Examining The Role of Differential Association and Techniques of Neutralization in Explaining Corporate Crime

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Examining the role of differential association and techniques of

neutralization in explaining corporate crime
Article in Deviant Behavior · February 2005

DOI: 10.1080/01639620590881930
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examining the role of differential association

and techniques of neutralization in explaining
corporate crime
Nicole Leeper Piquero , Stephen G. Tibbetts & Michael B. Blankenship
To cite this article: Nicole Leeper Piquero , Stephen G. Tibbetts & Michael B.
Blankenship (2005) examining the role of differential association and techniques of
neutralization in explaining corporate crime, Deviant Behavior, 26:2, 159-188, DOI:
10.1080/01639620590881930
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Deviant Behavior, 26: 159188, 2005
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ISSN: 0163-9625 print/1521-0456 online
DOI: 10.1080/01639620590881930
examining the role of

differential association and
techniques of neutralization in
explaining corporate crime
Downloaded by [CSUSB Pfau Library] at 09:07 20 December 2015
Nicole Leeper Piquero

University of Florida, Gainesville,
Florida, USA
Stephen G. Tibbetts
California State University, San Bernardino,
California, USA
Michael B. Blankenship
Boise State University,
Boise, Daho, USA
A limited number of studies have examined white-
collar offending decision making patterns and
virtually none have focused on testing Differential
Association or Techniques of Neutralization theory
in particular. This study evaluates the offending
decisions of MBA students to commit corporate
offending in the promotion=sales of a hypothetical
pharmaceutical drug. The sample consisted of 133
MBA students enrolled at a university in the United
States. Findings supported predictions that
anticipated agreement of coworkers and the board
of directors would be positively associated with
decisions to further market and produce a
hypothetical drug that was about to be recalled by
Received 26 April 2004; accepted 22 June 2004.

Address correspondence to Nicole Leeper Piquero, University of Florida, Department of
Criminology, Law, and Society, 206 Walker Hall, P.O. Box 115950, Gainesville, FL 32611.
E-mail: npiquero@crim.ufl.edu
159
160 N. L. Piquero et al.
the Food and Drug Administration. However,

results also showed that the decision to commit
corporate crime was inversely related to
perceptions that close friends and business
professors agree with the decision, which went
against predictions based on differential
association theory. Several neutralizing
techniques—especially the beliefs that government
exaggerates dangers to the consumer and profit is
the most important priority—predicted the decision
to further market the drug. Subsequent analyses
showed that older respondents were more likely to
employ techniques of neutralization in decisions to

commit corporate crime, especially techniques
relating to profits. Future research directions are
outlined.
Researchers have applied several theories to account for

white-collar and corporate crime including deterrence=
rational choice (Braithwaite and Makkai 1991; Makkai and
Braithwaite 1994; Paternoster and Simpson 1993, 1996;
Simpson and Koper 1992; Simpson et al. 1998), self-control
(Barlow 1990; Benson and Moore 1992; Geis 2000; Herbert
et al. 1998; Hirschi and Gottfredson 1987, 1989; Reed and
Yeager 1996; Simpson and Piquero 2002; Steffensmeier
1989; Yeager and Reed 1998), and organizational strain (Fin-
ney and Lesieur 1982; Simpson and Koper 1997; Vaughan
1983) theories. In particular, differential association theory
and techniques of neutralization have seldomly been applied
to explain occurrence of white-collar crime (see Benson
1985 and Hollinger 1991).
For the most part, differential association theories tend to
explain white-collar crime as a result of the learned defini-
tions and experiences that occur within the workplace
(Sutherland 1949). As workers learn the drives, motivations,
and rationales to commit white-collar crime, and when the
definitions favorable toward committing white-collar crime
outweigh the definitions against law violations, criminal
behavior is more likely to occur. Several studies have been
applied in this vein, including Cressey’s (1953) application
to embezzlement, Geis’ (1967) study of price-fixing in the
heavy electrical equipment industry, and, most recently,
Explaining Corporate Crime 161
Vaughan’s (1996) incorporation of differential association

theory into a cultural argument underlying the NASA space
shuttle disaster. More recent studies have applied elements
of this theoretical model, with the addition of punishment=
reinforcement components to a variety of crimes across
various age groups (for a review, see Akers 2004).
Although useful, the previous applications of differential
association and techniques of neutralization are limited in
their ability to realize their full explanatory potential for both
white-collar and corporate crimes. Most studies of differen-
tial association and techniques of neutralization are anec-
dotal accounts of criminal events after they have occurred.

In this paper, we move beyond these efforts with an original
data collection designed to assess the role of definitions,
drives, motives, and neutralizations in explaining a particular
type of corporate crime, dangerous pharmaceutical drug
distribution.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
When Sutherland (1940) first introduced the concept of
white-collar crime he was responding to the traditional expla-
nations of crime and criminality that explained criminal
behavior as the result of poverty or social class status. In
addition to sensitizing the field to the concept of white-collar
crime, Sutherland also introduced a new approach to
explaining the general process of all criminality, differential
association theory (Sutherland 1947). He argued that criminal
behavior is learned much like any behavior is learned,
namely through exposure of differential associations,
especially those of primary intimate groups. It is through the
associations with those who approve of illegal behavior and
those who do not that the process of learning occurs. The
actual learning process involves acquiring not only the mech-
anical techniques (i.e., how to break into a car or how to price
fix) of a crime but also the intellectual techniques (e.g.,
motives, drives, rationales) that allow the individual to use
the mechanical behaviors they have learned (Hamlin 1988).
Crime results when the weight of definitions favorable to
law violation exceeds the weight of unfavorable definitions.
Sutherland (1947) highlighted the importance of differen-
tial associations by suggesting that the frequency, duration,
priority, and intensity of associations will vary. In other

words, those associations that ‘‘are exposed first (priority),
more frequently, for a longer time (duration), and with great-
er intensity (importance)’’ will have a greater impact upon
the person (Akers 2000:73). Intimate personal groups, such
as family and friends, are often regarded as the most impor-
tant or influential associations to the individual. However,
corporate crime scholars and organizational theorists have
argued that an equally important group is the one that forms
in the workplace (Jackall 1988; Reed and Yeager 1996;
Vaughan 1996, 1998; Yeager and Reed 1998).
Since individuals can and often do have many differential

