What is the axiomatic method?

Author(s): Jaakko Hintikka

Source: Synthese, Vol. 183, No. 1, THE CLASSICAL MODEL OF SCIENCE II: THE AXIOMATIC
METHOD, THE ORDER OF CONCEPTS AND THE HIERARCHY OF SCIENCES (November 2011),
pp. 69-85
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41477650
Accessed: 04-09-2019 20:40 UTC

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Synthese (2011) 183:69-85
DOI 10.1007/sl 1229-009-9668-8

What is the axiomatic method?

Jaakko Hintikka

Received: 4 February 2008 / Accepted: 25 March 2009 / Published online: 9 October 2009
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Abstract The modern notion of the axiomatic method developed as a part of the
conceptualization of mathematics starting in the nineteenth century. The basic idea
of the method is the capture of a class of structures as the models of an axiomatic
system. The mathematical study of such classes of structures is not exhausted by the
derivation of theorems from the axioms but includes normally the metatheory of the
axiom system. This conception of axiomatization satisfies the crucial requirement
that the derivation of theorems from axioms does not produce new information in the
usual sense of the term called depth information. It can produce new information in
a different sense of information called surface information. It is argued in this paper
that the derivation should be based on a model-theoretical relation of logical conse-
quence rather than derivability by means of mechanical (recursive) rules. Likewise
completeness must be understood by reference to a model-theoretical consequence
relation. A correctly understood notion of axiomatization does not apply to purely
logical theories. In the latter the only relevant kind of axiomatization amounts to
recursive enumeration of logical truths. First-order "axiomatic" set theories are not
genuine axiomatizations. The main reason is that their models are structures of partic-
ulars, not of sets. Axiomatization cannot usually be motivated epistemologically, but
it is related to the idea of explanation.

Keywords Axiomatic method • Information • Logical consequence • Completeness •

Set theory

J. Hintikka (E3)
Department of Philosophy, Boston University,
745 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston, MA, USA
e-mail: hintikka@bu.edu

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 70 Synthese (201 1) 183:69-85

1 Axiomatic method and the c

One of the most important ingr

is the axiomatic method. This m
tives. Philosophers' and other th
formed largely in terms of its
instructive perspectives on it is of
ematics in the past two centuries
speaking, merely the study of tw
bers of different kinds, together
emphasis began to shift to what
Laugwitz 1996). The job descript
ization and study of different kin
of those structures. At first these structures were found within mathematics itself.
Early examples include the theory of surfaces by Gauss and Riemann, who were
able to formulate analytic definitions of such intuitively given geometrical notions
as curvature. Another, more abstract example is Galois theory, which involved the
abstract structural notion of group. The first explicit formulation of a research project
in this direction was Riemann 's proposal for the theory of manifolds. Manifolds were
as it were raw material on which different forms can be imposed. Later figures in
this development of the generalizing and structuralizing conception of mathematics
are dominantly David Hilbert and the Bourbaki group. The most abstract structures
studied in conceptual mathematics are undoubtedly sets. The genesis of set theory
is an integral part of the conceptualization of mathematics. In our present-day per-
spective, sets might not seem to have any structure at all. However, originally the
notion of a set did not exclude its possessing an internal organization. Indeed, at an
early stage of the development of set theory sets could be referred to in German as
Mannigfaltigkeiten , in other words as manifolds, without any sharp distinction from
Riemann's sense.
The structuralist orientation of modern mathematics naturally leads to the use of
axiomatization. To understand a kind of structure, for instance the structure of a group,
is to have an overview over all its instantiations. In an axiomatic system, this is accom-
plished by capturing all those structures as the models of the system. It is not an accident
that both Hilbert and Bourbaki relied on essentially the axiomatic method (cf. Hilbert
1918; Bourbaki 1 950). For this method is the natural one for a structuralist. The axioms
determine a class of structures as models of the axiom system. By deriving theorems
from the axioms a mathematician can study those structures.
This orientation toward structures means that the focus of an axiomatic system -
what the axioms axiomatize - are structures themselves, not propositions about them.
This induces a kind of model-theoretical preference into modern axiomatization
efforts. The study of an axiom system uses typically model-theoretical methods, such
as the construction of models that satisfy certain axioms but not others. (Think e.g.
of Padoa's method in the logical theory of definition.) This orientation is frequently
overlooked. For instance Hilbert is labeled by philosophers, almost as a reflex action,
as a formalist even though his interest and his work in axiomatization are in reality
strongly indicative of a model-theoretical way of thinking.

