Modern American PDF

The Dictionary of
Modern American
Philosophers,
Volumes 1, 2, 3 and 4
John R. Shook,
Editor
Thoemmes
The Dictionary
of Modern American Philosophers
THOEMMES
SUPERVISING EDITORS
Aesthetics Pragmatism
Jo Ellen Jacobs John R. Shook
Analytic Philosophy Psychology

Ernie Lepore Robert H. Wozniak
Ethical Theory and Applied Ethics Realism/Naturalism/Phenomenology

Guy W. Stroh Cornelis de Waal
Idealism Social, Political and Legal

James A. Good Philosophy
Jean Van Delinder
Philosophy of Religion
William D. Dean Women and Minorities
Stuart Rosenbaum Dorothy Rogers
Robert Wilson-Black
Philosophy of Science and Logic

Nathan Houser
THE DICTIONARY
OF MODERN AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHERS
Volume 1
A–C
GENERAL EDITOR
John R. Shook
CONSULTING EDITORS
Richard T. Hull
Bruce Kuklick
Murray G. Murphey
John G. Slater
First published in 2005 by
Thoemmes Continuum
11 Great George Street
Bristol BS1 5RR, England
http://www.thoemmes.com
The Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers

4 Volumes : ISBN 1 84371 037 4
© Thoemmes Continuum, 2005
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A CIP record of this title is available from the British Library
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by
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This book is printed on acid-free paper, sewn, and
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CONTENTS
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
How to use the Dictionary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xiii
General bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
List of contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii
Abbreviations for academic degrees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xlv
Abbreviations for biographical reference works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xlvii
Biographical entries A–Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Name Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2681
v
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INTRODUCTION
The Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers, which contains 1082 entries by over 500
authors, provides an account of philosophical thought in the United States and Canada between
1860 and the present. A dictionary for early American philosophers from the colonial period to
the Civil War is in preparation. An envisioned dictionary for Latin America will encompass
Mexico to complete the coverage of North America. Even after these dictionaries are all pub-
lished, scholarship advancement, new information, and error detection will demand updating and
enlargement in electronic format. Suggestions for additions, improvements, and corrections are
welcome and may be communicated to the general editor.
The chronological boundaries of the Dictionary are set by including figures who produced sig-
nificant philosophical thought in the US or Canada between 1860 and the early 1960s. The birth
dates of the Dictionary’s thinkers range from 1797 to 1942. The earliest works mentioned in
some entries date from around 1820, and the latest are from 2005, so nearly 200 years of philoso-
phy are covered by the Dictionary. Figures who died soon after the Civil War, such as some
elderly Transcendentalists, are included even though most of their publications appeared in the
1840s or 1850s. The Dictionary includes foreign-born philosophers who spent as little as a decade
in the US or Canada, provided that they made contributions to philosophy while here, such as the
Europeans who fled Nazi persecution and World War II. To select those who were active by the
early 1960s, the Dictionary editors considered those born by 1935 and who earned their terminal
degree by 1962, although a few figures born between 1935 and 1942 who made the greatest
impact on late twentieth-century philosophy are also included. The distribution of birth years of
figures in the Dictionary is as follows: 209 were born between 1797 and 1860, 170 were born
between 1861 and 1880, 177 were born between 1881 and 1900, 263 were born between 1901
and 1920, and 263 were born between 1921 and 1942. The philosophers of the generation born
after World War II, while not lacking in impact, have not yet concluded their work and some his-
torical distance is still required for proper judgment.
The label of “philosopher” has been broadly applied in this Dictionary to intellectuals who
have made philosophical contributions regardless of academic career or professional title. The
wide scope of philosophical activity across the time-span of this Dictionary would now be classed
among the various humanities and social sciences which gradually separated from philosophy
over the last 150 years. Many figures included were not academic philosophers but did work at
the philosophical foundations of such fields as pedagogy, rhetoric, the arts, history, politics, eco-
nomics, sociology, psychology, linguistics, anthropology, religion, and theology. Philosophy
proper is heavily represented, of course, encompassing the traditional areas of metaphysics, ontol-
ogy, epistemology, logic, ethics, social/political theory, and aesthetics, along with the narrower
fields of philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophy of law,
applied ethics, philosophy of religion, and so forth.
vii
Introduction
It should be remembered, however, that professional philosophers have had no monopoly on

these philosophical fields, especially before World War I. There is a large number of entries, for
example, about important theologians who made contributions to philosophy of religion and
philosophical theology. In nineteenth-century terms, the Dictionary includes theologians who
practiced “systematic” or “speculative” theology (rather than those who practiced only dogmatic
or apologetic theology). Likewise, the Dictionary contains major physicists, biologists, anthropol-
ogists, linguists, psychologists, cognitive scientists, sociologists, economists, political theorists, cul-
tural critics, literary critics, composers, artists, and architects who philosophized about their field
and influenced other philosophers. Social reformers whose writings manifest philosophical con-
cerns in a sophisticated way, such as deliberations on gender or racial equality, social justice, polit-
ical liberty, and so on, are another significant category of thinkers in this Dictionary.
The Dictionary entries vary in size from a minimum of around 500 words to a maximum of
4000 words. Entry size should not be construed as resulting from an editorial attempt to measure
some intrinsic philosophical value of the figures. The editors planned for roughly one-third of the
entries to be more than 1600 words, and those thinkers may indeed be judged among the more
significant of their contemporaries. However, many variables, including availability of informa-
tion, author enthusiasm, attempts to give extra space to figures ignored by other reference works,
and many more factors, together yield a great deal of variation. Since the primary purpose of this
Dictionary is to preserve valuable information about as many thinkers as possible, its virtue lies in
its wider historical breadth rather than its analytic depth. By including not only every well-known
thinker but also a vast number of lesser-known thinkers surrounding the “great philosophers”
with support, criticism, and intellectual context, the story of the evolution of philosophy in the US
and Canada becomes visible in broad outlines. Indeed, the number of intellectual disciplines and
fields of philosophy in this Dictionary is so large, the representation of diverse schools and move-
ments of philosophy is so successful, and the inclusion of so many women and minorities (130) is
so pluralistic, that it make a large contribution to the study of modern intellectual life in these two
countries.
The editors have sought to ensure that the breadth of significant philosophical activity finds rep-
resentation in the Dictionary in many ways beyond those already mentioned. For example, recog-
nition by one’s peers is one useful measure, so nearly all of the presidents of the three divisions of
the American Philosophical Association are included, along with many presidents of numerous
regional and topical philosophical societies, such as the Southwestern Philosophical Society, the
Metaphysical Society of America, and the Philosophy of Science Association. The Dictionary also
includes philosophers from nearly every geographical section of the US and Canada. Furthermore,
nearly every one of the 105 universities that had a doctoral program by 1970 has one or more of
their philosophers included here. The Dictionary also has many entries on the first philosophers to
teach at these major universities, as well as their more recent successors, so that the histories of
over one hundred philosophy departments in the US and Canada, along with many smaller col-
lege departments, are sketched from the perspective of individual professors.
The story of philosophy in North America comes to life in this Dictionary at its most personal
level: in the varied careers of the thinkers themselves, from poet, priest, and politician to abolition-
ist, socialist, and civil rights activist; often alongside their academic position. Public fame and rec-
ognized service are not necessarily incompatible with a philosophical life. Among the Dictionary
figures are an author of an Amendment to the US Constitution (Susan B. Anthony), a Roman
Catholic Cardinal (Elzéar-Alexandre Taschereau), two founders of new religious movements
(Mary Baker Eddy and Helena Blavatsky), two United States Commissioners of Education
(William T. Harris and Sterling McMullin), two martyred African-American leaders (Martin
viii
Introduction
Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X), three Presidential Medal of Freedom awardees (Alexander
Meiklejohn, Walter Lippmann, and Sidney Hook), four pioneers of environmentalism (Joseph
Wood Krutch, Aldo Leopold, Rachel Carson, Holmes Rolston, III), five US Supreme Court
Justices (Louis Brandeis, Benjamin Cardozo, William Douglas, Felix Frankfurter, and Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr.), eleven Presidential Medal of Freedom awardees (Alexander Meiklejohn,
Walter Lippmann, John von Neumann, Will Durant, Lewis Mumford, Rachel Carson, Sidney
Hook, Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek, Eric Hoffer, John Kenneth Galbraith), and fourteen
Nobel prize winners (Jane Addams, Kenneth Arrow, Emily Greene Balch, P. W. Bridgman, James
Buchanan, Nicholas Murray Butler, Albert Einstein, T. S. Eliot, Milton Friedman, John Harsanyi,
Martin Luther King, Jr., John Nash, Amartya Sen, Elie Wiesel). The mundane realm of technology
is here revealed to be thoroughly intertwined with philosophy as well – for example, consider the
evolution of the computer, through the work of Charles Peirce (first to recognize the connection
between Boolean algebra and electric switch circuits), Allan Marquand (first to design an electro-
mechanical digital machine), Arthur Burks (helped build the first general-purpose electronic com-
puter ENIAC), and John Kemeny (wrote the BASIC computer language). More examples of
diverse philosophical achievement could be enumerated, too many to list here, but how many
philosophers have climbed Mount Everest (Stephen Kleene), have a high mountain peak named
after him (Josiah Royce), or inspired the naming of an asteroid (Paul Kurtz)?
Even the less exciting but still rewarding career as a college professor of philosopher could entail
very different responsibilities across the timeline of this Dictionary. Very few philosophy positions
in American academia existed in 1860, and were typically attached to the title of college president
and carried clerical qualifications. With very few exceptions, only ministers approved by a col-
lege’s religious denomination could then teach philosophy, and at almost all colleges save for the
largest like Harvard, Princeton, and Columbia, the college president was usually assigned the
responsibility for teaching philosophy (meaning moral and social philosophy as the denomination
viewed it). Before 1860 only a few colleges, such as Harvard, Princeton, Andover Theological
Seminary, and Union Theological Seminary, offered any postgraduate education and the possibil-
ity of advanced training in philosophy. In 1866 Yale awarded the first American PhD in philoso-
phy, to Charles Fraser MacLean who became a judge in New York. Yale was soon followed by
Harvard (1878 – G. Stanley Hall), Johns Hopkins (1878 – Josiah Royce), and Cornell (1880 –
May Preston Slossen, the first American woman to receive a philosophy doctorate). Around half
of the philosophers educated between 1870 and 1910 spent some time at German and French uni-
versities for additional philosophical study, and this experience contributed to the gradual liberal-
ization and sophistication of religious and speculative thought in North America.
From 1860 to 1880 academic philosophers were scattered across the landscape, found only at
the more prestigious colleges and usually working alone as the person holding the one chair of
philosophy at their institution. Although the titles of Professor of Moral Philosophy and Professor
of Intellectual Philosophy had become more common and independent from the position of col-
lege presidency or minister by 1890, advanced philosophical training and skill was possessed only
by at most eighty of these professors in the US and Canada. Some of the most important philo-
sophical creativity was still generated by theologians during that era, especially those who cre-
atively struggled with the internal tensions of their faith’s doctrines, the challenge of evolution, or
the plight of the labor class. Another fertile source of philosophical thinking was coming from the
new category of “social scientist” composed of scholars searching for remedies to social problems.
The Dictionary recounts in the lives of its figures how philosophy was gradually liberated from
denominational creeds as modernizing universities tried to imitate the German model, with a
broadly scientific mission and many separate departments of specialists publishing their research.
ix
Introduction
The year 1866–7 was the greatest turning point with three key events: the first American PhD in
philosophy in 1866, the founding of America’s first philosophy journal, Journal of Speculative
Philosophy, in 1867, and the publication of Charles Peirce’s first series of essays on logic in 1867.
The next generation of academic philosophers, like Josiah Royce, John Dewey, James Mark
Baldwin, and George Santayana, found their positions in the 1880s and 1890s without a theolog-
ical degree or clerical ordination. Their degrees were from German universities or from the few
American universities offering the new PhD degree. The professionalization of philosophy was
swiftly achieved in the early 1900s, as enlarged universities divided the various social sciences
apart from philosophy, and philosophy departments inflated by hiring the newly minted PhD
graduates of Harvard, Princeton, Yale, Cornell, Columbia, Johns Hopkins, and Chicago. These
graduates were imbued with a sense of national importance. The closing of the frontier in 1890
signaled the inward shift of America’s manifest destiny to its classrooms. It also coincided with the
growth and importance of philosophy as the basis from which to craft a new type of intellectual
pioneer, one able to comprehend and articulate the unprecedented problems and challenges of the
next century. By a conservative estimate the number of academic philosophers tripled from 1880
to 1910, a rate comparable only to the dramatic increase of philosophy positions from 1945 to
1952 and again during the late 1960s.
Academic and intellectual growth is a major theme displayed by the Dictionary, but the long-
delayed recognition of philosophical talent in women and minorities is evidenced in the
Dictionary as well. Christine Ladd-Franklin was denied her earned diploma from Johns Hopkins
in 1882, as was Mary Whiton Calkins in 1895 when she did not receive her Harvard doctorate.
By 1940 only a handful of women had taught as regular philosophy faculty at major universities.
The small presence of Native Americans who came to philosophy only through other disciplines,
and the prejudice toward the few Jews in philosophy before 1950, is similarly evident in the
Dictionary, although it should be noted that a large number of Jewish philosophers found refuge
in American and Canadian institutions during World War II. Despite Alain Locke’s path-breaking
achievement as the first African-American PhD in philosophy (from Harvard) in 1918, few have
been able to follow him to academic prominence. In the 1940s the only African-American
philosopher at an Ivy League university was William Fontaine at Pennsylvania, and little improve-
ment can be seen since. Other religious and ethnic minorities also have suffered neglect and preju-
dice too extensive to recount here.
However the history of philosophy in the US and Canada may be judged by its treatment of
women and minorities, this Dictionary was designed to present the lives and careers of a broad
and diverse array of philosophical intellectuals. Despite the editors’ best efforts, future centuries
may yet judge this Dictionary and its inclusion choices to be erratic at best or seriously flawed at
worst. Charles Hutton’s impressive Mathematical and Philosophical Dictionary of 1796 omitted
John Locke and David Hume, after all – so some true philosophical genius has probably eluded
this Dictionary’s editors. Still more provoking is the thought that this Dictionary contains large
entries on figures who will someday be deemed beneath consideration by future historians of phi-
losophy. Still, it is hoped that this Dictionary will satisfactorily reveal what this era considered
philosophically interesting, stimulate closer attention and research into philosophical thought in
the US and Canada, and help make future enlightened judgments possible.
John R. Shook, 2005

University of Oklahoma, Stillwater
x
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The faithful devotion and never-failing energy of the many consulting and supervising edi-
tors deserves the most profound gratitude and praise. During the five years of labors on this
dictionary, the editors have been unfailingly and unflinchingly conscientious about pursuing
the highest standards of scholarship as they helped to shape this dictionary and oversee its
entries. As the enormous labors required became evident as we proceeded from a vision
towards execution due to this dictionary’s immense scale, our fortitude was frequently
tested, yet the amiable bonds of professional dedication to American philosophy always
stayed firm and carried us through. My personal gratitude to each and every one of them
for their admirable loyalty and hard work cannot be adequately expressed. The many hun-
dreds of contributors are also due the warmest thanks and praise for their willingness to
make their scholarly expertise available for this dictionary. The field of American philoso-
phy, and the understanding of the trajectory of philosophical thought in the US and
Canada, has been marvelously and permanently enriched by the fine efforts of the contribu-
tors and editors.
Of course this dictionary would not exist without the enthusiastic support of Rudi
Thoemmes and the confidence and trust that he extended to the editors. His own publishing
team of editors did a fine job of quality control and error correction. Special thanks must go
to the project manager, Merilyn Holme, who provided careful oversight and wise guidance
during the most crucial years of work. Special mention and thanks also go to David
Dusenbury for his copy-editing; Sandra Margolies for additional copy-editing; and Katerina
Hamza for proofreading and indexing.
John R. Shook
xi
HOW TO USE THE DICTIONARY
The Dictionary contains entries on 1082 philosophers. The title of each entry gives the sub-
ject’s name and dates of birth and death, where known. The names used are those by which
a subject was most commonly known; thus Samuel Langhorne Clemens is listed under his
famous pseudonym Mark Twain. Further biographical and career details, again where
known, are given in the text, usually in the opening paragraphs. The main body of each
entry discusses the subject’s writings, teaching, and thought. A cross-referencing system
refers the reader to other entries. Names which appear in small capitals, such as
WHITEHEAD, are themselves the subjects of entries in the Dictionary, and the reader may
refer to those entries for more information.
The concluding bibliography can contain as many as three sections. The initial section
contains the more significant publications by the subject, typically monographs and major
articles. Reprintings are only rarely given mention, where the original is particularly obscure
or hard to obtain. The second section, “Other Relevant Works,” contains additional publi-
cations that typically include more articles and book chapters, posthumous editions and col-
lected works, edited books, translations, autobiographies, or non-philosophical works of
interest. This section will also locate the figure’s archived papers, if known. The third sec-
tion, “Further Reading,” contains citations to standard biographical works that also
include the subject, such as American National Biography. The Abbreviations for
Biographical Reference Works on p. __ explains the citation method for these biographical
works. This third section also lists publications about the subject. The reader should be
advised that the most comprehensive works on the history of philosophy in America, listed
in the General Bibliography on pp. __, are not typically also listed in further reading sec-
tions to save space.
The reader should also be advised that for most entries the further reading section is the
joint product of the author and general editor’s efforts to guide the reader to a judicious and
useful selection of secondary writings that may be supportive, neutral, or critical towards
the subject. In no case should it be supposed that either the author or the general editor
themselves intend to convey a positive evaluation of every item mentioned in the further
reading section.
xiii
GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY
Armour, Leslie, and Elizabeth Trott. The Faces of Reason: An Essay on Philosophy and Culture in
English Canada 1850–1950 (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1981).
Biel, Steven. Independent Intellectuals in the United States, 1910–1945 (New York: New York
University Press, 1992).
Blau, Joseph L. Men and Movements in American Philosophy (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952).
Blau, Joseph L., ed. American Philosophic Addresses, 1700–1900 (New York: Columbia
Brodbeck, May. “Philosophy in America: 1900–1950,” in American Non-Fiction 1900–1950
(Chicago, 1952), pp. 3–94.
Caws, Peter, ed. Two Centuries of Philosophy in America (London: Blackwell, 1980).
Cohen, Morris R. American Thought: A Critical Sketch (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954).
Cunningham, G. Watts. The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Thought
(New York: Century, 1933).
Curti, Merle. The Growth of American Thought (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943).
Curtis, M. M. An Outline of Philosophy in America (Cleveland: Western Reserve University,
1896).
Dorrien, Gary. The Remaking of Evangelical Theology (Louisville, Kent.: Westminster John Knox
Press, 1998).
———. The Making of American Liberal Theology, vol. 1: Imagining Progressive Religion,
1805–1900 (Louisville, Kent.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001).
———. The Making of American Liberal Theology, vol. 2: Idealism, Realism, and Modernity,
1900–1950 (Louisville, Kent.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003).
Fay, Jay W. American Psychologies Before William James (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers
Flower, Elizabeth, and Murray G. Murphey. A History of Philosophy in America (New York:
G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1977).
Gray, James. Modern Process Thought (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1982.
Hall, G. Stanley. “On the History of American College Textbooks and Teaching in Logic, Ethics,
Psychology, and Allied Subjects,” Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society n.s. 9
(1893–4): 137–94.
Hall, G. Stanley. “Philosophy in the United States,” Mind 4 (1879): 89–105.
Harlow, Victor. A Bibliography and Genetic Study of American Realism (Oklahoma City:
Harlow Publishing Co., 1931).
xv
General Bibliography
Hofstadter, Richard. Social Darwinism in American Thought, 2nd edn (Boston: Beacon Press,
1955).
Hudson, W. D. A Century of Moral Philosophy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980).
Jones, Adam Leroy. Early American Philosophers (New York: Macmillan, 1898).
Kuklick, Bruce. A History of Philosophy in America, 1720–2000 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002).
———. Churchmen and Philosophers (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985).
———. The Rise of American Philosophy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977).
Muirhead, John H. The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy: Studies in the History of
Idealism in England and America (London: G. Allen & Unwin; New York: Macmillan,
1931).
Nauman, St. Elmo, Jr. Dictionary of American Philosophy (New York: Philosophical Library,
1973).
Passmore, John. A Hundred Years of Philosophy, 2nd edn (New York: Basic Books, 1966).
Perry, Ralph Barton. Philosophy of the Recent Past (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1926).
———. Present Philosophical Tendencies (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912).
Porter, Noah. “Philosophy in Great Britain and America,” in History of Philosophy from Thales
to the Present Time, by Friedrich Uberweg, trans. George S. Morris (London and New
York, 1874), vol. 2, pp. 442–50.
Reck, Andrew. The New American Philosophers (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1968).
———. Recent American Philosophy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1964).
Riley, I. Woodbridge. American Philosophy: The Early Schools (New York: Dodd, Mead, and
Co., 1907).
———. American Philosophy from Puritanism to Pragmatism and Beyond (New York: Henry
Holt, 1915).
Roberts, Jon. Darwinism and the Divine in America (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1988).
Rogers, Arthur K. English and American Philosophy Since 1800: A Critical Survey (New York:
Macmillan, 1922).
Ross, Dorothy. The Origins of American Social Science (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 1991).
Schneider, Herbert W. A History of American Philosophy, 2nd. edn. (New York: Columbia
———. Sources of Contemporary Philosophical Realism in America (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
1964).
Spiegelberg, Herbert. The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, 3rd edn
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1971).
Thayer, H. Stanley. Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism, 2nd edn
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981).
Werkmeister, William H. A History of Philosophical Ideas in America (New York: Ronald Press,
1949).
Wiener, Philip. Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
xvi
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Ruth Abbey Leslie Armour

Senior Lecturer, Department of Politics and IR Research Professor of Philosophy
University of Kent at Canterbury Dominican College of Philosophy and Theology and
Canterbury, Kent, UK University of Ottawa
Ottawa, Canada
William R. Abbott
Associate Professor Emeritus, Department of Randall E. Auxier
Philosophy Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy
University of Waterloo Southern Illinois University at Carbondale
Ontario, Canada (Oklahoma State University?)
Laird Addis Sidney Axinn

Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy Courtesy Professor
University of Iowa University of South Florida
Iowa City, Iowa Tampa, Florida
Michael W. Allen
Philosophy Department James T. Baker
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale Professor, Department of History
Carbondale, Illinois Western Kentucky University
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Robert E. Alvis
Saint Meinrad School of Theology Nicole B. Barenbaum
Meinrad, Indiana Professor of Psychology
University of the South
Douglas R. Anderson Sewanee, Tennessee
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Penn State University Stephen A. Barnes
University Park, Pennsylvania Philosophy Instructor
Northwest Vista College
Irving H. Anellis San Antonio, Texas
Contributing Editor, Peirce Edition Project
Fort Dodge, Iowa J. Edward Barrett
Emeritus Professor of Religion and Philosophy,
Edward P. Antonio Muskingum College
Associate Professor of Theology and Social Theory Highlands, North Carolina
Iliff School of Theology
Denver, Colorado
xvii
List of Contributors
Jeffrey A. Barrett Michael L. Birkel

Associate Professor and Chair, Department of Logic Professor of Religion, Religion Department
and Philosophy of Science Earlham College
University of California, Irvine Richmond, Indiana
Irvine, California
Larry Lee Blackman
Robert Barrett Associate Professor of Philosophy, Department of
Washington University Philosophy
St. Louis, Missouri State University of New York at Geneseo
Geneseo, New York
Scott Bartlett
Adjunct Professor of Philosophy Daniel Blair
Southern Methodist University Visiting Lecturer
Dallas, Texas University of Maryland
College Park, Maryland
John William Bates V
Philosophy Department Irene Bloom
Oklahoma State University Ann Whitney Olin Professor Emeritus, Department
Stillwater, Oklahoma of Asian and Middle Eastern Cultures
Barnard College
Steven R. Bayne New York City, New York
Writer
Somerville, Massachusetts Philip Blosser
Professor of Philosophy, School of History,
Mary Farrell Bednarowski Philosophy and Religion
Professor of Religious Studies Lenoir-Rhyne College
United Theological Seminary of the Twin Cities Hickory, North Carolina
New Brighton, Minnesota
Christine M. Bochen
Jeffrey K. Beemer Professor of Religious Studies, Department of
Senior Research Associate, Social and Demographic Religious Studies
Research Institute Nazareth College
University of Massachusetts Pittsburgh, New York
Amherst, Massachusetts
James W. Boettcher
Elizabeth A. Behnke Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy
Coordinator and Senior Research Fellow, Study Saint Joseph’s University
Project in Phenomenology of the Body Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Ferndale, Washington State
Peter J. Boettke
Alyssa R. Bernstein Department of Economics
Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy George Mason University
Ohio University Fairfax, Virginia
Athens, Ohio
Matthew Bokovoy
Wanda Warren Berry Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of History
Professor Emerita of Philosophy Oklahoma State University
Colgate University Stillwater, Oklahoma
Washington, D.C.
xviii
E. J. Bond Barry F. Brown

Professor Emeritus, Department of Philosophy Retired Associate Professor, Philosophy
Queen’s University University of Toronto
Kingston, Ontario, Canada Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Henry Warner Bowden B. Ricardo Brown

Professor, Religion Department Assistant Professor of Cultural Studies, Department
Rutgers University of Social Science and Cultural Studies
New Brunswick, New Jersey Pratt Institute
Brooklyn, New York
Mary Bowman-Kruhm
Johns Hopkins University Donald L. Brown
School of Professional Studies in Business and Assistant Dean, Minority Affairs
Education Rider University
Rockville, Maryland Lawrenceville, New Jersey
Harry McFarland Bracken Douglas Browning

Adjunct Professor of Philosophy Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, Department of
Arizona State University Philosophy
Tempe, Arizona University of Texas at Austin
Austin, Texas
Joseph A. Bracken
Retired Professor of Theology Paul Custodio Bube
Xavier University W. Lewis McColgan Professor of Religion,
Cincinnati, Ohio Department of Religion and Philosophy
Lyon College
Denny Bradshaw Batesville, Arkansas
Associate Professor of Philosophy, Department of
Philosophy and Humanities Glenn R. Bucher
University of Texas at Arlington Executive Director, The Boyer Center
Arlington, Texas Grantham, Pennsylvania
S. Daniel Breslauer Evelyn Burg

Professor of Religious Studies, Department of Lecturer, La Guardia Community College
Religious Studies City University of New York
University of Kansas Long Island City, New York
Lawrence, Kansas
Richard W. Burgh
Terry Brino-Dean Chair, Department of Philosophy
Visiting Assistant Professor of Theatre Studies Rider University
Maryville College Lawrenceville, New Jersey
Maryville, Tennessee
Alice Rowe Burks
Kyle Broom Ann Arbor, Michigan
Teaching Assistant
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Jill Vance Buroker
Urbana, Illinois Professor Philosophy, Department of Philosophy
California State University
San Bernardino, California
xix
Gregory S. Butler Paul E. Capetz

Associate Professor, Department of Government Associate Professor of Historical Theology
New Mexico State University United Theological Seminary of the Twin Cities
Las Cruces, New Mexico New Brighton, Minnesota
Thomas A. Byrnes André W. Carus

Professor of Religious Studies Open Court Publishing Company
Benedictine University Chicago, Illinois
Lisle, Illinois
James O. Castagnera
Associate Provost
Rebecca Bensen Cain Rider University
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Philosophy Lawrenceville, New Jersey
Department
Oklahoma State University Robert L. Castiglione
Stillwater, Oklahoma Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy
Rhode Island College
Robert R. Calder Providence, Rhode Island
(Formerly) Tutor in Philosophy, CCE
University of Strathclyde John Catalano
Hamilton, UK Dean
University of South Carolina
Robert M. Calhoon Lancaster, South Carolina
Professor of Religion, History Department
University of North Carolina at Greensboro Francis J. Catania
Greensboro, North Carolina Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, Philosophy
Department
Gary S. Calore Loyola University Chicago
Associate Professor of Philosophy Chicago, Illinois
Penn State University
Abington, Pennsylvania J. J. Chambliss
Professor of Education, Graduate School of
James Campbell Education
Distinguished University Professor, Philosophy Rutgers University
Department New Brunswick, New Jersey
University of Toledo
Toledo, Ohio J. Harley Chapman
Dean, Liberal Arts Division (retired) and Professor
Keith Campbell Emeritus, Philosophy and Humanities Department
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy William Rainey Harper College
University of Sydney Palatine, Illinois
Sydney, Australia
Ananya Chatterjea
Julie Harms Cannon Assistant Professor, Department of Theater Arts and
Assistant Professor of Sociology, Department of Dance
Sociology, Anthropology, and Social Work University of Minnesota
Texas Tech University Minneapolis, Minnesota
Lubbock, Texas
xx
Kah Kyung Cho Walter H. Conser, Jr.

SUNY Distinguished Teaching Professor, Professor of Religious Studies and Professor of
Department of Philosophy History, Department of History
University at Buffalo University of North Carolina at Wilmington
Buffalo, New York Wilmington, North Carolina
James J. Chriss Gary A. Cook

Associate Professor, Department of Sociology Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy
Cleveland State University and Religion
Cleveland, Ohio Beloit College
Beloit, Wisconsin
Lenny Clapp
Associate Professor of Philosophy, Department of Shelley Wood Cordulack
Philosophy Associate Professor of Art History, Art Department
Illinois Wesleyan University Millikin University
Bloomington, Illinois Decatur, Illinois
David O. Clark Angela L. Cotten

Editorial Assistant for the Journal of the History of Assistant Professor of Women’s Studies, Women’s
the Behavioral Sciences, Department of Psychology Studies Program
York University State University of New York at Stony Brook
Toronto, Ontario, Canada Stony Brook, New York
Catherine L. Coghlan Mark Cox

Assistant Director, Institutional Research PhD Student
Texas Christian University University of Glasgow
Fort Worth, Texas Glasgow, Scotland
Henry Cohen Christopher J. Coyne

Legislative Attorney Department of Economics
Library of Congress George Mason University
Washington, D.C. Fairfax, Virginia
Vincent M. Colapietro Kenneth Cracknell

Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy Professor of Theology and Global Studies
Pennsylvania State University Texas Christian University
University Park, Pennsylvania Fort Worth, Texas
E. Paul Colella John F. Crosby

Professor of Philosophy Professor of Philosophy
Xavier University Franciscan University
Cincinnati, Ohio Steubenville, Ohio
Louis J. Colombo Steven Crowell

Adjunct Professor of Philosophy, Philosophy Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy
Department Rice University
Rider University Houston, Texas
Lawrenceville, New Jersey
xxi
Hunter Crowther-Heyck David L. Davis

Assistant Professor of the History of Science, Graduate Student, History Department
Department of the History of Science Rice University
University of Oklahoma Houston, Texas
Norman, Oklahoma
Michael H. DeArmey
Garrett Cullity Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy
Associate Professor of Philosophy, Department of University of Southern Mississippi
Philosophy Hattiesburg, Mississippi
University of Adelaide
Adelaide, Australia Mary Jo Deegan
Department of Sociology
Terence Cuneo University of Nebraska – Lincoln
Assistant Professor, Philosophy Department Lincoln, Nebraska
Calvin College
Grand Rapids, Michigan John Deely
University of St Thomas, Houston
Phyllis Curtis-Tweed Houston, Texas
Associate Professor and Director, Freshman Year
Program C. F. Delaney
Medgar Evers College Professor of Philosophy, Philosophy Department
Brooklyn, New York University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana
Harry F. Dahms Lawrence J. Dennis

Associate Professor of Sociology and Director of Professor Emeritus, Educational Administration and
Graduate Studies Higher Education
Florida State University Southern Illinois University at Carbondale
Tallahassee, Florida Carbondale, Illinois
Gerard J. Dalcourt Ione Y. DeOllos

Professor Emeritus Associate Professor, Department of Sociology
Seton Hall University Ball State University
South Orange, New Jersey Muncie, Indiana
Joseph W. Dauben Claire Detels

PhD Program in History Coordinator of the Music History Area and
City University of New York Professor of Music
New York City, New York University of Arkansas
Fayetteville, Arkansas
William Davenport
Associate Professor of Philosophy (retired) William D. Dean
Western Illinois University Emeritus Professor of Constructive Theology
Macomb, Illinois Iliff School of Theology
Denver, Colorado
Mark Y. A. Davies
Associate Professor of Philosophy Max Deutscher
Oklahoma City University Emeritus Professor, Division of SCMP
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma Macquarie University
Sydney, Australia
xxii
David C. Devonis John Drummond

Associate Professor of Psychology, Department of Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy
Psychology Fordham University
Graceland University Bronx, New York
Lamoni, Iowa
Stephen D. Dumont
Cornelis de Waal, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Department of
Assistant Editor and Adjunct Professor of Philosophy
Philosophy University of Notre Dame
Peirce Edition Project Notre Dame, Indiana
Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis
Indianapolis, Indiana Elmer H. Duncan
Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy
Randall R. Dipert Baylor University
C.S. Peirce Professor of American Philosophy Waco, Texas
University at Buffalo
Buffalo, New York James Dye
Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy
Brian Domitrovic Northern Illinois University
Instructor of History, Department of History DeKalb, Illinois
Slippery Rock University
Slippery Rock, Pennsylvania Therese Boos Dykeman
Adjunct Professor
Martin Donougho Fairfield University
Professor, Department of Philosophy Fairfield, Connecticut
University of South Carolina
Columbia, South Carolina
C. Anthony Earls
Sarah K. Donovan Residence Life and Dining Services
Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy University of Wyoming
Wagner College Laramie, Wyoming
Staten Island, New York
Charles Edgley
Mark Dooley Professor and Head, Department of Sociology
Visiting Research Fellow, Department of Philosophy Oklahoma State University
University College Dublin Stillwater, Oklahoma
Dublin, Ireland
Rem B. Edwards
Gary Dorrien Lindsay Young Professor of Philosophy (Emeritus)
Parfet Distinguished Professor University of Tennessee
Kalamazoo College Knoxville, Tennessee
Kalamazoo, Michigan
Philip Ehrlich
Thomas Drucker Professor, Department of Philosophy
Lecturer, Department of Mathematical and Ohio University
Computer Sciences Athens, Ohio
University of Wisconsin – Whitewater
Whitewater, Wisconsin William D. Eisenhower
Interim Senior Pastor
Faith Presbyterian Church
Minnetonka, Minnesota
xxiii
Robin J. Effron Chielozona Eze

Law Clerk to the Hon. Alvin K. Hellerstein, US Assistant Professor of English
District Court for Northeastern Illinois University
the Southern District of New York Chicago, Illinois
New York
Monika Elbert Christopher Faille

Professor of English Reporter for Hedge World
Montclair State University White Plains, New York
West Orange, New Jersey
Seth A. Farber
Michael Eldridge Founding Director, www.itim.org.il
Lecturer, Department of Philosophy Jerusalem, Israel
University of North Carolina at Charlotte
Charlotte, North Carolina Richard Feldman
Professor, Department of Philosophy
Mark Barger Elliot University of Rochester
Riverside Presbyterian Church Rochester, New York
Riverside, Illinois
Steven Fesmire
Robert Ellwood Philosophy
Emeritus Professor of Religion Green Mountain College
University of Southern California Poultney, Vermont
Ojai, California
Thomas W. Flynn
Reinaldo Elugardo Editor, Free Inquiry Magazine, and Director, Robert
Full Professor, Department of Philosophy Green Ingersoll Birthplace Museum
University of Oklahoma Amherst, New York
Norman, Oklahoma
Dagfinn Føllesdal
Lester Embree C. I. Lewis Professor of Philosophy, Department of
William F. Dietrich Eminent Scholar in Philosophy, Philosophy
Department of Philosophy Stanford University
Florida Atlantic University Stanford, California
Boca Raton, Florida
Eugene Fontinell
Greg Eow Professor Emeritus, Department of Philosophy
Graduate Student, Department of History Queen’s College, City University of New York
Rice University Bronx, New York
Houston, Texas
Joan Grassbaugh Forry
Christopher H. Evans Instructor, Department of Philosophy
Associate Professor of Church History Temple University
Colgate Rochester Crozer Divinity School Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Rochester, New York
Nick Fotion
Rand B. Evans Professor, Department of Philosophy
Professor of Psychology, Department of Psychology Emory University
East Carolina University Atlanta, Georgia
Greenville, North Carolina
xxiv
Daniel M. Fox Don Garrett

President, Milbank Memorial Fund Kenan Distinguished Professor for Teaching
New York City, New York Excellence, Department of Philosophy
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Charles Frederick Frantz Chapel Hill, North Carolina
Adjunct Assistant Professor
Westminster Choir College of Rider University Charles Gattone
Princeton, New Jersey Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology
University of Florida
Amanda Frisken Gainesville, Florida
Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of
American Studies Tamar Szabó Gendler
SUNY College at Old Westbury Associate Professor of Philosophy, Department of
Old Westbury, New York Philosophy
Cornell University
C. George Fry Ithaca, New York
Professor, Church History and Theology
Winebrenner Theological Seminary Uta Gerhardt
Findlay, Ohio Full Professor of Sociology, Soziologie II
Universität Heidelberg
Alfred H. Fuchs Heidelberg, Germany
Emeritus Professor of Psychology, Department of
Psychology Lloyd P. Gerson
Bowdoin College Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy
Brunswick, Maine University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Robert C. Fuller
Professor of Religious Studies, Department of Joseph A. Giacalone
Religious Studies Professor of Economics and Henry George Chair in
Bradley University Economics, Department of Economics and Finance
Peoria, Illinois St John’s University
Queens, New York
Steve Fuller
Professor of Sociology, Department of Sociology Roger F. Gibson
University of Warwick Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy
Coventry, Warwickshire, UK Washington University
St. Louis, Missouri
Franklin I. Gamwell Michaela Giesenkirchen

The Divinity School English Department
University of Chicago Washington University
Chicago, Illinois St. Louis, Missouri
Catherine Villanueva Gardner Patrick J. Gilpin

Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Philosophy Gilpin Law Firm
Department Houston, Texas
University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth
North Dartmouth, Massachusetts Lou Goble
Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosoph
Willamette University
Salem, Oregon
xxv
Emanuel S. Goldsmith Carol C. Gould

Professor of Jewish Studies Professor of Philosophy and Government,
Queens College of the City University of New York Department of Philosophy
Flushing, New York George Mason University
Fairfax, Virginia
José María Gondra
Full Professor of Basic Psychology, Department of Daniel W. Graham
Basic Psychological Processes Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy
University of the Basque Country Brigham Young University
San Sebastián, Spain Provo, Utah
James A. Good Dean Graham

Associate Professor of History, Department of PhD Student and Teaching Assistant (Instructor),
History Department of Philosophy
North Harris College Temple University
Houston, Texas Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
James M. M. Good John Greco

Senior Lecturer, Department of Psychology Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy
University of Durham Fordham University
Durham, Northumberland, UK Bronx, New York
Julia Chenot GoodFox Christopher D. Green

University of Kansas Professor of Psychology, Department of Psychology
Lawrence, Kansas York University
Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Jacob Lynn Goodson
Garrett Evangelical Theological Seminary Judy Green
Evaston, Illinois Professor, Department of Mathematics
Marymount University
Nancy M. Gordon Arlington, Virginia
Independent Scholar
Amherst, Massachusetts Mitchell S. Green
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy
Geoffrey Gorham University of Virginia
Assistant Professor of Philosophy Charlottesville, Virginia
University of Wisconsin
Eau Clair, Wisconsin Larry Greenfield
Chicago, Illinois
Kevin Fox Gotham
Associate Professor, Department of Sociology Michael F. Gretz
Tulane University Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science
New Orleans, Louisiana New School University
New York City, New York
Allan Gotthelf
Visiting Professor of History and Philosophy of Susan Marie Groppi
Science Office for History of Science and Technology
University of Pittsburgh University of California
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Berkeley, California
xxvi
Lisa G. Guinn Bruce K. Hanson

Visiting Assistant Professor Professor of Philosophy and Religion
Ferris State University Fullerton College
Big Rapids, Michigan Fullerton, California
Richard B. Gunderman Charley D. Hardwick

Associate Professor, Schools of Liberal Arts and Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies,
Medicine Department of Philosophy and Religion
Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis American University
Indianapolis, Indiana Washington, D.C.
Bina Gupta Peter Hewitt Hare

Professor of Philosophy and Director, South Asia Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus,
Language and Area Program Philosophy Department
University of Missouri-Columbia University at Buffalo
Columbia, Missouri Buffalo, New York
William D. Guthrie Elizabeth Harman

Professor, School of Education Department of Philosophy
Rider University New York University
Lawrenceville, New Jersey New York, New York
William Harper
David D. Hall Professor, Philosophy Department
Professor of History University of Western Ontario
Harvard Divinity School London, Ontario, Canada
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Leonard Harris
Maurice Hamington Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy
Assistant Professor of Philosophy Purdue University
University of Southern Indiana West Lafayette, Indiana
Evansville, Indiana
Philip E. Harrold
J. Daniel Hammond Assistant Professor of History of Christianity
Professor of Economics, Department of Economics Winebrenner Theological Seminary
Wake Forest University Findlay, Ohio
Winston-Salem, North Carolina
Carl Hausman
Kathleen M. Haney Professor Emeritus of Philosophy
Professor of Philosophy Pennsylvania State University
University of Houston, Downtown University Park, Pennsylvania
Houston, Texas
John Hawthorne
Barry Hankins Professor of Philosophy, Philosophy Department
Associate Professor of History and Church-State Rutgers University
Studies New Brunswick, New Jersey
Baylor University
Waco, Texas Harry Heft
Professor, Department of Psychology
Denison University
Granville, Ohio
xxvii
Marty H. Heitz Michael R. Hill

Assistant Professor of Philosophy Editor, Sociological Origins
Oklahoma State University University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Stillwater, Oklahoma Lincoln, Nebraska
Bertrand Helm John W. Hillje

Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy Associate Professor of History, Department of
Southwest Missouri State University History
Springfield, Missouri Rider University
Harold Henderson
La Porte, Indiana Jaakko Hintikka
Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy
John R. Hermann Boston University
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science Boston, Massachusetts
Trinity University
San Antonio, Texas David Justin Hodge
The Extension School
Albert Hernández Harvard University
Assistant Professor of the History of Christianity Cambridge, Massachusetts
Iliff School of Theology
Denver, Colorado Brendan Hogan
Faculty, Liberal Studies and Faculty, Design and
Gary L. Herstein Management
Department of Philosophy New School for Social Research
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale New York City, New York
Carbondale, Illinois
Jess Hollenback
Susannah Heschel Associate Professor of History, History Department
Eli Black Associate Professor of Jewish Studies, University of Wisconsin – La Crosse
Department of Religion La Crosse, Wisconsin
Dartmouth College
Hanover, New Hampshire William G. Holzberger
Professor of English Emeritus, Department of
Thomas M. Hibbs English
Dean of the Honors College Bucknell University
Baylor University Lewisburg, Pennsylvania
Waco, Texas
Jason G. Horn
Larry A. Hickman Associate Professor of English, Humanities Division
Director, Center for Dewey Studies and Professor of Gordon College
Philosophy Barnesville, Georgia
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale
Carbondale, Illinois Nathan Houser
Director, Peirce Edition Project
David Hildebrand Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Philosophy Indianapolis, Indiana
Department
University of Colorado at Denver
Denver, Colorado
xxviii
R. E. Houser Shams Inati

Professor of Philosophy, Center for Thomistic Professor of Theology and Religious Studies,
Studies Department of Theology and Religious Studies
University of St Thomas Villanova University
Houston, Texas Villanova, Pennsylvania
Daniel Howard-Snyder Tyron Inbody

Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy Professor of Theology
Western Washington University United Theological Seminary
Bellingham, Washington State Dayton, Ohio
John Howie Nancy K. Innis

Professor of Philosophy Emeritus, Philosophy Professor, Department of Psychology
Deparment University of Western Ontario
Southern Illinois University, Carbondale London, Ontario, Canada
Carbondale, Illinois
Dominick A. Iorio
Jacob Howland Dean and Professor of Philosophy (Emeritus)
McFarlice Professor of Philosophy, Department of Rider University
Philosophy and Religion Lawrenceville, New Jersey
University of Tulsa
Tulsa, Oklahoma
Jason Baird Jackson
Jocelyn Hoy Assistant Professor of Folklore, Department of
Lecturer in Philosophy, Department of Philosophy Folklore and Ethnomusicology
University of California, Santa Cruz Indiana University
Santa Cruz, California Bloomington, Indiana
Richard T. Hull Jo Ellen Jacobs

Emeritus Professor of Philosophy Chair and Professor of Philosophy
State University of New York at Buffalo Millikin University
Clarence, New York Decatur, Illinois
David Hunter Megan Jacobs

Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy Department of Art and Art History
Buffalo State College University of New Mexico
Buffalo, New York Albuquerque, New Mexico
Paul Hurley Dale Jamieson

Full Professor, Department of Philosophy Henry R. Luce Professor, Department of Philosophy
Pomona College Carleton College
Claremont, California Northfield, Minnesota
Brian J. Huschle Jennifer G. Jesse

Assistant Professor Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Religion
Northwest Technical College Truman State University
East Grand Forks, Minnesota Kirksville, Missouri
xxix
Kenneth Paul Johnson Tim Kenyon

Director, Halifax County – South Boston Regional Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Department of
Library Philosophy
Halifax, Virginia University of Waterloo
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
Kent Johnson
Assistant Professor, Department of Logic and Fred Kersten
Philosophy of Science Frankenthal Professor Emeritus of Philosophy
University of California, Irvine University of Wisconsin – Green Bay
Irvine, California Green Bay, Wisconsin
Marjorie Jolles Kenneth Laine Ketner

ABD in Philosophy Paul Whitfield Horn Professor, and Director,
Temple University Institute for Studies in Pragmaticism
Madison, Wisconsin Texas Tech University
Lubbock, Texas
Kelly Dean Jolley
Alumni Associate Professor and Chair, Department Bockja Kim
of Philosophy Assistant Professor, Hong Kong University of
University of Auburn Science and Technology
Auburn, Alabama Kowloon, Hong Kong, China
David H. Jones Shannon Kincaid

Professor Emeritus, Department of Philosophy Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Department of
College of William and Mary Social Sciences
Williamsburg, Virginia Queensborough Community College
City University of New York
Susanna Jones Brooklyn, New York
Assistant Professor
Long Island University William M. King
Brooklyn, New York Professor of Religious Studies
Albright College
Reading, Pennsylvania
Heather E. Keith
Assistant Professor of Philosophy Nathan Knobler
Lyndon State College Professor of Graduate Studies
Lyndonville, Utah The University of the Arts
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Rosemary Skinner Keller
Academic Dean and Professor of Church History Milton R. Konvitz (deceased)
Union Theological Seminary Professor of Law Emeritus and Professor of
New York City, New York Industrial and Labor Relations Emeritus
Cornell University
P. C. Kemeny Oakhurst, New Jersey
Associate Professor of Religion and Humanities
Grove City College Joseph W. Koterski, S.J.
Grove City, Pennsylvania Chair, Department of Philosophy
Fordham University
Hendrika Vande Kemp Bronx, New York
Clinical Psychologist in Private Practice
Anandale, Virginia
xxx
Karen Kovach Megan Laverty

Assistant Professor, Biomedical Ethics Program Assistant Professor, Department of Educational
Mercer University School of Medicine Foundations
Macon, Georgia Montclair State University
Upper Montclair, New Jersey
Dan Krier
Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology Thelma Z. Lavine
Iowa State University Clarence J. Robinson Professor of Philosophy and
Ames, Iowa American Culture
George Mason University
Robert Kugelmann Fairfax, Virginia
Professor of Psychology, Psychology Department
University of Dallas Nam-In Lee
Irving, Texas Full Professor, Department of Philosophy
Seoul National University
Bruce Kuklick Seoul, South Korea
Nichols Professor of History, Department of
History Zosimo E. Lee
University of Pennsylvania Department of Philosophy
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania University of the Philippines
Quezon City, Philippines
Elke Kurz-Milcke
Research Scientist Ernie Lepore
Georgia Institute of Technology Professor
Atlanta, Georgia Rutgers University
Piscataway, New Jersey
Beth K. Lamont Paul J. Levesque

New York City, New York Assistant Professor, Department of Comparative
Religion
Henry A. Landsberger California State University, Fullerton
Professor Emeritus Fullerton, California
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, North Carolina Samuel S. Levey
Associate Professor of Philosophy, Department of
Robert Lane Philosophy
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Philosophy Dartmouth College
Program Hanover, New Hampshire
State University of West Georgia
Carrollton, Georgia Albert C. Lewis
Associate Editor, Peirce Edition Project
Simon Langlois Indiana University – Purdue University, Indianapolis
Professor, Département de Sociologie Indianapolis, Indiana
Université de Laval
Québec, Canada Bin Liang
Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology
Estella Lauter Oklahoma State University – Tulsa
Professor and Chair, Department of English Tulsa, Oklahoma
University of Wisconsin Oshkosh
Oshkosh, Wisconsin
xxxi
Richard Liebendorfer Timothy D. Lyons

Associate Professor, Philosophy Department Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Department of
Minnesota State University Philosophy
Mankato, Minnesota Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis
Indianapolis, Indiana
William D. Lindsey
Dean of Instruction
Philander Smith College Dana Noelle McDonald
Little Rock, Arizona Graduate Student in Philosophy, Philosophy
Department
Bernard Linsky Southern Illinois University, Carbondale
Professor, Department of Philosophy Carbondale, Illinois
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada J. J. MacIntosh
John Little University of Calgary
Independent Scholar Calgary, Alberta, Canada
Bracebridge, Ontario, Canada
Melanie McQuitty
D. Stephen Long Temple University
Associate Professor of Systematic Theology Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Garrett Evangelical Theological Seminary
Evanston, Illinois Terrance MacMullan
Assistant Professor, Departments of Philosophy and
Dominic M. Lopes Honors
Associate Professor of Philosophy, Department of Eastern Washington University
Philosophy Cheney, Washington
University of British Columbia
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada Angela Kristen McWilliams
Graduate Student, History
Christopher J. Lucas University of Illinois, Chicago
Professor of Higher Education and Public Policy Chicago, Illinois
Analysis
University of Arkansas E. H. Madden
Fayetteville, Arizona Professor Emeritus, Department of Philosophy
George R. Lucas, Jr. Buffalo, New York
Associate Chair, Department of Leadership, Ethics
and Law Gary B. Madison
US Naval Academy Professor Emeritus, Department of Philosophy
Annapolis, Maryland McMaster University
Hamilton, Ontario, Canada
Kirk Ludwig
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy Krishna Mallick
University of Florida Chairperson and Full Professor of Philosophy,
Gainesville, Florida Philosophy Department
Salem State College
Sebastian Luft Salem, Massachusetts
Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy
Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
xxxii
J. Christopher Maloney Ginette Michaud

Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy Professor, Department of French Studies
University of Arizona University of Montréal
Tucson, Arizona Montréal, Québec, Canada
Jeff Malpas Mark Moller

Professor and Head of School, School of Philosophy Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Philosophy
University of Tasmania Department
Hobart, Tasmania, Australia Denison University
Granville, Ohio
James A. Marcum
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy Robert E. Money, Jr.
Baylor University Assistant Professor of Philosophy
Waco, Texas Millikin University
Decatur, Illinois
Nancy Mardas
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Philosophy Bradley Monton
Department Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy
St Joseph College University of Kentucky
West Hartford, Connecticut Lexington, Kentucky
Andrei S. Markovits Edward F. Mooney

Karl W. Deutsch Collegiate Professor of Adjunct Professor of Religion, Department of
Comparative Politics and German Studies. German Religion
Department Syracuse University
University of Michigan Syracuse, New York
Ann Arbor, Michigan
Ronald Moore
Michele Marsonet Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy
Full Professor and Dean of the Faculty of Arts, University of Washington
Philosophy Department Seattle, Washington
University of Genoa
Genoa, Italy Scott Hunter Moore
Associate Professor of Philosophy and Director of
LaDona Martin-Frost the Great Books Program
Professor of Ethnomusicology Baylor University
Millikin University Waco, Texas
Decatur, Illinois
Evan Moreno-Davis
Kenneth R. Merrill Department of Philosophy
Professor, Department of Philosophy University of California, San Diego
University of Oklahoma La Jolla, California
Norman, Oklahoma
Hani Morgan
Aaron Meskin Associate Professor
Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy Mercer County Community College
Texas Tech University Trenton, New Jersey
Lubbock, Texas
xxxiii
Christopher W. Morris Paul Nagy

Department of Philosophy Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, Department of
University of Maryland Philosophy
College Park, Maryland Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis
Indianopolis, Indiana
Luise Helene Morton
Senior Lecturer, Department of Philosophy Mark Thiessen Nation
Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis Associate Professor of Theology
Indianopolis, Indiana Eastern Mennonite Seminary
Harrisonburg, Virginia
James G. Moseley
President William Neely
Franklin College Harvard University
Franklin, Indiana Cambridge, Massachusetts
Danièle Moyal-Sharrock L. Jackson Newell

PhD Student, Department of Philosophy President and Professor
University of Geneva Deep Springs College
Geneva, Switzerland Big Pine, California
Mark S. Muldoon Ian A. M. Nicholson

Former Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Algoma Associate Professor of Psychology, Department of
University College, Canada and former Lecturer in Psychology
Philosophy at Brock University, Canada St Thomas University
Davison, Michigan Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada
Murray G. Murphey Rolf H. Nihilartikel

Professor of American Civilization Emeritus Professor of Philosophy
University of Pennsylvania Elmira College
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Elmira, New York
Laurence L. Murphy Ilkka Niiniluoto

Temple University Department of Philosophy
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania University of Helsinki
Helsinki, Finland
David J. Murray
Emeritus Professor of Psychology, Department of Warren A. Nord
Psychology Director, Program in the Humanities and Human
Queen’s University Values
Kingston, Ontario, Canada University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Chapel Hill, North Carolina
William T. Myers
Associate Professor of Philosophy Margaret Nunnelley
Birmingham-Southern College Graduate Student, History Department
Birmingham, Alabama Rice University
Houston, Texas
Eric Oberheim
Humboldt University of Berlin
Berlin, Germany
xxxiv
Edward W. O’Brien Charles Parsons

Assistant Professor (retired) Edgar Pierce Professor of Philosophy, Department
Delaware Valley College of Philosophy
Doylestown, Pennsylvania Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Wesley Mason Olds
Adjunct Professor of Philosophy, English Stanley L. Paulson
Department, The Citadel, and Philosophy William Gardiner Hammond Professor of Law, and
Department, College of Charleston Professor of Philosophy
Charleston, South Carolina Washington University
St. Louis, Missouri
Kenneth A. Olliff
Assistant Director, Foundation Relations W. Creighton Peden
University of Chicago Fuller E. Callaway Professor Emeritus of Philosophy
Chicago, Illinois Augusta State University
Highlands, North Carolina
Michael Oppenheim
Professor, Department of Religion Stephen M. Perkins
Concordia University Assistant Professor of Sociology (Anthropology),
Montréal, Québec, Canada Department of Sociology
Oklahoma State University
Brian Orend Stillwater, Oklahoma
Director of International Studies and Associate
Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy Michael L. Peterson
University of Waterloo Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada Asbury College
Wilmore, Kentucky
John C. Orr
Associate Professor of English Bernard Phillips
University of Portland Assistant/Associate Professor of Sociology (retired),
Portland, Oregon Department of Sociology
Boston University
Provincetown, Massachusetts
Dean Papas
Lecturer, English Department Sami Pihlström
University of California, Riverside Department of Philosophy
Riverside, California University of Helsinki
Helsinki, Finland
Gregory Fernando Pappas
Associate Professor of Philosophy, Department of Anthony B. Pinn
Philosophy Professor of Religious Studies
Texas A&M University Macalester College
College Station, Texas St Paul, Minnesota
Anand C. Paranjpe William C. Placher

Professor Emeritus, Psychology Department Charles D. and Elizabeth S. LaFollette Distinguished
Simon Fraser University Professor in the Humanities
Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada Wabash College
Crawfordsville, Indiana
xxxv
Mary Ellen Poole Howard B. Radest

Dean Adjunct Professor, Philosophy
San Francisco Conservatory of Music University of South Carolina, Beaufort
San Francisco, California Dean Emeritus, The Humanist Institute
Hilton Head Island, South Carolina
Jeffrey R. Post
Adjunct Assistant Professor, Department of Francis B. Randall
Philosophy Professor Emeritus of Humanities
Rider University Sarah Lawrence College
Lawrenceville, New Jersey Bronxville, New York
James C. Poteet II William J. Rappaport

Graduate Student, Department of Philosophy Associate Professor of Computer Science and
Oklahoma State University Adjunct Professor or Philosophy, Department of
Stillwater, Oklahoma Computer Science and Engineering
Robert E. Prasch Buffalo, New York
Associate Professor, Economics, Department of
Economics Carl A. Raschke
Middlebury College Professor of Religious Studies, Department of
Middlebury, Vermont Religious Studies
University of Denver
William H. Pritchard Denver, Colorado
Henry Clay Folger Professor of English, Department
of English Larry L. Rasmussen
Amherst College Reinhold Niebuhr Professor of Social Ethics
Amherst, Massachusetts Union Theological Seminary
Meghan Probstfield
Doctoral Student and Teaching Assistant, Rupert Read
Department of Sociology Senior Lecturer, Department of Philosophy
Oklahoma State University University of East Anglia
Stillwater, Oklahoma Norwich, Norfolk, UK
Todd C. Ream
Qian Suoqiao Assistant Visiting Professor of Educational
Assistant Professor, Department of Chinese, Administration
Translation, Linguistics Baylor University
City University of Hong Kong Waco, Texas
Kowloon, Hong Kong, China
Andrew J. Reck
J. Douglas Rabb Tulane University
Professor Emeritus New Orleans, Louisiana
Lakehead University
Thunder Bay, Ontario, Canada Doren A. Recker
Associate Professor of Philosophy, Philosophy
Department
Oklahoma State University
Stillwater, Oklahoma
xxxvi
Harry P. Reeder Robert Campbell Roberts

Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy and Distinguished Professor of Ethics, Department of
Humanities Philosophy
University of Texas at Arlington Baylor University
Arlington, Texas Waco, Texas
George A. Reisch Wesley Roberts

Independent Scholar Temporary Instructor
Chicago, Illinois Indiana University of Pennsylvania
Indiana, Pennsylvania
Eric Reitan
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Department of James W. Robinson,
Philosophy Assistant Professor of Sociology, Department of
Oklahoma State University Sociology and Gerontology
Stillwater, Oklahoma University of Louisiana at Monroe
Monroe, Louisiana
Bryan S. Rennie
Associate Professor and Visa I. Heinz Professor of Dorothy Rogers
Religion, Department of Religion Assistant Dean, College of Humanities and Social
Westminster College Sciences
New Wilmington, Pennsylvania Montclair State University
Upper Montclair, New Jersey
Greg Restall
Associate Professor, Philosophy Department Mark Rollins
University of Melbourne Associate Professor and Chair, Department of
Parkville, Australia Philosophy
Washington University
Joerg Rieger St. Louis, Missouri
Associate Professor of Systematic Theology
Southern Methodist University Gideon Rosen
Dallas, Texas Professor of Philosophy, Philosophy Department
Princeton University
Giacomo Rinaldi Princeton, New Jersey
Professor of Philosophy, Faculty of Sociology
University of Urbino Stuart Rosenbaum
Urbino, Italy Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy
Baylor University
Mathias Risse, Yale University Waco, Texas
Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Philosophy
Harvard University John K. Roth
Cambridge, Massachusetts Edward J. Sexton Professor of Philosophy
Claremont McKenna College
Jon H. Roberts Claremont, California
Professor of History, Department of History
Boston University Richard Rumana
Boston, Massachusetts Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy
William Paterson University
Wayne, New Jersey
xxxvii
Alexandra Rutherford Elizabeth Scarborough

Assistant Professor, Department of Psychology Professor Emerita, Psychology Department
York University Indiana University, South Bend
Toronto, Ontario, Canada South Bend, Indiana
Barbara Ryan Aaron A. Schiller

Professor of Sociology, Social Science Division Graduate Student, Department of Philosophy
Widener University University of California, San Diego
Chester, Pennsylvania La Jolla, California
Frank X. Ryan Britt-Marie Schiller

Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Department of Associate Professor and Chair, Department of
Philosophy Philosophy
Kent State University Webster University
Kent, Ohio St. Louis, Missouri
Paul Ryan Nancy Hurd Schluter

New School University University Chaplain and Adjunct Professor
New York, New York Gill Chapel at Rider University
Lwarenceville, New Jersey
Lyle J. Salmi Robert F. Schopp

Associate Professor of Art, Art Department Professor of Law and Psychology, College of Law
Millikin University University of Nebraska
Decatur, Illinois Lincoln, Nebraska
Gregory Salmieri David E. Schrader

Graduate Student in Philosophy Professor of Philosophy, Philosophy Department
University of Pittsburgh Washington and Jefferson College
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Washington, D.C.
Merrilee H. Salmon
Professor Emerita, Department of History and Timothy Schroeder
Philosophy of Science Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Department of
University of Pittsburgh Philosophy
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania University of Manitoba
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
Barbara Sandrisser
Architecture and Environmental Aesthetics Robert Schwartz
New York City, New York Professor, Department of Philosophy
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
Paul F. Sands Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Assistant Professor of Religion, Department of
Religion Darryl Scriven
Baylor University Associate Professor of Philosophy, Department of
Waco, Texas English and Philosophy
Southern University
Raphael Sassower Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Tenured Full Professor, Department of Philosophy
University of Colorado
Colorado Springs, Colorado
xxxviii
Fred Seddon Marvin C. Shaw

Adjunct Professor of Philosophy, President of the Emeritus Professor of Religious Studies
West Virginia Philosophical Society Montana State University
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Bozeman, Montana
Kenneth Seeskin Mark Sherry

Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy Endowed Chair, Disability Studies
Northwestern University University of Toledo
Evanston, Illinois Toledo, Ohio
Jonathan P. Seldin Larry Shiner

Associate Professor of Mathematics and Computer Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy
Science University of Illinois at Springfield
University of Lethbridge Springfield, Illinois
Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada
Roger A. Shiner
Evan Selinger Visiting Professor of Philosophy
Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy Okanagan University College
Rochester Institute of Technology Kelowna, British Columbia, Canada
Rochester, New York
John R. Shook
James F. Sennett Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Philosophy
Professor of Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Department
Studies Oklahoma State University
Lincoln Christian College and Seminary Stillwater, Oklahoma
Lincoln, Illinois
John Shosky
Anthony Serafini Adjunct Assistant Professor, University Honors
Professor Emeritus Program
Centenary College American University
Hackettstown, New Jersey Washington, D.C.
Patrick Shade Philip Siegelman

Associate Professor of Philosophy, Philosophy Professor Emeritus of Political Science
Department San Francisco State University
Rhodes College Berkeley, California
Memphis, Tennessee
Beth J. Singer
Seth K. Sharpless Professor Emerita of Philosophy
Emeritus Professor of Biological Psychology Brooklyn College of the City University of New
University of Colorado at Boulder York
Boulder, Colorado Lynbrook, New York
Joshua Shaw Marcus G. Singer

Associate Instructor, Philosophy Department Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, Department of
Indiana University Philosophy
Bloomington, Indiana University of Wisconsin-Madison
Madison, Wisconsin
xxxix
David A. Sipfle Elise Springer

William H. Laird Professor of Philosophy and the Department of Philosophy
Liberal Arts (Emeritus), Department of Philosophy Hartwick College
Carleton College Oneonta, New York
Northfield, Minnesota
Gerald Sorin
D. W. Skubik Director, Jewish Studies Program
Professor of Philosophy and Humanities, and Dean State University of New York
of the College of Arts and Sciences New Paltz, New York
California Baptist University
Riverside, California Robert J. Stainton
John G. Slater University of Western Ontario
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, Department of London, Ontario, Canada
Philosophy
University of Toronto Jacqueline Bloom Stanfield
Toronto, Ontario, Canada Professor of Sociology, Department of Sociology
University of Northern Colorado
Robert O. Slater Greeley, Colorado
Professor
Texas A&M University J. Ron Stanfield
College Station, Texas Professor of Economics and Coordinator of
Graduate Studies, Department of Economics
David N. Smith Colorado State University
Associate Professor of Sociology, Department of Ft. Collins, Colorado
Sociology
University of Kansas Glen H. Stassen
Lawrence, Kansas Lewis B. Smedes Professor of Christian Ethics
Fuller Theological Seminary
Luther E. Smith, Jr. Pasadena, California
Professor of Church and Community
Emory University James P. Sterba
Atlanta, Georgia Philosophy Department
University of Notre Dame
Tara Smith Notre Dame, Indiana
University of Texas at Austin Edward A. Stettner
Austin, Texas Ralph Emerson and Alice Freeman Palmer Professor
of Political Science, Department of Political Science
David Sobel Wellesley College
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy Wellesley, Massachusetts
Bowling Green State University
Bowling Green, Ohio Dan R. Stiver
Professor of Theology
Andrew D. Spear Hardin-Simmons University
Graduate Student in Philosophy, Department of Abilene, Texas
Philosophy
State University of New York at Buffalo Daniel Stoljar
Buffalo, New York Senior Fellow, Philosophy Program
Australian National University
Canberra, Australia
xl
Lucian W. Stone, Jr. Dirk Tänzler

Assistant Professor of Philosophy Fachbereich Geschichte und Soziologie
Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville Universität Konstanz
Edwardsville, Illinois Konstanz, Germany
Guy W. Stroh Jon Taylor

Professor of Philosophy Emeritus, Philosophy Associate Professor of Religion
Department University of Great Falls
Rider University Great Falls, Montana
Michael R. Taylor
Philippa Strum Associate Professor of Philosophy, Philosophy
Director, Division of United States Studies Department
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Oklahoma State University
Washington, D.C. Stillwater, Oklahoma
Ellen Kappy Suckiel Michael Don Thompson

Professor of Philosophy Associate Professor of Religious Studies, Religion
University of California, Santa Cruz Department
Santa Cruz, California Oklahoma State University
Ronald Suter
Professor Emeritus, Department of Philosophy Richard L. Tieszen
Michigan State University Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy
East Lansing, Michigan San Jose State University
San Jose, California
Brendan Sweetman
Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy John J. Tilley
Rockhurst University Associate Professor of Philosophy, Department of
Kansas City, Missouri Philosophy
Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis
Zoltán Gendler Szabó Indianopolis, Indiana
Associate Professor of Philosophy, The Sage School
of Philosophy Lester Tome
Cornell University Teaching Assistant, Dance Department
Ithaca, New York Temple University
Michael David Székely
PhD Candidate, Philosophy Edgar A. Towne
Temple University Honorably Retired Minister, Presbyterian Church
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (USA), and Professor of Theology Emeritus,
Christian Theological Seminary
Indianapolis, Indiana
Stephen L. Tanner
Ralph A. Britsch Humanities Professor of English, Saul Traiger
English Department Department of Philosophy
Brigham Young University Occidental College
Provo, Utah Los Angeles, California
xli
Nick Trakakis Eric v. d. Luft

Doctoral Student and Casual Tutor/Lecturer, Curator of Historical Collections, Health Sciences
Department of Philosophy Library
Monash University SUNY Upstate Medical University
Clayton, Victoria, Australia Syracuse, New York
Peter Tramel James Van Evra

Assistant Professor, Department of English and Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy
Philosophy University of Waterloo
United States Military Academy Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
West Point, New York
Michael Ventimiglia
Daniel Trippett Assistant Professor of Philosophy
Philosophy Department Sacred Heart University
Oklahoma State University Fairfield, Connecticut
Ian Verstegen
Elizabeth Trott Visiting Assistant Professor, Art Department
Full Professor of Philosophy, Philosophy Ursinus College
Department Collegeville, Pennsylvania
Ryerson University
Toronto, Ontario, Canada Christopher Viger
Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy
Jennifer Tsukayama University of Western Ontario
Assistant Professor, Department of Dance London, Ontario, Canada
Arizona State University
Tempe, Arizona Donald Wayne Viney
Professor of Philosophy, Department of Social
Matthew Turner Sciences
Department of Philosophy Pittsburg State University
Temple University Pittsburg, Kansas
Anne K. Vittoria
Associate Professor of Sociology and Gerontology
Cicily Vahadji State University of New York at Cortland
Springfield, Massachusetts Cortland, New York
Marcia Morgan Vahrmeyer

Postdoctoral Researcher Erica Wagner
Technical University of Dresden Graduate Student, Department of Philosophy
Dresden, Germany Temple University
Jean Van Delinder
Associate Professor, Department of Sociology Mary Ellen Waithe
Oklahoma State University Professor of Philosophy, First College and College
Stillwater, Oklahoma of Arts and Sciences
Cleveland State University
Cleveland, Ohio
xlii
Kathleen A. Wallace Judy D. Whipps

Professor of Philosophy Associate Professor of Philosophy, and Director,
Hofstra University Liberal Studies Program
Hempstead, New York Grand Valley State University
Allendale, Michigan
F. Michael Walsh
Toronto, Ontario, Canada Peter J. Whitehouse
Director Integrative Studies, Department of
Philip Walsh Neurology, and Professor, University Memory and
Assistant Professor of Sociology, Department of Aging Center
Sociology/Anthropology Case Western Reserve University
State University of New York at Cortland Cleveland, Ohio
Cortland, New York
Christopher Wilkes
Roger Ward Vice President of Academic Affairs
Associate Professor of Philosophy Pacific University
Georgetown College Forest Grove, Oregon
Georgetown, Kentucky
Lisa A. Wilkinson
Anne Waters Assistant Professor of Philosophy
Albuquerque, New Mexico Nebraska Wesleyan University
Lincoln, Nebraska
Earle Waugh
Professor Emeritus in Religious Studies and Director Catherine Wilson
of the Dimic Research Institute Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta University of British Columbia
Edmonton, Alberta Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
Jack Weller Daniel J. Wilson

Assistant Professor of Sociology, Department of Professor of History, Department of History
Sociology Muhlenberg College
University of Kansas Allentown, Pennsylvania
Lawrence, Kansas
Robert Wilson-Black
Randy L. Wells Vice President
Sociology Graduate Student University of St Francis
New School of Social Research Joliet, Illinois
Andrew S. Winston
Kenneth R. Westphal Professor, Department of Psychology
Professor of Philosophy, School of Economic and University of Guelph
Social Studies Guelph, Ontario, Canada
University of East Anglia
Norwich, Norfolk, UK Martin Woessner
Doctoral Candidate in Modern Intellectual History,
Demian Wheeler Department of History
Iliff School of Theology The Graduate School and University Center
Denver, Colorado New York City, New York
xliii
Raymond Wolters Charles Yrigoyen, Jr.

Thomas Muncy Keith Professor of History, General Secretary, General Commission on Archives
Department of History and History
University of Delaware United Methodist Church
Newark, Delaware Madison, New Jersey
Richard Wood
Associate Professor, Department of Sociology Fred G. Zaspel
University of New Mexico Senior Pastor, Cornerstone Church of Skippack
Albuquerque, New Mexico Skippack, Pennsylvania
James A. Woodbridge
Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of
Philosophy
College of William and Mary
Williamsburg, Virginia
Mark P. Worrell, University of Kansas

University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas
Sarah Elizabeth Worth

Department of Philosophy
Furman University
Greenville, South Carolina
Robert H. Wozniak
Professor of Psychology, Department of Psychology
Bryn Mawr College
Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania
Cory Wright
Editorial Assistant, Philosophical Psychology,
University of California
La Jolla, California
Keith E. Yandell
Julius R. Weinberg Professor of Philosophy,
University of Wisconsin at Madison
Madison, Wisconsin
Jonathan Young
Director
Center for Story and Symbol
Santa Barbara, California
xliv
ABBREVIATIONS FOR ACADEMIC DEGREES
BA Bachelor of Arts DSc Doctor of Science
BBA Bachelor of Business Administration EdD Doctor of Education
BD Bachelor of Divinity JD Doctor of Law
BFA Bachelor of Fine Arts LLD Doctor of Laws
BLitt Bachelor of Literature LHD Doctor of Humane Letters
BM Bachelor of Music MD Doctor of Medicine
BS Bachelor of Science PhD Doctor of Philosophy
BSS Bachelor of Social Science STD Doctor of Sacred Theology
LLB Bachelor of Laws ThD Doctor of Theology
PhB Bachelor of Philosophy
STB Bachelor of Sacred Theology
MA Master of Arts
MBA Master of Business Administration
MS Master of Science
MDiv Master of Divinity
STL Licentiate in Sacred Theology
DCL Doctor of Classical Literature
DD Doctor of Divinity
DLitt Doctor of Literature
DPhil Doctor of Philosophy
xlv
ABBREVIATIONS FOR
BIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCE WORKS
Amer Nat Bio American National Biography, Robert Wilkinson (London and New
ed. John A. Garraty and Mark C. York: Routledge, 1996).
Carnes (New York: Oxford University Blackwell Analytic Phil Blackwell Companion
Press, 1999), plus ANB website supple- to Analytic Philosophy, ed. A. P.
ments. Martinich and David Sosa (Malden,
Amer Phils Before 1950 American Mass.: Blackwell, 2001).
Philosophers Before 1950, Dictionary Blackwell Comp Prag Blackwell Companion
of Literary Biography vol. 270, ed. to Pragmatism, ed. John Shook and
Philip Dematteis and Leemon Joseph Margolis (Malden, Mass.:
McHenry (Detroit: Thomson Gale, Blackwell, 2005).
2003).
Blackwell Comp Phils Blackwell Companion
Amer Phils 1950-2000 American Philosophers, to the Philosophers, ed. Robert
1950–2000, Dictionary of Literary Arrington (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell,
Biography vol. 279, ed. Philip 1999).
Dematteis and Leemon McHenry
Blackwell Amer Phil Blackwell Guide to
(Detroit: Thomson Gale, 2003).
American Philosophy, ed. Armen
Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio Appleton’s Marsoobian and John Ryder (Malden,
Cyclopedia of American Biography and Mass.: Blackwell, 2003).
Supplements, 13 vols, ed. James Grant,
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio Cambridge
John Fiske, and James Dearborn (New
Dictionary of American Biography, ed.
York: D. Appleton and Co., 1888,
John S. Bowman (Cambridge, UK:
1901, 1918).
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
Bio Dict Psych Biographical Dictionary of
Canad Encyc The Canadian Encyclopedia, ed.
Psychology, ed. Noel Sheehy, Antony
James H. Marsh (Toronto, Ontario:
Chapman, and Wendy Conroy
McClelland & Stewart, 2000).
(London: Routledge, 1997).
Comp Amer Thought A Companion to
Bio Dict Psych by Zusne Biographical
American Thought, ed. Richard J. Fox
Dictionary of Psychology, by Leonard
and James T. Kloppenberg (Oxford,
Zusne (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood
UK, and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell,
Press, 1984).
1995).
Bio 20thC Phils Biographical Dictionary of
Dict Amer Bio Dictionary of American
Twentieth-Century Philosophers, ed.
Biography and Supplements, 30 vols
Stuart Brown, Diané Collinson, and
xlvii
Abbreviations for Biographical Reference Works
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, (1902–49).

1928–95). Proc of APA Memorial Minutes in the
Dict Amer Religious Bio Dictionary of Proceedings of the American
American Religious Biography, 2nd Philosophical Association, vols
edn, by Henry Warner Bowden 23– (1949– ).
(Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, Nat Cycl Amer Bio The National Cyclopaedia
1993). of American Biography, 63 vols (New
Dict Canad Bio Dictionary of Canadian York: James T. White & Co.,
Biography, 14 vols, ed. Francess G. 1891–1984).
Halpenny et al. (Toronto: University of Oxford Comp Phil Oxford Companion to
Toronto Press, 1966–98). Philosophy, ed. Ted Honderich
Dict Economics A Dictionary of Economics, 4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
vols, ed. John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, 1995).
and Peter Newman (London and New Pres Addr of APA Presidential Addresses of the
York: Macmillan, 1987). American Philosophical Association,
Encyc Amer Bio Encyclopedia of American vols. 1–10, ed. Richard T. Hull
Biography, 2nd edn, ed. John A. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999–2001;
Garraty and Jerome L. Sternstein (New Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
York: HarperCollins, 1996). 2004– ).
Encyc Cog Sci Encyclopedia of Cognitive Routledge Encycl Phil Routledge Encyclopedia
Science, 4 vols, ed. Lynn Nadel of Philosophy, 10 vols, ed. Edward
(London and New York: Nature Craig (London and New York:
Publishing Group, 2003). Routledge, 1999), and Encyclopedia
Encyc Ethics Encyclopedia of Ethics, 3 vols, website supplements.
2nd edn, ed. Lawrence C. Becker and Who Was Who in Amer Who Was Who in
Charlotte B. Becker (New York: America, 14 vols (Chicago and New
Routledge, 2001). Providence, N.J.: Marquis Who’s Who,
Encyc Psych Encyclopedia of Psychology, 8 1943–2002).
vols, ed. Alan E. Kazdin (Washington, Who’s Who in Phil Who’s Who in Philosophy,
D.C.: American Psychological ed. Dagobert D. Runes (New York:
Association; Oxford: Oxford University Philosophical Library, 1942).
Press, 2000). Women Phils Women Philosophers: A Bio-
Encyc Relig Encyclopedia of Religion, 16 vols, Critical Source Book, ed. Ethel M.
ed. Mircea Eliade (New York: Kersey (New York: Greenwood, 1989).
Macmillan, 1987).
Encyc Social Behav Sci International
Encyclopedia of the Social and
Behavioral Sciences, 26 vols, ed. Neil
Smerlser and Paul Baltes (Amsterdam
and New York: Elsevier, 2001).
Proc of APA in Phil Rev Memorial Minutes in
the Proceedings of the American
Philosophical Association published in
Philosophical Review, vols 21–58
xlviii
A
ABBOT, Francis Ellingwood (1836–1903) Dover, New Hampshire, in 1864. The next
year, the Unitarians held a conference to form
Francis Ellingwood Abbot was born in Boston, a national association, which adopted in the
Massachusetts on 6 November 1836. Following preamble of the constitution the statement that
Boston Latin School, Abbot joined the class of Unitarians “are disciples of the Lord Jesus
1859 at Harvard College. He began his studies Christ.” Abbot and others objected to this state-
ranked number one in his class and graduated as ment on the ground that it violated the
a member of Phi Beta Kappa. Harvard provided Unitarian tradition of free inquiry. At the
the foundation for exploring philosophical ideas second conference, in 1866, Abbot led an
with associates. These discussions later led to unsuccessful attempt to remove what he con-
Abbot’s participation with Charles Sanders sidered a creedal statement in the preamble.
PEIRCE, William JAMES, and others in the Upon returning to Dover, Abbot resigned from
Metaphysical Club. Abbot attended Harvard the Unitarian ministry.
Divinity School and graduated from Meadeville The retention of this commitment to Jesus in
Theological School in 1863. the preamble led many Unitarians, and other
It was at Meadville that Abbot began a critical liberal religionists, to form the Free Religion
examination of William Hamilton’s philosophy, Association (FRA) in 1867, with Abbot as a
which led to the publication in 1864 in the North key figure in this movement. In 1869 Abbot
American Review of his “The Philosophy of became minister of the Unitarian Society of
Space and Time” and “The Conditioned and the Toledo, Ohio, on the condition that the con-
Unconditioned.” These two articles established gregation withdraw from the National
Abbot’s reputation as a significant American Unitarian Conference and abandon the name
philosopher, with Darwin and Hamilton both Unitarian. In 1870 Abbot became the founding
responding to Abbot. It was also on the basis of editor of The Index, which was considered the
these articles that the philosophy department at unofficial publication of the FRA. Abbot pub-
Harvard unanimously recommended Abbot for lished more than 800 articles in The Index and
a faculty appointment. However, the adminis- other journals.
tration at Harvard feared that Abbot’s open In 1872 Abbot spoke against the proposals
support of evolution would harm fund-raising being considered at the first convention of the
for the college. Therefore, Abbot was not National Association to Secure the Religious
appointed to the Harvard position and for Amendment of the Constitution of the United
similar reasons was never able to secure a per- States. Abbot returned from this convention
manent academic appointment. with a commitment to abolish the political
With a wife and two sons to support, Abbot power of American Christianity. In the next
became minister at the Unitarian Society in issue of The Index he called for the formation
1
ABBOT
of Liberal Leagues across America to fight the Philosophy. Less than a month later, on 23
proposed religious amendment. By the time October 1903, the tenth anniversary of his
Abbot returned to Boston in 1873 there were wife’s death, Abbot committed suicide on her
nine local Liberal Leagues. In 1876 Abbot led grave in Beverly, Massachusetts.
a national congress of Liberal Leagues in In 1864 Abbot published a defense of evo-
Philadelphia. At their second congress in 1877 lution that appeared in two installments in the
the Leagues nominated Robert INGERSOLL for North American Review. These writings, along
President of the United States and Abbot for with those of Chauncey WRIGHT around the
Vice President. Both declined the nomination. same time, are the first published defenses of
By 1880 Abbot fought his last battles for Darwinian evolution in America. In the first
free religion with The Index, turning over the article, “The Philosophy of Space and Time,”
editorial duties to his closest friend, William Abbot argued that the perceptions of objects as
James POTTER. In the spring of 1880 Abbot continuous in space and time emerge in the
enrolled in the doctoral program in philosophy mind as necessary logical conditions of these
at Harvard, and was awarded the PhD in 1881. sensuous perceptions. The mind encounters
However, his radical philosophical and reli- objects through sensuous perceptions and
gious views remained roadblocks to academic through its faculty known as sensuous imagi-
appointments. His dissertation led to the pub- nation creates a mental representation of these
lication of Scientific Theism in 1885. William objects and provides, via the “elaborative
James was interested in this work and secured faculty,” a new synthesis of these perceptions.
from Abbot “advance sheets” to share with The mind cannot form a conception of pure or
his class. Peirce considered Abbot’s book as empty space since the sensuous imagination
doing honor to American thought and espe- can never transcend the data of sensuous per-
cially praised Abbot’s introduction and his view ception. Abbot also deduced an important
of scientific realism. Peirce also praised Abbot’s corollary that the sensuous imagination cannot
insights concerning “relations,” predicting that mentally reproduce an object without at the
these insights would excite fruitful discussion. same time reproducing the physical conditions
Scientific Theism was translated into German, of the perception of that object.
which served to increase Abbot’s international Abbot argued that all knowledge is relative.
reputation. In 1890 Abbot published The Way Consequently, he thought that it is impossible
Out of Agnosticism or The Philosophy of Free for the mind to create objects of its own cog-
Religion, a collection of his essays. The book nition, for if that occurred the mind would
was heavily criticized by Josiah ROYCE, setting display a spontaneous activity that would
off an ugly public controversy. violate the law of the relativity of knowledge.
In 1893 Abbot’s wife, Katharine Fearing The mind must have all objects presented to it.
Loring, and his best friend, William Potter, Therefore, all objects of knowledge are empir-
both died. The following year he went as a ical. In developing this position, Abbot refuted
spectator to the National Conference of en masse all ontological theories. In developing
Unitarian and Other Christian Churches. At his argument, Abbot especially charged that
this gathering Abbot’s previous objections to Kant operated from the false premise that
Unitarians being “disciples of the Lord Jesus assumed the possibility of pure knowledge a
Christ” were rescinded. Although the priori. What Abbot championed as common
Unitarians had essentially accepted Abbot’s sense was the foundation of all truth. His
“free religion” position, he was never able to analysis provided the recognition by philosophy
resume his former fellowship within this reli- of the absolute and necessary correlation
gious community. In September 1903 Abbot between a priori and a posteriori knowledge.
finished his last work, The Syllogistic This correlation is important in Abbot’s view
2
ABBOT
because it bridges the chasm between the sub- the study. He further criticized Comte for
jective and the objective. Through this bridging failing to include all that is or can be presented
process, thought is brought face to face with to experience, whether internally or externally.
existence, thereby throwing light on the fun- Although Abbot appreciated Herbert
damental problem of the validity of human Spencer’s noted effort to organize all human
knowledge. knowledge, he rejected his universal formula of
In the second paper, “The Conditioned and the law of evolution on the contention that not
the Unconditioned,” Abbot established a prag- all phenomena can be reduced to changes of
matic criterion for determining the value of position of atoms and masses. Abbot also
intellectual contributions. He realized that the argued that it is inadequate to view growth in
most noted statements of one stage in history spirit and character as merely a rearrangement
had only transitional value for the next stage. of atoms. For Abbot, if positive science is to be
The pragmatic test for evaluating intellectual thoroughly scientific, it must extend itself
contributions is whether they foster or fetter the beyond purely physical phenomena and include
free movement of thought. Abbot rejected all also the purely spiritual phenomena of thought
systems that hamper the mind with arbitrary and feeling. Thus, for science to function
restrictions, especially those which postulate a properly, it must include all areas of human
special faculty of faith. knowledge, including the religious. The same
In discussing Hamilton’s view of the terms holds true for religion and theology. They too
“absolute” and “infinite” Abbot indicated that must employ the scientific method. Abbot pos-
to say God is infinite is an elliptical use of tulated that religion and theology must adapt
language. Adequate use of language would be the scientific approach, relinquish the pretense
to say that God is infinitely good or wise. What of being “scriptural” or “evangelical,” and
Abbot advances is that the idea of God emerges commit themselves to a scientific systemiza-
from the depths of humanity itself and not in tion of theism as a theological science. This
the suggestions of outward nature. The only shift for theology and religion is possible if
way we can infer God from nature is through truth is viewed as harmonious and organic in
our projecting God in nature. For Abbot, the all its ramifications.
primordial germ of the idea of God lies in the Abbot and Spencer continued their discus-
self’s consciousness. Thus, human nature is the sion in articles and a pamphlet from 1868
beginning point in the search for God. through 1870. Abbot applauded Spencer’s
In “Positivism in Theology” (1866, reprinted effort to base his philosophy on the organizing
in 1996) Abbot presented an analysis of the principle of universal evolution because it rests
positive method in relation to theology, using on the unity of the universe, the order of nature,
the contributions of Comte and Spencer as his and the absolute universality of law. However,
points of reference. Although he viewed posi- Abbot contended that Spencer’s cardinal
tivism as the great reform in the scientific demerits were his mechanical interpretation of
method, Abbot realized that only material the evolutionary process and his failure to
nature was being studied according to this follow boldly the idea of universal evolution to
approach, with human and theological studies its logical consequences. As a more satisfac-
yet to be adequately influenced by this tory approach to evolution, Abbot offered the
approach. The problem with Comte’s position vitalist theory, which views the natural evolu-
is that he arbitrarily rejected the mental sciences tion of life through the reciprocal play of
and dismissed metaphysics with contempt. external and internal forces whose manifesta-
Abbot rejected this position on the premise tions cannot be classified together. Abbot
that if one is going to engage in a truly scientific understood the vitalist theory to be in harmony
study of nature one may not arbitrarily restrict with the spirit of the development theory,
3
ABBOT
which necessitates the assumption of sponta- The position is theistic because it emphasizes
neous generation in place of special creation. the oneness of the human and the divine, and
What Abbot proposed was the reverent study it is rationalistic because it argues from the
of the ways of nature, using the scientific human to the divine. Epistemology is essential
method, without imposing on nature one’s own to Abbot’s philosophical views. He postulated
ways. that all knowledge is relative and that all objects
In “Theism and Christianity” (1865, of knowledge are empirical. This view is pre-
reprinted in 1996) Abbot added a new per- sented as a common-sense approach which lies
spective to his developing rational philosophy at the bottom of all truth. It was important to
of religion. He took as axiomatic that law and Abbot that there is an absolute and necessary
adaptation underlie all existence, supporting correlation between a priori and a posteriori
the one great rational postulate of the unity of knowledge because it bridges the chasm
the universe and the mutual harmony of all between subjective and objective knowledge.
facts and truths. He also viewed the individual’s During the years Abbot served as editor of
nature as having a permanent and universal The Index, his philosophy was focused on the
tendency to worship. From this postulate, he support of Free Religion and against the polit-
concluded that there must be an object which ical power of Christianity in America. Being
people are compelled to worship – a prophetic committed to the scientific approach, he viewed
impulse guiding the center of all Being. In other religion as the natural obligation of right and
words, if reason is possible, religion is rational. truth without the faintest restrictions upon any
Abbot’s position here comes close to Leibniz’s human faculty other than this natural obliga-
principle of sufficient reason. tion. For Abbot, this view of religion fits within
Based on his postulate of the unity of nature, the free inquiry obligation of the scientific
all personal beings share a common essence or approach and does not limit religion to pre-sci-
nature. God must also be a person. Certainly entific views of God or to traditions of super-
differences exist between the transcendent natural revelation. The mind must be free to
attributes of God and the finite limitations of search for truth, which is the dictate of religion.
humanity, but their natures are identical con- However, being religious requires more than
cerning goodness, justice, and love. Abbot thus being devoted to truth. It requires that one act
postulated a Godhead that can be interpreted in harmony with one’s highest convictions and
and apprehended from the perspective of an noblest sentiments. This devotion to truth and
ideal humanness. Private experience and indi- moral action is religious, because it is based
vidual consciousness, coupled with insights of on an indestructible instinct, sentiment, or
history and science, can serve as the foundation tendency that is common to universal human
of a theology of worth and value. By taking this nature and that is inherent in all great religions.
position, Abbot rejected individualism because According to Abbot, nature provides the ideal
it seeks the universal in the peculiar. To replace of what one ought to be. Nature also provides
it, he postulated a theology that is grounded on the instinct, sentiment, and obligation which
the basis of universal human nature. impel one to a higher stage of development. It
In summary of the foundation of his philos- is this pursuit of the moral ideal and the honest
ophy, Abbot presented a view of theism which endeavor to realize it in character and life that
understands that the ground and origin of all constitute all religion. Thus, religion is the effort
finite existence is One Infinite and Immanent by humans to perfect themselves by fulfilling
Personality, that all spiritual beings are one in their ideals.
nature with the Infinite Personality, and that Abbot realized that people differ greatly in
religion is the response of spiritual beings to the strength and clarity of their moral precepts.
revelations of love from the Infinite Personality. These differences can only be corrected by
4
ABBOT
mental enlightenment based on a more Abbot rejected the notion of Jesus’s divinity
adequate understanding of the truth, which is on the basis that there is nothing original in
only possible through an application of the sci- Jesus’s conviction of a special divine mission.
entific method. However, for such enlighten- Although Christianity and the other religions
ment to occur science must mature and include contributed to human development, Abbot
within its method the great subjective realities rejected all forms of Christianity because it
of our human conscience and come to under- limits free inquiry and places its followers in
stand that the truth of these great eternal mental and spiritual bondage. The net effect is
verities lies at the core of universal nature. that Christianity has separated religion from
Through the application of the scientific real life – dislocated the balance between the
method, education and culture will cleanse spiritual and the practical – by focusing on sal-
from religion the evils of superstition. Abbot vation to another world. The problem is that
asserted that if religion fails to make the nec- Christianity remains a system of thought and
essary adjustment to the scientific method in the authority that does not correspond to our
search for truth, religion will die and only growing understanding of the nature of the
survive as a part of history. universe and the whole of human life. Abbot
Abbot relies on the scientific method for the contends that this problem can only be resolved
discovery of the facts of nature. These facts are by free inquiry seeking truth. However, for free
an understanding of the relations of things in inquiry to be the guiding principle, Christians
nature, which is a system of the universe itself. must admit that their Confession is not true,
For Abbot, nature and God are the same. It is Jesus was not the Messiah, and the Christ
no longer necessary to seek God outside or longed for has never come and never will come.
above nature, for modern science has laid the In place of authoritarian pre-scientific reli-
foundation for a natural idea of God in the gions, Abbot proposed Free Religion based on
discovery of the principle of the simple unity of free inquiry operating within the bounds of the
force throughout the universe. Abbot is not scientific method. Free Religion is generally
saying that this principle of unity constitutes the defined as the universal religious sentiment
idea of God; rather, he postulates that the dis- running through all special religions. Although
covery of this unity provides a monotheism each special religion demands obedience to a
based exclusively on scientific grounds. Instead particular ideal, Free Religion requires obedi-
of studying scriptures of pre-scientific religions, ence to one’s own ideal in its natural and unper-
one now studies nature for an understanding of verted state. This central ideal is faith in
God. The theory of evolution also provides an humans as progressive beings. Nature has made
important insight that the history of the a part of each person an impulse toward the
universe is a connected whole. However, Abbot Better. This impulse is the life of God in each
rejected the notion that there is a divine center individual. Special or artificial religion has
of intelligence in nature, contending that the turned humans from the instinctive love of the
intelligence of nature cannot be centralized or ideal to repulsive forms of the ideal.
localized because it is boundless. Special religions claim to offer some type of
Christianity for Abbot is to be studied and salvation from the reality of this world, but
evaluated like all other historical religions. All Free Religion seeks the following of instinctive
religions are concerned with common univer- ideals which will move humans toward indi-
sal elements: purity, benevolence, mercy, for- vidual and social perfection. The aim of Free
giveness, humility, self-sacrifice, and love. Religion is to develop in the individual char-
Christianity is distinct from other religions in its acter – character for its own sake emanci-
claim that God conferred upon Jesus the par- pated from the hope of heaven and the fear of
ticular supernatural office of being the Messiah. hell. The goal of character is thoroughly sec-
5
ABBOT
ularized. Abbot was arguing that the aims of phy established on the relational character of
the individual and society are really one and nature based on human experience tested by the
the same. Individual character can only be scientific method. A brief review of Abbot’s
attained when one lives for universal ends – accomplishments clearly indicates the value of
for justice, truth, freedom, progress, and love. his diverse contributions: as one of the first
In living for others one achieves the noblest philosophers publicly supporting the
character possible for oneself. However, Darwinian revolution; a primary founder of
society must function in a way that encourages the Free Religious Association; the founding
and supports the development of the charac- editor of The Index; the founding President of
ter of each individual. Such character devel- the National Liberal League; a key participant
opment is impossible through special religions in the development of American empirical phi-
because these religions are based on exclusive losophy; a social philosopher redirecting
claims of supremacy. Free Religion provides American ethical thought from individualism to
the foundation for character development universalism; a major spokesperson for Free
because it is based on freedom of thought and Religion and its scientific orientation; and a
expression within the context of the scientific continual supporter of freethought and the
method. other human rights guaranteed in the
Abbot essentially rejects idealism, especially in Constitution of the United States.
the forms presented by Kant and Hegel. In its
place, he postulates the position of realistic evo- BIBLIOGRAPHY
lution as providing the concept of the immanent Scientific Theism (Boston, 1885).
relational constitution of the universe to be The Way Out of Agnosticism: Or The
viewed as an organism, which is infinitely intel- Philosophy of Free Religion (Boston,
ligible and also infinitely intelligent. This rela- 1890).
tional constitution is immanent in the group as The Syllogistic Philosophy: Or Prolegomena
a group but not in the group as a strictly indi- to Science, 2 vols (Boston, 1906).
vidual thing. Without this relational constitution
there would be no system of nature, as Abbot Other Relevant Works
conceived of these eternal relationships as being Abbot’s papers are at Harvard University.
the self-evolution of nature. Abbot began from “The Philosophy of Space and Time,” North
the foundation of human experience, employed American Review 99 (1864): 64–117.
the scientific method in the study of nature as an “The Conditioned and the Unconditioned,”
organism, and came to the conclusion that God North American Review 99 (1864):
is the All and that the All is God. In rejecting his 402–49.
position as a form of pantheism, Abbot con- Professor Royce’s Libel: A Public Appeal for
tended that God, according to scientific theism, Redress to the Corporation and Overseers
is both immanent and transcendent. God is of Harvard University (Boston, 1891).
immanent in the world of human experience, Is not Harvard Responsible for the Conduct
yet transcendent in the realm that lies beyond of Her Professors, As Well As of Her
human experience. However, he is careful to Students? A Public Remonstrance
indicate that God is in no sense transcendent of Addressed to the Board of Overseers of
the infinite universe per se. For Abbot, the God Harvard University (Boston, 1892).
of scientific theism satisfies the demands of The Collected Essays of Francis Ellingwood
human intellect and also the need of humans to Abbot (1836–1903): American
worship. Philosopher and Free Religionist, 4 vols,
As Peirce indicated, Abbot made a significant ed. W. Creighton Peden and Everett J.
contribution toward an evolutionary philoso- Tarbox, Jr. (Lewiston, N.Y., 1996).
6
ABBOTT
If Ever Two Were One: A Private Diary of Weekly, but he chaffed under the denomina-
Love Eternal, ed. Brian Sullivan (New tional limits on editorial freedom.
York, 2004). In 1876 Henry Ward Beecher invited him to
become associate editor of the Christian
Further Reading Union, in which Abbott’s social commentary
Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, appeared under the title “Outlook.” On
Bio 20thC Phils, Cambridge Dict Amer Beecher’s resignation in 1881, Abbott became
Bio, Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer Religious full editor, changing the name of the magazine
Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v24, Who Was to Outlook. Under his editorship circulation
Who in Amer v1 grew to 100,000 readers. Abbott also suc-
Ahlstrom, Sydney, and Robert B. Mullin. The ceeded Beecher as pastor of Plymouth
Scientific Theist (Macon, Georgia, 1987). Congregational Church in Brooklyn, where
Peden, W. Creighton. The Philosopher of he served from 1888 to 1899.
Free Religion: Francis Ellingwood Abbot, In the years from 1890 to 1915 Abbott was
1836–1903 (New York, 1992). Contains a a national figure speaking against American
bibliography of Abbot’s writings. isolationism and advocating rights for Native
Royce, Josiah. “Dr. Abbot’s Way Out of Americans and workers. He was a friend of
Agnosticism” International Journal of Theodore Roosevelt, who became associate
Ethics 1 (1890): 98–113. editor of Outlook after his presidency. Abbott
advocated progressive Protestantism, holding
W. Creighton Peden that all increases in knowledge advance the
Kingdom of God. Abbott’s Christian evolu-
tionism argues that Christendom is the highest
culture and that Christianity is the highest
religion. Outlook became increasingly secular
with the profound disillusionment following
ABBOTT, Lyman (1835–1922) World War I. With the gradual demise of pro-
gressivism, Abbott’s influence waned. Ernest
Abbott Lyman was born on 18 December Hamlin Abbott assumed editorship of Outlook
1835 in Roxbury, Massachusetts. Lyman grad- after his father’s death. Abbott died on 22
uated from New York University with a BA in September 1922 in New York City.
1853. He joined his brother’s law firm and
passed the bar in 1856, the same year he BIBLIOGRAPHY
married Abby Frances Hamlin. Influenced by Jesus of Nazareth: His Life and Teachings
the preaching of Henry Ward BEECHER, Abbott (New York, 1869).
left the law to study theology in 1859 to Old Testament Shadows of New Testament
prepare for the ministry. In 1860 he was called Truths (New York, 1870).
to pastor a Congregational church in Terre A Dictionary of Religious Knowledge (New
Haute, Indiana. Desiring to influence a stable York, 1872).
postwar society, he returned to New York in Laicus; or, the Experiences of a Layman in a
1865 to direct the American Freedman’s Union Country Parish (New York, 1872).
Commission. He became disillusioned with Illustrated Commentary on the New
the competition among aid societies, resigned Testament in Four Volumes (New York,
his position in 1869, and moved his family of 1875).
six children to Cornwall on Hudson in New For Family Worship (New York, 1883).
York to become a full-time writer. In 1871 he A Study in Human Nature (New York,
became the editor of Illustrated Christian 1884).
7
ABBOTT
In Aid of Faith (New York, 1886). ABRAMS, Meyer Howard (1912– )

Evolution of Christianity (Boston, 1892).
Plymouth Hymnal (New York, 1893). M. H. Abrams was born on 23 July 1912 in
The Life of Christ (Boston, 1894). Long Branch, New Jersey. He received his BA
Christianity and Social Problems (Boston, degree from Harvard University in 1934. His
1896). senior thesis, The Milk of Paradise, was pub-
The Theology of an Evolutionist (Boston, lished the same year. After studying for a year at
1897). the University of Cambridge he returned to
The Life and Letters of the Apostle Paul Harvard, where he received his MA in 1937 and
(Boston, 1898). PhD in 1940. Abrams began a distinguished
The Life and Literature of the Ancient career at Cornell University’s English depart-
Hebrews (Boston, 1901). ment in 1945 as assistant professor, rising
The Rights of Man (Boston, 1901). through the academic ranks to full professor in
The Life of Henry Ward Beecher (Boston, 1953 and Class of 1916 Professor of English in
1903). 1973. He has been emeritus professor since 1983.
The Other Room (New York, 1903). Abrams is known for his erudition and for
The Great Companion (New York, 1904). the depth and breadth of his scholarship in
The Christian Ministry (Boston, 1905). Romantic literature, aesthetic theory and crit-
The Home Builder (Boston, 1908). icism, and the history of ideas and cultures.
The Spirit of Democracy (Boston, 1910). These qualities are all on display in his two
My Four Anchors: What We Know in the best-known works, The Mirror and the Lamp
Realm of Religion (Boston, 1911). (1953) and Natural Supernaturalism (1971).
America in the Making (New Haven, 1911). Central to both books is his conviction that
Letters to Unknown Friends (New York, “Romantic thought and literature represented
1913). a decisive turn in Western culture” (1971, p.
The Last Days of Jesus Christ (New York, 14). Abrams depicts this decisive turn in The
1918). Mirror and the Lamp through the two con-
trasting metaphors of the book’s title. He shows
Other Relevant Works that the image of the mind as a mirror, reflect-
Reminiscences (Boston, 1915). ing an outer world of objects, predominated in
What Christianity Means to Me: A Spiritual both poetry and philosophy from Plato through
Autobiography (New York, 1921). the eighteenth century. Romantic thought then
reconceived the poet’s mind and the artist’s
Further Reading vocation through the metaphor of the lamp, a
Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, “radiant projector which makes a contribution
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer to the objects it perceives” (1953, p. viii).
Bio, Dict Amer Religious Bio, Nat Cycl The Mirror and the Lamp also introduces a
Amer Bio v1, Who Was Who in Amer v1 well-known and influential conceptual frame-
Brown, Ira V. Lyman Abbott: Christian work for classifying aesthetic theories. Abrams
Evolutionist (Cambridge, 1953). Contains identifies mimetic, pragmatic, expressive, and
a bibliography of Abbott’s writings. objective theories of art as respectively high-
lighting one element – universe, audience, artist,
Roger Ward or work – of the art work’s total situation. He
affirms the importance of theory by pointing out
the practical interdependence of the activities of
theorizing, criticism, and the production of par-
ticular art works. In Natural Supernaturalism,
8
ADAMS
Abrams continues his discussion of English and York, 1971).

German Romanticism, showing how Romantic The Correspondent Breeze: Essays in English
poets and philosophers effectively secularized Romanticism (New York, 1984).
inherited theological doctrines. Doing Things with Texts: Essays in Criticism
Abrams’s writings on contemporary critical and Critical Theory (New York, 1989).
theory are collected in Doing Things with Texts
(1989). A self-described traditionalist, he Further Reading
believes that literature conveys determinable Cambridge Dict Amer Bio
meanings and that we can understand, through Hartman, Geoffrey, et al., High Romantic
shared linguistic and social conventions, what Argument: Essays for M.H. Abrams
an author intended to communicate. Such (Ithaca, N.Y., 1981).
understanding is, however, approximate and
corrigible; and Abrams allows for the possibil- Dean Graham
ity, even inevitability, of multiple valid critical
interpretations and literary theories. A theory is
valid if it is useful in providing pertinent insights
into literary works from its particular vantage
point. The innumerable interests, perspectives,
and purposes served by theories make hopes for ADAMS, Elie Maynard (1919–2003)
a single, grand theory misplaced.
Abrams’s pragmatic pluralism is consonant E. Maynard Adams was born on 29 December
with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later anti-essen- 1919 in Clarkton, Virginia. He attended the
tialist philosophy, which holds that linguistic University of Richmond (BA 1941 and MA
meanings are to an extent fluid and cannot be 1944, both in philosophy); Colgate-Rochester
fixed in isolation from their situation in ever- Divinity School (BD 1944); and Harvard
widening eddies of deeply valuable cultural University (MA 1947 and PhD 1948, both in
practices. Looking to the actual practice of the- philosophy), where he studied with C. I. LEWIS
orizing about art, Abrams finds that it is “not and Ralph Barton PERRY. He taught for one
a science like physics but an enterprise of dis- year (1947–8) at Ohio University before
covery” (1989, p. 29). The enterprise of aes- moving to the University of North Carolina in
thetic theory is in this respect paradigmatic of 1948, where he spent the rest of his career. He
humanistic discourse, which at its best resem- served as chair of the philosophy department
bles an ongoing dialogue of mutual discovery from 1960 to 1965, and chair of the university
and clarification; accordingly, “the search for faculty from 1976 to 1979. In 1971 he was
humanistic truth has no ending” (1989, p. 87). named Kenan Professor of Philosophy, and
held that position until retiring in 1990. Adams
BIBLIOGRAPHY was actively engaged in a variety of good
The Milk of Paradise: The Effects of Opium causes in civil rights, poverty, peace, and edu-
Visions on the Works of De Quincey, cation. He was a highly respected and much-
Crabbe, Francis Thompson, and Coleridge loved member of both the faculty and the com-
(Cambridge, Mass., 1934; New York, munity. Adams continued to write until several
1971). months before his death on 17 November
The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory 2003 in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
and the Critical Tradition (New York, Adams’s work ranged across the major sub-
1953; 1960; 1971). fields of philosophy. In all, he wrote more than
Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and one hundred scholarly articles and he wrote or
Revolution in Romantic Literature (New edited twelve books. His most important book,
9
ADAMS
The Metaphysics of Self and World (1991), meaning and value led him to be a staunch sup-
provides a comprehensive account of his phi- porter of the humanities as providing our most
losophy. For Adams, the goal of philosophy is complete understanding of reality.
to develop a full and integrated understanding Adams was too much out of step with the
of persons, culture, and the world. His negative temper of the times to be influential. He belonged
agenda was to undermine the one-dimensional, to no school of philosophical thought. Though
purely factual, world of scientific and philo- it is too soon to say, his originality, the sweep of
sophical naturalism – which he believed to be his philosophical work, and the depth of his
both incoherent and culturally destructive critique of modern civilization suggest that he will
(because it undercuts the sources of value and some day be viewed as a prophetic thinker.
meaning in our lives). His positive agenda was
to work out the philosophical foundations of a BIBLIOGRAPHY
three-dimensional humanistic world of factual- Ethical Naturalism and the Modern World-
ity, meaning, and value that would intellectually View (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1960).
support the human enterprise and nurture the Philosophy and the Modern Mind (Chapel
human spirit. Hill, N.C., 1975).
Much of his work in epistemology was The Metaphysics of Self and World
directed toward showing that persons cannot be (Philadelphia, 1991).
understood in the categories of modern science. Religion and Cultural Freedom (Philadelphia,
Persons are not simply factually constituted, 1993).
but have an irreducible semantic dimension A Society Fit for Human Beings (Albany,
(which allows them to know their environment) N.Y., 1997).
and a normative structure in which reasons,
through their semantic presence, are causes; Other Relevant Works
mental causality is normative. Adams’s papers are at the University of North
Adams’s most striking contribution to phi- Carolina, Chapel Hill.
losophy was his claim that emotive experiences
are perceptions of the normative state of reality. Further Reading
For example, a pain is a perception that some Proc of APA v77
part of our body is not as it ought to be; a desire Weissbord, David, ed. Mind, Value, and
is the perception that something is normatively Culture: Essays in Honor of E. M. Adams
required. Of course, our emotive perceptions (Atascadero, Cal., 1989).
may be mistaken (just as our sensory percep-
tions may be). Morality is the reasoned assess- Warren A. Nord
ment of our often conflicting, sometimes
mistaken experiences of normative required-
ness in reality.
On a naturalistic view of the world, there is
no way to explain how meaning and value come
into existence. Adams argued that they must be ADAMS, George Plimpton (1882–1961)
eternal properties of reality. To say that God
exists is to say that reality has a normative struc- George Adams was born on 7 October 1882 in
ture, that there is purpose built into the universe. Northboro, Massachusetts, to Edwin A. Adams,
This is not an empirical claim, but a presuppo- a New England minister, and Caroline A.
sition of the fact that we must make sense of the Plimpton Adams. Adams later placed his
world in terms of meaning and value. Adams’s mother’s maiden name as his own middle name.
philosophical commitment to the categories of He attended prep school at the prestigious Lewis
10
ADAMS
Institute in Chicago. He then studied philosophy Idealism and the Modern Age (New Haven,
at Harvard University under William JAMES, Conn., 1919).
Josiah ROYCE, Hugo MÜNSTERBERG, and George Man and Metaphysics (New York, 1948).
SANTAYANA. He received the BA in 1904,
followed by the PhD in 1911. His dissertation Other Relevant Works
was titled “An Interpretation and Defense of the “‘Everybody’s World’ and the Will to
Principle of Idealism in Metaphysics.” Adams Believe,” Journal of Philosophy 10 (1913):
taught psychology and biology at the Lewis 186–8.
Institute from 1906 to 1908. “Mind as Form and as Activity,”
Adams began teaching philosophy in 1908 at Philosophical Review 22 (1913): 265–83.
the University of California at Berkeley as an “The Mind’s Knowledge of Reality,” Journal
instructor of philosophy, and he was promoted of Philosophy 12 (1915): 57–66.
to full professor in 1918. He was Dean of the “The Interpretation of Religion in Royce and
College of Letters and Science in 1917–18 and Durkheim,” Philosophical Review 25
again from 1943 to 1947. At Berkeley, Adams (1916): 297–304.
furthered faculty participation in academic “Activity and Objects in Dewey’s Human
administration. He also helped organize the Nature and Conduct,” Journal of
Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Philosophy 20 (1923): 596–603.
Organization in 1924 and served as President in “The Basis of Objective Judgments in
1927–8. In 1932 Adams was appointed Mills Ethics,” International Journal of Ethics 37
Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy (1927): 128–37.
and Civil Policy. Before accepting emeritus status “Immediacy and Meaning,” Philosophical
at Berkeley in 1954, Adams delivered the Faculty Review 37 (1928): 109–32.
Research Lectures at Berkeley in 1932, the “Truth, Discourse, and Reality,” University
Messenger Lectures at Cornell in 1939, and the of California Publications in Philosophy
Woodbridge Lectures at Columbia in 1946. He 10 (1928): 175–205.
married Mary Knowles Woodle in 1908, and “Naturalism or Idealism,” in Contemporary
their son, George Plimpton Adams, Jr., received American Philosophy: Personal
his PhD in economics from Berkeley and had a Statements, ed. G. P. Adams and W. P.
prominent career as an economist. Montague (New York, 1930), vol. 1, pp.
Adams’s early publications established him as 65–86.
a respected scholar of Hegel and idealism more “Truths of Existence and of Meaning,”
generally. He was particularly concerned with University of California Publications in
the relation of Hegel’s idealism to the perennial Philosophy 11 (1929): 33–61.
problems of religion and theology. His later “The Relation between Form and Process,”
writings focused on the social context of ethics University of California Publications in
as well as economic and political theory and Philosophy 13 (1930): 189–217.
practice. His philosophical reflections empha- “The Range of Mind,” University of
sized the broad social context of human expe- California Publications in Philosophy 19
rience, the great intellectual traditions of the (1936): 143–67.
past, and the trajectory of contemporary meta- Knowledge and Society: A Philosophical
physics and epistemology. Approach to Modern Civilization, with W.
R. Dennes et al. (New York, 1938).
BIBLIOGRAPHY Ed. with W. R. Dennes et al., Selected
The Mystical Element in Hegel’s Early Writings in Philosophy, a Companion
Theological Writings (Berkeley, Cal., Volume to Knowledge and Society (New
1910). York, 1939).
11
ADAMS
“The Idea of Civilization,” University of possessed one of the last great minds that
California Publications in Philosophy 23 moved easily among any number of fields,
(1942): 49–73. including history, architecture, science, and
philosophy. His works and voluminous letters
Further Reading are punctuated by musings on many of the
Bio 20thC Phils, Pres Addr of APA v3, Proc major philosophical issues of his day.
of APA v35, Who Was Who in Amer v9, Adams was educated at Harvard, and after
Who’s Who in Phil graduating with a BA in 1858, he focused his
Cox, George C. “Professor Adams and the ambition on political journalism, since his
Knot of Knowledge,” Journal of familial insider status offered him broad access
Philosophy 12 (1915): 269–72. to American political debates of the 1860s.
Schneider, Herbert W. “George Adams’s While serving as the private secretary for his
Man and Metaphysics,” Journal of father, Charles Francis Adams, ambassador
Philosophy 45 (1948): 624–8. to England during the American Civil War,
Henry privately wrote articles about the British
David L. Davis court for the New York Times, but the reve-
lation of his identity required that he abandon
the project.
While in England, Adams met John Stuart
Mill, a man whose works had already highly
influenced his thinking. He shared with Mill a
ADAMS, Henry Brooks (1838–1918) belief in the value of universal education, and
he readily adopted Mill’s precept that the best
Henry Adams was born on 16 February 1838 government is one where the best and bright-
in Boston, Massachusetts, and died on 27 est govern. Adams believed that his family’s
March 1918 in Washington, D.C. He was removal from positions of power was detri-
born into the first American political dynasty; mental to the trajectory of American social
the grandson of US President John Quincy and political history. Along with Mill, Alexis
Adams, Adams grew up convinced that he de Tocqueville provided the young Adams
would one day serve in a position of influ- with a means for understanding the upheavals
ence, but he eventually resigned himself to be in American culture that he was witnessing.
a companion to statesmen. He attempted, From de Tocqueville he also received valida-
through a variety of means, to exert influence tion for the importance of the New England
over the American political landscape, but he character, since de Tocqueville argued that
is remembered not for those efforts but for his American democracy depended on the domi-
historical writings and his more intimate nance of that type. Even though Adams lived
books, Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres most of his adult life outside of New England
(1913) and The Education of Henry Adams and often railed against his inherited mindset,
(1918). The former treated the evolution of his works often dealt with the theme of com-
medieval French culture seen through the eyes peting types, whether regional or mental, as a
of a student of the arts, while the latter related means of explaining social transformation.
his sense of loss over the diminished role his Returning to the United States following the
family and their class played in American war, Adams became intent upon exposing the
politics and the way that his Enlightenment financial scandals surrounding the Grant pres-
education ill-suited him for life in the twenti- idency, and he published several investigative
eth century. While not a trained philosopher in articles revealing official malfeasance.
the sense of disciplinary specialization, Adams Although the failure of his articles to elicit
12
ADAMS
reform discouraged him, he continued to dis- ernmental structures of Anglo-Saxon culture.

tinguish between the personally disinterested With students from his seminar in medieval
and republican motivations of his ancestors institutions, he published a scholarly collec-
and the economic excesses of finance capital- tion entitled Essays in Anglo-Saxon Law in
ism which were accompanied by politicians 1876 that explored aspects of the legal rights
enacting policy based on selfish motivations established by early Anglo-Saxon tribes and
rather than a sense of the public good. their influence on modern democracy. Adams’s
Like many from old fortunes, Adams main- desire to justify his familial heritage found a
tained throughout his life a healthy dislike of ready asset in the Teutonic theory that
modern capitalism and the titanic fortunes it provided the American system of separation of
spawned. In his class oration delivered in 1858, powers with an ancient ancestry.
he urged his classmates to resist the lure of Adams’s thinking at this time was also
easy financial gain at the cost of rejecting highly influenced by Lewis Henry Morgan’s
higher ideals. Likewise, as an older man, he Ancient Society. Of particular interest was the
became increasingly concerned with modern status of women in early cultures, a theme
finances in the 1890s, partially due to the Panic Adams turned to in his essay “The Primitive
of 1893 but also because of his increased affil- Rights of Women,” delivered as a Lowell
iation with his brother Brooks. Brooks’s book, Institute lecture in 1876. His interest in
The Law of Civilization and Decay (1896), women’s issues continued throughout his life.
deeply influenced the older brother’s thinking, His two novels, Democracy (1880), a roman
offering him a seemingly scientific explana- à clef on political corruption in American gov-
tion for the degeneration of modern society, in ernment, and Esther (1884), an underrated
part the work of financiers or “gold bugs.” meditation on religious faith, centered on
Unfortunately, the 1890s also witnessed a female protagonists who were intent upon
virulent anti-Semitism in Adams’s private understanding and gently challenging their role
writing, because he associated finance capital- in society. Moreover, the culture surrounding
ism with Jews. medieval reverence for the Virgin Mary that
The second phase of his career began in informed Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres was
1871, when he accepted a position at Harvard a lifelong fascination. Perhaps the hand of Mill
to teach medieval history as well as serve as the was again apparent in Adams’s interest in the
editor for The North American Review. status of women, though Adams never valued
During his short tenure at Harvard from 1871 the independent woman of the late nineteenth
to 1877, he was instrumental in bringing the century; his opinions on women were thor-
Germanic seminar structure to American uni- oughly Victorian. The Pre-Raphaelite venera-
versities, and he also encouraged his graduate tion of women is also apparent in his thinking,
students to publish their research in an era since, like them, his female figures of power
when scholarly publications were not the were idealized possessors of traditional
norm. At the same time, his position as editor feminine strength. That idealization led him to
of the influential journal gave him a stage for proclaim, in countless places, the superiority of
the dissemination of his reformist agenda. The women over men.
year 1872 also saw him marry Marian Adams’s career as an independent historian
Hooper, who like Henry was the descendant of and author began after he resigned his position
several powerful Boston families. at Harvard to edit the papers and write a biog-
At this point in his historical research, raphy of Albert Gallatin, Secretary of State
Adams was a disciple of the Teutonic theory of under Thomas Jefferson. Leaving Harvard also
history, the concept that modern forms of rep- allowed him to move from Boston to
resentative democracy derived from the gov- Washington, D.C., where he resided for the
13
ADAMS
remainder of his life, when not on one of his The masterwork of this phase of his life was
frequent travels. During the early years in his multi-volume History of the United States
Washington, the Adamses hosted a very fash- During the Administrations of Jefferson and
ionable and politically intriguing salon where Madison, completed in 1891. Beginning with
reform politics were discussed and promoted. a base-line for the year 1800, consisting of
The close proximity to national political physical conditions, characteristics of the
debates allowed Adams to function as a con- people, and intellectual issues that he used to
fidant and advisor for several politicians. The calculate the energy of the age, Adams traced
most significant among these was John Hay, the material and political transformation of
whose friendship with Adams was evident the early republic at a time of dramatic change,
when they built adjoining houses across complete with passages from official docu-
Lafayette Square from the White House in ments gleaned from his archival research. His
1885. Hay’s tenure as Secretary of State to predilection for character types recurred here
Presidents William McKinley and Theodore as he distinguished among the intellectual
Roosevelt was a particularly important time in mindsets of New England, the middle states,
this relationship, since Adams tended to and the South. As well, he was already seeking
temper the more imperialistic advice that Hay a means of translating human mental and
was hearing from other parties, including physical activity into units of energy or force
Henry Cabot Lodge, a former student of to be calculated and graphed, a quest he
Adams. While Adams was excited by the emer- pursued for years to come.
gence of the United States as a world power This method of establishing a set of material
following the Spanish-American War of 1898, and intellectual conditions served Adams well
he was troubled by the imperial direction that in many of his books, since they often related
American foreign policy was taking. His a culture’s growth and evolution. However, as
extended sojourn in the South Seas in 1890 an older man, devolution better suited his
and 1891 had confronted him with the conse- cosmic dyspepsia, and, like Oswald Spengler,
quences of European colonialism, and while his narratives became more focused on decline
not wholly able to transcend his Euro-centric rather than progress. Unlike Michel Foucault’s
perspective when confronted with native attempts almost a century later to unearth an
cultures, he was keenly aware of the destruc- archeology or genealogy of historical move-
tive powers of colonialism on subaltern ments, Adams’s approach, as was true of most
peoples. nineteenth-century thinkers, was to search for
Residing in Washington also meant easy a totalizing theory that would encompass the
access to government archives. As a mature entirety of historical development, one that
historian, Adams was a bridge figure between could, ideally, anticipate future developments.
traditional methodologies that related the story To the very end of his life, this search for a uni-
of a people’s transformation – a sort of group versal key to history intrigued him, and he
psychology – to a more modern historical repeatedly turned to science as the source for
approach built on archival research and such a master narrative.
focused on powerful individuals as agents of The completion of the History was little
change. Unlike later social historians, though, occasion for joy because the work failed to
he was never particularly interested in the lives garner significant approbation, thereby deflat-
of commoners. Diplomatic history and behind- ing Adams’s fantasies of being heralded the
the-scenes details of policy-making were his American Gibbon. But this disappointment
forte. He routinely sought to establish a base- paled beside the despair he had been strug-
line of concrete data from which to determine gling with since the 1885 suicide of his wife,
the extent of historical progression. who had suffered for years from depression.
14
ADAMS
He routinely referred to the years following her ity, a forgiving nature, capricious thought
death as his “posthumous life.” Once the process. From this feminine culture arose the
History was in print, he abandoned traditional great cathedrals, demonstrations of a creative
history and focused his energies on travel and power that is affiliated with women’s fecundity
the composition of his late works that defy and that can occur only in a feminized culture.
ready categorization. The Virgin, as idealized by Adams, had little to
The first of these was Mont-Saint-Michel do with systematic or scientific thinking, nor
and Chartres, which originated from Adams’s had she any place for gold bugs.
yearly retreats to France to escape the summer But the Virgin’s moment was short-lived.
heat in Washington, D.C. but was not pub- The moneyed powers that she disdained united
lished until 1913. He rediscovered the majesty to overthrow her, and they were aided by the
of Gothic cathedrals in the late 1890s and philosophical program of Thomas Aquinas
delighted in taking friends and family members who effectively demoted the Virgin to a lesser
on tours of them. That avuncular approach position in the Christian pantheon all the while
(his traveling companions were often his systematizing theology. The domineering
nieces) translated into the book as the narrator power of masculinity reasserted itself over her
guided the reader through the history of loving reign of irrationality, and the High
medieval French culture by reading the iconog- Gothic architecture of the cathedrals at Amiens
raphy of cathedrals and relating them to liter- and Beauvais symbolized that retrenching of
ature produced during the same era. Early on power.
he reminded his reader that his approach to Aside from the Church Architectural,
history was not conventional. To understand Adams constructed his version of the Church
the cultural transformation represented by Intellectual, particularly as it related to the
Mont-Saint-Michel and the cathedral at debate between universalism and nominalism.
Chartres, we need “not technical knowledge; For each group, Adams assigned a primary
not accurate information; not correct views figure: William of Champeaux for realism;
either on history, art, or religion; not anything Abélard for nominalism; Aquinas for moderate
that can possibly be useful or instructive; but realism. In an imaginative connection between
only a sense of what those centuries had to say, the two realms of the book, Adams declared
and a sympathy with their ways of saying it” that “Realism was the Roman arch – the only
(1913, p. 66). Facts gave way to sensitivities. possible foundation for any Church; because it
Starting with the dominance of “the church assumed unity, and any other scheme was
militant,” symbolized by the fortress-like compelled to prove it, for a starting point”
Mont-Saint-Michel, Adams traced how a (1913, p. 335). Likewise, conceptualism “was
patriarchal hierarchy was overcome by a a device, like the false wooden roof, to cover
matriarchal one, identified with the power of and conceal an inherent weakness of con-
the Virgin as a religious force. Her power was struction” (p. 337).
evident in the numerous cathedrals dedicated But the scholastics failed to reason their way
to Our Lady, and the Transition Gothic archi- to God, opening up the opportunity for
tecture of Chartres best emblematized her another avenue explored by the mystics.
reign. Adams also argued that this historical Continuing his metaphorical connection
moment indicated that the masculine Trinity between architecture and theology, Adams
was in some ways supplanted by the feminine noted that the “Transition is the equilibrium
mother figure. In the process of relating this between the love of God – which is faith –
transformation from masculine to feminine and the logic of god – which is reason; between
culture, Adams valorized stereotypical attrib- the round arch and the pointed.” (p. 356) The
utes ascribed to women: intuition, irrational- mystical approach of St. Francis of Assisi was
15
ADAMS
connected to the irrational love of the Virgin, tified that the “attempt to bridge the chasm
and both stood counter to the reason of the between multiplicity and unity is the oldest
scholastics. It should not be surprising that problem of philosophy, religion, and science”
the intellectual rigor and near empiricism of (p. 337). Multiplicity represented a state of
Aquinas led, in Adams’s perspective, to the separation between subject and object. But
downfall of the Virgin and the mystics associ- Adams lacked Hegel’s ability to synthesize the
ated with her. Nothing intervened between two; he could not negotiate a position outside
God and the individual in Aquinas’s world, of the subject/object split, despite his desire to
thus fusing the universal with the particular, do so.
but also placing the Virgin in an ornamental That desire largely accounted for Adams’s
position. Adams concluded his comparison motivation in valorizing what he conceived of
between architecture and theology with the as female consciousness. Unlike most of his
comment that “the ‘Summa Theologiae’ and contemporaries, Adams found in the epistemic
Beauvais Cathedral were excessively modern, distinction between masculine rationality and
scientific, and technical, marking the extreme feminine irrationality something of a utopian
points reached by Europe on the lines of possibility. “The charm of women,” he once
scholastic science” (p. 419). A part of Adams’s remarked, “is the Hegelian charm of the
research for the book involved reading Spinoza identity of opposites. You can assume nothing
and Pascal, and though the latter offered him regarding them, without assuming the contrary
a means to unite skepticism with mysticism, he to be equally true.” (The Letters of Henry
could not solve for the agnostic American Adams, vol. 3, p. 231) Even if not finally
thinker the problem of subject/object duality. capable of bridging the split in consciousness
The terms most often associated with the engendered by Western rationality, women
mature Adams – unity and multiplicity – offered what appeared to be a more unified
resonate throughout both of his late master- alternative to it as a consequence of their lack
pieces, for each relates the story of a once of rationality and their position as object for
stable and unified culture’s descent into insta- male subjectivity. Like the Transition arch that
bility and multiplicity. But for Adams in the united opposites, women offered Adams hope
early twentieth century, the split between unity for a unity of thought. For this reason, he
and multiplicity, while always a philosophical deplored the New Woman, for in trying to
problem, had lost the theological dimension survive in the arid world of masculine reason,
only to have it replaced by science, since it too she forfeited her natural female powers and
struggled with questions of order or chaos. thus her ability to bridge oppositions.
The two terms referred, as he suggested in Adams anticipated the direction of The
The Education of Henry Adams, to a chang- Education of Henry Adams when he turned in
ing world order which his training poorly pre- Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres to the image
pared him to understand. However, the dialec- of the modern dynamo as a force of energy for
tics of unity and multiplicity operated not the modern world comparable to the force of
simply on an historical continuum but also on the Virgin in her own. In doing so, he con-
a synchronic axis for Adams. The crisis repre- nected the lack of human free will underlying
sented by the two terms resonated in Adams’s Aquinas’s theology with the agentless and pas-
thought, as it did for virtually all the great sionless power of the dynamo, which appar-
nineteenth-century thinkers, as the dilemma ently functioned outside of the pale of human
of the subject/object split endemic to Western control but was itself a product of masculine
philosophy, not simply the transmogrification reason. This move identified Adams with the
of a culture from one state to its opposite. In naturalistic thinking of his time, a philosoph-
Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres, Adams iden- ical position he returned to most pointedly in
16
ADAMS
The Education when he defined man as “the progress” (1918, p. 493) most often promoted
sum of the forces that attract him” (1918, p. by historians.
474). As he did with his late essay, “A Letter to
The Education of Henry Adams was not American Teachers of History” (1910), Adams
released publicly until after Adams’s death in indicated in several places that his intention in
1918, though he had written the book more writing what many took to be his autobiogra-
than ten years earlier. In the first pages, Adams phy was to reform modern education, a vital
acknowledged that two of his models in necessity since he believed that historians’ nar-
writing the book were St. Augustine and ratives of progress did not square with the
Rousseau. Critics have also noted similarities evidence before them. Such a claim is easy to
to Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus. However, Adams dismiss, though the book did point out how
identified his figure to be explored as a the mental paradigms one inherited lagged
manikin upon which different clothing was behind technological and scientific develop-
draped. Far from the transcendent individual ments, a theme Lewis MUMFORD returned to
of the Romantics, Adams’s subject – ostensibly decades later. His parallel pursuit was to find
himself – seemed little more than a cipher. a means of charting human capacity for
Little wonder, then, that he chose to write the thought in terms of energy, thus drawing on
book in third-person narrative. modern physical sciences to interpret human
In The Education of Henry Adams, Adams actions. Likewise, as he mentioned in The
recounted the various educational experiences Education of Henry Adams, “Any law of
that impacted his development, noting that movement must include … some mechanical
traditional forms of education were by and formula of acceleration.” (1918, p. 488) Like
large useless. That was particularly the case a comet flying by the sun, society was acceler-
since his formal education fitted him to live in ating towards its demise.
the eighteenth century, though the world of the Like all thinkers in the latter decades of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth had little to nineteenth century, Adams was intent upon
do with the Age of Reason. His History con- understanding the ramifications of Darwinian
cluded with questions regarding whether the biology. References to Darwin’s theory or
moral development of the United States would Spencer’s concept of the survival of the fittest
match its economic development; The appear throughout his work and his private
Education of Henry Adams provided a correspondence, and the desire of conservative
resoundingly negative answer as it traced a thinkers to use Darwin as a justification for
movement from American unity of purpose opposing cultural reforms provided Adams
to self-serving multiplicity. Accompanying this with a methodology for his eventual attempt to
transformation was a revolution in science and derive theories of human history from the
technology that left Adams puzzling over its physical sciences. He never doubted that
meaning. science could aid in developing theories in the
More instructive than formal education were humanities; it was more a matter of what plots
modern politics, Worlds Fairs, and science. different sciences allowed. A former student of
From the one he learned that the New England Louis AGASSIZ at Harvard, the pessimistic
type had been supplanted by other regional Adams held his own doubts about the melior-
types who were less constrained by eighteenth- istic histories that disciples of Darwin rou-
century ideals. At the Fairs he came face to face tinely produced. Rather than hope for human
with developments in technology, symbolized progress due to evolution, he found entropy to
most famously in the dynamo. From the last he be a more vital explanation for the devolution
sought a key to explain the development of of humanity. By the end of The Education,
human society, to counter “the law of Adams hinted at a worldwide breakdown,
17
ADAMS
based on the same types of data that had C. Levenson et al. (Cambridge, Mass.,
served him so well throughout his historical 1982–8).
career. Likewise, in “The Rule of Phase
Applied to History” (1909), published posthu- Further Reading
mously by his brother along with “A Letter to Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
American Teachers of History” under the title Comp Amer Thought, Encyc Amer Bio,
The Degradation of the Democratic Dogma, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v11, Who Was Who
he furthered his proposition that human in Amer v1
history was accelerating in its downward Chalfant, Edward. Both Sides of the Ocean:
spiral. A Biography of Henry Adams. His First
Adams served an important function for the Life, 1838–1862 (Hamden, Conn.,
Lost Generation writers, since The Education 1982).
of Henry Adams predicted a world torn apart, ———, Better in Darkness: A Biography of
grinding down to entropic inertia. For those Henry Adams. His Second Life,
young people whose world was rendered a 1862–1891 (Hamden, Conn., 1994).
wasteland in the trenches of World War I, he ———, Improvement of the World: A
provided an interpretive framework to under- Biography of Henry Adams. His Last
stand what they had experienced. The Life, 1891–1918 (Hamden, Conn.,
Education of Henry Adams continues to be 2001).
considered among the most important books Decker, William Merrill. The Literary
written by an American. Vocation of Henry Adams (Chapel Hill,
N.C., 1990).
BIBLIOGRAPHY Levenson, J. C. The Mind and Art of Henry
Democracy: An American Novel (New Adams (Boston, 1957).
York, 1880). Samuels, Ernest. Henry Adams (Cambridge,
Esther: A Novel (under his pseudonym, Mass., 1989).
Frances Snow Compton) (New York,
1884). John C. Orr
History of the United States During the
Administrations of Thomas Jefferson and
James Madison, 9 vols (New York,
1889–91).
Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres (Boston,
1913). ADAMS, James Luther (1901–94)
The Education of Henry Adams (Boston,
1918). James Luther Adams was born on 12
November 1901 in Ritzville, Washington. He
Other Relevant Works received a BA degree from the University of
Most of Adams’s papers are in the Minnesota in 1924, and an M.Div. degree from
Massachusetts Historical Society in Harvard Divinity School in 1927. He was
Boston. ordained in that year, and continued to study at
Ed., The Degradation of the Democratic Harvard as a graduate student in comparative
Dogma (New York, 1919). literature (earning an MA) while entering the
“The Great Secession Winter of 1860-61” ministry. Adams served as minister of the
and Other Essays, ed. George Hochfield Second Church of Salem and the First Unitarian
(New York, 1958). Society of Wellesley Hills, Massachusetts from
The Letters of Henry Adams, 6 vols, ed. J. 1927 to 1935, taught English at Boston
18
ADAMS
University, and made several visits to Europe. In chairman of the Independent Voters of Illinois,
1937 Adams joined the faculty of Meadville consultant to the National Association for the
Theological School, a Unitarian seminary in Advancement of Colored People, and member of
Chicago. In 1943 he joined the Federated the state board of the Civil Liberties Union. He
Theological Faculty of the University of was among the first American members of the
Chicago. He completed his PhD in philosophy Société Européenne de Culture, an association of
at the University of Chicago in 1945. From intellectuals promoting political responsibility.
1956 until his retirement in 1968, Adams was Major themes of Adams’s thought include the
Edward Mallinckrodt, Jr. Professor of Divinity significance of history as the arena for the man-
at Harvard Divinity School. He occasionally ifestation of the divine; the relationships among
taught at Andover-Newton Theological School theology, power, and social organization;
and Meadville/Lombard Theological School sources of religious and political authority; the-
until 1976. At Harvard’s 350th anniversary in ological bases of social action; and contribu-
1986, Adams was honored for distinguished tions of religious ideals to democratic citizenship.
service to the university. He died on 26 July Two additional themes, his efforts at reforming
1994 in Cambridge, Massachusetts. religious liberalism and his theory of voluntary
A Unitarian, religious social ethicist, and association, warrant further explication.
liberal theologian, Adams’s intellectual influ- As a Unitarian clergyman and liberal
ences and friendships bring together a range of Christian, Adams devoted his talents through-
early and mid twentieth-century literary figures, out his career toward reforming and strength-
philosophers, and theologians, including Irving ening religious liberalism intellectually and insti-
BABBITT, T. S. ELIOT, Rudolph Otto, and Baron tutionally. Adams’s experiences in Germany
von Huegel. Adams contributed to the revital- raised profound questions for him regarding
ization of interest in Ernst Troeltsch and was the ability of progressive churches to effectively
strongly influenced by his studies with Alfred confront the evils of the modern world. This
North WHITEHEAD. American pragmatism concern was expressed through his explorations
mediated through Charles PEIRCE, John DEWEY, of the historical foundations of modern liberal-
and William JAMES shaped his understanding of ism in the prophetic biblical tradition and in the
the value of theological doctrines to evoke com- radical wing of the Protestant Reformation and
mitment. While teaching in Chicago, Adams through his criticism of liberalism’s shortcom-
was part of the sociohistorical and empirical ings. Adams’s contributions to the Unitarian
“Chicago School” of theology, whose members (later Unitarian Universalist) church also took
included Shailer MATHEWS, Henry Nelson the form of serving as editor of The Journal of
WIEMAN, and Bernard LOOMER. Paul TILLICH Liberal Religion, co-founding The Unitarian
was the subject of Adams’s doctoral dissertation Christian journal, chairing the denomination’s
and later a close friend. Adams became Tillich’s social responsibility committee, and establishing
primary interpreter to American audiences and ministerial study groups focused on disciplined
translated many of Tillich’s early works into theological reflection.
English. Adams also translated works of Erich Adams’s intellectual interests crystallized
FROMM and Karl Holl. around the history, theology, and politics of
Adams’s political commitments and theolog- voluntary associations. Adams analyzed the
ical outlook were shaped by an early encounter political and sociological meanings and reli-
with fascism in Hitler’s Germany while visiting gious and philosophical importance of non-
Europe’s leading religious thinkers. His reli- governmental organizations, not-for-profits,
giously inspired political concern led to involve- and publicly oriented associations as essential
ment in no less than thirty progressive social components of democratic life. In explicating a
and voluntary organizations, including serving as theory of voluntary associations, Adams traces
19
ADAMS
the historical development of voluntarism in The Thought of Paul Tillich (San

Western religious traditions and emphasizes Francisco, 1985).
the importance of human institutions in mani- Not Without Dust and Heat: A Memoir
festing the values and beliefs of their members. (Chicago, 1995).
“By their groups you shall know them,” Adams The Essential James Luther Adams: Selected
wrote. Although often ambiguous, voluntary Essays and Addresses, ed. George K. Beach
associations provide both a window into under- (Boston, 1998).
standing the associational dimension of human
existence and a medium for interpretation and Further Reading
analysis. Adams moved towards a theology of Who Was Who in Amer v11
voluntary associations, describing them as the Engel, J. Ronald, ed. “Religious and Political
form of organization most conducive to human Liberalism: Essays in Honor of James
fulfillment and as a basis for discerning the Luther Adams,” American Journal of
presence of God. Theology and Philosophy 17 (January
A master of the essay genre, Adams wrote 1996). Special issue devoted to Adams.
prolifically on a wide range of topics and inter- Hunt, James. James Luther Adams and His
ests. In addition to his contributions to the Demand for an Effective Religious
fields of social ethics and theology, Adams Liberalism. PhD dissertation, Syracuse
influenced American intellectual life through University (Syracuse, N.Y., 1965).
introducing and interpreting European authors Muelder, Walter. “James Luther Adams as
(especially Tillich and Troeltsch) to American Theological Ethicist,” Andover Newton
audiences and training a generation of Quarterly 17 (1977): 186–94.
American social and religious ethicists. Stackhouse, Max. “James Luther Adams: A
Biographical and Intellectual Sketch,” in
BIBLIOGRAPHY Voluntary Associations: A Study of
Taking Time Seriously (Glencoe, Ill., 1957). Groups in Free Societies, ed. D. B.
Paul Tillich’s Philosophy of Culture, Science, Robertson (Richmond, Virg., 1966), pp.
and Religion (New York, 1965). 333–57, 432–44.
On Being Human Religiously: Selected Wilcox, John R. Taking Time Seriously:
Essays in Religion and Science, ed. Max L. James Luther Adams (Washington, D.C.,
Stackhouse (Boston, 1976). 1978).
The Prophethood of All Believers, ed. George
K. Beach (Boston, 1986). Kenneth Olliff
An Examined Faith: Social Context and
Religious Commitment, ed. George K.
Beach (Boston, 1991).
Other Relevant Works

Adams’s papers are at Syracuse University, ADDAMS, Jane (1860–1935)
the Essex Institute in Salem,
Massachusetts, and Harvard Divinity Jane Addams was born on 6 September 1860
School. in Cedarville, Illinois to parents Sarah Weber
Trans., The Protestant Era, by Paul Tillich Addams and John Huy Addams. Although
(Chicago, 1948). she lost her mother very early on, her father,
Ed. with Seward Hiltner, Pastoral Care in the siblings, and later on, her stepmother Anna
Liberal Churches (Nashville, Tenn., 1970). Hostetter Haldeman all worked to fill the
Ed. with Wilhelm Pauck and Roger Shinn, void in the life of this motherless child.
20
ADDAMS
Initially, the Addams family was solidly House and apply its principles on a larger
middle class. However, her father’s second scale. For Addams, Hull-House would
marriage increased the family’s social class function both locally and nationally and,
standing and they quickly moved into higher indeed, Addams became the head of the set-
society. Addams had goals to attend Smith tlement movement in the United States. With
College in Massachusetts, but she attended the help of women such as Mary Rozet Smith,
Rockford Female Seminary in Illinois instead, Mary Keyser, Alice Hamilton, Julia Lathrop,
acceding to her father’s plans for her future. Florence Kelley, and others, Addams put her
Jane was disenchanted with the religious social philosophy into practice and con-
foundations of the seminary, but graduated tributed to the labor movement, educational
with a BA in 1881. reform, the international peace movement,
Suffering from nervous strain, a protracted and women’s rights.
illness, and the loss of her father, Addams Although not formally trained in sociol-
sought to find some meaning for her life. This ogy, Addams self-identified as a sociologist,
struggle set her on the path to what was to and was a member of the American
become a long career. Dissatisfied with the Sociological Society from its inception. She
role of a young socialite, she decided to travel published in the American Journal of
to Europe where she began to consider the Sociology and worked closely with the soci-
problems of the poor. It was during her ology and philosophy faculty at the University
second trip to Europe that she discovered of Chicago, who, at least for a time, also rec-
what would give her life meaning and become ognized her work as sociological. In addition,
her life’s work, the settlement movement. The she toured the United States lecturing at uni-
settlement movement in England was based versities and various social settlements. Until
on the idea of connecting universities with 1914 at the beginning of World War I,
the poor. This provided impoverished com- Addams was a laudable figure in American
munities with trained leaders who would culture and history. Her settlement work,
work and live in the neighborhoods they research, social thought, and efforts in the
served. It was hoped that such an arrange- women’s suffrage movement made her an
ment would mitigate social problems in urban American heroine. However, her ideals neces-
areas by increasing education and cultural sitated a pacifist position on the war which
awareness. made her the target of academics, politicians,
Using the Toynbee Hall model, Adams and and the American public. Addams became
her friend Ellen Gates Starr created their own President of the Women’s International
social settlement, Hull-House, in Chicago. League of Peace and Freedom which was ulti-
After some consideration, the women altered mately her downfall; she became a social and
their original conception of their settlement, intellectual pariah. She suffered greatly from
particularly in terms of religion. Rather than this rejection. In Peace and Bread in Time of
relying solely on the Christian ethic, Hull- War Addams writes: “Solitude has always
House incorporated democratic ideals that had its demons, harder to withstand than the
would allow for the full participation of all snares of the world, and the unnatural desert
community members. Addams hoped that into which the pacifist was summarily cast
such a model would serve to facilitate similar out seemed to be peopled with them.” (1922,
changes in the larger society as well. Hull- p. 82) Yet rejection from her colleagues
House gave Addams the opportunity to speak seemed to be even more hurtful: “Every
out for herself and on behalf of other student of our time had become more or less
oppressed groups. She believed that reason- a disciple of pragmatism and its great teachers
able individuals would learn from Hull- in the United States had come out for the war
21
ADDAMS
and defended their positions with skill and in terms of her pacifism more generally. At
philosophic acumen. There were moments Hull-House she surrounded herself with other
when one longed desperately for reconcilia- well-educated and socially conscious women.
tion with one’s friends and fellow citizens She believed women to be more capable of
…” (1922, p. 82) cooperation, nurturing, peacefulness, and
Despite the difficult war years, Addams even- capacity to care for others. She saw these as
tually regained her popularity and was awarded qualities essential to the healthy functioning of
the Nobel Peace Prize in 1931. Just prior to any society. Further, she believed that the entry
receiving this prestigious award, her health began of women into the public sphere would keep
to take a turn for the worse. She suffered from the United States from war, alleviate social
heart problems and, worse, intestinal cancer. problems such as poverty and crime, and create
Addams died on 21 May 1935 in Chicago, a greater sense of community and patriotism.
Illinois. The nation mourned for her and seemed Another social theorist, Charlotte Perkins
to remember only the good. This would not GILMAN, was influential concerning Addams’s
have come as a surprise to Addams, who wrote views about women. Gilman spent some time
about this selective tendency in The Long Road with Addams at Hull-House in 1895. They
of Women’s Memory. “For many years at Hull- worked together on a publication addressing
House I have at intervals detected in certain old the issues of working women and also con-
people, when they spoke of their past experi- tributed to the women’s peace movement.
ences, a tendency to an idealization, almost to a Although Gilman was somewhat more radical
romanticism suggestive of the ardent dreams than Addams, both shared the opinion that
and groundless ambitions we have all observed women’s economic dependence upon men
in the young when they recklessly lay their plans limited their social contributions and thus
for the future.” (1916, p. 3) hindered the advancement of the larger society.
Addams’s work is premised upon six ideo- In addition, Gilman argued that women’s isola-
logical assumptions: (1) cultural feminism, a tion in the home limited their exposure to fine art
belief in the superiority of feminine values such and educational methods. Society stagnates as
as peace, productivity, and justice; (2) progres- children are left to the care of socially and cul-
sivism, a desire to link social activism with turally ignorant women. It was just this type of
social scientific state reform; (3) social reform ignorance that Addams hoped to ameliorate
Darwinism, the advancement of society with her work at Hull-House. She understood
through social engineering; (4) philosophic the importance of helping oppressed groups to
pragmatism, the necessity of linking truth become active participants in the world around
claims to social practice; (5) social gospel them. In Women at The Hague Addams writes
Christianity, the work of bridging the gap about the peace movement and the entry of
between social class groups and calling con- women into the debate as a sign of international
gregations into service among the poor; and (6) social progress: “The recent entrance of women
the social settlement movement, an attempt to into citizenship coming on so rapidly not only in
bring conscientious reformers into contact with the nations of Europe and America, but dis-
the lives of those they sought to assist, but were cernable in certain Asiatic nations as well, is
separated from due to social class segregation. doubtless one manifestation of this change, and
Although these assumptions are central to an the so-called radical or progressive element in
understanding of Addams and her work, it is each nation, whether they like it or not, recog-
also important to consider her major intellec- nize it as such.” (1915, p. 113)
tual influences. While pragmatism as a branch of philosophy
Cultural feminism is a major component of was initially developed by Charles PEIRCE and
Addams’s work at Hull-House specifically and William JAMES, Addams’s “critical pragma-
22
ADDAMS
tism” was primarily informed by the works of aimed at explaining the impact of social rela-
her University of Chicago colleagues, John tions upon individual action. Indeed, for
DEWEY, George Herbert MEAD, and W. I. Mead, individuals become human only when
THOMAS. Further, this understanding was built they can internalize the larger society in terms
upon the understanding of a more cooperative of values and roles. However, the individual
Marxism, the Russian experience as told by has the potential to internalize national and
Leo Tolstoy and Peter Kropotkin, and British international values as well, therefore
social thought including that of Charles Booth, becoming a good global citizen. This ability
Beatrice Potter Webb, and Sydney Webb. coupled with social scientific research and
John Dewey was a valued colleague of democracy has the ability to transform social
Addams. The two held very similar ideas relationships. Through vocational education
regarding the importance of social science, and critical thinking, all individuals, regard-
democracy, and education. In fact, before less of social class or racial/ethnic back-
Dewey accepted the job offer at the University ground, could become participants in the
of Chicago, he visited Hull-House. He was larger society as workers and reflective
quite impressed with the settlement and citizens. Although Mead and Addams
believed in the applied vision of Addams. differed on their views of pacifism, with
Dewey was a frequent guest at Hull-House, Mead justifying conflict to further democ-
serving on its Board, giving lectures, partici- racy, they agreed on the importance of
pating in debates, and dining with the resi- women’s rights and higher education.
dents. Additionally, he helped Addams with Like Mead, Thomas also believed individ-
the Labor Museum, designed with the idea of uals to be capable of rational thought and
celebrating the culture and contributions of reflexivity, that they are products of social
Chicago’s many immigrant groups. It was relationships, and further, that they are
hoped that the museum would help to bridge dynamic agents in the creation of social
the gap between the new society and the old. In reality. Additionally, he also identified with a
this way new immigrants would begin to feel more applied sociology. His studies focused
more at home in their new society and also on the more marginal members of society,
pass down their heritage to second and third such as immigrants, deviant women, and
generations. Both Dewey and Addams recog- African Americans. He advocated complete
nized the alienation experienced by immigrant equality for women and African Americans
groups. Intellectually, they termed this problem, and argued that education, including voca-
“social disorganization.” However, they rec- tional education, would enable both groups
ognized the need to ameliorate its consequences to enter social life more successfully. For
and developed social programs to do just that. immigrants, Thomas identified the problem
Theorizing was only one part of the equation as stemming from environmental changes in
for these reformers. terms of culture, religion, occupation, and so
Mead was a close friend of Jane Addams on. These changes, although at first experi-
and Hull-House. He supported women’s enced negatively, could ultimately be oppor-
rights, reviewed Addams’s scholarly work, tunities for individual growth and success.
worked with her on a number of reform However, this could mean the weakening of
projects, and gave a number of lectures at group ties. Not surprisingly, Thomas was
Hull-House relating to Social Darwinism. very supportive of the settlement movement
Mead brought an understanding of the indi- and indeed used some of the Hull-House
vidual to sociology. He and W. I. Thomas reports in his own studies. He valued Addams
developed what is known as the “symbolic as a colleague and friend and even supported
interactionist” paradigm. His work was her pacifism when others abandoned her.
23
ADDAMS
Although clearly aligned with the pragma- are likely to fight most strongly for the
tist vision noted above, Addams also owes an hungry and oppressed in war-torn countries:
intellectual debt to Karl Marx. She agreed “As I had felt the young immigrant conscripts
with Marx that economic equality was an caught up into a great world movement,
essential component of a progressive society. which sent them out to fight, so it seemed to
However, she believed that commonality and me the millions of American women might be
cooperation rather than conflict could be the caught up into a great world purpose, that of
basis of social change. Stated differently, she conservation of life; there might be found an
argued that groups are more likely to come antidote to war in women’s affection and all-
together over shared interests and that these embracing pity for helpless children.” (1922,
interests are more likely to foster unity. But p. 48)
she did agree with some of Marx’s views British sociology and Fabianism made a
about the importance of labor. She argued lasting impression on Addams. Charles
that work could contribute to the unification Booth’s quantitative study of the poor in
of society. London was the inspiration for both Hull-
Addams’s perspectives on labor were House and Hull House Maps and Papers
enhanced by her reading of Tolstoy and her (1895), a sociological investigation of the
1886 visit with him in Russia. Tolstoy argued neighborhoods surrounding Hull-House. The
for a more simple existence based on indi- data were collected by the women of Hull-
vidual work on the land. This type of life House and utilized by the sociology faculty at
freed individuals from the alienating impact the University of Chicago for their studies of
of capitalism – a life that Tolstoy himself cul- urban life. Another follower of Booth,
tivated. Having worked the land himself, Beatrice Potter Webb, is also linked to
Tolstoy expected that Addams would also Addams and Hull-House. Webb visited
lead a modest life. He criticized her bour- Addams in Chicago on two occasions, once in
geois ways at every turn, particularly her 1893 and again in 1898. Addams also visited
dress and her ownership of land that was Webb and her husband Sydney in 1896,
never worked by Addams herself, but by 1915, and again in 1919. The Webbs were
hired help. Addams understood Tolstoy’s active in British political life, particularly
position, and respected it. However, she regarding the poor.
understood the social expectations of the Scholars of Addams have identified four
Hull-House neighborhood and knew that central themes that are woven throughout
they expected her to be a very different type the body of her social thought. First, she dis-
of leader from Tolstoy. She needed to dress trusted formal theory. It was impossible for
well and to be available to meet the needs of her to be a dispassionate observer of social
her community, which left her unable to fully life. She felt that academic work and social
adopt the peasant lifestyle. While her busy life reform must be carried out within close prox-
at Hull-House did not allow her actually to imity of its beneficiaries. Stated differently, it
take up the practice of daily bread labor, she is impossible to know what must be done
did take on the role of an international bread unless one understands the cultural and his-
laborer of sorts, traveling to Europe during torical milieu of the people. Furthermore, it is
times of famine and war to assist others in not only the oppressed who benefit from
securing both peace and bread. She consid- closer contact with the elite. In Twenty Years
ered this struggle to be the basic quest of all at Hull-House Addams includes her essay,
of humanity, yet that this quest had been per- “The Subjective Necessity for Social
verted by the violence of modern industrial Settlements.” In this essay she argues that to
capitalism. But for Addams, it is women who “shut one’s self away from that half of the
24
ADDAMS
race life [the poor] is to shut one’s self away ing democratic process. Charitable workers
from the most vital part of it; it is to live out must be taught to relate to the everyday lives
but half the humanity to which we have been of the individuals they serve. Without this
born heir and to use but half our faculties.” understanding, the charitable worker runs
(1919, p. 92) Addams took this quite literally, the risk of further alienating the individual
becoming neighbors with those she served. from the larger society. As for the rich, the
While her social class location and career set poor already expect indifference. But the
her apart from her neighbors, she worked stingy charitable worker is baffling: “this lady
hard to understand the intricacies of their visitor, who pretends to be good to the poor,
everyday lives. and certainly does talk as though she were
This relates to a second theme in Addams’s kind-hearted, what does she come for if she
work. Even with the unfortunate relation- does not intend to give them things which
ship with the Progressive Party which sup- are so plainly needed?” (1902, p. 18)
ported a platform that denied the rights of Finally, society must be assessed to identify
both African Americans and women, Addams the discrepancies between its stated values
understood very early on that the goals of and ideals and individual and group
the researcher and the researched, the charity outcomes. For example, the doctrine of indi-
worker and her clients might be at odds with vidualism no longer makes sense in a society
one another despite the best intentions of that has become increasingly stratified in
each. This early attempt at multiculturalism terms of social class. Furthermore, as the gap
is best exemplified in her work, Democracy between the rich and the poor increases, the
and Social Ethics (1902). For Addams, recog- life chances of each group are in a sense pre-
nition of cultural diversity is the first step in determined. There exists only a limited pos-
creating a more progressive and just society. sibility that an individual can, by his or her
However, Addams believed that all individu- own effort, lift him or herself out of poverty.
als have the capacity to understand differ- As individuals try to get ahead they neglect
ences and work towards the common good. the collective. Instead, we must teach indi-
For that reason it is essential that society viduals to relate more as equals and to
focus on making morality an active social consider the larger social good, develop new
endeavor. More specifically, democracy while sites for collective consciousness-raising such
an ideal, must also become an everyday lived as trade unions, women’s groups, study
reality or lifestyle. circles, and finally use this new conscious-
Thirdly, Addams felt that individuals may ness to influence the government to act
be limited by their social location, but that responsibly on behalf of all its citizens, par-
each person is motivated by self-interest and ticularly to increase the standard of living for
the common good. More specifically, indi- the poor. She argues that this is the more
viduals need to give and receive kindness natural state of humanity. This is also true
from others. While we have come to expect regarding international relations. In Peace
this kindness as functioning on a solely indi- and Bread in Time of War Addams writes:
vidual level, we can be taught to understand “We revolted not only against the cruelty and
it as part of the collective as well. Addams barbarity of war, but even more against the
sees this as essential for charitable workers. reversal of human relationships which war
As charitable workers represent larger social implied. We protested against the ‘curbed
organizations, they must respond to their intelligence’ and the ‘thwarted good will,’
clients as ambassadors of social justice. For when both a free mind and unfettered kind-
Addams, this keeps people connected to the liness are so sadly needed in human affairs.”
larger society and part of a healthy function- (1922, p. 4)
25
ADDAMS
Although much has been written about Other Relevant Works

Addams’s life and good works, not enough has A major collection of Addams’s papers is at
been written about her social philosophy or her Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania.
role in shaping the discipline of sociology. During Why Women Should Vote (New York,
the war years Chicago sociology separated from 1912).
the more radical Addams, relegating her and “A Modern Devil Baby,” American Journal
the other Hull-House women to the field of of Sociology 20 (1914): 117–18.
social work. While the men considered Hull- The Second Twenty Years at Hull-House
House a social experiment of sorts, Addams (New York, 1930).
argued that it was much more. She put her prin- The Excellent Becomes Permanent (New
ciples into action and created an institution York, 1932).
designed to facilitate both community and My Friend Julia Lathrop (New York,
democracy. She contributed much to the 1932).
founding of the discipline and also to the study Jane Addams: A Centennial Reader, ed.
of the impact of industrialization on the lives of (New York, 1960).
the oppressed. She brought a new level of caring The Social Thought of Jane Addams, ed.
and nurturing to the study of social life and rec- Christopher Lasch (Indianapolis, 1965).
ognized the necessity of women’s contributions The Jane Addams Papers, 1860–1960, 82
to such endeavors. Her optimism and stalwart microfilm reels (Ann Arbor, Mich.,
support of peace stands to benefit us as much 1984).
today as during her own lifetime. Jane Addams on Education, ed. Ellen C.
Lagemann (New York, 1985).
BIBLIOGRAPHY The Jane Addams Reader, ed. Jean Bethke
“The Subjective Necessity of Settlements,” in Elshtain (New York, 2002).
Philanthropy and Social Progress (New Jane Addams’s Writings on Peace, 4 vols,
York, 1893), pp. 1–26. ed. Marilyn Fischer and Judy D. Whipps
“Prefatory Note” and “The Settlement as a (Bristol, UK, 2003).
Factor in the Labor Movement,” in Hull- The Selected Papers of Jane Addams, vol.
House Maps and Papers (Boston, 1895), pp. 1–, ed. Mary Lynn McCree Bryan,
vii–viii and 183–204. Barbara Bair, and Maree de Angury
Democracy and Social Ethics (New York, (Urbana, Ill., 2003–).
1902).
Newer Ideals of Peace (New York, 1907). Further Reading
The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets (New Amer Nat Bio, Blackwell Amer Phil,
York, 1909). Blackwell Comp Prag, Cambridge Dict
Twenty Years at Hull-House (New York, Amer Bio, Comp Amer Thought, Dict
1910). Amer Bio, Dict Amer Religious Bio,
A New Conscience and an Ancient Evil (New Encyc Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v27,
York, 1912). Who Was Who in Amer v1
“Recreation as a Public Function in Urban Bryan, Mary Lynn. The Jane Addams
Communities,” American Journal of Papers: A Comprehensive Guide
Sociology 17 (1912): 615–9. (Bloomington, Ind., 1996).
Women at The Hague (New York, 1915). Davis, Allen F. American Heroine: The Life
The Long Road of Women’s Memory (New and Legend of Jane Addams (New York,
York, 1916). 1973).
Peace and Bread in Time of War (New York, Deegan, Mary Jo. Race, Hull-House, and
1922). the University of Chicago (Westport,
26
ADLER
Conn., 2002). (BA 1870) and then went on to the University

———, Jane Addams and the Men of the of Berlin for graduate study. At the same time,
Chicago School, 1892–1918 (New he was preparing for the rabbinate at Abraham
Brunswick, 1988). Geiger’s seminary. Leaving both, he transferred
Deegan, Mary Jo, and Michael Hill, eds. to Heidelberg where he earned his PhD in
Women and Symbolic Interaction Semitic studies in 1873. While a graduate
(Boston, 1987). student, Adler came under the influence of
Elshtain, Jean Bethke. Jane Addams and the Hermann Cohen. At the same time it was
Dream of American Democracy (New Friedrich Albert Lange’s Die Arbeitefrage
York, 2002). which, he said, “opened for me a wide and
Fischer, Marilyn. On Addams (Belmont, tragic prospect.” Thus began Adler’s lifelong
Cal., 2004). interests in neo-Kantian moral philosophy, in
Joslin, Katherine. Jane Addams: A Writer’s social ethics, and in the “labor” question.
Life (Urbana, Ill., 2004). Adler was expected eventually to succeed his
Lengermann, Patricia Madoo, and Jill father at the Temple. On his return to New
Niebrugge-Brandtley. The Women York, his first (and last) Emanuel sermon called
Founders: Sociology and Social Theory, for “religion not confined to church or syna-
1830–1930 (Boston, 1998). gogue. A religion such as Judaism ever claimed
Stebner, Eleanor J. The Women of Hull to be, not of the creed but of the deed.” Adler
House (Albany, N.Y., 1997). recalled later, “Some members [of the congre-
gation] came to me and asked whether I
Julie Harms Cannon believed in God. I said, ‘Yes, but not in your
God’” (Obituary, New York Times, 25 April
1933).
Adler had been schooled for the rabbinate or
the academy. The former was now closed to
him and the latter, given the prevailing anti-
ADLER, Felix (1851–1933) Semitism, seemed closed as well. However,
through the good offices and the substantial
Felix Adler was born on 13 August 1851 in generosity of several leading members of
Alzey, Germany, the son of Rabbi Samuel and Emanuel, a chair in Hebrew and Oriental
Henrietta Adler. In 1857 the family emigrated Literature was established at the newly founded
to the United States because Samuel, a leader in Cornell University. Felix was named to it as
the nascent Jewish Reform movement, was non-resident professor and taught from 1873 to
named to the rabbinate of Temple Emanuel in 1875.
New York City which was then, as now, one of Some of those who had heard the Temple
the most prestigious pulpits in Reform Judaism. sermon invited Felix to speak on the “plan of
Adler was enrolled in Columbia Grammar a new organization.” On 15 May 1876 at
School (no connection with the University) Standard Hall in New York City, Adler called
receiving a rigorous education in Greek, Latin, for “Diversity in the creed, unanimity in the
modern languages, literature, and mathematics. deed …. This is the common ground where we
But his schooling was not confined to the class- may all grasp hands … united in mankind’s
room. He joined his mother in visiting the sick, common cause” (1877). With that address,
the aged, and the poor. As a teenager, he taught Ethical Culture was born. Exhibiting formidable
– brilliantly, we are told – in the Temple’s powers of organization, Adler in those first years
religion school. On graduating from Columbia established a pattern of reform for his nascent
Grammar, Felix attended Columbia College movement. He founded the district nursing
27
ADLER
service (now the Visiting Nurse Service), a model Association in 1928–9. He was busy speaking,
tenement building company, a free kindergarten teaching, writing, organizing, and raising money
that grew into the Workingman’s School and for the Societies and for the Schools until the final
which is today the Ethical Culture Fieldston two years of his life. Adler died on 24 April
School. Societies were established in 1933 in New York City.
Philadelphia, Chicago, and St. Louis. The Adler was at home in the pulpit, the class-
Sunday meetings attracted an ever-growing room, the study, and the marketplace. Initially,
audience. Newly recruited colleagues joined he preached the relatively simple notion of “deed
Adler in leading the Societies and developing, not creed” inspired by the idea of an “ethical
among other projects, the Legal Aid Society and religion” called for by the Unitarian radicals
settlement houses. Theodore Parker and William Ellery Channing,
Adler was creating his own vocation. He was by Emerson, and by Jewish Reform.
President from 1878 to 1882 of the Free Philosophically, he affirmed Kant’s notion of
Religious Association, founded in 1866 by the metaphysical independence and centrality
Francis Ellingwood A BBOTT and O. B. of ethics. Religion was to emerge from ethics
FROTHINGHAM. Among its members were Ralph rather than the other way around. Institutionally,
Waldo EMERSON, Lucretia Mott, Wendell Adler’s Ethical Culture was situated in the nine-
Phillips, and Julia Ward HOWE. In the 1890s, teenth-century religious and social reform neigh-
Adler began to develop Ethical Culture in borhood that included the social gospel
Europe, Great Britain, and Japan. The movement, the Quakers, Reform and, later,
International Ethical Union was organized. Reconstructionist Judaism as well as assorted
Among other activities, it sponsored the utopians and secular radicals.
International Races Congress (1911) and the As Adler’s thought evolved, “deed not creed”
International Moral Education Congresses (first turned into “deed before creed.” No doubt,
in 1908 and periodically until the early 1930s). Adler’s institution building – the Ethical Societies,
Sadly, the depression, Nazism, and war made the Schools, the pioneering social agencies, the
international organization impossible and Ethical international congresses, the politics of reform,
Culture abroad – except for the British the labor and business projects – taught him
movement led by Stanton Coit and Harold that the “deed” was not self-evident and that
Blackham, and the Vienna Society – ceased to “creed” could not be dispensed with even if
exist. dogma could be. In his forties, he was to criticize
Adler was active in housing and political “mere” reform which seemed to him “mindless”
reform, joined the movement to oppose reform. Temperamentally, Adler was both
American imperialism in the Philippines and thinker and doer. So, developing the conceptual
Latin America, served as a labor arbitrator, and ground philosophically and religiously rounded
fostered participatory labor organization among out Adler’s life-project. Adler also remained
the successful business people who joined the committed to the common moral agenda, and to
Society. A prolific author and teacher, he the freedom of an individual to believe differently
founded the International Journal of Ethics in or not to believe at all. Ethical Culture continued
1890. While continuing his Ethical Culture lead- to be pluralistic and inclusive.
ership, Adler was appointed professor of politi- Adler grew increasingly critical of Kant’s
cal and social ethics at Columbia in 1902, and “individualism” and rationalism. He began to
he held this chair until his death. He was also develop action, relationship, and organism as
Theodore Roosevelt Professor at the University the key notions of his mature philosophy. Thus,
of Berlin (1908) and the Hibbert Lecturer at in reworking Kant’s “categorical imperative,” he
Oxford (1923). He served as President of the wrote, “Act as a member of the ethical manifold
Eastern Division of the American Philosophical (the infinite spiritual universe).” And, “Act so as
28
ADLER
to elicit in another the distinctive unique quality marketplace and in the streets as much as if not
characteristic of him as a fellow member of the more than in the pulpit. Thus, Adler’s and
infinite whole” (1918, p. 117). He introduced Ethical Culture’s projects were integral to moral
into his thought an abiding sense of the tragic, development and expressive of ethical religion,
writing toward the end of his life, of the experi- and not mere outcroppings of more basic reali-
ence of “spiritual pain.” Almost existentialist in ties and beliefs.
mood, he rooted pain ontologically and histor- Behind the institutions and reforms was
ically in the “Lilliputian disparity between man Adler’s guiding question: how is ethics possible
and the magnitude of the world … multitudes of in an industrial society? A realist, he did not
our fellow beings … sinking, drowning, and we disdain industry, business, the economics of give
are powerless to assist them … the intolerable and get. Instead, as he said over and over again,
strain of the divided conscience … felt by men industry was to be “ethicized.” And Adler both
who are eagerly desirous to make their life whole believed and demonstrated in thought and act
… and who do not see how to do it …” (1924, that it could be done. Adler’s philosophic expres-
pp. 13, 17–18, 24–5). sion of this was his notion of industrial democ-
Ethics, Adler held, was the “science of right racy and his reconstruction of the idea of
energizing” (1918, p. 221); one’s own individu- “vocation” in order to replace the dehumaniza-
ality emerged from the effort to elicit the indi- tions of the assembly line and vicious competi-
viduality of the other. No one, in other words, tiveness. Recognizing the move of American
could save him/herself alone! Again, drawing democracy from farm to city, he called for a
upon Kant, Adler “postulated” the “worth” of representative government based in vocational
every human being. But elaborating the bare groups – labor unions, professional associations,
bones of a moral geometry was unsuited to mothers (the PTA for instance), etc. – in order to
Adler’s intent and passion. In an interesting turn, assure the power to make changes and the com-
he imagined “worth” as emergent in ethical rela- petence to do so. The individual in a “mass”
tionships and not as a given of being. Indeed, the society had neither even if he or she had the
ethical character of any relationship was signaled vote.
precisely by how it contributed to this emer- Adler did not set out in 1876 with a grand
gence. Individuation was thus a relational idea, plan. But he was open to experience, learned
evolving as relationships evolved. Adler’s model from it, and was always looking for a way to put
was biological, a shift away from the its lessons to work. Adler’s was a philosophy of
Newtonianism of Kant. Adler’s philosophy was praxis. Adler has been difficult to place in the
organic and not atomistic. Of course, the “ideal” history of American philosophy. Labeling him as
could never be achieved. Moral success, always “neo-Kantian” doesn’t succeed. Using discrete
elusive, remained a permanent goad and goal. categories like “reformer,” “religious leader,”
The ideal, an infinite democracy of “ends,” war- “educator,” “professor,” misleads as often as
ranted an ethics of interdependence. it instructs. He was, of course, all of these
Irreplaceability was exhibited in action. The things. But in Adler they came together, were
space between ideal and empirical generated instrumental to each other, and finally served
moral motivation. the construction of an interesting turn that
Simultaneously, Adler was developing a philosophic idealism took under the influence
critical reconstruction of religion. An ethical of American democracy and the creativity of a
religion was not a religion of good works per se realistic idealist.
but of spiritual pedagogy. Good works,
whatever their other merits, were the vehicle for BIBLIOGRAPHY
personal and interpersonal development. Creed and Deed: A Series of Discourses
Religion like ethics therefore belonged in the (New York, 1877; 2nd edn 1886).
29
ADLER
The Moral Instruction of Children (New and Sanctions of the Founders of Ethical
York, 1892). Culture. PhD dissertation, Columbia
Life and Destiny, or, Thoughts from the University (New York, 1983).
Ethical Lectures of Felix Adler (New York, Kraut, Benny. From Reform Judaism to
1903). Ethical Culture: The Religious Evolution
The Essentials of Spirituality (New York, of Felix Adler (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1979).
1905). Radest, Howard B. Toward Common
The Religion of Duty (New York, 1905). Ground: The Story of the Ethical Societies
The World Crisis and its Meaning (New in the United States (New York, 1969; 2nd
York, 1915). edn 1987).
An Ethical Philosophy of Life (New York, ———, Felix Adler, An Ethical Culture (New
1918). York, 1998).
Marriage and Divorce (New York, 1923).
Reissued as Incompatibility in Marriage Howard B. Radest
(New York, 1930).
The Reconstruction of the Spiritual Ideal
(New York, 1924).
The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Ethical
Movement, 1876–1926 (New York,
1926). ADLER, Mortimer Jerome (1902–2001)
Other Relevant Works Mortimer Adler was born on 28 December

Adler’s papers are at Columbia University. 1902 in New York City. He began working as
Our Part in this World, ed. Horace L. Friess a copyboy for the New York Sun at age
(New York, 1946). fourteen, while still in public school. Two years
later he began to attend Columbia University.
Further Reading He did not earn a bachelor’s degree even
Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, though he had completed all the coursework,
Bio 20thC Phils, Comp Amer Thought, because he refused to take a required physical
Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer Religious Bio, education course in swimming. Nevertheless,
Encyc Ethics, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v23, Pres he earned a PhD in psychology from Columbia
Addr of APA v3, Who Was Who in Amer in 1928. In 1927, Robert Hutchins invited
v1 Adler to come to Yale University and discuss
Bacon, Samuel F. An Evaluation of the how psychological research might be relevant
Philosophy and Pedagogy of Ethical to the study of law. Probably due to his con-
Culture (Washington, D.C., 1933). versations with Hutchins, between 1927 and
Bridges, Horace J., ed. Aspects of Ethical his appointment to the faculty at the University
Religion: Essays in Honor of Felix Adler of Chicago in 1930, Adler switched his inter-
on the Fiftieth Anniversary of His ests from experimental social psychology and
Founding of the Ethical Movement, 1876 empirical social science to metaphysical phi-
(New York, 1926). losophy.
Friess, Horace L. Felix Adler and Ethical Adler spent his entire academic career at the
Culture, Memories and Studies, ed. Fannia University of Chicago. He was initially
Weingartner (New York, 1981). appointed associate professor in philosophy
Guttchen, Robert S. Felix Adler (New York, of law in the philosophy department from
1974). 1930 to 1931, and then his appointment was
Hornback, James F. The Philosophic Sources reassigned to the Law School, where he
30
ADLER
remained at the rank of associate professor tional classes. Adler’s vision for reforming
until 1942. He was professor in philosophy of American education was not shared by leading
law from 1942 to 1952, when he retired. He educational theorists such as John DEWEY or
returned to Chicago as a visiting lecturer from Sidney H OOK, with whom he engaged in
1963 to 1968. In 1952, Adler became director polemical debates in print.
of the Institute for Philosophical Research, His first book, Dialectic (1927), grew out of
first in San Francisco and then in Chicago after his interest in medieval thought and provided
it was moved there in 1963. Along with an outline of what he thought were the most
Hutchins, he co-edited the fifty-two volumes of relevant philosophical and religious ideas of
The Great Books of the Western World Western civilization. While at Chicago, Adler
(1952). Adler was Chairman and co-founder expanded these ideas into lectures and then as
with Max Weismann of the Center for the a series of books including The Higher
Study of The Great Ideas and editor-in-chief of Learning in America (1936), What Man Has
its journal Philosophy Is Everybody’s Business; Made of Man (1937), and his well-known
founder and Director of the Institute for How to Read a Book (1940), which has gone
Philosophical Research; Chairman of the through several editions and is still in print.
Board of Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, Adler believed that the primary goal of edu-
Inc.; editor-in-chief of the Great Books of the cation was to prepare everyone to be lifelong
Western World and Great Ideas: A Syntopicon learners. His vision of education was based
of Great Books of the Western World (1952); on the central importance of philosophy and
editor of The Great Ideas Today (1961–71; the liberal arts in giving people the necessary
1978–99; all published by Encyclopaedia tools to solve problems and make decisions in
Britannica); and co-founder and Honorary their daily lives, by developing each person’s
Trustee of The Aspen Institute. Ongoing innate ability to live ethically. Adler also
programs started or developed by Adler thought this included making everyone into
include: The Great Books Foundation (with responsible citizens who embraced democracy.
Robert Hutchins), the Basic Program of Liberal His hierarchy of knowledge reserved the study
Education for Adults at the University of of math, science, history, geography, mea-
Chicago (with Robert Hutchins), the Executive surement, and other subjects to the lower
Seminars of The Aspen Institute, the Paideia grades. He set aside the study of works of
Project (a plan for major reform of public fiction, poetry, drama, and art to high school
school education), and The Great Ideas and college. He reasoned that students would
seminars and lectures at the Center for the develop the necessary critical thinking skills
Study of The Great Ideas. Adler died on 28 and insights in order to understand not only
June 2001 in San Mateo, California. their own minds, but the minds of others as
Adler is known for advocating a populist well.
approach to general education in seminars Adler proposed that higher education should
using “great books” and “great ideas.” He adopt “Great Books” programs requiring all
sought to reform all educational curricula in students to take core classes in Western phi-
this way, reasoning that all students needed losophy, politics, and religion. Great Books
was a thorough understanding of the great was originally a list of one hundred essential
works of philosophy, literature, history, texts in Western civilization, also known as the
science, and religion. Adler thought this Western Canon. A book was selected if it met
approach to knowledge was sufficient for any Adler’s criteria of its contemporary signifi-
person, no matter their particular interests. He cance or relevance to the problems and issues
also wanted to include a single liberal, non-spe- of our times; if it could be read again and
cialized education without electives or voca- again with benefit; and if it was relevant to “a
31
ADLER
large number of the great ideas and great issues What Man Has Made of Man: A Study of
that have occupied the minds of thinking indi- the Consequences of Platonism and
viduals for the last 25 centuries” (1992, Positivism in Psychology (New York,
p. 142). 1937).
Though Adler hoped all public schools in the How to Read a Book: The Art of Getting a
United States would use classic works of Liberal Education (New York, 1940).
Western civilization to dominate their cur- The Philosophy and Science of Man: A
riculum, the greatest impact of his ideas has Collection of Texts as a Foundation for
been at the college level. During the 1920s and Ethics and Politics (Chicago, 1940).
1930s, a significant number of American A Dialectic of Morals: Towards the
colleges and universities adopted such a cur- Foundations of Political Philosophy
riculum, including Columbia University, his (New York, 1941).
alma mater. How to Think About War and Peace (New
When Adler and Hutchins released Great York, 1944).
Books of the Western World in 1952, it was The Idea of Freedom: A Dialectical
met with criticism from several quarters. Since Examination of the Conceptions of
the series appeared at the height of the Cold Freedom (Garden City, N.Y., 1958).
War their critics attacked them for trying to The Idea of Freedom: A Dialectical
use the Western Canon to promote American Examination of the Controversies About
political propaganda abroad. Great Books has Freedom (Garden City, N.Y., 1961).
also been attacked for celebrating only the Great Ideas from the Great Books (New
accomplishments of white, European males York, 1961).
while overlooking the voices of women and The Conditions of Philosophy: Its
people of color. Though this list was tenta- Checkered Past, Its Present Disorder, and
tive, many critics considered it presumptuous Its Future Promise (New York, 1965).
and laughable to nominate some Great Books The Difference of Man and the Difference
to the exclusion of all others. In 1990 a new It Makes (New York, 1967).
edition of Great Books was published, with six The Time of Our Lives: The Ethics of
more volumes of material, including works Common Sense (New York, 1970).
written in the twentieth century. The Common Sense of Politics (New York,
Adler’s multidisciplinary and integrated 1971).
approach to philosophy, politics, religion, law, Some Questions About Language: A
and education was aimed at making philoso- Theory of Human Discourse and Its
phy’s greatest texts accessible to everyone. Objects (La Salle, Ill., 1976).
Throughout his life, he remained devoted to Aristotle for Everybody: Difficult Thought
helping those outside academia educate them- Made Easy (New York, 1978).
selves further. As he once wrote, “No one can How to Think About God: A Guide for the
be fully educated in school, no matter how 20th-Century Pagan (New York, 1980).
long the schooling or how good it is.” No one, Six Great Ideas: Truth, Goodness, Beauty,
no matter how old, should stop learning, Liberty, Equality, Justice (New York,
according to Adler, who wrote more than 1981).
twenty books after he retired. The Angels and Us (New York, 1982).
The Paideia Proposal: An Educational
BIBLIOGRAPHY Manifesto (New York, 1982).
Dialectic (London, 1927). How to Speak / How to Listen (New York,
Art and Prudence: A Study in Practical 1983).
Philosophy (New York, 1937). Paideia Problems and Possibilities: A
32
ADLER
Consideration of Questions Raised by vols (Chicago, 1952).

The Paideia Proposal (New York, 1983). Ed., Great Ideas: A Syntopicon of Great
A Vision of the Future: Twelve Ideas for a Books of the Western World, 2 vols
Better Life and a Better Society (New (Chicago, 1952).
York, 1984). The Capitalist Manifesto, with Louis O.
Ten Philosophical Mistakes (New York, Kelso (New York, 1958).
1985). The New Capitalists: A Proposal to Free
A Guidebook to Learning: For a Lifelong Economic Growth from the Slavery of
Pursuit of Wisdom (New York, 1986). Savings, with Louis O. Kelso (New York,
We Hold These Truths: Understanding the 1961).
Ideas and Ideals of the Constitution Ed., The Great Ideas Today, 17 vols, with
(New York, 1987). Robert Hutchins (Chicago, 1961–77).
Intellect: Mind over Matter (New York, Ed., Gateway to the Great Books, 10 vols,
1990). with Robert Hutchins (Chicago, 1963).
Truth in Religion: The Plurality of Ed., The Annals of America, 21 vols
Religions and the Unity of Truth (New (Chicago, 1968).
York, 1990). The American Testament, with William
Desires, Right & Wrong: The Ethics of Gorman (New York, 1975).
Enough (New York, 1991). Ed., Propaedia: Outline of Knowledge and
Haves Without Have-Nots: Essays for the Guide to The New Encyclopaedia
21st Century on Democracy and Britannica 15th Edition (Chicago, 1975).
Socialism (New York, 1991). Ed., Great Treasury of Western Thought,
The Great Ideas: A Lexicon of Western with Charles Van Doren (New York,
Thought (New York, 1992). 1977).
The Four Dimensions of Philosophy: Philosopher at Large: An Intellectual
Metaphysical, Moral, Objective, Autobiography (New York, 1977).
Categorical (New York, 1993). Reforming Education: The Schooling of a
Art, the Arts, and the Great Ideas (New People and Their Education Beyond
York, 1994). Schooling, ed. Geraldine Van Doren
Adler’s Philosophical Dictionary: 125 Key (Boulder, Col., 1977).
Terms for the Philosopher’s Lexicon Ed., The Great Ideas Today, 20 vols
(New York, 1995). (Chicago, 1978–99).
The Paideia Program: An Educational
Other Relevant Works Syllabus, with Members of the Paideia
The Nature of Judicial Proof: An Inquiry Group (New York, 1984).
into the Logical, Legal, and Empirical Reforming Education: The Opening of the
Aspects of the Law of Evidence, with American Mind, ed. Geraldine Van
Jerome Michael (New York, 1931). Doren (Boulder, Col., 1988).
Diagrammatics, with Maude Phelps A Second Look in the Rearview Mirror:
Hutchins (New York, 1932). Further Autobiographical Reflections of a
Crime, Law and Social Science, with Philosopher at Large (New York, 1992).
Jerome Michael (London, 1933).
Trans., Scholasticism and Politics, by Further Reading
Jacques Maritain (London, 1940). Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Who Was Who
The Revolution in Education, with Milton in Amer v14, Who’s Who in Phil
Mayer (Chicago, 1944). Brameld, Theodore. Philosophies of
Ed., Great Books of the Western World, 52 Education in Cultural Perspective (New
33
ADLER
York, 1955). cism, championed the Arnold SCHOENBERG

Gilbert, James. Redeeming Culture: circle, and studied to be a professional
American Religion in an Age of Science musician. He received his PhD in philosophy
(Chicago, 1997). from the University of Frankfurt (now Johann
Hafner, Arthur W., ed. Democracy and the Wolfgang Goethe University) in 1924. An
Public Library: Essays on Fundamental abortive attempt to habilitate under Hans
Issues (Westport, Conn., 1993). Cornelius in 1927 was overcome when Paul
Shils, Edward. “Robert Maynard TILLICH assumed a chair of philosophy in 1929
Hutchins,” American Scholar 59 (1990): and directed Adorno’s work. In 1931 Adorno
211–36. finished his graduate studies by receiving his
Torre, Michael D. Freedom in the Modern Habilitation with a thesis titled “Kierkegaard:
World: Jacques Maritain, Yves R. Simon, The Construction of the Aesthetic,” and
Mortimer J. Adler (Mishawaka, Ind., became a privatdozent at Frankfurt. Also in
1989). 1931 Adorno founded the Frankfurt School of
Weismann, Max, ed. How to Think About critical sociology and philosophy with Max
The Great Ideas: From the Great Books H ORKHEIMER . In 1934 Adorno fled Nazi
of Western Civilization (Boulder, Col., Germany to live in Oxford, England.
1990). Adorno emigrated to the United States in
1938 and joined the faculty of the relocated
Jean Van Delinder Frankfurt School, now called the Institute for
Social Research, at Columbia University. In
1941 he moved with Horkheimer to Los
Angeles, California. After eleven years in the
US, with Horkheimer’s help he was given a
professorship in Frankfurt in 1949, where the
ADORNO, Theodor Ludwig Wiesengrund Institute of Social Research had been
(1903–69) refounded, allowing him to return to Germany
and continue his academic career. This culmi-
Theodor Ludwig Wiesengrund was born on 11 nated in a position as double Ordinarius of
September 1903 in Frankfurt, Germany. philosophy and sociology. In the Institute,
Theodor replaced his last name with Adorno, which was affiliated with the university,
his mother’s maiden name, in 1938. Adorno’s Adorno’s leadership status became ever more
father, a wholesale wine dealer, had converted apparent, while Horkheimer, who was eight
from Judaism to Protestantism and his mother, years older, gradually stepped back, leaving
who had been a professional singer, was his younger friend the sole directorship in
Catholic. In 1919, at age seventeen, he gradu- 1958. Adorno died while vacationing on 6
ated from the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gymnasium at August 1969 in Visp, Switzerland.
the top of his class. “Teddie,” as he was Adorno’s contributions to philosophy, social
known, led a comfortably sheltered life science, psychology, and cultural theory can
learning piano and composition from Bernard hardly be overestimated. From his first major
Sekles at the Hoch Conservatory (later, while work on Kierkegaard and aesthetics in 1933 to
in his early twenties, he was also a student of Negative Dialectics, his 1966 masterpiece,
Alban Berg and Eduard Steuermann in Adorno rarely failed to penetrate the dialecti-
Vienna), and philosophy with Siegfried cal relations between exchange, the formation
Kracauer (who was a family friend) and of alienated and mystified subjectivity, author-
Edmund Husserl. From his early days as a itarian political logic, and the contradictory
student until 1929 Adorno wrote music criti- nature of culture in modern society. Though he
34
ADORNO
sometimes lacked consistency he can nonethe- Antisemitism.” Adorno was intimately

less be credited, both individually and as a involved with both streams of research, and
member of the celebrated Institute of Social this period of research in California was
Research, otherwise known since the 1960s decisive not only for the Institute but for
as the “Frankfurt School,” with arguably the Adorno personally. The most famous study
most significant critical extension of Marx’s to emerge from the anti-Semitism program
analysis of capitalist society to date. was The Authoritarian Personality (1950)
As early as 1924 Adorno was already con- about authoritarian character structure,
nected in significant ways with individuals written in concert with political psychologists
who would later be his collaborators at the at Berkeley. Adorno contributed four big
Institute for Social Research. Horkheimer, who chapters under the heading of “Qualitative
would assume the directorship of the Institute Studies of Ideology,” and these chapters were
in 1931, was an assistant to Cornelius and an the strong theoretical sections of the book.
examiner of Adorno’s dissertation. His rela- Generally, Adorno’s aim in The Authoritarian
tionship with Kracauer also led to an associa- Personality was to explore the relationship
tion with Leo Lowenthal, destined to be a between ideological structures and personality
long-time member of Horkheimer’s inner – a phenomenology of authoritarianism from
circle, as well as Walter Benjamin, who, which the meaning behind surface expressions
though never officially a full member of the could be interpreted in the light of empirical
Frankfurt School, was a friend, kindred spirit, data.
and briefly listed as a research associate in Like Sartre’s classic Anti-Semite and Jew,
1938 while in Paris during World War II. the Berkeley study confirmed that anti-
Adorno’s official entry into the Institute Semitism was not principally a problem of
came in February 1938 when he arrived in Jews generating hatred, but, rather, a problem
New York City (he later applied for and of anti-Semites who construct the Jew as a
achieved US citizenship) to work part-time for substitute object out of social and psycholog-
both the Institute and Lazarsfeld’s Princeton ical elements. An object upon which to project
Radio Project. While Adorno proved unsuited hatred, the necessary material prop or carrier,
for the job with Lazarsfeld, he did gain was not dispensable: the object of hatred “…
valuable insight into American empirical must have certain characteristics in order to
methods which would, in modified form, fulfill its role … be tangible enough; and …
inform the wartime work undertaken by the have sufficient historical backing … . It must
Institute. As he later said, “For the first time I be defined in rigid and well-known stereo-
saw administrative research before me; I do not types. Finally, the object must possess features,
know today whether Lazarsfeld coined this or at least be capable of being perceived and
phrase or I in my astonishment at such a type interpreted in terms of features which harmo-
of science, focused directly on praxis, so utterly nize with the destructive tendencies of the prej-
unfamiliar to me.” (1998, p. 219) Adorno udiced subject.” (1950, p. 608) Anti-Semitism
remained with the Radio Project until 1941 was, Adorno stressed, independent from its
when he moved to California to assist object – a fantasy construct composed of mate-
Horkheimer with the dialectics project and, a rials provided by concrete social processes,
few years later, to co-direct the Berkeley study frustrations, repressions. Rather than focusing
on anti-Semitism and authoritarianism. on Jewish traits and suggesting ways in which
The wartime efforts of the Institute revolved Jews could better assimilate, Adorno insisted
around two main intellectual pillars: that the road to a theory of anti-Semitism
Horkheimer’s dialectics project and the more amounted to a theory of modern society as a
massive and important “Studies in whole.
35
ADORNO
Where Adorno’s empirically rooted theoriz- Massing and Gurland argued that there was
ing within the Institute’s anti-Semitism studies good news to be found in the data: if half of
was generally subtle and insightful, his thinking the workers in the United States were debili-
on the dialectics project was perhaps compro- tated to one extent or another by anti-
mised by Horkheimer’s impatience toward Semitism, then the good news was that edu-
interpretations that deviated from his growing cation, age, gender, and Americanization,
sense of despair and pessimism. Consequently, among other factors, all eroded the social bases
Dialectic of Enlightenment (first published in of anti-Semitic prejudice. The data supported
1944 as Philosophische Fragmente) co-authored the idea that American labor would, over time,
with Horkheimer and generally considered increasingly shed its irrational hatred of Jews.
today to be a major publication of the Institute, In other words, where Horkheimer saw only a
represents a schizophrenic web of competing moral, civil, and social abyss enveloping
philosophical impulses: orthodox Freudianism, Western civilization, the “Other” Frankfurt
bio-reductionism, and pessimism juxtaposed School, the empirical and editorial wing, saw
with the occasional use of Hegelian Marxism things in a very different light. Since the inner
(see Smith 1992). circle was in a downsizing mode and since the
One of the central ironies identified by outer circle was not interpreting society and
Horkheimer and Adorno was that what history in an appropriately abysmal fashion,
appeared to be a gulf between reason, enlight- the labor study was suppressed.
enment, and democratic liberalism, on the one Ironically, Dialectic of Enlightenment
hand, and irrationalism, romantic mysticism, offered its own kind of totalizing theory of
and fascism, was in fact illusory: fascism was anti-Semitism that failed to take into account
incomprehensible outside liberal, bourgeois national variations or even factors as crucial
democracy and the spirit of the Enlightenment. and elementary as class segmentation and
Enlightenment and terror were, in some social differentiation – witness such crude
respects, consubstantial; authoritarian mysti- assertions as “Anti-Semitism is a deeply
cism was the extreme manifestation (or the imprinted schema, a ritual of civilization.”
logical consequence) of sober, bourgeois lib- (1972, p. 171) Other Institute researchers
eralism itself. As bleak and unforgiving as this (Massing and Gurland in particular) found
interpretation was, the essay on anti-Semitism that Berlin anti-Semitism was only superfi-
was even more illustrative of the tensions cially similar to Detroit anti-Semitism. Unlike
brewing between Horkheimer’s inner circle their German counterparts, so-called white-
and the earlier intellectual trajectory of the collar workers in the United States were gen-
Institute. erally immune to anti-Semitism. They found
The Institute’s labor anti-Semitism study that education dramatically reduced levels of
(1944–5), one of the sub-projects in the larger hostility as well as variables such as gender,
Studies in Anti-Semitism program, was carried age, and long-term exposure to American
out simultaneously with both the Berkeley culture and values. Horkheimer and Adorno
study and the writing that went into Dialectic countered with notions of hypnotic gaze, blind
of Enlightenment. Principally authored by Paul obedience, mental induction currents, castra-
Massing and A. R. L. Gurland (Lowenthal tion fears, mimesis, biological prehistory, blind
and Pollock both contributed sections with transference, and so on until they blithely
Adorno providing general oversight functions), claimed that “contemporary anti-Semitism
the labor study offered a different set of inter- [has acquired an] impenetrable, meaningless
pretations and conclusions regarding the character” (1972, p. 206). Could the Adorno
working class and the nature of prejudice than of Dialectic of Enlightenment be the same
those endorsed by Horkheimer. In short, person who helped pen The Authoritarian
36
ADORNO
Personality and who was familiar with the wheat looking over its shoulder at corn to
labor study? Was Adorno simply of two minds know itself as an exchange value (the relative
on the subject or was his intellectual integrity and equivalent poles of the value form). The
hobbled by his collaboration with Hegelian-Marxist dialectic insisted, meta-
Horkheimer? physically, that this alienation inherent in
Upon returning to Germany in 1951, social relations (the struggle between alien
Adorno was a key player in the reformation of wills, between subject and other, between
the Institute in Frankfurt. Adorno remained agents and history) would work itself out, nec-
hostile to both socialism and capitalism and essarily, in the direction of freedom and that
adamant about publishing what he had written subjectivity would take care of itself.
while in exile, though some Institute figures Reconciliation with society and the world
had warmed to bourgeois enlightenment and would emerge through education, labor, col-
to a large extent had buried their Marxist past. lective (class) struggle, and the rational trans-
During the early 1960s Adorno was embroiled formation of society and nature.
in famous disputes with Karl Popper (summed The outbreak of World War I, and totali-
up in The Positivist Dispute in German tarianism following quickly on its heels, finally
Sociology) and tangled with the existential- brought to an end the faith-based optimism
ists, resulting in a brilliant slim book called The that characterized previous generations of
Jargon of Authenticity (1973) – a work he radical thinkers. The Frankfurt School, like
described as a “propaedeutic” to Negative other branches of neo-Marxist thought, set
Dialectics. German existentialism amounted out to interrogate, among other things, the
to what Adorno called a cult of authenticity failure of the working class to become the self-
that utilized a standardized jargon of pseudo conscious class of world historical change and
emotionality systematically to disorganize the dimly understood logic of collective sub-
language, transform the authority of the jectivity and domination. Adorno’s final
absolute into absolutized authority and, in so treatise on the problem does not offer an easy
doing, provided a refuge for fascism – “Within answer. In fact, it may offer no answers at all,
this refuge a smoldering evil expresses itself as with some writers likening it to the closing
though it were salvation.” (1973, pp. 5, 6) Far chapter of the Western Marxist tradition. But
from bringing people into contact with whatever the case, Negative Dialectics does
concrete, authentic reality, it instead sealed offer a deep exploration and expansion of the
them off inside a shell of mysticism and logic of subjectivity that Marx had only hinted
enabled, in the words of the existentialists, an at in Capital. That Adorno could both deepen
agreement with existence and a positive the tradition of Western Marxism, and also
relation to the world and life regardless of the create an intellectual impasse forbidding
dehumanizing and authoritarian nature of further development, was a logical conclusion
existence and the world. for an individual situated at the crossroads of
The most significant work of Adorno’s post- pessimism and optimism, speculation and empir-
war life was Negative Dialectics. His core con- ical inquiry, and orthodoxy and heterodoxy.
ceptual problems centered on the dynamics of With Adorno’s death, a form of Critical
alienation and reconciliation. Marx’s theory of Theory ended, one which had uniquely
the commodity was founded upon a theory of centered on the Institute of Social Research
alienation such that the social and moral and “on an urge for discovery that had its
statuses of things and people were dependent roots in anti-bourgeois sentiment and in a
upon the objective appearance in the world of sense of having a mission to criticize society”
a non-identical other to assume the shape and (1999, p. 654).
form of this moral substance, for example,
37
ADORNO
BIBLIOGRAPHY H. Lonitz, trans. N. Walker (Cambridge,

Philosophische Fragmente, with Max Mass., 1999).
Horkheimer (New York, 1944). Trans. The Adorno Reader, ed. Brian O’Connor
John Cumming, Dialectic of (Oxford, 2000).
Enlightenment (New York, 1972).
The Authoritarian Personality, with Else Further Reading
Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, Amer Nat Bio, Bio 20thC Phils, Blackwell
and R. Nevitt Sanford (New York, Comp Phils, Encyc Social Behav Sci,
1950). Oxford Comp Phil, Routledge Encycl
The Jargon of Authenticity (Evanston, Ill., Phil, Who’s Who in Phil
1973). Buck-Morss, Susan. The Origin of
Negative Dialektik (Frankfurt am Main, Negative Dialectics: Theodor W.
Germany, 1966). Trans. E. B. Ashton, Adorno, Walter Benjamin and the
Negative Dialectics (London and New Frankfurt Institute (New York, 1977).
York, 1973). Jameson, Fredric. Late Marxism: Adorno,
Philosophy of Modern Music (London and or, The Persistence of the Dialectic
New York, 1973). (London and New York, 1990).
Minima Moralia: Reflections of a Jay, Martin. The Dialectical Imagination
Damaged Life (London, 1974). (Berkeley, Cal., 1973).
Aesthetic Theory (London and New York, ———, Adorno (Cambridge, Mass.,
1984; Minneapolis, 1997). 1984).
Critical Models: Interventions and Krakauer, E. L. The Disposition of the
Catchwords (New York, 1998). Subject: Reading Adorno’s Dialectic of
Problems of Moral Philosophy, ed. Technology (Evanston, Ill., 1998).
Thomas Schröder, trans. Rodney Menke, Christoph. The Sovereignty of Art:
Livingstone (Stanford, Cal., 2000). Aesthetic Negativity in Adorno and
Derrida, trans. N. Solomon (Cambridge,
Other Relevant Works Mass., 1998).
Adorno’s papers are at the Theodor W. Morris, Martin. Rethinking the
Adorno Archive in Frankfurt am Main, Communicative Turn: Adorno,
Germany. Habermas, and the Problem of
Gesammelte Schriften, 20 vols, ed. Gretel Communicative Freedom (Albany, N.Y.,
Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann (1970–86). 2001).
The Positivist Dispute in German Nordquist, Joan. Theodor Adorno (Santa
Sociology, with others (London, 1976). Cruz, Cal., 1988). Bibliography on
The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Adorno.
Mass Culture, ed. J. M. Bernstein ———, Theodor Adorno (II) (Santa Cruz,
(London, 1991). Cal., 1994). Updated bibliography on
Nachgelassene Schriften, ed. Rolf Adorno.
Tiedemann et al. (Frankfurt am Main, Rose, Gillian. The Melancholy Science: An
Germany, 1995–). Introduction to the Thought of Theodor
Adorno: The Stars Down to Earth and W. Adorno (London, 1978).
Other Essays on the Irrational in Sherratt, Yvonne. Adorno’s Positive
Culture, ed. Stephen Crook (London, Dialectic (Cambridge, UK, 2002).
1998). Smith, David N. “The Beloved Dictator:
The Complete Correspondence, Adorno, Horkheimer, and the Critique
1928–1940, with Walter Benjamin, ed. of Domination,” Current Perspectives in
38
AGASSI
Social Theory 12 (1992): 195–230. the end of fixing beliefs is not a serious one.
Wiggershaus, Rolf. The Frankfurt School: The problems of the philosophy of technology
Its History, Theories, and Political do engage him, including the problem of
Significance (Cambridge, Mass., 1994). choosing scientific theories and ideas worthy of
application and implementation. Such choices
Mark P. Worrell are not obligatory but optional; often their
implementation requires license (professional
or political) and license requires corrobora-
tion by legally given standards, which in turn
are imperfect and invite modifications. Fake
corroboration (of hypotheses), a question that
AGASSI, Joseph (1927– ) engaged Popper and others, seems to Agassi to
be unproblematic in science, as by definition its
Joseph Agassi was born on 7 May 1927 in practitioners engage in the quest for the truth.
Jerusalem, Palestine. He received his MS in 1951 (Just as fake chess is no chess, so is fake science
at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and his no science at all and that is all that there is to
PhD in the field of “science: logic and scientific it. The difference between science and chess is
method” at the University of London in 1956. in the serious consequences of the scientific
He was a research associate in the Center for the enterprise and in the unproblematic character
Study of the Behavioral Sciences in Stanford, of the rules of chess.)
California in 1956–7, a lecturer in logic and sci- In technology, by contrast, there are
entific method at the London School of economic incentives to cheat, but these are
Economics from 1957 to 1960, and served as matters for the law to deal with, not philoso-
lecturer, reader, and head of the department of phy. Similarly, ever since science became highly
philosophy at the University of Hong Kong from prestigious, some people claim scientific status
1960 to 1963. After two years as associate pro- for their ideas. Those who care for science as
fessor of philosophy at the University of Illinois a theoretical enterprise can ask themselves
at Urbana (1963–5), he was professor of phi- why, and see if their characterization of the
losophy at Boston University from 1965 to reasons fits cases that are in doubt. This seems
1983. Agassi was also professor of philosophy at to Agassi to fit very closely with Popper’s ideas
Tel-Aviv University in Israel from 1971 to 1996, about keeping the scientific enterprise open to
and professor of philosophy at York University ongoing critical evaluation. The application
in Toronto from 1982 to 1997. He is currently of technology becomes obligatory in matters of
professor emeritus at both Tel-Aviv University personal responsibility to others, especially to
and York University. one’s charges such as the sick and the young –
Agassi takes it that philosophy is nothing if for example, the duty to administer to them the
not rationalist. For over fifty years he has best possible medication. These cases, too, are
studied the rationality of science, metaphysics, subject to the law of the land, and in the
and democratic politics. modern world this involves only what are
Agassi advocates Karl Popper’s philosophy, publicly recognized (at times quite erroneously)
with variations that may be significant. Taking and corroborated factual generalizations, never
science as a response to the challenge of theories. The status of factual assertions
explaining repeatable facts and testing the few outside science (in their inductive guises) is
explanations that we have, he ignores many of very interesting and it has changed over the
the problems that concern some philosophers centuries. It is in this vein, too, that Agassi
of science, chiefly that of theory choice: he maintains the importance of metaphysical
contends that choice depends on ends and that frameworks for the assessment of and choices
39
AGASSI
made in relation to scientific theories, princi- Selected Reviews and Comments (La
ples, and foundations. Salle, Ill., 1988).
To the extent that the application of science Diagnosis: Philosophical and Medical
is a moral duty, it hinges on the theory of Perspectives, with Nathaniel Laor
morality. Agassi suggests, in line with Popper’s (Dordrecht, 1990).
political philosophy, that all schools of thought The Siblinghood of Humanity: Introduction
have thus far neglected the one major practi- to Philosophy (Delmar, N.Y., 1990).
cal problem of ethics, namely moral brakes: Radiation Theory and the Quantum
when should one apply them? We know this Revolution (Basel, 1993).
much: the more decent people are, the sooner A Philosopher’s Apprentice: In Karl
they are ready to put their brakes on. For Popper’s Workshop (Amsterdam, 1993).
example, the German nation, Agassi observes, Liberal Nationalism for Israel: Towards an
lost its moral brakes as soon as its Nazi rulers Israeli National Identity (Jerusalem and
showed their hand. New York, 1994).
Agassi shares with Ernest Gellner (Agassi Science and Culture (Dordrecht, 2003).
has edited many of Gellner’s works) a view of
the original (modern) nationalist movements as Other Relevant Works
progressive. He views as their major charac- Ed. with Robert S. Cohen, Scientific
teristic and greatest asset their emancipation of Philosophy Today: Essays in Honor of
national minority groups and receiving them Mario Bunge (Dordrecht, 1982).
into the nation as equals. The reactionary trib- Ed. with I. C. Jarvie, Rationality: The
alist nationalism – the one that Popper rightly Critical View (Dordrecht, 1987).
attacked and wrongly saw as nationalism in
general – is a part of the reaction to the Further Reading
Enlightenment movement that provided the Anderson, Gunnar. “Lakatos and Progress
ideology for egalitarian, liberal nationalism. and Rationality in Science: A Reply to
Agassi,” Philosophia 16 (1986): 239–43.
BIBLIOGRAPHY Friedman, Jeffrey. “Truth and Liberation:
Towards an Historiography of Science Rejoinder to Brooks, Sassower and
(Middletown, Conn., 1963). Agassi, and Harris,” Critical Review 8
The Continuing Revolution: A History of (1994): 137–57.
Physics from the Greeks to Einstein (New
York, 1968). Raphael Sassower
Faraday as a Natural Philosopher (Chicago,
1971).
Science in Flux (Dordrecht, 1975).
Paranoia: A Study in Diagnosis, with
Yehuda Fried (Dordrecht, 1976).
Towards a Rational Philosophical
Anthropology (Dordrecht, 1977).
Science and Society: Studies in the AGASSIZ, Jean Louis Rodolphe (1807–73)
Sociology of Science (Dordrecht, 1981).
Psychiatry as Medicine, with Yehuda Fried Louis Agassiz was born on 26 May 1807 in
(Dordrecht, 1983). Motier-en-Vuly in Fribourg canton,
Technology: Philosophical and Social Switzerland. His father was a Protestant
Aspects (Dordrecht, 1985). pastor. Agassiz attended the College of
The Gentle Art of Philosophical Polemics: Lusanne in France from 1822 to 1824 and
40
AGASSIZ
decided to devote himself to the study of Two major American philosophers, Charles
nature. He received training in biology and PEIRCE and William JAMES, took courses with
natural history at the University of Zurich Agassiz during their educations at Harvard.
from 1824 to 1826, and at the University of Although both Peirce and James were quickly
Heidelberg in 1826–7. In 1827 he received convinced by Darwin’s theory of natural selec-
his MD from the University of Munich, and tion, they nevertheless appreciated and
then went to the University of Erlangen for his acquired Agassiz’s remarkable talent for sen-
PhD in zoology, which he received in 1829. sitivity to the empirical evidence presented by
With assistance from the French naturalist any object of the scientist’s study. James was
Georges Cuvier and the German scholar especially impressed by Agassiz as a model of
Alexander von Humboldt, Agassiz began his a tireless investigator, and went with Agassiz
career. From 1832 to 1846 Agassiz was pro- on a collecting expedition to Brazil in 1865–6.
fessor of natural history at the Collège de James’s later devotion to empiricism and prag-
Neuchâtel in Switzerland. During this time, he matism can partially be traced back to his
studied glaciers and fossilized fish, developing rejection of Agassiz’s use of religion in biology
his theory of divine creation of all organisms. and his affirmation of Agassiz’s demand for
His method of arranging the fossil record to empirical devotion.
reveal the stages of God’s creation was enor-
mously influential on zoology and natural BIBLIOGRAPHY
history. Monographies d’échinodermes vivans et
In 1846 the Prussian government sent fossils, 4 vols (1838–42).
Agassiz for a two-year study of American Études sur les glaciers (1840).
animal and plant species. In 1847 Harvard Twelve Lectures on Comparative
University appointed him to be the professor of Embryology (1849).
zoology and geology for its new Lawrence Principles of Zoology, with Augustus A.
Scientific School, and he held this post until his Gould (Boston, 1851).
death. Agassiz remained in the United States Contributions to the Natural History of the
for the rest of his life, except for occasional United States, 4 vols (Boston and London,
exploration expeditions, and became a natu- 1857–62).
ralized citizen in 1861. He established the An Essay on Classification (London, 1859;
Museum of Comparative Zoology at Harvard Cambridge, Mass., 1962).
in 1859 and served as a staunch defender of the Methods of Study in Natural History
theory of special creation against Darwin’s (Boston, 1863).
theory of evolution by natural selection.
Although his arguments against Darwin and Other Relevant Works
his supporters, such as Asa Gray, did not Agassiz’s papers are at Houghton Library
prevent the next generations of American sci- and the Museum of Comparative Zoology
entists from gradually adopting evolution, at Harvard University.
Agassiz was responsible for training many of Louis Agassiz: His Life and Correspondence,
the great biologists and naturalists of the latter 2 vols, ed. Elizabeth Cary Agassiz (Boston,
half of the nineteenth century. He was one of 1885).
the founders of the National Academy of Life, Letters and Works of Louis Agassiz, 2
Sciences in 1863, and helped to popularize sci- vols, ed. Jules Marcou (New York and
entific knowledge for a country that responded London, 1895).
with great admiration for his achievements.
Agassiz died on 14 December 1873 in Further Reading
Cambridge, Massachusetts. Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
41
AGASSIZ
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer tivist and instrumentalist characterizations of
Thought, Encyc Amer Bio aesthetic value, preferring his pluralistic
Fry, C. George, and John Paul Fry. analysis. He used it to promote the idea that
Congregationalists and Evolution: Asa practical or normative claims that may be made
Gray and Louis Agassiz (Lanham, Md., about a work of art are independent of that
1989). work’s empirically verifiable content. He
Lurie, Edward. Louis Agassiz: A Life in defended the relevance of symbolic cognitive
Science (Chicago, 1960; 2nd edn, processes to aesthetic judgments.
Baltimore, Md., 1988). Aiken edited a number of historical pieces,
including two by David Hume, and more
Nathan Houser notably The Age of Ideology (1956), a collec-
tion of works by various nineteenth-century
philosophers. Here he presents the view that
philosophers since Immanuel Kant have
increasingly begun to realize that their contri-
butions were not part of science, but instead
AIKEN, Henry David (1912–82) belong to what Aiken terms “ideology.” His
fondness for American pragmatism led him to
Henry David Aiken was born on 3 July 1912 the view that philosophy is thoroughly inter-
in Portland, Oregon. He attended Reed connected with language, morality, and other
College (BA 1935), then went on to graduate topics. He was a staunch supporter of ordinary
study in philosophy at Stanford University language philosophy, and took a significant
(MA 1937) and Harvard University (PhD interest in the study of education. He advo-
1943). After briefly working at Columbia cated several progressive changes to higher edu-
University and the University of Washington, cation curricula, to accommodate the changing
he returned to Harvard, where he taught phi- needs of students, and move beyond what he
losophy from 1946 to 1965. He was awarded perceived as the stifling rationalist view of edu-
a Guggenheim Fellowship in 1960. He left cation in Western society. He also investigated
Harvard to teach at Brandeis University, how education can assist the development of
hoping to apply his emerging views on the aim one’s aesthetic faculties and speculated on the
of universities. He became the Charles possible contributions of philosophy to educa-
Goldman Professor of Philosophy and tional reform.
remained at Brandeis until his retirement in
1980. Aiken died on 30 March 1982 in BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cambridge, Massachusetts. “A Pluralistic Analysis of Aesthetic Value,”
Aiken argued against both the primarily Philosophical Review 59 (1950): 493–513.
descriptive and emotive character of ethical “The Aesthetic Relevance of Belief,” Journal
claims. In “Moral Philosophy and Education” of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 9 (1951):
(1955) he stresses the social role such claims 301–15.
play in the regulation of conduct. Because this “The Levels of Moral Discourse,” Ethics 62
role is fundamental to the meaning of ethical (1952): 235–48.
judgments, these judgments are objective and “Moral Philosophy and Education,” Harvard
can be appraised as such, in terms of whether Educational Review 25 (1955): 39–59.
they are consistent with social norms. However, “Some Notes Concerning the Aesthetic and
since these norms do not obey the rules of logic, the Cognitive,” Journal of Aesthetics and
ethical judgments are not reducible to scientific Art Criticism 13 (1955): 378–94.
descriptions. Aiken also criticized purely emo- Ed., The Age of Ideology: The Nineteenth
42
ALBEE
Century Philosophers (Boston, 1956). Albee died on 26 May 1927 in Ithaca, New
Reason and Conduct: New Bearings in York.
Moral Philosophy (New York, 1962). Albee’s best-known contribution to phi-
Ed. with William Barrett, Philosophy in the losophy is his work on the history of utili-
Twentieth Century: An Anthology, 4 vols tarianism. Utilitarianism is a moral theory
(New York, 1962). which holds that an action can be regarded as
“Morality and Ideology,” in Ethics and moral if it promotes the greatest happiness for
Society: Original Essays on Contemporary the greatest number of people. Happiness is
Moral Problems, ed. Richard T. De George usually understood by the proponents of the
(Garden City, N.Y., 1966). theory as the promotion of pleasure and the
The Predicament of the University avoidance of pain. Actions are also evaluated
(Bloomington, Ind., 1971). by their consequences, and not by the inten-
tions of the moral agent. This ethical theory
Further Reading became very influential, even culturally
Who Was Who in Amer v8 dominant, in Western countries in the twen-
tieth century, and this makes Albee’s one
Evan Moreno-Davis major work, History of English Utilitarianism
(1901), a valuable resource on the history of
the movement.
Albee’s book was the only one of its kind,
because it was the first to treat the history of
utilitarianism from a philosophical, rather
ALBEE, Ernest (1865–1927) than a historical, point of view. He provides
a critical exposition of all of the major figures
Ernest Albee, the son of Solon and Ellen involved in the development of utilitarian
(Eames) Albee, was born on 8 August 1865 moral theory, including David Hume, Jeremy
in Langdon, New Hampshire. Albee attended Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Herbert
the University of Vermont, where he gradu- Spencer. He also traces the early origins of the
ated with his BA in 1887. His initial interest movement in the work of Anthony Ashley
was in psychology, leading him to pursue Cooper, the first Earl of Shaftesbury, the
graduate studies at Clark University in 1891. philosophers Francis Hutcheson, John Gay,
However, his interests soon turned to phi- and John Brown, and especially in the
losophy; he obtained a fellowship from thought of Richard Cumberland, whom
Cornell University, where he earned his PhD Albee regarded as the first significant thinker
in philosophy in 1894. His doctoral disserta- in the utilitarian tradition. Albee included
tion was titled “The Beginnings of English thinkers who are not normally associated
Utilitarianism” and involved a study of the with the movement of utilitarianism today,
eighteenth-century origins of utilitarian moral and illustrates in insightful ways their impor-
theory. In 1892 Albee was appointed to the tance to any understanding of the main
faculty at the Sage School of Philosophy at concepts of utilitarianism. He describes John
Cornell, where he remained for thirty-five Gay’s Preliminary Dissertation: Concerning
years until his death in 1927. He was instruc- the Fundamental Principle of the Virtue of
tor of philosophy from 1892 to 1902, assis- Morality (1731) as “one of the most interesting
tant professor from 1902 to 1907, and a full and important contributions to the early devel-
professor beginning in 1907. He served twice opment of the ‘greatest happiness’ principle”
as editor of the Philosophical Review, from (1901, p. 69). Hume’s Inquiry Concerning the
1903 to 1909, and again from 1924 to 1927. Principles of Morals (1751) is, according to
43
ALBEE
Albee, the classic statement of English utilitar- ALBRITTON, Rogers Garland (1923–2002)
ianism, a view which would be resisted by some
later scholars. His study of the origins of utili- Rogers Albritton was born on 15 August 1923
tarianism led him to a rather unenthusiastic in Columbus, Ohio. He enrolled in Saint John’s
view of the influence of Jeremy Bentham, a College in 1940, but with the outbreak of World
philosopher who later became closely associ- War II he enlisted in the US Army Air Corps,
ated with the theory, but whom Albee held as attaining the rank of sergeant. After the war
contributing little that was essentially new to Albritton returned to Saint John’s to complete his
ethical theory. BA degree. His senior thesis defended lyric poetry
Albee’s study of utilitarianism is a careful, against the implications of logical positivism.
fair, critical contribution to the history of phi- He then received his PhD in philosophy at
losophy. Because of the subsequent importance Princeton University in 1955. Albritton taught
of utilitarian moral theory, it became, and briefly at Cornell University before joining the
remains, an indispensable resource for the philosophy department at Harvard University in
history and development of the movement. 1956. He was department chair from 1963 to
1970. In 1972 Albritton went to the University
BIBLIOGRAPHY of California at Los Angeles, and taught philos-
The Beginnings of English Utilitarianism ophy there until his retirement in 1991. He was
(Boston, 1897). chair of that department from 1979 to 1981.
A History of English Utilitarianism Albritton served as President of the Pacific
(London and New York, 1901; 1957). Division of the American Philosophical
Association in 1984/5. After his retirement, he
Other Relevant Works continued to teach courses at UCLA through
“An Examination of Professor Sidgwick’s the mid-1990s, and remained a resident of Los
Proof of Utilitarianism,” Philosophical Angeles until his death there on 21 May 2002.
Review 10 (1901): 251–60. Albritton was an influential and deeply
“The Significance of Methodological respected philosopher despite publishing only a
Principles,” Philosophical Review 15 small number of articles over the course of his
(1906): 267–76. career. Yet those articles have had a major
“Descriptive and Normative Sciences,” impact on several areas of philosophical study.
Philosophical Review 16 (1907): 40–49. His early articles on Aristotle’s metaphysics have
“The Present Meaning of Idealism,” been highly influential, and his famous article on
Philosophical Review 18 (1909): Wittgenstein’s use of the term ‘criterion’ remains
299–308. an important contribution to Wittgenstein schol-
“Philosophy and Literature,” Philosophical arship. Albritton’s primary philosophical inter-
Review 27 (1918): 343–55. ests lay in ancient Greek philosophy, Descartes,
“Clarke’s Ethical Philosophy,” and Wittgenstein, particularly in problems con-
Philosophical Review 37 (1928): 304–27, cerning free will, skepticism, philosophy of mind,
403–32. and metaphysics. On the problem of free will, in
particular, Albritton’s influence is reflected in a
Further Reading number of scholarly articles by other philoso-
Amer Nat Bio, Dict Amer Bio, Who Was phers written in response to his work.
Who in Amer v1 Albritton was not known primarily as an
advocate of any particular philosophical
Brendan Sweetman position, but rather as a powerfully careful
explorer of philosophical problems. He was
greatly prized by his philosophical colleagues
44
ALCOTT
for his ability to clarify ideas and examine philo- ALCOTT, Amos Bronson (1799–1888)
sophical issues in conversation. These conversa-
tions with Albritton were legendary among his Bronson Alcott was born 29 November 1799,
friends and colleagues, as evening discussions in rural poverty at Spindle Hill near Wolcott,
regularly lasted well into the early morning Connecticut. Alcott had little schooling, but
hours. As his UCLA colleague David KAPLAN became known as one of the major leaders of
said at the time of his death, “His high position American Transcendentalism. As O. B.
in philosophy is based on the sheer power of his FROTHINGHAM said of Alcott’s contribution to
thought.” Albritton’s understanding of his role Transcendentalism, he represented the mystic,
as a philosopher was perhaps best expressed in whereas Ralph Waldo EMERSON was the seer,
the now famous words of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Theodore Parker the preacher, Margaret Fuller
“to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle.” the critic, and George Ripley the man of letters.
From 1818 until 1823 Alcott was a Yankee
BIBLIOGRAPHY peddler in Virginia and the Carolinas where he
“Forms of Particular Substances in Aristotle’s was struck by the grand manners of the
‘Metaphysics’,” Journal of Philosophy 54 southern planters. He would always embody
(1957): 699–707. this gentile sensibility. He then taught schools
“Present Truth and Future Contingency,” in small Connecticut towns where, with some
Philosophical Review 66 (1957): 29–46. help from stray books but mainly out of his
“On Wittgenstein’s Use of the Term own invention, he made such innovations as
‘Criterion’,” Journal of Philosophy 56 organized play, the honor system, pleasant
(1959): 845–56. rooms, and the abolition of physical punish-
“Comments on Hilary Putnam’s ‘Robots: ment.
Machines or Artificially Created Life’,” In 1828 Alcott opened a school in Boston,
Journal of Philosophy 61 (1964): 691–4. heard the Boston ministers, and though he was
“Comments on ‘Moore’s Paradox and their senior, his lack of formal education
Self–Knowledge’,” Philosophical Studies 77 enabled him to respond to these new stimula-
(1995): 229–39. tions. In 1830 he married Abigail May and a
few years later opened the Temple School in
Further Reading Boston, which would close in 1838 due to
Pres Addr of APA v9 Alcott’s progressive ideas, including the admis-
Watson, Gary. “Freedom and Strength of Will sion of an African-American girl to the school.
in Hoffman and Albritton,” Philosophical From 1859 to 1865 Alcott was superinten-
Studies 77 (1995): 261–71. dent of schools in Concord, Massachusetts.
Throughout the remainder of his life Alcott
David E. Schrader traveled extensively around America conduct-
ing “conversations” on a wide range of topics,
especially somewhat convoluted expositions
of his own brand of Transcendental Neo-
Platonism. The 1868 success of his daughter
Louisa May Alcott’s Little Women provided
much needed financial stability to his family.
In 1879 Alcott inaugurated his Concord
School of Philosophy and Literature at his
home, which served as a meeting place for
such thinkers as Emerson, Thomas DAVIDSON,
William T. HARRIS, William JAMES, Denton
45
ALCOTT
SNIDER, and various other representatives of New Connecticut, ed. F. B. Sanborn (Boston,
Hegelian and Transcendental philosophy, until 1887).
Alcott’s death on 4 March 1888 in Boston, Essays on Education, 1830–1862, ed. Walter
Massachusetts. Harding (Gainesville, Fla., 1960).
Alcott’s philosophical influences range from
Pythagoras, who inspired his commitment to Other Relevant Works
vegetarianism, Plato and Plotinus, who Bronson Alcott’s papers are at Harvard
provided his emanation theories of Being and University.
education, to Swedenborg, who offered him a The Journals of Bronson Alcott, ed. Odell
conception of religious faith that relied on Shepard (Boston, 1938).
personal revelation. Although Alcott was not The Letters of Bronson Alcott, ed. Richard
a great scholar in the usual sense – he was L. Herrnstadt (Ames, Iowa, 1969).
neither a careful reader nor a rigorously sys-
tematic thinker – he relied on his streak of Further Reading
genius to pick and choose points of wisdom Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
from others to augment his reliance on intu- Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer
ition and “divination.” Thought, Dict Amer Bio
Dahlstrand, Frederick C. Amos Bronson
BIBLIOGRAPHY Alcott: An Intellectual Biography
“Education of Infant Children,” American (Rutherford, N.J., 1982).
Journal of Education 3 (July 1828): Frothingham, O. B. Transcendentalism in
412–15. New England (New York, 1876).
“Maternal Instruction,” The Unitarian McCuskey, Dorothy. Bronson Alcott,
Advocate 1 (1828): 304–308. Teacher (New York, 1949).
“Primary Education, Account of the Method Morrow, Honore Willisie. The Father of
of Instruction in the Primary School No.1 Little Women (Boston, 1927).
of Cheshire, Connecticut,” American Pochmann, Henry A. New England
Journal of Education 3 (February 1828): Transcendentalism and St. Louis
86–94. Hegelianism (Philadelphia, 1948).
“Pestalozzi’s Principles and Methods of Sanborn, F. B. A. Bronson Alcott: His Life
Instruction,” American Journal of and Philosophy (Boston, 1893).
Education 4 (March 1829): 97–107. Shepard, Odell. Pedlar’s Progress: The Life
Observations on the Principles and Methods of Bronson Alcott (Boston, 1937).
of Infant Instruction (Boston, 1830).
On the Nature and Means of Early Scott Bartlett
Intellectual Education, as Deduced from
Experience (Boston, 1833).
The Doctrine and Discipline of Human
Culture (Boston, 1836).
Conversations with Children on the Gospels
(Boston, 1836–7). ALDRICH, Virgil Charles (1903–98)
Concord Days (Philadelphia, 1872).
Record of Mr. Alcott’s School (Boston, Virgil C. Aldrich was born on 13 September
1874). 1903 in Narsinghpur, India. His parents were
Ralph Waldo Emerson: An Estimate of his both missionaries, and he spent his youth living
Character and Genius (Boston, 1882). beneath the Himalayas in northern India. As an
Sonnets and Canzonets (Boston, 1882). undergraduate at Ohio Wesleyan he studied
46
ALDRICH
literature, and was known as a writer of short tive, and artificial” (1991, p. 246). Unlike
stories. He won a number of literary prizes, pictures, they were natural works of art.
but did not take a single course in philosophy. Aldrich believed that the analogy was a deep
It was after his 1925 graduation with a BA in one. Pictures had representational content, they
English that philosophy aroused his exclusive pictured something, according to Aldrich, and
interest. He then pursued his graduate studies the “body” of a picture (its physical constitu-
at Oxford, the Sorbonne (receiving an MA), tion) manifested that content. Like pictures,
and the University of California at Berkeley, what was “in” persons, their attitudes,
where he received his PhD in philosophy in thoughts, feelings, etc., was in a relevant sense
1931. In addition to visiting appointments at represented in their bodily activities.
Brown, Harvard, the University of Michigan, Aldrich ultimately developed what might be
Columbia University, and the University of called a “middle level” account of experience.
Texas, he held philosophy positions at Mills He argued that the dimensions of thought and
College, Wells College, Rice University, Kenyon experience could neither be reduced to a phys-
College (1946–65), and the University of North icalist account of them, nor contained by a
Carolina (1965–72). His influence on the philo- strictly conventionalist account.
sophical community, however, extended far
beyond his teaching and publishing activities. BIBLIOGRAPHY
He served as the President of the Western “An Ethics of Shame,” Ethics 50 (1939):
Division of the American Philosophical 57–77.
Association (1957–58), the President of the “The Spirit of the New Positivism,” Journal
American Society for Aesthetics, and the of Philosophy 37 (1940): 431–37.
Director of the Kyoto American Studies “John Dewey’s Use of Language,” Journal of
Institute. He received an honorary LHD degree Philosophy 41 (1944): 261–70.
from Ohio Wesleyan in 1961. After his retire- “Theory and the Integrity of Experience,”
ment from North Carolina he taught one class Journal of Philosophy 43 (1946): 379–82.
a year at the University of Utah until 1994. “Language, Experience, and Pictorial
Aldrich died on 28 May 1998 in Salt Lake Meaning,” Journal of Philosophy 45
City, Utah. (1948): 85–95.
Aldrich dedicated the greater part of his life “What Appears?” Philosophical Review 63
to the study of philosophy, offering two influ- (1954): 232–40.
ential books and literally hundreds of articles “The Informal Logic of the Employment of
and reviews to its ends. The scope of his work Expressions,” Philosophical Review 63
included significant contributions primarily in (1954): 380–400.
the areas of aesthetics and the philosophy of Philosophy of Art (Englewood, N.J., 1963).
mind and perception, though often crossing “Reflections on Ayer’s ‘Concept of a
over into epistemology and the philosophy of Person’,” Journal of Philosophy 62 (1965):
language as well. He was best known for his 111–28.
examinations of artifactuality and for his “An Aspect Theory of Mind,” Philosophy
analysis of experience. and Phenomenological Research 26
For Aldrich, an account of persons was (1966): 313–26.
closely linked to an account of artworks. “On Seeing Bodily Movements as Actions,”
Works of art are not natural kinds but artifacts, American Philosophical Quarterly 4
distinguishable from natural objects of aes- (1967): 222–30.
thetic interest, like flowers or mountains. “Design, Composition, and Symbol,” Journal
Aldrich added that persons are not natural of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 27 (1969):
kinds either. They were “conventional, inven- 379–88.
47
ALDRICH
“Illocutionary Space,” Philosophy and his PhD in 1879. His teachers were James
Phenomenological Research 22 (1971): MCCOSH, Charles W. SHIELDS, and Lyman H.
15–28. ATWATER. During 1875–7, he studied philos-
“Visual Noticing without Believing,” Mind ophy and psychology in Berlin and Vienna.
81 (1974): 512–33. In 1877 Alexander joined the faculty of
“Pictures and Persons – – An Analogy,” Columbia College in New York City as the
Review of Metaphysics 28 (1975): adjunct professor of moral and intellectual
599–610. philosophy, assisting Charles Murray Nairne,
“Point of View,” Philosophy and who had been professor of moral and intel-
Phenomenological Research 39 (1979): lectual philosophy and English literature since
498–510. 1857. Upon Nairne’s retirement, Alexander
“Mirrors, Picture, Words, Perceptions,” became professor of philosophy, ethics, and
Philosophy 55 (1980): 39–56. psychology on 7 November 1881, a date that
The Body of a Person (Lanham, Md., 1988). marked the formal inauguration of Columbia’s
“Photographing a Fact,” American philosophy department. Alexander’s only
Philosophical Quarterly 26 (1989): 81–4. notable philosophy student was Nicholas
“Persons as Natural Works of Art,” Murray BUTLER, who was already assisting in
American Philosophical Quarterly 28 his courses as a senior in 1882. Butler stayed
(1991): 245–49. for graduate work with Alexander, and after
earning his PhD in 1884 became assistant pro-
Further Reading fessor of philosophy in 1885. As Alexander’s
Oxford Comp Phil, Pres Addr of APA v6, health declined, Butler took over more of his
Proc of APA v72, Who’s Who in Phil courses, and filled his position when Alexander
Gustafson, Donald F., and Bangs L. retired from Columbia in 1889.
Tapscott. Body, Mind, and Method: While teaching at Columbia, Alexander
Essays in Honor of Virgil C. Aldrich completed two books, Some Problems of
(Dordrecht, 1979). Includes a biographical Philosophy (1886) and A Theory of Conduct
sketch and bibliography of Aldrich. (1890), and wrote articles for theology
journals. Some Problems of Philosophy dis-
Erica Wagner cusses a wide variety of issues, including the
nature of matter and life, the ego and uncon-
scious mental states, reason and knowledge,
the will, immortality, moral knowledge and
hedonism, the first cause, the infinite, God and
the right, atheism and pantheism, and cause
ALEXANDER, Archibald (1855–1917) and effect. In A Theory of Conduct Alexander
argues that the science of ethics concludes that
Archibald Alexander was born on 30 October total happiness is the aim and test of morality,
1855 in New York City. His father was Henry and so utilitarianism seems justified. However,
Martyn Alexander, a graduate of the College he claims, utilitarianism cannot supply the
of New Jersey (Princeton) in 1840. His mother motive to seek the general good, since people
was Susan Mary Brown Alexander, the tend toward egoism. Only Christianity, with its
daughter of Reverend Matthew Brown, doctrine that God can regenerate the human
President of Jefferson College in Pennsylvania character and its provision for immortality,
from 1822 to 1845. Alexander, like his father, explains how people can be moral.
attended the College of New Jersey and After leaving Columbia, Alexander contin-
received his BA in 1875, his MA in 1877, and ued to live in New York City for some years,
48
ALEXANDER
and worked in the editorial department of the “The Department of Philosophy,” in A

New York Evening Post. During this time he History of the Faculty of Philosophy,
completed his third book, Theories of the Will Columbia University (New York, 1957),
in the History of Philosophy (1898), which pp. 3–57 and 102–45.
surveys ancient philosophy, Christian theory,
British philosophy from Bacon to Reid, conti- John R. Shook
nental philosophy from Descartes to Leibniz,
and German philosophy from Kant to Lotze.
Without developing his own view, Alexander
expresses satisfaction with Lotze’s defense of
free will. He spent most of his later years in
Europe, especially Switzerland, traveling and ALEXANDER, Hartley Burr (1873–1939)
lecturing. Two Swiss universities, Neuchâtel
and Geneva, enjoyed his lectures most fre- Hartley Burr Alexander was born on 9 April
quently. Alexander died on 15 February 1917 1873 in Lincoln, Nebraska. His mother Abby
in Geneva, Switzerland. died when he was very young; his father
George Sherman Alexander, a Methodist
BIBLIOGRAPHY minister, later operated a newspaper in
Some Problems of Philosophy (New York, Syracuse, Nebraska, where Hartley was raised.
1886). He received his BA from the University of
A Theory of Conduct (New York, 1890). Nebraska in 1897. After some graduate school
Theories of the Will in the History of at the University of Pennsylvania studying with
Philosophy (New York, 1898). William R. NEWBOLD, Alexander transferred to
“The Paradox of Voluntary Attention,” Columbia University, where he received his
Journal of Philosophy 7 (1910): 291–8. PhD in philosophy in 1901. His dissertation
was titled “The Problem of Metaphysics and
Other Relevant Works the Meaning of Metaphysical Explanation: An
A file on Alexander is kept at Columbia Essay in Definitions.” Finding no teaching
University. position, Alexander moved to Boston and was
“German Thought and Schopenhauer’s an editor on dictionaries and encyclopedias
Pessimism,” Princeton Review 3rd ser. 1 with the Merriam publishing company from
(1878): 492–504. 1903 to 1908. During that time he continued
“Thomas Aquinas and the Encyclical to write, publishing some philosophy articles,
Letter,” Princeton Review 3rd ser. 5 his dissertation in 1902, and Poetry and the
(1880): 245–61. Individual in 1906.
Trans., Morituri; Three One-act Plays: Teja In 1908 Alexander accepted the chair of the
– Fritzchen – The Eternal Masculine, by philosophy department at the University of
Hermann Sudermann (New York, 1910). Nebraska and held that position until 1927,
Trans., The Latin Church in the Middle when he was hired as professor of philosophy
Ages, by André Lagarde (New York, to establish the philosophy department at the
1915). newly founded Scripps College in Claremont,
California. He also occasionally taught at the
Further Reading University of Southern California. Alexander
Peterson, James B. “Alexander’s Theories of was head of the Scripps philosophy depart-
the Will in the History of Philosophy,” ment from 1927 until his death on 27 July
Philosophical Review 8 (1899): 60–63. 1939 in Claremont, California. His son,
Randall, John H., Jr. “Introduction” and Hubert Griggs Alexander, became a professor of
49
ALEXANDER
philosophy at the University of New Mexico, nificance of our intellectual achievements is

and his grandson Thomas M. Alexander is a measured by their ability to satisfy our purposes.
professor of philosophy at Southern Illinois In a way similar to John DEWEY’s empirical
University. pragmatism, Alexander rejected both absolute
Alexander was highly respected among his idealism and materialism as excessively ratio-
philosophy colleagues in both America and nalist, and rescued values from epiphenomenal
Europe. Along with James H. TUFTS, Alexander status by locating them in the experienced
has the unusual distinction of being elected to world, instead of private consciousness.
the presidency of all three divisions of the Alexander’s “moral idealism” turns philosophy
American Philosophical Association: the away from its alliance with the quest of physics
Western Philosophical Association in 1917–18; to discover the ultimate unchanging quality,
the American Philosophical Association (now towards the dynamic drama of life. In his
Eastern Division) in 1918–19; and the Pacific “Drama as a Cosmic Category” (1930) he
Division in 1929–30. Alexander was invited to asserts the Drama is the ultimate mode of
lecture at the Sorbonne in Paris in 1905 and explanation.
again in 1925, when he was awarded with Alexander’s philosophy was anthropologi-
France’s Chevalier de la Légion d’Honneur. cal, ethnological, and symbolic. Alexander
Alexander also received Columbia University’s explored the multifaceted complexities of reality
Butler Medal in 1917, was made an honorary made manifest in the symbols of our basic belief
member of the American Institute of Architects, systems. Therefore, the arts and religions of all
and was an active member of archaeological cultures connect us to reality just as much as
and art organizations. At the 1939 commence- “objective” science, yielding for Alexander a
ment, the University of Nebraska awarded him profound ability to deeply sympathize with and
the honorary D.Litt. degree. understand many other cultures. Alexander’s
Alexander was a prolific writer and lecturer, own broadly Christian religious faith, as he
and was said to understand humanity com- describes in “Apologia Pro Fide” (1920), is
pletely. He worked on philosophy, religion and grounded in a fundamental moral dualism of
mythology, anthropology, poetry, and the inter- good and evil, and a promise of salvation. His
pretation of symbols. He focused on North last two books, Truth and the Faith: An
American Indian art, lore, mythology, and phi- Interpretation of Christianity (1929) and God
losophy. Alexander was the first non-Indian and Man’s Destiny: Inquiries into the
philosopher to seriously study and publish on Metaphysical Foundations of Faith (1936),
North American Indian art, mythology, and develop a philosophical theology defending
philosophy. During his university career he also basic Christian creeds and values.
wrote several books and many essays on meta- Alexander applied his philosophy in his col-
physics, religion, ethics, social and political laboration with the principal architect on the
theory, and education. Nebraska State Capitol building. Alexander’s
Early in Alexander’s career, he decided on philosophical ideals and study of mythology
the foundations of his philosophy: metaphysics are evident in his choice of decorative schemes
and all fields of knowledge are ultimately and inscriptions. His inscription over the main
grounded in human experience, which must be entrance of the Capitol declares, “The Salvation
philosophically ultimate yet mediated by of the State is Watchfulness of the Citizen.”
culture. Unlike idealism, which wrongly equates The success of this work brought him commis-
consciousness with experience, Alexander’s view sions to help design other notable structures,
sets individual consciousness within the wider including the Joslyn Art Museum in Omaha, the
setting of human experience of the world, so Oregon State Capitol, the Rockefeller Center in
that reality is always reality-for-us, and the sig- New York, and the Los Angeles Public Library.
50
ALEXANDER
Alexander explored democracy in several Journal of Ethics 14 (1904): 209–19.

interesting philosophical works. His writings “The Concept of Consciousness,” Journal of
during World War I, collected in Liberty and Philosophy 1 (1904): 118–24.
Democracy, and Other Essays in War-time “The Evolution of Ideals,” International
(1918), represent both his support for the war, Journal of Ethics 16 (1906): 311–32.
and his dismay at the downfall of traditional The Religious Spirit of the American Indian, as
democracy, as America discovered the hollow- shown in the Development of His Religious
ness of romanticized laissez-faire freedom and Rites and Customs (Chicago, 1910).
Europe reinvented the tyrannical machinery of “The Goodness and Beauty of Truth,” Journal
state-worship. Alexander suggests a conception of Philosophy 8 (1911): 5–21, 29–37.
of freedom as rational control of one’s abilities. “The Conception of ‘Soul’,” Journal of
Such freedom will foster genuine individualism, Philosophy 9 (1912): 421–30.
with only sympathetic understanding to hold “Justice and Progress,” Journal of Philosophy
individuals together. The solution to the 12 (1915): 207–12.
problem of maintaining a spiritual community North American [Mythology], vol. 10 of The
is art, decided Alexander in “Art and the Mythology of All Races, ed. Louis Gray
Democracy” (1918), since it is art’s function to (Boston, 1916).
energize and sustain the common symbols of “Liberty and Democracy,” International
both religion and politics. Journal of Ethics 27 (1917): 131–49.
“The Fear of Machines,” International
BIBLIOGRAPHY Journal of Ethics 28 (1917): 80–93.
The Problem of Metaphysics and the Meaning “Metaphysics as a Fine Art,” Journal of
of Metaphysical Explanation: An Essay in Philosophy 15 (1918): 477–81.
Definitions (New York, 1902). “Art and the Democracy,” International
Poetry and the Individual: An Analysis of the Journal of Ethics 29 (1918): 63–87.
Imaginative Life in relation to the Creative “Apologia Pro Fide,” Philosophical Review 29
Spirit in Man and Nature (New York, (1920): 113–34.
1906). Latin American [Mythology], vol. 11 of The
Odes on the Generations of Man (New York, Mythology of All Races, ed. Louis Gray
1910). (Boston, 1920).
Liberty and Democracy, and Other Essays in “Philosophy in Deliquescence,” Journal of
War-time (Boston, 1918). Philosophy 17 (1920): 617–22.
Letters to Teachers, and Other Papers of the Odes and Lyrics (Boston, 1922).
Hour (Chicago, 1919). Manito Masks: Dramatizations, with Music,
Nature and Human Nature: Essays of American Indian Spirit Legends (New
Metaphysical and Historical (Chicago, York, 1925).
1923). God’s Drum and Other Cycles from Indian
L’Art et la philosophie des Indiens de Lore: Poems by Hartley Alexander (New
l’Amérique du Nord (Paris, 1926). York, 1927).
Truth and the Faith: An Interpretation of “Drama as a Cosmic Category,” Philosophical
Christianity (New York, 1929). Review 39 (1930): 105–26.
God and Man’s Destiny: Inquiries into the “Self-discovery and World-discovery,” The
Metaphysical Foundations of Faith Personalist 30 (1949): 257–69.
(Oxford, 1936). The World’s Rim: Great Mysteries of the
North American Indians (Lincoln, Nebr.,
Other Relevant Works 1953; New York, 1999).
“The Spring of Salvation,” International
51
ALEXANDER
Further Reading green at the same time,” which results from

Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, Bio 20thC Phils, logically conjoining two elementary proposi-
Dict Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v46, tions. Allaire persuasively argued that
Pres Addr of APA v2, Proc of APA in Phil Wittgenstein’s attempts to account for the
Rev v49, Who Was Who in Amer v1 meaningfulness of such propositions substan-
Cailliet, Emile. Hartley Burr Alexander: A tially shaped his later “meaning as use” con-
Biography (Decorah, Iowa, 1992). ception of language. Allaire’s interests in the
———, “In Memoriam, Hartley Burr phenomenology of basic or “given” experi-
Alexander, 1873–1939,” in Scripps ence helped to inspire his defense of realism:
College Bulletin, vol. 15, no. 1 both a realism about the existence of universals
(Claremont, Cal., 1940), pp. 1–14. and a realism toward the perceived existence of
Masters, Margaret D. Hartley Burr nonmental objects. His realism is designed to
Alexander: Writer-in-stone (Lincoln, Neb., resolve the longstanding problems of individ-
1992). uation and universals.
In “Bare Particulars” (1963) Allaire explains
Richard T. Hull how two identical spots of color next to each
John R. Shook other are ontologically different and can be
discriminated as such. Each spot, over and
above its color and spatial properties (as rela-
tions cannot individuate), is a bare particular
with which the observer is acquainted through
perception. Allaire’s defense of bare particulars
ALLAIRE, Edwin Bonar, Jr. (1930– ) helped to stimulate a robust debate over indi-
viduation, universals, and the realism–nomi-
Edwin Allaire was born on 29 August 1930 in nalism debate that energized analytic meta-
Bayonne, New Jersey. He received his BA in physics for the rest of the twentieth century.
1956 from Drew University; and his MA in Allaire’s study of the realism–idealism struggle
1958 and PhD in philosophy in 1960 from the in modern philosophy has further revealed how
University of Iowa, working primarily with the question of the priority of epistemology or
Gustav BERGMANN. His dissertation was titled ontology has shaped the development of the
“A Critical Examination of Wittgenstein’s Anglo-American empiricist tradition. His critical
Tractatus.” In 1960 Allaire became instructor of expositions of Berkeley’s idealism have been
philosophy at Iowa, and was soon promoted to particularly influential; a volume titled
full professor. He served as chair of the depart- Berkeley’s Metaphysics: Structural, Interpretive,
ment from 1965 to 1967. He was visiting asso- and Critical Essays (1995), to which he con-
ciate professor at the University of Michigan in tributed a new essay, celebrates Allaire’s con-
1966–7, and visiting professor at Swarthmore tributions to Berkeley studies.
College in Pennsylvania in 1968–9. In 1969
Allaire became professor of philosophy at the BIBLIOGRAPHY
University of Texas, and has remained at Texas “Tractatus 6:3751,” Analysis 19 (1959):
as one of its prominent practitioners in analytic 100–105.
philosophy and modern philosophy. “Negative Facts and Belief,” Philosophical
Allaire’s work on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Studies 11 (1960): 1–2.
and later writings has been widely influential. “Existence, Independence, and Universals,”
One important contribution concerns a Philosophical Review 69 (1960): 485–96.
problem with seemingly contradictory propo- “Berkeley’s Idealism,” Theoria 29 (1963):
sitions such as “a point can be both red and 229–44.
52
ALLISON
“Bare Particulars,” Philosophical Studies 14 ALLISON, Henry Edward (1937– )

(1963): 1–7.
“The Tractatus: Nominalistic or Realistic?” Henry E. Allison was born on 25 April 1937
in Essays in Ontology, by Edwin Allaire et in New York City. He received his BA from
al. (Iowa City, Iowa, 1963). Yale University in 1959, and his MA in
“The Attack on Substance: Descartes to religion from Columbia University’s joint
Hume,” Dialogue 3 (1964): 284–7. program with the Union Theological
“Another Look at Bare Particulars,” Seminary. He received his PhD in philosophy
Philosophical Studies 16 (1965): 16–20. from the New School for Social Research in
“The Circle of Ideas and the Circularity of 1964, writing a dissertation on “Lessing and
the Meditations,” Dialogue 5 (1966): the Environment.” His teaching career began
131–53. as an assistant professor of philosophy at the
“Things, Relations and Identity,” Philosophy State University of New York at Potsdam in
of Science 34 (1967): 260–72. 1964–5, and at Pennsylvania State University
“Relations and the Problem of from 1965 to 1968. From 1968 to 1973
Individuation,” Philosophical Studies 19 Allison was associate professor of philosophy
(1968): 61–3. at the University of Florida, and from 1973 to
“Wolterstorff and Bradley on Ontology,” 1996 he was professor of philosophy at the
Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973): 727–33. University of California at San Diego. While at
“Truth,” Metaphilosophy 6 (1975): 261–76. San Diego, he served as department chair from
“Ontologically Speaking, Things are —-,” 1978 to 1982. In 1996 Allison became pro-
Theoria 42 (1976): 93–114. fessor of philosophy at Boston University, and
“Relations: Recreational Remarks,” in 2004 he joined the philosophy faculty of the
Philosophical Studies 34 (1978): 81–9. University of California at Davis in a part-
“Berkeley’s Idealism Revisited,” in Berkeley: time capacity.
Critical and Interpretive Essays, ed. Colin Allison has been a visiting professor at Yale
Turbayne (Minneapolis, 1982), pp. and Princeton, and Findlay Visiting Professor
197–206. at Boston University. He received a
“Berkeley’s Idealism: Yet Another Visit,” in Guggenheim Fellowship in 1986–7, National
Berkeley’s Metaphysics: Structural, Endowment for the Humanities Fellowships in
Interpretive, and Critical Essays, ed. 1969–70, 1980, and 1985–6, and many other
Robert G. Muehlmann (University Park, honors. He was President of the Pacific
Penn., 1995). Division of the American Philosophical
Association in 1996–7. He serves on several
Further Reading editorial boards, notably those of Kant-Studien
Addis, Laird. “Particulars and and The Monist, along with service on the
Acquaintance,” Philosophy of Science 34 advisory boards of The Cambridge History of
(1967): 251–9. Eighteenth-Century Philosophy and the
Chappell, Vere C. “Particulars Re-clothed,” Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel
Philosophical Studies 15 (1964): 60–64. Kant in translation.
Meiland, Jack W. “Do Relations The breadth of Allison’s scholarship extends
Individuate,” Philosophical Studies 17 widely across modern philosophy. He has pub-
(1966): 65–8. lished on British empiricists, continental ratio-
Moreland, James P. Universals (Montréal, nalism, Kant, Hegel, and post-Hegelian conti-
2001). nental philosophy. His outstanding work on
the philosophy of Kant, particularly his book
John R. Shook Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (1983), which
53
ALLISON
examines the Critique of Pure Reason, elevated Förster (Stanford, Cal., 1989), pp.
him to the status of one of the most significant 114–30.
interpreters of Kant in the twentieth century. “Kant on Freedom: A Reply to My Critics,”
Allison’s exposition presents Kant’s transcen- Inquiry 36 (1993): 233–52.
dental idealism as a viable system of thought “On Naturalizing Kant’s Transcendental
in its entirety, deviating from the usual effort Psychology,” Dialectica 49 (1995):
to salvage only portions of Kant’s philosophy. 335–51.
His subsequent books on Kant concern themes “Personal and Professional,” Harvard
from the second and third critiques. Kant Review of Philosophy 6 (Spring 1996):
scholars rarely have produced such influential 31–45.
commentaries and defenses of Kant’s entire “We Can Act Only Under the Idea of
system. Freedom,” Proceedings and Addresses of
the American Philosophical Association
BIBLIOGRAPHY 71 (November 1997): 39–50.
Lessing and the Enlightenment (Ann Arbor, “Morality and Freedom: Kant’s Reciprocity
Mich., 1966). Thesis,” in Kant’s Groundwork of the
The Kant–Eberhard Controversy Metaphysics of Morals: Critical Essays,
(Baltimore, 1973). ed. Paul Guyer (Lanham, Md., 1998), pp.
Benedict de Spinoza (Boston, 1975; New 273–302.
Haven, 1987). Ed. with Peter Heath, Theoretical
Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Philosophy after 1781, by Immanuel
Interpretation and Defense (New Haven, Kant (Cambridge, UK, 2002).
Conn., 1983; 2nd edn, 2004). “Reply to the Comments of Longuenesse
Kant’s Theory of Freedom (Cambridge, UK, and Ginsborg,” Inquiry 46 (2003):
1990). 182–94.
Idealism and Freedom: Essays in Kant’s
Theoretical and Practical Philosophy Further Reading
(Cambridge, UK, 1996). Pres Addr of APA v10
Kant’s Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Baron, Marcia. “Freedom, Frailty, and
Critique of Aesthetic Judgment Impurity,” Inquiry 36 (1993): 431–41.
(Cambridge, UK, 2001). Kitcher, Patricia. “On Interpreting Kant’s
Thinker as Wittgenstein’s ‘I’,” Philosophy
Other Relevant Works and Phenomenological Research 61
“Locke’s Theory of Personal Identity,” (2000): 33–63.
Journal of the History of Ideas 27 Longuenesse, Beatrice. “Kant’s Theory of
(1966): 41–58. Judgment, and Judgments of Taste: On
“Christianity and Nonsense,” Review of Henry Allison’s Kant’s Theory of Taste,”
Metaphysics 20 (1967): 432–60. Inquiry 46 (2003): 143–63.
“Bishop Berkeley’s Petitio,” The Personalist Westphal, Kenneth. “Freedom and the
54 (1973): 232–44. Distinction between Phenomena and
“Kant’s Critique of Spinoza,” in The Noumena: Is Allison’s View
Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, ed. Methodological, Metaphysical, or
Richard Kennington (Washington, D.C., Equivocal?” Journal of Philosophical
1980), pp. 199–228. Research 26 (2001): 593–622.
“Justification and Freedom in the Critique
of Practical Reason,” in Kant’s John R. Shook
Transcendental Deductions, ed. Eckhart
54
ALLPORT
ALLPORT, Gordon Willard (1897–1967) approach moved toward a social psychology.

