CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a 'no-man's land' for
e is some middle ground between the sexes, a 'no-man's land' for those
TITLE: PHILIPPINE AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
I. Kinds and Hierarchy of Rights
1. REPUBLIC vs JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN
G.R. No. 166676. September 12, 2008.]
Doctrine: Right to Liberty (Pursuit of Happiness)
FACTS:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law
and seeking a reversal of the Decision 1 dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in
Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries
in Cagandahan's birth certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to
"Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to "male".
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a
female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male
characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a
condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further
alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six,
underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen,
tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has
no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as
well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth
certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name
be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of
the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr.
Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that respondent's condition is known as CAH. He
explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones,
her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs — female and male. He
testified that this condition is very rare, that respondent's uterus is not fully developed because
of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that
respondent's condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender because
respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change
would be advantageous to her. The RTC granted respondent's petition in a Decision dated
January 12, 2005.
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the
abovementioned ruling.
ISSUES:
Whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical
condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff", under Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court.
HELD:
NO. In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. "It has been
individuals who are neither truly 'male' nor truly 'female'." The current state of Philippine statutes
apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is
not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid
classification.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent,
having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here
thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being
male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to
arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to
that of a male.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a
matter so innately private as one's sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or
not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. Respondent is the
one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit
of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what
courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the
absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent" and in the absence of evidence to
show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally
entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent's
position and his personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an
individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent's
congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary
person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help
make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.
WHEREFORE, the Republic's petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Jr. and Brion, JJ., concur.

2. PBM Employees vs PBM
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
DOCTRINE: Supremacy of human rights over property rights
The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also
political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and
complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic
establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public
affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights
so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and
protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.
FACTS:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor
union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and
petitioners. Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner
Union. Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at
Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. PBMEO
thru Pagcu confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally
cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained
further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no
quarrel or dispute with Management. The Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company
personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any demonstration for that matter should
not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. Workers who without previous leave
of absence approved by the Company, particularly, the officers present who are the organizers
of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed,
because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an
illegal strike.
the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. The employees'
pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed
they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which
the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally
affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can
be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale
and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the
primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition
for redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. To regard the
demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in
collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause
for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the
compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and
therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of
expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the
Issue raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons
can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members
will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their
position and abet continued alleged police persecution.

Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should
not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third
shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, filed a
charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, for a violation of
Republic Act No. 875 (Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No
Lockout.' Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assembly was violated.

HELD:

YES. It was to the interest of herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take
up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation
or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its
productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its
employees with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as
their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the
employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival,
utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment
of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or
damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in
3. ERMITA- MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS VS CITY MAYOR
G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967
DOCTRINE:
The mantle of protection associated with the due process does not cover petitioners. This
particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public
morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported
by anything of substance. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely
enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals.
The ordinance, having enacted by councilors, who must, in the very nature of things, be familiar
with the necessities of their particular municipality or city and with all the facts and
circumstances which surround the subject and necessitates action, must be presumed to be
valid and should not be set aside unless there is a clear invasion of personal property rights
under the guise of police regulation.
NO, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a
fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping
condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently
with what has hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both
procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. The councilors must,
in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and
with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local
legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are
essential to the well-being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside
legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise
of police regulation. It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the
necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its
face which is not the case here.

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
FACTS: certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio
Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate
The petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators questions the validity of Ordinance no. of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of
4760 enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila, approved by then Vice-Mayor Astorga, acting motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and
Mayor of the city at that time. The ordinance regulated the motels, in so far as the petitioners thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then
claimed, that it is unreasonable and violative of due process as it would impose annual fees of proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by
P6,000 and P4,500 to first and second classes motels, respectively. The provision in the same requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a
section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions
hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests."
letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the
form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income
name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, of the city government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining
the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his
passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has
personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper
or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound
together. Among others, it is also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels,
motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of
Police, or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due process
grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague,
indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the
guaranty against self-incrimination; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance
prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging
houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making
it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such
establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs
counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged
ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the license of
the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments,
there is once again a transgression of the due process clause. The RTC granted the petition for
Preliminary Injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether Ordinance No. 4760 is violative of due process which should be declared null and void

HELD:

