Unit 2

Meaning and definition

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This unit considers the role of definition in the description of meaning, through four main questions:
What units need to receive definition?
What forms should definitions take?
Can definitions be grounded in a set of semantic primitives?
What is the place of definition in semantics generally?
 2.1 Meaning and the dictionary (I)

The concept of a word’s meaning is closely linked to the concept of definition. Definitions have been particularly important for
conceptual theories of meaning, which traditionally assumed a close link between concepts and definitions: knowing the concept
HORSE, for example, would be the ability to use the word horse in a way that fits its definition. E.g.:

A. If X is a horse, X is an animal.
B. If X is a horse, it has a mane.
C. X is a rooster, so X is not a horse.
D. If X is a horse, it is a large four-footed mammal with hooves and a mane.
2.1 Meaning and the dictionary (II)
 2.1 Meaning and the dictionary (III)

When we think of a word’s meaning, we are inclined to think of something like its definition in a dictionary.

It is important to establish the similarities and differences between the definitions that might be proposed in theoretical linguistic
semantics, and the types that can be found in dictionaries.
 2.1.1 Semantics and lexicography

Dictionary-writing, or lexicography, is “a craft, a way of doing something useful. It is not a theoretical exercise to increase the sum
of human knowledge but practical work to put together a book that people can understand.” (Landau 1984: 121).

Linguistic semantics, by contrast, while also interested in the meanings of words, is a theoretical exercise. Nevertheless, the model
of the dictionary or ‘lexicon’ has been decisive in the way that many linguists conceive of the nature of language. [Read quotation
from Saussure, p. 46]
 2.1.1 Mental lexicon (I)

Our brains hold a “store of words in long term memory from which the grammar constructs phrases and sentences” (Jackendoff
2002: 130). This stock of words and associated meanings is the mental lexicon.
The primary task of linguistic semantics is to specify the stored meaning representation (the ‘entry’) associated with each lexeme in
the mental lexicon.

Each person has a lexicon applied when we are asked for the meaning of a determined word. Here we have to take into account the different
levels:
- Message level -> Concepts.
- Functional level -> Meaning.
- Positional level -> Order for syntactic info.
- Phonological encoding level.
- Articulation (BUT THIS IS NOT PART OF THE MENTAL LEXICON).

Mental lexicon is not only orthography.

HOW IS THE MENTAL LEXICON ORGANISED??? IT IS A NETWORK, A WORD IS PART OF A NETWORK.

THE CONCEPT OF SPREADING ACTIVATION IS VERY IMPORTANT NOW!!!

We can compare the process of matching a meaning with a word to that of consulting a dictionary.
In pages 47 and 48 we have the definition of “pour”.

*) SEMASIOLOGICAL APPROACH 
*) ONOMASIOLOGICAL APPROACH 
*) Dictionary -> LIST OF WORDS
*) Thesaurus -> LIST OF CONCEPTS
 How is the mental lexicon organised?

List? Network?

A word is a bundle of features A word is a part of a network.

Spreading Activation
Conceptual level

Lexical-semantic
(Lemma) level

Phonological
(lexeme) level
 2.1.1 Mental lexicon (II)

We can compare the process of matching a meaning with a word to that of consulting a dictionary.

Just as a language-learner discovers the meaning of an unknown word by looking it up in a dictionary, the production and
understanding of ordinary speech is a process of matching between stored word-forms and the stored meaning representations
associated with them in long-term memory.
 2.1.1 Mental lexicon (III)

It has been assumed that the mental lexicon also seeks the most efficient, least redundant listing of lexemes’ meanings, like
dictionaries.

What kind (and amount) of information do entries in the mental dictionary contain?
Much more detailed than ordinary dictionaries Grammatical properties, phonological structure, lexical relations.
 2.1.1 Mental lexicon (IV)

Even the most comprehensive dictionary entry will be lacking important information we speakers seem to know… Cf. The entry
pour in the example on pp. 47-48.
 2.1.1 Word-based and meaning-based
approaches to definitions (I)
The definitions found in dictionaries are the result of a word-based, or semasiological approach to meaning. This sort of approach
starts with a language’s individual lexemes, and tries to specify the meaning of each one (sign concept).
The onomasiological approach has the opposite logic: it starts with a particular meaning and lists the various forms available in the
language for its expression (concept sign).
 2.1.1 Word-based and meaning-based
approaches to definitions (II)
A semasiological analysis would start with a list of verbs, e.g., scare, frighten, terrify, startle, spook, and panic, and specify a
different meaning for each.

