAD. (Chron. ¶ 342.) Instead, he waited until July 20, 2011,
to make a report to IAD, and did so only at the direction of one of his superiors. (Chron. ¶ 361.)

While OIG’s analysis focuses on two trigger events for Walsh’s failures to properly
report to IAD, it bears noting that they constitute the initial and last events in a long chain of
opportunities and prompts to report in the intervening months. The file was the subject of
multiple FOIA requests, official OIG investigatory requests, and repeated searches prompted by
those requests during the previous six months. (Chron. ¶¶ 321, 393, 424.) Yet at no point did
Walsh make an official report to IAD that the original Koschman homicide file was missing.
(Chron. ¶¶ 205, 363.) In fact, when Walsh located the original file, he did not immediately report
the matter to IAD and stored it at his home. (Chron. ¶¶ 343-44.) At that point, CPD had already
closed the case. Walsh’s purported attempt at safekeeping suggests he knew the case was still the
subject of intense scrutiny and requests for the file. (Chron. ¶¶ 343-44.) Lt. Walsh’s long-running
failure to report the missing file to IAD or the CPD FOIA unit had significant, multiple
consequences for CPD, which as a result, responded to numerous file requests on the basis of
incomplete information and produced, to the State’s Attorney and OIG, what it implied to be the
complete file, when in fact, multiple original investigatory records were missing.

Lt. Walsh (and numerous others) might also be regarded as having violated CPD Rule 3
by failing to make a notification or ensure that anyone else made a notification to the FOIA Unit
that the original Koschman homicide file was missing and the only available file was incomplete.
Rule 3 prohibits any omission or failure to take any action that would be required by the stated
policy or goals of the Department. Departmental goals include enforcement of all laws and the
promotion of respect for the law, which includes the Illinois Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA). Walsh was aware of the pending FOIA request and that the file was missing, and he was
aware that, as a result, the CPD FOIA unit would be responding to the request without having
first reviewed the original file. (Chron. ¶¶ 175-76.) Walsh did not ensure that his superiors
notified the FOIA unit that the complete, original homicide file was missing. (Chron. ¶ 205.)
Walsh noted that he did not have contact with the FOIA unit and that he reported to his chain of
command that he could not locate the file. (Chron. ¶ 205.) It would not be unreasonable for him
to have assumed numerous others in his chain, including some who do interact with the FOIA

Page 12 of 20
OIG Case # 11-0255 (Lt. Walsh) December 4, 2015

unit, would have duly reported to the FOIA officer that the original file was missing in order to
ensure the FOIA unit did not unwittingly provide an under-informed and incorrect response.

In fact, CPD FOIA officer Rory O’Brien reported he did not learn that the original file
was missing until July 2011, well after CPD had responded to the various FOIA requests for the
Koschman investigative file. (Chron. ¶¶ 359, 422-23, 428, 441.) And, as a consequence, he and
other CPD FOIA officers responded to the Sun-Times FOIA request on the basis of inaccurate
information. Similarly, CPD tendered what it implied to be the complete original file to the Cook
County State’s Attorney, who, in turn tendered it to the Illinois State Police, incorrectly
representing it as the complete file. (Chron. ¶¶ 310, 316-17.) CPD also responded to OIG’s
request for the investigative file by tendering an incomplete copy without disclosing it was not
the original or that the original was missing. (Chron. ¶¶ 321, 323.) Indeed, CPD again searched
for the original file in April and May 2011 in response to OIG’s request for certain original
materials that were not present in CPD’s first tender of photocopied materials related to the
Koschman investigation. (Chron. ¶¶ 325-31.) Walsh’s reporting that the original file was missing
would have avoided this entire string of productions made under the implied pretense that CPD
possessed the original file and that its tenders in response to official requests were copies of the
original file.