associations (or influential groups), a particularly interesting
quagmire that has yet to be reconciled by learning theorists
is what happens when two or more of these groups have con-
flicting views. One approach to solving this dilemma offered
by corporate criminologists is to conceptualize motivation as
a social construction that may vary across different social
contexts (Yeager and Reed 1998). Vaughan (2002), for
example, refers to the situated nature of action by suggesting
that an individual’s action (referring to both the meaning
given to an act as well as the individual’s choice) is situated
within an immediate social setting that is vulnerable to influ-
ences from larger institutional, structural, and cultural
arrangements. Therefore, the influences upon an individual’s
decision-making process can and will vary across different
social settings. In other words, the choice an individual
makes in one setting, such as the decision to violate the
law in the workplace to meet company deadlines, may not
be the same choice that would be made in a different situ-
ation, such as violating traffic laws in order to get their kid
to tennis practice on time.
The influence of the social context or environment is parti-
cularly salient when dealing with decision-making in a cor-
porate or business setting. Although the socialization into the
corporate culture may or may not contradict the rules and
expectations of other realms of life (e.g., family and peers),
it undoubtedly has an important influence on how work-
place decisions are made, particularly when individuals
exhibit strong loyalties to their firms (Reed and Yeager
1996; Yeager and Reed 1998). Therefore, while the influence
of the corporate environment may not be the first association
made, it easily could be regarded as an association that is fre-

quent and of long duration (occurring daily as the individual
goes to work at the same job) as well as important (to con-
tinue to earn an income). Thus, the corporate culture
becomes an important intimate personal group that influ-
ences, in part, an individual’s decision-making process.
Since the publication of Sutherland’s (1947) original state-
ment of differential association, the theory has seen its share
of criticisms (Tittle et al. 1986), extensions into social learn-
ing theory (Akers 1973; Burgess and Akers 1966), and
empirical assessments (Matsueda 1988). Furthermore, Akers
(2004) has extended the theory of differential association to

include concepts of reinforcement, which include whether
an individual will be rewarded or punished by their actions.
Another particular clarification of the theory—techniques of
neutralization—focuses on explaining how the specific
drives and motives associated with the criminal behavior
are developed (Hamlin 1988).
Sykes and Matza (1957) proposed a theory of juvenile
delinquency that contends that individuals are not commit-
ted to criminal values and beliefs but rather adhere mostly
to conventional values, attitudes, and beliefs. Individuals
learn ways to neutralize or justify their criminal actions;
these rationalizations are called techniques of neutralization.
Therefore, individuals become delinquent by learning tech-
niques of neutralization rather than learning criminal defini-
tions. These learned techniques allow the individual to
justify or neutralize their behavior, thereby allowing him or
her to keep a non-criminal image and the ability to drift back
and forth between law-abiding and law-breaking behavior
(Matza 1964). Sykes and Matza (1957) identified five major
types of techniques of neutralization: denial of responsibility,
denial of injury, denial of the victim, condemnation of the
condemners, and appeal to higher loyalties. Other research-
ers proposed two additional techniques, defense of necessity
(Minor 1981) and metaphor of ledger (Klockars 1974). Next,
we briefly review these techniques.
Denial of responsibility refers to the notion that the crime
committed is not the fault of the individual; instead, it is
assumed that the deviant act was an accident and that the indi-
vidual is not accountable for the consequences of the action
because it was due to forces beyond their control. Denial of
injury refers to the negation of the behavior because there is

no harm caused nor inflicted because of the behavior. Excuses
such as ‘‘no one got hurt’’ are often utilized. Denial of the vic-
tim assumes that the victim deserved the consequences of the
action. Thus, the victim becomes juxtaposed as the wrong-
doer. Therefore, rather than viewing the harm as an injury, it
becomes viewed as a rightful retaliation or deserved punish-
ment. Condemnation of the condemners ‘‘shifts attention from
the deviant’s transgressions to the hypocrisy and moral failings
of those who disapprove of the violations’’ (Hollinger
1991:173). The offender justifies his or her behavior by draw-
ing attention to the wrongdoing of others. Appeal to higher

loyalties applies when the individual conducts his or her
behavior along the loyalties of a specific group rather than
to the norms of society in general. Thus, the norms and values
of some specific subgroup (e.g., family, gang, company)
supercede the norms and values of the collective whole. Jus-
tification occurs because in the eyes of the violator, the norms
of the subgroup are more important than those of the larger
society. Defense of necessity implies that ‘‘if an act is per-
ceived as necessary, then one need not feel guilty about its
commission, even if its considered morally wrong in the
abstract’’ (Minor 1981:298). A violator, therefore, can lessen
the amount of guilt by focusing on the fact that the act was
necessary and the isolates had no choice in the matter. Meta-
phor of the ledger works the notion of balancing good and bad
acts. When it is believed that an individual has accumulated a
surplus of ‘‘good’’ acts, then a ‘‘bad’’ act can be mitigated
because of the surplus of good that has accumulated (Klockars
1974). In this case, the individual does not focus on a
deviant=criminal personality but rather focuses on the deviant
act, in light of the good they have done.
While Sykes and Matza (1957) specifically focused on
explaining juvenile delinquency (see also Agnew 1994)
scholars have not been precluded from applying the theory
to other realms of offending (Cromwell and Thurman
2003). White-collar criminals, like most individuals, are
believed to have not committed themselves to a criminal
way of life. Instead, they maintain a crime-free self-image
(Benson 1985). Thus, techniques of neutralization theory
may be a unique and important theoretical lens within which
to view white-collar offending (Green 1997).
While not directly testing techniques of neutralization,

Benson (1985) interviewed a sample of convicted white-
collar offenders in order to determine how each accounted
for their adjudication as a criminal. An almost unanimous
account was the denial of basic criminality. In other words,
most offenders denied having a criminal intent rather than
denying that any criminal event had occurred (Benson
1985). However, Benson found that the specific type of justi-
fication(s) employed depended upon the crime type. For
example, those convicted of fraud would use a scapegoat
strategy by claiming that they were either set up by associates
or wrongfully convicted. Tax violators excused their behavior

by arguing that the act occurred because of a mistake or as a
product of special circumstances (in this case the complexity
of tax laws) and that although everyone does it, they just hap-
pened to be the unlucky few who got caught. Embezzlers
were unusual in that they actually admitted responsibility for
the act, though they were still able to mitigate their behavior
by arguing that they were under extraordinary circumstances
that explain their uncharacteristic behavior. Finally, antitrust
violators were most likely to argue the everyday character
and historical continuity of the offense. Their act was seen
as part of everyday business. In addition, some antitrust viola-
tors also argued that they were selectively prosecuted for
personal gain on the part of the local prosecutor.
Hollinger (1991) specifically examined the relationship
between four techniques of neutralization (denial of victim,
denial of injury, condemnation of the condemners, and
metaphor of the ledger) to self-reported workplace (property)
theft and production deviance. Utilizing a sample comprised
of retail, hospital, and manufacturing industry employees, he
found that the techniques employed varied by the type of
deviance. Denial of injury and denial of victim were signifi-
cant predictors in reporting both property theft and pro-
duction deviance while condemnation of the condemners
and metaphor of the ledgers predicted only production
deviance. Perhaps most importantly, Hollinger (1991) found
a significant interaction between age and two techniques of
neutralization (denial of victim and denial of injury). This
finding suggests that older employees tend to rely more heav-
ily on techniques of neutralization than do their younger
counterparts.
CURRENT RESEARCH
The current research builds upon previous work on learning
theories and white-collar crime in three ways. First, by utiliz-
ing a vignette research design, we are able to circumvent
some of the issues raised by temporal ordering concerns.
Temporal ordering is important when studying techniques
of neutralization in order to differentiate between neutraliz-
ing an act and rationalizing an act. Neutralization occurs
prior to the act whereas rationalizations occur after the act
(Green 1997). Studies utilizing cross-sectional data in order
to test the assumptions of neutralization theory have come

under attack for not appropriately differentiating the causal
mechanism inherent in the theory (Hollinger 1991). Two
plausible research methodologies can be utilized to over-
come this criticism. First, longitudinal data collected from
a minimum of two points in time could help to clearly estab-
lish the temporal ordering of events. However, because of
the dynamic nature of the neutralization process, the time
lag between Time 1 and Time 2 events may have changed.
Thus, a second approach utilizing vignette designs, such as
used in the current study, may be a promising approach,
since they allow for the instantaneous manipulation of both
conditions and variables.
Second, we investigate techniques of neutralization used
by white-collar criminals for a particular type of corporate
crime, which has not been explored in extant research.
Finally, we present an empirical assessment of differential
association and techniques of neutralization to account for
a type of corporate crime at the individual level. This is
important as most of this line of research has employed the
rational choice framework (Paternoster and Simpson 1993,
1996; Simpson et al. 1998). We believe that insights from
both a differential association and techniques of neutraliza-
tion approach may serve as a helpful compliment to the exist-
ing studies of corporate crime decision-making (Akers 1990).
The purpose of this paper is to explore how differential
associations and techniques of neutralization relate to inten-
tions to engage in a type of corporate crime, the distribution
(or recall) of a pharmaceutical drug known to be harmful to
consumers. Specifically, we test four hypotheses. First, we
assess how respondent’s associations with others (coworkers,
friends, business professors, and board of directors) related to

their own decision-making process. Second, we assess how
respondents employ a variety of techniques of neutralization
in their decision-making process. Third, we examine
whether these effects hold after controlling for several other
variables, including deterrence considerations. Finally, we
examine whether age moderates how techniques of neutrali-
zation related to offending decisions.
Method
Data were collected from 133 students enrolled in an MBA

program at one university. Respondents were enrolled in
either the traditional MBA program or the executive MBA
program that is specifically designed for those who have con-
siderable business experience or are working full-time. All
students were informed prior to the distribution of the survey
that they were part of a study, and all participants gave vol-
untary consent. These students were asked to complete a
questionnaire during class that presented a scenario regard-
ing the promotion and sales of a hypothetical drug—
‘‘Panalba’’—that was banned by the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA). This scenario was based on prior work by
Armstrong (1977), and respondents were asked to report
their decision on the avenue that should be taken, as well
as to estimate their perceptions of others regarding their
decision. Students also were asked to respond to a variety
of questions that dealt with their attitudes toward various
aspects (e.g., employing organization’s attitude) of such a
situation. Finally, participants were asked to provide demo-
graphic=characteristic information about themselves.1
Dependent Variable
Solution=Intentions to Commit Corporate Crime
The dependent measure is respondents’ self-reported
level of the extent to which they would further or inhibit
1
We recognize and appreciate the concerns associated with student samples. However,
two aspects of this type of sample are appealing. First, corporate crime decision-making
data do not exist in the community nor at the national level. Second this sample is com-
prised of what will be the future leaders of business and therefore are in a unique position
to provide valuable information. The average age of the sample is 30 and many respondents
have professional business experience.
the distribution of ‘‘Panalba,’’ which (given the scenario) is

known to harm persons (see Appendix).2 This measure was
coded on a scale ranging from 1 (recall ‘‘Panalba’’ immedi-
ately and destroy all existing inventories), 2 (stop production
of ‘‘Panalba’’ immediately but allow existing inventories to
be sold), 3 (stop all advertising and promotion of ‘‘Panalba’’
but continue distribution to those physicians who request it),
4 (continue efforts to effectively market ‘‘Panalba’’ until its
sale is actually banned), 5 (continue efforts to effectively
market ‘‘Panalba’’ while taking legal, political, and other
actions to prevent its banning), or 6 (continue efforts to mar-
ket ‘‘Panalba’’ in other countries after the FDA bans the drug
in the U.S.). The mean score on this item was 2.57, which
can be interpreted as the average respondent chose to either
stop production but allow existing inventories to be sold or to
stop all advertising and promotion but continue distribution
to physicians who request it. Descriptive information for all
variables is provided in Table 1.
Independent Variables
Favorable Definitions
Differential association=reinforcement theory suggests that
criminal behavior results when there is an excess of defini-
tions favorable to the violation of law. A major criticism of
differential association is that measuring the presence of
favorable definitions is very difficult to accomplish (Tittle
et al. 1986). In order to gain an understanding of the respon-
dents’ perceptions of favorable or supportive definitions, we
asked them a series of questions regarding the extent to which
some of those closest (coworkers, friends, business profes-
sors, board of directors) to them would support the decision
they made. Responses ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6
(strongly agree). Given established theoretical frameworks
(Akers 1973; Sutherland 1947, 1949) and previous studies
(for a review, see Akers 2004), all of the four differential asso-
ciation=reinforcement measures were predicted to be posi-
tively correlated with intentions to commit corporate crime.
2
Much of the decision-making research uses hypothetical scenarios to solicit offending
intentions. Extant research shows a strong correlation between projected and actual beha-
vior (Green 1989; Kim and Hunter 1993), and Pogarsky’s (2004) recent research details this
relationship.
TABLE 1 Descriptive Statistics for All Variables (N ¼ 133)
Variable Minimum Maximum M SD
Intentions 1.00 6.00 2.57 1.67