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Synthese (20 11)1 83 :69-85 7 1

A structure to be studied can be s

or as in group theory, which can b
all different kinds. But this origin o
treatment. For instance, the structu
theory. (I doubt that people have i
perhaps as a part of our geometric
Most importantly, the structures in
Thus the axiomatic method is app
ics. These applications to science c
recognized as being important. For
axiomatize actual scientific theories
of Ulrich Majer, especially Majer (
What a scientific theory does is to
the structures compatible with th
theories that we can most clearly
theory, which now are physical sys
oms governing them. What is cruci
axiomatized theory is to capture all
of the axioms. Once a complete ax
lished, it literally becomes possible
subject matter of that science in one
pencil and paper. Of course, in ou
by a computer. But even so, using
accelerator. Nuts-and-bolts experim
is in this way that e.g. the tradit
experimental mechanics) becomes
ble to predict what experience can
physicists to predict the existence
tion enabled physicists to realize t
variables simultaneously with com
One of the most striking examp
trates the same point. During Wor
the feasibility of an atom bomb wa
physicists never settled the questi
what was already known, so much
couple of days while interned in En
performing any experiments or ob
This then is one main use of axiom
thing we know of certain physical
The conceptualization of mathem
greater strictness in mathematica
philosophers' discussions received
ceptualization is in reality the mor
emphasis on logical strictness as a
dealing with abstract concepts ove
awareness of the laws of logic, in o

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 72 Synthese (2011) 183:69-85

instance, the study of Fourier ser

turned out to involve a host of
axiom of choice, which should b
This description of how an axi
readers. They think of an axioma
some one structure or some one
special case of the more general d
of structures targeted by the ax
axiom and each subset of the axioms delineates a class of structures as its models until
the whole set of axioms boils that class down to a single structure. In this sense, the
mechanism of axiomatization is the same no matter whether the axiomatist aims at a
class of structures or at a unique one.
Another respect in which the model-theoretic characterization of axiomatization
may look unfamiliar is that axiomatization is taken to mean formulating a system of
basic truths from which all the other truths of some body of knowledge can be derived
purely logically. There need not be anything wrong about this account of axiomatiza-
tion but it is not the whole story. The theorems so derived are the truths that hold in
all the models of the axiom systems in question. But there is a great deal more that
can be said of the models of an axiom system than merely the set of truths holding in
all of them. Hence the task of deriving theorems from the axioms of a system is only
a small part of the study of the structure that its models exemplify. This is the reason
why the study of an axiom system includes in mathematical practice its metatheory.

2 Axiomatization as a metatheoretical method

This fact is reflective in yet another aspect of the axiomatic method that is again con-
nected with the same overall development of mathematics. When a certain type of
structure is studied mathematically, this study is not restricted to what can be found
out about all such structures or about some subclass of them. A perhaps even more
important task in practice is to reach an overview over all such structures. The role
of an axiom system in conceptually oriented mathematics is not to serve as a set of
premises for deducing consequences, even though many philosophers seem to think
so. No, an axiom system is also calculated to serve also as an object for a metatheoret-
ical study. For instance, very little of the actual development of group theory consists
in deriving consequences from the axioms of group theory. Most of what is actually
called group theory consists of a metatheoretical study dealing with such questions as
the taxonomy of different kinds of groups, representation theorems, etc. Already in
Greek mathematics the idea was that relatively few conclusions are derived from the
axioms and postulates alone. Typical theorems also involve definitions of particular
geometrical notions.
For the purpose of reaching such a metatheoretical overview, it is crucial to grasp
the logical structure of the theory in question, in the sense of seeing what the differ-
ent independent assumptions of the theory are, of seeing which theorems depend on
which of these basic assumptions and so on. For this purpose, the axiomatic method
is eminently appropriate. Richer structures can be captured by adding further axioms.

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Synthese (2011) 183:69-85 73

The independence of different a

mutually independent assumpt
science or more generally about
Thus it is important to realize
typically serve the same overall
exploration of the models of an
of a given axiom can have an in
instance in Hilberťs classical (18
of the motivation of his work.
two potential axioms can promp
the special theory of relativity
classical mechanics and Maxwell
direction, see Trisch 2005).
Thus an axiom system requires
that is being used in the axiomat
choice of this
a con logic can be
dence-friendly) logic is used in
first-order logic. Then it turns
elementary arithmetic itself (s
Hintikka 1996).
Because of the metatheoretic
a logic for the metatheory for
no sharp distinction is made be
logic can serve both purposes.
metatheoretic component of mo
an axiom system should be capab
less appear that this desideratum
model-theoretical concept is tha
truth for a first-order language
sight suggest that first-order lo
for axiomatization. This is a m
that Tarski's result is due to th
is no hope of even construing a
as its own metalogic. Hence in
considerable confusion as to wh
genesis of IF logic has changed t
such logic can admit the formul
Be this as it may, the power of
interesting way of comparing d

3 What is required of axioma

In order to perform all these t

satisfy? In
formulating an answ
of the system takes place by de

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 74 Synthese (2011) 183:69-85

system has to be considered in c

to nontrivial requirements. Simi
the theory uses have to be specif
Fairly obviously, the following

(1) The models of the axiomatic

structures.

(2) All theorems are logical consequences of the axioms.

(3) The derivation of theorems from axioms must not introduce any new informat
into the conclusion.
(4) The logic used must be complete.

These requirements probably strike you as unproblematic, not to say as innocuous. In

reality they have much more bite than might at first seem to be the case. Much of the
rest of this essay is a commentary on these requirements.
The requirement (1) should be self-explanatory. The very purpose of the axiomatic
method is to study some class of structures by constructing an axiom system whose
models they are. Without the requirement (2) an axiom system could not help as to
study the network of dependence relations between the different truths and assump-
tions of a given theory.
The requirement (3) is connected with another perspective on the axiomatic method
that is historically important. This perspective is most conspicuous in the case of phys-
ical theories. There it is sometimes quite unclear what precisely is or is not assumed
or whether the logical and mathematical techniques allow the smuggling of new infor-
mation into an argument. This question was a genuine scientific one most prominently
perhaps in the case of Boltzmann's thermodynamics. There it was a live question
among other things whether the mathematical tools Boltzmann used tacitly introduced
factual assumptions into physical reality.
Hilbert already realized, however tacitly, the fundamental fact that the requirement
(3) is satisfied if the derivation of theorems from axioms uses only logical consequence
relations, in the model-theoretical sense of logical consequence (Hilbert 1922).
This problem of actually summarizing all the information actually used in a the-
ory in an axiom system was an important facet of Hilberťs motivation. He saw it as
a mathematical (conceptual) problem, not a scientific one. Indeed Problem 6 in his
famous list of open mathematical problems was the injunction: Axiomatize physical
theories. In his motivation of the sixth problem, Hilbert mentions in so many words
Boltzmann's thermodynamics (see Hilbert 1900).
The metamathematical dimension of axiomatization shows an important presuppo-
sition of its success. An axiom system must be accompanied by a metatheory capable
of studying its models, well, model-theoretically. In this sense, mathematical axiom
systems are not self-sufficient, unless their model-theory can be formulated as an
aspect of the theory itself. This requirement can be thought of as a further condi-
tion (5) on successful axiomatization. This requirement in turn imposes conditions on
the logic that is being used as the basis of an axiom system. For instance, ordinary
first-order logic cannot provide a metatheory for itself or usually for any substantial
theory formulated by its means. In contrast, an independence-friendly language allows

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Synthese (2011) 183:69-85 75

the definition of some of the ba

concept of truth (see Hintikka

4 What kind of completeness?

As to the requirement (4), the

fact, all the requirements form
completeness requirements. It m
to satisfy in some of the most in
ness theorem. It might at first loo
axiomatic method and perhaps
as tools for human thinking. Th
pects of satisfying both the req
is nevertheless due to a widespr
is requirement (2). What is mea
It is often, perhaps nearly unive
relations should be possible to c
This requirement has an old mo
which presupposes that all the
mally. However, "formal" does
Relations of model-theoretical (s
they depend only on the logical f
this sense of "formal" as applie
enumerability of the consequen
premises is simply a mistake. A m
lies in the desire of capturing
terms. But if this requirement
incomplete.
If the model-theoretical charac
is accepted, then the sense of lo
usually known as "logical conseq
theoretical (semantical) consequ
and В if and only if all the mod
even if not all such consequences
rules.

