G.R. No.

133250 July 9, 2002

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
This is an original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. The petition
seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari
Coastal Bay and Development Corporation ("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA
from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation.
The Facts
On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract
also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in
consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to
reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands."1 On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the
foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay"2 under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future
works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA." Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated
December 29, 1981, which stated:
"(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation, construction, and such other works in the MCCRRP as may be agreed upon by the parties, to be
paid according to progress of works on a unit price/lump sum basis for items of work to be agreed upon, subject to price escalation,
retention and other terms and conditions provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1594. All the financing required for such works shall be
provided by PEA.
xxx
(iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its development rights and hereby agrees to cede and transfer in favor of PEA, all of the rights, title, interest
and participation of CDCP in and to all the areas of land reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP as of December 30, 1981 which have not yet been
sold, transferred or otherwise disposed of by CDCP as of said date, which areas consist of approximately Ninety-Nine Thousand Four
Hundred Seventy Three (99,473) square meters in the Financial Center Area covered by land pledge No. 5 and approximately Three Million
Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (3,382,888) square meters of reclaimed areas at varying elevations above
Mean Low Water Level located outside the Financial Center Area and the First Neighborhood Unit."3
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land
so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine hundred
fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the
Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed
islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City. The Freedom
Islands have a total land area of One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and Forty One (1,578,441) square meters
or 157.841 hectares.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the
Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to
complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the
JVA through negotiation without public bidding.4 On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the
JVA.5 On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.6
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the
"grandmother of all scams." As a result, the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The Senate Committees reported the results of their
investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997.7 Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed
lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable
lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA
itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to
conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force were the
Secretary of Justice,8 the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel,9 and the Government Corporate Counsel.10 The Legal Task Force upheld the
legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees.11
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that there were on-going renegotiations between PEA and
AMARI under an order issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos. According to these reports, PEA Director Nestor Kalaw, PEA Chairman
Arsenio Yulo and retired Navy Officer Sergio Cruz composed the negotiating panel of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for Prohibition with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994 seeking to nullify the JVA. The Court dismissed the petition "for
unwarranted disregard of judicial hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling of the case before the proper court."12
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions
of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the
JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks to
enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion.
After several motions for extension of time,13 PEA and AMARI filed their Comments on October 19, 1998 and June 25, 1998, respectively.
Meanwhile, on December 28, 1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to require PEA to submit the terms of the renegotiated PEA-
AMARI contract; (b) for issuance of a temporary restraining order; and (c) to set the case for hearing on oral argument. Petitioner filed a
Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated May 26, 1999, which the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22, 1999.
In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement ("Amended JVA," for brevity). On May 28, 1999, the Office
of the President under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory grounds
the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."14
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioner, PEA15 and AMARI16 are as follows:
I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE PETITION ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;
II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR FAILING TO OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE GOVERNING THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS;
III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;
IV. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING THIS SUIT;
V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION INCLUDES OFFICIAL INFORMATION ON ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS
BEFORE A FINAL AGREEMENT;
VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT FOR THE TRANSFER TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS,
RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; AND
VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER FORUM FOR RAISING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT
IS GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.
The Court's Ruling
First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and academic because of subsequent events.
The petition prays that PEA publicly disclose the "terms and conditions of the on-going negotiations for a new agreement." The petition also
prays that the Court enjoin PEA from "privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any new agreement with AMARI."
PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot and academic because AMARI furnished petitioner on June 21, 1999 a copy of the signed
Amended JVA containing the terms and conditions agreed upon in the renegotiations. Thus, PEA has satisfied petitioner's prayer for a public
disclosure of the renegotiations. Likewise, petitioner's prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA is now moot because PEA and AMARI
have already signed the Amended JVA on March 30, 1999. Moreover, the Office of the President has approved the Amended JVA on May 28,
1999.
Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue by simply fast-tracking the signing and approval of the
Amended JVA before the Court could act on the issue. Presidential approval does not resolve the constitutional issue or remove it from the
ambit of judicial review.
We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the President cannot operate to moot the petition and
divest the Court of its jurisdiction. PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the
Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed
one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of Section 3, Article XII
of the Constitution, which prohibits the government from alienating lands of the public domain to private corporations. If the Amended JVA
indeed violates the Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to enjoin its implementation, and if already implemented, to annul the effects of
such unconstitutional contract.
The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but one which seeks to transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of
reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila Bay to a single private corporation. It now becomes more compelling for the Court to
resolve the issue to insure the government itself does not violate a provision of the Constitution intended to safeguard the national
patrimony. Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave
violation of the Constitution. In the instant case, if the Amended JVA runs counter to the Constitution, the Court can still prevent the transfer
of title and ownership of alienable lands of the public domain in the name of AMARI. Even in cases where supervening events had made the
cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the
bench, bar, and the public.17
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression. All previous decisions of the Court involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution,18 covered agricultural lands sold to private corporations which
acquired the lands from private parties. The transferors of the private corporations claimed or could claim the right to judicial confirmation
of their imperfect titles19 under Title II of Commonwealth Act. 141 ("CA No. 141" for brevity). In the instant case, AMARI seeks to acquire
from PEA, a public corporation, reclaimed lands and submerged areas for non-agricultural purposes by purchase under PD No. 1084
(charter of PEA) and Title III of CA No. 141. Certain undertakings by AMARI under the Amended JVA constitute the consideration for the
purchase. Neither AMARI nor PEA can claim judicial confirmation of their titles because the lands covered by the Amended JVA are newly
reclaimed or still to be reclaimed. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title requires open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain for at least thirty years since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Besides, the deadline for filing applications for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title expired on December 31, 1987.20
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition because of the possible transfer at any time by
PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the
latter's seventy percent proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses. The Amended JVA even allows AMARI to
mortgage at any time the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the reclamation project.21
Second issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to observe the principle governing the hierarchy of courts.
PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly from the Court. The principle of hierarchy of courts
applies generally to cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues. The
instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public.22 The Court can resolve this case without
determining any factual issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction
of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.
Third issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
PEA faults petitioner for seeking judicial intervention in compelling PEA to disclose publicly certain information without first asking PEA the
needed information. PEA claims petitioner's direct resort to the Court violates the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It also
violates the rule that mandamus may issue only if there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
PEA distinguishes the instant case from Tañada v. Tuvera23 where the Court granted the petition for mandamus even if the petitioners there
did not initially demand from the Office of the President the publication of the presidential decrees. PEA points out that in Tañada, the
Executive Department had an affirmative statutory duty under Article 2 of the Civil Code24 and Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63825 to
publish the presidential decrees. There was, therefore, no need for the petitioners in Tañada to make an initial demand from the Office of the
President. In the instant case, PEA claims it has no affirmative statutory duty to disclose publicly information about its renegotiation of the
JVA. Thus, PEA asserts that the Court must apply the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies to the instant case in view of the
failure of petitioner here to demand initially from PEA the needed information.
The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands held by PEA, a government corporation. Under Section 79 of the Government
Auditing Code,26 the disposition of government lands to private parties requires public bidding. PEA was under a positive legal duty to
disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The law obligated PEA to make this public disclosure even without
demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA failed to make this public disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the
result of a negotiated contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the public
disclosure, and was even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention.
Moreover, and this alone is determinative of this issue, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue
involved is a purely legal or constitutional question.27 The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by
PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations. We rule that the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case.
Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit
PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to institute mandamus proceedings to enforce his constitutional right to information without a
showing that PEA refused to perform an affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution. PEA also claims that petitioner has not shown
that he will suffer any concrete injury because of the signing or implementation of the Amended JVA. Thus, there is no actual controversy
requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties.
There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second is the
application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino
citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA to disclose publicly information on the sale of government lands worth billions of
pesos, information which the Constitution and statutory law mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from
alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a
constitutional duty to the nation.
Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public. In Chavez v. PCGG,28 the Court upheld the right of a citizen
to bring a taxpayer's suit on matters of transcendental importance to the public, thus -
"Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses is an issue of 'transcendental importance to
the public.' He asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of
government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they 'immediately affect the social,
economic and moral well being of the people.'
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right, such as in this case. He invokes several decisions of this Court which have set aside the procedural matter of locus standi, when
the subject of the case involved public interest.
xxx
In Tañada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public right and the object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement
of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is
interested in the execution of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result of the action. In the aforesaid
case, the petitioners sought to enforce their right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right then recognized in Section 6, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution, in connection with the rule that laws in order to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette
or otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling for the petitioners' legal standing, the Court declared that the right they sought to be
enforced 'is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.'
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while reiterating Tañada, further declared that 'when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the general
'public' which possesses the right.'
Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public funds may not have been involved under the questioned contract for the
development, management and operation of the Manila International Container Terminal, 'public interest [was] definitely involved
considering the important role [of the subject contract] . . . in the economic development of the country and the magnitude of the financial
consideration involved.' We concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure provision in the Constitution would constitute sufficient
authority for upholding the petitioner's standing.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to official records, documents and papers — a
right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of
the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a
public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar should be allowed."
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights - to information and to the
equitable diffusion of natural resources - matters of transcendental public importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final
agreement.
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to information on matters of public concern in this manner:
"Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." (Emphasis supplied)
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people's right to information on matters of
public concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus:
"Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest." (Emphasis supplied)
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well as
provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights. These twin provisions are essential to the
exercise of freedom of expression. If the government does not disclose its official acts, transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever
citizens say, even if expressed without any restraint, will be speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions are also essential to
hold public officials "at all times x x x accountable to the people,"29 for unless citizens have the proper information, they cannot hold public
officials accountable for anything. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation
of government policies and their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any
democracy. As explained by the Court in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.30 –
"An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and
the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may
perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and
thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to
information relating thereto can such bear fruit."
PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,31 that in cases of on-going negotiations the right to information is limited to "definite propositions of the
government." PEA maintains the right does not include access to "intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during
the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the 'exploratory stage'."
Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the pre-decisional stage or before the closing of the transaction. To support
its contention, AMARI cites the following discussion in the 1986 Constitutional Commission:
"Mr. Suarez. And when we say 'transactions' which should be distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the
Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?
Mr. Ople: The 'transactions' used here, I suppose is generic and therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract and already a
consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
Mr. Suarez: This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction.
Mr. Ople: Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.
Mr. Suarez: Thank you."32 (Emphasis supplied)
AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can invoke the right. Requiring government officials to reveal
their deliberations at the pre-decisional stage will degrade the quality of decision-making in government agencies. Government officials will
hesitate to express their real sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate public dissemination of their discussions, putting them
under all kinds of pressure before they decide.
We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding requires PEA to disclose publicly, and information the
constitutional right to information requires PEA to release to the public. Before the consummation of the contract, PEA must, on its own and
without demand from anyone, disclose to the public matters relating to the disposition of its property. These include the size, location,
technical description and nature of the property being disposed of, the terms and conditions of the disposition, the parties qualified to bid,
the minimum price and similar information. PEA must prepare all these data and disclose them to the public at the start of the disposition
process, long before the consummation of the contract, because the Government Auditing Code requires public bidding. If PEA fails to make
this disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA this information at any time during the bidding process.
Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not
immediately accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no "official acts,
transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises
a "definite proposition" on the part of the government. From this moment, the public's right to information attaches, and any citizen can
access all the non-proprietary information leading to such definite proposition. In Chavez v. PCGG,33 the Court ruled as follows:
"Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other
government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the
ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not
necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the
process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There is need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of
information in general, as discussed earlier – such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and
other classified information." (Emphasis supplied)
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission understood that the right to
information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a consummated
contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is
consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.1âwphi1.nêt
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the
government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a
situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in
the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an
emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest."
The right covers three categories of information which are "matters of public concern," namely: (1) official records; (2) documents and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions and decisions; and (3) government research data used in formulating policies. The first
category refers to any document that is part of the public records in the custody of government agencies or officials. The second category
refers to documents and papers recording, evidencing, establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining official acts, transactions
or decisions of government agencies or officials. The third category refers to research data, whether raw, collated or processed, owned by
the government and used in formulating government policies.
The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and expert
opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of reference and other documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA. However,
the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation of the
JVA.34 The right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who
exercises the right must copy the records, documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable
regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when
and how to conduct the inspection and copying.35
The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the separation of powers.36 The
right does not also apply to information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on
investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused, which courts have long recognized as
confidential.37 The right may also be subject to other limitations that Congress may impose by law.
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. The
information does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like
internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress,38 are recognized
as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas
and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-
making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. 39 This is not the situation in the instant case.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract.
The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like
privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order. 40 Congress has also
prescribed other limitations on the right to information in several legislations.41
Sixth issue: whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the
Constitution.
The Regalian Doctrine
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine which holds that the State owns all
lands and waters of the public domain. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all "lands, territories and possessions" in
the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.42 The King, as the sovereign ruler and representative of the people, acquired and owned all
lands and territories in the Philippines except those he disposed of by grant or sale to private individuals.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the State, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all
lands and waters of the public domain. The Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the time-honored principle of land ownership that "all
lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."43 Article 339 of the Civil
Code of 1889, which is now Article 420 of the Civil Code of 1950, incorporated the Regalian doctrine.
Ownership and Disposition of Reclaimed Lands
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was the first statutory law governing the ownership and disposition of reclaimed lands in the
Philippines. On May 18, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which provided for the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed
lands of the government to corporations and individuals. Later, on November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature approved Act No. 2874,
the Public Land Act, which authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals.
On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, which authorized the
lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. CA No. 141 continues to this day as the
general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain.
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and the Civil Code of 1889
Under the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the shores, bays, coves, inlets and all waters within the maritime zone of the Spanish territory
belonged to the public domain for public use.44 The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 allowed the reclamation of the sea under Article 5, which
provided as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons,
with proper permission, shall become the property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the
grant of authority."
Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land reclaimed from the sea belonged to the party undertaking the reclamation, provided the government
issued the necessary permit and did not reserve ownership of the reclaimed land to the State.
Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is –
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores,
roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is employed in some public service, or in the
development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and mines, until granted to
private individuals."
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In contrast, property devoted to public service referred to
property used for some specific public service and open only to those authorized to use the property.
Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also to property not so used but employed to develop
the national wealth. This class of property constituted property of public dominion although employed for some economic or commercial
activity to increase the national wealth.
Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889 governed the re-classification of property of public dominion into private property, to wit:
"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to the defense of the territory, shall become a part of the
private property of the State."
This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the executive department pursuant to law, must declare the property no
longer needed for public use or territorial defense before the government could lease or alienate the property to private parties.45
Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission
On May 8, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which regulated the lease of reclaimed and foreshore lands. The salient
provisions of this law were as follows:
"Section 1. The control and disposition of the foreshore as defined in existing law, and the title to all Government or public lands made or
reclaimed by the Government by dredging or filling or otherwise throughout the Philippine Islands, shall be retained by the
Government without prejudice to vested rights and without prejudice to rights conceded to the City of Manila in the Luneta Extension.
Section 2. (a) The Secretary of the Interior shall cause all Government or public lands made or reclaimed by the Government by dredging or
filling or otherwise to be divided into lots or blocks, with the necessary streets and alleyways located thereon, and shall cause plats and
plans of such surveys to be prepared and filed with the Bureau of Lands.
(b) Upon completion of such plats and plans the Governor-General shall give notice to the public that such parts of the lands so made or
reclaimed as are not needed for public purposes will be leased for commercial and business purposes, x x x.
xxx
(e) The leases above provided for shall be disposed of to the highest and best bidder therefore, subject to such regulations and
safeguards as the Governor-General may by executive order prescribe." (Emphasis supplied)
Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain title to all lands reclaimed by the government. The Act also vested in the
government control and disposition of foreshore lands. Private parties could lease lands reclaimed by the government only if these lands
were no longer needed for public purpose. Act No. 1654 mandated public bidding in the lease of government reclaimed lands. Act No. 1654
made government reclaimed lands sui generis in that unlike other public lands which the government could sell to private parties, these
reclaimed lands were available only for lease to private parties.
Act No. 1654, however, did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Act No. 1654 did not prohibit private parties from
reclaiming parts of the sea under Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters. Lands reclaimed from the sea by private parties with government
permission remained private lands.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
On November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act.46 The salient provisions of Act No. 2874, on
reclaimed lands, were as follows:
"Sec. 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to
time classify the lands of the public domain into –
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands, x x x.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the government and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the Governor-General, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession under this Act."
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited or classified x x x.
xxx
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, shall be classified as suitable for residential
purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural purposes, and shall be open to disposition
or concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.
Sec. 56. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
x x x.
Sec. 58. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-six shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not
otherwise, as soon as the Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall
declare that the same are not necessary for the public service and are open to disposition under this chapter. The lands included in
class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under the provisions of this Act." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 6 of Act No. 2874 authorized the Governor-General to "classify lands of the public domain into x x x alienable or disposable" 47 lands.
Section 7 of the Act empowered the Governor-General to "declare what lands are open to disposition or concession." Section 8 of the Act
limited alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified."
Section 56 of Act No. 2874 stated that lands "disposable under this title 48 shall be classified" as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
lands, as well as other lands. All these lands, however, must be suitable for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive non-
agricultural purposes. These provisions vested upon the Governor-General the power to classify inalienable lands of the public domain into
disposable lands of the public domain. These provisions also empowered the Governor-General to classify further such disposable lands of
the public domain into government reclaimed, foreshore or marshy lands of the public domain, as well as other non-agricultural lands.
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that disposable lands of the public domain classified as government reclaimed, foreshore
and marshy lands "shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise." The Governor-General, before allowing the
lease of these lands to private parties, must formally declare that the lands were "not necessary for the public service." Act No. 2874
reiterated the State policy to lease and not to sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain, a policy first
enunciated in 1907 in Act No. 1654. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain that the government could not sell to private parties.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy public lands for non-agricultural purposes
retain their inherent potential as areas for public service. This is the reason the government prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease,
of these lands to private parties. The State always reserved these lands for some future public service.
Act No. 2874 did not authorize the reclassification of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands
under Section 56 (d). Lands falling under Section 56 (d) were the only lands for non-agricultural purposes the government could sell to
private parties. Thus, under Act No. 2874, the government could not sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands to private
parties, unless the legislature passed a law allowing their sale.49
Act No. 2874 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea pursuant to Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
Lands reclaimed from the sea by private parties with government permission remained private lands.
Dispositions under the 1935 Constitution
On May 14, 1935, the 1935 Constitution took effect upon its ratification by the Filipino people. The 1935 Constitution, in adopting the
Regalian doctrine, declared in Section 1, Article XIII, that –
"Section 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development,
or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which
is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no
license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant."
(Emphasis supplied)
The 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural lands, which were the only natural resources
the State could alienate. Thus, foreshore lands, considered part of the State's natural resources, became inalienable by constitutional fiat,
available only for lease for 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The government could alienate foreshore lands only after these lands
were reclaimed and classified as alienable agricultural lands of the public domain. Government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public
domain, being neither timber nor mineral lands, fell under the classification of public agricultural lands. 50 However, government reclaimed
and marshy lands, although subject to classification as disposable public agricultural lands, could only be leased and not sold to private
parties because of Act No. 2874.
The prohibition on private parties from acquiring ownership of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain was only a
statutory prohibition and the legislature could therefore remove such prohibition. The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit individuals and
corporations from acquiring government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain that were classified as agricultural lands under
existing public land laws. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution provided as follows:
"Section 2. No private corporation or association may acquire, lease, or hold public agricultural lands in excess of one thousand and
twenty four hectares, nor may any individual acquire such lands by purchase in excess of one hundred and forty hectares, or by lease
in excess of one thousand and twenty-four hectares, or by homestead in excess of twenty-four hectares. Lands adapted to grazing, not
exceeding two thousand hectares, may be leased to an individual, private corporation, or association." (Emphasis supplied)
Still, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the legislature did not repeal Section 58 of Act No. 2874 to open for sale to private parties
government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain. On the contrary, the legislature continued the long established State policy of
retaining for the government title and ownership of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine National Assembly
On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly approved Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, which compiled the
then existing laws on lands of the public domain. CA No. 141, as amended, remains to this day the existing general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands. 51
Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the President to classify lands of the public domain into "alienable or disposable"52 lands of the public
domain, which prior to such classification are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Section 7 of CA No. 141 authorizes the President
to "declare what lands are open to disposition or concession." Section 8 of CA No. 141 states that the government can declare open for
disposition or concession only lands that are "officially delimited and classified." Sections 6, 7 and 8 of CA No. 141 read as follows:
"Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the
lands of the public domain into –
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, 53 for the purpose of their administration and
disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the President, upon recommendation
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under
this Act.
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and classified and,
when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor
in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may
be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. x x x."
Thus, before the government could alienate or dispose of lands of the public domain, the President must first officially classify these lands as
alienable or disposable, and then declare them open to disposition or concession. There must be no law reserving these lands for public or
quasi-public uses.
The salient provisions of CA No. 141, on government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain, are as follows:
"Sec. 58. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, is intended to be used for residential
purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural, and is open to disposition or concession,
shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter and not otherwise.
Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
Sec. 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the case may be, to any person, corporation, or association
authorized to purchase or lease public lands for agricultural purposes. x x x.
Sec. 61. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-nine shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not
otherwise, as soon as the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture, shall declare that the same are not necessary
for the public service and are open to disposition under this chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease
under the provisions of this Act." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 61 of CA No. 141 readopted, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, Section 58 of Act No. 2874 prohibiting the sale of
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the public domain. All these lands are intended for residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural purposes. As before, Section 61 allowed only the lease of such lands to private parties. The
government could sell to private parties only lands falling under Section 59 (d) of CA No. 141, or those lands for non-agricultural purposes
not classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the public domain. Foreshore lands, however, became
inalienable under the 1935 Constitution which only allowed the lease of these lands to qualified private parties.
Section 58 of CA No. 141 expressly states that disposable lands of the public domain intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other
productive purposes other than agricultural "shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter and not otherwise." Under Section
10 of CA No. 141, the term "disposition" includes lease of the land. Any disposition of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes must comply with Chapter IX, Title III of CA No. 141,54 unless a subsequent law amended or
repealed these provisions.
In his concurring opinion in the landmark case of Republic Real Estate Corporation v. Court of Appeals,55 Justice Reynato S. Puno
summarized succinctly the law on this matter, as follows:
"Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended for public use. So too are lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or
other means. Act 1654 mandated that the control and disposition of the foreshore and lands under water remained in the national
government. Said law allowed only the 'leasing' of reclaimed land. The Public Land Acts of 1919 and 1936 also declared that the foreshore
and lands reclaimed by the government were to be "disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise." Before leasing, however,
the Governor-General, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, had first to determine that the land
reclaimed was not necessary for the public service. This requisite must have been met before the land could be disposed of. But even then,
the foreshore and lands under water were not to be alienated and sold to private parties. The disposition of the reclaimed land was
only by lease. The land remained property of the State." (Emphasis supplied)
As observed by Justice Puno in his concurring opinion, "Commonwealth Act No. 141 has remained in effect at present."
The State policy prohibiting the sale to private parties of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain,
first implemented in 1907 was thus reaffirmed in CA No. 141 after the 1935 Constitution took effect. The prohibition on the sale of foreshore
lands, however, became a constitutional edict under the 1935 Constitution. Foreshore lands became inalienable as natural resources of the
State, unless reclaimed by the government and classified as agricultural lands of the public domain, in which case they would fall under the
classification of government reclaimed lands.
After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain continued to be only
leased and not sold to private parties.56 These lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain the
government could not sell to private parties.
Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the
public domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale. CA No. 141 does not authorize the President to reclassify government
reclaimed and marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 59 (d). Lands classified under Section 59 (d) are the only
alienable or disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes that the government could sell to private parties.
Moreover, Section 60 of CA No. 141 expressly requires congressional authority before lands under Section 59 that the government
previously transferred to government units or entities could be sold to private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 declares that –
"Sec. 60. x x x The area so leased or sold shall be such as shall, in the judgment of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, be
reasonably necessary for the purposes for which such sale or lease is requested, and shall not exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares:
Provided, however, That this limitation shall not apply to grants, donations, or transfers made to a province, municipality or branch or
subdivision of the Government for the purposes deemed by said entities conducive to the public interest; but the land so granted, donated,
or transferred to a province, municipality or branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated, encumbered, or
otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress: x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
The congressional authority required in Section 60 of CA No. 141 mirrors the legislative authority required in Section 56 of Act No. 2874.
One reason for the congressional authority is that Section 60 of CA No. 141 exempted government units and entities from the maximum area
of public lands that could be acquired from the State. These government units and entities should not just turn around and sell these lands to
private parties in violation of constitutional or statutory limitations. Otherwise, the transfer of lands for non-agricultural purposes to
government units and entities could be used to circumvent constitutional limitations on ownership of alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain. In the same manner, such transfers could also be used to evade the statutory prohibition in CA No. 141 on the sale of
government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain to private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes by operation of law a
lien on these lands.57
In case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain falling under Section 59 of CA No. 141, Sections 63 and 67 require a public
bidding. Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 provide as follows:
"Sec. 63. Whenever it is decided that lands covered by this chapter are not needed for public purposes, the Director of Lands shall ask the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of Natural Resources) for authority to dispose of the same. Upon receipt of such
authority, the Director of Lands shall give notice by public advertisement in the same manner as in the case of leases or sales of agricultural
public land, x x x.
Sec. 67. The lease or sale shall be made by oral bidding; and adjudication shall be made to the highest bidder. x x x." (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, CA No. 141 mandates the Government to put to public auction all leases or sales of alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain.58
Like Act No. 1654 and Act No. 2874 before it, CA No. 141 did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Private parties could
still reclaim portions of the sea with government permission. However, the reclaimed land could become private land only if classified as
alienable agricultural land of the public domain open to disposition under CA No. 141. The 1935 Constitution prohibited the alienation of
all natural resources except public agricultural lands.
The Civil Code of 1950
The Civil Code of 1950 readopted substantially the definition of property of public dominion found in the Civil Code of 1889. Articles 420 and
422 of the Civil Code of 1950 state that –
"Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth.
x x x.
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State."
Again, the government must formally declare that the property of public dominion is no longer needed for public use or public service,
before the same could be classified as patrimonial property of the State. 59 In the case of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the
public domain, the declaration of their being disposable, as well as the manner of their disposition, is governed by the applicable provisions
of CA No. 141.
Like the Civil Code of 1889, the Civil Code of 1950 included as property of public dominion those properties of the State which, without being
for public use, are intended for public service or the "development of the national wealth." Thus, government reclaimed and marshy lands
of the State, even if not employed for public use or public service, if developed to enhance the national wealth, are classified as property of
public dominion.
Dispositions under the 1973 Constitution
The 1973 Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, likewise adopted the Regalian doctrine. Section 8, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution stated that –
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease
for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-
five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses
other than the development of water power, in which cases, beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant." (Emphasis
supplied)
The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources with the exception of "agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain." In contrast, the 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources
except "public agricultural lands." However, the term "public agricultural lands" in the 1935 Constitution encompassed industrial,
commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the public domain.60 If the land of public domain were neither timber nor mineral land, it
would fall under the classification of agricultural land of the public domain. Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, therefore, prohibited
the alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands of the public domain.
The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the Philippines.
Private corporations, even if wholly owned by Philippine citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain
unlike in the 1935 Constitution. Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution declared that –
"Sec. 11. The Batasang Pambansa, taking into account conservation, ecological, and development requirements of the natural resources, shall
determine by law the size of land of the public domain which may be developed, held or acquired by, or leased to, any qualified individual,
corporation, or association, and the conditions therefor. No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred
hectares or acquire by purchase, homestead or grant, in excess of twenty-four hectares. No private corporation or association may hold by
lease, concession, license or permit, timber or forest lands and other timber or forest resources in excess of one hundred thousand hectares.
However, such area may be increased by the Batasang Pambansa upon recommendation of the National Economic and Development
Authority." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations could hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. Only individuals
could now acquire alienable lands of the public domain, and private corporations became absolutely barred from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. The constitutional ban extended to all kinds of alienable lands of the public domain, while the
statutory ban under CA No. 141 applied only to government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain.
PD No. 1084 Creating the Public Estates Authority
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA, a wholly government owned and
controlled corporation with a special charter. Sections 4 and 8 of PD No. 1084, vests PEA with the following purposes and powers:
"Sec. 4. Purpose. The Authority is hereby created for the following purposes:
(a) To reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, by dredging, filling or other means, or to acquire reclaimed land;
(b) To develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands, buildings, estates and
other forms of real property, owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government;
(c) To provide for, operate or administer such service as may be necessary for the efficient, economical and beneficial utilization of the above
properties.
Sec. 5. Powers and functions of the Authority. The Authority shall, in carrying out the purposes for which it is created, have the following
powers and functions:
(a)To prescribe its by-laws.
xxx
(i) To hold lands of the public domain in excess of the area permitted to private corporations by statute.
(j) To reclaim lands and to construct work across, or otherwise, any stream, watercourse, canal, ditch, flume x x x.
xxx
(o) To perform such acts and exercise such functions as may be necessary for the attainment of the purposes and objectives herein
specified." (Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged areas of the public domain. Foreshore areas are those covered and
uncovered by the ebb and flow of the tide.61 Submerged areas are those permanently under water regardless of the ebb and flow of the
tide.62 Foreshore and submerged areas indisputably belong to the public domain 63 and are inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as
alienable lands open to disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public service.
The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain did not apply to PEA since it
was then, and until today, a fully owned government corporation. The constitutional ban applied then, as it still applies now, only to "private
corporations and associations." PD No. 1084 expressly empowers PEA "to hold lands of the public domain" even "in excess of the area
permitted to private corporations by statute." Thus, PEA can hold title to private lands, as well as title to lands of the public domain.
In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain, there must be legislative authority
empowering PEA to sell these lands. This legislative authority is necessary in view of Section 60 of CA No.141, which states –
"Sec. 60. x x x; but the land so granted, donated or transferred to a province, municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government shall
not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress; x x x."
(Emphasis supplied)
Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public
domain. Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain would be subject to
the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. Hence, such legislative authority could
only benefit private individuals.
Dispositions under the 1987 Constitution
The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, has adopted the Regalian doctrine. The 1987 Constitution declares
that all natural resources are "owned by the State," and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, natural resources
cannot be alienated. Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution state that –
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands,
all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State. x x x.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of
the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain
shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve
hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the
Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions
therefor." (Emphasis supplied)
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands
of the public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private corporations
of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain is still CA No. 141.
The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban
The rationale behind the constitutional ban on corporations from acquiring, except through lease, alienable lands of the public domain is not
well understood. During the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the commissioners probed the rationale behind this ban,
thus:
"FR. BERNAS: Mr. Vice-President, my questions have reference to page 3, line 5 which says:
`No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, not to exceed one thousand hectares in
area.'
If we recall, this provision did not exist under the 1935 Constitution, but this was introduced in the 1973 Constitution. In effect, it prohibits
private corporations from acquiring alienable public lands. But it has not been very clear in jurisprudence what the reason for this is. In
some of the cases decided in 1982 and 1983, it was indicated that the purpose of this is to prevent large landholdings. Is that the intent of
this provision?
MR. VILLEGAS: I think that is the spirit of the provision.
FR. BERNAS: In existing decisions involving the Iglesia ni Cristo, there were instances where the Iglesia ni Cristo was not allowed to acquire
a mere 313-square meter land where a chapel stood because the Supreme Court said it would be in violation of this." (Emphasis supplied)
In Ayog v. Cusi,64 the Court explained the rationale behind this constitutional ban in this way:
"Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public agricultural lands by private corporations is to equitably
diffuse land ownership or to encourage 'owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm' and to prevent a recurrence of cases like
the instant case. Huge landholdings by corporations or private persons had spawned social unrest."
However, if the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could have simply limited the size of alienable lands of
the public domain that corporations could acquire. The Constitution could have followed the limitations on individuals, who could acquire
not more than 24 hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under the
1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the land in the name of a corporation would be more effective
in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs
would inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up of
farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area
of alienable lands of the public domain. Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable
lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many
corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as
stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by
individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a limited area of alienable land of the
public domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable public
lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-growing population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to this
constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit
arising from the constitutional ban.
The Amended Joint Venture Agreement
The subject matter of the Amended JVA, as stated in its second Whereas clause, consists of three properties, namely:
1. "[T]hree partially reclaimed and substantially eroded islands along Emilio Aguinaldo Boulevard in Paranaque and Las Pinas, Metro Manila,
with a combined titled area of 1,578,441 square meters;"
2. "[A]nother area of 2,421,559 square meters contiguous to the three islands;" and
3. "[A]t AMARI's option as approved by PEA, an additional 350 hectares more or less to regularize the configuration of the reclaimed area."65
PEA confirms that the Amended JVA involves "the development of the Freedom Islands and further reclamation of about 250 hectares x x x,"
plus an option "granted to AMARI to subsequently reclaim another 350 hectares x x x."66
In short, the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750-hectare reclamation project have
been reclaimed, and the rest of the 592.15 hectares are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay.
Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse PEA the sum of P1,894,129,200.00 for PEA's "actual cost" in partially reclaiming the
Freedom Islands. AMARI will also complete, at its own expense, the reclamation of the Freedom Islands. AMARI will further shoulder all the
reclamation costs of all the other areas, totaling 592.15 hectares, still to be reclaimed. AMARI and PEA will share, in the proportion of 70
percent and 30 percent, respectively, the total net usable area which is defined in the Amended JVA as the total reclaimed area less 30
percent earmarked for common areas. Title to AMARI's share in the net usable area, totaling 367.5 hectares, will be issued in the name of
AMARI. Section 5.2 (c) of the Amended JVA provides that –
"x x x, PEA shall have the duty to execute without delay the necessary deed of transfer or conveyance of the title pertaining to AMARI's Land
share based on the Land Allocation Plan. PEA, when requested in writing by AMARI, shall then cause the issuance and delivery of the
proper certificates of title covering AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI, x x x; provided, that if more than seventy percent (70%) of
the titled area at any given time pertains to AMARI, PEA shall deliver to AMARI only seventy percent (70%) of the titles pertaining to AMARI,
until such time when a corresponding proportionate area of additional land pertaining to PEA has been titled." (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5 hectares of reclaimed land which will be titled
in its name.
To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the unincorporated PEA-AMARI joint venture PEA's statutory authority, rights and
privileges to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay. Section 3.2.a of the Amended JVA states that –
"PEA hereby contributes to the joint venture its rights and privileges to perform Rawland Reclamation and Horizontal Development as well
as own the Reclamation Area, thereby granting the Joint Venture the full and exclusive right, authority and privilege to undertake the Project
in accordance with the Master Development Plan."
The Amended JVA is the product of a renegotiation of the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 and its supplemental agreement dated August 9,
1995.
The Threshold Issue
The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own under the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed
foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which state that:
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all
other natural resources shall not be alienated. x x x.
xxx
Section 3. x x x Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not
hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, x x x."(Emphasis supplied)
Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and Submerged Areas
PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay are alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. In its Memorandum,67 PEA admits that –
"Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain:
'Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means;
x x x.'" (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Legal Task Force68 constituted under Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 admitted in its Report and Recommendation
to then President Fidel V. Ramos, "[R]eclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain."69 The Legal
Task Force concluded that –
"D. Conclusion
Reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain. However, by statutory authority, the rights of ownership and disposition over reclaimed
lands have been transferred to PEA, by virtue of which PEA, as owner, may validly convey the same to any qualified person without violating
the Constitution or any statute.
The constitutional provision prohibiting private corporations from holding public land, except by lease (Sec. 3, Art. XVII, 70 1987
Constitution), does not apply to reclaimed lands whose ownership has passed on to PEA by statutory grant."
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the public
domain, waters x x x and other natural resources" and consequently "owned by the State." As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not
be alienated," unless they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not
convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or
presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession.
Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public
use.71
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially
delimited and classified."72 The President has the authority to classify inalienable lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain, pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141. In Laurel vs. Garcia, 73 the Executive Department attempted to sell the
Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan, which was acquired by the Philippine Government for use as the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy.
Although the Chancery had transferred to another location thirteen years earlier, the Court still ruled that, under Article 42274 of the Civil
Code, a property of public dominion retains such character until formally declared otherwise. The Court ruled that –
"The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial
property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66
SCRA 481 [1975]. A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership 'until
there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such' (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335
[1960]." (Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, authorized the issuance of special land patents for lands reclaimed by PEA from the foreshore or
submerged areas of Manila Bay. On January 19, 1988 then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 in the name of PEA
for the 157.84 hectares comprising the partially reclaimed Freedom Islands. Subsequently, on April 9, 1999 the Register of Deeds of the
Municipality of Paranaque issued TCT Nos. 7309, 7311 and 7312 in the name of PEA pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529 authorizing the
issuance of certificates of title corresponding to land patents. To this day, these certificates of title are still in the name of PEA.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official
proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquino's
issuance of a land patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer needed for public service. The Freedom
Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties.
At the time then President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had already reclaimed the Freedom Islands although subsequently
there were partial erosions on some areas. The government had also completed the necessary surveys on these islands. Thus, the Freedom
Islands were no longer part of Manila Bay but part of the land mass. Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the
public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks." Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands,
the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the public domain. Under the 1987
Constitution, agricultural lands of the public domain are the only natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All
other natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters x x x owned by the State" forming part of the public domain, and are
inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
AMARI claims that the Freedom Islands are private lands because CDCP, then a private corporation, reclaimed the islands under a contract
dated November 20, 1973 with the Commissioner of Public Highways. AMARI, citing Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, argues
that "if the ownership of reclaimed lands may be given to the party constructing the works, then it cannot be said that reclaimed lands are
lands of the public domain which the State may not alienate."75 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters reads as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private
persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms
of the grant of authority." (Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, private parties could reclaim from the sea only with "proper permission" from the
State. Private parties could own the reclaimed land only if not "otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority." This clearly meant
that no one could reclaim from the sea without permission from the State because the sea is property of public dominion. It also meant that
the State could grant or withhold ownership of the reclaimed land because any reclaimed land, like the sea from which it emerged, belonged
to the State. Thus, a private person reclaiming from the sea without permission from the State could not acquire ownership of the reclaimed
land which would remain property of public dominion like the sea it replaced.76 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 adopted the
time-honored principle of land ownership that "all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong
to the public domain."77
Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws subsequently enacted on the disposition of public lands. In
particular, CA No. 141 requires that lands of the public domain must first be classified as alienable or disposable before the government can
alienate them. These lands must not be reserved for public or quasi-public purposes.78 Moreover, the contract between CDCP and the
government was executed after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. This contract could not have converted the Freedom Islands into private lands of a private corporation.
Presidential Decree No. 3-A, issued on January 11, 1973, revoked all laws authorizing the reclamation of areas under water and revested
solely in the National Government the power to reclaim lands. Section 1 of PD No. 3-A declared that –
"The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas under water, whether foreshore or inland, shall
be limited to the National Government or any person authorized by it under a proper contract. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x."
PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 because reclamation of areas under water could now be undertaken
only by the National Government or by a person contracted by the National Government. Private parties may reclaim from the sea only
under a contract with the National Government, and no longer by grant or permission as provided in Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters
of 1866.
Executive Order No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, designated PEA as the National Government's implementing arm to undertake "all
reclamation projects of the government," which "shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any
person or entity." Under such contract, a private party receives compensation for reclamation services rendered to PEA. Payment to the
contractor may be in cash, or in kind consisting of portions of the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations
from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. The reclaimed land can be used as payment in kind only if the reclaimed land is first
classified as alienable or disposable land open to disposition, and then declared no longer needed for public service.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional 592.15 hectares which are still submerged and forming part of
Manila Bay. There is no legislative or Presidential act classifying these submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain open to disposition. These submerged areas are not covered by any patent or certificate of title. There can be no dispute that these
submerged areas form part of the public domain, and in their present state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Until
reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas are, under the Constitution, "waters x x x owned by the State," forming part of the public
domain and consequently inalienable. Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged areas be classified as public
agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the only natural resources that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and transformed
into public agricultural lands, the government may then officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition.
Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no longer needed for public service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain and within the commerce of man.
The classification of PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands into alienable or disposable lands open to disposition is necessary
because PEA is tasked under its charter to undertake public services that require the use of lands of the public domain. Under Section 5 of PD
No. 1084, the functions of PEA include the following: "[T]o own or operate railroads, tramways and other kinds of land transportation, x x x;
[T]o construct, maintain and operate such systems of sanitary sewers as may be necessary; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such storm
drains as may be necessary." PEA is empowered to issue "rules and regulations as may be necessary for the proper use by private parties
of any or all of the highways, roads, utilities, buildings and/or any of its properties and to impose or collect fees or tolls for their use."
Thus, part of the reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands held by the PEA would actually be needed for public use or service since many of
the functions imposed on PEA by its charter constitute essential public services.
Moreover, Section 1 of Executive Order No. 525 provides that PEA "shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating
all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government." The same section also states that "[A]ll reclamation projects shall be
approved by the President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by
it with any person or entity; x x x." Thus, under EO No. 525, in relation to PD No. 3-A and PD No.1084, PEA became the primary implementing
agency of the National Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands of the public domain. EO No. 525 recognized PEA as the
government entity "to undertake the reclamation of lands and ensure their maximum utilization in promoting public welfare and
interests."79 Since large portions of these reclaimed lands would obviously be needed for public service, there must be a formal declaration
segregating reclaimed lands no longer needed for public service from those still needed for public service.1âwphi1.nêt
Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by the PEA," could not automatically
operate to classify inalienable lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Otherwise, reclaimed foreshore and submerged
lands of the public domain would automatically become alienable once reclaimed by PEA, whether or not classified as alienable or
disposable.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a later law than either PD No. 1084 or EO No. 525, vests in the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources ("DENR" for brevity) the following powers and functions:
"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. The Department shall:
(1) x x x
xxx
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposable public lands, mineral resources and, in the process of
exercising such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such form of levy and collect such revenues for the
exploration, development, utilization or gathering of such resources;
xxx
(14) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of licenses, permits, concessions, lease agreements and such other
privileges concerning the development, exploration and utilization of the country's marine, freshwater, and brackish water and over
all aquatic resources of the country and shall continue to oversee, supervise and police our natural resources; cancel or cause to cancel
such privileges upon failure, non-compliance or violations of any regulation, order, and for all other causes which are in furtherance of the
conservation of natural resources and supportive of the national interest;
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain and serve as the sole agency
responsible for classification, sub-classification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation with appropriate agencies."80 (Emphasis
supplied)
As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State, DENR exercises "supervision and control over alienable and
disposable public lands." DENR also exercises "exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain."
Thus, DENR decides whether areas under water, like foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay, should be reclaimed or not. This means
that PEA needs authorization from DENR before PEA can undertake reclamation projects in Manila Bay, or in any part of the country.
DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of the public domain. Hence, DENR decides whether reclaimed
lands of PEA should be classified as alienable under Sections 681 and 782 of CA No. 141. Once DENR decides that the reclaimed lands should
be so classified, it then recommends to the President the issuance of a proclamation classifying the lands as alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain open to disposition. We note that then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. countersigned Special Patent No. 3517 in
compliance with the Revised Administrative Code and Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water, while PEA is vested with the power to undertake
the physical reclamation of areas under water, whether directly or through private contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of
the public domain into alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval of the President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop,
sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands
of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
Absent two official acts – a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that these
lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain. Only such an official
classification and formal declaration can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition
under the Constitution, Title I and Title III83 of CA No. 141 and other applicable laws.84
PEA's Authority to Sell Reclaimed Lands
PEA, like the Legal Task Force, argues that as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, the reclaimed lands shall be disposed of in
accordance with CA No. 141, the Public Land Act. PEA, citing Section 60 of CA No. 141, admits that reclaimed lands transferred to a branch or
subdivision of the government "shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when
authorized by Congress: x x x."85 (Emphasis by PEA)
In Laurel vs. Garcia,86 the Court cited Section 48 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which states that –
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the
deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following: x x x."
Thus, the Court concluded that a law is needed to convey any real property belonging to the Government. The Court declared that -
"It is not for the President to convey real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized
and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence." (Emphasis supplied)
PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525 constitute the legislative authority allowing PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085,
issued on February 4, 1977, provides that –
"The land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore area of Manila Bay pursuant to the contract for the reclamation and construction of the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project between the Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines dated November 20, 1973 and/or any other contract or reclamation covering the same area is hereby transferred, conveyed
and assigned to the ownership and administration of the Public Estates Authority established pursuant to PD No. 1084; Provided,
however, That the rights and interests of the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines pursuant to the aforesaid
contract shall be recognized and respected.
Henceforth, the Public Estates Authority shall exercise the rights and assume the obligations of the Republic of the Philippines (Department
of Public Highways) arising from, or incident to, the aforesaid contract between the Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines.
In consideration of the foregoing transfer and assignment, the Public Estates Authority shall issue in favor of the Republic of the Philippines
the corresponding shares of stock in said entity with an issued value of said shares of stock (which) shall be deemed fully paid and non-
assessable.
The Secretary of Public Highways and the General Manager of the Public Estates Authority shall execute such contracts or agreements,
including appropriate agreements with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, as may be necessary to implement
the above.
Special land patent/patents shall be issued by the Secretary of Natural Resources in favor of the Public Estates Authority without
prejudice to the subsequent transfer to the contractor or his assignees of such portion or portions of the land reclaimed or to be
reclaimed as provided for in the above-mentioned contract. On the basis of such patents, the Land Registration Commission shall issue
the corresponding certificate of title." (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 3 of EO No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, provides that -
"Sec. 3. All lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the PEA which shall be responsible for its administration, development,
utilization or disposition in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084. Any and all income that the PEA may derive
from the sale, lease or use of reclaimed lands shall be used in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084."
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred
"ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall
belong to or be owned by PEA." EO No. 525 expressly states that PEA should dispose of its reclaimed lands "in accordance with the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084," the charter of PEA.
PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all
kinds of lands x x x owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government."87 (Emphasis supplied) There is, therefore,
legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may sell to
private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance with the PEA charter free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on
private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.
PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private individuals since, with the legislative authority, there is
no longer any statutory prohibition against such sales and the constitutional ban does not apply to individuals. PEA, however, cannot sell any
of its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private corporations since Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expressly
prohibits such sales. The legislative authority benefits only individuals. Private corporations remain barred from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain, including government reclaimed lands.
The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands could be transferred by PEA to the "contractor or his assignees"
(Emphasis supplied) would not apply to private corporations but only to individuals because of the constitutional ban. Otherwise, the
provisions of PD No. 1085 would violate both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
The requirement of public auction in the sale of reclaimed lands
Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition, and further declared no longer
needed for public service, PEA would have to conduct a public bidding in selling or leasing these lands. PEA must observe the provisions of
Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 requiring public auction, in the absence of a law exempting PEA from holding a public auction. 88 Special
Patent No. 3517 expressly states that the patent is issued by authority of the Constitution and PD No. 1084, "supplemented by
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended." This is an acknowledgment that the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the disposition of reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain unless otherwise provided by law. Executive Order No. 654, 89 which authorizes PEA "to determine the
kind and manner of payment for the transfer" of its assets and properties, does not exempt PEA from the requirement of public auction. EO
No. 654 merely authorizes PEA to decide the mode of payment, whether in kind and in installment, but does not authorize PEA to dispense
with public auction.
Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code, the government is required to sell valuable
government property through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445 mandates that –
"Section 79. When government property has become unserviceable for any cause, or is no longer needed, it shall, upon application of the
officer accountable therefor, be inspected by the head of the agency or his duly authorized representative in the presence of the auditor
concerned and, if found to be valueless or unsaleable, it may be destroyed in their presence. If found to be valuable, it may be sold at public
auction to the highest bidder under the supervision of the proper committee on award or similar body in the presence of the auditor
concerned or other authorized representative of the Commission, after advertising by printed notice in the Official Gazette, or for not less
than three consecutive days in any newspaper of general circulation, or where the value of the property does not warrant the expense of
publication, by notices posted for a like period in at least three public places in the locality where the property is to be sold. In the event that
the public auction fails, the property may be sold at a private sale at such price as may be fixed by the same committee or body
concerned and approved by the Commission."
It is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is allowed, in which case the Commission on Audit must approve the selling
price.90 The Commission on Audit implements Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code through Circular No. 89-29691 dated January 27,
1989. This circular emphasizes that government assets must be disposed of only through public auction, and a negotiated sale can be
resorted to only in case of "failure of public auction."
At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the
public domain. Private corporations are barred from bidding at the auction sale of any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
PEA originally scheduled a public bidding for the Freedom Islands on December 10, 1991. PEA imposed a condition that the winning bidder
should reclaim another 250 hectares of submerged areas to regularize the shape of the Freedom Islands, under a 60-40 sharing of the
additional reclaimed areas in favor of the winning bidder.92 No one, however, submitted a bid. On December 23, 1994, the Government
Corporate Counsel advised PEA it could sell the Freedom Islands through negotiation, without need of another public bidding, because of the
failure of the public bidding on December 10, 1991.93
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands and the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it
also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area
to 750 hectares.94 The failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares,95 is not a valid justification for a
negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the area publicly auctioned. Besides, the failure of public bidding happened on December 10,
1991, more than three years before the signing of the original JVA on April 25, 1995. The economic situation in the country had greatly
improved during the intervening period.
Reclamation under the BOT Law and the Local Government Code
The constitutional prohibition in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is absolute and clear: "Private corporations or associations
may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, x x x." Even Republic Act No. 6957 ("BOT Law," for brevity), cited by
PEA and AMARI as legislative authority to sell reclaimed lands to private parties, recognizes the constitutional ban. Section 6 of RA No. 6957
states –
"Sec. 6. Repayment Scheme. - For the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of any infrastructure projects undertaken through
the build-operate-and-transfer arrangement or any of its variations pursuant to the provisions of this Act, the project proponent x x x may
likewise be repaid in the form of a share in the revenue of the project or other non-monetary payments, such as, but not limited to, the grant
of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional requirements with respect to the ownership of the land: x x
x." (Emphasis supplied)
A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a government BOT project, cannot acquire reclaimed alienable
lands of the public domain in view of the constitutional ban.
Section 302 of the Local Government Code, also mentioned by PEA and AMARI, authorizes local governments in land reclamation projects to
pay the contractor or developer in kind consisting of a percentage of the reclaimed land, to wit:
"Section 302. Financing, Construction, Maintenance, Operation, and Management of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector. x x x
xxx
In case of land reclamation or construction of industrial estates, the repayment plan may consist of the grant of a portion or percentage of
the reclaimed land or the industrial estate constructed."
Although Section 302 of the Local Government Code does not contain a proviso similar to that of the BOT Law, the constitutional restrictions
on land ownership automatically apply even though not expressly mentioned in the Local Government Code.
Thus, under either the BOT Law or the Local Government Code, the contractor or developer, if a corporate entity, can only be paid with
leaseholds on portions of the reclaimed land. If the contractor or developer is an individual, portions of the reclaimed land, not exceeding 12
hectares96 of non-agricultural lands, may be conveyed to him in ownership in view of the legislative authority allowing such conveyance.
This is the only way these provisions of the BOT Law and the Local Government Code can avoid a direct collision with Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution.
Registration of lands of the public domain
Finally, PEA theorizes that the "act of conveying the ownership of the reclaimed lands to public respondent PEA transformed such lands of
the public domain to private lands." This theory is echoed by AMARI which maintains that the "issuance of the special patent leading to the
eventual issuance of title takes the subject land away from the land of public domain and converts the property into patrimonial or private
property." In short, PEA and AMARI contend that with the issuance of Special Patent No. 3517 and the corresponding certificates of titles, the
157.84 hectares comprising the Freedom Islands have become private lands of PEA. In support of their theory, PEA and AMARI cite the
following rulings of the Court:
1. Sumail v. Judge of CFI of Cotabato,97 where the Court held –
"Once the patent was granted and the corresponding certificate of title was issued, the land ceased to be part of the public domain and
became private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction."
2. Lee Hong Hok v. David,98 where the Court declared -
"After the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby
automatically comes under the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein."3. Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v.
Heirs of Jose Aliwalas,99 where the Court ruled -
"While the Director of Lands has the power to review homestead patents, he may do so only so long as the land remains part of the public
domain and continues to be under his exclusive control; but once the patent is registered and a certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to
be part of the public domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction."
4. Manalo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,100 where the Court held –
"When the lots in dispute were certified as disposable on May 19, 1971, and free patents were issued covering the same in favor of the
private respondents, the said lots ceased to be part of the public domain and, therefore, the Director of Lands lost jurisdiction over the
same."
5.Republic v. Court of Appeals,101 where the Court stated –
"Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau
of Medical Services, Department of Health, of the whole lot, validly sufficient for initial registration under the Land Registration Act. Such
land grant is constitutive of a 'fee simple' title or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act,
which governs the registration of grants or patents involving public lands, provides that 'Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands
belonging to the Government of the United States or to the Government of the Philippines are alienated, granted or conveyed to persons or
to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act (Land Registration Act, Act 496) and
shall become registered lands.'"
The first four cases cited involve petitions to cancel the land patents and the corresponding certificates of titles issued to private parties.
These four cases uniformly hold that the Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over private lands or that upon issuance of the certificate of
title the land automatically comes under the Torrens System. The fifth case cited involves the registration under the Torrens System of a
12.8-hectare public land granted by the National Government to Mindanao Medical Center, a government unit under the Department of
Health. The National Government transferred the 12.8-hectare public land to serve as the site for the hospital buildings and other facilities of
Mindanao Medical Center, which performed a public service. The Court affirmed the registration of the 12.8-hectare public land in the name
of Mindanao Medical Center under Section 122 of Act No. 496. This fifth case is an example of a public land being registered under Act No.
496 without the land losing its character as a property of public dominion.
In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in the name of PEA, a wholly government owned corporation
performing public as well as proprietary functions. No patent or certificate of title has been issued to any private party. No one is asking the
Director of Lands to cancel PEA's patent or certificates of title. In fact, the thrust of the instant petition is that PEA's certificates of title should
remain with PEA, and the land covered by these certificates, being alienable lands of the public domain, should not be sold to a private
corporation.
Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the registrant private or public ownership of the land. Registration is
not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of ownership previously conferred by any of the recognized modes of acquiring
ownership. Registration does not give the registrant a better right than what the registrant had prior to the registration. 102 The registration
of lands of the public domain under the Torrens system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into private lands. 103
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the alienable land of the public domain
automatically becomes private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA. The transfer of the Freedom Islands to PEA was
made subject to the provisions of CA No. 141 as expressly stated in Special Patent No. 3517 issued by then President Aquino, to wit:
"NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority of the Constitution of the Philippines and in conformity with the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1084, supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, there are hereby granted and conveyed unto the Public
Estates Authority the aforesaid tracts of land containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four
(1,915,894) square meters; the technical description of which are hereto attached and made an integral part hereof." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom Islands on matters not covered by PD No. 1084. Section 60 of CA No. 141 prohibits,
"except when authorized by Congress," the sale of alienable lands of the public domain that are transferred to government units or entities.
Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes, under Section 44 of PD No. 1529, a "statutory lien affecting title" of the registered land even if not
annotated on the certificate of title.104 Alienable lands of the public domain held by government entities under Section 60 of CA No. 141
remain public lands because they cannot be alienated or encumbered unless Congress passes a law authorizing their disposition. Congress,
however, cannot authorize the sale to private corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain because of the constitutional
ban. Only individuals can benefit from such law.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not automatically convert alienable
lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public domain must be transferred to qualified
private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands.
Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in
the hands of a government agency tasked to dispose of public lands. This will allow private corporations to acquire directly from
government agencies limitless areas of lands which, prior to such law, are concededly public lands.
Under EO No. 525, PEA became the central implementing agency of the National Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas of
the public domain. Thus, EO No. 525 declares that –
"EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 525
Designating the Public Estates Authority as the Agency Primarily Responsible for all Reclamation Projects
Whereas, there are several reclamation projects which are ongoing or being proposed to be undertaken in various parts of the country
which need to be evaluated for consistency with national programs;
Whereas, there is a need to give further institutional support to the Government's declared policy to provide for a coordinated, economical
and efficient reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 3-A requires that all reclamation of areas shall be limited to the National Government or any person
authorized by it under proper contract;
Whereas, a central authority is needed to act on behalf of the National Government which shall ensure a coordinated and integrated
approach in the reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1084 creates the Public Estates Authority as a government corporation to undertake reclamation of
lands and ensure their maximum utilization in promoting public welfare and interests; and
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1416 provides the President with continuing authority to reorganize the national government including
the transfer, abolition, or merger of functions and offices.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1416, do hereby order and direct the following:
Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all
reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government. All reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon
recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity;
Provided, that, reclamation projects of any national government agency or entity authorized under its charter shall be undertaken in
consultation with the PEA upon approval of the President.
x x x ."
As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide, with authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took
the place of DENR as the government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public domain. The reclaimed lands being
leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of other alienable lands, does not dispose of
private lands but alienable lands of the public domain. Only when qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become private
lands. In the hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable of disposable lands of the public domain,
these lands are still public, not private lands.
Furthermore, PEA's charter expressly states that PEA "shall hold lands of the public domain" as well as "any and all kinds of lands." PEA
can hold both lands of the public domain and private lands. Thus, the mere fact that alienable lands of the public domain like the Freedom
Islands are transferred to PEA and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEA's name does not automatically make such lands private.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the
constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. PEA will simply turn around, as
PEA has now done under the Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a
single private corporation in only one transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which was intended to diffuse equitably the ownership of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipinos, now
numbering over 80 million strong.
This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public domain since PEA can "acquire x x x any and all
kinds of lands." This will open the floodgates to corporations and even individuals acquiring hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the
public domain under the guise that in the hands of PEA these lands are private lands. This will result in corporations amassing huge
landholdings never before seen in this country - creating the very evil that the constitutional ban was designed to prevent. This will
completely reverse the clear direction of constitutional development in this country. The 1935 Constitution allowed private corporations to
acquire not more than 1,024 hectares of public lands.105 The 1973 Constitution prohibited private corporations from acquiring any kind of
public land, and the 1987 Constitution has unequivocally reiterated this prohibition.
The contention of PEA and AMARI that public lands, once registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, automatically become private lands
is contrary to existing laws. Several laws authorize lands of the public domain to be registered under the Torrens System or Act No. 496, now
PD No. 1529, without losing their character as public lands. Section 122 of Act No. 496, and Section 103 of PD No. 1529, respectively, provide
as follows:
Act No. 496
"Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the x x x Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted,
or conveyed to persons or the public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall
become registered lands."
PD No. 1529
"Sec. 103. Certificate of Title to Patents. Whenever public land is by the Government alienated, granted or conveyed to any person, the same
shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Decree." (Emphasis supplied)
Based on its legislative history, the phrase "conveyed to any person" in Section 103 of PD No. 1529 includes conveyances of public lands to
public corporations.
Alienable lands of the public domain "granted, donated, or transferred to a province, municipality, or branch or subdivision of the
Government," as provided in Section 60 of CA No. 141, may be registered under the Torrens System pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529.
Such registration, however, is expressly subject to the condition in Section 60 of CA No. 141 that the land "shall not be alienated, encumbered
or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress." This provision refers to government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain that have been titled but still cannot be alienated or encumbered unless
expressly authorized by Congress. The need for legislative authority prevents the registered land of the public domain from becoming
private land that can be disposed of to qualified private parties.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 also recognizes that lands of the public domain may be registered under the Torrens System.
Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Code states –
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the
deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following:
(1) x x x
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, but titled in the name of any political subdivision or of any corporate
agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of a public wharf may be titled in the name of a government
corporation regulating port operations in the country. Private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of an airport
may also be titled in the name of the government agency tasked to administer the airport. Private property donated to a municipality for use
as a town plaza or public school site may likewise be titled in the name of the municipality.106 All these properties become properties of the
public domain, and if already registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, remain registered land. There is no requirement or provision in
any existing law for the de-registration of land from the Torrens System.
Private lands taken by the Government for public use under its power of eminent domain become unquestionably part of the public domain.
Nevertheless, Section 85 of PD No. 1529 authorizes the Register of Deeds to issue in the name of the National Government new certificates of
title covering such expropriated lands. Section 85 of PD No. 1529 states –
"Sec. 85. Land taken by eminent domain. Whenever any registered land, or interest therein, is expropriated or taken by eminent domain, the
National Government, province, city or municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality exercising such right shall file for registration in
the proper Registry a certified copy of the judgment which shall state definitely by an adequate description, the particular property or
interest expropriated, the number of the certificate of title, and the nature of the public use. A memorandum of the right or interest taken
shall be made on each certificate of title by the Register of Deeds, and where the fee simple is taken, a new certificate shall be issued in
favor of the National Government, province, city, municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality exercising such right for the land so
taken. The legal expenses incident to the memorandum of registration or issuance of a new certificate of title shall be for the account of the
authority taking the land or interest therein." (Emphasis supplied)
Consequently, lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not exclusively private or patrimonial lands. Lands of the public
domain may also be registered pursuant to existing laws.
AMARI makes a parting shot that the Amended JVA is not a sale to AMARI of the Freedom Islands or of the lands to be reclaimed from
submerged areas of Manila Bay. In the words of AMARI, the Amended JVA "is not a sale but a joint venture with a stipulation for
reimbursement of the original cost incurred by PEA for the earlier reclamation and construction works performed by the CDCP under its
1973 contract with the Republic." Whether the Amended JVA is a sale or a joint venture, the fact remains that the Amended JVA requires PEA
to "cause the issuance and delivery of the certificates of title conveying AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI." 107
This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that private corporations "shall not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease." The transfer of title and ownership to AMARI clearly means that AMARI will "hold" the
reclaimed lands other than by lease. The transfer of title and ownership is a "disposition" of the reclaimed lands, a transaction considered a
sale or alienation under CA No. 141,108 the Government Auditing Code,109 and Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and submerged areas form part of the public domain and are
inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable, unless
converted pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Historically, lands reclaimed by the government are sui
generis, not available for sale to private parties unlike other alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas
for public use or public service. Alienable lands of the public domain, increasingly becoming scarce natural resources, are to be distributed
equitably among our ever-growing population. To insure such equitable distribution, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions have barred private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Those who attempt to dispose of inalienable natural resources
of the State, or seek to circumvent the constitutional ban on alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations, do so at their
own risk.
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA,
are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these
lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as
alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such
classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of
the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares 110 of the Freedom Islands, such
transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares 111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such
transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other
than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed
lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable
lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409112 of the Civil Code,
contracts whose "object or purpose is contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the commerce of men," are "inexistent and void from the
beginning." The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void
ab initio.
Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the issue of whether the Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier of
facts, and this last issue involves a determination of factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY
ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-6276 March 21, 1911

TOMASA M. SANTIAGO, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
MARCELA C. CRUZ, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
Ramon Salinas for petitioners-appellants.
Eugenio Paguia for opponents-appellants.
CARSON, J.:
This is an appeal from a decree entered in the Court of Land Registration in a proceeding wherein the appellants sought to have title to the
land described in the application adjudicated in their favor and a decree entered for its registry.
The applicants are the widow and minor children of one Simon Tecson, deceased, and claim title to the land in question under a deed of sale
to him from Eduvigis Manikis, widow of Estanislao C. Cruz, deceased.
The objectors, who opposed the registry of the land in favor of the applicants in the court below, claim title to an undivided one-half interest
in the land, as the sole heirs of Estanislao C. Cruz, deceased, through his brother Pedro C. Cruz, deceased, their common ancestor.
It was satisfactorily proven, and, indeed, practically agreed in the court below that the land in question was originally public land, conveyed
to Estanislao C. Cruz, deceased, by Government grant in the year 1886; that it thereafter became the communal property of Estanislao C.
Cruz and his wife, Eduvigis Manikis; that after the death of Estanislao C. Cruz, his widow executed a deed of sale of the land on the 19th of
May, 1896, to Simon Tecson, deceased, the husband and father, respectively, of the applicants, and that from that date to the date of the filing
of the application in this proceeding, December 2, 1908 (a period of more than ten years' duration), Tecson and the appellants have
successively been in quiet, peaceable and uninterrupted possession, under a claim of ownership.
It was further practically agreed and satisfactorily proven in the court below, that at the time of the death of Estanislao C. Cruz, his estate and
his widow were each entitled to an undivided one-half interest in the land in question, it being a part of the bienes gananciales (communal
property); that the objectors in this proceeding are legitimate heirs of the estate of Estanislao C. Cruz, and his only heirs, if it be a fact that
Pedro C. Cruz (the brother of Estanislao C. Cruz, through whom they claim their right of inheritance) was lawfully married to Petra, his
alleged wife; but that if Pedro C. Cruz and Petra were not lawfully married, then the land in question, as a part of the estate of Estanislao C.
Cruz, went, at his death, to his widow, in accordance with the laws touching the distribution of intestate estates.
The applicants contend that the evidence does not sustain a finding that Pedro C. Cruz and Petra, his alleged wife, were lawfully married; and
that even if it be granted that they were, and that the objectors are the lawful heirs of Estanislao C. Cruz, through his brother Pedro C. Cruz,
nevertheless, the admitted occupation of the land in question for a period of more than ten years, under a claim of ownership, based on the
deed of sale executed by the widow of Estanislao C. Cruz, establishes a prescriptive title, valid even against the heirs of the estate of her
deceased husband.
The court below found against the applicants on both contentions, and was of opinion that they are entitled to but an undivided one-half
interest in the land in question, that being all that the widow owned at the time when she executed the deed of sale. We think that the
opinion of the trial judge in this regard must be sustained.
We have carefully examined the evidence of record touching the marriage of Pedro C. Cruz and Petra, his wife, and we agree with the trial
judge that the evidence upon which the applicants attempt to raise a question as to its legality is of the flimsiest character, and wholly
insufficient to justify us in holding that the trial court erred in finding the existence of a lawful marriage. True, the evidence in support of the
marriage (and we might here add of the birth and baptism of the offspring therefrom) lacks the confirmation which would be furnished by
duly authenticated copies of the pertinent extract from the parish registers (libros canonicos) of the church of San Rafael, in the Province of
Bulacan, wherein it is alleged the formal record of these events was kept, but we think that the other evidence of record satisfactorily
establishes the fact of the marriage, and further establishes the legitimacy of the alleged offspring therefrom. This evidence was properly
taken into consideration by the trial court, not only because no objection was offered to its introduction in the court below but also because
it appears from the record that the parish registers, wherein it was alleged the above mentioned entries were made, have been destroyed.
(Chua Soco vs. Veloso, 2 Phil. Rep., 658; Loper vs. Standard Oil Co., 5 Phil. Rep., 549; City of Manila vs. Cabangis, 10 Phil. Rep., 151; Bowler vs.
Alcazar, 13 Phil. Rep., 282; Marella vs. Reyes, 12 Phil. Rep., 1.)
Under the provisions of article 1950 of the Civil Code a prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by the mere possession thereof, under
a claim of ownership, for a period of ten years, unless a claim of ownership, or a period o ten years, unless it was originally acquired "con
justo titulo y buena fe" (with color o title and good faith). Good faith, in this connection, while it is always to be presumed in the absence of
proof to the contrary, requires a well-founded belie that the person from whom title was received was himself the owner of the land, with the
right to convey it. In the case at bar, it affirmatively appears that Simon Tecson, through whom applicants claim title, was well aware that the
widow, Eduvigis Manikis, was only entitled in her own right to an undivided one-half interest in the land in question at the time of her
husband's death, and that the other undivided one-half interest was the property o her deceased husband's estate, and, as such, of his heirs;
it also appears that, although the fact that the Government grant of the land in question was made to and in the name of Estanislao C. Cruz
was well known to Tecson, the original title deeds having been delivered to him when he purchased the land from the widow, nevertheless
he took from his vendor a deed which falsely makes it appear that the grant had been made to the widow herself, this false recital manifestly
having for its object the concealment of the fact that the vendor was entitled, in her own right, to only an undivided one-half interest in the
land conveyed; and it further appears that some, if not all, of the heirs of the estate of the deceased husband were living in the vicinity
wherein the transaction took place, and could hardly fail to have been known as such to the purchaser of the land had be made reasonable
inquiry to satisfy himself as to their existence or nonexistence. Under these circumstances we think that the finding of the lower court
against the existence of good faith in the original purchase — that is to say, of well-founded belief that the vendor was the owner of all the
land which she undertook to sell him, and had the right to convey it — must be sustained.
The trial court, however, having properly found that the appellants are only entitled to an undivided one-half interest in the land in question,
and that the objectors (opositores) are entitled to the remaining undivided one-half interest therein, thereupon improperly directed the
registry of the land as the property of both the applicants and the objectors in the proportions indicated. Under the provisions of section 19
of the Land Registration Act, which requires "That one or more tenants claiming undivided shares less than a fee simple in the whole land
described in the application shall not make application except jointly with the other tenant owning undivided shares, so that the whole fee
shall be represented in the action;" and under our ruling in the case of Tecson vs. Corporation de los PP. Dominicos, decided March 16,
19111 (with which compare Foss vs. Atkins, 201 Mass., 158; id., 204 Mass., 337), wherein we held that under the general provisions of the
Act, the court has no jurisdiction to decree the registry of title in favor of an objector (opositor); it is quite clear that the application should
have been dismissed, without prejudice to the right of the various owners of the undivided interest in the land, jointly to present a new
application for registry.
Twenty days hereafter judgment will be entered reversing the decree entered in the lower court without costs to either party in this
instance, and ten days thereafter the record will be returned to the court below where the proper decree will be entered in accordance
herewith. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 111141 March 6, 1998

MARIO Z. TITONG, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (4th Division), VICTORICO LAURIO and ANGELES LAURIO, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
Like a priceless treasure coveted by many, but capable of ownership by only one, this 20,592 square-meter parcel of land located at Barrio
Titong, Masbate, Masbate is claimed by two contestants in this petition for review on certiorari. Unfortunately, legal title over the property
can be vested in only one of them.
The case originated from an action for quieting of title filed by petitioner Mario Titong. The Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch
44 1 ruled in of private respondents, Victorico Laurio and Angeles Laurio, adjudging them the true and lawful owners of the disputed land.
Affirmed on appeal to the Court, of Appeals, petitioner comes to us for a favorable reversal.
Petitioner alleges that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with an area of 3.2800 hectares, more or less, surveyed as Lot No.
3918, and declared for taxation purposes in his name. He claims that on three separate occasions in September 1983, private respondents,
with their hired laborers, forcibly entered a portion of the land containing an area of approximately two (2) hectares; and began plowing the
same under pretext of ownership. Private respondents denied this allegation, and averred that the disputed property formed part of the 5.5-
hectare agricultural land which they had purchased from their predecessor-in-interest, 2 Pablo Espinosa on August 10, 1981.
In his testimony, petitioner identified Espinosa as his adjoining owner 3, asserting that no controversy had sprouted between them for
twenty years until the latter sold Lot No. 3479 to private respondent Victorico Laurio. 4 This was corroborated by Ignacio Villamor, who had
worked on the land even before its sale to Espinosa in 1962. The boundary between the land sold to Espinosa and what of petitioner's
property was the old Bugsayon river. When petitioner employed Bienvenido Lerit as his tenant in 1962, he instructed Lerit to change the
course of the old river and direct the flow of water to the lowland at the southern of petitioner' s property, thus converting the old river into
a riceland. 5
For his part, private respondent anchors his defense on the following facts: He denied petitioner's claim of ownership, recounting that the
area and boundaries of the disputed land remained unaltered during the series of conveyances prior to its coming into his hands. According
to him, petitioner first declared the land for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2916, 6 which showed that the land had an area of
5.5 hectares and was bounded on the North by the Bugsayon River; on the East by property under the ownership of Lucio Lerit; on the South
by property owner by Potenciano Zaragoza; and on the West by property owned by Agapito de la Cruz. 7 Private Respondent then alleges
that, on December 21, 1960, petitioner sold this property to Concepcion Verano vda. de Cabug, after which Tax Declaration No. 5339 8 was
issued in her favor. In compliance with their mutual agreement to repurchase the same, petitioner reacquired the property by way of
sale 9 on August 24, 1962 and then declared it for taxation purposes in his name under Tax Declaration No. 5720. 10 However, the property
remained in petitioner's hands for only four (4) days because, on August 28, 1962, he sold it to Espinosa 11 who then declared it in his name
under Tax Declaration No. 12311. 12 Consequently, the property became a part of the estate of Pablo Espinosa's wife, the late Segundina
Liao Espinosa. On August 10, 1981, her heirs executed an instrument denominated as "Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous
Sale" whereby the 5.5-hectare property under Tax Declaration No. 12311 was sold to private respondent 13 in consideration of the amount
of P5,000.00. Thereafter, Tax Declaration No. 12738 was issued in the name of private respondent. In all these conveyances, the area and
boundaries of the property remained exactly the same as those appearing in Tax Declaration No. 2916 under petitioner's name.
It was proved at the proceedings in the court a quo that two (2) surveys were made of the disputed property. The first survey 14 was made
for petitioner, while the second was the relocation survey ordered by the lower court. As anticipated, certain discrepancies between the two
surveys surfaced. Thus, contrary to petitioner's allegation in his complaint that he is the owner of only 3.2800 hectares, he was actually
claiming 5.9789 hectares, the total areas of Lot Nos. 3918, 3918-A and 3606. On the other hand, Lot No. 3479 pertaining to Espinosa, was left
with only an area of 4.1841 hectares instead of the 5.5 hectares sold by petitioner to him. Apprised of the discrepancy, private respondent
filed a protest 15 before the Bureau of Lands against the first survey, likewise filing a case for alteration of boundaries before the municipal
trial court, the proceedings of which, however, were suspended of the instant case. 16
Private respondent testified that petitioner is one of the four heirs of his mother, Leonida Zaragoza. In the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale
of Estate of the deceased Leonida Zaragoza, 17 the heirs adjudicated unto themselves the 3.6-hectare property of the deceased. The property
involved is described in the instrument as having been declared under Tax Declaration No. 3301 18 and as bounded on the North by Victor
Verano, on the East by Benigno Titong, on the South by the Bugsayon River and on the West by Benigno Titong. On September 9, 1969, Tax
Declaration No. 8723 was issued to petitioner for his corresponding share in the estate.
However, instead of reflecting only .9000 hectare as his rightful share in the extrajudicial settlement 19 petitioner's share was bloated to 2.4
hectares. It therefore appeared to private respondent that petitioner encroached upon his (Laurio's) property and declared it a part of his
inheritance. 20 The boundaries were likewise altered so that it was bounded on the North by Victor Verano, on the East by Benigno Titong,
on the South by property owner Espinosa, and on the West by property owner Adolfo Titong. 21 Private respondent accordingly denied that
petitioner had diverted the course of the Bugsayon River after he had repurchased the land from Concepcion Verano vda. de
Cabug 22 because the land was immediately sold to Espinosa shortly thereafter. 23
The lower court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, declaring him as the true and absolute owner of the litigated property
and ordering petitioner to respect private respondents' title and ownership over the property and to pay attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
costs and moral damages.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision. On motion for reconsideration, the same was denied for lack of
merit. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
At the outset, we hold that the instant petition must be denied for the reason that the lower court should have outrightly dismissed the
complaint for quieting of title. The remedy of quieting of title may be availed of under the circumstances enumerated in the Civil Code:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance
or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be
prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.
Under this provision, a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts
a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owner's title to or interest in real property. 24 The ground or reason for filing a complaint for
quieting of title must therefore be "an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding." Under the maxim expresio mius est exclusio
alterius, these grounds are exclusive so that other reasons outside of the purview of these reasons may not be considered valid for the same
action. 25
Had the lower court thoroughly considered the complaint filed, it would have had no other course of action under the law but to dismiss it.
The complaint failed to allege that an "instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding" beclouded the plaintiff's title over the
property involved. Petitioner merely alleged that the defendants (respondents herein), together with their hired laborers and without legal
justification, forcibly entered the southern portion of the land of the plaintiff and plowed the same.
He then proceeded to claim damages and attorney's fees. He prayed that, aside from issuing a writ or preliminary injunction enjoining
private respondents and their hired laborers from intruding into the land, the court should declare him "the true and absolute owner"
thereof. Hence, through his allegations, what petitioner imagined as clouds cast on his title to the property were private respondents' alleged
acts of physical intrusion into his purported property. Clearly, the acts alleged may be considered grounds for an action for forcible entry but
definitely not one for quieting of title.
When the issues were joined by the filing of the answer to the complaint, it would have become apparent to the court that the case was a
boundary dispute. The answer alleged, among other matters, that petitioner, "in bad faith, surreptitiously, maliciously and fraudulently had
the land in question included in the survey of his land which extends to the south only as far as the Bugsayon River which is the visible and
natural and common boundary between the properties." 26 Moreover, during the hearing of the case, petitioner proved that it was actually a
boundary dispute by evidence showing what he considered as the boundary of his property which private respondents perceived as actually
encroaching on their property. In this regard, the following pronouncements of the Court are apropos:
. . . (T)he trial court (and likewise the respondent Court) cannot, in an action for quieting of title, order the determination of the boundaries
of the claimed property, as that would be tantamount to awarding to one or some of the parties the disputed property in an action where the
sole issue is limited to whether the instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding involved constitutes a cloud upon the petitioners'
interest or title in and to said property. Such determination of boundaries is appropriate in adversarial proceedings where possession or
ownership may properly be considered and where evidence aliunde, other than the "instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding"
itself, may be introduced. An action for forcible entry, whenever warranted by the period prescribed in Rule 70, or for recovery of
possession de facto, also within the prescribed period, may be availed of by the petitioners, in which proceeding the boundary dispute may
be fully threshed out. 27
Nonetheless, even if the complaint below were to be considered as a valid one for quieting of title, still, the instant petition for review
on certiorari must fail.
As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon this Court. Such factual findings shall not be
disturbed normally unless the same are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or the judgment itself is based on a
misapprehension of facts. 28 Upon an examination of the records, the Court finds no evident reason to depart from the general rule.
The courts below correctly held that when petitioner "sold, ceded, transferred and conveyed" the 5.5-hectare land in favor of Pablo Espinosa,
his rights of ownership and possession pertaining thereto ceased and these were transferred to the latter. In the same manner, Espinosa's
rights of ownership over the land ceased and were transferred to private respondent upon its sale to the latter. This finds justification in the
Civil Code, as follows:
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate
thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.
In other words, a sale is a contract transferring dominion and other real rights in the thing sold. 29 In the case at bar, petitioner's claim of
ownership must of necessary fail because he has long abdicated his rights over the land when he sold it to private respondent's predecessor-
in-interest.
Petitioner's claim that he acquired ownership over the disputed land through possession for more than twenty (20) years is likewise
unmeritorious. While Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that "(o)wnership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by
ordinary prescription through possession of ten years," this provision of law must be read in conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code.
This article states that ". . . (o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things requires possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed
by law." Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of tea
years unless such possession was acquired con justo tilulo y buena fe (with color of title and good faith). 30 The good faith of the possessor
consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his
ownership. 31 For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one
of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit
any right. 32
Petitioners have not satisfactorily met the requirements of good faith and just title. As aptly observed by the trial court, the plaintiff's
admitted acts of converting boundary line (Bugsayon River) into a ricefield and thereafter claiming ownership thereof were acts constituting
deprivation of the rights of others and therefore "tantamount to bad faith." 33 To allow petitioner to benefit from his own wrong would run
counter to the maxim ex dolo malo non oritur actio (no man can allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing). Extraordinary
acquisitive prescription cannot similarly vest ownership over the property upon petitioner. Art. 1137 of the Civil Code states that
"(o)wnership and other real rights over immovables prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without
need of title or of good faith." Petitioner's alleged possession in 1962 up to September 1983 when private respondents entered the property
in question spanned twenty-one (21) years. This period of time is short of the thirty-year requirement mandated by Art. 1137.
Petitioner basically anchors his claim over the property on the survey plan prepared upon his request, 34 the tax declaration in his
name, 35 the commissioner's report on the relocation survey, 36 and the survey plan. 37 Respondent court correctly held that these
documents do not conclusively demonstrate petitioner's title over Lot Nos. 3918-A and 3606.
A survey is the act by which the quantity of a parcel of land is ascertained and so a paper containing a statement of courses, distances, and
quantity of
land. 38 A survey under a proprietary title is not a conveyance. It is an instrument sui generis in the nature of a partition; a customary mode
in which a proprietor has set off to himself in severalty a part of the common estate. 39 Therefore, a survey, not being a conveyance, is not a
mode of acquiring ownership. A fortiori, petitioner cannot found his claim on the survey plan reflecting a subdivision of land because it is not
conclusive as to ownership as it may refer only to a delineation of possession. 40
Furthermore, the plan was not verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands in accordance with Sec. 28, paragraph 5 of Act No. 2259, the
Cadastral Act, as amended by Sec. 1862 of Act No. 2711. Said law ordains that private surveyors send their original field notes, computations,
reports, surveys, maps and plots regarding a piece of property to the Bureau of Lands for verification and approval. 41 A survey plan not
verified and approved by said Bureau is nothing more than a private writing, the due execution and authenticity of which must be proven in
accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The circumstance that the plan was admitted in evidence without any objection as
to its due execution and authenticity does not signify that the courts shall give probative value therefor. To admit evidence and not to believe
it subsequently are not contradictory to each other. This Court cannot alter the conclusions of
the Court of Appeals on the credibility accorded to evidence presented by the parties. 42
Similarly, petitioner's tax declaration issued under his name is not even persuasive evidence of his claimed ownership over the land in
dispute. A tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of ownership. 43 It is merely an indicium of a claim of
ownership. 44 Because it does not by itself give title, it is of little value in proving one's ownership. 45 Moreover, the incompatibility in
petitioner's tax declaration and the commissioner's report as regards the area of his claimed property is much too glaring to be ignored. Tax
Declaration No. 8717 states that petitioner's property has an area of 3.2800 hectares while the totality of his claim according to the
commissioned geodetic engineer's survey amounts to 4.1385 hectares. There is therefore a notable discrepancy of 8,585 square meters. On
the other hand, private respondent's claimed property, as borne out by Tax Declaration No. 12738, totals 5.5 hectares, a more proximate
equivalent of the 5.2433-hectare property as shown by the commissioner's report.
There is also nothing in the commissioner's report that substantiates petitioner's claim that the disputed land was inside his property.
Petitioner capitalizes on the lower court's statement in its decision 46 that "as reflected in the commissioner's report dated May 23, 1984
(Exhibit 3-3-A), the area claimed is inside lot 3918 of the defendants (Exhibit 2)" 47 or the private respondents. A careful reading of the
decision would show that this statement is found in the summary of defendants' (herein private respondents) evidence. Reference to Lot No.
3918 may, therefore, be attributed to mere oversight as the lower court even continues to state the defendants' assertion that the 2-hectare
land is part of their 5.5-hectare property. Hence, it is not amiss to conclude that either petitioner misapprehended the lower court's decision
or he is trying to contumaciously mislead or worse, deceive this Court.
With respect to the awards of moral damages of P10,000.00 and attorney's fees of P2,000.00, the Court finds no cogent reason to delete the
same. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings to the effect that where fraud and bad faith have been established, the award of moral damages is
in order. 48 This pronouncement finds support in Art. 2219 (10) of the Civil Code allowing the recovery of moral damages for acts
enumerated in Art. 21 of the same Code. This article states that "(a)ny person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." The moral damages are hereby increased to
P30,000.00. We agree with the respondent court in holding that the award of attorney's fees is justified because petitioner filed a clearly
unfounded civil action. 49
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 174191 January 30, 2013