Recall immediately n ¼ 60
Stop production—sell existing inventories n ¼ 28
Stop advertising—distribute on request n ¼ 30
Continue production and market until ban n¼8
Impede the ban while
producing & marketing n ¼ 17
Market outside U.S. even after FDA ban n ¼ 13
Coworkers agree 1.00 6.00 4.58 1.12

Friends agree 2.00 6.00 3.80 1.16
Business professors agree 1.00 6.00 4.40 1.27
Board of directors agree 1.00 6.00 4.07 1.44
Government exaggerates 1.00 5.00 2.82 1.09
Regulations impede 1.00 5.00 2.55 1.01
Profit most important 1.00 5.00 2.90 1.24
Caveat emptor motto 1.00 5.00 2.30 1.07
Anything to make profit 1.00 5.00 2.42 1.11
Age 22.00 55.00 30.43 7.36
Gender 1.00 2.00 1.33 0.47
Race 1.00 2.00 0.76 0.46
Religious 0.00 1.00 0.86 0.35
Protestant 0.00 1.00 0.62 0.49
Political orientation 1.00 5.00 3.28 1.04
Executive MBA 1.00 2.00 1.21 0.41
Employer worried about legal suits 1.00 5.00 3.74 1.14
Techniques of Neutralization
In order to maintain a crime-free self-image, individuals may
employ any number of techniques of neutralization. Due to
the fact that the theory was originally designed to explain
juvenile delinquency, we have operalizationed our techni-
ques of neutralization around the same general concepts
put forth by Sykes and Matza (1957) with modifications
made to apply the concepts into the workplace. All
responses ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree) with 3 being the mid point (neutral or no opinion).
Higher scores on all five items indicated stronger levels of
neutralization, and consistent with theoretical frameworks
(Sutherland 1949) and previous studies (Hollinger 1991)
were predicted to be positively associated with higher levels

of intentions to commit corporate crime. Furthermore, these
dispositions toward more neutralization techniques were
expected to interact with age, such that older respondents
were predicted to use more neutralization in decisions to
commit corporate crime.
Government Exaggerates Dangers to Consumers
Denial of injury was operationalized by asking respon-
dents to give the response that best expressed their belief
for the following statement: ‘‘The government exaggerates
the danger to consumers from most products.’’ This state-

ment allows the individual to deny the injury of the act by
claiming that the government is overly cautious in assessing
the danger to the public. This belief also relates to denial of
responsibility in the sense that it implies that there is minimal
danger in the use of marketed products, so the companies
that produce such items should not be held responsible if
injuries do happen to occur from usage.
Regulations Impede
In order to tap into the condemnation of the condemners
technique, respondents were asked to give the response that
best expressed their belief for the following statement:
‘‘Government regulations impede business.’’ This statement
allows the individual to apply the blame of the act onto
the strict regulations placed on business by government.
Profit Most Important
Respondents were asked to give the response that best
expressed their belief for the following statement: ‘‘Profit is
emphasized above everything else at my place of work’’ in
order to serve as a proxy for the technique of appeal to
higher loyalty. This statement allows the individual to allevi-
ate feelings associated with the act by placing the blame
onto the goals of the organization or company for which
he or she works.
Caveat Emptor Motto
In order to tap into the denial of victim technique, respon-
dents were asked to give the response that best expressed
their belief for the following statement: ‘‘Caveat emptor’
(let the buyer beware) is the motto of my employer.’’ This

statement shifts the blame of the act onto the victim by
allowing the respondent to claim that the victim should have
known better.
Anything to Make a Profit
Denial of responsibility was operationalized by asking
respondents to give the response that best expressed their
belief for the following statement: ‘‘Where I work, it is all
right to do anything to make a profit unless it is against the
law.’’ This statement allows the individual to deny responsi-
bility of the event by placing the responsibility of the act onto

the organization in which he or she is are employed. In other
words, the individual dodges blame by allowing the com-
pany, by means of rules or culture, to be responsible for
the actions taken.
Control Variables
Seven variables were measured to control for respondents’
demographic characteristics. Age of the respondent was
coded as reported and ranged from 2255, with a mean of
30.43. Based on the results of previous studies, age was
expected to be positively related to intentions to commit cor-
porate crime. Gender was coded as 1 (male) or 2 (female),
with 33% of the sample consisting of females. Based on
previous studies, females were expected to be less likely to
commit corporate crime than males. Race was coded as
1 (non-white) or 2 (white), with 24% of the sample being
non-white; due to the lack of studies involving minorities,
no predictions were made regarding the association of this
variable with intentions to commit corporate crime. Execu-
tive MBA program was coded a 1 (regular program) or 2
(executive program), with 21% of the sample attending
the executive program. Based on previous studies, respon-
dents who were enrolled in the Executive MBA program
were predicted to have higher intentions to commit corpor-
ate crime than the respondents in the Regular MBA program.
Religious was coded as 0 (other) or 1 (religious), with 14% of
the sample reporting no religious affiliation; respondents
who reported being religious were predicted to have lower
intentions to commit corporate crime than those who
reported not being religious. Protestant was coded as
0 (non-Protestant) or 1 (Protestant), with 38% of the sample

reporting a non-Protestant affiliation. Based on prior studies,
respondents who reported being Protestant were predicted to
have lower scores on intentions to commit corporate crime
than those who did not report Protestant affiliation. Finally,
political orientation was coded as 1 (very liberal) to 3 (neu-
tral) to 5 (very conservative), with the mean of the sample
reporting themselves as 3.28, or relatively conservative.
Although there has been little empirical research on this
factor in disposing one toward corporate deviance, we pre-
dicted that the respondents who reported being more con-
servative would be more likely to have higher scores on