An onomasiological analysis would start with a general concept, FRIGHTEN, and list all of these verbs as possible realizations.
The difference between the two approaches corresponds to the difference between a dictionary (= list of words) and a thesaurus (=
list of concepts).

 2.2 The units of meaning

To associate meanings and forms we need to ask what the minimal meaning-bearing units of language are. Individual lexemes like
spider, crazy or elongate are the best examples of units with individually describable meanings. But we need to recognize meanings
both above and below the word level.

Below word level: Morphemes

Above word level: Idioms
 2.2.1 Words and morphemes
How can we determine what counts as a lexeme (word) in a language? What units should we be trying to attribute meanings to?
European languages words are the units surrounded by spaces in standard orthography. But:
Languages which have only recently been written down often have a very fluid practice of word-division. A meaning-bearing
unit considered by one speaker as only part of a word can be written as a separate word by another speaker.
Writing conventions tend to be quite unstable in the history of a
particular language (i.e., Greek or German [see ex. 13, p. 51]).
 2.2.1 Criteria for word identification (I)

How can we identify linguistic units? Which criteria can we use?

Potential pause: words are units before and/or after which pauses can be found in spoken language.
For languages like Chinese, which lacks complex morphology, this criterion may be workable. But for languages which show
even a small degree of morphological complexity, like English, it is clearly unsatisfactory. Dixon and Aikenvald (2002: 11) point
out that one may pause at morpheme boundaries within a single word, for example “It’s very un- (pause) suitable.” Similarly,
expletives in English can be inserted within what we normally consider a single word: abso-bloody-lutely.
2.2.1. Criteria for word identification (II)

Is Bloomfield’s definition of ‘word’ complete?

 A word is “a minimum free form” (1933: 178)
2.2.1 Criteria for word identification (III)

Morphemes: In linguistics, a morpheme is the smallest grammatical unit in language. A morpheme is not identical to a word; the
principal difference between the two is that a morpheme may or may not stand alone, whereas a word, by definition is freestanding.
Every word comprises one or more morphemes. E.g.: Unbreakable (un-: bound morpheme; break-: the root, free morpheme; -able:
bound morpheme).
2.2.1 Criteria for word identification (IV)

Words may be identified on two different levels:

Phonological level phonological words: according to phonological rules and processes (taking into account stress or
other phonological criteria).
Grammatical level grammatical words (according to their cohesiveness, fixed order, and conventionalized coherence
and meaning).
E.g.: cantaba, cantabas, cantábamos (root + inflection: cohesiveness / fixed order)
 2.2.1 Criteria for word identification (V)

Words are the clearest type of meaning-bearing unit in a language, but they are not the only ones
Below the word level, morphemes have meanings. Given the definition of a morpheme as the “minimal meaning-bearing unit” of
language, it is clearly impossible to conceive of a morpheme without a meaning, even if it is often hard to specify exactly what
this meaning is.
2.2.1 Criteria for word identification (VI)
Above the level of the individual word, phrasal verbs and compounds are two clear cases where a single meaning is associated
with a combination of lexemes [See ex. 16 & 17, p. 54]

Idioms also demonstrate the existence of units of meanings associated with several words simultaneously. Although we most often
think of meaning as something belonging to individual words, we must actually recognize that words are only the most obvious of
a number of meaning-bearing units.
 2.2.2 Meanings below the morpheme:
sound symbolism
Phonosemantics or ideophony studies the existence of semi-systematic correspondences between certain sounds and certain
meanings (i.e., words sharing partial form and meaning), usually within the domain of the individual morpheme, such as English
clash, clang, clatter, etc. Such associations may sometimes have a clear imitative basis, as with English click, thwack, meow, etc.