The development of unique and individual per-
Gordon W. Allport was born on 11 November sonality, for Allport, should be studied in its
1897 in Montezuma, Indiana, and grew up in social environment. His greatest contribution to
Cleveland, Ohio. Like his brother, Floyd Henry psychological theory was Personality: A
Allport, who also became a prominent psy- Psychological Interpretation (1937). A broadly
chologist, Gordon went to Harvard University liberal attitude and socially progressive views on
to study psychology and social ethics. After the proper work of social psychology resulted in
receiving his BA in 1919, he then earned his further influential studies, The Psychology of
PhD in psychology in 1922, working primarily Rumor (1947) and The Nature of Prejudice
with Herbert Langfeld. His dissertation was (1954). Allport’s legacy has been continued by
titled “An Experimental Study of the Traits of humanistic and positive psychologies that
Personality: With Special Reference to the became more respected toward the end of the
Problem of Social Diagnosis.” Two years of twentieth century.
study at the German universities of Berlin and
Hamburg introduced him to Gestalt, holistic, BIBLIOGRAPHY
and structuralist approaches to understanding Studies in Expressive Movement, with Philip
human behavior. E. Vernon and Edwin Powers (New York,
From 1924 to 1926 Allport was an instruc- 1933).
tor in Harvard’s department of social ethics. Personality: A Psychological Interpretation
He then was an assistant professor of psychol- (New York, 1937); rev. edn, Pattern and
ogy at Dartmouth College from 1926 to 1930, Growth in Personality (New York, 1961).
after which he returned to Harvard as professor The Psychology of Rumor, with Leo J.
of psychology. Allport helped establish Postman (New York, 1947).
Harvard’s department of social relations in The Individual and His Religion: A
1946, uniting psychology, sociology, and Psychological Interpretation (New York,
anthropology, and was appointed the first 1950).
Richard Clarke Cabot Professor of Social Ethics The Nature of Prejudice (Cambridge, Mass.,
shortly before his death. From 1937 to 1949 he 1954).
was the editor of the Journal of Abnormal and Becoming: Basic Considerations for a
Social Psychology. He was President of the Psychology of Personality (New Haven,
American Psychological Association in 1939, Conn., 1955).
and President of the Society for the Personality and Social Encounter: Selected
Psychological Study of Social Issues in 1944. In Essays (Boston, 1960).
1963 he was awarded the Gold Medal of the The Person in Psychology: Selected Essays
American Psychological Foundation, and in (Boston, 1968).
1964 he received the Distinguished Scientific
Contribution Award of the American Other Relevant Works
Psychological Association. Allport died on 9 Allport’s papers are at Harvard University.
October 1967 in Cambridge, Massachusetts. “The Historical Background of Modern
Allport’s psychology and philosophy centered Social Psychology,” in Handbook of
around human personality. Rejecting the mech- Social Psychology, ed. Edwin G. Boring
anistic behaviorism of John B. WATSON, he and Gardner Lindzey (New York, 1954),
developed a humanistic and value-oriented vol. 1, pp. 1–46.
theory of the person. Although he placed himself “Gordon W. Allport,” in A History of
in the tradition of William JAMES, and similarly Psychology in Autobiography, ed. Edwin
held great respect for religion and mysticism, his G. Boring and Gardner Lindzey (New
55
ALLPORT
York, 1967), vol. 5, pp. 1–26. band. A trip to the Berkeley library put him in
Waiting for the Lord: Meditations on God touch with Jacques MARITAIN’s Introduction to
and Man, ed. Peter A. Bertocci (1978). Philosophy and resulted in his deep and exten-
sive reading in the history of philosophy.
Further Reading Toward the end of the war, Alston’s knowledge
Amer Nat Bio, Encyc Psych, Encyc Social of philosophy so impressed Charner PERRY,
Behav Sci, Who Was Who in Amer v5, chair of the philosophy department at the
Who’s Who in Phil University of Chicago, that he was permitted to
Craik, Kenneth H., Robert Hogan, and enter the graduate program without previous
Raymond N. Wolfe, eds. Fifty Years of study of philosophy.
Personality Psychology (New York, Alston’s education continued at Chicago,
1993). aided mainly by Richard MCKEON and Charles
De Carvalho, Roy. The Founders of HARTSHORNE. He defended a dissertation on
Humanistic Psychology (1991). the metaphysics of Alfred North WHITEHEAD
Evans, Richard I. Dialogue with Gordon and received his PhD in philosophy in 1951.
Allport (New York, 1981). His first appointment was at the University of
Hall, Calvin, and Gardner Lindzey. Michigan as a professor of philosophy from
Theories of Personality (1970). 1949 to 1971, where he became familiar with
Maddi, Salvatore R., and Paul T. Costa. contemporary analytic philosophy. He later
Humanism in Personology: Allport, held appointments at Rutgers University from
Maslow, and Murray (Chicago, 1972). 1971 to 1976, the University of Illinois at
Nicholson, Ian. Inventing Personality: Urbana-Champaign from 1976 to 1980, and
Gordon Allport and the Science of Syracuse University from 1980 to 1992. Alston
Selfhood (Washington, D.C., 2003). became professor emeritus at Syracuse in 1992,
Ruggiero, Karen M., and Herbert C. where he continued to teach until 2000.
Kelman, eds. “Prejudice and Intergroup During his career, Alston was President of
Relations: Papers in Honor of Gordon the Western (now Central) Division of the
W. Allport’s Centennial,” Journal of American Philosophical Association in
Social Issues 55 (Fall 1999). Special issue 1978–9, President of the Society for
about Allport. Philosophy and Psychology in 1977, and
President of the Society of Christian
John R. Shook Philosophers. He is founding editor of Faith
and Philosophy, the journal of the Society of
Christian Philosophers (which he co-founded);
the Journal of Philosophical Research; and
Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion.
A recipient of numerous honors and fellow-
ALSTON, William Payne (1921– ) ships, Alston became a fellow of the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1990.
William P. Alston was born on 29 November Alston is best known for his work in phi-
1921 in Shreveport, Louisiana, to Eunice losophy of language, metaphysics, epistemol-
Schoolfield and William Alston. After gradu- ogy, philosophy of religion, and philosophical
ating from high school at age fifteen, he studied theology. Early in his career, Alston helped
music at Centenary College. During World break the stranglehold on philosophy of the
War II, he was stationed in Northern California verifiability criterion of meaning. His most sig-
(1942–6) where he played clarinet and bass nificant work in philosophy of language
drum in an army band and piano in a dance focuses on what it is for a sentence to have lin-
56
ALSTON
guistic meaning. Two themes dominate his Truth (1996), he defends alethic realism, the
answer: illocutionary acts, and the relation of twin thesis that the truth-value of a proposition
meaning to use and rule-governance. An illo- depends entirely on whether what it is about is
cutionary act is uttering a sentence with as it purports, and that truth is an important
specific content. To illustrate: if I issue a property. The first thesis, the realist conception
command under typical circumstances, “Please of truth, is about our ordinary concept of
pick up your toys,” the illocutionary act I truth; it is not a thesis about the property of
perform is commanding my son to pick up his truth, although it does presuppose that truth is
toys. In issuing this command, I take respon- a property. Thus, Alston’s realist conception of
sibility for certain conditions being satisfied – truth contrasts with deflationary theories of
that he has some toys, that he is able to pick truth, according to which talk that appears to
them up, and that I want them to be picked up, predicate a truth-value of propositions does
and so on – and I open myself to sanctions if not in fact do so, and epistemic conceptions of
these conditions are not satisfied. Generally, truth, according to which the truth-value of a
performing an illocutionary act by uttering a proposition, belief or statement depends
sentence subjects one’s utterance to an illocu- entirely on whether, or the extent to which, it
tionary rule, a rule implying that one may is justified, warranted, or rational. Alston’s
perform that act only if certain conditions are realist conception of truth, although compat-
satisfied. Alston groups illocutionary acts into ible with the correspondence theory of truth,
five categories: assertives, directives, commis- does not require it; and it is compatible with
sives, expressives, and exercitives. For each global metaphysical antirealism, the view that
category, and for many types within each all of reality is, at least in part, relative to our
category, Alston specifies the conditions conceptual choices.
speakers take responsibility for in uttering a Alston attempts to decide some of these
sentence of that category and type. metaphysical issues in A Sensible Metaphysical
To understand the meaning of a sentence is Realism (2001). If global metaphysical antire-
to recognize its relation to use and rule-gover- alism is to avoid absurdities, the sort of depen-
nance, and illocutionary acts are central to this dence posited between reality and conceptual-
recognition. A sentence’s having a certain ization must be constitutive dependence, not
meaning is its being usable for a certain role in causal dependence. To illustrate the difference:
communication, in the illocutionary acts one in a nonabsolute space and time, how fast a
uses it to perform. Thus, (1) a sentence’s train is moving is relative to a framework; the
having a certain meaning consists in its being framework does not cause the motion of the
usable to perform illocutionary acts of a certain train – the engine does that – but rather con-
type. Also, a sentence’s being usable to perform stitutes what it is for the train to be moving at
an illocutionary act of a certain type is its being that speed. An alternative to antirealism is
subject to a certain illocutionary rule; thus, (2) global metaphysical realism, the view that no
a sentence’s having a certain meaning consists part of reality is in any way relative to con-
in its being subject to a certain illocutionary ceptualization. Alston does not accept this
rule. Illocutionary acts unite meaning with use version of realism but nevertheless regards it as
and rule-governance; (1) and (2) are different a datum of common sense that should be
ways of saying the same thing. Alston’s devel- denied only for excellent reasons. Alston
opment of his theory spans nearly fifty years, arrives at a via media between realism and
culminating in Illocutionary Acts and Sentence antirealism, a sensible metaphysical realism:
Meaning (2000). vast stretches of reality are in no way relative
Alston espouses versions of realism about to conceptualization, but some aspects of it
truth and reality. In A Realist Conception of are.
57
ALSTON
In epistemology, Alston has contributed shows how a viable foundationalism can hold
work on knowledge and justification. Mere lower-level beliefs justified though their higher-
true belief is not knowledge. Traditionally, the level correlates are not justified. Anti-founda-
difference between true belief and knowledge tionalists also assume that directly justified
is said to be justification; knowledge is justified beliefs must be immune from doubt or error,
true belief. Many reject the traditional view on an assumption that invites skepticism. Again in
the grounds that although justification is nec- response, Alston shows how a viable founda-
essary for knowledge, it is not sufficient; Alston tionalism need not require such immunities of
argues it is not even necessary. What then is its directly justified beliefs.
justification? Alston distinguishes two families In The Reliability of Sense Perception
of concepts of justification, each of which has (1993), Alston argues that all arguments for
many members. According to the deontologi- the reliability of sense perception run afoul of
cal family, beliefs are justified just in case one epistemic circularity problems; all require
who holds them violates no duties or obliga- assuming in practice the reliability of sense
tions relevant to getting at the truth. According perception. This feature characterizes every
to the truth-conducive family, beliefs are jus- basic source of belief, including memory,
tified just in case one who holds them does so reason, and introspection. Nevertheless, Alston
on adequate grounds and is unaware of argues, it is rational to form beliefs on the
defeaters. Alston opts for the latter family, basis of sense perceptual experience, and to
arguing that the former mistakenly presup- regard it as reliable, since there is no practical
poses that we have voluntary control over our alternative to doing so. As for the nature of
believing activity. Furthermore, the adequacy perception itself, Alston is primarily concerned
of grounds consists in their making beliefs to characterize what is distinctive about per-
based on them very likely to be true; and, while ceptual experience in contrast with other
the adequacy of the grounds need not be inter- modes of cognition such as memory and reflec-
nally accessible to believers in order for their tion, and he aims to do so in a way that best
beliefs to be justified, the grounds themselves explains how such experience can be a source
must be thus accessible. of justification and knowledge. Toward that
Alston distinguishes direct justification from end, he advocates the theory of appearing, the
indirect justification. An indirectly justified view that what is most fundamental to per-
belief owes its justification to other beliefs or ceptual experience of physical objects is their
their interrelations; a directly justified belief is appearing to perceivers in specific ways. The
one that is not indirectly justified. According to view is best understood in contrast with its
Alston, indirectly justified beliefs ultimately two main rivals. In contrast with the adverbial
owe their justification to directly justified theory of Roderick CHISHOLM, which holds
beliefs, and many of our mundane beliefs that perceptual experience is merely a way of
about the immediate environment are directly being conscious, the theory of appearing insists
justified by experience. This theory is a version that perception is irreducibly relational; it
of foundationalism. Anti-foundationalists consists in an object’s appearing to a subject,
often assume that individuals’ beliefs are not or, equivalently, in an object’s presenting itself
justified unless they are justified in believing to a subject. In contrast with the once popular
those beliefs justified, an assumption that pre- sense-data theory – a theory holding that per-
cludes directly justified beliefs. In response, ceptual experience consists in internal mental
Alston distinguishes lower-level beliefs (beliefs objects appearing to the subject – the theory of
not about the justificatory status of other appearing insists that, typically, physical
beliefs) from higher-level beliefs (beliefs about objects themselves appear to the subject. As for
the justificatory status of other beliefs). He explaining how experience can directly justify
58
ALSTON
belief, both adverbial and sense-data theories way that ordinary perceptual beliefs about our
must forge a link external to experience itself immediate environment can owe their justifi-
in order to account for how it justifies beliefs; cation directly to mundane perceptual experi-
according to the theory of appearing, on the ence and not to arguments. What is distinctive
contrary, beliefs are directly justified because about Alston’s model is the notion of a
they register what is present within experience doxastic practice, a socially learned, moni-
itself. tored, and reinforced constellation of disposi-
In his more recent “Epistemic Desiderata” tions and habits, each of which yields a certain
(1993) and Beyond “Justification”: belief from certain input.
Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation (2004), Two aspects of doxastic practices are fun-
Alston argues that there is no justification damental. The most basic doxastic practices
understood as a single item over which episte- are the sole access to a certain stretch of reality;
mologists differ. Rather, competing theories for example, the practice of forming beliefs
of justification express an array of good- directly on the basis of sense perception
making features beliefs might have. Exactly provides our sole access to the physical envi-
how much of Alston’s previous views are com- ronment. Second, basic doxastic practices
patible with this later expression is unclear. contain an overrider system of beliefs and pro-
Alston is best known for his work in phi- cedures that its adherents can use to check for
losophy of religion and philosophical theology. reliability in particular cases. Alston applies
He has been at the forefront of the recent trend his doxastic practice epistemology to the
among Anglo-American Christian philoso- practice of forming beliefs about an ultimate
phers to take more seriously the Augustinian religious reality directly on the basis of what its
motto, “faith seeking understanding.” Living adherents take to be experience of that reality.
out that motto in his own case resulted in While this characterization of his project
work on the Trinity, the Resurrection, the emphasizes the first aspect mentioned above,
indwelling of the Holy Spirit, prayer, biblical it does so at the expense of the second, because
criticism, and the evidential value of the ful- different religious traditions have divergent
fillment of divine promises for spiritual and doctrinal beliefs about ultimate reality, and
moral development. their checking procedures likewise vary; and
Alston’s epistemology of religious experi- thus their overrider systems vary. Alston
ence has been quite influential; as have his pursues more narrowly individuated doxastic
contributions to understanding religious dis- practices – the Christian experiential doxastic
course and such other matters as whether practice, for example. According to Alston,
broadly Freudian explanations of religious there is no good reason to think that the
belief, and of suffering, defeat the justifica- Christian practice is unreliable, and signifi-
tions usually offered on behalf of religious cantly, the variety and diversity of doxastic
belief. Many have assumed that a religious religious practices provide no such reason.
belief can owe its justification to religious expe- Although like any other basic doxastic
rience only indirectly, by being a conclusion in practice, Christian practice cannot be shown in
an argument whose premises describe the a noncircular way to be reliable, it does display
experience. In contrast with this argumentative marks of significant self-support; consequently,
model and consonant with his moderate foun- those who engage in it may be regarded as
dationalism, Alston develops a model accord- practically rational.
ing to which persons’ beliefs about the activi- Alston rejects the trend in academic theology
ties, intentions, and character of God can owe to treat apparently literal religious assertions as
their justification, in no small part, directly to something else. Against theological antirealists
their own religious experience, in much the of various kinds, he argues that what look like
59
ALSTON
determinate assertions are genuinely what they The Reliability of Sense Perception (Ithaca,
seem, and that their truth or falsity is inde- N.Y., 1993).
pendent of our conceptual choices. Against A Realist Conception of Truth (Ithaca, N.Y.,
those who think that thought and talk about 1996).
God are irreducibly symbolic or metaphorical, Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning
he argues that even though such thought (Ithaca, N.Y., 2000).
derives from our thought about creatures, and A Sensible Metaphysical Realism
even though there is a vast gulf between the (Milwaukee, Wisc., 2001).
nature of God and of creatures, it remains Beyond “Justification”: Dimensions of
possible to speak of God literally; indeed, if we Epistemic Evaluation (Ithaca, N.Y., 2004).
can metaphorically express truth about God,
then it is in principle possible literally to Other Relevant Works
express the same truth about God. Alston is “Epistemic Desiderata,” Philosophy and
especially concerned to defend the view that Phenomenological Research 53 (1993):
personal predicates – predicates that apply dis- 527–51.
tinctively to persons, including predicates “A Philosopher’s Way Back to Faith,” in
ascribing actions – can apply literally to an God and the Philosophers: The
incorporeal being. Alston suggests two possi- Reconciliation of Faith and Reason, ed. T.
bilities for how this kind of dual predication is V. Morris (Oxford, 1994), pp. 19–30.
possible. The first is that, even if a personal “How to Think About Reliability,”
predicate can apply literally only to embodied Philosophical Topics 23 (1995): 1–29.
persons, that condition of application leaves “Back to the Theory of Appearing,”
intact a distinctive conceptual core that may Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999):
also apply literally to disembodied persons; 181–204.
Alston argues that this is true of most personal “Religious Language and Verificationism,”
predicates ordinary believers apply to God, in The Rationality of Theism, ed. P.
including such predicates as “making,” “com- Copan and P. K. Moser (London and New
manding,” “guiding,” and “forgiving.” The York, 2003), pp. 17–34.
second is Alston’s use of a functionalist
account of personal predicates to argue that Further Reading
divine perfection and atemporality are not Bio 20thC Phils, Oxford Comp Phil, Pres
barriers to their literal application to a divine Addr of APA v8
being. Lynch, Michael, and Heather Battaly, eds.
The scope and depth of Alston’s work has Perspectives on the Philosophy of William
significantly affected generations of American P. Alston (Lanham, Md., 2005).
students and professional philosophers. McLeod, Mark S. Rationality and Theistic
Belief: An Essay on Reformed
BIBLIOGRAPHY Epistemology (Ithaca, N.Y., 1993).
Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, Plantinga, Alvin. “Alstonian Justification,”
N.J., 1964). in Warrant: The Current Debate (Oxford,
Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory 1993).
of Knowledge (Ithaca, N.Y., 1989). ———, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford,
Divine Nature and Human Language: 2000).
Essays in Philosophical Theology (Ithaca, Senor, T. D., ed. The Rationality of Belief
N.Y., 1989). and the Plurality of Faith: Essays in Honor
Perceiving God: The Epistemology of of William P. Alston (Ithaca, N.Y., 1995).
Religious Experience (Ithaca, N.Y., 1991). “Symposium on Perceiving God,”
60
ALTIZER
Philosophy and Phenomenological century to transform the traditional discipline

Research 54 (1994): 863–99. of theology into the secular academic field of
religious studies.
Daniel Howard-Snyder From the outset of his career, Altizer focused
on setting a course and developing a rhetoric
that diverged dramatically from the school of
neo-orthodoxy that dominated American
theology and the theological profession.
Altizer’s earliest work focused on Eastern mys-
ALTIZER, Thomas Jonathan Jackson ticism and the application to theology of the
(1927– ) thought of famed historian of religions, Mircea
ELIADE.
Thomas J. J. Altizer was born on 28 September In the mid 1960s Altizer became a well-
1927 in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and grew known public figure with the appearance of
up in Charleston, West Virginia. He is a descen- his book The Gospel of Christian Atheism
dant and namesake of Confederate general (1966) and his declaration, along with fellow
Stonewall Jackson. He attended the University theologian William Hamilton, that “God is
of Chicago (BA 1948, MA 1951, PhD 1955) dead.” Their popularization of Nietzsche’s
and wrote a dissertation on Greek and Eastern slogan within the seminaries and mainline
religious philosophy. He taught religion at churches of the day quickly captured national
Wabash College from 1954 to 1956, Emory headlines and ignited a storm of controversy
University from 1956 to 1968, and State that culminated in a cover story by Time
University of New York at Stony Brook as pro- magazine.
fessor of religious studies in the English depart- Much of the general public, together with
ment from 1968 to 1996. most conservative Christians, to this day have
Altizer was the lead spokesperson for, and heeded only the shock value of Altizer’s
motivating force behind, the “death of God” message. But, in his proclamation of God’s
movement of the 1960s. He also served as the death, Altizer hit upon a startling and original
key theoretician for what came to be known as insight that, according to some interpreters,
“radical theology” during the late 1960s and stopped Christian neo-orthodoxy dead in its
1970s. Altizer exerted a considerable influence tracks and paved the way for what a later gen-
on the early phase of American religious post- eration of religious postmodernists would dub
modernism, particularly the work of Mark C. “the end of theology” itself. Altizer’s subse-
Taylor and Charles Winquist. quent books are rich and subtle variations on
Unlike his contemporaries, Altizer has con- this theme.
sistently written in a self-described “visionary” Altizer elaborated, in the context of late
style, which combines the oracular nature of twentieth-century Protestant religious thought,
poetry with a metaphysical grandeur charac- the deeper implications of nineteenth-century
teristic of those modern authors whom he has German idealism and existential philosophy.
repeatedly cited as influences and mentors. Because he continued throughout his career to
Those figures include John Milton, William write in his own unique declamatory style,
Blake, G. W. F. Hegel, Friedrich Nietzsche, without citing other contemporary theological
and James Joyce. Although throughout his writers, his importance as a crucial bridge to
career Altizer has considered himself primarily postmodernism is frequently overlooked.
as a Christian theologian, his impact has been Altizer built his “radical” or “death-of-God”
almost exclusively on those academic writers theology on the notion, first intimated by
who sought in the last quarter of the twentieth Luther and later accorded pride of place by
61
ALTIZER
Hegel in his Phenomenology of Spirit, that BIBLIOGRAPHY

God’s incarnation through Christ’s sacrifice on Oriental Mysticism and Biblical Eschatology
the cross inaugurates a new historical era in (Philadelphia, 1961).
which divinity can no longer be conceived as Mircea Eliade and the Dialectic of the Sacred
transcendent, but must be understood as (Philadelphia, 1963).
wholly immanent. Following Paul’s assertion The Gospel of Christian Atheism
that God “emptied” himself by becoming (Philadelphia, 1966).
human (Philippians 2:7) through death and Radical Theology and the Death of God,
suffering, Altizer views the crucifixion as the with William Hamilton (Indianapolis,
moment in which the infinite is utterly identi- 1966).
fied with, and absorbed into, the finite. This The New Apocalypse: The Radical Christian
divine self-emptying, or kenosis, is what is Vision of William Blake (East Lansing,
meant by the saying “God is dead,” an event Mich., 1967).
not genuinely acknowledged until the dawn of The Descent into Hell: A Study of the
modern consciousness. Radical Reversal of the Christian
The modern era is, at the same time, an Consciousness (Philadelphia, 1970).
“apocalyptic” one, inasmuch as it manifests “The Buddhist Ground of the Whiteheadian
God’s “total presence,” a total presence expe- God,” Process Studies 5 (1975): 227–36.
rienced in solitude, loss of individuality, the The Self-Embodiment of God (New York,
recovery of a thoroughly “archaic identity,” 1977).
and the realization of “purely immediate Total Presence: The Language of Jesus and
speech.” Altizer understands modern the Language of Today (New York, 1980).
“atheism” as the fulfillment of all Christian Deconstruction and Theology (New York,
history. Modernity itself is the “total silence and 1982).
emptiness of an original abyss” that has History as Apocalypse (Albany, N.Y., 1985).
become “an immediately present chaos” where Genesis and Apocalypse: A Theological
the “resurrected Christ” is “inseparable and Voyage toward Authentic Christianity
indistinguishable from the crucified Christ” (Louisville, Kent., 1990).
(1985, p. 254). The Genesis of God (Louisville, Kent., 1993).
During the 1990s Altizer’s writings dwelt on The Contemporary Jesus (Albany, N.Y.,
the theme of apocalypse as a term “indistin- 1997).
guishable” from both crucifixion and creation. Godhead and the Nothing (Albany, N.Y.,
In Genesis and Apocalypse (1990), Altizer char- 2003).
acterizes this moment as “an alien nothingness
that is absolutely irreversible” (p. 178). In The Other Relevant Works
Genesis of God (1993), he describes apoca- Ed., Truth, Myth, and Symbol (Englewood
lypse as “genesis,” as an “absolutely new act,” Cliffs, N.J., 1962).
which is the “disappearance of the will of the Ed., Toward a New Christianity: Readings in
Creator” and the full realization of freedom. the Death of God Theology (New York,
Altizer, like the epic authors he repeatedly ref- 1967).
erences, has sought to delineate a new modern Ed. with David Ray Griffin, John Cobb’s
mythology under the cover of rewriting Theology in Process (Philadelphia, 1977).
Christian theology. This mythology constitutes “The Challenge of Nihilism,” Journal of the
a “reversal” of the doctrine of incarnate logos, American Academy of Religion 62 (1994):
where flesh now becomes “word.” 1013–23.
“The Contemporary Challenge of Radical
Catholicism,” Journal of Religion 74
62
AMES
(1994): 184–91. University of Chicago, William Rainey Harper,

“The Otherness of God as an Image of offered Ames a fellowship in philosophy. At
Satan,” in The Otherness of God, ed. Chicago, Ames had a religious awakening, a
Orrin F. Summerell (Charlottesville, Virg., realization that the ideas of Alexander
1998). Campbell, imbibed as a youth, mirrored the
“Self-saving of God,” in The Blackwell compelling ideas of John Locke’s reasonable
Companion to Postmodern Theology, ed. Christianity. It was then that Ames was able to
Graham Ward (Oxford, 2001). identify the American philosophical lineage of
liberalism that he sought to advance: “Locke’s
Further Reading ideas of democracy shaped the political ideas of
Cobb, John B., Jr., ed. The Theology of Thomas Jefferson; his educational views were
Altizer: Critique and Response practiced by Horace Mann; and his religious
(Philadelphia, 1970). ideas were basic in American Unitarianism.”
Ogletree, Thomas W. The Death of God Ames brought a pragmatic understanding of
Controversy (Nashville, Tenn., 1966). Christianity to his congregation and classroom,
informed by his aesthetic Christian (often
Carl A. Raschke agnostic) understanding of the psychology of
religion (1959, pp. 42–3).
Ames taught religion at the newly formed
Disciples Divinity House at the University of
Chicago from 1895 to 1897, at Butler College
in Indiana from 1897 to 1900, and was pro-
AMES, Edward Scribner (1870–1958) fessor of philosophy at the University of
Chicago from 1900 to 1935. Ames was also the
Edward S. Ames was born in Eau Claire, minister of the Hyde Park Church, Disciples of
Wisconsin, on 21 April 1870, and died in Christ, from 1900 to 1940. From 1903 to
Chicago, Illinois, on 29 June 1958. He received 1951, he was founder and editor of the theo-
degrees from Drake University (BA 1889, MA logical journal of the Disciples movement, the
1891), Yale Divinity School (BD 1892), and the Scroll. Ames also made his mark among fellow
University of Chicago (PhD in philosophy, philosophers in developing the Disciples
1895). A churchman philosopher, Ames was a Divinity House at the University of Chicago, a
participant in what William JAMES called the non-degree-granting institution closely affili-
“Chicago School of Philosophy,” which ated with the Divinity School, where liberal
included pragmatists George Herbert MEAD, and philosophically minded ministers and
Addison W. MOORE, and John DEWEY. scholars of the Disciples movement gathered to
Ames chose Yale Divinity School’s exchange ideas and fellowship.
Congregational traditionalism for his theolog- In 1905 Ames taught the first course at the
ical studies, rejecting Harvard because of its University of Chicago in the psychology of
Unitarianism. Studying at either school was a religion, as part of a psychology and education
dramatic departure for a Disciples of Christ curriculum recently separated from the philos-
Iowan, as East Coast intellectualism was con- ophy department. For Ames, psychology
sidered foreign if not dangerous. At Yale, Ames offered to religion and the churches a way of
was inspired by the writings of William James, understanding the human desire to associate,
Otto Fleiderer, Immanuel Kant, and Arthur independent of any particular need to speculate
Schopenhauer, and he began investigations into theologically or to follow doctrines. “At the
the religious dimensions of human psychology. door of most churches one is met by required
In 1894 the founding President of the beliefs in a particular conception of God …
63
AMES
definite ideas concerning sin and salvation …. science and religion” in which one “reverts to
What people are really seeking is access to acceptance of traditional conceptions of reve-
refreshing fountains of life, sources of strength lation and supernatural grace” despite higher
and guidance.” Studying religion (Protestant criticism’s rejection of this “supernaturalistic
Christianity primarily) through the lens of early theology [which] hangs only by slender
twentieth-century psychological analysis, Ames threads” (1970, pp. 110–11). Ames also joined
saw religious rituals and interpersonal rela- social gospel adherents in arguing that the
tionships as superceding doctrine and ortho- “resurgence of the old theological tradition in
doxy for adherents (1959, pp. 92–3). Protestantism ha[d] tended to influence church
As a preacher and poet, Ames understood people to feel that … there is something secular
God as a “great spirit of love and comfort … and too humanistic in the social emphasis”
great companion … and giver of life.” As a (1959, p. 117). Ames’s dedication to the
philosopher, his description of God empha- Christian church as a natural expression of the
sized God as “the reality of a social process … highest human aspirations (God) was central to
the order of nature” over against a “meta- his philosophical writings and teaching. His
physical being of the anthropomorphic type” greatest influence was felt by those teachers
(1929, pp. 176–8). Ames believed strongly in and ministers who took from his philosophy a
the effectiveness of institutions, religious and greater understanding of the psychological and
educational, to embody the reality of a lived literary dimensions of religious expression.
theology or philosophy. The value of an insti-
tution to individuals and society was gauged by BIBLIOGRAPHY
answering the question: “What is its value for The Psychology of Religious Experience
the fullest life of mankind?” (1929, p. 266). (New York, 1910).
Ames proffered the idea that “religion” in The Divinity of Christ (Chicago, 1911).
1929 lacked the “old smoothness and The Higher Individualism (New York, 1915).
momentum” – largely due to scholars who The New Orthodoxy (Chicago, 1918; 2nd
were at that time unsatisfied with traditional edn 1925).
interpretations of Christian theology and scrip- Religion (Chicago, 1929).
ture. This ensuing crisis of authority provided, Letters to God and the Devil (New York,
for Ames, an important occasion for under- 1933).
standing God not as person but as process.
God was not a person or deity somewhere “out Other Relevant Works
there,” but the word and concept individuals Ames’s papers are at Southern Illinois
employed to describe their highest aspirations. University at Carbondale, the Disciples of
For Ames, the real meaning of “God” was in Christ Historical Society in Nashville,
his stature as “that other and larger self in Tennessee, and the University of Chicago.
which each little self lives and moves and has its Beyond Theology: The Autobiography of
being” (1959, p. 93). Edward Scribner Ames, ed. Van Meter
His responses to early twentieth-century Ames (Chicago, 1959).
crises of interpretation, authority, and the rela- Prayers and Meditations, ed. Van Meter
tionship of science and psychology to religion Ames (Chicago, 1970).
were in direct opposition to an amorphous but
influential Christian neo-orthodoxy and its Further Reading
diverse proponents, such as Karl Barth and Amer Nat Bio, Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer
Reinhold NIEBUHR. Neo-orthodoxy, proffered Religious Bio, Pres Addr of APA v3, Proc
by “one-time partial ‘liberals’,” was for Ames of APA v32, Who Was Who in Amer v3,
a “half-hearted and inconsistent treatment of Who’s Who in Phil
64
AMES
Arnold, Charles H. Near the Edge of Battle: him Humanist Fellow for Outstanding
A Short History of the Divinity School and Contributions to Humanist Thought in Ethics
the Chicago School of Theology, and Aesthetics. He was elected President of
1866–1966 (Chicago, 1966). the American Philosophical Association in
“Edward Scribner Ames,” The Scroll 49 1959, and also served as President of the
(Spring 1958): 1–30. Special issue devoted American Society of Aesthetics.
to Ames. Ames’s range of interests included aesthetics
Garrison, Winfred E., ed. Faith of the Free and history of aesthetics, ethics, American
(Chicago, 1940). Contains a bibliography pragmatism, existentialism, literature, poetry,
of Ames’s writings. and Zen Buddhism. He wrote on a broad
Peden, Creighton, ed. The Chicago School: range of topics, such as the history of philos-
Voices in Liberal Religious Thought ophy, the nature of art, the value of aesthetics,
(Bristol, Ind., 1987). existentialism and the arts, literature, poetry,
music, philosophy of religion, Eastern philos-
Robert Wilson-Black ophy with an emphasis on Zen thought,
George SANTAYANA, John Dewey, Edmund
Husserl, Thomas Mann, Marcel Proust, and
André Gide. He has written seven books on
these topics, over two hundred articles, and
several books of poetry.
AMES, Van Meter (1898–1985) Ames’s aesthetics is characterized by the idea
that the aesthetic experience is the pre-reflec-
Van Meter Ames was born in De Soto, Iowa, tive contemplation of values for their own
on 9 July 1898 and died in Cincinnati, Ohio, sake. In an aesthetic experience the flow of
on 5 November 1985. He was son of Edward habitual activity is interrupted by a problem-
Scribner AMES, minister of the University atic situation. Art facilitates this experience by
Church of Disciples of Christ, and dean of the presenting the data for it – the problematic
Disciples Divinity House of Chicago. His situation – in which these values are a part
father was also a member of the philosophy and so draws one’s attention to them. The
department at the University of Chicago with response is immediate, disinterested, and pre-
John DEWEY, James TUFTS, and George MEAD. reflective. Once reflection sets in, the aesthetic
Van Meter Ames was a student at the attitude has been interrupted. An aesthetic
University of Chicago, where he received a BA experience is not an isolated experience, but
in philosophy in 1919 and a PhD in philoso- can occur in any area of life.
phy in 1924. He joined the faculty of the phi- In Aesthetics of the Novel (1928), Ames
losophy department at the University of explains that the novel offers the aesthetic
Cincinnati in 1925 and remained there until his experience by bringing forth the problematic
retirement in 1966. From 1959 until 1966, he situations out of which the values the reader
was chair of the department. He received a contemplates in his or her pre-reflective state
Rockefeller grant to study French philosophy arise. The novel typically presents problem-
in France from 1948 to 1949. He became a atic situations characterized through the
fellow of the University of Chicago Graduate relation of the self to other selves and to
School in 1959. He was a Fulbright research society, “the social self.” The novelist’s role is
professor in Japan, where he lectured at to present the values of the social, not to solve
Komazawa, a Zen university in Tokyo, where them. Any attempt toward resolution requires
he studied Zen from 1958 to 1959. In 1976 the reflection, which is outside of the aesthetic
American Humanist Association designated experience.
65
AMES
This aesthetic attitude is also explained and on any transcendent or supernatural princi-
defended in such writings as Proust and ple” (1962, p. 5). Mead’s position, akin to
Santayana: The Aesthetic Way of Life (1937). Zen, heals the cleavage in Western culture by
The articles contained in this book either making humankind at home in nature.
discuss the aesthetic way of life or use Proust Ames was a holistic thinker, whose prag-
and Santayana as exemplifying the tradition matic yet spiritual attitude permeated every
that values the aesthetic way of life. The aes- area of his thought. He believed in the unity
thetic way of life is defined as an attitude that and solidarity of the peoples of the East and
values detached contemplation over action. West, as well as the idea that human beings
Aesthetic insight, or experience, as the pre- must accept themselves as part of nature. Ames
reflective contemplation of values is impor- understood art to be fundamental and the aes-
tant because it gives meaning to life and human thetic experience as invaluable. He insisted on
existence. the idea that aesthetics, science, and religion
Ames’s description of the aesthetic experience are inseparable, because they contain corre-
has affinities with his characterization of enlight- sponding values. These values are spiritual and
enment in Zen thought. “[Enlightenment] is lib- social. Understanding these disciplines and the
eration from the uneasy sense of confinement to values associated with them is constructive in
a little, limited self to be separate from other that it will bring together the peoples of the
selves and from the rest of the world” (1962, p. East and West.
9). Both enlightenment and the aesthetic attitude
bring humankind together through direct, imme- BIBLIOGRAPHY
diate experience. Aesthetics of the Novel (Chicago, 1928).
In Zen and American Thought (1962), Ames Introduction to Beauty (New York, 1931).
looks at Zen’s influence and compatibility with Proust and Santayana: The Aesthetic Way of
American values. The book traces the devel- Life (Chicago, 1937; 1966).
opment of American thought from Thomas André Gide (Norfolk, Conn., 1947).
Jefferson through Ralph Waldo EMERSON, Understanding the World: An Introduction to
Henry David Thoreau, and Walt WHITMAN, to Philosophy (New York, 1947).
Charles PEIRCE, Josiah ROYCE, Henry James, Japan and Zen (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1961).
Santayana, Dewey, and finally Mead, always Zen and American Thought (Honolulu,
keeping in mind Zen teachings. Mead is the Hawaii, 1962).
pivotal figure of the volume, because in his
ideas Ames finds affinities with Zen, as well as Other Relevant Works
recognizing the importance of Mead for Ames’s papers are at the University of
current Western thought. Chicago.
A central notion in Ames’s writings on Zen “The Function of Aesthetic Experience,”
is the “cleavage” of Western culture, which Journal of Philosophy 23 (1926): 603–609.
relates to the dualisms between humankind “Business and Art,” International Journal of
and the world, and Zen’s holistic approach. Ethics 41 (1930): 86–95.
Zen is defined as an entirely naturalistic way “An Apology for Aesthetes,” International
of thinking that denies the dualisms associ- Journal of Ethics 44 (1933): 56–7.
ated with traditional Western thought. Mead “Conscience and Calculation,” International
is also a naturalistic thinker in that he under- Journal of Ethics 47 (1937): 180–92.
stands one’s personality and mentality belong “The Function and Value of Aesthetics,”
to the same natural process of evolution as his Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 1
body. “He disposed of dualism by accounting (1941): 95–105.
for the human self and mind without relying “On Empathy,” Philosophical Review 52
66
AMES
(1943): 490–93. Art Criticism 15 (1956): 85–93.

“Art as Expression,” Ethics 54 (1944): “Zen and American Philosophy,” Philosophy
283–9. East and West 5 (1956): 305–20.
“Social Esthetic, with Special Reference to “Zen and Mead,” Proceedings and Addresses
Guyau,” Journal of Philosophy 41 (1944): of the American Philosophical Association
91–6. 33 (1960): 27–42.
“Volkelt’s Saving Humor,” Philosophical “Aesthetic Values in the East and West,”
Review 53 (1944): 295–301. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 19
“Science and the Reconstruction of Value,” (1960): 3–16.
Humanist 5 (1945): 8–16. “A Humanist at Heaven’s Gate,” Humanist
“Art and Science Inseparable,” Philosophical 23 (1963): 175–7.
Review 55 (1946): 183–9. “The New in the Novel,” Journal of
“The Idea of God,” Humanist 6 (1946): Aesthetics and Art Criticism 21 (1963):
75–81. 243–50.
“Expression and Aesthetic Expression,” “Butor and the Book,” Journal of Aesthetics
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 6 and Art Criticism 23 (1964): 159–65.
(1947): 172–9. “Aesthetics in Recent Japanese Novels,”
“Fetishism in the Existentialism of Sartre,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 24
Journal of Philosophy 47 (1950): 407–10. (1965): 27–36.
“Theater and Fiction in France,” Journal of “Buber and Mead,” Antioch Review 27
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 8 (1950): (1967): 181–91.
239–44. “What Is Music?” Journal of Aesthetics and
“America, Existentialism, and Zen,” Art Criticism 26 (1967): 241–9.
Philosophy East and West 1 (1951): 35–47. “The Humanity of Zen,” Humanist 28
“Existentialism and the Arts,” Journal of (1968): 17–19.
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 9 (1951): “Why Naturalistic Humanists Should Use the
252–6. Term God,” Religious Humanism 3 (1969):
“The Humanism of Thomas Mann,” Journal 27–31.
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 10 (1952): “Is it Art?” Journal of Aesthetics and Art
247–57. Criticism 30 (1971): 39–48.
“The Zenith as Ideal,” Journal of Philosophy “Art for Art’s Sake Again?” Journal of
49 (1952): 201–207. Aesthetics and Art Criticism 33 (1975):
“John Dewey as Aesthetician,” Journal of 303–307.
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 12 (1953):
145–68. Further Reading
“A Philosophy for Today,” Ethics 64 (1954): Amer Nat Bio, Pres Addr of APA v6, Proc
292–301. of APA v59, Who Was Who in Amer v9,
“The Archaic Smile,” Journal of Aesthetics Who’s Who in Phil
and Art Criticism 13 (1954): 265–6. Duncan, Elmer. “Van Meter Ames: An
“Zen and Pragmatism,” Philosophy East and Examination and Appraisal of His
West 4 (1954): 19–34. Philosophy of Art,” Journal of Aesthetics
“Mead and Husserl on the Self,” Philosophy Education 15 (1981): 97–114.
and Phenomenological Research 15 (1955): Suzuki, D. T. “Zen: A Reply to Ames,”
320–31. Philosophy East and West 5 (1956):
“Mead and Sartre on Man,” Journal of 349–52.
Philosophy 53 (1956): 205–18.
“What Is Form?” Journal of Aesthetics and Melanie McQuitty
67
ANDERSON
ANDERSON, Alan Ross (1925–73) logic of necessity and possibility. In the early
1950s modal logic was largely studied through
Alan Anderson was born on 11 April 1925 in syntactical, proof theoretic methods, rather
Portland, Oregon, and grew up in Little Rock, than the semantical methods that have since
Arkansas. His collegiate education was pri- proved to be so fruitful. In that context,
marily at Yale University, where he earned his Anderson presented decision procedures and
BA in 1950 and his PhD in 1955. He also alternative axiomatizations for various modal
studied at Cambridge University on a Fulbright logics. He is far better known, however, for his
Fellowship, earning an MLitt in 1952 with a contributions to deontic logic.
thesis on “Solutions to the Decision Problem Deontic logic, or as Anderson preferred to
for Certain Calculi of Modal Logic.” His PhD call it, the logic of normative systems, is the
dissertation at Yale was on “A Finitary System logic of normative concepts, such as obliga-
of Logic,” written under Frederick B. FITCH. tion, permission, and prohibition. Stemming
Anderson’s first teaching position was as from G. H. von Wright’s seminal paper,
instructor of philosophy at Dartmouth College “Deontic Logic” (1951), this branch of philo-
in 1954–5. He returned to Yale to teach phi- sophical logic came to be treated as a form of
losophy from 1955 to 1965, becoming full pro- modal logic, in which statements of the form
fessor in 1963. He was also a Fulbright “It ought to be that p” would be formalized as
Lecturer at the University of Manchester in Op, with a monadic modal operator O applied
1964–5, the same year in which he held a to a proposition p, and similarly for “It is per-
Guggenheim Fellowship. In 1965 Anderson mitted that p,” Pp, and “It is forbidden that p”,
moved to the University of Pittsburgh as pro- Fp. The deontic modalities then display strong
fessor of philosophy, where he remained until analogies with the alethic modes of necessity, L,
his death in 1973. While at Pittsburgh, possibility, M, and impossibility, I, respectively.
Anderson also held senior research associate The primary difference is that, while necessity
positions with both the Center for the implies truth, Lp ➝ p, obligation, alas, does
Philosophy of Science and the Knowledge not; sometimes obligations are not fulfilled.
Availability Systems Center. Throughout the Hence no respectable deontic logic would
1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s he was an active contain Op ➝ p, though it should have the
member and officer of the Association for weaker principle that obligation entails per-
Symbolic Logic and the American Philosophical mission, Op ➝ Pp. Likewise, it would not
Association, among other organizations. He contain the converse principle p ➝ Op, since
also served in editorial capacities with a variety many truths are not required.
of journals. Anderson died on 5 December With these measures in mind, Anderson
1973 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. demonstrated that deontic logic could be
Anderson was a philosophical logician, reduced to alethic modal logic. The leading idea,
whose research lay in three areas now (though which Anderson credits to Herbert Bohnert,
not then) commonly called modal logic, deontic though it has earlier antecedents, is that a state-
logic, and relevance logic. More than that, ment of the form “It ought to be that p” is to be
however, he was a logician who was strongly analyzed as saying that “if not-p, then S,” where
motivated by philosophical concerns and ques- S is a propositional constant referring to a bad
tions, and above all, he was a philosopher state of affairs, to a sanction or a violation of the
whose thinking was always fully informed by rules. Given such a constant, Op could then be
the methods and results of modern formal defined as ¬p ➝ S (with ¬ for negation and ➝
logic. for an appropriate “if-then”). This definition of
Anderson’s early work in philosophical logic the deontic operator is often called the
addressed problems in alethic modal logic, the “Andersonian reduction.” If the ➝ were classi-
68
ANDERSON
cal material implication, with p ➝ q equivalent implication, a material, but paradox-free, form
to ¬p ⁄ q (either not-p or q), then Anderson’s def- of implication in the systems of relevance logic
inition would lead to the collapse of the deontic that he and Nuel D. BELNAP, Jr. had been devel-
concept, since both p ➝ Op and Op ➝ p would oping.
be true for every proposition p if there were Relevance logics comprise the second area in
anything that was permitted, as there surely is. which Anderson’s contributions are most
Instead, Anderson proposed that the appropri- noted. These logics begin with concern about
ate sense of “if-then” was that of strict impli- the classic paradoxes of implication. If the
cation, such as formalized in the modal logics T, implication connective ➝ is construed as clas-
S4, and S5, etc. With this stipulation, and also sical material implication, then any true propo-
the stipulation that the sanction, S, is avoid- sition is implied by every proposition since p ➝
able, i.e., that it is possible that not-S, M¬S, (q ➝ p) is a theorem of classical logic, a tau-
then all of normal deontic logic can be derived tology. This does not obtain if ➝ is taken as
in these modal logics, and nothing can be strict implication, but that connective suffers
proved that should not be. In this way deontic similar problems, for a contradiction would
logic is reduced to alethic modal logic. still imply every proposition and a logical neces-
There is another aspect of the Andersonian sity would be implied by every proposition.
reduction which is widely overlooked. Anderson Both (p & ¬p) ➝ q and q ➝ (p ➝ p) are
showed that even the normative postulate M¬S theorems of standard modal logics. Against
is eliminable. Let B be a propositional constant these, Anderson and his collaborator Belnap
about which no assumptions are made, and let argue that when a proposition, p, entails
S be defined so that S = B & M¬B. The requi- another, q, there must be a necessary connec-
site proposition M¬S can then be derived in any tion between p and q, which excludes material
of the standard modal logics. (B might be implication, and there must also be a connec-
thought of as representing a bad state of affairs tion of meaning, or relevance, between p and q,
which obtains but might not.) See especially lest non sequiturs be licensed as valid. This
Anderson’s articles (1956 and 1968) for the full latter condition excludes both material impli-
account of the reduction of deontic logic to cation and standard strict implication. The
alethic modal logic, though the central ideas Anderson-Belnap logic E is a formalization of
recur in quite a number of his papers. just such an entailment. Their logic R, for
Anderson was not entirely satisfied with his relevant implication, relaxes the requirement of
original analysis of statements “It ought to be necessity while maintaining the requirement of
that p” as “necessarily, if not-p then S.” For, relevance. Relevant implication stands to entail-
when “necessarily, if-then” is taken as the strict ment much as material implication stands to
implication of, for example, the modal logic S4, strict implication.
it suffers from the so-called paradoxes of strict One way to think of the requisite sense of rel-
implication, including that necessities are evance is to consider entailment or implication
strictly implied by anything, since Lp ➝ (q ➝ in terms of inference or derivability. To say
p) is a theorem. This would have the conse- that p entails or implies q is thus to say that q
quence that all necessities are obligatory, Lp ➝ can be validly inferred or derived from p. One
Op. The definition also implies that whatever then expects that in a valid inference or deriva-
is obligatory is necessarily obligatory, Op ➝ tion, p must actually be used in obtaining q
LOp, which struck Anderson as a mistake since from p. (In other words, one should take the
very many norms seem to depend on contingent word “from” seriously.) Such use thus reflects
states of affairs. In place of strict implication in a real connection between p and q, and so con-
this sense, Anderson then proposed that the stitutes relevance. Natural deduction versions of
“if-then” of his analysis be taken as relevant the logics E and R make the sense in which a
69
ANDERSON
proposition is used in deriving another fully where Moore introduced the “talking type-
rigorous and precise. Another way that rele- writer” that enabled very young children to
vance is captured in these logics lies in the fact learn to read and write. This led to a series of
that whenever a formula A ➝ B is provable in films, Early Reading and Writing, for which
either system, then A and B share a variable, Anderson composed and performed the inci-
which thus provides for an element of common dental music. Anderson also wrote poetry, and
meaning in antecedent and consequent. (Notice loved games.
how both classical logic and standard modal
logics fail in this regard.) BIBLIOGRAPHY
Although there were predecessors, such as “Improved Decision Procedures for Lewis’s
Alonzo CHURCH, Moh Shaw-Kwei, and espe- Calculus S4 and von Wright’s Calculus
cially Wilhelm Ackermann, Anderson and M,” Journal of Symbolic Logic 19 (1954):
Belnap must be considered the primary 201–14.
founders of the field of relevance logic. Through The Formal Analysis of Normative Systems
their work, and that of their students, and now (New Haven, Conn., 1956). Reprinted in
many others, this has become a well-established The Logic of Decision and Action, ed.
part of philosophical logic, analogous to modal Nicholas Rescher (Pittsburgh, 1968), pp.
logic. See (1975) and (1992) for comprehensive 147–213.
expositions of this field, as well as extensive bib- “The Formal Analysis of Normative
liographies. Concepts,” with Omar K. Moore,
In addition to his work in philosophical logic, American Sociological Review 22 (1957):
and other aspects of the philosophy of logic and 9–17.
mathematics, where he maintained a robust “Reduction of Deontic Logic to Alethic
but irenic Platonism, Anderson was also par- Modal Logic,” Mind 67 (1958): 100–103.
ticularly interested in the philosophy of the “The Logic of Norms,” Logique et Analyse
social and behavioral sciences and the formal n.s. 1 (1958): 84–91.
analysis of concepts in those sciences. Here Completeness Theorems for the Systems E of
Anderson’s work in deontic logic becomes Entailment and EQ of Entailment with
directly applicable since so many social Quantification (New Haven, Conn.,
concepts carry a normative component. Much 1959). Reprinted in Zeitschrift für mathe-
of Anderson’s research in this area was in col- matische Logik und Grundlagen der
laboration with the social psychologist Omar Mathematik 6 (1960): 201–16.
Khayyam Moore. Their studies often centered Autotelic Folk-Models, with Omar K. Moore
on what they called “autotelic folk models,” (New Haven, Conn., 1959). Reprinted in
patterns of behavior that contain their own Sociological Quarterly 1 (1960): 203–16.
goals and motivation, rather than serving “Modalities in Ackermann’s ‘Rigorous
further personal or social ends. These include Implication’,” with Nuel D. Belnap, Jr.,
especially puzzles, games of chance, games of Journal of Symbolic Logic 24 (1959):
strategy, and aesthetic endeavors, all of which 107–11.
seem culturally universal. Such activities, they First-Degree Entailments,with Nuel D.
propose, serve as models within a pre-scientific Belnap, Jr. (New Haven, Conn., 1961).
culture by which members of the culture learn Reprinted in Mathematische Annalen 149
and practice the workings of their society. (1963): 302–19.
Further, such activities can typify individual “Enthymemes,” with Nuel D. Belnap, Jr.,
personalities according to the tasks they serve Journal of Philosophy 58 (1961): 713–23.
to introduce. Anderson also participated in “Tautological Entailments,” with Nuel D.
Moore’s research program in early education, Belnap, Jr., Philosophical Studies 13
70
ANDERSON
(1962): 9–24. Delaware Seminar, vol. 1, ed. B. Baumrin

“Logic, Norms and Roles,” Ratio 4 (1962): (New York, 1963), pp. 137–58.
36–49. Ed., Minds and Machines (Englewood Cliffs,
“Toward a Formal Analysis of Cultural N.J., 1964).
Objects,” with Omar K. Moore, Synthese “A New Square of Opposition: Eubouliatic
14 (1962): 144–70. Reprinted in Boston Logic,” in Akten des XIV Internationalen
Studies in the Philosophy of Science Kongresses für Philosophie (Vienna, 1968),
(Dordrecht, 1963), pp. 117–43. vol. 2, pp. 271–84.
“The Structure of Personality,” with Omar “St. Paul’s Epistle to Titus,” in The Paradox
K. Moore, Review of Metaphysics 16 of the Liar, ed. R. L. Martin (New Haven,
(1962): 212–36. Conn., 1970), pp. 1–11.
“Some Puzzling Aspects of Social “An Intensional Interpretation of Truth-
Interaction,” with Omar K. Moore, Values,” Mind 81 (1972): 348–71.
Review of Metaphysics 15 (1962): 409–33. “Meaning and Implication,” Idealistic
“The Pure Calculus of Entailment,” with Studies 4 (1974): 79–88.
Nuel D. Belnap, Jr., Journal of Symbolic “Fitch on Consistency,” in The Logical
Logic 27 (1962): 19–52. Enterprise, ed. A. R. Anderson, R. B.
“Some Open Problems Concerning the Marcus, and R. M. Martin (New Haven,
System E of Entailment,” Acta Conn., 1975), pp. 123–41.
Philosophica Fennica 16 (1963): 7–18. “Logic and Shoulder-Shrugging,” in Issues in
“Models and Explanations in the Behavioral the Philosophy of Language, ed. A. F.
Sciences,” with Omar K. Moore, in MacKay and D. D. Merrill (New Haven,
Concepts, Theory, and Explanation in the Conn., 1976), pp. 1–10.
Behavioral Sciences, ed. G. J. Direnzo “Von Wright on Entailment,” in The
(New York, 1966), pp. 79–90. Philosophy of Georg Henrik von Wright,
“Some Nasty Problems in the Formal Logic ed. P. A. Schilpp and L. E. Hahn (La Salle,
of Ethics,” Noûs 1 (1967): 345–60. Ill., 1989), pp. 581–601.
The Responsive Environments Project, with
Omar K. Moore (Pittsburgh, Penn., 1967). Further Reading
“Some Principles for the Design of Clarifying Oxford Comp Phil, Proc of APA v47, Who
Educational Environments,” with Omar K. Was Who in Amer v6.
Moore, in Handbook of Socialization Avron, Arnon. “Whither Relevance Logic?”
Theory and Research, ed. D. Goslin Journal of Philosophical Logic 21 (1992):
(Chicago, 1968), pp. 571–613. 243–81.
Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Iseminger, Gary. “Is Relevance Necessary for
Necessity, vol. 1, with Nuel D. Belnap, Jr., Validity?” Mind 89 (1990): 196–213.
(Princeton, N.J., 1975). Mares, Edwin D. “Andersonian Deontic
Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Logic,” Theoria 58 (1992): 3–20.
Necessity, vol. 2, with Nuel D. Belnap, Jr.
and J. Michael Dunn (Princeton, N.J., Lou Goble
1992).

Early Reading and Writing, Parts 1–3, with
Omar K. Moore (Pittsburgh, Penn., 1960).
Three documentary films.
“Platonism,” in Philosophy of Science: The
71
ANDERSON
ANDERSON, Fulton Henry (1895–1968) Anderson’s first book, The Argument of

Plato (1935), is essentially an exposition of
Fulton Henry Anderson was born on 23 May Plato’s philosophy for undergraduates and it
1895 on a farm near Morell, Prince Edward makes no original contribution to Platonic
Island, Canada. Anderson attended Dalhousie scholarship. His philosophical interests even
University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, receiving while he was writing it lay elsewhere, namely,
his BA in 1917. At Dalhousie, under the influ- in Lockean studies. He spent every summer in
ence of Herbert Leslie STEWART, he developed England mining the Lovelace collection of
an abiding interest in philosophy. Stewart, a Locke’s papers, then in private hands. One of
graduate of Lincoln College, Oxford, was a only two scholars allowed access to the papers
gifted teacher who insisted that his honor during this period, he amassed voluminous
students acquire a solid grounding in ancient notes on the manuscripts, but he never wrote
philosophy and British empiricism. Anderson his promised book on Locke. The outbreak of
flourished under Stewart and in his final year war in 1939 meant an increased teaching load
he was awarded the sole fellowship in philos- for him, since all the younger men were in
ophy offered by the University of Toronto. uniform. To add to the crisis Brett, then
There he was supervised by George Sidney departmental Head, was stricken with cancer
BRETT, also an Oxford graduate, in writing a and died in October 1944. Anderson was
thesis on “The Influence of Contemporary immediately appointed to succeed him; he
Science on Locke’s Method and Results.” His served as Head until he retired in 1963.
third year was spent at Princeton as a Proctor Anderson died on 11 January 1968 in
Fellow, Princeton’s highest award, where he Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, during
studied with Archibald Allan BOWMAN, a a lecturing visit to his old secondary school,
Scotsman who defended a form of idealism, Prince of Wales College.
and Warner FITE, who specialized in ethics. Anderson published two books on Francis
Anderson received his MA in 1918 and was Bacon, The Philosophy of Francis Bacon
awarded Toronto’s fourth PhD in philosophy (1948) and Francis Bacon: His Career and
in 1920. Thought (1962), both of which are skillful
In the summer of 1920 he was appointed and well-written syntheses of the immense sec-
Acting Head of the Philosophy Department in ondary literature on Bacon. Anderson was not
the University of Colorado at Boulder, and his an original philosopher; but he was a com-
work so pleased his superiors that they mitted student of the history of philosophy.
appointed him permanent Head when he was Thomas A. GOUDGE, who succeeded him in
only twenty-six years old. But he was not office, stated on the department’s oral history
happy living in the United States and watched tapes that “I once heard him say in public that
for an opportunity to return to Canada. When he really hadn’t the slightest interest in
the University of Toronto advertised a junior anything that happened after the seventeenth
position in 1924, he applied for it and Brett century.” This fixation on the past led to con-
appointed him, even though it meant a rather siderable friction with his younger colleagues.
severe drop in status, not a trivial matter for The curriculum, which remained decidedly his-
Anderson. Brett made the pill easier to swallow torical while he was in charge, was changed
by pointing out that two senior men were soon quite radically under Goudge. Anderson’s
due for retirement, so, if Anderson applied enduring legacies were the superior appoint-
himself, early promotion was assured. He did ments he made and the tenacious way he held
apply himself and was made a full professor in the department together during a trying period
1934, with a rise in salary when nearly in the history of the university.
everyone else was taking a cut.
72
ANDREWS
BIBLIOGRAPHY Pastoral theology was a third area in which he

The Influence of Contemporary Science on held an academic post early in his career as
Locke’s Method and Results (Toronto, university professor and administrator.
1920). Andrews made considerable contributions
The Argument of Plato (London, 1935). to the development and expansion of three
The Philosophy of Francis Bacon (Chicago, major American universities. In 1875 he
1948). assumed the presidency of Denison University
Francis Bacon: His Career and Thought in Granville, Ohio. Like many church-affili-
(Los Angeles, 1962). ated colleges during the post Civil War epoch
of the rising land-grant universities, Denison
Other Relevant Works was in deep financial straits. While simulta-
“Introduction,” in Philosophy in Canada: neously holding chairs in moral and intellec-
A Symposium, by John A. Irving tual philosophy, Andrews constructed a new
(Toronto, 1962). library and initiated a curriculum of elective
coursework. More significantly, he brought
Further Reading John D. Rockefeller onto the board of trustees.
Proc of APA v42 A proponent of the emerging “social gospel,”
Armour, Leslie, and Elizabeth Trott. The Andrews clashed with other trustees and
Faces of Reason: An Essay on Philosophy resigned the presidency in 1879. He was pro-
and Culture in English Canada, fessor of homiletics and pastoral theology at
1850–1950 (Waterloo, Ontario, 1981). the Newton Theological Institution during
Slater, John G. Minerva’s Aviary: 1879–82, and studied at German universities
Philosophy at Toronto 1843–1943 in 1882–3.
(Toronto, 2005), chap. 8. In 1883 he joined Brown University as pro-
fessor of political economy and history, and
John G. Slater following a brief stint on the Cornell
University faculty in 1888–9, returned to
become Brown’s President in 1889. He
founded a graduate school, increased under-
graduate enrollment from 176 to around 640,
and added more than one hundred graduate
ANDREWS, Elisha Benjamin (1844–1917) students to the rolls as well. Course offerings
and faculty were increased proportionately.
Benjamin (as he preferred) Andrews was In 1891 he opened a women’s college at
typical of the generation of great educators of Brown University. His somewhat tumultuous
his era in the United States. He was born on 10 tenure as President ended in 1898. His final
January 1844 in Hinsdale, New Hampshire, to higher education leadership role was chancel-
a Baptist minister and a schoolteacher. He lor of the University of Nebraska from 1900
served with distinction in the Civil War, rising to 1908, where he led the drive for increased
from private to second lieutenant and partic- enrollments and new campus construction
ipating in numerous military engagements. projects. Between the Brown presidency and
Wounds left him without sight in his left eye. the Nebraska chancellorship Andrews served
Discharged before the war’s conclusion, he as the superintendent of the Chicago public
completed his education at Brown University schools. His achievements include the addition
(BA 1870) and Newton Theological of kindergarten, regular health examinations,
Institution (BD 1874). His major fields of spe- and special education for the physically chal-
cialization were political economy and history. lenged.
73
ANDREWS
His scholarship accurately reflects his broad Who Was Who in Amer v1
teaching interests and varied faculty appoint- Hansen, James E. Gallant, Stalwart Bennie:
ments. His published works include two his- Elisha Benjamin Andrews (1844–1917), an
torical outlines: Brief Institutes of Our Educator’s Odyssey. PhD dissertation,
Constitutional History, English and American University of Denver (Denver, 1969).
(1886), and Brief Institutes of General History
(1887). His various works in political economy James O. Castagnera
and moral philosophy were capped by Wealth
and Moral Law in 1894. His personal philos-
ophy included a deep commitment to academic
freedom. His threat to resign the Brown presi-
dency in 1897, rather than accede to the
trustees’ demand that he foreswear his public ANGELL, James Rowland (1869–1949)
commitment to international bimetallism,
placed the principle of academic freedom on the James Rowland Angell was born on 8 May
national agenda. Andrews died on 30 October 1869 in Burlington, Vermont, and died on 4
1917 in Interlachen, Florida. March 1949 at Hamden, Connecticut. His
mother was Sarah Swope Caswell; his father,
BIBLIOGRAPHY James Burrill Angell, was President of the
Brief Institutes of Our Constitutional University of Vermont at the time of his son’s
History, English and American birth and subsequently served for thirty-eight
(Providence, R.I., 1886). years as President of the University of
Brief Institutes of General History (Boston, Michigan. James Rowland Angell grew up in
1887). Ann Arbor and attended school and college
An Honest Dollar (Baltimore, Md., 1889). there, graduating from Michigan in 1890
Institutes of Economics (Boston, 1889). with a BA degree. Angell was influenced by
The Economic Law of Monopoly his teacher, John DEWEY, and by reading
(Providence, R.I., 1890). William JAMES’s Principles of Psychology
The Duty of a Public Spirit (New York, (1890). He received his MA in 1891 from
1892). Michigan with a thesis on imagery. He then
Wealth and Moral Law (Hartford, Conn., studied psychology and philosophy at
1894). Harvard University, principally with James
Eternal Words, and Other Sermons and Josiah ROYCE, and received a second MA
(Hartford, Conn., 1894). from Harvard in 1892.
After Harvard, Angell, in keeping with the
Other Relevant Works practice of aspiring academic psychologists of
A Private’s Reminiscences of the First Year of his day, went to study in Germany. A place
the War (Providence, R.I., 1886). was not available in the laboratory of
History of the United States (New York, Wilhelm Wundt, the acknowledged origina-
1894). tor of laboratory psychology, so he went to
The Call of the Land: Popular Chapters on Berlin to study psychology with Hermann
Topics of Interest to Farmers (New York, Ebbinghaus and philosophy with Friedrich
1913). Paulsen, and then to Halle, where he studied
psychology with Benno Erdmann and the phi-
Further Reading losophy of Kant with Hans Vaihinger. Angell
Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, wrote a doctoral thesis that compared the
Dict Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v8, concept of freedom in Kant’s critique of pure
74
ANGELL
reason with the concept of freedom in the made Yale a great university” (Kelley 1974,
critique of practical reason. The thesis was p. 392). For his contributions as a psycholo-
accepted, but the award of the PhD depended gist and as an educator, he received honors
upon Angell’s revising the thesis to improve and honorary degrees from many American
its German and his passing a final examina- and European universities. He was elected to
tion. Angell did not revise the thesis, did not the National Academy of Sciences, the
complete the examination, and so did not American Philosophical Society, and the
receive his PhD degree. Instead, in the fall of American Academy of Arts and Sciences; and
1893, he accepted an offer from the he was awarded the gold medal of the
University of Minnesota to become an National Institute of Social Science.
instructor in philosophy at a salary that Angell’s contributions to psychology were
enabled him, in 1894, to marry Marion Isabel made before he assumed the major adminis-
Watrous after a four-year engagement. One trative responsibilities of his later career. His
year after her death in 1931, Angell married 1896 research with Addison W. M OORE
Katharine Cramer Woodman. helped to resolve a dispute over the interpre-
In 1894 Angell became an assistant pro- tation of experimental results on simple
fessor of philosophy at the University of reaction time (Woodworth 1938). Simple
Chicago where Dewey was the new chair of reaction time consisted of the time taken to
the department of philosophy, psychology, make a motor response (such as pressing a
and pedagogy. Angell was placed in charge of telegraph key) upon the occurrence of a
instruction in psychology and given an assis- stimulus (e.g., a sound or light). Wilhelm
tant to help with the laboratory work. He Wundt had asserted that when respondents
was promoted to the rank of associate pro- were instructed to focus attention on the
fessor in 1901 and named full professor and response to be made (motor reactions),
department chair in 1905 when an indepen- reaction times were always shorter than when
dent psychology department was established. the same responders were asked to focus
He served as the editor of the Psychological attention on the stimulus (sensory reactions).
Monographs from 1911 to 1922, served on Wundt interpreted the difference to mean
the council of the American Psychological that the longer time for sensory reactions
Association from 1903 to 1906, and was its resulted because the stimulus had to be
President in 1906. At Chicago, he also served “apperceived” (perceived and attended to)
as Dean of Senior College during 1908–11, while in the motor reaction the stimulus need
Dean of the Faculties during 1911–19, and as only to be perceived. Subtracting the shorter
Acting President in 1918–19. In 1919 he was time from the longer was thus considered to
appointed President of the Carnegie measure the time taken to apperceive a
Corporation. stimulus. Results obtained in other laborato-
In 1921 Angell accepted the call to become ries, however, found that for some individu-
President of Yale University. Before he retired als the motor reaction was longer than the
from Yale in 1937, Angell had greatly sensory reaction (Baldwinand Shaw 1895;
strengthened Yale’s Graduate School and the Baldwin 1896). Angell and Moore (1896)
professional schools (law and medicine), argued that the results of their experiments
established the residential quadrangles suggested that the observed reaction time dif-
modeled on the colleges of Oxford and ferences lay in the role of attention in the
Cambridge, enhanced the stature of the coordinated act of responding. For the
faculty and increased the size of the student responder who, by disposition or experience,
body, the faculty, expenditures, endowments tends to focus on the response, more time is
and the physical facilities. In doing so, “he needed to shift attention to the stimulus,
75
ANGELL
while the reverse is true for those who are ini- an approach that raised to equal status the
tially more disposed to focus on the stimulus. study of mental activity as manifest in cog-
In emphasizing reaction time response as a nition and behavior as part of the adaptation
coordinated activity, Angell aligned himself of individuals and species to the environ-
with Dewey (1896), who argued that psy- ment in which they find themselves.
chology should not focus on reflexes or Functional psychologists recognized the
responses in isolation, but on integrated place of introspective analyses of conscious
activity and the blending of stimulus and mental content as a significant task for sci-
response in behavior. Angell and Dewey’s entific psychology, but believed that limiting
psychological functionalism was the founda- psychology to that task narrowed the disci-
tion of Dewey’s pragmatic approach to the pline unnecessarily and restricted its useful-
mind, knowledge, and truth. Occasionally ness to the world outside the laboratory. In
Angell expressed some measure of agreement addition to the introspective observation of
with Dewey’s pragmatism. the generalized normal, adult, human con-
Angell’s chief contribution to the new and sciousness, Angell added the objective obser-
developing field of scientific psychology con- vation of animal activities (comparative psy-
sisted of the approach to psychology chology), of developmental patterns of
embodied in his 1904 textbook, Psychology, children, of abnormal behavior, of individ-
subtitled “An Introductory Study of the uals as they differ among themselves and as
Structure and Function of Human they exist as part of a social matrix, includ-
Consciousness,” and in his later An ing comparisons across cultures. This broad-
Introduction to Psychology (1918). A more ening of methodology within and beyond
formal statement of his systematic position the laboratory to include a wider range of
was contained in his 1906 presidential research subjects within psychology empha-
address to the American Psychological sized “mind in use” over mind as a static
Association, “The Province of Functional structure. Unlike Titchener, Angell did not
Psychology” (1907). accept the view that research on the psy-
In giving voice to a functional perspective chology of animals, children, and abnormal
for psychology, Angell was characterizing individuals could and should only occur
the research activities of many psychologists after the psychology of the generalized
while simultaneously challenging the defin- normal, adult human consciousness had
ition of psychology advanced by E. B. been completed. Angell’s aversion to narrow
T I T C H E N E R , a psychologist at Cornell strictures on the subject matter and methods
University. Titchener championed a psy- of study in psychology were manifest as well
chology that focused narrowly on the use of in his criticism of the behaviorism of John B.
introspection in experiments under labora- W ATSON . Watson, one of Angell’s many
tory conditions to analyze the structure prominent PhD graduates from Chicago,
(mental content) of the generalized normal, advocated the elimination of mind and con-
adult human mind. Titchener (1898) explic- sciousness from the subject matter of psy-
itly dismissed a psychology of function as chology to focus exclusively on the objective
that which had failed as faculty psychology study of behavior.
in the past and had been replaced by the Angell’s approach provided a broad
psychology of the structural components of umbrella under which many psychologists,
mind, identified in his system as elements of whose research covered many different
sensation, feeling, and image. Angell’s topics using varied methods, could shelter.
response to Titchener reflected a broader Another prominent student of Angell’s,
approach taken by American psychologists, Harvey CARR, continued and consolidated
76
ANGELL
Chicago’s stature as a center of functional- BIBLIOGRAPHY

ism, training a second generation of psy- “Reaction Time,” with Addison W. Moore,
chologists. Although perceived as a school of Psychological Review 3 (1896): 245–58.
thought (for example, Heidbreder 1933), “The Relations of Structural and
especially in the systematic debates through- Functional Psychology,” Philosophical
out the 1920s, Angell’s position was less a Review 12 (1903): 243–71.
firm system of psychology and more an Psychology: An Introductory Study of the
attitude that the advance of psychology Structure and Function of Human
might best be served by pursuing a variety of Consciousness (New York, 1904; 3rd edn
methods and research questions (Carr 1905).
1930). This broad approach within a “The Province of Functional Psychology,”
Darwinian framework raised questions Psychological Review 14 (1907): 61–91.
about the function of mind and conscious- “Imageless Thought,” Psychological
ness in several different ways. Mind and Review 18 (1911): 295–323.
consciousness function to serve adaptation; Chapters from Modern Psychology (New
studies of the evolution of intelligence ask York, 1912).
comparative questions about mental capac- “Behavior as a Category of Psychology,”
ities across the phylogenetic scale. Mental Psychological Review 20 (1913): 255–70.
processes can also be studied in their func- An Introduction to Psychology (New York,
tional relations to physiological processes 1918).
as in, for example, the dependence of sen-
sation and perception on the nervous system, Other Relevant Works
and as a function of the conditions under Angell’s papers are at Yale University.
which they were initiated, without regard “The Evolution of Intelligence,” in The
to their dependence on physiology. Evolution of Man, ed. George A. Baitsell
Angell’s inclusive and multidisciplinary (New Haven, Conn., 1922), pp. 103–25.
approach to the study of psychology in a “James Rowland Angell,” in History of
Darwinian framework was manifest in the Psychology in Autobiography, vol. 3, ed.
Institute of Psychology that he established at Carl Murchison (Worcester, Mass.,
Yale during his presidency. Funded in part 1936), pp. 1–38.
by the Laura Spellman Rockefeller
Memorial, the institute appointed psychol- Further Reading
ogists to represent the areas of primate Amer Nat Bio, Bio Dict Psych, Cambridge
biology, physiological psychology, and racial Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer Bio, Encyc
psychology; subsequently, the Child Psych, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v40, Who Was
Development Clinic was established. Who in Amer v2
Ultimately, both programs were brought Baldwin, J. Mark. “The ‘Type-theory’ of
together under the Institute of Human Reaction,” Mind 5 (1896): 81–90.
Relations, which also included research in Baldwin, J. Mark, and W. J. Shaw. “Types
clinical psychiatry and social science that of Reaction,” Psychological Review 2
embodied Angell’s vision of the most fruitful (1895): 259–73.
approach to the study of human behavior. Carr, Harvey. “Functionalism,” in
Angell’s administrative initiatives continued Psychologies of 1930, ed. Carl
his influential role in the development of Murchison (Worcester, Mass., 1930), pp.
psychology that had begun with the articles 59–78.
and books published early in his career. Dewey, John. “The Reflex Arc Concept in
Psychology,” Psychological Review 3
77
ANGELL
(1896): 357–70. division, Susan began being educated at home.

Dewsbury, D. A. “James Rowland Angell: She later finished her education at a boarding
Born Administrator,” in Portraits of school near Philadelphia. The depression of
Pioneers in Psychology, vol. 4, ed. 1837 forced her to seek work as a teacher to
Gregory A. Kimble and Michael help support her family. The very few employ-
Wertheimer (Washington, D.C., 2003), ment opportunities for middle-class women
pp. 57–71. made her realize at an early age that economic
Heidbreder, Edna. “Functionalism and the independence was necessary for women’s
University of Chicago,” in Seven emancipation and self-sufficiency. Anthony
Psychologies (New York, 1932), pp. also taught at another female academy, Eunice
201–33. Kenyon’s Quaker boarding school, in upstate
Hunter, W. S. “James Rowland Angell, New York from 1846 to 1849. She returned to
1869–1949,” American Journal of her family home in Rochester, New York
Psychology 42 (1949): 439–50. where she began her first public crusade on
Kelley, Brooks M. Yale: A History (New behalf of temperance.
Haven, Conn., 1974). Anthony’s introduction to Elizabeth Cady
Shook, John R., ed. The Chicago School of STANTON in 1851 led to their lifelong collabo-
Functionalism, 3 vols (Bristol, UK, 2001). ration on furthering women’s civil and political
Titchener, E. B. “The Postulates of a rights. Between 1854 and 1860 Anthony and
Structural Psychology,” Philosophical Stanton worked to obtain legal rights for
Review 7 (1898): 449–65. married women, including entitlements to
Woodworth, Robert S. Experimental property, wages, and child custody in divorce
Psychology (New York, 1938). settlements. In 1860 the Married Women’s
Property Act was passed in New York, due in
Alfred H. Fuchs large part to their collaborative efforts. During
the Civil War, Anthony and Stanton organized
the National Women’s Loyal League demand-
ing the abolition of slavery. Expecting women
to be given the vote, they were disappointed
when the Fifteenth Amendment only granted
ANTHONY, Susan Brownell (1820–1906) suffrage to black males. In 1868 they began a
newspaper, The Revolution, which carried the
Susan B. Anthony was born on 15 February masthead: “Men their rights, nothing more;
1820 in Adams, Massachusetts, and died on Women their rights, nothing less.” They
13 March 1906 in Rochester, New York. Her reported on anti-lynching, suffrage, racial rela-
father, Daniel Anthony, was a Quaker who tions, dress reform, women’s property rights,
was barred from his meeting because he education for blacks and women, an eight-hour
married Lucy Read, a Baptist. Though raised work-day, and equal pay for equal work.
in a religious household, the absence of regular Anthony called for women’s inclusion in unions
meeting attendance probably helped shape and the professions, stating there were no dif-
Susan’s fiercely independent nature. The ferences between the minds of women and men.
second of eight children, she was a precocious Anthony gradually focused her considerable
child and learned to read and write at the age skills in political organizing toward a single
of three. In 1826 the family moved from goal: women’s suffrage. She also realized that
Massachusetts to Battensville, New York this campaign had to be carried out at the
where she attended a district school. When federal and not the state level, concentrating
the teacher refused to teach Susan long her efforts toward a constitutional amend-
78
ANTHONY
ment. In 1872 she was arrested for trying to Women at the Podium, ed. Michele Nix
vote. She refused to pay the fine in order to use (New York, 2000).
her trial as a platform to speak out against “The Status of Woman: Past, Present and
the injustice of a democratic society denying Future,” in The American 1890s, ed.
women the rights of citizenship. She appeared Susan Harris Smith and Melanie Dawson
before every Congress from 1869 to 1906 (Durham, N.C., 2000).
asking for passage of the suffrage amendment, “Suffrage and the Working Woman,” in
which came to be named The Susan B. Ripples of Hope, ed. Josh Gottheimer
Anthony Amendment. Her unflagging activism (New York, 2003).
is revealed in her motto “Failure is
Impossible.” Other Relevant Works
Between 1881 and 1885 Anthony, Stanton, Anthony’s papers are at the Library of
and Matilda Justin Gage published the first Congress.
History of Woman Suffrage in three volumes. Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and
The fourth volume was edited by Anthony Susan B. Anthony, 45 microfilm reels, ed.
and Ida Husted Harper soon after, and two Patricia G. Hildebrand and Ann D.
more volumes were added by Harper some Gordon (Wilmington, Del., 1991).
years later. When the two major suffrage orga- The Elizabeth Cady Stanton–Susan B.
nizations united in 1890 into the National Anthony Reader, 2nd edn, ed. Ellen C.
American Woman Suffrage Association DuBois (Boston, 1992).
(NAWSA), Anthony was elected Vice The Selected Papers of Elizabeth Cady
President, becoming President in 1892 and Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, 3 vols to
retiring when she was eighty years old. Two date, ed. Ann D. Gordon (New
years later she presided over the International Brunswick, N.J., 1997–).
Council of Women. Stanton would not live to
see women’s suffrage, which finally was Further Reading
enacted as the Nineteenth Amendment to the Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
US Constitution in 1920. Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer
Anthony spent her life as an activist arguing Thought, Dict Amer Bio, Encyc Amer
for women’s natural rights, which she con- Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v4, Who Was
tended were formulated on the same basis of Who in Amer v1
logic and reason as men’s. The philosophic Barry, Kathleen. Susan B. Anthony, A
foundation for her beliefs was a radical Biography: The Singular Feminist (New
feminism and liberalism influenced by John York, 1988).
Stuart Mill’s writings on the primacy of civil Harper, Ida Husted. The Life and Work of
and political rights over religious ones. At the Susan B. Anthony (Indianapolis, 1908).
end of her life, she lamented the fact that Hewitt, Nancy M. Women’s Activism and
women everywhere were in chains, their servi- Social Change: Rochester, New York,
tude all the more debasing because they did not 1822–1872 (New York, 1984).
realize it. Lutz, Alma. Susan B. Anthony: Rebel,
Crusader, Humanitarian (Boston, 1959).
BIBLIOGRAPHY Pellauer, Mary D. Toward a Tradition of
History of Woman Suffrage, 4 vols, with Feminist Theology: The Religious Social
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Matilda Justin Thought of Elizabeth Cady Stanton,
Gage, and Ida Husted Harper (Rochester, Susan B. Anthony, and Anna Howard
N.Y., 1881–9). Shaw (New York, 1991).
“Citizenship Under the Constitution,” in Sher, Lynn. Failure is Impossible: Susan B.
79
ANTHONY
Anthony in Her Own Words (New York, Honorary Citizen of Olympia/Zaccharo in

1995). 1991, and the Gold Medal Honorary Citizen of
the Island of Samos, Greece, in 1988. He has
Barbara Ryan been elected a corresponding member of the
Academy of Athens (1983) and an honorary
member of the Parnassus Literary Society
(1992).
Anton has published extensively in classical
Greek philosophy, Hellenistic philosophy,
ANTON, John Peter (1920– ) American philosophy, and on topics in meta-
physics, ethics, and aesthetics. His disserta-
John P. Anton was born on 10 November tion, “The Doctrine of Contrariety in
1920 in Canton, Ohio. He attended Columbia Aristotle’s Philosophy of Process,” was super-
University, receiving the BS in 1949, the MA vised by John Herman R ANDALL, Jr. and
in 1950, and the PhD in philosophy in 1954. provided the material for his first book,
He was a visiting lecturer at the University of Aristotle’s Theory of Contrariety, first pub-
New Mexico in 1954–5; assistant professor of lished in 1957 and now in its third and inter-
philosophy at the University of Nebraska from national printing. Anton’s groundbreaking
1955 to 1958; and associate professor of phi- scholarship and analyses of classical philoso-
losophy at Ohio Wesleyan University from phers served to liberate generations of students
1958 to 1962. From 1962 to 1969, he taught and colleagues from the “Analytic” appropri-
at State University of New York at Buffalo, ation of ancient texts and thought. Anton
becoming a full professor in 1964 and also restores to the Greeks their vitality and rele-
serving as Associate Dean of the Graduate vance for contemporary ethical and political
School from 1967 to 1969. In 1969 Anton life.
went to Emory University, where he was Anton is one of only a few philosophers to
Callaway Professor of Philosophy from 1969 successfully correlate elements of American
to 1982, and also chair of the department pragmatism and naturalism with ancient
from 1969 to 1976. In 1982–3, he was pro- wisdom. This correlation yields profound
fessor of philosophy and Provost of the insight into the principles of democracy, edu-
University of South Florida’s New College. cation, and science. Drawing from his exten-
Since 1983, he has been Distinguished sive knowledge and experience, Anton illus-
Professor of Greek Philosophy and Culture, trates an active philosophy, dedicated to trans-
Director of the Center for Greek Studies, and forming life and culture in conjunction with a
Director of the Center for Neoplatonic human desire to know and the rational
Research at the University of South Florida, requirements of thought and action. In all of
Tampa. his writings and teachings, he implicitly or
Anton’s academic career reflects his continu- explicitly argues for the accuracy of historical
ing interests in the practice and administration knowledge because accuracy yields true philo-
of philosophy in terms of excellent teaching, sophic insight into the perennial questions of
scholarship, and institutional leadership. He human existence. In this way, Anton combines
was awarded Outstanding Educator of America the highest standards of scholarship with the
in 1972. He developed and instituted ongoing most meaningful philosophic communications.
philosophic exchange with an international
community, for which he was awarded an BIBLIOGRAPHY
honorary doctorate of philosophy from the Aristotle’s Theory of Contrariety (New
University of Athens in 1992, the Gold Medal York, 1957; 1987). Reprinted. as vol. 1
80
ARENDT
of Routledge Ancient Philosophy in Ten ARENDT, Hannah (1906–75)

Volumes (London and New York, 2000).
Philosophical Essays (Athens, 1969). Hannah Arendt was born on 14 October 1906
Critical Humanism as a Philosophy of in Hanover, Germany. She grew up in
Culture: The Case of E. P. Papanoutsos Königsberg in East Prussia but her father died
(Minneapolis, 1981). in 1913 and the years of World War I were dif-
The Poetry and Poetics of Constantine P. ficult ones for her and her mother, as they
Cavafy (London, 1995). lived near the Eastern Front on the
Categories and Experience: Essays on German/Russian border. Through her mother,
Aristotelian Themes (Oakdale, N.Y., a German Social Democrat, Arendt was first
1996). introduced to the writings of Rosa Luxemburg.
Archetypal Principles and Hierarchies: She graduated from high school in 1924 and
Essays on Neoplatonic Themes that fall began to study theology with Rudolf
(Binghamton, N.Y., 2000). Bultmann at the University of Marburg. Also
Essays and Correspondence 1946–1987 on the faculty was the young philosopher
with E. P. Papanoutsos (Athens, 2003). Martin Heidegger, whose lectures, which
American Naturalism and Greek would form the basis of his 1927 book Sein
Philosophy (Amherst, N.Y., 2004). und Zeit (Being and Time), were already
stirring interest in Existenzphilosophie. Arendt
Other Relevant Works had a brief but passionate affair with
Ed. with G. Kustas, Essays in Ancient Heidegger, a married man with children,
Greek Philosophy, 5 vols (Albany, N.Y., which ended when she went on to study at the
1971–92). University of Heidelberg with the philosopher
Ed., Naturalism and Historical Karl Jaspers. Jaspers, initially a psychiatrist,
Understanding: Essays on the Philosophy became her mentor. Arendt wrote her disser-
of John Herman Randall, Jr. (Albany, tation under Jaspers on the concept of love in
N.Y., 1967). St. Augustine’s thought (“Der Liebesbegriff
“Studies in Ancient Philosophy: Tragic bei Augustin”). She earned her PhD from
Vision and Philosophic Theoria in Heidelberg in 1929, and her dissertation was
Classical Greece,” in Philosophy and the published that same year.
Civilizing Arts: Essays Presented to As the Nazi party rose to power, Arendt
Herbert W. Schneider, ed. John P. Anton became increasingly involved in Jewish and
and Craig Walton (Athens, Ohio, 1974). Zionist politics. In 1930 she married Gunther
Stern (who wrote under the pen name of
Further Reading Gunther Anders). From 1933 she worked with
Harris, R. Baine, ed. The Structure of the German Zionist Organization and its
Being: A Neoplatonic Approach leader, Kurt Blumenfeld, to publicize the
(Norfolk, Virg., 1982). growing Nazi atrocities. She was eventually
Schrenk, Lawrence P., ed. Aristotle in Late arrested by the Gestapo but escaped to Paris.
Antiquity (Washington, D.C., 1994). From 1935 to 1939 she worked as Secretary
General of Youth Aliyah, a Jewish agency for
Lisa A. Wilkinson Palestine in Paris, and from 1938 to 1939 she
was a special agent for the rescue of Jewish
children from Austria and Czechoslovakia.
In 1936 she met Heinrich Blücher, a German
political refugee, whom she married on 16
January 1940, having divorced Stern in 1939.
81
ARENDT
When Germany invaded France, Arendt was she received the Sigmund Freud Prize of the
separated from her husband and sent to an German Akademie für Sprache und Dichtung.
internment camp in Gurs in southern France. She was awarded the Emerson-Thoreau Medal
She again escaped and was able to emigrate of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences
with her husband and mother to the United in 1969. In 1973–4 she delivered the Gifford
States in 1941. Settling in New York City, she Lectures at the University of Aberdeen in
worked as a journalist from 1941 to 1945, Scotland. She was awarded the 1975 Sonning
writing for Jewish Social Studies, Jewish Prize by the Danish government for
Frontier, and Aufbau, a German-language Contributions to European Civilization, which
newspaper. She directed research for the no American and no woman before her had
Commission on European Jewish Cultural received. Arendt died on 4 December 1975 in
Reconstruction from 1944 to 1946, attempt- New York City.
ing to locate and redistribute the remains of Arendt was one of America’s most promi-
Judaic artifacts and other treasures that had nent intellectuals. She is best known for The
miraculously been salvaged from the ruins of Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), published at
the Third Reich. the beginning of the Cold War. Examining the
In 1944, Arendt began work on what would idiosyncratic twentieth-century tyrannies of
become her first major political book, The Hitler and Stalin, she argued that their origins
Origins of Totalitarianism (1951). She pub- lay in imperialism’s racist ideologies, which
lished “What Is Existenz Philosophy?” in were already flourishing in Central and
1946. From 1946 to 1948 she was chief editor Western Europe by the end of the nineteenth
of Schocken Books in New York. From 1949 century. The final section of her book detailed
to 1952 she was the Executive Director for the workings of “radical evil,” arguing that the
Jewish Cultural Reconstruction. huge number of prisoners in the death camps
In 1951, Arendt began the first in a sequence marked “a horrifying discontinuity in
of visiting fellowships and professorial posi- European history itself.”
tions at American universities. She became an In 1958 she published The Human
American citizen and was awarded a Condition and in 1959 “Reflections on Little
Guggenheim Fellowship in 1952. In 1953 she Rock,” a controversial consideration of the
delivered the Christian Gauss Lectures at emergent black civil rights movement.
Princeton University, and in 1954 she received Between Past and Future was published in
a grant from the National Institute of Arts and 1961 and in that same year Arendt traveled to
Letters. She was a visiting professor at several Jerusalem to cover the trial of Nazi Adolf
universities: University of California at Eichmann for the New Yorker. She later pub-
Berkeley in 1955; Princeton University in 1959 lished her reflections on the Eichmann trial in
(the first woman to become a full professor at 1963, first in the New Yorker, and then as a
that university); Columbia University in 1960; book, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the
and Northwestern University in 1961. In Banality of Evil. Eichmann, an S.S. lieutenant
1961–2 she was a fellow at the Center for colonel who had been responsible for orches-
Advanced Studies at Wesleyan University in trating the transportation of millions of Jews
Connecticut. From 1963 to 1967 she was a to death camps, was captured by Israeli forces
professor on the Committee on Social Thought in 1960. Rather than painting a conventional
at the University of Chicago, and from 1967 to portrait of Eichmann as the embodiment of
1975 University Professor of Philosophy at the “radical evil,” Arendt saw him as a “typical”
New School for Social Research. From 1969 to bureaucrat who had dutifully followed orders
1975 she was also an associate fellow of and was the embodiment of “the banality of
Calhoun College of Yale University. In 1967, evil.” Arendt’s broader point was that this
82
ARENDT
type of evil was not necessarily confined to for Social Research, published posthumously
the particularities of the Third Reich, but could as Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy
be found in many societies. (1982). In her final years, she worked on a
Arendt used Eichmann’s trial to point out projected three-volume work, The Life of the
that the Jews themselves were also responsi- Mind. The first two volumes, on “Thinking”
ble for their systematic murder by being lulled and “Willing,” were published posthumously,
into complacency by the “banality of evil.” while the third volume on “Judging” remained
Many Jews mistook the Nazis for just another uncompleted at her death.
wave of anti-Semitism that could be somehow
bribed or appeased. Arendt’s view, which BIBLIOGRAPHY
placed at least some responsibility for the The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York,
Final Solution on the actions of the Jews 1951).
themselves, especially the delusion, fear, and The Human Condition (Chicago, 1958).
selfishness exhibited by many of the Jewish Between Past and Future (London, 1961).
councils (Judenräte), was met with harsh crit- On Revolution (New York, 1962).
icism; it also prompted investigations and Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the
closer scrutiny of the behavior of Jewish com- Banality of Evil (London, 1963).
munities under Nazi occupation. The resul- Men in Dark Times (New York, 1968).
tant scholarship has often reinforced her On Violence (New York, 1970).
unpopular view. By pointing out that the Crisis of the Republic (New York, 1972).
victims of the Final Solution were accountable
for their own inadequate and ill-conceived Other Relevant Works
political action, Arendt also hoped that other Arendt’s papers are in the Library of
people would realize that these horrors could Congress and the German Literary
be repeated under different historical condi- Archive in Marbach, Germany.
tions. She thought that modernity and the “What Is Existenz Philosophy?” Partisan
associated rise of mass society made it difficult Review 8 (Winter 1946): 34–56.
for people to listen to their consciences and Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess,
think clearly through the consequences of trans. Richard Winston and Clara
their actions. In particular, nationalism was Winston (London, 1957).
an impediment to reclaiming the possibilities The Jew as Pariah (New York, 1978).
of freedom grounded in the sense of a shared The Life of the Mind, 2 vols (London,
world. According to Arendt, then, Eichmann 1978).
had done evil not because he was sadistically Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy
anti-Semitic, but because he had failed to (Brighton, UK, 1982).
think through what he was doing (his Hannah Arendt/Karl Jaspers
thoughtlessness). Correspondence, 1926–1969, ed. Lotte
Her articles in the New York Review of Kohler and Hans Saner (New York,
Books in the 1960s and early 1970s continued 1992).
to express her reservations about the new Essays in Understanding, 1930–1954, ed.
world order by criticizing growing American Jerome Kohn (New York, 1994).
military intervention in Vietnam. In particular, Love and Saint Augustine (Chicago, 1996).
she singled out the increasing abuses of exec- The Portable Hannah Arendt, ed. Peter
utive power as further indication of the dan- Baehr (New York, 2000).
gerous imperialism of the presidency. Within Four Walls: The Correspondence
In 1970 Arendt gave her seminar on Kant’s Between Hannah Arendt and Heinrich
philosophy of judgment at the New School Blücher, 1936–1968, trans. Peter
83
ARENDT
Constantine (New York, 2000). Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe, and Jean-Luc

Letters, 1925–1975, Hannah Arendt and Nancy. Retreating the Political (London,
Martin Heidegger, trans. Andrew Shields 1997).
(Orlando, Fla., 2003). Parekh, Bhikhu. Hannah Arendt and the
Search for a New Political Philosophy
Further Reading (London, 1981).
Amer Nat Bio, Bio 20thC Phils, Blackwell Villa, Dana. Arendt and Heidegger: The
Comp Phils, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Fate of the Political (Princeton, N.J.,
Comp Amer Thought, Dict Amer Bio, 1996).
Encyc Ethics, Encyc Social Behav Sci, ———, ed. The Cambridge Companion to
Oxford Comp Phil, Routledge Encycl Arendt (Cambridge, UK, 2000).
Phil, Who Was Who in Amer v6, Women Wolin, Richard. Heidegger’s Children:
Phils Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans
Benhabib, Seyla. The Reluctant Modernism Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse (Princeton,
of Hannah Arendt (London, 1996). N.J., 2001).
Bernstein, Richard J. Philosophical Profiles: Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth. Hannah Arendt:
Essays in a Pragmatic Mode (Cambridge, For Love of the World (New Haven,
UK, 1986). 1982).
Canovan, Margaret. Hannah Arendt: A
Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought Jean Van Delinder
(New York, 1992).
d’Entrèves, Maurizio Passerin. The Political
Philosophy of Hannah Arendt (London,
1994).
Flynn, Bernard. Political Philosophy at the
Closure of Metaphysics (London, 1992). ARMOUR, Leslie (1931– )
Habermas, Jürgen. “Hannah Arendt: On
the Concept of Power,” in Philosophical- Leslie Armour was born on 9 March 1931 in
Political Profiles (London, 1983), pp. New Westminster, British Columbia, Canada.
171–87. He received his BA from the University of
Hill, Melvyn A., ed. Hannah Arendt: The British Columbia in 1952, and his PhD in phi-
Recovery of the Public World (New losophy from the University of London in
York, 1979). Contains a bibliography of 1956. During this time he also worked as a
Arendt’s writings. journalist for provincial and city newspapers in
Hinchman, Lewis P., and Sandra K. both countries. Armour’s teaching career
Hinchman. “In Heidegger’s Shadow: began at the University of Montana, from
Hannah Arendt’s Phenomenological 1957 to 1961. He then taught philosophy at
Humanism,” Review of Politics 46 California State University at Northridge in
(1984): 183–211. 1961–2; the University of Waterloo from 1962
Honig, Bonnie, ed. Feminist Interpretations to 1971; Cleveland State University, where he
of Hannah Arendt (University Park, also served as Dean of Arts, from 1971 to
Penn., 1995). 1977; and finally the University of Ottawa
Kielmansegg, Peter G., Horst Mewes, and from 1977 to 1996. After retiring from Ottawa
Elisabeth Glaser-Schmidt, eds. Hannah he became a research professor at the
Arendt and Leo Strauss: German Emigrés Dominican College of Philosophy and
and American Political Thought after Theology in Ottawa, occasionally offering
World War II (Cambridge, UK, 1995). courses and continuing his research. Professor
84
ARMOUR
Armour became a fellow of the Royal Society can interpret experiences. Truth is better
of Canada in 1998. understood as the success with which one can
During his prolific career Armour has pub- judge what data are relevant and will therefore
lished nine books, over 125 articles and book become the bases of available resources to
chapters, and many book reviews. He has answer one’s questions. Armour worked out
served on the editorial boards of journals on the conditions for the possibility of truth-
the history of philosophy, philosophy of claims in Logic and Reality. Such conditions
religion, philosophy of science, and economics. were not timeless and universal. His dialectical
His publications have concerned all of these logic emphasized the need to grasp multiple
topics and more, including metaphysics, theory schemes and frames of reference. Appealing to
of knowledge, moral philosophy, social and the law of non-contradiction, a favorite move
political philosophy, and the history of on the part of logicians, only works in a world
Canadian philosophy. He has published in where rules and symbols can be separated from
English and French and been an invited experience. Such an appeal does not help us to
speaker (in both languages) at conferences understand the experienced world that we
throughout North America, England, and struggle to express in language.
Europe. Armour became interested in his Canadian
Armour is primarily a metaphysician. His roots and this led to the publication (with his
early books, The Rational and The Real former doctoral student Elizabeth Trott) of
(1962), The Concept of Truth (1969), and The Faces of Reason: An Essay on Philosophy
Logic and Reality (1972), were influenced by and Culture in English-speaking Canada,
nineteenth and twentieth-century idealism. 1850–1950, in 1981. This work, which
However, his work also shows a determination surveys the major philosophers in English-
not to imitate the models of the British neo- speaking Canada, stands as the definitive
Hegelians, but instead to develop a con- resource in the history of Canadian philoso-
sciousness-based metaphysics on his own phy.
terms. Armour defends reason as the tool we In 1992 Armour published Being and Idea:
have for systematizing multiple sensations and Developments of Some Themes in Spinoza and
reflections which are understood to be so Hegel, and in 1993 he published “Infini Rien”:
through our use of language. Experience is the Pascal’s Wager and the Human Paradox.
result of our capacity to select and express our Being and Idea explored the relation between
own particular responses against a background G. W. F. Hegel and Baruch Spinoza. Hegel
of innumerable possible experiences and found the monism of Spinoza suspect, but he
responses. The self is a “tendency to actualize himself also left unsolved problems. Armour
possibility…. The explanation of its activity is extends the idealist metaphysics beyond its
ultimately logical and there is no duality subjective ground by seeking the logical prop-
between it and the world which it ‘experiences’ erties any possible world requires.
since it, too, would be nothing were it not for Armour’s book on Pascal explores the
the experiences which it has. Neither is intel- origins of the “wager,” the seemingly incom-
ligible without the other” (1962, p. 36). mensurable stand-off between the neo-
Armour’s focus on multiple possibilities and Platonists and seventeenth-century skeptics
the need to recognize patterns in and through over the rational grounds for accepting God as
change, led him to discuss truth as answers that a presence in our lives. Armour argues that
accord with systems of thought that have been Pascal’s mission was not to set up the
established. Truth as a measure of perfection, “gamble” but to illustrate with the most
an absolute, is an idea that fails to recognize prominent issue of the day that what it meant
the multiplicity of perspectives with which one to be human was to face our own limitations.
85
ARMOUR
There will be questions that we cannot answer, Goudge, Thomas. “Complex Disguises:
but in conceiving of there being answers to Reason in Canadian Philosophy,”
them we are conceiving of all possible answers, Dialogue 22 (1983): 339–46.
and God, as the source of those answers, is a Stevenson, Jack. “Reasonable Canadians,”
good bet. “The best reason to be interested in Canadian Forum 62 (June–July 1982):
Pascal’s wager, is, surely, that once one under- 31–2.
stands what is at issue there is something to be Sweet, William, ed. Idealism, Metaphysics
said for it – that it helps us to see the options and Community (Aldershot, UK, 2001).
that a reasonable human being ought to Essays in honor of Armour.
consider” (1993, p. 3). Trott, Elizabeth. “Designing Metaphysics,”
in Approaches to Metaphysics, ed.
BIBLIOGRAPHY William Sweet (Dordrecht, 2004), pp.
The Rational and the Real (The Hague, 317–26.
1962). Woodcock, George. “Philosophers, Not
The Concept of Truth (New York, 1969). Kings,” Canadian Literature 94 (Autumn
Logic and Reality (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1982): 164–5.
1980).
The Conceptualization of the Inner Life, Elizabeth Trott
with E. T. Bartlett, III (Atlantic
Highlands, N.J., 1980).
The Faces of Reason: An Essay on
Philosophy and Culture in English-
speaking Canada, 1850–1950, with
Elizabeth Trott (Waterloo, Ontario, ARMSTRONG, Andrew Campbell
1981). (1860–1935)
The Idea of Canada and the Crisis of
Community (Ottawa, 1981). Andrew Campbell Armstrong was born on 22
Being and Idea: Developments of Some August 1860 in New York City, to Andrew
Themes in Spinoza and Hegel Campbell Armstrong and Isabella Johnston
(Hildesheim, Germany, 1992). Sinclair Armstrong. In 1881 he completed his
“Infini-Rien”: Pascal’s Wager and the BA at Princeton University, and was a fellow
Human Paradox (Carbondale, Ill., 1993). of mental science for the subsequent year,
during which he trained in psychology with
Other Relevant Works President James MCCOSH. In 1885 he earned
Ed. with Elizabeth Trott, The Industrial an MA from Princeton Theological Seminary,
Kingdom of God, by John Clark Murray and he studied at the University of Berlin in
(Ottawa, 1982). 1885–6. He returned to Princeton’s Seminary
“The Faces of Reason and Its Critics,” in 1886 as associate professor of ecclesiastical
with Elizabeth Trott, Dialogue 25 (1986): history; in 1887–8 he was an instructor of
105–18. history at Princeton University. In 1888 he
joined the faculty of Wesleyan University in
Further Reading Connecticut as professor of philosophy, and
Burns, Steven. “Canadian Philosophy? The spent the rest of his distinguished career there,
Very Idea!” Dalhousie Review 61 retiring in 1930. Armstrong died on 21
(Summer 1982): 315–20. February 1935 in Middletown, Connecticut.
Elder, Bruce. Image and Identity (Waterloo, An admirable representative of American
Ontario, 1989) intellectuals and the profession of philosophy,
86
ARMSTRONG
Armstrong chaired the Metaphysics Section at common sense is a variable function – such
the St. Louis International Congress of Arts errors are as noteworthy in themselves as they
and Sciences in 1904, served as Honorary are deplorable because of the results to which
Secretary of the Sixth International Congress of they lead” (1916, p. 104).
Philosophy in 1926, and became a member of
the Permanent International Committee for BIBLIOGRAPHY
the International Congress. One of the Transitional Eras in Thought with Special
founding members of the American Reference to the Present Age (New York,
Philosophical Association, he served as its 1904).
President in 1915–16. He received honorary “Individual and Social Ethics,” Journal of
degrees from Wesleyan University of Philosophy 4 (1907): 119–22.
Connecticut (MA 1894, LHD 1930) and from “The Evolution of Pragmatism,” Journal of
Princeton (PhD 1896). Philosophy 5 (1908): 645–50.
Armstrong took a historical approach to the “The Idea of Feeling in Rousseau’s
problems of philosophy, as evidenced in his Religious Philosophy,” Archiv für
early translation of Richard Falckenberg’s Geschichte der Philosophie 24 (1911):
History of Modern Philosophy from Nicolas of 242–60.
Cusa to the Present Time (1893). In addition “The Progress of Evolution,” Journal of
to his publications in philosophical journals, he Philosophy 9 (1912): 337–42.
published Transitional Eras in Thought with “Bergson, Berkeley, and Philosophical
Special Reference to the Present Age (1904). In Intuition,” Philosophical Review 23
his memorial to Armstrong, Cornelius F. Krusé (1914): 430–38.
wrote, “Historical studies … were not ends in “The Principle of International Ethics,”
themselves for him, but became primarily Journal of Philosophy 12 (1915): 17–22.
means of orientation in the turbulence of “Philosophy and Common Sense,”
modern life.” Philosophical Review 25 (1916): 103–20.
Armstrong’s desire to address life’s problems “Philosophy and Political Theory,” Journal
with philosophy was evident in his ambas- of Philosophy 16 (1919): 421–8.
sadorial efforts (especially his postwar chair- “Kant’s Philosophy of Peace and War,”
manship, from 1916 to 1927, of the American Journal of Philosophy 28 (1931):
Philosophical Association’s Committee on 197–204.
International Cooperation) and in writings “Fichte’s Conception of a League of
that stressed the need to heal the rift between Nations,” Journal of Philosophy 29
common sense and philosophy. To take one (1932): 153–8.
example, in “Philosophy and Common Sense,” “Hegel’s Attitude on War and Peace,”
Armstrong’s 1915 presidential address, he said, Journal of Philosophy 30 (1933): 684–9.
“When philosophy overlooks the fact that
common experience supplies it with primary Other Relevant Works
data for its own activity; when it forgets that Trans., History of Modern Philosophy from
its explanatory force with reference to experi- Nicolas of Cusa to the Present Time, by
ence forms a principal criterion of its value; Richard Falckenberg (New York, 1893).
and, on the other hand, when common sense
denies the metaphysics implicit in its own con- Further Reading
victions; that there should be no realization of Pres Addr of APA v2, Proc of APA in Phil
the contributions which philosophy makes to Rev v45, Who Was Who in Amer v1
common sense; above all, that men should
lack the knowledge – or reject it – that David Hildebrand
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ARNHEIM
ARNHEIM, Rudolf (1904– ) interaction with that world. The meeting

ground was in the perceiver’s brain, where
Rudolf Arnheim was born on 15 July 1904 in holistic physical principles guided the isomor-
Berlin, Germany, the son of a piano manufac- phic formation of perceptual states. It was an
turer. At the University of Berlin he studied updated Spinozistic view of the world.
experimental psychology, philosophy, and the The experiments of Wertheimer, Köhler,
history of art and music. While Arnheim and Kurt KOFFKA – the three founders of
attended the lectures on aesthetics of Max Gestalt psychology – understood perception
Dessoir in Berlin, he was drawn to the newest upon a field metaphor. The percept is formed
results of Gestalt psychology and worked by the mutual interaction throughout the field.
closely with Wolfgang KÖHLER and Max Thus Gestalt psychology was inherently anti-
WERTHEIMER, the latter being the director of sensationalist. The doctrine of sense data was
his dissertation (PhD 1928) on the expressive- never accepted and instead a search was made
ness of visual form. In spite of his experimen- for an explanation of perceived forms.
tal work, Arnheim became a journalist and Arnheim’s dissertation extended this analysis
probably would not have entered academia into the realm of expressive form. Expression
save for his emigration to Italy in 1933 and was demonstrated to be radically context
then the United States in 1940. In 1943 he dependent, as different forms were embedded
became a professor of psychology at Sarah in different contexts (a nose on a head, for
Lawrence College and also taught on the example) and took on new expressive qualities.
graduate faculty of the New School for Social This did not discount the intersubjective reality
Research until 1968. He then went to Harvard of expression, but instead outlined in a scien-
University as a professor of the psychology of tific way how it lawfully arose.
art. Arnheim served twice as the President of Arnheim’s early works like Film as Art
the American Society of Aesthetics (1959–60, (1932) and Radio as Art (1938) emerged from
1979–80). He retired in 1974 and moved to his work as a journalist in Berlin and his fas-
Ann Arbor, Michigan, where he was visiting cination with these new media. Still, there is
professor in the history of art department at nothing journalistic about these works which
the University of Michigan. can be likened to observing the essence of film
Arnheim was an orthodox adherent to and radio in the manner that Roman Ingarden
Gestalt psychology his entire life and never investigated the literary work of art. The
strayed from its principles and promise. What language is not philosophically technical, as it
attracted him was the expectation of a natu- is in Ingarden, yet the result is similar. Later,
ralistic scientific theory that could do justice to the emergence of talking cinema and
human values. The image of humanity, Arnheim’s profound disappointment with the
demonstrated first by perceptual experiments results caused him to write “A New Laocoön”
and then more tangibly in social psychology, (1938/1957), an investigation of the mixture of
suggested that individuals naturally search different artistic media according to aesthetic
after meaning, truth, and understanding. laws. In these early works Arnheim combined
People perceive meaningful, value-filled whole the firsthand knowledge of art with deep
entities, called gestalten. These make up the reflection on theoretical possibilities.
basis of experience, and scientific psychology Arnheim’s stance in these works was that
ought not to distort this fact. But more than a science (psychology) would be the fastest
phenomenological revision of psychology, the vehicle to understanding this essence rather
naturalism of Gestalt theory stated that the than the techniques of Husserl’s phenomenol-
world itself was formed by the action of struc- ogy, a sentiment much like that in Köhler’s The
tural physical laws that aided the human’s Place of Value in a World of Facts (1938).
88
ARNHEIM
Scientific results on illusory movement and critical realism is partly perplexing but was
various effects (induced movement, etc.) regarded as the necessary concession to the
pointed to film’s limitations and best results. facts of phenomenal reality and their genetic
Arnheim’s aesthetics was born of a critical source in brain processes. While the position
attitude that presumed that the aesthetician was barely represented while Arnheim was
could only rely so much on analysis or intro- writing, it is now quite popular in various
spection. brands of emergent materialism.
It is against this background that Arnheim Visual forms were created by the field-like
faced the task of creating a true Gestalt psy- action of the visual system to produce the
chology of art after his emigration to America, simplest visual percept. This had far-reaching
entry into academia, and the death of his consequences for interpretation because these
mentor, Wertheimer – all during World War II. images – representing stable poles of brain
While Arnheim and his teachers were from an activity that could subsume a large number of
intensely artistic background, there were no similar stimulus situations – preserved gener-
precedents for the young professor as he ality. The ability to subsume particulars under
embarked on his work. Two important papers generalities blurs the distinction between seeing
introduced Arnheim’s emerging position and knowing. We perceive what is necessary to
against the background of mid-century behav- survive. There is no problem of solipsism due
iorism, “Perceptual Abstraction in Art” (1947) to the economy of the senses, as there is in
and “A Gestalt Theory of Expression” (1949), other theories, because the world also operates
both collected in Toward a Psychology of Art on economic processes. Thus, the world breaks
(1966). The first dealt with an imputation of off into holistic forms and it should be no
cognitive abstraction to perception, a now- surprise that our percepts register these forms.
familiar theme, and the second sought a natu- Art, for that matter, ought to deal in essentials,
ralistic explanation of visual expression and so Arnheim removed art’s reliance on
through the stresses and strains in the optical figures. Just as there is no separation between
medium in the act of perceiving. seeing and knowing, forms can convey the
After World War II Arnheim produced his basics of expression without the particulars.
classic text, Art and Visual Perception: A Furthermore, this has consequences for inter-
Psychology of the Creative Eye (1954/1974). pretation. For example, when a child draws a
Now he enunciated a more general psychology tadpole, a round circle with lines emerging
of the visual arts, bolstered by the hopeful from it, we cannot impute a particular identity
results of Köhler’s latest brain research. to this circle (head, tail, etc.) because the gen-
Arnheim outlined many different themes in erality of the form does not allow it.
this central book of his, and they may be Arnheim’s discussion of expression followed
broken down into a few elementary problems: the theory from “A Gestalt Theory of
(1) a critical realist approach to epistemology; Expression.” Arnheim ingeniously saw expres-
(2) belief in the abstracting ability of the senses; sion as the other side of the coin of the
and (3) a naturalistic explanation of pictorial economy of perceiving. In settling on a stable
expression. percept, certain strains and stresses would arise
Gestalt naturalism presumed the relevance in the discrepancy between the most econom-
of neuropsychological work for perceptual and ical outcome and the stimulus input, and these
aesthetic problems. However, Arnheim strains would be the cause of the perceived
balanced the causal foundation of perception tension that would ultimately give rise to the
in brain processes against the incorrigibility expressive content of the percept. Arnheim’s
of the senses in the delicate balancing act that solution remains as controversial as the brain
is common to Gestalt theory. This form of doctrine upon which it is based, but it repre-
89
ARNHEIM
sented the hope of a naturalistic bridge new position at Harvard. If the senses were
between ordinary perceiving and the rise of intelligent in the sense that elementary acts of
expression. perceiving contained abstraction, this was a
Arnheim continued to work against the rep- quality inherent to every act of perception.
utation of his teachers (Köhler died in 1967), Seeking to represent the dynamic movement of
never content with alternative philosophical thought in individual creative acts, however,
views. In the 1950s his essay “The Robin and Arnheim sharpened earlier insights (including
the Saint” (1966), a brilliant discussion of the Wertheimer’s own) into the imaginistic
ontology of images, was inspired by his reading elements of productive thinking, and specified
of Heidegger. Arnheim treated the level of the contribution made by vision. These insights
abstraction of images, seeking to show how the began in an early attempt to rehabilitate
generic quality of some abstract images does mental images into psychological study and
not support certain particular interpretations, then Arnheim’s next major work, Visual
and vice versa, other concrete images do not Thinking (1969).
support generic interpretations. The backyard, Arnheim’s basic thesis was that spatial rela-
stylized statue of St. Francis and the life-like tions are the true language of thought. This
bird decoy Arnheim discussed were quite dif- was not only a psychological point; in reha-
ferent. One could not say that Francis bilitating vision, art is placed at the center of
appeared angry, in the same way the bird did cognitive activity as one of the most distin-
not represent birdness. The abstract image guished examples of thought. The mind,
Arnheim called a self image, in the sense that Arnheim reasoned, needs sensuous images in
it had reference to the object it represented, but order to make productive strides. To under-
because it was so abstract, possessed a strong stand a logical rule such as “if all A are con-
objective quality of its own. At the other end tained in B, and if C is contained in A, then C
of the spectrum were likenesses, images which must also be contained in B,” we effect a per-
only have meaning by reference to another ceptual judgment based on a spatial recon-
object in all its individuality and do not stand struction of inclusion. The Euler diagram we
alone as objects on their own. construct to aid our reasoning actually shows
While inspired by Heidegger, such talk was what is said logically. Although Arnheim never
actually closer to Roman Ingarden’s ontology cited the commonality, some of his observa-
of aesthetic objects, which holds that works tions could be discussed in relation to Charles
of art possess only the determinacies which Sanders PEIRCE’s existential logic. What this
the artist has intentionally projected in the priority to vision presumed was a distrust or
work. What for Ingarden is a formal onto- qualification of the importance of language.
logical argument is for Arnheim an intuitive Arnheim traced the opposite tendency of lin-
point, argued with the problem of interpre- guistic reductionism back to Humboldt, and
tation (which Ingarden kept quite separate) had in mind the SAPIR-WHORF theory and
never far behind. The demand that abstrac- behaviorism when he wrote, but his thoughts
tion and the generic were positive qualities would mark his position as the “Linguistic
contained a reaffirmation of Locke’s position, Turn” continued throughout the 1970s and
against which Berkeley and much of Western 1980s. A school of Gestalt linguistics has lent
philosophy would take issue, a point also support to Arnheim’s position based on an
made by Arnheim’s contemporary Maurice underlying imaginistic grammar that semantic
MANDELBAUM. meaning depends upon underlying spatial
With his psychological theories fully con- grammatical structures.
solidated, Arnheim’s ideas turned in a new Arnheim even attempted to reconceptualize
direction, around the time that he took his the very meaning of symbolism based on
90
ARNHEIM
abstraction. In his remarkable definitions (once one vertical vector, but depending on its cen-
again recalling Peirce), a sign is an image tricity also a center. The vectoral quality gives
“which stands for a particular content without it a sharp directionality and the center a quality
reflecting its characteristics visually” (1969, of a unit. The verticality is counteracted,
p. 136); images are pictures “to the extent to depending on the style of work, by the
which they portray things located at a lower slumping concession to gravity of the figure.
level of abstractness than they are themselves” The head, and any other objects that take on
(1969, p. 137); and a symbol “portrays things a centric substantiality, become compositional
which are at a higher level of abstractness than subcenters in their own right and challenge
is the symbol itself” (1969, p. 138). This is the major center for perceptual (in this case,
once again a set of distinctions that is wholly visual) interest. The relationships between the
perceptual in its foundation, and contra Peirce, vertical and centric qualities, their varying
denies any Aristotelian taxonomy based on emphases, explain the mode of existence the
logical (linguistic) principles. It is an open artist is trying to communicate. Part of the
question to which degree Arnheim made visual plausibility of Arnheim’s theory derives from
thinking depend on actual vision. There is the tendency of viewers to identify with centers
some ambiguity about whether or not the of action in works of art as human-like quali-
salient dimension is vision or spatiality. In the ties of agency. Therefore, there is no require-
German edition, he translated visual as ment of the theory that recognizable objects be
Anschauliches, and this addresses some objec- represented.
tions of making thought too much a visual When The Power of the Center appeared in
and less a perceptual affair. 1982, the title could only be perceived as
Arnheim continued to publish sets of essays provocative in the current theoretical climate
until recently. However, his last great work of postmodernism. Arnheim admitted that
was The Power of the Center: A Study of “our terms have profound philosophical,
Composition in the Visual Arts (1982/1988). mystical, and social connotations” (1998, p.
The book was a natural extension of his earlier ix). Naturally, Arnheim would have believed
Art and Visual Perception but based on an that what he argued about the existence of
important new discovery: a basic syntax for centricity in artistic composition could also be
pictorial composition based on the relationship applied to metaphysics of the larger world.
of centric systems and the eccentric tensions But even though Arnheim was not above con-
that derive from their interactions. All works demnations of what he perceived as critical
of art, whether representational or not, could irrationalism, the book was more than a reac-
be reduced to systems of centers of expanding tionary protest against aesthetic nihilism. It
vectors. The milling centers of a work of art, argued the common sense point of view that
in addition, always have a balancing center some theory of perceptual composition would
that gives the work legibility and finality, hence have to be articulated, no matter what larger
the “power of the center.” Arnheim’s reason- theoretical commitments we might wish to
ing updated the tendency of Gestalt theorists to develop. Arnheim regarded as naïve the claim
work from field metaphors. Vectors, force, that centricity could be overridden in some
and so forth bring to mind the metaphysical sense. It could be argued that certain works of
monism of Gestaltism and the hope to link all art, like the paintings of Piet Mondrian or the
phenomena together under common underly- buildings of Giuseppe Terragni, frustrate
ing principles. centered readings and destabilize meanings.
Overlaid over freely interacting centers is However, Arnheim argued that centricity (the
the anisotropy of gravity. To sketch an formation of a unit) is the very condition of
example, a standing statue of a man is mostly perception, so it is senseless to think we can
91
ARNHEIM
cancel it. Whatever else they are, Mondrian’s aesthetics has not always been possible to assess
and Terragni’s works are units, so their because of differences in presentation and
meaning is precisely challenging centricity language. Nevertheless, once the hasty rejec-
within centricity. tion of what is perceived as his naïve or reac-
Arnheim’s concession to a modicum of foun- tionary realism is overcome, his brand of critical
dationalism suggested that art itself might not and relationalist realism can be appreciated.
resist definition. Arnheim called art “the ability
of perceptual objects or actions, either natural BIBLIOGRAPHY
or man-made, to represent, through their “Experimentell-psychologische
appearance, constellations of forces that reflect Untersuchungen zum Ausdrucksproblem,”
relevant aspects of the dynamics of human expe- Psychologische Forschung 11 (1928): 2–132.
rience” (1988, p. 225). It seems possible that this Film als Kunst (Berlin, 1932). Trans. L. M.
open-ended definition can be radicalized even Sieveking and Ian Morrow as Film (London,
further than Arnheim thought. Arnheim has 1933); the first half was repr. as Film as Art
been accused of an inability to accommodate (Berkeley, Cal., 1957).
postretinal art that has moved beyond the Rundfunk als Hörkunst (Munich, 1979).
canvas into conceptual, minimalist and ironic Trans. Mary Ludwig and Herbert Read as
appropriative directions. But if the constella- Radio (London, 1936); repr. as Radio: An
tions of forces are expanded beyond the confines Art of Sound (New York, 1971).
of the picture (or building, etc.) to include the “Nuovo Laocoonte,” Bianco e Nero (31
acts of the artists and conceptual information in August 1938): 3–33. Trans. Rudolf Arnheim
the human sphere, there is no reason that such as “A New Laocoön: Artistic Composites
a definition of art after postmodernism could and the Talking Film,” in Film as Art
not be entertained. (London, 1958), pp. 164–89. The original
In the case of The Power of the Center, German manuscript, “Neuer Laokoon: Die
Arnheim’s theoretical realism is clear but one is Verkoppelung der künstlerischen Mittel,” in
left to relate the theory to more contemporary Helmut Diederichs Kritiken und Aufsätze
debates. Since the foundational essays of the zum Film (Munich, 1977), pp. 81–112.
1950s and 1960s, there has not been a direct Art and Visual Perception: A Psychology of the
engagement with alternative theoretical per- Creative Eye (Berkeley, Cal., 1954; 1974).
spectives. Even the relationship to theoretical Toward a Psychology of Art: Collected
alternatives with which Arnheim sometimes Essays (Berkeley, Cal., 1966).
seems to share much – the phenomenology of Visual Thinking (Berkeley, Cal., 1969).
Ingarden, the analytic theories of Monroe Entropy and Art: An Essay on Disorder and
B EARDSLEY – are not really worked out. Order (Berkeley, Cal., 1971).
Arnheim’s later works are beautiful essays full The Dynamics of Architectural Form
of deep aesthetic observations but lacking the (Berkeley, Cal., 1977).
parrying and dissection of contemporary The Power of the Center: A Study of
analytic aesthetics. This does not diminish them Composition in the Visual Arts (Berkeley,
as sources of profound aesthetic observation, Cal., 1982; 1988).
but it requires that one be prepared to work New Essays on the Psychology of Art
along with an acute mind as various ideas (Berkeley, Cal., 1986).
embedded in an internal system are discussed. To the Rescue of Art: Twenty Six Essays
Arnheim presently has a mixed legacy. An (Berkeley, Cal., 1992).
established historical figure in film theory and The Split and the Structure: Twenty Eight
the most famous proponent of psychological Essays (Berkeley, Cal., 1996).
aesthetics, the importance of his theories for
92
ARROW
Further Reading University from 1949 to 1968; at Harvard

Bio Dict Psych, Cam Dict Amer Bio University from 1968 to 1979; and again at
Arnheim, Mary. Rudolf Arnheim: Stanford from 1979 until his retirement in
Bibliography of his Writings, 1928–1982 1991. He has won numerous awards, includ-
(Ann Arbor, Mich., 1983). The ing the John Bates Clark Medal in 1957, the
1983–1990 Supplement was added in John von Neumann Theory Prize in 1986,
1991. and most notably, the Nobel Prize in
Beardsley, Monroe. “The Role of Economics in 1972.
Psychological Explanation in Aesthetics,” Arrow’s contributions to economics and
in Perceiving Artworks (Philadelphia, related fields are many; they concern such
1980), pp. 185–212. topics as social welfare, production and
Carrier, David. “Theoretical Perspectives on growth, mathematical programming, optimal
the Arts, Sciences and Technology,” public policy, and general equilibrium theory.
Leonardo 19 (1986): 251–4. However, his renown among philosophers
Kleinman, Kent, and Lesley van Duzen, eds. stems from just one of those contributions: his
Rudolf Arnheim: Revealing Vision (Ann “impossibility theorem,” which he defends in
Arbor, Mich., 1997). his classic book, Social Choice and Individual
Sowers, Robert. Rethinking the Forms of Values (1951). This theorem has disturbing
Visual Expression (Berkeley, Cal., 1990). implications for the feasibility of basing social
Smith, Ralph, ed. “Essays in Honor of choices (such as the choice of a government
Rudolf Arnheim,” Journal of Aesthetic official) on the aggregation of individual pref-
Education 27 (1993): 1–189. erences; for example, on the aggregation of
Verstegen, Ian. “The Thought, Life, and Ann’s, Stan’s, and Dan’s personal rankings
Influence of Rudolf Arnheim,” Genetic, of the candidates, where Ann, Stan, and Dan
Social and General Psychological constitute the relevant social body. Arrow
Monographs 122 (1996): 197–213. demonstrates that we can find no procedure
for doing this: there is no “aggregation
Ian Verstegen device,” which meets certain reasonable, weak
conditions on such procedures. Those five
conditions are the following:
The Ordering condition. For each set of
coherent (i.e., transitive and complete) indi-
vidual preference orderings of a set of alter-
ARROW, Kenneth Joseph (1921– ) natives, an acceptable aggregation device
yields a unique, coherent social ordering of
Kenneth Arrow was born on 23 August those alternatives.
1921 in New York City. In 1940 he received The Unrestricted Scope condition. An
a BSS degree from the City College of New aggregation device must generate a social
York, and in 1941 an MA in mathematics ordering no matter how many citizens exist,
from Columbia University. He served as a no matter how many options the citizens are
weather officer in the US Army from 1942 considering, and no matter how each citizen
until 1946, and then continued his graduate ranks the options.
work at Columbia, receiving his PhD in eco- The Pareto Optimality condition. An
nomics in 1951. His first faculty position aggregation device must respect unanimity.
was teaching economics at the University of If every individual prefers alternative A to B,
Chicago in 1948–9. Arrow has since been then A must rank higher than B in the social
professor of economics at Stanford ordering of the alternatives.
93
ARROW
The Nondictatorship condition. An aggre- Feiwel, George R., ed. Arrow and the
gation device must not identify the social Ascent of Economic Theory (New York,
ordering of any set of alternatives with a par- 1987).
ticular individual ordering. In other words, “Kenneth J. Arrow,” in Lives of the
there is no citizen whose individual ranking of Laureates, 3rd edn, ed. William Breit and
a set of alternatives constitutes the social Roger W. Spencer (Cambridge, Mass.,
ordering of those alternatives, regardless of 1995).
the preferences of the other citizens. Mackay, Alfred F. Arrow’s Theorem: The
The Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Paradox of Social Choice (New Haven,
condition. In ordering two alternatives A and Conn., 1980).
B, an aggregation device must take into Saari, Donald. Decisions and Elections:
account no individual preference orderings Explaining the Unexpected (Cambridge,
of alternatives other than A and B. Also, in UK, 2001).
taking into account the individual preference
orderings of A and B, nothing is to count but John J. Tilley
the order in which A and B are ranked by the
relevant individuals.
Arrow’s impossibility theorem can now be
stated in this way: if the alternatives consid-
ered by a social group are at least three in
number, no aggregation device meets all five ATWATER, Lyman Hotchkiss (1813–83)
of the above conditions. Every such device,
including majority rule and the Borda Count, Lyman Hotchkiss Atwater was born on 20
violates at least one of these conditions. February 1813 in New Haven, Connecticut,
the son of Lyman Atwater and Clarissa
BIBLIOGRAPHY Hotchkiss. He was influenced early on by the
Social Choice and Individual Values (New preaching of Nathaniel William Taylor. He
York, 1951; 2nd edn 1963). entered Yale University at age fourteen, and in
General Competitive Analysis, with Frank 1831 had a profound conversion experience
H. Hahn (San Francisco, 1971). during a revival at the college. Following his
The Limits of Organization (New York, graduation with a BA in 1831 he taught for a
1974). year at Mount Hope Seminary in Baltimore,
and then returned to Yale Divinity School. In
Other Relevant Works 1835 he settled at the First Congregational
Collected Papers of Kenneth J. Arrow, 6 Church in Fairfield and married Susan
vols (Cambridge, Mass., 1983–5). Sanford, with whom he had five children.
During his tenure as pastor Atwater made
Further Reading explicit his objections to Taylor’s New
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Oxford Comp Divinity, especially its embrace of the excesses
Phil of revivalism and its rejection of divine power
Barry, Brian, and Russell Hardin, eds. over human will. He published frequently in
Rational Man and Irrational Society? Literary and Theological Review, The Biblical
(London, 1982). Repertory, The Princeton Review, and other
Chichilnisky, Graciela, ed. Markets, journals.
Information, and Uncertainty: Essays in Due to his clear articulation of Calvinism he
Economic Theory in Honor of Kenneth J. was appointed professor of mental and moral
Arrow (Cambridge, UK, 1999). philosophy at Princeton College in 1854,
94
ATWATER
where he taught courses on the correlation of A Manual of Elementary Logic

revealed religion and metaphysics. Atwater (Philadelphia, 1867).
served as co-editor of The Princeton Review “The Labor Question in its Economic and
from 1869 to 1878, contributing 110 articles Christian Aspects,” Presbyterian
on many subjects including theology, educa- Quarterly and Princeton Review 1 (July
tion, ethics, spirituality, economics, philoso- 1872): 468–95.
phy, and politics. During the academic year “The Late Commercial Crisis,” Presbyterian
1868–9 he served as interim President of Quarterly and Princeton Review 3 (1874):
Princeton. On the naming of James MCCOSH 106–19.
as President, Atwater became professor of “Taxation of Churches, Colleges and
logic, metaphysics, ethics, economics, and Charitable Institutions,” Presbyterian
politics in 1869, holding this position until his Quarterly and Princeton Review 3 (April
death. During his tenure at Princeton, in 1874): 340–48.
addition to teaching, Atwater served as an “Calvinism in Doctrine and Life,”
effective administrator. He conceived and con- Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton
ducted a campaign in 1862 that raised Review 4 (January 1875): 73–106.
$140,000 for endowment, and he served on a “Morality, Religion, and Education in the
committee in 1869 to reunite Old School and State,” Princeton Review 1 (March 1878):
New School Presbyterians. Atwater also taught 395–422.
philosophy and ethics at Princeton Seminary, “Religion and Politics,” in Report of
and he served on the board of trustees and as Proceedings of the General Council of the
Vice President of the seminary from 1877 until Presbyterian Alliance (Philadelphia, 1880).
his death. Atwater died on 17 February 1883 “Christian Morality, Expediency, and
in Princeton, New Jersey. Liberty,” Princeton Review 7 (January
Atwater’s most enduing contribution was 1881): 61–82.
A Manual of Elementary Logic (1867), which
became a standard text in many colleges. He Further Reading
defended Old School Calvinism vigorously Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
during a period of liberalization in American Dict Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v12
Protestantism. While at Fairfield he led an Porter, Noah, James McCosh, and William
unsuccessful effort to bring theological charges A. Taylor. Addresses Delivered at the
against Horace BUSHNELL. Atwater was a keen Funeral of Lyman Hotchkiss Atwater
observer of the American spiritual landscape, (New York, 1883).
and he argued for the significance of economic Smith, Gary Scott. The Seeds of
issues and for the need for a religious basis for Secularization: Calvinism, Culture and
legislation. Pluralism, 1870–1915 (St. Paul, Minn.,
1989).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
“The Power of Contrary Choice,” Biblical Roger Ward
Repertory and Princeton Review 12
(October 1840): 532–49.
“The Doctrinal Attitude of Old School
Presbyterians,” Bibliotheca Sacra 21
(January 1864): 81–112.
“Herbert Spencer’s Philosophy,” Biblical
Repertory and Princeton Review 37 (April
1865): 243–71.
95
AUBERY
AUBREY, Edwin Ewart (1896–1956) ological renaissance that “handed out musty
traditional language meant to warm hearts in
Edwin E. Aubrey was born on 19 March 1896 place of addressing serious issues that the non-
in Glasgow, Scotland. He emigrated to the theologian layperson faced.” In Secularism, A
United States at age seventeen. He became a Myth (1954), Aubrey offered an apologetic for
naturalized citizen in 1918, after having served a humanistic Christian faith, which he saw as
in World War I with the United States a viable alternative to neo-orthodoxy at mid
Ambulance Service in France and Italy. Aubrey century. Aubrey insisted on avoiding the polar
earned his B.Phil. degree from Bucknell opposites of rationalism and naturalism, and of
University in 1919, and his MA (1921), BD dogmatism and supernaturalism, seeking to
(1922), and PhD in religious education (1926) create and then to embrace a middle way for
from the University of Chicago. Aubrey then the church. In making his arguments against the
taught at Carleton College, Miami University of easy attack on secularism, Aubrey stood against
Ohio, and Vassar College. From 1929 to 1944, many of his theological colleagues.
he served as professor of Christian theology For Aubrey, an unintended consequence of
and ethics at the University of Chicago. He modernity was the realization that putting too
was President of Crozer Theological Seminary much faith in science was no better than putting
in Chester, Pennsylvania from 1944 to 1949. In too much faith in the Bible or dogmatic
1949 he established the Department of theology. A balance among these could help to
Religious Thought at the University of bridge the gap between science and religion. He
Pennsylvania, where he served as professor and contended that knowledge should not become
chairman of the department until his death on an end in itself, but serve the ends of human
10 September 1956 in Philadelphia, improvement. Science and religion needed each
Pennsylvania. other, and he believed theology offered
At Pennsylvania, Aubrey taught theology resources that could be particularly helpful in
and history courses, such as “Theology of bringing them together. Religion could save
Christian Mysticism,” “The Christian science, but not in the way fundamentalist
Conception of Man,” “Church and State in Christians might have imagined. At mid
Contemporary Thought,” and “Christianity century, he suspected the national “turn toward
and Democracy.” His philosophical writings religion” was superficial and misguided, but
expressed his hope for the renewal of both understandable given fears about nihilism and
church and college through the examination communism.
of Christian theology and ethics. He primar- During the Cold War, Aubrey wondered
ily addressed issues of secularization, religion, aloud why morals, values, and religious insights
and higher education, specialization, and the were not welcome in the university, noting that
necessary decline of Protestant sectarianism. astronomy had not been removed from the
Aubrey was a national Protestant educational curriculum just because a large number of
leader, consulting with numerous colleges, people believe in astrology. Aubrey’s mediating
universities, and churches while on the lecture position was criticized from both sides. To
and preaching circuit. He participated in the those religious leaders who wanted Protestant
influential conferences and foundations of Christianity to be powerful once again, Aubrey
the day, including the Science, Philosophy, seemed to be an anti-dogmatist; for those
and Religion Conference in New York with philosophers who refused to give the super-
Mortimer ADLER and Albert EINSTEIN during natural realm any foothold in modern life, he
World War II. appeared too religious or moralistic.
In Living the Christian Faith (1939), Aubrey
reinforced his attack on the neo-orthodox the-
96
AUDI
BIBLIOGRAPHY in 1996, and Charles J. Mach University

Religion and the Next Generation (New Professor in 2001. Audi joined the faculty of
York, 1931). the University of Notre Dame in 2003 as pro-
Present Theological Tendencies (New York, fessor of philosophy and David E. Gallo
1936). Professor of Business Ethics. He has received
Living the Christian Faith (New York, 1939). numerous fellowships, lectureships, consul-
Man’s Search for Himself (Nashville, Tenn., tantships, and other honors, in the United
1940). States and abroad. In 1987–8 he served as
Secularism, A Myth: An Examination of the President of the American Philosophical
Current Attack on Secularism (New York, Association Central Division. In 1995 he was
1954). awarded an honorary doctorate in social
Humanistic Teaching and the Place of science by the University of Helsinki.
Ethical and Religious Values in Higher Audi is a leading figure in contemporary
Education (Philadelphia, 1959). epistemology, a major contributor to action
theory and political philosophy, and probably
Other Relevant Works the leading ethical intuitionist since W. D.
Aubrey’s papers are at the University of Ross. He has also made important contribu-
Pennsylvania. tions to applied ethics and the philosophies of
mind, religion, science, law, and education. A
Further Reading tireless instigator of philosophical dialogue,
Nat Cycl Amer Bio v42, Who Was Who in his influence reaches beyond the world of pro-
Amer v3, Who’s Who in Phil fessional philosophy. He contributes to legal
Schneider, Herbert W. “Natural Thought and education journals and, in his capacity as
and the World of Religion,” Journal of general editor of the Cambridge Dictionary of
Philosophy 14 (1951): 66–73. Philosophy, he has done much to promote
philosophical literacy among the interested
Robert Wilson-Black public.
Perhaps Audi’s most important work to date
is The Architecture of Reason (2001). This
brings together his already influential, central
work in epistemology, ethics, and action
theory to form a unified theory of rationality.
AUDI, Robert Nemir (1941– ) He articulates the account by systematically
developing parallels between theoretical and
Robert Audi was born on 19 November 1941 practical reason. Although neither sort of
in New York City. He earned his BA in 1963 reason reduces to the other, they are informa-
from Colgate University. He then earned his tively analogous. Structurally, both have foun-
PhD in 1967 from the University of Michigan, dations and superstructures. Both are ulti-
where he wrote his dissertation on “The mately responsive, and responsible, to experi-
Explanation of Human Action in Common ence. At the foundational level the former are
Sense and Psychology” under the direction of capable of evaluations according to their cog-
William P. ALSTON. From 1967 to 1972 he nitive, the latter according to their conative
taught philosophy at the University of Texas. (understood largely in terms of felt reward and
For the next thirty years, from 1973 to 2003, punishment), adequacy to the experiences
he taught at the University of Nebraska, where which causally engender and evidentially
he rose from full professor in 1976 to Charles ground them. At the inferential level, or within
J. Mach Distinguished Professor of Philosophy the superstructures, further analogies between
97
AUDI
inferential beliefs and intentional actions intuitionism with many of the most important
emerge. Both are grounded in the reasons that epistemic features of moral epistemic “reflec-
sustain them. Rational belief is the “connective tionism.” This moral epistemology is the view
tissue” that produces ordered relations that (1) one’s moral beliefs become more jus-
between theoretical and practical reason. tified as one approaches reflective equilibrium,
Reason, then, is no “slave of the passions,” as a state of coherence among one’s moral beliefs
in Humean instrumentalist accounts. The at all levels of generality, and (2) justification
result of successful theoretical reasoning is, at no level of generality is privileged in such a
like a good map, “true to the territory it rep- way as to automatically trump justification at
resents”; and the result of successful practical other levels. His more general work on self-
reasoning will, like a good itinerary, deliver the evidence and the a priori (and in the philoso-
rewarding experiences it promises. Global phy of mind) informs his sophisticated account
rationality combines mutually interdependent of the psychological and epistemic nature of
successes of both kinds. moral intuition; and his moderate founda-
Audi’s theory has important normative tionalism facilitates his synthesis of intuition-
implications. For instance, it entails that, given ism, which, in its most plausible forms, entails
certain normal beliefs and desires, altruistic foundationalism, and reflectionism, which is
acts are sometimes reasonably, although not often (but wrongly, he argues) thought to
rationally, required. He distinguishes many entail coherentism.
varieties of relativism, and argues that, while An important source for Audi’s moral epis-
his theory is compatible with a wide variety of temology, and his other major contributions to
circumstantially and temperamentally variable ethical theory, is his Moral Knowledge and
ends, it does not entail any strong sort of epis- Ethical Character (1997). In ethics, his expe-
temic or ethical relativism. rientialism and pluralism are particularly
Audi’s considerable contributions to episte- important and basic. Experientialism is the
mology, which inform his account of theoret- view that experiences, and only experiences,
ical reason, are most comprehensively articu- are intrinsically valuable. Apart from experi-
lated and defended in The Structure of ence of them, real, unexperienced things, like
Justification (1993). Audi develops and beautiful mountain ranges on unvisited
defends a moderate foundationalist account planets, have “inherent” value, (roughly) the
of epistemic justification, which concedes the potential to be constituents in valuable expe-
fallibility and defeasibility of justified beliefs at riences. His pluralism affirms belief in an irre-
even the foundational level, and affords a ducible variety of kinds of intrinsically valuable
strong (but dependent) epistemic significance experiences, and it provides the grounds for his
to coherence. Of particular importance are the rejection of hedonism and his rejection of
distinctions which lead to his highly original moral theories in which rightness consists in
accounts of how coherence can affect justifi- merely optimizing or maximizing what is
cation at all levels within a foundationalist intrinsically valuable. Audi has also done
structure and how knowledge can have both important work on the analysis of central
internalist and externalist features. He is also moral concepts, such as goodness, rightness,
well known in epistemology for his work on and virtue, and their relations.
self-evidence and the a priori (he defends a Audi’s The Good in the Right: A Theory of
moderate rationalism), sense perception (he Intuition and Intrinsic Value (2004) contains
defends an adverbial account), testimony, the the most developed account of his intuitionism,
concept of belief, naturalism, and skepticism. and provides a sophisticated history and
Audi is a leading moral epistemologist. His critical taxonomy of intuitionisms. It intro-
moral epistemology combines a neo-Rossian duces an original neo-Kantian normative
98
AUDI
theory which, despite its Kantian leanings, gious epistemology, particularly his account
allows significant relevance to the optimization of rational faith and his work on the permis-
of reward-realization, and an even more sig- sibility of religious reasons in political and
nificant place to virtue, as regards moral legal contexts. An especially influential feature
responsibility and goodness. of his religious epistemology is his account of
So far the most comprehensive source for a fiducial faith, which is “both psychologi-
Audi’s work in action theory, which impor- cally strong enough to enable it to play a
tantly informs many of his views described central part in the cognitive dimension of reli-
above (and vice versa), is his Action, Intention, gious commitment and evidentially modest
and Reason (1993). Drawing on some of his enough to be rational on the basis of substan-
earliest published work, he there develops tially less grounding than is required for the
interdependent accounts of wanting and rationality of belief with the same content”
believing. Wanting and believing, on his view, (1991, p. 234). In Religion in the Public
are two of the most important concepts in Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in
action theory. His account of wanting, in par- Political Debate (1997), he develops and
ticular, is informed by his “nomic and quali- defends a view according to which someone
fiedly causal” view of the explanation of motivated by religious reasons to advocate a
action. The connection between intending and coercive public policy can justifiably do so
acting is explainable by appeal to laws – only if he also has adequate secular reasons.
although neither a priori nor scientific laws,
but rather laws of ordinary rationality – and BIBLIOGRAPHY
the connection is, in a non-trivial way, causally “Intending,” Journal of Philosophy 70
grounded in what explains it. On this basis he (1973): 387–403.
develops an account of responsibility for action “Acting for Reasons,” Philosophical
which is compatible with metaphysical deter- Review 45 (1986): 511–46.
minism, and he begins to develop the pluralis- Practical Reasoning (London, 1989).
tic, objectivist account of rational action that “Faith, Belief, and Rationality,”
achieves fruition in his more recent work on Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991):
the theory of rationality. 213–39.
Perhaps Audi’s three most distinctive contri- “Mental Causation: Sustaining and
butions to the philosophy of mind are his Dynamic,” in Mental Causation, ed. John
accounts of the causal power of intentional Heil and Alfred Mele (Oxford, 1992), pp.
states, the concept of believing, and mental 53–74.
images as properties. The first two of these are Action, Intention, and Reason (Ithaca,
especially seminal in his work in epistemology, N.Y., 1993).
ethics, and action theory. In the course of The Structure of Justification (Cambridge,
defending the causal power of intentional states, UK, 1993).
he importantly distinguishes between “reasons “Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to
as abstract contents” and “reason states,” and Believe,” Noûs 28 (1994): 419–34.
between “sustaining” and “dynamic” causal Religion in the Public Square: The Place of
relations. In explicating belief, he introduces an Religious Convictions in Political Debate,
influential distinction between dispositional with Nicholas Wolterstorff (Lanham,
beliefs and dispositions to believe. Md., 1997).
Characteristically, Audi’s major contribu- Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character
tions to the philosophy of religion are informed (Oxford, 1997).
by his work in the theory of rationality. Epistemology: A Contemporary
Especially influential among these are his reli- Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge
99
AUDI
(London, 1998; 2nd edn 2003). N.Y., 1996), pp. 155–69.

“Self-Evidence,” Philosophical Perspectives “The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of
13 (1999): 205–28. Knowledge and Justification,” American
The Architecture of Reason: The Structure Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997):
and Substance of Rationality (Oxford, 404–22.
2001). “The Axiology of Moral Experience,”
The Good in the Right: A Theory of Journal of Ethics 2 (1998): 355–75.
Intuition and Intrinsic Value (Princeton, “Philosophical Naturalism at the Turn of the
N.J., 2004). Century,” Journal of Philosophical
Research 25 (2000): 27–45.
Other Relevant Works “A Kantian Intuitionism,” Mind 110 (2001):
“Direct Justification, Evidential Dependence, 601–35.
and Theistic Belief,” in Rationality, “Epistemic Virtue and Justified Belief,” in
Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment, Virtue Epistemology, ed. Abrol
ed. Robert Audi and William Wainwright Fairweather and Linda Zagzebski (Oxford,
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1986), pp. 139–67. 2001), pp. 82–97.
“Scientific Objectivity and the Evaluation of “Prospects for a Naturalization of Practical
Hypotheses,” in The Philosophy of Logical Reason: Humean Instrumentalism and the
Mechanism, ed. Merrilee Salmon Normative Authority of Desire,”
(Dordrecht, 1988), pp. 321–45. International Journal of Philosophical
“The Separation of Church and State and the Studies 10 (2002): 235–63.
Obligations of Citizenship,” Philosophy & “An Internalist Theory of Normative
Public Affairs 18 (1989): 259–96. Grounds,” Philosophical Topics 29 (2002):
“Ethical Naturalism and the Explanatory 19–46.
Power of Moral Concepts,” in Naturalism: “Theoretical Rationality: Its Sources,
A Critical Appraisal, ed. Steven Wagner Structure, and Scope,” in The Oxford
and Richard Warner (South Bend, Ind., Handbook of Rationality, ed. Alfred Mele
1993), pp. 95–115. and Piers Rawling (Oxford, 2004).
“The Dimensions of Faith and the Demands
of Reason,” in Reasoned Faith, ed. Further Reading
Eleonore Stump (Ithaca, N.Y., 1993), pp. Pres Addr of APA v9
70–89. Foley, Richard. “Audi on Practical
“Between Faculty and Students: The Ethics of Reasoning,” Behavior and Philosophy 19
Teaching and the Ideals of Learning,” (1991): 59–72.
Academe 80 (1994): 27–36. Kappel, Klemens. “Challenges to Audi’s
Ed., The Cambridge Dictionary of Ethical Intuitionism,” Ethical Theory and
Philosophy (Cambridge, UK, 1995). Moral Practice 5 (2002): 391–413.
“Acting from Virtue,” Mind 104 (1995): Mele, Alfred. “Self-Deception, Action and
449–71. Will: Comments,” Erkenntnis 18 (1982):
“Religious Experience and the Practice 159–64.
Conception of Justification,” in The Radcliffe, Dana M. “Nondoxastic Faith:
Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Audi on Religious Commitment,”
Faith, ed. Thomas D. Senor (Ithaca, N.Y., International Journal for Philosophy of
1996), pp. 127–49. Religion 37 (1995): 73–86.
“Theism and the Mind-Body Problem,” in
Faith, Freedom, and Rationality, ed. Jeff Peter Tramel
Jordan and Daniel Howard-Snyder (Ithaca,
100
AUNE
AUNE, Bruce Arthur (1933– ) Kant’s Theory of Morals (1980), and a teaching
interest that he maintained until his retirement.
Bruce Aune was born on 7 November 1933 in Aune is also interested in a variety of issues in
Minneapolis, Minnesota. He attended the ontology, in which he maintains a broadly nom-
Minneapolis public schools, and received his inalist perspective, reflected in his recently pub-
BA (1955) and MA (1957) at the University of lished article, “Universals and Predication”
Minnesota. His master’s thesis focused on “The (2002).
Cognitive Content of Literary Art.” Aune spent
1957/8 at the University of California at Los BIBLIOGRAPHY
Angeles studying logic with Rudolph CARNAP, Knowledge, Mind, and Nature (New York,
Richard Montague, and Donald Kalish. He 1967).
returned to Minnesota with the intent of Rationalism, Empiricism, and Pragmatism
studying with Wilfrid SELLARS. Discovering that (New York, 1970).
Sellars had moved on to Yale, Aune worked pri- Reason and Action (Dordrecht, 1978).
marily with Alan DONAGAN and Herbert FEIGL, Kant’s Theory of Morals (Princeton, N.J.,
completing his PhD dissertation on “Sensation 1980).
and Human Behavior” with Feigl in 1960. Metaphysics: The Elements (Minneapolis,
After spending two years teaching philosophy 1985).
at Oberlin College, Aune joined the philoso- Knowledge of the External World (London,
phy department of the University of Pittsburgh 1990).
in 1963. In 1966 Aune became head of the phi-
losophy department of the University of Other Relevant Works
Massachusetts at Amherst, serving until 1971. “The Problem of Other Minds,”
During that period Aune bore primary respon- Philosophical Review 70 (1961): 320–39.
sibility for the recruitment and hiring of a group “Is There an Analytic A Priori?” Journal of
of young philosophers who transformed the Philosophy 60 (1963): 281–91.
department into a distinguished center of “Can,” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
graduate research. He remained professor of ed. Paul Edwards (New York, 1967), vol.
philosophy there until his retirement in 2001. 2, pp. 18–20.
Aune has held visiting appointments at the “Hypotheticals and ‘Can’: Another Look,”
University of Michigan, University of Analysis 27 (1967): 237–43.
Minnesota, University of California at “Action and Ontology,” Philosophical Studies
Riverside, Amherst College, Dartmouth College, 44 (1988): 195–213.
Mount Holyoke College, Smith College, and “Sellars’ Two Images of the World,” Journal
Union College. Aune has also been a of Philosophy 87 (1990): 537–45.
Guggenheim Fellow, a Fulbright Fellow, and a “The Unity of Plato’s Republic,” Ancient
resident fellow at the Center for Advanced Study Philosophy 17 (1997): 1–18.
in the Behavior Sciences at Stanford University. “Against Moderate Rationalism,” Journal of
Aune’s early scholarship focused primarily Philosophical Research 27 (2002): 1–26.
on issues in epistemology and philosophy of “Universals and Predication,” in Blackwell
mind. His article, “Hypotheticals and ‘Can’: Guide to Metaphysics, ed. Richard M. Gale
Another Look,” (1967), and his contribution, (Oxford, 2002), pp. 131–50.
“Can,” to the Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(1967) have both played major roles in the Further Reading
philosophical literature exploring analyses of Alston, William P. “Aune on Thought and
“S can do X.” In the 1970s, Aune’s interests Language,” Noûs 3 (1969): 169–83.
broadened to include Kant, leading to a book, Fowler, Corbin. “An Alternative to Aune’s
101
AUNE
Idealized View of Practical Reasoning,” Axinn’s own philosophical interests are pri-
Southern Journal of Philosophy 18 (1980): marily in Kant, in areas of social, moral, and
23–36. value theory, and in philosophy of war. He
Hunter, J. F. M. “Aune and Others on Ifs and was a member of the board of directors of the
Cans,” Analysis 28 (1968): 107–109. Journal of the History of Ideas from 1980 to
Rappaport, Steven. “Aune’s Wittgenstein on 1994, and the journal’s treasurer from 1982
the Empiricist Thesis,” Philosophical to 1994. He has been active in several philo-
Studies 24 (1973): 258–62. sophical societies, including the American
Society for Value Inquiry (serving as President
David E. Schrader in 1985); the American Philosophical
Association; the North American Kant
Society; the American Section of the
International Society for Law and Social
Philosophy; the Aristotelian Society; the
International Society for Chinese Philosophy;
AXINN, Sidney (1923– ) and Concerned Philosophers for Peace. Axinn
has remained active in scholarship during his
Sidney Axinn was born on 30 January 1923 in retirement, and since 2001 he has been a
New York City. After serving in the US Army courtesy professor at the University of South
during World War II from 1943 to 1946, he Florida.
completed his education at the University of Axinn’s major work on Kant, The Logic of
Pennsylvania, where he received his BA in Hope: Extensions of Kant’s View of Religion
1947 and his PhD in philosophy in 1955. He (1994), concerns the question posed by Kant,
was influenced early at Pennsylvania by C. “For what can a human being rationally
West CHURCHMAN’s pragmatism, and wrote hope?” Axinn examines Kant’s Religion
his dissertation on “A Study of Kant’s Within the Limits of Reason Alone in the
Philosophy of History.” In 1955 Axinn context of Kant’s moral and political theory,
became an instructor of philosophy at Temple and develops a theory for transforming the
University and was promoted up to full pro- world community into a Kingdom of Ends of
fessor by 1964, holding that position until individuals and a peaceful League of Nations.
retiring in 1993. He also was an adjunct pro-
fessor in the psychiatry department of Temple BIBLIOGRAPHY
University’s Medical School from 1956 to “Two Concepts of Optimism,” Philosophy
1993, and was a professor at the Temple of Science 21 (1954): 16–24.
University Japan in Tokyo during 1986–8. “Kant, Logic, and the Concept of
For many years during the 1950s, 1960s, Mankind,” Ethics 68 (1958): 286–91.
and 1970s, Axinn was the senior scholar and “And Yet: A Kantian Analysis of Aesthetic
leader of Temple University’s philosophy Interest,” Philosophy and
department. He served as department chair Phenomenological Research 25 (1964):
from 1952 to 1967, and helped to guide the 108–16.
department towards the establishment of its “Ayer on Negation,” Journal of Philosophy
doctoral program. By the 1970s, with the 65 (1964): 74–5.
arrival of colleagues Monroe BEARDSLEY, “Fallacy of the Single Risk,” Philosophy of
Hugues L EBLANC , and Joseph M ARGOLIS , Science 33 (1966): 154–62.
Temple’s philosophy department consolidated “Mathematics as an Experimental Science,”
its strengths in the history of philosophy, Philosophia Mathematica 5 (1968):
analytic philosophy, and aesthetics. 1–10.
102
AXTELLE
“Kant, Authority, and the French AXTELLE, George Edward (1893–1974)

Revolution,” Journal of the History of
Ideas 32 (1971): 423–32. George E. Axtelle was born on 28 November
“Kant and Goodman on Possible 1893 in Crandall, Texas. He completed his BS
Individuals,” The Monist 61 (1978): degree from the University of Washington in
476–82. 1923. From 1924 to 1930 he worked as a
“The Collective Sense of Equal Protection public school administrator in Hawaii, where
of the Laws,” in Social Justice, ed. he completed an MA degree at the University
Michael Bradie and David Braybrooke of Hawaii in 1928. Axtelle served as a Junior
(Bowling Green, Ohio, 1982), pp. 44–54. High School principal in Oakland, California
A Moral Military (Philadelphia, 1989). from 1930 to 1935, and received his EdD
“Moral Style,” Journal of Value Inquiry 24 degree from the University of California at
(1990): 123–33. Berkeley in 1935.
The Logic of Hope: Extensions of Kant’s From 1935 to 1942 Axtelle taught education
View of Religion (Atlanta, Georgia, at Northwestern University. During World War
1994). II he served at a number of public posts, includ-
“Kant on Possible Hope: The Critique of ing labor relations and employee relations. He
Pure Hope,” in The Proceedings of the was appointed to the education faculty of New
Twentieth World Congress of York University in 1945, and in 1946 became
Philosophy, vol. 7: Modern Philosophy, the chair of the history and philosophy of edu-
ed. Mark Gedney (Bowling Green, Ohio, cation department, a position that he occupied
2000), pp. 79–87. until 1959. While at New York University,
George Axtelle was a visiting faculty member
Other Relevant Works at Yale University in 1956–7 and Fulbright
“Autobiographical Sketch,” in A Quarter Lecturer in Egypt in 1952–3.
Century of Value Inquiry: Presidential In 1959 Axtelle joined the faculty at Southern
Addresses of the American Society for Illinois University at Carbondale as a professor
Value Inquiry, ed. Richard T. Hull of education. At Southern Illinois he taught
(Amsterdam, 1994), pp. 293–4. seminars on pragmatism, John DEWEY, William
Ed. with Jane Kneller, Autonomy and JAMES, Charles PEIRCE, and George MEAD.
Community: Readings in Contemporary Axtelle had a longstanding interest in the phi-
Kantian Social Philosophy (Albany, losophy of John Dewey, and was among the
N.Y., 1998). founding members of the John Dewey Society.
In 1960 he received a grant to edit and publish
Further Reading the complete writings of Dewey, and this
Cavallar, Georg. “Axinn’s The Logic of project eventually grew into what is today the
Hope,” Kant-Studien 89 (1998): 230–32. Center for Dewey Studies. Axtelle retired from
Southern Illinois University in 1966, and died
John R. Shook on 1 August 1974 in Carbondale.
Axtelle was active in many public service
areas. He served as Vice Chairman of the New
York Committee to Abolish Capital
Punishment, and Vice Chairman of the New
York Liberal Party. He was a member of the
executive board of the League for Industrial
Democracy, Vice President and member of the
executive council of the American Federation of
103
AXTELLE
Teachers, and President of the American Amherst College in 1920. In 1923 Ayres, along
Humanist Association at various times during with many other faculty, resigned from Amherst
his career. to protest the dismissal of President Alexander
MEIKLEJOHN. Ayres taught economics at Reed
BIBLIOGRAPHY College in 1923–4, and then was an associate
Democracy and the Curriculum, with Harold editor and author of many articles for the New
Rugg, Hollis L. Caswell, and George Republic from 1924 to 1927. In 1927 he left
Count (New York, 1939). academia for ranch life in New Mexico.
Ed. with William W. Wattenberg, Teachers During the 1920s, Ayres became increasingly
for Democracy (New York, 1940). interested in the American institutional econo-
“Social Implementation of Democracy and mists, especially Thorstein VEBLEN, and in John
Education,” in Teachers for Democracy, DEWEY’s philosophy of instrumentalism. In 1930
ed. George E. Axtelle and William W. Ayres became a professor of economics at the
Wattenberg (New York, 1940). University of Texas. He remained for the rest of
“Alfred North Whitehead and the Problem of his career, except for occasional leaves for service
Unity,” Educational Theory 19 (1969): in government, including terms as a governor of
129–53. the Federal Reserve Board during the 1960s.
“Dewey on Education and Schooling,” in Ayres also served on the national committee of
Guide to the Works of John Dewey, ed. Jo the American Civil Liberties Union for twenty
Ann Boydston (Carbondale, Ill., 1970), pp. years. He retired from Texas in 1968. Ayres
257–305. died on 24 July 1972 in Alamogordo, New
Mexico.
Other Relevant Works During his nearly forty years at Texas, Ayres
Axtelle’s papers are at Southern Illinois established the Texas School of institutional
University at Carbondale. economics, which continues to remind econo-
mists of the importance of economic philoso-
Further Reading phy. His life’s work became the integration of
Who Was Who in Amer v6 institutional economics and instrumental rea-
soning. Ayres’s most influential work is Theory
Michael R. Taylor of Economic Progress (1944/1962) in which he
criticized the ethnocentric commercial
economic view of conventional economics,
articulated an alternative view of economics,
and sketched a program for institutional
adjustment to sustain economic progress. He
AYRES, Clarence Edwin (1891–1972) defined progress in terms of finding how to do
more and better things. He insisted that
Clarence E. Ayres was born on 6 May 1891 in progress thus defined is irresistible and every-
Lowell, Massachusetts. After graduation from where at war with the status preoccupations
Brown University with his BA in 1912, he began and habitual sensibilities of propriety. Progress
graduate work at Harvard, but soon returned to occurs through new combinations of previ-
Brown where he completed his MA in econom- ously unrelated technical artifacts or ideas that
ics in 1914. He then went to the University of bear fruit in their admixture. This includes not
Chicago to study philosophy and was awarded only accretion of technical materials or tools
the PhD in 1917. He taught philosophy at the but more fundamentally the spread of knowl-
University of Chicago from 1917 to 1920, before edge about material process. Hence Ayres
becoming associate professor of economics at stressed widening participation as the key to
104
AYRES
progress. The more people who have the Ayres’s concern for redistribution went well
capacity and opportunity to engage in the beyond the macroeconomic concern for aggre-
material process of inquiry and development, gate demand; indeed, it went beyond even the
the greater the pool whence new combinations humanitarian concern for the underprivileged.
emerge. There is no trade-off between equality Progress for all would be advanced by the
and efficiency or growth in a real dynamic widening participation that income redistribu-
economy. tion would bring about. Wider participation
Ayres sketched a strategy for progress to would magnify the opportunities for creativity
guide the democratic industrial society in taking and new departures in knowledge and tech-
advantage of the opportunity presented in the nique. For this reason, Ayres advocated a guar-
immediate period after World War II. The anteed annual income to secure the financing of
strategy consisted of intensive and extensive household livelihoods. Ayres thought that
development of the New Deal program. social scientists and philosophers had an ideo-
Domestically the principles of balancing income logical responsibility to advocate such bold
flows and revamping the success criteria of cor- new departures that would make possible the
porate America were to be deepened to secure transition from the Welfare Society to the
universal participation in socially responsible Creative Society.
prosperity. Internationally, Ayres called for Ayres’s most philosophical book was
application of these principles in a World New Toward a Reasonable Society (1961), in which
Deal intended to promote global economic he elaborated his blending of the two most
progress and head off the abysmal deprivation important influences on his economic philoso-
that foments disorder and military conflict. phy. He considered the Veblenian dichotomy,
With respect to corporate governance, Ayres between knowledge, skill, and tools on the one
clearly took a “stakeholder” view, rather than hand and the socially structured personal rela-
a narrow “stockholder” view. He was con- tions, custom, and sentiments on the other, to
cerned with harnessing the power of large cor- be Veblen’s principal legacy. Veblen’s
porations to the social interest. Ayres advo- dichotomy contrasts the invidious and the non-
cated the concentration-and-control strategy. In invidious interests. The non-invidious interest
this view, corporate concentration of resources refers to the common good of all humanity. To
and power is seen to be inevitable and it is establish that a given use of resources is non-
therefore necessary to institute a strategy to invidious is to establish its service to enhancing
secure national and international social control human life on the whole. This direct contribu-
to channel corporate behavior toward the tion to the fullness of human life on the whole
public purpose. In order to facilitate democra- is drawn in contrast to the indirect or secondary
tic control by regulators and public opinion, utility of goods that derives from competitive
Ayres advocated opening corporate accounting emulation and the desire to make an invidious
to public view, as the functional equivalent of comparison. The invidious interest resides in
a street light in the interest of public safety. the individual’s desire to make a comparison of
Ayres and other institutionalists also agreed relative rank and status to his or her neigh-
with John Maynard Keynes about the need for bors. Veblenian waste is the expenditure of a
an offset policy to counteract the fundamental scarce resource to satisfy the desire for invidi-
tendency of finance capitalism toward macro- ous comparison.
economic stagnation. Creation of purchasing Much of Ayres’s work was dedicated to artic-
power by income transfers and public sector ulation of this dichotomy by weaving into the
projects counteracts this tendency and rescues institutionalist paradigm the instrumental rea-
the potential output that would otherwise go soning of John Dewey. For Ayres, instrumen-
unproduced and wasted. tal reasoning revealed that there are a handful
105
AYRES
of basic values – freedom, abundance, equality, 1962).

excellence, and security – that are more or less The Divine Right of Capital (Boston, 1946).
universally held in otherwise very diverse The Industrial Economy: Its Technological
human societies. So also is democracy, the Basis and Institutional Destiny (Boston,
process of collective governance that serves to 1952).
advance these basic values, revealed to be a Toward a Reasonable Society: The Values of
universal aspiration. But following Dewey, Industrial Capitalism (Austin, Tex., 1961).
Ayres conceived democracy differently from
the mechanical conception of majority rule. Other Relevant Works
Democracy is not simply or even most impor- Ayres’s papers are at the University of Texas,
tantly voting to monitor preferences and resolve Austin.
preference conflicts. Democracy is most impor- “The Function and Problems of Economic
tantly a process in which preferences are Theory,” Journal of Political Economy 26
reformed with the enhanced enlightenment that (1918): 69–90.
comes from the process of inquiry and reasoned “The Epistemological Significance of Social
discourse. In effect, this view of the democra- Psychology,” Journal of Philosophy 15
tic process implies the merger of the social sci- (1918): 35–44.
entist and social reformer. “The Basis of Economic Statesmanship,”
Ayres derided the tendency of conventional American Economic Review 23 (1933):
economics to equate price with value and 200–16.
making money with making goods. He insisted “Moral Confusion in Economics,”
that power and inequality as well as limited International Journal of Ethics 45 (1935):
information and competence led to mistakes in 170–99.
judgment and preferences for unhealthy and “Dewey and His ‘Studies in Logical
destructive products. The central issue is that Theory’,” in Books that Changed Our
wants are social habits that result from emo- Minds, ed. Malcolm Cowley and Bernard
tional conditioning. The preferences and capac- Smith (New York, 1939), pp. 111–26.
ities of individuals therefore have no more or “The Legacy of Thorstein Veblen,” in
less validity than the socialization process by Institutional Economics: Veblen,
which they are formed. For Ayres, the conven- Commons, and Mitchell Reconsidered
tional price theory is a metaphysical rational- (Berkeley, Cal., 1964), pp. 45–62.
ization of the extant power and distributive “Guaranteed Income: An Institutionalist
configuration. The positivist stance of conven- View,” in The Guaranteed Income, ed. R.
tional economics is a sham. Theobald (Garden City, N.Y., 1966), pp.
169–82.
BIBLIOGRAPHY “Ideological Responsibility,” Journal of
Science: The False Messiah (Indianapolis, Economic Issues 1 (1967): 3–11.
1927).
Holier Than Thou: The Way of the Further Reading
Righteous (Indianapolis, 1929). Reprinted Amer Nat Bio, Dict Economics
with Science: The False Messiah in one Breit, William, and W. P. Culbertson, Jr., eds.
volume (New York, 1973). Science and Ceremony: The Institutional
Huxley (New York, 1929). Economics of C. E. Ayres (Ayres, Tex.,
The Problem of Economic Order (New 1976).
York, 1938). Phillips, R. J., ed. Economic Mavericks: The
The Theory of Economic Progress (Chapel Texas Institutionalists (Greenwich, Conn.,
Hill, N.C., 1944; 2nd edn, New York, 1995).
106
AYRES
Stanfield, J. Ron and Jacqueline B. Stanfield,

“The Significance of Clarence Ayres and
the Texas School,” in Is Economics an
Evolutionary Science? ed. F. Louca and M.
Perlman (Northampton, Mass., 2000), pp.
83–94.
J. Ron Stanfield
Jacqueline Bloom Stanfield
107
B
BABBITT, Irving (1865–1933) dignity that ground genuine liberalism. Other
so-called humanisms, such as the pragmatism
Irving Babbitt was born on 2 August 1865 in of William JAMES and F. C. S. Schiller, only
Dayton, Ohio. He received the Harvard BA promote chaotic pluralism and relativism,
with final honors in classics in 1889 and the declared Babbitt in Literature and the
MA degree in classical literature in 1893. American College (1908). There is a proper
Disdainful of the novel doctorate degree, he left mean and balance essential to excellent human
to teach romance languages at Williams life, and the possible paths to moderation are
College. He was called back to Harvard in exemplified in the classics of humanistic liter-
1894 as instructor of romance languages, and ature. Their excellence as literature lies in their
later also taught comparative literature. He capacity to display concrete examples of ethical
was promoted to professor of French literature conduct.
in 1912 and remained at Harvard until his Philosophy, ultimately dependent on
death on 15 July 1933 in Cambridge, symbols of life from literature, can only sys-
Massachusetts. Babbitt was a visiting professor tematize the structure or formal conditions
at the Sorbonne in Paris in 1923, and was grounding truth, beauty, and goodness. When
elected as a corresponding member of the philosophy turns into history, the past’s dead
Institute of France. He was also elected to the hand of control dissolves creativity and respon-
American Academy of Arts and Letters in sibility. If philosophy surrenders its responsi-
1930. bilities to naturalism, on the other hand, then
With fellow Harvard student Paul Elmer the pragmatic rationality of the sciences com-
M ORE , Babbitt led the New Humanism pletely dissolves human nature into the
movement, which offered culturally and polit- subhuman and mechanical and thus likewise
ically conservative opposition to the growing abandons personal responsibility. Philosophy
romanticism and naturalism of America. must respect the free will that permits volun-
Among Babbitt’s students were T. S. ELIOT tary commitment to moral standards, and cor-
and Walter LIPPMANN; many later conservative respondingly must acknowledge the role of
intellectuals remain indebted to Babbitt’s personal responsibility in politics. Because
critical views of unrestrained democracy and human nature is divided between the lower
individualism. Like Lippmann and H. L. impulses and the higher will to follow the
M ENCKEN , Babbitt was dubious of unre- good, philosophy should help seek a middle
strained democracy for its own sake. place between naturalism and supernatural-
Romanticism’s elevation of the liberated ism. It is too late to expect the world’s great
personal self abandons the ethical self-control religions, in this age of fragmentation and
necessary for the universal human rights and skepticism, to perform their common task of
108
BABBITT
elevating human nature. Against both the introduction by Claes G. Ryn (New
Hegelian absolute of rigid history and the Brunswick, N.J., 1995). Contains a
materialistic hedonism of unrestrained desire, bibliography of Babbitt’s writings.
the new philosophy of humanism seeks a
virtuous aristocracy and a moderate middle Other Relevant Works
class eager to imitate their example. “Genius and Taste,” in Contemporary
Democracy and Leadership (1924) located the American Criticism, ed. James Bowman
foundation of politics in neither a constitution (New York, 1924), pp. 95–108.
nor the masses, but in the true leader who Trans., The Dhammapada (Oxford, 1936).
exemplifies moral character. Contains his essay “Buddha and the
Babbitt had little hope of achieving this goal Occident.”
in America, particularly because of the decay Irving Babbitt: Representative Writings, ed.
of higher education and the arts. His hostility George A. Panichas (Lincoln, Neb.,
to the transformation of universities in the first 1981).
decades of the twentieth century was leg-
endary. He decried the elective system that Further Reading
resigned the wisdom of the core humanities to Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio,
become just another optional major, and he Dict Amer Bio, Encyc Amer Bio, Nat
detested the way that the doctoral degree Cycl Amer Bio v23, Who Was Who in
engendered overspecialization. The arts in Amer v1
America were likewise degenerating. Dulled Brennan, Stephen C., and Stephen R.
by romanticism or naturalism, they are led Yarbrough. Irving Babbitt (Boston,
down the path of pandering to the lower 1987).
classes, or alternatively retreating into a sterile Hindus, Milton. Irving Babbitt, Literature,
and amoral aestheticism divorced from and the Democratic Culture (New
cultural life. Babbitt viewed contemporary Brunswick, N.J., 1994).
humanists like himself as a “saving remnant” Hoeveler, J. David, Jr. The New
ready to rescue civilization in the New World, Humanism: A Critique of Modern
yet regretfully unappreciated as puritanical America, 1900–1940 (Charlottesville,
defenders of outdated morality. Va., 1976).
Manchester, Frederick, and Odell Shepard,
BIBLIOGRAPHY eds. Irving Babbitt: Man and Teacher
Literature and the American College (New York, 1941).
(Boston, 1908). Nevin, Thomas R. Irving Babbitt: An
The New Laokoön: An Essay on the Intellectual Study (Chapel Hill., N.C.,
Confusion of the Arts (Boston, 1910). 1984).
The Masters of Modern French Criticism Panichas, George A. The Critical Legacy of
(Boston, 1912). Irving Babbitt (Wilmington, Del., 1999).
Rousseau and Romanticism (Boston, 1919). Panichas, George A., and Claes G. Ryn,
Democracy and Leadership (Boston, 1924). eds. Irving Babbitt in Our Time
On Being Creative and Other Essays (Washington, D.C., 1986).
(Boston, 1932). Ryn, Claes G. Will, Imagination, and
The Spanish Character and Other Essays, Reason: Babbitt, Croce, and the Problem
ed. Frederick Manchester, Rachel Giese, of Reality (New Brunswick, N.J., 1997).
and William F. Giese (Boston, 1940).
Reprinted as Character and Culture: John R. Shook
Essays on East and West, with a new
109
BABBITT
BABBITT, Milton Byron (1916– ) Babbitt has made certain well-known theo-
retical claims, including a recommendation
Milton Babbitt was born on 10 May 1916 in that musical practice take the language of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and grew up in science as its model. He has also defended the
Jackson, Mississippi. At an early age he studied need for music to be conceived and received lit-
violin, clarinet, and saxophone, and by the age erally, without any consideration of extramu-
of fifteen, Babbitt had already developed abili- sical (such as social or political) factors. In the
ties as a jazz musician and pop music composer. context of musical aesthetics, Babbitt is a strict
He studied mathematics at the University of formalist, analytic in method and autonomist
Pennsylvania starting in 1931. He soon in preference. Babbitt wrote a controversial
returned to music, studying at New York article in 1958 entitled “Who Cares if You
University (BA 1935), and then at Princeton Listen?” in which he urges composers to
University (MFA 1942). Babbitt taught on the withdraw from public life and not allow public
music faculty at Princeton from 1938 to 1942, and social aspects to hinder their freedom and
and then again from 1948 until his retirement focus.
in 1981; he was also on the mathematics faculty Milton Babbitt is still the subject of a variety
from 1943 to 1945. In 1960 he became William of criticism. His theoretical and social stance is
Shubael Conant Professor of Music. Since 1973 believed by some to be defeatist and detached,
Babbitt has been on the composition faculty at and considered to be elitist by others.
the Juilliard School. In 1982 Babbitt received a Furthermore, his compositional approach is
Pulitzer Prize Special Citation for his life’s work. criticized for its inaccessibility. Still, Babbitt
Other awards include the Joseph Bearns Prize has always insisted upon the relationship
for Composition, the New York Critics Circle between theory and practice. He has continued
Citation for “Composition for Four to influence a diverse array of musical practi-
Instruments,” and Guggenheim and MacArthur tioners, from those with strictly musical and/or
fellowships. theoretical preoccupations to more interdisci-
An influential American composer and plinary art forms that incorporate music in a
theorist, Babbitt is best known for his contri- variety of ways.
bution to the compositional approach known
as twelve-tone serialism, most closely associated BIBLIOGRAPHY
with Arnold SCHOENBERG. Babbitt’s particular Words About Music, ed. Stephen Dembski
brand of twelve-tone composition emphasizes and Joseph N. Straus (Madison, Wisc.,
the more scientific and mathematical princi- 1987).
ples of music. He clarified what is called com- “Who Cares if You Listen?” High Fidelity
binatoriality, where twelve-tone rows are (February 1958): 38–40, 126–7.
combined with other rows with identical pitch The Collected Essays of Milton Babbitt, ed.
classes. He also founded the terminology which Stephen Peles (Princeton, N.J., 2003).
dominates the theoretical discourse on twelve-
tone music, such as “pitch class” and “time Other Relevant Works
point sets” (note values are identified by their Composition for Four Instruments (1947–8).
position at the point of attack within the bar). All Set, for jazz ensemble (1957).
Although less known for his contributions to Philomel, for soprano soloist and synthesizer
the development of electronic music in (1963–4).
America, Babbitt consulted with RCA on their Reflections, for piano and synthesized tape
revolutionary Mark II synthesizer and became (1975).
one of the first major composers to utilize the Concerto for Piano and Orchestra (1985).
synthesizer.
110
BAHM
Further Reading his work include the nature and types of intu-
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio ition; logic; axiology, which he defined as the
Kostelanetz, Richard. On Innovative science of values; ethics, which he once defined
Music(ian)s (New York, 1990). as the science of “oughtness” and previously
Mead, Andrew W. An Introduction to the had defined as a behavioral science; meta-
Music of Milton Babbitt (Princeton, N.J., physics; and epistemology. He dealt with the
1994). philosophy of history from the standpoint of
Nichols, Janet. American Music Makers: An universal history, calling it “the philosopher’s
Introduction to American Composers world model.”
(New York, 1991). In 1932 Bahm debated with Henry Bradford
SMITH the question of the translatability of
Michael David Székely Aristotelian syllogistic into algebraic logic and
into the language of Principia Mathematica.
Smith had shown in his Symbolic Logic how to
deduce the postulates of Aristotle’s system
directly from the Boole-Schröder calculus, and
had proved, in “On the Relation of the
BAHM, Archie John (1907–96) Aristotelian Algebra to that of Boole-
Schroeder,” the consistency of Aristotelian
Archie J. Bahm was born on 21 August 1907 “algebra.” He then attempted to prove the
in Imlay, Michigan. He received his BA from invalidity of the equivalent of Barbara given in
Albion College in Michigan in 1929. He then Principia Mathematica. In response, Bahm
attended the University of Michigan, where he argued, in “Henry Bradford Smith on the
received his MA in 1930 and his PhD in phi- Equivalent Form of Barbara” (1932), that
losophy in 1933. From 1934 to 1946 Bahm Smith had failed to prove this invalidity as he
taught philosophy at Texas Technological claimed to do by his method of translation.
College (now Texas Tech University). He was Bahm worked as well in history and philos-
associate professor of philosophy at the ophy of logic, with special concern for dialec-
University of Denver from 1946 to 1948, when tical logic, the subject of his book Polarity,
he became professor of philosophy at the Dialectic, and Organicity (1970). His later
University of New Mexico. He held that work continued to display his special interest in
position until retiring in 1973. He was a Oriental philosophy. Although he studied
Fulbright Scholar at the University of Rangoon Confucian philosophy, he devoted greatest
in 1955–6, and at Banaras Hindu University in attention to Buddhist philosophy, and under-
1962–3. As emeritus professor he remained took comparative studies of Western, Indian,
very active at New Mexico in research and and Chinese philosophies. His preferred philo-
publishing. A founder of several philosophical sophical system, which he labeled as “organi-
societies, including the Southwest Philosophical cism,” found all realities to be composed of
Society (serving as its President in 1948), the organic wholes made up of mutually dependent
Mountains–Plains Philosophical Society, and parts.
the New Mexico–West Texas Philosophical
Society, he also founded and edited for three BIBLIOGRAPHY
decades the Directory of American Philosophy: An Introduction (New York,
Philosophers. Bahm died on 12 March 1996 in 1953).
Albuquerque, New Mexico. What Makes Acts Right? (Boston, 1958).
Bahm published numerous introductory text- Philosophy of the Buddha (New York and
books and philosophical treatises. The topics of London, 1959).
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BAHM
Logic for Beginners (Boston, 1960). (1958): 837–45.

Types of Intuition (Albuquerque, N.M., “Matter and Spirit: Implications of the
1961). Organicist View,” Philosophy and
The World’s Living Religions (New York, Phenomenological Research 20 (1959):
1964). 103–108.
Yoga for Business Executives and “Theories of Conscience,” Ethics 75 (1965):
Professional People (New York, 1965). 128–31.
The Heart of Confucius: Interpretations of “The Aesthetics of Organicism,” Journal of
Genuine Living and Great Wisdom (New Aesthetics and Art Criticism 26 (1968):
York, 1969). 449–59.
Polarity, Dialectic, and Organicity “The Logic of Interdependence,” Journal of
(Springfield, Ill., 1970). Thought 13 (1978): 106–10.
Ethics as a Behavioral Science (Springfield, “Improving Applied Ethics,” International
Ill., 1974). Journal of Applied Philosophy 2 (1984):
Metaphysics: An Introduction (New York, 61–8.
1974).
Comparative Philosophy: Western, Indian Further Reading
and Chinese Philosophies Compared Who Was Who in Amer v11, Who’s Who in
(Albuquerque, N.M., 1977). Phil
The Specialist: His Philosophy, His Disease, Kunstler, Miecyslaw-Jerzy. “To Compare or
His Cure (Albuquerque, N.M., 1977). Not to Compare,” Dialectics and
The Philosopher’s World Model (Westport, Humanism 6 (1979): 137–40.
Conn., 1979). Reinsmith, William A. “Improving Applied
Ethics, the Science of Oughtness Ethics: A Response to Bahm’s ‘Improving
(Albuquerque, N.M., 1980). Applied Ethics’,” International Journal of
Why Be Moral? (New Delhi, India, 1980; Applied Philosophy 2 (1985): 81–4.
2nd edn, Albuquerque, N.M., 1992). Smith, Henry Bradford. “On the Relation of
Axiology: The Science of Values the Aristotelian Algebra to That of Boole-
(Amsterdam, 1993). Schroeder,” The Monist 42 (1932): 282–9.
Epistemology: Theory of Knowledge
(Albuquerque, N.M., 1995). Irving H. Anellis
Organicism: Origin and Development; Life
and Publications of the Author
(Albuquerque, N.M., 1995).

Bahm’s papers are at Southern Illinois BAIER, Annette Claire (1929– )
University at Carbondale.
“Henry Bradford Smith on the Equivalent Born Annette Claire Stoop on 11 October 1929
Form of Barbara,” The Monist 42 (1932): in Queenstown, New Zealand, Annette Baier
632–3. received her BA (1951) and MA (1952) degrees
“Beauty Defined,” Philosophical Review 56 in philosophy at the University of Otago, and
(1947): 582–6. her B.Phil. (1954) at Somerville College,
“Existence and Its Polarities,” Journal of Oxford. In her preface to Moral Prejudices,
Philosophy 46 (1949): 629–36. she acknowledges the importance of her inter-
“Aesthetic Experience and Moral action in the all-female academic community of
Experience,” Journal of Philosophy 55 Somerville, where she studied with such famous
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philosophers as Philippa FOOT and Elizabeth In her essay, she suggests that Descartes’s own
Anscombe, who made it clear that the philo- philosophical project of ordering and recol-
sophical conversation includes women’s voices lecting events in his meditations presupposes an
(1994, p. viii). Baier has taught at the universi- embodied narrator. “Only a seeker of histori-
ties of Aberdeen, Auckland, Sydney, and cal truth would need recollection and narrative
Carnegie-Mellon. In 1973 she joined the phi- ability, and only one who tired and was capable
losophy department at the University of of relaxation would be a sleeper, one for whom
Pittsburgh where she held the position of the question ‘Awake or asleep?’ makes any
Distinguished Service Professor of Philosophy sense at all” (1985, p. 82). In this essay Baier
until her retirement in 1995. Baier served as also presents her influential, oft-quoted notion
President of the Eastern Division of the of “second persons.” Although Descartes
American Philosophical Association in himself may have missed or at least obscured
1990–91. She is married to philosopher Kurt the point, Baier – along with Donald DAVIDSON,
BAIER, and is currently living in New Zealand. Daniel DENNETT, and others – insists that self-
Annette Baier is chiefly known for her inno- consciousness requires cultural skills, in par-
vative scholarship on Hume and her contribu- ticular linguistic ones, that we acquire during
tions to ethics inspired both by her interests in our extended dependency on other persons.
Hume and also, crucially, by her feminism. “A person, perhaps, is best seen as one who
Even her early essays in philosophy of mind, was long enough dependent upon other persons
collected in Postures of the Mind (1985), to acquire the essential arts of personhood.
demonstrate her naturalist interpretations of Persons essentially are second persons, who
mental phenomena, where naturalism for her grow up with other persons” (1985, p. 84).
necessarily includes an emphasis on social, The importance of childhood for a philosoph-
cultural, historical circumstances as well as bio- ical conception of persons and minds is a point
logical and physical structures and environ- most philosophers ignore but one Baier makes
ments. Instead of viewing the mind as the central in her own philosophical development.
logical representer, or mirror, of the world, she Indeed, the developmental story becomes a
presents minds as formed by culture as well as main feature in all her accounts of minds and
by nature. Her discussions of memory, inten- morals, including her Carus Lectures, published
tion, and action, for example, locate mind in as The Commons of the Mind in 1997.
interactions with others, the world and human “Gods,” she quips, “if denied childhood,
conventions, thus insisting on the social nature cannot be persons” (1985, p. 85).
of the normative practices involved. “To be a Baier’s influential scholarship on Hume is
thinker at all,” she insists, “is to be responsive presented both in her 1991 book A Progress of
to criticism, a participant in a practice of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume’s Treatise as
mutual criticism and affirmation …” (1985, well as in her later essays connecting Hume
p. 70). A thinker is essentially a member of a with feminist ethics. While most Hume scholars
community. had ignored or dismissed Hume’s treatment of
In her essay “Cartesian Persons” as well as in the passions, Baier insists on reading Hume’s
later graduate seminars at the University of epistemology in Book One of The Treatise as
Pittsburgh, Baier offers challenging readings of serving his account of the passions and action
Descartes by paying attention to what he says in Books Two and Three. Baier reads the
about passions, practical reasoning and action, Treatise as a dramatic work whose moods and
and thus about embodiment. Baier’s “Cartesian turns demand careful attention. She focuses
Persons” stands in contrast to the standard especially on the conclusion of Book One,
view that emphasizes the incorporeal, private, which she reads as Hume’s “reductio ad
and first-personal nature of mental phenomena. absurdum of Cartesian intellect” and his turn
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to a new kind of philosophy, a more passion- away from legalistic, contractarian, individu-
ate and social successor to the gloom of the alistic theories of justice to an ethics of love,
metaphysical skeptic (1991, p. 21). Thus, rather care, and mutual responsibilities. For Baier, the
than the strictly epistemological problems elab- liberal views of persons and rights, underlying
orated in his famous skeptical analyses of cau- Kantian and contractarian ethics – notably
sation, necessity, and personal identity, Hume’s John RAWLS’s A Theory of Justice – cannot
main philosophical concerns, on Baier’s account for how real people begin as infants
reading, are practical, social ones. and learn how to keep promises, make con-
In her collection of essays on ethics entitled tracts, respect persons, and property. Her
Moral Prejudices (1994), she names Hume “the notion of “second persons” figures even more
women’s moral theorist” and “the women’s prominently in moral contexts. As she repeat-
epistemologist.” According to her, Hume trans- edly insists, infants need to be cared for in
forms the concept of reason not merely in his loving relationships so that they have even the
skeptical questioning of the meaning of meta- possibility of growing up to be competent
physical contentions, but much more impor- moral agents. But precisely their dependencies,
tantly in showing us our reasoning capacity as vulnerabilities, and developmental potentialities
a natural and practical one, essentially shared show that individualistic theories of
and developed in language, gesture, and senti- autonomous moral agents belong among those
ments shaped by intellectual, moral, and aes- fantasies she tries to expose. Baier’s feminism
thetic norms. Her naturalist view of persons focuses her discussions of morality precisely
takes our biological nature seriously, but on issues of vulnerability, development, coop-
includes its playful as well as vulnerable char- eration, connection – familial and social rela-
acter, conditioned by interdependencies, and tionships and responsibilities frequently not
marked by cooperation as well as conflict. chosen at all, but not on that account less
“[F]antasies of freedom from our own actual meaningful from a moral perspective.
history, actual dependency, actual mortality, Baier’s most famous contribution to ethics is
actual biological limitations, and determinate her sustained discussion of trust as an impor-
possibilities, have on the whole been male fan- tant, pervasive but philosophically ignored
tasies,” she claims, “and many women philoso- feature of morality and human life.
phers have found them strange” (1995, p. 323). Supplementing theories of both obligation and
Harvard psychologist Carol Gilligan explores care, the concept of appropriate trust also
the influence for ethics of such male fantasies in mediates between reason and feeling, “those
her 1982 book In a Different Voice. Gilligan tired old candidates for moral authority”: for
presents two distinctive, typically gendered her, trust is neither a simple belief nor a simple
approaches to morality that show up in her feeling but, rather, an attitude informed by
research on moral development. Gilligan’s “dif- beliefs and influencing actions (1994, p. 10).
ferent voice,” more often spoken by girls and She defines the attitude of trust as “accepted
women, articulates the responsibilities and care vulnerability to another person’s power over
involved in personal relationships, a kind of something one cares about, in the confidence
caring responsiveness often ignored or deni- that such power will not be used to harm what
grated by theorists emphasizing individual is entrusted” (1994, p. 341). Trust thus entails
autonomy and rights. Gilligan’s work pro- risk as well as connection. While it can be
foundly influenced Baier, prompting her to ask rational to trust someone in specific circum-
“What Do Women Want in a Moral Theory?” stances, trust also presupposes limited control
(1994, pp. 1–17). Objecting to obligation as the and limited knowledge of all the specifications
key concept of morality, Baier, with Gilligan in the relationship. According to her account,
and other feminist ethicists, shifts the focus therefore, an omniscient and omnipotent God
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would be, paradoxically, unable to trust (1994, Division. In this address she again staunchly
p. 187). advocates a naturalistic view of persons as bio-
While Baier’s paradigm of a trusting rela- logical, social, and cultural beings essentially
tionship is the child–parent relationship, obvi- marked by mutual responsiveness and interde-
ously not all relations of trust are morally jus- pendencies. “Self-understanding,” she says, “is
tifiable. She is well aware of the power differ- a shared taste, and cultivating it calls for our full
entials operative in trust relations, and pays capacities for mutual response” (1994, p. 326).
considerable attention to issues about the For Baier, responsiveness – not merely to accu-
appropriateness of trust and trustworthiness, sations of guilt, as Locke had noted, but to
and ways of sustaining and enhancing them needs, interests, conversations, invitations, con-
among the vulnerable. However, a perfectly flicts, joys, and sufferings – marks the different
clear, consistent test for adequate trust, or, voice Gilligan had highlighted and that she
more generally, a systematic moral theory with herself continually expresses in her philosoph-
trust as its fundamental principle, is not her ical work. To the question of how increasing
goal. She does not think that morality can be numbers of women in professional philosophy
presented as a systematic theory; nor does she influence the way philosophy, and especially
believe that morality needs first principles. For ethics, gets practiced, she refuses any simple
her it is only a dogma, one of those many moral answer. She approves of ethics in many differ-
prejudices she tries to unmask, to suppose ent voices. “Ethics,” she concludes, “is a poly-
moralities should imitate legal systems (1994, phonic art form, in which the echoes of the
p. 214). Discretion, judgment, experience – old voices contribute to the quality of the sound
these are necessary for sustaining trust or of all the new voices” (1994, p. 312). Her own
escaping from relationships of misplaced trust, original readings and reworkings of figures in
but for her these sorts of practical judgments the history of philosophy as well as her
cannot be formulated into rules or principles. profound insights into the complexities of
While other contemporary philosophers also moral life exhibit that art of shared cultivation
propound “anti-theory” and anti-Kantian constituting genuinely human and humane
approaches to morality, Baier’s reformulations understanding.
of ethics intentionally express her own experi-
ence as a woman moral philosopher who has BIBLIOGRAPHY
traveled widely, worked at diverse universities, “Cartesian Persons,” Philosophia 10 (1981):
and lived on three different continents. Her 169–88.
accounts of trust and distrust, for example, are Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and
peppered with anecdotes not only from litera- Morals (Minneapolis, 1985).
ture but also, importantly, from her own expe- “Trust and Anti-Trust,” Ethics 96 (1986):
riences – in airports, train stations, classrooms, 231–60.
and university committees. She sometimes apol- “The Need for More than Justice,” Science,
ogizes for her use of personal anecdote, but Morality, and Feminist Theory, ed. M.
her apologies seem more like Socratic invita- Hanan and K. Nielsen (Calgary, Alberta,
tions to a male-dominated profession to engage 1987), pp. 41–56.
with her in confronting real-life moral issues A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on
that defy more abstract, systematized treat- Hume’s Treatise (Cambridge, Mass.,
ments. In 1990 she delivered her presidential 1991).
address to the Eastern Division meeting of the “A Naturalist View of Persons,” Proceedings
American Philosophical Association, noting she and Addresses of the American
was only the fifth woman president in the Philosophical Association 65 (November
eighty-seven-year history of the Eastern 1991): 5–17.
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Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics Jaggar, Alison and Iris Marion Young, eds. A
(Cambridge, Mass., 1994). Companion to Feminist Philosophy
Tanner Lectures on Trust (Salt Lake City, (Oxford, 1998).
Utah, 1994). Johnson, Clarence S. “Annette Baier on
The Commons of the Mind (Chicago, 1997). Reason and Morals in Hume’s
Philosophy,” Dialogue 34 (1995): 367–80.
Other Relevant Works Noddings, Nel. Caring: A Feminine
“Intention, Practical Knowledge and Approach to Ethics and Moral Education
Representation,” in Action Theory: (Berkeley, Cal., 1986).
Proceedings, ed. M. Brand and D. Walton Tong, Rosemary. Feminine and Feminist
(Dordrecht, 1976), pp. 27–43. Ethics (Belmont, Cal., 1993).
“Natural Virtues and Natural Vices,” Social
Philosophy and Policy 8 (1990): 24–34. Jocelyn Hoy
“The Virtues of Resident Alienation,”
Nomos 34 (1992): 291–308.
“How Can Individualists Share
Responsibility?” Political Theory 25
(1993): 228–48.
“How to Get to Know One’s Own Mind: BAIER, Kurt Erich Maria (1917– )
Some Simple Ways,” in Philosophy in
Mind, ed. M. Michael and J. O’Leary- Kurt Baier was born on 26 January 1917 in
Hawthorne (Dordrecht, 1994), pp. 65–82. Vienna, Austria. He received his BA in 1944
“The Possibility of Sustaining Trust,” in from the University of Melbourne and his PhD
Norms, Values, and Society, ed. H. Pauer- in 1952 from the University of Oxford. Early
Studer (Dordrecht, 1994), pp. 245–59. in his career he taught at both the University of
“Moral Sentiments and the Difference They Melbourne and Canberra University. He emi-
Make,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian grated to America in 1962 to become professor
Society suppl. 69 (1995): 15–30. and later chair of the department of philosophy
“Doing Things with Others,” in at the University of Pittsburgh. He was elected
Commonality and Particularity in Ethics, President of the Australian Association of
ed. L. Alanen, S. Heinamaa, and T. Philosophy, President of the Eastern Division of
Wallgren (New York, 1996), pp. 15–44. the American Philosophical Association
(1977–8), and a fellow of the American
Further Reading Academy of Arts and Sciences. Baier retired in
Oxford Comp Phil, Pres Addr of APA v10 1995 and he currently lives in New Zealand
Alcoff, Linda, and Elizabeth Potter, eds. with his wife Annette BAIER.
Feminist Epistemologies (New York, His writings include The Moral Point of
1993). View (1958), Values and the Future: The
Friedman, Marilyn. What Are Friends For? Impact of Technological Change on American
Feminist Perspectives on Relationships and Values (1969) and his classic essay “Defining
Moral Theory (Ithaca, N.Y., 1993). Morality Without Prejudice” (1981). Among
Held, Virginia. Feminist Morality: the more significant of his scholarly publishing
Transforming Culture, Society and Politics activities was his appointment to the editorial
(Chicago, 1995). board of Philo, the official journal of the
———, ed. Justice and Care: Essential Society of Humanist Philosophers, published
Readings in Feminist Ethics (Boulder, Col., biannually at the Center for Inquiry. As the
1995). journal states their mission, “Philo is the only
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professional philosophy journal devoted exclu- makes it clear that he intends this question to
sively to criticisms of theism and defenses or have its moral sense. Baier argues that the right
developments of naturalism. To facilitate dis- answer to the moral question, “What shall I
cussion and debate, Philo also publishes do?” is the action which is buttressed by the
defenses of theism and criticisms of natural- clearest and most convincing reasons we can
ism. The interest in naturalism extends to the find. An important part of Baier’s analysis
relevant branches of naturalist philosophy, such involves distinguishing among the quality of
as naturalist metaphysics, and especially natu- reasons that play a role in our moral decision.
ralist ethics …” In trying to answer the question of what is the
In his early work The Moral Point of View best course of action he is thinking, not sur-
Baier tried to sort out the various ways in which prisingly, of good reasons. Baier holds that
facts contribute to making moral choices. He there are good reasons merely as a matter of
examines the relationship between self-interest empirical observation: in our development, we
and what he calls “the moral point of view,” learn that doing one thing rather than another
offering an interesting, albeit qualified, defense will harm society. It is a matter of observation,
of self-interest which will be discussed below. and a psychological fact, that people form
He argues that a valid moral position would beliefs that affect their actions.
consider social as well as individual facts, Another of the critical questions Baier
including special moral obligations, emotional examines is, “Why follow reason?” He says
ties to others, and one that would benefit that the question is often absurd, though not so
society – drawing support from Thomas when it has to do with the theoretical role of
Hobbes. reason. He argues that it must be recognized
For Baier, there are two aspects of the way that there are other viable interpretations to
we approach a moral problem. We obtain an the question by which it becomes coherent and
overview of the facts, and then determine how can be responded to. “Why should I follow
much weight to give to each fact. But there is reason?” could be a demand for a reason to
no guarantee that fallible human beings will do reflect hypothetically. Following reason com-
these things accurately. Our overview of the prises two tasks, a practical one and a theoret-
facts may be faulty, and we may err in deter- ical one. Baier argues that the purpose of the-
mining how much weight to give to a fact. Part oretical reasoning is primarily to guide practi-
of the problem is that the moral principles we cal decisions, and concludes that the question
use in weighing facts are not all equally impor- “Should I follow reason?” is really a question
tant. In any particular case, pleasure may be about theory rather than practice. Baier raises
more important than law, religion may be more the possibility, however, of another perspective
significant than self-interest, and so on. entirely, supposing that following the dictates
Baier further claims that the exploration of of reason could give way to following inspira-
moral issues is constituted by trying to answer tion and intuition for the appropriate analyses
the question, “What shall I do?” This might of ethical questions. However, Baier argues
seem like an odd way to frame the question that this really takes us nowhere. Even if we rely
since doing so might not give it any moral on some kind of nonrational insight, authority,
aspect at all, as with a so-called Kantian etc., the answer we get would have to be
“imperative of skill.” If one is interested in checked in a rational, reasoned way. Even if
stopping a table from wobbling he might ask, someone were to suggest that his intuitive lead-
“What shall I do?” and an answer like “put a ership was superior to reason, we would still
book under the shorter leg” would not strike have to check his claim by the ordinary
anyone as an answer to a moral question. methods of reason. His claim to be better than
However, the context of Baier’s discussion reason can only be supported by the fact that
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it tells us precisely the same as reason does. else’s interest, may be decent reasons for doing
Baier does admit that, as a practical matter, we a thing. He further holds that the reasons which
sometimes trust the judgment of a person are in one’s own interest might, in fact, be
without going through a complex series of better than those in the interest of someone
reasoned analyses, though deciding to trust else. In that case – should the interests not con-
such a person still involves reason. Hence, tradict one another – both can be satisfied by
reason seems inescapable. one’s actions. But when interests do collide, it
Baier has continued his analyses of theoreti- is not unreasonable to choose one’s own inter-
cal and practical logic in later writings. He has ests over those of another person. For example,
insisted that there are important similarities Baier suggests a situation where applying for a
between both theoretical and practical logic, job is more in one’s own interest than not
arguing that practical reasoning is fundamen- applying for it, since not doing so would be in
tally a matter of observation. Baier’s use of the some other person’s interest. He concludes that
term “practical reasoning” appears to be in society is better off when a person “looks out
line with classic uses of the term, referring to for Number One first,” since each of us is the
any logical analysis that deals with some moral best judge of what benefits us the most, and
issue or other. Thus, in Aristotle’s concept of because each person knows himself better than
the “practical syllogism,” the reasoning anyone else, he is more likely to push his own
involved is not aimed at deriving propositions interests before someone else’s.
but at action in daily life. Aristotle develops Baier notes that there are qualifications to
similar ideas in his concept of “phronesis,” or this view: this may not apply if there are inde-
intellectual virtue, as discussed in Book VI of pendent reasons for putting someone else’s
the Nichomachean Ethics. interests first. It must be remembered that we
The notion of practical reason has other uses are considering a case in which there are no
as well. It can be used to refute the notion that special reasons for preferring a particular
actions are prompted only by desire. Reason person’s interests to one’s own, such as when
comes into play, in the best Kantian-like sense, there are no special moral obligations or emo-
when a person separates himself from his own tional ties. Still, it is not hard to imagine cases
personal wants and is willing to evaluate his where one’s own interest might not take prece-
future conduct by principles that any rational dence over those of another. For instance, it
person would use. With Kant, a rational moral may be defensible to take advantage of a very-
agent has to ask only if his imagined action likely-profitable land investment oneself, rather
could be universalized. In discussions of moti- than tell some stranger about it. However, if
vation, furthermore, appeals to practical reason that person is someone in desperate financial
may seek to counter claims that only desire or straits whom one has promised to help out in
inclination can ultimately prompt one to action. any way one can, the binding nature of that
Yet practical reason encompasses even more promise would obligate one to tell the person
than this. If properly used, it involves compar- about the land investment opportunity.
ing and contrasting goals, wants and goods, in One of Baier’s most critical, as well as most
order to constitute a rational life-map of one’s interesting, lines of thought has to do with the
future choices. implausibility of self-interest as a candidate for
Returning to the question of self-interest, “the moral point of view.” Baier concedes that
while Baier attacks the concept, he surprisingly there is a distinction between what we might
argues that in valid moral judgments, self-inter- call narrow (or selfish) self-interest and enlight-
ested reasons can transcend altruistic ones. He ened self-interest. He asks if it is possible to
maintains that doing something which would salvage the notion that self-interest is the moral
be in one’s own interest, as well as in someone point of view. To do so, he distinguishes
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between what he calls “short-sighted” and judgments. For instance, he assaults the now-
“enlightened” self-interest. As Baier under- antiquated, though not necessarily wrong, pos-
stands it, the essential difference is that the itivist notion that moral pronouncements are
shortsighted person fails to consider how his simply commands or orders. Baier claims to the
actions will affect other people, while the contrary that moral questions like “What shall
enlightened person knows that failing to do so I do?” are really demands for new moral data.
will prevent him from enjoying a satisfying and It is worth noting that although Baier speaks
full life. The enlightened person will not ignore generally about positivist approaches to ethics,
the requirements of others. he reserves a good part of his attack specifically
Baier argues that no kind of self-interested for C. L. STEVENSON’s idea that thinking about
view, even of the enlightened kind, can work morality involves holding certain factual posi-
since it can never produce a resolution of any tions which, in their turn, lead to action. Baier
moral conflict. He hypothesizes a situation claims that Stevenson is wrong because his view
where two people, B and K, are candidates for restrictively holds that it is only desire that
political office and points out that, under leads to action, while fear, ambition, and other
normal circumstances, although both want to mental states can produce action. Baier is a
be elected, only one can be elected. Baier says type of ethical philosopher usually called a
that it could be argued that B ought to remove “prescriptivist.” Analyses of moral language,
K and, further, that it would be wrong for B not such as those of the logical positivists, interest
to do so. As Baier puts it, B would not have him less than examining the role of moral judg-
“done his duty” otherwise. The same reasoning ments, obligations, etc., in reaching moral deci-
would of course apply to the second candi- sions.
date, K. The second candidate, realizing that his Baier assaults Plato’s theory that there is a
elimination would be in the first candidate’s kind of moral intuition and claims that such a
interest, should try to stop the first candidate. faculty simply does not exist. This is perhaps
Indeed, he would not have done his duty if he arguable since people make moral judgments
did not try to do so. But Baier points out that whereas animals do not, and very often human
this would lead to a kind of paradox, it would beings will agree on a moral attitude regarding
be both right and wrong for the second candi- some real or contemplated action. Perhaps
date to act in this way. It would be wrong what Baier means is that there is no moral intu-
because it prevents B from doing what he itive faculty that produces epistemic certainty
should do, and wrong for B not to do it; and it on any moral question. Neither does Aristotle
would be not wrong because it is what K ought escape Baier’s hard-nosed analysis. He chal-
to do and it would be wrong for K not to do it. lenges Aristotle’s view that moral analysis nec-
But one and the same act (logically) cannot be essarily requires the determination of how we
both morally wrong and not morally wrong. can best achieve the ultimate good. Baier main-
Baier concludes that since one and the same tains that what we ought to do morally has to
action cannot be both right and wrong, in cases do with the goals we want to, or should, seek
like this morality does not apply. Baier claims and not with the best way of achieving these
that all of this is unworkable since it is precisely goals. Hume’s restrictive, quasi-quantitative
the purpose of the moral point of view to inter- account of moral reasoning, based on working
vene when interests collide in this way. With out the consequences, is also attacked.
only self-interest, no conflict of interests could Even with his exhaustive analysis of the role
ever be resolved. Thus, self-interest could not of reason, the different kinds of reason, and
possibly be the same as the moral point of view. reason versus self-interest, etc., it is a tribute to
Baier’s view involves analyzing other inter- Baier’s skills and thoroughness as a philosopher
pretations of how reason figures into moral that he anticipates and analyzes possible objec-
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tions to the role of reason which would strike employees in a corporation are restricted to
most people as unimpressive. According to those duties they agree to of their own free
Baier, reason has had a “bad press” over the choice. Another interesting outcome of Baier’s
past century, with many intellectuals turning to work is his insistence that the right to life is not
nonrational approaches, such as instinct, the a universal right, since it may collide with the
unconscious, the voice of the blood, inspiration, rights of other people. He applied this idea on
charisma, and the like, where they advocate a more general level as well, insisting that the
that one should not follow reason but instead alleged right to life of certain groups of persons
be guided by these other forces. might take precedence over others – an impor-
Baier continues this assault on opponents of tant theme in the abortion issue and other
reason, arguing that the question: “Should I current controversies.
follow reason?” is a tautological one, much
like asking if a circle is a circle, and that the BIBLIOGRAPHY
question “Why should I follow reason?” is as “Good Reasons,” Philosophical Studies 4
silly as “Why is a circle a circle?” It is by no (1953): 1–15.
means obvious, however, that the two are on a “Proving a Moral Judgment,” Philosophical
par. Some may think something askew here, Studies 4 (1953): 33–44.
because clearly there is an entire Eastern tradi- The Moral Point of View: A Rational Basis
tion, along with aspects of the Western tradi- of Ethics (Ithaca, N.Y., 1958; rev. edn
tion, that rejects the role of reason in favor of New York, 1965).
intuition, flashes of insight, etc., and these Ed. with Nicholas Rescher, Values and the
approaches are not nonsensical. Baier is aware Future: The Impact of Technological
of this, qualifies his remarks, and grants that the Change on American Values (New York,
question “Why follow reason?” is meaningful, 1969).
though only in its theoretical, rather than its “Rationality and Morality,” Erkenntnis 11
practical, role as suggested above. (August 1977): 197–223.
However, a word of caution must be noted. “Moral Reasons,” Midwest Studies in
One of the things which Baier’s approach relies Philosophy 3 (1978): 62–74.
on for its utility is the fact that it does not “Defining Morality Without Prejudice,” The
require any systematic set of moral principles. Monist 64 (June 1981): 325–41.
All we need is to find a plausible principle, one “Duties to One’s Employer,” in Just
that seems appropriate for the moral choice Business: New Introductory Essays in
we are facing. The problem rests in the fact Business Ethics, ed. Tom Regan
that these principles must be sound, else they (Philadelphia, 1983), pp. 60–99.
would be useless in making ethical decisions. The Rational and the Moral Order (Chicago,
But, unless one is an intuitionist of some kind, 1995).
or believes that these principles can be derived Problems of Life and Death: A Humanist
from some set of theological principles, we Perspective (Amherst, N.Y., 1997).
have to judge them by their results, thereby
landing ourselves in a type of consequentialism. Further Reading
Baier’s interests go beyond ethical theory, as Encyc Ethics, Oxford Comp Phil, Pres Addr
he has written on such things as technology of APA v8
and business ethics. A good example is his essay Frankena, William K. Ethics (Englewood
“Duties to One’s Employer” (1983) wherein he Cliffs, N.J., 1963).
discusses – and ultimately dismisses – the view Kerner, G. The Revolution in Ethical Theory
that capitalism can support freedom and the (New York, 1966).
good of all of society only if the duties of Schneewind, J. B., ed. Reason, Ethics, and
120
BAKEWELL
Society: Themes from Kurt Baier, with His Philosophical Association in 1910–11. In 1926
Responses (Chicago, 1996). he served on the executive committee of the
International Congress of Philosophy. In 1943
Anthony Serafini he was honored with an LLD from the
University of California. Bakewell died on 19
September 1957 in New Haven, Connecticut.
During World War I, Bakewell served as
inspector and historian under the Italian
Commission of the Red Cross in Italy, with
BAKEWELL, Charles Montague the rank of deputy and commissioner. For this
(1867–1957) service, he was awarded the silver medal of
honor of the Italian Red Cross and was made
Charles M. Bakewell was born on 24 April a Chevalier of the Order of the Crown of Italy.
1867 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. After brief A devoted member of the Republican Party, he
study at Western University of Pennsylvania also took an active role in American politics,
(later the University of Pittsburgh), he received serving in the Connecticut State Senate from
the BA and MA from the University of 1920 to 1924 and as chairman of the
California in 1890 and 1891, where he studied Commission to Revise and Codify Educational
under George H. HOWISON and Joseph Le Laws of Connecticut from 1921 to 1923. The
Conte. Bakewell then received more degrees in pinnacle of Bakewell’s political career came
philosophy from Harvard University: a second when he served one term as a Representative in
MA in 1892 and a PhD in 1894. He worked the United States Congress (1933–5), where he
with William JAMES, George SANTAYANA, Josiah vigorously opposed President Franklin D.
ROYCE, and George H. PALMER, and wrote a Roosevelt’s New Deal policies.
dissertation on “Hegelianism and Man: Or, The two most important influences on
the Problem of the One and the Many from a Bakewell’s mature thought were his close friend
Modern Standpoint.” Bakewell spent the years Thomas D AVIDSON , a Scottish-American
1894 to 1896 studying at the University of philosopher, and William James. Accordingly,
Berlin with Friedrich Paulsen and Georg Bakewell’s philosophy, which can best be
Simmel; the University of Strasbourg with described as a form of personal idealism, was
Wilhelm Windelband; and the Sorbonne in based upon a pluralistic metaphysics and had
Paris with Emile Boutroux. a radical individualistic emphasis.
In 1896 Bakewell returned to Harvard to
serve as an instructor of philosophy for a year, BIBLIOGRAPHY
and then taught at the University of California “The Philosophy of Emerson,” Philosophical
at Berkeley in 1897–8. In 1898 he was Review 12 (1903): 525–36.
appointed associate professor of philosophy at “Latter-Day Flowing-Philosophy,” University
Bryn Mawr College in Pennsylvania. He of California Publications in Philosophy 1
returned to Berkeley in 1900, and became full (1904): 92–114.
professor of philosophy in 1903. He resigned a “The Issue between Idealism and Radical
year later to accept a philosophy professorship Empiricism,” Journal of Philosophy 2
at Yale University. In 1908 he was appointed (1905): 687–91.
Sheldon Clark Professor of Philosophy, suc- “The Ugly Infinite and the Good-for-nothing
ceeding George T. LADD in that chair, and Absolute,” Philosophical Review 16
stayed at Yale until his retirement in 1933. He (1907): 136–43.
was awarded an honorary MA by Yale in “On the Meaning of Truth,” Philosophical
1905. He served as President of the American Review 17 (1908): 579–91.
121
BAKEWELL
“Idealism and Realism,” Philosophical Dewey, John. “Immediate Empiricism,”

Review 18 (1909): 505–13. Journal of Philosophy 2 (1905): 597–9.
“The Problem of Transcendence,” Strong, Charles A. “Why the Mind has a
Philosophical Review 20 (1911): 113–36. Body: Reply to Professor Bakewell,”
“Royce as an Interpreter of American Philosophical Review 13 (1904): 337–42.
Ideals,” International Journal of Ethics 27
(1917): 306–16. James A. Good
“The Continuity of the Idealist Tradition,” in
Contemporary Idealism in America, ed.
Clifford Barrett (New York, 1932), pp.
23–42.
Other Relevant Works BALANCHINE, George (1904–83)

Bakewell’s papers are at Yale University.
Ed., The Education of the Wage-earners: A Georgii Melitonovitch Balanchivadze was born
Contribution toward the Solution of the on 22 January 1904 in Saint Petersburg, Russia.
Educational Problem of Democracy, by He studied dance at the Imperial Theater’s
Thomas Davidson (Boston, 1904). Ballet School, and received a strong musical
Ed., The Philosophy of Goethe’s Faust, by training to become an accomplished pianist.
Thomas Davidson (Boston and New York, In 1924 he joined Serge Diaghilev’s Ballets
1906). Russes in Paris and changed his name to
Ed., Source Book in Ancient Philosophy George Balanchine. At this company he gained
(New York, 1907; 2nd edn 1939). a reputation as a choreographer and started a
Ed., Poems, by Ralph Waldo Emerson lifelong artistic relationship with Igor
(London and New York, 1915). Stravinsky. Their Apollo (1928) was the
Ed., Selected Papers on Philosophy, by turning point that led ballet to the neoclassic
William James (London and New York, style that persists in this art until today.
1917). Balanchine moved to the United States in 1933,
The Story of the American Red Cross in Italy and one year later he opened the School of
(1919). American Ballet, regarded as the most respected
Ed., The Republic, by Plato (New York, ballet conservatory in the USA. In 1948 he
1928). founded the New York City Ballet, which he
“The Philosophy of George Herbert Palmer,” used as a platform for the display of his aes-
in George Herbert Palmer, 1842–1933: thetic ideas and transformed into one of the
Memorial Addresses (Cambridge, Mass., leading companies in the international dance
1935), pp. 3–43. scene. Balanchine created over 200 ballets, as
“The Personal Idealism of George Holmes well as dances for movies and Broadway pro-
Howison,” Philosophical Review 49 ductions. Agon, Concerto Barocco, The Four
(1940): 623–40. Temperaments, Serenade, Symphony in C, and
Theme and Variations are some of his master-
Further Reading pieces. When he died on 30 April 1983 in New
Nat Cycl Amer Bio v45, Pres Addr of York City, he was regarded as the quintessen-
APA v2, Proc of APA v32, Who Was Who tial ballet choreographer of the century.
in Amer v3, Who’s Who in Phil Balanchine’s approach to dance echoes
Biographical Directory of the United States Eduard Hanslick’s philosophy of music. As the
Congress, 1744–1989 (Washington, D.C., Viennese aesthetician, the choreographer
1989). believed that it is formal structure that makes
122
BALCH
artworks enjoyable and dismissed emotional Other Relevant Works

reactions to art as sentimentalism. In his view, 101 Stories of the Great Ballets, with F.
the interplay of music and movement is inter- Mason, 3rd edn (Garden City, N.Y.,
esting in itself. His choreography visualized 1975).
musical form or complemented it by means of “Work in Progress,” with L. Botto,
counterpoint. Rather than paying attention to Intellectual Digest (June 1992): 6–8.
melody, he was interested in rhythm as archi- “An Interview with George Balanchine,”
tecture of time. He was particularly attracted to Horizon 3 (1961): 44–56.
the compositions of Stravinsky, Wolfgang Balanchine’s Tchaikovsky: Interviews with
Amadeus Mozart, Maurice Ravel, and Pyetoer George Balanchine, with Solomon Volkov
Ilyich Tchaikovsky. Even if he created some (New York, 1985).
ballets with argument, his typical works are
plot-less. Still, he did not subscribe to abstrac- Further Reading
tionism on the ground that human bodies Amer Nat Bio, Encyc Amer Bio, Who Was
cannot be abstract. In order to highlight chore- Who in Amer v8
ographic form, he used minimal costumes and Buckle, R. George Balanchine: Ballet Master
scenery. His aesthetics has had a deep impact in (London, 1988).
the creation and appreciation of dance, earning Denby, Edwin. Dance Writings and Poetry,
an important place for formalism in both ballet ed. Robert Cornfield (New Haven, Conn.,
and modern dance. 1998).
Balanchine’s formal experimentation stressed Haggin, B. H. Discovering Balanchine (New
the vocabulary of classical dance that he learned York, 1981).
in Russia, manipulating it in a dynamic mode, Jordan, S. Moving Music: Dialogues with
taking it to extreme possibilities, creating new Music and Dance in Twentieth-Century
step combinations, and at times using distortion Ballet (London, 2000).
as a choreographic device. The resulting style Scholl, T. From Petipa to Balanchine:
has been called neoclassic. The American and Classical Revival and the Modernization of
modern character of Balanchine’s pieces is asso- Ballet (London, 1984).
ciated with their speed, athleticism, and appetite
for space, as well as a certain jazzy and sensual Lester Tome
quality. The artist admired jazz and other
African-American dance forms and incorpo-
rated some of their elements into his choreog-
raphy.
BIBLIOGRAPHY BALCH, Emily Greene (1867–1961)

“Notes on Choreography,” Dance Index 4
(1945): 20–31. Emily Greene Balch was born on 8 January
“Marginal Notes on the Dance,” in The 1867 in Boston, Massachusetts, the daughter
Dance Has Many Faces, ed. Walter Sorrell of Francis V. and Ellen Noyes Balch. She died
(Chicago, 1951), pp. 35–43. on 9 January 1961 in Boston. An innovative
“The Dance Element in Stravinky’s Music,” educator, peace activist, and social reformer,
Dance Index 6 (1947): 250–56. Reprinted Balch received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1946
in Ballet Review 10 (1982): 14–18. for a lifetime of continuous work for the cause
Choreography by Goerge Balanchine: A of peace and justice. She was only the second
Catalogue of Works (New York, 1984). American woman to receive this prize; the first
was her friend and colleague, Jane ADDAMS.
123
BALCH
Balch was a founding member of the Women’s students learned about socialism, labor
International League of Peace and Freedom problems, and immigration issues, often
and worked in an unofficial capacity with both through innovative teaching methods that
the League of Nations and the United Nations. included experiential field-work. She pioneered
She demonstrated her commitment to peace service-oriented coursework, asking her
through the slow and careful work of culti- students to study poverty through hands-on
vating international relationships and research- investigations of slum conditions or by volun-
ing solutions to international problems. She teering at places like Denison House.
wrote or edited six books, contributed chapters In the era prior to World War I, Balch con-
to half a dozen more, wrote eight important sidered “the real business of the times” to be
pamphlets, and published over 120 articles. “the realization of a more satisfactory
She was trained as a sociologist and an econ- economic order.” That was the priority that
omist, but we see in her work the foundations she said she “had given myself unreservedly
of classical American pragmatist philosophy, from my undergraduate days” (1972, p. 77).
particularly in her support of a social democ- From a very early stage, Balch publicly identi-
racy achieved through particular and concrete fied herself as a socialist, but did not consider
social action, her reliance on experience as a herself a Marxist. In February 1909 she and
way of knowing, and in her opposition to class fellow Wellesley faculty member, Vida
hierarchies and international imperialism. SCUDDER, organized a three-day conference on
Balch was a member of the first graduating “Socialism as a World Movement.” She ceased
class of Bryn Mawr College in 1889. After calling herself a socialist after World War II,
graduation she received a fellowship from Bryn when she felt the term began to connote
Mawr in 1890–91 to study economics in Marxism.
France under Emile Levasseur. In 1892 Balch During her teaching years, she was a
was one of the founding members of Denison founding member and one-time President of
House, a settlement house in Boston, where the Women’s Trade Union League and was
she was the “headworker” for the first year. the President of the Massachusetts Minimum
She later returned to academia, believing that Wage Commission (1913), which drafted the
this was an area where she could be more first minimum wage law in the country. She
useful than in settlement work. She studied took two years off from Wellesley to research
sociology with Albion W. S MALL at the Slavic immigration to the United States, trav-
University of Chicago for a semester, and took eling throughout the US and Europe. Our
classes at the Harvard Annex (later named Slavic Fellow Citizens, the result of this inves-
Radcliffe College). She returned to Europe to tigation, was published in 1910.
study economics in Berlin in 1895–6. Her two Once the hostilities of World War I started
years of study in France and Germany formed in Europe, Balch became involved in the
the beginnings of many relationships that national peace movement, first through round-
would become important in her later interna- table meetings with a small group of progres-
tional work. sive reformers, out of which came her publi-
In 1896 Balch was appointed to teach eco- cation “Towards the Peace that Shall Last”
nomics and social science at Wellesley College. and the beginnings of the American Civil
For her, teaching the young women at Liberties Union. She was also an early member
Wellesley was part of her commitment to proof the Women’s Peace Party. She understood
gressive social reform, but throughout her that the threat of war interfered with any
teaching career she also continued to work in progress toward improved social or economic
community and international research, as well systems. Until the threat of war was removed,
as on social activist projects. In her courses, she said, “no permanent or trustworthy
124
BALCH
progress could be made in human relations” campaign against the war, visiting members of
(1972, p. 138). Congress to argue once again for mediation.
Balch was a delegate to the 1915 When the Congressional vote for the declara-
International Congress of Women at The tion of war was taken, a letter from Balch in
Hague, representing the Wellesley branch of opposition to the war was inserted into the
the Women’s Peace Party and the Women’s Congressional Record.
Trade Union League of Boston. As one of the Although she had taught at Wellesley for
forty-eight women activists sailing on the over twenty years, and was the chair of the
Noordam to Europe, she developed closer and department of economics and sociology, in
more collegial relationships with Addams and 1918 the Board of Trustees voted to
other influential female anti-war activists. “postpone” Balch’s reappointment, due to her
Balch edited the proceedings of this Congress peace activism. Her membership in the
at The Hague in three languages (French, People’s Council may have been influential in
German, and English). At the end of the this decision. In 1919, six months after the
Congress, she was one of the six delegates war ended, the Board voted to terminate her
asked to visit with the chief statesmen of contract. She found herself at the age of fifty-
warring and neutral countries in Europe, two with no means of support. For a short
asking for their cooperation in proposed medi- time in 1918 Balch joined the staff of The
ation measures. Balch visited the mostly Nation, before heading back to Europe to par-
neutral northern capitals, as well as Russia. ticipate in what became the founding of the
After returning to the US, she consulted with Women’s International League of Peace and
President Woodrow Wilson about possible Freedom (WILPF).
mediation efforts to end the war. Balch was In 1919 the women who had met at The
also one of the co-authors of Women at The Hague reconvened in Zürich with the goal of
Hague (1915) with Jane Addams and Alice influencing the Versailles Peace Treaty negoti-
Hamilton, published just eight months after ations. As a member of the board and of the
the Congress. executive committee of the International
Although she did not go on the famous Women’s Congress, Balch was responsible for
“Ford Peace Ship,” Balch did play an impor- planning the agenda and drafting resolutions
tant role as a member of the unofficial 1916 for discussion. At the Congress she was
Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation appointed the first international secretary-trea-
in Stockholm from April to July, where she surer of WILPF; in that role she was responsi-
served on the Mediation Committee and ble for setting up the Geneva headquarters and
prepared proposals for mediation. When she establishing relations with the League of
returned to the US, she met with President Nations. She also edited the Pax et Liberatas
Wilson and laid out the plans and conclusions (later titled Pax International), the newsletter
of the Stockholm Conference. Later, Balch of the WILPF. She spent much of her time in
gathered together various proposals for peace Geneva building relationships with the
into her 1918 book, Approaches to the Great members of the new League of Nations and
Settlement. writing proposals for consideration at its
After returning to the US in late 1916, Balch various committees. As the Nobel Peace orga-
joined the American Neutral Conference nization says of Balch, “She helped in one way
Committee, and published the journal Four or another with many projects of the League of
Lights: An Adventure in Internationalism. She Nations – among them, disarmament, the
also joined the Younger People’s Council of internationalization of aviation, drug control,
America, which was seen as a more radical the participation of the United States in the
pacifist organization, and continued to affairs of the League.” (Nobel Lectures, Peace
125
BALCH
1926–1950, 1972) During these early years of national chairs after Addams stepped down
WILPF, Balch continued to be involved in edu- from the position in 1929. She was President
cational work for peace because she believed of the US section of the WILPF in 1931 and
education was a major force for the prevention 1932. In 1933–4, when the WILPF was having
of war. The first summer school of the WILPF financial problems, Balch donated eighteen
on “Education for Internationalism” was orga- months to work at Geneva again, this time as
nized and led by both Balch and Addams. an honorary international secretary. In 1937
Balch resigned from her post as international Emily Balch was elected “Honorary
secretary-treasurer in 1922, but continued to International President” of the WILPF for life,
travel, write, and organize on the WILPF’s as she continued international research, writing
behalf. At the request of Haitian members of position papers, and proposing action plans,
the WILPF, in 1926 Balch headed a six-person many of which were considered by the League
multiracial team to Haiti to investigate and of Nations and later the United Nations.
report on the American occupation of that Balch shared with the American pragma-
nation. The results of this investigation, sup- tists a fundamental belief that the social envi-
plemented by intensive study both before and ronment is capable of transformation through
after the visit, were published in 1927 in intelligence and action. She certainly looked to
Occupied Haiti, edited and mostly written by Jane Addams for inspiration and guidance,
Balch. Reporting on the situation from the not just in policies, but also in moral senti-
Haitian viewpoint, she recounted that Haitians ment, and in ability to understand diverse sides
thought the American occupation was an of an issue. As with most progressive liberals
“unmixed curse.” She herself came to see the of her era, freedom and liberty were main com-
US as an occupying force that robbed Haitians ponents of her philosophy, and because of this,
of the responsibility of self-government, she struggled with the post-World War I atti-
regardless of the good that the Americans tudes. She wrote, in 1934, of fascism as an
thought they were bringing to Haiti in the example of the “powerful current of feeling of
form of bridges, hospitals, and stability. Balch the duty and happiness of merging self in the
did not advocate leaving smaller dependent community” (Randall 1964, p. 326). In 1927
countries such as Haiti completely isolated, Balch warned of the dangers of not thinking
but instead she advocated self-rule, limiting critically about nationalism. “How many
American intervention to assistance rather than Americans not only believe, but openly
control. As she said, “there are more ways of maintain … that unthinking obedience is better
helping a neighbor who is in trouble than than action based on individual conscience
knocking him down and taking possession of and thought, that patriotism is synonymous
his property and family” (1972, p. 147). When with nationalism, that liberty is dangerous,
she returned from Haiti she met with President that peace is a dream, and not even a beauti-
Calvin Coolidge and later submitted a ful dream” (Randall 1964, p. 326).
Memorandum on the situation to the official Balch proposed policies of “international-
Hoover Commission. The Memorandum was ism” that urged global thinking and formal,
piercing in its criticism of the racism of negotiated international agreements. In ways
Americans in Haiti, and she urged the US that are consistent with pragmatist philoso-
Commission studying Haiti to respect its phy, “internationalism” for her was not an
heritage and culture. Many of the specific rec- abstract universal principle; rather she saw it
ommendations in this document were eventu- as specific and particular efforts to direct inter-
ally adopted by the Hoover Commission. national work toward concrete constructive
Balch continued in active leadership in the projects in politics and education. These very
WILPF, becoming one of its three joint inter- particular tasks, she thought, would pave the
126
BALCH
way to international dialogue and under- what is done in our name in inconspicuous
standing, and would lead not to a type of but effective ways” particularly in Latin
world government, but rather to “a complex American, Samoa, and the Philippines. To
interweaving of functional arrangements for counter economic imperialism, she argued for
common interests” (Randall 1964, p. 371). regulation of trade through international
She believed that the dialogue resulting from agreements to protect against any one country
these concrete and functional joint efforts controlling the assets of another. She also
would diminish future threats of war. advocated temporary international trusteeship
For Balch, the key components to develop- of any country currently considered a colonial
ing this philosophy of internationalism are possession. As an example of this international
what she called “reason” and “good will.” trusteeship, she proposed international control
For her, reason did not mean abstract ratio- of the Arctic and Antarctica, as well as inter-
nality but rather it meant employing careful national cooperation in air and ocean trans-
and clear analysis to understand the problem portation.
as well as intentional empathic effort truly to World War II caused Balch anguish, as she
understand other viewpoints. In a 1949 essay found she could not support an entirely pacifist
she described good will as “a powerful activity position, believing that force was necessary to
of will directed to the good of others” (Randall combat Nazism. She believed that the necessity
1964, p. 185). Later, in the mid 1950s, she of military action in this war was a tragedy
acknowledged the “weak spots” or insuffi- resulting from the hostility and mismanagement
ciency of merely good will; she pointed out that of peace processes after World War I. In her sev-
prejudices based on differences of color, enties, Balch turned her energies toward tireless
religion, or of historical background and tra- work to obtain affidavits for individuals at risk
ditions need to be brought to awareness and in Germany, making it possible for German
addressed more specifically. In addition to refugees to escape from Nazi persecution and
reason and good will, she argued that find asylum in the US. Domestically, she worked
“adequate international organizations” were toward restraint against “heresy-hunting” or
needed to develop and maintain relationships blame on immigrant groups.
and laws. Balch was particularly concerned about
Throughout her international work, Balch colonialism resurfacing after World War II,
opposed colonialism and imperialism in all of and advocated that all trusteeships that
its forms, but always urged a nonviolent resulted from the peace process must be held
approach to ending colonialism. “Such internationally through the United Nations.
tyranny,” she said, “is bound to come to an Although the US said it did not claim territo-
end. May it go, not with violence and explo- ries after the war, in her article “America’s
sion, but as the ice goes in the spring through New and Irresponsible Imperialism” she crit-
resistless thawing.” (Randall 1964, p. 380) In icized the growing network of American strate-
a 1926 article titled “Economic Imperialism gic military bases, particularly on Pacific
with Special Reference to the United States,” islands mandated to Japan. In a paper written
she warned Americans of economic imperial- in 1945, she said that instead of this “strategic
ism – the “free field for profit makers” in less imperialism,” all military bases should be
powerful but “nominally independent under United Nations international control,
peoples.” She worried that Americans rarely and that local and civilian functions would be
thought critically about international business coordinated with military functions.
negotiations and economic imperialism in the As part of her opposition to imperialism,
beginning of the twentieth century; as Balch Balch fought for international standards for
said, Americans are “complacently unaware of human rights. She regretted that the League of
127
BALCH
Nations had not adopted a minimum human practice of thinking with others. She was
rights standard. In 1945, as the United Nations critical of American military preparations
was being established, she wrote to the President during the Cold War for many reasons, not the
of the conference urging for a Declaration of least because it perpetuated fear internationally
Specific International Rights of Individuals and and nationally. She understood that this fear
Groups. She advocated non-military forms of and suspicion corroded good will and pre-
pressure, such as embargoes or blockades, but vented rational judgment. She urged
was opposed to all forms of food blockades. Americans to continue thinking carefully about
In 1942, at a celebration of her seventy-fifth national policies during the McCarthy period,
birthday, Balch gave a short speech, “Towards saying she was “taken by surprise … most of
a Planetary Civilization.” She proposed more all by the hostility to thought lest it lead to
international administration of matters of change” (Randall 1964, p. 432). In this period,
common interest, using the airlines and the she continued to emphasize the importance of
shipping industries as examples, but did not education and dialogue, asking Americans to
advocate a “world government” since, as she look beyond their national boundaries to
says, she “see(s) no reason to be sure that a understand other countries and other posi-
world government would be run by men very tions. She challenged Americans to read papers
different in capacity and moral quality from in foreign languages, including articles that
those that govern national states.” She con- take positions other than their own, asking
tinued, “international unity is not in itself the Americans to think critically about what was
solution … if it is autocratic and not coopera- fed to them by the media. In her Nobel lecture
tive in tone, it may indeed be a Frankenstein” in Oslo, she reiterated her call to critical and
(Randall 1964, p. 346–7). She argued instead diverse thinking. “We must remember that
for an international unity that has a “disci- nothing can be woven out of threads that all
pline of moral standards.” run the same way. An unchallenged belief or
After receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in idea is on the way to death and meaningless-
1946, Balch continued for more than a decade ness.” (Randall 1964, pp. 433–4)
to work for peace, working with the WILPF, Throughout her long life, Balch worked for
writing essays, and meeting with other activists both economic and political change which she
and writers. In the 1940s and 1950s, she thought would lead to human progress,
became concerned about the cultural and working through both political and grassroots
mostly unconscious type of imperialism that efforts. In 1972 Balch’s biographer Mercedes
the United States was then practicing: the Randall said, “Unlike Jane Addams, Emily
intent to “see to it that the American way of Balch was not a philosopher. Her mind was
life makes the tour of the globe.” realistic and concrete … . She thought in terms
Counteracting the seeming naïveté of of specific problems and solutions; her pro-
Americans in the 1950s, so sure of the morals posals were not derived from abstract princi-
and values of their country, Balch attempted to ples.” (Randall 1964, p. 164) It may be true
draw critical attention to US policies of that she was not trained as a philosopher in
economic imperialism. As she said, “perhaps terms of traditional academic philosophy. But
America is all the more to be feared because part of the work to open up the definition of
our urge to spread our creed is so largely quite philosophy and to hear new or excluded voices
unconscious as well as uncritical” (Randall in the philosophic conversation leads us to
1964, p. 183). understand the wider implications of what it
During the Cold War, she cautioned means to be a philosopher in the world. Balch
Americans against fear and cynicism, advo- certainly worked within what can be seen as
cating once again “active good will” and the both pragmatist and feminist philosophy,
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BALDWIN
quietly breaking cultural boundaries for what (1961): 6–8.

was considered “women’s” work. When she ———, Improper Bostonian: Emily Greene
died in 1961, after nearly a century of dedi- Balch (New York, 1964).
cated international work, she left a political Shane, Martha P., ed. Papers of Emily
and cultural world dramatically different from Greene Balch, 1875–1961: Guide to the
the one she was born into in 1867. Scholarly Resources Microfilm Edition
(Wilmington, Del., 1988).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Public Assistance of the Poor in France Judy D. Whipps
(Baltimore, Md., 1893).
Our Slavic Fellow-Citizens (New York,
1910).
Contributions to Neutral Conference for
Continuous Mediation (Stockholm,
1916). BALDWIN, James Mark (1861–1934)
Approaches to the Great Settlement (New
York, 1918). James Mark Baldwin was born on 12 January
Women at The Hague: The International 1861 in Columbia, South Carolina, and died
Congress of Women and Its Results, with on 9 November 1934 in Paris, France. He was
Jane Addams and Alice Hamilton (New the son of Cyrus Hull Baldwin, businessman
York, 1915; Urbana, Ill., 2003). and occasional federal official, and Lydia
“The Hopes We Inherit,” with Jane Eunice Ford. After attending a series of private
Addams, in Building International Good elementary schools and spending two years as
Will (New York, 1927). a clerk in Columbia, Baldwin traveled north in
Occupied Haiti (New York, 1927). 1878 to enter the Salem (New Jersey)
The Miracle of Living (New York, 1941). Collegiate Institute, a private preparatory
Beyond Nationalism: Social Thought of school. Three years later, in 1881, he enrolled
Emily Greene Balch, ed. Mercedes M. as a sophomore at Princeton. Baldwin’s colle-
Randall (New York, 1972). giate coursework was focused on language
and philosophy. Under the influence of James
Other Relevant Works MCCOSH, he was introduced to both Scottish
Balch’s papers are in the Peace Collection of mental philosophy and the new experimental
Swarthmore College, Pennsylvania. psychology of Wilhelm Wundt. The contra-
dictions inherent in this juxtaposition provided
Further Reading the telos for much of his later intellectual devel-
Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, opment.
Dict Amer Bio, Who Was Who in Amer After graduating from Princeton with a BA
v4 in 1884, Baldwin went to Germany with the
“Emily Greene Balch,” in Nobel Lectures, support of the Green Fellowship in Mental
Peace 1926–1950, ed. F. W. Haberman Science. There he spent a semester at Berlin,
(Amsterdam, 1972). studying Spinoza under Friedrich Paulsen and
Randall, John Herman, Jr. Emily Greene a semester at Leipzig in Wilhelm Wundt’s
Balch of New England: Citizen of the recently established psychological laboratory.
World (Washington, D.C., 1940). By 1885, when he returned to Princeton as an
Randall, Mercedes M. “A Great instructor in French and German, he had
Internationalist: The Passing of Emily become a devotee of Spinozan metaphysics
Greene Balch,” Pax et Libertas 26 and a self-described “enthusiast” for the new
129
BALDWIN
physiological psychology. At Princeton, first laboratory of experimental psychology

Baldwin prepared a translation of Théodule (and thus the first in the British Empire) and
Ribot’s German Psychology of To-day (1886) initiated a groundbreaking series of studies on
and published his first significant paper, “The infant reaching. This work was important not
Postulates of a Physiological Psychology” only because it was psychology’s first system-
(1887), in which he combined principles of atic, quantitative, and reasonably controlled
the Scottish mental philosophy, the meta- experimental research on infant development
physics of Spinoza, and Wundtian psychology but also because it marked the beginning of
into what he conceived to be an integrative Baldwin’s shift toward the evolutionary per-
framework for mental science. spective on mind for which he is now best
Baldwin moved to Illinois in 1887 to accept remembered.
the position of professor of philosophy at Lake At Toronto, Baldwin also completed the
Forest University. In 1888 he married Helen second and final volume of his Handbook of
Hayes Green and completed his PhD in phi- Psychology, Feeling and Will, which appeared
losophy from Princeton. Although he had ini- in 1891. Replacing the global concept of
tially hoped to do his dissertation on Spinoza, “apperception,” around which the first volume
McCosh insisted instead that he produce a had been organized, with a focus on what
refutation of materialism. This he did, pub- would now be called “mechanisms of
lishing the work in part in 1890 as “Recent learning,” Baldwin argued that this process
Discussion in Materialism.” While at Lake involves both a consolidation of habit, char-
Forest, Baldwin also completed the first acterized psychologically by diffusion of atten-
volume of his Handbook of Psychology tion and automatic action, and an accommo-
(1889). Subtitled Senses and Intellect, it drew dation to new elements, characterized psy-
heavily on the “old” mental philosophy tradi- chologically by concentration of attention and
tion, albeit leavened with more than a smat- voluntary action. Also apparent in the second
tering of the “new” psychology. Dividing the volume of the Handbook is Baldwin’s growing
intellect into apperceptive and rational func- interest in what would come to be called the
tions, Baldwin devoted most of the book to “sensorimotor principle.” When an element
apperception. This he defined as an “activity of of reality is presented to the consciousness of
synthesis by which mental data of any kind an infant (e.g., when a rattle is shown to a
(sensations, percepts, concepts) are constructed baby), the infant’s tendency is to cognize that
into higher forms of relation” (p. 65) and dis- element through direct and immediate action
cussed in terms of Presentation (sensation and on it (such as grasping, shaking, or sucking a
perception), Representation (memory and rattle). Struck by the similarity between this
recognition), Combination (association, imag- principle and that seemingly involved in
ination, and illusion), and Elaboration hypnotic suggestibility, a phenomenon then
(thought). In a much shorter treatment of the very much at the center of psychological
rational function, Baldwin argued, following interest in France, Baldwin returned to Europe
McCosh, that rational intuition is both con- in the summer of 1892 to obtain a deeper
stitutive and regulative of mind, mental act understanding of new work on hypnotism and
and mental product, and that it leads irrevo- suggestion.
cably to the “ultimate end of knowledge … the Influenced especially by Hippolyte
comprehension of self in relation to the world Bernheim’s view of suggestion as the expres-
and God” (p. 324). sion of an idiodynamic tendency of mind in
In late 1889 Baldwin accepted the Chair of which ideas are cognized directly in terms of
Logic and Metaphysics at the University of related actions without the mediation of reflec-
Toronto, where he soon established Canada’s tion, Baldwin began to call attention to the
130
BALDWIN
suggestibility of the human infant, in whom the ontogenesis and phylogenesis. Because this par-
capacity for reflection is as yet undeveloped. allelism is only approximate, however, and
Recognizing in addition that many of the because stages necessary to phylogenesis are
actions most readily elicited idiodynamically in often lacking in ontogenesis, he began to
infants bear some resemblance to characteris- consider the possibility that individual adapta-
tics of the presentations (e.g., smiles, waves, tions are somehow linked to the evolutionary
vocalizations) that elicit them, Baldwin became history of the species. To lay the groundwork
convinced of the importance of imitation in the for this perspective, Baldwin developed his
child’s development, particularly with respect earlier view of the relation of habit to accom-
to the regulation of habit and accommoda- modation into a biological theory of individual
tion in voluntary action. intellectual growth or adaptation.
In 1893 Baldwin returned to Princeton to Children, Baldwin argued, are biologically
assume the Stuart Chair in Psychology. There he endowed with the ability to retain and act on
founded a new psychological laboratory, co- that which is worth repeating (i.e., “habit”) and
founded one of psychology’s most influential to vary their activity within certain constraints
journals, The Psychological Review, in 1894, in relationship to circumstance (i.e., “accom-
and set out to elaborate his views on habit, modation”). Because the environment naturally
accommodation, and imitation into what would constrains the child’s action, some variations
become his two most influential contributions in action lead to more fruitful environmental
to psychology, Mental Development in the outcomes than others. Actions that produce
Child and the Race (1895) and Social and better outcomes are more likely to be repeated
Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development: (i.e., are selected by the environment) and to
A Study in Social Psychology (1897). lead in turn to additional variations that are
From the opening pages of Mental even more successful. Adaptation, in other
Development, Baldwin made it clear that he no words, takes place through a gradual, circular
longer subscribed to the mental philosophy view process in which actions (and ultimately
of mind. “The older idea of the soul,” he wrote, thoughts) are repeated with variation and envi-
“was of a fixed substance, with fixed attrib- ronmental selection. Circular reaction – repeti-
utes. Knowledge of the soul was immediate in tion of action with variation and selection –
consciousness, and adequate… . The mind was constitutes an invariant, functional mechanism
best understood where best or most fully man- through which the mind develops toward a
ifested… . If the adult consciousness shows the more adequate apprehension of reality.
presence of principles not observable in the child Having laid out a theory of individual adap-
consciousness, we must suppose, nevertheless, tation, Baldwin then addressed the problem of
that they are really present in the child con- the relationship between development in the
sciousness beyond the reach of our observa- individual and that in the species. “No theory of
tion… . The genetic idea reverses all this. Instead development,” he suggested, “is complete …
of a fixed substance, we have the conception of which does not account for the transmission in
a growing, developing activity. Functional psy- some way, from one generation to another, of
chology succeeds faculty psychology … the the gains of the earlier generations …” (p. 204)
adult consciousness must, if possible, be inter- In 1895 he was only beginning to articulate the
preted by principles present in the child con- principle that he invoked to serve this function,
sciousness.” (1895, pp. 2–3) a principle that he termed “organic selection.”
Mind, Baldwin now recognized, must be con- In its most developed form (in Development
strued developmentally, both in the individual and Evolution, 1902), the basic idea was that
and in the species. Adopting a modified reca- adaptive behaviors acquired in the course of
pitulationism, he argued for an analogy between experience differentially increase the survival
131
BALDWIN
rate of organisms born with hereditary varia- their sense of self. For Baldwin, the self and the
tions that favor those acquisitions. Over evo- other were fundamentally social and inher-
lutionary time, therefore, acquired adaptations ently linked. It was this linkage that underlay
can become congenital. Although this idea, acculturation, the process by which children
later termed the “Baldwin effect,” has had rel- became like-minded members of the social
atively little currency in modern evolutionary groups of which they were a part.
theory, it has become quite influential in In addition to being awarded the Gold
current work on evolutionary algorithms in Medal of the Danish Royal Academy, Social
computer science. Reprinted six times within and Ethical Interpretations served as a funda-
ten years and translated into at least four lan- mental source of ideas for later thinkers. For
guages, Mental Development influenced a example, many of the most important concepts
number of important scholars. Of these, the of George Herbert MEAD’s symbolic interac-
best known is probably the Swiss genetic epis- tionism were derived from Baldwin (Holmes
temologist, Jean Piaget, who made significant 1942); Lev Vygotsky’s analysis of the encul-
use of Baldwin’s ideas (Broughton and turating force of the social system of meanings
Freeman-Moir 1982, Cahan 1984). into which the child is born was influenced by
Baldwin’s Social and Ethical Interpretations Baldwin’s views on social heredity (Valsiner
in Mental Development: A Study in Social and Van der Veer 1988); and Baldwin stimu-
Psychology was the first book to have “social lated both Piaget and, later, Lawrence
psychology” in its title. Baldwin extended the KOHLBERG to the study of children’s moral
principle of circular reaction to the domain of development (Broughton and Freeman-Moir
social interaction, developing a theory of social 1982).
adaptation to complement his theory of indi- Elected President of the American
vidual adaptation. In his view, social adapta- Psychological Association in 1897, Baldwin
tion took place through a continuous three- prepared a presidential address titled “On
phase, dialectical process in which children Selective Thinking” (1898), which is founda-
acted as others did, experienced themselves in tional for evolutionary epistemology.
ways that were similar to others, and assumed Conceiving of thinking in terms of variation
that the experiences of others were similar to with selection, he suggested that “the discovery
their own. In the first phase, which Baldwin of truth … [is] an adaptation to a given set of
called the projective phase, children modeled data, proceeding by a series of tentative selec-
their behavior imitatively on that of others tions from variations of imagery and fragments
(e.g., smiling when others smile). In acting as of hypothetical value… . Truth is what is
others did, children then naturally experienced selected under the control of the system of estab-
themselves in ways that were similar to the lished thoughts and facts, and assimilated to
experiences of others (e.g., just as others felt the body of socially acquired knowledges and
themselves smile, so too did the child). This beliefs. Truth thus becomes a tentative and
was the second or subjective phase. Finally, in slowly-expanding body of data, more or less
struggling at the same time to understand adequately reflecting the stable whole of thought
others, children just as naturally assumed that and action which is accepted as reality, and in
the subjectivity of the other was similar to turn enlarging and clarifying that whole.”
their own. Baldwin called this the ejective (1930, pp. 9–10) Although obviously consis-
phase. In the interplay between shared action, tent with early pragmatism, Baldwin’s interac-
a subjective feeling of self, and understanding tive instrumentalism was founded on the prin-
of the other, in other words, children’s sense of ciple that “knowledge presupposes a dualism of
self grew through common action with others controls: the agent, on the one hand, and the
and their sense of the other grew in terms of recognized world of truth and reality … on the
132
BALDWIN
other” (p. 10). In Baldwin’s view, this meant of logical meaning, and implication to higher-
that his approach was immune to the charges of order logical operations and aesthetic experi-
relativism and subjectivism sometimes directed ence.
towards pragmatism. Baldwin was, as always, engaged in trying to
During this same year, Baldwin also began to comprehend the relationship between reason
immerse himself in editorial work on what is and reality, thought and things. As he put it: “I
arguably his most important contribution to find that these dualisms are of a certain first-
philosophy, the Dictionary of Philosophy and hand and unreflective crudeness in the epochs
Psychology (1901–1905), widely known as before the rise of Judgment and Reflection, and
“Baldwin’s Dictionary.” A collaborative effort that they cannot be finally resolved by the ‘prac-
that brought together over fifty of the best minds tical’ methods of that epoch, as is claimed by
of the day (including William JAMES, John Instrumentalism or Pragmatism; that they are
D EWEY , Charles Sanders P EIRCE , Hugo given refined and characteristic form when
M ÜNSTERBERG , and Edward Bradford melted up and re-cast in the dualism of
TITCHENER among others), the Dictionary was Reflection, that of Self and Not-self, or Subject
an attempt to provide systematic definitions for and Object. Yet Thought as such, Reflection,
all major philosophical and psychological cannot resolve its own Dualisms; Rationalism is
concepts. As general editor, Baldwin found as helpless before the final problem of the
himself inundated with ideas. Every article meaning of Reality as is the cruder Pragmatism.”
received his personal attention; and for a time at (vol. 1, pp. ix–x)
least every author became his regular corre- For Baldwin, the final synthesis of subject
spondent. and object was to be found “… in a form of
The effect of this remarkable undertaking contemplation, Aesthetic in character … [in
was immediate. Baldwin’s international repu- which] the immediacy of experience constantly
tation soared. This led to his receiving Oxford seeks to re-establish itself. In the highest form of
University’s first honorary doctorate of science such contemplation, a form which comes to
in 1900 and to honorary degrees from the itself as genuine and profound Aesthetic
University of Glasgow (1901), the College of Experience, we find a synthesis of motives, a
South Carolina (1905), and the University of mode in which the strands of the earlier and
Geneva (1909). For the first time, his writings diverging dualisms are merged and fused. In
begin to reflect the influence of G. W. F. Hegel, this experience of a fusion which is not a
Hermann Lotze, Alexius Meinong, and others. mixture, but which issues in a meaning of its
What had been a nascent interest in logic own sort and kind, an experience whose essen-
became a central concern. After 1902 the tial character is just its unity of comprehension,
content and method of Baldwin’s work were consciousness has its completest and most direct
almost entirely philosophical; and in 1903 he and final apprehension of what reality is and
resigned his appointment in psychology at means.” (p. x)
Princeton to become professor of philosophy Dense, conceptually difficult, encumbered
and psychology at Johns Hopkins University. by an unrestrained tendency to neologism, and
Baldwin founded the Psychological Bulletin in appearing when psychology was struggling to
1904, and initiated work that would eventually free itself from philosophy, Thought and
become the three-volume Thought and Things Things was little read and less appreciated.
… or Genetic Logic (1906–11). In this work he Yet it represents, in some fundamental sense,
traced the development of cognition and expe- the natural culmination of Baldwin’s intellec-
rience from pre-logical thought, imagery, tual development. From mental philosopher
memory, play, and the rise of meaning through to evolutionary psychologist to evolutionary
discursive thought, reflection, the development epistemologist, he was constantly in search of
133
BALDWIN
an integrative balance between epistemological the outbreak of World War I, he devoted much
extremes – biology vs. culture, individual vs. of his time to lobbying for American entrance
society, thought vs. action, truth vs. value – in into the war on the side of the Allies. In 1916
the progressive coordination of thought with he wrote a “Message from Americans Abroad
things. In his final work in this series, a fourth to Americans at Home” that was widely cir-
volume separately titled Genetic Theory of culated by the American Rights League, pub-
Reality (1915), Baldwin went on to argue that lished a small book critical of Wilsonian neu-
this coordination leads, in its ultimate trality, American Neutrality, Its Cause and
outcome, to a kind of aesthetic experience (a Cure, and delivered an attack on German
“pancalism”) in which these dichotomies are political ideology in the Herbert Spencer
overcome. This was the endpoint of Baldwin’s Lecture at Oxford, “The Super-state and the
own intellectual development, and he consid- ‘Eternal Values’.” In that same year, Baldwin,
ered it to be his most important contribution his wife, and daughter survived a German
to human thought. torpedo attack on the Sussex, an unarmed
In 1908, in mid career, Baldwin suffered a French passenger ship crossing the English
personal fiasco. Arrested in a raid on a Channel. His open telegram to Woodrow
Baltimore bordello and forced in 1909 to Wilson about the affair was embodied in an
resign from Johns Hopkins, he exiled himself editorial of 4 April 1916 in the New York
both from America and from American psy- Times condemning the attack.
chology. Between 1908 and 1912 he divided Throughout the war, Baldwin contributed to
his time between residence in Paris and trips to charity and relief efforts organized on behalf of
Mexico, where he served the government as an the French, and in 1917 he was awarded the
occasional advisor on higher education and Legion of Honor for his efforts. After the
lectured in the School of Higher Studies at the USA’s entrance into the war, he helped
National University. organize a Paris branch of the American Navy
While in Mexico, Baldwin worked on two of League; and after the Armistice, he maintained
his final contributions to psychology. In informal academic contacts with Pierre Janet,
Darwin and the Humanities, which appeared Henri Bergson, and others. His memoirs, with
in 1909 and focused on Darwin’s own human selected letters, were published in 1926 as
studies, he attempted to demonstrate how the Between Two Wars (1861–1921).
natural selectionist account could be related to Baldwin was not only important in the early
important issues in psychology, ethics, logic, institutional history of American philosophy
philosophy, and religion through the applica- and psychology, he was one of the period’s
tion of his own principle of organic selection. most sophisticated thinkers. His biosocial
In Individual and Society, published in 1911, approach introduced a level of complexity in
he argued for a psychological (as against a conceptualization of the mind, its evolutionary
sociological) analysis of the nature of the social origins, ontogenetic development, and socio-
bond, the “rules of organization … which cultural formation that went far beyond the
characterize the personal development of prevailing thought of the period. He addressed
minds in relation to one another … [and] the topics as varied as the nature of developmen-
inner development of the social life within the tal and evolutionary mechanisms, the rela-
group” (p. 9). tionship between reason and reality, the genesis
In 1910, Baldwin was elected to succeed of logic, the value of aesthetic experience, and
William James as Correspondent of the the nature and development in children of
Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, habit, imitation, creative invention, altruism,
Institute of France. From 1912 until his death, egoism, morality, social suggestibility, social
Paris was his primary place of residence. After self, self-awareness, theory of mind, and encul-
134
BALDWIN
turation. His use and in some cases introduc- Genetic Theory of Reality (New York,
tion of concepts such as multiplicity of self, 1915).
ideal self, self-esteem, assimilation, accommo- Between Two Wars (1861–1921) (Boston,
dation, primary circular reaction, genetic logic, 1926).
genetic epistemology, and social heredity
exerted a formative influence on later scholars. Other Relevant Works
When Baldwin left psychology in 1908, Trans., German Psychology of Today, by
however, there were few who would or could Théodule Ribot (New York, 1886).
follow his intellectual lead. He had few Ed., Dictionary of Philosophy and
students, and American psychology was com- Psychology, 3 vols (New York,
mitting itself to an experimental empiricism 1901–1905).
irrelevant to his interests. By 1929 Baldwin Development and Evolution (New York,
could be dismissed with the assertion that his 1902).
“felicitous literary style, surpassed only by Fragments in Philosophy and Science (New
James, gave a transient vitality to his ideas: York, 1902).
but his effect was not permanent” (Boring History of Psychology (London, 1913).
1929, p. 518). What could not then be foreseen “James Mark Baldwin,” in A History of
was that many of Baldwin’s ideas would one Psychology in Autobiography, vol. 1, ed.
day return to psychology indirectly, through C. Murchison (Worcester, Mass., 1930),
the work of scholars such as Piaget, Mead, pp. 1–30.
and Vygotsky. Selected Works of James Mark Baldwin, 6
vols, ed. Robert W. Wozniak (Bristol,
BIBLIOGRAPHY UK, 2001).
“The Postulates of a Physiological
Psychology,” Presbyterian Review 8 Further Reading
(1887): 427–40. Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
Handbook of Psychology: Senses and Bio Dict Psych, Bio 20thC Phils, Dict
Intellect (New York, 1889). Amer Bio, Encyc Psych, Nat Cycl Amer
“Recent Discussion in Materialism,” Bio v25, Who Was Who in Amer v1
Presbyterian and Reformed Review 1 Boring, E. G. A History of Experimental
(1890): 357–72. Psychology (New York, 1929).
Handbook of Psychology: Feeling and Will Broughton, J. M., and D. J. Freeman-Moir,
(New York, 1891). eds. The Cognitive-Developmental
Mental Development in the Child and the Psychology of James Mark Baldwin
Race (New York, 1895). (Norwood, N.J., 1982).
Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Cahan, E. D. “The Genetic Psychologies of
Development: A Study in Social James Mark Baldwin and Jean Piaget,”
Psychology (New York, 1897). Developmental Psychology 20 (1984):
“On Selective Thinking,” Psychological 128–35.
Review 5 (1898): 1–25. Holmes, E. C. Social Philosophy and the
Thought and Things: A Study of the Social Mind: A Study of the Genetic
Development and Meaning of Thought Methods of J. M. Baldwin, G. H. Mead,
or Genetic Logic, 3 vols (New York, and J. E. Boodin (New York, 1942).
1906–11). Valsiner, J., and R. Van der Veer. “On the
Darwin and the Humanities (Baltimore, Social Nature of Human Cognition: An
1909). Analysis of the Shared Intellectual Roots
The Individual and Society (Boston, 1911). of George Herbert Mead and Lev
135
BALDWIN
Vygotsky,” Journal for the Theory of losophy faculty of Tulane University in 1946,
Social Behavior 18 (1988): 117–36. and remained there for the rest of his career. He
Wozniak, Robert H. “Thought and Things: was promoted to full professor in 1956, and in
James Mark Baldwin and the Biosocial 1977 he was named W. R. Irby Professor of
Origins of Mind,” in Psychology: Philosophy. Ballard was President of the
Theoretical-Historical Perspectives, ed. Southern Society for Philosophy and
R. W. Rieber and K. Salzinger Psychology in 1967. He served on the board of
(Washington, D.C., 1998), pp. 429–53. directors of the Center for Advanced Research
in Phenomenology during the 1980s. He retired
Robert H. Wozniak in 1980, and died on 8 September 1989 in El
Cerrito, California.
Ballard was one of the most important of the
early readers in the United States of what has
come to be called the continental tradition in
philosophy. He learned about Maurice
BALLARD, Edward Godwin (1910–89) Merleau-Ponty in France and first wrote about
him in 1957. Ballard next studied Edmund
Edward Ballard was born on 3 January 1910 Husserl and Martin Heidegger. His students
in Fairfax, Virginia. After receiving his BA in include Bernard Dauenhauer, Lester Embree,
1931 from the College of William and Mary, Kathleen Haney, John Sallis, and Michael
Ballard did graduate study in philosophy at Zimmerman.
the University of Virginia, receiving his MA in Ballard’s masterwork is a trilogy in which he
1936. Scott Buchanan, Stringfellow Barr, explores philosophy of history. His view, fol-
William Weedon, and Lewis Hammond, all lowing Karl Jaspers, is that history proceeds
leaders in the interbellum revival of the liberal through historical epochs. The task of philos-
tradition, taught him that the liberal arts were ophy is “the interpretation of archaic experi-
disciplines that freed the soul from its ancient ence.” As he explains in the first volume,
enemies: ignorance and prejudice. His lifelong Philosophy at the Crossroads (1971), modern
interest was in Plato whom he considered the philosophy broke from the perennial philoso-
first liberal artist and founder of the liberal arts phy because, beginning with Descartes, it val-
tradition. Ballard’s last published work was a orizes intellectual rationality – specifically as
collection of essays in the theory of the liberal expressed mathematically – to the exclusion of
arts. the truths of feeling. The Ancients in contrast
Ballard left Virginia for a brief period of work recognized that a human being was forever in
at Harvard where he studied with the poet, the breach between the two sides of his nature:
Robert Lowell, and the philosopher, A. N. reason and emotion. Poetic inspiration from
WHITEHEAD, who encouraged him to complete beyond must be honored, too. Ballard shows
the PhD in philosophy. Before he did so, that today we are still faced with the choice
Ballard taught English as an instructor at the between following the Cartesian path or
Virginia Military Academy, thereby becoming resuming the task of trying to become a whole
a member of Virginia’s militia. He served in the human being by acknowledging and reinte-
United States Navy as an officer in the subma- grating our dual nature.
rine corps during World War II. He received his The second volume, Man and Technology
PhD in philosophy from the University of (1978), describes technological man, one
Virginia in 1947, writing a dissertation titled option of the choice we are being asked to
“Of Poetic Knowledge: An Inquiry into a make at this historical crossroad. We can
Cognitive Aspect of Poetry.” He joined the phi- follow along the path of our culture or we can
136
BALZ
choose restoration of ourselves as human BALZ, Albert George Adam (1887–1957)

persons. The third and concluding volume,
Principles of Interpretation (1983), suggests Albert G. A. Balz was born on 3 January 1887
that the phenomenological epoche operates at in Charlottesville, Virginia. He received his BA
the successive levels of insight as the hero moves from the University of Virginia in 1908 and his
through in a tragedy. The self is a meaning- MA the following year. Balz became a fellow in
maker, who points back at being, “the non- philosophy at Columbia University for
being that renders meaning-giving possible.” 1912–13, and received his PhD in philosophy
Self-knowledge requires establishing a relation in 1916. Balz studied under John DEWEY, and
to one’s source, for therein lies the key to his dissertation, on “Idea and Essence in the
becoming oneself and realizing one’s own Philosophies of Hobbes and Spinoza,” was
meaning. published in 1918. In 1918 he served as Second
Lieutenant in the US Army Infantry.
BIBLIOGRAPHY Balz became an instructor of philosophy at
Art and Analysis: An Essay Toward a Theory the University of Virginia in 1910, and was an
in Aesthetics (The Hague, 1957). adjunct professor from 1911 until 1915. In
Socratic Ignorance: An Essay on Platonic 1915 he became associate professor, followed
Self-knowledge (The Hague, 1965). in 1919 by promotion to full professor. In 1936
Philosophy at the Crossroads (Baton Rouge, he was appointed Corcoran Professor of
La., 1971). Philosophy. He served as chair of the depart-
Man and Technology: Toward the ment from 1928 to 1954. He was President of
Measurement of a Culture (Pittsburgh, the Eastern Division of the American
1978). Philosophical Association in 1955–6. Balz
Principles of Interpretation (Athens, Ohio, retired in 1957, and died on 1 October 1957 in
1983). Charlottesville, Virginia.
Philosophy and the Liberal Arts (Dordrecht, Balz’s philosophical interests centered on
1989). early modern philosophy, especially Descartes.
Many of his writings are included in Cartesian
Further Reading Studies (1951) and Descartes and the Modern
Proc of APA v31, Who Was Who in Amer Mind (1952), which was awarded the Nicholas
v10 Murray Butler Medal by Columbia University.
Neville, Robert C. “A Critical Study of Balz was deeply concerned with the state of
Edward G. Ballard’s Socratic Ignorance: philosophy and the humanities in the South. In
An Essay on Platonic Self-Knowledge,” 1952 he published A Survey of the Humanities
International Philosophical Quarterly 7 in Southern Institutions and in 1954 Southern
(1967): 340–56. Teachers of Philosophy.
Sallis, John, ed. Philosophy and Archaic
Experience: Essays in Honor of Edward BIBLIOGRAPHY
G. Ballard (Pittsburgh, 1982). “Dualism and Early Modern Philosophy,”
Whittemore, Robert C., ed. Philosophical Journal of Philosophy 15 (1918):
Perspectives: Essays in Honor of Edward 197–219, 225–41.
Goodwin Ballard. Tulane Studies in Idea and Essence in the Philosophies of
Philosophy, vol. 29 (New Orleans, 1980). Hobbes and Spinoza (New York, 1918).
Contains a bibliography of Ballard’s The Basis of Social Theory, with W. S. A.
writings. Pott (New York, 1924).
The Value Doctrine of Karl Marx (New
Kathleen M. Haney York, 1943).
137
BALZ
“Matter and Scientific Efficiency,” Journal of BARAKA, Imamu Amiri (1934– )

Philosophy 41 (1944): 645–64, 673–85.
“Nature, Knowledge, and Myth,” Journal of Amiri Baraka was born LeRoi Jones on 7
Philosophy 43 (1946): 253–66, 288–302. October 1934 in Newark, New Jersey, to an
Cartesian Studies (New York, 1951). ambitious lower-middle-class family. His edu-
Descartes and the Modern Mind. (New cation included a BA in 1954 from Howard
Haven, Conn., 1952). University, and graduate study at the New
School for Social Research. He moved to
Other Relevant Works Greenwich Village in 1957, where he met and
Balz’s papers are at the University of Virginia. married Hettie Cohen. Together they edited
“Music and Emotion,” Journal of Philosophy Yugen, a “little magazine” of the literary
11 (1914): 236–44. vanguard, from 1958 to 1963. Their circle in
“Dualism in Cartesian Psychology and those years included the Beat poets and writers
Epistemology,” in Studies in the History of of the Black Mountain School. Jones’s 1960
Ideas (New York, 1918), pp. 118–57. visit to Cuba as a guest of Fidel Castro affected
“The Use and Misuse of History,” Journal of his politics profoundly. He published his first
Philosophy 16 (1919): 29–41. collection of poetry, Preface to a Twenty
“The Characterization of Moral Evolution,” Volume Suicide Note, in 1961.
International Journal of Ethics 37 (1927): Jones founded the Black Arts Repertory
403–18. Theatre School in 1964, and that same year
“Clauberg and the Development of won the Obie for what is still his best-known
Occasionalism,” Philosophical Review 42 play, Dutchman. In 1965, following the assas-
(1933): 553–72; 43 (1934): 48–64. sination of MALCOLM X, he divorced Hettie
“Whitehead, Descartes, and the Bifurcation Cohen and moved to Harlem. The nascent
of Nature,” Journal of Philosophy 31 Black Arts Movement attached great symbolic
(1934): 281–97. importance to these actions, and his plays from
“The Metaphysical Infidelities of Modern this period reject assimilation in favor of a
Psychology,” Journal of Philosophy 33 militant separatism. In 1967 Jones launched
(1936): 337–51. Spirit House in Newark, with the goal of using
“Cartesian Refutations of Spinoza,” theater as a weapon in the struggle for black lib-
Philosophical Review 46 (1937): 461–84. eration. Later that year he converted to Islam
Ed., Benedictus de Spinoza: Writings on and changed his name to Imamu Amiri Baraka.
Political Philosophy, trans. R. H. M. Elwes In 1974 Baraka rejected black nationalism in
(New York, 1937). favor of a Marxist–Leninist ideology, and
A Survey of the Humanities in Southern declared himself a Third World Socialist. He
Institutions: A Report (Lexington, Kent., joined the American Academy of Arts and
1952). Letters in 2001, and has been the center of
Southern Teachers of Philosophy (Lexington, controversy as New Jersey’s poet laureate.
Kent., 1954). Even his harshest critics agree that Baraka
has made a significant contribution to aesthet-
Further Reading ics through his writing about music. Beginning
Nat Cycl Amer Bio v46, Pres Addr of in 1959, he published a steady stream of jazz
APA v6, Proc of APA v31, Who Was Who criticism in such magazines as Down Beat and
in Amer v3, Who’s Who in Phil Kulchur, and in liner notes. Blues People (1963)
was the first monograph on blues and jazz by
Cornelis de Waal a black writer and, some would argue, the first
to insist on a historical, sociological, and psy-
138
BARBOUR
chological context in studying the genres. In Harris, William J. The Poetry and Poetics of
Blues People and Black Music (a compendium Amiri Baraka: The Jazz Aesthetic
of his jazz criticism from 1959 to 1967), he (Columbia, Missouri, 1985).
asserts that white consumers, critics, and even Watts, Jerry. Amiri Baraka: The Politics and
performers of jazz miss the point. According to Art of a Black Intellectual (New York,
Baraka, it is a mistake to study jazz as an art 2001).
form separate from the history of Africans as Woodard, Komozi. A Nation Within a
they became Americans, to ignore their unique Nation: Amiri Baraka (LeRoi Jones) and
cultural values and aesthetic (of functionalism Black Power Politics (Chapel Hill, N.C.,
versus absolutism), or to separate art from life. 1999).
Baraka uses jazz as a metaphor for the
ultimate failure of blacks to fully assimilate Mary Ellen Poole
and for the failure of whites to successfully
appropriate black art forms. The former leads
to a paradox: the adaptation of Africans to
America is a principal source of the blues and
jazz, but the music’s very failure of assimilation
is one reason for its survival. White appropri- BARBOUR, Ian Graeme (1923– )
ators have misunderstood the context of jazz,
applying inappropriate musicological tech- Ian Barbour was born on 5 October 1923 in
niques such as transcription as well as Beijing, China, the second of three sons of an
European (and in some cases, middlebrow) American Episcopalian mother and a Scottish
standards of excellence to its study. His criti- Presbyterian father. Both parents taught at
cism thus supports the Black Arts Movement’s Yenching University, he in geology and she in
insistence on artistic purity via a radical sepa- religious education. Barbour’s father was a
ration from mainstream (white) aesthetics. close friend and colleague of the Jesuit paleon-
tologist, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, and was
BIBLIOGRAPHY involved with him in the discovery of the
Blues People (New York, 1963). hominid skull called Sinanthropos or Peking
Dutchman, and The Slave (New York, Man. In 1931 the family returned to the United
1964). States. Barbour entered Swarthmore College,
Black Music (New York, 1967; 2nd edn starting as a major in engineering but switching
1980). to physics because its theories and experiments
The LeRoi Jones—Amiri Baraka Reader, ed. intrigued him. He received his BA in 1944 and
William J. Harris (New York, 1991). MA in 1946 at Swarthmore. As an alternative
Conversations with Amiri Baraka, ed. to military service during World War II, he
Charlie Reilly (Jackson, Miss., 1994). worked in a mental hospital at Duke
The Autobiography of LeRoi Jones (Chicago, University. While enrolled in the PhD program
1997). in physics at the University of Chicago, Barbour
was a teaching assistant to Enrico Fermi, who
Further Reading contributed to the development of the first
Comp Amer Thought atomic bomb.
Benston, Kimberly. W. Baraka: The After graduating with the PhD in 1949,
Renegade and the Mask (New Haven, Barbour taught physics at Kalamazoo College
Conn., 1976). in Michigan for four years but then decided to
———, ed. Imamu Amiri Baraka (LeRoi pursue a degree in theology at Yale University,
Jones) (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1978). where he took courses from H. Richard
139
BARBOUR
N IEBUHR , Roland Bainton, and Robert Science (1990; subsequently expanded to

Calhoun. In 1956 he earned his divinity degree include three introductory historical chapters,
from Yale and was hired as a professor in the and republished in 1997 as Religion and
departments of religion and physics at Carleton Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues)
College in Northfield, Minnesota. With the and Ethics in an Age of Technology (1993).
exception of one year (1973–4) when he was Both were highly regarded, but the first, above
Lilly Visiting Professor of Science, Theology all in the expanded version, enjoyed much
and Human Values at Purdue University, wider circulation. Barbour has also published
Barbour spent the rest of his teaching career at When Science Meets Religion (2000) and
Carleton College until his retirement in 1986. Nature, Human Nature, and God (2002). In
During that time, he was the first chairperson 1999 Barbour received the prestigious
of a newly created religion department and Templeton Prize for Progress in Religion. He
then Director of the program in Science, donated most of the prize money (one million
Technology and Public Policy. He presently dollars) to the Center for Theology and the
resides in Northfield, Minnesota. Natural Sciences (CTNS) in Berkeley,
Barbour’s first major work was the fruit of a California. CTNS, under the direction of a
fellowship from the Danforth Foundation in former colleague at Carleton and close friend
1963–4 to do research at Harvard. He attended Robert J. Russell, has sponsored courses, con-
a seminar on the philosophy of Alfred North ferences, and publications on science and
WHITEHEAD conducted by Gordon KAUFMAN religion for many years. Barbour has been
and read extensively in the process theology of involved in working groups on “Divine
Charles HARTSHORNE, John COBB, and David Action,” co-sponsored by CTNS and the
Griffin. After returning to Carleton, he com- Vatican Observatory, and in the program on
pleted Issues in Science and Religion (1966). By “Science and the Spiritual Quest” led by Philip
his own admission, it was an effort to fit Clayton and Mark Richardson under CTNS
together the two halves of his intellectual life. sponsorship.
In 1967–8, he was awarded Guggenheim and Six persistent themes in Barbour’s work will
Fulbright fellowships to explore epistemologi- be discussed here. The first is his appreciation
cal questions at Cambridge University, which for the function of models and paradigms in
issued in the publication of Myths, Models and both theology and natural science. This appre-
Paradigms in 1974. Mary Hesse’s writings on ciation led him to draw together what had been
models and Thomas KUHN’s work on paradigm regarded as totally different worlds of discourse
shifts were influential in that work. while respecting their inescapable differences in
Technology, Environment, and Human Values methodology and content. As Barbour notes,
(1980) was the result of grants from the models in both natural science and theology
National Science Foundation and the National “are to be taken seriously but not literally; they
Endowment for the Humanities to develop a are neither literal pictures nor useful fictions but
program at Carleton on Science, Technology, limited and inadequate ways of imagining what
and Public Policy. Students and faculty in that is not observable” (1997, p. 117).
program were drawn from the natural sciences, A second theme is Barbour’s adherence to
social sciences, and humanities. critical realism in opposition to both classical
From 1981 to 1986, Barbour was the first realism and instrumentalism. That is, in classi-
Winifred and Atherton Bean Professor of cal realism, theories are taken to be descriptions
Science, Technology and Society at Carleton. of nature as it is in itself, apart from the human
The invitation to give the Gifford Lectures in observer. In instrumentalism, theories are
Scotland in 1989 and 1990 allowed Barbour thought to be merely human constructs, calcu-
the opportunity to write Religion in an Age of lating devices for making predictions and con-
140
BARBOUR
trolling nature. By way of contrast, critical findings of science are strictly provisional and
realism claims that there are entities in the revisable so that to base theology on contem-
world resembling those postulated in the porary science is inherently risky.
models, but that the model is a symbolic rep- A fifth prevailing theme in Barbour’s work
resentation of the reality in question. has been his defense of emergence over reduc-
A third theme is Barbour’s fourfold typology tionism in accounting for progressively higher-
for the relationship between scientists and the- order levels of activity within nature. Whereas
ologians (or, in any case, religiously oriented many natural scientists want to reduce all forms
individuals): conflict, independence, dialogue, of life, even rational life, to ever more complex
and integration. While many individual scien- interactions at the molecular or even atomic
tists or theologians elude description in terms of level, Barbour is insistent that higher levels of
only one category, the typology nevertheless existence and activity within nature function in
makes clear that conflict and independence are terms of laws and principles proper to them-
less than satisfactory approaches to the rela- selves and are not simply reducible to variants
tionship between science and religion and that of molecular and atomic interactions. At stake
relationships either in terms of dialogue or inte- here is a metaphysical assumption that the
gration are more defensible. In dialogue, one whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Given
presumes that there are areas of overlap the requisite preparation at the lower level, a
between the two spheres of activity, even as new self-organizing ontological totality will
they remain distinct from one another both in emerge, which will not only be governed by its
content and methodology. Science, for own principles of activity, but which will also
example, raises “limit-questions” (such as exert a type of “top-down” causation on the
“Why is there something rather than lower-level forms of activity characteristic of its
nothing?”) which cannot be answered from a parts or members, taken separately. Barbour
scientific perspective. Yet believable religious avoids classical metaphysical dualism and yet
claims must likewise be somehow consonant does not endorse a purely materialistic expla-
with what is known about the physical world nation of the emergence of novelty within the
from a scientific perspective. Integration, to be cosmic process.
sure, goes well beyond dialogue in that it pre- A sixth characteristic of Barbour’s thought
supposes that the data of science and religion on religion and science is his consistent
can be organized into a single coherent world espousal of Whitehead’s process-relational
view. metaphysics as the philosophy best for the
The fourth theme in Barbour’s thought is his coordination and potential integration of the
preference for theology of nature rather than truth-claims proper to religion and science.
natural theology. He prefers to ground the the- In Barbour’s view, Whitehead best explains
ological world view in the scriptures and expe- how God can be active in the world without
riences of a specific religious tradition and then undermining creaturely spontaneity and,
to modify or reinterpret specific beliefs in the above all, human freedom. At the same time,
light of contemporary natural science (for in line with his thinking on the role of models
example, the classical doctrines of creation, in religion and science, Barbour remains
divine providence, and eschatology). Natural critical of certain weaknesses within process-
theology, by comparison, starts with the relational metaphysics, such as how to under-
findings of contemporary science and, from stand the continuing identity of the human
there, tries to “prove” or establish classic reli- self over and above a simple succession of
gious beliefs, such as the existence of God, life moments of experience, and how to explain
after death, etc., on purely rational grounds. the interplay of diverse levels of existence and
Barbour’s thinking is that the models and the activity within nonhuman nature.
141
BARBOUR
Barbour has achieved prominence in the field Finite Resources and the Human Future
of religion and science both because of his pio- (Minneapolis, 1976).
neering work in the 1960s and 1970s on the Energy and American Values, with Harvey
similarities and differences between these two Brooks, Sanford Lakoff, and John Opie
important spheres of human life and because of (New York, 1982).
his carefully balanced presentation of contro-
versial issues in the religion-and-science debate Further Reading
over the intervening years. He has also sum- Polkinghome, John C. Scientists as
marized his lifelong reflections on the interplay Theologians: A Comparison of the
between religion and science in several books Writings of Ian Barbour, Arthur Peacocke
which are more accessible to the nonprofes- and John Polkinghorne (London, 1996).
sional reader.
Joseph A. Bracken
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Christianity and the Scientist (New York,
1960).
Issues in Science and Religion (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J., 1966).
Science and Secularity: The Ethics of BARNES, Albert Coombs (1872–1951)
Technology (New York, 1970).
Myths, Models, and Paradigms: A Albert Barnes was born on 2 January 1872 in
Comparative Study in Science and Religion Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and died in a car
(New York, 1974). accident on 24 July 1951 in Chester County,
Technology, Environment, and Human Pennsylvania. He attended Central High
Values (New York, 1980). School, a school for students selected for their
Religion in an Age of Science: The Gifford potential, graduated from the University of
Lectures, 1989–91, vol. 1 (San Francisco, Pennsylvania Medical School in 1892, and in
1990). 1900 studied pharmacology, therapeutics, and
Ethics in an Age of Technology: The Gifford philosophy at Ruprecht-Karls-Universität in
Lectures, 1989–91, vol. 2 (San Francisco, Heidelberg, Germany. Barnes amassed his
1993). fortune by promoting the antiseptic Argyrol in
Religion and Science: Historical and 1902. A millionaire by 1907, he began to
Contemporary Issues (San Francisco, collect Barbizon School French landscape
1997). paintings, but upon the advice of his school
When Science Meets Religion (San Francisco, acquaintance the painter William C. Glackens
2000). in 1912, turned his attention to Impressionists
Nature, Human Nature, and God and Post-Impressionists. Today his collection
(Minneapolis, 2002). comprises one of the world’s greatest collec-
tions of those artists. His collection also
Other Relevant Works included paintings by the Old Masters, African
Science and Religion: New Perspectives on sculpture, and decorative work. In 1915 he
the Dialogue (New York, 1968). published his first article, “How to Judge a
Earth Might be Fair: Reflections on Ethics, Painting,” in Arts and Decoration.
Religion and Ecology (Englewood Cliffs, In 1922 Barnes, a champion of the common
N.J., 1971). man in general, and blacks in particular, and
Western Man and Environmental Ethics a disdainer of art critics and historians,
(Reading, Mass., 1972). founded the Barnes Foundation in Merion,
142
BARNES
Pennsylvania, which formally opened in 1925. Further Reading