It is also seen that if conseque

consequences В of a proposition
of the word that would not be c
By reviewing the advantages of
be seen that most of them are
in the model-theoretical (seman
of A iff all the models of A are
relation is not required. Some o
able only if the intended logical
underlying reason is obvious. A

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 76 Synthese (201 1) 183:69-85

is precisely relations between m

of logical consequence is based o
knowledge of a class of models (s
can study this class by means of
information about the specific su
a physical theory we do not need
If the notion of logical conseque
does not restrict the power of th
easily formulate model-theoretica
violating Gödel's first incomplet
relative to the assumption that th
tically complete axiomatizations o
terms of second-order logic or e
The advantages of the axiomatic
looked fact (noted above) that th
a sense as formal as any proof-th
only on the logical form of the p
occurring in the axioms. In this i
able" or "recursive" when we are
One can in fact turn the tables
contrary show that in axiomatic
be taken in a model-theoretical r
show that proof-theoretical cons
theoretical consequences of the a
theorems.
From the vantage point of the s
restriction to mechanizable cons
tively harmful. The very idea wa
axiomatic system in the form o
somehow restricted, this purpose
incomplete theory some of thos
axioms.
It is sometimes said that the use of a notion of logical consequence that cannot be
captured by explicit programmable rules of inference forces us to resort to irrational
sources of truths such as some kind of mathematical intuition. They are needed to
supplement logical deduction. Godei (1983) in fact claimed that there is a partial epis-
temologica! parity between sense-perception in science and intuition in mathematics.
The non-mechanizability of relations of logical consequence might therefore seem
to expose us to a danger of arbitrariness and perhaps even irrationality. This danger
seems to have been actualized in thinkers like Godei who actually propose that we
should rely on intuition.
In reality, this perceived danger is largely an illusion. Contrary to Gödel's unfor-
tunate comparison of intuition with sense-perception, new logical principles are not
dragged aus der Tiefe unseres Bewusstseins , by contemplating one's mathematical
soul (or is it a navel?) but by active thought-experiments by envisaging different kinds
of structures and by seeing how they can be manipulated in imagination. The relations

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 Synthese (2011) 183:69-85 77

that can be so revealed are model- t

thought-experiments are examples
mathematical intuition does not co
but to experimentation.
In sum, Gödel's first incompleten
itations of the axiomatic method o
are limitations of computers. It sh
completed when he or she has ma
rest of his or her work cannot be
derivation of theorems from axiom
ence of applied mathematicians. I
well known, and yet there is no
for particular problems. Many-bo
theory offer examples of such a s
that cannot be handled by means
Richards (1989).

5 Axiomatization and surface information

Here we seem to have a paradox, maybe even a contradiction, in our hands. The very
purpose of the axiomatic method was said to be the study of the models of the theory
by deriving theorems purely logically from the axioms. But it is now suggested that
purely logical inferences cannot yield new information. Something appears to be quite
wrong here.
This conundrum is in fact only one of the symptoms of the general confusion about
the role of logic and logical inferences. This apparent paradox is connected with var-
ious misinterpretations. For one thing, Hilberťs alleged formalism amounts to little
more than an emphasis on the uninformativeness of the derivation of theorems from
the axioms. This uninformativeness is but the other side of the coin of the indepen-
dence of subject matter of all derivations of theorems from axioms, in other words,
of the requirement that all the relevant information is codified in the axioms. This
subject matter independence is what is highlighted by Hilberťs often misunderstood
quip about tables, chairs and beermugs. This independence should not have been news
to anyone, let alone a shock. It is a consequence of the necessary truth-preservation
of logical inference. But in the context of an axiomatic theorizing in mathematics it
suggested that an axiomatic system cannot produce new information about its osten-
sive subject matter. The only new things that are produced in axiomatic theorizing
are uninformative proofs. Accordingly, Hilbert was interpreted as a formalist in his
axiomatic philosophy of mathematics.
An answer lies in a closer analysis of the very notions of information and inference.
This answer has been given in my earlier work (see Hintikka 2007a and the literature
referred to there). Very briefly explained, what a proposition gives us is a disjunc-
tion of a number of mutually exclusive possibilities concerning the world. Those
disjuncts specify different alternative possibilities concerning the world admitted by
the proposition in question. The prima facie information, called surface information,