NENITA QUALITY FOODS CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
CRISOSTOMO GALABO, ADELAIDA GALABO, and ZENAIDA GALABO-ALMACBAR, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 of petitioner Nenita Quality Foods Corporation (NQFC) to nullity the February 22, 2006
Decision2 and the July 13, 2006 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77006. The CA reversed the decision4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 17, which affirmed in toto the decision5 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Davao
City, Branch 5, in Civil Case No. 10,958-E-01. The MTCC dismissed the complaint for forcible entry and damages, which respondents
Crisostomo Galabo, Adelaida Galabo, and Zenaida Galabo-Almachar filed against NQFC.
The Factual Antecedents
The dispute in the case relates to the possession of a parcel of land described as Lot No. 102, PSD-40060, the former Arakaki Plantation in
Marapangi, Toril, Davao City with an area of six thousand seventy-four square meters (6,074 sq. m.).
As the CA summarized in the assailed decision, the respondents are the heirs of Donato Galabo. In 1948, Donato obtained Lot No. 722, Cad-
102, a portion of the Arakaki Plantation in Marapangi, Toril, Davao City, owned by National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation. Donato and
the respondents assumed that Lot No. 722 included Lot No. 102, per the original survey of 1916 to 1920.
When the Board of Liquidators (BOL) took over the administration of the Arakaki Plantation in the 1950s, it had Lot No. 722 resurveyed.
Allegedly, the resurvey did not include Lot No. 102; thus, when Donato acquired Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-214966 for Lot No. 722 on
April 26, 1953, Lot No. 102 was not included. The respondents, however, continue to posses, occupy and cultivate Lot No. 102.
When NQFC opened its business in Marapangi, Toril, Davao City in the late 1950s, it allegedly offered to buy Lot No. 102. Donato declined
and to ward off further offers, put up "Not For Sale" and "No Trespassing" signs on the property. In the 1970s, Crisostomo fenced off the
entire perimeter of Lot No. 102 and built his house on it.
On August 19, 1994, the respondents received a letter from Santos Nantin demanding that they vacate Lot No. 102. Santos claimed
ownership of this lot per the Deed of Transfer of Rights (Deed of Transfer) 7 dated July 10, 1972, which the respondents and their mother
allegedly executed in Santos’ favor. The respondents denied this claim and maintained that they had been occupying Lot No. 102, which the
BOL itself recognized per its letters8 and the Certification9 dated April 12, 2000 confirming Donato as the long-time occupant and awardee of
the property. To perfect their title, the respondents applied for free patent over Lot No. 102 on September 6, 2000.
On January 3, 2001 and again on a later date, NQFC’s workers, with armed policemen of Toril, Davao City, entered by force Lot No. 102 to
fence it. The respondents reported the entry to the authorities. On April 16, 2001, Crisostomo received a letter from NQFC’s counsel
demanding that he remove his house from Lot No. 102. NQFC subsequently removed the existing fence and cut down various trees that the
respondents had planted on the property.
NQFC, for its part, claimed that Santos immediately occupied and possessed Lot No. 102 after he purchased it from the respondents in 1972
and declared it under his name for taxation purposes. Santos was also granted Free Patent over the property by the Bureau of Lands, and
obtained Original Certificate of Title No. (OCT) P-403510 on June 18, 1974. On December 29, 2000, the heirs of Santos conveyed Lot No. 102
to NQFC via the Deed of Absolute Sale11 of even date. NQFC then filed a petition for cancellation of the respondents’ patent application over
Lot No. 102, which the BOL-Manila granted on April 19, 2001, on the ground that Donato failed to perfect his title over Lot No. 102 which has
long been titled in Santos’ name.
When conciliation failed, the respondents filed on September 17, 2001 a complaint 12 for forcible entry with damages before the MTCC
against NQFC, alleging that: (1) they had been in prior physical possession of Lot No. 102; and (2) NQFC deprived them of possession
through force, intimidation, strategy, threats and stealth.
The Ruling of the MTCC
Relying on the ruling of the BOL-Manila, the MTCC dismissed the respondents’ complaint,13 explaining that the questions raised before it
required technical determination by the administrative agency with the expertise to determine such matters, which the BOL-Manila did in
this case.14
The MTCC held that the pieces of evidence NQFC presented – the Deed of Transfer the respondents executed in Santos’ favor, Santos’ OCT P-
4035 over Lot No. 102, the Deed of Absolute Sale in NQFC’s favor, and the findings of the BOL-Manila – established NQFC’s rightful
possession over the property. It further held that: (1) the respondents relinquished their rights over Lot No. 102 when they executed the
Deed of Transfer in Santos’ favor; (2) the certificate of title over Lot No. 102 in Santos’ name shows that he was in actual physical possession
since actual occupation is required before an application for free patent can be approved; and (3) NQFC validly acquired ownership over Lot
No. 102 when it purchased it from Santos, entitling it to the right, among others, to possess the property as ancillary to such ownership.
The Ruling of the RTC
The respondents appealed the MTCC decision to the RTC but the latter court denied the appeal. 15 As the MTCC did, the RTC relied on the
findings of the BOL-Manila. It held that: (1) the respondents failed to perfect whatever right they might have had over Lot No. 102; and (2)
they are estopped from asserting any right over Lot No. 102 since they have long transferred the property and their right thereto, to Santos
in 1972.
In resolving the issue of possession of Lot No. 102, the RTC also resolved the question of ownership, as justified under the Rules, explaining
that the NQFC’s possession of Lot No. 102 was anchored on a Deed of Absolute Sale, while that of the respondents was based merely on the
allegation of possession and occupation by Donato, and not on any title.16
Thus, the question of concurrent possession of Lot No. 102 between NQFC and the respondents should tilt in NQFC’s favor.
When the RTC denied the respondents’ motion for reconsideration in an order 17 dated March 5, 2003, the respondents elevated their case to
the CA via a petition for review.18
The Ruling of the CA
The respondents claimed before the CA that the RTC erred when it held that NQFC had prior possession of Lot No. 102, based solely on its
Deed of Absolute Sale. They argued, among others, that: (1) Santos should have taken the necessary steps to oust the respondents had he
been in possession of Lot No. 102 beginning 1972; (2) Santos could not have validly obtained title over Lot No. 102 since it was still in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) as of 1980; 19 and (3) NQFC no longer had to forcibly evict the respondents in January
2001 if it had been in possession of Lot No. 102 after it bought this land from Santos in 2000.
The CA found reversible error in the RTC’s decision; thus, it granted the respondents’ petition and ordered NQFC to vacate Lot No. 102. The
CA explained that a plaintiff, in a forcible entry case, only has to prove prior material and physical possession of the property in litigation and
undue deprivation of it by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. These, the respondents averred in the complaint and
sufficiently proved, thus entitling them to recover possession of Lot No. 102. Relying on the doctrine of presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, the CA especially took note of the letters and the Certification which the BOL sent to the respondents
acknowledging Donato as the awardee of Lot No. 102 and the respondents as the actual occupants and possessors.
In brushing aside the RTC’s findings, the CA ruled that: (1) Donato’s failure to perfect his title over Lot No. 102 should not weigh against the
respondents as the issue in a forcible entry case is one of possession de facto and not of possession de jure; and (2) NQFC’s ownership of Lot
No. 102 is beside the point as ownership is beyond the purview of an ejectment case. The title or right of possession, it stressed, is never an
issue in a forcible entry suit. The CA, however, denied the respondents’ prayer for moral damages and attorney’s fees, and rejected the other
issues raised for being irrelevant.
In its July 13, 2006 resolution,20 the CA denied NQFC’s motion for reconsideration, prompting the NQFC’s present recourse.
The Petition
NQFC argues that the CA erred in holding that the respondents had prior physical possession of Lot No. 102. 21 It claims that, first, in
reversing the RTC findings, the CA relied solely on the letters and the Certification of the BOL, 22 which has been controverted by the
following pieces of evidence, among others: (1) the Deed of Transfer that the respondents executed in favor of Santos; (2) the order of the
Bureau of Lands approving Santos’ patent application; (3) Santos’ OCT P-4035; and (4) the Deed of Absolute Sale that Santos executed in
favor of NQFC.
NQFC maintains that the Bureau of Lands would not have granted Santos’ free patent application had he not been in possession of Lot No.
102 because continued occupation and cultivation, either by himself or by his predecessor-in-interest, of the property is a requirement for
such grant under the Public Land Act. By the very definition of "occupy," Santos is therefore deemed to have possessed Lot No. 102 prior to
1974, the year his free patent application was granted,23 and under the principle of tacking of possession, he is deemed to have had
possession of Lot No. 102 not only from 1972, when the respondents transferred it to him, but also from the time Donato acquired the lot in
1948. Thus, Santos had no reason to oust the respondents since he had been in possession of Lot No. 102 beginning 1972, by virtue of the
transfer.24
Second, the respondents had no documents to prove that they were in actual occupation and cultivation of Lot No. 102 – the reason they did
not heed the BOL’s request to perfect their title over it. Finally, citing jurisprudence,25 NQFC argues that the RTC rightly ruled on the issue of
its ownership over Lot No. 102 in deciding the issue of prior physical possession as the Rules allow this, by way of exception. 26
The Case for Respondents
The respondents’ arguments closely adhere to the CA’s ruling. They argue that NQFC, rather than meeting the issues, focused on its alleged
ownership of Lot No. 102 and the possession flowing out of its ownership. They deny ever meeting Santos and they maintain that their
continued possession and occupation of Lot No. 102 belie this supposed sale. Even granting that this sale occurred, Santos could still not
have acquired any right over Lot No. 102 for as of 1980, it was still in the name of the Republic. 27 Thus, they could not have transferred
ownership of Lot No. 102 to Santos, and he cannot claim ownership of Lot No. 102 by reason of this sale. 28
On the other hand, the respondents’ open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession of Lot No. 102 for three decades, coupled
by a claim of ownership, gave them vested right or interest over the property.29 This vested right is equivalent to an actually issued
certificate of title so that the execution and delivery of the title is a mere formality. To say the least, NQFC did not have to send them a formal
demand to vacate30 and violently oust them from the premises had it been in actual possession of the property as claimed.31
Lastly, the respondents invoked the settled rule that the Court’s jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited only to reviewing errors of law.
NQFC failed to show misapprehension of facts in the CA’s findings to justify a departure from this rule. 32
The Court’s Ruling
We first address the procedural issue raised. Resolving the contentions raised necessarily requires us to delve into factual issues, a course
not proper in a petition for review on certiorari, for a Rule 45 petition resolves only questions of law, not questions of fact.33 This rule is read
with the equally settled dictum that factual findings of the CA are generally conclusive on the parties and are therefore not reviewable by
this Court.34 By way of exception, we resolve factual issues when, as here, conflict attended the findings of the MTCC and of the RTC, on one
hand, and of the CA, on the other. Of minor note, but which we deem important to point, the petition needlessly impleaded the CA, in breach
of Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.35
Substantively, the key issue this case presents is prior physical possession – whether NQFC had been in prior physical possession of Lot No.
102.
We rule in the negative.
First, on the reliance on the BOL letters and Certification and the CA’s alleged disregard of NQFC’s evidence. To prove prior physical
possession of Lot No. 102, NQFC presented the Deed of Transfer, Santos’ OCT P-4035, the Deed of Absolute Sale, and the Order of the Bureau
of Lands approving Santos’ free patent application. In presenting these pieces of evidence, NQFC is apparently mistaken as it may have
equated possession that is at issue as an attribute of ownership to actual possession. The latter type of possession is, however, different from
and has different legal implications than the former. While these documents may bear weight and are material in contests over ownership of
Lot No. 102, they do not per se show NQFC’s actual possession of this property.
We agree that ownership carries the right of possession, but the possession contemplated by the concept of ownership is not exactly the
same as the possession in issue in a forcible entry case. Possession in forcible entry suits refers only to possession de facto, or actual or
material possession, and not possession flowing out of ownership; these are different legal concepts36 for which the law provides different
remedies for recovery of possession.37 As we explained in Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals,38 and again in the more recent cases of Gonzaga v.
Court of Appeals,39 De Grano v. Lacaba,40 and Lagazo v. Soriano,41 the word "possession" in forcible entry suits refers to nothing more than
prior physical possession or possession de facto, not possession de jure 42 or legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law.43 Title is
not the issue,44 and the absence of it "is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case." 45
Thus, in a forcible entry case, "a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself.
Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to
remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him."46 He cannot be ejected by force, violence or terror -- not even
by its owners.47 For these reasons, an action for forcible entry is summary in nature aimed only at providing an expeditious means of
protecting actual possession.48 Ejectment suits are intended to "prevent breach of x x x peace and criminal disorder and to compel the party
out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his." 49 Thus, lest the purpose of these summary
proceedings be defeated, any discussion or issue of ownership is avoided unless it is necessary to resolve the issue of de facto possession.
We agree with the respondents that instead of squarely addressing the issue of possession and presenting evidence showing that NQFC or
Santos had been in actual possession of Lot No. 102, the former merely narrated how it acquired ownership of Lot No. 102 and presented
documents to this effect. Its allegation that Santos occupied Lot No. 102 in 1972 is uncorroborated. Even the tax declarations under Santos’
name are hardly of weight; "tax declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive proof of possession. They are merely good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner"50 but not necessarily of the actual possession required in forcible entry cases.
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides when an action for forcible entry, and unlawful detainer, is proper:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by
virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person may at
any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial
Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for
the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. [emphasis ours; italics supplied]
Under this provision, for a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiff must allege and prove: (1) prior physical possession of the property;
and (2) unlawful deprivation of it by the defendant through force, intimidation, strategy, threat or stealth. 51 As in any civil case, the burden of
proof lies with the complainants (the respondents in this case) who must establish their case by preponderance of evidence. In the present
case, the respondents sufficiently alleged and proved the required elements.
To support its position, NQFC invokes the principle of tacking of possession, that is, when it bought Lot No. 102 from Santos on December 29,
2000, its possession is, by operation of law, tacked to that of Santos and even earlier, or at the time Donato acquired Lot No. 102 in 1948.
NQFC’s reliance on this principle is misplaced. True, the law52 allows a present possessor to tack his possession to that of his predecessor-in-
interest to be deemed in possession of the property for the period required by law. Possession in this regard, however, pertains to
possession de jure and the tacking is made for the purpose of completing the time required for acquiring or losing ownership through
prescription. We reiterate – possession in forcible entry suits refers to nothing more than physical possession, not legal possession.
The CA brushed aside NQFC’s argument on the respondents’ failure to perfect their title over Lot No. 102. It held that the issue in this case is
not of possession de jure, let alone ownership or title, but of possession de facto.1âwphi1 We agree with the CA; the discussions above are
clear on this point.
We agree, too, as we have indicated in passing above, that the issue of ownership can be material and relevant in resolving the issue of
possession. The Rules in fact expressly allow this: Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court 53 provides that the issue of ownership shall be
resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the question of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. But this provision is
only an exception and is allowed only in this limited instance-- to determine the issue of possession and only if the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership.54 Save for this instance, evidence of ownership is not at all material, as in the
present case.55
As a final reiterative note, this Decision deals only with de facto possession and is without prejudice to an appropriate action for recovery of
possession based on ownership.
WHEREFORE, in light of these considerations, we hereby DENY the petition; the decision dated February 22, 2006 and the resolution dated
July 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77006 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-37435 November 28, 1934

NUMERIANO PADILLA, applicant-appellee,
vs.
PABLO REYES and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositors-appellants.
Attorney-General Jaranilla and Jose Nava for appellants.
Sison and Siguion for appellee.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Appellee applied for the registration in his name of a parcel of land containing a little over 161 hectares located in Bongabong, Nueva Ecija.
The application was opposed by the Director of Lands and by nine homesteaders, on the ground that the property sought to be registered
was public land. One Pablo Reyes, who claimed to be the exclusive owner of the land, also filed an opposition. After due hearing, the court
below dismissed all the oppositions and decreed the registration of the land in the name of the appellee. From this judgment all the parties
who opposed the application appealed, although Pablo Reyes' appeal was dismissed for failure to file his brief on time.
In support of this appeal the following errors have been assigned: (1) That the lower court erred in holding that the appellee has established
his title to the property sought to be registered, and (2) that the lower court erred in decreeing the registration of the property in the name
of the appellee.
Appellee presented no valid and sufficient title deed showing his ownership of the land in question. He, however, tried to prove that he
inherited the same from his ancestors, who had been in possession of the land for many years dating back to the Spanish regime; that he as
well as his predecessors in interest had party cultivated the land and partly used it as a pasture; that various improvements had been made
on the land ever since the Spanish regime; and that upon the death of their father, Pablo Padilla, he and his sister Alejandra took possession
of the land. On the other hand, the appellants introduced evidence tending to show that the land in question was never occupied by Pablo
Padilla during the Spanish regime; that when the several homesteaders settled upon the land during the 1912 to 1918, the same was
unoccupied, unclaimed, and without any sign of previous cultivation or occupation; that the homesteaders were not molested in their
possession of portions of the land in question until 1927, after they had cleared their holdings and put the same in cultivation.
In Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa vs. Municipality of Taal (38 Phil., 367, 376), this court said: " . . . In order, however, that the petitioner for
registration of his land under the Torrens system shall be permitted to have the same registered and to have the benefit resulting from the
certificate of title finally issued, the burden is upon him to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee simple, of the lands which he is
attempting to have registered. The petitioner is not entitled to have his lands registered under the torrens system simply because no one
appears to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of his lands. In order that land may be registered under the torrens system, the
petitioner must show, even though there is no opposition, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple, of the same. . . ."1awphil.net
On the other hand, it is well-settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
government. A grant is conclusively presumed by law when the claimant, by himself or through his predecessors in interest, has occupied
the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and under a claim of title since July 26, 1894, or prior thereto. (Ongsiaco vs. Magsilang, 50 Phil.,
380.) In the case before us, appellee has failed to prove any express grant from the government; neither has he succeeded in proving
possession from which a constructive grant can be predicated.
It results that the judgment appealed from must be reversed, and it is hereby decreed and adjudged that the property sought to be registered
in this case is public land. Without any special pronouncement as to costs in this instance. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-31083 September 30, 1975

URSULA FRANCISCO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JULIAN RODRIGUEZ, defendant-appellee, MONINA RODRIGUEZ, defendant-intervenor-appellee.
Castillo Law Offices for plaintiff-appellant.
Arsenio Suazo for appellee Heirs of Julian Rodriguez.
Maximo N. Llanto, Jr. for oppositors-claimants.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor Octavio R. Ramirez for intervenor
Director of Lands.

MARTIN, J.:
In a span of more than two decades now, this case has been appealed to Us for the third time, with the plaintiff-appellant inquiring into the
extent and coverage of the reversion order of the Court in its anterior decision.
Sometime in 1932, the plaintiff-appellant, Ursula Francisco, applied for the purchase of Lot No. 595, Cadastral No. 102 of L-102 of Davao
Cadastre, consisting of 33.1185 hectares, situated in barrio Bunawan, Davao City, through Sales Application No. 15774. Unfortunately, the
Director of Lands rejected the sales application, for the reason that the plaintiff-appellant had permitted herself to be a dummy in the
acquisition of the land. Nonetheless, the plaintiff-appellant continued in possession and in June, 1940 she conveyed 29.3298 hectares of the
land to her former lawyer, defendant Julian Rodriguez. Later, upon discovering that the document she signed was a deed of absolute sale and
not the antichresis she thought of, she filed civil case 9-R in the Court of First Instance of Davao and sought for the annulment of the deed.
The deed was declared null and void, but the land was considered Government property and not plaintiff-appellant's. Subsequently, the
Bureau of Lands reinstated plaintiff-appellant's sales application, but stayed the execution thereof. Plaintiff-appellant then sued defendant
Julian Rodriguez in the Court of First Instance of Davao, docketed as Civil Case 268, for recovery of possession, sum of money, and damages.
Defendant Monina Rodriguez, Julian's daughter, was allowed to intervene.
After trial, the lower court adjudged plaintiff Ursula Francisco and defendants Julian Rodriguez and Monina Rodriguez not entitled to the
possession of the disputed land and left the disposition thereof to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Both parties
appealed to this Court.
On May 21, 1956, the judgment of the lower court was affirmed, the Court holding that the land dispute between the parties may well be left
to the action of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources.1 The parties separately moved for reconsideration, believing that the
decision of the Court had restored to them their status ante litem motan, to obtain possession of the property and the fruits thereof pendente
lite, but the motions were denied.
When the records of the case were returned to the lower court, the parties reiterated their motions, which the trial court also denied on the
ground that it is either the Secretary of Agriculture or the Director of Lands who should ask for the possession of the property.
On October 22, 1956, after the Bureau of Lands had completed its investigation of the land controversy ordered by the Secretary of
Agriculture, the Secretary denied the claims of Julian Rodriguez and his daughter Monina to the 29.3298 hectares and it improvements.
Further, it declared the land in question vacant, the steps leading to its sale, including the improvements, in a public bidding to be forthwith
taken.
The Office of the President affirmed the Secretary's ruling in toto.
On December 8 1958, the Director of Lands moved to intervene in Civil Case 268 before the lower court and prayed that the receivership be
dissolved after the receiver shall have rendered an accounting. The motion was granted and the final accounts of the receiver were
approved. Defendants Julian Rodriguez and Monina Rodriguez filed a motion asking for the possession of the property and discharge of the
receiver and later, together with the plaintiff-appellant, moved that the proceeds of the property be delivered to and divided between them
equally. The motions were denied and so, defendants Julian Rodriguez and Monina Rodriguez appealed to this Court2 imputing that the trial
court erred in declaring the litigated land already reverted to the State; the State's ownership of the land as carrying with it the right to
possession; in not declaring defendants entitled to the material and physical possession of the land; and in not terminating the receivership.
On October 31, 1962, the Court affirmed the judgment appealed from, ruling that the reversion is self-operative and separate action need not
be instituted by the Government for that purpose. The provision of Section 101 of the Public Land Law (Commonwealth Act No. 141) that "all
actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereof shall be instituted by the Solicitor
General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines," applies only when title
has already vested in the individual, which is not the case in the appealed judgment. Neither could the parties claim for the proceeds of the
property pendente lite because "all rights in and interest to, and the improvements and crops upon, land for which an application has been
denied or cancelled or a patent or grant refused, or a contract or concession rescinded or annulled, shall also be forfeited to the Government."
(Section 98, Commonwealth Act No. 141). Instead, the property as well as the fruits thereof pendente lite should be delivered to the Director
of Lands, who had intervened in Civil Case 268.3
On March 17, 1966, the Director of Lands sought the execution of the decision of the Court before the lower court. Plaintiff Ursula Francisco
opposed the petition, contending that only twenty-nine (29) hectares of the 33-hectare Lot No. 595, Cadastral No. 102 of Davao Cadastre,
was reverted to the State, excluding the four (4) hectares which she claims to have been in her possession even during the pendency of Civil
Case 268. Defendants Julian Rodriguez and Monina Rodriguez followed, claiming that an independent suit is necessary for the execution of
the judgment since more than five (5) years have already elapsed from its finality. Opposition also came from claimants-oppositors Alejo
Dugasa, et al., pressing on the impropriety of execution by mere motion and asserting their possessory right over the land in question.4
The lower court denied the oppositions in its Order of September 18, 1967 and directed the issuance of a writ of execution placing the
Government thru the Director of Lands and the District Land Officer in Davao in complete possession of the land in question.
In a subsequent order of November 10, 1967, the lower court also enjoined the receiver in the proceedings to submit its final accounting,
after which the Motion for Dissolution of Receivership filed by the Director of Lands would be heard.
Hence, on November 20, 1967, plaintiff-appellant filed her Notice of Appeal against the September 18, 1967 Order of the lower court. 5
Only one issue is raised by plaintiff-appellant and that is, whether the reversion ordered in G.R. No. L-15605, October 31, 1962, refers to the
whole Lot No. 595, Cadastral No. 102 of Davao, consisting of 33.1185 hectares, or only to the 29.3298 hectares, the conveyance of which by
the plaintiff-appellant to defendant Julian Rodriguez had been annulled.
The fundamental principle is that the State possesses plenary power "as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients
of public domain, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their
exercising what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership."6 And the law has laid in the Director of Lands "the power of executive
control, administration, disposition and alienation of public lands" that includes the survey, classification, lease, sale, or any other form of
concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain7 subject, of course, to the control of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources.8 Its decisions as to questions of fact are conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
resources. 9
It is indisputable that the only basis of the plaintiff-appellant's claim to the property in question is her Sales Application No. 15774, wherein
she applied for the purchase of Lot No. 595, Cadastral No. 102, Davao Cadastre, consisting of 33.1185 hectares. However, the application was
rejected by the Director of Lands on August 10, 1935, because she "permitted herself to be a dummy." She continued to possess the property
though and then sold 29 hectares thereof to her previous lawyer, defendant Julian Rodriguez. Later, the sale was declared null and void by
this Court in G.R. No. L-8263, May 26, 1952, not only because plaintiff-appellant's rights under her sales applications had been cancelled by
the Bureau of Lands but especially because the convenyance was made without the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture as
required by law (Section 29, Commonwealth Act No. 141), The nullity of such sale produced as a consequence "the reversion of the property
with all the rights thereto to the State." 10
The subsequent reinstatement of plaintiff-appellant's sales application by the Director of Lands did not redeem her claim to Lot 595,
Cadastral No. 102 from its incipient nullity because the application was finally denied by the Secretary of Agriculture on October 22, 1956
after formal investigation by the Bureau of Lands, a ruling now beyond judicial interference. 11 As a result, whatever rights or interests
plaintiff-appellant may have in Lot No. 595 had thus frittered away and the entire lot reverted to the mass of public lands, such reversion
being even imprescriptible. 12 By transgressing the law, i.e., allowing herself to be a dummy in the acquisition of the land and selling the same
without the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, plaintiff-appellant herself has eliminated the very
source (Sales Application) of her claim to Lot No. 595, as a consequence of which, she cannot later on assert any right or interest
thereon. 13 This is the imperative import of the pronouncements in G.R. No. L-8263 and in G.R. No. L-15605 that the invalidity of the
conveyance plaintiff-appellant "produced as a consequence the reversion of the property with all rights thereto to the State." As a matter of
fact, Section 29 of the Public Land Law (Commonwealth Act No. 141) expressly ordains that any sale and encumbrance made without the
previous approval of the Secretary Agriculture and Natural Resources "shall be null and void and shall produce the effect of annulling the
acquisition and reverting the property and all rights thereto to the State, and all payments on the purchase price theretofore made to the
Government shall be forfeited." Thus, in Republic v. Garcia, 14 quoted in Republic v. Ruiz, supra, it was held that "even if only 19 out of the
23.21 hectares of the homestead land had been sold or alienated within the prohibitive period of five years living date of issuance of the
patent to the grantee, such alienation is a sufficient cause for reversion to the State of the whole grant." 15 Much more, when even the mere
application is denied by the Bureau of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
In fact, even if a sales application were already given due course by the Director of Lands, the applicant is not thereby conferred any right
over the land covered by the application. It is the award made by the Director to the applicant (if he is the highest bidder) that confers upon
him a certain right over the land, namely, "to take possession of the land so that he could comply with the requirements prescribed by
law." 16 It is at this stage, when the award is made, that the land can be considered "disposed of by the Government", since the aforestated
right of the applicant has the effect of withdrawing the land from the public domain that is "disposable" by the Director of Lands under the
provisions of the Public Land Act (Director of Lands under the provisions of the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, supra,
citing People v. Lapasaran, 100 Phil. 40 and Diaz v. Macalinao, 55 O.G. 1021). However, the disposition is merely provisional because the
applicant has still to comply with the requirements prescribed by law before any patent is issued. After the requisites of the law are
complied with by the applicant to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands, the patent is issued. It is then that the land covered by the
application may be considered "permanently disposed of by the Government." 17 In case the applicant is found not to possess the
qualifications necessary for the award of the land, the application is revoked. 18
Furthermore, the finding of the Court in its previous decisions 19 that the Director of Lands and finally the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources had rejected plaintiff-appellant's sales application for Lot No. 595 may well be considered as the law of the case between
the parties herein, to the effect that the resulting absence of plaintiff-appellant's rights or interests to the entire Lot No. 595 constitutes
controlling legal rule between them. 20
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed order of the court a quo, dated September 18, 1967, ordering the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of the
Government, thru the Director of Lands, of Lot No. 595, Cadastral No. 102 of Davao Cadastre (for the whole area of 33.1185 hectares) is
hereby affirmed. Costs against plaintiff-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-15656 November 15, 1920

JESUS VAÑO, applicant-appellant,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, objector-appellee.
Jose A. Clarin for appellant.
Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:
All, that applicant desires by these proceedings is to obtain title to a tract of land containing a little over 3,793 hectares, including within its
boundaries four municipalities and constituting a not inconsiderable part of the entire Province of Bohol. Certainly a modest hope which,
however, was thwarted by the oppositions entered by the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, and the adverse judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Bohol, denying the registration of the land, with costs against the applicant, without prejudice. Applicant appeals.
To prove title, open continuous, exclusive, and notorious occupation of the land by the applicant and his predecessors in interest since 1882,
interrupted by the revolution, is relied upon. Included within the perimeter of the tract are approximately 685 hectares of forest land and
four logging trails in the nature of highways. These portions should, without question, be eliminated from the claim. The government
concedes, however, that approximately 1,060 hectares are under cultivation and that certain other portions have been used by the claimant
for pasturage. (See Exhibits A, 1, and 2.) But the doctrine of Lands ([1918]), 39 Phil., 175) cannot be successfully advanced for the claimant is
not holding the land under color of title. To the tracts, of which applicant is in actual possession, he can secure title, on submission of proper
plans.lawph!l.net
Judgment is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-37995 August 31, 1987

BUREAU OF FORESTRY, BUREAU OF LANDS and PHILIPPINE FISHERIES COMMISSION, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FILOMENO GALLO, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari, which seeks to annul and set aside the Decision 1 (promulgated on April 11, 1973) of the
respondent court in CA-G.R. No. 38163-R, affirming the decision 2 (dated April 6, 1966) of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Land
Registration Case No. N-506, G.L.R.O. Record No. N-20783 entitled "Filomeno Gallo, Applicant vs. Bureau of Forestry, Bureau of Lands, and
Philippine Fisheries Commission, oppositors. " The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court Orders the registration of Lots Nos. 2, 3, and 4 and the bigger portion of Lot No. 1 after excluding the portion
Identified as Lot 1-A together with the improvements thereon in the name of Filomeno Gallo, of legal age, widower, Filipino citizen, and
resident of 155 Fuentes Street, Iloilo City, Philippines. Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are subject to the road right-of-way of 15 meters wide which is
presently known as Sto. Rosario Rizal Montpiller provincial Road and Buenavista-Daraga provincial Road they being properties of the
Province of Iloilo and should be registered in the name of said province. The oppositions of the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and
the Philippine Fisheries Commission are dismissed. Lot 1-A with an area of 2.6864 hectares which is enclosed in red pencil and is found
inside Lot No. 1 in the plan Exhibit is hereby declared public land. After the decision has become final let the corresponding decree be issued.
SO ORDERED. (p. 38, Joint Record on Appeal Annex "A." p. 25, Rollo)
This appeal also seeks to annul and set aside respondent court's resolution dated December 14, 1973 denying for lack of merit, herein
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The basic issue which petitioners raise in this appeal is —
Whether or not the classification of lands of the public domain by the Executive Branch of the Government into agricultural, forest or mineral
can be changed or varied by the court depending upon the evidence adduced before it. (p. 9, Brief for the Petitioners, p. 105, Rollo)
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On July 11, 1961, four (4) parcels of land situated in Buenavista, Iloilo described in Plan Psu-150727, containing an approximate area of
30.5943 hectares were the subject of an application for registration by Mercedes Diago who alleged among others that she herself occupied
said parcels of land having bought them from the testate estate of the late Jose Ma. Nava who, in his lifetime, had bought the lands in turn
from Canuto Gustilo on June 21, 1934. The Director of Lands opposed said application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in-interest have sufficient title over the lands applied for, which could be registered under the Torrens systems, and that they
have never been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lands for at least 30 years prior to the filing of the application. The
Director of Forestry on the other hand anchored his opposition principally on the ground that certain specific portions of the lands subject
matter of the application, with an area of approximately 194,080 square meters are mangrove swamps and are within Timberland Block "B "
L.C. Project No. 38, L.C. Map No. 1971 of Buenavista, Iloilo.
On June 30, 1965, respondent Filomeno Gallo, having purchased the subject parcels of land from Mercedes Diago on April 27, 1965, moved to
be substituted in place of the latter, attaching to his motion an Amended Application for Registration of Title substantially reproducing the
allegations in the application of Mercedes Diago. Petitioner Philippine Fisheries Commission also moved on August 30, 1965 to be
substituted in place of petitioner Bureau of Forestry as oppositor over a portion of the land sought to be registered, supervision and control
of said portion having been transferred from the Bureau of Forestry to the Philippine Fisheries Commission.
On April 6, 1966, the trial court rendered its decision ordering the registration of the four (4) parcels of land in the name of respondent
Filomeno Gallo after excluding a portion Identified as Lot "1-A" which is the site of the municipal hall of Buenavista town, and subjecting Lots
Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to the road-of-way of 15 meters width.
Petitioners appealed from said decision to the respondent Court of Appeals assigning the following errors in their brief:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LAND WHICH CONSISTS OF TIMBERLAND,
FORESHORELAND AND LAND BELONGING TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN HENCE UNREGISTERABLE.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POSSESSION OF THE APPLICANT-APPELLEE AND HIS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST
HAD BEEN PEACEFUL, OPEN, CONTINUOUS, UNINTERRUPTED AND ADVERSE TO CLAIMANTS AND IN THE CONCEPT OF OWNER. (p. 6,
Brief for the Petitioners, p. 105, Rollo)
Respondent court affirmed said decision and denied a motion for reconsideration of the same hence the present petition with two (2)
assigned errors, basically the same issues raised with the respondent court:
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A PUBLIC LAND IS AGRICULTURAL OR STILL A
FOREST LAND RESTS EXCLUSIVELY UPON THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY (NOW DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), THE SECRETARY
OF NATURAL RESOURCES) AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE LAND IS PRESUMED TO BELONG TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND PRIVATE
RESPONDENT HEREIN HAS NOT CONVINCINGLY SHOWN THAT THE REMOTE PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST POSSESSED THE LAND IN
QUESTION SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL. (pp. 9 & 20, Brief for the Petitioners, p. 105, Rollo)
Out of the 30.5943 hectares applied for registration under the Torrens System, 11.1863 hectares are coconut lands and admittedly within
the disposable portion of the public domain. These are more particularly Identified as parcels "B," B-1", "B-2" and "B-3" of the sketch plan
Exh. "1-A." The rest, consisting of 19.4080 hectares and Identified as parcels A, A-1, A-2 and A-3 of the same plan Exh. "1-A," is now the
center of controversy of the present appeal.
Petitioners contend that respondent court completely ignored the undisputed facts that 1) the controverted area is within Timberland Block
"B," L.C. Project No. 38, L.C. Map No. 1971 of Buenavista, Iloilo and that 2) the certification of February 18, 1956 of the then Director of
Forestry to the effect that the area in question is needed for forest purposes. Respondent court in affirming the decision of the Iloilo trial
court ruled that although the controverted portion of 19.4080 hectares are mangrove and nipa swamps within Timberland Block "B," L.C.
Project No. 38, same cannot be considered part of the public forest not susceptible of private ownership since petitioners failed to submit
convincing proof that these lands are more valuable for forestry than for agricultural purposes, and the presumption is that these are
agricultural lands. Respondent court based its conclusion upon the premise that whether or not a controverted parcel of land is forest land,
is a question of fact which should be settled by competent proofs, and if such a question be an issue in a land registration proceeding, it is
incumbent upon the Director of Forestry to submit to the court convincing proofs that the land in dispute is not more valuable for
agriculture than for forest purposes. It is the position of respondent that respondent court did "not hesitate to apply this presumption with
full force particularly where, as in the case at bar, the lands applied for have been possessed and cultivated by the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest for a long number of years without the government taking any positive step to dislodge the occupants from their
holdings which have passed from one to another by inheritance or by purchase." (p. 9, Brief for private respondents) Otherwise stated, it is
Our impression that private respondents claim the rule of prescription against the government.
Such contentions of private respondents do not hold water. Admittedly the controversial area is within a timberland block as classification of
the municipality and certified to by the Director of Forestry on February 18, 1956 as lands needed for forest purposes and hence they are
portions of the public domain which cannot be the subject of registration proceedings. Clearly therefore the land is public land and there is
no need for the Director of Forestry to submit to the court convincing proofs that the land in dispute is not more valuable for agriculture
than for forest purposes, as there was no question of whether the land is forest land or not. Be it remembered that said forest land had been
declared and certified as such by the Director of the Bureau of Forestry on February 18, 1956, several years before the original applicant of
the lands for registration Mercedes Diago, filed it on July 11, 1961. In the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abella, 49 Phil. 49,
cited by private respondents themselves in their brief, We held —
Following the decision of Ankon vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10), it is again held, that whether a particular parcel of
land is more valuable for forestry purposes than for agricultural purposes, or vice versa, is a fact which must be established during the trial
of the case. Whether the particular land is agricultural, forestry or mineral is a question to be settled in each particular case unless the Bureau
of Forestry has, under the authority conferred upon it by law, prior to the intervention of private interest, set aside said land for forestry or
mineral resources. (Italics for emphasis)
We also held in the case of Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499, 503 that-
... As a general rule, timber or forest lands are not alienable or disposable under either the Constitution of 1935 or the Constitution of 1973.
... It is the Bureau of Forestry that has jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, occupancy
and use of all public forests and forest reservations and over the granting of licenses for the taking of products therefrom, including stone
and earth (Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code). That the area in question is a forest or timber land is clearly established by the
certification made by the Bureau of Forest Development that it is within the portion of the area which was reverted to the category of forest
land, approved by the President on March 7, 1958.
As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which was lifted from Act No. 2874, the classification or reclassification of public
lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not of the
courts. With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which determines the classification of lands of the
public domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the Government, through the Office of the President. Hence, it
was grave error and/or abuse of discretion for the respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed area is within a
timberland block and (2) as certified to by the then Director of Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes.
Furthermore, private respondents Cannot claim to have obtained their title by prescription inasmuch as the application filed by them
necessarily implied an admission that the portions applied for are part of the public domain which cannot be acquired by prescription,
unless the law expressly permits it. It is a rule of law that possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership
(Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, 23 SCRA 1184).
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the assailed decision is hereby SET ASIDE, and a new one is hereby rendered, declaring that:
1) Parcels "B," "B-1," "B-2 and "B-3" of the sketch plan Exhibit "1-A" consisting of 11.1863 hectares of coconut land and admittedly within
the disposable portion of the public domain are hereby ordered registered in the name of the applicant Filomeno Gallo and/or his
successors-in-interest as provided for by the Public Land Law; and
2) Parcels "A," "A-1," and "A-2," and "A-3" of the same plan Exh. "1-A," consisting of 19.4080 hectares, are forest lands or lands of the public
domain of the Republic of the Philippines and are therefore inalienable.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989

THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner
vs.
RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pena & Marcos for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares, as they are commonly known. If they are
part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under the Constitution. If they are considered public agricultural lands, they may be
acquired under private ownership. The private respondent's claim to the land in question must be judged by these criteria.
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied
for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than
forty years. He was opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the
application was approved by the Court of First Instance. of Capiz. 1 The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 2 The Director of
Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject
to private appropriation. He asks that the registration be reversed.
It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that the land is mangrove land. There is no
dispute as to this. The bone of contention between the parties is the legal nature of mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner claims, it
is forestal and therefore not disposable and the private respondent insists it is alienable as agricultural land. The issue before us is legal, not
factual.
For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the Philippine Bill of 1902, one of the earlier American organic acts in the
country. By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three grand divisions, to wit, agricultural,
mineral and timber or forest lands. This classification was maintained in the Constitution of the Commonwealth, promulgated in 1935, until
it was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That new charter expanded the classification of public lands to include industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, and grazing lands and even permitted the legislature to provide for other categories. 3 This provision
has been reproduced, but with substantial modifications, in the present Constitution. 4
Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in force when this case arose, only agricultural lands were allowed to be
alienated. 5 Their disposition was provided for under C.A. No. 141. Mineral and timber or forest lands were not subject to private ownership
unless they were first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for alienation.
In the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government, 6 promulgated in 1909, mangrove swamps or manglares were defined by the Court as:
... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grows various kindred plants which will not live except when watered by
the sea, extending their roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate there. These constitute the mangrove flats of
the tropics, which exist naturally, but which are also, to some extent cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible wood of the mangrove
and like trees as well as for the useful nipa palm propagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion
that they cannot be so regarded in the sense in which that term is used in the cases cited or in general American jurisprudence. The waters
flowing over them are not available for purpose of navigation, and they may be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what
remains.
xxx
Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law, the custom had grown of converting manglares and nipa lands into
fisheries which became a common feature of settlement along the coast and at the same time of the change of sovereignty constituted one of
the most productive industries of the Islands, the abrogation of which would destroy vested interests and prove a public disaster.
Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and so susceptible of private ownership.
Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared, despite the above-cited case, that mangrove swamps form part of the public
forests of this country. This it did in the Administrative Code of 1917, which became effective on October 1 of that year, thus:
Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose of this chapter 'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all
unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character.
It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the Court maintained the doctrine in the Montano case when two years later it
held in the case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry: 7
...the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish translation of that Act (Act of Congress) as terrenos forestales. We think there is
an error in this translation and that a better translation would be 'terrenos madereros.' Lumber land in English means land with trees
growing on it. The mangler plant would never be called a tree in English but a bush, and land which has only bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants
growing on it cannot be called 'timber land.
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or nipa swamps does not change the general character of the land from manglare to
timber land.
More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted Section 1820, the Court declared:
'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this Court said that the phrase agricultural lands as used in Act No. 926
means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress of July 1st 1902, classifies the public
lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are
necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its
enactment.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court should have considered them agricultural lands. If they are agricultural
lands, then the rights of appellants are fully established by Act No. 926.
The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera v. Obias, 8 promulgated on March 4, 1933, more than fifteen years
after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1917. Justice Ostrand declared for a unanimous Court:
The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the land covered by the application there are mangrove lands as shown in his
opponent's Exh. 1, but we think this opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has been definitely decided
that mangrove lands are not forest lands in the sense in which this phrase is used in the Act of Congress.
No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based on the cases of Montano and Jocson. And in 1977, the above ruling was
reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director of Forestry, 9 with Justice Fernando declaring that the mangrove lands in litis were agricultural in nature.
The decision even quoted with approval the statement of the trial court that:
... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees are small and sparse, fit only for firewood purposes and
the trees growing are not of commercial value as lumber do not convert the land into public land. Such lands are not forest in character. They
do not form part of the public domain.
Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, 10 the Court, citing Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 11 reiterated the ruling in the Mapa case that "all
public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa
swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a line of decisions holding the contrary view.
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 12 promulgated in 1983, the Court ruled "that the Bureau of Fisheries has no
jurisdiction to dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest
lands.
Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, 13 the Court was more positive when it held, again through Justice
Gutierrez:
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a
'mangrove swamps.' Although conceding that 'mangrove swamp' is included in the classification of forest land in accordance with Section
1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of the said Code as first, second
and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to
land registration proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of private persons for many years, and therefore, said land
was already 'private land' better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests
to be kept under forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. 'Forested lands' do not have to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classsified as 'forest' is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply.'
The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 14 where this Court agreed with the Solicitor General's submission that
the land in dispute, which he described as "swamp mangrove or forestal land," were not private properties and so not registerable. This case
was decided only twelve days after the De Porkan case.
Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a need for a categorical pronouncement that should resolve once and for
all the question of whether mangrove swamps are agricultural lands or forest lands.
The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to the legislature, which has the authority to implement the constitutional
provision classifying the lands of the public domain (and is now even permitted to provide for more categories of public lands). The
legislature having made such implementation, the executive officials may then, in the discharge of their own role, administer our public
lands pursuant to their constitutional duty " to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed' and in accordance with the policy prescribed. For
their part, the courts will step into the picture if the rules laid down by the legislature are challenged or, assuming they are valid, it is claimed
that they are not being correctly observed by the executive. Thus do the three departments, coordinating with each other, pursue and
achieve the objectives of the Constitution in the conservation and utilization of our natural resources.
In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of the Philippines the function of making periodic classifications of public
lands, thus:
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the
lands of the public domain into:
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Lumber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their administration and
disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable lands, the President, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this
Act.
With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the same law provides:
For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified,
according to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time make the classifications
provided for in this section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class to another.
As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states as follows:
Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves- Revocation of same. - Upon there commendation of the Director of Forestry, with the
approval of the Department Head, the President of the Philippines may set apart forest reserves from the public lands and he shall by
proclamation declare the establishment of such reserves and the boundaries thereof, and thereafter such forest reserves shall not be
entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall remain as such for forest uses, and shall be administered in the same manner as public
forest.
The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation alter or modify the boundaries of any forest reserve from time to time,
or revoke any such proclamation, and upon such revocation such forest reserve shall be and become part of the public lands as though such
proclamation had never been made.
Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes. - Lands in public forest, not including forest reserves, upon the certification of
the Director of Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by
the public interests to be kept under forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands.
With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion:
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the Philippines as defined in the aforecited
Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its
decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and, no less
noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive department. More importantly, the said provision has not been challenged as arbitrary
or unrealistic or unconstitutional assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus
presumed valid and so must be respected. We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of mangrove swamps as
forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. That
determination having been made and no cogent argument having been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges but to apply it. And so
we shall.
Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our agricultural lands should be understood as covering only those lands
over which ownership had already vested before the Administrative Code of 1917 became effective. Such lands could not be retroactively
legislated as forest lands because this would be violative of a duly acquired property right protected by the due process clause. So we ruled
again only two months ago in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 15 where the possession of the land in dispute commenced as
early as 1909, before it was much later classified as timberland.
It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly a part of the mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for which a minor
forest license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It could therefore not
be the subject of the adverse possession and consequent ownership claimed by the private respondent in support of his application for
registration. To be so, it had first to be released as forest land and reclassified as agricultural land pursuant to the certification the Director of
Forestry may issue under Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by the Director of Lands, 16 to prove that the land is
registerable. It should be plain, however, that the mere existence of such a plan would not have the effect of converting the mangrove
swamps, as forest land, into agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly in officious. The Director of Lands was not
authorized to act in the premises. Under the aforecited law, it is the Director of Forestry who has the authority to determine whether forest
land is more valuable for agricultural rather than forestry uses, as a basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release for private
ownership.
Thus we held in the Yngson case:
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until timber or forest lands are released as disposable
and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell or otherwise dispose of these lands
for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases and other modes of utilization.
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain
while such lands are still classified as forest land or timber land and not released for fishery or other purposes.
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registerable. The
adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot commence until after the forest
land has been declared alienable and disposable. Possession of forest land, no matter bow long cannot convert it into private property.'
We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in nature, the proof the private respondent offers of prescriptive possession
thereof is remarkably meager and of dubious persuasiveness. The record contains no convincing evidence of the existence of
the informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by the original transferor of the property, let alone the fact that the conditions for acquiring title
thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere has it been shown that the informacion posesoria has been inscribed or registered in the registry of
property and that the land has been under the actual and adverse possession of the private respondent for twenty years as required by the
Spanish Mortgage Law. 17 These matters are not presumed but must be established with definite proof, which is lacking in this case.
Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent were practically the only basis used by the appellate court in sustaining
his claim of possession over the land in question. Tax declarations are, of course, not sufficient to prove possession and much less vest
ownership in favor of the declarant, as we have held in countless cases. 18
We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his right to the registration of the subject land in his name. Accordingly, the
petition must be granted.
It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative definition embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917, which remains unamended up to now, mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines. As such, they
are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless they are first released as forest
land and classified as alienable agricultural land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application for registration of title of private respondent is
DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127060 November 19, 2002

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FLORENTINO CENIZA, SANTIAGO CENIZA,
ESTANISLAO CENIZA, ROMEO SIMBAJON, PABLO RAMOS,
ATILANO BONGO, EDGAR ADOLFO, EMMA ADOLFO,
JERRY ADOLFO, GLENN ADOLFO, GINA ADOLFO,
LORNA ADOLFO, CHONA ADOLFO, EVELYN ADOLFO,
in her own behalf and as guardian of the minors HUBERT and AMIEL ADOLFO,
and ELNITA ADOLFO in her own behalf and as guardian of minors
DAVID and PRESTINE MAY ADOLFO, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 dated September 28, 1994, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 31728,
affirming the decision2 in LRC Case No. N-46 of the Regional Trial Court in Mandaue City, Branch XXVIII, which declared private respondents
as the owners entitled to the registration of the lots in question.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Apolinar Ceniza was the declared owner in 1948 of Lot No. 1104, located at Cabancalan, Mandaue City, under Tax Declaration No. 01686.
When he died, his heirs took possession of the property and in 1960 partitioned the same through a deed of extrajudicial partition.
Apolinar’s children, namely, Santiago, Estanislao, Florencia, Manuela, Mercedes and Florentino, all surnamed Ceniza, each got 1/8 share of
the property. His grandchildren, namely, the siblings Remedios Adolfo, Melecio Ceniza, and Constancia Zanoria, each got 1/24 share, while
Apolinar’s other grandchildren, namely, the siblings Concepcion Suico, Benjamin Ceniza, Lilia Ceniza and Delfin Ceniza, each got 1/32 share.
Private respondent Florentino Ceniza purchased the shares of his sisters Manuela and Mercedes and the share pertaining to the siblings
Jesusa,3 Benjamin and Delfin. Together with his share, Florentino became the owner of Lot Nos. 1104-A&C and had them tax declared in his
name.
Florencia’s share, a portion of Lot No. 1104-B, was purchased by Mercedes who in turn bartered the same with the share acquired by
Santiago, another private respondent in this case.
A portion of Santiago’s property was bought by his daughter, Asuncion Ceniza, married to private respondent Atillano Bongo and who
successfully obtained a tax declaration therefor.
From the portion purchased by Asuncion Ceniza, another private respondent, Romeo Simbajon, purchased an area of 270 square meters.
Romeo also acquired a tax declaration in his name. He was the husband of Felicitas Ceniza, another daughter of Santiago.
The share acquired by Estanislao, another child of Apolinar, was also a portion of Lot No. 1104-B. He also caused the tax declaration
pertaining to the said lot transferred in his name.
The siblings Remedios Adolfo and Constancia Zanoria, married to private respondent Pablo Ramos, bought the share of their brother,
Melecio Ceniza. Remedios’ share, in turn, was transferred to her heirs, private respondents Edgar, Emma, Jerry, Glenn, Gina, Lorna, Chona,
Evelyn, Hubert, Amiel, all surnamed Adolfo, and the heirs of their brother Leoncio Adolfo, namely, his wife Elenita Adolfo, and children David
and Prestine May Adolfo.
On November 4, 1986, private respondents applied for registration of their respective titles over the property they inherited from Apolinar
Ceniza, with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General opposed the application on the following grounds:
1. That neither the applicant/s nor their precedessors-in-interest have been in open continuous exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto (Sec. 48 [b], C.A. 141, as amended by P.D. 1073).
2. That the muniment/s or title and/or the tax declaration/s and tax payment/s receipt/s of applicant/s if any, attached to or alleged in the
application, do/es not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the lands applied for or of their open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner, since June 12, 1945, or prior thereto. Said
muniment/s of title do/es not appear to be genuine and the tax declaration/s and/or tax payment receipts indicate pretended possession of
applicants to be of recent vintage.
3. That the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by the applicants who have
failed to file an appropriate application for registration within the period of six (6) months from February 16, 1976 as required by
Presidential Decree No. 892. From the records, it appears that the instant application was filed on October 25, 1996.
4. That the parcel/s applied for is/are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private
appropriation.
In a decision dated February 28, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City granted the application. 4 It held that since the applicants’
possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years was continuous, peaceful, adverse, public and to the exclusion of everybody, the same
was "in the concept of owners." Since the land was neither encumbered nor subject to any other application for registration, the trial court
ordered that, upon the finality of its decision, the decrees of registration should be issued in favor of the applicants.
The Solicitor General interposed an appeal for petitioner Republic of the Philippines before the Court of Appeals.
In a decision dated September 28, 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. It held that the ruling in Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals,5 that before public land could be registered in the name of a private individual, it must first be established that the
land had been classified alienable and disposable, "refers to public lands and not to those which have acquired the nature of a private
property in view of the continuous possession thereof by its claimants." The Court of Appeals held:
In this case, it was sufficiently established by appellees that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
subject lots even before the year 1927, or fifty nine (59) years before the application was filed (TSN, April 13, 1989, pp. 3-4; February 6,
1989, p. 7-11; June 2, 1988, pp. 3, 8-9). This period more than sufficiently satisfies the 30 years requirement of the Public Land Act for
property to be considered as private land. Significantly, Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1073 provides:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 4(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bonafide claim of ownership, since
June 12, 1945.
Appellant was thus no longer required to prove that the property in question is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. Clearly, the property no longer forms part of the public domain. The long and continuous possession thereof by appellees converted
said property to a private one. This finds support in the ruling in Director of Lands vs. Bengzon, 152 SCRA 369, to wit:
"x x x alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessor-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for
the prescribed statutory period (30) years under the Public Land Act, as amended is converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of said period, ipso jure." The above is a reaffirmation of the principle established in the earlier cases of Cariño v. Insular
Government, Suzi v. Razon, and Herico v. Dar, that open exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of
judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. x x x In interpreting the provisions of Section 48 (b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, this Court said in Herico v. Dar, "x x x when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied
with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be
evidenced by the patent and the torrens title to be issued upon the strength of the patent."
The Court of Appeals then cited Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court. 6 In that case, this Court ruled that "alienable public land
held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory
period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period,
ipso jure." Moreover, appellant Republic’s claim that the property in question remains to be "public land" under the Constitution, is "refuted"
by this Court’s pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court that "the Constitution cannot impair vested rights."
The Court of Appeals concluded its decision with the following observations:
Finally, we note that no opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the application of appellees on the ground that
the property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in question are forestal land, unlike the case of
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701, wherein the Director of Lands questioned the petition for registration filed by the
applicant therein on the claim that the property applied for registration in his favor was classified and proven to be forestal land.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a resolution dated October 29, 1996. Traversing petitioner’s argument
that under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, all lands of the public domain are owned by the State, the Court of Appeals stated that
said provision "further states that agricultural lands are excluded from those lands that may not be alienated." It further ruled:
In the instant case, among the documents presented by appellees are Real Estate tax receipts that sufficiently show that the subject land is
mainly utilized for agricultural purposes devoted to the planting of coconut, corn x x x and sugar cane x x x aside from using the same for
residential purposes x x x.
It is noticeable that appellant failed to present any proof to establish its claim that the land in question is not alienable. Although on July 10,
1989, the court a quo issued an order "directing the Bureau of Forest Development [BFD] to submit xx within thirty (30) days from its
receipt of [said order] a report on the status of the land xx to determine whether said land or any portion thereof is within the forest zone
xxx" (Record, p. 63), the BFD failed to comply. Moreover, appellant never contested appellees’ application nor did it may (sic) any
manifestation that the land in question is not alienable. Likewise, the prosecutor representing the Republic of the Philippines during the trial
did not even contest the classification of the land as stated in the evidence of appellees. Their belated objection should therefore not
prejudice appellees who openly and in good faith presented all the documents pertinent to their claims.
Presidential Decree No. 1073 extended the period within which a qualified person may apply for confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete
title by judicial legalization to December 31, 1987. The filing of this case in October, 1986 was therefore seasonable. Under the decree, this
right is available to a person who has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, by himself and through
his predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership since June 12, 1945. We reiterate that appellees have
proven themselves to have been in possession of the subject land even prior to June 12, 1945.
Hence, this petition for review, alleging that the Court of Appeals erred in: (1) holding that private respondents have registerable title to the
lots in question, and (2) ordering the registration thereof in their names.7
The issues raised before us are: (a) whether there is a need for private respondents to establish that the land subject of their application was
alienable and disposable despite proofs showing their possession thereof for more than 30 years; and (b) whether private respondents were
able to meet the period required by the Public Land Act, as amended.
Petitioner contends that before a public land can be registered in the name of a private individual, it must be shown first that (a) the land has
been classified alienable and disposable, and (b) the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto.
Petitioner claims that private respondents failed to meet the said requirements. They did not cite any official proclamation or presented the
land classification map covering the subject parcels of land to prove that they are alienable and disposable public lands. Neither did private
respondents adduce evidence to show that they had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Although they were able to show
possession by Apolinar, their predecessor-in-interest, since 1948, and private respondents’ actual possession beginning in 1960, no proof
was presented to show possession prior to 1948. Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to have the subject parcels of land
registered in their names.
In their comment, private respondents cite Section 48(b),8 before it was amended by PD No. 1073, and Section (50) 9 of the Public Land Act as
the applicable law in this case. They maintain that the land subject of their application is an agricultural land devoted to corn and other root
crops. Further, they have been in possession of the land since 1927. Estanislao Ceniza, one of the children of Apolinar and who was already
ten years old at that time, testified that his father was the one in possession of the land, appropriating its fruits and paying its realty taxes.
When their father died in 1947, Apolinar’s chidren took possession of the land. They also appropriated the fruits and paid realty taxes
therefor. In 1960, Apolinar’s heirs partitioned the property, declared their respective shares in their names for tax purposes and paid the
realty taxes.
Apart from this, private respondents claim that the land in question has long been a private one, it being a part of Hacienda de Mandaue de
Cebu, which in turn was recognized as a private land by the Court of First Instance of Cebu in several decisions dated February 27, 1934,
March 27, 1935, May 6, 1937 and August 6, 1937.
Indeed, before one can be granted a confirmation of title to lands of the public domain, the Public Land Act "requires that the applicant must
prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act." Only when these conditions are met may
the possessor of the land acquire, by operation of law, "a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued."10
Conclusively, the Court of Appeals erred when it held that mere adverse possession in accordance with law for a period likewise provided
for by law would automatically entitle the possessor to the right to register public land in his name. The applicant has to establish first the
disposable and alienable character of the public land. Otherwise, all public lands, regardless of their classification, can be subject of
registration of private titles, as long as the applicant shows that he meets the required years of possession. Worth noting is the case of
Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,11 where the applicant had been in possession of the property since 1908 but it was conclusively shown by the
government that the land was classified as alienable or disposable only on 27 March 1972. The Court said:
x x x. Thus, even granting that petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest had occupied the same since 1908, he still cannot claim title
thereto by virtue of such possession since the subject parcels of land were not yet alienable land at that time nor capable of private
appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable
or disposable portions of the public domain.12 (Italics supplied)
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; 13 an administrative action;14 investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators;15 and a legislative act or a statute.16
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the
lots involved were "found to be within the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555
dated December 9, 1980."17 This is sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of private respondents’
application.18 Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence, 19 which is true in this
case. Worth noting also was the observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:
…no opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the application of appellees on the ground that the property still
forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in question are forestal land....20
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public land for the period required by law would entitle its occupant
to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the land subject of their
application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject land even before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.21 Although
there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is one of them.22
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the decision, as well as the resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 31728 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 154953 June 26, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 21 August 2002 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658. The Court
of Appeals affirmed in toto the 16 December 1999 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 (trial court) in Land
Registration Case No. T-635.
The Antecedent Facts
This case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc. covering Lot 10705-B of the
subdivision plan Csd-04-019741 which is a portion of the consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre. The land, with an area of
564,007 square meters, or 56.4007 hectares, is located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas.
On 31 August 1999, the trial court set the case for initial hearing at 9:30 a.m. on 11 November 1999. The Notice of Initial Hearing was
published in the Official Gazette, 20 September 1999 issue, Volume 95, No. 38, pages 6793 to 6794, 4 and in the 18 October 1999 issue of
People’s Journal Taliba,5 a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The Notice of Initial Hearing was also posted in a conspicuous
place on the bulletin board of the Municipal Building of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, as well as in a conspicuous place on the land. 6 All adjoining
owners and all government agencies and offices concerned were notified of the initial hearing.7
On 11 November 1999, when the trial court called the case for initial hearing, there was no oppositor other than the Opposition dated 7
October 1999 of the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands (petitioner). On 15 November 1999, the trial court
issued an Order8 of General Default against the whole world except as against petitioner.
During the hearing on 19 November 1999, Ceferino Carandang (Carandang) appeared as oppositor. The trial court gave Carandang until 29
November 1999 within which to file his written opposition.9 Carandang failed to file his written opposition and to appear in the succeeding
hearings. In an Order10 dated 13 December 1999, the trial court reinstated the Order of General Default.
During the hearings conducted on 13 and 14 December 1999, respondent presented three witnesses: Anthony Dimayuga Torres (Torres),
respondent’s Operations Manager and its authorized representative in the case; Primitivo Evangelista (Evangelista), a 72-year old resident
of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas since birth; and Regalado Marquez, Records Officer II of the Land Registration Authority (LRA),
Quezon City.
The testimonies of respondent’s witnesses showed that Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy) had peaceful, adverse, open, and continuous
possession of the land in the concept of an owner since 1942. Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio Dimayuga
(Antonio). On 27 September 1960, Antonio executed a Deed of Donation covering the land in favor of one of his children, Fortunato
Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later, however, Antonio gave Fortunato another piece of land. Hence, on 26 April 1961, Antonio executed a Partial
Revocation of Donation, and the land was adjudicated to one of Antonio’s children, Prospero Dimayuga (Porting). 11 On 8 August 1997,
Porting sold the land to respondent.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated the land in favor of respondent.
The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation could apply for registration of land provided such entity and its predecessors-in-
interest have possessed the land for 30 years or more. The trial court ruled that the facts showed that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest
possessed the land in the concept of an owner prior to 12 June 1945, which possession converted the land to private property.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the Order of General Default, the Court hereby adjudicates and decrees Lot 10705-B,
identical to Lot 13637, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, on plan Csd-04-019741, situated in Barangay of San Bartolome, Municipality of Sto.
Tomas, Province of Batangas, with an area of 564,007 square meters, in favor of and in the name of T.A.N. Properties, Inc., a domestic
corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws with principal office at 19 th Floor, PDCP Bank Building, 8737 Paseo de Roxas,
Makati City.
Once this Decision shall have become final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioner appealed from the trial court’s Decision. Petitioner alleged that the trial court erred in granting the application for registration
absent clear evidence that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have complied with the period of possession and occupation as
required by law. Petitioner alleged that the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres are general in nature. Considering the area involved,
petitioner argued that additional witnesses should have been presented to corroborate Evangelista’s testimony.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court’s Decision.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelista’s knowledge of the possession and occupation of the land stemmed not only from the fact that he
worked there for three years but also because he and Kabesang Puroy were practically neighbors. On Evangelista’s failure to mention the
name of his uncle who continuously worked on the land, the Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelista should not be faulted as he was not
asked to name his uncle when he testified. The Court of Appeals also ruled that at the outset, Evangelista disclaimed knowledge of
Fortunato’s relation to Kabesang Puroy, but this did not affect Evangelista’s statement that Fortunato took over the possession and
cultivation of the land after Kabesang Puroy’s death. The Court of Appeals further ruled that the events regarding the acquisition and
disposition of the land became public knowledge because San Bartolome was a small community. On the matter of additional witnesses, the
Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to cite any law requiring the corroboration of the sole witness’ testimony.
The Court of Appeals further ruled that Torres was a competent witness since he was only testifying on the fact that he had caused the filing
of the application for registration and that respondent acquired the land from Porting.
Petitioner comes to this Court assailing the Court of Appeals’ Decision. Petitioner raises the following grounds in its Memorandum:
The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in allowing the grant of title to applicant corporation despite the following:
1. Absence of showing that it or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in the
concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier; and
2. Disqualification of applicant corporation to acquire the subject tract of land.13
The Issues
The issues may be summarized as follows:
1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable;
2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land
in the concept of an owner since June 1945 or earlier; and
3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land under the Public Land Act.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Respondent Failed to Prove
that the Land is Alienable and Disposable
Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land forms part of the
public domain. Petitioner insists that respondent failed to prove that the land is no longer part of the public domain.
The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the State. 14 The onus to
overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable
rests with the applicant.15
In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The 3 June
1997 Certification by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas City, 16 certified that "lot 10705, Cad-
424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with an area of 596,116 square meters falls within the
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31 December 1925." The second
certification17 in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, which was issued by the Regional Technical Director, Forest Management
Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated "that the subject area falls within an alienable and disposable land, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas,
Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582."
The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, 18 dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions and authorities
of the offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for areas below
50 hectares. The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land classification status for lands
covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38,19 dated 19 April 1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the
authority of the CENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares, as well as the authority of the PENRO to
issue certificates of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. 20 In this case, respondent applied for registration of Lot
10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705
with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable
and disposable.
The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of land classification. Under
DAO No. 20, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor products (OM) permits except rattan;
2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public infrastructure projects; and
4. Issues renewal of certificates of registration for logs, poles, piles, and lumber dealers.
Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor [products] (OM) permits except rattan;
2. Issues renewal of certificate of registration for logs, poles, and piles and lumber dealers;
3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic meters within calamity declared areas for public infrastructure projects; and
5. Approves original and renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public infrastructure projects.
Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, has no
probative value.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must
prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable,
and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by respondent. The government officials who issued
the certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents
of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they
have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether
of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x
x. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and
disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication 21 of the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable and
disposable.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer
are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which
gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the class of public documents contemplated in the
first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a
public officer," such as entries made by the Civil Registrar22 in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ship’s logbook.23 The
certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government
office. The certifications are not even records of public documents. 24 The certifications are conclusions unsupported by adequate proof, and
thus have no probative value.25 Certainly, the certifications cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and
disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated
therein.26 Such government certifications may fall under the class of documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule
132. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein.
The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts
stated therein.27 Here, Torres, a private individual and respondent’s representative, identified the certifications but the government officials
who issued the certifications did not testify on the contents of the certifications. As such, the certifications cannot be given probative
value.28 The contents of the certifications are hearsay because Torres was incompetent to testify on the veracity of the contents of the
certifications.29 Torres did not prepare the certifications, he was not an officer of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not conduct any
verification survey whether the land falls within the area classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable.
Petitioner also points out the discrepancy as to when the land allegedly became alienable and disposable. The DENR Secretary certified that
based on Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925. However, the certificate on the
blue print plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985.
We agree with petitioner that while the certifications submitted by respondent show that under the Land Classification Map No. 582, the
land became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925, the blue print plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31
December 1985. Respondent alleged that "the blue print plan merely serves to prove the precise location and the metes and bounds of the
land described therein x x x and does not in any way certify the nature and classification of the land involved."30 It is true that the notation by
a surveyor-geodetic engineer on the survey plan that the land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain is not
sufficient proof of the land’s classification.31 However, respondent should have at least presented proof that would explain the discrepancy
in the dates of classification. Marquez, LRA Records Officer II, testified that the documents submitted to the court consisting of the tracing
cloth plan, the technical description of Lot 10705-B, the approved subdivision plan, and the Geodetic Engineer’s certification were faithful
reproductions of the original documents in the LRA office. He did not explain the discrepancy in the dates. Neither was the Geodetic Engineer
presented to explain why the date of classification on the blue print plan was different from the other certifications submitted by
respondent.
There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious
Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an Owner
Petitioner alleges that the trial court’s reliance on the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres was misplaced. Petitioner alleges that
Evangelista’s statement that the possession of respondent’s predecessors-in-interest was open, public, continuous, peaceful, and adverse to
the whole world was a general conclusion of law rather than factual evidence of possession of title. Petitioner alleges that respondent failed
to establish that its predecessors-in-interest had held the land openly, continuously, and exclusively for at least 30 years after it was
declared alienable and disposable.
We agree with petitioner.
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession of the land before 1945. Yet, Evangelista only worked on the land for three
years. Evangelista testified that his family owned a lot near Kabesang Puroy’s land. The Court of Appeals took note of this and ruled that
Evangelista’s knowledge of Kabesang Puroy’s possession of the land stemmed "not only from the fact that he had worked thereat but more
so that they were practically neighbors."32 The Court of Appeals observed:
In a small community such as that of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, it is not difficult to understand that people in the said community
knows each and everyone. And, because of such familiarity with each other, news or events regarding the acquisition or disposition for that
matter, of a vast tract of land spreads like wildfire, thus, the reason why such an event became of public knowledge to them.33
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by Fortunato. However, he admitted that he did not know the exact relationship
between Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato, which is rather unusual for neighbors in a small community. He did not also know the relationship
between Fortunato and Porting. In fact, Evangelista’s testimony is contrary to the factual finding of the trial court that Kabesang Puroy was
succeeded by his son Antonio, not by Fortunato who was one of Antonio’s children. Antonio was not even mentioned in Evangelista’s
testimony.
The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that requires that the testimony of a single witness needs corroboration. However, in this
case, we find Evangelista’s uncorroborated testimony insufficient to prove that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. We cannot consider the testimony of Torres as sufficient
corroboration. Torres testified primarily on the fact of respondent’s acquisition of the land. While he claimed to be related to the Dimayugas,
his knowledge of their possession of the land was hearsay. He did not even tell the trial court where he obtained his information.
The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they
constitute proof of claim of ownership.34 Respondent did not present any credible explanation why the realty taxes were only paid starting
1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of the land before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes
starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption that the Dimayugas claimed ownership or possession of the land only in that year.
Land Application by a Corporation
Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation, cannot apply for registration of the land of the public domain in this case.
We agree with petitioner.
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the
public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain
shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares
in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by
purchase, homestead or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the
Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions
therefor.
The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. In Chavez v.
Public Estates Authority,35 the Court traced the law on disposition of lands of the public domain. Under the 1935 Constitution, there was no
prohibition against private corporations from acquiring agricultural land. The 1973 Constitution limited the alienation of lands of the public
domain to individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations, even if wholly owned by
Filipino citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain. The present 1987 Constitution continues the
prohibition against private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.36 The Court explained in Chavez:
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands
of the public domain only through lease. x x x x
[I]f the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could have simply limited the size of alienable lands of the
public domain that corporations could acquire. The Constitution could have followed the limitations on individuals, who could acquire not
more than 24 hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under the 1987
Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the land in the name of a corporation would be more effective
in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs
would inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up of
farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area
of alienable lands of the public domain. Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable
lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many
corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as
stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by
individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a limited area of alienable land of the
public domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable public
lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-growing population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to this
constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit
arising from the constitutional ban.37
In Director of Lands v. IAC,38 the Court allowed the land registration proceeding filed by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. (Acme) for five
parcels of land with an area of 481,390 square meters, or 48.139 hectares, which Acme acquired from members of the Dumagat tribe. The
issue in that case was whether the title could be confirmed in favor of Acme when the proceeding was instituted after the effectivity of the
1973 Constitution which prohibited private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease
not to exceed 1,000 hectares. The Court ruled that the land was already private land when Acme acquired it from its owners in 1962,
and thus Acme acquired a registrable title. Under the 1935 Constitution, private corporations could acquire public agricultural lands not
exceeding 1,024 hectares while individuals could acquire not more than 144 hectares. 39
In Director of Lands, the Court further ruled that open, exclusive, and undisputed possession of alienable land for the period prescribed by
law created the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other
sanction ceases to be public land and becomes private property. The Court ruled:
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the character and duration
prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself that the possessor(s) "x x x
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title x x x." No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a
formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from
public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already effected by operation of law from the moment the required period of
possession became complete.
x x x [A]lienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for
the prescribed statutory period of (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was
already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being
at the time no prohibition against said corporation’s holding or owning private land. x x x. 40 (Emphasis supplied)
Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case. In Director of Lands, the "land x x x was already private property at the time it was
acquired x x x by Acme." In this case, respondent acquired the land on 8 August 1997 from Porting, who, along with his predecessors-in-
interest, has not shown to have been, as of that date, in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the land for 30 years since 12 June 1945.
In short, when respondent acquired the land from Porting, the land was not yet private property.
For Director of Lands to apply and enable a corporation to file for registration of alienable and disposable land, the corporation must have
acquired the land when its transferor had already a vested right to a judicial confirmation of title to the land by virtue of his open,
continuous and adverse possession of the land in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years since 12 June 1945. Thus, in Natividad v. Court
of Appeals,41 the Court declared:
Under the facts of this case and pursuant to the above rulings, the parcels of land in question had already been converted to private
ownership through acquisitive prescription by the predecessors-in-interest of TCMC when the latter purchased them in 1979. All that was
needed was the confirmation of the titles of the previous owners or predecessors-in-interest of TCMC.
Being already private land when TCMC bought them in 1979, the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against corporations acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain except through lease (Article XIV, Section 11, 1973 Constitution) did not apply to them for they were no
longer alienable lands of the public domain but private property.
What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to apply is for the corporate applicant for land registration to establish that when
it acquired the land, the same was already private land by operation of law because the statutory acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years
had already lapsed. The length of possession of the land by the corporation cannot be tacked on to complete the statutory 30 years
acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an individual can avail of such acquisitive prescription since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
prohibit corporations from acquiring lands of the public domain.
Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original registration of land under the doctrine in Director of Lands. Republic Act No.
917642 (RA 9176) further amended the Public Land Act43 and extended the period for the filing of applications for judicial confirmation of
imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain until 31 December 2020. Thus:
Sec. 2. Section 47, Chapter VIII of the same Act, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which
to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12)
hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with Section Forty-five of this Act
shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any of said
persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President.
Sec. 3. All pending applications filed before the effectivity of this amendatory Act shall be treated as having been filed in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.
Under RA 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12 hectares, consistent with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution that a private individual may only acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable and disposable land. Hence, respondent, as
successor-in-interest of an individual owner of the land, cannot apply for registration of land in excess of 12 hectares. Since respondent
applied for 56.4007 hectares, the application for the excess area of 44.4007 hectares is contrary to law, and thus void ab initio. In applying
for land registration, a private corporation cannot have any right higher than its predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its right. This
assumes, of course, that the corporation acquired the land, not exceeding 12 hectares, when the land had already become private land by
operation of law. In the present case, respondent has failed to prove that any portion of the land was already private land when respondent
acquired it from Porting in 1997.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658 and the 16 December 1999
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land Registration Case No. T-635. We DENY the application for
registration filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 163767 March 10, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitioner,
vs.
ROSARIO DE GUZMAN VDA. DE JOSON, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This case concerns the discharge of the burden of proof by the applicant in proceedings for the registration of land under Section 14 (1) and
(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
The Republic appeals the adverse decision promulgated on January 30, 2004,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment
rendered on August 10, 1981 by the erstwhile Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bulacan (now the Regional Trial Court) in Registration Case
No. 3446-M granting the application of the respondent for the registration of her title covering a parcel of land situated in San Isidro,
Paombong, Bulacan.2
The respondent filed her application for land registration in the CFI in Bulacan. 3 The jurisdictional requirements were met when the notice
of initial hearing was published in the Official Gazette for two successive weeks, 4 as evidenced by a certification of publication.5 The notice of
initial hearing was also posted by the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan in a conspicuous place in the municipal building of Paombong, Bulacan as
well as on the property itself.6 On June 2, 1977, at the initial hearing of the application, Fiscal Liberato L. Reyes interposed an opposition in
behalf of the Director of Lands and the Bureau of Public Works. Upon motion by the respondent and without objection from Fiscal Reyes, the
CFI commissioned the Acting Deputy Clerk of Court to receive evidence in the presence of Fiscal Reyes. 7
The records show that the land subject of the application was a riceland with an area of 12,342 square meters known as Lot 2633, Cad-297,
Paombong, Bulacan, and covered by plan Ap-03-001603;8 that the riceland had been originally owned and possessed by one Mamerto
Dionisio since 1907;9 that on May 13, 1926, Dionisio, by way of a deed of sale,10 had sold the land to Romualda Jacinto; that upon the death of
Romualda Jacinto, her sister Maria Jacinto (mother of the respondent) had inherited the land; that upon the death of Maria Jacinto in 1963,
the respondent had herself inherited the land, owning and possessing it openly, publicly, uninterruptedly, adversely against the whole
world, and in the concept of owner since then; that the land had been declared in her name for taxation purposes; and that the taxes due
thereon had been paid, as shown in Official Receipt No. H-7100234.11
In their opposition filed by Fiscal Reyes,12 the Director of Lands and the Director of Forest Development averred that whatever legal and
possessory rights the respondent had acquired by reason of any Spanish government grants had been lost, abandoned or forfeited for failure
to occupy and possess the land for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application;13 and that the land applied for, being
actually a portion of the Labangan Channel operated by the Pampanga River Control System, could not be subject of appropriation or land
registration.14
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also filed in behalf of the Government an opposition to the application,15 insisting that the land was
within the unclassified region of Paombong, Bulacan, as indicated in BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927; that areas within the
unclassified region were denominated as forest lands and thus fell under the exclusive jurisdiction, control and authority of the Bureau of
Forest Development (BFD);16 and that the CFI did not acquire jurisdiction over the application considering that: (1) the land was beyond the
commerce of man; (2) the payment of taxes vested no title or ownership in the declarant or taxpayer. 17
Ruling ofthe CFI
On August 10, 1981, the CFI rendered its decision,18 ordering the registration of the land in favor of the respondent on the ground that she
had sufficiently established her open, public, continuous, and adverse possession in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years, to wit:
Since it has been established that the applicants and her predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, public, continuous, and adverse
possession of the said parcel of land in the concept of an owner for more than thirty (30) years, that it, since 1926 up to the present time,
applicant therefore is entitled to the registration thereof under the provisions od Act No. 496, in relation to Commonwealth Act No. 141 as
amended by Republic Act No. 6236 and other existing laws.
WHEREFORE, confirming the order of general default issued in this case, the Court hereby orders the registration of this parcel of land Lot
2633, Cad 297. Case 5, Paombong Cadastre[)] described in plan Ap-03-001603 (Exhibit D, page 7 of records) and in the technical description
(Exhibit F, page 5 of records) in favor of Rosario de Guzman Vda de Joson, of legal age, Filipino, widow and resident of Malolos, Bulacan.
After the decision shall have become final, let the corresponding decree be issued,
SO ORDERED19.
The Republic, through the OSG, appealed to the CA, contending that the trial court had erred in granting the application for registration
despite the land not being the subject of land registration due to its being part of the unclassified region denominated as forest land of
Paombong, Bulacan.20
Judgment of the CA
On January 30, 2004, the CA promulgated its assailed judgment,21 affirming the decision of the trial court upon the following ratiocination:
The foregoing documentary and testimonial evidence stood unrebutted and uncontroverted by the oppositor-appellant and they should
serve as proof of the paucity of the claim of the applicant-appellee over the subject property.
Upon the other hand, oppositor-appellant, in a lackluster fashion, advanced pro forma theories and arguments in its Opposition which
naturally failed to merit any consideration from the court a quo and also from this Court. The indorsement from the Bureau of Forest
Development, San Fernando, Pampanga to the effect that the subject area is within the unclassified region of Paombong, Bulacan does not
warrant any evidentiary weight since the same had never been formally offered as evidence by the oppositor-appellant. All the other
allegations in the Opposition field (sic) by the oppositor-appellant failed to persuade this Court as to the veracity thereof considering that no
evidence was ever presented to prove the said allegations.
Such being the case, this Court is not inclined to have the positive proofs of her registrable rights over the subject property adduced by the
applicant-appellee be defeated by the bare and unsubstantiated allegations of the oppositor-appellant.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.22
Hence, the Republic appeals by petition for review on certiorari.
Issue
(1) WHETHER OR NOT THE LAND SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION IS SUSCEPTIBLE OF PRIVATE ACQUISITION; and
(2) WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT, AS WELL AS THE COURT OF APPEALS, ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION.23
Ruling
The appeal is impressed with merit.
Section 14 (1) and (2) of the Property Registration Decree state:
Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper [Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.
xxxx
Section 14(1) deals with possession and occupation in the concept of an owner while Section 14(2) involves prescription as a mode of
acquiring ownership. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,24 the Court set the guidelines concerning land registration proceedings
brought under these provisions of the Property Registration Decree in order provide clarity to the application and scope of said provisions.
The respondent sought to have the land registered in her name by alleging that she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
peaceful, continuous, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the land in the concept of owner since time immemorial. However, the
Republic counters that the land was public land; and that it could not be acquired by prescription. The determination of the issue hinges on
whether or not the land was public; if so, whether the respondent satisfactorily proved that the land had already been declared as alienable
and disposable land of the public domain; and that she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, peaceful, continuous,
uninterrupted and adverse possession of the land in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
In Republic vs. Tsai,25 the Court summarizes the amendments that have shaped the current phraseology of Section 14(1), to wit:
Through the years, Section 48(b) of the CA 141 has been amended several times. The Court of Appeals failed to consider the amendment
introduced by PD 1073. In Republic v. Doldol, the Court provided a summary of these amendments:
The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No.141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was
superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25,
1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more is not sufficient. Therefore, since the effectivity of
PD 1073 on 25 January 1977, it must now be shown that possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicant, by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, started on 12 June 1945 or earlier. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1) of PD
1529.26
Under Section 14(1), therefore, the respondent had to prove that: (1) the land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; and (2) she, by herself or through her predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945, or earlier.27 It is the applicant who carries the
burden of proving that the two requisites have been met. Failure to do so warrants the dismissal of the application.
The respondent unquestionably complied with the second requisite by virtue of her having been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier. She testified on how the land had been passed on to her from
her predecessors-in-interest; and tendered documentary evidence like: (1) the Deed of Sale evidencing the transfer of the property from
Mamerto Dionisio to Romualda Jacinto in 1926;28 (2) Tax Declaration No. 4547 showing that she had declared the property for taxation
purposes in 1976;29 and (3) Official Receipt No. H-7100234 indicating that she had been paying taxes on the land since 1977. 30 The CFI
found her possession of the land and that of her predecessors-in-interest to have been open, public, continuous, and adverse in the concept
of an owner since 1926 until the present time, or for more than 30 years, entitling her to the registration under the provisions of Act No. 496,
in relation to Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 6236 and other existing laws. 31 On its part, the CA ruled that the
documentary and testimonial evidence stood unrebutted and uncontroverted by the Republic. 32
Nonetheless, what is left wanting is the fact that the respondent did not discharge her burden to prove the classification of the land as
demanded by the first requisite. She did not present evidence of the land, albeit public, having been declared alienable and disposable by the
State. During trial, she testified that the land was not within any military or naval reservation, and Frisco Domingo, her other witness,
corroborated her. Although the Republic countered that the verification made by the Bureau of Forest Development showed that the land
was within the unclassified region of Paombong, Bulacan as per BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927, 33 such showing was based on the
1st Indorsement dated July 22, 1977 issued by the Bureau of Forest Development,34 which the CA did not accord any evidentiary weight to
for failure of the Republic to formally offer it in evidence. Still, Fiscal Reyes, in the opposition he filed in behalf of the Government, argued
that the land was a portion of the Labangan Channel operated by the Pampanga River Control System, and could not be the subject of
appropriation or land registration. Thus, the respondent as the applicant remained burdened with proving her compliance with the first
requisite.
Belatedly realizing her failure to prove the alienable and disposable classification of the land, the petitioner attached as Annex A to her
appellee’s brief35 the certification dated March 8, 2000 issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources–Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO),36 viz:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the parcel of land described on lot 2633 located at San Isidro, Paombong, Bulacan as shown in the sketch plan
surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Carlos G. Reyes falls within the Alienable or Disposable Land Project No. 19 of Paombong, Bulacan per Land
Classification Map No. 2934 certified on October 15, 1980.
However, in its resolution of July 31, 2000,37 the CA denied her motion to admit the appellee’s brief, and expunged the appellee’s brief from
the records. Seeing another opportunity to make the certification a part of the records, she attached it as Annex A of her comment
here.38 Yet, that attempt to insert would not do her any good because only evidence that was offered at the trial could be considered by the
Court.
Even had the respondent’s effort to insert the certification been successful, the same would nonetheless be vain and ineffectual. In Menguito
v. Republic,39 the Court pronounced that a survey conducted by a geodetic engineer that included a certification on the classification of the
land as alienable and disposable was not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land still formed part of the inalienable public
domain, to wit:
To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed
words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the
Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. x x x." (Emphasis supplied.)
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the
State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen
into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant.
Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable and
disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in question.
Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor’s assertion,
petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable. 40
We reiterate the standing doctrine that land of the public domain, to be the subject of appropriation, must be declared alienable and
disposable either by the President or the Secretary of the DENR. In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 41 we explicitly ruled:
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.42
This doctrine unavoidably means that the mere certification issued by the CENRO or PENRO did not suffice to support the application for
registration, because the applicant must also submit a copy of the original classification of the land as alienable and disposable as approved
by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. As the Court said in Republic v. Bantigue
Point Development Corporation:43
The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The applicant for land registration has the burden of
overcoming the presumption of State ownership by establishing through incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to be registered is
alienable or disposable based on a positive act of the government. We held in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. that a CENRO certification is
insufficient to prove the alienable and disposable character of the land sought to be registered. The applicant must also show sufficient proof
that the DENR Secretary has approved the land classification and released the land in question as alienable and disposable.
Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO certification in support of its application. Clearly, this falls short of the requirements
for original registration.44
Yet, even assuming that the DENR-CENRO certification alone would have sufficed, the respondent’s application would still be denied
considering that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable came only after the filing of the application in court in 1976. The
certification itself indicated that the land was reclassified as alienable or disposable only on October 15, 1980. The consequence of this is
fittingly discussed in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, to wit:
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals since in the latter, the application for registration had
been filed before the land was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the
two. Yet two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza,
which involved a claim of possession that extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was declared alienable and disposable only
in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at registration in Ceniza
should have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the
lots involved were "found to be within the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555
dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of private respondents’ application.
Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting
also was the observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the application of appellees on the ground that the property still
forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in question are forestal land...."
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public land for the period required by law would entitle its occupant
to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the land subject of their
application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject land even before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Although
there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is one of them."
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who authored Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of
public domain lands declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is that in
Ceniza, the application for registration was filed nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared alienable or disposable, while in
Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9) years before the land was declared alienable or disposable. That crucial difference was also
stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference which the dissent seeks to belittle. 45 (citations omitted)
On the other hand, under Section 14(2), ownership of private lands acquired through prescription may be registered in the owner’s name.
Did the respondent then acquire the land through prescription considering that her possession and occupation of the land by her and her
predecessors-in-interest could be traced back to as early as in 1926, and that the nature of their possession and occupation was that of a
bona fide claim of ownership for over 30 years?
Clearly, the respondent did not. Again, Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic is enlightening, to wit:
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or,
indeed, be subject of the commerce of man. Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of
public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President or any duly authorized government officer of alienability
and disposability of lands of the public domain. Would such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code,
from property of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable and disposable lands may be
the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the
same provision further provides that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be
converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property
"which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable,
it remains property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth".1âwphi1
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or
the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run.
Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus
affects the registrability even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants
claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned
by the State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter.1âwphi1 The duty of the Court is to apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance
with their language and intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the legislative branch. Congress can very well be
entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the
requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.46
The period of possession prior to the reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain is not considered in
reckoning the prescriptive period in favor of the possessor. As pointedly clarified also in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic:47
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation
that they are no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, would the period of possession prior to the
conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? We rule in
the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of possession before the public domain land becomes
patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property before it
becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration under Section 14(2)
falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the land was still
classified as public dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration.48
In other words, the period of possession prior to the reclassification of the land, no matter how long, was irrelevant because prescription did
not operate against the State before then.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on January 30, 2004; DISMISSES the
application for land registration of respondent Rosario de Guzman Vda. De Joson respecting Lot 2633, Cad-297 with a total area of 12,342
square meters, more or less, situated in San Isidro, Paombong, Bulacan; and DIRECTS the respondent to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring
481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as
amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of
the Republic of the Philippines and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the
Articles of Incorporation particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29,
1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines
was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation until the
same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and
tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession
is already considered from time immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to
members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land
or within the public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of
improvements, said improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on September
18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was duly recognized by the government when the
Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this
negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the
Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the
Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand.
Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973
Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private
corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition
not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was
reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended,
reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a
bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial court which were cited and affirmed by the
Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme
purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through
their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were, by
reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there
any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands under any
provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be
confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the
prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If
they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private
lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In
that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in
1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-
in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the
application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco
appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen
claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration
under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on the one hand) alienable agricultural public
lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant
has on imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable
public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land
is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning with Carino in 1909 2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down
to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable
public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and
without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the
better — and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands
wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not
overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have
recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the
notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in
view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was
expected from all but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever
made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language, in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874,
amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and
physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively
and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when
Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant
of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land
in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the
Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and
Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs.
Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in
jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with
the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over
the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public
Land Act as by free patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to
have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land,
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation
is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be
issued upon the strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the character and duration
prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title ....
" No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality,
at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from
public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of
possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title,
but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on
October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition,
there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later)
prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors,
until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of
Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit
corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called
"incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural
lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the
1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law
came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the
Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the sales application of Binan Development Co., Inc.
because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution
allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner'
prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the
enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate
exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the land in
question had become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the
public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due
process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).<äre||anº•1àw> 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must be regarded as simply another
accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of
ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in
the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and
registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid
conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer
deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a
possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30
years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was
acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's
holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under
section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the
Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of
court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses
as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and
neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors
(as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by
operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at
the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all
these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence,
i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that
they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations
(both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to
the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of
title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in
empty charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of
the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only
reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many
past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad
Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for
confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its
Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as
essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed,
without costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is
herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case
of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established
doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public
Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the
period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said
possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by
reference for brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and discarding
the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in
amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the
statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that
certificate of title should be issued an order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a
legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and
had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his authority
to sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case
of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which
reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and
regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean
when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for
want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the
aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was
promulgated). We reaffirm the established doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by
operation of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain and
becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent corporation. (As
stressed in Herico supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the
title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public
policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully
acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title
to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935
Constitution which contained no prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later
1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the
Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in 1962
and P 45million investments redounding presumably to the welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality of
Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired by the
prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted into private land and
they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to
be established in confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and validly
transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and
incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the
settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously
occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant the
possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application which would have originally
expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to
December 31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and
not of substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by
considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as
natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and
mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified
to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or
exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from the majority ruling therein and
held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical
person rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the
relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of
Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in
the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under Section
48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while
concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of substance, and stated his
opinion that "the lots which are sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were acquired by the
petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that is
needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who may prove their undisputed and open
possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only
natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the
required statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the natural persons have
fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to
follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of their title, although they have lawfully transferred their title to
the land. But such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the
lands are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution would be to
consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the evidence, confirm their title
to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the
validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the
corporation reassign its rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia
ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the application for
confirmation of title to the private land.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed are the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) ...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a corporation from directly applying to the Courts for
the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799;
Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br.
1). It is my opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus
avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title
to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799,
823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the
Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of
court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing
spouses as the original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and
vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of
ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the
overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now." (Paragraphing supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of
title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits corporations
from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A
construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social
Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd.,
p. 351).
It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature
is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle that the courts should, if
reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole.
An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise
expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a
statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the former construction
is preferred. One part of a statute may not be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the
general rule against the enlargement of extension of a statute by construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise
words used in the law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity.
Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by implication.
(Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The proper course for the Court to take is to promote in
the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.

Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is
herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case
of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established
doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public
Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the
period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said
possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by
reference for brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and discarding
the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in
amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the
statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that
certificate of title should be issued an order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a
legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and
had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his authority
to sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case
of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which
reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and
regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean
when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for
want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the
aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was
promulgated).<äre||anº•1àw> We reaffirm the established doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place
ipso jure or by operation of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public
domain and becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent
corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public
policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully
acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title
to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935
Constitution which contained no prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later
1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the
Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in 1962
and P 45million investments redounding presumably to the welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality of
Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired by the
prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted into private land and
they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to
be established in confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and validly
transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and
incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the
settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously
occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant the
possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application which would have originally
expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to
December 31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and
not of substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by
considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as
natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and
mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified
to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or
exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from the majority ruling therein and
held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical
person rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the
relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of
Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in
the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under Section
48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while
concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of substance, and stated his
opinion that "the lots which are sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were acquired by the
petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that is
needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who may prove their undisputed and open
possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only
natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the
required statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the natural persons have
fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to
follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of their title, although they have lawfully transferred their title to
the land. But such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the
lands are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution would be to
consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the evidence, confirm their title
to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the
validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the
corporation reassign its rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia
ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the application for
confirmation of title to the private land.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed are the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) ...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a corporation from directly applying to the Courts for
the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799;
Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br.
1). It is my opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus
avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title
to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799,
823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the
Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of
court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing
spouses as the original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and
vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of
ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the
overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now." (Emphasis supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of
title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits corporations
from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A
construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social
Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd.,
p. 351).
It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature
is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle that the courts should, if
reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole.
An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise
expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a
statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the former construction
is preferred. One part of a statute may not be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the
general rule against the enlargement of extension of a statute by construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise
words used in the law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity.
Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by implication.
(Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The proper course for the Court to take is to promote in
the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.

G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision promulgated on April
29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel
of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not established by sufficient evidence their right to the
registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly
identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he
and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for
more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title. 1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated
June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at
Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be
within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such
under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanan’s application for land registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or
P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an
area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming
part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower,
and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property
belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan.
Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any
period of possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and
disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing
Malabanan’s period of possession.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CA’s decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court
through a petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit 5 (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine
especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its
declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land
Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the
declaration of the land subject of the application for registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or
earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio
for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. 6 to support their argument that the property had been ipso jure
converted into private property by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of
an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was essential was that the property had been
"converted" into private property through prescription at the time of the application without regard to whether the property sought to be
registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient evidence possession and
occupation of the property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be
deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos, 7 Menguito v.
Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to
acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that
Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof;
that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in
possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable by the State.
The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit and
Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land
subject of the application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different classifications of land in relation to the existing
applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of private ownership.11 Land is considered of
public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such
character but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State. 13 Land that is other
than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private
individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws
of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the State.15 This means that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony. 16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the
inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17
Classifications of public lands
according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the classification of public lands made under the
Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and
mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might
provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or
timber, and mineral, but added national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may
be devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act of the
Executive Department.22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of
private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as
provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or
timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive act
of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is
vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts.26 If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby
effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the
Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the State no
longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e.,
agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to
a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private
ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase
"alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the
following requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and occupation of the property subject of the
application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for
registration must have been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent
proof that the land is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the
presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on
the requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a public land as
agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable agricultural land should likewise have
been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no legal
effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial
social policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation was the sole
prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the
period of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945.
Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject of
the registration should have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete
title is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of
the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the
ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively
during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period.29 In fact, by virtue of
this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already converted to private
ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this
reason that the property subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of the
application for registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which prescription may run against the State. The
imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicant’s
possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a
grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by
the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified
Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of years prescribed by law 32 will be defeated. Indeed,
we should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative development bears out, when Congress enacted
legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33 in order to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public
land to qualified applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to area limitations.34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth by declaration
of Congress or the President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision concerning
disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can now run against the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that
are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under
Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the
agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided
the applicant’s possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the
applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a government grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by
virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private
property.37
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national
wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership
that may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is
prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite
acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation
that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to
private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State,
such that the land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land
continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the
President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration for
their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182913 November 20, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO, FELIZA, NEMESIO, ALBERTO, FELICIDAD, RICARDO, MILAGROS AND CIPRIANO, ALL SURNAMED BACAS; EMILIANA
CHABON, SATURNINO ABDON, ESTELA, CHABON, LACSASA DEMON, PDERITA CHABON, FORTUNATA EMBALSADO, MINDA J.
CASTILLO, PABLO CASTILLO, ARTURO P. LEGASPI, and JESSIE I. LEGASPI, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to review, reverse and set aside the November 12, 2007
Decision1 and the May 15, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64142, upholding the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 17, Cagayan de Oro City (RTC) , which dismissed the consolidated cases of Civil Case No. 3494, entitled Republic of the
Philippines v. Antonio, et al. and Civil Case No. 5918, entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Emiliana Chabon , et al. Said civil cases were filed
by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) for the cancellation and annulment of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-358 and OCT No.
O-669, covering certain parcels of land occupied and utilized as part of the Camp Evangelista Military Reservation, Misamis Oriental,
presently the home of the 4th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army.
The Antecedents:
In 1938, Commonwealth President Manuel Luis Quezon (Pres. Quezon) issued Presidential Proclamation No. 265, which took effect on
March 31, 1938, reserving for the use of the Philippine Army three (3) parcels of the public domain situated in the barrios of Bulua and
Carmen, then Municipality of Cagayan, Misamis Oriental. The parcels of land were withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for
military purposes, "subject to private rights, if any there be."
Land Registration Case No. N-275
[Antonio, Feliza, Nemesio, Roberto, and Felicidad, all surnamed Bacas, and the Heirs of Jesus Bacas, Applicants (The Bacases)]
The Bacases filed their Application for Registration3 on November 12, 1964 covering a parcel of land, together with all the improvements
found thereon, located in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City, more particularly described and bounded as follows:
A parcel of land, Lot No. 4354 of the Cadastral Survey of Cagayan, L.R.C. Record No. 1612, situated at Barrio Carmen, Municipality of Cagayan,
Province of Misamis Oriental. Bounded on the SE., along lines 1-2-3-4, by Lot 4357; and alongline 4-5, by Lot 3862; on the S., along line 5-6,
by Lot 3892; on the W. and NW., along lines 6-7-8, by Lot 4318; on the NE., along line 8-9, by Lot 4319, along line 9-10, by Lot 4353 and long
line 10-11, by Lot 4359; and on the SE., along line 11-1, by Lot 4356, all of Cagayan Cadastre; containing an area of THREE HUNDRED FIFTY
FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY SEVEN (354,377) square meters, more or less, under Tax Declaration No. 35436 and
assessed at ₱3,540.00.4
They alleged ownership in fee simple of the property and indicated in their application the names and addresses of the adjoining owners, as
well as a statement that the Philippine Army (Fourth Military Area) recently occupied a portion of the land by their mere tolerance.5
The Director of the Bureau of Lands, thru its Special Counsel, Benito S. Urcia (Urcia) , registered its written Opposition 6 against the
application. Later, Urcia, assisted by the District Land Officer of Cagayan de Oro City, thru the Third Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Misamis
Oriental, Pedro R. Luspo (Luspo) , filed an Amended Opposition.7
On April 10, 1968, based on the evidence presented by the Bacases, the Land Registration Court (LRC) rendered a decision 8 holding that the
applicants had conclusively established their ownership in fee simple over the subject land and that their possession, including that of their
predecessor-in-interest, had been open, adverse, peaceful, uninterrupted, and in concept of owners for more than forty (40) years.
No appeal was interposed by the Republic from the decision of the LRC. Thus, the decision became final and executory, resulting in the
issuance of a decree and the corresponding certificate of title over the subject property.
Land Registration Case No. N-521 [Emiliana Chabon, Estela Chabon and Pedrita Chabon, Applicants (The Chabons)]
The Chabons filed their Application for Registration9 on May 8, 1974 covering a parcel of land located in Carmen-District, Cagayan de Oro
City, known as Lot 4357, Cagayan Cadastre, bounded and described as:
A parcel of land (Lot 4357, Cagayan Cadastre, plan Ap-12445), situated in the District of Carmen, City of Cagayan de Oro. Bounded on the NE.
by property of Potenciano Abrogan vs. Republic of the Philippines (Public Land); on the SE. by properties of Geronimo Wabe and Teofilo
Batifona or Batipura; on the SW. by property of Teofilo Batifona or Batipura; and on the NW. by property of Felipe Bacao or Bacas vs.
Republic of the Philippines (Public Land). Point "1" is N. 10 deg. 39’W., 379.88 M. from B.L.L.M. 14, Cagayan Cadastre. Area SIXTY NINE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY TWO (69,632) SQUARE METERS, more or less.10
They alleged ownership in fee simple over the property and indicated therein the names and addresses of the adjoining owners, but no
mention was made with respect to the occupation, if any, by the Philippine Army. The Chabons likewise alleged that, to the best of their
knowledge, no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind affecting said land with the exception of 18,957 square meters sold to Minda J. Castillo
and 1,000 square meters sold and conveyed to Atty. Arturo R. Legaspi. 11
On February 18, 1976, there being no opposition made, even from the government, hearing on the application ensued. The LRC then
rendered a decision12 holding that Chabons’ evidence established their ownership in fee simple over the subject property and that their
possession, including that of their predecessor-in-interest, had been actual, open, public, peaceful, adverse, continuous, and in concept of
owners for more than thirty (30) years.
The decision then became final and executory. Thus, an order13 for the issuance of a decree and the corresponding certificate of title was
issued.
The present cases
As a consequence of the LRC decisions in both applications for registration, the Republic filed a complaint for annulment of titles against the
Bacases and the Chabons before the RTC. More specifically, on September 7, 1970 or one (1) year and ten (10) months from the issuance of
OCT No. 0-358, a civil case for annulment, cancellation of original certificate of title, reconveyance of lot or damages was filed by the Republic
against the Bacases, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 3494. On the other hand, on April 21, 1978 or two (2) years and seven (7) months
after issuance of OCT No. 0-669, the Republic filed a civil case for annulment of title and reversion against the Chabons, docketed as Civil
Case No. 5918.
Civil Case No. 3494 against the Bacases
The Republic claimed in its petition for annulment before the RTC14 that the certificate of title issued in favor of the Bacases was null and
void because they fraudulently omitted to name the military camp as the actual occupant in their application for registration. Specifically, the
Republic, through the Fourth Military Area, was the actual occupant of Lot No. 4354 and also the owner and possessor of the adjoining Lots
Nos. 431815 and 4357. Further, the Bacases failed to likewise state that Lot No. 4354 was part of Camp Evangelista. These omissions
constituted fraud which vitiated the decree and certificate of title issued.
Also, the Republic averred that the subject land had long been reserved in 1938 for military purposes at the time it was applied for and, so, it
was no longer disposable and subject to registration.16
Civil Case No. 5918 against the Chabons
In this case, the Republic claimed that it was the absolute owner and possessor of Lot No. 4357. The said lot, together with Lots 431817 and
4354, formed part of the military reservation known as Camp Evangelista in Cagayan de Oro City, which was set aside and reserved under
Presidential Proclamation No. 265 issued by President Quezon on March 31, 1938. 18
In its petition for annulment before the RTC,19 the Republic alleged that OCT No. 0-669 issued in favor of the Chabons and all transfer
certificates of titles, if any, proceeding therefrom, were null and void for having been vitiated by fraud and/or lack of jurisdiction.20 The
Chabons concealed that the fact that Lot 4357 was part of Camp Evangelista and that the Republic, through the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, was its actual occupant and possessor.21 Further, Lot 4357 was a military reservation, established as such as early as March 31,
1938 and, thus, could not be the subject of registration or private appropriation. 22 As a military reservation, it was beyond the commerce of
man and the registration court did not have any jurisdiction to adjudicate the same as private property. 23
Decision of the Regional Trial Court
As the facts and issues in both cases were substantially the same and identical, and the pieces of evidence adduced were applicable to both,
the cases were consolidated and jointly tried. Thereafter, a joint decision dismissing the two complaints of the Republic was rendered.
In dismissing the complaints, the RTC explained that the stated fact of occupancy by Camp Evangelista over certain portions of the subject
lands in the applications for registration by the respondents was a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.24 It would have
been absurd to state Camp Evangelista as an adjoining owner when it was alleged that it was an occupant of the land. 25 Thus, the RTC ruled
that the respondents did not commit fraud in filing their applications for registration.
Moreover, the RTC was of the view that the Republic was then given all the opportunity to be heard as it filed its opposition to the
applications, appeared and participated in the proceedings. It was, thus, estopped from contesting the proceedings.
The RTC further reasoned out that assuming arguendo that respondents were guilty of fraud, the Republic lost its right to a relief for its
failure to file a petition for review on the ground of fraud within one (1) year after the date of entry of the decree of
registration.26 Consequently, it would now be barred by prior judgment to contest the findings of the LRC. 27
Finally, the RTC agreed with the respondents that the subject parcels of land were exempted from the operation and effect of the
Presidential Proclamation No. 265 pursuant to a proviso therein that the same would not apply to lands with existing "private rights." The
presidential proclamation did not, and should not, apply to the respondents because they did not apply to acquire the parcels of land in
question from the government, but simply for confirmation and affirmation of their rights to the properties so that the titles over them could
be issued in their favor.28 What the proclamation prohibited was the sale or disposal of the parcels of land involved to private persons as a
means of acquiring ownership of the same, through the modes provided by law for the acquisition of disposable public lands. 29
The Republic filed its Notice of Appeal before the RTC on July 5, 1991. On the other hand, the Bacases and the Chabons filed an Ex-Parte
Motion for the Issuance of the Writ of Execution and Possession on July 16, 1991. An amended motion was filed on July 31, 1991. The RTC
then issued the Order,30 dated February 24, 1992, disapproving the Republic’s appeal for failure to perfect it as it failed to notify the Bacases
and granting the writ of execution.
Action of the Court of Appeals and the Court regarding the Republic’s Appeal
The Republic filed a Notice of Appeal on April 1, 1992 from the February 24, 1992 of the RTC. The same was denied in the RTC Order,31 dated
April 23, 1992. The Republic moved for its reconsideration but the RTC was still denied it on July 8, 1992. 32
Not satisfied, the Republic filed a petition before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 28647, entitled Republic vs. Hon. Cesar M.
Ybañez,33 questioning the February 24, 1992 Order of the RTC denying its appeal in Civil Case No. 3494. The CA sustained the government
and, accordingly, annulled the said RTC order.
The respondents appealed to the Court, which later found no commission of a reversible error on the part of the CA. Accordingly, the Court
dismissed the appeal as well as the subsequent motions for reconsideration. An entry of judgment was then issued on February 16, 1995.34
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The appeal allowed, the CA docketed the case as CA G.R. CV No. 64142.
On November 12, 2007, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It explained that once a decree of registration was issued under the Torrens
system and the reglementary period had passed within which the decree may be questioned, the title was perfected and could not be
collaterally questioned later on.35 Even assuming that an action for the nullification of the original certificate of title may still be instituted,
the review of a decree of registration under Section 38 of Act No. 496 [Section 32 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529] would only prosper
upon proof that the registration was procured through actual fraud,36 which proceeded from an intentional deception perpetrated through
the misrepresentation or the concealment of a material fact.37 The CA stressed that "[t]he fraud must be actual and extrinsic, not merely
constructive or intrinsic; the evidence thereof must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant, because the proceedings
which are assailed as having been fraudulent are judicial proceedings which by law, are presumed to have been fair and regular."38
Citing the rule that "[t]he fraud is extrinsic if it is employed to deprive parties of their day in court and, thus, prevent them from asserting
their right to the property registered in the name of the applicant,"39 the CA found that there was none. The CA agreed with the RTC that
there was substantial compliance with the requirement of the law. The allegation of the respondent that Camp Evangelista occupied portions
of their property negated the complaint that they committed misrepresentation or concealment amounting to fraud. 40
As regards the issue of exemption from the proclamation, the CA deemed that a discussion was unnecessary because the LRC already
resolved it. The CA stressed that the proceeding was one in rem, thereby binding everyone to the legal effects of the same and that a decree
of registration that had become final should be deemed conclusive not only on the questions actually contested and determined, but also
upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the land registration proceeding.41
Not in conformity, the Republic filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on May 15, 2008 for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
GROUNDS RELIED UPON
WARRANTING REVIEW OF THE
PETITION
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER
THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION FILED BY RESPONDENTS DESPITE THE LATTER’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY
REQUIREMENT OF INDICATING ALL THE ADJOINING OWNERS OF THE PARCELS OF LAND SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE A REGISTRABLE RIGHT OVER THE
SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND WHICH ARE WITHIN THE CAMP EVANGELISTA MILITARY RESERVATION.
3. IN G.R. NO. 157306 ENTITLED "REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANATALIA ACTUB TIU ESTONILO, ET AL.," WHICH INVOLVES
PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS CLAIMING RIGHTS OVER PORTIONS OF THE CAMP EVANGELISTA MILITARY RESERVATION, THIS HONORABLE
COURT HELD THAT THESE INDIVIDUALS COULD NOT HAVE VALIDLY OCCUPIED THEIR CLAIMED LOTS BECAUSE THE SAME WERE
CONSIDERED INALIENABLE FROM THE TIME OF THEIR RESERVATION IN 1938. HERE, THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE BEING SUSTAINED
BY THE COURT OF APPEALS WERE ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE DECISIONS OF THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT IN APPLICATIONS FOR
REGISTRATION FILED IN 1964 AND 1974. VERILY, THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN ISSUING THE HEREIN ASSAILED DECISION DATED
NOVEMBER 15, 2007 AND RESOLUTION DATED MAY 15, 2008, HAS DECIDED THAT INSTANT CONTROVERSY IN A MANNER THAT IS
CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.42
Position of the Republic
In advocacy of its position, the Republic principally argues that (1) the CA erred in holding that the LRC acquired jurisdiction over the
applications for registration of the reserved public lands filed by the respondents; and (2) the respondents do not have a registrable right
over the subject parcels of land which are within the Camp Evangelista Military Reservation.
With respect to the first argument, the Republic cites Section 15 of P.D. No. 1529, which requires that applicants for land registration must
disclose the names of the occupants of the land and the names and addresses of the owners of the adjoining properties. The respondents did
not comply with that requirement which was mandatory and jurisdictional. Citing Pinza v. Aldovino, 43 it asserts that the LRC had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. Moreover, such omission constituted fraud or willful misrepresentation. The respondents cannot
invoke the indefeasibility of the titles issued since a "grant tainted with fraud and secured through misrepresentation is null and void and of
no effect whatsoever."44
On the second argument, the Republic points out that Presidential Proclamation No. 265 reserved for the use of the Philippine Army certain
parcels of land which included Lot No. 4354 and Lot No. 4357. Both lots were, however, allowed to be registered. Lot No. 4354 was
registered as OCT No. 0-0358 and Lot No. 4357 as OCT No. O-669.
The Republic asserts that being part of the military reservation, these lots are inalienable and cannot be the subject of private ownership.
Being so, the respondents do not have registrable rights over them. Their possession of the land, however long, could not ripen into
ownership, and they have not shown proof that they were entitled to the land before the proclamation or that the said lots were segregated
and withdrawn as part thereof.
Position of the Respondents
The Bacases
The Bacases anchor their opposition to the postures of the Republic on three principal arguments:
First, there was no extrinsic fraud committed by the Bacases in their failure to indicate Camp Evangelista as an adjoining lot owner as their
application for registration substantially complied with the legal requirements. More importantly, the Republic was not prejudiced and
deprived of its day in court.
Second, the LRC had jurisdiction to adjudicate whether the Bacases had "private rights" over Lot No. 4354 in accordance with, and therefore
exempt from the coverage of, Presidential Proclamation No. 265, as well as to determine whether such private rights constituted registrable
title under the land registration law.
Third, the issue of the registrability of the title of the Bacases over Lot No. 4354 is res judicata and cannot now be subject to a re-litigation or
reopening in the annulment proceedings.45
Regarding the first ground, the Bacases stress that there was no extrinsic fraud because their application substantially complied with the
requirements when they indicated that Camp Evangelista was an occupant by mere tolerance of Lot No. 4354. Also, the Republic filed its
opposition to the respondents’ application and actively participated in the land registration proceedings by presenting evidence, through the
Director of Lands, who was represented by the Solicitor General. The Republic, therefore, was not deprived of its day in court or prevented
from presenting its case. Its insistence that the non-compliance with the requirements of Section 15 of P.D. No. 1529 is an argument that is at
once both empty and dangerous.46
On jurisdiction, the Bacases assert that even in the case of Republic v. Estonilo, 47 it was recognized in Presidential Proclamation No. 265 that
the reservation was subject to private rights. In other words, the LRC had authority to hear and adjudicate their application for registration
of title over Lot No. 4354 if they would be able to prove that their private rights under the presidential proclamation constituted registrable
title over the said lot. They claim that there is completely no basis for the Republic to argue that the LRC had no jurisdiction to hear and
adjudicate their application for registration of their title to Lot No. 4354 just because the proclamation withdrew the subject land from sale
and settlement and reserved the same for military purposes. They cited the RTC statement that "the parcels of land they applied for in those
registration proceedings and for which certificates of title were issued in their favor are precisely exempted from the operation and effect of
said presidential proclamation when the very same proclamation in itself made a proviso that the same will not apply to lands with existing
‘private rights’ therein."48
The Bacases claim that the issue of registrability is no longer an issue as what is only to be resolved is the question on whether there was
extrinsic or collateral fraud during the land registration proceedings. There would be no end to litigation on the registrability of their title if
questions of facts or law, such as, whether or not Lot No. 4354 was alienable and disposable land of the public domain prior to its
withdrawal from sale and settlement and reservation for military purposes under Presidential Proclamation No. 265; whether or not their
predecessors-in-interest had prior possession of the lot long before the issuance of the proclamation or the establishment of Camp
Evangelista in the late 1930’s; whether or not such possession was held in the concept of an owner to constitute recognizable "private
rights" under the presidential proclamation; and whether or not such private rights constitute registrable title to the lot in accordance with
the land registration law, which had all been settled and duly adjudicated by the LRC in favor of the Bacases, would be re-examined under
this annulment case.49
The issue of registrability of the Bacases’ title had long been settled by the LRC and is
res judicata between the Republic and the respondents. The findings of the LRC became final when the Republic did not appeal its decision
within the period to appeal or file a petition to reopen or review the decree of registration within one year from entry thereof.50
To question the findings of the court regarding the registrability of then title over the land would be an attempt to reopen issues already
barred by res judicata. As correctly held by the RTC, it is estopped and barred by prior judgment to contest the findings of the LRC.51
The Chabons
In traversing the position of the Republic, the Chabons insist that the CA was correct when it stated that there was substantial
compliance52 with the requirements of the P.D. No. 1529 because they expressly stated in their application that Camp Evangelista was
occupying a portion of it. It is contrary to reason or common sense to state that Camp Evangelista is an adjoining owner when it is occupying
a portion thereof.
And as to the decision, it was a consequence of a proceeding in rem and, therefore, the decree of registration is binding and conclusive
against all persons including the Republic who did not appeal the same. It is now barred forever to question the validity of the title issued.
Besides, res judicata has set in because there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. 53
The Chabons also assailed the proclamation because when it was issued, they were already the private owners of the subject parcels of land
and entitled to protection under the Constitution. The taking of their property in the guise of a presidential proclamation is not only
oppressive and arbitrary but downright confiscatory.54
The Issues
The ultimate issues to be resolved are: 1) whether or not the decisions of the LRC over the subject lands can still be questioned; and 2)
whether or not the applications for registration of the subject parcels of land should be allowed.
The Court’s Ruling
The Republic can question even final and executory judgment when there was fraud.
The governing rule in the application for registration of lands at that time was Section 21 of Act 496 55 which provided for the form and
content of an application for registration, and it reads:
Section 21. The application shall be in writing, signed and sworn to by applicant, or by some person duly authorized in his behalf. x x x It
shall also state the name in full and the address of the applicant, and also the names and addresses of all adjoining owners and occupants, if
known; and, if not known, it shall state what search has been made to find them. x x x
The reason behind the law was explained in the case of Fewkes vs. Vasquez, 56 where it was written:
Under Section 21 of the Land Registration Act an application for registration of land is required to contain, among others, a description of the
land subject of the proceeding, the name, status and address of the applicant, as well as the names and addresses of all occupants of the land
and of all adjoining owners, if known, or if unknown, of the steps taken to locate them. When the application is set by the court for initial
hearing, it is then that notice (of the hearing), addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the lot being registered and the
adjoining owners, and indicating the location, boundaries and technical description of the land being registered, shall be published in the
Official Gazette for two consecutive times. It is this publication of the notice of hearing that is considered one of the essential bases of the
jurisdiction of the court in land registration cases, for the proceedings being in rem, it is only when there is constructive seizure of the land,
effected by the publication and notice, that jurisdiction over the res is vested on the court. Furthermore, it is such notice and publication of
the hearing that would enable all persons concerned, who may have any rights or interests in the property, to come forward and show to the
court why the application for registration thereof is not to be granted.
Here, the Chabons did not make any mention of the ownership or occupancy by the Philippine Army. They also did not indicate any efforts or
searches they had exerted in determining other occupants of the land. Such omission constituted fraud and deprived the Republic of its day
in court. Not being notified, the Republic was not able to file its opposition to the application and, naturally, it was not able to file an appeal
either.
The Republic can also question a final and executory judgment when the LRC had no jurisdiction over the land in question
With respect to the Bacases, although the lower courts might have been correct in ruling that there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of law when they alleged that Camp Evangelista was an occupant, the Republic is not precluded and estopped from
questioning the validity of the title.
The success of the annulment of title does not solely depend on the existence of actual and extrinsic fraud, but also on the fact that a
judgment decreeing registration is null and void. In Collado v. Court of Appeals and the Republic, 57 the Court declared that any title to an
inalienable public land is void ab initio. Any procedural infirmities attending the filing of the petition for annulment of judgment are
immaterial since the LRC never acquired jurisdiction over the property. All proceedings of the LRC involving the property are null and void
and, hence, did not create any legal effect. A judgment by a court without jurisdiction can never attain finality.58 In Collado, the Court made
the following citation:
The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts of the public
domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of private applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of certificate of Title No. 15856 in the name of petitioners may be attacked at any time, either directly or
collaterally, by the State which is not bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of Limitations. 59
Prescription or estoppel cannot lie against the government
In denying the petition of the Republic, the CA reasoned out that 1) once a decree of registration is issued under the Torrens system and the
reglementary period has passed within which the decree may be questioned, the title is perfected and cannot be collaterally questioned later
on;60 2) there was no commission of extrinsic fraud because the Bacases’ allegation of Camp Evangelista’s occupancy of their property
negated the argument that they committed misrepresentation or concealment amounting to fraud; 61 and 3) the Republic did not appeal the
decision and because the proceeding was one in rem, it was bound to the legal effects of the decision.
Granting that the persons representing the government was negligent, the doctrine of estoppel cannot be taken against the Republic. It is a
well-settled rule that the Republic or its government is not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents. In Republic v.
Court of Appeals,62 it was written:
In any case, even granting that the said official was negligent, the doctrine of estoppel cannot operate against the State . "It is a well-settled
rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic or its government is usually not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents
(Manila Lodge No. 761 vs. CA, 73 SCRA 166, 186; Republic vs. Marcos, 52 SCRA 238, 244; Luciano vs. Estrella, 34 SCRA 769).
Consequently, the State may still seek the cancellation of the title issued to Perpetuo Alpuerto and his successors-interest pursuant to
Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Such title has not become indefeasible, for prescription cannot be invoked against the State (Republic vs.
Animas, supra).
The subject lands, being part of a military reservation, are inalienable and cannot be the subjects of land registration proceedings
The application of the Bacases and the Chabons were filed on November 12, 1964 and May 8, 1974, respectively. Accordingly, the law
governing the applications was Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141,63 as amended by RA 1942,64 particularly Sec. 48(b) which provided that:
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.
As can be gleaned therefrom, the necessary requirements for the grant of an application for land registration are the following:
1. The applicant must, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, have been in possession and occupation of the subject land;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application; and
4. The subject land must be an agricultural land of the public domain. As earlier stated, in 1938, President Quezon issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 265, which took effect on March 31, 1938, reserving for the use of the Philippine Army parcels of the public domain
situated in the barrios of Bulua and Carmen, then Municipality of Cagayan, Misamis Oriental. The subject parcels of land were withdrawn
from sale or settlement or reserved for military purposes, "subject to private rights, if any there be." 65
Such power of the President to segregate lands was provided for in Section 64(e) of the old Revised Administrative Code and C.A. No. 141 or
the Public Land Act. Later, the power of the President was restated in Section 14, Chapter 4, Book III of the 1987 Administrative Code. When
a property is officially declared a military reservation, it becomes inalienable and outside the commerce of man. 66 It may not be the subject
of a contract or of a compromise agreement.67 A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation
or ownership, until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such. 68 In the case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals and De Jesus,69 it was even stated that
Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired.1âwphi1 The claims 0f persons who
have settled on, occupied, and improved a parcel of public land which is later included in a reservation are considered worthy of protection
and are usually respected, but where the President, as authorized by law, issues a proclamation reserving certain lands and warning all
persons to depart therefrom, this terminates any rights previously acquired in such lands by a person who was settled thereon in order to
obtain a preferential right of purchase. And patents for lands which have been previously granted, reserved from sale, or appropriate, are
void.
Regarding the subject lots, there was a reservation respecting "private rights." In Republic v. Estonilo, 70 where the Court earlier declared that
Lot No. 4318 was part of the Camp Evangelista Military Reservation and, therefore, not registrable, it noted the proviso in Presidential
Proclamation No. 265 requiring the reservation to be subject to private rights as meaning that persons claiming rights over the reserved
land were not precluded from proving their claims. Stated differently, the said proviso did not preclude the LRC from determining whether
or not the respondents indeed had registrable rights over the property.
As there has been no showing that the subject parcels of land had been segregated from the military reservation, the respondents had to
prove that the subject properties were alienable and disposable land of the public domain prior to its withdrawal from sale and settlement
and reservation for military purposes under Presidential Proclamation No. 265. The question is of primordial importance because it is
determinative if the land can in fact be subject to acquisitive prescription and, thus, registrable under the Torrens system. Without first
determining the nature and character of the land, all the other requirements such as the length and nature of possession and occupation
over such land do not come into play. The required length of possession does not operate when the land is part of the public domain.
In this case, however, the respondents miserably failed to prove that, before the proclamation, the subject lands were already private lands.
They merely relied on such "recognition" of possible private rights. In their application, they alleged that at the time of their
application,71 they had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land for at least thirty (30)
years and became its owners by prescription. There was, however, no allegation or showing that the government had earlier declared it
open for sale or settlement, or that it was already pronounced as inalienable and disposable.
It is well-settled that land of the public domain is not ipso facto converted into a patrimonial or private property by the mere possession and
occupation by an individual over a long period of time. In the case of Diaz v. Republic,72 it was written:
But even assuming that the land in question was alienable land before it was established as a military reservation, there was nevertheless
still a dearth of evidence with respect to its occupation by petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest for more than 30 years. x x x.
x x x.
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim
of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. While grazing
livestock over land is of course to be considered with other acts of dominion to show possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing
livestock upon it, without substantial enclosures, or other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title thru
acquisitive prescription. The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.
[Emphases supplied]
In the recent case of Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines, 73 the Court emphasized that fundamental is the rule that lands
of the public domain, unless declared otherwise by virtue of a statute or law, are inalienable and can never be acquired by prescription. No
amount of time of possession or occupation can ripen into ownership over lands of the public domain. All lands of the public domain
presumably belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the
State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed.74
Another recent case, Diaz v. Republic,75 also held that possession even for more than 30 years cannot ripen into ownership. 76 Possession is of
no moment if applicants fail to sufficiently and satisfactorily show that the subject lands over which an application was applied for was
indeed an alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. It would not matter even if they declared it for tax purposes. In
Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio,77 the rule was reiterated. Thus:
Well-entrenched is the rule that unless a land is reclassified and declared alienable and disposable, occupation in the concept of an owner, no
matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. Consequently, respondents could not have occupied the Lot in the
concept of an owner in 1947 and subsequent years when respondents declared the Lot for taxation purposes, or even earlier when
respondents' predecessors-in-interest possessed the Lot, because the Lot was considered inalienable from the time of its declaration as a
military reservation in 1904. Therefore, respondents failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Lot is alienable and
disposable.
Public lands not shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable land remain part of the inalienable public domain. In view of the
lack of sufficient evidence showing that the Lot was already classified as alienable and disposable, the Lot applied for by respondents is
inalienable land of the public domain, not subject to registration under Section 14(1) of PD 1529 and Section 48(b) of CA 141, as amended by
PD 1073. Hence, there is no need to discuss the other requisites dealing with respondents' occupation and possession of the Lot in the
concept of an owner.
While it is an acknowledged policy of the State to promote the distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and in line with
the ideal of social justice, the law imposes stringent safeguards upon the grant of such resources lest they fall into the wrong hands to the
prejudice of the national patrimony. We must not, therefore, relax the stringent safeguards relative to the registration of imperfect titles.
[Emphases Supplied]
In Estonilo,78 where the Court ruled that persons claiming the protection of "private rights" in order to exclude their lands from military
reservations must show by clear and convincing evidence that the properties in question had been acquired by a legal method of acquiring
public lands, the respondents therein failed to clearly prove that the lands over which they lay a claim were alienable and disposable so that
the same belonged and continued to belong to the State and could not be subject to the commerce of man or registration. Specifically, the
Court wrote:
Land that has not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belongs to the State as part of the public domain. For
this reason, imperfect titles to agricultural lands are subjected to rigorous scrutiny before judicial confirmation is granted. In the same
manner, persons claiming the protection of "private rights" in order to exclude their lands from military reservations must show by clear
and convincing evidence that the pieces of property in question have been acquired by a legal method of acquiring public lands.
In granting respondents judicial confirmation of their imperfect title, the trial and the appellate courts gave much weight to the tax
declarations presented by the former. However, while the tax declarations were issued under the names of respondents’ predecessors-in-
interest, the earliest one presented was issued only in 1954.19 The Director, Lands Management Bureau v. CA20 held thus:
"x x x. Tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership.1âwphi1 They are mere indicia of [a] claim of
ownership. In Director of Lands vs. Santiago:
‘x x x [I]f it is true that the original owner and possessor, Generosa Santiago, had been in possession since 1925, why were the subject lands
declared for taxation purposes for the first time only in 1968, and in the names of Garcia and Obdin? For although tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the
holder had a claim of title over the property.’"
In addition, the lower courts credited the alleged prior possession by Calixto and Rosendo Bacas, from whom respondents’ predecessors had
purportedly bought the property. This alleged prior possession, though, was totally devoid of any supporting evidence on record.
Respondents’ evidence hardly supported the conclusion that their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since "time
immemorial."
Moreover, as correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the evidence on record merely established the transfer of the property
from Calixto Bacas to Nazaria Bombeo . The evidence did not show the nature and the period of the alleged possession by Calixto and
Rosendo Bacas. It is important that applicants for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles must present specific acts of ownership to
substantiate their claims; they cannot simply offer general statements that are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of
possession.
It must be stressed that respondents, as applicants, have the burden of proving that they have an imperfect title to Lot 4318. Even the
absence of opposition from the government does not relieve them of this burden. Thus, it was erroneous for the trial and the appellate courts
to hold that the failure of the government to dislodge respondents, judicially or extrajudicially, from the subject land since 1954 already
amounted to a title. [Emphases supplied]
The ruling reiterated the long standing rule in the case of Director Lands Management Bureau v. Court of Appeals,79
x x x. The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered under the Torrens system simply because no one appears to
oppose his title and to oppose the registration of his land. He must show, even though there is no opposition to the satisfaction of the court,
that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering property under the Torrens system, simply because there
is no opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any opposition, deny the registration of the land under the Torrens system, upon
the ground that the facts presented did not show that the petitioner is the owner, in fee simple, of the land which he is attempting to have
registered.
The Court is not unmindful of the principle of immutability of judgments that nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment
attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable.80 Such principle, however, must yield to the basic rule that a decision which is
null and void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court is not a decision m contemplation of law and can never become final and executory. 81
Had the LRC given primary importance on the status of the land and not merely relied on the testimonial evidence of the respondents
without other proof of the alienability of the land, the litigation would have already been ended and finally settled in accordance with law
and jurisprudence a long time ago.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 12, 2007 Decision and the May 15, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. CV No. 64142 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Judgment is rendered declaring the proceedings in the Land Registration Court
as NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, Original Certificate of Title Nos. 0-358 and 0-669 issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Cagayan de Oro City are CANCELLED. Lot No. 4354 and Lot No. 4357 are ordered reverted to the public domain.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 75042 November 29, 1988

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LUCENA, represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, and REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH LIII, LUCENA CITY, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Gilbert D. Camaligan for private respondent.