This foundation sought to educate predomi- Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio,
nantly working-class people (from whose Dict Amer Bio
origins he himself had arisen) in art and art Cantor, Gilbert M. The Barnes Foundation:
appreciation. Barnes’s prescribed educational Reality vs Myth (Philadelphia, 1963).
method for the school was that of the analysis Decker, Andrew. “Future Shock at the
of the form and expression of the actual works Barnes,” ARTnews 91 (Summer 1992):
in the collection rather than their iconographi- 106–11.
cal, biographical, or historical context. He main- De Mazia, Violette. “The Barnes
tained that form and content could not be sep- Foundation: The Display of Its Art
arated and that the aesthetic experience and the Collection,” Vistas 2 (1983): 107–20.
appreciation of art was an active process. His Glass, Newman. “Theory and Practice in the
first book, The Art in Painting (1925), remains Experience of Art: John Dewey and the
the foundation for the art classes taught at the Barnes Foundation,” Journal of Aesthetic
Barnes Foundation today. Barnes’s friend, the Education 31 (1997): 91–105.
philosopher John D EWEY , served as the Great French Paintings from the Barnes
Foundation’s education director. Dewey’s prag- Foundation: Impressionist, Post-
matism emphasized the validity of experiencing Impressionist, and Early Modern (New
the works of art themselves. For a brief period York, 1993).
beginning in 1941 Bertrand Russell was hired as Greenfield, Howard. The Devil and Dr.
a lecturer. Barnes’s teaching philosophy, also Barnes: Portrait of an American Art
influenced by William JAMES and George Collector (New York, 1987).
SANTAYANA, extended to the ahistorical display Hart, Henry. Dr. Barnes of Merion (New
of the works of art as well; works of art that York, 1963).
occupied a single wall were more closely bound Hughes, Robert. “Opening the Barnes
by aesthetic effect than style or period, as is Door,” Time (10 May 1993): 61–4.
common today. Schack, William. Art and Argyrol: The Life
Barnes did not approve of loaning his works, and Career of Dr. Albert C. Barnes (New
which accounts for the excellent condition of York, 1963).
the present-day collection. In 1961 the state
mandated that the Barnes Foundation open Shelley Wood Cordulack
its doors to the public. Barnes also did not
approve of color reproductions. However, the
1993 catalog of the traveling exhibition, orga-
nized to fund the refurbishment of the
building, presented the first color reproduc-
tions of such works as Matisse’s Joie de vivre. BARNES, Hazel Estella (1915– )
BIBLIOGRAPHY Hazel E. Barnes was born on 16 December

The Art in Painting (Merion, Penn., 1925). 1915 in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. After
The Art of Henri Matisse, with Violette De attending public schools there, she won the
Mazia (New York, 1933). Curran Scholarship which sent her to Wilson
The Art of Renoir, with Violette De Mazia College, a women’s college in Pennsylvania,
(Merion, Penn., 1935). for undergraduate study. She majored in
The Art of Cezanne, with Violette De Mazia classics, a course of study she would continue
(New York, 1939). after earning her BA in 1937 at Yale University.
In 1941 she earned her PhD in philosophy with
143
BARNES
her dissertation, “Philosophy as Katharsis in the In the fall of 1951 Barnes began translating
Enneades of Plotinus.” Barnes spent 1941 to Sartre’s L’Être et le néant (1943), a classic work
1945 teaching at two North Carolina colleges of French existentialism. With the publication
for women, the Women’s College of the of her translation in 1956, she became an
University of North Carolina at Greensboro, immediate authority on existentialism in
and Queens College in Charlotte. While at America. Barnes was among the first to intro-
Queens College, she began teaching courses in duce existentialist works and ideas to American
philosophy in addition to her regular classics audiences, and she stood alongside such impor-
courses. In the summer of 1944 she pursued her tant figures in the translation of postwar
interest in philosophy by taking graduate European ideas to American contexts as
courses at Columbia University. Marjorie GRENE, William BARRETT, J. Glenn
At the conclusion of World War II, Barnes Gray, and Walter KAUFMANN. Barnes and
took up a teaching post for three years at Pierce Grene were among the first women philoso-
College in Greece, which had fallen into ruin phers to puncture the patriarchal world of
under the German occupation. Upon returning postwar American philosophy, which was pri-
to the United States in 1948, she took a position marily analytic in orientation at that time.
at the University of Toledo, again teaching Unlike some of the other American com-
classics and philosophy. Barnes began teaching mentators on existentialism, Barnes did not
and working extensively on French existential- offer any philosophical genealogy for Sartre’s
ism in the early 1950s. She was an assistant work. She paid little attention to the German
professor at Ohio State University in 1952–3 existentialists and to Kierkegaard, sometimes to
and then went to the University of Colorado, the detriment of her own work. Instead, she
where for many years she taught courses in focused her energies on the French existential-
both classics and philosophy. She retired in ists almost exclusively, most notably Sartre,
1986 and presently resides in Boulder. She was Simone de Beauvoir, and Albert Camus. Her
named “Woman of the Year in Philosophy” by influential 1959 The Literature of Possibility: A
the Society for Women in Philosophy in 1989. Study in Humanistic Existentialism offered an
It was while she was teaching in Ohio, rather introductory interpretation of the major themes
than during her time in Greece or traveling in the works of all three.
throughout Europe in the postwar years – pre- Like many others who first introduced exis-
cisely the years when Jean-Paul Sartre’s star tentialism to America, Barnes made a conscious
was rising – that Barnes was first exposed to effort to reach out to the broader public beyond
existentialism. It all began innocently enough. academia. The Literature of Possibility was
As she recounted not long ago in her autobi- written for just such an audience. But she did
ography, The Story I Tell Myself: A Venture in even more than this. She introduced existen-
Existentialist Autobiography (1997), her tialism over the airwaves on Ohio State’s
lifelong association with existentialism origi- campus radio station and, in the early 1960s,
nated in the innocent question of one of her she devised and “starred” in the production of
students. “What is this existentialism every- a PBS television series on the subject, which she
body is talking about?” the student had asked entitled “Self-Encounter.” Barnes was not
(1997, p. 143). Not having an answer to such averse to lecturing for a wide array of audi-
a question ready at hand, Barnes embarked on ences, from the most academically rigorous to
an intense study of Sartre and his cohorts. An the most general. Often, she would speak about
intellectual conversion of sorts resulted. Not what she liked to call “applied existentialism”;
long after, she began teaching a regular course she would offer existentialist interpretations
on existentialism, one of the first of its kind in and perspectives on everything from education
America. to aging.
144
BARRETT
Even in her more demanding written work, Classical Themes (Lincoln, Neb., 1974).
Barnes made every attempt to ground her Sartre and Flaubert (Chicago, 1981).
thinking in the concerns of the day. An The Story I Tell Myself: A Venture in
Existentialist Ethics (1967) was Barnes’s most Existentialist Autobiography (Chicago,
original work. In it she engaged figures as 1997).
diverse as Ayn RAND, Norman Mailer, and the
student radicals of the 1960s – and showed Other Relevant Works
that the question of an existentialist ethics was Trans., Being and Nothingness: A
by no means an academic or abstract one. On Phenomenological Essay on Ontology, by
the contrary, it was a matter of concrete and Jean-Paul Sartre (New York, 1956).
immediate experience. In the following years,
she would again take up the topic of student Further Reading
radicalism in The University as the New Women Phils
Church (1970). Like other American inter- Calder, William M., III, Ulrich K. Goldsmith,
preters of existentialism, Barnes realized that and Phyllis B. Kenevan, eds. Hypatia:
there was more than just a superficial relation Essays in Classics, Comparative Literature,
between the student movement and existen- and Philosophy (Boulder, Col., 1985).
tialist philosophy. Presented to Barnes in honor of her
Barnes has been more than just a translator seventieth birthday.
and interpreter of Sartre. Her works, Sartre Cotkin, George. Existential America
(1973) and Sartre and Flaubert (1981), have (Baltimore, Md., 2003).
been indispensable. While drawing on the work Fulton, Ann. Apostles of Sartre:
of Sartre, de Beauvoir, and Camus, she has Existentialism in America, 1945–1963
made her own substantial contribution to (Evanston, Ill., 1999).
American philosophy. An Existentialist Ethics
was a major contribution to ethical theory. It Martin Woessner
highlighted the positive qualities of existential-
ism at a time when the popular conception of
existentialism dismissed it as little more than a
bleak and pessimistic brand of philosophy.
More importantly, it offered a tangible and
concrete exploration of existentialism put into BARRETT, William (1913–92)
ethical action. It stressed the potential relevance
of existentialist thought for causes such as William Barrett was born on 30 December
feminism and racial equality, causes for which 1913 on Long Island, New York. After receiv-
existentialism proved very useful. ing his BA in 1933 from City College, where,
like so many other noted American thinkers, he
BIBLIOGRAPHY studied under Morris R. COHEN, he went on to
The Literature of Possibility: A Study in do graduate work at Columbia University. At
Humanistic Existentialism (Lincoln, Neb., Columbia he studied under F. J. E.
1959). WOODBRIDGE, J. H. RANDALL, Ernest NAGEL,
An Existentialist Ethics (New York, 1967; and Richard MCKEON. He wrote an MA thesis
Chicago, 1978). in 1934 on Duns Scotus. His dissertation,
The University as the New Church (London, “Aristotle’s Theory of Movement,” was com-
1970). pleted in 1938 under the direction of
Sartre (Philadelphia, 1973). Woodbridge. He also studied under Rudolph
The Meddling Gods: Four Essays on CARNAP at the University of Chicago while a
145
BARRETT
two-time university fellow from 1936 to 1938. ism and, in the process, went a long way
Barrett taught philosophy at the University of toward rectifying the common assumption that
Illinois and Brown University, before serving in this new philosophy was merely a fashion or
the US Navy during World War II. At the con- fad – though it certainly was that as well.
clusion of the war, he served with the State Barrett’s postwar work was influenced most
Department in Italy. The war, by Barrett’s own by Martin Heidegger. Unlike Sartre who, in
admission, radically altered his philosophical Barrett’s opinion, was too indebted to a
outlook. No longer interested in the abstract Cartesian conception of the subject, Heidegger
and technical problems of Greek and medieval represented a path of thought that avoided the
philosophy, not to mention Carnap’s logic, pitfalls of both Marxism and positivism, while
Barrett was drawn to more concrete and imme- simultaneously calling into question the very
diate matters of experience, which led him to foundations of the Western tradition. In the
focus his intellectual energies on the works of introduction to a selection of writings on
the European phenomenologists and existen- Eastern philosophy, Zen Buddhism: Selected
tialists. Returning to New York, he moved to Writings of D. T. Suzuki (1956), Barrett refers
Greenwich Village, rekindled friendships from to Heidegger explicitly in this regard. In both
his days at City College and Columbia, and Irrational Man and the 1964 reissue of What is
became affiliated with the “New York Existentialism? – which included a lengthy new
Intellectuals.” He became an editor of Partisan section devoted entirely to Heidegger – the
Review, a post he held until 1951. He returned German philosopher emerges as the most
to academia to become professor of philosophy profound of all the existentialists. Following
at New York University from 1950 until his Heidegger’s later path of thought, Barrett
retirement in 1979. Barrett died on 8 September became increasingly interested in technology
1992 in Tarrytown, New York. and rationalism, and their relation to human
While at Partisan Review Barrett published existence – most notably, the question of
a collection of introductory essays in What is freedom. These concerns animated his The
Existentialism? Along with such philosophers Illusion of Technique: A Search for the
as Marjorie GRENE, Hazel BARNES, and J. Glenn Meaning of Life in a Technological Age (1978),
Gray, Barrett helped introduce the themes and which examined the work of William JAMES
ideas of European existentialism – from Søren and Ludwig Wittgenstein, as well as Heidegger.
Kierkegaard to Jean-Paul Sartre – to postwar They also appeared in his Death of the Soul:
American audiences. A philosopher with wide- From Descartes to the Computer (1986).
ranging interests and a rare talent for combin- As indebted as he was to Heidegger’s work,
ing philosophical rigor with lively prose, Barrett especially to his critiques of modern science
committed himself early on to writing for the and technology, Barrett was by no means blind
broader public. He wrote extensively on art to the potential limitations of Heidegger’s
and literature, frequently contributing essays thought. In The Illusion of Technique he turns,
and reviews to The New York Times and the in the end, to the pragmatism of William James.
Atlantic Monthly, where he was literary editor In the introduction to a selection of Heidegger’s
from 1961 to 1964. His work introducing work included in the multivolume Philosophy
philosophical subjects to popular audiences in the Twentieth Century (1962) he at least
was, by all accounts, a success. His classic text suggests – at a time when many of the facts
from 1958, Irrational Man: A Study in remained undisclosed – that there was some
Existential Philosophy, has been one of the connection between Heidegger’s support for
most widely read and influential introductions Nazism and his philosophical development.
to the subject. Barrett stressed the philosophi- Outside of his contributions to the study of
cal rigor and historical pedigree of existential- existentialism, Barrett is remembered chiefly
146
BARTLEY
for his intellectual memoir, The Truants: BARTLEY, William Warren, III (1934–90)
Adventures Among the Intellectuals (1982),
which documented his days among the New William Warren Bartley, III was born on 2
York intellectuals before and after World War October 1934 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He
II. This work was among other things a tribute received his BA in 1956 and his MA in 1958
to his lifelong friend, the poet Delmore from Harvard University. Bartley then
Schwartz. But the book’s perceptive portraits of attended the London School of Economics and
such well-known and influential figures as Political Science, where he earned his PhD in
Philip Rahv, Hannah ARENDT, Lionel Trilling, logic and scientific method in 1962. From
and Mary McCarthy – to name just a few – 1960 to 1963 he was a lecturer in logic at the
have made it required reading for anyone inter- London School of Economics, and from 1961
ested in the rich world of postwar American to 1964 a lecturer on the history of philosophy
letters. of science at the Warburg Institute of the
University of London. In 1963–4 he was a
BIBLIOGRAPHY visiting associate professor of philosophy at
What is Existentialism? (New York, 1947; the University of California at Berkeley, and
rev. edn 1964). from 1964 to 1967 he was associate professor
Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of D. T. of philosophy at the University of California at
Suzuki (New York, 1956). San Diego. After a year as the S. A. Cook Bye
Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Fellow at Gonville and Caius College,
Philosophy (New York, 1958). Cambridge, in 1966–7, Bartley returned to the
Ed. with Henry D. Aiken, Philosophy in the United States permanently.
Twentieth Century: An Anthology, 4 vols From 1967 to 1969 Bartley was associate
(New York, 1962). professor of philosophy at the University of
Ego and Instinct: The Psychoanalytic View Pittsburgh, and from 1969 to 1973 he was
of Human Nature, with Daniel professor of philosophy and history and phi-
Yankelovich (New York, 1970). losophy of science, and associate director of
Time of Need: Forms of Imagination in the Pittsburgh’s Philosophy of Science Center. In
Twentieth Century (New York, 1972). 1970 he began an association with California
The Illusion of Technique: A Search for the State University at Haywood as professor of
Meaning of Life in a Technological Age philosophy, and he taught there until 1989.
(New York, 1978). From 1985 until his death, he was a senior
The Truants: Adventures Among the research fellow at the Hoover Institution on
Intellectuals (New York, 1982). War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford
Death of the Soul: From Descartes to the University. Bartley also was a fellow and
Computer (New York, 1986). adjunct scholar at the Institute for Humane
Studies at George Mason University from 1984
Further Reading until his death. He held a variety of fellowships
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Proc of APA v66 and visiting lectureships at many universities in
Cotkin, George. Existential America the United States and Europe. Bartley died on
(Baltimore, Md., 2003). 5 February 1990 in Oakland, California.
Fulton, Ann. Apostles of Sartre: While an undergraduate at Harvard, Bartley
Existentialism in America, 1945–1963 became excited by Karl Popper’s philosophy of
(Evanston, Ill., 1999). science, and he went to the London School of
Economics to study with Popper. Much of his
Martin Woessner subsequent work developed Popper’s theories
of science and epistemology, and he soon
147
BARTLEY
became one of the most significant philoso- Theory of Rationality and the Sociology of
phers inspired by Popper, continuing the tra- Knowledge (1987), which he co-edited with
dition of critical rationalism and stimulating Gerard Radnitzky. Critics of Bartley’s theory
the evolutionary epistemology movement. of knowledge have mainly complained that
Bartley rescued a huge manuscript that Popper his theory of critical rationalism is itself incon-
had largely composed in the 1950s as a sequel sistent with its own critical standards of justi-
to The Logic of Scientific Discovery, and fication.
brought it to publication in three volumes in Bartley’s last book, Unfathomed
the 1980s. Bartley also brought to light some Knowledge, Unmeasured Wealth: On
of Lewis Carroll’s writings on symbolic logic; Universities and the Wealth of Nations (1990),
edited Friedrich Hayek’s last book The Fatal applies critical rationalism to the functioning
Conceit: The Errors of Socialism and began of universities. According to Bartley, universi-
editing Hayek’s collected works; and wrote ties are still havens for dogmatism because
widely read biographies of Ludwig they are largely insulated from the economic
Wittgenstein and Werner Erhard. forces of the free market. Following Hayek’s
Bartley’s first book, The Retreat to view that the economic free market and the
Commitment (1962), applied Popper’s anti- free market of competing ideas are mutually
foundationalist and anti-authoritarian theory interconnected, Bartley concludes that the
of knowledge to the question of the justifica- academic world should be forced to surrender
tion of religious beliefs. Religion often assumes its protected monopoly on knowledge pro-
that justification of a belief ultimately consists duction. The current status quo has been sub-
of a final appeal to an authority, usually a stantially aided by the intellectual world’s sat-
source of that belief. Protestant theology, for isfaction with justificationism, which effec-
example, has fallen into this “justificationist” tively immunizes both absolutist and relativist
model, immunizing religion from rational crit- philosophies from outside criticism. Bartley’s
icism by other systems that do not share the lengthy study of “The Curious Case of Karl
same foundations. Furthermore, much of Popper” in this book attempts to supply an
twentieth-century philosophy has retreated to example of this suppression of criticism, by
justificationism, so both rationalists and irra- exposing how professional philosophy has
tionalists simply disagree on how to locate ignored Popper in favor of authoritarian
final epistemological authority. The solution is stances inspired by Wittgenstein and Thomas
to abandon justificationism (which modern KUHN.
scientific method already has accomplished),
and understand the process of knowledge pro- BIBLIOGRAPHY
duction as the rational decision procedure for “Achilles, the Tortoise, and Explanation in
critically evaluating competing beliefs over Science and History,” British Journal for
time in light of the best available evidence. the Philosophy of Science 13 (1962):
This fallibilist and evolutionary understanding 15–33.
of epistemology offers a solution to the classi- The Retreat to Commitment (New York,
cal problem of the criterion, which threatens a 1962; 2nd edn, La Salle, Ill., 1984).
false dilemma of either having to suffer an “The Critical Approach to Philosophy:
infinite regress of justification or making a Rationality versus the Theory of
dogmatic appeal to basic foundational beliefs Rationality,” in The Critical Approach to
that themselves require no further justifica- Science and Philosophy, in Honor of Karl
tion. Bartley’s further work on this approach Popper, ed. Mario Bunge (New York,
of critical rationalism culminated in his papers 1964).
published in Evolutionary Epistemology: “The Reduction of Morality to Religion,”
148
BARWISE
Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970): “Philosophy of Biology versus Philosophy

755–66. of Physics,” in Evolutionary
Morality and Religion (London and New Epistemology: Theory of Rationality and
York, 1971). the Sociology of Knowledge, ed. William
Wittgenstein (Philadelphia, 1973; 2nd edn, W. Bartley, III and Gerard Radnitzky (La
La Salle, Ill., 1985). Salle, Ill., 1987), pp. 7–46.
L. Wittgenstein e K. Popper: maestri di Ed., The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of
scuola elementare (Rome, 1976). Socialism, by Friedrich Hayek (1988).
“The Philosophy of Karl Popper,”
Philosophia 6 (1976): 463–94; 7 (1977): Further Reading
675–716; 11 (1982): 121–221. Proc of APA v63
Werner Erhard: The Transformation of a Artigas, Mariano. The Ethical Nature of
Man, the Founding of est (New York, Karl Popper’s Theory of Knowledge:
1978). Including Popper’s Unpublished
“A Popperian Harvest,” in In Pursuit of Comments on Bartley and Critical
Truth, ed. Paul Levinson (Atlantic Rationalism (New York and Bern,
Highlands, N.J., 1982), pp. 249–89. Switzerland, 1999).
“The Challenge of Evolutionary Derkson, A. A. “The Failure of a
Epistemology,” in Absolute Values and Comprehensively Critical Rationalism,”
the Creation of the New World (New Philosophy of the Social Sciences 10
York, 1983), vol. 2, pp. 835–80. (1980): 51–66.
“Non-justificationism: Popper versus Hauptli, Bruce. “Unfathomed Knowledge,
Wittgenstein,” in Epistemology and Unmeasured Worth and Growth?”
Philosophy of Science, ed. P. Weingartner Philosophy of the Social Sciences 23
and J. Czermak (Vienna, 1983). (1993): 97–102.
“Knowledge Is a Product Not Fully Known Hudson, W. D. “Professor Bartley’s Theory
to Its Producer,” in The Political of Rationality and Religious Belief,”
Economy of Freedom, ed. K. Leube and Religious Studies 9 (1973): 339–50.
A. Zlabinger (Munich, Germany, 1985), Watkins, John. “Comprehensively Critical
pp. 17–45. Rationalism,” Philosophy 44 (1969):
Unfathomed Knowledge, Unmeasured 57–62.
Wealth: On Universities and the Wealth
of Nations (La Salle, Ill., 1990). John R. Shook

“Goodman’s Paradox, a Simple Solution,”
Philosophical Studies 19 (1968): 85–8.
Ed., Lewis Carroll’s Symbolic Logic: Part I,
Elementary, 1896, Fifth edition, Part II, BARWISE, Kenneth Jon (1942–2000)
Advanced (New York, 1977; 2nd edn,
1986). Jon Barwise was born on 29 June 1942 in
Ed., The Open Universe: An Argument for Independence, Missouri, and he died on 5
Indeterminism (Totowa, N.J., 1982). March 2000 in Bloomington, Indiana. His pre-
Ed., Quantum Theory and the Schism in cocity was evident from early years, and he
Physics (Totowa, N.J., 1982). achieved distinction in obtaining his BA degree
Ed., Realism and the Aim of Science, by from Yale University in 1963 in philosophy
Karl Popper (Totowa, N.J., 1983). and mathematics. From there he proceeded to
149
BARWISE
Stanford, where his MA was conferred in 1965 and, while Barwise paid tribute to the efforts of
and his PhD in mathematics in 1967, for a dis- his collaborators in putting the volume
sertation written under the direction of together, it was his editorial direction that made
Solomon FEFERMAN. While he was at Stanford, it so exceptionally useful. It is hard to imagine
Barwise was also influenced by Georg KREISEL a similar volume being assembled subsequently,
and Dana SCOTT, reflecting their breadth of both because of the growth of the field and the
interests and concerns about the match or lack of Barwise’s omniscience. He also edited
mismatch of logic and language. (together with his adviser Feferman) Model-
After leaving Stanford he spent a year at the theoretic Logics (1985), a collection that tried
University of California at Los Angeles as a to draw together some of the strands in gener-
National Science Foundation Fellow, and then alized model theory that had emerged over the
returned to Yale in 1968 as an assistant pro- previous decade.
fessor of mathematics and computer science. One of the reasons for Barwise’s interest in
The next two years at Yale gave him plenty of generalized quantifiers was his starting to work
opportunity to interact with Abraham on problems in linguistics and its interface with
ROBINSON and Paul Eklof, both of whom were logic. The work on admissible sets had already
involved in the study of the interplay between indicated the advantages of not restricting
algebra and logic. In 1970 he went to the attention to just finite sequences of “all” and
University of Wisconsin as an associate pro- “some.” By the late 1970s Barwise was looking
fessor of mathematics, part of the constella- at sentences of the form “Most boys and girls
tion that gathered there under the leadership of like each other” and trying to figure out how to
Stephen Cole KLEENE. make sense of them. He would solicit the
Barwise’s original research interests (as opinions of students and colleagues in an
attested to by his dissertation) lay in the area of attempt to get a sense of how they ought to be
infinitary logic, the use of expressions with an interpreted. He worked a good deal with the
infinite number of quantifiers. His book linguist Robin Cooper, and their joint paper on
Admissible Sets and Structures (1975) bore interpreting such sentences launched him into
witness to the stamp that he put on the field, a stage of his career in which philosophy of
both by his research and by his style of expo- language began to take precedence over math-
sition. He uses Kripke–Platek set theory for ematical logic.
setting out his results (developed by Saul KRIPKE In 1979 Barwise accepted a mathematics
and Richard Platek), which indicates his will- position at Stanford, perhaps for the sake of
ingness to strike out in directions not entirely returning to familiar surroundings, perhaps
fashionable. He also provides a recipe in the because it was difficult for Wisconsin to find a
midst of one of the drier sections of the text in way of accommodating his increasingly wide
an effort to refresh the reader (although the range of interests within its departmental struc-
rock cakes for which he gives directions can ture. At Stanford he worked intensely with
sometimes come out more like rocks than John Perry and started to formulate what has
cakes). The book was finished during a brief become known as situation semantics. Progress
visit at Oxford University. in this field was well documented by a collec-
Perhaps the most visible result of his years at tion of papers which Barwise published at the
Wisconsin was the Handbook of Mathematical end of the decade under the punning title The
Logic. This collection, which appeared in 1977, Situation in Logic (1989). The concern of sit-
sought to cover the entire field of logic and uation semantics was to find models on a small
included contributions by leading researchers scale for languages as used rather than
from around the world. The quality of the worrying about overly abstract creations that
exposition is unusually high for such a volume, were not needed in practice. This was a contrast
150
BARWISE
with the work of Richard Montague, which In 1990 Barwise went to Indiana University
had previously served as the model for mathe- as College Professor of Philosophy, Computer
matical linguistics. As a result, a good deal of Science, and Mathematics, and contributed to
Barwise’s attention was given to looking at the rise of informatics as a major area of
sentences in need of interpretation and to research in Bloomington. Perhaps his own dif-
responding to critics who felt that the new ficulties in getting interdisciplinary support else-
approach was either too ambitious or not ambi- where led to his enthusiasm for the wide range
tious enough. The creation of the Center for the of the scholarly community that came together
Study of Language and Information at Stanford around him. If one had to characterize the
under Barwise’s direction helped both to bring work of the last decade of his life, it was the
scholars together to work on the field of situa- extension of the notion of “situation” even
tion semantics and to make sure that their further, to visual representations and diagrams.
results found a publisher. His 1997 volume Information Flow (written
In the midst of working on these issues of lin- jointly with Jerry Seligman) presents an
guistics, Barwise also looked at questions of overview of how mathematics can be used to
paradox in conjunction with the philosopher describe the titular subject with an undercurrent
John Etchemendy. Their joint book The Liar of philosophical commentary. After his diag-
(1987)offers a solution to the paradox of the nosis with cancer in January 1999, Barwise
title based on the technical device of hypersets remained active and continued to work, even if
in conjunction with John L. Austin’s perspec- by dictation, up until the last few days of his
tive on semantics (which is defended as an alter- life.
native to what they call Russellian semantics). Barwise received an honorary degree from
The idea of looking at the ways the liar sentence the University of Pennsylvania in 1992. He was
can be used is connected with Austin’s inquiries known for his ability to find humor in fairly
into speech acts. While the perspective offered unlikely situations, which could cheer up
by Barwise and Etchemendy has scarcely students and colleagues alike. His influence in
received universal endorsement as a resolution the field of mathematical logic was immense,
of the paradox, it has helped to spur interest in and some of the technical details of his work
the anti-foundation axiom (which, as its name will receive philosophical articulation for some
implies, denies the usual “Axiom of years. While the fine points of the application
Foundation” of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory). of logic to language are not easy to render
As the authors observe, what made the axiom entirely convincing, Barwise did not allow the
appealing to them was its emerging from “a beauty of mathematical generalization to get in
coherent, intuitive conception of set, rather the way of seeing how best to use mathematics
than just being a formally consistent axiom.” in the service of communication.
Another practical occupation for Barwise
during the years at Stanford was the design of BIBLIOGRAPHY
software for teaching logic. He took the design Admissible Sets and Structures (Berlin, 1975).
of the mini-universe for “Tarski’s World” as a “Generalized Quantifiers and Natural
serious enterprise and worked on it with John Language,” with Robin Cooper,
Etchemendy. As was typical with items of Linguistics and Philosophy 4 (1981):
software, the shelf life of the software itself 159–219.
was not so long as with some of Barwise’s The Liar: An Essay on Truth and Circularity,
other enterprises, but the influence on teaching with John Etchemendy (New York, 1987).
continued. The design of the software reflects The Situation in Logic (Stanford, Cal., 1989).
the value Barwise attributed to small models for Vicious Circles, with Lawrence Moss
situations. (Stanford, Cal., 1996).
151
BARWISE
Information Flow: The Logic of Distributed Seminary in 1851, but left a year later to tutor
Systems, with Jerry Seligman (Cambridge, rhetoric and oratory at Williams College. That
UK, 1997). same year he married Abbie Burt who died in
1854. After her death, Bascom attended
Other Relevant Works Andover Theological Seminary, graduating in
“Back and Forth through Infinitary Logic,” 1855. That same year he returned to Williams
in Studies in Model Theory, ed. M. D. College, this time as professor of rhetoric and
Morley (Buffalo, N.Y., 1973), pp. 5–34. oratory. Shortly afterward, he married Emma
Ed., Handbook of Mathematical Logic Curtiss with whom he fathered three children.
(Amsterdam, 1977). In addition to rhetoric and oratory, Bascom
Situations and Attitudes, with John Perry taught philosophy at Williams. Between 1859
(Cambridge, Mass., 1983). and 1874, he published six books on political
Ed., with Solomon Feferman, Model- economy, aesthetics, rhetoric, psychology,
Theoretic Logics: Perspectives in religion, and literature.
Mathematical Logic (Berlin, 1985). In 1874 Bascom was appointed President of
Ed., with Gerard Allwein, Logical Reasoning the University of Wisconsin. During his thirteen-
with Diagrams (Oxford, 1996). year tenure, Bascom successfully elevated the
University of Wisconsin from an intellectual
Further Reading backwater to a major center of learning. He sup-
Devlin, Keith. “Jon Barwise’s Papers on ported female scholarship and developed an inno-
Natural Language Semantics,” Bulletin of vative system of administration. At Wisconsin
Symbolic Logic 10 (2004): 54–85. he was the primary professor of philosophy,
Feferman, Solomon. “In Memoriam: ardently encouraging students to use their edu-
Kenneth Jon Barwise 1942–2000,” cation for the good of society, and publishing
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 6 (2000): eight more volumes on theology, ethics, and soci-
505–508. ology. He continually pressed the spiritual
Shin, Sun-Joo. “Heterogeneous Reasoning element of higher learning and, in his own work,
and Its Logic,” Bulletin of Symbolic Logic sought to reconcile Christian theology with evo-
10 (2004): 86–106. lutionary theory. His central philosophical
problem was maintaining the efficacy of Christian
Thomas Drucker spirituality in an intellectual climate that was
increasingly favorable to empiricism. His avid
support of prohibition and a dispute with the
regents about operational issues eventually led to
his resignation from the University of Wisconsin
in 1887. Soon thereafter, he returned to Williams
BASCOM, John (1827–1911) College where he taught sociology and political
science until his retirement in 1903. While at
John Bascom was born on 1 May 1827 in Williams College, he published another six books
Genoa, New York. His early education took on theology, social theory, evolution, and nation-
place at Homer Academy followed by alism. Bascom died on 2 October 1911 in
Williams College, from which he graduated Williamstown, Massachusetts.
with a BA in 1849. Bascom spent a year
teaching at Ball Seminary in Hoosick Falls, BIBLIOGRAPHY
New York. He later studied law in Rochester, Political Economy (Andover, Mass., 1859).
New York, but left the law office after less Aesthetics; or, The Science of Beauty (New
than a year. He entered Auburn Theological York, 1862).
152
BATESON
Philosophy of Rhetoric (New York, 1866). 1848–1925, vol. 1 (Madison, Wisc.,

Principles of Psychology (New York, 1869). 1949).
Science, Philosophy, and Religion (New Jorgensen, Stan W. A Passage of Faith: The
York, 1871). Thought of John Bascom and His
Philosophy of English Literature (New Intellectual Successors. PhD dissertation,
York, 1874). University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill,
A Philosophy of Religion; or, The Rational N.C., 1976).
Grounds of Religious Belief (New York, Robinson, Sanford. John Bascom: Prophet
1876). (New York, 1922).
Growth and Grades of Intelligence (New
York, 1878). David L. Davis
Ethics; or, Science of Duty (New York,
1879).
Natural Theology (New York, 1880).
The Science of Mind (New York, 1881).
Problems in Philosophy (New York, 1885).
Sociology (New York, 1887). BATESON, Gregory (1904–80)
The New Theology (New York, 1891).
An Historical Interpretation of Philosophy Gregory Bateson was born on 9 May 1904 in
(New York, 1893). Grantchester, Cambridgeshire, England. His
Social Theory: A Grouping of Social Facts father, William Bateson, was an eminent biol-
and Principles (New York, 1895). ogist and proponent of Mendelism who sought
Evolution and Religion; or, Faith as a Part to understand the patterning of the natural
of a Complete Cosmic System (New York, world by examining normal and abnormal
1897). variations. Gregory studied at Cambridge
God and His Goodness (New York, 1901). University, where he took the Natural Sciences
Tripos in 1924 and the Anthropology Tripos in
Other Relevant Works 1926 under A. C. Haddon. In 1930 he was
Bascom’s papers are at the University of awarded an MA degree from Cambridge in
Wisconsin at Madison. anthropology and subsequently held the
Words of Christ (New York, 1883). position of research fellow at St. John’s College,
Growth of Nationality in the United States Cambridge, from 1931 to 1937. In his field-
(New York, 1899). work among the Iatmul of New Guinea, he
Things Learned by Living (New York, analyzed the patterns of interaction between
1913). Contains a bibliography of men and women. He distinguished between
Bascom’s writings. symmetrical and asymmetrical relationships
and showed how the Naven ceremony orga-
Further Reading nized these two kinds of relationship to prevent
Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, cumulative tensions between genders from
Dict Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v8, splitting the society apart. Subsequently, with
Who Was Who in Amer v1 his wife, anthropologist Margaret MEAD, he
Birge, E. A. “In Memoriam: Address made an extensive photographic analysis of
Delivered at the Funeral of Dr. John the noncumulative, steady-state patterns of
Bascom,” Wisconsin Alumni Magazine 13 interaction among the Balinese.
(November 1911): 45–55. After World War II, Bateson participated in
Curti, Merle, and Vernon Carstensen. The the Macy Conferences that spawned cybernet-
University of Wisconsin, a History: ics, initially defined as the science of commu-
153
BATESON
nication and control in animals and machines. system of organism in environment. Bateson
Bateson considered cybernetics “the biggest was distrustful of conscious purpose that dis-
bite out of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge regarded the circuitry of mind. As a corrective
that mankind has taken in the last 2000 years” to conscious purpose, he looked to aesthetics
(1972, p. 484). Subsequent to the Macy and to the sacred, even though he was an
Conferences, he concerned himself “with atheist. William Blake was his favorite artist.
building a bridge between the facts of life and Philosophically, Bateson understood what
behavior and what we know today of the he was doing as a combination of ontology
nature of pattern and order” (p. xxvi). Working and epistemology, with the emphasis on epis-
in various non-academic settings such as the temology. He argued that mind was immanent,
Veterans Administration Hospital in Palo Alto, not transcendent. He argued for a necessary
California, as an ethnologist from 1949 to unity between mind and nature. In conversa-
1963, and as the associate director of the tion he would describe himself as “practically
Oceanic Institute in Waimanalo, Hawaii, from a logical positivist,” yet indebted to Hegel. In
1965 to 1972, he engaged the “facts of life and sorting out human behavior, he made repeated
behavior” from a cybernetic or systems theory use of Bertrand Russell’s Theory of Logical
vantage. He articulated the double-bind theory Types, each time acknowledging the paradoxes.
of schizophrenia, offered an explanation of His lucid essays consistently draw on his own
why Alcoholics Anonymous was successful, skillful observation of patterns rather than the
elaborated a theory of play and fantasy, initi- texts of other thinkers. Often his essays include
ated a systemic approach to both aesthetics epigrammatic statements of key ideas. For
and learning theory, analyzed dolphin com- example: “Information is a difference that
munication, criticized evolutionary theory, and makes a difference”; “Validity is a function of
engaged the ecological crisis. From 1972 to belief”; “Communication is the creation of a
1978 Bateson was a part-time visiting senior redundancy pattern.” To understand commu-
lecturer at the University of California at Santa nication, he repeatedly insisted on the need to
Cruz, and in 1976 he was appointed to the understand context. Toward the end of his life,
Board of Regents of the University of Bateson revised his thinking to take a fuller
California. He was a scholar-in-residence at account of recursion (Harries-Jones 1995).
the Esalen Institute in Big Sur, California,
between 1978 and 1980. Bateson died on 4 BIBLIOGRAPHY
July 1980 at the Zen Center in San Francisco, Naven: A Survey of the Problems Suggested
California. by a Composite Picture of the Culture of a
Bateson contended that the Darwinian New Guinea Tribe Drawn from Three
theory of evolution had misidentified the unit Points of View (Cambridge, UK, 1936).
of survival as the breeding organism, the family Communication: The Social Matrix of
line, or the species. He argued that any species Psychology, with Jurgen Ruesch (New
that destroys its environment will destroy itself, York, 1951).
and insisted that the unit of survival must be re- Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected
identified as a-flexible-species-in-a-flexible-envi- Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry,
ronment. He thought of the unit of evolution- Evolution and Epistemology (San
ary survival as a unit of mind (1972, pp. Francisco, 1972).
454–71). He specified criteria for what qualifies Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity (New
as a mind, based on cybernetic theory, arguing York, 1979).
that any system with the circuit structure nec- Angels Fear: Towards an Epistemology of the
essary for self-correction is a mind, whether Sacred, with Mary Catherine Bateson
that system is a single organism or the larger (New York, 1987).
154
BAWDEN
A Sacred Unity: Further Steps to an Ecology his views on marriage and divorce. Bawden
of Mind, ed. Rodney E. Donaldson (New never held a teaching position again and lived
York, 1991). a farming life near San Diego, California, where
he died on 16 May 1950.
Other Relevant Works Like fellow graduate Addison W. MOORE,
Bateson’s papers are at the University of Bawden fully absorbed and embraced the
California at Santa Cruz. Chicago functionalist psychology and its meta-
physical stance of empirical naturalism. This
Further Reading naturalism rejects dualism’s view that experi-
Amer Nat Bio, Bio Dict Psych, Cambridge ence is an inner mental representation of the
Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer Bio world’s features. Bawden used his knowledge
Harries-Jones, Peter. A Recursive Vision: of physiology to argue that experience cannot
Ecological Understanding and Gregory be confined within the individual, and certainly
Bateson (Toronto, 1995). not within the brain. “Consciousness is no
Lipset, David. Gregory Bateson: The Legacy more confined to the nervous system than elec-
of a Scientist (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., trical phenomena are confined to the commu-
1980). tators by which the current is deflected.
Wilder, Carol, and John Weakland, eds. Consciousness is related to the activities of the
Rigor and Imagination: Essays from the entire organism … . What we call the single
Legacy of Gregory Bateson (New York, organism is merely a centre of interchange
1981). through which the universal energies surge to
and fro” (The Principles of Pragmatism 1910,
Paul Ryan pp. 92–3). Experience is fundamentally natural
and not mental, since it consists of those situ-
ations where natural objects including a human
being are interacting. The problem of how the
mind and matter relate to each other, left
unsolved by the parallelism theory, is thus a
BAWDEN, Henry Heath (1871–1950) psuedo-problem. Bawden further held, with
Dewey, James Mark BALDWIN, Lester WARD,
H. Heath Bawden was born on 28 September and Josiah ROYCE, that the mental aspect of
1871 in Elyria, Ohio. Bawden received his BA experience is inherently social. Meaningful and
at Denison University in 1894 and then studied goal-directed behaviors are abilities acquired
at Rochester Theological Seminary from 1894 through social interaction in the shared expe-
to 1896. He obtained a graduate fellowship in riences of cooperative activities.
philosophy at the University of Chicago for Bawden’s biological pragmatism portrays
1898 to 1900 to study with John DEWEY and knowledge as produced by the organism’s
George MEAD, receiving the PhD in 1900. His problem-solving thought. If an activity is inter-
dissertation title was “The Theory of the rupted by doubt and difficulty, then con-
Criterion.” Bawden taught philosophy at sciousness in its reflective sense arises, because
Vassar College from 1901 to 1907. In 1904 it is the dynamic tension in experience created
Bawden became a fellow of the American by a conflict in motor coordination toward a
Academy for the Advancement of Science. He goal. Reflective thought readjusts the meaning
left Vassar for the philosophy chair at the of both things and goals to suggest new courses
University of Cincinnati, but in 1908 he was of successful action. Knowledge accumulates
dismissed by the university president who towards objectivity and systematization since it
disliked Bawden’s separation from his wife and is the ability of things, and not ideas, to be
155
BAWDEN
useful for goals which decides truth. Only from Bulletin 1 (1904): 102–17.
the perspective of an anti-scientific philosophy, “What Is Pragmatism?” Journal of
which demands that truth have nothing to do Philosophy 1 (1904): 421–7.
with anything human, could pragmatism seem “The Physical and the Psychical,”
subjective. Furthermore, most human goals are Philosophical Review 13 (1904): 541–6.
social goals shared and tested by many people, “Methodological Implications of the Mind-
so the judgments that work well for one will Matter Controversy,” Psychological
typically work for many. Indeed, a culture’s Bulletin 3 (1906): 321–49.
technology is grounded on shared working “The New Philosophy Called Pragmatism,”
judgments. Since goals, technologies, and hence Popular Science Monthly 73 (1908):
cultures, are not universal, total agreement does 61–72.
not occur. But this is no reasonable objection The Principles of Pragmatism: A
against pragmatism. Nor is it reasonable to Philosophical Interpretation of Experience
demand that one theory of the workings of (Boston, 1910).
nature should satisfy all intellectual needs. “Mind as a Category of Science,”
Pragmatism entails a pluralistic and tolerant Psychological Bulletin 7 (1910): 221–5.
stance towards the proliferation of successful “The Presuppositions of a Behaviorist
modes of knowledge. Psychology,” Psychological Review 25
Bawden also wrote on education, aesthetics, (1918): 171–90.
free will, and immortality. Freedom cannot “The Evolution of Behavior,” Psychological
consist in absolute independence from nature, Review 26 (1919): 247–76.
since we are natural beings that have our own “Psychology and Scientific Method,” Journal
energies to create partial control. Immortality of Philosophy 16 (1919): 603–609.
of the individual soul or personality is impos- “Method,” Journal of Philosophy 41 (1944):
sible, because such things do not exist. Since 477–94.
one’s personality is social, immortality is “Primary and Secondary Behavior,”
gained with society’s and nature’s continued Psychological Review 52 (1945): 150–61.
existence. “The Psychical as a Biological Directive,”
Philosophy of Science 14 (1947): 56–67.
BIBLIOGRAPHY “We Call It Mind,” Journal of Philosophy 44
“The Functional Significance of the Terms (1947): 710–14.
‘Sensory’ and ‘Motor’,” Psychological
Review 7 (1900): 390–400. Other Relevant Works
“The Psychological Theory of Organic Bawden’s papers are at the Pragmatism
Evolution,” Journal of Comparative Archive at Oklahoma State University.
Neurology 11 (1901): 251–76. A Study of Lapses, Psychological Review
A Syllabus of Psychology (Poughkeepsie, Monograph Supplements 3 (April 1900):
N.Y., 1902). 1–122.
“The Functional View of the Relation Theory of Education: An Outline
between the Psychical and the Physical,” (Poughkeepsie, N.Y., 1904).
Philosophical Review 11 (1902): 474–84. “The Social Character of Consciousness and
“The Meaning of the Psychical from the Its Bearing on Education,” Elementary
Point of View of the Functional School Teacher 4 (1904): 366–76.
Psychology,” Philosophical Review 13 “Evolution and the Absolute,” Philosophical
(1904): 298–319. Review 15 (1906): 145–56.
“Recent Tendencies in the Theory of the “Aesthetic Imagery,” Psychological Review
Psychical and the Physical,” Psychological 16 (1909): 124–41.
156
BAYLIS
“Scientific Wish-thinking,” Review of He was elected Vice President of the Eastern

Religion 9 (1945): 254–66. Division of the American Philosophical
“Religion from the Standpoint of a Association in 1954, and was President of the
Naturalistic Philosophy,” Review of Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology
Religion 11 (1947): 381–96. in 1955. He was a Guggenheim Fellow and
Fulbright Senior Scholar in 1958–9.
Further Reading Baylis worked primarily in the areas of logic,
Shook, John R. “Introduction,” to The philosophy of logic, ethical theory, and meta-
Principles of Pragmatism, by H. Heath physics. In an early article, “Implication and
Bawden, vol. 1 of The Early Critics of Subsumption” (1931), he argued that neither the
Pragmatism (Bristol, UK, 2001), pp. definition of material implication in Principia
ix–xxv. Contains a bibliography of Mathematica by Bertrand Russell and A. N.
Bawden’s writings. WHITEHEAD nor C. I. Lewis’s strict implication
can account for cases in which the antecedent
John R. Shook (implicans) of an implication is irrelevant to the
consequent (implicand). With mathematician
Albert Arnold Bennett, Baylis authored Formal
Logic: A Modern Introduction in 1939. This
popular textbook remained in print for many
years. In addition, he held wide interests, leading
BAYLIS, Charles Augustus (1902–75) to a study of metaphysics and another on ethics,
in which he treated ethics as a decision-theoret-
Charles A. Baylis was born on 2 April 1902 in ical discipline.
Portland, Oregon. He received a BA in 1923 and
an MA in 1924 from the University of BIBLIOGRAPHY
Washington. He then went to Harvard Formal Logic: A Modern Introduction, with
University for further graduate study, receiving Albert Arnold Bennett (New York, 1939;
his PhD in philosophy in 1926. He was influ- 2nd edn 1946; 3rd edn 1950).
enced most by C. I. LEWIS and wrote a disserta- Ethics: The Principles of Wise Choice (New
tion entitled “Creative Synthesis as a York, 1958).
Philosophical Concept.” After spending the rest Metaphysics (New York, 1965).
of 1926 on a Sheldon Traveling Fellowship at
Cambridge University and traveling through Other Relevant Works
France and Germany, he joined the philosophy “Implication and Subsumption,” The Monist
department of Brown University in 1927. He 41 (1931): 392–9.
taught at Brown until 1949, when he became “How to Make Our Ideas Clearer,” Journal
professor and philosophy department chair at of Philosophy 37 (1940): 225–32.
the University of Maryland. In 1952 he became “Facts, Propositions, Exemplification, and
professor of philosophy at Duke University, and Truth,” Mind 57 (1948): 459–79.
served as department chair from 1956 until “Universals, Communicable Knowledge, and
1968. Baylis retired in 1970 and died on 30 Metaphysics,” Journal of Philosophy 48
August 1975 in Durham, North Carolina. (1951): 636–43.
Baylis was one of the founders of the “The Confirmation of Value Judgments,”
Association for Symbolic Logic, and served as Philosophical Review 61 (1952): 50–58.
secretary-treasurer from 1936 to 1942 and Vice “C. I. Lewis’s Theory of Value and Ethics,”
President from 1942 to 1946. He also helped Journal of Philosophy 61 (1964): 559–66.
establish the Journal of Symbolic Logic in 1936. “Foundations for a Presentative Theory of
157
BAYLIS
Perception and Sensation,” Proceedings of his later notable achievements. His first book,
the Aristotelian Society 66 (1966): 41–54. Practical Logic (1950), was a striking contrast
to the standard formal logic books of the day.
Further Reading This work dwelt on the elements of reasoning
Proc of APA v49, Who Was Who in Amer (informal fallacies and similar topics) that non-
v7, Who’s Who in Phil logicians need to know in order to clarify and
Peach, Bernard. “The Ethics of C. A. Baylis,” make cogent their lines of reasoning. His
Philosophy and Phenomenological second book, Thinking Straight (1950), devel-
Research 37 (1976): 1–24. oped and refined these same ideas, swiftly
Welsh, Paul, ed. Fact, Value, and Perception: becoming the dominant text on informal logic
Essays in Honor of Charles A. Baylis in the mid twentieth century. Even in these
(Durham, N.C., 1975). early works, however, Beardsley’s general
philosophical stance is evident. His point in
Irving H. Anellis presenting logic to his readers is not a matter
John R. Shook of teaching the rules of an arcane game or
formal practice but of pulling into focus lines
of reasoning that are of genuine practical
interest to the intelligent public. “Thinking,”
he observed, “is effective when it results in
true beliefs,” and logic is simply “the rules
BEARDSLEY, Monroe Curtis (1915–85) that thinking has to impose upon itself to be
effective” (Thinking Straight, 1950, pp.
Monroe Beardsley was born on 10 December xii–xiii). Because logic is instrumentally
1915 in Bridgeport, Connecticut. He was valuable in producing successful social com-
educated at Yale University, receiving his BA munication and coordination, it is ultimately
in 1936 and PhD in 1939. He was a philoso- valuable as contributing to the good life.
phy instructor at Yale from 1940 to 1944 and At the same time he was writing his logic
an assistant professor from 1946 to 1947. He texts, Beardsley was beginning to work out
also taught philosophy at Mount Holyoke his ideas about aesthetics, a field in which he
College (1944–6). He then was professor of had begun teaching regularly in 1947. The
philosophy at Swarthmore College (1947–69) landmark article that inaugurated his entry
and Temple University (1969–81). into this field was “The Intentional Fallacy”
Internationally recognized as an aesthetician, (1946), an essay in which he and the distin-
Beardsley was also a prominent logician and guished Yale literary critic William Wimsatt
philosopher of language. He was elected stood the prevailing literary theory on its head.
President of the American Society for The view they advanced was that authorial
Aesthetics (1967–8) and President of the intent is not the factor to consider in deter-
Eastern Division of the American Philosophical mining the meaning of a text. Instead, they
Association (1978–9), and was also a fellow of argued, words pronounced by an author have
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. a life of their own, one which must be tied in
For many years he served as an editor of the to the fabric of literary convention and which
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism and as must anticipate communities of potential
general editor of the Prentice-Hall Foundations future readers. They pointed out that the
in Philosophy series. He died on 18 September original intention of the author is generally
1985 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. not available to the reader, so it is pointless to
In the early part of his career, Beardsley’s think of it as a standard upon which one might
interests were trained on subjects remote from base an evaluation of a work; they reinforced
158
BEARDSLEY
this point in “The Affective Fallacy” (1949). thetic) strictures is a fruitful way of looking at
The audience need not be guided by the author the distinctive ways art and nature may affect
in appreciating a text, and emotive responses us. The problem, as Beardsley saw it, was to
are as detached from authorial intention as accept this intuition while realizing at the same
interpretive responses. Thus it should not time that there are so many different ways in
matter to our appreciation of a work that its which aesthetic elements of our awareness get
author felt this or that way about it. Together, distributed that the notion of a core concept of
the two articles took a stand that has been a aesthetic experience becomes suspect. His
focus of controversy ever since. The anti-inten- response was to build a defensible concept out
tionalism they ushered in insists that both cog- of general claims that can be distilled from
nitive and affective responses appropriate to a current social practices and common usage.
literary work are disconnected from whatever There are, he reasoned, four points on which
thoughts and emotions its author may have nearly everyone will agree. First, we take it to
had. If certain responses are relevant to our be a distinguishing mark of an aesthetic expe-
assessment of the aesthetic quality of literary rience that it involves attention trained on
works, it will have to be because the reader is various (but interrelated) elements of a phe-
prepared by literary culture to have those nomenal field (such as visual and auditory
responses and not because the reader thinks patterns, literary plots, designs of movement in
that they are what the author would have felt. dance). Second, an aesthetic experience is
In 1958 Beardsley published Aesthetics: commonly taken to be one of a certain degree
Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, which of intensity. It involves a bonding of emotion
immediately became known as a landmark to its object in a way that makes the experience
statement of philosophical perspectives on the seem concentrated. Third, the experience must
arts in the twentieth century. Beardsley hang together, or be coherent, to a high degree.
acknowledged that aesthetics was, at the time, This is a coherence that withstands interrup-
regarded as a feeble stepsister in the philo- tions, as when we lay down a novel to water
sophical family. But he asserted that this fact the lawn. Fourth, and finally, the experience
alone demanded that we expend more care must be complete in itself. That is, it must not
and effort on it than we would on some other, require for its enjoyment elements that are
more robust children. Aesthetics was unusual alien to it; and it is vulnerable to the intrusion
in its day in the degree to which the discussion of extraneous elements. What memory pre-
of its topic was presented in the form of serves as a single aesthetic experience is cut off
argument, presenting clear-sighted assessments from the ordinary run of experience by these
of thinking on all sides of important points of factors (1958, pp. 527–8).
controversy, and advancing theses on these The aesthetic theory Beardsley defended in
issues. The backbone of Beardsley’s line of Aesthetics and throughout his life revolves
argument is a perspicuous Deweyanism, around the concept of aesthetic experience.
wedded to the central importance of aesthetic His theory of critical interpretation is an
experience but responsive to the heterogeneous account of conditions and restraints bearing on
forms that experience can take in the arts. an artwork’s capacity for conducing to such an
Beardsley found much of what John DEWEY experience. His general theory of aesthetic
said in describing and defending his notion of value is an account of differential capacities of
aesthetic experience to be vague or cryptic and natural and artifactual objects to occasion and
unsusceptible to empirical demonstration. sustain such an experience. And his theory of
Nevertheless, he thought that Dewey’s notion taste is an account of conditions necessary for
that experience gets carved into experiences a person to make the finest, most discriminat-
in its submission to various (generally aes- ing use of sensory input and critical judgment
159
BEARDSLEY
in the course of aesthetic experience. Although artwork is taken to be an arrangement of con-

Beardsley’s work on these various topics is in ditions typically intended to be capable of
this way single-minded, it is not simplistic. By affording an experience with a marked aes-
freeing the idea of understanding an art object thetic character. There are, of course, a great
from the task of understanding the artist and many other important questions to which
by acknowledging correlative restrictions on Beardsley offered important answers. He con-
understanding that arise out of local and tributed more thought to more issues in a more
cultural contexts, Beardsley staked his claim to productive way than any other aesthetician of
a complex and inherently controversial theo- his time.
retical domain. Intentionalism and expres- Late in his career, in the course of pulling
sionism were off limits in one direction. together various of his essays into a collection
Institutional theories were off limits in the for posterity, he remarked on the tension
other. The distinctive approach to the arts he philosophers must feel between devotion to
developed between these limits acknowledged their hard-won doctrines and congenial will-
that artworks are intentional without making ingness to accede to cogent criticism. He
their meaning the captive of their creators’ eschewed both the stubbornness of the zealots
intentions, and that they are institution-related and the ease of concession. Instead, he
without making every artwork a candidate for mounted a new and invigorated defense of his
appreciation in an institutional setting. central doctrine of aesthetic experience, mod-
Beardsley was modest enough to recognize ifying it to fend off criticisms he took to be
that there are no certainties in this middle telling and amplifying the elements he took to
ground, yet bold enough to think that it is lie at its defensible core. He conceded that this
possible to find there true and convincing is “the concept that has given me the most
answers to some of the most important ques- trouble in aesthetics” despite its centrality in
tions of criticism. his general aesthetic theory, but insisted that
Among the questions to which he offered there were two things about which he was sure.
novel and insightful answers were: (1) What is First, that there is such a thing as aesthetic value.
the cognitive status of metaphor? He regarded Second, that is cannot be defined except in terms
metaphor as a special fact about language of aesthetic experience. The key is to make clear
whereby properties of objects are transformed what makes an experience aesthetic. In his final
into connotations of words. (2) What makes exposition of this notion – meant both to take
some poetry bad? He offered a purely aes- stock of criticisms he accepted and to incorpo-
thetic account of poetic badness in contrast to rate ideas he had come to find congenial – he
the prevailing account that had conflated aes- identifies five criteria to be applied as a
thetic and moral value. (3) Are simples (like (Wittgensteinian) family, with the proviso that
yellowness) ever beautiful? He held that beauty an experience must have the first and at least
occurs only in complexity. (4) Can interpreta- three of the rest to count as aesthetic. The
tion ever be completely free? No, he insisted, criteria are: (1) object directedness – the willingly
it must continually be checked against the text. accepted guidance over one’s mental states by
(5) Is irony a characteristic proper to texts or properties on which attention is fixed with a
to social contexts? He held that irony can feeling that “things are working themselves out
occur only when there is an internal clue that fittingly”; (2) felt freedom – a sense of release
makes the work ironic and not just social cir- from concerns about past and future, a sense of
cumstances in which some readers might find harmony with what is presented as if freely
it so. (6) And is “art” definable? Silent on this chosen; (3) detached affect – a sense that objects
issue for most of his career, he eventually of interest are set apart from us at some emo-
offered a roundabout definition in which an tional distance, permitting us to rise above even
160
BEARDSLEY
dark and disturbing things; (4) active discovery Thinking Straight (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,
– a sense of the mind’s exercising active con- 1950; 2nd rev. edn 1965; 3rd rev. edn
structive powers to make things cohere, a sense 1966; 4th rev. edn 1975).
of intelligibility; and (5) wholeness – a sense of “The Concept of Economy in Art,” Journal
personal integration, a contentment involving of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 14 (1956):
both self-acceptance and self-expansion (1982, 370–75.
pp. 288–9). Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of
In this final view of aesthetic experience, Criticism (New York, 1958).
Beardsley clarifies and reaffirms the qualities of “The Concept of Meter: An Exercise in
“being fully alive” he had long maintained to Abstraction,” with W. K. Wimsatt,
be the inherent values of our encounter with Publications of the Modern Language
art. Aesthetic experience, he consistently Association 74 (1959): 585–98.
argued, is more than a pleasant feeling. It coun- “The Definitions of the Arts,” Journal of
teracts violent and destructive impulses, Aesthetics and Art Criticism 20 (1961):
conduces toward the integration of personal- 175–87.
ity, refines perception and discrimination, “The Generality of Critical Reasons,”
develops imagination, fosters mutual sympathy Journal of Philosophy 50 (1962): 477–86.
and understanding, and “holds before us a “The Discrimination of Aesthetic
clue as to what life can be like in its great Enjoyment,” British Journal of Aesthetics
richness and joy.” Those who knew him affirm 3 (1963): 291–300.
that Beardsley’s own life reflected these same Philosophical Thinking: An Introduction,
values and that his love of art and philosophy with E. L. Beardsley (New York, 1965).
was matched by his kindness, open-minded- “The Creation of Art,” Journal of Aesthetics
ness, and generosity of spirit. In his retirement, and Art Criticism 23 (1965): 291–304.
Beardsley devoted a great deal of time and “The Aesthetic Problem of Justification,”
effort to the causes of civil rights and civil lib- Journal of Aesthetic Education 1 (1966):
erties, serving for a time as an officer in the 29.
Pennsylvania National Association for the Aesthetics from Classical Greece to the
Advancement of Colored People. As witty as Present: A Short History (New York,
he was wise, Beardsley took up the civil liber- 1966).
ties theme to mock his well-known profes- “Aesthetic Experience Regained,” Journal of
sional modesty in his last essay: “The civil lib- Aesthetics and Art Criticism 28 (1969):
erties of no reader can be taken away. Each 3–11.
reader retains his or her ‘right to reject’ my “The Aesthetic Point of View,”
judgment – except in the weak sense that all of Metaphilosophy 1 (1970): 39–58.
us have a duty to be rational, and my judgment The Possibility of Criticism (Detroit, 1970).
is supremely rational” (Fisher 1983, p. 299). “What is an Aesthetic Quality?” Theoria 39
(1973): 50–70.
BIBLIOGRAPHY “Is Art Essentially Institutional?” in Culture
“The Intentional Fallacy,” with W. K. and Art, ed. Lars Aagaard-Mogensen
Wimsatt, Sewanee Review 54 (1946): (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1976), pp.
3–23. 194–202.
“The Affective Fallacy,” with W. K. Writing with Reason: Logic for Composition
Wimsatt, Sewanee Review 57 (1949): (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1976).
31–55. “Metaphorical Senses,” Noûs 12 (1978):
Practical Logic (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 3–16.
1950). “The Role of Psychological Explanation in
161
BEARDSLEY
Aesthetics,” in Perceiving Artworks, ed. BEATTIE, Francis Robert (1848–1906)

John Fisher (Philadelphia, 1980), pp.
185–212. Francis R. Beattie was born on 31 March 1848
The Aesthetic Point of View: Selected near Guelph, Ontario, Canada. He was the
Essays, ed. M. Wreen and D. Callen son of Robert Beattie and Janet McKinley
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1982). (related to the family of President William
“What is Going on in a Dance?” Dance McKinley). Beattie received his BA in 1875
Research Journal 15 (1982): 31–6. and MA in 1876 from the interdenominational
“An Aesthetic Definition of Art,” in What is University of Toronto. In preparation for the
Art? ed. H. Curtler (New York, 1983), pp. Presbyterian ministry, he attended Knox
13–29. Theological College in Toronto and was
“The Refutation of Relativism,” Journal of ordained minister upon graduation in 1878.
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 41 (1983): He served churches in Baltimore, Maryland
265–70. and Cold Spring, Ontario until 1882, and in
Brantford, Canada from 1882 to 1888. He
Further Reading was an examiner for Toronto during 1884–8.
Bio 20thC Phils, Pres Addr of APA v8, Proc Based on his advanced study and publications
of APA v59 during those years, he received a BD from
Aagaard-Mogensen, Lars, and Luk De Vos, Knox in 1882, a PhD from Illinois Wesleyan
eds. Text, Literature, and Aesthetics: In University in 1884. He also received an
Honor of Monroe C. Beardsley honorary DD from the Presbyterian College of
(Amsterdam, 1986). Montréal in 1887 and an LLD from the
Davies, Stephen. Definitions of Art (Ithaca, Central University in Kentucky.
N.Y., 1991). Deciding to accept an invitation to leave the
Dickie, George, and Kent Wilson. “The ministry for academia, in 1888 Beattie joined
Intentional Fallacy: Defending Beardsley,” the faculty of Columbia Theological Seminary
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 53 in South Carolina as professor of natural
(1995): 233–50. science in connection with revelation and
Fisher, John, ed. Essays on Aesthetics: Christian apologetics, and he affiliated with the
Perspectives on the Work of Monroe C. Presbyterian Church South. In 1893 he became
Beardsley (Philadelphia, 1983). professor of apologetics and systematic
Iseminger, Gary, ed. Intention and theology at the Presbyterian Theological
Interpretation (Philadelphia, 1992). Seminary in Louisville, Kentucky, and held
Kallen, Donald. “Monroe Beardsley,” in A that position until his death. He also became
Companion to Aesthetics, ed. David the editor of the Christian Observer in 1893
Cooper (London, 1992), pp. 42–4. and associate editor of the Presbyterian
Wreen, Michael J. “Monroe Beardsley,” in Quarterly Review in 1895.
The Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, ed. Beattie’s Presbyterian Standards: An
Michael Kelly (New York, 1998), vol. 1, Exposition of the Westminster Confession of
pp. 232–7. Faith and Catechisms (1896) and Apologetics
(1903) became standard texts for both
Ronald Moore Presbyterian seminary students and ministers.
The Presbyterian Standards was the first
American commentary expounding all three
Westminster Standards: the Shorter Catechism,
the Larger Catechism, and the Confession of
Faith. Beattie’s theological writings were
162
BEAVEN
sophisticated elaborations of conservative (October 1899): 653–84.

Calvinist principles. Largely following the “The Toronto Council of the Alliance of
greatest Presbyterian theologian of that time, the Reformed Churches Holding the
Princeton’s Charles HODGE, Beattie defended Presbyterian System,” Presbyterian
the Reformed movement and the federal, or Quarterly 7 (January 1893): 108–20.
covenant, understanding of grace and salva- Ed., Memorial Volume of the Westminster
tion. Beattie divided apologetics into three Assembly, 1647–1897, Containing
branches: (1) philosophical apologetics which Eleven Addresses Delivered before the
proves God’s existence; (2) Christian apolo- General Assembly of the Presbyterian
getics which considers the truth of revelation Church in the United States, at Charlotte,
and the Bible; and (3) practical apologetics N.C. in May, 1897 (Richmond, Virg.,
which demonstrates Christianity’s effective- 1897).
ness in the world. As a powerful member of the
executive committee of the Alliance of the Further Reading
Presbyterian and Reformed Churches, Beattie Dict Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v21,
worked for a federation of all Presbyterian Who Was Who in Amer v1
churches. Later Presbyterian theologians, such Webb, Robert A. “Beattie’s Presbyterian
as Benjamin WARFIELD who wrote the intro- Standards,” Presbyterian Quarterly 11
duction to Apologetics, admired Beattie for (1897): 99–102.
his devotion to the Church and to theology.
John R. Shook
BIBLIOGRAPHY
An Examination of the Utilitarian Theory
of Morals (Brantford, Ont., 1885).
The Methods of Theism: An Essay
(Brantford, Ont., 1887).
Radical Criticism: An Exposition and BEAVEN, James (1801–75)
Examination of the Radical Critical
Theory Concerning the Literature and James Beaven was born on 9 July 1801 in
Religious System of the Old Testament Westbury, Wiltshire, England. Entering Oxford
Scriptures (New York, 1894; Chicago, University in 1820, he received the BA in 1824
1895). and was ordained priest in 1826. He took the
The Presbyterian Standards: An Exposition Oxford MA in 1827, and BD and NN degrees
of the Westminster Confession of Faith in 1842. He held clerical positions in
and Catechisms (Richmond, Virg., 1896). Staffordshire and Northamptonshire during the
Calvinism and Modern Thought 1830s and early 1840s, and displayed remark-
(Philadelphia, 1901). able intellectual capacity by publishing several
Apologetics; or, the Rational Vindication of short theological studies. His scholarship, con-
Christianity (Richmond, Virg., 1903). formist views, and interest in missionary work
made him an ideal candidate for a faculty
Other Relevant Works position at a Canadian college. He decided in
“Christian Apologetics,” Presbyterian 1843 to go to the newly opened King’s College
Quarterly 4 (July 1890): 337–69. in Toronto, which was chartered to be a college
“Primeval Man,” Presbyterian Quarterly 9 for the Church of England in Canada. As the
(July 1895): 351–71. professor of divinity, metaphysics, and moral
“Some Salient Features of Presbyterian philosophy he guided the small college’s affairs,
Doctrine” Presbyterian Quarterly 13 promoted missionary work, and built new
163
BEAVEN
churches, bringing the conservative and royalist most other Canadian clergy and intellectuals, did
High Church Tractarian movement to Ontario. not react with extreme hostility to Darwinian
King’s College was closed in 1849 so that it evolution when it arrived a short time after his
could be transformed into the interdenomina- book was published. Beaven was willing to grant
tional University of Toronto. Beaven reluctantly the scientific knowledge of his day; the philo-
joined the faculty of this new “godless” institu- sophical question was whether natural laws
tion, and in 1851 he became its first professor of working on matter could fully explain the scale
philosophy, as the chair of metaphysics and and complexity of organized and living crea-
ethics. He retired in 1871 under pressure from tures. If matter alone is real, Beaven reasoned,
students and authorities, giving up his chair to then there could be no explanation why matter
George Paxton Y OUNG . Beaven died on would tend to organize lawfully. Matter alone
8 November 1875 in Niagara, Ontario. cannot explain the human mind or its growth
Beaven is chiefly remembered by the Church and achievements. The simple existence of any
of England in Canada as a tireless organizer natural laws demands postulating an intelligent
and worker for the church, and an author of designer of the universe. More significantly, this
useful catechisms and clerical aids. His Account intelligent designer is the best explanation for the
of the Life and Writings of S. Irenaeus (1841) fact that so many laws of nature have to be per-
made a notable contribution to church history. fectly and harmoniously aligned to permit the
His Recreations of a Long Vacation was a existence of intelligent creatures. Only the
popular account of a diocesan tour in 1845 unique mind of God could establish this degree
through the wilds of western Ontario to Sault St. of harmony.
Marie. But to match his place as one of the first
secular professors of philosophy in North BIBLIOGRAPHY
America, he also has the distinction of publish- An Account of the Life and Writings of
ing the first philosophical work in English- S. Irenaeus (London, 1841).
speaking Canada (Jérôme Demers’s 1835 Latin Recreations of a Long Vacation; or A Visit
textbook has French Canadian priority). to Indian Missions in Upper Canada
Beaven’s Elements of Natural Theology (1850) (London and Toronto, 1846).
only considers philosophical arguments for reli- A Catechism on the Thirty-nine Articles of
gious conclusions, omitting Christian articles of the Church of England (Oxford and
faith dependent on revelation. The immortality London, 1850; rev. US edn, New York,
of the soul and the existence of God, the two 1853).
foundations of any religion, can be rationally Elements of Natural Theology (London,
demonstrated primarily by a variety of argu- 1850).
ments from design. Ontological arguments do “That they all may be one”: A Sermon,
not appear in his text; traditional cosmological Preached before the Synod of the Diocese
arguments receive only cursory attention; and of Toronto, on the 7th of June, 1859
the moral argument for God’s existence and (Toronto, 1859).
righteousness is mentioned without placing
much weight there. Beaven used William Paley’s Further Reading
books as course texts, and relied on suitably Canad Encyc, Dict Canad Bio
modified versions of Paley’s “watch-maker Armour, Leslie, and Elizabeth Trott.
argument.” “Reason and Authority: James Beaven
Unlike creationists who believe that modern and Natural Theology,” in The Faces of
science threatens not just the design argument Reason: An Essay on Philosophy and
but the entire faith, Beaven was acquainted with Culture in English Canada 1850–1950
the geology and biology of his day and, like (Waterloo, Ont., 1981), pp. 32–60.
164
BECK
Campbell, John. “The College, 1974; LHD Emory University, 1977;

Reverend Professor James Beaven, D.D., and D.Phil. Tübingen University, 1977. Beck
M.A.,” University of Toronto Monthly 3 died on 7 June 1997 in Rochester, New York.
(December 1902): 69–72. Beck was for many years a leading Kant
Rabb, J. Douglas. Religion and Science in scholar of world renown. He not only pub-
Early Canada (Kingston, Ont., 1988). lished widely used translations of Kant’s works,
Slater, John G. Minerva’s Aviary: but also wrote expert introductions and com-
Philosophy at Toronto 1843–1943 mentaries for these works. Over the years,
(Toronto, 2005), chap. 2. students and scholars have depended on Beck’s
translations and helpful commentary. Beck
John R. Shook served as editor of Proceedings of the Third
International Kant Congress in 1970. He also
served on several editorial boards, including
Kant-Studien, and wrote numerous scholarly
articles for the journal.
Beck begins one of his studies of Kant with
BECK, Lewis White (1913–97) the remark that you can philosophize with
Kant or against him, but you can’t philoso-
Lewis White Beck was born on 26 September phize without him. For Beck, Kant is important
1913 in Griffin, Georgia. He received his BA at because he set the problems of modern philos-
Emory University in 1934, and his MA in 1935 ophy and also set much of its agenda with his
and PhD in 1937 at Duke University. After extensive influence. This is especially true in the
postdoctoral study at the University of Berlin, theory of knowledge and ethics, but it is true in
he served at Emory University as instructor in other areas of philosophy as well, including
philosophy from 1938 to 1941; University of the possibility of metaphysics and the philoso-
Delaware as assistant and associate professor phy of religion. In his 1965 Studies in the
from 1941 to 1948; and Lehigh University as Philosophy of Kant, Beck devotes three of his
professor of philosophy during 1948–9. He own essays to Kant’s famous analytic synthetic
then was professor of philosophy at the distinction and the so-called synthetic a priori.
University of Rochester from 1949 to 1979, Kant himself had claimed that mathematical
and he served as Dean of the Graduate School judgments are synthetic a priori in the sense that
in 1956–7. He was visiting professor at they must pertain to, or apply to, experience –
Columbia University, University of Minnesota, but they cannot be derived from experience.
and University of California at Berkeley. He Kant also claimed that if real metaphysical
was a member of the national council of the judgments are possible then they cannot be
National Endowment for the Humanities derived empirically but must be based on pure
(1970–75), the American Academy of Arts and reason. Also, in his moral philosophy, Kant
Sciences, the American Association of claimed that any real moral law or principle of
University Professors (member of executive morality must be synthetic a priori. Beck was
council 1954–6), the American Philosophical well aware of the central importance of Kant’s
Association (President of the Eastern Division analytic–synthetic distinction and view of the
1971–2 and board chairman 1974–7), and Phi synthetic a priori for philosophy of mathemat-
Beta Kappa. His awards included: Guggenheim ics, epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics.
fellow, 1957–8; Edward P. Curtis Prize for Consequently, he tried to clarify Kant’s use of
undergraduate teaching at the University of these ideas by asking a whole series of impor-
Rochester, 1962; American Council of Learned tant questions, such as whether synthetic judg-
Societies fellow, 1965; D.Litt. Hamilton ments be made analytic, whether the episte-
165
BECK
mology of synthesis accounts for the factor of cannot simply be a matter of faith, nor can
necessity in knowledge, and whether Kant morality be coerced. Consequently, Kant’s
wrongly made things necessary which are in great problem in his second Critique is to try to
fact contingent. Beck is careful to locate show how morality can be both rational and
numerous terminological confusions in Kant free.
which have caused much controversy concern- Beck was also interested in the question of
ing what he meant by critical notions. For what exactly is a secular philosophy. In his
example, Beck claims that Kant’s use of “syn- 1961 book Six Secular Philosophers, he
thetic” as having one meaning in his transcen- examined this question, identifying families of
dental logic, another in his general logic, and secular philosophers, and giving special atten-
also another in his methodology, is confusing tion to Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Nietzsche,
and unfortunate. Beck admits that translating William JAMES, and George SANTAYANA. Beck
Kant is difficult, since many of the terms that claims that these six philosophers made impor-
he uses were invented by him and do not have tant contributions to what he calls liberal
a fixed meaning even in his own writings. religion. While we cannot expect a rigid or
Beck also claimed that Kant’s Critique of exact notion of secular philosophy, we can
Practical Reason has been neglected in favor of expect that secular philosophy requires inde-
the more popular Foundations of the pendence of thought, and is not simply another
Metaphysics of Morals. But he contends that an theology of a defense of a particular form of
adequate understanding of Kant’s moral phi- religion. A secular philosophy will take religion
losophy cannot be achieved without paying seriously and try to answer questions concern-
attention to important discussions of freedom, ing its meaning and value.
the postulates of pure practical reason, and the Beck divides the six secular philosophers he
notion of practical reason found in the second studies into two distinct families. The first
Critique. Beck tried to remedy the neglect of group, made up of Spinoza, Hume, and Kant,
this work with his elaborate A Commentary on considered science and philosophy as limiting
Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, published the scope and validity as well as the content of
in 1961. Beck states that it is only in the second religious belief. The second family, made up of
Critique that all of the various strands of Kant’s Nietzsche, James, and Santayana, was most
thoughts are woven together into the pattern of concerned with the relation of religious values
his practical philosophy. For Kant, ethics is to other values in life and culture. Spinoza
only possible if there is a moral law. But a viewed science, religion, and philosophy as all-
moral law is a synthetic a priori practical rational in requiring reason as their basis. As a
proposition, because its universality and neces- monist, Spinoza viewed God, nature, and
sity cannot be derived from experience, and reality as one, or essentially the same thing in
must be imposed on it by some causality of substance. Kant, on the other hand, according
the mind. This is a causality of freedom which to Beck, agreed with Hume that no religious
seems to contradict, or conflict with, the nec- belief can be confirmed by a scientific inter-
essary causality operating in nature. While Kant pretation of nature. For both, there is no sci-
had faced this dilemma in his earlier Critique of entific basis of religion. But, Beck alleged, where
Pure Reason, it was left to the second Critique Hume concluded so much the worse for
to resolve this problem in greater detail. For religion, Kant instead said that there is another
Kant, freedom is the only one of the basis for religion that is also rational. This, for
Transcendent Ideas of pure reason that we can Kant, is our moral consciousness. True religion
know, while the Ideas of God and Immortality can be based on the fact of morality, just as
of the Soul are unknowable. But morality Spinoza thought it could be based on true phi-
depends on freedom and reason; morality losophy and science. Nietzsche, according to
166
BECK
Beck, gave a negative answer to the question Trans., Kant, Foundations of the
whether religion could be justified by reference Metaphysics of Morals and What is
to moral values. Nietzsche saw the illusions of Enlightenment? (New York, 1959).
religion as encumbrances to be cast away, if A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of
humans are to become mature and masters of Practical Reason (Chicago, 1961).
their own destiny. Six Secular Philosophers (New York, 1961).
According to Beck, both James and Trans., Kant, On History (Indianapolis, Ind.,
Santayana found an error in Nietzsche’s notion 1963).
that all actions spring from a natural will to Studies in the Philosophy of Kant
power. Even if men are driven by power, this (Indianapolis, 1965).
power can be transformed and made morally Early German Philosophy: Kant and His
useful and valuable, according to James. For Predecessors (Cambridge, Mass., 1969).
James, religion can help humans pragmatically, The Actor and The Spectator (New Haven,
to set higher goals for themselves and make Conn., 1974).
piecemeal progress, and thus improve their Kant’s Latin Writings, Translations,
lives. For Santayana, religion was a myth to be Commentaries, and Notes (New York,
taken seriously, but not literally. Taken literally, 1985).
religion conflicts with fact and cannot be Essays by Lewis White Beck: Five Decades as
defended. But taken figuratively, it can have a Philosopher (Rochester, N.Y., 1998).
great poetic value, moral value, and beauty.
For Santayana, religion pursues a life of reason Other Relevant Works
through the imagination. Without imagination Beck’s papers are at the University of
human life does not rise above its merely Rochester.
animal nature, and cannot produce the chief Ed., Macmillan Sources in Philosophy (New
embodiments of culture: fine art, morality, lit- York, 1965).
erature, philosophy, or even science itself. Beck Ed., Eighteenth Century Philosophy (New
goes on to state in detail ways in which his six York, 1966).
thinkers developed their secular philosophies, Ed., Kant Studies Today (LaSalle, Ill., 1969).
which in their different ways sought to show Trans., Foundations of the Metaphysics of
the role of religion in modern life. Morals, Immanuel Kant, ed. R. P. Wolff
In 2001 a group of prominent scholars paid (Indianapolis, 1969).
tribute to Beck’s numerous scholarly contribu- Ed., Kant’s Theory of Knowledge: Selected
tions over the years with the publication of Papers From The Third International Kant
Kant’s Legacy: Essays in Honor of Lewis White Conference (Dordrecht, 1974).
Beck. Walter KAUFMANN, a leading scholar of Ed., Essays on Kant and Hume (New Haven,
German philosophy and translator of Conn., 1978).
Nietzsche’s works, in his 1980 Goethe, Kant
and Hegel, pays a special tribute to Beck who Further Reading
encouraged his efforts despite Kaufmann’s Pres Addr of APA v8, Proc of APA v71,
harsh criticisms of Kant’s philosophy. Who’s Who in Phil
Cicovacki, Predrag, ed. Kant’s Legacy: Essays
BIBLIOGRAPHY In Honor of Lewis White Beck (Rochester,
Trans., Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical N.Y., 2001).
Reason and Other Writings on Moral
Philosophy (Chicago, 1949). Guy W. Stroh
Philosophic Inquiry, an Introduction to
Philosophy (New York, 1952).
167
BECKER
BECKER, Carl Lotus (1873–1945) European history was The Heavenly City of
the Eighteenth-century Philosophers (1932),
Carl Becker was born on 7 September 1873 in which examines the efforts of the philosophes to
Black Hawk County, Iowa. After one year at replace authority with reason.
Cornell College in Mt Vernon, Iowa, he went to Becker explored issues in the philosophy of
the University of Wisconsin, where he became history, especially the possibility of objective
a student of the eminent historian Frederick historical knowledge, in several essays that
Jackson Turner. He received his BLitt degree were later collected in Detachment and the
with honors in history in 1896, and after some Writing of History (1958). Perhaps of greatest
study at Columbia with James Harvey impact was his 1931 presidential address
Robinson and a couple of one-year teaching “Everyman His Own Historian,” which high-
positions, he became assistant professor of lighted the many obstacles preventing neutral
history at the University of Kansas in 1902. impartiality. Both the selection of historical
Under Turner’s direction Becker completed his facts and theories to explain them are colored
Wisconsin PhD in history in 1907 and was by the historian’s own personality, interests,
promoted to professor of history in 1909. He and cultural assumptions. Becker pragmati-
went to the University of Minnesota in 1916 but cally doubted whether even the wider com-
in 1917 he accepted an invitation from Cornell munity of historians could converge on any
University to be professor of European history, truth; the more likely result is that each gen-
where he stayed until his retirement in 1941. eration develops a unique approach to history
Becker was elected to the Royal Historical and weaves its own version of past times.
Society (1921), to the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences (1923), was President of the BIBLIOGRAPHY
American Historical Association (1931), and The Beginnings of the American People
was elected to the National Institute of Arts (Boston, 1915).
and Letters (1933). Becker died on 10 April The United States: An Experiment in
1945 in Ithaca, New York. Democracy (New York, 1920).
Becker became prominent by interpreting Declaration of Independence: A Study in
colonial politics and the American Revolution the History of Political Ideas (New York,
through the lens of the Progressive Era’s concern 1922).
for economic justice, class relations, and power The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-
distribution. His work quickly progressed from century Philosophers (New Haven,
the history of politics to political theory itself. 1932).
The United States: An Experiment in Everyman His Own Historian: Essays on
Democracy (1920) starkly contrasts the original History and Politics (New York, 1935).
purposes of the Framers with the vastness of Modern Democracy (New Haven, 1941).
modern government, yet Becker approved of New Liberties for Old (New Haven, 1941).
the idea that the meaning of the Constitution How New Will the Better World Be? A
democratically evolves. His Declaration of Discussion of Post-war Reconstruction
Independence: A Study in the History of (New York, 1944).
Political Ideas (1922) thoroughly analyzed the Freedom and Responsibility in the
document’s language in light of the cultural and American Way of Life (New York,
political context, revealing justifications for 1945).
democracy and fundamental rights. His later Progress and Power (New York, 1949).
books of the 1940s optimistically discuss the
prospects and problems for democracy during Other Relevant Works
its darkest years. Becker’s major work in Becker’s papers are at Cornell University.
168
BEDAU
Snyder, Phil L., ed., Detachment and the injunction. His vindication came from the
Writing of History: Essays and Letters of Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which
Carl L. Becker (Ithaca, N.Y., 1958). declared the oath unconstitutional. He was a
Kammen, Michael, ed., “What Is the Good card-carrying member of the American Civil
of History?” Selected Letters of Carl L. Liberties Union and the American Association of
Becker, 1900–1945 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1973). University Professors, and his defense of
academic freedom continued in his efforts to
Further Reading protect colleagues engaged in anti-war protests
Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, from institutional retribution.
Comp Amer Thought, Dict Amer Bio, Not surprisingly, his early scholarship focused
Nat Cycl Amer Bio v33, Who Was Who on academic freedom, justice and equality, and
in Amer v2 civil disobedience. This focus was aimed in par-
Brown, Robert E. Carl Becker on History ticular upon the philosophy of law and espe-
and the American Revolution (East cially the death penalty in the American criminal
Lansing, Mich., 1970). justice system. His best-known book, The Death
Smith, Charlotte W. Carl Becker: On Penalty in America (1964), has been reprinted,
History and the Climate of Opinion updated, and supplemented numerous times over
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1956). the past forty years. In the preface to the 1997
Strout, Cushing. The Pragmatic Revolt in edition, Bedau reflected, “In 1964, in my preface
American History: Carl Becker and to … the grandparent of this book …, I warned
Charles Beard (New Haven, Conn., the reader that it was not a volume conceived in
1958). scholarly neutrality. I was then and still am
Wilkins, Burleigh T. Carl Becker: A opposed to the death penalty in all its forms, no
Biographical Study in American matter how awful the crime or how savage the
Intellectual History (Cambridge, Mass., criminal.” Colleagues and scholars alike have
1961). noted this same passionate partisanship with
regard to other issues which have captured
John R. Shook Bedau’s interest; it seems a fair statement that
Bedau the philosopher is inseparable from Bedau
the man and citizen.
Upon the occasion of Bedau’s retirement from
Tufts in 1999, a resolution of the Tufts faculty
of arts and sciences observed, “Hugo’s contri-
BEDAU, Hugo Adam (1926– ) bution to the debate on the death penalty is
analytic, normative, and empirical.” The reso-
Hugo Bedau became known as a philosopher lution adds, “His moral critique of retributive
who lived and acted upon his philosophical con- views is fundamental, showing that the only
victions. He was born on 23 September 1926 in plausible component to such views, a principle
Portland, Oregon. He earned the BA, summa of proportionality between crime and punish-
cum laude, from University of Redlands (1949), ment, does not imply a life for a life or a rape for
and the MA and PhD (1961) degrees from a rape.” Bedau has argued that the debate over
Harvard. When hired by the philosophy depart- deterrence is not only empirical but also moral.
ment of Tufts University in 1966, from a tenured He has provided a philosophic framework for
position at Reed University, he refused to sign the the public debate concerning the death penalty.
loyalty oath that accompanied his first contract. Bedau has said that controversial issues are
His appointment was cancelled by the Board of the best things to talk about. His philosophy of
Trustees, and Bedau went to court and won an pedagogy is grounded in this principle. He
169
BEDAU
contends that students learn more, and better, BIBLIOGRAPHY

by discussing highly controversial topics. There “On Civil Disobedience,” Journal of
are things to be said on both sides of the issue, Philosophy 58 (1961): 653–65.
and the students are more interested, he claims. “Justice and Classical Utilitarianism,”
Other areas of controversy upon which Bedau Nomos VI: Justice (1963): 284–305.
has turned his philosopher’s mind and his The Death Penalty in America: An
prolific pen are the proper role of human rights Anthology (Garden City, N.Y., 1964).
in international affairs and US foreign policy, “Death Sentences in New Jersey,
group decision-making processes, and ethics in 1907–1960,” Rutgers Law Review 19 (Fall
government. 1964): 1–64.
Despite, or perhaps because of, his lifelong “Capital Punishment in Oregon,
courting of controversies, he has won numerous 1903–1960,” Oregon Law Review 45
honors, including the Abolitionist Award of (December 1965): 1–39.
the National Coalition to Abolish the Death “Egalitarianism and the Idea of Equality,”
Penalty (1989); the August Vollmer Award Nomos IX: Equality (1967): 3–27.
from the American Society of Criminology “Civil Disobedience and Personal
(1997); and the Phi Beta Kappa/Romanell Responsibility for Injustice,” Monist 54
Professorship in Philosophy (1994–5), which (1970): 517–35.
resulted in a book on casuistry entitled Making Victimless Crimes: Two Sides of a
Mortal Choices (1997). Casuistry is use of the Controversy, with Edwin M. Schur
case method for arriving at moral decisions. (Englewood, N.J., 1974).
The case method has been essential for law The Courts, the Constitution, and Capital
school education since its introduction at Punishment (Lexington, Mass., 1977).
Harvard Law School a century ago. Bedau’s “Retribution and the Theory of
Making Mortal Choices draws upon the back- Punishment,” Journal of Philosophy 75
ground facts of famous American law cases. (1978): 601–20.
For example, he asks his readers to consider the “Gregg v. Georgia and the ‘New’ Death
circumstances of the survivors of the sinking of Penalty,” Criminal Justice Ethics 4
a ship named the William Brown in 1841, who (Summer/Fall 1985): 3–17.
were required to determine – in the absence of “Classification-Based Sentencing: Some
sufficient boats and provisions – which of them Conceptual and Ethical Problems,” Nomos
would live and which would die. Described by XXVII: Criminal Justice (1986): 89–118.
some reviewers as Bedau’s most elegant book, Death is Different: Studies in the Morality,
it aims at teaching the art of reasoning in a Law and Politics of Capital Punishment
consistent fashion which shows proper regard (Boston, 1987).
for human life. “Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital
Still an active philosopher and scholar after Cases,” with Michael L. Radelet, Stanford
his retirement, Bedau co-edited a volume in Law Review 40 (November 1987):
2002 on critical thinking and the art of 21–179.
argument. An anthology of essays from ancient “Punitive Violence and its Alternatives,” in
times to the present, its goal is to teach the Justice, Law, and Violence, ed. James B.
critical reading and reasoned writing of argu- Brady and Newton Garver (Philadelphia,
ments. In true Bedau fashion the volume deals 1991), pp. 193–209.
with such contemporary ethical and moral In Spite of Innocence: Erroneous Convictions
issues as abortion, legalization of drugs, and US in Capital Cases, with Constance E.
immigration policy. Putnam and Michael L. Radelet (Boston,
1992).
170
BEECHER
“The Eighth Amendment, Human Dignity, BEECHER, Catharine Esther (1800–1878)

and the Death Penalty,” in The
Constitution of Rights: Human Dignity Catharine Beecher was born 6 September 1800
and American Values, ed. Michael J. in East Hampton, Long Island, and died 12
Meyer and William A. Parent (Ithaca, May 1878 in Elmira, New York. She was the
N.Y., 1992), pp. 145–77. daughter of the great Calvinist theologian and
Thinking and Writing about Philosophy preacher Lyman Beecher and his first wife,
(Boston, 1996; 2nd edn 2002). Roxana Foote, who died of tuberculosis when
Making Mortal Choices: Three Exercises in Catharine was fifteen years old. Raised in
Moral Casuistry (New York, 1997). Litchfield, Connecticut, Beecher’s early educa-
Killing as Punishment: Reflections on the tion emphasized classical Roman poetry,
Death Penalty in America (Boston, 2004). English poetry, American literature, mathe-
matics, science, and the domestic female arts of
Other Relevant Works maintaining a household. During her early
Ed., Civil Disobedience: Theory and Practice twenties she founded the Hartford Female
(New York, 1969). Seminary in 1823, undertaking the education of
Ed., Justice and Equality (Englewood Cliffs, young girls including that of her younger sister,
N.J., 1971). Harriet Beecher.
Ed. with Chester Peirce, Capital Punishment In 1932 Catharine Beecher moved with her
in the United States (New York, 1976). father, stepmother, and siblings to Cincinatti,
Ed. with Sylvan Barnet, Current Issues and Ohio where Lyman Beecher had been
Enduring Questions (New York, 1987). appointed President of Lane Theological
Ed., Civil Disobedience in Focus (New York, Seminary. Shortly thereafter Catharine estab-
1991). lished the Western Female Institute, but it soon
Ed. with Sylvan Barnet, Critical Thinking, failed financially. Born during the decline of
Reading and Writing: A Brief Guide to Puritanism to a Puritan theologian, Catharine
Argument (Boston, 1993). Beecher lived through the period of the
Ed., The Death Penalty in America: Current American Civil War. She came from a house-
Controversies (New York, 1997). hold in which the power of the spoken word
Ed. with Paul G. Cassell, Debating the Death was recognized as a powerful tool for personal
Penalty: Should America have Capital moral development and social change.
Punishment? The Experts from Both Sides Daughter of one of New England’s most
Make Their Best Case (Oxford, 2004). famous preachers, sister and half-sister to seven
other preachers, Catharine Beecher used her
Further Reading rhethorical skills to champion social reform.
Campbell, Jessie. “Striving to Initiate Her twenty-nine publications during a forty-
Controversy,” The Tufts Observer (22 five year period, and her numerous public
January 1998). speeches, reflect Beecher’s dedication to
“Resolution on the Retirement of Hugo addressing many of the social and religious
Adam Bedau,” adopted by the Faculty of concerns of the new republic. These include
Arts and Sciences of Tufts University slavery, war, and the movements for the edu-
(Boston, 17 May 1999). cation and enfranchisement of women and
non-whites.
James O. Castagnera Beecher devoted her life to several causes
emerging from her response as an adult to the
Puritanism of her father. First, she conceived a
more active role for women as equal comple-
171
BEECHER
ments of their spouses that would require more works on philosophy of mind. The other is
substantial education of girls. Several of her Common Sense Applied to Religion, or, The
writings argue for this goal, and several others Bible and the People (1857). Beecher was
are didactic works intended for use in the heavily influenced by the Scottish Common
teaching of young girls. In furtherance of this Sense philosophy of Thomas Reid and David
goal she cofounded several schools for girls. In Hume, and by Jeremy Bentham’s
addition, she traveled the eastern United States, Utilitarianism. She criticizes authors who
especially the New England region, giving examine philosophy of mind but stop short of
speeches to assemblies of women regarding examining the role of the divinity, divine
women’s education and women’s rights. A insight, and revelation in the activities of the
second goal related to the reconciliation of her mind. In her preface to Elements Beecher says,
developing religious philosophy with secular “The works of Aristotle, and of other ancient
moral thought, especially that of the Scottish sages, the speculations of more modern writers,
Common Sense movement and Utilitarianism. the lucubrations of heathens, infidels, and
In furtherance of this goal she wrote a number sceptics, are quoted in abundance, but to estab-
of philosophical works on philosophy of mind, lish any thing on this subject by an appeal to the
moral philosophy, and philosophy of religion. Bible, is a phenomenon almost unknown.”
A third goal, also later pursued with her (1831, p. iv)
sister Harriet Beecher Stowe, author of Uncle Both works contain chapters that analyze
Tom’s Cabin, was emancipation of Americans the nature of and classify mental phenomena
held in slavery. In furtherance of this goal she (chapters 1 and 7, respectively), sensation and
traveled the country giving speeches to the perception (2 and 9), conception and memory
largely women-led emancipation movement. (3 and 10), attention and abstraction (4 and
At the time there was no unified movement, 11), association (5 and 12), and so on. The
merely unaffiliated groups with various reasons parallel construction of these two works,
for desiring emancipation. These groups had written a quarter-century apart, and the fact
dissimilar views regarding the political means that the first was privately published and closely
through which emancipation should occur, and circulated, suggests that the latter is the revised,
held varying opinions regarding financial com- polished version of an earlier draft. Common
pensation to former slaves or to slaveholders, Sense Applied to Religion, or, The Bible and the
and regarding the possible enfranchisement of People goes beyond the earlier Elements in its
newly-freed slaves. Through a series of lectures analysis of the application of philosophy of
and published pamphlets Beecher argued in mind to philosophy of religion. In these
favor of emancipatory movements and higher writings Beecher rather unapologetically and
education for emancipated slaves, but in ways unphilosophically accepts the truth of the Bible
that minimized social discord. as a source of revealed knowledge. Given the
In addition to writings on religious, moral, times and given her lineage, this is not terribly
and social philosophy, Beecher authored surprising, yet a little disappointing.
didactic texts that reveal her philosophy of edu- Beecher examines these questions more sat-
cation. Chief among these is her classic, credited isfactorily in Letters on the Difficulties of
as founding the field of home economics, later Religion, written in the interim between the
revised and co-authored with her sister Harriet composition of Elements and Common Sense,
Beecher Stowe, Principles of Domestic Science but Beecher’s point of departure for these two
(1870). works is that of a Christian philosopher who
The Elements of Mental and Moral believes that the Bible is an irrefutable source of
Philosophy, Founded upon Experience, Reason knowledge about the divine will and divine
and the Bible (1831) is one of Beecher’s two intention. From her description of the way in
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BEECHER
which Common Sense philosophy was movements including the Fourierists and Saint-
modified by Puritan theology, Beecher’s Ethics Simoneans: they cannot succeed because their
examines what we can learn from philosophy goal is to create a society in which evil does not
of mind about the nature and content of moral exist. For some utopian movements, organized
knowledge. Common Sense has a lesser religion has paradoxically resulted in evils:
emphasis on ethics, but, like Elements, it too intolerance, oppression, and (as the Mormons
focuses on the consequence of moral action for would find out) violence. Beecher rightly notes
salvation. that even if the atheistic movements banished
Her Letters on the Difficulties of Religion organized religion from their midst, utopist
(1836), Beecher assures us, have their founda- societies would still be visited by the occasional
tions in her careful reconstructions of actual natural evils: famine, flood, fire, storm, and
correspondence. This volume is valuable in and disease were undoubtedly on Beecher’s mind.
of itself, if for no other reason than it is an On Beecher’s view, which she acknowledges the
excellent example of the very extensive body of atheists do not share, these evils are visited
philosophic literature responding to and for upon humans by God for reasons related either
the most part adopting and adapting Jeremy to the moral development of those who suffer,
Bentham’s utilitarianism. Contemporary or to their punishment for sin. But, Beecher
philosophers who are not historians of nine- argues, atheists’ lack of religious faith does not
teenth-century English philosophy sometimes protect them from the “natural” evils that God
forget that utilitarianism was not merely rep- sends. Indeed, we suspect that her view actually
resented by the great works of Bentham, John is that God sends these evils because of the
Mill, and John Stuart Mill. In Letters Beecher atheists’ infidelity. And although Beecher fondly
sets out her goal, to examine “what is the best wishes that atheists would find God, she instead
method of promoting right intellectual views of advises the benefits to them of Common Sense
truth and duty, and that right state of heart philosophy. Common Sense in Beecher’s view,
which will lead men to practice what they augmented with utilitarianism, yields half-a-
know to be right?” (1836, pp. v–vi). The next dozen maxims for philosophical belief:
350 pages answer this question.
Beecher is a utilitarian, seeking to articulate 1. Nothing is to be considered as true, which
the Christian foundations to follow the has no positive evidence in its favor.
Benthamite rule to do that which will produce 2. Whatever has the balance of evidence in its
the most good with the least evil. In Beecher’s favor is to be considered as true, even when
account, the course of action for an intellectual there is some opposing evidence.
discussion of this question requires following a 3. Men have the control of their belief; that
set of guidelines that include confining the dis- they are to blame for believing wrong; and
cussion to the merits of principles rather than that their guilt for wrong belief is propor-
personalities, treating one’s disputant as sincere tioned to the importance of the interests
and having good motives, avoiding negative involved, and to the amount of evidence
comments about those whose views you are within reach.
attempting to sway, and so on. However, the 4. [One has a moral duty to seek] for
focus of the letters is an examination of the evidence, and to attending to it, when it is in
perceived antipathy of atheism and the our reach.
Common Sense movement. Beecher takes an 5. A man’s actions in certain cases, are the
opportunity to criticize the then-popular utopist proof of what is his belief.
movements that often were associated with 6. Where there are two alternatives and one
atheistic views. Her criticism of the Owenites’ of them involves danger, and the other is
New Harmony settlement applies to all utopist equally promising as to benefit, and is also
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BEECHER
perfectly safe, we are obligated to choose the American family is the American state writ
safe course. small. Women, she argues, have a moral duty
to fulfill their nature by providing moral lead-
Upon these six Common Sense maxims Beecher ership on the domestic scene and as voices for
builds the Pascalian case that it is not merely moral righteousness in social policy. Moral
prudent, but morally obligatory to believe in leadership on the domestic front is best
the God of the Bible. Part of this series of letters expressed through virtuous childrearing that
examines various claims about the reliability of nurtures moral and physical development of
biblical evidence and the implications for moral children, through careful secular, moral, and
action of select biblical exhortations. Without religious education of their own and others’
actually saying so, Beecher demonstrates her children, and in acting as a moral voice for
dissatisfaction with the evangelical Calvinism of social reform. In these works and the privately
her father Lyman Beecher. From her other published Letter to Benevolent Ladies (1857),
writings we come to suspect that her dissatis- Catharine Beecher exhorts women to fulfill
faction with the Puritan Calvinist view of their natural leadership roles by example and
women and its resulting imposition of religious through generous donations of time, influence,
and social limits on women seeded this dissat- money, and goods.
isfaction. But Beecher is too much a respectful, Beecher’s epistolary True Remedy for the
dutiful daughter of that tradition to make this Wrongs of Woman; with a History of an
point explicit. In the last parts of the Letters Enterprise Having That for Its Object appeared
Beecher turns to an examination of in 1851. The series of eighteen letters is affec-
Unitarianism as a moral religion and philoso- tionately addressed to her sister “Mrs. H. B.
phy. The entire discussion is interesting, nicely Stowe” as “My dear sister.” In the early letters
argued in most cases, and provides a good Beecher appears willing to discuss the merits of
glimpse of a philosophical process that women’s suffrage. But in later letters we see her
occupied much of the nineteenth and twentieth develop arguments against it, favoring instead
centuries: the development of secular moral a national system of liberal education for girls
philosophy that was respectful of the religious and young women. This is a technique often
sentiments and the religious foundations of so employed by Beecher: first state what is clear,
much of moral thought. strong, good about an opinion with which you
The Duty of American Women to Their disagree, then state what is deficient or wrong
Country appeared in 1845 and popularized about it. The letters contain the reflections of a
Catharine Beecher as a speaker in the increas- now fifty-year-old woman who is descended
ingly popular ladies’ clubs that had long existed from Puritans on the subject of “female
in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, but manners.” She is especially distressed that
whose appeal had spread to smaller towns in American women are following European
upstate New York and the near Midwest. The fashions, the most libertine of which are
Evils Suffered by American Women and somewhat “manly.” While we might not think
American Children: The Cause and the such observations to merit philosophical dis-
Remedy is the text of a speech presented at cussion, we must grant her underlying point:
such women’s meetings during 1846 and 1847. preoccupation with and slavish obedience to
In Duty and in Evils Beecher draws on her fashion may well go hand-in-hand with a friv-
Puritan beliefs to set out arguments that olous lack of concern for deeper issues. Until
support the view that women have a special American women on a whole evidence a
duty to educate children and to be moral exem- concern for political and social issues and
plars that hopefully shame men into imitation. evidence that they are sufficiently well-educated
In Duty as well as Evils Beecher argues that the to think through those issues and reach an
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BEECHER
informed opinion, maybe they should not be obtained by prayer …” (1872, p. 171), she
voting on matters of national policy. She backs offers her own answer, bolstered by a lengthy
up her concerns in letters detailing the state of set of anecdotal empirical evidence that each
higher education for American girls and women generation of children and each generation of
during the middle of the nineteenth century. In women in particular are becoming less and less
appendices she proposes detailed plans, includ- healthy. This “fact” counts as evidence that
ing physical layout, floor-plans, and fiscal her contemporaries are either impeded by
accounting for expenditures to establish a poverty or simply failing (morally) at doing
women’s Normal Institute (for teacher training) their job of raising healthy families who are
in Milwaukee. then well prepared to succeed in life. Giving
An anti-suffrage petition drafted by Beecher women the franchise, Beecher argues, will
was presented to Congress and published in further distract them from their natural duties
one of the leading magazines, Godey’s Lady’s of nurturance. Worse, by usurping the natural
Book, in May 1871. But one needs to read role of men (to represent the interests of the
almost all of Beecher’s works to understand family in the public arena) suffrage introduces
the logic of her reasons for opposing suffrage. discord into the family unit. Moreover, as an
They are summarized in the petition itself: educator of women, Beecher felt that women
“Because we hold that an extension of suffrage were not yet educated in sufficient numbers to
would be adverse to the interests of the working be capable as a group of exercising the franchise
women of the country, with whom we heartily well.
sympathize. Because these changes must intro- Beecher wrote an early and important pro-
duce a fruitful element of discord in the existing emancipation pamphlet An Essay on Slavery
marriage relation, which would tend to the and Abolitionism, with Reference to the Duty of
infinite detriment of children, and increase the American Females (1837). Although many of its
already alarming prevalence of divorce arguments are incorporated into other later
throughout the land.” works, it stands alone as an early pre-Civil War
Beecher’s anti-suffrage views are explained at argument for emancipation of African slaves
length, but for the most part not philosophi- held in America. It is addressed to Angelina
cally, in her Woman’s Profession as Mother Grimke, whose abolitionist methods she dis-
and Educator, with Views in Opposition to agrees with on moral grounds. Beecher argues
Woman Suffrage (1872). Like many of her that the horrific stories of mistreatment of slaves
writings, this is addressed to a general reader- by their masters notwithstanding, the majority of
ship of educated women, at a time when a slaveholders are Christians. They therefore
complete grammar school education was not accept a set of moral precepts that, Beecher will
common for girls in America. Woman’s argue, also have a firm philosophical foundation.
Profession is a compilation of two speeches Such slaveholders are therefore basically moral
given in opposition to suffrage from the very people, susceptible to reason and moral persua-
end of 1870 in Boston and in May 1871 in sion. Reasoning with them, serving as an
Hartford. It is difficult to imagine the public lis- example to them, and finding economically
tening to oral presentations of one hundred viable alternatives to slavery that will not require
pages and seventy pages respectively. These plantation owners to abandon their lives, are
speeches are followed by an “address” written methods more likely to succeed in abolishing
to sum up and fill in the blanks of the previous slavery than the methods commonly used by
pages. And although Beecher says that the ques- Northern abolitionists. Beecher urges Grimke
tions of suffrage are “questions which every to treat slaveholders as reasonable people, as
woman must settle for herself aided by moral people who need guidance, insight, and
common sense, the Bible, and the Divine aid persuasion to see the error of their ways and to
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BEECHER
find methods to abolish the institution of slavery, Letter to Benevolent Ladies in the United
promote education and training for slaves and States (New York, 1849).
freedmen alike, and live as equals with them in Truth Stranger than Fiction (New York,
new communities. 1850).
Beecher participated in the development of The True Remedy for the Wrongs of
American philosophy out of the Scottish Woman; with a History of an Enterprise
Common Sense and English Utilitarian move- Having That for Its Object (Boston,
ments in ethics. She made notable contribu- 1851).
tions to an analysis of the moral foundations of Letters to the People on Health and
religion, and to the two most powerful social Happiness (New York, 1855).
movements of nineteenth-century America: the Common Sense Applied to Religion, or. The
emancipation of slaves, and the movement for Bible and the People (New York, 1857).
women’s educational rights. An Appeal to the People on Behalf of Their
Rights as Authorized Interpreters of the
BIBLIOGRAPHY Bible (New York, 1860).
Suggestions Respecting Improvements in The American Woman’s Home or,
Education, Presented to the Trustees of Principles of Domestic Science, with
the Hartford Female Seminary (Hartford, Harriet Beecher Stowe (New York,
Conn., 1829). 1869).
The Elements of Mental and Moral Principles of Domestic Science; as Applied
Philosophy, Founded upon Experience, to the Duties and Pleasures of the Home.
Reason, and the Bible (Hartford, Conn., A Text Book for the Use of Young Ladies
1831). in Schools, Seminaries, and Colleges, with
An Essay on the Education of Female Harriet Beecher Stowe (New York, 1870).
Teachers (New York, 1835). Woman Suffrage and Woman’s Profession
Letters on the Difficulties of Religion (New York, 1871).
(Hartford, Conn., 1836). Woman’s Profession as Mother and
An Essay on Slavery and Abolitionism, Educator, with Views in Opposition to
with Reference to the Duty of American Woman Suffrage (Philadelphia, 1872).
Females (Philadelphia, 1837). Educational Reminiscences and Suggestions
“An Essay on Cause and Effect in (New York, 1874).
Connection with the Difference of
Fatalism and Free Will,” American Other Relevant Works
Biblical Repository and Classical Review Beecher’s papers are at Yale University,
2 (October 1839): 381–408. Radcliffe College, Mount Holyoke
Letters to Persons Who Are Engaged in College, the Cincinnati Historical Society,
Domestic Service (New York, 1842). and the Stowe-Day Foundation in
Treatise on Domestic Economy, for the Use Hartford, Connecticut.
of Young Ladies at Home, and at School Dykeman, Therese, and Dorothy Rogers,
(Boston, 1843). eds. The Social, Political and
The Duty of American Women to Their Philosophical Works of Catharine
Country (New York, 1845). Beecher, 6 vols (Bristol, UK, 2003).
An Address to the Protestant Clergy of the
United States (New York, 1846). Further Reading
The Evils Suffered by American Women Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
and American Children: The Causes and Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer
the Remedy (New York, 1846). Thought
176
BEECHER
Boydston, Jeanne, et al., eds. The Limits of where he came under the influence of John E.
Sisterhood: The Beecher Sisters on Lovell, who drilled Beecher in oratory.
Women’s Rights and Woman’s Sphere Beecher overcame his difficulties and began to
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1988). excel at public speaking. After graduating
Gardner, Catherine Villanueva. “Heaven- from seminary he spent the first decade of his
Appointed Educators of Mind: Catharine career as a pastor, first in Lawrenceburg, then
Beecher and the Moral Power of in Indianapolis, in Indiana. In 1847 he became
Women,” Hypatia 19 (2004): 1–16. pastor of the Plymouth Congregational
Harveson, Mae. Catharine Esther Beecher, Church in the Brooklyn Heights area of New
Pioneer Educator (Philadelphia, 1932). York City, where he remained until his death
Sklar, Kathryn Kish. A Study in American forty years later. The final two decades of his
Domesticity (New York, 1973). career were marred by a sex scandal in the
Waithe, Mary Ellen. Modern Women 1870s when the husband of a woman he was
Philosophers, 1600–1900 (Dordrecht, counseling accused the two of adultery. Civil
1991). and ecclesiastical courts acquitted Beecher,
White, Barbara Anne. The Beecher Sisters but his reputation suffered. Nevertheless, to
(New Haven, Conn., 2003). the end of his days he had a large following
both at Plymouth Church and across the
Mary Ellen Waithe nation. After Beecher’s death in 1887, Lyman
ABBOTT succeeded him to Plymouth Church’s
pulpit.
At Plymouth, Beecher became the most
famous American preacher of his era, and his
church can be considered the first suburban
BEECHER, Henry Ward (1813–87) “mega-church” in American history. In
addition to his Sunday sermons, he delivered
Henry Ward Beecher was born on 24 June hundreds of public lectures in the northeastern
1813 in Litchfield, Connecticut, and died on 8 United States, including the prestigious Lyman
March 1887 in New York. He was the eighth Beecher Lectures at Yale University for three
child of Lyman and Roxana Beecher. Henry’s straight years (1872–4). He spoke out on a
father was one of the most famous and influ- variety of public issues including slavery,
ential preachers in America during the first women’s rights, temperance, and poverty. In
half of the nineteenth century, becoming a historically famous event in the 1850s his
President of Lane Seminary in Cincinnati, Ohio church sent rifles to Kansas to help arm the
in 1832. Henry’s siblings included Harriet free-state forces that were fighting for control
Beecher Stowe, author of Uncle Tom’s Cabin; of the territory. The guns were shipped in a
Edward Beecher, pastor and editor; and edu- crate stamped “Beecher’s Bibles,” a term that
cational reformer Catharine BEECHER. quickly worked its way into American lore.
Beecher attended Mount Pleasant Academy, To this day there is a church on the plains of
a preparatory school in Amherst, Kansas called “The Beecher Bible and Rifle
Massachusetts, from 1827 to 1830. He then Church.” While remaining an advocate of
received his BA from Amherst College in 1834, some progressive causes like women’s rights,
and studied at Lane Seminary from 1834 until Beecher became for the most part a social
1837, when he was ordained minister. As a conservative after the Civil War, usually
young boy he had a speech impediment that attributing poverty to sin, for example, and
led to his being considered dull-witted, but appropriating the Social Darwinism of
this changed at Mount Pleasant Academy Herbert Spencer.
177
BEECHER
Beecher’s most important contribution was critical method and came to take lightly many
his articulation of an incipient liberal claimed historical events as well as doctrinally
Protestant theology. He was the first preacher central biblical passages. For liberals like
in America with a regional and even national Beecher, the myths or stories of the Bible had
audience who taught that Christian theology a central point that was true, but the particu-
must be modified in accordance with modern lar facts need not be taken literally. Beecher
ways of thinking. Darwinian evolution was spoke out forcefully against literalism and
one of the two most influential modern move- verbal inspiration, the doctrine that the actual
ments that reshaped Protestant theology in the words of scripture were inspired. Instead, he
late nineteenth century. In the 1880s, as even believed that the biblical authors, not the
some conservative Protestants attempted to words, were inspired and in a way quite similar
harmonize evolution (though not natural selec- to the inspiration experienced by some of
tion) with the Bible, Beecher went much history’s great nonbiblical authors. This belief
further. For him, as for most theological mod- about inspiration was part of liberalism’s nat-
ernists (later called liberals), evolution became uralization of Protestant theology. Inspiration
the model for understanding everything, came more from inner experience than from a
including theology and even the Bible. He transcendent God.
believed that the Christian faith itself had Inner experience became central to liberal
evolved since having been originally outlined in Protestantism and provided a strong Romantic
scripture. This put him in direct opposition to counter-balance to the “scientific” approach to
evangelical Protestant orthodoxy, which had scripture. Beecher’s form of liberal
taught since the Reformation that the faith Protestantism, in keeping with the theology of
found in the Bible was the purest and truest Friedrich Schleiermacher and other German
form of Christianity, not the most rudimentary theologians of the time, placed experience over
and undeveloped. Beecher used a biological doctrine. Beecher denied the eternal punish-
analogy, asking why people would want to ment of sinners, and he played down Calvinist
study acorns when they were standing amidst doctrines such as the transcendence of God,
oak trees. The acorn was the first-century faith human sinfulness, predestination, and the need
with its ancient and outdated supernaturalism for supernatural salvation. In place of these,
and superstition, while the oak tree was a Beecher preached God’s loving immanence
mature, naturalized, and scientifically sophis- and religion as a natural and world-affirming
ticated nineteenth-century faith. enterprise. Jesus was less the transcendent
The second modern challenge facing Christ who died for the sins of the world than
Protestantism in the late nineteenth century a model of what all humans might become. In
was higher criticism of scripture. Biblical contrast to Dwight L. Moody, the most prolific
scholar Julius Wellhausen and others at the orthodox revivalist of the late nineteenth
leading theological schools in Germany began century, Beecher believed there was great
to subject the Bible to the same historical and potential for human progress. With Christ as
archeological criticism as other ancient texts. the model for living, the world would become
The result was the rejection of the presumed or better and better. Beecher once said, “Mr.
stated authorship of several books of the Bible Moody thinks this is a lost world, and is trying
and doubt about the historical accuracy of to save as many as possible from the wreck; I
many biblical stories. Higher criticism of scrip- think Jesus Christ has come to save the world,
ture, an attempt to take a scientific and objec- and I am trying to help him save it.”
tive approach to the Bible, was a product of the Beecher’s chief legacy was as a popularizer
Enlightenment. Beecher, while no theologian, of the liberal theology that was developing in
readily adopted the findings of the higher the most prominent theological schools of
178
BELL
Germany and being exported to American Amer Bio v3

seminaries. He was a transitional figure Abbot, Lyman. Life of Henry Ward Beecher
between the Protestant orthodoxy of the nine- (Philadelphia, 1887).
teenth century that was based on essential Clark, Clifford E., Jr. Henry Ward Beecher
biblical doctrines and supernaturalism, and (Urbana, Ill., 1978).
the mainstream Protestant liberalism of the McLoughlin, William G. The Meaning of
twentieth century that saw Christianity as a Henry Ward Beecher (New York, 1970).
natural and world-affirming experience. He Ryan, Halford R. Henry Ward Beecher:
put into practice a liberal theology that empha- Peripatetic Preacher (Westport, Conn.,
sized feeling and experience over intellect, the 1990).
heart over the head, being good and experi- Shaffer, Jane. Henry Ward Beecher: The
encing God over the centrality of a supernat- Indiana Years, 1837–1847 (Indianapolis,
ural conversion. 1973).
BIBLIOGRAPHY Barry Hankins

Life Thoughts, ed. Edna Dean Proctor
(Boston, 1858).
Royal Truths (Boston, 1866).
Yale Lectures on Preaching, 3 vols (New
York, 1872–4).
The Life of Jesus, the Christ (New York, BELL, Daniel (1919– )
1872).
God Unknowable and How to Know Him Daniel Bell was born on 10 May 1919 in New
(London, 1876). York City. The son of Jewish immigrants, he
“Progress of Thought in the Church,” North was attracted to socialism early in his life, and
American Review 135 (August 1882): never abandoned a commitment to “economic
99–117. socialism,” although this position was modified
Last Sermons (London, 1887). by his self-described liberalism in politics and
cultural conservatism. He attended City College
Other Relevant Works of New York, received a BSS in 1939, and was
Beecher’s papers are at the Library of trained initially as a journalist. In the 1940s and
Congress, Yale University, and Harvard 50s he edited a number of journals and period-
University. icals, and from 1948 to 1958 he worked as the
Bible Studies, ed. John R. Howard (New labor editor for Fortune magazine. In 1959 Bell
York, 1893). accepted an appointment as professor of soci-
Autobiographical Reminiscences of Henry ology at Columbia University, and received a
Ward Beecher, ed. T. J. Ellinwood (New PhD in sociology there in 1961 for his book
York, 1898). The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of
Lectures and Orations by Henry Ward Political Ideas in the Fifties, which was pub-
Beecher, ed. Newell Dwight Hillis (New lished in 1960. In 1980 Bell was appointed
York, 1913). Henry Ford II Professor of Sociology at Harvard
University, and he held that title until retiring in
Further Reading 1990. He served on the board of directors of the
Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, American Civil Liberties Union from 1957 to
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer 1961, and is a fellow of the American
Thought, Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer Sociological Association and the American
Religious Bio, Encyc Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Academy of Arts and Sciences.
179
BELL
Although Bell saw himself as a sociologist, social structure, which includes the economy,
his work has been acknowledged as impor- technology, and the occupational hierarchy of
tant in several fields, including economics, society, the axial principle of post-industrial
social and political theory, and the philosophy society is the role of theoretical knowledge,
of social science. A series of influential articles which is gradually replacing straightforward
and books in the 1950s culminated in The capital growth as the key determinant of
End of Ideology. In this work, Bell argued that economic and technological development. This
the historical fractures between the political represents the increasing priority of human
parties in the advanced industrialized nations, capital, in the form of skilled technical workers
together with their constituencies and ideolo- – engineers and scientists – to financial capital,
gies, which had originated in the process of and thus the ascendance of a “knowledge
industrialization, had been largely overcome. economy.” But such an outcome does not have
Modern political parties, bereft of new politi- the implications for politics and lifestyle that
cal ideas, were largely accepting of the politi- Marxists and others on the left had argued
cal status quo, including the continuing roles for previously. This is because the social milieu
of such institutions as the large business enter- within which post-industrialism develops is
prise (whether state-owned or private) and the also characterized by greater differentiation,
bureaucratic state. Such institutions had and its spheres (politics, social structure,
become unquestioned as the basis for the main- culture) become increasingly independent of
tenance of an industrialized economy and mass each other’s axial principles. The axial princi-
consumption lifestyle. Bell refined, revised and ple of culture is not knowledge, but increas-
extended this argument in two later works, ingly the cult of individualism, expressed par-
The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (1973) adigmatically in the emergence of the values
and The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism associated with the 1960s counterculture –
(1976), which together comprise his main con- self-expression, independence, and hedonism.
tributions to the theory and practice of the The axial principle of politics, by contrast, is
social sciences. democratization, understood along the lines
In The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, of a deliberative model, in which participa-
Bell argued that existing social forces, and the tion in the decision-making processes of shared
processes of social change they engendered, life takes precedence. These changes in the
could no longer be understood within the separate spheres of society do not spell the
existing paradigms of the social sciences. In end of conflict or contradiction, but merely
particular, the base-superstructure model of an alteration in the forms social conflict will
classical Marxism could no longer describe take.
either the major changes in the economies of The theme of the differentiation of spheres
the developed nations, which were undergoing was developed further in The Cultural
a shift toward the dominance of the tertiary Contradictions of Capitalism, arguably Bell’s
sector, and thus becoming “post-industrial,” or most influential work, in which he sought to
the accompanying changes in the political and show that the cluster of values that had
cultural spheres. Bell instead proposed a multi- presaged the emergence of capitalist modernity
dimensional model, in which social forces in the United States – Weber’s so-called
should be understood as independently oper- “Protestant ethic” of asceticism, thrift, belief
ative within the realms of the social-structural, in the inherent value of labor, moral inferior-
the cultural and the political realm. Within ity, and religious sensibility – were being over-
each sphere, different processes, each obedient whelmed by a culture of acquisitiveness, mass
to a different set of “axial principles,” are the consumption, individualism, and moral
prime agents of social change. In the realm of vacuity. Bell analyzed the traces of this shift
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BELL
within the aesthetic of modernism and post- pendently of those purposes – what has some-
modernism, which he indicted for their reflex times been called the “view from nowhere” –
antinomianism and moral permissiveness, as is a philosophical fiction that owes its origin to
they became ascendant in the 1960s and early eighteenth-century Enlightenment ideology.
70s. While the inner dynamic of the counter- Bell’s epistemological perspectivism is
culture, based on the axial principle of indi- embedded in a substantive historicism that
vidualism, contradicts the rational principles of occasionally takes on the contours of a full-
the economic realm, the differentiation of the fledged philosophy of history. This is domi-
two spheres means that a degree of co-exis- nated by a view of the centrality of the role of
tence is possible, although Bell clearly believes technology in shaping the course and outcomes
that the erosion of traditional values is not of human history. Humanity is distinguished
functionally sustainable in the long run; hence by its tool-wielding and symbol-producing
the “contradictions” between capitalism as an capacity, together with its ability to turn these
economic and social structural principle, and capacities toward previously conceived ends.
capitalism as culture. Bell’s concern with the These abilities have been united in the modern
potentially corrosive effects of capitalism as idea of technology as the active mastery of
culture place him into contact with contem- nature by self-conscious and socially conscious
porary theorists such as Jürgen Habermas and rational agents. The growth of technology is
Alasdair MACINTYRE. historically linear and accumulative, and the
These positions have also embedded Bell in overall trajectory of human history involves
a set of philosophical presuppositions that can increasing rational control over the natural
be picked out, though nowhere does Bell and social order. But process is not teleologi-
commit himself to a systematic presentation of cal; the ends of that process cannot be pro-
them, or their implications. Philosophy jected or known in advance, and social and his-
appears, from Bell’s own perspective – as it did torical change cannot be unified under some
from Émile Durkheim’s – as a kind of super- overarching ordering principle such as “spirit”
numerary practice, with which sociology need (Hegel), “mode of production” (Marx) or
not be overly concerned. “society” (Durkheim).
Epistemologically, Bell espouses a form of Bell espouses a kind of cryptic existentialism
post-Kantian perspectivism that is indebted to with respect to the ends of individual life and
John DEWEY, and quite similar to recent forms moral norms. Human culture consists in
of pragmatism. On Bell’s view, society cannot symbols and representations devoted to pro-
be known as an object in itself; it is best under- duction of meaning, including the apprehen-
stood from a particular perspective that sion of the ethical and the sacred. This is
emphasizes those elements that are useful to driven not by some nascent quality of human
the knower. Thus, the distinction between the nature, or by the functional needs of society’s
realms of social structure, politics, and culture need for integration, but by a shared human
is not a reflection of social reality, but a con- devotion to that which exceeds the self and is
ceptual framework that allows for particular apprehended in the mystery of being-with-
elements to be picked out and described in others. Bell’s existentialism should not be
ways that will be socially useful. Bell therefore taken as an engagement with the tradition of
denies both the correspondence theory of truth continental philosophy associated with Martin
and scientific realism. The description and re- Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre, of which he
description of events, processes, and things are is quite scornful, but perhaps is best under-
not “of reality as it is in itself” but of reality as stood as evolving out of his interest in and
it appears always in the context of human engagement with secularized forms of Judaic
purposes. The notion of “reality” as it is inde- ethics.
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BELL
The projections for the future that Bell Agony of Modern Liberalism (Westport,
extracts from these stances are ambiguous, but Conn., 1985).
in The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism Waters, Malcolm. Daniel Bell (London,
and elsewhere, he has outlined the possible 1996).
“return of the sacred” in the form of the
restored role for religion in social life. In this, Philip Walsh
his outlook echoes such mid-century social
thinkers as Reinhold NIEBUHR and Robert
Lynd. His social forecasts for the increasing
importance of the knowledge economy have
been widely credited as prescient, although his
cultural conservatism has attracted criticism BELLAH, Robert Neelly (1927– )
from liberals and socialists. His more general
concerns are perhaps best understood as part Robert N. Bellah was born on 23 February
of the conversation among Anglo-American 1927 in Altus, Oklahoma, where his father
theorists such as Richard RORTY and Anthony was a small-town newspaper publisher, and
Giddens (who has appropriated the concept of was raised in Los Angeles, California. He grad-
post-industrialism from Bell), regarding the uated summa cum laude in 1950 from Harvard
future and fate of modernity from the per- with a BA degree in social relations and a con-
spective of liberalism. centration in social anthropology. His under-
graduate honors thesis focused on Southern
BIBLIOGRAPHY Athabascan cultural patterns in the American
Marxian Socialism in the United States Southwest and was published in 1952 as
(New York, 1952; Ithaca, N.Y., 1996). Apache Kinship Systems. He then pursued
Work and Its Discontents (Boston, 1956). doctoral studies under the leading social
The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of theorist of the period, Talcott PARSONS, earning
Political Ideas in the Fifties (Glencoe, Ill., his PhD in sociology and Far Eastern languages
1960; Cambridge, Mass., 2000). from Harvard in 1955. His dissertation was a
Reforming of Education: The Columbia Weberian analysis of the role of religion in the
College Experience in Its National modernization of Japan and was published as
Setting (New York, 1966). Tokugawa Religion in 1957. This formative
The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A period coincided with the systematic effort
Venture in Social Forecasting (New York, within American social science to translate into
1973; 2nd edn 1999). English the works of the European founders of
The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism sociology, particularly Max Weber and Émile
(New York, 1976; 2nd edn 1996). Durkheim (with their roots in the philosophi-
The Winding Passage: Essays and cal work of Hegel), and to incorporate their
Sociological Journeys (New York, 1980). insights into an overall theory of social rela-
tions. Though the resulting school of “struc-
Further Reading tural functionalism” was later rejected by most
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer social scientists – and in some ways transcended
Thought in Bellah’s own work – this attention to
Brick, Howard. Daniel Bell and the Decline American and European currents of social
of Intellectual Radicalism: Social Theory thought would mark his entire career.
and Political Reconciliation in the 1940s Bellah’s undergraduate engagement with
(Madison, Wisc., 1986). Marxist politics and the McCarthy-inspired
Liebowitz, Nathan. Daniel Bell and the closure of intellectual freedom in the United
182
BELLAH
States during the 1950s led to his acceptance of TILLICH (1952), he also intellectually and per-
a postdoctoral fellowship at the Institute for sonally re-engaged with the Christian tradi-
Islamic Studies at McGill University in tion, ultimately as a member of the Episcopal
Toronto, where he studied from 1955 to 1957. Church. Bellah’s middle period focused on the
He returned to Harvard in 1957, and until role of religion and religion-like phenomena
1967 he served as a research associate, lecturer, as the central cultural systems of society. The
associate professor, and professor of sociol- core insights of this period are found in three
ogy. In 1967 Bellah became the Ford Professor publications: “Religious Evolution” (1964),
of Sociology at the University of California at “Civil Religion in America” (1967; both
Berkeley, where he remained until his retire- reprinted in Bellah 1970), and the introduc-
ment as Elliott Professor Emeritus of Sociology tion to Émile Durkheim on Morality and
in 1997. He was awarded the National Society (1973). This period brought a more
Humanities Medal in 2000. profoundly Durkheimian cast to Bellah’s
In developing a theoretical framework for analysis, particularly in his attention to the
interpreting empirical sociological findings, dynamics of collective effervescence and shared
Bellah drew on the classical sociological tradi- mental structures in society. In this vein, Bellah
tion of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim and on a analyzed the ceremonies, symbolism, and
long tradition of social thought within philos- concepts of civic and religious currents in
ophy, particularly Aristotle, Hegel, and the American life. Beginning in the 1970s, Bellah’s
American pragmatists, as interpreted by such work turned increasingly toward critical
contemporary philosophers as Alasdair engagement with American culture and insti-
M AC I NTYRE and Charles T AYLOR . Thus, tutions in a genre he termed “sociology as
although few of Bellah’s works are explicitly public philosophy.” In two co-authored books
philosophical in tone, much of his work carries (1985, 1991) and myriad magazine articles and
important philosophical weight through its public lectures, Bellah emerged as a leading
wide-ranging attention to classical and con- public intellectual, calling for reform within
temporary social theory, American and American society, in the tradition of Walter
European social philosophy, and the philoso- LIPPMANN, John DEWEY, Reinhold NIEBUHR,
phy of religion from both Eastern and Western John Courtney MURRAY, and, before them,
traditions. The important contributions of Jonathan Edwards, Charlotte Perkins GILMAN,
Bellah’s research and teaching include his long and W. E. B. DU BOIS.
focus on an interpretive and humanistic under- Sociology, understood as public philosophy,
standing of social analysis (during a period of strives to provide a tool for social self-under-
narrowly positivist emphasis within much of standing and self-reflection by entering into an
American sociology) and his influence on ongoing dialogue with the cultural currents that
several generations of scholars in the sociol- flow within and provide meaning to social life –
ogy of religion, the sociology of culture, reli- holding up a mirror to society in a way that
gious studies, and social theory. allows members to reflect upon and thus criti-
Bellah’s most important works fall into three cally re-appropriate their own cultural tradi-
areas. His earliest works focused on applying a tions. Such public philosophy is skeptical of
Weberian intellectual framework to two impor- attempts in recent decades by the social sciences
tant societal systems never systematically to emulate the physical or biological sciences,
analyzed by Max Weber: the tribal societies of with their focus on accumulating objective
the Americas (using Apache societies as the knowledge of relatively fixed phenomena. It
case study), and of Japan during the Tokugawa questions the disciplinary gulf between social
Period (1600–1868). During this period, and sciences and the humanities – particularly phi-
partly under the influence of theologian Paul losophy – and seeks to reconnect them by
183
BELLAH
drawing on social scientific knowledge and social exemplified in the poetry of Walt WHITMAN; its
theory for the purpose of better-informed and contemporary expressions include the influen-
more democratic public dialogue about society tial American culture of psychotherapy, “New
and its direction. Sociology, as public philoso- Age” spirituality, and the celebration of sexu-
phy, thus combines an analytic and a normative ality devoid of interpersonal commitment.
intent, simultaneously pursuing firmer knowl- In criticizing the inability of utilitarian and
edge, deeper insight, and a voice in the shaping expressive individualism to ground long-term
of a good society. Oriented to the pursuit and commitment and provide meaningful orienta-
promotion of the Aristotelian virtues of phrone- tion to human life, Bellah and his co-authors
sis (practical reason), public philosophy seeks argued for a cultural re-appropriation of other
to deepen democracy through a public dialogue longstanding cultural currents that relativize
that crosses the boundaries of philosophy and individualism, particularly civic republicanism
other disciplines in the humanities, the social and biblical religion. The American tradition of
sciences, and the physical sciences. civic republicanism originated in the city-states
In Habits of the Heart: Individualism and of classical Greece and Rome and deeply influ-
Commitment in American Life (1985), Bellah enced the founding generation of the American
and his co-authors fundamentally criticized the Revolution. The republican tradition empha-
recent dominance of longstanding American sizes shared membership in a national com-
cultural currents of “utilitarian individualism” munity and commitment to work for the
and “expressive individualism.” Key philo- common good. Thomas Jefferson and
sophical figures in the tradition of utilitarian Abraham Lincoln represent key figures in this
individualism include Hobbes, Locke, and current of American life, though Lincoln also
Bentham, with their emphasis on the self-inter- drew deeply from the biblical tradition in
ested pursuit of particular ends by maximizing framing his understanding of America.
one’s own share of those ends. Benjamin Biblical religion matters enormously in
Franklin represents the paradigmatic American American culture because it provides ethical
figure in this tradition. Though most at home grounding for trans-individualistic commitment
in the business sphere, utilitarian individual- through participation in “communities of
ism has become a dominant cultural theme memory.” Bellah’s analysis of biblical religion
across a great deal of American culture, most as a key cultural tradition providing a coun-
clearly wherever economic exchange, self- terweight to the dark side of American indi-
interest maximization, and cost–benefit analysis vidualism should not be mistaken for a tri-
explicitly predominate, but also implicitly at umphal celebration of mainstream religion.
work wherever human goods are treated as Given their historical centrality in American
commodities to be maximized. In the schol- culture, Christianity and Judaism inevitably
arly domain, the dominant versions of utilitar- serve as the focus of analysis, but they are
ian individualism take the form of rational important because they offer cultural symbols
actor models of human behavior. transcending individualism and are the locus of
Expressive individualism emerged in widespread commitment within American
American life in the nineteenth century, partly society. Other religious traditions – particu-
in opposition to the rising dominance of utili- larly others with long historical experience and
tarian individualism. It posits an inner core of societal roots – have parallel ethical resources
emotion, intimate experience, and uniqueness and can play similar roles in contemporary
to each individual, which must be expressed in American society. Likewise, Bellah and his co-
pursuit of self-realization. The fountainhead of authors recognize and sharply criticize those
expressive individualism in American culture ways in which biblical religions themselves have
was nineteenth-century Romanticism, best succumbed to the corrosive effects of individu-
184
BELLAH
alism and therapeutic culture. Thus, some reli- The most consistent objection raised to the
gious traditions some of the time offer vibrant line of argument pursued in these works argues
resources in this regard, while others do not. that, in their close attention to moral traditions
Implicit in Habits of the Heart and explicit in and democratic public dialogue, Bellah and his
The Good Society (1991) – both by the same co-authors fail to take seriously enough the
authors – is the role of institutions in sustain- workings of societal power. Though certainly
ing the cultural possibility of ethical commit- recognizing that more power-centered analyses
ment and in providing the settings in which have their own value, and having pursued in
such commitment is exercised. The term “insti- earlier writings those related to race (1975)
tutions” is used in its social scientific sense, and in recent public lectures those related to
quite different from the everyday sense in which economic polarization in American society,
it essentially serves as a synonym for “organi- Bellah ultimately emphasizes the ways that
zation.” Rather, “institution” here refers to cultural patterns shape even the workings of
“patterns of normative, which is to say moral, societal power; thus, in the concluding pages of
expectations” (1991, p. 288). Thus, institu- The Good Society, he and his co-authors argue,
tions shape interpersonal and societal under- “Such a moral argument cannot alone produce
standings of how we are to act and what con- significant institutional change. Power and
stitutes legitimate ends and means; institutions profit are always involved. But where moral
serve to stabilize interaction by generating agreement is strong enough, it will find oppor-
mutually shared expectations. Because institu- tunities for breaking through, and power and
tions mediate between the self and the wider profit will find it advantageous to go along.
world (in both its social and natural dimen- Such outcomes cannot occur without conflict,
sions), they are crucial to our individuality and when power is pitted against power. But,
to our understanding of others, science, and our without the moral argument, there is no steady
place in the world. The focus of attention in pressure to bring economic and political forces
The Good Society falls on analyzing particular to the service of human ends.” (1991, p. 306)
institutional spheres in American life – the A consistent theoretical position termed
market, corporations, and work; government, “symbolic realism” runs throughout Bellah’s
law, and politics; education; and religion – but work. Though only discussed explicitly in a
the underlying orientation is to the ways we are few places, it is central to understanding the
embedded in institutions and can work to philosophical substratum of his work. Best
reform them from within. Because institutions articulated in the essay “Between Religion and
in the form of mutual expectations exist within Social Science” (in 1970), symbolic realism
the fabric of interaction, all of us, as social rejects both the anti-religious bias of
actors, either reify current institutional com- Enlightenment rationalism, which sees religion
mitments or reform them by calling institu- as essentially false, and its main alternative in
tions back to their ideals and criticizing their the Western intellectual tradition, termed
basic values. We do the latter typically by seeing “symbolic reductionism.” The latter accepts
a given institutional sphere – for example, the that religious insight may hold a kernel of truth
workplace – in light of the values and commit- but that this kernel must be extracted from the
ments of another institutional sphere, such as fantastic myths and fabrications of traditional
religion, with its call to mutual respect, or religion; that is, whatever religious truth may
politics, with its call to greater equality. In this exist can and must be reduced to its nonreli-
way, institutional reform depends upon a rich gious core. Bellah argues that symbolic reduc-
plurality of strong institutional spheres; each tionism misses the real import of religion,
strengthens the others by providing cultural because it partakes in the mistaken cognitive
resources for critique and reform. bias of Western rationalism since the
185
BELLAH
Enlightenment: “This position has held that theologians, who are still working with a cog-
the only valid knowledge is in the form of fal- nitive conception of religious belief that makes it
sifiable scientific hypotheses. The task then parallel to objectivist scientific description. But if
with respect to religion has been to discover the the theologian comes to his subject with the
falsifiable propositions hidden within it, to assumptions of symbolic realism … then we are
discard the unverifiable assertions and those in a situation where for the first time in cen-
clearly false, and, even with respect to the ones turies theologian and secular intellectual can
that seem valid, to abandon the symbolic and speak the same language. Their tasks are differ-
metaphorical disguise in which they are ent but their conceptual framework is shared.
cloaked.” (1970, p. 251) What this can mean for the reintegration of our
Bellah’s symbolic realism instead strives to fragmented culture is almost beyond calcula-
understand symbolic statements – including reli- tion.” (1970, p. 253)
gious symbols, rituals, narratives, etc. – not as Throughout his career Bellah was oriented by
cognitive statements about the nature of the self this commitment to symbolic realism. This is
or of external reality, but as evocations of the real evident in his analysis of the religious systems of
relationship between the self, others, the wider Japanese and Apache societies, his theoretical
world, and ultimate reality. Thus, “reality is seen work on religious phenomena as cultural
to reside not just in the object but in the subject, systems, and his work as a public philosopher.
and particularly in the relation between subject This orientation and Bellah’s role in training
and object. The canons of empirical science several generations of scholars at Harvard
apply primarily to symbols that attempt to University, the University of California at
express the nature of objects, but there are Berkeley, and the Graduate Theological Union
nonobjective symbols that express the feelings, made Bellah a key figure in the late twentieth-
values, and hopes of subjects, or that organize century dialogue between religion and social
and regulate the flow of interaction between science, not only in America but in societies
subjects and objects, or that attempt to sum up around the world. Since his retirement from
the whole subject-object complex or even point teaching in 1997, he continued to lecture widely
to the context or ground of that whole. These while working on a final major work, an expan-
symbols, too, express reality and are not sion and updating of the seminal work
reducible to empirical propositions. This is the “Religious Evolution” (in 1970) in light of recent
position of symbolic realism.” (1970, p. 252) scholarly understanding of human origins, pre-
Thus, though Bellah polemically states, “To put historic societies, human history, and genetic
it bluntly, religion is true” (1970, p. 253), the and cultural evolution.
fundamental point is that to make primary the
cognitive question about truth is to miss the BIBLIOGRAPHY
essential nature of religion and symbolism more Apache Kinship Systems (Cambridge, Mass.,
generally. They attempt to express what is real 1952).
in the world of human experience rather than Tokugawa Religion; the Values of Pre-
what is true in some abstract cognitive sense Industrial Japan (Glencoe, Ill., 1957).
lying beyond human experience. He notes that Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-
“religious symbolization and religious experi- Traditional World (New York, 1970).
ence are inherent in the structure of human exis- The Broken Covenant: American Civil
tence … all reductionism must be abandoned. Religion in a Time of Trial (New York,
Symbolic realism is the only adequate basis for 1975; 2nd edn Chicago, 1992).
the social scientific study of religion. When I say Varieties of Civil Religion, with Phillip E.
religion is a reality sui generis I am certainly not Hammond (New York, 1980).
supporting the claims of the historical realist Habits of the Heart: Individualism and
186
BELLAMY
Commitment in American Life, with BELLAMY, Edward (1850–98)

Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann
Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton (Berkeley, Edward Bellamy was born on 26 March 1850
Cal., 1985). in Chicopee Falls, Massachusetts. In 1867 he
The Good Society, with Richard Madsen, was rejected for admission to the United States
William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Military Academy at West Point, and instead
Steven M. Tipton (New York, 1991). entered Union College in New York, where he
Imagining Japan: The Japanese Tradition and developed his own reading courses in literature,
Its Modern Interpretation (Berkeley, Cal., political science, history, and political geogra-
2003). phy. During his year at Union College he also
became interested in socialism and how to use
Other Relevant Works Auguste Comte’s ideas of naturalistic science
Ed., Religion and Progress in Modern Asia as a way to free mankind from living under the
(New York, 1965). burden of the past. From 1868 to 1869, he and
Ed. with William G. McLoughlin, Religion in his cousin, William Packer, studied in Dresden,
America (Boston, 1968). Germany, and traveled in Europe. This
Ed., Émile Durkheim on Morality and Society: European sojourn awakened him to the many
Selected Writings (Chicago, 1973). social problems created by industrialization,
Ed. with Frederick E. Greenspahn, Uncivil poverty being the most pervasive and acute. He
Religion: Interreligious Hostility in America returned to Springfield, Massachusetts, to study
(New York, 1987). law in 1869, passing the bar in 1871. Declining
“Rousseau on Society and the Individual,” in an invitation to join an established law practice,
Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Social Contract he opened his own office.
and the First and Second Discourses, ed. S. In November 1871 Bellamy retired from law
Dunn (New Haven, Conn., 2002). after arguing his first case and moved to New
“The Ritual Roots of Society and Culture,” in York City, where he wrote intermittently for the
Handbook for the Sociology of Religion, ed. New York Post. He returned to Chicopee Falls
M. Dillon (New York, 2003). in June 1872 as the editorial writer and literary
“Durkheim and Ritual,” in Cambridge editor and reviewer for the Springfield Union. In
Companion to Durkheim, ed. Jeffrey this year Bellamy gave his first public lecture on
Alexander and Brian K. Smith (Cambridge, socialism at a local school, outlining his faith in
UK, 2004). a better future deduced from scientific facts
rather than the “mystical hyperboles” of
Further Reading religion. He resigned from the Union in
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio December 1877 due to ill health and, accom-
Madsen, Richard, et al., eds. Meaning and panied by his brother Frederick, spent the next
Modernity: Religion, Polity, and Self six months traveling to the Sandwich Islands in
(Berkeley, Cal., 2001). This festschrift the South Pacific, as well as the Western frontier
contains Bellah’s autobiographical in the United States.
“Epilogue.” In 1878 he published his first novel, Six to
Yeaman, Patricia A. Methodology in the One: A Nantucket Idyll, followed by The Duke
Sociology of Religion: Three Contemporary of Stockbridge, a story about Shays’s Rebellion
Sociologists, Peter Berger, Robert Bellah that was initially serialized in the Berkshire
and Thomas O’Dea. PhD dissertation, Courier and published posthumously as a book
Fordham University (New York, 1980). in 1900. Another serialized novel, Dr.
Heidenhoff’s Process, was published as a book
Richard Wood in 1880; it was an unusual psychological study
187
BELLAMY
of guilt. In 1880 Edward and Charles Bellamy Exposition of Modern Socialism. Some critics
founded the Springfield Penny News, which claim that Looking Backward is actually little
became the Daily News in 1881. Edward retired more than a fictionalized version of Gronlund’s
from the Daily News in 1884 to devote himself work (Shurter 1973, p. 177). Nevertheless,
to writing fiction. Bellamy’s novel gained so much attention after
In 1888 Bellamy published Looking it was published that Gronlund himself eventu-
Backward, 2000–1887, a utopian novel about ally endorsed Bellamy’s vision as the means to
a future in which society has evolved into social- a new socialist society.
ism, where industry is nationalized, there is an Looking Backward was also influential in
equal distribution of wealth, and class divisions the thinking of economist Thorstein VEBLEN,
have been destroyed. The book was widely read who after reading it began working out his own
in America and Europe, and was translated into theory, attributing social injustice to economic
several foreign languages. The first of many emulation or the argument that people struggle
Bellamy Nationalist Clubs, advocating the not only for physical needs but for favorable
nationalization of industrial production, was economic standing as compared to others
formed in Boston in the fall of 1888, and pub- (Morgan 1944, p. xi). John DEWEY found in
lication of a monthly journal, The Nationalist, Bellamy’s utopia the view that society was
began. From January 1891 to 1893 Bellamy evolving toward acquiring the technical means
also published a weekly journal, The New for a better, more humane social order (pp.
Nation. Bellamy’s Nationalist philosophy was xi–xii).
embodied in the platform of the Peoples’ Party In the decade after Looking Backward was
of 1892. In 1897 he published Equality, a sequel published, scores of other utopian novels
to Looking Backward. Bellamy died on 22 May emerged in quick succession, praising or con-
1898 in Chicopee Falls, Massachusetts. demning Bellamy’s nationalistic utopia (for
Bellamy’s most famous and influential work, example, see Michaelis 1890, Roberts 1893,
Looking Backward, initially dismissed by many Vinton 1890). By late 1888 the first Bellamy
as just another utopian fiction, anticipates a Nationalist Club was formed, and the
future America in the year 2000, when society movement quickly spread across the country.
has been peacefully transformed through enlight- The main purpose of these clubs was to institute
ened inquiry. Bellamy thought that society was Bellamy’s utopian vision. Members formed
enslaved by moral guilt inherited from past gen- coalitions with other reformist political groups,
erations, just as he was initially bound into servi- and the Nationalists were represented at the
tude by the Calvinist doctrine of innate deprav- 1891 Populist Party convention. Eugene DEBS
ity. He was able to overcome his sense of sin (or also initially advocated some of Bellamy’s
burden of guilt) through critical inquiry, exer- programs. However, these alliances began to
cising reason and observing his guilt from many unravel once it was obvious there were funda-
different points of view. Gradually he came to mental disagreement about how to bring about
the conclusion that this excessive feeling of guilt social change. The Nationalists advocated a
or nemesis was an unnecessary burden that not gradual or evolutionary transition ushered in by
only he but the entire human race was forcing a small group of educated leaders, not a revo-
itself to live under. Bellamy’s struggle with the lution by the masses of laborers or workers, as
doctrine of nemesis gradually developed into a foreseen by more radical socialists and pop-
vision of society consistent with spiritual ulists. The breakdown of alliances with these
freedom: socialism. latter groups contributed to the Nationalist
Bellamy’s primary inspiration for Looking movement’s marginalization by 1894.
Backward was Laurence GRONLUND’s 1884 After he began urging immediate national-
book The Cooperative Commonwealth: An ization of railroads, telegraphs, and other vital
188
BELLAMY
industries, even Bellamy’s most ardent admirers Bowman, Sylvia E. The Year 2000: A
began to lose their enthusiasm for his utopian Critical Biography of Edward Bellamy
ideals. The politicization of his ideas through the (New York, 1958).
hundreds of Nationalist Clubs, and his prema- ———, Edward Bellamy Abroad: An
ture death, along with the proliferation of American Prophet’s Influence (New
counter-utopias, caused Bellamy’s own vision to York, 1962).
gradually lose focus. However, the spirit of his ———, Edward Bellamy (Boston, 1986).
social reforms was carried forward into the Griffith, Nancy Snell. Edward Bellamy: A
Progressive Era of the early twentieth century. Bibliography (Metuchen, N.J., 1986).
Kesselman, Stephen. The Modernization of
BIBLIOGRAPHY American Reform: Structures and
Six to One: A Nantucket Idyll (New York, Perceptions (New York, 1979).
1878). Lipow, Arthur. Authoritarian Socialism in
Dr. Heidenhoff’s Process (New York, America: Edward Bellamy and the
1880). Nationalist Movement (Berkeley, Cal.,
Miss Ludington’s Sister: A Romance of 1982).
Immortality (Boston, 1884). Michaelis, R. C. Looking Further Forward
Looking Backward, 2000–1887 (New (New York, 1890).
York, 1888). Morgan, Arthur Ernest. Edward Bellamy
Equality (New York, 1897). (New York, 1944).
Patai, Daphne, ed. Looking Backward,
Other Relevant Works 1988–1888: Essays on Edward Bellamy
Bellamy’s papers are at Harvard University. (Amherst, Mass., 1988).
Blindman’s World: And Other Stories (New Peyser, Thomas. Utopia and Cosmopolis:
York, 1898). Globalization in the Era of American
The Duke of Stockbridge (New York, Literary Realism (Durham, N.C., 1998).
1900). Rhodes, H. V. Utopia in American Political
Talks on Nationalism (Salem, N.H., 1938). Thought (Tucson, Ariz., 1967).
Selected Writings on Religion and Society, Roberts, J. W. Looking Within (New York,
ed. Joseph Schiffman (New York, 1955). 1893).
Apparitions of Things to Come: Edward Shurter, Robert L. The Utopian Novel in
Bellamy’s Tales of Mystery and America, 1865–1900 (New York, 1973).
Imagination (Chicago, 1988). Spann, E. K. Brotherly Tomorrows:
Significant Unpublished and Uncollected Movements for a Cooperative Society in
Writings by and about American Writer America, 1820–1920 (New York, 1989).
Edward Bellamy (1850–1898), ed. Toby Thomas, John L. Alternative America:
Widdicombe and Herman Preiser Henry George, Edward Bellamy, Henry
(Lewiston, N.Y., 2002). Demarest Lloyd, and the Adversary
Tradition (Cambridge, Mass., 1983).
Further Reading Vinton, A. D. Looking Further Backward
Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, (New York, 1890).
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer Widdicombe, Toby, and Richard Toby
Thought, Dict Amer Bio, Encyc Amer Widdicombe, eds. Edward Bellamy: An
Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v1 Annotated Bibliography of Secondary
Aaron, Daniel. Men of Good Hope: A Story Criticism (New York, 1988).
of American Progressives (New York,
1951). Jean Van Delinder
189
BELNAP
BELNAP, Nuel Dinsmore, Jr. (1930– ) functions something like a prosentence in

analogy with pronouns, and on the revision
Nuel Belnap was born on 1 May 1930 in theory of truth (with Gupta, 1993), arguing
Evanston, Illinois. He received a BA from the that the circular phenomena exhibited in self-
University of Illinois in 1952. He went to Yale referentially paradoxical sentences (such as the
for postgraduate study in logic under the super- liar: “this sentence is not true”) should not be
vision of Alan Ross ANDERSON, receiving an avoided but rather, should be taken to be a
MA in 1957 and a PhD in 1960. After gradu- defining feature of the concept.
ation, Belnap continued to teach at Yale as Belnap has published on the philosophy of
assistant professor of philosophy until 1963, physics, and the semantics of agency in his
when he moved to the philosophy department work on branching space–time (1992) and on
of the University of Pittsburgh to become an the STIT (for “sees to it that”) theory of agency,
associate professor. He is presently still at (Facing the Future, 2001). This work takes the
Pittsburgh, where he is Alan Ross Anderson picture of branching times (or space–time loca-
Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, in tions, in a relativistic setting) as the grounds of
addition to holding positions in sociology, a precise theory. In the context of metaphysics,
history and philosophy of science, and the intel- Belnap provides a theory of indeterminism in
ligent systems program. branching time that is consistent with general
Belnap’s research covers logic and related relativity and the absence of a single privileged
fields such as the philosophy of language and “present moment.” In the context of semantics
metaphysics and philosophy of science. His and agency, STIT theory provides a formal
name is most often associated with his teacher setting for understanding indeterminism,
and colleague Alan Anderson and their research choice, and the open future.
program in relevance logic. Belnap’s research, Belnap’s work is often collaborative, and he
with Anderson, and their colleagues and has played a central role in supporting and
students, first at Yale, and then at Pittsburgh, developing work in philosophical logic in the
provided a rigorous formal theory of logical United States, and elsewhere. At Pittsburgh
consequence and implication that takes account Belnap taught many graduate students, includ-
of relevance. The two volumes Entailment ing Robert K. Meyer, J. Michael Dunn, and
(1975, 1992) provide a survey of work in this Alasdair Urquhart, who have become promi-
field, which has continued since the 1950s. nent logicians in their own right. Belnap played
Belnap’s contributions to relevance logic are a major role in the formation for the Society of
too numerous to examine, but many have gone Exact Philosophy (Vice President from 1971
on to shape a thriving, if not quite orthodox, to 1974, and President from 1974 to 1976), and
research community. A good example of the Journal of Philosophical Logic (on the edi-
Belnap’s contributions is his paper “Display torial board from 1970 to present, as Treasurer
Logic” (1982), which develops a new way of from 1970 to 1976, Vice President from 1976
seeing the structure of proof, encompassing to 1982, and Chairman of the Board of
classical, intuitionistic, modal, and relevance Governors from 1982 to 1988). Both organi-
logic. zations have been crucial to the success of philo-
Belnap’s research is not restricted to rele- sophical logic as a discipline in philosophy in
vance logic. He has also written extensively on North America in the second half of the twen-
the logic of questions (1976), arguing against tieth century.
formal logic’s near-exclusive focus on declara-
tive forms; on truth, working on both the pros- BIBLIOGRAPHY
entential theory of truth (with Grover and Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and
Camp, 1975) according to which “is true” Necessity, vol. 1, with Alan R. Anderson
190
BENACERRAF
(Princeton, N.J., 1975). threatened, and then to New York in 1940.

“A Prosentential Theory of Truth,” with Benacerraf was educated at Peddie School in
D. L. Grover and J. L. Camp, Jr, Hightstown, New Jersey, and then at Princeton
Philosophical Studies 27 (1975): 73–125. University, receiving his BA in 1953 and his PhD
The Logic of Questions and Answers, with in philosophy in 1960. He wrote his dissertation
T.B. Steel (New Haven, Conn., 1976). on “Logicism: Some Considerations” under the
“Display Logic,” Journal of Philosophical supervision of Hilary PUTNAM. He joined the
Logic 11 (1982): 103–16. Princeton philosophy department as an instruc-
Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and tor in 1960 and he has remained at Princeton
Necessity, vol. 2, with Alan R. Anderson ever since. He has also served as chair of the phi-
and J. Michael Dunn (Princeton, N.J., losophy department during 1975–84 and
1992). 1992–9; associate dean of the Graduate School
“Branching Space-time,” Synthese 92 (1992): (1965–7); associate provost for special studies
385–434. (1968–70); and Provost of the University
The Revision Theory of Truth, with Anil (1988–91). He is currently James S. McDonnell
Gupta (Cambridge, Mass., 1993). Distinguished University Professor at Princeton.
Facing the Future: Agents and Choices in Benacerraf’s early interest in philosophy was
Our Indeterminist World, with Michael galvanized by positivist and post-positivist phi-
Perloff and Ming Xu (Oxford, 2001). losophy of science as represented by his teachers,
including Putnam, Carl G. HEMPEL, and John G.
Further Reading KEMENY. His work in philosophy has been
Avron, Arnon. “Whither Relevance Logic?” devoted almost exclusively to the philosophy of
Journal of Philosophical Logic 21 (1992): mathematics. He is the author of a number of
243–81. central papers, among which are two classics,
Cohen, Daniel H. “A New Axiomatization of “What Numbers Could Not Be” (1965) and
Belnap’s Conditional Assertion,” Notre “Mathematical Truth” (1973). Characteristic
Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (1986): of Benacerraf’s work, both essays are
124–32. exploratory rather than dogmatic. “What
Dunn, J. Michael, and Anil Gupta, eds. Truth Numbers Could Not Be” argues against the
or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel then-prevailing consensus that the natural
Belnap (Dordrecht, 1990). numbers are to be identified with certain sets.
Hart, W. D. “Prior and Belnap,” Theoria 48 He maintains that since there are many equally
(1982): 127–38. adequate ways of representing arithmetic in set
theory, no particular identification of numbers
Greg Restall with sets can be correct. At the same time,
Benacerraf rejects the view that arithmetic is
concerned with a domain of sui generis math-
ematical objects. The preferred alternative is
that the “objects” of arithmetic are not really
objects at all; rather, the truths of arithmetic are
BENACERRAF, Paul Joseph Salomon truths about any sequence of objects satisfying
(1931– ) certain structural conditions. The essay is a key
work for the view that has since come to be
Paul Benacerraf was born on 26 March 1931 in known as structuralism in the philosophy of
Paris, France, the son of a Moroccan-Venezuelan mathematics.
father and an Algerian mother. The family “Mathematical Truth” argued that existing
moved to Caracas in 1939 as World War II philosophical accounts of mathematical truth
191
BENACERRAF
fall to a dilemma. Some accounts (so-called Further Reading

combinatorial accounts) maintain that a math- Balaguer, Mark. “A Platonist Epistemology,”
ematical statement is true if and only if it is a Synthese 103 (1995): 303–25.
theorem of one or another given formal system. Creath, Richard. “Benacerraf and
Such accounts entail that the semantics for the Mathematical Truth,” Philosophical
language of mathematics is radically discontinu- Studies 37 (1980): 335–40.
ous with the semantics for the rest of the Hale, Bob, and Crispin Wright. “Benacerraf’s
language. What is worse, it is generally quite Dilemma Revisited,” European Journal of
unclear why the combinatorial property in Philosophy 10 (2002): 101–29.
question should be regarded as a species of truth. Hart, W. D. “Benacerraf’s Dilemma,” Critica
On the other hand, so called Platonist or realist 23 (1991): 87–103.
accounts of mathematical truth secure a uniform Katz, Jerrold. “What Mathematical
semantics at the expense of representing mathe- Knowledge Could Be,” Mind 104 (1995):
matical truth as unknowable. If a sentence such 491–522.
as “2 is a prime number” is to count as true only Maddy, Penelope. “Philosophy of
if a certain abstract mathematical object, the Mathematics: Prospects for the 90s,”
number 2, has a certain mathematical property, Synthese 88 (1991): 155–64.
then it is unclear how we could ever come to Morton, Adam, and Stephen P. Stich, eds.
know the truth of such a sentence. The objects of Benacerraf and His Critics (Oxford, 1996).
mathematics, on the Platonist account, are Shapiro, Stewart. Thinking About
causally inert and thus altogether inaccessible to Mathematics: The Philosophy of
us. The argument for the second horn of Mathematics (Oxford, 2000).
“Benacerraf’s Dilemma” has spawned an Wright, Crispin. “Skolem and the Skeptic,”
enormous literature. The contemporary debate Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
over nominalism in the philosophy of mathe- suppl. 59 (1985): 117–37.
matics can be traced directly to this paper.
Gideon Rosen
BIBLIOGRAPHY
“Tasks, Super-tasks and the Modern
Eleatics,” Journal of Philosophy 59 (1962):
765–84.
“What Numbers Could Not Be,”
Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 47–73. BENEDICT, Ruth Fulton (1887–1948)
“God, the Devil and Gödel,” The Monist 51
(1967): 9–33. Ruth Fulton was born on 5 June 1887 in New
“Mathematical Truth,” Journal of York City, the daughter of Frederick and
Philosophy 70 (1973): 661–79. Bertrice Shattuck Fulton. Also a graduate of
“Frege: The Last Logicist,” Midwest Studies Vassar, her mother worked as a teacher and a
in Philosophy 6 (1981): 17–35. librarian in order to support her daughter after
“Skolem and the Skeptic,” Proceedings of the her father’s death. Ruth earned a BA degree
Aristotelian Society suppl. 59 (1985): from Vassar College in 1909, and then traveled
85–115. to Europe, returning home to teach at a private
girls’ school from 1910 to 1914. She married
Other Relevant Works Stanley Benedict, a chemist, in 1914, and con-
Ed. with Hilary Putnam, Philosophy of tinued to study independently until 1918 when
Mathematics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., she enrolled at Columbia University. At
1964; 2nd edn, Cambridge, UK, 1983). Columbia she took courses with John DEWEY
192
BENEDICT
before discovering anthropology, which she dated a wide range of native cultural practices
studied with Franz BOAS, and she also took and emphasized understanding over judgment,
courses with anthropologists at the New and relativity over absolutism.
School for Social Research. After completing
her PhD in anthropology in 1923, publishing BIBLIOGRAPHY
her dissertation in that year, Benedict taught “The Vision in Plains Culture,” (1922)
part-time at Columbia and Barnard College, American Anthropologist 24: 1–23.
and studied Native American cultures in the The Concept of the Guardian Spirit in
Great Plains and Southwest. By 1930 her North America (Menasha, Wisc., 1923).
marriage had fallen apart, and she had a short- Patterns of Culture (Boston, 1934).
lived relationship with Margaret MEAD, with Zuni Mythology (New York, 1935).
whom she maintained a lifelong friendship. Race: Science and Politics (New York,
In 1931 Benedict was appointed assistant 1940; 2nd edn 1945).
professor of anthropology at Columbia to join The Races of Mankind, with Gene Weltfish
Boas. Benedict gradually took greater responsi- (New York, 1943). Rev. edn, In Henry’s
bilities for the anthropology department, con- Backyard: The Races of Mankind (New
tinued to research Native American and York, 1947).
Japanese culture, and began publishing her most The Chrysanthemum and the Sword:
important books. She edited the Journal of Patterns of Japanese Culture (Boston,
American Folklore from 1925 to 1940, served 1946).
as President of the American Anthropological Thai Culture and Behavior: An
Association in 1947, and was promoted to full Unpublished War Time Study (Ithaca,
professor in early 1948. Benedict died on 27 N.Y., 1952).
September 1948 in New York City.
A career anthropologist, Benedict is recog- Other Relevant Works
nized in philosophy as a cultural relativist who Benedict’s papers are at Vassar College in
explored ethics and moral theory. She argued New York.
that what is defined as morally normal and Mead, Margaret, ed. An Anthropologist at
right is relative to one’s cultural traditions and Work: Writings of Ruth Benedict
teachings. In her view, all theories that (Boston, 1959).
allegedly find a priori or necessary or absolute
moral rules are just reflections of one’s own Further Reading
deeply imbedded habits acquired from one’s Amer Nat Bio, Comp Amer Thought, Dict
culture. She wrote in Patterns of Culture Amer Bio, Encyc Amer Bio, Encyc Social
(1934) that, “Morality differs in every society, Behav Sci, Encyc Relig, Nat Cycl Amer
and is a convenient term for socially approved Bio v36, Who Was Who in Amer v2,
habits.” Interestingly, she was unable to Who’s Who in Phil
endorse relativism when confronted by Banner, Lois W. Intertwined Lives:
Germany’s Nazi regime. Benedict fought Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, and
against the racism in academic anthropology Their Circle (New York, 2003).
that was receding in America but revived in Caffrey, Margaret. Ruth Benedict: Stranger
Germany in the 1930s. in This Land (Austin, Tex., 1989).
In her studies of Native American cultures, Lapsley, Hilary. Margaret Mead and Ruth
Benedict also observed the influences of mod- Benedict: The Kinship of Women
ernization on these cultures. Her published (Amherst, Mass., 1999).
discussions of these studies served to influence Mead, Margaret. Ruth Benedict (New
American popular consciousness. They vali- York, 1974).
193
BENEDICT
Modell, Judith. Ruth Benedict: Patterns of logical structure of science, an introduction to

a Life (Philadelphia, 1983). philosophy of science, a treatment of opera-
tionalism (the view that any term used in the
Dorothy Rogers exposition or description of a scientific concep-
tion or theory which had no operational value or
definition ought to be discarded from scientific
discourse), and a discussion of human values as
they relate to science and technology.
In “Philosophy of the Sciences” (1950),
BENJAMIN, Abram Cornelius (1897–1968) Benjamin considered that philosophy of science
deals with three principal kinds of question:
Abram Cornelius Benjamin was born on 25 (1) those relating directly or indirectly to the
August 1897 in Grand Rapids, Michigan. He methodology of science, for example, the dif-
received his BA in 1920, his MA in 1921, and his ference between mathematical proof and
PhD in philosophy in 1924, all from the empirical verification; (2) clarification of the
University of Michigan. His dissertation was subject matter and leading concepts of science,
entitled “The Logical Atomism of Bertrand such as “force,” “matter,” and “motion” in
Russell.” Benjamin was an assistant in mathe- physics, and the elimination from scientific dis-
matics at the University of Michigan in 1920–21, cussion and explanation of terms and concepts
and an assistant in philosophy there in 1922–3. which have no operational value or substantive
From 1923 to 1924 he was an assistant profes- explanatory power (following pragmatist John
sor of philosophy at the University of Illinois at DEWEY and operationalist Percy BRIDGMAN);
Urbana, and stayed there until 1932, when he and (3) a group of miscellaneous problems such
became assistant professor of philosophy at the as the nature of the relationships among the dif-
University of Chicago. In 1945 he was named ferent sciences.
John Hiram Lathrop Professor of Philosophy
and chair of the philosophy department at the BIBLIOGRAPHY
University of Missouri. Ill health forced his retire- The Logical Atomism of Bertrand Russell
ment from the chair in 1956, but he continued (Champaign, Ill., 1927).
to teach (with some interruptions) until retiring The Logical Structure of Science (London,
in 1966. Benjamin died on 19 October 1968 in 1936).
Columbia, Missouri. An Introduction to Philosophy of Science
Benjamin was active in several philosophical (New York, 1937).
organizations. He was a prominent leader of Syllabus for the Course on Methods, Values,
the Western Division of the American and Concepts (Chicago, 1940).
Philosophical Association, serving as secretary- Operationism (Springfield, Ill., 1955).
treasurer in 1934–36, Vice President from 1942 Science, Technology, and Human Values
to 1945, and President in 1947–8. He helped (Columbia, Miss., 1965).
organize the Missouri Philosophical
Association, and served as its first President. He Other Relevant Works
was a fellow of the American Association for “What Is Empirical Philosophy?” Journal of
the Advancement of Science and a member of Philosophy 36 (1939): 517–25.
Sigma Xi. “Philosophy, the Cult of Unintelligibility,”
In the late 1920s, Benjamin produced a critical Philosophical Review 57 (1948): 347–62.
exposition of Russell’s logical atomism, and “Philosophy of the Sciences,” in A History of
throughout his career he authored several works Philosophical Systems, ed. Vergilius Ferm
on philosophy of science, including a study of the (New York, 1950), pp. 540–51.
194
BENNETT
Further Reading debater, and a prolific writer who, though

Pres Addr of APA v5, Proc of APA v42, holding strong opinions, exercised a
Who’s Who in Phil “hermeneutic of appreciation” (James M.
Gustafson’s phrase) in seeking common ground
Irving H. Anellis among theological and ethical positions.
Bennett’s significance as a theological ethicist is
found at the intersection of the twentieth-
century perspectives that shaped his thinking:
Social Gospel Christianity, theological liberal-
ism, Christian realism, ecumenical Christianity,
BENNETT, John Coleman (1902–95) and Third World theology. His balancing of
social concern with fair judgment, of a passion
John Coleman Bennett was born on 22 July for justice with a gentle decency (Mark
1902 in Kingston, Ontario, the son of a Juergensmeyer’s language) is the result of his
Presbyterian minister. He was educated at being more influenced by events than by books.
Phillips Exeter Academy, Williams College (BA Bennett looked for countervailing tendencies in
1924), the University of Oxford (BA in the positions he criticized. He was not tempted
theology 1926, MA 1930), and Union by absolutisms and said he was uncomfortable
Theological Seminary in New York City (BD in secular politics despite his considerable influ-
1927, STM 1929). His STM thesis was on ence on many mid-century politicians.
“Schleiermacher’s Early Philosophy of For forty-three years (1928–71), Bennett was
Religion.” He was ordained in the closely associated with his more well-known
Congregational Christian Churches in mentor at Union, Reinhold NIEBUHR. Between
Berkeley, California, in 1939. Bennett’s career Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932) and
as a Christian ethicist included theology Man’s Nature and His Communities (1965),
teaching positions at Auburn (Presbyterian) Reinhold Niebuhr formulated the religio-polit-
Seminary from 1930 to 1938; Pacific School of ical philosophy known as Christian political
Religion (United Church of Christ) from 1938 realism, a philosophy which, especially in the
to 1943; and Union Theological Seminary in 1940s, provided a public ethic combining a
New York City, where he was professor of balanced moral assessment of human nature
Christian theology and ethics from 1943 to with a pragmatic regard for national self-
1970. From 1961 to 1970 his title was interest and power. Bennett’s significance lies in
Reinhold Niebuhr Professor of Social Ethics. At his capacity to stand squarely in the Niebuhrian
Union he also served as dean of the faculty, as tradition and to represent the forces that shaped
acting President, and as President from 1963 to it: from a movement critical of theological lib-
1970. Bennett was a visiting professor of eralism in the 1930s, to a position on morality
Christian ethics at the Pacific School of Religion and foreign policy in the 1940s, to the social
from 1970 to 1977. After his retirement he and ethical pragmatic synthesis (words of
was an occasional visiting professor at the Ronald H. Stone) it achieved in Niebuhr’s later
Claremont School of Theology. He died on 27 years, and then to its development after
April 1995 in Claremont, California. Niebuhr’s death in the thought of Bennett
At his death, the New York Times credited himself.
him with outspoken views on religion, politics, Bennett’s first book, Social Salvation,
and social policy that influenced American appeared in 1935. Nearly thirty years later in
thinking, ecumenical Christianity, Catholic and a paper entitled “What I Believe It Means to Be
Protestant relations, and foreign policy. Bennett Saved,” he reaffirmed the thesis that, although
was regarded as a precise speaker, a skilled salvation cannot be social without being
195
BENNETT
personal, social conditions interfere with Protestant Concepts of Church and State,
personal salvation. In a lecture, “Reflections Thomas Sanders called it a “reformationized
on Death,” he considered at length the subject liberalism.” Donald Meyer labeled it “neo-lib-
of nuclear death, thus reiterating the connection eralism” and Bennett referred to it as a “liberal
between the personal and the social. dilution of Niebuhr.” Illustrating a method
When Bennett began his teaching career, he consistent with these designations in his inau-
was already a critic of the Social Gospel, though gural address as President of Union Theological
closer to theological liberalism than to any Seminary in 1963, Bennett called for a contin-
other perspective. An admirer of Walter uing fresh response to the original Christian
RAUSCHENBUSCH, Bennett warned in 1939 that sources of faith and revelation. What is
the radical shift in theology to a pessimistic required, he argued, is a new Protestant
view of human nature was to be both acknowl- theology that makes sense of the relation of
edged and resisted. Those who retain continu- God in Christ to the nature and general history
ity with the liberal tradition, he said, are in the of humankind. This theological perspective
proper position to contribute to a fresh theo- shaped his approach to ethics.
logical synthesis. He delivered the Alexander Graham Bell
Rejecting both abstract rationalism and a lecture, “Christian Ethics and the National
theology which thrives on the discontinuity Conscience,” at Boston University in 1964. In
between revelation and reason, Bennett acknowl- the introduction, Bennett asked whether there
edged his shifts in emphasis in the late 1930s and is “such a thing as a moral consensus or a
early 1940s but denied that they were radical common ground morality? And, if there is,
breaks from his earlier disposition. He identified how do we relate Christian Ethics or the dis-
with Niebuhr’s “third position” on war, criti- tinctive teaching of the church to it?” Bennett
cized the neo-isolation and irrelevance of recognized particular Christian implications
Christian Century editorials, and labeled himself for ethical thought and action, but his apolo-
a “peace-minded nonpacifist.” getic statement made clear that the Christian
In the preface to a 1941 book, Christian faith is an open absolute: there are evidences of
Realism, Bennett characterized himself as “a the divine spirit outside the Christian commu-
liberal who tries to take seriously the contri- nity. He recognized the authenticity of non-
bution of such thinkers as Karl Barth, Emil Christian religious experience, of general reve-
Brunner, and Reinhold Niebuhr; and as a lation, and of common-ground morality, which
Congregationalist who believes in the central he sometimes referred to as moral overlap or
importance of the ecumenical Church.” For national or international conscience.
him, the contributions of Christian realism His theological and ethical method reflects
included the interdependence of faith and the ways in which he merged theological liber-
reason, the rejection of natural theology as a alism and Christian political realism. Unlike
point of departure and sole method of Niebuhr, whose contrasts between mutual love
knowing, acceptance of Augustinian views on and pure agape led him to be haunted by per-
sin, emphasis on forgiveness and justification by fectionism, Bennett was a common sense
faith, and an endless capacity for self-criticism. meliorist whose ethical focus is on available
Bennett also was critical (though not often alternatives. Continuity is a key concept in his
publicly) of Niebuhr’s polemics, of the tendency theological and ethical method. He emphasized
of realists to offer moral rationalization for the formation of character as well as the process
self-interested necessity, and of the divorce of of decision-making, the linking of equality with
strategic answers from moral criticism. the need for new social structures, and what he
His theological position is best characterized has called ‘the humanizing of Christian ethics,”
as a redefined theological liberalism. In a departure from ethical legalism that takes
196
BENNETT
into account the impact of secularism and the transformed and that is continually transform-
human situation on the nature of ethics. ing, represents the convergence of ecumenical,
The impact of Niebuhr and Bennett on the World Council, and Roman Catholic thinking.
ecumenical movement and thought was signif- Bennett’s article “After Liberalism, What?”
icant. Niebuhr’s influence was episodic; Karl reveals the trend toward continuity in his
Barth called him “the man of Amsterdam,” an thought in which historical events and ethical
acknowledgment of the impact of Niebuhr’s issues led to modifications of liberalism but
Gifford Lectures. Bennett, on the other hand, not full rejection. “In some respects I still think
has been what might be called the “servant” of realistically,” said Bennett. This is his way of
ecumenical Christianity. In 1939, Bennett said calling attention to the mixed moral character
that “the church is the carrier of the Christian of nations, the case against moralism in inter-
tradition which molds my thought more than national affairs, the role and limitations of
any other system or tradition,” a comment that pacifism in national discussions, and the
led some to conclude that in Bennett, more than critique of idealism and dualism in the role of
in most Niebuhrians, the church emerges as religion in the national consciousness.
society’s conscience. This is a direct result of the Theology, for Bennett, provided a framework
influence of Christian realism on his thinking. In and established certain intellectual parameters,
Social Salvation (1935), The State of the Church but policy cannot be derived from this per-
(which he wrote for the Federal Council of spective. Rather, it is necessary to examine the
Churches in 1942), and Christian Ethics and real alternatives and, from them, determine a
Social Policy (1946), the independence of the theologically responsible course of action.
church and the relationship between worship In two 1982 addresses, one at Boston
and social action are emphasized. Bennett’s role University (“After Liberal Progressivism,
at the first assembly of the World Council of Reflections on Human Hope”) and the other at
Churches in 1948 in Amsterdam illustrated his the College of Wooster (“Christian Realism and
interest in ecumenical activity and explains its American Responsibility”), Bennett expressed
impact on his thought. sympathy with both Social Gospel Christianity
Before Amsterdam, Bennett was in charge of and Christian political realism. He said that his
preparations for the Oxford Conference (1937) chastened confidence was the result of being less
in the United States in the mid 1930s and secre- troubled about the human prospect than those
tary of its section on the church and economic who had only the experience of Christian
life, due in part to the influence of Henry Pitney realism. As early as 1933, he called for a mixed
Van Dusen and William Adams BROWN. After view of humanity, which emphasized not only
Amsterdam, he edited a volume of the 1966 self-centeredness and hardness of heart but also
Geneva Conference, Christian Social Ethics in a human love and compassion.
Changing World, a conference which marked In the Wooster address, Bennett cited and
the convergence of ecumenical thinking with assessed two of Niebuhr’s statements as intel-
Third World issues and the beginnings of liber- lectual background for the lecture. The state-
ation theology. In the 1950s, he served on the ments, both from Moral Man and Immoral
Federal Council of Church’s Dun Commission, Society, dealt with the transmutation of
which dealt with the moral issues of nuclear unselfish individualism into national egoism in
weapons and deterrence, and on NCC commit- patriotism and with the hypocrisy of nations.
tees on international affairs and on economics Regarding patriotism, Bennett said he wanted
and ethics, which produced ten volumes. In a to reclaim “patriotism” as a positive word and
1979 article, “The Ecumenical Commitment to regarded the word “hypocrisy” as too extreme.
a Transforming Justice,” Bennett said that this The nation, in World War II and the early Cold
notion, defined as justice that is continually being War, served good causes, however mixed the
197
BENNETT
motives; hence, moral claims are not always Niebuhr), Christian political realism served not
hypocritical. But he also reaffirmed Niebuhr’s as a dogma, but as a theological and ethical cor-
criticisms of national messianic illusions and the rective, thus maintaining its creative edge.
self-deception of citizens. Bennett reminded his
listeners that Niebuhr wanted to emphasize BIBLIOGRAPHY
three themes: the creation of human beings in Social Salvation: A Religious Approach to the
the divine image, the depth and pervasiveness Problems of Social Change (New York,
of sin, and human openness to forgiving, 1935).
healing, changing grace. Christianity and Social Salvation
Bennett emphasized that Niebuhr himself (Philadelphia, 1938).
(“never a dogmatic pessimist, fatalist, or cynic”) Christian Realism (New York, 1941).
moved beyond the realist position and that The State of the Church (New York, 1942).
underlying his views on World War II and the Christian Ethics and Social Policy (New
early Cold War were strong commitments to York, 1946).
social justice, equality, and a consistent critique Christianity and Communism (New York,
of national pride. Realism was also a corrective 1948). Rev. as Christianity and
for Bennett. He argued that it had a similar, Communism Today (New York, 1960).
though more forceful, impact on Niebuhr’s The Christian as Citizen (New York, 1955).
development and particularly affected his Christians and the State (New York, 1958).
doctrine of human nature. Though it is more When Christians Make Political Decisions
difficult to identify stages of development in (New York, 1964).
Bennett than Niebuhr, Bennett views their Foreign Policy in Christian Perspective (New
respective developments in similar ways. Still, York, 1966).
there are differences, but they are explained The Radical Imperative: From Theology to
more by family background, political experi- Social Ethics (Philadelphia, 1975).
ence, temperament, travel, and style than by U.S. Foreign Policy and Christian Ethics,
fundamental theological and ethical differences. with Harvey Seifert (Philadelphia, 1977).
Bennett was not as negative about liberalism or
as caught up in the realist corrective. He also Other Relevant Works
had a considerably longer time to develop the Bennett’s papers are at Union Theological
meaning of realism in changed situations, Seminary.
which made him an exponent of an open and “The Social Interpretation of Christianity,”
changing realism. in The Church through Half a Century:
In his afterword to the second edition of Essays in Honor of William Adams
Charles Kegley’s Reinhold Niebuhr: His Brown, ed. Samuel Cavert and Henry P.
Religious, Social, and Political Thought (1982), Van Dusen (New York, 1936).
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. criticizes recent charac- “If America is Drawn into the War, Can
terizations of Niebuhr as the philosopher of You, As a Christian, Participate in It or
the Cold War, the enemy of revolution, and the Support It?” The Christian Century 57
original neo-conservative, claiming that these (1940): 1506.
views of the Old Left, the New Left, and the “The Christian Conception of Man,” in
neo-conservatives cannot do justice to the Liberal Theology, An Appraisal: Essays in
essential character of Niebuhr’s political and Honor of Eugene William Lyman, ed.
social convictions. Bennett’s work, Niebuhrian David Roberts and Henry P. Van Dusen
as it is, corroborates Schlesinger’s conclusions (New York, 1942).
and cannot be ignored by those who claim they “Reinhold Niebuhr’s Social Ethics,” in
have found the real Niebuhr. In Bennett (as in Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social
198
BENNETT
and Political Thought, ed. Charles W. active in local educational politics. Bennett
Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (New York, grew up attending local state schools, before
1956), pp. 99–141. heading to Canterbury University College
Ed., Nuclear Weapons and the Conflict of where he studied philosophy with Arthur N.
Conscience (New York, 1962). Prior. Bennett wrote a thesis titled “The
Ed., Christian Social Ethics in a Changing Paradoxes of Strict Implication” for his MA in
World (New York, 1966). 1953, which was the basis for his first pub-
“The Ecumenical Commitment to a lished papers. His studies then took him to
Transforming Social Justice,” in the University of Oxford for two years, and in
Continuity and Discontinuity in Church 1955 he earned the BPhil. After one year
History: Essays Presented to George teaching philosophy at Haverford College in
Huntston Williams, ed. F. Forrester the United States, he returned to England in
Church and Timothy George (Leiden, 1956 to take the post of lecturer in moral
1979). science at the University of Cambridge. In
1968 Bennett moved to Simon Fraser
Further Reading University as professor of philosophy, and then
Amer Nat Bio two years later he went to the University of
Juergensmeyer, Mark. Conversations with British Columbia. In 1979 he came to Syracuse
John Bennett: Reflections on His Life and University as professor of philosophy, where
on the Career of Christian Ethics he would spend the rest of his academic career.
(Berkeley, Cal., 1982). He was President of the Eastern Division of the
Kegley, Charles, ed. Reinhold Niebuhr: His American Philosophical Association in
Religious, Social and Political Thought 1987–8. In 1985 he became a fellow of the
(New York, 1984). American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and
Lee, Robert. The Promise of Bennett: a corresponding fellow of the British Academy
Christian Realism and Social in 1991. He was awarded the LittD from the
Responsibility (Philadelphia, 1969). University of Cambridge in 1991 and was the
Long, Edward, Jr., and Robert Handy, eds. John Locke Lecturer at Oxford in 1992.
Theology and Church in Times of Change Bennett retired in 1997, and lives on Bowen
(Philadelphia, 1970). Contains a Island near Vancouver.
bibliography of Bennett’s writings. Bennett has written extensively in philoso-
Smith, David H. The Achievement of John C. phy, publishing ten books and more than a
Bennett (New York, 1970). hundred articles over a wide range of topics.
The majority of his work falls into five areas:
Glenn R. Bucher early modern philosophy, philosophy of mind
and language, theory of events, ethics and
action theory, and theory of conditionals. He is
an eclectic thinker – eclectic in his subjects, in
the resources he brings to his studies, and in his
methods – and has been widely noted for his
BENNETT, Jonathan Francis (1930– ) creativity. Still, Bennett’s philosophy carries
with it not only an instantly recognizable voice
Jonathan Bennett was born on 17 February and style but also a set of systematic intellectual
1930 in Greymouth, New Zealand. His father, emphases. He is acclaimed as much for his
Francis Oswald Bennett, was a physician and techniques as for his specific views. Most
published author of fiction and history; his notable in this regard has been his work in
mother, Pearl Allan Bennett, was a homemaker history of philosophy.
199
BENNETT
With the 1966 publication of Kant’s wade into the increasingly baroque and partisan
Analytic, Bennett helped to launch a wave of disputes over methodology that had become an
research that would bring early modern phi- academic preoccupation. Only in his fifth and
losophy back to active interest among philoso- final book in history of philosophy, the two-
phers. Its approach to the subject, one Bennett volume Learning from Six Philosophers (2001),
described in part as “fighting Kant tooth and did Bennett address the question of method in
nail” in order to learn from him (p. viii), would detail and offer defense of his own approach. But
also prove influential. The essay is marked by by then the issue was largely resolved at the level
its focus on Kant’s arguments and its often of scholarly practice. Methodological pluralism
critical assessment, and by Bennett’s efforts to has proved to be the order of the day, and the
engage Kant as philosopher with something to collegial approach has become an important
contribute to the understanding of ongoing and entrenched tradition. Bennett’s work in this
philosophical discussions. “To this end,” area continues with the provision of freely acces-
Bennett notes, “I have freely criticized, clarified, sible on-line versions of the early modern classics,
interpolated and revised.” Kant’s Analytic revised with the aim of removing stylistic imped-
spoke directly to the issues in Kant’s philosophy iments to understanding the texts while leaving
and devoted little space to questions of histor- the philosophical content intact.
ical or intellectual context. For Bennett, history Bennett’s philosophical writings – historical
of philosophy would be philosophy with a and otherwise – belong to the analytic tradition
special technique, not history with a special and display the imprint of the “linguistic turn”
subject matter. in philosophy with its signature emphasis on
This “philosophical” or “collegial” approach language. He describes his work as conceptual
to the history of philosophy sparked contro- analysis, that is, as the articulation of a body of
versy. It struck many as an exciting form of “analytic truths” about, for example, the
inquiry, one casting new light on philosophy concept of meaning, or causation, or moral
and its history and instituting a high standard of accountability. Yet his own view of concep-
active philosophical reflection on the part of the tual analysis incorporates a kind of rationalist
commentator. Others sharply disapproved. outlook that separates him sharply from the
Critics characterized Bennett’s work as histori- mid-twentieth-century Oxford analysts.
cally insensitive or anachronistic. The philo- Bennett sees in the human mind deep struc-
sophical payoff, it was suggested, was coming at tures of concepts and meaning that order our
the expense of sound scholarship. Bennett’s thought about the world, and he views them as
answer was to write three more books in early being expressed in our linguistic practices and
modern philosophy in the same mode: Locke, in the syntax and grammar of language.
Berkeley, Hume (1971), Kant’s Dialectic (1974), Linguistic data do therefore offer a passage to
A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics (1984). This did the subject matter of philosophy and so merit
not placate the critics, but it did confirm close attention. But they serve only as a stepping
Bennett’s place as a preeminent scholar in the stone to the principal goal of his philosophical
study of early modern philosophy. Yet for all his work: to bring the underlying conceptual struc-
influence in establishing a rigorous, philosophy- tures to light where they can be examined in
minded approach to the subject, the post- relation to modern canons of argument,
modern turn from history of philosophy to his- inquiry, and explanation.
toriography of philosophy – the rise of the study In his 1988 study Events and Their Names,
of the commentator – did not itself hold much following the lead of work by Zeno VENDLER,
interest for Bennett. Characteristically, his sights Bennett approaches the theory of events with a
were trained on the philosophy in the texts distinction between two types of sentence nom-
before him, and for the most part he did not inalizations. A sentence such as “Tenzing
200
BENNETT
climbed Everest” allows a perfect nominal argument on the subject, one later refined and
form, “Tenzing’s climbing of Everest,” as well deepened in The Act Itself (1995).
as an imperfect form, “Tenzing’s climbing Consider the distinction between killing
Everest.” Both constructions operate as names someone and letting someone die. It is often
and each refers to a part of the history of moun- thought that there is a morally significant dis-
taineering. But the distinction here tracks a crimination to be made: killing is worse than
deeper conceptual division and the two names letting someone die, despite the fact that death
actually refer to entities of distinct ontological will be the outcome in both cases. An important
types: the imperfect nominal names a fact, the moral weight apparently attaches to the act
perfect form names an event. Nor, Bennett itself, independently of its consequences. But
argues, are the two conceptual frameworks what is the ground of the distinction between
equivalent. Facts and events require distinct the act of killing and that of letting die that will
semantical treatments, and moreover for support this difference in moral status?
important theoretical roles – such as the con- Bennett’s subtle inquiry into action theory finds
struction of causal explanations – the concept no basis in the act itself for drawing this
of a fact is superior to that of an event. Bennett common-sense moral distinction. Killing and
contends that a failure to draw the distinction letting die are instances of a more general
properly has given rise in philosophy to an contrast between making things happen and
incorrect semantics for event language and to allowing things to happen, and underlying that
a mistaken promotion of the category of events contrast there is indeed a sharp action-theo-
for theoretical work. The event concept does retic distinction. But, Bennett argues, it is one
manage to pick out a feature of reality: events devoid of moral significance. Contrary to our
belong to the broader ontological category of common-sense view, the distinction between
“tropes” or particular instantiations of prop- making and allowing cannot carry any moral
erties at a place and a time, like the fall of a weight. Killing is morally no worse than letting
sparrow or the paleness of Socrates’s face. But die; alternatively, letting die is just as immoral
the fact concept, in virtue of its fineness of as killing – and likewise for all kinds of harms
grain, is more precise, more informative, and that one commits or fails to prevent. Bennett’s
better suited to the purposes of causal expla- analysis naturally yields a form of consequen-
nation. Of our two ways of thinking of the tialism in ethics and so raises familiar chal-
world and its causal superstructure, the one lenges to common sense and faces familiar
involving the event concept is, in the end, dis- problems about the prospects of an extraordi-
pensable. narily demanding morality. It is not the conse-
The balance, and perhaps tension, between quentialist conclusion that centrally matters,
descriptive and revisionary analyses of human however, but rather the line of inquiry that
understanding in Bennett’s philosophy, as well produced it. For any effective reply will have to
as his focus on conceptual foundations, also come at the level of foundations, where the
appears prominently in his writings on ethics work consists in patiently, clearly and method-
and action theory. Initially his research in this ically asking after the most basic concepts
quarter concentrated on the question of what around which we frame our understanding of
role the consequences of an act should have in moral and immoral behavior.
determining the moral status of that act. Yet his There is also a strong empiricist streak tem-
strategy soon became to ask after the very pering Bennett’s work that expresses itself in his
concept of an act and whether an act could concern to state empirical conditions under
provide a locus for moral evaluation indepen- which we would be justified in applying the
dently of consequences. In his 1981 Tanner concepts under study. Bennett routinely seeks
Lectures, he articulated an influential line of to couch his inquiries in terms that can refer
201
BENNETT
back to experience, keeping the reflective meaningful behavior, thus keeping the behav-
analysis on a tether. This dates to his earliest ioral frame intact at every stage of the analysis
writings and is most evident in his work on the of language and meaning.
nature of language and mind, especially Bennett has also worked on the theory of
Rationality (1964) and Linguistic Behaviour conditionals. His earliest publications address
(1976). The first book addresses the mental the concept of “entailment” or “strict implica-
states of animals, defining “rationality” to be tion” – where a statement p strictly implies a
whatever it is that separates humans, in men- statement q just in case it is impossible that p
talistic kind, from other terrestrial animals. be true and q false – and belong to philosophy
Bennett poses his question by asking what of logic. His later writings focus on conditional
would have to be added to the language-like constructions in natural language that express
behavior of honeybees for it to be appropriate weaker, more complex forms of connections
to ascribe beliefs (and other “contentful” states) between statements. A central question
to them. He suggests that belief should be concerns taxonomy. Consider three examples.
understood in relation to wants, needs, and (1) “If Booth didn’t shoot Lincoln, someone
behavior, and that the correct constraint on did.” (2) If Booth doesn’t shoot Lincoln,
belief ascription is not that the animal be able someone will.” (3) “If Booth hadn’t shot
to express a belief in language but only that it Lincoln, someone would have.” Indicative con-
have the ability to manifest the belief in its ditionals like (1) are widely thought to differ in
behavior. Arguing that beliefs about the past their semantics and functional roles from sub-
and general beliefs cannot be so manifested by junctive or counterfactual conditionals like (3).
non-linguistic animals, Bennett concludes that Indicative conditionals (it is thought) are sub-
rational creatures are distinguished by the jective, express links among an agent’s system
ability to escape cognitively from the present of beliefs, and do not have truth-values,
into the past and from the particular into the whereas subjunctive conditionals are objective,
general. report principled relations among possibilities,
Linguistic Behavior revisits the whole subject and have truth-values. Whether to classify
of language, belief, and meaning, and features common future-directed conditionals like (2)
a Gricean analysis of linguistic meaning in with the indicatives or with the subjunctives is
terms of intention. Again Bennett develops his unclear. Tradition locates (2) with (3), but there
case by taking sub-linguistic systems of com- are dissenters. Bennett began as a traditionalist,
munication – this time the bees are replaced by briefly departed by arguing that most (2)-type
imaginary “anthropoid mammals” – and grad- conditionals belong with the indicatives like
ually adding complexity to the behaviors of (1), and then recanted, offering an exacting
the individuals until the evidence for the attri- and novel defense of the traditional account.
bution of intentions, beliefs, and so on is in
place. He also gives clear voice to the empiricist BIBLIOGRAPHY
scruple: “statements about minds are based Rationality (London, 1964).
upon facts about behavior, and I shall never Kant’s Analytic (Cambridge, UK, 1966).
introduce any mentalistic concept without first Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes
displaying its behavioral credentials, saying (Oxford, 1971).
what sorts of physical behavior would entitle us Kant’s Dialectic (Cambridge, UK, 1974).
to apply it” (1976, p. 3). The project starts Linguistic Behaviour (Cambridge, UK,
with an analysis of the concept of goal-oriented 1976).
behavior that sets the notion of teleology on A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics (Indianapolis,
firm ground, then builds up an account of 1984).
intentional behavior, and finally advances to Events and Their Names (Indianapolis,
202
BENTLEY
1988). Way is Right,” Mind 104 (1995): 331–54.

The Act Itself (Oxford, 1995). “Conditionals and Explanations,” in Fact
Learning from Six Philosophers (Oxford, and Value: Essays on Ethics and
2001). Metaphysics for Judith Jarvis Thomson, ed.
A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals A. Byrne, R. Stalnaker, and R. Wedgwood
(Oxford, 2003). (Cambridge, Mass., 2001), pp. 1–28.
Other Relevant Works Further Reading

“Meaning and Implication,” Mind 63 Oxford Comp Phil, Pres Addr of APA v9
(1954): 451–63. Buchanan, Cathy L. Jonathan Bennett on
“Analytic-Synthetic,” Proceedings of the Language and Belief. PhD dissertation,
Aristotelian Society 59 (1959): 163–88. University of Chicago (Chicago, 1983).
“A Myth about Logical Necessity,” Analysis Cover, J.A., and Mark Kulstad, eds. Central
21 (1960): 59–63. Themes in Early Modern Philosophy:
“Substance, Reality and Primary Qualities,” Essays Presented to Jonathan Bennett
American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (Indianapolis, 1990).
(1965): 1–17. Scheffler, Samuel. “Deontology and the
“‘Whatever the Consequences’,” Analysis 26 Agent: A Reply to Jonathan Bennett,”
(1965): 83–102. Ethics 100 (1989): 67–76.
“The Age and Size of the World,” Synthese Thomson, Judith J. “Bennett’s ‘The Act
23 (1971): 127–46. Itself’,” Noûs 30 (1996): 545–57.
“Shooting, Killing, Dying,” Canadian Wood, Allen W. “Kant’s Dialectic,”
Journal of Philosophy 2 (1973): 315–23. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1975):
“The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn,” 595–614.
Philosophy 49 (1974): 123–34.
“Philosophy and Mr Stoppard,” Philosophy Samuel S. Levey
50 (1975): 5–18.
“Morality and Consequences,” in The
Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. 2,
ed. S. McMurrin (Salt Lake City, Utah,
1981), pp. 49–116.
“Counterfactuals and Temporal Direction,” BENTLEY, Arthur Fisher (1870–1957)
Philosophical Review 93 (1984): 57–91.
“Thoughtful Brutes,” Proceedings of the Arthur Bentley was born on 16 October 1870
American Philosophical Association 62 in Freeport, Illinois. He briefly attended York
(September 1988): 197–210. College and the University of Denver before
“Farewell to the Phlogiston Theory of going to Johns Hopkins University, where he
Conditionals,” Mind 97 (1988): 509–27. earned his BA in 1892 and a PhD in sociology
“Truth and Stability in Descartes’s in 1895. He also attended the universities of
Meditations,” Canadian Journal of Berlin and Freiburg in 1893–4, hearing lectures
Philosophy Supplementary Volume 16 by Georg Simmel and Wilhelm Dilthey. In
(1990): 75–108. 1895–6 Bentley was a lecturer in sociology at
“Negation and Abstention: Two Theories of the University of Chicago, and attended a
Allowing,” Ethics 104 (1993): 75–96. course in the theory of logic by pragmatist John
“Descartes’s Theory of Modality,” D EWEY . Finding no permanent teaching
Philosophical Review 103 (1994): 639–67. position, he became a reporter and editor for
“Classifying Conditionals: The Traditional the Chicago Times-Herald and its successor, the
203
BENTLEY
Chicago Record-Herald. In 1911 he retired philosophy of transactionalism, which reinter-

and moved to Paoli, Indiana, to pursue his prets traditional philosophical dichotomies, such
research and writing. His only return to the as mind and body or fact and value, as mutually
classroom was as a visiting professor at dependent factors within some greater encom-
Columbia University in 1941–2. Bentley died passing whole. Applying that theory to persons,
on 21 May 1957 in Paoli, Indiana. they viewed individuals in terms of their social
Bentley’s interests ranged across the history of relationships, as a fluctuating part of a group, or
agrarian economics; the sociology of politics, community, having shared interests, values, and
government, and industry; the philosophy of conceptions of their social and political envi-
science; logic; and linguistics. The Process of ronment.
Government (1908) was a pioneering work in
political science that received close attention BIBLIOGRAPHY
when reprinted after World War II. In Relativity The Condition of the Western Farmer as
in Man and Society (1926) Bentley applied Illustrated by the Economic History of a
Albert EINSTEIN’s general theory of relativity to Nebraska Township (Baltimore, Md.,
sociology, urging that social events and behav- 1893).
iors should not be abstracted from their temporal The Process of Government: A Study of Social
and spatial context. He espoused the logicist Processes (Bloomington, Ind., 1908;
doctrine of Bertrand Russell and A. N. Cambridge, Mass., 1949).
WHITEHEAD’s Principia Mathematica, but in Relativity in Man and Society (New York,
“The Linguistic Structure of Mathematical 1926).
Consistency” (1931) he gave an erroneous proof The Linguistic Analysis of Mathematics
of the denumerability of the real numbers, which (Bloomington, Ind., 1932).
is false. In The Linguistic Analysis of Behavior, Knowledge, Fact (Bloomington,
Mathematics (1932) he argued against the Ind., 1935).
logistic thesis that mathematics is reducible to Knowing and the Known, with John Dewey
logic or can provide a foundation for mathe- (Boston, 1949).
matics. Instead, he explained how mathematics Inquiry into Inquiries: Essays in Social
and its foundations are to be understood within Theory, ed. Sidney Ratner (Boston, 1954).
a linguistic context, and undertook an analysis Makers, Users, and Masters, ed. Sidney
of the connection between ordinary language Ratner (Syracuse, N.Y., 1969).
and systems of symbols and notations. He also
discussed the mathematical sciences within the Other Relevant Works
context of language, semantics, and semiotics. Bentley’s papers are at Indiana University.
In Behavior, Knowledge, Fact (1935) Bentley “The Units of Investigation in the Social
urged an empirical, observational approach to Sciences,” Annals of the American
the study of human behavior, in order that soci- Academy of Political and Social Science 5
ology can become a fully fledged science to (1895): 915–41.
which the scientific method could legitimately be “The Linguistic Structure of Mathematical
applied. In the 1930s he began a correspondence Consistency,” Psyche 12 (1931): 78–91.
with Dewey, and they realized the large extent of John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley: A
their common interests and shared pragmatic Philosophical Correspondence,
views. Bentley collaborated with Dewey during 1932–1951, ed. Sidney Ratner (New
the 1940s on a series of articles about the prag- Brunswick, N.J., 1964).
matic theory of inquiry, knowledge, and science
which were later collected in their Knowing and Further Reading
the Known (1949). Together they developed the Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio,
204
BERENSON
Dict Amer Bio, Encyc Amer Bio, Who In his book The Florentine Painters of the
Was Who in Amer v3 Renaissance, Berenson applied psychology to
Black, Max. “Note on Mr. Bentley’s Alleged aesthetics by suggesting that great painters
Refutation of Cantor,” Psyche 12 (1931): should be able to visually stimulate the tactile
77–9. imagination, allowing the viewer to imagine
Kress, Paul F. Social Science and the Idea of and to experience physiologically volume,
Progress: The Ambiguous Legacy of weight, and surface texture, as well as
Arthur F. Bentley (Urbana, Ill., 1970). movement and space – what he called “tactile
Ratner, Sidney. “Arthur F. Bentley, values” in art. This idea had already been for-
1870–1957,” Journal of Philosophy 55 mulated in Adolf von Hildebrand’s 1893 Das
(1958): 573–8. Problem der Form in der bildenden Kunst and
Ryan, Frank X. “The ‘Extreme Heresy’ of other German writers on “empathy theory”
John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley,” beginning with Robert Vischer’s work in 1873,
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce and in the work of Berenson’s teacher from
Society 33 (1997): 774–94, 1003–23. 1884 to 1887, William JAMES (Principles of
Taylor, Richard W., ed. Life, Language, Psychology, 1890). Berenson also embraced
Law: Essays in Honor of Arthur F. Bentley Friedrich Nietzsche’s idea of those things that
(Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1957). are “life enhancing” and Arthur Schopenhauer’s
Ward, James F. Language, Form, and notion of the oneness of viewer and art during
Inquiry: Arthur F. Bentley’s Philosophy of the aesthetic experience.
Social Science (Amherst, Mass., 1984). Berenson’s methods, which went beyond
Giorgio Vasari’s biographical and uncompli-
Irving H. Anellis cated progression of Italian artistic achievement,
John Shook were formalism and connoisseurship (attribut-
ing paintings to certain artists through measur-
able form and structure – particularly in details
of the painting such as ears, drapery, landscape,
etc. – based on the method of Giovanni Morelli
and stylistic/quality issues based on the ideas of
BERENSON, Bernard (1865–1959) Walter Pater). These methods were unusual at
the time in that Berenson concentrated on the
Bernard Berenson was born Bernhard values within the works of art themselves rather
Valvrojenski in Butremancz, Lithuania, on 26 than their content. His formalistic approach
June 1865, and died in Settignano, Italy, on 6 influenced such later critics as Clive Bell (his
October 1959. Berenson attended Boston’s concept of “Significant Form”) and Roger Fry,
Latin School and studied Greek, Latin, Sanskrit, as well as the modern art he professed to
Hebrew, and German languages at Harvard disdain. In his later career (from 1910) Berenson
University after his family immigrated to the revised many of his earlier works and published
United States in 1875. By 1886 he was editor of memoirs and diaries. Scholars now look upon
The Harvard Monthly, founded by George his written works on drawing to have best with-
SANTAYANA. He received his BA from Harvard stood the test of time, although many art histo-
in 1887. Although not technically an art historians and critics still refer to his term of “tactile
rian, his 1887–90 visit to Europe inspired him values” in art. For the most part, however, his
to live in Italy studying Italian art, helping him thought remains grounded in the work of late
to become a connoisseur of the subject. In 1907 nineteenth-century German philosophy and
Berenson and his wife Mary purchased the Villa William James. Berenson’s Villa I Tatti, along
I Tatti in Settignano, near Florence. with its collections and libraries, was donated to
205
BERENSON
Harvard University and now serves as the Samuels, Ernest. Bernard Berenson: The
Center for Italian Renaissance Studies – a fitting Making of a Connoisseur (Cambridge,
legacy to Berenson’s idea that art exert a human- Mass., 1979).
izing influence upon society. ———, Bernard Berenson: The Making of a
Legend (Boston, 1987).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The Venetian Painters of the Renaissance Shelley Wood Cordulack
(New York, 1894; rev. edn 1895, 1897).
Lorenzo Lotto: An Essay in Constructive Art
Criticism (New York, 1895; rev. edn 1901;
rev. edn London, 1956).
The Florentine Painters of the Renaissance
(New York, 1896; rev. edn 1900; 1909). BERGER, Peter Ludwig (1929– )
The Central Italian Painters of the
Renaissance (New York, 1897; rev. edn Peter Berger was born on 17 March 1929 in
1909). Vienna, Austria. He immigrated to the United
Study and Criticism of Italian Art (1st series States at the age of seventeen, and earned his
New York, 1901; 2nd series 1902; 3rd BA from Wagner College in 1949. He then
series 1916). studied sociology at the New School for Social
The Drawings of the Florentine Painters Research, receiving the MA in 1950 and PhD
(London, 1903; rev. edn Chicago, 1938). in 1954. He spent one year as a student at the
North Italian Painters of the Renaissance Lutheran Theological Seminary in Philadelphia
(New York, 1907). before deciding that, though he was fully com-
A Sienese Painter of the Franciscan Legend mitted to the Christian message, he could not
(London, 1909). preach this message in its conventional form.
Sketch for a Self-Portrait (London, 1919). Berger then taught sociology at the Women’s
Three Essays in Method (Oxford, 1926). College of the University of North Carolina
The Italian Painters of the Renaissance (1956–8), was associate professor of social ethics
(Oxford, 1930; rev. edn London, 1952). at Hartford Theological Seminary (1958–63),
Italian Pictures of the Renaissance (Oxford, and then professor of sociology at the New
1932; rev. edn London, 1957–68). School for Social Research. In the 1970s he
Aesthetics and History in the Visual Arts taught at Rutgers University and Boston College.
(New York, 1948). In 1981 he went to Boston University to become
professor of sociology and theology. In 2002
Other Relevant Works Berger became professor emeritus, continuing
The Berenson Archive: An Inventory of to occasionally teach and remaining as Director
Correspondence, ed. Nicky Mariano of the Institute for the Study of Economic
(Florence, 1965). Culture and Director of the Institute for Religion
and World Affairs at Boston.
Further Reading Berger’s numerous publications cover a wide
Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, range of academic areas, including sociological
Dict Amer Bio, Encyc Amer Bio, Nat Cycl theory, the sociology of knowledge, the sociol-
Amer Bio v48, Who Was Who in Amer v3 ogy of religion, Third World development, and
Calo, Mary Ann. Bernard Berenson and the liberal theology. Berger embraced sociology as
Twentieth Century (Philadelphia, 1994). a tool for personal liberation. The central
Mostyn-Owen, William. Bibliografia di message of his Invitation to Sociology (1963)
Bernard Berenson (Milan, 1955). was that sociology can awaken us to the
206
BERGER
profound role that society has in determining The implication was that religious doctrines
our identities and values. This thin volume has do not really contain information about God
sold over a million copies, helping more than but are instead the product of humanity’s spec-
two generations of readers understand how a ulative efforts to understand and explain the
sociological perspective can free us from social universe. A further implication was that soci-
masks and enable us to accept personal respon- ology is itself a component of secularization.
sibility for our lives. That is, by exposing religion as a human pro-
In 1966 Berger and Thomas LUCKMANN co- jection grounded in specific social settings, soci-
authored The Social Construction of Reality, ology was furthering the gradual decline of
one of the most widely read treatises in the religion’s influence in Western culture. Yet, in
sociology of knowledge. Their argument was the second appendix to this book, Berger voiced
that social processes play a pivotal role in a his own personal (as opposed to professional)
culture’s establishment of knowledge. The soci- opinion that the sociological perspective does
ology of knowledge was thus a modern form of not necessarily have the last word. He coun-
philosophical relativism and cast suspicion on tered that it is possible that humans project
human claims to absolute truth. In this book, sacred meanings on to the world because the
Berger identified himself with a philosophical world really is sacred. Even though sociology is
tradition that included Karl Marx, Friedrich a valuable tool for understanding how social
Nietzsche, Max Weber, and Karl Mannheim. processes give specific shape to our religious
He and Luckmann, like Marx, argued that beliefs, sociology has nothing to say about the
human consciousness is determined by our possibility that there really is a transcendent
social being. And, like Nietzsche, they demon- reality toward which our religious beliefs point.
strated how the “art of mistrust” concerning Berger spent much of the 1970s examining
claims to absolute or transcendental truth can the process of modernization in Third World
lead to liberation and personal authenticity. It countries and related theoretical debates con-
was, however, from Mannheim and Weber cerning the connections between economics
that they gleaned a somewhat utopian hope and democracy (1975, 1977). His overarching
that the sociology of knowledge might enable interest, however, remained that of the possi-
us to minimize ideologizing influences and bility of meaningful religious thought in the
thereby inch closer to more reliable and uni- modern world. On the one hand, Berger began
versal forms of knowledge. his life as a staunch theological conservative,
Berger then applied the sociology of knowl- influenced by the writings of theologian Karl
edge to the field of religion in The Sacred Barth. Yet, as his career progressed, Berger
Canopy (1967). Though this work was written moved to a decidedly liberal theological view-
in an abstract and jargon-ridden way, it point. He saw in the writings of the classic
nonetheless became one of the most important liberal Protestant theologian, Friedrich
books ever published in the sociology of Schleiermacher, a model for locating the core of
religion. Berger concentrated almost entirely religion in experience rather than doctrine. First
on religious thought or doctrine, defining in A Rumor of Angels (1969) and then in The
religion as “the human enterprise by which a Heretical Imperative (1979), Berger offered one
sacred cosmos is established” (1967, p. 25). of the most lucid theological strategies of the
By this he meant that societies invent religious late twentieth century. In these works Berger
beliefs as a way of bestowing authority upon sought to demonstrate the superficiality of
their customs, morals, and socioeconomic modern secular thought as well as the intellec-
structures. Basic to his argument was the tual dishonesty of conservative religion’s claim
assumption that religion is human-made, a pro- to absolute truth. In their place he proposed a
jection of our own hopes, needs, and desires. liberal theological perspective grounded in
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BERGER
humanity’s experiences of a superhuman, A Far Glory: The Quest For Faith in an Age
supernatural reality. Religious thinking should of Credulity (New York, 1992).
proceed inductively, based upon empirical Questions of Faith: A Skeptical Affirmation
accounts of human “consciousness of some- of Christianity (Oxford, 2003).
thing beyond itself” rather than deductively
from scripture. Berger maintained that “reli- Other Relevant Works
gious truth has nothing to fear from reason … The Noise of Solemn Assemblies: Christian
[and that] truth will reassert itself again and Commitment and the Religious
again no matter how many sobering questions Establishment in America (Garden City,
are addressed to it” (1979, p. 86). He conceded N.Y., 1961).
that an empirical approach to religious thought Ed., Marxism and Sociology: Views from
cannot yield absolute truths. He claimed it Eastern Europe (New York, 1969).
could, however, establish the empirical fact Pyramids of Sacrifice: Political Ethics and
that humans have recurring experiences of Social Change (Garden City, N.Y., 1975).
something beyond themselves, and that this Ed. with Richard J. Neuhaus, Against the
might be sufficient for a faith characterized by World for the World: The Hartford Appeal
open-mindedness and toleration. and the Future of American Religion (New
York, 1976).
BIBLIOGRAPHY “From Secularity to World Religions: How
The Precarious Vision: A Sociologist Looks My Mind Has Changed,” Christian
at Social Fictions and Christian Faith Century 97 (1980): 41–5.
(Garden City, N.Y., 1961). Sociology Reinterpreted: An Essay on
Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Method and Vocation, with Hansfried
Perspective (Garden City, N.Y., 1963). Kellner (Garden City, N.Y., 1981).
The Social Construction of Reality: A The War over the Family: Capturing the
Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, Middle Ground, with Brigitte Berger
with Thomas Luckmann (Garden City, (Garden City, N.Y., 1983).
N.Y., 1966). The Capitalist Revolution: Fifty Propositions
The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a About Prosperity, Equality, and Liberty
Sociological Theory of Religion (Garden (New York, 1986).
City, N.Y., 1967). Redeeming Laughter: The Comic Dimension
A Rumor of Angels: Modern Society and the of Human Experience (New York, 1997).
Rediscovery of the Supernatural (Garden Ed., The Desecularization of the World:
City, N.Y., 1969). Resurgent Religion and World Politics
Movement and Revolution, with Richard J. (Washington, D.C., 1999).
Neuhaus (Garden City, N.Y., 1970). Ed. with Samuel P. Huntington, Many
The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the
Consciousness, with Brigitte Berger and Contemporary World (Oxford, 2002).
Hansfried Kellner (New York, 1973).
Facing up to Modernity: Excursions in Further Reading
Society, Politics, and Religion (New York, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio
1977). Ahern, Annette. Berger’s Dual-citizenship
The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Approach to Religion (New York, 1999).
Possibilities of Religious Affirmation Hunter, James D., and Stephen C. Ainlay.
(Garden City, N.Y., 1979). Making Sense of Modern Times: Peter L.
The Other Side of God: A Polarity in World Berger and the Vision of Interpretive
Religions (Garden City, N.Y., 1981). Sociology (London and New York, 1986).
208
BERGMANN
Woodhead, Linda, Paul Heelas, and David the University of Vienna and then worked as a
Martin. Peter Berger and the Study of corporate lawyer in Vienna. As a Jew, with little
Religion (London and New York, 2001). opportunity to obtain an academic post, espe-
Wuthnow, Robert. Cultural Analysis: The cially following the Anschluss or annexation of
Work of Peter L. Berger, Mary Douglas, Austria by Germany, Bergmann was obliged to
Michel Foucault, and Jürgen Habermas leave Austria, arriving in the United States in
(London, 1984). October 1938. Soon after his arrival in America,
Bergmann was invited to lunch with Gödel, who
Robert C. Fuller asked him, “And what brings you to America,
Herr Bergmann?” Bergmann also recalled that,
ironically, during World War II he was obliged,
as a native of an enemy country, to register his
ham radio and to report to the local police
station every evening. In 1939 he arrived at the
BERGMANN, Gustav (1906–87) University of Iowa, to serve as an assistant to
psychologist Kurt Lewin. In 1940 he joined
Gustav Bergmann was born on 4 May 1906 in Iowa’s philosophy department, and added an
Vienna, Austria. Before going to the univer- appointment to the psychology department in
sity, he attended the same gymnasium as Kurt 1943. He became a patron of the arts, donating
GÖDEL, with whom he maintained a friendly financially to the Iowa City music scene.
contact. He attended the University of Vienna, Bergmann spent the remainder of his career at
where he studied mathematics and minored in the University of Iowa, as professor with a dual
philosophy, working in geometry with Hans appointment in the departments of philosophy
Hahn, a member of the Vienna Circle. Through and psychology. He was President of the
his membership of the Vienna Circle he was Western Division of the American Philosophical
especially influenced by GÖDEL, by Moritz Association in 1967–8. He retired in 1974, and
Schlick, Friedrich Waismann, and Rudolf died on 21 April 1987 in Iowa City, Iowa.
CARNAP. He wrote his doctoral thesis under Even before leaving Vienna, Bergmann began
Hahn’s direction on the axiomatics of developing his “metaphysics of logical posi-
geometry, which subsequently appeared as his tivism,” arguing in favor of the ontological com-
first publication, “Zur Axiomatik der mitment behind, and reflected by, the syntax of
Elementargeometrie” in the Monatshefte für one’s ideal language. The “metaphysics of logical
Mathematik und Physik. When Bergmann positivism” is philosophizing in an ideal
received his PhD in mathematics from Vienna language about what there is. Logic without
in 1928 at age twenty-two, he was the youngest ontology is merely a calculus (1964, p. 151),
doctor produced at the university until that whereas “Interpretation makes a calculus into an
time. His most important recollection of his artificial language.” (p. 67) Logical positivists
classes was of Hahn telling students that such as Carnap, he held, bring metaphysics in
“When you know how a proof goes, you know “through the semantical back door” in an
nothing; when you know why it goes this way implicit ontology (1967, p. 68); whether they
rather than that way or some other way, then knew it or not, they “were all either metaphys-
you know something.” ical materialists or phenomenalists” (pp. ix, 194).
Bergmann taught mathematics at the Neubau In Realism: A Critique of Brentano and
Realschule in Vienna for an academic year, and Meinong (1967), Bergmann offered a critique
then moved to Berlin to join his former profes- of Austrian realism and used it as a foil to
sor Walther Mayer, as one of Albert EINSTEIN’s develop his own realistic position, which
assistants. In 1935 he obtained a JD degree from exploits the syntax of the logic of A. N.
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BERGMANN
WHITEHEAD and Bertrand Russell’s Principia cisely this relational regress that Bergmann
Mathematica, in which a higher-order logic found in Goodman’s system, in which particu-
built upon set theory with ramified types lars were to be tied to particulars by “nextness”
provides the syntax and logical form for his or overlapping, on the basis upon which he
realist ontology. Victor Kraft explained that defended his realism.
“An ontological grounding of logic makes logic Because the form of Bergmann’s world has
unconditionally usable.” Entities in Bergmann’s ontological status (1964, p. 56), a ramified
world are analyzed as natured particulars, each theory of types is required. The metalanguage
consisting of a bare particular, a principium M of a language S is interpreted, and therefore
individuationis, which Bergmann erroneously Bergmann disagreed with Ludwig Wittgenstein
equated with Aquinas’s materia signata, but that “logical form is nothing,” holding, on the
which in fact is akin to Aquinas’s materia contrary, that “a metalanguage is always inter-
prima, and a collection of universals, or prop- preted” (p. 254). Natured particulars are indi-
erties. Thus, the constituents of an entity such viduals, universals that comprise the properties
as a red circle would consist of a bare particu- of natured particulars are first-order. The prop-
lar, Redness, and Roundness, with Redness erties or “pseudocharacters” of the metalan-
and Roundness bound to the bare particular by guage include Existence, Generality,
an inhomogeneous nexus, called Particularity, etc.; these are also predicates,
Exemplification, also a universal, with one being higher-order properties of natured par-
instantiation of Exemplification to tie each of ticulars and syncategorematic, while character
the other properties to the bare particular. properties, such as Redness and Roundness are
Exemplification is inhomogeneous because, categorematic. Pseudocharacters are second-
although it is, like Redness and Roundness, a order predicates, properties of properties, or
universal, it is not a character of natured par- sets, taken as entities (individuals) in their own
ticulars. Exemplification may also tie elements right; syncategories include also logical con-
(quasi-constituents) of a set to a collective. If nectives; Generality and Particularity are third-
Tom, Dick, and Harry are denoted by T, D, H, level types; Existence is a fourth-level type.
and the predicate “Man” by M, then M = {T, In addition to developing in detail his meta-
D, H}; but M does not consequently become an physics of logical positivism, Bergmann con-
individual of the same type as T, D, or H, since tributed to philosophy of logic, and to philos-
M is a higher-level type than T, D, and H. “A ophy of psychology and philosophy of mind.
collection of entities,” Bergmann often reiter- He argued in favor of a realism, comprised of
ated, “is not itself an entity.” With a dualism of mind and matter, neither reducible
Exemplification, then, one obtains a complex to the other, in which mental acts are intentions
or natured particular; without it, merely a that pertain to the external manipulation of
“cluster.” matter. Bergmann was influenced by the phe-
In opposition to his brand of realism, nomenalism of Austrian realists Franz Brentano
Bergmann posed Nelson GOODMAN’s nomi- and Alexius Meinong, and the phenomenol-
nalism as found in The Structure of Appearance ogy of Edmund Husserl.
and its underlying Calculus of Individuals In his Philosophy of Science (1957), in which
devised by Goodman and W. V. QUINE as a Bergmann dealt particularly with philosophy of
counter-foil. One serious difficulty with physics and probability theory, he remained
Bergmann’s analysis, pointed out by Moltke S. close to the original conception of science as
Gram, which he failed to solve, is that presented by the logical positivists. In dealing
Exemplification yields a Bradleyan regress, with intentionality, Bergmann was closer to
since, as a universal, it in turn requires a nexus Husserl insofar as he held that mental acts
to be bound to a bare particular. Yet it was pre- involved a “fringe” and a “core” in which there
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BERGMANN
was a representation of the objects perceived by Philosophy and Phenomenological

the mind, the latter being a temporal sequence Research 8 (1947): 55–82.
of perceptions of properties (e.g., Redness, “Logical Positivism,” in A History of
Roundness), thought, desire, and that these Philosophical Systems, ed. Vergilius Ferm
mental objects are obtained by acquaintance, (New York, 1950), pp. 471–82.
that is, as experienced objects. The mental “Semantics,” in A History of Philosophical
objects have the same ontological status, then, Systems, ed. Vergilius Ferm (New York,
as experienced entities. Through his theory of 1950), pp. 483–92.
acquaintance, Bergmann was also close to the “The Logic of Quanta,” in Readings in the
behaviorists, especially B. F. SKINNER, insofar as Philosophy of Science, ed. Herbert Feigl
he held that behavior can best be studied by and May Brodbeck (New York, 1953), pp.
observation and explained in terms of the 475–508.
stimulus–response mechanism. “Propositional Functions,” Analysis 17
Bergmann’s work fostered an active “school” (1956): 43–8.
of metaphysicians of logical positivism, “Diversity,” Proceedings and Addresses of
centered around the University of Iowa, but the American Philosophical Association 41
one which had little influence outside the (1968): 21–34.
Midwest. Its chief propagator was Elmer David “Two Criteria for an Ideal Language,” in
Klemke, who edited anthologies of writings on The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in
the philosophies of Frege, Russell, and Philosophical Method, ed. Richard Rorty
Bergmann, helping to bring the work of (Chicago, 1970), pp. 132–4.
members of the Bergmannian school to wider
national and international attention. Further Reading
Amer Nat Bio, Oxford Comp Phil, Pres
BIBLIOGRAPHY Addr of APA v7, Proc of APA v61
Metaphysics of Logical Positivism (New Addis, Laird. “The Philosophy of Gustav
York, 1954; 2nd edn, Madison, Wisc., Bergmann,” Algemeen Nederlands
1967; 3rd edn, Westport, Conn., 1978). Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 63 (1971):
Philosophy of Science (Madison, Wisc., 78–98.
1957; 2nd edn, Westport, Conn., 1977). Baker, Robert. “Alice, Bergmann, and the
Logic and Reality (Madison, Wisc., 1964). Mad Hatter,” Review of Metaphysics 24
Realism: A Critique of Brentano and (1971): 707–36.
Meinong (Madison, Wisc., 1967). Carnap, Rudolf. “Hall and Bergmann on
Meaning and Existence (Madison, Wisc., Semantics,” Mind 54 (1945): 148–55.
1968). Geels, Donald. “Wolterstorff on Bergmann’s
New Foundations of Ontology, ed. William Principium Individuum,” Philosophical
Heald (Madison, Wisc., 1992). Studies 24 (1973): 257–8.
Gram, Moltke S., and Elmer D. Klemke, eds.
Other Relevant Works The Ontological Turn: Studies in the
“Zur Axiomatik der Elementargeometrie,” Philosophy of Gustav Bergmann (Iowa
Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik City, Iowa, 1974).
36 (1929): 269–84. Körner, Stephen, “On Bergmann’s
“Syntactical Analysis of the Class Calculus,” Ontology,” Philosophy of Science 35
Philosophy of Science 9 (1942): 227–32. (1968): 64–71.
“Pure Semantics, Sentences, and Peterson, John. “Bergmann’s Hidden
Propositions,” Mind 53 (1944): 238–57. Essences,” Review of Metaphysics 22
“Undefined Descriptive Predicates,” (1969): 660–75.
211
BERGMANN
———, “Bergmann’s Realism Revisited,” (1945–53) and New York University

Review of Metaphysics 25 (1972): 326–36. (1945–9). In 1958 his book Ideal and the
Wolterstorff, Nicholas. “Bergmann’s Community showed that although Berkson
Constituent Ontology,” Noûs 4 (1970): was a follower of Dewey’s ideas on democ-
109–34. racy, cultural pluralism, and progressive edu-
cation, he had combined the values and ideals
Irving H. Anellis of his own Jewish heritage with his mentor’s
teachings. Rejecting the “melting pot” concept
as a form of assimilation, as well as Horace
KALLEN’s “democracy of nationalities” with
its “undue exaltation” (1920, pp. 162–3) of
ethnic culture as dangerously isolating,
BERKSON, Isaac Baer (1891–1975) Berkson favored “community theory.” He
maintained that “cultural groups” can live
Isaac Berkson was born on 23 December 1891 interspersed with others, engaging in
in New York City, and died there on 10 March economic, political, and social life as
1975. His main interests were in Jewish phi- American citizens, while continuing to
losophy and education. He received his BA maintain their particular cultural heritage,
from City College of New York in 1912. He mostly through education in the family and
then studied with John DEWEY and William H. the school.
KILPATRICK, earning a PhD from Teachers Berkson fiercely opposed parochial school-
College at Columbia University in 1919. His ing of the Catholic mode, but the Jewish after-
dissertation was published a year later as noon school, as supplement to the public
Theories of Americanization. school, he said, was essential to the preserva-
Berkson began his teaching career at the tion of a unique culture and ought to be the
Central Jewish Institute in New York City in central agency around which the ethnic group
1911, becoming its Director in 1917. From builds its life. In this context, Berkson saw
1918 to 1927 he worked for the city’s Bureau ethnic survival – in this case, Jewish cultural-
of Jewish Education supervising Jewish schools religious reconstruction and revival – as fully
and extension programs. He taught education harmonious with Americanization. Indeed,
courses at the Graduate School for Jewish such “double allegiance,” he said, “is greater
Social Work, and for a short time at the Jewish than twice a single allegiance” (1920, p. 120),
Institute of Religion, but left in 1928 to survey since knowledge of an additional language and
schools in Palestine under the auspices of the culture makes people more richly complex and
Jewish Agency. He remained in Palestine until prevents the chauvinism which threatens
1935 as superintendent of the Jewish school American liberalism and democracy.
system. One finds democracy, Berkson argued,
Beginning in 1938 Berkson lectured on the “where there is a progressive consideration of
philosophy of education at the City University uniqueness, a multiplicity of diverse possibili-
of New York and in 1955 was promoted to ties [and] a growing consciousness of man’s
professor, holding that position until retiring interdependence” (1920, p. 39). Despite his
in 1961. By that time, in addition to Theories optimism, Berkson admitted that Dewey’s phi-
of Americanization, his influential work on losophy, even salted with Jewish ideals, would
cultural pluralism, Berkson had also written not by itself be able to generate sufficient
Preface to an Educational Philosophy (1940) cultural power to sustain the Jewish group.
and Education Faces the Future (1943). To support his community theory, then, he
Berkson also taught at Dropsie College also invoked the teachings of Ahad Ha’am
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BERLEANT
who emphasized Hebrew culture and language an accomplished musician and composer as
as “eternally” part of the Jewish people and well as a philosopher. His first degrees were
who saw Palestine as a spiritual center which a BM from Eastman School of Music in 1953
would help replenish the spirit of Jewishness in and an MA from Eastman in 1955, with a
mobile America. thesis on “The Fugue in the Orchestral Works
of Bartok.” For his doctoral work Berleant
BIBLIOGRAPHY turned to philosophy and was awarded the
Theories of Americanization: A Critical PhD in 1962 by the State University of New
Study (New York, 1920). York at Buffalo with a dissertation on “Logic
The Zionist School System (Jerusalem, and Social Doctrine: Dewey’s Methodological
1930). Approach to Social Philosophy.” He was pro-
Preface to an Educational Philosophy (New fessor of philosophy at the C. W. Post
York, 1940). Campus of Long Island University from 1962
Education Faces the Future: An Appraisal until his retirement in 1992. Over the years he
of Contemporary Movements in has managed to combine a distinguished
Education (New York, 1943). career as a teacher, lecturer, and writer in
The Ideal and the Community: A philosophy with a parallel career as a
Philosophy of Education (New York, composer and performer. He has also been an
1958). officer in a variety of international organiza-
Ethics, Politics, and Education (Eugene, tions devoted to the study of both theoretical
Oregon, 1968). and applied aesthetics, especially groups con-
cerned with environmental issues.
Further Reading Given the dual focus of his career and his
Amer Nat Bio interest in social and environmental philoso-
Goren, Aryeh. “I. B. Berkson,” New York phy, it is no accident that among the key
Public Library, Oral Histories, Box 6, no. concepts of his aesthetic theory are “experi-
4, 1965. ence” and “engagement,” or that he consid-
Goren, Arthur. New York Jews and the ers “performance” one of the four funda-
Quest for Community (New York, mental factors of the aesthetic field. This
1970). general outlook goes hand in hand with a
Skirball, Henry F. Isaac Baer Berkson and conviction that aesthetic theory must always
Jewish Education. PhD dissertation, be conceived in relation to ethics, meta-
Columbia University Teachers College physics, and political philosophy as well as in
(New York, 1977). relation to the specific practices and experi-
ences of the various arts. Although many
Gerald Sorin philosophers of art and aesthetics try to draw
examples from literature and music as well as
painting and sculpture, Berleant also gives an
important place to dance, film, architecture,
and environment. This breadth of outlook is
partly a function of Berleant’s belief that aes-
BERLEANT, Arnold Jerome (1932– ) thetic experience is not simply a way of
approaching the traditional fine arts, but a
Arnold Berleant was born on 4 March 1932 dimension of all experience. As a result,
in Buffalo, New York. Although known pri- Berleant did not follow mainstream analytic
marily as an aesthetician, Arnold Berleant philosophy of art during the 1970s and 1980s
pursued a wide range of interests and became in its preoccupation with issues surrounding
213
BERLEANT
the definition of art, but pursued a descriptive ceiver. Berleant depicts the aesthetic field from
approach to aesthetic experience itself. the beginning as a structure always in
This focus on aesthetic experience was a movement, a field of dynamic interaction
natural outgrowth of his work on John among its four aspects. The second notable
DEWEY, and Berleant’s mature aesthetic theory characteristic of Berleant’s description of the
is clearly in the Deweyan tradition. The subtitle aesthetic is his way of placing the performer on
of his first book, The Aesthetic Field: A an equal footing with the artist/creator and
Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience with the work of art itself. This is not simply
(1970), seems to suggest that existential phe- a prejudice arising out of his own experience
nomenology is his primary methodological as a composer and performer, but a carefully
commitment. Yet the phenomenology Berleant argued stance in favor of the active role of the
pursues is not the specific eidetic method devel- perceiver along with the observation that the
oped by Edmund Husserl with its peculiar artist in any medium is at the same time both
idealist baggage, but a robust empiricism that a performer and a perceiver as well as a
interprets Husserl’s slogan “to the things them- creator. Berleant’s description of the aesthetic
selves” in a thoroughly American (and prag- field as a lively transaction among these four
matist) sense. The central theme of The elements is a key to understanding both his
Aesthetic Field is the need to base aesthetic critique of the mainstream tradition that views
theory on a careful description of aesthetic the aesthetic as the disinterested contemplation
experience rather than try to mold experience of an autonomous art object, and his counter-
according to some “surrogate” model drawn position in favor of an aesthetics of engage-
from other modes of knowledge or practice. ment and participation.
Like most theorists of art and the aesthetic, Berleant devotes the larger part of The
whether analytic or phenomenological, Aesthetic Field to a description of the charac-
Berleant takes our everyday practice of distin- teristics of the aesthetic transaction that knits
guishing among various areas of experience – together the four factors. One will look in vain,
social, religious, technical, artistic – as his however, for a traditional definition of the aes-
primary data. Rather than launch immediately thetic in terms of some property or attribute.
into a description of the distinctive character- The aesthetic is not a separate kind of experience
istics of aesthetic experience, he first offers a but a mode, phase, or aspect of experience and
sustained critique of traditional theories of art. requires an identification in terms of a set of
Each of those theories, whether imitation, coordinates; an empirical inquiry into the basic
expression, communication, form, etc., tends features of what people generally associate with
to make a limited feature of experience a sur- their experience of art. Among the features
rogate for the richness and complexity of Berleant comes up with – active/receptive, qual-
actual aesthetic experience. Berleant seeks to itative, sensuous, immediate, intuitive, noncog-
assure the adequacy of his description by nitive – his discussion of the last is perhaps the
starting with the structure of the aesthetic field, most revealing of his position: “cognition leaves
the total situation in which experiences of art behind the living directness of sensory experi-
actually occur. The aesthetic field is made up ence” (1970, p. 119). Here Berleant sees himself
of the object, the aesthetic perceiver, the artist, in a tradition that embraces aspects of both
and the performer. David Hume and Immanuel Kant, but more
Two things are striking about Berleant’s particularly John Dewey and Maurice Merleau-
detailed account of the aesthetic field. First, his Ponty, who provide him with the most telling
description of the object already includes the support for turning our attention to the way that
role of both the perceiver, who experiences it, sensory or perceptual experience unites per-
and of the artist, who is herself also a perceiver, object, artist, and performer.
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BERLEANT
The twenty years between The Aesthetic occasion for an actively integrative experience.
Field and Berleant’s next book were among the Architecture, for example, has too often been
most productive in his career as a composer treated as an object of visual contemplation,
and performer even as he continued to publish whereas both psychological and phenomeno-
extensively in aesthetics. Some of the longer logical studies of spatial experience suggest a
compositions include Theodora, an eleven- participatory, kinetic understanding of space
movement ballet for chamber orchestra that involves the whole body and treats build-
(1979), Thirteen Ways of Looking at a ings and their sites as total environments.
Blackbird, songs for flute, oboe, and voice Here is one of many occasions that Berleant
(1980), Seven Bagatelles for piano (1981), Duo has even taken to task an existential phenom-
for violin and viola (1982), Prelude and enologist like Merleau-Ponty, remaining too
Toccata for piano (1982), and Adagio for solo anthropocentric and still treating artworks pri-
oboe, with flute, clarinet, and strings (1983). marily as objects, rather than as co-constituted
Berleant’s many articles on aesthetics and in our experience of them. But it is the case of
ethics during this period explored issues musical composition where Berleant is able to
opened up in The Aesthetic Field and applied offer the most striking example of how differ-
its insights to particular areas of the arts. In a ent an aesthetic of engagement would look
series of essays revisiting the history of aes- from traditional approaches. He speaks of
thetics, Berleant argued ever more forcefully musical generation rather than creation to
against what he saw and still sees as the fun- underline that the composer does not stand
damental error of traditional aesthetics – the over against his or her material as a shaper of
disengaged and distanced spectator, a conforms, but enters into the material as a partic-
struct rooted in the more general dualism of ipant in a dynamic process combining intu-
subject and object that has plagued Western ition and auditory perception. Similarly, the
philosophy. In contrast to this impoverished performer and listener also participate in a
picture of actual aesthetic experience, Berleant combined intuitional and auditory perception
continued to develop his case for an aesthetics in reconstituting and interpreting the work.
of participation. But his most important new Berleant suggests that music incorporates aes-
work during this period also showed how the thetic engagement more thoroughly than any
themes of the earlier book were able to illu- other art. He concludes this pivotal book of his
minate problems of the emerging field of envi- career by arguing that a participatory
ronmental aesthetics. The reflections and approach can claim for aesthetics and art an
studies of these years were subsequently incor- equal place within the panoply of regions of
porated into Art and Engagement (1991) and experience alongside science, politics, morality,
The Aesthetics of Environment (1992). and religion.
In Art and Engagement Berleant argues that Berleant’s next two books, The Aesthetics of
the most important movements in the twenti- Environment and Living in the Landscape
eth-century arts have themselves been inviting (1997), along with the majority of his papers
us to turn away from the contemplative, and lectures since 1991, have been devoted to
subject-centered aesthetic of the past toward the theme of environmental aesthetics. Berleant
aesthetic experience as active participation and was led to environmental issues by his previous
toward a view of the arts as integrated into life emphasis on the dynamic unity of aesthetic
rather than forming a separate realm. Taking participation. His environmental aesthetics is
up in turn landscape painting, architecture, both a natural outgrowth of his aesthetics of
literature, music, dance, and film, Berleant engagement and an intensification of many of
shows how traditional aesthetics treated each its most distinctive positions. The environ-
as an object for observation rather than an ment, for Berleant, is not an aesthetic object,
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BERLEANT
not even a surround, but an extension of our ceptual/sensory experience of the world, an
bodies and as much social and cultural as it is experience in which all values, political, moral,
natural. and religious, intersect. As such it is as much
In order to offer an exemplification of the about sound, touch, smell, and bodily
fusion of multilevel experiences that consti- movement as it is about sight. In Berleant’s
tute our integration with the natural, social, conception, our bodies are no more an object
and cultural environment, Berleant has exper- than is the landscape. Environment is an exten-
imented with a distinctive literary genre which sion of our bodies and our bodies of the earth.
he calls descriptive aesthetics. In a series of Moreover, the body in question is not that of
vignettes in The Aesthetics of Environment he an isolated individual, but of a member of
describes various kinds of aesthetic experi- several interlocking human communities.
ences in their somatic totality – the sights, Berleant also conceives of human community
sounds, smells, textures, and the bodily feel of itself in terms of an aesthetics of engagement.
places, along with the sense of movement and He believes that a participatory aesthetics of
passing time in our experience of them. Some sensual perception can help us transcend the
of the places he chooses are in nature, “Paddle usual ethical dichotomies of the isolated
on the Bantam River,” some in a social/cultural rational ego versus the dominating organic
setting, “Stroll through a Small Town,” and community in favor of an understanding of
some combine nature and machine, “A Spring community as a unifying experience of mutu-
Drive in the Rain.” What distinguishes ality and reciprocity. Berleant’s favored term
Berleant’s combination of narrative and evo- for the series of unities that constitute the total
cation from other nature writing is his way of aesthetic experience is continuity. Continuity
encouraging the reader’s own aesthetic unites not only the four aspects of aesthetic
encounters while at the same time articulating experience (perceiver, performer, artist, and
related issues for theoretical reflection. object), but also more broadly, person and
Although most of Berleant’s descriptions are place, body and environment, self and com-
drawn from the countryside and small towns, munity. Continuity is thus the ontological as
his analytic chapters give equal place to issues well as epistemological heart of Berleant’s
of urban ecology. The problem of turning the vision of aesthetics. As a result, Berleant gives
often-negative environment of our cities into a aesthetic experience a more exalted role in the
viable habitat by altering the fundamental life of both the individual and the community
values that drive city planning (or lack of it) than almost anyone since Friedrich Schiller.
leads Berleant to the useful idea of a negative
aesthetics. Central to such aesthetic reflection BIBLIOGRAPHY
is Berleant’s concept of aesthetic harm, which The Aesthetic Field: A Phenomenology of
consists in the various ways our profit and Aesthetic Experience (Springfield, Ill.,
efficiency dominated environments impoverish 1970).
sensory experience and fill our lives with “Toward a Phenomenological Aesthetics of
banality and simulacra. As a result, Berleant Environment,” in Descriptions, ed. Hugh
argues that the aesthetic appreciation and Silverman and Don Idhe (Albany, N.Y.,
critique of environment is at the same time a 1985), pp. 112–28.
moral critique, something he illustrates with a “The Historicity of Aesthetics,” British
chapter deconstructing Disneyland (1997, pp. Journal of Aesthetics 26 (1986): 101–11,
41–58). 195–203.
For Berleant, environmental aesthetics is not Art and Engagement (Philadelphia, 1991).
primarily about the experience of pleasure or The Aesthetics of Environment
beauty in nature, but concerns our total per- (Philadelphia, 1992).
216
BERNSTEIN
“Aesthetics and Community,” Journal of Further Reading

Value Inquiry 28 (1994): 257–72. Carlson, Allen. “Aesthetics and
Living in the Landscape: Towards an Engagement,” British Journal of Aesthetics
Aesthetic of Environment (Lawrence, 33 (1993): 220–27.
Kansas, 1997).
“Environmental Aesthetics,” in Larry Shiner
Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, ed. Michael
Kelly (New York, 1998), vol. 2, pp.
114–20.
“On Getting Along Beautifully: Ideas for a
Social Aesthetics,” in Aesthetics in the
Human Environment, ed. Pauline von BERNSTEIN, Richard Jacob (1932– )
Bonsdorff and Arto Haapala (Lahti,
Finland, 1999), pp. 12–29. Richard J. Bernstein was born on 14 May
“Embodied Music,” in Environment and the 1932 in New York City. He excelled in school,
Arts: Perspectives on Art and earning admission to the University of Chicago
Environment, ed. Arnold Berleant (New accelerated program for intellectually
York, 2002), pp. 143–55. advanced high school students. An interdisci-
plinary course integrating science and philos-
Other Relevant Works ophy taught by Joseph Schwab had an impact
“Artists and Morality: Toward an Ethics of upon him, and he also met Richard RORTY
Art,” Leonardo: The Journal of the there, which was the beginning of a lifelong
Contemporary Artist 10 (1977): 195–202. friendship and philosophical dialogue. After
“Subsidization of Art as Social Policy,” completing his BA in 1951 with honors in phi-
Journal of Behavioral Economics 7 losophy, he attended Columbia University as
(1979): 23–37. a way to solidify his credentials for attending
“Cultivating an Urban Aesthetic,” Diogenes graduate school. He earned a BS in 1953 and
136 (1986): 1–18. began his graduate philosophy at Yale the fol-
“Musical Decomposition,” in What is lowing year, earning his MA in 1953 and PhD
Music? ed. Philip Alperson (New York, in philosophy in 1958. While at Yale, Bernstein
1987), pp. 239–54. was again in the company of Rorty, and
“Aesthetic Perception in Environmental encountered the philosopher who had the
Design,” in Environmental Aesthetics: greatest influence upon him, Hegel, for the
Theory, Research, and Applications, ed. first time. It was also at this time that he began
Jack Nasar (Cambridge, UK, 1988), pp. serious study of John DEWEY under professor
84–97. John E. SMITH. Besides Smith, Paul WEISS and
“Beyond Disinterestedness: Prolegomenon to Wilfrid SELLARS were two of his main influ-
a Postmodern Aesthetics,” in Primum ences and interlocutors. From Weiss he learned
Philosophari, ed. Jolanta Brach-Czaina what it meant to be a “real” philosopher, and
(Warsaw, 1993), pp. 199–213. from Sellars he learned how to combine the
“Notes for a Phenomenology of Musical tools of analytic philosophy with a deep
Performance,” Philosophy of Music respect for, and knowledge of, the history of
Education Review 7 (1999): 73–9. philosophy. The climate at Yale at the time of
Ed., Environment and the Arts; Perspectives Bernstein’s education was one that fostered a
on Art and Environment (Aldershot, UK, respect for the history of philosophy and had
2002). not succumbed to the trends of logical empiri-
cism then sweeping through American
217
BERNSTEIN
graduate programs in philosophy. The force of John Dewey Society Award for outstanding
this powerful movement was certainly enough achievement; he was also the American
of a presence, however, that Bernstein’s dis- Philosophical Association Romanell Lecturer,
sertation on “John Dewey’s Metaphysics of and the Phi Beta Kappa Visiting Lecturer. He
Experience” can be read as bold counter-move was President of the Metaphysical Society of
to the fashionable tendencies and trends in America, the Charles S. Peirce Society, and the
Anglo-American analytic philosophy at the American Philosophical Association Eastern
time. Indeed, with such figures as Rorty and Division in 1988–9. His editorial positions began
Hilary PUTNAM, Bernstein is one of the figures at Yale when he took up the assistant editorial
primarily responsible for the resurgence of position of the Review of Metaphysics, becoming
American pragmatism. managing editor in 1964, a post he held until
Bernstein considers himself primarily and most 1971. In addition, he served as editor-in-chief of
importantly a teacher. He has held three main Praxis International (now Constellations) from
faculty posts. After spending a year as a Fulbright 1980 to 1984. He has served on the editorial
Lecturer at Hebrew University and finishing his boards of numerous journals, including the
dissertation, he returned to Yale as a philosophy Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society,
professor in 1959, where he remained until the Journal of Value Inquiry, and the Graduate
1965, when he was denied tenure in a contro- Faculty Philosophy Journal.
versial decision that led to student protest. After Bernstein’s career includes works in social
returning to Hebrew University for one year as and political philosophy, hermeneutics, phi-
a visiting professor, he was hired as professor losophy of natural and social science, pragma-
and chair of the philosophy department at tism, continental philosophy, psychoanalysis,
Haverford College in 1966, where he became the and a study on evil. The breadth of his writings
T. Wistar Brown Professor of Philosophy in is one of the more remarkable features of
1979. He moved to his current position as Vera Bernstein’s corpus. Outside of his book-length
List Professor of Philosophy at the New School treatments of these topics, his work includes in-
for Social Research in 1989, which is his current depth articles on such diverse figures as Hannah
position. In addition, Bernstein became Dean of ARENDT, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wilfrid Sellars,
the Graduate Faculty of (the renamed) New Charles TAYLOR, Emmanuel Levinas, Michel
School University in 2002. In addition to that at Foucault, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jürgen
Hebrew University, he held visiting professor- Habermas, Richard Rorty, Jacques Derrida,
ships at institutions including Catholic University Alasdair MACINTYRE, Martin Heidegger, John
of America, University of Pennsylvania, and McDowell, and Friedrich Nietzsche. Bernstein
Frankfurt University. From 1977 to 1984 he has also written articles on the mind–body
also served as co-director of an institute for phi- problem and scientific materialism. The engage-
losophy and social science in Dubrovnik in the ment with such a wide range of thinkers is
former Yugoslavia. weighted down by a commitment to what
Bernstein has been a fellow at the Institute for could be called immanent reconstructive
Advanced Study in Berlin, the Franz critique with an ethical purpose.
Rosenzweig Research Center in Jerusalem, and Bernstein’s writing career began by recover-
recipient of many fellowships including awards ing, analyzing, and sharply criticizing American
from National Endowment for the Humanities pragmatism, specifically Dewey and Charles
and the American Council of Learned Societies. PEIRCE. His first book, John Dewey (1966),
Recognition for his teaching has been wide- has served as a touchstone for scholars of
spread, earning him five distinguished teaching Dewey since, and his “Introduction” to John
awards, including some at a national level. Dewey: On Experience Nature and Freedom
Among many other awards are included the (1960) also remains a classic overview of
218
BERNSTEIN
Dewey’s thought. Bernstein’s presentation of also in The Restructuring of Social and Political
Dewey’s theory of quality is important, espe- Theory (1976) and Beyond Objectivism and
cially as this relates to a pragmatic theory of Relativism (1983), in the Hegelian mode of
experience and its consequences for such topics immanent critique. Bernstein presents the posi-
as value theory and philosophy of science. tions of his chosen interlocutors to bring out
Bernstein’s article “John Dewey’s Metaphysics tensions in their own work that they often
of Experience” (1961) has served as more of a remain blind to, resist, or overtly deny. In
lightning rod than a touchstone, as thinkers addition, he brings into conversation widely
are still grappling with an unresolved dualism separated philosophical positions and schools,
in Dewey’s work between the metaphysics of arguing that they share much more than their
existence and the metaphysics of experience. respective practitioners think, and that they
Bernstein argued that though Dewey did differ in ways to which they are equally blind.
perhaps more than any other American philoso- Praxis and Action offers what Dewey might
pher to work out a philosophy that does justice have called the “criticism of criticisms.”
to the richness and depth of human experience, Bernstein’s goal is the reconstruction and devel-
there still remains a tension in his philosophy. opment of the nineteenth and twentieth-cen-
This tension lay in one of his most important turies’ leading conceptions of praxis and action,
concepts, “quality.” Dewey’s use of this concept reorganizing our contemporary reflective
in reconstructing philosophy is a pillar of his position in articulating a theory of action. This
project. Yet his attempted reconciliation of the is done specifically in light of the fragmentation
seemingly subjective, qualitative dimensions of of philosophical approaches to action in the
the phenomenological pole of experience with twentieth century. Bernstein’s views of four dif-
the real, objective “generic traits of existence” ferent approaches to actions are critical, yet
remains unconvincing, separated by a “deep retrieve the contribution to understanding
crack.” In addition his commentary on the human action and the praxis of understanding
deficits of Peirce’s emphasis on community, as human action that they make. He argues that
that force which ends up determining what is there is a solipsism and unavoidable nihilism in
considered reality, is too strong. Regarding Kierkegaard’s and Sartre’s existentialism,
Peirce, in “Action, Conduct, and Self-Control” respectively, though they provide a rich account
(in 1965) Bernstein argues that Peirce’s concep- of human subjectivity. The pernicious forms
tion of the individual as the repository of error of a priorism that run through analytic philoso-
and ignorance, of the emergence of the individ- phers’ theory of action that presents itself
ual as the result of error is wrongheaded by unselfconsciously as “the final solution” to all
overemphasizing the negativity of emergent indi- philosophical problems of action degenerates
viduality. While Peirce is right to emphasize the for Bernstein into ideological posturing at its
fundamental inextricability, or co-constitutive worst. However, analytic philosophy also
character of the community and the individual, provides conceptual clarification at its best, dis-
he does not do justice to the positive dimension solving the pseudo-scientific claims of previous
of the subjective side of this dialectic. theories and their faulty ontological biases.
In his books during the 1970s and 1980s, Marx provides a penetrating understanding of
Bernstein exemplifies this commitment to the socially embedded nature of human sub-
immanent critique. Hegel’s influence is evident jectivity and action, even if he neglects the main
in these works, especially in Praxis and Action strengths that American pragmatism provides:
(1971), where the concept of action is traced a critical account of the norms of inquiry.
from Marx in the “Hegelian background” to Bernstein remarks that each of these strands of
disputes in existentialism, pragmatism, and philosophical inquiry can be combined to
analytic philosophy. The influence of Hegel is enlighten and deepen the others.
219
BERNSTEIN
The Restructuring of Social and Political intellectual practices, and our ethical commit-
Theory takes a similar approach by presenting ments. The question of rationality is a main
the metatheoretical framework of four different focus in hermeneutics, philosophy of natural
schools of social and political theory. Here and social science, critical theory, Rorty’s neo-
Bernstein is perhaps most explicitly critical of pragmatism, and Hannah Arendt’s reflections
empirical social science and its confused com- on judgment. Bernstein, in a vein similar to
mitment to a hypostatized version of the some of the writings of Dewey, reconstructs the
fact–value distinction. While acknowledging seemingly diametrically opposed and irrecon-
the work of some of the major empiricist social cilable concepts of objectivism and relativism
scientists and philosophers with regard to this by denying the legitimacy of the terms. He casts
thorny problem, clearly the influence of logical the former as “the basic conviction that there
empiricism has left mainstream empirical social is or must be some permanent ahistorical
science blind to the ways in which it behaves matrix or framework to which we can ulti-
ideologically, as opposed to dialogically. The mately appeal in determining the nature of
three other schools of social and political theory rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness
– ordinary language analysis, phenomenology, or rightness” (1983, p. 8). The objectivist insists
and critical theory – criticize it for just this on a notion of objectivity that would eliminate
blindness. Bernstein remains staunchly com- from it any trace of human subjectivity, his-
mitted to the irreducibly intentional aspect of toricity, or sociality. Bernstein takes this objec-
describing and explaining human actions, tivist task to be not only impossible, but a dis-
against those who would map the methodology tortion of how our concept of objectivity
of natural science and its categories of obser- emerges and works. He traces the insistence
vation onto human phenomena in its totality. on this chimerical notion of objectivity, “objec-
However, he also claims that his emphasis on tivism,” to a certain reading of Descartes. He
intentionality, so well formulated in the phe- terms it the “Cartesian Anxiety,” an anxiety
nomenological tradition, is not incompatible that produces the false antinomy between an
with the critical theoretical point that the objectivity dependent for its validity on an algo-
sources of our intentions are often the products rithmic methodology of science and a method-
of forces outside of our control and opaque to ological relativism that Paul FEYERABEND disin-
us, either internally or externally. However, genuously characterizes under the dictum
Bernstein does not hold that recent critical “anything goes.” Relativism entails that “there
theory, exemplified by the work of Habermas, can be no higher appeal than to a given con-
has succeeded in providing the foundations for ceptual scheme, language game, set of social
understanding and describing human action. practices, or historical epoch … there is no
Habermas’s slippage into quasi-transcenden- substantive overarching framework in which
tal postulates with regard to our knowledge radically different and alternative schemes are
claims does not, nor could it ever, receive the commensurable” (1983, p. 12).
full justificatory grounding it needs without Bernstein explores the debate about ratio-
falling into the kind of a priorism for which nality in its various guises, concluding that
Bernstein criticized analytic philosophy in there are elements to all inquiry that must be
Praxis and Action. taken into consideration; there are fallibilist,
The main argument of Beyond Objectivism contextualist, practical, and normative dimen-
and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and sions to scientific inquiry understood as a
Praxis concerns the convergence of themes in practice making theoretical claims. Bernstein
the investigation of rationality and the conse- understands the practical dimension to be
quences of a view of rationality for questions inflected with the Aristotelian understanding of
regarding the status of our truth-claims, our praxis. The practice of understanding is not
220
BERNSTEIN
merely a means to an end, but itself contains its choosing between good and evil is inscrutable
own end. This emphasis is crucial for working (2002, pp. 225–35).
out the normative character of inquiry, and While Bernstein’s work is committed to an
making knowledge of a scientific character a engaged, and open-ended pluralism, it is a plu-
communal practice that involves the norms of ralism checked by norms of critical self-reflec-
dialogue. His discussion of the philosophy of tion, committed to getting improved responses
science of Feyerabend, Imré Lakatos, and regarding the fundamental questions that dif-
Thomas K UHN , alongside Gadamer’s ferent theorists disagree upon through a dia-
hermeneutics, Habermas’s theory of commu- logical model or rational inquiry. Bernstein’s
nicative rationality, and Arendt’s implicit pluralism does not make the mistakes of what
theory of judgment, typifies the reconstructive he refers to in his American Philosophical
and dialogical pragmatism as displayed in Association Presidential address “Pragmatism,
Praxis and Action and The Restructuring of Pluralism, and the Healing of Wounds” as
Social and Political Theory. flabby, polemical, or defensive pluralism.
Bernstein’s recent work has taken up themes Bernstein’s philosophy is pragmatic insofar as
that have traditionally been seen, rightly or it is committed to anti-foundationalism and
wrongly, to suffer great neglect or even myopic the self-corrective character of inquiry; an irre-
oversight in the pragmatic tradition: religious ducibly social understanding of subjectivity;
identity and evil. The working out of the psy- fallibilism with regard to all cognitive, practi-
choanalytic dimensions of community identity cal, and moral claims; and engaged pluralism in
as passed down through tradition serves as one grappling with the varied approaches to philo-
of the main focal points of his work on Freud’s sophical questions and what counts as a philo-
Moses and Monotheism, relating it to Freud’s sophical question. Bernstein is committed to a
own Jewish identity. His meditations on nonskeptical fallibilism with regard to moral
Hannah Arendt and Judaism exhibit sensitivity and epistemological issues; a critical faith in
to the religious dimensions of the life of a self- democratic means and ends; methodological
proclaimed pariah. His work on religious pluralism in intellectual practices; and a deep
themes, which includes a reflection on John commitment to interdisciplinary cross-fertil-
Paul II’s encyclical on the relationship between ization, to what he has referred to as the “uni-
faith and reason, Fide et Ratio, has been widely versal discourse” common to intelligent reflec-
recognized in circles outside of philosophy by tion on fundamental questions of our human
theology scholars and students of religion. The existence. To deny the connections that exist
ethical character of philosophy, and of all between different approaches to these ques-
thinking, is given a grave reading in Radical tions is not just an intellectual mistake, falling
Evil (2002). There he says, in a typically prag- prey to Popper’s “myth of the framework”
matic fashion, that though evil can never be based on a lack of dialogical dexterity. Rather,
given a full conceptual articulation and that it Bernstein claims that this is primarily an ethical
is “inscrutable,” there nonetheless remains a failure as philosophers, and as fellow human
responsibility to grapple with the problem as beings. We should be engaged, fallibilist plu-
best we can, to perform a kind of ongoing ernst ralists in inquiry understood as a fundamentally
der begriff: a labor of the concept of “evil.” His communal, ethical, dialogical, and open-ended
theses for further reflection on the problem project.
include rethinking the concept of responsibility;
evil is a concept with no singular essence and BIBLIOGRAPHY
exists in plural forms; evil resists total compre- John Dewey (New York, 1966).
hension even and especially in theodicies that Praxis and Action (Philadelphia, 1971).
attempt to justify it; and the ultimate ground for The Restructuring of Social and Political
221
BERNSTEIN
Theory (New York, 1976). “Metaphysics, Critique, and Utopia,” Review

Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, of Metaphysics 42 (1988): 255–74.
Hermeneutics and Praxis (Philadelphia, “Interpretation and Solidarity: An Interview
1983). with Richard Bernstein by Dunja Melcic,”
Philosophical Profiles: Essays in a Pragmatic Praxis International 9 (1989): 201–19.
Mode (Philadelphia, 1986). “Pragmatism, Pluralism, and the Healing of
The New Constellation: The Ethical-political Wounds,” Proceedings and Addresses of
Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity the American Philosophical Association 63
(Cambridge, Mass., 1992). (November 1989): 5–18.
Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question “Social Theory as Critique,” in Social Theory
(Cambridge, Mass., 1996). of Modern Societies: Anthony Giddens and
Freud and the Legacy of Moses (Cambridge, his Critics, ed. D. Held and J. B.
UK, 1998). Thompson (Cambridge, UK, 1990).
Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation “The Lure of the Ideal,” in Peirce and Law,
(Cambridge, UK, 2002). ed. Roberta Kavelson (New York, 1991).
“The Resurgence of American Pragmatism,”
Other Relevant Works Social Research 59 (1992): 813–40.
“Knowledge, Value, and Freedom,” in John “Richard Rorty’s Philosophical Papers,”
Dewey and the Experimental Spirit in Journal of the British Society for
Philosophy, ed. Charles Hendel (New Phenomenology 23 (1992): 76–83.
York, 1960). “Hans Jonas: Rethinking Responsibility,”
Ed., John Dewey: On Experience, Nature, Social Research 61 (1994): 833–52.
and Freedom (New York, 1960). “American Pragmatism: The Conflict of
“John Dewey’s Metaphysics of Experience,” Narratives,” in Rorty and Pragmatism, ed.
Journal of Philosophy 57 (1961): 5–14. Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. (Nashville, Tenn.,
Ed., Perspectives on Peirce (New Haven, 1995), pp. 54–67.
Conn., 1965). “Whatever Happened to Naturalism?”
“Philosophy in the Conversation of Proceedings and Addresses of the
Mankind,” Review of Metaphysics 33 American Philosophical Association 69
(1980): 745–76. (November 1995): 57–76.
Ed., Habermas and Modernity (Oxford, “Are We Beyond the Enlightenment
1985). Horizon?” in Knowledge and Belief in
“The Meaning of Public Life,” in Religion America, ed. W. M. Shea and P. A. Huff
and American Public Life, ed. R. W. Lovin (Cambridge, 1995).
(New York, 1986). “The Retrieval of the Democratic Ethos,”
“Structuration as Critical Theory,” Praxis Cardoza Law Review 17 (1996): 1127–46.
International 6 (1986): 235–49. “Community in the Pragmatic Tradition,” in
“One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward: The Revival of Pragmatism: New Essays
Richard Rorty on Liberal Democracy and on Social Thought, Law, and Culture, ed.
Philosophy,” Political Theory 15 (1987): Morris Dickstein (Durham, N.C., 1998),
538–63. pp. 141–56.
“The Varieties of Pluralism,” American “Faire la part de ce qui sépare Rorty et
Journal of Education 95 (1987): 509–25. Habermas et se situer dans l’entre-deux,”
“Hermeneutics and Its Anxieties,” in La Modernité en Question: De Rorty à
Proceedings of the American Catholic Jürgen Habermas, ed. Françoise Gaillard,
Philosophical Association 62 (1988): Jacques Poulain, and Richard Schusterman
58–70. (Paris, 1998).
222
BERRY
“Faith and Reason: Response to Pope John 15 (1987): 564–80.

