Legal Medicine (Atty. J. Montemayor, Jr.

)
Submitted by: DENNIE VIEVE D. IDEA, ROBERT V. BULAYUNGAN, JR. and ROMAN AMADEO CAPUCHINO
New Era University College of Law

CASE BRIEF FACTS ISSUE/S DOCTRINES/DISCUSSIONS/DEFINITIONS

Professional Services, Inc.
vs. Natividad and Enrique
Agana
CAPTAIN OF THE SHIP DOCTRINE
Dr. Ampil was the lead Whether or not the Court of The Court was correct in ruling that Dr. Ampil
surgeon during the operation Appeals erred in ruling Dr. was negligent and must be held liable and in
of Natividad. He requested Ampil liable and absolving absolving Dr. Fuentes.
the assistance of Dr. Fuentes Dr. Fuentes?
only to perform hysterectomy Under the “Captain of the Ship” rule, the
when he found that the operating surgeon is the person in complete
malignancy in her sigmoid charge of the surgery room and all personnel
area had spread to her left connected with the operation. Their duty is to
ovary. Dr. Fuentes performed obey his orders.
the surgery and thereafter
reported and showed his work As stated before, Dr. Ampil was the lead
to Dr. Ampil. The latter surgeon. In other words, he was the “Captain of
examined it and finding the Ship”. That he discharged such role is
everything to be in order, evidenced from his following conduct:
allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave
the operating room. Dr. (1) calling Dr. Fuentes to perform a
Ampil then resumed hysterectomy;
operating on Natividad. He
was about to finish the (2) examining the work of Dr. Fuentes and
procedure when the attending finding it in order;
nurses informed him that two
pieces of gauze were missing. (3) granting Dr. Fuentes’ permission to leave;
and,
A “diligent search” was
conducted, but the misplaced (4) ordering the closure of the incision. It was
gauzes were not found. Dr. this act of ordering the closure of the incision
Ampil then directed that the notwithstanding that two pieces of gauze
incision be closed. During remained unaccounted for, that caused injury to
Legal Medicine (Atty. J. Montemayor, Jr.)
Submitted by: DENNIE VIEVE D. IDEA, ROBERT V. BULAYUNGAN, JR. and ROMAN AMADEO CAPUCHINO
New Era University College of Law

this entire period, Dr. Fuentes Natividad’s body.

was no longer in the operating
room and had, in fact, left the Clearly, the control and management of the thing
hospital. which caused the injury was in the hands of Dr.
Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes.

