Cari vs Cari

G.R. No. 132529

February 2, 2001

Facts

SPO4 Santiago S. Carino contracted two marriages. The first was

with petitioner Susan Nicdao Carino with whom he begot 2 children,
while the second, during the subsistence of the first, was with
respondent Susan Yee Carino with whom he had no issue. In 1988,
SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes
complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on
November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his
medical and burial expenses. Petitioner and respondent led claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance from various government
agencies. Petitioner collected P146, 000 from MBAI, PCCUI,
commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-Ibig, while respondent collected
P21, 000 from GSIS and SSS. Respondent, in an action for
collection, sought to recover half the amount collected by petitioner.
She claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage with
petitioner and presented evidence that the same was contracted
without the necessary marriage license.

Issue

Whether or not Susan Yee can claim half the amount acquired by
Nicdao.
Held

No. The marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the

deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage
license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the
marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio. the
presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has
been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to
prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required
marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the
trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained
the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court
of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the
issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her
case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage
cannot stand.

It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since
the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio,
the "death benefits" under scrutiny would now be awarded to
respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family
Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a
party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second
marriage would also be void.

Malcampo-Sin vs Sin

G.R. No. 137590


March 26, 2001

Facts

On January1987, after a two-year courtship and engagement,

Florence and respondent Philipp T. Sin, a Portugese citizen, were
married at a church wedding

On September 20, 1994, Florence filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 158, Pasig City, a complaint for "declaration of nullity of
marriage" against Philipp. Trial ensued and the parties presented
their respective documentary and testimonial evidence.

We note that throughout the trial in the lower court, the State did not
participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jose Danilo C. Jabson
filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 16, 1994,
stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not
actively participate therein. Other than entering his appearance at
certain hearings of the case, nothing more was heard from him.
Neither did the presiding Judge take any step to encourage the fiscal
to contribute to the proceedings.

Issue

Whether or not the marriage can be declared null and void without
the participation of the State

Held
No. The records are bereft of any evidence that the State participated
in the prosecution of the case not just at the trial level but on appeal
with the Court of Appeals as well. Other than the "manifestation" filed
with the trial court on November 16, 1994, the State did not file any
pleading, motion or position paper, at any stage of the proceedings.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Erlinda Matias Dagdag, while we

upheld the validity of the marriage, we nevertheless characterized the
decision of the trial court as "prematurely rendered" since the
investigating prosecutor was not given an opportunity to present
controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered. This
stresses the importance of the participation of the State.

Having so ruled, we decline to rule on the factual disputes of the

case, this being within the province of the trial court upon proper re-
trial.
 Ancheta vs Ancheta

G.R. No. 145370.

March 4, 2004.

Facts

After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the

respondent resided in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. They had eight
children during their marriage. On December 6, 1992, the
respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned the petitioner and
their children. On January 25, 1994, petitioner Marietta Ancheta led a
petition with the RTC of Makati, , against the respondent for the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership and judicial separation of
property with a plea for support and support pendente lite. On April
20, 1994, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement where
some of the conjugal properties were adjudicated to the petitioner
and her eight children. In the meantime, the respondent intended to
marry again. On June 5, 1995, he led a petition with the RTC of Naic,
Cavite, Branch 15, for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity. Although the
respondent knew that the petitioner was already residing at the resort
Munting Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, he, nevertheless,
alleged in his petition that the petitioner was residing at No. 72 CRM
Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas,
Metro Manila, "where she may be served with summons." The clerk
of court issued summons to the petitioner at the address stated in the
petition. The sheriff served the summons and a copy of the petition by
substituted service on June 6, 1995 on the petitioner's son, Venancio
Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his residence in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.
The petitioner failed to le an answer to the petition. The respondent
testifed in his behalf and adduced documentary evidence. On July 7,
1995, the trial court issued an Order granting the petition and
declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio. Eventually the
respondent and Teresita H. Rodil were married in civil rights before
the municipal mayor of Indang, Cavite. Eventually the petitioner found
out about the marriage and filed a petition against the respondent.
The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondent committed gross
misrepresentations by making it appear in his petition in Sp. Proc. No.
NC-662 that she was a resident of No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM
Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, when in
truth and in fact, the respondent knew very well that she was residing
at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. According to the
petitioner, the respondent did so to deprive her of her right to be
heard in the said case, and ultimately secure a favorable judgment
without any opposition thereto. The petitioner also alleged that the
respondent caused the service of the petition and summons on her
by substituted service through her married son, Venancio Mariano B.
Ancheta III, a resident of Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, where the
respondent was a resident. Furthermore, Venancio M.B. Ancheta III
failed to deliver to her the copy of the petition and summons. Thus,
according to the petitioner, the order of the trial court in favor of the
respondent was null and void (1) for lack of jurisdiction over her
person; and (2) due to the extrinsic fraud perpetrated by the
respondent.

Issue

Whether the declaration of nullity of marriage was valid

Held

The records show that for the petitioner’s failure to file an answer to
the complaint, the trial court granted the motion of the respondent
herein to declare her in default. The public prosecutor condoned the
acts of the trial court when he interposed no objection to the motion of
the respondent. The trial court forthwith received the evidence of the
respondent ex-parte and rendered judgment against the petitioner
without a whimper of protest from the public prosecutor. In this case,
the original petition and the amended petition in the Court of Appeals,
in light of the material averments therein, were based not only on
extrinsic fraud, but also on lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over
the person of the petitioner because of the failure of the sheriff to
serve on her the summons and a copy of the complaint. The
actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor are in defiance
of Article 48 of the Family Code, which reads:
Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State
to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment
shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of
judgment.
The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18,
Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for
legal separation.— If the defendant in an action for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a
collusion between the parties exits, and if there is no collusion,
to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated.