REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW

RULES ON EVIDENCE

LEGAL EVIDENCE (b) Burden of Proof and Presumption (By whom

-consists of those rules, statutory and judicial,
which regulate the acceptance or rejection of the
information to a legal tribunal which will justify a
conclusion or judgment upon the matter in issue
before it.
-(Sir James Stephen) that part of the law of
procedure which, with a view to ascertain individual
rights and liabilities in particular cases, decides:
(i) What facts may, and what may not be
proved in such cases;
(ii) what sort of evidence must be given of a
fact which may be proved; and
(iii) By whom and in what manner the
evidence must be produced by which by which
any fact is to be proved.
Rule 128. GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC 1. EVIDENCE, DEFINED.
Sec 1. Evidence defined. -- Evidence is the means,
sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial
proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact.
1. 4 COMPONENT ELEMENTS
Evidence as a means of ascertainment
(a) Sanctioned by these rules
-the evidence must be allowed by the RoC.
(b) In a judicial proceeding
-Rules of Court is not applicable in ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS because they are only quasi-judicial
bodies, I.e., NLRC, SEC.
(c) The truth respecting a matter of fact
must evidence be presented?;
(c) Of what proposition in issue need be
presented without evidence?
5. CLASSIFICATION OF RULES OF EVIDENCE
a) Rules of Probative Policy
i. Exclusionary Rules
-excludes evidence on grounds partly of relevancy and
partly of policy, i.e., character of parties in civil cases
ii. Preferential Rules
-rules requiring one kind of evidence in preference to
any other, I.e., Best Evidence Rule.
iii. Analytic Rules
-subjects certain kinds of evidence to rigid scrutiny, so
as to expose its possible weaknesses and shortcomings,
I.e., without an opportunity to cross-examine a
testimony will make it hearsay.
iv. Prophylactic Rules
-rules which apply beforehand, certain measures to
prevent risk or falsity or mistake, I.e., rule that
witness must take an oath before testifying.
v. Quantitative Rules
-requires certain kinds of evidence to be produced in
specific quantity. I.e., Extrajudicial confession by
accused must be corroborated by evidence of corpus
delicti.

2. SOURCES OF RULES ON EVIDENCE b) Rules of Extrinsic Policy

i. Rules of Court, Rule 128-134 (As - rules seeking to exclude useful evidence for the
amended by the  A.M. No. 19-08- 15- sake of upholding other policies considered more
SC) paramount and are either absolute or conditional.
ii. 1987 Constitution I.e., Art III Sec 3(2). Illegally seized evidence is
iii. Anti Wire Tapping Law (RA 4200) inadmissible as evidence.
iv. Bank Secrecy Law (RA 1405)
v. Rule 115 on Rules on Cross-examination 6. DIFFERENT KINDS OF EVIDENCE (RMCDC(+/-)R-
vi. Decisions of the SC PSXP-CCC)
a) Relevant Evidence
3. FACTUM PROBANDUM VS FACTUM PROBANS -when it has a tendency in reason to establish the
FACTUM PROBANDUM FACTUM PROBANS probability or improbability of fact in issue (Sec 4
(fact in issue) (Material proof) Rule 128)
-or the Proposition to -or material evidencing b) Material Evidence
be established is the the proposition. -when it is directed to prove a fact in issue as
ultimate fact to be determined by the rules of substantive law and
established. pleadings.
- It is what the party -It is the evidentiary c) Competent Evidence
affirms and the other fact or fact by which -when it is not excluded by law in a particular case.
denies, the tribunal the factum probandum d) Direct and Circumstantial
having as yet not is established. Direct Circumstantial
committed in either -evidence to the - indirectly related to
direction. precise point in issue the fact in issue, these
circumstances having
4. THE SETTLEMENT OF THE RELATION OF FACTUM been found by
PROBANS AND FACTUM PROBANDUM INVOLVES 3 experience so
DISTINCT QUESTIONS associated with that
(a) Admissibility (What facts may be presented?); fact in relation of cause
and effect they lead to

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 REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW
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a satisfactory Reconveyance and Damages by husband Jose Hosana.

conclusion. Tomas filed a Cross claim; Milagros is in default.
Tomas claims that his payment should be return to
e) Positive and Negative him. He alleged that he paid a total of P700,000, as
Positive Negative corroborated by his goddaughter.
-when the witness -when the witness RTC ruled that the sale is void. CA ruled that P200k
affirms that a fact did states the he did not be returned.
or did not occur see or know the ISSUE: Can a null and void contract be admitted as
evidence and used as the basis of the consideration
occurrence of a fact
paid?
f) Rebutting HELD. Yes.
-that which is given to repel counteract or disprove While the terms of a void contract cannot be
facts given in evidence on the other side. enforced since it is deemed inexistent, it does not
preclude the admissibility of the contract as evidence to
g) Primary/Best and Secondary prove matters that occurred in the course of executing
Primary/Best Secondary/Inferior the contract, I.e, what each party has given in the
-that which the law -it indicates the execution of the contract.
regards as affording the existence of more The purpose of introducing documentary evidence
greatest certainty of original source of is to ascertain the truthfulness of a matter at issue,
which can be the entire content or a specific
the facts in question information provision/term in the document.
h) Expert The deed of sale as a documentary evidence may
-testimony of one possessing, in regard to a particular be used as a means to ascertain the truthfulness of the
subject or department of human activity, knowledge consideration stated and its actual payment. The
purpose of introducing the deed of sale as evidence is
not usually acquired by other person.
not to enforce the terms written in the contract, which
i) Prima Facie is an obligatory force and effect of a valid contract. The
--standing alone unexplained or uncontroverted, is deed of sale, rather, is used as a means to determine
sufficient to maintain the proposition affirmed. matters that occurred in the execution of such contract,
a) Conclusive Evidence I.e, the determination of what each party has given
-incontrovertible evidence under the void contract to allow restitution and prevent
b) Cumulative Evidence unjust enrichment.
-additional evidence of the same kind of bearing on Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the
issue and is not excluded by law of theses rules.
the same point.
There is no provision in the Rules of Evidence which
c) Corroborative excludes the admissibility of a void document. The
-additional evidence to a different kind and character, Rules only require that the evidence is relevant and
tending to prove the same point. not excluded by the Rules for its admissibility.
Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence
3. EVIDENCE VS PROOF because the purpose of introducing it as evidence is
Evidence Proof to ascertain the truth respecting a matter of fact, not
-the means of proof -the effect of the to enforce the terms of the document itself.
(2) TOLENTINO V. MENDOZA
evidence
***PROOF is that degree and quantity of evidence FACTS
that produces conviction. Petitioners (+)Romero Laygo, Solomon Lumalang
Sr, Meliton Evangelista Sr, and Nelson Melgar filed a
4. FORMS OF EVIDENCE case of Grossly Immoral Conduct, and Misconduct
May in a form of: against respondent alleging that he fathered two
a) Testimony given in open court; illegitimate children with his paramour. They submitted
b) Documentary evidence; the children’s birth certificate.
Respondent alleged that the evidence of Birth Cert
c) Form of tangible objects or exhibits. are inadmissible for being illegally procured , and a
d) Opinion testimony violation of -Rule 24. Non-Disclosure of Birth Records.
e) AO No.1, 1992.
5. STIPULATION AS TO EVIDENCE
-Individuals and parties litigant cannot, by ISSUE: ARE THE BIRTH CERTS ADMISSIBLE?
private contract, stipulate rules of evidence that HELD. YES
shall be binding on the courts. Respondent mistakenly argues that the birth
certificates of the children are inadmissible for having
been obtained in violation of such law.
CASE LAW Sec 3, Rule 128 of Revised Rules on Evidence provides
(1) TAN JR VS HOSANA (VOID DOCUMENT admissible as that “evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the
Evidence) issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules.”
There could be no dispute that the subject birth
FACTS certificates are relevant to the issue.
Milagros Hosana sold to Tomas, with forged SPA The only question, therefore, is whether the law
from Jose(Working in Japan), for P200,000. A Complaint or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth
for Annulment of Sale/ Cancellation of TCT/ certificates allegedly for having been obtained in

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violation of such law. d) OTHER CASES AS MAY BE PROVIDED FOR BY

Such law only provides for sanctions against persons LAW;
violating the rule on confidentiality of birth certificates, e) LAND REGISTRATION CASES; AND
but nowhere does it state that procurement of birth f) ELECTION CASES
certificate in violation of said rule would render said
records inadmissible in evidence.
(3) PEOPLE V. CARANGUIAN (Hearsay is Inadmissible) 3. EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES VS CRIMINAL CASES
EVIDENCE IN CIVIL EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
FACTS CASES CASES
Caranguian was charged with Murder for the killing -Preponderance of -Proof beyond
of Ben Lumboy. evidence reasonable doubt
Civil Volunteer Org Members, Ben Lumboy and -An offer of GR. An offer of
William Capili informed PO3Birung that they saw 2
compromise is not an compromise by the
CAFGU members . PO3 Birung accompanied them, and
had an encounter in the wooden bridge with the two admission of liability accused may be
CAFGU members. Ben was killed and was wounded. and is not admissible in received in evidence as
Caranguian averred he was 15 km away from the evidence against the an implied admission of
locus criminis. offeror guilt.

ISSUE: IS THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT? Testimony of EXC.

Lumboy and Palos to PO3 Birung- Hearsay 1. Criminal cases
PO3 Birung’s testimony is hearsay because he said
involving quasi-
he was informed by Lumboy and Capili that they sighted
two former CAFGU members in Catarauan. offenses; and
The hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who Criminal cases allowed
merely recites what someone else has told him, by law to be
whether orally or in writing. Sec 36, Rule 130 provides compromised
that a witness can testify only to those facts which he -Judicial admission -not admissible in
knows of his personal knowledge; that is which are withdrawn becomes evidence against the
derived from his own perception, except as otherwise extrajudicial admission accused who made plea
provided in the rules. In fact, PO3 Birung’s testimony is
even double or multiple hearsay, since it is based upon
or admission, when it is
“third-hand” information. withdrawn
-GR. There exists no The accused enjoys the
SEC 2. SCOPE presumption in favor of presumption of
Sec 2. Scope. -- The rules of evidence shall be either party, except in innocence
the same in all courts and in all trials and cases specially
hearings, except as otherwise provided by law or provided for by law
these rules. -IF THERE IS AN - Accused is acquitted
1. VARIATION BASED ON TYPE OF ACTION EQUIPONDERANCE OF
a) By preponderance of evidence EVIDENCE, the party
-meant simply evidence which is of greater weight, or who has the burden of
more convincing, than that which is offered in proof loses
opposition thereto. -No circumstantial -Circumstantial
b) Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt evidence available evidence applicable
-Moral certainty is only required, or that proof which only in criminal cases
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
SEC 3. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
-does not mean such degree of proof as excluding SEC 3. Admissibility of Evidence. -- Evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
possibility of error, and or that degree of proof which
excluded by the constitution, the law or these rules.
produces absolute
-The exclusionary rule under the Constitution
certainty.
was included, but even before the amendment, the
c) Substantial Evidence
term “law” was understood to encompass the
-that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
constitution.
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
1. REQUIREMENTS OF ADMISSIBILITY
a) Relevancy -Evidence is relevant if it may
2. UNIFORMITY OF RULES OF EVIDENCE IN JUDICIAL
establish directly or indirectly the existence
PROCEEDINGS: The rules of evidence shall be the
or non-existence of the facts in issue.
same in all courts and in all trials and hearings, except
b) Competency - that which is not excluded by
as otherwise provided by law or these rules, such as
the Rules on Evidence, the law and the
those enumerated under Sec 4, Rule 1 which are:
Constitution
(NICOLE)
2. TWO AXIOMS OF ADMISSIBILITY
a) NATURALIZATION PROCEEDINGS;
a) Axiom of Relevancy
b) INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS;
c) CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS;

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-none but facts having rational probative value

are admissible 6. EXCLUSIONARY RULES
b) Axiom of Competency a) Right against unreasonable search and
-all facts having rational probative value are seizure;
admissible unless some specific rule forbids their b) Right ti privacy and inviolability of
admission. communication;
c) Right of a person under investigation for an
3. TYPES OF ADMISSIBILITY offense;
a) Multiple Admissibility of Evidence d) Right against self-incrimination;
-may be admitted for any or all of the purposes e) RA 9745, Any confession, admission or
b) Conditional Admissibility of Evidence statement obtained as result of torture shall
-condition that the other facts will be proved be inadmissible as evidence EXCEPT if the
thereafter, otherwise it will be stricken out same person is used as evidence against a
c) Curative Admissibility of Evidence (Fire person or persons accused of committing
with fire) torture;
- where improper evidence was admitted over the f) RA No 9372, Any listened to, intercepted,
objection of the opposing party, he should be and recorded communications, messages,
permitted to contradict it with similar improper conversations, discussions, or spoken or
evidence introduced to cure, contradict, or neutralize written words, or any parts or parts thereof,
improper evidence presented by the other party. or any information or fact complained
ADMISSIBILTY WEIGHT therein, including their existence, content,
(PROBATIVE VALUE) substance, purport, effect, or meaning
As to the questions -refers to the question which have been secured in violation of the
resolved, it refers to of whether or not the provisions of the Human Security Act shall
the question of evidence proves an absolutely be inadmissible in any judicial,
whether or not the issue quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative
evidence is to be investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or
considered at all. hearing.
-pertains to its -pertains to its g) Evidence obtained in violation of RA No.
relevance and tendency to convince 4200.
competence and pursuade 7. DOCTRINE OF THE “FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS
-It depends on logic - it depends on the TREE
and law guidelines provided in -Once the primary source is shown to have been
Rule 133 and doctrines unlawfully obtained, any secondary evidence derived
laid down by the SC from it is also inadmissible.
-Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is
4. RULES OF EXCLUSION V. EXCLUSIONARY RULES obtained as as direct result of the illegal act, whereas
RULES OF EXCLUSION EXCLUSIONARY RULES the “fruit of the poisonous tree” is at least once
- in the system of -these are commonly removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is
evidence, they are used for evidence equally inadmissible.
rules of exception to a excluded by the
general admissibility of Constitution. “But for” test or “Taint doctrine” -test is whether or
all that is rational and not the evidence could not have been obtained but for
probative the illegal action of the police.
E,g. the contents of a E.g. evidence obtained
photocopied document in violation of EXC. When the secondary evidence to which an
may be relevant but prohibition against objection is also made would have been inevitably
may be inadmissible searches and seizures discovered by law enforcement authorities by sources
under the BER or procedures independent of illegal search or seizure.

5. RULES OF EXCLUSION 8. ADMISSIBILITY OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS (CA)

a) Best Evidence Rule (i) Must COMPLY with the rules on admissibility
b) Parol Evidence Rule prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws; and
c) Hearsay Evidence Rule (ii) must be AUTHENTICATED in the manner
d) Offer of Compromise in Civil Cases prescribed by the Rules on Electronic Evidence
e) Disqualification of Witness by Reason of
Mental Incapacity or Immaturity 9. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN
f) Disqualification of Witness by Reason of VIOLATION OF LAW ON SECRECY OF BANK DEPOSITS
Death or Insanity of Adverse Party (RA 1405)
g) Disqualification by reason of marriage;
h) Disqualification by reason of Privileged Gen Rule: All deposits with banking institutions in the
Communication Philippines including investments in bonds issued by

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the Government of the Philippines are considered as
of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be
examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office.
EXC.
(1) written permission of the depositor,
(2) In cases of impeachment,
(3) Upon order of the competent court in cases of
bribery and dereliction of duty of public officials, or
(4) In cases where the money deposited is the
subject matter of the litigation.
- Nothing in RA 1405 provides that unlawful
examination of bank accounts will make the
evidence obtained thereby inadmissible. Sec 5 only
punishes violators of the law with 5 years
imprisonment or fine, or both.
ART 7 OF PD NO. 603, only provides for sanctions
against persons violating the rule on confidentiality of
birth records, but nowhere does it state that
procurement of birth records in violation of said
article would render said records inadmissible in
evidence.
CASE LAW
Admissibility of Evidence
(1) PEOPLE VS DEL MONTE (SEC 21 RA 9165)
FACTS
“Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act 2002”
12/10/02(3pm) Confidential Informant informed
PDEA Baliuag. Buy-bust operation was conducted by
SPO2 MAUNG (TL), PO1 TOLENTINO JR (POSEUR BUYER),
and PO1 Barrerras as BackUp
Defense alleged that the procedure was in
violation of SEC 21, RA 9165.Pictures not taken
immediately.
ISSUE:Whether the evidence is inadmissible
for failure to comply with such provision?
HELD. NO.
In People v. Pringas, we explained that non-
compliance with Section 21 will not render an accused's
arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
In the case at bar, appellant never questioned the
custody and disposition of the drug that was taken from
him. In fact, he stipulated that the drug subject matter
of this case was forwarded to PNP Regional Crime
Laboratory Office 3, Malolos, Bulacan for laboratory
examination which examination gave positive result for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. We
thus find the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
drug seized from appellant not to have been
compromised.
We would like to add that non-compliance with
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
Section 21 of said law, particularly the making of the
inventory and the photographing of the drugs
confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs
inadmissible in evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule 128
of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or
these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there
should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If
there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be
admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will
accorded it by the courts. One example is that provided
in Section 31 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court wherein a
party producing a document as genuine which has been
altered and appears to be altered after its execution, in
a part material to the question in dispute, must account
for the alteration. His failure to do so shall make the
document inadmissible in evidence. This is clearly
provided for in the rules.
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or
in any rule that will bring about the non-admissibility of
the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-
compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.
(2) BSB GROUP INC VS GO (BANK SECRECY LAW)
FACTS
In 2002, Estafa/Qualified Theft -Several Checks-
P1,534,135.50 (Security bank-Divisoria)
Subpoena was issued against Managers of Security
bank and Metrobank Jose Abad Santos .(Resp claims is
irrelevant in MTQ)
Respondent Invokes RA 1405. CA suppressed the
SCTC rep’s testimony
ISSUE:Is testimony of Marasigan, SBTC Rep irrelevant to
the case? Does it violate RA 1405?
HELD. YES. It is irrelevant.
RELEVANCE: Whether they HAVE SUCH DIRECT RELATION
to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or
non-existence.
EXCEPTIONS to RA 1405.
(1) Upon written permission of depositor;
(2) in cases of impeachment,
(3) upon order of a competent court in cases of
bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or
(4) in cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter or invested is the subject
matter of litigation.
What constitutes “subject matter of litigation”, the
money deposited in the account is itself the subject of
action.
(3) DE JESUS VS SANCHEZ-MALIT
FACTS
Disbarment case: Grave misconduct, dishonesty,
malpractice
- 06/23/04- drafted and notarized REM of a public
market falsely naming himself as the owner. Mortgagee
sued Atty for perjury
- notarized a contract without lessees’ signature.
-Notarized an agreement of sale of CLOA, without
telling him that such property is subject to prohibition
period.
-Notarized 3 blank SPAs.. Additional evidence.
IBP- immediate revocation of Notarial Commission
DEFENSE: Additional Evidence are inadmissible, in
violation of Sec 4 Rule VI off Rules on Notarial Practice.
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RULES ON EVIDENCE
ISSUE: Is the additional evidence inadmissible for
violation of the Notarial Law?
HELD. No.
The 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contains no provision
declaring the inadmissibility of documents obtained in
violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly considered in
evidence the other notarized documents submitted by
complainant as additional evidence.
(4) PEOPLE VS SAMONTANEZ (Fruit of the Poisonous
Tree)
FACTS
11/25/95- Corazon Delas Alas- Lolita (18yo)- Ilaya,
Batangas. 8pm same day- lifeless body of Lolita in mid
of sugar cane plantation
6:30pm. Accused left sugar cane plantation.
11/28-Roberto was arrested in his workplace. He
admitted in police headquarters, Lolita’s belongings
were in his bag.
RTC found him guilty. Sentenced to DEATH
APPEAL: Plea of guilt is inadmissible, for having
improvidently made. No Counsel in Custodial
Investigation.
“Fruits of the Poisonous Tree”:In Roberto’s bag:Omax
wrist watch, pawnshop receipt of gold ring owned by
Lolita, fan knife
ISSUE 1: IS THE PLEA OF GUILT VALID?
HELD. NO.
Sec 2 Rule 116 provides for the mandate that trial
courts should follow in case where the accused pleads
guilty.
Based on the rule, three things are enjoined of the
trial court after a plea of guilty to a capital offense is
entered by the accused:
(1) The trial court must conduct a searching inquiry
into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea;
(2) The trial court must require the prosecution to
present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and
the precise degree of his culpability through the
requisite quantum of evidence, and
(3) The trial court ask the accused if he desires to
present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if
he desires. It must be emphasized that the said
procedure is mandatory at any judge who fails to
observe it commits grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE 2: ARE THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE?
HELD. No. The considered pieces of evidence that are
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial
“fruit of the poisonous tree:.
We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda
warnings in our jurisdiction. We have also adopted the
libertarian exclusionary rule known as the “fruit of the
poisonous tree” , that once the primary source is shown
to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or
derivative evidence derived from it is also inadmissible/
Illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct
result of the illegal act, whereas the “fruit of the
poisonous tree” is the indirect result of the same illegal
act.
“The fruit of the poisonous tree” is at least once
removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is
equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle
that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not
be used to gain other evidence because the originally
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
illegally obtained evidence taint all evidence
subsequently obtained.
(5) NAVARRO VS CA ( RA4200)
FACTS
2/4/90, nighttime, Accused, member of Lucena
Integrated National Police, assaulted IKE LINGAN inside
Lucena Police HQ. Hit the Butt of his Gun to the Head
Concussion of Linganm causing his death.
Stanley Jalbuena & Ike Lingan- Reportes of DWTI.
Jalbuena took a picture of a nude dancer at a stripclub.
“Kinakalaban mo si Kabo liquin?”. Jalbuena signed
a blotter with a gun in his head. Jalbuena was able to
record on tape the exchange.
ISSUE: Is the recording inadmissble because of RA
4200?
HELD.No.
The quarrel is not private. Law prohibits
overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private
communications.
Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the
testimony of Jalbuena on the ground that he was a
biased witness, having a grudge against him. The
testimony of a witness who has an interest in the
conviction of the accused is not, for this reason alone,
unreliable. Trial courts, which have the opportunity to
observe the facial expressions, gestures, and tones of
voice of a witness while testifying, are competent to
determine whether his or her testimony should be given
credence. In the instant case, petitioner Navarro has not
shown that the trial court erred in according weight to
the testimony of Jalbuena. 
Indeed, Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the
voice recording he had made. It may be asked whether
the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which
prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative.
The law provides:
SECTION 4. Any communication or spoken word, or
the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained obtained or secured by
any person in violation of the preceding sections of this
Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial,
quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation.
(6) Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing,
intercepting, or recording of private
communications.  Since the exchange between
petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape
recording is not prohibited.
SEC 4. RELEVANCY; COLLATERAL MATTERS
SEC 4. RELEVANCY; COLLATERAL MATTERS--Evidence
must have such relation to the fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence;
Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed,
except when it tends in any reasonable degree to
establish the probability or improbability of the fact
in issue.
1. RELEVANCY
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RULES ON EVIDENCE

-the evidence is relevant when it is related to a

fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-
existence

2. TEST OF RELEVANCY
a) Experience and the Rule of Logic
-naturally and logically tends to establish a fact in
issue
b) The Rational or Logical Relevancy Test
-whether there is a logical or rational connection
between the fact which is sought to be proved
c) The Logical Connection Test in Collateral
Matters
-whether evidence is admissible to show collateral
fact or where proffered evidence is relevant to a
collateral issue.

3. EVIDENCE ON COLLATERAL MATTERS

-refers to matters other than the fact in issue.
These are matters outside the controversy, or are not
directly connected with the principal matter or issue
in dispute, as indicated in the pleadings of the parties.
-Evidence on collateral matters shall not be
allowed.

4. FACT IN ISSUE VS FACT RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE

FACT IN ISSUE FACT RELEVANT TO
THE ISSUE
-those which the -are those facts which
plaintiff must prove in render probable the
order to establish his existence or non-
claim and those facts existence of a fact in
which the defendant issue, or some other
must prove in order to relevant fact.
establish a defense set
up by him, but only
when the fact alleged
by one party is not
admitted by the other
party.

