BEHAVIORTHERAVY23, 225-249, 1992

Some Clinical Implications of Contextualistic Behaviorism:

The Example of Cognition
STEVEN C . HAYES

LINDA J . HAYES

University of Nevada

Radical behaviorism can be interpreted either mechanistically or contextualistically.

The present article describes the essence of the contextualistic interpretation and con-
trasts it with other positions common in behavior therapy. Contemporary behavior
analysis, contextually viewed, is applied to the problem of cognition. Derived stimulus
relations are argued to be at the core of cognition, and that the relation between cogni-
tion and other kinds of behavior is contextually situated. New therapeutic strategies
emerge from a reexamination of the philosophy and theory of contextualistic behavior
analysis.

While the growth of behavior therapy has been one of the success stories
in applied psychology over the last 25 years, its intellectual development seems
less dramatic. The present article examines the contribution contextualistic
behaviorism might make to the further progress of behavior therapy.

A Brief History of Intellectual Trends in Behavior Therapy

Early behavior therapy was committed both to the application of clearly
specified and replicable techniques, made available by well-designed and sys-
tematic experimental research, and to learning theory (Eysenck, 1972). For
example, Franks and Wilson (1974) argued that the common element in be-
havior therapies was an adherence to "operationally defined learning theory
and conformity to well established experimental paradigms" (p. 7). Media-
tional learning theory was embraced: "One can study inferred events or
processes and remain a behaviorist as long as these events or processes have
measurable and operational referents" (Franks & Wilson, 1974, p. 7). Radical
behaviorism, in rejecting both S-R learning theory and cognitive mediational
accounts, had very little impact on the development of behavior therapy during
this early period. Very few clinicians were trained in the position. On the con-
trary, "Methodological behaviorism is much more characteristic of contem-

Requests for reprints should be sent to: Steven C. Hayes, Department of Psychology, Univer-
sity of Nevada, Reno, NV 89557-0062.

225 0005-7894/92/0225-024951.00/0
Copyright 1992 by Association for Advancementof Behavior Therapy
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
226 HAYES & HAYES

porary behavior modifiers than is radical behaviorism" (Mahoney, Kazdin,

& Lesswing, 1974, p. 15). Thus, in early behavior therapy, behavioral tech-
nology was most closely linked to experimental methodology, mediational
learning theory, and methodological behavioral philosophy.
As behavior therapy developed, cognitive techniques and concepts were in-
creasingly added to its core. Early cognitive mediational accounts of behavior
change (e.g., Bandura, 1969) soon blossomed into the cognitive therapy move-
ment (e.g., Mahoney, 1974; Meichenbaum, 1977). Despite protests from some
founders that these ideas had been present all along (e.g., Wolpe, 1980), the
very vitality of the movement suggested that many therapists felt otherwise.
The cognitive movement sought not just the addition of a range of verbal psy-
chotherapies to the technical armamentarium of behavior therapy, but also
the addition of modern cognitive mediational constructs to mediational
learning theory concepts already in place.
With the cognitive wave fully assimilated both technologically and theoret-
ically, behavior therapy in the 1980s settled down to an expansion into new
areas (e.g., behavioral medicine, behavioral assessment), new populations or
problems (e.g., AIDS, spousal violence), and new leadership roles (e.g., helping
to develop DSM-III and IV, editing important mainstream journals, par-
ticipating in the direction of federal funding). The recent expansion of be-
havior therapy, in other words, has been largely in the areas of technology
and political influence.

Radical Behaviorism: An Alternative Tradition

More recently, some behavior therapists have been considering the value
of radical behaviorism as a set of coordinating assumptions for the develop-
ment of behavior therapy (e.g., Jacobson, 1991a, 1991b; Kohlenberg & Tsai,
1987). This interest in radical behaviorism is not so much an interest in radical
behaviorism as it had always been but in a radical behaviorism that has evolved
out of this original position. In recent years, two major subtypes within rad-
ical behavioral thinking have been identified, and the distinction between these
types and traditional behavioral philosophy can now be made more clearly.
In addition, a set of new findings has emerged in basic behavior analysis and
the significance of these findings for the analysis of verbal humans' behavior
is becoming clearer. Some discussion of the history of these developments
will be helpful in understanding their relevance to contemporary behavior
therapy. We will consider the philosophical developments first, then the findings
and their implications.

Systemic Foundations of Behaviorism

Behaviorism was originally a movement against consciousness as the sub-
ject matter of psychology and introspection as the method of its investigation
(Watson, 1924, pp. 2-5). Watson (1924, p. 14) claimed behavior as the subject
matter of psychology and defined it by its form: behavior was muscle move-
ments and glandular secretions. From his perspective, all activities of the or-
ganism could be reduced to these events (a kind of metaphysical behaviorism);
and even if mental or other non-movement activities existed, they could not
 CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CONTEXTUALISTIC BEHAVIORISM 227

constitute the subject matter of a scientific psychology because public agree-

ment as to their occurrence was impossible (a kind of methodological be-
haviorism). Thus for Watson, scientific legitimacy was an issue of public ob-
servability.
Skinner deviated considerably from these views, Skinner distinguished the
subjective/objective dichotomy (which he thought to be of fundamental
scientific importance) from the private/public dichotomy (which he thought
was not fundamental). Skinner (1945) defined scientific observations as those
under the control of a certain kind of contingency. Only when an observation
was controlled by particular stimulus events (largely those of a nonverbal sort)
and a general history of reinforcement for speaking under the control of those
events, as opposed to control by audience factors, states of reinforceability,
and so on, was the observation scientifically valid. As such, observations could
be private and objective (scientifically legitimate) or public and subjective
(scientifically illegitimate), depending upon the contingencies controlling the
observations.
Public subjective observations are readily demonstrated. In discussing this
point in classes we show the class the following words on the blackboard for
about one-half second and then cover them:
Paris in
the
the spring
The class is asked to write down what they read. Virtually all will write "Paris
in the spring." If interrater reliability were being calculated, it would be very
high, and if that were the metric for objectivity we could be confident the words
indeed were "Paris in the spring." But these observations were subjective in
the sense that they were controlled by individual histories with particular
words - "Paris in the spring" is familiar, "the, the" is unfamiliar, and so o n -
rather than by what was observed and a history of reinforcement for control
by observed events. In Skinner's view, the observations of the class are
scientifically illegitimate, even though highly "reliable."
This is the sense in which "radical behaviorism" is radical or "to the root":
Even its core concepts and observations are defined in terms of contingencies,
specifically, those bearing on the behavior of the scientist. Skinner rejected
methodological behaviorism because he did not believe that public agreement
provided assurance of proper contingency control. As in the example above,
it is easy to find instances where whole groups of observers are similarly
influenced by motivational states and other subjective conditions.
In solving this problem by way of contingency analysis, Skinner opened
up behaviorism to the very thing Watson was trying to eliminate" Introspec-
tive observations of private events. For example, Skinner said that radical be-
haviorism "does not insist upon truth by agreement and can therefore con-
sider events taking place in the private world within the skin. It does not call
these events unobservable" (Skinner, 1974, p. 16). Radical behaviorism is not
interpretable as extreme behaviorism for this reason, despite claims to the con-
trary (e.g., Mahoney, 1989). In a fundamental sense, radical behaviorism is
not part of the tradition of "behaviorism" at all because all psychological ac-
228 HAYES & HAYES