Paul II’s encyclical letter, Fides et Ratio,” “Symposium on Praxis and Action,”
Books and Culture: A Christian Review Philosophy Forum 14 (December 1974).
(July–August 1999).
“Creative Democracy – The Task Still Before Brendan Hogan
Us,” American Journal of Theology and
Philosophy 21 (2000): 215–28.
“Religion and Public Life: Engaged
Pluralism,” Modern Schoolman 78 (2001):
189–98.
“The Constellation of Hermeneutics, Critical BERRY, Wendell Erdman (1934– )
Theory, and Deconstruction,” in The
Cambridge Companion to Gadamer, ed. Wendell Berry was born on 5 August 1934
R. J. Dostal (Cambridge, UK, 2002). near New Castle in Henry County, Kentucky.
“McDowell’s Domesticated Hegelianism,” in He received his degrees in English (BA 1956,
Reading McDowell on Mind and World, MA 1957) from the University of Kentucky.
ed. Nicholas H. Smith (London, 2002). Berry taught English at Georgetown College
“Pragmatism’s Common Faith,” in in Kentucky (1957–8), was a teaching fellow
Pragmatism and Religion, ed. Stuart at the Creative Writing Center at Stanford
Rosenbaum (Urbana, Ill., 2003). University (1958–60), studied in Europe on a
“Rorty’s Inspirational Liberalism,” in Guggenheim Fellowship (1961–2), and then
Richard Rorty, ed. Charles Guignon and taught at New York University (1962–4). He
David Hiley (Cambridge, UK, 2003). became professor of English at the University
of Kentucky in 1964, and began reviving the
Further Reading Lanes Landing Farm in Port Royal which has
Comp Amer Thought, Pres Addr of APA v9 been his family’s for five generations. In 1971
Benhabib, Seyla, and Nancy Fraser, eds. Berry became Distinguished Professor of
Pragmatism, Critique, Judgment: Essays English at Kentucky, and in that year he was
for Richard J. Bernstein (Cambridge, awarded the National Institute of Arts and
Mass., 2004). Letters Literary Award, the first of many pres-
Couture, Tony. “Bernstein, McCarthy and tigious awards including the T. S. Eliot
the Evolution of Critical Theory,” Award, the Lannan Literary Award for
Philosophy and Social Criticism 19 (1993): Nonfiction, the Vachel Lindsay Prize, and
59–75. honorary degrees. In 1977 Berry resigned to
Margolis, Joseph. “Objectivism and pursue full-time farming and writing. He
Relativism,” Proceedings of the returned occasionally to offer courses such as
Aristotelian Society 85 (1985): 171–91. “Readings in Agriculture” and “Composition
McCarthy, Thomas. “The Differences That for Teachers” from 1987 until 1993, when he
Make a Difference: A Comment on resumed the private life of farming that
Richard Bernstein,” in Proceedings of the demonstrates his moral and political com-
1982 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy mitments.
of Science Association, vol. 2, ed. P. D. Berry is the most sophisticated author in
Asquith and T. Nickles (East Lansing, the long Southern agrarian tradition. He has
Mich., 1983). developed a comprehensive philosophical
Rorty, Richard. “Thugs and Theorists: A defense of the superior value of rural and
Reply to Bernstein’s ‘One Step Forward, agricultural culture. This defense includes the
Two Steps Backward’,” Political Theory development of a holistic environmentalism
223
BERRY
of diverse and sustainable agriculture, and BIBLIOGRAPHY

an analysis of the economic sustainability of Farming: A Handbook (New York, 1970).
local communities. To accomplish these envi- A Continuous Harmony: Essays Cultural
ronmental and economic aims, Berry argues and Agricultural (New York, 1972).
that the welfare of the region must be prior- The Unsettling of America: Culture and
itized over any greater territory such as state Agriculture (San Francisco, 1977).
or country, even if the advantages of heavy The Gift of Good Land: Further Essays
industrialization and mass-market capitalism Cultural and Agricultural (San Francisco,
must be surrendered. Most of these advan- 1981).
tages are illusory in Berry’s view, in light of Recollected Essays, 1965–1980 (San
the obvious and hidden costs to the individ- Francisco, 1981).
ual good in the short run and to the collective Home Economics: Fourteen Essays (San
good of humanity on this planet in the long Francisco, 1987).
run. Berry exposes, as past American social- What Are People For? (San Francisco,
ists and agrarians have emphasized, how the 1990).
values taught by capitalism – individualism, Standing on Earth: Selected Essays
greed, and competition – have threatened (Ipswich, UK, 1991).
earth’s ecosystems, impoverished the human Sex, Economy, Freedom and Community
spirit, and devalued democratic power. Berry (New York, 1993).
would not eliminate either technology or Another Turn of the Crank: Essays
industrial production to live like the Old- (Washington, D.C., 1995).
Order Amish (although he has been inspired A World Lost (Washington, D.C., 1997).
by their way of life), but he does insist that Citizenship Papers: Essays (Washington,
only limited and careful use of machines is D.C., 2003).
compatible with agrarianism. Likewise, Berry
would not eliminate the capitalist mode of Other Relevant Works
production for profit in favor of the planned Nathan Coulter (Boston, 1960).
or command economies of communism, but November Twenty-six, Nineteen Hundred
he does expect local production to place Sixty-three (New York, 1964).
priority upon local needs. The Long-legged House (New York, 1969).
Berry’s philosophy is religiously grounded The Hidden Wound (Boston, 1970).
and politically radical. From the standpoint of Standing by Words: Essays (San Francisco,
religion, people should live in harmonious 1983).
and cooperative community with both nature The Collected Poems, 1957–1983 (San
and society. From the standpoint of morality, Francisco, 1985).
people should place social relationships and Life Is a Miracle: An Essay Against Modern
group welfare above personal profit. And Superstition (Washington, D.C., 2001).
from the standpoint of politics, people should The Art of the Commonplace: The Agrarian
organize into community blocks with wide Essays of Wendell Berry, ed. Norman
powers over local affairs. Berry’s vision of Wirzba (Washington, D.C., 2002).
decentralized and socialist democracy resem-
bles both Thomas Jefferson’s agricultural Further Reading
republicanism that seeks virtuous citizens Cambridge Dict Amer Bio
capable of exercising political power and Angyal, Andrew J. Wendell Berry (New
John D EWEY ’s socialist democracy that York, 1995).
permits legislation over economic affairs by Cornell, Daniel. “A Vision of Stewardship:
the educated public. Wendell Berry’s Ecological Ethic,”
224
BERTALANFFY
Literature and Belief 12 (1992): 13–25. reductively understood as merely the result of
Freedman, Russell. Wendell Berry: A the interactions of their physical parts. In 1934
Bibliography (Lexington, Kent., 1998). he received his habilitation for the first volume
Gamble, David E. “Wendell Berry: The of his Theoretische Biologie, and became a
Mad Farmer and Wilderness,” Kentucky Privatdozent at the University of Vienna. From
Review 8 (Summer 1988): 40–52. 1939 to 1948 Bertalanffy was professor of
Goodrich, Janet. The Unforeseen Self in the zoology at Vienna, where he conducted pio-
Works of Wendell Berry (Columbia, neering research into cancer growth.
Missouri, 2001). In 1949 Bertalanffy accepted the position
Merchant, Paul, ed. Wendell Berry of professor of biology at McGill University in
(Lanham, Md., 1991). Montréal, Canada, and he also was director of
Smith, Kimberly K. Wendell Berry and the research at the Faculty of Medicine of the
Agrarian Tradition: A Common Grace University of Ottawa until 1952. From 1954
(Lawrence, Kent., 2003). until 1958 he was a professor at the Center for
Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences in
John R. Shook Stanford, California, and co-director of bio-
logical research at Mount Sinai Hospital in
Los Angeles. From 1958 to 1961 he was Alfred
P. Sloan Visiting Professor at the Menninger
Foundation in Topeka, Kansas. In 1961
Bertalanffy founded the Center for Advanced
BERTALANFFY, Karl Ludwig von Studies in Theoretical Psychology at the
(1901–72) University of Alberta in Edmonton, and in
1966 he became professor of theoretical
Ludwig von Bertalanffy was born on 19 biology at Alberta. From 1969 until his death
September 1901 in Atzgerdorf near Vienna, he was professor of theoretical biology at State
Austria. He studied the history of art, philos- University of New York at Buffalo. Bertalanffy
ophy, and biology at the University of was an honorary fellow of the American
Innsbruck and the University of Vienna. At Psychiatric Association; a member of the
Vienna his teachers included Moritz Schlick Deutsche Akademie der Naturforscher; a
and Robert Reininger, and after writing a dis- fellow of the International Academy of
sertation about German physicist and philoso- Cytology; and a fellow of the American
pher Gustav Theodor Fechner, he received his Academy of Arts and Science. Bertalanffy died
PhD in philosophy in 1926. Although he on 12 June 1972 in Buffalo, New York.
attended meetings of the Vienna Circle with Bertalanffy’s most important achievements in
Schlick, Bertalanffy rejected positivism, both biology include his work on the physiology of
mechanistic and vitalistic accounts of life, and metabolism and growth and on the laws of
all forms of reductionism, seeking instead a biological growth and adaptation. On his
naturalistic view of life that preserved a special theory of biology, living organisms dynami-
scientific status for living systems. Bertalanffy cally maintain adaptive structures far from
continued to study biology and philosophy equilibrium. With Ilya Prigogine, who also con-
of biology and published Kritische Theorie jectured on nonequilibrium thermodynamics
der Formbildung (Modern Theories of around the same time, Bertalanffy was among
Development) in 1928, which proposed an the most important theoretical biologists of his
organismic system theory. Biological organ- time. He developed a dynamic theory of sta-
isms should be studied as self-organizational tionary open systems, designed a General
and openly dynamic systems that cannot be System Theory valid for any theoretical scien-
225
BERTALANFFY
tific modeling, and made major contributions Humanistic Psychology 6 (1966):

to the emerging field of cognitive psychology. 113–38.
His holistic and pragmatic epistemology offered “Evolution: Chance or Law,” in Beyond
a viable alternative to the positivism and neobe- Reductionism, ed. A. Koestler and J. R.
haviorism of the mid-twentieth century. Smithies (London, 1969), pp. 59–84.
Bertalanffy, together with Kenneth Boulding,
Jim Miller, Anatol RAPOPORT, and others, Further Reading
founded the Society for General Systems Dict Economics, Who Was Who in Amer
Research (now the International Society for the v6
Systems Sciences) in 1954. Davidson, Mark. Uncommon Sense: The
Life and Thought of Ludwig von
BIBLIOGRAPHY Bertalanffy (1901–1972), Father of
Kritische Theorie der Formbildung (Berlin, General Systems Theory (Los Angeles,
1928). Trans. J. H. Woodger, Modern 1983).
Theories of Development: An Gray, William, and Nicholas D. Rizzo, eds.
Introduction to Theoretical Biology Unity Through Diversity: A Festschrift
(Oxford, 1933; New York, 1962). for Ludwig von Bertalanffy, 2 vols (New
Theoretische Biologie, 2 vols (Berlin, 1932, York, 1973).
1940). Laszlo, Ervin. Introduction to Systems
Das Gefüge des Lebens (Leipzig, 1937). Philosophy: Toward a New Paradigm of
Vom Molekül zur Organismenwelt Contemporary Thought (New York,
(Potsdam, 1940). 1972).
Das biologische Weltbild (Bern, 1949). ———, ed. The Relevance of General
Trans. Problems of Life: An Evaluation Systems Theory: Papers Presented to
of Modern Biological Thought (New Ludwig von Bertalanffy on His
York, 1952; 1960). Seventieth Birthday (New York, 1972).
Biophysik des Fliessgleichgewichts, with W.
Beier and R. Laue (Braunschweig, 1953; John R. Shook
2nd edn 1977).
Robots, Men and Minds: Psychology in the
Modern World (New York, 1967).
General System Theory: Foundations,
Development, Applications (New York,
1968). BERTOCCI, Peter Anthony (1910–89)
The Organismic Psychology and Systems
Theory (Worcester, Mass., 1968). Peter Anthony Bertocci was born on 13 May
Perspectives on General Systems Theory: 1910 in Gaeta, Italy, and died on 13 October
Scientific-philosophical Studies, ed. Edgar 1989 in Boston, Massachusetts. Soon after his
Taschdjian (New York, 1975). birth, he and his elder brother, Angelo, were
A Systems View of Man, ed. Paul A. brought by their mother to join their father in
LaViolette (Boulder, Col., 1981). Somerville, Massachusetts, where Peter and
his two brothers and three sisters were raised
Other Relevant Works in abject poverty. He completed his BA degree
“An Outline of General Systems Theory,” with honors in philosophy and a minor in psy-
British Journal for the Philosophy of chology at Boston University in 1931, and was
Science 1 (1950): 139–64. elected to Phi Beta Kappa. In 1932, he earned
“Mind and Body Re-examined,” Journal of his MA in psychology from Harvard
226
BERTOCCI
University, working primarily with Gordon sonality and seeking to live a good life in the
ALLPORT and also influenced by Alfred North world of persons, both human and Divine.
WHITEHEAD, Ralph Barton PERRY, William Bertocci’s personalistic metaphysics shares
Ernest HOCKING, and Clarence Irving LEWIS. In many points of contact with the philosophies
1935 he completed his PhD in philosophy at of Bowne and Brightman. Bertocci agrees with
Boston University under Edgar Sheffield Bowne’s and Brightman’s criticisms of scien-
BRIGHTMAN, with supervision by Frederick R. tific materialism’s mechanical model of the
Tennant at the University of Cambridge. His universe. He maintains that the mechanistic
dissertation was titled “The Empirical materialists do not account adequately for the
Argument for God in Late British Thought” “appearance, survival, and development of
and focused on the place of person and living beings, and the appearance and contin-
personal values in the understanding of the uance of self-conscious, free, moral persons”
universe. Harvard University Press published it (1951, p. 355). In addition, the acceptance of
in 1938 with a foreword by Tennant. the mechanistic materialistic hypothesis
Bertocci began his teaching career with an requires more faith than the acceptance of the
appointment at Bates College in Maine from hypothesis that the universe is the expression
1935 to 1944, where he primarily taught psy- of a great Living Agency. Bertocci also finds
chology. Bertocci was invited to join the the personalistic hypothesis of an intelligent
department of philosophy at Boston University cosmic mind to be more empirically coherent
in 1944, and taught part-time in psychology as than the mechanistic model, given that the per-
well. Following the death of Brightman in sonalistic hypothesis accounts more adequately
1953, Bertocci was appointed Borden Parker for “the data of the physical, biological, and
Bowne Professor of Philosophy at Boston social sciences … [as well as that] of the moral
University, the position he held until his retire- life” (1951, p. 357).
ment in 1975. Bertocci was a Fulbright For Bertocci, reality is not simply the
Research Scholar in Italy in 1950–51, and product of blind chance; reality includes pur-
again in 1960–61 in India. Bertocci was a posive elements. Bertocci accepts the evolu-
Guggenheim Fellow in 1968–9. He was tionary hypothesis concerning the develop-
President of both the Metaphysical Society of ment of life in nature as being the most empir-
America and the American Theological ically coherent explanation of the method by
Association. He was an active member of the which nature and human beings are created,
American Philosophical Association and the but evolution explains very little about the
Personalist Discussion Group. cause of creation. Concerning the cause of
A third-generation Boston personalist, after creation, Bertocci accepts the personalistic
Borden Parker B OWNE and Brightman, hypothesis of a Cosmic Person based on the
Bertocci’s primary philosophical interests criterion of empirical coherence. This is not to
included personalistic metaphysics, philoso- be confused with a contention that the empir-
phy of religion, ethics, psychology, and human ical evidence proves the existence of a personal
sexuality. He was attracted to Boston person- creator God, rather he maintains that the per-
alism for its focus on living a meaningful life, sonalistic hypothesis makes better sense of the
and a practical application of philosophy to life empirical data related to creation than any
can be seen in Bertocci’s commitment to other hypothesis he has considered.
applying philosophy to individual and social Bertocci hypothesizes that the Cosmic
behavior and to questions of human persons’ Person, or God, is the unity of change that
relationship with other persons and with the grounds the dependent order and change of
Cosmic Person, God. For Bertocci, philoso- nature. He finds it plausible that the various
phy is about learning how to become a full per- and changing aspects of the universe are
227
BERTOCCI
grounded in the activity of a cosmic Will. The logically real. They function as substance-
Cosmic Person energizes the inorganic causes, i.e., they are more than mere effects of
space–time world and interacts with the some other underlying cause. This leaves open
myriad forms of life that the Cosmic Person the possibility that although we know the sub-
creates and sustains. Nonmental nature is part personal selves as phenomenally spatial, the
of the activity and expression of the mind of subpersonal selves may not be merely phe-
God, but God is not nature alone. nomenal themselves. Thus, unlike Bowne,
The worlds of values and facts are held Bertocci asserts the ontological reality of sub-
together by the Supreme Mind, who is “the personal selves, and he extends the notion of
ultimate source of values, persons, and nature” selfhood all the way down to, but not includ-
(1951, p. 298). The mechanical model ing, the inorganic world (1956, p. 225).
provides no coherent account of the interrela- Bertocci’s organic panpsychism is a signif-
tionship of these various aspects of reality. icant development in the Boston personalist
Our own consciousness is the only thing we tradition and has positive implications for
experience that interrelates these various understanding the intrinsic value of nature.
aspects into a unified whole. For Bertocci and Whereas the inorganic world may be seen as
the other Boston personalists, it is more plau- possessing only instrumental value, Bertocci
sible to hypothesize that something analogous recognizes the intrinsic value of all organic
to our experience of mind, or consciousness, existence, especially sentient existence. For
holds the totality of the universe together than Bertocci, the seat of value seems to reside in
to accept the mechanistic hypothesis that the the experience of all life and not solely in the
universe is the chance product of matter in personal experience of human beings or other
motion. Bertocci hypothesizes that the interpersonal beings in the universe. Bertocci
relationship of matter, life, mind, and human supports Albert Schweitzer’s insistence on
values is grounded in the activity of a personal “reverence for life,” and he maintains that
God, a Cosmic Consciousness. “mere existence, be it of animals or of human
As the context in which human persons think beings, is not to be taken lightly” (Personality
and act and realize their ideal values, nature is and the Good, 1963, p. 333). Bertocci rec-
obviously instrumentally valuable for persons ognizes that we ought not to destroy any
according to Bertocci. What then of the intrin- sentient being without good reasons to do
sic value of nature? Here it is important to note so.
Bertocci’s distinction between the organic and Although Bertocci recognizes that subper-
inorganic (living and nonliving) in nature. sonal selves possess a degree of autonomy and
Bertocci agrees with Bowne and Brightman therefore intrinsic value, the person is, for
that the inorganic world we experience as “the Bertocci, the key metaphysical principle, and
spatial universe is the nonspatial activity of the development of personality and personal
cosmic Will” (1956, p. 223). God’s activity in values is the key ethical task. Bertocci makes a
the inorganic world functions as the patterned significant contribution to Boston personal-
and purposeful context in which subpersonal ism by moving beyond Bowne’s and
selves and persons act with various degrees of Brightman’s Cartesian views of the person.
autonomy – the more personal the self, the Bertocci explicitly rejects a mind/body dualism
more autonomous the activity. and affirms both consciousness and uncon-
Unlike Brightman, Bertocci maintains that sciousness as belonging to the person. He does
every conative unity, including living cells, pos- not consider the person to be a mental sub-
sesses selfhood. We experience the activity of stance, which by definition would entail that it
these conative unities as phenomenal reality, is separate from physical substance. Instead
but the conative unities themselves are onto- of being two un-relatable substances, mind
228
BERTOCCI
and body are viewed as two manifestations of ‘world’-focus is clear) to self-conscious, pur-
the one person. Bertocci refuses to reify the poseful organization of telic tendency” (1970,
abstractions of mind and body into substances, p. 63).
and instead he views them as having their unity Bertocci’s view of personal mentality allows
in personal experience. Not only does Bertocci one to view human persons as having much
reject the notion of the person as a mental more in common with nonhuman animals than
substance, he rejects the notion of a substan- does the thought of Bowne and Brightman. By
tive self altogether. In Bertocci’s view, the self affirming that the various phases of mentality
does not have, but instead is its experiences. are part of the total experience of the person,
The self is what it is doing; it is not a substance Bertocci rejects equating personhood with self-
that possesses experiences. conscious awareness, thus leaving the door
Bertocci affirms both consciousness and open to speak of nonhuman persons who do
unconsciousness as belonging to the person. not possess self-consciousness, but who may
Both aspects of mentality are part of person’s experience other levels of mentality. Bertocci’s
activities as a whole. By affirming uncon- understanding of the person allows for conti-
sciousness as part of the person, Bertocci parts nuity between human consciousness and
with Brightman’s view that the unconscious is nonhuman experience. This is an explicit rejec-
no part of the self. Yet by affirming the “will- tion of Cartesian dualism and its many negative
agency” of the person, that is the ability of the ecological implications. From Bertocci’s per-
person to choose, Bertocci is in deep disagree- spective, human persons are no longer viewed
ment with behaviorism and any other form of as existing on a completely different plane of
reductionistic psychology of the person. Any reality than nonhuman life. Human persons
proposition about the human person or about share some similar experiences with the
reality as whole must be based upon the totality nonhuman world, and all forms of life share a
of human experience, and the totality of human dependence on the natural environment. In this
experience includes both consciousness and view of reality, there may be various levels of
unconsciousness, both mind and body. consciousness and experience and more or less
Bertocci’s affirmation of both consciousness developed personalities, but there need not be
and unconsciousness belonging to the I allows any radical ontological separations among
him to account more readily for the identity of various aspects of the community of life.
the person through periods of unconsciousness For Bertocci, the ethical task of the person in
and in various levels of mentality. Bertocci the community of life is to balance human
moves away from focusing solely on the cog- values in relation to the values of sentient exis-
nitive activities of personality and emphasizes tence. Each person experiences a symphony of
the essentially conative activities of various values of greater and lesser worth and
feeling–emoting–desiring. Bertocci claims “that is faced with the challenge of orchestrating this
telic-conative processes are broader, though symphony in the most harmonious way
still mental, than the cognitive functions that possible. Bertocci asserts that harmonious
persist in them” (1970, p. 62). The person is a orchestration necessitates achieving optimum
unity of telic processes that may not at all times quality of value without sacrificing variety. The
entail self-conscious awareness. Bertocci morally responsible person ought to attempt
suggests a polar nature of the mental life of “to protect a maximum-optimum of value
human beings rather than a clear dichotomy of experience in as many value bearers, or persons,
cognitive and conative activities. He defines as possible” (1970, p. 192). This entails finding
“the essence of mentality at the human level as the most satisfying values that “also support the
the range of telic tendency, from minimal pur- maximum of other values and, at the same
posive striving (in which ‘self’-focus nor time, encourage the creation of value” (1970,
229
BERTOCCI
p. 192). Persons ought to seek a creative Why Believe in God? (New York, 1963).
harmony of values in which personal values Sex, Love, and the Person (New York,
are maximized while at the same time con- 1967).
tributing to value in general. Bertocci claims The Person God Is (London and New York,
that persons should seek, “like Whitehead’s 1970).
God, to see that nothing worthwhile is lost” Is God for Real? (New York, 1971).
(Personality and the Good, 1963, pp. 357–8). The Goodness of God (Washington, D.C.,
From Bertocci’s perspective the ecological 1981).
context may be seen as the community in which The Person and Primary Emotions (New
all values are realized, be they human values or York, 1988).
values of sentient existents. Bertocci also
emphasizes the importance of the ecological Other Relevant Works
context for the experience of rich human value Bertocci’s papers are at Boston University.
experience. For Bertocci, the values that human “The Person as the Key Metaphysical
persons experience are the “joint products of Principle,” Philosophy and
human nature in commerce with the total envi- Phenomenological Research 17 (1956):
ronment” (1970, p. 193). The quality of values 207–25.
experienced by human persons is dependent Ed. with Jannette E. Newhall and Robert S.
“on the potential for values in human nature as Brightman, Person and Reality (New York,
a whole and in the nurturant environment” 1958).
(Personality and the Good, 1963, p. 357). “Towards a Metaphysics of Creation,” Review
Without a rich and diverse natural environ- of Metaphysics 17 (1964): 493–510.
ment, the possibility of enjoyable human and Ed., Mid-Twentieth Century American
nonhuman value experiences is greatly dimin- Philosophy (New York, 1974).
ished. By affirming that one ought to always “Why Personalistic Idealism?” Idealistic
consider the consequences on all beings before Studies 10 (1980): 181–98.
promoting values for oneself, Bertocci provides “Reflections on the Experience of ‘Oughting’,”
an ethical stance that is supportive of an eco- in The Boston Personalist Tradition of
logical ethic that considers the importance of Philosophy, Social Ethics, and Theology, ed.
ecological systems in providing a context for Paul Deats and Carol Robb (Macon,
rich value experience, while in no way dimin- Georgia, 1986), pp. 209–19.
ishing the value of human persons.
Further Reading
BIBLIOGRAPHY Amer Nat Bio, Amer Phils 1950–2000, Proc of
The Empirical Argument for God in Late APA v63, Who’s Who in Phil
British Thought (Cambridge, Mass., Allport, Gordon W. “Peter Bertocci:
1938). Philosopher-Psychologist,” Philosophical
The Human Venture in Sex, Love, and Forum (Boston) 21 (1963–4): 3–7.
Marriage (New York, 1949). Buford, Thomas O., and Harold H. Oliver,
Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion eds. Personalism Revisited (Amsterdam and
(New York, 1951). New York, 2002).
Free Will, Responsibility, and Grace (New Burrow, Rufus, Jr. Personalism: A Critical
York, 1957). Introduction (St. Louis, 1999).
Religion as Creative Insecurity (New York, Howie, John, and Thomas O. Buford, eds.
1958). Contemporary Studies in Philosophical
Personality and the Good, with Richard M. Idealism (Cape Cod, Mass., 1975). Essays in
Millard (New York, 1963). honor of Bertocci, with a bibliography of his
230
BIRKHOFF
writings. geometry. Of the early 1930s, when he devel-

Knott, T. Garland. “Personhood: F. R. oped lattice theory, Birkhoff wrote (1976, p.
Tennant and Peter Bertocci in the Light of 57) that he “had dreamed up lattices …
Contemporary Physics,” Personalist Forum plucking them out of semithin air as a gener-
8 (Fall 1992): 101–14. alization of the Boolean algebra.” When he
“Special Issue in Honor of Peter Anthony wrote Lattice Theory, he did so with the
Bertocci,” Personalist Forum 7 (Spring purpose of treating the algebra of logic from
1991). Contains Bertocci’s autobiography the standpoint of algebra rather than of logic.
and bibliography. Birkhoff (1940, p. 9) asserted that lattices
can be found in Charles PEIRCE’s work, in
Mark Y. A. Davies particular in “On the Algebra of Logic.”
Birkhoff studied Peirce’s proof of the distrib-
utivity of lattices, and provided a sketch of the
proof for Huntington. Birkhoff’s book Lattice
Theory, which went through three editions,
remains a classic to this day, as does his
BIRKHOFF, Garrett (1911–96) textbook, co-authored with Saunders Mac
Lane, A Survey of Modern Algebra. Richard
Garrett Birkhoff, son of mathematician Dedekind and Ernst Schröder’s Dualgruppe
George David Birkhoff (1884–1944), was presented what became the lattice; Fritz
born on 10 January 1911 in Princeton, New Klein-Barmen provided the first modern treat-
Jersey. His family moved to Cambridge, ment of distributive lattices and developed
Massachusetts, in 1912. Entering Harvard in the modern terminology, but in Lattice
1928, he passed his entire career there (BA Theory, Birkhoff developed lattice theory as
1932, PhD 1936, mathematics faculty an independent topic of investigation and
1936–81), except for one year at Cambridge provided a full and systematic axiomatic pre-
University (1932–3). Retiring in 1981, he sentation for the theory.
moved to Water Mill, New York, and died
there on 22 November 1996. BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. N. WHITEHEAD’s Treatise of Universal Lattice Theory (New York, 1940; 2nd edn
Algebra, treating algebra of logic as a special 1948, Providence, Rhode Island; 3rd edn
case of the general concept of an algebra and 1973).
as the only member of the non-numerical A Survey of Modern Algebra, with
genus of Universal Algebra, provided Birkhoff Saunders Mac Lane (New York, 1941).
with the name of the branch of mathematics “The Rise of Modern Algebra to 1936,” in
which he pursued. Birkhoff’s paper “On the Men and Institutions in American
Structure of Abstract Algebras” has been Mathematics, ed. J. Dalton Tarwater,
called the “first real paper on universal John T. White, and J. D. Miller
algebra” (Mac Lane 1981, pp. 17–18); in it (Lubbock, Tex., 1976), pp. 41–63.
Birkhoff proved the theorem “characterizing
varieties of algebras closed under (infinite) Further Reading
products, quotients, and the formation of Alexanderson, Gerald, and Carroll Wilde.
subalgebras.” He was concerned with the “Interview: Garrett Birkhoff”, in
structures of algebras and a study of the prop- Mathematical People: Profiles and
erties of various types of lattices, his consid- Interviews, ed. D. J. Albers and G. L.
erations including ordered systems and the Alexanderson (Boston, Basel, and
application of lattices to describe projective Stuttgart, 1985), pp. 3–15.
231
BIRKHOFF
Anellis, Irving H. “In Memoriam. Garrett pastor of the Independent Congregational

Birkhoff”, Modern Logic 7 (1997): 81–2. (Unitarian) Church in Belfast, Maine, from
Huntington, Edward Vermilye. “Set of 1874 to 1878. In 1875 Bixby delivered a
Independent Postulates for the Algebra of course of lectures on “Physical Theories and
Logic,” Transactions of the American Religious Truths” at the Lowell Institute in
Mathematical Society 5 (1904): 288–309. Boston, and in 1883 he returned to give
Mac Lane, Saunders. “Part I, History of lectures on “Inductive Philosophy of
Algebra: History of Abstract Algebra: Religion.”
Origin, Rise, and Decline of a From 1878 to 1881, Bixby was professor of
Movement”, in American Mathematical religious philosophy and ethnic religions at
Heritage: Algebra and Applied Meadville Theological School in
Mathematics, ed. Dalton Tarwater, John Pennsylvania. He resigned his position to
T. White, Carl Hall, and Marion E. study religion and philosophy at universities
Moore (Lubbock, Tex., 1981), pp. 3–35. in Heidelberg, Jena, and Leipzig for two years
Mehrtens, Herbert. Die Entstehung der during 1883–5, and earned a PhD in philos-
Verbandstheorie (Hildesheim, 1979). ophy at Leipzig in 1885. He returned to the
Peirce, Charles S. “On the Algebra of United States in 1885, and briefly pastored at
Logic”, American Journal of the Unitarian Church in Ann Arbor,
Mathematics 3 (1880): 15–57. Reprinted Michigan. From 1887 until his retirement in
in Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A 1903 he was pastor of the Unitarian Church
Chronological Edition, vol. 4: in Yonkers, New York. During this period, he
1879–1884, ed. Christian J. W. Kloesel was active in New York civic and religious
(Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1989), organizations. He served as chair of the
pp. 163–209. Liberal Ministers’ Association from 1891 to
Whitehead, Alfred North. A Treatise on 1903. In retirement Bixby continued to
Universal Algebra (Cambridge, UK, publish articles on religion despite his blind-
1898; repr. New York, 1960). ness. He died on 26 December 1921 in
Yonkers, New York.
Irving H. Anellis Bixby combined his liberal Unitarianism
with a respect for science, advocating a sci-
entific theology that could accommodate
natural evolution. Bixby optimistically saw in
evolution a continual progress of both intel-
ligence and morality. His many articles on
BIXBY, James Thompson (1843–1921) religion and science in the Unitarian Review,
New Englander and Yale Review, The New
James Thompson Bixby was born on 30 July World, and Bibliotheca Sacra encouraged the
1843 in Barre, Massachusetts. After receiving scientific and comparative study of the
his BA from Harvard College in 1864, he world’s religions. Against Herbert Spencer’s
was a private tutor for three years in New hedonism, Bixby argued in The Ethics of
York City. He returned to Harvard, received Evolution (1900) that moral progress demon-
the MA (at that time a more honorary strates the existence of a unifying spiritual
degree), and began study at its Divinity trend in humanity. Although morality is a
School. Bixby graduated with a BD in 1870 natural product of this evolution, human
and was ordained minister. He served as nature is progressively improving towards a
pastor of the Unitarian Society of Watertown, higher perfection planned by God.
Massachusetts from 1870 to 1874, and was
232
BIXLER
BIBLIOGRAPHY President of Amherst College. She died shortly

Similarities of Physical and Religious after Julius’s birth. Bixler received a BA from
Knowledge (Boston, 1876). Reprinted as Amherst in 1916, then taught Latin and English
Religion and Science as Allies; or, for a year in Madura, India, before entering
Similarities of Physical and Religious Union Theological Seminary. He found
Knowledge (Chicago, 1889). theology at the seminary limiting and, after a
The Crisis in Morals: An Examination of tour in the army during World War I, returned
Rational Ethics in the Light of Modern to Amherst where he received his MA degree in
Science (Boston, 1891). Reprinted as The 1920. After two years lecturing on philosophy
Ethics of Evolution: The Crisis in Morals at the American University in Beirut, he con-
Occasioned by the Doctrine of tinued graduate studies at Yale. He wrote his
Development (Boston, 1900). dissertation on William JAMES and received his
The New World and the New Thought (New PhD in philosophy in 1924. From 1928 to
York, 1902). 1929, he attended Martin Heidegger’s lectures
The Open Secret: A Study of Life’s Deeper at the University of Freiburg.
Forces (Boston, 1912). Bixler joined the faculty of Smith College in
1924, where he taught biblical literature until
Other Relevant Works he moved to the Harvard Divinity School in
“From what Faculties does Religion Spring? 1933, becoming Bussey Professor of Religion.
The Psychology of Religion,” New In 1942, he became President of Colby College
Englander and Yale Review 45 (June in Waterville, Maine. He retired in 1960 to
1886): 1005–27. take up lecturing and writing, which he pursued
until his death in 1985. The inscription of the
Further Reading LLD degree bestowed on Bixler in 1952 by
Dict Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v11, Bowdoin College summarizes his career:
Who Was Who in Amer v1 “Inspiring teacher of philosophy and religion,
Ryan, Frank X., ed. Darwinism and well-known author of books of educational
Theology in America, 1850–1930, 3 vols and spiritual value, convincing advocate of
(Bristol, UK, 2000). liberal education.”
Bixler’s essays on the place of religious studies
John R. Shook in the humanities and in academe merit contin-
ued attention. As a philosophical theologian,
he makes the strong case for a dualism of
knowledge. Perception, grounding the physical
sciences, forms one pole. The experience of
value, pursued by religion, forms the second
BIXLER, Julius Seelye (1894–1985) pole, which is equally validating if less easily
demonstrated. Science is about fact; religion is
Julius Seelye Bixler was born on 4 April 1894 about value. Both must be reasonable and open.
in New London, Connecticut, and died on 28 The impartial pursuit of truth requires both.
March 1985 in Weston, Massachusetts. His That the pursuit of knowledge and truth is a
father, James Wilson Bixler, was educated at social enterprise becomes clear in Bixler’s 1963
Amherst and Yale, studied in Germany, and essay “The Failure of Martin Heidegger.” His
then ministered in Congregational churches in deep appreciation of Heidegger is apparent.
Connecticut and Massachusetts. His mother, His critique touches, first, on Heidegger’s idio-
Elizabeth James, was an alumna of Smith syncratic use of language, but he moves quickly
College and the daughter of James H. Seelye, to identify even there the radical individualism
233
BIXLER
of Heidegger’s program. He finds this individ- “Dr. Schweitzer’s One Answer to the
ualism ultimately destructive of the deepest Problem of the Many,” in To Albert
human values, values constructed in the com- Schweitzer on His Eightieth Birthday, ed.
munity of experience. Homer A. Jacks (Evanston, Ill., 1955), pp.
3–10.
BIBLIOGRAPHY “The Relevance of Reason,” in In Search of
Religion in the Philosophy of William James God and Immortality, ed. Julius S. Bixler
(Boston, 1926). (Boston, 1961), pp. 27–45.
Immortality and the Present Mood “The Failure of Martin Heidegger,” Harvard
(Cambridge, Mass., 1931). Theological Review 56 (1963): 121–43.
Religion for Free Minds (New York, 1939).
Conversations with an Unrepentant Liberal Further Reading
(New Haven, Conn., 1946). Amer Nat Bio, Proc of APA v59, Who Was
A Faith that Fulfills (New York, 1951). Who in Amer v8, Who’s Who in Phil
Education for Adversity (Cambridge, Mass., “In Honor of Dr. J. Seelye Bixler,” Colby
1952). Library Quarterly series 5, no. 11
German Recollections: Some of My Best (September 1961): 288–322.
Friends were Philosophers (Waterville,
Maine, 1985). Jon Taylor

Bixler’s papers are at Smith College.
“A Phenomenological Approach to Religious
Realism,” in Religious Realism, ed.
Douglas C. Macintosh and Arthur K. BLACK, Max (1909–88)
Rogers (New York, 1931), pp. 55–98.
“The Philosophy of Religion,” in The Church Max Black was born on 24 February 1909 in
Through Half a Century: Essays in Honor Baku, which was then in Russia and is now the
of William Adams Brown, ed. John capital of Azerbaijan. His father, Lionel Black,
Coleman and Julius S. Bixler (New York, was a businessman. Because the Blacks were
1936), pp. 145–62. Jewish and suffered from the anti-Semitism
“Can Religion Become Empirical?” in The prevalent in Russia at the time, the family left
Nature of Religious Experience, ed. Baku shortly after Max’s birth. After a brief
Eugene G. Bewkes and Julius S. Bixler stay in Paris, they emigrated to England in
(New York, 1937), pp. 68–92. 1912. Black received his entire education in
“Whitehead’s Philosophy of Religion,” in England, and grew up thoroughly assimilating
The Philosophy of Alfred North English culture instead of the Jewish-Russian
Whitehead, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (Evanston, culture into which he was born. As a child,
Ill., 1941), pp. 487–511. Black exhibited great talent in both mathe-
“William James as Religious Thinker,” in matics and music. He was a gifted violinist and
William James, The Man and The Thinker, pianist, at one point contemplating a career in
ed. Max C. Otto (Madison, Wisc., 1942), music. He decided instead upon a career in
pp. 117–41. mathematics, and entered Queen’s College,
“Science, Materialism and the Human Cambridge. There, under the influence of
Spirit,” in The Social Implications of Bertrand Russell and Frank Ramsey, and to
Scientific Progress, ed. John Ely an even greater degree, G. E. Moore and
(Cambridge, Mass., 1950), pp. 204–13. Ludwig Wittgenstein, his interests turned
234
BLACK
increasingly toward philosophy of mathemat- ism than with sensitivity to common language
ics first, and then toward philosophy gener- and common sense. This sensitivity was an
ally. He completed the BA degree in 1930 and inheritance from his Cambridge exposure to C.
was awarded a year-long fellowship to attend D. Broad, F. P. Ramsey, and G. E. Moore,
the University of Göttingen, where he studied although the greatest single influence on Black
with Hermann WEYL, Paul Bernays, and David was Wittgenstein. While his philosophical inter-
Hilbert. Black returned to complete the PhD at ests ranged widely, mathematics and language
the University of London in 1939, writing a dis- provided the central foci around which his
sertation on “Theories of Logical Positivism.” work developed.
While pursuing his doctoral studies, Black During his early study at Göttingen, Black
taught at the Royal Grammar School in wrote his first book, The Nature of
Newcastle upon Tyne, and then, from 1936 to Mathematics (1933). It was a critical exposition
1940, at the Teacher Training Institute of of Bertrand Russell and Alfred North
Education at London University. In 1940 he WHITEHEAD’s Principia Mathematica with sup-
moved to the United States to accept a philos- plementary accounts of intuitionist and for-
ophy position at the University of Illinois. He malist approaches to mathematics. His expo-
became a United States citizen in 1948. In 1946 sition of L. E. J. Brower’s intuitionism was par-
he became a professor of philosophy at Cornell ticularly clear and insightful. Also before the
University, and in 1954 became the Susan Linn completion of his doctorate, Black wrote
Sage Professor of Philosophy at Cornell, a “Vagueness: An Exercise in Logical Analysis”
position he held until his retirement in 1977. In (1937). In that paper Black explored the nature
his retirement, Black continued to serve as of vagueness and, perhaps more importantly,
Director of the Cornell Program in Science, the significance the notion of vagueness might
Technology and Society until 1978, and he was have for logic. It was the first attempt to give a
a participant in that program until his death on precise analysis of what Black called “vague
27 August 1988 in Ithaca, New York. sets,” or what are now called “fuzzy sets.”
Black held visiting appointments at Oxford While Black’s list of book publications is long,
and Cambridge, as well as in Australia, India, most of his books are collections of essays, his
Israel, Japan, Scandinavia, and Continental favored medium of writing. Black wrote of
Europe. He also held visiting fellowships at the himself that he had “always been interested, like
Princeton and Stanford Institutes of Advanced a poet, in minute particulars.” This interest in
Study and the National Humanities Center. minute particulars manifested itself in the treat-
He served as President of the Eastern Division ment of an exceptionally broad range of philo-
of the American Philosophical Association in sophical issues, including such topics as the
1958–9, and as President of the International nature of rules, the warrant for induction, rea-
Institute of Philosophy in 1981–4, being only soning with vague or loose concepts, metaphor,
the second American to hold the latter position. and the shortcomings of the picture theory of
He was also a fellow of the American Academy language. As Black looked back on his own
of Arts and Sciences. work only a few years before his death, he
As a philosopher, Black was not committed divided his writings into three groups, exposi-
to a particular system of philosophy. He under- tory, critical, and constructive. Black classified his
stood the primary purpose of philosophy as magisterial Companion to Wittgenstein’s
conceptual clarification, or as he characterized Tractatus (1964), as well as a number of later
his own work by the end of his career, “the essays in which he pursued themes drawn from
articulation of concepts.” In his efforts at clar- his work with Wittgenstein, as at the same time
ifying wide ranges of philosophical problems, both expository and critical. Black also
Black was less concerned with precise formal- included his important and pioneering logic
235
BLACK
text, Critical Thinking (1946), among his Black’s work in the articulation of concepts
expository writings, as well as The Labyrinth also carried him deeply into questions of philo-
of Language (1968). sophical method and into traditional questions
Black’s critical writings, in addition to the of metaphysics. In the 1940s he wrote several
critical elements in his various writings relating articles on the paradox of analysis and the
to Wittgenstein’s work, included the essays, problem of how analysis of terms can be infor-
largely on method, in Language and mative. The influence of Wittgenstein led Black
Philosophy (1949). They also included essays to reject the notion that terms possess meanings
on Rudolf CARNAP’s views on semantics, J. L. that are constituents of the world waiting to be
Austin’s understanding of performative uses of discovered, clarified, and categorized by
language, Paul GRICE’s work on conversational philosophers. Rather Black recognized that
meaning, and Nelson GOODMAN’s work on understanding the functioning of human
symbol systems. Moving away from issues in language also involved, to use a title of a 1949
the philosophy of language, Black also wrote article, “Speaking With the Vulgar.” His high
critically of behaviourist B. F. SKINNER. regard for ordinary language accordingly led
Black characterized his constructive work as Black, like many philosophers who worked in
focusing most importantly on four sets of the tradition of Wittgenstein, to pay less atten-
issues: vagueness, models and metaphors, tion to meanings and more to rules. Black
induction and probability, and rationality. His devoted a good deal of attention to the analysis
work on vagueness, as already noted, started of rules, how they are formulated in various
with his pioneering essay of 1937. His interest kinds of statements, and how they are
in metaphor, starting with his 1955 paper by expressed in various forms of practice.
that title, extended the importance of Black’s Black’s method was to start with the deliv-
work into the area of aesthetics. The basis of erances of ordinary language. In particular,
probabilistic and inductive reasoning was a long- Black favored starting out by identifying certain
standing concern in Black’s work, starting with paradigm cases of the application of the
his 1947 paper, “Professor Broad on the Limit concepts to be articulated. He believed that
Theorems of Probability,” and his 1949 “The through the examination of the range of these
Justification of Induction,” and continuing paradigm cases the philosopher can move, by
through a number of later papers and exchanges an essentially inductive process, to a set of
defending a common-sense understanding of cautious generalizations that will lead to an
induction according to which the very request for integrative articulation of the concept. Careful
a justification of induction is fundamentally mis- examination of paradigm cases, on Black’s
guided. Black’s exploration of the notion of view, enables the philosopher to identify the
rationality was a particularly dominant theme rules and criteria that govern the use of the
toward the end of his career. In that area of his concepts, and to show their place within
work he explored traditional problems of ratio- various systems of semantically and pragmati-
nality such as the prisoner’s dilemma, the core cally related concepts. Black’s understanding of
question of “Why Should I Be Rational?” and method clearly involved a marriage of the
the usefulness of formal decision theory in ordinary language analysis of his English philo-
modeling our rationality. His very last published sophical education and the pragmatism of his
papers were a critique of Bayesian decision adopted America.
theory, arguing that intelligent human choices Black devoted considerable attention,
are based more on a practical and informal art starting with his 1951 “Achilles and the
than on the application of some kind of formal Tortoise,” to temporal paradoxes. Black’s con-
calculus of probability, and an exploration of tributions in this area contributed to a lively
“Ambiguities of Rationality.” debate with Richard T AYLOR and Adolf
236
BLACK
GRÜNBAUM in particular. In 1952 Black wrote BIBLIOGRAPHY

an article, “The Identity of Indiscernibles,” that The Nature of Mathematics: A Critical Study
has been widely reprinted in metaphysics texts (London, 1933; 2000).
and elicited substantial journal response from “Vagueness: An Exercise in Logical
other philosophers, Black raised his ingenious Analysis,” Philosophy of Science 4 (1937):
“twin globe” counter-example to the traditional 427–55.
principle that distinct entities can only be distinct Critical Thinking (New York, 1946).
by virtue of some qualitative difference. Language and Philosophy: Studies in Method
Beyond Black’s interest in and important con- (Ithaca, N.Y., 1949).
tributions to traditional technical problems of “The Identity of Indiscernibles,” Mind 61
philosophy, Black also manifested a career-long (1952): 153–64.
concern for what one might call the more The Problems of Analysis: Philosophical
human face of philosophy. As early as 1944, Essays (Ithaca, N.Y., 1954).
Black wrote a paper, “Education as Art and Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language
Discipline.” This interest in education and in and Philosophy (Ithaca, N.Y., 1962).
ethics continued throughout Black’s career. In A Companion to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
the final decade of his life, for example, he wrote (Ithaca, N.Y., 1964).
a contribution, “Humanistic Education and the The Labyrinth of Language (New York,
Physician’s Art,” for an anthology on Changing 1968).
Values in Medicine, and authored “The Mount The Margins of Precision: Essays in Logic and
Carmel Declaration,” a statement issued by a Language (Ithaca, N.Y., 1970).
symposium on ethics and technology. Art, Perception, and Reality, with E. H.
Black’s project of “the articulation of Gombrich and Julian Hochberg (Baltimore,
concepts” centered around a concept of method Md., 1972).
that was rooted in common sense, ordinary Caveats and Critiques: Philosophical Essays in
language, and a clearly pragmatic understand- Language and Logic (Ithaca, N.Y., 1975).
ing of reasonableness that went beyond any The Prevalence of Humbug and Other Essays
kind of formalizable rationality. He rejected (Ithaca, N.Y., 1983).
any attempt by others to identify him with any Perplexities: Rational Choice, the Prisoner’s
particular philosophical “school,” character- Dilemma, Metaphor, Poetic Ambiguity, and
izing himself as “logician, ‘detached empiricist’ Other Puzzles (Ithaca, N.Y., 1990).
(J. Passmore), and active skeptic (in the spirit of
Goethe’s tätige Sepsis).” He was concerned Other Relevant Works
with particular problems rather than the con- Max Black’s papers are at Cornell University.
struction of some overarching conception of “Conventionalism in Geometry and the
reality. Or perhaps it would be more accurate Interpretation of Necessary Statements,”
to say that Black thought that whatever there Philosophy of Science 9 (1942): 335–49.
is of an overarching reality is at bottom nothing “Some Objections to Ogden and Richards’
more than a collection of particular minutiae. Theory of Interpretation,” Journal of
Black was careful to avoid jargon and techni- Philosophy 39 (1942): 281–9.
cal terminology. While he maintained through- “Education as Art and Discipline,” Ethics 54
out his career his deep and profound love of the (1944): 290–94.
mathematical, we might well leave with the “The ‘Paradox of Analysis’,” Mind 53 (1944):
impression that he thought that reality was 263–7.
more like a poem than like a mathematical “The Limits of a Behavioristic Semiotic,”
system. Philosophical Review 56 (1947): 258–72.
“Linguistic Method in Philosophy,”
237
BLACK
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (1980): 17–23.

8 (1948): 635–50. Cross, Charles B. “Max Black on the Identity
“The Semantic Definition of Truth,” Analysis of Indiscernibles,” Philosophical Quarterly
8 (1948): 49–63. 45 (1995): 350–60.
“Carnap’s Semantics,” Philosophical Review Ferraiolo, William. “Black’s ‘Twin Globe’
58 (1949): 257–64. Counterexample,” Southwest Philosophy
“Achilles and the Tortoise,” Analysis 11 Review 13 (1997): 59–66.
(1951): 91–101. Garver, Newton. “Max Black,” in The
“Why Cannot an Effect Precede Its Cause?” Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York,
Analysis 16 (1956): 49–57. 1967), vol. 1, 318–19.
“Necessary Statements and Rules,” Grünbaum, Adolf. “Messrs Black and Taylor
Philosophical Review 67 (1958): 313–41. on Temporal Paradoxes,” Analysis 12
“The ‘Direction’ of Time,” Analysis 19 (1952): 144–8.
(1959): 54–63. Johnson, Bredo C. “Black and the Inductive
“Can Induction Be Vindicated?” Philosophical Justification of Induction,” Analysis 32
Studies 10 (1959): 5–16. (1972): 110–12.
“Reasoning With Loose Concepts,” Dialogue Marcus, Ruth B. “Max Black (1909–1988),”
2 (1963): 1–12. Dialectica 44 (1990): 5–8.
Ed., Philosophy in America (Ithaca, N.Y., Martinich, A. P. “Meaning and Intention:
1965). Black Versus Grice,” Dialectica 44 (1990):
“The Elusiveness of Sets,” Review of 79–98.
Metaphysics 24 (1971): 614–36. Salmon, Wesley C. “Should We Attempt to
“Humanistic Education and the Physician’s Justify Induction?” Philosophical Studies 8
Art,” in Changing Values in Medicine, ed. (1957): 33–48.
Eric J. Cassell (New York, 1979), pp. Sanford, David H. “The Inductive Support of
181–95. Inductive Rules: Themes from Max Black,”
“Why Should I Be Rational?” Dialectica 36 Dialectica 44 (1990): 23–41.
(1982): 147–68. Scherzinger, Martin. “Max Black’s
“The Radical Ambiguity of a Poem,” Synthese ‘Interaction View’ of Metaphor,”
59 (1984): 89–108. Conference 6 (1995): 89–97.
“The Articulation of Concepts,” in Taylor, Richard. “Mr. Black on Temporal
Philosophers on Their Own Work, vol. 12, Paradoxes,” Analysis 12 (1951): 38–43.
ed. André Mercier and Maja Svilar (Bern, Warner, Martin. “Black’s Metaphors,” British
Switzerland, 1985), pp. 9–41. Journal of Aesthetics 13 (1973): 367–72.
“Making Intelligent Choices, How Useful is
Decision Theory?” Dialectica 39 (1985): David E. Schrader
19–34.
Further Reading
Amer Nat Bio, Bio 20thC Phils, Oxford
Comp Phil, Pres Addr of APA v6, Proc of
APA v64, Who Was Who in Amer v9, BLACK ELK (1863–1950)
Who’s Who in Phil
Bohan, James C. “On Black’s ‘Loose’ Black Elk was born to Black Elk and Mary
Concepts,” Dialogue 10 (1971): 332–6. Leggins Down (also known as White Cow
Calistro, Ralph F. “On Discovering Rules: Sees) in December 1863 near the Little Powder
Max Black’s Methods,” De Philosophia 1 River in present-day Campbell county in
238
BLACK ELK
northeastern Wyoming. He died on 19 August following this massacre. Perhaps he had mis-
1950 in Manderson, South Dakota. Taking interpreted the vision or given away its power
the given name Nicholas after his conversion in sharing it with others, he said, and this was
to Catholicism in 1904, Black Elk embodies the reason it had not yet come to fruition. The
the complex mix of traditional Native image of Black Elk that seeped into American
American and Anglo/European experience that consciousness as a result of the publication of
has permeated Native American life in this book is that of the noble Native American
America. leader yearning for a past that is forever lost:
Black Elk was a traditional Lakota Sioux “I, to whom so great a vision was given in my
medicine man whose first vision at the age of youth, – you see me now a pitiful old man
nine foretold not only the conflicts Native who has done nothing, for the nation’s hoop
Americans would have with white Americans is broken and scattered. There is no center any
as the US government pursued its policies of longer, and the sacred tree is dead.” (1932, p.
westward expansion and Indian removal, but 207)
also his own ability to be a spokesman and Black Elk lived another sixty years after
healer for his people. He began serving as a Wounded Knee and spent the majority of those
medicine man in 1881, after his family had years as a Catholic. According to his daughter,
been uprooted and resettled on the Pine Ridge Lucy Looks Twice, Black Elk readily accepted
Reservation in South Dakota along with other the Catholic faith and saw it as transcending
Oglala Lakotas. Black Elk continued to hold the religion of the Lakotas. He had expressed
the status of a medicine man among his people, neither anger nor a significant sense of loss to
but life as he knew it had been disrupted. In her when recounting the circumstances under
1886 he toured with Buffalo Bill’s Wild West which he converted. In 1904 a priest deliver-
Show to parts of Europe. When he returned to ing last rites to a dying child implored Black
South Dakota, he found his people placing Elk to renounce Satan as he sought to heal the
their hope in the Ghost Dance, a ritual that child using traditional Native American
called upon the strength of the ancestors to methods. Rather than respond with anger,
revitalize Native American life and help them Black Elk simply expressed the sense that he
regain their sovereignty. This movement was and his religious perspective were ill-guided
brutally crushed, however, by a US Army and mistaken, and he converted to Christianity
massacre at Wounded Knee in 1890. within two weeks after the priest’s confronta-
The most famous account of Black Elk’s tion. He became first a devout lay person, then
life, Black Elk Speaks (1932), focuses on his a catechist, and later a missionary to the Oglala
thought in the years just after Wounded Knee. and other tribes.
His narrative provides a window into Native Black Elk’s religious conversion points to
American thought in this period and the tra- the complexity of Native American life in the
ditions from which they sprung. A deeply reli- late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
gious man, Black Elk had full faith in the Great Black Elk, like Charles EASTMAN, Gertrude
Spirit which unified all creatures and spoke of BONNIN, and Luther STANDING BEAR, all born
human beings as children fully dependent on and/or raised as Sioux in the Dakota
the earth for their sustenance. He also strug- Territories in the 1860s and 1870s, tried to
gled to make sense of the vision he had as a preserve and record Indian culture, traditions,
youth, especially in light of the devastation he and ways of thought. However, while Black
and his people experienced at Wounded Knee. Elk continued to participate in Lakota
With his son Ben Black Elk, who was his inter- pageants and ceremonies, he also appears to
preter for Black Elk Speaks, he recalled the have had a very genuine sense of having dis-
deep sense of despair and loss he and others felt covered a new and fresh religious perspective
239
BLACK ELK
that gave him and many of his fellow converts Rainbow (Lincoln, Nebr., 1995).
faith in the future. At the heart of his decision Neihardt, Hilda, and Lori Utecht, eds.
to convert, however, was his pragmatic view of Black Elk Lives: Conversations with the
the role that this new religion played in reser- Black Elk Family (Lincoln, Nebr., 2000).
vation life. When asked why he converted, his Rice, Julian. Black Elk’s Story:
response was simply, “My children had to live Distinguishing Its Lakota Purpose
in this world.” (Steltenkamp 1993, p. 20) (Albuquerque, N.M., 1991).
Steltenkamp, Michael F. Black Elk: Holy
BIBLIOGRAPHY Man of the Oglala (Norman, Okla.,
Neihardt, John G. Black Elk Speaks: Being 1993).
the Life Story of a Holy Man of the Tedlock, Dennis, and Barbara Tedlock, eds.
Oglala Sioux (New York, 1932; Lincoln, Teachings from the American Earth:
Nebr., 1988). Indian Religion and Philosophy (New
Brown, Joseph E., ed. The Sacred Pipe: York, 1975).
Black Elk’s Account of the Seven Rites of
the Oglala Sioux (Norman, Okla., 1953). Dorothy Rogers
Rev. edn, The Gift of the Sacred Pipe:
Based on Black Elk’s Account of the
Seven Rites of the Oglala Sioux
(Norman, Okla., 1982).
DeMallie, Raymond J., ed. The Sixth
Grandfather: Black Elk’s Teachings BLACKSTONE, William Thomas (1931–77)
Given to John G. Neihardt (Lincoln,
Nebr., 1984). William Blackstone was born on 8 December
1931 in Augusta, Georgia. He received a BA
Other Relevant Works degree from Elon College in 1953 and his MA
Black Elk’s papers are in the Holy Rosary and PhD degrees from Duke University in 1955
Mission Records at Marquette University and 1957. He was an associate professor of phi-
in Wisconsin, and in the John G. losophy at Elon College in North Carolina, from
Neihardt Collection at the University of 1957 to 1958. He then was an assistant profes-
Missouri, Columbia. sor of philosophy at the University of Florida
from 1958 to 1961. The remainder of his
Further Reading academic career was spent at the University of
Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Georgia, first as a professor of philosophy and
Comp Amer Thought, Encyc Relig religion from 1961 to 1963, then as chair of the
Archambault, Marie Therese. A Retreat Division of Social Sciences from 1963 to 1977.
with Black Elk: Living in the Sacred He was Vice President of the American
Hoop (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1998). Philosophical Association Eastern Division in
Black Elk, Wallace H., and William S. 1960–61, and was a member of the executive
Lyon. Black Elk: The Sacred Ways of a council for both the Southern Society for
Lakota (San Francisco, 1990). Philosophy and Religion and the Southern
Holler, Clyde. Black Elk’s Religion: The Society for Philosophy and Psychology from
Sun Dance and Lakota Catholicism 1965 to 1968. He was President of the Georgia
(Syracuse, N.Y., 1995). Philosophical Society in 1966–7 and the
Holler, Clyde, ed. The Black Elk Reader Southeastern Philosophy of Education Society in
(Syracuse, N.Y., 2000). 1969. For three consecutive years, 1959 to 1961,
Neihardt, Hilda. Black Elk and Flaming he received the annual award of the Southern
240
BLACKWELL
Society for Philosophy and Psychology for the BIBLIOGRAPHY

best research paper, and he received the M. G. The Problem of Religious Knowledge
Michael Award from the University of Georgia (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963).
in 1965. He was an advisor to US Senator Sam Francis Hutcheson and Contemporary
Nunn on energy concerns. In addition, he was a Ethical Theory (Athens, Georgia, 1965).
consultant to the National Humanities Religious Language and Knowledge (Athens,
Foundation and served on the editorial boards of Georgia, 1972).
six professional journals. He died in Athens, Political Philosophy: An Introduction (New
Georgia, on 14 November 1977. In 1978, York, 1973).
Ethics, Free Enterprise, and Public Policy, edited
by Richard T. DE GEORGE and Joseph A. Pichler, Other Relevant Works
was dedicated to the memory of Blackstone. Ed., The Concept of Equality (Minneapolis,
Blackstone is credited with organizing the first 1969).
philosophical conference on environmental Ed. with George L. Newsome, Education and
ethics, held at the University of Georgia in 1971. Ethics (Athens, Georgia, 1969).
The proceedings were published as Philosophy Ed., Philosophy and Environmental Crisis
and Environmental Crisis in 1974. This collec- (Athens, Georgia, 1974).
tion of essays includes Blackstone’s “Ethics and Ed. with Robert D. Heslep, Social Justice and
Ecology” and other notable papers such as Pete Preferential Treatment: Women and Racial
A. Y. GUNTER’s “The Big Thicket” and Eugene Minorities in Education and Business
P. Odum’s “Environmental Ethic and the (Athens, Georgia, 1977).
Attitude Revolution.” Blackstone acknowledged Ed. with Tom L. Beauchamp and Joel
an environmental crisis created by overpopula- Feinberg, Philosophy and the Human
tion, abuse of technology, ignorance of interre- Condition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1980).
lationships in nature and, most of all, misguided
values. Rather than focusing on factual data, he Further Reading
affirms a human “transvaluation of values” that Proc of APA v51
“require fundamental changes in the social, polit-
ical, and economic institutions…” 1974, p. 17). Charles Frederick Frantz
These changes are grounded in the notion that
a livable environment is a human right and
should also be made a legal right. Furthermore,
this right overrides any purely economic con-
sideration. The solution is a new economic
theory that embodies values that are not present BLACKWELL, Antoinette Louisa Brown
in private enterprise. The formation of a cen- (1825–1921)
tralized agency would implement this new
policy. Antoinette Louisa Brown was born on 20
Blackstone’s concern for the environment, May 1825 in Henrietta, New York. In 1856
social justice and health care was a development she married Samuel Blackwell, who backed
of his earlier research in ethics, religion, and Antoinette wholeheartedly, helping to raise
science. His professional life emphasized inter- their children so that she could work part-
disciplinary exploration, a deep concern for time and write. She died on 5 November
human ethical questions, a comprehensive 1921 in Elizabeth, New Jersey. Exposed by
knowledge of philosophy, and a systematic her family to the Protestant revivals of the age
treatment of important philosophical issues. and religiously precocious, she was made a
member of her Congregational church at age
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BLACKWELL
nine. She graduated from Oberlin College’s of the species and the female but a modifica-
non-degree-granting Ladies Department in tion of it. She argues that on the subject of the
1847. She then enrolled as a “resident normal powers and functions of woman at
graduate” in the Theological Seminary, which least, women are more than the equals of
refused to enroll women officially, and which even the wisest men. She sanctioned part-
granted her neither a degree nor a license to time employment for women, made possible
preach upon completion of her studies. by assistance with household duties from
For two years Blackwell preached where men, and her greatest contribution must be
invited and lectured on women’s rights, anti- that she modeled this herself by combining
slavery and temperance. Many a fellow marriage, children, social activism, profes-
preacher tried to shout her down from the sional work, public speaking, and scholarly
pulpit. Even her own activist friends, includ- writing in a long, productive life.
ing Lucy STONE, Susan B. ANTHONY, and
Elizabeth Cady STANTON, discouraged her, BIBLIOGRAPHY
as they considered organized religion corrupt Shadows of Our Social System (New York,
and outdated. In 1850 she was a delegate to 1856).
the first National Women’s Rights Studies in General Science (New York,
Convention in Worcester, Massachusetts. In 1869).
1853, taking a Congregational pulpit, she The Sexes Throughout Nature (New York,
became the first woman minister of a recog- 1875).
nized denomination in the United States. Ten The Physical Basis of Immortality (New
months later she resigned, her increasingly York, 1876).
liberal religious views diverging too radically The Philosophy of Individuality; or, The
from Calvinist tenets. Eventually she became One and the Many (New York, 1893).
a Unitarian. The Making of the Universe: Evolution the
Blackwell moved to New York City, vol- Continuous Process which Derives the
unteering in slums and prisons and studying Finite from the Infinite (Boston, 1914).
the effects of poverty on mental health and The Social Side of Mind and Action (New
society. At publisher Horace Greeley’s sug- York, 1915).
gestion she wrote weekly articles for his New
York Tribune, collected in her first book, Other Relevant Works
Shadows of Our Social System (1856). In the Blackwell’s papers are in the Library of
1870s she returned to the lecture circuit, and Congress and Radcliffe College in
in 1878 was recognized as a Unitarian Massachusetts.
minister. Oberlin granted her honorary Soul Mates: the Oberlin Correspondence of
degrees in 1878 and 1908. In 1920 she cast Lucy Stone and Antoinette Brown,
her first vote, one of the few women’s 1846–1850, ed. Carol Lasser and
suffrage pioneers who lived long enough to Marlene Merrill (Oberlin, Ohio, 1983).
do so. Friends and Sisters: Letters between Lucy
In her scientific treatises, Blackwell tries to Stone and Antoinette Brown Blackwell,
show the evolution of the universe from the 1846–93, ed. Carol Lasser and Marlene
simple to the complex. She brings all of Merrill (Urbana, Illinois, 1987).
Creation, however, back to “one Mind
infinite in executiveness.” In The Sexes Further Reading
Throughout Nature (1875) she argues against Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer, dis- Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer
puting that the male is the representative type Thought, Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer
242
BLANSHARD
Religious Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v29, to teach the history of philosophy to his fellow
Who Was Who in Amer v1, Women soldiers. During this period he dropped his
Phils given first name, Percy.Upon leaving the Army,
Cazden, Elizabeth. Antoinette Brown he returned to Merton to write a thesis on
Blackwell: A Biography (New York, John DEWEY’s theory of judgment. After receiv-
1983). ing his Oxford BSc degree, he went to Harvard
University where he completed a PhD thesis on
Cicily Vahadji the “Nature of Judgment” under C. I. LEWIS,
although Lewis gave only infrequent advice.
In 1921 Blanshard became an assistant pro-
fessor of philosophy at the University of
Michigan. He moved to Swarthmore College
in 1925, where he eventually became a full
BLANSHARD, Brand (1892–1987) professor. In 1945 he moved to Yale University
as Sterling Professor of Philosophy, holding
Brand Blanshard was born on 27 August 1892 that position until his retirement in 1961. He
in Fredericksburg, Ohio, and died on 18 also served as chair of the philosophy depart-
November 1987 in New Haven, Connecticut. ment from 1945 to 1950, and 1959 to 1961.
Together with a fraternal twin named Paul, Blanshard gave both the Gifford Lectures
later a prominent social critic, he was raised by and Carus Lectures, an honor shared only by
his grandmother in penurious conditions. Dewey at that time. His many other lecture-
Their home, however, was one where learning ships included the Hertz (British Academy),
was encouraged, and the family twice relo- the Howison (California), the Adamson
cated for educational purposes, the second (Manchester), and the Whitehead, Dudleian,
time in 1910, when they moved to Ann Arbor and Noble (Harvard). His Adamson Lecture
so that the boys could attend the University of became the delightful classic On Philosophical
Michigan, an affordable public institution. In Style (1954). He was a corresponding fellow of
his junior year Blanshard won a Rhodes schol- the British Academy, an honorary fellow of
arship, enrolling at Merton College, Oxford, in Merton College, and a Guggenheim Fellow.
the fall of 1913. At Oxford his key influences He received fourteen honorary doctorates;
were F. H. Bradley, Harold Joachim, and H. served as President of the American
W. B. Joseph. Bradley’s work and presence at Philosophical Association Eastern Division in
Merton cast an inspirational spell on the 1942–5; and, despite his avowed agnosticism,
aspiring philosopher (who met with him was President of the American Theological
twice); Joachim was his tutor and thesis super- Society. He published approximately three
visor; and Joseph’s conversations and writings hundred articles and eight books, the most
had a lifetime impact on specific features of noteworthy of which are his two-volume The
Blanshard’s work. Nature of Thought (1939) and the trilogy
World War I interrupted Blanshard’s Reason and Goodness (1961), Reason and
Oxford education. A pacifist, he signed up Analysis (1962), and Reason and Belief (1974).
with the YMCA, serving in India and Critical reaction to his work was highlighted
Mesopotamia, before returning to the United by his selection as the fourth American in the
States in September 1917 to enroll at distinguished series The Library of Living
Columbia University to complete an MA thesis Philosophers.
on Hume’s theory of judgment. When the Blanshard devoted his long career to a
United States entered the war, he was drafted defense of reason and reasonableness, which he
and assigned to an educational unit in France believed were threatened, respectively, by
243
BLANSHARD
narrow-minded empiricism and prejudice. In ferent” (p. 528). Blanshard believed in internal
doing so, he staunchly defended the tenets of relations: relations that cannot be changed or
philosophical rationalism and the virtue of removed without affecting the terms them-
reasonableness. His one constant belief was selves between which those relations hold.
in the primacy of reason, and his paramount Further, he agreed with Spinoza that “the
goal was to live the life of a reasonable man. causal relation is really a logical one – that a
Blanshard’s most fundamental presupposition causal law, if precisely stated, would reveal a
was that reality was ultimately intelligible and connection in which the character of the cause
he believed that the rational life is the most logically necessitates that of its effect; and if
valuable, for the rationalistic temperament is this is true … the facts and events of the world
just the actualization of our natural desire to must thus compose a single rational and intel-
know and is thus productive of good. ligible order” (1974, p. 531).
Blanshard often referred to his work as neo- Cautious about the senses, and seeing reality
Spinozistic and much of it does have close par- as an ordered system accessible to the intellect,
allels with Spinoza’s thought. Late in his he was also a strict determinist, maintaining
career, he summarized his understanding of that there were no contingently true proposi-
Rationalism in an Encyclopaedia Britannica tions – given sufficient knowledge we could
article as: “the philosophical view that regards deduce an effect from prior knowledge of its
reason as the chief source and test of knowl- cause. (That his mother accidentally burned
edge. Holding that reality itself has an inher- herself to death when he was an infant perhaps
ently logical structure, the Rationalist asserts adds poignancy to Blanshard’s strict necessi-
that a class of truths exists that the intellect can tarianism.) Finally, he followed Spinoza,
grasp directly. There are, according to the Bradley, Joseph, and others in maintaining
Rationalists, certain rational principles – espe- that thought was purposive in character: “It
cially in logic and mathematics, and even in was the position of all these men that there is
ethics and metaphysics – that are so funda- a conatus or drive in human nature that
mental that to deny them is to fall into con- demands for its satisfaction an understanding
tradiction.” (“Rationalism,” 1974, p. 527) In of the world, a vision of the whole, in which
contrast, empiricism holds that all knowledge the nature and place of each thing is to be
both comes from and must ultimately be tested understood only by seeing its place in an all-
by experience, whereas rationalism maintains inclusive order. Philosophy is the systematic
that “reason is a faculty that can lay hold of attempt at the apprehension of that order.”
truths beyond the reach of sense perception, (Schilpp 1980, p. 126)
both in certainty and generality” (p. 527). Although blessed with an unusually felici-
These truths include universals and their rela- tous style, Blanshard nonetheless wrote long
tions, which admit of no exception. books (The Nature of Thought has 1,132
Rationalism may also involve epistemological pages), chiefly because his primary method
and metaphysical commitments. For instance, was argument by elimination. His method is
the “belief that the world is a rationally something like the following procedure: A
ordered whole, the parts of which are linked by problem is posed and initial candidate solu-
logical necessity and the structure of which is tions are carefully enumerated; these are
thereby intelligible” (p. 528); the belief that “a reduced one-by-one by counter-arguments
and not-a cannot coexist” holds not merely for until only one is left standing in the field; the
sentences but for the real world; and the belief arguments against it are considered and found
that facts involve a positive coherence, that not to be decisive; however, it is often granted
“they are so bound up with each other that that the arguments in favor of the candidate
none could be different without all being dif- are not, by themselves, completely compelling
244
BLANSHARD
as they do not serve to prove the conclusion drive in human nature in which from the very
drawn; therefore, it is admitted that there are beginning the end of coherent system was
no grounds for a claim to certainty on the immanently at work and became clearer in
question at issue; despite this, it is maintained conception and firmer in its guidance as the
that it is reasonable to accept this candidate as development progressed” (Schilpp 1980, p.
the best available, even in the face of residual 591).
uncertainty, because doing so allows one to But how, one asks, can we be confident that
make sense of what would otherwise be an our beliefs conform to the world, and that a
inexplicable world (escaping skepticism); fur- coherent system of beliefs offers us a genuine
thermore, acceptance makes it possible to view of reality? In his early work, Blanshard
continue discussion on this and related matters, emphasized we can do so because thought and
thereby enabling us to work towards an ideal things are related, the first being the partial ful-
goal of understanding reality. fillment of what the latter fulfills perfectly.
Blanshard is best known for his advocacy of Thought, he wrote, “is a half way house on the
coherence as both the nature and criterion of road to reality” (1939, vol. 1, p. 494). Thought
truth. Coherence has both metaphysical and is purposive in that it seeks satisfaction in an
psychological roots in his thought. As to the explanation that would allow inquiry to come
latter, he wrote that in reflection we (1) specify to rest. In the presence of the incoherent this
a problem, (2) amass data through observation would be impossible. Of course, while we may
and memory, (3) make a leap of suggestion, (4) come closer to an understanding of reality, we
deduce the consequences of that suggestion, never reach our goal, and thus truth must be
and then (5) compare these implications with understood to have degrees, as our explana-
fact. He argued that the last two of these steps tions never fully satisfy. “Truth is the approx-
are really a single process that establishes the imation of thought to reality. It is thought on
coherence of a suggestion with experience. its way home. Its measure is the distance
This reflective process is purposive, aiming at thought has traveled, under guidance of its
truth and understanding, which are essentially inner compass, toward that intelligible system
equivalent. “To know the truth about anything which unites its ultimate object with its
is … to apprehend it in a system of relations ultimate end …. At any given time the degree
that makes it intelligible, and this is what we of truth in our experience as a whole is the
mean by understanding it” (1939, vol. 1, p. degree of system it has achieved. The degree of
78). It is only when we have such contextual truth of a particular proposition is to be judged
knowledge that we understand why something in the first instance by its coherence with expe-
holds, i.e. grasp its necessity within that rience as a whole, ultimately by its coherence
context. This concurs with his metaphysical with that further whole, all-comprehensive
position regarding the fundamentally system- and fully articulated, in which thought can
atic character of reality. “The upshot of this … come to rest.” (1939, vol. 2, p. 264) For
was what seemed to me a clear insight that Blanshard, truth is ideal coherence.
thought from the beginning was a drive toward Strictly speaking, a coherent system is a set
understanding, and that this drive could in the of propositions in which each stands to the rest
end be satisfied by one thing only. This was the such that it is logically necessary that it be true
achievement of a system of thought in which if all the rest are true and such that none is log-
the question Why? had been pressed through ically independent of the others. Blanshard
to the end in all directions. Such a system grants that, in practice, we never attain such an
would be at once all-comprehensive and so ideal coherent system in which every proposi-
related internally that nothing intelligible tion is entailed by the others jointly and even
remained. In short, thought was a distinctive singly. Nonetheless, such a standard is implicit
245
BLANSHARD
in our grading of knowledge as better or worse, sonable to believe than its negation because it
more or less adequate, etc. Consequently, we is progressively confirmed by experience. The
need not be driven to skepticism because our truth of our present judgment thus lies in a
ideal is that judgments be seen to be true in the prospective relationship between that thought
context of all possible knowledge. For ordinary and reality conceived as what would ultimately
purposes the coherence we seek is with present satisfy the ideal intellect.
knowledge, particularly scientific knowledge, Blanshard shared Spinoza’s position that
not an inaccessible absolute. Indeed, our things are either necessary or impossible. For
attitude to science at any time must recognize Spinoza, they are necessary because their exis-
its provisional explanatory adequacy – it must tence follows necessarily from their essence
be open and critical. (i.e. as infinite modes of God) or from a given
In response to the oft-stated criticism that efficient cause. They are impossible either
there might be more than one, indeed an because their essence or definition involves a
infinite number of consistent and thus coherent contradiction or because there is no external
systems, Blanshard argued first, that his ideal cause which has been determined to produce
coherence also required comprehensiveness so such a thing. They are never contingent, for “a
that everything real and possible be included; thing is called contingent only because of a
and second, that it is impossible that there defect of our knowledge” (Ethics, I, paragraph
could be two such systems. For there to be 33, section 1). Similarly, it is an important
two they would have to differ either in facts or postulate of Blanshard’s thought that there are
structure, and if so, either one would not be no accidents, no events in the universe that
comprehensive or the structure of each would occur outside of a system of necessary causal
be a fact not included in the other. relationships, and no true inferences that are
For Blanshard, the problem of truth arises in not impelled by necessity. Necessity, he argues,
the context of reflective thinking, where our is characteristic not only of our conceptual
object is understanding or explaining to our- systems but also of the object of those systems,
selves. Judgments can be self-justifying reality itself. Indeed, in his view, reasoning is
provided they are not considered in isolation pointless without necessity, for without neces-
from other judgments, but are determined to sity the world could not be said to be intelligi-
be fully coherent with those judgments. ble. Simply put, reason is a drive towards intel-
However, if their coherence is to be truth guar- ligibility (under the guidance of an ideal of
anteeing (or in a weaker sense, warranting), system) that can only be satisfied by the appre-
then their truth must itself lie in their coher- hension of necessity, that is, when we see that
ence. But a high standard of coherence is something not only is so, but must be so.
required – not only must these propositions be He insisted that there were genuine logical,
tied together necessarily, they must also be as moral, and natural necessities that are inter-
comprehensive as the state of our knowledge linked. For instance, logical necessities involve
at a given time will permit. If pressed, any more than the connection of abstract elements
question calls for an indefinitely inclusive – they involve the real connection of things.
system that links the unexplained fact to its Further, natural causation involves logical
context in such a way as to show that the necessity. Fundamental logical laws record not
context requires that fact for its completion. just an actual or recommended movement of
Blanshard grants that the question whether thought in inference but genuine structural
reality is, as a matter of fact, a coherent system, characteristics of nature: as Bradley had said,
with which coherent thought can accord, is reality does not contradict itself. Moral neces-
itself not provable but is a postulate of reason. sities are revealed in such beliefs as that
However, it is a postulate that is more rea- pleasure is better than pain. They do not just
246
BLANSHARD
indicate preferences but are forced upon us by “make a sequence in which I have tried to
moral realities. sketch the office of reason in the theory of
Perhaps Blanshard’s most controversial knowledge, ethics, and religion respectively”
position in this area is his insistence that cau- (Reason and Belief, 1974, p. 10).
sation is a necessary relation. He thought that In Reason and Analysis much more than
if this were not so we would be trapped in the just the analytic “theory of knowledge” of the
world of the presently given, unable to move post-World War I period is considered. Topics
to the realms of the past or future and with no in epistemology, logic, and metaphysics are
knowledge of actual physical objects. thoroughly surveyed, and much is found
Awareness of causes gives us our ability to wanting in the theories of the new schools.
predict and control. Again, intelligibility Blanshard produced what is perhaps our most
depends on it, for B is truly intelligible only effective critique of the various analytical
when it is seen to follow necessarily from A. schools, and their empiricist ancestors (such as
He contends that “the universe itself may be Hume), because he also offered an alternative.
regarded as one gigantic congeries of events He points out the sharp contrasts between the
linked directly or indirectly by a network of idealistic rationalism that dominated philoso-
causal laws. And … the strands [the causal phy at the turn of the century and the realism,
relations] that form this network belong to naturalism, pragmatism, positivism, and lin-
the nature of things no less than the items guistic analysis that gained ascendancy after
linked” (1962, p. 445). While he would agree the war. On a range of core issues, Blanshard
with Hume that this causal process is largely demonstrates that reason must be the proper
impenetrable to us, Blanshard nonetheless foundation of philosophical thought, and that
insists, against Hume, that necessity runs it finds its chief work in the tracing of neces-
through it; otherwise belief in regular succes- sary connections between universals.
sion entails a belief that the world is involved Reason and Goodness, the second of the
in an outrageous run of luck. The lawfulness trilogy, is primarily concerned with the
we apprehend cries out for an explanation, question whether moral judgments express
and this can only be provided by the operation knowledge or feeling. Blanshard stands firmly
of necessity. “For on the chance hypothesis on the side of knowledge, the position which
every successive repetition of a conjunction began with Socrates’s identification of virtue
given in the past is the occurrence of the pro- and knowledge. But the most striking example
gressively more improbable, while on the of a rationalistic ethic is that of the Stoics:
hypothesis of intrinsic connection, it is only a “the most remarkable experiment on record in
confirmation, more impressive at each recur- the surrender of life to reason at the expense of
rence, of what the hypothesis predicted” feeling and desire” (1961, p. 43). Two aspects
(1939, vol. 2, p. 506). of the stoic tradition in ethics are especially
In the winters of 1952 and 1953, Blanshard important to Blanshard: (1) following the
delivered two courses of Gifford Lectures at guidance of what Aristotle had said was dis-
the University of St. Andrews. The first course tinctive or essential in our own nature, i.e.
of ten lectures had the subject “Reason and Its reason; and (2) conforming to that which was
Critics” and the second course “Reason and essential in outward nature, i.e. intelligible
Goodness.” In December 1959, he delivered law. In this way, Blanshard arrived at the same
the Carus Lectures to the American position as Spinoza concerning human
Philosophical Association meeting in New freedom. How can we be fully determined and
York City. This latter group of three lectures yet free? They answered that true freedom
and the earlier twenty given in Scotland formed consists in acting solely from a necessity of
the basis of his great trilogy on reason. They one’s nature. It is the nature of a stone to fall
247
BLANSHARD
and of a mind to think. Determination by BIBLIOGRAPHY

reason is freedom: “For a rational being to act The Nature of Thought, 2 vols (London,
under the influence of seen necessity is to place 1939).
himself at the farthest possible extreme from “Current Strictures on Reason,”
the behavior of the puppet. For a moral agent Philosophical Review 54 (1945): 345–68.
to choose that good which in the light of reflec- “The Philosophy of Analysis,” Proceedings
tion approves itself as intrinsically greatest is to of the British Academy 38 (1952): 39–69.
exercise the only freedom worth having …. On Philosophical Style (Manchester, UK,
To think at its best is to find oneself carried 1954).
down the current of necessity. To choose most “The Impasse in Ethics – and a Way Out,”
responsibly is to see alternative goods with University of California Publications in
full clearness and to find the greatest of them Philosophy 28 (1955): 93–112.
tipping the beam. This, in a way, is to be deter- Reason and Goodness (London, 1961).
mined. But there is nothing mechanical about Reason and Analysis (London, 1962).
it. For it is what the rational man means by “Internal Relations and Their Importance to
freedom” (1962, p. 493). Philosophy,” Review of Metaphysics 21
Reason and Belief considers the respective (1967): 227–36.
roles of reason and revelation in forming reli- The Uses of a Liberal Education: And Other
gious beliefs. Blanshard again argues that we Talks to Students, ed. Eugene Freeman
should be guided by reason alone, that to base (La Salle, Ill., 1973).
one’s beliefs on revelation or authority is to Reason and Belief (London, 1974).
violate an ethics of belief that should direct all Four Reasonable Men: Marcus Aurelius,
our beliefs, including the religious. As an John Stuart Mill, Ernest Renan, Henry
example, if reality is a coherent whole the law Sidgwick (Middletown, Conn., 1984).
of causality leaves no room for miracles.
Where then does God fit in? Once again, he Other Relevant Works
sides with Spinoza: “For us the ultimate reality Blanshard’s papers are at Yale University.
in the universe is to be found in no part of it, “Personal Ethics,” in Preface to Philosophy:
however great, but only in the whole. It is the Textbook, ed. W. P. Tolley (New York,
universe itself, not indeed as a scattered litter 1946), pp. 101–95.
of items but as the one comprehensive and “The Case for Determinism,” in
necessary order that a full understanding Determinism and Freedom, ed. Sidney
would find in it” (Reason and Belief, 1974, pp. Hook (New York, 1958), pp. 3–15.
523–4). Such a world is neither morally nor “Interrogation of Brand Blanshard,” in
intrinsically good, but indifferent. It is a world Philosophical Interrogations, ed. S. Rome
governed by logic, not love. However, there are and B. Rome (New York, 1964), pp.
genuine goods we can seek by fulfilling our 201–57.
nature as rational beings. To do so we must “In Defense of Metaphysics,” in
recognize reason for what it is. “It will at no Metaphysics: Readings and Reappraisals,
stage give [us] finality, but [we] will approach ed. W. E. Kennick and M. Lazerowitz
[our] goal by means of it or not at all …. Take (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966), pp.
reason seriously …. Give it its head. Let it 331–55.
shape belief and conduct freely. It will shape “The Limits of Naturalism,” in
them aright if anything can.” (Reason and Contemporary American Philosophy:
Belief, 1974, p. 572) Second Series, ed. J. E. Smith (London,
1970), pp. 21–53.
“Rationalism,” in Encyclopaedia Britannica,
248
BLAVATSKY
15th edn (London, 1974), vol. 15, pp. posts in Ukraine and southern Russia. During
527–32. a year in the Astrakhan region, where her
“The Philosophic Enterprise,” in The Owl of grandfather was administrator, she encoun-
Minerva: Philosophers on Philosophy, ed. tered the Kalmuck tribe, which practiced a
C. J. Bontempo and S. J. Odell (New form of Tibetan Buddhism. As an adult she
York, 1975), pp. 163–77. reported being strongly influenced by her early
contact with the Kalmucks’ chief priest.
Further Reading Helena’s formal education was limited to a
Amer Nat Bio, Amer Phils 1950-2000, Bio series of governesses, but she came from a
20thC Phils, Oxford Comp Phil, Pres literary family; her mother was a successful
Addr of APA v5, Proc of APA v64, Who novelist, her grandmother an amateur natu-
Was Who in Amer v9, Who’s Who in Phil ralist, and her maternal uncle a writer on polit-
“Brand Blanshard,” Review of Metaphysics ical and military subjects. After her mother’s
21 (1967): 227–72. Special section of death in 1842, Helena went to live perma-
articles on Blanshard with his “Rejoinder nently with her grandparents then residing in
to My Critics.” Saratov, where she encountered the library of
Idealistic Studies 20 (May 1990): 97–170. her late great-grandfather, Prince Pavel
Special issue devoted to Blanshard. Dolgorukii, a prominent Rosicrucian
Reck, Andrew J. The New American Freemason in the years before Catherine II
Philosophers: An Exploration of Thought closed the lodges. In 1847 Helena went to live
Since World War II (Baton Rouge, La., in the new family home in Tbilisi, where she
1968), pp. 81–119. became acquainted with Prince Aleksandr
Schilpp, Paul A., ed. The Philosophy of Golitsyn, a Freemason who encouraged her
Brand Blanshard (La Salle, Ill., 1980). to travel abroad and pursue her growing
Contains Blanshard’s autobiography and interest in esotericism.
bibliography. In 1849 she married Nikifor Blavatsky, vice
“Truth and Reason: Essays Written in governor of Yerevan province, but she aban-
Honor of Brand Blanshard’s Eightieth doned her husband within a short time and
Birthday, August 27, 1972,” Idealistic went to Istanbul and then to Cairo, where she
Studies 4 (1974): 1–105. Blanshard’s “A studied with Paolos Metamon, a Coptic
Reply to My Critics” is on pp. 107–30 of magician. In the early 1850s, she met Albert
the following issue. Rawson, an American artist, author, and
explorer, with whom she traveled widely in the
F. Michael Walsh Middle East, Europe, and America. Rawson,
who became a leading figure in the Free
Thought movement and several Masonic orga-
nizations, later joined the Theosophical Society
in New York. Blavatsky spent much of her
thirties in the company of Agardi Metrovitch,
BLAVATSKY, Helena Petrovna (1831–91) a Hungarian opera singer and radical leftist.
Metrovitch was a disciple of Giuseppe
Helena Petrovna Blavatsky was born on 12 Mazzini, prophet of Italian nationalism, with
August 1831 (31 July in the Russian calendar), whom Blavatsky was associated in the 1850s
in Ekaterinoslav, Ukraine, and died on 8 May in London. She traveled with Metrovitch in
1891 in London, England. She spent her child- Ukraine, Italy, and Eastern Europe, but
hood alternating between the estates of her returned to her family in Russia for a long
maternal grandparents and a series of military visit in 1858. She performed various mediu-
249
BLAVATSKY
mistic feats during this time according to mitted letters to Olcott alleged to be from
family memoirs, and alleged psychic phenom- various “adepts” beginning in the summer of
ena continued in one form or another for the 1875. The following autumn, Olcott and
rest of her life. Blavatsky founded the Theosophical Society,
Although she possibly visited India and whose other cofounders included Charles
neighboring countries around 1856 and again Sotheran, an English immigrant to New York
in 1869, her travels and associations during who was a noted journalist and Socialist.
this period remain undocumented. In the early Sotheran was also a Rosicrucian and
1870s she went with Metrovitch to Egypt, Freemason, associated with Rawson in several
where he died. There she was reunited with secret societies.
Metamon and became affiliated with a group In 1877, Blavatsky’s first book Isis Unveiled
she would later call the Brotherhood of Luxor. was published to mixed reviews but impressive
Among her likely associates in this group was sales. It attacked religion and science on behalf
Jamal ad-Din “al-Afghani,” an Iranian politi- of an ancient gnosis allegedly superior to both,
cal organizer, religious reformer, and leader of traces of which she found preserved by secret
subversive movements throughout the Muslim societies around the world as well as in scrip-
world, whose travels paralleled hers for thirty tures of many religions. Many of its themes
years. One of his closest colleagues was James were shared by two other authors affiliated
Sanua, an Egyptian playwright and journalist with the Theosophical Society – Emma
of Italian Jewish background, later exiled to Hardinge Britten and Marie, Countess of
Paris, where he spent most of his life. For many Caithness – in books appearing shortly before
years, Sanua maintained close ties with Lydia Isis. But Blavatsky’s emphasis soon shifted
Pashkov, a Russian travel writer and friend of away from Spiritualism and Western esoteri-
Blavatsky, who accompanied her on a long cism, and all her later writings are unambigu-
Syrian journey in 1872. An advisor during ous in support of reincarnation, which was
Blavatsky’s later career was Raphael Borg, a denied in her first book.
British diplomat in Egypt, who had recruited Soon after the establishment of the
Afghani and Sanua as members of a Cairo Theosophical Society, Blavatsky and Olcott
Masonic lodge. were visited by James Peebles, an American
After Blavatsky settled in New York City in Spiritualist traveling lecturer who had recently
1873, she was visited there by Pashkov and returned from India and Ceylon. He intro-
also by a Cypriot magician who called himself duced them to leaders of the Indian reform
“Ooton Liatto” and who seems to be the inspi- group the Arya Samaj, and of Sinhalese
ration for her references to “the Master Buddhism, both of which were crucial to the
Hilarion.” Almost immediately upon her Theosophists’ decision to move to Bombay at
arrival in New York City, Blavatsky set out to the end of 1878. Blavatsky and Olcott arrived
make a name for herself among Spiritualists. in India acclaiming the leader and founder of
She met Henry Steel Olcott at a series of the Arya Samaj, Swami Dayananda Sarasvati,
seances in Chittenden, Vermont, conducted as their guru. The Theosophical Society and
by William and Horatio Eddy, noted for their the Arya Samaj were amalgamated but the
materialization of spirits. Olcott, captivated alliance ended in rancor in 1882. In their first
by her talk of distant lands and occult secrets, year in India, Blavatsky founded The
became her ardent disciple. Soon after meeting Theosophist and began to write for Mikhail
Olcott, Blavatsky began to write articles for Katkov, a Moscow newspaper editor. Katkov
Spiritualist journals and New York newspa- was also a political conspirator, who later
pers. Assuring him that she was the agent of a encouraged a Russian attack on British India
secret brotherhood of initiates, Blavatsky trans- and plotted with French sympathizers and
250
BLAVATSKY
Indian revolutionaries to that end. Olcott and and Theosophical Society were all involved in
Blavatsky traveled extensively in India estab- the establishment of the Indian National
lishing their society during 1879 and 1880. In Congress in 1885, an organization that con-
1880 Olcott and Blavatsky also made an tinued to have Theosophical ties well into the
extended tour of Ceylon where they publicly twentieth century. In Bengal, many
embraced Buddhism. Theosophists were also affiliated with the
The central figure in Blavatsky’s Caves and Brahmo Samaj, another reformist organiza-
Jungles of Hindostan (1892), a travel book tion that influenced the Freedom Movement.
published serially in two of Katkov’s newspa- Norendro Nath Sen, a Calcutta newspaper
pers, is “Gulab-Singh,” a Hindu ruler pre- editor, was Theosophy’s most influential sup-
sented as a chief sponsor of the Theosophical porter in Bengal.
leaders’ travels. The likely historical basis for In 1885 Blavatsky left India forever, fol-
this figure is Maharaja Ranbir Singh of lowing the investigation of her alleged psychic
Kashmir, who appears under his own name in phenomena by British philosopher Richard
another series of Russian articles by Blavatsky Hodgson, sponsored by the Society for
entitled The Durbar in Lahore. Another char- Psychical Research. Based largely on the testi-
acter in Caves and Jungles is “Ram-Ranjit- mony of Emma and Alexis Coulomb, dis-
Das,” a Sikh official at the Golden Temple in gruntled staff members who claimed to have
Amritsar. His most persuasive historical assisted Blavatsky in faking psychic phenom-
analogue appears to be Sirdar Thakar Singh ena, Hodgson concluded that Blavatsky was an
Sandhanwalia, founder of the Singh Sabha, a impostor and her Masters nonexistent. His
Sikh reform organization allied with the report to the Society for Psychical Research
Theosophical Society. Beginning in 1880, the was devastating to Blavatsky’s reputation
Anglo-Indian newspaper editor A. P. Sinnett outside the ranks of the Theosophical Society.
and government official A. O. Hume were the It has remained controversial to the present
recipients of a series of “Mahatma letters” day, repeatedly criticized by Theosophists and
alleged to be authored by Morya and Koot sympathizers.
Hoomi, mysterious Indians living in Tibet who After her departure from India, Blavatsky
had chosen Blavatsky as their messenger to lived briefly in Italy, Germany, and Belgium,
the outside world. Morya was another name before settling in London in 1887. In the four
for Gulab-Singh, according to Blavatsky’s remaining years of her life, Blavatsky com-
letters to a Russian friend. Although Blavatsky pleted three books that established her repu-
herself has been accused of authoring the tation as a leading author of the late Victorian
letters, neither their authorship nor the occult revival: The Secret Doctrine (1888), The
question of Tibetan sources has been definitely Key to Theosophy (1889), and The Voice of the
resolved. Handwriting analyses have yielded Silence (1889). The latter, as well as some
conflicting results, and while Blavatsky clearly material left unpublished at her death, revealed
had some role in the letters’ production she her growing familiarity with Tibetan Buddhism.
does not appear to have been their sole author. Olcott’s close friendship with the Bengali
The Singh Sabha’s co-founder, Bhai explorer Sarat Chandra Das, who had pene-
Gurmukh Singh, was a leading Sikh intellectual trated Tibet in the early 1880s and returned
with Theosophical associations, as was his col- with more than two hundred manuscripts, might
league Sirdar Dayal Singh Majithia, a philan- account for Blavatsky’s apparent familiarity with
throphist, journalist, and political leader who Tibetan source material in her later writings.
might be the basis for Blavatsky’s references to The Secret Doctrine includes commentary on a
a “Djual Kul” associated with Morya and hitherto unknown text the Stanzas of Dzyan,
Koot Hoomi. The Singh Sabha, Arya Samaj, and the Voice of the Silence claims to be the
251
BLAVATSKY
translation of a likewise unknown Book of Blavatsky acquired American citizenship in

Golden Precepts. Whether these were 1878, but spent only five of her sixty years in the
Blavatskian inventions or genuine texts has been United States. Her primary influence on
debated ever since their publication. American culture has been as an early promoter
Although Blavatsky is generally considered of Eastern religious doctrines, particularly rein-
as a figure in religious history because she carnation and karma, which became widely
founded a new spiritual movement, her known through Theosophical publications.
Theosophy claimed to reconcile and synthesize Some of her doctrines have been adopted in
science, religion, and philosophy. The Secret several later occultist groups, as have the names
Doctrine is the most philosophical of her and characters of the Theosophical Mahatmas,
works, but it usually juxtaposes ancient phi- mostly in the US. In Europe, Blavatskian
losophy with modern science, without refer- Theosophy had an impact on the arts, inspiring
ence to modern philosophy. Immanuel Kant painters Wassily Kandinsky and Piet Mondrian
and G. W. F. Hegel each receive a mere eight and the music of Aleksandr Scriabin. Through
mentions in the text, compared to eighty-seven her acquaintance with William Butler Yeats and
for Plato and Platonism and fifty-four for George Russell, Blavatsky had an influence on
Pythagoras and Pythagoreans. Among her con- the Irish literary renaissance. Theosophy had a
temporaries, the authors most frequently cited lasting role in the Indian Freedom Movement,
are Ernst Haeckl, Thomas Huxley, and especially during the Theosophical Society pres-
Herbert Spencer, all of whom she strongly crit- idency of Annie Besant.
icizes as exponents of Darwinism. Blavatsky’s Blavatsky is usually portrayed as a marginal
Theosophy repudiates scientific materialism figure in American religious history, as well as
and scriptural literalism, attempting to recon- philosophically. The only philosopher to take
cile evolution with religion. She teaches a mon- note of her was William JAMES, who endorsed
adology, frequently citing Gottfried Leibniz, Hodgson’s report but commented sympatheti-
which is combined with Vedantic pantheism, cally on The Voice of the Silence in his 1902
producing an emanationist cosmology in Varieties of Religious Experience. Despite her
which all monads emerge from divine unity at marginality she is also frequently regarded as a
the beginning of a cosmic cycle and return to pivotal figure, an author whose Theosophical
the source at its close. Although the cycles of writings set the agenda for much of popular
Blavatskian cosmology are Hindu in name, occultism of the last century.
the overwhelming focus on sevenfold cycles
of individual, global, and cosmic initiation BIBLIOGRAPHY
suggests Isma`ili doctrines. Her emphasis on Isis Unveiled: A Master-key to the Mysteries
Advaita Vedanta philosophy reflects the influ- of Ancient and Modern Science and
ence of a Brahmin associate T. Subba Row, as Theology (New York, 1877).
well as that of some of her royal sponsors. The Secret Doctrine: The Synthesis of
Nonetheless, she proclaimed herself a Buddhist Science, Religion, and Philosophy
even before taking formal vows in 1880, and (London, New York, and Madras, 1888).
her society was closely allied with leaders of The Voice of the Silence (London and New
Sinhalese Buddhism thereafter. Her writings York, 1889).
recognize no conflicts between Buddhist and The Key to Theosophy (London, 1889).
Vedanta doctrines, nor for that matter between From the Caves and Jungles of Hindostan,
Indic spiritual traditions and those of Western trans. Vera Johnston (London and New
esotericism. She described Theosophy as a uni- York, 1892; 2nd edn, Wheaton, Ill.,
versal solvent and asserted the essential 1975).
harmony of Eastern and Western religions.
252
BLAU
Other Relevant Works Life and Influence of Helena Blavatsky,

Gems from the East (London and New Founder of the Modern Theosophical
York, 1890). Movement (Los Angeles, 1993).
Transactions of the Blavatsky Lodge of the Godwin, Joscelyn. The Theosophical
Theosophical Society (London, 1890–91). Enlightenment (Albany, N.Y., 1994).
Nightmare Tales (London, New York, and Gomes, Michael. The Dawning of the
Madras, 1892). Theosophical Movement (Wheaton, Ill.,
The Theosophical Glossary, ed. G. R. S. 1987).
Mead (London, 1892). Harrison, Vernon. H. P. Blavatsky and the
A Modern Panarion (London, 1895). SPR (Pasadena, Cal., 1997).
The Letters of H. P. Blavatsky to A. P. Johnson, K. Paul. The Masters Revealed:
Sinnett (London, 1925). Madam Blavatsky and the Myth of the
Some Unpublished Letters of Helena Great White Lodge (Albany, N.Y., 1994).
Petrovna Blavatsky, with an Introduction The Mahatma Letters to A. P. Sinnett, 2nd
and Commentary by Eugene Rollin edn (London, 1926).
Corson (London, 1929). Meade, Marion. Madame Blavatsky: The
The People of the Blue Mountains Woman behind the Myth (New York,
(Wheaton, Ill., 1930). 1980).
H. P. B. Speaks, 2 vols, ed. C. Jinarajadasa Reigle, David. Blavatsky’s Secret Books (San
(Madras, India, 1950–51). Diego, Cal., 1999).
H. P. Blavatsky: Collected Writings, 15 vols, Society for Psychical Research. “Report on
ed. Boris de Zirkoff (Wheaton, Ill., Phenomena connected with Theosophy,”
1966–91). Proceedings of the Society for Psychical
H. P. Blavatsky to the American Research 3 (December 1885): 201–400.
Conventions, 1888–1891 (Pasadena, Cal.,
1979). Kenneth Paul Johnson
The Inner Group Teachings of H. P.
Blavatsky (San Diego, Cal., 1985).
The Letters of H. P. Blavatsky (Wheaton,
Ill., 2003).
Helena Blavatsky, ed. Nicholas Goodrick-
Clarke (London, 2004). BLAU, Joseph Leon (1909–86)
Further Reading Joseph Blau was born on 6 May 1909 in

Amer Nat Bio, Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer Brooklyn, New York, the son of Joel Leon
Religious Bio, Encyc Relig, Nat Cycl Blau, a rabbi, and Rachel Woolf Blau. He
Amer Bio v15 received his BA (1931), MA (1933), and PhD
American Theosophical Society. The in philosophy (1944) from Columbia
Theosophic Messenger (San Francisco, University. His dissertation, titled “The
1899–1912). Changed title to The Christian Interpretation of the Cabala in the
Theosophical Messenger and then to The Renaissance,” was written under the philoso-
American Theosophist (Wheaton, Ill., phers James Gutmann and Herbert SCHNEIDER.
1933–96). Changed title to The Quest During the years of his graduate study, Blau
(Wheaton, Ill., 1996–). taught English in New York City high schools.
Carlson, Maria. No Religion Higher Than After earning his doctorate, he was a professor
Truth (Princeton, N.J., 1993). of philosophy at Columbia from 1944 until
Cranston, Sylvia. HPB: The Extraordinary 1963, when he became a professor of religion.
253
BLAU
From 1967 to 1976 he served as chair of the ophy for the non-specialist; The Jews of the
religion department. Blau retired in 1977, and United States, 1790–1840 (1963), edited with
died on 28 December 1986 in New York City. S. W. Baron; and Judaism in America (1976).
Blau’s scholarship concerned two areas of Blau suggests that, according to one under-
overlapping interests: (1) historical American standing of the Kabbalah, humanity’s spiri-
philosophy, and (2) the development of Jewish tual and ritual acts of character aid God’s own
philosophy. For the first of these interests he self-reconciliation, making both evil and
wrote Men and Movements in American creative deeds possible.
Philosophy (1958). This became his best- His colleagues (including Maurice
known book and it was widely studied, dis- Wohlgelernter and James Martin, Jr.) orga-
cussed, and translated into five languages. It nized Blau’s festschrift volume, History,
was dedicated to his friend Herbert Schneider, Religion, and Spiritual Democracy (1980).
whose pattern of thought it followed. Blau
also supplied the extensive bibliographies BIBLIOGRAPHY
included in Schneider’s 1946 A History of Christian Interpretation of the Cabala in
American Philosophy. the Renaissance (Port Washington, N.Y.,
John DEWEY’s influence was evident in 1944).
Blau’s other work. For both Blau and Dewey, Cornerstones of Religious Freedom in
God is the relationship between the actual and America (Boston, 1949).
the ideal. Briefly stated, God must be the Men and Movements in American
realized existence of human beings. Philosophy (New York, 1952).
Commitment to these “ideals,” in their The Spiritual Life of American Jewry,
broadest reach, is the religious attitude, and 1654–1954 (New York, 1955).
religion is a quality of all human experience. If Essays on Jewish Life and Thought (New
we proceed analytically we will uncover dif- York, 1959).
ferent but related types of twentieth-century The Story of Jewish Philosophy (New
naturalism: (1) the poetic naturalism of George York, 1962).
SANTAYANA; (2) the rationalistic naturalism of Ed. with Salo W. Baron, The Jews of the
Morris COHEN; and (3) the experimental nat- United States, 1790–1840: A
uralism of John Dewey, the category in which Documentary History (New York, 1963).
Blau’s work is best placed. Modern Varieties of Judaism (New York,
In the field of Jewish philosophy, Blau 1966).
attempted to clarify the whole span of Jewish Judaism in America: From Curiosity to
philosophy from the Old Testament to Martin Third Faith (Chicago, 1976).
Buber in contemporary time. In his writings,
Blau considers creation, freedom, the theories Other Relevant Works
of Philo, the Talmudists, and Kabbalists, Blau’s papers are at Columbia University
Spinoza, Gnosticism, God, individualism, and in the archives of the Ethical Culture
prophesy, Moses, Maimonides and other less Movement in New York City.
well-known figures and groups. Ed., American Philosophic Addresses:
Like his teacher, Salo Wittmayer Baron, Blau 1700–1900 (New York, 1946).
stressed the cross-cultural effect on the devel- Ed., Nature (Indianapolis, 1948).
opment of Judaism. Among his works are: Ed. with Salo W. Baron, Judaism,
Christian Interpretation of the Cabala in the Postbiblical and Talmudic Period (New
Renaissance (1944); The Story of Jewish York, 1954).
Philosophy (1962), the first single-volume Ed., Social Theories of Jacksonian
treatment of the entire span of Jewish philos- Democracy: Representative Writings of
254
BLEDSOE
the Period 1825–1850 (New York, Illinois. He never lost his primary interest in
1954). theology and philosophy, publishing his first
Ed., Reform Judaism: A Historical book, An Examination of President Edwards’
Perspective, Essays from the Yearbook of Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will in 1845.
the Central Conference of American In 1848 he accepted a position as professor of
Rabbis (New York, 1973). mathematics and astronomy at the University
“Science and Social Progress,” in of Mississippi, and in 1854 became professor
Philosophy and the Civilizing Arts: of mathematics at the University of Virginia.
Essays Presented to Herbert W. With the onset of the Civil War in 1861 he
Schneider, ed. Craig Walton and John P. joined the Confederate Army as a colonel.
Anton (Athens, Ohio, 1974). Confederate President Jefferson Davis soon
promoted him to assistant secretary of war,
Further Reading and then encouraged him to compose a defense
Amer Nat Bio of the constitutional justification for
Hoffman, R. Joseph. Biblical v. Secular Confederate secession. In 1863 Bledsoe went
Ethics: The Conflict (Buffalo, N.Y., to London to do legal research, and remained
1988). there until 1866, when he returned to
Wohlgelernter, Maurice, et al., eds. History, Baltimore to publish Is Davis a Traitor? Or
Religion, and Spiritual Democracy: was Secession a Constitutional Right previous
Essays in Honor of Joseph L. Blau (New to the War of 1861? The next year he re-
York, 1980). Contains a bibliography of founded and edited the Southern Review,
Blau’s writings. which promoted a pro-Southern, anti-indus-
trialist, and theological agenda. In 1871
John Howie Bledsoe was ordained a minister in the
Methodist Church; he occasionally preached,
but never settled with a congregation. For
some years he ran a girls’ school with the assis-
tance of his daughter, Sophia McIlvaine
Bledsoe, who also co-edited the Southern
BLEDSOE, Albert Taylor (1809–77) Review from 1874 to 1878. Bledsoe continued
to edit the Southern Review and to publish
Albert Taylor Bledsoe was born on 9 extensively in its pages until his death on 8
November 1809 in Frankfort, Kentucky. After December 1877 in Alexandria, Virginia.
graduating from the United States Military Bledsoe’s Philosophy of Mathematics (1866)
Academy at West Point in 1830, he served at was the first advanced textbook on mathe-
Fort Gibson on the frontier in the Seventh US matics in America by that title, although its
Infantry, but in 1832 he resigned his commis- philosophical aspects go little beyond exami-
sion. He taught mathematics and French at nations of analytical geometry and the calculus
Kenyon College in 1833–4, and then was proof infinitesimals. His defense of the
fessor of mathematics at Miami University in Confederate secession had a far wider impact,
1834–5. During these years he studied law succinctly stating the best case that could be
and theology and was ordained in the made for voluntary federalism and states’
Episcopal Church in 1835, but growing doc- rights, and it perhaps played a helpful role in
trinal disagreements over baptismal regenera- Davis’s trial for treason. His early book on
tion sent him in the direction of practicing law Liberty and Slavery (1857) had also advanced
instead of the ministry. From 1838 to 1848 he this interpretation of the Constitution along-
maintained a law practice in Springfield, side a virulently racist view of slaves as legiti-
255
BLEDSOE
mate property. Bledsoe, like some other Other Relevant Works

Southern pro-slavery intellectuals including Bledsoe’s family papers are at Harvard
Robert Lewis DABNEY, offered biblical inter- University and some letters are at the
pretations in support of slavery. University of Virginia.
Bledsoe’s theology in most respects imitates
the mainstream Protestant views of provi- Further Reading
dence and salvation, with a particular Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
emphasis on the reality of free will. His rejec- Dict Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v8
tion of Jonathan Edwards’s treatise against Anonymous. Is Slavery a Blessing? A Reply
libertarianism is grounded on an appeal to to Prof. Bledsoe’s Essay on Liberty and
the experience of freedom and a denial that Slavery; with Remarks on Slavery as it is
volition can be explained in terms of cause and (Boston, 1857).
effect. Worse, the false doctrine of predesti- Bennett, John B. “Albert Taylor Bledsoe:
nation leads to unbelief, in Bledsoe’s opinion. Social and Religious Controversialist of
Another cause of unbelief is a false perspective the Old South,” PhD dissertation, Duke
on the nature and origin of evil. His Theodicy University (Durham, N.C., 1942).
(1853) attempts to vindicate God’s goodness Hays, Willard M. “Polemics and
and righteousness in the face of apparent Philosophy: A Biography of Albert
moral and natural evils. Although it was Taylor Bledsoe,” PhD dissertation,
designed to match John Wesley’s position, University of Tennessee (Nashville,
contemporaries noted that Bledsoe’s tactics 1971).
justifying the fall and sin as necessary for the Herrick, Sophia Bledsoe. “Albert Taylor
glory and dominion of God actually proceed Bledsoe (1809–1877),” in Library of
in a manner reminiscent of Edwards. Bledsoe Southern Literature, ed. Edwin Alderman
also caused controversy within the Southern and Joel Harris (Atlanta and New
Methodist Church through his defense of Orleans, 1907), vol. 1, pp. 395–9.
infant baptism by appeal to tradition and McCorkle, William P. “Bledsoe’s Theory of
near-universal acceptance, although he con- Moral Freedom,” Presbyterian Quarterly
fessed that he was unable to find biblical 5 (April 1891): 243–61.
evidence for the practice. Miller, C. W. The Southern Review and
Infant Baptism, or, Methodist Literature
BIBLIOGRAPHY Vindicated against the Attacks of Dr. A.
An Examination of President Edwards’ T. Bledsoe (Nashville, Tenn., 1874).
Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will
(Philadelphia, 1845). John R. Shook
A Theodicy, or, Vindication of the Divine
Glory as Manifested in the Constitution
and Government of the Moral World
(New York, 1853).
An Essay on Liberty and Slavery
(Philadelphia, 1857). BLEWETT, George John (1873–1912)
Is Davis a Traitor? Or was Secession a
Constitutional Right previous to the War George Blewett was born on 9 December 1873
of 1861? (Baltimore, 1866). in Yarmouth Township, Ontario, Canada. He
Philosophy of Mathematics (Philadelphia, excelled at his college studies in political
1866). economy, and received the BA from Methodist
Victoria University in Toronto in 1894. Active
256
BLEWETT
in the Methodist Church, he was eventually merged fields of activity whose personal
ordained in 1898 and did some preaching, but centers are distinct. His idealism emphasized
his intellectual interests kept him attached to the social relations, including those with God,
psychology and philosophy. He completed the of cooperation/conflict that sustain human
honors philosophy program at Victoria minds. God is the supreme sustainer of all rela-
College in 1897 and also studied theology. He tions, whose role as the knower of nature guar-
then entered the PhD program in psychology antees nature’s existence, because the laws of
at the University of Toronto with August nature are the laws of experience. In this way
Kirschmann, who encouraged him to take scientific conclusions about nature are not only
courses in Germany in 1899 with Oswald compatible with, but necessary for, human
Kulpe and Karl Marbe. For his PhD he desired knowledge about God. However, science does
the Harvard degree instead; largely on the basis not exhaust all knowledge since the logically
of his previous work and a dissertation on the prior question, how scientific knowledge is
metaphysical basis of ethics titled “The possible, must also be answered by philosophy.
Metaphysical Basis of Preceptive Ethics,” he Following Wilhelm Wundt’s and James’s vol-
earned the PhD in philosophy in 1900. untaristic psychology, knowledge is intrinsi-
Although his time with psychologist Hugo cally involved with purposive activity.
MÜNSTERBERG and philosophers William JAMES Materialism is an abstract and lifeless picture
and Josiah ROYCE was brief, their teachings of reality that deterministically pre-empts
confirmed his commitment to a theological explaining the immaterial foundation and free
and personal idealism. growth of knowledge. Deism, pantheism, and
After some postgraduate work at Cambridge, supernaturalism can fall into the same deter-
Oxford (with A. M. Fairbairn), and Berlin (with ministic error.
George Simmel), Blewett returned to Canada to Blewett’s crucial role for nature, as the field
take the chair of church history and historical of contact between our energies and God’s
theology at Wesley College in Winnipeg, where thoughts, requires that nature itself be in
he taught from 1901 to 1906. In 1906 he process. “Nature, then, has its being in a
assumed the Ryerson chair of ethics and apolo- process in which God fulfils Himself in the
getics at Victoria College of the University of gradual creation of a spiritual society. But, as
Toronto. With the publication of his first book, we have had at every point to notice, we our-
The Study of Nature and the Vision of God selves are active in that process. To have
(1907), his reputation as one of North America’s knowledge of nature the human soul must
important thinkers was secured. He patriotically exert energies of its own; although those
declined invitations to take Borden Parker energies of its own could neither exist, nor
BOWNE’s vacated chair at Boston University, but have any effect in the way of knowledge, unless
he did agree to present the Nathaniel William similar energies were working on a greater
Taylor Lectures at Yale University’s Divinity scale through the whole of nature. And if this
School during the winter of 1910–11, later pub- is true of the knowledge of nature, still more is
lished as The Christian View of the World it true of that practical intercourse with nature
(1912). In the following year Blewett drowned, – the labour and the wrestle, the steadily
on 15 August 1912, while vacationing in Go growing mastery crossed by occasional and
Home Bay, Ontario. terrible defeat – which has an even greater
Blewett’s philosophical religion brings God place than knowledge in the total process in
into community with nature and humanity. which we at once receive and achieve our spir-
Unlike some personal idealists who demand itual being.” (1912, pp. 188–9).
that God must be an entirely separate being Self-development as persons, which we
from human persons, Blewett postulated know through undeniable experience, is the
257
BLEWETT
key to understanding all reality, including and Culture in English Canada,

God’s. At times Blewett willingly embraces a 1850–1950 (Waterloo, Ont., 1981).
kind of mysticism that unifies our strivings MacCollum-Paterson, Morton. “George
with God’s. The ethical dimension to this John Blewett: A Forgotten Personalist,”
union is essential; although Absolute, God Idealistic Studies 8 (1978): 179–89.
needs our moral contribution to the universe’s ———, “Blewett’s Vision of God,” in
progress. Blewett’s idealism is based on a pro- Religion and Science in Early Canada,
cessive and ethical metaphysics, where what ed. J. Douglas Rabb (Kingston, Ont.,
ought to be grounds what becomes. The great 1988), pp. 233–7.
metaphysical difficulty, which Blewett con- Paterson, Morton. “Divine Encounter in
fronts but does not defeat, is how to uphold Blewett,” Studies in Religion (Waterloo,
traditional theistic views of God as a Trinity, Ont.) 6 (1976–7): 397–403.
as eternally complete, and purely good, while Slater, John G. Minerva’s Aviary:
also maintaining that God is essentially Philosophy at Toronto 1843–1943
involved with the temporal progress (and evils) (Toronto, 2005), chap. 13.
of the world. Pantheism was not an option
for Blewett, any more than was Calvinism: John R. Shook
our condition is not one of either natural
goodness or natural badness. Blewett took an
optimistic view of our opportunities to gradu-
ally become more perfect, guided by Christ’s
example.
Blewett offers a theodicy that explains sin as BLOOD, Benjamin Paul (1832–1919)
necessarily resulting from our imperfections as
finite and partial creatures. Although Blewett Benjamin Paul Blood was born on 21
was far less indebted to Hegel than was his November 1832 in Amsterdam, New York.
fellow Canadian John WATSON, they both His father, John Blood, was a moderately
agreed that socially progressive action is obliga- wealthy landowner of 700 acres, who taught
tory for Christians. Salvation is dependent on his only son the skills of farming but little else.
living in a more righteous community, but faith Although Benjamin had no college education,
in creeds cannot ultimately supply the criteria of his own reading and native intelligence made
progress. For Blewett, Christianity itself evolves him a local prodigy and a good debater with
through humanity’s intellectual efforts; this traveling lecturers or spiritualists visiting the
liberal stance does not mean a surrender to sec- town. Mechanically inclined, he claims in some
ularism but rather opens the entire field of society autobiographical remarks to have patented
for Christian reform. some “devices” including a swathing reaper.
He also admits to his “loose and wandering
BIBLIOGRAPHY ways” that included gambling. Blood was
The Study of Nature and the Vision of God married twice: to Mary Sayles and, following
(Toronto, 1907). her death, to Harriet Lefferts, having a
The Christian View of the World (New daughter from each marriage. He lived his
Haven, 1912). entire life in Amsterdam and died there on 15
January 1919.
Further Reading Blood’s life would have passed entirely
Canad Encyc, Dict Canad Bio unnoticed by the wider intellectual world,
Armour, Leslie, and Elizabeth Trott. The except for his encounter with nitrous oxide at
Faces of Reason: An Essay on Philosophy a dentist’s office in 1860 and his subsequent
258
BLOOD
efforts to draw attention to the mystical met and dealt with by faculties more akin to
powers of the gas. Further experiments con- our activities and heroisms and willingnesses,
vinced Blood that all genuine metaphysical than to our logical powers. This is the anaes-
knowledge of reality arose from the sort of thetic insight, according to our author. Let my
mystical experiences that also happened to be last word, then, speaking in the name of intel-
caused by anesthetic drugs. He wrote and pub- lectual philosophy, be his word: There is no
lished a thirty-seven-page pamphlet titled The conclusion. What has concluded that we might
Anaesthetic Revelation and the Gist of conclude in regard to it? There are no fortunes
Philosophy (1874), mailing copies to nearly to be told, and there is no advice to be given –
every prominent philosopher, psychologist, Farewell!” (1910, pp. 758–9)
theologian, and literary figure he could think Blood’s final work, Pluriverse: An Essay in
of. the Philosophy of Pluralism (1920), was pub-
One of the recipients was Harvard philoso- lished because James had urged the responsi-
pher and psychologist William J AMES . bilities of literary executor upon his former
Although Blood received more kind replies student Horace M. KALLEN. Two of Blood’s
than he deserved, and began lengthy corre- poems are in the Library of America volume
spondences with several figures including on American Poetry: The Nineteenth Century,
Ralph Waldo EMERSON and Alfred Tennyson, Volume Two.
only James permitted Blood’s speculations to
significantly influence his own thought. James BIBLIOGRAPHY
promptly tried nitrous oxide himself and came The Philosophy of Justice between God and
to agree with Blood that “normal” conscious- Man (New York, 1851).
ness is but a limited and somewhat misleading Optimism: The Lesson of the Ages (Boston,
encounter with reality. James’s religious spec- 1860).
ulations arrived at the same conclusion: that The Anaesthetic Revelation and the Gist of
our intellectual methods can distort or obscure Philosophy (Amsterdam, N.Y., 1874).
the more fundamental features of wider spirit “What Is Truth?” Journal of Speculative
always available at the “fringes” and Philosophy 10 (1875): 89–94.
“margins” of consciousness. “Philosophic Reveries,” Journal of
Most of Blood’s publications consist of pam- Speculative Philosophy 20 (1886): 1–53.
phlets on diverse topics, some poetry, and Plato! Jesus! Kant! The Flaw in Supremacy
numerous letters to the editors of local news- (Amsterdam, N.Y., 1893).
papers such as the Amsterdam Gazette and Pluriverse: An Essay in the Philosophy of
Recorder, the Utica Herald, and the Albany Pluralism, ed. Horace M. Kallen (Boston
Times. James regularly received Blood’s latest and London, 1920).
work, approved of his transition from monism
towards pluralistic empiricism, and occasion- Other Relevant Works
ally quoted his musings. James liked to quote Blood’s papers are at Harvard University.
Blood’s phrases: “the universe is wild-game The Bride of the Iconoclast, A Poem:
flavored as a hawk’s wing” (1893, p. 7) and Suggestions toward the Mechanical Art of
“ever not quite.” James’s last publication Verse (Boston, 1854).
before his death in 1910, “A Pluralist Mystic,” Napoleon I: A Historical Lecture
described how Blood’s efforts “fascinated me (Amsterdam, N.Y., 1863).
so ‘weirdly’ that I am conscious of its having The Colonnades (Amsterdam, N.Y., 1868).
been one of the stepping-stones of my thinking A Letter to Workingmen: On Hard Times
ever since.” James’s final words tell us that and the Political Situation (Amsterdam,
“[The mystery] remains as something to be N.Y., 1878).
259
BLOOD
The Democratic Heart: A Sketch of Cornell University as a professor of govern-

Conservative Sentiment and Policy ment (1963–70); and to the University of
(Amsterdam, N.Y., 1882). Toronto as a professor of political science
A Capitalist’s View of Socialism (New (1970–79). He returned to the University of
York, 1916). Chicago in 1979 to become a professor of
Heirlooms: A Book of Poems, ed. John E. political philosophy and to teach political phi-
Willoughby (Albany, N.Y., 1924). losophy and social theory as a member of the
Committee of Social Thought, and remained
Further Reading there until his death. Bloom died on 7 October
Dict Amer Bio 1992 in Chicago.
James, William. “Consciousness under Philosopher, political and social theorist,
Nitrous Oxide,” Psychological Review 5 subject of a novel, guest of presidents and
(1898): 194–6. prime ministers, Bloom spent most of his sixty-
———, “A Pluralistic Mystic,” Hibbert two years as a relatively obscure academic,
Journal 8 (1910): 739–59. known mainly for his translations, most
Kallen, Horace M. “Preface,” in Pluriverse: notably those of Rousseau’s Emile (1979) and
An Essay in the Philosophy of Pluralism, Plato’s Republic (1968), the latter being a
ed. Horace M. Kallen (Boston, 1920), pp. literal translation and considered, like Bloom
xv–xliv. himself, to be somewhat eccentric. But obscu-
Perry, Ralph Barton. The Thought and rity was not in Bloom’s destiny.
Character of William James (Boston, Late in life, virtually overnight, he found
1935), pp. 552–60. himself famous. He skyrocketed to interna-
Wright, A. J. “Benjamin Paul Blood: tional attention, becoming, as he himself
Anesthesia’s Philosopher and Mystic,” in bemusedly observed, the academic equivalent
The History of Anesthesia: Third of a rock star. He was “picked up by the great
International Symposium Proceedings, hydraulic forces of the country,” as his friend
ed. B. R. Fink (Park Ridge, Ill., 1992), Saul Bellow describes it in Ravelstein, his
pp. 447–56. roman à clef on Bloom, a source of valuable
insights into both the man himself and his phi-
John R. Shook losophy.
The vehicle that propelled Bloom from
obscurity to the television talk-show circuit
was a book, The Closing of the American
Mind (1987), which he wrote at Bellow’s
urging and hurriedly, apparently in a matter of
BLOOM, Allan David (1930–92) months, motivated in no small part by his des-
perate need to pay off the large debts he had
Allan Bloom was born on 14 September 1930 accumulated trying to live like an aristocrat on
in Indianapolis, Indiana. At the age of sixteen a University of Chicago professor’s salary, a
he began attending the University of Chicago, lifestyle described in sometimes comic detail in
where he earned his BA in 1949, his MA in Ravelstein (Bellow 2000). Bloom’s book,
1953, and his PhD from the Committee of which topped the bestseller lists in both the US
Social Thought in 1954, with a thesis on the and France, generated so much controversy
political philosophy of Isocrates. Bloom joined that in the end academics were writing articles
the Chicago liberal arts faculty as a lecturer in about “How Bloom did it” – that is to say,
1955, and then moved on to Yale University as how did he achieve such notoriety with a single
a professor of political science (1962–3); to work?
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BLOOM
“Difficult but popular – a spirited, intelli- to be of the utmost importance). Perhaps the
gent, warlike book,” to use Bellow’s descrip- book’s subtitle, How Higher Education has
tion (Bellow 2000, p. 4), The Closing of the Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls
American Mind develops most fully ideas that of Today’s Students, is partly to blame for
Bloom had sketched out in his lectures and this. The title is at once revealing and decep-
earlier essays, notably the introductions to his tively simple. The book is about much more
translations. Love and Friendship, published than higher education, though higher educa-
posthumously, does not supersede but rather tion is centrally important to the larger
complements it. Whereas The Closing of the problem it articulates, a problem many of his
American Mind is about reason (the critics, focused as they are on only the univer-
Enlightenment) and the consequences for sity, fail to see.
Western culture of reason’s rise to dominance, Bloom introduces this problem by way of a
particularly in the form of science, Love and practical question, a question characteristically
Friendship is, as the title says, about two of his in scope and tone, and one that has preoc-
reason’s opposites, namely, love and friend- cupied philosophers both ancient and modern:
ship. Accordingly, this last published work of how can we achieve real happiness and
Bloom’s can be read as the other half of his become autonomous? Autonomy, for Bloom,
general thesis about happiness and the human is a necessary and perhaps even a sufficient
condition in modern advanced capitalist condition for our being happy. How do you
democracies in general and the United States in create, especially in the context of modernity,
particular. an autonomous human being, morally and
Bloom’s main objective in The Closing of the intellectually independent, the only kind of
American Mind is “to capture modernity in its human being that can be truly happy? Bloom’s
full complexity and to assess its human costs” work, then, can be viewed as “a plea for
(Bellow 2000, p. 14). He pursues this goal by authentic liberation” (1987, p. 48), and this
way of analysis of modernity’s exemplar, the central point can be used to help make sense
United States, and views the problematics of out of the structure of the Closing of the
modernity through the American window. American Mind.
From this perspective he must perforce discuss The first of the three major parts of the book
America and the American condition. Of paris “Students.” This section can be read as
ticular interest is the condition of democracy in Bloom’s attempt to address the question of
America, especially as he saw it reflected in the what an autonomous and happy human being
beliefs of his undergraduate students (part 1 of looks like by describing contemporary 1980s
the book), in the new language and concepts he young Americans, whom he considered to be
felt Americans had adopted to describe them- neither autonomous nor particularly happy.
selves and their relationships (part 2), and, They are, says Bloom, “homogenized persons”
finally, in the state of affairs of the contempo- (1987, p. 319) as opposed to persons with
rary American university (part 3). That the truly different goals and motives of action that
book takes democracy in general and democ- can be taken seriously, “flat” and “maimed
racy in America in particular as its focus is souls” (p. 83) who manifest the individualism
not always appreciated by its critics, who are and atomism predicted by Tocqueville in his
quick to seize upon Bloom’s critique of higher Democracy in America. Young Americans,
education, especially its relativism and his- Bloom says, “can be anything they want to be
toricism, intellectual phenomena which – but have no particular reason to be anything in
perhaps with the exception of Martha particular” (p. 87).
Nussbaum – they rarely if ever link to democ- In the second part of the book, “Nihilism
racy itself (a connection which Bloom believed American Style,” Bloom tries to show how
261
BLOOM
Americans have unwittingly adopted a vocab- deserve particular mention. For Bloom, as for
ulary (and with it a Zeitgeist) from German Rousseau, politics is decisive for individual
philosophy, a language which ill suits them, development, setting limits on or creating pos-
given their empiricist–scientific background sibilities for what we can be and do as human
and principles. America and Americans, says beings. In Shakespeare’s Politics (1981) he
Bloom, are products of a self-conscious and writes: “Human virtues and vices can be said
philosophical project, the Enlightenment. Its to be defined primarily in political terms. Civil
general principle is that what is true and good society and its laws define what is good and
can be discovered through the use of reason, bad, and its education forms the citizens. The
and this general principle informs all modern character of life is decisively influenced by the
political regimes founded on freedom and character of the regime under which a man
equality, hence on the consent of the governed lives, and it is the regime that encourages or
(1987, p. 158). But through their German con- discourages the growth within it of the various
nection, brought to them during and after human types. Any change in a way of life pre-
World War II, principally by German émigrés supposes a change in the political, and it is by
to the faculties and classrooms of America’s means of the political that the change must be
universities, Americans have unawares effected. It is in their living together that men
adopted a relativist and historicist language. develop their human potential, and it is the
“The new language is that of value relativism political regime which determines the goals
and it constitutes a change in our view of and the arrangement of the life in common.
things moral and political as great as the one (pp. 8–9) … various nations encourage various
that took place when Christianity replaced virtues in men; one cannot find every kind of
Greek and Roman paganism” (p. 141). The man in any particular time and place. Just the
“self,” “creativity,” “culture,” “values” – these difference between paganism and Christianity
are terms central in this language, part not of has an important effect on the kinds of preoc-
our original Enlightenment vocabulary but of cupations men have.” (p. 11)
the language of value relativism. The question Concerning virtue and virtue theory, the
that has never been raised, says Bloom, is passage just cited – as well as many others
whether this value relativism is harmonious that could also be cited – suggests that Bloom
with democracy. He believes it is not. subscribes to some kind of virtue theory.
In the third part of The Closing of the Again, in Shakespeare’s Politics he writes: “A
American Mind, Bloom addresses the proper man is most what he is as a result of what he
role of the university in a democratic society. does; a man is known, not simply by his exis-
The university’s most important obligation, tence, but by the character of his actions –
he argues, is to give students what they need to liberal or greedy, courageous or cowardly,
become autonomous. For Bloom, this means frank or sly, moderate or profligate. Since these
giving them the ability to reflect seriously on qualities produce happiness or misery, they
the various alternative answers to the most are of enduring interest to human beings …
important questions in life. This is an obliga- Passions, feelings, and the whole realm of the
tion which he feels the American university, psychological are secondary. This is because
suffering from the value relativism which it feelings are properly related to certain kinds of
purveys, is shirking. In so doing, it is putting action and to the virtues which control such
democracy in America at risk and, given action.” (p. 8)
America’s superpower status, is possibly Bloom, who greatly admires Rousseau, does
putting the world at risk as well. not appear to subscribe to his view that we are
In the course of his analysis Bloom touches by nature moderate and only go to extremes
on a great many themes, some of which because our experience in society has upset
262
BLOOM
the equilibrium upon which our moderation of its complexity and assess its consequences,
depends. Bloom rather seems to take the older and one of the consequences of modernity is
view, going back to Aristotle, which holds that our reluctance to talk about the existence of a
our desires are by nature infinite and that they “soul,” using instead the term “self,” which, as
must be checked by our faculty of will, which, he points out in the second part of The
guided by reason, can be used to control our Closing, is the modern substitute for the soul
desires for the sake of the good. “Virtue was (1987, p. 173).
in this older view understood to be natural Bloom’s theory of human nature is scattered
and the control exercised by it to be productive throughout his works. We all have common
of at least one part of happiness,” Bloom needs, both high and low, which must be sat-
writes (1993, p. 44). “Throughout the whole isfied if we are to be happy. We are beings who
tradition, religious and philosophic, man had must take our orientation from visions of our
two concerns, the care of the body and the possible perfection. We must play with the
care of his soul, expressed in the opposition “fires of utopia” to know what we can be at
between desire and virtue. In principle he was our highest as opposed to our lowest. We have
supposed to long to be all virtue, to break free souls. Our souls are constituted in part by our
from the chains of bodily desire.” (p. 174) reason and our desires, which must be properly
The moderns, says Bloom, broke with the balanced if we are to be happy. Our natural
tradition of thought which held that desire disposition or tendency is to go to extremes
was to be tamed and perfected by virtue. The and we must work to keep ourselves in
goal, rather, became to discover one’s desires balance. We are composed of not just one
and live by them, an objective reflected in our duality but several dualities. We are opposites
present-day emphasis on authenticity. Our held together in a tension.
unity and wholeness were not to be found, as For Bloom, the point of liberal education is
the ancients believed, in our overcoming of to teach us how to be autonomous. Becoming
desire but in our recognizing and acknowl- autonomous means, in the first place, recog-
edging it. Most importantly, for Hobbes and nizing and acknowledging the distinction
Locke, we were to recognize our most between nature and convention. “No real
powerful desire of all – our desire for self- teacher,” says Bloom, “can doubt that his task
preservation or, alternatively, our fear of death. is to assist his pupil to fulfill human nature
Upon this basic desire nations could be built against all the deforming forces of convention
and maintained. Thus the moderns cut off the and prejudice.” (1987, p. 21) Our happiness
higher aspirations of man and our modern depends upon our being able to properly
nation-states came to be built, as Leo STRAUSS balance the conflicting demands of our nature
put it, on low but solid ground. For Bloom, and to reconcile these, in turn, with the oblig-
however, the modern grounds of the nation- ations with which convention, our society,
state are not so solid. From this grounding, confronts us. We all want and need to be
selves have grown that live according to the happy, and freedom or autonomy is one of
opinions of others. the major conditions of our really being so. In
Closely related to Bloom’s virtue theory are trying to be free, however, we are faced with
his ideas about the soul and human nature. a twofold problem, one part having to do with
Bloom’s use of the term “soul” seems to date ourselves and the other with the particular
him and leads one to expect a more religious society, the set of conventions, culture and
and spiritual discussion than he actually political regime into which we are born and
provides. But on reading him, it becomes clear that present themselves to us as the best ways
that he chooses this term quite carefully. of thinking and of feeling and of living life. But
Bloom is trying to understand modernity in all we can never know whether in fact they are the
263
BLOOM
best ways (for us) unless we can gain enough Palmer, M., and T. Pangle. Political
distance to examine them critically and then Philosophy and the Human Soul: Essays
choose for ourselves, perhaps reaffirming in Memory of Allan Bloom (Lanham,
them, perhaps not, but nonetheless in the Md., 1995).
process rendering ourselves autonomous from
their original hold over us. The main task of Robert O. Slater
education, particularly a liberal education, the
only kind of education that matters for Bloom,
is to enable us to achieve autonomy. Education
can do this by helping us learn and reflect on
the various alternative answers that one can
give to the most important questions of life, BLOOMFIELD, Leonard (1887–1949)
questions which, as we become more
autonomous, we can answer for ourselves or Leonard Bloomfield is perhaps the most impor-
which, if we do not, others will answer for us. tant figure in American linguistics in the first
American higher education, concerned as it is half of the twentieth century. In one form or
with specialization, disregards what is in a another, ‘structural linguistics’ as it came to be
democracy its most important obligation – to identified with Bloomfield’s name, was the
expose students to the major alternatives. dominant view in linguistics as well as anthro-
pology and a number of other fields. Further,
BIBLIOGRAPHY the rise of behaviorism in the 1930s, 40s, and
Shakespeare’s Politics, with Harry Jaffa 50s in the study of language and mind owe no
(Chicago, 1981). small debt to Bloomfield’s legacy. It was against
The Closing of the American Mind: How the backdrop of Bloomfield’s influence and
Higher Education has Failed Democracy that of his students and disciples that some of
and Impoverished the Souls of Today’s the characteristic themes of cognitive science
Students (New York, 1987). and computational models of the mind were
Giants and Dwarfs (New York, 1990). developed, even if many of these later ways of
Liberal Education and Its Enemies studying language and mind owe Bloomfield a
(Colorado Springs, Col., 1991). debt by way of his explicit defense of the
Love and Friendship (New York, 1993). autonomy of the study of language from other
Shakespeare on Love and Friendship disciplines such as anthropology under which
(Chicago, 2000). it was often subsumed.
Leonard Bloomfield was born on 1 April
Other Related Works 1887 in Chicago, Illinois. He was educated at
Trans., The Republic of Plato (1968). Harvard (BA in 1906), University of Wisconsin,
Trans., Emile, or On Education by Jean- and the University of Chicago (PhD in linguis-
Jacques Rousseau (New York, 1979). tics in 1909). He was instructor in German at
Ed., Confronting the Constitution the University of Cincinnati (1909–10) and the
(Washington, D.C., 1990). University of Illinois (1910–13), and then
studied with leading German linguists at the
Further Reading universities of Leipzig and Göttingen
Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio (1913–14). He went back to Illinois to be assis-
Bellow, Saul. Ravelstein (New York, 2000). tant professor of comparative philology and
Nussbaum, Martha. “Undemocratic German (1914–21), and then was professor of
Vistas,” New York Review of Books 34 German and linguistics at Ohio State University
(1987): 20–26. (1921–7). He established himself as the pre-
264
BLOOMFIELD
eminent linguist of his day while he was pro- nomena of almost every variety, from the com-
fessor of Germanic philology at the University position of the basic units of a language’s sound
of Chicago from 1927 to 1940. From 1940 pattern to the meanings of its sentences and dis-
until his death, he was Sterling Professor of courses. The work had the effect of synthesiz-
Linguistics at Yale University, although his ing a good deal of knowledge about particular
work was disrupted by World War II and aspects of language under one, very general
health problems. Bloomfield died on 13 April view about the nature of language.
1949 in New Haven, Connecticut. Structural linguistics as practiced by
Bloomfield made contributions to every Bloomfield and others can be characterized as
branch of linguistics, including grammar, mor- the study of language via the description of
phology, phonology, and phonetics, as well as “distinctive classes.” The overriding interests of
semantics and descriptive grammar. He also structural linguists was in the classification of
made significant contributions to the study of the various ways in which the sounds and struc-
Native American languages, compiling detailed tures of a language can be combined and form
descriptions of a number of languages that had up different classes of pairings. The goal was to
not received attention from American and capture the distribution of various linguistic
European linguists, including a number of lan- forms. Much of the time, this amounted to
guages from Northern Canada. He also saying when two forms were the same or dif-
inspired a number of other linguists to do the ferent, depending upon which class the expres-
same. His most important work is his 1933 sion belonged to.
book Language, which represented the received Bloomfield’s announced goal in Language
view in linguistics for more than thirty years. was to construct a fully general theory of
His other works include a variety of influential language, one that applied to all aspects of
articles on the nature of linguistic entities as language, starting with the structure of the
well as the scientific status and methodology of phoneme and applying the same techniques to
psychology and linguistics. more and more complex structures within
Structuralism, in one form or another, had language. The nature of the phoneme was
been around for some time in linguistics and much debated by linguists at this time and
elsewhere before Bloomfield. The idea that one earlier. Bloomfield took the phoneme to be the
should look at the structure of language as a smallest element of a language to be analyzed
system of differences and similarities was by the linguist. Below that level we find acoustic
present in Ferdinand de Saussure’s famous data that, while of interest for some areas of
work at the turn of the century and the same psychology and physics, does not form a lin-
basic idea can be found in a number of other guistically significant group of phenomena. The
linguists and anthropologists in the opening theory of distinctive classes, applied to the case
decades of the twentieth century, such as Franz of phonemes, resulted in a description of the
B OAS and Edward S APIR . But it was basic classes of the phonemes of a language
Bloomfield’s detailed defense and articulation together with a list of how these basic elements
of the structuralist theory in his most famous can be combined with one another.
book that made the view into the received view Bloomfield’s view was that one could study
about the nature of language and played no the other aspects of linguistic structure in much
small role in its dominance in American the same way that one studied the sound
academic life. It is not hard to see why pattern of language. Therefore, a description of
Bloomfield’s book came to play this role. Not the formation of morphologically complex
only does Bloomfield give a detailed defense of verbs would take the form of a distributional
the structuralist position, he also shows how to analysis of which patterns of affixation and
apply the method in detail to linguistic phe- suffixation were attested with which verbs,
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BLOOMFIELD
together with the various cross-generalizations of language is one of a set of overlapping

among these classes. The same method applied patterns, phonological, morphological, and so
to syntactically complex expressions as well. on. This view formed the backdrop against
Bloomfield sought to accommodate all of the which many of the distinctive claims of gener-
phenomena of language using the same basic ative grammar were first made. The particular
techniques and methods. The structuralist way in which Bloomfield applied the method of
approach to language is sometimes described as distinctive features deserves some comment,
one giving “distributional analyses” of various for it was innovative in its time. The only thing
phenomena, by formulating sets of generaliza- that belongs to a particular phoneme was those
tions about which elements co-occur with ways in which it differed from other related
which other elements and the various excep- phonemes. The description of a phoneme, for
tions to be found with respect to them. example, should mention only its distinctive
On the topic of semantics, Bloomfield’s views features. The similarities among phonemes, the
were much less developed. In some places, properties that all phonemes of a certain class
Bloomfield expresses the idea that the meaning share with one another, were not to be included
that any individual utterance may have can in the description of a particular phoneme.
never be known in its entirety because, in order Another prominent part of Bloomfield’s view
to do so, one would have to know the entire is his behaviorism. Like many others of roughly
history of the individual’s conditioning and the the same period, he contended that talk of
events which led up to those events and so on. “ideas” and inner processes was not to be
In this way, there is no study of semantics that admitted into a scientific approach to the struc-
would not be, at the same time, a study of the ture of language. As he memorably put it, “in
history of the world. For this reason, Bloomfield the study of language, one can make do with
often expressed skepticism about whether there just the noise,” by which he meant that one
could ever be a realistic semantics for a natural should exclude from consideration such things
language. It seems impossible that there could as speakers’ beliefs, their speech intentions, and
ever be such a theory, given all that it would the ideas and images that are often associated
need to encompass in order to capture even the with words in speakers’ minds, where these
simplest kind of semantic fact, according to could not be given clear behavioral descrip-
Bloomfield. Instead, we would have to make do tions. Although much of his early research was
with various approximations to such a theory, conducted in the framework of Wilhelm
of which he gave us various illustrations. It Wundt’s ideational psychology, by the time he
should be noted that Bloomfield makes no firm came to write Language, his views had shifted
distinction between what is now called prag- considerably under the influence of behavior-
matics and semantics, nor does he clearly dis- ists. Bloomfield was persuaded by the behav-
tinguish between sentence meaning and speaker iorists’ view that the only admissible data for a
meaning, a distinction of no small importance theory of language and psychology were
to later developments in the philosophy of observable states and processes. Anything else
language. It is also notable that on this view, lay outside the province of serious science.
explicit knowledge of the meanings of words is Bloomfield also followed the traditional way
at best approximate. of viewing language as essentially a social phe-
The prevailing wisdom for several decades nomenon, related to its use in communication.
was that the study of language is a taxonomic Assuming that psychology was supposed to be
enterprise. For Bloomfield, the fundamental the study of individual personalities and their
datum about linguistics is that “in every speech traits, it seemed to Bloomfield that language
community, some utterances are alike in form must lie outside the study of individual minds.
and meaning,” as he put it. The resulting view This view had several consequences. Given his
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BLOOMFIELD
view that the study of meaning would have to Bloomfield’s intellectual legacy lies mostly
involve a detailed inspection of an individual’s with his formulation of a theory of language in
history of conditioning and the myriad forces his major work and the application of a single
which prompted any of his particular utter- methodology to a diverse group of phenomena.
ances, it would appear to follow that the study There are aspects of Bloomfield’s linguistic
of meaning also lies outside the study of lin- work that set the stage for later developments,
guistics, as Bloomfield conceives of it. This is especially his investigations of morphology and
somewhat different from the usual way in phonology, and his modifications of earlier
which behaviorists of the time sought to elim- views on formulating the laws governing
inate talk of ideas and the like from their psy- various phenomena. However, the brand of
chology. Bloomfield’s brand of behaviorism structural linguistics that he practiced and advo-
represented a break with the tradition in lin- cated is now largely of historical interest,
guistics of thinking of language and meaning as serving as the backdrop for later development,
linked to the psychological states of its users. including the work of generative grammarians
Thus, unlike his contemporary Edward Sapir, in the 1950s and 60s. Nonetheless, many of
for whom language was a psychological phe- Bloomfield’s descriptions of various linguistic
nomenon, Bloomfield held that language ought phenomena have retained their usefulness for
to be studied in isolation from these other later writers.
factors. The eclipse of the psychological view of The idea that there could be a single, analyt-
language within linguistics is largely a product ical procedure which could be fruitfully applied
of Bloomfield’s influence. to a syntax, morphology, phonology, and
Besides the articulation of structuralist lin- semantics no longer compels any widespread
guistics and his methodological arguments, acceptance. Workers in these fields today are
Bloomfield’s major work is famous for a likely to adopt different analytical and descrip-
number of other reasons. Most importantly, it tive devices for different phenomena without
also contains the first arguments for distin- worrying about whether the same techniques
guishing linguistics as a separate science from can be deployed elsewhere in linguistics.
such fields as philology, sociology, and anthro- Although his behaviorism is also out of fashion,
pology. This was done by showing how the there are aspects of his skepticism about the
patterns that pertain to the structure of place of meaning and semantics in the expla-
language were law-like, and how linguists can nation of linguistic phenomena that fore-
state those laws. The most important examples shadow W. V. QUINE’s skepticism about trying
come from the study of sound change, to which to separate the meaning of an expression from
Bloomfield also made important contributions. the collateral information that often accompa-
Bloomfield sought to show how the manner in nies its utterance. Given Quine’s own behav-
which the sound patterns of a language change iorism, this overlap is not surprising.
over time was governed by exceptionless laws. Besides those aspects of Bloomfield’s work
The lawfulness of these changes together with that were abandoned by later generations of
other structuralist analyses demonstrated that linguists, however, there is an important sense
linguistics was concerned with exceptionless in which many of the linguistic sciences of
laws, just as other sciences were. Bloomfield’s today remain in his debt. He was the first sig-
advocacy of linguistics as a separate discipline nificant figure to argue for making the study
was not limited to methodological arguments. of language into a separate science, a position
He was also quite influential in establishing an that is usually taken for granted today among
important scholarly society and journal in otherwise quite diverse groups of theoreti-
addition to an annual summer school in lin- cians.
guistics that continues to this day.
267
BLOOMFIELD
BIBLIOGRAPHY Matthews, P. H. Grammatical Theory in the

An Introduction to the Study of Language United States from Bloomfield to
(New York, 1914). Chomsky (Cambridge, UK, 1993).
“The Menomini Language,” in Proceedings
of the Twenty-First International Congress Daniel Blair
of Americanists (The Hague, 1924), pp.
336–43.
“A Set of Postulates for the Study of
Language,” Language 2 (1926): 153–64.
“Linguistics as a Science,” Studies in
Philology 27 (1930): 553–7. BLOW, Susan Elizabeth (1843–1916)
Language (New York, 1933).
Plains Cree Texts (New York, 1934). Susan Blow was born on 7 June 1843 in St.
Linguistic Aspects of Science (Chicago, Louis, Missouri, the oldest child of Henry and
1939). Minerva Grimsley Blow, and died on 26
March 1916 in New York City. Her education
Other Relevant Works consisted of quality private tutoring until her
Bloomfield’s papers are at the American teenage years, at which time she was sent to a
Philosophical Society in Philadelphia, and private girls’ school in New York. She received
the National Anthropological Archives at no formal higher education, but she continued
the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, to read important works of philosophy and lit-
D.C. erature on her own throughout her life, ulti-
A Leonard Bloomfield Anthology, ed. C. F. mately rising to prominence as the “mother of
Hockett (Bloomington, Ind., 1970). the kindergarten” in America.
Contains a bibliography of Bloomfield’s Blow was from an influential St. Louis
writings. family. Her father Henry was first a regional
and then a national political figure, who
Further Reading staunchly supported the Union during the Civil
Amer Nat Bio, Bio 20thC Phils, Cambridge War in a sharply divided Missouri. Henry
Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer Bio, Encyc joined her uncle, Taylor Blow, in serving as an
Social Behav Sci, Who Was Who in Amer advocate for Dred Scott in his legal battle for
v2, Who’s Who in Phil freedom in the years leading up to the Civil
Anderson, Stephen R. Phonology in the War. When Scott lost his case in the Supreme
Twentieth Century (Chicago, 1985). Court, Taylor Blow had the title to Scott trans-
Esper, Erwin A. Mentalism and Objectivism ferred to him in order to give the man his
in Linguistics: The Sources of Leonard freedom. Henry Blow began traveling as a
Bloomfield’s Psychology of Language diplomat in 1861 and took the family with
(New York, 1968). him on several assignments, including an
Fought, John G., ed. Leonard Bloomfield: extended stay in Russia in 1870. It was during
Critical Assessments of Leading Linguists, this assignment that Susan became acquainted
3 vols (London and New York, 1999). with German pedagogical theory.
Hall, Robert A., ed. Leonard Bloomfield: In 1871 Blow returned to St. Louis and then
Essays on His Life and Work (Amsterdam, went to New York to study kindergarten edu-
1987). cation theory with Baroness Marenholz von
Hall, Robert A. A Life for Language: A Bulow, an expert in the pedagogical methods
Biographical Memoir of Leonard of Friedrich Froebel. In 1873 in St. Louis, Blow
Bloomfield (Amsterdam, 1990). established the first successful public kinder-
268
BLOW
garten system in the United States, and soon selfhood and experiment with a new, albeit
became a national leader in early childhood temporary, self. When the game was over, the
education. In 1876 she gained international child could then return to his or her everyday
attention with her kindergarten exhibit at the self. Yet with the new-found knowledge of
Paris World’s Fair, an exhibit that influenced what it was like to “be” a fish or a bear, a
Kate Wiggins, Elizabeth Harrison, and Jane doctor or a teacher, the child gained a new
and Ellen Lloyd Jones, the maternal aunts of sense of him/her self. This experience while at
Frank Lloyd WRIGHT who believed his child- play helps children to grow.
hood play with Froebel’s blocks and spheres Blow often embedded discussions of episte-
contributed to his architectural abilities. In mology and metaphysics into her books on
1882 Blow began a kindergarten teacher childhood education, and these sections of her
training program, and in 1884 a series of work make it clear that she was a theist, a
lectures on child care, philosophy, and literature personal idealist, and a monist. This is espe-
for mothers of her kindergarten students. After cially true in her final work, Educational Issues
a physical and emotional breakdown caused by in the Kindergarten (1908), in which she
Graves’ disease in the mid 1880s, Blow again devotes the final chapter to a discussion of
rose to prominence as a writer and lecturer. She philosophy. Blow firmly believed that a theistic
headed up the national Kindergarten Union presence animates the world and gives it
and held a visiting position at Columbia meaning. She also believed that this theistic
University Teachers College from 1905 to presence must be both “person” and “one.” In
1909. She wrote numerous articles on kinder- her letters and occasionally in her published
garten theory and practice along with several works, she criticized thinkers whose ideas she
books on the subject. thought were atomistic, pluralistic, and/or
Blow is best known as a St. Louis idealist atheistic, including John DEWEY, William
and a pedagogical theorist. She was still con- JAMES, George Holmes HOWISON, and Thomas
sidered a canonical figure in education schools DAVIDSON.
until the middle of the twentieth century. She Blow had a long-time and trusting intellec-
saw the works of Froebel as the model for tual friendship with William Torrey HARRIS.
kindergarten teaching, but appended to it her She was also close to several minor figures in
own ideals of childhood, which were based the St. Louis movement: Susan Beeson,
on Hegel’s philosophy. Blow saw play as Gertrude Garrigues, and Laura Fisher. But
children’s natural means of learning and Blow was a strong-willed woman and by some
growing, not only physically and cognitively, accounts a difficult personality. She had a con-
but morally and spiritually as well. In good tentious and competitive relationship with a
Hegelian fashion, she believed that an indi- rival in the kindergarten movement, Mary
vidual’s selfhood would naturally unfold and McCullough. She also had a long-term
flourish, if only the appropriate educational personal and professional conflict with the
tools were used for young children: songs, Shakespeare scholar, Denton SNIDER. Having
games, and other forms of play. The world of herself been an orthodox Presbyterian who
imagination through story opened up the nearly converted to Catholicism, she disap-
world and facilitated a level of selfhood for proved of the beliefs of the free religionist
older children and youth. Davidson and the Unitarian Howison. In
As Blow developed her theory of early child- addition, she was strongly opposed to
hood pedagogy, she began to develop a child feminism as it was developing in her day. She
psychology. The role a child played in a game thought women would be irreparably harmed
of make-believe allowed him or her to become by entering the “industrial realm” and should
estranged from their everyday sense of shun the women’s movement. Her counter-
269
BLOW
feminist stance no doubt explains why there is Louis, Missouri.

no evidence of a close relationship between Menius, Joseph M. Susan Blow (St. Clair,
Blow and some equally prominent women in Missouri, 1993).
the American idealist movement – Anna Rogers, Dorothy, ed. Women in the St.
BRACKETT, Grace Bibb, Mary Beedy, Ellen Louis Idealist Movement, 1860–1925
MITCHELL, and Eliza SUNDERLAND – all of (Bristol, UK, 2003).
whom were committed feminists. Snider, Denton J. The St. Louis Movement
in Philosophy (St. Louis, 1920).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A Study of Dante (New York, 1886). Dorothy Rogers
Symbolic Education: A Commentary on
Froebel’s “Mother Play” (New York,
1894).
The Mottoes and Commentaries on
Friedrich Froebel’s “Mother Play” (New
York, 1895; Bristol, UK, 2000). BLUMER, Herbert George (1900–87)
“The History of the Kindergarten in the
United States,” Outlook 55 (1897): Herbert Blumer was born on 7 March 1900 in
932–8. Saint Louis, Missouri, and grew up in nearby
“The Kindergarten Ideal,” Outlook 56 Webster Groves, Missouri. He earned his BA
(1897): 890–94. in 1921 and MA in 1922 from the University
Letters to Mothers on the Philosophy of of Missouri. In 1928 he completed the PhD in
Froebel (New York, 1898; Bristol, UK, sociology at the University of Chicago. The
2000). sociologist Robert E. PARK and philosopher
Kindergarten Education (Albany, N.Y., George Herbert MEAD were notable influences.
1898). Blumer stayed at the University of Chicago as
Educational Issues in the Kindergarten a professor of sociology from 1928 until 1952,
(New York, 1908; Bristol, UK, 2003). when he became professor and chair of soci-
ology at the University of California at
Other Relevant Works Berkeley. He retired in 1967 and remained an
Blow’s papers are in the Carandolet active scholar at Berkeley as professor emeritus
Historical Society in St. Louis, Missouri. until 1986. Blumer died on 13 April 1987 in
Pleasanton, California.
Further Reading Blumer was a foremost interpreter of the
Amer Nat Bio, Dict Amer Bio thought of the pragmatist philosopher George
Harrison, Elizabeth. Sketches Along Life’s Herbert Mead. He studied with Mead and
Road (Boston, 1930). succeeded him as the instructor of his famous
Hill, Patty S. “Personal Reminiscences of seminar in social psychology. Blumer was a
Susan Blow,” Kindergarten and First leading proponent of “symbolic interaction-
Grade 1 (1915): 224. ism,” a view of human social life deriving from
Hilliker, Margaret. “The Life and Work of the pragmatist traditions he encountered at
Susan Blow” (1952), unpublished Chicago. He is noted for his incisive critiques
manuscript archived in the Carandolet of standard sociological methods and concep-
Historical Society in St. Louis, Missouri. tual schemes. Blumer also contributed impor-
———, “The Blow Family” (1955), tant essays on race relations and other socio-
unpublished manuscript archived in the logical concepts. Original work continues to be
Carandolet Historical Society in St. edited and published from his manuscripts.
270
BLUMER
Blumer edited the American Journal of process, an individual attends to particular

Sociology from 1940 to 1952. He served as objects within a situation and – by building up
President of the Society for the Study of Social interpretations and actions – fashions adjust-
Problems in 1954, and as President of the ments to the situation. An individual thus
American Sociological Association (ASA) in selects and fits a line of action to the situation
1956. In 1983 he received the ASA’s highest and with the actions of others. At the heart of
honor, “The Award for a Career of this view of social life, Blumer placed the
Distinguished Scholarship.” human ability to indicate one’s own self as an
For Blumer, symbolic interactionism is a object. The “self” is an interpretive process
perspective on human social life that he found concerning one’s own being. Blumer argued
in the sociology of the “Chicago School” and that symbolic interaction and the self are unde-
the social psychology of Mead. Symbolic inter- niable, inescapable, and central features of
actionism’s logical starting point is a view of human social life, and that concepts and
social life as interdependent of joint social methods to study social life must take them
actions. Symbolic interactionism shares with into account. In particular, interaction should
some other action perspectives an emphasis be viewed as a contingent and constructive
on meanings as prompts, organizers, and process, not as a neutral conduit merely
guides to social actions. It is distinctive, carrying causal effects. His commitment to the
however, in the prominence given to the role perspectives of symbolic interactionism
of interaction in constructing and selecting the provided Blumer with a durable standpoint
meanings that predicate actions. Symbolic from which to challenge concepts and methods
interactionism highlights a social process of derived from other perspectives.
interpretation in which individuals indicate Blumer emphasized generic concepts as the
salient features of situations, assess and antic- hallmark of science and as a major goal of
ipate others’ actions, and construct adjust- research. The defining imagery of a concept,
ments in light of those interpretations. This Blumer pointed out, “grasps together” features
process grounds “joint actions” incorporating of an object under study and provides an
a variety of actors. Thus, unlike some other understanding of the object and how it
action perspectives, symbolic interactionism operates. He saw the creation and use of sci-
focuses analysis on emergent (rather than fixed entific concepts as instances of the essential
or established) meanings as predicates of human practice of indicating an object and
actions. In this view, to understand social life understanding its character in preparation to
it is crucial to see that the process of interac- act toward the object. Science seeks to estab-
tion is creative and that actors participating in lish concepts and relationships that character-
interaction exercise judgment, choice, and ize the nature of a class of instances. In doing
agency. so, scientific research empirically tests and
Symbolic interaction occurs in several ways. reforms concepts. Improved concepts yield
Interpersonal interaction knits together the more useful understanding and control of the
responses and coordinates the interdependen- objects and relationships under study. Blumer
cies of individuals. Symbolic interaction also thus decentered a standard sociological
takes place between collective actors, as in research emphasis on causal relations among
union-management bargaining. Most distinc- variables. Blumer claimed that variable
tively, Blumer attributes deep significance to an analysis is not a fit procedure for those vast
intrapersonal level of interaction. “Self inter- areas of social life where contingent interpre-
action” is the process in which one succes- tive processes mediate relationships between
sively indicates objects to one’s self and conditions and effects. Human society operates
responds to those indications. Through this through the process by which living people
271
BLUMER
produce social action. He saw social struc- given that respondents may omit and lie.
tures, not as causes of action, but as inferences Further, the data do not allow a decisive test
from observations of action. that could rule out alternative theoretical
Blumer attributed an obdurate character to interpretations. Blumer argued that methods
social life that permits sociological concepts to of social research should be developed to
be tested. But he also maintained that like any meet these crucial methodological problems.
reality, social life can only be noted, acted The starting point that he advocates is to
toward, and studied through humanly created respect the interpretive and contingent nature
concepts. He attributed this position to prag- of social life and to form concepts and
matist philosophy and claimed it is testable in methods accordingly.
human experience. The objects we study are Although Blumer strongly advocated empir-
always symbolically constructed and indicated. ical research, the extent and ways in which he
Yet, concepts are not merely free-floating nom- engaged in it himself are unclear. His call to
inations. Experiencing social life’s obduracy study social life directly and closely has been
constitutes an empirical social world which is widely cited to justify ethnographic research,
the central point of concern for sociology. but there is no indication that he undertook the
When our examination of social life is direct type of systematic firsthand observations of
and close, its obdurate reality can “talk back” ongoing social life that his methodology is
against the concepts we have used to approach usually interpreted as advocating. Some have
it. Blumer urged that appropriate concepts stated that he did little or no empirical research
could only be worked out by empirical tests. of any kind. Blumer did, however, publish
Both the concepts and the methods of any important essays directed toward improving
science must be constructed with respect to what he saw as key sociological concepts.
“the nature of the empirical world under Blumer’s substantive essays on collective
study.” In particular, he criticized forming behavior, public opinion, fashion, and race
concepts by analogy with schemes imported relations remain influential. Robert E. Park
from other fields of study. developed the concept of “collective behavior”
An Appraisal of Thomas and Znaniecki’s to refer to such temporary, large, dynamic
The Polish Peasant in Europe and America groups as crowds, public factions, and social
(1939) and Blumer’s introduction to its reissue movements. Blumer’s discussion of collective
in 1979 are windows onto his thinking regard- behavior dominated conceptualizations in the
ing methods of research. Blumer praises field until the 1960s. Then, objections to the
Thomas and Znaniecki’s The Polish Peasant in weight he gave to emotional and other “non-
Europe and America for the mutual intelligi- symbolic” influences in the dynamics of col-
bility that its data and conceptual schemes lective behavior placed his concepts sharply
lend to each other. Yet, Blumer also concludes out of favor. Increasingly since the 1980s, after
that Polish Peasant illustrates an important decades of rejection in favor of rational-choice
dilemma. While it is “absolutely necessary” and other cognitive perspectives, elements of
for sociological analyses to include data on Blumer’s thought, if not his terminology, have
subjective meanings of actors, the means of stolen back into the literature. Blumer also
“getting such subjective elements do not allow followed up Park’s interest in the study of
us to meet the customary criteria for scientific publics. Blumer’s seminal critique challenged
data” (1979, pp. xii–xiii). The personal docu- the emerging discipline of public opinion
ments and life histories used by Thomas and polling with the claim that representative
Znaniecki could not be shown to be from a samples painstakingly constructed for public
representative sampling of a known popula- opinion polls fail to capture how public
tion. These data on meanings may be incorrect, opinion actually works. As he saw it, public
272
BLUMER
opinion matters when it brings influence to Sciences: An Appraisal of Thomas and

bear on decision-makers. Public opinion is a Znaniedki’s “The Polish Peasant in
social process sensitive to power, resources Europe and America (New Brunswick,
and effort, in which the powerful and the com- N.J., 1979).
mitted have disproportionate effects. These “Collective Behavior,” in An Outline of the
disproportionate effects are not captured by a Principles of Sociology, ed. Robert E.
concept of public opinion that sees each indi- Park (New York, 1939), pp. 219–80.
vidual’s ideas as having an equivalent effect. “The Problem of the Concept in Social
Blumer’s efforts to conceptualize dynamic Psychology,” American Journal of
processes are also reflected in an essay on Sociology 42 (1940): 707–19.
fashion. He saw contemporary societies as “What is Wrong with Social Theory?”
continually subject to fashion processes. The American Sociological Review 14 (1954):
diversity and impermanence of such societies 3–10.
prompt searches for effective innovations. “Society as Symbolic Interaction,” in
Fashion processes are continually generated Human Behavior and Social Processes,
not only to define new standards for dress and ed. Arnold M. Rose (Boston, 1962), pp.
other trivialities, but also to define such matters 179–92.
of consequence as how corporations will be “Sociological Implications of the Thought
managed. Another influential article on social of George Herbert Mead,” American
dynamics, reformulating the concept of “social Journal of Sociology 71 (1966): 535–44.
problems,” provided a beginning for con- Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and
structionism. Blumer’s essays on race relations Method (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1969).
treat the color line as produced and modified Industrialization as an Agent of Social
by symbolic interaction. The relevance of this Change: A Critical Analysis, ed. David R.
view of race relations has become more Maines and Thomas J. Morrione (New
apparent as new definitions of disadvantage, York, 1990).
new distinctions of difference, and new George Herbert Mead and Human
rhetoric of anti-racialism emerge. In Social Conduct, ed. Thomas J. Morrione (New
Order and Public Philosophy (1988) Lyman York and London, 2004).
and Vidich develop a humanistic, liberal public
philosophy from Blumer’s essays on race rela- Other Relevant Works
tions and other topics and collect several of his “Social Attitudes and Non-Symbolic
scattered essays. Interaction,” Journal of Educational
The posthumous publication of George Sociology 42 (1936): 515–23.
Herbert Mead and Human Conduct (2004) “Public Opinion and Public Opinion
promises to expand Blumer’s influence on Polling,” American Sociological Review
Mead’s legacy. Two additional volumes of 13 (1948): 542–54.
Blumer’s as yet unpublished work (to be edited “Psychological Import of the Human
by Thomas J. Morrione) are expected. Group,” in Group Relations at the
Crossroads, ed. Musafer Sherif and M.
BIBLIOGRAPHY O. Wilson (New York, 1953), pp.
“Science without Concepts,” American 185–202.
Journal of Sociology 37 (1931): 515–33. “Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group
An Appraisal of Thomas and Znaniecki’s Position,” Pacific Sociological Review 1
The Polish Peasant in Europe and (1958): 3–7.
America (New York, 1939). 2nd edn, “Fashion: From Class Differentiation to
Critiques of Research in the Social Collective Selection,” Sociological
273
BLUMER
Quarterly 10 (1969): 275–91. BOAS, Franz (1858–1942)

“Social Problems as Collective Behavior,”
Social Problems 18 (1971): 298–306. Franz Boas was born on 9 July 1858 in
“Social Unrest and Collective Protest,” Minden in Westphalia, Germany, to middle-
Studies in Symbolic Interaction 1 (1978): class Jewish parents. Boas studied physics and
1–54. geography at the universities of Heidelberg,
Bonn, and Kiel. He earned his PhD in physics
Further Reading from Kiel in 1881 with a dissertation on the
Amer Nat Bio optics of seawater. His professional and
Braugh, Kenneth, Jr. The Methodology of personal journey from physical science through
Herbert Blumer (Cambridge, UK, 1990). psychophysics and human geography to
Hammersley, Martin. The Dilemma of anthropology is symbolized by his year-long
Qualitative Method: Herbert Blumer and expedition during 1883–4 to Baffin Island in
the Chicago Tradition (London, 1989). Canada, where he lived and worked among the
“Herbert Blumer’s Legacy,” Symbolic Central Eskimo Inuit. This experience crystal-
Interaction 11 (1988): 1–143. Special lized Boas’s thinking about cultural relativism
issue on Blumer. and revealed to him the professional possibil-
Kurtz, Lester R. Evaluating Chicago ities and moral urgencies of anthropological
Sociology: A Guide to the Literature with research. Published as The Central Eskimo
an Annotated Bibliography (Chicago, (1888), the results of this expedition fore-
1984). shadow many of the concerns that would
Lyman, Sanford M., and Arthur Vidich. occupy him throughout his life.
Social Order and The Public Philosophy: Boas emigrated to the United States in 1887
An Analysis and Interpretation of the when he was hired as assistant editor of the
Work of Herbert Blumer (Fayetteville, magazine Science, and from 1888 to 1892 he
Ark., 1988). Reprints twelve of Blumer’s taught anthropology at Clark University. In
articles. 1891 he became a US citizen. In 1892 Boas was
Maines, David R. “Herbert Blumer on the named curator of anthropology at the Field
Possibility of Science in the Practice of Museum in Chicago, and in 1895 he joined the
Sociology: Further Thoughts,” Journal of staff of the American Museum of Natural
Contemporary Ethnography 18 (July History in New York City, later serving as
1989): 160–77. curator of ethnology from 1901 to 1905. In
Plummer, Ken. “Herbert Blumer,” in Key 1899 Boas became a professor of anthropology
Sociological Thinkers, ed. Rob Stones at Columbia University, where he taught until
(Washington Square, N.Y., 1998), pp. 1936. He edited the Journal of American
84–95. Folklore from 1908 to 1925. He was President
Shalin, D. N. “Pragmatism and Social of the American Anthropological Society in
Interactionism,” American Sociological 1907–1908, and of the New York Academy of
Review 51 (1986): 9–29. Sciences in 1910. Boas died on 21 December
Shibutani, Tamotsu, ed. Human Nature 1942 in New York City.
and Collective Behavior: Papers in In the twentieth century Boas was the
Honor of Herbert Blumer (Englewood- dominant figure in North American anthro-
Cliffs, N.J., 1970). pology, defining the field’s scope while pro-
fessionalizing the discipline and orchestrating
Jack Weller its institutionalization in universities and
museums. Having founded American anthro-
pology’s first doctoral program at Columbia,
274
BOAS
he trained the initial generation of professional lection of essays Race, Language and Culture
anthropologists. These students in turn (1940). Boas’s philosophical perspectives on
founded academic departments throughout the nature and study of humanity can be con-
the United States and shaped the discipline’s sidered in his general works, including
formative institutions and intellectual Primitive Art (1955), Anthropology and
concerns. The American anthropology that Modern Life (1928), and The Mind of
Boas fashioned integrated the study of arche- Primitive Man (1911). His pioneering work on
ology, ethnology, linguistics, and human the nature of language can be accessed in his
biology and was attuned to several broadly Introduction to the Handbook of American
philosophical questions. These included Indian Languages (1911). Many of his
exploring the role of particular languages and students and collaborators established them-
cultures in shaping thought, perception, and selves not only as leaders in their field, but
awareness, the place of the individual in society also as prominent public intellectuals. Among
and history, the nature of culture and the the most philosophically oriented of these are
factors shaping cultural change, and the scope Edward S APIR , Alexander Goldenweiser,
and significance of human diversity – biologi- Benjamin Lee W HORF , Ruth B ENEDICT ,
cal, cultural, and linguistic. Margaret MEAD, and Alfred Kroeber.
Like his peers among the American prag-
matists, Boas advanced an anti-foundational- BIBLIOGRAPHY
ist theory of knowledge, a refined under- The Central Eskimo (Washington, D.C.,
standing of human pluralism and diversity, 1888).
and a cosmographic and historical approach to Introduction to the Handbook of American
science. He favored empirical methods and Indian Languages (Washington, D.C.,
induction, and resisted premature generaliza- 1911).
tions. Boas was attentive to contingency and to The Mind of Primitive Man (New York,
the role of individuals in human affairs. From 1911; 2nd edn 1938).
his German intellectual heritage, Boas inherited Anthropology and Modern Life (New
a historicist outlook and an orientation toward York, 1928).
culture rooted in the Kantian and Race, Language and Culture (New York,
Humboldtian traditions. Within social science, 1940).
his researches buttressed arguments, largely Primitive Art (New York, 1955).
successful, against nineteenth-century social
evolutionist perspectives. Politically, Boas and Other Relevant Works
his work contributed to progressive social Boas’s papers are at the American
reform efforts, particularly his opposition to Philosophical Society and Columbia
racism, ethnocentrism, and other forms of dis- University.
crimination. The Shaping of American Anthropology,
Following his Eskimo studies, his own field 1883–1911: A Franz Boas Reader, ed.
research was dominated by the ethnography George W. Stocking, Jr. (New York,
and linguistics of the Northwest Coast region 1974).
of North America, where he conducted studies A Wealth of Thought: Franz Boas on
of American Indian societies. He also authored Native American Art, ed. Aldona Jonaitis
influential works dealing with general issues, (Seattle, 1995).
from questions of race and human variation to
linguistic structure and variability. An Further reading
overview of his approach to specific problems Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
within anthropology can be gained in his col- Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer
275
BOAS
Thought, Encyc Amer Bio, Encyc Psych, 1917, served in the US Army from 1917 to 1919,
Encyc Social Behav Sci, Encyc Relig, Nat and then returned to his position at Berkeley. In
Cycl Amer Bio v12, Who Was Who in 1921 he was appointed to the philosophy faculty
Amer v2 at Johns Hopkins University by department chair
Cole, Douglas. Franz Boas: The Early Arthur O. LOVEJOY, and was promoted up to full
Years, 1858–1906 (Seattle, 1999). professor by 1933. During World War II, Boas
Darnell, Regna. Invisible Genealogies: A again sought military service and became a
History of Americanist Anthropology Naval Reserve Commander at General Dwight
(Lincoln, Neb., 2001). D. Eisenhower’s headquarters. After the war,
Goldschmidt, Walter, ed. The he led an effort to recover Belgian art stolen by
Anthropology of Franz Boas: Essays on the Nazis, and was decorated with the Order of
the Centennial of His Birth, American Leopold by the Belgian government. He returned
Anthropological Association Memoir no. to Johns Hopkins and taught there until he
89 (Menasha, Wisc., 1959). retired in 1957, remaining active for many years
Hyatt, Marshall. Franz Boas, Social as professor emeritus. Boas died on 17 March
Activist: The Dynamics of Ethnicity 1980 in Ruxton, Maryland.
(New York, 1990). Boas was a trustee of the Baltimore
Lewis, Herbert. “Boas, Darwin, Science, Museum of Art for many years, and was
and Anthropology,” Current President of the American Society of
Anthropology 42 (2001): 381–406. Aesthetics in 1950. He was a visiting profes-
Stocking, George W., ed. Volksgeist as sor at several universities; the Annie Talbot
Method and Ethic: Essays on Boasian Cole Lecturer at Wheaton College in 1932;
Ethnography and the German the Traux Lecturer at Hamilton College in
Anthropological Tradition (Madison, 1957; the visiting Mellon Professor at the
Wisc., 1996). University of Pittsburgh in 1960–61; a fellow
Williams, Vernon J. Rethinking Race: Franz at the Center for Advanced Studies at
Boas and His Contemporaries Wesleyan University in Illinois in 1961–2; and
(Lexington, Kent., 1996). the John Danz Lecturer at the University of
Washington in 1965. He was Vice President of
Jason Baird Jackson the American Philosophical Association
Eastern Division in 1948 and President in
1951–2, and was invited by the Association to
deliver the Paul Carus Lectures in 1959. These
were published as The Inquiring Mind: An
Introduction to Epistemology (1959).
BOAS, George (1891–1980) Boas’s primary philosophical interests centered
on aesthetics, epistemology, naturalism, and the
George Boas was born on 28 August 1891 in history of philosophy. His relativism, pluralism,
Providence, Rhode Island. He attended Brown and naturalism were ultimately based on a nom-
University, where he received both his BA and inalistic skepticism toward objective classes and
MA degrees in 1913. He then earned another categories. This skepticism brought him to the
MA in philosophy in 1915 from Harvard conclusion that aesthetic value is always a matter
University, and received his PhD in philosophy of an ineffable and emotional personal appreci-
in 1917 from the University of California at ation of an art work at a particular moment.
Berkeley. His dissertation was entitled “An Because personal aesthetic appreciation is par-
Analysis of Certain Theories of Truth.” Boas tially conditioned by society, Boas also defended
became an instructor in forensics at Berkeley in a stance of cultural relativism toward art and aes-
276
BOAS
thetic value in Wingless Pegasus: A Handbook The Limits of Reason (New York, 1961).
for Critics (1950) and The Heaven of Invention Rationalism in Greek Philosophy (Baltimore,
(1963). Md., 1961).
Boas followed Lovejoy’s methodology of The Heaven of Invention (Baltimore, Md.,
tracing the history of ideas, searching for 1963).
dominant systems of thought in each historical The Challenge of Science (Seattle, 1965).
period, and pondering the causes for transitional The Cult of Childhood (London, 1966).
phases between them. His best efforts in intel- The History of Ideas: An Introduction (New
lectual history are represented by two books, York, 1969).
Dominant Themes of Modern Philosophy Vox Populi: Essays in the History of an Idea
(1957) and The History of Ideas: An (Baltimore, Md., 1969).
Introduction (1969), while the clearest summa-
rization of his “history of ideas” approach is Other Relevant Works
presented in “Some Problems of Intellectual Boas’s papers are at Johns Hopkins University
History” (1953). Boas also composed narrower in Baltimore, Maryland.
studies of selected historical periods, including “The Truth of Immediate Knowledge,”
Greek thought, medieval philosophy and Journal of Philosophy 23 (1926): 5–10.
theology, modern philosophy, and French “The Datum as Essence,” Journal of
Romanticism. Philosophy 24 (1927): 487–97.
Never Go Back: A Novel Without a Plot
BIBLIOGRAPHY (New York, 1928).
A Critical Analysis of the Philosophy of Emile Ed., The Greek Tradition (Baltimore, Md.,
Meyerson (Baltimore, Md., 1920). 1939).
Philosophy and Poetry (Norton, Mass., 1922). Ed., Courbet and the Naturalistic Movement
French Philosophies of the Romantic Period (Baltimore, Md., 1938).
(Baltimore, Md., 1925). Ed., Romanticism in America (Baltimore, Md.,
The Major Traditions of European Philosophy 1940).
(New York, 1928). “The Meeting of Philosophy and Psychology,”
Our New Ways of Thinking (New York, Journal of Philosophy 38 (1941): 466–70.
1929). “Learning from Experience,” Journal of
The Happy Beast in French Thought of the Philosophy 43 (1946): 466–71.
Seventeenth Century (Baltimore, Md., “The Classification of the Arts and Criticism,”
1933). Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 5
Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity, (1947): 268–72.
with A. O. Lovejoy (Baltimore, 1935). Rev. “The Acceptance of Time,” University of
edn, Essays on Primitivism and Related California Publications in Philosophy 16
Ideas in the Middle Ages (Baltimore, Md., (1950): 249–69.
1948). “In Defense of the Unintelligible,” Journal of
A Primer for Critics (Baltimore, 1937). Aesthetics and Art Criticism 9 (1951):
Wingless Pegasus: A Handbook for Critics 285–93.
(Cambridge, Mass., 1950). “The Perceptual Element in Cognition,”
Dominant Themes of Modern Philosophy: A Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
History (New York, 1957). 12 (1952): 486–94.
The Inquiring Mind: An Introduction to “Communication in Dewey’s Aesthetics,”
Epistemology (La Salle, Ill., 1959). Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 12
Some Assumptions of Aristotle (Philadelphia, (1953): 177–83.
1959). “Some Problems of Intellectual History,” in
277
BOAS
Studies in Intellectual History by George the realist notion that objects of knowledge
boas et. al. (Baltimore, Md., 1953). exist prior to particular situations of knowing;
instead, that which exists is used in experience
Further Reading to make objects of knowledge. Bode’s func-
Pres Addr of APA v6, Proc of APA v53, tional conception of mind held that stimulus
Who Was Who in Amer v7, Who’s Who in and response are not simply fixed in the
Phil nervous system since the stimulus does not
Wiener, Philip P. “In Memoriam: George precede the response in a mechanical way.
Boas (1892–1980),” Journal of the History Instead, they work simultaneously; for
of Ideas 4 (1980): 453–6. example, a baseball player learns to judge a fly
ball by seeing its flight in terms of the response
John R. Shook needed to catch it. The object – the baseball in
flight – is seen in terms of responses already at
work in the actions of the player. The objective
is catching the baseball in flight, which shows
that stimulus and response are not simply “con-
nected” in the nervous system but take on
BODE, Boyd Henry (1873–1953) meaning in terms of the behavior needed to
realize the objective. Therefore, “mind” is a
Boyd H. Bode was born on 4 October 1873 in name for the way the environment functions,
Ridott, Illinois, and died on 29 March 1953 in and this includes both actor and action taken
Gainesville, Florida. He was the son of Dutch in relation to one another. Mind is what things
immigrant parents and grew up in farm com- do, not a “substance” or a collection of
munities in South Dakota and Iowa. His father “mental states.”
was a minister in the Christian Reformed In 1910 Bode became a professor of philos-
Church, a branch of the Dutch Reformed ophy at the University of Illinois, where his
Church. Bode attended Yankton College in challenges to the absolutes of established reli-
South Dakota; William Penn College in Iowa gious sectarianism and entrenched philosoph-
(BA 1896); and the University of Michigan ical orthodoxies attracted hundreds of students
(BA 1897). He then went to Cornell’s Sage to his classes. The inclusion of his chapter,
School of Philosophy, where he studied with “Consciousness and Psychology” in the coop-
James CREIGHTON, Ernest ALBEE, Edward erative volume by pragmatists, Creative
MCGILVARY, and Edward TITCHENER. Bode Intelligence (1917), affirmed his status in
received his PhD in 1900, and in that year he American philosophy and openly allied him
began teaching philosophy at the University of with John DEWEY. In this chapter Bode’s
Wisconsin. His first articles in the Journal of movement away from “transcendental
Philosophy and Philosophical Review in 1905 elements” in experience and the search for
criticized pragmatism and realism from the objects of knowledge existing prior to experi-
standpoint of idealism. ence is complete. The question of what is real
By the 1910s, Bode had moved from idealism prior to or transcending experience, he argued,
towards pragmatism, and defended pragma- is “absolutely sterile.” We must learn how to
tism on grounds he had found untenable eight explain things in terms of facts “that dwell in
years earlier. His pragmatism rejected idealism’s the light of common day.” From this point he
“transcendental element” in experience by never looked back to yearn for certainty in
holding that subject and object do not exist as experience, but remained persuaded that we
separate entities in experience, but are func- cannot escape the responsibility of working on
tions that arise within experience. Bode rejected the problems endemic to everyday experience.
278
BODE
At Illinois, Bode began teaching educational about resolving those conflicts that have to be
theory in a seminar along with William C. tested in the lives experiencing the conflicts.
Bagley in the College of Education. Bode’s Philosophy originates in human problems, and
developing interest in the difference that phi- then it returns to those problems and attempts
losophy might make in the practical human to make differences in striving to solve them.
affairs made teaching educational theory attrac- Bode was critical of those who sought guidance
tive to him. Bode also taught logic at Wisconsin from sources external to human experience,
and Illinois, and his first book was on logic in whether from an alleged extranatural being,
1910. He jokingly referred to the study of logic from “pure mind,” or from the various claims
as “horse sense made asinine.” When Bagley that reality can be described in a particular
left Illinois for the Teachers College of way and that children should be educated to fit
Columbia University, Bode continued the into it. Reality is not something to be
seminar in educational theory himself. He “described” or to be “fit into”; reality is to be
sought ways in which thinking could function made.
more meaningfully in human conduct. Bode called for recognizing democracy as an
Thinking as a practical necessity became a experiment in which our faith is not placed in
priority over logic as an academic study. something already completed, but in a process
In the preface to his first book on education, by which citizens become creators of the ends
Fundamentals of Education in 1921, Bode they value, rather than working toward ends
wrote that the volume’s purpose was “to inter- established by others. Bode liked to quote
pret present-day educational problems from William JAMES’s portrayal of genuine experi-
the standpoint of pragmatic philosophy.” This ence as “being on the ragged edge of things.”
purpose Bode sought to realize in moving to For Bode this meant that the essential value of
Ohio State University in 1921 as a professor of what exists is not merely in what it is, but in
education. Until his retirement in 1944, his what it might become; we can say this of indi-
presence there made that university a center viduals, of ideas, of whatever is experienced:
for the study of educational theory. He excited there is something intangible about what exists,
both colleagues and students to turn philo- and this character gets to be changed by our
sophical thinking on educational practice, very attempts to describe it. Thus to experience
aiming to give practice a sense of rational direc- something is to move toward a qualitatively dif-
tion and to test the ideas of pragmatic philos- ferent experience; the end of experience is an
ophy in the work of teachers and learners. activity of growing, not the gaining of a fixed
Three interrelated dimensions in Bode’s end. It is a fallacy to take what allegedly is for
teaching and writings provide a sense of the what should be. It is suggestive that for Bode,
ways in which he worked to realize the aims the possibilities of democracy as a way of life,
implicit in the purpose of education stated in a functional theory of mind, and experience as
1921. a way of growing, are all parts of the same
Bode insisted that democracy as a way of reality. We can make distinctions between
life needs to more fully turn its possibilities into them, but they are inseparable in the develop-
actualities. These possibilities must come from ment of experience of the sort that Bode had in
the experience of ordinary people, and insofar mind. A democratic way of life is mind in its
as they can be actualized, that also must take functioning while striving to make a difference
place in the experience of ordinary people in our social life by helping individuals to grow.
working together. Like other pragmatists, Bode Another way of considering the fundamental
believed that philosophy grows out of genuine problems faced by schools in our democracy is
conflicts of values in the lives of human beings what Bode called “the cleavage in our culture.”
and, further, that philosophy generates ideas One side of the cleavage believes that a reality
279
BODE
exists different from and superior to ordinary H. Kilpatrick (New York, 1933), pp. 3–31.
experience, one that is necessary to give “Education and Social Reconstruction,”
meaning to ordinary experience. The other side Social Frontier 1 (1935): 18–22.
of the cleavage denies the necessity of such a “The Great American Dream,” in American
reality and holds that our problems can only be Philosophies Today and Tomorrow, ed.
settled in terms of human experience. The Horace M. Kallen and Sidney Hook (New
cleavage exists, not only in the culture York, 1935).
“outside” us; it exists also within each of us “Liberal Education for Today,” Antioch
because we have grown up in a culture mani- Review 4 (1944): 112–21.
festing the cleavage. It is clear on which side of “Russell’s Educational Philosophy,” in The
the cleavage Bode stood: his own development Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, ed. Paul
from idealism to pragmatism gives us a sense of Schilpp (Evanston, Ill., 1944).
what it means for citizens in a democracy to “Harvard Report,” Journal of Higher
overcome the cleavage. Education 17 (1946): 1–8, 201–204.
“Education for Freedom,” Teachers College
BIBLIOGRAPHY Record 49 (1948): 276–85.
“The Concept of Pure Experience,”
Philosophical Review 14 (1905): 684–95. Further Reading
An Outline of Logic (New York, 1910). Amer Nat Bio, Dict Amer Bio, Pres Addr of
“Objective Idealism and Its Critics,” APA v2, Proc of APA v26, Who Was Who
Philosophical Review 19 (1910): 597–609. in Amer v3, Who’s Who in Phil
“The Paradoxes of Pragmatism,” The Monist Bullough, Robert V. Democracy in
23 (1913): 112–22. Education: Boyd H. Bode (Bayside, N.Y.,
“Consciousness and Psychology,” in Creative 1981).
Intelligence (New York, 1917), pp. Chambliss, J. J. Boyd H. Bode’s Philosophy
228–81. of Education (Columbus, Ohio, 1963).
Fundamentals of Education (New York, Childs, John L. American Pragmatism and
1921). Education (New York, 1956), chap. 9.
Modern Educational Theories (New York, Seeger, Ruth E. Writings By and About Boyd
1927). H. Bode (Columbus, Ohio, 1951).
Democracy as a Way of Life (New York, Tanner, Daniel. Crusade for Democracy:
1927). Progressive Education at the Crossroads
Conflicting Psychologies of Learning (Albany, N.Y., 1991).
(Boston, 1929).
Progressive Education at the Crossroads J. J. Chambliss
(New York, 1938).
How We Learn (Boston, 1940).

“Objectives in Education,” School and
Society 18 (1923): 546–52. BOHM, David Joseph (1917–92)
“The Humanizing of Education,” American
Review 4 (1926): 507–15. David Joseph Bohm was born on 20 December
“Education at the Crossroads,” Progressive 1917 into a Jewish emigrant family in Wilkes-
Education 8 (1931): 543–9. Barre, Pennsylvania. He studied physics as an
“The Confusion in Present-day Education,” undergraduate at Penn State University, receiv-
in The Educational Frontier, ed. William ing his BA in 1939. As a graduate student, he
280
BOHM
began studies at the California Institute of quantum mechanics, liked the book as a clear
Technology, then finished his research under statement of the Copenhagen interpretation
Robert Oppenheimer at the University of but reported to Bohm that he still could not
California, Berkeley. He was awarded a PhD in accept the theory. This and his own worries led
physics in 1943 for research on the scattering Bohm to formulate a new theory of quantum
behavior of fundamental particles. This research mechanics based on explaining the distinctive
was immediately classified due to its relevance to quantum-mechanical behavior of fundamen-
the Manhattan Project. Bohm also became inter- tal particles by their being pushed around by a
ested in radical politics while in California. new “quantum potential.” This theory stands
Bohm became assistant professor of physics as a counter-example to most of the meta-
at Princeton University in 1946, where he physical conclusions physicists and philoso-
worked with Albert EINSTEIN. On 12 April phers had drawn from orthodox quantum
1949 he was subpoenaed to testify before the mechanics. Bohm’s hidden-variable theory
House Committee on Un-American Activities makes the same statistical predictions for
in connection with his own interest in Marxism particle positions as the orthodox theory, but,
and acquaintances he had made at Berkeley. unlike it, his theory can be written in a form
Bohm refused to cooperate, citing his Fifth that is fully deterministic. Quantum probabil-
Amendment rights. He was arrested for ities result not from a fundamentally random
contempt of Congress and suspended from his process but from one’s ignorance concerning
academic position in 1950. Although later the initial state. On Bohm’s theory, the
acquitted on all charges, he was not reap- observed nonlocal correlations of quantum-
pointed. In 1951 he accepted a chair in physics mechanically entangled systems result from the
at the University of São Paulo in Brazil, and in predicted interdependence of the motions of
1955 he went to Israel to teach at the Technion arbitrarily distant particles.
in Haifa. In 1957 Bohm moved to England Bohm’s thought concerning the nonlocal
and held a research fellowship at the University behavior of quantum-mechanically entangled
of Bristol. In 1961 he became a professor of systems led him to propose a quantum holism
theoretical physics at Birkbeck College, where the physical world can only be fully
University of London, and he held that position understood as a single indivisible unit. This
until retiring in 1987. Bohm died on 27 view is now common among physicists and
October 1992 in London. philosophers of physics, but Bohm saw in it
Bohm’s most important contributions to phi- connections to such philosophical traditions as
losophy are the result of his reflection on the Eastern mysticism and Native American
nature of physical theories generally and thought. His interests led him to become a
quantum mechanics in particular. By 1932 the student and a close associate of Jiddu
Copenhagen formulation of quantum mechan- Krishnamurti, and he also was a friend of the
ics, developed by Niels Bohr and his colleagues, Dalai Lama. Bohm’s investigation into possible
had become the orthodox theory. Though relationships between Western and other philo-
Bohm was always uncomfortable with it, while sophical traditions, like his research generally,
at Princeton he set out to write a careful was always characterized by openness to new
textbook explaining the orthodox statistical ideas, intellectual honesty, and a desire for clear
formulation of quantum mechanics. The result understanding.
was Quantum Theory (1951). This book is
remarkable for its clear explanations and argu- BIBLIOGRAPHY
ments and for its honest reflections on the struc- Quantum Theory (New York, 1951).
ture of the theory. Einstein, a prominent Causality and Chance in Modern Physics
opponent of the orthodox formulation of (Princeton, N.J., and London, 1957).
281
BOHM
The Special Theory of Relativity (New York, BONNIN, Gertrude Simmons (1876–1938)
1965).
Wholeness and the Implicate Order (London, Gertrude Simmons was born on 22 February
1980). 1876 in the Yankton Reservation in south-
Science, Order, and Creativity (New York, eastern South Dakota. Her mother was Ellen
1987). Tate’lyohiwin (Reaches for the Wind)
The Undivided Universe: An Ontological Simmons; her father abandoned the family
Interpretation of Quantum Theory, with before Gertrude’s birth. She was also given
Basil J. Hiley (London and New York, the name Zitkala Sa, or “Red Bird,” and was
1993). raised as a Sioux until the age of eight, when
she was sent to White’s Manual Labor
Other Relevant Works Institute, a Quaker school, in Indiana. She
Bohm’s papers are at Birkbeck College, attended Earlham College in Indiana from
University of London. 1895 to 1897 and the Boston Conservatory of
Truth and Actuality, with Jiddu Music in 1899, and then taught at the Carlisle
Krishnamurti (San Francisco, 1978). Indian Training School during 1897–9. She
The Ending of Time, with Jiddu was one of a number of assimilated Native
Krishnamurti (San Francisco, 1985). Americans who helped reinforce white domi-
Thought as a System (London and New nation, while at the same time working to
York, 1994). record and honor tribal ritual and tradition.
On Creativity, ed. Lee Nichol (London and After studying at Earlham College, Simmons
New York, 1998). taught at the Carlisle Indian Training School in
The Limits of Thought, with Jiddu Pennsylvania, an institution that used rigid
Krishnamurti (London and New York, military-style discipline to force assimilation of
1999). Native American students. Students were for-
The Essential David Bohm, ed. Lee Nichol bidden to use their tribal languages, required
(London and New York, 2003). to do manual labor, and punished severely for
failing to conform to the standards set by the
Further Reading training school. Simmons taught at Carlisle
Bio 20thC Phils for two years before leaving to study violin at
Hiley, Basil J., and F. David Peat, eds. the Boston Conservatory of Music, performing
Quantum Implications: Essays in Honour at the World Expo the following year in Paris.
of David Bohm (London and New York, She returned to the Dakotas in order to help
1998). improve reservation life, serving as a clerk at
Peat, F. David. Infinite Potential: The Life Standing Rock Reservation in North Dakota in
and Times of David Bohm (Reading, 1902, where she met Raymond Bonnin, whom
Mass., 1996). she married in May 1902. Bonnin and her
husband, also a Sioux, moved to Utah where
Jeffrey A. Barrett she was a clerk and tribal organizer at the
Uintah and Ouray reservations from 1902 to
1916.
In 1916, Bonnin moved to Washington,
D.C. where she was the editor of American
Indian Magazine, the journal of the Society of
American Indians, an advocacy group that
lobbied for Native rights. By 1926 she and
her husband had established their own orga-
282
BOODIN
nization, the National Council of American Susag, Dorothea M. “Zitkala-Sa (Gertrude

Indians, to which she dedicated herself for the Simmons Bonnin), A Power(full) Literary
rest of her life. Bonnin died on 25 January Voice,” Studies in American Indian
1938 in Washington, D.C., and is buried in Literatures 5 (1993): 3–24.
Arlington National Cemetery. Tedlock, Dennis, and Barbara Tedlock, eds.
Bonnin’s writings focused on reforms in US Teachings from the American Earth:
government policy toward Native Americans, Indian Religion and Philosophy (New
as well as on the recovery of Indian stories York, 1975).
and ways of life. She wrote three books, and Welch, Deborah. Zitkala-Sa: An American
published several articles in popular publica- Indian Leader, 1876–1938. PhD
tions like Harper’s and Atlantic Monthly. dissertation, University of Wyoming
Bonnin, together with Charles EASTMAN , (Laramie, Wyo., 1985).
BLACK ELK, and Luther STANDING BEAR, all
born and/or raised as Sioux in the Dakota Dorothy Rogers
Territories in the 1860s and 1870s, tried to
teach their non-Indian readers about Indian
culture, traditions, and ways of thought.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Old Indian Legends (Boston, 1901; BOODIN, John Elof (1869–1950)
Lincoln, Nebr., 2004).
“Why I Am a Pagan,” Atlantic Monthly 90 John Elof Boodin was born on 14 September
(December 1902): 801–3. 1869 on the Barsedt homestead in Pjätteryd
American Indian Stories (Washington, parish, Småland, Sweden. He was the fifth of
D.C., 1921; Lincoln, Nebr., 2003). ten children and had other half-siblings from
Oklahoma’s Poor Rich Indians; an Orgy of his father’s previous marriage. Boodin’s
Graft and Exploitation of the Five parents were pious Lutherans and his keen
Civilized Tribes, Legalized Robbery, with intellect was recognized early by two of the
Charles H. Fabens and Matthew K. local pastors, who advised that young Elof
Sniffen (Philadelphia, 1924). should receive a university education. Up to the
age of sixteen he worked on the family farm
Further Reading and explored the countryside of Småland.
Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio From this he gained a firsthand appreciation
“Bonnin, Gertrude Simmons,” in A for nature, both the beautiful and the harsh
Biobibliography of Native American aspects. Between 1885 and 1887 he attended
Writers, 1772–1924, ed. D. F. Littlefield the respected Fjellstedt Gymnasium in
and J. W. Parins (Metuchen, N.J., 1981), Uppsala. Upon the death of his father in 1887,
p. 17. Contains a bibliography of financial need led Boodin to emigrate to the
Bonnin’s writings. United States and he settled in Colchester,
Fisher, Dexter. “Zitkala Sa: The Evolution Illinois. He was following several older siblings
of a Writer,” American Indian Quarterly already in the US, who planned that he should
5 (August 1979): 229–38. receive his advanced education there, in spite
Johnson, David, and Raymond Wilson. of his knowing not a word of English.
“Gertrude Simmons Bonnin, 1876–1938: Thus began a remarkable climb through
‘Americanize the First American’,” American academia. Boodin adapted quickly
American Indian Quarterly 12 (Winter to his new country, attending first Macomb
1988): 27–40. Normal and Commercial College, then
283
BOODIN
Augustana College, followed by the University Boodin was elected President of the Pacific
of Colorado in 1892, the University of Division of the American Philosophical
Minnesota in 1893, and finally Brown Association in 1933–4.
University, from which he received the BA in Boodin is known for his command of both
1895 and MA in 1896 in philosophy, studying contemporary science and the history of phi-
under James Seth. From there he went to losophy, for his creative ideas, his rigorous
Harvard University in 1897 for doctoral work, arguments, and his poetic style of writing.
where he studied with William JAMES, Josiah Time has tended to confirm many of his philo-
R OYCE , and George S ANTAYANA , among sophical hypotheses, although he has been
others. The effort to blend and synthesize these rarely read in recent years. Some interpreters
influences provided the impetus for Boodin’s read Boodin’s philosophy as an effort to
thought. He received his PhD in 1899, writing temper Royce’s absolutism with James’s
a dissertation on “A Theory of Time.” realism. He is often classed with idealists in the
Boodin served as a lecturer at Harvard in philosophical literature. This classification
1899–1900, and then was a professor of phi- seems to derive largely from Boodin’s willing-
losophy at Iowa College (now Grinnell ness to embrace and elaborate Royce’s social
College) from 1900 to 1904, followed by the philosophy, especially as set out in The
University of Kansas from 1904 to 1912. At Problem of Christianity (1913), and Royce’s
Kansas, Boodin fought the university’s presi- logic of relations, and also in part because of
dent on a matter of principle, perhaps winning Boodin’s conception of God. Others have seen
the moral high ground but losing the profes- James as Boodin’s primary influence, and his
sional battle. After a year back in Cambridge, life’s work as an effort to work out the theory
Massachusetts, he was professor of philosophy of energistic fields in pluralistic metaphysics, a
at Carleton College in Minnesota from 1913 project that James was never able to complete
to 1927, then at the University of Southern to his own satisfaction. Boodin had a greater
California in 1928–9, and finally at the talent for metaphysics than James, making the
University of California at Los Angeles from task more manageable for him.
1929 until his retirement in 1939. Boodin died Boodin’s epistemology was a type of prag-
on 14 November 1950 in Los Angeles, matic realism, very much guided by and con-
California. nected to the findings of empirical science. But
There were travels and visiting lectures in Boodin was critical of aspects of both prag-
London and Oxford as his reputation grew, matism and scientism. Pragmatism was weak
but Boodin was always disappointed not to in logic and metaphysics, he thought, while
have been called back to Harvard, and at being science provides at most some good analogies
obliged to create his philosophical works in the for metaphysics, and he warned against taking
spare time he could find between heavy those analogies literally. Even a perfected
teaching and administrative responsibilities. science would not answer some of the most
Nevertheless, he published nine substantial serious philosophical demands, particularly
books and close to 100 scholarly articles. that the universe must be comprehended not
During his lifetime Boodin was well respected just rationally in terms of truth, but also aes-
and often cited and anthologized. A sign of the thetically and morally in terms of beauty and
esteem of his contemporaries came when he goodness. Yet Boodin kept up with the best
was elected early in his career to the presi- science of his day, especially physics, and
dency of the Western Philosophical strove to conform his philosophical vocabulary
Association (today’s Central Division of the and viewpoint to its findings.
American Philosophical Association) in Still others see Boodin as a process philoso-
1912–13. Then, at the height of his powers, pher, even though he was often critical of
284
BOODIN
Henri Bergson. Indeed, one of Boodin’s prin- Royce had defined realism as the conception
cipal criticisms of both absolute and empirical that “to be is to be independent,” and while
idealism was that these philosophies ignore Boodin granted that there is no such thing as
process. And still others see Boodin as a kind complete metaphysical independence, individ-
of theistic naturalist, on account of his view of uals must be conceived as metaphysically
the relation between God and nature, a pan- discrete, and hence some metaphysical rela-
experientialist and panentheist view. tions are not internal to any overall totality.
All of these assessments of Boodin, as an The totality is rather a cosmos, an order in
idealist, pragmatist, realist, theistic naturalist, process, and the notion of energy “serves as a
and process philosopher, are correct. At a convenient name, however thin, for the whole
mature stage in his career he described his phi- world of process” (1911, p. 303). Boodin held
losophy as “empirical realism and metaphysi- that the cosmos consists of “a hierarchy of
cal energism with a functional conception of fields.” Such hierarchies of nested and
qualities and values” (Nelson 1987, p. 24). mutually dependent energy fields are found in
Nelson adds to this description that Boodin organisms of all sorts, in our daily experience.
defends also a “cosmic idealism.” For example, in the human organism “there
Understanding what is meant by these terms is are fields of the lower centers of the nervous
a basis for understanding Boodin’s whole phi- system; there are also cerebral fields and psy-
losophy. chological fields. The cerebral fields give defi-
Boodin’s philosophical thought really began niteness and organization to the lower neural
with a theory of time, first published in 1904. fields” (1932, p. 212), and the nested depen-
Noting that both the Bergsonian qualitative dence of higher patterns of organization upon
view and the scientific quantitative view of the lower ones continues to the very top of our
serial character of time have a number of intellectual and imaginative capabilities. The
failings, he argues that our thinking about time universe itself must be conceived by analogy to
may be improved by seeing it as a “real this organic structure, if any adequate meta-
dynamism” in which “truth [is] relative to physics is to be offered, since explanations
process, not process to truth… . If process is must satisfy not only our logical and empirical
real, then reality is infinite and truth never can demands but also our aesthetic and moral
exhaust reality … it will take an infinite demands. At the height of our imaginative and
number of truth universes to register or sym- intellectual life, we find the logical order of
bolize a universe of process.” (1904, p. 80) thought itself. Arguing that we may be assured
Time is, for Boodin, “dynamic non-being” of the universal applicability of logical laws,
that acts within being, as a limit, as a mode of because the mind is fully at home in nature,
existence without content, as possibility. Boodin reasons that the study of science dis-
Identifying process with reality twenty-five covers exemplifications in natural processes
years ahead of Alfred North WHITEHEAD, and of a broader orderliness. “The cosmos must be
time with real dynamism following Bergson, conceived not merely as a dynamic equilib-
prepared Boodin as few others for the philo- rium, but as a living dynamic equilibrium of
sophical encounter with the theory of relativ- such a structure or ‘curvature’ that the loss of
ity and the quantum revolution. Boodin was available energy in one part is compensated for
already able to deal with the idea of energy by an equal increase elsewhere, for only a
philosophically before it became the very living equilibrium can be self-sustaining.”
center of natural philosophy. (1932, p. 200) The universe is conceived by
Following Royce, Boodin argued that “to be Boodin as being alive, as a sophisticated
is to be uniquely related to a whole,” but he arrangement of interdependent energistic
departed from Royce’s criticisms of realism. fields, dynamically encountering possibility.
285
BOODIN
Prior to developing this cosmic idealism, Boodin was quick to capitalize on the notion
Boodin expended significant effort on issues of of quantum indeterminacy to argue that
method and knowledge to formulate his empir- realism no longer meant giving one’s philoso-
ical realism. His realism is grounded in arguing phy to determinate laws of nature as the
that discrete metaphysical individuals have ground of form. Knowable structure and form
“reference to an object existing beyond the in nature are consistent with a process con-
apperceptive unity of momentary individual ception of energy within a realist epistemology.
consciousness” (1911, p. 251). There is a felt The topic of God and the divine in relation
sense of the encompassing whole from any to nature played a large role in Boodin’s
given perspective, but no realistic basis upon mature work. Arguing that the first and most
which to bind that whole in a single account of basic mistake in human thinking about God is
“truth.” Hence, reality always exceeds truth. the habit of severing the natural from the
Truth concerns relations that make a practical super-natural, Boodin argues that these are
difference in the universe. Thus, one might ask really two perspectives on all reality: the per-
how the nested energistic fields that are organ- spective of the part or individual, and the per-
ically internal to the metaphysical individuals spective of the living and developing whole. A
can have a discoverable relation to the ener- human conception of God must be derived
gistic fields from which metaphysical individ- empirically from the way in which each and
uals are discrete. This is the way the every part is suffused with the meaning of the
mind–body problem appears in Boodin’s whole. We know we live in an empirically real
terms. To solve the mind–body problem real- “community of minds” that is not wholly
istically and empirically, Boodin points out rationalizable, but we often fail to recognize
that the concept of energy, as empirically that our relation to the divine is analogous.
defined, is the capacity to do work in the real Rejecting “proofs” for the existence of God,
universe, a difference that makes a difference Boodin sought an apt way to fill out this
in the universe. Whether we have yet learned relation of part to whole, arguing that “we
the details or not, we can safely assume that have an analogy in the human personality.
ideas, consciousness, mind, or whatever term The events in the life of the organism are
we use for those groups of relations internal to guided by a whole pattern – the field of the
individuals, do make a difference in the individual soul – which gives a unique quality
universe. For all their mysteriousness, it can to the individual… . It is through this soul that
easily be seen that ideas are a kind of energy, energy is directed so as to find its place where
by definition, because they alter the universe. it is needed in the life of the whole.” (God: A
To deny this is to commit oneself to an equiv- Cosmic Philosophy of Religion, 1934, p. 33)
ocal definition of energy. Hence it is both Alluding to the first law of thermodynamics,
empirical and realistic to conceive of energy as Boodin continues, “nothing is lost which is
existing in fields that possess genuine interde- significant to the life of the whole. The light
pendent but discrete forms. The forms of that goes out here is rekindled yonder… . Only
energy fields are dynamic, contingent, active, the trivial, insignificant and bad dies, not to rise
and evolving. Time and energy are, then, the again to life. This is the second death – the
two complementary agencies of creative death of the individual – not the loss of energy,
becoming: energy is dynamic being and time is but the loss of pattern, the suicide of person-
dynamic non-being. This may not be a ality” (p. 33). Thus, Boodin conceives of God
standard form of metaphysical and empirical as a kind of natural, cosmic personality, “the
realism, but Boodin insists upon its classifica- spiritual field in which everything lives and
tion as a kind of realism. In the second edition moves and has its being – the field which
(1931) of his major work, A Realistic Universe, guides the cosmic process, though the parts
286
BOODIN
must adapt themselves to the structure of this development of individual personality, is insuf-
field in their own way, according to their own ficient for “social mind.” Boodin says “in
relativity, in their moving finite frames of ref- order to have a social mind there must be a
erence” (p. 34). Boodin conceives of God as sense of reciprocal or sympathetic response to
the soul of the whole, its center of personal the situation. On the lower levels this means
energy. the abandon to a common impulse, on the
Although he had been working out his higher levels it means the leading of a common
theory of the social mind for many years, purpose.” (p. 157) In proportion as a group
Boodin’s last major development came to can be fused in pursuit of an ideal purpose,
fruition on the eve of World War II. He there is a social mind in the personal sense.
attempted to set out along democratic lines This fusion is not the result of individual per-
the notion that “mind” (recalling this is a kind sonalities choosing rationally, it is what creates
of “energy”) is not an idea that can be limited individual personalities and provides the
to atomic individuals. In the shadow of both measure of their rationality. In terms of
communist collectivism and fascistic national- forming normative judgments about better and
ism, Boodin sought to articulate a social phi- worse purposes, Boodin embraces Royce’s
losophy that respected individuality while rec- notion of loyalty and develops it further.
ognizing that there is more to “mind” than
“subcranial or solipsistic” individual psychol- BIBLIOGRAPHY
ogy. Thus he outlines a social ontology on Time and Reality (New York, 1904).
“the analogies between the organism and Truth and Reality: An Introduction to the
society” (1939, p. 130). Boodin’s analogy is, as Theory of Knowledge (New York, 1911).
always, more careful than the scientistic and A Realistic Universe (New York, 1916; 2nd
reductionistic versions found in communist edn 1931).
and fascist ideologies. “The social organism is Cosmic Evolution: Outlines of Cosmic
merely a metaphor, a vague analogy.” (p. 131) Idealism (New York, 1925).
Given the intimacy and immediacy of the God: A Cosmic Philosophy of Religion
union of personal selves with the personal (New York, 1934).
divine, it is not easy, Boodin realizes, to explain Three Interpretations of the Universe (New
how the “social” can be anything more than York, 1934).
an abstraction. He solves this problem with an The Social Mind: Foundations of Social
account of intersubjective continuity and Philosophy (New York, 1939).
response that follows Royce and is critical of The Religion of Tomorrow (New York,
James while bearing a close resemblance 1943).
(without explicit reference) to the social Posthumous Papers of John Elof Boodin,
ontology of William E. HOCKING. Arguing that ed. Donald A. Piatt (Los Angeles, 1957).
the idea of social companionship is a pervasive,
intuitive feature of all experience, Boodin Other Relevant Works
reasons that absolute discontinuity among Boodin’s papers are at the University of
discrete individuals is an abstraction at best. California at Los Angeles.
Social continuity of metaphysically discrete “What Pragmatism Is and Is Not,” Journal
individuals is the only warranted idea. The of Philosophy 6 (1909): 627–35.
overall thrust of social development is in the “The Existence of Social Minds,” American
direction of creative synthesis, the creation of Journal of Sociology 19 (1913): 1–47.
larger and more complex energistic fields. But “Biographical” and “Nature and Reason,”
our intuitive response that points to intersub- in Contemporary American Philosophy:
jective continuity, although it is prior to the Personal Statements, vol. 1, ed. George P.
287
BOODIN
Adams and William P. Montague (New Boolos was promoted to full professor. In 1995
York, 1930), pp. 136–42, 143–66. he was elected President of the Association for
“God and Cosmic Structure,” in Symbolic Logic. He also was an editor of the
Contemporary Idealism in America, ed. Journal of Symbolic Logic, and a fellow of the
Clifford Barrett (New York, 1932), pp. American Academy of Arts and Sciences. His
197–216. wife was the philosopher Sally Sedgwick of
“Functional Realism,” Philosophical Dartmouth College. Just before his death he
Review 43 (1934): 147–78. was appointed Laurance S. Rockefeller
Professor of Philosophy at MIT. Boolos died on
Further Reading 27 May 1996 in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Bio 20thC Phils, Pres Addr of APA v2, Boolos’s international reputation rests on
Proc of APA v24, Who Was Who in research in three main areas. First, he is widely
Amer v3, Who’s Who in Phil recognized as one of the originators of prov-
Auxier, Randall E. “Introduction,” to ability logic, where the logic of necessity and
Truth and Reality, by John Elof Boodin possibility is applied to the theory of mathe-
(Bristol, UK, 2001). matical proof. He published two books on this
Holmes, Eugene C. Social Philosophy and topic. Second, Boolos made significant contri-
the Social Mind: A Study of the Genetic butions to the philosophy of logic and, in par-
Methods of J. M. Baldwin, G. H. Mead ticular, to the understanding of second-order
and J. E. Boodin (New York, 1942). logic. One central insight, now standard in the
Nelson, Charles H. John Elof Boodin: field, is that second-order variables could be
Philosopher Poet (New York, 1987). interpreted as making plural reference to the
Reck, Andrew. “The Cosmic Philosophy of objects in the range of first-order variables,
John Elof Boodin,” in Recent American instead of as ranging over sets of such objects.
Philosophy: Studies of Ten According to many, this semantic insight
Representative Thinkers (New York, allowed one to accept second-order logic
1964), chap. 4. without being thereby committed to the exis-
tence of abstract objects.
Randall E. Auxier Third, Boolos was an international expert
on the work of German philosopher and math-
ematician Gottlob Frege, widely viewed as the
grandfather of modern logic. Frege’s attempt to
ground arithmetic in logic failed when Bertrand
Russell showed that one of the set-theoretic
BOOLOS, George Stephen (1940–96) axioms Frege employed led to a contradiction.
For almost a century, Frege’s project was
George Boolos was born on 4 September 1940 viewed as a grand failure. But, along with
in Manhattan, New York. He graduated from Crispin Wright and Richard Heck among
Princeton University in 1961 with a BA degree others, Boolos showed that a more modest,
in mathematics. As a Fulbright scholar, he though still substantial mathematical result
earned a BPhil degree from the University of could be saved from the project. At the time of
Oxford in 1963. In 1966 he earned a PhD in his death, Boolos was at work on a book on
philosophy from Massachusetts Institute of Frege, funded through a Guggenheim
Technology, which was the first doctorate in Fellowship. His most important articles on set-
philosophy granted by MIT. Boolos taught phi- theory and Frege’s logic were published in a
losophy at Columbia University from 1966 posthumous collection, Logic, Logic, and Logic
until 1969, when he returned to MIT. In 1980 (1998). Boolos’s unique mix of humor and
288
BORING
genius was exemplified by his three-page article, “The Hardest Logical Puzzle Ever,” Harvard
“Godel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem Review of Philosophy 6 (1996): 62–5.
Explained in Words of One Syllable” (1994).
Further Reading
BIBLIOGRAPHY Who Was Who in Amer v11
Computability and Logic, with Richard Oliver, Alex. “Logic, Mathematics and
Jeffrey (Cambridge, UK, 1974). Philosophy,” British Journal for the
The Unprovability of Consistency: An Essay Philosophy of Science 51 (2000): 857–73.
in Modal Logic (Cambridge, UK, 1979). Parsons, Charles. “George Boolos,” Notre
Honor of Richard Cartwright, ed. Judith Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (1999):
Jarvis Thomson (Cambridge, Mass., 3–5.
1987), pp. 3–20.
The Logic of Provability (Cambridge, UK, David Hunter
1993).
Logic, Logic, and Logic, ed. Richard Jeffrey
(Cambridge, Mass., 1998).

“Degrees of Unsolvability of Constructible BORING, Edwin Garrigues (1886–1968)
Sets of Integers,” with Hilary Putnam,
Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (1968): E. G. Boring was born on 23 October 1886 in
497–513. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and died on 1 July
“Effectiveness and Natural Languages,” in 1968 in Cambridge, Massachusetts. From the
Language and Philosophy: A Symposium, 1920s to the 1960s, he was one of the most
ed. Sidney Hook (New York, 1969). influential figures in academic psychology. In
“The Iterative Conception of Set,” Journal of addition to his primary role as a builder of the
Philosophy 68 (1971): 215–32. discipline, Boring published theoretical and sys-
“On Second-Order Logic,” Journal of tematic works, both psychological and philo-
Philosophy 72 (1975): 509–27. sophical in content, that may be considered a
“Provability, Truth, and Modal Logic,” significant contribution to history of science,
Journal of Philosophical Logic 9 (1980): philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind.
1–7. Boring was raised in a matriarchal Quaker
“To Be is to Be the Value of a Variable (or household and attended the George School.
Some Values of Some Variables),” Journal While studying electrical engineering at Cornell
of Philosophy 81 (1984): 430–50. University, he chose E. B. TITCHENER’s psy-
“Nominalist Platonism,” Philosophical chology course as an elective, and was inspired
Review 94 (1985): 327–44. by Titchener’s lectures. After receiving a
“The Consistency of Frege’s Foundations of Masters of Engineering degree from Cornell in
Arithmetic,” in On Being and Saying: 1908, Boring spent a year working at
Essays for Richard Cartwright, ed. Judith Bethlehem Steel and taught science in a
Jarvis Thomson (Cambridge, Mass., Moravian Church school. Returning to Cornell
1987). in 1910 for an MA, with plans to continue
Ed., Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor teaching, he found himself attracted to psy-
of Hilary Putnam (Cambridge, UK, 1990). chology. He became a devoted student of
“Godel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem Titchener and a member of Titchener’s labo-
Explained in Words of One Syllable,” ratory, one of the most important of its time.
Mind (1994): 1–3. For his dissertation, Boring studied sensory
289
BORING
processes in the alimentary tract, a topic history of psychology and the history of science
assigned by Titchener. After receiving the PhD throughout his career, interweaving psycho-
in psychology in 1914, Boring spent four addi- logical, sociological, and philosophical
tional years as an instructor at Cornell. In 1918 concepts. These widely read papers dealt with
he became Chief Psychological Examiner at social and cultural factors in scientific devel-
Camp Upton, Long Island, where he played a opment, the history of method, and problems
major role in World War I army intelligence of scientific communication.
testing. Working under psychologist Robert Beginning in 1927, Boring attempted to
M. Yerkes, Boring helped to prepare a massive analyze the problems of “founders,” creativity,
report on the army testing program. originality, and “greatness” in science. He
Throughout the rest of his career he remained introduced psychologists to Goethe’s concept of
cautious and was sometimes critical regarding Zeitgeist, but transformed it into “the total
the interpretation of intelligence tests. body of knowledge and opinion” at a given
In 1919 Boring was invited by G. Stanley time in a specific culture, thus providing a
HALL to accept appointment as professor of version that positivists could find congenial.
experimental psychology at Clark University. Using Robert Merton’s concept of “multiples”
Three years later, during intense administrative to explicate scientific discoveries, Boring
controversies and “red scare” issues at Clark, outlined a view of history of science that rec-
Boring accepted a position as associate profes- onciled “Great Man” notions with Zeitgeist
sor at Harvard. He served as Director of the explanations of scientific change. By adding
Psychological Laboratory from 1924 to 1949, “erudition,” love of the unexpected, visualiza-
and as de facto chair of psychology, which was tion, alertness, and efficient thinking as psy-
not separated from the department of philoso- chological attributes, he hoped to explain the
phy and psychology until 1934. He was made mysteries of “scientific genius.”
Edgar Pierce Professor of Psychology at His writings on experimental control, mea-
Harvard in 1956 and retired in 1957. His heavy surement, statistics, and the role of evolution-
administrative responsibilities at Harvard left ary theory in psychology provided an analysis
him with little time for experimental work, and of basic methodological and theoretical con-
his limited output caused deep self-criticism structs in historical context. Although Boring’s
and even personal crises during the 1930s. historiography was narrow by contemporary
However, Boring and his students did complete standards, the clarity of his writing and careful
a well-known series of experiments on the argumentation undoubtedly helped to maintain
moon illusion between 1936 and 1941. Using a common discursive framework among exper-
a cleverly designed series of mirrors to create imental psychologists in the face of challenges
artificial moons, they showed that the illusion from Gestalt psychology and phenomenology.
depended in part on the position of the eyes in Of his concerns with scientific method, his pro-
the skull. motion of P. W. BRIDGMAN’s operationism was
Boring is primarily known to psychologists the most significant. Although Boring credited
for his 1929 A History of Experimental his most noted student, S. S. STEVENS, with
Psychology and its 1950 revision. Although introducing the concept to psychology, Boring
heavily criticized in recent years for presenting had hinted at features of operationism in his
a distorted view of Wilhelm Wundt, Boring’s writings of the 1920s on the stimulus error and
History was read by nearly all graduate intelligence testing. In the mid 1930s, with
students in psychology through the 1960s, and Stevens and possibly under the influence of
it shaped the way in which psychologists Herbert FEIGL, he began active promotion of
viewed their emerging science and the aims of the concept. Despite the disunity over opera-
experimentation. Boring published on the tionism evident at the famous symposium held
290
BORING
in 1945, Boring continued to argue that oper- course on public television. In 1959 the
ations could converge and provide a foundation American Psychological Foundation awarded
for the advancement of knowledge, thus reveal- him a Gold Medal for his achievements as an
ing his essentially positivist faith. experimentalist, teacher, critic, theorist, admin-
Less well recognized by psychologists is istrator, popularizer, and editor.
Boring’s contribution to the mind–body
problem. Only after the death of his domi- BIBLIOGRAPHY
neering mentor Titchener, could Boring attempt “The Stimulus Error,” American Journal of
a reformulation of Titchener’s dualism. Psychology 32 (1921): 449–71.
Boring’s 1933 Physical Dimensions of “The Problem of Originality in Science,”
Consciousness attempted to transcend the lim- American Journal of Psychology 39
itations of Titchener’s view and bridge struc- (1927): 70–90.
turalism and behaviorism using monistic phys- A History of Experimental Psychology (New
icalism as a guiding principle. This physicalism York, 1929; 2nd edn 1950).
was conceptually related to operationism, but The Physical Dimensions of Consciousness
in 1933 Boring had not yet read Bridgman. (New York, 1933).
Retrospectively, Boring described operationism Psychology: A Factual Textbook, with H.
as a modern form of physicalism, in that con- Langfeld and H. Weld (New York, 1935).
sciousness was reduced to the operations by “A Psychological Function is the Relation of
which consciousness was known to scientists. Successive Differentiations of Events in the
He was able to “save” Titchener’s work by Organism,” Psychological Review 44
translating dimensions of consciousness (for (1937): 445–61.
example, intensity) into physicalist terms. Sensation and Perception in the History of
Boring’s position rejected both ontological and Experimental Psychology (New York,
epistemological dualism and all parallelisms in 1942).
favor of monism, but he did not consider “The Moon Illusion,” American Journal of
himself a behaviorist. For Boring, consciousness Physics 11 (1943): 55–60.
had to be understood in terms of neural “The Use of Operational Definitions in
systems, in a position he called “psychoneural Science,” Psychological Review 52 (1945):
isomorphism” or what later came to be called 243–5.
“identity theory” of mind. In this arena, it is “Mind and Mechanism,” American Journal
likely that Boring had more influence on the of Psychology 59 (1946): 173–92.
subsequent views of psychologists than of “Great Men and Scientific Progress,”
philosophers. Proceedings of the American Philosophical
Boring worked tirelessly to organize and Society 94 (1950): 339–51.
promote the discipline of psychology. He served “The Nature and History of Experimental
as the President of the American Psychological Control,” American Journal of Psychology
Association in 1928, Secretary of the IX 67 (1954): 573–89.
International Congress of Psychology in 1929, “Eponym as Placebo,” Acta Psychologica 23
and Honorary President of the XVII (1964): 9–23.
International Congress of Psychology in 1963.
He was a founder and the first editor of Other Relevant Works
Contemporary Psychology. With Herbert “Edwin Garrigues Boring,” in A History of
Langfeld and Henry Weld he authored a series Psychology in Autobiography, vol. 4, ed.
of widely used introductory textbooks; and, as Edwin G. Boring et al. (Worcester, Mass.,
the 1957 Harvard Lowell Television Lecturer, 1952), pp. 27–52.
he was one of the first to present a psychology Psychologist at Large: An Autobiography
291
BORING
and Selected Essays (New York, 1961). City, he earned an EdD from Columbia
History, Psychology, and Science: Selected University in 1958. In 1962 Borowitz joined the
Papers, ed. D. T. Campbell and R. I. faculty of the Hebrew Union College–Jewish
Watson (New York, 1963). Institute of Religion in New York, where he
presently holds the Sigmund L. Falk
Further Reading Distinguished Professorship of Education and
Amer Nat Bio, Bio Dict Psych, Dict Amer Jewish Religious Thought.
Bio, Encyc Psych, Who Was Who v5 Borowitz’s important and programmatic
Cerullo, John. “E. G. Boring: Reflections on essay, “The Jewish Need for Theology,”
a Discipline Builder,” American Journal of appeared in Commentary in 1962. He recog-
Psychology 101 (1988): 561–75. nized in religious existentialism a useful tool
Jaynes, Julian. “Edwin Garrigues Boring: for conveying Jewish religious thought to a
1889–1968,” Journal of the History of the contemporary audience and developed a famil-
Behavioral Sciences 5 (1969): 99–112. iarity with both Jewish and non-Jewish theo-
Kelly, Barry. “Inventing Psychology’s Past: E. logical work. This expertise led to his publi-
G. Boring’s Historiography in Relation to cation in 1965 of A Layman’s Introduction to
the Psychology of His Time,” Journal of Religious Existentialism, a book that bears the
Mind and Behavior 2 (1981): 229–41. hallmark of all his subsequent writings – clarity
O’Donnell, John. “The Crisis of of expression, an ability to distill difficult ideas
Experimentalism in the 1920s: E. G. into a more easily understood form, and a
Boring and His Uses of History,” breadth of interests and subjects. A later book,
American Psychologist 34 (1979): 289–95. Contemporary Christologies (1980), contin-
Rosenzweig, Saul. “E. G. Boring and the ues his interest in Christian thought. His many
Zeitgeist: Eruditione gesta beavit,” Journal subsequent writings include reflections on
of Psychology 75 (1970): 59–71. Jewish education, theology, interfaith dialogue,
Winston, Andrew S. “‘The Defects of His ethics, and political thought, balancing com-
Race …’ E. G. Boring and Antisemitism in mitment to Jewish sources with advocacy of
American Psychology, 1923–1953,” personal autonomy. In 1970 he founded
History of Psychology 1 (1998): 27–51. Sh’ma: A Journal of Jewish Responsibility and
served as its senior editor from 1993 to 1997.
Andrew S. Winston This journal provides a forum in which Jews of
every persuasion discuss and debate theologi-
cal, social, cultural, sexual, and political issues.
He was instrumental in both the shaping and
the explication of the 1976 publication Reform
Judaism: A Centenary Perspective. He has
BOROWITZ, Eugene Bernard (1924– ) spoken widely in both academic and non-
academic settings and received several
Eugene B. Borowitz was born on 20 February honorary degrees.
1924 in Columbus, Ohio. He received his BA Borowitz concludes his Layman’s
from Ohio State University in 1943. He then Introduction to Religious Existentialism by
attended the Hebrew Union College in explaining why he finds existentialism a useful
Cincinnati, receiving rabbinic ordination in tool for expressing a modern religiousness: it
1948 and the Doctor of Hebrew Letters in sets the modern individual face to face with the
1952. After becoming Director of the Religious biblical God, and it introduces the biblical
Education Department of the Union of God into the life of the contemporary individ-
American Hebrew Congregations in New York ual. His thinking emphasizes the dialogue
292
BOROWITZ
between individuals and the divine, a com- through changes and variations. Its ultimate
mitment to reading Torah as a way of dis- incarnation as part of the second edition of
cerning divine commands, and the problems of Choices in Modern Jewish Thought (1995)
mediating between a traditionalism that limits includes a striking recognition of the place of
human autonomy and a modernism that over- women in Judaism – the language becomes
values human independence. These criteria gender neutral, except when referring to the
establish the standard by which Borowitz divinity, and a special section on Jewish
judges other thinkers and the motivation that feminism is added by a Jewish feminist. The
animates his own work. Borowitz’s review of evolution of that book reflects Borowitz’s
modern Jewish thought, A New Jewish concern for applying covenantal theology to
Theology in the Making (1968), examines the ethical questions. Covenantal ethics, itself,
seminal Jewish thinkers from Moses responds to an ethical dilemma – the reconcil-
Mendelssohn through the present and con- iation of human autonomy and divine author-
cludes by considering a “covenantal” theology ity. Borowitz insists that Judaism preserves the
that offers an existentialist entry into Jewish independence of the individual Jew while still
belief and thought. demanding obedience to God’s command-
Borowitz’s How Can a Jew Speak of Faith ments. Jewish moral decisions arise from a
Today? (1969) is something of a companion dialogue between the two covenant members,
piece to the previous volume. It examines par- the divine and the human. He applies this
ticular Jewish issues such as prayer, the cele- dialogic technique to analyze sexual ethics, to
bration of festivals, hope in the divine, and wrestle with economic questions, to mediate
interfaith dialogue from a similar perspective. interfaith relationships, and to reach a moral
Characteristically, Borowitz remarks in that stance concerning the modern State of Israel.
book that “the thinker … must slowly find a Borowitz’s thinking on these subjects has been
way to outgrow” his former beliefs. He himself consistently dialogical and dynamic – remark-
shows that ability. By the 1970s he realized able for including changes and transitions
that a new approach was needed. His award- resulting from his covenantal wrestling with
winning volume The Mask Jews Wear (1973) religious issues.
took up the same challenge of setting people
before God and God before people in a dif- BIBLIOGRAPHY
ferent key, by articulating the hidden theology “The Jewish Need for Theology,”
behind Jewish folkways. By the 1990s Commentary 33 (August 1962): 138–44.
Borowitz realized that disillusionment with A Layman’s Introduction to Religious
the promises of the Enlightenment and with Existentialism (Philadelphia, 1965).
liberalism had become widespread. A new, A New Jewish Theology in the Making
postmodern, Jew was positioned to hear the (Philadelphia, 1968).
teachings of Judaism differently from previous Choosing a Sex Ethic (New York, 1969).
generations. His Renewing the Covenant How Can a Jew Speak of Faith Today?
(1991) marked a transition to a new approach (Philadelphia, 1969).
to Jewish theology that initiated a “decade of Reform Judaism Today (New York,
fruition” in which postmodernism served as “a 1977–8).
cultural language” for interpreting Judaism to The Mask Jews Wear: The Self-Deceptions
the world. The tools of interpretation changed, of American Jewry (New York, 1973;
but Borowitz consistently found existentialist, 2nd edn 1980).
sociological, or postmodernist ways to convey Contemporary Christologies: A Jewish
God’s presence to a contemporary audience. Response (New York, 1980).
Borowitz’s A New Jewish Theology went Choices in Modern Jewish Thought: A
293
BOROWITZ
Partisan Guide (New York, 1983; 2nd Despite dying at the young age of thirty-
edn 1995). two during an influenza epidemic, Bourne had
Exploring Jewish Ethics: Papers on a profound influence on the pacifist intellectual
Covenant Responsibility (Detroit, 1990). movement of World War I, worked as an edu-
Renewing the Covenant: A Theology for cational theorist and popularizer of the ideas
the Postmodern Jew (Philadelphia, 1991). of John DEWEY, and served as an inspiration to
Judaism After Modernity: Papers from a generations of young radical thinkers. His
Decade of Fruition (Lanham, Md., 1999). writing career was only about eight years long,
Studies in the Meaning of Judaism from 1911 to 1918, but he published three
(Philadelphia, 2002). books, edited another, and had two collec-
tions of his work published almost immedi-
Further Reading ately after his death. He wrote Youth and Life
Helfman, Amy W. A Life in Covenant: The (1913), The Gary Schools (1916), and
Complete Works of Eugene B. Borowitz, Education and Living (1917). He edited
1944–1999: A Bibliography (New York, Towards an Enduring Peace in 1917, and
1999). shortly after his death appeared the History of
Hoffman, Lawrence A., and Arnold J. a Literary Radical (1919) and Untimely Papers
Wolf, eds. Jewish Spiritual Journeys: 20 (1920). All of these works are in addition to
Essays Written to Honor the Occasion of the great many articles he wrote, mostly for
the 70th Birthday of Eugene B. Borowitz The Atlantic Monthly, The New Republic,
(West Orange, N.J., 1997). Seven Arts, and The Dial, as well as the public
Ochs, Peter, ed. Reviewing the Covenant: speeches he gave during his short time of intel-
Eugene B. Borowitz and the Postmodern lectual and academic activity.
Renewal of Jewish Theology (Albany, When he was a child, Bourne’s family was
N.Y., 2000). comfortably well off, and from a Presbyterian
background. Bourne had a pastor, a Civil War
S. Daniel Breslauer colonel, and lawyers among his relatives. After
he left high school, however, his family expe-
rienced a financial crisis that forced him to
work rather than go directly to college. For six
years, he worked a variety of jobs, including
playing the piano for plays and movie houses,
BOURNE, Randolph Silliman (1886–1918) working in a factory, and teaching piano
lessons. These jobs, especially a stint involving
Randolph Silliman Bourne was born on 30 ever-decreasing piece wages for the produc-
May 1886 in Bloomfield, New Jersey, and tion of musical arrangements, gave Bourne a
died on 23 December 1918 in New York City. lifelong sympathy for the working class. He
Bourne was delivered with the use of forceps, remembered these experiences as he started
which permanently disfigured his face and mis- classes at Columbia University at the age of
shaped his ear. Further, at the age of four, twenty-three.
Bourne developed spinal tuberculosis, which At the time, Columbia was the largest uni-
hampered his growth and permanently bent his versity in the country, with more than 6000
back so he eventually grew to be only five feet students. Columbia was also rare in that it
tall. His physical challenges were never some- had more graduate than undergraduate
thing he discussed or wrote about in any great students – the resulting rich intellectual envi-
detail, and he rarely complained of the illnesses ronment had a powerful influence on young
and discomforts he endured. Bourne. He studied under John Dewey,
294
BOURNE
Charles Beard, James Harvey Robinson, and France, especially Paris. There he found the
Franz BOAS, and he read the works of Leo model of activist, scholar, writer, and artist
Tolstoy, Thomas Hardy, Maurice that he tried throughout his life to emulate
Maeterlinck, Friedrich Nietzsche, Henri and import into the United States. Bourne was
Bergson, John Dewey, Josiah ROYCE, and alarmed, however, by the growing nationalism
William JAMES. By this point in his life, Bourne he saw in Italy and Germany. After much
considered himself a socialist, and became a travel was done and many letters, journal
member of the Intercollegiate Socialist Society. notes, and essay ideas were written, Bourne
By 1912 Bourne was the editor of The was forced to flee Germany just as it declared
Columbia Monthly and an active participant in war on Russia and France.
the life of the campus community. Upon returning to the United States, Bourne
Earlier, in 1908, Ellery Sedgwick had taken completed his MA at Columbia and began
over The Atlantic Monthly from its previously writing for the new magazine, The New
conservative editors, and turned its focus toward Republic. He published a piece in its first issue,
more contemporary problems and concerns. By and became the editor for education, religion,
1913 Bourne was writing a series of essays for and urban planning. For the rest of his life, he
The Atlantic Monthly, which were a call to would have a continuing, though sometimes
action for the nation’s young to revitalize democ- ebbing and flowing, relationship with The
racy and challenge the traditions of older gener- New Republic. In his role as education editor,
ations. The essays were then republished as he traveled to Gary, Indiana to profile the new
Youth and Life (1913). In these early writings, schools being built there by the United States
Bourne concentrated on vitality, change, and Steel Corporation in an attempt to model and
possibility. In “Youth,” Bourne stressed the embody the many progressive educational
virtues of youthful experimentation, of fighting theories of the day. He gathered his writings on
against tradition. He argued that planning out these matters in The Gary Schools (1916),
one’s life and falling into habits of old limit the which praised the attempts to unify learning in
ability of a person to develop her or his own self and out of the classroom, and other means of
and her or his own self-consciousness. In “The implementing the educational theories of John
Life of Irony,” Bourne developed an “ironic” Dewey. Throughout his work at The New
strategy of comparing experiences to bring out Republic, as well as in some of his later works,
inconsistencies. He advocated the production of Bourne acted as a great popularizer of previ-
social goals and ideals based upon acts of reveal- ously under-recognized figures. In addition to
ing present and actual failures through ironic Dewey, Bourne also worked to bring Henri
critique: “Irony, the science of comparative expe- Bergson, Friedrich Nietzsche, H. G. Wells, and
rience, compares things not with an established George Bernard Shaw to a new level of famil-
standard but with each other, and the values iarity for the American public.
that slowly emerge from the process, values that By 1917, however, the relationship between
emerge from one’s own vivid reactions, are con- the ever-radical Bourne and the increasingly-
stantly revised, corrected, and refined by that moderate The New Republic was showing
same sense of contrast.” (1977, p. 136) signs of strain. The New Republic began to
In 1913 Bourne had the opportunity to consider itself a voice of intellectuals who sup-
travel to Europe with the support of a fellow- ported the Wilson administration and the par-
ship from Columbia. He earned this honor ticipation of the United States in the Great
just as he began Master’s studies in the then- War. Many at The New Republic aimed to
young study of sociology. From 1913 to 1914 shape the country and the world toward pro-
he toured Europe and was heartened by the gressive reform, but they thought it best to do
heady intellectual atmosphere he found in so by supporting the war and working to shape
295
BOURNE
its ends toward democratic and liberal the Intellectuals,” he wrote, “The American
purposes. Bourne vehemently disagreed with intellectuals … seem to have forgotten that
these tactics. the real enemy is War rather than Imperial
In 1917 and 1918 the federal government, Germany. There is work to be done to prevent
under the aegis of the new Espionage and this war of ours from passing into popular
Sedition Acts, arrested 1500 Americans for mythology as a holy crusade.” (1965, p. 158)
disloyalty, and 4000 for becoming conscien- Eventually, however, The Seven Arts went out
tious objectors to the war. In the heat of these of business, mostly due to a withdrawal of its
difficulties, Bourne published a series of anti- underwriting support, and Bourne shifted to
war articles for the new journal, The Seven spending much of his time writing book
Arts, a peace-advocating magazine of intellec- reviews for The New Republic and The Dial.
tual artists. In April 1917, the same month as Near the end of his short life, Bourne began
Wilson’s war speech to Congress, Bourne pub- work on an autobiographical novel and “The
lished “The Puritan’s Will to Power,” and State,” a lengthy political essay on the psychol-
from June to October of that year, wrote and ogy of the state in times of war and peace.
published several other anti-war essays for The Neither was finished. In “The State,” we see the
Seven Arts. Throughout, he was especially repeated appearance of Bourne’s famous
critical of the cooptation of intellectuals by epigram, “War in the health of the State.” The
the government. He believed that through State, according to Bourne, thrives on war, even
appointments in its administration, Wilson as the people suffer. War destroys diversity, upon
had made many writers and academics, who which democracy thrives: “War … unifies all the
previously argued against warfare, complicit in bourgeois elements and the common people,
its participation in World War I. and outlaws the rest.” (1977, p. 367) In peace,
In his essays for The Seven Arts, Bourne according to Bourne, we rarely think about the
argued that pragmatists, especially Dewey, sur- State – we talk instead about Government, “a
rendered their principles for the gains they saw legitimate object of criticism and even contempt”
in the Wilson administration and the potential (1977, p. 355). In times of war, however, the
gains they saw in the outcome of the war. State rises to power and squelches opposition.
Bourne held Dewey to be the exemplar of this Differences among persons disintegrate as the
betrayal of progressive ideals because Dewey power of the State rises to combat enemies
advocated the use of force as an instrument of abroad and halt criticism at home. According to
policy, and claimed that criticisms of the Bourne, the “State is essentially a concept of
inevitable and unstoppable war were futile power, of competition; it signifies a group in its
and wasteful. Bourne directly attacked Dewey aggressive aspects” (1977, p. 358). Bourne’s
in “Conscience and Intelligence in War” essay unifies many of his earlier anti-war writings
(1917). Here, he wrote: “In wartime, there is and synchronizes his criticisms of the intelli-
literally no other end but war, and the gentsia in America and his suspicions of large-
objector, therefore, lives no longer with a scale power, bellicosity, and the desire to submit
choice of alternatives … . The appeal to force and surrender to accepted ways of living and
removes everything automatically to a nonin- thinking.
telligent sphere of thinking and acting.” (1965, Throughout his life, Bourne nourished many
pp. 130–31) Bourne, however, launched his close friendships, and was sometimes wary of
most famous series of criticisms of intellectu- strangers. He was a prolific letter writer,
als’ support for the war in a series of essays however, and had an especially voluminous
from 1917 that included “The Puritan’s Will correspondence with many young women.
to Power,” “The War and the Intellectuals,” Bourne worried throughout his life that he
and “Twilight of the Idols.” In “The War and would never find romantic love, and was
296
BOURNE
thrilled to meet Esther Cornell, a descendent of 1917): 239–40.

the founder of Cornell University. They fell in “The Puritan’s Will to Power,” Seven Arts
love late in his life, and even talked of 1 (April 1917): 631–7.
marriage. But Bourne took ill with what he “The War and the Intellectuals,” Seven Arts
thought was simply a bad cold. It was, rather, 2 (June 1917): 133–46.
influenza, from which he never recovered. He “Conscience and Intelligence in War,” The
reportedly died in his bed with friends and Dial 63 (13 September 1917): 193–5.
loved ones nearby, dying as he lived, harangu- “Twilight of Idols,” Seven Arts 2 (October
ing an adversary. 1917): 535–47.
“Denatured Nietzsche,” The Dial 63 (20
BIBLIOGRAPHY December 1917): 389–91.
Youth and Life (Boston, 1913).
The Gary Schools (Boston, 1916). Further Reading
Education and Living (New York, 1917). Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio,
Ed., Towards an Enduring Peace (New Comp Amer Thought, Dict Amer Bio,
York, 1917). Encyc Amer Bio, Who Was Who in
Untimely Papers, ed. James Oppenheim Amer v1
(New York, 1919). Blake, Casey N. Beloved Community: The
History of a Literary Radical, ed. Van Cultural Criticism of Randolph Bourne,
Wyck Brooks (New York, 1920). Van Wyck Brooks, Waldo Frank &
The Radical Will: Selected Writings Lewis Mumford (Chapel Hill, N.C.,
1911–1918, ed. Christopher Lasch (New 1990).
York, 1977). Clayton, Bruce. Forgotten Prophet: The
The Letters of Randolph Bourne: a Life of Randolph Bourne (Baton Rouge,
Comprehensive Edition, ed. Eric J. Louisiana, 1984).
Sandeen (New York, 1981). Lasch, Christopher. The New Radicalism in
America (New York, 1965).
Other Relevant Works Moreau, John Adam. Randolph Bourne:
Bourne’s papers are at Columbia Legend and Reality (Washington, D.C.,
University. 1966).
“The Handicapped,” The Atlantic Monthly Mumford, Louis. “The Image of Randolph
108 (September 1911): 320–39. Bourne,” New Republic 64 (24
“Youth,” The Atlantic Monthly 109 (April September1930): 151–2.
1912): 433–41. Paul, Sherman. Randolph Bourne
“The Excitement of Friendship,” The (Minneapolis, 1966).
Atlantic Monthly 110 (December 1912): Rahv, Philip. The Discovery of Europe
795–800. (Boston, 1947).
“The Life of Irony,” The Atlantic Monthly Resek, Carl, ed. War and the Intellectuals
111 (March 1913): 357–67. (New York, 1968).
“Impressions of Europe, 1913–1914,” Schlissel, Lillian, ed. The World of
Columbia Quarterly 17 (March 1915): Randolph Bourne (New York, 1965).
109–26.
“American Use For German Ideals,” New Stephen A. Barnes
Republic 4 (4 September 1915): 117–19.
“Mental Unpreparedness,” New Republic 4
(11 September 1915): 143–4.
“A Modern Mind,” The Dial 62 (22 March
297
BOUWSMA
BOUWSMA, Oets Kolk (1898–1978) thing makes us laugh, is comical: Bouwsma

tickled his reader into philosophically signifi-
O. K. Bouwsma was born on 22 November cant laughter. Bouwsma’s studies of English
1898 in Muskegon, Michigan. He studied literature left their mark on his writing. His
English literature and philosophy at Calvin prose was dedicated, racy, idiosyncratic, and
College from 1916 to 1919, and at the high-demotic – more of a piece with John
University of Michigan where he earned the Donne than with John Duns Scotus.
BA in 1920, MA in 1921, and PhD in philos- During this period, Bouwsma’s most signif-
ophy in 1928. His early philosophical tastes ran icant published essays were “Descartes’ Evil
in the direction of Hegel and Absolute Idealism; Genius,” “The Expression Theory of Art,” and
his tastes later ran in a decidedly different direc- “The Mystery of Time” (all collected, along
tion, first toward G. E. Moore and second with “Moore’s Theory of Sense-Data,” in
toward Ludwig Wittgenstein. Bouwsma was a Philosophical Essays, 1965); and also
professor of philosophy at the University of “Anselm’s Argument,” “I Think I Am,” and
Nebraska from 1928 to 1966. He then was “Double-Talk, Jackie Vernon and X” (col-
professor of philosophy at the University of lected, along with twelve lectures by others, in
Texas from 1966 until his retirement in 1974. The Nature of Philosophical Inquiry, 1970).
Bouwsma was President of the Western His philosophical influence was as much or
Division of the American Philosophical more a product of his teaching than of his pub-
Association in 1957–8. He died on 1 March lished writings. Some of the writings Bouwsma
1978 in Austin, Texas. did for his classes, along with several unpub-
Bouwsma’s work on Moore created his early lished papers, have been collected and edited by
reputation, which later resulted in his invitation J. L. Craft and Ronald Hustwit in Toward a
to give the John Locke Lectures at the University New Sensibility and Without Proof or Evidence.
of Oxford in 1950–51. But by the time he gave
the John Locke Lectures, Bouwsma had BIBLIOGRAPHY
immersed himself in Wittgenstein’s work, par- “Moore’s Theory of Sense-Data,” in The
ticularly in the Blue Book. In the (unpublished) Philosophy of G. E. Moore, ed. Paul
Lectures, titled The Flux, Bouwsma disassembled Schilpp (Evanston, Ill., 1942), pp. 203–21.
the problems of sense-experience with tools “Russell’s Argument on Universals,”
acquired from both Moore and Wittgenstein. Philosophical Review 52 (1943): 193–9.
Bouwsma anticipated changes in Wittgenstein’s “Descartes’ Skepticism of the Senses,” Mind
work that were revealed only when 54 (1945): 313–32.
Philosophical Investigations was published. “Naturalism,” Journal of Philosophy 45
Bouwsma’s reputation later intertwined with (1948): 12–21.
Wittgenstein’s. Unlike many influenced by “Descartes’ Evil Genius,” Philosophical
Wittgenstein, Bouwsma spent little time writing Review 58 (1949): 141–51.
about Wittgenstein. He instead applied “The Mystery of Time,” Journal of
Wittgenstein to other philosophers and to Philosophy 51 (1954): 341–62.
philosophical problems. Bouwsma wooed his “Reflections on Moore’s Recent Book,”
reader from latent nonsense to patent nonsense. Philosophical Review 64 (1955): 248–63.
He led their words, exaggerated, empty and in “The Blue Book,” Journal of Philosophy 58
the empyrean, back to green pastures and still (1961): 141–61.
waters, where they shrank and were filled. Philosophical Essays (Lincoln, Neb., 1965).
More than any other Wittgensteinian, The Nature of Philosophical Inquiry, ed.
Bouwsma internalized Wittgenstein’s comment Joseph Bobik (Notre Dame, Ind., 1970).
that it is philosophically significant that some-
298
BOWEN
Other Relevant Works publishing house before entering Phillips Exeter

Bouwsma’s papers are at the University of Academy in 1829. The following year he
Texas. enrolled at Harvard from which he graduated
Toward a New Sensibility, ed. J. L. Craft and with a BA summa cum laude in 1833. While
Ronald Hustwit (Lincoln, Neb., 1982). attending college, Bowen worked in various
Without Proof or Evidence, ed. J. L. Craft places as a schoolteacher. In 1835, having
and Ronald Hustwit (Lincoln, Neb., taught mathematics for two years at Phillips
1984). Exeter Academy, he became a tutor in intellec-
Wittgenstein: Conversations, 1949–1951, ed. tual philosophy and political economy at
J. L. Craft and Ronald Hustwit Harvard. In 1839 he took leave to travel to
(Indianapolis, 1986). Europe. While he was in Paris, he met the econ-
Bouwsma’s Notes on Wittgenstein’s omist Jean-Charles-Léonard Simonde de
Philosophy, 1965–1975, ed. J. L. Craft and Sismondi and the philosopher-statesman Joseph
Ronald Hustwit (Lewiston, N.Y., 1986). Marie De Gerando. Bowen returned to
O. K. Bouwsma’s Commonplace Book: Cambridge in 1841, having decided to devote
Remarks on Philosophy and Education, himself to literature.
ed. J. L. Craft and Ronald Hustwit In 1843 Bowen became the editor of North
(Lewiston, N.Y., 2001). American Review, and remained in this
position for over a decade. During this time, he
Further Reading wrote close to one-fourth of the articles in the
Bio 20thC Phils, Pres Addr of APA v6, Proc review. He was also for six years editor of the
of APA v52, Who’s Who in Phil American Almanac and Repository of Useful
Ambrose, Alice, and Morris Lazerowitz. Knowledge. In 1842 Bowen published an
Essays in the Unknown Wittgenstein edition of Virgil’s writings with copious notes
(Buffalo, N.Y., 1984). and commentary. In the same year Bowen’s
Hustwit, Ronald. Something About O. K. Critical Essays on a Few Subjects Connected
Bouwsma (Lanham, Md., 1992). with the History and Present Condition of
Newman, Jay. “Bouwsma’s View of Speculative Philosophy appeared. He also
Metaphysics: A Reading of ‘Naturalism’,” wrote biographies of James Otis (1844) and
Philosophical Investigations 4 (1981): Benjamin Lincoln (1847). In 1848–9 Bowen
12–18. delivered the Lowell Lectures, which were pub-
Rollins, C.D. “O. K. Bouwsma, 1937 and lished in 1849 as On the Application of
Later,” Philosophical Investigations 8 Metaphysical and Ethical Science to the
(1985): 208–16. Evidences of Religion.
During the last part of his tenure at North
Kelly Dean Jolley American Review Bowen drew fire by taking an
unpopular stance on the popular Hungarian
revolution, which also cost him the McLean
professorship of history at Harvard College.
Bowen had been chosen for this professorship
in May 1850 and fulfilled the position’s
BOWEN, Francis (1811–90) teaching responsibilities for the following fall
semester, but the Harvard overseers, who still
Francis Bowen was born on 8 September 1811 had to confirm his nomination in January,
in Charlestown, Massachusetts. He attended decided not to confirm it. Bowen lectured again
Mayhew Grammar School in Boston and for the Lowell Institute. In 1850 he lectured on
worked for several years as a clerk in a Boston political economy and in 1852 he lectured on
299
BOWEN
the origin and development of the English and the ground that America was economically
American constitutions. much weaker than England, and he repeatedly
A few years later, however, Bowen did obtain spoke in favor of high tariffs. In economics,
a Harvard professorship. In 1853 he was Bowen also opposed Malthus’s views on pop-
appointed Alford Professor of Natural Religion, ulation and Ricardo’s views on rent. He
Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity. The 1783 remained politically active, serving in 1876 on
endowment for this chair required instruction the US Silver Commission.
that would demonstrate the existence of God During his whole career, Bowen was a strong
and explain His providence and government, and orthodox defender of Unitarianism, whose
and His Revelation. Whereas Bowen’s immedi- philosophical underpinnings he sought to
ate successor, George Herbert PALMER, called strengthen. He advocated a non-Calvinistic,
the terms of the bequest into question, Bowen freewill-based, evangelical brand of Christianity,
remained faithful to them, even in his 1856 developing his views within the context of the
Principles of Political Economy. Bowen Scottish Commonsensism of Thomas Reid and
remained the Alford Professor until his retire- his followers. Bowen was a strong and vocal
ment in 1889. He died on 21 January 1890 in opponent of the New England
Cambridge, Massachusetts. Transcendentalists (especially Ralph Waldo
The Alford professorship made Bowen for EMERSON) and of the many forms of agnosticism
many years the principal philosophy professor and materialism that sprang up in the nineteenth
at Harvard. Chauncey WRIGHT, Charles PEIRCE, century, especially after the 1859 publication of
Oliver Wendell HOLMES, and William JAMES The Origin of Species. In fact, Bowen’s outspo-
were all his students. Bowen has been identified ken opposition against the theory of evolution
as an early source of pragmatism in America. made him quickly obsolete. Using his common
A central theme that runs though Bowen’s sense based empiricism Bowen sought to provide
thought is that philosophy should keep in mind an ardent antidote against the flights of fancy of
the practical application of ideas. Philosophy, Emerson as well as Darwin.
for Bowen, should not be an ivory tower disci- Philosophically, Bowen remained a strong
pline. He was a conservative teacher who defender of Hamilton, even after John Stuart
rejected the lecture system that was being imple- Mill’s onslaught in An Examination of Sir
mented in his time by Harvard President William Hamilton’s Philosophy (1865), while
Charles W. Eliot. developing a branch of Scottish Common Sense
Concerned about the British influence on realism that in his later years he infused with
American thought, Bowen advocated the pub- elements taken from German idealism. While
lication of an American treatise on political Bowen showed a close affinity to Locke in his
economy. When no satisfactory treatise was 1842 Critical Essays, the question that remained
forthcoming, Bowen decided to compose one foremost on his mind was how to avoid skepti-
himself. This resulted in 1856 in the Principles cism. To address this question, Bowen – reject-
of Political Economy. In this treatise Bowen ing Kant’s answer to Hume – allied himself with
defended capitalism, but as is befitting for a the Scottish Commonsensists whom he saw as
professor in natural religion, he did so by the natural successors to traditional empiri-
relating it explicitly to God. It is through God cism. According to the common sensists, one
and His providence that the acts of self-inter- should start with introspection and make the
ested individuals bring about the public good. dictates of common sense one’s first principles.
Notwithstanding his strong leanings toward No derivation of these dictates from so-called
economic liberalism, Bowen rejected the free- “more ultimate truths” could produce knowl-
trade doctrine of Adam Smith. In its stead edge that is more secure than the dictates of
Bowen defended a suspension of free trade on common sense. For example, the conscious
300
BOWEN
experience that the will is free is better evidence BIBLIOGRAPHY

for free will than any rational argument that Critical Essays on the History and Present
seeks to affirm this. Bowen argued along these Condition of Speculative Philosophy
lines for the existence of God and the goodness (Boston, 1842).
of His nature. Though interested mainly in Lowell Lectures on the Application of
natural theology, Bowen reserved a place for Metaphysical and Ethical Science to the
revealed theology as well, and allowed for Evidences of Religion (Boston, 1849).
divine miracles made possible through the sus- Principles of Political Economy: Applied to
pension of natural laws. Bowen’s student, the Condition, Resources, and Institutions
Charles S. Peirce, would later advocate a critical of the American People (Boston, 1856).
commonsensism. Treatise on Logic; or, the Laws of Pure
Bowen became an early and vocal opponent Thought Comprising Both the Aristotelic
of the theory of evolution, beginning with his and Hamiltonian Analyses of Logical
extensive review of The Origin of Species, in Forms and Some Chapters of Applied
North American Review. Largely because of his Logic (Cambridge, 1864).
continued and outspoken opposition to Darwin, American Political Economy, With Remarks
Bowen became quickly outmoded. Bowen used on the Finances Since the Beginning of the
his common sense philosophy to counter Civil War (New York, 1870).
Darwin’s claims and to categorize him as a poor Modern Philosophy, from Descartes to
empiricist. According to Bowen, Darwin’s con- Schopenhauer and Hartmann (New York,
clusions were a product of inappropriate extrap- 1877).
olations from empirical data. In fact, Darwin’s Gleanings from a Literary Life, 1838–1880
speculative conclusions went straight against (New York, 1880).
some of the most basic common sense intuitions, A Layman’s Study of the English Bible,
such as the design-like quality of the universe, the Considered in its Literary and Secular
fixity of species, and the idea that the division Aspect (New York, 1885).
between man and animal is one of kind and not
of degree. Bowen specifically attacked the idea of Other Relevant Works
a hereditary transmission of variations and the Bowen’s papers are at Harvard University.
“gemmules” which Darwin had postulated to Ed., P. Virgilii Maronis Bucolica, Georgica,
explain this transmission. The fact that Darwin’s et Aeneis (Boston, 1842).
most stalwart defenders were often philosophi- Ed., Elements of the Philosophy of the
cal descendents of Hume only fueled Bowen’s Human Mind, by Dugald Stewart (Boston,
disapproval of Darwin’s theory, if only because 1854).
many of them replaced a skepticism-based rejec- Ed., Documents of the Constitution of
tion of religion with a dogmatic embracing of England and America to 1789
materialism. (Cambridge, Mass., 1854).
During the following two decades Bowen “Review of The Origin of Species by Charles
moved away from Locke, as he believed Darwin,” North American Review 90
Locke’s position would lead to materialism, (1860): 474–506.
while getting closer to Berkeley and Kant. The Metaphysics of Sir William Hamilton:
Dismissing various forms of mostly German Collected, Arranged, and Abridged
idealism, Bowen argued for a presentational (Cambridge, Mass., 1861).
realism which he believed was in line with Ed., Democracy in America, 2 vols, by Alexis
Hamilton’s metaphysics. His later thoughts, de Tocqueville, trans. H. Reeve
however, were never systematically worked out (Cambridge, Mass., 1862).
and they remained without influence.
301
BOWEN
Further Reading be read by a substitute at the end of the

Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, 1935–6 academic session.
Dict Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v11 The notes for Bowman’s large ordinary
Kuklick, Bruce. The Rise of American class lectures, extensively rewritten more than
Philosophy: Cambridge Massachusetts once, were seriously considered for publica-
1860–1930 (New Haven, 1977), pp. tion after his death, but only some extracts
28–45. appear in the completion of A Sacramental
Universe (1941). Many students of the gen-
Cornelis de Waal eration he taught were deeply interested in
philosophical questions but were unlikely to
develop such concerns in life after university,
and so the examinable basics were presented
within a large-scale systematic presentation.
He “taught an honours course to his ordinary
BOWMAN, Archibald Allan (1883–1936) class.” Students who proceeded under the
degree arrangements at the time into tech-
Archibald Allan Bowman was born on 4 nology or the sciences were as likely as col-
April 1883 in the Congregational Union leagues who entered public or pastoral service
manse in Beith, Ayrshire, Scotland, and he to continue to cite him.
died on 7 June 1936 in the Professors’ Square The early papers listed in Bowman’s full bib-
of Glasgow University in Scotland. He liography (1989) correct the error of claiming
attended Spier’s School in Beith and then him a late or perhaps revisionist adherent of
Glasgow University, from which he gradu- Edward Caird’s idealist school. In his writing
ated with second-class honours in classics on “the stupendous set of ruins that is the
and first-class honours in philosophy in 1905. critical philosophy” his citations demonstrate
A Ferguson Scholarship funded him on the closeness to such continental contemporaries
first of a series of summer vacations which he and sometime teachers as Georg Simmel, Aloys
spent studying in Germany between 1905 Riehl (Vanuxem Lecturer and honorand of
and 1912. In 1906 he was appointed assistant Princeton in 1913), Paul Natorp and Emile
and lecturer in the department of logic and Boutroux. Friedrich Nietzsche, Leo Tolstoy,
metaphysics, and philosophy lecturer to the and Fyodor Dostoevsky are other important
women’s college at Glasgow University. references. Of a generation influenced by John
In 1912 Bowman was appointed to the Burnet, he was a sufficiently independent active
Stuart Chair in Logic at Princeton University, classicist to raise points of detail in a number
succeeding John Grier HIBBEN. In 1915 he of his citations from Burnet. Unusual in his
secured academic leave to join the British generation in having written about Thomas
military. From April 1918 until the end of the Reid, he is more unusual in having written of
war he was in prisoner-of-war camps. On Reid in relation to the Upanishads, although
release he served some further time in Indian thought is discussed in some depth in
Germany; he returned to Princeton in 1920. the earlier, more massive of Bowman’s two
In 1926 Bowman returned to Glasgow in posthumous books.
1926 as professor of logic, and in 1927 he As Bowman himself later noted with ret-
transferred to the chair of moral philosophy. rospective amazement, his resolve in 1914 to
Alarmingly active in public and political life enlist and fight, despite the recent birth of a
after his return to Glasgow, he succumbed to first child, was representative of many of his
the chest complaint which prevented him generation and culture, regardless of any alle-
delivering his final class lectures; they had to giance or otherwise to absolute idealism. On
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the front line in April 1918, he surrendered to Bowman, however, though convinced that
a German fellow alumnus of Heidelberg. very early human beings had much the same
During his ordeal after a failed attempt to psycho-physical equipment as their twenti-
escape from a prisoner-of-war camp, eth-century descendants, argued that scientific
Bowman underwent what he described to his observation was a late discovery: a result of
friend and later editor J. W. Scott as “expe- the long experience of many, including
rience of spirit.” In Scott’s report this sounds witness to the emergence of contradictions
like one of the “Mystical Experiences of the within tradition – or between traditions
Prison Camps” discussed by Mihajlo which circumstances hitherto had permitted
Mihajlov. To Bowman the experience was in to coexist without awareness of mutual
effect a scientific discovery crucial to the conflict. Religion was another such discovery,
inspiration of the work which went into his as were science or the sciences, morality, and
big books – in the event unfinished and secularity. Each aspired to its own autonomy,
posthumously published. On these a very and there is no lack of evidence that within
considerable but very localized reputation the development of each, and certainly within
was founded. that of religion, there are tendencies toward
Studies in the Philosophy of Religion one-sidedness, and toward an increasing
(1938) was only ever a provisional title for a impersonality.
work finally some 800 pages long, which What Bowman termed Enlightenment
Bowman composed during the 1920s and set might be regarded as such a development of
aside to allow work on the 1934 Charles one-sidedness and impersonality.
Eliot Vanuxem Lectures at Princeton, the “Enlightenment” comes into force from time
basis of his other big book. The topic of to time throughout history (as it did, for
Studies might be termed “mind or con- instance, during what is now called “The
sciousness” quite as much as “spirit,” if the Enlightenment”) with an oversimplified view
latter term can be allowed to include both the of things. It lacks a sense of what Bowman
former. With Baron Charles von Hügel, calls “Significant Contrasts,” attempting to
Bowman treated of “religion” as tradition enshrine a self-sufficient secularism as
(without reduction of the former term to a rational, superior to, and able to dispose of
narrowing conception of the latter). He moral and other traditions. Bowman dis-
would not venture a preliminary definition of cusses conflicts between traditions in various
religion, other than by way of extensive contexts, Significant Contrasts and “the self-
description of various religions as processes. criticism of religion,” instructively within the
Following preliminaries on method which Old Testament. His discussion of the book of
include a severe critique of Bertrand Russell’s Job refers to the coming into being of one
logic in its pretence to exhaustiveness and a entirely new orientation toward life. Scholarly
critique of what he called (no “the”) reference to revisions of the text of Job, made
Enlightenment, Bowman argued an anthro- long after any “urtext” had been set down,
pological account of the historical develop- allows Bowman to consider the development
ments of minds. He engaged in extended of that new orientation, interpreting identifi-
debate with Emile Durkheim’s Elementary able accretions within the transmission of the
Forms of the Religious Life and with Edward narrative, as evidence of subsequent readings
B. Tylor’s account of “animism,” in the latter and retrospects on it within Judaic tradition.
case to secure the term for his own use. Religion, in becoming exclusive as it
Tylor and J. G. Frazer are notorious for becomes impersonal, does not merely exclude
having projected the viewpoint of the scien- such other discoveries as secularity and
tific observer on early or primitive man. morality. Bowman demonstrates, with refer-
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ence to “Eastern religions,” that religion, language, but has generated everything, from
having come into being with the ordering or the conscious and living to the lifeless and
organization of performances, can become unconscious.
antithetical to what he calls “the desire for Bowman takes on Alfred North WHITEHEAD’s
life.” This “desire for life” is characteristic of notion of “eternal objects” as what is/are stable
animism and is the spring of all the “discov- in the flux of events. Does not this notion merely
eries” he discusses. If the reader disagrees replace an old mind–body dualism with impli-
with Bowman’s preference for the desire for cations of untenable doctrines of representative
life over the exclusivist religious alternative, perception?
there is a summary of his case in the light- A great deal of attention is paid in both of
hearted address read out to students at the Bowman’s books, first, to an account of the
end of the 1935–6 lecture course which he nature of mind, consciousness, and spirit;
was too ill to deliver in person. then, to an account of consciousness in the
The published text of A Sacramental creatures in whom it might be discerned; and,
Universe was compiled by J. W. Scott, who finally, to the states or conditions of human
added to the completed first half of the consciousness as between fading and even a
planned book the platform summaries from liminal state (external sensitivity in the
which Bowman had delivered his lectures at sleeper) beyond the bracketed consciousness
Princeton and connected scattered passages of specialized scientific observation. For
he had worked up in notebooks. The book spirit, esse est percipere.
was rounded off with the Platonic myth that Bowman takes issue with George
was the book’s intended conclusion, and with SANTAYANA’s notion of consciousness as an
what can fairly be called the climax of operative state of the organism, one which
Bowman’s large series of class lectures. Scott’s comes into being as a rectifying function when
editorial achievement was considerable. normal animal processes are inadequate to any
There is some overlap between the later situation. Consciousness can at times be in
chapters of Studies and the book Scott edited, abeyance or partial suspension or restriction, but
the former book having begun with a focus it is not episodic. Bowman, for all that Ernst
on anthropology and moved toward issues in Cassirer praised his “revival of dualism,” was
the philosophy of science. A Sacramental not, he himself insisted, a dualist. Dualism is a
Universe begins with an address to the newer point of view, whereas, like John Anderson
philosophical work which took its start from (who was in other respects very different from
recent developments within the sciences, not him), Bowman insists that minds – or, for him,
least post-Einsteinian physics. spirits – are existences of a certain character,
In Studies Bowman moves in the direction describable, not entities hypothesized within a
of Plato, shifting from consideration of “sub- dualist doctrine.
stance” to the notion of system, a mathesis The extensive discussion of physics in A
universalis. He does not mention Husserl, Sacramental Universe effects full recognition
but there are plain parallels between the phe- of the work of Albert E INSTEIN , Erwin
nomenologist’s discussion of the contents of Schrödinger, and others, but not in supplant-
pure consciousness and Bowman’s insistent ing standpoints of mind, consciousness, and
standpoint of consciousness. Bowman’s ori- perception. Like Bronislaw Malinowski,
entation is, however, emphatically the (tran- whose then untranslated Polish work he could
scendental) realism of an avowed opponent of not know but of whose opponents Ernst
phenomenalism. In a parallel with Berkeley Mach and Richard Avenarius he was not
which Bowman does not leave obscure, God ignorant (he certainly knew his friend Norman
has not merely provided a divine visual Kemp S M I T H ’s critique of Avenarius),
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BOWMAN
Bowman drew on his mathematical training project of refuting doctrines of a predesti-

for the notion of function. narian or fatalist character. The spiritual is
Bowman, unlike Malinowski, remained a for one thing to be considered as the spirited,
philosopher, and his notion of function was not the passive, while also encompassing the
more complex than that in Malinowski’s higher values of reverence and religion. The
functionalist anthropology. Function as a physical is precisely the physicist’s exact field
relationship between processes is a concept of study. It is a value, it is valuable, and where
developed extensively in Bowman’s second for a strict exclusive phenomenalist theory
book. He is concerned more with mathesis there is nothing behind phenomena, there are
than with mathematics, and with the notion no values in the physical. It is there, but it has
of reality, of the universe – granted the unity had to be looked for. It is there neither for nor
of physical theory – as a system of functional to anyone who is not looking for it.
relationships. The one-ness of things consists Nature, on the other hand, is the system of
in participation in reciprocal functional rela- things functionally related which has no being
tionships. Whatever this might say about without the awareness of a spirit. It is, as it
mathematical physics – and Bowman has his were, the realm of perceptual and other trans-
say against a notion of reality as founded on actions in which human beings are engaged.
a projection of competing calculated proba- In the physical there are no human beings,
bilities – it is not a way of leaving mind or insofar as no human values obtain.
spirit out of things. Mind is a function of Translated into a later idiom, Bowman’s dis-
brain no more and no less than brain is a tinction between nature and the physical is
function of mind: m and b alike are f(mb). one whose transgression results in not merely
Bowman’s “transcendental realism,” a a mixed discourse but confusion.
realism never without concern as to how At the end of A Sacramental Universe
knowledge comes to be, is opposed to what Bowman does speak the language of speculative
he calls the theoretician’s “pragmatism of metaphysics, that of Samuel Alexander, a
negations,” the abuse of Occam and the phe- personal friend and philosopher whom he
nomenalist fallacy of mistaking the observer’s regarded highly. It is a language of attempted
standpoint for awareness itself. A pragma- integration, of functional system, such as that
tism of negations is always at the mercy of with which Bowman rounded off his large and
letting the soundly refuted in again by the intensively argued works into a Christian theistic
back door, whether it is a dualism refuted vision. The entire universe is an emanation of
earlier in the case, or, in Eddington’s physical God in what are – in sheer physical terms –
theory, reference to pretty well the operation vibrations, ranging in their respective con-
of such powers as are recognized in pre-reli- sciousness of him from the absolutely uncon-
gious animistic ideas. scious to the reverent. Bowman does make clear,
A Sacramental Universe proceeds to a clas- however, that this is strictly an extrapolation or
sification of values thorough enough to transition beyond what he might have hoped to
include discussion of mere matters of taste demonstrate philosophically.
(choice of wallpaper) to higher aesthetic
values (Beethoven, say), and ethical and reli- BIBLIOGRAPHY
gious value. These belong to the larger clas- “Difference as Ultimate and Dimensional,”
sification, the spiritual, which stands differ- Mind 19 (1910): 492–522.
entiated from the physical, and from nature. “The Problem of Knowledge from the
Certainly deeply read in idealist philoso- Standpoint of Validity,” Philosophical
phy, in respect of the spiritual, Bowman Review 23 (1914): 1–16, 146–58,
makes important brief reference to Fichte’s 299–316.
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BOWMAN
“Kant’s View of Metaphysics,” Mind 25 was a farmer, a justice of the peace, a

(1916): 1–24. Methodist preacher, and a vocal abolitionist
“Kant’s Phenomenalism in Its Relation to at a time when such a stand was controversial.
Subsequent Metaphysics,” Mind 25 His mother was of a Quaker family and also
(1916): 461–89. an abolitionist. As a youth Bowne was able to
The Absurdity of Christianity (London, observe the example of parents who were
1931). Reprinted in The Absurdity of unbending on points of moral significance,
Christianity and Other Essays, ed. particularly regarding the dignity of all
Charles W. Hendel (New York, 1958). persons. Later on, he himself was instrumen-
“Spirit-time,” Proceedings of the tal in supporting integration in higher educa-
Aristotelean Society 33 (1933): 296–332. tion, and in 1891 he presided over the disser-
Studies in the Philosophy of Religion tation of the first African American to earn a
(London, 1938). PhD from an American university, John
A Sacramental Universe: Being a Study in Wesley Edward Bowen (1855–1933). In
the Metaphysics of Experience, ed. J. W. demeanor and bearing Bowne was very
Scott (Princeton, N.J., and Oxford, formal, even with his own family members,
1941). businesslike and orderly. He followed the
manner of personal discipline from which the
Other Relevant Works Methodists originally took their name.
Bowman’s papers are at Glasgow Bowne entered New York University in
University. 1867 amidst the swirling new controversy of
Sonnets from a Prison Camp (London and Darwin’s evolutionary theory, and in that year
New York, 1919). he was licensed to preach in the Methodist
Church. He worked his way through college
Further Reading employed at his uncle’s grocery in Brooklyn
Proc of APA in Phil Rev v46 while preaching and pastoring part-time. He
Bowman, Ian. “The Philosophy of A. A. studied the standard curriculum and gradu-
Bowman,” Edinburgh Review 82 (1989): ated with a BA degree in 1871. Bowne’s
103–20. With a selection of “Remarks on formal ordination as a Methodist deacon
Education” by Bowman on pp. 100–102, followed in 1872 and he was assigned a con-
and a bibliography of his writings. gregation at Whitestone in rural Long Island,
Scott, J. W. “Archibald Alan Bowman,” New York. In 1873 the opportunity came to
Hibbert Journal 35 (1936): 77–83. continue his studies in Europe. He studied
mainly at the universities of Paris, Halle, and
Robert R. Calder Göttingen, being most deeply influenced at
the last of these by the empirical strain of
Kantian philosophy then prevailing under
Rudolf Hermann Lotze. Bowne worked as a
journalist in New York City from 1874 until
1876, when he completed an MA at New
BOWNE, Borden Parker (1847–1910) York University. He accepted a call to the
philosophy department at Boston University
Borden Parker Bowne was born on 14 January in 1877, and later refused attractive offers
1847 near Leonardville, New Jersey. He was from Yale and the new University of Chicago
one of six children of upright parents raised in as his reputation grew. In 1888 he became
rural New Jersey, near what is today called the first Dean of the Graduate School at
Atlantic Highlands. His father, Joseph Bowne, Boston University and held that position until
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BOWNE
his death. Bowne died on 1 April 1910 in be any number of trends and happenings in
Boston Massachusetts. natural or human history which were dead
Bowne’s most lasting contributions came in ends and no one is scandalized by their lack of
the philosophy of religion. His religious back- issue, so why should any theist be scandalized
ground is important in this regard. He was a where the issue of natural or historical
popular guest preacher throughout his career processes is so immensely and obviously
and a volume of his sermons was published valuable as in the case of evolution? On the
posthumously under the title The Essence of other side, the defenders of “special creation”
Religion (1910). His constant stream of contri- err in assuming that God is something super-
butions to popular religious magazines and natural, something wholly apart from nature.
newspapers made him one of the foremost the- Bowne argued that unless God is conceived
ological opinion leaders of his time. These volu- as working immanently within each moment
minous popular writings were applications of of experience, be it natural or human, the sus-
his technical philosophical positions to the social taining continuity of natural or human expe-
and religious issues of the day. They display an rience is wholly without an explanation. Thus,
unusual mixture of progressive ideas, the every event is a special creation in the sense
guiding spirit of which is a devotion to clarity of that the complete explanation for its existence
thought and practicality of viewpoint. It will cannot be given by science, history, theology,
be worthwhile to make note of two theological or any other device of human understanding.
and biographical points before moving to a Scientific explanations are incomplete, just as
summary of Bowne’s formal philosophy. theological explanations are incomplete. One
Bowne was able to negotiate a kind of result of this view is that there is no reason to
theistic naturalism that enabled him to avoid defend the idea of miracles in the traditional
much of the controversy over evolutionary sense of the word, since a serviceable concep-
theory during his career. His basic position tion of the immanent activity of God in nature
was that there was no naturalistic or theolog- renders such traditional tales more suitable for
ical basis for treating nature, its changes, devel- children than for persons of mature faith,
opments, and laws, as something over against according to Bowne. This latter view, in which
God. The idea that a scientific description of Bowne denies the traditional view of miracles
nature could contradict the basic principles of and argues against the blood atonement, and
theism betrayed a misunderstanding of both by implication the resurrection, led him into
nature and theism. Thus, the reductive evolu- troubles with the conservative constituency of
tionist misunderstands nature by assuming his church, and also led Harvard philosopher
that the result of a process ought to be under- William JAMES to remark, in a letter to Bowne
stood through its beginnings or origins, when dated 29 December 1903, that he (James) was
in fact it is only from the practical survey of the “a better Methodist than you, in spite of your
results that the origins can be empirically efforts to persuade me to the contrary. If the
approached or deduced. This same limiting ass and the blatherskite succeed in their efforts
principle applies to all human understanding to weed you out of the body [of the church], I
and knowledge regardless of whether the hope they will have the wisdom to get me
question before us is natural, cultural, or his- voted in to fill the vacuum.” Bowne’s standard
torical. In addition, whatever principles and answer to such charges was to remind his
trends may have prevailed regarding an origin, accusers that there was a difference between
they are undeveloped in their original state matters of knowledge in which human
and therefore not to be valued except as seen methods could expect some success, however
through a later accomplishment, i.e., their limited, and in matters of faith which take up
having produced a valuable result. There might where investigation will avail nothing.
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James’s remark about “weeding out” Bowne suppositions and our genuine evidence.
was a reference to the controversy brewing in Conceptual clarity is to be sought and self-
1903 which resulted in Bowne’s heresy trial in contradiction to be avoided, not because a
the spring of 1904 – the only heresy trial in the clear description is certain to provide access to
history of the Methodist Church. In addition the structures of the real (be they mental or
to the issues described above, Bowne had material), but because conceptual confusion
defended the teaching of the controversial is likely to cloud our judgments about what
higher criticism of the Bible at Boston exists and what we know. Therefore, the
University, where a religion professor had been primary function of logic is the normative clar-
dismissed for teaching this approach. Having ification of thought, and the function of clear
had the example of his own parents, Bowne thinking is to bring to the fore knowledge,
was unintimidated by those who pointed understanding, or appreciation of what we
fingers and threw epithets his way. He calmly value. Abstractions are tools, not principles of
defended himself and was acquitted of all the real. The following passage from Bowne’s
charges, unanimously, by a council of 1899 treatise on method, Theory of Thought
Methodist bishops (some of whom were his and Knowledge, exemplifies his outlook: “The
former students). In many ways this episode root thought of this work is that thought is an
served to bring Methodist theology into an organic activity which unfolds from within,
influential role, together with other mainline and can never be put together mechanically
denominations, in the forging of what has from without… . Knowledge is no longer
since been called the “liberal Protestant con- something originating outside the mind,
sensus,” which was so influential in twentieth- possibly in the nerves, and passed along ready-
century philosophical theology and social made into the mind; it is rather something
ethics. The Bowne heresy trial was one of built up by the mind within itself in accor-
many turning points in the creation of that dance with principles immanent in the mental
important perspective. nature. Nothing is nearer to us than thought,
Among important philosophical associations and yet nothing is harder to grasp. The reason
in Bowne’s environment, James was perhaps is that spontaneous thought deals with its
the most notable. Bowne was part of a group objects rather than with itself, and the work of
that met every two weeks for some years in the reflection is difficult.” (pp. iii–iv) Bowne’s
rooms of Thomas DAVIDSON in Boston. The approach is a kind of phenomenology that is
group also included George H. HOWISON, governed not by an ontologically grounded
James E. CABOT, William Torrey HARRIS, and pure logic, but by a supposition that careful
Charles C. EVERETT. A close examination of reflection can reveal some portion of its own
the philosophies of those who were part of origins and structures, and can be more clearly
this group suggests that this pleasant fort- described as greater care is given to the refine-
nightly meeting might have been the birth- ment of our descriptions. However, ontologi-
place of pluralistic philosophy in America, in cal knowledge is not the result of this process
the rich exchanges particularly among any more than it is the ground; more or less
Howison, James, and Bowne. useful guides for action are the most we can
Bowne’s method was a descriptive (as expect in our endeavors, and epistemology is
opposed to prescriptive or formalist or logical) the critical treatment of the processes by which
version of Kantian philosophy, similar to valuable knowledge is acquired.
Lotze’s, but with a greater emphasis upon the Regarding the limits of description and
empirical roots of our descriptions. In describ- philosophical knowledge, Bowne warns
ing experience we are enjoined to remember against the twin pitfalls of epistemology: “I
always the difference between our conceptual have emphasized two points the knowledge
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BOWNE
of which is of great importance, if not and his writing itself is clever, pithy, econom-
absolutely necessary, for our intellectual sal- ical, and insightful. His prose bears up well to
vation. The first point is the volitional and the contemporary eye.
practical nature of belief. Persons living on the In metaphysics, Bowne was an early propo-
plane of instinct and hearsay have no intellec- nent of process philosophy. In the first edition
tual difficulty here, or anywhere else; but of his Metaphysics (1882), he attacked the tra-
persons entering upon the life of reflection ditional notion of “substance” and “being”
without insight into this fact are sure to lose and suggested that it be replaced with a notion
themselves in theoretical impotence and prac- of process. His idea of God as the “world
tical impudence. The impotence manifests itself ground” is similar to Alfred North
in a paralyzing inability to believe, owing to the WHITEHEAD’s idea of God in the twentieth
fancy that theoretical demonstration must century. This move rendered “time” and
precede belief. The impudence shows itself in “space” as they had appeared in Kantian and
ruling out with an airy levity the practical prin- Aristotelian philosophies phenomenal as
ciples by which men and nations live, because opposed to either noumenal or ontological.
they admit of no formal proof. These extremes This and other such positions in metaphysics
of unwisdom can be escaped only by an insight labeled Bowne as an idealist, but he insisted
into the volitional and practical nature of that his brand of pluralistic objective idealism
belief.” (pp. iv–v) Hence Bowne embraces was entirely consistent with the conviction of
what is better known under the aegis of prag- the reality of an order quite beyond our mental
matism as “the will to believe,” in James’s ter- processes, although such a reality cannot be
minology, or alternatively as “the scientific conceived as wholly independent, since
method of fixing belief,” in Charles S. PEIRCE’s nothing is wholly independent of anything else
vocabulary. Whether Bowne ought to be called at the level of existence. What was required in
a pragmatist is a matter of some debate, but order to provide consistent and usable descrip-
that his method can be characterized as prag- tions in metaphysics was a central principle
matic seems very clear. James did not regard which provided a reliable and fruitful clue to
Bowne as a radical empiricist, but a case might the place we hold in the broader reality. Bowne
be made that he was that as well. found this “clue” in the idea of the person.
Bowne continues: “The second point … is Whatever else we might suppose about the
the almost universal illusion arising from what nature of reality, we can be assured that it is
I have called the structural fallacies of uncrit- compatible with, or not entirely hostile to, the
ical thought. Spontaneous thought is pretty personal mode of existence. In addition, it
sure to take itself as the double of reality. Thus seems that a pervasive and indeed inevitable
arises the fallacy of the universal, the parent of feature of all our philosophical descriptions is
a very large part of popular speculation. And that they express the perspective and values of
when to this are added the omnipresent impos- personal beings. Thus, person is a mode of
ture and deceit of language, there results a relation that we may safely take as a clue to the
great world of abstract and verbal illusion structure of objective reality and a feature of all
against which we cannot be too much on our philosophical description. Accordingly, Bowne
guard, seeing that it is the source both of so brings his critical acumen to bear against the
much theoretical error and of so much practi- various “impersonalist” philosophies of his
cal menace and aberration.” (p. v) Here is a time. Absolute idealism errs by sacrificing the
statement of method that is hard to distin- clear empirical plurality of persons in our expe-
guish from pragmatism or from process phi- rience to an impersonal Absolute. Materialism
losophy. Bowne’s consistency in adhering to errs in reducing a personal reality to an imper-
these methodological principles is exemplary, sonal principle which can only be abstract.
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Impersonalist versions of naturalism and psy- wells up in us from moment to moment, from
chologism suffer from similar errors, according fastidious (and really preposterous) dialectic
to Bowne. Ultimately his claim is that philoso- contradictions, impossibilities and vetoes.”
phies that eliminate the personal principle fall Arguably, then, Bowne’s personalism is a kind
into the “structural fallacies of uncritical of pragmatism that insists upon “person” in a
thought” or the fallacy of the universal, what way analogous to the way that John DEWEY,
James called “the philosopher’s fallacy” and for example, insists upon “organism.”
Whitehead called “the fallacy of misplaced The idea that “person” is both a fundamen-
concreteness.” tal modality of existence and a reliable descrip-
This trajectory in metaphysics culminated tive principle in philosophy supplies a needed
in the expression of Bowne’s mature philoso- bridge between metaphysics, method, and
phy in Personalism (1908). Although his philo- ethics. Accordingly, Bowne wrote extensively in
sophical system bore several names along the moral philosophy, arguably his most important
way, including “objective idealism” and “tran- writings, in terms of subsequent impact on the
scendental empiricism,” its final label was world. His ethical philosophy is characterized by
“personalism.” Whether this is a very good its guarded meliorism: an emphasis on practi-
label can be questioned, but it has stayed with cality and on learning to be circumspect about
philosophy in the tradition of Bowne in subhuman nature and possibilities. Bowne tends
sequent generations. Personalism was an to take a fairly dim view of the prospects for
important force in mainstream philosophy improving human behavior, but he is convinced
until the decline of idealistic philosophies in that we may find exemplars of freedom well
America became a marked phenomenon in the employed in our midst. He is a progressive,
1930s. In theology and social ethics personal- arguing that ethical philosophy ought to learn
ism exerted greater influence through Bowne’s from its past, but exists for the sake of the
student Edgar Sheffield B RIGHTMAN , and present and future and must not be tied down
Brightman’s student Martin Luther KING, Jr., to tradition. Freedom is a given in moral phi-
who was perhaps the most important social, losophy in the sense that it is implied by the very
political and ethical thinker in the personalist notion of personal existence. An unfree being
tradition. In the philosophy of religion, per- cannot be a personal being, and a personal being
sonalism continues to exercise some influence cannot fail to be free in some sense. Thus, the
in the circles that take philosophical theology idea of freedom is not a postulate for Bowne,
seriously. The term “personalism” has gained but an ontological requirement of meaningful
greater currency in these circles in recent years existence and a presupposition of all descrip-
with the espousal of this view by Pope John tions. The dignity and equality of all persons
Paul II. Due to the importance of this philoso- thus becomes part and parcel of their ontolog-
pher-pope it is likely that the term “personal- ical freedom, and seeking to develop the
ism” will be in use for the foreseeable future, freedom of persons is an ethical imperative
and with the same basic meaning that Bowne beside which none other can compare. Hence,
gave it. Bowne favored the equality of women and non-
Regarding the mature expression of Bowne’s white races at a time when these views were con-
philosophy in Personalism, James, upon troversial. He did not limit the notion of
reading it, remarked in a letter dated 17 August personal existence to human beings, recognizing
1908 to Bowne: “It seems to me that you and as early as 1882 that other beings, including
I are now aiming at exactly the same end… . animals, must be described as having a personal
The common foe of us both is the dogmatist- form of existence.
rationalist-abstractionist. Our common desire While Bowne was an uncompromising apol-
is to redeem the concrete personal life which ogist of progressive morality, it led him to dis-
310
BOWNE
parage the ways of life of “savages” and The Immanence of God (Boston, 1905).
“indians,” not because of their race or natural Personalism (Boston, 1908).
inferiority, but because he saw “primitive” Studies in Christianity (Boston, 1909).
ways of life as morally inferior to the ways of The Essence of Religion (Boston, 1910).
“civilized men.” In this regard Bowne was very A Man’s View of Woman Suffrage (Boston,
much a man of his own age. He did not credit 1910).
the idea of an ascent of man as either natural- Kant and Spencer: A Critical Exposition
ized or divinely ordained, but he did hold (Boston, 1912).
without apology the idea that not all ways of
life have achieved the same level of moral Other Relevant Works
excellence and some ways of life deserved our Bowne’s papers are at Boston University.
round condemnation. His model of a morally Representative Essays of Borden Parker
advanced life was that of city-dwelling Anglo- Bowne, ed. Warren E. Steinkraus (Utica,
Europeans, wherever they might be found. N.Y., 1981).
While he took a dim view of human nature,
Bowne still believed there was reason to hope Further Reading
that we might become less self-destructive, and Amer Nat Bio, Amer Phils Before 1950,
clarity of thought could only help. Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, Bio 20thC
Bowne thought that the mode of relating in Phils, Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer
the family unit probably holds our best clues Religious Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v11,
to moral progress. While the situation of the Routledge Encycl Phil, Who Was Who in
family in Bowne’s age, as in our own, was Amer v1
nothing to praise, he argued that it was the best Auxier, Randall E., ed. “The Relevance of
set of moral relations we have, and that moral Borden Parker Bowne,” Personalist
progress will be achieved by the expansion of Forum 13 (Spring 1997). Special issue
the sphere of moral concern to include the devoted to Bowne.
consideration of wider and wider circles of ———, “Bowne on Time, Evolution and
individuals, a “family of humankind” rather History,” Journal of Speculative
than a “kingdom of ends.” Philosophy 12 (1998): 181–203.
Bowne, Kate Morrison. “An Intimate
BIBLIOGRAPHY Portrait of Bowne,” The Personalist 2
The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer (New (1921): 5–15.
York, 1874). Burrow, Rufus, Jr. Personalism: A Critical
Metaphysics: A Study in First Principles Introduction (St. Louis, 1999).
(New York, 1882; 2nd edn 1898). Dearing, Mary H. “Reminiscences of
Studies in Theism (New York, 1882). Borden Parker Bowne,” Philosophical
Introduction to Psychological Theory (New Forum 15 (1957): 51–5.
York, 1886). Deats, Paul, and Carol Robb. The Boston
Philosophy of Theism (New York, 1887; Personalist Tradition in Philosophy,
2nd edn 1902). Social Ethics and Theology (Macon,
The Principles of Ethics (New York, 1892). Georgia, 1986).
Theory of Thought and Knowledge (New Flewelling, Ralph Tyler, and Rudolf
York, 1899). Eucken. Personalism and the Problems of
The Christian Revelation (Cincinnati, Philosophy: An Appreciation of the
1898). Work of Borden Parker Bowne (New
The Christian Life (Cincinnati, 1899). York, 1915).
The Atonement (Cincinnati, 1900). Franquiz Ventura, Jose A. Borden Parker
311
BOWNE
Bowne’s Treatment of the Problem of With the outbreak of the American Civil
Change and Identity (Rio Piedras, Puerto War, Brackett was forced to return to Boston,
Rico, 1942). by way of St. Louis, where she met other
Gacka, Bogumil. Bibliography of American members of the newly developing St. Louis
Personalism (Lublin, Poland, 1994). philosophical movement, including William
Knudson, Albert C. The Philosophy of Torrey HARRIS. She returned to St. Louis in
Personalism (New York, 1927). 1863 at the invitation of Harris to become
———, “Bowne as Teacher and Author,” principal of the normal school there, reportedly
The Personalist 1 (1920): 5–14. the first woman to head a secondary school in
Lazarus, Frederick. The Metaphysics of the United States. By 1872 Brackett had
Ramanuja and Bowne (Bombay, India, returned to New York City, where she opened
1962). her own private girls’ school with her life
McConnell, Francis J. Borden Parker partner, Ida Eliot. She and Eliot remained in
Bowne: His Life and Philosophy (New New York City, vacationing in Vermont and
York, 1929). New Hampshire until Brackett’s death.
Pyle, Charles Bertram. The Philosophy of Brackett died on 18 March 1911 in Summit,
Borden Parker Bowne and Its New Jersey.
Application to the Religious Problem During all of her professional life, Brackett
(Columbus, Ohio, 1910). was a prominent feminist and pedagogical
Robinson, Daniel S., ed. “Borden Parker theorist. She wrote, edited, and translated
Bowne’s Letters to William T. Harris,” several books. She also wrote articles on edu-
Philosophical Forum 13 (1955): 89–95. cation and women’s issues for both profes-
Smith, Harmon L. “Borden Parker Bowne: sional education journals and popular publi-
Heresy at Boston,” in American Religious cations. Though Brackett firmly believed that
Heretics: Formal and Informal Trials, ed. advanced and co-education should be available
George H. Shriver (Nashville, Tenn., to women, she worked effectively within her
1966), pp. 148–87. given social and historical context to ensure
that the education of her own students was
Randall E. Auxier rigorous. Her girls’ school was recognized for
its excellent college preparatory curriculum,
and her students were often admitted to Vassar
College with advanced standing.
Brackett was among a number of women
who were active in the St. Louis Philosophical
BRACKETT, Anna Callender (1836–1911) Society, despite the fact that its male leaders
failed to consider women as full members. Her
Anna Callender Brackett was born on 21 May work represents the early feminist theory that
1836 in Boston, Massachusetts. She was the she and other women in the St. Louis circle
daughter of a Boston businessman and his developed in the last third of the nineteenth
wife, Samuel E. and Caroline S. Brackett, and century. As a normal school pedagogue and
a cousin of social work pioneer, Jeffrey advocate, her feminist ideals and pedagogical
Brackett. She was educated at the Abbott theory were intertwined. She wrote and
School and the Framingham State Normal lectured on the need for women’s educational
School, graduating in 1856. Brackett briefly equality as well as on their academic and
taught in the Boston area, then accepted a administrative ability to be educational leaders.
position as the vice principal of a normal In her essays “The Education of American
school in Charleston, South Carolina. Girls” and “Sex in Education” (in The
312
BRACKETT
Education of American Girls, 1874), Brackett introduction to him on behalf of Thomas

adhered to a classic liberal understanding of Davidson.
feminism. Women are more similar to than Shortly before her death in 1911, several
different from men, she declared in these former students and lifelong colleagues estab-
works. Rarely did she make pleas for women’s lished a scholarship fund with the Association
expanded role in public life that were based on of Collegiate Alumnae in Brackett’s name. The
their privileged maternal point of view, as did fund has now been subsumed under the schol-
some of her contemporaries, such as Frances arship and fellowship program of ACA’s suc-
Wright and her allies in the Women’s Christian cessor, the American Association of University
Temperance Union. Women; this is a fitting legacy for one of
An accomplished equestrian who com- America’s most vocal and active proponents of
plained that games like croquet tired a person women’s education.
out without giving them an adequate amount
of exercise, Brackett rejected claims of BIBLIOGRAPHY
women’s delicacy or special nature outright. In “Analysis of an Article on Hegel,” Journal
fact, in her paraphrase of the pedagogical of Speculative Philosophy 5 (1870):
theory of Karl Rosenkranz, a disciple of G. W. 38–48.
F. Hegel, she explicitly dismissed a passage in “Woman’s Work,” St. Louis Ladies’
which he said girls needed only dancing Magazine no. 3 (1871): 150.
lessons, but no real physical education. Such a “The American Normal School,” in
statement was no more than Rosenkranz’s Addresses and Proceedings of the
own German traditionalism creeping into the National Education Association, vol. 15
text, according to Brackett. (Washington, D.C., 1872), pp. 181–9.
Brackett’s philosophical thought does not “Organization as Related to Civilization,”
extend very far beyond her pedagogical theory in Papers Read at the Third Congress of
and her feminism. Much of her time in St. Women, Syracuse, October 13, 14, and
Louis was spent trying to convince the school 15, 1875 (Chicago, 1875).
board that teaching is a profession worthy of The Science of Education: A Paraphrase of
more than a year or two of training in a Dr. Karl Rosenkranz’s Paedagogik als
normal school. In New York she was busy as System (St. Louis, 1878).
an educator, administrator, and public
lecturer. She failed to go deeply into feminist Other Relevant Works
theory or philosophy, though she did help give Some papers and materials about Brackett
shape to early American feminism. are in the Memorial Scholarship File with
Brackett was well acquainted, both person- the Educational Foundation Papers in the
ally and professionally, with fellow St. Louis archives of the American Association of
idealists Harris, Thomas DAVIDSON, Mary University Women, Washington, D.C.
Beedy, and Grace Bibb. She was also profes- More materials are in the Alumni File at
sionally acquainted with the Michigan idealist Framingham State College in
and feminist, Eliza SUNDERLAND, who provided Massachusetts. Some more
a room in her home for Brackett’s adopted correspondence is in the Thomas
daughter, Hope, while she attended the Davidson Papers at Yale University.
University of Michigan. Ralph Waldo “Margaret Fuller Ossoli,” The Radical 9
EMERSON thought highly of Brackett, whom he (1871): 354.
saw as something of a latter-day Margaret Trans., Pedagogics as a System, by Karl
Fuller, and she knew Oliver Wendell HOLMES, Rosenkranz (St. Louis, 1872).
Sr. well enough to offer to write a letter of Ed., The Education of American Girls:
313
BRACKETT
Considered in a Series of Essays (New woman lawyer, Bradwell achieved a series of

York, 1874). path-breaking professional accomplishments.
Poetry for Home and School, with Ida She was a political activist and journalist who
Elliot (New York, 1876). advocated for women’s rights in suffrage,
Trans., The Philosophy of Education, by employment, and property, as well as for a
Karl Rosenkranz (New York, 1893). variety of social reforms, such as treatment of
Ed., Woman and Higher Education (New the insane and reform of the standards for
York, 1893). participation in the legal profession.
Like most women of her time, Bradwell had
Further Reading little formal education. She attended a finish-
Amer Nat Bio, Dict Amer Bio, Nat Cycl ing school in Wisconsin and completed her
Amer Bio v11, Who Was Who in Amer education at the Elgin Female Seminary where
v1 she would later teach. Her education probably
Goetzmann, William H., ed. The American consisted of a curriculum in the liberal arts as
Hegelians: An Intellectual Episode in the well as the traditional and subordinate role of
History of Western America (New York, “true womanhood” expected of nineteenth-
1973). century women. Bradwell’s legal education
Kendall, Edith. “Anna C. Brackett: In primarily consisted of an apprenticeship (then
Memoriam,” Association of Collegiate a common and accepted path to the bar) to her
Alumnae pamphlet (New York, 1915). husband, a prominent lawyer and judge in
Lundgren, Maria. “Anna C. Brackett: Illinois.
Educator, Essayist, Poet.” Master’s Bradwell established the Chicago Legal
thesis, Iowa State University (Ames, News: Journal of Legal Intelligence in 1868,
Iowa, 1989). and was both editor and business manager
Rogers, Dorothy, ed. Women in the St. until 1893. Although she passed the Illinois bar
Louis Idealist Movement, 1860–1925, 3 exam with high honors in 1869, she was
vols (Bristol, UK, 2003). denied admission to the Illinois bar in 1869
Weiss, Beverly J. “Footprints in the Sands and 1870. These denials led to the famous
of Time: A Notable American Woman: Bradwell v. Illinois case in which the US
Anna C. Brackett,” The Echo (alumni Supreme Court upheld the decision of the
publication of Framingham State College) Illinois courts to exclude women from the
17 (1996): 2. practice of law. In 1890 Bradwell was finally
admitted to the Illinois bar, becoming the first
Dorothy Rogers woman lawyer in Illinois. She was allowed to
argue cases before the United States Supreme
Court in 1892, following in the footsteps of
Belva Ann LOCKWOOD who had been the first
women so privileged in 1879. After turning her
paper over to her daughter Bessie Bradwell
BRADWELL, Myra Colby (1831–94) Helmer, who had also become a lawyer,
Bradwell died on 14 February 1894 in
Myra Colby was born on 12 February 1831 in Chicago, Illinois.
Manchester, Vermont, and raised in Portage, Bradwell promulgated her ideas primarily
New York and then Schaumberg, Illinois. She through the Chicago Legal News. The paper
married James B. Bradwell in 1851, with enjoyed a wide circulation, first locally in
whom she had four children, two surviving Illinois and then nationally. Bradwell engaged
beyond early childhood. As a pioneering courts and legislatures in a series of agree-
314
BRAMELD
ments to allow the paper to report newly Illinois upon the Application of Myra
enacted statutes and judicial decisions months Bradwell to be admitted to the Bar,”
before their usual official appearance in print, Chicago Legal News 2 (5 February 1970):
making the Legal News an indispensable pub- 144–55.
lication. This secured a large, mainstream, and
dedicated audience for views on a variety of Further Reading
issues. Her columns were known for their bold Amer Nat Bio, Dict Amer Bio, Nat Cycl
statements of policy and ideology as well as for Amer Bio v2
their wit and humor. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873).
Bradwell’s philosophy challenged the tradi- Friedman, Jane M. America’s First Woman
tional understandings of the role of women Lawyer: The Biography of Myra Bradwell
by advocating for the right to enter any pro- (Buffalo, N.Y., 1993).
fession or occupation regardless of gender or Morello, Karen Berger. The Invisible Bar:
marital status, and she expended considerable The Woman Lawyer in America, 1638 to
effort, arguing for women’s rights to practice the Present (Boston, 1988).
law. She further sought to defy the stereotype “Myra Bradwell,” in Album of Genealogy
of the dependent woman, arguing for example and Biography, Cook County, Illinois
that women had equal rights to custody of with Portraits, 3rd edn (Chicago, 1895),
their children, and that married women had a pp. 135–8.
right to retain their own income. In 1869,
together with other women activists, she suc- Robin J. Effron
ceeded in her efforts to secure passage of law
that gave married women the right to retain
their own wages and protected the rights of
widows. In Chicago Legal News she published
a series of articles entitled “History of Woman
Suffrage,” edited by Elizabeth Cady STANTON, BRAMELD, Theodore Burghard Hurt
Susan B. ANTHONY, and Matilda Joslyn Gage. (1904–87)
Other aspects of Bradwell’s writings and
activism demonstrate a commitment to a more Theodore Brameld was born on 20 January
traditional ideology of “true womanhood.” 1904 in Neillsville, Wisconsin. He received his
For instance, although Bradwell labored tire- BA from Ripon College in 1926 and his PhD
lessly for the cause of women’s suffrage, she in philosophy at the University of Chicago in
stressed that it was the “devoted wives and 1931. His dissertation was on “The Role of
mothers” who respected their husbands and Acquiescence in Leninism.” The study of polit-
fathers who would win women the right to ical theory and education under T. V. SMITH at
vote. Her philosophy stressed the fact that the Chicago led him toward a democratic social-
lives of politically active women would coexist ism similar to that of John DEWEY. Brameld
harmoniously with their roles as wives and taught philosophy at Long Island University
mothers, and that inclusion of “true women” from 1931 to 1935 and at Adelphi College in
would improve, not denigrate, the political 1935–9. He then went to the University of
sphere. Minnesota for a position in educational phi-
losophy, where he participated in a high
BIBLIOGRAPHY school’s education reform which was mistak-
“A Woman Cannot Practice Law or Hold enly branded as communistic, and he was
any Office in Illinois: Full Report of the forced out of his job. Brameld left Minnesota
Proceedings in the Supreme Court of in 1947 to become a professor of educational
315
BRAMELD
philosophy at New York University, where he and problems instead of domestic ones.
stayed until 1958. Finally, he was a professor Followers of Brameld, and like-minded reform-
at Boston University until his retirement in ers around the world who look to schools to lead
1969. He participated in an experimental and transform society, have continued to
college at the University of Hawaii in the early demand that schools be democratically designed
1970s, and continued to actively lecture and to resist capitalist exploitation.
publish books. Brameld died on 18 October
1987 in Durham, North Carolina. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brameld was a powerful force for integrating Worker’s Education in the United States
insights from other social sciences, such as behav- (New York, 1941).
ioral psychology, sociology, and anthropology, Minority Problems in the Public Schools
into educational theory. He viewed schooling as (New York, 1946).
embedded in the wider culture. Schools can Ends and Means in Education: A Mid-
simply indoctrinate the prevailing culture’s values century Appraisal (New York, 1950).
into the young, but they can also be an instru- Patterns of Educational Philosophy: A
ment for gradually changing that culture. Since Democratic Interpretation (New York,
schools will unavoidably teach ethics and values, 1950).
the unavoidable pedagogical issue is which Philosophies of Education in Cultural
values to teach. Brameld was hostile to the rela- Perspective (New York, 1955).
tively unrestrained form of capitalism then Toward a Reconstructed Philosophy of
existing in the United States, because of its anti- Education (New York, 1956).
democratic tendencies. His hostility was there- Cultural Foundations of Education: An
fore also directed towards the many ways that Interdisciplinary Exploration (New York,
capitalist values were infecting public schools, 1957).
effectively perverting what ought to be the most The Remaking of a Culture: Life and
democratic of institutions. Education in Puerto Rico (New York,
Brameld departed from the broad Progressive 1959).
education movement by demanding that schools Education for the Emerging Age: Newer
should not only prepare the young (and adults Ends and Stronger Means (New York,
as well) for democratic participation but should 1961).
also guide students towards socialist values. Education as Power (New York, 1965).
Schools that taught the priority of community The Use of Explosive Ideas in Education
welfare, social solidarity, group consensus, and (Pittsburgh, 1965).
working-class needs would produce adults ready The Climactic Decades: Mandate to
for a planned economy instead of the doomed Education (New York, 1970).
capitalist system. Together with other philoso- Patterns of Educational Philosophy:
phers of education who agreed with this agenda Divergence and Convergence in
for schools, such as John L. CHILDS, George S. Culturological Perspective (New York,
COUNTS, and Harold Rugg, Brameld expected 1971).
the Great Depression to cause immense social The Teacher as World Citizen: A Scenario
and political disruption and transformation. of the 21st Century (Palm Springs, Cal.,
Intense debates erupted with fellow progressives 1976).
and socialists like Dewey, who instead believed
that schools must maintain a neutral stance Other Relevant Works
toward whatever democratic solution emerged. Brameld’s papers are at the University of
After World War II, Brameld’s “social recon- Vermont.
structionism” turned toward global perspectives Japan: Culture, Education, and Change in
316
BRANDEIS
Two Communities (New York, 1968). tioner of social justice and citizen involve-
Tourism as Cultural Learning: Two ment in democratic change. “My early asso-
Controversial Case Studies in ciations were such as to give me greater rev-
Educational Anthropology, with Midori erence than I now have for the things that are
Matsuyama (Washington, D.C., 1977). because they are,” Brandeis would say later.
“Experience of life has made me democratic.”
Further Reading (1934, p. 36) The tale of his life and thought
Amer Nat Bio, Proc of APA v61, Who’s is the story of a developing democratic phi-
Who in Phil losophy that revolved around human possi-
Brubacher, John S. Modern Philosophies of bilities and limitations.
Education (New York, 1962). Throughout his life, Brandeis emphasized
Kneller, George F. Introduction to the human dignity and the fulfillment of human
Philosophy of Education (New York, potential. He initially believed those goals
1971). would be achieved through laissez-faire cap-
Thompson, Richard H. The Educational italism but his experiences as a lawyer grad-
Theory of Reconstructionism as Viewed ually led him to think that both were threat-
by George S. Counts and Theodore ened by unbalanced power. Called upon in
Brameld, PhD dissertation, University of 1902 to explore the reasons for a union’s
Texas (Austin, Tex., 1985). strike against one of his clients, for example,
Brandeis discovered that the workers were
John R. Shook paid well when they worked but that employ-
ment was seasonal and sporadic. He
promptly created a system that would enable
labor to be spread out during the year to
prevent the irregularity of employment that
deprived workers of both dignity and finan-
BRANDEIS, Louis Dembitz (1856–1941) cial security. His encounters with union nego-
tiators during that strike, and in subsequent
Louis D. Brandeis was born in Louisville, labor disputes he was called upon to mediate,
Kentucky on 13 November 1856, and died on convinced him that unions were necessary to
5 October 1941 in Washington, D.C. He was counteract the power of employers.
educated in Louisville’s public schools and By 1915 Brandeis had developed a general
in Germany at Dresden’s Annen-Realschule. theory of labor relations based on the concept
At age eighteen he enrolled in Harvard Law of “industrial democracy,” which he equated
School, and earned the highest grades ever with the checks and balances of the political
awarded by that institution, receiving his BA sphere. He urged unions to fight for reasonable
in 1877. He remained at the school for a year hours as well as wages for, as members of a
of graduate work. democracy, workers needed leisure “among
After practicing law for a few months in St. other reasons, because with us every man is of
Louis, in 1879 Brandeis joined a Harvard the ruling class … . Our great beneficent exper-
classmate in the new Boston law firm of iment in democracy will fail unless the people,
Warren & Brandeis. Brandeis, the son of a our rulers, are developed in character and intel-
small but prosperous merchant, began his ligence” (Letters, vol. 1, p. 407). Education,
career as the representative of small business. which meant not only formal instruction but
He also started his transformation from a lifetime learning after the classroom, required
relatively unreflective proponent of laissez- “freshness of mind … and to the preservation
faire capitalism to a proponent and practi- of freshness of mind a short work day is for
317
BRANDEIS
most people essential.” (p. 407) Informed lies, the New England railroad monopoly,
citizens were the foundation of a democracy, and the life insurance monopoly (in response
which is the means by which human beings to the last, he created savings bank life insur-
organized society so as to perform the tasks ance). At the turn of the twentieth century the
people cannot carry out themselves and to country was caught up in the expansion of
maximize the possibility of human fulfill- sprawling businesses, made possible by the
ment. In return for the benefits provided by rapidly developing transportation and com-
a democratic government, citizens have the munication systems. Brandeis, however,
responsibility to participate in the political found large commercial enterprises to be sur-
sphere – and intelligent participation requires prisingly inefficient – a failure he attributed to
the leisure time in which to acquire informa- human limitations. Human beings had to
tion. “adjust our institutions to the wee size of
Workers have a similar right and obligation man,” he counseled (1957, p. 120). He
to participate in economic decision-making. assumed that if an institution was so big that
By 1907 Brandeis had come to believe that as no one person knew what was going on in it,
the producers of a company’s income, it was out of control. He approved of dele-
workers have a right to share in its profits. gation of power and a degree of specializa-
His thinking continued to evolve, and by tion, agreeing that “organization can do
1912 he was writing about giving each much to make concerns more efficient [and]
worker management responsibilities as well larger units possible … . But … organization
as profits. In 1915 he declared that “indus- can never supply the combined judgment, ini-
trial democracy … means that the problems tiative, enterprise and authority which must
of a trade should be no longer the problems come from the chief executive officer.” (1934,
of the employer alone … . The employees pp. 216–17)
must have the opportunity of participating in Another reason for his opposition to
the decisions as to what shall be their condi- bigness in business was his belief that con-
tion and how the business shall be run … . centrated private power inevitably results in
We must insist upon labor sharing the respon- public corruption. By 1912 he was convinced
sibilities for the rest of the business.” Worker- that the burgeoning trusts had become so
participation, he continued, is necessary politically potent that even if workers had
because “we Americans are committed not sufficient leisure to involve themselves in the
only to social justice … but … to democracy political process, the trusts prevent the votes
… . The end for which we must strive is the of workers and other citizens from having an
attainment of rule by the people, and that impact. The 1912 presidential election
involves industrial democracy as well as polit- matched Theodore Roosevelt’s platform for
ical democracy.” (1934, pp. 73–4) In an governmental control of the trusts against
updating of Jeffersonian thought, Brandeis Woodrow Wilson’s insistence that govern-
argued that if economic independence was ment could not control the trusts without
no longer possible for the majority of income- becoming so big itself that it would be
producing Americans, they are at least unwieldy and ultimately unaccountable to
entitled to participation in the economic the public. Brandeis volunteered to write most
decision-making that directly affects their of Wilson’s trust-busting platform and later
lives. helped Wilson as US President design the
The young Brandeis became involved in Federal Reserve System and the Federal Trade
public service efforts early in his career, and Commission.
between 1886 and 1916 he fought against Nominating him to the Supreme Court in
Boston’s paper and transportation monopo- 1916, Wilson gave Brandeis the opportunity
318
BRANDEIS
to expound his political philosophy from the the democratic state, so that it will not lose
nation’s highest tribunal. Brandeis remained the democratic nature that makes it respon-
on the Supreme Court until 1939. The polit- sive to individual needs. The right to hear
ical thought he took to Washington, the result brings the concomitant duty to speak.
of his experiences in the world of business His opinion in Whitney v. California
and his efforts on behalf of the public, was (1927), which has become the template of
based on an abhorrence of bigness, a distrust American speech jurisprudence, assumes that
of entrenched power, and a belief in the pos- human beings are simultaneously “good” in
sibilities of citizen action and the need for their ability to act intelligently and “bad” in
citizen responsibility. It was therefore unsur- their susceptibility to the pitfalls of power
prising that the theory of government and illogical thinking. In exercising their intel-
reflected in his Supreme Court opinions ligence, they create a government that will
remained Jeffersonian. He did not agree that ensure them the liberty necessary to develop
the government that governed least was nec- individual talents. That government logically
essarily the best, but he did emphasize decen- must be democratic by being responsive to the
tralization of power. expressed will of the people. It must not act
To Brandeis, that meant that the states arbitrarily or in an illegitimately repressive
should be left as free as possible to serve as manner, and mechanisms must be incorpo-
experimental laboratories in both the rated into its structure to prevent such liberty-
economic and the political spheres. If human threatening behavior.
progress is to be made, experimentation The imperfect State may threaten liberty,
should be encouraged but potentially dan- not only because institutions are run by
gerous large-scale experimentation should fallible human beings but because it is in the
not (New State Ice Co. v. Liebermann, 1932; nature of humanity to generate and heed “evil
Liggett v. Lee, 1933). At the federal level, counsels,” at least temporarily. For that
separation of powers should be rigorously reason, no government is to be trusted
enforced (Myers v. United States, 1926). The entirely, no matter who its administrators
Supreme Court should decline to inject itself are, and every democratic government must
into disputes unless the popularly elected be subjected to constant examination by the
branches of government cannot handle them people. That is why one of the functions of
successfully (Ashwander v. T.V.A., 1936). government is maintenance of the free flow of
The Supreme Court, however, should ensure ideas, through which the people exchange
that the government does not violate the lib- ideas about current and possible government
erties of the people. policies and actions.
Speech is foremost among those liberties. Brandeis acknowledged that speech could
Brandeis considered free speech crucial to be dangerous, but the danger had to be borne
democracy and to the human ability to create if democratic institutions were to be pro-
a society that enables its citizens to fulfill tected. While his judicial colleagues favored
their potential. The free individual is the goal; suppression or punishment of speech that
democracy, the means by which individual might tend to lead to disruption, Brandeis
freedom is to be achieved. People have to be argued that the answer for bad speech was
able to explore all available ideas if they are good speech. “If there be time to expose
to learn, stretch their intellectual horizons, through discussion the falsehood and fallac-
and fulfill their individual capabilities. As it is ies, to avert the evil by the processes of edu-
only within a formal community that indication, the remedy to be applied is more
vidual fulfillment could be attained, each indi- speech, not enforced silence,” he wrote in
vidual is obligated to participate actively in Whitney. The sole triggering element that
319
BRANDEIS
would permit suppression of speech was “the seminal brief in Muller v. Oregon (1908),
probability of serious injury to the State,” which contained almost no recitation of legal
and that could occur only if there was an precedents but instead detailed the societal
“emergency [that] does not permit reliance reasons for upholding a law limiting women’s
upon the slower conquest of error by truth.” work days, heralded a major change in the
Harmful acts could be punished but, even if function of American constitutional lawyers.
the speech behind them resulted in damage to Their job was to bridge the gap between the
property, it could neither be prohibited nor sovereign people and the judges who presided
criminalized as long as the state remained over the people’s courtrooms by presenting
safe. the judges with factual material. To Brandeis,
The right to privacy was closely related to the twentieth century was the age of science,
the right to speech as a check upon the gov- and science was dependent upon facts. As
ernment and as a human necessity. The “right John D EWEY ’s instrumentalism was an
to be let alone,” which he described in attempt to adapt the techniques of scientific
Olmstead v. United States (1928) as “the experimentation to social problems,
most comprehensive of rights and the right Brandeis’s sociological jurisprudence was
most valued by civilized men,” was an impor- meant to bring science into the courtroom,
tant component of human dignity. “The and to do so in the name of democracy.
makers of our Constitution,” he wrote, Brandeis the justice followed the path blazed
“undertook … to protect Americans in their by Brandeis the attorney, and produced fact-
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions, and laden opinions designed to explain why the
their sensations.” It was not only their dignity people and their legislators chose to enact
that would be impaired by governmental vio- specific public policies (Jay Burns Baking Co.
lations of their privacy; it would in addition v. Bryan, 1924; United Railways v. West,
be their ability to exchange their thoughts 1939). His approach to the law became the
and engage in the kind of questioning reflec- norm during the second half of the twentieth
tion crucial to citizens of a democracy. century, as reflected in the fact-laden briefs
The view of law as reflecting the changing presented to the Supreme Court and the fact-
needs of a democratic society, implicit in laden decision handed down by it in Brown
Brandeis’s speech jurisprudence, illuminated v. Board of Education (1954).
his approach to all law. His democratic faith, One of his protégés, Felix FRANKFURTER,
based on the premise that the people know wrote that to Brandeis, “democracy is not a
best what is good for them, led logically to the political program. It is a religion.” (Mr.
belief that the people’s will should be reflected Justice Brandeis, 1932, p. 137) It certainly
in public policy. Legislators thus have an was as close to a faith as Brandeis came;
obligation to produce laws based on what clearly, it was the guiding principle of his
the electorate considered the “felt necessi- thought.
ties” of the day. Judges have a concurrent
obligation to interpret laws, including the BIBLIOGRAPHY
Constitution, according to the same criterion, “The Right to Privacy,” with Samuel D.
recognizing societal needs and addressing Warren, Jr., Harvard Law Review 4
them in statutes. Yet judges, removed from (1890): 193–220.
the popular will as well as the popular whim, Business: A Profession (Boston, 1914).
might not be familiar with societal realities. Other People’s Money and How the
Brandeis the litigator decided that the Bankers Use It (New York, 1914).
responsibility for providing courts with the Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)
relevant information lay with lawyers. His (dissenting).
320
BRANDT
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 BRANDT, Richard Booker (1910–97)
(1928) (dissenting).
The Curse of Bigness (New York, 1934). Richard B. Brandt was born on 17 October
1910 in Wilmington, Ohio. He received a BA
Other Relevant Works from Denison University in 1930, majoring in
Brandeis’s papers are at the University of philosophy and classical studies. He went on to
Louisville in Kentucky, the Library of study at Trinity College, Cambridge, received
Congress, and the Harvard Law School another BA from the University of Cambridge
Library. in philosophy of religion in 1933, and then
Mr. Justice Brandeis, ed. Felix Frankfurter studied at Tübingen University in 1934–5. In
(New Haven, Conn., 1932). 1936 he received his PhD in philosophy from
The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Yale University and remained there for a year
Brandeis, ed. Alexander M. Bickel on fellowship studying logical positivism.
(Cambridge, Mass., 1957). Brandt taught philosophy from 1937 to 1964
Letters of Louis D. Brandeis, 5 vols, ed. at Swarthmore College, also serving as chair for
Melvin I. Urofsky and David W. Levy nineteen years. In 1964 he became chair of the
(Albany, N.Y., 1971–8). department of philosophy, and later Roy Wood
Sellars Distinguished College Professor of
Further Reading Philosophy, at the University of Michigan.
Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Bio, Comp While serving as chair at both institutions he
Amer Thought, Dict Amer Bio, Encyc distinguished himself not only as a prominent
Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v36, Who philosopher, but also as an excellent adminis-
Was Who in Amer v1 trator. Brandt was the John Locke Lecturer at
Konefsky, Samuel J. The Legacy of Holmes the University of Oxford in 1974, which
and Brandeis (New York, 1956). resulted in his A Theory of the Good and the
Lahav, Pnina. “Holmes and Brandeis: Right (1979). In 1981 Brandt retired and was
Libertarian and Republican Justifications appointed visiting professor at the Law Center
for Free Speech,” Journal of Law and at Georgetown University a year later. Brandt
Politics 4 (1988): 451–82. served as fellow for the Guggenheim
Mason, Alpheus T. Brandeis: A Free Man’s Foundation in 1945, fellow for the Center for
Life (New York, 1946). Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences in
Strum, Philippa. Louis D. Brandeis: Justice Stanford, California, and for the National
for the People (Cambridge, Mass., 1984). Endowment for the Humanities. He was a
———, Brandeis: Beyond Progressivism member of the American Academy of Arts and
(Lawrence, Kan., 1993). Sciences, served as President of the Western
Teitelbaum, Gene. Justice Louis D. Division of the American Philosophical
Brandeis: A Bibliography of Writings and Association in 1969–70, and was President of
Other Materials on the Justice (Littleton, the American Society for Political and Legal
Col., 1988). Philosophy. Brandt died on 10 September 1997
in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
Philippa Strum Noted as one of the most influential moral
philosophers from the second half of the twen-
tieth century and as the contemporary utilitar-
ian of his time, Brandt wrote nearly one
hundred articles and six books. While at
Swarthmore, Brandt developed interests in the
philosophy of science, mathematics, physics,
321
BRANDT
and epistemology. Eventually his attention ment of defective newborns. Although influ-
turned toward ethics, psychology, and anthro- enced to a great extent by the classic utilitarian
pology. Although his primary philosophical theorists Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill,
interests were in ethics and the theory of knowl- as well as John RAWLS, Brandt’s views stand in
edge, anthropology and psychology were also contrast to his predecessors in a number of
quite important to him. Wolfgang KÖHLER, a ways.
psychologist at Swarthmore during 1935 to Brandt introduced the distinction between
1958, was influential on Brandt’s endeavors in “act” and “rule” utilitarianism in his 1959
the latter field. Brandt defended the concept of book Ethical Theory, although he paid tribute
Jeremy Bentham’s theory that the good follows to Berkeley for being the first to distinguish
from the promotion of the greatest amount of between the two forms. Brandt maintained that
happiness for the greatest number of people there were other forms of utilitarianism, but
against the traditional criticisms and dealt with that these were the most important. He addi-
the debate over the relationship between tionally discussed the connections that cultures
hedonism and utilitarianism. Although most have with ethical standards, and provided a
utilitarians have taken up these tasks, Brandt’s clear account of the importance the study of
treatment is quite distinct. He was also one of anthropology has on an historical understand-
the first philosophers to ground an ethical ing of the development of ethical theories, par-
theory in anthropology, most clearly found in ticularly to critical ethics. Brandt also furnished
his Hopi Ethics (1954). In addition, he was an analysis of ethical standards in relation to
one of the first utilitarians to bring a clear con- certain schools of psychology, such as the
ception of psychology into utilitarianism, which Freudian and Gestalt theories. Some further
was common throughout his writings. Perhaps topics discussed in this work are the Hopi
his interest here was due to his rejection of the Indians, forms of ethical relativism, moral
traditional appeals to intuition to justify obligation, distributive justice, and human
morality. rights.
Primarily concerned with the welfare of According to Brandt, act-utilitarianism iden-
society, Brandt’s philosophy is distinguished tifies the right action as that which carries with
from other utilitarians by his type of “rule-util- it the best possible consequences based on the
itarianism” and his conception of practical agent’s evidence. He claimed that G. E. Moore,
rationality. He claimed to find the roots of rule- Henry Sidgwick, and Bertrand Russell were
utilitarianism in the philosophies of Epicurus, proponents of this view. Rule-utilitarianism,
Thomas Aquinas, and George Berkeley. however, does not see right action in relation to
According to Brandt, this theory is not suscep- a certain action, but to the prevalence of a
tible to the traditional criticisms that have been moral code. Brandt’s brand of utilitarianism
brought against utilitarianism and is the most adds the complexity of basing right and wrong
effective practical theory of ethics. His major action on the “optimal code” for a particular
works deal with the justification of what is society. What is moral is seen as following
good or morally correct, which include detailed certain moral laws, not to promote the most
analyses of moral psychology. Brandt also pro- happiness as in most traditional forms of util-
fessed a need to teach the conception, function, itarianism. Moral questions are answered based
and value of moral codes for the benefit of on the benefits that would result from the
society. Further, his view that utilitarianism acceptance of moral rules by the individuals in
can work toward economic equality has been a society. Brandt claimed that Mill held a
quite influential on economic theory. His con- similar view. The optimal code maximizes
tributions to social ethics include theories on benefit, or the welfare of society. A moral virtue
suicide, rules of war, welfare, and the treat- is one that is beneficial for society, not just an
322
BRANDT
individual or group. With an injection of an that inclined a person to want to repeat the
anthropological view, he maintained that all experience. He maintained that this concep-
societies have certain standards embedded in tion of pleasure entails the fact that not only
their cultures. Each member of a society shares physical sensations give pleasure. Another
in certain desires and aversions. According to important issue that Brandt dealt with is the
Brandt, these standards provide security for fact that there are various subgroups of society
individuals and also help guide them to live in that often have different moral codes. One
a cooperative manner, as such standards inform moral code that is optimal for one group may
the members of a society of their parts in orga- not be optimal for another. According to
nizational behavior. He additionally illustrated Brandt, such issues fall under the subject matter
the development of such ethical standards in an of professional ethics.
evolutionary manner. As they are recognized as Brandt expanded his John Locke Lectures
better to have for their rewards to society, given at Oxford University in the spring of
ethical standards are implemented and refined 1974 to become the 1979 A Theory of the
accordingly. Good and the Right. He paid tribute in it to
Brandt further discussed the morality of a John Rawls, for his influence and kindness,
society, or moral code of a community, and and to William FRANKENA, for his friendship
identified this code as the average person’s con- and criticism. Some readers see this work as a
science. He explained this in a general way, mere elaboration of Brandt’s earlier classic.
and then applied his view to the ethical system Although he claimed to be still a rule-utilitar-
of the Hopi Indians; a group referred to in a ian, Brandt provided a more advanced form
number of his writings. Brandt’s later work on than in his earlier Ethical Theory. In addition,
the Hopi Indians, Hopi Ethics, resulted from he noted that some of his views had changed
his research conducted in Arizona. This book since 1959 and that others had been more
was a milestone in the examination of philo- developed. The sophistication of his discussion
sophical matters through anthropological data. on ethical issues that tie in with psychology is
This project began when Brandt sought to test a clear example of the latter. Some of the topics
the theory of the absolutism of moral judg- of A Theory of the Good and the Right are
ments held by the psychologists at Swarthmore moral systems of society, welfare, justice, self-
with whom he worked. He concluded that interest, and a psychological analysis of desire
evidence shows some moral norms vary among and pleasure. The focus of the book revolves
cultures. around the questions over what is worthy of
His explication in Ethical Theory of the rela- wanting and what is morally right. His favor of
tionship that this social conscience has with utilitarianism remains at the forefront of his dis-
moral action is also noteworthy. According to cussion in this work and he calls for a moral
Brandt, certain shared aversions of a commu- code that maximizes happiness. Brandt main-
nity are learned dispositions as well that cause tained that all people with “rational” desires
guilt in one who acts counter to such aversions would benefit by adopting such a moral code
or disapproval in one who witnesses such an for society and then theorizes how this could be
act. This point illustrates his incorporation of accomplished. His conception of rationality is
psychological theory into his moral philoso- quite distinct, however. The rational desire,
phy, as conscience is a central part of his moti- according to his theory, is one that meets the
vational theory of pleasure. Rather than leave criteria of a detailed test of cognitive psy-
the meaning of the term pleasure vague, as is chotherapy. Once the desires that fail to meet
the common criticism of the hedonists, Brandt this test are removed and the individual is
provided his motivational theory of pleasure. aware of all the relevant facts, Brandt claimed
The pleasurable activity, he claimed, was one that people then are able to choose a common
323
BRANDT
code to live under. The code he endorses is nearly thirty years. Included are a number of his
applicable to moral and legal matters; it classic essays dealing with critical and norma-
includes a list of rules and certain procedures to tive ethical theory. Other essays explore several
deal with any conflicts that may arise among applications of utilitarianism to important
the rules. Critics, however, would argue that the social issues.
idea of expunging the so-called irrational Brandt’s final book, Facts, Values, and
desires from a majority of individuals living in Morality (1996), provides an excellent
a community is quite utopian. summary of his views. In this work he again
His essay “Utilitarianism and the Rules of dealt with the justification of value judgments
War” provides an insightful application of his and moral belief. Brandt sought to justify the
rule-utilitarianism to the rules of warfare. This good through an explanation of moral psy-
essay, originally published in Philosophy and chology, rather than by intuition or theories
Public Affairs in 1972, was reprinted in 1974 about the meanings of moral words. After
in War and Moral Responsibility. Brandt pointing out several weaknesses of different
claimed to be working from a “contractual” ethical systems, for example forms of natural-
form of rule-utilitarianism, a term for which he ism, Brandt applied his theory of utilitarianism.
pays tribute to Rawls. According to Brandt, A moral belief is justified for society in his
rules pertaining to warfare are morally justifi- system if one can show that the belief is a part
able as they contribute to the long-range utility of a social code of morals that, if rational and
of a society through their acceptance and free from error or confusion, he or she would
enforcement. He again maintained that all support if expectations were to remain in that
rational and impartial people would accept society. His presentation includes a detailed
such rules since they would maximize the future psychology and sociology of personal morality,
utility for nations at war. Morally justified rules developed through facts of anthropology and a
of war, according to Brandt, do not impair psychological analysis of desire. This latter
either side, as both would benefit from sharing analysis incorporates his motivational view of
such rules. This point exemplifies the maxi- morality. Morality, according to Brandt, is not
mization of utility through these rules, as it is merely a strict cognitive matter. Additionally, in
better to have moral rules in times of war than this work, Brandt applied his theory to the
to lack them. Brandt further discussed certain view of distributive justice and deals with the
types of rules in different areas of warfare, such relevant issues such as income and taxation.
as the treatment of civilians and prisoners of This discussion includes the beginnings of
war, mass bombing, and retaliation. His essay Brandt’s tax proposal. Other topics of discus-
“Moral Philosophy and the Analysis of sion are criminal law in the United States, the
Language” originated as a lecture given at the notion of charitable giving as a moral require-
University of Kansas and was published as such ment, and the rationality of morality.
in Freedom and Morality (1976). This work is Although his major works focus on his version
a collection of ten Lindley Lectures given by of rule-utilitarianism and the general conse-
prominent philosophers such as Brandt, quential benefits for society, Brandt also applied
Frankena, and Paul RICOEUR. In his essay, his theory to a number of important social issues
Brandt attacked the view that moral philosophy such as nuclear weapons, the plea of insanity as
must begin with an analysis of the language of a legal defense, and abortion. In addition, he
morals. He argues that this approach is too has published some other notable works.
simplistic, as it ignores important issues such as Brandt’s 1941 book The Philosophy of
context and implicit meaning. His 1992 work, Schleiermacher is an explication of the contri-
Morality, Utilitarianism, and Rights, is a col- butions made by F. D. E. Schleiermacher to the
lection of reprinted essays that span a range of fields of epistemology and theology.
324
BRANDT
Schleiermacher developed a theological view Frankena, Charles Stevenson, and Richard

that was based on subjective religious experience Brandt, consists of essays by W. V. O. QUINE,
and had a great deal of influence on the empir- John Rawls, and Roderick CHISHOLM, among
ical movement in theology during his time. This others. All three honored in these essays were
book is an edited version of Brandt’s doctoral professors of philosophy at the University of
dissertation, and is based on research he began Michigan. Rationality, Rules, and Utility
while at Cambridge University. Brandt addi- (1993) serves as another noteworthy collection
tionally co-edited two books, both of which of essays about Brandt, with his responses.
would serve as excellent texts in relevant courses
in philosophy. His Meaning and Knowledge: BIBLIOGRAPHY
Systematic Readings in Epistemology (1965), “On the Possibility of Reference to Inferred
co-edited with Ernest NAGEL, is a collection of Ethics,” Journal of Philosophy 35 (1938):
readings based on problematic issues in the 393–405.
theory of knowledge, such as meaning, univer- “The Emotive Theory of Ethics,”
sals, skepticism, empirical knowledge, and jus- Philosophical Review 59 (1950): 305–18.
tification. This text includes a wide range of Hopi Ethics: A Theoretical Analysis
figures from the history of philosophy and would (Chicago, 1954).
be an asset for any introductory course in epis- “Thinking and Experience,” Review of
temology. Brandt’s 1967 The Problems of Metaphysics 7 (1954): 632–43.
Philosophy: Introductory Readings, co-edited “Blameworthiness and Obligation,” in
with William P. ALSTON, is a collection of works Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. A. I.
from well-known philosophers ranging from Melden (Seattle, Wash., 1958), pp. 3–39.
Aristotle to J. S. Mill and John HICK. This book “Determinism and the Justifiability of Moral
would have served as quite useful to any intro- Blame,” in Determinism and Freedom, ed.
ductory course in philosophy in the latter part of Sidney Hook (New York, 1958), pp.
the twentieth century. Some of the issues covered 137–43.
in this text are religious belief, free will and deter- Ethical Theory: The Problems of Normative
minism, mind and body, and the foundations of and Critical Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,
knowledge. 1959).
Brandt’s 1961 Value and Obligation: “Toward a Credible Form of Utilitarianism,”
Systematic Readings in Ethics is a similar work in Morality and the Language of Conduct,
that would have been worthy of any introduced. H. N. Castaneda and G. Nakhnikian
tory ethics course during its time. In this book, (Detroit, Mich., 1963), pp. 107–43.
he covers some of the main issues in ethics in a “The Concept of Welfare,” in The Structure
systematic way and prefaces a wide range of of Economic Science: Essays on
readings from a number of noted philosophers Methodology, ed. S. R. Krupp (Englewood
such as Plato and C. D. Broad. Brandt’s 1962 Cliffs, N.J., 1966), pp. 257–76.
Social Justice includes a collection of essays by “Some Merits of One Form of Rule-
Frankena, Gregory V LASTOS , Kenneth utilitarianism,” University of Colorado
Boulding, Paul Freund, and Alan GEWIRTH. Studies in Philosophy, Series 3 (1967):
These essays, which began as lectures given at 39–65.
Swarthmore College, deal with the problem of “Rational Desires,” Proceedings and
justice in relation to society. Addresses of the American Philosophical
In 1978 a collection of essays on Brandt’s Association 43 (1970): 43–64.
philosophy by a number of very prominent “Utilitarianism and the Rules of War,” in
philosophers was published. The book, entitled War and Moral Responsibility, ed.
Values and Morals: Essays in Honor of William Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and
325
BRANDT
Thomas Scanlon (Princeton, N.J., 1974), Contains a bibliography of Brandt’s

pp. 25–45. publications.
“Moral Philosophy and the Analysis of Hooker, Brad. Rationality, Rules, and Utility:
Language,” in Freedom and Morality, ed. New Essays on the Moral Philosophy of
John Bricke (Lawrence, Kan., 1976), pp. Richard B. Brandt (Boulder, Col., 1993).
1–22. Lyons, David. The Forms and Limits of
A Theory of the Good and the Right Utilitarianism (Oxford, 1965).
(Oxford, 1979). Narveson, Jan. Morality and Utility
Thinking About Morality (Ann Arbor, Mich., (Baltimore, Md., 1967).
1980). Postow, B. C. “Criteria for Theories of
“The Concept of a Rational Action,” Social Practical Rationality: Reflections on
Theory and Practice 9 (1983): 143–64. Brandt’s Theory,” Philosophy and
“Problems of Contemporary Utilitarianism: Phenomenological Research 49 (1989):
Real And Alleged,” in Ethical Theory in 69–88.
the Last Quarter of the Twentieth Smart, J. J. C. An Outline of Utilitarian
Century, ed. Norman E. Bowie Ethics (Melbourne, 1961).
(Indianapolis, 1983), pp. 81–105. Velleman, David J. “Brandt’s Definition of
Morality, Utilitarianism, and Rights Good,” Philosophical Review 97 (1988):
(Cambridge, UK, 1992). 353–71.
Facts, Values, and Morality (Cambridge, UK,
1996). Jeffrey R. Post

The Philosophy of Schleiermacher: The
Development of His Theory of Scientific
and Religious Knowledge (New York,
1941). BRAYBROOKE, David (1924– )
Ed., Value and Obligation: Systematic
Readings in Ethics (New York, 1961). David Braybrooke was born 18 October 1924 in
Ed., Social Justice (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Hackettstown, New Jersey. He received his BA
1962). from Harvard in 1948, and his PhD in philosophy
Ed. with Ernest Nagel, Meaning and from Cornell University in 1953. He was an
Knowledge: Systematic Readings in instructor at Harvard and William Smith Colleges
Epistemology (New York, 1965). from 1948 to 1950, a teaching fellow at Cornell
Ed. with William P. Alston, The Problems of from 1950 to 1952, instructor in philosophy at the
Philosophy: Introductory Readings University of Michigan in 1953–4, and at
(Boston, 1967). Bowdoin College from 1954 to 1956. He then
went to Yale University as assistant professor of
Further Reading philosophy, teaching there from 1956 to 1963.
Bio 20thC Phils, Encyc Ethics, Oxford Leaving Yale, he was McCulloch Professor of
Comp Phil, Pres Addr of APA v7, Proc of Philosophy and Politics at Dalhousie University in
APA v71, Who Was Who in Amer v12, Nova Scotia from 1963 to 1988. He became a
Who’s Who in Phil naturalized Canadian citizen during that time. In
Goldman, Alvin I., and Jaegwon Kim, eds. 1990 he became professor of philosophy and gov-
Values and Morals: Essays in Honor of ernment at the University of Texas.
William Frankena, Charles Stevenson, and Braybrooke used the methods of analytic phi-
Richard Brandt (Dordrecht, 1978). losophy in their application to and illumination
326
BRAYBROOKE
of the social sciences. From his 1963 work with (New York, 1963).
the economist C. E. Lindblom in A Strategy of Philosophical Problems of the Social Sciences
Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process, (New York, 1965).
to his 1983 Ethics in the World of Business and Studies in Moral Philosophy: Essays (Oxford,
other works, he showed in some detail how phi- 1968).
losophy can be applied to ongoing social Three Tests for Democracy: Personal Rights,
problems, bringing to the fore the presence of Human Welfare, Collective Preference
ethical issues in philosophy and in the social (New York, 1968).
sciences. In Three Tests for Democracy (1968) Traffic Congestion Goes Through the Issue-
he demonstrated the continuing need to evaluate machine (London, 1974).
democracy in terms of personal rights, human Ethics in the World of Business (Totowa,
welfare, and collective preference. Ethical issues N.J., 1983).
cannot be ignored in the area of policy decision. Meeting Needs (Princeton, N.J., 1987).
Braybrooke has contended that both the social Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood
sciences and philosophy must evolve their prin- Cliffs, N.J., 1987).
ciples and procedures incrementally since both “Gauthier’s Foundations for Ethics Under the
are ongoing activities. Utilitarianism has been Test of Application,” in Contractarianism
practically effective as a philosophy and promises and Rational Choice: Essays on David
to continue to be, and capitalism is acceptable Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement, ed. Peter
and even preferable to alternative systems. But Vallentine (New York, 1991), pp. 56–70.
Braybrooke insists that both capitalism and util- “No Rules Without Virtues: No Virtues
itarianism must be continually applied and tested Without Rules,” Social Theory and
if they are to show their benefits. Braybrooke Practice 17 (1991): 139–57.
believes that ethics is as much social science as it Logic on the Track of Social Change, with
is philosophy in tracing and deciding all the Bryson Brown, Peter K. Schotch, and
details of human actions and behaviors. His Laura Byrne (Oxford, 1995).
1974 work on traffic congestion would seem Moral Objectives, Rules, and the Forms of
far removed from philosophy, and his 1965 Social Change (Toronto, 1998).
work on philosophical problems of the social Natural Law Modernized (Toronto, 2001).
sciences seems far removed from everyday Utilitarianism: Restorations, Repairs,
concerns of people. Braybrooke would say this Renovations (Toronto, 2004).
is a mistake. Philosophy only makes progress in
addressing real social problems, and real social Further Reading
problems are more than meets the eye – they Bio 20thC Phils
have imbedded in them deeper concerns with Bonevac, Daniel. “Ethical Impressionism: A
values, principles, and concepts that philosophy Response to Braybrooke,” Social Theory
has always been concerned about. With and Practice 17 (1991): 157–73.
improved methods in linguistic and conceptual Goldman, Alvin. “Reply to Braybrooke,”
analysis, philosophy can be of use in the Philosophical Studies 30 (1976): 273–6.
enhancement of all the social sciences. By using Phillips, Griffiths. “The Generalization
improved statistical and other quantifying Argument: A Reply to Mr. Braybrooke’s
methods, the social sciences can be beneficial to Collective and Distributive Generalization
philosophy and ethics. in Ethics,” Analysis 23 (1963): 113–15.
BIBLIOGRAPHY Guy W. Stroh

A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as
a Social Process, with C. E. Lindblom
327
BRECKINRIDGE
BRECKINRIDGE, Sophonisba Preston finally appointed to a professorship at the

(1866–1948) University of Chicago, the Samuel Deutsch
Professor of Public Welfare Administration in
Sophonisba Preston Breckinridge was born the School of Social Services Administration.
on 1 April 1866 in Lexington, Kentucky, to This appointment came nine years after she had
a prominent Kentucky family. Her father, helped to create the Graduate School of Social
William C. P. Breckinridge, was a lawyer and Service Administration in 1920, the result of a
US Congressman who supported women’s merger between the Chicago School of Civics
rights, including their access to higher edu- and Philanthropy and the University of Chicago.
cation. “Nisba,” as she was called, initially Breckinridge retired in 1942 and died on 30
attended Agricultural and Mechanical July 1948 in Chicago, Illinois.
College in Lexington before enrolling at Breckinridge may be best remembered for
Wellesley College in Massachusetts, where her contributions to social work. Her texts on
she studied Latin and mathematics, earning a the subject introduced innovative methods
BS degree in 1888. She taught mathematics at such as the case study method and she was
Washington High School in the District of instrumental in the development of social
Columbia from 1888 to 1890. She then work as an academic discipline and profes-
returned home to Lexington and read law in sion. From 1907, she was involved with the
her father’s law office. She passed the bar education and formal training of social
examination in 1892, and was the first workers. In 1927 Breckinridge co-founded
woman to be admitted to the Kentucky bar. with Edith Abbott a professional journal
Recognizing the limited opportunities for titled Social Service Review, and she also
female attorneys, Breckinridge began helped to establish what would become the
graduate studies at the University of Chicago American Association of Schools of Social
in 1895, earning a MA in political science in Work. She was an officer and committee
1897 and a PhD magna cum laude in 1901. member of the National Conference of Social
Her dissertation, which was published in Work and served as President of the Illinois
1903 under the title Legal Tender, was a Conference on Social Welfare.
comparison of monetary policy in the United As a scholar and reformer, Breckinridge
States and England. Breckinridge enrolled in was committed to the idea that social research
the University of Chicago law school in 1903 could be used to create social change. She
and was the first woman to earn a JD degree was interested in understanding the genesis of
from Chicago in 1904. She was also the first specific social problems so that something
woman to be admitted to the Order of the could be done about them. She did not, and
Coif, an honorary legal society recognizing probably could not, separate her research
outstanding scholarly achievement. from her social action. She was not concerned
After graduation from law school, with developing general principles and
Breckinridge was appointed as a part-time theories about how society worked; she
instructor in the department of household wanted to improve society. Breckinridge’s
administration at the University of Chicago, scholarly works can be loosely grouped into
where she also served as Assistant Dean of three categories: empirical studies that
Women. In 1907, she accepted an appoint- examined various social problems, social
ment at the Chicago School of Civics and work texts, and works that examined public
Philanthropy, becoming its research director policy. She focused her energies on vulnera-
in 1908 and its Dean in 1909, while contin- ble groups, particularly women, immigrants,
uing to hold her part-time faculty position at children, juvenile delinquents, and the poor.
the University of Chicago. In 1929 she was Her empirical studies are rich with numbers,
328
BRECKINRIDGE
details, and descriptions of the social condi- where she worked with Jane ADDAMS, and
tions and problems encountered by such belonged to the community of women com-
groups. These works helped to raise public mitted to progressive causes (Fitzpatrick
consciousness of the problems and provided 1990). On the local level, Breckinridge was
the empirical evidence that she and other active in the Progressive Party, and was a
reformers needed to press for legislative founding member of the Chicago chapters of
reforms. Much modern protective legislation both the National Association for the
for vulnerable groups such as women and Advancement of Colored People (1911) and
children can trace its roots to the research the Urban League (1915). She was also
and activism of Breckinridge and her con- involved with the Association of Colored
temporaries. Her works on public policy Women and the black Wendell Phillips
examined the effects of various policies on the Settlement. She served on a fact-finding com-
family and other groups such as immigrants. mission on race relations after the 1919
One of Breckinridge’s most important con- Chicago race riot and had previously tried
tributions was The Modern Household (unsuccessfully) to integrate women’s dormi-
(1912), written with Marion Talbot. This tories at the University of Chicago in 1907. In
little-known work gives a picture of how addition, she served on the board of directors
Breckinridge and other Progressive Era of the Juvenile Protective Association and on
women helped to transform the role of the executive committee of the Chicago
women from the private sphere of the family Consumer League; was a founder and officer
and home to one in which they had an of the Immigrants Protective League; was
increasingly strong voice in public affairs. In active in the Women’s Trade Union League
The Modern Household, Talbot and (WTUL); and served as a factory inspector in
Breckinridge reinterpreted the nineteenth- Chicago in 1906, and for a time as a non-
century cult of domesticity, which mandated salaried “Tenement Inspector” in the
that women’s proper place was in the home, Department of Health. She was also an early
by arguing that any woman had a right and President of the Women’s City Club of
an obligation to enter into affairs outside her Chicago.
home if these improved or influenced her As a feminist, Breckinridge served as Vice
family in some way. Because their families President of the National American Woman
consumed prepared food, wore ready-made Suffrage Association in 1911. She partici-
clothes, lived in neighborhoods, and traveled pated in three White House conferences on
the city streets, women had not only a right children. As an international activist, she
but a responsibility to be engaged in oversee- belonged to the Women’s Peace Party and
ing the inspection of food production, the Women’s International League of Peace
clothing manufacture, sanitation, and street and Freedom, was a delegate to the
maintenance among other things. In this way, International Congress of Women in 1915,
Talbot and Breckinridge challenged the very and was the first woman to represent the
doctrine that sought to confine women, by United States at an international conference,
using it as a basis from which to liberate them the Pan-American Conference in 1933.
from the household. The Modern Household Much of Breckinridge’s legacy is a result of
was a revolutionary work, which influenced her seemingly tireless activism, informed by
the redefinition of women’s role in society, yet her research. As a social activist, she helped
it has gone largely unnoticed until recently. to shape contemporary public opinion about
Like others of her era, Breckinridge was the social problems faced by vulnerable
involved in the settlement house movement. groups and what could or should be done to
She lived at Hull-House at various times, alleviate those problems. Some of her more
329
BRECKINRIDGE
notable reform accomplishments include stances, coupled with her family legacy,
obtaining congressional support for a shaped and molded Breckinridge into a
national study of women and children wage scholar and social reformer.
earners which resulted in the study
“Investigation of Woman and Child Wage BIBLIOGRAPHY
Earners” and helping to draft legislation to Legal Tender: A Study in English and
regulate women’s wages and hours of American Monetary History (New York,
employment (Abbott 1948). Breckinridge’s 1903).
legal training and background gave her a The Delinquent Child and the Home, with
strong foundation for reform activities, made Edith Abbott (New York, 1912).
her the natural author of numerous legislative The Modern Household, with Marion
bills, and laid the foundation for modern leg- Talbot (Boston, 1912).
islation on children’s and women’s rights. Truancy and Non-Attendance in the
Although she never married, she was com- Chicago Schools, with Edith Abbott
mitted to the improvement of family life and (New York, 1917).
demonstrated through her activism that if a New Homes for Old (New Brunswick, N.J.,
woman was to take care of a family, she must 1921).
be involved in public life. Breckinridge’s Family Welfare Work in a Metropolitan
actions exemplify what she and Talbot Community: Selected Case Records
argued in The Modern Household, that (Chicago, 1924).
because a woman’s family existed in the Public Welfare Administration in the
larger context of the city, state, country and United States (New York, 1927).
world, there was nothing that did not belong Marriage and the Civic Rights of Women
in the woman’s sphere. (Chicago, 1931).
Breckinridge was born at just the right time Women in the Twentieth Century: A Study
to have opportunities for education and self- of Their Political, Social and Economic
development that generations of women Activities (New York, 1933).
before her could barely imagine. As a woman The Family and the State: Select Documents
coming of age in the late nineteenth century, (New York, 1934).
she found herself caught between two worlds, Social Work and the Courts: Select Statutes
one that opened doors of opportunity for her and Judicial Decisions (Chicago, 1934).
and another that kept them shut. As a The Tenements of Chicago 1908–1935,
member of an upper-middle-class family, she with Edith Abbott (New York, 1936).
was able to take advantage of those new The Illinois Poor Law and Its
freedoms, especially the expanding opportu- Administration (Chicago, 1939).
nities for women in higher education after
the Civil War. As a white southerner growing Other Relevant Works
up in the post-Civil War south, she benefited Breckinridge’s papers are at the University
from the built-in privileges of belonging to the of Chicago.
dominant group. She was raised in a family “Two Decisions Relating to Organized
environment that tolerated, but did not fully Labor,” Journal of Political Economy 13
embrace, free blacks. As she matured, she (1905): 593–7.
developed an awareness of her own racial “Legislative Control of Women’s Work,”
prejudice which challenged her to grow. Journal of Political Economy 14 (1906):
Confronting her own prejudice, she became a 107–9.
strong advocate for the rights of blacks and “Employment of Women in Industries:
other oppressed groups. All of these circum- Twelfth Census Statistics,” with Edith
330
BRETT
Abbott, Journal of Political Economy 14 Professionalization in the Origins of the

(1906): 14–40. U.S. Welfare State: The Careers of
“Neglected Widowhood in the Juvenile Sophonisba Breckinridge and Edith
Court,” American Journal of Sociology Abbott, 1890–1935,” Journal of Policy
16 (1910): 53–87. History 2 (1990): 290–315.
“Women in Industry: The Chicago Stehno, Sandra M. “Public Responsibility
Stockyards,” with Edith Abbott, Journal for Dependent Black Children: The
of Political Economy 19 (1911): 632–54. Advocacy of Edith Abbott and
Ed., The Child in the City: A Series of Sophonisba Breckinridge,” Social Service
Papers Presented at the Conferences Held Review 62 (1988): 485–503.
During the Chicago Child Welfare
Exhibit (New York, 1912). Catherine L. Coghlan
“A Recent English Case on Women and the
Legal Profession,” Journal of Political
Economy 23 (1915): 64–70.
“The Home Responsibilities of Women
Workers and the ‘Equal Wage’,” Journal
of Political Economy 31 (1923): 521–43. BRETT, George Sidney (1879–1944)
Further Reading George Sidney Brett was born on 5 August

Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, 1879 in Britton Ferry, South Wales, and died
Comp Amer Thought, Dict Amer Bio, on 27 October 1944 in Toronto, Canada. Since
Dict Economics, Encyc Amer Bio, Nat his parents were English, Brett always consid-
Cycl Amer Bio v37, Who Was Who in ered himself an Englishman and not a
Amer v2 Welshman. As a star pupil at Kingswood in
Abbott, Edith. “Sophonisba Preston Bath, Brett fell under the influence of its head-
Breckinridge over the Years,” Social master who was passionately interested in
Service Review 22 (1948): 416–23. geology. He soon had Brett scouring the land
Costin, Lela B. Two Sisters for Social around Bath in search of geological specimens
Action: A Biography of Grace and Edith for the school’s geological museum. In later
Abbott (Urbana, Ill., 1983). years Brett traced his interest in the history of
Deegan, Mary Jo. “Sophonisba science to those heady outings.
Breckinridge (1886–1948),” in Women in In 1898 Brett won an open exhibition in
Sociology: A Biobibliographical classics to Christ Church College, Oxford. For
Sourcebook, ed. Mary Jo Deegan (New his first two years he read Classical
York, 1991), pp. 80–89. Moderations, and then moved into the School
Diner, Steven J. “Chicago Social Workers of Literae Humaniores, graduating from
and Blacks in the Progressive Era,” Social Oxford with first class honors in 1902. It was
Service Review 44 (1970): 393–410. during his final two years that he discovered
———, “Scholarship in the Quest for philosophy and was delighted to find that it
Social Welfare: A Fifty-Year History of fitted both his interests and his talents. He had
the Social Service Review,” Social Service been lucky in his tutors in both parts of his
Review 51 (1977): 1–66. studies. In classics he had John Alexander
Fitzpatrick, Ellen. Endless Crusade: Women Stewart, a superb classical scholar with an
Social Scientists and Progressive Reform interest in psychology; his lectures on Aristotle’s
(New York, 1990). psychology had a profound influence on Brett
Muncy, Robyn. “Gender and and eventually led him to write his greatest
331
BRETT
work. In philosophy his tutor was Herbert W. departments of classics within the University of
Blunt who took great pride in the fact that he Toronto. Since classics included the works of
did not have a philosophical position. Instead the Greek philosophers, Brett was free to teach
of spending his time defending a set of doc- the whole of ancient philosophy and not just its
trines, he took a passionate interest in any new ethics. It was a cumbersome system, but one
ideas that came his way and sought to deter- forced on the university by the religious affili-
mine whether or not there was any truth in ations of the federated colleges. Brett made a
them. Blunt advised his pupils to be in no hurry very favorable impression at Trinity and the fol-
to adopt a particular philosophy, because it lowing year was promoted to professor of
would inevitably have a terribly dampening ethics and ancient philosophy.
effect on their own thinking. Of all his pupils, Brett felt constrained by the restrictions on
Brett probably took this teaching most to heart. teaching philosophy at Trinity, and in 1909 he
After leaving Oxford in 1902, Brett lived for accepted a position as temporary assistant in
a year and a half in London, supporting himself philosophy and logic in the University
by temporary teaching and doing some editing Department. He gradually transferred all of
and translating for the Macmillan publishing his work to the University Department. By
house. Early in 1904 he took an appointment 1916 he was appointed professor of philosophy
as professor of philosophy at the Government (part-time) and in 1921 his position was made
College in Lahore, India (now in Pakistan), full-time. An additional reason for his move
where he proved to be a very popular teacher. was that the pay was much better in the uni-
His duties extended beyond teaching philoso- versity than it was at Trinity.
phy to teaching English and serving as librarian; During his early years in Toronto he com-
he also coached the school’s soccer team. pleted the first volume of his History of
During his four years at Lahore he learned to Psychology. Subtitled Ancient and Patristic, it
speak Hindustani and taught himself to read was the culmination of a project that had been
Sanskrit and Arabic. Unfortunately he also con- hatched while listening to Stewart’s lectures as
tracted malaria, and suffered from recurring an undergraduate. In the preface to the second
bouts of it throughout his life. In 1908, the volume, published in 1921, he stated his
year that he left for Canada, he published two original plan for the book: “As originally
books: Representative English Poems, an edited planned this history was to record, in their
work, with a long introduction, probably chronological order, the steps by which psy-
intended to be used as a textbook in Lahore; chology has reached its present stage of devel-
and The Philosophy of Gassendi, the first opment. At the same time indications would be
book-length study of this contemporary of given of the relation between psychology and
Descartes in English. those phases of human thought to which it was
Upon arrival in Toronto, Brett took up a allied. The complexity of the result is due to the
position as librarian and lecturer in classics in subject-matter.” (1921, p. 5) Psychology, it
Trinity College, affiliated with the Anglican turns out, is intimately connected with just
Church, which had just become federated with about every sphere of human thought.
the University of Toronto. The Act of Brett’s command of languages allowed him
Federation divided the subject of philosophy in to examine critically the relevant literature of
this way: the federated colleges were restricted both the west and the east and to discuss the
to teaching ethics; the rest of the subject was the complicated role that psychology played in
responsibility of the University Department of these works. His erudition is extremely impres-
Philosophy. Classics, on the other hand, was sive. It is important to note that he did not
taught by the federated colleges and by think there was a single definition of “psy-
University College; thus, there were four chology.” In the ancient and patristic period it
332
BRETT
referred to the study of the soul; in the middle ities were growing apart, and his Oxford expe-
ages, to the study of the mind; in the nineteenth rience served to confirm it. In pondering this
century, to the study of consciousness; and in unwelcome state of affairs, he came to the con-
the early twentieth century, to the study of clusion that there was something he could do
behavior. In every historical period it was about it. Brett proposed to humanize the
entwined with nearly every area of human sciences by use of the historical method.
thought. In carrying out his plan, he made a Properly written, a history of a science should
thorough examination of each historical period. provide a meeting place for scientists and
humanists. What is of crucial importance in
First comes an estimate of the condition of such a history is stating fully and clearly the
those sciences which at the time were clearly logical process by which science advances, thus
important in the eyes of the authors whose removing some of the mystery surrounding sci-
work is to be treated: next comes the descrip- entific discoveries. He found nearly all existing
tion of the works upon psychological topics histories of science deficient in this respect.
written during the period: to this is added an They concentrated their attention on the results
account of the general influence of psychol- of scientific work, and therefore resembled text-
ogy and of the applications of the theories books that record “the established truths
during the period in question. (1921, pp. without any reference to their genesis or to the
5–6) men who established them” (1921, p. 6). What
has been left out is the involved way in which
The historian, in Brett’s view, must not go truths emerge from the errors of the past.
beyond his data: “The business of the historian In a lecture entitled “The History of Science
is to record rather than interpret. He should as a Factor in Modern Education,” read to the
confine himself to giving such interpretations of assembled Fellows of the Royal Society of
these phenomena as were actually given by Canada in 1925, Brett made the point that
writers contemporary with the events, and so special training was required to write a history
presenting the views of both the believers and of science. A great scientist without such
skeptics.” (1912, p. x) The injunction against training would fail to write an acceptable
interpretation includes anticipating the future history of his science, because he would “value
development of the subject: “A history of psy- all the factors in terms of their ultimate truth,
chology must not anticipate; it must be a record while the complex conditions of success would
of beliefs about the soul and of the growth of escape him. But the humanistic element latent
the human mind in and through the develop- in a genuine history of science could only be
ment of those beliefs.” (1912, p. x) In the exposed by the writer who had a power to
second and third volumes, both published in comprehend the struggle as much as the
1921, he brought his account up to the end of outcome, the spirit as much as the achieve-
the nineteenth century, but, in doing so, he ment, the necessity for a suitable environment
largely ignored the quantitative turn which psy- as well as the need for a genius to whom the
chology took in the last quarter of that century. truth is revealed.” (p. 42) In his opinion, all
The philosophical attitudes of men like Gustav existing histories of science were deficient: “The
Fechner and Wilhelm Wundt were discussed, chief lack seems to be due to ignoring the actual
but he offered no treatment of either their logical processes by which the results were
experimental methods or their findings. reached. The results being out of date there is
Brett’s interest in the history of science can be nothing of interest except the method and
traced back to his prep-school studies, and process, which are usually omitted.” (p. 42) In
during his years at Kingswood he gradually his own historical studies he attempted to meet
became aware that the sciences and the human- this standard.
333
BRETT
Brett argued that including histories of groundless. The same fate, he predicted, was in
science in the curriculum would benefit store for experimental psychology. He then
students in both the humanities and science. proceeded to dredge up every fallacious
Humanities students, many of whom have no argument going the rounds, all of which Brett
scientific training, would be able to read well- demolished, and, contrary to his usual style, he
written histories because all the steps, including made no effort to spare Scott’s feelings. At the
the false ones, leading to a particular discovery very end of his critique Brett turned Scott’s
would be laid out. Students in science would analogy sharply against him: “The great
gain in a different way: mystics of all time have been psychologists in
their degree and would not today be found
As history tends to become “past sociology” among the doubters. Nor would the great
rather than “past politics,” scientists will mediaeval logicians have countenanced the
learn that they are not independent of social fallacy that because charlatans are often called
forces. It is not to be supposed that science psychologists, psychologists can be called char-
has always been the benefactor of society, latans.” (1924, p. 480)
rescuing it from political strife or religious Brett was hailed by his students as a great
mania; nor has it been free from supersti- teacher, but those who wrote accounts of his
tions, bigotry, and the kind of narrow-mind- teaching were unanimous in stating that they
edness which thinks to build without proper had no very clear idea of his own philosophi-
foundations. A candid history will deal out cal position. Thomas A. G OUDGE , in an
blame as well as praise, it will show how obituary, stated that Brett made it very clear in
often scientific work has suffered from the his teaching that he rejected monistic idealism,
failure to promote its own interests without epistemological dualism, and instrumentalism;
obscurantism or rivalry; it may also have to Goudge thought that his view was “a sort of
show how excessive vulgarization can dynamic pluralism,” but he did not specify it
produce contempt, and excessive organiza- further. Brett seemed to follow Blunt’s advice
tion produce sterility. (1925, pp. 45–6) throughout his life, for he often mentioned it to
his students and he certainly never spent any
This is an important part of what Brett meant time defending his own views. In a talk he gave
by humanizing science. to the philosophy club, Brett told the students
Brett appeared to have no interest in the that in order to criticize another’s position one
emerging field of experimental psychology, but had to have a basis for one’s judgment, and this
he was prepared to defend it against ignorant he thought could fairly be called one’s own
critics. In December 1924 he published, in the system. Since he spent much time in the class-
Canadian Journal of Religious Thought (a new room criticizing the views of other philoso-
periodical he had helped to found), an article phers, he was perhaps giving his students a
entitled, “Some Beliefs About Psychology,” in hint as to his own system. All they had to do
reply to an earlier piece, “Some Doubts about was to figure out for themselves the basis of his
Psychology,” published in the same place by criticisms of others and they would be on their
Ernest F. Scott, professor of biblical theology in way to ferreting out his position. But by leaving
Union Theological Seminary in New York City. an aura of mystery about himself, he was also
Brett’s examination of Scott’s putative encouraging them to think matters through for
argument was devastating. Scott took the line themselves.
that the modern vogue for psychology could be In 1927, the same year in which psychology
likened to that enjoyed by formal logic in the achieved departmental status at Toronto, Brett
late Middle Ages, which, he claimed, had was appointed head of the philosophy depart-
petered out when its excessive claims proved ment and he served in that position until his
334
BRIDGMAN
death. In 1932 he took on the additional job of BRIDGMAN, Percy Williams (1882–1961)
Dean of the School of Graduate Studies, and
again he held it until his death. In addition to Percy Williams Bridgman was born on 21 April
these administrative duties, he continued to 1882 in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He received
teach a full load of courses. It is little wonder a BA summa cum laude in 1904 from Harvard
then that he did not publish any books during University, and remained there for his MA in
the last fifteen years of his life. 1905 and PhD in physics in 1908. Bridgman
was a research fellow at Harvard from 1908 to
BIBLIOGRAPHY 1910, and then became an instructor of physics
A History of Psychology: Ancient and in 1910. He was promoted to full professor by
Patristic (London, 1912). 1919, and in 1926 he became Hollis Professor of
A History of Psychology: Mediaeval and Mathematics and Natural Philosophy. In 1950
Early Modern Period (London, 1921). he was named Higgins University Professor, and
A History of Psychology: Modern held that position until retiring in 1954.
Psychology (London, 1921). Bridgman died on 10 August 1961 in Randolph,
“Some Beliefs about Psychology,” Canadian New Hampshire.
Journal of Religious Thought 1 (1924): Bridgman was a Nobel Prize–winning physi-
473–80. cist for his path-breaking work in high- pressure
“The History of Science as a Factor in physics. He was also an original and important
Modern Education,” in Proceedings and philosopher of science. He was the proponent of
Transactions of the Royal Society of a position in the philosophy of science he called
Canada, ser. 3, vol. 19 (1925), pp. 39–46. operationalism (or operationism), stating that
the meaning of a concept consists of “the oper-
Other Relevant Works ations which [are] used by us or our neighbour
The Philosophy of Gassendi (London, 1908). in applying the concept to any concrete situa-
Representative English Poems (London, tion” (1952, p. 7). Bridgman’s views were well
1908). known and frequently cited by philosophers of
The Government of Man: An Introduction to science in the period from the late 1920s into the
Ethics and Politics (London, 1913). 1960s. Bridgman’s basic thesis in operationalism
Psychology: Ancient and Modern (New dates from The Logic of Modern Physics (1927).
York, 1928). The operational view has clear similarities with
Introduction to Psychology (Toronto, 1929). pragmatism, broadly construed, and with the
Brett’s History of Psychology, ed. R. S. Peters logical positivism or “verificationism” of the
(London, 1953). Vienna Circle. Nevertheless, Bridgman was
apparently completely uninfluenced by prag-
Further Reading matism and by the nascent movement of logical
Bio Dict Psych by Zusne, Bio 20thC Phils, positivism. Treating operationalism as a theory
Canad Encyc, Encyc Psych, Proc of APA of meaning, or as a demarcation criterion (as
in Phil Rev v55, Who’s Who in Phil Karl Popper sought) between science and non-
Irving, John A. “The Achievement of George science, it seems to fit midway between prag-
Sidney Brett (1879–1944),” University of matism and logical positivism. Pragmatism
Toronto Quarterly 14 (1945): 329–65. might be defined as declaring the meaning of a
Slater, John G. Minerva’s Aviary: Philosophy concept to consist in all the ways it could guide
at Toronto, 1843–1943 (Toronto, 2005), action (as part of a proposition that is believed),
chap. 7. including further investigative efforts.
Meaninglessness then arises if a concept or its
John G. Slater containing proposition results in no character-
335
BRIDGMAN
istic actions. Positivism defines meaning to precise influence of Bridgman and the specific
consist of the distinctive possible sense experi- flavor of operationalism in these broad
ences that arise from a concept or the truth of American philosophical movements of prag-
its containing proposition. Meaninglessness matism, positivism (and in the wider European
arises if a concept makes no difference in actual scientific-philosophical diaspora that included
or possible sense experience. Since sense expe- Albert EINSTEIN), and naturalism is, however,
riences of all sorts are action-guiding, we might difficult to discern.
suppose, then, that (logical) positivism is a Bridgman’s life and his professional work in
species of pragmatism, but that there may be his main field of physics should be briefly
some forms of action-guiding concepts or recounted, in order to see some of the sources
propositions that need not generate sense expe- for his philosophical views. In his lifetime,
riences. Examples include, according to Bridgman was mainly known for his work in
William JAMES, faith or belief in certain values, high-pressure physics, and it is for this work
free will, religion, or other first principles. that he won his Nobel Prize in 1946. By 1908
“Operations,” by which Bridgman primarily he had already become interested in producing
means measurements of physical features, are and measuring high pressures (of hundreds and
actions, but not all actions are measurements. thousands of atmospheres), and later in his
So operationalism is in this respect a narrower career he became interested in various unusual
theory of meaning than pragmatism: fewer behaviors of substances under high pressures
concepts and propositions will be operationally and temperatures. This made him valuable in
meaningful. wartime service in World War I and then in
Despite Bridgman’s extensive and much-read experimenting with the impact of projectiles
publications, and some common ground he and in the Manhattan Project in World War II,
found with logical positivists such as Moritz and later still in the development of techniques
Schlick and Rudolf CARNAP especially through to produce synthetic diamonds. Bridgman’s
the mediation of Herbert FEIGL) and even with doctoral dissertation, “Mercury Resistance as
pragmatists John DEWEY and Charles PEIRCE (as a Pressure Gauge,” included on its committee
explained to him by Arthur BENTLEY), posi- Benjamin Osgood Peirce, who was Charles
tivism and pragmatism seem to have played no Peirce’s third cousin, and upon B. O. Peirce’s
role in the development and modification of death in 1914 Bridgman inherited his courses
Bridgman’s views. These earlier similar philoso- in electrodynamics. In the great divide within
phies at best made professional opinion sympa- physics between experimentalists and theoreti-
thetic to Bridgman’s views. The main complaint cians, it is quite clear that Bridgman worked
seems to have always been that his all-important primarily as an experimentalist. (In fact, much
notion of “operation” was crucially vague in of what Bridgman did would now be consid-
ways that the positivistic notion of sense experi- ered either engineering or physical chemistry.)
ence and the pragmatic notion of action were Especially early in his career, he was a hands-
not. Noted philosopher of science Mario BUNGE on experimenter, and an expert in instrumen-
has pronounced the legacy of operationalism to tation, inventing or helping to invent measur-
be “ambivalent.” Nonetheless, historian of ing devices, seals (especially the self-tightening
science Gerald Holton has argued that seal), and utilizing exotic alloys such as carbide
Bridgman was a crucial figure in the 1940s and steel with cobalt for pistons and containers.
1950s, linking positivism and the Vienna Circle This was sometimes dangerous work, and there
with a group of influential thinkers in the was a death and injuries in his laboratory from
Harvard–Cambridge area that included Philipp explosions and projectiles. However, Bridgman
FRANK, W. V. QUINE, Norbert WIENER, Richard also performed extensive experiments on sub-
VON MISES, Roman Jacobson, and others. The stances under high pressure concerning
336
BRIDGMAN
liquid–solid transitions and electrical activity. Hans REICHENBACH, Ernest NAGEL, and others
These experiments and his teaching obligations in the twentieth century. Some sort of holistic
(or opportunities) pushed him into theoretical principle of verification of an entire theory
physics, and he became an expert in some similar to what Einstein endorses was widely
features of relativity, electrical conductivity, accepted in the twentieth century. Bridgman
quantum mechanics, and, in his last years, in seems to have stubbornly stuck to a require-
what became solid-state physics. He was thus ment that each term and phenomenon be indi-
not just an experimentalist – although that is vidually testable or relevant for measurements
mainly where his fame within physics lay – and and operations (as did Mach, rejecting the exis-
was a general expert in physics in a way that tence of atoms).
became nearly impossible after World War II. The other source of operationalism in
Operationalism had its origins in two closely Bridgman’s thought, and perhaps ultimately
related sources. One was Bridgman’s interpre- the more important one, is his understanding of
tation of what he saw as the dominant princi- the importance of “dimensional analysis” in
ple in Einstein’s discovery of the Special Theory physics. Dimensional analysis looks not at the
of Relativity as well as the General Theory. numbers involved in equations of physics, but
This was that all scientific terms, to be scien- at the units in which they are measured. Thus
tifically meaningful, must have “operational” from the well-known equation F = ma, and a
criteria for measuring them. Bridgman was study of the units used to measure quantities,
especially concerned to banish from physics we can determine that force itself is to be
Newton’s ghost of absolute space; like the analyzed as: mass-units times distance-units,
logical positivists, Bridgman read and was all divided by the square of time-units (since
clearly influenced by the empiricism of Ernst a = s/t2). By a similar principle one can vindicate
Mach and his rejection of absolute space. that E = mc2 is, at least in terms of units
However, Einstein himself, who had also been measured, correct. Dimensional analysis,
influenced by Mach, argued that it was not although it appears to be a purely a priori mode
necessary that each proposition (about forces, of guessing the basic forms of equations, is
phenomena, etc.) be testable, but only that the counted by Bridgman as operational manipu-
whole theory “implies empirically testable lation of measurable quantities, and therefore
assertions” (as quoted in Walter 1990, p. 117). operationally acceptable. He seems to have
Einstein’s holistic position on theory confir- resisted any effort to describe mathematics as
mation would have been attractive to anyone unique in either its subject matter or its tech-
familiar with the work of nineteenth-century niques. He equated (metaphysical) necessity
writers Pierre Duhem and Henri Poincaré, who with (epistemic) certainty, a confusion that is
argued that observable consequences only arise common enough, but then rejected any possi-
with the interaction between a main theory bility of certainty, and thus necessity. The
(about fundamental phenomena) and an aux- logical positivists, although less so pragmatists
iliary theory, usually about testing and mea- (and notoriously John Stuart Mill), were careful
suring equipment, such as the auxiliary theory to carve off the a priori realm of logic and
of optics that renders observations from tele- mathematics for special consideration. Peirce,
scopes and microscopes relevant to astronomy for example, sometimes suggested that mathe-
and microbiology. This view resulted further in matics was an observational science in light of
an important discussion about conventionalism its construction, manipulation, and observa-
in the geometric structure of space (for tion of diagrams including symbols. This view
example, it depends on how one defines a is similar to, although better motivated than,
straight line, say as the path of a light beam, in Bridgman’s view that both experimentation
the auxiliary theory) that is associated with and mathematics somehow equally involve
337
BRIDGMAN
operations. His views about mathematics and intensely concerned with the role which scien-
operations led him to attack set theory, since tists and science should play in society. He was
the operations of a converging series could one of the very few thinkers of his time who
never be completed, or infinite sets analyzed. developed a coherent and systematic account of
This brought him into conflict with most of the the relationship between individual and society.
mathematical and logical establishment, but He formulated an attempt to remake the social
for different and probably less sophisticated sciences on the basis of operationalist thinking.
reasons than the mathematical Intuitionists. Most of these views were first stated in The
Various problems beset Bridgman’s views Intelligent Individual and Society (1938) and
and the accumulation of such problems pre- reemerged at the end of The Way Things Are
vented any widespread appreciation for his phi- (1959). His writings on social phenomena have
losophy of science. No major figure in the in common with his philosophical opinions a
natural sciences or philosophy accepted most of lack of reference to all previous work and the
Bridgman’s ideas. In the social sciences, his opinions of major figures. One of the peculiar
influence has been extensive, although he often implications of his own interpretation of oper-
rejected the way his views were applied to social ationalism was that other individuals’ con-
phenomena. For example, Bridgman’s views sciousness could not be operationally tested; it
resulted in Edward C. TOLMAN’s interesting was meaningless to talk of others’ conscious-
efforts to give operational meaning to the ness. This feature was placed at the center of his
meaning of “demand” in economics. However, new understanding of the social sciences.
within economics, the Austrian “individualist” Operational meaning and the primary impor-
school that included Ludwig von Mises and tance of the individual were to be fundamental
led to Milton FRIEDMAN’s positivist manifesto principles of the new social sciences. (This
seems to have arisen independently. One brought him into a debate with B. F. SKINNER,
general problem with Bridgman’s proposal was who argued that individual consciousness was
the consensus that he was stretching the actually a social product.) Bridgman believed
meaning of operation as primarily measure- that the recent history of science had shown the
ment when he allowed thought experiments importance of sweeping away all previous
and mathematical or logical operations. “absolute” or mythical conceptions. Naturally,
Another implication Bridgman drew from the the individual was sovereign over the state, and
importance of measurement was the ultimate the state was to be conceived as merely a col-
subjectivity of operations (measured size is lection of individuals.
relative to an observer, as is simultaneity This fundamental belief brought with it a
according to the Special Theory of Relativity, hostility to views that held the state to be an
for example). He went further to propose that entity itself, or more important than the indi-
there are not really physical things. There are viduals of which it was composed. Bridgman
measurable aspects of them. This view antici- announced his opposition to these “totalitari-
pates Quine’s suggestion in the introduction anisms” (fascist and communist) and went so
to Word and Object that physical objects are at far as to refuse to work in any way with physi-
best “posits” and even accords with Quine’s cists who maintained such views. His more
eventually abandoned behaviorist theory of specific views about the role of the state have
meaning. Finally, Bridgman declared that been called “libertarian,” in the sense that he
propositions about the future had no meaning maintained only a minimal state was permissi-
since operations to confirm them could in many ble. There is some truth in this. However, his
cases not be performed now. central philosophical reality, of the operational
Bridgman was one of several important meaning of only one’s own consciousness, is
physicists in the mid-twentieth century to be actually solipsistic and would even seem to
338
BRIDGMAN
make writing articles and books a bit pointless. that have excited universal admiration from
He argues against the notion of duty (since it the time of the Greeks” strike him as an
required a notion of others’ consciousness) so “utterly depressing exhibition of human frailty”
strongly that one wonders whether moral oblig- and in reading them he simply cannot get his
ations of any sort were possible. But his liber- mind around them.
tarianism is idiosyncratic in other ways too. Bridgman’s operationalism is one of the more
For example, in The Way Things Are he argues systematic and original efforts, stretching from
against the graduated income tax, but his oppo- Mill’s System of Logic, through Mach, logical
sition is not to imposing taxes one did not positivism, Peirce’s and possibly Dewey’s form
choose to pay (if it was still in fact in your of pragmatism, and especially to the dominant
interest as determined by others) but to the fact naturalism of the late twentieth century, to
that for wealthy individuals it violated a quid discover “the” scientific method, and then utilize
pro quo principle. They did not get back its methods or conclusions (such as physicalism)
anything like the taxes they paid. in philosophy itself. With relatively few excep-
He seems to have had grand hopes that if tions, few of these writers were themselves
only scientifically minded persons would empirically minded to the extent that they
address social problems with all the objectivity studied the longer history of science to find what
and myth-busting energy they could muster, methods had been employed and were success-
social problems could simply be solved. ful. For most of them, until Thomas KUHN and
Working with famous sociologist Talcott the historicist philosophy of science, there was an
PARSONS, he proposed a standing interdiscipli- optimistic view that there was a single scientific
nary seminar at Harvard that would systemat- method and that it could be discovered a priori,
ically provide (where possible) operational def- or at most by understanding only developments
initions for all terms in the social sciences. One in modern physics. So too Bridgman. Despite
unenthusiastic participant was graduate student having a fine, inquiring mind and a beautifully
Henry Kissinger, later a foreign policy advisor clear writing and thinking style, Bridgman seems
to President Richard Nixon. to hold on to the view that somehow all of what
One of the truly curious aspects of philosophy does can be done better and simply
Bridgman’s views is that despite their sophisti- by turning to how we do science.
cation and clarity, and his important place in
American philosophy and intellectual life, he BIBLIOGRAPHY
himself seems not to have engaged with or even Dimensional Analysis (New Haven, Conn.,
grasped philosophical literature that was close 1922).
to his concerns. For example, without stating it The Logic of Modern Physics (New York,
clearly, he dismisses the Problem of Induction 1927).
as a mere issue in the definition of “logic.” For The Nature of Physical Theory (New York,
this reason, and because of what seem to be 1936).
many improbable and even unacceptable impli- The Intelligent Individual and Society (New
cations of his theories, philosophers have not York, 1938).
fully engaged with Bridgman’s philosophical “The Operational Aspect of Meaning,”
theories. His views in politics have disappeared Synthese 8 (1951): 251–9.
without a trace, although he has had a contin- The Nature of Some of Our Physical
uing influence on the perpetually vexing issue Concepts (New York, 1952).
of methodology in the social sciences. “Some Philosophical Aspects of Science,”
Bridgman’s impatience with philosophy Synthese 10 (1958): 318–26.
erupted in The Way Things Are, where he The Way Things Are (Cambridge, Mass.,
declares that the “great philosophical writings 1959).
339
BRIDGMAN
“The Logic of Modern Physics After Thirty BRIGGS, Charles Augustus (1841–1913)
Years,” Daedalus 88 (1959): 518–26.
Charles Augustus Briggs was born on 15
Other Relevant Works January 1841 in New York City. He briefly
Bridgman’s papers are at Harvard University. studied at the University of Virginia in the late
Reflections of a Physicist (New York, 1950). 1850s, and then Union Theological Seminary in
New York City from 1861 to 1863. He was
Further Reading licensed to preach by the First (Old School)
Amer Nat Bio, Bio 20thC Phils, Cambridge Presbytery of New York in 1866 and departed
Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer Bio, Encyc for Berlin to study the new critical-historical
Psych, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v48, Oxford methods. Briggs returned in 1869 to serve as
Comp Phil, Routledge Encycl Phil, Who pastor of a Presbyterian church in Roselle, New
Was Who in Amer v4, Who’s Who in Phil Jersey. In 1874 he began teaching languages
Benjamin, A. Cornelius. Operationism and theology at Union, and in 1876 he was
(Springfield, Ill., 1955). appointed Davenport Professor of Hebrew and
Bunge, Mario. “The Ambivalent Legacy of Cognate Languages.
Operationalism,” Philosophia Naturalis 25 In 1890 Briggs was appointed to the newly
(1988): 337–45. founded Edward Robinson Chair of Biblical
Hardcastle, Gary L. “S. S. Stevens and the Theology at Union. His inaugural address,
Origins of Operationism,” Philosophy of “The Authority of Holy Scripture,” was a
Science 62 (1995): 404–24. vigorous attack on the belief in biblical
Holton, Gerald. “A Personal View of Percy inerrancy represented by the Princeton theology
W. Bridgman, Physicist and Philosopher,” associated with Charles HODGE and Benjamin
Methodology and Science 26 (1993): 1–5. WARFIELD, then dominant in the Presbyterian
Koch, Sigmund. “Psychology’s Bridgman vs. Church. At the same time, Briggs made clear
Bridgman’s Bridgman,” Theory and that he was in all other matters a theologically
Psychology 2 (1992): 261–90. conservative evangelical Christian, affirming
Moyer, Albert E. “P. W. Bridgman’s the conceptual (but not verbal) inspiration of
Operational Perspective on Physics,” Scripture, its sufficiency in matters of faith and
Studies in History and Philosophy of morals, the miracles as special acts of God, the
Science 22 (1991): 237–58, 373–97. virgin birth of Jesus, and the Chalcedonian
Schlesinger, George. “P.W. Bridgman’s incarnationist Christology.
Operational Analysis: The Differential Briggs maintained that belief in verbal inspi-
Aspect,” British Journal for the Philosophy ration and inerrancy represented recent reac-
of Science 9 (1959): 299–306. tionary innovations in theology rather than the
Walter, Maila L. Science and Cultural Crisis: normative church tradition. Verbal inspiration
An Intellectual Biography of Percy and inerrancy are neither taught in the Bible
Williams Bridgman (1882–1961) itself nor found in the creeds. The plain results
(Stanford, Cal., 1990). of modern study show a host of errors and
contradictions in the Bible in historical details
Randall R. Dipert and other matters not essential to faith, and the
interpretation of prophecy as minutely pre-
dicting events in the future leads to results that
are easily disproved. In addition, Briggs claimed
that the dominant theology erroneously insisted
on views of the authorship of biblical books
that are contrary to the results of modern study.
340
BRIGGS
Moses is not the author of the Pentateuch, and Times (New York, 1889).
Isaiah is the author of less than half of the The Authority of Scripture (New York,
Book of Isaiah. Verbal inspiration and 1891).
inerrancy, Briggs concluded, are dangerous The Bible, the Church, and the Reason (New
innovations that create a stumbling-block to York, 1892).
faith. The Ethical Teaching of Jesus (New York,
Union Seminary was affiliated with the 1904).
Presbyterian Church, and in 1870 on the Church Unity: Studies of Its Most Important
reunion of that church’s Old School and New Problems (New York, 1909).
School factions, Union’s board made a gesture Theological Symbolics (New York, 1914).
of reconciliation by granting to the church the
right of approval of faculty appointments. In Other Relevant Works
response to Briggs’s address, the General Briggs’s papers are at Union Theological
Assembly of the Presbyterian Church voted in Seminary.
1891 to reject the Briggs appointment. Union American Presbyterianism, Its Origin and
supported Briggs and maintained that the Early History (New York, 1885).
church had no right to question what was A General Introduction to the Study of Holy
actually only a transfer from one faculty Scripture (New York, 1899).
position to another. Briggs was tried by the A History of the Study of Theology, 2 vols
Presbytery of New York for teaching contrary (New York, 1916).
to the Westminster Confession. He was acquit-
ted, but the prosecution appealed the verdict Further Reading
and the Presbyterian General Assembly sus- Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
pended Briggs from the ministry in 1893. Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer Bio,
Briggs was ordained in 1900 by the Dict Amer Religious Bio, Nat Cycl Amer
Episcopal Bishop of New York, thus becoming Bio v7, Who Was Who in Amer v1
the first non-Presbyterian faculty member in “Chas. Augustus Briggs,” American Journal
the history of Union Seminary. Subsequently of Theology 17 (1913): 497–508.
Union became an independent, interdenomi- Christensen, Richard L. The Ecumenical
national school. Until his death on 8 June 1913 Orthodoxy of Charles Augustus Briggs
in New York City, Briggs continued to teach at (1841–1913) (Lewiston, N.Y., 1995).
Union, expressing a strong interest in the reunit- Essays in Modern Theology and Related
ing of the churches, including the Roman Subjects (New York, 1911). Essays in
Catholic Church. When Catholic modernists honor of Briggs.
were condemned by a papal commission, Hatch, Carl E. The Charles A. Briggs Heresy
Briggs supported their use of historical criti- Trial: Prologue to Twentieth-Century
cism, but not their liberal theological views. Liberal Protestantism (New York, 1969).
Briggs was associate editor of the standard Massa, Stephen M. Charles Augustus Briggs
Hebrew lexicon, co-editor of the monumental and the Crisis of Historical Criticism
International Critical Commentary, and a (Minneapolis, 1990).
founding member of the Society for Biblical Toy, C. H., ed. Essays in Modern Theology
Literature. and Related Subjects (New York, 1911).
Contains a bibliography of Briggs’s
BIBLIOGRAPHY publications.
Biblical Study (New York, 1883).
Messianic Prophecy (New York, 1886). Marvin C. Shaw
Whither? A Theological Inquiry for the
341
BRIGHTMAN
BRIGHTMAN, Edgar Sheffield (1884–1953) and psychology. He was able to complete the
requirements for his doctorate during that year,
Edgar Sheffield Brightman was born on 20 and he received his PhD in philosophy from
September 1884 in Holbrook, Massachusetts, Boston University in 1912. Brightman contin-
the only child of George Edgar Brightman, a ued to teach at Nebraska Wesleyan until 1915,
Methodist minister, and Mary Sheffield when he became associate professor of ethics
Brightman. The itinerancy of the Methodist and religion at Wesleyan University in
ministry led Brightman to live in various places Middletown, Connecticut, where he remained
in New England during his childhood, includ- until 1919. While at Wesleyan, Brightman
ing Nantucket and Martha’s Vineyard. In 1899 wrote his first book, The Sources of the
Brightman’s family moved to Whitman, Hexateuch (1918).
Massachusetts, where he graduated from high In 1919 Brightman was invited to return to
school in 1901. He worked for a year in a Boston University as professor of philosophy in
grocery and meat market in Provincetown the Graduate School. In 1925 he became the
before entering Brown University in 1902, first Borden Parker Bowne Professor of
where he studied classics and philosophy. He Philosophy at Boston University, a position he
was the chaplain and member of the Kappa held until his death in 1953. He spent a sab-
Sigma Fraternity, and in his junior year he was batical year in 1930–31 in Oxford, Austria,
elected to Phi Beta Kappa. During his senior and Berlin. Brightman served as President of the
year, Brightman experienced an accident that Eastern Division of the American Philosophical
caused him serious burns and made him unable Association in 1936–7, of the American
to complete the winter term. His father died in Theological Society, and of the National
March of that same year. Brightman took extra Association of Biblical Instructors. In the late
courses in order to be able to graduate from 1940s, Brightman’s health began to fail to the
Brown with his BA in 1906. point that he began to withdraw from respon-
Following his graduation, Brightman taught sibilities beyond teaching and scholarly writing.
for two years as an assistant in philosophy and Brightman died on 25 February 1953 in
Greek at Brown and Pembroke, the women’s Newton, Massachusetts.
college, while working on his MA degree in phi- Brightman was the most powerful exponent
losophy at Brown, which he received in 1908. of Boston personalism of his generation, and he
He also preached every Sunday at a church in shared many of the same philosophical
Wickford, Rhode Island, during this time. In concerns as his teacher, Bowne. One of their
the fall of 1908, Brightman entered Boston central philosophical concerns was to provide
University School of Theology with concurrent a theistic and personalistic alternative to the
enrollment in the Graduate School. It was here mechanistic materialism of philosophic natu-
that Brightman came under the intellectual ralism and its attempts to equate nature with all
influence of Borden Parker BOWNE, the founder reality. Brightman understood philosophical
of Boston personalism. Brightman was able to naturalism as affirming that only the being of
complete his STB degree in 1910, and he the physical world that is able to be investigated
received the Jacob Sleeper Fellowship, which by the natural sciences is real, while denying
enabled him to study for two semesters at the any ontological status to nonphysical aspects of
University of Berlin and one semester at the reality such as personality and ideas. In the
University of Marburg in the areas of philoso- language of Bowne, naturalism mistakes phe-
phy, church history, and Bible. nomenal reality for ontological reality.
In 1912 Brightman took a teaching position Brightman attempts to avoid the fallacy of
at Nebraska Wesleyan University where he equating “Reality,” or “all that is,” with the
taught a heavy schedule in religion, philosophy, world of sense objects. “Nature is not all that
342
BRIGHTMAN
there is because experience contains more than spective on the universe, the bodies of human
sensory experience” (1958, p. 247). beings are physically in the natural world, but
Brightman was also wary of equating nature human persons as minds are not a part of
with absolutely everything because this, in nature.
effect, reduces God to nature. Consequently, to Brightman distinguishes “methodological
avoid confusion, not to mention the philo- naturalism” from “metaphysical naturalism” in
sophical and theological problems of panthe- that “the latter takes the incomplete descrip-
ism, Brightman opts for defining nature as the tions and heuristic methods of the former to be
“realm of phenomena” (1958, p. 247) or “the either final truth about reality or at least the
world of sense objects” (1945, p. 38). It is “the limits of present human knowledge” (1960, p.
illuminating absent indicated by the shining 320). He objects to metaphysical naturalism’s
present” of personal experience, and it “is the concept of nature that tends to include “con-
experience of an ordering, creative Mind other scious” persons in a “strictly spatio-temporal
than any human mind” (1958, p. 248). Nature, system” (1960, p. 321). If naturalists insist on
in Brightman’s view, is the expression and speaking of persons as part of nature,
activity of a unifying force, the Cosmic Brightman believes the word “nature” must
Consciousness, the Cosmic Person – God. It is then signify the “metaphysical X,” i.e., the
not mindless stuff, but rather the activity of a metaphysically real that includes but also tran-
purposive and responsive Mind. The activity of scends spatiotemporal systems. Brightman
nature is within God as a part of God’s expe- maintains that the presence of persons, experi-
rience. Brightman reasons that “any part of ents, telic processes, and value in our universe
God’s experience (such as Nature) must be cannot be understood solely in terms of spa-
incomplete” (1958, p. 248). Consequently, it tiotemporal relations and materialistic causa-
makes no sense to equate nature with tion. Persons cannot be reduced to the rela-
absolutely everything. “Nature is one area of tions of physical objects.
interaction, cooperation, and communication Like Bowne, Brightman maintains that both
with God.” (1958, p. 251) the Cosmic Person (God) and finite human
Defining nature as the world of sense objects persons are of an order different from the
excludes all nonphysical aspects of reality from natural order. Brightman affirms that nature is
nature. Brightman admits that our bodies are immanent in God. Nature is not external to
physical and a part of nature, but maintains God, but God is the source of the natural order,
that our consciousness, our ideas, values, and not a part of it. Nature is the activity and
beliefs are not part of nature. Brightman argues expression of God, not God itself. God is also
that although the distinction between person- understood as the source of all finite persons,
ality and nature does imply a duality in our yet persons are also of a supernatural order
experience, this “definition does not set up two insofar as mind, or consciousness, is under-
irreconcilable and unrelatable orders of being” stood to be externally related to the body and
(1945, p. 45). Nature and personality represent the rest of the natural world.
two realms within one ultimate reality that has Brightman’s reluctance to affirm a naturalism
its unity in God, and thus there is a possibility that includes God, persons, and the nonhuman
of knowledge of the physical world through the world within one all-inclusive nature is due to
reliance on “empirical coherence” as we his metaphysical conviction of the ontological
observe and reason about our sense experi- primacy of persons. For Brightman, persons
ences. According to Brightman, “All other are not just one ontological reality among
experiences – of memory, emotion, obligation, others, rather they are the sole ontological
value, choice, and worship – are supernatural.” reality. Nature is not the ground of personality,
(1958, p. 249) In Brightman’s personalistic per- rather personality is the ground for nature.
343
BRIGHTMAN
Nature is the expression of consciousness and majority of nonhuman experiences do not

not vice versa. Persons are in interaction with approach the level of complexity and rational-
the natural world, but for Brightman the rela- ity that Brightman ascribes to personal experi-
tions between persons and nature are external, ence. Although Brightman’s sentiments lead
as are the relations between mind and body, him to affirm the value of nonhuman life, his
consciousness and unconsciousness. Nature, metaphysical system makes it difficult for him
body, and unconsciousness are all external to to express his sentiments in a consistent
the person. manner. In Brightman’s view of nature and
Brightman agrees with Bowne that “the reality, it is difficult to grant nonhuman beings
universe is a society of persons” and that “all full membership in the society of persons that
reality is personal reality” (1951, p. 293). Brightman equates to reality. This, in turn,
Brightman also shares Bowne’s bias towards makes it difficult for Brightman to affirm the
consciousness in his definition of the person. intrinsic value of nonhuman life in nature
Brightman defines personality (or person, or without falling back on the idea that nonhuman
personal self) as follows: “A personality is a life derives its value from being the activity and
complex but self-identifying, active, selective, expression of God. From this perspective,
feeling, sensing, developing experience, which respect for nature would be grounded in a
remembers its past (in part), plans its future, respect for God’s person.
interacts with its subconscious processes, its Brightman shares Bowne’s view that nature
bodily organism, and its natural and social is the activity and the expression of the Cosmic
environment, and is able to judge and guide Person. Nature has value by virtue of being
itself and its objects by rational and ideal stan- part of God’s personal activity, and this is an
dards.” (1945, p. 53) Brightman goes on to activity that we as human persons ought to
argue that “this definition does not presuppose respect. Like Bowne, Brightman rejects the
that all of the traits mentioned function at all mechanistic explanations of the universe, and
times in any person … . The definition means he understands reality to be infused with value
rather that unless all the experiences described by its Creator. According to Brightman, “The
arise or can arise in the course of the develop- universe of experience could never be under-
ment of experience, that experience, although stood as the outcome of units such as electrons,
it may still be called a self (or experient), is not protons, positrons, and neutrons; whereas elec-
a personal self.” (1945, p. 53) trons and the like can be understood as aspects
Brightman asserts that “personality is the or processes of personal experience; not of
seat of all value” (1944, p. 544). In agreement human experience alone, it is true, but of the
with British Idealist T. H. Green, Brightman objective divine experience.” (1951, p. 298)
maintains that value “is always ‘for, of, or in a Similar to Bowne, Cartesian residues also
person’” (1944, p. 544). In other words, in are evident in Brightman’s views concerning
order for there to be value, there must be a the relations between human persons and
person who is valuing, i.e., experiencing value. nature and in his understanding of the rela-
Brightman admits that consciousness is not tions between the mind and the body.
limited to human persons, and therefore value Brightman distinguishes between what he calls
is not limited to human persons. However, the “shining present” and the “illuminating
Brightman’s formal definition of personality, absent.” According to Brightman, “The shining
with its emphasis on the ability of persons to present is conscious awareness.” (1958, p. 47)
guide themselves by rational and ideal stan- In other words, the shining present is a person’s
dards, is more descriptive of human con- present consciousness, which includes all the
sciousness than of nonhuman experience. “sensations, memories, beliefs, knowledges,
Careful observations indicate that the great hopes, fears, and vaguenesses” that are a part of
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BRIGHTMAN
a person’s present consciousness (1958, p. 47). intrinsic value when he writes, “All human
The shining present is the person. Everything persons, whatever subhuman persons there
outside of the shining present, Brightman refers may be, as well as the Supreme Superhuman
to as the “illuminating absent,” and this Divine Person are seats of intrinsic value.”
includes the person’s body, other persons, and (1944, p. 545) Given that Brightman’s defini-
nature. The illuminating absent is “the object or tion of person focuses so heavily on self-reflec-
the cause of the experience,” but it is not part tive consciousness, he uses the term person only
of the shining present itself (1958, p. 47). The for those nonhuman beings with complex,
shining present interacts with the illuminating more human-like consciousness.
absent, but the illuminating absent is not part Brightman recognizes that other forms of life
of the person and vice versa. For Brightman, the besides human persons enjoy a shining present.
body is not a part of the person, and the person To emphasize the different manifestations of
is not a part of nature, although the person “shining presents,” Brightman distinguishes
interacts with both the body and nature. between selves (experients) and persons (per-
Brightman attempts to explain this interaction sonalities). According to Brightman, “A con-
by rejecting Descartes’s “assertion of two … scious being – that is, any complex of con-
discontinuous and radically different kinds of sciousness that is aware of its complexity and
being [as] a theoretical invention of the mind unity – is called a self or an experient. Any self
that causes more trouble than it is worth” or experient that is able to judge itself rationally
(1951, p. 300). For Brightman, the illuminating and to strive for ideal values is a person or per-
absent is not composed of extended things, sonality or mind.” (1951, pp. 294–5) For
rather it is composed of other selves and Brightman, “If any being lacks the power to
persons with whom the person interacts. Thus reason, such a being is a subpersonal self.”
the world is characterized by interpersonal rela- (1951, p. 297) In contrast to Bowne, however,
tions, not by “the Occidental dualism of matter Brightman sees such subpersonal selves as being
and mind, which [Brightman claims] all per- a part of reality, and Brightman includes them
sonalists reject” (1951, p. 300). in his definition of reality. According to
For Brightman, the “person” is “a complex Brightman, “The universe is a society of selves
unity of self-consciousness that is able to and persons with a Supreme Person as its cause
develop ideal values and to act in itself and to and guiding purpose.” (1951, p. 300)
interact with others” (1958, p. 201). Brightman is a personalist, but he is by no
Brightman’s focus is on consciousness. Without means an individualist. He focuses on interper-
consciousness, there is no person, and, for sonal relations and the social forms of personal
Brightman, personal consciousness involves a existence. For Brightman, “The goal of the
level of self-awareness and reflection that makes universe is … the interpersonal development of
it difficult for him to refer to many other life all persons in the creation and enjoyment of
forms on earth as persons. Although Brightman values … . The ultimate category is social; the
distinguishes between persons and subpersonal goal of the universe is inexhaustible, developing
selves, at times he speaks of the personality of love.” (1951, p. 303) Persons have a moral oblig-
some more highly developed subhuman selves, ation to work together, and, although the indi-
and he admits that they possess some level of vidual is not lost in the collective, each person
value. Given his axiological commitment to “stands in a wide variety of interpersonal rela-
personality as the seat of all value, Brightman tions … [and] when these relations are rightly
must attribute some form of personality to at ordered, they enlarge and enhance the person”
least some nonhuman beings if he wants to (1951, p. 301). According to Brightman, “We
claim they have intrinsic value. Brightman belong together in interpersonal community, yet
admits that subhuman persons would possess we all have individual existence and personal
345
BRIGHTMAN
rights.” (1951, p. 303) Such views contributed Brightman also showed a career-long concern
to Brightman’s support of democratic socialism for speaking meaningfully about the nature of
and pacifism while at Boston University. God, God’s activity in the world, and God’s
As persons living in an interpersonal commu- relation to good and evil. Brightman struggled to
nity, Brightman affirms that we ought to attempt reconcile the goodness of God with the power of
to realize the best possible values. Brightman’s God, and he was deeply troubled by traditional
value theory is more inclusive than Bowne’s in portrayals of God as infinitely powerful. The
affirming that some higher forms of animal life presence of so much unaccountable evil in the
possess at least rudimentary levels of personality world led Brightman to the hypothesis that if
and may even be called persons, thereby granting God is infinitely good, then he must be finite in
them at least rudimentary levels of value expe- power. Brightman posits a “Given” in the person
rience. In addition to expanding the notion of of God that limits God’s power in the universe,
personhood, in Brightman’s last book, Person a “Given” with which God must struggle in his
and Reality (1958), he includes selves as well as activity of realizing values. Brightman’s
persons as beings capable of value experience. finite–infinite God, finite in power and infinite in
Brightman writes, “Values have their being solely goodness, was one of the more controversial
in the shining present of the self or person who and revolutionary hypotheses about the nature
experiences them.” (1958, p. 291) Perhaps of God during the mid twentieth century.
Brightman was beginning to see that other forms
of life enjoy a shining present, or some kind of BIBLIOGRAPHY
conscious experience, albeit in a different way An Introduction to Philosophy (New York,
than human persons do. Following this line of 1925; 2nd edn 1951; 3rd edn 1963).
reasoning, to the extent that nonhuman life Immortality in Post-Kantian Idealism
forms have the experience of a shining present, (Cambridge, Mass., 1925).
they would possess intrinsic value. Thus it might Religious Values (New York, 1925).
be more appropriate for Brightman to claim that A Philosophy of Ideals (New York, 1928).
value is for, of, or in experients, thereby avoiding The Problem of God (New York, 1930).
the possible interpretation that God and human The Finding of God (New York, 1931).
persons are the only loci of value in the universe. Is God a Person? (New York, 1932).
Brightman was not only concerned about Moral Laws (New York, 1933).
creating plausible hypotheses about persons, Personality and Religion (New York, 1934).
reality, and values, he was also concerned about A Philosophy of Religion (Englewood Cliffs,
providing some guidance for moral choices by N.J., 1940).
persons in the world. This interest led Brightman The Spiritual Life (Nashville, Tenn., 1942).
to develop a system of moral laws, which was one Nature and Values (New York, 1945).
of his most significant contributions to the Boston Persons and Values (Boston, 1952).
personalist tradition and a powerful influence Person and Reality: An Introduction to
on his most famous student, Martin Luther KING, Metaphysics, ed. Peter A. Bertocci, Jannette
Jr. All of King’s most significant principles for A. Newhall, and Robert S. Brightman (New
action find expression in Brightman’s moral law York, 1958).
system. Brightman describes the moral laws as
universal principles to which the will ought to Other Relevant Works
conform its choices. These laws are not to be Brightman’s papers are at Boston University.
confused with prescriptions for action in specific The Sources of the Hexateuch (New York,
circumstances, rather they act in a regulatory 1918).
way as principles according to which one should Ed., Proceedings of the Sixth International
choose if one is to be moral. Congress of Philosophy (New York, 1927).
346
BRODBECK
“The Finite Self,” in Contemporary Idealism Burrow, Rufus, Jr. Personalism: A Critical
in America, ed. Clifford Barrett (New Introduction (St. Louis, 1999).
York, 1932), pp. 169–96. Lavely, John H. “Edgar Sheffield Brightman:
“An Empirical Approach to God,” Good-and-Evil and the Finite-Infinite
Philosophical Review 46 (1937): 147–69. God,” in The Boston Personalist Tradition
The Future of Christianity (New York, in Philosophy, Social Ethics, and
1937). Theology, ed. Paul Deats and Carol Robb
Ed., Personalism in Theology: A Symposium (Macon, Georgia, 1986), pp. 121–46.
in Honor of Albert Cornelius Knudson, by Muelder, Walter G. “Edgar S. Brightman:
Associates and Former Students (Boston, Person and Moral Philosopher,” in The
1943). Boston Personalist Tradition in
“Philosophical Ideas and Enduring Peace,” in Philosophy, Social Ethics, and Theology,
Approaches to World Peace, ed. Lyman ed. Paul Deats and Carol Robb (Macon,
Bryson et al. (New York, 1944), pp. Georgia, 1986), pp. 105–20.
542–56. Newhall, Jannette E. “Brightman on the
“Personalistic Metaphysics of the Self: Its Influence of Bowne,” Philosophical Forum
Distinctive Features,” in Radhakrishnan: 20 (1962–3): 11–16.
Comparative Studies in Philosophy The Personalist 34 (Autumn 1953). Special
Presented in Honour of His Sixtieth issue on Brightman.
Birthday, ed. W. R. Inge et al. (London, Philosophical Forum (Boston) 8 (Spring
1951), pp. 287–304. 1950). Special issue on Brightman.
Studies in Personalism: Selected Writings of Philosophical Forum (Boston) 12 (1954).
Edgar Sheffield Brightman, Borden Parker Memorial volume dedicated to Brightman.
Bowne Professor of Philosophy, Boston Reck, Andrew J. “The Personalism of Edgar
University, 1924–1953, ed. W. E. Sheffield Brightman,” in Recent American
Steinkraus and Robert N. Beck (Utica, Philosophy: Studies of Ten Representative
N.Y., 1984). Thinkers (New York, 1964), chap. 10.
Hartshorne and Brightman on God, Process, Ross, Floyd H. Personalism and the Problem
and Persons: The Correspondence, of Evil (New Haven, Conn., 1940).
1922–1945, ed. Randall E. Auxier and
Mark Y. A. Davies (Nashville, Tenn., 2001). Mark Y. A. Davies
Further Reading
Amer Nat Bio, Amer Phils Before 1950, Bio
20thC Phils, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio,
Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer Religious Bio,
Nat Cycl Amer Bio v41, Oxford Comp BRODBECK, May Selznick (1917–83)
Phil, Pres Addr of APA v4, Proc of APA
v27, Who Was Who in Amer v3, Who’s May Brodbeck was born on 26 July 1917 in
Who in Phil Newark, New Jersey. She received a BA degree
Bertocci, Peter A. “The Personalism of Edgar in chemistry at New York University in 1941.
S. Brightman and Ultimate Reality,” She then taught high school chemistry, worked
Ultimate Reality and Meaning 6 (1983): in industry, and participated as a physicist in
32–50. the Manhattan project to build the atomic
Buford, Thomas O., and Harold H. Oliver, bomb. Her graduate training was in philosophy
eds. Personalism Revisited (Amsterdam at the University of Iowa, earning the MA in
and New York, 2002). 1945 and the PhD in 1947, both under the
347
BRODBECK
supervision of Gustav BERGMANN. Her disser- forty-one essays. Like the earlier collection
tation was on John DEWEY’s Logic. For the edited with Feigl, this one stood for many years
next twenty-seven years, from 1947 to 1974, as the leading one in its field, and displayed
Brodbeck was a professor of philosophy at the once again Brodbeck’s unusual talent for orga-
University of Minnesota. She was chair of the nizing and making sense of the ideas of others,
department during 1967–70 and Dean of the while at the same time continuing to offer her
Graduate School during 1972–4. In 1974 she own technical contributions.
returned to the University of Iowa as Carver Brodbeck’s work in the philosophy of the
Professor of Philosophy, Vice President for social sciences led her into the philosophy of
Academic Affairs, and Dean of the Faculties. mind. Among the papers in this area was her
She retired from her administrative position in presidential address to the American
1981 and her faculty position in 1983. Among Philosophical Association, “Mind: From
her honors were a visiting professorship at the Within And From Without,” where Brodbeck
University of Cambridge, a Fulbright lecture renewed and restated her challenge to the
tour of Europe, membership on various edito- dominant materialist theories of mind, dis-
rial boards, and a fellowship at the Center for agreeing with most of the philosophers in the
Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at analytic tradition of her training.
Stanford University in 1981–2. She was
President of the Western (now Central) BIBLIOGRAPHY
Division of the American Philosophical “Coherence Theory Reconsidered: Professor
Association in 1971–2. Brodbeck died on 1 Werkmeister on Semantics and on the
August 1983 in Menlo Park, California. Nature of Empirical Laws,” Philosophy of
Following the publication of a number of Science 16 (1949): 75–85.
technical papers in the philosophy of science “The New Rationalism: Dewey’s Theory of
and a major essay titled “Philosophy in Induction,” Journal of Philosophy 46
America: 1900–1950,” Brodbeck established (1949): 780–90.
her name by co-editing with Herbert FEIGL in “Toward a Naturalistic ‘Non-naturalistic’
1953 the book that for many years was the Ethic,” Philosophical Studies 2 (1951):
leading anthology in the field, Readings in the 7–11.
Philosophy of Science. Brodbeck’s ambitious “An Analytical Principle of Induction?”
introductory essay, “The Nature and Function Journal of Philosophy 49 (1952): 747–9.
of the Philosophy of Science,” succeeded bril- “Philosophy of the Social Sciences,”
liantly by providing a thorough but reasonably Philosophy of Science 21 (1954): 140–56.
concise statement of the main ideas of the field. “Methodological Individualisms: Definition
Turning in 1954 to a more specialized and Reduction,” Philosophy of Science 25
domain, the philosophy of the social sciences, (1958): 1–22.
Brodbeck produced a number of important “Explanation, Prediction, and ‘Imperfect’
papers over the next decade and a half, includ- Knowledge,” in Minnesota Studies in the
ing the often anthologized essay of 1963, Philosophy of Science, vol. 3, ed. Herbert
“Meaning and Action,” a particularly incisive Feigl (Minneapolis, 1962), pp. 231–72.
critique of a Wittgensteinian theory of the “Logic and Scientific Method in Research on
relation of mind to behavior. This phase of her Teaching,” in Handbook of Research on
labors culminated in 1968 with the publication Teaching, ed. N. L. Gage (Chicago, 1963),
of another extensive anthology, Readings in pp. 44–93.
the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, to which “Meaning and Action,” Philosophy of
she contributed a general introduction, sub- Science 30 (1963): 309–24.
stantial sectional introductions, and four of the “The Philosophy of John Dewey,” Indian
348
BROGAN
Journal of Philosophy 3 (1963): 69–101. philosophy at the University of Texas in 1914.

“Mind: From Within and From Without,” When G. Watts CUNNINGHAM arrived as pro-
Proceedings and Addresses of the fessor of philosophy in 1917, Brogan’s title
American Philosophical Association 45 became adjunct professor. In 1923 he was
(1972): 42–55. promoted to associate professor of philoso-
phy, and from 1925 until his retirement in
Other Relevant Works 1963 he was professor of philosophy. Brogan
“Philosophy in America: 1900–1950,” in died on 9 April 1983 in Austin, Texas.
American Non-Fiction 1900–1950 Brogan guided the early growth of the phi-
(Chicago, 1952), pp. 3–94. losophy department at Texas, as Edwin T.
Ed. with Herbert Feigl, Readings in the Mitchell arrived in 1923; George Gentry in
Philosophy of Science (New York, 1953). 1931; and David L. MILLER in 1934 (all three
Includes her essay “The Nature and were graduates of the University of Chicago).
Function of the Philosophy of Science.” Brogan also held university posts as Assistant
Ed., Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Dean of the Graduate School from 1932 to
Sciences (New York, 1968). Contains four 1936, and Dean of the Graduate School from
essays by Brodbeck. 1936 to 1959. He was a visiting professor at
the University of Chicago and Cornell
Further Reading University in 1931. Brogan was active in
Amer Nat Bio, Bio 20thC Phils, Pres Addr of several professional societies. He was a
APA v8, Proc of APA v57, Who Was Who member of the American Association for the
in Amer v8, Women Phils Advancement of Science, and served as
Margolis, Joseph. “Reply to a Reaction: President of the Conference of Deans of
Second Remarks on Brodbeck’s Southern Graduate Schools, President of the
Objectivism,” Philosophy of Science 33 Philosophical Society of Texas in 1949, and
(1966): 293–300. President of the Western Division of the
Mayeroff, Milton. “The Nature of American Philosophical Association in
Propositions in John Dewey’s “Logic”: A 1931–2.
Reply to Miss Brodbeck,” Journal of Brogan devoted much of his philosophical
Philosophy 47 (1950): 353–8. thought to a relational theory of value, in
which value judgments are always a matter of
Laird Addis comparing the intrinsic goodness of one thing
to that of another. Being relational, intrinsic
values are neither subjective nor so objective
that they exist beyond human knowledge. The
moral values of a group, as an example of
comparative values, can be statistically studied
BROGAN, Albert Perley (1889–1983) by questionnaire to reveal rankings and pref-
erences, and then groups (such as the genders,
Albert P. Brogan was born on 22 July 1889 in or geographically separated groups) can be
Omaha, Nebraska. From 1907 to 1909 he statistically compared against each other. In
attended the University of Nebraska, and then “Moral Valuations About Men and Women”
he transferred to Harvard University, where he (1925) Brogan also reveals how moral judg-
received his BA in 1911, his MA in 1912, and ments upon a behavior can vary depending
his PhD in philosophy in 1914. He wrote his on whether a man or a woman does it.
dissertation on “The Problem of Intrinsic Brogan’s preferred ethical theory is the
Values.” Brogan was appointed instructor in pragmatist theory of ethics as moral problem
349
BROGAN
solving, as explained in “Ethics as Method” Further Reading

(1926). His “objective pluralism” builds on Proc of APA v57, Pres Addr of APA v4,
his relational approach to values. Value judg- Who Was Who in Amer v8, Who’s Who
ments are both objective (since contradictory in Phil
judgments cannot both be true) and plural
(since there is no greatest good to encompass John R. Shook
or judge all others). Monistic theories (such as
the summum bonum or hedonistic theories)
of value wrongly argue that values cannot be
intelligently compared unless they are reduced
to some single type of value.
BROKMEYER, Henry Conrad
BIBLIOGRAPHY (1826–1906)
“The Fundamental Value Universal,”
Journal of Philosophy 16 (1919): Henry Conrad Brokmeyer was born to
96–104. Frederick William and Sophia Brokmeyer in
“Urban’s Axiological System,” Journal of Minden, Westphalia, Prussia, on 12 August
Philosophy 18 (1921): 197–209. 1826. Late in life, he told Denton SNIDER that
“A Dilemma About Dilemmas,” Journal of he left his parents’ home because his mother
Philosophy 18 (1921): 566–7. burned his copy of Goethe’s poems. At seven-
“A Study in Statistical Ethics,” teen he arrived in New York City with twenty-
International Journal of Ethics 33 five cents in his pocket, as an indentured
(1923): 119–34. servant. Hard work earned his release, and he
“Group Estimates of Frequency of traveled across the United States as far west as
Misconduct,” International Journal of the Rockies, learning various trades along the
Ethics 34 (1924): 254–71. way.
“Moral Valuations About Men and In 1850 Brokmeyer enrolled at Georgetown
Women,” International Journal of Ethics College in Kentucky, and in 1852 he trans-
35 (1925): 105–24. ferred to Brown University. At Brown he met
“Ethics as Method,” International Journal Frederick Henry HEDGE, who had published
of Ethics 36 (1926): 263–70. some of the first English translations of post-
“Objective Pluralism in the Theory of Kantian German philosophy. Through Hedge
Value,” International Journal of Ethics and Francis Wayland, President of Brown,
41 (1931): 287–95. Brokmeyer was introduced to American
“Philosophy and the Problem of Value,” Transcendentalism. Under the influence of
Philosophical Review 42 (1933): 105–29. Henry David Thoreau, in 1854 Brokmeyer
“John Locke and Utilitarianism,” Ethics 69 retreated from civilization, moving to a hut in
(1959): 79–93. the back woods of Warren County, Missouri.
“A Criticism of Mr. A. J. Ayer’s Revised His son, E. C. Brokmeyer, eventually pub-
Account of Moral Judgments,” Journal lished diaries that Brokmeyer kept during this
of Philosophy 56 (1959): 270–80. time, as A Mechanic’s Diary (1910). Soon after
“Aristotle’s Logic of Statements About he arrived in Missouri, Brokmeyer began trans-
Contingency,” Mind 76 (1967): 49–61. lating the works of Hegel and Goethe into
English.
At an 1858 meeting of a St. Louis literary
group, Brokmeyer met William T. HARRIS.
Harris persuaded the reluctant Brokmeyer to
350
BROKMEYER
tutor him in philosophy, particularly the activity in Hegel’s analysis of self-conscious-

writings of Hegel and Goethe. After fighting as ness. Consciousness in its immediacy is vital
a Union officer during the Civil War, feeling. In the awareness of an object, media-
Brokmeyer abandoned the solitary life and tion begins. Consciousness must negate other
became an attorney. His law office was soon objects and set them aside to discriminate one
a regular meeting place for the St. Louis from the others. A human being is aware of
Hegelians. In a brief political career, itself through the same process, but here one
Brokmeyer was elected to the St. Louis City recognizes the object as itself, other than con-
Council, and then the state legislature, where sciousness, and reaches self-consciousness by
he was a chief architect of the state of negation of otherness. Finally, self-conscious-
Missouri’s new constitution. In 1876 he served ness sees the object of consciousness as its own
as lieutenant governor and, for a while, as work, its own selection and interpretation.
acting governor. In the 1880s he spent some Brokmeyer systematically tested everything
time with the Creek Indians near Muskogee in by its universality, in opposition to the spe-
the present-day state of Oklahoma. He cialization of the new universities. More specif-
devoted his last years to revising his translation ically, the ultimate test of every claim was its
of Hegel’s Science of Logic, which was never standing in Hegel’s Logic. Whereas self-activity
published. He died on 26 July 1906 in St. is the foundational idea making the movement
Louis, Missouri. of the categories possible in the Logic, the cat-
Brokmeyer was the central figure in the St. egories of the logic itself are presupposed in all
Louis Philosophical Movement from its for- mental activity. It is a shame, Brokmeyer
mative years in the late 1850s through the claimed, that Hegel did not stylize this all-
1870s. His original studies and interpretations important study for moderns who ride trains
of Hegel and Goethe attracted young intellec- and live in a hustle and bustle world.
tuals, particularly in the aftermath of the Civil On the basis of self-activity and the
War. Although by all accounts Brokmeyer movement within the Logic, Brokmeyer criti-
conveyed ideas best in conversation, his two cized Bronson ALCOTT and New England tran-
chief published works provide insight into his scendentalism. He claimed that Alcott recog-
philosophy. A Mechanic’s Diary, which covers nized only diremption (emanation) from the
only six months in 1856, reveals Brokmeyer’s Absolute or God, but not return of the
transition from transcendentalism to dirempted multiplicity. Transcendentalism not
Hegelianism. The entries contain reflections only had a truncated view of God, but also of
on Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Kant, and Hegel, human life. It greatly underestimated the
alongside entries about woodpeckers, frogs, importance of institutional life, which is all-
and squirrels. Throughout the diary important for social stability and the enrich-
Brokmeyer manifests his exuberance for the ment of individuals.
United States, and proceeds to show how “Letters on Faust,” a two-part article that
adaptable Hegelian philosophy is to interpret- Brokmeyer published in the St. Louis
ing and assessing American life. Hegelians’ Journal of Speculative Philosophy
Brokmeyer based his Hegelianism on the in 1867 and 1868, exemplifies his use of Hegel
German philosopher’s concept of self-activity in interpreting works of art. Hegel saw works
and self-determination. He saw at once the of art as manifesting an age’s self-awareness,
practical value of such a view, and argued that often reflecting conflicts within a person or
it was particularly suited to America and to the nation. Brokmeyer organized Goethe’s Faust
resolution of internal conflicts. God exists as a from beginning to end according to its self-
self-active, self-relating, and self-determining reflecting ideas, interspersed with analogies
being. Brokmeyer found the locus of self- and comments of special interest to American
351
BROKMEYER
readers. “Letters on Faust” opens with a 1973).

critique of the idea of literary criticism. Harmon, Francis. The Social Philosophy of
Criticism should not be how the work of art the St. Louis Hegelians (New York, 1943).
affects the critic, for this says more about the Pochmann, Henry A. German Culture in
critic than the work itself. It should not be America: Philosophical and Literary
founded on the author’s biography, nor Influences, 1600–1900 (Madison, Wisc.,
present the work according to the prevalent 1957).
standards of literary criticism. Rather, Snider, Denton J. A Writer of Books in His
Brokmeyer aimed at understanding the under- Genesis (St. Louis, 1910).
lying idea of the poem. ———, The St. Louis Movement in
According to Brokmeyer, Kant’s claim that Philosophy, Literature, Education,
we cannot know the thing-in-itself destroys Psychology with Chapters of
Faust’s capacity to receive, produce, and aspire Autobiography (St. Louis, 1920).
for truth and beauty. As Faust’s reason is
ensnared in a conflict with itself, and the insti- Michael H. DeArmey
tutions of society, he is led into mysticism and
magic. The practical world collapses into a
cause and effect relationship centering on
personal gratifications. From there, Faust
proceeds to destroy Gretchen and the rela-
tionships and feelings within her family. The BROMBERGER, Sylvain (1924– )
movement of Goethe’s Faust, which unfolds
the deleterious effects of Kant’s philosophy, Sylvain Bromberger was born on 7 July 1924
ends in destruction and death. in Antwerp, Belgium, where his parents had
moved from Poland. His entire family fled
BIBLIOGRAPHY Belgium when the Nazis invaded in 1940. They
“Letters on Faust,” Journal of Speculative eventually made it to the United States by way
Philosophy 1 (1867): 178–87; 2 (1868): of Portugal, which they were able to reach at
114–20. the last minute thanks to Aristides de Sousa
A Mechanic’s Diary (Washington, 1910). Mendes, a Portuguese consul in Bordeaux who
helped many Jews escape the Holocaust.
Other Relevant Works (Bromberger’s only book, described below, is
Brokmeyer’s papers are at the Missouri dedicated to the memory of Sousa Mendes.)
Historical Society in St. Louis, Missouri. The family settled in New York City, where
Bromberger attended high school and the École
Further Reading Libre des Hautes Etudes, the Free French
Amer Nat Bio, Dict Amer Bio, Who Was University staffed by professors who had
Who in Amer v4 escaped from France. He enrolled at Columbia
DeArmey, Michael H., and James A. Good, University as an undergraduate in 1942, but
eds. The St. Louis Hegelians, 3 vols was drafted into the US Army during his
(Bristol, UK, 2001). freshman year, and eventually returned to
Dodgson, G. R. “An Interpretation of the St. Europe to fight as an infantryman. In 1946,
Louis Philosophical Movement,” Journal after his discharge, Bromberger returned to
of Philosophy 6 (1909): 337–45. Columbia, where he studied physics and phi-
Goetzmann, William H., ed. The American losophy, graduating with his BA in 1948. His
Hegelians: An Intellectual Episode in the earliest philosophical interests were sparked by
History of Western America (New York, Hans REICHENBACH (then visiting New York)
352
BROMBERGER
and Ernest NAGEL. After a year of graduate articulates and develops a highly original alter-
studies at Columbia, Bromberger went to native to the positivistic conception of science.
Harvard University, where his most influential His conclusive “flagpole” type counter-
teachers were W. V. QUINE, Morton WHITE examples to Hempel’s deductive model of
(his thesis supervisor), and Nelson GOODMAN. explanation are now standard refutations of
These exciting days in philosophy were marked the positivistic model. Bromberger’s alterna-
by intense discussions about the relative merits tive conception takes our “ability to formulate
of positivism and the new ordinary language and to entertain questions whose answers we
philosophy and Wittgenstein. His dissertation know we do not know” (1992, p. 2) to be at
was entitled “The Concept of Explanation” the core of scientific endeavors. According to
and he received his PhD in philosophy in 1961. Bromberger, “A science, at any moment of its
Bromberger was an instructor and lecturer in history, consists of a set of accepted (or at least
philosophy at Princeton University from 1954 seriously entertained) propositions, a set of
to 1960, and then associate professor of phi- unanswered questions to which these proposi-
losophy at the University of Chicago from 1961 tions give rise, and a set of principles or devices
to 1966. In 1966 he went to Massachusetts for establishing the answers to such questions.
Institute of Technology, where he remained for The evolution of a science is a sequence of
the rest of his career. It is interesting to note, related changes among these components.”
given his eventual interest in the philosophical (1992, p. 101)
foundations of phonology, that Bromberger’s The last two articles in On What We Know
first appointment at MIT was actually in lin- We Don’t Know, “Types and Tokens in
guistics, as a visiting scholar. He was invited in Linguistics” and “The Ontology of Phonology”
1967 to join the revitalized philosophy (with the famous MIT phonologist Morris
program, which already included Jerrold KATZ, Halle), were written near the end of
Jerry FODOR, Judith Jarvis THOMSON, and Bromberger’s teaching career. These papers
James Thompson. Bromberger was professor of signal a shift in his interests toward providing
philosophy at MIT from 1967 until his retire- an interpretation of generative linguistics, espe-
ment in 1993, and he remains active there as cially phonology, that avoids Platonism and
professor emeritus. He regularly taught courses instrumentalism. His recent paper, “The
on theories of explanation, erotetic logic (i.e., Contents of Phonological Signs” (1997), con-
“the logic of questions”), philosophy of tinues to advance this important, but unfortu-
language, and philosophy of science (including, nately neglected, set of issues.
in later years, a seminar he co-taught with
Thomas KUHN on natural kinds). He taught BIBLIOGRAPHY
courses in linguistics as well, and supervised “Questions,” Journal of Philosophy 63
doctoral students in both areas. (1966): 597–606.
Bromberger’s most important publication is “Why-Questions,” in Mind and Cosmos:
his book, On What We Know We Don’t Know Essays in Contemporary Science and
(1992). It collects many of his most important Philosophy, vol. 3, ed. R. G. Colodny
early essays, including classics on explanation (Pittsburgh, 1966), pp. 86–111.
(“An Approach to Explanation”), the nature of “Science and the Forms of Ignorance,” in
theories (“A Theory About the Theory of Observation and Theory in Science, ed.
Theory and About the Theory of Theories”), Maurice Mandelbaum (Baltimore, Md.,
and questions, including especially “why”- 1971), pp. 45–67.
questions (“Questions”; “Why-Questions”; “On the Relationship between Phonetics and
“What We Don’t Know When We Don’t Phonology,” with Morris Halle, in
Know Why”). In these papers Bromberger Invariance and Variability in Speech
353
BROMBERGER
Processes, ed. Joseph S. Perkell and Dennis BROTHERSTON, Bruce Wallace

H. Klatt (Mahwah, N.J., 1986), pp. (1877–1947)
510–20.
“What We Don’t Know When We Don’t Bruce W. Brotherston was born on 12 August
Know Why,” in Scientific Inquiry in 1877 in Coboury, Ontario, Canada. When he
Philosophical Perspective, ed. Nicholas was still a child he moved with his family to
Rescher (Lanham, Md., 1987), pp. North Adams, Massachusetts. Without a
75–104. formal high school education, Brotherston
“Rational Ignorance,” Synthese 74 (1988): worked as a tinsmith while preparing himself
47–64. for college. He received his BA from Williams
“Why Phonology Is Different,” with Morris College in 1903 and a BST from Andover
Halle, Linguistic Inquiry 20 (1989): Newton Seminary in 1906. He remained there
51–70. for an additional year as a teaching fellow. For
On What We Know We Don’t Know the next thirteen years Brotherston held
(Chicago, 1992). Congregational pastorates in North Conway
“The Ontology of Phonology,” with Morris and Intervale in New Hampshire, and at
Halle, in Logic, Methodology and Gilbertville and Milton in Massachusetts. As a
Philosophy of Science, ed. D. Prawitz, B. minister (on occasion still acting as a tinsmith
Skyrms, and D. Westerstahl (Oxford, – he once personally re-roofed his church),
1994), pp. 725–43. Brotherston preached the social gospel until a
“Natural Kinds and Questions,” in Essays on growing dissonance between his own liberal
Jaakko Hintikka’s Epistemology and ideals and the conservative views of his parish-
Philosophy of Science, ed. Matti Sintonen ioners made him change his interests towards
(Amsterdam, 1997), pp. 149–63. philosophy.
“The Contents of Phonological Signs: A Brotherston continued his studies at Harvard
Comparison Between Their Use in on an Andover Fellowship, earning his PhD in
Derivational Theories and in Optimality 1923 with a dissertation entitled “Moral Evil
Theories,” with Morris Halle, in and the Social Conscience.” That same year
Derivations and Constraints in Phonology, Brotherston became a professor in philosophy
ed. Iggy Rocca (Oxford, 1997), pp. at St. Lawrence University. In 1930 he accepted
93–123. a position at Tufts College, where he became
Fletcher Professor of Philosophy. He also held
Further Reading the chair of philosophy and religion in the
Belnap, Nuel D., Jr. “Questions, Answers, School of Religion. Brotherston remained at
and Presuppositions,” Journal of Tufts until his retirement in 1944. After his
Philosophy 63 (1966): 609–10. retirement Brotherston acquired a greenhouse
Teller, Paul. “On Why-Questions,” Noûs 8 in Holliston, Massachusetts, where he grew
(1974): 371–80. flowers commercially until his death there on
17 April 1947.
Leonard Clapp Influenced by William JAMES and John
DEWEY, Brotherston was a pragmatist in phi-
losophy and a liberal in religion. He also took
great interest in Charles PEIRCE’s form of
empiricism and George H. MEAD’s social
behaviorism. Many of his articles offered
searching criticisms of each of the pragmatists,
in search of a pragmatic empiricism purified of
354
BROWN
any metaphysical presuppositions. Brotherston BROWN, Harold Chapman (1879–1943)

also wrote philosophical essays on religion and
political theory. He authored one book, A Harold Chapman Brown was born on 2 April
Philosophy for Liberalism (1934). Work on a 1879 in Springfield, Massachusetts. He was
second book was interrupted by his death. educated at Williams College, receiving his BA in
1901, and at Harvard University, receiving his
BIBLIOGRAPHY MA in 1903 and PhD in philosophy in 1905. He
“The Concept of Responsibility,” was an instructor in philosophy at Columbia
International Journal of Ethics 39 (1929): University from 1905 to 1913, and then joined
469–80. the faculty of Stanford University in 1913, to
“The Empirical Method in Philosophy,” replace the departing George H. SABINE. He was
Journal of Philosophy 30 (1933): 449–58. professor of philosophy at Stanford, and also
A Philosophy for Liberalism (Boston, 1934). served as department head, for many years. He
“The Empirical Spirit,” The Monist 45 (1935): was a visiting lecturer at several other universi-
186–98. ties. A member of Phi Beta Kappa, the American
“The Philosophic Importance of the Civil Liberties Union, and the Palo Alto
Determining Tendency,” Journal of Cooperative Society, in his later years he was
Philosophy 32 (1935): 67–76. active with the American-Russian Institute in
“Firstness,” Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939): San Francisco. Brown was a member of the
533–43. American Association for the Advancement of
“The Wider Setting of ‘Felt Transition’,” Science, and President of the Pacific Division of
Journal of Philosophy 39 (1942): 97–104. the American Philosophical Association in
“The Genius of Pragmatic Empiricism,” 1924–5 and in 1932–3. Brown retired in 1943
Journal of Philosophy 40 (1943): 14–21, and died on 19 November 1943 in Stanford,
29–39. California.
“Sensuous and Non-sensuous Perception in Brown published more than fifty articles on a
Empirical Philosophy,” Journal of variety of philosophical topics, ranging from
Philosophy 40 (1943): 589–96. philosophy of mathematics and logic to philos-
“The Use of Reason in Morals,” Journal of ophy of language and social and political phi-
Philosophy 43 (1946): 561–72. losophy. In “The Logic of Mr. Russell” (1911)
he argued that Russellian logistic put what he
Other Relevant Works called a “new face” on old problems. He argued,
A file on Brotherstone is held by the in particular, that Bertrand Russell’s theory of
Andover-Harvard Theological Library at types is merely a rediscovery of universes of dis-
Harvard University. course, or domains, which John Venn had
“What Christianity Means to Me,” in Tufts defined and which specifies and restricts the sets
Papers on Religion (Boston, 1939). or terms to be taken into consideration. He was
an opponent of F. C. S. Schiller’s pragmatic and
Further Reading psychologistic logic, and in favor of formal logic
Proc of APA in Phil Rev v58, Who’s Who in as logistic, defending both Russell’s logicism and
Phil his notion of truth and validity. Brown con-
Ziegler, Albert F. “Bruce Brotherston, John tributed the essay “A Logician in the Field of
Calvin and Hosea Ballou,” manuscript at Psychology” to The Philosophy of Bertrand
Andover-Harvard Theological Library. Russell in the Library of Living Philosophers.
Brown had some sympathies with American
Cornelis de Waal naturalism and pragmatism, of the form that
John DEWEY defended. William JAMES and E. B.
355
BROWN
HOLT exerted an early influence on him, and Contemporary American Philosophy:

thereafter he opposed scientific reductionism Personal Statements, vol. 1, ed. George P.
and materialism in favor of a pluralistic and Adams and William P. Montague (New
emergent naturalism of infinite levels. Without York, 1930), pp. 169–95.
reducing mind to matter, Brown argued that
mental states and abilities are produced by Further Reading
physiological events. He wrote, “The self is Pres Addr of APA v3, Who’s Who in Phil
then nothing but the organism when its more
habitual and characteristic ways of action are Irving H. Anellis
abstractly emphasized as the character of a self,
and when certain evaluating epithets are
applied by the observer.” (1933, p. 153)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
“The Logic of Mr. Russell,” Journal of BROWN, William Adams (1865–1943)
Philosophy 8 (1911): 85–91.
“Value and Potentiality,” Journal of William Adams Brown was born in New York
Philosophy 11 (1914): 29–37. City on 29 December 1865. He received a BA
“Human Nature and the State,” from Yale University in 1886 and an MA in
International Journal of Ethics 26 (1916): economics in 1888. He then earned a BD from
177–92. Union Theological Seminary in 1890 and was
“Intelligence and Mathematics,” in Creative awarded a graduate fellowship for study in
Intelligence: Essays in the Pragmatic Berlin during 1890–92, where he studied under
Attitude (New York, 1917), pp. 118–75. Adolf von Harnack. He was ordained to the
“Social Psychology and the Problem of a Presbyterian ministry in 1893 by the Presbytery
Higher Nationality,” International Journal of New York. He earned his PhD in philosophy
of Ethics 28 (1917): 19–30. from Yale University in 1901. Brown spent his
“The Definition of Logic,” Journal of entire professional career at Union Theological
Philosophy 16 (1919): 533–41. Seminary, teaching church history (1892–3)
“Scientific Thought and Reality,” Journal of and systematic theology (until 1930) and then
Philosophy 21 (1924): 393–410. serving as research professor of applied
“The Material World – Snark or Boojum?” Christianity (1930–36). He also took a leading
Journal of Philosophy 22 (1925): 197–214. role in reorganizing the administration of Yale
“Contingency and Necessity in Nature,” University, serving as a member of the govern-
Journal of Philosophy 26 (1929): 393–401. ing board from 1917 to 1930, and as acting
“Mind – An Event in Physical Nature,” provost of Yale during the 1919–20 academic
Philosophical Review 42 (1933): 130–55. year. He also served as acting president of
“Ethics from the View Point of Modern Union Theological Seminary in 1925, and held
Science,” Journal of Philosophy 34 (1937): many offices in the Presbyterian Church and
113–21. ecumenical organizations. He died on 15
“A Logician in the Field of Psychology,” in December 1943 in New York City.
The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, ed. A champion of the liberal spirit in theology,
Paul A. Schilpp (Evanston, Ill., 1944). Brown emphasized an empirical approach to
Christianity, asserting that theological doctrines
Other Relevant Works must be reformulated on the basis of a personal
Brown’s papers are at Stanford University. experience of Christ and then lived out in social
“A Philosophic Mind in the Making,” in service. Grounded in the theology of Harnack
356
BROWN
and Albrecht Ritschl, Brown struggled through- BIBLIOGRAPHY

out his career to integrate modern standards of The Essence of Christianity: A Study in the
scholarship with the doctrinal positions of the History of Definition (New York and
Presbyterian Church. He focused on “the Edinburgh, 1902).
historic personality of Jesus Christ” as the vital- Christian Theology in Outline (New York and
izing essence of faith, through which we directly Edinburgh, 1906).
experience God’s self-revelation. On that The Christian Hope: A Study in the Doctrine
empirical foundation, he reinterpreted inherited of Immortality (New York and London,
beliefs in light of contemporary scientific and 1912).
historical approaches to Christian texts and Modern Theology and the Preaching of the
doctrines, and did this in order to communicate Gospel (New York, 1914).
effectively what he understood to be the core Is Christianity Practicable? (New York, 1916).
revealed values of Christianity. His goal was to New Thoughts on an Old Book (New York,
produce a gospel-centered activism that could 1920).
transform society. The Church in America (New York, 1922).
Brown influenced the development of liberal Imperialistic Religion and the Religion of
Protestantism in America mainly as a teacher Democracy: A Study in Social Psychology
and church leader rather than as a theological (New York, 1923).
innovator. His first two books, The Essence of The Life of Prayer in a World of Science (New
Christianity (1902) and Christian Theology in York, 1926).
Outline (1906), set out his theological agenda Beliefs That Matter: A Theology for Laymen
and were very influential in academic circles. (New York, 1928).
The rest of his publications promoted the pro- Pathways to Certainty (New York and
gressive ideals of the social gospel movement to London, 1930).
a more popular audience. Perhaps his most God At Work: A Study of the Supernatural
profound impact resulted from his embodi- (New York, 1933).
ment of those ideals in ecumenical and social The Education of American Ministers:
service projects. He was a leading activist in the Ministerial Education in America, vol. 1
international ecumenical movements that led to (New York, 1934).
the formation of the World Council of The Church: Catholic and Protestant (New
Churches (founded in 1948) and he served on York, 1935). Also published as Your
the committee that drafted the constitution for Church and Mine (London, 1935).
the World Council. He helped organize the Finding God in a New World (New York,
Universal Christian Conferences on Life and 1935).
Work in Stockholm (1925) and Oxford (1937) The Church and State in Contemporary
and the World Conferences on Faith and Order America (New York, 1936).
in Lausanne (1927) and Edinburgh (1937). He The Minister, His World and His Work: A
also assisted the founding of the Union Study of Some Pressing Tasks and Problems
Settlement, a settlement house established in of Present-Day Protestantism (Nashville,
1895 on the upper East Side of New York City, Tenn., 1937).
which provided social outreach to the poor The Case for Theology in the University
and ministerial training for students of the (Chicago, 1938).
seminary. Brown served as President of the A Creed for Free Men: A Study of Loyalties
Union Settlement Association from 1917 to (New York, 1941).
1919 and he was an active member of the The New Order in the Church (New York,
board of directors until 1930. 1943).
How to Think of Christ (New York, 1945).
357
BROWN
Other Relevant Works master’s degree, taking courses from Josiah

Brown’s papers are at Union Theological R OYCE and George S ANTAYANA . He was
Seminary. awarded his MA in philosophy from Harvard
Morris Ketchum Jesup: A Character Sketch in 1911. Harvard also awarded him the James
(New York, 1910). Walker Traveling Fellow in Philosophy in
“Seeking Beliefs that Matter,” in 1912, which he used to travel to Tübingen
Contemporary American Theology: University in Germany and to Cambridge
Theological Autobiographies, vol. 1, ed. University, where he studied under Bertrand
Vergilius Ferm (New York, 1933), pp. Russell. He started teaching at the Kansas State
63–102. Normal College in Emporia in 1913, upon his
A Teacher and His Times: A Story of Two return from Europe. In 1917, he began his
Worlds (New York, 1940). military career, going from enlisted man to
officer, and serving in both the Army and the
Further Reading Navy, and finally the National Guard. His
Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, service period included the Mexican border
Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer Religious Bio, campaign and World War I, when he began to
Who Was Who in Amer v2, Who’s Who in write poetry that was published in magazines
Phil like The New Republic, Poetry, and The Dial.
Cavert, Samuel M., and Henry P. Van Dusen, Brownell taught English at the University
eds. The Church Through Half a Century: of Idaho in 1919–20, wrote editorials for the
Essays in Honor of William Adams Brown Chicago Daily News during 1920–21, and in
(New York, 1936). 1921 started teaching at Northwestern
Dorrien, Gary. The Making of American University, lecturing in editorial writing. He
Liberal Theology: Idealism, Realism, and held an appointment as professor of contem-
Modernity, 1900–1950, vol. 2 (Louisville, porary thought in Northwestern’s School of
Kent., 2003). Journalism from 1925 to 1934, and in the
Kraus, C. Norman. The Principle of College of Liberal Arts from 1934 to 1947.
Authority in the Theology of B. B. Brownell was then professor of philosophy at
Warfield, William Adams Brown, and Northwestern from 1947 until his retirement
Gerald Birney Smith. PhD dissertation, in 1953. He traveled extensively and was a
Duke University (Durham, N.C., 1961). visiting lecturer at the University of Kansas
City, University of Chicago, University of
Jennifer G. Jesse Wisconsin, and the Garrett Biblical Institute.
The courses Brownell taught over the years
were designed to help students integrate and
organize into a unified intellectual under-
standing the diverse subjects they had studied.
His course in Contemporary Thought at
BROWNELL, Baker (1887–1965) Northwestern, the first of its kind in the United
States, consisted of weekly lectures by promi-
Baker Brownell was born on 12 December nent scholars in areas ranging over history,
1887 in St. Charles, Illinois. Entering the biology, psychology, physics, art, economics,
University of Washington in 1906, he trans- and philosophy. Brownell thought this inte-
ferred to Northwestern in 1907 where he gration of education would be a key element to
earned his BA in philosophy in 1910 after prevent the breaking down of the “human
studying for a year at Harvard. During his community.” Preventing or mitigating the
time at Harvard, he also began work on his effects of the breakdown of the small commu-
358
BROWNING
nity was his lifelong passion, expressed first in University.

The New Universe (1926), and then in 1929 in Ed., Man and His World: Northwestern
the twelve-volume series Man and His World, University Essays in Contemporary
a collection of works that he edited, which Thought, 12 vols (Chicago, 1929).
includes sixty lectures by a variety of professors The Other Illinois (New York, 1958).
who taught in his Contemporary Thought
courses. In his concern for the preservation of Further Reading
the “grassroots” of society and its importance Nat Cycl Amer Bio v51, Who Was Who in
within the context of the larger human com- Amer v1, Who’s Who in Phil
munity, he was a prolific writer over many
areas ranging from sociology and anthropol- James C. Poteet II
ogy to aesthetics and architecture. In 1937 he
wrote Architecture and Modern Life with
Frank Lloyd W RIGHT . In his retirement,
Brownell continued to write until his death on
5 April 1965 in Fairhope, Alabama.
BROWNING, Grayson Douglas (1929– )
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The New Universe: An Outline of the Douglas Browning was born on 7 March
Worlds in Which We Live (New York, 1929 in Seminole, Oklahoma. He entered the
1926). Reprinted as The New Universe: University of Texas in 1946, but joined the
A Biography of the Worlds in Which We Air Force in 1948 and served until 1952.
Live (New York, 1929). Returning to the University of Texas, he
A Preface to the Universe, with T. V. Smith, received his MA in English in 1955 and his
Clarence Darrow, et al. (New York, PhD in philosophy in 1958. Browning’s
1929). master’s thesis was on the poetry of Dylan
Earth Is Enough: An Essay in Religious Thomas, and later in 1964 he published a
Realism (New York, 1933). book of poetry titled Poems and Visions. His
Architecture and Modern Life, with Frank dissertation in philosophy was on “Judgment
Lloyd Wright (New York, 1937). and Motivation in Contemporary Intuitionist
Art Is Action: A Discussion of Nine Arts in Ethics.” From his teachers he learned ana-
a Modern World (New York, 1939). lytical skills but he did not abandon his
The Philosopher in Chaos: An Attempt to passion for metaphysics and the larger ques-
Make Head and Tail of the Modern tions of human experience. Browning became
World (New York, 1941). interested and influenced by the works of the
Economic Order and Religion, with Frank American pragmatists studying under the
Knight and Thornton Merriam (New direction of David M ILLER (scholar and
York, 1945). student of George Herbert MEAD), and his
The Human Community: Its Philosophy thought was also influenced by other non-
and Practice in Times of Crisis (New analytic philosophers, such as Alfred North
York, 1950). WHITEHEAD, Ernst Cassirer, and José Ortega
The College and the Community: A Critical y Gasset.
Study of Higher Education (New York, In 1958 Browning accepted a philosophy
1952). position at the University of Miami, and he
was promoted up to full professor by 1968.
Other Relevant Works While at Miami he published a number of
Brownell’s papers are at Northwestern articles and one book, Act and Agent (1964),
359
BROWNING
and edited another book. In 1969–70 he was things as they make their appearance in their
a visiting professor at the University of Texas, own right.
which became a permanent position as pro-
fessor of philosophy in 1970. He was chair of BIBLIOGRAPHY
the philosophy department from 1972 to Act and Agent (Coral Gables, Fla., 1964).
1976. He was President of the Florida Ed., Philosophers of Process (New York,
Philosophical Association in 1967; the 1965; 2nd edn, New York, 1998).
Southern Society for Philosophy and Poems and Visions (South Miami, Fla.,
Psychology in 1972; and the Southwestern 1968).
Philosophical Society in 1977. Because of the Ontology and the Practical Arena
breadth of his philosophical interest and (University Park, Penn., 1990).
expertise, as well as his wholehearted com-
mitment to his graduate students, he directed Other Relevant Works
nearly thirty dissertations. His influence is “Sorting and Grading,” Australasian
felt in the impact he has had on his students, Journal of Philosophy 38 (1960):
who have become scholars in ethics and prag- 234–45.
matism. Browning’s inquiries in metaphilos- “The Moral Act,” Philosophical Quarterly
ophy and metaphysics culminated with the 12 (1962): 97–108.
publication of Ontology and the Practical “The Feeling of Freedom,” Review of
Arena in 1990. He retired from Texas in Metaphysics 18 (1964): 123–46.
1999. “Creativity, Correspondence, and
Browning’s numerous articles and books Statements About the Future,”
are on a wide range of philosophical subject Philosophy and Phenomenological
matters. These methodological commitments Research 28 (1968): 514–36.
stand out. (1) The only legitimate starting “Quine and the Ontological Enterprise,”
and ending point for any philosophical inves- Review of Metaphysics 26 (1973):
tigation is our own everyday, concrete expe- 492–510.
rience. Experience is nothing more nor less “Believing in Natural Kinds,” Southwestern
than that which appears, rough and unfin- Journal of Philosophy 9 (1978): 135–48.
ished as it usually is, in our lives from day to “Some Meanings of Automobiles,” in
day. (2) Any responsible guide to metaphys- Technology and Human Affairs, ed.
ical speculation must rest upon a careful Larry Hickman and Azizah Al-Hibri (St.
survey of how things actually make their Louis, 1980).
appearance in our lives. One must learn to be “Sameness Through Change and the
painfully attentive and honest about how the Coincidence of Properties,” Philosophy
things that we find in our experience show and Phenomenological Research 49
their faces. (3) The practical stance of (1988): 103–21.
everyday life, that within which the agent “Necessity in Dewey’s ‘Logic’,” in Frontiers
who considers what to do in the particular sit- in American Philosophy, vol. 1, ed.
uation at hand is also an interactive con- Robert W. Burch and Herman J.
stituent, has been neglected in philosophy Saatkamp, Jr. (College Station, Tex.,
when it should be primary for metaphysical 1992), pp. 221–9.
and ethical inquiry. (4) The project of propos- “Dewey and Ortega on the Starting Point,”
ing criteria for the sorting or classification of Proceedings of the Charles S. Peirce
all of the things of everyday life, as they Society 34 (1998): 69–92.
actually appear there, is ill founded. It dis- “Designation, Characterization, and Theory
tracts us from the brute autonomy of those in Dewey’s Logic,” in Dewey’s Logical
360
BROWNSON
Theory: New Studies and Interpretations, curious combination of Christianity and

ed. F. Thomas Burke, Robert B. Talisse, romantic naturalism. In keeping with much
and D. Micah Hester (Nashville, Tenn., of the literature of the early nineteenth-century
2002), pp. 160–79. transcendentalists, his earliest essays were
highly critical of the “otherworldliness” of
Further Reading orthodox Christianity. Like Ralph Waldo
Harris, George W., and Stephen Leighton, E MERSON , George Ripley, William Ellery
eds. The Ontological and the Practical: Channing, and Amos ALCOTT, Brownson
Essays in Honor of Douglas Browning, looked inward to the individual conscience for
Southwest Philosophy Review, vol. 11 a knowledge of things divine. The conscience
suppl. (Fulton, Miss., 1995). is akin to the voice of God, indeed a portion of
divine being itself implanted upon the human
Gregory Fernando Pappas soul. In calling into question the traditional
hierarchy of being, Brownson’s radical uni-
versalism naturally invited reflection upon the
possibility of progressive advance toward a
more divine-like perfection of the human con-
dition. It was in this way that the religious
BROWNSON, Orestes Augustus views of the late 1820s and 1830s developed
(1803–76) a pronounced political component, for
Brownson felt powerfully drawn toward issues
Orestes A. Brownson was born on 16 of social justice as a function of his inner-
September 1803 in Stockbridge, Vermont, and worldly spirituality. He was particularly inter-
died on 17 April 1876 in Detroit, Michigan. ested in the utopian speculations of Robert
Brownson was a prolific essayist, theologian, Owen, Francis Wright, William Ellery
political philosopher, and literary critic, and Channing, William Godwin, and Comte de
was a well-known figure in the New England Saint-Simon. This interest is reflected in
transcendentalist movement. He was largely Brownson’s first book, New Views of
self-educated; his only formal schooling was at Christianity, Society, and the Church (1836),
the Ballston Academy in New York, where he a work inspired by the neo-Gnosticism of the
was enrolled for only about a year. Important French socialist Comte de Saint-Simon. In this
formative influences included the King James brief volume Brownson expressed his faith in
Bible, Watt’s Psalms and Divine Songs, The the immanent unfolding of a purified civiliza-
Franklin Primer, Jonathan Edwards’s The tion that would be free of all political and
History of Redemption, and a range of English social antagonisms. Similar expectations of
classics in literature and poetry. He was par- utopian transformation, driven by profound
ticularly drawn to theology and philosophy, religious conviction, are contained in the
especially as he encountered these subjects proto-Marxist essay “The Laboring Classes”
through the New England Presbyterian, (1840) and “Church of the Future” (1842),
Universalist, and Unitarian traditions. At the collected in The Works of Orestes Brownson
age of twenty-two Brownson was ordained as (1882–7).
a Universalist minister, and began his literary During the early 1840s, however, Brownson
career as a frequent contributor of sermons to began a thorough reconsideration of his theo-
The Gospel Advocate and Impartial logical and philosophical convictions, and the
Investigator. politics that stemmed from them. This process
Brownson’s early theological and philo- would eventually produce one of the more
sophical convictions were animated by a compelling American conservative minds of
361
BROWNSON
the nineteenth century. Upon studying the concomitant state of moral and ethical nihilism
work of fellow transcendentalist Theodore (“Protestantism Ends in Transcendentalism,”
Parker, Brownson began to suspect that the 1846). Under Protestantism, the human is
form of revolutionary socialism they shared severed from the divine, and the search for
was built upon a philosophically weak foun- meaning in both personal and social existence is
dation. As retold some years later in his auto- frustrated. It was from such conclusions that
biography The Convert, Brownson sensed that Brownson, in a remarkable about-face from his
his religious commitment to the “religion of early career, joined the Catholic Church in
humanity” would lead not to utopia but, in 1844.
effect, to the death of God. Like some later Following his radical change of views,
critics of modernity, Brownson was disturbed Brownson became a pariah in New England
by the nihilistic implications of those who intellectual circles. Even so, he continued his
desire “to be as gods” and recreate the world literary career through his own Brownson’s
according to a human standard of justice. Quarterly Review and Isaac HECKER’s Catholic
Spiritual longing, he reasoned, must ultimately World. In his later work Brownson mainly
identify the divine transcendent as the source occupied himself with two tasks: presenting the
of all human progress, both spiritually and philosophical and theological case for
socially. In developing his critique of the Catholicism over and against Protestant prej-
“religion of humanity” school, Brownson was udices and assumptions, and presenting his
particularly influenced by Pierre Leroux’s phi- own unique political philosophy concerning
losophy of participatory consciousness, and Catholicism and the American regime. He was
the correlative doctrine of divine-human com- especially concerned with the familiar charge
munion. in his day that a democratic regime is incom-
Brownson’s acceptance of transcendent patible with the Catholic faith.
divine being as the source of human good Often at odds with the American hierarchy
meant that revolutionary socialism must lose of his day, Brownson was insistent that only a
its appeal, for God’s creation contained within vibrant and highly visible Catholic cultural
it all that was necessary for fulfilling presence could sustain American democracy.
humanity’s spiritual longing. This meant a He argued that the success of the American
return to orthodox Christianity. Under the experiment in liberty depended upon an
influence of Leroux, Brownson began to see adequate moral foundation, and such can only
the figure of Christ as more than a mere be supplied by an authoritative (i.e., Catholic)
example of the perfect humanitarian. The per- moral teaching regarding the inherent worth
fection of Christ became, as it were, a link to and dignity of all human beings. Moreover,
God himself, and therefore the very incarna- according to Brownson, the American
tion of the communion principle (“The Constitutional order is well founded to culti-
Mediatorial Life of Jesus,” 1842). The idea vate this cultural presence because of the
reestablished for Brownson a more traditional freedom guaranteed to Catholics by the prin-
understanding of the hierarchy of being, and ciples of toleration and the limited state. In no
the necessity of human dependence upon a other nation does the Church find so much
transcendent God. Moreover, Brownson con- freedom to carry out its spiritual and civiliza-
cluded that only the Catholic theological and tional mission. Brownson develops this
spiritual tradition could uphold this primal dis- argument in one of the seminal works in
tinction between the divine and human. All vari- American Catholic political philosophy, The
eties of Protestantism, insofar as they held to American Republic: Its Constitution,
individualistic epistemological assumptions, were Tendencies, and Destiny (1865).
bound to degenerate into subjectivism and a
362
BRUMBAUGH
BIBLIOGRAPHY American Religious Weathervane (Grand

New Views of Christianity, Society, and the Rapids, Mich., 2004).
Church (Boston, 1836). Gilhooley, Leonard. Contradiction and
Essays and Reviews, Chiefly on Theology, Dilemma: Orestes Brownson and the
Politics, and Socialism (New York, American Idea (New York, 1972).
1852). Herrera, R. A. Orestes A. Brownson: Sign
The Convert; or, Leaves from My of Contradiction (Wilmington, Del.,
Experience (New York, 1857; 2nd edn 1999).
1877). Lapati, Americo D. Orestes A. Brownson
The American Republic: Its Constitution, (New York, 1965).
Tendencies, and Destiny (New York, Marshall, Hugh. Orestes Brownson and the
1865). American Republic (Washington, D.C.,
The Works of Orestes Brownson, 20 vols, 1971).
ed. Henry F. Brownson (Detroit, Maynard, Theodore. Orestes Brownson:
1882–7). Yankee, Radical, Catholic (New York,
1943).
Other Relevant Works Raemers, Sidney A. America’s Foremost
Brownson’s papers are at the University of Philosopher (Washington, D.C., 1931).
Notre Dame. Roemer, Lawrence. Brownson on
Literary, Scientific, and Political Views of Democracy and the Trend Toward
Orestes A. Brownson, ed. Henry F. Socialism (New York, 1953).
Brownson (New York, 1893). Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. Orestes A.
The Brownson Reader, ed. Alvin S. Ryan Brownson: A Pilgrim’s Progress (Boston,
(New York, 1955). 1939).
Orestes Brownson: Selected Political
Essays, ed. Russell Kirk (New Brunswick, Gregory S. Butler
New Jersey, 1990).
Selected Writings, ed. Patrick W. Carey
(New York, 1991).
The Early Works of Orestes A. Brownson,
4 vols, ed. Patrick Carey (Milwaukee,
Wisc., 2000–2003). BRUMBAUGH, Robert Sherrick
Orestes A. Brownson: Works in Political (1918–92)
Philosophy, vol. 1, ed. Gregory S. Butler
(Wilmington, Del., 2003). Robert S. Brumbaugh was born on 2
December 1918 in Oregon, Illinois. He
Further Reading attended the University of Chicago, receiving
Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, his BA in 1938, MA in 1938, and PhD in phi-
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer losophy in 1942. His dissertation was on “The
Thought, Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer Role of Mathematics in Plato’s Dialectic,”
Religious Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v7, working primarily with Richard MCKEON.
Oxford Comp Phil After service in the US Army during World
Butler, Gregory S. In Search of the War II from 1943 to 1946, he was assistant
American Spirit: The Political Thought of professor of philosophy at Bowdoin College
Orestes Brownson (Carbondale, Ill., from 1946 to 1948, and at the University of
1992). Indiana from 1948 to 1950. In 1951
Carey, Patrick W. Orestes A. Brownson: Brumbaugh became assistant professor of phi-
363
BRUMBAUGH
losophy at Yale University. He was promoted lations among major systems of thought, pre-
up to full professor by 1961 and taught at sented in Western Philosophic Systems and
Yale for the rest of his career, retiring in 1988. Their Cyclic Transformations (1992).
Brumbaugh died on 14 July 1992 in North
Haven, Connecticut. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brumbaugh’s scholarship interests were con- The Spirit of Western Philosophy: A Historical
centrated in Greek philosophy, metaphysics, Interpretation Including Selections from the
and philosophy of education. He was research Major European Philosophers, with
fellow at the American School for Classical Newton P. Stallknecht (New York, 1950).
Studies in Athens in 1962–3, and a Fulbright The Compass of Philosophy: An Essay in
visiting professor at Hebrew University in Intellectual Orientation, with Newton P.
Jerusalem in 1967. He also was a Morse Stallknecht (New York, 1954).
Fellow in 1954–5 and a Guggenheim Fellow in Plato’s Mathematical Imagination: The
1976–7. He was a member of the Society for Mathematical Passages in the Dialogues and
Ancient Greek Philosophy; the American Their Interpretation (Bloomington, Ind.,
Philosophical Association; the Metaphysical 1954).
Society of America (serving as President in Plato on the One: The Hypotheses in the
1965–6); the Association for Process Parmenides (New Haven, Conn., 1961).
Philosophy of Education (President in Plato for the Modern Age (New York, 1962).
1986–8); the American Association of The Philosophers of Greece (New York, 1964;
University Professors (chapter President in Albany, N.Y., 1981).
1961–2 and member of national council Ancient Greek Gadgets and Machines (New
during 1975–8); the Connecticut Academy of York, 1966).
Arts and Sciences; and Phi Beta Kappa. Philosophical Themes in Modern Education,
Besides Brumbaugh’s several studies of Plato with Nathaniel M. Lawrence (Boston,
and Greek philosophy, he attempted in Plato 1972).
for the Modern Age (1962), Philosophical The Most Mysterious Manuscript: The
Themes in Modern Education (1972), and Voynich “Roger Bacon” Cipher Manuscript
other writings to reveal how mistaken meta- (Carbondale, Ill., 1978).
physical assumptions have shaped modern life Whitehead, Process Philosophy, and
and society, not always to our benefit. In the Education (Albany, N.Y., 1982).
1970s, he turned his talents from his mathe- Unreality and Time (Albany, N.Y., 1984).
matical explorations of Plato’s dialectics Platonic Studies of Greek Philosophy: Form,
toward an attempt to decipher the mysteri- Arts, Gadgets, and Hemlock (Albany, N.Y.,
ously encoded “Voynich manuscript,” a chal- 1989).
lenge that had defeated many others, including Western Philosophic Systems and Their Cyclic
philosopher William R. NEWBOLD. Introduced Transformations (Carbondale, Ill., 1992).
by Charles HARTSHORNE to process philosophy
at Chicago, Brumbaugh adopted some of A. N. Other Relevant Works
WHITEHEAD’s metaphysical and educational “An Aristotelian Defense of ‘Non-Aristotelian’
views, and incorporated them into his own Logics,” Journal of Philosophy 48 (1951):
metaphysical speculations on time, change, 582–5.
and reality. His Unreality and Time (1984) “Aristotle’s Outline of the Problems of First
gathers together most of his best efforts on Philosophy,” Review of Metaphysics 7
speculative metaphysics. Brumbaugh’s study of (1954): 511–21.
the entire history of Western philosophy cul- “Kinds of Time: An Excursion in First
minated in his theories about the deep interre- Philosophy,” in Experience, Existence and
364
BRUNSWIK
the Good, ed. Irwin C. Lieb (Carbondale, BRUNSWIK, Egon (1903–55)

Ill., 1961), pp. 119–25.
Ed. with Nathaniel M. Lawrence, Egon Brunswik was born on 17 March 1903 in
Philosophers on Education: Six Essays on Budapest, Hungary and died on 7 July 1955
the Foundations of Western Thought in Berkeley, California. Growing up as a
(Boston, 1963). descendent of a well-known family most of
“Logic and Time,” Review of Metaphysics 18 whose male family members served the
(1965): 649–56. Austro-Hungarian crown as civil servants and
“The Trial of Socrates,” in Six Trials, ed. engineers, Brunswik was destined for higher
Robert S. Brumbaugh (New York, 1969), education. Before turning to the study of psy-
pp. 9–23. chology, he spent two years studying engi-
“Applied Metaphysics and Social Unrest,” neering. In 1927 he graduated from the
Metaphilosophy 1 (1970): 66–70. University of Vienna with a degree as a teacher
“Changes of Value Order and Choices in of mathematics and physics and a doctorate in
Time,” in Value and Valuation: Axiological psychology. His dissertation title was
Studies in Honor of Robert S. Hartman, ed. “Strukturmonismus und Physik.” Brunswik’s
John W. Davis (Knoxville, Tenn., 1972). dissertation contained a critical appraisal of
“Cosmography: The Problem of Modern the philosophical aspects of modern physics
Systems,” Review of Metaphysics 26 that had found application in the field of
(1973): 511–21. Gestalt psychology. The psychologist Karl
“Robert Hartman’s Formal Axiology: An Bühler and the philosopher Moritz Schlick were
Extension,” Journal of Value Inquiry 11 on his doctoral advisory committee. While
(1977): 259–63. Bühler and Schlick shared the general quest for
“Plato’s Ideal Curriculum and Contemporary an overarching perspective on the relationship
Philosophy of Education,” Educational between the sciences and for the appropriate
Theory 37 (1987): 169–77. positioning of psychology as a science, they
pursued starkly contrasting programs with
Further Reading regard to this general issue; Bühler’s was
Benson, Garth, and Bryant Griffith, eds. informed by the study of language, Schlick’s by
Process, Epistemology, and Education: an analysis of the development of physics. One
Recent Work in Educational Process was therefore led to align psychology with a
Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Robert S. general theory of signs, the other with physiol-
Brumbaugh (Toronto, 1996). ogy and even with a vision of a physics of brain
“Brumbaugh, Robert Sherrick 1918–1992,” in mechanisms.
Contemporary Authors, New Revision Brunswik similarly sought to identify a con-
Series, vol. 70 (Detroit, 1998), pp. 111–12. ceptual basis for psychology. He felt strongly
Hendley, Brian P. “Robert Brumbaugh: that psychology as a relatively recent science
Towards a Process Philosophy of should be careful about uncritically adopting
Education,” Process Studies 17 (1988): principles from other sciences to guide its mode
227–31. of inquiry and the questions it would undertake
———, ed. Plato, Time, and Education: to study. In its most developed form, his
Essays in Honor of Robert S. Brumbaugh proposal appears in a 1952 paper, “The
(Albany, N.Y., 1987). Contains a Conceptual Framework of Psychology,” pub-
bibliography of Brumbaugh’s writings. lished in the International Encyclopedia of
Unified Science.
John R. Shook After receiving his doctorate, Brunswik con-
tinued his academic career at the Vienna
365
BRUNSWIK
Psychological Institute, then under the direc- where a Rockefeller stipend had been obtained
torship of Karl Bühler (see Benetka 1997). As for him by Tolman. While the general political
a main assistant to Bühler he took charge of atmosphere in Austria had become uncom-
much of the experimental work in perception, fortable for many academics after an authori-
some of it with a developmental focus. He also tarian regime had taken power in 1934 (four
lectured in this area. In 1931–2 he served as a years prior to the Nazi invasion in 1938), in
visiting lecturer at the Gazi Institute, then a Brunswik’s case the move was equally moti-
college of education in Ankara, Turkey, where vated by career opportunity. In 1937, shortly
he set up a psychological laboratory, probably after the University of Vienna had promoted
the country’s first. He returned to Vienna and him to the status of associate professor,
in 1934 was appointed Privatdozent. His Brunswik accepted appointment as assistant
Habilitationsschrift was published in 1934 as professor of psychology at the University of
Wahrnehmung und Gegenstandswelt. From California, Berkeley. In 1938 he married his
Schlick and the Vienna Circle he took the com- fiancée, Else Frenkel (PhD with Charlotte
mitment to a careful scrutinization of scientific Bühler at Vienna in 1930), who also had a sig-
language and methodology, in his case of the nificant career in psychology and whose work
notion of “object” (Gegenstand), and of the in personality theory Brunswik considered
assumptions underlying measurement in per- immediately relevant to his own conception of
ceptual research. With Bühler he shared a com- psychology as a science (1952). Brunswik
mitment to the notion of “signs” (which in became an American citizen in 1943. He was
Brunswik’s later work became “cues”) and a promoted to full professor of psychology in
biological, as distinct from a physiological, ori- 1947 and held this position until his death.
entation towards the study of psychology. During his years at Berkeley, Brunswik devel-
At the University of Vienna, Brunswik made oped a unique integration of: (1) a functional-
the acquaintance of Edward C. TOLMAN, who ist approach to the study of psychology; (2) a
was there on sabbatical leave. As a result of critique of widely held methodological stan-
their discussions, Tolman and Brunswik co- dards in experimental psychology; coupled with
authored a paper in 1935 conjoining their the- (3) a probabilistic theory of the ecology (see
oretical perspectives in arguing that intended Gigerenzer 1987). This integration came to be
objects are attained through a process involv- known as “probabilistic functionalism” (1955).
ing local representation or signs. Examples in As Brunswik once put it, in the United States his
perception, Brunswik’s domain, were cues sig- self-assigned task became, the “bringing to con-
naling depth or distance from the observer; vergence European academic with Anglo-
examples in learning, Tolman’s domain, were American statistical tradition” (1947, p. 56).
means to achieving a goal, such as choosing an This convergence entailed the introduction of
action in order to find food. In both cases the correlational statistics to research on perceptual
relationship between signs and objects (to be constancies (see 1940). His new practice was a
achieved) was conceptualized as one of equiv- departure from the approach that he had used
ocality, and thus required the language of in Vienna, which had involved a constancy
uncertainty, i.e., probability, for its descrip- ratio, also known as “the Brunswik ratio.”
tion. In this way, the “uncertainty of knowledge With this measure, a separate ratio had to be
and behavior” became linked to the frequency computed for each observed item in an exper-
of couplings of characteristic features of the imental set-up and these were then combined to
environment (Tolman and Brunswik 1935, p. create indices describing classes of items accord-
55; see Kurz-Milcke and Innis 2003). ing to experimental condition. By contrast, the
In 1935–6 Brunswik spent the academic year use of the correlation coefficient generated
in Berkeley at the University of California, measures that aggregated over items in an
366
BRUNSWIK
experimental set-up and were therefore no frequency of precision” (Perception and the
longer geared towards individual items or even Representative Design of Psychological
experimental conditions. Experiments, 1956, p. 146). These method-
Along with this new cue-based approach to ological and theoretical considerations culmi-
the study of perception, mediation became a nated in his proposal and call for “representa-
significant research question. Initially, media- tive design” in psychological research. With
tion was merely a one-dimensional concept this new paradigm, Brunswik was on a path
involving, for example, no more than correlat- that led him irrevocably away from experi-
ing retinal size (the mediating stimulus) with mental research conceived in terms of orthog-
measured size of the items in an experimental onal variables under the control of an experi-
set-up and also with perceptual judgments by menter.
the observers (1940). Size constancy (the rela- From his days as a doctoral student in
tively constant perceived size of items placed at Vienna and throughout his career, Brunswik
varying distances) also remained among remained in contact with the unity of science
Brunswik’s favorite working examples for the movement, and at various times contributed to
elaboration of mediation. His elaborate schema its conferences and publications. At the time of
for this case contained a hierarchy of mediating his death he was a member of the board of
distance cues (reprinted in Perception and the trustees of the Institute for the Unity of Science
Representative Design of Psychological in Boston. As a scholar Brunswik was highly
Experiments, 1956). This schema for size con- respected; but his approach to the study of psy-
stancy bears notable resemblance to his subse- chology was, in its substance, either ignored or
quently proposed “generalized ‘lens-model’,” openly rejected by his peers (see reactions by
which he intended broadly as a “composite Leo Postman, Ernest R. Hilgard, David KRECH,
picture of the functional unit of behavior” and Herbert FEIGL presented at the Berkeley
(1952, p. 678; see Kurz-Milcke and Innis Conference for the Unity of Science, published
2003). with Brunswik, 1955). His contribution to the
From early on Brunswik had the reputation philosophy of science, where he emphasized
of being an outstanding experimenter. In his the thematic differentiation among the sciences,
later career in the United States he came to has gone largely unrecognized. Nor has psy-
push the envelope of experimental psychology, chology generally responded to his critique of
in theory and practice, seeking out a novel nomothetically oriented experimentation and
methodology for the study of perception and, his proposal of “representative design,” both of
more generally, of human judgment. This novel which challenged convictions deeply held by his
approach involved taking research on percep- colleagues.
tual constancy outside the psychological labo- Brunswik’s intellectual contributions resist
ratory without, however, ever giving up his easy classification into the better-known
urge for sophistication in measurement. In this schools of thought existing now or during his
new paradigm he had only a few observers (or lifetime. He held relations to logical positivism,
participants, one of them the “non-interfering but his thought on psychology’s standing as a
‘experimenter’”) making many judgments of science did not mark him as a logical positivist;
various items as they walked about the Berkeley his philosophy of science was, in fact, more
campus. This approach and design, which he closely related to that of Karl Bühler. He shared
characterized as the “laissez-faire policy for the Gestalt psychology’s interest in perception, but
ecology” (1955, p. 198), was utterly predicated with an ecological orientation, which is
upon his focus on “achievement,” which in his markedly different from the views of well-
assessment meant the robustness of perception known Gestalt psychologists, such as Wolfgang
from grave error “at the expense of the highest KÖHLER. He studied learning (at one time, with
367
BRUNSWIK
rats) but was not a behaviorist of any known Morris (Chicago, 1952), pp. 655–750.
school although he had ties with Tolman’s pur- “Representative Design and Probabilistic
posive behaviorism, itself not an easily classifi- Theory in a Functional Psychology,”
able brand of behaviorism. He studied human Psychological Review 62 (1955): 193–217.
cognition and although sympathetic toward Perception and the Representative Design of
cybernetics and information processing theory, Psychological Experiments (Berkeley, Cal.,
which appeared relatively late in the develop- 1956).
ment of his thought, his major intellectual alle- “Historical and Thematic Relations of
giances were with theoretical psychology. Psychology to Other Sciences,” Scientific
After Brunswik’s death, his work maintained Monthly 83 (1956): 151–61.
a steady influence with a small number of psy-
chologists interested in research on human Other Relevant Works
judgment and decision-making. In recent years The Psychology of Egon Brunswik, ed.
there has been something of a reawakening of Kenneth R. Hammond (New York, 1966).
interest in his ideas. His influence has been felt Wahrnehmung und Gegenstandswelt: Zum
in a number of areas, not only within psychol- Lebenswerk von Egon Brunswik
ogy (such as cognition, social psychology, and (1903–1955), ed. Kurt R. Fischer and
human factors), but also within the medical Friedrich Stadler (Vienna, 1995).
field and environmental sciences. The Essential Brunswik: Beginnings,
Explications, Applications, ed. Kenneth R.
BIBLIOGRAPHY Hammond and Thomas R. Stewart (New
Wahrnehmung und Gegenstandswelt – York, 2001).
Grundlegung einer Psychologie vom
Gegenstand her (Leipzig and Vienna, Further Reading
1934). Bio Dict Psych by Zusne, Encyc Psych
“The Organism and the Causal Texture of Benetka, G. Psychologie in Wien: Sozial- und
the Environment,” with Edward C. Theoriengeschichte des Wiener
Tolman, Psychological Review 42 (1935): Psychologischen Instituts 1922–1938
43–77. (Vienna, 1997).
“Psychology as a Science of Objective Gigerenzer, G. “Survival of the Fittest
Relations,” Philosophy of Science 4 Probabilist: Brunswik, Thurstone, and the
(1937): 227–60. Two Disciplines of Psychology,” in The
“Thing Constancy as Measured by Probabilistic Revolution, vol. 2, ed. L.
Correlation Coefficients,” Psychological Krüger, G. Gigerenzer, and M. S. Morgan
Review 47 (1940): 69–78. (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), pp. 49–72.
“Distal Focussing of Perception: Size-con- Hammond, K. “Probabilistic Functionalism
stancy in a Representative Sample of and the Clinical Method,” Psychological
Situations,” Psychological Monographs 56 Review 62 (1955): 255–62.
(1944): 1–49. Kurz, E. M., and R. D. Tweney. “The
Systematic and Representative Design of Heretical Psychology of Egon Brunswik,”
Psychological Experiments: With Results in A Pictorial History of Psychology, ed.
in Physical and Social Perception W. G. Bringmann, H. E. Lueck, R. Miller,
(Berkeley, Cal., 1947). and C. E. Early (Carol Stream, Ill., 1997),
“The Conceptual Framework of pp. 221–32.
Psychology,” in International Encyclopedia Kurz-Milcke, E., and Nancy Innis. “Egon
of Unified Science, vol. 1, ed. Otto Brunswik: Student of Achievement,” in
Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, and Charles Portraits of Pioneers in Psychology, vol. 5,
368
BRYANT
ed. G. A. Kimble and M. Wertheimer twelve he began having a recurrent dream in

(Mahwah, N.J., 2003), pp. 209–28. which he found himself “bound to a huge iron
Kurz-Milcke, E., and L. Martignon. wheel that rolled along without the slightest jar
“Modeling Practices and Tradition,” in and with tremendous velocity along a thin,
Model-based Reasoning: Scientific perfectly straight line of fire stretched through
Discovery, Technological Innovation, empty space …” This “struggle with the
Values (New York, 2002), pp. 127–46. infinite” occupied him much of his adult life
Leary, D. E. “From Act Psychology to (1898, pp. 408–409).
Probabilistic Functionalism: The Place of At the beginning of the Civil War Bryant
Egon Brunswik in the History of enlisted as a private in the 3rd Iowa infantry,
Psychology,” in Psychology in Twentieth- rising to the rank of adjutant general with
Century Thought, ed. M. G. Ash and W. special honors by the time of his discharge in
R. Woodward (New York, 1987), pp. 1864. After the war, he attended Ohio
115–42. Wesleyan University, receiving the BA in 1869
Scholz, R. W., and O. Tietje. Embedded Case and the MA in 1871. During those years, he
Study Methods: Integrating Quantitative also met the woman he married, Sarah
and Qualitative Knowledge (Thousand Augusta Shade. She would later be known as
Oaks, Cal., 2002). an accomplished landscape painter and
Tolman, E. C. “Wahrnehmung und assisted him in writing the Philosophy of
Gegenstandswelt – Grundlegung einer Landscape Painting (1882).
Psychologie vom Gegenstand her, by Egon In 1873 he accepted a position in the St.
Brunswik,” Psychological Bulletin 32 Louis public schools so that he could study phi-
(1935): 608–13. losophy under the direction of idealist William
———, “Egon Brunswik, Psychologist and T. H ARRIS as a member of the St. Louis
Philosopher of Science,” Science 122 Philosophical Society. Bryant was an active
(1955): 910. member from the 1870s until his death. The
———, “Egon Brunswik: 1903–1955,” only published St. Louis philosopher with a
American Journal of Psychology 69 background in natural science (geology),
(1956): 315–42. Bryant sought to reconstruct and develop
Hegel’s philosophy of nature and aesthetics. In
Elke Kurz-Milcke 1881 Harris placed him in charge of the
department of psychology and ethics in the St.
Louis High School. Bryant published
numerous translations and philosophical
articles in The Journal of Speculative
Philosophy and several philosophical books
BRYANT, William McKendree and pamphlets. For thirty-nine years he taught
(1843–1919) in the St. Louis Public School System. Retiring
in 1912, Bryant moved his family to their
William McKendree Bryant was born on 31 summer home in Waynesville, North Carolina,
March 1843 in Lake County, Indiana, the son where he died on 28 May 1919.
of Eliphalet W. and Esther Eliza (Brown) Bryant’s The World-energy and Its Self-con-
Bryant. As a child he was taught in a log cabin servation (1890) is the first installment of a
schoolhouse. On Sundays the family attended projected two-volume work. The second
a Methodist church where the preacher volume on human nature never appeared,
emphasized the agonies of hell, instilling in although Bryant worked on it until his death.
Bryant a morbid fear of the infinite. At age The World-Energy focuses on the question of
369
BRYANT
what nature is as a prologue to the second identical to “World-energy,” whose basic

volume, which would have addressed the physical modulations are the relations of attrac-
question of man’s place in nature. In the tion and repulsion. The tensions between attrac-
preface, Bryant discusses two approaches to tions and repulsions throughout the cosmos
the philosophy of nature – the speculative and create intensive quantities, the source of quali-
the scientific. Speculative philosophy of nature ties, and all objects. All finite entities and
involves contextual or relational thinking, processes, including cognition, are relations
aiming at the concrete universal, which is the internal to World Spirit. Bryant’s first move is
unity of universality and particularity reached to show that all forms of knowledge, from
by holding differences or otherness as consti- simple feeling to the World Spirit’s return to
tutional to what a thing is. itself in self-conscious beings, are based upon the
Bryant agrees with many critics of Hegel’s unity of sameness and otherness. His second
speculative philosophy of nature that it analysis begins with the atom and its particles,
contains astonishing errors. The method of and ends with cosmological theory. The third
science, he contends, avoids speculation, con- and final analysis starts with the inorganic and
structing hypotheses out of known facts. But traces the evolution of man as the courier of
Bryant asserts that the popular view that World Spirit’s self-consciousness.
science deals exclusively with facts is naïve. Bryant’s first analysis shows the relational
Facts must be interpreted, and interpretation nature of knowledge, from sensation to logic,
involves theorizing and relational thinking. and at the same time reveals that at each level
Science proceeds from principles and reflec- their distinctive objects are isomorphic with
tion, anticipating experience and proceeding to such relations. The most rudimentary form of
the verification process. Reductionism is a by- cognition is one in which a sensitive subject is
product of the naïve avoidance of speculative related to a spatial object through direct contact.
thinking that robs human life of meaningful Skin or membrane sensations/feelings are more
orientation and destroys our efforts to har- or less definite, yet there is present an experi-
monize our being with the cosmos. The reli- enced distinction between the act and the object.
gious impulse to position oneself in harmony Even at this basic level there is the double ref-
with the cosmos is the most general expression erence of awareness: an intentional object and
of Darwinian adaptation in human life. the sense that this object is for me. In sensation
An adequate view of nature would blend the world enters my body and is reflected in
the positive features of the speculative and sci- bodily awareness.
entific methods, by revealing speculative Perception involves the use of sensory organs
elements in modern science. This would result that form definite images of external objects.
in a speculative and dialectical philosophy of These images are a function of the structure of
nature, in which the identity of thought and both the sensory organs and the object. In per-
being is demonstrated. Along the way, Bryant ception the conscious subject fixes its attention
employees insights from other thinkers, espe- on an object that it has singled out from a mul-
cially Aristotle, Baruch Spinoza, Sir Isaac tiplicity of objects. The objects in a multiplicity
Newton, Immanuel Kant, Herbert Spencer, are similar in that they belong to the same sur-
Charles Darwin, Hermann von Helmholtz, rounding totality, yet their individuality is
and Bryant’s mentor, William T. Harris. founded upon their differences. The act of
In The World-energy Bryant shows that the explicitly recognizing relations of sameness and
objects of scientific study, namely atoms, parti- difference is the beginning of conception.
cles, chemical combinations, and the evolution Conceptions function in making judgments,
of life and consciousness, are differentiations which are based on the laws of thought, the
of the World Spirit. World Spirit is by nature principles of identity, contradiction, and
370
BRYANT
excluded middle. The laws of thought provide and time, because they are universal features of
a fixed point of reference or nonrelativity and experience.
show that thought and being are isomorphic. The objects of sensory experience are
The law of identity says a thing is identical extended in space, which we know by the resis-
with itself. This means that existence is tance an object offers to our activity. The
uniform or changelessly one with itself. The attempt to compress an object manifests resis-
locus of this in modern physics is the principle tance in the form of the object’s parts resisting
of the conservation of energy. The totality of inclusion. That is to say, the object’s parts
energy in the universe neither increases nor repel one another. The attempt to divide or
decreases. The law of contradiction entails that split an object also manifests resistance but in
a thing must be either A or not A depending on the form of attraction of its parts. Repulsion
a set of conditions. “A” must change as its and attraction are two universal modes of uni-
surrounding conditions change. For example, versal energy. Objects in space are dispersed or
when a diamond is vaporized and combined concentrated. Dispersion is due to the basic
with oxygen, plants can absorb it as carbon force of repulsion. If only repulsion existed,
dioxide. “A” can be both A and not A if not dispersion would be total. If only attraction
A is potentiality, or liability to changing con- existed, all matter would be concentrated into
ditions. Since surrounding conditions are them- a single heavy point that would implode upon
selves surrounded by yet other conditions, itself.
change must be ceaseless. The law of contra- Bryant argues that repulsion and attraction,
diction implies that change can only be serial, though opposites, are coupled within the logic
and that a self-same substance must exist of essence. To be a force, something must be
through these transformations. The third law overcome, some counterforce must resist. Thus
of thought, excluded middle, entails that the neither repulsion nor attraction is thinkable
categories of existence or nonexistence exhaust without the other. If we imagine a linear series
all possibilities. Bryant concludes from his first of five particles (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) the middle
analysis that World Spirit, as the totality of particle (3) will be in a state of equilibrium, the
existence, is the energy system of the world. All recipient of repulsion from each side pair. This
change is serial and internal to the World repulsion against the middle particle concen-
Spirit. The World Spirit as totality is in eternal trates force in it, which acts as a counterforce
repose, however. Sensitive creatures know of repulsion to each side pair. If we imagine
changes relationally as self/other, same/differ- this linear series rotating, thereby forming a
ent, polarities that constitute the singleness of disc, there will be different distances from one
sensitive creatures. Thought cannot be wholly particle to another, the forces lessening in pro-
distinct from nature, Bryant argues, otherwise portion to the greater distance. The addition of
the ability of thought to go beyond itself would more lines of particles creates a rotating sphere,
be wholly inexplicable. which constitutes mass. Mass is the number of
Bryant’s second analysis focuses upon the force centers that constitute a body. The atom
objects of research in physics and chemistry. itself is a dense core of force spheres.
He rejects the existence of Newtonian space Bryant rejects the notion of unknowable
because space has no positive characteristics, objects. Reality divorced from appearance
for example., no dimensions and no internal- leaves appearances unexplained. Following
ity. Space only has the negative characteristic Hegel, he says that appearance is reality mani-
of lack of resistance. Real space is a relation festing itself. Science too has its shadowy meta-
between bodies, whole to part, part to part. physical posits, one of which is the material
Likewise, time is a relation between events. atom. Bryant considers and rejects two rival
There are no special organs to detect space views of the atom, concluding that the material
371
BRYANT
atom is bad metaphysics. Matter is essentially collecting around a center through attractive
energy in its two necessarily related modes, force. The particles making up centrality have
attraction and repulsion. Points of matter are a mere external relation to one another,
centers from which force radiates in all direc- forming a more or less stable equilibrium.
tions, the intensity of the force inversely related Beyond this is the second type of individual,
to increase in distance from that center. Atoms the chemical compound. Here atoms depend
have no fixed boundary and no simple on other atoms for what they lack, i.e., they
location, because they are spheres of force with share particles and manifest affinity or indif-
a focus or nuclear density that constitutes each ference for one another. This affinity/indiffer-
atom’s impenetrability. The universe is an indi- ence is proto-choice, the first manifestation of
visible unity, or plenum, of these spheres of the internal nature of centrality. The internal
force. Gravity is not a kind of matter, but core of centrality in compounds is revealed in
mutual attraction. When an object falls to proto-spontaneity. New qualities appear
earth, the earth falls toward that object as well, throughout the vast array of such compounds.
the latter movement being far too small to These qualitative features are based upon the
measure. There is an indefinite number of tensions between the attractions and repul-
dimensions to the universe, but it is not splin- sions of their parts. The third type of individ-
tered by its indefinite dimensionality. ual is the organism, which incorporates cen-
Bryant’s third analysis is of World Spirit itself. trality and affinity, but goes beyond it in com-
The principle of the conservation of energy holds plication. In the living individual assimilation
that it cannot be destroyed but only transformed. of parts from an environment on a continuous
This totality cannot have been created by some- or rhythmic basis is necessary for the unity, sta-
thing else, because that would presuppose the bility, and spontaneity of the unit. Whereas a
existence of energy. The totality cannot be group of atoms or a compound can be divided
destroyed, for that too would require energy. without altering the nature of either, the
The totality cannot be measured by mathemat- removal of parts of an organism alters the
ical calculus. Energy is the one substance, nec- nature of the unit through debilitation or
essarily differentiating itself. The development of death. A separated part collapses into the
the World Spirit is systematic, logical, and uni- merely chemical. With living individuals the
versal in its processes. World Spirit exhibits both World Spirit differentiates itself in the creative
self-determination and spontaneity, because it is environment, which is absorbed by the living
not determined from without, and also exhibits thing. It would be just as correct to say that the
play and sporting because it is a variety-maker, environment, as energizing World Spirit,
experimenting as it unfolds novelty. World creates its species, as it would be to say that the
Spirit’s manifold differentiations are necessary; species has an environment. The self-conscious
otherwise it would be mere abstract identity. All unit is the fullest expression of individuality.
phases of differentiation are forms of coming- The World Spirit objectifies itself into the being
forth and returning, emanation and absorption. that can make itself its own object. Moreover,
To meet the frequent criticism that this unit can contrast or oppose itself to World
Hegelianism reduces the individual to a mere Spirit. The self-conscious being, as a type, will
moment or phase in the advance of the be repeated with restricted variation through-
Absolute, Bryant offers a theory of the devel- out the cosmos, where similar environing con-
opment of individuality out of the self-differ- ditions prevail. Self-conscious beings are true
entiation of World Spirit. There are three and distinct individuals because they occupy a
grades of individuality. The simplest is “cen- spatiotemporal nexus, oppose themselves to
trality,” which characterizes the atom. others, have freedom and self-determination. It
Centrality is characterized by foci of energy is open to each person to progressively approx-
372
BUCHANAN
imate the rationality of the world, and at the (Bristol, UK, 2001).
same time to become a playful or sporting Snider, Denton J. The St. Louis Movement in
variant of its personality. Philosophy, Literature, Education,
Bryant’s philosophy of nature provided Psychology with Chapters of
inspiration for his aesthetics. He saw the Autobiography (St. Louis, 1920).
advance of science and speculative philosophy
increasingly embodied in landscape painting Michael H. DeArmey
over the centuries. The range in the artist’s
ability to depict breeze, fog, mist, rocks, the
waves of the ocean, forests, etc., and to depict
properties like weight, perspective, motion,
and light, runs concurrently with the history of
science and philosophy. In this vision, the BUCHANAN, James McGill (1919– )
universe is like the radiant interior of a church.
The morbid fear of endlessness, the rolling James M. Buchanan was born on 3 October
wheel of fire through empty space, is 1919 in Murfreesboro, Tennessee. He was
overcome. The task of life is to perfect per- educated at a local public school and then the
sonality towards the reason, self-determina- local college, Middle Tennessee State College,
tion, and energetic play of the World Spirit. where he earned a BA in 1940. He also earned
One will undergo physical death, but one’s an MS from the University of Tennessee in
personality will merge into the eternal repose 1941. After being drafted into the United
of World Spirit. States Navy in 1941 and serving through 1945,
he returned to school on a GI subsidy, earning
BIBLIOGRAPHY a PhD in economics from the University of
Philosophy of Landscape Painting (St. Louis, Chicago in 1948. After graduation he taught
1882). economics at the University of Tennessee for
The World-energy and Its Self-conservation three years until he moved to Florida State
(Chicago, 1890). University where he was professor of eco-
Hegel’s Educational Ideas (Chicago, 1896). nomics until 1956. After 1956 Buchanan had
Life, Death and Immortality, with Kindred three main professional associations with
Essays (New York, 1898). academic institutions in Virginia. He was pro-
fessor of economics at the University of
Other Relevant Works Virginia from 1956 to 1969, and was
Goethe as a Representative of the Modern University Distinguished Professor of
Art Spirit (St. Louis, 1889). Economics at Virginia Polytechnic Institute
Eternity: A Thread in the Weaving of a Life from 1969 to 1983, where he established the
(Chicago, 1892). Center for the Study of Public Choice. In 1983
A Syllabus of Psychology (Chicago, 1893). Buchanan moved, with the Public Choice
A Syllabus of Ethics (Chicago, 1894). Center, to George Mason University as
Ethics and the New Education (Chicago, Holbert L. Harris University Professor of
1894). Economics, which remains his current
position. He is also the Advisory General
Further Reading Director of the James Buchanan Center for
Nat Cycl Amer Bio v5, Who Was Who in Political Economy at George Mason
Amer v1 University. In 1986 Buchanan was awarded
DeArmey, Michael H., and James A. Good, the Nobel Prize in Economics.
eds. The St. Louis Hegelians, 3 vols A self-described “libertarian socialist,” on
373
BUCHANAN
his arrival at Chicago Buchanan was “con- mental challenge in Buchanan’s Public
verted” to classical liberalism after six weeks Principles of Public Debt (1958). Buchanan
of price theory with Frank KNIGHT. The liber- challenged the Keynesian doctrine on method-
tarian values remained, but now Buchanan ological and analytical grounds. The level of
understood through Knight that the market aggregation in Keynesian fiscal theory, for
(not government) was the organizational form example, strained imagination, violated the
most consistent with those values. Knight political norms of democratic society, and fun-
became Buchanan’s intellectual role model. damentally misconstrued the nature of the debt
Also at Chicago, Buchanan discovered Knut burden. By confining their focus to the aggre-
Wicksell’s principle of just taxation while gate unit, fiscal theorists were unable to address
browsing Harper Library. Buchanan’s work to the problem of who will have to pay for the
a large extent can be summarized as the per- creation of public goods and when payment
sistent and consistent development of the two will be made. The problem was an elementary
intellectual influences from Knight and one: the principle of opportunity cost and
Wicksell. The final intellectual influence on economic decision-making was forgotten in the
Buchanan was the Italian tradition of public Keynesian analysis.
finance that he was exposed to during a The controversy over the burden of debt
Fulbright Fellowship year in 1955–6. This tra- issue forced Buchanan to re-examine the con-
dition emphasized “real” as opposed to ideal ceptual foundations of economic science. This
politics, which provided the final piece of the led to his Cost and Choice (1969), a slim
intellectual puzzle that led to Buchanan’s devel- volume, but broad in implication. The consis-
opment of public choice theory. tent pursuit of the opportunity cost logic of
From Knight, Buchanan obtained his basic economics would lead to surprising results on
economic theory framework and the idea that a broad range of issues, from the burden of debt
economics is not a science in the traditional to issues concerning the military draft, the
meaning of that term. From Wicksell, problem of externalities, and the choice context
Buchanan learned that politics needs to be of bureaucratic decision-making.
understood in an exchange framework. It is The Calculus of Consent (1962),
Efficiency in the public sector would be guar- Buchanan and Gordon Tullock’s comprehen-
anteed only under a rule of unanimity for col- sive examination of the political market, that
lective choices. From the Italians, Buchanan deserves credit for shifting scholarly focus.
learned that public finance theory must neces- Before Public Choice, it was commonplace in
sarily postulate a theory of the state, and that economic theory to postulate an objective
it would be best to reject either Benthamite welfare function which “society” sought to
utilitarianism or Hegelian idealism in postu- maximize, and to assume that political actors
lating such a theory. In retrospect, once these were motivated to pursue that objective welfare
three elements were brought together, the nec- function. The Buchanan/Tullock critique
essary foundational framework for Buchanan’s amounted to simply pointing out that (1) no
contributions to the economics of the public objective welfare function exists, (2) that even
sector were there. What remained was working if one existed “societies” do not choose, only
out the implications. individuals do, and (3) that individuals within
By recasting the questions of public finance the political sector, just as in the private sector,
in light of this Knight/Wicksell/Italian connec- base their choices on their private assessment of
tion, Buchanan was able to challenge the costs and benefits.
received wisdom of his day on several fronts. Many of the major insights of modern polit-
For example, the Keynesian theory of func- ical economy flow from these three elementary
tional finance met perhaps its most funda- propositions including the vote motive, the
374
BUCHANAN
logic of dispersed costs and concentrated individuals within politics. In particular, if

benefits, the shortsightedness bias in policy, government officials are revenue maximizing,
and the constitutional perspective in policy then the question becomes: what rules of the
evaluation. Politics must be endogenous in game are necessary to transform revenue-max-
any reasonable model of economic policy- imizing behavior into wealth-maximizing
making, and realistic political processes are behavior? This is a question of constitutional
not something to be romanticized. But the design – one that affects the time preference of
intellectual spirit of the age (the 1950s and rulers and the range of policy choices at their
early 1960s) was one of overly zealous disposal for pursuing their interests. In both of
optimism about the beneficial nature of his books written with Geoffrey Brennan, The
politics. The Buchanan warning of democra- Power to Tax (1980) and The Reason of
tic folly, and the need for constitutional con- Rules (1985), Buchanan employed the
straint was one that did not sit well with the economic man assumption to establish rules,
intellectual/political idealist of the day. In the which guard against “worst case” scenarios in
wake of the Vietnam War and Watergate, as politics. Even if rulers were sinners, then it
well as the failed economic policies that have would be an important political theory result
emerged from both Democratic and to design a constitution that would compel
Republican administrations during the post these sinners by constraints to act more like
World War II era, it is now difficult to imagine saints.
a non-cynical view of politics. This is not an Throughout Buchanan’s career there is a
endorsement of apathy and malcontent with surprising unity in his research purpose and
politicians. Nowhere in the Buchanan body of the basic propositions that guide his work.
work is it suggested that politicians are any From his early critique of social choice theory
worse than the lot of us. Rather, his work and welfare economics to his most recent
simply stressed that politicians are just like writings on constitutional design, Buchanan’s
the rest of us – neither sinners nor saints, but work persistently stresses the following points.
a bit of both. To Buchanan, economics is a “science” but
During the 1970s Buchanan’s work shifted not one like the physical sciences; it is a
to social philosophy. Limits of Liberty (1975) “philosophical” science and the strictures
is his statement of the contractarian perspective against scientism offered by Frank Knight and
in political economy. This was followed by col- F. A. HAYEK should be heeded. Economics is
lections of essays in Freedom in Constitutional about choice and processes of adjustment, not
Contract (1977), Liberty, Market and State states of rest. Equilibrium models are only
(1986), and The Economics and the Ethics of useful when we recognize their limits. Though
Constitutional Order (1991). economics is about exchange, it is not about
On a methodological front, Buchanan maximizing. Exchange activity or arbitrage
employed the assumption of economic man should be the central focus of economic
within politics not as a description of the moti- analysis. Most importantly, economics is about
vation of any particular political actor, but individual actors, not collective entities. Only
rather as a modeling strategy in constitutional individuals choose. Economics is about a game
design. In developing models of public finance, played within rules and it cannot be studied
as noted above, Buchanan learned from the properly outside of politics. The choices among
Italians (and from Wicksell) that one must different rules of the game cannot be ignored.
postulate a theory of the state. By postulating Finally, the most important function of eco-
the revenue-maximizing Leviathan, Buchanan nomics as a discipline is its elementary and
was able to address the political rules of the didactic role in explaining the principle of
game, which would constrain the behavior of spontaneous order (1979, pp. 280–82).
375
BUCHANAN
Finally, it is important to recognize the basic (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1966).

methodological schema that Buchanan Demand and Supply of Public Goods
employs to address questions in political (Chicago, 1968).
economy and how this schema allows him to Cost and Choice: An Inquiry in Economic
weave these eight propositions into a coherent Theory (Chicago, 1969).
framework for social theory. He emphasizes Academia in Anarchy: An Economic
that we must distinguish between pre- and Diagnosis, with Nicos Devletoglou (New
post-constitutional levels of analysis. Pre-con- York, 1970).
stitutional analysis opens up the discourse over The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy
the rules of the game, while post-constitutional and Leviathan (Chicago, 1975).
analysis reflects an examination of the strate- Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy
gies players adopt within the defined rules. of Lord Keynes, with Richard E. Wagner
Political economy, properly understood, is the (New York, 1977).
tacking back and forth between these two levels Freedom in Constitutional Contract:
of analysis. Successful application of modern Perspectives of a Political Economist
political economy to the world of public policy (College Station, Tex., 1977).
demands that the analyst adopt such a consti- What Should Economists Do?
tutional perspective. In this regard, Buchanan (Indianapolis, 1979).
introduces the vital distinction for applied polit- The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations
ical economy of “policy within politics” and of a Fiscal Constitution, with Geoffrey
the systematic change in the rules of the game. Brennan (Cambridge, UK, 1980).
Lasting reform, Buchanan argues, results not The Reason of Rules: Constitutional
from policy changes within the existing rules (or Political Economy, with Geoffrey
changes in people), but rather from systemic Brennan (Cambridge, UK, 1985).
changes in the rules of governance. Thus, far Liberty, Market and State: Political
from the “conservative” intellectual that many Economy in the 1980s (New York,
falsely believe him to be, Buchanan is an intel- 1986).
lectual radical seeking to get at the root cause of Essays on the Political Economy
social/political ills. This final point is apparent (Honolulu, 1989).
upon examination of how Buchanan has re- The Economics and the Ethics of
focused the research attention of a generation of Constitutional Order (Ann Arbor, Mich.,
scholars. 1991).
Better than Plowing: And Other Personal
BIBLIOGRAPHY Essays (Chicago, 1992).
Prices, Income, and Public Policy, with C. Ethics and Economic Progress (Norman,
L. Allen and M. R. Colberg (New York, Okla., 1994).
1954; 2nd edn 1959).
Public Principles of Public Debt Other Relevant Works
(Homewood, Ill., 1958). Ed. with Robert Tollison, The Theory of
Fiscal Theory and Political Economy Public Choice – II (Ann Arbor, Mich.,
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1960). 1984).
The Calculus of Consent: Logical Ed. with Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J.
Foundations of Constitutional Vanberg, Economics: Between Predictive
Democracy, with Gordon Tullock (Ann Science and Moral Philosophy (College
Arbor, Mich., 1962). Station, Tex., 1987).
Public Finance in Democratic Process: The Collected Works of James Buchanan,
Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice 20 vols (Indianapolis, 1999–2002).
376
BUCHLER
Further Reading the Society for the Advancement of American

Cambridge Dict Amer Bio Philosophy. Buchler later received the society’s
Brennan, Geoffrey, Hartmut Kliemt, and highest honor, the Herbert W. Schneider
Robert D. Tollison, eds. Method and Award, in 1989. Buchler retired from Stony
Morals in Constitutional Economics: Brook in 1981, and died on 19 March 1991 in
Essays in Honor of James M. Buchanan Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.
(Berlin, 2002). While not a pragmatist, Buchler was influ-
Reisman, David. The Political Economy of enced by Peirce, William JAMES, Josiah ROYCE,
James Buchanan (College Station, Tex., and John DEWEY. He was also influenced by
1990). George S ANTAYANA and Alfred North
WHITEHEAD. Buchler’s systematic work covers
Peter J. Boettke two broad areas: human process and general
Christopher J. Coyne ontology. He was guided by two principles:
(1) ontological parity, which asserts the equal
reality of whatever is; and (2) ordinality, which
asserts the indefinite complexity of whatever is.
Any being – in Buchler’s terminology, any
“(natural) complex” – is what it is because it is
BUCHLER, Justus (1914–91) located in orders, that is, is related to other
complexes in determinate respects. Each
Justus Buchler was born on 27 March 1914 in complex “locates” other complexes and there-
New York City, the eldest son of Ida and fore, every complex is also an order (a location
Samuel Buchler. He earned a BSS in 1934 at the for other complexes). Since on this view com-
College of the City of New York. He then plexity is irreducible, there are no definitive
earned an MA in 1935 and the PhD in philos- boundaries to a complex or between one
ophy in 1938 at Columbia University, where he complex and another. Buchler’s method of
studied with Morris R. C OHEN , F. J. E. exposition resembles Aristotle’s by identifying
WOODBRIDGE, and Ernest NAGEL. His MA previous well-known concepts (for example,
thesis was on Locke; his PhD dissertation was in general ontology, being/becoming; in the
on Charles PEIRCE, which upon publication in theory of human process, experience), showing
1939 became a well-respected work. Buchler what is defective about them, and then fur-
taught part-time at Brooklyn College and nishing his own categories. This method
Columbia University until he gained a full-time required some neologisms (for example, “pro-
philosophy appointment at Columbia in 1942. ception,” “alescence”), but more typically
He participated in the Contemporary Buchler created a novel signification of familiar
Civilization program of Columbia College, concepts. In general ontology, examples are
becoming its administrative head in 1950. order, relation, possibility, actuality; in the
Buchler was book editor for the Journal of theory of human process, examples include
Philosophy and Vice Chairman of the National judgment and communication.
Academic Freedom Committee of American Buchler characterized his work as a “meta-
Civil Liberties Union from 1958 to 1965. In physics of natural complexes.” Some com-
1971 he became Distinguished Professor of mentators have noted that this seems to make
Philosophy at the State University of New York Buchler’s work continuous with American nat-
at Stony Brook. In 1973 he was awarded the uralism and have thus characterized it as
Butler Silver Medal by Columbia University. In “ordinal naturalism” or “ordinal ontology”
the early 1970s Buchler and his wife, philoso- (see Singer 1983). In Buchler’s system, “natural
pher Evelyn Shirk, were founding members of complex” is the basic term of identification. A
377
BUCHLER
natural complex conceptualizes the reality of color is as real as the possibility-of-being-sold.

any complex’s locations, without insisting that The car is its complexity of traits, which it
this is the only way of doing this. In a meta- acquires by residing in the orders it does.
physics of natural complexes, there is no onto- Simultaneously, the car is itself an order; it
logical distinction between the real and unreal. locates complexes (minimally, its own traits).
Whatever is, is real; the objects we daily expe- According to an ordinal analysis of percep-
rience are as real as the clouds of atomic parti- tion, the human visual order is no less a
cles described by physics; fictional objects as location of the car than the spatiotemporal,
real as material objects. legal, and social orders. Perception is a rela-
The principle of ontological parity entails tional complex, for example, a car-in-percep-
that no being or any one kind of being can be tual-relation-to-observer or conversely,
singled out as the “really real.” The principle of observer-in-perceptual-relation-to-car. Some
ordinality conceptualizes the determinateness of traits of the car may prevail in each, the spatio-
any being (complex) as an interrelation of loca- temporal, the visual and the legal orders; there
tions or traits. Actuality and possibility are are other traits that it has only in one respect or
ordinally defined as traits of natural complexes. the other. Buchler’s claim is that ontologically
For Buchler, three pairs of categories constitute all of its traits are “really” traits of the complex,
the formal structure of the metaphysics of albeit in different respects. This entails that two
natural complexes: (1) prevalence and ales- different perceptions of the same object are
cence (the technical vocabulary for concepts each “really” of the object, in a given respect.
like being, existence, becoming, changing); (2) For example, in relation to color-blind percep-
ordinality and relation (categories of determi- tion the automobile is gray; in relation to
nateness); and (3) possibility and actuality (cat- normal human color-sighted perception it is
egories of “natural definition,” that is, cate- red. A claim that the automobile is “really”
gories that conceptualize the limits of a red is an affirmation of the priority or greater
complex). The term “becoming” is suitable for comprehensiveness of the order of normal-
certain kinds of physical and biological change color-sightedness in human experience. A hal-
– an acorn becomes a sapling, a sapling lucination would have different ordinal loca-
becomes a tree – but does not capture the devel- tions from, and hence, not be capable of vali-
oping-being of a logical proof or of a concep- dation as, a perception, however much it may
tual shift in the understanding of a historical feel like a perception to the hallucinator. Thus,
event. With the term “alescence” Buchler the psychology of perception and mental states
intends to introduce a concept that does not is distinguished from their ontological analysis.
obscure the insight of ontological parity, The issue of the limit or boundary of any par-
namely, that becoming (altering) is just as real ticular complex leads to the modal categories,
as being. possibility and actuality. Necessity is defined in
An example of a commonplace object will terms of possibility. There is a boundary to
illustrate some aspects of an ordinal conceptu- determinateness, but that boundary is itself
alization. A car, qua physical object, prevails in indeterminate. Buchler’s solution to this
a spatial-temporal set(s) of relations, or orders. apparent paradox is to articulate boundary in
The same car, qua legal and social entity, is terms of actuality and possibility. A boundary
owned, has an assessed value, a market value, of a complex is determinate insofar as it
and so on; it resides in social, economic, and contains actualities and indeterminate because
legal contexts or orders (driving rules, owner- it contains possibilities. This is no less true of
ship rules, market relations, and so on). Every logical as it is of empirical possibility; possibil-
trait (ordinal location) is real. Physical size is as ity is a matter of ordinal location. Not just
real as atomic structure, as real as legal status; anything is a possibility for a complex, because
378
BUCHLER
every possibility is determinate, for example, in a particular respect. Perspectives are not
prevails in an ordinal location. Boundaries, or intrinsically private, but can be communicated
determinateness, cannot be wholly fixed and shared. A perspective is the relational
because actualization is a condition for new context of the judger (or judgers) and the world
possibilities. Buchler argues that according to that is judged. A judgment can be an action or
the principles of ordinality there is no totalizing an arranging, or can be propositional. For
order of orders, such as “world” or “nature.” example, the act of purchasing a piece of land
He also shows that other attempts to argue for is just as much a judgment in the context of
the notion of totality fail. His specific targets are real-estate development as the assertion “that
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Thomas Hobbes, R. G. land is valuable.” Similarly, when one perceives
Collingwood, and Whitehead. a piece of land, one perceives the land, just as
In the works on the metaphysics of human it is the land that one buys, puts in a trust with
process, Buchler aims to reconceptualize the the Nature Conservancy, or sells to another
notions of experience and judgment. His theory owner. An object of judgment is a “complex”
rejects such categories as mind/body, or con- in relation to a judger, and judgments (such as
sciousness/nature by employing a novel purchasing, entrusting, selling) articulate some-
category, proception, for broadening the con- thing about the judger as well as about the
ception of experience. While this category may thing judged. Judgments can be assertive (such
bear some resemblance to Whitehead’s pre- as propositional assertions), active (or, a
hension, it is restricted to human reality only. purchase of land) or exhibitive (for example, an
However, human process is always relationally arrangement of colors or shapes on a canvas).
located, and thus, for Buchler, experience (pro- Buchler’s view of judgment is thus distinguished
ception) breaks down the gap between world by a rejection of the requirement of mentality
and experiencer. Experience (proception) and or language, and by the hierarchy he estab-
judgment is each a relation of some kind lishes among the three modes. In a specific
between the individual and the world. context or for a specific purpose, one mode of
Judgment is an appraisive relation of the judgment may be better than another, but, in
individual to the world, the world as it is in conformity with the principle of parity, none is
relation to the individual. For Buchler, the indi- intrinsically higher than another.
vidual cannot relate to “the world” indiscrim- Buchler’s systematic work, while widely
inately for, first, there is no single overarching known and respected, remained outside the
totality, “the world” and; second, the particu- mainstream of analytic Anglo-American
lar locations constituting an individual con- thought during his lifetime. More recent devel-
tribute to or influence what the individual can opments in feminism, science, and philosophy
appraise. For example, a deaf individual will be may prove a more fertile ground for his con-
limited with respect to judgments about the tributions to take hold.
aural dimensions of the world in ways non-deaf
persons are not. Conversely, a deaf person BIBLIOGRAPHY
might be capable of judgments, such as tactile Charles Peirce’s Empiricism (London, 1939).
or vibratory judgments, of which a non-deaf Toward a General Theory of Human
person is not. An individual not trained in Judgment (New York, 1951; 2nd edn
mathematics will be limited (until or unless 1979).
trained) in ways that mathematicians are not, Nature and Judgment (New York, 1955).
with respect to judgments about mathematical The Concept of Method (New York, 1961).
orders. Metaphysics of Natural Complexes (New
Moreover, judgment is always perspectival. York, 1966; 2nd edn, Albany, N.Y., 1990).
It is located. It is always made by an individual The Main of Light: On the Concept of Poetry
379
BUCHLER
(Oxford, 1974). Robert S. Corrington, eds. Nature’s

“On a Strain of Arbitrariness in Whitehead’s Perspectives: Prospects for Ordinal
System,” Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969): Metaphysics (Albany, N.Y., 1991).
589–601. Contains a bibliography of secondary litera-
“On the Concept of the ‘World’,” Review of ture.
Metaphysics 31 (1978): 555–79. McGandy, Michael J. “Buchler’s Notion of
“Probing the Idea of Nature,” Process Studies Query,” Journal of Speculative Philosophy
8 (1979): 157–68. 11 (1997): 203–24.
Reck, Andrew J. The New American
Other Relevant Works Philosophers: An Exploration of Thought
Ed. with B. Schwartz, The Obiter Scripta of since World War II (Baton Rouge, Louis.,
George Santayana (New York, 1936). 1968), chap. 4.
“Value Statements,” Analysis 4 (1937): 49–58. Ross, Stephen D. Transition to an Ordinal
Ed., The Philosophy of Peirce: Selected Metaphysics (Albany, N.Y., 1980).
Writings (London, 1940). Paperback edn, Singer, Beth J. Ordinal Naturalism: An
Philosophical Writings of Peirce (New Introduction to the Philosophy of Justus
York, 1955). Buchler (Lewisburg, Penn., 1983). Contains
Philosophy: An Introduction, with John H. a bibliography of Buchler’s writings.
Randall, Jr. (New York, 1942; 2nd edn Singer Beth J., and Joseph G. Grassi, eds.
1971). “Symposium on the Philosophy of Justus
“Russell and the Principles of Ethics,” in The Buchler,” Southern Journal of Philosophy
Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, ed. Paul 14 (Spring 1976). Includes Buchler’s replies
Schilpp (Evanston, Ill., 1944). to participants.
Ed., Introduction to Contemporary Wallace, Kathleen. “Ontological Parity and/or
Civilization in the West, 2 vol. (New York, Ordinality?” Metaphilosophy 30 (1999):
1946). 302–18.
“Reconstruction in the Liberal Arts,” in A ———, “Autonomous ‘I’ of an Intersectional
History of Columbia College on Self,” Journal of Speculative Philosophy 17
Morningside (New York, 1954). (2003): 176–91.
“Ontological Parity,” in Naturalism and
Historical Understanding: Essays on the Kathleen A. Wallace
Philosophy of John Herman Randall, Jr.,
ed. John P. Anton (Albany, N.Y., 1967), pp.
162–75.
Further Reading
Amer Phils 1950-2000, Bio 20thC Phils, BUCKHAM, John Wright (1864–1945)
Blackwell Amer Phil, Oxford Comp Phil,
Proc of APA v65, Who Was Who in Amer John Wright Buckham was born on 5
v10, Who’s Who in Phil November 1864 in Burlington, Vermont. He
Campbell, James, et al. “The Impact of Justus was educated at the University of Vermont,
Buchler: American Philosophy at Stony where his father Matthew Henry Buckham
Brook,” Society for the Advancement of served as President from 1871 to 1910. At
American Philosophy Newsletter no. 98 Vermont, Buckham studied philosophy with
(June 2004): 16–37. Symposium of articles Henry A. P. TORREY and embraced Kant’s
about Buchler. critical idealism and moral religion.
Marsoobian, Armen, Kathleen Wallace, and Graduating with his BA from Vermont in
380
BUCKHAM
1885, he entered Andover Theological idealism as a source of commonality and

Seminary at the height of the “Andover unity for the liberal theology movement,
Controversy” over future probation and his- admonishing in Religion as Experience
torical criticism. Buckham identified with the against “bickering among ourselves over the-
controversial “Progressive Orthodoxy” of his ological and denominational differences”
teachers, graduated from Andover in 1888, (1922, p. 128). Unlike Howison, he affirmed
and was ordained a Congregational minister mystical experience as a valuable dimension
in that year, although conservatives objected of good religion and favored the mystically
to his belief in biblical criticism and universal tinged writings of Friedrich von Hugel and
salvation. From 1890 to 1903 Buckham was Rufus M. J ONES . Unlike Howison, who
minister of the Crombie Street Church in restricted God’s relation to the world to
Salem, Massachusetts, and continued to study Aristotelian final causality, Buckham also
idealistic philosophy and liberal theology. affirmed personal theism. In his 1914
In 1903 Buckham was appointed to the Nathaniel W. Taylor Lectures at Yale
chair of Christian theology at Pacific University, he argued that God is the supreme
Theological Seminary in Berkeley, California. person, human beings are developing persons,
Buckham taught William Newton CLARKE’s and Christ is the ideal divine–human person.
liberal theology and forged a key friendship Emphasizing social dimensions of person-
with University of California at Berkeley alist thought that were slighted by its
philosopher George H. H OWISON . Like founders, Buckham and other liberals of his
Howison, Buckham embraced the basic tenets generation (notably Francis McConnell and
of personalist metaphysical idealism acquired Henry Churchill KING) blended personalist
from Harvard philosophers Josiah ROYCE and philosophy and the social gospel. He argued
George Herbert PALMER. In addition, he was that salvation is the realization of personality,
influenced by the philosophical writings of which is both individual and social, and that
Borden Parker BOWNE , Rudolf Hermann personality is the source of all creativity and
Lotze, and James Seth. The American per- human flourishing. In Progressive Religious
sonalist tradition, which came to be centered Thought in America he enthused that modern
at Boston University and the University of Christianity preached “the kinship of God
California, taught that mind is the ultimate with men as taught by Christ, the presence of
reality and that personality is the immediate the ideal human soul, [and] the conviction
and univocal key to reality. Following his that society itself is instituted by God and
mentors, Buckham argued that personality is will respond to the appeal of the social idea”
the only reality that is known immediately (1919, p. 256).
and directly, that it is the one reality that Buckham retired from the (renamed)
explains everything, and that it cannot be Pacific School of Religion in 1937. In 1941 he
explained by anything else. published his last work, The Inner World,
Buckham’s writings ranged widely over which ended where he began. The Inner
theology, philosophy of religion, mysticism, World emphasized “the religious aspect of
social ethics, psychology, and American personality,” taught that the starting point of
history, but nearly all of his work was all inquiry in religious philosophy is “oneself
centered on his concern to expound the reli- and his experience,” and described the
gious implications of personalism. Buckham personal starting point as “one who is living
was a frequent contributor to the University the life of the Spirit in the fellowship of God
of California philosophy journal The and man” (1941, pp. 3, 282). Buckham died
Personalist, edited by Ralph Tyler on 30 March 1945 in Berkeley, California.
F LEWELLING . Buckham viewed personal
381
BUCKHAM
BIBLIOGRAPHY “Idealism and Realism: A Suggested

Christ and the Eternal Order (Boston, Synthesis,” Journal of Philosophy 39
1906). (1942): 402–14.
Personality and the Christian Ideal: A
Discussion of Personality in the Light of Further Reading
Christianity (New York, 1909). Amer Nat Bio, Who Was Who in Amer v2,
Mysticism and Modern Life (New York, Who’s Who in Phil
1915). Aubrey, Edwin E. “Personal Theism,”
Progressive Religious Thought in America: A Journal of Religion 9 (1929): 638–40.
Survey of the Enlarging Pilgrim Faith Wieman, Henry Nelson. “Dewey and
(Boston, 1919). Buckham on Religion,” Journal of
Religion as Experience (New York, 1922). Religion 15 (1935): 10–21.
Personality and Psychology: An Analysis for Williams, Daniel Day. The Andover
Practical Use (New York, 1924). Liberals: A Study in American Theology
The Humanity of God: An Interpretation of (New York, 1941).
the Divine Fatherhood (New York, 1928).
Christianity and Personality (Boston, 1936). Gary Dorrien
The Inner World: An Introduction to the
Philosophy of Christianity (New York,
1941).