3. Failure to Provide All Material Facts in his Report to IAD

When Lt. Walsh finally did make a report to IAD, he failed to provide all relevant,
material facts about his discovery of the Blue Binder file. First, Lt. Walsh failed to report that
Sergeant Thomas Flaherty was present in the Area 3 sergeant’s office when Lt. Walsh
discovered the Blue Binder file, a fact that Lt. Walsh first revealed two years later when
interviewed by the OSP pursuant to a proffer agreement. (Chron. ¶¶ 376-81, 383-84.) Lt. Walsh
omitted the fact that Flaherty was present for the discovery in both a June 30, 2011 memorandum
to his superiors and a July 20, 2011 memorandum to IAD. (Chron. ¶¶ 355, 361.) The fact that
Flaherty was present when Lt. Walsh discovered the formerly missing file was clearly a relevant
and material fact that would have benefited IAD’s investigation.

Second, Lt. Walsh failed to report the fact that former Det. Yawger had also
contemporaneously found his separate “working file” for the Koschman case (the “Yawger
working file”) on June 30, 2011. (Chron. ¶¶ 350, 385.) This additional relevant and material fact
could also have benefitted the IAD investigation of the misconduct, and therefore, was required
to be reported under GO 08-01-02. Accordingly, Lt. Walsh failed to fully meet his obligation to
report the misconduct under CPD Rules and orders and acted in a manner that brought discredit
on the Department. As a supervisor, Lt. Walsh had an added obligation to ensure IAD’s ability to
perform a complete and comprehensive investigation, yet Lt. Walsh omitted obviously material
facts in his report and performed incompetently in the course of his duties.

B. Providing Deliberately Incomplete Answers During his IAD Interview

Lt. Walsh again failed to disclose Flaherty’s presence or the discovery of the Yawger
working file during his interview with IAD’s Sergeant Richard Downs. (Chron. ¶¶ 381-385.)
Lt. Walsh’s deliberately incomplete and evasive answers in an official investigation violated:

Page 13 of 20
OIG Case # 11-0255 (Lt. Walsh) December 4, 2015

 Rule 2: any action or conduct which impedes the Department’s efforts to achieve its
policy and goals or brings discredit upon the Department, including maintenance of
the highest standards of integrity and ethics and excellence in the performance of
duty;
 Rule 6: disobedience of an order or directive, namely, GO 08-01-02;
 Rule 22: failure to report to the Department any violation of Rules and Regulations or
any other improper conduct which is contrary to the policy, orders or directives of the
Department; and
 Rule 11: incompetency in the performance of duty.

On August 24, 2011, Sgt. Downs interviewed Lt. Walsh about his complaint of a possible
violation of CPD Rule 41 (unauthorized removal of department records) during which interview
Lt. Walsh made no mention of Flaherty’s presence during the discovery of the original file.
(Chron. ¶ 384.) According to Lt. Walsh, he did not mention Flaherty’s presence during this
interview because Downs did not specifically ask if anyone else was present when Walsh found
the file. (Chron. ¶ 384.) It was Walsh’s opinion that, “you don’t volunteer things” to IAD,
despite the fact that Walsh was being interviewed as a complainant and not as a subject of the
investigation. (Chron. ¶ 384.) Walsh’s statement is troubling at best, and at worst raises
substantial concerns about his credibility and fitness as a law enforcement officer. Walsh was the
complainant. He was being interviewed as a mere fact witness. As such, there was no reason
whatsoever to approach the interview as if he were a subject—unless, of course, he himself was
complicit in the extended disappearance and highly suspicious reappearance of the long-missing,
high profile homicide case file.

Moreover, Walsh acknowledged that he failed to provide these details even after Sgt.
Downs asked if there was “anything [Lt. Walsh] would like to add to [his] statement at this
time.” (Chron. ¶ 384.) Walsh claims that he did not mention Flaherty’s presence when the file
was discovered because he did not believe it was “germane.” (Chron. ¶ 384.) This is neither
logical nor credible. Walsh was far too experienced a detective to not recognize the importance
of these facts. Flaherty was a witness to the event that triggered the complaint and IAD
investigation. Indeed, as discussed above, Lt. Walsh appears to have approached the IAD
interview as if he were the target of the investigation, yet he mystifyingly asserts that the
existence of a witness who could corroborate his account of the “discovery” would not be
“germane.” The logic here does not hold up. Lt. Walsh claims that his failure to provide
complete information during the IAD interview was consistent with his deposition and
interrogation training in which he was instructed not to volunteer information. This explanation
is unavailing. Lt. Walsh was not being deposed or interrogated. He was being interviewed as a
complainant with firsthand knowledge relevant to an internal CPD investigation—to wit, an
investigation related to a matter of significant public interest and controversy. At best,
Lt. Walsh’s response shows a disingenuousness that is unbefitting a sworn officer, and, at worst,
could be construed as indicative of an intent to mislead.

According to Sgt. Downs, he would have expected Lt. Walsh, as the complainant and a
sworn member of CPD, to have reported Flaherty’s presence, even though Walsh was not
specifically asked if anyone else was present. (Chron. ¶ 385.) In addition, in Sgt. Downs’s view,

Page 14 of 20
OIG Case # 11-0255 (Lt. Walsh) December 4, 2015

Lt. Walsh should have reported the discovery of Yawger’s working file. (Chron. ¶ 385.) Sgt.
Downs further noted that Lt. Walsh failed to inform him in the IAD interview that Lt. Walsh had,
in fact, stored the newly discovered file at his home and had not secured the file at Area 3.
(Chron. ¶ 385.) Lt. Walsh’s failure to report these material facts was a violation of CPD’s
General Order 08-01-02, requiring members to provide all facts relating to an incident of
misconduct. As acknowledged by Sgt. Downs, that information would have led him to take
different and additional investigative steps that may have advanced the investigation. Based on
the limited information provided by Lt. Walsh, however, Sgt. Downs concluded that there was
no way to determine who actually removed the file. (Chron. ¶ 385.)

Lt. Walsh’s rationale for his lack of candor with Sgt. Downs shows a fundamental
misconception of his obligation to report misconduct to IAD and his duties as a supervisor. As a
CPD supervisor, Lt. Walsh has an even greater responsibility to assist IAD in fully investigating
internal misconduct, yet he failed to be forthcoming and acted instead like the subject of the
investigation, refusing to provide information unless specifically asked.

In sum, Lt. Walsh failed to cooperate with the IAD investigation, failed to fulfill his
obligations to report misconduct, and acted incompetently in the course of his duties. Lt. Walsh’s
actions display a significant lack of judgment and a failure to ensure IAD could adequately
investigate misconduct within CPD. Lt. Walsh’s failure to disclose relevant information was
compounded by the fact that the missing file and the surrounding circumstances had already
raised public concerns regarding CPD officers’ conduct and appropriate handling of the
Koschman case and potentially undermined public trust and confidence in CPD.

C. Improper Removal of Koschman Homicide File

Lt. Walsh improperly removed what CPD believes to be the original Koschman homicide
file (the Blue Binder file) from Area 3 and stored the file at his home, in violation of:

 Rule 41: disseminating, releasing, altering, defacing or removing any Department

record or information concerning police matters except as provided by Department
orders;
 Rule 2: any action or conduct which impedes the Department’s efforts to achieve its
policy and goals or brings discredit upon the Department; and
 Rule 6: disobedience of an order or directive, namely, DDSO 11-01, effective May 9,
2011, which governs investigative file maintenance and requires the use of an
investigative file control card to document the removal of a file from its repository,
and further requires Violent Crime units to either maintain homicide files in the
Detective Division unit or with the Records Division.

According to Lt. Walsh, after he discovered the Blue Binder file, containing various
original investigative records, he asked Byrne to keep the file, but Byrne refused and ordered
Lt. Walsh to keep it. (Chron. ¶ 343.) In response, Lt. Walsh locked the file in a cabinet in his
Area 3 office and later took the file home and placed it in his personal safe. (Chron. ¶ 343.)
Lt. Walsh explained that he took the file home because he believed his home would be the safest
place for the file and asserted that the Area 3 building had experienced multiple thefts from

Page 15 of 20
OIG Case # 11-0255 (Lt. Walsh) December 4, 2015

officers’ lockers in the past 12 years. (Chron. ¶ 344.) After some period of time, however, CPD
First Assistant General Counsel Bill Bazarek told Lt. Walsh that keeping an original homicide
file at his home was not a good decision, so Lt. Walsh brought the file back to Area 3. (Chron. ¶
343.)