tivities that are contacted in a scientifically valid manner are subject to anal-
ysis. In this way at least, radical behaviorism rejects both methodological be-
haviorism and Watsonian metaphysical behaviorism.
Skinnerians did not move rapidly to investigations of thinking and feeling
for another reason, however. Skinner felt that an understanding of private
events was not necessary for a scientific understanding of overt activity (Skinner,
1953). We will analyze why he came to this conclusion later and will argue
that there are reasons to believe that he was mistaken.
Inconsistencies in Skinner's position. Radical behaviorism was a position
virtually defined by the writings of B. E Skinner, and Skinner often failed
to be precise about his core assumptions, or wrote about them in contradic-
tory ways (Parrott, 1983, 1986; Hayes, Hayes, & Reese, 1988). The definition
of behavior is a case in point. In 1938 Skinner defined behavior both mechan-
ically and interactively- one definition following the other in successive para-
graphs. The mechanical definition, in the tradition of Watson, treats behavior
as an organismic phenomenon, taking place in settings made up of things and
events conceptualized as existing independently of the behavior itself. In ac-
cord with this view, Skinner defined behavior as "the movement of an organism
or of its parts in a frame of reference provided by the organism itself or by
various external objects or fields of force" (Skinner, 1938, p. 6). When be-
havior is defined as movement in this way, changes in the conditions of its
occurrence or "frame of reference" may change the occurrence of behavior
or its probability but they do not change behavior per se. For example, raising
a hand to get attention and raising a hand to stretch a muscle is the same be-
havior when behavior is defined by movement. The two episodes differ, of
course, because the "causal determinants" of the behavior differ, but the be-
havior is a raising of the hand in either case.
In 1938 Skinner also defined behavior as an interaction between an organism
and its environment, the implication being that behavior and its environment
constitute a unitary phenomenon. In Skinner's words, behavior is "the func-
tioning of an organism which is engaged in acting upon or having commerce
with the outside world" (1938, p. 6). From this perspective, behavior does change
its nature as its circumstances of occurrence change because the behavior and
those circumstances are two aspects of a single event. In other words, getting
attention is a different behavior than stretching regardless of the similar move-
ments involved.
The 1938 b o o k is the only place where Skinner attempted a definition of
"behavior" and the two definitions given differ in a philosophically fundamental
way. As a result, some Skinnerians have defined behavior much as Watson
did, as movement in a frame of reference (e.g., Johnston & Pennypacker, 1981).
Conversely, some radical behaviorists view behavior as an event of a whole
organism interacting in and with a context (e.g., Hayes et al., 1988; Morris,
1988).
Similar problems occur in other areas of Skinner's work including his view
of causality, the relation between psychology and biology, the nature of stimuli,
and other topics. In each case, Skinner's analysis is either ambiguous or con-
tradictory at a fundamental level. For example, Skinner's position sometimes
has a linear, causal quality, as when he claims that: "We have discovered more
 CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CONTEXTUALISTIC BEHAVIORISM 229

about how the living organism works and are better able to see its machine-
like properties" (Skinner, 1953, p. 47). At other times, he rejects the causal
logic of reductionism (Skinner, 1938, p. 418-432. See Hayes et al., 1988 for
a more detailed analysis of Skinner's views).
Because Skinner embraced philosophically incompatible views, it is not pos-
sible to articulate the radical behavioral position. There appear to be two dis-
tinct philosophical systems operating under the banner of radical behaviorism.
Understanding the nature of this division is important for our purposes since
the clinical implications of the two versions o f radical behaviorism are quite
different.

The Metaphilosophy of Stephen Pepper

The division within contemporary radical behaviorism can be understood
from the point of view of the philosophical categories constructed by Stephen
C. Pepper. Pepper (1942) delineated four kinds of philosophical system or
world views on the basis of what he called their "root metaphors" and their
truth criteria, namely: Formism (e.g., Plato); Organicism (e.g., Hegel), Mech-
anism (e.g., S-R learning theory) and Contextualism (e.g., James). These world
views, he argued, were orthogonal to each other because their assumptions
differed so greatly that meaningful discourse among them was impossible. The
inconsistencies in Skinner's position may be understood as an unwitting at-
tempt to operate on the basis o f two sets of incompatible assumptions, those
characteristic of mechanism on one hand, and of contextualism on the other.
Pepper's idea was that humans philosophize on the basis of certain common-
sense models, and that the understanding achieved in this manner is then
metaphorically applied to the world. Different philosophies operate on the
basis o f different models or root metaphors. The root metaphor o f mecha-
nism is the machine. A machine (such as a lever) consists of discrete parts
(e.g., a fulcrum and lever), a relation among these parts (e.g., the lever must
sit atop the fulcrum), and forces to make the parts operate (e.g., pressing down
on one end of the lever produces a precisely predictable force at the other
end). If we wished to understand a machine, we would need to disassemble
it and identify the parts, relations, and forces that constitute it and its opera-
tion. Note also that when the machine is disassembled, the parts remain un-
changed despite their independence from the rest of the machine. In other
words, a spark plug is a spark plug whether screwed into a cylinder or sitting
on the kitchen table.
When applied to the subject matter o f behavioral psychology, a mechanical
metaphor takes stimuli, responses, cognitions, and other parts of a psycho-
logical event to be discrete parts, related to each other by "mechanisms," and
animated by forces (e.g., information, drives). The existence o f such parts in
the world is assumed: our job as theorists is simply to find ways to "take the
cover oft" (literally, to dis-cover them) so that they can be seen. The parts are
further assumed to retain their nature when isolated from the whole. Accord-
ingly, mechanists often make use of research preparations that isolate hypothe-
sized components so that they may be studied out o f context (e.g., sensation
is studied as a means to understand perception).
The goal o f mechanistic research is the development of a model of the ma-
230 HAYES ~ I~YES