BIDIN, J.:
This is an appeal from the 1) decision * of the FIRST CIVIL CASES DIVISION of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated May 13, 1986, in
AC G.R. No. 01410 entitled the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF Lucena, represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, applicant-appellee vs. Republic of
the Philippines, et al., Oppositors-appellants, affirming the decision ** of the then Court of FIRST INSTANCE of Quezon, 9th Judicial District,
Branch 1, dated November 4, 1980 in Land Registration Case No. N-1106 entitled the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, represented
by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, applicant vs. the Director of Lands and the Director, Bureau of Forest Development, oppositors, ordering the
registration of title to the parcel of land designated, as lots 1, 2 and 3 of plan PSD-65686 and its technical descriptions, and the parcel of land
described in plan PSU-112592 and its technical description, together with whatever improvements existing thereon, in the name of the
ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena and 2) its resolution Dated June 19,1986, denying appellant's "Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit."
The factual background of the case as found by the Intermediate Appellate Court are as follows:
On February 2, 1979, the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, filed an application for confirmation of
title to four (4) parcels of land. Three of said parcels, denominated as Lots 1, 2 and 3, respectively, of plan PSU-65686 are situated in Barrio
Masin, Municipality of Candelaria, Quezon Province. The fourth parcels under plan PSU-112592 is located in Barrio Bucal (Taguan), same
municipality and province. As basis for the application, the applicant claimed title to the various properties through either purchase or
donation dating as far back as 1928.
The legal requirements of publication and posting were duly complied with, as was the service of copies of notice of initial hearing on the
proper government officials.
In behalf of the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, the Solicitor General filed an Opposition on April 20,
1979, alleging therein among others, that the applicant did not have an imperfect title or title in fee simple to the parcel of land being applied
for.
At the initial hearing held on November 13, 1979, only the Provincial Fiscal in representation of the Solicitor General appeared to interpose
personal objection to the application. Hence, an Order of General Default against the whole world was issued by the Court a quo except for
the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development.
The preliminaries dispensed with, the applicant then introduced its proofs in support of the petition, summed up by the lower court as
follows:
With respect to Lots 1, 2, and 3, plan PSU-65686.
Lots 1, 2 and 3 of plan PSU-65686 respectively containing an area of 18,977, 6,910 and 16,221 square meters, are adjoining lots & are
situated in the Barrio of Masin, Municipality of Candelaria, Province of Quezon (formerly Tayabas) (Exhibits F, F-1, F-2 and F-3). Said lots
were surveyed for the Roman Catholic Church on November 3, 1928 (Exhibit P-5) and the survey plan approved on October 20, 1929
(Exhibit F-6).
Lot 1 was acquired by the Roman Catholic Church thru Rev. Father Raymundo Esquenet by purchase from the spouses Atanacio Yranso and
Maria Coronado on October 20, 1928 (Exhibits G, G-1), portion of Lot 2 also by purchase thru Rev. Father Raymundo Esquenet from the
spouses Benito Maramot and Venancia Descaller on May 22, 1969 (Exhibits M, N-1), while the remaining portion of Lot 2 and Lot 3 were
already owned and possessed by the Roman Catholic Church even prior to the survey of the said three lots in 1928.
Records of burial of the Roman Catholic Church of Candelaria, Quezon showed that even as early as November 1918, Lot 3 has already been
utilized by the Roman Catholic Church as its cemetery in Candelaria, Quezon (Exhibit N, N-1 to N-5).<äre||anº•1àw>
These three lots presently constituted the Roman Catholic Church cemetery in Candelaria, Quezon.
Lots 1, 2 and 3 are declared for taxation purposes in the name of the Roman Catholic Church under Tax Declaration Nos. 22-19-02-079, 22-
19-02-077 and 22-19-02-082 as 'cemetery site' (Exhibit S, V and T).
With respect to the parcel of land described in plan PSU-112592:
This parcel of land situated in the barrio of Bucal (Taguan), Municipality of Candelaria, Province of Quezon (formerly Tayabas) and more
particularly described in plan PSU-1 12592 and its technical description with an area of 3,221 square meters (Exhibit 1) was formerly
owned and possessed by the spouses Paulo G. Macasaet, and Gabriela V. de Macasaet. Said spouses, on February 26, 1941, donated this lot to
the Roman Catholic Church represented by Reverend Father Raymundo Esquenet (Exhibit J, J-1 to J-4). It was surveyed for the Roman
Catholic Church on Aug. 16, 1940 as church site and the corresponding survey plan approved on Jan. 15, 1941 (Exhibits I-1, I-2, 1-3).
Previously erected on this Lot was an old chapel which was demolished and new chapel now stands in its place on the same site.
For his part, the Fiscal in a Manifestation dated July 22, 1980, said 'the State will not adduce evidence in support of its opposition and will
submit the instant case for decision.'
Evaluating the applicant's submitted proofs, the court a quo concluded, on the basis of acquisitive prescription at the very least, that the
former had adequately shown title to the parcels of land being claimed.
Since the acquisition of these four (4) lots by the applicant, it has been in continuous possession and enjoyment thereof, and such possession,
together with its predecessors-in interest, covering a period of more than 52 years (at least from the date of the survey in 1928) with respect
to lots 1 and 2, about 62 years with respect to lot 3, all of plan PSU- 65686; and more than 39 years with respect to the fourth parcel
described in plan PSU-112592 (at least from the date of the survey in 1940) have been open, public, continuous, peaceful, adverse against
the whole world, and in the concept of owner.
Accordingly, the court ordered the registration of the four parcels together with the improvements thereon "in the name of the ROMAN
CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LUCENA, INC., a religious corporation sole duly registered and existing under the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines."
Against this decision, the Solicitor General filed a Motion for reconsideration on the following grounds:
1. Article XIV, Section 11 of the New Constitution(1973) disqualifies a private corporation from acquiring alienable lands for the public
domain.
2. In the case at bar the application was filed after the effectivity on the New Constitution on January 17, 1973.
which was denied by the lower court for lack of merit.
Still insisting of the alleged unconstitutionality of the registration (a point which, incidentally, the appellant never raised in the lower court
prior to its Motion for Reconsideration), the Republic elevated this appeal. (Rollo, pp. 25-28)
On May 13, 1986, the first Civil Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered its Decision the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the judgment a quo to be supported by law and the evidence on record, the same is hereby AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo p. 30)
A reconsideration of the aforequoted Decision was sought by Appellant Republic of the Philippines, but for lack of merit, its motion for
reconsideration was denied on June 19, 1986, by Resolution of the First Civil Case Division, Intermediate Appellate Court which resolution
reads in full:
Considering appellant Republic of the Philippines "Motion for reconsideration" filed on June 4, 1986; the Court RESOLVED to DENY the
Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit, grounds raised therein having all been considered in the decision. (Rollo, p. 31)
Hence, this petition.
The following are the assigned errors raised by the petitioner in its petition:
1. The decision and the resolution in question are contrary to law and decisions of this honorable Court in Meralco vs. Castro-Bartolome and
Republic, 114 SCRA 799 (prom. June 29,1982); Republic vs. Judge Villanueva and Iglesia ni Cristo, 114 SCRA 875, June 29, 1982); and Republic
vs. Judge Gonong and Iglesia ni Cristo, 118 SCRA 729-733 (November 25,1982); Director of Lands vs. Hermanos y Hermanas, Inc. 141 SCRA
21-25 (Jan. 7,1986).
2. The lands applied for registration were the subject of a previous registration case where a decree of registration was already issued.
3. Respondent corporation failed to establish the indentity of the lands applied for. (Rollo, pp. 14-15)
The issue raised in this case involves the question of whether the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena, as a corporation sole is qualified to apply
for confirmation of its title to the four (4) parcels of land subject of this case.
Corollary thereto is the question of whether or not a corporation sole should be treated as an ordinary private corporation, for purpose of
the application of Art. XIV, Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution.
Article XIV, Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution, in part provides:
Sec. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares....
Sec. 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a Certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) ...
In its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner contends that the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena (private respondent herein) which is
admittedly a corporation sole is disqualified to own and register its title over the parcels of land involved herein. (Rollo, p. 41)
In its petition it likewise argued that being a juridical entity, private respondent cannot avail of the benefits of Sec. 48(b) of the public land
law which applies to FILIPINO citizens or NATURAL persons. On the other hand, private respondent in its MEMORANDUM espoused the
contrary view.
There is no merit in this petition.
The parties herein do not dispute that since the acquisition of the four (4) lots by the applicant, it has been in continuous possession and
enjoyment thereof, and such possession, together with its predecessors-in-interest, covering a period of more than 52 years (at least from
the date of survey in 1928) with respect to lots 1 and 2, about 62 years with respect to lot 3, all of plan PSU-65686; and more than 39 years
with respect to the fourth parcel described in plan PSU-11 2592 (at least from the date of the survey in 1940) have been open, public,
continuous, peaceful, adverse against the whole world, and in the concept of owner.
Being disputed before this Court is the matter of the applicability of Art. XIV Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution to the case at bar.
Petitioner argues that considering such constitutional prohibition, private respondent is disqualified to own and register its title to the lots
in question. Further, it argues that since the application for registration was filed only on February 2, 1979, long after the 1973 Constitution
took effect on January 17, 1973, the application for registration and confirmation of title is ineffectual because at the time it was filed, private
corporation had been declared ineligible to acquire alienable lands of the public domain pursuant to Art. XIV, Sec. 11 of the said constitution.
(Rollo, p. 41)
The questioned posed before this Court has been settled in the case of DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509
[1986]) which reversed the ruling first enunciated in the 1982 case of Manila Electric Co. vs. CASTRO BARTOLOME, (114 SCRA 789 [1982])
imposing the constitutional ban on public land acquisition by private corporations which ruling was declared emphatically as res judicata on
January 7, 1986 in Director of Lands vs. Hermanos y Hermanas de Sta. Cruz de Mayo, Inc., (141 SCRA 21 [1986]).<äre||anº•1àw> In said case,
(Director of Lands v. IAC, supra), this Court stated that a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the
registration proceedings must be made. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative.
If, on the other hand, they were already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporation or
association obviously does not apply. In affirming the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in said case, this Court adopted the
vigorous dissent of the then Justice, later Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, tracing the line of cases beginning with CARINO, 1 in 1909, thru
SUSI, 2 in 1925, down to HERICO, 3 in 1980, which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed
possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the
requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes' private property.
(DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. IAC, supra, p. 518).
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the character and duration
prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the state than the dictim of the statute itself; 4 that the possessor "... shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title ..."
No proof being admissable to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality,
at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time, and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not ORIGINALLY convert the land from
public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already effected by operation of law from the moment the required period of
possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title,
but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. (DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. IAC, supra, p. 520).
The open, continuous and exclusive possession of the four lots by private respondent can clearly be gleaned from the following facts on
record: Lot 1 and portion of Lot 2 was acquired by purchase in 1928 and 1929, respectively. The remaining portion of lots 2 and 3 was
already owned and possessed by private respondent even prior to the survey of said lots in 1928. In fact, records of burial of the Roman
Catholic Church of Candelaria, Quezon showed that as early as 1919, Lot 3 has already been utilized by the Roman Catholic Church as its
cemetery. That at present, said three lots are utilized as the Roman Catholic Church of Candelaria, Quezon. That said lots are declared for
taxation purposes in the name of the Roman Catholic Church. The fourth parcel of land was acquired by donation in 1941 and same lot is
utilized as church site.
It must be emphasized that the Court is not here saying that a corporation sole should be treated like an ordinary private corporation.
In Roman Catholic Apostolic Administration of Davao, Inc. vs. Land Registration Commission, et al. (L-8451, December 20,1957,102 Phil. 596).
We articulated:
In solving the problem thus submitted to our consideration, We can say the following: A corporation sole is a special form of corporation
usually associated with the clergy. Conceived and introduced into the common law by sheer necessity, this legal creation which was referred
to as "that unhappy freak of English Law" was designed to facilitate the exercise of the functions of ownership carried on by the clerics for
and on behalf of the church which was regarded as the property owner (See 1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 682-683).
A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be one at a time), in some particular station, who are
incorporated by law in order to give them some legal capacities and advantages, particulary that of perpetuity, which in their natural
persons they could not have had. In this sense, the King is a sole corporation; so is a bishop, or deans distinct from their several chapters
(Reid vs. Barry, 93 fla. 849, 112 So. 846).
Pertinent to this case is the provision of Sec. 113 Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 which reads as follows:
Sec. 113. Acquisition and alienation of property. — Any corporation sole may purchase and hold real estate and personal property for its
church, charitable, benevolent or educational purposes, and may receive bequests or gifts for such purposes. Such corporation may
mortgage or sell real property held by it upon obtaining an order for that purpose from the Court of First Instance of the province where the
property is situated; but before the order is issued, proof must be made to the satisfaction of the Court that notice of the application for leave
to mortgage or sell has been given by publication or otherwise in such manner and for such time as said court may have directed, and that it
is to the interest of the corporation that leave to mortgage or sell should be granted. The application for leave to mortgage or sell must be
made by petition, duly verified by the chief archbishop, bishop, priest, minister, rabbi or presiding elder acting as corporation sole, and may
be opposed by any member of the religious denomination, sect or church represented by the corporation sole: Provided, That in cases where
the rules, regulations and discipline of the religious denomination, sect or church religious society or order concerned represented by such
corporation sole regulate the method of acquiring, holding, selling and mortgaging real estate and personal property, such rules, regulations
and discipline shall control and the intervention of the courts shall not be necessary.
There is no doubt that a corporation sole by the nature of its Incorporation is vested with the right to purchase and hold real estate and
personal property. It need not therefore be treated as an ordinary private corporation because whether or not it be so treated as such, the
Constitutional provision involved will, nevertheless, be not applicable.
In the light of the facts obtaining in this case and the ruling of this Court in Director of Lands vs. IAC, (supra, 513), the lands subject of this
petition were already private property at the time the application for confirmation of title was filed in 1979. There is therefore no cogent
reason to disturb the findings of the appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit and the appealed decision and Resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-16173 October 6, 1921

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN M. AGUSTIN, ET AL., claimants;
LADISLAO DAYRIT, claimant-appellee;
AMADO L. SANTOS, claimant-appellant.
Mariano Buyson Lampa for appellant.
Ramon Diokno for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
Some time prior to the 29th day of July, 1918, the Director of Lands presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Pampanga for the registration of a certain piece or parcel of land under the Cadastral system. On the 29th day of July, 1918, the appellant
Amado L. Santos presented a claim lots Nos. 112 and 123, alleging that said lots belonged to him, and prayed that the same be registered in
his name. To the claim of the appellant Amado L. Santos, Ladislao Dayrit presented his opposition, alleging that he was the owner of lot No.
124 and that there existed in favor of said lot (No. 124) an easement upon said lots Nos. 122 and 123, and requested that said easement be
noted upon whatever title might be issued to Amado L. Santos for said lots Nos. 122 and 123.
Upon the issue thus presented with reference to the registration of said lots nos. 122 and 123, two questions arose, namely:
(1) Was Amado L. Santos the owner in fee simple of said lots Nos. 122 and 123, and entitled to have the same registered under the Cadastral
system (Torrens system)?
(2) Whether the owner of said lot No. 124 was entitled to have his alleged easement noted upon whatever certificate of title might be issued
to Amado L. Santos for lots Nos. 122 and 123. 1awph!l.net
That no person is entitled to have land registered under the Cadastral or Torrens system unless he is the owner in fee simple of the same,
even though there is no opposition presented against such registration by third persons, has been decided by the courts many times. One of
the primary and fundamental purposes of the registration of land under the Torrens system is to secure to the owner an absolute
indefeasible title, free from all encumbrances and claims whatsoever, except those mentioned in the certificate of title issued, and, so far as it
is possible, to make the certificate issued to the owner by he court, absolute proof of such title. In order that the petitioner for the
registration of his land shall be permitted to have the same registered, and to have the benefit resulting from the certificate of title, finally
issued, the burden is upon him to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee simple, of the land which he is attempting to have
registered. The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered under the Torrens system simply because no one appears to
oppose his title and to oppose the registration of his land. He must show, even though there is no opposition, to the satisfaction of the court,
that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering property under the Torrens system, simply because there
is no opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any opposition, deny the registration of the land under the Torrens system, upon
the ground that the facts presented did not show that the petitioner is the owner, in fee simple, of the land which he is attempting to have
registered. (Malolos and Malvar vs. Director of Lands, 25 Phil., 548; De los Reyes vs. Paterno, 34 Phil., 420, 424; Roman Catholic Bishop of
Lipa vs. Municipality of Taal, 38 Phil., 367, 376.)
The lower court, at the close of the hearing, reached the conclusion that Amado L. Santos had not adduced proof sufficient to show that he
was the owner in fee simple of said lots Nos. 122 and 123, but granted to him sixty days within which to present additional proof showing
his right to have said lots registered, subject, however, to the easement which the said Ladislao Dayrit claimed against said lots. In other
words, while the lower court found that the evidence was insufficient to justify a registration of said lots Nos. 122 and 123 under the
Cadastral system, it did find that the evidence showed that there existed in favor of lot No. 124 an easement of the right to take water
through a canal across said lots Nos. 122 and 123.
The said Amado L. Santos, instead of presenting additional proof showing his right to have said lots Nos. 122 and 123 registered, subject to
said easement, immediately appealed to this court, and attempts to show, among other things, that said lots (Nos. 122 and 123) should not
be subjected to the said easement in favor of lot no. 124, and that the evidence adduced during the trial was sufficient to show that he was
the owner in fee simple of said lots.
After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the lower court made an ocular inspection of the existence of the easement
in question, and became thoroughly convinced, not only from the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, but from said ocular
inspection, that there existed the easement in question in favor of said lot No. 124.
With reference to the sufficiency of the evidence to show that Amado L. Santos was the owner in fee simple of said lots (Nos. 122 and 123)
and entitled to have the same registered in his name, it may be said (a) that the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause is not
sufficient to sustain his contention, and (b) that in his argument in support of that assignment of error, he cites no proof nor any part of the
record in support of his contention.
After a careful examination of the entire record we are forced to the conclusion that the judgment of the lower court should be, and is
hereby, affirmed with costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 163767 March 10, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitioner,
vs.
ROSARIO DE GUZMAN VDA. DE JOSON, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This case concerns the discharge of the burden of proof by the applicant in proceedings for the registration of land under Section 14 (1) and
(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
The Republic appeals the adverse decision promulgated on January 30, 2004, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment
rendered on August 10, 1981 by the erstwhile Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bulacan (now the Regional Trial Court) in Registration Case
No. 3446-M granting the application of the respondent for the registration of her title covering a parcel of land situated in San Isidro,
Paombong, Bulacan.2
The respondent filed her application for land registration in the CFI in Bulacan.3 The jurisdictional requirements were met when the notice
of initial hearing was published in the Official Gazette for two successive weeks,4 as evidenced by a certification of publication.5 The notice of
initial hearing was also posted by the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan in a conspicuous place in the municipal building of Paombong, Bulacan as
well as on the property itself.6 On June 2, 1977, at the initial hearing of the application, Fiscal Liberato L. Reyes interposed an opposition in
behalf of the Director of Lands and the Bureau of Public Works. Upon motion by the respondent and without objection from Fiscal Reyes, the
CFI commissioned the Acting Deputy Clerk of Court to receive evidence in the presence of Fiscal Reyes. 7
The records show that the land subject of the application was a riceland with an area of 12,342 square meters known as Lot 2633, Cad-297,
Paombong, Bulacan, and covered by plan Ap-03-001603;8 that the riceland had been originally owned and possessed by one Mamerto
Dionisio since 1907;9 that on May 13, 1926, Dionisio, by way of a deed of sale,10 had sold the land to Romualda Jacinto; that upon the death of
Romualda Jacinto, her sister Maria Jacinto (mother of the respondent) had inherited the land; that upon the death of Maria Jacinto in 1963,
the respondent had herself inherited the land, owning and possessing it openly, publicly, uninterruptedly, adversely against the whole
world, and in the concept of owner since then; that the land had been declared in her name for taxation purposes; and that the taxes due
thereon had been paid, as shown in Official Receipt No. H-7100234.11
In their opposition filed by Fiscal Reyes,12 the Director of Lands and the Director of Forest Development averred that whatever legal and
possessory rights the respondent had acquired by reason of any Spanish government grants had been lost, abandoned or forfeited for failure
to occupy and possess the land for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application; 13 and that the land applied for, being
actually a portion of the Labangan Channel operated by the Pampanga River Control System, could not be subject of appropriation or land
registration.14
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also filed in behalf of the Government an opposition to the application, 15 insisting that the land was
within the unclassified region of Paombong, Bulacan, as indicated in BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927; that areas within the
unclassified region were denominated as forest lands and thus fell under the exclusive jurisdiction, control and authority of the Bureau of
Forest Development (BFD);16 and that the CFI did not acquire jurisdiction over the application considering that: (1) the land was beyond the
commerce of man; (2) the payment of taxes vested no title or ownership in the declarant or taxpayer. 17
Ruling ofthe CFI
On August 10, 1981, the CFI rendered its decision,18 ordering the registration of the land in favor of the respondent on the ground that she
had sufficiently established her open, public, continuous, and adverse possession in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years, to wit:
Since it has been established that the applicants and her predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, public, continuous, and adverse
possession of the said parcel of land in the concept of an owner for more than thirty (30) years, that it, since 1926 up to the present time,
applicant therefore is entitled to the registration thereof under the provisions od Act No. 496, in relation to Commonwealth Act No. 141 as
amended by Republic Act No. 6236 and other existing laws.
WHEREFORE, confirming the order of general default issued in this case, the Court hereby orders the registration of this parcel of land Lot
2633, Cad 297. Case 5, Paombong Cadastre[)] described in plan Ap-03-001603 (Exhibit D, page 7 of records) and in the technical description
(Exhibit F, page 5 of records) in favor of Rosario de Guzman Vda de Joson, of legal age, Filipino, widow and resident of Malolos, Bulacan.
After the decision shall have become final, let the corresponding decree be issued,
SO ORDERED19.
The Republic, through the OSG, appealed to the CA, contending that the trial court had erred in granting the application for registration
despite the land not being the subject of land registration due to its being part of the unclassified region denominated as forest land of
Paombong, Bulacan.20
Judgment of the CA
On January 30, 2004, the CA promulgated its assailed judgment,21 affirming the decision of the trial court upon the following ratiocination:
The foregoing documentary and testimonial evidence stood unrebutted and uncontroverted by the oppositor-appellant and they should
serve as proof of the paucity of the claim of the applicant-appellee over the subject property.
Upon the other hand, oppositor-appellant, in a lackluster fashion, advanced pro forma theories and arguments in its Opposition which
naturally failed to merit any consideration from the court a quo and also from this Court. The indorsement from the Bureau of Forest
Development, San Fernando, Pampanga to the effect that the subject area is within the unclassified region of Paombong, Bulacan does not
warrant any evidentiary weight since the same had never been formally offered as evidence by the oppositor-appellant. All the other
allegations in the Opposition field (sic) by the oppositor-appellant failed to persuade this Court as to the veracity thereof considering that no
evidence was ever presented to prove the said allegations.
Such being the case, this Court is not inclined to have the positive proofs of her registrable rights over the subject property adduced by the
applicant-appellee be defeated by the bare and unsubstantiated allegations of the oppositor-appellant.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.22
Hence, the Republic appeals by petition for review on certiorari.
Issue
(1) WHETHER OR NOT THE LAND SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION IS SUSCEPTIBLE OF PRIVATE ACQUISITION; and
(2) WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT, AS WELL AS THE COURT OF APPEALS, ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION.23
Ruling
The appeal is impressed with merit.
Section 14 (1) and (2) of the Property Registration Decree state:
Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper [Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.
xxxx
Section 14(1) deals with possession and occupation in the concept of an owner while Section 14(2) involves prescription as a mode of
acquiring ownership. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,24 the Court set the guidelines concerning land registration proceedings
brought under these provisions of the Property Registration Decree in order provide clarity to the application and scope of said provisions.
The respondent sought to have the land registered in her name by alleging that she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
peaceful, continuous, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the land in the concept of owner since time immemorial. However, the
Republic counters that the land was public land; and that it could not be acquired by prescription. The determination of the issue hinges on
whether or not the land was public; if so, whether the respondent satisfactorily proved that the land had already been declared as alienable
and disposable land of the public domain; and that she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, peaceful, continuous,
uninterrupted and adverse possession of the land in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
In Republic vs. Tsai,25 the Court summarizes the amendments that have shaped the current phraseology of Section 14(1), to wit:
Through the years, Section 48(b) of the CA 141 has been amended several times. The Court of Appeals failed to consider the amendment
introduced by PD 1073. In Republic v. Doldol, the Court provided a summary of these amendments:
The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No.141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was
superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25,
1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more is not sufficient. Therefore, since the effectivity of
PD 1073 on 25 January 1977, it must now be shown that possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicant, by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, started on 12 June 1945 or earlier. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1) of PD
1529.26
Under Section 14(1), therefore, the respondent had to prove that: (1) the land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; and (2) she, by herself or through her predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945, or earlier. 27 It is the applicant who carries the
burden of proving that the two requisites have been met. Failure to do so warrants the dismissal of the application.
The respondent unquestionably complied with the second requisite by virtue of her having been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier. She testified on how the land had been passed on to her from
her predecessors-in-interest; and tendered documentary evidence like: (1) the Deed of Sale evidencing the transfer of the property from
Mamerto Dionisio to Romualda Jacinto in 1926;28 (2) Tax Declaration No. 4547 showing that she had declared the property for taxation
purposes in 1976;29 and (3) Official Receipt No. H-7100234 indicating that she had been paying taxes on the land since 1977. 30 The CFI
found her possession of the land and that of her predecessors-in-interest to have been open, public, continuous, and adverse in the concept
of an owner since 1926 until the present time, or for more than 30 years, entitling her to the registration under the provisions of Act No. 496,
in relation to Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 6236 and other existing laws.31 On its part, the CA ruled that the
documentary and testimonial evidence stood unrebutted and uncontroverted by the Republic.32
Nonetheless, what is left wanting is the fact that the respondent did not discharge her burden to prove the classification of the land as
demanded by the first requisite. She did not present evidence of the land, albeit public, having been declared alienable and disposable by the
State. During trial, she testified that the land was not within any military or naval reservation, and Frisco Domingo, her other witness,
corroborated her. Although the Republic countered that the verification made by the Bureau of Forest Development showed that the land
was within the unclassified region of Paombong, Bulacan as per BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927,33 such showing was based on the
1st Indorsement dated July 22, 1977 issued by the Bureau of Forest Development, 34 which the CA did not accord any evidentiary weight to
for failure of the Republic to formally offer it in evidence. Still, Fiscal Reyes, in the opposition he filed in behalf of the Government, argued
that the land was a portion of the Labangan Channel operated by the Pampanga River Control System, and could not be the subject of
appropriation or land registration. Thus, the respondent as the applicant remained burdened with proving her compliance with the first
requisite.
Belatedly realizing her failure to prove the alienable and disposable classification of the land, the petitioner attached as Annex A to her
appellee’s brief35 the certification dated March 8, 2000 issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources–Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO),36 viz:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the parcel of land described on lot 2633 located at San Isidro, Paombong, Bulacan as shown in the sketch plan
surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Carlos G. Reyes falls within the Alienable or Disposable Land Project No. 19 of Paombong, Bulacan per Land
Classification Map No. 2934 certified on October 15, 1980.
However, in its resolution of July 31, 2000,37 the CA denied her motion to admit the appellee’s brief, and expunged the appellee’s brief from
the records. Seeing another opportunity to make the certification a part of the records, she attached it as Annex A of her comment
here.38 Yet, that attempt to insert would not do her any good because only evidence that was offered at the trial could be considered by the
Court.
Even had the respondent’s effort to insert the certification been successful, the same would nonetheless be vain and ineffectual. In Menguito
v. Republic,39 the Court pronounced that a survey conducted by a geodetic engineer that included a certification on the classification of the
land as alienable and disposable was not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land still formed part of the inalienable public
domain, to wit:
To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed
words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the
Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. x x x." (Emphasis supplied.)
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the
State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen
into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant.
Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable and
disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in question.
Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor’s assertion,
petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable. 40
We reiterate the standing doctrine that land of the public domain, to be the subject of appropriation, must be declared alienable and
disposable either by the President or the Secretary of the DENR. In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 41 we explicitly ruled:
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.42
This doctrine unavoidably means that the mere certification issued by the CENRO or PENRO did not suffice to support the application for
registration, because the applicant must also submit a copy of the original classification of the land as alienable and disposable as approved
by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. As the Court said in Republic v. Bantigue
Point Development Corporation:43
The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The applicant for land registration has the burden of
overcoming the presumption of State ownership by establishing through incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to be registered is
alienable or disposable based on a positive act of the government. We held in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. that a CENRO certification is
insufficient to prove the alienable and disposable character of the land sought to be registered. The applicant must also show sufficient proof
that the DENR Secretary has approved the land classification and released the land in question as alienable and disposable.
Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO certification in support of its application. Clearly, this falls short of the requirements
for original registration.44
Yet, even assuming that the DENR-CENRO certification alone would have sufficed, the respondent’s application would still be denied
considering that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable came only after the filing of the application in court in 1976. The
certification itself indicated that the land was reclassified as alienable or disposable only on October 15, 1980. The consequence of this is
fittingly discussed in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, to wit:
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals since in the latter, the application for registration had
been filed before the land was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the
two. Yet two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza,
which involved a claim of possession that extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was declared alienable and disposable only
in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at registration in Ceniza
should have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the
lots involved were "found to be within the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555
dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of private respondents’ application.
Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting
also was the observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the application of appellees on the ground that the property still
forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in question are forestal land...."
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public land for the period required by law would entitle its occupant
to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the land subject of their
application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject land even before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Although
there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is one of them."
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who authored Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of
public domain lands declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is that in
Ceniza, the application for registration was filed nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared alienable or disposable, while in
Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9) years before the land was declared alienable or disposable. That crucial difference was also
stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference which the dissent seeks to belittle. 45 (citations omitted)
On the other hand, under Section 14(2), ownership of private lands acquired through prescription may be registered in the owner’s name.
Did the respondent then acquire the land through prescription considering that her possession and occupation of the land by her and her
predecessors-in-interest could be traced back to as early as in 1926, and that the nature of their possession and occupation was that of a
bona fide claim of ownership for over 30 years?
Clearly, the respondent did not. Again, Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic is enlightening, to wit:
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or,
indeed, be subject of the commerce of man. Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of
public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President or any duly authorized government officer of alienability
and disposability of lands of the public domain. Would such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code,
from property of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable and disposable lands may be
the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the
same provision further provides that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be
converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property
"which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable,
it remains property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth".1âwphi1
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or
the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run.
Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus
affects the registrability even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants
claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned
by the State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter.1âwphi1 The duty of the Court is to apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance
with their language and intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the legislative branch. Congress can very well be
entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the
requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.46
The period of possession prior to the reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain is not considered in
reckoning the prescriptive period in favor of the possessor. As pointedly clarified also in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic:47
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation
that they are no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, would the period of possession prior to the
conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? We rule in
the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of possession before the public domain land becomes
patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property before it
becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration under Section 14(2)
falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the land was still
classified as public dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration.48
In other words, the period of possession prior to the reclassification of the land, no matter how long, was irrelevant because prescription did
not operate against the State before then.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on January 30, 2004; DISMISSES the
application for land registration of respondent Rosario de Guzman Vda. De Joson respecting Lot 2633, Cad-297 with a total area of 12,342
square meters, more or less, situated in San Isidro, Paombong, Bulacan; and DIRECTS the respondent to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-28021 December 15, 1977

JULIAN SANTULAN substituted by his children named PATROCINIO, ADORACION, ARTURO, CONSTANCIA, and PEPITA, all surnamed
SANTULAN and minor grandchildren, JOCELYN, ROSAURO and ROBERTO, all surnamed SANTULAN assisted by their guardian ad
litem, PATROCINIO SANTULAN petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, and
ANTONIO LUSIN, substituted by his Heirs named TEODOSIA BALANZA (widow) and Children LEOPOLDO, ARMANDO. ALFONSO,
EMILIANO, MAGDALENA, ERLINDA and ESTRELLA (ESTER), all surnamed LUSIN, and Heirs of CAROLINA LUSIN-LUCERO named
MANOLITO LUCERO and MARIO LUCERO, respondents-appellees.
Isidoro Crisostomo for appellants Heirs of Julian Santulan.
Romulo C. Felizmeña for appellees Heirs of Antonio Lusin.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Conrado T. Limcaoco for The Executive Secretary,
etc.

AQUINO, J.
This case is about the lease of a parcel of foreshore land of the public domain with an area of about four and one-half hectares located at
Barrio Kaingin, Kawit, Cavite abutting on Bacoor Bay and the Ankaw Creek.
It is protracted controversy that has been pending for more than thirty years between the rival claimants Julian Santulan plan and Antonio
Lusin, who have been succeeded by their heirs.
Santulan claimed that foreshore land was an extension of his land, Lot No. 986 of the Kawit cadastre, with an area of 17,301 square meters,
registered in his name in 1937 under Original Certificate of Title No. 6 which was issued by virtue of a free patent. The northern boundary of
Lot No. 986 is Bacoor (Manila) Bay (Exh. A). The said foreshore land was allegedly formed by soil deposits accumulated by the alluvial action
of the sea.
On December 5, 1942 Santulan caused the said land to be surveyed. The survey plan was approved by the Director of Lands in 1944 (Exh. B).
On December 29, 1942 Santulan, pursuant to Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, filed an application, F.L.A. No. V 562, to lease for five years
for agricultural purposes an area of 36,120 square meters of the said foreshore land (Exh. F).
On that same date, December 29, 1942, Santulan, pursuant to Act No. 3077 and Lands Administrative Order No. 8-3, filed with the Bureau of
Lands an application for a revocable permit to occupy the said land. He indicated therein that he would use the land for 11 capiz beds and
oyster beds, the planting of bakawan and pagatpat and later to be developed into a fishpond" (Exh. G).
Seven years later, or on December 22, 1949, Santulan filed with the Bureau of Fisheries an application for an ordinary fishpond permit or
lease of the said foreshore land (Special Use Permit, pp. A. No. 5114, Exh. H).
At the instance of the Director of Fisheries, the Director of Forestry investigated the condition of the said foreshore land. The latter in his
first indorsement dated June 19, 1950 found that it was swampy "and not an improved fishpond as alleged by Antonio Lusin" and that it is
within the disposable areas for agricultural purposes under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands (Exh. L-1).
The chief of the division of commercial fisheries sent a letter to Lusin dated April 28, 1950 apprising him that he was reported to have
illegally entered the area covered by Santulan's fishpond permit application and directing him to refrain from introducing improvements,
with the warning that court proceedings would be taken against him (Exh. J).
On January 12, 1951 an attorney, acting for the Director of Lands wrote the following letter to Lusin advising him to vacate the disputed land
and maintain the status quo:
Mr. Antonio Lusin
Caiñgin, Kawit, Cavite
S i r:
We have been informed that the area which is presently controverted by and between you and Julian Santulan, under the applications noted
above, was recently entered by you and some companion and that you are destroying the dikes and other improvements previously
constructed thereon by said Julian Santulan.
If this information is true, and inasmuch as you are aware that the controversy is still pending final adjudgment in this Office, is desired that
you take proper advice and leave the area and its existing improvements in status quo in order to avoid possible confusion of rights which
ma delay the final disposition of the area in question.
You are advised further that the acts imputed to you may make you liable to prosecution and punishment under the law; and that whatever
improvements you may make for yourself in the premises will not legally accrue to your benefit, nor will they serve as basis for a claim to
preferential rights. (Paragraphing supplied, Exh, J-1).
Santulan declared the said foreshore land in his name for tax purposes. Tax Declaration No. 2923, which took effect in 1948 and which
cancelled Tax Declaration No. 13816 also in Santulan's name, shows that the land was assessed at P460. He paid the realty taxes due on the
said land for the years 1945-46, 1948-55 and 195760 (Exh. C, D and E, el seq.).
On the other hand, Antonio Lusin in 1942 and 1945 (he died in 1962) filed with the Bureau of Lands applications for a revocable-permit and
lease of a foreshore land, respectively, for the purpose of producing salt on the said land. He claimed that he had been in the continuous and
exclusive possession of the land since 1920, when it was still under water, and that he had used it as a site of his fish corrals.
He allegedly converted two hectares of the said land into a fishpond. The entire area was enclosed with mud dikes and provided with a
concrete sluice gate and another sluice gate made of wood On the northern part of the land bordering the bay were bamboo stakes placed at
close intervals to serve as water breakers to protect the mud dikes from being washed away by the action of the sea. Lusin introduced the
alleged improvements from 1951 to 1953.
The 1942 foreshore lease applications of Santulan and Lusin gave rise to Bureau of Lands Conflict No. 8 (N). The Director of Lands in his
decision in that case dated February 1, 1951 found that the disputed land is foreshore land covered and uncovered by the flow and ebb of
the ordinary tides that it is an extension of Santulan's Lot No. 986 and it was formerly a part of the sea; that Santulan was the first to enter
the land and to make dikes thereon, and that Lusin entered the land later and made dikes also (Exh. K made a part hereof for reference as
Annex A).
The Director ruled that the disputed foreshore land was subject "to reparian rights which may he invoked by Santulan as owner of the
upland in accordance with section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1" (Exh. K). Hence the Director rejected Lusin's application for a
foreshore lease and for a revocable permit and gave due course to Santulan's foreshore lease application.
Lusin filed a motion for reconsideration. The Director in his order of October 19, 1951 denied that motion. lie found that Lusin was a
possessor in bad faith: that it is not true that Lusin had improved and possessed the said foreshore land for twenty years, that the disputed
area is covered by water, two to three feet deep during ordinary tides and is exposed land after the ebb of the tides, and that Lusin's alleged
possession and improvements could not nullify Santulan's preferential right to lease the land by reason of his riparian rights. The Director
ordered Lusin to vacate the land within sixty days from notice (Exh. L made a part hereof for reference as Annex B).
Lusin appealed to the Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who in his decision of October 13, 1952 dismissed the appeal
and affirmed the Director's 1951 decision (Exh. M made a part hereof for reference as Annex C). Lusin's motion for reconsideration was
denied in the Secretary's order of February 28, 1953 (Exh. N made a part hereof for reference as Annex D).
Lusin asked for a reinvestigation of the case. His request was granted. The Department ordered a reinvestigation on May 12, 1953.
After receipt of the report of reinvestigation, the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, by authority of the Secretary, in his
order of December 14, 1954, reaffirmed the rejection of Lusin's revocable permit and foreshore lease applications but ordered Santulan to
reimburse to Lusin the appraised value of his improvements (Exh. O made a part hereof for reference as Annex E).
Lusin appealed to the President of the Philippines after his motion for reconsideration was denied in the Undersecretary's order of May 19,
1955 (Exh. OO made a part hereof for reference as Annex F).
Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo, by authority of the President, held in his decision of April 10, 1958 that section 32 of Lands Administrative
Order No. 7-1 (promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on April 30, 1936 pursuant to Acts Nos. 2874 and 3038)
was "rendered obsolete" by section 67 of the Public Land Law which took effect on December 1, 1936 (Exh. P made a part hereof for
reference as Annex G).
On the basis of the foregoing ruling and since the record is silent as to whether or not the land in question has been declared by the
President as not necessary for the public service and as open to disposition (Sec. 61, Public Land Law), the Executive Secretary sustained
Lusin's appeal and reversed the orders of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in favor of Santulan.
Secretary Pajo decided the case in the alternative as follows:
On the assumption that the land in question has been declared open for disposition and is not necessary for the public service, this Office
directs that an oral bidding for the leasing thereof to interested parties pursuant to the provisions of Section 67 of Commonwealth Act .No.
141 be conducted and the contract of lease awarded to the highest bidder whoever shall be the highest bidder, if other than the appellant,
shall be required to pay to the appellant the appraised value of the improvements introduced by him on the land to be determined by that
Department.
If the land in question has not been so declared, this Office directs that a revocable permit under Section 68 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 be
Id to the appellant requiring him to pay permit fees since the year 1951.
Accordingly, the orders and decisions of that Department and the Bureau of Lands are hereby revoked.
Santulan's case was distinguished from that of Gonzalo Monzon whose Lot No. 987 adjoins Santulan's Lot No. 986. Executive Secretary Fred
Ruiz Castro (now Chief Justice) in his decision of May 10, 1954 upheld the preferential right of Monzon to lease the foreshore land north of
his lot, which foreshore land is adjacent to the foreshore land now in dispute in this case (Exh. Q made a part hereof for reference as Annex
H).
Santulan's motion for reconsideration was denied in the letter of the Acting Executive Secretary dated August 20, 1959 (Exh. W).
On October 22, 1959 Santulan filed in the Court of First Instance of Cavite a petition for certiorari wherein he alleged that the Executive
Secretary committed a grave abuse of discretion in misinterpreting certain provisions of Act No. 2874, Commonwealth Act No. 141, and
Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1.
In the lower court the parties agreed that the case Involves only a question of law. On August 18. 1961 the lower court dismissed the petition
and affirmed the Executive Secretary's decision. Santulan appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution of July 21, 1967 elevated
the record to this Court on the ground that Santulan in his brief raised only the legal questions of whether the Public Land Law repealed
section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7 1 and whether the Executive Secretary's decision is "legally sound and correct" (CA-G. R. No.
30708-R).
It should be emphasized that. as found by tile investigators of the Bureau of Lands, Santulan was the prior possessor of the foreshore land in
question. lie had it surveyed in 1942. The survey plan Psu-115357) was approved by the Director of Lands in 1944. Santulan paid the realty
taxes on that land .
It should further be underscored that the regulations pie him a preferential right to lease the land as a riparian owner. Lands Administrative
Order No. 7-1 dated April 30. 1936. which was issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources upon the recommendation of
the Director of Lands for the disposition of alienable lands of the public domain, provides:
32. Preference of the Reparian Owner — The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy lands or lands covered with water
bordering upon shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply for such lands adjoining his property as may
not be needed for the public service, subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies therefor
within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his preferential right.
Paragraph 32 quoted above is a substantial copy of paragraph 4 of Lands Administrative Order No. 8-3 dated April 20, 1936, which was
promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources upon the recommendation of the Director of Lands for issuance of
temporary permits of occupation and use of agricultural lands of the public domain.
The word "riparian" in paragraphs 32 and 4 of the departmental regulations is used in a broad sense as referring to any property having a
water frontage (Shepard's Point Land Co. vs. Atlantic Hotel, 44 S. E. 39, 45, 132 N. C. 517, 65 C. J. S. 143, note 84). Strictly speaking, "riparian"
refers to rivers. A riparian owner is a person who owns land situated on the bank of a river.
But in paragraphs 32 and 4, the term "riparian owner" embraces not only the owners of lands on the banks of rivers but also the littoral
owners, meaning the owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. The littoral is the coastal region including
both the land along the coast and the water near the coast or the shore zone between the high and low watermarks.
Therefore, on the basis of paragraphs 32 and 4 of the said administrative regulations, Santulan or his heirs Should be allowed to leased or
occupy the said foreshore land.
But the Executive Secretary ruled that paragraph 32 was rendered obsolete by Commonwealth Act No. 141 or, as held by the trial court,
Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 was repealed by the Public Land Law. Is that conclusion correct? We hold that it is wrong.
It is true that Lands Administrative Orders Nos. 7-1 and 8-3 were issued when the 1919 Public Land Act was in force or before the present
Public Land Law took effect on December 1, 1936. But that circumstance would not necessarily mean that the said departmental regulations
are not good under the 1936 Public Land Law.
In rationalizing the alleged repeal of paragraph 32, the Executive Secretary cited the following provisions of Act No. 2874, the 1919 Public
Land Act (15 Public Land laws 24):
SEC. 64. The lease or sale shall be adjudicated to the highest bidder; and if there is no bidder besides the applicant, it shall be adjudicated to
him. The provisions of section twenty-seven of this Act shall be applied wherever applicable. If all or part of the lots remain unleased or
unsold the Director of Lands Shall from time to time announce in the Offcial Gazette or otherwise the lease or sale of those lots if necessary .
(Section 27 refers to sealed bidding).
The Executive Secretary held that the above-quoted section 64 was by the for provisions of on wealth Act No. 141 which took effect on
December 1, 1936:
SEC. 67. The lease or sale shall be made through oral bidding-, and ajudication shall be made to the highest bidder. However, where m
applicant has made improvements on the land by virtue of a permit issued to him by competent authority, the sale or lease shall be made by
sealed bidding as prescribed in section twenty-six of this Act, the provisions of which shall be applied wherever applicable. If all or Dart of
the lots remain unleased or unsold. the Director of Lands shall from time to time announce in the Official Gazzate, or in any other
newspapers of general circulation, the lease or sale of those lots, if necessary. (Section 26, like section 27 of Act No. 2874, refers to sealed
bidding).
The Executive Secretary noted that under section 64 of Act No. 2874 sealed bidding was the general rule of procedure in an award of a lease
of foreshore land and that the t is entitled to equal the bid of the highest bidder. On the other hand, under 67, oral bidding is the general rule.
Hence, the Executive Secretary assumed that, while under section 64 of the 1919 old Public Land Act, the fact that the applicant has a
preferential right to lease foreshore land was a crucial factor it is thus under section 67 of the 1936 Public Land Law because in oral bidding
the appellant is not entitled to equal the bid of the highest bidder.
The Executive Secretary concluded that, because the preferential right of the applicant to lease foreshore land was immaterial under 67 of
the present Public Land Law, paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, which gives such preference. had become "idle and
useless".
That conclusion is wrong because it is based on the erroneous hypothesis that section 64 of the 1919 Public Land Act is different from
section 67 of the 1936 Public Land Law. They are not different. The truth is that section 64 was amended by Act No. 3517 which took effect
on February 4, 1919 (24 Public Laws 416). Section 64, as thus amended, is substantially the same as section 67 of the 1936 Public Land Law.
That fact was overlooked by the Executive Secretary. Hence, his conclusion, that paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 71 was
repealed or rendered obsolete by section 67 of the present Public Land Law, is wrong because its premise is wrong.
In other words, paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, issued on April 30, 1936, was promulgated under section 64 of the old
Public Land Law, as amended. And since the amended section 64 was substantially reproduced in section 67 of the 1936 Public Land Law, it
is glaringly incorrect to say that section 67 rendered obsolete the said paragraph 32. Paragraph 32 is still in force and is good under the
existing Public Land Law.
The foregoing discussion reveals that the Executive Summary's rationalization of the alleged repeal of paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative
Order No. 7-1 (identical to paragraph 4 of Lands Administrative Order No. 8-3) is not only deficient in clarity and cogency but is predicated
on the false assumption that section 64 of the 1919 Public Land Act is different from section 67 of the present Public Land Law.
Consequently, the aforementioned decision of Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo under review bas to be set aside.
This case is governed by the precedent established in the case of Gonzalo Monzon, which, as already noted, is similar to this cm since the
foreshore land involved in the Monzon case is adjacent to the foreshore land involved in this case.
In the Monzon case, the Office of the President, applying the oft-cited paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 held that Monzon,
the littoral owner of the registered land abutting upon the foreshore land, has the preferential right to lease the foreshore land,
The location of the lots of Santulan and Monzon and the foreshore lands abutting thereon is shown in the following sketch bawd on the plan,
Psu-115357 (Exh. B):
Manila Bay or Bacoor Bay
Disputed Area

