[G.R. No. 14639. March 25, 1919.

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO ET AL., petitioners, vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.

Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.

City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT OF DOMICILE; LIBERTY; HABEAS CORPUS; CONTEMPT. — One hundred and seventy
women, who had lived in the segregated district for women of ill repute in the city of Manila, were by orders of the Mayor of the city
of Manila and the chief of police of that city isolated from society and then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity
to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. No
law, order, or regulation authorized the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of the police of that city to force citizens of the
Philippine Islands to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. Held: That the writ of habeas corpus was properly granted,
and that the Mayor of the city of Manila who was primarily responsible for the deportation, is in contempt of court for his failure to
comply with the order of the court.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action,
and (3) habeas corpus. A civil action was never intended effectively and promptly to meet a situation in which there is restraint of
liberty. That the act may be a crime and that the person may be proceeded against is also no bar to the institution of habeas corpus
proceedings. Habeas corpus is the proper remedy.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — These women, despite their being in a sense lepers of society, are nevertheless not chattles, but Philippine
citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens.
4. ID.; ID. — The privilege of domicile is a principle often protected by constitutions and deeply imbedded in American
jurisprudence.
5. HABEAS CORPUS; NATURE. — The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
6. ID.; PARTIES. — Where it is impossible for a party to sign an application for the writ of habeas corpus, it is proper for the writ
to be submitted by some person in his behalf.
 7. ID.; JURISDICTION. — It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions
for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the Court of First Instance.
8. ID.; ID. — The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the
Philippine Islands.
9. ID.; ID. — Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the
discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances.
10. ID.; RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY. — A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty.
The essential objects and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished
from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient.
11. ID.; ID. — The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties,
who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been
imprisoned. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released
or until they freely and truly waived this right.
12. ID.; ID. — The true principle should be that if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to
obey the order of the court, and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so.
13. ID.; ID. — Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the
application for the writ, is no reason why the writ should not issue.
14. ID.; ID. — The place of confinement is not important to the relief if the guilty party is within the reach of process so that by
the power of the court he can be compelled to release his grasp.
15. ID.; COMPLIANCE WITH WRIT. — For respondents to fulfill the order of the court granting the writ of habeas corpus, three
courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; (2) they could
have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity these persons could not safely be brought before the Court; or (3)
they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of
Criminal Procedure, Sec. 87.)
16. CONTEMPT OF COURT. — The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on
the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the
administration of justice must falter or fail.
17. ID. — When one is commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court
must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or fined.
 18. ID. — An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus, when he has power to do
so, is contempt committed in the face of the court.
19. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; A GOVERNMENT OF LAWS. — The Government of the Philippine Islands
is a government of laws. The court will assist in retaining it as a government of laws and not of men.
20. ID.; ID. — No official, however high, is above the law.
21. ID.; ID. — The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors.