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RULE 129
WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED
1. MATTERS THET NEED NOT BE PROVED:(JASPA)
a) Facts which are the subject of judicial
notice;
b) Facts which are admitted;
c) Matters are not Specifically denied in the
answer;
d) Facts which are legally presumed;
e) Those which are the subject of an agreed
statement of facts between the parties.
2. JUDICIAL NOTICE
- is the cognizance of certain facts which judges
may properly take and act on without proof because
they already know them.
3. EFFECT OF JUDICIAL NOTICE UPON THE BURDEN
OF PROVING A FACT
-Judicial notice relieves the parties from the
necessity of introducing evidence to prove the fact
noticed
-Stipulations and admissions of the parties or their
counsel cannot prevail over the operation of the
doctrine of judicial notice, and such stipulations and
admissions are all subject to the operation of the
doctrine of judicial notice,
4. MATERIAL REQUISITES [CSK]
a) The matter must be one of COMMON AND
GENERAL knowledge;
b) It must be well and authoritatively settled
and not doubtful or uncertain; and
c) It must be known to be within the limits of
the jurisdiction of the court.
5. TEST OF NOTORIETY
-the principal guide in determining what facts
may be assumed to be judicially known is that of
notoriety.
- Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is
limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts
of general notoriety.
6. JUDGE’S PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
-Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge.
-Judicial Cognizance is taken only of those
matters which are commonly known.
7. KINDS OF JUDICIAL NOTICE
a) Mandatory; and
b) Discretionary
CASE LAW
What Need Not be Proved
(1) SPS LATIP VS CHUA
FACTS
Lessor, Chua leased 2 cubicles at 1 st and 2nd floor,
56sqm for P60K monthly.
- Chua sent a letter demanding backpay and to vacate
premises. Latip already paid P2,570,000.00 with
receipts in Rosalie’s handwriting. Rosalie averred she
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
accepted it in goodwill. Contract of lease is novated by
sale of lease rights.
MeTC- ordered Latip to pay 1 year rental- P720K
RTC- reversed. Lease contract was not notarized, no
signature of Chua’s husband, and signatures of SPS Latip
CA-reversed and ordered the ejectment of Sps Latip.
Judicial notice of the common practice in the area in
Baclaran, where Goodwill money is paid.
ISSUE: Did CA err in taking judicial notice of the
practice in Baclaran where goodwill money is paid?
RULING. YES.
It is apparent that the matter which CA took judicial
notice does not meet the requisite of notoriety. To
begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this
supposed practice to pay goodwill money. The practice
was not of “common knowledge”.
DISCUSSION ON JUDICIAL NOTICE
On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro is instructive:
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the
wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take
judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with
caution; care must be taken that the requisite
notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the
subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have
three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in
determining what facts may be assumed to be
judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be
said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced
by public records and facts of general notoriety.
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a
fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form
of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the
fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the
court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will
not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial
knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the
judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and
he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge
of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the
basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of
those matters which are "commonly" known. SaHIEA
Things of "common knowledge", of which courts
take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the
ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters
which are generally accepted by mankind as true and
are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration.
Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may
be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of
such universal notoriety and so generally understood
that they may be regarded as forming part of the
common knowledge of every person. 
The principal guide in determining what facts may
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be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety.
Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to
facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety.
Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not
subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either:
(1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court; or
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by
resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questionable.
Things of "common knowledge", of which courts take
judicial notice, may be matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the
ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters
which are generally accepted by mankind as true and
are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration.
Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may
be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are
such of universal notoriety and so generally understood
that they may be regarded as forming part of the
common knowledge of every person. As the common
knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety
of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being
matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take
judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent
on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the
court has no constructive knowledge.
(2) JUAN VS JUAN [ Internet Sources]
-”Lavandera Ko”-July 4, 1994- Certficate of Copyright in
1997
-1997,he formed Laundromatic Corp. Then he
discovered his brother Roberto, was able to register
with IPO “lavendera ko” on 2001, and threatened his
franchisees of criminal and civil cases if they do not
stop the use of the mark and name.
RTC ruled that parties are not entitled to the right of
use and enjoy “Lavandera Ko” based on information
from the internet, which the RTC ruling cited.
ISSUE: Is the court allowed to take judicial notice of
such information from the internet?
RULING. NO.
RTCs basis or source, being an article appearing in a
website, in its ruling cannot be considered a subject of
judicial notice that does not need further
authentication or verification. Judicial notice is the
cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly
take and act on without proof because these facts are
already known to them.
The article in the website cited by the RTC patently
lacks a requisite for it to be of judicial notice to the
court because such article is not well and
authoritatively settled, and is doubtful or uncertain. It
must be remembered that some articles appearing in
the internet or on websites are easily edited and their
sources are unverifiable.
SEC 1. JUDICIAL NOTICE, WHEN MANDATORY
SEC.1 JUDICIAL NOTICE, WHEN MANDATORY. --A court
shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
evidence of the existence and territorial extent of
states, their political history, forms of government and
symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty
and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the
political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the National Government of the
Philippines, the laws of nature. The measure of time,
and the geographical divisions.
-Señga Notes-
The new rule clarifies that only the official acts
of the legislative, executive and judicial departments
of the National Government are those subject of
mandatory judicial notice. Consequently, the official
acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of local government units are generally
not subject of mandatory judicial notice.
In Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr., G.R.
No. 156052 (Resolution), February 13, 2008, the
Supreme Court ruled that while courts are required to
take judicial notice of the laws enacted by Congress,
the rule with respect to local ordinances is different.
Ordinances are not included in the enumeration of
matters covered by mandatory judicial notice under
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
In this case, it was alleged that Section 50 of RA
409 or the Revised Charter of Manila, provides that
“All courts sitting in the city shall take judicial notice
of the ordinances passed by the [Sangguniang
Panglungsod].”
The Supreme Court ruled that the foregoing
provision cannot be taken to mean that the Supreme
Court, since it has its seat in the City of Manila, should
have taken steps to procure a copy of the Manila
ordinance on its own, relieving the party of any duty
to inform the Supreme Court about it. Even where
there is a statute that requires a court to take judicial
notice of municipal ordinances, a court is not required
to take judicial notice of ordinances that are not
before it and to which it does not have access. The
party asking the court to take judicial notice is
obligated to supply the court with the full text of the
rules the party desires it to have notice of. Counsel
should take the initiative in requesting that a trial
court take judicial notice of an ordinance even where
a statute requires courts to take judicial notice of
local ordinances.
The intent of a statute requiring a court to take
judicial notice of a local ordinance is to remove any
discretion a court might have in determining whether
or not to take notice of an ordinance. Such a statute
does not direct the court to act on its own in obtaining
evidence for the record and a party must make the
ordinance available to the court for it to take notice.
1. MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE (EP- NAP-ON- TG)
a) The existence and territorial extent of
states;
b) Their Political history, forms of
government, and symbols of nationality;
c) The law of Nations;
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d) The Admiralty and maritime courts of the
world and their seals;
e) The political constitution and history of the
Philippines;
f) The Official acts of the legislative,
executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines;
Matters relating to the legislative department
-Bound to take judicial notice of the dates
when Congress begins and closes, its session, the
number and functions, and privileges of its
members. Joint resolution of public character
passed by the legislature must also be judicially
known.
Matters relating to the executive department
-these include the organization of the
Executive Department and its principal officers,
whether elected or appointed.
Matters relating to the SC courts of justice
-SC has taken judicial notice of its record in
a previous case in connection with the conduct of
the litigant or witness on a similar matter. But
the SC does not take judicial notice of
proceedings in various courts of justice in the PH.
g) Laws of Nature; [ law on gravity, flow of
tides etc]
h) Measure of Time; and
i) Geographical divisions
CASE LAW
(1) PEOPLE VS DOCUMENTO [ Territorial Bounds]
Facts
4/22/96(Ochoa Ave), and 10/15/95((brgy
Antongalon) In Butuan Cuty, Minor 16 yo, carnal
knowledge.RA 7659
- She was raped when 10yo, and gave birth in 1993.
Pled Not Guilty- Changed to Guilty- then said was
coerced by Prosecutor
Accused said he had consensual sexual relations with
AAA, and disowned the handwritten letters of apology to
AAA’s parents.
RTC- DEATH; CA-Reclusion Perpetua
Accused avers that there is no territorial jurisdiction
over the crime, and that the prosecution failed to
establish that the two counts of rape were done in
Butuan City. CA pointed out that although “Butuan City”
was not mentioned in the testimony, it was stated that
it happened in Ochoa Ave and Brgy Antongalan.
ISSUE: Did the prosecution fail to establish the
territorial jurisdiction where the crime was allegedly
committed?
HELD. No.
The inclusion of the two barangays in the City of
Butuan is a matter of Mandatory Judicial Notice by
the trial court.
(2) PELTAN DEVELOPMENT INC. VS CA [Jurisprudence]
Facts
Filed for “Cancellation of titles and damages. .
197,527sqm, Bar. Tindig na Manga, Las Pinas.Rey had
been occupying and cultivating for many years. Illegally
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
bulldozed and destroyed by Edgardo Espinosa. Despite
no opposition to their application for free patent, it was
obstructed because of the existence TCT under the
name of Peltan Devt. From a fictitious OCT.
RTC- Rey and Araujo not real party in interest,
dismissed complaint
CA- reversed. SC reversed.
CA failed to take judicial notice of “Margolles vs
CA” ruling( upheld the validity of OCT No. 4126).
RULING
It is axiomatic nonetheless that a court has a
mandate to apply relevant statutes and jurisprudence in
determining whether the allegations in a complaint
establish a cause of action. While it focuses on the
complaint, a court clearly cannot disregard decisions
material to the proper appreciation of the questions
before it. In resolving a motion to dismiss, every court
must take cognizance of decisions this Court has
rendered because they are proper subjects of
mandatory judicial notice as provided by Section 1 of
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
The Court is well aware that a decision in Margolles
vs. CA, rendered on 14 February 1994, upheld the
validity of OCT No. 4216 (and the certificates of title
derived therefrom), the same OCT that the present
complaint seeks to nullify for being "fictitious and
spurious." Respondent CA, in its assailed Decision dated
29 June 1994, failed to consider Margolles vs. CA. The
Supreme Court promulgated Margolles ahead of the
assailed CA decision. It was incumbent upon Respondent
CA to take judicial notice thereof and apply it in
resolving this case. That the CA did not is clearly a
reversible error.
(3) PEOPLE VS SEVILLENO [Territorial Jurisdiction]
FACTS
7/22/95(10am) Accused Paulino Tamayowas
charged with rape with homicide of 9yo niece, Virginia.
She was found dead in Sugarcane fields “Campo 9”.
He pled guilty to rape and murder of a 9yo girl.
Due to Typhoon Pepang- Accused escaped detention.
Trial in Absentia ensued. Accused was recaptured.
The testimony of Norma Baquia was disregarded for
failure to establish that the incident happened in the
territorial jurisdiction of the court.
ISSUE: Is the failure to account Norma’s testimony on
account that it failed to establish that the offense
happened in the territorial jurisdiction of the court
proper?
HELD. NO.
The court below erred in disregarding the testimony
of Norma Baquia "for the reason that her testimony
failed to establish that the incident happened within the
territorial jurisdiction of this court." The court did not
consider her testimony purportedly because she only
testified that her sister Virginia went with the accused
to Guindali-an without specifying as to what
municipality or city it was part of. Again, this is error.
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court requires courts
to take judicial notice, without the introduction of
evidence, of the existence and geographical divisions of
our country.
There is only one Sitio Guindali-an, Brgy. Guadalupe,
San Carlos City (Negros Occidental). ET
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SEC 2. JUDICIAL NOTICE, WHEN DISCRETIONARY.
Sec 2. Judicial Notice, When Discretionary. --A court
may take judicial notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges.
1. DISCRETIONARY JUDICIAL NOTICE [PDF]
a) Matters which are of Public Knowledge;
b) Matters capable of unquestionable
Demonstration;
c) Matters ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial Functions.
2. FOREIGN LAWS
Gr. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can a
court take judicial notice of them, Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved
EXC. In certain decided cases however, judicial notice
has been taken of the laws of another country [C-
PAWS]
(i) Common Law;
(ii) When a foreign law is part of a Published
treatise, periodical, or pamphlet and the writer is
recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the
subject, the court, may take judicial notice of the
treatise;
(iii) Foreign statute Accepted by the government;
(iv) those Generally WELL-KNOWN, is within the
actual knowledge of the court , had been ruled upon I
previous case before it and none of the parties claim
otherwise; and
(v) Stipulation by the parties.
3. DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION
(Doctrine of Presumed-Identity Approach)
-where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if
pleaded,is not proved, the presumption is that foreign
law is the same as ours.
4. JUDICIAL NOTICE OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES
a) Inferior courts should take mandatory
judicial notice of municipal or city
ordinances in force in their territorial
jurisdiction;
b) The RTC should take judicial notice of
municipal ordinances in force in the
municipalities within their jurisdiction only
when:
i. Required by law;
ii. On appeal to it from the inferior court
in which the latter took judicial notice
5. JUDICIAL NOTICE OF RECORDS PREVIOUSLY TRIED
6. MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE VS DISCRETIONARY
JUDICIAL NOTICE
CASE LAW
Judicial Notice, When Discretionary
(1) CANDELARIA VS PEOPLE [Price of Diesel]
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
FACTS
7/23/06- Viron Transit Corp ordered 14,000L of Diesel
worth P497,000 from United Oil Petroleum Phils owned
by Lao.
Candelaria, a truck driver employed by Lao was
dispatched to deliver the fuel.
Candelaria carnapped the lorry truck, plate no. PTA945.
RTC-Guilty
CA- guilty on circumstantial evidence.
ISSUE: Can the courts take judicial notice to
determine the value of the thing stolen?
HELD.
The imposable penalty for the crime of Qualified
Theft depends upon the value of the thing stolen. To
prove the value of the stolen property for purposes of
fixing the imposable penalty under Articles 309 and 310
of the RPC, as amended, the Court explained in People
v. Anabe  that the prosecution must present more than
a mere uncorroborated "estimate." 
In the absence of independent and reliable
corroboration of such estimate, the courts may either
apply the minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix
the value of the property taken based on the
attendant circumstances of the case.  In Merida v.
People (Merida),  which applied the doctrine
enunciated in People v. Dator (Dator),  the Court
deemed it improper to take judicial notice of the selling
price of narra at the time of the commission of its
theft, as such evidence would be "unreliable and
inconclusive considering the lack of independent and
competent source of such information." 
However, in the more recent case of Lozano v.
People (Lozano), the Court fixed the value of the stolen
magwheels at P12,000.00 as the "reasonable allowable
limit under the circumstances,"  notwithstanding the
uncorroborated testimony of the private complainant
therein. Lozano cited, among others, the case
of Francisco v. People  (Francisco) where the Court
ruled that "the trial court can only take judicial notice
of the value of goods which are matters of public
knowledge or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration," further explaining that the value of
jewelry, the stolen items in the said case, is neither a
matter of public knowledge nor is it capable of
unquestionable demonstration. 
In this case, Candelaria has been found guilty of
stealing diesel fuel. Unlike in Francisco, where the
Court had no reference to ascertain the price of the
stolen jewelry, or in Merida and Dator, where the Court
refused to take judicial notice of the selling price of
lumber and/or narra for "lack of independent and
competent source" of the necessary information at the
time of the commission of the theft, the value of diesel
fuel in this case may be readily gathered from price lists
published by the Department of Energy (DOE). In this
regard, the value of diesel fuel involved herein may
then be considered as a matter of public knowledge
which falls within the purview of the rules on
discretionary judicial notice. 
 To note, "judicial [notice], which is based on
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considerations of expediency and convenience,
displace[s] evidence since, being equivalent to proof, it
fulfills the object which the evidence is intended to
achieve."  safely be assumed from the tribunal's general knowledge
While it is true that the prosecution had only presented
the uncorroborated testimony of the private
complainant, Lao, to prove that the value of the diesel
fuel stolen is P497,000.00, the Court — taking judicial
notice of the fact that the pump price of diesel fuel in
August 2006 (i.e., the time of the commission of the
crime) is within the range of P37.60 to P37.86 per
liter  — nonetheless remains satisfied that such amount
must be sustained. As the value of the goods may
independently and competently be ascertained from the
DOE's price publication, adding too that the defense had
not presented any evidence to contradict said finding
nor cross-examined Lao anent her proffered valuation,
the Court, notwithstanding the solitary evidence of the
prosecution, makes this determination following the
second prong set by case law — and that is, to fix the
value of the property taken based on the attendant
circumstances of the case. Verily, such circumstances
militate against applying the alternative of imposing a
minimum penalty and, more so, the CA's arbitrary
valuation of P14,000.00, since the basis for which was
not explained. Therefore, for purposes of fixing the
proper penalty for Qualified Theft in this case, the value
of the stolen property amounting to P497,000.00 must
be considered. Conformably with the provisions of
Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC, the proper penalty to
be imposed upon Candelaria is reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole,  to conform
with prevailing law and jurisprudence.  submitted by the survey team that had been constituted
(2) HABAGAT GRILL V. DMC URBAN PROPERTY
Facts
Consunji Inc. - residential lot situated in Matina
Davao City.
6/13/91-David Consunji Inc transferred said lot to its
sister company, the DMC Urban Property Developers, Inc
(DMC)
Alleging that Louie Biraogo forcibly entered said
lot and built the Habagat Grill in December 1993, DMC
filed [1994] a Complaint for Forcible Entry against
Habagat Grill and/or Louie Biraogo. rental value of said
lot is P10,000 a month. Louie Biraogo in his Answer
denied illegally entering the lot in question.
MTC- denied on lack of jurisdiction
Respondent argues that the trial court
indiscriminately ignored the Report of the survey team
that had been constituted to determine the exact
location of Habagat Grill. Respondent further contends
that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the
metes and bounds of the property covered by
Presidential Proclamation No. 20. Although the lower
court may take judicial notice of PD No. 20, it may not
do so in regard to the metes and bounds of Times
Beach. Neither, may it claim knowledge of the
situational relation between the land in question and
Times Beach.
RULING
SC agrees with respondent. "Judicial notice is the
cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly
take and act on without proof because they already
know them." Its object is to save time, labor and
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
expense in securing and introducing evidence on
matters that are not ordinarily capable of dispute or
actually bona fide disputed, and the tenor of which can
or from a slight search on its part.
Indeed, municipal courts may take judicial notice
of the municipal ordinances in force in the municipality
in which they sit. Such notice, however, is limited to
what the law is and what it states.
A court may take discretionary judicial notice
where the boundaries of the lot covered by the law
are not a matter of public knowledge capable of
unquestionable demonstration.—The location of
Habagat Grill cannot be resolved by merely taking
judicial notice of Presidential Proclamation No. 20; such
location is precisely at the core of the dispute in this
case.
Moreover, considering respondent’s allegation that
the supposed lot covered by the Ordinance has been lost
due to inundation by the sea, we cannot fathom how
the trial court could have known of the actual location
of the metes and bounds of the subject lot. Neither may
the MTC take discretionary judicial notice under Section
2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, because the exact
boundaries of the lot covered by that law are not a
matter of public knowledge capable of unquestionable
demonstration. Neither may these be known to judges
because of their judicial functions.
Hence, the CA was correct in disregarding the findings
of the trial courts, because they had erred in taking
judicial notice of the exact metes and bounds of the
property. The appellate court aptly relied on the Report
by the trial court, precisely for the purpose of
determining the location of Habagat Grill in relation to
respondent’s lot.
SEC 3. JUDICIAL NOTICE, WHEN HEARING NECESSARY
Sec 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. --
During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on
request of a party, may announce its intention to take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal,
the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a
party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow
the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is
decisive of a material issue in the case.
Judicial Notice, When Hearing Necessary. —
During the pre-trial and the trial, the court, motu
proprio or upon motion, shall hear the parties on
the propriety of taking judicial notice of any
matter.
Before judgment or on appeal, the court,
motu proprio or upon motion, may take judicial
notice of any matter and shall hear the parties
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material
issue in the case.
-SEÑGA NOTES
Even during the pre-trial, matters sought to be
taken judicial notice of may be heard. The old rule
provided that the hearing on matters sought to be
taken judicial notice of may take place during trial,
without mentioning pre-trial.
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With the amendment changing the term “may” to
“shall”, it appears that the intention is to make
mandatory the hearing on the matter sought to be
taken judicial notice of, whether it be during pre-trial,
trial, at any time before judgment and even on
appeal.
Note that generally , theories, issues and
arguments not brought to the attention of the trial
court will not be considered by a reviewing court,
except when their factual bases would not require
presentation of any further evidence by the adverse
party in order to enable him to properly meet the
issue raised, such as when the factual bases of such
novel theory , issue or argument is (a) subject of
judicial notice; or (b) had already been judicially
admitted. (Borromeo v. Mina, G.R. No. 193747, June
5, 2013)
1. STAGES UPON WHICH THE COURT MAY TAKE
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF A FACT
a) During Pre-trial (Revised Rules)
b) During trial;
c) After trial and before judgment; or
d) Appeal
2. PURPOSE OF HEARING
-to afford the parties reasonable opportunity to
present information relevant to the propriety of taking
such judicial notice or the tenor of the matter to be
noticed.
3. JUDICIAL NOTICE DURING PRE-TRIAL OR TRIAL VS
BEFORE JUDGMENT OR ON APPEAL
DURING PRETRIAL OR TRIAL, the court may announce
its intention to take judicial notice of “ any matter”
and may hear the parties thereon.
AFTER TRIAL BUT BEFORE JUDGMENT OR ON APPEAL,
the court may take judicial notice of any matter and
allow the parties to be heard “if such matter is
decisive of a material issue in the case.”
CASE LAW
Judicial Notice, When hearing si Necessary
(1) PEOPLE VS TUNDAG (Age)
FACTS
-her father, Tomas Tundag, raped her twice. First
was on 9/ 5/1997 and the other on 11/18/1997. Also
alleged that she was 13 years old when she was raped by
her father. (However, the prosecution in the case at bar
was not able to show any documents pertaining to Mary
Ann’s age at the time of the commission of the rape.
The prosecution then asked the Court to take judicial
notice that Mary Ann was under 18 years of age which
was subsequently granted without conducting a
hearing.)
After the commission of the second rape, Mary Ann
went to her neighbor, Bebie Cabahug. They reported
this to the police and was later examined by a doctor
RTC- DEATH
CA, Tomas flatly denied that the incidents
complained of ever took place. He contends that on
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
September 5, 1997, he was working as a watch
repairman near Gals Bakery in Mandaue City Market and
went home tired and sleepy at around 11:00 o’clock
that evening. On November 7, 1997, he claims he was at
work.
Issue : Was it correct for the Court to take judicial
notice of Mary Ann’s age without a hearing?.
Held: No.
With respect to other matters not falling within the
mandatory or discretionary judicial notice, the court
can take judicial notice of a fact pursuant to the
procedure in Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
which requires that — SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when
hearing necessary. — During the trial, the court, on its
own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce
its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and
allow the parties to be heard thereon. After the trial,
and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on
its own initiative or on request of a party, may take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material
issue in the case.
In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is
improper, despite the defense counsel's admission
thereof, acceding to the prosecution's motion. As
required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any other
matters such as age, a hearing is required before courts
can take judicial notice of such fact. Generally, the age
of the victim may be proven by the birth or baptismal
certificate of the victim, or in the absence thereof,
upon showing that said documents were lost or
destroyed, by other documentary or oral evidence
sufficient for the purpose.
(2) PEOPLE VS LIBAN (Minority must be alleged)
Facts
Having been found guilty of raping his own minor
daughter, appellant was meted the penalty of death
under RA 7659. Hence, this appeal, where appellant
bewailed the penalty imposed upon him on the ground
that the prosecution failed to prove the real age of the
victim.
Under RA 7659, rape of a minor by her own father
is punishable by death. However, to appreciate the
qualifying circumstance of minority of the victim in
incestuous rape cases, the same must not only be
specifically alleged in the information but must likewise
be established beyond reasonable doubt during trial.
Here, save the bare testimony of the victim that
she was 10 years old at the time of the first rape,
nothing else could be elicited from the records to
ascertain the correct age of the victim.
ISSUE:Can the court take judicial notice of the
minority of the victim?
HELD. No
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RULES ON EVIDENCE

The Court here emphasizes that the severity, as -As a rule, it is -they are generally
well as the irreversible and final nature, of the penalty conclusive upon the disputable except when
of death once carried out makes the decision-making party making them elements of estoppel
process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most
are present
exacting rules of procedure and evidence.
It is to be recognized that, due to variable 2. REQUISITES [PCN]
circumstances, no two cases are really ever alike that, a) The same must be made by the Party to the
at times, may easily mislead one to perceive the Court case’
to be giving, albeit inaccurately, vacillating rulings. b) Admission must be made in the Course of
Relative particularly to the qualifying circumstance of the proceedings in the same Case; and
minority of the victim in incestuous rape cases, the c) There is not particular form for an
Court has consistently adhered to the idea that the admission--It may either be written or
victim's minority must not only be specifically alleged in
verbal
the information but must likewise be established
beyond reasonable doubt during trial. Neither the
obvious minority of the victim, nor the absence of any 3. WHAT NEED NOT TO BE PROVED
contrary assertion from the defense, can exonerate the a) Admission made in the course of the
prosecution from these twin requirements. proceedings
Judicial notice of the issue of age, without the b) Admissions in amended pleadings
requisite hearing conducted under Section 3, Rule - an amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it
129, of the Rules of Court, would not be considered amends. However, admissions in superseded pleadings
enough compliance with the law. The birth certificate
may be received in evidence against the pleader
of the victim or, in lieu thereof, any other documentary
evidence, like a baptismal certificate, school records c) Rule on Dismissed Pleadings
and documents of similar nature, or credible testimonial -merely extra judicial admissions
evidence, that can help establish the age of the victim
should be presented. While the declaration of a victim d) Rules on Pleadings not filed
as to her age, being an exception to the hearsay i. IF SIGNED BY THE PARTY, considered
proscription, would be admissible under the rule on EJC
pedigree, the question on the relative weight that may ii. IF SIGNED BY THE ATTY, not admissible
be accorded to it is another matter. Corroborative
“ An attorney has authority to make statements
evidence would be most desirable or even essential
when circumstances warrant. on behalf of hos client only in open court or in a
pleading actually filed.
SEC 4. JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
Sec 4. Judicial admissions. -- An admission, verbal oral e) Admission made by counsel
or written, made by a party in the course of the GR. Admissions made by a counsel are binding upon
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. the client.
The admission may be contradicted only by showing that EXC. In cases where reckless or gross negligence of
it was made through palpable mistake or that no such counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or
admission was made. the imputed admission was not, when its application will result in outright deprivation
in fact, made. of the client’s liberty or property, or where interest of
-the phrasing was changed by the Revised Rules on justice so require, relief is accorded to the client who
Evidence but the meaning remains the same. suffered by reason of the lawyer’s gross or palpable
mistake or negligence.
GR. A Judicial admission is conclusive upon the party
making it and does not require proof f) Implied admissions of Actionable
EXC. Documents
1. When it is shown that the admission was made g) Other cases of Judicial Admissions
through palpable mistake; and i. Failure to specifically deny the
2. When it is shown that no such admission was in fact allegations
made. ii. Negative pregnant
1. JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS VS EXTRA-JUDICIAL 4. REMEDY OF A PARTY WHO GAVE A JUDICIAL
ADMISSIONS ADMISION
JUDICIAL ADMISSION EXTRA-JUDICIAL a) In case of a written judicial admission,
ADMISSIONS MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE PLEADINGS,
-admission, verbal or -those made out of MOTION OR OTHER WRITTEN INSTRUMENT
written, made by a court, or in a judicial CONTAINING SUCH ADMISSION;
party in the course of proceeding other than b) In case of an oral judicial admission,
the proceedings in the the one in COUNSEL IN OPEN COIRT MAY MOVE FOR THE
same case consideration EXCLUSION OF SUCH ADMISSION
-does not require proof -should be formally
offered in evidence 5. DOCTRINE OF ADOPTIVE ADMISSION
otherwise will not be
considered

ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN 14

 REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW
RULES ON EVIDENCE
-It is the party’s reaction to a statement or
action by another person when it is reasonable to
treat the party’s reaction as an admission of
something stated or implied by the other person.
CASE LAW
(1) ALFELOR VS HALASAN
Facts
Josefina filed an motion for intervention on the
Action for partition of Teresita, who claims to be the
surviving spouse.
Teresita testified that “While she did not know
Josefina personally, she knew that her husband had
been previously married to Josefina and that the two
did not live together as husband and wife. She knew
that Josefina left Jose in 1959. “
CA ruled that Josefina is the surviving spouse, based
on Teresita’s admission in her reply to the intervention.
Teresita avers that Teresita's statement in the
Reply-in-Intervention admitting knowledge of the
alleged first marriage, is without probative value for
being hearsay.
Private respondent, for her part, reiterates that
the matters involved in this case fall under Section 4,
Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, and thus
qualify as a judicial admission which does not require
proof.
Issue: Should the admission be considered in the case,
to consider that Josefina is actually the surviving
spouse?
HELD. YES
The fact of the matter is that Teresita Alfelor and
her co-heirs, petitioners herein, admitted the existence
of the first marriage in their Reply-in-Intervention filed
in the RTC, to wit:
1.1. Plaintiff Teresita S. Alfelor
admits knowledge of the previous
marriage of the late Jose K.
Alfelor, with that of the herein
intervenor were married on
February 1, 1956;  on this doctrine, thus: ". . . (b)y its very nature, an
Likewise, when called to testify, Teresita admitted
several times that she knew that her late husband had
been previously married to another. To the Court's
mind, this admission constitutes a "deliberate, clear and
unequivocal" statement; made as it was in the course of
judicial proceedings, such statement qualifies as a
judicial admission. A party who judicially admits a fact
cannot later challenge that fact as judicial admissions
are a waiver of proof;  production of evidence is
dispensed with.  A judicial admission also removes an
admitted fact from the field of controversy.
 Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings
cannot be controverted by the party making such
admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all
proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should
be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party
or not.  The allegations, statements or admissions
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the
pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position
contrary of or inconsistent with what was pleaded. 
(2) PEOPLE VS CASTILLO[ EJC]
FACTS
Accused-appellant Julian Castillo was convicted
with Homicide and Illegal Possession of Firearms
aggravated by Homicide.
On November 14, 1995 at about 8:00 a.m., Rogelio
Abawag was being closely pursued by Julian Castillo.
During the chase, Castillo pointed a gun at Abawag and
shot him.
The police then arrested Castillo on board a vessel
bound for Cebu. The police also found in his possession
a .38 caliber handmade revolver, three empty shells and
three live ammunitions. Further inquiry revealed that
the accused owned the gun but he has no license to
possess it.
For his defense, Castillo interposed the theory of
self-defense. Appellant impugned solely his conviction
for illegal possession of firearm for which he was
sentenced to the supreme penalty of death.
In appellant’s extra-judicial confession, he
admitted that he does not have license to carry a gun.
Prosecution did not present other evidence to prove
that he does not have a license.
ISSUE: Can the court rely on the extra-judicial
admission of appellant to prove his guilt in illegal
possession of firearms?
HELD. No.
In the case at bar, although the appellant himself
admitted that he had no license for the gun recovered
from his possession, his admission will not relieve the
prosecution of its duty to establish beyond reasonable
doubt the appellant's lack of license or permit to
possess the gun. In People vs. Solayao, we expounded
'admission is the mere acknowledgment of a fact or of
circumstances from which guilt may be inferred, tending
to incriminate the speaker, but not sufficient of itself to
establish his guilt.' In other words, it is a 'statement by
defendant of fact or facts pertinent to issues pending,
in connection with proof of other facts or
circumstances, to prove guilt, but which is, of itself,
insufficient to authorize conviction.' From the above
principles, this Court can infer thatan admission in
criminal cases is insufficient to prove beyond doubt the
commission of the crime charged.
 "Moreover, said admission is extrajudicial in
nature. As such, it does not fall under Section 4 of Rule
129 of the Revised Rules of Court which states: 'An
admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case
does not require proof.' "Not being a judicial admission,
15
 REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW
RULES ON EVIDENCE
said statement by accused-appellant does not prove
beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal
possession of firearm. It does not even establish
a prima facie case. It merely bolsters the case for the
prosecution but does not stand as proof of the fact of
absence or lack of a license."
Additionally, as pointed out by both the appellant and
the Solicitor General, the extrajudicial admission was
made without the benefit of counsel.
(3) Constantino vs Heirs of Constantino
Facts
CA ruled that the petitioners are in pari delicto
based on the admissions made in the pre-trial.
RULING
The records show that apart from respondent
Asuncion I,aquindanums's statement that the parcel of
land subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement with Waiver is not part of the estate of
Pedro Sr., their common ancestor, no other evidence
was offered to support it. The CA in giving credence to
the respondents' claim, merely relied on the alleged
typographical error in the Deed. The basis for the CA's
conclusion was the inclusion of the wife of Pedro Jr. and
that of their children, which the CA considered as proof
that the property was owned by Pedro Jr. and not part
of the estate of Pedro Sr.
Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party
making the admissions. Pre-trial admission in civil cases
is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly
provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the  Rules of
Court,which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial
order shall control the subsequent course of the action,
thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried.
In Bayas, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,  this Court
emphasized that:
Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and
signed by the parties and their counsels, they become
binding on the parties who made them. They become
judicial admissions of the fact or facts
stipulated. Even if placed at a disadvantageous
position, a party may not be allowed to rescind them
unilaterally, it must assume the consequences of the
disadvantage. The exceptions allows one to contradict
an admission by denying that he made such an
admission. TECSH
However, respondents failed to refute the earlier
admission/stipulation before and during the trial. While
denying ownership by Pedro Sr. of the 192 sq.m. lot,
respondent Asuncion Laquindanum, when placed on the
stand, offered a vague explanation as to how such
parcel of land was acquired by Pedro Jr.
(4) ATILLO VS CA [admissions in pre-trial]
“A party’s testimony in open court may override
admissions he made in the answer.”
RULING
We find petitioner's contention to be without merit
and the reliance on the general rule regarding judicial
admissions enunciated by the abovementioned provision
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
of law and jurisprudence misplaced.
As provided for in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court, the general rule that a judicial.
admission is conclusive upon the party making it and
does not require proof admits of two exceptions: 1)
when it is shown that the admission was made through
palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such
admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows
one to contradict an admission by denying that he made
such an admission.
"For instance, if a party invokes an 'admission' by
an adverse party, but cites the admission out of
context,' then the one making the admission may show
that he made no 'such' admission, or that his admission
was taken out of context. This may be interpreted as to
mean 'not in the sense in which the admission is made
to appear.' That is the reason for the modifier 'such.'"
Petitioner appears to have taken the admissions
made by LHUILLIER in paragraph 3.11 of his Answer "out
of context. " Petitioner is seemingly misleading this
Court by isolating paragraph 3.11 of the said Answer
from the preceding paragraphs. A careful scrutiny of the
Answer in its entirety will show that paragraph 3.11 is
part of the affirmative allegations recounting how
LHUILLIER was persuaded to invest in AMANCOR which
was previously owned and managed by petitioner.
Paragraph 3.11 has reference to the fact that in all
investments made with AMANCOR through stock
purchases, only petitioner and LHUILLIER dealt with
each other. It is more than obvious that paragraph 3.11
has nothing to do with the obligation of AMANCOR to
petitioner which is the subject of the present case.
Contrary to petitioner's allegations, LHUILLIER had
categorically denied personal liability for AMANCOR's
corporate debts.
ADMISSION MADE IN ANSWER CAN BE OVERRIDDEN BY
PARTY'S TESTIMONY IN OPEN COURT. — Granting
arguendo that LHUILLIER had in fact made the alleged
admission of personal liability in his Answer, We hold
that such admission is not conclusive upon him.
Applicable by analogy is our ruling in the case of
Gardner vs. Court of Appeals which allowed a party's
testimony in open court to override admissions he made
in his answer. It is clear that inspite of the presence of
judicial admissions in a party's pleading, the trial court
is still given leeway to consider other evidence
presented. This rule should apply with more reason
when the parties had agreed to submit an issue for
resolution of the trial court on the basis of the evidence
presented.
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 REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW
RULES ON EVIDENCE

RULE 130 Tangible object that Tangible evidence that

RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY played some actual role merely illustrates a
A. Object Evidence in the matter that gave matter of importance
1. Inherent limitation rise to the litigation. in the litigation.
a) Irrelevant evidence; and
b) Illegally obtained evidence No probative value in
2. Non-inherent limitation itself but serve merely
-relevant evidence may be excluded on the ground as a visual aid to the
that although relevant and authentic, its probative court in comprehending
value is exceeded by its prejudicial effect such as the verbal testimony of a
following: witness or other
a) Indecency and impropriety; evidence.
b) Undue prejudice; As to how foundation is laid
c) Offensive to sensibilities; The foundation that The foundation involves
d) Inconvenience and unnecessary expenses; must be laid in order to showing that the object
e) Confusing or misleading; or be admissible relates to fairly represents or
f) The testimonial or documentary evidence proving that the illustrates what is
presented in court already portrays the evidence is indeed the alleged to illustrate.
object such that a view thereof is object used in the
unnecessary. underlying event.
B. Documentary Evidence
a) Best Evidence Rule Types of Demonstrative Evidence
b) Parol Evidence Rule 1. Selected Demonstrative Evidence (existing genuine
c) Rules on Hearsay Evidence handwriting specimen)
C. Testimonial Evidence 2. Prepared or Reproduced Demonstrative Evidence
a) Rules on Hearsay Evidence (Scale, model, photograph)
b) Opinion Evidence
c) Character Evidence E. REQUISITES FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF OBJECT
d) Parol Evidence Rule EVIDENCE
(1) The object must be relevant to the fact in issue;
A. OBJECTIVE (REAL) EVIDENCE and
SECTION 1. OBJECT AS EVIDENCE (2) The object must be authenticated before it is
Sec 1. Object as evidence. -- Objects as admitted.
evidence are those addressed to the senses of the
court. When an object is relevant to the fact in F. AUTHENTICATION
issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed The object sought to be offered must be shown
by the court. to have been the very same thing in issue and or what
A. OBJECT OR REAL EVIDENCE its proponent says it is. It is equivalent to
- that which is addressed to the senses of the identification insofar as object evidence is concerned.
court. It is not limited to view of an object but
extends to what is perceived by the senses of hearing, Authentic means what it is claimed to be even though
taste, smell or touch. It is the most credible kind of it consists of false information.
evidence.
Purpose of Authentication
B. PHYSICAL EVIDENCE 1. To prevent the introduction of an object different
-a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth and from the one testified about; and
it ranks high in the hierarchy of trustworthy evidence-- 2. To ensure that there has been no significant
where the physical evidence on record runs counter to changes in the object’s condition
the testimonial evidence, the physical evidence should
prevail. (BPI v. REYES) Types of Authentication
1. By Testimony
C. Object Evidence may be: -if the real evidence is of a type which can be readily
1. Direct-- evidence can prove directly the fact for identified by a witness, the witness’ testimony will be
which it is offered. sufficient authentication.
2. Circumstantial--facts about the object are proved
as the basis for an interference that other facts are 2. By chain of custody
true. -if the real evidence is of a type which cannot easily
be recognized or readily be confused or tampered
D. OBJECT EVIDENCE VS DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE with, the proponent must present evidence of its chain
Object (Real) Demonstrative of custody. It must be shown that there was a strong
As to nature probability of correct identification.

ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN 17

 REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW
RULES ON EVIDENCE
DOCTRINE OF CHAIN OF CUSTODY
The duly recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or
plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Includes the identity and signature of the
person who held temporary custody of the seized
item, the date and time when such transfer of custody
were made in the course of safekeeping and used in
court as evidence, and the final disposition. (DDB
Regulation No.1 Series 2002)
i. Purpose of Establishing Chain of Custody:
to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items are preserved, so much that
unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence
are removed.
CHAIN OF CUSTODY IN DRUG RELATED CASES
The existence of the drug is the very corpus
delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, and thus a condition sine qua non for
conviction.
i. Marking the Evidence
-first stage in the chain of custody;
marked/signed in the presence of the apprehended
violator immediately upon arrest.
ii. How chain of Custody is observed
1. Apprehending team shall make a physical
inventory and photograph of the objects seized in
the presence of (AMNP)
(a) the accused or his representative or
counsel;
(b) Representative from the media;
(c) Representative from the National
Prosecution Services; and
(d) Any elected public official
2. The objects seized must be submitted to the
PDEA for qualitative and quantitative examination
within 24 hours
3. A certification of the results must be issued by
the forensic laboratory within 24 hours after
receipt.
4. If the volume does not allow completion of
testing within the time frame, partial results may
be issued. Thereafter, the completed result must
be issued within the next 24 hours.
5. Ocular inspection by the court within 72 hours
after filing the criminal case, destruction or
burning of the objects shall proceed through the
PDEA.
6. Issuance by the board of a sworn statement of
the fact of destruction or burning to be submitted
to the court
The alleged offender, his representative or
counsel is allowed to personally observe the
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
proceedings. Their presence is not an admission of
guilt to the commission of the crime.
iii. Non-compliance with the Doctrine of Chain of
Chain of Custody: It is NOT FATAL and will not make
accused’s arrest illegal provided:
(a) There is justifiable ground;
(b) The integrity and evidentiary value of the
items are properly preserved.
CHAIN OF CUSTODY IN DNA EVIDENCE
-applies in the assessment of the probative value
of DNA Evidence. Issues on how the biological samples
were collected, handled and the possibility of
contamination will be taken into consideration. (Rule
on DNA Evidence Sec 7(a))
Identification: To authenticate the object, there must
be someone who would identify the object to be the
actual thing involved in the litigation. An object
evidence, being inanimate, cannot speak for itself.
The evidence must be “sponsored” by a witness.
Testimonial Foundation: because there is some
danger of fabrication, abuse or distortion with
demonstrative evidence prepared specifically for trial,
the law seeks to minimize these dangers by requiring
testimonial assurances of accuracy.
G. Categories of Object Evidence
A. For purposes of presentation in court, an object
evidence may be that which consists in: (XNX)
i. The exhibition or production of the
object inside or outside the courtroom;
ii. The inspection of the object outside
the courtroom; and
iii. The making of an experiment
(Demonstrative evidence)
B. For purposes of authentication of an object, object
evidence may be classified into:
i. Unique Objects -- objects that have
readily identifiable marks (gun w/
serial number)
ii. Objects made unique- object that are
made readily identifiable. (knife that
the witness can identify in court)
iii. Non-unique objects -these are objects
with no identifiable marks and cannot
be marked (drops of blood)
H. HOW OBJECT EVIDENCE IS PRESENTED: Exhibited,
Examined; Viewed.
Experiment: Permitting an experiment to be tried
during the course of the trial is a matter which rests in
the discretion of the trial judge.
Experiment should be excluded, if it is too
complicated to afford any fair inference, or of it
cannot be performed in such a manner as fairly to
illustrate the fact to be found.
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Personal Appearance: To determine whether a person
is an alien or not; the age of a person.
The body of the plaintiff as object evidence in
personal injury case: TWO THEORIES
1. The plaintiff cannot be compelled to subject
himself to an examination of his body.
2. The plaintiff may be compelled on the theory that
“if the court is powerless, in action for personal
injuries, to require a plaintiff to submit himself to a
physical examination, then the law will permit him to
disclose just so much and such parts of the facts as, in
his judgment would benefit his case, at the expense of
his adversary, and to invoke the court’s aid to
compensate him for the injury through a partial and
one-sided investigation. (Weight of authority in favor
of 2nd theory)
The body of the accused as object evidence in
criminal cases: The accused may be compelled to
submit himself to an inspection of his body for the
purpose of ascertaining identity or for other purposes.
The prohibition of compelling a man to be a witness
against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communications from
him, NOT an exclusion of his body as evidence when it
may be material.
CASES
Object Evidence
1. PEOPLE VS GUINTO (3yo rape; Physical Appearance)
FACTS
Nov 17 1995, in QC, Cyra May Francisco Buenafe, 3.5
years old, was raped by Ronnie Guinto, the houseboy.
Cyra Mae told her mother,Gloria, that Ronnie inserted his
penis in her anus and mouth.
RTC sentenced Ronnie with death penalty.
Rape when the victim is less than 7yo is Death
Penalty, whil Rape of a victim less than 12 yo is
punishable by Reclusion Perpetua (Art 335 RPC, as
amended by RA 7659). Prosecution did not present
Certificate of Live Birth as evidence.
ISSUE 1: Absent certificate of live birth, or the like, is the
presentation of the victim’s appearance admissible as
evidence to prove her age?
HELD 1: Yes.
A person's appearance, where relevant, is admissible as
object evidence, the same being addressed to the senses
of the court.
There can be no question, therefore, as to
the admissibility of a person's appearance in determining
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
his or her age.
ISSUE 2: Should Ronnie be punished with Death Penalty
for rape of a woman below 7 years old or with Reclusion
Perpetua for the rape of a woman below 12 years?
HELD 2: Reclusion Perpetua for the rape of a woman
below 12 years old.
This is because in the era of modernism and rapid
growth, the victim's mere physical appearance is not
enough to gauge her exact age. For the extreme penalty
of death to be upheld, nothing but proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime must be substantiated. Verily, the minority of the
victim should be not only alleged but likewise proved with
equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. Be it
remembered that the proof of the victim's age in the
present case spells the difference between life and
death.47
In the present case, the prosecution did not offer
the victim's certificate of live birth or similar authentic
documents in evidence.
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged
age (three years old) and the age sought to be proved
(below twelve years), the trial court would have had no
difficulty ascertaining the victim's age from her
appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore, exists that
the second element of statutory rape, i.e., that the
victim was below twelve years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense, is present.
Whether the victim was below seven years old, however,
is another matter. Here, reasonable doubt exists. A
mature three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken
for an underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance of
the victim, as object evidence, cannot be accorded much
weight and, following Pruna, the testimony of the mother
is, by itself, insufficient.
As it has not been established with moral certainty
that Cyra May was below seven years old at the time of
the commission of the offense, accused-appellant cannot
be sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Only the
penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him.
PRUNA DOCTRINE
People v. Pruna, established a set of guidelines in
appreciating age as an element of the crime or as a
qualifying circumstance, to wit:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended
party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar
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 REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW
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authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
school records which show the date of birth of the victim
would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is
shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victim's mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on
matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date
of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40,
Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient
under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years
old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12
years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18
years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic
document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or
relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's
testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the
age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to
object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not
be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical
finding as to the age of the victim
2. BPI VS REYES [OPENING BANK ACCOUNT;PHYSICAL
EVIDENCE]
FACTS
Plaintiff Jesusa Reyes contended that she opened an
ATM account and deposited P200,000 consisting of
P100,000 cash and P100,000 from her existing account
from BPI Zapote Branch. Bank Teller, Cicero Capati,
arranged for her opening of account. Whereby there was
an alteration in the withdrawal slip of P200,000 to
P100,000 as countersigned by Jesusa Reyes. Jesusa Reyes
was given a deposit slip of P200,000.
When she learned that only P100k reflected on her
account, she presented the deposit slip, but such was
validated and made to reflect P100k. She filed a
complaint for the return of her P100,000.
BPI alleged that only P100,000 from her account was
deposited, and no cash was given.
RTC and CA ruled in favor of Mrs Jesusa Reyes , giving
credence to Jesusa Reyes and Joan’s testimonies.
ISSUE: Are the evidence sufficient to rule that BPI should
pay P100,000?
HELD. No.
BPI Reyes
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
Physical Evidence Physical Evidence
- Teller’s Tape -Deposit slip
Testimonial Evidence: Testimonial Evidence
- Emerenciana Tornero, Teller -Jesusa and Joan’s testimonies
Respondents failed to successfully prove by
preponderance of evidence that respondent Jesusa
made an initial deposit of  P 200,000.00 in her
Express Teller account.
Respondent Jesusa's bare claim, although
corroborated by her daughter, that the former
deposited P 100,000.00 cash in addition to the fund
transfer of P 100,000.00, is not established by
physical evidence. While the duplicate copy of the
deposit slip was in the amount of P 200,000.00 and
bore the stamp mark of teller Torneros, such
duplicate copy failed to show that there was a cash
deposit of P 100,000.00. An examination of the
deposit slip shows that it did not contain any entry
in the breakdown portion for the specific
denominations of the cash deposit. This demolishes
the testimonies of respondent Jesusa and her
daughter Joan.
The deposit slip only contained a Tornerno’s
stamp but it was not machine validated. Tornero’s
teller’s tape gave established the fact that Jesusa
Reyes’ initial intention was to deposit P200,00
which was why there were alterations.
DOCTRINE
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent
manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our
hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. We have, on
many occasions, relied principally upon physical
evidence in ascertaining the truth. Where the
physical evidence on record runs counter to the
testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses,
we consistently rule that the physical evidence
should prevail.
3. RICALDE VS PEOPLE (No trace of Sperm in anus or
recent trauma)
FACTS
XXX, 10 year old boy, invited Richard Ricalde, 31 yo
distant relative and textmate of XXX, for dinner with his
mother. After dinner XXX slept in the couch while XXX
slept in the living room floor. Later that night, XXX went
to his mother crying that Ricalde raped him. Ricalde was
asked to leave the house.
Mother and XXX went to the barangay and subjected XXX
to a medical examination.
Dr. Roy Camarillo examined XXX and found no signs of
recent trauma in his anal orifice that was also "NEGATIVE
for spermatozoa.”
RTC found Ricalde guilty for rape through sexual
assault. CA affirmed.
Ricalde’s argues the medico-legal testified that he
found "no physical signs or external signs of recent trauma
[in XXX’s] anus," or any trace of spermatozoa. He
contends that physical evidence "ranks high in [the
court’s] hierarchy of trustworthy evidence." 
ISSUE: Should Ricalde be exculpated for the physical
evidence in the medico-legal finding no trace of
spermatozoa or recent trauma in the anus?
HELD. No.
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Petitioner’s reliance on the medico-legal’s finding of
no recent trauma in XXX’s anal orifice, or any trace of
spermatozoa, lacks merit. The absence of spermatozoa in
XXX’s anal orifice does not negate the possibility of an
erection and penetration. This result does not contradict
the positive testimony of XXX that the lower courts found
credible, natural, and consistent with human nature.
This court has explained the merely corroborative
character of expert testimony and the possibility of
convictions for rape based on the victim’s credible lone
testimony.
In any case, the medico-legal explained that his
negative finding of trauma in the anal orifice does not
remove the possibility of an insertion considering the
flexibility of the sphincter:
4. When the court asked Dr. Roy why he testified that XXX
was sodomized even if his findings states that he did not
find any congestion or abrasion. Dr. Roy answered: “based
on my examination[,] there were no external signs of
recent trauma to the anus. It should be realized that the
sphincter, that is the particular portion of the anus
controlling the bowel movement, it exhibits a certain
flexibility such that it can resist any object inserted and
that area is very vascular, meaning to say, it is rich in
blood supply, such that any injuries would be healed in 24
hours or less than 24 hours.”
B. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
SECTION 2. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
Sec 2. Documentary evidence. --Documents as
evidence consist of writings, recordings,
photographs or any material containing letters,
words, sounds, numbers, figures, symbols or
their equivalent, or other modes of written
expressions offered as proof of their contents.
Photographs include still pictures, drawings,
stored images, x-ray films, motion pictures or
videos.
-Señga Notes-
The definition of a documentary evidence was
amended to further include recordings and
photographs or any material containing sounds or the
equivalent of letters, words, sounds, numbers figures
or symbols.
The term photograph was further defined to
include still pictures, drawings, stored images, x-ray
films, motion pictures or videos.
Prior to the amendment, some took the position
that videos or photographs take the nature of object
evidence. With the amendment, they are now
considered as documentary evidence, provided that
they are offered as proof of their contents.
Notably, under the Rules on Electronic Evidence,
Audio, Photographic and video evidence are under
Rule 11, separate from the definition of an electronic
document, under Rule 3 thereof.
With the amendment, it is clear that the
photographic, video and audio evidence are not
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
electronic documents but rather, simply
documentary evidence.
1. DOCUMENT, when Object or Documentary
Evidence
A document may constitute as object(real) and as
documentary evidence depending on the purpose for
which the document is offered.
If it is produced without regard to the message
which it contains, it is treated as real evidence. In
such case, the Best Evidence rule does not apply.
If the document is offered to prove what is
written on it, its contents, then the document will be
treated as documentary evidence.
2. HOW TO PRESENT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
(AIMO)
1. it should be Authenticated and proved in the
manner provided in the rules of court;
2. It should be Identified and Marked ; and
3. It should be formally Offered to the court and
shown to the opposing party so that the latter may
have the opportunity to object thereto.
SECTION 3. BEST EVIDENCE RULE
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RULE
Sec. 3. ORIGINAL DOCUMENT MUST BE
PRODUCED; EXCEPTIONS-- When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, writing,
recording, photograph or other record, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been is lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under
the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice, or the
original cannot be obtained by local judicial
processes or procedures;
(c) When the original consists of numerous
accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and
the fact sought to be established from them is
only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office; and
(e) When the original is not closely-related
to a controlling issue.
-Señga Notes-
The “Best Evidence Rule” was changed to the
“Original Document Rule” because the former is a
misnomer as it does not refer to some hierarchy of
evidence. Rather, the rule simply states that there is
preference for original documents to prove the actual
contents thereof. In other jurisdictions, the Best
Evidence Rule is also known as the Original Writing
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Rule or the Original Document Rule, which is now
reflected in the amended rule.
The first paragraph was amended to take into
account the revised definition of a documentary
evidence, that includes recordings, photographs or
other records.
Paragraph (a) was amended to reflect a present
tense.
Paragraph (b) was amended to reflect the rule
that the notice may be in the form of a motion for
the production of the original or made in open court
in the presence of the adverse party or via a
subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in
custody of the original has sufficient time to produce
the same. When such party has the original of the
writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or
refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be
admitted. (Bayani Magdayao v. People, G.R. No.
152881, August 17, 2004)
No change in paragraphs (c), and (d).
Paragraph (e) is a new insertion. It means that
secondary evidence may be admitted if the original
documentary evidence is not closely-related to a
controlling issue in the case. This paragraph appears
to pertain to irrelevant evidence. However, by
definition, evidence, to be admissible, must be
relevant. Here, it contemplates an irrelevant
document or evidence. There is no need to produce
the original of an irrelevant document. The issue now
is, if it is irrelevant then it would not have been
admitted in the first place. It appears that this
paragraph contemplates a situation where there is
an irrelevant document or evidence that was
nevertheless admitted in evidence (lack of
objection/admitted by the court). In such a situation,
the original thereof need not be produced.
1. ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RULE (ODR)
- Formerly known as the BEST EVIDENCE RULE
(BER)
-is that which requires the highest grade of
evidence obtainable to prove a disputed act.
In requiring the production of the best evidence
applicable to each particular fact, it means that no
evidence shall be received which is merely
substitutionary in nature, so long as the original
evidence can be had.
“BEST” = “ORIGINAL” OR “PRIMARY EVIDENCE” ≠
“PROBATIVE VALUE”
GR: ODR (BER) states that when the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, the best
evident is the original document itself and no other
evidence is admissible.
EXCEPTION: (PLAN)
1. When the original is a Public record in the custody
of a public officer or is recorded in a public office;
2. When the original has been is lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
3. When the original is in the custody or under the
control of the party Against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice, or the original cannot be obtained
by local judicial processes or procedures;
4. When the original consists of Numerous accounts or
other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the
whole;
5. Irrelevant evidence (as amended by Revised Rules
of Evidence)
NOTE: Non-production of an original document,
UNLESS falling within the exception, will give rise to
PRESUMPTION OF SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE adverse
to the part who withholds it.
2. APPLICABILITY OF BER
Only when the terms of writing are in issue.
CASES
1. CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST CORP V. DEL
MONTE MOTOR WORKS (Duplicate of Original
Promissory Note; ISSUE IS NOT THE TERMS)
FACTS
Petitioner Solidbank filed before RTC Manila a
complaint for the recovery of sum of money against
respondent corporation, and impleading Sps Morales,
alleging that it extended a loan of P1,000,000 as
evidenced by a Promissory Note.
Under the promissory note, respondents Del Monte
Motor Works, Inc. (respondent corporation) and Morales
bound themselves jointly and severally to pay petitioner
the full amount of the loan through 25 monthly
installments, to which they defaulted.
Petitioner attached to its complaint as Annexes A, B,
and C, respectively, a photocopy of the promissory note
supposedly executed by respondents, a copy of the
demand letter it sent respondents dated 20 January
1983, and statement of account pertaining to
respondents loan.
Respondent Corporation alleged that the promissory
note is void for want of consideration.
Respondent Morales averred that he never signed the
PN attached to the complaint in his personal capacity,
that the PN is ineffective, unenforceable and void for
lack of consideration.
As the original copy of Exhibit A could no longer be
found, petitioner instead sought the admission of the
DUPLICATE ORIGINAL OF THE PN, under exhibit E.
Respondents averred the exclusion of such evidence
and filed separate MTD. RTC dismissed the complaint.
CA affirmed on the ground of Best Evidence Rule.
ISSUE: Does the Best Evidence Rule apply in this case?
HELD. No.
The rule finds no application to this case. It should
be noted that respondents never disputed the terms and
conditions of the promissory note thus leaving us to
conclude that as far as the parties herein are
concerned, the wording or content of said note is clear
enough and leaves no room for disagreement.
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In their responsive pleadings, respondents principal
defense rests on the alleged lack of consideration of the
promissory note. In addition, respondent Morales also
claims that he did not sign the note in his personal
capacity. These contentions clearly do not question the
precise wording of the promissory note which should
have paved the way for the application of the best
evidence rule. It was, therefore, an error for the Court
of Appeals to sustain the decision of the trial court on
this point.
Besides, the best evidence rule as stated in our
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is not absolute. As
quoted earlier, the rule accepts of exceptions one of
which is when the original of the subject document is in
the possession of the adverse party. As pointed out by
petitioner in its motion to inhibit, had it been given the
opportunity by the court a quo, it would have
sufficiently established that the original of Exhibit A was
in the possession of respondents which would have
called into application one of the exceptions to the best
evidence rule.
Significantly, Respondents failed to deny specifically
the execution of the promissory note. This being the
case, there was no need for petitioner to present the
original of the promissory note in question. Their
judicial admission with respect to the genuineness and
execution of the promissory note sufficiently established
their liability to petitioner regardless of the fact that
petitioner failed to present the original of said note.
DOCTRINE: RATIONALE OF BER
According to McCormick, an authority on the rules of
evidence, the only actual rule that the best evidence
phrase denotes today is the rule requiring the
production of the original writing the rationale being:
(1)that precision in presenting to the court
the exact words of the writing is of more than average
importance, particularly as respects operative or
dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and
contracts, since a slight variation in words may mean a
great difference in rights,
(2) that there is a substantial hazard of
inaccuracy in the human process of making a copy by
handwriting or typewriting, and
(3) as respects oral testimony purporting to
give from memory the terms of a writing, there is a
special risk of error, greater than in the case of
attempts at describing other situations generally. In the
light of these dangers of mistransmission, accompanying
the use of written copies or of recollection, largely
avoided through proving the terms by presenting the
writing itself, the preference for the original writing is
justified.
2. Engr. BAYANI MAGDAYAO V. PEOPLE (EXCEPTION
TO BER; ORIGINAL IS IN CUSTODY OF RESPONDENT)
FACTS
An Information was filed charging petitioner, Engr.
Bayani Magdayao with violation of B.P. Blg. 22, alleging
that he issued a check with drawee bank PNB Dipolog
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
Branch and delivered such to RICKY OLVIS for payment
of his obligation in the amount of P600,000, which was
dishonored when presented due to insufficient funds.
Olvis alleged that when he initially filed a complaint
in Sept 4, 1992, Bayani offered to pay Olvis with two
checks, retrieving the dishonored check. Bayani failed
to make goof with his promise.
The prosecution offered in evidence the photocopy
of PNB Check No. 399967, which the court admitted.
Bayani did not attend court hearings. Bayani filed an
Omnibus Supplemental Motion and to Allow Him to
Adduce Evidence alleging, inter alia, that due to the
absence of the original and only a xerox copy of the PNB
check, which he allegedly paid already.
Prosecution averred that the original check was
already returned to petitioner. It also pointed out that
the petitioner failed to object to the presentation of
the photocopy of the dishonored check.
RTC convicted him of violation of BP 22. CA
affirmed.
ISSUE: Is the photocopy of the check inadmissible as
evidence due, applying the Best Evidence Rule?
HELD.
When original document is in adverse party’s
custody or control. If the document is in the custody or
under the control of the adverse party, he must have
reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and
after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to
produce the document, secondary evidence may be
presented as in the case of its loss.
The mere fact that the original of the writing is in
the custody or control of the party against whom it is
offered does not warrant the admission of secondary
evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done all in
his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice
to the said party to produce the document. The notice
may be in the form of a motion for the production of
the original or made in open court in the presence of
the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum,
provided that the party in custody of the original has
sufficient time to produce the same. When such party
has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily
offer to produce it or refuses to produce it, secondary
evidence may be admitted.
The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the need
for the production of the original copy of PNB Check No.
399967, and the fact that the prosecution was able to
present in evidence only a photocopy thereof because
the original was in his possession. In fact, in the
Omnibus Supplemental Motion dated February 8, 1996,
and in his Special Manifestation filed on May 28, 1996,
the petitioner complained of the prosecutions violation
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RULES ON EVIDENCE
of the best evidence rule.
The petitioner, however, never produced the
original of the check, much less offered to produce the
same. The petitioner deliberately withheld the original
of the check as a bargaining chip for the court to grant
him an opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense,
which he failed to do following his numerous unjustified
postponements as shown by the records.
There was no longer a need for the prosecution to
present as witness the employee of the drawee bank
who made the notation at the dorsal portion of the
dishonored check to testify that the same was
dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient
funds.
3. JOSEF V. PEOPLE (EXCEPTION TO BER; ORIGINAL IN
THE POSSESSION OF RESPONDENT AND ESTOPPEL)
FACTS
From June -Aug 1991, Petitoner Albino Josef, a
Marikina-based manufacturer and seller of shoes,
purchased materials from respondent Agustin Alarilla, a
seller of leather products from Meycauayan, Bulacan,
for which he issued 26 post dated checks against his
account, which was dishonored due to closed accounts.
Josef issued new checks and retrieved the dishonored
checks, but retained photocopies of such. The new
checks were also dishonored.
As a result, the private respondent filed criminal
complaints against petitioner for violation of BP 22.
RTC convicted petitioner on all counts. CA affirmed.
Petitioner admits having issued the 26 dishonored
checks, but interposed that such checks were paid in
cash, and applying the Best Evidence Rule, the
photocopies of the original checks are inadmissible,
until after he had been given reasonable notice to
produce the original.
ISSUE: Is the Best Evidence Rule applicable in this
case?
HELD. No.
Having admitted, albeit impliedly, that the
photostatic copies of the checks admitted in evidence
by the Court a quo were the faithful reproduction of the
original copies in his possession, the Petitioner was thus
estopped from invoking Section 3, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence.
We agree with the Court of Appeals. By admitting
that the originals were in his possession and even
producing them in open court, petitioner cured
whatever flaw might have existed in the prosecutions
evidence. The fact that these originals were all
stamped account closed merely confirmed the
allegations of the respondent that the checks were
dishonored by reason of the account being closed.
Because they were entirely consistent with its main
theory, the prosecution correctly adopted these
originals as its own evidence. In addition, by petitioners
own admission, five of the original checks were lost,
thus rendering the photocopies thereof admissible as
exceptions to the Best Evidence Rule.
4. ANITA LORENZANA V. RODOLFO LELONA
(Photocopy of Deed of Absolute Sale; WAIVER OF BEST
EVIDENCE RULE)
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
FACTS
In 1975, Ambrosia Lelina, married to Aquilino Lelina,
conveyed 1/2 of a 1,600sqm land to Roberto Rodolfo,
her son, through a Deed of Absolute Sale.
In 1995, Anita Lorenzana claims that she is now the
owner of the entire 1,600sqm land by virtue of a Deed
of Final Conveyance, after the land was foreclosed due
to the debt of Aquilino Lelina.
RTC ruled in favor of Rodolfo and cancelled the
Deed of Final Conveyance because the land was entitled
only to Ambrosia, excluding Aquilino. CA affirmed.
Anita questions the ruling, averring that Rodolfo’s
sole basis of claim is a Deed of Absolute Sale, to which
he cannot produce the original thereof. Only a
photostatic copy of the Deed was produced.
ISSUE: Should the Best Evidence Rule apply?
HELD.No.
The best evidence rule requires that when the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence is admissible other than the original document
itself except in the instances mentioned in Section 3,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. As such, mere
photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to
the best evidence rule. Nevertheless, evidence not
objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly
considered by the court in arriving at its
judgment. Courts are not precluded to accept in
evidence a mere photocopy of a document when no
objection was raised when it was formally offered.
In order to exclude  evidence,  the  objection to 
admissibility  of evidence must be made at the proper
time, and the grounds specified. Objection to evidence
must be made at the time it is formally offered. 
In case of documentary evidence, offer is made
after all the witnesses of the party making the offer
have testified, specifying the purpose for which the
evidence is being offered. It is only at this time, and not
at any other, that objection to the documentary
evidence may be made. And when a party failed to
interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time
they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be
considered as waived. This is true even if by its nature
the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely been
rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time.
 Moreover, grounds for objection must be specified in
any case. Grounds for objections not raised at the
proper time shall be considered waived, even if the
evidence was objected to on some other ground. Thus,
even on appeal, the appellate court may not consider
any other ground of objection, except those that were
raised at the proper time.
In this case, the objection to the Deed of Absolute
Sale was belatedly raised. Respondent submitted his
Formal Offer of Evidence on February 12, 2003 which
included the Deed of Absolute Sale as Exhibit A. While
petitioner filed a Comment and Objection on
February 21, 2003, she only objected to the Deed of
Absolute Sale for being self-serving. In the
Order dated February 27, 2003, the RTC admitted the
Deed of Absolute Sale, rejecting the objection of
petitioner. Having failed to object on the ground of
inadmissibility under the best evidence rule,
petitioner is now deemed to have waived her
objection on this ground and cannot raise it for the
first time on appeal.
5. PEOPLE V. GENARO CAYABYAB (Rape 6yo; Birth
Certificate; BER EXCEPTION; WHEN ORIGINAL IS A
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PUBLIC RECORD IN CUSTODY OF A PUBLIC OFFICER)
FACTS
Alpha Jane was born on November 26, 1994, she was
six years and nine months old when the rape was
committed on August 7, 2001.
6:00 p.m., Alpha Jane was at home taking care of
her younger siblings. Her mother went to buy kerosene,
while her father was out. On the guise of teaching
arithmetic, GENARO CAYABYAB went to the victim's
house and asked her to lie down on her father's bed.
When she refused, appellant removed her clothes and
his own clothes, then forced her to lie down on the bed
and laid on top of her and inserted his penis into her
vagina. Alpha Jane shouted in pain which startled the
appellant who sprayed her with tear gas and left.
On August 10, 2001, appellant was charged with rape
before the RTC Pasay.
RTC found Cayabyab guilty of Rape under Art 335,
and sentenced him with Death Penalty.
ISSUE: Should the photocopy of the certificate of live
birth be inadmissible as evidence to prove her age,
applying Best Evidence Rule?
Held. No.
To paraphrase Pruna, the best evidence to prove
the age of a person is the original birth certificate or
certified true copy thereof; in their absence, similar
authentic documents may be presented such as
baptismal certificates and school records. If the original
or certified true copy of the birth certificate is not
available, credible testimonies of the victim's mother or
a member of the family may be sufficient under certain
circumstances. In the event that both the birth
certificate or other authentic documents and the
testimonies of the victim's mother or other qualified
relative are unavailable, the testimony of the victim
may be admitted in evidence provided that it is
expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
In Pruna, no birth certificate or any similar
authentic document, such as the baptismal certificate
of the victim was presented to prove her age. The trial
court based its finding that Lizette was 3 years old when
she was raped on the Medico-Legal Report, and the fact
that the defense did not contest her age and questioned
her qualification to testify because of her tender age. It
was however noted that the Medico-Legal Report never
mentioned her age and only the testimony of her
mother was presented to establish Lizette's age. The
Court found that there was uncertainty as to the
victim's exact age, hence, it required that corroborative
evidence, such as her birth certificate, baptismal
certificate or any other authentic document should be
introduced in evidence in order that the qualifying
circumstance of 'below seven (7) years old is
appreciated.
Unlike in Pruna, the trial court in this case made
a categorical finding that Alpha Jane was only 6 years
old at the time she was raped, based not only on the
testimonies of the complainant and her mother, but
also on the strength of the photocopy of Alpha Jane's
birth certificate. It is well to note that the defense
did not object to the presentation of the birth
certificate; on the contrary it admitted the same 'as
to fact of birth.
We are not unaware of our ruling in People v.
Mantis that a mere photocopy of the birth certificate, in
the absence of any showing that the original copy was
lost or destroyed, or was unavailable, without the fault
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
of the prosecution, does not prove the victim's minority,
for said photocopy does not qualify as competent
evidence for that purpose.
However, there are other exceptions to the 'best
evidence rule as expressly provided under Section 3,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Without doubt, a certificate of live birth is a
public record in the custody of the local civil registrar
who is a public officer. Clearly, therefore, the
presentation of the photocopy of the birth certificate of
Alpha Jane is admissible as secondary evidence to prove
its contents. Production of the original may be
dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion, whenever
in the case at hand the opponent does not bona fide
dispute the contents of the document and no other
useful purpose will be served by requiring production.
In the case at bar, the defense did not dispute the
contents of the photocopied birth certificate; in fact it
admitted the same. Having failed to raise a valid and
timely objection against the presentation of this
secondary evidence the same became a primary
evidence, and deemed admitted and the other party is
bound thereby.
In fine, we find that the prosecution sufficiently proved
that Alpha Jane was only six-years-old, being born on
November 26, 1994, when the rape incident happened
on August 7, 2001.
6. HEIRS OF PRODON V. HEIRS OF ALVAREZ ( BER
Exceptions; Original Title in Register of Deeds)
FACTS
In a complaint for quieting of title and damages
against Margarita Prodon, Heirs of Alvarez averred hat
their parents were the registered owners of the subject
parcel of land. They said that they could not locate
their duplicate copy of the title, but the original was
with RD Manila.
Heirs of Alvarez contends that the original copy
contained an entry stating that the property had been
sold to defendant Prodon subject to the right of
repurchase; and that the entry had been maliciously
done by Prodon because the deed of sale with right to
repurchase covering the property did not exist.
Consequently, they prayed that the entry be cancelled,
and that Prodon be adjudged liable for damages.
Custodian of the records of the property attested
that the copy of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase could not be found in RD Manila.
RTC ruled that there was a “right of repurchase” ,
although the deed itself could not be presented as
evidence in court, its contents could nevertheless be
proved by secondary evidence in accordance with
Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, upon proof of
its execution or existence and of the cause of its
unavailability being without bad faith.
The RTC concluded that the original copy of the
deed of sale with right to repurchase had been lost, and
that earnest efforts had been exerted to produce it
before the court.
ISSUE: Is the Best Evidence Rule applicable?
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RULES ON EVIDENCE

HELD: No. common-law remedy for the removal of any cloud or

Best Evidence Rule was not applicable herein
The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving
the terms of a written document the original of the
document must be produced in court. The rule excludes
any evidence other than the original writing to prove
the contents thereof, unless the offeror proves: 
(a) the existence or due execution of the original;  be material to an action for quieting of title, depending
(b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the
reason for its non-production in court; and 
(c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to
which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed.  doubt that the Best Evidence Rule will come into play.
doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property by
reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid
or effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be
prejudicial to said title.
The action for quieting of title may be based on
the fact that a deed is invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable. The terms of the writing may or may not
on the ground alleged by the plaintiff. For instance,
when an action for quieting of title is based on the
unenforceability of a contract for not complying with
the Statute of Frauds, Article 1403 of the Civil
Code specifically provides that evidence of the
agreement cannot be received without the writing, or
a secondary evidence of its contents. There is then no

The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to

ensure that the exact contents of a writing are brought 7. MARQUEZ V. ESPEJO ( ADMISSION OF THE
before the court, considering that  CONTENTS BUT ASSAILS TRUE INTENT; DEED OF SALE
DESCRIPTION DISCREPANCY)
(a) the precision in presenting to the court the
exact words of the writing is of more than average FACTS
importance, particularly as respects operative or Property located at Barangay Lantap, Bagabag,
dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and Nueva Vizcaya and the Murong Property located at
contracts, because a slight variation in words may Brgy. Murong of the same town which were subsequently
mean a great difference in rights;  foreclosed and sold to Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc.
(RBBI) due to their failure to pay the loans in the said
bank. But a Deed of Sale was made covering the Murong
(b) there is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the property without description as to the location of the
human process of making a copy by handwriting or subject property whether it is in Brgy. Murong or
typewriting; and  Brgy.Lantap.

(c) as However, both TCTs did not specifically state its

TCT No. T-62096 TCT No.respects oral testimony purporting to give
T-62836 (RBBI)
from memory
Murong Property Lantap Property the terms of a writing, there is a
special risk of error, greater than in the case of
attempts at describing other situations generally.  RBBI executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land
The rule further acts as an insurance against
fraud. Verily, if a party is in the possession of the best
evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute
inferior evidence in its place, the presumption naturally
arises that the better evidence is withheld for
fraudulent purposes that its production would expose
and defeat.  Lastly, the rule protects against misleading
inferences resulting from the intentional or
unintentional introduction of selected portions of a
larger set of writings.  expressed that its subject is the land covered by TCT
But the evils of mistransmission of critical facts,
fraud, and misleading inferences arise only when the
issue relates to the terms of the writing. Hence, the
Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a
writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be
introduced concerns external facts, such as the
existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without
reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be
invoked. In such a case, secondary evidence may be
admitted even without accounting for the original.
This case involves an action for quieting of title, a
location whether it is in Barangay Lantap or Barangay
Murong.
Transfer (VLTs) in favor of Marquez and Dela Cruz
covered by TCT of Lantap Property but described being
located in Brgy. Murong.
Espejos filed Complaint  before the RARAD based on
the Deed of Sale indicating that TCT No. T-62096
(referring to Murong Property) was the subject of their
buy-back transaction.
CA. In using the Best Evidence Rule embodied in Rule
130, Section 3, the Deed of Sale is the best evidence as
to its contents, particularly the description of the land
which was the object of the sale. Since the Deed of Sale
No. T-62096 – the Murong property – then that is the
property that the respondents repurchased.
ISSUE: Is the Best Evidence Rule Applicable?
HELD. No.
Indeed, the appellate court erred in its application
of the Best Evidence Rule. The Best Evidence Rule
states that when the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, the best evidence is
the original document itself and no other evidence
(such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is
admissible as a general rule. The original is preferred
because it reduces the chance of undetected tampering

ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN 26

 REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW
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with the document. 

In the instant case, there is no room for the
application of the Best Evidence Rule because there is
no dispute regarding the  contents  of the documents. It
is admitted by the parties that the respondents' Deed of
Sale referred to TCT No. T-62096 as its subject; while
the petitioners' Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer
referred to TCT No. T-62836 as its subject, which is
further described as located
in Barangay Murong. DSAICa
The real issue is whether the admitted contents of these
documents adequately and correctly express the true
intention of the parties. As to the Deed of Sale,
petitioners (and RBBI) maintain that while it refers to
TCT No. T-62096, the parties actually intended the sale
of the Lantap property (covered by TCT No. T-62836).

ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN 27

 REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW
RULES ON EVIDENCE
RULE ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
(A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, August 1, 2001)
1. ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS AS FUNCTIONAL
EQUIVALENT OF PAPER-BASED DOCUMETS
2. ADMISSIBILITY
The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an
Electronic document as admissible in evidence if:
A. It complies with the rules on admissibility
prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws; and
B. Is authenticated in the manner prescribed by
the rules
3. ELECTRONIC DATA MESSAGE VS ELECTRONIC
DOCUMENT
Electronic Data Electronic Document
Message
-has reference to - the document itself
information
electronically sent,
stored, or transmitted,
it does not necessarily
mean that it will give
rise to a document.
4. BEST EVIDENCE RULE
ORIGINAL OF AN ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT, Electronic
evidence and its printout
COPIES AS EQUIVALENT OF THE ORIGINALS, When a
document is printed two or more copies at same time
5. MANNER OF AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC
DOCUMENT
a) By evidence that it has been digitally signed
by the person purported to have signed the
same;
b) By evidence that other appropriate security
procedures or devices as may be authorized
by the SC or by law for the authentication of
electronic documents were applied to the
document; or
c) By other evidence showing its integrity and
reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.
6. ELECTRONICALLY NOTARIZED DOCUMENT
- a document electronically notarized in
accordance with the rules promulgated by the SC shall
be considered as a public document and proved as a
notarial document under the RoC.
7. ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE
- refers to any distinctive mark, characteristic,
and/or sound in electronic form, representing the
identity of a person and attached to or logically
associated with the electronic data message or
electronic document or any methodology or
procedures employed or adopted by a person and
executed or adopted by such person with the intention
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
of authenticating or approving an electronic data
message or electronic document.
8. AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES
a) By evidence that a method or process was
utilized to establish a digital signature and
verify the same;
b) By any other means provided by law;
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE ACT
(RA 8792)
1. REQUISITES FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT (SEC 7)
a) Where the law requires a document to be in
writing, the requirement is met by an
electronic document if the said electronic
document maintains its integrity and
reliability and can be authenticated so as to
be usable for subsequent reference;
i. The E-document has remained
complete and unaltered, apart from
the addition of any endorsement and
any authorized change or any change
which arises in the normal course of
communication;
ii. The E-document is reliable in the light
of the purpose for which it was
generated and in light of all relevant
circumstances
b) Paragraph(1) applies whether the
requirement is in the form of an obligation
or whether the law simply provides
consequences for the document not being
presented or retained in its original form;
c) Where the law requires that the document
be presented or retained in its original
form, that requirement is met by an
electronic document, if:
i. There exists a reliable assurance as to
the integrity of the document from the
time it was first generated in its final
form; and
ii. That document is capable of being
displayed to the person to whom it is
to be presented; provided that no
provision of this act shall apply to vary
any and all requirements of existing
laws on formalities required in the
execution of documents for their
validity.
CASE LAW
(1) GARCILLANO VS HOUSE OF REP COMMITTEE ON
PUBLIC INFO (Senate Rules and Guidelines; Publication)
Doctrine: RA 8792 only recognizes electronic documents
as evidence and not as a means of publishing.
FACTS
A wiretapped conversation, purportedly of Pres. GMA
and COMELEC Chair Virgilio Garcillano, or the “HELLO
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GARCI” Tapes circulated, giving cloud to the 2004
Presidential elections, whereby PGMA won over FPJ.
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to
due process considering that he is summoned to attend
the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of
his rights therein through the publication of the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which
underpins the investigation.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the
constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that
the rules have never been amended since 1995 and,
despite that, they are published in booklet form
available to anyone for free, and accessible to the
public at the Senate’s internet web page.
Respondent invokes RA No. 8782, or the
Electronic Commerce Act.
Issue: Whether or not publication of the Rules of
Procedures Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
through the Senate’s website, satisfies the due
process requirement of law.
Held: No.
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the
website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at
the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v.
Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that
the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after
publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation," precluding any other form of publication.
Publication in accordance with Tañada is mandatory to
comply with the due process requirement because
the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A
person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be
arrested and detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the
provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim
of valid publication through the internet is all the more
incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data
message or an electronic document as the functional
equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary
purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the
admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of
electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents. It does not make the internet a medium for
publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate
Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative
inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct
of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be
deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the
rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure."
(2) PEOPLE VS HINGPIT (TEXT MESSAGES)
FACTS
The defendant, taxi driver Enojas was asked by
police officers to accompany them to the police station.
Enojas agreed. On the way, the officers stopped at a
7/11 to use the restroom. Returning to the police car,
he found that Enojas had fled the scene. Later, the
police searched his abandoned taxi car and found
Enojas’ phone. They monitored the messages on the
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
phone and communicated with the other suspects,
resulting in an entrapment operation.
Enojas, along with several other defendants, was
charged with murder in 2006 before the Las Pinas
Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE: Are the text messages admissible as evidence
against Enojas?
HELD.Yes
As to the admissibility of the text messages, the
RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court's
earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic
Evidence to criminal actions. 
Text messages are to be proved by the testimony
of a person who was a party to the same or has personal
knowledge of them.  Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the
accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the
other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As
the recipient of those messages sent from and to the
mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal
knowledge of such messages and was competent to
testify on them.
The Court found that the text messages were
properly admissible because the police officer, posing
as Enojas, had personal knowledge of the messages
and was competent to testify about them.
(3) MAIKSI VS COMELEC [ PRINTED OUT BALLOT
IMAGES]
FACTS
During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan the winner for the
position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite.
Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second
highest number of votes, brought an election protest in
the RTC IMUS in Imus alleging irregularities in the
counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts.
RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the
results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly
elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease
and desist from performing the functions of said office.
Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the meanwhile,
the RTC granted Maliksi’s motion for execution pending
appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor.
In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First
Division, without giving notice to the parties, decided to
recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of
the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued an
order dated March 28, 2012 requiring Saquilayan to
deposit the amount necessary to defray the expenses for
the decryption and printing of the ballot images.
ISSUE: Whether the ballot images in the CF cards are
mere secondary evidence that should only be used
when the physical ballots are not available
HELD. No.
We have already ruled that the ballot images in
the CF cards, as well as the printouts of such images,
are the functional equivalent of the official physical
ballots filled up by the voters, and may be used in an
election protest.
In the recent consolidated cases of Vinzons-Chato
v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and
Panotes and Panotes v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and Vinzons-Chato,  the Court ruled
that "the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and
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 REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW
RULES ON EVIDENCE
recorded by the PCOS, are likewise 'official ballots' that
faithfully capture in electronic form the votes cast by
the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. No.
9369." The Court declared that the printouts of the
ballot images in the CF cards "are the functional
equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters
and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes
in an electoral protest." In short, both the ballot images
in the CF cards and the printouts of such images have
the same evidentiary value as the official physical
ballots filled up by the voters.
Hence, the COMELEC First Division did not gravely
abuse its discretion in using the ballot images in the CF
cards.
Maliksi further alleged that the ballot images in
the CF cards should merely be considered as secondary
evidence and should be resorted to only when the
physical ballots are not available or could not be
produced.
Maliksi is mistaken.
Rule 4 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC  is clear on this issue. It
states:
SECTION 1. Original of an Electronic Document. — An
electronic document shall be regarded as the
equivalent of an original document under the Best
Evidence Rule if it is a printout or output readable by
sight or other means, shown to reflect the data
accurately.
SECTION 2. Copies as equivalent of the
originals. — When a document is in two or more copies
executed at or about the same time with identical
contents, or is a counterpart produced by the same
impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or
by mechanical or electronic recording, or by chemical
reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which
accurately reproduces the original, such copies or
duplicates shall be regarded as the equivalent of the
original.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, copies or
duplicates shall not be admissible to the same
extent as the original if:
(a) a genuine question is raised as to the
authenticity of the original; or
(b) in the circumstances it would be
unjust or inequitable to admit the copy in lieu
of the original. (Emphasis supplied)
The ballot images, which are digital, are
electronically generated and written in the CF cards
when the ballots are fed into the PCOS machine. The
ballot images are the counterparts produced by
electronic recording which accurately reproduce the
original, and thus are the equivalent of the original. As
pointed out by the COMELEC, "[t]he digital images of the
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
physical ballots are electronically and instantaneously
generated by the PCOS machines once the physical
ballots are fed into and read by the machines."  Hence,
the ballot images are not secondary evidence. The
official physical ballots and the ballot images in the CF
cards are both original documents. The ballot images in
the CF cards have the same evidentiary weight as the
official physical ballots. HDIATS
The Court notes that Maliksi did not raise any
allegation that the use of the ballot images falls under
any of the exceptions under Section 2, Rule 4 of A.M.
No. 01-7-01-SC that would make their use inadmissible
as original ballots.
(2) BARTOLOME VS MARANAN [Court Stenographer;
TEXT MESSAGES; EPHEMERAL ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS]
FACTS
Ella Bartolome filed a case against Rosalie Maranan,
Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 20, Imus, Cavite with charging her with
extortion, graft and corruption for asking for P200,000
to facilitate the filing of an annulment of marriage. She
attached in her complaint the transcript and sim card
containing their conversation.
Respondent was apprehended in an entrapment
operation.
In support of her allegations, the complainant
attached to her affidavit-complaint the transcribed
electronic communications (text messages) between
her and the respondent;  a copy of an Electronic
Psychiatric History form given to her by the respondent
for her to accomplish in filing the petition for
annulment of marriage; 
The respondent's actions from the time the
complainant started communicating with her on October
21, 2009 and thereafter through a series of messages
they exchanged via SMS, until the entrapment operation
on November 11, 2009, showed that the complaint is
indeed meritorious. The respondent's text messages sent
to the complainant corroborate that she promised to
expedite — in exchange for a monetary consideration of
P160,000.00 and that she would provide the lawyer who
would file the annulment case — the complainant's
annulment case once it is filed.
ISSUE: Are the sms messages admissible as evidence?
Held. Yes.
Ephemeral electronic communications are now
admissible evidence, subject to certain conditions.
"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to
telephone conversations, text messages, chatroom
sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other
electronic forms of communication the evidence of
which is not recorded or retained. 
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 It may be proven by the testimony of a person who
was a party to the communications or has personal
knowledge thereof.  the functional equivalent and to have the same legal
 In the present case, we have no doubt regarding the
probative value of the text messages as evidence in
considering the present case. The complainant, who was
the recipient of the text messages and who therefore
has personal knowledge of these text messages,
identified the respondent as the sender through
cellphone number 09175775982. The respondent herself
admitted that her conversations with the complainant
had been thru SMS messaging and that the cellphone
number reflected in the complainant's cellphone from
which the text messages originated was hers. She
confirmed that it was her cellphone number during the
entrapment operation the Imus Cavite Police conducted.
(3) MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORP VS SAANGYONG CORP
(FAX; NOT ELECTRONIC DATA MESSAGE)
FACTS
MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling
stainless steel products and one of its supplier
Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong), conducted business
through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy
transmissions.  Model Law's definition of "data message," without
Ssangyong would send the pro forma invoices
containing the details of the steel product order to MCC;
if the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes
his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to
Ssangyong, again by fax.
On April 13, 2000, Ssangyong Manila Office sent,
by fax, a letter addressed to Gregory Chan, MCC
Manager [also the President of Sanyo Seiki Stainless
Steel Corporation], to confirm MCC's and Sanyo Seiki's
order of 220 metric tons (MT) of hot rolled stainless
steel under a preferential rate of US$1,860.00 per MT.
Chan, on behalf of the corporations, assented and
affixed his signature on the conforme portion of the
letter.
Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a
civil action for damages due to breach of contract
against MCC for breach of their contract.
RTC rendered its Decision on March 24, 2004, in
favor of Ssangyong. CA Affirmed, and ruling that Pro
Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-
POSTS0401-2  were admissible in evidence, although
they were mere facsimile printouts of MCC's steel orders
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
sustaining the admissibility in evidence of the pro-
forma invoices despite the fact that the same were
mere photocopies of facsimile printouts.
Held: YES
The definitions under the Electronic Commerce Act
of 2000, its IRR and the Rules on Electronic Evidence, at
first glance, convey the impression that facsimile
transmissions are electronic data messages or electronic
documents because they are sent by electronic means.
The expanded definition of an "electronic data message"
under the IRR, consistent with the UNCITRAL Model Law,
further supports this theory considering that the
enumeration "xxx [is] not limited to, electronic data
interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex
or telecopy." And to telecopy isto send a document from
one place to another via a fax machine.
Accordingly, in an ordinary facsimile transmission,
there exists an original paper-based information or data
that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-
printed at the receiving end. Be it noted that in
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
enacting the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, Congress
intended virtual or paperless writings to be
function as paper-based documents.Further, in a virtual
or paperless environment, technically, there is no
original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the
virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are
considered as originals. Ineluctably, the law's definition
of "electronic data message," which, as aforesaid, is
interchangeable with "electronic document," could not
have included facsimile transmissions, which have
anoriginal paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based
facsimile copy as received. These two copies are
distinct from each other, and have different legal
effects. While Congress anticipated future
developments in communications and computer
technology when it drafted the law, it excluded the
early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and
telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a
newer development as compared to the ordinary fax
machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined
the term "electronic data message."
Clearly then, the IRR went beyond the parameters
of the law when it adopted verbatim the UNCITRAL
considering the intention of Congress when the latter
deleted the phrase "but not limited to, electronic data
interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or
telecopy." The inclusion of this phrase in the IRR offends
a basic tenet in the exercise of the rule-making power
of administrative agencies. After all, the power of
administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to
what is found in the legislative enactment itself. The
implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot
extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to
amend or repeal a statute is vested in the
Legislature.Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the
basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is
the former that prevails, because the law cannot be
broadened by a mere administrative issuance—an
administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of
Congress. 
Had the Legislature really wanted ordinary fax
transmissions to be covered by the mantle of the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, it could have easily
lifted without a bit of tatter the entire wordings of the
UNCITRAL Model Law.
Incidentally, the National Statistical Coordination
Board Task Force on the Measurement of E-
Commerce,on November 22, 2006, recommended a
working definition of "electronic commerce," as "[a]ny
commercial transaction conducted through electronic,
optical and similar medium, mode, instrumentality and
technology. The transaction includes the sale or
purchase of goods and services, between individuals,
households, businesses and governments conducted over
computer-mediated networks through the Internet,
mobile phones, electronic data interchange (EDI) and
other channels through open and closed networks." The
Task Force's proposed definition is similar to the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development's (OECD's) broad definition as it covers
transactions made over any network, and, in addition, it
adopted the following provisions of the OECD definition:
(1) for transactions, it covers sale or purchase of goods
and services; (2) for channel/network, it considers any
computer-mediated network and NOT limited to
Internet alone; (3) it excludes transactions
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received/placed using fax, telephone or non-interactive
mail; (4) it considers payments done online or offline;
and (5) it considers delivery made online (like
downloading of purchased books, music or software
programs) or offline (deliveries of goods).
We, therefore, conclude that the terms
"electronic data message" and "electronic document,"
as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000, do not include a facsimile transmission.
Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be
considered as electronic evidence. It is not the
functional equivalent of an original under the Best
Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic
evidence.
Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data
message" or an "electronic document," and cannot be
considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with
greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission
not electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore,
Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-
POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"), which are mere
photocopies of the original fax transmittals, are not
electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both the
trial and the appellate courts.
SECTION 4. ORIGINAL OF THE DOCUMENT
Sec 4. ORIGINAL OF DOCUMENT--
(a) The original of a document is one the contents of
which are the subject of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies
executed at or about the same time, with identical
contents, all such copies are equally regarded as
originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course
of business, one being copied from another at or near
the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise
equally regarded as originals.
(a) An “original” of a document is the
document itself or any counterpart intended to
have the same effect by a person executing or
issuing it. An "original" of a photograph includes
the negative or any print therefrom. If data is
stored in a computer or similar device, any
printout or other output readable by sight or
other means, shown to reflect the data
accurately, is an "original."
(b) A “duplicate” is a counterpart produced
by the same impression as the original, or from
the same matrix, or by means of photography,
including enlargements and miniatures, or by
mechanical or electronic recording, or by
chemical reproduction or by other equivalent
techniques which accurately reproduce the
original.
(c) A duplicate is admissible to the same
extent as an original unless (1) a genuine
question is raised as to the authenticity of the
original, or (2) in the circumstances, it is unjust
or inequitable to admit the duplicate in lieu of
the original.
-Señga notes-
It appears that the term “original” is defined in
its ordinary sense as the original of the document
itself. It may be because defining the “original
document” under the old rule as one the contents of
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
which are the subject of inquiry is inaccurate since a
secondary document would also have its contents as
the subject of inquiry.
The definition was also revised to include any
counterpart of an original document intended to
have the same effect as the original document by
the person executing or issuing it. (See paragraph b)
The revision also includes the definition of an original
document, which contemplates either the negative or
print of the photograph. The definition also adopted
the definition used for an original of an electronic
document in that if the data is stored in a computer
or similar device, “any printout or other output
readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect
the data accurately” is an original.
However, while the definition adopted the
phrasing of an original of an electronic document, it
appears that definition of a document under the
revised rules does not contemplate an electronic
document. This is because under Section 1(h) of the
Rules on Electronic Evidence, the electronic document
refers to those that are “received, recorded,
transmitted, stored processed, retrieved or produced
electronically”. The revised rule, only states that if
the document or data is stored in a computer or other
similar device, any printout or other output readable
by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data
accurately, is considered as its original.
Under the amendment, the phrase “duplicate is
a counterpart produced by the same impression as
the original”, may still encompass the definition
under the original paragraph (b).
A duplicate produced by photography, such as
for instance, a screen shot, is still considered the
original, given that by definition, a photograph is a
documentary evidence.
Enlargements, miniatures, mechanical or
electronic re- recording, or by chemical reproduction,
or by other equivalent techniques which accurately
reproduce the original cover the expanded definition
of the document, meaning that an enlargement of an
x-ray film, for instance, is considered the duplicate
thereof, and hence, the original. An electronic re-
recording can pertain to a re-recorded audio or video,
such as a CCTV footage.
Note, however, that consistent with the ruling in
National Power Corporation v. Codilla, Jr., G.R. No.
170491, April 3, 2007, a reproduction of a paper based
document with the use of a photocopy machine, would
not make the copy produced thereby an original
document. It is still secondary to the original paper
based that was photocopied, similar to MCC Industial
Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong Corp., G.R. No. 170633,
October 17, 2007, where it was held that the facsimile
copy is not an original but secondary evidence, there
being a paper based original thereof.
The new paragraph (c) became necessary such
that the foregoing duplicates shall not be admissible
as original if:
(1) a genuine question is raised as to the
authenticity of the original; or
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(2) in the circumstances, it is unjust or
inequitable to admit the duplicate in lieu of the
original.
The new paragraph (c) became necessary to
address questions on the authenticity of or to
encompass other issues or circumstances that would
render the duplicate inadmissible.
The new paragraph (c) is similar to the exception
under Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rule on Electronic
Evidence, which provides that copies of the original
shall be deemed as equivalent of the
original (see complete definition thereunder which is
the same as the revised rule) but the same shall not
be admissible if the grounds under paragraph (c) are
present.
With the deletion of the old paragraph (c), it
appears that an entry repeated in the regular course
of business, one being copied from another at or
near the time of the transaction, is no longer
considered an original, unless it may be argued to fall
under the definition of a counterpart produced by the
same impression as the original, or from the same
matrix, among others.
**** Before Secondary Evidence can be presented, all
duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for, and
no excuse for the non-production of the original
document itself can be regarded as established until
all its parts are unavailable.
1. RULE ON DUPLICATE ORIGINAL
- Must be executed at or about the same time
with identical contents and all such copes are equally
regarded as originals. (under the old rule)
-is a counterpart produced by the same
impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or
by means of photography, including enlargements and
miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic recording,
or by chemical reproduction or by other equivalent
techniques which accurately reproduce the original.
2. RULES ON COPIES OF A DOCUMENT
a) Carbon Copy- duplicate and admissible as
best evidence
b) Letter Press Copies- not duplicate originals
as they are not produced simultaneously
with the original copies
c) Photographs and photographic copies
-Under the new rules, A duplicate produced
by photography such as a Screen shot is an
original.
d) Blueprints and tracings- considered originals
e) Telegraph messages -
i. If the fact to be proved is the telegram
as received, it is the original
ii. If the issue is the telegram as sent, the
original is the telegram delivered for
transmission.
CASE LAW
(1) BPI VS SMP
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
FACTS
January 1995, Maria Teresa Michaela Ong, as Sales
Executive of SMP, Inc. undertook the acceptance and
servicing of a purchase order of CLOTHESPAK
MANUFACTURING PHILS. (Clothespak) for 4,000 bags or
sacks of General purpose (GPS) polystyrene products.
The ordered products were delivered, for which
delivery receipts were issued.
As payment, Clothespak issued postdated checks
in favor of plaintiff SMP and delivered the same to Maria
Teresa Michaela Ong. When the same were deposited by
SMP Inc. on their maturity dates, the drawee bank
dishonored and returned said checks for the reason
"Account Closed."
In order to discredit the claim of ownership by
SMP, petitioner questions the admissibility of the
receipt presented by the former, wherein the ownership
was reserved for the buyer until after full payment of
the purchase price. Petitioner claims that the same was
inadmissible in evidence and was in contravention of
the best evidence rule.
ISSUE: Are the receipts presented admissible?
HELD. No.
The best evidence rule is the rule which requires
the highest grade of evidence obtainable to prove a
disputed fact. Although there are certain recognized
exceptions when the subject of inquiry is the contents
of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself. 
However, in the instant case, contrary to
petitioner's contention, the receipt presented by SMP is
deemed as an original, considering that the triplicate
copy of the provisional receipt was executed at the
same time as the other copies of the same receipt
involving the same transaction. Section 4, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. Original of document. —
(a) The original of the document
is one the contents of which are
the subject of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or
more copies executed at or about
the same time, with identical
contents, all such copies are
equally regarded as originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of
business, one being copied from another at or near the
time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise
equally regarded as originals. 
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(2) CAPITAL SHOES FACTORY VS TRAVELER KIDS evidence were mere photocopies.
( Carbon copy; Invoice Slips) The TSNs further reveal that after the comparison, the
photocopies were the ones retained in the records.
FACTS:
In 2000, Capital Shoes Factory Ltd., (CSFL) and
Traveler Kids, Inc. (TKI) entered into an agreement
where TKI would pay 30% of purchase price by way of
credit, and the balance of 70% by way of telegraphic
transfers. They failed to pay the agreed payments.
During trial, CSFL through its witness, identified
several sales invoices and order slips it issued as
evidence of its transactions with TKI.
TKI objected to the identification, pointing out
that the documents being presented were mere
photocopies.

ISSUE: Should the invoices and order slips be

admitted?
HELD. Yes.

RATIO:
CA erred in not admitting the invoices and order
slips which were duplicate originals.
Section 4(b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 4 . Original of document. —
(b) When a document is in two or more copies
executed at or about the same time, with identical
contents, all such copies are equally regarded as
originals.
In Trans Pacific Industrial Supplies v. The Court of
Appeals and Associated Bank, it was stressed that
duplicate originals were admissible as evidence:
“It is undisputed that the documents presented
were duplicate originals and are therefore admissible
as evidence. Further, it must be noted that respondent
bank itself did not bother to challenge the
authenticity of the duplicate copies submitted by
petitioner. In People vs. Tan, (105 Phil. 1242
[1959]), we said:
When carbon sheets are inserted between two or
more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a
contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature
of the party to be charged thereby, produces a facsimile
upon the sheets beneath, such signature being thus
reproduced by the same stroke of pen which made the
surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets so
written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either
of them may be introduced in evidence as such without
accounting for the non-production of the others.”
The transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs)
clearly show that Chiu convincingly explained that CSFL
usually prepared two (2) copies of invoices for a
particular transaction, giving one copy to a client and
retaining the other copy.
The Court combed through her testimony and found
nothing that would indicate that the documents offered
were mere photocopies.
The Court sees no reason why Section 4(b), Rule
130 of the Rules of Court should not apply. At any rate,
those exhibits can be admitted as part of the testimony
of Chiu.
The Court went over the RTC records and the TSNs
and found that, contrary to the assertion of TKI, the
duplicate originals were produced in court and
compared with their photocopies during the hearing
before the trial court.
The transcripts bare all of these but were missed
by the appellate court, which believed the assertion of
TKI that what were produced in court and offered in

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2. SECONDARY EVIDENCE
Sec 5. When Original document is unavailable. --
When the original document has been lost or destroyed,
or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof
of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his or her part, may
prove its contents by a copy or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic documents, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
CASE LAW
(1) DANTIS V. MAGHIRANG JR. (PROOF OF DUE
EXECUTION)
 
FACTS
The case draws its origin from a complaint for
quieting of title and recovery of possession with
damages filed by petitioner Rogelio Dantis (Rogelio)
against respondent Julio Maghinang, Jr. (Julio, Jr.) "
Julio claimed that his father, Julio Maghinang Sr.,
bought the said lot from the parents of Rogelio Dantis.
He admitted that the affidavit was not signed by the
alleged vendor, Emilio Dantis, the father of Rogelio
Dantis. The receipt he presented was admittedly a mere
photocopy.
RTC rendered its decision declaring Rogelio as the
true owner of the entire as evidenced by his TCT over
the same. 
CA held that the receipt was an indubitable proof
of the sale of the 352 square meter lot between Emilio
and Julio, Sr. It also ruled that the partial payment of
the purchase price, coupled with the delivery of the res,
gave efficacy to the oral sale and brought it outside the
operation of the statute of frauds.  Under the General Bonded Warehouse Act, the
Issues: Is the receipt admissible as secondary
evidence?
HELD. No.
The undated handwritten receipt of initial
downpayment in the amount of P100.00 supposedly
issued by Emilio to Julio, Sr. in connection with the sale
of the subject lot jurisprudence dictates that an
affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its
affiant /maker did not take the witness stand.
The sworn statement of Ignacio is hearsay evidence.
It cannot be deemed a declaration against interest for
the matter to be considered as an exception to the
hearsay rule because the declarant was not the seller
(Emilio), but his father Ignacio". On the other hand, the
undated handwritten receipt is considered secondary
evidence being a mere photocopy which, in this case,
cannot be admitted to prove the contents of such
receipt. The best evidence rule requires that the
highest available degree of proof must be produced. For
documentary evidence, the contents of a document are
best proved by the production of the document itself to
the exclusion of secondary or substitutionary evidence,
pursuant to Rule 130, Section 3.
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon
compliance with Rule 130, Section 5,which states that:
when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot
be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated. Proof of the due
execution of the document and its subsequent loss
would constitute the basis for the introduction of
secondary evidence.
In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Sangyong
Corporation, it was held that where the missing
document is the foundation of the action, more
strictness in proof is required than where the document
is only collaterally involved.
Guided by these norms, the court holds that Julio,
Jr. failed to prove the due execution of the original of
affidavit as well as its subsequent loss. His testimony
was riddled with improbabilities and contradictions
which tend to erode his credibility and raise doubt on
the veracity of his evidence. his claim of Julio, Jr. that
Emilio affixed his signature on the original affidavit in
1953 is highly improbable because record shows that
6milio died even before that year, specifically, on
November 13, 1952.
Seemingly, Julio, Jr. wanted to prove the sale by
a receipt when it should be the receipt that should
further corroborate the existence of the sale. At best,
his testimony only alleges but does not prove the
existence of the verbal agreement. Julio, Jr. miserably
failed to establish by preponderance of evidence.
(2) COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE VS LAGMAN (Proof
of Loss before Secondary Evidence is Allowed)
FACTS
Nelson Santos (Santos) applied for a license with
the National Food Authority (NFA) to engage in the
business of storing not more than 30,000 sacks
of palay in his warehouse.
approval for said license was conditioned upon
posting of a cash bond.
Lagman's insists on the novation of the1990
Bond.
Lagman presented a mere photocopy of the
1990 Bond. We rule as inadmissible such copy.
ISSUE: Is the photocopy of the 1990 Bond
admissible?
HELD. No.
Under the best evidence rule, the original
document must be produced whenever its contents
are the subject of inquiry.  The rule is encapsulated
in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.A
photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not
admissible unless it is shown that the original is
unavailable. 
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary
evidence to prove the contents of the original, the
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offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or
due execution of the original; (2) the loss and
destruction of the original or the reason for its non-
production in court; and (3) on the part of the
offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the
unavailability of the original can be attributed. The
correct order of proof is as follows: existence,
execution, loss, and contents. 
In the case at bar, Lagman mentioned during
the direct examination that there are actually four
(4) duplicate originals of the 1990 Bond: the first is
kept by the NFA, the second is with the Loan Officer
of the NFA in Tarlac, the third is with Country
Bankers and the fourth was in his possession. 
 A party must first present to the court proof of
loss or other satisfactory explanation for the non-
production of the original instrument. When more
than one original copy exists, it must appear that all
of them have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court before secondary evidence can be
given of any one. A photocopy may not be used
without accounting for the other originals.  duplicate of the title
Despite knowledge of the existence and
whereabouts of these duplicate originals, Lagman
merely presented a photocopy. He admitted that he
kept a copy of the 1990 Bond but he could no longer
produce it because he had already severed his ties with
Country Bankers. However, he did not explain why
severance of ties is by itself reason enough for the non-
availability of his copy of the bond considering that, as
it appears from the 1989 Bonds, Lagman himself is a
bondsman. Neither did Lagman explain why he failed to
secure the original from any of the three other
custodians he mentioned in his testimony. While he
apparently was able to find the original with the NFA
Loan Officer, he was merely contented with producing
its photocopy. Clearly, Lagman failed to exert diligent
efforts to produce the original.
REPUBLIC VS SPS MATEO [Proof of Lost]
FACTS
Spouses Lorenzo and Feliciana Mateo filed a
Petition for the Reconstitution of the Original Copy as
well as the Owner‘s Duplicate Copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-38769 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Bataan in the name of Jose Tan.
The property under the said title was purchased by the
Spouses Mateo from Jose Tan. Nevertheless, the original
copy of the said TCT was deemed lost and cannot be
located in the Registry of Deeds.
The Regional Trial Court of Balanga denied the
petition and the Motion for Reconsideration. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court‘s decision
and held that Mateo satisfactorily proved that the
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
original TCT was lost. Hence, the filing of this petition.
It was alleged that CA erred in giving weight to the
photocopy of the owner’s duplicate of TCT, as a
secondary evidence, as basis of the order for the
reconstitution of the title.
ISSUE:Should the photocopy of the title be admissible
as secondary evidence?
HELD.NO.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 26, “AN ACT PROVIDING A
SPECIAL PROCEDURE FOR THE RECONSTITUTION OF
TORRENS CERTIFICATES OF TITLE LOST OR DESTROYED,”
which has been quoted by the trial court in its decision,
enumerates the sources-documents-bases of a
reconstitution of a transfer certificate of title. To
repeat, they are, in the following order:
1. the owner’s duplicate of the title
2. the co-owner’s mortgagee’s, or lessee’s
3. a certified copy of the title previously
issued by the register of deeds or by a legal
custodian
4. an authenticated copy of the decree of
registration or patent, as the case may be,
pursuant to which the OCT was issued
5. a document, on file in the registry of
deeds, by which the property . . . is . . .
encumbered or an authenticated copy of said
document showing that its original had been
registered; and any other document which, in
the judgment of the court, is sufficient and
proper basis for reconstituting the lost or
destroyed title.
Since, except for the last above-enumerated
document, the Mateos have failed to present
any of the other documents, the rule on
secondary evidence under Sec. 5 of Rule 130
applies. 
As the immediately quoted provision of the Rules
directs, the order of presentation of secondary evidence
is: existence, execution, loss, contents. The order may,
however, be changed if necessary in the discretion of
the court. The sufficiency of the proof offered as a
predicate for the admission of an allegedly lost
document lies within the judicial discretion of the trial
court under all the circumstances of the particular
case. 
Assuming that the existence and execution of the
original of the TCT has been satisfactorily shown, and
that it was taken in 1973 by the Department of Justice
and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in
connection with the investigation of the judge on whose
order the OCT from which the TCT was transferred,
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which OCT was also taken by said government agencies,
there is no satisfactory showing that the TCT has been
lost.
In fine, the Mateos have not satisfactorily shown
that the original of the TCT has been lost or is no longer
available. On this score alone, the Mateos’ petition for
reconstitution fails.
In any event, even assuming that the original of the TCT
was lost or is no longer available, not only is the
photocopy of the alleged owner’s duplicate copy thereof
— Exh. “1”  partly illegible. When, where and under
what circumstances the photocopy was taken and where
it was kept to spare it from being also “lost” were not
even shown. These, not to mention the conduct by the
Department of Justice and NBI of an investigation
behind the issuance of the OCT and TCT caution and
lead this Court to rule against the sufficiency of the
Mateos’ evidence and propriety of a grant of their
petition for reconstitution.
CITIBANK VS TEODORO
FACTS
Respondent Efren S. Teodoro was one of the
cardholders of the petitioner Citibank, N.A. Mastercard.
On January 25, 1995, respondent's obligations stood at
P191,693.25, inclusive of interest and service charges.
Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for collection.
During the hearing, petitioner presented several
photocopies of sales invoices or charge slips to the total
amount of P24,388.36.
The Court of Appeals ruled that that the
photocopies of the sales invoices or charge slips were
incompetent proofs of the obligation of respondent.
Hence, this petition for review. 
ISSUE:ARE THE PHOTOCOPIES OF SALES INVOICE
ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE?
HELD: NO.
The original copies of the sales invoices are the best
evidence to prove the alleged obligation. Photocopies
thereof are mere secondary evidence. As such, they are
inadmissible because petitioner, as the offeror, failed to
prove any of the exceptions provided under Section 3 of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as well as the conditions
of their admissibility. Because of the inadmissibility of
the photocopies in the absence of the originals,
respondent's obligation was not established.
REQUISITES BEFORE A SECONDARY EVIDENCE MAY BE
PRESENTED. — Applying Sec. 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court to the present case, before a party is allowed to
adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the
original sales invoices, the offeror must prove the
following:
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
(1) the existence or due execution of the original;
(2) the loss and destruction of the original or the
reason for its nonproduction in court; and
(3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad
faith to which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed. The correct order of proof is as
follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents. At
the sound discretion of the court, this order may be
changed if necessary.
LOSS OF THE ORIGINALS AND REASONABLE DILIGENCE
IN THE SEARCH FOR THEM, NOT ESTABLISHED IN CASE
AT BAR. — In the present case,the existence of the
original sales invoices was established by the
photocopies and the testimony of Hernandez.
Petitioner, however, failed to prove that the originals
had been lost or could not be produced in court after
reasonable diligence and good faith in searching for
them. Indeed, the loss of the originals and reasonable
diligence in the search for them were conditions that
were not met, because the sales invoices might have
been found by Equitable. Hernandez, testifying that he
had requested the originals from Equitable, failed to
show that he had subsequently followed up the request.
WHEN MORE THAN ONE ORIGINAL COPY EXISTS, A
PHOTOCOPY MAY NOT BE USED WITHOUT
ACCOUNTING FOR THE OTHER ORIGINALS. — [W]hen
more than one original copy exists, it must appear
that all of them have been lost, destroyed, or cannot
be produced in court before secondary evidence can be
given of any one. A photocopy may not be used without
accounting for the other originals. In Santos v.
Santos the Court upheld the pronouncement of the CA
that before the appellees therein could be allowed to
adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the
original, they had to prove - with the requisite quantum
of evidence - the loss, the destruction or the
unavailability of all original copies of the document.
SECTION 6. WHEN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT IS IN
ADVERSE PARTY’S CUSTODY OR CONTROL
Sec 6. When original document is in adverse
party’s custody or control. -- If the document is
in the custody or control of the adverse party, he
or she must have reasonable notice to produce it.
If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of
its existence, he or she fails to produce the
document, secondary evidence may be presented
as in the case of its loss.
(1) ENGR. BAYANI VS PEOPLE
[ Original is in the custody of the adverse party]
Under Section 3(b), Rule 130 of the said Rules,
secondary evidence of a writing may be admitted when
the original is in the custody or under the control of the
party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice. To
warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when
the original of a writing is in the custody or control of
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the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that
the adverse party must be given reasonable notice, that
he fails or refuses to produce the same in court and that
the offeror offers satisfactory proof of its existence.
The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the
custody or control of the party against whom it is
offered does not warrant the admission of secondary
evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done all in
his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice
to the said party to produce the document. The notice
may be in the form of a motion for the production of
the original or made in open court in the presence of
the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum,
provided that the party in custody of the original has
sufficient time to produce the same. When such party
has the original of the writing and does not
voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to produce
it, secondary evidence may be admitted.
SECTION 7. EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE WHEN THE ORIGINAL
DOCUMENT IS A PUBLIC RECORD SUMMARIES
Sec 7. Evidence admissible when original
document is a public record. -- When the original
of a document is in the custody of a public officer
or is recorded in a public office, its contents may
be proved by a certified copy issued by the public
officer in custody thereof.
Sec 7. Summaries. — When the contents of
documents, records, photographs, or numerous
accounts are voluminous and cannot be examined
in court without great loss of time, and the fact
sought to be established is only the general result
of the whole, the contents of such evidence may
be presented in the form of a chart, summary, or
calculation.
The originals shall be available for
examination or copying, or both, by the adverse
party at a reasonable time and place. The court
may order that they be produced in court.
The original Section 7 is renumbered to Section
8. Section 7 under the amended rule is a new
insertion. It should be read together with Rule 130,
Sec. 3 (c).
The new Section 7 provides the manner by which
the original consisting of voluminous accounts may be
presented, i.e., in the form of a chart, summary or
calculation. While the summary may be produced, still
the originals of the voluminous accounts shall be
available for examination or copying, or both, by the
adverse party at a reasonable time and place. The
court may also order that the voluminous accounts be
produced in court.
SECTION 7 8. EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE WHEN THE
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT IS A PUBLIC RECORD
Sec 7. 8. Evidence admissible when original
document is a public record. -- When the original
of a document is in the custody of a public officer
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
or is recorded in a public office, its contents may
be proved by a certified copy issued by the public
officer in custody thereof.
CASE LAW
(1) REPUBLIC VS DEVELOPMENT REOSURCES
[ Probative Weight of Land Classification Map;
Compare with SAAD AGRO CASE]
FACTS
This case is about the probative weight of a
Land Classification (LC) Map which the Republic of
the Philippines (Republic) presented to prove that the
land was not alienable and disposable at the time it
was adjudicated to the original owner.
The RTC ruled that LC Map has no probative
value because: (1) the copy presented in court was a
reproduction and not the original or certified copy;
and (2) it does not show that the land was declared
alienable and disposable only as of August 6, 1923;
rather that it was certified on that date. 
ISSUE: Should the LC Map be admitted as evidence?
HELD: No.
The Court held in SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc. v.
Republic of the Philippines  that a mere photocopy
of an LC Map is not a competent evidence of the
existence of such map. While evidence is
admissible when the original of a document is in
the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office, as in this case, there is a need to
present a certified copy of it issued by the public
officer having custody of the document to prove its
contents.
The Republic of course claims that its version of LC
Map 47 should be regarded as the original itself because
it was the official copy of the region furnished by the
National Mapping and Resources Inventory Authority
where the original is kept.  But, as admitted by Crisanto
Galo, the Land Evaluation Coordinator for DENR Region
XI, the copy they presented was neither marked nor
certified as a reproduction of the original.  Hence, it
cannot be considered as an official copy, more so an
original copy.
(2) BUNAGAN-BANSIG V. CELERA [Marriage Contract]
FACTS
This is a petition for disbarment by complainant
Bunagan-Bansig against Respondent Atty. Celera for
Gross Immoral Conduct.
Respondent was married to complainant's sister,
Gracemarie R. Bunagan (Bunagan), as evidenced by a
certified photocopy of the contract of marriage dated
May 8, 1997. Notwithstanding this, Respondent
contracted marriage to one Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba
(Alba), as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the
certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration
Officer of San Juan, Manila.
ISSUE: Are the certified xerox copies of marriage
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contracts admissible as evidence?
HELD: YES.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage
contracts, issued by a public officer in custody thereof,
are admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as
provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the
marriage certificates, other than being admissible in
evidence, also clearly indicate that respondent
contracted the second marriage while the first marriage
is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the
marriage certificates would already have been sufficient
to establish the existence of two marriages entered into
by respondent. The certified xerox copies should be
accorded the full faith and credence given to public
documents. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding,
these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of
respondent are competent and convincing evidence to
prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him
unfit to continue as a member of the Bar.
(3) SAAD AGRO-INDUSTRIES VS REPUBLIC [LC Maps]
FACTS
Socorro Orcullo (Orcullo) filed her application for
Free Patent which was granted. Subsequently, the
subject lot was sold to SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc.
(petitioner) by one of Orcullo's heirs.
Sometime in 1995, the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Solicitor General, filed a complaint for
annulment of title, on the ground that the issuance of
the said free patent and title for Lot No. 1434 was
irregular and erroneous, following the discovery that the
lot is allegedly part of the timberland and forest reserve
of Sibonga, Cebu.   Sec 8. 9. Party who calls for document not
CA held that timber or forest lands, to which the
subject lot belongs, are not subject to private
ownership, unless these are first classified as
agricultural lands, relying on the photocopy of a land
classification map submitted as evidence.
ISSUE: IS THE LC MAP ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE?
HELD:
 However, at the hearing on 6 June 1997, the trial
court denied admission of the map for the purpose of
showing that the subject lot falls within a timberland
reserve after respondent had failed to submit either a
certified true copy or an official publication
thereof.  The Court observes that the document
adverted to is a mere photocopy of the purported
original, and not the blue print as insisted by
respondent. 
A mere photocopy does not qualify as competent
evidence of the existence of the L.C. Map. Under the
best evidence rule, the original document must be
produced, except:
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
1. When the original has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without
bad faith on the part of the offeror;
2. When the original is in the custody or
under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it
after reasonable notice;
3. When the original consists of numerous
accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the
fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and
4. When the original is a public record in
the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office. 
In this case, respondent claims that the
presentation of the original L.C. Map is unnecessary
since it is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in the public office. Evidence, indeed, is
admissible when the original of a document is in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office. However, to prove its contents, there is a need
to present a certified copy issued by the public officer
in custody thereof. 
In addition, while the L.C. Map may be considered a
public document and prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein, the map, to be admissible for any
purpose, must be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal
custody of the record. 
SEC 8. 9. PARTY WHO CALLS FOR
DOCUMENT NOT BOUND TO OFFER IT
bound to offer it. -- A party who calls for the
production of a document and inspects the same
is not obliged to offer it as evidence.
The original Section 8 and the new Section 9 are
the same.
This rule should be read in relation to Section 1,
Rule 27. The production or inspection of documents or
things as a mode of discovery sanctioned by the rules
may be availed of by any party upon a showing of good
cause therefor before the court in which an action is
pending. The court may order any party:
a) to produce and permit the inspection and
copying or photographing of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, which are not
privileged; which constitute or contain evidence
material to any matter involved in the action; and
which are in his possession, custody or control; or
b) to permit entry upon designated land or other
property in his possession or control for the purpose of
inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the
property or any designated relevant object or
operation thereon.
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Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the

documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things that may be
produced and inspected should not be privileged. The
documents must not be privileged against disclosure.
On the ground of public policy, the rules providing for
production and inspection of books and papers do not
authorize the production or inspection of privileged
matter; that is, books and papers which, because of
their confidential and privileged character, could not
be received in evidence. Such a condition is in
addition to the requisite that the items be specifically
described, and must constitute or contain evidence
material to any matter involved in the action and
which are in the party's possession, custody or control
(Air Philippines Corp. v. Pennswell, Inc., G.R. No.
172835, 13 December 2007)
RULE 27
PRODUCTION OR INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS OR
THINGS

SEC 1. Motion for production or inspection; order. --

Upon motion of any party showing good cause therfor,
the court in which an action is pending may
(a) order any party to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing, by or on
behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged,
which constitute or contain evidence material to any
matter involved in the action and which are in his
possession, custody or control; or
(b) Order any party to permit entry upon
designated land or other property in his possession or
control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring,
surveying, or photographing the property or any
designated relevant object or operation thereon.
The order shall specify the time, place and
manner of making the inspection and taking
copies and photographs, and may prescribe such
terms and conditions as are just.

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3.PAROLE EVIDENCE
SEC 9. 10. EVIDENCE OF WRITTEN AGREEMENTS
Sec 9.10. Evidence of written agreements. --
When the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing
all the terms agreed upon and there can be, as
between the parties and their successor in
interest, no evidence of such terms other than
the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to
modify, explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement if he or she puts in issue in his a
verified pleading.
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or
imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to
express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by
the parties or their successors in interest after
the execution of the written agreement.
The term “agreement” includes wills.
The second paragraph addresses gender
sensitivity and requires that any of the issues
warranting the exception to the Parol Evidence Rule
should be raised in a verified pleading. Prior to the
amendment, it was enough to raise said issue in a
pleading that is not necessarily verified. The
verification here must take into account the amended
definition of a verification under the amended Rule 7,
Sec. 6.
All the grounds warranting the application of said
exception are the same.
CASE LAW
(1) PILIPINAS BANK VS CA (INTRINSIC AMBIGUITY)
FACTS
Petitioner Pilipinas Bank obtained an insurance
policy from Meridian Assurance Corp. While the
insurance was in force, petitioner’s armored vehicle was
robbed by two armed men wearing police uniforms.
Respondent denied claim arguing that such is not
covered by the policy. Petitioner presented as witness
Mr Cesar to testify the existence of the policy and to
testify on the negotiations that were made, and that led
to the attachment of warranties, to prove that the loss
was covered.
Petitioner filed a motion to Recall witness, to allow
Cesar to testify on the negotiations pertaining to the
terms and conditions of the policy. Respondent objects
on the ground that it would violate the parol evidence
rule.
ISSUE: Would the petitioner’s Motion to Recall Cesar
constitute a violation of the Parole Evidence Rule?
HELD. YES.
Sec 9 Rule 130 expressly requires that for Parol
Evidence to be admissible to vary the terms of the
written agreement, the mistake or imperfection thereof
or its failure to express the true agreement of the
parties should be put in issue by the pleadings.
Petitioner failed to raise the issue of an intrinsic
ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the terms of the
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
Policy, or of the failure of said contract to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties thereto in its
Complaint.
Xxx depending exclusively on human memory, is not
as reliable as written or documentary evidence.
Spoken words could be notoriously undesirable unlike
a written contract which speaks of a uniform
language. Xxxx
(2) EAGLERIDGE DEV’T CORP VS CAMERON GRANVILLE
(NOT A PARTY)
FACTS
CA ordered respondent Cameron to produce the
LOAN SALE AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT (LSPA).
Respondent argues that the production of the LSPA will
violate the parole evidence rule.
Petitioners contend that respondent was not a party
to the deed of assignment, but Cameron Granville Asset
Management Inc, hence not a violation of PER.
Petitioner argues PER is not applicable because they
were not parties to the deed of assignment and they
cannot be prevented from seeking evidence to
determine the complete terms of the Deed of
Assignment.
ISSUE: Will the allowance the LSPA constitute a
violation of the Parol Evidence Rule?
HELD: No.
The PER does not apply to the petitioners who are
not parties to the deed of assignment and do not base
their claim on it. Hence, they cannot be prevented from
seeking evidence to determine the complete terms of
the deed of assignment.
Even assuming that Rule 130 Sec 9 is applicable, an
exception to the rule under the second paragraph is
when the party puts in issue the validity of the written
agreement, as in the case a quo.
Besides, what is forbidden under the parol evidence
rule is the presentation of oral or extrinsic evidence,
not those expressly referred to in the written
agreement.
“Documents ca be read together when one refers to
the other.” By the express terms of the deed of
assignment, it is clear that the deed of assignment was
meant to be read in conjunction with the LSPA.
(3) MANILA ELECTRIC CO. VS HEIRS OF SPS DELOY
(MERALCO ITSELF SUBMITTED THE EVIDENCE;
Constitute admission)
FACTS
Respondents, the owners of land in Trece Martires
City, donated a portion of the property to CEDA for the
latter to provide cheap and affordable electric supply to
the province of Cavite, whereby a Deed of Donation was
executed. CEDA sold it to MERALCO,embodied in a MOA.
Respondents offered to sell the property to
MERALCO, but they denied. Respondents filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer.
MERALCO avers that the extrinsic or extraneous
evidence (Letter and Internal Memorandum) submitted
by respondents cannot contradict the terms of the deed
of sale between CEDA and MERALCO pursuant to PER.
In the letter and internal memorandum, MERALCO
acknowledged that the owners of the subject property
were the Deloys.
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ISSUE: Is the admission of the extrinsic evidence
submitted by respondent a violation of the PER?
HELD. No.
MERALCO never disputed the declarations contained
in these letters which were even marked as its own
exhibits. Pursuant to Sec 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Evidence, these admissions and/or declarations are
admissible against MERALCO.
The letter and the internal memorandum presented,
offered and properly admitted as part of the evidence
on record by MERALCO itself, constitute an admission
against its own interest. Hence, MERALCO should
appropriately be bound by the contents of the
documents.
(4) SPS PARAS VS KIMWA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVT
CORP [ EXCEPTIONAL CASE ALLOWING ADMISSION OF
PAROLE EVIDENCE]
FACTS
Spouses Paras filed a complaint against respondent
Kimwa for violation of their agreement. Kimwa asserted
that the Agreement articulated the parties’ true intent
that 40,000 cubic meters was a maximum limit and that
May 15,1995 was never set as a deadline.
Invoking the Parol Evidence Rule, it insisted that
Spouses paras were barred from introducing evidence
which would show that the parties had agreed
differently.
ISSUE: Is the production of evidence to prove the
intent of the parties other than the agreement itself a
violation of Parol Evidence Rule?
HELD. No.
Petitioners Sps Paras pleaded in the Complaint they
filed before the trial court a mistake or imperfection in
the Agreement, as well as the Agreement’s failure to
express the true intent of the parties. Further,
respondent Kimwa also responded to petitioners
pleading these issues. This is thus an EXCEPTIONAL
CASE ALLOWING ADMISSION OF PAROL EVIDENCE.
Considering how the Agreement’s mistake,
imperfection, or supposed failure to express the parties’
true intent was successfully put in issue in petitioners
Sps Paras’ Complaint, and respondents Answer, this case
falls under the exceptions provided in Sec 9 Rule 130.
Accordingly, the testimonial and documentary parol
evidence sought to be introduced by the petitioners Sps
Paras, which attest to these supposed flaws and what
they aver to have been the parties’ true intent, may be
admitted and considered.
PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE ; DISCUSSION
Per this rule, reduction to written form, regardless
of the formalities observed, “forbids any addition to, or
contradictions of, the terms of a written agreement by
testimony or other evidence purporting to show that
different terms were agreed upon by the parties,
varying the purport of the written contract.
This rule is animated by a perceived wisdom in
deferring to the contracting parties’ articulated intent.
In choosing to reduce their agreement in writing, they
are deemed to have done so meticulously and carefully,
employing specific-- frequently, even technical--
language as are appropriate to theur contect. From an
evidentiary standpoint, this is also because “oral”
testimony … coming from a party who has an interest in
the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
human memory, is not a reliable as written or
documentary evidence. Spoken words could be
notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which
speaks of a uniform language.”
This, however, is merely a general rule. Provided
that a party puts in issue in its pleading any of the
four(4) items enumerated in the 2nd paragraph of Rule
130, Sec 9, “ a party may present evidence to modify,
explain or add to the terms of the agreement.”
Raising any of these items as an issue in a pleading
such that it falls under the exception is not limited
to the party initiating an action.
If the defendant set up the affirmative defense
that the contract mentioned in the complaint does
not express the true agreement of the parties, then
parol evidence is admissible to prove the true
agreement of the parties. Moreover, as with all
possible objections to the admission of evidence, a
party’s failure to timely object is deemed a waiver,
and parol evidence may then be entertained.
(5) MARQUEZ VS ESPEJO [ True Intention of the
Documents; Respondents are not parties to the VLT]
FACTS
- Case about the Deed of Voluntary Transfer having
the indicating the wrong TCT No. VLT had the TCT
number of the Lantap Property but the description of
location in Brgy. Murong.
CA ruled that the Deed of Voluntary Transfer is
controlling, upholding the BER, and PER.
ISSUE: Was the PER properly applied in this case?
HELD. No.
The application of the Parol Evidence Rule is
improper int he case at bar.
(1) Respondents are not parties to the VLTs executed
between RBBI and petitioners; they are strangers to the
written contracts. Rule 130 Sec 9 specifically provides
that parol evidence rule is exclusive only as “between
the parties and their successors-in-interest.” The parol
evidence rule may not be invoked where at least one of
the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party
to the written document in question, and does not base
his claim on the instrument or assert a right originating
in the instrument.
(2) The case falls under the exceptions to the Parol
Evidence Rule. A party may present evidence to modify,
explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if
he puts in issue in his pleading:
(i) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection
in the written agreement;
(ii) The failure of the written agreement to
express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto.
(6) SPS AMONCIO VS BENEDICTO [No Objection]
DOCTRINE
“Where a party entitled to the benefit of the parol
evidence rule allows such evidence to be received
without objection, he cannot, after the trial has closed
and the case has been decided against him, invoke the
rule in order to object to the respondent’s testimony in
the trial court, petitioners waived the protection of the
parol evidence rule.”
RULING
Although the present case does not appear to fall
under any of the given exceptions written in Sec 9 of
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Rule 130, however, a party to a contract may prove the
existence of any separate oral agreement as to any
matter which is not inconsistent with its terms. This
may be done if, from the circumstances of the case, the
court believes that the document dies not convey
entirely the whole of the parties’ transaction.
(7) SPS TRINIDAD VS IMSON [True Intention]
FACT
CA ruled in favor of respondents after considering
the records of payment of purchase price through
personal checks, acknowledgment of payment by way of
affidavit and receipts, and respondent’s exercise of acts
of ownership prove that she is the owner of the disputed
condominium unit and, thus is entitled to the possession
thereof.
Petitioners content that since the former owners, as
well as respondent, are all parties to the Deed of
Assignment and transfer of Rights, they are bound by
the said Deed and they cannot allege terms
which are not found within the said agreement.
ISSUE: Should the Parol Evidence Rule be applied to
bar evidence adduced by respondents?
HELD. No.
CA correctly held that the existence and due
execution of these the Deed of Assignment and Transfer
of Rights and Deed of Absolute Sale are not in issue The
presumption of truth of the facts stated in notarized
documents is merely prima facie, which means that this
presumption can be overcome by clear and convincing
evidence. Hence, the truth of the facts stated in the
disputed Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights as
well as the Deed of Absolute Sale may be rebutted by
evidence.
In the present case, what is being asserted by
respondent is that the above documents do not embody
the true intent and agreement of the parties to this
end, respondent submitted sufficient proof to refute the
contents of the documents and to establish the real
intent of the parties.
(8) LEIGHTON CONTRACTORS PHILS VS CNP
INDUSTRIES [ Modification of the Terms of the Original
Agreement]
of the Rules of Court holds that when the terms of an
agreement have been reduced into writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and
there can be, between the parties and their successors
in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement. It, however, admits
of exceptios such as when the parties subsequently
modify the terms of their original agreement.”
(9) ROSARIO TEXTILE MILLS CORP VS HOMES BANKERS
SAVINGS AND TRUST CO.
FACTS
Yujuico contends that the suretyship agreement
does not bind him, the same being a mere formality.
RULING.
The Suretyship Agreement signed by petitioner
Yujuico binds him. The terms clearly show that he
agreed to pay jointly and severally with RTMC.
“Under this Rule (PER), the terms of a contract are
rendered conclusive upon the parties and evidence
aliunde is not admissible to vary or contradict a
complete and enforceable agreement embodied in a
document. We have carefully examined the Suretyship
Agreement signed by Yujuico and found no ambiguity
therein, Documents must be taken as explaining all the
terms of the agreement between the parties when there
appears to be no ambiguity in the language of said
documents nor any failure to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties.”
4. INTERPRETATION OF DOCUMENTS
[SECTION 10-19 11-20]
The provisions on the Interpretation of
Documents under the amended rule are contained
under Sections 11-20.
The comparable provisions are exactly the same,
except for: (1) Section 13 (now Section 14) and Section
17 (now Section 18), which contain amendments to
address gender sensitivity; and (2) the renumbering of
the sections.

ISSUEL Whether or not the case falls within an

exception to the PER after petitioner approved of the
additional cost estimates, in effect modifying the
original agreement in the subcontract.
HELD. YES.
The scope of work was defined in the subcontract as
the completion of the structural steel works according
to the main drawing, technical specifications and the
main contract. Thus to determine whether the roof
ridge ventillation and crane beams were included in the
scope of work, reference to the main drawing, technical
specifications, and the main contract is necessary.
The main contract stated that the structural steel
works included Drawing . This, according to petitioner
and respondent referred to the roof ridge ventillation
and crane beams. Hence, the said works clearly
included in the sub-contract works.

“ The parol evidence rule, embodied in Sec 9 Rule 130

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C. TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE (Oral Evidence)
-evidence elicited from the mouth of a witness
as distinguished from real and documentary
evidence.
-viva voce evidence, meaning “living voice” or
by word of mouth
Based on jurispridence, Testimonial evidence has
the least weight, if incredible.
REASON: Man’s memory is being relied upon.
Moreover, both parties and their witnesses will recall
only those favorable to them and deliberately for get
those which are adverse
1.QUALIFICATION OF WITNESSES
Sec. 20. 21. Witnesses; their qualifications. -- Except
as provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome
of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise
provided by law, shall not be a ground for
disqualification.
-SEÑGA NOTES-
The provision referring to the original Section 21
was deleted. The originally deleted provision, in
referring to the now deleted original Section 21 meant
that:
(a) those whose mental condition at the time of
their production for examination, is such that they are
incapable of intelligently making known their
perception to others; and
(2) children whose mental maturity is such as to
render them incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which they are examined and of relating
them truthfully, cannot be witnesses.
It is submitted that reference to the foregoing
was deleted because:
1. those with mental condition that cannot make
known their perception is already encompassed in the
definition of those qualified to testify. The definition
in the original Section 20, now Section 21, states that
qualified witnesses are those who can perceive and
can make known their perceptions. Thus, if one
cannot make known his perception due to a mental
condition, then the witness is disqualified. The
deletion was probably to remove redundancy.
2. The disqualification on the child witness is no
longer relevant with the Rule on Examination of Child
Witness, which provides that every child is presumed
qualified to be a witness (Rule on Examination of Child
Witness, Sec. 6)
1.WITNESS
-refers to a person who testifies in a case or
gives evidence before judicial tribunal.
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
WHAT WILL THE WITNESS TESTIFY ON?
GR. All persons who can perceive, and perceiving,
can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the
outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime shall
not be a ground for disqualification.
EXCEPTIONS. The following are prohibited by law or
rules to testify:
1. Those disqualified under Sections 21 22 to
24 of Rule 130 { Disqualified by reason of mental
incapacity, by reason of marriage, by reason of
death or insanity of adverse party, or by reason of
privileged communication};
2. Art 821 of the Civil Code disqualifies those:
3. Section 17, Rule 119 of the RoC requires
that the accused sought to be discharged to be state
witness has not at any time been convicted of any
offense involving MORAL TURPITUDE. The same
requirement is provided for a state witness under
R.A 6981 or the Witness Protection, Security and
Benefit Act.
2. A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his
client, EXCEPT. (FS)
(1) On FORMAL MATTERS, such as the mailing,
authentication or custody of an instrument, and the
like; or
(2) On SUBSTANTIAL MATTERS, in cases where his
testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in
which event he must, during his testimony entrust
the trial of the case to another counsel.
QUALIFICATIONS OF A WITNESS
A prospective witness must show that he has
the following abilities: (ORRR)
(a) To OBSERVE- the testimonial quality of
perception;
(b) To REMEMBER- the testimonial quality of
memory;
(c) To RELATE - the testimonial quality of
narration; and
(d) To RECOGNIZE a duty to tell the truth - The
testimonial quality of sincerity.
3. COMPETENCY OF WITNESS means the legal fitness
or ability of a witness to be heard on trial of a cause.
CASE LAW
1. ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES RETIREMENT
AND SEPARATION BENEFITS SYSTEM VS. REPUBLIC (No
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RULES ON EVIDENCE
Authority Required; VP)
FACTS
Petitioner was "created under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 361 and was designed to establish a
separate fund to guarantee continuous financial support
to the Armed Forces of the Philippines military
retirement system as provided for in Republic Act No.
340."
Petitioner filed an Application for Registration
of Title over three parcels of land located in West
Bicutan, Taguig City, as granted by former Pres. FVR on
May 8, 1998.
The petitioner then presented as its witness,
Ms. Alma P. Aban (Ms.Aban), its Vice President and Head
of its Asset Enhancement Office.
In response, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed a MR dated May 12, 2008, wherein it argued
that the petitioner failed to prove that it has personality
to own property in its name and the petitioner failed to
show that the witness it presented was duly authorized
to appear for and in its behalf.
ISSUE: Was the dismissal of the application for land
registration on the ground of failure to prosecute due
to the lack of authority of Ms. Aban to testify on
behalf of the petitioner?
HELD: YES.
Cavili v. Judge Florendo speaks of the disqualifications:
Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for
specific disqualifications.
Section 19 disqualifies those who are
mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age
or immaturity renders them incapable of being
witnesses.
Section 20 provides for disqualification
based on conflicts of interest or on relationship.
Section 21 provides for disqualifications
based on privileged communications.
Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule
on disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds
when a witness may be impeached by the party against
whom he was called.
A reading of the pertinent law and
jurisprudence would show that Ms.Aban is qualified to
testify as a witness for the petitioner since she
possesses the qualifications of being able to perceive
and being able to make her perceptions known to
others.
FURTHERMORE, she possesses none of the
disqualifications described above.
2. PEOPLE VS UMALI (Drug Addict witness)
FACTS
Francisco Manalo, was investigated by operatives
of the Tiaong, Quezon Police Department and for which
a case for violation of the Dangerous Drug Act was filed
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
against him. He was likewise facing other charges such
as concealment of deadly weapon and other crimes
against property.
Pat. Felino Noguerra went to the Tiaong Municipal
Jail, and sought the help of MANALO to identify the
source of the marijuana. In return he asked the
policeman to help him in some cases pending against
him. He was told to buy marijuana with marked bills.
Few minutes thereafter, Manalo returned with two
(2) foils of dried marijuana which were allegedly bought
from the accused Gloria Umali. Thereafter, he was
asked to make a statement.
After securing a search warrant, with the help of
Manalo’s affidavit, supported by the toils of marijuana,
the police operatives, went to the house of Gloria
Umali.
Gloria Umali avers that the witness Francisco
Manalo is not reputed to be trustworthy and reliable,
that he has several charges against him, and that he was
likely to tell falsehood to have his cases dismissed.
ISSUE: Should Manalo’s testimony should be given
credit?
HELD: Yes.
Religious or political belief, interest in the
outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless
otherwise provided by law, shall not be aground for
disqualification.
The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise
provided by law" takes into account Article 821 of the
Civil Code which states that persons convicted of
falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony"
are disqualified from being witnesses to a will."
Since the witness Francisco Manalo is not
convicted of any of the above-mentioned crimes to
disqualify him as a witness and this case does not
involve the probate of a will.
We rule that the fact that said witness is facing several
criminal charges when he testified did not in any way
disqualify him as a witness.
3. PEOPLE V. DOMINGUEZ (Pending Criminal Case)
FACTS:
Accused ELEUTERIO DE LEON and REYNALDO
MANAYAO were charged with the crime of murder.
Aug 23, 1992, 10am, in Angat, Province of Bulacan,
Philippines armed with Armalite rifles and Caliber .45
pistols, ambushed, attacked and shot from behind
Marcelino Santiago who was hit at the head while he
was driving his owner-type jeep, and as a result he died
instantaneously.
The prosecution presented three witnesses: the
two eyewitnesses, namely, Simon Mariano, a farmer
from Angat, Bulacan, and Ramon Chavez, an employee
of Robal Transit; and SPO2 Alfredo Bartolome.
Petitioner alleges that Mariano is disqualified to be
a witness because of a pending criminal case against
him.
ISSUE: Did the pendency of a criminal case against a
Mariano disqualify him from becoming a witness?
HELD: NO.
Clearly, the mere pendency of a criminal case
against a person does not disqualify him from becoming
a witness. As a matter of fact, conviction of a crime
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does not disqualify such person from being presented as
a witness unless otherwise provided by law.
4. PEOPLE VS DE LEON (Previously Convicted)
FACTS:
2/6/86, 8pm, on the eve of the "snap" presidential
election, appellant Prudencio Dominguez (Mayor of
Sinacban, Misamis Occidental, and affiliated with KBL,
and working for the reelection of Pres. Marcos) and his
brother Roger C. Dominguez went to visit their second
cousin, Judge Purita A. Boligor, who was promoting the
candidacy of Mrs Corazon Aquino.
Mayor Dominguez and Roger arrived at Judge
Boligor's house in an Integrated National Police ("INP")
jeep, and met with Judge Boligor and her brother
Luther Avanceña who was then the UNIDO Chairman in
Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental.
About ten (10) minutes later, Rodolfo Macalisang
entered Judge Boligor's house with an M-16 armalite
automatic rifle and bursts of gunfire were heard. Shortly
thereafter, Mayor Dominguez and Roger ran out of the
house, got into the jeep which had been waiting for
them and sped away.
Prosecution's case rested mainly on the testimony
of Oscar Cagod who witnessed the above sequence of
events from a store across the street.
The defense, for its part, attacked the credibility
and the testimony of Oscar Cagod on the following
grounds:
First, Cagod was not a disinterested witness,
having lived in the house of Judge Boligor for eighteen
(18) to nineteen (19) years and having treated the Judge
like his own mother;
Second, Cagod waited for four (4) months
after the slaying of Judge Boligor and Luther Avanceña
before he executed his sworn statement;
Third, Cagod, according to the defense,
executed his sworn statement only after the police
authorities had arrested him and promised him
immunity from prosecution.
His testimony therefore came from a polluted
source and should be received only with utmost caution.
Fourth, Cagod had been convicted, when he was
twelve (12) years old, of murder, a crime involving
moral turpitude and accordingly his testimony
deserved no credence.Last, the defense assailed the
testimony of Cagod as being incredible in itself.
ISSUE: WON the prior conviction of a crime of Oscar
Cadot would discredit him as a witness.
HELD. NO.
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides as
follows: Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. — . . .
[C]onviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by
law, shall not be a ground for disqualification. .
In Cordial v. People, this Court echoed the above
cited provision of law stating that even convicted
criminals are not excluded from testifying in court so
long as, having organs of sense, they "can perceive and
perceiving can make known their perceptions to others.
The fact of prior criminal conviction alone does
not suffice to discredit a witness; the testimony of such
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
a witness must be assayed and scrutinized in exactly the
same way the testimony of other witnesses must be
examined for its relevance and credibility. None of the
cases cited by the appellants militates against this
proposition.
Oscar Cagod did not dispute his prior conviction for
murder when he was only twelve (12) years old. Because
of his minority, instead of being imprisoned, he was
placed under the custody of Judge Boligor and her late
husband, who was then Chief of Police of Sinacaban.
Cagod lived with the for eighteen (18) or nineteen (19)
years until Judge Boligor was slain. During that period of
time, Cagod had no record of any bad or socially
destructive behavior. He had in fact been of much help
around the Boligors' house and had in fact worked for
appellant Mayor Dominguez himself as a motorcar
driver. His testimony was not in favor of an accused
"comrade," and Oscar Cagod, moreover, was obviously
not a hardened criminal. Taking account of these
circumstances, the Court considers that Oscar Cagod's
credibility was not put in doubt by reason alone of
conviction of a crime when he was twelve (12) years
old.
5. PEOPLE VS ALEMAN (DEAF MUTE: Urinating
Witness, Fat man killed)
FACTS:
Mark, witness, was 14 yo when he testified, deaf-
mute and assisted by a licensed sign language
interpreter from the Phil. Registry of Interpreters for
Deaf, who has been teaching since 1990.
2/10/03, 7pm, Mark went out of his to play
basketball. When he went to urinate he saw a fat man
talking on his phone while being followed by 2 men who
stabbed the fat man repeatedly.
He followed them to where they burried the knife,
and to another place where the culprits uncovered their
faces.
Accused-appellant also attempted to show
that the eyewitness, Mark, failed to identify him during
the police line-up. He further stated that Mark failed to
identify accused-appellant during the police line-up.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mark, being a deaf-mute, is
qualified to be a witness.
HELD: The mere fact that Mark is a deaf-mute does not
render him unqualified to be a witness. The rule is that
"all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses."
A deaf-mute may not be able to hear and speak
but his/her other senses, such as his/her sense of sight,
remain functional and allow him/her to make
observations about his/her environment and
experiences.
The inability to hear and speak may prevent a
deaf-mute from communicating orally with others but
he/she may still communicate with others in writing or
through signs and symbols and, as in this case,
sketches. Thus, a deaf-mute is competent to be a
witness so long as he/she has the faculty to make
observations and he/she can make those observations
known to others.
When a deaf-mute testifies in court, “the manner in
which the examination should be conducted is a matter
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to be regulated and controlled by the trial court in its
discretion, and the method adopted will not be
reviewed by the appellate court in the absence of a
showing that the complaining party was in some way
injured by reason of the particular method adopted.
6. PEOPLE VS BUSTOS (A 1928 case; Ruling opposite of
the case of People vs Aleman)
DOCTRINE: The testimony given at trial by a deaf-mute
interpreted by a teacher of deaf-mutes is INADMISSIBLE
AS EVIDENCE when said interpreter has not had frequent
contact with the Deaf-Mute witness so as to enable her
to understand the latter’s signs.
FACTS:
10/24/25, Laureana Yumul, Angel Del Castillo’s wife,
who was also at the place of fight went to her home. On
her way she saw her deaf-mute daughter SOLEDAD
ENCARNACION, under a mango tree gesticulating and
making signs, and pointed to her son Felipe Del Castillo,
who was expired moments later.
Laureana Yumul testified that her dying son
told her Francisco Bustos and Antonio Macaspac hacked
him.
The prosecution also presented Soledad
Encarnacion, deaf-mute daughter of Laureana Yumul,
who was interpreted by a teacher from the deaf and
dumb school
(a)who had never taught the witness;
(b) nor had the latter ever been to such a
school
ISSUE: Should Soledad Encarnacion’s testimony, as a
deaf-mute interpreted by a teacher, admitted as
evidence?
HELD:No.
While it is true that modern pedagogy has made
tremendous strides in the instruction and education of
persons so afflicted, even to the extent of enabling the
blind to read by means of the sense of touch and deaf-
mutes to receive instruction through conventional signs
and objects, nevertheless, with respect to deaf-mutes,
it is necessary that he who is to communicate with
them know the meaning of their signs, either from
having had them taught to him, or from having
acquired a knowledge of them through frequent
contact with the same. Without these circumstances,
although it is possible to guess part of what deaf-mutes
mean by their signs even without having had much to do
with them, still much of what they wish to say escapes
us, and in our eagerness to understand them, we resort
to enjecture. It will be seen how dangerous then in such
a procedure to arrive at the truth, and above all when
the life and liberty of an accused man are at stake.
This was shown in the present case, in which during the
course of interpretation, there were times when the
interpreter could not make out what the witness
meant by such signs as she uses, and this is due to the
fact that the deaf-mute had never been a pupil of the
interpreter, nor had the latter previously had anything
to do with the former, such as would have given her an
opportunity to acquire some knowledge of the meaning
of the signs the deaf-mute used. In view of this, it
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
would not be prudent to admit the deaf-mute's
testimony as interpreted by the teacher.
7. PEOPLE VS TUANGCO
[ANG] [People v. Tuangco, G.R. No. 130331,
November 22, 2000
DOCTRINES: Deaf Mutes are competent where they
a) can understand and appreciate the sanctity of
an oath;
b) Can comprehend facts they are going to testify
on; and
c) Can communicate their ideas through qualified
interpreter.
FACTS: In the morning of January 4, 1995, the naked
cadaver of Aurea Eugenio, a bookkeeper employed by
the Centro Escolar University Credit Cooperative in
Manila was found lying beside a creek about 50 meters
away from the national highway in Apalit.
Appellants Adel Tuangco and Nelson Pineda Jr. (Jun
Tatoo) and Sonny Tuangco(Baba) were charged and
covicted of rape with homicide and theft of Aurea
Eugenio.
The principal evidence against the accused
consisted of the testimony of an eyewitness, Silvestre
Sanggalan, a deaf-mute who was 3.5 meters away from
the scene. He gave his testimony through sign language,
which was interpreted by a sign language expert.
EVA SANGCO, sign language interpreter;22
years of teaching experience at the Philippine School for
the Deaf.
DEFENSE:Silvestre Sanggalan had no formal schooling in
a special school for deaf-mutes. Certain portions of
Sanggalan's testimony which appeared unclear, e.g., the
witness admitted that the place where the incident
happened was "very dark", and he was inconsistent as to
who, between Adel Tuangco or Jun Tatoo, was the first
to rape the victim. Thus, his handicap prevented a
truthful narration of what really transpired.
ISSUE: Is the testimony of the deafmute Sanggalan
admissible?
HELD: Yes.
-The theory that Sanggalan could not truthfully
and convincingly convey what really happened on that
fateful night because he had no formal schooling in a
school for special persons like him and the interpreter
was not the one who had taught his is not tenable.
The imperfections or inconsistencies cited do not
detract from the credibility of his testimony, much less
justify the total rejection of the same.
What is material is that he knew personally the
accused-appellants, was with them on the fateful night
when the incident happened, and had personally
witnessed the rape-slay and theft 3.5 meters away from
the scene.
He did not waiver in the identification of the 3
accused despite rigorous cross-examination, and
positively pointed to the accused-appellants as the
persons who raped and killed Eugenio and took her
personal effects.
8. PEOPLE VS GERONES
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DOCTRINE: A Mental Retardate who can make her
perception made to others can testify.
FACTS: Liliosa Gargantilla, a mental retardate,filed a
complaint for rape against Calixto Raga alias "Calix" and
Leonardo Gerones alias "Nanding or Narding".
DEFENSE: the complaint did not give jurisdiction to the
trial court the same having been signed by a mentally
incompetent woman. Initially, a complaint was filed
with the barangay captain by Francisco Gargantilla, the
victim's father.
Rule 110, Section 5 also provides that in the case
of a deceased or incapacitated person, the State may
initiate the criminal action in her behalf. The
information filed by the Provincial Prosecutor, the
complaint initiated by the father, and the complaint
filed by the offended party herself sufficiently confer
jurisdiction on the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not an incompetent's testimony may
be given credence.
HELD: YES. Determination of the competency of
witnesses to testify in the hands of the trial court.
The records show that the victim managed to
communicate her ordeal to the court clearly and
consistently. The trial court found Liliosa to have the
mental capacity of a ten year old. We are convinced
that a ten year old girl can adequately narrate facts
which show that she has been raped. Thus, the trial
court observed: ". . . In the overall, she was able to
communicate that the man who is not blind and the man
without eyes helped each other in deflowering her thru
force and intimidation. Her narration was crude but she
managed to communicate the traumatic incident".
Moreover, while the psychiatry report states that
the victim cannot be expected to be a capable witness,
at the same time it admitted that Liliosa can
comprehend the nature of her acts under a limited
extent. The same report concludes that she is verbally
productive although she talks in incomplete sentences
at times. What is required by the rules merely is that
the witness is able to make her perception known to
others.
Considering the foregoing, we agree with the trial
court that Liliosa Gargantilla is a competent witness.
What is decisive in the rape charge is the
complainant's positive identification of the accused-
appellants as the malefactors. The victim was even able
to testify that only one actually had sexual intercourse
with her and that was the blind, man while the other
man who was not blind held her and pointed a knife at
her while the former was raping her.
9. PEOPLE VS HAMTO
DOCTRINE: Mere Intellectual weakness of a witness is
not a ground to disqualify a witness, or at the very
least discredit a witness.
FACTS:
"Iniyot ako ni Mario, Fernan and Dondon." That
statement uttered by mental Retardate Mary Grace
Labatete to her sister Werlinia upon seeing Fernan
Pervera.
Mario Hamto was convicted of rape of Mary Grace.
Dr. Ma. Cristina Freyra, Medico-legal Officer of the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, confirmed
that Mary Grace had deep-healed lacerations indicating
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
that she is no longer a virgin and were inflicted more
than seven (7) days prior to the examination.
Dr. Celeste Peña-Vista, a resident physician at the
National Center for Mental Health, conducted a
psychiatric examination of Mary Grace and found that
Mary Grace was retarded with a mental age of a seven-
year-old. She was perceptive but had difficulty in
interpretation. She could tell what happened but found
it difficult to know the meaning of things.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of a mental
retardate may be given probative value.
HELD: YES. Although Mary Grace was mentally retarded,
her testimony cannot be discredited. All persons who
can perceive, and perceiving can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses. Mere
intellectual weakness of a witness is not a ground to
disqualify, or at the very least discredit, a witness.
The intellectual weakness of Mary Grace does not
make her incompetent as a witness if, at the time she
testified, she had the mental capacity to distinguish
between right and wrong, understand the nature and
obligation of an oath, and give a fairly intelligent and
reasonable narrative of the matters about which she
testifies. Her narration as to how the rape was
committed, in the court's view, was straightforward,
despite her mental weakness.
A perusal of said testimony would readily show that
Mary Grace despite her mental deficiency was able to
testify clearly and persuasively. The psychiatrist who
examined her testified that Mary Grace was capable of
being receptive and perceptive. She could tell what
happened but found difficulty in interpreting things.
Mary Grace's credibility commands great weight and
respect.
10. PEOPLE VS DEAUNA
FACTS: Sometime in September 1996, victim Josephine
Deauna who was 19 years old at that time, was at their
house in Litex Village San Jose, Montalban, Rizal. She
was lying down while her sister Jasmin was already
sleeping when a man suddenly held her hand. She
recognized the man to be her father, appellant Richard
Deauna, who thereafter raped her.
Richard Deauna was convicted two counts of the
rape of his daughter Josephine Deauna.
The defense presented the testimonies of two
medical officers in the National Center for Mental
Health, one of which noted that the subject Josephine
was insane because her thought processes were loose,
there was derailment in the words used, and
depersonalization (a strange sense of the personal self
or the body) was evident.
ISSUE: Is Josephine, a credible witness?
HELD: NO.
The accused may be convicted on the basis of the
lone uncorroborated testimony of the rape victim,
provided that her testimony is clear, credible,
convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature
and the normal course of things. When a rape victim’s
testimony is straightforward, unflawed by any material
or significant inconsistency, it deserves full faith and
credence and cannot be discarded.
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In determining the credibility of the testimony of