intentions to commit corporate crime.
Lastly, we included a variable that taps into the theoretical
component of perceptual deterrence. As previously noted,
the majority of studies examining intentions to engage in
white-collar=corporate misconduct are drawn from the
rational choice framework. Thus, we included a variable to
take into account the possibility of a deterrent effect. Respon-
dents were asked to give the response that best expressed
their belief for the following statement: ‘‘My employer wor-
ries about penalties that government regulators might impose
because of violations.’’ Responses ranged from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) with 3 being the midpoint
(neutral or no opinion). Consistent with previous studies in
the area of deterrence and rational choice research, it was
predicted that the respondents who had high levels of wor-
ries regarding penalties that government regulators might
impose due to violations would have lower scores on inten-
tions to commit corporate crime.
Method of Analysis
Our empirical analysis was conducted in three steps. First,
we examine the bivariate correlations to check for multicol-
linearity and to examine the bivariate relationships among
predictors and control variables with intentions to commit
corporate crime. Then, we examine the effects of differential
association=social learning variables on offending intentions
in a multivariate model. Next, we examine the impact of
techniques of neutralization on offending intentions in a
similar multivariate regression model. We then estimate
a full multivariate model including favorable definitions,
techniques of neutralization, and control variables to assess

which predictors relate to corporate offending intentions
in a fully specified model. Finally, we estimated separate
regression equations to test for predicted interactions
between age and techniques of neutralization.
It should be noted that although the dependent variable
was not measured on an interval or ratio scale, which is
generally required for ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
analysis, it does obviously have an ordinal nature of increas-
ing level of criminality. Furthermore, additional regression
models were estimated that utilized a variety of dichoto-
mized dependent variables in which the dependent measure

reported in this study was split at every point in the ordinal
scale (e.g., those reporting 6 were compared to students
reporting 15 on the dependent measures: those reporting
1 were compared to students reporting 26 on the dependent
measure). Additional analyses also were estimated dichoto-
mizing the continuous dependent measure at the mean and
median. For all analyses, the estimated coefficients were
generally consistent with those estimated by the continuous
measure used in the OLS models reported.
RESULTS
Before we examine the multivariate analyses, it is worth-
while to examine the bivariate correlations among all vari-
ables (see Table 2). Specifically, none of the correlations
between the independent variables exceeded .60, so multi-
collinearity did not appear to be a problem in the analysis.
Other indicators of multicollinearity (e.g., VIF scores) also
were examined to check for multicollinearity, but all tests
indicated that there were no such problems. In addition to
checking for multicollinearity, it is interesting to note that
higher scores on the dependent variable were positively
and significantly related with two variables—perceptions
that boards of directors agree and the belief that government
exaggerates dangers to the consumer—both of which were
consistent with predictions. Another significant correlation
that was consistent with expectation was the inverse associ-
ation between intentions and two control variables, namely
females were less likely to further market and produce the
TABLE 2 Bivariate Correlations Between All Variables (N ¼ 133)
174
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Solution 1.00
Coworkers agree .09 1.00
Friends agree .41 .11 1.00
Business .30 .21 .27 1.00
professors agree
Board of directors .22 .39 .07 .01 1.00
agree
Employer worried .18 .04 .10 .05 .10 1.00
suits
Government .28 .04 .17 .16 .00 .07 1.00
exaggerates
Regulations .02 .03 .07 .07 .09 .10 .27 1.00
impede
Profit most .14 .21 .01 .01 .13 .29 .22 .15 1.00
important
Caveat emptor .10 .09 .10 .14 .10 .15 .10 .02 .32 1.00
motto

Anything to .06 .15 .03 .01 .11 .30 .06 .04 .42 .44 1.00
make profit
Gender .26 .04 .27 .16 .02 .00 .30 .33 .00 .00 .13 1.00
Race .00 .02 .14 .16 .04 .07 .13 .24 .00 .21 .18 .16 1.00
Religious .03 .06 .07 .19 .14 .14 .07 .01 .14 .29 .27 .09 .35 1.00
Protestant .04 .02 .04 .14 .01 .10 .01 .01 .10 .23 .23 .03 .30 .49 1.00
Political .05 .08 .01 .08 .11 .03 .19 .38 .01 .12 .07 .23 .30 .33 .22 1.00
orientation

Executive MBA .03 .14 .08 .05 .01 .13 .28 .12 .25 .22 .18 .05 .11 .08 .09 .02 1.00
Age .05 .07 .04 .05 .06 .09 .20 .07 .12 .11 .07 .16 .05 .01 .08 .03 .59 1.00

p < .05, two-tailed; p < .01, two-tailed.
hypothetical drug, as were respondents who perceived their

employers being worried about legal suits.
Although most of the bivariate correlations with offending
intentions were in the predicted direction, two significant
correlations went against differential association expecta-
tions. The differential association measures of closest friends
and business professors agreeing with respondents’ decisions
of whether or not to continue to market and produce the drug
were inversely related with these decisions. Thus, respon-
dents did not seriously take into consideration what their
friends and professors would think about their making such
a decision. After all, the strength and significance of the

observed negative correlations indicate that the participants
often believed that their friends and teachers would strongly
disagree with their decision regarding ‘‘Panalba.’’ It is quite
possible that the corporate climate was so strong that it
negated any effect that the non-corporate associations
(friends and professors) had on respondents’ decision-making
process (e.g., Simpson et al. 1998).
Despite these bivariate associations, it is necessary to
examine the relationships between the predictors and depen-
dent variable while controlling for the influence of other
independent factors. Therefore, we estimated a series of mul-
tivariate equations in which the effects of other variables are
controlled. The first of these models (see Table 3) included
only the four differential association variables in predicting
intentions to commit corporate crime. Consistent with the
bivariate analysis, one differential association variable was,
as predicted, positively associated with intentions to commit
corporate crime: board of directors agree.
Interestingly, the degree to which coworkers agree with
the decision did not have a significant impact on determining
the intentions to offend. It was expected that coworkers
would have perhaps the biggest influence on intentions to
offend, due to their proximity and importance in everyday
operations, and especially the development of mores in the
office environment. Even more interesting is the significant
inverse effect that two differential association variables—
closest friends and business professor agree—have on inten-
tions to commit corporate crime. This finding implies that
employees not only disregard the norms and feelings of those
outside their corporate workplace, but they actually defy
TABLE 3 OLS Regression Coefficients of Differential Association=