DECISION

MALCOLM, J : p

The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which this application for habeas corpus
submits for decision. While hardly to be expected to be met with in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet, after all, the
cause presents no great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the basic principles of popular government, and if we
give expression to the paramount purpose for which the courts, as an independent power of such a government, were constituted.
The primary question is — Shall the judiciary permit a government of men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the
Philippine Islands?
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which might prove profitable reading for other
departments of the government, the facts are these: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to
exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the
city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by
the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending
the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard
cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers, At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the
police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban,
descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited
their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they
were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao.
They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the
deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a
detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of
October 25.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by
Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yñigo,
who appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the
city of Manila. The further happenings to these women and the serious charges growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public
interest, but are not essential to the disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women married, others
assumed more or less clandestine relations with men, others went to work in different capacities, others assumed a life unknown
and disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to return to Manila.
To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao, the attorney for the
relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the
Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the women who were
sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the application will be considered as including
them. The application set forth the salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally re- strained
of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by certain
unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before the full court. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and
Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted because
the petitioners were not proper parties, because the action should have been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao,
Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or control, and
because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. According to an exhibit attached to the
answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on the hacienda of Yñigo and Governor Sales. In
open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to a question of a member of the court, that these women had been sent out of Manila
without their consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of
Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano
Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on
December 2, 1918.
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense. On motion of counsel for
petitioners, their testimony was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner. On the day named in the
order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the respondents. It
has since been shown that three of those who had been able to come back to Manila through their own efforts, were notified by the
police and the secret service to appear before the court. The fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more comprehensively, reiterated
the stand taken by him when pleading to the original petition copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the
provincial governor of Davao and the answer thereto, and telegrams that had passed between the Director of Labor and the
attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and offered certain affidavits showing that the women were contented with their life in
Mindanao and did not wish to return to Manila. Respondent Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the order of
the Supreme Court because the women had never been under his control, because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao,
and because they had married or signed contracts as laborers. Respondent Yñigo answered alleging that he did not have any of the
women under his control and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the mandate. The court, after due deliberation, on
December 10, 1918, promulgated a second order, which related that the respondents had not complied with the original order to
the satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be
brought before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yñigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in
written statements voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or
unless the respondents should demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was further stated that
the question of whether the respondents were in con- tempt of court would later be decided and the reasons for the order
announced in the final decision.
Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women, of certain detectives and policemen,
and of the provincial governor of Davao, was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the clerk of
the Court of First Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity. On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically presented before
the Court the women who had returned to the city through their own efforts and eight others who had been brought to Manila by
the respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns, once again recounted the facts and further endeavored to
account for all of the persons involved in the habeas corpus. In sub- stance, it was stated that the respondents, through their
representatives and agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao with their consent eight women; that eighty-one women were
found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they could return to Manila, transportation free, renounced the right through
sworn statements; that fifty- nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and that despite all efforts to find them twenty-
six could not be located. Both counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. The first formally
asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila Jose
Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto
Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal
requested that the replica al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck
from the record.
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus in the final decision. We
will now proceed to do so.
One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then
at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled
on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and
gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed
necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact
impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question — By authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief
of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands ?
We turn to the statutes and we find —
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of Congress. The Governor- General
can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and Section
733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and punishment by a court of justice of any person
who is common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States, who may have been convicted of
vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and other States have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of
women convicted of being common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the health authorities compel vaccination. or establish a
quarantine, or place a leprous person in the Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in vain
for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to
force citizens of the Philippine Islands — and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not
chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are — other citizens to change their domicile
from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being
expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence.
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to be found in the Bill of Rights
of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in jurisprudence
and considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands even the President of the United States, who has often been said to exercise more power than any king or
potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality,
who acts within a sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police could, at their mere behest or even for the most
praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the citizen so insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other
municipalities of the Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take to themselves such power, then any other official
can do the same. And if any official can exercise the power, then all persons would have just as much right to do so. And if a
prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no law from one locality to another within the country, then officialdom can
hold the same club over the head of any citizen.
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized
of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor
condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any
man either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 Eng. Stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is
above the law. The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The
law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system
of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to
that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee
[1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be
compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another,
seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886],
118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very
beginning that the primary question was whether the courts should permit a government of men or a government of laws to be
established in the Philippine Islands.
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil action;
(2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.
The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup money damages. It may still rest
with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but it was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any such situation
as that now before us.
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands provides:
"Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general character in force in the Philippines who
shall banish any person to a place more than two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by virtue of the
judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not less than three hundred and twenty-five and not more than three thousand
two hundred and fifty pesetas.
"Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a general character in force in the
Philippines who shall compel any person to change his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of not
less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas." (Art. 211.)
We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find that any public officer has
violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they have
defended the same official in this action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be
proceeded against, is no bar to the instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case which will later be referred to
— "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by one unlawfully confined, to be restored to his liberty, it could
be a sufficient answer that the confinement was a crime, and therefore might be continued indefinitely until the guilty party was
tried and punished therefor by the slow process of criminal procedure. "(In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The
writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the
best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ,
whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific objections to its issuance in this
instance. The fiscal has argued (1) that there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not assume
jurisdiction, and (3) that the persons in question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the
jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not
bring the women from Davao.
The first defense was not pressed with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives and friends of the deportees. The
way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was
consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 78; Code of Civil
Procedure, Sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of
habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty,
though no application be made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court.
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or should have
been made returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience,
petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast
rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine
Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before
the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular
circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any
means by which to advance their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys,
and the two original respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties situated in
different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown
that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate court. The
failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits
of the writ.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was prayed for, says counsel, the
parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of
the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer
examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of the writ of habeas corpus.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of