Lt. Walsh believed he told Yamashiroya before taking the file home, and Yamashiroya
confirmed that, at some point, he learned that Lt. Walsh took the file home. (Chron. ¶¶ 344-45.)
Yamashiroya asserted that there is no department policy against taking a homicide file home and
that he was only concerned that the file was secure. (Chron. ¶ 345.) Yamashiroya further asserted
that the Koschman file was a special circumstance, and thus, Lt. Walsh was not required to
document his removal of the file from Area 3 as would normally be done with a green checkout
card for a homicide file removed from the storage room. (Chron. ¶ 345.) Yamashiroya believed
that Byrne and Andrews also knew that Lt. Walsh maintained custody of the file. (Chron. ¶ 345.)

When Lt. Walsh removed the file, on or about June 29, 2011, the case was closed.
(Chron. ¶ 365.) Lt. Walsh had no valid police purpose or work-related need to remove the file
from Area 3. Despite the acquiescence of his supervisors, Lt. Walsh’s decision to take the long-
missing Koschman homicide file home and his failure to document the removal of the file in
accordance with departmental orders, exhibited seriously flawed judgment. This file had been
missing for months, the subject of multiple FOIA requests, a complete reinvestigation of the
underlying incident, and significant media attention, yet Lt. Walsh removed it to his personal
safe, with no documentation, no investigative file control card, and no current work-related need
for the file. Lt. Walsh’s implausible explanation for removing the file was that his own police
station, Area 3, is subject to repeated thefts, from officers’ own lockers. (Chron. ¶ 344.)
Lt. Walsh’s assertion that the file could not be secured within a police station is simply not
credible. Moreover, Lt. Walsh’s removal of the file raises doubt about the integrity of the file and
its contents. Certain documents, including some of the detectives’ GPRs, were not in the Blue
Binder file and have never been found. But without a complete inventory or preservation of the
file in a secure CPD location rather than Lt. Walsh’s home, it is impossible to know when those
documents went missing from the file.

Lt. Walsh’s actions reflect poorly on his judgment and leadership as a supervisor. As a
lieutenant, Lt. Walsh was responsible for following, and ensuring officers under his command
follow, all applicable file maintenance policies. And under DDSO 11-01-04, the closed
Koschman homicide file was required to be maintained in the unit or sent to the Records
Division.

D. Engaging in Email Communications that Bring Discredit Upon CPD

On two occasions, Lt. Walsh used CPD facilities and technology to engage in
inappropriate electronic communications regarding the Koschman homicide investigation that
tend to bring discredit upon the Department. Lt. Walsh’s actions violated:

 Rule 2: any action or conduct which impedes the Department’s efforts to achieve
its policy and goals or brings discredit upon the Department.

Page 16 of 20
OIG Case # 11-0255 (Lt. Walsh) December 4, 2015

Specifically, on January 11, 2011, Lt. Walsh exchanged emails with Yamashiroya
regarding the Koschman case, in which Lt. Walsh sent Cmdr. Yamashiroya a 2004 Sun-Times
article about the case, later commenting “Looks like the case is over . . . . can we get Cline to
close it” and referencing a photo of a very young Vanecko sitting on his grandfather’s, Mayor
Richard J. Daley’s, lap. (Chron. ¶¶ 188-91.) With specific references to Vanecko’s familial
relationship to the former mayor and the suggestion that the case be closed, these emails reflect
an unprofessional, cavalier attitude toward the investigation.

According to Lt. Walsh, his comment asking, “can we get Cline to close it,” was an
attempt at humor. (Chron. ¶ 192.) Lt. Walsh noted that the former Superintendent had already
publicly stated that no charges were needed. (Chron. ¶ 192.) Lt. Walsh asserted that he was not
aware of any departmental policy that prohibited the emails he sent Yamashiroya in which he
joked about the Koschman case. (Chron. ¶ 192.) According to Yamashiroya, because the 2004
Sun-Times article had reported that Superintendent Cline had stated that there was insufficient
evidence to support charges, Yamashiroya surmised that Lt. Walsh’s email was meant to convey
that “there is nothing to this case” and to suggest that it should have been closed. (Chron. ¶ 192.)