In this jurisdiction, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule

RES IPSA LOQUITOR/RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
Ramos vs. Court of Erlinda Ramos underwent a
Appeals surgical procedure to remove respondents were negligent
stone from her gall bladder
(cholecystectomy). They
hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon,
to conduct the surgery at the
De Los Santos Medical
Center (DLSMC). Hosaka
assured them that he would
find a good anesthesiologist.
But the operation did not go
as planned, Dr. Hosaka
arrived 3 hours late for the
operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the
of substantive law, hence, does not per se create
or constitute an independent or separate ground
of liability, being a mere evidentiary rule. In
other words, mere invocation and application of
the doctrine does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of negligence. Here, the
negligence was proven to have been committed
by Dr. Ampil and not by Dr. Fuentes.
Whether or not the private RES IPSA LOQUITOR DEFINED
and thereby caused the A procedural or evidentiary rule which means
comatose condition of “the thing or the transaction speaks for
Ramos? itself.” It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of
the occurrence of an injury, taken with the
surrounding circumstances, may permit an
inference or raise a presumption of negligence,
or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and
present a question of fact for defendant to meet
with an explanation, where ordinarily in a
medical malpractice case, the complaining party
must present expert testimony to prove that the
attending physician was negligent.
Legal Medicine (Atty. J. Montemayor, Jr.)
Submitted by: DENNIE VIEVE D. IDEA, ROBERT V. BULAYUNGAN, JR. and ROMAN AMADEO CAPUCHINO
New Era University College of Law
anesthesiologist “botched”
the administration of the
anesthesia causing Erlinda to
go into a coma and suffer
brain damage. The botched
operation was witnessed by
Herminda Cruz, sister in law
of Erlinda and Dean of
College of Nursing of Capitol
Medical Center.
The family of Ramos
(petitioners) sued the hospital,
the surgeon and the
anesthesiologist for damages.
The petitioners showed expert
testimony showing that
Erlinda's condition was
caused by the anesthesiologist
in not exercising reasonable
care in “intubating” Erlinda.
Eyewitnesses heard the
anesthesiologist saying “Ang
hirap ma-intubate nito, mali
yata ang pagkakapasok. O
lumalaki ang tiyan.”
Diagnostic tests prior to
surgery showed that Erlinda
was robust and fit to undergo
surgery.
This doctrine finds application in this case. On
the day of the operation, Erlinda Ramos already
surrendered her person to the private respondents
who had complete and exclusive control over
her. Apart from the gallstone problem, she was
neurologically sound and fit. Then, after the
procedure, she was comatose and brain
damaged—res ipsa loquitur!—the thing speaks
for itself!
Negligence – Private respondents were not able
to disprove the presumption of negligence on
their part in the care of Erlinda and their
negligence was the proximate cause of her
condition. One need not be an anesthesiologist in
order to tell whether or not the intubation was a
success. [res ipsa loquitur applies here]. The
Supreme Court also found that the
anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for the first
time on the day of the operation which indicates
unfamiliarity with the patient and which is an act
of negligence and irresponsibility.
The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also
negligent. He failed to exercise the proper
authority as the “captain of the ship” in
determining if the anesthesiologist observed the
proper protocols. Also, because he was late, he
did not have time to confer with the
Legal Medicine (Atty. J. Montemayor, Jr.)
Submitted by: DENNIE VIEVE D. IDEA, ROBERT V. BULAYUNGAN, JR. and ROMAN AMADEO CAPUCHINO
New Era University College of Law
The RTC held that the
anesthesiologist ommitted to
exercise due care in
intubating the patient, the
surgeon was remiss in his
obligation to provide a “good
anesthesiologist” and for
arriving 3 hours late and the
hospital is liable for the
negligence of the doctors and
for not cancelling the
operation after the surgeon
failed to arrive on time. The
surgeon, anesthesiologist and
the DLSMC were all held
jointly and severally liable for
damages to petitioners. The
CA reversed the decision of
the Trial Court.
Dr. Huang vs. Phil. This case involve petitioner
Hoteliers, Inc. who was invited by her friend
to Dusit Hotel. She and her
friend decided to swim in the
Hotel’s pool where the
accident happened.
They exceeded on staying in
the pool area. The 2 went to
the shower room adjacent to
Whether or not Respondent
Hotel is liable for damages
due to injuries incurred by
petitioner?
anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia
delivery. (Sir discussed this)
The hospital failed to adduce evidence showing
that it exercised the diligence of a good father of
the family in hiring and supervision of its doctors
(Art. 2180). The hospital was negligent since
they are the one in control of the hiring and
firing of their “consultants”. While these
consultants are not employees, hospitals still
exert significant controls on the selection and
termination of doctors who work there which is
one of the hallmarks of an employer-employee
relationship. Thus, the hospital was allocated a
share in the liability.
NO. Initially, Huang sued respondents mainly on
account of their negligence but not on any breach
of contract. Presently, she claims that her cause
of action can be based both on quasi-delict and
breach of contract. A perusal of the complaint
evidently shows that her cause of action was
based solely on quasi-delict (negligence). It is
evident from the complaint and from her open
court testimony that the reliance was on the
alleged tortious acts committed against her by
Legal Medicine (Atty. J. Montemayor, Jr.)
Submitted by: DENNIE VIEVE D. IDEA, ROBERT V. BULAYUNGAN, JR. and ROMAN AMADEO CAPUCHINO
New Era University College of Law
the swimming pool to take a
shower and dress up. When
they came out of the
bathroom, the entire
swimming pool area was
already pitch black and there
were the only ones there. The
doors were also locked. After
some time, Huang saw a
phone behind the lifeguard‘s
counter. As she went inside,
the wooden countertop fell on
her head and knocked her
down almost unconscious.
respondents, through their management and
staff. In quasi-delict, there is no presumption of
negligence and it is incumbent upon the injured
party to prove the negligence of the defendant,
otherwise, the former‘s complaint will be
dismissed.
As Huang‘s cause of action is based on quasi-
delict, it is incumbent upon her to prove the
presence of the following requisites before
respondents PHI and Dusit can be held liable, to
wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b)
fault or negligence of the defendant, or some
other person for whose acts he must respond; and
(c) the connection of cause and effect between
the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by the plaintiff.
Second element is Absent.
In this case, Huang utterly failed to prove the
alleged negligence of respondents. Other than
her self-serving testimony that all the lights in
the hotel‘s swimming pool area were shut off
and the door was locked, which allegedly
prompted her to find a way out and in doing so a
folding wooden counter top fell on her head
causing her injury, no other evidence was
presented to substantiate the same. Even her own
companion during the night of the accident
Legal Medicine (Atty. J. Montemayor, Jr.)
Submitted by: DENNIE VIEVE D. IDEA, ROBERT V. BULAYUNGAN, JR. and ROMAN AMADEO CAPUCHINO
New Era University College of Law

inside the hotel‘s swimming pool area was never

presented to corroborate her allegations.