Reinforcement Variables Predicting Intentions to Commit
Corporate Offending (N ¼ 133)
Variable b SE B t
Coworkers agree .163 .126 .105 1.296

Friends agree 337 .111 .357 4.785
Business professor agree .337 .102 .252 3.303
Board of directors agree .230 .093 .195 2.466
Constant 1.621 .410 3.957
R2 .269

those beliefs. Overall the model of the differential associ-

ation variables accounted for approximately 27% of the vari-
ation in intentions to commit corporate crime, which is
relatively good considering the model only included four
independent variables.
A second multivariate equation was estimated that included
only the five techniques of neutralization variables in predicting
intentions to commit corporate crime (see Table 4). Two of
the five neutralization measures were found, as predicted, to
have positive effects on intentions to commit corporate crime.
These two variables were the perception that the government
exaggerates dangers to consumers and the belief that profit is
most important. The other three neutralization measures were
TABLE 4 OLS Regression Coefficients of Techniques of Neutralization

Variables Predicting Intentions to Commit Corporate Offending
(N ¼ 133)
Variable b SE B t
Government exaggerates .543 .124 .351 4.387

Regulations impede .211 .133 .126 1.582
Profit most important .256 .119 .189 2.162
Caveat emptor motto .138 .133 .088 1.037
Anything to make profit .003 .135 .002 .021
Constant 6.334 .909 6.967
R2 .143

not significantly related to intentions to commit corporate

crime and, thus, it is not surprising that this model did not
explain much of the variation in intentions to commit corporate
crime, explaining approximately 14% of the variation in such
intentions.
A fully-specified model was estimated (see Table 5), which
included all differential association variables, techniques
of neutralization variables, and all control variables. This
model showed positive effects for closest coworkers agree
and board of directors agree, which were consistent with
predictions that differential association measures would be
positively associated with intentions to commit corporate

crime. Predicted effects also were observed for two techniq-
ues of neutralization measures: government exaggerates
dangers to consumers and profit is most important, which
supported previous analyses. Results of the model that were
TABLE 5 OLS Regression Coefficients of Independent Variables

Predicting Intentions to Commit Corporate Offending (N ¼ 133)
Variable b SE B t
Coworkers agree .399 .136 .243 2.939

Friends agree .540 .113 .359 4.756
Business professors agree .277 .104 .202 2.655
Board of directors agree .202 .095 .169 2.112
Government exaggerates .433 .124 .277 3.501
Regulations impede .244 .140 .144 1.740
Profit most important .384 .114 .278 3.368
Caveat emptor motto .200 .130 .127 1.542
Anything to make profit .104 .131 .067 .795
Gender .517 .292 .144 1.774
Race .302 .324 .074 934
Executive MBA .600 .389 .145 1.542
Religious .308 .448 .060 .687
Protestant .208 .291 .059 .714
Political orientation .071 .137 .042 .518
Age .032 .020 .148 1.673
Employer worried about suits .160 .118 .102 1.356
Constant 6.530 1.284 5.087
R2 .485

counter to expectations were the inverse effects observed for

closest friends agreeing and business professors agreeing with
intentions to commit crime. Interestingly, the fully-specified
model accounted for approximately 48% of the variation in
intentions to commit corporate crime, and the theoretical
model accounted for virtually all of the influence of demo-
graphic variables (e.g., female, white, religious, political
orientation, executive program, and age).
Finally, consideration was given to the possible interaction
between age and techniques of neutralization due to pre-
vious studies of such non-linear relationships (Hollinger
1991). An estimate of the effect of ‘‘age-neutralization’’ inter-

action on intentions to commit corporate crime was esti-
mated and the coefficient was significant (p < .01), so
separate models of techniques of neutralization (with control
variables) were estimated for respondents who were aged
under 35 and for respondents who were 35 or older (see
Table 6). Respondents were split into these groups because
other recent studies examining interaction have separated
cases based on a 75%=25% criteria; furthermore, we per-
formed the analysis with other percentage breakdowns
(50%=50%) and they resulted in substantially similar results.
Additional models also were estimated that incorporated the
differential association variables into these interaction equa-
tions, but the results were substantively similar (i.e., no
changes in direction or significance of the neutralization
effects); thus, only the models with the neutralization
and control variables are included due to the problems of
the limited sample size of the older (over 35 years old) group.
These models showed that respondents aged 35 or older
were significantly more influenced by techniques of neutrali-
zation than were the younger respondents. Specifically, the
younger respondents were significantly influenced by only
one of the neutralization measures—government exaggerates
dangers to consumers—whereas the older respondents were
significantly influenced by this neutralization, as well as two
additional forms of neutralization: profit most important and
the belief that anything is justified to make a profit.3
3
A coefficient comparison test (Paternoster et al. 1998) indicated that the effects for
profit most important (Z ¼ 3:10) and anything to make a profit (Z ¼ 1:85) were significantly
different across older and younger respondents.
TABLE 6 Differential Effects Across Age—Influence of Techniques of Neutralization on Intentions to Commit

Corporate Offending
Age 35 or older (n ¼ 36) Age under 35 (n ¼ 97)
Variable b SE B t b SE B t
Government exaggerates .789 .266 .530 2.965 .548 .169 .351 3.237
Regulations impede .299 .310 .161 .965 .260 .205 .160 1.269
Profit most important 1.042 .286 .745 3.642 .039 .150 .029 .258
Caveat emptor motto .290 .248 .180 1.166 .007 .186 .004 .036
Anything to make profit .737 .353 .426 2.090 .008 .172 .006 .046
Gender 1.312 .734 .304 1.788 .628 .389 .189 .1.64
Race .130 .668 .027 .194 .250 .472 .065 .529
Executive MBA 1.152 .584 .306 1.973 .063 .706 .011 .090
Religious .418 .886 .077 .471 .244 .620 .051 .394
Protestant .299 .544 .080 .549 .366 .416 .110 .880
Political orientation .124 .289 .069 .429 .036 .190 .022 .188
Age .053 .063 .122 .831 .014 .057 .030 .247
Constant 9.321 3.907 2.386 6.466 1.980 3.265
R2 .648 Adjusted R2 .464 R2 .164 Adjusted R2 .046