Psu-1 15357 Psu- 1 15358

Foreshore land Forshore land

claimed by leased to

Julian Santulan Gonzalo Monzon

and

Antonio Lusin

Lot No. 986 Lot no. 987

Belonging to Belonging to

Julian Santulan Gonzalo Monzon

Considering that the foreshore land abutting upon Santolan's lot is in the same situation as the foreshore land abutting upon Monzon's lot,
there is no reason why Santulan should not enjoy, with respect to the disputed foreshore land, the rights given to Monzon over the foreshore
land adjacent to his lot.
Now, then, is there any justification for giving to the littoral owner the preferential right to lease the foreshore land abutting on his land?
That rule in paragraph 32 is in consonance with article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 which provides that, while lands added to the
shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea form part of the public domain, such lands, "when they are no
longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or
for the coast guard service", shall be declared by the Government "to be the property of the owner of the estates adjacent thereto and as
increment thereof" (cited in Ignacio vs. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335, 338).
In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral owner (riparian according to paragraph 32) to the foreshore land
formed by accretions or alluvial deposits due to the action of the sea (Ker & Co. vs. Cauden 6 Phil. 732, 736, 223 U.S. 268, 56 L. Ed. 432, 435;
Jover vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 522, 40 Phil. 1094, 1100, 221 U.S. 623, 55 L. Ed. 884).
The reason for that preferential right is the same as the justification for giving accretions to the riparian owner, which is that accretion
compensates the riparian owner for the diminutions which his land suffers by reason of the destructive force of the waters (Cortes vs. City of
Manila, 10 Phil. 567). So, in the case of littoral lands, he who loses by the encroachments of the sea should gain by its recession (Banks vs.
Ogden 2 Wall. 57, 67, 17 L. Ed. 818, 821).
That preferential right is recognized in American jurisprudence where the rule is that the owner of the land adjacent to navigable waters has
certain riparian or littoral rights of a proprietary nature not possessed by the general public which rights are incident to the ownership of
the banks or the uplands: riparian as respects the waters of a river and littoral as to sea waters or the waters of a lake (65 C.J. S. 143-145).
It may be mentioned that the Director of Lands stated in his manifestation of October 26, 1977 that Lands Administrative Orders Nos. 7-1
and 8-3 are still in force and have not been superseded by any later regulations and that the directive of the President of the Philippines to
the Director of Lands dated May 24, 1966, stopping the grant of foreshore leases all along Manila Bay, towards Cavite and Bataan, has not
rendered the instant case moot and academic "because the foreshore lease application involved is pending award."
In view of the foregoing considerations, the trial court's decision and the decision of the Executive Secretary dated April 10, 1958 are
reversed and set aside and the order of the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated December 14, 1954 and the orders of
the Director of Lands dated February I and October 19, 1951 are affirmed.
The lease application of Julian Santulan mentioned in the order of February 1, 1951 should be recorded in the names of his heirs and the
obligation to make reimbursement mentioned in the dispositive part of the Undersecretary's order should now devolve upon the heirs of
Santolan. The reimbursement should be made to the heirs of the late Antonio Lusin The obligation to vacate the disputed land, as required in
the Director's order of October 19, 1951 devolves upon the heirs of Lusin Costs in both instances against respondent heirs of Lusin (As
amended by Resolution of February 17, 1977.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion Jr. and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Guerrero, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
Fernando and Santos, JJ., are on leave.

Annexes to Opinion in L-28021, Julian Santolan

vs. Executive , et al.
F. L. A. No. V-562, R. P. A. (New). Julian Santolan, Applicant & Contestant vs. F. L. A. (New), R. P. A. (New), B. L. Conflict No. 8 (N) Psu- 1 15357,
Kawit, Cavite.
Julian Santolan, Applicant-Appellant vs. Antonio Lusin, Applicant-Appellant, D.A.N.R. Case No. 625, Psu- 1 15357, Kawit, Cavite.
Annex A — Order of Director of Lands dated February 1, 1951.
Annex B — Order of Director of Lands dated October 19, 1951.
Annex C — Decision of Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated October 13, 1952.
Annex D — Order of Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated February 28,1953.
Annex E — Order of Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resource dated December 14, 1954.
Annex F — Order of Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated May 19, 1955.
Annex G — Decision of Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo dated April 10, 1958.
Annex H — Decision of Executive Secretary Fred Ruiz Castro dated -May 10, 1954 in Emiliano del Rosario vs. Gonzalo Monzon.
ANNEX A
ORDER
Julian Santolan, who owns Lot No. 986 of the Kawit Cadastre, under a free patent grant with Original Certificate of Title No. 6 issued to him
on June 9, 1937, claims preferential rights to all the areas extending seaward from the said lot. He caused the said areas to be surveyed for
him in 1942, and the survey plan thereof was approved in 1944, as may be seen in the Survey Plan Psu-115357 of this Office which is
reproduced in the sketch drawn. on the back of the last page hereof. Except the portion marked "A" in the sketch, he made a foreshore lease
application and a revocable permit application for these areas in 1942 to devote the areas applied for to fishpond purposes. Presently, he
now includes the portion "A" in his applications herein mentioned to be devoted to the same purposes — in fact, he now intends to utilize
the entire area comprised in his Survey Psu-115357 for fishery purposes and has filed therefor with the Bureau of Fisheries fishpond permit
application No. 5114. Upon this claim he contests the revocable permit (new) application and the foreshore lease (new) application for the
portion O these mm marked "X" in the sketch which were filed by Antonio Lusin in 1942 and 1945, respectively, for salt-producing purposes.
Lot No. 986 of the Kawit Cadastre, mentioned above as owned by Julian Santolan, a to be bounded on the north by the Bacoor Bay. It is
evident therefore that the areas now in Santolan's Survey Psu-115357, were formerly parts of the bay, and that presently they exist as a
result of the of the waters of the sea. Investigation disclosed that these areas are now foreshore lands, — covered and uncovered by the flow
and ebb of the tides. Santolan was found to have entered the areas first and made dikes Lusin was found to have entered lately and made
does also. None of them, however, has obtained from this Office any permit of occupancy and use, and their applications are not yet
approved.
On the basis alone of actual occupancy or introduction of improvements neither of the parties here may claim preferential rights, for under
the law and regulations, it is only such occupancy and introduction of improvements as are made upon the authority of an official permit
issued by this Office which could serve as a reason for holding a sealed bidding in a public auction of the right to low at which the permittee
is given the preferred right to equal the highest bid that might be put by any other party. This is the rule prescribed by Section 67 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (the Public land Act)' It appears, however, that the areas — portions "A", "X" and the parts extending up to the
Bar Bay now, as may be seen in the sketch, — which are comprised by Santolan's Survey Plan -Psu-115357, are immediately adjoining Lot
No. 986, which is his private property, and are extensions of the said lot to the sea. The areas, being foreshore lands, are therefore subject to
riparian fights which may be invoked by Santolan as owner of the upland in accordance With Section 32 of lands Administrative Order No. 7-
1 which provides the following:
Sec. 32. The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy lands, or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks
of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public
service, subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies therefor within 60 days from the date he
receives a communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his preferential right
As Julian Santolan is interested in utilizing the entire area covered by his Survey Psu- 1 15357 over which he is fully entitled to exercise his
riparian rights, the above-noted foreshore lease (new) application and revocable (new) application of Antonio Lusin, both covering the
portion marked "X" in the sketch, are hereby rejected. The lease application of Santolan, shall be recorded as Foreshore Urn Application No.
562 and given due course for the whole area (including portion "A) shown in the said sketch.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, February 1, 1951.
JOSE P. DANS
Director of Lands

ANNEX B
ORDER
Counsel for respondent Antonio Lusin has filed in due time a motion for the reconsideration of our Order of February 1, 1951, which
resolved this case in favor of contestant Julian Santolan, praying that the said order be set aside and the case, reopened for purposes of a
formal hearing for the submission of evidence. Substantially stated, respondent Lusin claims that he is entitled to preference because he has
been in possession of the premises for a period of over twenty years, placing stakes and planting aquatic trees for the raising and cultivation
of shell fish and sea shells, besides constructing dikes for pending fish and making salt beds, — all these works undertaken by him being the
cause for the gradual filling of the area and its conversion into a productive state. He contends that the areas under question had been
formed thru "artificial accretion" caused by his own labor and, consequently, he has the right of pre-emption.
There is no question, however, that the areas under question are parts of the foreshore. Under Section 61 of Commonwealth Act No. 141
(Public Land Act), they are disposable to private parties by k only and not otherwise; and under Section 67 of the same Act, the lease shall be
made thru oral bidding, the adjudication to be made to the highest bidder.
There is no question also that the areas under question extend to the sea from lot No. 986 of the Kawit Cadastre, which is actually owned by
respondent Santolan under Original Certificate of Title No. 6 of the land records of Cavite. Undoubtedly, respondent has riparian rights to the
foreshore in question which he can invoke against contestant Lusin under the provisions of Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-
1, quoted in toto in the order sought to be reconsidered.
Records show that the areas under question are also involved in the Fishpond Application No. 5114 of Julian Santolan with the Bureau of
Fisheries which is also contested by Antonio. lt appears that upon request of the Director of Fisheries to the Bureau of Forestry for
certification as to the availability of the areas for fishery purposes, the latter made investigation, inquiring at the same time into the claim of
Antonio Lusin, made formally in writing, that he has improved the areas into a fishpond and has been in occupation thereof for more than 20
years. The Bureau of Forestry made the findings that those areas are within the disposable areas for agricultural purposes under the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands; and that they are swampy lands, formerly under sea water of the Bacoor Bay, "and not an improved
fishpond as alleged by Antonio Lusin". These findings were transmitted to the Director of Fisheries under first indorsement dated June 19,
1950.
Our own investigating officer, reporting on this case on January 25, 1951, stated the following: "On December 15, 1950, when I conducted
the first ocular inspection of the premises in the presence of both parties, the only visible improvements found thereon are the newly-
constructed dikes made thereon by Julian Santolan, a few bacauan and ape-ape trees of about two to three years old, bamboo stakes placed
thereon at intervals, and a small old hut located at almost the middle of the land in question. All these improvements were claimed to have
been introduced by Julian Santolan. Antonio Lusin, however, claimed that those bamboo stakes found therein were his."
It is evident from the findings of both the inspecting officer of the Bureau of Forestry and our own investigating officer that the areas under
question are foreshore lands, and that they have not been really improved and possessed by respondent Lusin for over twenty years as he
alleged. The improvements found therein have been recently made, and they are not of such nature and extent as would have changed the
character of the areas as foreshore. In fact, according to the investigating officer, the areas have been seen by him on different occasions, and
he found that the same, as well as the neighboring areas in the same belt, were covered by tidal waters of from 2 to 3 feet deep during
ordinary rise of the tides, and uncovered by the tides at ebb.
There is, therefore, no reason for changing our disposition in our order of February 1, 1951. It is not necessary to re-open the case to receive
evidence on respondent's allegation that he has been in possession of the premises for over 20 years and has gradually improved them
because, aside from the fact that the allegation is belied by the physical condition of the premises, whatever evidence may be gathered on
that allegation could not change the nature of the areas as foreshore, nor would it avoid the rights of contestant as riparian owner. The
presence of the respondent in the premises has not been authorize by competent authorities, and his introduction of improvements thereon
was not done with proper permit of temporary occupancy and -use such as is prescribed in our administrative practice. The circumstances
under which he made improvements cannot justify his claim for a preferred right under Section 67 of the Public Land Act; on the contrary,
he stands to forfeit the improvements to the Government for, as reported by our investigating officer, he entered the Premises and
commenced making the improvements after contestant Santolan himself has already made improvements, and after he has been warned on
December 15, 1950 by the investigating officer not to continue working, which warning was confirmed by us in our letter to him of January
12, 1951. His bad faith is quite evident, and he cannot avail of his presence in the premises now to demand the issuance to him of a
provisional or revocable permit of temporary occupancy and use under our rules and regulations in order to legal his entry and give validity
to his improvements. The right to demand issuance of such a permit is concomittant to the right of contestant Santolan to be a preferred
applicant by virtue of his riparian right recognized in Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 cited hereinabove.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the instant motion for reconsideration and reinvestigation of respondent Antonio Lusin is hereby denied, and he shall
vacate the premises within 60 days from receipt of notice hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, October 19, 1951.
JOSE P. DANS
Director of Lands

ANNEX C
DECISION
The order of the Director of Lands dated February 1, 1951, rejected Foreshore Lease Application (New) and Revocable Permit Application
(New) of Antonio Lusin and gave due course to the Foreshore Lease Application No. 562 of Julian Santolan. Antonio Lusin claims that the
order is against the fact and the law. He presented three (3) motions for reconsideration: one on October 19, 1951; the other on December
12, 1951; and the last on April 9, 1952. Said motions were all denied. Hence, the present appeal. The subject of contention is the strip of land
having an area of 41/2 hectares from Lot No. 986 of the Kawit Cadastre No. 203 to the waters of Bacoor Bay. Lot No. 986 is covered by I
Certificate of Title No. 6 issued to Julian Santolan on June 9, 1937. Santolan's titled property is bounded on the north by Bacoor Bay.
On December 5, 1942, Santolan filed his foreclosure km application for the entire tract entervening between his property and Bacoor Bay. So
he caused Psu- 115357 to be executed and same was approved in 1944 by the Director of Lands.
On November 26, 1945, Antonio Lusin applied for permit for an area of 4.5 for salt bed purposes. The area for which permit was asked is by
his F.L.A. (New) filed on November 17, 1945, the boundaries of which are as follows:
NE — V. del Rosario and E. del Rosario
SE — Julian Santolan
SW — Ankaw River
NW — Bacoor Bay
The two applications of Santolan and Lusin cover the same area. Julian Santolan duly protested in 1946 against Lusin's application. The
question to be decided in this appeal is: Which of the two applicants, Julian Santolan or Antonio Lusin, has right of preference to the land in
controversy?
By virtue of the fact that he is a riparian owner, Julian Santolan has the right of preference pursuant to the provisions of Section 32 Of
Administrative Order No. 7-1, which reads as follows:
Sec. 32. The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy lands, or hinds covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks
of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public
service, subject in the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies therefor within sixty (60) days from the
date he receives communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his preferential right.
It is true that appellant Lusin introduced improvements on the in question, but that fact does not give him preferential right , not only
because he had not acquired any permit from the Bureau of Lands before doing so, but also because his entry on the was duly protested by
Santolan.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, and finding that the order of the Director of lands on Feb. 1, 1951, is in accordance with the facts of
record and the provisions of the law on the matter, the herein appeal from said order should be, as hereby it is, dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, October 13, 1952.
JOSE S. CAMUS
Acting Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources

ANNEX D
ORDER
This is a motion filed by Antonio Lusin, thru counsel, for the reconsideration of the decision of this Office dated October 13, 1952, dismissing
his appeal from the decision of the Director of Lands under date of February 1, 1951.
In support of the said motion for reconsideration, Lusin substantially alleges that he has been improving the land in question since 1920,
spending for such improvements no more than P20,000.00, and for that reason, he should be given the preferential right to acquire the said
land. To reinforce his allegation, movant cites the case of Rosalia Vida Vda. de Tirona vs. Magdaleno Tragico, CA G.R. No. 9050, decided by the
Court of Appeals on June 30, 1943, wherein it was held that because Tragico has constructed fishpond on a portion of the land in question by
means of the improvements he has introduced thereon and has possessed the land for sufficient time to acquire the land by right of
prescription, he was awarded the land in dispute.
We have found this allegation of movant to be far from the truth. lt is the finding of the investigating officer who made an investigation of this
case that it is Julian Santolan and not movant Lusin who has been actually occupying the land in question and introducing improvements
thereon. The pertinent portion of his M reads as follows:
On December 16, 1950,, when I conducted the first ocular inspection of the premises in the presence of both parties, the only visible
improvements found thereon were the newly constructed dikes made thereon by Julius Santolan, a few bacauan and ape-ape trees of about
two to three years old, bamboo stakes placed thereon at intervals and a small old hut located at almost the middle of the land in question. All
these improvements were claimed to have been introduced thereon by Julian Santolan. Antonio Lusin, however, claimed that the bamboo
stakes found thereon were his.
Moreover, according to the further finding of the said investigating officer, the WW in question fails under the category of foreshore land.
That portion of his report referring to this finding is hereby quoted as follows:
It may not be amiss to state in this connection that I have. or different occassions, the opportunity to inspect the land subject hereof on both
high and low tides. During ordinary low tide, the whole area. and further seaward, is entirely ex to the surface while during ordinary high
tide, it is wholly covered with tidal water with an approximate depth of two to three feet. The land in question in its entirety is marshy
covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow of tidal water.
As the land is a foreshore land, the same is susceptible to the riparian right of the owner of the adjoining land. According to Section 32 of
Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, the owner of the property adjoining foreshore land, shall be given preference to apply for such land
adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public service. Inasmuch as the land in question adjoins Lot No. 980, Kawit Cadastre,
which is a private property of Julian Santolan, said Julian Santolan shall have the preference right to apply therefor over and above any other
applicant. It may be mentioned, in this connection, that the said case of Rosalia Vida Vda. de Tirona vs. Magdaleno Tragico who had and
improved the land claimed by him, it is Santolan and riot movant Lusin who has been actually occupying and improving the land subject of
the present controversy.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion for reconsideration filed by Antonio Lusin, as well as his request for reinvestigation of this case, should be,
as hereby it is, denied.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, February 28,1953.
FERNANDO LOPEZ
Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources

ANNEX E
ORDER
On October 13, 1952, the Office a in connection with the above-case can, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
In view of all the foregoing and that the order of the Director of Lands on February 1, 1961, is in with the facts of record and the provisions of
law on the matter the herein appeal from the said order should be, as hereby it is dismissed.
From the said decision Antonio Lusin filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied as per order of this Office dated February 28,
1953. Still not satisfied with the aforementioned order, Lusin again filed a second notion for reconsideration predicating his motion on the
following grounds:
1. That he (Lusin) is in actual ion of the land in question since 1920;
2. That said area is an agricultural land actually devoted to fishpond and, therefore, is not a foreshore land;
3. That even granting without admitting that Santolan is a riparian owner, Santolan had lost his riparian right thereto in view of the
continuous ion by Lusin of the area since 1920; and
4. That in the investigation relied upon by the Director of Lands in his decision and confirmed by this Office, the movant herein was not given
opportunity to be heard because the said investigation was never completed, and as a result, the conclusions of the investigator thereat were
one sided
Adhering to its Policy of giving party litigants the outmost opportunity to present their respective sides of the case, this Office ordered a
reinvestigation of the case to determine whether or not the allegations of Antonio Lusin are true.
From the said reinvestigation, the facts of this case may be stated as follows:
The disputed area is a strip of land containing an approximate area of 4-1/2 hectares located at the Barrio of Kaingin, Municipality of Kawit,
Province of Cavite- lt is bounded on the North by Bacoor Bay, on the East by the property occupied by Vicente del Rosario and E. del Rosario,
on the South by Lot No. 896 of Kawit Cadastre No. 203; and on the West by Ankaw River. Lot 986, mentioned above as the boundary of the
area in question on the South, is owned and possessed by Julian Santolan, his ownership thereof being evidenced by a free patent grant with
Original Certificate of Title No. 6 issued on June 9, 1937. The only issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not Julian Santolan, as
riparian owner, is entitled to the preference provided for in Section 32, Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, which reads as follows:
32. Preference of Riparian Owner.— The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy lands, or lands covered with water
bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply or such lands adjoining his property as
may not be needed for the public service, subject to the laws and regulations governing Ian of this nature, provided that he applies therefor
within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his preferential right.
During the reinvestigation of this case by a representative of this Office, it was disclosed that Antonio Lusin is the actual occupant of the area
in question - his present possession thereof dating back as of 1951. During his occupation, Lusin has introduced considerable improvements
in the area investing his fife sa therein. Today, a portion of approximately two hectares of the said area is a complete fishpond surrounded
with dikes. A concrete gate was constructed on the western side of the fishpond in 1951. Water breakers were constructed around the dikes
to protect them from the action of the waves. The remaining portion of the area in question is fenced with bamboo stakes.
On the other hand, it is apparent that the area in question is an extension of Lot 986 to the sea and that its present existence is the result of
the continuous recession of the water of the sea. There is no doubt that the area in question is a foreshore, it being situated along the shore
lying between medium high and low water marks and is covered and uncovered by the flow and ebb of ordinary tide.
Both Parties claim prior ion of the disputed area, Santolan's claim dating way back in 1907, the year he claims said area was donated to him
by his father-in-law while Lusin alleges that he was already in possession of the same since 1920. The evidence presented by both parties
during the reinvestigation were so diametrically opposed with each other that they only create doubts as to the veracity of the respective
claims of said parties. From the testimonies of witnesses for both sides, there could be gathered sufficient grounds to believe that prior to
1942, neither Party Possessed the area to the exclusion of the other. Rather, there are good reasons to believe that both parties fished in the
premises jointly and/or simultaneously without claiming the property exclusively for themselves because then the area was covered with
water which at that time was still deep. It was only in 1942 that Julian Santolan took positive step to claim the property by filing a foreshore
lease and a revocable permit application for said area with the intention of converting the same into a fishpond. Santolan caused said area to
be surveyed in 1942, the survey plan was approved in 1944 as may be seen in survey Plan Psu- 115357 of the Bureau of Lands. Since 1942,
Santolan exercised dominion over the property although Lusin occasionally entered the premises with a similar intention of claiming the
area for himself. In January of 1951 Lusin entered the area in question and wrested the n thereof from Santolan. Since then up to the present,
Lusin is in continuous possession of the same notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of Santolan.
Lusin alleges that the area in question does not fall within the purview of the above quoted Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1
on the theory that the lands enumerated in said provision, whether foreshore lands, marshy lands, or lands covered with water, must be
bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers. And it is argued that the area in question is bordering the shores of Manila
Bay, which is neither a lake nor a river, the owner of the adjoining property is not en to the preferential right accorded by said Lands
Administrative Order.
We cannot agree with this contention. This Office is of the opinion and so holds that the said provision of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-
1, Section 32 speaks of the following kinds of lands, distinct and separate from one another:
(1) Foreshore lands
(2) Marshy lands, or
(3) Land covered with water bordering upon the shores of navigable lakes or rivers.
The phrase "bordering upon the shores of navigable lakes or river" in said provision modifies only the third classification, that is, "lands
covered with water", for if the law that said phrase should modify the three types of land enumerated are then the punctuation mark,
comma, should not have been placed before the alternative "or" but instead between the words "water" and "bordering" making said
provision to appear as follows:
The owner of the property adjoining foreshore ands marshy lands or lands covered with water, bordering upon the shores or banks of
navigable lakes or rivers ... .
The use of the alternative "or" instead of the conjunction "and" shows the intention of the law in segregating foreshore lands from marshy
lands and those two from lands covered with water bordering upon shores of navigable lakes or rivers.
It is also alleged that even granting that Santolan was the preferential rights accorded to a riparian owner, said right has prescribed on the
ground that Lusin has been in continuous ion of the said area since 1920. This allegation was not duly proven during the reinvestigation.
While Lusin claims ion of the disputed area since 1920, on the other hand. Santolan claims that he possessed the same since 1907 when it
was donated to him by his father-in-law. As we have- already stated, it is the - finding of this Office that prior to 1942, neither party the
premises exclusively. It was only in 1942 when Santolan took positive steps to claim the area for himself. There are even evidence on record
that Santolan paid the land taxes for the area in 1936. In 1951, Lusin effected his entry to the area up to the present. It may be recalled,
however, that these actuations of Lusin had been the subject of a criminal complaint filed by Santolan before the Justice of the Peace Court of
Kawit, Cavite, wherein Lusin was acquitted on the ground that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Needless to say, proof beyond reasonable doubt is absolutely necessary before conviction in criminal cases could be had. On the other hand,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove a matter of fact in civil and/or administrative cases. The preponderance of evidence
adduced at the reinvestigation of this case conducted by a representative of this Office, shows that the present occupation of Lusin of the
area in question was effected by force, although there are good reasons to believe that such force was employed by Lusin to assert what he
believed was his right over the property in question.
From the foregoing facts and circumstances, it is therefore, apparent that the area in question is a foreshore land, and Santolan, being the
riparian owner, is entitled to the preferential rights accorded by the provision of Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1.
Considering, however, the fact that during the reinvestigation of this case, it was disclosed that Antonio Lusin had introduced considerable
improvements in the premises and had invested his life savings therefor, and considering further that if Santolan were the one who
converted the area into a fishpond, as he intends to do, he would have incurred the same expenses as was incurred by Lusin in the premises
in question, it is the belief of this Office that justice would be fully served if Santolan be required to reimburse Lusin of the value of the
improvements now existing in the area as may be appraised by the Committee on Appraisal of the Bureau of Lands.
WHEREFORE, the above-noted foreshore lease (New) application and revocable permit (New) application of Antonio Lusin should remain,
as hereby it is, REJECTED; and Foreshore Lease Application No. V-65 of Julian Santolan given due course, PROVIDED, he reimburses Antonio
Lusin of the appraised value of the improvements now existing in the area within sixty (60) days after notification of said appraisal.
The Director of Lands is hereby directed to instruct the Committee on Appraisal concerned to make the necessary appraisal of the value of
the improvements now existing in the area in question within thirty (30) days from receipt of this order and to notify Julian Santolan of the
result of said appraisal.
In the event that Julian Santolan fails to reimburse Antonio Lusin of the appraisal value of the said improvements within the period specified
in this order, he shall lose his preferential rights over the area and Antonio Lusin will be allowed to file an appropriate public land
application therefor.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, December 14, 1954.
By Authority of the Secretary:
JAIME M. FERRER
Undersecretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources

ANNEX F
ORDER
On December 14, 1954, this Office issued an order in connection with the above-entitled case wherein the rejection of the foreshore lease
application and revocable permit (both new) of Antonio Lusin was upheld and Foreshore Lease Action No. V-62 of Julian Santolan given due
course provided he reimburses Antonio Lusin of the appraised value of the improvements now existing in the area within sixty (60) days
after notification of said appraisal.
From said order, both parties to this conflict filed separate motions seeking reconsideration of the same.
Santolan premised his motion on the theory that as fat as that po of the order which requires him to reimburse Lusin of the appraised value
of the improvements within sixty (60) days after notification of said appraisal is concerned, same is contrary to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 and of the New Civil Code.
Santolan argues that the best procedure that should have been followed in the disposition of this case was for the Government to forfeit all
the improvements introduced by Lusin in the area in question in its (Government's) favor and then let Santolan pay to the Government the
appraised value of said improvements within ten (10) years after notification of said appraisal. He further argues that the "law does not
authorize the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to dispose of the proceeds of the sale of the improvement to any person
whomsoever", and "certainly the Secretary does not claim the prerogative of disbursing government funds without authority of law."
In the first place, the order sought to be reconsidered does not contemplate any ale from which proceeds could be disposed of by the
Secretary "to any person whomsoever". In the second Place, in the issuance of the order sought to be reconsidered this Office has taken into
consideration the Provisions of Wealth Act No. 141 and those of the Civil Code cited by movant Santolan with in go me respect to the
forfeiture ' favor of the government of the improvements found in the areas covered by rejected applications. However, this Office is also
fully aware of that cardinal principle that 'no man shall enrich himself at the expense of another.
During the reinvestigation of this case by a representative of this Office, it was found that Lusin was the, actual occupant of the disputed area
since 1951. During his occupation, Lusin was introduced considerable improvements in the area, investing his life savings therein. At the
time of inspection, approximately two (2) hectares of the said area was a veritable and complete with dikes and water breakers, and the
remaining portion was surrounded with bamboo stakes. While this Office of Lusin's occupation as having effected by force, this Office also
believes that such force was employed by Lusin only to enforce what he believed was his right over the property in question. This being the
case, justice and equity demands that Lusin should be compensated of the improvements introduced by him in the area in question by
whomsoever shall enjoy the fruits of his (Lusin's) toil. Julian Santolan, being the person who shall benefit from said improvements, it is only
fair and just that he should reimburse Lusin of the value of said improvements, especially considering that the said area adjudicated to
Santolan is already a producing fishpond.
Antonio Lusin, on the other hand, contends that the order sought to be reconsidered is contrary to the facts of the case and to the law
applicable thereto.
Lusin assigns the following errors as having been allegedly committed by this Office:
(1) In holding that the possession of Lusin dated only as Of 195 1;
(2) In holding that the ion of Lusin was effected through force;
(3) In holding that Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 is applicable in the instant case;
(4) In not holding that the preferential rights of Julian Santolan, granting that he has any, has already prescribed; and
(5) In giving due course to the foreshore lease application of Santolan for the entire area in question.
With respect to the first two assignments of errors, a review of the records of this case shows that the findings of this Office are in
accordance with the facts of the case as deduced from the reinvestigation Of this conflict, and as supported by previous records of this case.
This Office, therefore, finds no sufficient ground to disturb its findings of facts.
Anent the next two assignments of errors, which are mere reiteration of movant's allegation in his previous memorandum, and which were
thoroughly passed upon by this Office, it is believed that discussing them further is no longer necessary since after another close
examination of the case, this Office finds its disposition in this particular respect well justified and in accordance with the law and
regulations applicable thereto.
Now coming to the last allegation, Lusin contends that the foreshore lease application of Julian Santolan, if given the course, should not cover
the entire area in question. Movant Lusin advances the theory that since the reason behind the law in granting preferential rights to reparian
owners is to compensate for whatever loss said riparian owner may suffer from the actions of the water, said riparian owner cannot stand to
lose more than what he owns, and therefore, since Santolan's property, which adjoins the area in question, is only two (2) hectares, Santolan
can never lose more than two hectares.
Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, the particular Point of law involved provides as follows:
32. Preference of Riparian Owner.— The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy lands, or lands covered with water
bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply for such lands, adjoining his property as
may not be needed for the public service, subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he applied
therefor within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his preferential right.
The above-quoted provision of the Lands Administrative Order does not impose any restriction or limitation with respect to the extent of the
area to which a riparian owner is preferred as long as said area is not needed for public service. The said order, being clear on this point, this
Office has no other alternative but to interpret said regulation in the meaning it clearly conveys.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the instant motion for reconsideration filed respectively by the conflicting parties
herein, should be, as hereby they are, denied.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 160453 November 12, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III, and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the current of the water- belongs to the owner of the
land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to the
State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person.
Antecedents
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7,
1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area
of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079
belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Parañaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned
road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan.1
On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latter’s
co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious,
public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years.2
The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that it needed the property for its flood control
program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the property was not
covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was an
orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion.3
Ruling of the RTC
On May 10, 2000,4 the RTC granted the application for land registration, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants, ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS, III and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., both Filipinos and of
legal age, as the TRUE and ABSOLUTE OWNERS of the land being applied for which is situated in the Barangay of San Dionisio, City of
Parañaque with an area of one thousand forty five (1045) square meters more or less and covered by Subdivision Plan Csd-00-000343,
being a portion of Lot 4998, Cad. 299, Case 4, Parañaque Cadastre, LRC Rec. No. and orders the registration of Lot 4998-B in their names with
the following technical description, to wit:
xxxx
Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory, let the corresponding Order for the Issuance of the Decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed.
Ruling of the CA
In its appeal, the Republic ascribed the following errors to the RTC,5 to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED IS AN ACCRETION TO THE ADJOINING
PROPERTY OWNED BY APPELLEES DESPITE THE ADMISSION OF APPELLEE ARCADIO C. SANTOS JR. THAT THE SAID PROPERTY WAS NOT
FORMED AS A RESULT OF THE GRADUAL FILLING UP OF SOIL THROUGH THE CURRENT OF THE RIVER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION DESPITE APPELLEE’S FAILURE TO FORMALLY
OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLEES HAD SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THEIR CONTINUOUS, OPEN, PUBLIC AND
ADVERSE OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.
On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.6
The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on October 20, 2003.7
Issues
Hence, this appeal, in which the Republic urges that:8
I
RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AN ACCRETION TO THEIR ADJOINING LAND THAT WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO
REGISTER IT UNDER ARTICLE 457 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS CONTRADICTED BY THEIR OWN EVIDENCE.
II
ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED WAS "PREVIOUSLY A PART OF THE PARAÑAQUE RIVER WHICH BECAME AN
ORCHARD AFTER IT DRIED UP," THE REGISTRATION OF SAID PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE ALTERNATIVELY
JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 461 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO FORMALLY OFFER
IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS FATAL TO THEIR
APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.
IV
THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE CONTINUOUSLY, OPENLY, PUBLICLY AND ADVERSELY OCCUPIED
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE.
To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was applicable herein; and whether or not respondents could claim the
property by virtue of acquisitive prescription pursuant to Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
I.
The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to respondents’ benefit
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the currents of the waters."
In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as follows:
On the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the Court finds that Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., are the
owners of the land subject of this application which was previously a part of the Parañaque River which became an orchard after it dried up
and further considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned by applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after it was obtained by him
through inheritance from his mother, Concepcion Cruz, now deceased. Conformably with Art. 457 of the New Civil Code, it is provided that:
"Article 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters."9
The CA upheld the RTC’s pronouncement, holding:
It could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from
the effects of the current of the waters" (Article 457 New Civil Code) as in this case, Arcadio Ivan Santos III and Arcadio Santos, Jr., are the
owners of the land which was previously part of the Parañaque River which became an orchard after it dried up and considering that Lot 4
which adjoins the same property is owned by the applicant which was obtained by the latter from his mother (Decision, p. 3; p. 38 Rollo). 10
The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil Code was erroneous in the face of the fact
that respondents’ evidence did not establish accretion, but instead the drying up of the Parañaque River.
The Republic’s submission is correct.
Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of proof to establish the merits of their application by a
preponderance of evidence, by which is meant such evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing than that offered in opposition to
it.11 They would be held entitled to claim the property as their own and apply for its registration under the Torrens system only if they
established that, indeed, the property was an accretion to their land.
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. 12 The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a)
gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of
rivers.13
Accordingly, respondents should establish the concurrence of the elements of accretion to warrant the grant of their application for land
registration.
However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show that the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil
through the effects of the current of the river had formed Lot 4998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was the dried-up
river bed of the Parañaque River, leading both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold that Lot 4998-B was "the land which was previously
part of the Parañaque River xxx (and) became an orchard after it dried up."
Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did not yet exist when the original title of Lot 4 was issued in their mother’s name
in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B came about only thereafter as the land formed between Lot 4 and the Parañaque River, the unavoidable
conclusion should then be that soil and sediments had meanwhile been deposited near Lot 4 by the current of the Parañaque River, resulting
in the formation of Lot 4998-B.
The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one, respondents thereby ignore that the effects of the current of the river are not the
only cause of the formation of land along a river bank. There are several other causes, including the drying up of the river bed. The drying up
of the river bed was, in fact, the uniform conclusion of both lower courts herein. In other words, respondents did not establish at all that the
increment of land had formed from the gradual and imperceptible deposit of soil by the effects of the current. Also, it seems to be highly
improbable that the large volume of soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with an area of 1,045 square meters had been deposited in a
gradual and imperceptible manner by the current of the river in the span of about 20 to 30 years – the span of time intervening between
1920, when Lot 4 was registered in the name of their deceased parent (at which time Lot 4998-B was not yet in existence) and the early
1950s (which respondents’ witness Rufino Allanigue alleged to be the time when he knew them to have occupied Lot 4988-B). The only
plausible explanation for the substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B was the dried-up bed of the Parañaque River. Confirming this
explanation was Arcadio, Jr.’s own testimony to the effect that the property was previously a part of the Parañaque River that had dried up
and become an orchard.
We observe in this connection that even Arcadio, Jr.’s own Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687 confirmed the uniform conclusion of the
RTC and the CA that Lot 4998-B had been formed by the drying up of the Parañaque River. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687 recited that
Lot 4 of the consolidated subdivision plan Pcs-13-002563, the lot therein described, was bounded "on the SW along line 5-1 by Dried River
Bed."14
That boundary line of "SW along line 5-1" corresponded with the location of Lot 4998-B, which was described as "bounded by Lot 4079 Cad.
299, (Lot 1, Psu-10676), in the name of respondent Arcadio Santos, Jr. (Now Lot 4, Psd-13-002563) in the Northeast."15
The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that became respondents’ property pursuant to Article
457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of
the water level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition
of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did not recede and was more or less maintained.
Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical
language of Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision only to accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and
categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language of the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for
interpretation; there is only room for application.16 The first and fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law.17
The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares
that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State. 18 It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to
belong to the
State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong to some
other person.19
II
Acquisitive prescription was
not applicable in favor of respondents
The RTC favored respondents’ application for land registration covering Lot 4998-B also because they had taken possession of the property
continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than 30 years based on their predecessor-in-interest being the adjoining owner of the
parcel of land along the river bank. It rendered the following ratiocination, viz: 20
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicants became the owners thereof, they took possession of the same property
continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years because their predecessors-in-interest are the adjoining owners
of the subject parcel of land along the river bank. Furthermore, the fact that applicants paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision
plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC–
Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not a portion of the Parañaque River and that
it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.
Finally, in the light of the evidence adduced by the applicants in this case and in view of the foregoing reports of the Department of Agrarian
Reforms, Land Registration Authority and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Court finds and so holds that the
applicants have satisfied all the requirements of law which are essential to a government grant and is, therefore, entitled to the issuance of a
certificate of title in their favor. So also, oppositor failed to prove that the applicants are not entitled thereto, not having presented any
witness.
In fine, the application is GRANTED.
As already mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC.
Both lower courts erred.
The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), which pertinently states:
Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper [Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxxx
Under Section 14(1), then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following, namely: (a) that the land forms part of the
disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.21
The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts that respondents "took possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly
and adversely for more than thirty (30) years."22
Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are accorded the highest degree of
respect, and generally will not be disturbed on appeal, with such findings being binding and conclusive on the Court, 23 the Court has
consistently recognized exceptions to this rule, including the following, to wit: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when in making its
findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g)
when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by
respondent; and (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.24
Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; and that the inference made by the RTC and
the CA was manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible. Hence, the Court should now review the findings.
In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open, public and adverse possession of the land for more than 30 years, the RTC
declared:
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicant became the owners thereof, they took possession of the same property
continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty years because their predecessor in interest are the adjoining owners of the
subject parcel of land along the river banks. Furthermore, the fact that the applicant paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision
plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC –
Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not a portion of the Parañaque River and that
it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.
The RTC apparently reckoned respondents’ period of supposed possession to be "more than thirty years" from the fact that "their
predecessors in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land." Yet, its decision nowhere indicated what acts respondents
had performed showing their possession of the property "continuously, openly, publicly and adversely" in that length of time. The decision
mentioned only that they had paid realty taxes and had caused the survey of the property to be made. That, to us, was not enough to justify
the foregoing findings, because, firstly, the payment of realty taxes did not conclusively prove the payor’s ownership of the land the taxes
were paid for,25 the tax declarations and payments being mere indicia of a claim of ownership; 26 and, secondly, the causing of surveys of the
property involved was not itself an of continuous, open, public and adverse possession.
The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil does not need to make an express act of possession,
and that no acts of possession are necessary in that instance because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong to the
riparian owner from the time that the deposit created by the current of the water becomes manifest 27 has no applicability herein. This is
simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to the river bank by respondents’
predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.
On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous, open, public and adverse possession of Lot 4998-B was not even validated or
preponderantly established. The admission of respondents themselves that they declared the property for taxation purposes only in 1997
and paid realty taxes only from 199928 signified that their alleged possession would at most be for only nine years as of the filing of their
application for land registration on March 7, 1997.
Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for more than thirty years in the character they
claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by prescription or by other means without any competent proof that the land was already
declared as alienable and disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration, the land still belonged to the State as part of its public
dominion.
Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of public dominion or of private ownership. Article 420 of the Civil Code
lists the properties considered as part of public dominion, namely: (a) those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; and (b) those which belong to the
State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. As earlier
mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil Code declares that rivers and their natural beds are of public dominion.
Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to acquisitive prescription or not was a question that the Court resolved in favor of the
State in Celestial v. Cachopero,29 a case involving the registration of land found to be part of a dried-up portion of the natural bed of a creek.
There the Court held:
As for petitioner’s claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of the Salunayan Creek, based on (1) her alleged long
term adverse possession and that of her predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966, when she purchased
the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of
the Civil Code, the same must fail.
Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription,
the adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or
disposable portions of the public domain. It is only after the Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural
land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. As such, under
Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not
susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. And, absent any declaration by the government, that a portion of the creek
has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.
xxxx
Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil Code took effect, the subject land would clearly not belong
to petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest since under the aforementioned provision of Article 461, "river beds which are abandoned
through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners of the land occupied by the new course," and the
owners of the adjoining lots have the right to acquire them only after paying their value.
And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil Code are applicable only when "river beds are abandoned through
the natural change in the course of the waters." It is uncontroverted, however, that, as found by both the Bureau of Lands and the DENR
Regional Executive Director, the subject land became dry as a result of the construction an irrigation canal by the National Irrigation
Administration. Thus, in Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:
The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370 applies only if there is a natural change in the course of
the waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or
artificial drainage systems. Considering our earlier finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the active
intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar and, hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto
supposedly as riparian owners.
The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the land of the public domain which cannot be subject
to acquisition by private ownership. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in the course of a river, not where the river simply dries
up. In the instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a situation, commentators are of the
opinion that the dry river bed remains property of public dominion. (Bold emphases supplied)
Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State.30 No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the Government. It is indispensable,
therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the State.31 Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.32
Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river beds that are abandoned through the natural change
in the course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land occupied by the new course, and which gives to the owners of
the adjoining lots the right to acquire only the abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land affected by the
natural change of course of the waters only after paying their value), all river beds remain property of public dominion and cannot be
acquired by acquisitive prescription unless previously declared by the Government to be alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot
4998-B was not shown to be already declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the
property through prescription.
Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already classified as alienable and disposable by the Government. They cite as proof of
the classification as alienable and disposable the following notation found on the survey plan, to wit: 33
NOTE
ALL CORNERS NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED ARE OLD BL CYL. CONC. MONS 15 X 60CM
All corners marked PS are cyl. conc. mons 15 x 60 cm
Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 007604-48 of the Regional Executive Director issued by the CENR-OFFICER dated Dec. 2,
1996.
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev’t. on Jan. 3, 1968.
Lot 4998-A = Lot 5883} Cad 299
Lot 4998-B = Lot 5884} Paranaque Cadastre.
Was the notation on the survey plan to the effect that Lot 4998-B was "inside" the map "classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of
Forest Development on 03 Jan. 1968" sufficient proof of the property’s nature as alienable and disposable public land?
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a
positive act of the Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation reports of the
Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the alienability and disposability of public land, we said in Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap34 that:
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable.There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of
an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed
for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court.
The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a
government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot
accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification
or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof." (Emphasis supplied)
In Menguito v. Republic,35 which we reiterated in Republic v. Sarmiento,36 we specifically resolved the issue of whether the notation on the
survey plan was sufficient evidence to establish the alienability and disposability of public land, to wit:
To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed
words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the
Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. x x x."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the
State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen
into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant.
Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable and
disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in question.
Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor’s assertion,
petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable. (Emphasis supplied)
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,37 we dealt with the sufficiency of the certification by the Provincial Environmental Officer (PENRO) or
Community Environmental Officer (CENRO) to the effect that a piece of public land was alienable and disposable in the following manner,
viz:
x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must
prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable,
and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by respondent.1âwphi1 The government officials who
issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the
contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in
evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.
xxxx
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and
disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated
therein. Such government certifications may fall under the class of documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule
132. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. (Emphasis supplied)
These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-000343 to the effect that the "survey is inside
a map classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev’t" did not prove that Lot 4998-B was already classified as alienable and
disposable. Accordingly, respondents could not validly assert acquisitive prescription of Lot 4988-B.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on May 27, 2003; DISMISSES the
application for registration of Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. and Arcadio Ivan S. Santos III respecting Lot 4998-B with a total area of 1,045 square
meters, more or less, situated in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, Metro Manila; and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively belonging
to the State for being part of the dried--up bed of the Parat1aque River.
Respondents shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182908 August 6, 2014