Res Ipsa Loquitur & Respondeat Superior:

With regard to Huang‘s contention that the

principles of res ipsa loquitur and respondeat
superior are applicable in this case, this Court
holds otherwise.

Res ipsa loquitur - The doctrine finds no

application if there is direct proof of absence or
presence of negligence. In the case at bench,
even granting that respondents‘ staff negligently
turned off the lights and locked the door, the
folding wooden counter top would still not fall
on Huang‘s head had she not lifted the same.
Records showed that she lifted the said folding
wooden counter top that eventually fell and hit
her head.

Doctrine of respondeat superior – also finds no

application in the absence of any showing that
the employees of respondents were negligent.
Since in this case, the trial court and the CA
found no negligence on the part of the employees
of respondents, thus, the latter cannot also be
held liable for negligence.

Third element: On the issue on whether Huang‘s

Legal Medicine (Atty. J. Montemayor, Jr.)
Submitted by: DENNIE VIEVE D. IDEA, ROBERT V. BULAYUNGAN, JR. and ROMAN AMADEO CAPUCHINO
New Era University College of Law

debilitating and permanent injuries were the

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Anonuevo vs. Court of Private respondent Whether or not private
Appeals, Jerome Villagracia was travelling respondent Villagracia is
Villagracia along Boni Avenue on his guilty of contributory
bicycle, while petitioner negligence?
Anonuevo, driving his
Lancer, was traversing the
opposite lane when the
collision occurred. The car
was owned by P&G Inc.,
employer of petitioner’s
brother. Villagracia sustained
injuries due to the collision.
Villagracia instituted an
action for damages against
P&G and Anonuevo. Both the
RTC and CA ruled in favor of
Respondent.
The present petition was
based on Petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration with the
following arguments:
result of the accident she suffered at the hotel‘s
swimming pool area, the Court holds that there is
no cogent reason to depart from the lower courts‘
findings.
NO. To prove contributory negligence, it is still
necessary to establish a causal link, although not
proximate, between the negligence of the party
and the succeeding injury.
Petitioner claims that Respondent violated traffic
regulations when he failed to register his bicycle
or install safety gadgets thereon hence, Article
2185 should be applied by analogy. However,
the Court held that no, there is a historical reason
why there is segregation between motorized and
non-motorized vehicle, since motor vehicle are
more capable of inflicting greater injury.
A driver of an automobile, under such
circumstances, is required to use a greater degree
of care than drivers of animals, for the reason
that the machine is capable of greater
destruction, and furthermore, it is absolutely
under the power and control of the driver;
whereas, a horse or other animal can and does to
some extent aid in averting an accident.
NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF
Legal Medicine (Atty. J. Montemayor, Jr.)
Submitted by: DENNIE VIEVE D. IDEA, ROBERT V. BULAYUNGAN, JR. and ROMAN AMADEO CAPUCHINO
New Era University College of Law
1. Article 2185 of the Civil
Code should apply by
analogy to non-motorized
vehicle;
2. Villagracia’s own fault and
negligence serves to absolve
him from any liability for
damages
RESPONDENT:
Even if the legal presumption under Article 2185
should not apply to Villagracia, this should not
preclude any possible finding of negligence on
his part. While the legal argument as formulated
by Añonuevo is erroneous, his core contention
that Villagracia was negligent for failure to
comply with traffic regulations warrants serious
consideration, especially since the imputed
negligent acts were admitted by Villagracia
himself.
Negligence
The Civil Code characterizes negligence as the
omission of that diligence which is required by
the nature of the obligation and corresponds with
the circumstances of the persons, of the time and
of the place.
The existence of negligence in a given case is
not determined by the personal judgment of the
actor in a given situation, but rather, it is the law
which determines what would be reckless or
negligent. Añonuevo asserts that Villagracia was
negligent as the latter had transgressed traffic
regulations. However, Añonuevo was speeding
as hemade the left turn, and by his own
admission, he had seen Villagracia at a good
Legal Medicine (Atty. J. Montemayor, Jr.)
Submitted by: DENNIE VIEVE D. IDEA, ROBERT V. BULAYUNGAN, JR. and ROMAN AMADEO CAPUCHINO
New Era University College of Law

distance of ten (10) meters. Had he been

decelerating, as he should, as he made the turn,
Aonuevo would have had ample opportunity to
avoid hitting Villagracia, such negligent act was
the proximate cause of the accident.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

To hold a person as having contributed to his

injuries, it must be shown that he performed an
act that brought about his injuries in disregard of
warnings or signs of an impending danger to
health and body. To prove contributory
negligence, it is still necessary to establish a
causal link, although not proximate, between the
negligence of the party and the succeeding
injury. In a legal sense, negligence is
contributory only when it contributes
proximately to the injury, and not simply a
condition for its occurrence.