Other labels > “sound symbolism” or “linguistic iconism” to cover any process of word formation based on sound.
2.2.3 Meanings above the word level:
idioms (I)
Idioms are non-compositional phrases—phrases like throw in the towel, whose overall meaning is not the same as the combined
meaning of the individual parts.
Non-compositional vs. Compositional vs. Mixed understandings of multi-word units This may vary from one speaker to
another. [Read p. 56: ex. “to scoop the pool”]
 2.2.4 Contextual modulation of meaning (I)

The meaning of words and other morphemes vary according to their collocation, the immediate linguistic context in which they occur.
In English, the meanings of the verbs seem to vary slightly depending on the noun which they govern.
…cut my foot
…cut the grass
…cut a cake
…cut someone’s hair
….cut the wood
…cut a diamond
...cut a deck of cards
…cut a disc
…cut a notch
 2.2.4 Contextual BLEIBation of meaning (II)

The nature of the event, the means by which it is accomplished, its typical object, and the extent to which it is deliberate
may all vary in these different uses. Despite this variation, we have the strong sense that essentially the ‘same’ meaning of cut is
involved in all those cases. Cruse (1986: 52) refers to this phenomenon as the contextual modulation of meaning.
The degree of semantic ‘distance’ gets even greater if we consider more ‘extended’ meanings, like cut a deal, cut corners, cut a
paragraph, cut prices.
2.2.4 Contextual modulation of meaning (III)

This type of phenomenon poses an interesting descriptive and theoretical problem: do the differences in meaning of the different
collocations arise compositionally or not? Are the meanings of the collocations just the results of the combinations of the meanings
of their parts, or are the whole collocations themselves the meaning-bearing units?
2.2.4 Contextual modulation of meaning (IV)

We have two possibilities:

One which lists the meanings of cut, foot, grass, cake, hair, etc., and sees the specific meanings of the collocations cut one’s
foot, cut the grass, cut a cake, as derived compositionally from the meanings of the parts (compositionality).

One which just lists all the different collocations in which cut appears and specifies a different meaning for the entire
collocation (non-compositionality).
2.2.4.1 Compositionality in meaning
The first possibility is that the meanings of cut one’s foot, cut the grass, cut a cake, etc. result compositionally from the meaning of
the verb cut and the meanings of its noun objects. The meaning of cut the grass is just the meaning of cut combined with the
meaning of grass. Two hypothesis:
The general meaning hypothesis: Cut might have the same vague or general meaning in all its different collocations: it
refers to some act of accomplishing a material breach in a surface, with the particular details of each type of breach being
inferred by the listener, rather than being built into the meaning of the verb itself.
The multiple meaning hypothesis: Cut might have a separate meaning in each collocation: the cut in cut one’s foot has its
own entry in the mental lexicon (‘breach surface of, usually accidentally’), as does the cut of cut the grass (‘sever one part of
surface from another, usually deliberately’).
2.2.4.1 Problems with the general meaning
hypothesis
Describing the common core of general meaning supposedly present in all cases of cut is not necessarily an easy matter: the Concise
Oxford (2004) gives “make an opening, incision, or wound with a sharp tool or object” as its definition, but this is not involved
when someone cuts butter, for example, nor when a whip cuts someone’s flesh: the cutting object in these situations need not be
sharp.
In the same way, the definition does not adequately distinguish cut from chop, slit, stab or unpick: to chop a sausage, slit a letter,
stab someone’s side or unpick a seam. We have failed to distinguish cut from various non- synonymous verbs in the same semantic
field.
 2.2.4.1 Problems with the multiple
meaning hypothesis (I)
The second option is to propose multiple meanings for cut, a separate one for each collocation.
In cut one’s foot, for example, cut could be described as meaning something like ‘partially breach a surface with a sharp
instrument, typically accidentally’.
In cut the grass and cut someone’s hair, on the other hand, the verb conveys the meaning of more than just a partial breach in
the surface of the object: the meaning of these collocations is that one part is completely detached from the rest.
 2.2.4.1 Problems with the multiple
meaning hypothesis (II)
The different meanings will have highly specific collocational restrictions: ‘partially breach a surface with a sharp instrument,
typically accidentally’, for example, will be a very likely sense of cut in collocation with foot, but not with cake, as cutting a cake is
usually an entirely deliberate action.
 2.2.4.1 Problems with the multiple
meaning hypothesis (III)
So, the first problem is the large number of the different senses of cut, although it is the same verb in all collocations. The
attribution of a separate meaning to cut in each collocation may be inefficient, as it would entail a considerable number of separate
verb entries.
 2.2.4.1 Problems with the multiple
meaning hypothesis (IV)
The second problem is that given this variety of different possible meanings of cut, how does the correct specific meaning get
chosen in a given case? E.g., cut a deck of cards (p. 60). The process of word sense disambiguation is highly problematic.
2.2.4.1 Problems with compositionality (I)