chinery that is assumed to exist. If such a model is shown to correspond to

a range of relevant observations (especially if it is predictively verified) then
it is said to be true. Hypothetico-deductive theorizing is a classic example of
this strategy, and mechanistic psychologies gravitate toward it.
The archetype of mechanistic psychology is S-R learning theory, and its
descendent, information processing. In modern mechanical theorizing, the
computer is usually taken to be the base model. Entities such as "short term
m e m o r y stores" are believed to exist and to be discoverable. Elaborate models
of mental machinery are developed and carefully subjected to empirical test.
Contextualistic philosophizing is quite different. In contextualism, the root
metaphor is the historically situated action, alive and in the present, such as
"going to the store" or "making dinner." Actions such as these are whole units
involving an action in and with a context. In the world of common-sense, it
is not possible to separate "going to the store" into distinct units. For example,
the fact that a person is walking to the store does not mean that the action
is walking, while the home that was left behind or the store that is approached
are separate. "Going to the store" is all o f these working together. Further,
even this occurs in a context (e.g., "needing something from the store," or
"having money to buy things," or "knowing where the store is" or "being an
organism that eats"). Thus, the event constituting the focus of analysis from
a contextualistic standpoint is abstracted from an ever widening circle of pos-
sible events. The most trivial act may lead to a concern with the whole uni-
verse. What keeps analysis from being overwhelmed by the need to become
ever more inclusive is that analysis is taken to be an activity that itself has
a context and a purpose. Thus, analysis need be taken only to the point at
which its purpose is achieved. Insofar as a way of speaking achieves its pur-
pose, it is "true." Theorizing is thus taken to be an act of construction, not
discovery, because there are no grounds to say that a given analysis is the cor-
rect analysis.
As the act-in-context is applied to psychological theorizing, note first that
there are no fundamental "parts." The parts identified in the act of analysis
are held to exist as features of the analysis not as aspects of the world. As
such, the contextual theorist may be legitimately interested in anything from
grasping a rattle to adopting a life-style. Further, the parts that are identified
are identified in concert with a context such that if context changes so does
the event. Walking to the store is a different action than walking the plank,
even if the muscles contract in the same sequence. In short, a contextualistic
perspective mitigates against the use of topographical or formal criteria as
defining characteristics o f behavior.
An example may be helpful in this regard. Suppose a behaviorist watches
an animal in a cage and notes that the animal is scratching at the door and
biting the latch. If asked "what is the operant here?" an appeal to these re-
sponse forms alone will not supply the answer. What must be considered are
the historical and current contexts that would organize these forms into the
interactive unit called an operant. One analyst might conclude that the an-
imal is engaging in "when-confined-get-out-of-the-cage-behavior," another
"when-not-stimulated-produce-stimulation-behavior." These descriptions or-
 CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CONTEXTUALISTIC BEHAVIORISM 231

ganize the same topographies into completely different events, not in the sense
that they are influenced by different forces, but in the sense of qualitatively
different interactions with different contextual participants.
Both of the operants described above might also be organized into larger
or smaller units. For example, rearing up to access parts o f the environment
(as when the animal does so to sniff at an opening) might itself be understood
as an operant with a distinct history. Indeed, an infinity o f operant construc-
tions are simultaneously possible, and there are no grounds in contextualistic
thinking on which to argue that one or the other of them is "the correct one"
save the extent to which a given construction serves the purposes of the ana-
lyst. Contextualistic truth, in other words, is that which accomplishes the
analysts' goals.
Pepper's categories are useful in the present context not because behaviorists
self-consciously consider themselves to be mechanists or contextualists, but
because they point to fundamental differences in the assumptions and premises
of groups of behavior analysts and therapists. We and others have argued else-
where that radical behaviorism is, in essence, contextualistic (Hayes et al., 1988;
Hayes, 1987; Morris, 1988). It would be more accurate to say, however, that
in the hands of some, radical behaviorism appears contextualistic, while in
the hands of others, it appears mechanistic.
It is not our intention to suggest that either mechanism or contextualism
is correct, the other wrong. Evaluated on their own terms, both mechanism
and contextualism are coherent, viable positions. Our point is, rather, that
Skinner combined the two in an incoherent fashion; one consequence of which
has been to render the term "radical behaviorism" useless as a category name.
Radical behaviorism encompasses both mechanistic and contextualistic types
of behaviorism. The two positions are incompatible, and the differences cannot
be resolved by way of a compromise. In the remainder of the article we will,
therefore, restrict our analysis to only one o f these interpretations o f radical
b e h a v i o r i s m - the contextualistic p o s i t i o n - a n d will develop the clinical im-
plications of this position as it bears on cognition. First we will describe in
more detail the core conceptions of contextualistic behaviorism.

Contextualistic Behaviorism
Though several types of contextualistic behaviorism are possible, we will
restrict our analysis to a type defined by four characteristics: a) a focus on
the psychological level of analysis, b) a commitment to contextually delimited
constructs, c) a pragmatic view of truth, and d) an interest in the joint goals
o f description, prediction, control, and interpretation achieved with precision,
scope and depth, and based upon verifiable experience.

Psychological Level of Analysis

Contextualistic behaviorism defines the psychological level of analysis as
the study of whole organisms interacting in and with a context. At this level
o f analysis behavior cannot be separated from context, and parts of the or-
ganism cannot be separated from the whole. Because the unit is considered
232 HAYES & HAYES

to be fundamentally indivisible and interactive, contextualists hold that psy-

chology can never be explained by events at other levels of analysis. For ex-
ample, a psychological act-in-context cannot be explained by appeal to ac-
tions of various parts of the organism involved in the interaction (e.g., its brain,
glands, etc.). This is not to say that contextualistic behaviorism denies the
legitimacy of other levels of analysis (biology, anthropology). On the con-
trary, these other levels are recognized as legitimate in their own right and
are further assumed to provide a context for psychological analyses.

Contextually Delimited Constructs

The unit of analysis in contextualistic behaviorism is an interactive whole.
All constructs in a contextualistic system are contextually delimited. An act
alone and cut off from a context is not considered a psychological act at all.
Legs moving is not the same action as walking to the store.

Pragmatic Truth Criterion

If the unit is interactive, all abstractions of distinct features are themselves
arbitrary acts occurring in and with a context. In other words, the act of anal-
ysis is the situated action of the analyst, not the discovery of truth. As with
all "acts-in-context" we can organize actions on the basis of their purpose:
in behavioral terms, operants are organized by their consequences. This means
that selecting among certain scientific constructs over others can only be
justified on the basis of utility--the achievement of some end that the analyst
is seeking in doing the analysis. Skinner was quite clear on this point, claiming
that scientific knowledge "is a corpus of rules for effective action, and there
is a special sense in which it could be 'true' if it yields the most effective action
possible . . . . (A) proposition is 'true' to the extent that with its help the listener
responds effectively to the situation it describes" (Skinner, 1974, p. 235).