As between Añonuevo and Villagracia, the lower

courts adjudged Añonuevo assolely responsible
for the accident. The petition does not
demonstrate why this finding should be reversed.
It is hard to imagine that the same result would
not have occurred even if Villagracia’s bicycle
had been equipped with safety equipment.
Respondent Noe was going Whether or not respondents’ No, but there was contributory negligence.
home to Dumaguete from negligence hold them liable
Legal Medicine (Atty. J. Montemayor, Jr.)
Submitted by: DENNIE VIEVE D. IDEA, ROBERT V. BULAYUNGAN, JR. and ROMAN AMADEO CAPUCHINO
New Era University College of Law
Cebu via Bato and Tampi. At for the accident?
Tampi, he boarded a Ford
Fiera jeepney driven by
respondent Quinquillera and
owned by Bandoquillo. He
was seated on the extension
seat placed at the center of the
Fiera.
Then, as an old woman
wanted to ride, he offered his
seat, and he just hung on the
left rear of the vehicle. Then,
on its journey, the Fiera
began to slow down and
stepped to pick up passengers
when a Isuzu cargo truck hit
the rear end portion of the
Feira which smashed
respondent where his lower
left was amputated.
Respondent filed with the
RTC compliant for damages
arising from quasi-delict
alleging that the truck driver’s
reckless imprudence was the
proximate cause of the
incident.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
We agree with petitioner that respondent Noe’s
act of standing on the rear carrier of the Fiera
exposing himself to bodily injury is in itself
negligence on his part. We find that the trial
court and the CA erred when they failed to
consider that respondent Noe was also guilty of
contributory negligence.
“to hold a person as having contributed to his
injuries, it must be shown that he performed an
act that brought about injuries in disregard of
warning or signs of an impending danger to
health and body”.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
DEFINED
Conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has
suffered, which falls below the standard to which
he is required to conform for his own protection.
Still the proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of the truck driver for driving it with
faulty brakes and at a high speed.
Legal Medicine (Atty. J. Montemayor, Jr.)
Submitted by: DENNIE VIEVE D. IDEA, ROBERT V. BULAYUNGAN, JR. and ROMAN AMADEO CAPUCHINO
New Era University College of Law

NOEL CASUMPANG v. The case is about the death of Whether or not SJDH is Yes, but not under Article 2180 of the Civil
NELSON CORTEJO Edmer Cortejo, 11-year old vicariously liable with the Code, but on the basis of the doctrine of apparent
son of Respondent, who died petitioners? authority or agency by estoppel.
died of Dengue Hemorraghic
Fever Stage IV. First the Court discussed the existence of
Employer-Employee Relationship.
Respondent alleged that the
death of his son was caused Between SJDH and the Petitioning Doctors
by the negligence of the In determining whether an employer-employee
physicians/doctors of San relationship exists between the parties, the
Juan de Dios Hospital (SJDH) following elements must be present: (1) selection
for diagnosing his son’s and engagement of services; (2) payment of
symptoms as only wages; (3) the power to hire and fire; and (4) the
“bronchopneumonia” despite power to control not only the end to be achieved,
the conditions respondent has but the means to be used in reaching such an
stated with the doctors. end.

Aside from the petitioners, Control, which is the most crucial among the
Respondent included SJDH as elements, is not present in this case.
one of its defendant in the
action for damages filed by Based on the records, no evidence exists
Respondent wherein both the showing that SJDH exercised any degree of
RTC and the CA ruled in control over the means, methods of procedure
favour of the latter. and manner by which the petitioning doctors
conducted and performed their medical
profession. SJDH did not control their diagnosis
and treatment. Likewise, no evidence was
presented to show that SJDH monitored,
supervised, or directed the petitioning doctors in
the treatment and management of Edmer’s case.
Legal Medicine (Atty. J. Montemayor, Jr.)
Submitted by: DENNIE VIEVE D. IDEA, ROBERT V. BULAYUNGAN, JR. and ROMAN AMADEO CAPUCHINO
New Era University College of Law

In these lights, the petitioning doctors were not

employees of SJDH, but were mere independent
contractors.

SJDH is Solidarily Liable Based

on The Principle of Agency or Doctrine
of Apparent Authority

Despite the absence of employer-employee

relationship between SJDH and the petitioning
doctors, SJDH is not free from liability.

As a rule, hospitals are not liable for the

negligence of its independent contractors.
However, it may be found liable if the physician
or independent contractor acts as an ostensible
agent of the hospital. This exception is also
known as the "doctrine of apparent authority."