To sum up, we have been considering the possibility that the meaning of collocations like cut one’s foot, cut the grass, etc. are
derived compositionally from the meanings of their elements. We have looked at two options for the details of this:
The first is that the meaning of cut is general or vague in each collocation. This creates the problem of properly defining this
general or vague meaning.
The second option is that cut has a separate meaning in each collocation. But if we adopt this solution we find that the number
of definitions of cut grows rapidly. How then do speakers know which meaning to choose in any given case?
2.2.4.1 Problems with compositionality (II)

The compositional solution seems quite problematic. This does not imply that we should reject it, just that it poses complex
questions. Let us now look at the non-compositional solution.
2.2.4.2 Non-compositionality in meaning (I)

A number of the problems of the compositionality solution are avoided if each collocation as a whole is seen as the relevant
definition-bearing unit.
On this approach, the meaning of the collocation is not constructed compositionally; we learn one definition for the unit cut the
grass, another for cut one’s foot, a third for cut a CD. The fact that in cutting the grass, a mower or a scythe is the instrument of the
action, and that in cutting a disc it is a CD-burner, is not part of the meaning of cut itself, but is a property of the collocation as a
whole. This avoids several problems of the compositional solution:
2.2.4.2 Non-compositionality in meaning (II)

We do not have to advance a general definition of cut that will work in every context, as we do in the general-meaning version of
the compositional solution.
We do not have the problem of word-sense disambiguation, since each collocation carries its own definition.
2.2.4.2 Non-compositionality in meaning (III)

Another consideration in favour of non-compositionality is that it is not just cut whose meaning is determined by its collocational
environment: the collocation also determines what reading is operative for cut’s object.
Thus, English speakers know that cutting the grass refers to the grown grass blades, whereas planting the grass refers to grass
seeds, and smoking grass refers to the leaves of a completely different plant.
Because both verb and object have different meanings in different collocations, it seems reasonable to think that the basic meaning-
bearing unit is the collocation as a whole, not the individual words.
2.2.4.2 Problems with non-compositionality

This solution is just as problematic as the compositional one. It seems precisely to ignore our intuition of the compositionality of
the meanings of the collocations: the reason that cut the grass has the interpretation it does has to do with the combination of the
meanings of cut and grass.
If we take the analogy of the ‘mental lexicon’, this option also involves a considerable number of entries. Analysing each
collocation involving cut as having a specific meaning would lead to an enormous amount of repetition and redundancy in the
mental lexicon.

[See figure on p. 61]

 2.2.4.2 Should we choose? (I)

In the absence of a clear understanding of how the brain actually processes and stores language, linguists have assumed that the
description of linguistic competence should reflect the same criteria of economy and non- redundancy that operate in real paper
dictionaries.

Thus, much linguistic research has assumed that the mental lexicon does not contain a huge number of independently listed entries,
but that it extracts the maximun number of generalizations about the meaning of a verb like cut across all its collocational contexts,
in order to present the most economical, least redundant entry COMPOSITIONAL MEANING
 2.2.4.2 Should we choose? (II)