Goals of Analysis
Unlike all other world views, the truth criterion of contextualism is subor-
dinated to something else: The goals of the analysis. "Serious analysis for [the
contextualist] is always either directly or indirectly p r a c t i c a l . . . If from one
texture you wish to get to another, then analysis has an end, and a direction,
and some strands have relevancy to this end and others do not, a n d . . , the
enterprise becomes important in reference to the end" (Pepper, 1942, pp.
250-251). From a contextualistic perspective, any event or any feature of an
event is conceptualized as an event-in-context. This conceptualization presents
a problem when the context of an event comes under consideration, because
it then becomes the event-in-context with the result that a contextualistic anal-
ysis of anything can devolve into an appreciation of the whole, about which
nothing can be said. A word about the whole holds itself apart from the whole,
and thus a true appreciation of the whole is mute (L. J. Hayes, in press).
What saves contextualism from silence is a goal. The act of the scientist
is an act in context. It is a purposive act (not causally but descriptively). Anal-
ysis ends not with a discovery of the truth, but with the production of verbal
constructions that help achieve a goal. In contextualistic behaviorism, "truth"
 CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CONTEXTUALISTIC BEHAVIORISM 233

is that achievement. Any goal may be embraced, but the analytic practices
useful in terms of one goal may not be useful for another (Hayes & Brown-
stein, 1986). Thus, contextualistic psychologies may differ widely depending
on their goals.
No justification can be given for the selection of these goals because
justification necessarily appeals to truth or correctness, and for a contextu-
alist, truth cannot be evaluated except in terms of a goal. Goals are therefore
a priori events that can be articulated but not justified. If a scientist seeks,
for example, a personal experience of coherence and eschews any interest in
prediction and control, this cannot be criticized as illegitimate. Many prag-
matists, starting with James himself, have failed to appreciate the necessary
but a priori nature of goals for contextualistic analyses. As a result they have
either been vague about their goals or have dogmatically asserted that their
goals were the only ones possible. Skinner, for example, very clearly adopted
a pragmatic view of truth (see the quote at the end of the last section), but
he often seemed to be arguing that prediction and control were the goals of
science, not just his goals.
Contextualistic behaviorism, as here defined, is a psychological variety of
what has been termed "functional contextualism" (Biglan & Hayes, 1991).
"Functional contextualism" was coined to distinguish positions having an in-
strumental character from more descriptive forms of contextualism that seek
simply an understanding of participants in an interaction (e.g., Rosnow &
Georgoudi, 1986). The behavior analytic form of contextualistic behaviorism
has as its goals the description, prediction, control, and interpretation of or-
ganismic interactions in and with a context. It seeks empirically-based anal-
yses that achieve all of these goals jointly (not any one in isolation) with preci-
sion (a restricted set of constructs apply to any particular event), scope (a wide
number of events can be analyzed with these constructs), and depth (analytic
constructs at the psychological level cohere with those at other levels).
Causality. The interest in control does not mean that contextualistic be-
haviorists embrace an ontological view of causality. A holistic perspective
cannot take the position that there really are "causes." For one event to "cause"
another at least two independent events are necessary. All contexts are in prin-
ciple relevant to any event, and there are no truly independent events (Hayes,
1989). Causality is instead taken to be a useful way of speaking about the
achievement of goals when certain contextual features are assumed.
For example, for a contextualist, saying that a spark caused the explosion
may be a useful way of speaking because it points to ways of avoiding such
results: avoid sparks. Fuel, oxygen, and a certain base temperature were also
necessary features for the explosion, and these might have been described as
"causes." The operation of these features in turn depend upon other contex-
tual features (e.g., in the early stages of the big bang substances interacted
in different ways), that could also be called "causes." The selection of any one
"cause" depends upon the other features being assumed, and the pragmatic
effect of the description. For instance, in most human environments oxygen
is present, and the spark is a more important focus of causal constructions.
In other cases (as when welding in a vacuum) the spark is assumed and explo-
234 HAVES& HAYES

sions are more likely to be explained by the loss of the vacuum and the resul-
tant presence of oxygen.
This concludes our discussion of philosophical developments in behavior
analysis. It is to contextualistic behaviorism that we are seeing some contem-
porary behavior therapists turn their attention in recent years. We suspect that
contextualism represents a more palatable philosophical position for clinical
workers than did traditional mechanistic behaviorism. This aside for the mo-
ment, recall our earlier suggestion that the evolution in the movement known
as behavior analysis was occurring on more than one front. The other notable
difference between behavior analysis as originally conceived and the new wave
of this movement has to do with a set of unusual findings that are drawing
into question some long held assumptions and premises. We turn now to these
developments.

Stimulus Equivalence
When humans are taught a series of related conditional discriminations,
the stimuli that enter into those discriminations often become connected to
one another in ways not explicitly trained. The phenomena involved are typi-
cally investigated in a matching to sample format. For example, given the pres-
ence of a particular unfamiliar visual form (the s a m p l e - call it A1), the person

Equivalence Relation

Reflexivity Reflexivity Reflexivity

I I I I I I
I I I I I~
IV, IV I ,
\4k' A Trained B Trained ./

I I I I
II LI Symmetry i L Symmetry I tI

I I
I I
I..
Transitivity j
FIG. 1. A diagrammaticpresentation of the trained and derivedrelations in a typical stimulus
equivalence network. The solid arrows indicate trained relations; the dotted arrows indicate de-
rived relations.
 CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CONTEXTUALISTIC BEHAVIORISM 235

will be taught to choose another particular unfamiliar visual form from an

array of three such forms (the comparisons-call them B1, B2, and B3). We
could say that the person learns "given A1 pick BI." The person is then taught
to select another unfamiliar visual form from another array of forms, given
the same sample, or "given A1 pick CI." With this kind of training, it is likely
that without additional training, the person will select A1 from an array of
comparisons, given B1 or given C1 as samples. The person is also likely to
select B1 given C1 as a sample, and C1 given B1 as a sample (e.g., Sidman,
1971; Sidman, Cresson, & Willson-Morris, 1974), This set of phenomena is
called "stimulus equivalence" (see Figure 1).
An equivalence class is said to exist if the stimuli in the class show the three
defining relations of reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity, and combinations of
these (Sidman & Tailby, 1982). This definition has some notable difficulties,
but we will adopt it as a point of departure. In matching-to-sample proce-
dures, reflexivity is identity matching. For example, given A the person picks
A from an array. Symmetry refers to the functional reversibility of the condi-
tional discrimination: The trained discrimination "given A1 pick BI" leads
to the derived discrimination "given B1 pick AI." This reversibility must be
demonstrated in the absence of direct reinforcement to be considered sym-
metry (Sidman, Rauzin, Lazar, Cunningham, Tailby, & Carrigan, 1982). To
demonstrate transitivity, at least three stimuli are required. If after the dis-
criminations "given A1 pick BI" and "given B1 pick CI" have been taught,
"given A1 pick CI" emerges without additional training, transitivity has been
demonstrated. The derived relations "given C1 pick AI" is usually termed simply
an equivalence relation and is viewed as a combination of symmetry and tran-
sitivity (Fields, Verhave, & Fath, 1984).
A major source of interest in stimulus equivalence is the apparent corre-
spondence between the stimulus equivalence phenomenon and language
phenomena. In naming tasks, symmetry and transitivity between written words,
spoken words, pictures, and objects is commonplace. Several studies on
stimulus equivalence have used naming-like preparations using auditory and
visual stimuli (e.g., Dixon & Spradlin, 1976; Sidman, 1971; Sidman & Tailby,
1982; Sidman, Kirk, & Willson-Morris, 1985; Spradlin & Dixon, 1976). The
equivalence phenomenon may provide a new avenue for the empirical investi-
gation of language. For many, it has become a kind of working model of
semantic relations.
If stimulus equivalence is a preliminary model of verbal stimulation, one
would expect to see it emerge readily in humans, but not so readily or perhaps
not at all in non-humans. This has turned out to be the case. Stimulus equiva-
lence has been shown with a wide variety of human subjects using a wide va-
riety of stimulus materials (Dixon, 1977; Dixon & Spradlin, 1976; Gast, Van-
Biervlet, & Spradlin, 1979; Hayes, Tilley, & Hayes, 1988; Mackay & Sidman,
1984; Sidman, 1971, Sidman et al., 1974; Spradlin, Cotter, & Baxley, 1973;
Sidman & Tailby, 1982; Spradlin & Dixon, 1976; VanBiervlet, 1977; Wulfert
& Hayes, 1988) even with children as young as two years old (Devany, Hayes,
& Nelson, 1986). It has not been shown with non-human organisms, however
(D'Amato, Salmon, Loukas, & Tomie, 1985; Kendall, 1983; Sidman et al., 1982;
236 nnws ~ HAVES