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 78 Synthese (2011) 183:69-85

is (ceteris paribus) the greater the

possibilities concerning the real
It turns out, however, that som
world are only seemingly realiz
its form. If we assume that all
juncts) are eliminated, we can us
measure a kind of information c
we can in the same way charact
called surface information. (In b
be weighted in some suitable way
information that I have used so
"implicit information". They ar
In other words, by means of p
some of those prima facie altern
possible. For instance, such an al
who on a closer examination wil
natives that are not so eliminable
This kind of information seems
the proposition. Yet the elimina
information in a most down-to-
be prepared for the eventuality
an encounter of two individual
surface information is indeed in
sense than depth information.
As a simple illustration we can t
to conceptually. What Marconi
move a transmitter and a receiver
knew about their interaction wi
tions. But what that meant in a
out a solution of the equations w
Or else a scientist could find ou
gained nontrivial surface inform
Thus the usefulness of the axio
a systematic means of extractin

6 Axiomatization and the notio

The distinction between depth in

another misconception that ma
the axiomatic method. This mis
analytic truth (and perhaps by
ble. It would be tempting but
another example of his prejudic
be unfair to blame Quine mere
depth information, even though

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 Synthese (2011) 183:69-85 79

In the last analysis, Quine's positi

surface information can serve to
as depth information.
In Quine's perspective, this mea
mation from each other behavio
itdoes not follow that the two c
can apparently be distinguished
stretches of behavior than Quin
recognition of a true element in
it in the least. There is no real
the derivation of theorems from
It is in any case important to r
truth threatens to make nonsen
(This is because it means makin

7 Axiomatîzing logic

From what has been found, it f

enterprise if not an outright du
theory requires an explicit logic
logic? The answer is not obviou
applying logic to logic. However
it is generally held that for mo
stronger logic. This is what Tarsk
one seems to be driven outside
theorizing.
Alternatively, one is reduced to the mere syntax of logic, that is, to considering any
recursive enumeration of logical truths as an axiomatization of logic. However, this
idea is predicated on the view rejected in Sect. 4. As far as the meaning of axiomatiza-
tion in general is concerned, this improper sense is the only viable one in which one
can speak of the axiomatization of logic. It seems that some thinkers have been led
by this fact to think that recursive enumerability of theorems is an essential feature of
axiomatization at large.
One of the purposes of this paper is to expose the inadequacy of the current 'syn-
drome' of ideas concerning the axiomatization of logic. On the negative side, it will
be shown in the next section that set theory is not in its present form a viable medium
of axiomatization in logic or anywhere else. Indeed, the current incarnation of set
theory as a first-order axiomatic theory is a hopeless mare's nest of problems. On the
positive side independence-friendly (IF) logic provides us with languages whose me-
tatheory can at least partly be formulated in the same language (see Hintikka 1996).
In other words, we can by means of such logic apply logic to study logic, perhaps
even to axiomatize it in some other sense. How far these newly gained possibili-
ties reach remains largely to be investigated. The main result already reached is of
course the possibility of formulating a truth predicate for a suitable IF language in
itself.