On June 22, 2011, Lt. Walsh and Cmdr. Yamashiroya again exchanged a series of emails
joking about the Koschman homicide and the missing file. (Chron. ¶ 339.) One week before Lt.
Walsh found the Blue Binder file, Yamashiroya emailed Lt. Walsh, appearing to joke that
another unrelated homicide file, the Michael Scott file, was with the Koschman file. (Chron.
¶ 339.) Michael Scott, a longtime, close friend of Mayor Daley, was the president of the Chicago
Board of Education when he died. (Chron. ¶ 339.) The investigation of his death was also the
subject of public allegations of police misconduct. (Chron. ¶ 339.) In response to Yamashiroya’s
unprofessional email, Lt. Walsh responded in kind, commenting “[t]he mayor has them both.”
(Chron. ¶ 339.) Lt. Walsh acknowledged that he intended the comment as a joke. (Chron. ¶ 340.)
These emails again show disrespect and lack of professionalism regarding both homicide
investigations.

In addition to displaying unprofessional conduct, Lt. Walsh’s emails, sent from his CPD
email address and discussing official public business, constitute public records and are
potentially public under the Illinois FOIA. The communications and attitudes expressed by
Lt. Walsh undermine the credibility and professionalism of the Department and clearly bring
discredit upon CPD.

E. Engaging in Actions that Compromised the Independence of Area 5’s

Reinvestigation

Finally, despite CPD’s efforts to reassign the Koschman homicide from Area 3 to Area 5
for an independent, unbiased investigation, Lt. Walsh, the Area 3 Lieutenant, remained actively
involved in the 2011 reinvestigation, continued to communicate with Area 5 Detective Gilger to
receive updates on the case, and met with Detective Yawger, the original homicide detective
assigned to the investigation. Lt. Walsh’s involvement exhibited poor judgment and a lack of
appreciation for the stated goals of reassigning the case to Area 5 personnel, including that of
avoiding an appearance of impropriety by Area 3 members, with whom the case had remained
open and unworked, for seven years. Lt. Walsh thereby violated:

Page 17 of 20
OIG Case # 11-0255 (Lt. Walsh) December 4, 2015

 Rule 2: Any action or conduct which impedes the Department’s efforts to achieve
its policy and goals or brings discredit upon the Department.

Lt. Walsh continued to involve himself in the Koschman reinvestigation after the case
was reassigned to Area 5. (Chron. ¶¶ 226-29.) More specifically, on January 13, 2011, Lt. Walsh
sought updates on the case from Detective Gilger. (Chron. ¶ 228.) On January 17, 2011, Lt.
Walsh sent a blank email with just his contact information to Detective Gilger. (Chron. ¶ 226.)
On February 9, 2011, while the Koschman homicide reinvestigation was still ongoing, Detective
Gilger responded to that email with an update “on the Vanecko case.” (Chron. ¶¶ 226-27.)
Lt. Walsh asserted that he did not recall the emails but knew that he had received updates on the
investigation. (Chron. ¶ 227.) He did not believe he was ever instructed not to speak to Gilger
about the investigation. (Chron. ¶ 227.)

Lt. Walsh also independently engaged in communications with Detective Yawger

without providing that information to Area 5 detectives. Lt. Walsh’s cell phone records show he
called Detective Yawger’s cell number on January 18, 2011, and texted Yawger’s number on
January 26, 2011. (Chron. ¶ 230.) Lt. Walsh believed these calls related to a meeting he had with
Yawger at some point in January 2011 about the Koschman homicide reinvestigation. (Chron.
¶ 231.) Lt. Walsh claimed that he met Yawger at the instruction of one his supervisors who was
present during the January 13, 2011 reassignment meeting. (Chron. ¶ 231.) Lt. Walsh did not
recall the specifics of the conversation but believed that Yawger explained that Vanecko’s
lawyer would not let detectives interview Vanecko. (Chron. ¶ 231.) While Lt. Walsh asserts he
was instructed to contact Yawger about the missing file, Detective Gilger reported never
receiving information from Lt. Walsh about his conversation with Yawger. (Chron. ¶ 231.)