Lipkens, Kop, Matthijs, 1988. As for Mclntire, Cleary, & Thompson, 1987
and Vaughan, 1988, see Hayes, 1989a). Furthermore, children without spon-
taneous productive use of signs or speech also show little equivalence (Devany
et al. 1986).
To understand why stimulus equivalence is having a major impact on be-
havioral researchers one should note that is not readily predicted from a three
term contingency formulation. If an organism learns that the probability of
reinforcement for selecting B1 is greater in the presence of A1 than in the pres-
ence of, say, A2, this does not imply that the probability of reinforcement
for selecting A1 is greater in the presence of B1 than in its absence.
The development of theoretical accounts of stimulus equivalence is still in
its infancy in behavior analysis. Some researchers view stimulus equivalence
as a primitive, unanalyzable into component processes (e.g., Sidman 1986;
1990). Another alternative has appealed to the historical development of rela-
tional responding (Hayes, 1991a; Hayes, & Hayes, 1989). The latter view holds
that the action of relating two arbitrary stimuli itself has a history. For ex-
ample, with enough instances of directly trained symmetrical responding in
a given context, derived symmetrical responding may emerge with respect to
novel stimuli in that context. Such relational derivation is arbitrarily applicable
in the sense that it need not be based on formal properties of the relata, and
may be brought to bear on stimuli by virtue of contextual cues to do so. In
this view, stimulus equivalence is viewed as a special case of arbitrarily ap-
plicable relational responding (Hayes & Hayes, 1989). In both analyses, how-
ever, equivalence is a case of something new.
Neo-behavioral analyses of this kind of phenomenon have existed for most
of this century. The existing behavioral interpretations, however, either have
appealed to derived relations between stimuli and responding to explain de-
rived relations between stimuli (Hull, 1934), or have relied on processes such
as classical conditioning to explain the findings (e.g., Staats & Staats, 1957).
The former approach begs the q u e s t i o n - t h e latter imposes process limita-
tions that do not fit the actual experimental preparations used in the equiva-
lence literature.
Implications of Contextualistic Behaviorism: The Example of Cognition
To show where these philosophical developments and new findings may lead,
we will consider the topic of cognition. The role of cognitive events in psy-
chopathology has been among the most discussed topics in behavior therapy
over the last decade. There are arguments about whether or not cognition plays
a controlling role in organism-environment interactions, arguments about the
nature of cognition or the nature of disturbed cognition, and arguments over
the role of cognitive change in the amelioration of psychopathology. In this
paper we will consider the nature of cognition, the nature of cognitive con-
trol, and the clinical implications of this analysis.

The Nature of Cognition

Cognition and the whole organism. From the view of contextualistic be-
haviorism, cognition is an activity of a whole organism interacting in and with
 CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CONTEXTUALISTIC BEHAVIORISM 237

the world. In other words, it is psychological activity. It is specifically not the

activity of the brain, nor is it activity taking place in a nonspacio-temporal
"mental" world. Brain activity occurs concomitant to all actions of whole or-
ganisms, but as a matter of definition the actions of parts of the organism
are not psychological actions. It would be a rare psychologist who suggested
that legs walk to the store or genitals make love, yet the idea that brains think
seems to be widely and uncritically accepted.
Since contextualistic behaviorism uses the term "behavior" for psycholog-
ical interactions, it is proper to say that cognition is behavior. This is not enough,
however. What kind of behavior is it?
Cognition as a kind o f knowing. Cognition is a kind of knowing. The word
"know" in English is a very interesting one, because it has two entirely distinct
etymological roots: the Latin words "gnoscere," meaning "know by the senses;
perception" and "scire," meaning "know by the mind; reason." The accident
of the similar pronunciation of these Latin words, combined with their related
meanings, lead in English to their collapse into a single verb: to know. Thus
knowing is commonly said to have two aspects: apprehending and compre-
hending. Originally, these were simply two different kinds of knowing.
Historically, cognitive psychology and behavior analysis each studied a single
kind of knowing. Behavior analysis studied knowing by direct contact with
the world (e.g., direct principles of contingency control), while cognitive psy-
chology studied knowing by indirect, logical means (e.g., principles of cogni-
tive mediation). It might be assumed that a more complete account could come
from their combination, but the contextualistic behaviorist can find little of
value in most of cognitive psychology, even if it is admitted that there are two
kinds of knowing. The philosophy and goals differ so dramatically that the
analytic constructions in one have little utility for the other.
In the hands of information processors, cognitive psychology is mechanistic.
The computer serves as the ultimate machine model. Hypothetico-deductive
theories are developed that purport to identify the true parts of this machine
via predictions of its functioning. The experimental preparations are for the
most part designed to isolate hypothesized cognitive components, rather than
to examine cognition as situated action. (The "talk aloud while thinking"
methods described by Ericsson & Simon, 1984 provide an interesting excep-
tion, but the exception proves the point. These methods were first used by John
Watson in 1920 and have been readily appreciated by modern behavior analysts,
e.g., Hayes, 1986; Wulfert, Dougher, & Greenway, 1991). Context is consid-
ered mechanically if at all. Cognitive processes are taken to be "synonymous
with brain processes" (Ellis & Hunt, 1983, p. 11), and thus reducible to the
isolated action of a part of the organism. No sense of the whole organism
interacting with the world is sustained.
Rather than attempt to combine the two fields, a more philosophically sen-
sible approach to greater completeness is for contextualistic behavior analysis
to develop analyses for both kinds of knowing. What, behaviorally, might
it mean to know the world indirectly, not through direct experience or con-
tact? This is where stimulus equivalence comes in.
Stimulus equivalence and the second kind o f knowing. If an event "A" has
238 H A Y E S & HAYES