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 80 Synthese (201 1) 183:69-85

It is nevertheless important to
ness that is also relevant to the
logic is a recursive enumeration
enumerates only) logical all (and
leadingly called semantical com
of a nonlogical axiom system,
if its logic is complete in the se
there might be logical conseque
by means of the logic used in it
of completeness is the model-th

8 Axiomatizing set theory

If we for a moment return to t

satisfactory axiom systems, they
impression is not accurate, howe
type of an axiom system flunks
set theory. The basic source of
this, take any first-order axioma
should be structures of sets. But,
not consist of sets. They are str
relation cannot without further
most important instance, in man
elements which do not constitute
(Vx)(x e e X is in a). Admittedl
characterized, such as the cumu
structures tell about the nature o
(see here Hintikka 2004a).
Moreover, there turn out to b
some of whose models can be i
rems must therefore be conside
forthcoming).
Thus the models of AX do not in any reasonable sense capture the intended set-
theoretical structures. But even if they did, there would be further trouble. Condition
(4) would be violated. Frege might have believed that the general rules for quantifiers
codified in first-order logic suffice also for all reasoning about higher-order entities
like sets. We know that they do not. Hence what a first-order set theorist must resort
to doing is to introduce them as axioms, such as the so-called axiom of choice. This
is a strange procedure. What a resulting axiom system captures through its models is
a mélange of set-theoretical and logical truths.
The received first-order axiom system does not even capture the full force of the
"intuitions" that back up the axiom of choice, either. A fully general form of the axiom
of choice would have to imply the existence of a full array of Skolem functions for
each true sentence. But if this assumption is added to the usual axioms, a contradiction
results.

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Synthese (2011) 183:69-85 81

In fact, the unrestricted axiom of c

reasoning (see Hintikka forthcomin
the semantical job description of q
independence of variables by the f
fiers to which they are bound. Thi
axiomatist of set theory. The good n
of choice by switching over to the
that unless the set theorist also doe
contradiction.
If we look at the enterprise of axio
we find an ironical story (see her
1930). Zermelo did not begin to axi
of his theoretical heart. His main p
practice, this largely meant to just
history, his axiomatization led to all
story. Worse still: Zermelo's specif
axiom of choice turns out to be in
Furthermore, Zermelo's project is
intuitions that presumably are cod
choice in the usual axiom system for
In particular, they justify all infere
to the existence of a full array of
guarantee the existence of all the "w
the proposition in question. Howeve
axiomatization of set theory all th
each set-theoretical proposition as
its Skolem functions as its conseq
system would be inconsistent in v
formulate a truth predicate in it.)
Zermelo's project can thus been sh
To add incompleteness to injury, t
also turn out to be too weak in the
order theory AX is not strong eno
one cannot define truth in a mode
the widespread but mistaken idea o
theory. In its incarnation as AX set t
This fact has important methodolo
be advisable to study specific set-t
by means other than first-order axi
Thus the analysis of the axiomati
first-order axiomatizations of set th
is a misuse of the axiomatic method.

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 82 Synthese (201 1) 183:69-85

9 Is axiomatization epistemolo

But are there perhaps other purp

ally, axiomatization is sometimes
of a theory, perhaps by making
consideredskeptically. The logica
duce any new information and h
(A theorem's credibility might o
that it is independent of some of
must be due to the axioms. Where
axioms are calculated to capture c
introduced by experience.
No matter how an axiom system
cal study of a certain class of st
mathematical point of view all
cle to its serving this function w
only epistemological justification
model-theoretical consistency. Su
tional work.

Likewise, an axiom system calculated to capture our intuitions about some sub-
ject matter does not need any particular epistemological justification. It is at most a
question to be addressed to empirical psychologists as to how accurately an axiom
system really captures our intuitions, for instance whether our visual space is perfectly
Euclidean or perhaps slightly non-Euclidean in its metric. We also have to heed the
possibility that our intuitions can be re-educated. An imaginative writer, such as Abbott
(1935) the author of Flatland or Reichenbach (1958) in the Philosophy of space and
time might actually induce in us an intuitive picture as to what it would feel like to
live in a non-Euclidean space.
Someone might suggest as a historical objection to what was just said the need
mathematicians felt to prove the parallel postulate (Euclid's fifth postulate) from other
assumptions. Does that show that some intuitions are less intuitive than others and
hence in need of a proof? This seems not to be the case, for the special character of
the parallel postulate amply explains the attention paid to it. For one thing, it is the
only assumption in Euclid whose uses in proofs require arbitrarily long lines, lines
that would for instance extend beyond the finite Aristotelian universe. Can such a
postulate nevertheless be true in the actual universe? This question alone motivates
amply mathematicians' concern about the parallel postulate.
On the other hand, if an axiom system is supposed to be a theory about the real world,
its axioms must be verified empirically in the same way as any other scientific truths.
Hilberťs axioms of geometry may have been suggested to him by his intuitions, but
unlike Kant he makes it perfectly clear that their applicability to reality presupposes an
empirical verification of axioms, however intuitive they may be (Hilbert 191 8, p. 149).
This applies even to the continuity axioms. Indeed, the status of similar continuity and
differentiability assumptions in thermodynamics had in fact been a moot issue in the
philosophy of physics.