“James Marsh and Coleridge,” Bibliotheca BUGBEE, Henry Greenwood, Jr.
Sacra 41 (April 1904): 305–17. (1915–99)
“The Organization of Truth,” International
Journal of Ethics 20 (1909): 63–72. Henry Bugbee was born on 19 February 1915
“The Principles of Pacifism,” The Biblical in New York City. He received a BA in phi-
World 48 (1916): 88–90. losophy from Princeton University in 1936,
“Immanence-transcendence,” Journal of submitting “In Demonstration of the Spirit” as
Philosophy 28 (1931): 204–11. an honors thesis in which we find his lifelong
“From Philosophy to Theology,” in philosophical concerns already in focus. In his
Contemporary American Theology, ed. view, science and technology threaten to
Vergilius Ferm (New York, 1932), pp. suppress a proper view of the distinctively
85–103. human. A kind of aesthetic appreciation,
“God and the Ideal: Professor Dewey rather than technical cognitive grip, is the key
Reinterprets Religion,” Journal of to meaningful moral or religious life. The
Religion 15 (1935): 1–9. Spanish existentialist Miguel de Unamuno is
“Religious Experience and Personality: A exemplary here. Bugbee’s graduate study at
Reply to Professor Wieman,” Journal of the University of California at Berkeley was
Religion 15 (1935): 309–15. interrupted by naval service in the Pacific. In
Ed. with George M. Stratton, George 1948 he received his PhD in philosophy,
Holmes Howison, Philosopher and writing on aesthetics under Jacob
Teacher: A Selection from His Writings, L OEWENBERG . After briefly teaching at
with a Biographical Sketch (Berkeley, Cal., Stanford, he was assistant professor of philos-
1934). ophy at Harvard University from 1948 to
“Personal Realism,Åh Philosophical Review 1954. From 1957 to 1977 he was professor of
45 (1936): 601–609. philosophy at the University of Montana,
382
BUGBEE
where he was twice department chair. Bugbee person. The detached “reportorial” or “spec-
died on 18 December 1999 in Missoula, tator’s” third-person stance toward the world
Montana. W. V. QUINE remembered him as and others, so characteristic of British empiri-
“the ultimate exemplar of the examined life.” cism and logical positivism, necessarily derails
Religion scholar Huston SMITH commended the quest for meaning that is the calling of
Bugbee’s The Inward Morning: A philosophy and, in a wider sense, of human
Philosophical Exploration in Journal Form life.
(1958) as “the most Daoist western book I In his 1948 dissertation, Bugbee traces a
know.” Others call it “a uniquely American conception of being through Aristotle and
existentialism,” a “lyrical philosophy,” or a evokes a sense of being peculiar to one’s place.
“philosophy of place.” In journal format, In an American idiom, Heideggerian themes
Bugbee explores wilderness, art, philosophy, are pursued a full decade before Bugbee
and responsive receptivity in human thought encountered Heidegger’s work. We learn that
and action. Shakespeare and Melville as well as expressiveness of place is expressiveness of
Plato, Eckhart, and Spinoza appear in a sweep being, focused in a moment of recognition,
of philosophical interest reminiscent of Augenblick, in which both viewer and viewed,
Bugbee’s student, Stanley CAVELL. In the actor and ambiance, are transformed. These
1950s, Bugbee traveled with D. T. SUZUKI and themes are amplified in The Inward Morning.
joined French existentialist Gabriel Marcel in Persons rely on mutual recognition for a sense
discussions with Martin Heidegger. He par- of being and of their being. Such transforma-
ticipated in colloquia with Hans-Georg tive moments can instill an inescapable sense of
Gadamer at Syracuse University in the 1970s. affirmative mutuality, an attunement to the
The Inward Morning was followed by essays eloquent reality of others and of place that
on the book of Job, wilderness, Marcel, the blocks, for the moment, the shadow of skep-
sublime, love, and education. Albert ticism, indifference, or despair.
Borgmann, the philosophical environmentalist
critic of technology, recalls his colleague as “a BIBLIOGRAPHY
humanist par excellence” devoted to “the great “The Moment of Obligation in
literature of the West and the East” who “lived Experience,” Journal of Religion 33
with and out of those texts.” (1953): 1–15.
The lasting contribution of The Inward The Inward Morning: A Philosophical
Morning is its moving evocations of wonder Exploration in Journal Form (State
and attentive immersion in one’s place, of College, Penn., 1958; New York, 1961;
action and its precedents in responsiveness to Athens, Georgia, 1999).
a claim or call, of one’s personal “intuitive “Thoughts on Creation,” in Essays in
condition” so often abandoned for abstrac- Philosophy, ed. Penn State University
tion and theory, and of mystery underlying Philosophy Department (University Park,
meaningful life. These evocations exemplify a Penn., 1962).
unique sense of philosophy and of writing phi- “On Starting with Love,” Humanitas 2
losophy. Bugbee confides that for him, phi- (1966): 149–64.
losophy is “an approximation to a poem,” “The Philosophical Significance of the
wedded to the local and individual, a walking Sublime,” Philosophy Today 11 (1967):
“meditation of the place.” The place evoked 55–9.
might be a gentle stream or deadly wartime “L’Exigence ontologique,” in The
battle; it might be a passage from Melville or Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, ed. Paul A.
Spinoza, or a discussion with C. I. LEWIS. These Schlipp (La Salle, Ill., 1968).
“experiential reflections” are ineluctably first “Loneliness, Solitude, and the Twofold Way
383
BUGBEE
in Which Concern May Be Claimed,” Buenos Aires. Unhappy with Argentinian

Humanitas 10 (1974): 313–27. politics, from 1960 onward Bunge held visiting
“Wilderness in America,” Journal of the positions at the philosophy departments of the
American Academy of Religion 42 (1974): University of Pennsylvania in 1960–61,
614–20. University of Texas in 1963, Temple University
in 1963–4, and University of Delaware in
Further Reading 1964–5. In 1966 he became professor of phi-
Nat Cycl Amer Bio v35, Who Was Who in losophy at McGill University in Montréal,
Amer v2 Canada. Bunge has been awarded honorary
Conway, Daniel W. “Answering the Call of degrees from several universities, and became a
the Wild: Walking with Bugbee and fellow of the American Association for the
Thoreau,” Personalist Forum 14 (1998): Advancement of Science in 1984 and a fellow of
49–64. The Royal Society of Canada in 1992.
———, “The Wilderness of Henry Bugbee,” Bunge advocated the rigorous axiomatiza-
Journal of Speculative Philosophy 17 tion of scientific theories, which would help
(2003): 259–69. eliminate unnecessary heuristic devices and
Mooney, Edward F. “Two Testimonies in models and expose the genuine relations
American Philosophy: Stanley Cavell, between theories. Scientific theories should be
Henry Bugbee,” Journal of Speculative interpreted realistically even though they are
Philosophy 17 (2003): 108–21. fallible, replaceable, and do not absorb the pos-
Mooney, Edward F., ed. Wilderness and the tulated entities of their predecessors; Bunge
Heart: Henry Bugbee’s Philosophy of Place, accepts the label of “critical realism” for his
Presence, and Memory (Athens, Georgia, stance. His philosophy is comprehensively
1999). explained in the eight volumes of his Treatise on
Rudd, Anthony. Expressing the World: Basic Philosophy (1974–89), which covers his
Skepticism, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger philosophy of science, ontology, epistemology,
(Chicago, 2003). technology, and ethics. Against positivism and
Wilshire, Bruce. “Henry Bugbee,” The Primal reductionism, Bunge legitimizes metaphysics (if
Roots of American Philosophy (University conducted by the scientific method) and a type
Park, Penn., 2000), chap. 9. of emergent materialism that refuses any
demand that one field of science (such as
Edward F. Mooney physics) should have an exclusive grasp on the
composition of reality.
Bunge refers to his naturalistic ontology as an
“integrated pluralism” which holds that science
investigates various levels of dynamic systems
that together make up the universe. While at any
BUNGE, Mario Augusto (1919– ) level those existing systems rely on older and
underlying systems for their emergence and
Mario Augusto Bunge was born on 21 August maintenance, their properties are not reducible
1919 in Buenos Aires, Argentina. He received to those other systems. Scientific theories can
his PhD in physico-mathematical sciences in operate relatively autonomously and their sci-
1952 from Universidad de La Plata. From 1956 entific laws can be valid independently of any
to 1959 he was a professor of theoretical physics other theories about other levels. Bunge’s
at Universidad de La Plata and Universidad de systems approach to materialism led him to the
Buenos Aires, and from 1957 to 1962 he was view that mental systems should be character-
professor of philosophy at Universidad de ized as functions of brain activity.
384
BUNGE
Uncomfortable with materialistic denials that Emergence and Convergence (Toronto,

the qualitative features of consciousness really 2003).
exist, Bunge locates such qualities in emergent
mental systems. Other Relevant Works
Ed., The Critical Approach to Science and
BIBLIOGRAPHY Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Karl
Causality: The Place of the Causal Principle in Popper (New York, 1964).
Modern Science (Cambridge, Mass., 1959). Ed., Exact Philosophy: Problems, Tools and
3rd edn, Causality and Modern Science Goals (Dordrecht, 1973).
(New York, 1979). Ed., The Methodological Unity of Science
Metascientific Queries (Springfield, Ill., 1959). (Dordrecht, 1973).
Intuition and Science (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,
1962). Further Reading
The Myth of Simplicity (Englewood Cliffs, Agassi, Joseph, and Robert S. Cohen, eds.
N.J., 1963). Scientific Philosophy Today: Essays in
Problems in Foundations of Physics (Berlin, Honor of Mario Bunge (Dordrecht, 1982).
1967). Forman, Frank. The Metaphysics of Liberty
Scientific Research, 2 vols (Berlin, 1967). 2nd (Dordrecht, 1989).
edn, Philosophy of Science (New Freiheit, Heike, and Erwin Rosenthal. “Zur
Brunswick, N.J., 1998). philosophischen position Mario Bunges,”
Method, Model and Matter (Dordrecht, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 36
1973). (1988): 233–40.
Philosophy of Physics (Dordrecht, 1973). Schlegel, Richard. “Mario Bunge on
Treatise on Basic Philosophy, 8 vols Causality,” Philosophy of Science 28
(Dordrecht, 1974–89). (1961): 72–82.
Ciencia y desarrollo (Buenos Aires, 1980). Serroni-Copello, Raul. Encuentros con Mario
Epistemologia (Barcelona, 1980). Bunge (1989).
The Mind–Body Problem (Oxford, 1980). “Systems and Mechanisms: A Symposium on
Scientific Materialism (Dordrecht, 1981). Mario Bunge’s Philosophy of Social
Philosophy of Psychology, with Ruben Ardila Science,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences
(Berlin, 1987). 34 (June, September 2004). Special issues
Finding Philosophy in Social Science (New about Bunge.
Haven, 1996). Vacher, Laurent-Michel. Entretiens avec
Foundations of Biophilosophy, with Martin Mario Bunge (Montréal, 1993).
Mahner (Berlin, 1997). Weingartner, Paul, and Georg Dorn, eds.
Critical Approaches to Science and Studies on Bunge’s Treatise (Amsterdam,
Philosophy (New Brunswick, N.J., 1998). 1990). Contains a bibliography of Bunge’s
Philosophy of Science, 2 vols (New writings.
Brunswick, N.J., 1998).
Social Science Under Debate (Toronto, 1998). John R. Shook
The Sociology–Philosophy Connection (New
Brunswick, N.J., 1999).
Philosophy in Crisis: The Need for
Reconstruction (Amherst, N.Y., 2001).
Scientific Realism: Selected Essays by Mario
Bunge, ed. Martin Mahner (Amherst, N.Y.,
2001).
385
BURGESS
BURGESS, John William (1844–1931) the state as political science’s field of scientific
study, shaped conservative political theory
John Burgess was born on 26 August 1844 in until the 1920s.
Cornersville, Tennessee. During the Civil War Burgess wrote influential histories of nine-
he eluded impressment into the Confederate teenth-century America and the Civil War in
army and instead served in the Union army. He light of his political theories. Although his
graduated with his BA in 1867 from Amherst early major writings supported immigrant
College, where he took classes with the assimilation and the notion that the Anglo-
Hegelian Julius H. S EELYE . Burgess then Saxon race had a special leadership position
studied law and was admitted to the in the world, his later writings repudiated
Massachusetts bar in 1869. He briefly taught US aggression and regretted its growing
at Knox College before spending over two imperialism. Looking back on the 1898
years studying in German universities. Upon Spanish–American War as a watershed event
his return in 1873 Burgess found a position and distressed over World War I, his Recent
teaching history and political science at Changes in American Constitutional Theory
Amherst College. In 1876 he became professor (1923) called the US government “auto-
of history, political science, and international cratic” and enumerated many government
law at Columbia University, and with Nicholas intrusions into private rights.
Murray BUTLER he established the first school
of political science for graduate study in 1880. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Burgess gathered an outstanding faculty at Political Science and Comparative
Columbia, including John Bates CLARK and Constitutional Law (Boston, 1890–91).
Charles A. Beard. He founded the Academy of The Middle Period, 1817–1858 (New
Political Science in 1880 and the Political York, 1897).
Science Quarterly in 1886. Burgess retired in The Civil War and the Constitution,
1912 and died on 13 January 1931 in 1859–1865 (New York, 1901).
Brookline, Massachusetts. Reconstruction and the Constitution,
Burgess’s German education in historical 1866–1876 (New York, 1902).
methods of cultural study was thoroughly The European War of 1914 (Chicago,
Hegelian. This produced his conviction that 1915).
the modern state was the rational destiny of The Reconciliation of Government with
human progress. Modernism for him meant Liberty (New York, 1915).
laying down the democratic foundations of America’s Relation to the Great War
governmental authority for the protection of (Chicago, 1916).
individual liberties. On Burgess’s theory, a gov- Recent Changes in American Constitutional
ernment serves a nation, which is defined by Theory (New York, 1923).
possession of a common language and culture. The Sanctity of the Law: Wherein Does It
Rejecting the “dual sovereignty” theory, which Consist? (New York, 1928).
placed a citizen in two relationships with both The Foundations of Political Science (New
a state and the federal government, Burgess York, 1933).
instead held that the people themselves are
sovereign and constitute what he generically Other Relevant Works
termed the state. Therefore, on this theory, Burgess’s papers are at Columbia
the people (the “state”) uses federal, state, and University.
local governments to effect its popular will. Reminiscences of an American Scholar
Burgess’s Political Science and Comparative (New York, 1934).
Constitutional Law (1890–91), which defined
386
BURKE
Further Reading In an unusually long and productive life,

Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, Burke was a literary critic, philosopher of
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer language, poet, and analyst of rhetorical forms.
Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v23, Who Was He made substantial contributions to all of
Who in Amer v1 these areas as well as formulating a unique
Brown, Bernard E. American Conservatives: philosophy of his own which he called
The Political Thought of Francis Lieber “dramatism.” His vast influence can be seen
and John W. Burgess (New York, 1951). not only in art and literature, but also in qual-
Gunnell, John G. The Descent of Political itative forms of social science including history,
Theory: The Genealogy of an American political science, and sociology. He is claimed
Vocation (Chicago, 1993). as the founding father of dramaturgical social
Ross, Dorothy. The Origins of American psychology (Brissett and Edgley 1990).
Social Science (Cambridge, UK, 1991). “Dramatism,” which derived from an
analysis of literature, took human agency to be
John R. Shook the fundamental principle in the study of man.
His early work, Permanence and Change
(1935), subtitled for emphasis “an anatomy of
purpose,” set a theme which he never com-
promised: human conduct is in the realm of
action rather than motion, therefore the
BURKE, Kenneth Duva (1897–1993) starting point for all analysis is in varieties of
conduct rather than knowledge or condition-
Kenneth Burke was born on 5 May 1897 in ing. Rejecting Cartesian dualisms, all deter-
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Announcing in 1917 minisms, and all forms of reduction, Burke
that he was quitting Columbia College so he insisted that human beings are symbol-using
could “begin studying,” Burke never obtained and motive-invoking creatures who resist all
even a bachelor’s degree, much less a doctor- efforts to reduce them to objective forms.
ate. Nevertheless, he made his mark on “Things move – people act” was his simple
American philosophy over the next six decades starting point that swept away attempts to
with a singular determination to reject posi- treat people as mere objects, and to differenti-
tivism and to replace it with a philosophical ate the human condition with its linguistic
form reminiscent of hermeneutics and which dimensions from other forms of nature.
anticipated many of the tenets of postmoder- The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in
nity. Burke supported himself in Greenwich Symbolic Action (1941) examines the formal
Village by editing and contributing to The Dial structure of literature and its relation to a
from 1927 to 1929 and to The Nation from literary work’s meaning. In the first two parts
1934 to 1936. In 1943 Bennington College in of an unfinished trilogy, A Grammar of
Vermont appointed him as a lecturer in literary Motives (1945) and A Rhetoric of Motives
criticism, and he taught literary criticism and (1950), Burke set out the five key terms which
literature part-time there until 1961. He also constitute a dramatistic analysis. They are Act,
was a visiting professor at other universities, Scene, Agent, Agency, and Purpose. Motives
including Princeton University and Kenyon are neither levers nor pulleys which make
College. Burke was elected to the National people act the way they do in some determin-
Institute of Arts and Letters in 1951 and to the istic sense, but rather words human beings use
American Academy of Arts and Sciences in to communicate with one another about what
1966. Burke died on 19 November 1993 in they are doing and why they are doing it. In
Andover, New Jersey. these symbolic interactions each of these prin-
387
BURKE
ciples answers a fundamental question. Act William Rueckert, Angelo Bonadonna,

names what took place in thought or deed. Scene and William Rueckert (Berkeley, Cal.,
names the background and situation in which 2003).
the act occurred, Agent names the person or
kind of person who performed the act, Agency Further Reading
names how the act was accomplished, and Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio,
Purpose says why the act was done. Comp Amer Thought, Who Was Who in
This Pentad applies to all human acts and the Amer v11
ratios between the elements comprise an analysis Brissett, Dennis and Charles Edgley. Life as
of what is happening. Whether one is analyzing Theater: A Dramaturgical Sourcebook
literature, poetry, a social system, or the inter- (New York, 1990).
personal dynamics of a situation, these five Crusius, Timothy. Kenneth Burke and the
elements are always present. The tendency to Conversation After Philosophy
reduce all human action to but one of the (Carbondale, Ill., 1999).
elements must be avoided, and Burke shows Duncan, Hugh D. Communication and
how various disciplines and deterministic Social Order (New York, 1962).
theories have fallen into this trap. The recently Frank, Armin. Kenneth Burke (New York,
discovered final work in the trilogy, the manu- 1969).
script A Symbolic of Motives, was to have been Henderson, Greig and David Williams, eds.
a culmination of his dramatistic system (portions Unending Conversations: New Writings
are in Henderson and Williams 2001). by and about Kenneth Burke
(Carbondale, Ill., 2001).
BIBLIOGRAPHY Rueckert, William. Kenneth Burke and the
Counter-statement (Los Altos, Cal., 1931). Drama of Human Relations
Towards a Better Life, Being a Series of (Minneapolis, 1963).
Epistles or Declamations (New York, ———, ed. Critical Responses to Kenneth
1932). Burke, 1924–1966 (Minneapolis, 1969).
Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of White, Hayden and Margaret Brose, eds.
Purpose (New York, 1935). Representing Kenneth Burke (Baltimore,
Attitudes toward History, 2 vols (New Md., 1982).
York, 1937).
The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies Charles Edgley
in Symbolic Action (New York, 1941).
A Grammar of Motives (New York, 1945).
A Rhetoric of Motives (New York, 1950).
The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in
Logology (Boston, 1961).
Terms for Order and Perspectives by BURKS, Arthur Walter (1915– )
Incongruity, ed. Stanley Hyman
(Bloomington, Ind., 1964). Arthur Burks was born on 13 October 1915 in
Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Duluth, Minnesota. From age ten through high
Life, Literature, and Method (Berkeley, school, he lived in Batavia, Illinois, west of
Cal., 1966). Chicago, where his father commuted to teach
mathematics at Marshall High School. Burks
Other Relevant Works earned his BA in mathematics and physics from
On Human Nature: A Gathering While DePauw University in 1936. He received his
Everything Flows, 1967–1984, ed. PhD in philosophy at the University of
388
BURKS
Michigan in 1941, writing his dissertation on Burks’s work on Peirce took him to Harvard
Charles Sanders PEIRCE. After taking a govern- University in 1955, to edit the seventh and
ment-sponsored defense-training course in the eighth volumes of Collected Papers of Charles
summer of 1941 at the Moore School of Sanders Peirce (1958), completing the series
Electrical Engineering at the University of for which Charles HARTSHORNE and Paul WEISS
Pennsylvania, Burks stayed on there as a had edited the first six volumes. In recent years,
wartime instructor and research engineer. In the he has been an adjunct professor at Indiana
fall of 1945, wishing to return to philosophy, University – Purdue University Indianapolis,
he accepted a part-time instructorship at nearby consulting for the Peirce Edition Project as it
Swarthmore College for the school year produces a comprehensive chronological series
1945–6, but continued to work full-time at the of Peirce’s writings.
Moore School through mid-February. Shortly Burks’s years at the Moore School during
thereafter, he began commuting to the Institute World War II had entailed an abrupt shift from
for Advanced Study at Princeton for three days his doctoral studies in philosophy to research in
a week through the balance of the spring term electrical engineering. His first assignment was
and for five days a week that summer. In the to a mine-sweeping project, with its task of
fall of 1946 he commenced his career at the advising the Philadelphia Navy Yard as to the
University of Michigan, starting as assistant speed and the successive altitudes at which
professor of philosophy and retiring, in 1986, mine-sweeping airplanes should fly over
as professor of philosophy in the College of stretches of ocean in order to detonate any
Literature, Science, and the Arts and as pro- possible underwater bombs. Its difficulty lay in
fessor of electrical engineering and computer the need to explode the mine, whatever its
science in the College of Engineering. Burks depth, at such a point that the resulting large
has received many honors, including the Russel spout of water would not strike and crash the
Lectureship for 1977–8, the highest honor low-flying plane. The required calculations, in
bestowed on a faculty member by the which he joined J. Presper Eckert, John W.
University of Michigan, nominated by col- Mauchly, and Cornelius Weygandt, were done
leagues in both philosophy and computer on desk calculators and on the school’s differ-
science. Burks was President of the American ential analyzer. Burks’s adaptation to this and
Philosophical Association Western Division in other early projects made clear that his under-
1972–3. graduate studies at DePauw and his graduate
As Burks noted in his “Replies” for The work at Michigan, followed by the intensive
Philosophy of Logical Mechanism, the 1990 government course at the Moore School, had
Festschrift edited by Merilee Salmon, his “long- provided the foundation he needed for war
range philosophical interests have always been research.
in broad questions of epistemology, logic, meta- His main work at the Moore School was as
physics, and value, such as those treated by a principal designer, under Eckert and
Plato, Lucretius, Hume, Kant, and Peirce.” At Mauchly, of the ENIAC (Electronic Numerical
Michigan he taught courses in logic, the phi- Integrator and Computer), the world’s first
losophy of science, and the history of modern general-purpose, or programmable, electronic
philosophy. He has written papers in all of computer. In this US Army-sponsored project,
these areas. His major book is Chance, Cause, Burks contributed to the designs of the basic
Reason: An Inquiry into the Nature of Scientific arithmetic unit (the accumulator) and the high-
Evidence (1977), in which he developed his speed multiplier. His chief contribution,
calculus of probabilistic choice and his logic of though, was the fundamental organization of
causal propositions, together with their appli- the computer’s master programmer, the com-
cations to traditional philosophical problems. ponent that consolidated all the local programs
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BURKS
of the thirty individual units into a single gramming, automata theory, computer
program, with repetitions and branches. In this modeling, and self-reproducing cellular
regard, he prepared the first electronic automata, much of it inspired by von
computer program – for calculating a shell tra- Neumann’s original work in those areas.
jectory, the task for which the ENIAC was Burks’s Logic of Computer Group led, in
originally conceived. When the computer was 1956, to a doctoral program in computers and
tentatively finished, Burks worked successively then, in 1967, to a new department of
with T. Kite Sharpless and Robert F. Shaw to computer and communication sciences in the
check the entire electronic system for logical Literary College, with Burks as its first Chair.
correctness and for adherence to a set of strict In 1983 the faculty of that department was
design principles devised to ensure reliability in shifted to the department of electrical engi-
this 18,000-vacuum-tube behemoth. neering and computer science in the
At the Institute for Advanced Study, where Engineering College. Within this discipline,
he had been invited by John VON NEUMANN to Burks taught courses in (and wrote papers on)
work on the IAS computer after the ENIAC’s computer architecture, computer logic, the
dedication in early 1946, he co-authored, with theory of cellular automata, and the history of
von Neumann and Herman H. Goldstine, the computing.
June 1946 Preliminary Discussion of the His writing on computer history began in
Logical Design of an Electronic Computing the mid 1970s. As early as 1950, he had been
Instrument. This work, which provided the asked by several corporations to consult on
paradigmatic form of von Neumann’s the ENIAC – as to who did what and when –
computer architecture, has been widely in anticipation of the issuance of the Eckert-
regarded as one of the most influential docu- Mauchly patent on that computer. He was
ments in the field. Although he left the Institute especially involved in consulting for Honeywell
for Michigan that fall, Burks returned for the after the patent was granted in 1964, as Sperry
summers of 1947 and 1948. Rand, which had acquired the patent rights,
The wartime move from philosophy to what began demanding huge royalties from the entire
was to become known as computer science electronic data processing industry. Honeywell
carried over to Burks’s postwar years, so that balked and ultimately became the plaintiff in a
he actually devoted about half his time at lawsuit against Sperry Rand. In October 1973
Michigan to philosophy and half to computer Judge Earl R. Larson, of the US District Court
science, together with efforts to build bridges in Minneapolis, handed down his decision ren-
between two fields that were generally consid- dering the ENIAC patent invalid. A major basis
ered distinct. Fortunately, the philosophy for this invalidation was the finding that the
department at Michigan took a broad view of ENIAC had been derived from the work of an
its subject matter. obscure physicist/mathematician, John V.
In the fall of 1948, with this strong interest Atanasoff, and his prior electronic computer,
in electronic computers and their basis in logical the ABC, through a visit Mauchly had made to
manipulations, he began consulting for Atanasoff’s Iowa State University laboratory in
Burroughs Adding Machine Co., in Detroit. A 1941.
year later he formed the Logic of Computers This case led Burks to revise his long-held
Group at Michigan, which Burroughs spon- view that the ENIAC was the world’s first elec-
sored through 1954, when Burks left for his tronic computer. And he now undertook to
year at Harvard. That group was re-established write the history, as it became apparent that
upon his return, supported by various govern- neither industry nor academia was presenting
ment research grants, and continued beyond his the unappealed trial outcome with either
retirement in 1986. It did research on pro- accuracy or acceptance. He recognized that the
390
BURKS
ABC, though a special-purpose computer, nev- to bear on his metaphysical system. It is this
ertheless embraced some dozen original coincidence that has enabled Burks both to
concepts that remain basic today, and that the explain Peirce’s work and to criticize it in light
ENIAC, which did go far beyond the ABC and of later scientific developments. From this per-
led to the stored-program computers and spective, it becomes clear that Burks’s philoso-
beyond, was properly seen as the first general- phy of logical mechanism is generally harmo-
purpose electronic computer. nious with and continuous with Peirce’s phi-
Burks and his wife Alice wrote a lengthy losophy. Burks shows how computer simula-
article on the ENIAC for the Annals of the tion can explain the role of probability and the
History of Computing in 1981, and then a gradual development of complexity in evolu-
book, The First Electronic Computer: The tion. These two phenomena have their coun-
Atanasoff Story in 1988. He continues to write terparts in the first two stages of Peirce’s cosmic
on this history, as now the only remaining theory of evolution: his tychism (probability)
survivor of that vacuum-tube era who tries to and his synechism (gradual development). As a
sort out and explain the relevant issues and logical mechanist, Burks rejects Peirce’s third
their roles in the modern computer revolution. stage, his agapism (final causation; that is,
The question that most often arises with unlimited progress toward a better and better
regard to Burks’s career concerns a seeming universe) in favor of a reductive account of
incongruity between philosophy and computer evolution. Burks spells out his views by com-
science. Indeed, though the idea that a parison with Peirce’s views most succinctly in
computer is a logic machine is quite well rec- the conclusion to his 1997 “Logic, Learning,
ognized today, this implicit connection between and Creativity in Evolution,” an essay in
the two disciplines met with considerable resis- Studies in the Logic of Charles S. Peirce. He
tance for many years, so that Burks found gives an extended account in the Festschrift
himself living in two separate worlds that were, cited earlier, The Philosophy of Logical
to him, strongly linked. It so happened that as Mechanism.
long ago as the 1880s philosopher Peirce had
remarked on the role of logic in computing BIBLIOGRAPHY
devices, even suggesting that electromagnetic “Peirce’s Conception of Logic as a
relays could be basic computing elements. Normative Science,” Philosophical Review
Atanasoff, in designing his binary serial 52 (1943): 187–93.
add–subtract mechanisms, realized that he was “Laws of Nature and Reasonableness of
doing logic, as he devised and followed a truth- Regret,” Mind 55 (1946): 170–72.
table for adding or subtracting two streams of “Empiricism and Vagueness,” Journal of
pulses and producing the correct sums or dif- Philosophy 42 (1946): 477–86.
ferences, together with their carry or borrow Preliminary Discussion of the Logical Design
digits. Burks recognized that many circuits of of an Electronic Computing Instrument,
the ENIAC were performing the logical func- with Herman H. Goldstine and John von
tions of NOT, NOT-OR, NOT-AND, and Neumann (Princeton, N.J., 1946; 2nd edn
complexes of these. Other computer designers 1947). Reprinted in Burks and Aspray
also understood, to varying degrees, that they 1987, pp. 97–142.
were doing logic. Burks carried the relationship “Super Electronic Computing Machine,”
forward for the rest of his career. Electronic Industries 5 (1946): 2–67, 96.
Burks’s philosophy of logical mechanism is “Electronic Computing Circuits of the
itself a combining of philosophy and science, ENIAC,” Proceedings of the Institute of
with mathematical logic as a foundation. Radio Engineers 35 (1947): 756–67.
Further, Peirce brought these same disciplines Reprinted in Proceedings of the Institute of
391
BURKS
Electrical and Electronic Engineers 85 Computer Systems 18 (2002): 871–92.

(1997): 1169–82.
“Icon, Index, and Symbol,” Philosophy and Further Reading
Phenomenological Research 9 (1949): Pres Addr of APA v8, Who’s Who in Phil
673–89. Salmon, Merilee H., ed. The Philosophy of
“Logic, Computers, and Men,” Proceedings Logical Mechanism: Essays in Honor of
and Addresses of the American Arthur W. Burks, with His Responses
Philosophical Association 46 (1973): (Dordrecht, 1990).
39–57.
Chance, Cause, Reason: An Inquiry into the Alice Rowe Burks
Nature of Scientific Evidence (Chicago,
1977).
“An Architectural Theory of Functional
Consciousness,” in Current Issues in
Teleology, ed. Nicholas Rescher (New
York, 1986), pp. 1–14. BURTT, Edwin Arthur (1892–1989)
“Peirce’s Evolutionary Pragmatic Idealism,”
Synthese 106 (1996): 323–72. Edwin A. Burtt was born on 11 October 1892
“Logic, Learning, and Creativity in in Groton, Massachusetts, and died on 6
Evolution,” Studies in the Logic of Charles September 1989 in Ithaca, New York. He was
S. Peirce, ed. Don Roberts, Nathan the second son of Edwin Palmer and Harriet
Houser, and James van Evra Jerome Burtt. His father was a New England
(Bloomington, Ind., 1997), pp. 497–535. Baptist minister, who trusted in God both as
healer, by rejecting traditional medicine to
Other Relevant Works treat illness, and as provider, by rejecting a
Ed., Collected Papers of Charles Sanders salaried income to support his family. When
Peirce, vols 7 and 8 (Cambridge, Mass., Burtt was thirteen, his father became a mis-
1958). sionary and moved the family to south
Ed., Theory of Self-reproducing Automata, China. After rebelling against his father’s reli-
by John von Neumann (Urbana, Ill., gious fundamentalism, Burtt returned to the
1966). United States in 1909 and attended the Mount
Ed., Essays on Cellular Automata (Urbana, Herman School in Massachusetts for two
Ill., 1970). years. He then attended Yale University, where
“The ENIAC: First General-Purpose he majored in philosophy and was awarded a
Electronic Computer,” with Alice R. BA degree in 1915. He next moved to New
Burks, Annals of the History of Computing York City to study for the ministry at the
3 (1981): 310–99. Union Theological Seminary. Although he
Ed., with William Aspray, Papers of John received a BD degree in 1920 and an STM
von Neumann on Computing and degree in 1922, Burtt abandoned his plan to
Computer Theory (Cambridge, Mass., become a minister to pursue a career as an
1987). academic philosopher. He went to Columbia
The First Electronic Computer: The University as a doctoral student in philoso-
Atanasoff Story, with Alice R. Burks (Ann phy, when the department included John
Arbor, Mich., 1988). DEWEY and F. J. E. WOODBRIDGE. In 1925 he
“The Invention of the Universal Electronic was awarded a PhD in philosophy from
Computer – How the Electronic Computer Columbia, with Woodbridge supervising the
Revolution Began,” Future Generation dissertation.
392
BURTT
Burtt began his academic career as an ticularly evident in the metaphysical categories
instructor at Columbia, where he taught from used to frame the modern perception of cos-
1921 to 1923. In 1923, he accepted a position mology: specifically, the modern categories of
at the University of Chicago as an assistant space, time, and mass replaced the medieval
professor and was promoted to full professor categories of substance, essence, and form.
in 1928. During Burtt’s tenure at the univer- Moreover, modern reality becomes atoms and
sity, the philosophy department was still a their motions, efficient causality, and the iden-
stronghold of pragmatism. Burtt was a visiting tification of mind with the brain. Burtt’s
professor at Harvard University in 1927–8. In demonstration of the importance of meta-
1931 Burtt resigned from Chicago along with physical presuppositions in the development of
other prominent members of the philosophy scientific knowledge ran counter to the then-
department. He then taught at Stanford prevalent logical positivists’ view that meta-
University in 1931–2. physics is superfluous in the natural sciences.
In 1932 Burtt joined the Sage School of Burtt’s supporters included Imré Lakatos,
Philosophy at Cornell University, where he who praised Burtt for his critique of posi-
was named the Susan Linn Sage Professor of tivism’s anti-metaphysical view, but some
Philosophy in 1941. He retired as emeritus thinkers strongly criticized his main thesis.
professor from Cornell in 1960 but continued Bertrand Russell interpreted Burtt’s thesis as an
to write and publish actively. Burtt was also a attack on the rational foundation of modern
visiting professor at the University of Hawaii science. Another Columbia doctoral student,
in 1941 and 1945 and a lecturer on philosophy Edward Strong (1936), whose dissertation was
and religion in India, Ceylon, and China in also directed by Woodbridge, argued that
1946–7 and 1953–4. He received several metaphysical categories in the natural sciences
academic awards, including an LHD from the are methodologically determined so that
University of Chicago in 1951 and the science is driven by methods or procedures
Nicholas Murray Butler Silver Medal from and not by metaphysics. Burtt (1943)
Columbia University in 1958. He was active in responded that certain metaphysical categories,
professional societies, serving as President of such as “gravity,” are methodologically or
the American Theological Society in 1949–50 operationally determined, while other cate-
and President of the Eastern Division of the gories, such as the “ether,” are convention-
American Philosophical Association in ally defined. Burtt never felt a need to revise his
1963–4. classic work after further twentieth-century
Burtt is best known for The Metaphysical revolutions in physics. Science, however, and
Foundations of Modern Physical Science, pub- especially as it related to religion, remained
lished first in 1924 as his doctoral disserta- an important part of Burtt’s scholarly activity
tion on Isaac Newton’s metaphysics and then throughout his career.
in 1932 in a revised version. In that book he During his tenure at Cornell, Burtt taught
maps the development of metaphysical pre- courses in the history of religions and com-
suppositions in the physical sciences from parative religion. This experience had a
Copernicus and Kepler to Newton. His thesis profound impact on the direction of his schol-
is that contemporary philosophical issues, par- arship, as well as on his personal life. In the late
ticularly those associated with the displace- 1920s, Burtt subscribed to religious humanism
ment of humans from the physical and meta- and signed the “Human Manifesto” in 1933,
physical center of the cosmos, reflect philoso- which was atheistic in intent and also substi-
phers’ uncritical acceptance of the shift from a tuted the spirit of humanity for traditional
medieval worldview to a Newtonian or notions of the divine. His conversion to
modern scientific worldview. That shift is par- humanism was evident in a series of lectures
393
BURTT
that he delivered before the Institute of World particular philosopher or philosophical system.
Unity at Greene Acre in August 1928; these Rather, after his religious conversions he
were published as Religion in an Age of Science attempted to forge a philosophical approach or
(1929). Burtt argued that religion must be rad- sensitivity that accommodated both Eastern
ically transformed toward consonance with and Western traditions.
the spirit of science and must come to regard Burtt’s philosophical method was advanced
its dogmas as tentative. During World War II, by a trip to the Far East in the mid 1940s. In
however, he rejected religious humanism a report to the Second Inter-American
because of its inability to account for evil and Congress of Philosophy held at Columbia in
became a member of Religious Society of 1947, he claimed that his travels had opened
Friends until his death. In 1947 while in India, new vistas for him and had afforded him “the
Burtt also took vows as a lay Buddhist to opportunity to begin exploring a vaster
demonstrate publicly the nourishment he universe than any I had glimpsed before”
received from this religious tradition. Although (1949, p. 387). In a paper contributed to a
Quakerism and Buddhism appear to be fun- symposium on Oriental philosophy in a 1948
damentally different religious traditions, Burtt issue of Philosophical Review, Burtt
found important points of contact between expounded upon a notion of “context” in an
them; he saw the Quaker notion of “inward attempt at rapprochement between apparently
light” as congenial to principles of Eastern irreconcilable differences separating Eastern
spirituality. and Western philosophical traditions.
Burtt’s dissatisfaction with humanism and Although Burtt did not precisely define
his religious conversion initially found their context, he used the notion operationally to
way into his philosophy, in terms of the refer to the “linguistic equivalents” between
problem of philosophical method. In a paper two cultures and to the “point of view” of a
on the topic published in 1946, Burtt com- culture. He then examined key philosophical
plained that philosophizing often represents concepts in Eastern and Western philosophy
“personal idiosyncrasy” or allegiance to a and argued that rapprochement between the
specific “school of thought.” After reviewing two traditions is possible only by respecting the
the positions of several prominent philoso- culture of other traditions and by continued
phers on philosophical method, he enumer- growth that transcends the limits of a particu-
ated several features he considered essential lar tradition. With respect to the outcome of
for philosophizing, including relativity of view- this process, Burtt acknowledged, “No present
points, probability of truth, inclusiveness, and thinker, Western or Eastern, can anticipate
contextual evaluation. Burtt called his method- with any assurance what form that notion [of
ological position “impartial cooperation,” for fact and truth] will take, but when it appears
what philosophers “can properly insist upon is it will present itself as a fulfillment of the
that their proposed criteria [for evaluating partial standards which on both sides now
philosophical arguments] along with ours be obtain.” (1948, p. 604)
rendered intelligible in the sense in which ‘intel- Burtt’s philosophical goal after the mid
ligible’ is identical with ‘sharable.’ Then all 1940s was to work toward a “world philoso-
alike become subject to cooperative assess- phy,” in which the limitations of Eastern and
ment.” (1946, p. 533) Although a variety of Western philosophical traditions were tran-
philosophers, including John Dewey and Søren scended in an integration of their achieve-
Kierkegaard, and different philosophical ments. To attain that integration, he devel-
systems, including pragmatism and existen- oped a notion of “expansion of awareness”
tialism, influenced Burtt’s philosophical and introduced it in his final major published
position, he never completely endorsed any work, In Search of Philosophic Understanding
394
BURTT
(1965). This newer notion eclipsed the earlier tions in Western society – science and religion
notion of context and included three essential – by developing a “new metaphysics” and
components: presuppositions, valuations, and attendant categories for a new world under-
motivations. Presuppositions were the premises standing, especially with the aid of Eastern
that underpin thinking and that compose the philosophical traditions. Not only was he a
scaffolding for constructing a world view. first-class, influential metaphysician who made
Valuations and motivations represent the emo- significant contributions to twentieth-century
tional dimension of epistemology and are philosophical thought, but Burtt’s character
important for adopting specific presupposi- and integrity were legendary: “He stands for a
tions. Another important component of Burtt’s quality of intellectual and spiritual hospitality
drive towards an expanded awareness was that is all the more inspiring because it stems
psychoanalysis, which Burtt himself had from widespread scholarly analysis and a
undergone since the mid 1940s. Through psy- moral passion for catholicity and civility.”
choanalysis, unconscious motivations that lead (Bertocci 1975, p. 269)
to valuing particular presuppositions can be
made explicit. Burtt argued that “insight” into BIBLIOGRAPHY
the underlying presuppositions is required to The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern
transcend unconscious biases towards grasping Physical Science: A Historical and Critical
truth and “ultimate” reality. Besides psycho- Essay (London, 1924; 2nd edn 1932).
analysis, Burtt also recommended Eastern Principles and Problems of Right Thinking:
meditation for transcending the biases often A Textbook for Logic, Reflective
inherent in unconscious presuppositions. Thinking, and Orientation Courses (New
Importantly, Burtt’s intention was not to York, 1928; 2nd edn 1931).
propose another philosophical system for Religion in an Age of Science (New York,
obtaining truth; rather, “my main aim is to 1929).
raise questions that cannot be ignored by a Types of Religious Philosophy (New York,
seeker for truth, to put them in the most 1939; 2nd edn 1951).
promising form I can, to open vistas ahead by Right Thinking: A Study in Its Principles and
probing in various directions and sketching Methods (New York, 1946).
fertile possibilities, and to entice you to roam Man Seeks the Divine: A Study of the
farther in whatever way you judge likely to be History and Comparative Religions (New
rewarding” (1965, p. xiii). York, 1957; 2nd edn 1964).
When over eighty years of age Burtt summed In Search of Philosophic Understanding
up his approach to philosophy: “My funda- (New York, 1965).
mental maxim now was ‘Keep growing!’ and “Toward a Philosophy of Philosophy,” in
this clearly was a process to which there would Mid-Twentieth Century American
be no end.” (1974, p. 106) Until his death, Philosophy: Personal Statements, ed. Peter
Burtt continued to search for the philosophical A. Bertocci (New York, 1974), pp.
light to grow towards a fuller conscious life. 104–19.
Many have found Burtt’s eclectic style discon- The Human Journey (Calcutta, 1981).
certing, but as Francis Moriarty argues, “there
is a connecting thread uniting his diverse Other Relevant Works
works, namely, his determination to develop a Burtt’s papers are at Cornell University, and
post-empiricist metaphysics that would receive the University of Adelaide, Australia.
its political expression in a world community” Ed., The English Philosophers from Bacon
(1994, pp. 3–4). Burtt spent his academic to Mill (New York, 1939).
career trying to bridge two powerful institu- “Method and Metaphysics in Sir Isaac
395
BURTT
Newton,” Philosophy of Science 10 Sixteenth and Seventieth Centuries

(1943): 57–66. (Berkeley, Cal., 1936).
“What is Metaphysics?” Philosophical Villemaire, D. D. E. A. Burtt, Historian and
Review 54 (1945): 533–57. Philosopher: A Study of the Author of The
“The Problem of Philosophical Method,” Metaphysical Foundations of Modern
Philosophical Review 55 (1946): 505–33. Physical Science (Boston, 2002).
“How Can the Philosophies of East and
West Meet?” Philosophical Review 57 James A. Marcum
(1948): 590–604.
“Philosophy and Philosophers in the Far
East,” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 9 (1949): 377–88.
Ed., The Teachings of the Compassionate
Buddha (New York, 1955). BUSH, Wendell Ter (1866–1941)
“The Core of Dewey’s Way of Thinking,”
Journal of Philosophy 57 (1960): 401–19. Wendell T. Bush was born on 25 September
“Descriptive Metaphysics,” Mind 72 (1963): 1866 in Ridgeway, Michigan, and died on 10
18–39. February 1941 in New York City. His father,
“My Path to Philosophy,” Philosophy East Rufus T. Bush, belonged to an old and promi-
and West 22 (1972): 429–40. nent Hudson River Valley family of Dutch
origin. Rufus entered the oil-processing business
Further Reading and was one of the founders of the Bush &
Bio 20thC Phils, Pres Addr of APA v7, Proc Denslow Manufacturing Co., which began its
of APA v64, Who Was Who in Amer v9, operations in 1870. The company merged with
Who’s Who in Phil Standard Oil, yielding Bush’s father a great
Bertocci, Peter A. “Love and Reality in E. A. fortune. After the death of Rufus Bush in 1890,
Burtt’s Philosophy: A Personalistic the large estate was incorporated as the Bush
Critique,” Idealistic Studies 5 (1975): Company, with Wendell Bush, his younger
269–89. brother Irving, and his mother as its officers.
Daston, L. “History of Science in an Elegiac The company invested in high-grade New York
Mode: E. A. Burtt’s Metaphysical City and Brooklyn real estate, including the
Foundations of Modern Science Bush Terminal in South Brooklyn.
Revisited,” Isis 82 (1991): 522–31. Wendell Bush came to New York City early
Lindberg, D. C., and R. S. Westman, eds. in life and graduated from Brooklyn
Reappraisals of the Scientific Revolution Polytechnic Institute. In 1896 he married Mary
(Cambridge, UK, 1990). L. Potter, the daughter of a ship captain. They
Moriarty, F. J. The Philosophy of E. A. had one adopted daughter, Anna. In 1898 he
Burtt: The Metaphysical Foundations for a obtained his MA from Harvard, where he
World Community. PhD dissertation, studied with William JAMES and Josiah ROYCE.
University of Adelaide (Adelaide, He continued his education at the University of
Australia, 1994). Berlin in 1900–1901, and in 1905 he received
Stainton, E. M. “E. A. Burtt: Bibliography,” his PhD in philosophy at Columbia University
Philosophy East and West 22 (1972): with a dissertation on Swiss philosopher
461–5. Richard Avenarius. In the same year, Bush
Strong, E. W. Procedures and Metaphysics: began teaching at Columbia, and in 1906 he
A Study in the Philosophy of joined colleague Frederick J. E. WOODBRIDGE as
Mathematical-physical Science in the an editor of the Journal of Philosophy, then
396
BUSHNELL
called the Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, Philosophy 10 (1913): 533–41.

and Scientific Methods. He also provided a “Constructive Intelligence,” Journal of
substantial financial endowment for the Journal Philosophy 14 (1917): 505–20.
and contributed many articles. Bush remained “An Impression of Greek Political
at Columbia for his entire career, becoming Philosophy,” in Studies in the History of
full professor in 1928 and retiring in 1938. Ideas (New York, 1918), pp. 43–79.
Among other non-academic activities, Bush “The Background of Instrumentalism,”
chaired a committee in 1917 that sponsored a Journal of Philosophy 20 (1923): 701–14.
“pilgrimage of patriotism” to Washington, “Religion and Art,” Journal of Philosophy
D.C. to urge an immediate declaration of war 27 (1930): 5–14.
against Germany. “The Obvious in Esthetics,” Journal of
Bush had a strong leaning toward James’s Philosophy 30 (1933): 197–212, 225–42.
empiricism, and to positivism both in its nine-
teenth-century French variety and its revival in Other Relevant Works
the works of the logical positivists. Bush was “Memories and Faith,” Journal of
also sympathetic to the American new realists Philosophy 26 (1929): 505–19.
and had a strong appreciation for John
DEWEY’s logic. In the final decades of his life, Further Reading
Bush developed a strong interest in the cultural Proc of APA in Phil Rev v51 & 55, Who
and philosophical study of religion, and he Was Who in Amer v1
founded the program of studies in religion and Friess, Horace L. “Professor Bush and his
culture at the Columbia graduate school. Collection of Religion and Culture,”
Whereas James had sought to capture religious Columbia University Quarterly 33 (April
experience by studying diaries and biographies, 1941): 159–64.
Bush examined anthropological monographs
and religious artifacts. He traveled widely col- Cornelis de Waal
lecting countless artifacts connected to the
history of religion, such as fetishes, amulets, and
medicine bundles. In 1935 he donated his
extensive collection, now called the Bush
Collection of Religion and Culture, to
Columbia University. BUSHNELL, Horace (1802–76)
BIBLIOGRAPHY Horace Bushnell was born on 14 April 1802 in

Avenarius and the Standpoint of Pure New Preston, Connecticut, the first of eight
Experience (New York, 1905). children of Ensign Bushnell and Dotha Bishop.
“An Empirical Definition of Consciousness,” He graduated with a BA from Yale College in
Journal of Philosophy 2 (1905): 561–8. 1827, taught school, and edited the Journal of
“A Factor in the Genesis of Idealism,” in Commerce in New York during 1828–9. He
Essays Philosophical and Psychological, in then entered Yale Law School in 1829 and
Honor of William James (New York, graduated in 1831. During a revival later in
1908), pp. 83–102. that year he decided to pursue the ministry. At
“The Existential Universe of Discourse,” Yale Divinity School he challenged the ideas of
Journal of Philosophy 6 (1909): 175–82. theology professor Nathaniel William Taylor.
“The Emancipation of Intelligence,” Journal His study of Hebrew developed his apprecia-
of Philosophy 8 (1911): 169–80. tion of language, and his reading of Coleridge’s
“The Empiricism of James,” Journal of Aids to Reflection deeply influenced him.
397
BUSHNELL
Bushnell left Yale when called to North God in Christ (Hartford, Conn., 1849).
Congregational Church in Hartford in 1833, Christ in Theology (Hartford, Conn., 1849;
and he married Mary Apthorp that same year. New York, 1987).
Bushnell’s career as preacher and writer devel- Sermons for the New Life (New York,
oped amid the conflict of free inquiry and con- 1858).
servative Calvinism. His book Christian Nurture Nature and the Supernatural, as Together
(1860), an American classic, provoked fellow Constituting One System of God (New
Congregationalist Bennett Tyler by holding that York, 1858).
infant baptism requires religious education to The Character of Jesus: Forbidding His
fulfill it. Bushnell had a striking spiritual con- Possible Classification with Men (New
version in 1848. “I was set upon by the personal York, 1860; New York, 1973).
discovery of Christ, and of God represented in Christian Nurture (New York, 1860; New
him” (Edwards 1992, p. 96). After this experi- Haven, Conn., 1967).
ence, Bushnell entered into a fresh examination Work and Play, or Literary Varieties (New
of Christian doctrine. In opposition to the York, 1864; 2nd edn 1903).
economic trinity of Calvinism, Bushnell, fol- Christ and His Salvation: In Sermons
lowing Schleiermacher, argued for an instru- Related Variously Thereto (New York,
mental trinity. He challenged Puritan thought 1864).
with his argument that play represents the true The Vicarious Sacrifice, Grounded in
end of man more than work. Principles of Universal Obligation (New
Bushnell also challenged common sense phi- York, 1864).
losophy’s claim that imprecision in language Moral Uses of Dark Things (New York,
can be overcome by careful formulation. 1868).
Bushnell argued that symbols provide the best Women’s Suffrage: The Reform Against
way for people to rediscover a dwelling place Nature (New York, 1869).
within Christian faith. Charles HODGE, among Sermons on Living Subjects (New York,
others, strongly criticized Bushnell’s God in 1872).
Christ (1849); organized opposition among Forgiveness and Law, Grounded in
Congregational ministers in 1850, led by Principles Interpreted by Human
Lyman ATWATER, failed in its effort to censure Analogies (New York, 1874). Reprinted
Bushnell. as The Vicarious Sacrifice, vol. 2 (New
In 1859 Bushnell resigned his pulpit, although York, 1877).
he continued to be intellectually active, publish- Building Eras in Religion (New York, 1881).
ing his further theological conclusions in a series The Spirit in Man: Sermons and Selections,
of books. He also led the city of Hartford to ed. Henry Learned (New York, 1903).
transform a garbage dump into a park. Recalling Contains a bibliography of Bushnell’s
the words of Job, “There is a spirit in man; and writings.
the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them
understanding,” Bushnell sought to shed Other Relevant Works
Christian light on public issues. Bushnell died on Bushnell’s papers are at Yale University and
17 February 1876 in Hartford, Connecticut. Harvard University.
Horace Bushnell: Twelve Selections, ed. H.
BIBLIOGRAPHY Shelton Smith (Oxford, 1965).
Discourses on Christian Nurture (Boston, Horace Bushnell: Selected Writings on
1847). Language, Religion, and American
Views of Christian Nurture and of Subjects Culture, ed. David L. Smith (Chico, Cal.,
Adjacent Thereto (Boston, 1847). 1984).
398
BUSSEY
Horace Bushnell: Sermons, ed. Conrad graduate study at Columbia in 1908–1909,

Cherry (New York, 1985). teaching at a private school in Bronxville, and
more study at Oxford University during
Further Reading 1912–14, she went to Northwestern University
Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, to receive her PhD in philosophy in 1915. Her
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer dissertation was titled “Typical Recent
Thought, Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer Definitions of Freedom.”
Religious Bio, Encyc Relig, Nat Cycl In 1915 Bussey was appointed instructor of
Amer Bio v8 philosophy at Goucher College in Baltimore,
Cheney, Mary Bushnell. Life and Letters of Maryland, and she remained there for the rest of
Horace Bushnell (New York, 1880). her career. She was promoted to full professor in
Crosby, Donald A. Horace Bushnell’s 1921, and chaired the philosophy department
Theory of Language (The Hague, 1975). from 1924 until her retirement in 1953. Bussey’s
Cross, Barbara M. Horace Bushnell: early publications analyzed freedom from an
Minister to a Changing America (Chicago, anti-absolutist standpoint, while a couple of later
1958). articles concerned the nature of religion. She
Duke, James O. Horace Bushnell: On the was a member of the American Philosophical
Vitality of Biblical Language (Chico, Cal., Association, the Southern Society of Philosophy
1984). Contains a bibliography of and Psychology, the American Association of
Bushnell’s writings. University Professors, the American Association
Edwards, Robert L. Of Singular Genius, of of University Women, and Phi Beta Kappa. In
Singular Grace: A Biography of Horace 1954 she received an honorary LHD from
Bushnell (Cleveland, 1992). Goucher College. Bussey died on 12 March
Mullin, Robert B. The Puritan as Yankee: A 1961 in New York City.
Life of Horace Bushnell (Grand Rapids, Bussey was devoted to several progressive
Mich., 2002). social and political causes, most notably the
Munger, Theodore. Horace Bushnell: Women’s International League for Peace and
Preacher and Theologian (Boston, 1899). Freedom (WILPF), which was founded in 1915
Porter, Noah. “Horace Bushnell,” New by Jane ADDAMS and Emily Greene BALCH.
Englander and Yale Review 36 (January Bussey was an original member of WILPF’s
1877): 152–69. Baltimore branch from the 1930s. Over the years
Smith, David L. Symbolism and Growth: she served as Chairperson of the local branch,
The Religious Thought of Horace National President during 1939–41, and co-
Bushnell (Chico, Cal., 1981). chairperson of WILPF, and wrote much of its
history. Bussey was also a co-founder and leader
Roger Ward of Maryland’s Civil Liberties Committee, which
later became a branch of the American Civil
Liberties Union. Other organizations that bene-
fited from her service and leadership were the
Baltimore Open Forum, the Consumers’ League
of Maryland, the Baltimore YMCA, and the
BUSSEY, Gertrude Carman (1888–1961) Church League for Industrial Democracy.
Gertrude C. Bussey was born on 13 January BIBLIOGRAPHY

1888 in New York City. Bussey first attended “Dr. Bosanquet’s Doctrine of Freedom,”
Barnard College of Columbia, and received her Philosophical Review 25 (1916): 711–19,
BA in 1908 from Wellesley College. After 728–30.
399
BUSSEY
“Anticipations of Kant’s Refutation of Philosophical Association Central Division in

Sensationalism,” Philosophical Review 1992–3, and the Central States Philosophical
31 (1922): 564–80. Association, and also was editor of the Journal
“Croce’s Theory of Freedom,” of Philosophical Research.
Philosophical Review 39 (1930): 1–16. Throughout Butchvarov’s work, one finds
“Religion and Truth,” Journal of Religion arguments that are simultaneously intricate,
(1932): 80–93. subtle, and substantial. Influenced by
Women’s International League for Peace Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and
and Freedom, 1915–1965: A Record of making use of ideas found in continental and
Fifty Years’ Work, with Margaret Tims analytic sources, his is a systematic philosoph-
(London, 1965). ical position with a phenomenological ontology
at its core and includes interrelated views on
Other Relevant Works ethics, epistemology, the philosophy of
Some of Bussey’s correspondence is in the language, and the philosophy of mind. For
Peace Collection at Swarthmore College, example, the account of universals appearing in
Pennsylvania. Resemblance and Identity (1966) and further
Trans., Man a Machine, by Julien Offroy de developed in Being Qua Being (1979) supports
la Mettrie (Chicago, 1912). the ethical realism of Skepticism in Ethics
(1989). Goodness is seen as a highly generic
Further Reading universal. Among other things, this helps us
Nat Cycl Amer Bio understand G. E. Moore’s claim that goodness
is a nonnatural property. For Moore, the
John R. Shook natural properties of a thing – such as yellow –
are parts of it and possibly exist apart from it.
One of Butchvarov’s points is that, the more
generic a property, the less sense it makes to
think of it as a Moorean natural property.
In The Concept of Knowledge (1970),
BUTCHVAROV, Panayot Krustev (1933– ) Butchvarov defends the view that knowledge is
the absolute unthinkability of mistake. The
Panayot Butchvarov was born on 2 April 1933 view is grounded in the claim that the beliefs
in Sofia, Bulgaria. He was educated at the Sofia constituting primary knowledge may not be
Gymnasium from 1946 to 1949; Robert states wholly separate from their objects. The
College in Istanbul, Turkey (BA 1952); and he identity of a belief is determined in part by its
received his philosophy degrees at the context. This context may include one’s aware-
University of Virginia (MA 1954, PhD 1955). ness of the object of the belief, and, in some
He became a United States citizen in 1959. cases, the awareness may include the object
Butchvarov taught philosophy at the University itself. “The headache and the [seen] black
of Baltimore in 1955–6, the University of South marks are constituents of the contexts of my
Carolina during 1957–9, and Syracuse respective beliefs and thus are in a certain sense
University from 1959 to 1968, where he rose to constituents of the beliefs themselves.” (p. 86)
the rank of full professor. In 1968 he moved to Perhaps most well known is the work on
the University of Iowa. He served as depart- identity, elaborated in Being Qua Being.
ment chair from 1970 to 1977. Since 1995, he Butchvarov focuses on the problem of account-
has been University of Iowa Foundation ing for the apparent distinctness of material
Distinguished Professor of Philosophy. He has identicals. Genuine informative identity state-
served as President of both the American ments of the form a = b, in contrast to mere
400
BUTLER
instances of the law of identity (x)(x = x), are Sosa, Ernest. “On the Nature and Objects of
always about things that are presented as two Knowledge,” Philosophical Review 81
but, when the statement is true, are in fact one. (1972): 364–71.
He understands such identity in terms of two Strawson, P. F. “Reply to Panayot
objects – in effect, intentional objects, though Butchvarov,” in The Philosophy of P. F.
not necessarily actually intended by anyone – Strawson, ed. Lewis E. Hahn (Chicago,
being one entity. Alternatively, a thing exists if 1998).
it is indefinitely identifiable, if there are an indef- Swindler, J. K. “Butchvarov on Existence,”
inite number of objects each identical with it. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (1981):
Yet, identity does not correspond to anything in 229–36.
the world, is not for example a relation, falls
under none of the categories. It is in this sense Denny Bradshaw
a transcendental concept and forms the basis of
the mitigated irrealism, or qualified realism,
about the external world that he defends in
Skepticism about the External World (1998).
BIBLIOGRAPHY BUTLER, Nicholas Murray (1862–1947)

“The Concept Of Possibility,” Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research 20 (1960): Nicholas Murray Butler was a professor of phi-
318–37. losophy, a university president, a national polit-
Resemblance and Identity: An Examination ical leader, an advisor to seven US Presidents,
of the Problem of Universals (Bloomington, and a liaison with dozens of foreign diplomats.
Ind., 1966). He was decorated by fifteen governments,
The Concept of Knowledge (Evanston, Ill., awarded with degrees from thirty-seven colleges
1970). and universities, and received the Nobel Peace
“Identity,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 Prize.
(1977): 70–89. Butler was born on 2 April 1862 in
Being Qua Being: A Theory of Identity, Elizabeth, New Jersey. He absorbed his
Existence, and Predication (Bloomington, college education at Columbia University with
Ind., 1979). an amazing ferocity, earning his BA in 1882,
“The Ontology Of Philosophical Analysis,” his MA in 1883, and PhD in philosophy in
Noûs 15 (1981): 3–14. 1884, writing a dissertation on “The History
Skepticism in Ethics (Bloomington, Ind., of Logical Doctrine.” Butler was already
1989). helping philosophy professor Archibald
“The Truth and the Untruth of Skepticism,” ALEXANDER teach his courses by 1881, and
Proceedings and Addresses of the American became convinced that his future was in edu-
Philosophical Association 67 (January cation. Alexander and Columbia President
1994): 41–61. Frederick Barnard recognized Butler’s extra-
Skepticism about the External World ordinary talents, and sent him to Europe to
(Oxford, 1998). study at Berlin and Paris. At Berlin, Butler
sampled the theology of Adolf von Harnack
Further Reading and the philosophies of Eduard Zeller and
Pres Addr of APA v10 Friedrich Paulsen, and returned to America
Dejnozka, Jan. “Butchvarov: Phenomenology, with a determination to elevate Columbia
Ontology, Universals, and Goodness,” University to the high standards of German
Philosophia 28 (2001): 445–54. scholarship and pedagogy.
401
BUTLER
Butler was assistant to Alexander in 1885–6, BIBLIOGRAPHY

tutor of philosophy from 1886 to 1889, and The Meaning of Education, and Other
upon Alexander’s retirement in 1889, he Essays and Addresses (New York, 1898).
became adjunct professor of philosophy, ethics, Enlarged edn, The Meaning of
and pedagogy, and head of the department. Education: Contributions to a
Butler engineered the creation of the Faculty of Philosophy of Education (New York,
Philosophy (the equivalent of a college of arts 1915).
and sciences) and became its first Dean in 1890, True and False Democracy (New York,
permanently leaving the classroom. In 1887 1907).
Butler also established and led the New York The American as He Is (New York, 1908).
College for the Training of Teachers, which The International Mind: An Argument for
became Columbia’s Teachers College in 1901. the Judicial Settlement of International
In 1890 Butler founded the Educational Review Disputes (New York, 1912).
and during the 1890s he was active on boards Why Should We Change Our Form of
of education and curriculum reform organiza- Government? (New York, 1912).
tions. He was President of the National The Building of the Nation (New York,
Education Association in 1894–5, and helped to 1916).
reorganize the New York State Education The Basis of Durable Peace (New York,
Department to reduce the power of elected 1917).
politicians and school boards. A World in Ferment: Interpretations of the
In 1902 Butler became President of Columbia War for a New World (New York,
University, and held that position until retiring 1918).
in 1945. Under Butler’s leadership Columbia Is America Worth Saving? Addresses on
became a world-class university of 34,000 National Problems and Party Policies
students. The philosophy faculty naturally pros- (New York, 1920).
pered under Butler. By the 1920s the philosophy Scholarship and Service: The Policies and
department was one of the largest in America, Ideals of a National University in a
staffed by prominent figures including John Modern Democracy (New York, 1921).
DEWEY, Frederick WOODBRIDGE, Felix ADLER, Building the American Nation: An Essay of
and William MONTAGUE. Butler never could Interpretation (New York, 1923).
agree with Dewey’s progressive views on edu- The Faith of a Liberal: Essays and
cation, however. Addresses on Political Principles and
Besides his political aspirations, which nearly Public Policies (New York, 1924).
garnered a nomination for the Republican can- The Path to Peace: Essays and Addresses on
didate for President, Butler’s energies were Peace and Its Making (New York, 1930).
attracted to fostering international cooperation Looking Forward: What Will the American
and peace. From 1925 to 1945 Butler was People Do about It? Essays and
President of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace; Addresses on Matters National and
he chaired the Lake Mohonk Conferences on International (New York, 1932).
International Arbitration; and he supported the Between Two Worlds: Interpretations of
Kellogg–Briand Treaty of 1929 which con- the Age in Which We Live (New York,
demned using the threat of war in international 1934).
policy. For these efforts Butler shared the 1931 The Family of Nations: Its Need and Its
Nobel Peace Prize with Jane ADDAMS. Butler Problems (New York, 1938).
died on 7 December 1947 in New York City. Why War? Essays and Addresses on War
and Peace (New York, 1940).
Liberty, Equality, Fraternity: Essays and
402
BUTLER
Addresses on the Problems of Today and v34, Proc of APA in Phil Rev v57, Who
Tomorrow (New York, 1942). Was Who in Amer v2, Who’s Who in
The World Today: Essays and Addresses Phil
(New York, 1946). Marrin, Albert. Nicholas Murray Butler
(Boston, 1976).
Other Relevant Works Thomas, Milton H. Bibliography of
Butler’s papers are at Columbia University. Nicholas Murray Butler, 1872–1932
Across the Busy Years: Recollections and (New York, 1934).
Reflections, 2 vols (New York, 1939–40). Whittemore, Richard. Nicholas Murray
Contains a bibliography of Butler’s Butler and Public Education (New York,
writings. 1970).
Further Reading John R. Shook

Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer
Bio, Encyc Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio
403
C
CABOT, Ella Lyman (1866–1934) mology are closely related for the activities of
the soul – memory, imagination, and feeling –
A teacher and philosopher of ethics for to have a moral aspect. For Cabot, ethics
children, Ella Lyman was born 26 February should take up “living issues,” and to be suc-
1866 in Boston, Massachusetts, the second cessful should widen interest in politics,
girl in a family of four daughters and two sons history, and literature.
born to Ella (Lowell) and Arthur Theodore Cabot wrote Ethics for Children (1910)
Lyman. In 1894 she married Richard Clarke because she believed that no “systematic book
Cabot, a local doctor and later professor of on ethics” for children had yet been written.
medicine at the Harvard Medical School. She put faith in ethics as a discipline, for as a
Having attended Radcliffe College from 1887 discipline, she deemed it capable of determin-
to 1900, she later became a member of the ing what facts are relevant, of clearing up self-
Radcliffe Board of Trustees. From 1900 to deceit, and of putting reason in order; hence,
1904 she took courses in logic and metaphysics she compiled an ethics in a “systematic effort
as a graduate student at Harvard University. to anticipate and solve recurrent problems.”
After teaching ethics and psychology in She did not think an ethics for children should
Boston private schools, she taught at the be Kantian or concerned with “duty.” Instead,
Garland School of Homemaking, Wellesley Cabot’s ethical theory is pragmatic in that it
College, and Pine Manor Junior College. She relies on “experience” and integration with
also became involved with religious education childhood. While it draws upon the pragmatic
and child welfare. President of the Women’s philosophy of Josiah ROYCE and William
Educational Association, she was elected JAMES, it intermingles such practical arts as
member of the Massachusetts State Board of “helpfulness” with virtue ethics.
Education in 1905. The following year she Cabot sought to teach children to see “invis-
began publishing books, particularly on ethics ible” ideal virtue, while aiming to show them
for children and young adults, but also on that “the right act is what [they] truly want.”
childhood development. Cabot died on 20 She advances this aim by selecting materials
September 1934 in Boston, Massachusetts. and methods with a view toward the interests
Cabot’s first book, Everyday Ethics (1906), of age groups and with the belief that it is
includes an introduction by William Torrey better to challenge the talents of the child than
HARRIS, the nationally renowned philosopher not. From grades one through eight, the ethical
and educator. The text explains ethics as a lessons are taught through legends, poetry,
habit not only of the will but also of thinking, stories, and biographical example. Her peda-
for it maintains that the study of ethics is to gogical philosophy asserts that a graphic
“think out problems.” Thus ethics and episte- incident is better than summary. Hence, it is
404
CABOT
not a philosophical method of prescriptive CABOT, James Elliot (1821–1903)

maxims, such as those of Anne Bradstreet’s
Meditations. Instead, Cabot’s method is one of James Elliot Cabot was born on 18 June 1821
questioning and of weighing and balancing in Boston, Massachusetts. He was the son of
arguments rather than of authoritarian rule, Samuel Cabot – who worked for the industrial
for she believed that the student has a “rich mill business of T. H. Perkins – and Eliza
mine of past experience in which to dig.” Perkins, the daughter of Samuel’s employer.
Cabot’s ethics encompasses home, school, and After graduating from Harvard College with
civic arenas of activity, presenting both their his BA in 1840, Cabot traveled in Europe for
common and their unique issues. Perseverance, three years. While in Berlin, he heard lectures
loyalty, and kindness are virtues that appear by Friedrich W. J. Schelling; later he trans-
frequently in the readings for the younger lated Shelling’s “Essay on Freedom” into
audience, whereas purpose, truth, self-gover- English. Also while abroad, he began reading
nance, and sympathy are more often the Ralph Waldo EMERSON’s Essays (1841), and
virtues subject to discussion for the older the transcendentalist periodical, The Dial.
audience. When Cabot published anonymously an essay
The psychology in Cabot’s teaching methods on “Immanuel Kant” in the last issue of The
is discernible in her descriptive approach to Dial (April 1844), Emerson was presiding as
childhood development and consequent editor (having assumed the role from Margaret
parental response. Cabot manifests feminist Fuller in 1842). In 1845, Cabot and Emerson
awareness in her ethics for children as evi- met. For the next thirty years, the two
denced in her frequent choice of women remained close friends, collaborators, and cor-
authors and exemplars. Her feminism is also respondents.
evident in the formulation of her childhood Cabot collaborated with Emerson and
development theory, in which she points out Theodore Parker to edit The Massachusetts
misconceptions about girls, such as the Quarterly Review (published from 1847 to
assumption that girls exhibit little interest in 1850), which was a more politically oriented
being team players. and anti-slavery successor to The Dial. Cabot
also worked with acclaimed Harvard natural-
BIBLIOGRAPHY ist, Louis AGASSIZ in the 1850s, aiding him
Everyday Ethics (New York, 1906). with an account of Agassiz’s exploration at
Ethics for Children: A Guide for Teachers Lake Superior. Along with James Russell
and Parents (Boston, 1910). Lowell, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Oliver
Volunteer Help to the Schools (Boston, Wendell HOLMES, Emerson, and a few others,
1914). Cabot helped found The Atlantic Monthly in
Our Part in the World (Boston, 1918). 1857. Esteemed by his peers, Cabot was
Teachers Manual for Our Part of the World elected as a fellow of the American Academy
(Boston, 1918). of Arts and Sciences.
Seven Ages of Childhood (Boston, 1921). In 1875 Cabot became Emerson’s editorial
Temptations to Rightdoing (Boston, 1929). assistant, and later became Emerson’s literary
executor and official biographer. After
Further Reading Emerson’s death in 1882, Cabot published the
Who Was Who in Amer v1 twelve-volume Emerson’s Complete Works
(1883–93), accompanied by Cabot’s A
Therese Boos Dykeman Memoir of Ralph Waldo Emerson (1887).
This memoir is Cabot’s most enduring literary
enterprise. The other influential Emerson biog-
405
CABOT
raphy at that time was Holmes’s Ralph Waldo Ed., Emerson’s Complete Works, 12 vols
Emerson, which was a much more conven- (Boston, 1883–93).
tional biographical account. Cabot’s memoir J. Elliot Cabot: Autobiographical Sketch,
might be understood as a pastiche, since he Family Reminiscences, Sedge Birds
used so many firsthand documentary sources (Boston, 1904).
in the creation of a narrative for Emerson’s life.
Holmes relied more upon his own interpreta- Further Reading
tions of Emerson’s work. However, Cabot’s Higginson, Thomas Wentworth. “James
memoir served the important purpose, in the Elliot Cabot,” Proceedings of the
years immediately following Emerson’s death, American Academy of Arts and Sciences
of providing scholars with access to many 29 (1903–1904): 649–55.
unpublished essays, letters, and journal entries, ———, Carlyle’s Laugh, and Other
which are now more widely and easily avail- Surprises (Boston, 1909), pp. 233–46.
able in annotated multivolume anthologies Simmons, Nancy Craig. Man Without a
and collections. Cabot’s memoir stands as a Shadow: The Life and Work of James
fairly reliable chronologically organized record Elliot Cabot. PhD dissertation, Princeton
of biographical data (people, dates, events) University (Princeton, N.J., 1980).
that are complemented by extensive use of
primary source material. David Justin Hodge
Cabot died on 16 January in the year of the
Emerson centenary of 1903, in Boston,
Massachusetts. A marble bust of Cabot by
Daniel Chester French is at the Boston
Athenaeum. It is to Cabot, in his service as
editor and biographer, that we owe the ground CAGE, John Milton (1912–92)
upon which the initial inheritance of Emerson’s
work would take place in the decades imme- John Cage was born on 5 September 1912 in
diately following Emerson’s death. Los Angeles, California, the son of an inventor.
He died on 12 August 1992 in New York City.
BIBLIOGRAPHY He was the most important voice of the
“Immanuel Kant,” The Dial 4 (April 1844): postwar musical avant-garde, but his influ-
409–15. ence extends to all the arts. His education
“The Philosophy of the Ancient Hindoos,” included two years at Pomona College, which
The Massachusetts Quarterly Review no. he left in 1930 to spend eighteen months
4 (September 1848): 401–22. studying and traveling in Europe. In 1933 he
A Memoir of Ralph Waldo Emerson, 2 vols studied non-Western, folk, and contemporary
(Boston, 1887). music with Henry Cowell at the New School
for Social Research in New York City, where
Other Relevant Works he also joined the composition studio of
Cabot’s papers are at Harvard University. Adolph Weiss. Returning to Los Angeles in
Lake Superior: Its Physical Character, 1934, he took private composition lessons and
Vegetation, and Animals, Compared with classes in musical analysis with Arnold
Those of Other and Similar Regions, with SCHOENBERG.
Louis Agassiz (Boston, 1850). In 1937 Cage took a job at the University of
Letter to the Governor of Massachusetts, on California, Los Angeles, as a dance accompa-
Occasion of his Late Proclamation, of nist and composer. In a similar position in
August 20, 1861 (Boston, 1861). 1938 at the Cornish School for the Arts in
406
CAGE
Seattle, Cage began his lifelong collaboration the negation of intention, and, in 1952, to
with the dancer and choreographer Merce what would become his best-known and most
Cunningham. Their partnership inspired his controversial work, the “silent” piece 4’33”.
early works for percussion ensemble and sub- Simultaneously and as part of his search for
sequently prepared piano, and his structural other kinds of new sounds, Cage experimented
use of duration parallels choreographic with magnetic tape – among the first such
practice. Cage eventually became musical efforts by an American – in his Imaginary
director for Cunningham’s eponymous Landscape No. 5 (1951–2). In 1958 he taught
company, and tours with this group intro- at Darmstadt, the famed summer school for
duced him to artists who would shape his the European avant-garde, where he devel-
musical and philosophical path: the faculty oped a technique of indeterminate composition
and students of North Carolina’s Black using transparencies. Luciano Berio subse-
Mountain College in 1947 and, on a 1949 quently invited him to work in Milan at the
tour of Europe, Pierre Boulez and Pierre Studio di Fonologia, where he assembled
Schaeffer. Fontana Mix using the transparency method.
The years around 1950 were exceptionally In 1969 Cage created HPSCHD with LeJaren
fruitful for Cage. In 1946 he met the Indian Hiller, using computerized compositional
musician Gita Sarabhai and began work on techniques developed at the University of
Sonatas and Interludes, a multi-movement Illinois.
work for prepared piano which, following its Cage published his important collection of
completion in 1948, earned him recognition essays Silence in 1961, articulating his con-
from the National Academy of Arts and trarian views of art, artists, and the increas-
Letters and the Guggenheim Foundation. ingly academic avant-garde. His writing style
Inspired by his encounter with Sarabhai, it reflects the influence of Gertrude STEIN in its
aims to portray the eight permanent emotions playful, blatant disregard of standard gram-
of Indian aesthetics and their common impulse matical and punctuation rules as well as its
towards tranquility. In its manipulation of the piercing refusal to submit to standard argu-
sound source, the placing of nuts, bolts, mentative models. This only confirmed the
washers, etc., on the piano strings, Sonatas prevailing view that he was more of a philoso-
and Interludes is also an important forerunner pher than a musician. In a way similar to
of Cage’s work in the electronic medium. Schoenberg’s claim to continue the long line of
The late 1940s also found Cage at Columbia Austro-German classicism, Cage came to see
University attending lectures on Zen Buddhism himself as perpetuating a tradition. In 1982 he
by Daisetz SUZUKI. This would lead him first to wrote to a young composer that he had “redis-
experiments with chance (and later indetermi- covered the traditional purposes for making
nacy) in composition and ultimately toward an music[:] a) to imitate nature in her manner of
aesthetic of silence. In 1950 the third operation, and b) to sober and quiet the mind
movement of his Concerto for Prepared Piano thus making it susceptible to divine influences.
and Orchestra introduced chance operations, Thus I was freed from self expression” (Cope
and that same year Cage famously pro- 1998, p. xv).
nounced, in a speech at the New York Artists’ Imitation of nature was of course an old
Club, “I have nothing to say and I am saying idea made new, but before Cage the
it and that is poetry as I need it” (1961, p. composer’s practice was to imitate with
109). Shortly thereafter he began to experi- artifice. He embraced Marshall McLuhan’s
ment with using the I Ching in the composi- idea that the invention of electronic instru-
tional process. This abdication of creative ments had resulted in a dissolving of bound-
control led Cage naturally to exalt silence as aries between human beings and their envi-
407
CAGE
ronment. Cage took this one step further and experiment in an anechoic chamber, where he
asserted that electronics render us “technically heard only the high-pitched sound of his
equipped to transform our contemporary nervous system and the low-pitched sound of
awareness of nature’s manner of operation his circulatory system, brought him to the
into art” (1961, p. 9). Along with this new tool definitive conclusion that silence does not exist.
came permission to use any sound as music. In 4’33” was the rational extension of such rev-
this Cage followed not only Luigi Russolo’s elations, a surrendering of responsibility by
1913 Futurist manifesto The Art of Noises but the composer (who has written nothing, even
also his older colleague Edgard Varèse, who though he knows how to write) and by the per-
had earlier written of composition as the orga- former (who plays nothing, even though he
nization of sound masses. knows how to play). They both collude in
In 1952 Cage participated in multimedia placing the entire burden on the audience, who
experiments at Black Mountain College along must abandon the old way of listening – with
with the pianist David Tudor, abstract expres- its aggressive pursuit of understanding – for the
sionist painter Robert Rauschenberg, and practice of bare attention. Cage wrote in
Cunningham. Each contributed a prepared response to criticism of the piece, “Life goes on
(nonrandom) element to a random sequence of very well without me” (Kostelanetz 1970, p.
events. These collaborations encouraged Cage 118).
to view theater, which “takes place all the time Such openness risks and even invites chaos.
wherever one is,” as a promising venue for Cage was unfazed by this; he agreed with
the imitation of nature (1961, p. 174). They Charles IVES, that “requiring that many parts
were also, of course, direct precursors of 1960s be played in a particular togetherness, is not an
“happenings.” accurate representation of how things are,”
Perhaps the most radical effect of this extro- and embraced “the coexistence of dissimilars”
version of consciousness was the complete in his music (1961, pp. 11–12). This led him to
destruction of the creator’s ego. Cage’s goal to embrace indeterminacy as a goal (as opposed
be “freed from self expression” subverts one of to a technique, for he freely admitted never
the accepted purposes of art since the having achieved it), and to develop a number
Renaissance. To relinquish control over which of strategies toward that goal.
sounds happen (and when they happen) during In 1949, as Cage was attempting to plot
a piece of music calls into question the very rhythmic structures on charts, he hit upon the
definition of art. Cage arrived at this point via idea of chance – tossing coins, for example –
his study of Eastern thought. He would allow as a means of making precompositional deci-
himself only one pure example of abdication of sions and, more importantly, of imitating the
the creator’s will, with 4’33”. Beyond that he operations of nature. With its incorporation of
felt compelled to construct systems that the I Ching, Music of Changes (1951) was the
resulted in various degrees of indeterminacy. height of such indeterminate composition
Cage was quoting Gita Sarabhai when he leading to highly determined performance. In
claimed for music the purpose of sobering and 1952, while working on his tape piece
quieting the mind, “thus rendering it suscepti- Imaginary Landscape No. 5, Cage became
ble to divine influences.” His attraction to this frustrated over the difficulty of precise syn-
openness was confirmed by the lectures of chronization. He “began to move away from
Daisetz Suzuki, and by the “white paintings” the whole idea of control, even control by
of Robert Rauschenberg, which he saw at chance operations …. [It was] an omen to go
Black Mountain in 1952. Canvases empty of toward the unfixed” (Tomkins 1965, pp.
all but white paint, their content is determined 115–16). At Darmstadt in 1958, he developed
by the individual viewer. Cage’s famous 1952 a new method using multiple transparencies,
408
CAGE
whereby the performer devises his or her own posteriori, and asked the listener to approach
score, making each performance simply one each event with a fresh pair of ears, empty of
aspect of the total work. historical expectations.
That each successive piece should be some- In Silence, Cage defined the purpose of writing
thing new had long been an axiom for the music as a paradox, “a purposeful purposeless-
artistic avant-garde. Cage extended this into ness or purposeless play. This play, however, is
the realm of each successive iteration or per- an affirmation of life – not an attempt to bring
formance of a given piece. He carried the order out of chaos nor to suggest improvements
primacy of the new to an unprecedented in creation, but simply a way of waking up to the
extreme: repetition was the great enemy of art, very life we’re living, which is so excellent once
and the past was “used up.” Furthermore, one gets one’s mind and one’s desires out of the
Cage made it the listener’s responsibility to way and lets it act of its own accord” (1961, p.
perceive each musical event with shoshin or 12). Cage thus anticipates by more than thirty
“beginner’s mind.” Western harmonic proce- years the current philosophical interest in the aes-
dures, which he connected to the rise (and, thetics of everyday living.
optimistically, to the fall) of materialism in the
West, were his special target. His exposure to BIBLIOGRAPHY
the talas or rhythmic structures of Indian music Silence: Lectures and Writings (Middletown,
in the 1940s persuaded him that duration, not Conn., 1961).
vertical sonority, should be the organizing A Year from Monday: New Lectures and
component in music. The postwar invention of Writings (Middletown, Conn., 1967).
magnetic tape for audio recording gave him a M: Writings, 1967–73 (Middletown, Conn.,
new tool with which to measure musical time 1973).
and led to what James Pritchett calls the “time- Empty Words: Writings, 1973–78
length” works of the mid 1950s. (Middletown, Conn., 1979).
Cage always denied any intention to épater For the Birds, with D. Charles (Boston,
le bourgeois, but it is not difficult to find direct 1981).
lines of influence from his musical hero Erik Another Song, with S. Barron (New York,
Satie (1866–1925), who also stood accused of 1981).
leaving behind ideas weightier than his music. Themes and Variations (Barrytown, N.Y.,
This statement by Cage echoes Satie’s deadpan 1982).
perversity: “Whenever I’ve found that what X: Writings, 1979–82 (Middletown, Conn.,
I’m doing has become pleasing, even to one 1983).
person, I have redoubled my efforts to find
the next step.” (Tomkins 1965, p. 107) Further Reading
Cage took the final step in a process begun Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio,
quietly by Satie and more spectacularly by Comp Amer Thought, Encyc Amer Bio,
Marcel Duchamp, dethroning in one fell Who Was Who in Amer v10
swoop art, the artist, the interpreter, the Cope, David. New Directions in Music
artifact, and the audience. Like Duchamp in his (Dubuque, Iowa, 1971; Prospect Heights,
“ready-mades,” he called into question the Ill. 1998).
traditional materials of creation. He relin- Fetterman, William. “Merce Cunningham
quished that Promethean dominance vested in and John Cage: Choreographic Cross-
the artist by Romantic aestheticians, and currents,” Contemporary Music Review
demanded that the performer relinquish it as 18 (1999): 121–42.
well. He was as indifferent to failure in concert Kostelanetz, Richard, ed. John Cage (New
as he was to success. He labeled the score a York, 1970).
409
CAGE
———, Conversing with Cage (New York, Cailliet was assistant professor of French
1987). literature at the University of Pennsylvania
Miller, Leta E. “Cage, Cunningham, and from 1927 to 1931 and professor of French
Collaborators: The Odyssey of Variations literature and civilization at Scripps College
V,” Musical Quarterly 85 (2001): 545–67. and Claremont Graduate School in California
Nicholls, David, ed. The Cambridge from 1931 to 1941. Returning to the
Companion to John Cage (Cambridge, University of Pennsylvania in 1941, he was
UK, 2002). professor of French literature and civilization
O’Driscoll, Michael J. “Silent Texts and until 1946. He taught at Wesleyan University
Empty Words: Structure and Intention in as professor of French literature and philos-
the Writings of John Cage,” ophy from 1946 until 1959. He then became
Contemporary Literature 38 (1997): professor of Christian philosophy at
616–39. Princeton Theological Seminary, where he
Patterson, David, ed. John Cage: Music, stayed from 1960 until his death. He held
Philosophy, and Intention, 1933–1950 concurrent positions as a fellow in the
(New York, 2001). Academy of Colonial Science in Paris (now
Perloff, Marjorie, and Charles Junkerman, the Academy of Overseas Science) and was
eds. John Cage: Composed in America awarded the Officier d’Academe in 1934 for
(Chicago, 1994). his work in Madagascar.
Pritchett, James. The Music of John Cage Cailliet’s work on cultural anthropology
(Cambridge, UK, 1993). and Christian philosophy, especially the use
Shultis, Christopher. Silencing the Sounded of symbols in primitive religious works,
Self: John Cage and the American revolved around the usage of “sign” and
Experimental Tradition (Boston, 1998). “symbol” by both pagan and Christian. A
Tomkins, Calvin. The Bride and the “symbol” indicated participation with a com-
Bachelors (New York, 1965). munity, for example, Jesus Christ was God’s
symbolic participation with Man. One’s
Mary Ellen Poole Christian faith, conversely, is seen as an active
participation with Christ. Cailliet also wrote
on the development of Pascal’s Christian
thinking in Pascal: The Emergence of Genius
(1961), having earlier translated Great
Shorter Works of Pascal (1948) and Pascal’s
CAILLIET, Emile (1894–1981) Short Life of Christ (1950). Cailliet died on
4 June 1981 while travelling in California.
Emile Cailliet was born on 17 December
1894 in Dampierre, France. He studied at BIBLIOGRAPHY
the universities of Chalons and Nancy, Essai sur la psychologie du Hova (Paris,
earning his undergraduate degree. After 1924).
serving with the French infantry in World La Foi des ancêtres; essai sur les représenta-
War I, he received his PhD from the tions collectives des vieux Malagaches
University of Montpellier in 1926, based on (Paris, 1930).
research on the use of primitive religious sym- La Prohibition de l’occulte (Paris, 1930).
bolism which he carried out while in Trans. George Cole, Why We Oppose the
Madagascar. He earned a second postgradu- Occult (Philadelphia, 1931).
ate degree, a doctorate of theology, in 1937 The Themes of Magic in Nineteenth
from the University of Strasbourg. Century French Fiction, trans. Lorraine
410
CALDWELL
Haven (Paris, 1932). Haines, George L. “The Princeton

Symbolisme et âmes primitives (Paris, Theological Seminary, 1925–1960,” PhD
1936). dissertation, New York University (New
Mysticisme et “mentalité mystique.” Etude York, 1966). Contains a bibliography of
d’un problème posé par les travaux de m. Cailliet’s works.
Lévy-Bruhl sur la mentalité primitive Lemke, Steve Warner. “The Christian
(Paris, 1938). Philosophy of Emile Cailliet,” PhD dis-
The Life of the Mind (New York, 1942). sertation, Southwestern Baptist
The Clue to Pascal (Philadelphia, 1943; Theological Seminary (Fort Worth, Tex.,
London, 1944). 1985).
La Tradition littéraire des idéologues
(Philadelphia, 1943). James C. Poteet II
El Christianismo y la cultura (Buenos Aires,
1944).
Pascal: Genius in Light of Scripture
(Philadelphia, 1945).
The Beginning of Wisdom (New York,
1947). CALDWELL, William (1863–1942)
The Christian Approach to Culture
(Nashville, 1953). William Caldwell was born on 10 November
The Dawn of Personality (Indianapolis, 1863 in Edinburgh, Scotland. He was educated
1955). at Edinburgh University, receiving his MA in
The Recovery of Purpose (New York, 1884 and DSc in 1886. He studied with the
1959). professor of logic and metaphysics, Alexander
Pascal: The Emergence of Genius (New Campbell Fraser, who took that post upon
York, 1961). the death of William Hamilton. Fraser was
Young Life (New York, 1963). the foremost scholar of Locke and Berkeley,
Journey into Light (Grand Rapids, Mich., and also taught an early type of personal
1968). idealism that greatly impressed Caldwell.
Caldwell absorbed continental trends during
Other Relevant Works additional postgraduate work in Germany,
Cailliet’s papers are at Princeton France, and Cambridge. He was awarded the
Theological Seminary. Shaw Fellowship in Mental Philosophy, lec-
Trans., Great Shorter Works of Pascal turing in 1893 on “Schopenhauer’s System in
(Philadelphia, 1948). Its Philosophical Significance,” later published
Trans., Pascal’s Short Life of Christ in 1896. From 1891 to 1903 he taught at
(Princeton, N.J., 1950). Cornell, the University of Chicago (with John
Hartley Burr Alexander: A Biography DEWEY), and Northwestern University as the
(Decorah, Iowa, 1992). Chair of Ethics and Social Philosophy
Alone at High Noon: Reflections on the (1895–1903). In 1903 he was called to McGill
Solitary Life (Grand Rapids, Mich., University in Montréal, Canada, to be Sir
1971). William MacDonald Professor of Moral
Philosophy. He retired in 1933 and died in
Further Reading Montréal on 14 December 1942.
Gaebelein, Frank E. “Emile Cailliet Caldwell’s idealism echoes many of Fraser’s
(1894–1981),” Theology Today 40 arguments for the metaphysical primacy of the
(1983): 55–7. mind’s self-consciousness, and for the volun-
411
CALDWELL
taristic view that reason and knowledge is an reaction against absolute idealism there has
aspect of willful agency. Caldwell avoided arisen a “new” and “ethical” idealism, best
solipsism by arguing that mind is essentially exemplified in James’s writings. Recent phi-
social in nature, agreeing with many idealists losophy has taken a “practical turn,” trying to
in the 1880s and 90s, including the Hegelians “grasp the significance of the world from the
who incorporated social psychology such as standpoint of the moral and social activity of
Dewey, Josiah ROYCE, and Bernard Bosanquet. man.” This teleological metaphysics refuses to
But Caldwell worried that these Hegelian ide- divorce science from morality, and fact from
alists might go too far, beyond the social psy- value. Caldwell asserts that “the real object of
chology necessary for replacing subjective knowledge is to store up reality or experience
Cartesianism, to arrive at a metaphysical in conceptions that may, in the form of
theory of an all-absorbing Absolute mind. motives, influence or determine conduct,” and
Caldwell’s rejection of the Absolute, elabo- that “the mind itself is a dynamic thing.”
rated in chapter eight of Pragmatism and Caldwell’s Pragmatism and Idealism
Idealism (1913), confirms his membership in demands additional principles to supplement
the smaller company of personal idealists pragmatism. The most important are an
including Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, F. C. applicable criterion for judging consequences
S. Schiller, Borden Parker BOWNE, and George and truth, and a clear statement of the nature
H. HOWISON. Caldwell, like most idealists of of reality and its relation to our experience of
his era, did retain a role for a theistic God. Yet reality. Caldwell offers the missing meta-
like the other personal idealists, Caldwell physics: if human experience is necessarily a
ensured that God’s role was carefully restricted matter of willful interaction with nature, then
so that human free will and moral responsi- those social beliefs which best anticipate suc-
bility were preserved, as he moved beyond cessful interactions with nature will naturally
older idealisms into new territory. be aroused and retained as knowledge. An
Caldwell was therefore sympathetic with idealism that includes God would also ground
the novel functional psychology and pragma- a universal morality by supplying a clear cri-
tism inaugurated by William JAMES and Dewey terion for distinguishing right from wrong.
in America. In 1898 Caldwell published Caldwell’s demand for a theistic and moralis-
“Philosophy and the Activity-Experience,” in tic personalism is a representative example of
the same year as James’s announcement of the sort of compromise available to American
pragmatism in “Philosophical Conceptions idealists resisting scientism and materialism.
and Practical Results.” Caldwell’s article enu-
merates dozens of philosophers and psycholo- BIBLIOGRAPHY
gists, including James, who have defended the “Schopenhauer’s Criticism of Kant,” Mind
six tenets of “practical philosophy” with which o.s. 16 (1891): 355–74.
his own standpoint agrees: experience is part Schopenhauer’s System in Its Philosophical
of natural reality; experience is cognitive Significance (Edinburgh and London,
aspects in harmony with feeling and volition; 1896).
consciousness is not primarily knowledge but “The Epistemology of Ed. V. Hartmann,”
action; there is no Absolute mind that ratio- Mind n.s. 2 (1893): 188–207.
nally thinks all possible truths in logical coher- “Professor Patten’s Theory of Social Forces,”
ence; philosophy must respect the existence of International Journal of Ethics 7 (1897):
free will and human creative powers; and 345–53.
ethical theory is central to philosophy’s sys- “Philosophy and the Activity-Experience,”
tematic comprehension of reality. In International Journal of Ethics 8 (1898):
“Pragmatism” (1900) Caldwell claims that in 460–80.
412
CALKINS
“The Will to Believe and the Duty to a clergyman at a Congregational pastorate in

Doubt,” International Journal of Ethics 9 Newton, Massachusetts, and Calkins enrolled in
(1899): 373–8. Newton High School. Her graduation essay
“Social and Ethical Interpretations of Mental was entitled, “The Apology Which Plato Should
Development,” American Journal of Have Written.” As a vindication of the charac-
Sociology 5 (1899): 182–92. ter of Xanthippe, this essay displayed Calkins’s
“Von Hartman’s Moral and Social early commitment to women’s struggles.
Philosophy,” Philosophical Review 8 In 1882 Calkins was admitted to Smith
(1899): 465–83, 589–603. College with an advanced standing as a sopho-
“Pragmatism,” Mind n.s. 9 (1900): 433–56. more. The following year, Calkins’s only sister
Pragmatism and Idealism (London and Maud became suddenly ill and died. The emo-
Toronto, 1913). tional impact of the death forced Calkins to
take a leave of absence from college. She spent
Further Reading the following academic year of 1883–4 at home
Who Was Who in Amer v3 studying Greek and tutoring her two younger
“Caldwell, William,” in The Canadian brothers. She returned to Smith the following
Who’s Who, ed. C. Roberts and A. L. year with senior standing, and graduated with
Tunnell (Toronto, 1936), vol. 2, p. 159. her BA in 1885 with a concentration in classics
Shook, John, and Kenneth Westphal. and philosophy. The next year, she actively
“Introduction,” to Pragmatism and participated with her mother in the Social
Idealism, by William Caldwell, vol. 4 of Science Club of Newton, a group of local
The Early Critics of Pragmatism (Bristol, women who studied economic and social
UK, 2001), pp. xii–xix. problems. Her first book, Sharing the Profits
Watson, John. “Pragmatism and Idealism,” (1888), was the culmination of the research
Queen’s Quarterly 21 (1914): 465–72. undertaken during that year. In 1886 her family
embarked on a sixteen-month trip to Europe,
John R. Shook during which Calkins met Abby Leach, an
instructor in Greek at Vassar who asked
Calkins to accompany her on a trip to Greece.
Calkins accepted the offer and continued her
travels when her family returned to the United
States.
CALKINS, Mary Whiton (1863–1930) Calkins earned her MA from Smith College
in 1887. Soon after, she began as a tutor in
Mary Whiton Calkins was born on 30 March Greek at Wellesley College, the institution at
1863 in Hartford, Connecticut, and died on 26 which she remained for the rest of her career.
February 1930 in Newton, Massachusetts. she Soon after Calkins arrived at Smith, Wellesley’s
was one of five children; her father was Wolcott philosophy department was planning expan-
Calkins, a Protestant clergyman educated at sions into new fields of psychology, and they
Yale University and Union Theological offered Calkins a position in psychology on
Seminary, and her mother was Charlotte condition that she undertake a year of training
Whiton, a social activist. She received her early in the discipline. Deliberating over the best
education in local schools in Buffalo, New institution at which to prepare, she decided
York, where her father was a minister of the upon Harvard University. Though the univer-
North Presbyterian Church from 1866 to 1880. sity refused to admit women formally, pressure
Her education was supplemented with private from Calkins’s father and the President of
lessons in German. In 1880 her father became Wellesley succeeded in securing for Calkins
413
CALKINS
informal permission to attend graduate degree upon Calkins. Though Radcliffe College
seminars. Studying under Josiah ROYCE and attempted to offer Calkins a PhD in lieu of
William JAMES, Calkins had the privilege of Harvard’s refusal, she turned it down on prin-
being the sole student in a seminar held by ciple because she did not undertake study at
James just after the publication of his Principles that institution. She received an honorary
of Psychology. She also studied psychology degree of Litt.D. from Columbia in 1909, and
under Edmund C. Sanford at Clark University. an LLD from Smith College in 1910.
She finished her informal study at Harvard Calkins was promoted from instructor to
and began as an instructor in psychology at associate professor of psychology in 1894. She
Wellesley in 1890. She held the position of was promoted again in 1896 to the position of
instructor in psychology from 1890 to 1894. In associate professor of philosophy and psychol-
addition to teaching, she established a labora- ogy, which she held until 1898. As a professor
tory within Wellesley’s psychology department, of both philosophy and psychology, Calkins
which was the first established at a woman’s noticed the different focuses regarding the
university, and one of the first established in the person within each field. Whereas psychology
United States. She sought advice from Royce, focused on the determined aspects of the
James, and Sanford about places to undertake person, philosophy focused on the freedom of
formal graduate study in psychology, and seri- the person. Calkins’s initial resolution to this
ously considered studying under Hugo dichotomy was derived from Münsterberg’s
MÜNSTERBERG at the University of Freiburg. distinction between the objectifying sciences
Further plans were suspended when and the subjectifying sciences. From 1901 to
Münsterberg accepted a position teaching 1905, Calkins drew upon this distinction in
experimental psychology at Harvard in 1892. her recommendation that the study of the
Petitioning Harvard again, Calkins received person utilize both sciences in a manner that
permission to continue her informal study keeps each science in check. She called this
under Münsterberg in addition to James and process a “double entry” approach. In 1909,
Royce, while she continued her teaching duties Calkins revised her recommendation in favor of
at Wellesley. She incorporated the experimen- a “single entry” approach of the subjectifying
tal ideas that she learned at Harvard into the sciences. While she did not negate the validity
curriculum at Wellesley; in turn, her instruction of the objective sciences, she was weary of their
of students and laboratory work at Wellesley atomism.
aided her further study at Harvard. Her article Calkins’s contributions within psychology
“Experimental Psychology at Wellesley were significant. In addition to inventing a
College” (1892) reflects this process of inter- memory technique of paired associates still
change between teaching and learning. employed within memory research today, she
In 1895 Calkins unofficially presented and published voluminously. Publications in psy-
defended her dissertation, “An Experimental chology include a monograph supplement in
Research on the Association of Ideas,” before Psychological Review entitled “Association:
the faculty of the philosophy department at An Essay Analytic and Experimental” (1896),
Harvard, which included James, Royce, An Introduction to Psychology (1901), Der
Münsterberg, and George SANTAYANA. She Doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologie
passed her oral defense with distinction. The (1905), and A First Book in Psychology (1909).
faculty sent a letter to Harvard’s President noti- In addition, she published over fifty articles
fying him that she had fulfilled all of the and reviews in the area of psychology alone.
requirements for her degree. For the next Calkins was promoted from associate pro-
twenty-eight years, various faculty and alumni fessor to full professor of philosophy and psy-
requested, to no avail, that Harvard confer a chology in 1898, a position which she held
414
CALKINS
until she retired in 1929. Though Calkins main- BIBLIOGRAPHY

tained an active interest in psychology through- “Association: An Essay Analytic and
out her career, in 1898 she passed her labora- Experimental,” Psychological Review
tory work on to a newer colleague, Eleanor monograph suppl. no. 2 (February 1896).
Gamble. At this point, Calkins’s own meta- An Introduction to Psychology (New York,
physical system of “personalistic absolutism” 1901).
became a prominent focus. The chief influences Der Doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologie
of Calkins’s metaphysics were G. W. F. Hegel, (Leipzig, 1905).
F. H. Bradley, and Royce. As an idealistic per- The Persistent Problems of Philosophy: An
sonalism, her metaphysics was idealist insofar Introduction to Metaphysics through the
as it held that all realities within the universe Study of Modern Systems (New York,
were comprised of mind; it was personalistic 1907; 5th edn 1925).
insofar as it held that all realities were a self or A First Book in Psychology (New York,
aspect of a self. Her metaphysics held that one 1909; 4th edn 1924).
all-inclusive Absolute Person comprised the The Good Man and The Good: An
lesser mental selves of the universe within it. Introduction to Ethics (New York, 1918).
In addition to her numerous publications in “The Personalistic Conception of Nature,”
psychology, Calkins published much in phi- Philosophical Review 28 (1919): 115–46.
losophy as well. Her books in philosophy “The Basis of Objective Judgments in
include The Persistent Problems of Philosophy Subjective Ethics,” in Proceedings of the
(1907), and The Good Man and The Good: An Sixth International Congress of
Introduction to Ethics (1918). She also edited Philosophy, ed. Edgar S. Brightman
volumes of Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and (Cambridge, Mass., 1926), pp. 408–14.
Hume. Important articles include “The “The Philosophical Credo of an Absolutistic
Personalistic Conception of Nature” (1919) Personalist,” in Contemporary American
and “The Philosophical Credo of an Philosophy: Personal Statements, ed. G. P.
Absolutistic Personalist” (1930). Adams and W. P. Montague (New York,
Calkins received many honors throughout 1930), vol. 1, pp. 197–218.
her life in the fields of psychology and philos-
ophy. In American Men of Science (1903), Other Relevant Works
James McKeen CATTELL ranked Calkins twelfth Calkins’s papers are at Wellesley College.
among the nation’s top fifty psychologists. She Sharing the Profits (Boston, 1888).
was the first woman elected President of both Ed., The Metaphysical System of Hobbes
the American Psychological Association in (Chicago and London, 1905).
1905, and the American Philosophical Ed., Locke’s Essay Concerning Human
Association in 1918 (and only William James Understanding (Chicago and London,
and John DEWEY have also held both presi- 1905).
dencies). In addition, she was granted honorary “A Reconciliation Between Structural and
membership in the British Psychological Functional Psychology,” Psychological
Association in 1927. During that year, Calkins Review 8 (1906): 61–81.
also gave two lectures on conceptions of “Self and Soul,” Philosophical Review 17
meaning and value at Bedford College of the (1908): 272–80.
University of London. She retired in 1929 from “Psychology as Science of Self,” Journal of
teaching at Wellesley to a research professor- Philosophy 5 (1908): 12–20, 64–8,
ship, with the intent of writing more and 113–22.
spending time with her mother, but soon died “Henri Bergson: Personalist,” Philosophical
the next year. Review 21 (1912): 666–75.
415
CALKINS
Ed. with J. McCormack, An Enquiry Calkins,” in Notable American Women

Concerning Human Understanding, and 1607–1950, ed. Edward T. James
Selections from A Treatise of Human (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), pp. 278–80.
Nature, by David Hume (Leipzig, 1913; La
Salle, Ill., 1958). Dana Noelle McDonald
“The Self in Scientific Psychology,” American
Journal of Psychology 26 (1915):
495–524.
“A Personal Idealist’s Concern for
Psychology,” The Personalist 5 (1924):
7–11. CALVERT, George Henry (1803–89)
“Critical Comments on the ‘Gestalt
Theorie’,” Psychological Review 33 George Henry Calvert was born on 2 January
(1926): 135–58. 1803 in Prince George County, Maryland.
Ed., Essay, Principles, Dialogues, with Calvert came from a distinguished family; he
Selections from Other Writings, by George was heir to the lands of Lord Baltimore, the
Berkeley (New York, 1929). founder of the Colony of Maryland, and his
“Autobiography of Mary Whiton Calkins,” grandfather, Benedict Calvert, was a close
in History of Psychology in personal friend of George Washington. Calvert
Autobiography, vol. 1 (Worcester, Mass., studied at Harvard from 1819 to 1823 but did
1930), pp. 31–62. not graduate, and then he went to the
University of Göttingen in Germany, where he
Further Reading mastered German and became enthralled with
Amer Nat Bio, Amer Phils Before 1950, German literature. Impressed with the writings
Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, Bio Dict Psych, of Johann Goethe, Friedrich Schiller, and the
Bio 20thC Phils, Cambridge Dict Amer German Romantics, Calvert managed to visit
Bio, Dict Amer Bio, Encyc Psych, Nat Goethe during his stay at Göttingen. He edited
Cycl Amer Bio v13, Pres Addr of APA v2, the Baltimore American upon returning to the
Proc of APA in Phil Rev v40, Who Was United States during the 1830s and eventually
Who in Amer v1, Women Phils made a second tour of Europe in 1840 with his
Furumoto, Laurel. “From Paired Associates wife, Elizabeth Steuart Calvert. Calvert visited
to the Self: The Intellectual Odyssey of William Wordsworth on this trip and recorded
Mary Whiton Calkins,” in Portraits of his impressions of Europe in Scenes and
Pioneers in Psychology, ed. G. Kimble, M. Thoughts in Europe (1846). He settled in
Wertheimer, and C. White (Hillsdale, N.J., Newport, Rhode Island, in 1843 and was
1991), pp. 57–72. elected the first mayor of Newport, but soon
In Memoriam: Mary Whiton Calkins, retired from political service to resume his intel-
1863–1930 (Wellesley, Mass., 1931). lectual career. Calvert died on 24 May 1889 in
Magg, P. “The Personalism of Mary Whiton Newport, Rhode Island.
Calkins,” The Personalist 28 (1947): Calvert was not so much a philosopher as a
44–53. man of letters. His interests were extremely
Munk, Arthur W. “Samples of the American broad. He was a poet, dramatist, travel writer,
Feminine Mind: Focus on Mary Whiton aesthetician, art critic, translator, and biogra-
Calkins as Philosopher,” Review Journal pher. His wealth of interests can be seen in the
of Philosophy and Social Science 2 (1977): numerous prominent literary figures whom he
170–82. counted among his acquaintances: Johann
Onderdonk, Virginia. “Mary Whiton Goethe, William Wordsworth, Ralph Waldo
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CAMPBELL
EMERSON, Margaret Fuller, Edgar Allen Poe, Essays Aesthetical (Boston, 1875).
Thomas Carlyle, and Henry Wadsworth The Life of Rubens (Boston, 1876).
Longfellow. Calvert never developed a com- Wordsworth: A Biographic Aesthetic Study
prehensive aesthetic theory, but his writings (Boston, 1878; Folcroft, Penn., 1970).
are peppered with philosophical ideas about Shakespeare: A Biographic Aesthetic Study
art, beauty, and poetics drawn from idealist, (Boston, 1879).
Romantic, and transcendentalist authors. He Coleridge, Shelley, Goethe: Biographic
argues in “The Beautiful” in his Essays Aesthetic Studies (Boston, 1880).
Aesthetical (1875), for example, that our expe-
rience of beauty consists in the feeling provoked Further Reading
in us by the perception of the ideal or perfect in Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
nature. Calvert sometimes uses the language Dict Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v5
of divinity to describe this process. Beauty Everson, Ida G. George Henry Calvert (New
occurs when the spark of divinity in us recog- York, 1944).
nizes the spark of divinity in nature. Elsewhere, Tompkins, H. B. Bibliography of the Works
in “What is Poetry?,” he links this analysis of of George Henry Calvert (Newport, R.I.,
beauty to the creation of art by associating 1900).
poetry with imagination, which he defines as an
intellectual power for mentally recreating and Joshua Shaw
perfecting perceptual experiences. He defines
poetry as the imagination’s creations when it is
motivated by an emotion longing to uncover
the “fair and perfect” in nature.
Calvert’s most important contributions lay,
however, in his efforts to popularize German CAMPBELL, Donald Thomas (1916–96)
literature and ideas from continental Europe.
He wrote some of the first English translations Donald T. Campbell was born on 20
and commentaries on Goethe and Schiller and November 1916 in Grass Lake, Michigan. He
was Goethe’s most vocal literary defender in attended San Bernadino Junior College and
American of his time. He also popularized ideas then the University of California at Berkeley,
like hydropathy and Charles Fourier’s utopian where he received his BA in 1939 and his PhD
socialism in his Scenes and Thoughts in Europe. in psychology in 1947 (after service in the
Finally, he was a pioneer in the area of biogra- Naval Reserve). He was a student of Egon
phy, writing the first American biographies on BRUNSWIK and Edward TOLMAN, and wrote
literary, rather than political or military, figures. his dissertation on “The Generality of a Social
He published biographies of Goethe, Attitude.” Campbell taught psychology at
Wordsworth, Shakespeare, and Paul Reubens, Ohio State University and the University of
an ancestor on his mother’s side. Chicago before going to Northwestern
University in 1953. After retiring from
BIBLIOGRAPHY Northwestern in 1979, he was Schweitzer
Scenes and Thoughts in Europe, by an Professor in the Maxwell School at Syracuse
American (New York, 1846; 2nd edn University until 1982, when he went to Lehigh
1852). University with the title of “university profes-
The Gentleman (Boston, 1863). sor” and relationships with the psychology,
Goethe: His Life and Works, An Essay (New sociology, anthropology, and education
York, 1872). departments. He also held visiting positions
Brief Essays and Brevities (Boston, 1873). at several universities including Yale. Campbell
417
CAMPBELL
retired from Lehigh in 1994 and died on 5 1960s. Mostly inspired by his acquaintance
May 1996 in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. with Karl Popper’s philosophy of science,
Campbell was among the most important Campbell postulated that all knowledge is
social scientists of the twentieth century. He created by trial and error. Beginning with his
made significant contributions to psychology, “Blind Variation and Selective Retention in
sociology, anthropology, education, and epis- Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge
temology. For the many accomplishments of Processes” (1960), he wrote a series of articles
his career, he received the Distinguished applying Popper’s view of knowledge as that
Scientific Contribution Award of the American which survives vigorous testing to various
Psychological Association (he was its President problems in the sociology of knowledge. By the
in 1973), and the award for Distinguished early 1970s, he had selected the label of “evo-
Contribution to Research in Education from lutionary epistemology” for his theory, and
the American Educational Research was the first to publish a paper with that title
Association. He was elected to membership in in 1974, joining a new and vibrant interdisci-
the National Academy of Sciences in 1973, plinary sub-field. Other students of Popper
and became a member of the American had similarly sought a general theory of knowl-
Philosophical Society in 1993. Numerous uni- edge based on Popper, notably William W.
versities awarded him their honorary degrees, BARTLEY. Campbell’s inquiries found that
including Michigan, Florida, Chicago, and basing a theory of knowledge on evolutionary
Southern California. considerations is as old as the theory of evo-
Campbell’s training in social psychology led lution itself, and in later writings he discussed
to his pioneering work in the emerging field of the work of such thinkers as Herbert Spencer,
cross-cultural psychology in the 1950s, for William JAMES, James Mark BALDWIN, and
which he first gained recognition. His next Konrad Lorenz.
major contribution was to uncover fundamen- Campbell’s epistemology requires a natural-
tal problems with the standard research method- istic view of intelligence and a realistic attitude
ology of experimentation with human subjects. toward knowledge’s ability to partially repre-
His article written with Donald W. Fiske on sent the external world. As a natural activity of
“Convergent and Discriminant Validation by an organism, the intelligent exploration of the
the Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix” (1959) environment requires no postulation of non-
developed the statistical methods of “quasi- natural mental states or powers. Because the
experimentation” that approach the genuinely surrounding environment’s features are par-
randomized scientific experiments in the natural tially responsible for the success of human
sciences. It is perhaps the most frequently cited experiments, and the refinement of knowledge
paper in social science. Campbell expanded his through further successful trials is best
theory of research design in later books (1963, explained by crediting knowledge with gradu-
1979) that have long been the standard texts on ally approximating those external features, we
the subject. He also developed techniques for should believe that scientific knowledge pro-
uncovering the deep and pervasive influences of gresses toward some greater realistic accuracy.
bias and prejudice on social attitudes, which in However, as Campbell stresses, the human
turn can entrench “misinformation” and false organism is imperfectly sensitive only to a small
knowledge. This research produced several range of relevant environmental features, and
studies and a book titled Ethnocentrism: heavily reliant on inductive reasoning, and
Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes, and therefore a strong form of the correspondence
Group Behavior (1971). theory of truth is not justifiable.
Campbell became interested in the social Following other thinkers such as general
creation and transmission of knowledge in the systems theorist Ludwig B ERTALANFFY ,
418
CAMPBELL
Campbell realized that the learning accom- developmental Psychology of James

plished by living organisms requires Mark Baldwin, ed. John M. Broughton
“downward causation” in addition to ordinary and D. John Freeman-Moir (Norwood,
upward causation. Campbell rejected reductive N.J., 1982), pp. 87–97.
materialism, which holds that the only causal “Selection Theory and the Sociology of
powers are those of the smallest parts of reality Scientific Validity,” in Evolutionary
which must in turn be solely responsible for Epistemology: A Multiparadigm
anything “upwards” that is done by larger Program, ed. W. G. Callebaut and R.
wholes. He postulated that whole systems can Pinxten (Dordrecht, 1987), pp. 139–58.
also exert “downward” selective control over Methodology and Epistemology for Social
the activation of the causal powers of its parts. Science: Selected Papers, ed. E. Samuel
Campbell was brought to this view by his Overman (Chicago, 1988).
theory of learning, in which it is impossible to “Popper and Selection Theory,” Social
explain what sort of knowledge emerges by Epistemology 2 (1988): 371–7.
considering only the micro-causal causal “Epistemological Roles for Selection
powers of the brain, since it is the Theory,” in Evolution, Cognition, and
organism–environment interaction which reg- Realism, ed. Nicholas Rescher (Lanham,
ulates knowledge creation. Md., 1990), pp. 1–19.
“Levels of Organization, Downward
BIBLIOGRAPHY Causation, and the Selection-Theory
“Perception as Substitute Trial and Error,” Approach to Evolutionary
Psychological Review 63 (1956): 331–42. Epistemology,” in Theories of the
“Methodological Suggestions from a Evolution of Knowing, ed. Gary
Comparative Psychology of Knowledge Greenberg and Ethel Tobach (Hillsdale,
Processes,” Inquiry 2 (1959): 152–82. N.J., 1990), pp. 1–17.
“Blind Variation and Selective Retention in “From Evolutionary Epistemology via
Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Selection Theory to a Sociology of
Processes,” Psychological Review 67 Scientific Validity,” Evolution and
(1960): 380–400. Cognition 3 (1997): 5–38.
Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Social Experimentation, with M. Jean
Attitudes, and Group Behavior, with Russo (Thousand Oaks, Cal., 1999).
Robert A. LeVine (New York, 1971). “Emergence,” with Mark H. Bickhard, in
“Downward Causation in Hierarchically Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies
Organized Biological Systems,” in Studies and Matter, ed. P. B. Andersen, C.
in the Philosophy of Biology, ed. Emmeche, N. O. Finnemann, and P. V.
Francisco Ayala and Theodosius Christiansen (Århus, Denmark, 2000),
Dobzhansky (Berkeley, Cal., 1974), pp. pp. 322–48.
179–86.
“Evolutionary Epistemology,” in The Other Relevant Works
Philosophy of Karl Popper, ed. Paul A. “Convergent and Discriminant Validation
Schilpp (La Salle, Ill., 1974), pp. 412–63. by the Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix,”
“On the Conflicts Between Biological and with Donald W. Fiske, Psychological
Social Evolution and Between Psychology Bulletin 56 (1959): 81–105.
and Moral Tradition,” American Experimental and Quasi-experimental
Psychologist 30 (1975): 1103–26. Designs for Research, with Julian Stanley
“The ‘Blind-Variation-and-Selective- (Chicago, 1963).
Retention’ Theme,” in The Cognitive- Quasi-experimentation: Design and
419
CAMPBELL
Analysis Issues for Field Settings, with T. 1987).

D. Cook (Boston, 1979). Wuketits, Franz M. “The Philosophy of
A Primer on Regression Artifacts, with Donald T. Campbell: A Short Review
David A. Kenny (New York, 1999). and Critical Appraisal,” Biology and
Social Measurement, with M. Jean Russo Philosophy 16 (2001): 171–88.
(Thousand Oaks, Cal., 2001).
John R. Shook
Further Reading
Bio Dict Psych, Encyc Psych, Encyc Social
Behav Sci, Who Was Who in Amer v11
Baum, Joel, and Bill McKelvey, eds.
Variations in Organization Science: In
Honor of Donald T. Campbell CAMPBELL, Joseph (1904–87)
(Thousand Oaks, Cal., 1999).
Bickman, Leonard, ed. Validity and Social Joseph Campbell was born on 26 March 1904
Experimentation: Donald Campbell’s in White Plains, New York, and died on 30
Legacy (Thousand Oaks, Cal., 2000). October 1987 in Honolulu, Hawaii. His child-
Brewer, Marilynn B., and Thomas D. hood was strongly Irish Catholic. This heritage
Cook. “Donald T. Campbell led to an earnest immersion in the rituals and
(1916–1996),” American Psychologist 52 symbols of the church, including becoming an
(1997): 267–8. altar boy. His interest in mythology began at
———, eds. Scientific Inquiry and the age seven when he saw the Indians in Buffalo
Social Sciences: A Volume in Honor of Bill’s Wild West Show in Madison Square
Donald T. Campbell (San Francisco, Garden. Campbell developed an intense fasci-
1981). nation with Native American lore that ulti-
Dunn, William N., ed. The Experimenting mately led to a life of scholarship. His boyhood
Society: Essays in Honor of Donald T. he spent studying the Indian exhibits at the
Campbell (New Brunswick, N.J., 1998). American Museum of Natural History and
Hansen, Forest. “A Critique of the reading all the books he could find on Native
Epistemological Skepticism of Campbell’s Americans, including the reports of the Bureau
Phenomenological Behaviorist of American Ethnology.
Psychology,” Behaviorism 7 (1979): Campbell graduated from Canterbury
65–85. School in New Milford, Connecticut, in 1921.
Heyes, Cecilia, and David L. Hull, eds. On a crossing of the North Atlantic in 1924,
Selection Theory and Social he met Jiddu Krishnamurti, who would
Construction: The Evolutionary become a great world teacher of the
Naturalistic Epistemology of Donald T. Theosophists. This friendship led to a deep
Campbell (Albany, N.Y., 2001). interest in the traditions of India. Campbell
Hooker, Cliff A., and Wayne Christensen. received his BA in English from Columbia
“The Organization of Knowledge: University in 1925. He completed his MA in
Beyond Campbell’s Evolutionary medieval literature in 1926 with a thesis on
Epistemology,” Philosophy of Science “The Dolorous Stroke,” the origin of the
suppl. 66 (1999): 237–49. Wasteland symbolism in the Grail legends. His
Radnitzky, Gerard, and William W. advisor was Roger Loomis, a leading
Bartley, III, eds. Evolutionary Arthurian scholar. During 1926, Campbell
Epistemology, Rationality, and the took classes at the New York City Religious
Sociology of Knowledge (La Salle, Ill., Science Church taught by one of the founders
420
CAMPBELL
of that movement, Fenwick Holmes. As part of editing and substantial writing of four books
his studies, Campbell read Holmes’s Science of based on Zimmer’s papers.
Mind. Campbell’s other early writing included the
A year in Paris during 1927–8 for disserta- commentary on a Navajo ceremonial story,
tion research included other significant Where the Two Came to Their Father (1943).
learning experiences, such as tutorials in aes- He also co-authored with Henry Morton
thetics with sculptor Antoine Bourdelle. He Robinson, A Skeleton Key to Finnegan’s Wake
was impressed with the art of Pablo Picasso, (1944); this was the first comprehensive
Constantin Brancusi, and Georges Braque. analysis of Joyce’s complex novel. From Joyce,
During this time, Campbell read W. B. Yeats, Campbell drew the concept of the monomyth
T. S. ELIOT, and James Joyce. Joyce’s pub- – the one great mythic story told in all eras and
lisher, Sylvia Beach, befriended him and regions that was the initiatory adventure of
explained the intricacies of Ulysses. At the the hero.
University of Munich in 1928–9, Campbell The publication of The Hero with a
studied how Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung Thousand Faces in 1949 established Campbell
used myth in psychology. He also noted mythic as the preeminent comparative mythologist of
dimensions in the novels of Thomas Mann. All the twentieth century. Campbell intended the
these masters of modernity would greatly influ- book to be a guide to reading a myth, and he
ence his thinking, leading him later to theorize explained how challenging experiences could
that mythologies are the artistic expressions of be seen as initiatory adventures. This connec-
psychological life. tion between ancient stories and the emotional
Returning to Columbia University, concerns of modern life was distinctive. As
Campbell wanted to expand the scope of his Campbell observed, “The latest incarnation
dissertation topic beyond the Grail myth to of Oedipus, the continued romance of Beauty
include parallels with psychology, literature, and the Beast, stand this afternoon on the
and art. His advisors made it clear that such an corner of 42nd Street and Fifth Avenue,
interdisciplinary perspective would not be waiting for the traffic light to change.”
acceptable. Choosing not to complete his doc- Campbell’s description of the hero’s journey
torate, Campbell spent several years in has been used extensively by generations of
Woodstock, New York, reading extensively. artists and scholars. His description shows
He visited California in 1931–2, where he similarities among the great stories of world
befriended novelist John Steinbeck and biolo- mythology, and is a model of initiatory
gist Ed Ricketts. During this time, he first read elements in myth, religion, literature, and
Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the West; ritual. Campbell elaborated on a more ele-
Campbell’s sweeping vision owes much in style mentary matrix (departure, transformation,
to Spengler. return) developed by Arnold van Gennep in
Campbell became professor of literature at Rites of Passage (1912). Campbell used two
Sarah Lawrence College in 1933, and he theories to explain the universality of symbols,
remained in that position until 1972. He myths, and rituals: one theory was the princi-
married a former student, Jean Erdman, who ple of elementary ideas developed by Adolf
became prominent in modern dance as both Bastian; the other was the similar concept of
performer and choreographer. They had no archetypes found in the psychology of Carl
children. Jung.
Campbell’s principal mentor was Indologist The hero’s journey as described in The Hero
Heinrich Zimmer, a colleague of C. G. Jung. with a Thousand Faces explains an initiatory
Zimmer died suddenly of pneumonia in 1943. sequence. The opening stage includes: the call
Over the next twelve years, Campbell did the to adventure, meeting the mentor, and the
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CAMPBELL
threshold passage. Once into the adventure, The third function is the sociological. Myth
the challenges involve finding allies and guides, supports and validates the specific moral order
facing ordeals, resisting temptations, braving of the society out of which it arose. Particular
enemies, enduring the dark night of the soul, life-customs of this social dimension, such as
surviving the supreme ordeal, and winning the ethical laws and social roles, evolve dramati-
elixir (the boon). The concluding steps are the cally. This social function, and the rites by
return threshold passage, resurrection, cele- which it is rendered, establishes in members of
bration, acceptance of a role of service (sharing the relevant group a system of sentiments that
the elixir), and, finally, the merger of two link those members spontaneously to the
worlds. Campbell shows why societies must group’s ends.
have heroes to incarnate values upon which a The fourth function of myth is psychological.
nation or world-order thrives. The seeker The myths show how to live a human life under
provides a society with the vitality essential any circumstances. This pedagogical function of
for its survival. mythology carries individuals through the
The Hero with a Thousand Faces showed various stages and crises of life: from childhood
the similarities among mythological traditions. dependency, to responsibilities of maturity, to
Campbell followed this work with a series of the reflection of old age, and finally, to death; it
writings on the great differences among world enables people to grasp with integrity the
myths. The four-volume Masks of God – unfolding of their lives. This psychological
Primitive Mythology (1959), Oriental function of myth initiates individuals into the
Mythology (1962), Occidental Mythology realities of their own psyches, and guides them
(1964), and Creative Mythology (1968) – toward enrichment and realization.
analyzed the distinctions among the mytholo- The psychological function was the principal
gies of various regions and cultures. focus of Campbell’s scholarship. He credited
Campbell introduced one of his principal his students at Sarah Lawrence College, par-
theoretical constructs in the Masks of God ticularly the women, with making his work
series. In Occidental Mythology, Campbell accessible. He noted their insistence on hearing
first outlined the four functions of myth. The how the mythological traditions were relevant
first function is metaphysical. Myth awakens to their lives. Partly in response to their perse-
and supports a sense of awe before the verance, Campbell put great emphasis on how
mystery of being; it reconciles consciousness to wisdom literature embodied psychological
the preconditions of its own existence. Myth dynamics. The use of myth as a guide to inner
induces a realization that behind the surface life gained Campbell both a large following
phenomenology of the world, there is a tran- and substantial criticism; some of his col-
scendent source of mystery. Through this leagues believed the original purposes of the
vitalizing mystical function, the universe mythic texts were primarily sociological.
becomes holy. Campbell edited many books, beginning
The second function is a cosmological one with The Portable Arabian Nights (1952). He
and deals with the image of the world as the was general editor of the series Man and Myth
focus of science. This function shows the shape (1953–4), which included major works by
of the universe, but in such a way that the Maya Deren (Divine Horsemen: The Living
metaphysical mystery still comes through. The Gods of Haiti, 1953), Carl Kerenyi (The Gods
cosmology corresponds to the actual experi- of the Greeks, 1954), and Alan Watts (Myth
ence, knowledge, and mentality of the culture. and Ritual in Christianity, 1954). He was
This interpretive function changes radically editor of The Portable Jung (1972), con-
over time and presents a map or picture of the tributing a lengthy introduction on Jung’s
order of the cosmos and our relationship to it. thought.
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CAMPBELL
Campbell’s involvement in the Eranos ers. The next stage appears in the planters’
Conferences (founded by Carl Jung) led to his rituals of birth, death, and rebirth. The third
editing six volumes of papers from the stage involves high civilizations of Goddesses,
meetings: Spirit and Nature (1954), The heroes, and priestly orders. In the final stage,
Mysteries (1955), Man and Time (1957), individuals are able to comprehend illumina-
Spiritual Disciplines (1960), Man and tion directly as an internal state. This last stage
Transformation (1964), and The Mystic Vision leads up to the modern era in Western civi-
(1969). lization. Not all regions or cultures go through
Campbell retired from Sarah Lawrence these stages simultaneously; in the contempo-
College in 1972 to focus on writing. His rary world, cultures appear in each of the four
interest went beyond the texts to other dimen- stages.
sions of the mythic imagination. He argued Campbell’s lasting eminence owes much to
that timeless wisdom is approached in three his gifts as a public speaker. He was able to
ways. The mythic story is first of all access to convey the essence of ancient teachings
the mysteries beyond conscious knowing. The through vivid storytelling and commentary. A
next primary way it offers to approach that series of public lectures at the Cooper Union in
wisdom is through ritual; ceremonial practices New York City became the accessible book,
often accompany major myths and allow par- Myths to Live By (1972). He presented annual
ticipants to enter into personal experience of seminars for seventeen years at the State
the story through their own dramatic reenact- Department’s Foreign Service Institute. For
ment of the text. The third way that wisdom decades, he gave annual workshops at the
is approached is through the image; this image Esalen Institute in California. He also spoke
might be a statue or painting of a religious frequently for C. G. Jung Institutes, University
exemplar, or it might be an image from a of California Extension in Berkeley, and the
dream or the imagination. For example, pon- Pacifica Graduate Institute in Santa Barbara.
dering mythic stories brings to mind images Campbell’s prizes and awards include
that represent beyond themselves; the larger several honorary doctorates. The Hero with a
content of their representation is reached Thousand Faces won the National Institute of
through considering metaphors conveyed in Arts and Letters Award for Contributions to
the image. Campbell’s richly illustrated book, Creative Literature. In 1985, he received the
The Mythic Image (1974), explains this point. National Arts Club Medal of Honor for liter-
A new generation discovered Campbell ature for his work on the Historical Atlas of
when George Lucas based much of his screen- World Mythology. At the award ceremony,
play for Star Wars (1977) on his reading of psychologist James Hillman said, “No one in
The Hero with a Thousand Faces. The most our century – not Freud, not Thomas Mann,
successful film series in history was a retelling not Lévi-Strauss – has so brought the mythical
of the initiatory adventures that Campbell had sense of the world and its eternal figures back
so vividly described. Lucas gratefully acknowl- into our everyday consciousness.” In 1987
edged his use of Campbell’s work and consid- Campbell was elected to the American
ered him a mentor. Academy of Arts and Letters.
In his eighties, Campbell launched a multi- The most memorable contribution of
volume Historical Atlas of World Mythology Campbell’s career came through television in
(1983, 1988) that investigated the major the six-part series Joseph Campbell and The
mythological periods and proposed a model of Power of Myth with Bill Moyers. Most of the
cultural development through stages. The interviews were conducted at Skywalker
earliest stage, the beginning of symbolic Ranch, the film studio built by George Lucas
thinking, is that of shaman led hunter-gather- in California’s Marin County. The interviews
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CAMPBELL
for the last episode were done at the American Flight of the Wild Gander: Explorations in
Museum of Natural History where Campbell the Mythological Dimension (New York,
had pondered Native American artifacts as a 1969).
boy. Public television stations first broadcast Myths to Live By (New York, 1972).
the series in late 1987, and it has been rebroad- The Mythic Image (Princeton, N.J., 1974).
cast many times since. The 1988 book based The Inner Reaches of Outer Space:
on transcripts of the interviews became a best- Metaphor As Myth and As Religion (New
seller. The Power of Myth significantly York, 1982).
increased public awareness of the wisdom in Historical Atlas of World Mythology, 2 vols
mythology. Several books published posthu- (New York, 1983, 1988).
mously are based on his papers and recorded Joseph Campbell and The Power of Myth
lectures. An Open Life (1988) is a book of with Bill Moyers, ed. Betty Sue Flowers
interviews originally given on a radio series. A (New York, 1988).
Joseph Campbell Companion: Reflections on Mythic Worlds, Modern Words: On the Art
the Art of Living (1991) is based on tapes of a of James Joyce, ed. Edmund L. Epstein
seminar given at Esalen. Thou Art That (2001) (New York, 1993).
is a collection of studies of meanings of key Thou Art That: Transforming Religious
metaphors in the Judeo-Christian traditions. Metaphor, ed. Eugene C. Kennedy
An obituary in Newsweek summarized his (Novato, Cal., 2001).
accomplishments, “Campbell has become one Pathways to Bliss: Mythology and Personal
of the rarest of intellectuals in American life: a Transformation, ed. David Kudler
serious thinker who has been embraced by the (Novato, Cal., 2004).
popular culture.” Campbell continues to stim-
ulate debate among scholars about whether it Other Relevant Works
is appropriate to use mythology to illustrate Campbell’s papers are at the Pacifica
psychological principles. Meanwhile, an ever- Graduate Institute in Carpinteria,
expanding audience is seeing and studying the California.
Moyers interviews. The Collected Works of Ed., Where the Two Came to Their Father:
Joseph Campbell will include several addi- A Navaho War Ceremonial (New York,
tional new books based on lectures and papers. 1943).
Joseph Campbell’s vision of the mythic imag- Ed., The Portable Arabian Nights (New
ination will have a lasting influence. York, 1952).
Ed., The Portable Jung (New York, 1972).
BIBLIOGRAPHY An Open Life: Joseph Campbell in
A Skeleton Key to Finnegan’s Wake, with Conversation with Michael Toms, eds
Henry Morton Robinson (New York, John M. Maher and Dennie Briggs (New
1944). York, 1988).
The Hero with a Thousand Faces (Princeton, A Joseph Campbell Companion: Reflections
N.J., 1949). on the Art of Living, ed. Diane K. Osbon
The Masks of God, vol. 1: Primitive (New York, 1991).
Mythology (New York, 1959).
The Masks of God, vol. 2: Oriental Further Reading
Mythology (New York, 1962). Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio,
The Masks of God, vol. 3: Occidental Who Was Who in Amer v9
Mythology (New York, 1964). Cousineau, Philip, ed. The Hero’s Journey
The Masks of God, vol. 4: Creative (San Francisco, 1990).
Mythology (New York, 1968). Larsen, Stephen, and Robin Larsen. Joseph
424
ČAPEK
Campbell: A Fire in the Mind (New York, Čapek published nearly one hundred articles in
1991). both English and French-language journals. His
Noel, Daniel C., ed. Joseph Campbell and doctoral dissertation argued that the philosophy
the Study of Religion (New York, 1990). of Henri Bergson anticipated novel elements in
Segal, Robert A. Joseph Campbell (New contemporary physics. Upon receiving a copy,
York, 1987). Bergson wrote, “It would be impossible to better
understand what is essential in my views of
Jonathan Young duration and matter,” crediting Čapek with an
insight shared only “perhaps, in some measure,”
by Alfred North WHITEHEAD (Bergson’s letter is
reproduced in Čapek’s Bergson and Modern
Physics, 1971). Work begun in the dissertation
culminated in his two major works, The
ČAPEK, Milič (1909–97) Philosophical Impact of Contemporary Physics
(1961) and Bergson and Modern Physics.
Milič Čapek was born in the village of Čapek devoted his career to developing a meta-
Trebechovice, Bohemia, Austro-Hungary (now physics based both on the revolution created in
in the Czech Republic), on 26 January 1909. physics by the theory of relativity and quantum
He received a PhD in philosophy in 1935 and mechanics and on Bergsonian insights into the
a MSc in physics in 1936 from Charles nature of time and duration. With great erudition
University in Prague. Čapek taught secondary and a firm grasp of the history of science and of
school in his native country from 1937 until philosophy, he argued that contemporary physics
1939, when a scholarship to study at the requires a metaphysics of events, not of enduring
Sorbonne enabled him to leave what had substances, and that these events are not the
become German-occupied Czechoslovakia. He instantaneous events of standard interpretations
soon had to flee Paris as the German army of relativity theory, but events partaking of the
advanced, and found his way, via North qualities of Bergsonian duration. Following
Africa, to the United States. During the war, he Bergson, Čapek argued that the passage of time
participated in the Army Specialized Training requires the emergence of novelty and thus that
Program in foreign languages at the University the determinism of classical physics must be
of Iowa and taught physics in the Navy V12 replaced with the indeterminism of quantum
program at Doan College and the Air Corps mechanics and Bergsonian duration.
program at the University of Nebraska.
Returning to Czechoslovakia after the war, BIBLIOGRAPHY
Čapek taught briefly at the University of The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary
Olomouc before fleeing once again, on the eve Physics (Princeton, N.J., 1961; 2nd edn
of the communist coup d’état in 1948, to take 1969).
up permanent residence, and citizenship, in Bergson and Modern Physics: A
the United States. He was a professor of phi- Reinterpretation and Re-evaluation
losophy at Carleton College in Minnesota (Dordrecht, 1971).
from 1948 to 1962, and at Boston University The Concepts of Space and Time: Their
from 1962 until his retirement in 1974. Structure and Their Development
Visiting professorships included the University (Dordrecht, 1976).
of California at Davis, Emory University, The New Aspects of Time, Its Continuity and
North Texas University, and Yale University. Novelties: Selected Papers in the Philosophy
Čapek died on 17 November 1997 in Little of Science (Dordrecht, 1991).
Rock, Arkansas.
425
ČAPEK
Other Relevant Works York Supreme Court, resigned his judgeship in

“Two Views of Motion: Change of Position 1872, before a legislative committee was about
and Change of Quality,” Review of to impeach him for misconduct.
Metaphysics, 33 (1979): 447–56. Despite this taint of notoriety, Cardozo
Ed. with Karl Hrub, T. G. Masaryk in chose to enter the law as his career. He entered
Perspective: Comments and Criticism Columbia College in New York City, at the
(Ann Arbor, Mich., 1981). age of fifteen, and received his BA in 1889
“Eternal Recurrence – Once More,” and an LLM from the School of Political
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Science in 1890. Then he started his law school
Society 19 (1983): 141–54. education but left in 1891 after two years
“Time-space Rather Than Space-time,” without a degree. However, Columbia
Diogenes 123 (1983): 30–49. University later awarded him an honorary law
“The Conflict Between the Absolutist and degree in 1915. Despite not finishing law
Relational Theory of Time Before school, Cardozo was admitted to the bar and
Newton,” Journal of the History of Ideas joined his father’s law firm, practicing law in
48 (1987): 595–608. New York City from 1891 to 1914. In 1913
“The Search for an Elusive a priori,” the political leaders of an anti-Tammany
Journal of the British Society for fusion ticket in New York City needed a
Phenomenology 22 (1991): 65–74. Jewish candidate to fill a New York Supreme
Court vacancy and selected Cardozo, who was
Further Reading elected by a narrow margin. After sitting on the
Proc of APA v71 Supreme Court for just a short period of time,
Bjelland, Andrew G. “Čapek, Bergson, and he was designated by the Governor, upon rec-
Process Proto-mentalism,” Process ommendation of the Court of Appeals judges,
Studies 11 (1981): 180–89. to sit on the Court of Appeals as one of three
Van Fraassen, Bas C. “Čapek on Eternal extra judges named to help clear a backlog.
Recurrence,” Journal of Philosophy 59 Cardozo subsequently received an appoint-
(1962): 371–5. ment to that Court and was elected to a regular
fourteen-year term in 1917. It was those years
David A. Sipfle in the Court of Appeals that Cardozo enjoyed
most; during this time he worked most pro-
ductively, delivered his most influential court
decisions and intellectual lectures, and as a
result, established himself as one of the most
outstanding common-law jurists in American
CARDOZO, Benjamin Nathan judicial history. He became Chief Judge in
(1870–1938) 1927, declining a part-time assignment as an
American member of the Permanent Court of
Benjamin Nathan Cardozo was born on 24 Arbitration at The Hague, Netherlands.
May 1870 in New York City. The Cardozo In 1932 President Herbert Hoover
family is one of America’s oldest and most appointed Cardozo to the Supreme Court of
distinguished Sephardic Jewish families. The the United States to fill the seat of the leg-
family lived a well-mannered upper-class life, endary Oliver Wendell HOLMES, Jr. Cardozo
which laid a solid basis for Carzodo’s educa- became the second Jew, after Justice Louis D.
tion and career. However, the Cardozo family BRANDEIS, to serve on the nation’s highest
image suffered a major setback when his court. Unfortunately, Cardozo’s judgeship in
father, Albert Cardozo, a judge of the New the Supreme Court did not last long because of
426
CARDOZO
his health condition. After suffering heart consistent with his strong belief in a coherent
attacks and strokes, Cardozo died on 9 July legal framework, Cardozo gave active spon-
1938 in Port Chester, New York. sorship to this project.
A study of the records of his early years of Devoting himself exclusively to his judgeship
law practice demonstrates that Cardozo was a and legal work, Cardozo to a large extent
first-rate trial and appellate lawyer, and he restrained his own extra-judicial, academic
was much sought after by other lawyers to writing. Modest in demeanor, he expounded
argue difficult cases. In twenty-three years as his philosophy of law and the judicial process
a lawyer, he submitted briefs in 197 cases on in three classics of jurisprudence: The Nature
appeal, 128 of them at the intermediate-court of the Judicial Process (1921), The Growth of
level (he prevailed 89 times) and 69 of them to the Law (1924), and The Paradoxes of Legal
the Court of Appeals (he prevailed 44 times). Science (1928). He also wrote Law and
Besides his excellent record, he also developed Literature and Other Essays and Addresses
a reputation for the utmost integrity despite the (1931). In his works, Cardozo was primarily
handicap of his father’s disgrace. All these concerned with the theory of adjudication,
made him surpass his peers and built a solid and in particular of common-law adjudica-
foundation for his future judgeship. tion. How do and should common-law judges
Cardozo never married. Despite his family handle their business of judging? What is the
background, he was not a strong religious role of the judges’ personal values? What are
believer, and described himself as an agnostic the sources of judicial decisions?
in his later years. However, he never failed to Cardozo specifically identified four methods
identify himself as a proud Jew and remained which judges should consider and utilize when
a Jewish traditionalist in many aspects. Despite they make decisions. First is the rule of analogy
his authority and reputation, he was very or the method of philosophy. Common-law
modest and friendly to colleagues and profes- judges should give primary consideration to
sional scholars. He openly appreciated the previous cases and try to apply principles
work being done by academics and was one of extracted from those precedents. Second, the
the first judges to cite their works (such as rule of history or the method of evolution
legal treatises and law review articles) regularly emphasizes the importance of knowing where
in his opinions. In return, they applauded him a rule/law came from if one is to determine its
loudly and muted their criticism. Cardozo also contemporary scope and relevance. Third, the
knew how to avoid and handle political issues method of tradition takes into consideration
through his personal charisma, and his father’s the customs of the community, aimed to close
incident might have taught him a lesson: to the gap between men’s doings and law’s
remain above suspicion, above politics, and sayings. Fourth, the method of sociology (not
even above strong partisan sentiment. in its current meaning) emphasizes the notion
In 1923 Cardozo helped establish the of justice, morals, and social welfare, the mores
American Law Institute and served as the Vice of the day. Cardozo believed that law ought to
President of the Institute. Among many efforts, be guided by consideration of the effects of its
one major work by the Institute was to launch decisions, rules, doctrines, and institutions on
a series of “restatements” of the law. It was an social welfare. As a result, Cardozo was some-
attempt to organize myriad decisions in times labeled as a “realist” or “pragmatist” in
numerous fields of law into a series of state- his legal decision-making. However, Cardozo
ments of governing principles with examples was not specific in explaining when one of his
and commentary. The purpose was to restate methods should predominate over another,
the law in those fields for the benefit of the and he did not give a formula that shows how
bench, the bar, and the public. Seeing it as to reach a conclusion when these elements
427
CARDOZO
suggested a variety of possible results. flicting interests within a restrained legal

Nevertheless, his effort was the first to explain framework is a question faced by all judges.
systematically what good judging was about, The common-law system, according to
and received positive reactions from both the Cardozo, is an effective weapon to deal with
academics and common people. this problem. He praised the power of judicial
Cardozo demonstrated a philosophical lawmaking but warned of the importance of
understanding and analysis in his writings judicial restrictions at the same time. The
when he queried about issues such as stability balance in Cardozo’s messages – the justifica-
and progress, legal form and substance, gen- tion of judicial lawmaking and the insistence
eralities and specificities, and equality and on important restrictions – made for ambigu-
liberty. For example, Cardozo was very much ity sometimes. Judicial theorists with diver-
concerned about the balance between stability gent views have both found supporting
and progress (he identified it as one great need language in Cardozo’s writings. But Cardozo
along with another need for restatements of was not ambiguous about his own position,
law, which he helped to cover through the and he had a genius, through powerful rhetoric
American Law Institution). On the one hand, in his opinions, to make them logical,
he emphasized the importance of extracting inevitable, and legally unassailable. His insight
principles from previous cases and following was to see the possibility of strengthening
precedents; on the other hand, he realized the judge-made law while respecting various
necessity for legal changes. He refused to treat restrictions on judicial discretion required by
rules and principles of case law as final truths, “the rule of law.” As pointed out, Cardozo
but only as working hypotheses, continually was therefore an incrementalist working pri-
retested in the courts of justice. Every new case marily in an incremental medium, the common
is an experiment, and if the accepted rule yields law.
a result that is felt to be unjust, the rule should Cardozo’s philosophizing about law made
be reconsidered. It is therefore important to him a self-conscious judge. But he was a judge
reach a delicate balance between stability and much more than he was a philosopher. His life
progress, in which precedent and formal logic experience was that of a practitioner and a
point to stability while the principle of rela- judge. He thought like a lawyer and judge,
tivity in the adaptation of the law to conduct not like a philosopher. His references on phi-
points to the way to change. As he expressed losophy were always to substantiate some
it: “Law must be stable, and yet it cannot stand point about judging and not to involve himself
stiff.” in any of the eternal questions of philosophy.
Moreover, Cardozo strongly proposed a Cardozo joined the Supreme Court of the
study of philosophy of law, which helps people United States during a momentous period of its
understand the genesis, the growth, the history, and he chose the theory that gave great
function, and the end of law. It is these gener- deference to legislative choice. Such a choice
alities and abstractions in such a study that give was in line with his belief that law should,
direction to legal thinking and determine the with some qualifications, represent commu-
outcome of doubtful lawsuits. Through such a nity values. He voted to uphold the constitu-
study, Cardozo believed that judges and tionality of most of the major pieces of New
scholars could reach a connection between Deal legislation. He strongly believed in the
generalities (in theories) and specificities (in democratically elected legislature and his
legal cases). Based on his experience in a legal respect was evident in those cases in which he
career, Cardozo also found constant conflicts refused to consider reforming a legal doctrine
in legal issues. How to reconcile these con- because that decision was the prerogative of
flicts and find a middle way to balance con- the legislature. He also believed in the need for
428
CARNAP
government regulation to redress economic Goodhart, Arthur L. English Contributions

and social ills, and his judicial philosophy gen- to the Philosophy of Law (Oxford,
erally found no constitutional bar to such reg- 1949).
ulation. As a result, he earned himself a label Kaufman, Andrew L. Cardozo (Cambridge,
as “progressive and liberal.” But there is reser- Mass., 1998).
vation: as pointed out, Cardozo was hardly Levy, Beryl H. Cardozo and Frontiers of
liberal in cases involving morality, sexuality, Legal Thinking (Cleveland, 1969).
religion, and social order. He indeed held a Noonan, John T., Jr. Persons and Masks of
strong sense of the importance of personal the Law (New York, 1976).
responsibility, duty, and right conduct in life, Polenberg, Richard. The World of
consistent with his religious heritage. This is Benjamin Cardozo (Cambridge, Mass.,
why some critics argued that Cardozo’s entire 1997).
career illustrated the importance of personal Pollard, Joseph P. Mr. Justice Cardozo
values in the judicial process, even though he (Westport, Conn., 1970).
tried never to let his personal identification Posner, Richard A. Cardozo: A Study in
influence his judicial reasoning. Reputation (Chicago, 1990).
In the years since his death, many of the
doctrines that mattered most to Cardozo have Bin Liang
been overturned. Nevertheless, Cardozo’s rep-
utation as one of the most outstanding
common-law judges has endured, and his
major opinions, his theoretical writings, and
his approach to judging have remained a
subject for study. CARNAP, Rudolf (1891–1970)
BIBLIOGRAPHY Rudolf Carnap was born on 18 May 1891 in

The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Ronsdorf, now part of the industrial town of
Haven, Conn., 1921). Wuppertal in the Ruhr area of western
The Growth of the Law (New Haven, Germany. His father died when he was a
Conn., 1924). young child. He was taught at home by his
The Paradoxes of Legal Science (New mother until he went to secondary school. In
York, 1928). 1908 the family moved to Jena, a small uni-
Law and Literature and Other Essays and versity town in Thüringen, where Carnap
Addresses (New York, 1931). finished school and went to university. He
attended lectures in many subjects, especially
Other Relevant Works mathematics, physics, psychology, and phi-
Cardozo’s papers are at Harvard Law losophy of the later neo-Kantian variety. He
School. also attended the lectures of Gottlob Frege,
Selected Writings of Benjamin Nathan whose logical ideas were fundamental to
Cardozo, ed. Margaret E. Hall (New Carnap’s philosophy in all its phases. During
York, 1947). his Jena years Carnap participated actively in
the German Youth Movement, which left him
Further Reading with the strong conviction that human cog-
Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, nitive and social conventions were under
Comp Amer Thought, Dict Amer Bio, human control, and could be decided on
Encyc Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v27, without unreflective conformity to traditional
Who Was Who in Amer v1 prejudices. This “voluntarism,” as it has been
429
CARNAP
called, was also a central component in his he became professor of natural philosophy at
later thought. the German University in Prague,
Carnap’s studies were interrupted by Czechoslovakia. Carnap was forced to
World War I. Like Wittgenstein, he enlisted, emigrate from Central Europe to the United
participated in some of the bloodiest battles States in 1935 to escape the Nazi threat. He
(on the western rather than the eastern front), joined the philosophy faculty of the
was wounded and decorated, and was deci- University of Chicago in 1936, at the invita-
sively changed by the experience. But this tion of Charles W. MORRIS, became a US
influence was almost diametrically opposite citizen in 1941, and taught at Chicago until
in the two philosophers. Wittgenstein 1952. From 1952 to 1954 he was a fellow at
retreated into mystical inwardness and turned the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton,
his back on the world. Carnap became con- New Jersey. After Reichenbach’s death,
vinced that it was precisely by withdrawing Carnap was invited in 1954 to fill his position
from public life in this way that German intel- as professor of philosophy at the University of
lectuals had helped to cause the war. He California at Los Angeles, and he held that
joined the party of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl position until his retirement in 1961. Carnap
Liebknecht before they were murdered, dis- died on 14 September 1970 in Los Angeles,
tributed clandestine newsletters to soldiers at California.
the front, and wrote articles about world gov- One part of Carnap’s early utopian ideal
ernment and socialism for an underground was a “total system of all concepts” in which
newspaper. His philosophical interests the whole of knowledge could be traced back
became part of this political project. He con- to a few basic components. He did not see
ceived of a highest-level “conceptual politics” how to implement this idea until he read
whose object was the planning and design of Bertrand Russell’s Our Knowledge of the
conceptual frameworks in which the species External World in early 1922, which gave
could organize its global civic cohabitation. him the tools for constructing his “total
To put the human “form of community” on system of all concepts.” His starting point
a rational basis, he thought, an overall system had been Hans Vaihinger’s neo-Kantian
of the sciences was needed, a Leibnizian “positivist idealism.” Vaihinger held that we
calculus philosophicus or universal charac- genuinely know only what we have immedi-
teristic, of which a logic of Frege’s kind was ate subjective access to in the present “chaos
evidently to be a central component. He of perception,” while the “reality” we con-
received his PhD in philosophy from Jena in struct (whether the scientific reality of forces
1921, writing a dissertation entitled Der and fields or the everyday reality of objects
Raum: Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre and causes) is based on fictions, which are
(1922) which concerned the concept of space useful though we know them to be false.
in physics, mathematics, and philosophy. Carnap accepted this broad picture, including
Carnap soon became an important member its explictly pragmatist orientation. But his
of the Vienna Circle after meeting Hans goal was to connect the “chaos” with the
REICHENBACH at a conference in Erlangen in fictive “reality” and to keep the fictions
1923. In 1926 Carnap became an assistant required for the construction of a “reality” to
professor of philosophy at the University of a disciplined minimum. Russell’s principle of
Vienna. He became a leading member of the abstraction gave him the key. Instead of ana-
Vienna Circle together with Reichenbach, lyzing the “chaos of experience,” as Mach
Moritz Schlick, Hans Hahn, and Otto and other empiricists had tried to do, quali-
Neurath. In 1930 he and Reichenbach ties and physical objects could be constructed
founded the journal Erkenntnis, and in 1931 by taking equivalence classes of “similar”
430
CARNAP
experiences; these equivalence classes could from the 1922 sketch in certain important
stand in for the qualities. Furthermore, respects. Following Russell’s dictum that
Carnap used Edmund Husserl’s phenome- “logic gives the method for philosophy, as
nology to give more structure to the “chaos” mathematics does for physics,” Carnap gave
than Vaihinger had allowed. Thus Carnap up the distinction between a fixed “primary
distinguished between “living” and “dead” world,” delineated by phenomenological
sectors of the “chaos” (essentially Hume’s reflection, and optional “secondary worlds.”
impressions and ideas, respectively), and he Logical construction took over from phe-
used this distinction as a basis for a temporal nomenology. The basic relations were steadily
ordering of instantaneous time-slices of total reduced down to a single one, the “recollec-
experience. Qualities could then be con- tion of similarity” between time-slices. And
structed as equivalence classes of aspects (e.g., Carnap even suggested that this single basic
a color-sensation within a defined range at relation could be eliminated, so that the entire
certain coordinates of the visual field) across system would be purely structural.
these time-slices. So what could be genuinely The evolution of the Aufbau system did
known, within the “chaos,” was greatly not stop with the publication of the Aufbau.
expanded. Fictions were required, though, to Important problems remained unsolved,
get from this fixed primary world (which, arising mainly out of the Vienna Circle’s
phenomenological reflection showed, was embrace of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus as an
two-dimensional) to an optional, fictive “sec- account of logic and mathematics. On the
ondary world” of reality (to ascend from two one hand, the Tractatus was indispensable
to three or more dimensions). In place of for them, as all previous forms of empiri-
Vaihinger’s undisciplined proliferation of cism had been unable to account plausibly
fictions, however, Carnap thought the whole for mathematics. On the other hand,
of scientific “reality” could be constructed Wittgenstein’s picture theory of meaning,
from the primary world with just two taken literally, seemed to consign scientific
fictions, corresponding to Kant’s categories of theories (understood as universal laws), to
cause and substance. the realm of nonsense, as well as all meta-lin-
This conception of a “total system of all guistic “elucidations,” statements about
concepts” was sketched in a document language such as the Aufbau or the Tractatus
Carnap gave the Vaihinger-reminiscent title itself. Neither of these indispensable kinds of
“From the Chaos to Reality.” Carnap con- statements could be expressed as truth-func-
tinued to work on the system until 1926, tional concatenations of atomic sentences.
when he moved to Vienna as a junior lecturer Carnap’s task, therefore, was to find a way
at the university and joined the Vienna Circle. to express scientific laws and meta-linguistic
The result was published in 1928 as The elucidations within the constraints of the
Logical Construction of the World (usually picture theory.
called the Aufbau after its German title), and His first big project on this front was the
became the Vienna Circle’s prime example attempt to fit axiomatic (implicitly defined)
of a “rational reconstruction.” It recon- concepts into a Wittgensteinian framework.
structed the concept of “empirical content” or This was especially important because of the
“empirical meaning, and thus also provided new developments stemming from David
the Circle with a criterion for distinguishing Hilbert that used a meta-mathematics to
meaningful sentences (which could be traced prove results about the structural character-
back to experience in the style of the Aufbau) istics (the consistency, completeness, cate-
from meaningless ones (which could not). goricity, etc.) of actual (axiomatic) mathe-
The published Aufbau of 1928 differed matics. It was essential to show that this
431
CARNAP
meta-mathematics could actually be accom- ceptable sentences, as Carnap demonstrated

modated, at bottom, within the single, on a passage from Heidegger (which of course
Wittgensteinian language. But after three could not be translated into a “correct”
years of work on this attempt, Carnap was language). Using Gödel’s trick of arithmeti-
convinced by Alfred TARSKI in early 1930 zation, Carnap was able to express the meta-
that his results did not really capture the language of arithmetic in its own object
meta-mathematical concepts intended. He language. So despite his adoption of Hilbert’s
abandoned the axiomatics project. Worse, meta-language method, he was back to a
that summer Kurt GÖDEL showed that there single language after all! Moreover, this
were true arithmetic sentences that could not language was strong enough to express all
be proved from the axioms of arithmetic – a the mathematics needed for physics, and in
result that contradicted the main theorem of the Circle’s view, all science could be
Carnap’s axiomatics project. And all these expressed in the language of physics. So
results had been arrived at by Hilbert’s meta- Carnap and Otto Neurath proposed the
mathematical method. By the end of 1930, language of physics as a universal language
then, the Vienna Circle program was troubled for all knowledge, including the logic of
by these developments. science itself (to be expressed in the meta-
In January 1931 the solution to all these language as an arithmetized sublanguage).
problems came to Carnap in a sleepless night All this reinforced Carnap’s conviction that
“like a vision.” He abandoned Wittgenstein’s the language he was converging on was gen-
picture theory, and instead made a sharp dis- uinely correct or canonical.
tinction between a pure formal calculus, mere One of the essential requirements for this
marks on a page, and its interpretation. And canonical language was a definition of ana-
he restricted interpretation to the scientific lyticity or logical truth, to make it possible to
object language. Philosophy – the “elucida- state whether a formal-mode sentence
tions” – in the meta-language was to remain “holds” or is true. Carnap attempted such a
strictly uninterpreted. The only reference was definition in 1931–2 (essentially a substitu-
to linguistic configurations in the object tional definition). But Gödel pointed out that
language. The ordinary way of speaking of the definition was defective; it fell foul of
facts and things, the “material mode of what we now know as Tarski’s theorem on
speech” had to be replaced, for all statements the indefinability of truth. Carnap did even-
that were not straightforwardly factual, by tually produce a new definition of analyticity,
the “formal mode of speech”: instead of in a meta-language, under Gödel’s guidance
speaking of extra-linguistic facts and things, (one quite similar to Tarski’s of about the
we must speak only of linguistic objects – same time), but this no longer had the privi-
sentences and thing-names. The material leged status that a definition in the same
mode could still be permitted, in everyday language, had it been possible, could have
scientific discourse, but only under the claimed. No particular meta-language for
proviso that everything said could be trans- such a definition could claim to be “correct”
lated back into the formal mode. What or “canonical.” There are infinite possibili-
remained of philosophy became the logic of ties. And while some meta-languages may
science (“Wissenschaftslogik”). seem more “natural” than others, or more
Carnap’s first priority, under this new useful for certain purposes, there is no
regime, was to develop the canonical “logical reality” for this choice to correspond
language for the formal mode of speech. This to. Carnap saw that the disputes among the
“correct” language would be the new crite- foundational schools, like the disputes within
rion to distinguish acceptable from unac- the Circle about the correct form of evidence
432
CARNAP
statements or “protocol sentences,” revolved logical relation between observation sentences

around the question of how to set up the and theoretical sentences. After he abandoned
language, and there was no right or wrong the Aufbau effort to construct theories
way to settle such questions. One could only directly from subjective experience, a series of
try out different ways, and see which ones looser definitions of “empirical content” or
worked better. This new attitude, which first “empirical reducibility” were given. These
appeared in Carnap’s reply to Neurath about attempts were also subjected to searching crit-
protocol sentences in 1932, was definitively icism, above all by Carl Hempel. The lesson
stated as a “principle of tolerance” in the derived from this failure has generally been to
Logical Syntax of Language in 1934. abandon the question altogether, unfortu-
The Logical Syntax combined the ideas of nately, instead of confining the pessimism to
January 1931 (a sharp distinction between a Carnap’s particular approach. Third, the last
formal calculus – specified by explicit rules – three decades of Carnap’s life were largely
and its interpretation) and of late 1932 (the devoted to the creation of an inductive logic.
principle of tolerance). These were retained This was intended as a tool for practicing
throughout Carnap’s later work and became scientists, to give them a way of measuring
the basis for his mature ideal of explication. the objective probability of a theory with
But the idea of restricting the philosophical respect to the available evidence. It was
meta-language to the “formal mode of intended to make precise the informal usage,
speech” was dropped shortly after the Syntax in everyday and scientific life, by which the
was published, in 1935, when Carnap evidence is taken to “make” one hypothesis
realized from Tarski’s semantic work that “more likely” than another. Carnap’s pro-
the interpretation of a calculus could also be posals attained some currency in the 1950s
specified by explicit rules. and 1960s, but are no longer in the main-
Carnap’s work was interrupted by the Nazi stream of discussion.
threat and emigration to the US. In wartime Even if these language projects are written
and postwar America, Carnap had felt con- off as failures, however, this would not dis-
strained to keep his radical ideas about credit the larger vision or ideal of explica-
society and politics well concealed, and thus tion and language engineering that guided
to focus even more exclusively on purely tech- Carnap after 1935. At the basis of this ideal
nical work. Nonetheless, the new American is the utopian conception of highest-level
surroundings appear to have reaffirmed and “conceptual politics” – the planning and
reinforced the pragmatist orientation inspired design of our conceptual frameworks and
by Vaihinger. “form of community” – that never left him
The three and a half decades of Carnap’s after 1918. He believed that philosophers
American career were largely occupied by a have a responsibility to devise conceptual
series of not very successful technical frameworks for the whole of knowledge that
language projects. First, he tried, in a series of will maximize the usefulness of that knowl-
semantic works, to develop a general defini- edge for the human species, for all uses to
tion of “analyticity” that would distinguish which different humans put knowledge, espe-
analytic from synthetic sentences in a natural cially for the purpose of liberation from unre-
and obvious way. The shortcomings of these flective tradition and conformity. In devising
successive attempts were pointed out by W. these frameworks we are constrained by
V. QUINE, and were often taken to under- certain obvious human limitations, but we
mine other parts of Carnap’s view, such as the should not allow ourselves to be constrained
principle of tolerance itself. Second, Carnap by the past and the languages handed down
also tried unsuccessfully to specify a strict to us by our ancestors. Those are a beginning,
433
CARNAP
certainly, and we could get nowhere without readmission of traditional prejudices and con-
that beginning. But Carnap thought we formities of all kinds. Certainly we need to
should not treat the puzzles and contradic- make assumptions, he acknowledged, but we
tions embedded in natural languages, or in can decide on these, and spell them out; they
historical languages of philosophy, with any are not “out there” for us to find. On these
undue reverence. In fact, we should liberate grounds he deprecated Quine’s preoccupa-
ourselves from them as far as possible. tion with ontology. It makes no sense to talk
Though our habitual ways of thinking and about “what there is,” Carnap said, without
talking are deeply entrenched, in Carnap’s specifying the language framework in which
view this is no reason to be constrained by this is being asserted; any such claim is
them when we envision new ones. relative to a framework. It makes perfectly
There are three levels of language engi- good sense to ask, within a framework that
neering or language study, in Carnap’s includes, say, the Zermelo–Frankel axioms
mature conception. Syntax considers lan- for set theory, whether there are infinite
guages in isolation from anything extra-lin- numbers. Such “internal” questions have
guistic they might be thought of as repre- determinate answers. But it makes no sense,
senting. Semantics considers languages as rep- outside such a framework, to ask “just in
resenting extra-linguistic things, but still in general” whether “there are” infinite
isolation from their concrete uses by humans. numbers. Not only is there no determinate
Pragmatics considers languages in relation to answer, but there is no way to give such an
their use contexts and their users (the labels “external” question itself any clear meaning.
derive from Morris). Each of these three What we can ask instead is the practical
(syntax, semantics, pragmatics) can be con- question whether it is better (e.g., for use in
sidered as engineering activities (the creation science) to choose a linguistic framework that
or discussion of new or improved languages) has infinite numbers or one that does not.
or as empirical studies (the study of existing But this is not a question of ontology or
languages). The engineering activity Carnap semantics; it is a question of pragmatics, a
called “pure” syntax, semantics, or pragmat- question of which language we want.
ics, while the empirical study he called The process by which the human species
“descriptive” syntax, semantics, or pragmat- upgrades its messy and imprecise inherited
ics. Linguists, as a rule, study the descriptive languages to newly built and more precise
syntax, semantics, and pragmatics of already ones Carnap called explication. He acknowl-
existing natural languages, while logicians edged that this is a piecemeal, not a revolu-
engage in the pure syntax and semantics of tionary process. Humanity replaces its
constructed languages. Epistemology and concepts a few at a time. Even the people
methodology belong to pragmatics, while working at the frontier of knowledge have to
whatever remains of metaphysics and use a vernacular, a derivative of ordinary
ontology belongs to semantics, though this language, to discuss the application of the
becomes a matter of deciding which entities more precise calculi in which they frame their
and categories to make fundamental to our theories. Their vernacular is certainly cleaner
language framework, given existing scientific and more precise than the vernacular of the
knowledge, rather than finding out what society at large. In the scientific vernacular, all
those entities are or might be. concepts used are intended in their scientifi-
This voluntarism also remained funda- cally rigorous meanings. Behind a scientist’s
mental. The notion that something beyond use of the word “light,” for instance, lurks the
the scope of science might actually be the entire theory of quantum electrodynamics in
case seemed to Carnap a back door to the its present state of development.
434
CARNAP
But many concepts even in this tidied-up Under the regime of tolerance, there is no
vernacular have no such precise meanings. single correct language. There is an infinity of
They may be used for generations before they possible languages, and the community must
are made precise. An example Carnap often decide among them. Explication is therefore
cited was the replacement of our vague, sub- dialectical. On the one hand, knowledge has
jective, intuitive sense of “hot” and “cold” by obvious and far-reaching effects on our prac-
the precise, quantitative concept of tempera- tical life; it can tell us about the likely conse-
ture, which we can define intersubjectively by quences of various value systems and courses
reference to measurement devices. This of action, far more than we could have
concept not only takes the place of the former known a few centuries ago. On the other
vague concepts, for many purposes, but also hand, our representation of our knowledge to
gives us many capabilities the vague concepts ourselves is language-relative. We can only
lacked. It can, for instance, provide an outside, know what we know in the form given it by
objective framework or standard against which a particular language. The choice among lan-
to judge subjective feelings; instead of just guages, though, is not a choice we make
saying “I feel hot” or “I feel feverish,” I can within a given language framework. It is a
take my temperature and find out exactly how practical choice, involving values. So is the
much higher it is than its ordinary level. So choice among explications for some given
explication also provides a framework of explicandum. These are external questions, in
objectivity that enables us to escape from a Carnap’s terms. So knowledge and values are
merely subjective view of the world. But the in a constant feedback relation to each other;
replacement of the vague, informal world view knowledge shapes values and values shape
by a framework of more objective concepts is knowledge. This would appear to make
never complete, and does not proceed uni- Carnap as radically “pragmatist” as William
formly; temperature is not an ultimate con- JAMES. In Carnap’s ideal, reason is not the
stituent of our theory of nature. slave of the passions (or of anything else) but
Explication, which in Carnap’s view is the each side informs the other. Reason informs
main task of conceptual engineering, consists the passions (and the rest of life in the realm
in the replacement of a vague concept in need of “practice”), and the passions inform
of explication, the explicandum, by a more reason. Neither is subordinate.
precise one, the explicatum. The first step is the
clarification of the explicandum, the estab- BIBLIOGRAPHY
lishment of some basic agreement among those Der Raum: Ein Beitrag zur
using the vague concept as to what they mean Wissenschaftslehre (Berlin, 1922).
by it. The next step is a proposal for its replace- Physikalische Begriffsbildung (Karlsruhe,
ment, a proposed explicatum. This explica- Germany, 1926).
tum should have most of the important uses Der logische Aufbau der Welt (Berlin,
that were agreed on in the clarification stage, 1928). Trans. Rolf George, The Logical
but need not have all of them. It should, if Structure of the World: Pseudoproblems
possible, be expressed in a language frame- in Philosophy (Berkeley, Cal., 1967).
work that makes clear its relation to a wide Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie: das
range of other concepts. The (provisional) fremdpsychische und der readlismusstreit
acceptance of an explicatum is just its use by (Berlin, 1928).
the specific community to which it has been Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung der
proposed, and, ultimately, its wider use by the Wiener Kreis, with Otto Neurath and
community of those who use the tidied-up sci- Hans Hahn (Vienna, 1929).
entific vernacular. Logische Syntax der Sprache (Vienna,
435
CARNAP
1934), Trans. Amethe Smeaton, The Awodey, Steve, and Carsten Klein, eds.
Logical Syntax of Language (London, Carnap Brought Home: The View from
1937). Jena (La Salle, Ill., 2004).
Philosophy and Logical Syntax (London, Creath, Richard, and Michael Friedman,
1935). eds. The Cambridge Companion to
Foundations of Logic and Mathematics Carnap (Cambridge, UK, 2005).
(Chicago, 1939). Friedman, Michael. Reconsidering Logical
Introduction to Semantics (Cambridge, Positivism (Cambridge, UK, 1999).
Mass., 1942). ———, A Parting of the Ways: Carnap,
Formalization of Logic (Cambridge, Mass., Cassirer, Heidegger (La Salle, Ill., 2000).
1943). Giere, Ronald N., and Alan W. Richardson,
Meaning and Necessity: A Study in eds. Origins of Logical Empiricism
Semantics and Formal Logic (Chicago, (Minneapolis, 1996).
1947; 2nd edn 1956). Hintikka, Jaakko, ed. Rudolf Carnap,
Logical Foundations of Probability Logical Empiricist: Materials and
(Chicago, 1950). Perspectives (Dordrecht, 1975).
The Continuum of Inductive Methods Lepage, François, Michel Paquette, and
(Chicago, 1952). François Rivenc, eds. Carnap aujourd’hui
Philosophical Foundations of Physics, ed. (Paris, 2002).
Martin Gardner (New York, 1966). Rev. Ricketts, Thomas. “Carnap’s Principle of
edn, Introduction to the Philosophy of Tolerance, Empiricism, and
Science (New York, 1974). Conventionalism,” in Reading Putnam,
ed. Peter Clark and Bob Hale (Oxford,
Other Relevant Works 1994), pp. 176–200.
Carnap’s papers are in the Archive for Schilpp, Paul A., ed. The Philosophy of
Scientific Philosophy in the Twentieth Rudolf Carnap (La Salle, Ill., 1963).
Century at the University of Pittsburgh. Contains Carnap’s autobiography and
“Testability and Meaning,” Philosophy of bibliography.
Science 3 (1936): 419–71; 4 (1937): Stadler, Friedrich. Studien zum Wiener
1–40. Kreis: Ursprung, Entwicklung und
“Meaning Postulates,” Philosophical Wirkung des Logischen Empirismus im
Studies 3 (1952): 65–73. Kontext (Frankfurt am Main, 1997).
Dear Carnap, Dear Van: The Stein, Howard. “Was Carnap Entirely
Quine–Carnap Correspondence and Wrong, After All?” Synthese 93 (1992):
Related Work, ed. Richard Creath 275–95.
(Berkeley, Cal., 1990).
Logical Empiricism at Its Peak: Schlick, André W. Carus
Carnap, and Neurath, ed. Sahotra Sarkar
(New York, 1996).
Further Reading
Amer Nat Bio, Amer Phils Before 1950,
Bio 20thC Phils, Blackwell Analytic Phil, CARR, Harvey A (1873–1954)
Blackwell Comp Phils, Cambridge Dict
Amer Bio, Comp Amer Thought, Dict Harvey Carr was born on 30 April 1873 in
Amer Bio, Proc of APA v44, Who Was Morris, Illinois. He later added a middle letter
Who in Amer v5, Who’s Who in Phil of his own choice. He attended DePauw
436
CARR
College from 1893 to 1895, but illness and setting any mental activity in its proper context
lack of money delayed further education until of purposive behavior, Carr left behind the
he was twenty-six. He earned a BS in 1901 rationalism and introspectionism that pre-
and MS in 1902 from the University of vented psychology from becoming experimen-
Colorado, where his interest in psychology tal and scientific. This functionalism grants sci-
began. On a fellowship he went to study psy- entific status to teleological explanations,
chology with John DEWEY, James ANGELL, and however, which was and remains problematic.
John B. WATSON at the University of Chicago, The “adaptive act” to which Carr continually
earning his PhD in 1905. After three years of appealed has both a reactive and motivated
teaching at small schools, he was called back to aspect, where the motivation is in reference to
Chicago as an assistant professor of psychology some desired goal. This view of intelligence is
in 1908 to replace the departed Watson. Carr the foundation of American pragmatism as
took charge of animal psychology, and also well.
led research in comparative psychology, For Carr, an adaptive act has at least five
learning, and space perception. He was chair of characteristics: (1) a motive that gives some
Chicago’s psychology department from 1922 direction to behavior; (2) a sensory situation
until 1938, the year of his retirement. He had that is perceived or cognized; (3) an incentive;
a quite large influence on the direction of (4) a response from the organism that modifies
American psychology. He helped edit the the situation towards satisfying the motive; and
Journal of Experimental Psychology and (5) an established association formed between
Journal of General Psychology for many years. the stimuli and the response. In Carr’s words,
He also advised numerous doctoral graduates “mental activity is concerned with the acquisi-
(over one hundred). He was President of the tion, fixation, retention, organization, and eval-
American Psychological Association in 1926. uation of experiences, and their subsequent uti-
Carr died on 21 June 1954 in Culver, Indiana. lization in the guidance of conduct. The type of
Carr’s theoretical approach to psychology conduct that reflects mental activity may be
followed the functionalism of his teachers termed adaptive or adjustive behavior.” (1925)
Dewey and Angell. Behaviorism had risen to
challenge functionalism for dominance by the BIBLIOGRAPHY
time that Carr’s Psychology was published in Psychology: A Study of Mental Activity (New
1925. Carr maintained that behaviorism at best York, 1925).
was appropriate only for animal psychology. An Introduction to Space Perception (New
His presidential address, published in 1927, York, 1935).
admitted that establishing the existence of
animal consciousness depended on correlating Other Relevant Works
similar human and animal responses. Although Carr’s papers are at the Archives of the
Carr expressed dismay and skepticism over History of American Psychology at the
psychology’s dependence on reified notions of University of Akron, Ohio.
memory, attention, and similarly alleged entities “Interpretation of the Animal Mind,”
in the mind, he was unwilling to eliminate con- Psychological Review 34 (1927): 87–106.
sciousness from psychology. “Functionalism,” in Psychologies of 1930,
The functions of mental activity that Carr ed. Carl Murchinson (Worcester, Mass.,
investigated were those manifested in the 1930), pp. 59–78.
organism’s adaptive activities as it manages to “Harvey A. Carr,” in A History of
survive by learning, though interacting with its Psychology in Autobiography, vol. 3, ed.
environment. Mental operations always come Carl Murchinson (Worcester, Mass.,
to exist in service of some organic need. By 1930), pp. 69–82.
437
CARR
Further Reading inspired him to compose two books: Henri

Bio Dict Psych by Zusne, Encyc Psych, Who Bergson: The Philosophy of Change (1911)
Was Who in Amer v3 and The Philosophy of Change: A Study of the
Heidbreder, Edna. “Functionalism and the Fundamental Principle of the Philosophy of
University of Chicago,” in Seven Bergson (1914). The success of these works,
Psychologies (New York, 1933), pp. along with two other books on truth and on
201–33. Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce, led to his
Hilgard, E. R. “Harvey Carr and Chicago appointment as head of the psychology depart-
Functionalism: A Stimulated Interview,” in ment of King’s College for one year in 1914.
Portraits of Pioneers in Psychology, vol. 1, Carr then became professor of philosophy at
ed. G. A. Kimble, M. Wertheimer, and C. the University of London in 1918, and he held
White (Washington, D.C., 1991), pp. this position for the remainder of his life.
121–36. In 1925 Carr began a relationship with the
Owens, D. A., and M. Wagner, eds. Progress University of Southern California, arriving as
in Modern Psychology: The Legacy of visiting professor of philosophy, and in 1926
American Functionalism (Westport, Conn., Southern California honored Carr with an
1992). LLD degree. Carr’s presence on the philosophy
Pillsbury, W. B. “Harvey A Carr: faculty was very welcome, and he taught
1873–1954,” American Journal of during most semesters for six years. Several of
Psychology 68 (1955): 149–51. Carr’s colleagues were favorably inclined
toward various kinds of idealism, including
John R. Shook personal idealists Ralph T. FLEWELLING, F. C.
S. Schiller (who arrived from England in 1926),
and Wilbur H. Long. He contributed to the
school of personalism then flourishing at
Southern California, and published five more
books. Carr was elected President of the
CARR, Herbert Wildon (1857–1931) American Philosophical Association Pacific
Division for 1928–9. He died on 8 July 1931
Herbert Wildon Carr was born on 16 January in Los Angeles, California.
1857 in London, England. He attended Before encountering Bergson’s philosophy,
Stationer’s School in London and then King’s Carr held an equal suspicion toward absolute
College London, but did not complete a idealism, materialism, and interactionist
degree. From the late 1870s until 1909, Carr dualism. Both absolute idealism and material-
operated a financial firm in London. ism diminish the significance and power of the
However, he had become interested in phi- human mind and personality, mainly by
losophy, joined the Aristotelian Society in reducing to illusion our creative freedom.
1880, and was elected its Vice President in Against the third possibility that mind and
1884. He also served as secretary and trea- brain are distinct and separate realities yet
surer for several years, helped edit its annual interact through mysterious processes, Carr
volume of proceedings, and was President raised the usual objection that no causal rela-
from 1915 to 1918. Carr became proficient in tions can be imagined between such different
metaphysics and philosophical psychology; kinds of things. For him, it is impossible that
Durham University awarded him its D.Litt. consciousness could depend on physical
degree in 1912. processes. His dissatisfaction with the princi-
In 1910 Carr encountered the philosophy of pal schools of philosophy of his day brought
French philosopher Henri Bergson, which him in the early 1900s to a kind of philo-
438
CARR
sophical skepticism, although he always held sistic mind could ever know another, Carr
a faithful commitment to religious theism. simply proceeds from the existence of one
Upon encountering the philosophy of Henri monadic mind to the assertion of a community
Bergson as elaborated in his Creative of monadic minds that cannot communicate.
Evolution, Carr was immediately converted. His last book, Cogitans Cogitata (1930), gives
He was particularly attracted to the theory a terse and compact presentation of his final
that life-energy is the most fundamental reality metaphysical theories. The pantheistic God
of the universe, and that God should be pan- has evaporated to a mere religious ideal for the
theistically identified with this universal spiri- community of persons. Our conception of God
tual force. In his books on Bergson, Carr sym- suggests a path toward moral and spiritual
pathetically explains his conclusion that the perfection, but as only a human conception, it
evolutionary progress from simpler to more places no constraints on personal freedom.
complex organisms is really the process of the
supreme world-spirit gradually revealing itself BIBLIOGRAPHY
through finite beings. Like the absolute ideal- Henri Bergson: The Philosophy of Change
ists who tried to account for individual limited (London and New York, 1911).
minds, Carr offered the metaphysical theory The Problem of Truth (London and New
that each finite mind has an organic relation to York, 1911).
God’s whole while still retaining the freedom The Philosophy of Change: A Study of the
to exercise its own powers. The organic Fundamental Principle of the Philosophy
metaphor, proceeding from our understanding of Bergson (London, 1914).
of living creatures composed of cells, suggests The Philosophy of Benedetto Croce: The
by analogy for Carr the notion that each mind Problem of Art and History (London and
is a spiritual cell of God. This evolutionary New York, 1917).
pantheism properly respects, in Carr’s view, The General Principle of Relativity in Its
the relative independence, real growth, and Philosophical and Historical Aspect
intellectual freedom of each individual person, (London, 1920).
although God can still influence the develop- Mind-Energy: Lectures and Essays (London
ment of the universe toward His ends. and New York, 1920).
Carr also turned to the philosophy of A Theory of Monads: Outlines of a
Leibniz, as did many personal idealists in that Philosophy of the Principle of Relativity
era, for designing an antimechanistic and (London, 1921).
vitalist philosophy and for inspiration on the The Scientific Approach to Philosophy:
problem of the relation of persons to the Selected Essays and Reviews (London,
supreme person of God. In two books, A 1924).
Theory of Monads: Outlines of a Philosophy Changing Backgrounds in Religion and
of the Principle of Relativity (1921) and Ethics: A Metaphysical Meditation (New
Leibniz (1929), and in his 1930 edition of York, 1927).
Leibniz’s Monadology, Carr accepts the solip- The Freewill Problem (London, 1928).
sistic standpoint that all we ever know is the The Unique Status of Man (New York,
contents of our private minds and that nothing 1928).
external to mind could possibly exist to cause Leibniz (Boston and London, 1929).
ideas within the mind. All thought and action Cogitans Cogitata (Los Angeles and
is the internal growth of personal spirit. The London, 1930).
new relativistic physics demonstrates that
reality only exists in relation to the observer. Other Relevant Works
Having no explanation of how such a solip- “On Mr. Shadworth Hodgson’s
439
CARR
Metaphysic of Experience,” Mind 8 1931,” Mind 40 (1931): 535–6.

(1899): 383–96. Turner, J. E. “Dr. Wildon Carr’s Theory of
“The Theory of Subjective Activity,” the Relation between Body and Mind,”
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1 Journal of Philosophy 17 (1920):
(1901): 191–9. 268–72.
“The Metaphysical Criterion and Its ———, “Dr. Wildon Carr and Lord
Implications,” Proceedings of the Haldane on Scientific Relativity,” Mind
Aristotelian Society 5 (1905): 117–30. 31 (1922): 40–52.
“Impressions and Ideas – The Problem of
Idealism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian John R. Shook
Society 8 (1908): 115–38.
“Life and Logic,” Mind 22 (1913): 484–92.
“Why the Mind Seems to Be, and Yet
Cannot Be, Produced by the Brain,”
“The Philosophical Aspect of Freud’s CARSON, Rachel Louise (1907–64)
Theory of Dream Interpretation,” Mind
23 (1914): 321–34. Rachel Carson was born on 27 May 1907 in
“The Metaphysical Implications of the Springdale, Pennsylvania, and died on 14 April
Principle of Relativity,” Philosophical 1964 in Silver Spring, Maryland. She received
Review 24 (1915): 1–16. a BA in science (magna cum laude) from the
“The Moment of Experience,” Proceedings Pennsylvania College for Women (now
of the Aristotelian Society 16 (1916): Chatham College) in 1929. She received an
1–31. MA in zoology from Johns Hopkins University
“The Problem of Recognition,” Proceedings in 1932. She had a rugged upbringing in a
of the Aristotelian Society 17 (1917): farmhouse outside the river town of Springdale
1–27. where she acquired a lifelong passion for nature
“The Interaction of Mind and Body,” (particularly the ocean) from her mother. Her
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 18 first publication, “A Battle in the Clouds,”
(1918): 1–37. appeared in 1918 in St. Nicholas, a children’s
“The Concept of Mind-Energy,” Mind 29 magazine, and three additional stories were
(1920): 1–10. published in 1919 and another in 1922 in the
“The Fiftieth Session,” Proceedings of the same magazine. During the late 1930s Carson
Aristotelian Society 29 (1929): 359–86. supported herself, her mother, her sister and
“Real and Ideal Relations,” Philosophical later, her sister’s two daughters; and she
Review 38 (1929): 1–22. adopted her grandnephew in 1957.
Ed., The Monadology of Leibniz (Los She began her career as a teaching assistant
Angeles, 1930). in biology at Johns Hopkins University during
summer sessions from 1930 to 1936. From
Further Reading 1931 to 1933 she was a half-time assistant in
Pres Addr of APA v3, Proc of APA in Phil zoology at the University of Maryland. In 1935
Rev v41, Who Was Who in Amer v1 she wrote a radio program entitled “Romance
Flewelling, Ralph T. “Herbert Wildon Carr under the Waters.” Carson was the first
– Christian Stoic,” The Personalist 37 woman to take and pass the civil service test,
(1956): 117–27. and was subsequently hired by the Bureau of
Schiller, F. C. S. “In Memoriam: Herbert Fisheries as a full-time junior biologist in 1937.
Wildon Carr, January 1, 1857–July 8, Her first major publication, “Undersea,”
440
CARSON
appeared in The Atlantic Monthly in 1941. and the long vista of the beach were cold silver
Her first book, Under the Sea Wind, was pub- overlaid with that faint, loveliest violet which
lished in 1949. She became the chief editor for is the overtone colour of the coast.” (1928, p.
the US Fish and Wildlife Service in 1951. Her 96) Compare this passage with Carson’s
next book, The Sea Around Us, for which she description of a black skimmer, a bird called
received the National Book Award and the Rynchops, from Under the Sea Wind. “As he
John Burroughs Medal, appeared in 1951. neared the shore of the island the skimmer
Carson retired from government service in drifted closer to the water, bringing his dark
1952 and continued to live in Maryland, while form into strong silhouette against the gray
spending summers in Maine. Her last two sheet, like the shadow of a great bird that
books, The Edge of the Sea and Silent Spring, passed unseen above. Yet so quietly did he
were published in 1955 and 1962. Carson approach that the sound of his wings, if sound
received the Conservationist of the Year award there were, was lost in the whisper song of the
from the National Wildlife Federation. To water turning over the shells on the wet sand.”
honor her, CBS produced the television special (1941, p. 5) While the similarity relates only to
“The Silent Spring of Rachel Carson” in 1964. poetic style, Carson’s literary talent – and a
She was posthumously awarded the vast scientific knowledge – became a means to
Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1980. develop a profound environmental ethic.
Rachel Carson was an acclaimed Carson’s central philosophical principle of
scientist/ecologist who communicated in her ecology was proclaimed in her own words in a
writings intricate biological interrelationships in speech before the Women’s National Book
a literary prose style. By her own admission, she Association on 15 February 1963. “In each of
could not write about nature, and especially the my books I have tried to say that all of the life
sea, without the language of poetry. She of the planet is inter-related, that each species
asserted that nature was intrinsically poetical, has its own ties to others, and that all are
and to write about it in any other manner related to the earth. This is the theme of The Sea
would be to diminish nature’s essential quality. Around Us and the other sea books, and it is
Her ability to describe complex concepts in also the message of Silent Spring.” For example,
lyrical phrases engaged the educated nonsci- she stated that consequential modifications of
entific public. Consequently, humankind’s per- marine life occur even with slight variations in
ception of the living world has been changed. ocean currents and water temperature. In The
Rachel Carson has merited the distinction of Edge of the Sea, Carson refers to the living
being called the “mother of the modern envi- coral coasts as growing in ocean water seventy
ronmental movement.” degrees Fahrenheit and above, since coral
A significant influence on Carson’s writing animals can secrete their calcareous bone struc-
was Henry Beston’s 1928 classic of American ture only in those temperatures. Moreover, an
nature literature, The Outermost House: A integral concept in her environmental ethic
Year of Life on the Great Beach of Cape Cod. questions whether changes in any environ-
Beston’s book is remarkable for its poetic mental condition are man-made or part of a
imagery. Consider his painterly description of natural cycle.
a flock of turnstones, Arenaria interpres Carson’s ethic becomes a challenge in the
morinella, on New Year’s Day. The “three opening pages of her most celebrated book,
dominant colours of this bird [are] … black, Silent Spring. She develops her ecological per-
white, and glowing chestnut red; and these spective by characterizing earth’s life history.
colours are interestingly displayed in patches “The history of life on earth has been a history
and bold stripes seen at their best when the of interaction between living things and their
bird is flying. The great dunes behind them surroundings. To a large extent, the physical
441
CARSON
form and the habits of the earth’s vegetation Carson points to two crucial factors that the
and its animal life have been molded by the pesticide control programs mentioned above
environment. Considering the whole span of have ignored: “the … effective control of insects
earthly time, the opposite effect, in which life is that applied by nature, not by man,” and
actually modifies its surroundings, has been “the explosive power of a species to reproduce
relatively slight. Only within the moment of once the resistance of the environment has been
time represented by the present century has weakened” (1962, p. 247). In this spirit, Carson
one species – man – acquired significant power suggests biological solutions as an alternative to
to alter the nature of his world” (1962, p. 5). the pest problem, that is, approaches that turn
This thoughtful introduction ushers in a particular insect species against itself.
nothing less than a disclosure of, and an attack Specifically, she notes Edward Knipling’s theory
on, the widespread use of insecticides and her- of male sterilization of insects by using X-rays
bicides. Their hazardous effects – meticulously or gamma rays. During the 1950s, the United
documented with scientific fact – are traced States Department of Agriculture and the State
from ground-surface water to soil, to crops, to of Florida funded an effort to eliminate the
wildlife, and finally to humans. The targeted screw-worm, a major insect enemy of livestock,
chemicals, many of which were an outgrowth by using Knipling’s sterilization technique. The
of industry developing agents for chemical extinction of this devastating insect pest was
warfare during World War II, include the chlo- achieved in the Southeast by 1959.
rinated hydrocarbons (DDT, dieldrin, hep- The impact of Silent Spring has often been
tachlor, chlordane, aldrin, endrin), organic compared to Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle
phosphates (parathion, malathion), and the Tom’s Cabin. Responding to Carson’s book,
herbicides (dinitrophenol, pentachlorophenol). President John F. Kennedy’s Science Advisory
Carson documents the futility and disastrous Committee conducted an investigation that ulti-
side-effects of major insecticide programs: mately led to the creation of the Environmental
spraying for Dutch Elm disease, the Canadian Protection Agency in 1970 and the banning of
DDT campaign to eliminate the spruce DDT in 1972. Former Vice President Al Gore
budworm, and the “eradication” of the fire mentions, in his introduction to the 1994
ant in the southern United States. edition of Silent Spring, that a panel of distin-
Carson’s ecological principle of interrela- guished Americans chose Silent Spring as the
tionships is clearly demonstrated in her discus- most influential book within the last fifty years.
sion of the Canadian spruce budworm He suggests that Carson has revealed an essen-
program. In the chapter entitled “Rivers of tial truth to modern civilization: the interrela-
Death,” she refers to the time-immemorial cycle tionship between human beings and their envi-
of adult salmon returning to fresh water to ronment.
spawn their young – in this case, up the Often removed from an urban environment,
Miramichi River on the Canadian coast of New the remote seacoast was a place where Carson
Brunswick. Following the spraying of DDT in could immerse herself in thoughtful observation
1954, the chemical permeated the balsam of nature. Continual change and fluidity
forests and reached the soil and streams. Within throughout time’s passage, as opposed to stasis,
days, dead and dying fish appeared on the characterizes her philosophical view of this
banks of these streams. The rich variety of world. In many passages throughout The Edge
insect life on which salmon feed also perished. of the Sea, Carson ponders her surroundings in
Consequently, the newborn salmon had a way that reflects Henri Bergson’s intuition of
nothing to eat, and died. Despite the continued duration. She refers to time as continuously
spraying, the budworm population became and inevitably moving toward a future of
resistant to DDT and, ironically, persisted. unforeseen novelty, and then speaks of a life
442
CARSON
force that contains a history of the past in the Food from the Sea: Fish and Shellfish from
present. The following excerpt illustrates this Middle Atlantic Coast, Conservation
idea of evolution. “On all these shores there are Bulletin #38 (Washington, D.C., 1945).
echoes of past and future: of the flow of time, Always Rachel: The Letters of Rachel Carson
obliterating yet containing all that has gone and Dorothy Freeman, ed. Martha
before … . For as the shore configuration Freeman (Boston, 1995).
changes in the flow of time, the pattern of life Lost Woods: The Discovered Writing of
changes, never static, never quite the same from Rachel Carson, ed. Linda Lear (Boston,
year to year.” (1955, p. 250) 1998).
The language of poetry is manifest in this
passage as in all Carson’s writing. But, a deeper Further Reading
philosophical truth about nature emerges – one Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio,
that is grounded in scientific observation. The Comp Amer Thought, Dict Amer Bio,
theme of nature’s balances, and man as part of Encyc Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v51,
that balance, becomes an environmental ethic. Who Was Who in Amer v4
The urgency of Carson’s message resonated Brooks, Paul. The House of Life: Rachel
with humanity’s anxiety over nuclear weapons Carson at Work (Boston, 1972). 2nd rev.
of mass destruction during the 1950s and edn, The Writer at Work (Boston, 1998).
1960s – a potential threat about which she was ———, Speaking for Nature: How Literary
deeply concerned. In the present-day world of Naturalists from Henry David Thoreau to
more complex technology, her voice speaks to Rachel Carson Have Shaped America
our inner beings in an imperative, and yet com- (Boston, 1980).
forting, manner. Free, Ann Cottrell. Since Silent Spring: Our
Debt to Albert Schweitzer and Rachel
BIBLIOGRAPHY Carson (Washington, D.C., 1992).
Under the Sea Wind (New York, 1941). Gartner, Carol B. Rachel Carson (New York,
The Sea Around Us (New York, 1951; 1983).
Oxford, 2003). Graham, Frank, Jr. Since Silent Spring
The Edge of the Sea (New York, 1955). (Boston, 1970).
Silent Spring (Boston, 1962; 2002). Hynes, Patricia H. The Recurring Silent
The Sense of Wonder (New York, 1965; Spring (New York, 1989).
1998). Lear, Linda. “Bombshell in Beltsville: The
USDA and the Challenge of ‘Silent
Other Relevant Works Spring’,” Agricultural History 66 (1992):
Carson’s papers are at Yale University. A 151–70.
collection of materials about Carson is at ———, “Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring,”
Connecticut College. Environmental History Review 17 (1993):
Food from the Sea: Fish and Shellfish of New 23–48.
England, Conservation Bulletin #33 ———, Rachel Carson: Witness for Nature
(Washington, D.C., 1943). (New York, 1997).
Food from the Sea: Fishes of the Middle Lutts, Ralph H. “Chemical Fallout: Rachel
West, Conservation Bulletin #34 Carson’s Silent Spring, Radioactive Fallout
(Washington, D.C., 1943). and the Environmental Movement,”
Food from the Sea: Fish and Shellfish of the Environmental Review 9 (1985): 214–25.
South Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, Marco, Gino J., Robert M. Hollingworth,
Conservation Bulletin #37 (Washington, and William Durham, eds. Silent Spring
D.C., 1944). Revisited (Washington, D.C., 1987).
443
CARSON
Waddell, Craig, ed. And No Birds Sing: speech and the fine points of usage. Among
Rhetorical Analyses of Rachel Carson’s the Formalist giants, so it is said, were Gottlob
Silent Spring (Carbondale, Ill., 2000). Frege, Bertrand Russell, the logical positivists,
and W. V. QUINE. Among the giants of the
Charles Frederick Frantz Ordinary Language approach were J. L. Austin,
Gilbert Ryle, the later Wittgenstein and his fol-
lowers (such as Norman MALCOLM), and also
G. E. Moore. Whatever the historical merits of
dividing things up this way, it is clear that
Cartwright cannot be made to fit neatly into
CARTWRIGHT, Richard Lee (1925– ) either camp. To begin with, the philosophers
who most influenced him were Moore and
Richard Cartwright was born on 13 December Quine, supposedly combatants on opposing
1925 in Hamilton, Ohio. He began his formal sides. Moreover, Cartwright’s published papers
education in philosophy at Oberlin College, exhibit both enormous logical sophistication,
where he received a BA in 1945. His doctoral like Quine, but also great care about the nuance
work was done at Brown University, where he of wording, like Moore.
worked under Roderick CHISHOLM and Curt A theme that runs throughout Cartwright’s
DUCASSE. He graduated with a PhD in philos- philosophical papers – they are few in number
ophy in 1954, after taking his first teaching as he is too seldom satisfied with his work to
appointment in 1949 at the University of publish regularly – are puzzles in metaphysics
Michigan. He cites William FRANKENA as an that emerge from reflection upon linguistic
important influence (1987, p. xvii) during his semantics. Does reference to mythical creatures
time there. While at Michigan, Cartwright also require that there “be” a thing referred to, but
encountered J. O. Urmson and J. L. Austin, one which does not exist? Do we need sentence
and developed an appetite for Oxford philos- meanings and propositions, or can proposi-
ophy of the period – an appetite that fit well tions simply be sentence meanings? If we say
with his longstanding interest in G. E. Moore. that false propositions are those which do not
In 1961 Cartwright joined the thriving philos- “correspond” to any fact, must we immedi-
ophy department at Wayne State University, ately distinguish true propositions from facts –
where he worked closely with Hector on the grounds that true propositions must
CASTAÑEDA , Edmund GETTIER , and Alvin merely correspond to, rather than be identical
PLANTINGA. Cartwright remained at Wayne to, facts? If the answer is affirmative, how can
State for only six years, moving in 1967 to the true propositions be distinguished from facts?
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where Does failure of substitutivity salva veritate at
he was professor of philosophy and helped to the level of linguistic items really imply failure
build a new doctoral program. Cartwright of identity at the level of their referents? What
remained at MIT until his retirement in 1994. are the existential commitments of singular
Cartwright is married to Helen Morris propositions, i.e., ones which contain objects
Cartwright, also a specialist in analytic meta- “neat”, not under any description? In particu-
physics and philosophy of language, and they lar, can a proposition about A be true (or false
presently live in Boston. for that matter), in a world where A does not
Histories sometimes depict twentieth-century exist?
philosophy of language as a battle between the Later in his career, Cartwright turned to
Formalists, steeped in mathematical logic and history of philosophy. During this stage, he
natural science, and the Ordinary Language had two historical foci: early analytic philoso-
theorists, exquisitely attuned to colloquial phy, especially Moore, Russell, and the early
444
CARUS
Wittgenstein, and late medieval philosophy, CARUS, Paul (1852–1919)

especially Aquinas. Here too, his interest was in
the broad issue of how facts about what we say Paul Carus was born on 18 July 1852 in
relate to facts about what there is. Ilsenburg, Germany. He was the son of Gustav
and Laura Krueger Carus. Gustav rose to high
BIBLIOGRAPHY office in the Lutheran Church in East Prussia,
“Negative Existentials,” Journal of and Paul originally intended to follow him into
Philosophy 57 (1960): 629–39. the clergy. However, “the more I studied the
“Propositions,” in Analytical Philosophy, 1st more that sinful tendency to doubt grew.”
series, ed. R. J. Butler (Oxford, 1962). Instead, he obtained a PhD in classical philol-
“Propositions Again,” Noûs 2 (1968): ogy at Tübingen in 1876 and a teaching
229–46. position at the military academy of the Royal
“Identity and Substitutivity,” in Identity and Corps of Cadets of Saxony in Dresden. In 1880
Individuation, ed. Milton K. Munitz (New he published a pamphlet in which he denied the
York, 1971). literal truth of the Bible and described it as a
“Indiscernibility Principles,” Midwest Studies literary work comparable to the Odyssey. His
in Philosophy 4 (1979): 293–306. employer considered these views “not in
Philosophical Essays (Cambridge, Mass., harmony with the Christian spirit” and
1987). required him to recant or quit. He quit, and
“Singular Propositions,” Canadian Journal of emigrated to England in 1881, and then to the
Philosophy Supplementary Volume 23 United States in 1884. Carus soon came into
(1997): 67–84. contact with Edward C. Hegeler, a successful
zinc manufacturer in La Salle, Illinois, who had
Other Relevant Works turned to philosophy. Hegeler espoused what
“The Second Way,” Medieval Philosophy he called “the religion of science” in hopes of
and Theology 5 (1996): 189–204. resolving the nineteenth-century religious
“Aquinas on What Could Have Been,” dilemma. His world view was conservative in
Philosophical Perspectives 10 (1996): style, retaining such terms as “God” and
447–58. “immortality” but attaching non-traditional
“Aquinas on Infinite Multitudes,” Medieval meanings to them.
Philosophy and Theology 6 (1997): Hegeler became well known in religious
183–201. circles such as the Ethical Cultural Society and
the Free Religious Association, groups posi-
Further Reading tioned between Unitarianism on one side and
Hochberg, Herbert. “Professor Quine, outright materialism and agnosticism on the
Pegasus, and Dr. Cartright,” Philosophy of other. In 1887 he hired Benjamin and Sara
Science 24 (1957): 191–203. Underwood to run his new magazine, The
Thomson, Judith J., ed. On Being and Open Court, but soon found that he could not
Saying: Essays for Richard Cartwright abide their agnostic views and replaced them
(Cambridge, Mass., 1987). with Carus. Together he and Carus sought with
varying degrees of success to promote the
Robert J. Stainton religion of science, the transplantation of
European and German ideas to the New
World, and open philosophical debate gener-
ally. There can be little doubt that Carus’s gre-
garious personality, command of idiomatic
English, and rhetorical flair enabled the pub-
445
CARUS
lishing enterprise to flourish even though it important and one of the earliest popularizers
never earned a profit. of Oriental thought in America.” Probably
Carus married Hegeler’s well-educated Open Court’s best-selling title was Carus’s The
daughter Mary, and expanded Hegeler’s pub- Gospel of Buddha, a compilation drawing on
lishing operation to include book publishing forty-five Buddhist sources. With what he
(beginning in 1887) and a second, more tech- called “due consideration and always in the
nical philosophical journal, The Monist (begin- spirit of a legitimate development,” Carus made
ning in 1890). Both entities survive today in additions and alterations to his sources, but
somewhat altered form. (The Open Court was neglected to alert the reader where his sources
a casualty of the Depression.) Carus wrote ended and he began. The product found favor
more than seventy books and one thousand with Buddhists in various locations, but not
articles on philosophy, religion, history, litera- with scholarly students of the religion. Carl
ture, politics, poetry, mathematics, and other Jackson says simply that the Buddhism pre-
subjects. Working in La Salle and Chicago, he sented in his books “is a Buddhism that owed
oversaw the publication of 113 issues of The as much to Carus as it did to Buddha.”
Monist and 732 issues of The Open Court. Carus encouraged and financially supported
Carus was busy with these publishing enter- Oriental missionaries in the United States,
prises until his death on 11 February 1919 in La including Anagarika Dharmapala and Shaku
Salle, Illinois. Soyen. One of Soyen’s young associates,
Carus’s position on the margins of religious Teitaro SUZUKI, translated The Gospel of
dissent enabled him to publish then-familiar Buddha and then spent eleven years in the US,
mainstays of the movement such as Moncure mostly working with Carus in La Salle, before
CONWAY. Of more interest today are other con- returning to Japan and his distinguished later
tributors like physicist-philosopher Ernst Mach career as a popularizer of Zen Buddhism.
and Charles S. PEIRCE. Mach wrote that Open Exposure to non-Westerners made a differ-
Court’s English translations of his work were ence in Carus’s own writings. For a time he
more important to him than the original consciously addressed himself to a diverse
German editions. The Monist published some audience no longer assumed to be exclusively
of Peirce’s best-known work, including the Western and Christian in background. On one
classic “The Doctrine of Necessity Examined” occasion, Carus went so far as to say he was a
in 1892. Carus’s publication of these pieces Buddhist – but he did not mean that he had
does not imply that he agreed with them or converted. “You must not forget,” he wrote
even understood them, however. As late as Dharmapala in 1896, “that I am at the same
1906 he wrote, “I would think that Professor time a Christian in so far as I accept certain
Mach in speaking of the sense-perception of a teachings of Christ. I am even a Taoist, in so far
star, includes with it the star itself and the as I accept certain doctrines of Lautsze. I am an
whole immeasurable depth of celestial space Israelite, in so far as I sympathize with the aspi-
which according to our scientific knowledge rations of the Israelitic prophets. In one word,
the light of the star has to travel. Professor I am, as it were, a religious parliament incar-
Mach has informed me that such is not his nate.”
view.” Carus took an active interest in local activi-
Carus was also well placed to be influenced ties in central Illinois and traveled frequently to
by the Oriental religious thoughts and person- Europe. He blamed Britain for the outbreak of
alities that were part of the 1893 World’s World War I, a view that shaped the contents
Parliament of Religions, a conference held with of The Open Court magazine, until the United
the World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago. States entered the war against Germany in 1917
Carl Jackson describes him as “one of the most and public hostility and government pressure
446
CARUS
silenced him on the subject. Open Court staff stop at the axioms of geometry and the laws of
were interviewed and Carus family homes were motion, had provided Newtonian physics with
searched under various pretexts, but nothing objective metaphysical foundations. From this
was ever found to suggest that the family had point of view, Carus also rejected William
done anything other than hold unpopular JAMES’s pragmatism, which impugned the
opinions. “The worst I can say,” Carus wrote objectivity of knowledge, he thought, and made
in a letter the New York Tribune refused to everything depend on mere human whim.
publish, “is that I do not sympathize with our Carus’s thought progressed from the
policy in entering into this war, and if that is a “monist” pole, in his early years, to the pre-
crime make the worst of it.” dominance of the “philosophy of form” after
Carus often describes his philosophical views he settled in La Salle. In the early “monist”
as “monist”; another frequent label is “the phi- phase, the emphasis was on monism as a critical
losophy of form.” These two slogans may be doctrine, and especially its rejection of tradi-
taken as representing the poles he vacillated tional theism. From this viewpoint there could
between throughout his career. The “monism” be no objection to the skepticism of Spencer or
derives originally from German monism, whose Mill, or a scientific critique of traditional values
leading thinker was Ernst Haeckel, a biologist and social hierarchies. Later, under Hegeler’s
who wrote many popular science books and influence, Carus came to emphasize monism
articles of a free-thinking, anti-establishment rather as a positive doctrine, a substitute
tendency. Haeckel, one of Darwin’s first cham- religion or “religion of science.” This new
pions in Germany, combined a respect for the attitude made positive conviction paramount;
ethical role of religion with a strong antipathy the worst sin, now, was not theism but “agnos-
toward established religion and theoretical ticism.” The main motive for this seems to have
theism. His monist view of the world, he been Hegeler’s doctrine of the practical efficacy
claimed, was neither materialistic – despite of strong conviction. Carus seems thus to have
appearances and frequent accusations – nor fallen prey to a pragmatic justification for fun-
spiritualistic, but “neutral,” like Spinoza’s (or, damental principles of precisely the kind he so
more relevantly for his audience, Goethe’s). deprecated in James.
What he stressed most vehemently was that There were many tensions within the “phi-
the human species was a part of nature. losophy of form” Carus tried to develop in his
The “philosophy of form,” the other pole of later years. Chief among these is ambivalence
Carus’s intellectual life, was Kantian, though about what was meant by “form.” On the one
Kant was seen by Carus, initially at least, hand, we have what often sounds like a
through the eyes of Schopenhauer. (The interest Kantian conception, or possibly a neo-Kantian
in Eastern thought may well have had its conception like that developed by Hermann
origins in Schopenhauer’s writings as well.) In Cohen in the 1870s, in which “form” consists
any case, Carus, like other post-Kantians, of the categories of pure reason, prior to all
wrestled with the problem of the “thing in content, that the intellect imposes on the
itself” and tried to eliminate it, though his chaotic manifold of experience. Like Cohen
attempts appear, as we will see, to have been and many others, Carus was dissatisfied with
based on a misunderstanding. The intersection Kant’s “pure forms of intuition” that forced
between Haeckel and Kant, for Carus (as for particular axioms of geometry and arithmetic
his patron Hegeler) was the positive role both on us as ineluctable media of apprehending the
these thinkers assigned to objective knowledge. external world; we humans have no choice,
As Haeckel had rejected the claim that there Kant had said, but to perceive the world as
were frontiers beyond which human knowl- spatial and temporal. The great scientist
edge could not penetrate, so Kant, unwilling to Hermann von Helmholtz (who had played a
447
CARUS
key role in reviving Kant’s philosophy during there seems to have been a more fundamental
the later nineteenth century) had argued per- obstacle to his achievement of a consistent view
suasively that even if the world ineluctably about it. This is that “form” for him also rep-
presents itself to us in spatial and temporal resented the world of aspirations, ideals, or
form, as Kant had said, this did not mean that values more generally. In writing about the
particular axioms of geometry or mathematics poet Friedrich Schiller, for instance, Carus indi-
are forced on us. Cohen’s answer was to assim- cates that Schiller’s frequent contrast between
ilate the pure forms of intuition to the cate- the transient world and an “ideal world” was
gories of the understanding; the axioms of precisely that between the chaotic world of our
geometry and the whole of mathematics sensibility and the world of “form” – the values
become principles of (objective) reason. or ideals we impose on an otherwise lifeless
Mathematics and the basic principles of science world. Though they may provide regulative
become creatures of the intellect, rather than guidance, such “ideals” were not, in Kant’s
being forced on us by the organization of our view, anchored in the objective existence of the
sensibility. This “logical idealism” creates world we perceive and live in. But Carus did
problems of its own, which we need not not accept this fundamental trade-off, and thus
address here, but it was a much-discussed in effect regressed, without explicitly realizing
option among philosophers in the late nine- it, to a kind of Platonic view of “forms” as
teenth and early twentieth centuries. Carus trans-empirical entities that are in some vague
took a different approach. Though he accepted sense “realized” in the empirical world.
Kant’s argument for the subjectivity of space Carus shared many of the concerns and pre-
and time, he seems not to have understood that occupations of his German contemporaries,
it was precisely the fact that our sensibility but was unable to articulate them into a con-
imposes these forms on nature, for Kant, that sistent overall view or a compelling argument
guaranteed the objectivity of the principles of for any particular ideal. On the other hand,
science (within the realm of appearance). It is his broad interests, and his awareness of intel-
because the constitution of the human mind lectual trends, qualified him as an interlocutor
puts them there, Kant had argued, that the and stimulant for more serious and rigorous
axioms of geometry are everywhere valid for minds.
us. Where Cohen had sought an alternative
guarantee of objectivity, Carus wanted to keep BIBLIOGRAPHY
Kant’s original one – while also undermining it. Fundamental Problems: The Method of
Carus fails to see why Kant’s arguments should Philosophy as a Systematic Arrangement of
block our access to a “real existence” to which Knowledge (Chicago, 1889).
the concepts Kant regards as subjective may The Gospel of Buddha According to Old
objectively be applied. Carus discerns an Records (Chicago, 1894).
“objective space” as an “inherent quality of Kant and Spencer: A Study of the Fallacies of
things” that “is not, as in subjective space, a Agnosticism (Chicago, 1899).
construction.” While acknowledging that The History of the Devil and the Idea of Evil
Kant’s arguments hold for “subjective” space (Chicago, 1900).
and time, Carus somehow thought we could The Foundations of Mathematics (Chicago,
also, nonetheless, stand outside our sensibility 1908).
and compare an “objective” space – a thing in Philosophy as a Science: A Synopsis of the
itself – with our apprehensions of it. Writings of Dr. Paul Carus (Chicago,
But even if Carus had adopted a more 1909).
promising strategy in regard to “form” in this Truth on Trial: An Exposition of the Nature
highly abstract and purely intellectual sense, of Truth Preceded by a Critique of
448
CASE
Pragmatism and an Appreciation of its the New Hampton Library Institute in New
Leader (Chicago, 1911). Hampshire. In 1900, while in New Hampshire,
Goethe, with Special Consideration of His he was ordained and served a part-time pas-
Philosophy (Chicago, 1915). torate in a Baptist church. The next year, he left
his teaching post and began studies at Yale
Other Relevant Works Divinity School, earning his BD in 1904. For
Carus’s papers are with the Open Court the next two years, he taught Greek at Yale,
Papers at Southern Illinois University, while working toward his PhD in New
Carbondale. Testament, which he completed in 1907. He
“Mr. Charles S. Peirce’s Onslaught on the also served in church pastorates during his time
Doctrine of Necessity,” The Monist 2 at Yale.
(1892): 560–82. After a brief appointment in 1907–8 in the
The Point of View: An Anthology of Religion history and philosophy of religion at Cobb
and Philosophy Selected from the Works Divinity School in Lewiston, Maine, Case
of Paul Carus, ed. Catherine E. Cook accepted a position as assistant professor of
(Chicago, 1927). Contains a bibliography New Testament interpretation at the University
of Carus’s writings. of Chicago Divinity School, which he held until
1925. He also held an appointment in early
Further Reading church history from 1917 to 1938, served as
Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, chair of the church history department from
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer Bio, 1923 to 1938, and as Dean of the Divinity
Dict Amer Religious Bio, Nat Cycl Amer School from 1933 to 1938. During his tenure
Bio v14, Proc of APA v26, Who Was Who at Chicago, he also revitalized and headed the
in Amer v1 American Society of Church History (1920s
Henderson, Harold. Catalyst for and 1930s), which sponsored national and
Controversy: Paul Carus of Open Court regional meetings, and published substantial
(Carbondale, Ill., 1993). resources in church history and American reli-
McCoy, R. E. Open Court: A Centennial gious history. Case retired in 1938 and contin-
Bibliography, 1887–1987 (La Salle, Ill., ued teaching and publishing. In 1938, he
1987). lectured in New Testament at Bexley Hall, an
Episcopal seminary in Gambier, Ohio, and in
Harold Henderson 1940 he became professor of religion at Florida
A. W. Carus Southern College and Dean of the Florida
School of Religion. He served in these posi-
tions until he died on 5 December 1947 in
Lakeland, Florida.
Case did not present himself as a philosopher
but as an historian of Christianity. While he
CASE, Shirley Jackson (1872–1947) constructed his own thought with ideas
provided through philosophical disciplines –
Shirley Jackson Case was born on 28 chiefly philosophy of history and philosophy of
September 1872 at Hatfield Point, New religion – he distrusted speculative philosophy
Brunswick, Canada. He majored in mathe- for its lack of attention to social factors as for-
matics at Acadia University, receiving his BA in mative of ideas and institutions. Case asserted
1893 and MA in 1896. After teaching mathe- the superiority of “scientific,” empirical, and
matics in the New Brunswick area from 1893 functional approaches to the historical study of
to 1897, he taught mathematics and Greek at religion and treated these as normative, without
449
CASE
acknowledging the philosophical assumptions reviews. He also edited the American Journal of
guiding that choice. Case’s work may be most Theology (with G. B. Smith, 1912–20) and the
adequately assessed within the disciplinary Journal of Religion (1921–39).
domains of the history of religions and Case’s development of the socio-historical
Christian theology. method was his most important contribution to
Raised in the Free Will Baptist tradition, with the study of religion in America. According to
its Arminian theology, Case found himself Case, Christian doctrines do not express
drawn to the liberal theological movements of absolute or normative truths. Rather, they
his time. His work shows the influence of Adolf evolve over time, as shaped by the social
von Harnack, Albrecht Ritschl, German stan- concerns of particular Christian communities,
dards for the higher criticism of the Bible, and and their validity should be measured in terms
German history-of-religions approaches to of their functional effects. In his 1932 essay
Christianity as practiced by such theologians as “Education in Liberalism,” Case wrote that
Ernst Troeltsch. His work also shows the effects “every item in Christian belief at any period in
of American pragmatism, with its emphasis on history is a product of the experience and con-
functional approaches to truth-claims, and of viction of Christian people, and can be regarded
the Yale School tradition of applying historical- as valid only so long as it serves adequately to
critical methods to religious studies. Case, express the sincerest convictions and deepest
however, did not belong strictly to any of these experiences of each new generation of Christian
movements, and his thought diverged signifi- persons. This is the inescapable conviction to
cantly from each of them. which we have been driven by the historical
Case’s thought was more directly shaped by study of Christianity.” (1932, p. 115) Given his
the early twentieth-century modernist–funda- insistence on the evolutionary, empirical, social,
mentalist controversy in American and functional nature of all religious beliefs
Protestantism, which revolved around theories and ecclesiastical forms, Case proposed the
of history, evolution, biblical interpretation, socio-historical method as the most appropri-
and Christian doctrines. His works must be ate means to analyze and evaluate them. This
interpreted in that polemical context, as argu- methodology appeared fully for the first time in
ments fueling one side of an extremely charged The Evolution of Early Christianity (1914) and
debate with enormous social, political, and the- most completely in The Christian Philosophy of
ological implications. Along with Shailer History (1943).
MATHEWS, George Burman FOSTER, Edward The socio-historical method is Case’s devel-
Scribner AMES, and Gerald Birney SMITH, Case opment of higher criticism in New Testament
led the “Chicago School of theology,” a mod- studies extended to the history of Christianity.
ernist form of religious progressivism that trans- Because the historical forms and beliefs of any
formed liberal theology and religious scholar- religion are evolutionary and socially condi-
ship by applying the scientific method of tioned, he concluded that we must interpret
modern scholarship to the texts, doctrines, and them in light of their own social and cultural
historical records of Christianity. Case and environments if we are to understand their
Mathews were the chief architects of the meaning accurately. This necessitated integrat-
“socio-historical method,” which provided the ing the studies of other disciplines into reli-
methodology for the entire modernist agenda. gious history; to understand any religious tra-
While Mathews was the more energetic public dition properly, the historical events, social
figure in the modernist vanguard, Case conditions, political systems, cultural forms,
produced more of the solid scholarship behind and other religions of the environment affect-
the movement, authoring sixteen books, over ing that tradition must be analyzed rigorously.
ninety-five major articles, and nearly 400 book Case saw these investigations as thoroughly
450
CASE
empirical; if religion is social in nature, we must systems was the theological significance of Jesus
look to the actual experiences of the real indi- for those who followed him. Therefore, he con-
viduals who produced this religion in response centrated on analyzing the successive
to their particular needs in that environment. Christologies that evolved over time, each of
For Case, this renders metaphysical specula- which sought to translate the meaning of the
tion irrelevant, because one’s purpose is to historical Jesus to communities of believers in
understand the actual meaning and significance very different times and places.
of religious beliefs in lived experience. In the second phase of Case’s career, reflected
The single most distinctive feature of Case’s in such works as The Evolution of Early
socio-historical method is his insistence on the Christianity (1914) and The Social Origins of
functional view of religion: that the genuine Christianity (1923), he applied the socio-his-
meaning or validity of an image or doctrine torical method to the history of Christianity
must be determined by judging how adequately itself, analyzing the documents, institutions,
it expresses the experiences and values of its beliefs, and practices of the Christian church
adherents. Beliefs are validated by the degree to through the centuries, interpreting them as
which they serve the needs of their society in a products of the social realities and processes
particular time and place. Furthermore, given they express. He viewed the history of
this functional and evolutionary view of reli- Christianity as animated by an inner vitalism
gious forms, Case also rejected the normative expressed most essentially in the religion of
use of history. Instead of using past standards Jesus, which focused on an experiential aware-
to judge or validate current beliefs and prac- ness of unity with God and a life of service to
tices, he treated the past as a valuable guide to others. This vital spirit was embodied in forms
the present, which could be used to recognize that were adapted continually to meet the
the changing needs of contemporary circum- changing social needs of Christian believers.
stances. In turn, this encourages the revision of By developing and promoting the socio-his-
past beliefs into new forms in order to preserve torical method, Case set a new standard for
the vital functions of those ideas for a new age. writing religious history, which provided
Case used the socio-historical method both in exciting new ways to interpret religious litera-
the field of New Testament studies and in the ture and to explain intelligibly the changing
history of Christianity, the two phases of his forms of religious beliefs, practices, and insti-
own career at the University of Chicago. In his tutions. Case’s impact on American religious
first book, The Historicity of Jesus (1912), Case studies may be best expressed by recognizing
discussed the evidences for Jesus’s existence. how many of his theoretical propositions are
Case held that the historical Jesus, rather than taken for granted in contemporary liberal reli-
the Christ of faith, was the formative factor for gious scholarship: the view of history as partly
Christianity. In such works as Jesus: A New the product of human responsibility and cre-
Biography (1927) and Jesus yhrough the ativity rather than as simply the playing out of
Centuries (1932), he argued that applying the a divinely orchestrated drama; the empirical,
socio-historical method to historical and New grassroots view of history as an interpreted
Testament records would make it possible to record of the actual experiences of individuals
recover, to some extent, the life and personal and societies rather than of institutions or ide-
religious beliefs of the historical Jesus. This ological belief-systems; the thoroughly social
process would provide valuable clues to the view of history; the application of these new
vital message of Jesus that continues to animate historical insights to religious traditions, includ-
the Christian religion. However, Case consis- ing Christianity; the treatment of Christian
tently maintained that the main focus of the history, doctrines, and texts in terms of an evo-
New Testament texts and Christian theological lutionary process; the interdisciplinary nature of
451
CASE
all religious studies; the instructive rather than Thinking (Chicago, 1918).
the normative use of history in adjudicating The Revelation of John: A Historical
religious controversies; and the recognition that Interpretation (Chicago, 1919).
the validity of religious beliefs is due, in part, to Experience with the Supernatural in Early
how well they function in the particular social Christian Times (New York and London,
circumstances of their time. All of these princi- 1929).
ples are inherent in the socio-historical method “Education in Liberalism,” in Contemporary
pioneered by Case. American Theology, vol. 1, ed. Vergilius
Ferm (New York, 1932), pp. 107–21.
BIBLIOGRAPHY Report of the Church History Deputation to
“The Religion of Jesus,” American Journal of the Orient, September, 1931, to March,
Theology 14 (1910): 234–52. 1932 (New York, 1932).
“The Historicity of Jesus,” American Journal The Social Triumph of the Ancient Church
of Theology 15 (1911): 2–42. (New York, 1933).
The Historicity of Jesus: A Criticism of the Makers of Christianity: From Jesus to
Contention that Jesus Never Lived, a Charlemagne (New York, 1934).
Statement of the Evidence for His
Existence, an Estimate of His Relation to Further Reading
Christianity (Chicago, 1912). Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer Religious Bio, Nat
The Evolution of Early Christianity: A Cycl Amer Bio v36, Who Was Who in
Genetic Study of First-century Christianity Amer v2
in Relation to Its Religious Environment Hynes, William J. Shirley Jackson Case and
(Chicago, 1914). the Chicago School: The Socio-Historical
“The Historical Study of Religion,” Journal Method (Chico, Cal., 1981).
of Religion 1 (1921): 1–17. Reprinted, Jennings, Louis B. The Bibliography and
Journal of Religion 29 (1949): 5–14. Biography of Shirley Jackson Case
The Social Origins of Christianity (Chicago, (Chicago, 1949).
1923). McNeill, John T., Matthew Spinka, and
“The Religious Meaning of the Past,” Harold R. Willoughby, eds. Environmental
Journal of Religion 4 (1924): 576–91. Factors in Christian History (Chicago,
Jesus: A New Biography (Chicago, 1927). 1939). Essays by colleagues and students in
Jesus Through the Centuries (Chicago, Case’s honor.
1932).
Highways of Christian Doctrine (Chicago, Jennifer G. Jesse
1936).
Christianity in a Changing World (New
York, 1941).
The Christian Philosophy of History
(Chicago, 1943).
The Origins of Christian Supernaturalism CASTAÑEDA, Hector-Neri (1924–91)
(Chicago, 1946).
Héctor-Neri Castañeda-Calderón was born on
Other Relevant Works 13 December 1924 in San Vicente Zacapa,
The Book of Revelation: An Outline Bible- Guatemala. He attended the Normal School
Study Course of the American Institute of for Boys in Guatemala City, later called the
Sacred Literature (Chicago, 1918). Military Normal School for Boys, from which
The Millennial Hope: A Phase of War-Time he was expelled for refusing to fight a bully; the
452
CASTAÑEDA
dramatic story, worthy of being filmed, is told rigorous and formal where possible, but his
in the “De Re” section of his autobiographical preferences lay in developing comprehensive
“Self-Profile” (1986). He then attended a theories that could account for all available
normal school in Costa Rica, followed by data.
studies in philosophy at the University of San Castañeda’s theory of the nature of practical
Carlos, Guatemala. He won a scholarship to thinking arose from his earliest work, on the
the University of Minnesota, where he received foundations of morality, for which he devel-
his BA in 1950, MA in 1952, and PhD in 1954, oped a theory of deontic logic based on an
all in philosophy. His dissertation, “The Logical “ought-to-do” operator. Unlike the more usual
Structure of Moral Reasoning,” was written “ought-to-be” operator, which applies to
under the direction of Wilfrid S ELLARS . propositions (it ought to be the case that P,
Castañeda returned to teach in Guatemala, and where P is a proposition), the “ought-to-do”
then received a scholarship to study at the applies to the proposition-like entity that
University of Oxford in 1955–6, after which he remains when the “ought” is removed from
took a sabbatical-replacement position in phi- John ought to pay his debts. This is analyzed,
losophy at Duke University. not as it ought to be the case that John pays his
Castañeda’s first full-time philosophy debts, but as Ought-to-do (John to pay his
position was at Wayne State University from debts). Consistent with his later theory of guises
1957 to 1969, where he founded the philoso- (see below), there is a special mode of predica-
phy journal Noûs. In 1969 he moved (along tion that links, for example, John with to pay
with several of his Wayne State colleagues) to one’s debts to form the “practition” John to
Indiana University, where he eventually became pay his debts, expressible in English by a subject
the Mahlon Powell Professor of Philosophy noun-phrase followed by an infinitive verb-
and, later, its first Dean of Latino Affairs during phrase. The special case of a first-person prac-
1978–81. He remained at Indiana until his tition is called an “intention”: In I ought to pay
death. He was also a visiting professor of phi- my debts, the ought-to-do operator is applied
losophy at the University of Texas at Austin in to the I to pay my debts intention (that is, the
1962–3, and a fellow at the Center for intention I have to pay my debts). This theory
Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in was explored in great detail in Thinking and
1981–2. He received grants and fellowships Doing (1975), in which Castañeda showed
from the Guggenheim Foundation in 1967–8, how it can provide solutions for the paradoxes
the Mellon Foundation, the National of deontic logic (including, especially, the Good
Endowment for the Humanities, and the Samaritan Paradox). His theories of practical
National Science Foundation. He was President reasoning have found many applications in
of the American Philosophical Association artificial intelligence, both in the field of
Central Division in 1979–80, elected a member planning and acting, and in computational
of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences theories of deontic reasoning (especially in the
in 1990, and received the Presidential Medal of work of the computational legal theorist
Honor from the Government of Guatemala in L. Thorne McCarty). Further relevant works
1991. He died on 7 September 1991 in are “On the Semantics of the Ought-to-Do”
Bloomington, Indiana. (1970), “Intentions and the Structure of
Castañeda’s philosophical interests spanned Intending” (1971), The Structure of Morality
virtually the entire spectrum of philosophy, (1974), Thinking and Doing (1975), “The
and his theories form a highly interconnected Paradoxes of Deontic Logic” (1981), and
whole. He was a system-builder, while still Thinking, Language, and Experience (1989).
remaining firmly in the tradition of Anglo- The special role of the self occupied much of
American analytic philosophy. His work was Castañeda’s philosophical career and provided
453
CASTAÑEDA
one of his motivations for doing philosophy, ter’s indexical thoughts, by expressing them
which, he often said, should be done “in the via quasi-indicators without their antecedents);
first person, for the first person.” He singled it and it has been used in artificial-intelligence
out for special treatment in his theory of inten- research in knowledge representation. See these
tions (mentioned above), and he investigated articles: “‘He’: A Study in the Logic of Self-
what he called the “phenomeno-logic” of “the Consciousness” (1966), “Indicators and Quasi-
I.” (“Phenomeno-logic” is not phenomenol- Indicators” (1967), “On Knowing (or
ogy; rather, it is the study of the logical struc- Believing) that One Knows (or Believes)”
ture of phenomenal appearance.) One of his (1970), Thinking, Language, and Experience,
major discoveries was the “quasi-indicator” and The Phenomeno-Logic of the I (1999).
(or “quasi-indexical”): a term that allows a Castañeda’s guise theory is a theory of the
speaker to attribute an indexical reference to mechanisms of reference and of Kantian “phe-
another cognitive agent. For example, the nomena” – of the world as it is presented to us
speaker of “John believes that he himself is in appearance. The theory arose primarily from
rich” uses the quasi-indicator “he himself” two converging sources (among others, such as
(often written “he*”) to express John’s first- aspects of his theories about quasi-indicators
person reference to himself (that is, to John). and practitions). One source was Castañeda’s
That sentence is the speaker’s way of depicting exploration of the consequences of one of the
the proposition that John would express in the several logically possible responses to Frege’s
first person by “I am rich.” Note that the paradox of reference, namely, denying that the
speaker cannot express it via “John believes copula in sentences such as “The President of
that I am rich,” since that occurrence of “I” the US is the Commander-in-Chief” or
would refer to the speaker. Nor can the speaker “Oedipus’s father was the previous King of
express it via “John believes that John is rich,” Thebes” must be strict identity. Castañeda
since this allows for an interpretation under interpreted the copula using a family of weaker
which John believes that someone named relations (including “consubstantiation” and
“John” (and who is not necessarily himself) is “consociation”) that hold among objects of
rich. Most importantly, John might believe that thought (which he called “guises”). The other
someone named “John” is rich yet fail to source was the observation that thinking about
believe that he himself is rich, an observation truth and reality (such as believing that Plato
that was adapted by John Perry for his theory was a philosopher, or thinking about Plato) is
of the “essential indexical.” Note that in the indistinguishable from (i.e., is the same kind of
expression denoting the practition John to pay act as) thinking about falsehood and fiction
his debts, “his” is a quasi-indicator. And in (such as believing that Santa Claus brings
“John said that he would read that book there presents or that Plato was a computer scientist,
and then,” the terms “he”, “there”, “that”, thinking about Santa Claus). Instead of saying
and “then” (and, arguably, “would”) are all that such acts of thinking differed in that they
quasi-indexical, since, presumably, John had different kinds of objects (true versus false,
actually said, “I will read this book here and existing versus non-existing), Castañeda asked
now.” The theory of quasi-indicators is also what a theory would look like that treated both
related to the notion of belief “de se” (that is, kinds of objects of thought on a par, and how
beliefs about oneself) discussed by David LEWIS, real objects might be constructed (see below)
to the linguistic theory of “logophoric” from objects of thought (guises) that are neutral
pronouns (quasi-indexical lexical items that are with respect to reality and non-reality. Roughly,
found in some natural languages), and to the guises are items corresponding to sets of prop-
literary theory of “free indirect discourse” (used erties; they are both intensional (i.e., non-exten-
in narrative text directly to represent a charac- sional) and intentional (i.e., objects of thought);
454
CASTAÑEDA
some are perceivable, others only conceivable; c({…F…}∪{G}) (i.e., as the guise whose core
they can be incomplete (e.g., the guise the red consists of all of a’s core properties and also
square is constituted by only two properties, property G). Then (1) a is-externally G (in one
whereas a really existing red square would have sense) if C*(a,a[G]) (i.e., G can be predicated
many more properties); and they can be incon- externally of a if a and a[G] are consubstanti-
sistent (e.g., the guise the round square). ated). For example, “the morning star is a
Guise theory is a fully intensional theory planet” is true because C*(c{being the last
with one type of object (guises), one type of object seen in the morning before the Sun rises,
property (in contrast to theories, such as that of being star-like in appearance}, c{being the last
Terence PARSONS, that distinguish between object seen in the morning before the Sun rises,
“nuclear” and “extranuclear” properties), and being star-like in appearance, being a planet});
two modes of predication (“internal” and i.e., the two guises, the morning star and the
“external,” of which there are several vari- morning star that is a planet, are consubstan-
eties). More precisely, there are (1) properties tiated. (2) Guise a “is the same as” guise b if
(e.g., being round, being square, being blue, and only if C*ab (i.e., a and b are consubstan-
existing, etc.), (2) sets of properties (called tiated). For example, “the morning star is the
“guise cores”; e.g., {being round, being evening star” is true because C*(c{being the
square}), and (3) an “individuating operator,” last object seen in the morning before the Sun
c, which is an ontic counterpart of the definite rises, being star-like in appearance}, c{being
article that produces guises from guise cores the first object seen in the evening after the Sun
(e.g., c{being round, being square} is the guise sets, being star-like in appearance}); i.e., the
the round square). Guises can be understood, guise the morning star and the guise the evening
roughly, as things-under-a-description, as star are consubstantiated. And (3) a (“really”)
“facets” of (physical and non-physical) objects, exists if and only if, for some guise b, C*ab.
as “roles” that objects play – in general, as Moreover, a real object (an infinitely-proper-
intentional objects of thought. There are tied, multifaceted “Leibnizian individual”) was
“internal” and “external” modes of predica- at the “apex” of a semi-lattice of consubstan-
tion: In general, a guise c{…F…} is-internally F; tiated guises. Because of the internal and
i.e., a guise whose core contains the property F external modes of predication, it is not a con-
thereby has F internally predicated of it, and so tradiction to say that the guise the existing
one can say that an F thing “is” F. For example, round square both exists and does not exist: It
the guise c{being round, being square} – i.e., the is-internally existing, but it is not consubstan-
round square – is-internally only round and tiated with any guise (hence does not “really”
square. The two guises the tallest mountain – or externally – exist). Another external mode
and Mt Everest (e.g., c{being a mountain, being of predication is “consociation” (C**). This is
taller than any other mountain} and c{being an equivalence relation that holds between
named ‘Mt Everest’}) are related by an external guises that a mind has “put together,” i.e.,
mode of predication called “consubstantiation” between guises in a “belief space.” For
(C*). Castañeda originally conceived of con- example, the guise Hamlet is consociated with
substantiation as an equivalence relation within the guise Prince of Denmark – C**(Hamlet, the
the domain of actual objects (though he may Prince of Denmark) – because “they” are the
have weakened this requirement in later “same” character in Shakespeare’s play.
writings). He used it to analyze (1) external (Perhaps it is better to say that they are two
predication, (2) co-reference, and (3) existence: guises of that character.) Other external modes
Let a = c{…F…} be a guise (i.e., a guise con- of predication include “transubstantiation” (to
taining in its core, possibly among other prop- handle identity across time) and “transconso-
erties, the property F), and define a[G] as ciation” (to handle identity across different
455
CASTAÑEDA
works of fiction). Guise theory has had an “Thinking and the Structure of the World,”
influence on artificial-intelligence research on Philosophia 4 (1974): 3–40.
intensional knowledge representation. For The Structure of Morality (Springfield, Ill.,
further reading, see “Thinking and the 1974).
Structure of the World” (1972), “Identity and “Leibniz’s Concepts and Their Coincidence
Sameness” (1975), “Perception, Belief, and the Salva Veritate,” Noûs 8 (1974): 381–98.
Structure of Physical Objects and Thinking and Doing: The Philosophical
Consciousness” (1977), “Fiction and Reality” Foundations of Institutions (Dordrecht,
(1979), “Reference, Reality, and Perceptual 1975).
Fields” (1980), and Thinking, Language, and “Individuation and Non-Identity: A New
Experience. Look,” American Philosophical Quarterly
Also noteworthy are Castañeda’s investiga- 12 (1975): 131–40.
tions into the history of philosophy – especially “Fiction and Reality: Their Basic
his writings on Plato and Leibniz – and his Connections,” Poetics 8 (1979): 31–62.
(related) metaphilosophical distinction between On Philosophical Method (Bloomington,
“Athenian” and “Darwinian” history of phi- Ind., 1980).
losophy: On the Athenian approach, one views “Reference, Reality, and Perceptual Fields,”
(or attempts to view) a philosopher’s writings Proceedings and Addresses of the
as a unitary system, with the inevitable diffi- American Philosophical Association 53
culty of trying to reconcile inconsistencies. On (August 1980): 763–823.
the Darwinian approach – which Castañeda “The Paradoxes of Deontic Logic: The
favored – a philosopher’s writings are viewed Simplest Solution to All of Them in One
as different (possibly inconsistent) theories Fell Swoop,” in New Studies in Deontic
struggling for survival, each of which must be Logic, ed. Risto Hilpinen (Dordrecht,
treated on its own merits. He also developed a 1981), pp. 37–85.
more general metaphilosophical stance: “Self-Profile,” in Hector-Neri Castañeda, ed.
Philosophers should consult as much data as James E. Tomberlin (Dordrecht, 1986), pp.
possible and construct as many comprehensive 3–137.
philosophical theories as possible. Philosophical Thinking, Language, and Experience
analysis should be a helpful endeavor: (Minneapolis, 1989).
Philosophers should not attack each other’s Intentionality, Modality, and Supervenience,
views but should ask questions and provide ed. M. Jeroen van den Hoven and Gert-
more data in order to help others develop their Jan C. Lokhorst (Rotterdam, 1990).
own theories. These theories, then, can be Contains a bibliography of Castañeda’s
compared and generalized. Examples include writings during 1986–90.
“Plato’s Phaedo Theory of Relations” (1972), The Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on
“Leibniz’s Concepts and Their Coincidence Self-Consciousness, ed. James G. Hart and
Salva Veritate” (1974), “Individuation and Tomis Kapitan (Bloomington, Ind., 1999).
Non-Identity” (1975), and On Philosophical
Method (1980). Other Relevant Works
“Imperatives, Decisions, and Oughts,” in
BIBLIOGRAPHY Morality and the Language of Conduct,
“‘He’: A Study in the Logic of Self- ed. Hector-Neri Castañeda and George
Consciousness,” Ratio 8 (1966): 130–57. Nakhnikian (Detroit, 1963).
“Plato’s Phaedo Theory of Relations,” “Consciousness and Behavior: Their Basic
Journal of Philosophical Logic 1 (1972): Connections,” in Intentionality, Mind, and
467–80. Perception, ed. Hector-Neri Castañeda
456
CATTELL
(Detroit, 1966). Presented to Hector-Neri Castañeda, with

“Private Language Problem,” in His Replies (Indianapolis, 1983).
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Tomberlin, James E., ed. Hector-Neri
Edwards (New York, 1967), vol. 6, Castañeda (Dordrecht, 1986). Contains a
pp. 458–64. bibliography of Castañeda’s writings.
“Omniscience and Indexical Reference,”
Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967): 203–9. William J. Rapaport
“Indicators and Quasi-indicators,” American
Philosophical Quarterly 4 (1967): 85–100.
“On Knowing (or Believing) that One Knows
(or Believes),” Synthese 21 (1970):
187–203.
“On the Semantics of the Ought-to-do,” CATTELL, James McKeen (1860–1944)
Synthese 21 (1970): 449–68.
“Intentions and the Structure of Intending,” James McKeen Cattell was born on 25 May
Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 453–66. 1860 in Easton, Pennsylvania. He was the son of
“Identity and Sameness,” Philosophia 5 William C. Cattell, a Presbyterian minister and
(1975): 121–50. President of Lafayette College. Cattell received
Ed., Action, Knowledge, and Reality: Critical his BA from Lafayette in 1880, where he devel-
Studies in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars oped an interest in, and adopted with Comtean
(Indianapolis, 1975). modifications, the philosophy of Francis Bacon.
“On the Philosophical Foundations of the In 1881–2 Cattell traveled to Europe to study at
Theory of Communication: I. Reference,” the universities of Göttingen and Leipzig under
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977): Wilhelm Wundt. In 1882–3 he studied at Johns
165–86. Hopkins University, and then returned to Leipzig
“Perception, Belief, and the Structure of to pursue further studies with Wundt. In 1886
Physical Objects and Consciousness,” Cattell became the first American to earn a PhD
Synthese 35 (1977): 285–351. in psychology in Wundt’s new program for
experimental psychology. One of his studies
Further Reading showed that people naturally read whole words,
Pres Addr of APA v8, Proc of APA v65, rather than just syllables. To the consternation of
Who Was Who in Amer v10 Wundt, Cattell’s dissertation research, published
Jacobi, Klaus, and Helmut Pape, eds. as Psychometric Investigation in 1886, made no
Thinking and the Structure of the World: use of introspection’s internal mental states to
Hector-Neri Castañeda’s Epistemic explain reaction times, instead relying only on
Ontology Presented and Criticized (Berlin, the subject’s behaviors.
1990). Cattell took a research and lecturing position
Orilia, Francesco, and William J. Rapaport, in experimental psychology at St. John’s College,
eds. Thought, Language, and Ontology: Cambridge in 1886, where he came into contact
Essays in Memory of Hector-Neri with Francis Galton’s ideas about individual
Castañeda (Dordrecht, 1998). Contains a psychological differences and positive eugenics,
bibliography of Castañeda’s writings of which Cattell approved. In 1888 he married
during 1991–9. Josephine Owen, with whom he had seven
Shope, Robert. The Analysis of Knowing: A children. In January 1888 Cattell began spending
Decade of Research (Princeton, N.J., 1983). alternate semesters in the United States, lecturing
Tomberlin, James E., ed. Agent, Language, on psychology at Bryn Mawr College in
and the Structure of the World: Essays Pennsylvania.
457
CATTELL
In 1889 Cattell started his appointment as Columbia University and its President,
professor of psychology at the University of Nicholas Murray B UTLER, along with his
Pennsylvania, joining George Stuart pacifist stance during World War I, led to his
FULLERTON. His was the first professorship in eventual dismissal in 1917. His later years were
psychology at any university, since psycholo- devoted to his other major academic pursuit of
gists were usually appointed in philosophy or popularizing psychology and science, through
medical departments. Cattell also founded an journals such as Science and American
experimental psychology laboratory at Naturalist, and the directory American Men
Pennsylvania in 1889, which was used for both of Science. Cattell died on 20 January 1944 in
undergraduate and graduate instruction. He Lancaster, Pennsylvania.
continued his experiments measuring the
relation between physical sensation and BIBLIOGRAPHY
stimulus. Cattell’s emphasis upon the study of The Inertia of the Eye and Brain (London,
the subject’s behavior promoted a behavioris- 1885).
tic approach to psychology soon imitated by Psychometrische Untersuchungen (Leipzig,
many more American psychologists. 1886).
In 1891 Cattell moved to Columbia “The Time Taken up by Cerebral
University as professor of psychology and head Operations,” Mind o.s. 11 (1886):
of his department. In 1895 he hired psycholo- 220–42, 377–92, 524–38.
gist and philosopher Charles Augustus STRONG “Experiments on the Association of Ideas,”
to join him, and in 1899 Edward L. THORNDIKE Mind o.s. 12 (1887): 68–74.
arrived, making Columbia’s psychology “Mental Tests and Measurements,” with
department as prominent as its philosophy Francis Galton, Mind o.s. 15 (1890):
department, led by John DEWEY. Seeking prac- 373–81.
tical applications for psychology, Cattell devel- On the Perception of Small Differences, with
oped “mental testing” but was unable to show Special Reference to the Extent, Force and
a positive relationship between educational Time of Movement, with George Stuart
achievement and reaction times, sensory dis- Fullerton (Philadelphia, 1892).
crimination, and memory. Intelligence testing in On Reaction-times and the Velocity of the
America would wait twenty more years when Nervous Impulse, with Charles S. Dolley
the Binet-Simon Test arrived. Cattell’s career as (Washington, D.C., 1895).
an editor and publisher started in 1894 when “Mental Measurement,” Philosophical
he and James Mark BALDWIN founded the Review 2 (1893): 316–32.
Psychological Review, and Cattell served as Physical and Mental Measurements of the
co-editor until 1904. In 1894 Cattell also took Students of Columbia University, with
ownership of the weekly Science, and in 1900 Livingston Farrand (New York, 1896).
he made it the official publication of the “On Relations of Time and Space in Vision,”
American Association for the Advancement of Psychological Review 7 (1900): 325–43.
Science, editing it until his death. In 1900 he “Reactions and Perceptions,” in Essays
bought Popular Science Monthly and operated Philosophical and Psychological in Honor
it until 1915. In 1907 Cattell took over the of William James by his Colleagues at
journal American Naturalist, and in 1915 he Columbia University (New York, 1908).
founded School and Society. “A Statistical Study of American Men of
Cattell was President of the American Science,” Science n.s. 24 (1910): 537–96.
Psychological Association in 1895, and became
the first psychologist elected to the National Other Relevant Works
Academy of Sciences in 1901. His strife with Cattell’s papers are at the Library of
458
CAVELL
Congress and Columbia University. Depression, while his mother was an accom-
Scientific Societies and Associations (Albany, plished and well-known pianist for radio,
N.Y., 1904). vaudeville, and silent movies. Cavell learned
University Control (New York, 1913). the piano from a young age, and when he
James McKeen Cattell, 1860–1944: Man of began college at the University of California at
Science, 2 vols, ed. A. T. Poffenberger Berkeley, he decided to pursue a degree in
(Lancaster, Penn., 1948). music. His involvement in theater at Berkeley,
An Education in Psychology: James McKeen as well as his coursework in literature and
Cattell’s Journal and Letters from philosophy, started Cavell’s interest in a broad
Germany and England, 1880–1888, ed. range of the arts and humanities. After com-
Michael M. Sokal (Cambridge, Mass., pleting his BA in music in 1947, Cavell moved
1981). to New York with plans to further his educa-
Seminal Research Papers, ed. Daniel N. tion in composition at the Juilliard School,
Robinson (Washington, D.C, 1977). but he soon realized that he was no longer
interested in a conservatory education.
Further Reading Cavell moved back to California to study
Amer Nat Bio, Bio Dict Psych, Bio Dict philosophy at the University of California at
Psych by Zusne, Dict Amer Bio, Encyc Los Angeles from 1948 to 1951, and was then
Psych, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v13 invited to join the Harvard University Society
Sokal, Michael M. “James McKeen Cattell of Fellows as a junior fellow from 1953 to
and the Failure of Anthropometric Mental 1956. Cavell then moved back to California to
Testing, 1890–1901,” in The Problematic accept a position at the University of
Science: Psychology in Nineteenth-Century California at Berkeley as assistant professor of
Thought, ed. William R. Woodward and philosophy, while he continued his doctoral
Mitchell G. Ash (New York, 1982), pp. work. Cavell completed his dissertation, “The
322–45. Claim to Rationality: Knowledge and the
Sokal, Michael M. “James McKeen Cattell Basis of Morality,” and was awarded his PhD
and American Psychology in the 1920s,” from Harvard in 1961. Cavell served on the
in Explorations in the History of faculty at UC Berkeley for six years before
Psychology in the United States, ed. Josef departing in 1962 for a yearlong fellowship at
Brozek (East Brunswick, N.J., 1984), pp. the Institute for Advanced Studies in
273–323. Princeton, New Jersey. In 1963 Cavell
accepted a position as professor of philosophy
John R. Shook at Harvard University, and in 1965 was
named the Walter M. Cabot Professor of
Aesthetics and the General Theory of Value.
He remained in this position until his retire-
ment in 1997. Cavell’s career is notable for his
many professional honors and awards, includ-
CAVELL, Stanley Louis (1926– ) ing a MacArthur Fellowship in 1992. He was
President of the Eastern Division of the
Stanley Cavell was born on 1 September 1926 American Philosophical Association (1996–7).
in Atlanta, Georgia, to Irving H. and Fannie In addition, his contributions to film studies
(Segal) Goldstein, and he grew up in both have been honored with the creation of the
Atlanta and Sacramento, California. His Stanley Cavell Curatorship of the Harvard
immigrant father was a jeweler whose Film Archive. Cavell also won the Morton
business went under during the Great Dauwen Zabel Award in Criticism from the
459
CAVELL
American Academy and Institute of Arts and Cavell’s Wittgenstein places great significance
Letters in 1985. He has received honorary on the necessity of human judgment in regards
degrees from several institutions. to language and communication. Cavell sees a
Cavell’s work has been most influential in way out of the skeptical dilemma of language,
the philosophy of art, particularly in regards to for although common ordinary language is
film. He is regarded by many film theorists as untidy and often disruptive, the possibilities of
a seminal figure in the development and legit- human judgment and interpretation open a
imization of film studies as a scholarly disci- space for meaningful communication through
pline. Cavell has also made significant contri- ordinary language, as well as through language
butions in the philosophies of literature, that is marked by expressiveness and creativ-
language, epistemology, politics, ethics, and ity. Cavell is critical of philosophical tradi-
culture. Throughout his writing, Cavell suc- tions that repress the value and importance of
cessfully explores the intersections between human expressivity, and he seems to hope that
the traditions of analytical, continental, and his approach to philosophical questions will
American philosophies, and in so doing he help lead to greater theoretical understanding
reveals particular debts to such seemingly dis- and acceptance of the value of human expres-
parate figures as J. L. Austin (one of Cavell’s sion.
own teachers), Ludwig Wittgenstein, Friedrich Cavell’s interest in judgment and expression
Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, William directly reflect his recurrent preoccupation
Shakespeare, Ralph Waldo EMERSON, and with aesthetics. Whether the precise target of
Henry David Thoreau. In addition, Cavell’s his analysis is epistemology, morality, political
interest in psychoanalysis helps to shape his theory, or the philosophy of language, Cavell
approach to a broad range of philosophical critiques the skeptical turn time and time again
problems. As a writer, Cavell is known for a by returning to the matter of expression with
prose style that has a unique stylistic flair; it has aesthetic resonance. In his writings on aes-
sometimes been likened to a form of artistic thetic questions themselves, Cavell most often
expression in and of itself. As a result of his approaches topics from the immediate per-
diverse interdisciplinary approach and his spective and concerns of the critic. More often
interest in cultural forms often marginalized as than not, he moves from an analysis of a par-
“low culture,” Cavell is often perceived to be ticular work of art to philosophical issues
stretching the boundaries between traditional rather than from theoretical issues to specific
philosophy and more practical modes of examples in the arts.
cultural criticism. In Cavell’s first book, Must We Mean What
Cavell’s earliest writings demonstrate the We Say? (1969), he addresses aesthetic issues
influence of Austin through Cavell’s defense of in a more overt and exacting way than he does
ordinary language philosophy. Cavell links the in any of his other publications. In fact, he
precepts of ordinary language with late argues for a more important and central place
Wittgensteinian thought. His concerns with for aesthetics within the practice of philosophy.
the problems of modern skepticism appear Cavell addresses a range of aesthetic topics: he
here, and they continue to figure prominently analyzes the relationship between aesthetics
throughout his philosophy. Cavell sees all and criticism, probes aesthetic questions
forms of skepticism, both ancient and modern, regarding artistic mediums and genres, and
as emerging from the primordial human desire explicates issues surrounding notions of inten-
to escape the inevitable tribulations posed by tions, significance, and pleasure. The book
language. He considers efforts to ground com- also includes some examples of his dramatic
munication in foundations considered more criticism. A later book on Shakespeare, titled
rational as being fundamentally skeptical. Disowning Knowledge: In Six Plays of
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CAVELL
Shakespeare (1987), solidified Cavell as one of Tears: The Hollywood Melodrama of the
America’s leading literary critics. Here Cavell Unknown Woman (1996), Cavell elucidates
demonstrated the link between Cartesian skep- another genre from the same period, which he
ticism and Shakespeare’s seeming preoccupa- refers to as “the melodrama of the unknown
tion with the volatility of human knowledge woman.” He demonstrates that comedies of
and certainty. His criticism also extends to remarriage tend to portray a woman’s pursuit
Romantic literature, particularly that of of a shared partnership in life and love, but
Thoreau and Emerson, which Cavell has that the melodramas instead chronicle a
sought to connect to the critique and modifi- woman’s discovery that she is alone and
cation of Kant and more recent forms of moral isolated in that pursuit. Both of these books
perfectionism. Throughout his philosophy of mark a particular moment in film history that
literature, Cavell addresses the problem of Cavell points to as demonstrating an evolving
reading, and in so doing, has emphasized that cultural consciousness in women about their
writing is a particularly human exercise, one role in society, their relationship to men, and
which meets the human desire for expressive their own potential independence.
communication. Psychoanalysis has figured more and more
Cavell’s work in film theory and criticism prominently into Cavell’s philosophy and crit-
began with philosophical questions about the icism over the years. Cavell utilizes psychoan-
nature of the medium of film in The World alytic readings in order to understand what
Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film causes one to be drawn to a work of art. His
(1971). Cavell examines the narrative potential approach can be distinguished from other psy-
of film given its photographic character. He choanalytic critics who utilize Sigmund Freud
concludes that the essence of film, as distin- in order to arrive at a deeper and more
guished from other art forms, is the fact that it grounded interpretation of a work. On the
is photographic. Since films are photographic, surface, Cavell’s psychoanalysis seems to be a
the medium allows us to see things that are not form of reception theory, but he believes that
present, and in seeing what is not present, we a more comprehensive psychological under-
are able to remain unseen. The fact that we are standing of the reasons for one’s seduction by
able to see the world that is not present but a work of art can yield a more intense and
recreated for us in film while at the same time unfettered engagement with that art.
remaining unseen fulfills a natural human wish The idea of facilitating an intense interaction
to be able to view the world without respon- with a work runs counter to traditional philo-
sibility. Cavell also interrogates the theories sophical aesthetics, which has historically
of other influential film critics, such as Andrè encouraged the establishment of a sense of
Bazin. The World Viewed is now regarded as aesthetic distance from which the perceiver of
a classic in the philosophy of film. a work of art can come to appreciate an object
Cavell focused his analysis on the film genre or event for its intrinsic qualities in a detached
of comedy by examining seven films of the fashion. Cavell’s emphasis on the importance
1930s and 1940s in Pursuits of Happiness: of human expression, intention, and judgment
The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage (in this case on the part of the perceiver of
(1981). Here he argues that this group of art), as well as his psychoanalytic mode of crit-
comedies, which he calls examples of the icism, have led him to reject the possibility
comedy of remarriage, are the direct descen- and the desirability of a detached, impartial,
dants of Shakespearean romantic comedy, and universalized perceiver. Modern skepticism,
that these movies constitute a unique mode of and traditional philosophy, rejects (or is sus-
comic drama unlike those delineated by other picious of) the immediacy of bodily experi-
comic theorists. More recently, in Contesting ences in its haste to ensure that some objective
461
CAVELL
distance is established; it is through this objec- Conditions of Handsome and Unhandsome:

tive perspective from which it is thought that The Constitution of Emersonian
more accurate and effective analyses of art can Perfectionism (Chicago, 1990).
occur. On the contrary, Cavell suggests that A Pitch of Philosophy: Autobiographical
diving into the depths of human expression is Exercises (Cambridge, Mass., 1994).
the best way to understand works of art, and Philosophical Passages: Wittgenstein,
to understand each other. There is no better Emerson, Austin, Derrida (Oxford, UK,
way to examine the significance of art than to 1995).
submit to the attraction we feel in our experi- The Cavell Reader, ed. Stephan Mulhall
ence of a work and to dwell for a while in our (Cambridge, Mass., 1996).
fascination and wonder. Contesting Tears: The Hollywood
Cavell’s writing insists that we retain our Melodrama of the Unknown Woman
awareness of ordinary language and the subtle (Chicago, 1996).
nuances and meanings that it expresses to us. Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes, ed. David
His philosophical investigations into a broad Justin Hodge (Stanford, Cal. 2003).
range of topics challenge us to acquiesce to Cities of Words: Pedogogical Letters on a
the experiences that intrigue and seduce us in Register of the Moral Life (Cambridge,
the hopes that we might learn everything we Mass., 2004).
can from those experiences, rather than deny Philosophy the Day after Tomorrow
their power over us. (Cambridge, Mass., 2005).
BIBLIOGRAPHY Further Reading

Must We Mean What We Say? (New York, Bio 20thC Phils, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio,
1969; 2nd edn, Cambridge, UK, 1976; 3rd Comp Amer Thought, Oxford Comp Phil,
edn 2002). Pres Addr of APA v10, Routledge Encycl
The World Viewed: Reflections on the Phil
Ontology of Film (New York, 1971; 2nd Cohen, Ted, Paul Guyer, and Hilary
edn, Cambridge, Mass., 1976). Putnam, eds. Pursuits of Reason: Essays in
The Senses of Walden (New York, 1972; Honor of Stanley Cavell (Lubbock, Tex.,
2nd edn, San Francisco, 1981). 1993).
The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Dauber, Kenneth, ed. Ordinary Language
Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy Criticism: Literary Thinking after Cavell
(Oxford, 1979). after Wittgenstein (Evanston, Ill., 2003).
Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Eldridge, Richard. Stanley Cavell
Comedy of Remarriage (Cambridge, (Cambridge, UK, 2003).
Mass., 1981). Fischer, Michael. Stanley Cavell and Literary
Themes Out of School: Effects and Causes Skepticism (Chicago, 1989).
(San Francisco, 1984). Fleming, Richard. The State of Philosophy:
Disowning Knowledge: In Six Plays of An Invitation to a Reading in Three Parts
Shakespeare (Cambridge, UK, 1987; 2nd of Stanley Cavell’s The Claim of Reason
edn 2003). (Lewisburg, Penn., 1993).
In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Fleming, Richard, and Michael Payne, eds.
Skepticism and Romanticism (Chicago, The Senses of Stanley Cavell (Lewisburg,
1988). Penn., 1989).
This New Yet Unapproachable America: Gould, Timothy. Hearing Things: Voice and
Lectures After Emerson After Wittgenstein Method in the Writing of Stanley Cavell
(Albuquerque, N.M., 1989). (Chicago, 1998).
462
CHAN
Hammer, Espen. Stanley Cavell: Skepticism, College in Pennsylvania, and taught there until
Subjectivity, and the Ordinary retiring in 1982. From the mid 1960s to the late
(Cambridge, Mass., 2002). 1980s he also was a visiting professor of Chinese
Mulhall, Stephan. Stanley Cavell: thought at Columbia University. In 1992 he
Philosophy’s Recounting of the Ordinary received the Distinguished Service Award from
(Oxford, 1994). the Association for Asian Studies. Chan died on
Rothman, William, and Marian Keane. 12 August 1994 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Reading Cavell’s World: A Philosophical Chan published more than twenty books and
Perspective on Film (Detroit, 2000). hundreds of articles, in Chinese and in English,
Smith, Joseph, and William Kerrigan, eds. on an extraordinary range of topics in Chinese
Images in Our Souls: Cavell, philosophy. For readers of English, the most
Psychoanalysis and Cinema (Baltimore, notable of these are his works of translation,
Md., 1987). the most important being A Source Book in
Chinese Philosophy (1963), a collection of edited
Terry Brino-Dean and annotated translations representing philo-
sophical works deriving from the pre-Confucian
period down to and including philosophy in
Communist China. This volume has been so
influential that it was translated from English
back into Chinese. Other works of translation
CHAN, Wing-tsit (1901–94) include Instructions for Practical Living and
Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-
Wing-tsit Chan (Ch’en Jung-chieh) was born on ming (1963) and Reflections on Things at Hand:
18 August 1901 in Kaiping, in the rural Toy-san The Neo-Confucian Anthology by Chu Hsi and
area of Kwangdong province in south China. Lü Tsu-ch’ien (1967). These and other studies
After graduating from Lingnan University in and translations, particularly in the area of Neo-
Canton in 1924, he came to the United States to Confucian thought, have both opened the field
enroll in the philosophy department at Harvard and defined it from their publication to the
University, where he earned an MA in 1927 and present.
a PhD in philosophy in 1929, with a dissertation In addition to being a prolific scholar, Chan
on the early Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi. was a living exemplar of the Chinese philo-
Returning to China, he served as Dean of the sophical tradition, a participant in and con-
Faculty and professor of philosophy at Lingnan tributor to the ongoing career of Chinese phi-
University from 1929 to 1936. In 1936 he was losophy. Among the leading figures in the field
named professor of Chinese philosophy and of twentieth-century Chinese philosophy –
institutions at the University of Hawaii, and also including T’ang Chün-I, Mou Tsung-san, Fung
served from 1940 to 1942 as the first chair of Yulan, and Ch’ien Mu – Chan was the one
Hawaii’s philosophy department. Chan and col- who came to the West, making his personal and
leagues Charles Moore and Gregg Sinclair inau- scholarly life in the United States, but always in
gurated the East-West Philosophers’ Conferences active touch with Asia. He served as a link
in 1939, from which emerged the journal between the culture of China’s past and the
Philosophy East and West. culture of its future. During a prolonged period
In 1942 Chan was appointed professor of when the Confucian tradition was under
Chinese culture and philosophy at Dartmouth assault in China, he played a crucial role in
College where he taught until his retirement in transplanting it to the West. In a variety of
1966. In that year he was named Anna R. D. ways he encouraged its life and growth in the
Gillespie Professor of Philosophy at Chatham United States and Europe until, with the
463
CHAN
thawing of frozen philosophical ground in the CHAPPELL, Vere Claiborne (1930– )

1980s, it became possible to encourage
renewed growth in its place of birth. Through Vere Chappell was born on 22 March 1930 in
correspondence, visits, conferences, and encour- Rochester, New York. He was educated in the
agement of younger scholars, Chan carried on Rochester public schools and Yale University,
the work of this complicated and fascinating from which he received the BA in 1951, MA in
transmission and renewal. 1953, and PhD in philosophy in 1958. In
1953–4 he received a Fulbright Fellowship to
BIBLIOGRAPHY study at the University of Heidelberg. Between
A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy 1957 and 1970 Chappell was a professor of
(Princeton, N.J., 1963). philosophy at the University of Chicago, and
Instructions for Practical Living and Other served as acting chair of the department in
Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang- 1964–5.
ming (New York, 1963). In 1970 Chappell accepted the position of
Reflections on Things at Hand: The Neo- head of the philosophy department at the
Confucian Anthology by Chu Hsi and Lü University of Massachusetts at Amherst,
Tsu-ch’ien (New York, 1967). serving until 1974; he has also been acting
Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism (Honolulu, Dean and Associate Provost there. He is
Hawaii, 1986). presently professor of philosophy at
Neo-Confucian Terms Explained (The Pei- Massachusetts. He has also held visiting
hsi tzu-i), by Ch’en Ch’un, 1159–1223 appointments at Amherst College, Mount
(New York, 1986). Holyoke College, North Central College, Smith
Chu His: Life and Thought (Hong Kong, College, Indiana University, Notre Dame
1987). University, the University of Illinois at Chicago,
Chu His: New Studies (Honolulu, Hawaii, the University of Illinois at Urbana, and the
1989). University of Southern California.
Chappell’s scholarship has focused primarily
Further Reading on the history of early modern philosophy, par-
Who’s Who in Phil ticularly Descartes and Locke, philosophy of
Bloom, Irene. “Remembering Wing-tsit mind, and metaphysics. He has edited many
Chan, 1901–1994: Excerpts from an Oral influential collections of work in these areas.
Autobiography,” China Review His positions on a variety of issues in meta-
International 2 (Fall 1995): 305–44 . physics and the philosophy of mind have
———, “Wing-tsit Chan, 1901–1994: In emerged both through the introductions to his
Memoriam, on the Occasion of the East- many edited works as well as through his
West Philosophers’ Conference, January 8, numerous published articles. Issues regarding
1995, Philosophy East and West 45 the concept of person and the concept of matter
(1995): 467–71. have been central to Chappell’s philosophical
work, although he has increasingly come to
Irene Bloom examine those notions as they are developed in
the work of the early modern philosophers,
particularly Locke and Descartes. Recently, his
editing of The Cambridge Companion to
Locke has solidified his reputation as one of the
pre-eminent Locke scholars of the second half
of the twentieth century.
464
CHENEY
BIBLIOGRAPHY Other Relevant Works

“Whitehead’s Theory of Becoming,” Journal Ed., The Philosophy of Mind (Englewood-
of Philosophy 58 (1961): 516–27. Cliffs, N.J., 1962).
“The Concept of Dreaming,” Philosophical Ed., The Philosophy of David Hume (New
Quarterly 13 (1963): 193–213. York, 1963).
“Stuff and Things,” Proceedings of the Ed., Ordinary Language (Englewood-Cliffs,
Aristotelian Society 71 (1970): 61–76. N.J., 1964; rev. edn, New York, 1981).
“The Theory of Ideas,” in Essays on Ed., Hume (New York, 1966).
Descartes’ Meditation, ed. A. O. Rorty Twenty-Five Years of Descartes Scholarship,
(Berkeley, Cal., 1987), pp. 177–98. 1960–1984: A Bibliography, with Willis
“Locke and Relative Identity,” History of Doney (New York, 1987).
Philosophy Quarterly 6 (1989): 69–83. Ed., Essays on Early Modern Philosophy, 12
“The Theory of Sensations,” in The vols (New York, 1992).
Philosophy of Thomas Reid, ed. M. Ed., The Cambridge Companion to Locke
Dalgarno and E. Matthews (Dordrecht, (New York, 1994).
1989), pp. 49–63. Ed., Descartes’s Meditations (Lanham, Md.,
“Locke on the Ontology of Matter, Living 1997).
Things and Persons,” Philosophical Studies Ed., Locke (Oxford, 1998).
46 (1990): 19–32. Ed., Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and
“Descartes’s Compatibilism,” in Reason, Necessity (New York, 1999).
Will and Sensation: Studies in Cartesian
Metaphysics, ed. John Cottingham Further Reading
(Oxford, 1994), pp. 177–90. Allaire, Edwin B. “Another Look at Bare
“Locke on the Freedom of the Will,” in Particulars,” Philosophical Studies 16
Locke’s Philosophy: Content and Context, (1965): 16–20.
ed. G. A. J. Rogers (Oxford, 1994), pp. Cartwright, Helen M. “Chappell on Stuff
101–21. and Things,” Noûs 6 (1972): 369–76.
“L’homme cartésien,” in Descartes, Objecter Spiegelberger, Herbert. “Rejoinder to
et répondre, ed. Jean-Marie Beyssade and Chappell and Roderick Chisholm,” The
Jean-Luc Marion (Paris, 1994), pp. Monist 49 (1965): 38–43.
403–26.
“Locke on the Intellectual Basis of Sin,” David E. Schrader
Journal of the History of Philosophy 32
(1994): 197–207.
“Locke’s Theory of Ideas,” in The
Cambridge Companion to Locke, ed. Vere
Chappell (Cambridge, UK, 1994), pp.
26–55. CHENEY, Ednah Dow Littlehale
“Descartes’s Ontology,” Topoi 16 (1997): (1824–1904)
111–27.
“Determinism and Human Freedom,” with Ednah Dow Littlehale was born on 27 June
Robert Sleigh and Michael della Rocca, in 1824 in Boston, Massachusetts to Ednah
The Cambridge History of Seventeenth- Parker Dow and Sargent Smith Littlehale.
Century Philosophy, ed. Michael Ayers Littlehale provided well for his family as a
and Daniel Garber (Cambridge, UK, wholesale grocer. A Gloucester Universalist, he
1997), pp. 1195–270. believed in abolitionism and women’s rights,
and these causes inspired his daughter’s
465
CHENEY
devotion and great energy. Ednah became a attending Fuller’s classes for three years, Cheney
Unitarian, particularly drawn to the transcen- participated in the Conversations of Bronson
dentalist Rev. Theodore Parker, in whose study Alcott, particularly for his lectures on
she met her lifelong friend Julia Ward HOWE in Pythagoras, Plotinus, and Plato in which Alcott
1845. In 1853 she married the celebrated claimed Cheney to have been his best student.
engraver, Seth Cheney, of the Cheney silk man- She claimed that the analysis of language and
ufacturing family from Connecticut, and their practice in defining, as drawn from Lindley
marriage was a happy one. Seth was influenced Murray’s grammar, was of great importance to
by the example of his own father who, unlike her scholarship. Perhaps that is why her style of
many nineteenth-century men, helped in every writing is clear and systematic.
aspect with the children. In his memoirs he says, Fluent in several languages, Cheney read
“God forbid that a woman should hold her Dante in Italian and Goethe in German. She lists
peace because she is a woman. Methinks the among her reading the ancient philosophers as
apostle meant no such thing, but meant that well as Brown, Stewart, and Reid, whom she
they should let their light shine before men.” In admired for their philosophy of Common Sense,
1856, before their only child Margaret Swan Sismondi, Machiavelli and Schiller, and histori-
was a year old, Seth died. ans Gibbon, Bulwer, and Michelet. Cheney
After the death of her husband, Ednah Dow studied art theory and, accompanied by her artist
Cheney began her lifelong career of writing and husband, was introduced to a number of
lecturing, making her permanent home in the European artists. She studied American art as
Jamaica Plain section of Boston. In 1882 well, becoming a friend of artists Washington
Cheney’s daughter Margaret died from cholera Allston and his only student Sarah Freeman
while a science student at Massachusetts Institute Clarke in particular, and came to support con-
of Technology. Had Margaret Swan Cheney temporary women artists, encouraging them
lived, she would have been MIT’s second through her writing and speaking.
woman to receive a degree, and a room for The tragedies in Cheney’s life seem to have
women still exists at MIT in her name. In inspired her to more rather than less work for
response to this tragedy, Ednah once again put social and moral causes, especially the cause of
her energies to profitable works. It was said that, education for women and the unfortunate.
when this formerly dark-haired, attractive, Before her marriage, she had been instrumental
young woman became gray-haired, she pre- in founding a school of design in 1851, which
sented a “picture of beaming benevolence upon she hoped would allow women to become eco-
all mankind.” Cheney died at eighty years old on nomically self-sufficient. Later she helped found
18 November 1904 in Boston. Referring to her a horticultural school for girls and the Girls’
funeral ceremony, Alice Stone Blackwell’s Latin School in Boston. In 1859 through Dr
obituary in The Woman’s Journal pronounced Maria Zakrzewska, Cheney developed an
it to have been “more like a coronation than a interest in women‘s medical education, eventu-
funeral.” Her career, it was claimed in Cheney’s ally succeeding Lucy Goddard as President of the
memorial, had been “a link connecting us with New England Hospital for women and children
that unfinished career of Margaret Fuller.” in Boston. From the 1870s through the 1890s
Cheney is buried in Manchester, Connecticut. she wrote books for hospital patients and for
Cheney attended the best schools in Boston, children and lectured at the International
the Pembertons’ school and the Mt. Vernon Council of Women in Washington, D.C. on
school of Joseph Hale Abbott. When her formal “Hospitals Managed by and for Women” (27
schooling ended, she went on to enroll in the March 1888). Interest in continuing education
Conversations of Margaret Fuller, where at for adults led Cheney to become a founding
sixteen she was the youngest member. After member of the New England Women’s Club
466
CHENEY
where she lectured often during 1868–93 along mentaries for the Woman’s Journal, her own
with a roster of the best minds in the New pamphlets on suffrage were considered excep-
England area at the time. tionally well written. However, she died before
An intimate friend of Harriet Jacobs, Harriet she could vote.
Tubman, and Booker T. WASHINGTON, and As the Honorary Director of the Free Religious
admirer of the words of Frederick DOUGLASS, Association, newly formed in 1867, Cheney
Cheney was personally and publicly supportive recruited speakers and lectured herself in Boston
of African-Americans. She herself went to and at meetings as far away as Chicago. She also
Readville to teach reading to those in the occasionally preached at various churches at a
encampment of the first African-American time when few women held such privilege. She
recruits for the Civil War. Cheney stood beside lectured on religion and individualism at the
Lt Shaw’s mother when the Black Regiment left Radical Club in Boston, and published articles on
for the Civil War, and called the diminished roll ethics and other subjects related to religion. She
when it returned at its close. In England from the contributed articles to The Christian Examiner,
women’s caged gallery at Parliament she listened and other journals that supported a pluralistic
to Bostonian abolitionist William Lloyd approach to religion, to The Radical, and over
GARRISON. After the Civil War, she was involved 100 articles to The Index alone. She wrote as
with directing the Freedmen’s Schools in the well for the philosopher Paul CARUS’s philosoph-
South, as secretary of the teacher’s committee of ical and religious journal Open Court. In fact,
the New England Freedmen’s Aid Society for ten Cheney’s contributions to periodicals besides the
years, taking trips to the South to ensure their ones mentioned were many: The Atlantic,
continuance, sending reports to the Chautauquan, Commonwealth, The North
Massachusetts House of Representatives. She American Review, Unitarian Review. Among her
wrote a Handbook for American Citizens in published works are several poems and prayers.
1866. An advocate of education, in 1873 Cheney
By 1860 Cheney was taking part in women’s toured the St. Louis schools presided over by
rights conventions. She wrote biographies to William Torrey HARRIS. A year later, at age
honor the many women she felt deserved to be fifty, Cheney began ten years of lecturing at the
memorialized: Louisa May Alcott, author, 1889; Concord School of Philosophy, on such
Susan Dimmock, physician, 1875; Abby May, subjects as History of Art (1879), Color
President of the Horticulture School for Women, Theory and American Art (1880), Relation of
1893; Lucretia Mott, chair of the mathematics Poetry to Science (1881), Nature, and
department at Antioch College, 1893, 1900; Reminiscences of Emerson (1882), Study of
Harriet Winslow Sewell, who had in turn col- Nirvana (1883), Emerson and Boston (1884),
lected the letters of Lydia Maria CHILD. Cheney Goethe (1885), Dante and Michelangelo
often supported the younger women by writing (1886), Philip Massinger, and John Ford
about them in newspapers, as in her 1875 (1887). In her later years, Cheney developed an
comments on an Anna C. BRACKETT speech, or interest in psychology, and at seventy-nine
writing letters of recommendation, as in the case lectured on the subject at the revival of the
of Marietta KIES in 1892. Cheney delivered the Concord School of Philosophy in 1903.
eulogy for Elizabeth Palmer PEABODY in the Cheney’s lectures were often quoted at length
Church of the Disciples where women on the and commented upon in the Boston and
pulpit were an anomaly. Cheney believed that Concord newspapers.
the “emancipation of women has especially Friends noted Cheney as a philosopher:
marked the nineteenth century.” In her opinion, Franklin B. Sanborn called her a person of
it was “the most important and far reaching “philosophic character and culture” who
reform of the world.” Often contributing com- “constantly looked at the problems of life in
467
CHENEY
the genuine philosophic light” and who “put taste or beauty, but as “all that which seeks to
her theories of life in practice” (Sanborn 1905, express thought in a material form, without ref-
pp. 6, 11). Julia Ward Howe referred to erence to its use for any material function.” Art
Cheney as a person “throned in philosophic is a human activity that subordinates matter to
ease.” Cheney’s philosophical interests encom- spirit, giving full life to the soul. In “Art and
passed art, nature, feminism, and ethics. Her Religion,” Cheney saw art’s special work as
notion of being is dualistic; her ethical stance relational, synthetic, harmonious; its truth both
is pluralistic. Her method analytical rather conceptual and sensitive, free and disciplined; its
than intuitive seeks to expose the duality and unity not one but integrated dualism. Art, for
consequently the necessary balance required of Cheney, serves ethics, and is integral to educa-
it. The Eastern philosophical influences she tion. Her contribution to the young discipline of
was exposed to in transcendentalism are American aesthetics is one that is both theoret-
evident in her thought, as well as elements of ical and practical. In the chapter devoted to art
Coleridge whom she admired, Goethe, Hegel, in her memoirs, Reminiscences (1902), Cheney
Plato, and the then-forming American prag- views American art as wrongly unappreciated.
matism. She was deeply involved in its vitality, writing
When Cheney was asked by a young girl critical reviews of her contemporary women
about what to study, her advice was to encour- artists, writing the Life of Christian Daniel
age her to “learn to record … the processes of Rauch (1893) to introduce his work to
reasoning” and to investigate five subject American sculptors, and as well writing
matters: natural science, history (“history is memoirs of Seth (1881) and John Cheney
philosophy teaching by examples”), mental (1889) as testaments to their artistic produc-
philosophy, language, and mathematics tions. However, in the histories of American
(Sanborn 1905, pp. 8–10). She recommended aesthetics Ednah Dow Cheney has been com-
the conservative benefits of reading Locke: his pletely neglected.
clear and consistent reasoning, his dryness and Cheney’s philosophy of woman begins with
hardness, and his search into the laws of her definition of sex as being essential spirit
thought, a good foundation for studying both that is both eternally feminine and masculine,
the idealist and the sensationalist philosophers. but only in abstract form, and both residing in
Through the years 1840–50, though at first God. The feminine, meaning “attraction,” is
skeptical, Cheney embraced transcendental- the Goethian principle that draws one upward.
ism. Later, having been subjected to widely Hence the feminine principle is the active prin-
different methods of argument in the company ciple. This principle is blended in every individ-
of Fuller, Alcott, Ralph Waldo EMERSON, and ual. From this definition of woman comes her
Parker among others, and having acknowl- definition of being as duality. Not only is the
edged the benefits of each, Cheney adopted a duality feminine and masculine, but also form
pluralistic philosophy and a liberal point of and matter. Duality as center and circumstance
view. Valuing her independence of thought, she is the essence of the nature of both God and
formulated her own dualistic philosophy of man. Not only art but also science in both sub-
God, man, and art. stance and method is of two-fold nature of
Cheney’s first lecture at the Concord School thought and expression, imagination and
of Philosophy was on art, the subject to which reason. Consequently, the urge comes for
Cheney chiefly devoted her philosophical harmony and unity. Health is the balance of the
writings. With her publication of Gleanings in dual processes of repair and destruction.
the Field of Art in 1881, she became the first The universe, a “two-fold” tale, is both
American woman to have written a philoso- Empedoclean and Platonic; so too, is society as
phy of art or aesthetics. She defined art not as it tells its “tale” of the individual and the
468
CHENEY
nation. Cheney writes in her essay “Nature,” 331–56.

that “Nature … symbolizes the flow of spirit, Gleanings in the Fields of Art (Boston,
the resistance of matter … she is a great artist, 1881).
teaching us not alone by symbolism, but by her “Emerson and Boston,” in The Genius and
rare power of suffusing the mind with new Character of Emerson: Lectures at the
life … [helping solve the great problems], the Concord School of Philosophy, ed. F. B.
greatest of all, the relation of the individual to Sanborn (Boston 1885), pp. 1–35.
the universal, the me to the not-me, the one to “Das ewig-weibliche,” in The Life and
the many, the changing to the permanent.” Genius of Goethe: Lectures at the
Hence in nature she sees being as process as Concord School of Philosophy, ed. F. B.
well as duality, for nature also offers all “in the Sanborn (Boston, 1886), pp. 218–50.
great struggle for the survival of the fittest.” Louisa May Alcott: The Children’s Friend
Cheney developed her pluralistic outlook ques- (Boston, 1886).
tioning the pre-eminence of Christianity over Memoir of Margaret Swan Cheney (Boston,
all the religions of the world, studying the 1889).
meaning of nature, and the nature of art. She Life of Christian Daniel Rauch of Berlin,
claimed that pluralism allows one “con- Germany (Boston, 1893).
sciousness of the manifold,” and in this disal-
lows fanaticism. Other Relevant Works
An aspect of all of Cheney’s investigations Papers of Cheney are at the Boston Public
into understanding the universe is inquiry into Library, the Massachusetts Historical
morality. Nature and art are both teachers Society in Boston, Radcliffe College,
that contribute to ethics by awakening and Smith College, and the Concord
expanding the soul. Ethics is derived from Memorial Library in Massachusetts.
understanding and intuiting the nature of being Ed., Selected Poems from Michelangelo
from the Nature of God, source of all good, Buonarroti (Boston, 1885).
wherein originates the eternal principles, the Ed., Louisa May Alcott: Her Life, Letters,
“eternally womanly” and “eternally manly,” and Journals (Boston, 1889).
equality, human dignity, love or attraction Reminiscences of Ednah Dow Cheney
which stimulates action. Man’s relation to (Boston, 1902).
woman is a moral fact as much as is drunken-
ness that lowers human dignity and injures Further Reading
the brain. Cheney notes the importance of Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
Emersonian intuition in seeing the significance Dict Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v9,
of the feminine in God in being the appeal to Who Was Who in Amer v1
ideal good. When that ideal does not become Blackwell, Alice Stone. “Ednah Dow
real, imbalance occurs. Moral progress neces- Cheney,” Women’s Journal (26
sitates seeking harmony and balance that is November 1904): 1, 389.
manifest in the ideal to fulfill the function of Dykeman, Therese B. American Women
human life. Cheney lived her own philosophy Philosophers 1650–1930, Six Exemplary
dualistically balancing inward reflection with Thinkers (Lewiston, N.Y., 1993).
outward action and pluralistically embracing Contains a bibliography of Cheney’s
many definitions of being. writings.
———, “Ednah Dow Cheney’s American
BIBLIOGRAPHY Aesthetics,” in Presenting Women
“Women of Boston,” in The Memorial Philosophers, ed. Cecile T. Tougas and
History of Boston (Boston, 1881), pp. Sara Ebenreck (Philadelphia, 2000), pp.
469
CHENEY
41–50. Oregon, and was taught by his father to live

———, “The Philosophy of Halfness and according to the “old ways.” When his father
the Philosophy of Duality: Julia Ward died in 1871, Joseph became chief of the Wal-
Howe and Ednah Dow Cheney,” lam-wat-kin band of the Chute-pa-lu (Nez
Hypatia 19 (2004): 17–34. Perce). He buried his father in the Wallowa
Hanaford, Phebe. Daughters of America; valley which belonged to his father and, by
or, Women of the Century (Boston, succession, now belonged to him and his
1883). people. The role of chief, in the Nez Perce
Howe, Julia Ward. Reminiscences tradition, meant being a servant-leader, and he
1819–1899 (Boston, 1899). brilliantly fulfilled this role by convening and
Howe, Julia Ward, ed. Representative chairing councils, becoming chief negotiator,
Women of New England (Boston, 1904). and a caring administrator. The image of
McFadden, Margaret. “Boston Teenagers Joseph as the prominent engineer of military
Debate the Woman Question, strategies in the Nez Perce War is a myth
1837–1838,” Signs (Summer 1990): created in the late 1800s by US Army person-
832–47. nel and the media. Chief Joseph’s greatness lies
Sanborn, Franklin B., et al. Ednah Dow in his servant-leadership and his clear oratory
Cheney, 1824–1904: Memorial Meeting, in explaining the position of his people. The
New England Women’s Club, Boston, military successes of the Nez Perce resulted
February 20, 1905 (Boston, 1905). from a combined effort of the people, fired by
Shakir, Evelyn. “Ednah Dow Cheney: Jack their determination based on the righteousness
of All Trades” American Transcendental of their cause, and facilitated by the leadership
Quarterly 47-48 (Summer–Fall 1980): of their chiefs such as Chief Joseph.
95–115. Chief Joseph’s ideas were spoken but not
Sprague, Julia A., ed. History of New written down by him. His pronouncements
England Women’s Club 1868–1893 were translated into English by others and
(Boston, 1894). often edited. This process eliminated the direct
expression of his ideas, but their essence
Therese B. Dykeman remains. His surrender address on 5 October
1877 is one of the most recognized statements
in the Western world. In the address Chief
Joseph honorably surrenders, reminding
everyone of the Army’s promise to help the
Nez Perce return to their homeland, and pro-
CHIEF JOSEPH (1840–1904) claiming that the Nez Perce owned the land
and never relinquished that ownership. His
Chief Joseph was born In-mut-too-yah-lat-lat immediate concern was the welfare of his
(Thunder Rolling in the Mountains) in early people. “Hear me my chiefs. I am tired: my
1840 near Joseph Creek in the Wallowa heart is sick and sad. From where the sun
Valley of Oregon Territory (now in Wallowa now stands I will fight no more forever”
County in north-eastern Oregon). He was (1879, p. 429). Chief Joseph died on the
baptized on 12 April 1840 and was raised for Colville reservation in Eastern Washington
the first seven years of his life under the influ- on 21 September 1904.
ence of the Presbyterian Mission at Lapwai On a visit to Washington, D.C. in 1879,
where he attended day school. In 1847 Joseph Chief Joseph was interviewed by a reporter
moved with his family to their ancestral with Arthur Chapman interpreting. It is
domain, the Wallowa and Grande Ronde in believed that his “own story” was probably
470
CHILD
highly edited before publication in the North McWhorter, L. V. Hear Me, My Chiefs! Nez
American Review. In this story, his sentiments Perce Legend and History (Caldwell, Ida.,
were that all men are created by the same Great 2001).
Spirit Chief and are, therefore, brothers; the
earth is the mother of all people and so people William D. Guthrie
should have equal rights upon it; and that
words which do not amount to something do
not last. “I know that my race must change. We
cannot hold our own with the white men as we
are. We only ask an even chance to live as other
men live” (1877, p. 630). Chief Joseph CHILD, Lydia Maria Francis (1802–80)
expressed a clear call for justice.
Lydia Maria Francis was born on 11 February
BIBLIOGRAPHY 1802 in Medford, Massachusetts, and died on
“Chief Joseph’s Surrender Speech,” in Report 20 October 1880 in Wayland, Massachusetts.
of Secretary of War (Washington, D.C., The youngest of six children born to Convers
1877), vol. 1, p. 630. Reprinted in Mark Francis, a baker, and Susannah Rand Francis,
H. Brown, The Flight of the Nez Perce Lydia inherited from her father the abolition-
(Lincoln, Neb., 1967), p. 407. ist zeal that guided her throughout her adult
“An Indian’s View of Indian Affairs,” with life. Other than a basic grammar school edu-
William H. Hare, North American Review cation, she was entirely self-taught. She
128 (April 1879): 412–33. Chief Joseph’s acquired a strong background in British liter-
statement is on pp. 415–33. Reprinted in ature, German philosophy, and American
That All the People May Be One People, history. She lived for a time in the household
Send Rain to Wash the Face of the Earth of her sister Mary Preston in the Maine
(Sitka, Alaska, 1995). Territory where she frequently visited the
“Chief Joseph’s Speech on 14 January 1879 Abnaki people, who made a lasting impression
at Lincoln Hall, Washington, D.C.,” in on her. On 18 October 1828 Lydia married
The Wisdom of the Great Chiefs: The David Lee Child, a lawyer who was a co-
Classic Speeches of Chief Red Jacket, Chief founder in 1832 of the New England Anti-
Joseph, and Chief Seattle, ed. Kent Slavery Society. His excessive generosity and
Nerburn (San Rafael, Cal., 1994). poor financial judgment was a source of great
stress for Child throughout their married life.
Further Reading Child quickly became a prolific and persua-
Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, sive writer, authoring over thirty books and
Encyc Amer Bio pamphlets. While she is most famous for her
Beal, Merrill D. “I Will Fight No More uncompromising condemnation of slavery, she
Forever”: Chief Joseph and the Nez Perce was also a pioneer in children’s fiction,
War (Seattle, Wash., 1963). women’s history, early American history, and
Gridley, M. Kopet: A Documentary the history of religion. Child was the editor of
Narrative of Chief Joseph’s Last Years The Juvenile Miscellany, the first children’s
(Seattle, Wash., 1981). periodical in the United States, as well as an
Howard, Helen A. War Chief Joseph editor of National Anti-Slavery Standard.
(Caldwell, Idaho, 1941). Reprinted as Saga Child participated in virtually every pro-
of Chief Joseph (Lincoln, Neb., 1978). gressive movement of nineteenth-century
Howard, O. O. Nez Perce Joseph (Boston, America. Her first two novels, Hobomok, a
1881). Tale of Early Times (1824) and The Rebels or
471
CHILD
Boston Before the Revolution (1825), testify to made by Francis Wright in her work of
both her early commitment to correct the racist romantic Hellenism, A Few Days in Athens
attitudes of American society and her critical (1822). Wright’s novel, in which she implicitly
stance towards Calvinism, which grew out of advanced her own arguments against orga-
her Unitarian intellectual roots. She was also a nized religion and for women’s equality, had
prominent figure in New England transcen- offered a favorable account of the unfairly
dentalism. Her brother and earliest intellec- maligned Epicurus and his Garden. While
tual influence, Reverend Convers Francis, was Child agreed with Wright on the need for
a close friend of Ralph Waldo EMERSON and many religious, social, and political reforms,
hosted the early meetings of the she disagreed with Wright’s agnosticism and
Transcendentalist Club in his home. At one views on free love. Philothea therefore counters
such meeting Child met Emerson, who later Wright’s epicurean critique of religion with a
published her poem “What is Beauty?” (1843) neo-Platonist defense of transcendentalism.
in the primary transcendentalist journal, The The fame that Child earned through her
Dial. Henry David Thoreau cited her work fiction, children’s periodicals, and domestic
Philothea (1836) as an early influence. manual turned to opprobrium with her publi-
Child’s first commercial success, The Frugal cation of works advocating social justice for
Housewife (1830), was one of many domestic African Americans and Native Americans.
manuals that urged women to gain power in Stirred by the recent publication of ardent abo-
the domestic and social spheres by thoughtful litionist works such as David Walker’s Appeal
control of household finances and resources. in Four Articles (1829) and William Lloyd
While Child’s manual was not the first, it was GARRISON’s newspaper The Liberator (1831),
one of the most popular, running through an Child wrote An Appeal in Favor of That Class
astounding thirty-three printings by 1855. of Americans Called Africans (1833). This
Finally, she contributed to the historical study work was the first book-length argument in
of Christianity and religion in her era with her favor of abolition published in the United
three-volume work titled The Progress of States. Child documented the cruelty of
Religious Ideas Through Successive Ages slavery, using both historical and personal nar-
(1855). rative forms to refute the common miscon-
In 1836 Child published her most complex ception that slavery was benign or even bene-
and misunderstood work, a novel, Philothea: ficial for slaves. She eschewed the gradualist
A Romance. On its surface, the novel appears approach to the abolition of slavery by con-
to be an unremarkable example of romantic demning the practice as barbaric and calling
Hellenism: a fictionalized and gauzy account of for immediate emancipation. In her Appeal,
Athens during its Golden Age. However, the Child also included biographies of prominent
novel’s florid language conceals two serious Africans and African Americans to show that
agendas. The first is an expression of Child’s people of color were equal to white people.
abolitionism. While she condemned slavery Child then published her Anti-Slavery
directly in her political essays, in Philothea she Catechism (1836), in which Child presented
accomplishes the same task subtly in the char- the anti-slavery stance in a question-and-
acter Eudora. The friend of the protagonist answer format. Years later she authored An
Philothea, Eudora is a slave living in Athens Appeal for the Indians (1868), making the
who equals or surpasses the native women of case for the equality of Native Americans on
Athens in intellect and character, yet is for- many of the same grounds. Her work on polit-
bidden from marrying her love because of a ical and social issues stands as an early out-
xenophobic and unjust law. The second standing example of American humanistic
purpose of the novel was to rebut the claims multiculturalism.
472
CHILDS
BIBLIOGRAPHY Index to the Microfiche Edition, ed.