a psychological function, and that event is in an equivalence relation with an-

other event "B", under certain conditions "B" may acquire a new psycholog-
ical function based on the function of "A" and the relation between "A" and
"B." Suppose a child is trained that the written word DOG is called "dog"
and that the word goes with actual dogs. We may say that the child has had
two relations directly trained: DOG ~ dog and DOG ~ "dog." Later the child
plays with a dog for the first time and enjo2cs it. We may say that dogs have
directly acquired various joyous functions by virtue o f the play. Now, upon
hearing his mother say "dogs" from another room the child may smile and
go to the other room even though a dog is not visible and the child has no
direct history of reinforcement for any of these activities in response to the
word "dog." The child knows something about the word "dogs," but it is an
indirect form of knowing.
This kind of effect has been shown in many studies. Transfer of discrimina-
tive functions have been shown across equivalence relations in simple equiva-
lence classes (Hayes, Brownstein, Devany, Kohlenberg, & Shelby, 1987; Koh-
lenberg, Hayes, & Hayes, 1991), and conditional equivalence classes (Wulfert
& Hayes, 1988), and across symmetrically related stimuli (e.g., Catania, Horne,
& Lowe, 1989; De Rose, Mcllvane, Dube, Galpin, & Stoddard, 1988; Lazar,
1977; Lazar & Kotlarchyk, 1986; Gatch & Osborne, 1989). Transfer of conse-
quential functions has also been shown (Hayes et al., 1987; Hayes, Kohlen-
berg, & Hayes, 1991).
Because this second kind of knowing occurs readily in verbal humans but
with difficulty or not at all in non-humans or non-verbal humans, it is easy
to see how behavior a n a l y s i s - w i t h its commitment to the animal behavior
t r a d i t i o n - a n d cognitive psychology have had so little to say to one another.
From a modern behavior analytic viewpoint, cognition may be defined as the
derivation of arbitrarily applicable stimulus relations. "Logic" and "reason"
refer to the derivation of such relations according to certain conventional rules.
Because these rules are themselves the product of (or an instantiation of) ar-
bitrarily applicable derived stimulus relations it is not correct to say that logic
or reason produce cognitive interactions-rather they are such interactions
(Hayes, 1989b).

Cognitive Control
We come now to the key issue of the relation between certain cognitive
e v e n t s - w e will use the words " t h o u g h t s " - a n d other forms of activity such
as emotion or overt behavior. In the cognitive tradition the link is mechanical.
Thus, the focus of therapy is on the nature or occurrence of particular thoughts.
If a person is thinking an "irrational" thought and then feeling anxious, the
focus of therapy would be on the presence of this thought or the sources of
its "irrational" form; that the thought leads to anxiety would be explained
on the basis of these same dimensions of presence and form.
Based on conceptualizations such as these, therapists can either: a) estab-
lish a new thought (e.g., the therapist may help the person relate "should" and
"irrational" for the first time); or b) make an old thought more or less likely
(e.g., asking a client to think "self-reinforcing" thoughts whenever a partic-
 CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CONTEXTUALISTIC BEHAVIORISM 239

ular situation has been faced). What is important about these approaches is
that the thought-emotion relation itself is not at issue, much as the movement
o f one end of a lever is easily explained by the pressure on the other end. The
two are mechanically linked.
The behavioral objection to this kind o f theorizing is pragmatic. Skinner
expanded the objection to such a degree that he saw little use in the analysis
of emotions or cognitions. The nature o f his objection, and the reasons for
his excessive expansion of the point, deserve a more extended discussion.
Cognition and the pragmatic purposes o f contextualistic behaviorism. The
conceptualization o f the relationship between thoughts and other activities
has assumed a variety of forms within behaviorism and behavior therapy (see
Figure 2). The Watsonian behaviorists essentially tried to eliminate non-motor
or glandular behavior from consideration, either because the existence of such
was in question or because an adequate method for their scientific study was
unavailable. A few early behavior therapists encouraged a focus on overt be-
havior only, on the assumption that thoughts (and feelings, etc.) would change
on their own. The current mainstream position in behavior therapy is that
a change in thoughts will produce changes in overt activity. Traditional as-
sociationistic forms of behavior therapy and cognitive therapy do not differ
in this regard. The idea that relaxation will encourage a phobic to approach
is philosophically the same as the idea that rational thoughts will do likewise.
Contextualistic behaviorism takes a different view. It has an interest in the
joint goals of description, prediction, control, and interpretation. The inclu-
sion of control puts certain constraints on the kinds of analyses that are useful
for the scientist, because only statements that point to events external to the
behavior of the individual organisms being studied can directly lead to con-
trol. Scientific rules are rules for scientists and their consumers, not rules for
the world. Since therapists a r e - a n d can only ever b e - i n another organisms's
environment, rules for modifying behavior must start there. Skinner said it
this way: "In practice, all these ways o f changing a man's mind reduce to
manipulating his environment, verbal or otherwise" (Skinner, 1969, p. 239).
O f course, analyses o f human action that do not seek control as a goal need
not be constrained in this way (Hayes & Brownstein, 1986), but in the world
of therapy such a goal is a s s u m e d - b y the client at least.
Thus, control as a goal forces a contextual focus to psychological analyses.
Mediational analyses of all kinds must be rejected when the supposed media-
tional elements are in principle non-manipulable (cf. Watkins, 1990). When
thinking is related to other psychological activities, a contextual behaviorist
has two things to point out: First, both forms o f activity are the dependent
variables of psychology and both occur in and with a context. A claim that
a thought controls overt behavior is at best the description of a behavior-
behavior relation. Second, a behavior-behavior relation is itself an event-in-
context.
The structure of the contextualist's point is the same whether one is speaking
o f the behavior effects of thinking, emoting, sensing, and so on. These are
all conceived of as behavior-behavior relations (where "behavior" is defined
as psychological activity), and such a relation itself is viewed as contextually
240 i ~ Y ~ s & HAYES

Conceptualizing the Relation Between

Thinking and Other Forms of Behaving

WATSONIAN METAPHYSICAL BEHAVIORISM

SOME PARTS OF TRADITIONAL BEHAVIOR THERAPY

Thoughts ~ Overt Behavior

COGNITIVE BEHAVIOR THERAPY

& MOST OF TRADITIONAL BEHAVIOR THERAPY

Thoughts ~ Overt Behavior

CONTEXTUALISTIC BEHAVIORISM

Thoughts ~ Overt Behavior

Behavior ~ Behavior

Context
FIG. 2, Four ways of conceptualizing the relationship between thinking and overt acting.

situated. Any behavior-behavior relation is inherently incomplete as an expla-

nation if one's goals include control because the direct application of this
knowledge is impossible. Behavior cannot be directly manipulated- only con-
textual variables have this quality. If causality is a way of speaking about how
to accomplish such goals, behavior-behavior relations can never be "causal"
for the contextual behaviorist.
 CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CONTEXTUALISTIC BEHAVIORISM 241