4. VICENTE DE LA CRUZ v. EDGARDO L. PARAS,
GR No. L-42571-72, July 25, 1983
DOCTRINES: Police Power; Due Process; Equal Protection Clause
FACTS:
On November 5, 1975, two cases by Vicente dela Cruz, et al for prohibition with preliminary
injunction were filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The grounds alleged follow: "
Ordinance No. 84 is null and void as a municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful business,
occupation or calling. Ordinance No. 84 is violative of the petitioners' right to due process and
the equal protection of the law, as the license previously given to petitioners was in effect
withdrawn without judicial hearing, that under Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, by
Presidential Decree No. 259, the power to license and regulate tourist-oriented businesses
including night clubs, has been transferred to the Department of Tourism.
However, according to the Municipal Council, it is authorized by law not only to regulate but to
prohibit the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, invoking Section 2243 of
the RAC, CA 601, RA Nos. 938, 978 and 1224. The MC also contends that property rights are
subordinate to public interest.
There was the admission of the following facts as having been established: "1. That petitioners
Vicente de la Cruz, et al. in Civil Case No. 4755-M had been previously issued licenses by the
Municipal Mayor of Bocaue to the petitioners; 2. That petitioners had invested large sums of
money in their businesses; 3. That the night clubs are well-lighted and have no partitions, the
tables being near each other; 4. That the petitioners owners/operators of these clubs do not
allow the hospitality girls therein to engage in immoral acts and to go out with customers; 5. That
these hospitality girls are made to go through periodic medical check-ups and not one of them is
suffering from any venereal disease and that those who fail to submit to a medical check-up or
those who are found to be infected with venereal disease are not allowed to work; 6. That the
crime rate there is better than in other parts of Bocaue or in other towns of Bulacan."
Then came on January 15, 1976 the decision upholding the constitutionality and validity of
Ordinance No. 84 and dismissing the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.
The lower court dismissed the petitions. Its rationale is set forth as "Those who lust cannot last.
This in essence is also why this Court, obedient to the mandates of good government, and
cognizant of the categorical imperatives of the current legal and social revolution, hereby
[upholds] in the name of police power the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 84,
Series of 1975, of the Municipal Council of Bocaue, Bulacan.
ISSUE:
Whether a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, can prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade,
the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of lawful occupation, such clubs employing
hostesses and withdraw licenses previously issued without judicial hearing
HELD:
This Court is, however, unable to agree with such a conclusion and for reasons herein set forth,
holds that reliance on the police power is insufficient to justify the enactment of the assailed
ordinance. It must be declared null and void.
1. Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms as follows: "General power
of council to enact ordinances and make regulations.— The municipal council shall enact such
ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the
morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants
thereof, and for the protection of property therein." It is practically a reproduction of the former
Section 39 of Municipal Code. An ordinance enacted by virtue thereof, is valid, unless it
contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine
Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating, or in derogation of common right. Where the power to legislate upon a given
subject, and the mode of its exercise and the details of such legislation are not prescribed, the
ordinance passed pursuant thereto must be a reasonable exercise of the power, or it will be
pronounced invalid."
It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general
welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the
corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State." If night clubs were merely
then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity.
In US v Abendan and US v Salaveria, the two leading cases set forth, this Court had stressed
reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as
well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping
exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The
objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure
that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by
overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable
restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. It is clear that in the guise of a police
regulation, there was in this instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in
the case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of
the investments made and salaries to be earned by those therein employed.
2. The decision now under review refers to Republic Act No. 938 as amended. It was originally
enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS
AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS." The first section was amended to include not merely "the
power to regulate, but likewise "prohibit . . ." The title, however, remained the same. It is worded
exactly as Republic Act No, 938. It is to be admitted that as thus amended, if only the above
portion of the Act were considered, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation
of night clubs. If that were all, then the appealed decision is not devoid of support in law. That is
not all, however. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one whit. The exact
wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. There is
thus support for the view advanced by petitioners that to construe Republic Act No. 938 as
allowing the prohibition of the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional
question. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.” Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating,
not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of
Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise
of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the
morals," in the language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great
public needs," to quote from Holmes, and to interdict any calling, occupation, or enterprise. In
accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two
possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the
other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save
rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself. We have done so
before We do so again.
3. There is reinforcement to the conclusion reached by virtue of a specific provision of the
recently-enacted Local Government Code. 25 The general welfare clause, a reiteration of the
Administrative Code provision, is set forth in the first paragraph of Section 149 defining the
powers and duties of the sangguniang bayan. It read as follows: "(a) Enact such ordinances and
issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities
conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health,
safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the
prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the
protection of property therein; . . . ." It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the
operation of might clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their
business. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued
existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. To compel petitioners to close their
establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a
temporary termination of their business. During such time, their employees would undergo a
period of deprivation. Certainly, if such an undesirable outcome can be avoided, it should be.
The law should not be susceptible to the reproach that it displays less than sympathetic concern
for the plight of those who, under a mistaken appreciation of a municipal power, were thus left
without employment. Such a deplorable consequence is to be avoided. If it were not thus, then
the element of arbitrariness enters the picture. That is to pay less, very much less, than full
deference to the due process clause with its mandate of fairness and reasonableness.

4. The conclusion reached by this Court is not to be interpreted as a retreat from its resolute
stand sustaining police power legislation to promote public morals. The commitment to such an
ideal forbids such a backward step. Reference is made by respondents to Ermita-Malate Hotel
and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. That was a regulatory measure.
Necessarily, there was no valid objection on due process or equal protection grounds. It did not
prohibit motels. It merely regulated the mode in which it may conduct business in order precisely
to put an end to practices which could encourage vice and immorality,

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the decision of the lower court dated January
15, 1976 reversed, set aside, and nullied. Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of the Municipality
of Bocaue is declared void and unconstitutional. The temporary restraining order issued by this
Court is hereby made permanent. No costs.