Hobomok, a Tale of Early Times (Boston, Milton Meltzer and Patricia G. Holland
1824). (Millwood, N.Y., 1980).
The Rebels or Boston Before the Lydia Maria Child, Selected Letters,
Revolution (Boston, 1825). 1817–1880, ed. Milton Meltzer and
The Frugal Housewife (Boston, 1830). Patricia G. Holland (Amherst, Mass.,
The Mother’s Book (Boston, 1831). 1982).
The Coronal: A Collection of Miscellaneous A Lydia Maria Child Reader, ed. Carolyn
Pieces, Written at Various Times (Boston, L. Karcher (Durham, N.C., 1997).
1831).
An Appeal in Favor of That Class of Further Reading
Americans Called Africans (Boston, Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
1833). Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer
Brief History of the Condition of Women, Thought, Dict Amer Bio, Encyc Amer
in Various Ages and Nations, 2 vols Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v2
(Boston, 1835). Baer, Helene G. The Heart Is Like Heaven:
Anti-Slavery Catechism (Newburyport, The Life of Lydia Maria Child
Mass., 1836). (Philadelphia, 1964).
Philothea: A Romance (Boston, 1836). Clifford, Deborah Pickman. Crusader for
“What is Beauty,” The Dial 3 (April 1843): Freedom: A Life of Lydia Maria Child
490–92. (Boston, 1992).
The Progress of Religious Ideas Through Karcher, Carolyn L. The First Woman in
Successive Ages, 3 vols (Boston, 1855). the Republic: A Cultural Biography of
The Patriarchal Institution, as Described by Lydia Maria Child (Durham, N.C.,
Members of its Own Family (New York, 1994).
1860). Meltzer, Milton. Tongue of Flame: The Life
The Duty of Disobedience to the Fugitive of Lydia Maria Child (New York, 1965).
Slave Act: An Appeal to the Legislators of Osborne, William S. Lydia Maria Child
Massachusetts (Boston, 1860). (Boston, 1980).
The Freedmen’s Book (Boston, 1865). Pratt, Scott L. “Rebuilding Babylon: The
An Appeal for the Indians (Boston, 1868) Pluralism of Lydia Maria Child,”
Hypatia 19 (2004): 92–104.
Child’s papers are at Cornell University, Terrance MacMullan
Harvard University, the Boston Public
Library, the Massachusetts Historical
Society, the American Antiquarian
Society, and the New York Public
Library.
Letters of Lydia Maria Child, ed. Harriet CHILDS, John Lawrence (1889–1985)
Winslow Sewall (Boston, 1882).
The Collected Correspondence of Lydia John L. Childs was born on 11 January 1889
Maria Child, 1817–1880, 97 microfiche in Eau Claire, Wisconsin, and died on 31
sheets, ed. Milton Meltzer and Patricia G. January 1985 in Rockford, Illinois. The family
Holland (Millwood, N.Y., 1979). was devoutly Methodist, and Childs was raised
The Collected Correspondence of Lydia to respect the value of hard work; productive
Maria Child, 1817–1880: Guide and labor was viewed as both a social and a moral
473
CHILDS
obligation. At the University of Wisconsin, for certain things and against others, when
Childs majored in journalism, joining the staff selections and rejections are made in the con-
on the Daily Cardinal and eventually becoming struction of the curriculum and in identifying
its editor-in-chief. During his Madison years, the purposes of the school. This view went a
while developing his ideas on social matters, he little beyond Dewey and moved in the direction
became active in the campus YMCA. Upon of the social reconstructionism of George S.
graduation with a BA in 1911 he joined the COUNTS, Childs’s friend and colleague.
staff of the YMCA, but in 1915, shortly after Counts and Childs were deeply involved in
his marriage to Grace Fowler, he rather union activities, in the organizing of the New
abruptly chose to go to China as secretary to York Liberal Party, for which Childs served as
the Foreign Department of the International state Chairman, and in several publications,
Committee of the YMCA based in Peking. including the radical Social Frontier. Childs
Childs quickly came to identify with the also carried on a correspondence with Boyd
Chinese as his gospel became increasingly H. BODE. While agreeing on many points, Bode
social. In 1922 he took a sabbatical and held that the method of intelligence, so impor-
enrolled at Union Theological Seminary in New tantly enunciated by Dewey, inevitably led to
York City to pursue his master’s degree in reli- democratic outcomes. Childs instead took
gious education. He returned to China in 1924 Counts’s view that students needed to be indoc-
clearly changed by his experience in New York. trinated into democratic and socialist values.
Childs wrote that what he once thought was
divine revelation actually had a naturalistic BIBLOGRAPHY
explanation. He also publicly questioned the Education and the Philosophy of
divinity of Christ. Childs returned to New York Experimentalism (New York, 1931).
City in 1927 and continued his studies at Union America, Russia, and the Communist Party
and Teachers College of Columbia University. in the Postwar World, with George S.
Childs became particularly close to William Counts (New York, 1943).
Heard KILPATRICK, and earned his PhD in edu- Education and Morals: An Experimentalist
cation in 1930. It was through Kilpatrick’s Philosophy of Education (New York,
efforts that Childs was appointed assistant pro- 1950).
fessor at Teachers College in 1939 after the American Pragmatism and Education: An
publication of his dissertation, Education and Interpretation and Criticism (New York,
the Philosophy of Experimentalism (1931). 1956).
From this point on, the enlightened Methodist
became one of the leading New York pragma- Other Relevant Works
tists, even after his retirement from teaching in Childs’s papers are at Southern Illinois
1954. University, Carbondale.
During his career at Teachers College, Childs “The Social-economic Situation and
wrote and spoke widely on the educational Education,” in The Educational Frontier,
philosophy of John DEWEY, and drew attention ed. William H. Kilpatrick (New York,
to the implications that an experimentalist phi- 1933), pp. 32–72.
losophy might have for morality in education, “The Educational Philosophy of John
culminating in Education and Morals (1950). Dewey,” in The Philosophy of John
For Childs, morality lay in the making of Dewey, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (Evanston, Ill.,
choices, particularly educational choices. Hence 1939), pp. 419–43.
moral interest is engaged when choices have to “Boyd H. Bode and the Experimentalist,”
be made between better and worse in the Teachers College Record 55 (1953): 1–9.
nurture of the young, when an educator stands
474
CHISHOLM
Further Reading awards and honors, including appointments

Who Was Who in Amer v8, Who’s Who in as a fellow of the American Academy of Arts
Phil and Sciences, President of the Eastern Division
Dennis, Lawrence J. From Prayer to of the American Philosophical Association in
Pragmatism: A Biography of John L. 1968–9, President of the Metaphysical Society
Childs (Carbondale, Ill., 1992). of America, and Executive Director of the
Franz Brentano Foundation. Numerous con-
Lawrence J. Dennis ferences have been held in his honor and several
collections of essays examining his work have
been published, including a volume in the
Library of Living Philosophers.
Chisholm is one of the most influential
philosophers of the second half of the twenti-
CHISHOLM, Roderick Milton (1916–99) eth century. In addition to presenting novel
philosophical theories in a wide variety of areas,
Roderick Chisholm was born on 27 November Chisholm wrote and taught in a distinctive
1916 in North Attleboro, Massachusetts. style that inspired his readers and students. His
Chisholm entered Brown University in 1934 characteristic methodology was to begin his
with the intention of becoming a journalist. discussion of a philosophical issue by identify-
An introductory course in philosophy led him ing a few key questions and citing pre-analytic
to switch to philosophy. After his graduation data that an adequate theory should accom-
with a BA in 1938, he enrolled in the doctoral modate. He formulated his theories by first
program at Harvard University, where he introducing a small number of primitive or
obtained a PhD in philosophy in 1942. He unanalyzed terms and then constructing an
entered the US Army in 1942 and served first often elaborate system of definitions and prin-
as administrator of psychological tests to ciples all built on these primitives. The final
inductees and later as a clinician in army hos- principles and definitions provided answers to
pitals. Chisholm was discharged in 1946, and the questions with which he began and accom-
he took a position as a lecturer in philosophy modated the data he had cited. The clarity and
of art at the Barnes Foundation in elegance of the systems were remarkable.
Pennsylvania. The Foundation was associated Chisholm encouraged readers and students to
with the University of Pennsylvania, and criticize his systems by proposing counter-
Chisholm’s position also included an appoint- examples and objections. They were eager to do
ment there. He returned to Brown as an assis- so, and Chisholm took great joy in revising
tant professor of philosophy in 1947 and he and improving upon his views in the light of
spent the next forty years on the philosophy their comments.
faculty at Brown. He also had numerous Chisholm published influential work in many
visiting positions around the United States, areas of philosophy, most notably in epistemol-
taught regularly at the University of ogy and in metaphysics. His publications in epis-
Massachusetts at Amherst, and for many years, temology include his first book, Perceiving: A
following the end of Brown’s spring semester, Philosophical Study (1957), The Foundations
he taught a seminar at the University of Graz. of Knowing (1982), and three editions of Theory
From 1972 until his retirement in 1987 he was of Knowledge (1966, 1977, 1989). Several
the Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the themes are prominent in these works as well as
Humanities at Brown. Chisholm died on 19 in Chisholm’s other epistemological writings.
January 1999 in Providence, Rhode Island. One of them is his anti-skepticism. In an essay
Chisholm was the recipient of numerous describing his philosophical development,
475
CHISHOLM
Chisholm reports that the philosopher who those things that reflective common sense tells
most impressed him during his term as the us we know. Throughout his career Chisholm
President of the Harvard Philosophy Club was repeatedly refined and revised an epistemolog-
G. E. Moore. He heard Moore present a lecture ical system characterizing this knowledge.
that was later published as his well-known These systems may be the work for which
essay “Four Forms of Skepticism.” Like Moore, Chisholm is most well known. One crucial part
Chisholm took it as a starting point for his of the system was a set of precise definitions of
epistemological theorizing that we do have terms of epistemic appraisal. Using the primi-
knowledge of the external world. This was not tive and undefined concept – being more rea-
something he thought he could prove to the sat- sonable than – Chisholm defined the concepts
isfaction of a skeptic. This idea can be clarified of certainty, being evident, being beyond rea-
by means of an epistemological topic that sonable doubt, being acceptable, and so on.
intrigued Chisholm throughout his career, the Each of these terms implies its successor. Thus,
problem of the criterion. if something is certain, then it is (at least)
According to Chisholm, epistemology con- evident, and if it is evident, then it is (at least)
sisted of Socratic inquiry into the questions beyond reasonable doubt. A key necessary con-
“What can we know?” and “What are the dition for knowing a proposition, according
criteria of knowledge?” He thought that a to Chisholm, was that the proposition be
puzzle faces anyone who attempts to answer evident.
these questions. It appears that to answer the Chisholm used these terms of epistemic
first question, one needs a criterion to distin- appraisal in formulating principles describing
guish things that are known from things that the status various propositions had in various
are not known. That is, one needs an answer to circumstances. These principles were heavily
the second question. But to have an answer to revised over the years, yet the general struc-
the second question, he thought, one needs a list ture remained constant. His outlook was gen-
of the things one knows so that one can identify erally that of a “foundationalist.” He held that
the features that distinguish knowledge from its we have a sort of direct knowledge of some of
opposite. That is, one needs an answer to the our own psychological properties. These prop-
first question. Lacking such an answer, erties were “self-presenting.” An example of
Chisholm feared, one would not be in a such a property is “thinking that it is raining.”
position to be confident that any proposed cri- According to an epistemic principle governing
terion of knowledge was correct. Chisholm self-presenting properties, if you have a self-pre-
calls those who think that they have an answer senting property, then it is certain for you that
to the second question that they can use to you have it. Other properties describe appear-
answer the first “methodists” and those who ances, or, in Chisholm’s terminology, how you
think that they have an answer to the first are appeared to. For example, in the presence
question that they can use to answer the second of a ripe tomato, you would be appeared to
“particularists.” Chisholm himself was a par- redly. This might also happen in a dream.
ticularist, yet he claimed that he had no According to Chisholm when you are appeared
argument to offer against methodism or against to a certain way, then (provided you have no
the view that neither question could be defeating evidence) it is evident to you that
answered without a prior answer to the other. something is appearing that way to you and
In a number of places he said that the problem that something actually is that way. Through a
of the criterion could be answered only by complex set of principles, including principles
begging the question. having to do with concurrence or coherence,
Chisholm’s starting point for epistemology Chisholm’s system had the implication that
was the particularist thesis that we do know much of what we ordinarily take ourselves to
476
CHISHOLM
know is evident. What is most distinctive about questions that intrigued Chisholm in this area
these principles is that they are not instances of are questions about how the mind succeeds in
more general logical principles and they are making its thoughts be about particular objects
not true in virtue of any facts about causal con- in the world. One might think that one can
nections or reliability. They are fundamental think about a particular object by entertaining
epistemological facts. a proposition that refers to that object.
A final epistemological doctrine for which However, Chisholm rejected this view on the
Chisholm is particularly well known is “inter- grounds that one can believe propositions such
nalism.” Chisholm characterized internalism as “the tallest man is tall” without thereby
in the following way: “The internalist assumes having a thought about the individual who
that, merely by reflecting upon his own con- happens to be the tallest man. In developing his
scious state, he can formulate a set of epistemic views about intentionality, Chisholm always
principles that will enable him to find out, with held to “the primacy of the intentional” – the
respect to any possible belief he has, whether he idea that the intentionality (or “aboutness”) of
is justified in having that belief. The epistemic the mental is basic and is not to be understood
principles that he formulates are principles that in terms of linguistic behavior or linguistic dis-
one may come upon and apply merely by sitting positions. The debate over this issue was a
in one’s armchair, so to speak, and without central part of a celebrated exchange with
calling for any outside assistance. In a word, Wilfrid SELLARS. In his later work, a theme that
one need only consider one’s own state of emerged is the idea that the primary sort of
mind.” (Theory of Knowledge, 1989, p. 76) A intentionality is self-attribution. According to
crucial implication of this doctrine is that this doctrine, attitudes toward abstract propo-
people whose conscious states are alike must be sitions and thoughts about external objects are
justified in believing the same propositions. ultimately to be understood in terms of the
Also present in the quoted passage is a related attribution of properties to oneself. This is the
theme concerning the autonomy of epistemol- central theme of his influential book, The First
ogy. Chisholm held that epistemologists did Person (1981).
not need the assistance of the empirical sciences Chisholm rejected determinism, holding that
in answering their purely epistemological ques- human beings did at times act freely and that
tions. In advancing these doctrines, Chisholm free actions could not be the result of prior
took issue with the externalist and naturalistic causes outside the agent. Early in his career he
theories, such as the causal theory and reliabil- advocated a version of the theory of agency
ism, that gained favor with many epistemolo- which holds that free actions result from a dis-
gists toward the end of Chisholm’s career. tinctive kind of agent causation. On this view,
Chisholm’s work in metaphysics (broadly a person acts freely when the person, rather
construed) includes influential work on inten- than any state of the person or event involving
tionality, the problem of freedom and deter- the person, is the ultimate cause of the person’s
minism, the nature of persons, and ontology behavior. His later writings less clearly
generally. Chisholm’s work on intentionality advanced this view, though throughout his
was greatly influenced by the Austrian philoso- career Chisholm advocated indeterminism.
pher Franz Brentano. A point that played a In his work on the nature of persons
central role in Brentano’s thinking was that a Chisholm claimed that persons are individual
person can think about things such as unicorns substances that continue to exist through
and golden mountains – things that don’t exist. changes in their bodies and minds. He consis-
Furthermore, a person’s thoughts can be tently rejected the thesis that a person is to be
directed toward things that do exist, such as identified with his or her body. Although at
horses and ordinary mountains. Among the times he seemed to endorse the view that a
477
CHISHOLM
person is a non-physical soul, what attracted The Foundations of Knowing (Minneapolis,

him during the latter part of his career is the 1982).
idea that persons are “minute proper parts of Brentano and Intrinsic Value (New York,
our gross material bodies” (1979, p. 52). 1986).
Chisholm did not explicitly endorse this On Metaphysics (Minneapolis, 1989).
unusual thesis. Instead, he said that “there is A Realistic Theory of Categories: An Essay
something to be said for it” and he suggested on Ontology (Cambridge, UK, 1996).
that it is the best of the materialistic views of the
self. Questions about the relation of persons Other Relevant Works
and bodies are closely connected to more “Sextus Empiricus and Modern Empiricism,”
general metaphysical questions about parts and Philosophy of Science 8 (1941): 371–84.
wholes and about the persistence of objects “The Problem of the Speckled Hen,” Mind
through time. Chisholm addressed all these 51 (1942): 368–73.
issues with his characteristic care and preci- “Law Statements and Counterfactual
sion, making use of clearly identified primitive Inference,” Analysis 15 (1955): 97–105.
terms and explicit definitions of the remaining “Sentences about Believing,” Proceedings of
terms employed in his theory. A comprehensive the Aristotelian Society 56 (1955): 125–48.
treatment of these topics appears in his book “Chisholm-Sellars Correspondence on
Person and Object (1976). Intentionality,” Minnesota Studies in the
Chisholm also contributed in other areas of Philosophy of Science 2 (1957): 521–39.
philosophy. He wrote some influential papers “He Could Have Done Otherwise,” Journal
in ethics, on the nature of intrinsic value, the of Philosophy 64 (1967): 409–18.
metaphysics of time, and the ontological status “The Indispensability of Internal
of events and states of affairs. He was a realist Justification,” Synthese 74 (1988): 285–96.
about abstract entities. Chisholm’s philosoph- “The Nature of Epistemic Principles,” Noûs
ical influence was enormous. While his views 24 (1990): 209–16.
on particular issues were often rejected even by “On the Simplicity of the Soul,”
those who most admired him, he identified Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991):
many of the central philosophical issues to be 157–81.
addressed and the adequacy of proposed solu- “Agents, Causes, and Events: The Problem of
tions was often measured by comparison to Free Will,” in Agents, Causes, and Events:
his own. His contagious love for philosophy Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will, ed.
inspired his many colleagues and students. Timothy O’Connor (New York, 1995), pp.
95–100.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Perceiving: A Philosophical Study (Ithaca, Further Reading
N.Y., 1957). Bio 20thC Phils, Blackwell Analytic Phil,
Human Freedom and the Self (Lawrence, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Oxford Comp
Kan., 1964). Phil, Pres Addr of APA v7, Proc of APA
Theory of Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, v72, Routledge Encycl Phil
N.J., 1966; 2nd edn 1977; 3rd edn 1989). Alston, William P. “Some Remarks on
The Problem of the Criterion (Milwaukee, Chisholm’s Epistemology,” Noûs 14
Wisc., 1973). (1980): 565–86.
Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study Amico, Robert P. “Roderick Chisholm and
(London, 1976). the Problem of the Criterion,”
The First Person: An Essay on Reference and Philosophical Papers 17 (1988): 217–30.
Intentionality (Minneapolis, 1981). Bogdan, Radu, ed. Roderick M. Chisholm
478
CHO
(Dordrecht, 1986). und Geist.” From 1957 until 1969, he taught

Hahn, Lewis, E., ed. The Philosophy of philosophy at Seoul National University, with
Roderick M. Chisholm (Chicago, 1997). appointments in between as Fulbright visiting
Contains Chisholm’s autobiography and professor in Yale in 1961–2, Buffalo in 1967–8,
bibliography. and as Alexander von Humboldt Foundation
Lehrer, Keith, ed. Analysis and Metaphysics: research scholar at the Husserl Archives in
Essays in Honor of R. M. Chisholm Cologne in 1963. In 1970 he moved perma-
(Dordrecht, 1975). nently to Buffalo as successor to Marvin
Lewis, C. I. “Professor Chisholm and FARBER’s chair of phenomenology. He was also
Empiricism,” Journal of Philosophy 45 visiting professor at the University of Frankfurt
(1948): 517–24. in 1976, University of Texas in 1977, and
Noonan, Harold. “Chisholm, Persons and fellow of the Japan Society for the Promotion
Identity,” Philosophical Studies 69 (1993): of Science at Osaka in 1990. He was named
35–58. SUNY Distinguished Professor in 1994.
“The Philosophical Legacy of Roderick M. Cho’s contribution to philosophy is most
Chisholm,” Metaphilosophy 34 (October visible in his initiating and maintaining a critical
2003). Special issue on Chisholm. dialogue of intercultural phenomenology. His
Plantinga, Alvin. “Chisholmian Internalism,” global vision encompasses both the Western and
in Philosophical Analysis, ed. David Austin Eastern tradition, as is indicated by the subtitle
(Dordrecht, 1988), pp. 127–51. “phänomenologischer West-Ost-Diwan” of his
Rowe, William L. “Two Criticisms of the representative work, Bewußtsein und Natursein.
Agency Theory,” Philosophical Studies 42 In contrast to the genre of phenomenology that
(1982): 363–78. correlates the Being of nature solely with the
Shope, Robert. The Analysis of Knowing: A domain of objects constituted in consciousness,
Decade of Research (Princeton, N.J., Cho directs his thought to the otherness of Being
1983). that cannot be tallied by means of parsimo-
Sosa, Ernest, ed. Essays in the Philosophy of niously doled-out intentional act series. “Water
Roderick M. Chisholm, Grazer let through the controlled sluice gate” is not a
philosophische Studien 7/8 (Amsterdam, lively image of nature that “weaves and strives”
1979). and often “takes us by surprise.”
What prompted Cho’s engagement in an
Richard Feldman East–West dialogue had little to do with the
movement of phenomenology as such. It was
rather Heidegger’s conception of Being with
its underhanded appeal to “decentralize” the
human subjectivity that fostered an ambience
congenial to explicating it with the language of
CHO, Kah Kyung (1927– ) Taoism. To such language belonged “nothing-
ness,” “diminution of self,” and “withdrawal.”
Kah Kyung Cho was born on 7 June 1927 in However, Cho addressed this issue not from the
Seoul, Korea as the eldest son of Myo Dong usual vantage point of Eastern philosophy so as
Cho and Kum Ran Shin, who had seven to prove Heidegger’s indebtedness to Lao Tzu.
children. After graduating from Seoul National Instead, he held on to the question of internal
University with a BA in 1952, he studied for consistency in Heidegger’s conception of Being
four years in Heidelberg and received his PhD which could show as much affinity with
in philosophy in 1957 under Karl Löwith with Taoism as with the older Greek experience of
a dissertation entitled “Die Einheit von Natur physis and Eckehart’s notion of Deity.
479
CHO
If Heidegger’s relationship to Lao Tzu ed. K. Cho and Y. Lee (Freiburg, 1999),
meant a challenge for Cho to provide a much pp. 15–29.
needed “corrective” to a question floating in
speculation, Cho found in Husserl’s genetic Nam-In Lee
phenomenology a very specific and systematic
aptitude to the problems of comparative and
intercultural understanding. For Husserl has
gone far beyond the intentional constitution
of the alien as “the extension of the familiar”
and delved deeper into the dimension of the CHOMSKY, Noam Avram (1928– )
temporally and culturally Other. Cho, on his
part, is committed to an ethnomethodologi- Noam Chomsky was born on 7 December 1928
cal development of this genetic aspect of phe- to William (Zev) Chomsky and Elsie Simonofsky
nomenology to render the neglected heritage in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. His father had
of the East relevant. The otherness in history, emigrated to the United States from Russia, and
society, and in human mores in general was an eminent scholar on the history and
requires the methodical articulation of the teaching of Hebrew. Noam entered the
ethnic plurality in such indexically essential University of Pennsylvania in 1945. There he
notions as Self, Time, Language, Community, came in contact with Zellig HARRIS, a prominent
and World. linguist and the founder of Pennsylvania’s lin-
guistics department, the first in the United States.
BIBLIOGRAPHY In 1947 Chomsky decided to major in linguistics,
Philosophy of Existence (Seoul, 1961; 13th and in 1949 he began his graduate studies in that
edn 1995). field. His BA honors thesis Morphophonemics of
Ontology, with Myung-no Yun and Modern Hebrew (1949, revised as an MA thesis
Myung-kwan Choi (Seoul, 1965). in 1951) contains several ideas that foreshadow
Bewußtsein und Natursein: Chomsky’s later work in generative grammar. In
Phänomenologischer West-Ost-Diwan 1949 he married the linguist Carol Schatz.
(Freiburg, 1987). During the years 1951 to 1955 Chomsky was a
junior fellow of the Harvard University Society
Other Relevant Works of Fellows. Pennsylvania awarded Chomsky the
Ed., Philosophy and Science in PhD in linguistics in 1955; his dissertation was
Phenomenological Perspective titled “Transformational Analysis” (published as
(Dordrecht, 1984). part of The Logical Structure of Linguistic
Ed. with J. Hahn, Phänomenologie in Theory in 1975).
Korea (Freiburg, 2001). Chomsky received a faculty position at MIT
in 1955 and he has been teaching there ever
Further Reading since. In 1961 he was appointed full professor in
Guignon, Charles B. and Nam In Lee. “A the department of modern languages and lin-
Phenomenological Dialogue between East guistics; the graduate program in linguistics
and West,” American Philosophical began the same year. In 1966 he was appointed
Association Newsletter (Spring 2002): Ferrari Ward Professor of Linguistics; in 1976,
43–6. he became Institute Professor. In the same year,
Vetter, Helmuth. “Die Frage nach dem the linguistics and philosophy programs at MIT
‘Natursein’ bei Heidegger aus der Sicht were merged to form the department of linguis-
von Kah Kyung Cho,” in tics and philosophy; this has been Chomsky’s
Phänomenologie der Natur, home department ever since.
480
CHOMSKY
Alongside his career as a linguist, Chomsky phonology, morphology, syntax, and semantics.
has been active in left-wing politics. In 1965 he It is hard to avoid the impression that there is no
organized a citizen’s committee to publicize tax unified subject matter here. Cognitive linguistics,
refusal in protest at the war in Vietnam. Four as Chomsky conceives of it, is the study of the
years later he published his first book on politics, language faculty of individual human minds
American Power and the New Mandarins. By (and ultimately brains). The key observation is
the 1980s he had become both the most distin- that having a language is a species property of
guished figure of American linguistics and one of homo sapiens, both in the sense that linguistic
the most influential left-wing critics of American competence (what speakers of a language know
foreign policy. He has been extremely prolific as in virtue of being speakers) is remarkably
a writer: thirty-three books in linguistics (broadly uniform across members of our species, and in
construed), and in excess of forty books on the sense that a similar competence cannot be
politics. According to a 1992 tabulation of found among members of other species. The
sources from the previous twelve years in the uniformity of linguistic competence among
Arts and Humanities Citation Index, Chomsky humans had been obscured by excessive focus on
was the most frequently cited person alive, and the diversity of linguistic performance of
one of the eight most frequently cited authors of speakers (facts about their actual linguistic
all time. behavior) and on the diversity of languages
Chomsky’s intellectual life had been divided spoken in the world. But, according to
between his work in linguistics and his political Chomsky, brute observation of speaker behavior
activism, philosophy coming as a distant third. is a poor guide in linguistics and underneath the
Nonetheless, his influence among analytic apparent diversity we can discover universal
philosophers has been enormous due to three principles of human languages. The lack of lin-
factors. First, Chomsky contributed substan- guistic competence among non-human animals
tially to a major methodological shift in the is obscured by the fact that some of them (such
human sciences, turning away from the prevail- as bees or dolphins) have the capacity to com-
ing empiricism of the middle of the twentieth municate and by the limited success researchers
century: behaviorism in psychology, structural- have had in teaching some of them (like chim-
ism in linguistics, and positivism in philosophy. panzees and orangutans) to understand simple
Second, his groundbreaking books on syntax verbal instructions. But existing systems of
(1957, 1965) laid a conceptual foundation for a animal communication consist of a finite set of
new, cognitivist approach to linguistics and symbols, and there is no evidence that animals
provided philosophers with a new framework can acquire much more than that through
for thinking about human language and the instruction. Language, on the other hand, has a
mind. And finally, he has persistently defended recursive grammar capable of generating a
his views against all takers, engaging in impor- potentially infinite set of expressions. Although
tant debates with many of the major figures in we humans do employ language for the purpose
analytic philosophy including Tyler Burge, of communication (as well as for the purposes of
Donald DAVIDSON, Michael Dummett, Saul self-expression, clarification of thoughts, con-
KRIPKE, Thomas NAGEL, Hilary PUTNAM, W. V. structing and strengthening social ties, and so
O. QUINE, and John SEARLE. on), Chomsky denies that communication is an
Traditional linguistics produced recommen- inherent function of our language and in general
dations about socially acceptable forms of rejects the contention that language should be
speech, guidelines for learning hitherto unknown studied in the context of human interactions.
languages, hypotheses about the origin and To characterize what is distinctive in his way
development of vernaculars, and a large amount of specifying the subject matter of linguistics,
of useful data concerning their current and actual Chomsky (1986) introduced the distinction
481
CHOMSKY
between I-language and E-language. He thinks specified. Additional empirical evidence for
the proper subject of the study of language is innateness comes from research showing that
the former: a natural object internal to the language acquisition is remarkably fast, devoid
brain of an individual whose working is repre- of certain sorts of errors we would prima facie
sentable as a function-in-intension generating expect, and comes in characteristic stages
structural descriptions of (as opposed to mere whose order and duration seem independent of
strings of) expressions. I-language is to be environmental factors. Chomsky’s hypothesis is
studied in a way in which we might approach, that language arises in the mind of the child
for example, the visual system. In both cases the through a realization in the brain of a language
systems produce representations employed to faculty, which begins in an initial state (also
facilitate thought and action, but their scientific called Universal Grammar), goes through a
study must abstract away from the relations series of intermediate states, and reaches a
these representations bear to objects in the steady state, which is no longer subject to fun-
world. (An immediate consequence of this is damental changes.
that semantics, insofar as it is thought to inves- The conceptual framework of Chomsky’s
tigate language–world relations, must be an ill- early work on syntax has been extremely influ-
conceived enterprise.) By contrast, E-language ential among philosophers, to some extent
is something external to individuals, either a because his distinction between deep and
social object constituted by norms and con- surface structure seemed to sit well with the tra-
ventions, or some abstract object, say, a set of dition within analytic philosophy (going back
sentences. The traditional notion of a language to Bertrand Russell’s theory of descriptions)
(like Bulgarian or Swahili) and the traditional that the surface appearance of a sentence often
notion of a dialect (like the Norfolk or the masks its true structure. In Chomsky (1965),
Yorkshire dialect of British English) are of no grammar is divided into two levels of repre-
scientific use. Variations among competent sentation: the deep structure generated by the
speakers may be considered significant or recursive rules of a context-free phrase structure
insignificant for a variety of purposes and there grammar (this is what makes the grammar gen-
is nothing systematic to be said about these erative) and the surface structure derived from
classifications. Chomsky often mentions the the deep structure through the application of
bon mot that a language is a dialect with an transformation rules (this is what makes it
army and a navy; occasionally he even transformational). Much of the subsequent
expresses doubts about the very coherence of development of the theory in the 1970s can be
the notion of an E-language. viewed as a series of attempts to formulate con-
According to Chomsky, the language faculty straints on both the generative and the trans-
is part of our biological endowment, and as formational components. (An example of the
such it is largely genetically determined. The former is the development of X-bar theory,
chief argument for this view comes from facts which specifies a common internal structural
about language acquisition. According to the skeleton for all phrases; an example of the latter
poverty of stimulus argument, there are many is the proposal to reduce the available move-
aspects of the linguistic competence of adult ments to the single rule (“move á”), whose
speakers that could not have been learned on applicability is then restricted by a few general
the basis of the primary linguistic data available constraints.) Although the details underwent
for the child during the period of language considerable change by the end of the 1970s,
acquisition (sentences and pseudo-sentences the fundamental framework remained the
heard along with accompanying gestures and same.
other situational clues). Consequently, these Starting with Chomsky (1981), however, the
aspects are never learned and must be innately familiar framework was abandoned. Chomsky
482
CHOMSKY
began to think of Universal Grammar as a where the head must come first there cannot be
system of innate principles combined with a phrases where the head must come last. There
certain number of (probably binary) parameters are, however, polysynthetic languages, like
whose values are not genetically fixed. Mohawk, where there is no fixed order. It has
Language acquisition is then a process of para- been hypothesized that this is due to another
meter setting, and the fundamental ways in parameter, set one way in Mohawk and
which human languages differ can be charac- another way in English and Korean.
terized in terms of the values of these parame- Chomsky (1993, 1995) has initiated a new
ters. In a complex system with a rich internal research program within the boundaries of the
structure the change in a single parameter can principles and parameters framework. The
have a wide variety of consequences prolifer- central idea of the minimalist program is the
ating in various parts of the grammar. What is hypothesis that the language faculty is, in a
universal – pace parametric variation – accord- sense, a perfect device. Representations and
ing to Chomsky, is syntax. The apparent syn- derivations are in fact as minimal as it is con-
tactic variety of human languages is the result ceptually possible, given the constraints put on
of variations in idiosyncratic morphological them by the fact that they have to interact with
features originating in the lexicon: inflectional the performance systems (articulatory-percep-
morphemes or functional elements, such as tual systems and conceptual-intentional
tense and case. This picture implies a radical systems). The assumption is that the deriva-
methodological shift in the study of language. tion of sentences begins with a set of items
If the theory is on the right track, the con- drawn from the lexicon and the computational
struction of rule systems for particular lan- system then attempts to derive a pair of repre-
guages can no longer be regarded as the central sentations, one component of which is a
task for linguistics. Instead, the structure of phonetic form (PF) and the other the logical
any particular human language should be form (LF). Lexical items are supposed to be
studied through the study of human languages bundles of features, some of which are formal
in general, through uncovering the principles of (e.g., tense), some phonological (e.g., that
Universal Grammar and through the identifi- ‘know’ is pronounced as /nô/), some semantic
cation of parameters whose setting accounts (e.g., that ‘table’ is [artifact]). They are merged
for linguistic variation. one by one to form successively larger and
An example of an innate principle is that all larger syntactic objects. After a certain point
grammatical operation is structure dependent; (called spell-out) the derivation splits: semantic
this principle rules out, for example, an opera- operations continue without any overt phono-
tion that would move the second word of a logical realization to produce LF and phono-
sentence to the front, and thereby accounts for logical operations continue without affecting
the fact that children tend not to try out the meaning of the syntactic object.
sequences such as *“Of glasses water are on the The drive behind movement (the reason why
table?” when they seek the interrogative coun- a random array of lexical items is typically not
terpart of “Glasses of water are on the table.” grammatical) is the fact that certain features are
An example of an innate parameter is the head uninterpretable for the conceptual-intentional
(position) parameter whose setting determines system, that features can only be erased (the
whether within a phrase the head precedes the technical term is checked) when an appropriate
complement, as in English, or follows it, as in pair of them stand in the right sort of structural
Korean. Assuming the parameter is binary, the relation to one another, and that a well-formed
prediction is that there are no intermediate representation must be fully interpreted. This
cases: Universal Grammar dictates that in a last principle of Universal Grammar is called
possible human language that has phrases the principle of full interpretation. (For
483
CHOMSKY
example, the reason the string *“He not loves tionary pressure that interaction with our envi-
her” is ungrammatical is that the third person ronment may have created. Third, given his
singular nominative features of the verb cannot radical internalism about language, Chomsky
be checked by the subject separated from it by rejects semantic theories that are based on truth
“not.” So, the relevant features of “loves” move and reference and consequently require the
out of their position, carrying with them the study of language–world relations. In doing
phonetic features corresponding to “-s” as well, so, he forfeits a major part of the rationalist
and attach themselves to the auxiliary “do” enterprise, namely, the justification of logical
appropriately related to the subject resulting inference (that is, the justification of the truth-
in “He does not love her”.) Movements are preserving character of such inferences) on the
constrained by economy principles, which basis of the postulation of an underlying logical
require, in effect, that they occur only as a last form.
resort and in a manner that requires the least There is a final, crucial respect in which
effort. If anything counts as surface form in Chomsky breaks with the rationalist tradition.
this picture, it must be the phonetic form. Rationalism in philosophy knows no funda-
Everything else (including the logical form, mental obstacle to the expansion of human
which is not conceived of as a formula of some knowledge; it is the empiricists who have placed
preferred formal language whose inferential special emphasis on the limits of thought by
properties match the inferential properties of insisting that experience places severe con-
the derived sentence) counts as “deep”. And, as straints on concept formation. Being an
Chomsky has repeatedly emphasized, the innatist, Chomsky does not believe in empiri-
surface grammar of philosophical analysis has cist constraints on thought – he advocates his
no status whatsoever. own conception of limitations instead. He has
Given his characterization of language as a often spoken of a science-forming faculty con-
system of knowledge – his willingness to ceived along the same basic lines as the
downplay the significance of actual perfor- language faculty. The fundamental principles of
mance, to emphasize the creative aspect of the science-forming faculty are genetically
language use, to endorse innate principles of encoded and environmental factors permit only
grammar, and to postulate structure invisible minor variations. Just as rats seem genetically
on the surface – Chomsky is rightly regarded as incapable of dealing with certain mazes,
an heir to the rationalist tradition in the phi- humans may well be barred from unlocking
losophy of language and mind. He himself has some of the secrets of nature. He calls questions
often emphasized his indebtedness to such a tra- within the scope of the science-forming faculty
dition, especially to the Port-Royal Grammar problems, and distinguishes them sharply from
and to Humboldt; see especially Chomsky mysteries that are outside that scope. The
(1966). But there are important aspects in problems of consciousness and free will may
which Chomsky’s views diverge from the ratio- well be mysteries, according to Chomsky. Be
nalist picture. First of all, in speaking about that as it may, Chomsky advocates the pursuit
linguistic competence he is willing to consider of fundamental questions – whether or not they
a kind of knowledge that is (although innate) turn out to be problems – with uniform scien-
not based on reason. In fact, the very idea of a tific vigor without any pre- or post-scientific
justification for a certain aspect of our compe- prejudice.
tence seems out of place. Second, he does not
think that Universal Grammar bears any inter- BIBLIOGRAPHY
esting relation to the structure of reality. Syntactic Structures (The Hague, 1957).
Moreover, he does not think that Universal Current Issues in Linguistic Theory (The
Grammar evolved under any particular evolu- Hague, 1964).
484
CHOMSKY
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, New Horizons in the Study of Language and
Mass., 1965). Mind (Cambridge, Mass., 2000).
Cartesian Linguistics (New York, 1966). On Nature and Language (Cambridge, UK,
Sound Pattern of English, with Morris Halle 2002).
(New York, 1968). Understanding Power: The Indispensable
American Power and the New Mandarins Chomsky, ed. Peter R. Mitchell and John
(New York, 1969). Schoeffel (New York, 2002).
Problems of Knowledge and Freedom: The Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for
Russell Lectures (New York, 1971). Global Dominance (New York, 2003).
Studies on Semantics in Generative Grammar
(The Hague, 1972). Other Relevant Works
Language and Mind (New York, 1972). “Skinner’s Verbal Behaviour,” Language 35
The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory (1959): 26–58.
(Chicago, 1975). “On Certain Formal Properties of
Reflections on Language: The Whidden Grammars,” Information and Control 2
Lectures (New York, 1975). (1959): 137–67.
Essays on Form and Interpretation (New “Recent Contributions to the Theory of
York, 1977). Innate Ideas,” Synthese 17 (1967): 2–11.
Morphophonemics of Modern Hebrew (New “Quine’s Empirical Assumptions,” in Words
York, 1979). and Objections: Essays on the Work of W.
Rules and Representations (New York, 1980). V. Quine, ed. Donald Davidson and
Lectures on Government and Binding: The Jaakko Hintikka (Dordrecht, 1969), pp.
Pisa Lectures (Dordrecht, 1981). 53–68.
Some Concepts and Consequences of the “Remarks on Nominalization,” in Readings
Theory of Government and Binding in English Transformational Grammar, ed.
(Cambridge, Mass., 1982). R. A. Jacobs and P. S. Rosenbaum
Barriers (Cambridge, Mass., 1986). (Waltham, Mass., 1970), pp. 184–221.
Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin, “Principles and Parameters in Syntactic
and Use (New York, 1986). Theory,” in Explanation in Linguistics:
The Chomsky Reader, ed. James Peck (New The Logical Problem of Language
York, 1987). Acquisition, ed. N. Hornstein and D.
Language and Politics, ed. C. P. Otero Lightfoot (London, 1981).
(Montréal, 1988; 2nd edn, Oakland, Cal., “Language and Problems of Knowledge,”
2004). Synthesis Philosophica 5 (1988): 1–25.
Manufacturing Consent: The Political “Accessibility ‘in Principle’,” Brain and
Economy of the Mass Media, with Edward Behavioral Science 13 (1990): 600–601.
S. Herman (New York, 1988). “Explaining Language Use,” Philosophical
Deterring Democracy (New York, 1991). Topics 20 (1992): 205–31.
Language and Thought (Wakefield, R.I., “A Minimalist Program for Linguistic
1993). Theory,” in The View from Building 20,
Language and the Problem of Knowledge: ed. K. Hale and J. Keyser (Cambridge,
The Managua Lectures (Cambridge. Mass., 1993).
Mass., 1994). “Chomsky, Noam,” in A Companion to the
World Orders, Old and New (New York, Philosophy of Mind, ed. Samuel
1994). Guttenplan (Oxford, 1994), pp. 153–67.
The Minimalist Program (Cambridge, Mass., “Language and Nature,” Mind 104 (1995):
1995). 1–61.
485
CHOMSKY
Further Reading Leiber, Justin. Noam Chomsky: A Philosophic

Bio 20thC Phils, Blackwell Analytic Phil, Overview (Boston, 1975).
Blackwell Comp Phils, Comp Amer Lewinton, Richard. “The Evolution of
Thought, Encyc Amer Bio, Oxford Comp Cognition,” in An Invitation to Cognitive
Phil, Routledge Encycl Phil Science, ed. D. N. Osherson and E. E. Smith
Baker, Mark. The Atoms of Language (New (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), vol. 3, pp.
York, 2001). 229–46.
Barsky, Robert F. Noam Chomsky: A Life of Lyons, John. Noam Chomsky (New York,
Dissent (Cambridge, Mass., 1997). 1970).
Cowie, Fiona. What is Within? Nativism McGilvray, James, ed. The Cambridge
Reconsidered (Oxford, 1999). Companion to Chomsky (Cambridge, UK,
Crain, Stephen, and Rosalind Thornton. 2005).
Investigations in Universal Grammar: A Nagel, Thomas. “Chomsky: Linguistics and
Guide to Experiments on the Acquisition of Epistemology,” in Other Minds: Critical
Syntax and Semantics (Cambridge, Mass., Essays, 1969–1994 (Oxford, 1995).
2000). Piatelli-Palmarini, Mario, ed. Language and
D’Agostino, Fred. Chomsky’s System of Ideas Learning: The Debate between Jean Piaget
(Oxford, 1986). and Noam Chomsky (Cambridge, Mass.,
Fodor, Jerry. “The Present Status of the 1980).
Innateness Controversy,” in Representations Pinker, Stephen. The Language Instinct: How
(Cambridge, Mass., 1981), pp. 257–316. the Mind Creates Language (New York,
George, Alexander, ed. Reflections on 1994).
Chomsky (Oxford, 1989). Putnam, Hilary. “The ‘Innateness Hypothesis’
Green, Judith. Psycholinguistics: Chomsky and Explanatory Models in Linguistics,”
and Psychology (Harmondsworth, UK, Synthese 17 (1967): 12–22.
1972). Quine, W. V. “Reply to Chomsky,” in Words
Harman, Gilbert, ed. On Noam Chomsky: and Objections: Essays on the Work of W.
Critical Essays (New York, 1974). V. Quine, ed. Donald Davidson and Jaakko
Harris, Randy A. The Linguistics Wars Hintikka (Dordrecht, 1969), pp. 302–11.
(Oxford, 1993). ———, “Methodological Reflections on
Hawkins, John A., ed. Explaining Language Current Linguistic Theory,” Synthese 21
Universals (Oxford, 1988). (1970): 386–98.
Higginbotham, James. “Elucidations of Robinson, Ian. The New Grammarians’
Meaning,” Linguistics and Philosophy 12 Funeral: A Critique of Noam Chomsky’s
(1989): 465–517. Linguistics (Cambridge, UK, 1975).
Hornstein, Norbert, and Louise Anthony, eds. Smith, Neil. Chomsky: Ideas and Ideals
Chomsky and His Critics (Oxford, 2003). (Cambridge, UK, 1999; 2nd edn, 2004).
Jackendoff, Ray. Foundations of Language: Smith, Neil, and Deirdre Wilson. Modern
Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Evolution Linguistics: The Results of Chomsky’s
(Oxford, 2002). Revolution (Bloomington, Ind., 1979).
Kasher, Asa, ed. The Chomskyan Turn
(Oxford, 1993). Zoltán Gendler Szabó
Kayne, Richard. Parameters and Universals
(Oxford, 2001).
Larson, Richard, and Gabriel Segal.
Knowledge of Meaning (Cambridge, Mass.,
1995).
486
CHURCH
CHURCH, Alonzo (1903–95) Brouwer. Even though Brouwer and Hilbert

disagreed over the fundamental issue of the
Alonzo Church was born on 4 June 1903 in logical foundation of mathematics, Church
Washington, D.C., and died on 11 August seems to have been able to learn from both of
1995 in Hudson, Minnesota. His father, them without feeling involved enough to take
Samuel Robbins Church, was a justice of the sides. One of the characteristics of much of
municipal court of Washington, D.C., and his Church’s writing was a willingness to investi-
grandfather had been librarian of the United gate approaches to mathematics or language
States Senate. He was an undergraduate at without discounting their possible fruitfulness.
Princeton University, where he received his BA On his return from Europe, Veblen was
in mathematics in 1924. He married Mary instrumental in procuring for Church an
Julia Kuczinski on 25 August 1925 and the appointment as assistant professor of mathe-
marriage lasted until her death in 1976. matics at Princeton in 1929. He had supported
Church remained at Princeton for his doctoral Church in his application for fellowship
work, which he pursued under Oswald support and felt that he had the chance to
VEBLEN. Veblen had written a great deal on continue Veblen’s efforts to make Princeton
logic in the time that he was at Princeton and, one of the centers for research in logic as a part
with his encouragement, Church followed the of mathematics. It is clear from Church’s rec-
path of the study of mathematical logic. He ollections of his early years that there were
received his PhD in mathematics in 1927, colleagues who did not regard logic as a par-
writing a dissertation on the axiom of choice ticularly valuable or intellectually respectable
(or, as it was more often called in those days, branch of mathematics. If so, Church was one
“Zermelo’s Axiom”). The choice of topic was of those who did the most to transform the
not entirely out of keeping with the style of impression of logic within the mathematical
logic characteristic of Veblen and the era community.
around the beginning of the twentieth century, Church’s influence on logic took several
especially in the United States. Veblen was of forms. One was his central role in getting The
the generation called the “Postulate Theorists,” Journal of Symbolic Logic inaugurated. He
who were especially devoted to looking at argued that standard mathematical journals
systems of axioms for deductive systems and did not have enough room for the important
identifying basic characteristics. In particular, research in logic, basing this both on his expe-
they were looking at issues of consistency, riences as writer and as referee. As a result, the
independency, and completeness. This reflected new journal would encourage students to
the influence of David Hilbert’s treatment of pursue logic and to remain in the field, since
geometry, which had been rapidly translated their efforts would have an outlet. He was
from German into English. responsible from its inception for the
After Church’s graduation he obtained a fel- “Reviews” section, recruiting the leaders in
lowship for study at Harvard University and the field of logic to contribute evaluations (and
elsewhere. He spent the academic year 1927–8 not just abstracts) of articles and books in the
at Harvard, where there was a good deal of area. In response to complaints that the review-
philosophical interest in logic, and then pro- ers were inclined to do too much evaluation,
ceeded to the University of Göttingen, where Church responded that it was important for
Hilbert and his collaborator Paul Bernays were good work to be distinguished (and, by
studying logic and looking at issues of exposi- contrast, for bad work to be chastised). One of
tion as well. After Göttingen, Church pro- his continuing concerns in raising the status of
ceeded to Amsterdam, where he spent time logic within the mathematical community was
with the Dutch mathematician L. E. J. to point out to his colleagues that even logi-
487
CHURCH
cians were capable of recognizing nonsense Boone, Hartley Rogers, Michael Rabin, and
that tried to pass under the guise of logic. In the Simon Kochen. The range of work that was
early days of the Journal of Symbolic Logic, undertaken by these students and its influence
Church could be found doing all the tasks on the direction of logic attest to what
from typing to binding the issues, although he Church’s supervision accomplished.
did not retain the editorial direction beyond the Church’s course on logic at Princeton was
reviews section for nearly so many years. In transformed into a textbook under the title
addition to his labor, he also was instrumen- Introduction to Mathematical Logic, which
tal in making sure that funding was available appeared in 1944 in the series “Annals of
for supporting the publication, and Princeton Mathematics,” published by Princeton
University was one of the institutions that University Press, and then in an expanded form
provide that support. as an independent volume. The introduction to
One of the most ambitious projects that that volume provides one of the most thorough
Church undertook on behalf of the Association accounts of Church’s view of the foundations
for Symbolic Logic was putting together a bib- for logic, and the number of footnotes that he
liography of symbolic logic. That involved uses to explain his views in greater detail
coming up with criteria for inclusion, which probably detracted from its appearance as a
led to his selecting a paper of Leibniz from text in 1956. However, those footnotes do
1666 as the first entry, and with guidelines for attest to the breadth of Church’s reading and
which parts of recent mathematics did not his readiness to tackle issues in detail that had
need to be included. Subsequent evolution of been raised by contemporaries like Rudolf
the field of logic has led to encompassing a CARNAP, Alfred TARSKI, and W. V. QUINE. By
little more territory than Church included, but the time the book came out, it was not the only
the bibliography was a kind of programmatic competitor in the field, and the market for
statement about the distinguished history of logic texts was distinctly less robust than for
the field and the increasing rate of recent pub- other branches of mathematics. Still, the
lication. volume had a lasting influence, and served as
Another form of influence was his teaching. one of the standard references for many years.
Church had perhaps the most distinguished The third line of influence was, of course, his
collection of logicians in history as his graduate publications, and Church produced in his first
students at Princeton, and they went forth to decade a couple that altered the face of logic
spread the gospel of logic to universities forever. One task that he confronted was
throughout the country. Stephen Cole KLEENE coming up with a mathematically precise way
and J. Barkley Rosser were two of the first of specifying what it means for a function to be
three, and their work, originally together with “effectively computable.” The intuitive notion
Church and then subsequently independently, was sufficient for contemporaries to feel that
helped to create the discipline of recursive they could get a handle on the subject, but
function theory and to clarify consequences that was never Church’s preferred method of
of the fundamental work of Kurt GÖDEL on the proceeding. As he points out in the introduc-
incompleteness of arithmetic. Alan Turing tion to his textbook, formalization was an
came from England to obtain a doctorate from essential tool for judging the value of any con-
Church, a tribute to Church’s status at a time tribution to mathematical thought (and he
when Turing already had impressive academic likely felt that the same criterion was useful in
accomplishments to his name. Other names a broader sphere). As a result, he was obliged
that appear on the list of Church’s students are to come up with a system that would enable
John K EMENY , Dana S COTT , Raymond the notion of “computability” to be spelled
Smullyan, Leon Henkin, Martin Davis, W. W. out explicitly.
488
CHURCH
The system that Church created is known as itionistic mathematics, in which Church’s
the “lambda calculus.” The name comes from thesis can be explicitly formulated.)
the use of the Greek letter lambda as a kind of What finally convinced Church of the truth
operator that identifies what function is being of the thesis was Turing’s characterization of
talked about as a prefix for a description of computability in terms of machines. The intu-
that function. The system was originally intro- itive character of Turing’s description of how
duced as part of a foundation Church wanted a computation must proceed was especially
to lay for all of mathematics, but his students attractive to Church, and it did add one more
Kleene and Rosser were able to show that the to the list of characterizations that was
system as a whole was inconsistent. In addition provably equivalent to the lambda calculus.
to this discovery’s causing Kleene to have to Once the thesis is accepted, then the specific
rewrite his thesis, it also forced Church to look form of definition for computability begins to
at his system and to try to detach the functional lose importance, and one of the consequences
part from the logical part. It was the former was a decrease in attention to the lambda
which is modeled by the lambda calculus, and calculus. That ebb was, however, brought to a
Church devoted some attention to proving rapid end with the rise of computer program-
that it was consistent. He devoted a book to ming languages of the functional variety. The
the lambda calculus and used it as a tool for LISP computer language, for example, was
approaching many issues about computability. inspired by the lambda calculus, and other
The approach of the lambda calculus was con- subsequent languages also took up issues that
nected with that of combinatory logic, as Church had already considered.
developed concurrently by Haskell CURRY. Church was one of the first mathematicians
The lambda calculus was not, however, the to try to understand exactly the consequences
only system that was being offered for proof Gödel’s proof that arithmetic was not
viding a precise notion of computability. Gödel complete. Originally, he had the hope that
came up with an approach of “recursive func- Gödel’s negative result depended crucially on
tions,” and his definitions had a slightly more the features of the system of Principia
intuitive character than those of the lambda Mathematica which were the basis of his pub-
calculus. The influence of Gödel on Church lished work. In particular, he thought that
and vice versa can be debated, although they perhaps the typed system of the work of
were aware of one another’s work. As Church Bertrand Russell and Alfred North WHITEHEAD
was trying fully to understand the notion of was what laid it open to Gödel’s decisive
“computability,” he was pleased to discover rejoinder. On more careful examination (and
that his system and Gödel’s were equivalent in perhaps after his conversations with Gödel), he
that they picked out the same set of functions recognized that the argument was more sig-
as computable. This led him to surmise that nificant than he had suspected. Church turned
perhaps all satisfactory definitions of com- the argument that Gödel had proposed into a
putable led to the same class of functions. This slightly different direction and showed that it
surmise, which starts in tentative fashion in could be used to demonstrate that first-order
letters, became known as “Church’s Thesis” logic was not decidable, that is, that there was
and provided much of the original motivation no effective procedure for deciding the truth or
behind the investigation of different models falsity of every statement in predicate logic.
for computability. It was not clear how far This negative result ran parallel with results
Church himself trusted the thesis that he had indicating that particular branches of predicate
propounded and which, by its very nature, logic did have effective decision procedures.
could not be given a form in which it could be Church rose through the ranks at Princeton,
proved. (There is a contrast here with intu- becoming associate professor in 1939 and full
489
CHURCH
professor in 1947. He seemed destined to comments, as made in correspondence or in

remain there, but Princeton did have a manda- the pages of reviews in The Journal of
tory retirement policy and the university indi- Symbolic Logic, have a sharpness all their own.
cated that, after Church’s retirement, it would His views on foundations did not crystallize
no longer be willing to support the secretarial too early, as he was not even aware of the
efforts needed to continue to produce the work of Gottlob Frege until after his initial
Reviews section of The Journal of Symbolic work at Princeton in the early 1930s. His
Logic. As a result, Church sought a new home exposure to Frege led to his adopting a certain
that would provide for the journal as well. He amount of the Fregean machinery of “sense”
became professor of philosophy and mathe- and “denotation,” as he preferred to translate
matics at the University of California at Los “Sinn” and “Bedeutung.” That machinery he
Angeles in 1967. By this time he was sixty- then used to tackle some of the philosophical
four, and it may have been assumed that his problems that he saw as fundamental for the
stay in Los Angeles would be a short one. formalization of mathematics and ordinary
Church’s devotion to work, however, kept him language. Among the notions to which he
at UCLA until 1990, although he gave up devoted attention was that of synonymy,
editing the Reviews section in 1979. His where he crossed swords with Carnap. His
reason, even then, for giving up that task was work on the paradoxes of analysis and of the
not increasing age, but his disagreement with name relation tackled other proposed solu-
a change in policy forced upon the editor of the tions head-on. The goal for Church was always
Reviews by the editorial board of the journal. a fruitful formal system in which to work. He
Financial exigency led them to cut back on did not agree with those who felt that logic
the number of items being reviewed, and could be done without a commitment to
Church felt that was a dangerous alteration. abstract entities and his efforts at a universal
Part of his attitude about the importance of not semantics suggest that he felt that Tarski’s lim-
taking bad work for granted may have been itative results could somehow be circumvented.
due to his recollections of the environment In many cases, his suggestions of philosophical
when he first came to Princeton and logic disagreement (expressed perhaps in a footnote)
needed to earn its reputation in the eyes of the were not worked out in sufficient detail to
rest of the mathematical community. constitute philosophical arguments but were
After his retirement from UCLA, Church conducive to elaboration by others.
moved to Hudson, Minnesota, in order to be Perhaps the best example of Church’s prag-
near his son Alonzo Church, Jr. He continued matic judgment concerned intuitionistic logic
to remain intellectually active and to respond and its refusal to accept the law of the excluded
to inquiries from historians and philosophers middle. In his careful and explicit fashion,
about details of controversies and discussions Church pointed out that one could work with
from sixty years before. His first paper had a logical system which included the law of the
appeared in 1924 and one appeared in the excluded middle, or one could work with a
year of his death, as well. That kind of logical logical system which did not make explicit use
longevity is one explanation of his lasting influ- of the law, or one could work with a logical
ence. He received honorary degrees from Case system which involved the rejection of the law.
Western Reserve University, Princeton, and Any of these was a legitimate target for math-
the State University of New York at Buffalo. ematical investigation, and the value of any of
Another explanation was his patient and them, he implied, was where it led by way of
dogged devotion to making points as carefully mathematical content. This pragmatic view of
as he could. Church was never a gifted stylist the foundations of logic communicated itself to
like Quine, but many of his off-hand students of his as well.
490
CHURCH
BIBLIOGRAPHY Origins of Mathematical Logic at

“Alternatives to Zermelo’s Assumption,” Princeton,” in Perspectives on the
Transactions of the American History of Mathematical Logic, ed.
Mathematical Society 29 (1927): Thomas Drucker (Boston, 1991), pp.
178–208. 54–70.
“On the Law of the Excluded Middle,” Barendregt, Henk. “The Impact of the
Bulletin of the American Mathematical Lambda Calculus in Logic and Computer
Society 34 (1928): 75–8. Science,” Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 3
“A Note on the Entscheidungsproblem,” (1997): 181–215.
Journal of Symbolic Logic 1 (1936): Berlinski, David. The Advent of the
101–2. Algorithm (New York, 2000).
“An Unsolvable Problem of Elementary Enderton, H. B. “In Memoriam: Alonzo
Number Theory,” American Journal of Church,” Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 1
Mathematics 58 (1936): 345–63. (1995): 486–8.
Bibliography of Symbolic Logic (Menasha, ———, “Alonzo Church and the Reviews,”
Wisc., 1937–9). Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 4 (1998):
The Calculi of Lambda Conversion 172–80.
(Princeton, N.J., 1941). Engel, Pascal. The Norm of Truth: An
Introduction to Mathematical Logic Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic
(Princeton, N.J., 1956). (Toronto, 1991).
“Intensional Isomorphism and Identity of Hesseling, Dennis E. Gnomes in the Fog:
Belief,” Philosophical Studies 5 (1954): The Reception of Brouwer’s Intuitionism
65–73. in the 1920’s (Basel, Switz., 2003).
“Intensionality and the Paradox of the Kleene, S. C. “Lambda-definability and
Name Relation,” in Themes from Recursiveness,” Duke Mathematics
Kaplan, ed. Joseph Almog, John Perry, Journal 2 (1936): 340–53.
and Howard Wettstein (New York, Manzano, Maria. “Alonzo Church: His
1989), pp. 151–66. Life, His Work, and Some of His
“A Revised Formulation of the Logic of Miracles,” History and Philosophy of
Sense and Denotation,” Noûs 27 (1993): Logic 18 (1997): 211–32.
141–57. Schulz, Klaus-Dieter. Die These von
Church: zur erkenntnistheoretischen und
Further Reading sprachphilosophischen Bedeutung der
Amer Nat Bio, Bio 20thC Phils, Cambridge Rekursionstheorie (New York, 1997).
Dict Amer Bio, Oxford Comp Phil, Pres Sieg, Wilfried. “Step by Recursive Step:
Addr of APA v8, Routledge Encycl Phil, Church’s Analysis of Effective
Who Was Who in Amer v12, Who’s Calculability,” Bulletin of Symbolic
Who in Phil Logic 3 (1997): 154–80.
Anderson, C. Anthony. “Alonzo Church’s
Contributions to Philosophy and Thomas Drucker
Intensional Logic,” Bulletin of Symbolic
Logic 4 (1998): 129–71.
Anderson, C. Anthony, and Michael
Zelëny, eds. Logic, Meaning, and
Computation: Essays in Memory of
Alonzo Church (Dordrecht, 2001).
Aspray, William. “Oswald Veblen and the
491
CHURCHLAND
CHURCHLAND, Paul Montgomery tific theory as are commonsensical theories of

(1942– ) the heavens, matter, and reproduction. In
fact, we may confidently expect to see such a
Paul Churchland was born on 21 October replacement, for there is already compelling
1942 in Vancouver, British Columbia, evidence that our commonsensical or “folk”
Canada. He received his BA from the theory of the mind is not a good enough
University of British Columbia in 1964 and theory to survive future scientific develop-
his PhD in philosophy from the University of ments. Epistemology too must be ready to
Pittsburgh in 1969, writing a dissertation on be changed by new understandings of the
“Persons and P-predicates.” His work at mind, and in particular to turn away from its
Pittsburgh was under the supervision of traditional focus on rules for the rational
Wilfrid SELLARS, whose philosophical outlook revision of sententially structured beliefs,
greatly influenced Churchland’s own. given the likelihood that science will abandon
Churchland began academic life before grad- the concept of sententially structured belief as
uation with an appointment at the University no more useful to psychology than the
of Toronto, and then became assistant pro- concept of the superlunary realm was to
fessor of philosophy at the University of astrophysics.
Manitoba, where he remained from 1969 All of these themes receive an early treat-
until 1984. He was promoted to full profes- ment in Churchland’s first book, Scientific
sor in 1979 and spent a year as a visiting Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (1979),
member of the Institute for Advanced Studies and are dealt with in the essays collected in
in Princeton, New Jersey. In 1984, he and his third, A Neurocomputational Perspective
his collaborator (and wife) Patricia Smith (1989). Both books have been particularly
Churchland became professors of philosophy influential insofar as they have defended
at the University of California at San Diego. Churchland’s view that, while materialism is
Churchland’s philosophical work has a correct theory of the mind, folk psychology
centered on themes in the philosophy of is profoundly mistaken. This view, known as
science, epistemology, and most especially eliminative materialism, was initially most
the philosophy of mind. His large-scale vision associated with Paul F E Y E R A B E N D and
of these fields, held fairly consistently since Richard RORTY, but has come to be inextri-
the later 1970s, begins with the claim that cably linked to the Churchland name. It
science gives us a (typically) accurate theo- derives its support from a number of consid-
retical picture of reality, one that often erations. First, while it is a manifest fact that
departs from the equally theoretical picture of human beings and other organisms have
reality provided by common sense and the minds, it is not manifest how that mind is best
presuppositions of language. Many accept understood as being organized. Second, there
that science does this when describing the is good reason to think that common-sense
heavens, matter, reproduction, and so on, psychological thinking is not the best way to
but Churchland has argued that it can be understand how the mind is organized. Here
expected to do the same when describing the Churchland brings up the fact that folk psy-
mind. Common sense provides a sophisti- chology has no adequate way to explain
cated but unscientific theory of human and learning, sleep, dreaming, mental disorder,
other animal minds, invoking beliefs, desires, or many other phenomena, and scientific
intentions, states of consciousness, dreams, explanations of these phenomena show no
and so on to explain behavior. But “folk psy- sign of making use of concepts such as belief
chology,” Churchland argues, is just as sus- and desire. Furthermore, scientific explana-
ceptible to replacement by a superior scien- tions of “simpler” things such as language
492
CHURCHLAND
skills, action, and perception appear to be Manitoba, and she has remained more con-
readily integrated with these other phenom- nected to the neuroscientific world since then.
ena, but via theoretical constructs (such as In addition to being the leading advocate of
activation vectors in multidimensional phase eliminative materialism, Paul Churchland has
spaces) that bear no substantial relation to also made important contributions to discus-
familiar beliefs and desires. The third and sions of the nature of concepts and con-
final piece of support for eliminative materi- sciousness, and remains active in most
alism is the claim that, if our best explana- debates that link philosophy and neuro-
tions of mental phenomena have no substan- science.
tive relation to folk psychological explana-
tions, then the posits of the superior expla- BIBLIOGRAPHY
nations are probably real, while the posits of Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of
folk psychology (beliefs, desires, and the like) Mind (Cambridge, UK, 1979).
are probably not. Matter and Consciousness: A
Paul Churchland’s more recent book, The Contemporary Introduction to the
Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul (1995), Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, Mass.,
is an unusual philosophical work. Written in 1984).
an accessible style, it is as much a product of A Neurocomputational Perspective: The
missionary ambitions as scholarly ones. While Nature of Mind and the Structure of
also making arguments for Churchland’s Science (Cambridge, Mass., 1989).
philosophical views, it attempts to teach the The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul:
reader how to conceive of her own mental life A Philosophical Journey into the Brain
in terms other than those of folk psychology. (Cambridge, Mass., 1995).
Readers are introduced in some depth to On the Contrary: Critical Essays,
parallel distributed processing (PDP or 1987–1997, with Patricia Smith
“neural network”’) models of taste, smell, Churchland (Cambridge, Mass., 1998).
color vision, facial recognition, learning, cat-
egorization, inference, and more. PDP models Other Relevant Works
of mental phenomena, which made their sci- “The Logical Character of Action-explana-
entific breakthrough in the mid 1980s, have tions,” Philosophical Review 79 (1970):
long been championed by Churchland as the 214–36.
source of a more adequate self-understanding “Eliminative Materialism and Propositional
than folk psychology; The Engine of Reason Attitudes,” Journal of Philosophy 78
brings that vision of self-understanding (1981): 67–90.
together and attempts to make it the reader’s “Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical
own. Neutrality: A Reply to Jerry Fodor,”
No discussion of Paul Churchland would Philosophy of Science 55 (1988): 167–87.
be complete without some mention of his “Theory, Taxonomy, and Methodology,”
ongoing collaboration with his wife and col- Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93
league, Patricia Smith Churchland. She has (1993): 313–9.
been almost as important a contributor to “The Rediscovery of Light,” Journal of
science, especially neuroscience, as to philos- Philosophy 93 (1996): 211–28.
ophy, and her interests have driven her “Conceptual Similarity Across Neural
husband’s research program at least as much Diversity: The Fodor/Lepore Challenge
as the reverse. She was the first of the pair to Answered,” Journal of Philosophy 95
be introduced to hands-on work in the neu- (1998): 5–32.
rosciences while at the University of “Outer Space and Inner Space: The New
493
CHURCHLAND
Epistemology,” Proceedings and dissertation on “The Logic of Modality,” and

Addresses of the American Philosophical his most influential teachers were Edgar A.
Association 76 (2002): 25–48. SINGER, Jr. who had been a student of William
J A M E S , and Henry Bradford S M I T H .
Further Reading Churchman was an instructor and assistant
Bio 20thC Phils, Oxford Comp Phil professor of philosophy at the University of
Churchland, Patricia Smith. Pennsylvania from 1937 to 1948, and also
Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified served as department chair from 1945 to
Science of the Mind/Brain (Cambridge, 1948. He then was an associate professor of
Mass., 1986). philosophy at Wayne State University from
Double, Richard. “More on the Eliminable 1948 to 1951. From 1951 to 1957 he was
Intentional: A Reply to Churchland’s professor of engineering administration at
‘Cognition and Conceptual Change: A Case Institute of Technology in Cleveland,
Reply to Double’,” Journal for the and from 1957 until 1981 he was professor of
Theory of Social Behavior 17 (1987): business administration at the University of
219–25. California at Berkeley. In retirement, he occa-
Fodor, Jerry, and Ernest Lepore. “All at Sea sionally taught at Berkeley as a professor of
in Semantic Space: Churchland on peace and conflict studies until 1996.
Meaning Similarity,” Journal of Churchman died on 21 March 2004 in
Philosophy 96 (1999): 381–403. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Haldane, John. “Theory, Realism and Adopting the pragmatism taught by Singer,
Common Sense: A Reply to Paul Churchman contributed to propositional logic,
Churchland,” Proceedings of the philosophy, and methodology of science, oper-
Aristotelian Society 93 (1993): 321–7. ations research, systems theory, psychology
Hirstein, William. On the Churchlands and linguistics, decision theory, metrology, and
(Belmont, Cal., 2004). statistics. Utilizing the mathematical tools devel-
McCauley, Robert N. The Churchlands and oped in the managerial sciences, and especially
Their Critics (Cambridge, Mass., 1996). cybernetics as a mathematical model for orga-
“Symposium on The Engine of Reason, the nization and application of decision theory to
Seat of the Soul,” Philosophy and the real world, he applied these methods to
Phenomenological Research 68 (1998): planning and management of business opera-
859–904. tions, environmental protection, and resource
allocation, and worked in developing mathe-
Timothy Schroeder matical models for psychology, managerial
science, economics, and ecology. For example,
World Modeling (1976) dealt with mathemat-
ical models of economic and social history, and
Challenge to Reason (1968) studied manage-
ment science. Measurement, Definitions and
CHURCHMAN, Charles West Theories (1959) dealt both which metrology
(1913–2004) and mathematical modeling.
Churchman and his student Russell Ackoff
C. West Churchman was born on 29 August attempted to define personality experimentally,
1913 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He was turning to psycholiguistics as a means of inves-
educated at the University of Pennsylvania, tigating the psychology of personality, a study
receiving his BA in 1934, his MA in 1935, and which anticipated the structuralist approach
his PhD in philosophy in 1938. He wrote his of employing language as a key to patterns of
494
CHURCHMAN
behaviors and beliefs. Churchman wrote an Challenge to Reason (New York, 1968).
introductory textbook on operations research, The Systems Approach (New York, 1968;
and two texts on systems theory, a book 2nd edn 1979).
dealing with the application of decision theory The Design of Inquiring Systems: Basic
to industrial management and management Concepts of Systems and Organization
values, and another applying and justifying a (New York, 1971).
systems theory approach to social systems. Thinking for Decisions: Deductive
Churchman and his colleagues edited an Quantitative Methods, with Leonard
anthology dealing with the mathematics of Auerbach and Simcha Sadan (Chicago,
consumer behavior, as statistically measured 1975).
through sampling techniques and opinion The Systems Approach and Its Enemies
polling. He applied the tools of dialectics and (New York, 1979).
philosophy of science in an examination of the Thought and Wisdom (Seaside, Cal., 1982).
impact which researchers and managers have Natural Resource Management:
upon one another and the experimental data Introducing a New Methodology for
through their interactions. Management Development, with Albert
In addition to his contribution to the theory Harold Rosenthal and Spencer H. Smith
of propositions in his doctoral thesis, (Boulder, Col., 1984).
Churchman wrote an introductory textbook
of mathematical logic and scientific method, a Other Relevant Works
treatment of the philosophy and methodology “Statistics, Pragmatics and Induction,”
of science, which dealt specifically with the Philosophy of Science 15 (1948): 249–68.
theory of experimental evidence, and a Ed. with Russell Lincoln Ackoff, An
textbook on the use of statistics as a tool for Experimental Definition of Personality
carrying out experimental inferences, which he (Philadelphia, 1948).
applied to decision theory. “Ethics, Ideals, and Dissatisfaction,” Ethics
18 (1952): 64–5.
BIBLIOGRAPHY Ed., Experience and Reflection, by Edgar A.
Elements of Logic and Formal Science Singer, Jr. (Philadelphia, 1959).
(Philadelphia, 1940). Ed. with Richard O. Mason, World
Towards a General Logic of Propositions Modeling: A Dialogue (New York,
(Philadelphia, 1942). 1976).
Psycholinguistics, with Russell Lincoln
Ackoff (Philadelphia, 1946). Further Reading
Theory of Experimental Inference (New Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Who’s Who in
York, 1948). Phil
Methods of Inquiry, with Russell Lincoln Britton, G. A., and McCallion, H. “An
Ackoff (St. Louis, 1950). Overview of the Singer/Churchman/
Introduction to Operations Research, with Ackoff School of Thought,” Systems
Russell Lincoln Ackoff and E. Leonard Practice 7 (1994): 487–521.
Arnoff (New York, 1957). Dean, B. V. “West Churchman and
Measurement, Definitions and Theories, Operations Research: Case Institute of
with Philburn Ratoosh (New York, Technology, 1951–1957,” Interfaces 24
1959). (1994): 5–15.
Prediction and Optimal Decision: Ulrich, Werner. Critical Heuristics of Social
Philosophical Issues of a Science of Planning: A New Approach to Practical
Values (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1961). Philosophy (New York, 1994).
495
CHURCHMAN
———, ed. “C. West Churchman – 75 the requirement of two years of seminary study
Years,” Systems Practice 1 (December was waived. However, Clark was himself
1988). Special issue about Churchman. driven away from the Orthodox Presbyterian
Church soon after by doctrinal disagreements.
Irving H. Anellis Clark continued to change affiliations for the
rest of his life, having membership in the
United Presbyterian Church and the Reformed
Presbyterian Church, among others.
Clark’s influence in American religious phi-
losophy was notable. He was the mentor of
CLARK, Gordon Haddon (1902–85) well-known modern theologians such as
Ronald Nash, John Carnell and Carl F. H.
Gordon H. Clark was born on 4 April 1902 in HENRY. Primarily writing in the field of philo-
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and died on 9 sophical theology and philosophy of religion,
April 1985 in Westcliffe, Colorado. He Clark’s philosophy is written from the per-
attended the University of Pennsylvania, spective of Augustinian Calvinism. At the
earning a BA in French and a PhD in philoso- foundation of Clark’s philosophy is the sover-
phy in 1929. He wrote his dissertation on eign God of the Christian Bible. The triune
“Empedocles and Anaxagoras in Aristotle’s God as revealed in the Christian scriptures is
De Anima” under the direction of William R. the starting point of all knowledge. Clark laid
NEWBOLD. After graduating, he undertook a heavy emphasis on the law of non-contradic-
period of further graduate study at the tion and the importance of logic as a test for
Sorbonne in Paris. From 1924 to 1937 Clark truth. While admitting that no finite system
was an instructor of philosophy at can be expected to give answers to every
Pennsylvania, and also was a visiting professor problem, Clark contended that the preferred
at the Reformed Episcopal Seminary from system should the one that offers the most
1932 to 1936. In 1937 Clark became associ- solutions, gives more meaning to life, and
ate professor of philosophy at Wheaton makes no self-contradictions. For Clark, the
College in Illinois where he taught until 1943. Christ of the New Testament is the logos (the
He went to Butler University in Indiana to logic of God). Christianity is true in the final
become professor of philosophy and chair of analysis because it is the only system of
the philosophy department in 1945. Clark held thought that is free from logical fallacies. All
these positions for twenty-eight years until other world views have logically contradic-
retiring in 1973. In retirement he occasionally tory beliefs in one or more of their central doc-
taught at Covenant College in Pennsylvania trines. It is this belief that served as the impetus
and then at Sangre de Cristo Seminary in for Clark’s many writings in the field of apolo-
Colorado until 1984. getics as well.
Clark was a prominent reformed theologian Following Augustine, Clark’s philosophy is
and philosopher. He was an ordained characterized by an epistemology in which
Presbyterian minister and served as a ruling God must illuminate the human mind if
elder in the Presbyterian Church. Clark knowledge is to be possible. Apart from this
protested the liberalizing movement within the illumination via God-given innate ideas, the
Presbyterian Church with his address “The mind is not capable of understanding sense
Auburn Heresy” in 1935 (published in 1946). experience without a priori innate ideas
He joined the new Orthodox Presbyterian implanted in man as the image of God.
Church organized by J. Gresham Machen, and Following from this, the most effective
in 1944 he was ordained by that church, after argument for God’s existence is the need to
496
CLARK
presuppose God and his revelation in the Bible BIBLIOGRAPHY

as the only logical starting point (or first prin- A Christian Philosophy of Education (Grand
ciple) in order to make sense of knowledge and Rapids, Mich., 1946).
experience itself. A Christian View of Men and Things (Grand
Another feature of Clark’s philosophy is his Rapids, Mich., 1952).
rejection of the traditional “proofs” of God’s What Presbyterians Believe (Philadelphia,
existence – particularly those proofs that are 1956).
dependent on an empirical theory of knowl- Religion, Reason and Revelation
edge. Clark flatly rejected the epistemology of (Philadelphia, 1961).
empiricism, arguing (similar to Hume) that there Karl Barth’s Theological Method
is no necessary connection between ideas and (Philadelphia, 1963).
events. At best, we have memories of past expe- The Philosophy of Science and Belief in God
rience which we take as indicative of future (Nutley, N.J., 1964).
occurrences. But there is no strictly logical con- What Do Presbyterians Believe? The
nection between an event and its cause. Hence, Westminster Confession, Yesterday and
argument for God’s existence from motion and Today (Philadelphia, 1965).
causality are not logically valid arguments for Biblical Predestination (Nutley, N.J., 1969).
Clark. Along these lines, Clark rejected Historiography: Secular and Religious
Aquinas’s “proofs” of the existence of God as (Nutley, N.J., 1971).
purely formal, circular, and indefensible. “The Language and Theology (Phillipsburg, N.J.,
argument for the existence of God, is at best, 1980).
useless. It proves no more than a finite or God’s Hammer: The Bible and Its Critics
physical God. It allows, but does not prove, the (Jefferson, Md., 1982).
existence of a good God, but He need neither be The Biblical Doctrine of Man (Jefferson,
omnipotent nor the cause of all that happens.” Md., 1984).
On the basis of his sharp rejection of an empir- In Defense of Theology (Milford, Mich.,
ical epistemology, the cosmological argument 1984).
becomes “worse than useless.”
Clark contributed much to the field of philo- Other Relevant Works
sophical theology. His emphasis on the law of Clark’s papers are at the Presbyterian
non-contradiction as a test for truth is essential Church of America Historical Center in St.
for clear thinking in matters of religion and phi- Louis, Missouri.
losophy. Another positive contribution is Ed., Selections from Hellenistic Philosophy
Clark’s stress on objective propositional truth. (New York, 1940).
If truth is simply person-variable, it is hard to see “Apologetics,” in Contemporary Evangelical
how debates about philosophy and religion are Thought, ed. Carl F. H. Henry (Grand
worthwhile. One might question the seeming Rapids, Mich., 1957).
circularity of Clark’s insistence upon God as Thales to Dewey: A History of Philosophy
the requisite starting point in epistemology, or (Boston, 1957).
whether his arguments against empiricism still Dewey (Philadelphia, 1960).
stand in light of contemporary discussion. William James (Philadelphia, 1963).
Nevertheless, Clark contributed greatly to the Clark Speaks from the Grave (Jefferson,
history of philosophical thought by providing a Md., 1986).
needed reminder and emphasis on the impor-
tance of objective truth and the value of logic in Further Reading
matters of philosophy and religion. Who’s Who in Phil
Geisler, Norman. Christian Apologetics
497
CLARK
(Grand Rapids, Mich., 1976). in his The Distribution of Wealth (1899).

Lewis, Gordon. Testing Christianity’s Truth This theory remains at the core of what is
Claims (Chicago, 1976). today the neoclassical school of economics.
Longfield, Bradley J. The Presbyterian Clark’s ethical commitments, and his conse-
Controversy: Fundamentalists, quent social philosophy, were simultaneously
Modernists, and Moderates (Oxford, a motivation and consequence of this impor-
1991). tant theorem. His hope was to uncover a just
Nash, Ronald H., ed. The Philosophy of and politically defensible distribution of
Gordon Clark (Philadelphia, 1968). income under competitive capitalist conditions.
Robbins, John W. Gordon H. Clark: According to Clark’s theory under a regime
Personal Recollections (Jefferson, Md., of “natural competition” (roughly equivalent
1989). Contains a bibliography of Clark’s to our modern conception of “perfect compe-
writings. tition”) each worker, acre of land, and unit of
capital will be paid the dollar value of the
Mark Cox additional output that he, she, or it contributes
to their firm or industry. “The pay of labor in
each industry tends to conform to the marginal
product of social labor employed in connection
with a fixed amount of social capital, as such.”
(1899, p. 116) On this theory, the competitive
CLARK, John Bates (1847–1938) wage is not equal to the average level of pro-
duction, but rather to the last, or marginal,
John Bates Clark was born on 26 January quantity of production that can be attributed
1847 in Providence, Rhode Island. He grew to the last, or marginal, unit of labor (or land,
up in Minneapolis, Minnesota, but in 1865 or capital) employed.
he returned east to attend Brown University To Clark this theory represented more than
and later studied economics at Amherst an answer to a technical problem in economic
College. He continued his graduate studies in theory, although this is how it would come to
economics in Europe at the University of be perceived over the last century. Clark’s
Heidelberg in 1874 and 1877 under Karl motivation was to uncover the principles of
Knies. Clark was professor of economy and economic justice, so as to establish the basis of
history at Carlton College in Minnesota 1877 a just distribution under modern economic
to 1881, and then was professor of econom- conditions. If the competitive market process,
ics at Smith College in Massachusetts from whether guided by the laws of the state or not,
1881 to 1895. In 1895 he became professor ensured that each laborer were to earn a wage
of economics at Columbia University, and equal to his or her marginal contribution to the
taught there until 1923. He also was the output of society then, Clark maintained, the
Director of the history and economic section resulting distribution of income could be con-
of the Carnegie Endowment for International sidered just as each person would earn the
Peace from 1911 to 1923. From 1893 to monetary equivalent of their contribution.
1895 he served as the third President of the Moreover, and he was most explicit about
American Economic Association. He died in this, the ethical basis of socialism would be
New York City on 21 March 1938. undermined as the latter could no longer plau-
Clark’s most lasting contribution to theo- sibly claim that under competitive conditions
retical and applied economics was the capitalists expropriate the produce of labor.
Marginal Product Theory of distribution, Clark concluded that public policy should be
which received its most complete exposition directed toward establishing the institutions of
498
CLARK
competitive bargaining that would allow the Clark believed in the essential justice of a
several contributors to the productive process competitive market economy based on
to receive the marginal product of their labor, private property. But he was not an ideo-
land, or capital: “If the natural law of wages is logue. He understood that under modern con-
an honest and beneficent law, and if it works ditions unregulated competition could
fairly well and can be made to work better, then generate an unjust distribution, widespread
we know, at least, at what we should aim in all harm, and a political demand for radical
civil law making. It will remain only to frame reform along socialist lines. Since he believed
the statutes that will accomplish this purpose in that “natural” competition would be unlikely
view.” (1910, p. 452) to reestablish itself in light of trends in
Clark’s anti-socialist sentiments have led some modern technology and business methods,
interpreters to conclude that his primary agenda Clark concluded that enlightened laws would
was to give political legitimacy to laissez-faire have to intervene to restore a distribution of
capitalism. This is inaccurate. Clark supported income consistent with private property and
neither socialism (which he defined as the state economic justice.
ownership of firms) nor unfettered laissez-faire.
He believed that the former would stifle BIBLIOGRAPHY
economic progress while denying citizens the The Philosophy of Wealth: Economic
benefits of political liberty. He thought the Principles Newly Formulated (Boston,
latter, under modern conditions of production, 1885).
was overly favorable to the formation of private The Distribution of Wealth: A Theory of
economic power in the form of monopolies. Wages, Interest and Profit (New York,
Moreover, laissez-faire under modern condi- 1899).
tions could potentially demoralize less skilled The Essentials of Economic Theory, as
and less organized workers through destructive Applied to Modern Problems of Industry
competition. However, as Clark believed that and Public Policy (New York, 1907).
the rising monopolies of his era were the result Social Justice Without Socialism (Boston,
of progress, he did not favor using the anti- 1914).
trust laws to restore competition. What he did A Tender of Peace: The Terms on Which
support was the use of regulations to guide or Civilized Nations Can, If They Will,
shape the competitive process so that society Avoid Warfare (New York, 1935).
could reap the benefits associated with the pro-
ductivity of large consolidated firms while simul- Other Relevant Works
taneously neutralizing their monopoly power. Clark’s papers are at Columbia University.
Consistent with his gradualist and conser- “Is Authoritative Arbitration Inevitable?”
vative approach to addressing economic and Political Science Quarterly 17 (1902):
social questions, Clark argued that lasting 553–67.
reforms should be built on already existing The Control of Trusts, with John Maurice
laws and institutions: “I shall try to show Clark (New York, 1912).
that society is organized on a plan that is “The Minimum Wage,” The Atlantic
essentially sound, and that law may facilitate Monthly 112 (September 1913): 289–97.
its development. This special work, which “Anarchism, Socialism and Social Reform”
the law has to do, falls within its time- (c. 1910), ed. Robert E. Prasch, Journal
honored function of protecting person and of the History of Economic Thought 24
property. Yet, in a sense, it is a new work; for (2002): 443–62.
it demands specific things that have never
been done.” (2002, p. 452)
499
CLARK
Further Reading visiting professor at the University of Western

Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Ontario). Clark moved to Indiana University in
Comp Amer Thought, Dict Amer Bio, 1970 as professor of philosophy and adjunct
Dict Economics, Encyc Amer Bio, Nat professor of the history and philosophy of
Cycl Amer Bio v13, Who Was Who in science. He was department chair for two years,
Amer v1 and retired in 1990.
Everett, John R. Religion in Economics: A Clark’s primary writings are about percep-
Study of John Bates Clark, Richard Ely tion, language, and reasoning. He wrote bril-
and Simon Patten (New York, 1946). liantly and elegantly about the relation of sen-
Henry, John F. “John Bates Clark and the sation to perception, seamlessly merging his
Marginal Product: An Historical Inquiry original ideas here with his signature study of
into the Origins of Value-Free Economic predication. His papers on the semantics of
Theory,” History of Political Economy abductive reasoning wrestle with some of
15 (1983): 375–89. Charles PEIRCE’s most difficult problems. As a
———, John Bates Clark: The Making of a metaphysical minimalist, Clark sharpened
Neoclassical Economist (New York, Occam’s razor in a series of devastating cri-
1995). tiques of unrepentant ontologies that extrava-
Hollander, J. H., ed. Economic Essays gantly posit entities answering to every thought
Contributed in Honor of John Bates thereof.
Clark (New York, 1927). Contains a Clark is a direct realist within the philosophy
bibliography of Clark’s writings. of perception. Perception, he argues, connects
Prasch, Robert E. “John Bates Clark’s the mind to its environment directly rather than
Defense of Mandatory Arbitration and through inferential processes that exploit phe-
Minimum Wage Legislation,” Journal of nomenally evident sense data or impressions.
the History of Economic Thought 22 With Wilfrid SELLARS, Clark holds that sense
(2000): 251–63. impressions are theoretical posits hidden from
immediate awareness. These impressions secure
Robert E. Prasch the distinctively sensuous character of percep-
tion. However, unlike Sellars, Clark maintains
that sense impressions are conceptual elements
in perceptual judgments. According to Clark,
basic perceptual judgments are best modeled by
natural language. Sense impressions are to basic
CLARK, Romane Lewis (1925– ) perceptual judgments as predicates are to their
containing simple declarative sentences. Sense
Romane L. Clark was born on 3 December impressions attribute selected properties of
1925 in Waverly, Iowa. He served in the US Air objects in the subject’s environment while the
Force during 1943–4. He then attended the sheer occurrences of these impressions demon-
University of Iowa, where he earned the BA in stratively refer to these same objects. This is
1949, MA in 1950, and PhD in philosophy in why the content of perceptual judgments – as
1952. Clark’s initial faculty appointment was opposed to judgments generally – is essentially
as a lecturer at the University of Iowa in limited to depiction of the ambient array. Basic
1952–3. The following year he became assis- perception is the direct, immediate awareness of
tant professor of philosophy at Duke what is distally, but sensuously, available. It
University, where he was promoted through does not trade on (unconscious) inference from
the ranks to full professor and remained for sev- knowledge of occurrent sense impressions as
enteen years (except 1968–9, when he was premises to conclusions regarding the external
500
CLARK
milieu. According to Clark, sensuously to judge different sense impressions but, context playing
an object’s color, for example, is simply to its part in establishing the impressions’
suffer the occurrence of a sense impression contents, each sees the other as a boy.
within a mental state. This state functions like Clark cautioned against drawing ontological
a simple declarative sentence, with the occur- conclusions from patterns of natural language
rent impression acting the part of a contextu- or logical formalisms. He endorsed modal
ally sensitive predicate representing the color of logics for the propositional attitudes generally
the object to which the impression’s occurrence and perception in particular but eschewed
demonstratively refers. semantical interpretations for these systems
Clark departs from classical empiricists by requiring more than the mundane objects of the
further insisting that perception is not restricted external world of common and scientific sense.
to the familiar Aristotelian proper and common Similarly, Clark’s logic of predicate modifiers –
sensibles. Rather, Clark concurs with J. J. while important in its own right – offers an
GIBSON and N. R. HANSON that, within certain alternative to Donald DAVIDSON’s reification
but unspecified limits, perception offers direct, of events embedded in his account of the impli-
noninferential, sensuous, cognitive access to cations of complex predicates.
some of the kinds, natures, and even the dis- Russell refuted naïve set theory by pointing
positions of the things sensed. For Clark, to the paradoxical character of sets having as
sequences of sense impressions constitute non- members only those sets that are not members
basic perceptual judgments or ascriptions of of themselves. There is not always a set corre-
abstract properties that transcend the concep- sponding to each predicate we might use or
tual limits foundationalists typically suppose. every concept we might deploy. The creative
Glancing at the hunting tiger about to spring, powers of the mind are thus limited in ways
one might literally see it as a tiger, as a predator that Meinong, Frege, and their followers did
and as poised to pounce – no inference required not anticipate. In a series of acute papers, Clark
– depending on the sequence of sense impres- – with an eye on Russell – demonstrates that
sions one happens to have. A contextualist, Hector-Neri CASTAÑEDA errs by proliferating
Clark allows that the content of a sense impres- (mental) entities – propositions, senses, or
sion or sequence of such impressions is deter- guises – answering to every thought.
mined by various fluctuating factors including Clark’s metaphysical minimalism has several
the subject’s background knowledge and per- aspects. Perception is a direct mode of thought.
ceptual perspective in ways that defy precise It does not require sense data implicated in a
specification. Contextually sensitive features of proliferation of inferences to the world beyond.
indexicals and demonstratives allow two scuf- Thought too is direct. Neither does it require
fling boys each to threaten the other by saying, entities like propositions, senses, or guises to tie
“I’ll punch you in the nose!” So too, different the mind to the world. Rather, according to
perceivers might simultaneously deploy similar Clark, the bare minimum suffices. The mind;
sense impressions to achieve perceptual judg- the world. That’s all; that’s enough.
ments with different content. The child and
adult both see the coin obliquely from similar BIBLIOGRAPHY
perspectives. Their sense impressions are “Comments on Professor Hintikka’s ‘The
similar. Nevertheless and context providing, Logic of Perception’,” in Perception and
the naïve child sees it as elliptical, but the Personal Identity, ed. N. S. Care and R. H.
seasoned adult sees it as circular. Dissimilar Grimm (Cleveland, 1969), pp. 174–87.
but contextually determined sense impressions “Concerning the Logic of Predicate
might engender congruent perceptual judg- Modifiers,” Noûs 4 (1970): 311–35.
ments. In staring at each other, the boys collect “Sensuous Judgments,” Noûs 7 (1973):
501
CLARK
45–56. “Deeds, Doings and What is Done: The Non-

“Adverbial Modifiers,” in Ontological extensionality of Modifiers,” Noûs 23
Commitment, ed. R. Severens (Athens, (1989): 199–210.
Georgia, 1974), pp. 22–36. “Seeing and Inferring,” Philosophical Papers
“The Sensuous Content of Perception,” in 22 (1993): 81–96.
Action, Knowledge and Reality, ed.
Hector-Neri Castañeda (Indianapolis, Further Reading
1975), pp. 4–17. Aquila, Richard E. “Perceptions and
“Old Foundations for a Logic of Perception,” Perceptual Judgments,” Philosophical
Synthese 33 (1976): 75–99. Studies 28 (1975): 17–31.
“Not Every Object of Thought Has Being: A Castañeda, Hector-Neri. “Philosophical
Paradox in Naive Prediction Theory,” Method and the Theory of Predication and
Noûs 12 (1978): 181–8. Identity,” Noûs 12 (1978): 189–210.
“Considerations for a Logic for Naive Heidelberger, Herbert. “Beliefs and
Realism,” in Studies in Perception, ed. P. Propositions: Comments on Clark,”
Machamer and R. Turnbull (Columbus, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1980):
Ohio, 1978), pp. 525–56. 525–31.
“Sensing, Perceiving, Thinking,” Grazer Landini, Gregory. “Salvaging ‘The F-er is F’:
Philosophische Studien 12 (1981): 273–95. The Lesson of Clark’s Paradox,”
“Not Every Act of Thought Has a Matching Philosophical Studies 48 (1985): 129–36.
Proposition,” Midwest Studies in
Philosophy 5 (1980): 509–23. J. Christopher Maloney
“When Is a Fallacy Valid? Reflections on
Backward Reasoning,” Notre Dame
Journal of Formal Logic 23 (1982): 1–13.
“Sensibility and Understanding: The Given of
Wilfrid Sellars,” The Monist 65 (1982):
350–64. CLARKE, William Newton (1841–1912)
“Predication Theory: Guised and Disguised,”
in Agent, Language, and Structure in the William Newton Clarke was born on 2
World, ed. J. E. Tomberlin (Indianapolis, December 1841 in Cazenovia, New York, and,
1983), pp. 111–29. as the son of a Baptist minister, lived in several
“What is a Perceptually Well-Defined small towns in northern parts of his native
Individual? Hintikka’s Views on state where strict Calvinist principles still
Perception,” in Jaakko Hintikka, ed. Radu exerted considerable influence. In 1861 he
Bogdan (Dordrecht, 1987). graduated with a BA degree from Madison
“Predication and Paronymous Modifiers,” College (now Colgate University) and in 1863
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 received a BD from Hamilton Theological
(1986): 376–92. Seminary, located on the same campus.
“Objects of Consciousness: The Non-rela- Thereafter he served in pulpits at Keene, New
tional Theory of Sensing,” Philosophical Hampshire (1863–9), Newton Center,
Perspectives 1 (1987): 481–500. Massachusetts (1869–80), and Montréal,
“A Categorical Analysis of Predication: The Canada (1880–83). Clarke severely injured an
Moral of Bradley’s Regress,” in Mind, elbow and knee after slipping on ice in 1883
Value, and Culture: Essays in Honor of E. and this accident caused him to seek less
M. Adams, ed. David Weissbord vigorous occupations than those required in an
(Atascadero, Cal., 1989). active ministry. From 1883 to 1887 he tried
502
CLARKE
academia as professor of New Testament inter- an immediate success, running to twenty

pretation at Toronto Baptist College, and then editions in almost that many years. It also
served once again as minister of a Baptist stands as the first systematic American treat-
church. In 1890 he assumed the position in ment of religious ideas derived from biblical
which he became nationally famous: professor criticism and a scientific knowledge of the
of Christian theology at the now renamed natural world. Such widespread popularity
Colgate Seminary in New York. Teaching for indicates that a significant number of liberal-
eighteen years in that capacity, and then for minded Protestants had been looking for
another four years from 1908 to 1912 as someone who could articulate their general
lecturer in ethics, Clarke rounded out a long feelings. Clarke showed how one could break
career as a seminal thinker who shaped the with outmoded doctrinal statements and yet
contours of Protestant liberalism. adhere to the basics of earlier confessional
Clarke’s religious ideas and values were patterns without sacrificing rational integrity
derived from his practical experience in pas- or relevance to modern life. Many regarded his
torates over a period of more than two work as the most influential Protestant theo-
decades. Biblical studies in the original Greek, logical publication issued in America at the
pastoral counseling, and sermon composition dawn of the twentieth century.
provided a solid background for the ideas he In Clarke’s view, the beginning point for
began to systematize for classroom use. everything else in theology was a proper under-
Drawing to some extent on the ideas promul- standing of Jesus of Nazareth. He thought of
gated by Adolf von Harnack in Germany and Jesus as a human being whom God’s spirit
Horace BUSHNELL in the US, Clarke perceived had permeated to such an extent that his teach-
the world of past and present as part of an ings about divine presence and proper ethics
extended evolutionary process. He held reli- were normative for all others. Jesus’ religious
gious ideas or theology to be natural expres- experience thus became a universal pattern
sions of the human spirit; as cultural conditions wherein people were to discern two salient
changed over time, so did human experiences categories: (1) revering God as a loving parent
and, in like manner, people’s religious under- to all humanity; and (2) treating other mortals
standing as they tried to make religion relevant as spiritual kinsfolk and neighbors. Religion in
in specific contexts. everyday life, patterned after Jesus as the
On the premise that all ideas and practices example par excellence, was essentially moral
have developed over time, Clarke argued that endeavor. The proper response to God’s spir-
people in each age should formulate a theology itual guidance, Clarke held, was a life of service
relative to the cultural circumstances of their and sacrifice, a striving for moral excellence
own setting. This contradicted traditionalist with love as its greatest expression.
approaches, which regarded certain doctrines There was little room in this liberal religious
as perennially true. Such approaches, for perspective for a divine Christ, a sacrificially
Clarke, were arbitrarily forced on varied atoning death, or sacramental rituals in a
cultural contexts instead of being derived from gathered church. There was even little
them. This insight made his work compatible emphasis on human sin, aside from recogniz-
within the larger intellectual atmosphere ing the presence of recurrent selfishness in both
affected by biblical criticism, historical rela- private and communal experience. Clarke was
tivism, and scientific knowledge of the natural convinced that God’s beneficial purposes
world. guided people as they moved toward greater
After a few years of teaching, Clarke put realizations of their potential. Human progress
his lecture notes into a more organized system. was the primary achievement of evolutionary
His Outline of Christian Theology (1898) was processes, and all of God’s influence con-
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CLARKE
tributed to the supreme purpose of redemp- CLARKE, William Norris (1915– )

tion. Clarke’s optimistic, progressivist view-
point defined salvation as human effort toward W. Norris Clarke was born on 1 June 1915
moral improvement, and he was confident that in New York City. Upon graduation from
cooperation with divine wisdom and power the Loyola School in New York, he spent
would eventually triumph over every failing. several years at Georgetown University before
As one who pioneered such liberal emphases, entering the Society of Jesus in 1933. During
Clarke greatly influenced the next generation his early Jesuit training during 1936–9 on
of such thinkers. Perhaps his most noted the Isle of Jersey in the English Channel he
student and exponent of this genre in modern studied such thinkers as Joseph Maréchal and
Protestantism was Harry Emerson Fosdick, Maurice Blondel. He then received an MA in
who perpetuated Clarke’s ideas for more than philosophy in 1940 at Fordham University,
fifty years in New York City. Owing to his studying with the Thomist Anton PEGIS. From
wife’s and his own poor health, they wintered 1940 to 1942 he taught philosophy at Loyola
in a warmer climate, and Clarke died on 14 College in Baltimore, Maryland, and then
January 1912 in Deland, Florida. studied theology at Woodstock College in
Maryland prior to priestly ordination in
BIBLIOGRAPHY 1945. In 1950 he received his PhD in philos-
Commentary on the Gospel of Mark ophy from the Université Catholique de
(Philadelphia, 1881). Louvain, where he had studied with Fernand
An Outline of Christian Theology (New van Steenberghen and Louis De Raeymaeker.
York, 1898). His dissertation, “The Limitation of Act by
What Shall We Think of Christianity? (New Potency: Aristotelianism or Neoplatonism?”
York, 1899). has been widely recognized as a seminal work
The Use of Scripture in Theology (New in contemporary Neothomism. During this
York, 1905). period he also read broadly in existentialist
The Christian Doctrine of God (New York, phenomenology, and especially the personal-
1909). ism of Emmanuel Mounier, Martin Buber,
Sixty Years with the Bible (New York, and Gabriel Marcel.
1912). After teaching at Woodstock College from
1949 to 1952 and at Bellarmine College in
Further Reading Kentucky from 1952 to 1955, Clarke joined
Amer Nat Bio, Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer the philosophy department at Fordham
Religious Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v22, University, where he taught from 1955 until
Who Was Who in Amer v1 his retirement in 1985. Since then he has been
Clarke, Emily S. William Newton Clarke: A a visiting professor at many Jesuit colleges,
Biography (New York, 1916). including Xavier University, the University
Howe, Claude L. The Theology of William of San Francisco, Canisius College, John
Newton Clarke (New York, 1980). Carroll University, and Wheeling Jesuit
University, as well as a lecturer in the
Henry Warner Bowden Philippines and Ireland. The author of more
than sixty articles, Father Clarke has
produced five books, including The One and
the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic
Metaphysics (2000). In 1961 he co-founded
the International Philosophical Quarterly,
which he edited until 1985. Clarke was
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COBB
President of the Jesuit Philosophical The Universe as Journey: Conversations

Association of North America in 1960–61, with W. Norris Clarke, S.J., ed. Gerald A.
President of the Metaphysical Society of McCool (New York, 1988).
America in 1968, President of the American Explorations in Metaphysics: Being-God-
Catholic Philosophical Association in 1969, Person (Notre Dame, Ind., 1994).
and the elected President of the International Person and Being (Milwaukee, Wisc.,
St. Thomas Society in 1996. He was honored 1993).
with the Aquinas Medal from the American The One and the Many: A Contemporary
Catholic Philosophical Association for dis- Thomistic Metaphysics (Notre Dame,
tinguished contributions to philosophy in Ind., 2000).
1980.
As a Thomist deeply committed to dialogue Further Reading
with other traditions, Father Clarke has made “A Festschrift in Honor of W. Norris
a point of engaging proponents of various Clarke, S.J.,” International Philosophical
philosophical schools, including Oriental Quarterly 40 (June 2000). Special issue
metaphysicians about the question of the self, about Clarke.
American process philosophers about the Ford, Lewis S. “The Immutable God and
metaphysics of substance and relation, and Father Clarke,” New Scholasticism 49
analytic philosophers about the nature and (1975): 189–99.
validity of analogical language in the quest for
knowledge of God. Joseph W. Koterski, S.J.
Within contemporary Thomism he is well
known for his “creative retrievals” of certain
aspects of Aquinas’s thought as a way to
promote Thomism as a living philosophy and
not just an interesting historical position. In
Neothomist circles he has been prominent COBB, John Boswell, Jr. (1925– )
for further developing Etienne GILSON’s con-
centration on esse as the concrete act of exis- John Cobb was born on 9 February 1925 in
tence and Maréchal’s interpretation of Kobe, Japan. His parents, John B. Cobb and
Rousselot’s theory of the subject. Of special Theodora Atkinson Cobb, were Methodist mis-
significance in his recent work has been the sionaries, originally from Georgia. He attended
elaboration of a Thomistic philosophy of the Emory junior college at Oxford, Georgia, from
person-in-relation. Reflecting upon the 1941 to 1943 before entering the United States
evidence provided by mutual self-communi- Army, where he underwent training to be a
cation as illuminative of the nature of the Japanese translator. After World War II,
human subject, he has elaborated a philoso- without having earned a bachelor’s degree, he
phy of the human person that is as deeply entered the Divinity School of the University of
faithful to the Thomistic metaphysics of sub- Chicago, where he earned his MA (1949) and
stance, act, and potency as it is open to phe- PhD (1952). At the Divinity School he studied
nomenological and process insights about under philosophers Richard MCKEON and
receptivity and relation. Charles HARTSHORNE. McKeon, who has been
characterized variously as a “neo-Aristotelian”
BIBLIOGRAPHY and “systematic pluralist,” was notorious
The Philosophical Approach to God: A among his students as a proponent of intellec-
Neo-Thomist Perspective (Winston- tual rigor and engagement with a wide range of
Salem, N.C., 1979.) philosophical perspectives. Hartshorne, who
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viewed his philosophy as “neoclassical” meta- wider experience and knowledge, especially
physics, was a major proponent of process phi- scientific knowledge. Cobb views cosmology as
losophy. Cobb wrote his master’s thesis on the necessary to, but not sufficient for, theology.
theological method of the empirical theologian Hence, he uses the phrase Christian natural
Henry Nelson WIEMAN, and wrote his doctoral theology to describe his thought. The choice of
dissertation, “The Independence of Faith from a cosmology is warranted by its coherence with
Speculative Beliefs,” under another process the- empirical knowledge (consistency with faith
ologian Bernard LOOMER. experience) and philosophical excellence
Cobb taught religion at Young Harris (internal consistency and explanatory power).
College in Georgia from 1950 to 1953 while In Cobb’s writings since the late 1970s, he adds
serving as a Methodist pastor to several small to these criteria the pragmatic ability of the
rural churches. From 1953 to 1958, Cobb cosmology to promote a just, participatory,
taught theology at the Candler School of and sustainable society. To that end, Cobb
Theology at Emory University. He moved to takes a decidedly postmodern approach to sys-
Claremont School of Theology in 1958, tematic theology by not grounding his theology
becoming the Ingraham Professor of Theology. in Whitehead’s cosmology, but rather by using
In 1960 he took a joint appointment at the that cosmology to articulate and explore the
Claremont Graduate School, serving as the theological significance of the preconscious
Avery Professor until his retirement in 1990. He experience of Christian faith or the Christian
is now emeritus Professor at both the vision of the world.
Claremont School of Theology and Claremont Cobb believes employing Whitehead’s cos-
Graduate School. mology to articulate a Christian natural
In 1973 Cobb co-founded the Center for theology is vindicated by its ability to illuminate
Process Studies at Claremont with David several key issues confronting contemporary
Griffin. The center is dedicated to promoting Christian theology: the nature of God, the
and applying process thought, broadly con- problem of evil, the relationship of Jesus Christ
ceived, (including the ideas of Alfred North to God, the challenge of liberation movements,
WHITEHEAD, Charles Hartshorne, and Pierre the challenge of the ecological crisis, global
Teilhard de Chardin) across traditional disci- economic justice, and the relationship of
plinary boundaries. Cobb’s work has been rec- Christianity to other religions. At the same
ognized with numerous awards and honors, time, in his engagement with these issues, Cobb
including co-winner of the 1992 Grawemeyer has not hesitated to extend and/or revise many
Award for Ideas Improving World Order (for elements of Whitehead’s cosmology that fail
his book with Herman Daly, For the Common to address coherence with faith experience,
Good, 1989) and honorary doctorates at the philosophical consistency, or promotion of a
University of Mainz, Emory University, Linfield just, participatory, and sustainable society.
College, DePauw University, and the University Cobb became convinced early in his career
of Victoria. that the traditional philosophical view of God
Since his years of graduate study, Cobb has is problematic both to a modern scientific
had a strong interest in the question of how reli- understanding of the world and to biblical
gious faith can be integrated with scientific Christianity. The substance ontology presup-
thought. He finds in Whitehead a cosmology posed by traditional philosophical views of
that is amenable to both a Christian vision of God (and ultimately based upon ancient Greek
the world and a post-Newtonian scientific categories) has been untenable at least since
world view. Cobb chooses Whitehead’s cos- the time of Hume and is difficult to defend in
mology as a means of systematically elaborat- light of modern physics, which understands
ing and consistently relating faith experience to the world in terms of interactions among
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quanta of energy. Moreover, the “God of the only would Whitehead’s categoreal scheme be
philosophers” bears little resemblance to the violated, so too would the Christian experi-
Bible’s depiction of a personal God who is ence of God as personal. The primordial nature
deeply affected by relations to creation and is of God (God’s mental pole) is complemented
understood in terms of love. by the consequent nature of God (God’s
In Whitehead and Hartshorne, Cobb finds an physical pole); that is, God’s reception of the
understanding of the world and God that he actualized world into God’s own experience.
believes is more amenable to both science and Put differently, while the primordial nature of
Christian faith experience. Cobb takes over God includes all possibilities for actualization,
Whitehead’s basic analysis of reality as made up the consequent nature of God includes God’s
of actual occasions of experience. All actual feelings of all actualizations. Just as other actual
occasions, whether those that make up a water occasions of experience prehend the past world,
molecule or those that make up our immediate God prehends all that has come into being,
experience, are “events” which are “internally experiencing all that is experienced. This is
related” to other events. Put differently, an God as “the great companion – the fellow
actual occasion’s prehension (unconscious sufferer who understands” (Whitehead 1978,
experience or feeling) of past entities are con- p. 351). Moreover, since God is both the basis
stitutive of what that actual occasion is and is of all things coming to be as well as the one that
the basis of causal efficacy. experiences all things in a unity of divine expe-
However, the present does not merely repeat rience, God aims at ever-increasing richness of
the past. Change and novelty also characterize experience, or what Whitehead calls Beauty: the
reality. Novelty is affected by God’s primordial integration of diverse experience into intense
nature. As primordial, God is the eternal harmonies. Hence, all existence is suffused with
ground of all possibilities for actualization. value for each actual occasion and for God.
These formal possibilities for actualization are The interrelatedness of all actual occasions
“eternal objects” that represent “every possible and the dipolar view of God are fundamental
state of the actual world” entertained by God to Cobb’s theology. To understand God’s rela-
(1965, pp. 155–6). The eternal objects relevant tionship to the world as one who lures the
to an actual occasion are a “lure for feeling” world into novel actualization or “creative
that both gives direction to actualization and advance” points to an understanding of
allows freedom for how each actual occasion creation that is amenable to contemporary sci-
constitutes itself. This direction and freedom entific theories of the origin of the universe as
compose the “subjective aim” of each occasion well as the origin and evolution of life. In
of experience and affect all actual occasions process terms, God’s creativity is characterized
from those that constitute atoms to those that by acting as a lure for all occasions of experi-
constitute human consciousness. The capacity ence toward increasing complexity, or richer
for freedom is diminished by the determination forms of existence. Yet, precisely because God’s
provided by past actual occasions and increased relationship to the world is that of a lure
by the eternal objects (the novel possibilities toward being that makes possible and promotes
provided by God). Conscious experience rep- freedom, the creative advance of the world
resents a highly developed capacity for enter- allows for chance and change in a way that is
taining novelty and thus freedom, whereas compatible with evolutionary theory.
unconscious experience tends to have little Perhaps more important for Cobb’s theo-
capacity to do more than repeat the past. logical interest is the advantage of a process
Cobb follows Whitehead’s contention that view of reality for illuminating the problem of
God is not merely an eternal ground of possi- evil. The traditional theological view that God
bilities. If God were merely primordial, not is an absolute, immutable, omnipotent, omni-
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scient being has always presented difficulties for Cobb develops his Christology more fully in
theodicy. If God is all-powerful and all-good, Christ in a Pluralistic Age (1975), where he
why is it that the innocent suffer? The Shoah connects the biblical idea of Christ as the Logos
(Holocaust) raised that question in its most of God to the Whiteheadian notion of creative
radical form. The ecological crisis has raised it transformation. God’s creative transformative
for all life on our planet (see 1972 and 1981). activity in the world, luring the world into
For Cobb, the power of God is necessarily per- novel and richer forms of actualization,
suasive rather than coercive. As the lure toward captures the central meaning of the Logos, by
freedom and richness of experience in a rela- which and through which all things that have
tional world, God cannot override the freedom come to be have their being (John 1:3). As
of actual occasions. The greater capacity for such, Christ is present and effective in the world
achievement of value corresponds to the greater even if Christ is not consciously acknowledged
capacity for freedom, which in turn allows for (although conscious acknowledgment of Christ
greater possibility for evil. God is, however, can promote and further God’s creative
both the one who suffers with those who suffer activity). Moreover, for the Christian to rec-
and who always and everywhere acts as the ognize Christ as God’s creative transformative
creative, redeeming lure to bring about new activity allows the Christian to find common
value, even out of suffering. Here, Cobb and cause with others in participating in God’s aim
other process theologians have been strongly to bring about greater achievements of value in
criticized as saying that God is deficient in all creation.
power. Cobb responds that we can redefine As Cobb came to be challenged by liberation
omnipotence in terms of persuasive power, (especially feminist) theologies on the one side
instead of attributing to God a monopoly of and the environmental crisis on the other, he
power. Put differently, divine omnipotence is expanded his characterization of the Logos in
God’s life-giving, creative, and liberating per- terms of other biblical images, particularly the
suasion: perfect power expressed as perfect Sophia of God (1988) and Life (Birch and
love. Cobb 1981). The feminine image of Sophia is
Cobb finds in process thought a way to not only closely connected to the biblical notion
understand the philosophically problematic of Logos, but it also acts as a creative lure for
notion of the doctrine of the incarnation. feeling, challenging Christians to embrace a
Indeed, Whitehead viewed the Christian idea of richer, more inclusive understanding and expe-
the incarnation as the key to his notion of rience of God and all of God’s people, female
internal relatedness of actual occasions to one as well as male.
another and thus “the only fundamental The image of Life also acts as a creative lure
improvement on Plato’s metaphysics” for feeling that calls both Christians and non-
(Whitehead 1933, p. 167). God is internally Christians to widen their appreciation of and
related to every actual occasion and every commitment to all of God’s creation, recog-
actual occasion is internally related to God. nizing both God’s presence in all things and
For Cobb, that relation was uniquely realized God’s love for all things. Cobb finds
in Jesus of Nazareth. On the one hand, God’s Whitehead’s thought particularly congenial to
initial aim for Jesus emphasized God’s own environmental ethics. The Whiteheadian view
feelings of the world (God’s consequent nature) that every actual occasion is an achievement of
as its main content and, on the other, Jesus value in response to God’s lure for it, and the
fully incorporated God’s ideal aim into his sub- recognition that all experience is experienced by
jective aim (1966, p. 146). Put in traditional God, lifts up the largely neglected biblical idea
theological language, the fullness of God was in Genesis 1 that all things that are created are
fully present in Jesus’s being and action. good in themselves and are good to God.
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Moreover, the fundamental interrelatedness of the sharing of a common goal. Rather, he

all entities to one another and to God recalls believes that greater learning and growth occurs
that what is done to the least is done to God, when we recognize that diverse traditions may
and to all. To ally oneself with Life is to reject have different sources and different aims that
anthropocentrism in favor of promoting the ought to be appreciated and respected.
liberation, and thus the greater richness of expe- Sensitive to criticisms that the Whiteheadian
rience, of the entire ecosystem. conceptuality that informs most of his theology
The relationship of human liberation and is too esoteric for the average lay person, Cobb
ecological liberation is often viewed as prob- has devoted much of his writing in the last
lematic in ethics. Many philosophers analyze twenty years to communicating the insights of
the relationship in terms of trade-offs or com- process theology in nontechnical language and
promises between the well-being of humans on even in narrative form (see 1985 and 1990).
the one side and the well-being of the rest of One reason Cobb has been able to succeed in
creation on the other. Cobb’s theological this endeavor is that his method is ultimately
approach is to view these two goals from the pragmatic. Although Cobb describes himself
perspective of creative transformation, both as a Whiteheadian, his methodology reflects
ethically and methodologically. To that end, the pragmatic roots of Whitehead’s own cos-
Cobb has devoted several years of study and mology (see Whitehead 1978, pp. xii–xiii), as
writing (particularly during the 1990s) to well as the pragmatic influences mediated by
economic theory. Working with economists Hartshorne’s Peircean interests and McKeon’s
like Herman Daly, as well as sustainable agri- systematic pluralism. Indeed, Cobb places the
culturalists like Wes Jackson, Cobb has development of process theology squarely in the
authored or co-authored a number of articles pragmatic, pluralistic, relativistic, holistic, and
and books that treat the goals of human liber- naturalistic tendencies of William JAMES, John
ation and ecological liberation as fundamen- DEWEY, and Charles PEIRCE. His application of
tally interrelated with the ethical values of creative transformation in his engagement with
justice, participation, and sustainability. This ethics and inter-religious relations carries a dia-
work has been as much practical as theoretical logical and fallibilist approach to philosophy of
and has included concrete alternatives to religion and theology into the twenty-first
current economic measures, such as proposing century.
a measurable Index of Sustainable Economic
Welfare to replace the measure of Gross BIBLIOGRAPHY
National Product (Daly and Cobb 1989). Varieties of Protestantism (Philadelphia,
Cobb has long had an interest in inter-reli- 1960).
gious relations, especially between Christianity Living Options in Protestant Theology: A
and Japanese forms of Buddhism, such as Pure Survey of Methods (Philadelphia, 1962).
Land. The model of creative transformation A Christian Natural Theology: Based on the
provides the method and framework for Thought of Alfred North Whitehead
engaging the insights of diverse traditions (see (Philadelphia, 1965).
1982 and 1990). Cobb’s aim is not to eliminate “The Finality of Christ in a Whiteheadian
or ignore fundamental differences between reli- Perspective,” in The Finality of Christ, ed.
gious experiences but to explore what those Dow Kirkpatrick (Nashville, Tenn., 1966),
differences might tell adherents about their own pp. 122–54.
traditions even as his aim challenges them to The Structure of Christian Existence (New
incorporate insights from others. Cobb rejects York, 1967).
efforts to reduce diverse religious traditions to God and the World (Philadelphia, 1969).
an underlying perennial philosophy or even to Is It Too Late? A Theology of Ecology
509
COBB
(Beverly Hills, Cal., 1972). (New York, 1981), pp. 74–81.

Christ in a Pluralistic Age (Philadelphia, Ed. with W. W. Schroeder, Process
1975). Philosophy and Social Thought (Chicago,
Process Theology: An Introductory 1981).
Exposition, with David R. Griffin Praying for Jennifer (Nashville, Tenn., 1985).
(Philadelphia, 1976). Ed. with Christopher Ives, The Emptying
Theology and Pastoral Care (Philadelphia, God: A Buddhist-Jewish-Christian
1977). Conversation (New York, 1990).
The Liberation of Life: From the Cell to the Ed. with Clifford Cobb, The Green National
Community, with Charles Birch (London, Product: A Proposed Index of Sustainable
1981). Economic Welfare (Lanham, Md., 1994).
Beyond Dialogue: Toward a Mutual Ed. with Clark H. Pinnock, Searching for an
Transformation of Christianity and Adequate God: A Dialogue Between
Buddhism (Philadelphia, 1982). Process and Free Will Theists (Grand
Process Theology as Political Theology Rapids, Mich., 2000).
(Philadelphia, 1982). Ed., Speaking of Religion and Politics: The
Talking About God, with David Tracy (New Progressive Church Tackles Hot Topics
York, 1983). (Louisville, Kent., 2003).
“Christ Beyond Creative Transformation,” in
Encountering Jesus, ed. Stephen J. Davis Further Reading
(Philadelphia, 1988). Bube, Paul Custodio. Ethics in John Cobb’s
For the Common Good: Redirecting the Process Theology (Atlanta, 1988).
Economy Toward Community, Davaney, Sheila, ed. Feminism and Process
Environment, and a Sustainable Future, Thought (New York, 1981).
with Herman Daly (Boston, 1989; rev. edn Griffin, David Ray, and Thomas J. J. Altizer,
1994). eds. John Cobb’s Theology in Process
Sustainability: Economics, Ecology, and (Philadelphia, 1977).
Justice (New York, 1992). Griffin, David Ray, and Joseph C. Hough,
Founders of Constructive Postmodern Jr., eds. Theology and the University:
Philosophy: Peirce, James, Bergson, Essays in Honor of John B. Cobb, Jr.,
Whitehead, and Hartshorne, with David (Albany, N.Y., 1991). Includes a
R. Griffin, Peter Ochs, Marcus P. Ford, bibliography of Cobb’s writings.
and Pete A. Y. Gunter (Albany, N.Y., Whitehead, Alfred North. Process and
1993). Reality (New York, 1929; corrected edn,
Sustaining the Common Good (Cleveland, ed. D. R. Griffin and D. W. Sherburne,
1994). 1978).
The Earthist Challenge to Economism: A ———, Adventures of Ideas (New York,
Theological Critique of the World Bank 1933).
(New York, 1999).
Postmodernism and Public Policy: Reframing Paul Custodio Bube
Religion, Culture, Education, Sexuality,
Class, Race, Politics, and the Economy
(Albany, N.Y., 2001).

“A Critical View of Inherited Theology,” in
Theologians in Transition, ed. J. M. Wall
510
COE
COE, George Albert (1862–1951) (1900) and The Psychology of Religion (1916)
also developed his functionalist and somewhat
George Albert Coe was born on 26 March pragmatist theory of religion. Rather than
1862 in Mendon, New York, the son of emphasizing the personal and private experi-
Methodist minister George W. Coe and ence of religion, like James, Coe discussed the
Harriet Van Voorhis. He received his BA in effects of religious belief on the realization of
1884 from the University of Rochester, and his personality under social conditions. Coe
STB in 1887 and MA in philosophy and world argued that special religious experiences
religions in 1888 from the Boston University cannot be the proper foundation for religious
School of Theology. From 1888 to 1890 he conviction, which instead must rest more on
was professor of philosophy at the University the wisdom of intellectual reflection.
of Southern California. He then studied Coe also was the leading figure of the field
religion at the University of Berlin in 1890–91. of religious education for many decades. In
Upon returning to Boston University and pre- 1903 he was a co-founder of the Religious
senting his dissertation on “The Problem of Education Association and served as its
Knowledge,” Coe received his PhD in philos- President in 1909. At Union Theological
ophy in 1891. His mentor at Boston was Seminary, he helped to maintain the prevailing
Borden Parker BOWNE, who introduced Coe to spirit of the Social Gospel movement and the
his type of idealism called personalism. ideas of Walter RAUSCHENBUSCH. His liberal
In 1891 Coe was appointed acting professor theory of religious education, elaborated in
of intellectual and moral philosophy at Social Theory of Religious Education (1917)
Northwestern University, and in 1893 he was and What is Christian Education? (1929), was
named the John Evans Professor of Moral and very influential for two generations of
Intellectual Philosophy, holding that position Protestant educators. Coe was active in settle-
until 1909. During much of this period, his ment work, local political reform, and led
philosophy colleague was the professor of efforts to reduce the military’s presence at high
ethics and social philosophy, William schools and colleges. In later years Coe became
C ALDWELL. From 1909 to 1922 Coe was convinced of Marxism’s superiority over cap-
Skinner and McAlpin Professor of Practical italism for proper spiritual and personality for-
Theology and taught religious education and mation. He faulted American churches for
psychology of religion at Union Theological abandoning the pursuit of social justice and
Seminary in New York City, where he estab- capitulating to capitalism in his last book,
lished the department of religious education What Is Religion Doing to Our Consciences?
and psychology. From 1922 until retiring in (1943).
1927, he was professor of religious education
at Columbia University Teachers College. In BIBLIOGRAPHY
retirement Coe remained active in lecturing The Spiritual Life: Studies in the Science of
and publishing into his eighties. Coe died on 9 Religion (New York, 1900).
November 1951 in Claremont, California. The Religion of a Mature Mind (Chicago,
With William J AMES and Edwin D. 1902).
STARBUCK, Coe was one of the three leading Education in Religion and Morals
pioneers in psychology of religion. Using (Chicago, 1904).
experimental psychology, he investigated the The Psychology of Religion (Chicago,
physiological and temperamental traits under- 1916).
lying the susceptibility to having mystical or Social Theory of Religious Education (New
conversion experiences. His books The York, 1917).
Spiritual Life: Studies in the Science of Religion The Motives of Men (New York, 1928).
511
COE
What is Christian Education? (New York, Nicholson, Ian. “Academic

1929). Professionalization and Protestant
What Is Religion Doing to Our Reconstruction, 1890–1902: George
Consciences? (New York, 1943). Albert Coe’s Psychology of Religion,”
Journal of the History of the Behavioral
Other Relevant Works Sciences 30 (1994): 348–68.
Coe’s papers are at Yale University and
Northwestern University. John R. Shook
“The Philosophy of the Movement for
Religious Education,” American Journal
of Theology 8 (1904): 225–39.
“Religious Value,” Journal of Philosophy 5
(1908): 253–6.
“The Mystical as a Psychological Concept,” COFFIN, Henry Sloane (1877–1954)
Journal of Philosophy 6 (1909):
197–202. Born on 5 January 1877 in New York City,
“On Having Friends: A Study of Social Henry Sloane Coffin came to appreciate
Values,” Journal of Philosophy 12 “order” through his father Edmund, an
(1915): 155–61. attorney, and his mother Euphemia, a devout
“Borden Parker Bowne,” Journal of Presbyterian. Coffin once said, “God is to me
Philosophy 7 (1910): 281–2. that creative force, behind and in the universe,
“What Constitutes a Scientific who manifests Himself as energy, as life, as
Interpretation of Religion?” Journal of order, as beauty, as thought, as conscience, as
Religion 6 (1926): 225–35. love.” Coffin’s parents provided Henry with
“My Own Little Theater,” in Religion in the best education, including the Cutler School
Transition, ed. Vergilius Ferm (New for Boys in New York City; Yale University
York, 1937). (BA 1897), where he became a member of Phi
Beta Kappa and Skull and Bones; New College
Further Reading of the University of Edinburgh (1897–9); and
Amer Nat Bio, Dict Amer Bio, Who Was the University of Marburg in Germany (1899),
Who in Amer v3 where he was taught the higher criticism
Archibald, Helen A. George Albert Coe: approach to biblical studies. Returning to the
Theorist for Religious Education in the United States, Coffin sensed God, the “creative
Twentieth Century. PhD dissertation, force,” calling him into ministry and entered
University of Illinois (Urbana, Ill., 1975). Union Theological Seminary where he received
Bremer, David H. George Albert Coe’s his BD in 1900.
Contribution to the Psychology of In 1900 Coffin was ordained as a
Religion. PhD dissertation, Boston Presbyterian minister and served the Bedford
University (Boston, 1949). Park Presbyterian Church in New York City.
Campbell, Eldrich C. George Albert Coe In 1904 he was given a part-time appointment
and Religious Education (New York, on the faculty of Union Theological Seminary,
1974). and taught as an associate professor of practi-
“In Memoriam, George Albert Coe, cal theology until 1926. In 1905 Coffin was
1862–1951,” Religious Education 32 presented with what would prove to be a
(March–April 1952). Special issue pivotal opportunity in his life, accepting a call
devoted to Coe, and includes a to serve as senior pastor of Madison Avenue
bibliography of Coe’s writings. Presbyterian Church. Coffin led this historic
512
COFFIN
church for twenty-one years, growing its mem- efforts were unsuccessful. After his retirement
bership from 500 to 2,500. At the time Coffin from Union Theological Seminary in 1945,
arrived at Madison Avenue, the church sat in Coffin was a well-sought lecturer and preacher
the midst of the Upper East Side, one of the and often referred to affectionately as “Uncle
more affluent neighborhoods in the city which Coffin.” Coffin died on 25 November 1954 in
was also separated by the Third Avenue train New York City.
tracks from tenement buildings that housed Coffin’s contribution to the canon of philo-
many recent immigrants. Following his “con- sophical and religious thought is grounded in
science,” Coffin led outreach efforts to these his unique voice as a preacher, writer, and
“East Siders” and intentionally invited them educator. Perceived by many as eloquent, per-
into the life of the congregation. suasive, and passionate, Coffin added to the
Later, as a theological chasm emerged in the national and religious debate with his zest for
Presbyterian Church between fundamentalists social reform and church unity in the face of
and modernists, Coffin became an articulate factionalism. He believed the church must
voice for diversity of opinion in regards to faithfully live out Jesus’s example of reaching
church doctrine. In 1915, Coffin delivered an out to the poor, and that there must always be
address at Union Seminary which eventually room for thoughtful reflection and even dis-
led to the Auburn Affirmation. This document agreement in regards to church doctrine and
argued for what was then called “Liberal beliefs concerning the person of Jesus Christ.
Evangelicalism,” a name for non-Calvinistic
doctrines that maintained the authority of BIBLIOGRAPHY
Jesus while at the same time sought to appeal The Creed of Jesus (New York, 1907).
in a persuasive manner to individuals who Social Aspects of the Cross (New York,
were thoughtful yet uncommitted in regards to 1911).
their religious convictions. At the General Some Christian Convictions: A Practical
Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in 1927, Restatement in Terms of Present-day
Coffin’s leadership enabled that body to Thinking (New Haven, Conn., 1915).
declare no individual or church body had the In a Day of Social Rebuilding: Lectures on
authority to define a particular interpretation the Ministry of the Church (New Haven,
of scripture as “essential and necessary.” Conn., 1918).
Coffin left Madison Avenue Presbyterian What is There in Religion? (New York,
Church in 1926 to serve as President of Union 1922).
Theological Seminary, a post he held for The Meaning of the Cross (New York,
nineteen years. During his tenure the seminary 1931).
moved forward in many areas, in particular What Men are Asking: Some Current
offering full rights and privileges to women, Questions in Religion (Nashville, Tenn.,
and attracting Reinhold NIEBUHR and Paul 1933).
TILLICH to the seminary faculty. In 1929, God’s Turn (New York, 1934).
Coffin participated in the reunion of the Religion Yesterday and Today (New York,
Church of Scotland and the United Free 1940).
Church of Scotland, which underscored in his The Public Worship of God (Philadelphia,
mind the necessity of church unity in the 1946).
United States. In 1943, Coffin was elected God Confronts Man in History (New York,
moderator of the General Assembly and saw 1947).
this as his opportunity to facilitate a similar
reunion between the Northern and Southern Other Relevant Works
branches of the Presbyterian Church, but his Coffin’s papers are at Union Theological
513
COFFIN
Seminary in New York City. and established the department of the history
University Sermons (New York, 1914). of science in 1966. He also was among the
“Why I Am a Presbyterian,” in Twelve founding members of the Kennedy School of
Modern Apostles and Their Creeds, eds G. Government’s seminar on science and public
K. Chesterton et al. (New York, 1926). policy. In 1977 he was named the Victor S.
Communion Through Preaching (New Thomas Professor of the History of Science.
York, 1952). He retired in 1984, but occasionally offered
courses until 2000. Cohen died on 20 June
Further Reading 2003 in Waltham, Massachusetts.
Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, Cohen was an advocate of the case study
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer method in teaching, and his introductory
Bio, Dict Amer Religious Bio, Nat Cycl natural sciences course at Harvard, “The
Amer Bio v55, Who Was Who in Amer Nature and Growth of the Physical Sciences,”
v3, Who’s Who in Phil was a perennial favorite with students. His
Longfield, Bradley J. The Presbyterian philosophy of science education was reflected
Controversy: Fundamentalists, in a volume edited early in his career, the result
Modernists, and Moderates (Oxford, of a “Workshop in Science in General
1991). Education” held at Harvard in 1950. Cohen
Niebuhr, Reinhold, ed. This Ministry: The was a natural teacher, and in the course of his
Contribution of Henry Sloane Coffin career also lectured and taught at Boston
(New York, 1945). College; Brandeis University; University
Noyes, Morgan P. Henry Sloane Coffin: The College, London; Queen’s University, Belfast;
Man and His Ministry (New York, 1964). and Tel Aviv University, among others. He
was also a founding visiting fellow of Clare
Mark Barger Elliot Hall and a visiting overseas fellow at Churchill
College of Cambridge University.
Cohen played a substantial role in the pro-
fessionalization of the history of science as an
academic discipline, both in the United States
and internationally. He served as President of
COHEN, Isidor Bernard (1914–2003) the US History of Science Society in 1961–2
and edited the Society’s journal Isis from 1953
I. Bernard Cohen was born on 1 March 1914 to 1958. In 1974 he was awarded the George
in Far Rockaway, Long Island (now in Sarton Medal, the highest award conferred by
Queens, New York City). Cohen spent virtu- the History of Science Society. He also served
ally his entire academic career at Harvard, as Vice President of both the American
where he earned his BS in mathematics in 1937 Academy of Arts and Sciences and the
and joined Phi Beta Kappa. He then went on American Association for the Advancement
to graduate study under the guidance of of Science. He was an honorary life member of
George Sarton, began teaching at Harvard as the New York Academy of Sciences, a member
an instructor in physics in 1942, and earned of the American Philosophical Society, a
the first PhD in history of science in 1947. He Benjamin Franklin Fellow of the Royal Society
was an instructor in the physics department of Arts, a fellow of the Royal Astronomical
teaching the history of science until 1947, Society, a corresponding fellow of the British
when he joined the history of science program Academy, and a member of the International
as an instructor of the history of science. He Academy of the History of Science. He served
was promoted up to full professor by 1959, as Chairman of the US National Committee
514
COHEN
for the History and Philosophy of Science, and N.Y., 1960; 2nd edn 1985).
as President of the International Union of the Revolution in Science (Cambridge, Mass.,
History and Philosophy of Science. Among his 1985).
many honors were a Guggenheim Fellowship Benjamin Franklin’s Science (Cambridge,
in 1956 and honorary doctoral degrees from Mass., 1990).
Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute, George Interactions: Some Contacts between the
Washington University, and the University of Natural Sciences and the Social Sciences
Bologna. In 1998 he was awarded the (Cambridge, Mass., 1994).
Centennial Medal from Harvard’s Graduate The Natural Sciences and the Social
School of Arts and Sciences. Sciences: Some Critical and Historical
As a scholar, Cohen was as prolific as an Perspectives (Dordrecht, 1994).
editor as he was as an author. Best-known for Science and the Founding Fathers: Science
his scholarship on Isaac Newton, he was also in the Political Thought of Jefferson,
interested in history of science in America, the Franklin, Adams, and Madison (New
history of scientific instruments and comput- York, 1995).
ing, and the role of quantification in the social Howard Aiken: Portrait of a Computer
sciences. His greatest impact in philosophy is Pioneer (Cambridge, Mass., 2000).
the result not only of the meticulous variorum The Triumph of Numbers: How They
edition of the Principia Mathematica he edited Shaped Modern Life (New York, 2005).
with Alexandre KOYRÉ, but of his own detailed
Introduction to Newton’s “Principia” pub- Other Relevant Works
lished as a companion to the variorum edition Ed., Benjamin Franklin’s Experiments: A
(1971), and the first English translation of New Edition of Franklin’s Experiments
Newton’s Principia Mathematica since 1729 and Observations on Electricity
that he and Anne Whitman published in 1999. (Cambridge, Mass., 1941).
Cohen’s most philosophically reflective work Ed. with Fletcher G. Watson, General
is his comprehensive analysis of the nature of Education in Science (Cambridge, Mass.,
science and the scientific enterprise in 1952).
Revolution in Science (1985), which won the Ed., Opticks, by Isaac Newton (New York,
Pfizer Award from the History of Science 1952).
Society the following year. Ed., Isaac Newton’s Papers and Letters on
Natural Philosophy and Related
BIBLIOGRAPHY Documents (Cambridge, Mass., 1978).
Benjamin Franklin: His Contribution to the Ed., Puritanism and the Rise of Modern
American Tradition (Indianapolis, 1953). Science: The Merton Thesis (New
Franklin and Newton: An Inquiry into Brunswick, N.J., 1990).
Speculative Newtonian Experimental Ed. with Richard S. Westfall, Newton:
Science and Franklin’s Work in Texts, Backgrounds, Commentaries (New
Electricity (Philadelphia, 1956). York and London, 1995).
Introduction to Newton’s “Principia” Ed. with Robert V. Campbell and Gregory
(Cambridge, Mass., 1971). W. Welch, Makin’ Numbers: Howard
From Leonardo to Lavoisier, 1450–1800 Aiken and the Computer (Cambridge,
(New York, 1980). Mass., 1999).
The Newtonian Revolution: With Trans. with Anne Whitman, The Principia.
Illustrations of the Transformation of Preceded by a Guide to Newton’s
Scientific Ideas (Cambridge, UK, 1980). Principia (Berkeley, Cal., 1999).
The Birth of a New Physics (Garden City, Ed. with Jed Z. Buchwald, Isaac Newton’s
515
COHEN
Natural Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass., tive recommendations from the faculty and a
2001). recent bride he set off in search of an academic
Ed. with George E. Smith, The Cambridge appointment.
Companion to Newton (Cambridge, UK, After teaching mathematics at the City
2002). College of New York for five years, he finally
received an appointment in the philosophy
Further Reading department there in 1912. Philosophy profes-
Haigh, T. “I. Bernard Cohen (1 March sor Harry Allen OVERSTREET fought to have
1914–20 June 2003),” Annals of the Cohen join him on the philosophy faculty, and
History of Computing, IEEE 25 Cohen was likely the first Jew in America to
(October–December 2003): 89–92. attain a regular philosophy position. Cohen
Mendelsohn, Everett, ed. Transformation quickly established himself as one of the most
and Tradition in the Sciences: Essays in powerful personalities on the faculty and he
Honor of I. Bernard Cohen (Cambridge, became a pivotal figure not only in that insti-
UK, 1984). tution but in the American Philosophical
Association. Among his many students who
Joseph W. Dauben had philosophy careers were Ernest NAGEL,
Sidney HOOK, Paul WEISS, Herbert SCHNEIDER,
and Philip WIENER. He was visiting professor at
Stanford, the New School for Social Research,
and Harvard. After retiring from City College
in 1938, he taught philosophy at the University
COHEN, Morris Raphael (1880–1947) of Chicago until 1942. Cohen died on 28
January 1947 in Washington, D.C.
Morris R. Cohen was born on 25 July 1880 in Inspired by one of his philosophical models,
Minsk, Russia. Raised in an orthodox Jewish Charles S. PEIRCE (of whose papers he was
community, he was imbued with the spirit and appointed the first editor), Cohen thought of
the letter of the Bible and the Talmud. In 1892 himself primarily as a logician and philosopher
the Cohens emigrated to America and settled in of science standing firmly but moderately in the
New York City. After attending public school “rationalist” tradition. Against the current of
Morris matriculated at the City College of the time his project was to argue that reason
New York from which he was graduated in was an objective feature of the world and his
1900 with a BS. His intellectual interests had philosophical targets were empiricism, nomi-
turned from religious orthodoxy to science nalism, and atomism. Like Peirce, he started
and socialism and he became seriously with the conviction that we have an effective
involved in the social problems of his New method for attaining knowledge, namely, sci-
York community. Science and socialism entific method, and then conceived of the
combined to spark an interest in philosophy metaphysical project as the effort to construct
which he pursued first at Columbia, where he a general description of nature consistent with
was a student of Wilmon SHELDON, Felix the success of that method.
ADLER, and F. J. E. WOODBRIDGE, and then at For Cohen, scientific method is neither
Harvard where he received his PhD in philos- empiricist induction nor a priori deduction, but
ophy in 1906. While at Harvard he roomed a sophisticated integration of reasoning and
with Felix FRANKFURTER and he studied under confrontations with the experience which
Josiah ROYCE , William JAMES, and Hugo fallibly delivers a real grasp of the structure of
MÜNSTERBERG, among others. He wrote his the world. The obvious success of this way of
dissertation on Immanuel Kant. With superla- knowing has metaphysical presuppositions
516
COHEN
about the relation of mind and nature. He felt individual that transcends its abstract relations
that this realistic view of science would make and universal connections. This duality of
little sense on either an empiricist dualism of rational nature and brute existence mirrors the
mental universals and physical particulars, or dual dimensions of the scientific method that
on a Kantian dualism of a creative mind and an enables us to discern the nature of our world.
unknowable thing-in-itself. Empiricists like Just as scientific method is neither purely deduc-
Mach and Pearson were driven to construe tive nor purely experiential, so nature is neither
laws and theories as mere conventions while a rational “one” nor an irrational “plurality.”
Kantians saw them as mental constructions. Nature is rational in the sense that its phenom-
Both accounts were inadequate. ena do conform to rational laws at many differ-
Cohen proposed to overcome these dualisms ent levels, but it also transcends rationality since
and restore a robust view of nature that would it cannot be reduced to laws alone. While deeply
make sense out of the realistic reach of science. suspicious of all forms of irrational mysticism
He located the problem in their failure to appre- and maintaining that everything intelligible can
ciate the real nature of mathematics, logic, and be expressed in logical form, Cohen maintained
reason in general. These were not merely that the essence of all expression is to point
mental manipulations but truly indicative of beyond itself.
the structure of the natural world. He defended This having been said, it would be a clear
a version of logical realism construing the enter- mistake to think of Cohen as merely a specu-
prise of logic as the exploration of the realm of lative philosopher. This was far from the case.
possibility and hence as the basic chapter in As said, from early adulthood his two passions
ontology. The rules of logic, while indepen- were science and socialism, and on the latter
dent of any specific content, have reference to front he was among the most active of public
all possible content and the relations of com- intellectuals in the early part of the twentieth
patibility and incompatibility were as real as century. From its inception in 1914, The New
any other relations in the world. Republic recruited Cohen and he became a
The natural world is neither unknown nor a frequent contributor and editorialist, as he was
mere collection of particulars, but a complex of a contributor to many other journals of social
things-in-relation whose structure can be dis- opinion. In addition, he was extremely active in
cerned by monitored reasoning. For Cohen, social organizations in New York and was a
nature is a relational system and the intelligible frequent speaker at all sorts of public forums.
nature of any actual existent is constituted by This activism also flowed into his academic
its logical relations, its place in the system. Its work in practical philosophy. He wrote a sub-
nature is the group of invariant characters it stantial treatment of the philosophy of history
involves and these characters can involve and even a history of philosophy in America,
several different levels. The object can have but his principal contribution beyond philoso-
one relational properly at one level of analysis phy of science and metaphysics was as one of
and the opposite property at another without the major figures in the development of phi-
contradiction. This invokes Cohen’s famous losophy of law in America. The same temper
but elusive “principle of polarity” which was that informed his philosophy of science
central to his metaphysical vision. informed his philosophy of law. Law was both
Balancing this emphasis on the rationality of a principle of stability and a principle of
nature and the ability of science to discern it, dynamism, a bridge between tradition and the
Cohen was not a thoroughgoing rationalist. emerging demands of society. As such it had to
Although the “nature” of everything is thor- be informed by reason and the various norms
oughly rational, there is more to any given being reason dictated, but it also had to be grounded
than rationality. There is a brute facticity to the in the facts of human nature historically under-
517
COHEN
stood. Like Kant and Peirce before him, Delaney, C. F. Mind and Nature: A Study of
Cohen’s mantra was that experience without the Naturalistic Philosophies of Cohen,
reason is blind and reason without experience Woodbridge and Sellars (Notre Dame,
empty. Ind., 1969).
Freedom and Reason: Studies in the
BIBLIOGRAPHY Philosophy of Jewish Culture in Memory
A Preface to Logic (New York, 1914). of Morris Raphael Cohen, ed. Salo W.
Reason and Nature: An Essay on the Baron (Glencoe, Ill., 1952).
Meaning of Scientific Method (New York, Hollinger, David. Morris R. Cohen and the
1931; 2nd edn, Glencoe, Ill., 1959). Scientific Ideal (Cambridge, Mass., 1975).
Law and the Social Order: Essays in Legal Rosenfield, Leonora. Portrait of a
Philosophy (New York, 1933). Philosopher: Morris Raphael Cohen in Life
An Introduction to Logic and Scientific and Letters (New York, 1962).
Method, with Ernest Nagel (New York, Singer, Marcus G. “Two American
1934). Philosophers: Morris Cohen and Arthur
The Faith of a Liberal (New York, 1946). Murphy,” in American Philosophy
The Meaning of Human History (LaSalle, (Cambridge, UK, 1985), pp. 295–329.
Penn., 1947).
Studies in the Philosophy of Science (New C. F. Delaney
York, 1949).
Reason and Law: Studies in Juristic
Philosophy (Glencoe, Ill., 1950).
American Thought: A Critical Sketch (New
York, 1961).
COHEN, Selma Jeanne (1920– )
Cohen’s papers are at the University of Selma Jeanne Cohen was born on 18
Chicago. September 1920 in Chicago, Illinois. Her
“The Faith of a Logician,” in Contemporary parents sent her to the primary and secondary
American Philosophy: Personal Statements, laboratory school at the University of Chicago,
ed. G. P. Adams and W. P. Montague founded by John DEWEY, and she graduated in
(New York, 1930), vol. 1, pp. 221–47. 1937. However, her true passion was for
A Dreamer’s Journey: The Autobiography of dance. At age thirteen, she began ballet lessons
Morris Raphael Cohen (Glencoe, Ill. under Edna McRae and fell in love with it,
1949). Contains a bibliography of Cohen’s although Cohen herself admits she was at best
writings. a mediocre dancer. Her dancing ability was
Reflections of a Wondering Jew (Boston, also hampered by her poor three-dimensional
1950). vision. McRae kept books on dance and the
King Saul’s Daughter (Glencoe, Ill., 1952). arts in her studio and Cohen borrowed all of
them. She discovered that, other than the occa-
Further Reading sional biography, few books existed on dance
Amer Nat Bio, Amer Phils Before 1950, Bio history or theory. Since she was not destined to
20thC Phils, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, dance professionally, she vowed to write about
Comp Amer Thought, Dict Amer Bio, Nat dance. No degree programs in dance history or
Cycl Amer Bio v40, Pres Addr of APA v3, theory existed at that time. Dance instruction
Proc of APA in Phil Rev v57, Who Was was either concealed within physical education
Who in Amer v2, Who’s Who in Phil departments, or students received private
518
COHEN
lessons. Cohen instead pursued her second Approaching dance through aesthetics and
love for books. philosophy of art, Cohen strives to create a
In 1939 she completed an associate’s degree partnership between theory and the actual
at Stephen’s College, which prepared her for a works of art. She believes that throughout
library career. She then returned to the history, dance served three functions world-
University of Chicago to study English with a wide: (1) ritual – such as dancing for spirits and
minor in philosophy while continuing to read gods; (2) social – such as dancing with another
anything available on dance. Cohen particu- person; and (3) theatrical – dancing for an
larly admired Plato because he recognized the audience. By exploring disciplines such as
importance of dance and also because he artic- anthropology, art history, music, folklore, and
ulated the notion that an ideal definition gives philosophy, Cohen attempts to make us under-
us the essence of a thing. This became Cohen’s stand why people dance and why it is impor-
life’s work: defining dance so that we under- tant that they dance. She asks the following
stand its essential qualities. Cohen completed questions: (1) What is the difference between
her BA in 1941, her MA in 1942, and while body movement and dance? (2) How does one
teaching in the English department, her PhD in apply aesthetic standards to dance that are
English in 1946. Her dissertation on Gerard applicable worldwide and historically? (3)
Manley Hopkins (1844–1889) focused on the Indeed, is this possible? (4) Finally, how do we
relationship between his poetry and his reli- apply aesthetic standards to different kinds of
gious thought. His poetry, oftentimes pro- dance and choreography found within the
foundly intense, used a technique called same time and place?
“sprung rhythm” to recreate the cadence of In 1952 Cohen moved to New York City
everyday speech. The notion of the movement where ballet, modern dance, and other forms
of words within a time frame related to her of dance were already established and thriving.
interest in dance. Initially she taught dance history at the High
Cohen began teaching English at the School of Performing Arts, then at a number of
University of California at Los Angeles in colleges and universities in New England such
1946. In 1949 she attended the annual meeting as Connecticut College for Women. In the late
of the American Society of Aesthetics, 1950s she became the deputy assistant to arts
exchanging ideas with philosopher Rudolf critic John Martin of the New York Times, and
ARNHEIM and later Francis SPARSHOTT, Hilde later wrote her own dance reviews. She was
HEIN, Julie van Camp, Arnold BERLEANT, and one of the first female critics hired by the New
Peter Kivy. Arnheim encouraged her to submit York Times. One of her colleagues, art critic
a paper on dance to their scholarly journal, Clive Barnes, called her dance reviews exem-
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. plary. In 1959, she co-founded Dance
Following his suggestion, “Some Theories of Perspectives. Extensively illustrated, each issue
Dance in Contemporary Society” was pub- concentrated on a specific aspect of dance
lished in 1950. Since then Cohen has written written by an expert. She remained its editor
more than 200 scholarly articles, book and until it closed in 1976.
dance reviews, introductions and prefaces, cri- In 1974 at the Dance Critics Association
tiques, informed biographies, obituaries, and meeting, the idea to create an encyclopedia of
essays on dance aesthetics. Her goal was to dance encompassing the entire world emerged
turn dance history, theory, and aesthetics into from a discussion between Cohen and Arlene
academic disciplines. She was one of the first Croce. Cohen was drafted as editor; and so
to note that dance becomes history the began twenty-four years of intensive, exhila-
moment the performance ends, since no two rating, and occasionally frustrating work. In
dance performances are exactly alike. 1976 the National Endowment for the
519
COHEN
Humanitites awarded a planning grant to get (1982), that explored questions of identity
the project underway. An editorial board was using Swan Lake as her primary example.
created, headed by Cohen. Although the Cohen reminds us that dance theory must be
project received numerous grants, it was combined with experiencing dance perfor-
shuttled from publisher to publisher until mance, that we must see dance, not only think
1991, when Oxford University Press agreed to about it. “Dance,” she wrote, “does not take
publish it. By then, much of the material was place in the mind (though I admit I have chore-
outdated, needing extensive revisions and addi- ographed some magnificent ballets there), but
tions. New articles were added, new photos, on the stage.” (1982, p. ix) Her gentle wit,
and an elaborate cross-referencing system so notwithstanding, reinforces the notion that
that dance genres from, for example, Armed separation of the physical and the emotional
Dances to Trance Dance to Wayang could from the mental is not particularly construc-
relate to different parts of the world, dance tive. There is a need to relate to the dancer as
types, and performing groups. Entries also a person, just as the dancer asserts her per-
included biographies of choreographers and sonality to the audience. This is one reason
performers, lighting, makeup, costume and we return to see Swan Lake yet again, even if
stage design, circus performers, Ainu dances, we have seen it the week before.
the hula – creating for the first time compre- From 1983 to 1989 Cohen taught dance
hensive, worldwide approaches to dance. Her history and theory at the University of
wish to bring together scholars and perform- California, Riverside, while continuing to work
ers resulted in endorsements from Rudolf on the encyclopedia; in 1990 she became a
Arnheim and choreographer Jerome Robbins. Distinguished Scholar. In a concerted effort to
In her preface to the six-volume encyclopedia, encourage future dance scholars, the Society of
finally published in 1998, Cohen explains that Dance History Scholars inaugurated the Selma
the significance of dance is that it promotes Jeanne Cohen Awards in 1996. In 2000
intercultural understanding that transcends Cohen’s wish to internationalize dance schol-
language. She notes that the evolution of dance arship and make scholarly papers available to
throughout the world reflected different a multidisciplinary forum resulted in the Selma
cultural forms. Understanding the diversity of Jeanne Cohen Fund for International
dance movement enables us to “comprehend Scholarship on Dance, administered by the
the message conveyed by the moving body” Fulbright Association. After more than fifty
(1998, p. xviii) better than by using rigid stan- years of steadfast commitment, her determi-
dards that cannot possibly apply to all dance. nation to give dance intellectual respectability
Understanding the aesthetic value of dance and philosophical significance seems success-
enables scholars, creators, and performers to ful. Past and future generations will remember
think, observe, and share ideas with one her for her considerable scholarly contribu-
another and with audiences. tions, her respect for dancers, choreographers,
Cohen was a charter member of the critics, and scholars, and for her levity, never
National Endowment for the Arts dance panel, taking herself or her accomplishments too seri-
serving from 1966 to 1971. In 1976 she ously. Cohen realizes the difficulty choreogra-
received a Fulbright Grant to travel to Russia phers, dancers, and audiences have with this
to conduct research on dance performance and seemingly trivial subject; still she looks forward
choreography, and to interview dance histori- to seeing nice old lady characters dancing.
ans and dance critics. In 1980 she received a
Guggenheim Fellowship, which enabled her BIBLIOGRAPHY
to begin work on a new book, Next Week, “Some Theories of Dance in Contemporary
Swan Lake: Reflections on Dance and Dances Society,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art
520
COHON
Criticism 9 (1950): 111–18. Jeanne Cohen,” Dance Research Journal 32

“Dance as an Art of Imitation,” Journal of (Summer 2000): 34–8.
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 12 (1953):
232–6. Barbara Sandrisser
Ed. with Francis Gadan-Pamard and Robert
Maillard, Dictionary of Modern Ballet
(New York, 1959).
“A Prolegomenon to an Aesthetics of
Dance,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art
Criticism 21 (1962): 19–26. COHON, Samuel Solomon (1888–1959)
Ed., The Modern Dance: Seven Statements
of Belief (Middletown, Conn., 1966). Samuel S. Cohon was born on 22 March 1888
Next Week, Swan Lake: Reflections on in Lohi, Minsk, Russia. In his youth he was
Dance and Dances (Middletown, Conn., given a Jewish education in rabbinic texts and
1982). traditional learning. He immigrated to the United
“Problems of Definition,” in What is Dance? States in 1904. His studies in the United States
ed. Roger Copeland and Marshall Cohen included earning a high school diploma in New
(Oxford, 1983), pp. 339–54. Jersey, seminars at the University of Chicago,
Ed., Dance as Theatre Art: Source Readings and a BA degree from the University of
in Dance History from 1581 to the Present Cincinnati in 1911. He was ordained as a
(Hightstown, N.J., 1992). Reform rabbi at the Hebrew Union College in
Ed., International Encyclopedia of Dance Cincinnati, Ohio, in 1912, studying with
(Oxford, 1998). Kaufmann KOHLER, the architect of American
Reform Judaism’s theological stance. After ordi-
Other Relevant Works nation, he served several Reform Jewish con-
“Woman as Artistic Innovator: The Case of gregations.
Choreographer,” in A Sampler of In 1923, Cohon was appointed as professor of
Women’s Studies, ed. Dorothy G. Jewish theology at Hebrew Union College upon
McGuigan (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1973), pp. Kohler’s retirement. During the next two
5–16. decades, the Reform movement in Judaism was
“What Does Sugar Plum Fairy ‘Mean’?” undergoing considerable change and develop-
Dance Chronicle 4 (1981): 279–96. ment. Cohon was one of the leaders shaping
“Virtuosity and the Aesthetic Ideals of this change. Until his retirement in 1956, he
Japanese Dance and Western Classical influenced the growing trend toward infusing
Dance,” with Gunji Masakatsu, Dance Reform Judaism with greater emotionalism and
Research Annual 14 (1983): 88–95. respect for tradition. Notable publications during
“Beyond Performance: Dance Scholarship this time include his 1923 revision of the Reform
Today,” with A. J. Faro, S. D. Lokko, Ou Union Haggadah, a text for home use on the
Jian-Ping, J. Robinson, and E. Souritz, holiday of Passover; his editing of the Reform
Ballet Review 17 (1989): 2–2F. prayer book Rabbi’s Manual in 1928; and, most
strikingly, in the coup by which his statement of
Further Reading Reform principles became the basis for the
Dorris, George E., and Barbara G. Palfry. creedal formulation of the so-called Columbus
“Selma Jeanne Cohen,” Dance Chronicle 18 Platform, which in 1937 replaced and radically
(1995): 143–152, 319–332. Contains a bib- altered the earlier statement of Reform ideals in
liography of Cohen’s publications. the Pittsburg Platform of 1885 established under
Dorris, George E., et al. “Tributes to Selma the influence of Kohler.
521
COHON
Cohon published scholarly books and religiosity. Judaism combines a personal expe-
articles on the nature of religion, the signifi- rience of the divine with a communal identity
cance of specific Jewish practices, the key ideas derived from history. Judaism, however, has
of Jewish thought, and the relationship transformed the social into a transcendent
between Judaism and other religious tradi- value. Judaism balances loyalty to the Jewish
tions, in particular the relationship to people with personal faith such that national
Christianity. By the time of his retirement he aspirations are tied to spiritual goals. The
had authored over 300 publications. Upon maligned idea of the chosen people subordi-
retiring he went to Los Angeles, California, nates national existence to the effort of attain-
where he nurtured that branch of the Hebrew ing higher values.
Union College until his death there on 22 Cohon integrated his ideas into a double
August 1959. meaning attributed to the belief in immortal-
Cohon’s thought took as its foundation a ity. Immortality implies the belief that within
pragmatist’s view of religion: religion proves its each person exists a spirit that extends beyond
truth through its usefulness. To argue for such the confines of the body. Immortality in the
usefulness he turned to psychology and social highest sense, however, is attained by insuring
anthropology. Drawing on Rudolf Otto and the continuation of one’s ideals and values
William JAMES, he emphasized the “phenom- through the continuation of civilization.
enon” of the “Holy” and the individual’s
response to it. Cohon sought to correct the BIBLIOGRAPHY
“rationalism” of previous Reform Jewish What We Jews Believe (1931).
thinkers. Reason provides an important com- Judaism: A Way of Life (Cincinnati, 1948).
plement and corrective to emotional experi- Jewish Theology: A Historical and
ence, but religion essentially arises as a living Systematic Interpretation of Judaism and
response to a personal deity. Religion tran- Its Foundations (Assen, The Netherlands,
scends both politics and ethics in its concern 1971).
for the personal. Even during times of national Religious Affirmations (Los Angeles, 1983).
crisis, such as World War II, Cohon pro- Essays in Jewish Theology, ed. Walter Jacob,
claimed that the most pressing question was Stanley Dreyfus, and Sidney Brooks
that of keeping “the divine alive in man.” This (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1987).
emphasis on personal religiousness led Cohon
to attack the emphasis on Jewish peoplehood Further Reading
in Mordecai K APLAN ’s Reconstructionist Amer Nat Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v47,
Judaism. Who Was Who in Amer v4, Who’s Who
Cohon, however, also criticized Jewish exis- in Phil
tentialists for ignoring the social dimensions of Wiener, Theodore. “The Writings of Samuel
Jewish religion. He learned from Émile S. Cohon,” Studies in Bibliography and
Durkhiem and Max Müller that religion often Booklore 2 (1956): 160–78.
functions to bring social solidarity. All indi-
viduals exist as parts of a greater whole: a S. Daniel Breslauer
family, a nation, the human race. Religion is
functional, and that function has a communal
aspect as in clear in Judaism. Jews are part of
a social body, not just a creedal community.
The language of the Jewish people, Hebrew,
and the experience of Jewish history were part
of the complete complex that made up Jewish
522
COMMONS
COMMONS, John Rogers (1862–1945) for the rational and objective creation of leg-
islation. Throughout his long career, he was
John R. Commons was born on 13 October actively involved with various government
1862 in Hollandsburg, Ohio. He earned his agencies and private advocacy groups, largely
BA degree from Oberlin College in 1888 and in connection with labor-related causes. His
that same year enrolled for graduate study at concern for and activity with respect to public
Johns Hopkins University. He studied under policy issues took precedence over the devel-
Richard T. ELY, which furthered his commit- opment of a systematic body of economic
ment to Christian social reform, awakening a theories.
lifelong interest in social research. Though he Although Commons never developed a
was a gifted student, his academic record was totally acceptable explanation of institutional
uneven, which was probably related to a series economics, he clearly distanced himself from
of nervous collapses. He failed his history the prevailing neoclassical school of thought.
examinations and never finished his doctorate. A survey of his writings shows the diversity of
He was appointed as an instructor at Wesleyan his search for an understanding of economic
University in Middletown, Connecticut in behavior. This work includes research on the
1890, and after Oberlin awarded him an role of religion, political arrangements, legal
honorary master of arts degree he spent one foundations, race, immigration, and trade
year there as assistant professor of sociology in unionism among others. His multidisciplinary
1891. He went on to teach sociology at approach, which focused very heavily on
Indiana University from 1892 to 1895 and at actual human behavior, was in sharp contrast
Syracuse University from 1895 to 1899. After with the mainstream, neoclassical approach
he was dismissed from Syracuse, he spent five which, in Commons’s view, was too mecha-
years without an academic appointment before nistic and treated economics like a physical
Ely hired him at the University of Wisconsin as science. Moreover, Commons argued that the
professor of economics in 1904. Commons neoclassical emphasis on individual behavior
served as President of the American Economic was incorrect. He believed the focus should be
Association in 1917. He remained at on collective action.
Wisconsin until his retirement in 1932. He It was in his studies of the labor movement
died on 11 May 1945 in Fort Lauderdale, in the United States and the legal roots of cap-
Florida. italist society where Commons was most effec-
Although Commons is most frequently asso- tive and influential. Many of the labor reforms
ciated with the “Institutionalist” school of he pioneered in the state of Wisconsin were
economic thought and wrote a book entitled ultimately extended to the federal level. Indeed,
Institutional Economics (1934), he is most in 1989 John Commons was among the first
noted for his successes in the development of four persons to be inducted into the Labor
public policy legislation for the state of Hall of Fame created by the United States
Wisconsin, especially in the area of industrial Department of Labor.
relations. An expert in labor history and labor
economics, he was closely involved with BIBLIOGRAPHY
Robert LaFollette’s Progressive Party and was The Distribution of Wealth (New York,
instrumental in developing legislation in areas 1893).
such as workplace safety, workman’s com- Social Reform and the Church (New York,
pensation, unemployment compensation, and 1894).
public utility regulation. He helped develop Proportional Representation (New York,
Wisconsin’s Legislative Reference Service, the 1896; 2nd edn 1907).
first of its kind, to provide resources and data Trade Unionism and Labor Problems
523
COMMONS
(Boston, 1905). Somers, Gerald, ed. Labor, Management,

Races and Immigrants in America (New and Social Policy: Essays in the John R.
York, 1907). Commons Tradition (Madison, Wisc.,
Labor and Administration (New York, 1963).
1913).
Principles of Labor Legislation, with J. B. Joseph A. Giacalone
Andrews (New York, 1916).
History of Labor in the United States, 4 vols
(New York, 1918–35).
Industrial Goodwill (New York, 1919).
Legal Foundations of Capitalism (New
York, 1924). COMPTON, John Joseph (1928– )
Institutional Economics: Its Place in Political
Economy (New York, 1934). John J. Compton was born on 17 May 1928
in Chicago Illinois. He studied mathematics at
Other Relevant Works the College of Wooster in Ohio, where he
Commons’s papers are in the State Historical received a BA in mathematics and music in
Society Library in Madison, Wisconsin. 1949. From there he continued his education
A Documentary History of American at Yale University, majoring in philosophy,
Industrial Society, 10 vols, with others and earned his MA in 1951 and his PhD in
(New York, 1910–11). 1953. Compton became an assistant professor
Myself (New York, 1934). of philosophy at Vanderbilt University in
The Economics of Collective Action, ed. 1952, and was promoted up to full professor
Kenneth Parson (New York, 1950). by 1968. He served as chair of the philosophy
Contains a bibliography of Commons’s department from 1963 to 1973. He was a
writings. visiting professor of philosophy at Colorado
College in 1977 and a visiting professor at
Further Reading Wesleyan University in 1984. He retired in
Amer Nat Bio, Comp Amer Thought, Dict 1998, and remains active at Vanderbilt.
Amer Bio, Dict Economics, Who Was Compton has received numerous awards for
Who in Amer v2 his contributions to the discipline of philoso-
Barbash, Jack. “John R. Commons: Pioneer phy. He was a Phi Beta Kappa member and
of Labor Economics,” Monthly Labor received a Kent fellowship in 1951. In 1956–7
Review 112 (May 1989): 44–9. he earned funding through a fellowship from
Blaug, Mark. Wesley Mitchell (1874–1948), the Belgian-American Education Foundation.
John Commons (1862–1945), Clarence He won the Danforth Foundation award for
Ayres (1891–1972) (Aldershot, UK, distinguished teaching in 1966, and received
1992). both the Madison Sarratt Prize for distin-
Dorfman, Joseph. The Economic Mind in guished teaching and the Chancellor’s Cup of
America, 1918–1933 (New York, 1959). the Nashville Vanderbilt Club for
Gonce, Richard A. The Development of Student–Faculty Relations in 1967. He held a
John R. Commons’ System of Thought. visiting fellowship at Princeton University in
PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin 1968, and a National Endowment for the
(Madison, Wisc., 1967). Humanities Senior Fellowship in 1974–5. The
Harter, Lafayette. John R. Commons: His Center for Humanities of Wesleyan University
Assault on Laissez-faire (Corvallis, awarded him an associate fellowship in 1974. In
Oregon, 1962). 1979 he received the Distinguished Alumni
524
COMPTON
Award from Wooster College; in 1982 the Religion, and Ecology, ed. Ian Barbour
Alumni Professor Award of the Vanderbilt (New York, 1972), pp. 33–47.
Alumni Association; and in 1990 the “Responsibility and Agency,” Southern
Distinguished Teaching Award from Peabody Journal of Philosophy 11 (1973): 83–9.
College. “Hare, Husserl and Philosophical Discovery,”
Along with these prestigious awards, in Analytic Philosophy and
Compton is also a member of the American Phenomenology, ed. Harold Durfee
Philosophical Association (serving as Secretary of (Boston, 1976).
the Eastern Division during 1970–73 and as “Reinventing the Philosophy of Nature,”
Vice President in 1974), the American Academy Review of Metaphysics 33 (1979): 3–28.
of Arts and Sciences, and the American “Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Human
Association of University Professors. He was Freedom,” Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982):
elected President of the Metaphysical Society of 577–88.
America in 1979. He has memberships in the “On the Sense of There Being a Moral Sense
Society for Phenomenology and Existential of Nature,” Personalist Forum 2 (1986):
Philosophy, Merleau-Ponty Circle, Philosophy of 38–55.
Science Association, American Association for “Phenomenology and the Philosophy of
the Advancement of Science, American Nature,” Man and World 21 (1988):
Association of University Professors, Society for 65–89.
Values in Higher Education, and Society of “Some Contributions of Existential
Christian Philosophy, and he was an honorary Phenomenology to the Philosophy of
faculty member of Omicron Delta Kappa. Natural Science,” American Philosophical
Compton’s main areas of research involve Quarterly 25 (1988): 99–113.
metaphysics, philosophy of science, phenome- “Phenomenological Reflections and the
nology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of Human Meaning of Science,” in American
nature. He has also written extensively on Phenomenology: Origins and
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy and exis- Developments, ed. Eugene Kalelin and
tential phenomenology. In his study of the phi- Calvin Schrag (Dordrecht, 1989).
losophy of science, Compton has recognized “Merleau-Ponty’s Thesis of the Primacy of
that scientists have become agents of social Perception and the Meaning of Scientific
change, that is, our lives are drastically affected Objectivity,” in Merleau-Ponty: Critical
by technological advances. While he admits that Essays, ed. Henry Pietersma (Washington,
we are, in a sense, “better off” by these advances, D.C., 1990).
on the other hand, ever-growing scientific “The Persistence of the Problem of Freedom,”
progress brings us face to face with new ques- Review of Metaphysics 60 (2001): 95–115.
tions concerning religion, politics, ethics, human
nature, and, perhaps most significantly, the def- Further Reading
inition of nature itself. Kohak, Erazim. “Reply to Compton’s ‘On the
Sense of There Being a Moral Sense of
BIBLIOGRAPHY Nature’,” Personalist Forum 2 (1986):
“Toward an Ontology of Value,” 56–60.
Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1958): 157–70. McMullin, Ernan. “Compton on the
“Natural Science and the Experience of Philosophy of Nature,” Review of
Nature,” in Phenomenological America, ed. Metaphysics 33 (1979): 29–58.
James Edie (Chicago, 1967).
“Science and God’s Action in Nature,” in Daniel Trippett
Earth Might Be Fair: Reflections on Ethics,
525
CONE
CONE, James Hal (1938– ) tempting job offers, and in 1969 he left Adrian
College and accepted a position at Union
James Cone, the son of Charlie and Lucy Theological Seminary. He believed Union’s
Cone, was born on 3 August 1938 in Fordyce, strong history of theological creativity and its
Arkansas, and grew up in Bearden, Arkansas. location within the heart of black America –
Cone argues in his writings that life in Bearden Harlem – would provide the best opportunity
provided him with the two principles that for him to continue the development of a black
would guide his academic work and his sense theology of liberation.
of praxis: confrontation with the nature of For a short period of time, Cone considered
racism and the life-affirming nature of the returning to graduate school to pursue
black Christian faith. advanced work in literature. He saw this as a
Beginning his college career at Shorter way of working through some of his sociopo-
College, Cone transferred to Philander Smith litical and intellectual concerns. However, the
College in Arkansas and graduated with his BA growing intensity of the civil rights struggle
in 1958. Having accepted a “call” to preach at disrupted these plans and strengthened his
the age of sixteen, he nurtured his interest in determination to apply his training and faith to
church ministry as a college student by serving, the movement against injustice. Although he
at various times, as pastor of several African wrestled with the sociopolitical ramifications
Methodist Episcopal (AME) churches, includ- of Christianity for the destruction of racism
ing Allen Chapel AME Church. In addition to during much of his schooling, it was at Adrian
practical experience as a minister, Cone College that he began discussing publicly this
secured professional training by earning the attempt to reconcile black power and the
BD degree from Garrett Theological Seminary Gospel of Christ. The intellectual pieces began
in 1961. Overcoming numerous obstacles, falling in place when Ronald Goetz invited
including both explicit and implicit racism, he him to give a lecture in February 1968 at
then entered the PhD program at Garrett. Elmhurst College. In this lecture, “Christianity
While a graduate student, Cone wrestled with and Black Power,” Cone verbalized his rejec-
the challenges of the civil rights movement, tion of theological paradigms offered by white
debating whether he could be of greater service thinkers as universally applicable, and he
to the struggle by leaving school and becoming began to formulate a theological interpreta-
involved full time or by using his educational tion of the Christ event that spoke more
process and faith commitment as tools for the directly to the existential condition of African
destruction of racism. Cone decided to remain Americans, through an equating of black
in graduate school, receiving the MA in 1963 power and the Gospel of Christ. In this sense,
and a PhD in theology in 1965 from Garrett unlike most other theologians at that time, he
Theological Seminary, writing his dissertation saw no contradiction between black power
on Karl Barth. and the Christian faith. In fact, he attempted
With no real prospects for pastoring an to show a necessary synergy between the two.
AME church or working at one of the AMEC Cone would come to understand his theolog-
colleges, Cone accepted a teaching appoint- ical work as a way of holding the Church
ment as an assistant professor at Philander accountable for praxis related to the radical
Smith College. However, due to the conserva- gospel of Christ.
tive leanings of the administration, he left While rejected by some, this essay received
Philander Smith and began teaching as an positive attention from leading scholars such as
assistant professor at Adrian College in C. Eric Lincoln, whom Cone credits with his
Michigan in 1966. Cone’s eventual promi- receiving other invitations to lecture (as well as
nence in theological circles resulted in various job offers). During the next year, 1969,
526
CONE
through the encouragement of Lincoln and As one might expect, many theologians
the invitation from Metz Rollins, Executive objected to Cone’s radical reworking of
Director of the National Conference of Black theology. While some African-American
Churchmen (NCBC), to become a member of scholars were in this camp, others argued that
the group’s theological commission (charged his theological system remained, although
with writing a black theology statement), Cone rhetorically black, too indebted to the
gave more focused attention to his growing European theological tradition, as evidenced
theological sensibilities, often arguing that the by his strong use of Karl Barth and Paul
NCBC afforded him the necessary organiza- TILLICH. These critics, who included Gayraud
tional and political platform on which to base Wilmore and Cone’s brother Cecil, called for
his theological concerns. It was also during a theological discourse that made more use of
this year that Cone published his first book, African-American cultural resources. In a
Black Theology and Black Power, in which he response tied to this critique, Charles Long
began to outline the contours of what he raised questions concerning the usability of
would call Black Theology of Liberation. One theology as a proper method for exploring
year after the publication of this book, Cone African-American religion and the struggle for
provided the first systematic discussion of liberation when it is a product of the world
black theology in Black Theology of view African Americans are attempting to
Liberation (1970). Here he offered a new escape. In addition William R. Jones ques-
grounding or foundational principle for theo- tioned the theodical underpinning of black
logical discourse, one that would mark his theology, suggesting that a humanocentric
work from that time to the present: liberation theism might provide a better response to the
as the focus of the Christ event. disproportionate suffering encountered by
What Cone provided in these books was a African Americans.
turn in theological discourse, one that took Cone addressed his critics in several texts,
seriously the reality of oppressed African beginning with Spirituals and the Blues (1972),
Americans and used this historical lens to inter- which focused attention on African-American
pret the Christ event. In addition to scripture musical culture as a theological resource for the
as a theological resource, as this shift might development of a more appropriate language
suggest, Cone gave attention to African- and grammar for the doing of theology. Other
American culture, the African-American expe- works, including God of the Oppressed (1975)
rience, and African-American history as and Martin and Malcolm and America (1992),
resources for the doing of theology. And he which more concretely outlined the norm,
argued that using these various resources to sources, and structure of black theology,
read scripture pushed to the fore God’s intense followed this book. He has also extended his
commitment to the oppressed. According to writing and teaching to include issues related
Cone, and this was one of the major theolog- to the global impact of liberation theology. In
ical shifts his work marked, God’s connection all, Cone has published some eleven books,
to the oppressed is so strong that God is onto- more than 150 articles, and he has lectured on
logically black – with blacks representing for black theology and black religion at more than
him the paradigm of oppression in the United one thousand colleges, universities, divinity
States. Within these works, he also provided a schools, and community organizations in the
theological analysis of violence that argued for United States, Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin
the oppressed as the shapers of theological America. At Union Theological Seminary,
language and the nature of praxis. According where he is the Charles A. Briggs Distinguished
to Cone, physical violence could be a legitimate Professor of Systematic Theology and has
tool of struggle against injustice. taught for roughly three decades, he has
527
CONE
trained a significant number of scholars who Singleton, Harry H., III. Black Theology
have continued to work in various forms of lib- and Black Ideology: Deideological
eration theology. His impressive contributions Dimensions in the Theology of James H.
to theological studies have been noted through Cone (Collegeville, Minn., 2002).
various honorary degrees, as well as awards
such as the American Black Achievement Anthony B. Pinn
Award (in religion) from Ebony Magazine
(1992), and the Theological Scholarship and
Research Award from the Association of
Theological Schools (1994).
BIBLIOGRAPHY CONWAY, Moncure Daniel (1832–1907)

Black Theology and Black Power (New
York, 1969; Maryknoll, N.Y., 1990). Moncure Daniel Conway was born on 17
Black Theology of Liberation (Philadelphia, March 1832 to Walker Peyton Conway and
1970; Maryknoll, N.Y., 1990). Margaret (Daniel) Conway in Stafford County,
Spirituals and the Blues: An Interpretation Virginia, where the Conways were one of the
(New York, 1972; Maryknoll, N.Y., most prominent and wealthy slaveholding
1991). families. In 1849 Conway graduated with his
God of the Oppressed (New York, 1975; BA from Dickinson College in Carlisle,
Maryknoll, N.Y., 1997). Pennsylvania, where the seed of abolitionist
For My People: Black Theology and the thought was planted in his mind. He began to
Black Church (Maryknoll, N.Y., 1984). study law for the bar in 1850 and simultane-
My Soul Looks Back (Nashville, Tenn., ously began to study progressive thinkers such
1986). as Horace Greeley and Horace Mann. Inspired
Speaking the Truth: Ecumenism, by Mann, Conway lobbied the Virginia legis-
Liberation, and Black Theology lature for compulsory public education. This
(Maryknoll, N.Y., 1986; 1999). effort bore no fruit, but the conservatism of the
Martin and Malcolm and America: A Virginia legislature convinced him that slavery
Dream or a Nightmare (Maryknoll, N.Y., had stultified the thinking of the Virginia estab-
1992). lishment, which seemed to cling to the status
Ed. with Gayraud Wilmore, Black quo against all reason. Conway’s private
Theology: A Documentary History pursuit of knowledge drove his intellectual
(Maryknoll, N.Y., 1993). development and, a month after he began to
Risks of Faith: The Emergence of a Black study the law, his life was transformed by an
Theology of Liberation, 1968–1998 encounter with the writings of Ralph Waldo
(Boston, 1999). EMERSON. Emerson’s celebration of the indi-
vidual led Conway in new intellectual paths
Further Reading and germinated the seed of abolitionist thought.
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio Early in 1851 Conway abandoned his legal
Burrow, Rufus, Jr. James H. Cone and studies, choosing to become a Methodist
Black Liberation Theology (Jefferson, minister instead. The Methodist Church’s
N.C., 2001). emphasis on the equality of all believers before
Hopkins, Dwight N., ed. Black Faith and God and its earlier prohibition against slave
Public Talk: Critical Essays on James ownership by church members were consistent
Cone’s Black Theology and Black Power with his budding abolitionism. He became a
(Maryknoll, N.Y., 1999). circuit-riding Methodist minister on his nine-
528
CONWAY
teenth birthday and continued to read Emerson by events beyond his control. In the summer of
and other radical authors. Conway’s sermons 1856 he resolutely denounced slavery in a
began to alarm the faithful as he emphasized sermon; within three months he was ousted
the fulfillment of a person’s life on this earth from his position, accused of using the pulpit as
rather than preparation for the afterlife. During a political forum. In his defense Conway main-
this period, he decided that his interest in edu- tained that slavery was a moral, and hence,
cational reform, his opposition to the conser- religious issue. By December of 1856 he
vatism of the slaveholding aristocracy in accepted an appointment to the First
Virginia, and his attraction to Emerson and Congregational Church of Cincinnati, Ohio,
other radical writers were all expressions of a where the members were more tolerant of his
desire for autonomy, not only for himself, but abolitionism.
for all men and women. Conway embarked Initially, Conway flourished in the heavily
on the quest of a freethinker, seeking to expose Germanized city of Cincinnati, marrying Ellen
and root out arbitrary authority wherever he Dana, the well-educated daughter of a promi-
encountered it. nent businessman in 1858. He was particularly
In 1852 Conway left his Methodist ministry impressed with German intellectuals in
to attend Harvard Divinity School. In the Cincinnati, especially John B. STALLO and
Boston area he befriended several local lumi- August WILLICH, the latter of whom sharpened
naries, particularly Henry Wadsworth his sensitivity to labor problems in the indus-
Longfellow and Jared Sparks. Although ini- trializing city. Conway’s theology moved
tially repelled by the radical transcendentalism further left as he studied David Friedrich
of Theodore Parker, he ultimately went beyond Strauss’s Das Leben Jesus and questioned the
Parker’s radical theology. Conway also made veracity of biblical accounts of miracles, the
the short pilgrimage to Concord to meet divinity of Jesus, and the authority of the Bible.
Emerson, who introduced him to other promi- In 1859 Conway’s church split over his
nent transcendentalists. Conway graduated theology, but he retained a following sufficient
from Harvard with his BD in 1854 and to remain in the pulpit. He finally left the
accepted the prestigious Unitarian pulpit in Unitarian Church in 1862 and, after leading the
Washington, D.C. He increasingly found Conway family slaves to safety in Ohio, he
himself torn between his opposition to slavery moved to Boston to serve as co-editor with
and his allegiance to the South. Although he Franklin B. Sanborn of an antislavery weekly,
abhorred slavery, he disapproved of radical The Commonwealth.
abolitionists’ blanket condemnations of all Conway’s reasons for leaving Cincinnati
southerners, arguing that northerners had been went beyond theology, however. As the esca-
complicit in the growth of southern slavery. lating sectional crisis turned to war in April of
Nonetheless, northern abolitionists, including 1861, he was thrust into the most difficult
radicals like William Lloyd GARRISON and period of his tumultuous life. While his aboli-
Wendell PHILLIPS, welcomed Conway to their tionist allies abandoned their pacifism to
cause, recognizing the power of an eloquent support the Union cause, he nearly succumbed
abolitionist from an influential, slave-owning to the psychological pressures created by his
Virginia family. commitment to abolitionism and his compas-
During the first year of his Washington sion for southerners. He argued that immediate
ministry, Conway was cautious about express- emancipation of slaves and opposition to the
ing his abolitionist views before a congrega- war should be linked as one overriding goal,
tion that included wealthy slave owners. As because emancipation would undermine the
Americans became increasingly polarized over South’s ability to prosecute the war as inspired
the issue of slavery, however, he was swept up slaves rebelled against their owners. Although
529
CONWAY
he felt the horror of war more profoundly than Probably his most important literary accom-
many Americans, Conway’s commitment to the plishment was his revival of the reputation of
abolitionist cause never wavered, and he lectured Thomas Paine, who had been condemned by
at numerous venues on the subject throughout Americans for decades as an atheistic Jacobin.
the war. In 1863 he managed to convince skep- Conway’s publications, as well as his life,
tical abolitionist colleagues that he should travel provide invaluable insight into American tran-
to England to promote their cause. Conway scendentalism, the abolitionist movement,
apparently felt compelled to leave the United pacifist thought, and liberal religious thought
States because he could not tolerate the emo- during the late nineteenth century.
tional whirlpool into which he had been drawn.
In the summer of 1863 Conway sent a letter BIBLIOGRAPHY
to James Murray Mason, the Confederate envoy Tracts for Today (Cincinnati, 1857).
in London, in which he proposed that if the The Golden Hour (Boston, 1862).
Confederacy would liberate its slaves, American Idols and Ideals, with an Essay on
abolitionists would advocate an end to the war Christianity (New York, 1867).
that would allow the South to secede from the The Earthward Pilgrimage (London, 1870).
Union. A controversy immediately arose because Republican Superstitions as Illustrated in the
he had presented himself as a representative of Political History of America (London,
American abolitionists, knowing that the 1872).
proposal was not acceptable to that group. Demonology and Devil Lore, 2 vols (New
Mason used the opportunity to discredit York, 1879).
American abolitionist leaders as duplicitous to Thomas Carlyle (London and New York,
their supporters, publishing his correspondence 1881).
with Conway in the pro-Confederate London Emerson at Home and Abroad (Boston,
Times. Conway became the bane of American 1882).
abolitionists who rushed to repudiate his Omitted Chapters of History Disclosed in the
position. Feeling alienated, he sent for his wife Life and Papers of Edmund Randolph
and sons, having unintentionally severed his ties (New York, 1888).
to the United States. Life of Nathaniel Hawthorne (New York,
Despite this episode, Conway enjoyed the spir- 1890).
itual and intellectual freedom he found in London. Prisons of Air (New York, 1891).
In 1864 he was appointed minister of London’s The Life of Thomas Paine (New York,
most radical religious institution, South Place 1892).
Chapel, a freethought church that still meets at My Pilgrimage to the Wise Men of the East
Conway Hall in Red Lion Square. In 1884, having (Boston, 1906).
regained credibility with his former abolitionist
colleagues, he returned to the United States for a Other Relevant Works
brief triumphal visit. After the death of his wife Conway’s papers are at Columbia University
Ellen in 1897, he returned to the United States and Dickinson College.
once more, where he denounced American impe- The Rejected Stone; or, Insurrection vs.
rialism and promoted free religion. In 1898 he Resurrection in America (Boston, 1861;
moved to Paris where he devoted himself to the 3rd edn 1862).
peace movement and writing. He died on 15 Testimonies Concerning Slavery (London,
November 1907 in Paris, France. 1864).
Throughout the course of his life, in addition Ed., The Sacred Anthology: A Book of
to innumerable pamphlets and articles, Ethnical Scriptures (London and New
Conway authored over seventy books. York, 1874).
530
COOLEY
Barons of the Potomack and the COOLEY, Charles Horton (1864–1929)

Rappahannock (New York, 1892).
Ed., The Writings of Thomas Paine, 4 vols Charles H. Cooley was born on 17 August
(New York, 1894–6). 1864 in Ann Arbor, Michigan. His father,
Solomon and Solomonic Literature (Chicago Thomas McIntyre Cooley, was on the faculty
and London, 1899). of the University of Michigan Law School,
Autobiography, Memories and Experiences published several influential works on law and
of Moncure Daniel Conway, 2 vols legal theory, and was also a judge at the
(Boston, New York, and London, 1904). Supreme Court of Michigan. In 1880 Charles
Addresses and Reprints, 1850–1907: Cooley entered the University of Michigan to
Published and Unpublished Work study mechanical engineering. His studies were
Representing the Literary and interrupted several times due to chronic ill
Philosophical Life of the Author (Boston, health and a sojourn in Europe. After receiv-
1909). ing the Michigan BA in 1887, Cooley went to
Washington, D.C. to work for the Commerce
Further Reading Commission and then on to the Census
Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, Bureau. His search for a life career led him
Dict Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v1, back to graduate work at the University of
Who Was Who in Amer v1 Michigan where he was offered a part-time
Budd, Susan. Varieties of Unbelief (London, instructorship in the department of political
1977). economy. He completed his dissertation, “The
Burtis, Mary Elizabeth. Moncure Conway, Theory of Transportation,” and earned his
1832–1907 (New Brunswick, N.J., 1952). PhD in political economy with a minor in soci-
D’Entremont, John. Southern Emancipator: ology in 1894. During his graduate work
Moncure Conway, the American Years, Cooley associated with Lester WARD, Franklin
1832–1865 (New York, 1987). Giddings, and James ANGELL, then President of
Easton, Loyd D. Hegel’s First American the University of Michigan. In 1892 Cooley
Followers: The Ohio Hegelians: J. B. accepted a teaching position as instructor of
Stallo, Peter Kaufmann, Moncure Conway, sociology at the University of Michigan where
August Willich (Athens, Ohio, 1966). he remained for the duration of his career. He
Fredrickson, George M. The Inner Civil War: was promoted to the rank of assistant profes-
Northern Intellectuals and the Crisis of the sor in 1899 and attained full professorship in
Union (Urbana, Ill., 1965; 1993). 1907, holding that position until his death.
Good, James A. “Introduction,” to Moncure He was chair of the sociology department and
Daniel Conway: Autobiography and twice President of the American Sociological
Miscellaneous Writings, 3 vols (Bristol, Society, which he helped found in 1905.
UK, 2003), vol. 1, pp. v–x. Cooley died on 7 May 1929 in Ann Arbor,
Ratcliffe, S. K. The Story of South Place Michigan.
(London, 1955). Cooley was a seminal thinker who defies
Smith, Warren S. The London Heretics (New categorization. Endowed with a brilliant intel-
York, 1968). lect and having cultivated an especially rich
Walker, Peter. Moral Choices: Memory, imagination, he had interests in a variety of
Desire and Imagination in Nineteenth- fields including sociology, philosophy, social
Century American Abolitionism (Baton psychology, political economy, and political
Rouge, La., 1978), pp. 3–86. science. He was influenced significantly
throughout his life and in all of his writings by
James A. Good his study of philosophy and the organic view
531
COOLEY
modified from the work of Herbert Spencer. 1930). Contains a bibliography of

The writings of Ralph Waldo EMERSON, J. W. Cooley’s writings.
Goethe, Henry David Thoreau, and Thomas à On Self and Social Organization, ed. Hans-
Kempis were an abiding source of nurture for Joachim Schubert (Chicago, 1998).
Cooley’s work from his early years onward. His
trilogy, Human Nature and the Social Order Other Relevant Works
(1902), Social Organization (1909), and Social Cooley’s papers are at the Bentley
Process (1918), which he planned over the Historical Library, University of
course of almost thirty years, represents the heart Michigan.
of his scholarly work and the mark of a highly “Reflections upon the Sociology of Herbert
original mind. These works made valuable con- Spencer,” American Journal of Sociology
tributions to social psychology, sociology, and 26 (1920): 129–45.
philosophy. Cooley became an important social “Heredity or Environment,” Journal of
theorist during the early twentieth century in Applied Sociology 10 (1926): 303–307.
the company of William JAMES, James Mark “The Roots of Social Knowledge,”
BALDWIN, and George H. MEAD. American Journal of Sociology 32
Cooley was linked with the schools of objec- (1926): 59–79.
tive idealism and pragmatism. As an idealist, “Sumner and Methodology,” Sociology and
Cooley was interested in social problems as Social Research 12 (1928): 303–306.
well as problems associated with the self. He
wrote eloquently of the evolution of the self, Further Reading
which he verified empirically through obser- Amer Nat Bio, Bio Dict Psych by Zusne,
vation of and introspection about his own Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer
family. His ideas on the social origins of both Thought, Who Was Who in Amer v1
the mind and the self built on James’s work Angell, Robert C. “Charles Horton
and surpassed it with the concept of the Cooley,” in International Encyclopedia
reflected or “looking glass self.” His family of the Social Sciences (New York, 1968),
observations gave rise to a foundational vol. 3, pp. 378–82.
concept in the social sciences, “the primary Cohen, Marshall J. Charles Horton Cooley
group” and its role in nurturing human and and the Social Self in American Thought
moral development. Cooley believed in the (New York, 1982).
inextricable link and mutual dependency Coser, Lewis A. “Charles Horton Cooley,”
between the individual and society which he in Masters of Sociological Thought: Ideas
helped make a core concept in sociology. His in Historical and Social Context (New
theory of values and his examination of social York, 1971), pp. 305–30.
institutions have made lasting contributions Jandy, Edward C. Charles Horton Cooley:
to the discipline of sociology. His Life and His Social Theory (New
York, 1942).
BIBLIOGRAPHY Schubert, Hans-Joachim. Demokratische
Human Nature and the Social Order (New Identität: der soziologische Pragmatismus
York, 1902; New Brunswick, N.J., von Charles Horton Cooley (Frankfurt
1983). am Main, 1995).
Social Organization (New York, 1909).
Social Process (New York, 1918). Anne K. Vittoria
Sociological Theory and Social Research:
Being Selected Papers of Charles Horton
Cooley, ed. Robert C. Angell (New York,
532
COOLIDGE
COOLIDGE, Mary Lowell (1891–1958) that American pragmatism, as a form of critical

philosophy, is closer to being a philosophy for
Mary Lowell Coolidge was born on 9 December the people. Insofar as professional philosophy
1891 in Lagrange, Illinois, and died on 8 informs popular consciousness, critical philoso-
October 1958. She attended public and private phy is an important improvement upon specu-
schools in Concord and Brookline, lative philosophy, according to Coolidge,
Massachusetts, and graduated from Bryn Mawr because it resists the ready appropriation by
College with a BA in 1914. She earned a Master political ideology, as illustrated by the case of
of Education from Harvard University in 1926, dialectical materialism in Soviet Russia and that
and an MA and a PhD in philosophy from of totalitarian nationalism in Nazi Germany. A
Radcliffe College in 1930. Her dissertation was citizen inspired by critical philosophy analyzes
titled “Subjectivity and Objectivity in the theories of her day with the view to devel-
Contemporary Aesthetic Theory.” In 1929 she oping a set of nondogmatic opinions that (1)
was appointed for one year at Vassar College as are tentatively held; (2) are “forward looking and
an instructor of philosophy. In 1931 she joined melioristic”; (3) presuppose “social interrelat-
the faculty of Wellesley College where she edness and mutual responsibility”; and (4) are
remained until her retirement in 1957, also open to change (p. 623). She concludes that
serving as Dean from 1931 to 1938. Coolidge although professional philosophers will continue
was an active member of the American to engage in speculative philosophy, the emer-
Philosophical Association but not a prolific gence of critical philosophy ensures the subjec-
writer, publishing only five philosophy articles in tion of these theories to ongoing, piecemeal, and
her lifetime in the Journal of Philosophy and relevant criticism, preventing them from
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. becoming totalizing – something she thinks is
Although each of Coolidge’s articles deals imperative for the engagement in philosophical
with a separate philosophical issue, together they reflection to be possible.
are characterized by thematic and methodolog- “Ethics – Apollonian and Dionysian” was
ical continuities. Coolidge was committed to published in 1941, also in the Journal of
pragmatism, as the best available philosophy Philosophy. It uses Nietzsche’s analysis of classic
for the people. For Coolidge, pragmatism is not and romantic art in terms of our Apollonian
naïvely optimistic as is often assumed, and it is and Dionysian impulses to defend normative
has much in common with the esteemed ethics against the assertion of logical positivism
European philosophies of phenomenology and that ethical judgments and theories do nothing
existentialism. Methodologically speaking, more than express and excite emotion.
Coolidge liked to work with established ideas or Apollonian art, according to Nietzsche, depicts
distinctions in philosophy (Nietzsche’s use of a dream or image that is persuasive in terms of
the Apollonian and Dionysian distinction, its beauty and “measured limitation.” Dionysian
William JAMES’s distinction between the once- art, by way of contrast, is wild and internally
born and twice-born outlook as well as Kant’s contradictory; it is an art of drunkenness, self-
category of “purposiveness without purpose”) forgetfulness, ecstatic revelry, and exuberant
and apply them to particular developments in the vitality. Coolidge defends the thesis that
history of ideas, like the logical positivist critique Apollonian treatments of the good are found in
of ethics, for example, so as to develop a more the utopian writings of Plato, Bacon, and
fruitful understanding and ways to proceed. Marx. She argues that Dionysian treatments
Coolidge’s first article, “Today’s Philosophy of the good are found in the Old Testament
and Tomorrow’s,” published in the Journal of with the great variety of its teaching and the
Philosophy in 1940, distinguishes between contradictions between them; in the writings
critical and speculative philosophy. She argues of Nietzsche with his simultaneous affirma-
533
COOLIDGE
tion and rejection of rationalism; and in psy- phy, and also to reveal their limitations. In The
choanalysis. She recognizes that philosophy Varieties of Religious Experience, James distin-
tends to emphasize Apollonian rather than guishes between the once-born outlook – a
Dionysian interpretations of the good life and healthy tendency to look on all things as having
identifies the ethical philosophies of Lucretius, the values that they appear to have – and the
Hobbes, Rousseau, and Schopenhauer as rep- twice-born outlook – an unhealthy tendency to
resenting an uneasy compromise between the be suspicious of ordinary value as mere appear-
two. Coolidge concludes that the viability of the ance that needs to be renounced in order to
Apollonian and Dionysian distinction in ethics move in the direction of genuine value. Coolidge
establishes that ethical theories do more than uses James’s distinction to represent John
show and excite emotion: they attempt to DEWEY’s empirical naturalism as characteristic of
answer the question of what the morally good the first-born outlook. Dewey’s empirical natu-
life consists in. ralism is optimistic in the sense that it represents
In “Purposiveness without Purpose in a the given world as capable of yielding the satis-
New Context,” published in 1943 in factory experiences constitutive of the good life
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, – no rebirth into another environment is neces-
Coolidge draws on Kant’s Critique of sary. She draws on C. I. LEWIS’s book, An
Judgment to defend A. N. WHITEHEAD against Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, to show
the criticism that he has two accounts of the Dewey’s empirical naturalism is more complex.
Good which he fails to reconcile. In some Lewis accepts that human beings aspire to a
places, critics charged, Whitehead’s Good is good life, but emphasizes that we therefore nec-
a pattern found in the world, and in other essarily conceive and live life as a unity. It follows
places Good is a feeling within us. Coolidge then that good living cannot be a matter of quan-
argues that the point of Whitehead’s account titatively maximizing good experiences, but
is to demonstrate that our appreciation of rather must involve a relation of experiences in
goodness is equivalent to an appreciation of a “temporal Gestalt” – the whole of experience
“purposiveness without purpose,” interpret- takes precedence over the distinguishable expe-
ing this phrase as Kant intended it, namely as riences they include. Lewis makes two points
a recognition of a form or order in the world, about this. First, it follows that “whole” expe-
by way of a feeling. It is not surprising there- riences have a transcendental quality, in that
fore that Kant used “purposiveness without they may be taken as evidence for a life or even
purpose” to distinguish our experience of all life, suggestive of an alternative existence.
artistic and natural beauty. Coolidge argues Second, this “whole experience” will make ref-
that, by way of analogy, Whitehead’s analysis erence to a context, incorporating reference to
of the Good as both a pattern found in the the lives of others and to the circumstances of
world and a feeling, need not be read as inter- those lives: social, economic, geographic, and
nally contradictory. Whitehead conceives of so on. The implication of Lewis’s argument is, as
beauty (and creativity) as one of the ultimate Coolidge suggests, either that the once-born
categories of the universe, making aesthetic position is more complex than James represents
judgment original and final. it as being, or that American philosophy does not
Coolidge’s most sophisticated article, “Some fall within the once-born outlook – it is not as
Vicissitudes of the Once-born and of the Twice- optimistic or natural as it might initially appear.
born Man,” appeared in Philosophy and Coolidge’s final article, “The Experimental
Phenomenological Research in 1950. She uses Temper in Contemporary European Thought,”
James’s distinction between the once-born and was published in 1955 in the Journal of
the twice-born person to analyze recent devel- Philosophy. For Coolidge, pragmatism takes the
opments in European and American philoso- middle ground between empiricism and ratio-
534
COOMARASWAMY
nalism, while European experimentalism takes the Twice-Born Man,” Philosophy and
the middle ground between logical positivism Phenomenological Research 11 (1950):
on the one hand and idealism and dialectical 75–87.
materialism on the other. Pragmatism begins “The Experimental Temper in
from the position that thinking is a psychologi- Contemporary European Philosophy,”
cal process carried on by a biological animal Journal of Philosophy 52 (1955):
whose nature is to be forward-looking. In order 477–92.
to evaluate thought, therefore, we evaluate its
consequences for individuals and communities of Further Reading
individuals, for these are never wholly separable Who’s Who in Phil, Women Phils
in pragmatism. Pragmatic tendencies begin to
find expression in the writings of Nietzsche and Megan Laverty
Kierkegaard as well as the schools of phenome-
nology and existentialism. All involve a direct
appeal to experience and constitute a revolt
against traditional orthodoxies. They share with
pragmatism a refusal to treat fact and value as
separate, an emphasis on the temporality of COOMARASWAMY, Ananda Kentish
human existence, and a concept of consciousness (1877–1947)
as always situational.
Distinguishing Coolidge’s defense of pragma- Ananda Coomaraswamy was born on 22 August
tism is its novel and insightful use of other philo- 1877 in Colombo, Sri Lanka, and died on
sophical developments, refusing to use philo- 9 September 1947 in Needham, Massachusetts.
sophical caricatures whether of pragmatism or He was the son of Sir Mutu Coomaraswamy, a
Nietzsche or Kant. Her work stands as a model respected Sri Lankan Tamil scholar, and his wife
of the philosophical enterprise: take all criticism Elizabeth Clay Beeby from Kent, England. His
seriously even if you suspect that it contains father passed away when he was only two years
undisclosed biases; defend your view by testing old, and he was raised by his mother in England.
it; make use of sound philosophical distinctions After graduating from Wycliff College, he went to
and ideas already available to you; consider the University College London in 1897 and earned a
implications of your philosophical endeavors PhD in geology in 1906. He is credited with dis-
for the broader community; and always be covering the mineral thorianite.
mindful of the history of ideas into which your He accepted a position as the Director of the
work falls. Mineralogical Survey of Sri Lanka and con-
tinued the research that he had embarked
BIBLIOGRAPHY upon as part of his doctoral studies in Sri
“Today’s Philosophy and Tomorrow’s,” Lanka. These years were pivotal: they offered
Journal of Philosophy 37 (1940): him scope to familiarize himself with the
617–26. effects of British colonization of Sri Lanka
“Ethics – Apollonian and Dionysian,” and spurred the development of his political
Journal of Philosophy 38 (1941): and philosophical ideas. In 1905 he published
449–65. “An Open Letter to the Kandyan Chiefs,” in
“Purposiveness without Purpose in a New an independent newspaper, The Ceylon
Context,” Philosophy and Observer, where he bemoaned the degenera-
Phenomenological Research 4 (1943): tion and neglect that had fallen upon the tra-
85–93. ditional Kandyan architecture and crafts in the
“Some Vicissitudes of the Once-born and of face of slavish imitations of Western artistic
535
COOMARASWAMY
and literary traditions. In the same year, he ously published Indian Drawings (1910), the
was instrumental, along with some other latter subtitled Chiefly Rajput, noting that his
thinkers, in establishing the Ceylon Social subsequent travels had enabled him to better
Reform Society, which encouraged reform in distinguish the Rajput and Mughal artistic
social and cultural practices among Sri styles. Like his other writings in this field, he
Lankans, and critiqued thoughtless and super- worked painstakingly to historicize the devel-
ficial imitations of European customs. This opment of these traditions, though according to
emphasis on cultural revivalism continued to be a modernist linear model of historiography.
an important strain in his work. His exhorta- He also continued to situate the artistic practice
tions to revive the past artistic glory of these in a richly layered cultural context, and to
South Asian countries, combined with his identify patterns and themes running through
abhorrence for the “impoverished reality” of them. All of this research contributed to his
the modern world, have caused some to label later, more mature writings on aesthetic
him as an Orientalist. theories of Indian art.
A Renaissance man, he applied his training As he traveled through India, Coomaraswamy
in scientific investigative methodologies to witnessed gathering unrest against colonial rule
artistic analysis and published his first major and met leaders of the nationalist movement,
book, Mediaeval Sinhalese Art (1908), in who were advocating the boycott of British man-
England. Working through a sociological ufactured goods and the adoption of Swadeshi,
reading of Kandyan social organization at that the goods manufactured in one’s own country.
time, and aesthetic processes and practices in This fired his imagination and strengthened his
place, this book located artists and craftsmen in enthusiasm for the revival and nurturing of older
a specific sociocultural context. It also marked indigenous cultural practices. In essays and
the beginning of Coomaraswamy’s theorizing papers written at this time, such as Art and
of ideas of tradition and the spiritual core of Swadeshi (1912), he critiqued the colonized
arts in South Asian cultures, a predominant mindset that sought after Western imports and
idea in his later books such as The Dance of styles. While Coomaraswamy indubitably
Shiva (1918). Through these ideas he located romanticized the artistic legacy that contempo-
continuities among diverse artistic practices in rary India had allegedly inherited from the past,
South Asia, as well as among the high arts and his colonial critique had become sharper.
those practiced as crafts, and established the Abhorring both the crass consumerism of
cornerstone of his theory regarding much Western mechanical production as well as the
artistic practice in India and Sri Lanka: the Anglicized tastes and habits of many leaders of
integral connection between the aesthetic and the nationalist movement, he reframed Swadeshi
functional aspects of art in these cultural as an aesthetic–religious, as well as political,
contexts. practice. He urged reform in the areas of artistic
Coomaraswamy began to travel in India, practice and educational policy, which could
picking up an intimate knowledge of the artistic provide vital tools to prevent the kinds of intel-
traditions there with particular reference to the lectual and creative poverty he saw as inevitable
visual arts and collecting art objects. By 1911 in the colonial experience. He also repeatedly
he published several essays on Indian arts and challenged the political leaders of the community
crafts, and was well known among other the- to pay attention to the indigenous imaginative
oreticians and philosophers as a historian and and cultural resources in shaping the national
researcher of Indian art. It was soon thereafter movement.
that he arrived at what was to become a long- While these writings seem conservative and
term research area for him: Rajput paintings. In problematic to contemporary readers,
1912 he added another volume to his previ- Coomaraswamy’s ideas were by no means
536
COOMARASWAMY
narrow and conformist. By the time he returned and to draw parallels, compare, and contrast,
to England in 1912, he was deeply invested in as is obvious, in his Christian and Oriental
researching Western thinkers and artists such as Philosophy of Art (1956). His seminal essays at
William Blake and Friedrich Nietzsche, whose this time reveal the depth of his thought regard-
rebellious ideas he was drawn to. Woven into his ing the ways in which artistic and cultural dif-
writings on art history and religion – primarily ference are contextualized. For instance, in his
the tenets of Hinduism and Buddhism – are address Why Exhibit Works of Art? before the
questions about contemporary problems and American Association of Museums in 1941,
challenges to the socio-political order. Inspired he upheld the symbolic and educational value
by some ideas of these thinkers, Coomaraswamy of art. Critiquing the curio-cabinet nature of
imagined a world- order that defied the con- many museum collections, he argued that such
straints of any organized religion, but was deeply works must not be exhibited in ways that spec-
embedded in ethical, moral, and artistic consid- tacularize them, but rather, must be related to
erations – an ideology he described as “idealis- the conditions in which they were created, to
tic individualism.” The leaders in this new order the aesthetic values from which they emerged,
would be artists, who alone could intuit the and their place in the world view from which
moral and aesthetic ideals that characterized it. they emerge.
By the late 1910s, both his writings and col- In the last few years of his life, he worked
lections had made for him a name as an art his- indefatigably to recover and systematically
torian in international circles. In 1917 he was research traditional knowledge in fields ranging
invited to join the Asiatic Section of the Museum from art, dance, and aesthetics to religion, phi-
of Fine Arts in Boston, Massachusetts, and he losophy, metaphysics, education, and govern-
was appointed Curator of the recently created ment. Besides being a prolific scholar, he was
Indian section, the first of its kind in the United also a poet, a photographer, and painter. And
States. As Keeper of Indian and Mohammedan while he evolved no new system of thought, the
Art of the Museum, Coomaraswamy continued philosophical ideals that suffused all of his
his scholarly and research work. Through his work made him an excellent expositor of the
work of cataloguing the art collections at the systems of thought and aesthetics he loved and
Museum, to which he added his own, his own knew intimately. His critics have charged him
knowledge of Indian art became literally ency- with falling into the modernist trap of
clopedic. This is reflected in the level of detail in dichotomizing nature and culture, exoticizing
his later works, such as History of Indian and Indian traditions, and creating master narra-
Indonesian Art (1927), as well as in the several tives of culture. And while all of these mediate
catalogues and essays published under the the value of his work, his erudition and his
auspices of the Museum. Adept at presenting work in systematizing and in recovering knowl-
his scholarship in lectures, he was quickly edge that might otherwise have remained
welcomed into the academic circuit and traveled obscure remain the bases for much current
intensively to universities. scholarship in the arts.
Charged with the mission of explaining and
interpreting South Asian arts for Western audi- BIBLIOGRAPHY
ences in his position at the Museum, The Deeper Meaning of the Struggle (Broad
Coomaraswamy worked to develop a sophis- Campden, UK, 1907).
ticated and philosophical writing style that posi- Mediaeval Sinhalese Art (Broad Campden,
tioned him uniquely as translator of East to UK, 1908).
West. His deep knowledge of the paradigms of The Aims of Indian Art (Broad Campden,
artistic excellence and ethics and values in both UK, 1908).
worlds enabled him to move between them, Essays in National Idealism (Colombo, Sri
537
COOMARASWAMY
Lanka, 1909). Why Exhibit Works of Art? (London,

The Indian Craftsman (London, 1909). 1943).
Indian Drawings (London, 1910). Figures of Speech, or, Figures of Thought:
The Oriental View of Woman (Broad Collected Essays on the Traditional, or,
Campden, UK, 1910). “Normal” View of Art (London, 1946).
Selected Examples of Indian Art (Broad Am I My Brother’s Keeper? (New York,
Campden, UK, 1910). 1947).
Indian Drawings: Chiefly Rajput (London, The Bugbear of Literacy (London, 1947).
1912). Time and Eternity (Ascona,
Art and Swadeshi (Madras, India, 1912). Switzerland, 1947).
Visvakarma: Examples of Indian
Architecture, Sculpture, Painting, Other Relevant Works
Handicraft (London, 1912). Portfolio of Indian Art (Boston, 1923).
The Arts and Crafts of India and Ceylon Catalogue of the Indian Collections in the
(London, 1913; 2nd edn 1964; 3rd edn Museum of Fine Arts (Boston, 1923).
1971). Bibliographies of Indian Art (Boston,
Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism (New 1925).
York, 1916). Writings and Speeches, ed. S. D. Raja
Rajput Painting (London, 1916). Singam (Singapore, 1960).
The Mirror of Gesture: Being the Abhinaya The Sacred and the Secular in India’s
Darpana of Nandikesvara Performing Arts: Ananda K.
(Cambridge, Mass., 1917). Coomaraswamy Centenary Essays, ed. V.
Myths of the Hindus and Buddhists, with Subramaniam (Delhi, 1980).
Sister Nivedita (London, 1918). Sources of Wisdom (Colombo, Sri
The Dance of Shiva: Fourteen Indian Essays Lanka, 1981).
(New York, 1918; 2nd edn 1924; 3rd edn Ananda Coomaraswamy Centenary Essays,
1959). ed. C. D. Narasimhaiah (Mysore, India,
Introduction to Indian Art (Madras, India, 1982).
1923; 2nd edn Delhi, 1969). Paroksa: Coomaraswamy Centenary
Yaksas: Essays in the Water Cosmology Seminar Papers, ed. Gulam Mohammed
(Washington, D.C., 1923–31; 2nd edn Sheikh, K. G. Subramanyan, and Kapila
1971; 3rd rev. edn 1993). Vatsyayan (New Delhi, India, 1984).
History of Indian and Indonesian Art (New Fundamentals of Indian Art (Jaipur, India,
York, 1927). 1985).
A New Approach to the Vedas (London, Selected Letters of Ananda K.
1933). Coomaraswamy, ed. Alvin Moore, Jr.
The Transformation of Nature in Art and Rama P. Coomaraswamy (Delhi,
(Cambridge, Mass., 1934). India, 1988).
The Darker Side of Dawn Essays in Early Indian Architecture, ed.
(Washington, D.C., 1935). Michael Meister (New Delhi, 1992).
Elements of Buddhist Iconography Essays in Architectural Theory, ed. Michael
(Cambridge, Mass., 1935). Meister (Delhi, 1995).
Spiritual Authority and Temporal Power in The Door in the Sky: Coomaraswamy on
the Indian Theory of Government (New Myth and Meaning, ed. Rama P.
Haven, Conn., 1942; 2nd edn 1978; 3rd Coomaraswamy (Princeton, N.J., 1997).
edn 1993). Perception of the Vedas, ed. Vidya Misra
Hinduism and Buddhism (New York, 1943). (New Delhi, 2000).
538
COOPER
The Essential Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, COOPER, Anna Julia Haywood

ed. Rama P. Coomaraswamy (1858–1964)
(Bloomington, Ind., 2004).
Anna Julia Haywood was born into slavery on
Further Reading 10 August 1858 in Raleigh, North Carolina.
Amer Nat Bio, Dict Amer Bio, Who Was She was the daughter of slave Hannah Stanley
Who in Amer v2, Who’s Who in Phil and, by Anna’s own convictions, the man who
Bagchee, Moni. Ananda Coomaraswamy: A held Hannah as a slave, George Washington
Study (Varanasi, India, 1977). Haywood. Cooper felt a deep sense of love
Bharatha Iyer, K., ed. Art and Thought: and gratitude toward her mother who worked
Issued in Honour of Dr. Ananda K. to ensure that Anna’s life would be better than
Coomaraswamy on the Occasion of His her own. Like Frederick DOUGLASS, Cooper
70th Birthday (London, 1947). expressed nothing but disdain for her white
Crouch, James S. A Bibliography of Ananda father, from whom her mother escaped as soon
Kentish Coomaraswamy (Delhi, 2002). as slavery was abolished. Anna is believed to
Fernando, Ranjit, ed. The Unanimous have learned to read and write at the home of
Tradition: Essays in Honor of Ananda Charles Busbee, for whom her mother was
Kentish Coomaraswamy (Colombo, Sri hired out as a nursemaid.
Lanka, 1991). Anna studied at St. Augustine’s Normal
Kamaliah, K. C. Ananda Coomaraswamy, School from 1867 to 1877, and soon after
Wise Man from the East (Madras, graduating she married Reverend George C.
India, 1977). Cooper, a teacher at St. Augustine’s, at the
Lipsey, Roger. Daedalus: Lectures age of nineteen. George Cooper, also a former
Commemorating the Birth Centenary of slave, was fourteen years her senior; he died in
A.K. Coomaraswamy (Dharwad, India, 1879, just two years after they were married.
1980). Faced with the need to earn her own living,
Raja Singam, S. Durai. A Garland of Cooper returned to St. Augustine’s to teach
Tributes: Homage to Ananda K. from 1879 to 1881, and committed herself to
Coomaraswamy (Kuala Lumpur, a life as an educator. Though she never remar-
Malaysia, 1948). ried, she did adopt five nieces and nephews
———, Ananda Coomaraswamy: later in life, and was devoted to nurturing the
Remembering and Remembering Again intellectual and personal growth of young
and Again (Petaling Jaya, Malaysia, 1974). people.
Rao, C. V. Ramachandra. A.K. After receiving her BA from Oberlin College
Coomaraswamy: An Inspirer of Indian in 1884, she taught at Wilberforce College
Renaissance and Other Cultural Causerie from 1885 to 1887, and at the M Street High
(Nellore, India, 1980). School in Washington, D.C. from 1887 to
Roebuck, Valerie. Meaning and Symbolism 1902, where she also was the school’s princi-
in the Work of Ananda Coomaraswamy pal from 1902 to 1906. After teaching for four
(London, 1990). years at the Lincoln Institute in Jefferson City,
Rowland, Benjamin. The Wall-paintings of Missouri, she returned to the M Street High
India, Central Asia and Ceylon (Delhi, School to teach under a new administration,
India, 1985). and remained on its faculty until retiring in
Sastri, P. S. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy 1930. During this time she pursued a doctor-
(Delhi, India, 1974). ate, studying modern languages and literature
in France and at Columbia University in the
Ananya Chatterjea mid 1910s. The Sorbonne in Paris finally
539
COOPER
accepted transfer credits and her dissertation American women at this famous event, thereby
on the role of slavery in the French Revolution, educating her white contemporaries and inspir-
granting Cooper the PhD in history in 1925. In ing her black colleagues and followers.
1930 Cooper became President of Like so many women in this era, Cooper saw
Frelinghuysen University in Washington, D.C. education as the key to true emancipation for
This university for adult education benefited both women and minorities. She agreed with
from her energies for much of the rest of her W. E. B. DU BOIS and Alexander CRUMMELL,
life. She served as President until 1937, and whose family she was close to, that a classic
continued to be involved afterwards. liberal education was more valuable to African
Cooper was the first woman elected to mem- Americans than vocational training. She also
bership in the exclusive American Negro believed that quality education would improve
Academy in 1897. She was the fourth African- the social and political standing of African-
American woman in the US to earn a doctoral American women and enrich both their personal
degree. She was also one of only two women and their professional lives.
to lecture at the first Pan-African Conference
in London in 1900. Cooper did not fully retire BIBLIOGRAPHY
from teaching until she reached the age of A Voice from the South, by a Black Woman
eighty-four. She died on 27 February 1964 in of the South (Xenia, Ohio, 1892;
Washington, D.C., at the age of 105. Oxford, 1988).
Cooper became an educator largely because Attitude de la France à l’égard de
she saw education as a way of lifting African l’esclavage pendant la revolution (Paris,
Americans out of the state of poverty and 1925). Trans. Frances Richardson Keller,
degradation slavery had left them in. She also Slavery and the French Revolutionists
saw women as playing an especially impor- (1788–1805) (Lewiston, N.Y., 1988).
tant role within African-American culture. A The Voice of Anna Julia Cooper: Including
maternal feminist, Cooper believed that A Voice from the South and Other
women were inherently nurturing and caring, Important Essays, Papers, and Letters,
which meant that African-American women ed. Charles Lemert and Esme Bhan
were able to ennoble and purify their race as (Lanham, Md., 1998).
mothers and educators. Her views on this
subject are outlined in her major work, A Other Relevant Works
Voice from the South. Cooper’s papers are at Howard University.
Cooper also expressed her views on race
relations in A Voice. In fact, she was not afraid Further Reading
to call white women to account for their Amer Nat Bio
racism. She facetiously suggested that the name Bailey, Catherine. “Anna Julia Cooper:
of the organization “Wimodausis,” which ‘Dedicated in the Name of My Slave
stood for “wives, mothers, daughters, and Mother to the Education of Colored
sisters” be changed to “Whimodausis” – white Working People’,” Hypatia: A Journal of
mothers, daughters, and sisters – because it Feminist Philosophy 19 (2004): 56–73.
was not open to women of color. She was also Baker-Fletcher, Karen. A Singing
among several African-American women to Something: Womanist Reflections on
insist on being given a chance to speak at the Anna Julia Cooper (New York, 1994).
women’s sessions of the Chicago World’s Fair Gable, Leona C. From Slavery to the
in 1893. She lectured, along with Fanny Sorbonne and Beyond: The Life and
Jackson Coppin and Fannie Barrier WILLIAMS, Writings of Anna J. Cooper
about the status and progress of African- (Northampton, Mass., 1982).
540
COPE
Hutchinson, Louise Daniel. Anna J. Cope was America’s first major theoretician
Cooper: A Voice from the South and philosopher on evolution, and a prominent
(Washington, D.C., 1981). and influential neo-Lamarckian. He postulated
Johnson, Karen A. Uplifting the Women that most of the higher organisms arose from
and the Race: The Educational “unspecialized ancestors” of relatively small
Philosophies, and Social Activism of body sizes, whose larger descendants are much
Anna Julia Cooper and Nannie Helen more specialized. Therefore, most current species
Burroughs (New York, 2000). are highly susceptible to degeneracy and extinc-
May, Vivian. “Thinking from the Margins, tion, and further evolution will proceed from
Acting at the Intersections: Anna Julia the few remaining small and unspecialized
Cooper’s A Voice from the South,” mammals now alive. This theory is still debated
Hypatia 19 (2004): 74–91. today, although his idea that evolution proceeds
in a relatively cumulative and linear manner has
Dorothy Rogers lost credibility. Cope made little advance with his
theory of “acceleration and retardation” over
Lamarck’s own position that the learned habits
of adults correspondingly modify their repro-
ductive cells so that offspring will be more likely
to display the same habit. Interestingly, accord-
COPE, Edward Drinker (1840–97) ing to Cope, this modification did not happen by
a chemical mechanism,
Edward Cope was born on 28 July 1840 in In his more speculative discussions of
Philadelphia. He attended a private academy biology, Cope could not credit chance
and the University of Pennsylvania, followed by mutation with creating fitter variations over
further study at the Philadelphia Academy of time. The initial origin of fitter organic struc-
Sciences and the Smithsonian Institution. He tures cannot be explained by selection and
then attended the University of Heidelberg in survival. He thus argued that biology cannot
1863–4, receiving a PhD. He was professor of rest on materialism and Darwin’s theory of
natural sciences at Haverford College from 1864 natural selection, but instead must appeal to
to 1867, and from 1865 to 1873 he was curator spiritual or mental forces to explain sustained
of the Academy of Natural Sciences in growth and progress. Unlike his contempo-
Philadelphia. He specialized in reptile, amphib- rary Chauncey WRIGHT, who was America’s
ian, and fish paleontology, exploring first the most sophisticated defender of Darwin’s
eastern regions of the United States and then theory of natural selection, Cope insisted that
several western states, assembling and classifying higher animals and humanity could not have
vast collections of thousands of fossils. Cope resulted from fortuitous chance. Entropy
was also a chief paleontologist for the United prevails over matter, so that there must be an
States Geological Survey during the late 1870s organizing force to compensate against
and 1880s. In 1889 he was appointed professor mechanical energy’s tendency to dissipate. In
of geology and paleontology at the University of his early writings Cope was willing to see
Pennsylvania, and was professor of zoology and God’s own guiding hand in all stages of evo-
comparative anatomy from 1896 until his death. lution, following many other zoologists such as
He was an honorary member of several inter- Louis AGASSIZ. Furthermore, Cope accepted
national scientific societies, and in 1896 he was and taught the racist notion that the “lower”
elected President of the American Association for (dark-skinned) races display the immature
the Advancement of Science. Cope died on 12 characteristics of the fully evolved “higher”
April 1897 in Philadelphia. (white) race.
541
COPE
His later writings move away from explicit 1876).

theism towards a kind of vitalism. Cope’s The Origin of the Fittest: Essays on
theory of evolution required an initial supply Evolution (New York, 1886).
of basic mental energy which permitted prim- Theology of Evolution (Philadelphia,
itive life to make discriminations and form 1887).
successful habits that are inheritable and The Primary Factors of Organic Evolution
improvable. It was supposed to be this form of (Chicago, 1896).
nonmaterial energy that modified the adult’s
reproductive cells. Intelligence will develop in Other Relevant Works
step with the increasing specialization, sensi- Most of Cope’s papers are at the American
tivity, and usefulness of the organism’s parts. Museum of Natural History in New York
This empiricist theory of intelligence was City and at Haverford College.
designed by Cope to compromise with the
dominant psychological theory of psycho- Further Reading
physical parallelism. Parallelism had no pro- Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
vision for evolutionary mental development, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer
rested on a rationalistic view of mind, and was Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v23
notoriously unable to explain mind–body Jaffe, Mark. The Gilded Dinosaur: The
interaction. Like Charles PEIRCE at about the Fossil War between E. D. Cope and O.
same time, Cope was unable to find in physics C. Marsh and the Rise of American
or chemistry the sort of energy that could Science (New York, 2000).
explain intelligence and evolutionary progress, Osborn, Henry F. Cope: Master Naturalist.
and so both thinkers postulated a higher form The Life and Writings of Edward Drinker
of dynamic and purposive causality and iden- Cope (Princeton, N.J., 1931). Contains a
tified it with mind. Cope held that his evolu- bibliography of Cope’s publications.
tionary theory of mind eliminates the need to
postulate an indeterministic free will. John R. Shook
Cope’s theory of inherited habits resulted in
his view that humanity’s moral habits will per-
manently rest in a delicate balance between
altruism and selfishness. Excessive altruism
cannot long survive in a population, although
some individuals will have a preponderance of COPI, Irving Marmer (1917–2002)
social qualities. Our destiny as a species is a
perpetual struggle between justice and injustice. Irving Copi was born on 28 July 1917 in
Duluth, Minnesota, to Samuel Bernard
BIBLIOGRAPHY Copilowish and Rose Marmer Copilowish. He
On the Origin of Genera (Philadelphia, received his BA in 1938 and MS in 1940 from
1869). the University of Michigan. After working in
On the Hypothesis of Evolution: Physical Detroit automobile factories and participating
and Metaphysical (New Haven, Conn., in union politics during World War II, he
1870). returned to Michigan for his MA in 1947 and
On the Method of Creation of Organic PhD in philosophy in 1948. He immediately
Types (Philadelphia, 1871). joined the Michigan philosophy faculty, where
Consciousness in Evolution (Philadelphia, he taught until 1969, when he became profes-
1875). sor of philosophy at the University of Hawaii.
The Theory of Evolution (Philadelphia, Copi retired in 1991, and died on 19 August
542
COPI
2002 in Honolulu, Hawaii. Introduction to Logic (New York, 1953; 9th

Relying on Charles P EIRCE ’s 1870 edn 1994).
“Description of a Notation for the Logic of Symbolic Logic (New York, 1954; 10th edn
Relatives” while employing the Principia 1998).
Mathematic notation developed by its authors “Another Variant of Natural Deduction,”
Bertrand Russell and A. N. WHITEHEAD, Copi Journal of Symbolic Logic 21 (1956):
developed a modern matrix logic for the 52–5.
algebra of relations. He noted that Peirce “Artificial Languages,” in Language,
sought to introduce matrices “partly as an aid Thought and Culture, ed. Paul Henle (Ann
in his classification of relations, and partly for Arbor, Mich., 1958), pp. 96–102.
the sake of illustrations or examples” (1984, “The Burali–Forti Paradox,” Philosophy of
pp. 193–6). Science 25 (1958): 281–6.
Copi’s Symbolic Logic was one of the most The Theory of Logical Types (London,
widely used and controversial textbooks of the 1971).
mid twentieth century. The quantifier rules in “Objects, Properties, and Relations in the
its first and second editions were shown to be Tractatus,” in Essays on Wittgenstein’s
erroneous by numerous authors. In its third Tractatus, ed. Irving M. Copi and Robert
edition, Copi borrowed quantifier rules W. Beard (New York, 1966), pp. 167–86.
provided by Hugues LEBLANC. “Logic versus Illogic,” International Logic
In “Artificial Languages” (1958), Copi Review 19–20 (December 1979): 111–13.
defined an “ideal language” in terms of Informal Logic (New York, 1986).
material, but not formal, adequacy. He then
rejected the concept of an ideal language on the Other Relevant Works
basis of the vicious circle principle, arguing Ed. with James A. Gould, Contemporary
that a knowledge of the structure of the world Readings in Logical Theory (New York,
is a prerequisite to definition of the structure of 1967).
a logically correct language, so that the Ed. with James A. Gould, Contemporary
language cannot be known to be “ideal” except Philosophical Logic (New York, 1967).
by comparison of the structure of the language
with the structure of the world. An “ideal” Further Reading
language must thus be constructed in order to Proc of APA v76
examine the logical and ontological structure of Anellis, Irving H., “Forty Years of
the world, and to determine what exists. Copi ‘Unnatural’ Natural Deduction and
thought he saw an early variant of Russell’s Quantification: A History of First-order
simple theory of types in the theory of cate- Systems of Natural Deduction, from
gories as found in Plato’s Sophist (1971, p. 26), Gentzen to Copi,” Modern Logic 2
and argued that Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1991): 113–52.
Tractatus is nominalistic. Bradley, M. C. “Copi’s Method of
Deduction Again,” Notre Dame Journal
BIBLIOGRAPHY of Formal Logic 12 (1971): 454–8.
“Matrix Development of the Calculus of Fang, Joong, “The ‘User-hostile’ Logic:
Relations,” Journal of Symbolic Logic 13 ‘Logic’ versus ‘Illogic’,” Philosophia
(1948): 193–203. Mathematica 2 (1987): 77–109.
“The Inconsistency or Redundancy of Johnson, Frederick A. “Copi’s Method of
Principia Mathematica,” Philosophy and Induction,” Notre Dame Journal of
Phenomenological Research 11 (1950): Formal Logic 20 (1979): 295–300.
190–99. Leblanc, Hughes. “Minding Ones X’s and
543
COPI
Y’s,” Logique et Analyse 8 (1965): complete at the time of his death, and was
207–8. published posthumously.
Peirce, Charles S. “Description of a Cornman may be best known for his adver-
Notation for the Logic of Relatives, bial theory of sensations, and for his metaphilo-
Resulting from an Amplification of the sophical reflections on the place of linguistic
Conceptions of Boole’s Calculus of analysis in philosophy. With respect to the
Logic,” Memoirs of the American former, Cornman denied that there are sensa or
Academy 9 (1870): 317–78. Reprinted in phenomenal objects; thus there can be no issue
Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A of such objects exhibiting non-material prop-
Chronological Edition, vol. 2: erties. Sensory experiences are, for him, object-
1867–1871, ed. Edward C. Moore less events, which are identical to brain events.
(Bloomington, Ind., 1984), pp. 359–429. For example, it is philosophically misleading to
talk about having a pain (phenomenal object)
Irving H. Anellis which is intense (mental property thereof).
Instead, what really occurs is that someone
suffers painfully, and intensely so. Cornman’s
central argument for adverbial materialism was
its superiority over its two rivals: the utter elim-
ination of sensation, as in Richard RORTY and
CORNMAN, James Welton (1929–78) W. V. QUINE, and the (to Cornman implausi-
ble) reduction of sense data to physical entities,
James Cornman was born on 16 August 1929 as in his reading of Sellars.
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He first studied As for metaphilosophy, Cornman endorsed
philosophy at Dartmouth, receiving the BA in “the linguistic turn.” However, there were
1956. He then undertook graduate studies at three familiar varieties of linguistic philosophy
Brown University. Cornman received the MA that he resisted. He rejected the reform of
from Brown in 1957, supervised by Roderick language, as in Russell and CARNAP, seeking
CHISHOLM, and completed the PhD in philos- instead a description of the actual workings of
ophy in 1960, working with John Lenz. ordinary language. He insisted, against
Cornman was an assistant professor of phi- Wittgensteinians who favored linguistic
losophy at Ohio State University from 1960 to therapy, that traditional philosophical
1963, associate professor at the University of problems are perfectly sensible. He equally
Rochester from 1963 to 1967, and professor insisted that philosophy is not about language:
of philosophy at the University of philosophers want to know about God, sen-
Pennsylvania from 1967 to 1978. Cornman sations, physical objects, the will, etc., not
had a Mellon postdoctoral fellowship at merely about “God,” “sensations,” “physical
Pittsburgh in 1964–5, where he worked objects,” or “the will.” But if one rejects not
intensely with Wilfrid SELLARS. He was killed just reform and therapy, but also the idea that
in a car accident on 31 May 1978 in philosophy is about language, how can lin-
Norristown, Pennsylvania. guistic analysis make positive contributions
Cornman published four books and more to traditional metaphysics, understood as
than forty articles during his lifetime. These being about extra-linguistic entities? The
works presented his views on metaphiloso- evidence-base (facts internal to language) does
phy, reference, the mind–body problem (issues not seem to fit with the stated topic (facts
involving sensations in particular), and phi- external to language). Cornman’s suggestion
losophy of science. A fifth book, Skepticism, involved a kind of coherentist bootstrapping.
Justification and Explanation, was nearly Carried out in practice across several books,
544
COSTELLO
the method involved careful study of particu- of Cornman,” Philosophia 16 (1986):

lar philosophical problems – mind–body rela- 377–88.
tions, sense data, skepticism – each providing Elugardo, Reinaldo. “Cornman, Adverbial
evidence, along the way, about which theory of Materialism and Phenomenal Properties,”
reference was on the right track. Those findings Philosophical Studies 41 (1982): 33–49.
about reference then provide a sort of bridge Pitcher, George. “Sensations and Information:
from language-internal evidence to language- A Reply to Cornman,” Australasian
external ontological results. These, in turn, Journal of Philosophy 56 (1978): 65–7.
would yield further results about reference, and Sellars, Wilfrid. “Science, Sense Impressions
so on. Cornman cautioned, however, that such and Sensa: A Reply to Cornman,” Review
investigations could never be conclusive or of Metaphysics 24 (1971): 391–447.
ultimate, precisely because the various philo- Swain, Michael. “Cornman’s Theory of
sophical positions – about reference and oth- Justification,” Philosophical Studies 41
erwise – all support one another. (1982): 129–50.
Cornman believed that philosophical theories
generally, not just those which are more or less Robert J. Stainton
directly about language, have implications for
the correct account of reference, and vice versa.
He had hoped to write two further books, on
ethics and aesthetics, thereby affording a fairly
complete philosophical system against which to
check his prior accounts of reference, mind, COSTELLO, Harry Todd (1885–1960)
sensation, evidence, and so on.
Harry Todd Costello, nicknamed “Butch,” was
BIBLIOGRAPHY born on 1 November 1885 in Richmond,
Metaphysics, Reference, and Language (New Indiana, and died on 25 January 1960 in
Haven, Conn., 1966). Hartford, Connecticut. In 1908 Costello grad-
Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An uated with a BA from Earlham College, where
Introduction, with Keith Lehrer (New Edwin D. STARBUCK was his first philosophy
York, 1968). teacher. Next he went to Harvard on a univer-
Materialism and Sensations (New Haven, sity scholarship where he received his MA in
Conn., 1971). 1910. Costello studied symbolic logic under
Perception, Common Sense, and Science Josiah ROYCE by taking his Philosophy 20C
(New Haven, Conn., 1975). seminar in 1909–10 and 1910–11. Pleased with
Skepticism, Justification and Explanation his work, Royce appointed him as “recording
(Dordrecht, 1980). Contains a bibliogra- secretary” for this seminar for the year
phy of Cornman’s writings. 1913–14. Costello’s “secretarial notes” have
been preserved, and they were published
Further Reading posthumously in 1963. In 1911 Costello
Bio 20thC Phils, Who Was Who in Amer v7 received his PhD in philosophy with a disserta-
Choy, Victoria. “The Philosophy of James tion on economic organization entitled “The
W. Cornman,” Philosophical Studies 41 Fundamental Characteristics of Organization:
(1982): 7–29. Especially as Illustrated by those Organizations
Domotor, Zoltan, and Michael Friedman. Through which the Results of Science are
“Cornman and Philosophy of Science,” Applied in the Arts and Industries.” Royce, R.
Philosophical Studies 41 (1982): 115–28. B. PERRY, and E. B. HOLT were on his disserta-
Duran, Jane. “A Contextualist Modification tion committee.
545
COSTELLO
After his graduation Costello spent one year Costello, ed. Grover Smith (New
in Paris on a Sheldon Fellowship to attend Brunswick, Canada, 1963). Contains a
Bergson’s lectures at the Sorbonne. On his bibliography of Costello’s writings.
return he taught philosophy at Harvard from
1912 to 1914. In the spring of 1914 Costello Further Reading
was also assistant lecturer in an advanced logic Proc of APA v34, Who Was Who in Amer
course that was taught by visiting professor v4, Who’s Who in Phil
Bertrand Russell.
Costello left Harvard in 1914, teaching at Cornelis de Waal
Yale University in 1914–15, and Barnard
College of Columbia University from 1915 to
1920. In 1920 he became the Brownell
Professor of Philosophy at Trinity College in
Hartford, Connecticut, succeeding Wilbur M.
URBAN. Costello remained at Trinity College COUNTS, George Sylvester (1889–1974)
until his retirement in 1956. He was a visiting
lecturer at the University of California, at George S. Counts was born on 9 December
Berkeley in 1922 and Harvard in 1930. In 1952 1889 near Baldwin City, Kansas. He received
he gave the Woodbridge Lectures at Columbia, his BA in 1911 at Baker University and taught
which were published in 1954 as A Philosophy in high schools for two years. He then earned
of the Real and the Possible. His only other a PhD in education and social sciences from
book is his annotated A List of Books for a the University of Chicago in 1916, studying
College Student’s Reading (1925), which went with Charles Hubbard Judd and Albion W.
through five editions. Indifferent to social life, S MALL . He embarked on a busy career,
Costello secluded himself to the point of eccen- teaching at the University of Delaware, Harris
tricity, devoting all his time to reading. He died College, the University of Washington, Yale
suddenly in 1960, having lived for thirty-nine University, the University of Chicago, and
years in a cluttered suite of two rooms on the finally Columbia University Teachers College
Trinity College campus. from 1927 to 1955. After his retirement from
Columbia, he held visiting teaching positions
BIBLIOGRAPHY at the University of Pittsburgh, the University
“A Neo-Realistic Theory of Analysis,” of Colorado, Michigan State University,
Journal of Philosophy 10 (1911): 494–8. Northwestern University, and finally Southern
“Hypotheses and Instrumental Logicians,” Illinois University at Carbondale (1962–74).
Journal of Philosophy 15 (1918): 57–64. Counts died on 10 November 1974 in
A List of Books for A College Student’s Belleville, Illinois.
Reading (Hartford, Conn., 1925). Counts was a leading philosopher of edu-
“Logic and Reality,” Journal of Philosophy cation and a powerful force in the later years
43 (1946): 169–90. of the progressive education movement. He
A Philosophy of the Real and the Possible served on educational commissions and com-
(New York, 1954). mittees for many American educational soci-
“Logic in 1914 and Now,” Journal of eties, including the National Education
Philosophy 54 (1957): 245–64. Association, and was President of the
American Federation of Teachers from 1939 to
Other Relevant Works 1942. He was active in international educa-
Josiah Royce’s Seminar, 1913–1914: As tion, studying several countries including the
Recorded in the Notebooks of Harry T. Soviet Union and Japan. His energies were
546
COUNTS
also devoted to a variety of political organiza- When Counts looked at schools realistically,
tions. He was the New York State chairman of he saw another social institution designed to
the American Labor Party (1942–4). He then make students conform to the values and expec-
established the Liberal Party in New York, tations consistent with the form of capitalism
unsuccessfully ran for the US Senate in 1952, then existing. The necessary question for
and chaired the party for four years (1955–9). philosophers of education is which values shall
He served for many years on the national com- be taught, and Counts believed that progressive
mittee of the American Civil Liberties Union education tended to avoid this question.
(1940–73). Ironically, as Counts’s admiration for the Soviet
Counts agreed with other liberal educational Union diminished after World War II, he
leaders such as John DEWEY that schools should attacked that country for using its schools to
prepare students for social usefulness and demo- indoctrinate children into communism.
cratic participation. Also like Dewey, Counts
was politically aligned with socialism and its BIBLIOGRAPHY
judgment that unrestrained capitalism is both School and Society in Chicago (New York,
unjust and unsustainable. The Great Depression 1928).
confirmed these views for Counts, but he went The American Road to Culture: A Social
farther than many progressive educators includ- Interpretation of Education in the United
ing Dewey by demanding that schools teach States (New York, 1930).
the values of socialism. With the other philoso- The Soviet Challenge to America (New
phers of education Theodore BRAMELD, John L. York, 1931).
CHILDS, and Harold Rugg, Counts expected “Dare Progressive Education Be
that schools could quickly become forces for Progressive?” Progressive Education 9
social change and produce citizens ready for (1932): 257–63.
social democracy and the inevitable planned Dare the School Build a New Social Order?
economy. A fierce dispute arose among liberal (New York, 1932).
educators, with Dewey replying that schools The Social Foundations of Education (New
should remain neutral with respect to any York, 1934).
economic solution that emerges. The Prospects of American Democracy
Counts could not see how schools, as firmly (New York, 1938).
embedded in the broader culture, could ever The Country of the Blind: The Soviet
remain neutral; they always teach some values. System of Mind Control, with Nucia
He anticipates Dewey’s objection: “You will Lodge (Boston, 1949).
say, no doubt, that I am flirting with the idea of Education and American Civilization (New
indoctrination. And my answer is again in the York, 1952).
affirmative. Or, at least, I should say that the The Challenge of Soviet Education (New
word does not frighten me. We may all rest York, 1957).
assured that the younger generation in any Education and the Foundations of Human
society will be thoroughly imposed upon by its Freedom (Pittsburgh, 1963).
elders and by the culture into which it is born.
For the school to work in a somewhat different Other Relevant Works
direction with all the power at its disposal could Count’s papers are at Southern Illinois
do no great harm. At the most, unless the supe- University, Carbondale.
riority of its outlook is unquestioned, it can George S. Counts: Educator for a New Age,
serve as a counterpoise to check and challenge ed. Lawrence Dennis and William Eaton
the power of less enlightened or more selfish (Carbondale, Ill., 1980).
purposes.” (1932, p. 263)
547
COUNTS
Further Reading of stating Craig’s Theorem is as follows: let R

Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Who Was Who be a recursively enumerable theory. Supposing
in Amer v6 that there exists an effective procedure for
Dennis, Lawrence J. George S. Counts and dividing the theorems of R into two sets, S
Charles A. Beard: Collaborators for and its complement, then there is a recursively
Change (Albany, N.Y., 1989). axiomatizable subtheory of R theory whose
Gutek, Gerald L. The Educational Theory theorems are S.
of George S. Counts (Columbus, Ohio, Jaakko HINTIKKA, aware of connections
1970). between the complexity of proofs in tableaux
and arboricity proofs and interpolation, cor-
John R. Shook rectly suggested that with proper caution one
could consider the interpolation formula X to
be an index of the complexity of the tree proof
of S…T. Craig’s lemma may in turn be used to
give tree proofs of Beth’s Definability Theorem
and Robinson’s Consistency Theorem. These
CRAIG, William Lane (1918– ) connections have been presented by Craig in
his paper “Three Uses of the Herbrand-
William Craig was born on 13 November Gentzen Theorem” (1957). The Craig–Vaught
1918 in Nuremberg, Bavaria, Germany. He Theorem asserted that every class of infinite
emigrated to the United States for his educa- models defined by an R-system of axioms of
tion and earned a BA in 1940 from Cornell the system Σ1 of first-order axioms is defined
University. He then received his PhD in phi- by a projective second-order axiom.
losophy in 1950 from Harvard University Craig’s Theorem was involved in debates
under W. V. QUINE’s supervision. Craig was during the 1970s and 1980s between scientific
assistant professor of mathematics at realists and anti-realist empiricists. Anti-realist
Pennsylvania State University from 1951 to empiricists generally try to argue that scientific
1960, and professor of philosophy at the theories should not be interpreted realistically
University of California at Berkeley from 1960 because their theoretical statements about non-
until his retirement in 1989. Craig was observable entities actually fail to make onto-
President of the Association for Symbolic Logic logical claims. Some of these anti-realists
during 1965–8, and President of the Pacific claimed that theoretical statements are logi-
Division of the American Philosophical cally related to observational statements, sup-
Association in 1978–9. posedly by applying Craig’s Theorem, to reveal
Craig’s research concerned algebraic logic, a how all theoretical statements can be effec-
model theory, and connections between proof tively “eliminated” or reduced to sets of obser-
theory and model theory. His Interpolation vational statements.
Lemma, or Interpolation Theorem, first pre-
sented for classical first-order logic in “Linear BIBLIOGRAPHY
Reasoning,” is his best-known contribution. “Linear Reasoning: A New Form of the
Craig’s lemma says that if a sentence S with Herbrand–Gentzen Theorem,” Journal of
vocabulary V logically follows from a sentence Symbolic Logic 22 (1957): 250–68.
T with vocabulary W, then there is a third “Three Uses of the Herbrand–Gentzen
interpolating sentence X written using symbols Theorem in Relating Model Theory and
from the intersection of W and V such that Proof Theory,” Journal of Symbolic
there is a logical proof of S from T via X. X is Logic 22 (1957): 269–85.
called the interpolation formula. Another way “Finite Axiomatizability Using Additional
548
CREIGHTON
Predicates,” with Robert Vaught, Journal in that age, he spent 1889–90 studying in
of Symbolic Logic 23 (1958): 289–308. Germany at the universities of Leipzig and
Combinatory Logic, vol. 1, with Haskell B. Berlin, returning to Cornell to defend his thesis.
Curry and Robert Feys (Amsterdam, He became an instructor in philosophy at
1958). Cornell in 1889, was promoted to assistant pro-
Logic in Algebraic Form: Three Languages fessor of modern philosophy in 1892, and then
and Theories (Amsterdam, 1974). was named the Sage Professor of Logic and
“Unification and Abstraction in Algebraic Metaphysics in 1895, holding that position until
Logic,” in Studies in Algebraic Logic, ed. his death. He also was Dean of the Graduate
Aubert Daigenault (Washington, D.C., School from 1914 to 1923. Creighton died on
1974), pp. 91–104. 8 October 1924 in Ithaca, New York.
“Boolean Logic and the Everyday Physical More than his written work, it was
World,” Proceedings and Addresses of Creighton’s ideas concerning how to live the
the American Philosophical Association philosophical life, and his manner of imple-
52 (1979): 751–78. menting those ideas, that has left a lasting
mark on philosophy in North America. This
Further Reading contribution is marked by paradoxes,
Pres Addr of APA v8 however. There was probably not another
English, Jane. “Underdetermination: Craig single individual as important as Creighton in
and Ramsey,” Journal of Philosophy 70 establishing the form and expectations of the
(1973): 453–62. modern “profession” of philosophy, its role in
Hooker, C. A. “Craigian contemporary universities, its characteristic
Transcriptionism,” American curriculum, its professional organizations, and
Philosophical Quarterly 5 (1968): its form and style of publication. The profes-
152–63. sionalization of philosophy bears the mark of
Putnam, Hilary. “Craig’s Theorem,” Creighton’s vision at every turn. Yet, one could
Journal of Philosophy 62 (1965): 251–9. hardly find a philosopher who conceived of the
philosophical life in less professional terms.
Irving H. Anellis The philosophical life was for Creighton the
John R. Shook life of leisure – disciplined and properly
employed – for the development of the mind
and of character, for the formation of small
groups of excellent minds who press them-
selves and one another for the genuine attain-
ment of ideals. This idea is something close to
CREIGHTON, James Edwin (1861–1923) Aristotle’s notion of the “divine life,” apoliti-
cal and contemplative, and nearly the opposite
James Edwin Creighton was born on 8 April of the “engaged professional.” For both better
1861 in Pictou, Nova Scotia, Canada. He grew and worse, Creighton thus defined not only the
up on his parents’ farm and taught grade school role of the engaged professional philosopher
in Nova Scotia until the age of twenty-two. for the twentieth century, but also the image of
Creighton entered Dalhousie College in 1883 the philosopher as unengaged and contempla-
and studied philosophy with Jacob Gould tive. While his philosophical ideas were widely
SCHURMAN, who became his lifelong friend and influential, it was his professional influence
patron. Creighton followed Schurman to over his fellow philosophers, and its further
Cornell University in 1887, and received the consequences, that marks his major contribu-
PhD in philosophy in 1892. As was customary tion to American philosophy.
549
CREIGHTON
Creighton’s conception of the philosophi- tarian strife and Cornell and White set out to
cal life was that of the humanistic scholar who show that a non-sectarian Christian institu-
uses leisure for the improvement of the mind. tion, promoting both the liberal arts and the
An excellent mind was marked by its clarity, natural and applied sciences, especially at the
measured by its capacity for rigorous argu- graduate level, was the idea of the future.
mentation. The best way to attain this clarity Cornell opened in 1868 and in many ways
and skill is through the study of the history of was the epicenter of the cultural forces that
philosophy, Creighton thought. Broad ques- developed the liberal Protestant consensus in
tions and questions of principle are the the US in the twentieth century, the tacit agree-
philosopher’s province, he believed. An ethos ment among mainline denominations to strive
of intellectual honesty, forthrightness, and for public unity by emphasizing points of
sharp criticism of oneself and one’s fellows agreement while privatizing points of sectarian
was to be cultivated in this “society of minds.” difference. In this space grew the secular plu-
Creighton urged that apprentices to the philo- ralistic American ideal in both higher educa-
sophical life trust their intuitions and disci- tion and the nation. Cornell was progressive
pline those intuitions by means of logic. from the beginning, becoming co-educational
Agreement upon a final set of ideas or a by 1872, awarding degrees in new fields such
system was not the aim of the philosophical as journalism and veterinary medicine, pio-
life, rather the end was the cultivation of excel- neering the ideas of the lending library and
lent and clear thinking about philosophical the university press. The available resources
issues among individuals committed to the were marvelous. Among the many experiments
life of the mind. Philosophical excellence was tried at Cornell was the Sage School of
as much to be measured by one’s capacity to Philosophy. Creighton’s teacher at Dalhousie
carry on conversation, dialectic in the Platonic and lifelong friend Schurman was made
sense, as by one’s capacity to write. Creighton President of Cornell University in 1892, and
advocated high academic standards through- immediately appointed Creighton to the chair
out his life. Originality in philosophical ideas in logic and metaphysics. Together they estab-
was neither especially to be sought nor likely lished the Sage School, and quickly began to
to be attained, in Creighton’s view. As a result create the institutional structures required to
of this idea of the philosophical life, Creighton realize their ideal of the philosophical life. The
published comparatively little himself. idea of the Sage School was to be a center for
However, he actually lived the life he envi- all sorts of philosophical activities, but most of
sioned, and by living it concretized the ideal of all for the formation of a society of minds
the philosophical life he advocated. As a col- devoted to the pursuit of philosophy both for
league described him, “he rarely left Ithaca, its own intrinsic worth and for the betterment
took little exercise, and spent most of his life of their own character. The Sage School
in the library” (Hammond 1925, p. 254). included, in addition to graduate and under-
Understanding Creighton’s ideas about the graduate education in the history of philoso-
philosophical life and his ability to realize them phy, colloquia and gatherings at which ideas
requires some grasp of the animating ideals were to be presented and debated, a published
and resources of Cornell University. Cornell journal, a philosophy club, and formal and
was the brainchild of the controversial acade- informal ties to other centers of philosophy in
mician Andrew Dickson White and the the US and abroad. In effect, the pursuit of
wealthy Ezra Cornell. It started as an experi- graduate education at Cornell in the 1890s set
mental way to take advantage of the Morrill the pattern easily recognized in most every
Land Grant Act of 1862. The public and American graduate school of philosophy
private colleges of the US had been torn by sec- today.
550
CREIGHTON
Among the first institutions created in the Apart from the two journals, a third way in
Sage School were Schurman’s Philosophical which Creighton played a significant role in
Review (founded 1892), of which Creighton creating the public face of professional phi-
became co-editor in 1896, and editor-in-chief losophy was through his contribution of
in 1902, a position he held until his death. twenty-six articles to the new Encyclopedia
Creighton also served as American editor of Americana, insuring that students around
Kant-Studien from 1896 until his death. These America would be consulting Creighton’s
roles not only established the form in which interpretations of major figures and move-
professional philosophy would be published, ments in philosophy. The list of his contribu-
but made Creighton the principal gatekeeper tions is telling. He wrote articles on Aristotle,
and the setter of standards. It also placed him Descartes, Kant, Schopenhauer, and Spinoza,
in the role of the American philosopher who among the figures, and Bergsonism,
presented ideas to the German-speaking acad- Cartesianism, determinism, empiricism,
emies. Naturally the publication of profes- idealism, materialism, pluralism, pragmatism,
sional philosophy followed the European rationalism, realism, and other movements.
forms in most ways, but it should be recalled Creighton was sharply critical of many of these
that earlier American journals, such as William perspectives and movements and to have him
T. HARRIS’s Journal of Speculative Philosophy defining their basic principles and arguments
had conceived of philosophy as something that for students everywhere placed him in a
can and should be published and discussed at position of enormous authority. In these and
a high level beyond the academies. The other writings Creighton was the consummate
Philosophical Review published academic commentator on the philosophical develop-
philosophers and tacitly (and perhaps uncon- ments of his time, a sort of journalist of the
sciously) advocated an exclusively academic highest stripe.
idea of philosophical rigor, form, and schol- Creighton exerted great influence over how
arship. The great success of The Philosophical philosophy came to contribute to the overall
Review, along with the advent of The Journal curriculum of American universities. Prior to
of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific the development of Cornell’s school of phi-
Methods in 1903, squeezed out high-level losophy, and before Harvard University,
philosophical discussion among thinkers Boston University, and Johns Hopkins
beyond the academy. The paradox involved is University tried other models, moral philoso-
that Creighton’s high standards also func- phy was usually taught by the college president
tioned as barriers to those who had not been (often an ordained minister), to seniors before
enculturated to academic styles and forms of they graduated. The old idea was to impart to
philosophical discourse. To participate in the them a sense of the responsibility to God (and
important discussions, one would have to perhaps country) of the educated class.
adopt its rules, and to adopt the rules one Commonly “natural philosophy” was taught
would need to study philosophy formally in by a practicing physicist, and particularly was
the academy. As a result it was not easy, sub- dominated by the study of optics and electric-
sequently, for academics to distinguish ity. Mental philosophy was often associated
between worthy ideas that were in non- with rhetoric and elocution. The coming of
standard forms and poor thinking. So while the modern non-sectarian university, exempli-
Creighton was a great champion of free fied by Cornell, signaled an opportunity for
expression, especially open criticism, his philo- philosophy to separate itself from religious
sophical style contributed much to the segre- commitments, sectarian and non-sectarian,
gation of public and academic philosophical and to redefine its role in the academy. The
discourse, both in the US and abroad. idea of a “philosophy department” was in the
551
CREIGHTON
air, but the form it eventually took was greatly knowledge, as they were claiming to be, then
shaped by the Sage School under Schurman philosophy must have a role in this project,
and Creighton. Such a department would teach Creighton believed. He thus created the insti-
the history of philosophy and rational psy- tutional space for formal logic to become the
chology, but not rhetoric and elocution; it center of attention, but he did not contribute
would teach logic but not grammar; it would to the creation of formal logic itself; nor would
teach foundations of the objective world in Creighton have approved of the complete for-
metaphysics and epistemology, but not the malization of logic. However, he should be
natural sciences. Creighton held that it was recognized as a visionary in seeing that phi-
the job of philosophy to “interpret” the losophy would have to redefine itself in light of
sciences and to examine their assumptions crit- the way universities were evolving. As he
ically. The centerpiece of philosophy’s contri- observed, “in many colleges and universities
bution to the university or college would be the place of philosophy is only grudgingly
logic on Creighton’s model. In 1898 there were conceded. It is regarded as a more or less useful
plenty of logic texts available for colleges, such handmaid to theology, or perhaps education,
as the famous texts of William Whewell, but its scientific status as a real and indepen-
Stanley Jevons, and even Josiah ROYCE’s 1881 dent subject of investigation is tacitly or explic-
Primer of Logical Analysis (which still inte- itly denied.” He saw how this problem could
grated logic with grammar and writing). But it be overcome by allying philosophy to the
was Creighton’s textbook, An Introductory sciences. The plan was successful. Without
Logic (1898), and its many reprintings, that Creighton’s foresight philosophy as a disci-
established the subject of logic as philosophy’s pline might have met the same fate in the uni-
contribution to the curriculum. This textbook versity as elocution and rhetoric, since, as
was still in print as late as 1947, giving it a Creighton noted:
half-century of influence during the formative
period of the modern American university. It does not seem too much to say that phi-
The paradox arising here is that Creighton’s losophy does not enjoy the general recogni-
ideas about logic were not even close to the tion, even among educated men, that is
formal discipline logic became during the accorded to many of the other sciences, nor
revolt against idealism in between 1910 and is the philosophical teacher and writer uni-
1930. Creighton conceived of logic in human- versally conceded to be a specially trained
istic terms, with little formalization. Defining scholar whose opinions in his own field are
the role of logic in philosophy was something as much entitled to respect as those of the
closely akin to defining what philosophy itself physicist or biologist in his special domain.
is, grasping what it can and cannot do. Logic
was the tool philosophers use to do philoso- Creighton was among a small group of phi-
phy, and not much more than that. The effect losophy professors who founded the American
of Creighton’s view of the role of logic in the Philosophical Association and he was elected
university became far more influential than its first President in 1901. While the APA was
his conception of logic itself. As logic became preceded by the Western Philosophical
formalized and mathematical during Association by a year, the idea was much cir-
Creighton’s lifetime, it nevertheless held fast to culated during the progressive era that
the idea that the teaching and development of respectable disciplines should form profes-
logic is the contribution philosophy makes to sional organizations for education, intellectual
the advancement, interpretation, and clarifi- exchange, and for setting the standards of their
cation of knowledge. If universities were disciplines. While the first president of the
founded for the creation and advancement of Western Association, Frank T HILLY of
552
CREIGHTON
Missouri, used his presidential address to going humanist who would not recognize the
discuss the theory of interaction, Creighton largely anti-humanist association it eventually
used his address to present a manifesto on the became. Second, in spite of his own devotion
purposes of the association, subsequently pub- to the history of philosophy, and the role he
lished in Philosophical Review. The connection gave it in graduate study at Cornell (and
of the APA with Philosophical Review was Cornell remains a historically oriented
one factor that led to the gradual dominance program), Creighton did not project the study
of Creighton’s association over the Western or discussion of the history of philosophy as
Association. The American Philosophical being of central importance to the association.
Association today very much still bears the “The history of philosophy is only intelligible
forms and self-concept that Creighton when read in light of present day problems,”
espoused in his presidential address, making he said, and the activity of the association “is
that piece perhaps his most influential and likely to be centered in the actual problems of
important writing. The address makes clear the present time.” The APA has taken
that philosophers themselves are not altogether Creighton at his word in this regard. The pro-
certain why an association is needed or what motion of scholarship and research was the
it should try to do. Eschewing the idea that the sole purpose of the association. Third,
association should gather for the edification of although Creighton was a legendary and influ-
its members, and rejecting the idea that the ential teacher himself, he insisted “it would
association could solve every problem philoso- be a mistake to make the discussion of
phers face, Creighton sought to define the methods of teaching philosophy a co-ordinate
scope and purposes of the APA by noting that purpose” of the APA. He argued that papers
“all modern scientific work” has the “striking on teaching ought not be presented on the
characteristic” of “conscious co-operation program and the matter of teaching should
among a number of individuals.” The old not even be discussed, since such discussion
notion of the philosopher as a “man of was “a rather stupid way of wasting time.”
leisure,” eccentric, alone in his contemplations And in this context Creighton made the case,
and scriblings, was not to be perpetuated in the oft-repeated in later years, that the best teacher
coming age. The philosopher was, for is a good researcher who attacks the problems
Creighton, a kind of cooperative scientist. The firsthand, and so we should “actually discover
term “science” was meant in the broad by our own efforts what we teach students,
Germanic sense of Wissenschaft, an ordered that is the one thing needful.” The APA’s
and systematic kind of study leading to knowl- ambivalence regarding teaching and promoting
edge, in the broadest sense, and not limited by the teaching of philosophy takes its impetus
the narrow definition of “natural science” such from Creighton’s vision.
as is common today. The advantage of having All of Creighton’s experiments and ideas,
allied philosophy with science at the begin- along with their paradoxes, might have failed
ning became clear as the growing prestige of to take hold were it not for the number and
the sciences pressed hard against the humani- subsequent influence of his students. Cornell
ties in the twentieth century. In spite of was among only a few institutions producing
Creighton’s broad sense of “science,” ideas doctorates in philosophy at a time when the
about what renders a discipline scientific modern university was forming. These students
narrowed and formalized with the increasing carried out Creighton’s legacy and ideals in
success of quantitative methods. The paradox numerous places around the country, imple-
of the American Philosophical Association is menting versions of his ideal in schools every-
that its initial vision as “scientific” and devoted where. Twelve of Creighton’s students became
to “research” was articulated by a thorough- presidents of the APA, the Western
553
CREIGHTON
Philosophical Association, or one of the three philosopher is not to do some one thing co-
divisions of the APA after the merger. This ordinate with the work of the natural scientist
presidential number included two women, or of the man of practice, but sympathetically
Grace Andrus D E LAGUNA and Katherine and intelligently to penetrate the work of all
Everett GILBERT, during the days when the pro- classes of men and to help them become intel-
fessional barriers for women were enormous. lectually self-conscious and mutually respect-
It would have been anathema to Creighton’s ful.” This is, of course, a Socratic conception
style or thinking to expect his students to of the place of the philosopher in the agora.
follow his ideals. As a teacher he insisted only Many readers have commented on how much
upon clear thinking and expression and never Creighton’s idealism resembles the very prag-
sought disciples. But his vision of the philoso- matism of which he was so critical, but one
phy profession and the philosophical life was might say the same for Socrates, and it was
freely and eagerly propagated by his students. Socrates of whom Creighton was fondest. In
The Creighton model spread, although largely the end it seems that the Socratic ideal is the
without being credited to its visionary founder. notion that relieves some of the tensions in
Ironically Creighton’s own philosophy did not Creighton’s simultaneous professionalization
meet with similar influence, which attests to of philosophy and his humanistic concept of
the autonomy of thinking he encouraged in the philosophical life. These motions together
his students. None of Creighton’s students dismay have been a practical way of convincing
tinguished themselves as philosophers in any the public to award the heirs of Socrates the
lasting way, but many were prominent as pension he claimed to deserve in the Apology,
leaders of the profession and many lived ful- and to insure that the marketplace would
filling philosophical lives. always have an ample supply of gadflies. If
Creighton defended a version of personal that was Creighton’s aim, he succeeded beyond
idealism he called “speculative idealism.” his fondest imaginings.
There were three basic touchstones of his view:
(1) that philosophy is a social activity; (2) that BIBLIOGRAPHY
the history of philosophy is central to philos- “Modern Psychology and Theories of
ophy itself; and (3) that speculative idealism Knowledge,” Philosophical Review 3
defines the philosophical attitude. Since we (1894): 196–200.
have seen above how the first two of these “The Nature of Intellectual Synthesis,”
views played out, grasping the third is all that Philosophical Review 5 (1896): 135–56.
remains. The term “speculative” does not An Introductory Logic (New York, 1898;
imply, as Katherine Gilbert puts it, “the 2nd edn 1900; 3rd edn 1909; 4th edn
roaming fancy or any character that conflicts 1920; 5th edn rev. by Harold Smart,
with strict logical procedure.” The speculative 1932).
and idealist posture meant taking a certain “The Purposes of a Philosophical
approach to any and every objective and Association,” Philosophical Review 11
changing problem in the world, a commitment (1902): 219–37.
to reflective and critical engagement with any “The Standpoint of Experience,”
subject matter at all. Idealism could not be Philosophical Review 12 (1903):
subjective because the world itself, objectively 593–610.
existing, changing and rational, was the refer- “Purpose as Logical Category,”
ence point without which thought itself is Philosophical Review 13 (1904): 284–97.
impossible. The philosophical attitude does “Experience and Thought,” Philosophical
not possess a peculiar subject matter. Rather, Review 15 (1906): 482–93.
as Gilbert summarizes it, “the business of the “The Nature and Criterion of Truth,”
554
CROLY
Philosophical Review 17 (1908): of James Edwin Creighton by Former

592–605. Students in the Sage School of Philosophy
“Knowledge and Practice,” International (New York, 1917).
Journal of Ethics 20 (1909): 29–48. Randall, John Herman, Jr. “Josiah Royce
“The Copernican Revolution in and American Idealism,” in Philosophy
Philosophy,” Philosophical Review 22 after Darwin: Chapters for The Career of
(1913): 133–50. Philosophy, Volume III, and Other
“Two Types of Idealism,” Philosophical Essays, ed. Beth Singer (New York,
Review 26 (1917): 514–36. 1977).
“The Social Nature of Thinking,” Thilly, Frank. “The Philosophy of James
Philosophical Review 27 (1918): 274–95. Edwin Creighton,” Philosophical Review
“The Form of Philosophical Objectivity,” 34 (1925): 211–29.
Philosophical Review 32 (1923): 247–62. Werkmeister, William H. “Creighton’s
Studies in Speculative Philosophy, ed. Speculative Idealism,” in A History of
Harold R. Smart (New York, 1925). Philosophical Ideas in America (New
York, 1949), pp. 289–93.
Creighton’s papers are at Cornell Randall E. Auxier
University.
Trans. with E. B. Titchener, Lectures on
Human and Animal Psychology, by
Wilhelm Wundt (London, 1894).
Trans. with A. Lefevre, Immanuel Kant:
His Life and Doctrine, by Friedrich CROLY, Herbert David (1869–1930)
Paulsen (New York, 1902).
Herbert Croly was born 23 January 1869 in
Other Relevant Works New York City, and died on 17 May 1930 in
Amer Nat Bio, Bio 20thC Phils, Cambridge Santa Barbara, California. Croly studied phi-
Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer Bio, Nat Cycl losophy at Harvard University from 1886 to
Amer Bio v23, Pres Addr of APA v1, 1888, and part-time until 1899, with Josiah
Who Was Who in Amer v1 R OYCE , William J AMES , and George
Cunningham, G. Watts. “In Memoriam: S ANTAYANA among others. He also took
James Edwin Creighton,” International courses in economics, history, and politics, but
Journal of Ethics 35 (1925): 214–16. never earned a degree. Abandoning his plans
———, The Idealist Argument in Recent for a philosophy career, he became one of
British and American Philosophy (New America’s leading cultural critics and political
York, 1933). theorists.
Gilbert, Katherine. “James E. Creighton as Croly began work as an architectural critic.
Writer and Editor,” Journal of Concerns about American culture led him to a
Philosophy 22 (1925): 256–64. broader interest in American thought and
Hammond, William A. “James Edwin politics, and in 1909 he published The Promise
Creighton,” Journal of Philosophy 22 of American Life. Croly argued that Americans
(1925): 253–6. needed to construct a stronger sense of
Sabine, George H. “The Philosophy of national purpose, proposing a combination of
James Edwin Creighton,” Philosophical Hamiltonian nationalism and Jeffersonian
Review 34 (1925): 230–61. democracy for American “reconstruction.”
———, ed. Philosophical Essays in Honor His argument led him to a re-examination of the
555
CROLY
philosophic foundations of American democ- in a proposed book, The Breach in Civilization,

racy, emphasizing in particular that equality which he withdrew before publication. Here,
needed to be combined with an emphasis on Croly tried to develop a fuller understanding of
individual excellence. Croly also explored the human nature, particularly in its religious dimen-
meaning of liberty, endorsing the traditional sion, but he failed to state the argument to his
notion of individual freedom against govern- own satisfaction.
ment, thus placing himself in the tradition of Croly’s achievements are his two important
liberal theory, but also developing what has books and The New Republic, which in his
come to be called “positive freedom,” the idea years attracted a most distinguished collection
that an individual may sometimes be made more of writers, providing a superb commentary on
free with government assistance. Croly also a wide range of political and cultural issues.
argued strongly for the reform of the American His thought is important in the development of
political system and for extensive government a modern American liberal political theory.
regulation of the economy and particularly of
large corporations. BIBLIOGRAPHY
After the publication of The Promise of The Promise of American Life (New York,
American Life, Croly became politically involved 1909; Cambridge, Mass., 1965).
in the developing Progressive Movement, espe- Marcus Alonzo Hanna: His Life and Work
cially as an advisor to Theodore Roosevelt in (New York, 1912).
1912. He rethought his political philosophy in Progressive Democracy (New York, 1914).
Progressive Democracy (1914), where he was Willard Straight (New York, 1924).
clearly influenced by pluralist arguments, and
where his thought is more obviously democratic Further Reading
than in the earlier work. Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio,
In these years, Croly and Walter LIPPMANN Comp Amer Thought, Dict Amer Bio,
obtained financial support to begin a weekly Encyc Amer Bio, Who Was Who in Amer
“journal of opinion,” and in November 1914 the v1
first issue of The New Republic appeared. He Forcey, Charles. The Crossroads of
had intended that the “paper” would emphasize Liberalism: Croly, Weyl, Lippmann, and
domestic political and cultural reform, but the the Progressive Era, 1900–1925 (Oxford,
reality of World War I forced him to focus on 1961).
international affairs as well. Croly continued as Levy, David W. Herbert Croly of the New
editor-in-chief of The New Republic from 1914 Republic: The Life and Thought of an
to 1928. In hundreds of articles, Croly treated a American Progressive (Princeton, N.J.,
wide range of issues. Perhaps most notable was 1985).
his support of President Wilson’s decision to Neuchterlein, James A. “The Dream of
enter the war, and his subsequent rejection of the Scientific Liberalism: The New Republic
Versailles Treaty as a betrayal of Wilson’s earlier and American Progressive Thought,
positions. Croly also strongly opposed the “Red 1914–1920,” Review of Politics 42
Scare” of 1918 to 1920, coming to realize anew (1980): 167–90.
and to restate the arguments for individual lib- Stettner, Edward A. Shaping Modern
erties. His efforts were particularly important Liberalism: Herbert Croly and
in stating the importance of freedom of speech Progressive Thought (Lawrence, Kan.,
and of the press. 1993).
Croly was disillusioned by postwar America.
He sought to recast his political theory in the Edward A. Stettner
1920s, in articles in The New Republic and also
556
CRUMMELL
CROOKS, Ezra Breckenridge (1874–1941) BIBLIOGRAPHY

“Is It Must or Ought?” International
Ezra Breckenridge Crooks was born on 6 Journal of Ethics 23 (1913): 323–39.
October 1874 in Clinton, Kentucky. His parents “Professor James and the Psychology of
were James David and Elizabeth Bugg Crooks. Religion,” The Monist 23 (1913):
He received his BA from Central College in 122–30.
Fayette, Missouri, in 1899 and his MA from
Vanderbilt University in 1901. Ordained a Further Reading
Methodist minister, from 1902 to 1906 Crooks Proc of APA in Phil Rev v51, Who Was
was an educational missionary in Brazil. Upon Who in Amer v2
his return he attended Harvard University, where
he received his STB in 1908, his MA in 1909, John R. Shook
and PhD in philosophy in 1910. Crooks studied
with William JAMES and Josiah ROYCE, and
wrote a dissertation titled “Religion as
Experience.”
Crooks was an assistant professor in phi-
losophy and history at Harvard in 1910–11, CRUMMELL, Alexander (1819–98)
and assistant professor of philosophy at
Northwestern University from 1911 to 1913. Alexander Crummell was born 3 March 1819
From 1913 to 1922 he was professor of phi- in New York City, and died on 10 September
losophy and head of the department of phi- 1898 in Point Pleasant, New Jersey. His father,
losophy and education at Randolph-Macon Boston Crummell, was born in Sierra Leone
Woman’s College in Lynchburg, Virginia. and worked as an oysterman. His mother,
During World War I he interrupted his Charity Hicks, was a free-born black American
academic career to go into government from Jericho, Long Island. Since blacks of the
service. In 1917–18 he was the Director of period inherited the slave status of their
Publicity for the US Food Administration. He mothers, Crummell was likewise born free.
then went to France as a liaison officer on However, he and his family were deeply com-
behalf of the YMCA with the Portuguese mitted to the abolitionist cause. Freedman’s
troops serving under the British 5th Army, Journal, the first black American newspaper,
and was decorated with the Military Order of was founded in the Crummells’ home. The
Christ by the Portuguese government. newspaper was committed to promoting black
In 1922 Crooks became professor and head self-reliance and correcting politically moti-
of the department of philosophy and social vated misconceptions about Africa and
sciences at the University of Delaware, which Africans. From an early age, Crummell was
had just reorganized its academic departments taught the value of education, academic and
during a period of growth. The faculty publi- religious, as well as social service. He attended
cation, Delaware Notes, was edited by Crooks the African Free School in Manhattan and, in
after its founding in 1923. He also continued 1831 at age twelve, attended the Canal Street
to participate in public administration and High School. During his four years there,
education, serving on several state commis- Crummell was able to interact with the Canal
sions. When he retired in 1940, Lewis White Street’s directors, Peter Williams and Theodore
BECK was hired to replace him. Crooks died on Wright, who were two of the leading black
8 March 1941 in Newark, New Jersey. clergy of the period. In 1835 Crummell, along
with Henry Highland Garnet, attended the
Noyes Academy in Canaan, New Hampshire.
557
CRUMMELL
The school had only been open a few months nectedness to African Diasporic redemption.
before local white residents dragged it into a He would later be dismissed from his teaching
swamp, forcing it to close. post in 1866 because of frequent clashes with
The next year, Crummell entered Oneida school administrators. As a result, Crummell
Institute in Whitesboro, New York and grad- went on to establish his own school modeled
uated in 1839. He also attended Yale Divinity after his alma mater, Oneida Institute.
School for a time but, for financial reasons, did However, a color caste civil war erupted in
not finish the Masters of Divinity program. Liberia before the school could be built.
Crummell nevertheless decided on a career as Crummell returned to the United States in
a minister of the Protestant Episcopal Church. 1873, settled in Washington, D.C., and even-
He spent the next four years studying with tually established St. Luke’s Episcopal Church
leading clergy in Boston and Providence, as there. Much of the next twenty years would be
well as battling rejection of his ministry on the spent in ministry and encouraging the black
basis of race. Crummell was finally ordained a intelligentsia to produce scholarship and to
priest in 1844 and returned to New York to resist anti-black racism. In 1897 Crummell
pastor a small, poor black congregation. founded the American Negro Academy, pro-
During this time, his great oratorical talent moting the African race through independent
was utilized for the abolitionist cause as well scholarly achievement. He also taught at
as the cause of general black uplift. Yet he Howard University from 1895 until 1897, and
always subordinated these efforts to his reli- died the next year from heart disease.
gious duties, seeing them, at the time, Throughout his life Crummell battled sickness;
somewhat separately. Because of strained nevertheless, he published several books of
finances and the need of the congregation for sermons and speeches.
a church building, Crummell ventured to Crummell’s thought blended philosophy,
England to raise funds for this endeavor. sociology, religion, psychology, and history
Crummell lived in England from 1848 to and stressed the development of the black
1853 preaching, lecturing, and studying at scholar-philanthropist who, while educated as
Queen’s College, Cambridge from which he a matter of principle, would build and support
graduated with his BA in 1853. Instead of institutions that improved the conditions of
returning to the United States, he went to black life. In this way, he anticipated and con-
Liberia as a missionary. He came to believe ceptually embodied the later social theories of
that American blacks would have greater W. E. B. DU BOIS and Booker T. WASHINGTON.
opportunities in Liberia and that their skills
would be more appreciated. He also became BIBLIOGRAPHY
committed to the general cause of African lib- The Relations and Duties of Free Colored
eration and, consequently, became a citizen of Men in America to Africa (Hartford,
Liberia and an advocate of emigration to Conn., 1861).
Liberia. During the American Civil War, The Future of Africa; Being Addresses,
Crummell made three visits to the United Sermons, etc., etc., Delivered in the
States to promote this idea and came to work Republic of Liberia (New York, 1862).
closely with the American Colonization The Greatness of Christ, and Other
Society. Shortly before this time (1858), Sermons (New York, 1882).
Crummell was appointed to the faculty of Africa and America: Addresses and
Liberia College in Monrovia along with his Discourses (1891; Miami, Fla., 1969).
associate Edward Blyden. This afforded
Crummell an opportunity to speak publicly Other Relevant Works
on behalf of Liberian nationalism and its con- Crummell’s papers are at the New York
558
CUMMING
Public Library, the Library of Congress, during 1938–40. Cumming served in the US
and Columbia University. Army during World War II, participated in
Alexander Crummell, 1844–1894: The the liberation of Paris, and received the Croix
Shades and Lights of a Fifty Years’ de Guerre and the Legion of Merit. He studied
Ministry: A Sermon by Alex. Crummell, at the Sorbonne after the war in 1945–6, and
Rector, and a Presentation Address by upon returning to the USA went to the
Mrs. A. J. Cooper (Washington, D.C., University of Chicago for graduate studies in
1894). philosophy. He wrote a dissertation on “The
Psychological Structure of Descartes’ Moral
Further Reading Philosophy” and received his PhD in philoso-
Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, phy in 1950.
Dict Amer Religious Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Cumming was appointed as an instructor of
Bio v5 philosophy at Columbia in 1948, and was
Du Bois, W. E. B. “Of Alexander soon promoted up to full professor. He was the
Crummell,” in The Souls of Black Folk philosophy department chair from 1959 to
(New York, 1903), chap. 12. 1964, also taught courses in the department of
Moses, Wilson Jeremiah. Alexander public law and government, and was named
Crummell: A Study of Civilization and Frederick J. Woodbridge Professor of
Discontent (New York, 1989). Philosophy in 1976. From 1957 to 1964 he
Oldfield, J. R. Alexander Crummell, was the editor of the Journal of Philosophy. He
1819–1898 and the Creation of an held fellowships from the American Council of
African/American Church in Liberia Learned Societies, the Fulbright Foundation,
(Lewiston, N.Y., 1990). the Guggenheim Foundation, and the National
Rigsby, Gregory U. Alexander Crummell: Endowment for the Humanities. After retiring
Pioneer in Nineteenth-Century Pan in 1985, he completed several more books that
African Thought (New York, 1987). were published before his death, and he also
finished his war memoirs and a manuscript
Darryl Scriven about the novels of Henry James. Cumming
died on 25 August 2004 in New York City.
For many years Cumming worked in both
the history of political theory and twentieth-
century continental philosophy. His early
major book, Human Nature and History: A
CUMMING, Robert Denoon (1916–2004) Study of the Development of Liberal Political
Thought (1969), was a very successful and
Robert Denoon Cumming was born on 27 widely read examination of over two hundred
October 1916 in the town of Sydney on Cape years of political philosophy. Cumming edited
Breton Island in Nova Scotia, Canada. He the first English-language collection of Sartre’s
grew up in Bangor, Maine, where his father, philosophical writings, published in 1965, and
Charles G. Cumming, was a professor of the efforts of his later career were directed
theology at Bangor Theological Seminary. He towards the existentialist, phenomenology,
attended Philips Exeter Academy in New and deconstruction movements.
Hampshire, and after graduating in 1934 he The four volumes of his Phenomenology
became a classics major at Harvard University and Deconstruction (1991–2001) examine and
(where his roommate was Donald DAVIDSON). contrast the philosophies of the movement’s
He earned his BA from Harvard in 1938, and major figures starting with Edmund Husserl.
went to Oxford on a Rhodes Scholarship The Dream Is Over (1991) has the broadest
559
CUMMING
scope, presenting a survey of the phenomeno- “This Place of Violence, Obscurity and
logical movement from Husserl to its conclu- Witchcraft,” Political Theory 7 (1979):
sion with Derrida. Method and Imagination 181–200.
(1992) exposes the major divergences between “To Understand a Man,” in The
Husserl and Heidegger on the one hand and Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, ed. Paul
Sartre on the other. Breakdown in A. Schilpp (La Salle, Ill., 1981), pp.
Communication (2001) centers on Husserl’s 55–85.
rejection of Heidegger’s Being and Time. Their “Role-playing: Sartre’s Transformation of
disagreement concerned more than just differ- Husserl’s Phenomenology,” in
ences between conceptions of phenomenolog- Cambridge Companion to Sartre, ed.
ical method, according to Cumming, because Christina Howells (Cambridge, UK,
Heidegger had decided to criticize not only 1992).
the wider philosophical tradition but Husserl’s
own philosophy as well. Solitude (2001) mag- Further Reading
nifies Cumming’s own interest in the role of Glendinning, Simon. “Submerged
“the personal” in phenomenology, as he Initiative,” Times Literary Supplement
explores the significance of Heidegger’s Nazi (29 August 2003): 7.
sympathies and further compares Heidegger Holland, Nancy J. “Two as an Odd
with Karl Jaspers and Sartre. Number: On Cumming on Derrida on
Schapiro on Heidegger on Van Gogh,”
BIBLIOGRAPHY Philosophy Research Archives 8 (1982):
Human Nature and History: A Study of the 383–92.
Development of Liberal Political Shapiro, Gary. “Cumming’s Starting
Thought, 2 vols (Chicago, 1969). Point,” Journal of the History of
Starting Point: An Introduction to the Philosophy 22 (1984): 131–3.
Dialectics of Existence (Chicago, 1979).
Phenomenology and Deconstruction, John R. Shook
Volume One: The Dream Is Over
(Chicago, 1991).
Phenomenology and Deconstruction,
Volume Two: Method and Imagination
(Chicago, 1992).
Phenomenology and Deconstruction, CUNNINGHAM, Gustavus Watts
Volume Three: Breakdown in (1881–1968)
Communication (Chicago, 2001).
Phenomenology and Deconstruction, Gustavus Watts Cunningham was born on 14
Volume Four: Solitude (Chicago, 2001). November 1881 in Laurens, South Carolina. In
1902 Cunningham received an MA from
Other Relevant Works Furman College in South Carolina. His first
“Descartes’ Provisional Morality,” Review teaching job was in English at Howard College
of Metaphysics 9 (1955): 207–35. in Birmingham, Alabama, where he taught
“Existence and Communication,” Ethics 65 from 1902 to 1905. He then studied at Cornell
(1955): 79–101. University under the idealist James Edwin
“Mill’s History of His Ideas,” Journal of CREIGHTON and received his PhD in philosophy
the History of Ideas 25 (1964): 235–56. in 1908. His dissertation on “Thought and
Ed., The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre Reality in Hegel’s System” became his first
(New York, 1965). book, published in 1910.
560
CUNNINGHAM
In 1908 Cunningham became an instructor He says that any conception of nature without
of philosophy at Middlebury College in mind becomes unintelligible because it ignores
Vermont, where he was promoted to full pro- the presupposition that nature is conceivable.
fessor in 1915. In 1917 he went to the To conceive of nature as unknowable is ulti-
University of Texas, where he remained until mately unintelligible. Cunningham does not
1927, when he returned to Cornell as professor reject the Absolute, but he quotes with approval
of philosophy. He served as chair of the school Bernard Bosanquet’s “metaphor of the tide”
of philosophy, and also as Dean of the that the Absolute is only “the high water mark”
Graduate School from 1944 to 1949. of “fluctuations” of ordinary “experience”
Cunningham was President of the Western (1933, pp. 136–7).
Division of the American Philosophical In the section of The Idealistic Argument
Association in 1930–31, and President of the about the Absolute (pp. 534–42), Cunningham’s
Eastern Division of the American Philosophical aversion to most kinds of reductionism asserts
Association in 1937–8. Cunningham retired in itself strongly. The “Absolutists” generally
1949, and died on 1 April 1968 in Laurens, wanted to “sublate” individuals into the
South Carolina. Absolute. Cunningham called this the “weakest
Cunningham was a central figure in the point” in systems of absolute idealism (1933, p.
Cornell school of idealists that included Jacob 534). The necessity of this “sublating” does not
Gould SCHURMAN as well as Creighton, and seem to follow from the nature of things them-
followed them as an editor of Philosophical selves but from the decision to make the
Review. However, he struggled with many of Absolute the principle of explanation. The time-
the central ideas in the idealist tradition. The lessness of more conventional views of the
problem of time especially bothered him, and Absolute continued to trouble him. He and
he turned to Henri Bergson for guidance. His Viscount Haldane exchanged notes of agree-
Study in the Philosophy of Bergson (1916) ment throughout their long correspondence.
suggests an organic and teleological universe. They could agree that process is real, as Bergson,
Cunningham also responded to some of the Samuel Alexander, Alfred North WHITEHEAD,
American “new realist” critiques of idealism. In and others were saying. But Cunningham and
their correspondence, he and Viscount Richard Haldane insisted that this does not deflect from
Burdon Haldane remark favorably on some of the truth of idealism.
the work of Roy Wood SELLARS. In particular, Cunningham shared the concerns of the
Cunningham insisted that meaning requires growing analytic movement and the American
two dimensions. One of them is, indeed, realists about meaning and objectivity. He was
“intrinsic” and mental, but there is also an also deeply skeptical of the personalists who
extrinsic dimension that requires a contrast adopted what he called “spiritual pluralism”
with the knowing subject. Still, he maintained and who saw nature as a collection of spirits.
that knowledge of every kind is tightly bound He could see no evidence that the “lower orders
up with the objects of knowledge. Knowledge of nature are to be conceived as ‘spiritual’
is impossible if what we know is wholly distinct centers,” and he feared “unbridled anthropo-
from our knowledge. In this sense Cunningham morphism” (1933, p. 511).
remained an idealist. Cunningham was a voluminous correspon-
In The Idealistic Argument in Recent British dent. In addition to forty-seven letters from
and American Philosophy (1933) Cunningham Viscount Haldane and several from Creighton,
dismisses many of the common idealist argu- there are letters in the Cornell archives from
ments outright and only accepts one. The one Herbert Wildon CARR, Andrew Seth Pringle-
that he accepts gives more precision to his claims Pattison, and George H. SABINE. Those from
about knowledge and the objects of knowledge. Creighton about the Absolute are particularly
561
CUNNINGHAM
interesting. Much of his discussion with “Meaning, Reference, and Significance,”

Haldane is about relativity and the ways in Philosophical Review 47 (1938): 155–75.
which Albert E INSTEIN ’s relativity theory “On the Linguistic Meaning-Situation,”
connects the subject and the object while at Philosophy and Phenomenological
the same time permitting objectivity in science. Research 4 (1943): 251–66.
The result, they believed, is an “idealism” of the “Must We All Be Thomists?” Philosophical
sort Cunningham and Haldane favored. Review 57 (1948): 493–504.