the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of
these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region,
deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either
money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The
restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they
freely and truly waived this right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief executive of any municipality in the
Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then,
when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that
he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is
within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has
inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a
person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting
under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, these same officials must necessarily have
the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to
restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while
the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for decision. Nevertheless, strange as it may
seem, a close examination of the authorities fails to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable courts are however
very persuasive in nature.
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to whether or not a writ of habeas
corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor child
under guardianship in the State, who has been and continues to be detained in another State. The membership of the Michigan
Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices.
On the question presented the court was equally divided. Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should
be quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom concurred Christiancy, J., held
that the writ should issue. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell was predicated to a large extent on his conception of the English
decisions, and since, as will hereafter appear, the English courts have taken a contrary view, only the following eloquent passages
from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:
"I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the present writ on the petition which was
laid before us. . . .
 "It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries and a half have been expended upon the
Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke could declare in his speech
on the petition of right that 'Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will have no sovereign,' and after the extension of its benefits
and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas corpus acts, it should now be discovered that evasion of that great
clause for the protection of personal liberty, which is the life and soul of the whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is
so, it is important that it be determined without delay, that the legislature may apply the proper remedy, as I can not doubt they
would, on the subject being brought to their notice. . . .
"The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of imprisonment within the state — seems
to me to be based upon a misconception as to the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in England that the court of king's
bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not passed to give the right, but to
compel the observance of rights which existed. . . .
"The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ is, that it is directed to and served
upon, not the person confined, but his jailor. It does not reach the former except through the latter. The officer or person who serves
it does not unbar the prison doors, and set the prisoner free, but the court relieves him by compelling the oppressor to release his
constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the means to be resorted to for the
purposes of compulsion are fine and imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode of affording relief, and if any other means are resorted
to, they are only auxiliary to those which are usual. The place of confinement is, therefore, not important to. the relief, if the guilty
party is within reach of process, so that by the power of the court he can be compelled to release his grasp. The difficulty of affording
redress is not increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of the state, except as greater distance may affect it. The
important question is, where is the power of control exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy." (In the matter of Jackson
[1867], 15 Mich., 416.)
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa,
193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)
The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been taken out of England by the
respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother and her husband
directing the defendant to produce the child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce the child, but
he did not do so. His return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed over by him to another; that it was
no longer in his custody or control, and that it was impossible for him to obey the writ. He was found in contempt of court. On
appeal, the court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said:
"A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That writ commanded the defendant to have
the body of the child before a judge in chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the writ, together
with the cause of her being taken and detained. That is a command to bring the child before the judge and must be obeyed, unless
some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it could be shown that by reason of his having lawfully
parted with the possession of the child before the issuing of the writ, the defendant had no longer power to produce the child, that might
 be an answer; but in the absence of any lawful reason he is bound to produce the child, and, if he does not, he is in contempt of the Court
for not obeying the writ without lawful excuse. Many efforts have been made in argument to shift the question of contempt to some
anterior period for the purpose of showing that what was done at some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. But the
question is not as to what was done before the issue of the writ. The question is whether there has been a contempt in disobeying
the writ after it was issued by not producing the child in obedience to its commands." (The Queen vs. Barnardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D.,
305. See also to the same effect the Irish case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N.S.], 233; The Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's
Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was directed to the defendant to have before
the circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the writ,
stated on oath that he had purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they were removed
beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and that they were then beyond his control and out
of his custody. The evidence tended to show that Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ
of habeas corpus. The court held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and
Davis being present in court, and refusing to produce them, ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until he
should produce the negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released
upon the production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis
produced the two negroes on the last day of the term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C. C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See
also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U. S., 624; Church on Habeas Corpus, 2nd ed., p. 170.)
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defenses offered by the respondents constituted a
legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
There remains to be considered whether the respondents complied with the two orders of the Supreme Court awarding the
writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they did not, whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as purged.
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to present
the persons named in the writ before the court on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents
were thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record discloses, the Mayor of the city of
Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao. According to the response
of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to
Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in
none of the parties in question being brought before the court on the day named.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the
bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness
or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show ,that the
parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 87.) They did not produce the
bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of performance; and they did not
present writings that waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show
that the women were contented with their life in Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended
to the return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to
Manila is demonstrated by the fact that during this time they were easily to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about
this number either returned at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted summarily in finding the
respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-
production of the persons were far from sufficient. The authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to
indicate with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case, supra, the Magistrate in
referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought that, having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act, he
must take the consequences; and we said that he was bound to use every effort to get the child back; that he must do much more
than write letters for the purpose; that he must advertise in America, and even if necessary himself go after the child, and do
everything that mortal man could do in the matter; and that the court would only accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by
way of excuse." In other words, the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the
respondents. That the court forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it did not wish to see presented to the public
gaze the spectacle of a clash between executive officials and the judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents another
chance to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more zealous and to have shown a
better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in
rounding up the women, and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and counter-charges in such
a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with
our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced
somewhat by our sincere desire to see this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao, it
should receive an executive investigation. If any particular individual is still restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of
separate habeas corpus proceedings.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it, nothing further in this connection
remains to be done.
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton
Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of
Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal
of the city of Manila.
The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only
occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice
must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a valid
excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must order him either
imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power
to do so, is a contempt committed in the face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C.,
407.)
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human imperfections, we cannot say that any of the
respondents, with the possible exception of the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its authority.
Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law of public
officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating circumstance. The hacendero Yñigo appears
to have been drawn into the case through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto
Diaz, would seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city government. Finding him
innocent of any disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike from the record the memorandum of attorney for the
petitioners, which brings him into this undesirable position, must be granted. When all is said and done, as far as this record
discloses, the official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the same,
who made arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and
who later, as the head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate women to Manila,
was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods were
unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.
It would be possible to turn to the provisions of Section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which relates to the penalty for
disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as P400
each, which would reach to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal with him as for a contempt. Some members of the
court are inclined to this stern view. It would also be possible to find that since respondent Lukban did comply substantially with the
second order of the court, he has purged his contempt of the first order. Some members of the court are inclined to this merciful
view. Between the two extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate of
the court tended to belittle and embarrass the administration of justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered
only as extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine will at once command such respect without being unduly oppressive — such an
amount is P100.
 In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The respondents Hohmann,
Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of
court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The
motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25, 1919,
is granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So ordered.
In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the hope that this decision may serve
to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachment.
Arellano, C. J., Avanceña and Moir, JJ., concur.
Johnson and Street, JJ., concur in the result.
||| (Villavicencio v. Lukban, G.R. No. 14639, [March 25, 1919], 39 PHIL 777-812)
 [G.R. No. L-2662. March 26, 1949.]

SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner, vs. Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE,
Colonel MARGARITO TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO TABUENA, Major FEDERICO
ARANAS, MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT, respondents.

Pedro Serran, Jose G. Lukban, and Liberato B. Cinco for petitioner.

Fred Ruiz Castro, Federico Arenas, Mariano Yengco, Jr., Ricardo A. Arcilla, and S. Meville Hussey for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; VALIDITY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 68 ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL WAR CRIMES OFFICE. —
Executive Order No. 68 which was issued by the President of the Philippines on the 29th day of July, 1947, is valid in its section 3 that
"The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the nation."
2. INTERNATIONAL LAW; VIOLATORS OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR, OF HUMANITY AND CIVILIZATION,
LIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF. — In accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law of the present day,
including the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the
United Nations, all those persons, military of civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and
of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto, in violation of the laws and customs of war, of
humanity and civilization, are held accountable therefor.
3. ID.; POWER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES. — IN the promulgation and enforcement of Executive Order No.
68, the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted principles and policies and international law
which are part of our constitution.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POWER OF PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF OR ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES.
— The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his powers as Commander in Chief of all our armed
forces.
5. ID.; ID.; — The President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this unfinished aspects of war, namely,
the trial and punishment of war criminals, through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.
 6. INTERNATIONAL LAW; HAGUE AND GENEVA CONVENTION FORM PART OF THE LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES; EVEN IF
THE PHILIPPINES WAS NOT SIGNATORY THEREOF, PROVISIONS OF PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION HAS BEEN COMPREHENSIVE
TO THAT EFFECT. — The rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions form part of and are wholly based on the
generally accepted principles of international law. In fact, these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations,
the United States and Japan, who were signatories to the two Conventions. Such rules and principles, therefore, form part of the law
of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as
contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
7. id.; rights and obligations of a nation were not erased by assumption of full sovereignty RIGHT TO TRY AND PUNISH
CRIMES THERETOFORE COMMITTED. — When the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed, the Philippines
was under the sovereignty of the United States, and thus we were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan, to
the rights and obligations contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and obligations were not erased
by our assumption of full sovereignty. If at right, on our own, of trying and punishing those who committed crimes against our people.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; — War crimes committed against our people and our government while we are a Commonwealth, are triable
and punishable by our present Republic.
9. MILITARY COMMISSION GOVERNED BY SPECIAL LAW. — Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by
a special law and not by the Rules of Courtwhich govern ordinary civil courts.
10. MILITARY COMMISSION; COUNSEL APPEARING BEFORE IT NOT NECESSARILY A MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR.
— There is nothing in Executive Order No. 68 which requires that counsel appearing before said commission must be attorneys
qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In fact, it is common in military tribunals that counsel
for the parties are usually military personnel who are neither attorneys nor even possessed of legal training.
11. ID.; TRIAL OF WAR CRIMES BEFORE PHILIPPINE COURTS; ALLOWANCE OF AMERICAN ATTORNEYS TO REPRESENT
UNITED STATES. — The appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our national sovereignty. It is only fair and
proper that the United States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of
our nation, should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has been any relinquishment of sovereignty, it
has not been by our government by the United States Government which has yielded to us the trial and punishment of her enemies.
The least that we could do in the spirit of comity is to allow them representation in said trials.
12. ID.; ID.; ID. — It is of common knowledge that the United States and its people have been equally, if not more greatly,
aggrieved by the crimes with which petitioner stands charged before the Military Commission. It can be considered a privilege for our
Republic that a leader nation should submit the vindication of the honor of its citizens and its government to a military tribunal of our
country.
 13. ID.; JURISDICTION; SUPREME COURT WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH DUE PROCESSES OF MILITARY COMMISSION. —
The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law, with jurisdiction over the crimes charged which fall under the
provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by having said petitioner in its custody,
this court will not interfere with the due processes of such Military Commission.
Per PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
14. ATTORNEYS AT LAW; ALIENS CANNOT PRACTICE LAW. — It appearing that Attys. Hussey and Port are aliens and have
not been authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law, they cannot appear as prosecutors in a case pending before the War
Crimes Commission.
15. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE POWER VESTED IN CONGRESS; EXCEPTION. — While there is no express
provision in the fundamental law prohibiting the exercise of legislative power by agencies other than Congress, a reading of the whole
context of the Constitution would dispel any doubt as to the constitutional intent that the legislative power is to be exercised
exclusively by Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President, to his to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, to place any part
of the Philippines under martial law, to the rule-making power expressly vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court.
16. ID.; ID.; SCOPE OF POWERS OF DIFFERENT GOVERNMENTAL DEPARTMENTS. — Because the powers vested by our
Constitution to the several departments of the government are in the nature of grants, not a recognition of pre-existing powers, no
department of the government may exercise any power or authority not expressly granted by the Constitution or by law by virtue of
express authority of the Constitution.
17. ID.; ID.; POWER OF PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE EXECUTIVE ORDER DEFINING AND ALLOCATING JURISDICTION
FOR PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMES ON MILITARY COMMISSION. — The provision in Executive Order No. 68 (series of 1947) of
the President of the Philippines, that persons accused as war criminals shall be tried by military commission, is clearly legislative in
nature and intends to confer upon military commission jurisdiction to try all persons charged with war crimes. But, the power to
define and allocate jurisdiction for the prosecution of persons accused of crimes is exclusively vested by the Constitution in Congress.
18. ID.; ID.; POWER TO ESTABLISH GOVERNMENT OFFICE. — Executive Order No. establishes a National War Crimes Office;
but, the power to establish government offices is essentially legislative.
19. ID.; RULE-MAKING POWER OF SUPREME COURT; PRESIDENT HAS NO POWER, MUCH LESS DELEGATE SUCH A
POWER, TO PROVIDE RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR CONDUCT OF TRIALS. — Executive Order No. 68 provides rules of procedure
for the conduct of trials before the War Crimes Office. This provision on procedural subject constitutes a usurpation of the rule-
making power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court. It further authorizes military commissions to adopt additional rules
of procedure. If the President of the Philippines cannot exercise the rule making power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme
Court, he cannot, with more reason, delegate that power to military commissions.
 20. ID.; LEGISLATIVE POWER VESTED IN CONGRESS; USURPATION OF POWER TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS. — Executive
Order No. 68 appropriates funds for the expenses of the National War Crimes Office. This constitutes another usurpation of legislative
power, as the power to vote appropriations belongs to Congress.
21. ID.; EMERGENCY POWERS OF PRESIDENT UNDER COMMONWEALTH ACTS NOS. 600, 620 AND 671. — Commonwealth
Acts Nos. 600, 620 and 671, granting the President of the Philippines emergency powers to promulgate rules and regulations during
national emergency has ceased to have effect since the liberation of the Philippines, or at latest, upon the surrender of Japan on
September 2, 1945. The absurdity of the contention that these emergency acts continued in effect even after the surrender of Japan
cannot be gainsaid. Only a few months after liberation, and even before the surrender of Japan, the Congress started to function
normally. To let the hypothesis on continuance prevail will result in the existence of two distinct, separate and independent legislative
organs. — the Congress and the President of the Philippines. Should there be any disagreement between Congress and the President,
a possibility that no one can dispute, the President may take advantage of the long recess of Congress (two-thirds of every year) to
repeal and overrule legislative enactments of Congress, and may set up a veritable system of dictatorship, absolutely repugnant to
the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
22. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; PRESUMPTION THAT LEGISLATIVE BODY DID NOT INTEND TO
VIOLATE CONSTITUTION. — It has never been the purpose of the National Assembly to extend the delegation (embodied in
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600, 620 and 671) beyond the emergency created by war, as to extent it farther would be violate of the
express provisions of the Constitution. We are of the opinion that there is no doubt on this question; but, if there could still be any,
the same should be resolved in favor of the presumption that the National Assembly did not intend to violate the fundamental law.
23. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW. — Executive Order No. 68 violates the
fundamental guarantees of due process and equal protection of the law, because it permits the admission of many kinds of evidence
by which no innocent person can afford to get acquittal, and by which it is impossible to determine whether an accused is guilt or not
beyond all reasonable doubt.

DECISION

MORAN, C. J : p

Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese
Imperial Forces in the Philippines during a period covering 1943 and 1944, who is now charged before a Military Commission
convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge
his duties as such commander to control the operations of members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities
and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces, in violation of the laws and
customs of war" — comes before this Court seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the
Philippines; to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of
petitioner's case before the Military Commission; and to permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of
petitioner.
In support of his case, petitioner tenders the following principal arguments:
First. — "That Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provisions of our constitutional law
but also our local laws, to say nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention
on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and, therefore, petitioner is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and
international." Hence, petitioner argues — "That in view of the fact that this commission has been empanelled by virtue of an
unconstitutional law and an illegal order, this commission is without jurisdiction to try herein petitioner."
Second. — That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the Commission in behalf of the
United States of America, of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port, who are not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to
practice law in the Philippines, is a diminution of our personality as an independent state, and their appointments as prosecutors
are a violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to practice law in the Philippines.
Third. — That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecutors, the United States not being a party in interest
in the case.
Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial
of accused war criminals, was issued by the President of the Philippines on the 29th day of July, 1947. This Court holds that this
order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that —
"The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the nation."
In accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law of the present day, including the Hague Convention, the
Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United Nations, all those persons,
military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and
offenses consequential and incidental thereto, in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization, are held
accountable therefor. Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68, the President of the
Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted principles and policies of international law which are part of our
Constitution.
The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his powers as Commander in Chief of all our
armed forces, as upheld by this Court in the case of Yamashita vs. Styer L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 654) 1 when we said —
 "War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed hostilities, incidents of war may remain
pending which should be disposed of as in time of war. 'An important incident to a conduct of war is the adoption of measures by
the military command not only to repel and defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies
who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of war.' (Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct.,
2.) Indeed, the power to create a military commission for the trial and punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war. And,
in the language of a writer, a military commission 'has jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues. This includes the
period of an armistice, or military occupation, up to the effective date of a treaty of peace, and may extend beyond, by treaty
agreement.' (Cowls, Trial of War Criminals by Military Tribunals, American Bar Association Journal, June, 1944.)"
Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect of war,
namely, the trial and punishment of war criminals, through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of
the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only
in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly based
on the generally accepted principles of international law. In fact, these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent
nations, the United States and Japan, who were signatories to the two Conventions. Such rules and principles, therefore, form part
of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has
been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international
law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Furthermore, when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed, the Philippines was under the
sovereignty of the United States, and thus we were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan, to the rights and
obligations contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and obligations were not erased by our
assumption of full sovereignty. If at all, our emergence as a free state entitles us to enforce the right, on our own, of trying and
punishing those who committed crimes against our people. In this connection, it is well to remember what we have said in the case
of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372):
". . . The change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those
charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government
and the same sovereign people . . . "
By the same token, war crimes committed against our people and our government while we were a Commonwealth, are triable and
punishable by our present Republic.
Petitioner challenges the participation of two American attorneys, namely, Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port, in the
prosecution of his case, on the ground that said attorneys are not qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with
our Rules of Court and the appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our national sovereignty.
 In the first place, respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special law and not by the Rules
of Court which govern ordinary civil courts. It has already been shown that Executive Order No. 68 which provides for the
organization of such military commissions is a valid and constitutional law. There is nothing in said executive order which requires
that counsel appearing before said commissions must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with
the Rules of Court. In fact, it is common in military tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are
neither attorneys nor even possessed of legal training.
Secondly, the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our national sovereignty. It is only fair and
proper that the United States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal
of our nation, should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has been any relinquishment of
sovereignty, it has not been by our government but by the United States Government which has yielded to us the trial and
punishment of her enemies. The least that we could do in the spirit of comity is to allow them representation in said trials.
Alleging that the United States is not a party in interest in the case, petitioner challenges the personality of attorneys Hussey
and Port as prosecutors. It is of common knowledge that the United States and its people have been equally, if not more greatly,
aggrieved by the crimes with which petitioner stands charged before the Military Commission. It can be considered a privilege for
our Republic that a leader nation should submit the vindication of the honor of its citizens and its government to a military tribunal
of our country.
The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law, with jurisdiction over the crimes charged which fall
under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by having said petitioner in
its custody, this Court will not interfere with the due processes of such Military Commission.
||| (Shigenori Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-2662, [March 26, 1949], 83 PHIL 171-194)
 [G.R. No. L-49112. February 2, 1979.]

LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner; HON.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Minister of National Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his capacity as
Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his capacity as
Minister of Public Highways, respondents.