For example, the formulation "John does poorly because he thinks irra-
tional thoughts" must be rejected as a causal formulation, not because there
is no such thing as thinking or because there can be no relation between thinking
and other activity but because it is impossible to act directly given such a for-
mulation. To intervene, the clinician must do something (e.g., talk to the client).
Whatever is done will be the context for the client's future action. Therefore,
when measured against a pragmatic criterion, causal constructions must point
to ways of altering context, not to the effect of action cut off from context.
A more directly useful formulation would specify the contextual features that
participate in doing poorly, thinking irrationally, and in the relationship be-
tween them.
If one sought only prediction, thinking could be considered "causal" by
a contextualist, but it would be a rare therapist who sought only prediction.
If, conversely, one is a mechanist, it is quite legitimate to view thoughts as
causes, because causality for a mechanist is a description the operation of
the machine based on its parts, relations, and forces.
Skinner took the pragmatic point one step further. He argued that feelings,
cognitions, and so on were not important to the understanding of behavior
because the conditions that gave rise to feelings (etc.) were isomorphic with
those that gave rise to associated overt behavior. For example, while recog-
nizing that aversive events occasion both anxiety and avoidance, Skinner
claimed that "the middle term is of no functional significance, either in a the-
oretical analysis or in the practical control of behavior" (1953, p. 181). No
new contextual features emerge in the analysis of feeling or thoughts. In effect,
Skinner's radical behaviorism gave scientific legitimacy to cognition and emo-
tion with one hand, but took away their practical importance with the other
(Parrott, 1986).
There is a flaw in Skinner's reasoning that is revealed in the stimulus equiva-
lence phenomenon. The histories that give rise to the derivation of stimulus
relations and the transfer of control seen in equivalence are not the histories
that establish a particular instance of a trained stimulus relation.
In an organism without derived stimulus relations of this kind-without
the second kind of knowing- Skinner is entirely correct. If all psychological
history is either direct or indirect based upon formal properties of events (e.g.,
stimulus generalization), an analysis of overt behavior can always ignore the
phenomena of emotion and cognition. A rat who is afraid and avoids some
particular circumstance does not avoid it because of fear. Rather, both the
fear and the avoidance are due to a direct and identical history with that cir-
cumstance (of shock, for example). There is, as a result, no need to study fear
as a means of understanding avoidance.
In verbal organisms the situation is different. The conditions that gave rise
to fear and avoidance, and the fear and avoidance themselves, may all enter
into networks of derived stimulus relations. The social/verbal history of the
person participates in the overt behavior. Verbal organisms have a history with
both kinds of knowing. A thought-overt behavior relation involves both, and
analyzing the thought leads to a contextual analysis of a key feature of the
total event. For example, a verbal adult has learned many verbal rules about
242 HAYES & HAYES

fear and what it means to be fearful. In situations viewed as fearful by the

person (such as feeling closed in at a mall), this verbal history is part of the
total event. No amount of understanding of a person's direct history with malls
is sufficient to understand the role of these indirect forms of knowing. For
this reason, understanding the behavior-behavior relations between thinking
and overt action, emotion and overt action, and so on, can be crucial to un-
derstanding a given instance of behavior.
We earlier defined contextualistic behaviorism on the basis of its view of
the psychological level of analysis, a commitment to contextually delimited
constructs, a pragmatic view of truth, and on the basis of its goals. The anal-
ysis of cognition has these same features. Cognition is viewed as an interac-
tion of a whole organism in and with a context. The analysis of cognitive con-
trol is explicitly pragmatic, and is guided by the goal of controlling the
phenomenon. Many common analyses are rejected as a result.

Implications for Cognition and Therapy

The contextualistic behavior conceptualization leads to an entirely different
range o f therapeutic approaches. Instead of focusing on the presence or ab-
sence of cognitive events, contextual variables can be manipulated to poten-
tiate or depotentiate the thinking-acting (behavior-behavior) relation itself.
Whereas cognitive therapy has focused on a change in the form of private
events, contextual therapies focus on changing their function without neces-
sarily changing their form.
When an individual derives a stimulus relation, this action occurs in a con-
text established by the social/verbal community. Basic research on stimulus
relation derivation has shown contextual control over both the form of rela-
tions derived (e.g., Steele & Hayes, 1991; Wulfert & Hayes, 1988) and the transfer
of functions through these relations (e.g., Hayes, Kohlenberg, & Hayes, 1991;
Hayes, Thompson, & Hayes, 1989). Thus, the impact of derived relations is
itself contextually sensitive.
Suppose an agoraphobic thinks "I am going to humiliate myself in this mall,"
then starts to feel panicky, and leaves the mall. A contextualistic behaviorist
would not explain the panic or escape on the basis of the form of the thought
per se, but on the contexts giving rise to the thought-emotion or thought-overt
behavior relation. These contexts include a) those that give meaning to the
content of the thought, or the context of literal meaning; b) those that estab-
lish the valence of humiliation, or the context of evaluation; c) those that allow
the person to "explain" and "justify" behavior on the basis of the private events,
or the context of reason-giving; and d) those that establish the goal of avoiding
"undesirable" private events, or the context of emotional and cognitive control.
Instead of trying to change the thought or the emotion, the therapist can
change these contexts in an attempt to change the behavior-behavior relation
itself (Hayes, 1987; Hayes, Kohlenberg, & Melancon, 1989; Hayes & Melancon,
1989). We will give a brief example of contextual strategies for depotentiating
a behavior-behavior relation in each of these four cases. Some of the examples
are trivial, but they have been selected for the ease with which the point can
be made.
 CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CONTEXTUALISTIC BEHAVIORISM 243

a) The context of literal meaning depends upon socially conventional equiva-

lence classes and other derived stimulus relations. Altering that context re-
quires altering the "meaningful" use of language, not by providing new equiva-
lence classes (e.g., new thoughts or new beliefs), but by using language in ways
that are confusing, nonsensical, arational, or experiential. To take one example
originally used by Titchner in demonstrating his context theory of meaning,
(Lundin, 1990), if the person said the word "humiliation" over and over again
very fast for perhaps 5 minutes, the word would temporarily loose all rela-
tional functions, retaining only its auditory functions. This would not have
lasting impact in itself, but would help the client see that literal meaning is
a contextually-controlled phenomenon, and the issue may not be the form
of the thinking but the contexts that determine the impact of thinking.
Similarly in Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) the beginning
client is gravely warned by the therapist not to believe a word the therapist
is saying (Hayes, 1987). This kind of statement attacks literal meaning, be-
cause if it is itself believed then it must not be believed.
With enough attacks of this kind of literal meaning, the stimulus function
of verbal events may begin to depend less on their literal (conventional) meaning
and more on their role as a guide to effective action. Many thoughts, no matter
how "reasonable," have proven themselves to be useless guides to action. For
example, the obsessive-compulsive has repeatedly experienced the futility of
effortfully trying to eliminate undesirable thoughts. In this context, we would
argue that the obsessive-compulsive is trying to follow a completely reason-
able rule: "I don't like thinking X; therefore do not think X." Unfortunately,
"do not think X" is itself a thought about X and is thus doomed to fail. The
client has repeatedly experienced the worthlessness of this thought as a guide
to action, and yet its literal reasonableness is so great that it is hard to abandon.
Rather than argue logically with an eminently reasonable thought, an alter-
native is to attack the hegemony of literal meaning itself.
b) The context of evaluation is based on conventional verbal agreements
about what is bad and good. When combined with literal meaning, evalua-
tions present themselves not as actions, but as actions of the world: we say
"that is bad" not "that is, and I evaluate it as bad." Such a verbally-established
illusion structures our environment in a powerful way because it hides the in-
direct and arbitrary nature of evaluation and places it in the world of things.
If this very process is a problem, it does no good for a clinician to attempt
to alter evaluative statements directly (e.g., "you shouldn't say should") be-
cause the clinician is using the selfsame context of evaluation. The context
of evaluation is challenged by refusing to order events evaluatively. To take
one example, also from ACT, a therapist might take any report of any emo-
tion, thought, memory, and so on, regardless of its conventional valence, and
respond to it positively but non-differentially. This should challenge the con-
text of evaluation because the therapist's openness would not depend upon
the evaluative content. Example: Client - " I am worried I'll humiliate myself";
Therapist - "Wonderful. That's really neat. Tell me about that."
c) The context of reason-giving is established by the tendency of the verbal
community to support actions if a sufficiently good explanation is given for
244 nAVES i HAYES