These actions, by which Lt. Walsh remained involved in the Koschman homicide
investigation, contravened Dep. Chief Andrews’s specific instructions to reassign the case to
Area 5 to avoid any appearance of impropriety. (Chron. ¶ 186.) The case had been mishandled
by Area 3 personnel in 2004 and remained open and unworked for seven years before it was
brought to the Department’s attention again. (Chron. ¶¶ 160-62.) At the reassignment meeting,
Andrews made clear that he was seeking a fresh set of eyes on the case and that the reassignment
was intended to avoid an appearance of impropriety. (Chron. ¶¶ 186, 196.) Yet, Lt. Walsh
continued to actively involve himself in the investigation, directly undermining Andrews’s
efforts to remove the case from Area 3 and avoid an appearance of impropriety. Moreover,
Lt. Walsh’s involvement could have had an improper influence on the manner in which the
reinvestigation was conducted, thereby undermining Andrews’s efforts to have a separate,
independent look into the matter.

V. CONCLUSION

OIG’s investigation established that Lt. Walsh violated multiple CPD Rules, General
Orders, and Detective Division Special Orders in the course of his involvement with the
reinvestigation of the Koschman homicide.

Page 18 of 20
OIG Case # 11-0255 (Lt. Walsh) December 4, 2015

At the time of the January 2011 FOIA request for the Koschman homicide file, the case
had remained open and unworked for seven years at Area 3, Lt. Walsh’s assigned area. Lt. Walsh
was immediately aware that the case was the focus of media attention in 2004 and again in 2011.
Following the reassignment of the case from Area 3 to Area 5, Lt. Walsh was aware of
Departmental concerns about the appearance of impropriety, the increased scrutiny of the case by
senior CPD leadership and the public, and the obvious shortcomings of the 2004 investigation
conducted by Area 3 detectives. Yet, Lt. Walsh displayed a lack of professionalism and disregard
for CPD rules and orders both during and after the 2011 reinvestigation. Lt. Walsh failed to
report or ensure that anyone else reported to IAD or the CPD FOIA office, that the original
Area 3 homicide file was missing. Once he discovered the missing file, Lt. Walsh failed to make
a timely report to IAD. Additionally, when Lt. Walsh finally made the report, he omitted
material facts about his discovery of the missing case file, including the presence of a purported
witness to his discovery, as well as the additional discovery of Detective Yawger’s “working
file.” Moreover, Lt. Walsh failed to cooperate with IAD by omitting material facts when
interviewed by IAD during the official investigation related to the missing and rediscovered case
file.

Lt. Walsh further violated CPD Rules and orders by removing the original Koschman
homicide case file from the CPD Area 3 headquarters and storing the file, by then a closed case,
at his residence. Lt. Walsh further engaged in email communications regarding the Koschman
homicide that bring discredit on the Department, joking with Commander Yamashiroya about
the missing file and Vanecko’s relationship to the Mayor. Finally, Lt. Walsh engaged in actions
that impeded Departmental goals in violation of CPD Rule 2 by remaining involved in the
investigation despite CPD’s efforts and the express directive of a superior, Dep. Chief of
Detectives Andrews, to have the reinvestigation conducted by personnel outside of Area 3.

Most, if not all, of these violations raise fundamental concerns regarding Lt. Walsh’s
judgment, integrity, objectivity, and competence to perform his role as a lieutenant for the City
of Chicago. OIG therefore recommends that CPD discharge Lt. Walsh and refer him for
placement on the ineligible for rehire list maintained by the Department of Human Resources.

VI. CPD RULE VIOLATIONS

Rule 2 Any action or conduct which impedes the Department’s efforts to achieve
its policy and goals or brings discredit upon the Department.

Rule 3 Any failure to promote the Department’s efforts to implement its policy or
accomplish its goals.

Rule 6 Disobedience of an order or directive, whether written or oral.

Rule 11 Incompetency or inefficiency in the performance of duty.

Rule 22 Failure to report to the Department any violation of Rules and Regulations
or any other improper conduct which is contrary to the policy, orders or
directives of the Department.

Page 19 of 20
OIG Case # 11-0255 (Lt. Walsh) December 4, 2015

Rule 41 Disseminating, releasing, altering, defacing or removing any Department

record or information concerning police matters except as provided by
Department orders.

Page 20 of 20