Leovillo C. Agustin Law Office for petitioner.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor Amado D. Aquino for
respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Letter of Instruction No. 229 (1974) as amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 (1976) required every motor vehicle owner to
procure and use one pair of a reflectorized triangular early warning device whenever any vehicle is stalled or disabled or is parked for
thirty (30) minutes or more on any street, or highway, including expressways or limited access roads. The implementing rules and
regulations prepared by the respondent Land Transportation Commissioner on December 10, 1976 were not enforced as President
Marcos, on January 25, 1977, ordered a six-month period of suspension insofar as the installation of early warning device (EWD) as a
pre-registration requirement for motor vehicles was concerned. Letter of Instruction No. 716, issued on June 30, 1978 lifted such
suspension and in pursuance thereof, the rules and regulations prepared by respondent Commission were approved for immediate
implementation by respondent Minister of Public Works and Communication.
Petitioner came to court alleging that Letter of Instruction 229, as amended, clearly violates the provisions of the
New Constitution on due process, equal protection and delegation of police power. That it is oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary,
confiscatory and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society. The respondents' Answer demonstrated that the
assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of the police power; that the implementing rules and regulations of respondent
Land Transportation Commissioner do not constitute unlawful delegation of legislative power and that the hazards posed by such
obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on
Road Signs and Signals of which Philippines was a signatory and which was duly ratified and the United Nations Organization.
The Court dismissed the petition for prohibition ruling that the Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of
the State's police power intended to promote public safety; that there has been no undue delegation of legislative power as a
standard has been set; and that the country cannot repudiate its commitment to international bodies and the accepted principles of
international law.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POLICE POWER OF THE STATE; ENACTMENT OF LEGISLATION TO PROMOTE GENERAL
WELFARE; JURISPRUDENCE. — The broad and expansive scope of the police power, which was originally identified by Chief Justice
Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as "nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty" was stressed in the case of Edu v. Ericta, (L-32096, Oct. 24, 1970), thus: "Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after
the Constitutioncame into force, Calalang v. Williams, (70 Phil. 720) [1940] identified police power with the state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could
thus 'be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.'
Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso (80 Phil. 71) reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as
'the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the
people.' The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as 'that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.' In the sense it
could be hardly distinguishable as noted in Morfe v. Mutuc (L-20387 Jan. 31, 1969) with the totality of legislative power. It is in the
above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm, 'the most essential, insistent,
and at least illimitable powers,' extending as Justice Holmes, aptly pointed out 'to all the great public needs.' Its scope, over-
expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice
Cardozo: 'Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What
is critical or urgent changes with the time.' The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined,
rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional
rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactments of such
salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.'"
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; LETTER OF INSTRUCTION NO. 229; INTENDED TO PROMOTE PUBLIC SAFETY. — Letter of Instruction 229 is
a police measure clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be rare occurrence for the Court to invalidate a legislative or
executive act of that character. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, R.A. No. 5715
(1969), an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose
of which was: "To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads . . . ."
 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ISSUED AFTER CAREFUL STUDY BY THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT. — The issuance of Letter of
Instruction No. 229 is encased in the armor of prior, careful study by the Executive Department. The President had in his possession
the necessary statistical information and data at the time he issued said letter of instruction and such factual foundation cannot be
defeated by petitioner's naked assertion, not backed up by demonstrable data on record, that early warning devices are not too vital
to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents. To set it aside for alleged repugnancy to the due process clause is to give sanction
to conjectural claims that exceeded even the broadest permissible limits of a pleader's well-known penchant for exaggeration.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EARLY WARNING DEVICE REQUIREMENT NOT OPPRESSIVE AND CONFISCATORY. — There is nothing
in the questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, or in the implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order
No. 1 issued by the Land Transportation Commission, which requires or compels motor vehicle owners to purchase the early warning
device prescribed thereby. All that is required is for motor vehicle owners concerned to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of this
early warning device in question, procuring or obtaining the same from whatever source. With a little of industry and practical
ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even personally make or produce this early warning device so long as the same substantially
conforms with the specifications laid down in said letter of instruction and administrative order. Accordingly, the early warning device
requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it make manufacturers and dealers of
said devices instant millionaries at the expense of car owners as petitioner so sweepingly concludes.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ATTACK ON THE WISDOM THEREOF CANNOT BE SUSTAINED. — The attack on the validity of the
challenged provision insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent, on its wisdom cannot be sustained. That approach
is distinguished by its unorthodoxy. It bears repeating "that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, 'does not pass upon questions
of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.' As expressed by Justice Tuason:' It is not the province of the courts to supervise
legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern.'
There can be no possible objection then to the observation of Justice Montemayor:' As long as laws do not violate any constitutional
provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary.' For they, according to
Justice Labrador, 'are not supposed to override legitimate policy and . . . never inquire into the wisdom of the law.' It is thus settled,
to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional power or competence, not
the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation
of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere.
There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the
judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of
justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and
prescriptions. . . ."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO INFRINGEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER. — The alleged
infringement of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power is without any support in well-settled legal doctrines. An excerpt
from the aforecited decision of Edu v. Ericta sheds light on the matter: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a
standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps
out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is
to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either
express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically.
It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. . . ."
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; STATE RECOGNITION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS. — Where the two whereas clauses of the
assailed Letter of Instruction read: "(Whereas), the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by
international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United
Nations Organization (U.N.); (Whereas), the said Vienna Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D.
No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; . . .", it cannot be
disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitutionpossesses relevance: "The Philippines . . . adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, . . ." The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and
Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The
concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international
morality.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
1. STATUTES; LETTER OF INSTRUCTION NO. 229; EARLY WARNING DEVICE REQUIREMENT; OPPRESSIVE, ARBITRARY
AND DISCRIMINATORY. — It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory to require owners of motor vehicles with built-in and more
effective and efficient early warning devices (E.W.D.'s) such as "(a) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles, (b) battery-
powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, (c) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles . . . ." to
purchase the E.W.D. specified in the challenged order, whose effectivity and utility have yet to be demonstrated.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO PUBLIC NECESSITY THEREFOR. — The public necessity for the challenged order has yet to be shown. No
valid refutation has been made of petitioner's assertion that the "E.W.D.'s" are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular
accidents. Statistics show that the 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that occurred in 1976, only 390 or 1.5 percent involved rear-end
collisions, "as to require the purchase and installation of the questioned E.W.D. for almost 900,000 vehicles throughout the country.
There is no imperative need for imposing such a blanket requirement on all vehicles. The respondents have not shown that they have
availed of the powers and prerogatives vested in their offices such as ridding the country of dilapitated trucks and vehicles which are
the main cause of the deplorable highway accidents due to stalled vehicles, establishing an honest and fool-proof system of
examination and licensing of motor vehicle drivers so as to ban the reckless and irresponsible and a sustained education campaign to
 install safe driving habits and attitudes that can be carried out for much less than the P50 million burden that would be imposed by
the challenged order.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J : p