private complainant, the pivotal question to be resolved
HELD. Yes.
is whether she was insane when she testified in court
on the rape incidents.
The normal state of mind of the victim was Sweet’s testimony should not be disregarded.
unperturbed even after the foregoing initial mental
examination and remained intact during the early and
A witness’ young age will not deter him or her
the middle part of the trial. Although one of the expert
from being a competent and credible witness. All the
witnesses testified that the mental illness of the victim
requirements to be a competent child witness were
could have existed prior to the diagnosis made on her,
met by Sweet.
no clear and categorical statement to this effect was
presented. In any event, courts are not bound by the
opinions of expert witnesses on such matters, especially 12. PEOPLE VS MENDOZA
when they appear to be merely speculative and
conjectural, as in this case.
Even assuming that the victim was already insane DOCTRINE: Any Child, regardless of age, can be a
during her earlier testimony, this fact alone will not competent witness.
render her statements incredible or inadmissible in
evidence. Her mental imbalance or abnormal state of FACTS
mind would not automatically affect her credibility.
Indeed, even a mental retardate or feeble-minded
person may qualify as a competent witness, considering Maria Gina Avila Mendoza was put to file in her
that all persons who can perceive and, perceiving, can home in Bulacan. Her husband, Rolando Mendoza, was
make known their perception to others, may be accused of parricide.
witnesses.
Unsoundness of mind does not per se render a Prosecution presented as its witnesses, Paul
witness incompetent. One may be insane, yet be Michael Mendoza, 5 yo child of the victim and
capable in law of giving competent testimony. The accused.
general rule is that lunatics or persons affected with
insanity are admissible as witnesses, if they have
sufficient understanding to apprehend the obligation At first, the child only said that his father boxed
of an oath and are capable of giving correct accounts his mother in the mouth, but the court noticed that
of the matters that they have seen or heard with he was only scared of his father because he was
respect to the questions at issue. looking at his father the whole time. When he was
again presented as witness, the accused was placed
out of direct sight of the witness, where he testified
11. PEOPLE VS ACBANGIN that he personally saw his father put kerosene over
his mother.
DOCTRINE: To be a competent child witness, the
following criteria must be met:

(a) capacity of observation; ISSUE: Is the witness, 4 yo boy, a credible witness?

(b) capacity of recollection and HELD. YES

(c) capacity of communication. A child,regardless of age, can be a competent witness

if he can perceive, and perceiving, can make known
his perception to others and of relating truthfully
FACTS
facts respecting which he is examined.

Jocelyn Acbangin was charged with the crime of

kidnapping and serious illegal detention of her 4 year
old nice, Sweet Grace Acbangin.
According to Sweet’s father, she was last seen at
Jocelyn’s house playing at the appellant’s house but
appellant denied knowing the child’s whereabouts.
Sweet’s testimony stated that it was Jocelyn who
brought her to Niu’s house.
ISSUE: Is Sweet a credible witness?
13. PEOPLE VS. GALAS
DOCTRINE:
FACTS
12/23/95, 9pm, Fedrico Gamayon and his 15yo son
Crisanto, who was riding on a carabao, and 6yo
nephew JOEMAR, who was riding on the sled was on
their way home, when Federico was called by
GONZALO GALAS, who hacked Federico with a bolo,
thereafter Josue, Dimas, and Maximo ganged up on
Federico.
DEFENSE: Joemar’s testimony should be disregarded

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 REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW
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because of its unreliability, claiming that he cannot
even remember the month and the year when the
incident happened.
ISSUE: ARE JOEMAR credible witnesses, with regard to
their relationship to the victim and age?
HELD. No.
A close scrutiny of his testimony discloses that
Joemar was clear on the facts he observed
surrounding the death of Federico which according to
him took place on a date “nearing Christmas”.
RULES ON THE EXAMINATION OF A CHILD WITNESS
(A.M. No. 004-07-SC. November, 21, 2000)
1. APPLICABILITY
Unless otherwise provided, this Rule shall givern
the examination of the following witnesses : (VAW)
a. Child witnesses who are victims of crime;
b. Child witnesses who are accused of a crime;
and
c. Child witnesses who are witnesses to crime.
(Sec 1)
N.B. Applies to all criminal proceedings and non-
criminal proceedings involving child witnesses.
2. “CHILD WITNESS”
-any person who at the time of giving testimony
is below the age of 18 years.
In child abuse cases, a child includes one over 18 years
but is found by the court as:
a) Unable to fully take care of himself because of a
physical or mental disability or condition; or
b) Unable to protect himself from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation because of a physical or
mental disability or condition.
3. DETERMINATION: made at the time of giving the
testimony.
4. FACILITATOR
- a person appointed by the court to pose questions to
a child.
-the facilitator may be a :
(1) Child Psychologist;
(2) Psychiatrist;
(3) Social worker;
(4) Guidance counselor;
(5) Teacher;
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
(6) Religious Teacher;
(7) Parent; or
(8) Relative
5. SUPPORT PERSON
-is a person chosen by the child to accompany
him to testify at or attend a judicial proceeding or
deposition to provide emotional support for him.
6. COMPENTENCY OF A CHILD WITNESS
Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness.
(Sec 6)
- It does not preclude the court from conducting a
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION/ competency examination of
the child.
-The court shall conduct a Voir Dire Examination of a
child, motu proprio or on motion of a party, when it
finds that substantial doubt exists regarding:
1. the ability of the child to perceive;
2. The ability of the child to remember;
3. The ability of the child to communicate,
distinguish truth from falsehood; or
4. The ability of the child to appreciate the duty
to tell the truth in court.
CASE LAW
(1) PEOPLE VS ESUGON (5yo Muymoy; Robbery)
DOCTRINE: Every child is presumed qualified to be a
witness. The party challenging the competency of a
child as a witness has the burden of substantiating his
challenge.
FACTS
Carl or Muymoy, (5 yo) son of victim Josephine
Castro testified that he saw “Nonoy” enter their house
while everyone was sleeping and stabbed his mother.
Muymoy was peeping through a chair. Carl identified the
appellant as the neighbor who often goes to their house.
Muymoy admitted that he did not see very well the
perpetrator because there was no light.
DEFENSE: Muymoy’s testimony is filled with
inconsistencies, thus not credible.
ISSUE: Is Muymoy a credible witness?
HELD. Yes.
That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason
for disqualification.The dismissiveness with which the
testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past
has long been erased.
Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness,
every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness.
To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on
the party challenging the child’s competency.
Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the
ability of the child to perceive, remember,
communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or
appreciate the duty to tell the truth will the court,
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motu proprio or on motion of a party, condct a
competency examination.
Appellant did not object to Carl’s competency as a
witness. He did not attempt to adduce evidence to
challenge such competency by showing that the child
was incapable of perceiving events and of
communicating his perceptions, or that he did not
posses the basic qualifications of a competent witness.
(2) PEOPLE VS IBANEZ
FACTS
8/29/04 in Bulacan, Wilfredo Atendido was invited by
Afredo to a drinking session with Jesus and Edwin.
Rachel, 10 yo Wilfredo’s daughter, was underneath
the house of a neighbor, 3 meters away from the place
where he saw his father get murdered.
DEFENSE: Rachel was a mere child who was only able to
study up to 1st grade and could barely read and did not
know how to tell time.
ISSUE: Is Rachel’s testimony credible?
HELD. YES.
There is no showing that her mental maturity
rendered her incapable of testifying and of relating the
incident truthfully.
Petitioner’s flimsy objections to Rachel’s lack of
education and inability to read and tell time carry no
weight and cannot overcome the clear and convincing
testimony of Rachel as to who killed her father.
(3) PEOPLE VS RAMA (5yo Roxanne; Biscuit)
DOCTRINE: Trial court’s assessment of credibility of
child witness will not be disturbed on review.
FACTS
Roger Rama was convicted of kidnapping an infant
child, Joyce Ann Cabiguin, based on the testimony of 5
yo Roxanne.
Roxanne testified that in the evening of January 1,
1998, while she was playing with her relatives, Rama
called Roxanne and told her that if she would bring her
beautiful cousin to him, he would give him a biscuit.
Accused gave her 1 biscuit. Roxanne carried Joyce Ann
to the accused who ran away with little Joyce Anne.
Roger claims that Roxanne’s testimony does not
deserve credit and that he was convicted based on
single eye witness account.
ISSUE: Is Roxanne’s testimony sufficient for Roger’s
conviction?
HELD. YES.
The trial court correctly relied upon the sole
testimony of 5 yo Roxanne who was straightforward in
identify the accused Rama as the culprit.
The determination of credibility of child as a witness
rests primarily with the trial judge as he had the
opportunity to see the demeanor of the witness, his
apparent intelligence or lack of it, and his
understanding of the nature of the oath. As many of
these qualities cannot be conveyed by the record of the
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case, the trial judge’s evaluation will not be disturbed
on review,UNLESS it is clear from the record that his
judgment is erroneous.
This conclusion is in accord with the spirit and
letter of the Rule on Examination of Child Witness
which became effective last December 15,2000.
SEC 21. DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF MENTAL
INCAPACITY OR IMMATURITY
Sec 21. Disqualification by reason of mental
incapacity or immaturity. -- The following persons
cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time
of their production for examination, is such that
they are incapable of intelligently making known
their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as
to render them incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which they are examined and of
relating them truthfully.
The original Section 21 was deleted, to remove
redundancy.
CASE LAW
1. PEOPLE VS OBOGNE (AAA, 12 yo)
FACTS
JERRY OBOGNE was charged of the crime of rape a
12 year old mentally retarded person, AAA.
Obogne argues that the testimony of AAA deserves
no credence because she was incapable of intelligently
making known her perception to others by reason of her
mental disability.
ISSUE: Should AAA’s testimony be disregarded due to
her mental disability?
HELD. NO.
AAA is totally qualified to take the witness stand
notwithstanding her mental condition. She was able to
recall what had happened to her.
Mental retardation per se does not affect a witness’
credibility. A mental retardate may be a credible
witness.
2. DULLA VS CA (3 year old Andrea)
FACTS
Nicanor Dulla was charged with the crime of rape
of Andrea Ortega, 3 years old. Andrea testified against
her uncle who touched her vagina while doing a
pumping motion with his penis exposed to her.
Trial court convicted him of Acts of Lasciviousness.
ISSUE: IS Andrea a credible witness?
HELD. Yes.
In the case at bar, Andrea was 3 years old and 10
months old at the time she testified.
Despite her young age, however, she was able to
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respond to the questions put to her. She answered “yes”
and “no” to questions and, when unable to articulate
what was done to her by petitioner, Andrea
demonstrated what she meant. During her interrogation,
she showed an understanding of what was being asked.
She was consistent in her answers to the questions asked
by the prosecutor, the defense counsel and even the
judges.
3. PEOPLE VS GOLIMLIM
FACTS
Evelyn Canchela, a mental retardate, was left
under the custody of her aunt Jovita Guban and uncle
SALVADOR GOLIMLIM.
August 1996, While Jovita was away, SALVADOR
raped Evelyn while pointing a knife at her. When she
told Jovita about it, she scolded Evelyn.
When Evelyn was transferred to her half-sister,
Lorna Hachero, She discovered that Evelyn was
pregnant.
ISSUE: Should Evelyn’s testimony be given credence?
HELD. Yes
That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify
her as a witness not render her testimony bereft of
truth.
A mental retardate or a a feebleminded person is
not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, he
rmental condition not being a vitiation of her
credibility. It is now universally accepted that
intellectual weakness, no matter what form it assumes,
is not a valid objection to the competency of a witness
so long as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and
reasonable narrative of the matter testified to.
If a mental retardate’s testimony is COHERENT, it
is admissible in court.
4. PEOPLE VS MACEDA (Left alone; 32 yo Maribeth)
FACTS
Maribeth Quinto, 32 yo mental retardate, while
alone in the house because her mother wasn’t able to
get back home, opened the door for Edgardo “Boboy”
Maceda who was looking for Maribeth’s youngest
brother. When she said that he wasn’t there, he entered
the house and raped Maribeth.
Maceda was convicted of rape. He argues that
complainant;s mental condition rendered her testimony
so vague, uncertain and incoherent that it could not be
understood.
ISSUE: Should Maribeth be disqualified to testify?
HELD. NO.
It has been held that the mental unsoundness of the
witness at the time the fact to be testified to occurred
affects only her credibility. As long as the questions
propounded, she is a competent witness even if she is a
mental retardate.
5. PEOPLE VS LAGARTO Y PETILLA
FACTS
Henry Lagarto and Ernesto Cordero were convicted
of raping and slaying a 7yo ANGLE ALQUIZA.
Prosecution relied mainly on the statements and
testimonies of Herminia Barlam. She pointed to
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
accused-appellants as among the three men she saw in
the warehouse. She narrated how they stabbed the face
and genitals of angel, hit her with a piece of wood , and
raped her as she bled then killed her. She saw how they
tied her hands and feet, wrapped her in a yellow table
cloth, and put her in a sack.
Because of her hearing impairment, the defense
sought to disqualify Barlam on the ground of
incompetence. She was referred to the National Center
for Mental Health upon repeated motion of defense
counsels to determine if she was competent to testify.
Where Barlam met the minimum requirements for
qualifying as a witness.
ISSUE: Is the testimony of Barlam admissible?
HELD. YES.
Barlam adequately met the minimum requirements
for qualifying as a witness. Barlam could certainly
perceive and make known her perception to others.
Even if she is deaf, she saw what happened and she
related what she saw to the police, to the psychiatrists,
and the trial court.
Everybody understood her even is some of her
statements on minor points were inconsistent. A perusal
of the transcript of stenographic notes would readily
reveal that counsels for the defense attempted in vain
to confuse her on relevant facts, even confronting her
with her own statement
SECTION 22. DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF
MARRIAGE TESTIMONY CONFINEDTO PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE
Sec 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. --
During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife
may testify for or against the other without the consent
of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one
against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latter’s
direct descendants or ascendants.
Sec 36. 22. Testimony generally confined to
personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. — A
witness can testify only to those facts which he or
she knows of his or her personal knowledge; that
is, which are derived from his or her own
perception, except as otherwise provided in these
rules.
The original Section 36 was moved to the
amended Section 22 and the sequence seems proper
since it provides for what a witness should testify on –
those facts of his or her personal knowledge.
Previously, this provision was placed right before the
exceptions to the hearsay rule. Since there was a
change in order, the last phrase laying the basis for
the exceptions to the hearsay rule that would refer to
the provisions following the same was deleted, since
the exceptions to the hearsay rule no longer follow the
new Section 22. The deletion does not mean that
there is no more admissible hearsay evidence or
exceptions to the hearsay evidence. There is still
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admissible hearsay evidence and the title on
Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule found in the later part
of the rules was maintained.
Other than the foregoing and the amendment to
address gender sensitivity, the comparable provisions
are the same.
SECTION 22. 23. DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF
MARRIAGE
Sec 22. 23. Disqualification by reason of marriage. --
During their marriage, neither the husband nor or the
wife may cannot testify for or against the other without
the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil
case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a
crime committed by one against the other or the
latter’s direct descendants or ascendants.
CASE LAW
1. ALVAREZ V. RAMIREZ (Arson)
DOCTRINES: The reasons given for the rule are:
1. There is identity of interest between husband
and wife;
2. Of one were to testify for or against the other,
there is consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security
and confidences of private life, even at the risk of an
occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic
disunion and unhappiness;
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility
there is danger of punishing one spouse through the
hostile testimony of the other.
FACTS
Susan Ramirez filed a complaint against Maximo
Alvarez, husband of her sister, Esperanza Alvarez.
Private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez,
estranged wife of accused, as witness. She said that she
saw Maximo pour gasoline in the house of her sister and
ignited it, knowing that she and her family was there.
She testified while showing “uncontrollable emotions”.
Trial court disqualified Esperanza from further testifying
and deleted her testimony from the record.
ISSUE: Can Esperanza testify against her husband?
HELD. Yes.
There are exceptions to the marital disqualification
rile, both in civil actions between the spouses and in
criminal cases for offenses committed by one against
the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are
backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases,
outweigh those in support of the general rule.
Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to
petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation
between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, embodied
in the information for arson filed against him,
eradicates all the major aspects of marital life as trust,
confidence, respect, and love by which virtues the
conjugal relationship survives and flourished.
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Prior to the commission of the offense, the
relationship between petitioner and his wife was
already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto
almost 6 months before the incident. Indeed the facts
presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage
between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an
interest the State aims to protect.
2. PEOPLE V. QUIDATO (Parricide)
FACTS
Bernardo Quidato Jr. was charged with parricide of
his father, Bernardo Quidato Sr, together with Reynalo
and Eddie Malita, who was charged separately but tried
jointly.
Prosecution presented as witnesses Quidato’s
brother, wife and Pat. Lucrecio.
Gina Quidato, wife of accused, testified that on
the evening before the killing, her husband and the
Malita brothers were drinking tuba at their house and
overheard them planning to go to her father-in-laws
house to get money from the latter.
Bernardo objected to his wife’s testimony on the
ground of marital disqualification. RTC still allowed the
testimony despite cognizance of such rule.
ISSUE: Did the RTC correctly ruled on the applicability
of the wife’s testimony?
HELD. No.
The disqualification is between husband and wife,
the law not precluding the wife from testifying when it
involves other parties or accused. Hence, Gina could
testify in the murder case against Reynaldo and Eddie,
which was jointly tried with accused-appellant’s case.
The testimony cannot be used against accused-
appellant directly or through the guise of taking judicial
notice of the proceedings in the murder case without
violating the marital disqualification rule,
“What cannot be done directly cannot be done
indirectly.”
SEC 24. DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
Sec 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. — The following persons cannot
testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after
the marriage, cannot be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication
received in the other during the marriage except
in a civil case by one against the other, or in a
criminal case for a crime committed by one
against the other or the latter's direct
descendants or ascendants.
(b) xxx
(c) xxx
(d) xxx
(e) xxx
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CASE LAW
1. EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS CAMERON
GRANVILLE
2. AIR PHILIPPINES CORP. VS PENNSWELL
A. HUSBAND AND WIFE
CASE LAW
1. ZULUETA VS CA
2. LACURON VS JACOBA
3. UNITED STATES VS ANTIPOLO
4. PEOPLE VS CARLOS
B. ATTORNEY VS CLIENT
Sec 24 (a)xxx
(b) An attorney or person reasonably
believed by the client to be licensed to engage
in the practice of law cannot, without the
consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him or her,
or his or her advice given thereon in the course
of, or with a view to, professional employment,
nor can an attorney's secretary stenographer, or
clerk or other persons assisting the attorney be
examined, without the consent of the client and
his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge
of which has been acquired in such capacity,
except in the following cases:
(i) Furtherance of crime or fraud. If the
services or advice of the lawyer were sought or
obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or
plan to commit what the client knew or
reasonably should have known to be a crime or
fraud;
(ii) Claimants through same deceased client.
As to a communication relevant to an issue
between parties who claim through the same
deceased client, regardless of whether the
claims are by testate or intestate or by inter
vivos transaction;
(iii) Breach of duty by lawyer or client. As to
a communication relevant to an issue of breach
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
of duty by the lawyer to his or her client, or by
the client to his or her lawyer;
(iv) Document attested by the lawyer. As to
a communication relevant to an issue
concerning an attested document to which the
lawyer is an attesting witness; or
(v) Joint clients. As to a communication
relevant to a matter of common interest
between two or more clients if the
communication was made by any of them to a
lawyer retained or consulted in common, when
offered in an action between any of the clients,
unless they have expressly agreed otherwise.
-Señga Notes-
The disqualification under paragraph (b) now
covers a person who is not a lawyer, but is reasonably
believed by the client to be licensed to engage in the
practice, as well as any other person assisting the
attorney. The amended rule also includes exceptions
to the disqualification, such as when the
commination/advice thereon pertains to:
1. The furtherance of crime or fraud, which the
client knew or reasonably could have known to be a
crime or fraud;
2. Communication relevant to an issue between
parties who claim through the same deceased client,
regardless of whether the claims are by testate or
intestate or by inter vivos transaction;
3. Communication relevant to an issue of breach
of duty by the lawyer to his or her client, or by the
client to his or her lawyer;
4. Communication relevant to an issue concerning
an attested document to which the lawyer is an
attesting witness;
5. Communication relevant to a matter of
common interest between two or more clients if the
communication was made by any of them to a lawyer
retained or consulted in common, when offered in an
action between any of the clients, unless they have
expressly agreed otherwise.
CASE LAW
1. HILADO VS DAVID
2. REGALA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
3. SAURA JR. VS AGDEPPA
4. SANVICENTE VS PEOPLE
C. PEOPLE AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE MEDICINE AND
PATIENT
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine,
surgery or obstetrics A physician,
psychotherapist or person reasonably believed
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by the patient to be authorized to practice
medicine or psychotherapy cannot in a civil
case, without the consent of the patient, be
examined as to any advice or treatment given by
him or any information which he may have
acquired in attending such patient in a
professional capacity, which information was
necessary to enable him to act in capacity, and
which would blacken the reputation of the
patient;any confidential communication made
for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of the
patient's physical, mental or emotional
condition, including alcohol or drug addiction,
between the patient and his or her physician or
psychotherapist. This privilege also applies to
persons, including members of the patient's
family, who have participated in the diagnosis
or treatment of the patient under the direction
of the physician or psychotherapist.
A "psychotherapist" is:
(a) A person licensed to practice medicine
engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a
mental or emotional condition, or
(b) A person licensed as a psychologist by
the government while similarly engaged.
The coverage of Paragraph (c) was amended. It
now states physician, and includes a psychotherapist
or person reasonably believed by the patient to be
authorized to practice medicine or psychotherapy .
Psychotherapist was defined as a person licensed:
(a) to practice medicine engaged in the diagnosis
or treatment of a mental or emotional condition; or
(b) as a psychologist by the government while
similarly engaged. It also applies to persons, including
members of the patient's family, who have
participated in the diagnosis or treatment of the
patient under the direction of the physician or
psychotherapist.
As with the old rule, the application of the rule is
still limited to civil cases.
Under the old rule the privilege pertains to “any
advice or treatment given by him or any information
which he may have acquired in attending such patient
in a professional capacity, which information was
necessary to enable him to act in capacity, and which
would blacken the reputation of the patient”. The
new rule pertains to “any confidential communication
made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of the
patient's physical, mental or emotional condition,
including alcohol or drug addiction, between the
patient and his or her physician or psychotherapist,”
regardless of whether the information would blacken
the reputation of the patient.
CASE LAW
1. GONZALES VS CA
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2. LIM VS CA
3. CHAN VS CHAN
4. KROHN VS CA
D. MINISTER OR PRIEST AND PERSON MAKING
CONFESSION
(d) A minister or priest or person reasonably
believed to be cannot, without the consent of
the affected person making the confession, be
examined as to any communication or confession
made to or any advice given by him or her in his
or her professional character in the course of
discipline enjoined by the church to which the
minister or priest belongs;
The disqualification under paragraph (d) was
broaden to include any person reasonably believed
to be a minister or priest. The privilege now covers
any communication, and not just confession made to
or advice given. However, it appears that “any
communication” is still qualified by the provision that
the same is made in the professional character and in
the course of discipline enjoined by the church to
which the minister or priest belongs.
E. PUBLIC OFFICER
(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his
term of office or afterwards, or after his or her
tenure as to communications made to him or her
in official confidence, when the court finds that
the public interest would suffer by the disclosure.
The communication shall remain privileged,
even in the hands of a third person who may
have obtained the information, provided that
the original parties to the communication took
reasonable precaution to protect its
confidentiality.
The privilege under paragraph (e) was
paraphrased under the new rule but the rule remains
the same.
This last paragraph was added under the revised
rule and states that the communication, even in the
hands of a third person who may have obtained the
information, provided that the original parties to the
communication took reasonable precaution to protect
its confidentiality. Thus, if there is no reasonable
precaution to protect its confidentiality then it may be
construed as waiver thereof and hence, not covered
by the privilege.
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F. OTHERS
(a) RULES ON EXAMINATION OF A CHILD WITNESS
(b) RA 1405, An Act Prohibiting Disclosure of Or
Inquiry Into, Deposits with Any Banking Institution
and Providing Penalty Therefor
(c) RA 10365, An Act Further Strengthening The
Anti-Money Laundering Law, Amending For the
Purpose RA No. 9160, Otherwise Known as the
“Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001” as amended
CASE LAW
1. NERI VS SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTING OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS
2. PNB VS GANCAYCO
3. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK V.
PURISIMA
4. PEOPLE VS ESTRADA
5. PENTAGON STEEL CORP VS CA
SEC 25. PARENTAL FILIAL RELATIONSHIP
Sec 5. Parental and filial privilege. — No person
may be shall compelled to testify against his or
her parents, other direct ascendants, children or
other direct descendants, except when such
testimony is indispensable in a crime against
that person or by one parent against the other.
The new rule incorporates Article 215 of the
Family Code, which is mandatory in character (as
compared to the directory character of the old rule),
and provides for the exception when testimony may be
compelled, i.e., when the testimony is indispensable
in a crime against that person or by one parent against
the other
SEC 26.PRIVILEGE RELATING TO TRADE SECRETS
Sec 26. Privilege Relating to Trade Secrets. — A
person cannot be compelled to testify about
any trade secret, unless the non-disclosure will
conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice.
When disclosure is directed, the court shall
take such protective measure as the interest of
the owner of the trade secret and of the parties
and the furtherance of justice may require.
This is a new insertion. There is no similar
provision under the old rules. However, while this
provision was not under the old rule, it has long been
recognized that there are other privileged matters
that not mentioned by Rule 130. Among them are the
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
following: (a) editors may not be compelled to disclose
the source of published news; (b) voters may not be
compelled to disclose for whom they voted; (c) trade
secrets; (d) information contained in tax census
returns; and (d) bank deposits. Jurisprudence has
consistently acknowledged the private character of
trade secrets. There is a privilege not to disclose one’s
trade secrets. The Supreme Court has declared that
trade secrets and banking transactions are among the
recognized restrictions to the right of the people to
information as embodied in the Constitution. The
drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally
affirmed that, aside from national security matters
and intelligence information, trade or industrial
secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code
and other related laws) as well as banking transactions
(pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act), are
also exempted from compulsory disclosure
(Air Philippines Corp. v. Pennswell, Inc., G.R. No.
172835, 13 December 2007)
A trade secret is a process or device intended for
continuous use in the operation of the business, for
example, a machine or formula, but can be a price list
or catalogue or specialized customer list. Trade
secrets constitute proprietary rights. The inventor,
discoverer, or possessor of a trade secret or similar
innovation has rights therein which may be treated as
property, and ordinarily an injunction will be granted
to prevent the disclosure of the trade secret by one
who obtained the information "in confidence" or
through a "confidential relationship. (Air Philippines
Corp. v. Pennswell, Inc., G.R. No. 172835, 13
December 2007)
In Cocoland Development Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 98458, 17 July 1996, it
was ruled that any determination by management as
to the confidential nature of technologies, processes,
formulae or other so-called trade secrets must have a
substantial factual basis which can pass judicial
scrutiny. The Court rejected the employer’s naked
contention that its own determination as to what
constitutes a trade secret should be binding and
conclusive upon the NLRC. As a caveat, the Court said
that to rule otherwise would be to permit an employer
to label almost anything a trade secret, and thereby
create a weapon with which he/it may arbitrarily
dismiss an employee on the pretext that the latter
somehow disclosed a trade secret, even if in fact
there be none at all to speak of. Hence, in Cocoland,
the parameters in the determination of trade secrets
were set to be such substantial factual basis that can
withstand judicial scrutiny.
However, for compelling reasons, the courts may lift
the veil of confidentiality which shields trade secrets.
(Air Philippines Corp. v. Pennswell, Inc., G.R. No.
172835, 13 December 2007)
Thus, under the new rule, a person cannot be
compelled to testify about any trade secret, unless the
non-disclosure will conceal fraud or otherwise work
injustice. Even when disclosure is directed, the court
shall still take such protective measure as the interest
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of the owner of the trade secret and of the parties and

the furtherance of justice may require.