179
Ultimately, the amount of variation explained in these two

models was drastically different. The model for respondents
under the age of 35 only explained approximately 16% of vari-
ation in offending intentions, whereas the model for respon-
dents 35 and older accounted for 65% of variation in
intentions to commit corporate crime. Thus, the results strongly
support the findings of previous studies (Hollinger 1991) that
found techniques of neutralization were employed more by
older respondents in their decision to commit corporate crime
as compared to their younger counterparts.
CONCLUSIONS
Recognizing that few theoretical models have been applied
to understanding unethical corporate decision-making, we
obtained data from 133 MBA students and executives in
training in an effort to understand how differential associ-
ation and techniques of neutralization theories accounted
for decisions to market and produce an illegal drug. The find-
ings of this study support the application of differential
association and techniques of neutralization theoretical fra-
meworks in understanding decisions to commit corporate
crime. Furthermore, subsequent analyses supported the pre-
dicted and observed interaction between age and neutraliza-
tion techniques in such decisions regarding corporate crime.
Specifically, older respondents compared to their younger
counterparts were more likely to employ techniques of neu-
tralization in decisions to violate obvious violations regard-
ing corporate activities.
The results of this study suggest that an employee’s corpor-
ate climate, namely attitudes of their closest coworkers and
the perceived attitudes of the board of directors had a posi-
tive and significant influence on what they would do when
they had to decide whether to engage in acts that were
unethical. On the other hand, the perceived attitudes or reac-
tions of those outside of this corporate workplace—their
closest friends and business professors—did not have much
influence at all on what they would decide; in fact, the
estimates indicate that respondents were actually inclined
to go against what they believed their friends and business
teachers felt was the right decision. These results suggest
the powerful effects of the corporate climate and the relative
insignificance of influences external to the workplace

environment (see Vaughan 1996). It is disappointing and
somewhat disturbing to acknowledge the implications of
our findings. After all, many of the respondents, particularly
the older and more experienced participants, essentially
reported that they would take actions that would lead to
injuring or killing innocent people, while knowingly disre-
garding the ethical responsibilities they learned from their
professors and defying moral values of their closest friends.
Thus, this may represent a specific form of differential associ-
ation theory to be applied to corporate crime, whereby an
individual’s corporate environment can subvert the other

associations and normative values that the individual has
learned. Perhaps this is due to the extensive amounts of
hours spent at work and immersed in the corporate climate,
as well as the fact that survival instincts are likely to kick in
when the actions they take at work decides what type of life
they will be providing for themselves and their families.
Regardless of the reasons, it is clear that business employees
such as those in our sample are far more likely to be affected
by their corporate environments in their corporate decisions
than by ethical standards they have learned outside of the
workplace.
Findings from this study also support the use of techniques
of neutralization in that several of the neutralization mea-
sures that were included had a significant effect on decisions
to commit corporate crime. Specifically, the idea that the
government exaggerates dangers to the consumer reeks of
the traditional ‘‘denial of injury’’ as identified by Sykes and
Matza (1957), in the sense that it says that no real harm is
actually caused or inflicted by corporate misbehavior. It also
points to the idea of ‘‘denial of responsibility’’ that suggests
products on the market are generally safe so the corporate
producers should not take blame for the few injuries that
occur. Obviously, neither of these beliefs are true, especially
regarding the further marketing and production of a danger-
ous drug (such as ‘‘Panalba’’ ). Apparently however, this
does not appear to stop individuals, particularly older
and more experienced professionals, from adopting such
attitudes. Perhaps more disconcerting is the attitude of
profit being most important, which was observed for the
older respondents. For many experienced individuals, the
bottom-line is all that matters, regardless of any other con-

cerns. This reflects Sykes and Matza’s (1957) principle of
‘‘appeal to higher loyalty,’’ and the company’s profit is their
primary (if not only) loyalty. This is precisely the attitude that
should be targeted for altering by business (and other) profes-
sors in college courses. If nothing else, we believe this study
shows that Sykes and Matza’s original framework for techni-
ques of neutralization, while specifically designed to explain
delinquent behavior, can be applied to other forms of crimi-
nality such as corporate criminality.
Finally, the findings of this study support those of other
empirical researchers, namely Hollinger (1991) who found

that older individuals are more likely to employ neutrali-
zation techniques in corporate environments than their
younger counterparts. This result is somewhat surprising
given that techniques of neutralization were originally
designed by Sykes and Matza (1957) to explain juvenile
delinquency. However, Sykes and Matza never claimed that
such a model would not apply to other forms of offending,
and furthermore they likely did not anticipate the extent to
which corporate crime, and other modern forms of crime,
would evolve that appear to fit their model so well. We
believe that not only is the Sykes and Matza model salient
for decisions to commit corporate crime, as our findings
suggest, but that it is even more applicable for such crimes
and for older persons than it is for delinquency.
Another notable finding of this study is that individuals did
not appear to be deterred by legal sanctions. The measure of
respondents’ perceptions of their employer being concerned
about legal suits did not have a significant effect when other
factors were accounted for. This does not support deterrence
models of compliance and reiterates the need for more infor-
mal measures, such as education, in curbing corporate crime
as well as other forms of criminal activity. After all, formal
deterrence is not likely to work in environments where the
social climate is so strong as to suggest that it (crime) is part
of the everyday functioning of the company=agency. As
Benson (1985) noted, antitrust violators were most likely to
argue the everyday character and historical continuity of
the offense. Their criminal activity was seen as part of every-
day business. Consistent with our findings, such attitudes
almost always come from the top (e.g., board of directors)
and are typically endemic throughout the company (e.g.,

coworkers=peers) (Reed and Yeager 1996). It is obvious that
different measures must be explored for curbing such prac-
tices, and this implicates education and socialization prior
to employment, as well as after. Consistent with this idea is
recent empirical research that has shown a relationship
between academic cheating in college and participation in
unethical business practices (Sims, 1993). Individuals are
likely to learn cheating practices quite early on and carry
them when they move on to the corporate world. Despite
our null findings regarding the influence of professors, much
more must be done in this area to develop more effective