However, this assumption has been challenged in more recent theories of language. Cognitive linguistics, for instance, rejects the
dichotomy and considers that both the separate listing and the compositional approach could be valid.
2.3 Different ways of defining meanings
Real and nominal definition
Definition by ostension
Definition by synonymy
Definition by context or typical exemplar
Definition by genus and differentia
 2.3 Team work
Work in groups of five students
Student A: 2.3.1 Real and nominal definition (pp. 62-65)
Student B: 2.3.2 Definition by ostension (p. 65)
Student C: 2.3.3 Definition by synonymy (p. 66)
Student D: 2.3.4 Definition by context and typical exemplar (pp. 66-67)
Student E: 2.3.5 Definition by genus and differentia (pp. 67-69)
Each student has to read the section assigned, take notes, summarise the information and then explain it to the other people in the
group.
When this is finished, someone from the group will have to present the
main ideas of each definitional technique to the class.
 2.3.1 Real and nominal definition (I)

The concept of definition goes back to Aristotle. In Posterior Analytics, a treatise devoted to the explanation of the structure of
scientific knowledge, he discusses that a definition (horismos) has two different interpretations: “in defining, one exhibits either
what the object is or what its name means”.
A definition can therefore be considered:
A sort of summation of the essence or inherent nature of a thing (real definition; Latin res ‘thing’).
A description of the meaning of the word which denotes this thing
(nominal definition; Latin nomen ‘name, noun’).
 2.3.1 Real and nominal definition (II)

 Aristotle, who is interested in providing a basis for

understanding nature, adopts the first interpretation (i.e.,
real definition).

 Example of real definition:

 Salt is NaCl.
definiendum definiens

 Example of nominal definition:

 Salt is a white, crystal-like compound, sodium
chloride, used for seasoning and preserving food.
2.3.1 Real and nominal definition (III)

Some people have considered that definitions of the underlying nature of objects are the only types of definitions which can be of
interest.
Diderot, for instance, stated that “definitions of words differ in no way from definitions of things” (quoted in Meschonic 1991:
102).
Real definitions will be formulated by scientific disciplines because science is taken to reveal this underlying nature.
[Read quotation p. 63]
2.3.1 Real and nominal definition (IV)

According to Bloomfield, the meaning of a word should be identified with a scientific “definition” of its denotation (Remember
that denotation is the set of all the referents of a word. It is the entire class of objects to which an expression correctly refers).

If there is not a scientifically established definition of a denotation, there is nothing that can be said with any certainty about the
word’s meaning.
For Bloomfield, for instance, there is no precise way of defining words like love and hate.
2.3.1 Real and nominal definition (V)

This view is a serious obstacle to a comprehensive account of meaning. It is not just abstract nouns like love or hate which lack a
scientific definition, but the vast majority of the vocabulary of any natural language:
Words like unicorn or time machine lack any denotation in the real world but nevertheless have a meaning.
Most of the vocabulary of a language consists of words for objects, processes, relations and states which are not “scientific”
(postpone, ready, etc.).
2.3.1 Real and nominal definition (VI)

 Even in the case of terms like salt which can be associated with a scientific definition, the scientific definition (“NaCl”) has
little to do with most speakers’ understanding or use of the word. While this definition might perhaps be satisfactory as a real
definiton of actual salt, it is certainly unsatisfactory as a psychologically realistic one. People use and understand the word salt
even without specialized scientific knowledge. English speakers’ first exposure to this word will come at an age when the
technical scientific knowledge that supposedly defines it is entirely inaccessible.

For these reasons, we will reject Bloomfield’s approach to definition: linguistic semantics aims to define the meaning(s) of a word,
not the underlying essence of the object it refers to. It is thus concerned with nominal, not real definition.
 2.3.1 Nominal definitions (I)

They fulfill two different functions:

Delimiting the meaning of a word so that there can be no ambiguity about its denotation Extensional definition
Provoking an understanding of the meaning of a word in someone who does not already understand it, typically in order to
enable the word to be correctly used Cognitive definition
 2.3.1 Nominal definitions (II)

The definition ‘featherless biped’ is an extensional definition of the noun human, since it identifies all and only the members of the
class of humans. However, it is not necessarily a very good cognitive definition, since human is not typically conceived of in terms
of bipedality or absence of feathers: when we think about the concept HUMAN, we are likely to think of many different
characteristics—a certain physical form and a range of behaviours—before these ones.
 2.3.2 Definition by ostension (I)