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 Synthese (201 1) 183:69-85 83

The normal development of theo

theories whose axioms were far
directly from experience or other
their consequences. As a represen
"But in no way can a direct proof
It appears most logical, therefore
they had been arrived at, and con
plausibility depend on the very l
we take this point of view we ca
render the understanding of Max
p. 38).
Hence obviousness and certainty are not among the crucial characteristics of the axi-
oms of a system that is supposed to apply to the actual world. This is not a recent view,
either. Already according to Aristotle the first principles in a deductively organized
science are found only through a potentially complex interrogative process (see here
Hintikka 2004b). Likewise, according to Newton the greatest difficulty in physics is
to find the forces that govern natural phenomena (cf. here Newton 1972, 'Author's
Preface', p. 16). They are the explanatory assumptions from which phenomena to be
explained are derived. And these forces are not merely assumed, they are derived from
phenomena. In the case of his Principia , "we derive from celestial phenomena the
gravitational forces"; In general a physicist's task is "to discover the forces of nature
from the phenomena of motions (ibid.)."
Hence the axioms of a scientific system do not mean to occupy a privileged posi-
tion epistemologically. This is related to the fact that the derivation of theorems
from axioms can produce new surface information but not new depth information
(cf. Sect. 5).

10 Axiomatization and explanation

There is nevertheless another epistemological dimension of the axiomatic method

which has not been studied in any depth by philosophical methodologists. Maybe
the axiomatic system does not in any direct sense contribute to the certainty of the
theorems derivable from it. However, many practitioners of the axiomatic method
emphasize its uses in explaining these theorems. This is for instance true of the axio-
matists of the Bourbaki school. For instance, according to Claude Chevalley another
innovation of Bourbaki was "the principle that every fact in mathematics must have
an explanation." This principle is separate from the idea of causality meaning that one
fact causes the occurrence of another. Bourbaki held that "anything that was purely the
result of calculation was not considered by us a good proof' (quoted in Aczel 2006).
But what is this explanatory role of the axiom system? Unfortunately, no answer
is forthcoming from the earlier discussions of explanation by philosophers. Most of
the earlier literature consists of nitpicking and fruitless controversies about whether
explanation is subsumption to a covering law, finding causal connections, unification
or what not. However, an analysis of the role of logic is now available (see Hintikka
2007b and the references given there). It is shown there how one kind of explanation

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 84 Synthese (2011) 183:69-85

of why G must be true if F is tr

relation. By "usual" is here mean
ing the consequence relation mus
a tableau proof in which there i
right side.
In particular, such a normal form brings out an interpolation formula I which can
be thought of as the explanation why G follows from F. This formula is normally
more complicated than F or G. This additional complication can serve as a measure
of the explanatory depth of the consequence relation in question. It in effect shows
how the structure characteristic of the models of G inevitably emerges when we try
to construct in reality or in thought a model of F. It thus constitutes an explanation of
the connection between F and G in a vivid sense.
In this sense, the axioms of a system can provide explanations of theorems.
But what is needed for them to be able to serve this explanatory purpose? A partial
answer lies in what has been said: The axioms must be simple in the sense that they
involve few individuals forming a straightforward structure. (In formal terms, this
presupposes low quantificational depth.) Such simplicity does not in the case of an
applied axiom system make by itself the axiom any more likely. However, it is vital
for the explanatory function of axiomatization. This function deserves closer study
than has been devoted to it in the literature. The notion of surface information offers
to us a conceptual tool in this investigation.

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