means for instilling and maintaining ethical values and
responsibility.
There are several limitations that should be acknowl-
edged. First, our data come from a single site, and only con-
tain 133 individuals. Though our use of such a sample is in
line with extant research on understanding corporate
decision-making (Simpson 2002), future research should
attempt a broader sample, as well as one dealing with cor-
porate executives. Second, we only examined one type of
corporate illegality, marketing and producing a drug recalled
by the FDA. Future work should attempt to collect infor-
mation on a wider range of corporate illegalities (e.g.,
price-fixing, toxic dumping, etc.). It may be possible that
key independent variables relate in different ways to different
outcomes. Third, though not a central focus of our effort, it
would be important to understand where favorable defini-
tions and techniques of neutralization are formed with regard
to business crime. Are such views imported into the work-
place, or are such views cultivated there? Finally, although
our study did provide some important evidence regarding
corporate culture and how it influences decision-making,
much more organizational-level information is needed in
order to provide a more complete account of corporate
decision-making. Studies should think critically about the
vast array of cultural components in corporate illegalities,
and attempt to collect the requisite data.
In the end, our modest effort has shown that differential
associations and techniques of neutralization are related
to corporate illegalities, even in the face of strong deterrent
messages. Moreover, our research also points to important
age-moderating effects that indicate older individuals are

more responsive to some techniques of neutralization than
are younger individuals. Delineating the reasons for this
(and related) findings is an important task for future
research.
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APPENDIX
Vignette
As chief executive officer of a Fortune 500 pharmaceutical

company, you have just received information about a pro-
duct known as ‘‘Panalba.’’
Panalba, a ‘‘fixed-ratio’’ prescription antibiotic containing
a combination of drugs, has been on the market for over 13
years and now accounts for 50 million dollars in yearly sales,
which is 15% of the corporation’s gross income in the U.S.
Panalba is marketed under a different name in foreign mar-
kets, and profits are roughly comparable to those in the U.S.
Over the past 20 years, numerous medical scientists have
objected to the sale of most fixed-ratio drugs, arguing that:
(1) no evidence proves these fixed-ratio drugs are superior
to single drugs; and (2) detrimental side effects, including
death, are at least doubled for fixed-ratio drugs. For example,
estimates indicate that Panalba causes 14 to 22 deaths per
year that could be prevented by using a single drug manufac-
tured by a competitor. Despite these recommendations to
remove fixed-ratio drugs from the market, physicians have
continued to prescribe them because they offer a ‘‘shotgun’’
approach to treatment for the physician who is unsure of his
or her diagnosis.
Recently a National Academy of Science—National
Research Council panel conducted extensive research on
fixed-ratio drugs and recommended that the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) ban the sale of Panalba. One of the
panel members stated to the press that, ‘‘There are few
instances in medicine when so many experts have agreed
unanimously and without reservation’’ about banning the
sale of Panalba. This view was typical of comments made
by other members of the panel and of comments made about
fixed-ratio drugs over the past 20 years. The panel concluded
that while all drugs have potential negative side effects, those
associated with Panalba far exceeded the benefits derived
from the drug.
The corporation just received FDA notification of its inten-
tion to ban the distribution of Panalba in the U.S. Should the
ban become effective, the corporation will have to stop dis-
tribution of the drug in the U.S. and remove existing inven-
tories from the market. Such action could also threaten the
overseas market for Panalba. The corporation has no substi-
tute for Panalba, so consumers will have to switch to a com-
petitor’s product. Some substitutes offer benefits equivalent
to those of Panalba, but without known serious side effects.

The retail price of the substitutes is approximately the same
as for Panalba. The repercussions from the loss of Panalba
will reduce shareholders’ profits, jeopardize employment,
and threaten the future viability of the corporation.
On the other hand, research suggests that it is extremely
unlikely that bad publicity from this case would have any
significant effect on the long-term profits of the corporation.
Therefore, there are several alternatives to the FDA’s pro-
posed action.
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Examining the role of differential association and techniques of

Article in Deviant Behavior · February 2005

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ISSN: 0163-9625 (Print) 1521-0456 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/udbh20

examining the role of differential association

Nicole Leeper Piquero , Stephen G. Tibbetts & Michael B. Blankenship

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01639620590881930

Published online: 21 Aug 2006.

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examining the role of

Nicole Leeper Piquero

Received 26 April 2004; accepted 22 June 2004.

the Food and Drug Administration. However,

employ techniques of neutralization in decisions to

Researchers have applied several theories to account for

Vaughan’s (1996) incorporation of differential association

dotal accounts of criminal events after they have occurred.

priority, and intensity of associations will vary. In other

Since individuals can and often do have many differential

made, it easily could be regarded as an association that is fre-

(2004) has extended the theory of differential association to

injury refers to the negation of the behavior because there is

ing attention to the wrongdoing of others. Appeal to higher

While not directly testing techniques of neutralization,

or wrongfully convicted. Tax violators excused their behavior

to test the assumptions of neutralization theory have come

friends, business professors, and board of directors) related to

Data were collected from 133 students enrolled in an MBA

the distribution of ‘‘Panalba,’’ which (given the scenario) is

TABLE 1 Descriptive Statistics for All Variables (N ¼ 133)

Variable Minimum Maximum M SD

Intentions 1.00 6.00 2.57 1.67

Coworkers agree 1.00 6.00 4.58 1.12

were predicted to be positively associated with higher levels

the danger to consumers from most products.’’ This state-

(let the buyer beware) is the motto of my employer.’’ This

bility of the event by placing the responsibility of the act onto

0 (non-Protestant) or 1 (Protestant), with 38% of the sample

servative would be more likely to have higher scores on

techniques of neutralization, and control variables to assess

mized dependent variables in which the dependent measure

TABLE 2 Bivariate Correlations Between All Variables (N ¼ 133)

hypothetical drug, as were respondents who perceived their

a decision. After all, the strength and significance of the

TABLE 3 OLS Regression Coefficients of Differential Association=

Coworkers agree .163 .126 .105 1.296

those beliefs. Overall the model of the differential associ-

TABLE 4 OLS Regression Coefficients of Techniques of Neutralization

Government exaggerates .543 .124 .351 4.387

not significantly related to intentions to commit corporate

positively associated with intentions to commit corporate

TABLE 5 OLS Regression Coefficients of Independent Variables

Coworkers agree .399 .136 .243 2.939

counter to expectations were the inverse effects observed for

1991). An estimate of the effect of ‘‘age-neutralization’’ inter-

TABLE 6 Differential Effects Across Age—Influence of Techniques of Neutralization on Intentions to Commit

Age 35 or older (n ¼ 36) Age under 35 (n ¼ 97)

Ultimately, the amount of variation explained in these two