The most obvious way to define many words is by ostension, i.e., by pointing out the objects which they denote. In spite of the
apparent obviousness of this method, it has difficulties:
Verbs, adjectives and prepositions are not open to this definitional method: if you point at a black cat running along a wall, you
are pointing at a cat, not at ‘black’, ‘running’ or ‘along’.
Even in the case of objects, ostensive definition is problematic and seems to give rise to too many ambiguities to be viable.
[Read ex. on p. 65]
 2.3.2 Definition by ostension (II)

The only way to overcome the problems of ostensive definition would be to use language itself as the medium in which definitions
can be expressed: this seems to be the only way in which we can get the level of definitional precision we need.
 2.3.3 Definition by synonymy (I)
We can try to define words by providing synonyms, in either the same language as the word being defined or in a different one.

Definiens or ‘defining’ word(s) proposed as the definition.

Definiendum or ‘needing to be defined’ word for which a definition is required.
 2.3.3 Definition by synonymy (II)
E.g.: mad and furious as English definitions of angry. It could be objected that neither mad nor furious is really synonymous with
angry:
mad also means ‘insane’, which angry does not.
furious means something like ‘very angry’.

What types of words are most easily defined through synonymy? For what words is synonymy least satisfactory as a
definitional method?
 2.3.4 Definition by context and typical
exemplar (I)
Another way to define a word is to place it in a system of wider relations through which we can see the specificity of the
definiendum.

This definitional strategy differs from the synonymy strategy in simply showing the position of a definiendum with respect to other
related notions which are not themselves identical to it (synonyms are considered to be identical).
 2.3.4 Definition by context and typical
exemplar (II)
A possible definition of the verb scratch would be ‘the type of thing you do when you are itchy’. This is an example of definition
by context: the definition identifies the event of scratching by placing it in relation to another event, being itchy, whose meaning is
assumed to be already known, and which is taken as a typical context for the definiendum.
This definition only works if the intended meaning is inferred.
 2.3.4 Definition by context and typical
exemplar (III)
Definition by typical exemplar: This definition is a list of typical examples or instances of the definiendum.
If, for the German definiendum Vogel, I supply a list like ‘swans, robins, geese, hens, magpies, etc.’ and add that ‘bats, butterflies
and aeroplanes’ are excluded, it could be correctly concluded that Vogel means ‘bird’.
 2.3.4 Definition by context and typical
exemplar (IV)
Definition by context or by typical exemplar are both subject to similar difficulties. What might these be?
Both are relational, i.e., they define a word’s meaning through its connections with other words. They may often be workable as
cognitive definitional strategies, but are unlikely to be successful as extensional definitions.
Why? Because they leave the essential nature of the definiendum’s meaning to be worked out by the definition’s addressee, and as
a result there is the risk that the wrong meaning may be inferred.
2.3.5 Definition by genus and differentia (I)
The only way to convey the essential nature of the definiendum’s meaning is apparently the strategy of definition by genus and
differentia (GD definition), which was developed by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics.
According to Aristotle, definition involves specifying the broader class to which the definiendum belongs (the definiendum’s
genus), and then showing the distinguishing feature of the definiendum (the differentia) which distinguishes it from the members
of this broader class.
2.3.5 Definition by genus and differentia (II)

A classic example of GD definition is that of man (in the sense of ‘human being’) as ‘rational animal’. This definition names the
broader class of entities to which man belongs—animals—and specifies the distinguishing feature which picks man out from the
members of the class of animals—rationality.
2.3.5 Definition by genus and differentia (III)

For many definienda, GD definition seems to be almost inevitable. Saying what something is seems to equal saying what sort of
thing it is, and what makes it different from other examples of the same sort. Often, GD definition is a useful strategy of cognitive
definition. Many definitions in dictionaries explicitly or implicitly exemplify this strategy.
E.g.: keg ‘small barrel’. This definition shows the larger class to which the definiendum belongs (barrel), and specifies that it is
distinguished from other members of this class by the quality of smallness.
2.3.5 Definition by genus and differentia (IV)

In many cases GD definitions may be either ineffective or impossible, as it presupposes a system of categories or genera according
to which definienda can be classed: defining man as ‘rational animal’ presupposes that the addressee already knows the meaning of
those two terms.
For many words, the relevant genus will not be familiar to the definition’s addressee, and hence a GD definition will not be an
effective strategy for a cognitive definition.
2.3.5 Definition by genus and differentia (V)