HEIRS OF FRANCISCO I. NARVASA, SR., and HEIRS OF PETRA IMBORNAL and PEDRO FERRER, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact,
MRS. REMEDIOS B. NARVASA-REGACHO, Petitioners,
vs.
EMILIANA, VICTORIANO, FELIPE, MA TEO, RAYMUNDO, MARIA, and EDUARDO, all surnamed IMBORNAL, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated November 28, 2006 and the Resolution3 dated May 7, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 57618 which reversed and set aside the Decision 4 dated August 20, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court
of Dagupan City, Branch 44 (RTC) in Civil Case No. D-6978, declared (a) the descendants of Ciriaco Abrio 5 as the exclusive owners of the
Motherland covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1462,6 (b) the descendants of respondent Victoriano Imbornal (respondent
Victoriano) as the exclusive owners of the first accretion (First Accretion) covered by OCT No. P-318,7 and (c) the descendants of Pablo
Imbornal (Pablo) as the exclusive owners of the second accretion (Second Accretion) covered by OCT No. 21481, 8 and dismissed the
complaint and counterclaim in all other respects for lack of merit.
The Facts
Basilia Imbornal+ (Basilia) had four (4) children, namely, Alejandra, Balbina, Catalina, and Pablo.Francisco I. Narvasa, Sr. 9 (Francisco) and
Pedro Ferrer (Pedro) were the children10 of Alejandra, while petitioner Petra Imbornal (Petra) was the daughter of Balbina. 11 Petitionersare
the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco, Pedro, and Petra (Francisco, et al.). On the other hand, respondentsEmiliana, Victoriano,
Felipe, Mateo, Raymundo, Maria, and Eduardo, all surnamed Imbornal, are the descendants of Pablo. 12
During her lifetime, Basilia owned a parcel of land situated at Sabangan, Barangay Nibaliw West, San Fabian, Pangasinan with an area of
4,144 square meters (sq. m.), more or less (Sabangan property), which she conveyed to her three (3) daughters Balbina, Alejandra, and
Catalina (Imbornal sisters) sometime in 1920.13
Meanwhile, Catalina’s husband, Ciriaco Abrio (Ciriaco), applied for and was granted a homestead patent over a 31,367-sq. m. riparian land
(Motherland) adjacent to the Cayanga River in San Fabian, Pangasinan. 14 He was eventually awarded Homestead Patent No.
2499115 therefor, and, on December 5, 1933, OCT No. 1462 was issued in his name. Later, or on May 10, 1973, OCT No. 1462 was cancelled,
and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 10149516 was issued in the name of Ciriaco’s heirs, namely: Margarita Mejia; Rodrigo Abrio,
marriedto Rosita Corpuz; Antonio Abrio, married to Crisenta Corpuz; Remedios Abrio, married to Leopoldo Corpuz; Pepito Abrio;
Dominador Abrio; Francisca Abrio; Violeta Abrio; and Perla Abrio (Heirs of Ciriaco).
Ciriaco and his heirs had since occupied the northern portionof the Motherland, while respondents occupied the southern portion.17
Sometime in 1949, the First Accretion, approximately 59,772 sq. m. in area, adjoined the southern portion of the Motherland. On August 15,
1952, OCT No. P-318 was issued in thename of respondent Victoriano, married to Esperanza Narvarte, covering the First
Accretion.18 Decades later, or in 1971, the Second Accretion, which had an area of 32,307 sq. m., more or less, abutted the First Accretion on
its southern portion.19 On November 10, 1978, OCT No. 21481 was issued in the names of all the respondents covering the Second Accretion.
Claiming rights over the entire Motherland, Francisco, et al., as the children of Alejandra and Balbina, filed on February 27,1984 an Amended
Complaint20 for reconveyance, partition,and/or damages against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. D-6978. They anchored their claim
on the allegation that Ciriaco, with the help of his wifeCatalina, urged Balbina and Alejandra to sell the Sabangan property, and that Ciriaco
used the proceeds therefrom to fund his then-pending homestead patent application over the Motherland. In return, Ciriaco agreed that once
his homestead patent is approved, he will be deemed to be holding the Motherland – which now included both accretions – in trust for the
Imbornal sisters.21
Likewise, Francisco, et al.alleged that through deceit, fraud, falsehood, and misrepresentation, respondent Victoriano, with respect to the
First Accretion, and the respondents collectively, with regard to the Second Accretion, had illegally registered the said accretions in their
names, notwithstanding the fact that they werenot the riparian owners (as they did not own the Motherland to which the accretions merely
formed adjacent to). In this relation, Francisco, et al. explained that they did not assert their inheritance claims over the Motherland and the
two (2) accretions because they respected respondents’ rights, until they discovered in 1983 that respondents have repudiated their
(Francisco, et al.’s) shares thereon.22 Thus, bewailing that respondents have refused them their rights not only with respect to the
Motherland, but also to the subsequent accretions, Francisco, et al. prayed for the reconveyance ofsaid properties, or, in the alternative, the
payment of their value, as well as the award of moral damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00, actual damages in the amount of ₱150,000.00,
including attorney’s fees and other costs.23
In their Amended Answer dated March 5, 1984,24 respondents contended that: (a) the Amended Complaint statedno cause of action against
them, having failed to clearly and precisely describe the disputed properties and specify the transgressions they have allegedly committed;
(b) the action was barred by prescription; and (c) that the properties sought to be reconveyed and partitioned are not the properties of their
predecessors-ininterest but, instead, are covered by Torrens certificates of titles, free from any encumbrance, and declared for taxation
purposes in their names. In this regard, respondents prayed that the Amended Complaint be dismissed and that Francisco, et al.be held liable
for the payment of moral damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit in their favor.
During trial, it was established from the testimonies of the parties that the Motherland was eventually sold bythe Heirs of Ciriaco to a certain
Gregorio de Vera (de Vera), and thatsaid heirs and deVera were not impleaded as parties in this case. 25
The RTC Ruling
On August 20, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision 26 in favor of Francisco, et al. and thereby directed respondents to: (a) reconvey to
Francisco, et al. their respective portions in the Motherland and in the accretions thereon, or their pecuniary equivalent; and (b) pay actual
damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00, moral damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00, and attorney’s fees in the sum of ₱10,000.00, as well
as costs of suit.
The RTC found that the factual circumstances surrounding the present case showed that an implied trust existed between Ciriaco and the
Imbornal sisters with respect to the Motherland.27 It gave probative weight to Francisco, et al.’s allegation that the Sabangan property,
inherited by the Imbornal sisters from their mother, Basilia, was sold in order to help Ciriaco raise funds for his then-pending
homesteadpatent application. In exchange therefor, Ciriaco agreed that he shall hold the Motherland in trust for them once his homestead
patent application had been approved. As Ciriaco was only able to acquire the Motherland subject of the homestead patent through the
proceeds realized from the sale of the Sabangan property, the Imbornal sisters and, consequently, Francisco, et al. (as the children of
Alejandra and Balbina) are entitled to their proportionate shares over the Motherland, notwithstanding the undisputed possession of
respondents over its southern portion since 1926.28
With respect to the accretions thatformed adjacent to the Motherland, the RTC ruled that the owner of the Motherland is likewise the owner
of the said accretions. Considering that the Imbornal sisters have become proportionate owners of the Motherland by virtue of the implied
trust created between them and Ciriaco, they (Imbornal sisters) and their heirs are also entitled to the ownership of said accretions despite
the fact that respondents were able to register them in their names.
Dissatisfied with the RTC’s ruling, respondents elevated the matter on appeal to the CA.
The CA Ruling
On November 28, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision29 reversing and setting aside the RTC Decision and entering a new one declaring: (a) the
descendants of Ciriaco as the exclusive owners of the Motherland; (b) the descendants of respondent Victoriano asthe exclusive owners of
the First Accretion; and (c) the descendants of Pablo (i.e., respondents collectively) as the exclusive owners of the Second Accretion.
With respect to the Motherland, the CA found that Ciriaco alone was awarded a homestead patent, which later became the basis for the
issuance of a Torrens certificate of title in his name; as such, saidcertificate of title cannot be attacked collaterally through an action for
reconveyance filed by his wife’s (Catalina’s) relatives (i.e., Francisco, et al.being the children of Alejandra and Balbina, who, in turn, are the
sisters of Catalina). The CA further observed that the homestead patent was not aninheritance of Catalina; instead, it was awarded by the
government to Ciriaco after having fully satisfied the stringent requirements set forth under Commonwealth Act No. 141, 30 as
amended,31 and his title thereto had already become indefeasible.32 Consequently, since the entire Motherland was titled in Ciriaco’s name,
his descendants should be regarded as the absolute owners thereof.
On the other hand, with regard to the disputed accretions, the CA ruled that respondents – i.e., respondent Victoriano with respect to the
First Accretion, and all the respondents withrespect to the Second Accretion – need not be the owners of the Motherland in order to acquire
them by acquisitive prescription. Considering that accretions are not automatically registered in the name of the riparianowner and are,
therefore, subject to acquisitive prescription by third persons, any occupant may apply for their registration. In this case, the CA found that
respondents have acquired title to the subject accretions by prescription,33 considering that they have been in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the First Accretion in the concept of an owner since 1949 (when the First Accretion was formed), which resulted in the
issuance of a certificate of title in the name of respondent Victoriano covering the same. Accordingly, they have also become the riparian
owners of the Second Accretion, and given thatthey have caused the issuance of OCT No. 21481 in their names over the said Accretion, they
have also become the absolute ownersthereof. Since Francisco, et al. took no action to protect their purported interests over the disputed
accretions, the respondents’ titles over the same had already become indefeasible, to the exclusion of Francisco, et al. 34
At odds with the CA’s disposition, Francisco et al. filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however,denied by the CA in a
Resolution35 dated May 7, 2008, hence, this petition taken by the latter’s heirs as their successors-in-interest.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the CA erred in declaring that: (a) the descendants of Ciriaco are the exclusive
owners of the Motherland; (b) the descendants of respondent Victoriano are the exclusive owners of the First Accretion; and (c) the
descendants of Pablo (respondents collectively) are the exclusive owners of the Second Accretion on the basis of the following grounds: (a)
prescription of the reconveyance action, which was duly raised as anaffirmative defense in the Amended Answer, and (b) the existence of an
implied trust between the Imbornal sisters and Ciriaco.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
A. Procedural Matter: Issue of Prescription.
At the outset, the Court finds that the causes of action pertaining to the Motherland and the First Accretion are barred by prescription.
An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner.36 Thus,
reconveyance is a remedy granted only tothe owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled in another’s name. 37
As the records would show, the Amended Complaint filed by petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest, Francisco, et al. is for the reconveyance of
their purported shares or portions in the following properties: (a) the Motherland, originally covered by OCT No. 1462 in the name of
Ciriaco; (b) the First Accretion, originally covered by OCT No. P-318 in the name of respondent Victoriano; and (c) the Second Accretion,
covered by OCT No. 21481 in the name of all respondents. To recount, Francisco, et al. asserted co-ownership over the Motherland, alleging
that Ciriaco agreed to hold the same in trustfor their predecessors-in-interest Alejandra and Balbina upon issuance of the title in his name.
Likewise, they alleged that respondents acquired the First and Second Accretions by means of fraudand deceit.
When property is registered in another’s name, an implied or constructive trust is created by law in favor of the true owner. 38 Article 1456 of
the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee ofan implied trust for the
benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years, reckoned from
the date of registration of the deed or the date ofissuance of the certificate of title over the property, 39 if the plaintiff is not in possession.
However, if the plaintiff is in possession of the property, the action is imprescriptible. As held in the case of Lasquite v. Victory Hills, Inc.:40
An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10 years. The reference point of the 10-yearprescriptive period is the
date of registration of the deed or the issuance of the title. The prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the
property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the realowner of the property also remains in
possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not run against him. In such a case,
an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is
imprescriptible.41 (Emphases supplied)
Based on the foregoing, Francisco, et al. had then a period of ten (10) years from the registration of the respective titles covering the
disputed properties within which to file their action for reconveyance, taking into account the fact that they were never in possessionof the
said properties. Hence, with respect tothe Motherland covered by OCT No. 1462 issued on December 5, 1933 in the name of Ciriaco, an
action for reconveyance therefor should have been filed until December 5, 1943; with respect to the First Accretion covered by OCT No. P-
318 issued on August 15, 1952in the name of respondent Victoriano, an action of the same nature should have been filed untilAugust 15,
1962; and, finally, with respect to the Second Accretion covered by OCT No. 21481 issued on November 10, 1978in the name of the
respondents, a suit for reconveyance therefor should have been filed until November 10, 1988.
A judicious perusal of the records, however, will show that the Amended Complaint 42 covering all three (3) disputed properties was filed
only on February 27, 1984. As such, it was filed way beyond the 10-year reglementary period within which to seek the reconveyance of two
(2) of these properties, namely, the Motherland and the First Accretion, with only the reconveyance action with respect to the Second
Accretion having been seasonably filed. Thus, considering thatrespondents raised prescription as a defense in their Amended Answer,43 the
Amended Complaint with respect to the Motherland and the First Accretion ought to have beendismissed based on the said ground, with
only the cause of action pertaining to the Second Accretion surviving. As will be, however, discussed below, the entirety of the Amended
Complaint, including the aforesaid surviving cause of action, would falter on its substantive merits since the existence of the implied trust
asserted in this case had not been established. In effect, the said complaint is completely dismissible.
B. Substantive Matter: Existence of an Implied Trust.
The main thrust of Francisco, et al.’s Amended Complaint is that an implied trust had arisen between the Imbornal sisters, on the one hand,
and Ciriaco, on the other, with respect to the Motherland. This implied trust is anchored on their allegation that the proceeds from the sale of
the Sabangan property – an inheritance of their predecessors, the Imbornal sisters – were used for the then-pending homestead application
filed by Ciriaco over the Motherland. As such, Francisco, et al. claim that they are, effectively, coowners of the Motherland together with
Ciriaco’s heirs.
An implied trust arises, not from any presumed intention of the parties, but by operation of law in order to satisfy the demands of justice and
equity and to protect against unfair dealing or downright fraud.44 To reiterate, Article 1456 of the Civil Code states that "[i]f property is
acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the
person from whom the property comes."
The burden of proving the existence ofa trust is on the party asserting its existence, and such proof must be clear and satisfactorily show the
existence of the trust and its elements.45 While implied trusts may be proven by oral evidence, the evidence must be trustworthy and
received by the courts with extreme caution, and should not be made to rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations. Trustworthy
evidence is required because oral evidence can easily be fabricated.46
In this case, it cannot be said, merely on the basis of the oral evidence offered by Francisco, et al., that the Motherland had been either
mistakenly or fraudulently registered in favor of Ciriaco. Accordingly, it cannot be said either that he was merely a trustee of an implied trust
holding the Motherland for the benefit of the Imbornal sisters or their heirs.
As the CA had aptly pointed out,47 a homestead patent award requires proof that the applicant meets the stringent conditions 48 set forth
under Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, which includes actual possession, cultivation, and improvement of the homestead. It must
be presumed, therefore, that Ciriaco underwent the rigid process and duly satisfied the strict conditions necessary for the grant of his
homestead patent application. As such, it is highly implausible thatthe Motherland had been acquired and registered by mistake or through
fraudas would create an implied trust between the Imbornal sisters and Ciriaco, especially considering the dearth of evidence showing that
the Imbornal sisters entered into the possession of the Motherland, or a portion thereof, orasserted any right over the same at any point
during their lifetime. Hence, when OCT No. 1462 covering the Motherland was issued in his name pursuant to Homestead Patent No. 24991
on December 15, 1933, Ciriaco’s titleto the Motherland had become indefeasible. It bears to stress that the proceedings for land registration
that led to the issuance of Homestead Patent No. 24991 and eventually, OCT No. 1462 in Ciriaco’s name are presumptively regular and
proper,49 which presumption has not been overcome by the evidence presented by Francisco, et al.
In this light, the Court cannot fully accept and accord evidentiary value to the oral testimony offered by Francisco, et al. on the alleged verbal
agreement between their predecessors, the Imbornal sisters, and Ciriaco with respect to the Motherland. Weighed against the presumed
regularity of the award of the homestead patent to Ciriaco and the lack of evidence showing that the same was acquired and registered by
mistake or through fraud, the oral evidence of Francisco, et al.would not effectively establish their claims of ownership. It has been held that
oral testimony as to a certain fact, depending as it does exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary
evidence,50 especially since the purported agreement transpired decades ago, or in the 1920s. Hence, with respect to the Motherland, the CA
did not err in holding that Ciriaco and his heirs are the owners thereof, without prejudice to the rights of any subsequent purchasers for
value of the said property.
Consequently, as Francisco, et al.failed to prove their ownership rights over the Motherland, their cause of action with respect to the First
Accretion and, necessarily, the Second Accretion, must likewise fail. A further exposition is apropos.
Article 457 of the Civil Code states the rule on accretion as follows: "[t]o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." Relative thereto, in Cantoja v. Lim, 51 the Court, citing
paragraph 32 of the Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 dated April 30, 1936, in relation to Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866,
as well as related jurisprudence on the matter, elucidated on the preferential right of the riparian owner over the land formed by accretions,
viz.:
Being the owner of the land adjoining the foreshore area, respondent is the riparian or littoralowner who has preferential right to lease the
foreshore area as provided under paragraph 32 of the Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, dated 30 April 1936, which reads:
32. Preference of Riparian Owner. – The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshylands or lands covered with water
bordering upon shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply for such lands adjoining his property as may
not be needed for the public service, subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies therefor
within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his preferential right.
The Court explained in Santulan v. The Executive Secretary[170 Phil. 567; 80 SCRA 548 (1977)] the reason for such grant of preferential
right to the riparian or littoral owner, thus:
Now, then, is there any justification for giving to the littoral owner the preferential right to lease the foreshore land abutting on his land?
That rule in paragraph 32 is in consonance with Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 which provides that, while lands added to the
shore by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea form part of the public domain, such lands, "when they are no longer
washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the established [sic] of special industries, or for
the coast guard service, "shall be declared by the Government "to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as
increment thereof."
In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral owner (riparian according to paragraph 32) to the foreshore land
formed by accretionsor alluvial deposits due to the action of the sea.1âwphi1
The reason for that preferential right is the same as the justification for giving accretions to the riparianowner, which is that accretion
compensates the riparian owner for the diminutions which his land suffers by reason of the destructive force of the waters. So, in the case of
littoral lands, he who loses by the encroachments of the sea should gain by its recession.52
Accordingly, therefore, alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek or a river do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property
automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner
of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition
through prescription by third persons.53
In this case, Francisco, et al. and, now, their heirs, i.e., herein petitioners,. are not the riparian owners of the Motherland to which the First
Accretion had .attached, hence, they cannot assert ownership over the First Accretion. Consequently, as the Second Accretion had merely
attached to the First Accretion, they also have no right over the Second Accretion. Neither were they able to show that they acquired these
properties through prescription as it was ·not established that they were in possession of any of them. Therefore, whether through accretion
or, independently, through prescription, the discernible conclusion is that Francisco et al. and/or petitioners' claim of title over the First and
Second Accretions had not been substantiated, and, as a result, said properties cannot be reconveyed in their favor. This is especially so since
on the other end of the fray lie respondents armed with a certificate of title in their names covering the First and Second Accretions coupled
with their possession thereof, both of which give rise to the superior credibility of their own claim. Hence, petitioners' action for
reconveyan.ce with respect to both accretions must altogether fail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 28, 2006 and the Resolution dated May 7, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 57618 are hereby AFFIRMED, and a new judgment is entered DISMISSING the Amended Complaint dated February 27,
1984 filed in said case.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-31673 June 30, 1971

QUIRINO FERNANDEZ, VICTORIO FABRICA, ILUMINADO FABRICA, ARSENIO LABRICA, MARCELINO ABELLA, RODULFO SY and
RUFINO CAUMERAN, petitioners,
vs.
SANTIAGO O. TAÑADA as presiding Judge of Branch V, Court of First Instance of Cebu, and JUAN BORROMEO, respondents.
Melquiades S. Caumeran for petitioners.
Filiberto Leonardo for private respondent.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This is special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction.
The antecedent facts follow:
In an application for registration dated 21 December 1967 filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch V (L. R. C. No. N 767, L.R.C.
Rec. No. 34192), respondent Juan Borromeo prayed that he be declared as the real and absolute owner of the parcel of land situated in
Barrio Pook, Talisay, Cebu, consisting of 5,897 square meters more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land (described in Original Plan Psu-234595) situated in Barrio Pook, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines,
having an area of 5,897 square meters, more or less, assessed at P70.00 as per Tax Declaration No. 026448 and bounded as follows:
N — Lot No. 191 owned by Juan Borromeo (applicant);
E — by a lot belonging to Claudio Baller;
S — Bohol Strait or Seashore; and
W — lot No. 2586 owned by Juan Borromeo (applicant).
Respondent bases his claim of ownership on Article 457 of the New Civil Code, 1 alleging that the land sought to be registered was formed by
accretion having been deposited therein gradually by currents of a Register bordering lot Nos. 7191 and 2586 owned by him. Respondent
further prayed that the Register of Deeds be ordered to issue an original certificate of title in his name.
On 8 March 1968, petitioners herein opposed the abovesaid application on the grounds, among others, that (a) Article 457 of the New Civil
Code could not be invoked, the disputed area having been fanned by action of the sea and not by river currents, there being no river in the
vicinity; (b) that it was the oppositors who occupied the said land openly and public and not respondent; and (c) respondent Juan Borromeo
is an alien, not qualified to own real properties in the Philippines.
In an order dated 28 July 1969, the Land Registration Court (LRC for short) ruled that the petitioners-oppositors have no interest over the
subject land, thereby dismissing the opposition filed by them for lack of legal basis. However, the said order was set aside after a Motion for
Reconsideration was filed by said petitioners-oppositors.2 In an order dated3 December 1969, the aforesaid order of 28 July 1969 was
revived, directing further there the demolition of the 11 huts in the premises built by the herein petitioners-oppositors.
Petitioners-oppositors tried to appeal the aforesaid order of 3 December 1969 but the LRC denied the appeal bond and record on appeal in
its order of 14 January 1970, on the ground that the order was merely interlocutory and, therefore, unappealable. Petitioners moved to
reconsider the order of 14 January 1970 but the motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
The jurisdictional issue raised by applicants herein is without merit. If it be true that the lot sought to be registered.
was formed by accretion which it gradually received from the effects of the current of the waters flowing on the river bordering the said Lots
No. 7191 and 2586 of the herein applicant (now private respondent Juan Borromeo) (Application, Annex "A" of Petition, paragraph 3)
then title to the lot vested in said applicant under Article 457 of the Civil Code of the Philippine from the time the alluvial deposit was
formed. Borromeo's petition to the Registration Court "to declare him the owner" of the lot is in effect a request for confirmation of the title
already vested in him by the law, and the court plainly had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the application.
It is true that the oppositors averred below that the deposit was not aluvial but a result of the action of the sea. This issue, however, is
dependent on the result of the evidence to be produced at the trial on the merits that was still to be held. The same thing can be said of the
allegation that the applicant for registration was disqualified to acquire agricultural land. Neither of these claim can now be inquired into at
this stage of the proceedings.
The respondent court ordered the option of herein petitioners to be dismissed as improper, for lack of personality to oppose the registration
independently of that of the national government, after receiving evidence that oppositors were mere sales applicants to the Bureau of Land
and that they had been warned that they should not enter nor improve the land object of their sales applications, prior to the approval
thereof by the land authorities; and in fact paragraph 6 of their sales applications explicitly provided that the same conveyed no right to
occupy the land prior to approval (Order of 3 December 1969, Annex "E", of Petition). Under the circumstances, We can not say that the
action of the court below was in abuse of discretion, considering the rule in Leyva vs. Jandoc,4 where this Court fully agreed with the Court of
Appeals' ruling that:
Although the provisions of law just cited apparently authorizes any person claiming any kind of interest to file an opposition to an
application for registration, it is our view nevertheless that the opposition must be based on a right of dominion or some other real right
independent of and not at all subordinate to, the rights of the Government. We have examined Soriano vs. Cortes, 8 Phil. 459; Roxas vs. Cuevas, 8
Phil. 469; and Archbishop of Manila vs. Barrio of Santo Cristo, et al., 39 Phil. 1, all of which cases are discussed in the petition and answer, and
we find that in all these cases the interest of the oppositors were each private in nature; otherwise stated, their interests were not in any
manner subordinate to those of the Government. While the right claimed by the petitioners herein seemed at first blush to be directly
opposed to the adjudication of ownership to the applicant, it developed in the proceedings that their right, that of being foreshore lessees of
public land, is completely subordinate to the interests of the Government, and must necessarily be predicated upon the property in question
being part of the public domain. In such case, it is incumbent upon the duly authorized representatives of the Government to represent its
interests as well as private claim intrinsically dependent upon it. It is well-settled that the interest of the government cannot be represented
by private persons. (Emphasis supplied)
In the recent case of Mindanao vs. Director of Lands,5 it was declared by this Court that "persons who claim to be in possession of a tract of
public land and have applied with the Bureau of Lands for its purchase have the necessary personality to oppose registration". An
examination of the facts of the said case, however, not only reveals that the subject land was already determined to be public, but that the
application was opposed by the Directors of Lands and of Forestry as well as by the Private Oppositor, who likewise alleged session that "is
open, continuous, notorious and under the claim of owner for at least 60 years. Moreover, it was not shown that the sale application of
private oppositor therein was subject to the restrictions on entry and improvement found in the sales applications of the petitioners in the
case at bar. Manifestly, the proper step for petitioners herein would have been to urge the Director of Lands to oppose the application for
registration of the applicant Juan Borromeo.
But the dismissal of the oppositions to the registration application did not warrant the respondent court's order to demolish the houses and
improvements of herein petitioners in the controversed land. The reason is obvious: there is as yet no decision, much less a decree of
registration, in favor of applicant Borromeo; neither is there any showing that the land authorities had complained of petitioners' occupancy.
Even if their land sales applications forbade entry before approval, the Director of Lands could waive that condition. Only after the land is
duly registered, and a writ of possession issued after due hearing (or alternatively, a final court order of ejectment) can oppositors below,
now petitioners in this court, be dispossessed. In ordering the demolition of petitioners' houses at this stage of the proceedings, the
respondent court acted in grave abuse of discretion, equivalent to excess of jurisdiction, and certiorari lies to correct it.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the order of 3 December 1969 is declared null and void in so far as it directed the demolition of the 11 huts
of petition oppositors on the disputed premises; and the preliminary writ of injunction heretofore issued is made permanent. Let the records
be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. Costs against private respondent Juan Borromeo.

G.R. No. L-12958 May 30, 1960

FAUSTINO IGNACIO, applicant-appellant,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and LAUREANO VALERIANO, oppositors-appellees.
Acting Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Crispin V. Bautista for appellee Director of Lands.
Benjamin H. Aquino for appellee Laureano Veleriano.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Faustino Ignacio is appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, dismissing his application for the registration of a parcel of
land.
On January 25, 1950, Ignacio filed an application for the registration of a parcel of land (mangrove), situated in barrio Gasac, Navotas, Rizal,
with an area of 37,877 square meters. Later, he amended his application by alleging among others that he owned the parcel applied for by
right of accretion. To the application, the Director of Lands, Laureano Valeriano and Domingo Gutierrez filed oppositions. Gutierrez later
withdrew his opposition. The Director of Lands claimed the parcel applied for as a portion of the public domain, for the reason that neither
the applicant nor his predecessor-in-interest possessed sufficient title thereto, not having acquired it either by composition title from the
Spanish government or by possessory information title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and that he had not possessed the
same openly, continuously and adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894. In his turn, Valeriano alleged he was
holding the land by virtue of a permit granted him by the Bureau of Fisheries, issued on January 13, 1947, and approved by the President.
It is not disputed that the land applied for adjoins a parcel owned by the applicant which he had acquired from the Government by virtue of a
free patent title in 1936. It has also been established that the parcel in question was formed by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the
action of the Manila Bay which boarders it on the southwest. Applicant Ignacio claims that he had occupied the land since 1935, planting it
with api-api trees, and that his possession thereof had been continuous, adverse and public for a period of twenty years until said possession
was distributed by oppositor Valeriano.
On the other hand, the Director of Lands sought to prove that the parcel is foreshore land, covered by the ebb and flow of the tide and,
therefore, formed part of the public domain.
After hearing, the trial court dismissed the application, holding that the parcel formed part of the public domain. In his appeal, Ignacio
assigns the following errors:
I. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question, altho an accretion to the land of the applicant-appellant, does not belong to him
but forms part of the public domain.
II. Granting that the land in question forms part of the public domain, the lower court nevertheless erred in not declaring the same to be the
necessary for any public use or purpose and in not ordering in the present registration proceedings.
III. The lower court erred in not holding that the land in question now belongs to the applicant-appellant by virtue of acquisitive
prescription, the said land having ceased to be of the public domain and became the private or patrimonial property of the State.
IV. The lower court erred in not holding that the oppositor Director of Lands is now in estoppel from claiming the land in question as a land
of the public domain.
Appellant contends that the parcel belongs to him by the law of accretion, having been formed by gradual deposit by action of the Manila
Bay, and he cites Article 457 of the New Civil Code (Article 366, Old Civil Code), which provides that:
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters.
The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it refers to accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers, while the accretion in the present
case was caused by action of the Manila Bay.
Appellant next contends that Articles 1, 4 and 5 of the Law of Waters are not applicable because they refer to accretions formed by the sea,
and that Manila Bay cannot be considered as a sea. We find said contention untenable. A bay is a part of the sea, being a mere indentation of
the same:
Bay. — An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all sides except at the entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct
from a river, a bending or curbing of the shore of the sea or of a lake. 7 C.J. 1013-1014 (Cited in Francisco, Philippine Law of Waters and
Water Rights p. 6)
Moreover, this Tribunal has some cases applied the Law of Waters on Lands bordering Manila Bay. (See the cases of Ker & Co. vs. Cauden, 6
Phil., 732, involving a parcel of land bounded on the sides by Manila Bay, where it was held that such land formed by the action of the sea is
property of the State; Francisco vs. Government of the P.I., 28 Phil., 505, involving a land claimed by a private person and subject to the ebb
and flow of the tides of the Manila Bay).
Then the applicant argues that granting that the land in question formed part of the public domain, having been gained from the sea, the trial
court should have declared the same no longer necessary for any public use or purpose, and therefore, became disposable and available for
private ownership. Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 reads thus:
ART. 4. Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When
they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special
industries, or for the coastguard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto
and as increment thereof.
Interpreting Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866, in the case of Natividad vs. Director of Lands, (CA) 37 Off. Gaz., 2905, it was there held
that:
Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that when a portion of the shore is no longer washed by the waters of the sea and is not
necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for coastguard service, the government shall declare
it to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof. We believe that only the executive and
possibly the legislative departments have the authority and the power to make the declaration that any land so gained by the sea, is not
necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, on for coast-guard service. If no such declaration has
been made by said departments, the lot in question forms part of the public domain. (Natividad vs. Director of Lands, supra.)
The reason for this pronouncement, according to this Tribunal in the case of Vicente Joven y Monteverde vs. Director of Lands, 93 Phil., 134,
(cited in Velayo's Digest, VI. I, p. 52).
. . . is undoubtedly that the courts are neither primarily called upon, nor indeed in a position to determine whether any public land are to be
used for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters.
Consequently, until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the executive department or the Legislature, to the effect
that the land in question is no longer needed for coast guard service, for public use or for special industries, they continue to be part of the
public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership.
Appellant next contends that he had acquired the parcel in question through acquisitive prescription, having possessed the same for over ten
years. In answer, suffice it to say that land of the public domain is not subject to ordinary prescription. In the case of Insular Government vs.
Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil., 505 this Court said:
The occupation or material possession of any land formed upon the shore by accretion, without previous permission from the proper
authorities, although the occupant may have held the same as owner for seventeen years and constructed a wharf on the land, is illegal and is
a mere detainer, inasmuch as such land is outside of the sphere of commerce; it pertains to the national domain; it is intended for public uses
and for the benefit of those who live nearby.
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised in the appeal.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with costs.

G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and
COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN
DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-
CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW
TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY
MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI
NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW
ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA
GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE
CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN,
VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE
H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN,
RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY,
ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY
UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO
DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY
SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING
MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID,
represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN
MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD
M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and
GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. 1 In compliance, respondents Chairperson and
Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its
provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the
petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the
view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays
that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a
member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed
their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the
petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The
CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee
the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural
Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et
al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they
reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to
an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in
violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral
and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of
minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with
nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for
not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and
portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest
cover or reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even
include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law
applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due
process clause of the Constitution.4
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the
sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to
the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary
of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to
property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the
interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that
"the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for
purposes of policy and program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over executive
departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and
invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing
the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and
desist from implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds
for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of
carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of
Philippine natural resources."7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and
Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all
challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale
exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand,
Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have
standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that
Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of
Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated
by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional.
Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after
redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is
DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.