The validity of a Letter of Instruction 1 providing for an early warning device for motor vehicles is assailed in this prohibition
proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process and, insofar as the rules and regulations for its
implementation are concerned, for transgressing the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power. The Letter of
Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner, who is possessed of the requisite standing, as being arbitrary and oppressive. A temporary
restraining order as issued and respondents Romeo F. Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner; Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of
National Defense; Alfredo L. Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and Baltazar Aquino, Minister of
Public Highways; were required to answer. That they did in a pleading submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza. 2 Impressed with a highly persuasive quality, it makes quite clear that the imputation of a constitutional infirmity is devoid
of justification. The challenged Letter of Instruction is a valid police power measure. Nor could the implementing rules and regulations
issued by respondent Edu be considered as amounting to an exercise of legislative power. Accordingly, the petition must be
dismissed. llcd

The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued on December 2, 1974, reads
in full: "[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major causes of fatal or serious accidents in land transportation is the presence of
disabled, stalled, or parked motor vehicles along streets or highways without any appropriate early warning device to signal
approaching motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by
international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United
Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No.
207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; [Now, therefore, I,
Ferdinand E. Marcos], President of the Philippines, in the interest of safety on all streets and highways, including expressways or
limited access roads, do hereby direct: 1. That all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in their motor
vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning device consisting of triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors
at least 15 cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the sides. 2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled or disabled or is parked for thirty (30)
minutes or more on any street or highway, including expressways or limited access roads, the owner, user or driver thereof shall cause
the warning device mentioned herein to be installed at least four meters away to the front and rear of the motor vehicle stalled,
disabled or parked. 3. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall cause Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning Devices, as herein
described, to be prepared and issued to registered owners of motor vehicles, except motorcycles and trailers, charging for each piece
not more than 15% of the acquisition cost. He shall also promulgate such rules and regulations as are appropriate to effectively
implement this order. 4. All hereby concerned shall closely coordinate and take such measures as are necessary or appropriate to
carry into effect these instructions." 3 Thereafter, on November 15, 1976, it was amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 in this wise:
"Paragraph 3 of Letter of Instructions No. 229 is hereby amended to read as follows: '3. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall
require every motor vehicle owner to procure from any source and present at the registration of his vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized
triangular early warning device, as described herein, of any brand or make chosen by said motor vehicle owner. The Land
Transportation Commissioner shall also promulgate such rules and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this
order.'" 4 There was issued accordingly, by respondent Edu, the implementing rules and regulations on December 10, 1976. 5 They
were not enforced as President Marcos, on January 25, 1977, ordered a six-month period of suspension insofar as the installation of
early warning device as a pre-registration requirement for motor vehicles was concerned. 6 Then on June 30, 1978, another Letter of
Instruction 7 ordered the lifting of such suspension and directed the immediate implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229 as
amended. 8 It was not until August 29, 1978 that respondent Edu issued Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded thus: "In pursuance
of Letter of Instructions No. 716, dated June 30, 1978, directing the implementation of Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended
by Letter of Instructions No. 479, requiring the use of Early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicles, the following rules and
regulations are hereby issued: 1. LTC Administrative Order No. 1, dated December 10, 1976; shall now be implemented provided that
the device may come from whatever source and that it shall have substantially complied with the EWD specifications contained in
Section 2 of said administrative order; 2. In order to insure that every motor vehicle, except motorcycles, is equipped with the device,
a pair of serially numbered stickers, to be issued free of charge by this Commission, shall be attached to each EWD. The EWD serial
number shall be indicated on the registration certificate and official receipt of payment of current registration fees of the motor
vehicle concerned. All Orders, Circulars, and Memoranda in conflict herewith are hereby superseded, This Order shall take effect
immediately." 9 It was for immediate implementation by respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as Minister of Public Works, Transportation,
and Communications. 10
Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly equipped when
it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as an early warning device in case of
the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations in
Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the Land Transportation Commission," 11 alleged that said Letter of Instruction No. 229, as
amended, "clearly violates the provisions and delegation of police power, [sic] . . .:" For him, they are "oppressive, unreasonable,
arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society." 12 He contended that
they are "infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public;" 13 are "one-sided, onerous
and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners
who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device at the rate of P56.00 to P72.00 per set." 14 are unlawful and
unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part of
the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified set of
EWDs." 15 He therefore prayed for a judgment declaring both the assailed Letters of Instructions and Memorandum Circular void and
unconstitutional and for a restraining order in the meanwhile.
A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on October 19, 1978: "L-49112 (Leovillo C. Agustin v. Hon. Romeo F.
Edu, etc., et al.) — Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for prohibition
with writ of preliminary prohibitory and/or mandatory injunction, the Court Resolved to [require] the respondents to file an answer
thereto within ten (10) days from notice and not to move to dismiss the petition. The Court further Resolved to [issue] a [temporary
restraining order] effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by this Court." 16
Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and granted. Then on November 15, 1978, he
Answer for respondents was submitted. After admitting the factual allegations and stating that they lacked knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle car, 17 they "specifically deny the allegations in
paragraphs X and XI (including its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition to the effect that Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended
by Letters of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716 as well as Land Transportation Commission Administrative Order No. 1 and its
Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the constitutional provisions on due process of law, equal protection of law and undue
delegation of police power, and that the same are likewise oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided, onerous, immoral,
unreasonable and illegal, the truth being that said allegations are without legal and factual basis and for the reasons alleged in the
Special and Affirmative Defenses of this Answer." 18 Unlike petitioner who contented himself with a rhetorical recital of his litany of
grievances and merely invoked the sacramental phrases of constitutional litigation, the Answer, in demonstrating that the assailed
Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of the police power and implementing rules and regulations of respondent Edu not
susceptible to the charge that there was unlawful delegation of legislative power, there was in the portion captioned Special and
Affirmative Defenses, a citation of what respondents believed to be the authoritative decisions of this Tribunal calling for application.
They are Calalang v. Williams, 19 Morfe v. Mutuc, 20 and Edu v. Ericta. 21 Reference was likewise made to the 1968 Vienna Conventions
of the United Nations on road traffic, road signs, and signals, of which the Philippines was a signatory and which was duly
ratified. 22 Solicitor General Mendoza took pains to refute in detail, in language calm and dispassionate, the vigorous, at times
intemperate, accusation of petitioner that the assailed Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations cannot
survive the test of rigorous scrutiny. To repeat, its highly-persuasive quality cannot be denied.LexLib

This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the issues being clearly joined. As noted at the outset, it is far
from meritorious and must be dismissed.
1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the
main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended
against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing.
The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme
Court in an 1847 decision, as "nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty" 23 was stressed in
the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: "Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into
force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty
or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus 'be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.' Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v.
Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as 'the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.' The concept was set forth in negative terms by
Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as 'that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.' In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court
in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of
government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, 'the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers,' extending as Justice
Holmes aptly pointed out 'to all the great public needs.' Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to
anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: 'Needs that were narrow or parochial in the
past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.' The police
power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the
state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual
citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace,
safety, good order, and welfare." 24
2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the particular police power measure
challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative
or executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision
in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, 25 an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v.
Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: "To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction
on roads and streets designated as national roads . . ." 26 As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of
the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, 27 with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative
demands of public safety. LLphil

3. The futility of petitioner's effort to nullify both the Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations becomes
even more apparent considering his failure to lay the necessary factual foundation to rebut the presumption of validity. So it was held
in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. 28 The rationale was clearly set forth in an
excerpt from a decision of Justice Brandeis of the American Supreme Court, quoted in the opinion: "The statute here questioned
deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific
method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of
fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of some factual foundation of record in overthrowing the statute." 29
4. Nor did the Solicitor General, as he very well could, rely solely on such rebutted presumption of validity. As was pointed out
in his Answer: "The President certainly bad in his possession the necessary statistical information and data at the time he issued said
letter of instructions, and such factual foundation cannot be defeated by petitioner's naked assertion that early warning devices 'are
not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents' because allegedly only 390 or 1.5 per cent of the supposed 26,000
motor vehicle accidents that occurred in 1976 involved rear-end collisions (p. 12 of petition). Petitioner's statistics is not backed up by
demonstrable data on record. As aptly stated by this Honorable Court: 'Further: "It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a
presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which
is not the case here"' . . . But even assuming the verity of petitioner's statistics, is that not reason enough to require the installation of
early warning devices to prevent another 390 rear-end collisions that could mean the death of 390 or more Filipinos and the deaths
that could likewise result from head-on or frontal collisions with stalled vehicles?" 30 It is quite manifest then that the issuance of such
Letter of Instruction is encased in the armor of prior, careful study by the Executive Department. To set it aside for alleged repugnancy
to the due process clause is to give sanction to conjectural claims that exceeded even the broadest permissible limits of a pleader's
well-known penchant for exaggeration.
5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of Instruction was exposed in the Answer
of the Solicitor General thus: "Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners
whose cars are already equipped with 1) 'blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,' 2) 'battery-powered blinking lights
inside motor vehicles,' 3) 'built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles,' or 4) 'well-lighted two (2)
petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and
visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the
world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude,
without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is
stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the
aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because
he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such
confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision." 31
6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go unrefuted in the Answer of the Solicitor General:
"There is nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, or in Administrative Order No. 1, which requires or
compels motor vehicle owners to purchase the early warning device prescribed thereby. All that is required is for motor vehicle
owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of this early warning device in question, procuring or
obtaining the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even
personally make or produce this early warning device so long as the same substantially conforms with the specifications laid down in
said letter of instruction and administrative order. Accordingly, the early warning device requirement can neither be oppressive,
onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it make manufacturers and dealers of said devices 'instant millionaires at the
expense of car owner's as petitioner so sweepingly concludes . . . Petitioner's fear that with the early warning device requirement 'a
more subtle racket' may be committed by those called upon to enforce it . . . is an unfounded speculation. Besides, that unscrupulous
officials may try to enforce said requirement in an unreasonable manner or to an unreasonable degree, does not render the same
illegal or immoral where, as in the instant case, the challenged Letter of Instruction No. 229 and implementing order disclose none
of the constitutional defects alleged against it." 32
7. It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised on lack of power, the justification
for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to say negative, view he entertains as to its wisdom. That approach, it
put it at its mildest, is distinguished, if that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It bears repeating "that this Court, in the
language of Justice Laurel, 'does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.' As expressed by Justice
Tuason: 'It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense.
That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern.' There can be no possible objection then to the observation of Justice
Montemayor: 'As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of
whether or not they are wise or salutary.' For they, according to Justice Labrador, 'are not supposed to override legitimate policy and
. . . never inquire into the wisdom of the law.' It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute
invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each
department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a
matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as
there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain
unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as
there may be objections, even if valid and cogent, on is wisdom cannot be sustained." 33
8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-himself with authoritative pronouncements from this
Tribunal, he would not have the temerity to make such an assertion. An excerpt from the aforecited decision of Edu v. Ericta sheds
light on the matter: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the
legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication
may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public
agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which
legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above
guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-
 delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the
policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly, the legislative objective is public safety. What is
sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads." This is to adhere to the recognition given expression
by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too long after the Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-
delegation "has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain
limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern
governments.' He continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the
delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.' Consistency with the
conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the
statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed." 34
9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this consideration. The petition
itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to
traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and
Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine
Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices;
. . ." 35 It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: "The Philippines . .
. adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, . . ." 36 The 1968 Vienna Convention on
Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged
its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of
international morality. LLpr

10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference to equal protection did not even elicit any attempt on the
part of petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and categorical, why such a casual observation should be taken seriously.
In no case is there a more appropriate occasion for insistence on what was referred to as "the general rule" in Santiago v. Far Eastern
Broadcasting Co., 37 namely, "that the constitutionality of a law will not be considered unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted
upon, and adequately argued." 38 "Equal protection" is not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit
can rightfully expect that success will crown his efforts. The law is anything but that.
WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
||| (Agustin v. Edu, G.R. No. L-49112, [February 2, 1979], 177 PHIL 160-181)