These problems are less serious for extensional GD definitions, which are not concerned with ease of understandability.
[Cf. definition of feather on p. 69]
A different kind of problem affects cognitive and extensional GD definitions equally, in those cases where it is not clear that the
definiendum (the object language word for which a definition is required) does belong to any broader class. Self and time are two
possible examples.
2.4 Definition and substitutability (I)
How can the accuracy of a definition be checked? For most semantic theories, a minimum requirement on a term’s definition is:
substitution of the definiens for the definiendum should be truth preserving in all contexts.
2.4 Definition and substitutability (II)

For example, ‘keep in equilibrium’ can be accepted as the definition of balance if it is possible to replace this phrase with balance
in all the contexts in which balance occurs without rendering any of them false.
All the following sentences remain true if ‘keep in equilibrium’ is substituted:
I balanced the plank on my head.
She balanced the ball on the end of the bat.
Now, children, you have to balance the egg on the spoon.
I’ve never managed to balance the demands of work and play.
2.4 Definition and substitutability (III)

Although the register may change, the fact that the sentences remain true is a sign of the adequacy of the definition. The rationale
of this requirement is the principle of identity under substitution articulated by the seventeeth-century German philosopher
Leibniz: “things which can be substituted one for the other with truth intact are the same”.
 2.5 Semantic primitives (I)
The conceptual theory of meaning identifies meanings with concepts. Thus, each lexeme would correspond to an entirely different
concept.
For example, the English lexemes cup and mug would each correspond to the separate concepts CUP and MUG, each of which is
unitary and undecomposable. The two concepts are semantic primitives: they cannot be broken down into anything conceptually
simpler.
 2.5 Semantic primitives (II)

Thus, semantic primitives are hypothesized fundamental units of meaning which cannot be broken down into anything conceptually
simpler.
Proponents of the conceptual theory of meaning believe that most word meanings are not primitive, but are composites of a finite
stock of primitive concepts. These semantic primitives are the basic building blocks of meaning out of which all other meanings
can be constructed.
 2.5 Semantic primitives (III)

Certain theories of semantics, such as the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) theory, try to restrict the language of definitions
to a set of universal or language-specific semantic primitives.
 2.6 Problems with definitions (I)
So far we have been assuming that it is actually possible to formulate successful definitions for words in a significant number of
cases.
One of the most frequent criticisms of definitional theories of semantics is that no satisfying definition of a word has ever actually
been formulated.
The scepticism about the existence of definitions is so widespread that many researchers in disciplines closely related to linguistics,
such as cognitive science and artificial intelligence, have completely abandoned the idea that definitions even exist.
 2.6 Problems with definitions (II)
A classic case of definitional inadequacy is the ‘definition’ of bachelor as ‘unmarried man’, which is the type of definition found in
some dictionaries.
One problem here is that there are many types of unmarried male, such as widowers or the Pope, whom we would not describe as
bachelors. The definition therefore fails.
 2.6 Problems with definitions (III)
A possible response here would be to claim that the inadequacy of the definition of bachelor is only its extreme brevity.
If a definer tries hard enough, satisfactory definitions can be achieved. According to Wierzbicka (1996), the true definitions of most
ordinary words are significantly longer than the brief statements we are used to reading in dictionaries.
2.7 Definition, understanding and use (I)
What is the point of defining meaning?
In some domains of human activities, such as science, technology, law, etc., definitions guarantee the consistency of language.
Terms in these fields require clear definitions which fix their denotation.
Conversations and other examples of language do not normally have the need for explicit definition: this is only required to resolve
confusions.
From this point of view, explicit definition plays a rather insignificant role in language.
2.7 Definition, understanding and use (II)
We may be able to use a word appropriately, without being able to phrase a satisfactory definition of it: the knowledge enabling
correct use of the word is unconscious and does not imply an ability to produce an explicit definition.
But definitions take on a central role in language use if we take concepts to be essentially definitional in nature, and assume that
concepts are the meanings of words.