them. Often reasons for one action devolve into the presence of other actions
(e.g., "I couldn't go because I was afraid" or "I did it because I was worried
about you."). When these verbal linkages are supported by listeners, the
behavior-behavior relation itself is also supported because the presence of one
behavior signals altered contingencies surrounding the other.
For example, a slight illness that would never lead to cancelling an impor-
tant engagement might lead to cancelling an undesirable appointment. The
cancellation can be done "with a clear conscience" and a ready and "honest"
excuse is available, even to oneself. Reason-giving thus tends to glue behaviors
together in conventional ways. A variety of strategies might challenge reason-
giving. It could be challenged directly. For example, if a client is asked "why"
repeatedly, the shallowness of reason-giving quickly emerges: C l i e n t - " I
decided I had to leave, even though it didn't make sense," T h e r a p i s t - " w h y
did you decide that?", Client-"well, I just wanted to go," Therapist - "why
did you want that?", C l i e n t - " I don't know! Why are you asking me this?"
Usually within about four "whys" the verbal structure of reasonableness begins
to fray, to be replaced by irritation at the "unreasonable" behavior of the ther-
apist. Reason-giving could be challenged more indirectly simply by treating
reason-giving as a thing to be noticed rather than an explanation to be taken
literally. Example: C l i e n t - " I just had to leave. I had no choice." T h e r a p i s t -
"That's an interesting thought. You ought to thank your mind for that one.
What else has your mind had to say?"
d) The context of emotional control is a core issue for many clients. It is
common for clients to come into therapy with a list of undesirable thoughts,
feelings, memories, and bodily sensations that seemingly need to be removed,
altered, or avoided, and indeed we as therapists name most of the disorders
we treat and the treatments themselves in the same way ("anxiety disorders,"
"anxiety management," and so on). Emotional control glues behaviors together
because usually implicit in the effort to change feeling X is that if it doesn't
change some other form of activity cannot occur (e.g., "I can't travel! I'm too
anxious!"). The context of emotional control is often challenged in acceptance-
oriented approaches through deliberate exercises that create the private events
that are being avoided. Although emotional control has been massively sup-
ported in mainstream behavior therapy, the recent interest in acceptance-based
approaches in behavior therapy shows signs of possible changes to come (e.g.,
Hayes, 1991b; Jacobson, 1991b). In ACT numerous metaphors and exercises
try to make evident the pervasiveness and uselessness of emotional control
efforts. Often efforts are made to take the client's own words and turn them
from emotional control declarations into emotional exposure declarations.
For example, a depressed client might say "I'll never do well until I feel better"
to which the therapist might reply "I think that's right. You won't do well until
you do a better job of feeling what is here to be f e l t - u n t i l you feel better."
Later on, every time "feel better" is used by the client to explain why some
feeling has to change, "feel better" can be brought up to shift the issue.
Contextual strategies often seem confusing or paradoxical toclients because
they fail to address content in the normal way. Contextual strategies neither
 CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CONTEXTUALISTIC BEHAVIORISM 245

agree with nor disagree with the content of clients' self-verbalizations. Rather,
they place these activities into a different social/verbal context. For example,
in the context of evaluation and emotional control, "negative thoughts" must
be changed. These contexts are so ubiquitous that their presence is hardly no-
ticed. A client complaining of being terribly worried or terribly anxious im-
plicitly expects a therapist to agree that worry or anxiety is bad and must be
removed. If the therapist does not behave accordingly, the client will often
be extremely confused- as if the natural order of things is being challenged.
In the different social/verbal context of deliteralization and emotional accep-
tance, thoughts evaluated as negative may simply be noticed, with no efforts
either to change them or to behave in accord with them. There is no necessary
reason that worry or anxiety or sadness or any private event must be removed
if their disruptive effects are dependent upon particular contexts. A second
alternative exists: change the contexts.
In principle, there is no reason that the direct cognitive strategies and the
contextual strategies could not be combined. For example, a cognitive ther-
apist might arrange conditions that potentiate a thought-emotion relation in
order to provide more evidence for the need to modify thoughts themselves.
Ellis (1962) has long combined cognitive control with acceptance strategies,
as has Barlow and others (e.g., Barlow & Craske, 1989; Barlow, Craske, Cerny,
& Klosko, 1989). For our purposes it is more important to see that purely con-
textual forms of therapy are also possible, in which cognitions are dealt with
continuously and deliberately, but without any interest in creating new thoughts
or modifying the probability of old ones (e.g., Hayes, 1987). The reason this
is important for the topic is that it shows how unusual and counter-intuitive
therapy alternatives flow from contextualistic behavioral philosophy. The data
on the impact of such strategies are limited, but those that are available show
both that these strategies can make an impact on a variety of disorders (Biglan,
1990; Hayes, 1987; Zettle, 1984; Zettle & Raines, 1989) and that they work
through different psychological processes than cognitive strategies (Khor-
akiwala, 1990; McCurry, 1991; Zettle & Hayes, 1986; Zettle & Raines, 1989).

Conclusion
Contextualistic behaviorism is a subtle position, with assumptions that differ
radically from normal ways of thinking about the world. We have considered
the topic of cognition in this article, but we might instead have analyzed the
role of sense of self, of consciousness, or the therapeutic relationship, or dozens
of other areas where the therapeutic implications of this approach are novel
and non-obvious. The therapeutic value of ideas is ultimately an empirical
matter, but it is important to have a range of ideas to test. Behavior therapy
has been relying on common sense, associationism, and cognitive theory for
many years. Perhaps a renewed and enlightened examination of contemporary
behaviorism will provide an alternative source of technical innovation and
theoretical analysis.
246 HAYES • ~_~YES

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RECEIVED: September 6, 1991

ACCEPTED: January 17, 1992