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3. ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS any liability, and are not admissible in evidence
SEC 26. 27. ADMISSIONS OF A PARTY against the offeror. This new addition is subject to
SEC 26. 27. The act, declaration or omission of a the EXCEPTION: that evidence otherwise discoverable
party as to a relevant fact may be given in or offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or
evidence against him or her. prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of
undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a
criminal investigation or would be admissible.
CASES prosecution would be admissible.
SAN VICENTE V. PEOPLE The new rule adds that the rule also now covers
and makes inadmissible any statement made in the
PEOPLE VS LORENZO CORSINO
course of plea bargaining with the prosecution,
which does not result in a plea of guilty or which
ESTRADA VS DISIERTO
results in a plea of guilty later withdrawn. This should
PEOPLE VS CARITATIVO also be read in connection with Section 5, Rule 116 on
withdrawal of improvident plea of guilty.
ESTRELLA VS COURT OF APPEALS

CUISON VS COURT OF APPEALS PEOPLE VS MAGDAYAO

PEOPLE VS LICAYAN CIVIL CASES

CASES
HEIRS OF CLEMEÑ ZURBANO VS HEIRS OF BIEN SMITH BELL AND CO VS CA
TRANS-PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES VS C

SEC 27. 28. OFFER OF COMPROMISE NOT ADMISSIBLE TAN VS RODIL ENTERPRISES
Sec 27. 28. Offer of Compromise Not
SERVICE WIDE SPECIALISTS VS CA
Admissible.
— In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not
EL VARADERP DE MANILA VS INSULAR LUMBER CO
an admission of any liability, and is not admissible
in evidence against the offeror. Neither is PAL INC VS PAL EMPLOYEES SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOC,
evidence of conduct nor statements made in INC
compromise negotiations admissible, except
evidence otherwise discoverable or offered for
another purpose, such as proving bias or CRIMINAL CASES
prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention CASES
of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct PEOPLE VS DE JOYA
a criminal investigation or prosecution.
PEOPLE VS MEJIA Y VILLAFANIA
In criminal cases, except those involving
quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those SAN MIGUEL CORP VS KALALO
allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in PEOPLE VS MANUEL
evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
A plea of guilty later withdrawn or an PEOPLE VS MANGAT
unaccepted offer of a plea of guilty to a lesser
offense is not admissible in evidence against the BRICENIO VS PEOPLE
accused who made the plea or offer. Neither is
any statement made in the course of plea PEOPLE VS DE GUZMAN
bargaining with the prosecution, which does not
PEOPLE VS ABADIES Y CLAVERIA
result in a plea of guilty or which results in a
plea of guilty later withdrawn, admissible. PEOPLE VS PRADES
An offer to pay, or the payment of medical,
hospital or other expenses occasioned by an injury PEOPLE VS ERGUIZA
, is not admissible in evidence as proof of civil or
criminal liability for the injury . PEOPLE VS BAYANI
The old and new rule are the same insofar as it
provides that in civil cases, an offer of compromise is SEC 28. 29. ADMISSION BY THIRD PARTY
not an admission of any liability, and is not RES INTER ALIOS ACTA, PART ONE
admissible in evidence against the offeror. Sec 28. 29. Admission by Third Party. — The
However, the new rule adds that evidence of rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
conduct and statements made in compromise declaration, or omission of another, except as
negotiations are also not considered as admission of hereinafter provided.

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CASES
PEOPLE VS RAQUEL
TAMARGO VS AWINGAN
FGU INSURANCE CORP VS GP SARMIENTO TRUCKING
CORP
REYES VS OMBUDSMAN
SALAPUDDIN VS CA
SANTIAGO VS CA
SEC 29. 30. ADMISSION BY CO-PARTNER OR AGENT
Sec 29. 30. Admission by Co-Partner or Agent.
-The act or declaration of a partner or agent
of the party authorized by the party to make a
statement concerning the subject, or within the
scope of his or her authority and during the
existence of the partnership or agency, may be
given in evidence against such party after the
partnership or agency is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration. The same rule
applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner,
joint debtor, or other person jointly interested
with the party.
The revised rule is capable of 2 constructions.
First. It may mean that the declaration is
qualified by the new insertion that the declaration by
the partner or agent would only be binding if the
agent was authorized to make the statement
concerning the subject. This would mean that the
past rule would no longer hold true - that regardless of
the authority to make the statement, the declaration
made by a partner or agent within the scope of
authority and during the existence of the partnership
or agency, may be given in evidence against such
party.
For example, in Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos.
146710-15 and 146738, 3 April 2001, former
President Estrada never categorically authorized then
Executive Secretary Angara to make the statements on
his behalf as contained in the Angara Diary.
Nevertheless, the same was admitted in evidence
against then President Estrada, even if the latter
objected to the same. Assuming the revised rule is to
be construed as mentioned above, then it would mean
that the ruling in Estrada and similar cases would no
longer hold true – that unless there is authority to
make that statement, such would not be binding
against the party.
Second. It may just be a harmless addition that
adds that declarations of a partner or agent
authorized by the party to make a statement
concerning the subject, in addition to the existing rule
that acts or declarations of a partner or agent, within
the scope of his or her authority , and during the
existence of the partnership or agency, may be given
in evidence against such party after the partnership or
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
agency is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. In other words, under this second
construction, the new addition is encompassed by the
subsequent provision of “or within the scope of his or
her authority”, such that regardless of any authority
to make the statement, the act or declaration would
be binding against the party. With this construction,
there is no substantial change between the new and
old rule.
It being unclear, at this point, what is the
intention of this provision, it is respectfully submitted
that we will have to wait for jurisprudence that would
clarify the import of the amended rule.
CASES
ESTRADA VS DESIERTO [ Rule on Admission by Partner
is no longer applicable under the first construction of
the rule under Revised Rules.]
LEARNING CHILD INC VS AYALA ALABANG VILLAGE
ASSOCIATION
NARRA NICKEL MINING & DEVELOPMENT VS REDMONT
CONSOLIDATED MINES CORP
SEC 30. 31. ADMISSION BY CONSPIRATOR
Sec 30. 31. Admission by conspirator. — The act
or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy in furtherance of the conspiracy and
during its existence, may be given in evidence
against the co- conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
This rule, prior to the amendment, relates to
acts or declarations made in furtherance of the
conspiracy. It appears that the new rule only further
clarified this.
CASES
PEOPLE VS BOKINGO
PEOPLE VS PALIJON
PEOPLE VS CACHUELA
PEOPLE VS CONSTACIO
PEOPLE VS COMILING
PEOPLE VS BAYDO
PEOPLE VS BAHARAN
SEC 31. 32. ADMISSION BY PRIVIES
Sec 31. 32. Admission by privies. — Where one
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derives title to property from another, the

latter’s act, declaration, or omission of the PEOPLE VS DENIEGA
latter, while holding the title, in relation to the
property, is evidence against the former if done PEOPLE VS FELIMINIA
while the latter was holding the title.
PEOPLE VS JIMENEZ
The old and new provisions are the same except
for the re- arrangement of the sentence. PEOPLE VS CHI CHAN LIU

REPUBLIC VS SANDIGANBAYAN AQUINO VS PAISTE

MESINA VS PEOPLE
SEC 32. 33. ADMISSION BY SILENCE
Sec 32. 33. Admission by Silence. PEOPLE VS GUTING
- An act or declaration made in the presence
and within the hearing or observation of a party PEOPLE VS SISON
who does or says nothing when the act or
MANUEL VS N.C. CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY
declaration is such as naturally to call for action
or comment if not true, and when proper and PEOPLE VS MARRA
possible for him or her to do so, may be given in
evidence against him or her. PEOPLE VS SUAREZ

PEOPLE VS ROA PEOPLE VS BULURAN

PEOPLE VS GERONA PEOPLE VS GALGARIN

PEOPLE VS PARAGSA GUTANG VS PEOPLE

SOLAS VS POWER TELEPHONE SUPPLY PHILS INC PEOPLE VS PAYNOR

PEOPLE VS RANARIO PEOPLE VS CARREON

PEOPLE VS OMILIG
SEC 33. 34. CONFESSION
Sec 33. 34. Confession. — The declaration of an LADIANA VS PEOPLE
accused acknowledging his or her guilt of the
offense charged, or of any offense necessarily
included therein, may be given in evidence
against him or her.

PEOPLE VS DELOS SANTOS

PEOPLE VS SATORRE

PEOPLE VS CAVITE

US VS CORRALES

PEOPLE VS ARTELLERO

PEOPLE VS URRO

PEOPLE VS BASCUGIN

PEOPLE VS MUIT

Ra 7438, An Act Defining Certain Rights Of Person Arrested,

Detained Or Under Custodial Investigation As Well As The
Duties Of The Arresting, Detaining And Investigating Officers,
And Providing Penalties For Violations Thereof

PEOPLE VS OMILIG

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4. PREVIOUS CONDUCT AS EVIDENCE

SEC. 34. 35. SIMILAR ACTS AS EVIDENCE/

RES INTER ALIOS ACTA, PART 2
Sec 34. 35. Similar acts as evidence. — Evidence
that one did or did not do a certain thing at one
time is not admissible to prove that he or she did
or did not do the same or similar thing at another
time; but it may be received to prove a specific
intent or knowledge; identity , plan, system,
scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.

CASES
CRUZ VS CA

TANZO VS DRILON

PEOPLE VS ACOSTA

PEOPLE VS MAGPAYO

PEOPLE VS DADLES

TANZO VS DRILON

PEOPLE VS MAGTULOY

MALIG VS SANDIGANBAYAN

PEOPLE VS SAGUBAN

RA 8505, Rape Victim Assistance and Protection Act of 1998

RA 10364, Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012

Child Witness, A.M. No. 004-07-SC, December 15, 2000

SEC 35. 36. UNACCEPTED OFFER

Sec 35. 36. Unaccepted offer. — An offer in
writing to pay a particular sum of money or to
deliver a written instrument or specific personal
property is, if rejected without valid cause,
equivalent to the actual production and tender of
the money, instrument, or property.

MCLAUGHLIN VS CA

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5. HEARSAY
SEC 36. TESTIMONY GENERALLY CONFINED TO
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE; HEARSAY EXCLUDED
SEC 37. HEARSAY
Sec 37. Hearsay.
-Hearsay is a statement other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at a trial or
hearing, offered to prove the truth of the facts
asserted therein.
A statement is
(1) an oral or written assertion or
(2) a non-verbal conduct of a person, if it is
intended by him or her as an assertion.
Hearsay evidence is INADMISSIBLE except as
otherwise provided in these Rule.
A statement is not hearsay of the declarant
testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to
cross-examination concerning the statement,
and the statement is
(a) inconsistent with the declarant’s
testimony, and was given under oath subject to
the penalty of perjury at a trial hearing, or
other proceeding, or in a deposition;
(b) consistent with the declarant’s
testimony and is offered to rebut an express or
implied charge against the declarant of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive; or
(c) one of identification of a person made
after perceiving him or her.
This is a new insertion. Prior to the amendment,
there is no exact section providing for definition of
hearsay evidence, and instead, it was implied under
the old Section 36, such that if it does not fall under
Section 36, then it is hearsay. Note that not all
hearsay is inadmissible, as it admits of exceptions,
which were and are recognized under the old and new
rules.
The new rule provides that hearsay is a
statement other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at a trial or hearing, offered to prove the
truth of the facts asserted therein. Even without the
amendment, it has been recognized that if the
statement is not being offered to prove the truth of
the facts asserted therein but only to prove that the
statement was made, it is admissible under the rule on
independent relevant statements.
Additionally, the rule provides that it is not
hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross- examination concerning the
statement, and the statement is
(a) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony,
and was given under oath subject to the penalty of
perjury at a trial hearing, or other proceeding, or in a
deposition;
(b) consistent with the declarant's testimony and
is offered to rebut an express or implied charge
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive; or
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
(c) one of identification of a person made after
perceiving him or her.
CASES
ESPINELI VS PEOPLE
GULAM VS SPOUSES SANTOS
BAYANO VS PEOPLE
LEA MER INDUSTRIES VS MALAYAN INSURANCE CO. INC
6. EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE
SEC 37.38. DYING DECLARATION
Sec 37. 38. Dying declaration. — The declaration
of a dying person, made under the consciousness
of an impending death, may be received in any
case wherein his or her death is the subject of
inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death.
CASES
PEOPLE VS DE LAS ERAS ZAFRA
PEOPLE VS PEÑA
PEOPLE VS NORRUDIN
SEC 23.DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF DEATH OR
INSANITY OF ADVERSE PARTY
SEC 39. STATEMENT OF DECEDENT OR PERSON OF
UNSOUND MIND
Sec 23. Disqualification by reason of death or
insanity of adverse party. 39. Statement of
Decedent or Person of Unsound Mind.
— Parties or assignor of parties to a case, or
persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, In
an action against an executor or administrator or
other representative of a deceased person, or
against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or
demand against the estate of such deceased
person or against such person of unsound mind,
cannot testify as to any where a party or
assignor of a party or a person in whose behalf a
case is prosecuted testifies on a matter of fact
occurring before the death of such the deceased
person or before such person became of unsound
mind, any statement of the deceased or the
person of unsound mind, may be received in
evidence if the statement was made upon the
personal unsound mind at a time when the
matter had been recently perceived by him or
her and while his or her recollection was clear.
Such statement, however, is inadmissible if
made under circumstances indicating its lack of
trustworthiness.
The original Section 23 deals with a similar matter as
that contained under the amended Section 39.
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The old Section 23 was also known as the “Dead
Man's Statute”, which provides that if one party to the
alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by
death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the
surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage
of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained
account of the transaction. But before this rule can be
successfully invoked to bar the introduction of
testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:
1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to
a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a deceased
person or a person of unsound mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or
demand against the estate of such deceased person or
against person of unsound mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact
which occurred before the death of such deceased
person or before such person became of unsound
mind. (Sunga- Chan v. Chua, G.R. No. 143340, August
15, 2001)
The presence of the foregoing requisites under
the old Section 23 renders the testimonial evidence
inadmissible.
Under the new rule, with the foregoing
requisites, any statement of the deceased or the
person of unsound mind, may now be received in
evidence, provided that:
(1) the statement was made upon the personal
knowledge of the deceased or the person of
unsound mind;
(2) it was made at a time when the matter had
been recently perceived by him or her, and while
his or her recollection was clear.
Such statement, however, is inadmissible if made
under circumstances indicating its lack of
trustworthiness.
DEAD MAN’S STATUTE
(Survivorship Disqualification Rule)
-Parties or assignor of parties to a case, or
persons in whose behalf a case is prosecutedm against
an executor or administrator or other representative
of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound
mid, upon a claim or demand against the estate of
such deceased person or against such person of
unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased person or
before such person became of unsound mind.
REASON: (1) If the death has closed the lips of
one party, the policy of law is to close the lips of the
other.; (2) Temptation to falsehood and concealment
in such cases is considered too great to allow the
surviving party to testify in his own behalf.
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
REQUISITES: (PA-CB) (amended by the new rules)
1. The witness is a PARTY or assignor of a party to a
case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted;
2. The action is AGAINST an executor or administrator
or other representative of a deceased person or person
of unsound mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a CLAIM or
demand against the estate of such deceased person or
against person of unsound mind; and
4. The subject matter of the testimony refers to any
matter of fact which occurred BEFORE the death of
such deceased person or before such person became of
unsound mind.
SEC 38. 40. DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST
Sec 38. 40. Declaration against interest. — The
declaration made by a person deceased, or unable
to testify , against the interest of the declarant,
if the fact is asserted in the declaration was at
the time it was made so far contrary to
declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man
person in his or her position would not have
made the declaration unless he or she believed it
to be true, may be received in evidence against
himself or herself or his or her successors in
interest and against third persons. A statement
tending to expose the declarant to criminal
liability and offered to exculpate the accused is
not admissible unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement.
The new rule adds a second sentence, not
present under the old rule. It provides that a
statement against interest tending to expose the
declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate
the accused (which is presumably different from the
declarant) is not admissible unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of
the statement.
CASES
LAZARO VS AGUSTIN
PAREL VS PRUDENCIO
PHIL FREE PRESS INC. VS CA
SEC 39. 41. ACT OR DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE
Sec 39. 41. Act or declaration about pedigree.
— The act or declaration of a person deceased,
or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of
another person related to him or her by birth,
adoption, or marriage or, in the absence
thereof, with whose family he or she was so
intimately associated as to be likely to have
accurate information concerning his or her
pedigree, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the
relationship between the two persons is shown by
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evidence other than such act or declaration. The
word "pedigree" includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates
when and the places where these facts occurred,
and the names of the relatives. It embraces also
facts of family history intimately connected with
pedigree.
CASES
HERRERA VS ALBA
DELA CRUZ VS GRACIA
TECSON VS COMELEC
SEC 40. 42. ACT OR DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE
Sec 40. 42. Family reputation or tradition
regarding pedigree. — The reputation or tradition
existing in a family previous to the controversy, in
respect to the pedigree of any one of its
members, may be received in evidence if the
witness testifying thereon be also a member of
the family, either by consanguinity or affinity; or
adoption. Entries in family bibles or other family
books or charts, engravings on rings, family
portraits and the like, may be received as
evidence of pedigree.
PEOPLE VS GALLANO
SEC 41. 43. COMMON REPUTATION
Sec 41. 43. Common reputation. — Common
reputation existing previous to the controversy, as
to boundaries of our customs affecting lands in
the community and reputation as to events of
general history important to the community, or
respecting facts of public or general interest more
than thirty years old, or respecting marriage or
moral character, may be given in evidence.
Monuments and inscriptions in public places may
be received as evidence of common reputation
The old rule speaks of common reputation
existing previous to the controversy as to: (1) facts of
public or general interest more than thirty years old;
or (2) respecting marriage or moral character.
The new rule replaced the first item with
boundaries of or customs affecting lands in the
community and reputation as to events of general
history important to the community.
CSC VS BELAGAN
SEC 42. 44. PART OF RES GESTAE
Sec 42. 44. Part of res gestae. — Statements
made by a person while a startling occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
thereto, under the stress of excitement caused
by the occurence with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence
as part of res gestae. So, also, statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the
issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be
received as part of the res gestae
The new rule makes clear that the statements
made must be under the stress of excitement caused
by the occurrence, although even without such
revision, this qualification was recognized under the
old rule.
CASES
DBP POOL OF ACCREDITED INSURANCE CO. V.
RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK INC
PEOPLE VS LOBRIGAS
CAPILA VS PEOPLE
PEOPLE VS PALANAS
PEOPLE VS PALMONES
TALIDANO VS FALCON MARITIME & ALLIED
SERVICES INC
PEOPLE VS PRECIADOS
SEC 43. ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS
SEC 45. RECORDS OF REGULARLY CONDUCTED
BUSINESS ACTIVITY
Sec 43. Entries in the course of business. —
Entries made at, or near the time of transactions
to which they refer, by a person deceased, or
unable to testify, who was in a position to know
the facts therein stated, may be received as
prima facie evidence, if such person made the
entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty and in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty.
Sec 45. Records of Regularly Conducted
Business Activity. — A memorandum, report,
record or data compilation of acts, events,
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made by
writing, typing, electronic, optical or other
similar means at or near the time of or from
transmission or supply of information by a
person with knowledge thereof, and kept in the
regular course or conduct of a business activity,
and such was the regular practice to make the
memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation by electronic, optical or similar
means, all of which are shown by the testimony
of the custodian or other qualified witnesses, is
excepted from the rule on hearsay evidence.
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The old rule under Section 43 requires the
following requisites to be present:
1. The person who made the entry must be dead,
outside the country or unable to testify;
2. The entries were made at or near the time of
the transactions to which they refer;
3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts
stated in the entries;
4. The entries were made in his professional
capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether
legal, contractual, moral or religious; and
5. The entries were made in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty (Canque v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 96202, 13 April 1999)
Under the amended rule, it is no longer required
that the person who made the entry must be dead,
outside the country or unable to testify.
Also, under the revised rule, the entries are not
only just made at or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer. Now, they refer to
memorandum, report, record or data compilation of
acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made
by writing, typing, electronic, optical or other similar
means at or near the time of or from transmission or
supply of information.
Similar to the old rule, it is made by a person
with knowledge thereof.
It must also be kept in the regular course or
conduct of a business activity, and such was the
regular practice to make the memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation by electronic, optical or
similar means.
All of the foregoing must be shown by the
testimony of the custodian or other qualified
witnesses, to be excepted from the rule on hearsay
evidence.
CASES
JOSE JR. VS MICHAELMAR PHILS INC
LBP VS MONET’S EXPORT AND MANUFACTURING CORP
SECURITY BANK & TRUST CO VS GAN
SEC 44. 46. ENTRIES OF OFFICIAL RECORDS
Sec 44. 46. Entries in official records. — Entries
in official records made in the performance of his
or her duty by a public officer of the Philippines,
or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated.
CASES
DST MOVERS CORP VS PEOPLE’S GENERAL
INSURANCE CORP
BARCELON, ROXAS SECURITIES INC VS CIR
DIMAGUILA VS SPS MONTEIRO
SEC 45. 47. COMMERCIAL LISTS AND THE LIKE
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
Sec 45. 47. Commercial lists and the like. —
Evidence of statements of matters of interest to
persons engaged in an occupation contained in a
list, register, periodical, or other published
compilation is admissible as tending to prove the
truth of any relevant matter so stated if that
compilation is published for use by persons
engaged in that occupation and is generally used
and relied upon by them therein.
Manila Electric Co. v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 127598
(Resolution), February 22, 2000
SEC 46. 48 LEARNED TREATISES
Sec 46. 48. Learned treatises. — A published
treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of
history, law, science, or art is admissible as
tending to prove the truth of a matter stated
therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a
witness expert in the subject testifies, that the
writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical
or pamphlet is recognized in his or her profession
or calling as expert in the subject.
Paje, et al., v. Casiño, et al., G.R. Nos. 207257-76, 207282 &
207366, February 3, 2015
SEC 47. 49 TESTIMONY OR DEPOSITION AT A FORMER
PROCEEDING
Sec 47. 49. Testimony or deposition at a former
proceeding. — The testimony or deposition of a
witness deceased or out of the Philippines or
who cannot, with due diligence, be found
therein, or is unable or otherwise unable to
testify, given in a former case or proceeding,
judicial or administrative, involving the same
parties and subject matter, may be given in
evidence against the adverse party who had the
opportunity to cross-examine him or her.
The new rule adds the deposition of a witness out
of the Philippines or who cannot, with due diligence,
be found therein or is unavailable, in addition to one
who is unable to testify.
Ilao-Quianay, et al., v. Mapile, G.R. No. 154087, October 25,
2005
Ambray, et al., v. Tsourous, et al., G.R. No. 209264, July 5,
2016
SEC 50. RESIDUAL EXCEPTION.
Sec 50. Residual Exception.
-A statement not specifically covered by any
of the foregoing exceptions, having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is
admissible if the court determines that
(a) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact;
(b) the statement is more probative on the
point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts; and
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(c) the general purposes of these rules and

the interests of justice will be best served by
admission of the statement into evidence.
However, a statement may not be admitted
under this exception unless the proponent
makes known to the adverse party, sufficiently
in advance of the hearing, or by the pre-trial
stage in the case of a trial of the main case, to
provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to prepare to meet it, the
proponent’s intention to offer the statement
and the particulars of it, including the name
and address of the declarant.

This is a new insertion. The residual exception to

the hearsay rule provides that any statement not
covered by the enumerated exceptions in the previous
sections but having equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness, shall be admissible if
the court determines that:
(a) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact;
(b) the statement is more probative on the
point for which it is offered than any other evidence
which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and
(c) the general purposes of these rules and the
interests of justice will be best served by admission
of the statement into evidence.
It appears that all three should be present to
warrant the application of the residual exception rule.
The new rule adds that a statement may not be
admitted under the foregoing exception unless the
proponent makes known to the adverse party ,
sufficiently in advance of the hearing, or by the pre-
trial stage in the case of a trial of the main case, to
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer
the statement and the particulars of it, including the
name and address of the declarant.

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7. OPINION RULE
SEC 48. 51. GENERAL RULE
Sec 48. 51. General Rule. – The opinion of a
witness is not admissible, except as indicated in
the following sections.
SEC 49. 52. OPINION OF EXPERT WITNESS
Sec 49. 52. Opinion of Expert Witness. –The
opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education, which he or she is shown to possess,
may be received in evidence.
CASES
MARCOS VS HEIRS OF LATE DR. ANDRES NAVARRO
TABAO VS PEOPLE
SEC 50. 53. OPINION OF ORDINARY WITNESSES
Sec 50. 53. Opinion of ordinary witnesses.
--The opinion of a witness for which proper
basis is given, may be received in evidence
regarding—
(a) the identity of a person about whom he or
she has adequate knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he or she has
sufficient familiarity; and
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he
or she is sufficiently acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his or her
impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition
or appearance of a person.
CASES
DELA LLANA VS BIONG
PEOPLE VS DURANAN
HERNANDEZ VS SAN JUAN-SANTOS
SPS LIM ET.AL VS. CHUATOCO
8. CHARACTER EVIDENCE
SEC 51. 54. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT GENERALLY
ADMISSIBLE; EXCEPTIONS.
Sec 51. 54. Character Evidence not generally
admissible; Exceptions.
--Evidence of a person’s character or trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of
proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion, except:
(a) In Criminal Cases:
(3) (1) The good or bad moral character of
the offended party may be proved if it tends to
establish in any reasonable degree the
probability or improbability of the offense
charged.
(1) (2) The accused may prove his or her good
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
moral character, pertinent to the moral trait
involved in the offense charged. (2) Unless in
rebuttel,However, the prosecution may not prove
his or her bad moral character unless on
rebuttal. which is pertinent to the moral trait
involed in the offense charged.
(b) In Civil Case:
Evidence of the moral character of a party in a
civil case is admissible only when pertinent to the
issue of character involved in the case.
(c) In the case provided for in Rule 132, Sec 14
In Criminal and Civil Cases:
Evidence of the good character of a witness
is not admissible until character has been
impeached.
In all cases in which evidence of character or
a trait of character of a person is admissible,
proof may be made by testimony as to
reputation or by testimony in the form of an
opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is
allowable into relevant specific instances of
conduct.
In cases in which character or a trait of
character of a person is an essential element of
a charge, claim or defense, proof may also be
made of specific instances of that person’s
conduct.
The new rule adds a first paragraph. It provides
the general rule that Evidence of a person's
character or a trait of character is not admissible for
the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion. This general rule
is subject to the exceptions as provided under the
old and new sections.
The revised rule rearranges the numbering where
the first and second items under the old rule are
joined together under item 2 of the new rule and the
third item under the old rule is renumbered to the
first item under the first rule. The meaning of the
provisions are the same, although rephrased
differently.
The old and new provisions under paragraph (c)
are essentially the same. The old rule mentions
Section 14, Rule 132, while the new rule reproduces
said provision under paragraph (c). The new rule also
makes clear that the exception under this paragraph
applies to criminal and civil cases.
The last 2 paragraphs are new insertions. It
appears that the character evidence may be given in
the form of an opinion, which means that this is
another exception to the general rule on the
inadmissibility of opinion.
The last paragraph explains how character, when
an essential element of a charge, claim or defense,
may be proven, i.e., by specific instances of that
person's conduct.
PEOPLE VS LEE
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RULES ON EVIDENCE
RULE 131
BURDEN OF PROOF, BURDEN OF EVIDENCE
AND PRESUMPTIONS
SEC 1. BURDEN OF PROOF
Sec 1. Burden of proof and Burden of Evidence.
— Burden of proof is the duty of a party to
present evidence on the facts in issue necessary
to establish his or her claim or defense by the
amount of evidence required by law. Burden of
proof never shifts.
Burden of evidence is the duty of a party to
present evidence sufficient to establish or rebut
a fact in issue to establish a prima facie case.
Burden of evidence may shift from one party to
the other in the course of the proceedings,
depending on the exigencies of the case.
The old and new provisions for defining burden of
proof are the same, except for amendment to address
gender sensitivity and the new rule adds that the
burden of proof never shifts. However, even without
the amendment, the rule that Burden of proof never
shifts has long been settled.
The new rule adds burden of evidence under
Section 1 and provides for its definition.
CASES
SUPREME TRANSLINER VS CA
PEOPLE VS KINOK
SEC 2. CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTIONS
Sec 2. Conclusive presumptions. — The following
are instances of conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his or her own
declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led to another to believe a particular
thing true, and to act upon such belief, he or she
cannot, in any litigation arising out of such
declaration, act or omission, be permitted to
falsify it; and
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the
title of his or her landlord at the time of
commencement of the relation of landlord and
tenant between them.
CASES
DATALIFT MOVERS INC VS BELGRAVIA REALTY & DEVT
SPS TRINIDAD VS IMSON
CONCEPCION VS CA
PNB VS SPS REBLANDO
SEC 3. DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS
Sec 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted,
but may be contradicted and overcome by other
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
evidence:
(a) That a person is innocent of crime or
wrong;
(b) That an unlawful act was done with an
unlawful intent;
(c) That a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary act;
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns;
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would
be adverse if produced;
(f) That money paid by one to another was
due to the latter;
(g) That a thing delivered by one to another
belonged to the latter;
(h) That an obligation delivered up to the
debtor has been paid;
(i) That prior rents or installments had been
paid when a receipt for the later one is produced;
(j) That a person found in possession of a
thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act
is the taker and the doer of the whole act;
otherwise, that things which a person possess, or
exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by
him;
(k) That a person in possession of an order on
himself for the payment of the money, or the
delivery of anything, has paid the money or
delivered the thing accordingly;
(l) That a person acting in a public office was
regularly appointed or elected to it;
(m) That official duty has been regularly
performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such,
whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was
acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction;
(o) That all the matters within an issue raised
in a case were laid before the court and passed
upon by it; and in like manner that all matters
within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for
arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and
passed upon by them;
(p) That private transactions have been fair
and regular;
(q) That the ordinary course of business has
been followed;
(r) That there was a sufficient consideration
for a contract;
(s) That a negotiable instrument was given or
indorsed for a sufficient consideration;
(t) That an endorsement of negotiable
instrument was made before the instrument was
overdue and at the place where the instrument is
dated;
(u) That a writing is truly dated;
(v) That a letter duly directed and mailed was
received in the regular course of the mail;
(w) That after an absence of seven years, it
being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, he is considered dead for all purposes,
except for those of succession.
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The absentee shall not be considered dead for
the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the
age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years
shall be sufficient in order that his succession may
be opened.
The following shall be considered dead for all
purposes including the division of the estate
among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a
sea voyage, or an aircraft with is missing, who has
not been heard of for four years since the loss of
the vessel or aircraft;
(2) A member of the armed forces who has
taken part in armed hostilities, and has been
missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death
under other circumstances and whose existence
has not been known for four years;
(4) If a married person has been absent for
four consecutive years, the spouse present may
contract a subsequent marriage if he or she has
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is
already dead. In case of disappearance, where
there is a danger of death the circumstances
hereinabove provided, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient for the purpose of
contracting a subsequent marriage. However, in
any case, before marrying again, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceedings as
provided in the Family Code and in the rules for
declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
(x) That acquiescence resulted from a belief
that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to
the law or fact;
(y) That things have happened according to
the ordinary course of nature and ordinary nature
habits of life;
(z) That persons acting as co-partners have
entered into a contract of co-partneship;
(aa) That a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into
a lawful contract of marriage;
(bb) That property acquired by a man and a
woman who are capacitated to marry each other
and who live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
or under void marriage, has been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry.
(cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man
and a woman who are not capacitated to marry
each other and who have acquired property
through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry, such contributions and their
corresponding shares including joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit are equal.
(dd) That if the marriage is terminated and
the mother contracted another marriage within
three hundred days after such termination of the
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
former marriage, these rules shall govern in the
absence of proof to the contrary:
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty
(180) days after the solemnization of the
subsequent marriage is considered to have been
conceived during the former such marriage,
provided even though it be born within the three
hundred days after the termination of the former
marriage; and
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days
following the celebration of the subsequent
marriage is considered to have been conceived
during such marriage, even though it be born
within the three hundred days after the
termination of the former marriage.
(ee) That a thing once proved to exist
continues as long as is usual with things of the
nature;
(ff) That the law has been obeyed;
(gg) That a printed or published book,
purporting to be printed or published by public
authority, was so printed or published;
(hh) That a printed or published book,
purporting contain reports of cases adjudged in
tribunals of the country where the book is
published, contains correct reports of such cases;
(ii) That a trustee or other person whose duty
it was to convey real property to a particular
person has actually conveyed it to him or her
when such presumption is necessary to perfect
the title of such person or his successor in
interest;
(jj) That except for purposes of succession,
when two persons perish in the same calamity,
such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is
not shown who died first, and there are no
particular circumstances from which it can be
inferred, the survivorship is determined from the
probabilities resulting from the strength and the
age of the sexes, according to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years,
the older is deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age sixty, the
younger is deemed to have survived;
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above
sixty, the former is deemed to have survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and
the sex be different, the male is deemed to have
survived, if the sex be the same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and
the other between those ages, the latter is
deemed to have survived.
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two
or more persons who are called to succeed each
other, as to which of them died first, whoever
alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall
prove the same; in the absence of proof, they
shall be considered to have died at the same
time. 
There appears to be a typographical error under
the first item. The old rule is based on and is exactly
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RULES ON EVIDENCE

the same as Article 168 of the Family Code. Under the
old rule and the Family Code, the child born before
180 days after the solemnization of the subsequent
marriage is considered to have been born during the
former marriage.
Under the new rule, it is considered to have been
conceived during such subsequent marriage. The
revised rule cannot modify or amend substantive
law. Also, the phrase “even though it be born within
300 days after the termination of the former
marriage” under the first item seems to be incorrect
since the same first item under paragraph 1 of the old
rule and the Family Code states instead “provided it
be born within 300 days after the termination of the
former marriage”. It is respectfully submitted that this
must be a typographical error.
Criminal Cases. – If a presumed fact that
establishes guilt, is an element of the offense
charged, or negates a defense, the existence of
the basic fact must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt and the presumed fact must
be proved beyond reasonable doubt and the
presumed fact follows from the basic fact
beyond reasonable doubt.
This is a new insertion that deals with presumed
facts that establish guilt in that the existence of the
basic fact must be proved beyond reasonable doubt
and the presumed fact follows from the basic fact
beyond reasonable doubt.

CASES
PEOPLE VS URZAIS

BARCELON, ROXAS SECURITIES INC VS CIR

BLUE CROSS HEALTH CARE, INC VS OLIVARES

ROYAL CARGO CORP VS DFS SPORTS UNLIMITED INC

SEC 4. NO PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACE

OR ILLEGITIMACY
Sec 4. No Presumption of Legitimacy or
illegitimacy. –There is no presumption of
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after
three hundred days following the dissolution of
the marriage or the separation of the spouses.
Whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of
such child must prove his allegation.

SEC 5. PRESUMPTIONS IN CIVIL ACTIONS

AND PROCEEDINGS
Sec 5. Presumptions in Civil Actions and
Proceedings. – In all civil actions and
proceedings not otherwise provided for by the
law or these Rules, a presumption imposes on
the party against whom it is directed the
burden of going forward with evidence to rebut
or meet the presumption.
If presumptions are inconsistent, the
presumption that is founded upon weightier
considerations of policy shall apply. If
considerations of policy are of equal weight,
neither presumption applies.
This is a new insertion. The first paragraph deals
with burden of evidence.
The second paragraph provides the rule on how
to treat inconsistent presumptions.

SEC 6. PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST AN ACCUSED

IN CRIMINAL CASES
Sec 6. Presumption against an Accused in

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 REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW
RULES ON EVIDENCE
RULE 132
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
A. EXAMINATION OF WITNESS
SEC 1. EXAMINATION TO BE DONE IN OPEN COURT
Sec 1. Examination to be done in open court. –The
examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing
shall be done in open court, and under oath or
affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to
speak, or the question calls for a different mode of
answer, the answer of the witness shall be given orally.
People v. Go, G.R. Nos. 130714 and 139634, 140845-46,
December 27, 2002
San Luis v. Rojas, G.R. No. 159127, March 3, 2008
Santamaria v. Cleary, G.R. Nos. 197122 &197161, June 15,
2016
People v. Servano, G.R. Nos. 143002-03, July 17, 2003
Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, A.M. No. 004-07-SC,
December 15, 2000
SEC 2. PROCEEDINGS TO BE RECORDED
Sec 2. Proceedings to be recorded. – The entire
proceedings of a trial or hearing, including the questions
propounded to a witness and his or her answers thereto,
the statements made by the judge or any of the parties,
counsel, or witnesses with reference to the case, shall
be recorded by means of shorthand or stenotype or by
other means of recording found suitable by the court.
A transcript of the record of the proceedings made
by the official stenographer, stenotypist or recorder and
certified as correct by him or her shall be deemed
prima facie a correct statement of such proceedings.
SEC 3. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF A WITNESS
Sec 3. Rights and obligations of a witness. – A witness
must answer questions, although his or her answer may
tend to establish a claim against him. However, it is the
right of a witness:
(1) To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or
insulting questions, and from harsh or insulting
demeanor;
(2) Not to be detained longer than the interest of
justice require;
(3) Not to be examined except only as to matters
pertinent to the issue;
(4) Not to give an answer which will tend to subject
him or her to a penalty for an offense unless otherwise
provided by law; or
(5) Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade
his reputation, unless it be to the very fact at issue or to
a fact from which the fact in issue would be presumed.
But a witness must answer to the fact of his or her
previous final conviction for an offense.
Lee v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 177861, July 13, 2010
SEC 4. ORDER IN THE EXAMINATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL
WITNESS
Sec 4. Order in the examination of an individual
witness. – The order in which an individual witness may
be examined is as follows:
(a) Direct examination by the proponent;
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
(b) Cross-examination by the proponent;
(c) Re-direct examination by the proponent;
(d) Re-cross-examination by the opponent.
SEC 5. DIRECT EXAMINATION
Sec 5. Direct Examination. – Direct examination is the
examination-in-chief of a witness by the party
presenting him on the facts relevant to the issue.
Judicial Affidavit Rule
SEC 6. CROSS-EXAMINATION;
ITS PURPOSE AND EXTENT
Sec 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and
extent. — Upon the termination of the direct
examination, the witness may be cross-examined
by the adverse party on any relevant matter, as
to any matters stated in the direct examination,
or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness
and freedom to test his or her accuracy and
truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or
the reverse, and to elicit all important facts
bearing upon the issue.
The old rule provides that the cross-examination
may be on any matters stated in the direct
examination, or connected therewith, while the new
rule provides that the cross- examination may be on
any relevant matter, meaning that it is allowed even if
it is not necessarily stated in the direct examination,
provided it is relevant. However, even prior to the
amendment, it was recognized that even if the matter
was not exactly stated in the direct examination but is
connected therewith, cross- examination thereon may
be allowed. The new rule seems to just further clarify
the old rule.
People v. Ortillas y Gamlanga, G.R. No. 137666, May 20, 2004
People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 139180, July 31, 2001
People v. Estibal y Calungsag, G.R. No. 208749, November 26,
2014
SEC 7. REDIRECT EXAMINATION;
IT’S PURPOSE AND INTENT
Sec 7. Re-direct examination; its purpose and extent.
— After the cross-examination of the witness has been
concluded, he or she may be re-examined by the party
calling him or her, to explain or supplement his or her
answers given during the cross-examination. On re-
direct-examination, questions on matters not dealt with
during the cross-examination, may be allowed by the
court in its discretion.
SEC 8. RE-CROSS EXAMINATION
Sec 8. Re-cross-examination. — Upon the conclusion of
the re-direct examination, the adverse party may re-
cross-examine the witness on matters stated in his or
her re-direct examination, and also on such other
matters as may be allowed by the court in its discretion.
SEC 9. RECALLING WITNESS
Sec 9. Recalling witness. — After the examination of a
witness by both sides has been concluded, the witness
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RULES ON EVIDENCE
cannot be recalled without leave of the court. The court
will grant or withhold leave in its discretion, as the
interests of justice may require.
People v. Ortillas y Gamlanga, G.R. No. 137666, May 20, 2004
Zaldivar v. People, G.R. No. 197056 (Resolution), March 2,
2016
People v. Leodones, G.R. No. 138735, November 22, 2000
SEC 10. LEADING AND MISLEADINGS QUESTIONS
Sec 10. Leading and misleading questions. — A
question which suggests to the witness the answer which
the examining party desires is a leading question. It is
not allowed, except:
(a) On cross examination;
(b) On preliminary matters;
(c) When there is a difficulty is getting direct and
intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant, or a
child of tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a deaf-
mute;
(d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or
(e) Of a witness who is an adverse party or an
officer, director, or managing agent of a public or
private corporation or of a partnership or association
which is an adverse party.
A misleading question is one which assumes as
true a fact not yet testified to by the witness, or
contrary to that which he has previously stated. It is not
allowed.
Dulla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123164, February 18, 2000
Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, A.M. No. 004-07-SC,
December 15, 2000
SEC 11. IMPEACHMENT OF ADVERSE PARTY’S
WITNESS
Sec 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness. — A
witness may be impeached by the party against whom
he or she was called, by contradictory evidence, by
evidence that his or her general reputation for truth,
honestly, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he or
she has made at other times statements inconsistent
with his or her present testimony, but not by evidence
of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown
by the examination of the witness, or the record of the
judgment, that he or she has been convicted of an
offense.
Civil Service Commission v. Belagan, G.R. No. 132164,
October 19, 2004
SEC 12. IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF
CONVICTION OF CRIME
Sec 12. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of
Crime. – For the purpose of impeaching a witness,
evidence that he or she has been convicted by final
judgment of a crime shall be admitted if
(a) the crime was punishable by a penalty in
excess of one year; or
(b) the crime involved moral turpitude regardless
of the penalty.
However, evidence of a conviction is not
admissible if the conviction has not been the subject
of an amnesty or annulment of the conviction.
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
This is a new insertion. A witness may now be
impeached by evidence that the witness was
previously convicted by final judgment involving:
(1) a punishable penalty exceeding 1 year,
regardless of whether the crime involves moral
turpitude, or
(2) a crime of moral turpitude, regardless of the
penalty.
SEC 12. 13. PARTY MAY NOT IMPEACH
HIS OR HER OWN WITNESS
Sec 12. 13. Party may not impeach his or her
own witness. — Except with respect to witnesses
referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 10
of this Rule, the party presenting the producing
a witness is not allowed to impeach his or her
credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or
hostile only if so declared by the court upon
adequate showing of his adverse interest,
unjustified reluctance to testify, or his or her
having misled the party into calling him or her to
the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or
the witness who is an adverse party, may be
impeached by the party presenting him or her in
all respects as if he or she had been called by the
adverse party, except by evidence of his or her
bad character. He or she may also be impeached
and cross-examined by the adverse party, but
such cross-examination must only be on the
subject matter of his or her examination-in-chief.
Gomez v. Gomez-Samson, G.R. No. 156284, February 6, 2007
Ng Meng Tam v. China Banking Corp., G.R. No. 214054,
August 5, 2015
SEC 13. 14. HOW WITNESS IMPEACHED BY EVIDENCE
OF INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS.
SEC 13. 14. How witness impeached by evidence of
inconsistent statements. — Before a witness can be
impeached by evidence that he or she has made at
other times statements inconsistent with his or her
present testimony, the statements must be related to
him or her, with the circumstances of the times and
places and the persons present, and he or she must be
asked whether he made such statements, and if so,
allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing
they must be shown to the witness before any question
is put to him or her concerning them
People v. Doca, G.R. No. 126781, September 13, 2000
People v. Sambahon y Nueva, G.R. No. 182789, August 3,
2010
People v. Bajada y Bautista, G.R. No. 180507, November 20,
2008
People v. Castillano, G.R. No. 139412, April 2, 2003
SEC 15. EXCLUSION AND SEPARATION OF WITNESSES
Sec 15. Exclusion and separation of witnesses.
—The court, motu proprio or upon motion,
shall order witnesses excluded so that they
cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses.
This rule does not authorize exclusion of
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RULES ON EVIDENCE

(a) a party who is a natural person, or she chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it and
(b) a duly designated representative of a may read it in evidence. So, also, A witness may also
juridical entity which is a party to the case, testify from such a writing or record, though he or she
retains no recollection of the particular facts, if he or
(c) a person whose presence is essential to
she is able to swear that the writing or record correctly
the presentation of the party’s cause, or stated the transaction when made; but such evidence
(d) a person authorized by a statute to be must be received with caution.
present.
On any trial or hearing, the judge may exclude Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-31342, L-31740,
from the court any witness not at the time under April 7, 1976
examination, so that he may not hear the Canque v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96202, April 13, 1999
testimony of other witnesses. The court judge People v. Plasencia y Desamparado, G.R. No. 90198,
may also cause witnesses to be kept separate and November 7, 1995
to be prevented from conversing with one
SEC 17. WHEN PART OF TRANSACTION, WRITING OR
another, directly or through intermediaries, RECORD GIVEN IN EVIDENCE, THE REMAINDER ADMISSIBLE
until all shall have been examined. Sec 17. When part of transaction, writing or record
The purpose of the rule remains the same, that given in evidence, the remainder admissible. — When
witnesses may be excluded so that they cannot hear part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or
the testimony of other witnesses. However, the record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of
amended rule provides that the following shall not be the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and
excluded: when a detached act, declaration, conversation, writing
(a) a party who is a natural person; or record is given in evidence, any other act,
declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary
(b) a duly designated representative of a juridical to its understanding may also be given in evidence.
entity which is a party to the case;
(c) a person whose presence is essential to the
presentation of the party's cause; or People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 139180, July 31, 2001
(d) a person authorized by a statute to be People v. Kempis, G.R. No. 97169, May 10, 1993
present. Chan v. Chan, G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013
The foregoing exceptions were not present under
the old rule. SEC 18. RIGHT TO INSPECT WRITING
SHOWN TO WITNESS
Likewise, it was directory or not mandatory for
Sec 18. Right to respect writing shown to
the court under the old rule to order exclusion of witness. — Whenever a writing is shown to a witness, it
witnesses, as the old rule used the word “may”. The may be inspected by the adverse party.
amended rule now mandates the court to exclude
witnesses, with the use of the word “shall”, subject to
the exceptions provided in the amended rule.
The second paragraph under the amended rule is
similar to the second sentence under the old rule, in
that apart from excluding the witnesses from trial or
hearing to prevent them from hearing the testimony of
other witnesses, the court may also order that they be
kept separate from each other to be prevent them
from conversing with one another. The amended rule
provides additionally that this may be done not only to
prevent the witnesses from conversing directly with
one another but also through intermediaries, until all
have been examined.

People v. Sandal, G.R. Nos. 32394, 32395, September 5, 1930

Design Sources International, Inc. v. Eristingcol, G.R. No.
193966, February 19, 2014

SEC 16. WHEN WITNESSES MAY

REFER TO MEMORANDUM
Sec 16. When Witness May Refer to Memorandum.
— A witness may be allowed to refresh his or her
memory respecting a fact by anything written or
recorded by himself or herself, or under his or her
direction, at the time when the fact occurred, or
immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the
fact was fresh in his or her memory and he or she knew
that the same was correctly written or recorded; but in
such case, the writing or record must be produced and
may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he

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 REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW
RULES ON EVIDENCE
B. AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF DOCUMENTS
SEC 19. CLASSES OF DOCUMENTS
Sec 19. Classes of Documents. — For the purpose
of their presentation in evidence, documents are
either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals,
and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or
of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary
public except last wills and testaments;
(c) Documents that are considered public
documents under treaties and conventions
which are in force between the Philippines and
the country of source; and
(d) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of
private documents required by law to be entered
therein.
All other writings are private .
The old and new provisions are the same except
that under the amended rule, an additional item was
added under public document - Documents that are
considered public documents under treaties and
conventions which are in force between the
Philippines and the country of source. An example of
this treaty is the Apostille Convention, which became
effective in the Philippines on 14 May 2019.
Patula v. People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012
Salas v. Sta. Mesa Market Corp., G.R. No. 157766, July 12,
2007
Republic v. Spouses Gimenez, G.R. No. 174673, January 11,
2016
Iwasawa v. Gangan, G.R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013
Heirs of Ochoa v. G & S Transport Corp., G.R. No. 170071,
170125 (Resolution), July 16, 2012
SEC 20. PROOF OF PRIVATE DOCUMENT
Sec 20. Proof of private document. — Before any
private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or
written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature
or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified
as that which it is claimed to be.
Patula v. People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Philippine Nails & Wires Corp.,
G.R. No. 138084, April 10, 2002
Dycoco v. Orina, G.R. No. 184843, July 30, 2010
SEC 21. WHEN EVIDENCE BY AUTHENTICITY OF PRIVATE
DOCUMENT NOT NECESSARY
Sec 21. When evidence of authenticity of
private document not necessary. — Where a
private document is more than thirty years old, is
produced from the custody in which it would
naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished
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by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion,
no other evidence of its authenticity need be
given.
Aldemita v. Silva, G.R. No. 166403
SEC 22. HOW GENUINENESS OF HANDWRITING PROVED
Sec 22. How Genuineness of Handwriting Proved. —
The handwriting of a person may be proved by any
witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such
person because he or she has seen the person write, or
has seen writing purporting to be his or hers upon which
the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus
acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given
by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
Progressive Trade & Service Enterprises v. Antonio, G.R. No.
179502, September 18, 2009
Raz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73010, April
27, 1990
SEC 23. PUBLIC DOCUMENTS AS EVIDENCE
Sec 23. Public documents as evidence.
— Documents consisting of entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by a
public officer are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. All other public documents
are evidence, even against a third person, of the
fact which gave rise to their execution and of the
date of the latter.
Reyes v. Sotero, G.R. No. 167405, February 16, 2006
Republic v. Galeno, G.R. No. 215009, January 23, 2017
Teoco v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No.
162333, December 23, 2008
SEC 24. PROOF OF OFFICIAL RECORD
Sec 24. Proof of official record. — The record of
public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may
be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer
has the custody .
If the office in which the record is kept is in
a foreign country, which is a contracting party
to a treaty or convention to which the
Philippines is also a party, or considered a
public document under such treaty or
convention pursuant to paragraph (c) of Section
19 hereof, the certificate or its equivalent shall
be in the form prescribed by such treaty or
convention subject to reciprocity granted to
public documents originating from the
Philippines.
If the office in which the record is kept is in
foreign country, For documents originating from
a foreign country which is not a contracting
party to a treaty or convention referred to in
the next preceding sentence, the certificate
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may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his or her office.
A document that is accompanied by a
certificate or its equivalent may be presented
in evidence without further proof, the
certificate or its equivalent being prima facie
evidence of the due execution and genuineness
of the document involved. The certificate shall
not be required when a treaty or convention
between a foreign country and the Philippines
has abolished the requirement, or has
exempted the document itself from this
formality.
The first sentence of the old and revised rules
are the same.
A second paragraph was inserted, which refers to
and should be read in connection with the revised
Section 19 (c) of Rule 132, on Documents that are
considered public documents under treaties and
conventions which are in force between the
Philippines and the country of source. This
presupposes that the Philippines is a contracting party
to the treaty together with the foreign country
concerned. The treaty shall govern the form of the
certificate of its equivalent, subject to reciprocity
granted to public documents originating from the
Philippines.
The second sentence of the old rule may be
compared with the third paragraph of the amended
rule. This provision presupposes that the foreign
country from where the document originates is not a
party to a treaty with the Philippines. Under the old
rule, there was no distinction. However, as earlier
mentioned, the Apostille Convention came into force
on 14 May 2019, hence this revision. Thus, the old
second sentence applies to foreign documents
originating from countries not party to a treaty with
the Philippines.
The last paragraph under the revised rule is a
new insertion, and it makes clear that the document
that is accompanied by a certificate or its equivalent
may be presented in evidence without further proof,
the certificate or its equivalent being prima facie
evidence of the due execution and genuineness of the
document involved. However, the certificate shall not
be required when a treaty or convention between a
foreign country and the Philippines has abolished the
requirement, or has exempted the document itself
from this formality. See Apostille Convention.
Sec. 24. Proof of official record
Nedlloyd Lijnen B.V. Rotterdam v. Glow Laks Enterprises,
Ltd., G.R. No. 156330, November 19, 2014
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Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Guerrero, G.R. No.
136804, February 19, 2003
Heirs of Spouses Arcilla v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 162886, [August
11, 2008
SEC 25. WHAT ATTESTATION OF COPY MUST STATE
Sec 25. What Attestation of Copy Must State. —
Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for
the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be.
The attestation must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer, if there be any, or if he or she be the
clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court.
Willamette Iron & Steel Works v. Muzzal, G.R. No. 42538, May
21, 1935
Nedlloyd Lijnen B.V. Rotterdam v. Glow Laks Enterprises,
Ltd., G.R. No. 156330, November 19, 2014
Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
198742, August 10, 2012
SEC 26. IRREMOVABILITY OF PUBLIC RECORD
Sec 26. Irremovability of public record. — Any public
record, an official copy of which is admissible in
evidence, must not be removed from the office in which
it is kept, except upon order of a court where the
inspection of the record is essential to the just
determination of a pending case.
SEC 27. PUBLIC RECORD OF A PRIVATE DOCUMENT
Sec 27. Public record of a private document. — An
authorized public record of a private document may be
proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof,
attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an
appropriate certificate that such officer has the
custody.
Salas v. Sta. Mesa Market Corp., G.R. No. 157766, July 12,
2007
SEC 28. PROOF OF LACK OF RECORD
Sec 28. Proof of lack of record. — A written statement
signed by an officer having the custody of an official
record or by his deputy that after diligent search no
record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in
the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate
as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or entry.
Sevilla v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006
Abbas v. Abbas, G.R. No. 183896, January 30, 2013
Kho v. Republic, G.R. No. 187462, June 1, 2016
Vitangcol v. People, G.R. No. 207406, January 13, 2016
SEC 29. HOW JUDICIAL RECORD IMPEACHED
Sec 29. How judicial record impeached. — Any judicial
record may be impeached by evidence of: (a) want of
jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer, (b) collusion
between the parties, or (c) fraud in the party offering
the record, in respect to the proceedings.
Yucuanseh Drug Co., Inc., et al., v. National Labor Union,
G.R. No. L-9900, April 30, 1957
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SEC 30. PROOF OF NOTARIAL DOCUMENTS

Sec 30. Proof of notarial documents. — Every
instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified
as provided by law, may be presented in evidence
without further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the
execution of the instrument or document involved.

Destreza v. Riñoza-Plazo, G.R. No. 176863, October 30, 2009

Gutierrez v. Mendoza-Plaza, G.R. No. 185477, December 4,
2009

SEC 31. ALTERATIONS IN DOCUMENT,

HOW TO EXPLAIN
Sec 31. Alteration in document, how to explain. — The
party producing a document as genuine which has been
altered and appears to have been altered after its
execution, in a part material to the question in dispute,
must account for the alteration. He may show that the
alteration was made by another, without his
concurrence, or was made with the consent of the
parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly or
innocent made, or that the alteration did not change
the meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails to
do that, the document shall not be admissible in
evidence.

Cabotaje v. Pudunan, G.R. No. 134712, August 13, 2004

Republic v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 175493, March 25, 2015
Spouses Cirelos v. Spouses Hernandez, G.R. No. 146523

SEC 32. SEAL

Sec 32. Seal. — There shall be no difference between
sealed and unsealed private documents insofar as their
admissibility as evidence is concerned.

Sec. 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language

People v. Tomaquin, G.R. No. 133188, July 23, 2004
Pisueña v. Unating, G.R. No. 132803, August 31, 1999
People v. Siojo, G.R. No. 41746, March 27, 1935

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C. OFFER AND OBJECTION
SEC 34. OFFER OF EVIDENCE
Sec 34. Offer of Evidence. -The court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is
offered must be specified.
Ala-Martin v. Sultan, G.R. No. 117512, October 2, 2001
Parel v. Prudencio, G.R. No. 146556, April 19, 2006
Westmont Investment Corporation v. Francia, Jr., G.R. No.
194128, December 7, 2011
Republic v. Go, G.R. No. 168288, January 25, 2017
SEC 35. WHEN TO MAKE OFFER
Sec 35. When to Make Offer. – As regards All
evidence must be offered orally.
The offer of the testimony of a witness in
evidence, the offer must be made at the time the
witness is called to testify.
The offer of documentary and object evidence
shall be made offered after the presentation of a
party's testimonial evidence. Such offer shall be
done orally unless allowed by the court to be
done in writing.
The amended provision should be read in relation
to the revised Rule 30, Section 6, which provides that
after presentation of evidence, the offer of exhibits
shall be made orally and thereupon, the objections
thereto shall be made and the court shall also orally
rule on the same. This is also consistent with the rules
on continuous trial for criminal cases.
While the timing when the offer of evidence for
testimonial, object and documentary evidence remain
the same, the revised rules require that the same shall
be made orally. Under the old rules, it shall be done
orally unless allowed by the court to be in writing.
People v. Vargas, G.R. No. 122765, October 13, 2003
People v. Dequito, G.R. No. 132544, May 12, 2000
Rodson Philippines, Inc., v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
141857, June 9, 2004
SEC 36. OBJECTION
Sec 36. Objection. — Objection to offer of evidence
offered orally must be made orally immediately after
the offer is made.
Objection to the testimony of a witness for lack of
a formal offer must be made as soon as the witness
begins to testify. Objection to a question propounded in
the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be
made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become
reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to
within three (3) days after notice of the unless a
different period is allowed by the court.
In any case, The grounds for the objections must be
specified.
The old rule was revised so that there is no more
distinction between an oral and written offer of
evidence. Thus, the first sentence now states
objection to offer of evidence, without distinction as
to whether the evidence was offered orally or not,
unlike under the old rule. The revised rule also
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
provides that in case a witness begins to testify
without the offer of testimony being made prior to
said testimony, the objection to such lack of formal
offer must be made as soon as the witness begins to
testify.
The provision on when an objection to written
offer of evidence was deleted. It appears that unlike
the old rule, the court no longer has discretion to
allow the formal offer of evidence in writing.
People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 180501, December 24, 2008
Chan v. Chan, G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013
People v. Boras, G.R. No. 127495, December 22, 2000
SEC 37. WHEN REPETITION OF OBJECTION
UNNECESSARY
Sec 37. When repetition of objection
unnecessary.—When it becomes reasonably
apparent in the course of the examination of a
witness that the questions being propounded are
of the same class as those to which objection has
been made, whether such objection was sustained
or overruled, it shall not be necessary to repeat
the objection, it being sufficient for the adverse
party to record his or her continuing objection to
such class of questions.
SEC 38. RULING
Sec 38. Ruling. – The ruling of the court must be
given immediately after the objection is made,
unless the court desires to take a reasonable time
to inform itself on the question presented; but
the ruling shall always be made during the trial
and at such time as will give the party against
whom it is made an opportunity to meet the
situation presented by the ruling.
The reason for sustaining or overruling an
objection need not be stated. However, if the
objection is based on two or more grounds, a
ruling sustaining the objection on one or some of
them must specify the ground or grounds relied
upon.
Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in RTC Branches 29,
56 & 57, Libmanan, Camarines Sur, A.M. No. 98-1-11-RTC,
October 7, 1999
SEC 39. STRIKING OUT ANSWER
Sec 39. Striking out answer. – Should a witness
answer the question before the adverse party had
the opportunity to voice fully its objection to the
same, or where a question is not objectionable,
but the answer is not responsive, or where a
question is not objectionable, but the answer is
not responsive, or where a witness testifies
without a question being posed or testifies
beyond limits set by the court, or when the
witness testifies beyond limits set by the court,
or when the witness does a narration instead of
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answering the question, and such objection is

found to be meritorious, the court shall sustain
the objection and order such answer, testimony
or narration to be stricken off the record.
On proper motion, the court may also order
the striking out of answers which are
incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise improper.
The revised rule adds instances for striking the
answer of a witness.
The old rule was limited to striking an answer to
a question when the answer was made before the
adverse party had the opportunity to voice fully its
objection to the same. In addition to the foregoing,
the revised rule also provides:
(1) where the question is not objectionable but
the answer of the witness is not responsive to the
question,
(2) a witness testifies without a question being
posed,
(3) a witness testifies beyond limits set by the
court, or
(4) when the witness does a narration instead of
answering the question,
and objection thereto is properly raised and
found meritorious, the court shall sustain the
objection and order such answer, testimony or
narration to be stricken off the record.
The second paragraphs are the same. Even
without the new insertions under the revised rule, the
same may still fall within the contemplation of the
second paragraph.

Gochan v. Gochan, G.R. No. 143089, February 27, 2003

SEC 40. TENDER OF EXCLUDED EVIDENCE

Sec 40. Tender of Excluded Evidence. – if the
documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by
the court, the offeror may have the same attached to or
made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is
oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and
other personal circumstances of the witness and the
substance of the proposed testimony.

Yu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154115, November 29, 2005

Fortune Tobacco Corporation v. CIR, G.R. No. 192024, July 1,
2015
Catacutan v. People, G.R. No. 175991, August 31, 2011

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RULE 133. WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
SEC 1. PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
Sec 1. Preponderance of Evidence, How Determined.
— (a) Whether the opinion is based upon sufficient
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof
must establish his or her case by a preponderance of
evidence. In determining where the preponderance or
superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies,
the court may consider all the facts and circumstances
of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing
the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the
facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony, their interest or want
of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as
the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The
court may also consider the number of witnesses,
though the preponderance is not necessarily with the
greater number.
Ogawa v. Menigishi, G.R. No. 193089, July 9, 2012
Spouses Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150284,
November 22, 2010
Ong v. Yap, G.R. No. 146797, February 18, 2005
SEC 2. PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
Sec 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. –In a criminal
case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his
or her guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree
of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces
absolutely certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.
Amanquiton v. People, G.R. No. 186080, August 14, 2009
Mahawan v. People, G.R. No. 176609, December 18, 2008
San Mateo v. People, G.R. No. 200090, March 6, 2013
SEC 3. EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION, NOT SUFFICIENT
GROUND FOR CONVICTION
Sec 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground
for conviction.—An extrajudicial confession made by an
accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction,
unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
People v. Licayan y Sucano, G.R. No. 144422, February 28,
2002
SEC 4. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, WHEN SUFFICIENT
Sec 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.-
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Inferences cannot be based on other inferences.
People v. Abdulah, G.R. No. 182518, January 20, 2009
Espineli v. People, G.R. No. 179535, June 9, 2014
SEC 5. WEIGHT TO BE GIVEN
OPINION OF EXPERT WITNESS
Sec 5. Weight to be Given Opinion of Expert Witness,
How Determined.
-In any case, where the opinion of an expert
ENGR. ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
witness is received in evidence, the court has a wide
latitude of discretion in determining the weight to be
given to such opinion, and for that purpose may
consider the ff:
facts of data;
(b) Whether it is the product of reliable principles
and methods;
(c) Whether the witness has applied the principles
and methods reliably to the facts of the case; and
(d) Such other factors as the court may deem
helpful to make such determination.
This is a new insertion. It provides that in case of
opinion of expert witness, the court has a wide
latitude of discretion in determining the weight of
evidence to be given to such opinion. Even prior to
this amendment, such rule was already settled by
jurisprudence.
The opinion of an expert witness or expert
evidence is admissible, but such testimony is merely
persuasive and are not binding upon the courts.
(Orense, Jr. v. Recasas, G.R. No. 199992 (Notice), 19
April 2017)
Courts may place whatever weight they may
choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the
facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency
of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province
of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and
character of the witness, his actions upon the witness
stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by
which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in
favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that
he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for
study and observation of the matters about which he
testifies, and any other matters which deserve to
illuminate his statements. The problem of the
credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of
his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court
whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the
absence of abuse of discretion. (Tabao v. People, G.R.
No. 187246, 20 July 2011)
With the incorporation of the foregoing
jurisprudential pronouncement, the revised rule also
provides for the factors for the court to consider in
determining the weight to be given to such opinion.
SEC 5.6. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Sec 5.6. Substantial Evidence. – In cases filed before
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be
deemed established if it is supported by substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Zaldarriaga, G.R. No. 175349,
June 22, 2010
SEC 6. 7. POWER OF THE COURT
TO STOP FURTHER EVIDENCE
Sec 6. 7. Power of court to stop further evidence. –
The court may stop the introduction of further
testimony upon any particular point when the evidence
upon it is already so full that more witnesses to the
same point cannot be reasonably persuasive. This power
should be shall be exercised with caution.
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Sec. 6. Power of the court to stop further evidence

Go v. Looyuko, G.R. No. 147923, 147962, 154035, October 26,
2007

SEC 7. 8. EVIDENCE ON MOTION

Sec 7. 8. Evidence on Motion. – When a motion is based
on facts not appearing of record, the court may hear the
matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the
respective parties, but the court may direct that the
matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or
depositions.

Sec. 7. Evidence on motion

Parel v. Prudencio, G.R. No. 146556, April 19, 2006

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Rule on DNA Evidence

People v. Umanito, G.R. No. 172607, October 26, 2007
Herrera v. Alba, G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005
Estate of Rogelio G. Ong v. Diaz, G.R. No. 171713, December
17, 2007
Lejano v. People, G.R. No. 176389, December 14, 2010

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