Thought and Reality in Hegel’s System (New Bio 20thC Phils, Pres Addr of APA v4, Proc
York, 1910). of APA v44, Who Was Who in Amer v6,
A Study in the Philosophy of Bergson (New Who’s Who in Phil
York, 1916). Aldrich, Virgil C. “Meaning without Mind,”
Five Lectures on the Problem of Mind Philosophical Review 43 (1934): 607–19.
(Austin, Tex., 1925). Brother Benignus. “Professor Cunningham
Problems of Philosophy, an Introductory and Thomism,” Philosophical Review 58
Survey (New York, 1924; 2nd edn, (1949): 585–98.
London, 1925). Howie, John, and Thomas O. Buford, eds.
The Idealistic Argument in Recent British Contemporary Studies in Philosophical
and American Philosophy (New York, Idealism (Cape Cod, Mass., 1975).
1933). Pratt, James B. “What is Speculative
Idealism?” Journal of Philosophy 30
Other Relevant Works (1933): 673–83.
Cunningham’s papers are at Cornell
University. Leslie Armour
“Coherence and Organization,” in
Philosophical Essays in Honor of James
Edwin Creighton, ed. George H. Sabine
(New York, 1917), pp. 133–50.
“Emergence and Intelligibility,” International
Journal of Ethics 39 (1929): 148–66. CURRY, Haskell Brooks (1900–82)
“On the Second Copernican Revolution in
Philosophy,” Philosophical Review 41 Haskell Brooks Curry was born on 12
(1932): 107–29. September 1900 in Millis, Massachusetts. His
“A Search for System,” in Contemporary parents were Samuel Silas Curry and Anna
American Philosophy: Personal Baright Curry, founders of the School for
Statements, ed. G. P. Adams and W. P. Expression in Boston, now known as Curry
Montague (New York, 1930), vol. 1, College. He graduated from high school in 1916
251–74. and entered Harvard College with the inten-
“On the Meaning Situation,” in tion of going into medicine. When the US
Contemporary Idealism in America, ed. entered World War I in 1917, he changed his
Clifford Barrett (New York, 1932), pp. major to mathematics because he thought it
67–100. might be useful for military purposes in the
“Perspective and Context in the Meaning- artillery. He also joined the Student Army
Situation,” University of California Training Corps on 18 October 1918, but the
Publications in Philosophy 16 (1935): war ended before he saw action. He received his
29–52. BA in mathematics from Harvard University in
562
CURRY
1920. From 1920 until 1922 he studied electri- to take a trip around the world in 1962, visiting
cal engineering at Massachusetts Institute of a number of universities and giving talks. He
Technology in a program that involved working retired in 1966 and accepted the position of
half-time at the General Electric Company. professor of logic, history of logic, and philos-
From 1922 until 1924 he studied physics at ophy of science at the University of Amsterdam
Harvard; during the first of those two years he in The Netherlands, where he stayed until 1970.
was a half-time research assistant to P. W. After a visit to the University of Pittsburgh in
BRIDGMAN, and in 1924 he received an MA in 1971–2, he returned to live in State College,
physics. He then studied mathematics at Pennsylvania, where he died on 1 September
Harvard until 1927; during the first semester of 1982.
1926–7 he was a half-time instructor. During Curry’s main work was in the field of math-
1927–8 he was an instructor at Princeton ematical logic. In 1922 he read the first chapter
University. During 1928–9, he studied at the of A. N. WHITEHEAD and Bertrand Russell’s
University of Göttingen, where he wrote his Principia Mathematica, and he noticed that the
doctoral dissertation; his oral defense under system was based on two rules: modus ponens
David Hilbert was on 24 July 1929, although and substitution of well-formed formulas for
the published version carries the date of 1930 propositional variables. He also noticed imme-
and his PhD was awarded by Göttingen in diately that this rule of substitution was signif-
1930. icantly more complicated than modus ponens,
In the fall of 1929 Curry joined the mathe- more complicated to describe and use, and also
matics faculty of Pennsylvania State College more complicated in the sense of computer
(now Pennsylvania State University), where he implementation (although this was long before
spent most of the rest of his career. He also there were either computers or computer imple-
held visiting fellowships and appointments. In mentations of logical systems). He wanted to
1931–2 he was at the University of Chicago as break the rule of substitution down into simpler
a National Research Council Fellow; in 1938–9 rules, and his work on this led him to what he
he was in residence at the Institute for Advanced called “combinatory logic,” which became the
Study at Princeton; during 1942–6 he worked main part of his life’s work. Since he was
for the United States government doing applied working on a new foundation for logic, he had
mathematics for the war effort at the Frankford to begin with a discussion of the nature of these
Arsenal (1942–4) and the Applied Physics foundations, and his early ideas on this appear
Laboratory at Johns Hopkins University in his first two papers: “An Analysis of Logic
(1944–5); in 1945–6 he did research at the Substitution” (1929) and “Grundlagen der
Ballistic Research Laboratories at the Aberdeen Kombinatorischen Logik” (1930). Here Curry
Proving Ground, where he worked on the first defines what he means by a formal system
ENIAC project; in 1950–51 he was at the (which he originally called an “abstract
University of Louvain in Belgium on a Fulbright theory”). Stating clearly that such a theory does
grant. During this time Curry became one of not involve meaningless symbols, he indicates
America’s foremost mathematical logicians and that such a theory is based on a “primitive
philosophers of logic. He was one of the frame,” which is to specify the formal objects
founders of the Association for Symbolic Logic considered by the theory, what it means to say
in 1936, and he served as its President from that a formal object is asserted, and which asser-
1938 to 1940. tions are true. Thus, for Curry, what was proved
In 1960 Curry became Evan Pugh Research in an abstract theory were not formal objects,
Professor of Mathematics at Pennsylvania State but statements, which were of the form “X is
University, and this enabled him to devote most asserted” where X is a formal object; these state-
of his time to his research. It also enabled him ments are formed from the formal objects by the
563
CURRY
predicate “is asserted.” The formal objects and “Some Properties of Equality and Implication in
the true assertions are inductively defined sets, Combinatory Logic” (1934). Church and his
and although he does not emphasize the point students responded by abandoning the idea of
at this stage, the formal objects need not be basing logic and mathematics on this kind of
words on an alphabet. In “Grundlagen der system, and they abstracted from Church’s
Kombinatorischen Logik,” he makes the point system the l-calculus, which is equivalent to
that he wants to have in his system formal basic combinatory logic (without any logical
objects which represent the paradoxes, for connectives and quantifiers). For Curry,
example, if F is the property of properties p for however, who had already considered the pos-
which F(p) = not p(p), then F(F) = not F(F), and sibility of a contradiction developing as he
so F(F) represents the liar paradox. Curry extended his system, the contradiction discov-
proposes here to avoid the paradox by denying ered by Kleene and Rosser only meant that a
that F(F) is a proposition, but he wants this fact contradiction could be derived from weaker
about F(F) not being a proposition to be a assumptions than he had realized; his ideas
theorem of his logic and not to have the formal about the prelogic and the category of proposi-
object involved excluded from the theory by tions gave him a means of searching for a system
the rules of formation. that would be consistent, but now he felt he
Following “Grundlagen der Kombinatorischen needed a consistency proof. As part of this
Logik,” Curry published a series of technical work, he discovered, in “The Inconsistency of
papers continuing the development of combina- Certain Formal Logics” (1942), a much simpler
tory logic. In one of them, “First Properties of contradiction than that of Kleene and Rosser
Functionality in Combinatory Logic” (1936, but which would follow from the same assump-
written in 1932), he introduced into combinatory tions as theirs.
logic machinery for treating grammatical or Meanwhile, in response to a request to
logical categories, such as “proposition,” and present a paper on the subject to a meeting of
showed how certain paradoxes could be the International Congress for the Unity of
avoided by the postulates adopted for these Science, which was held at Cambridge,
formal objects. In a footnote in this paper, he Massachusetts in 1939, he began to write inde-
stated the view that a proof of absolute consis- pendently on his philosophical ideas. His first
tency is a secondary matter for the acceptabil- manuscript was too long for the meeting, and
ity of a theory. He concluded that a theory of was eventually published with only minor revi-
logic should be judged as a whole, and should sions in 1951 as Outlines of a Formalist
be treated as a hypothesis, which can be Philosophy of Mathematics. But the manuscript
accepted as long as it remains useful. Clearly the served as the basis for the paper he did present
discovery of a contradiction would make a at the meeting, “Remarks on the Definition and
theory useless, but in the absence of a contra- Nature of Mathematics” (1939). In these works,
diction, a proof of consistency is not really Curry proposed that mathematics be defined as
needed. the science of formal systems. He intended this
In 1932–3, Alonzo CHURCH published “A to be an alternative to (naïve) realism, which
Set of Postulates for the Foundation of Logic,” holds that mathematics is about objects that
which contained a system with a basis very exist in the physical world, and idealism, which
similar to Curry’s combinatory logic. Then, holds that mathematics is about mental objects.
Church’s students, Stephen C. KLEENE and John His examples of idealism in mathematics were
B. Rosser, in “The Inconsistency of Certain Platonism and intuitionism. In order to explain
Formal Logics” (1935), proved the inconsis- this definition of mathematics, Curry devoted a
tency of Church’s original system and the exten- considerable amount of space, especially in
sion of Curry’s original system that appeared in Outlines of a Formalist Philosophy of
564
CURRY
Mathematics, to an exposition of his idea of formal system to a calculus, which is a class of

formal systems, with many examples. This was symbols of a language, the object language,
essentially the definition he had given of an together with rules for their manipulation.
abstract theory in “An Analysis of Logical Curry indicated how to convert mechanically a
Substitution” and “Grundlagen der formal system into a calculus and a calculus
Kombinatorischen Logik,” except that in into a formal system. He also coined the word
addition to the one-place predicate assertion he “contensive” to refer to realist or idealist
allowed for other predicates with other arities, philosophies of mathematics (intending it as a
so that the statements of a formal system could, translation for the German word “inhaltlich”).
for example, be equations. In addition to this In his view, mathematics is not contensive,
definition, Curry pointed out that a study of because it does not have any essential subject
formal systems is not limited to deriving one matter, and the only subject matter of mathe-
formal theorem after another, but also involves matical propositions is other mathematics.
proving metatheorems, or general theorems In a series of further papers, Curry elabo-
about the system. In Outlines of a Formalist rated these ideas and related them to the ideas
Philosophy of Mathematics, he suggests that of others, including Rudolf C ARNAP and
this metatheory itself might be formalized. Lorenzen. The ideas were further elaborated
Indeed, he had already started a project of jus- into the introductions to his books A Theory of
tifying the rules of standard logical systems in Formal Deducibility, Leçons de logique
natural deduction formulations by taking the algébrique (1952), Combinatory Logic, vol. 1
systems as formalizing the elementary metathe- (1958), Foundations of Mathematical Logic,
ory of an elementary formal system. He did this and Combinatory Logic, vol. 2 (1972). Curry
first in an unfinished manuscript “Some refined his notion of formal system so that it
Properties of Formal Deducibility” (1937). This would include some versions of calculi. As part
project was eventually finished and published as of this process, he revised his terminology as
A Theory of Formal Deducibility (1950), where others criticized his use of some terms. Thus, for
Gentzen-style L-formulations were also consid- example, his original term for formal object in
ered, and this was all expanded in Foundations the 1920s and early 1930s was “entity” in
of Mathematical Logic (1963). English and “Etwas” (used as a noun) in
Curry also made a point of distinguishing German. When a philosopher told him that his
between truth within a system or theory, which use of the English word “entity” involved some
depends on the definition of the system or philosophical assumptions that he did not wish
theory, and the acceptability of the system or to make, he stopped using it, and in Outlines of
theory for some purpose, which depends on the a Formalist Philosophy of Mathematics used
purpose. Curry called this philosophy of math- the English word “term.” However, his use of
ematics “formalism.” Curry felt the need to use the word “term” for the formal object was in
the label “formalism” for his views, probably conflict with the use of that word in systems of
because he studied at Göttingen under Hilbert, predicate logic, and so starting about 1950 he
but his philosophy actually appears to be a form substituted for it a word of his own: “ob.” (See
of structuralism (Shapiro 2000, chap. 10). Curry the preface to the second edition of A Theory of
elaborated his philosophy of mathematics in Formal Deducibility, 1957.) But not all formal
the paper “Some Aspects of the Problem of objects are obs in this sense; obs are formal
Mathematical Rigor” (1941). He emphasized objects with the property that each one has a
the distinction between the formal objects and unique construction from the atomic formal
their representations; these representations may objects. In a system in which the formal objects
be strings of letters, but they may also be entirely are words on an alphabet, not every word has
different things. In addition, he contrasted a a unique construction, since the word “abc”
565
CURRY
can be constructed by adding “c” to the right of Curry believed strongly that mathematics is
“ab” or by adding “a” to the left of “bc.” Curry like language, a creation of human beings. He
thus distinguished two kinds of formal systems: also thought that what was thus created had
ob systems, in which every formal object has a objective existence after it was created. Thus, for
unique construction from the atomic formal Curry, mathematics belonged to what Karl
objects, and syntactical systems, in which the Popper called the “third world.” In fact, when
formal objects are words on an alphabet. The Popper presented his ideas on this in his paper
standard systems of propositional and predi- “Epistemology without a Knowing Subject” at
cate logic are both, since the formal objects are, the Third International Congress for Logic,
indeed, words on an alphabet, but in all the Methodology, and Philosophy of Science in
standard definitions, the “well-formed 1967, it was at a session which Curry chaired.
formulas” all have a unique construction from Curry’s immediate reaction to Popper’s paper
the atomic formulas. was that it only elaborated upon what is trivially
Another example is an objection raised by true.
Kleene to Curry’s use of the prefix “meta-,”
which Kleene felt should apply only to symbols BIBLIOGRAPHY
and languages. So, starting about 1951, Curry “An Analysis of Logical Substitution,”
began systematically using the prefix “epi-” American Journal of Mathematics 51
instead of “meta-.” (See the preface of Outlines (1929): 363–84.
of a Formalist Philosophy of Mathematics.) “Grundlagen der Kombinatorischen
This idiosyncratic use of words has made some Logik,” American Journal of
of Curry’s works difficult to read, and has Mathematics 52 (1930): 509–36,
caused some misunderstanding of some of his 789–834.
ideas. For more on Curry’s notion of formal “Some Properties of Equality and
system see Seldin (1975), and the history of Implication in Combinatory Logic,”
Curry’s terminology is described in Foundations Annals of Mathematics 35 (1934):
of Mathematical Logic (pp. 85–6). 849–60.
By the early 1960s Curry was no longer “First Properties of Functionality in
saying that mathematics is the science of Combinatory Logic,” Tôhoku
formal systems, but that it is the science of Mathematical Journal 41 (1936):
formal methods (1963, p. 14). This revised 371–401.
definition can be used to answer a criticism “Some Properties of Formal Deducibility,”
made on several occasions that under Curry’s Bulletin of the American Mathematical
earlier definition there could have been no Society 43 (1937): 615.
mathematics before there were formal “Remarks on the Definition and Nature of
systems. In “The Purposes of Logical Mathematics,” Journal of Unified Science
Formalization” (1968), Curry compares the 9 (1939): 164–9.
process that led from the nineteenth-century “Some Aspects of the Problem of
arithmetization of analysis to twentieth- Mathematical Rigor,” Bulletin of the
century formal logic to the process that led American Mathematical Society 47
from the informal seventeenth and eighteenth- (1941): 221–41.
century deductions in calculus to the more “The Inconsistency of Certain Formal
formal e–d proofs of nineteenth-century Logics,” Journal of Symbolic Logic 7
analysis. This indicates that Curry considered (1942): 115–17.
the introduction of e–d proofs to be a kind of A Theory of Formal Deducibility (Notre
formalization, and that therefore, for Curry, Dame, Ind., 1950; 2nd edn 1957).
formal methods go far beyond formal systems. Outlines of a Formalist Philosophy of
566
CURTI
Mathematics (Amsterdam, 1951). “Some Philosophical Aspects of

Leçons de logique algébrique (Paris and Combinatory Logic,” in The Kleene
Louvain, 1952). Symposium: A Collection of Papers on
Combinatory Logic, vol. 1, with Robert Recursion Theory and Intuitionism, ed.
Feys and William Craig (Amsterdam, Jon Barwise, H. Jerome Keisler, and
1958). Kenneth Kunen (Amsterdam, 1980), pp.
Foundations of Mathematical Logic (New 85–101.
York, 1963).
Combinatory Logic, vol. 2, with J. R. Further Reading
Hindley and J. P. Seldin (Amsterdam, Who Was Who in Amer v8, Who’s Who in
1972). Phil
“The Purposes of Logical Formalization,” Church, Alonzo. “A Set of Postulates for
Logique et analyse 11 (1968): 357–66. the Foundation of Logic,” Annals of
Mathematics 33 (1932): 346–66; 34
Other Relevant Works (1933): 839–64.
“Language, Metalanguage, and Formal Hindley, J. R., and J. P. Seldin, eds. To H.
System,” Philosophical Review 59 B. Curry: Essays on Combinatory Logic,
(1950): 346–53. Lambda Calculus and Formalism
“L-semantics as a Formal System,” in (London and New York, 1980).
Congrès International de Philosophie des Kleene, Stephen C., and John B. Rosser,
Sciences, Paris 1949, II Logique, “The Inconsistency of Certain Formal
Actualités Scientifiques et Industrielles Logics,” Annals of Mathematics 36
(Paris, 1951), pp. 19–29. (1935): 630–36.
“Philosophische Bemerkungen zu Einigen Seldin, J. P. “Arithmetic as a Study of
Problemen der Mathematischen Logik,” Formal Systems,” Notre Dame Journal of
Archiv für Philosophie 4 (1951): 147–56. Formal Logic 16 (1975): 449–64.
“On the Definition of Substitution, Shapiro, Stewart. Thinking about
Replacement, and Allied Notions in an Mathematics: The Philosophy of
Abstract Formal System,” Revue Mathematics (Oxford, 2000).
Philosophique de Louvain 50 (1952):
251–69. Jonathan P. Seldin
“Mathematics, Syntactics, and Logic,”
Mind 62 (1953): 172–83.
“Theory and Experience,” Dialectica
(Neuchatel) 7 (1953): 176–8.
“Calculuses and Formal Systems,”
Dialectica 12 (1958): 249–73. CURTI, Merle Eugene (1897–1996)
“Logic as a Mathematical Science,” Annals
of the Japan Association for the Merle Eugene Curti was born on 15 September
Philosophy of Science 2 (1963): 131–43. 1897 in Papillion, Nebraska. He received his
“The Relation of Logic to Science,” in BA in 1920 and PhD in 1927 from Harvard
Information and Prediction in Science, University, studying with Frederick Jackson
ed. S. Dockx and P. Bernays (New York, Turner. Curti became a pioneer in American
1965), pp. 79–96. intellectual and social history, and was influ-
“The Equivalence of Two Definitions of enced by Progressive historians like his close
Elementary Formal System,” Compositio friend Charles Beard and Carl BECKER, and
Mathematicae 20 (1968): 13–20. also by John DEWEY’s pragmatism. Curti
567
CURTI
taught history at Beloit College, Smith College oaths, anti-intellectualism, and McCarthyism.
(1925–37), and Columbia University Teachers In 1959 Curti and his research assistants at the
College (1937–42). In 1942 he became pro- University of Wisconsin published The Making
fessor of history at the University of Wisconsin, of an American Community, a detailed study
and from 1947 until his retirement in 1968 he of Trempealeau County in Wisconsin. The
held the Frederick Jackson Turner professor- team pioneered use of the federal manuscript
ship in Wisconsin’s history department. census to shed further light on Turner’s
Richard Hofstadter and John Higham were concept of frontier democracy assessing ethnic
two of his many outstanding students. In 1952 assimilation and mobility through longitudinal
Curti was President of the Mississippi Valley historical study. The use of quantitative data to
Historical Association (renamed the study historically inarticulate “common
Organization of American Historians in 1964) people” in American history is the distin-
and President of the American Historical guishing feature of New Left social history to
Association in 1954. He died on 9 March 1996 this day.
in Madison, Wisconsin. With his senior colleagues Merrill Jensen
Curti helped establish peace studies as a field and Howard Beale at Wisconsin, Curti led a
of scholarship with publication of his disser- historiographic revival in the late 1950s that
tation The American Peace Crusade (1929). In provided inspiration for the historical politics
1943 he received the Pulitzer Prize in history of New Left historians like Warren Susman,
for The Growth of American Thought (1943), George Rawick, William Appleman Williams,
a sweeping overview of the social history of William Preston, Herbert Gutman, and Gar
ideas, and the relationship of ideas to society Alperovitz. Although there is no “Curti
in American history. It became an indispens- School” of history, his eighty-six doctoral
able guide to American studies scholars after students wrote on dozens of topics. He was
World War II, a field Curti helped influence as legendary for the openness of his classroom
an Americanist. and his eclectic and wide-ranging intellect. He
Throughout his career, Curti strongly sup- had immense bibliographic knowledge of all
ported academic freedom and grassroots social fields of history. He never forced specific inter-
democracy. He embraced the idea that empir- pretations or methods on his students, but
ical evidence and local study would stimulate rather encouraged them to explore approaches
social intelligence to improve the human con- to the study of the human condition and the
dition. In the 1930s he completed two addi- American scene. During the 1950s Cold War,
tional books on the peace movement, Bryan eminent social historian Herbert Gutman
and World Peace (1931) and Peace or War: remembered his Madison years as a time of
The American Struggle (1936). This marked intellectual awakening. He called Curti “that
him as somewhat of a “radical” in a very con- gentle and thoughtful man.” Curti encouraged
servative historical profession. He considered George Rawick, the prominent historian of
himself a socialist with a “small s.” In 1934 slavery, to continue his academic career.
Curti was “very blue and discouraged” with Although a Marxist, Rawick respected his
ideological conflicts while at Smith, a place mentor for “his deep-seated commitment to
that had “a whole crew of young people … American grass-roots democracy” as
that are reactionary and fascist.” During the “‘mankind’s last best hope.’”
Cold War, he was often attacked for his polit- In retirement, Curti remained engaged in
ical convictions. As President of the Mississippi the profession through publication, participa-
Valley Historical Association and the tion, and correspondence until his death. Allen
American Historical Association, he used his F. Davis, the biographer of Jane ADDAMS,
presidential addresses to denounce loyalty recalled receiving letters from his former
568
CURTIS
advisor that “praised or criticized books that Pettegrew, John. “A Tribute: Merle Curti,
I had never heard of or had not got around to Pragmatist Historian,” Intellectual
read.” Merle Curti established intellectual History Newsletter 18 (1996): 70–75.
history and American studies as fields to learn
and teach about American culture. Matthew Bokovoy
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The American Peace Crusade (Durham,
N.C., 1929).
The Social Ideals of American Educators
(New York, 1935). CURTIS, Olin Alfred (1850–1918)
The Growth of American Thought (New
York, 1943). Olin Alfred Curtis was born on 10 December
The Roots of American Loyalty (New 1850 in Frankfort, Maine. While working in
York, 1946). business in Chicago, he was greatly influenced
The Making of an American Community: A by the preaching of Dwight Moody and began
Case Study of Democracy in a Frontier religious work. He was twenty-seven when he
County (Stanford, Cal., 1959). graduated with a BA from Lawrence
University. He then attended Boston University
Other Relevant Works Theological School, graduating three years
Curti’s papers are at the University of later in 1880. After serving in the ministry for
Wisconsin, Madison. several years at Methodist Episcopal churches
“The Dramatic Theme in American in Wisconsin and Chicago and studying for
Historical Literature,” Mississippi Valley two years at Leipzig, he became professor of
Historical Review 39 (1952): 3–28. systematic theology at Boston University
“Intellectuals and Other People,” American Theological School in 1889. He spent six years
Historical Review 60 (1955): 259–82. in this position, traveling several times for
“American Philanthropy and the American study in Europe: to Erlangen in 1890, Marburg
Character,” American Quarterly 10 in 1893, and Edinburgh in 1894. In 1896 he
(1958): 420–37. took the chair of systematic theology at Drew
Theological Seminary, where he stayed until
Further Reading his retirement in 1914. Curtis died on 8
Who Was Who in Amer v11 January 1918 in Leonia, New Jersey.
Breisach, Ernst. American Progressive Curtis proved to be an effective teacher of
History: An Experiment in theology as a result of his diverse education
Modernization (Chicago, 1993). and experience. He had served as a ship’s
Buhle, Paul, ed. History and the New Left: chaplain in the Spanish-American War, leading
Madison, Wisconsin, 1950–1970 him to espouse a patriotic stance. Curtis
(Philadelphia, 1990). studied intensely the subjects within theology,
Cronon, E. David. “Merle Curti: An mastering the history of Christian doctrine and
Appraisal and Bibliography of His contemporary religious thought. In addition to
Writings,” Wisconsin Magazine of theological material, he was well read in liter-
History 54 (Winter 1970–71): 119–35. ature and American history. Widely respected
Novick, Peter. That Noble Dream: The as a theologian, his book entitled The Christian
“Objectivity Question” and the Faith: Personally Given in a System of
American Historical Profession Doctrine (1905) was a staple in Methodist
(Cambridge, UK, 1988). theological circles and was required reading for
569
CURTIS
most young Methodist ministers. Curtis was BIBLIOGRAPHY

admired as a professor and had great influence The Christian Faith: Personally Given in a
on his student Edwin LEWIS, who succeeded to System of Doctrine (New York, 1905).
his chair of systematic theology. “The Catechism of Sir Oliver Lodge,”
In The Christian Faith, Curtis set out to Methodist Review 89 (1907): 681–92.
show that in Christ “alone our Lord opens his “Professor Denney’s Irenic Attempt,”
mind, his heart, his personal consciousness to Methodist Review 91 (1909): 694–707.
the whole inflow of the horror of sin, the “A New Estimate of the Theological
endless history of it, from the first choice of Situation,” Methodist Quarterly Review
selfishness on, on to the eternity of hell, the 60 (1911): 627–40, 758–60.
boundless ocean of desolation, he allows wave “Personal Creed,” Methodist Review 109
upon wave to overwhelm his soul” (p. 1). He (1926): 274–9.
thus sets out to give a psychological theory of
God’s relationship to the world. Curtis clearly Further Reading
thinks that the sin of humanity changes the Amer Nat Bio, Dict Amer Bio, Who Was
psyche of God. Because sin negatively impacts Who in Amer v1
God, he does not think that predestination is Dalton, Charles B. “The Theology of Olin
a possibility, because God can change God’s Alfred Curtis,” Methodist Review 104
mind and does so based upon the actions of (1921): 891–903.
humanity. Against the Calvinist doctrine of Hough, Lynn H. “Making Theology Live,”
predestination, then, Curtis develops and Methodist Review 101 (1918): 686–95.
defends an Arminianism that posits how Limpscomb, Thomas H. “The Christian
human perfection is possible through one’s Faith,” Methodist Quarterly Review 55
free will. This Arminianism is definitive of (1906): 419–31.
Curtis’s Methodist evangelicalism. Not only Ryan, Michael D. “The Theology of Olin
did he defend Arminianism, but he also Curtis,” Drew Gateway 33 (Winter
defended a sort of personalism. He thought 1963): 82–90.
that this was the best way to defend spiritual- Terry, Milton S. “A Worthy Creed,”
ism against the theory of evolution that was Methodist Review 92 (1910): 131–2.
starting to gain popularity in his day.
Angela Kristen McWilliams
570
The Dictionary
of Modern American Philosophers
THOEMMES
SUPERVISING EDITORS
Aesthetics Pragmatism
Jo Ellen Jacobs John R. Shook
Analytic Philosophy Psychology

Ernie Lepore Robert H. Wozniak
Ethical Theory and Applied Ethics Realism/Naturalism/Phenomenology

Guy W. Stroh Cornelis de Waal
Idealism Social, Political and Legal

James A. Good Philosophy
Jean Van Delinder
Philosophy of Religion
William D. Dean Women and Minorities
Stuart Rosenbaum Dorothy Rogers
Robert Wilson-Black
Philosophy of Science and Logic

Nathan Houser
THE DICTIONARY
OF MODERN AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHERS
Volume 2
D–J
GENERAL EDITOR
John R. Shook
CONSULTING EDITORS
Richard T. Hull
Bruce Kuklick
Murray G. Murphey
John G. Slater
First published in 2005 by
Thoemmes Continuum
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http://www.thoemmes.com
The Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers

4 Volumes : ISBN 1 84371 037 4
© Thoemmes Continuum, 2005
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D
DABNEY, Robert Lewis (1820–98) to the attention of a like-minded officer, and in
1862 he briefly filled the position of chief of
Robert Lewis Dabney was born on 5 March staff to General “Stonewall” Jackson. After
1820 in Louisa County, Virginia, an area the war he became more entrenched in defend-
where loyalty to conservative religious and ing ideas about the antebellum South and its
social principles was natural and considered to presumed social refinements. Arguing that
be a point of honor. This attitude may also slavery had been a moral social arrangement,
have become part of his personality at the age he defended the “peculiar institution” as a
of thirteen, when the death of his father caused beneficial step in the annals of human progress.
him to assume oversight of the family farm. He Dabney idealized many myths that buttressed
studied for a short while in 1836–7 at the “lost cause” mentality and declaimed at
Hampden-Sydney College but resumed length about the purity of Southern life which
farming again while also teaching at a local had been overwhelmed by greater numbers
school. In 1842 he obtained an MA degree and material strength, not by superior virtues.
from the University of Virginia and four years His postwar reactionary views portrayed a
later a BD degree from Union Theological genteel culture facing dire threats from
Seminary in the same state. After ordination Reconstruction policies and suffrage extended
within a few months Dabney traveled as a mis- to freedmen. Dabney supported various
sionary in several counties and then served schemes to salvage Southern achievements
from 1846 to 1853 as minister of the Tinkling through possible immigration to Brazil and
Springs Presbyterian church in Augusta Australia, but most of his embittered focus
County. Many agreed that he had reached the remained at home where an American South
apex of his career when he joined the faculty was beleaguered by unwanted changes forced
of Union Theological Seminary, the most influ- on it by alien invaders.
ential Presbyterian institution in the South. War and its aftermath did little to make
During his tenure there from 1853 to 1883, Dabney adopt more conservative positions
Dabney molded generations of ministerial regarding doctrine, moral standards, or polity.
students in ecclesiastical history, polity, and, He had made a name for himself as a staunch
most importantly, in systematic theology. supporter of Old School Presbyterianism in
While a social conservative on most issues, his early years, and he continued to sustain
Dabney opposed the groundswell of support those convictions for the rest of his life.
for secession in the 1850s. When war broke Because he tempered rigidities in the system
out, however, he volunteered to serve as a with gentleness and expressing a positive
chaplain in the Confederate army. His appreciation of revivals, Dabney appealed to
emphasis on discipline and duty brought him Presbyterians at many different levels of con-
571
DABNEY
viction and consequently was deemed to be one BIBLIOGRAPHY

of the most influential theologians of his gener- Life and Campaigns of Lieutenant-general
ation. As a defender of doctrinal and biblical Thomas J. Jackson (New York, 1866).
orthodoxy, he held that strict adherence to creed Defence of Virginia and the South (New
and discipline was a virtue in and of itself. York, 1867).
Beyond that, he chose the category of episte- Treatise on Sacred Rhetoric (Richmond,
mology as a proper ground on which to defend Virg., 1870).
conservative creedalism. Standing with the Syllabus and Notes on the Course of
Scottish Common Sense perception of reality, he Systematic and Polemic Theology
became particularly antagonistic toward (Richmond, Virg., 1871).
Darwinists and beyond that to all who relied on Sensualistic Philosophy of the Nineteenth
positivistic and naturalistic criteria in the physical Century Examined (New York, 1875).
sciences. Limiting viable knowledge to such Practical Philosophy (Kansas City,
criteria would, he held, eviscerate metaphysical Missouri, 1897).
truths and lead to the eventual destruction of reli-
gious sensitivity. Accepting the hypotheses of Other Relevant Works
evolution would lure the unwary deeper into Dabney’s papers are at Union Theological
the materialism and sensuality that had always Seminary in Richmond, Virginia.
been earmarks of original sin.
While battling the threats of intellectual Further Reading
error, Dabney moved to Texas in 1883, hoping Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
to enjoy better health in a warmer climate. He Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer Religious Bio,
soon became the professor of mental and Nat Cycl Amer Bio v2
moral philosophy at the University of Texas in Dabney, W. H. Sketch of the Dabneys of
Austin in 1883 and taught there until 1894, Virginia (Chicago, 1888).
and he was also instrumental in founding what Johnson, Thomas Cary. Life and Letters of
became Austin Presbyterian Theological Robt. Lewis Dabney (Richmond, Virg.,
Seminary in 1884. But physical transition did 1903).
not produce any softening of attitudes. Dabney
had long opposed reunion with northern Henry Warner Bowden
branches of the Presbyterian denomination,
and his activities stiffened Southern resistance
to any such overtures. He also tried to thwart
all attempts by churchwomen to form their
own auxiliary or management committees in
education or missions. On a third controversial DAHL, Robert Alan (1915– )
issue he denounced the ordination of African
Americans because it might possibly place a Robert Alan Dahl was born on 17 December
black official over white congregants in some 1915 in Inwood, Iowa. He received his BA
local presbytery. By 1890 Dabney was blind from the University of Washington in 1936,
and suffered from a number of infirmities. In and a PhD in political science from Yale
1894 he announced his retirement but contin- University in 1940. He served in the federal
ued to speak out vehemently in ways that government, first in the Office of Price
showed how much he was still at war with Administration and later in the War
most changes in the world around him. Always Production Board, and in 1943 enlisted in the
a defiant old romantic, Dabney died on 3 US Army. After the war, Dahl joined the
January 1898 in Victoria, Texas. faculty of Yale University as an instructor of
572
DAHL
political science in 1946, and was promoted up populist conception of democracy, one that
to full professor. He became Eugene Meyer he sometimes discusses in almost wistful terms,
Professor of Political Science in 1955 and the writing for example that “looking back on the
chair of the political science department two rise and decline of democracy, it is clear that
years later. He was the Sterling Professor of we cannot count on historical forces to insure
Political Science from 1964 until his retire- that democracy will always advance – or even
ment in 1986. Dahl is presently a senior survive, as the long intervals in which popular
research scientist in sociology at Yale. He is a governments vanished from the earth remind
member of the National Academy of Sciences, us” (1998, p. 25).
the American Philosophical Society, and the Dahl’s influence has been enormous, both in
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a the United States and abroad, touching
corresponding member of the British scholars as different from one another as con-
Academy, and was President of the American servative Harvard criminologist James Q.
Political Science Association in 1966–7. Wilson, idiosyncratic Berkeley economist
In the 1950s and 60s Dahl’s name became Oliver Williamson, and Edward P. Weber,
closely associated with a controversial theory author of a fine study of the politics of envi-
in American studies known as pluralism. This ronmental regulation which bears the Dahl-
view denied the contention of such scholars as inspired title, Pluralism by the Rules.
C. Wright MILLS that there is a single dominant
“power elite” in the United States. Dahl BIBLIOGRAPHY
instead asserted that public policy at all levels Congress and Foreign Policy (New York,
is the result of both conflict and cooperation 1950).
among several overlapping but competing Politics, Economics, and Welfare: Planning
elites, any one of which has an effective veto and Politico-economic Systems resolved
over those issues that concern it most deeply. into Basic Social Processes, with Charles
These elites are accommodated by what Dahl E. Lindblom (New York, 1953).
dubbed a “decentralized bargaining bureau- A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago,
cracy.” 1956).
Dahl set out this theory on a theoretical level Who Governs? Democracy and Power in
in 1956, and he offered a supporting empirical an American City (New Haven, Conn.,
study of the politics of the city of New Haven, 1961).
Connecticut in 1961. There has always been Modern Political Analysis (Englewood
some ambiguity, though, as to whether Dahl’s Cliffs, N.J., 1963).
pluralism was a descriptive or a normative Pluralist Democracy in the United States:
theory. In general, Dahl himself believed in Conflict and Consent (Chicago, 1967).
this period both that a plurality of elites is an Rev. edn, Democracy in the United
accurate description of the American scene States: Promise and Performance
and that this is on the whole good news. The (Chicago, 1972).
specifically normative component of the theory After the Revolution? Authority in a Good
he called “polyarchy.” Society (New Haven, Conn., 1970).
Through the 1970s and 80s Dahl became Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition
convinced that the concentration of wealth is (New Haven, Conn., 1971).
a great threat to democracy in any normative Size and Democracy, with Edward R. Tufte
sense. “A desirable economic order would (Stanford, Cal., 1973).
disperse power, not concentrate it,” he wrote Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy:
in 1985. In more recent writings, Dahl has Autonomy vs. Control (New Haven,
largely abandoned polyarchy for a more Conn., 1982).
573
DAHL
A Preface to Economic Democracy (Berkeley, DALY, Mary (1928– )

Cal., 1985).
Controlling Nuclear Weapons: Democracy Mary Daly was born on 16 October 1928 in
versus Guardianship (Syracuse, N.Y., Schenectady, New York, to Irish Catholic
1985). working-class parents and was educated in
Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven, Roman Catholic schools. She received a BA in
Conn., 1989). English from the College of St. Rose in Albany,
On Democracy (New Haven, Conn., 1998). New York, and an MA in English from the
How Democratic is the American Catholic University of America. Her desire to
Constitution? (New Haven, Conn., 2001). study Catholic philosophy and theology was
frustrated by the fact that women were not
Other Relevant Works accepted in the authorized programs. She com-
“Marxism and Free Parties,” Journal of pleted the new doctoral program in religion at
Politics 10 (1948): 787–813. St. Mary’s College, Notre Dame, but found
“A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model,” that it did not open teaching opportunities in
American Political Science Review 52 challenging programs in Catholic thought. The
(1958): 462–9. only opportunities seemed to be in Europe and
“Democracy in the Workplace,” Dissent she decided to go to the University of Fribourg,
(Winter 1984): 54–60. Switzerland, where state support prevented
the exclusion of women. Supporting both
Further Reading herself and her mother by loans and by
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio teaching in study abroad programs, she earned
Domhoff, G. William. Who Really Rules? a baccalaureate, licentiate, and in 1963 a doc-
New Haven and Community Power torate in sacred theology (the first granted to
Reexamined (New Brunswick, N.J., 1978). a woman). After completing her sacred
Hoffman, Tom. “The Quiet Desperation of theology dissertation on “The Problem of
Robert Dahl’s (Quiet) Radicalism,” Critical Speculative Theology: A Study in Saint
Review 15 (2003): 87–122. Thomas,” in 1965 she obtained a third doc-
Lee, Donald J. Polyarchy: The Political Theory torate, in philosophy, also from Fribourg, with
of Robert A. Dahl (New York, 1991). a dissertation on “Natural Knowledge of God
Shapiro, Ian, ed. Power, Inequality, and in the Philosophy of Jacques Maritain.”
Democratic Politics: Essays in Honor of Visiting the Second Vatican Council in 1965
Robert A. Dahl (Boulder, Col., 1988). helped to motivate Daly’s first articles criti-
Weber, Edward P. Pluralism by the Rules: cizing the church’s policies toward women.
Conflict and Cooperation in Environmental These led to an invitation to write The Church
Regulation (Washington D.C., 1998). and the Second Sex (1968), much of which
Williamson, Oliver E. Markets and was completed before she returned to the USA
Hierarchies: A Study in the Economics of to take a position in the theology department
Internal Organization (New York, 1975). at Boston College in 1966. Although during
Wilson, James Q. Bureaucracy: What subsequent years she lectured extensively both
Government Agencies Do and Why They internationally and nationally, this Jesuit insti-
Do It (New York, 1989). tution remained her professional location until
she retired as an associate professor in 1999
Christopher Faille after thirty-three years. These years were
marked by several widely publicized contro-
versies over her candidacies for tenure and
promotion and over her pedagogical strate-
574
DALY
gies. Her courses centered on feminist ethics, human existence with the power of “self-
enrolled both graduate and undergraduate naming,” she calls women “to name the self,
students, and were available to students at the world and God,” in other words, to artic-
nine other universities and schools of theology ulate meaning in terms of their own becoming,
in the Boston area. rather than simply to conform to inherited
The Church and the Second Sex calls upon doctrines. Later, she calls herself a “pirate” who
the Catholic Church to reform its policies steals resources from the intellectual traditions
toward women and defends Christianity in (for example, Thomism) in order to transform
dialogue with Simone de Beauvoir. However, them for the sake of women’s becoming. An
by the time Daly was asked to prepare a early example is her appropriation of the
second edition, she no longer hoped for reform ontologies of Thomas Aquinas, Alfred North
of the religious traditions and had become a WHITEHEAD, and Paul TILLICH in terms of her
radical feminist philosopher and theologian. metaphor of Ultimate/Intimate Reality as
She then began her policy of authorizing “new “Verb.” Daly is convinced that the women’s
editions” of her works that were unchanged movement has a spiritual dimension and needs
texts but with additional introductions that to be grounded in an image of ultimate reality
revealed the subsequent transformations of as dynamic interconnected process. At first she
her thought. speaks metaphorically of “God the Verb.”
Daly’s radical feminism considers all inher- Later, she decides that the word “God” cannot
ited languages, symbolic traditions, and insti- be liberated from its associations with the reified
tutions as so profoundly shaped by systems of Father God and she speaks simply of “the
male domination that women must refuse to Verb.” This is developed in terms of Aristotle’s
grant authority to them in order to claim their emphasis on final causality and, eventually, is
own creativity, intellectual powers, and spiri- called “Quintessence.”
tuality. Recognizing the power of language, By the time of her third book, Gyn/Ecology
her method calls for wordplay that jolts con- (1978), Daly had not only formulated her
sciousness so that it reveals patriarchal hege- radical feminism and her rhetorical methods,
monies and embraces women’s agency. While she had come to a personal realization of les-
her first books were shaped by somewhat tra- bianism. This, however, did not restrict her
ditional frameworks, later books reject audience, since she addresses all who affirm
standard philosophical and theological for- women’s becoming and are open to criticizing
mulations. At the same time, however, she reg- societal systems that have perpetuated both
ularly uses classical thinkers (for example, psychological and physical atrocities against
Aristotle and Aquinas) as “springboards” for women and “other biophilic creatures.” She
her own analyses. introduces here her unremitting analysis of the
The internationally influential Beyond God “Sado-Ritual Syndrome” that is played out in
the Father (1973) is a philosophy of religion “necrophilic” patriarchal phenomena such as
developed as a feminist challenge to patriarchal witch burnings, genital mutilation, footbind-
religion, specifically to Christian doctrines. It ing, and psychoanalysis.
gave impetus to several different feminist From the time of Beyond God the Father,
movements that have transformed much con- Daly has aimed to reveal the connections
temporary theology as well as some religious between sexism, violence, and ecological dev-
institutions. While many feminists disagree astation. In Pure Lust (1984) she calls for the
with aspects of Daly’s radical feminism, certain ecstatic recovery of “elemental” passionate
themes of her thought regularly recur through- participation in Ultimate/Intimate Reality as
out feminist theology and she is universally opposed to the “plastic and potted” emotions
recognized as the field’s pioneer. Identifying encouraged by contemporary economic
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DALY
systems. The Wickedary (1987), with ironic Outercourse: The Be-Dazzling Voyage (San
humor, uses a dictionary format to present the Francisco, 1992).
current results of the etymological experimen- Quintessence … Realizing the Archaic
tation that marks her writing. Outercourse Future: A Radical Elemental Feminist
(1992) blends autobiography with philosophy Manifesto (Boston, 1998).
as it analyzes her own intellectual as well as
personal development in terms of radical Further Reading
feminism’s need to criticize “foreground” Cambridge Dict Amer Bio
patriarchally conditioned realities by invoking Hoagland, Sarah Lucia, and Marilyn Frye,
the “Background,” women’s original poten- eds. Feminist Interpretations of Mary
tialities. Quintessence (1998) imagines the Daly (University Park, Penn., 2000).
future in critical dialogue with present ecolog- Ratcliffe, Krista. Anglo-American Feminist
ical and social violence, with particular atten- Challenges to the Rhetorical Traditions:
tion to the threats posed by religious funda- Virginia Woolf, Mary Daly, Adrienne
mentalisms and genetic engineering. Rich (Carbondale, Ill., 1996).
Some feminist theorists criticize Daly as an
essentialist who does not adequately recognize Wanda Warren Berry
the diversity of women’s experiences. Others
think she successfully maintains an existen-
tialist and ontological critique of essentialism.
Her emphasis on the power of language and on
the self as process resonates with postmod-
ernism. However, she criticizes the relativism DANTO, Arthur Coleman (1924– )
and social determinism sometimes associated
with postmodernism and continues to Arthur Danto was born on 1 January 1924 in
advocate the ontological powers of intuitive Ann Arbor, Michigan. He received his BA
reason existentially appropriated. degree from Wayne State University in 1948,
and his MA in 1949 and PhD in philosophy in
BIBLIOGRAPHY 1952 from Columbia University. He began
The Problem of Speculative Theology teaching philosophy at Columbia in 1951,
(Washington, D.C., 1965). became full professor in 1966, and is now
Natural Knowledge of God in the Johnsonian Professor Emeritus of Philosophy.
Philosophy of Jacques Maritain (Rome, Initially an artist before he turned to philoso-
1966). phy, Danto is best known for his work in aes-
The Church and the Second Sex (Boston, thetics. He is married to Barbara Westman, an
1968; 1975; 1985). artist and noted creator of covers and illustra-
Beyond God the Father: Toward a tions for The New Yorker magazine. Danto
Philosophy of Women’s Liberation has received two Guggenheim Fellowships, an
(Boston, 1973; 1985). ACLS Fellowship, and a Fulbright Grant, as
Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical well as the National Book Critics Circle Prize
Feminism (Boston, 1978; 1990). in 1990 for Encounters and Reflections. He
Pure Lust: Elemental Feminist Philosophy was a longtime editor of The Journal of
(Boston, 1984; San Francisco, 1992). Philosophy and has been President of both the
Websters’ First New Intergalactic Eastern Division of the American Philosophical
Wickedary of the English Language, with Association (1983–4) and the American
Jane Caputi (Boston, 1987; San Society of Aesthetics. Since his retirement he
Francisco, 1993). has continued to publish in philosophy and
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DANTO
has received considerable acclaim as the art According to Danto, actions have two com-
critic for The Nation. ponents: a representation and a behavior. The
For Danto, philosophy studies ways of capacity for the behavior, he argues, is usually
making connections to the world. These con- produced through operant conditioning.
nections take two forms: knowledge and However, it becomes an action when a repre-
action. They may be manifested in various sentation of a desired outcome is what causes
ways, notably in historical events and scientific the relevant movement to occur. I raise my
or philosophical theories, as well as in indi- hand (the behavior), because I intend to vote
vidual actions and expressions of belief. Of (the representation). The behavior is not simply
particular importance in Danto’s later work a reflexive response or disposition realized
are the connections made in the production upon the presentation of a stimulus of a non-
and perception of art. Both knowledge and representational sort. If we apply that analysis
action are grounded on two fundamental rela- to ideas-as-actions, the implication would seem
tions: causation and representation. However, to be that the behavior in question need not
the two relations are intertwined in ways that involve bodily movement, outside the perime-
make representation the central concept in all ters of the skull. There may be, instead,
of the areas in which Danto works. The cen- habitual patterns of thought (call them
trality of representation is displayed in Danto’s ideational behaviors) that antecedent ideas
analysis of knowledge and action; representa- sometimes activate. But conditioned behav-
tion constitutes knowledge if it is caused by the iors are physical phenomena, the results of
state of affairs that makes it true. Something is rewards and punishments administered
an action when it is caused by a representation through physical pleasure or pain. How can
that it makes true. patterns of thought be construed in that way?
Danto’s construal of knowledge and action Moreover, ideas or beliefs have “wide” or
applies to both internal and external represen- extensional content: they refer to objects and
tations; beliefs or intentions, as psychological events in the world. In that case, how can
entities, but also spoken or written sentences, ideational behaviors be identified with physical
and visible pictures as well. The common movements inside the skull? Both questions
account of internal and external representations call for an account of the relation of the mind
is underwritten in Danto’s theory partly by the to the brain.
view that beliefs are psychologically real sen- On Danto’s conception, patterns of thought
tential states. These are encoded much in the are vested in patterns of neural activity. That
manner of what Jerry FODOR calls a language of is part of what it means to say that beliefs are
thought. We are “constructed sententially,” sentential states: the relevant sentences are
Danto says; in fact, “we are sentential beings” encoded in brain tissue and neurochemicals,
(The Body/Body Problem, p. 87) and so his more or less as sentences are inscribed in paper
account of knowledge applies to representa- and ink. This allows patterns of thought and
tions that occur both inside and outside of the belief systems to be conditioned through
head. His theory of action also applies to whatever literal pleasures are provided through
internal as much as to external events, and not connections to the brain’s limbic system and
just because bodily movements become actions the subpersonal delights that neurotransmitters
when they are caused by the appropriate mental such as serotonin can supply. However, it does
states. Beyond that causal relation, Danto some- not follow that the contents of beliefs or the
times says, ideas are themselves actions, only of meanings of sentential states can be identified
a mental sort. That point is revealing, and can with, or reduced to, their neurological under-
be understood by mapping his theory of action pinnings – the electrochemical encoding by
onto his philosophy of mind. which they are internally expressed. Danto
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DANTO
advocates a materialist conception of the mind, analysis of basic action and ideas-as-actions
but it is a nonreductionist and broadly func- that there must also be basic mental represen-
tionalist type. Beliefs supervene on brain states, tations that cause basic actions to occur.
but there is more to belief than neurology can Moreover, the view that there are such repre-
ever describe. Danto is a realist about beliefs sentations is consistent with the language of
and other mental representations, and a thought hypothesis, according to which some
semantic realist as well. There are psycholog- capacity to conceptualize and form hypotheses
ically real beliefs, and there are facts of the must be innate, to explain how we learn
matter that can be used to determine what natural language at all. This view also fits well
beliefs are about. He rejects arguments for with the appeal to the modularity of percep-
either the elimination of propositional atti- tion, which requires that basic perceptual cat-
tudes from cognitive science and philosophy, egories not be affected or acquired through
or their identification with brain events. learning. Whether basic representations in
Danto’s functionalist view of the psycho- these particular forms are the causes of basic
logical reality of mental representations actions or not, the foundationalist argument is
includes a commitment to a modularity thesis the same. There are discoverable basic actions
about how the mind and brain are organized. that are embedded in nonbasic actions, Danto
At the level of basic perceptual abilities, at argues, “and parallel claims, I am certain, can
least, mental representations – perceptual be vindicated for basic and non basic cogni-
ideas, we might call them – are impervious to tion” (The Body/Body Problem, 1999, p. 60).
the effects of learning and full background However, the question arises of what larger
knowledge. They are cognitively impenetra- philosophical significance basic elements might
ble in the sense that Fodor has described. This have, apart from stopping logical regressions.
provides a foundation for perceptual knowl- Danto now acknowledges that basic actions
edge that plays an important part in Danto’s need not be the objects of direct awareness
theories of action, knowledge, and art. and so do not have the importance he once
The most straightforward argument for the thought they had. What does it matter if the
need for foundations can be seen in Danto’s representations produced in early visual pro-
analysis of basic actions, which has changed in cessing, for instance, are everywhere and at
certain ways over the years. A basic action is all times exactly similar, whenever perceivers
one that is not caused by another action, are confronted with the same sort of stimuli?
although of course it might have antecedent Danto’s answer has two parts: basic elements
causes of other kinds. The argument for such matter a lot to philosophical methodology, he
actions is simply that, without them, an thinks; but they do not matter much to an
account of action faces an infinite regress: each account of what representations mean. The
action would be caused by another action, and appeal to constant, noncomplex factors sets
so on without end. Although such actions are, the stage for philosophical analysis. However,
as we might put it, done directly, Danto no once we acknowledge them, we realize how
longer believes that they must be known little they contribute to our understanding of
directly and consciously. However, basic words and pictures, ideas, and beliefs.
actions can be identified by subtracting away The methodological significance of basic
from nonbasic actions until a description is perceptual abilities derives from Danto’s well-
reached from which no further subtractions known method of indiscernibles, his central
can be made. philosophical technique to distinguish action
The appeal to subtraction and infinite from mere behavior, knowledge from mere
regress can then be extended to argue for basic belief, and artworks from mere real things.
elements of other kinds. It follows from the Take two texts, two pictures, two arm-raising
578
DANTO
events, two statements or propositions, two quite broad. In the identification of meaning of
physical objects, or two sentences inscribed in both beliefs and paintings, extended causal
the brain. The two items in each pair may be relations to the world play an important role.
visually identical, yet they may have a very In the case of mental representations, causal
different ontological status or be as different in relations do more than transform belief into
meaning as night and day. This presupposes knowledge, behavior into action. To some
that such items can be visually indistinguish- extent, they determine which beliefs are so
able, even if we know that they were intended transformed and which intentions have the
to be, or to represent, different things. That transforming effect. As we have seen, truth
possibility is grounded on the existence of basic conditions are critical for Danto’s theories of
perceptual abilities, basic representations, knowledge and action. Recall, for instance,
which such knowledge supposedly cannot that a belief becomes knowledge when it is
affect. However, it then follows that we must caused by the state of affairs that makes the
account for the differences between the two belief true. But, of course, it can only be made
items in terms of something other than the true by the state of affairs that causes it, so long
basic representations on which the perception as those affairs are what it represents. Danto
of them depends. This reveals the limited says that we cannot even say what an idea is
semantic significance of basic elements where an idea of without knowing its truth condi-
the difference is one of meaning or content. To tions. Moreover, those conditions are, on his
capture that difference, some account of their view, only satisfied when the representation is
different causal histories is required, as well as caused in the right way. This means that some
a theory of how beliefs about those histories appeal to causal history is required in order to
are brought to bear through interpretations identify the conditions that would make the
by which meaning is ascribed. representation true. It follows that a certain
This brings us to the second way in which type of causal relation must be what makes an
Danto’s conception of the mind is important for idea or a picture the idea or picture it is. When
his philosophy overall. His functionalist form of the actual cause of a token sentence or picture
semantic realism raises the question of how does not match the type with which its content
broadly to construe the representational func- is identified, there is misrepresentation. The
tions that brain states can implement. This is a same is true for neural encoding of sentential
question about the scope of beliefs and inten- or (if there are such things) pictorial states of
tions, a matter of how we determine what they mind.
are about. A central concern in all of Danto’s The appeal to causal history can be more or
philosophy has to do with the relation of less restricted in scope. In the more restricted
meaning and history, where the meaning in application, it establishes denotation or refer-
question belongs to representations of all kinds. ence; the extensional sense of what a belief or
In his philosophy of mind, the issue is how world artwork represents. For example, The Polish
history informs the contents of beliefs and Rider depicts a man on a horse, but this can be
desires. A similar question can be asked about only a small part of the story according to
the contents of art; for art and mind are reflec- Danto’s method of indiscernibles. What would
tions of each other where meaning and content be recognized as the same in two identical
are concerned. As Danto asks rhetorically, “if a pictures is just what the representations happen
bit of mere paint can be of the Passion of the to denote. Two images may denote a man on
Lord, why on earth cannot a state of our brain?” an incline in exactly the same way, yet repre-
(The Body/Body Problem, 1999, p. 30). sent (indeed, depict) him as walking uphill or
As the emphasis on history makes clear, downhill, as the case may be. Equally different
Danto’s theory of representational content is meanings could be attributed to exactly similar
579
DANTO
paintings of a man on a horse. Visually iden- For Danto’s philosophy of art, his theory of
tical pictures can denote the same objects, yet knowledge and action applies to public –
have essentially incompatible contents and not novels and paintings – as well as private rep-
just be variations on a theme. The same is true resentations. Artworks convey knowledge by
for thoughts and beliefs. Two of those may be virtue of the same sort of causal and represen-
inscriptionally identical and refer to the same tational relations that constrain true beliefs.
state of affairs, yet be quite different in They are also the products of actions – indeed,
meaning for all of that. Apprehending the ref- they are actions – insofar as they are caused by
erential relation is not enough to give us a full and express the artist’s intentions and ideas. In
understanding of what the thoughts and beliefs these respects, Danto holds a cognitivist and
are about. Moreover, in the case of fictional symbolic expressionist theory of art. The point
representations, there is an intentional sense of of calling the locus of representations a text
aboutness, a kind of content, that clearly (even where it is a painting) is to bring out the
remains, even when they refer to nothing at all. importance of interpretation for the identifi-
Winged angels and one-eyed monsters may cation of content or meaning in representa-
have never existed, but pictures and stories tions of any kind. Interpreting such texts
about them abound nonetheless. Some expla- requires understanding a complex system of
nation of this fact is required. The question beliefs and intentions; in particular, the beliefs
then is, in what, beyond denotation, does the and intentions of the person who produced
meaning of a representation consist? them. In that case, the maker’s intentions are
In philosophy of mind, it is tempting to think a particularly salient factor in the causal history
that, beyond the level of denotation, the of the representation and, of course, those inten-
meaning of a mental sentence or belief tions have causal histories of their own. The
becomes a matter of interconnected concep- maker’s beliefs and intentions provide a
tual or functional roles, the inferential and standard of correctness for the attribution of
causal relations into which the sentences and meaning to his representations, the truth con-
beliefs can enter. These are typically viewed as ditions that make interpretation into knowl-
defined just by parameters of the local systems edge when they play a central role in bringing
in which they are housed; individual brains, in the interpretation about. But then, the artist’s or
the case of the human mind. Danto suggests agent’s beliefs also have truth conditions, and his
this in holding that the identity of a (mental) intentions may or may not result in an action (a
sentence depends on the other sentences with painting, a gesture) that makes them true.
which it co-occurs. Moreover, he says, in Interpretations must take both of these causal
taking account of systems of sentential atti- relations into account. Danto can say that the
tudes, we are effectively treating the mind as artist’s intentions provide a standard of cor-
if it were a text. This is a challenge, because rectness for interpretations and at the same time
individual systems of beliefs and intentions hold that interpretations that acknowledge those
can be “pretty eccentric”; mental texts can intentions are constitutive of what a represen-
vary considerably from one person to the next tation means. Interpretations that bring more
(The Body/Body Problem, 1999, p. 97). to the meaning than the artist could have
Danto’s fundamental commitment to the intended may be illuminating, but they are not
essential bearing of history on meaning implies constitutive of meaning in Danto’s sense.
that the relevant relations among beliefs and Constitutive interpretations must place the
other representations can only be understood artist’s intentions in a larger context, that of the
by way of their historical connections; con- historical context from which they have arisen
ceptual roles that are long-armed enough to and in which they may succeed or fail. In that
reach into the distant past. case, historical relations constrain both the
580
DANTO
meanings of paintings and their maker’s inten- them salient, “in terms that later events make
tions. To that extent, Danto holds a historicist available but that generally cannot have been
view, although he believes that philosophy dis- know about when the earlier events took place”
covers the concepts and ideas in terms of which (The Body/Body Problem, 1999, p. 6).
representations are interpreted and meanings The watershed moment for the development
attributed. He has therefore been called an of Danto’s thinking was provided by the
essentialist, a neo-Hegelian whose historicism infamous American artist, Andy Warhol. The
consists in the following fact: ideas may be artistic actions of Warhol were for Danto’s
discovered, but not all ideas, and not all actions analysis what Napoleon’s conquests were for
or artworks, are possible at all times. There is Hegel’s thought. They transformed the world,
a kind of logic to their emergence as history including the world of ideas, making theories
unfolds. What a thing essentially is depends on possible that had not been possible before. By
what has preceded it; the types of things that placing ordinary Brillo boxes in a museum,
can follow it depend on what sort of thing it is. turning them into Brillo Boxes, as a work of art,
There are contingencies, to be sure. The world Warhol crystallized for Danto the idea of an art
might have been one way rather than another, world, under the auspices of which things can
but it is constrained by logical relations among come to be works of art. This is a type of insti-
actual and possible objects, actions, and events. tutional theory. However, it should be distin-
For example, if O is a snow shovel, it cannot guished from other institutional theories like
be made into art (by Marcel Duchamp, that of George DICKIE in certain important
perhaps) before it is an ordinary object. If E is respects. On Danto’s view, the art world is a
a hand-raising, it cannot be an act of voting world that is circumscribed by the discourse of
before the relevant political institutions exist. available reasons and theories about art. Art is
If O is a representation in putative pictures or not defined by canons simply laid down by a de
descriptions, or E is a simulation or perfor- facto academy; that is, strictures with canonical
mance of some kind, even if the representations status because they are espoused by philoso-
are fictions (there being no Os to denote), the phers, artists, curators, and critics who happen
type of fictions they are, and the kinds of atti- to be influential at the time.
tudes they can express, will depend on the Warhol’s work, and other related develop-
nature of fictive representation, that have gone ments in this period, also signaled what Danto
before. One work can be a parody of another, describes as the end of art. His claim is not that
but only after the first piece has been made. To we have reached the end of art-making, but
return to mental representations, this implies that art history can be understood as a series
that the content of a belief or intention will of developments in the project of self-defini-
depend on the sequence of concepts, beliefs, tion, in which various conceptions and atti-
and ideas that have preceded it, not so much in tudes about representation emerged. This
the individual believer as in the world. It is in project reached a culmination when ordinary
this sense that that the attribution of belief objects were presented and accepted as
contents, in interpretations of actions and utter- artworks, raising and attempting to answer a
ances, must be conceptually and causally long- philosophical question of how to distinguish
armed. Danto argues that although actions and art from nonart things. In so doing, art con-
representations in the present have to be inter- verges with philosophy, and there art’s project
preted in terms of a prior causal sequence of of self-definition reached an end.
actions and representations, the description of Danto believes the question “what is art?”
that sequence often takes a quasi-teleological can be answered: art expresses ideas and is
tone. Antecedent causes are singled out after the subject of interpretation that takes account
the fact by reference to later events that make of its history, in which it is treated essentially
581
DANTO
as metaphor. “What a work expresses is what Playing with the Edge: The Photographic
it is a metaphor for …” (1981, p. 194). The Achievement of Robert Mapplethorpe
Brillo boxes in Brillo Boxes are like Brillo (Los Angeles, 1996).
boxes in the real world, but transformed into The Body/Body Problem: Selected Essays
meaningful objects by the artist’s actions (Los Angeles, 1999).
(intentions) in ways constrained by the art his- Philosophizing Art (Los Angeles, 1999).
torical context. The work is therefore a The Madonna of the Future: Essays in a
metaphor for art as Warhol construes it. This Pluralistic Art World (New York, 2000).
conception is not limited to one artistic The Abuse of Beauty: Aesthetics and the
movement in New York in the 1960s, of Concept of Art (Chicago, 2003).
course. For example, the Portrait of Madame
Cézanne denotes Madame Cézanne, but it is Other Relevant Works
about painting and expresses the view that “Anselm Kiefer,” The Nation (2 January
painting should reveal geometrical forms, 1989): 26–8.
serving as a metaphor for what Cézanne “Andy Warhol,” The Nation (3 April 1989):
believes painting to be. 458–61.
Danto’s career comprises a philosophical “Narrative and Style,” Journal of Aesthetics
system in which an extended causal–historical and Art Criticism 49 (1992): 201–209.
theory of representation is the basis for his “Seeing and Showing,” Journal of Aesthetics
accounts of knowledge and action, which and Art Criticism 59 (2001): 1–9.
provide for connections to the world that “The Pigeon within Us All: A Reply to Three
perhaps are best understood through the lens Critics,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art
of his influential theory of art. Criticism 59 (2001): 39–44.

“The Artworld,” Journal of Philosophy 61 Amer Phils 1950–2000, Bio 20thC Phils,
(1964): 571–84. Oxford Comp Phil, Pres Addr of APA v9
Analytical Philosophy of History Carrier, David, ed. “Danto and His Critics:
(Cambridge, UK, 1968). Art History, Historiography and After the
Analytical Philosophy of Knowledge End of Art,” History and Theory 37
(Cambridge, UK, 1968). (December 1998). Special issue devoted to
Analytical Philosophy of Action (Cambridge, Danto.
UK, 1973). Carroll, Noel. “Modernity and the Plasticity
The Transfiguration of The Commonplace of Perception,” Journal of Aesthetics and
(Cambridge, Mass., 1981). Art Criticism 59 (2001): 11–19.
Narration and Knowledge (New York, Davis, Whitney. “When Pictures Are Present:
1986). Arthur Danto and the Historicity of the
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art Eye,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art
(New York, 1986). Criticism 59 (2001): 29–38.
The State of the Art (New York, 1987). Rollins, Mark, ed. Arthur Danto and His
Connections to the World (New York, Critics (Cambridge, UK, 1993).
1989). ———, “The Invisible Content of Visual
Encounters and Reflections: Art in the Art,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art
Historical Present (New York, 1990). Criticism 59 (2001): 19–27.
Beyond the Brillo Box: The Visual Arts in
Post-historical Perspective (New York, Mark Rollins
1992).
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DAVIDSON
DAVIDSON, Donald Herbert (1917–2003) showing either that reasons and actions satisfy
the necessary condition in question, or that the
Donald Davidson was born on 6 March 1917 would-be necessary condition for causal inter-
in Springfield, Massachusetts. He entered action is not one at all.
Harvard University in the fall of 1935, was After “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”
influenced by a course with A. N. WHITEHEAD, Davidson became interested in practical rea-
and graduated with a BA in philosophy and soning, which led him to the nature of events.
classics in the spring of 1939. He received a In 1968 he went to Australia to give the David
graduate scholarship from Harvard to further Gavin Lectures at the University of Adelaide.
pursue these interests, studying primarily with These lectures gave rise to his first volume of col-
W. V. QUINE. He left graduate school in 1942 lected papers Essays on Action and Events
to enlist in the US Navy. He was discharged in (1980). Davidson’s chief claim about actions
1945, returned to Harvard, and also began and events is that like tables and chairs they are
teaching as a philosophy instructor at Queens concrete, dated particulars that can be described
College in New York City, starting in 1946. He in various non-logically equivalent and non-syn-
received his PhD in philosophy in 1949, writing onymous ways. What distinguishes them from
his dissertation on Plato’s Philebus. In 1951 other sorts of concrete, dated particulars is their
Davidson joined the philosophy department at potential for causal interaction, and so it is part
Stanford University, teaching there until 1967. of the nature of being an event that it can stand
He then was professor of philosophy at in a causal relationship. Since Davidson treats
Princeton University from 1967 to 1970, causation as a relation between events, and takes
Rockefeller University from 1970 to 1976, and action to be but a species of event, events
the University of Chicago from 1976 to 1981. comprise the very subject matter of action
From 1981 until his death, Davidson was pro- theory, as well as science and ethics.
fessor of philosophy at the University of In the mid 1960s Davidson discovered the
California at Berkeley. He was President of the logician Alfred T A R S K I ’s paper, the
Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Wahrheitsbegriff, on the concept of truth.
Association in 1973–4, and President of the Davidson’s own contributions to this area are
Pacific Division of the American Philosophical best exemplified in his papers “Theories of
Association in 1985–6. Davidson died on 30 Meaning and Learnable Languages” (1965)
August 2003 in Berkeley, California. and “Truth and Meaning” (1967). Though
Until Davidson’s “Actions, Reasons, and natural languages are spoken by finite speakers,
Causes” (1963), something close to a consen- they still have an infinity of meaningful (non-syn-
sus had formed in philosophy that whatever the onymous) sentences, each of which, at least
relationship between reasons and actions might potentially, a speaker could understand. For any
be, it could not be causal. It was believed that (indicative) sentence S of English, a new one can
an alleged logical connection between reasons be formed by prefacing it with “It is believed
and actions excluded any causal relation that.” For any two (indicative) sentences, S and
between them. Much of Davidson’s essay is S’, a new one can be formed by disjoining them
devoted to refuting various arguments, then with the word “or”; and so on for other pro-
popular, that purported to show that reasons ductive mechanisms of our language. The novel
could not cause the actions they rationalize. sentences which these productive mechanisms
According to each, a necessary condition for give rise to are intelligible to normal speakers
causal interaction cannot be satisfied by reasons if their components are. This capacity seems to
and actions. Though these arguments are too require that speakers have learned (a finite
many to be properly treated here, it suffices to number of) rules that determine from a finite set
say that Davidson replied to all of them by of semantic primitives what counts as mean-
583
DAVIDSON
ingful compositions, where an expression is Davidson argues that an adequate compo-

semantically primitive if the “rules which give sitional meaning theory must be empirically
the meaning for the sentences in which it does warranted under the practice of radical inter-
not appear do not suffice to determine the pretation. What this means is that certain
meaning of the sentences in which it does specific empirical considerations must be
appear” (1965, p. 9). Based on such consider- respected in choosing between distinct but true
ations, Davidson requires of a theory of compositional meaning theories; namely, in
meaning that it specify what every sentence opting for a compositional meaning theory for
means by exhibiting its meaning as a function German that issues in (S) over one that issues
of the meaning of its significant parts (based, in (W).
presumably, on their arrangement in the
sentence). Let us call any such theory for a (W) “Schnee ist weiss” is true in German if,
language “a compositional meaning theory” and only if, grass is green.
for that language.
Davidson was the first philosopher to bring (W) is, as a matter of fact, true, but, unlike (S),
to prominence the importance of the require- it fails to interpret ‘Schnee ist weiss’, and so no
ment that a theory of meaning of our language compositional meaning theory for German
exhibit it as compositional (1965, p. 23). The that issues in (W) can be adequate. But for
requirement focuses attention on the need to languages we do not already understand, a
uncover structure in natural languages. compositional meaning theory must be selected
Davidson’s positive suggestion for a composi- on the basis of “evidence plausibly available to
tional meaning theory for a language L, sur- an interpreter,” that is, “someone who does
prisingly, utilizes no concept of meaning that not already know how to interpret utterances
goes beyond truth. To wit, his theory of the theory is designed to cover” (1973, p. 128).
meaning takes the form of a (finite) theory of Is it not possible that different people, com-
truth that, for each sentence S of L, entails munities, cultures or periods view, conceptu-
what we shall call a T-sentence of form alize, or make the world (or their worlds) in
different ways? Could not another thinker
(T) S is true in L if, and only if, p. have concepts or beliefs radically different
from our own? Davidson identifies concep-
where ‘p’ specifies (in a metalanguage) condi- tual schemes with sets of intertranslatable lan-
tions under which S is true in L. So, for guages (1974, p. 185). He thereby transforms
example, an adequate compositional meaning the question about alternative conceptual
theory for German should issue in a theorem schemes into one about whether there could be
like (S): non-intertranslatable languages. Pressures
from the nature of radical interpretation
(S) ‘Schnee ist weiss’ is true in German if, and together with the fact that “all understanding
only if, snow is white. of the speech of another involves radical inter-
pretation” (1973, p. 125) force him to draw
A compositional theory of meaning for a his critical conclusions.
language L that issues in interpretive T-sen- Davidson’s views about the nature of events
tences like (S) is such that anyone who knows and their relation to laws brought him to a
it is positioned to understand every sentence of stunning conclusion about the relationship
L. The observation that natural languages are between minds and bodies, namely, his thesis
compositional is the foundation upon which of anomalous monism. Much can and has
Davidson builds his program in the theory of been said in favor of each of the following
meaning. three claims:
584
DAVIDSON
1. The mental and the physical are distinct. that an interpreter cannot find speakers to have
2. The mental and the physical causally largely false beliefs, even if she herself has no
interact. opinion as to the general truth and falsity of
3. The physical is causally closed. these beliefs. Given what beliefs are, and how
their contents are determined on this story,
The problem, though, is they seem inconsistent. Davidson is committed to the impossibility that
Consider their application to events. (1) Says “all our beliefs about the world might be false”
that no mental event is a physical event; (2) says (“Three Varieties of Knowledge,” 1991, p.
that some mental events cause physical events, 193). A radical interpreter must have beliefs
and vice versa; a loud noise reaching Tom’s about the world in order to succeed in ascrib-
ear may cause him a desire to turn down his ing to others beliefs about the world. But, as
radio; and his desire to turn down his radio radical interpretation is conceived, she also
may cause his arm to move in such a way to must find others largely in agreement with her
result in the volume of his radio being lowered. in those beliefs.
(3) Says that all the causes of physical events are Davidson’s anti-skeptical argument from
themselves physical events. The dilemma posed radical interpretation rests on two assumptions:
by the plausibility of each of these claims and that to be a speaker is to be interpretable by
by their apparent incompatibility is the tradi- others, and that to be interpretable by others
tional mind–body problem. Davidson’s reso- requires being largely right, not only in one’s
lution, as articulated in “Mental Events” general beliefs, but in beliefs about the local
(1970) consists of theses (4)–(6), which taken environment. On the assumption that radical
together comprise his thesis of anomalous interpretation is possible, the proper way to
monism: state the requirement on a speaker is that her
beliefs about her environment be mostly true.
4. There are no exceptionless psychological The crucial aspect of radical interpretation is
or psychophysical laws, and in fact all excep- the importance of causality in determining what
tionless laws can be expressed in a purely someone means or believes. We cannot “in
physical vocabulary (1970, p. 214–5). general fix what someone means independently
5. Mental events causally interact with of what he believes and independently of what
physical events (1970, p. 208). caused the belief …. The causality plays an
6. Event c causes event e only if an excep- indispensable role in determining the content of
tionless causal law subsumes c and e (1970, what we say and believe.” (“A Coherence
p. 208). Theory,” 1986, p. 435) So, it is the central role
of causation in fixing the contents of beliefs
The thesis is monistic, since it assumes there is that ensures that the truth of everything we
but one kind of stuff in the world, physical believe is not in general “logically indepen-
stuff, but it is anomalous, since although its dent” of having those beliefs; and that others
monism commits it to physical and mental stuff cannot differ too much from us in what they
being the same stuff, it denies that there is a believe.
strict reduction of the one to other. A central feature of the Cartesian tradition in
Of the many consequences of radical inter- modern philosophy is that at the foundation of
pretation one quite striking one is anti-skepti- the structure of our justified beliefs about the
cism, the impossibility of massive error. In a world are our beliefs about our own mental
number of articles, including “Empirical states, our attitudes, experiences, and sensa-
Content” (1986) and “A Coherence Theory of tions. As we have seen, Davidson’s approach
Truth and Knowledge” (1986), Davidson both to meaning and interpretation, and to
argues, on the basis of a principle of charity, central issues in epistemology, is anti-Cartesian
585
DAVIDSON
inasmuch as he rejects this assumption. A ment of the theory of truth for a language as an
radical interpreter is restricted to behavioral empirical theory, and to the adoption of the
evidence in interpreting another. From this stance of the radical interpreter as the stand-
standpoint, Davidson treats the central point for confirmation, linking the structure of
concepts employed in interpreting another as a rich theory with its basic evidence, and
theoretical concepts introduced to keep track of placing the theory of meaning in the context of
behavior. Viewed from his perspective, the role a theory of rational agency. Adopting this
of a theory of interpretation is to identify and stance as fundamental is tantamount to the
systematize patterns in the behavior of speakers rejection of Cartesianism and empiricism, and
in relation to their environment. If this is right, so the abandonment, among other philosoph-
we do not first have access to facts about ical mainstays, of conceptual relativism, global
speakers’ meanings and attitudes, including our skepticism, and representationalism. Theories
own. frequently yield insight into problems that they
Another consequence of Davidson’s taking were not specifically designed to solve. As with
what we might call a third-person perspective other significant philosophers, a careful reading
of the radical interpreter as methodologically of Davidson’s writings bears out both how
fundamental is the rejection of all forms of tra- broad in scope his philosophical accomplish-
ditional empiricism. Essential to traditional ments are and, more importantly, how well
empiricism is its attempt to account for our they cohere.
knowledge of the world exclusively by appeal
to sensory experience. What is distinctive about BIBLIOGRAPHY
empiricism is not the thought that sensory expe- Decision Making: An Experimental
rience can play a role in justifying our beliefs Approach, with Patrick Suppes (Stanford,
about the world around us, but that it plays the Cal., 1957).
role of a foundation for our empirical knowl- “Actions, Reasons and Causes,” Journal of
edge. This in turn entails that the first-person Philosophy 60 (1963): 685–99.
point of view is fundamental, since each “Theories of Meaning and Learnable
person’s experience is treated as being his own Languages” (1965). Reprinted in Inquiries
foundation for his empirical knowledge. In into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford,
adopting the third-person point of view as fun- 2001), pp. 3–16.
damental, Davidson rejects a central tenet of all “Truth and Meaning,” Synthese 17 (1967):
forms of empiricism, and the traditional project 304–23.
associated with it of explaining our empirical “Mental Events,” in Experience and Theory,
knowledge by appeal to experience. Rather, in ed. Lawrence Foster and J. W. Swanson
Davidson’s view, our knowledge of the world (London, 1970), pp. 79–101.
around us, of other minds, and of our own “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,”
minds, has a unified source in our nature as Proceedings of the American Philosophical
rational beings capable of communicating with Association 47 (1974): 5–20.
one another. Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford, 1980;
Davidson argues that language, mind, and 2nd edn 2001).
action are inseparable. To account for Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation
language, he advances the radical idea that a (Oxford, 1984; 2nd edn 2001).
theory of meaning can be satisfactory only if it “Rational Animals,” in Actions and Events:
discovers a finite basic vocabulary and rules of Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald
composition in the language to be interpreted. Davidson, ed. Ernest Lepore and Brian
The aim to provide a comprehensive under- McLaughlin (Oxford, 1985), pp. 473–80.
standing of natural languages led him to a treat- “A Coherence Theory of Truth and
586
DAVIDSON
Knowledge,” in Truth and Interpretation: 60 (January 1987): 441–58.

Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald “The Myth of the Subjective,” in Relativism:
Davidson, ed. Ernest Lepore (Oxford, Interpretation and Confrontation, ed.
1986), pp. 307–19. Michael Krausz (Notre Dame, Ind., 1989),
Plato’s Philebus (New York, 1990). pp. 159–72.
“The Structure and Content of Truth,” “Davidson, Donald,” in A Companion to the
Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990): Philosophy of Mind, ed. Samuel
279–328. Guttenplan (Oxford, 1994), pp. 231–6.
“Three Varieties of Knowledge,” in A. J. “On Quine’s Philosophy,” Theoria 60
Ayer Memorial Essays, ed. A. Phillips (1994): 184–92.
Griffiths, Philosophy suppl. 30 (1991): “Radical Interpretation Interpreted,” in
153–66. Philosophical Perspectives: Logic and
“Thinking Causes,” in Mental Causation, ed. Language, ed. James Tomberlin
John Heil (Oxford, 1993), pp. 3–18. (Atascadero, Cal., 1994).
Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective “Could There Be a Science of Rationality?”
(Oxford, 2001). International Journal of Philosophical
Problems of Rationality (Oxford, 2004). Studies 3 (1995): 1–16.
“Laws and Cause,” Dialectica 49 (1995):
Other Relevant Works 263–79.
“On Saying That,” Synthese 19 (1968): “The Folly of Trying to Define Truth,”
130–46. Journal of Philosophy 93 (1996): 263–78.
Ed. with Jaakko Hintikka, Words and “Seeing through Language,” in Thought and
Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Language, ed. J. Preston (Cambridge, UK,
O. Quine (Dordrecht, 1969; rev. edn 1997), pp. 15–28.
1975). In Conversation: Donald Davidson, discus-
Ed. with Gilbert Harman, Semantics of sions with other philosophers on 19 video-
Natural Language (Boston, 1972; 2nd edn cassettes, filmed by Philosophy
1977). International (London, 1997).
“Radical Interpretation,” Dialectica 27 “Replies to My Critics,” Critica 30 (1998):
(1973): 314–28. 97–112.
“Belief and the Basis of Meaning,” Synthese “The Emergence of Thought,” Erkenntnis 51
27 (1974): 309–23. (1999): 7–17.
“The Method of Truth in Metaphysics,” “Truth Rehabilitated,” in Rorty and His
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977): Critics, ed. Robert Brandom (Oxford,
244–54. 2000), pp. 65–74.
“Empirical Content,” in Truth and “What Thought Requires,” in The
Interpretation: Perspectives on the Foundations of Cognitive Science, ed. Joao
Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. Branquinho (Oxford, 2001), pp. 121–32.
Ernest Lepore (Oxford, 1986), pp.
320–32. Further Reading
“A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs,” in Truth Amer Phils 1950–2000, Bio 20thC Phils,
and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Blackwell Analytic Phil, Blackwell Comp
Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. Phils, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Oxford
Ernest Lepore (Oxford, 1986), pp. Comp Phil, Pres Addr of APA v8,
433–46. Routledge Encycl Phil
“Knowing One’s Own Mind,” Proceedings Brandl, Johannes, and Wolfgang L.
of the American Philosophical Association Gombocz, eds. The Mind of Donald
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DAVIDSON
Davidson, Grazer Philosophische Studien Philosophy of Language: An Introduction

36 (Amsterdam, 1989). (Oxford, 1989).
Dasenbrock, Reed Way, ed. Literary Theory Stoecker, Ralf, ed. Reflecting Davidson:
After Davidson (University Park, Penn., Donald Davidson Responding to an
1993). International Forum of Philosophers
De Caro, Mario, ed. Interpretations and (Berlin, 1993).
Causes: New Perspectives on Donald Stüber, Karsten. Donald Davidsons Theorie
Davidson’s Philosophy (Dordrecht, 1999). sprachlichen Verstehens (Frankfurt am
Engel, Pascal. Davidson et la philosophie du Main, 1993).
langage (Paris, 1994). Vermazen, Bruce, and Merrill B. Hintikka,
Envine, Simon. Donald Davidson (Stanford, eds. Essays on Davidson: Actions and
Cal., 1991). Events (Oxford, 1985).
Fodor, Jerry, and Ernest Lepore. Holism: A Wheeler, Darrell. On Davidson (Belmont,
Shopper’s Guide (Oxford, 1992). Cal., 2003).
Glock, Hans-Johann. Quine and Davidson Zeglen, Urszula, ed. Donald Davidson:
on Language, Thought, and Reality Truth, Meaning and Knowledge (London
(Cambridge, UK, 2003). and New York, 1999).
Hahn, Lewis E., ed. The Philosophy of
Donald Davidson (Chicago, 1999). Ernie Lepore
Contains Davidson’s autobiography and
bibliography.
Köhler, Wolfgang R., ed. Davidsons
Philosophie des Mentalen (Paderborn,
Germany, 1997).
Kotátko, Petr, Peter Pagin, and Gabriel Segal, DAVIDSON, Thomas (1840–1900)
eds. Interpreting Davidson (Stanford, Cal.,
2001). Thomas Davidson was born into poverty on
Lepore, Ernest, ed. Truth and Interpretation: 25 October 1840, on a small farm in the
Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald parish of Old Deer, Scotland. His mother,
Davidson (Oxford, 1986). Mary Warrender, moved a year later to the
Lepore, Ernest, and McLaughlin, Brian, eds. nearby village of Fetterangus. Neither
Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Davidson nor his brother, John Morrison
Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Oxford, Davidson, knew who their father was, but
1986). church records in the parish indicate that he
Letson, Ben H. Davidson’s Theory of Truth was Thomas Davidson, a nearby farmer. As a
and Its Implications for Rorty’s boy Davidson displayed a natural vivacity and
Pragmatism (New York, 1997). joy for living, a passion for reading, and an
Ludwig, Kirk, ed. Donald Davidson exceptional memory. As a young boy he
(Cambridge, UK, 2003). attended the library auction of a deceased
Malpas, Jeff. Donald Davidson and the preacher, where the books were being sold in
Mirror of Meaning: Holism, Truth, lots. Unable to compete in the bidding, when
Interpretation (Cambridge, UK, 1992). the auction was over, the auctioneer gave all
Preyer, G., F. Siebelt, and A. Ulfig, eds. of the remaining books to the delighted boy.
Language, Mind, and Epistemology: On When Davidson spread the books out in his
Donald Davidson’s Philosophy attic room, his joy was abated, for the books
(Dordrecht, 1994). were all in foreign languages – French,
Ramberg, Bjørn. Donald Davidson’s German, and Dutch. The studious boy began
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DAVIDSON
an intense study of foreign languages; by the plurality together in a continuous act of

end of his life he had mastered thirteen, “world-building.” Feeling is the paradigm for
including Sanskrit, Icelandic, and Arabic. understanding the self, because it provides for
In 1856 Davidson won a bursary prize to the many-within-one out of which increasing
King’s College, Aberdeen, from which he grad- discrimination, individuality, and world-
uated in 1860, first in his class in Greek and building grow. Davidson eventually related
second in the humanities. He taught Latin and these ideas to a Leibnizian monadology that
Greek for six years and then made his way to was also indebted to Giordano Bruno and
Boston in 1867 where he befriended Henry Maxmillian Drossbach.
Wadsworth Longfellow, Ralph Waldo Davidson traveled to London in June 1877,
EMERSON, and Bronson ALCOTT. In November where he apparently met Heinrich Schliemann,
1867 he left for St. Louis where he accepted a the eminent archaeologist. From London,
teaching position in the St. Louis Public School Davidson traveled to Greece for a walking
system, under the direction of Superintendent tour of historic sites and, with Schliemann,
William Torrey HARRIS. He joined the St. Louis surveys of archaeological sites. One result of
Philosophical Society, led by Henry C. this trip was Davidson’s The Parthenon Frieze,
B ROKMEYER and Harris, both committed and Other Essays (1882), which offered a new
Hegelians. Although he regularly attended explanation of the meaning and purpose of
meetings of the Philosophical Society, the frieze. According to Davidson, the
Davidson rejected Hegel’s philosophy and Parthenon frieze represents Pericles’s dream
formed a competing Aristotle Club. of a league or confederation of Greek cities
In 1875 Davidson moved to Boston where with Athens as its leader. The building itself
he revived Charles S. PEIRCE’s Metaphysical and its chryselephantine statue represent
Club. The new club, which took up the study Athens’s triumph over Persia and its new
of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, ascendancy. Like a ribbon that ties or binds,
included William JAMES, Joseph Bangs Warner, the girdling frieze, he claims, represents the
Nicholas St. John GREEN, Oliver Wendell hope for unity in the Greek world. The
H OLMES Jr., John F ISKE , George Holmes probable date for the completion of the
HOWISON, Francis BOWEN, Charles Carroll Parthenon (445 BCE) matches the time at which
EVERETT, and James Elliot CABOT. The group’s the ambassadors were sent out, calling for con-
discussions revolved around the problem of ventions and a confederacy. To encourage the
relations and Kant’s distinction between Spartans to join, the frieze represents two sets
analytic and synthetic truths. Davidson read a of gods: Ionic and Dorian, or Athenian and
paper to the club on 7 December 1878, in Spartan.
which he denied the validity of the distinction, Davidson returned to Boston in the summer
and seemed to defend empiricism. Although of 1878 and lectured at Alcott’s Concord
Davidson’s paper is lost, another paper from Summer School of Philosophy in its founding
the same time, “Individuality” (from 22 year of 1879. Despite frequent trips to Europe,
October 1878), together with comments in his he was a frequent lecturer at the Concord
letters, indicates his position: universals do not School until its close in 1888, lecturing on a
exist. Universality lies in how predicates are wide range of topics: Plato, Aristotle, Sappho,
applied. Following Aristotle and Leibniz, only Dante, Goethe, immortality, education,
individuals exist. The self is always subject, Emerson, irony, Émile Zola, and ontology.
never predicate. The self is therefore a simple, At the urging of his close friend Princess
eternal entity. Its object is the world, a plural- Katherine Sayn-Wittgenstein, in January 1880
ity, in which actions and events take place in Davidson journeyed to Rome where he met
temporal and spatial form. The self holds this Vatican scholars, and had at least one meeting
589
DAVIDSON
with the Pope to discuss the philosophy of dining hall, and cottages for guests. For ten
Aquinas. He then traveled to the Rosminian years the “Glenmore Summer School for the
monastery in Domodosolla in the Italian Alps Culture Sciences” brought together some of the
where he studied the philosophy of Antonio greatest figures in American philosophy.
Rosmini-Serbati for two years. Inspired by James, John DEWEY, Josiah ROYCE, Morris
Rosmini and Dante, he became enamored with COHEN, and many others exchanged and
the idea of a vita nuova, a new life of moral debated ideas. Young people, especially from
and spiritual regeneration. He combined the the Lower East Side of New York City, studied
Rosminian emphasis on feeling, sympathy, and at the feet of these men in a well-ordered daily
devotion to others with the Faustian urge to routine.
assimilate all cultural possibilities in his con- Beginning in 1890 Davidson divided his year
ception of the new life. into two parts. From October through March
In 1883 Davidson formed a “Fellowship for he resided in New York City, but in early April
the New Life” in London that counted among he returned to Glenmore. After opening the
its members Edward Carpenter, Havelock buildings, he arranged the lectures for that
Ellis, Ramsay McDonald, Edward Pease, and summer’s course of study. The 1892 summer
George Bernard Shaw. According to course was typical: Dewey lectured on nine-
Davidson’s scheme, the group held that moral teenth-century English philosophy, especially
regeneration must precede social regeneration; conservatism and liberalism; Harris spoke on
they must live in proximity, in the same New England transcendentalism; Royce on
building or same neighborhood, and share ethics; Ibn Abi Suleiman on Islam; Max
tasks and material goods; they must dissemi- Margolis on Judaism; and Davidson on Greek
nate high culture to the poor; they must repu- philosophy in Christendom to the seventh
diate competition and selfishness, the culture of century.
acquisition, replacing it with the simple life of In 1898 Davidson was invited to lecture to
satisfaction in arts and crafts. a large group of young Jewish immigrants at
Although the Fellowship lasted through the the Educational Alliance, a settlement house on
1890s, from its inception a rift among its the Lower East Side. After his lecture, which
members plagued the group. Some members emphasized high culture, he was challenged
wanted a commitment to activism and social- by the audience to state how its acquisition was
ist ideas written into the constitution. Others possible for poor laborers. Davidson met the
saw the goal of the New Life as first and challenge by establishing a “Breadwinner’s
foremost spiritual rebirth and moral recon- College” at an available building, the People’s
struction. Unable to reconcile these aims, the Institute, and proceeded to design a curriculum
members agreed to create a sister society to that included remedial English, foreign lan-
accommodate the activists. Thus, although he guages, health and hygiene, natural science,
detested socialism, “The Fabian Society” is and great works in the humanities. Although
perhaps the most enduring outcome of Davidson died on 14 September 1900 in
Davidson’s initiative. Montréal, Canada, his students were inspired
In 1888 Davidson established his own by his example to continue the Breadwinner’s
summer school, after the fashion of Concord, College for many more years. Elizabeth
first in Orange, New Jersey, and then F LOWER and Murray G. M URPHEY aptly
Farmington, Connecticut. With the financial explain that “Students grew into professionals
assistance of an old St. Louis friend, Joseph and teachers, and the list of those associated
Pulitzer, in 1889 he purchased 167 acre tract with the college reads like a Who’s Who of the
of land on Mt. Hurricane, in Keene, New next generation’s intelligentsia and reformers”
York. Davidson built a cottage for himself, a (Flower and Murphey 1997, vol. 2, p. 486).
590
DAVIDSON
Anyone wishing to peer deeper into the when he wrote that there are “people known to
thought of Davidson must grapple with the fact me” for whom “a life hereafter is … an obses-
that several of his key essays were never pub- sion” (James 1956, pp. 3–4). James suggested
lished and are now missing. The remaining that the brain might serve either a permissive or
pieces reveal Davidson’s embrace of Aristotle’s transmissive function and, after the dissolution
God as a self-replicator, Davidson’s assertion of of one’s biology, experiences might remain in a
the ontological irreducibility of selves and the higher self, a “mother-sea” of consciousness.
monadic nature of the self, and a fervent belief Although Davidson criticized James’s theory of
in the immortality of the soul as the appropria- the absorbing “mother-sea” as pantheistic, in
tion of a succession of lives. regard to the mechanism of immortality, some-
In his journal Davidson defends a view he thing like James’s doctrine is the direction of
calls “apeirotheism,” which he defines as “a Davidson’s apeirotheism.
theory of Gods infinite in number.” There is a A perusal of memorials to Davidson reveal
primary or archetypal individual, self, or God. that his most enduring influence was that of a
This primary individual is Aristotle’s unmoved loving friend, a passionate educator, and a
mover as reworked by Davidson. The primary sterling example of the philosophical life. James
Individual is thinking or Nous. God thinks only captures this aspect of Davidson particularly
of himself, but there must be some content to this well: “the value of Thomas Davidson … lay in
self, otherwise God would be mere abstract the example he set to us all, of how – even in the
identity (A = A). Therefore God must include the midst of this intensely worldly social system of
world as part of himself. This world consists of ours, in which every interest is organized collec-
secondary individuals, selves, or Gods, which tively and commercially – a single man may still
have unfolded from the primary individual. be a knight-errant of the intellectual life, and
Davidson claims that Aristotle’s God can be preserve freedom in the midst of sociability”
fully actual yet contain at the same time unen- (James 1911, p. 118).
ergized reserves, reserves that are not potentials.
He derives this from Aristotle’s distinction BIBLIOGRAPHY
between having knowledge and exercising it, The Parthenon Frieze, and Other Essays
the metaphysical distinction between first and (London, 1882).
second actualities. Secondary individuals emerge The Philosophical System Of Antonio
from the primary individual like droplets of Rosmini-Serbati (London, 1882).
moisture that appear on a glass of water. The Prolegomena to In Memoriam, with an
primary individual is not static perfection but Index to the Poem (Boston and New York,
“ever-advancing activity.” Although we use God 1889).
as a uniquely referring name, Davidson explains, Aristotle and Ancient Educational Ideals
it is in fact an essence. Secondary individuals or (New York, 1892).
selves are therefore essentially monadic Gods. The Education of the Greek People and Its
Through cooperation, love, and the Faustian Influence on Civilization (New York,
drive for all possibilities, the secondary self 1894).
approaches the perfection of the primary self. Rousseau and Education According to
One can speculate about Davidson’s view of Nature (New York, 1898).
immortality from evidence contained in William A History of Education (New York, 1900).
James’s 1898 Ingersoll Lectures, Human The Education of the Wage-earners, ed.
Immortality. A Glenmore participant and Charles M. Bakewell (Boston, 1904).
devoted friend of Davidson’s, James was well The Philosophy of Goethe’s Faust, ed.
aware of his radical individualism and passion Charles M. Bakewell (Boston, 1906).
for eternity. He probably had Davidson in mind
591
DAVIDSON
Other Relevant Works Flower, Elizabeth, and Murray G. Murphy.

Davidson’s papers are housed in the Sterling A History of Philosophy in America, 2
Memorial Library at Yale University. vols (New York, 1977).
Journal, 1884–1898. Thomas Davidson Good, James A. “The Value of Thomas
Papers, Yale University. Davidson,” Transactions of the Charles S.
“Discussion with A. Vera Concerning Peirce Society 40 (2004): 289–318.
L ’Ancienne et la Nouvelle Foi,” Journal James, William. “Thomas Davidson: A
of Speculative Philosophy 8 (1874): Knight-Errant of the Intellectual Life,” in
281–2; 9 (1875): 434–7. Memories and Studies (New York, 1911).
“Education,” Atlantic Monthly 39 (January ———, Human Immortality (New York,
1877): 231. 1956).
“Antonio Rosmini,” The Fortnightly Review Knight, William Angus, ed. Memorials of
36 (1881): 583. Thomas Davidson: The Wandering
“A Solitude in the Italian Alps,” Pall Mall Scholar (Boston, 1907).
Gazette (28 May 1882). Repr. in Snider, Denton J. A Tour of Europe (St.
Memorials of Thomas Davidson: A Louis, 1907).
Wandering Scholar, ed. William Angus ———, The St. Louis Movement in
Knight (Boston, 1907), pp. 231–4. Philosophy, Literature, Education,
“The Concord Philosophical School,” Town Psychology, with Chapters of
Topics (22 August 1885): 7. Autobiography (St. Louis, 1920).
“Goethe’s Titanism,” in The Life And
Genius of Goethe; Lectures at the Michael H. DeArmey
Concord School of Philosophy, ed. F. B.
Sanborn (Boston, 1886), pp. 68–106.
Thomas Davidson, “Noism,” The Index
(April 1886): 525.
“Cooperation,” The Freethinker’s Magazine
(February 1887): 50–61. DAVIS, Noah Knowles (1830–1910)
“Bruno’s Thought,” The Freethinker’s
Magazine (September 1889): 288–9. Noah Davis was born on 15 May 1830 in
“When the ‘Higher Criticism’ Has Done Its Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and died on 4 May
Work,” International Journal of Ethics 7 1910 in Charlottesville, Virginia. He received
(1897): 435–48. several degrees including a BA in chemistry
“American Democracy as a Religion,” from Mercer University in 1849, the MA, PhD,
International Journal of Ethics 8 (1898): and the LLD His father, Noah Davis, was a
21–41. minister for the Baptist Tract Society. Shortly
“Autobiographical Sketch,” Journal of the after his birth Noah’s father died, and his
History of Ideas 8 (1957): 531–6. mother Mary married the Southern Baptist
theologian John L. Dagg. After graduating
Further Reading from Mercer, Davis went to Philadelphia to
Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, study chemistry. He edited two books, The
Dict Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v23, Model Architect and The Carpenter’s Guide,
Who Was Who in Amer v1 and worked in an architect’s office. From 1852
DeArmey, Michael H. “Thomas Davidson’s to 1865 he worked in Alabama, first as a
Apeirotheism and Its Influence on William teacher of natural science for seven years at
James and John Dewey,” Journal of the Howard College and, later, as the head of the
History of Ideas 48 (1987): 691–708. Judson Female Institute. During his presidency
592
DAY
at Judson, Davis succeeded in increasing Elements of Ethics (Boston and New York,
student attendance to its highest annual rate. 1900). Abridged version, Elementary
Davis became President of Bethel College in Ethics (Boston and New York, 1900).
Russelville, Kentucky in 1868 where he made
major changes. He not only raised the stan- Other Relevant Works
dards of the college to make it more competi- Juda’s Jewels, A Study of the Hebrew Lyrics
tive with other colleges, but also increased the (Nashville, Tenn., 1896).
course offerings. In 1873 the University of Synopsis of Events in the Life of Jesus of
Virginia appointed him as chair of moral phi- Nazareth (Charlottesville, Virg., 1900).
losophy, a position he held for twenty years. The Story of the Nazarene in Annotated
Educators of his time described him as a stim- Paraphrase (New York, 1903).
ulating and intellectual teacher who made his
institutions rise among the leading colleges in Further Reading
America. Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, Dict Amer Bio,
As a writer, Davis was described as Nat Cycl Amer Bio v4, Who Was Who in
profound, clear, and original. He made contri- Amer v1
butions to The Forum, Christian Thought, and Denny, Collins. Analysis of Noah K. Davis’s
The North American Review. In 1880 he pub- Elements of Deductive Logic and of his
lished The Theory of Thought which was at the Elements of Psychology (Nashville, Tenn.,
time a very comprehensive work on logic. 1916).
Elements of Psychology (1892) was recognized
by a large number of colleges as a leading book Hani Morgan
in the field. In Elements of Ethics (1900), Davis
discusses his theory of morals. According to
Davis, every person has moral worth, but while
some people are respected when their conduct
conforms with moral law, others do not earn
this respect, because they disregard it. Davis DAY, Henry Noble (1808–90)
also contends that ethics is the study of real
truth. He goes on to discuss duty, virtue, self- Henry Noble Day was born on 4 August 1808
ishness, charity, the family, and the community. in New Preston, Connecticut. Before graduat-
Davis had strong religious beliefs which were ing from Yale College with a BA in 1828, he
reflected in his Sunday lectures to students on lived with Jeremiah Day, his uncle and
biblical passages. He began giving these reli- President of Yale at the time. After college,
gious discourses every Sunday during the early Day taught in a seminary for a year, studied
1880s. The lectures were popular with students, law, returned to Yale to serve as a tutor, and
and their main ideas were made available to the then spent fifteen months traveling in Europe.
wider community in three religious volumes In 1836 he was appointed pastor of the First
published from 1895 to 1903. Congregational Church of Waterbury,
Connecticut. In 1840 he became professor of
BIBLIOGRAPHY theology at Western Reserve College in
The Theory of Thought (New York, 1880). Hudson, Ohio. During his time there, he
Elements of Psychology (New York, 1892). worked to make the college resemble Yale in
Elements of Deductive Logic (New York, various ways. Day also edited the Ohio
1893). Observer, and managed various railroads. In
Elements of Inductive Logic (New York, 1852 the theology department was eliminated
1895). when the college underwent a financial crisis
593
DAY
brought about by low enrollment. His affilia- Many of Day’s books were written as intro-
tion with Western Reserve remained merely ductions to a particular subject. His style was
nominal until 1858, when he became President highly structured; consistent with his view that
of Ohio Female College at College Hill (on the the disciplines under study were sciences, he
outskirts of Cincinnati). After his resignation in attempted to systematically break them down
1864, he returned to New Haven where he into their major constituents for examination.
spent the rest of his life. Day died on 12 January Another technique he used, figuring promi-
1890 in New Haven, Connecticut. nently in The Science of Aesthetics (1872), was
His life in New Haven was Day’s most prolific one in which he proceeded from an analysis of
period; he was a full-time writer and produced the essential aesthetic elements or properties, to
most of his twenty textbooks. Whereas his a classification of these properties into kinds,
earlier works had been mostly about rhetoric and the derivation of laws regarding these
and bookkeeping, his later writings explored kinds, and their practical applications.
such diverse topics as logic, ethics, epistemology, Day’s work on aesthetics was the culmina-
aesthetics, and education. His investigation of tion of one of his two major projects, which
these themes represented one of the two over- began with his writings on rhetoric. He
arching intellectual projects that one may discern described rhetoric as comprising three parts:
within his writing: aesthetics and logic. The thought, form (words), and the process of
former project was the more ambitious, and, in applying the thought to an appropriate form.
his eyes, the more all-encompassing, since it was This stance led to his interest in aesthetics,
from psychology that one could derive the asso- which he described as “the philosophy of
ciated laws of many subordinate disciplines. For form.” The Art of Rhetoric, published in 1850
instance, in his Elements of Psychology, a and revised in 1867 under the name The Art of
textbook “for beginners in metaphysical Discourse, was an attempt to remedy a
studies” (1876, p. iii), he mentions William problem with earlier texts by, for instance,
Hamilton’s taxonomy of the phenomena of the Richard Whately and Hugh Blair. Day noted
mind into the three mental sciences of aesthet- that the former regards rhetoric as a purely
ics, logic, and ethics. In light of their derivation logical endeavor, and emphasizes the formula-
from mental facts, Hamilton calls these the three tion of arguments, whereas the latter treated it
nomological sciences. However, it was not until as entirely a matter of taste. Day, in contrast,
after Day had separately written on each of stressed the equal importance of logic and aes-
these three sciences that he began to delve thor- thetics, as well as ethics.
oughly into the topic that evidently unified them, In his characteristic manner, he began with
an undertaking that completely occupied his the division of rhetoric into two component
final years. In this book Day also described the processes, based on logic and grammar. He
classification of mental phenomena as falling labeled these elements invention and style
under intelligence, sensibility, and will. This was respectively. However, rhetoric consists of more
a common demarcation; the novel contribution than the sum of these interdependent parts; as
of Day’s approach was his treatment of sensi- mentioned above, a third critical factor was
bility as prior to intelligence, which would the ability to combine them, putting logical
prevent confusion and error that arises from thought into grammatical form. This skill, “the
attempts to treat imagination and memory as great art of the writer and speaker” (1872, p.
part of intelligence. He also studied sensibility in iv) was, like others in the arts, one that could
greater detail than previous authors, and noted only be acquired by practice. This fact induced
that the other two faculties, intelligence and Day to write Rhetorical Praxis ten years later
will, cannot properly be understood indepen- (1860), to help students become accustomed to
dently of it. thinking about abstract rhetorical concepts.
594
DAY
He defined invention as “the art of supplying his meticulousness and exhaustive attention to
the requisite thought in kind and form for dis- detail.
course” (1867, p. 42), and observes it to be Well before finishing the study in rhetoric, Day
founded on logic. He reduced the process to wrote Elements of Logic (1867), partly to
several steps: explanation, confirmation, exci- improve upon the logic texts that were available
tation, and persuasion. Style, on the other hand, at the time. However, the book also made
is “that part of rhetoric which treats of the original contributions, such as the grounding of
expression of thought in language” (1867, p. induction on relationships of parts and their com-
208). Day divided style’s properties into plements, and accordingly, a new classification of
absolute and relative, and further characterized reasoning, and a new logical methodology. Day
relative properties as either relative-subjective also asserted that thought, and all its products
(that is, relative to the thoughts of the speaker; (notably concepts, and language – the latter of
this includes significance, consciousness, and which is produced by the application of reason-
naturalness) or relative-objective (or relative to ing to these concepts), are entirely reducible to
the listener; in descending order of importance, identity relations. Here Day departed from
these are clearness, energy, and beauty). The Hamilton, although he acknowledged his indebt-
absolute properties of style include the oral, edness to Hamilton’s work.
suggestive, and grammatical properties. Day Day’s book on the third of the mental
was unique among rhetoricians in recognizing sciences, ethics, was published immediately after
the relative nature of energy and beauty. He Elements of Psychology.. His approach was
was also the one of the few of his time to invoke explicitly deontological; he attempted to study
classical authors, including Cicero and Aristotle. “the essential principles of duty” to determine
Day found that the problems of embodying a what actions are moral. He maintained that
thought in an external form were not unique to unlike rhetoric, ethics was not an art, because
rhetoric, but instead pervaded other artistic dis- one could uncover objective ethical truths
ciplines. In The Science of Aesthetics he used regardless of one’s method. Indeed, he took the
countless examples in an effort to reveal results of his analysis to be so self-evident that
common features among these varied expres- he openly presented his procedure as didactic,
sions of beauty. He maintained that beauty rather than argumentative. Unfortunately, many
exists independently of the observer, arguing of his assertions reflect his theological commit-
that both idea and matter were essential to ments, and are hardly uncontroversial to
beauty, and since they had an objective reality, modern readers.
so must their union. The kinds of beauty that he
identified were material, ideal, and formal, BIBLIOGRAPHY
which unite in varying degrees. For example, in Elements of the Art of Rhetoric (Hudson,
rhetoric, material beauty is to be found in the Ohio, 1850). Revised. as The Art of
grammar, ideal in the logic, and formal in the Discourse: A System of Rhetoric (New
application of the one to the other. Day also York, 1867).
delineated elaborate interconnections between Rhetorical Praxis (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1860).
beauty, truth, and good, and logic, ethics, and Elements of Logic (New York, 1867).
aesthetics, and then proceeded to discuss the The Science of Aesthetics; or, The Nature,
implications of this position. The majority of the Kinds, Laws, and Uses of Beauty (New
book, however, is spent on the derivation of Haven, Conn., 1872).
laws and very specific applications of aesthetic Elements of Psychology (New York, 1876).
principles to the “six leading arts”: architec- The Science of Ethics: An Elementary System
ture, landscape, sculpture, painting, music, and of Theoretical and Practical Morality (New
discourse. Here, as elsewhere, he demonstrated York, 1876).
595
DAY
Other Relevant Works his capacities as a partisan of democratic

The Art of Bookkeeping (Cincinnati, Ohio, socialism, a labor activist and a five-times
1861). presidential candidate that Debs is best
The Logic of Sir William Hamilton remembered. He had a long career as a social-
(Cincinnati, Ohio, 1863). ist politician and labor organizer but has
Grammatical Synthesis: The Art of English suffered a somewhat undeserved reputation
Composition (New York, 1867). for simplicity and lack of philosophical sophis-
Introduction to the Study of English tication. Debs died on 20 October 1926 in
Literature: Comprising Representative East Elmhurst, Illinois.
Masterpieces in Poetry and Prose (New Debs is known more as a great orator,
York, 1869). whose gift was to make the simplest of ideas
Outlines of Ontological Science, or a seem eloquent and grandiose. Most of his col-
Philosophy of Knowledge and of Being lected writings are comprised of correspon-
(New York, 1878). dence and the voluminous transcriptions of
The Elements of Mental Science (New York, his impassioned speeches. In his entire career,
1886). Debs composed only one book, the posthu-
The Science of Education (New York, 1889). mously published Walls and Bars (1927),
written mostly during his imprisonment from
Further Reading 1918 to 1921 for violating the World War I
Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, Dict Amer Bio, era Espionage Acts. This book was mostly a
Nat Cycl Amer Bio v22 description of prison conditions, from which
Henry Noble Day (New Haven, Conn., his publisher downplayed his political com-
1890). A collection of tributes. mentary. Despite Debs’s failure to produce
Wohl, R. Richard. “Henry Noble Day: A any profound theoretical treatises, through-
Study in Good Works, 1808-–1890,” in out his career he made many unique contri-
Men in Business, ed. W. Miller butions to political philosophy and enriched an
(Cambridge, Mass., 1952), pp. 153–92. American political culture that has long
suffered an inability to consider alternatives to
Evan Moreno-Davis Lockean liberalism and laissez-faire capital-
ism. Debs also made important contributions
to the theory of the American labor movement.
Moreover, when considered in the global
context of the period, his thought stands out
within socialist theory itself, as a unique and
DEBS, Eugene Victor (1855–1926) important alternative to both Second
International socialism and Bolshevism.
Eugene Debs was born on 5 November 1855 After leaving home in 1870 to join the ranks
in Terre Haute, Indiana, where his parents, of the expanding railroad proletariat, Debs
Jean Daniel and Marguerite Marie Bettrich quickly moved up the ranks from laborer to
(recent immigrants from the Alsace region of painter and eventually became a railroad
the Franco-German borderlands), owned a fireman, a skilled occupation. In 1874 he
grocery store. His formal education ended briefly left the railroad to work as a billing
when he completed the ninth grade at age clerk, but the next year he joined the newly
fourteen and went to work for the Terre Haute organized Brotherhood of Locomotive
and Vandalia Railroad. His experiences as a Firemen (BLF) and became its secretary. Over
railroad worker forged Debs’s commitment to the next two decades, Debs devoted his life to
socialism and the workers’ movement. It is in union work, most notably as editor of the BLF
596
DEBS
magazine. In this period his approach to labor Union in 1893, a new industrial union in
issues was not very radical and in fact even which membership was open to all railroad
appears conservative when compared to his employees regardless of craft. For Debs, craft
later years. Initially, Debs abhorred strikes and unionism had become a weapon of the
criticized the anarchists for what today might employers to divide the proletariat against itself
be called “class war rhetoric.” For the early based on differing skill level. His initial
Debs, capital and labor were not mutually somewhat abstract humanism toward the
opposed, but rather dependent on one another. labor question did not suffer any defined
The goal of union organizing was to prevent change until the 1894 Pullman Strike, an event
certain capitalists from abusing the reciprocal that served to redefine his world view and
relationship that bound the two main classes of bring the failures of the labor movement of the
modern society in a kind of organic unity. day into sharp relief. Now in a position of
Debs initially did not consider socialism as the national importance, Debs was arrested for
answer to working people’s oppression. defying a court injunction to stop directing
Rather, he seemed to envision a future society the strike, and was sentenced to six months in
where the division of labor continued to exist, jail. During his incarceration by the Sheriff of
but in which workers would enjoy the full McHenry County, Illinois, Debs corresponded
fruits of their labor. In this early period, Debs and visited with socialists, who introduced
formulated philosophical commitments that him to Marx’s Das Kapital. Although it is
would follow him throughout his career: a clear that Debs was rapidly moving toward
certain humanist approach to social transfor- socialism at the time, upon his release from jail
mation, coupled with a moralist view of justice in 1895 he supported William Jennings Bryan’s
and the good life. Nevertheless, his early hos- Populist Party in the election of 1896. The
tility to radical labor militancy consistently subsequent defeat of the Populists in the
eroded as the last two decades of the nine- election of 1897 ended any faith Debs might
teenth century brought some of the United have had in the parties of capitalist reformism,
States’ most intense moments of class conflict. and in early 1897 he announced that he was
Debs’s editorials from the period evidence an now a socialist.
increasing willingness to endorse strikes and In June of the same year, Debs convinced the
other militant actions. American Railway Union to disband and reor-
Nevertheless, Debs entered party politics for ganize as the Social Democracy of America.
the first time not as a socialist, but as a member Immediately, he found himself immersed in
of the Democratic Party. In 1879 and 1881 he the theoretical and tactical debates of the
was elected to two-year terms as the city clerk socialist movement. Although Debs initially
of Terre Haute and in 1884 he was elected to flirted with a somewhat far-flung utopian plan
the Indiana House of Representatives. While to colonize a Western territory with socialists
Debs would later turn on the Democratic and then apply for statehood as a socialist
Party, his experience in local office during the commonwealth, he was dissuaded from this
1880s foreshadowed his later conceptualiza- course by colleagues and finally endorsed the
tion of socialism, in which the role of elec- political road to socialism through party-
toral politics in bringing about the social trans- building, labor organizing, and electoral
formation was paramount. politics. The SDA’s platform included posi-
In the 1890s Debs’s approach to the labor tions common to most European socialist
movement developed dramatically. Already parties of the era, calling for state ownership
antagonistic to the craft unionism of Samuel of important industries; shorter working hours;
Gompers’s American Federation of Labor, he unemployment compensation; as well as
became President of the American Railway specifically American demands for increased
597
DEBS
democracy through initiatives, referendums, more out of what he perceived to be its subjec-
the direct election of US Senators, and pro- tive potential to allow the workers, and eventu-
portional representation. In the main, this is ally the entire human species, a better life, rather
the political program that Debs would defend than out of a simple acknowledgment of objec-
his entire life, with only minor modification. tive scientific laws governing the evolutionary
In 1898 the SDA split, leading to the forma- succession of modes of production.
tion of the Social Democratic Party, which ran Debs’s humanist interpretation of socialism
Debs as its candidate for President in 1900, is also evident in his attitude towards religion.
1904, 1908, and in 1912 when he won six Like Marx, he abhorred the church as an insti-
percent of the popular vote, the most for any tution, but he did not despise church leaders,
socialist candidate in American history. He ran many of whom he recognized as having a similar
for President again on the SPA ticket in 1920, concern with the betterment of mankind. In this
while an inmate at the Atlanta Federal peniten- sense, Debs anticipated Ernst Bloch’s reconcili-
tiary. It is somewhat unclear if Debs ever believed ation of Marxism and Christianity after the
he had a chance to win any of these elections. rediscovery of Marx’s earlier writings on the
However, he considered victory a secondary subjective life of man. Another tension in Debs’s
goal to the opportunity to educate the working thought concerned the question of violence and
class about socialism and the class struggle. its relationship to the process of social transfor-
In all of these presidential campaigns, as well mation. While professing to be a revolutionary
as an unsuccessful bid for the US House of and a presidential candidate at the same time is
Representatives from Indiana in 1916, Debs’s not necessarily contradictory, Debs’s rhetoric
political message to the American working class on the subject was often confusing. Though he
remained consistent. He preached that capitalism acknowledged the inevitability of violent class
was both a morally and historically bankrupt conflict in his speeches, he withdrew his mem-
system in which the producers of wealth saw bership from the Industrial Workers of the
their labor expropriated by a parasitic class of World for using sabotage rather than electoral
capitalists. Debs spread the word to the workers politics to resolve class differences. Debs worked
that the Republican and Democratic parties, or towards the election of a new socialist govern-
the “Too Old Parties” as he called them, were ment, though he saw this event as likely to be
equally useless, reform was a dead-end and only preceded by a period of potentially violent class
a revolution would sweep away the debris of conflict, brought on by the capitalists’ lack of
class society and provide the fresh start needed concern for the workers’ welfare.
to build a new human society of cooperation and Debs also rejected the philosophy of “boring
mutual association. within,” the idea that the old conservative craft
Nevertheless, despite the consistency of his unions of the AFL could be transformed into rev-
message there were several important tensions in olutionary organs through a patient policy of
Debs’s conceptualization of socialism. While he internal penetration and education by socialists.
was capable of parroting some of the bland ideas Instead, he favored the creation of new industrial
of economic determinism that dominated much unions, a trajectory that the American labor
of socialist theory at the time – i.e., the idea that movement would assume in the decades fol-
socialism is an almost inevitable phase of his- lowing his death.
torical development that is on the imminent Debs’s most important contribution to
horizon and as such is invincible – Debs was also socialist thought concerned the relationship
committed to a more humanist explanation as to between capitalism and war. Debs frequently
why socialism was not simply inevitable but also addressed this subject in his speeches, seeing
necessary and just. He saw it as the only just way the two as inextricably linked. When World
of ordering society. Debs championed socialism War I began in 1914, Debs felt his approach
598
DEBS
had been vindicated. While most of the Other Relevant Works

European socialist parties had supported their Debs’s papers are primarily at Indiana State
nation’s war efforts after 1914, Debs and the University. Other collections are at New
SPA stood firm against participation. On 16 York University, Duke University, and
June 1918 in Canton, Ohio, he delivered a Indiana University.
famous speech attacking the war. For this, he Letters of Eugene V. Debs, 3 vols, ed.
was charged with violating the World War I Robert J. Constantine (Urbana, Ill.,
Espionage Acts and sentenced to ten years in 1990).
prison. Though he was released by President The Eugene V. Debs Reader: Socialism and
Warren Harding less than three years later, his the Class Struggle, ed. William A. Pelz
imprisonment illuminates the latent anti-liberal- (Chicago, 2000).
ist tendencies of American political culture.
After his release from prison in December Further Reading
1921, Debs emerged to find a socialist Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
movement in disarray. The success of the Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917 had Thought, Dict Amer Bio, Encyc Amer
led to several splits in the old SPA, and a new Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v12, Who Was
communist movement beckoned Debs to be its Who in Amer v1
leader, which he refused. Though a critic of Brommel, Bernard J. Eugene V. Debs:
Lenin, Debs refused to reject totally the Spokesman for Labor and Socialism
Russian Revolution, considering the Bolsheviks (Chicago, 1978).
as potential allies in the global struggle against Currie, Harold W. Eugene V. Debs
capitalism. Debs’s stay in prison worsened his (Boston, 1976).
persistent bad health and the years that Ginger, Ray. The Bending Cross: A
followed his release were punctuated by Biography of Eugene Victor Debs (New
frequent visits to sanitariums and hospitals. Brunswick, N.J. 1949).
Scholars disagree about Debs’s legacy. Some Kann, Mark E. “Challenging Lockean
characterize him as a utopian radical whose Liberalism in America: The Case of Debs
socialist philosophy was alien to America’s and Hillquit,” Political Theory 8 (1980):
liberal tradition making it unsurprising that 203–22.
the socialist movement in the United States Morgan, H. Wayne. “The Utopia of Eugene
went into sharp decline following his death. Debs,” American Quarterly 11 (Summer
On the other hand, Debs’s opposition to war 1959): 120–35.
and his early attempts to reshape American ———, Eugene V. Debs: Socialist for
democracy to include the powerless came to President (Syracuse, N.Y., 1962).
fruition with such programs as the New Deal, Salvatore, Nick. Eugene V. Debs: Citizen
the Civil Rights Movement, the War on and Socialist (Urbana, Ill., 1982).
Poverty, and the Anti-Vietnam War Young, Marguerite. Harp Song for a
Movement of the 1960s and 70s. Radical: The Life and Time of Eugene
Victor Debs (New York, 1999).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Debs: His Life, Writings and Speeches Michael F. Gretz
(Girard, Kan., 1908).
Walls and Bars: Prison Life in the “Land of
the Free” (Chicago, 1927).
Eugene V. Debs Speaks, ed. Jean Y.
Tussey (New York, 1970).
599
DE GEORGE
DE GEORGE, Richard Thomas (1933– ) visiting professor at Santa Clara University.

He is presently University Distinguished
Richard T. De George was born on 29 January Professor of Philosophy, of Russian and East
1933 in New York City. He attended the European Studies, and of Business
University of Paris in 1952–3 before receiving Administration, and co-director of the
his BA (egregia cum laude) in 1954 from International Center for Ethics in Business at
Fordham College. He earned a PhB with great the University of Kansas.
distinction in 1955 from the Université de De George’s administrative positions have
Louvain, Belgium. This was followed by an influenced some of the most influential insti-
MA (1958) and PhD (1959) in philosophy tutions in higher education. He has served as
from Yale University. After serving as an assis- president of prestigious academic organiza-
tant professor of philosophy at the University tions including the American Philosophical
of Kansas, De George did postdoctoral study Association Central Division (1989–90), the
at the University of Freiburg, where he was Metaphysical Society of America, the Society
associated with the Institute of East European for Business Ethics, and the International
Studies. This early exposure to Eastern Society for Business, Economics and Ethics.
European thought and culture, particularly in De George’s administrative experience has
terms of the Soviet form of Marxism practiced been complimented by his influence upon
at the time, was to have lasting influence on De advanced scholarship and academic publish-
George’s approach to ethical studies especially ing. He has served on editorial boards for
in terms of international economic considera- numerous philosophy journals. He is the
tions. author of more than 160 articles and the
From 1962 to 1964 De George served as an author, or editor, of twenty books, including
associate professor of philosophy at the The Ethics of Information Technology and
University of Kansas, then was professor of Business (2003), Academic Freedom and
philosophy from 1964 to 1972. During this Tenure: Ethical Issues (1997), and Business
time he was a senior research fellow at Ethics (1982) – a text now in its fifth edition
Columbia University in 1965–6, where he also (1999) which has been translated into
lectured in philosophy, and in 1969–70 he was Japanese, Chinese, and Russian. Competing
a research fellow at Yale University. He served with Integrity in International Business (1993)
as chair of the philosophy department at the was also translated into Chinese. In 1996, in
University of Kansas from 1966 to 1972. In recognition of his pioneering work in applied
1972 the University of Kansas honored De ethics, De George received an honorary doc-
George by naming him University torate from Nijenrode University in The
Distinguished Professor. Over the course of Netherlands along with Bill Gates and Nelson
his career, De George’s attention evolved Mandela.
steadily toward an interest in value-based De George showed an early inclination that
administrative and applied ethics. He put this has been sustained throughout his professional
interest into practice as co-director of the career of attention to political and interna-
Center for Humanistic Studies at the University tional issues, and their relevance to theoretical
of Kansas from 1977 to 1982. As the Center’s ethics. This interest was to take a pragmatic
Director in 1982–3, he set a model for applied and innovative turn towards business, and
ethics as a catalyst for advanced inquiry and applied ethics in particular; and in doing so,
scholarship in the humanities. In 1985 De was predictive of ethical issues latent both in
George was visiting professor for the Graduate the advent of the information age and the inter-
School of Business at the University of St. relationship of economic growth beyond the
Gallen, Switzerland, and in 1986 he was strict boundaries of the nation-state. Thus De
600
DE GEORGE
George’s career was marked by what had tra- with ethics as the underlying basis for the
ditionally been referred to as an “interdisci- examination of constructs. With ethics as the
plinary” approach to ethics. This approach, foundation, strictly theoretical ethics as well
however, particularly in the twenty-first comes under scrutiny. De George uses ethical
century, has proven to be prescient of the prag- considerations in their applied sense as the
matic turn ethics was to take in the later stages guidelines for an ever-evolving social and
of, and soon after, the Cold War. economic secular reality. Consequently, De
Early in his career, De George had the fore- George’s critical use of ethical criteria antici-
sight to incorporate political and economic pates emerging transitions in both technolog-
theory into ethical inquiry by employing ethical ical advances and global politics.
criteria as a foundation for the validity, and As the author of foundational texts in
viability, of social and political systems. Rather business ethics, De George has had great influ-
than analyzing history on the basis of ence on the contemporary approach to the
economic and political considerations alone, study of the subject, using not only case studies
De George subjected historical and social and existing ethical issues as premises, but
analysis to ethical criticism. With an underly- examining potential issues and hypothetical
ing pragmatic emphasis, De George’s turn considerations in the form of thought experi-
toward applied ethics revealed that often polit- ments. Under De George’s guidelines, business
ical and theoretical constructs have an ethical ethics (which, by his own admission, was not
underpinning in the form of foundational values taken seriously until the 1960s) becomes fun-
which inevitably must align and define the fea- damental to a future that demands criteria of
sibility of sustaining these values systemically. value in order to address ethical dilemmas
De George uses this insight as a platform from emerging out of the rapid development and
which to raise the level of contemporary ethical proliferation of technology, medical advances,
discourse, while simultaneously challenging and global economic development. With a
systemic dogma. Rather than instituting argu- pragmatic orientation, De George has applied
ments of justification for applied ethics, De this approach as an academic leader and
George opens a continuing critical discourse administrator, and as a professor. In bringing
that addresses ethical concerns as a means of ethics into a new venue of address outside the
self-examination, using intent, purpose, and academic community, he has advised such
consistency as a critical apparatus for re-exam- organizations as Motorola, Hallmark, Kansas
ining the basis of foundational values. This City Power and Light, Koch Industries, and
secular and pragmatic turn in De George’s General Motors, among others. His special
applied ethics has led to the examination of area of interest continues to be ethical issues in
existing social and political structures, while international business. He has been a leader in
anticipating ethical dilemmas and the means of innovative ethical thought, lecturing through-
addressing them, as they are bound to occur out the world and, in the process, has become
with advances in technology and the realign- a well-known American philosopher with
ment of political and economic order. great influence beyond the borders of the
De George’s approach to ethics has United States.
advanced from an original interdisciplinary
and international scope to the advent of the age BIBLIOGRAPHY
of globalization and the resulting problems of Patterns of Soviet Thought: The Origins and
forming universal axiological premises as the Development of Dialectical and Historical
foundation for value consensus. As a result, Materialism (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1966).
political science, economics, and cultural Soviet Ethics and Morality (Ann Arbor,
anthropology are brought into critical thought, Mich., 1969).
601
DE GEORGE
A Guide to Philosophical Bibliography and Graybosch, Anthony, and Joel Rudinow.

Research (New York, 1971). Ethics and Values in the Information Age
The Philosopher’s Guide to Sources, (Belmont, Cal., 2002).
Research Tools, Professional Life and
Related Fields (Lawrence, Kan., 1980). Laurence L. Murphy
Business Ethics (New York and London,
1982; 5th edn 1999).
The Nature and Limits of Authority
(Lawrence, Kan., 1985).
Competing with Integrity in International
Business (Oxford, 1993). DE KONINCK, Charles (1906–65)
Academic Freedom and Tenure: Ethical
Issues (Lanham, Md., 1997). Charles De Koninck was born 20 July 1906 in
The Ethics of Information Technology and Thourout, West Flanders, Belgium. He received
Business (Oxford, 2003). the PhD from Louvain University in 1934,
writing a dissertation on “Eddington’s
Other Relevant Works Philosophy of Science.” De Koninck was a
Ed., Classical and Contemporary Dominican novice, but preferred an academic
Metaphysics: A Source Book (New York, career, and was professor of philosophy of
1962). nature and scientific methodology at the
Ed., Ethics and Society: Original Essays on Université de Laval in Québec, Canada, from
Contemporary Moral Problems (New 1934 until his death. He served as the Director
York, 1966). of Laval’s philosophy faculty from 1939 to
Science and Ideology in Soviet Society (New 1956. De Koninck died on 13 February 1965 in
York, 1967). Rome, Italy.
The New Marxism (New York, 1968). De Koninck formulated a philosophy of
Ed., The Structuralists, From Marx to Levi- science compatible with Thomistic theology and
Strauss (New York, 1972). a Christian world view. He produced stimulat-
Ed. with James Scanlan, Marxism and ing and influential writings in metaphysics,
Religion in Eastern Europe (Dordrecht, natural and doctrinal theology, and philosophy
1976). of religion. His work was widely read in both
Ed. with Joseph Pichler, Ethics, Free French-speaking Canada and in English-
Enterprise and Public Policy (Oxford, speaking Canada and the United States. In 1945
1978). he co-founded with Alphonse-Marie Parent the
Ed., Semiotic Themes (Lawrence, Kan., journal Laval Théologique et Philosophique. A
1981). prominent intellectual Catholic, De Koninck
“Ethics and Coherence,” Proceedings and was involved in the Vatican II debates in the
Addresses of the American Philosophical early 1960s. Université de Laval awarded him
Association 64 (November 1990): 39–52. the STD degree, and the American Catholic
“Law and Ethics in the Information Age,” Philosophical Association awarded him the
Business and Professional Ethics Journal Aquinas Medal in 1964. De Koninck lectured
20 (2001): 5–18. widely across Canada and the United States.
Perhaps his most popular book was The
Further Reading Hollow Universe (1960), which offers a recon-
Pres Addr of APA v9 ciliation of science, philosophy, and religion.
Bowie, Norman, ed. Blackwell Guide to De Koninck argued that modern science does
Business Ethics (Oxford, 2002). not deserve to decide the nature of reality
602
DE LAGUNA
because the abstractions of scientific theories Further Reading

have no meaning apart from the ordinary yet Canad Encyc, Who’s Who in Phil
concrete experience of nature. In his natural Armour, Leslie. “Science and Religion in the
theology, De Koninck considerably departed Work of Charles De Koninck,” Laval
from traditional arguments. Nature displays Théologique et Philosophique 47 (1991):
design, but design is not incompatible with 387–400.
chance and indeterminism, because intelligence George, Richard. “Traditional Wisdom of
will take advantage of randomness to still Charles De Koninck,” American
achieve its intended results. Evolution by Benedictine Review 16 (1965): 586–97.
random mutation and divine guidance towards McInerny, Ralph M. “Charles De Koninck: A
more perfect forms are therefore quite compat- Philosopher of Order,” New Scholasticism
ible. De Koninck argued, in an interpretation of 39 (1965): 491–516.
Aquinas, that spiritual causes are necessary to Mélanges à la mémoire de Charles De
explain fully the emergence of the form as the Koninck (Québec, 1968). Contains a
perfection of matter, and that forms are evident bibliography of De Koninck’s writings.
even in the infinitely diverse partial perfections
of matter. John R. Shook
BIBLIOGRAPHY
De la primauté du bien commun contre les
personnalistes: le principe de l’ordre
nouveau (Québec and Montréal, 1943).
The Hollow Universe (London and Québec, DE LAGUNA, Grace Mead Andrus
1960). (1878–1978)
Tout homme est mon prochain (Québec,
1964). Grace Mead Andrus was born on 28 September
1878 in East Berlin, Connecticut, the daughter of
Other Relevant Works Wallace R. and Annis Mead Andrus. She
De Koninck’s papers are at the Jacques received her BA from Cornell University in 1903,
Maritain Center at the University of Notre where she was Phi Beta Kappa, and her PhD in
Dame. philosophy from Cornell in 1906. The title of her
“Le problème de l’indéterminisme,” in dissertation was “The Mechanical Theory in
L’Académie Canadienne Saint-Thomas Pre-Kantian Rationalism.” In 1905 she married
d’Aquin (Québec, 1937), pp. 65–159. Theodore DE LAGUNA, with whom she collab-
“Thomism and Scientific Indeterminism,” orated on philosophical works. She taught at
Proceedings of the American Catholic Bryn Mawr College in Pennsylvania her entire
Philosophical Association 13 (1937): career; as an assistant professor of philosophy
58–76. from 1912 to 1916, associate professor from
“Concept, Process, and Reality,” Philosophy 1922 to 1929, and as full professor from 1929
and Phenomenological Research 9 (1949): to 1944. De Laguna became department chair
440–47. when her husband died in 1930. She was Vice
“The Moral Responsibilities of the Scientist,” President of the American Philosophical
Laval Théologique et Philosophique 6 Association Eastern Division in 1938–9, and
(1950): 352–6. President in 1941–2. In her retirement she con-
“Abstraction from Matter,” Laval tinued to write, and published her third book in
Théologique et Philosophique 13 (1957): 1963. De Laguna died on 17 February 1978 in
133–96. Devon, Pennsylvania.
603
DE LAGUNA
De Laguna’s early work was concerned with gate reflection becomes just the thing immedi-
interpreting the philosophical significance of ately felt and cannot, as such, refer beyond
the transition from pre-Darwinian to post- itself and become a doubt as to the nature of
Darwinian thought. Central to her analysis is the thing experienced, so as to evoke the
the distinction between dogmatic (classical and function of thought and thereby lead to the
modern rationalism and empiricism) and evo- reconstruction of experience that settles the
lutionary thought (absolute idealism, critical, problematic situation. As a result, according to
particularly neo-Kantian, philosophy and prag- De Laguna, a robust pragmatism incorporates
matism). For De Laguna, the common postu- “the real,” not as what is immediately experi-
late of both rationalism and empiricism is the enced, but as that which is “good for some-
dogma of the possibility of an ultimate analysis thing else in experience.” In a departure from
or terminus of inquiry, located by rationalists Dewey, she identified “the real” as the known,
in the discovery of logical presuppositions and which she considered the continuously
by empiricists in the discovery of psychologi- changing product of an unavoidably fallible
cal structure. Consistent with early pragmatist and self-correcting scientific method.
critiques of modernist epistemology, De Understood in its historical context, immedi-
Laguna maintained that all such foundational atism can be seen as pragmatism’s reaction
assumptions are undermined by (Darwinian) against the ontological framework of absolute
evolutionary logic. In Dogmatism and idealism, the doctrine that reality is the object
Evolution (1910) she adopted a position of an absolute knowledge in which every
broadly sympathetic with John DEWEY’s func- element is what it is by reason of its relation to
tionalist psychology and instrumentalism while and determination by every other. For the
rejecting the doctrine of immediatism, as pragmatist, the standard of absolutely com-
expressed in Dewey’s “postulate of immediate pleted knowledge, in relation to which actual
empiricism” and William JAMES’s notion of thought and judgment is to found true or false,
“pure experience.” These concepts she viewed is a chimera. Yet, according to De Laguna, a
as dogmatic vestiges of pre-evolutionary foun- thoroughgoing and consistent instrumental-
dationalism that serve only to weaken the force ism finds value in the ontological and episte-
of pragmatic methodology. mological ideals of absolute idealism as
In “The Practical Character of Reality,” limiting conceptions only, which like the
reprinted in Dogmatism and Evolution, De limiting conceptions of mathematics and the
Laguna argued that Dewey’s immediatism physical sciences, are subject to criticism both
functions as a surrogate for ontology and leads in terms of their logical consistency and their
to intolerable contradictions. The pragmatist’s efficacy in the analysis of the facts of actual
attempt to describe the reality of all things in experience. It is in this sense as an ideal limit
terms of what they are experienced as runs that we should approach the pragmatist con-
afoul of the requirement of an instrumentalist ception of immediate experience as well; not as
epistemology to maintain a distinction between that which is the fundamental datum of exis-
the what and the that of experience. tence/experience prior to all interpretation, but
Immediatism, in her view, involves an unwel- as that tendency in or character of the experi-
come (and unnecessary) reduction of meaning ential/existential context which resists the
to existence. For Dewey, it is the experience as wholesale reduction of the qualitatively felt
knowledge which is said to effect a resolution that to the cognitively refined what.
of the experience as problematic; it is in this De Laguna’s mature work, in many
sense that reality can be said to change as the respects an outgrowth of the themes first
result of successful inquiry. Yet, the doubt, sketched in Dogmatism and Evolution, took
vagueness, or uncertainty that is said to insti- a bold speculative turn. Rooted in the
604
DE LAGUNA
American grain, her philosophical develop- becomes self-directed and the end becomes the
ment bears the influences of other traditions as control of evolutionary change itself. So, for De
well, notably continental phenomenology and Laguna, a corollary task of philosophy is to
existentialism, and process metaphysics. These satisfy the “anthropic principle” by conceptu-
diverse strains were woven by De Laguna’s alizing nature in terms that allow for the exis-
original philosophical temperament with the tence of human reality as a product of evolu-
naturalistically and scientifically oriented tionary processes.
elements of the classical American tradition While philosophical concerns must remain
into an intellectual fabric of remarkable texture grounded in empirical science, philosophical
and strength. She embraced the primacy of inquiry, on De Laguna’s terms, is necessarily
scientific method, as inseparably bound up speculative. For De Laguna, speculative phi-
with the actual facts of the existence of human losophy is the search for being, which generic
inquiry and human inquirers, as a path to traits manifest themselves both in the wider
knowledge of reality. Her substantial psycho- world of nature and in the human life-world.
logical and anthropological writings, signifi- A philosopher must make the world of nature
cant in their own right, embody a commit- intelligible as including within it human reality
ment to pragmatist methodology in its insis- as lived. At the same time, in order to under-
tence upon the continuity between epistemol- stand ourselves and our world as lived, she
ogy and a philosophical anthropology must uncover the very nature to which we
grounded in the empirical theory of human belong as human beings. De Laguna’s project
beings in their social and cultural contexts. constitutes an attempt to reconcile the modern
De Laguna’s later work continued to explore opposition between philosophies of nature and
the philosophical implications of Darwinian philosophies of the human life-world through
biology, providing a point of departure for her the so-called lebenswelt. To this end she found
most important work, On Existence and the Heidegger’s ontological inquiry, as the search
Human World (1963), a summation of nearly for being through an analysis of Dasein, or
forty years of intellectual labor. She formu- human reality, to be highly significant, but
lates what might be called a speculative natu- flawed. Heidegger’s failure, in her view, con-
ralism, in which she situates human and non- sisted in refusing to see that an existential
human (including inorganic) reality along an analysis of entities other than man is possible
evolutionary continuum, whose unifying and by maintaining an ontological dualism
element is the conception of “teleonomy,” or “as dogmatic as Descartes,” by not pursuing
“end-directedness.” “Selection” is thus a uni- such an analysis of the “ontic” world, the
versal datum of nature: inorganic and organic world of non-human nature. For De Laguna,
evolution can be distinguished by their teleo- to be is to exist as an individual; moreover, the
nomic differences. What is selected in the being of what exists is intrinsically temporal.
former are structures suited to the mainte- This means that being must include both actu-
nance of individual entities; what is selected in ality and potentiality. No being is passive,
the latter is organization directed to the repli- rejecting with A. N. WHITEHEAD classical
cation of its own structure in other entities, mechanics with its insistence upon the inertial
that is, biological reproduction. In fact, the character of all physical entities, instead
task imposed upon philosophy by biology is holding that to exist is to be active. Every indi-
that of making sense of the notion – in the vidual makes present the future by actualizing
absence of rejected conceptions of classical the potentialities inherent in its being. To do
teleology – that there are ends in nature that do so, every existent must endure and thus must
not derive from human valuation. With the act so as to maintain itself as potential, as
emergence of humanity, however, selection capable of acting in the ways which are con-
605
DE LAGUNA
stitutive of its being (which is mutually depen- moral judgment when confronted with cultural
dent upon the actualities and potentialities of practices, such value judgment on his part is an
other beings). She wrote, “The ontological essential part of understanding the peculiar
self-relatedness that Heidegger found to be a pattern of the “value-economy” through
distinctive characteristic of Dasein we thus which the culture is maintained. The value-
find to be an essential condition for all economy of a culture is that system of norma-
temporal existence. There is a sense – an onto- tive preferences which selects the positive-
logical sense – in which the being of every values or “goods” to be attained at the cost of
existent individual is ‘at stake’ and is ‘an issue negative values or “evils.” Such valuation is to
for it’.” (1963, p. 96) be regarded to a certain extent culturally
Even as De Laguna rejected Heidegger’s relative, but not entirely. Anthropology, on
interpretive phenomenology as incompletely her view, necessarily assumes a core of
naturalistic, so it is not, ultimately, a common goods that all cultures value and a
lebensweltsphilosophie, but the science of core of common evils to be avoided. Certain
cultural anthropology that shapes her thought norms appear to be universal across cultures,
concerning human nature and the cultural the injunction against murder and the obliga-
world. Her approach is informed by deep tion to care for the young, for example. In
understanding of ethnographical method and fact, the anthropologist’s understanding of the
practice, with which she was intimately particular value-economy of a culture presup-
familiar through her daughter and colleague, poses universal and objective standards of
the distinguished anthropologist Frederica De value in accordance with which such an
Laguna. Culture, for the elder De Laguna, con- economy can be judged as “sound,” that is, to
stitutes the environment of humanity. The the extent that the balance of benefits and
human world is a cultural one and cultures are costs – assuming the above-mentioned
fundamentally normative systems, which make “psychic unity of mankind” – results in a struc-
available ideals for the integration of person- ture that is “stable” rather than “precarious.”
ality and, moreover, individuals’ attainment De Laguna argued that while anthropology
of personhood. The premise of anthropologi- is justified in regarding the specific and
cal theory and practice is the recognition that varying moral standards of different cultures
belief systems and values are relative to as relative to these cultures, its own scien-
culture, which is defined as a functional tific procedure, itself the outgrowth of a par-
whole. Yet, the anthropologist, as a scientist, ticular culture, involves the acceptance of uni-
assumes the objectivity and validity of scien- versal and objective standards. What is true
tific method. As such, she must also affirm the of anthropology is true of every science: sci-
truth of particular beliefs and note the falsity entific method is one and presupposes belief
of contradictory beliefs that are to be found in in a fully intelligible order of being. To be
the alien culture she studies. No one would sure, this belief is a regulative ideal, for in
fault the anthropologist for passing judgment practice the sciences’ realization of it is
upon those beliefs of a culture that obviously incomplete and limited. Yet, the very tran-
ran counter to established scientific truth. In scendence of scientific method lies in its
fact, recognition of such beliefs as false often inherent fallibility. As self-critical and self-cor-
plays a significant role in the understanding of recting, science must deal not only with nature
what makes the culture function. and with human beings as living organisms,
According to De Laguna, the ethnographer’s but with the human achievement of culture: it
predicament is not dissimilar when it comes to must include itself as a form of being. As such,
another culture’s moral norms. Not only is it it must be critically self-engaged in relation to
unreasonable for the anthropologist to suspend those actualities and potentialities of culture
606
DE LAGUNA
through which it can sustain itself. One of the “Knowing and Being: A Dialectical Study,”
potentialities, according to De Laguna, upon Philosophical Review 45 (1936): 435–56.
which the pursuit of science rests, is the ideal “Cultural Relativism and Science,”
of universal moral standards, including the Philosophical Review 51 (1942): 141–66.
respect for human rights. With the sought-for “Communication, the Act and the Object
affirmation of the unity of truth-seeking and with Reference to Mead,” Journal of
truth-knowing, no less than that of being and Philosophy 43 (1946): 225–38.
the good, does the remarkable speculative “Democratic Equality and Individuality,”
project of this noteworthy American philoso- Philosophical Review 55 (1946): 111–31.
pher find closure. “Existence and Potentiality,” Philosophical
Review 60 (1951): 155–76.
BIBLIOGRAPHY “The Lebenswelt and the Cultural World,”
Dogmatism and Evolution: Studies in Journal of Philosophy 57 (1960):
Modern Philosophy, with Theodore De 777–90.
Laguna (New York, 1910). “The Role of Teleonomy in Evolution,”
Speech: Its Function and Evolution (New Philosophy of Science 29 (1962):
Haven, Conn., 1927). 117–31.
On Existence and the Human World (New “The Person,” Review of Metaphysics 17
Haven, Conn., 1963). (1963): 171–86.
“Speculative Philosophy,” in
Other Relevant Works Transparencies: Philosophical Essays in
De Laguna’s papers, along with Brand Honor of J. Ferrater Mora, ed. Priscilla
Blanshard’s manuscript “Memories and Cohn (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1981).
Reflections in Honor of Grace De
Laguna” and a bibliography of her Further Reading
writings, are at Bryn Mawr College in Amer Nat Bio, Bio 20thC Phils, Pres Addr
Pennsylvania. of APA v5, Proc of APA v50, Who’s
“The Practical Character of Reality,” Who in Phil, Women Phils
Philosophical Review 18 (1909): Lovejoy, Arthur O. “Dogmatism and
396–415. Evolution,” Philosophical Review 20
“Sensation and Perception,” Journal of (1911): 535–45.
Philosophy 13 (1916): 533–47, 617–30. Natanson, Maurice. “Nature, Value, and
“The Empirical Correlation of Mental and Action,” Man and World 1 (1968):
Bodily Phenomena,” Journal of 293–302.
Philosophy 15 (1916): 617–30.
“The Limits of the Physical,” in Gary S. Calore
Philosophical Essays in Honor of James
Edwin Creighton, ed. George H. Sabine
(New York, 1917), pp. 175–83.
“Emotion and Perception from the
Behaviorist Standpoint,” Psychological
Review 26 (1919): 409–27.
“The Psychological Element,” Philosophical
Review 24 (1924): 371–89.
“Dualism and Gestalt Psychology,”
Psychological Review 37 (1930):
187–213.
607
DE LAGUNA
DE LAGUNA, Theodore de Leo asserting that Royce’s title promised much

(1876–1930) more than it delivered. De Laguna neverthe-
less asserted his preference for Royce’s system
Theodore De Laguna was born on 22 July to that of Alfred Bray Kempe in “On the
1876 in Oakland, California. He received his Relation between the Logical Theory of
BA in philosophy from the University of Classes and the Geometrical Theory of
California at Berkeley in 1896, and stayed at Points,” upon which Royce’s work was
Berkeley for his MA in philosophy and based, while C. I. LEWIS reworked Royce’s
English literature in 1899. He received his system in terms of ordered elements rather
PhD in philosophy from Cornell University in than Royce’s O-collections or multisets, and
1901, writing a dissertation on “The Relation using strict implication rather than material
of Ethics to Evolution.” De Laguna taught implication or an ordering relation.
English in the Philippines from 1901 to 1903. De Laguna’s major works were Dogmatism
He then was assistant in philosophy at and Evolution (1910), co-authored with his
Cornell University from 1903 to 1905, and wife and Bryn Mawr philosophy colleague
assistant professor of education at the Grace Mead Andrus D E L A G U N A ;
University of Michigan from 1905 to 1907. Introduction to the Science of Ethics (1914);
He became assistant professor of philosophy and The Factors of Social Evolution (1926).
at Bryn Mawr College in Pennsylvania in These works exhibited his close interest in
1907, and was promoted up to full professor the social and ethical implications of science,
by 1910. He also became department chair, especially of the biological sciences. He had
and held these positions until his death. De early been influenced by neo-Kantian George
Laguna died on 22 September 1930 while Holmes HOWISON, one of his teachers at
vacationing in Hardwick, Vermont. Berkeley, who taught logic, methodology,
De Laguna worked primarily in philosophy and philosophy of science and whose course
of logic and philosophy of science, and he “Propaedeutic to Philosophy” treated
was expert on Greek philosophy, especially “empirical psychology, including formal
Plato. Early in his career, he published articles logic, deductive and inductive,” as well as by
on the square of opposition and the syllo- the pragmatism of William JAMES. De Laguna
gism, at a time when there was considerable rejected both pragmatism and the new
debate in both British and American philo- realism, holding that pragmatism is too anti-
sophical journals on the relationship between intellectual and new realism is too dependent
and comparative merits of traditional syllo- on the ontological priority of external rela-
gistic logic and mathematical logic (whether tions. He developed a radical skepticism that
the older algebraic logic of George Boole, held inductive reasoning to be impossible and
Charles PEIRCE, and Ernst Schröder, or the stated that there can be no general theory of
more recent logistic). He also worked on the truth. A systematic scientific philosophy is
related question of the validity of proposi- therefore impossible because there is no
tions according to the traditional square of sound basis for distinguishing between
opposition on the one hand and the Boolean knowledge and belief.
or existential square of opposition on the
other, and on the logical paradoxes. He BIBLIOGRAPHY
reviewed Josiah R O Y C E ’s article “The Dogmatism and Evolution: Studies in
Relation of the Principles of Logic to the Modern Philosophy, with Grace Mead
Foundations of Geometry,” in which the Andrus De Laguna (New York, 1910).
principles of logic and set theory were Introduction to the Science of Ethics (New
employed axiomatically to develop geometry, York, 1914).
608
DELANY
The Factors of Social Evolution (New DELANY, Martin Robison (1812–85)

York, 1926).
Martin Robison Delany was born in Charles
Other Relevant Works Town, Virginia (now West Virginia) on 6 May
De Laguna’s papers are at Bryn Mawr 1812, and died on 24 January 1885 in
College in Pennsylvania. Wilberforce, Ohio. His father, Samuel, was a
“Stages of the Discussion of Evolutionary slave but his mother, Pati Peace, was a free
Ethics,” Philosophical Review 14 (1905): black woman. His mother moved the family to
576–89. Chambersburg, Pennsylvania in 1822 after it
“Review of Josiah Royce, ‘The Relation of was discovered that she had taught her
the Principles of Logic to the Foundations children how to read and write in violation of
of Geometry’,” Journal of Philosophy 3 state law. His father joined them a year later
(1906): 357–61. after purchasing his freedom. Delany moved to
“The Externality of Relations,” Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in 1831 and enrolled
Philosophical Review 20 (1911): 610–21. as a student of Revd Lewis Woodson in the
“Opposition and the Syllogism,” Journal of cellar of Pittsburgh’s Bethel African Methodist
Philosophy 9 (1912): 393–400. Church on Wylie Street. In 1832 he studied
“The Logical-analytic Method in classics, Latin, and Greek at Jefferson College
Philosophy,” Journal of Philosophy 12 (now Washington and Jefferson College) in
(1915): 449–62. Washington, Pennsylvania. Throughout this
“On Certain Logical Paradoxes,” period he supported himself working as a
Philosophical Review 25 (1916): 16–27. barber and laborer.
“The Sociological Method of Durkheim,” During the 1833 cholera epidemic, Delany
Philosophical Review 29 (1920): 213–25. apprenticed himself to Andrew N. McDowell,
a white doctor who taught him the skills of a
Further Reading physician’s assistant as a cupper and leecher.
Amer Nat Bio, Proc of APA in Phil He set up his own practice as a physician in
Rev v40 1836. In addition to his medical practice, he
Kempe, Alfred Bray. “On the Relation worked with a covert organization that
between the Logical Theory of Classes provided safe passage and transport for
and the Geometrical Theory of Points,” runaway slaves as they passed through
Proceedings of the London Mathematical Pittsburg. Delany also agitated against other
Society 21 (1889): 147–82. types of slavery, such as the moral degradation
Lewis, Clarence Irving. “The Calculus of of alcohol addiction. In 1837 he founded a
Strict Implication,” Mind 23 (1913): temperance organization called “Young Men’s
240–47. Literary and Moral Reform Society of
Royce, Josiah. “The Relation of the Pittsburgh.”
Principles of Logic to the Foundations of In 1843 Delany introduced the Mystery, an
Geometry,” Transactions of the abolitionist periodical in Pittsburgh. He was an
American Mathematical Society 24 agent of Frederick DOUGLASS’s newspaper
(1905): 353–414. North Star during 1847–8. In 1850 Delany
was accepted at Harvard Medical School in
Irving H. Anellis Cambridge, Massachusetts, along with two
black Bostonians sponsored by the American
Colonization Society, Isaac H. Snowden and
Daniel Laing, Jr. A minority of white students
protested their presence, and the Dean along
609
DELANY
with Professor Oliver Wendell HOLMES, Delany’s logical obstacles to black self-liberation were the
preceptor in anatomy and physiology, approved ones erected by white supremacy: the economic
their dismissal in March 1851. Delany was dependence created by slave labor and the spir-
allowed to complete only one of two four-month itual complacency espoused by religion. His
terms. In 1856 he moved his family to Chatham, views met with a chilly reception by white abo-
Ontario in Canada, and from there began to litionists and caused Frederick Douglass to
organize emigration to Africa for ex-slaves. In remark: “I thank God for making me a man, but
1859 he explored the Niger River Valley in West Delany thanks him for making him a black
Africa, hoping to find a suitable location to man” (italics in original). Embittered and dis-
produce enough cotton to compete with the couraged over how to overcome the badge of
slave South. This scheme failed to materialize inferiority inherited from slavery and racism in
and he returned to the United States just as the American society, Delany thought the only viable
Civil War was starting in 1861. solution was to relocate in Africa. After his
During the war, Delany worked to recruit death, he remained relatively unknown until his
black troops and was later commissioned a critique of white domination was rediscovered
major in the 104th United States Colored Troops by black nationalists in the 1960s.
in 1865. After the war, Delany served with the
Freedmen’s Bureau at Hilton Head, South BIBLIOGRAPHY
Carolina, and became involved in South The Condition, Elevation, Emigration and
Carolina Republication Party politics. He Destiny of the Colored People of the United
worked to acquire land for ex-slaves so they States (Philadelphia, 1852).
could be economically self-supporting. But, the The Origin and Objects of Ancient
political corruption of the Radical Freemasonry; Its Introduction into the
Reconstruction eventually drove him to favor United States and Legitimacy Among
southern home rule and even to support ex-con- Colored Men (Pittsburgh, 1853).
federate, white supremacist Wade Hampton as Blake: Or the Huts of America (Boston,
the Democratic candidate for governor of South 1859).
Carolina. He edited the Charleston Independent Official Report of the Niger Valley Exploring
in the late 1870s and published a volume on the Party (New York, 1861).
contributions of African civilization in 1879. He Homes for the Freedman (Charleston, S.C.,
pursued another unsuccessful Africa emigration 1871).
scheme that was short-lived in Liberia. In 1880 Principia of Ethnology: The Origin of Races
Delany returned to the black community of and Color with an Archaeological
Xenia, Ohio, where his family had settled, and Compendium and Egyptian Civilization
there he died in 1885. from Years of Careful Examination and
Delany was one of the first black abolitionists Enquiry (Philadelphia, 1879).
to formulate and articulate an ideology of Black
Nationalism. He thought the only way black Other Relevant Works
Americans could break free of white domination “Political Destiny of the Colored Race on the
was to emigrate to Africa, a view he first pub- American Continent,” in Index of the
lished in The Condition, Elevation, Emigration Report of the Select Committee on House
and Destiny of the Colored People of the United Resolution No. 576 (Washington, D.C.,
States (1852). Delany argued that going back to 1862).
Africa would provide the necessary physical and Martin R. Delany: A Documentary Reader,
emotional space to be free of the fetters created ed. Martin Levine (Chapel Hill, N.C.,
by white economic and religious hegemony. He 2003).
thought that some of the most important ideo-
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DE MAN
Further Reading New York from 1949 to 1951. He then lived

Encyc Amer Bio in Boston and took classes at Harvard; in 1954
Adeleke, Tunde. Without Regard to Race: The he joined Harvard’s Society of Fellows and
Other Martin Robison Delany (Jackson, studied comparative literature and literary crit-
Miss., 2003). icism with Harry Levin and Reuben Brower.
Bell, Howard H., ed. Minutes and Proceedings He received his MA in 1958 and PhD in com-
of National Negro Conventions 1830–1864 parative literature in 1960. He taught com-
(Manchester, N.H., 1969). parative literature at Cornell University from
Griffith, Cyril E. The African Dream: Martin 1960 to 1966, the University of Zurich in
R. Delany and the Emergence of Pan- 1966–67, and at Johns Hopkins University
African Thought (University Park, Penn., from 1967 to 1970. In 1970 de Man became
1975). professor of French and comparative litera-
Kahn, Robert M. “The Political Ideology of ture at Yale University, and he held that
Martin Delany,” Journal of Black Studies 4 position until his death on 21 December 1983
(1984): 415–40. in New Haven, Connecticut.
Levine, Robert S. Martin Delany, Frederick In 1966 de Man met French philosopher
Douglass and the Politics of Representative Jacques Derrida, who was using the term
Identity (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1997). “deconstruction” to refer to the view that
Painter, Nell Irvin. “Martin R. Delany: Elitism literary criticism can reveal multiple meanings
and Black Nationalism,” in Black Leaders of any text, and none is more correct or more
of the Nineteenth Century, ed. Leon accurate than any other. They realized their
Litwack and August Meier (Urbana, Ill., common standpoint and aims, and collabo-
1988), pp. 149–71. rated for many years. In 1967 de Man pub-
Rollin, Frank A. Life and Public Service of lished Blindness and Insight, which quickly
Martin R. Delany (Boston, 1883). established him as one of America’s foremost
Sterling, Dorothy. The Making of an Afro- literary theorists and soon brought decon-
American: Martin Robison Delany (Garden struction and postmodernism to the forefront
City, N.Y., 1971). of both critical theory and philosophy. Further
Ullman, Victor. Martin Delany: The books kept de Man and deconstruction in the
Beginnings of Black Nationalism (Boston, spotlight in both academia and the wider
1971). culture that appreciated the anti-authoritar-
ian implications of the deconstruction method-
Jean Van Delinder ology. Allegories of Reading (1979) and three
posthumously published books, The Rhetoric
of Romanticism (1984), The Resistance to
Theory (1986), and Aesthetic Ideology (1992),
were widely acclaimed as major contributions.
De Man’s reputation was destined to fall as
DE MAN, Paul (1919–83) quickly as it rose. Within four years of his
death, allegations arose that he had written
Paul de Man was born on 6 December 1919 in pro-Nazi propaganda and anti-Semitic articles
Antwerp, Belgium. He studied chemistry at during World War II. Besides throwing his
the University of Brussels from 1939 to 1942, own career into obscurity, attacks on decon-
and then earned a living writing and translat- struction itself were raised to a new intensity,
ing for Belgian and French publishers. After as some critics wondered whether deconstruc-
emigrating to the United States in 1947, he tion had some deep connection with a charac-
taught French literature at Bard College in ter such as de Man’s.
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DE MAN
Refusing to assign primary meaning to the ities. Although postmodernism has been allied
literal understanding of a text, de Man argued with politically liberal efforts to criticize tra-
that the text’s performative functions through ditional power relationships supported by ide-
rhetoric, allegory, and metaphor (and other ologies, de Man regarded deconstruction as
categories) supply equally valid readings. By applying equally to all discourse regardless of
contrasting the grammatical and rhetorical political motivation.
features of a text, the critic can “deconstruct”
the text, uncovering and challenging its sup- BIBLIOGRAPHY
posedly intended message (and thus challenge Blindness and Insight: Essays in the
the reader’s understanding as well). Of special Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism
importance for de Man are occasions when a (Oxford, 1971; 2nd edn 1983).
text’s grammatical and rhetorical features con- Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in
tradict each other, making it “undecidable” or Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust
“unreadable.” Furthermore, the rhetorical (New Haven, Conn., 1979).
meanings of a text are all culturally and his- The Rhetoric of Romanticism (New York,
torically relative. Therefore, the reader (and the 1984).
critic) should not try to discern what the text’s The Resistance to Theory (Minneapolis,
author intended to mean; whatever the author 1986)
believes the text to mean is just another Critical Writings, 1953–1978, ed. Lindsay
possible reading having no more authority Waters (Minneapolis, 1989).
than any other. No text can indicate, by itself, Aesthetic Ideology, ed. Andrzej Warminski
what its exact meaning is; since meaning is (Minneapolis, 1992).
relational and not intrinsic, readings are Romanticism and Contemporary Criticism:
actually productions of new texts. All readings The Gauss Seminar and Other Papers,
are commentaries; none is more true than the ed. E. S. Burt, Kevin Newmark, and
rest. Similar views on the relational nature of Andrzej Warminski (Baltimore, Md.,
language can be found in the semiotics of 1992).
Charles PEIRCE and Ferdinand de Saussure.
Further philosophical implications of decon- Other Relevant Works
struction were indicated by de Man and De Man’s papers are at the University of
Derrida, which helped to inspire much of post- California at Irvine.
modernism’s standpoint. By deposing the Wartime Journalism, 1939–43, ed. Werner
semantic relation between a text and the reality Hamacher, Neil Hertz, and Tom Keenan
it purports to mirror, deconstruction replaced (Lincoln, Neb., 1988).
the correspondence theory of truth with rela-
tivism and pluralism. Like Derrida, de Man Further Reading
aims to subvert Western philosophy’s logo- Amer Nat Bio
centrism and its supporting metaphysics of Cohen, Tom, Barbara Cohen, J. Hillis
privileged categories such as being over Miller, and Andrzej Warminski, eds.
becoming, permanence over change, and Material Events: Paul de Man and the
intrinsic over relational properties. Since there Afterlife of Theory (Minneapolis, 2001).
really are no fixed and universal structures of Derrida, Jacques. Mémoires: For Paul de
meaning, postmodernism’s alternative is to Man, 2nd edn (New York, 1986).
gain reflective control of the ideologies, or Hamacher, Werner, Neil Hertz, and
systems of thought which determine reference Thomas Keenan, eds. Responses: On
to reality, by contrasting them with each other Paul de Man’s Wartime Journalism
and by revealing their own internal complex- (Lincoln, Nebr., 1989).
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DEMOS
Herman, Luc, Kris Humbeeck, and Geert tributions to the program, a scholarship was
Lernout, eds. (Dis)continuities: Essays on established in his name. His scholarship earned
Paul de Man (Amsterdam, 1989). him many grants and awards during his lifetime:
Lehman, David. Signs of the Times: a Guggenheim Fellowship to Paris (1928–9), an
Deconstruction and the Fall of Paul de award from the Rockefeller Foundation (1956),
Man (New York, 1991). another one from the American Philosophy
Morrison, Paul. The Poetics of Fascism: Association (1959), and a grant from the
Ezra Pound, T. S. Eliot, Paul de Man Littauer Foundation (1960).
(Oxford, 1996). During his tenure at Harvard, he became
Norris, Christopher. Paul de Man: known as America’s leading Plato scholar, begin-
Deconstruction and the Critique of ning with his studies under A. N. WHITEHEAD,
Aesthetic Ideology (London and New who once said that all philosophy is but a
York, 1988). footnote to Plato. Demos went on to publish
Waters, Lindsay, and Wlad Godzich, eds. many articles on Plato and served as the editor
Reading de Man Reading (Minneapolis, for two volumes dedicated to Plato’s philosophy:
1989). Plato: Selections (1927) and Complete Works of
Plato (1936). Raphael called himself a Christian
John R. Shook Platonist, and grounded his philosophy within
the common ground that both realms share: the
idea that there is a better world that is the root
cause of this one, and that the idea of Good (or
God) is the ultimate ground of all being, not
only within this world of shadows and illusions,
DEMOS, Raphael (1892–1968) but also within the more real realm of Ideas.
His works on Plato were focused on the difficult
Raphael Demos was born on 23 January 1892 areas of metaphysics and epistemology, and
in Smyrna, in the Ottoman Empire (now making these problems understandable for
Turkey). In 1910 he received his BA from modern readers of Plato. He was hailed in his
Anatolia College in Marsovan. He emigrated to day as one of Harvard’s favorite philosophy
the United States in 1913 (becoming a natural- professors by the many students who enrolled in
ized citizen in 1921) and earned his PhD from his classes. Demos retired to his homeland of
Harvard in 1916. He pursued postgraduate Greece and died there on 8 August 1968 in
work at Cambridge in 1918–19, and later Kifissia near Athens.
studied at the University of Paris in 1928–9.
Demos taught at Harvard University for his BIBLIOGRAPHY
entire career, beginning in 1919. He was named “A Discussion of a Certain Type of Negative
the Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Proposition,” Mind 26 (1917): 188–96.
Philosophy, and Civil Polity in 1945 (succeeding “A Discussion of Modal Propositions and
William E. HOCKING) and held that position Propositions of Practice,” Mind 27 (1918):
until retiring in 1962. 77–85.
Demos also traveled and taught in many “Romanticism vs. the Worship of Fact,”
places throughout the world; as visiting profes- Journal of Philosophy 19 (1922): 197–200.
sor he taught at Vanderbilt University (1962–7) “Legal Fictions,” International Journal of
as well as McGill University (1963–4); he was Ethics 34 (1923): 37–58.
the Director of the College Year in Athens “Possibility and Becoming,” Journal of
program, of which he was an influential Philosophy 23 (1926): 234–40.
founding member in 1967–8. To honor his con- “On Persuasion,” Journal of Philosophy 29
613
DEMOS
(1932): 225–32. DENNES, William Ray (1898–1982)

“Non-being,” Journal of Philosophy 30
(1933): 85–102. William Dennes was born on 10 April 1898 in
“Eros,” Journal of Philosophy 31 (1934): Healdsburg, California, and died on 2 May
337–45. 1982 in Berkeley, California. He earned his
“The Fundamental Conceptions of Plato’s BA in 1919 and MA in 1920 from the
Metaphysics,” Journal of Philosophy 32 University of California, Berkeley, along the
(1935): 561–78. way receiving the University Medal as the out-
“Plato’s Idea of the Good,” Philosophical standing scholar in his undergraduate class,
Review 46 (1937): 245–75. and holding the Mills Fellowship as an MA
The Philosophy of Plato (New York, 1939). candidate. He attended Oxford University as a
“The State and the Law,” Journal of Rhodes Scholar, receiving his PhD in philoso-
Philosophy 41 (1944): 589–98. phy there in 1923.
“Society and the Ethics of Individualism,” Dennes was a longtime member, and three
Philosophical Review 54 (1945): 97–114. times the chair, of the philosophy department
“The Meaningfulness of Religious Language,” at Berkeley. He began there as an instructor in
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1923 and, after advancing to assistant profes-
18 (1957): 96–106. sor in 1924 and associate professor in 1927,
“Paradoxes in Plato’s Doctrine of the Ideal became a full professor in 1936. From 1958
State,” Classical Quarterly 7 ns (1957): until his retirement in 1965 he was Mills
164–74. Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy
“Is Moral Reasoning Deductive?” Journal of and of Civil Polity. He also was Dean of the
Philosophy 55 (1958): 153–9. Graduate Division from 1948 to 1955, and
“A Fallacy in Plato’s Republic?” Philosophical served on many campus and state committees.
Review 73 (1964): 395–8. He held several visiting positions, including
“Plato’s Philosophy of Language,” Journal of posts at Harvard in 1935 and Stanford in 1941
Philosophy 61 (1964): 595–610. and 1943.
“Plato’s Doctrine of the Psyche as a Self- Dennes won many honors, including a
moving Motion,” Journal of the History of Guggenheim fellowship in 1929, and an
Philosophy 6 (1968): 133–46. honorary Doctor of Laws from NYU in 1951.
“Spinoza’s Doctrine of Privation,” in Studies Dennes was much admired for his professional
in Spinoza: Critical and Interpretive Essays, and public service. He served on an impressive
ed. S. Paul Kashap (Berkeley, Cal., 1972). number of university committees and on many
statewide and national organizations. He was
Other Relevant Works President of the Pacific Division of the
Ed., Plato: Selections (New York and Chicago, American Philosophical Association in 1945–6,
1927). and President of the Graduate Council of the
Association of Land-Grant Colleges and
Further Reading Universities in 1952. In 1943 he briefly served
Pres Addr of APA v44, Who Was Who in as an assistant director of the Los Alamos
Amer v5, Who’s Who in Phil Project.
Dennes’s best-known writings concern two
James C. Poteet II themes: the resolution of conflict and the
problems of philosophical naturalism. The first
theme is reflected in “Conflict” (1946), which
defends “the ancient faith in reason as the
resolver of conflicts” in the face of “the current
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DENNETT
eclipse of reason’s reputation.” (1946, p. 346) Yervant Krikorian (New York, 1944), pp.
The second is reflected in Some Dilemmas of 270–94.
Naturalism (1960), the published version of “Conflict,” Philosophical Review 55 (1946):
his 1958 Woodbridge Lectures. The book 343–76.
explores dilemmas of that perspective which, “Knowledge of Values,” in Symbols and
on the one hand, construes “the cognitive Values, ed. Lyman Bryson et al. (New
meaning of explanatory beliefs … in such a York, 1954), pp. 603–18.
way that we may become progressively clearer Some Dilemmas of Naturalism (New York,
about what empirical evidence would confirm 1960).
them,” and, on the other, contends that “we are
seriously justified in holding only those beliefs Other Relevant Works
which are thus confirmed”. (1960). By “Santayana’s Materialism,” in The
“dilemmas” Dennes means “predicaments in Philosophy of George Santayana
which what appear to be justified opinions, or (Evanston, Ill., 1940).
justified ways of analyzing or interpreting “Lewis on the Morally Imperative,” in The
beliefs and evaluations, seem nevertheless to Philosophy of C. I. Lewis, ed. Lewis Hahn
require us to accept sets of beliefs that are either (La Salle, Ill., 1968).
irreconcilable with one another or otherwise Philosophy and the University since 1915,
unsatisfactory”. (1960). For example, if natu- interview with J. D. Ariff (Berkeley, Cal.,
ralism is true “must we … concede that uni- 1970). Unique copy at the Regional Oral
versal statements … are meaningless? Must we History Office, Bancroft Library,
deny cognitive meaning to statements about University of California at Berkeley.
so-called ‘unobservable entities’ … ?” (1960) In Contains a bibliography of Dennes’s
discussing these and other dilemmas Dennes writings.
addresses many topics, including analyticity,
meaning and use, and the naturalistic fallacy. Further Reading
Perhaps the best-known chapters are the last Pres Addr of APA v5, Who Was Who in
two, in which Dennes construes moral judg- Amer v8, Who’s Who in Phil
ments as nondescriptive expressions of
approval yet argues that in a significant sense John J. Tilley
they can be tested empirically.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
“The Method of Metaphysics,” University of
California Publications in Philosophy 5
(1924): 49–77. DENNETT, Daniel Clement, III (1942– )
“Practice as the Test of Truth,” University of
California Publications in Philosophy 10 Daniel Dennett was born on 28 March 1942 in
(1928): 87–116. Boston, Massachusetts. His parents met in
“Truth and Perception,” University of Lebanon, where his mother, Ruth Leck
California Publications in Philosophy 11 Dennett, was teaching English at the American
(1929): 139–66. Community School in Beirut and his father,
“The Meaning of Individuality,” University Daniel C. Dennett, Jr., was working on his
of California Publications in Philosophy PhD in Islamic history from Harvard University
20 (1937): 53–78. while teaching at the American University of
“The Categories of Naturalism,” in Beirut. Daniel C. Dennett, Jr. began his
Naturalism and the Human Spirit, ed. academic career at Clark University. Because of
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DENNETT
his expertise on the Middle East and his fluency student in the class being a graduate student,
in Arabic, he was recruited by the OSS to be a Dennett soon found the course difficult, so he
secret agent based in Beirut during World War spent many hours in the math library. There by
II; his cover was as cultural attaché at the chance he found W. V. QUINE’s From a Logical
American Legation. Thus the philosopher Point of View. By morning he had finished it,
Daniel Dennett’s early years were spent living and had decided to transfer to Harvard. That
a diplomatic lifestyle – he spoke Arabic and experience together with a reading of
French at nursery school and had a pet gazelle Descartes’s Meditations in his first philosophy
when he was four years old. In 1947 his father course set Dennett on the path of philosophy of
was offered a job at Harvard University, but mind and language.
was killed in an airplane crash in the mountains The next year Dennett transferred to
of Ethiopia while on a mission. Dennett, who Harvard and enrolled in Quine’s philosophy of
was only five, his mother, and two sisters language course. With the main text being
returned to Winchester, Massachusetts near Word and Object, fresh off the press, several
Boston, where his paternal grandparents lived. graduate students were in the class, including
His mother, having an MA degree in English David LEWIS, Saul KRIPKE, Thomas NAGEL, and
from the University of Minnesota, was able to Gilbert HARMAN. The course inspired Dennett
get a job as an editor of history and social to the point that he began working on a senior
science textbooks with Ginn & Company, a thesis on “Quine and Ordinary Language” in
Boston textbook publisher. Because his mother his second year; his objective was to refute
was away in Boston working during the days, Quine, whom he thought to be “very, very
the children had a housekeeper who played a interesting but wrong.” In order not to be pre-
significant role in raising them. A boyhood empted by Quine before he had a chance to
friend of his father, Sherman Russell, was the work through the project, Dennett decided
father figure in Dennett’s childhood. There against Quine as a supervisor, opting instead
were many books and magazines in the Dennett for Dagfinn FØLLESDAL, the teaching assistant
household, and so young Dennett became a for the course on Word and Object. However,
voracious reader, but he also loved to build Quine did examine the thesis together with
things in his basement workshop. Despite his Charles PARSONS. Dennett came away from the
fascination with the workings of machinery, defense with a new confidence about being a
Dennett grew up under his father’s legacy, so philosopher; and he also had promise as a
that it was assumed and expected that he would sculptor and had shown pieces in Boston.
attend Harvard and become a professor in one Dennett’s senior year included another life-
of the humanities. shaping event: in the summer of 1962 he was
Dennett began high school in Winchester at married to Susan Bell; the Dennetts have had
which time he realized that he wanted to be a two children.
teacher. He completed his last two years of Because one of the few contemporary books
high school at Phillips Exeter Academy in New in philosophy that Dennett really liked was
Hampshire. The school was an excellent match Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind, Dennett
for Dennett, as it was intellectually intense, thought that the logical next step after obtain-
with a significant emphasis on writing. ing his Harvard BA degree in 1963 was to
Contrary to expectations, after he graduated in study with Ryle at the University of Oxford. He
1959, he went to Wesleyan University rather applied to three colleges, Balliol, University,
than Harvard. Because he had advanced place- and Ryle’s Magdalen College but was rejected
ment in mathematics and English, he ended up by all three since they were popular choices
in an advanced math course being taught by the among the Rhodes and Marshall scholars and
logician Henry KYBURG. With the only other therefore had a full quota of Americans.
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DENNETT
Disappointed at not being able to study with ential meeting with Allen NEWELL, and Dennett
Ryle, Dennett was preparing to accept a had found his niche in the philosophical com-
graduate position at the University of California munity. Dennett’s interests throughout his
at Berkeley, when he received an acceptance to career have been with the conceptual issues
Hertford College, Oxford, to read for the arising from the scientific investigation of the
B.Phil. in philosophy. What was strange about mind, including artificial intelligence (AI)
this acceptance was that Dennett had not research and robotics, psychology, neuro-
applied to Hertford; as he was to learn years science, and evolutionary biology. On the
later from Ryle, Ryle had seen his application strength of Content and Consciousness,
to Magdalen, with Quine’s recommendation, refereed by Quine, he was promoted to associ-
and forwarded it with a note of his own to a ate professor in 1970.
friend at Hertford. In 1971 Dennett moved to the philosophy
Study for the B.Phil. degree in philosophy department at Tufts University in Massachusetts,
allowed Dennett to have Ryle as his supervisor where, apart from various visiting positions, he
(regardless of college the supervisor was one of has been teaching ever since. One of his visiting
the professors) but it was also notoriously dif- positions was at Harvard in 1973 during which
ficult, requiring a thesis and three tough exam- time Georges Rey, then a graduate student,
inations within a few weeks of each other at the introduced him to Jerry FODOR, with whom he
end of the second year. As he became absorbed formed a reading group. In 1975 Dennett was
in writing the thesis, which was later published promoted to full professor. The next year he
as his first book, Content and Consciousness was made chair of the philosophy department
(1969), his motivation to prepare for the exam- at Tufts, a position he held until 1982. In
inations diminished and he became certain that 1978–9 he was a Fulbright Fellow with Steven
he would not successfully complete the B.Phil. Stich in Andrew Woodfield’s philosophy and
requirements. He consulted Ryle on this, with psychology research group at the University of
the suggestion that he switch his degree to the Bristol. The following year, he worked on
B.Litt., which required only a thesis. Instead, problems in philosophy and AI with John
Ryle recommended Dennett for the D.Phil. MCCARTHY, Patrick Hayes, Zenon PYLYSHYN,
degree. The examiners were A. J. Ayer and the Robert Moore, and John Haugeland at the
neuroanatomist J. Z. Young from London, Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral
chosen because of Dennett’s forays out of Sciences at Palo Alta, California. It was there
strictly philosophical issues into speculations that he met Douglas Hofstadter. At
about the brain sciences. The thesis was Hofstadter’s suggestion they worked together
accepted in 1965, so, suddenly at the age of to produce an anthology: The Mind’s I. This
twenty-three, Dennett had to turn from more experience pushed Dennett further toward the
graduate study and towards applying for sciences and away from more traditional philo-
faculty positions. On the strength of a letter sophical perspectives. Hofstadter also intro-
alone he was hired by A.I. MELDEN as an assis- duced Dennett to Stephen Jay Gould and
tant professor in the newly formed department Richard Dawkins, opening up the area of evo-
of philosophy at the University of California at lutionary theory to Dennett.
Irvine. Dennett was the only appointment In 1985 Dennett became the Director of the
Melden made that year, so with the exception Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts
of ethics, which Melden taught, Dennett taught University, a position he still holds. The Center
the entire undergraduate curriculum. was established by Tufts in order to retain
While at Irvine, Dennett was drawn into dis- Dennett when the University of Pittsburgh
cussions with a small group of artificial intelli- offered him the chair vacated by Wilfrid
gence researchers. That, together with an influ- SELLARS’s retirement. Also in 1985, Dennett
617
DENNETT
was named Distinguished Professor of Arts and the mind. His main position is a kind of inter-
Sciences. It was around this time that he began pretationism in which having mental states is
collaborating with the neuropsychologist behaving in a way that is predictable with the
Marcel Kinsbourne, going on hospital rounds ascription of mental states, such as beliefs and
with him to witness for himself the pathologies desires. Ascription of mental states is part of a
that were informing his views about con- predictive strategy, the intentional strategy,
sciousness. Together with psychologist Nick according to which an entity is ascribed the
Humphrey and linguist Ray Jackendoff, they beliefs and desires it ought to have given its
started a discussion group. The group has con- history and niche in the world. The entity is
tinued with notable additions of MIT roboticist ascribed mental states under the assumption
Rodney Brooks and Harvard psychologists of idealized rationality in which it acts based on
Marc Hauser, Steve Pinker, Elizabeth Spelke, its beliefs to satisfy its desires. “All there is to
and Susan Carey. In 2000, with a unanimous being a true believer is being a system whose
nomination from his department, Dennett was behavior is reliably predictable via the inten-
honored with the title University Professor at tional strategy, and hence all there is to really
Tufts University. He is also the Austin B. and truly believing that p (for any proposition
Fletcher Professor of Philosophy at Tufts p) is being an intentional system for which p
University. occurs as a belief in the best (most predictive)
Dennett has been awarded more than one interpretation.” (1987, p. 29)
dozen fellowships during his career, including Dennett is often taken to be an instrumen-
the Santayana Fellowship at Harvard in 1974; talist, speaking as if there are mental states is
a Fulbright Fellowship at the University of predictively useful, though in fact there are no
Bristol in 1978; a visiting fellowship at All such things. “You could take an instrumental-
Souls College, Oxford in 1979; an NEH senior ist view of intentional explanation. You could
fellowship in 1979; a fellowship at the Center hold that though there are, strictly speaking, no
for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences such things as beliefs and desires, still talking as
in 1979–80; and a Guggenheim Fellowship in though there were some often leads to con-
1986–7. He has given nearly two dozen special firmed behavioral predictions …. The most
lectureships, including the Herbert Spencer extensively worked-out version of instrumen-
Lecture at Oxford in 1979; the John Locke talism about the attitudes in the recent literature
Lectures at Oxford in 1983; the John Dewey is surely owing to D. C. Dennett.” (Fodor 1990,
Lecture at the University of Vermont in 1986; pp. 6–8). However, Dennett insists that propo-
and the Jean Nicod Lectures at the Institut sitional attitudes are real because they explain
Nicod in Paris in 2001. Dennett sits on the edi- genuine detectable patterns in behavior. What
torial board of sixteen journals and is the asso- is crucial to understanding Dennett’s view is
ciate editor of the Journal of Cognitive that the real patterns which license the ascrip-
Neuroscience. He is a member of several tion of propositional attitudes are only
learned societies including the American detectable from a particular point of view: the
Academy of Arts and Sciences, the American intentional stance. The intentional stance can
Association for Artificial Intelligence, and the best be understood by contrasting it with two
American Philosophical Association. Dennett other explanatory stances we adopt: the
was President of the Society for Philosophy physical stance and the design stance. The
and Psychology in 1980–81, and the President physical stance is the point of view we adopt in
of the Eastern Division of the APA in explaining the constituent make-up and basic
2000–2001. properties something possesses. From this point
Dennett’s philosophy centers on conceptual of view we can learn, for example, that some-
issues arising from scientific investigations of thing is made of 250 grams of steel, but not that
618
DENNETT
something is a corkscrew or a kidney, which complexity of intentional systems virtually

would instead require the adoption of the guarantees that the sub-personal realizations
design stance, focusing on the function some- of intentional states will have no common
thing plays in its environment. Something is explanation below personal-level ascriptions.
just as truly a corkscrew as it is 250 grams of The personal/sub-personal distinction should
steel, but these different regularities are per- not be conflated with the distinction between
ceivable only from different perspectives. the intentional stance and other stances,
Similarly, something is an intentional system if however, for it is possible to adopt the inten-
there are regularities noticeable only from the tional stance towards sub-personal processes.
perspective of it having beliefs and desires. The personal/sub-personal distinction is that
Something is as truly a believer as it is a the content ascribed at the personal level likely
corkscrew or 250 grams of steel, but they are will not map on to the content ascribed at the
very different kinds of things, as the differing sub-personal level.
points of view required to identify them make One of the personal level attributes that
clear. Dennett has made considerable efforts to
On Dennett’s view, a belief is real in the explain is consciousness. By considering the
same way that a center of gravity is real. constraints imposed on a theory of conscious-
Physical systems have centers of gravity, though ness from our expanding understanding of sub-
to search for them as a constituent part of an personal processes of brain activity, Dennett
object would be to misunderstand their nature. has challenged the very coherence of a pervasive
Similarly, some physical systems are intentional [mis]conception about the nature of con-
systems, though again to search for a belief as sciousness. The misconception is that there is
if it were some proper component of a system, some place and moment where experiences
in the way that circuits or gears are compo- come together for the inner self, dubbed the
nents, is to misunderstand the nature of belief. “Cartesian Theater” by Dennett for its roots in
The subject of intentional ascriptions is an the philosophy of René Descartes. The flaw in
entire system considered at what Dennett coins this picture is that it presupposes some inner
a personal level. Personal-level intentional homunculus to view the screen in the Theater,
ascriptions, such as having pains, are those by where viewing by the homunculus constitutes
which we understand ourselves and others as consciousness. But what of the consciousness of
persons in daily life. Importantly, it is not nec- the homunculus? This picture leads to an
essary to know the inner workings of a system infinite regress that explains nothing.
to make personal-level intentional ascriptions, Dennett insists that we take seriously the
just as it is not necessary to know anything of idea that the processing in virtue of which we
the microstructure of a magnet to recognize its are conscious is smeared across the brain both
magnetic properties and treat it as a magnet. Of spatially and temporally; there is no place or
course, there are microphysical properties in time at which it all comes together. The new
virtue of which something is a magnet just as picture of consciousness that emerges is very
there are underlying sub-personal processes in different from our standard conception. Our
virtue of which something is an intentional brains are constantly processing distinct (and
system. Sub-personal cognitive psychology is in sometimes contradictory) contents as our state
the business of explaining those inner workings of information changes. Subsystems processing
of intentional systems but Dennett does not different streams of content compete with each
expect the personal-level regularities to reduce other for behavioral control of the system, the
to regularities at the sub-personal level, partic- winner becoming for a short time a virtual
ularly if we consider intentionality extending captain of the system; thus Dennett compares
beyond human cognition. The variety and inner consciousness to fame. The competition, pan-
619
DENNETT
demonium as Dennett refers to it, is more like evolutionary biologists, Dennett rejects any line
transactions in the stock exchange than in the of reasoning that is tantamount to positing a
courtroom. There is no central executive, just skyhook. However miraculous some process or
local interactions of competing interpretations of structure might seem, from the complexity of
experience, multiple drafts of the information we the cell to the complexity of the mind, it should
receive. The winning content constitutes our have a scientific explanation that essentially
take on the world. The ascribed subject of all the includes its selective history. Dennett argues
winning contents is the self, for which reason that processes can build on each other, cranes
Dennett likens the self to a center of narrative lifting other cranes, speeding up selection
gravity; it is the common element in our com- processes to the point of genetic engineering. All
peting narrative fragments of content around of this is natural selection explicable using
which contents are selected to be coherent with Darwinian reasoning.
our personal history and current beliefs. The Free will, like everything else on this planet,
conscious self is the story the dynamic interac- had to evolve. Dennett has argued against lib-
tions of our subsystems write in virtue of how ertarians and determinists that determinism
they determine our behavior. The stable unity of and free will are compatible. Both of these
the self is a feature of the world and our dispo- views are based on the reasoning that if deter-
sitions to interact with it, not an intrinsic feature minism is true, i.e., if the course of future events
of an inner mind. follows necessarily from past events, then there
The explanation of consciousness in terms of is no free will. Determinists use this reasoning
order arising from local processes is a special to reject free will, while libertarians use it to
case of another major theme in Dennett’s reject determinism, sometimes invoking
thinking, evolutionary theory. For Dennett, quantum indeterminacy in arguing for free will.
perhaps the single greatest idea anyone has ever Dennett rejects the supposition by distinguish-
had is Darwin’s idea that random local ing determinism from inevitability. The
processes can result in highly structured systems outcome of some event is whatever it turns out
because of naturally occurring selective pres- to be, regardless of whether it is brought about
sures. Characteristics of members in a popula- deterministically, randomly, or some other
tion can be quite diverse but when environ- way. We imagine freedom to be the power to
mental conditions favor a particular charac- change the outcome of an event, but since there
teristic in the sense that those possessing it are is no outcome until things play themselves out
more likely to reproduce, the characteristic will there is no changing of outcomes. Determinism
increase its proportion within the population. or not, the particulars of a situation lead crea-
Just which characteristics confer reproductive tures to act in certain ways. Whether their
advantages within a population can change actions are inevitable depends on whether they
depending on the ever-changing environment. can act based on information about their situ-
This simple-sounding process has resulted in ation to alter an anticipated outcome, typically
the staggering variety of species on our planet. to their benefit. Creatures that are not hard-
Dennett’s emphasis in discussing evolution- wired to respond in every situation can learn
ary theory is that we had to get here from there, how to use information to guide their actions;
where “there” refers to an earlier time on our therefore, they have distinct possible futures,
planet when it was devoid of life and minds. which is to say that other creatures of that type
The processes of evolution are natural could have acted differently in those circum-
processes, “cranes” as Dennett refers to them, stances. The notion of possibility based on an
in contrast to the fictitious “skyhook” that we intentional characterization of circumstances
can hang on the clouds to lift ourselves provides a naturalistic account of freedom,
whenever needed. Whether from creationists or since possibilities arise as creatures evolve infor-
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DENNETT
mation-processing capacities. It is the only kind “Why the Law of Effect Will Not Go Away,”
of freedom worth wanting, according to Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour
Dennett, since other notions introduce freedom 5 (1975): 169–87.
at the expense of willing. Interestingly, as tech- “True Believers: the Intentional Strategy and
nology gives us access to more information we Why it Works,” in Scientific Explanation,
become freer, perhaps freer than we want or are ed. A. F. Heath (Oxford, 1981).
ready to be. “Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology,” in
Dennett has never shied away from new Reduction, Time and Reality, ed. Richard
fields of inquiry and he has introduced philoso- Healey (Cambridge, 1981).
phers to many fascinating and philosophically Ed. with Douglas Hofstadter, The Mind’s I:
relevant scientific research programs. This has Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul
provided him with a novel perspective on philo- (New York, 1981).
sophical questions, enabling him to challenge “Beyond Belief,” in Thought and Object:
philosophers’ presuppositions with unnerving Essays on Intentionality, ed. A. Woodfield
poignancy through thought experiments, intu- (Oxford, 1982), pp. 1–96.
ition pumps as he calls them, that confound the “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology:
philosophical community. Dennett is a major the ‘Panglossian Paradigm’ Defended,”
influence on philosophy, psychology, artificial with commentaries, Behavioral and Brain
intelligence research, and cognitive science. Sciences 6 (1983): 343–90.
“Quining Qualia,” in Consciousness in
BIBLIOGRAPHY Modern Science, ed. A. Marcel and E.
Content and Consciousness (London and Bisiach (Oxford, 1988), pp. 42–77.
New York, 1969). “Real Patterns,” Journal of Philosophy 88
Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind (1991): 27–51.
and Psychology (Cambridge, Mass., 1978). “Time and the Observer: The Where and
Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will When of Consciousness in the Brain,” with
Worth Wanting (Cambridge, Mass., M. Kinsbourne, followed by commen-
1984). taries, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15
The Intentional Stance (Cambridge, Mass., (1992): 183–247.
1987). “Artificial Life as Philosophy,” Artificial Life
Consciousness Explained (Boston, 1991). 1 (1994): 291–2.
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the “Dennett, Daniel C.,” in A Companion to
Meanings of Life (New York, 1995). the Philosophy of Mind, ed. Samuel
Kinds of Minds: Towards an Understanding Guttenplan (Oxford, 1994), pp. 236–44.
of Consciousness (New York, 1996). “The Virtues of Virtual Machines,” with
Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds Shannon Densmore, Philosophy and
(Cambridge, Mass., 1998). Phenomenological Research 59 (1999):
Freedom Evolves (New York, 2003). 747–67.
Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a “Making Tools for Thinking,” in
Science of Consciousness (Cambridge, Metarepresentations: A Multidisciplinary
Mass., 2005). Perspective, ed. D. Sperber (New York,
2000): 17–29.
Other Relevant Works “Who’s Afraid of Determinism? Rethinking
“Machine Traces and Protocol Statements,” Causes and Possibilities,” with Christopher
Behavioral Science 13 (1968): 155–61. Taylor, in The Oxford Handbook of Free
“Intentional Systems,” Journal of Philosophy Will, ed. Robert Kane (Oxford, 2002), pp.
68 (1971): 87–106. 257–77.
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DENNETT
“In Darwin’s Wake, Where Am I?” in Higher-order Thoughts,” Philosophy and

Proceedings and Addresses of the Phenomenological Research 53 (1993):
American Philosophical Association 75 911–8.
(November 2001): 13–30. Ross, Don, Andrew Brook, and David
“Who’s On First? Heterophenomenology Thompson, eds. Dennett’s Philosophy: A
Explained,” Journal of Consciousness Comprehensive Assessment (Cambridge,
Studies 10 (2003): 19–30. Mass., 2000).
Stich, Stephen. “Dennett on Intentional
Further Reading Systems,” Philosophical Topics 12 (1981):
Bio Dict Psych, Bio 20thC Phils, Cambridge 39–62.
Dict Amer Bio, Oxford Comp Phil, Symons, John. On Dennett (Blemont, Cal.,
Routledge Encycl Phil 2002).
Brook, Andrew, and Don Ross, eds. Daniel
Dennett (Cambridge, UK, 2002). Christopher Viger
Churchland, Paul M. “Densmore and
Dennett on Virtual Machines and
Consciousness,” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 59 (1999):
763–7.
Dahlbom, Bo, ed. Dennett and His Critics: DEUTSCH, Eliot (1931– )
Demystifying Mind (Oxford, 1993).
Elton, Matthew. Daniel Dennett: Reconciling Eliot Deutsch was born on 8 January 1931 in
Science and Our Self-conception (Malden, Gary, Indiana. After the death of his father,
Mass., 2003). who was a successful building contractor and
Fodor, Jerry. A Theory of Content and Other developer, he and his mother moved to
Essays (Cambridge, Mass., 1990). Chicago. His mother, while trained as a
———, “Deconstructing Dennett’s Darwin,” librarian, was a devoted housewife and vol-
Mind and Language 11 (1996): 246–62. unteer worker. Deutsch received his BS degree
Hill, Christopher, ed. “The Philosophy of from the University of Wisconsin in 1952,
Daniel Dennett,” Philosophical Topics 22 then went on to do graduate study briefly at
(Spring–Fall 1995). Special issue on the University of Chicago (concentrating on
Dennett. art history and philosophy) before going to
Hornsby, Jennifer. “Dennett’s Naturalism,” Harvard for one year of graduate work in
in Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naïve architecture. After being drafted and serving
Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind time in the army he attended Columbia
(Cambridge, Mass., 1997), pp. 168–84. University, where in 1960 he received his PhD
McLaughlin, Brian P. “Why Intentional degree in philosophy. His dissertation focused
Systems Theory Cannot Reconcile on the modern Indian philosopher Sri
Physicalism with Realism about Belief and Aurobindo, whose demonstration of the
Desire,” Protosociology 14 (2000): inseparable relationships between philo-
145–57. sophical and spiritual imperatives strongly
Ramberg, Bjørn. “Dennett’s Pragmatism,” attracted Deutsch’s interest.
Revue Internationale de Philosophie 53 Deutsch’s academic career began at
(1999): 61–86. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in 1960 and
Rorty, Richard. “Dennett on Awareness,” flourished when he moved to the University
Philosophical Studies 23 (1972): 153–62. of Hawaii in 1967 as professor of philosophy
Rosenthal, David M. “Multiple Drafts and and successor to Charles A. Moore as editor
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of Philosophy East and West (a position that physical non-dualism of the Indian school
he held from 1967 until 1987). During Advaita Vedānta (literally, the “non-dual”
Deutsch’s tenure as editor, this became the school of thought based upon the “end” or
major academic journal in the field of Asian “culmination” of the Vedas, that is, the
and comparative philosophy. He also directed Upaniśads). As Deutsch himself “recon-
the East–West Philosopher’s Conference structs” this philosophy (in Advaita Vedānta:
program from 1970 through the Sixth A Philosophical Reconstruction, 1969), fol-
Conference held in 1989 on the theme lowing the commentary of its chief exponent,
“Culture and Modernity.” The Conference åankara (788–820 CE), “reality” is unitary,
drew 130 scholars from over thirty-three timeless, spaceless, and totally transcends
countries. Deutsch has chaired the Hawaii human conceptual knowledge and language.
philosophy department from 1997 to the While this level of reality (or alternatively,
present. In addition to being invited to speak Brahman) transcends the grasp of the human
at over thirty-four colleges and universities in mind, it is the essence of our being, one and
Europe, Asia and the Americas, he has been the same with the innermost reality of the
a visiting professor at the University of Self (or, Atman). Hence the famous expres-
Chicago and at Harvard University, and a sion of the Upaniśads, tat tvam asi, “thou
visiting fellow at Clare Hall, Cambridge, to art that,” meaning that the ground of the
which he was elected a life member in 1999. self, the Atman, is in fact one with the ground
Deutsch has been a pioneering leader in the of all being, Brahman. Since reality is, in fact,
field of comparative philosophy, carrying on unitary and beyond determination, the world
the work of Charles A. Moore and Wing-Tsit as it appears (dualistic and bounded) is not
CHAN and standing shoulder to shoulder with reality, but māyā the play of illusion. As the
such allies as Roger T. Ames and David L. title of this school of thought indicates,
Hall, Tu Wei-Ming, Henry Rosemont, Jr., however, the realm of māyā is not separate
Herbert FINGARETTE, and J. N. MOHANTY. from reality, nor is it truly other than reality:
Deutsch has contributed to this field not simply reality, in essence, is non-dual. It is only our
through critical commentary on specific texts ignorance (avidyā) which, by mistaking what
of Eastern philosophies, but by his creative is of reality for illusion and what is illusion for
reworking of themes and concepts from a reality, mistakes the world for what it is – the
broad range of philosophical sources, as much free, purposeless creative play of Tśvara, or
from the West as the East. There are many Brahman in the determinate guise of creator.
voices present in each of his works, not so That is, lacking knowledge of reality, of
much vying with each other as offering ingre- oneness, we accept the world of appearance,
dients conducive toward his own unique style with all its inherent conflict and imperma-
of thought and expression. His latest published nence, as all that is, and so are caught in its
major work, Persons and Valuable Worlds: A ensnaring webs. We take the world seriously,
Global Philosophy (2001), shows clearly his and so find ourselves seriously at odds with
philosophical career as one devoted to explor- it, with others, and with ourselves. The wise,
ing philosophies from around the globe and rather, having an enlightened knowledge of
appropriating them in his own creative enter- reality, become “liberated” from the world
prise. But it also speaks of the philosopher (mokśa), and are free to enjoy the play, free
himself as well, for it takes a truly “global to join in creation and partake of its beauty,
philosopher” to harmonize these many voices without taking it all that seriously, without,
and compose such a philosophy. that is, needing an answer to “why?”
Multivalenced as it may be, Deutsch’s Deutsch’s philosophy likewise enjoins us
thinking is pre-eminently colored by the meta- to appreciate the inherent beauty of existence
623
DEUTSCH
through the free creative play of our own since whatever is said to be true is so if and
personhood, such personhood understood as only if there is no “correct alternative to [it]
an achievement, a work ever in progress, and within the matrix of its presentation” (On
as the central task in the cultivation of our Truth: An Ontological Theory, 1979, p. 93).
humanity. “A person,” he writes in Persons What is remarkable about his definition of
and Valuable Worlds, “is a creative articula- truth is that it is formulated with an eye first
tion, in varying degrees of rightness, of his or to truth as displayed by works of art and
her individuality within the matrix of social truth as evinced by religious language, and
community and within the enduring reality of only then does it seek to account for propo-
the Self” (2001, p. 3). One’s individuality is sitional truth. In each case, Deutsch argues,
largely the matrix of personal and environ- we must understand the degree to which a
mental conditions that particularize oneself work, textual or artistic, appropriately
and distinguish one from others, while the realizes its own “intentionality,” such inten-
“Self” is that which is one with all reality, tionality being the “direction” toward which
itself unconditioned, and what inherently a work moves, which we recognize by under-
links us with all that is. Persons, then, are standing the field of possibilities open to it,
more than their individuality, but less than and indeed, opened by the work (or proposi-
totally real, or the Self. To achieve person- tion) itself. But inherent in this “universal”
hood does not mean, for Deutsch, to realize theory of truth (since it can be applied equally
your “true self,” to be true to your inner to aesthetic, religious, and epistemic contexts)
(introspectively known) self, but demands a is a lack of ultimacy: ultimate, or final, perfect
certain, though appropriate, “masking.” To truth is not available to us on the conditioned
be as a person is to continually reappropriate level (or to what he also terms our “bounded
one’s individuality in the given context, to consciousness”). Only enlightened realization
tend toward possibilities that are uniquely of unity, of reality, can be said to be ultimate.
revealed and “right” for oneself. Persons Yet far from making skeptics or cynics of us,
understand and accept this fluid and changing this opens up and greatly expands the realm
condition of their personhood, and lovingly of creativity, even and especially in philoso-
relinquish attachments to ego. Thus maturing phy, for at root all discourse and human
as a person “is a matter not of discovering work is a kind of fiction: not ultimately true
who I am but of creating the socially or real, yet inherently open to the possibility
informed sensitive person that is right for me. of beauty and valuable, loving achievement.
A person who is right is like a work of art; he This lack of ultimate verifiability which
or she is a simplification that is richly consti- constitutes a more fertile ground for creativ-
tuted,” and there can be no one, single ity and freedom is likewise seen in Deutsch’s
“right” articulation (2001, p. 27). This is the musings on aesthetics (especially as expressed
freedom opened and necessary for creativity, in Essays on the Nature of Art, 1996). What
and is the space within which one “plays” makes a particular art work beautiful, or even
one’s humanity, such play being an integra- what “art” itself is, is not a question that can
tion of meaning and form that is spontaneous be answered without considering how the
yet stable. work is seen, how it in fact expresses itself in
Since reality is cognitively unknowable, a play of imagination, a play enacted by both
nothing of this conditioned world, or what the seeing and the work itself. As imitative, a
we may say of it, or even do in it, is ulti- work of art “acts out” its meaning or aes-
mately real, or true. Largely following thetic content, such acting out rooted in a
åankara, truth (or, for Deutsch, “rightness”) natural yet spiritual ground of being, such
is never ultimate and always open to revision, that an aspect of reality itself comes to expres-
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sion in the art work, yet always in a mode “but only if this writer’s voice is allowed as
appropriate to its particular form and well to have something essentially to do with
context. When such expression is “right” or the meaning that is inscribed” (1995, p. x).
appropriate for a particular work we notice Perhaps Deutsch is hinting that we would do
such rightness as beauty, and see the fulfill- well to read this text as an “appropriate”
ment of the work’s intentionality as an expression of Deutsch’s own creativity, and
integral part of its aesthetic accomplishment. listen for its “rightness” within the context of
In summarizing his view of the art work its own intentionality. Such an intentionality
Deutsch says: “A work of art, even though can only be discerned by the individual
culturally embedded, thus has its own inten- reader, but perhaps Deutsch furnishes us with
tionality, which is precisely its aiming to be another clue of sorts. In Part 1, entitled “A
aesthetically forceful, meaningful, and beau- Phenomenology of Spirituality,” he writes of
tiful.” (1996, p. 33) But like creative person- solitude, spiritual passivity, divine love, and
hood, it is still play, a play that can reveal a wisdom; speaking of wisdom he says,
truth of being (wherein it carries a certain “Wisdom, in short, does not deliver knowl-
“authenticity”) – and so fall within the realm edge; it tells us what is worth knowing – and
of the meaningful – but is just as likely to especially not-knowing.” (1995, p. 10) This
reveal the inherent “no-meaning” of exis- is perhaps indicative of the work itself, as the
tence, or what he terms the absurd. To text teaches by pointing us toward that
accomplish this means that the work reveals “radical discontinuity of being,” in its own
something of the radical “discontinuity” of discontinuous modes of discourse.
being, the radical difference between the Thus mirroring the Vedāntic “non-dual
world perceived as real through avidyā and dichotomy” of reality and māyā and its dis-
the infinite unity of being realized through course on ignorance (avidyā), Eliot Deutsch’s
enlightenment. There is thus a profound lifelong pursuit has been, on one portrayal, to
alliance between art and religion, as both deeply understand and joyfully exhibit the
may point to, though never embody fully, Spielraum that opens up between an ineffable
spiritual reality. Yet the work of art, through reality and our relatively absurd human con-
a certain aesthetic content, enables one to dition. “The ontologist’s dilemma: in being
realize something of the nature of the self, and one loses the power of speech; with beings
so of Reality. there is nothing truthful to say. Silence
This non-reducibility of Reality to human becomes the place for listening.” (1992, p.
comprehension, which is seen precisely in the 97) From silence and spontaneous being come
light of enlightened realization, likewise leads creativity, egoless love, and the source of all
to his playful ruminations on the nature of beauty, and into silence all that is created,
religion. In Religion and Spirituality (1995) loved, and beautiful will return. Deutsch’s
Deutsch explores the nature of, and the rela- profound understanding of this spiritual
tionships between, religion and spirituality, dimension of all existence not only informs
sometimes in directly “authorial” discourse his own creative ventures, but challenges all
and sometimes more metaphorically through of us, qua persons, to give ear to this silence,
the use of a wide variety of linguistic forms. and so discover the sources of our own
The text includes philosophical commentary creative and aesthetically meaningful play.
and analysis, plays, aphorisms, dialogues,
monologues, stories, prose-poems, defini- BIBLIOGRAPHY
tions, meditations, and discussions, a panoply The Bhagavad Gita: An English
of forms that Deutsch himself muses may Translation from the Sanskrit with
well be a kind of “postmodern” discourse, Introductory Essays and Philosophical
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Analyses (New York, 1968). ed. Leroy S. Rouner (Notre Dame, Ind.,
Advaita Vedānta: A Philosophical 1998).
Reconstruction (Honolulu, 1969). “Rationality and Tradition(s),” in The
Humanity and Divinity: An Essay in Empirical and the Transcendental: A
Comparative Metaphysics (Honolulu, Fusion of Horizons, ed. Bina Gupta
1970). (Lanham, Md., 2000).
Studies in Comparative Aesthetics
(Honolulu, 1975). Further Reading
On Truth: An Ontological Theory Ames, Roger, ed. The Aesthetic Turn:
(Honolulu, 1979). Reading Eliot Deutsch on Comparative
Creative Being: The Crafting of Person and Philosophy (Chicago, 2000).
World (Honolulu, 1992). Levine, Michael. “No-self, Real Self,
Religion and Spirituality (Albany, N.Y., Ignorance and Self-deception: Does Self-
1995). deception Require a Self?” Asian
Essays on the Nature of Art (Albany, N.Y., Philosophy 8 (1998): 103–10.
1996). Puligandla, R. “Professor Deutsch on
Persons and Valuable Worlds: A Global Karma,” Darshana International 10
Philosophy (Lanham, Md., 2001). (1970): 27–33.
Other Relevant Works Marty H. Heitz

“Sri Aurobindo’s Interpretation of Spiritual
Experience: A Critique,” International
Philosophical Quarterly 4 (1964):
581–94.
“Karma as a ‘Convenient Fiction’ in
Advaita Vedānta,” Philosophy East and DEUTSCH, Karl Wolfgang (1912–92)
West 15 (1965): 3–12.
“On the Concept of Art,” Journal of Karl Wolfgang Deutsch was born on 21 July
Chinese Philosophy 3 (1976): 373–98. 1912 in Prague, Austro-Hungary, to German-
“Causality and Creativity,” International speaking parents. His father Martin was an
Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1978): optician and his mother Maria Scharf was
19–32. one of the first female parliamentarians of
“The Ontological Power of Speech,” the newly established Czechoslovakia fol-
Journal of Chinese Philosophy 12 (1985): lowing World War I. Deutsch graduated from
117–30. the German Staatsrealgymnasium in Prague
Ed. with Gerald Larson, Interpreting Across with high honors in 1931. He received his
Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative first university degree from the Deutsche
Philosophy (Princeton, N.J., 1988). Universität, also in Prague, in 1934. Deutsch’s
“Community as Ritual Participation,” in outspoken leadership of anti-Nazi groups
On Community, ed. Leroy S. Rouner forced him to interrupt his studies and seek
(Notre Dame, Ind., 1991), pp. 15–26. refuge in England where he studied optics
“Creative Friendship,” in The Changing and mathematics. Though he never pursued
Face of Friendship, ed. Leroy S. Rouner a career in optics, his sojourn in England
(Notre Dame, Ind., 1994). helped him develop an interest in quantitative
Ed., Introduction to World Philosophies political science both as a fundamentally new
(New York, 1996). epistemology as well as an innovative
“Loneliness and Solitude,” in Loneliness, methodology.
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DEUTSCH
Deutsch returned to Prague to obtain his JD study politics in order to help people overcome
law degree from Czech national Charles the dangers of large wars, hunger, poverty,
University in 1938, graduating with high and population growth. Deutsch never sur-
honors in seven fields. This was a signal honor rendered his immense talents to the sole pursuit
for a German-ethnic Czech in this time of bitter of an academic career and always perceived his
antagonism between ethnic Czechs and scholarship as part of a larger commitment to
Germans. In 1939 he was awarded a fellow- improve the human condition. Ever the
ship to study at Harvard University, from optimist until his dying day, he was convinced
which he received the PhD in political science that more knowledge, better education, and
in 1951. America’s entry into World War II led improved channels of communication will
Deutsch to offer his services to the United inevitably lead to better understanding among
States government as an analyst of authori- peoples and thus to a much-improved world of
tarian and totalitarian political systems. It was reduced conflict, if not everlasting peace.
through this involvement that Deutsch became Even before he finished his dissertation,
one of the main contributors to the famous Deutsch began publishing articles on the
“Blue Book” on Juan Domingo Peron’s efforts complex interactions among intolerance,
to extinguish democracy in Argentina. Deutsch religion, territoriality, freedom, and economic
also participated in the International development. His early work showed both
Secretariat of the San Francisco Conference of the promise of his mature scholarship and,
1945 which created the United Nations. more significantly, discernment in his view of
Deutsch taught political science at society and politics. His dissertation,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology from “Nationalism and Social Communication,”
1945 to 1956 and then at Yale University until was a path-breaking study of modern nation-
1967, when Deutsch moved to Harvard alism’s dual oppositions of cohesiveness and
University as professor of government. He was integration as well as its destructive-alienating
named Stanfield Professor of International dimensions. Deutsch’s dissertation also broke
Peace at Harvard in 1971, a post he held until new methodological grounds by using sophis-
he retired in 1983. He was President of the ticated quantitative analyses to illustrate the
New England Political Science Association in relationship between politics and society both
1964–5, the American Political Science in a diachronic as well as synchronic dimen-
Association in 1969–70, and the International sion. Deutsch’s dissertation was published as a
Political Science Association during 1976–9. book with the same title in 1953; it has
Deutsch was also a member of the National remained a classic in the literature of political
Academy of Science and of the American science and the study of nationalism to this
Academy of Arts and Sciences. Deutsch died day.
on 1 November 1992 in Cambridge, While teaching at MIT, Deutsch became
Massachusetts. interested in the ideas of Norbert WIENER, one
Deutsch was part of the trans-Atlantic of the inventors of cybernetics and its applica-
migration of European intellectuals who tion to the social sciences. While he was at the
sought refuge in America from the Nazi Center for Research on World Political
regime. Though he never returned to live in his Institutions at Princeton University in 1953–4,
homeland, Deutsch frequently toured the Deutsch and his colleagues applied these ideas
United States to speak on behalf of the Free into a theoretical analysis of large-scale polit-
Czechoslovak movement. In his adopted ical integration, Political Community and the
country, Deutsch dedicated himself to work on North Atlantic Area (1957). In 1956–7, while
behalf of a general improvement of the human a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in
condition. He made it his life’s purpose to the Behavioral Sciences in Palo Alto,
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DEUTSCH
California, he laid the basis for another book journals of this field. On the undergraduate
that used an innovative application of cyber- level, Deutsch attained legendary status on
netics to the study of politics. This book, The campus by giving countless lectures on the most
Nerves of Government (1963), revolutionized varied topics, always to packed venues. Virtually
the discipline of political science. Once again without exception, each lecture was followed by
using concepts derived from cybernetics, an ovation, rewarding Deutsch’s unique style of
Deutsch made a nuanced analysis of essential combining a breathtaking array of empirical
political mechanisms such as power, authority, examples culled from all over the world from
governance, cohesion, conflict, guidance, and antiquity to the present with a breezy delivery
breakdown. It was also at this time that full of wit and humor. The Yale Political Union
Deutsch held a visiting professorship at the awarded Deutsch with the prestigious William
University of Chicago in 1954 and received Benton Prize in 1965 for having done the most
his first Guggenheim Fellowship in 1955. among the Yale faculty to stimulate and
In Germany Rejoins the Powers, with Lewis maintain political interest on campus.
J. Edinger (1959), Deutsch used data on public Deutsch was also invested with the director-
opinion, the background of elites, and eco- ship of the International Institute for
nomics to analyze West Germany’s postwar Comparative Social Research of the Science
progress. Another highly original study of Center in Berlin where he and his team of inter-
politics and society is his seminal article “Social national scholars pioneered and refined the
Mobilization and Political Development” study of global modeling in political science.
(1961). While at Yale during the 1960s, Deutsch’s scholarly legacy to the various sub-
Deutsch established the Yale Political Data fields comprising the discipline of political
Program, to develop quantitative indicators science, as well as to the social sciences in
for testing significant theories and proposi- general, includes the introduction of quantitative
tions in social science. He organized a multi- methodology requiring rigorous statistical
university research team, sometimes called the analyses and measurements. He also conceptu-
Yale Arms Control Project, to investigate the alized empirically grounded theories of such
prospects for arms control, disarmament, and crucial issues as nation-building, state-building,
steps toward unification in Western and Central social mobilization, national and international
Europe. This project also assumed an increas- integration, center-periphery relations, and the
ingly prominent role in the development of an distribution of power between, within, and
international social science network. During his among states. He contributed to communication
Yale years, Deutsch also held visiting profes- theory, particularly cybernetics, using in
sorships at Heidelberg University in Germany Wiener’s work that Deutsch introduced some
and at Nuffield College of Oxford University. aspects of John VON NEUMANN’s influential
Deutsch was also a great teacher, supervising breakthroughs in game theory that later become
the doctoral work of an unusually large number a mainstay of political science by the 1980s.
of students, all of whom became major political Deutsch’s work was profoundly interdisci-
scientists in their own right and assumed pres- plinary and he freely used concepts borrowed
tigious posts at the world’s leading research uni- from anthropology, sociology, economics, sta-
versities where they continued to uphold Karl tistics, mathematics, biology, and physics. His
Deutsch’s intellectual legacy. It was at Yale that work always had a strong empirical dimen-
an informal but certainly palpable “Deutsch sion, remaining firmly anchored in history and
school of political science” emerged. Moreover, geography. He feared that political science,
it was during this period that Deutsch became like any social science, ran the risk of becoming
far and away the most frequently cited scholar vacuous if it drifted too far away from studying
of international relations in the leading academic empirical reality in favor of abstract theoreti-
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DEWEY
cal models. Throughout his life, Deutsch Merritt, Richard L., and B. M. Russett, eds.
remained an avid reader of history and his From National Development to Global
work reflects his deep commitment to histori- Community: Essays in Honor of Karl W.
cal knowledge. Deutsch (London, 1981).
Vickers, Jill McCalla. An Examination of
BIBLIOGRAPHY the Scientific Mode of Enquiry in Politics
Nationalism and Social Communication: with Special Reference to Systems Theory
An Inquiry into the Foundations of in the Works of Easton, Almond, Kaplan
Nationality (Cambridge, Mass., 1953). and Deutsch (New York, 1991).
Political Community and the North
Atlantic Area: International Organization Andrei S. Markovits
in the Light of Historical Experience,
with S. A. Burrell, R. A. Kann, M. Lee,
Jr., et al. (Princeton, N.J., 1957).
Germany Rejoins the Powers: Mass
Opinion, Interest Groups, and Elites in
Contemporary German Foreign Policy, DEWEY, John (1859–1952)
with L. J. Edinger (Stanford, Cal., 1959).
“Social Mobilization and Political John Dewey was born on 20 October 1859 in
Development,” American Political Burlington, Vermont, and died on 1 June 1952
Science Review 55 (1961): 493–514. in New York City. The son of a grocer,
The Nerves of Government: Models of Archibald, who served as a quartermaster in the
Political Communication and Control Union Army during the civil war, Dewey spent
(New York, 1963). his youth and college years in Burlington. His
Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance: mother, Lucina, was an evangelical Christian
Europe Faces Coming Policy Decisions who encouraged her sons to have a personal
(New York, 1967). relationship with Jesus, but she also insisted
The Analysis of International Relations that they be educated. Dewey was increasingly
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968). uneasy with the first expectation but readily
Nationalism and Its Alternatives (New embraced the second. While at the University of
York, 1969). Vermont Dewey was introduced to a tradi-
Politics and Government: How People tional form of philosophy, but he also read
Decide Their Fate (Boston, 1970). widely on his own in intellectual and literary
journals. Upon graduation with his BA in 1879,
Other Relevant Works he taught high school in Pennsylvania and
Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance: Vermont for three years, and continued his
Europe Faces Coming Policy Decisions philosophical reading with his college teacher,
(New York, 1967). H. A. P. TORREY, upon his return to Vermont.
France, Germany and the Western Alliance: He then entered the newly established Johns
A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Hopkins University in 1882 to pursue graduate
Integration and World Politics, with L. J. work in philosophy. There he encountered
Edinger, R. C. Macridis, and R. L. Charles S. PEIRCE, who was teaching logic, and
Merritt (New York, 1967). G. Stanley HALL, the experimental psychologist.
Peirce was inventing pragmatism, and Hall had
Further Reading been a student of William JAMES, who publicly
Encyc Social Behav Sci, Who Was Who in introduced the term “pragmatism” and devel-
Amer v11 oped an alternative version to Peirce’s. But the
629
DEWEY
philosopher who influenced Dewey the most major books and was in heavy demand as a
during his graduate study was the historically teacher, lecturer, writer, and public figure.
oriented neo-Hegelian George S. MORRIS. Upon Dewey had long been involved in public
completing the PhD in philosophy in 1884, affairs – he was on the first board of Jane
Dewey joined Morris as an assistant professor ADDAMS’s Hull House in Chicago – and was an
of philosophy at the University of Michigan. In advocate for various liberal causes, writing for
1888 Dewey accepted the position of head of the New Republic and other intellectual
the philosophy department at the University journals. In 1909 he played a minor role in the
of Minnesota. founding of the National Association for the
In 1889 Morris suddenly died, and Dewey Advancement of Colored People. He was more
returned to Michigan as the chair of the phi- involved in the founding of the American
losophy department. In 1894 he moved to the Association of University Professors, serving
recently founded University of Chicago as the as its first President in 1915. Dewey was ini-
head of the department of philosophy, psy- tially opposed to American involvement in
chology and pedagogy. It was during these World War I, but finally decided on pragmatic
years that Dewey was drifting away from grounds to support Woodrow Wilson’s war
Hegelianism, as he later described it, and began policy. This strained his relationship with Jane
to formulate his instrumentalist version of prag- Addams and other pacifists, notably the pas-
matism. The process was mostly complete by sionate and articulate young writer, Randolph
the time he resigned from Chicago in 1904. In B OURNE . Dewey was disappointed in his
later reminiscences Dewey said that a support of Wilson but later said he would have
“Hegelian deposit” remained with him made the same decision again, given what he
throughout his career, but thought that he had knew at the time. Nevertheless, he became the
contributed to the development of a pragma- principal intellectual supporter of the Outlawry
tism, or instrumentalism, as he came to regard of War movement in the 1920s, and did not
his version of pragmatism, that had moved support entering World War II, fearful of the
beyond Hegelian idealism. The years at harm to American civil liberties. Dewey was
Chicago were productive, and two of his col- convinced that social intelligence was possible
leagues, George H. MEAD and James H. TUFTS, even with regard to the momentous and emo-
who had also been at Michigan, became tionally charged issues of war and peace.
lifelong friends and collaborators. In the 1930s Dewey became even more
Unfortunately, Dewey and Chicago’s President, involved in public affairs. He was active in the
William Rainey Harper, had an unpleasant dis- League for Independent Political Action’s
agreement over Harper’s handling of an insti- efforts to form a third political party. This
tutional restructuring of the experimental placed him in opposition to Franklin D.
“Dewey” school which Dewey had founded, Roosevelt’s Democratic Party and the New
that had dismissed Dewey’s wife, Alice, as its Deal, which he considered too much of a blind
Principal. trial-and-error effort. He favored a more explic-
Dewey was invited by Columbia University itly experimental and socialist approach. He
to be a central member of their philosophical also chaired the commission that examined the
department, and he began teaching there as charges brought against Leon Trotsky in the
professor of philosophy in 1905. This began a Moscow Trials. In the highly charged ideolog-
long association that saw him become a world- ical battles of the time, this was no small or
renowned figure and America’s best-known casually assumed task. Still another fray, which
philosopher in the first half of the twentieth he entered with a calm but passionate com-
century. It was during the almost fifty years that mitment to cooperative intelligence, was one
he lived in New York City that he published his involving the grievances of the Communist
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DEWEY
Party insurgents within the New York City (1910). But the book that Dewey himself
Teachers Union. Dewey patiently chaired the thought for many years best captured his whole
grievance committee, providing a working thought was Democracy and Education
example of his faith in democracy and inquiry. (1916). Dewey understood the desired form of
Any understanding of Dewey as a philosopher schooling (and education generally) to be a
must take into account this devotion to intelli- democratic practice. It was not just that edu-
gent inquiry and practice. cation reflected society, but a democratic
Dewey retired from Columbia in 1929, society was enhanced by schools (and other
shortly after the death of Alice, but remained at educational activities) that were democratic in
the university until 1939 as an emeritus pro- character. This continuity of means and ends,
fessor and an advisor to doctoral students. as we shall see below, is one of the most dis-
Dewey remarried in 1946, and continued to tinctive features of Dewey’s thinking.
publish on philosophy and social issues until his Perhaps the book that best serves as a pro-
death in 1952. grammatic statement for his later work is
Dewey was a prolific writer. The critical Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920).
edition published by Southern Illinois Originally delivered as lectures at the Imperial
University Press contains thirty-seven volumes. University in Tokyo in 1919, Reconstruction
One major early and very influential article is anticipates many of his major books of the
“The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology” 1920s and 30s. The first of these is Human
(1896), in which Dewey provided an integrated Nature and Conduct (1922), which develops a
understanding of psycho-physical action that social psychology. Through his naturalistic
overcomes mind–body dualism. Dewey moved approach to ethics, it provides the intellectual
easily between philosophy, psychology, and understanding of human conduct that makes
education. Philosophy and psychology were his ethical proposals feasible, working out his
just separating into distinct disciplines at the understanding of the social individual who
end of the nineteenth century, so it was not engages in the moral life.
unusual for one to be engaged in what are now The one book that many point to as Dewey’s
considered distinct fields. What distinguished major work is Experience and Nature (1925).
Dewey, particularly in the Chicago years, was A comprehensive treatment of the way in which
his interest in education and his intellectual we interact with one another and with and
leadership of the “Dewey School.” This expe- within nature, Experience and Nature is read
rience provided the basis for his School and by many as being Dewey’s metaphysics, despite
Society (1899), bringing him to the attention the fact that he was often sharply critical of
not only of philosophers but also the educated metaphysics. At best it is a new sort of meta-
public. Dewey was also interested in episte- physics, a naturalistic one, one that describes
mology and logic, publishing with his col- the “generic features” of our existence without
leagues at Chicago a volume of essays, Studies any recourse to the supernatural or a reality
in Logical Theory (1903). Dewey’s four essays behind the appearances. A book review by
were revised and joined with more on knowl- George SANTAYANA accused Dewey of a “half-
edge and truth for Essays in Experimental hearted naturalism” because it allowed the
Logic (1916). foreground of human experience to dominate
Another collaborative volume was the widely the rest of existence. Hence it was no true nat-
used Ethics textbook, jointly authored by uralism, for “in nature there is no foreground
Dewey and Tufts (1908). A book concerned or background, no here, no now, no moral
with both logic and education, reflecting cathedra, no centre so really central as to reduce
Dewey’s interest in promoting a critical and all other things to mere margins and mere per-
experimental intelligence, was How We Think spectives” (1925). Dewey denied that he had
631
DEWEY
compromised his naturalism by privileging interest in religion, but here he recast his prag-
human experience, instead giving an accurate matic naturalism as a religious way of life.
account of the place of experience within Making a distinction between “religion” and
nature. “the religious,” he proposed that one could,
Experience and Nature was followed by The without reference to or dependence upon the
Quest for Certainty (1929), which deals with supernatural, develop a meaningful life of pas-
another core concern of philosophy: epistemol- sionate intelligence. Also catching some by
ogy or the theory of knowledge. He subtitled the surprise were his Harvard University William
book, A Study of the Relation of Knowledge James Lectures on art and aesthetic experience.
and Action, thus connecting it to his ongoing Building on what he had written in Experience
concern with intelligent action, and much of the and Nature, Dewey put forward an original con-
book is an attack on traditional essentialist and tribution to the philosophy of art. He was con-
foundationalist theories of knowledge. Some cerned to show that a work of art originates in
have quipped that a better title would be The experience – hence the title, Art as Experience –
Quest Against Certainty; it is an account of but also that experience, the interaction of an
how we can live (and know) without certainty organism with its environment, can be some-
because it is a profound mistake to seek security thing other than routine or desultory. It can be
in certainty. Security is to be found in a falli- artfully done. Dewey showed how we can intel-
bilist, probabilistic way of knowing–acting. ligently transform our lives, making them more
The Public and Its Problems (1927) reacted satisfactory than they would otherwise be.
to Walter LIPPMANN, the well-regarded public Less well received was Dewey’s Logic: The
intellectual and Dewey’s fellow contributor to Theory of Inquiry, the culmination of his
the New Republic, who had published two efforts to devise intellectual tools for dealing
books that called into question the feasibility of with human problems. However, mainstream
democracy. In Lippmann’s view the public was philosophy was not interested in this approach,
not competent to govern; at best it can choose finding promise instead in the developments in
between competing groups of insiders to serve formal logic and its promise of an ideal
as their elected representatives. Dewey took up language that could accurately represent reality.
the challenge in The Public and Its Problems, The reception of Dewey’s Logic was not helped
describing how a mass society could be a demo- by Bertrand Russell’s highly negative reaction
cratic one. This book is not his entire political (reprinted in Schilpp 1939) and Dewey’s efforts
philosophy, only taking up the task of showing to reply (see Burke 1994).
how the changing society of the 1920s could be Most interpreters of Dewey have chosen to
a richly democratic one by becoming more understand his work from a particular vantage
adept at exercising social intelligence. point, such as politics, art, ethics, or religion. It
Dewey continued to speak to political, edu- is difficult to hold together all of his philo-
cational, and ethical issues in the 1930s in sophical goals over his long career, but some
Individualism, Old and New (1930), pervasive themes can be identified. One way to
Liberalism and Social Action (1935), Freedom start is with a story he told in The School and
and Culture (1939), Experience and Education Society, about his search for appropriate desks
(1938), and Theory of Valuation (1939). But for the University of Chicago Elementary
the more remarkable books, in terms of the School. Dewey recalled his troubles “trying to
reaction they received, were A Common Faith find desks and chairs … suitable … to the needs
(1934), Art as Experience (1934), and Logic: of the children.” One dealer, whom Dewey
The Theory of Inquiry (1938). A Common significantly describes as being “more intelligent
Faith is interesting because Dewey was per- than the rest,” finally put his finger on the
ceived as a secular humanist with little or no problem: “I am afraid we have not what you
632
DEWEY
want. You want something at which the phers for dealing with” human problems. The
children may work; these are all for listening” story that best captures this shift is the one told
(1899). In traditional education, students were by Charles FRANKEL, who as a graduate student
regarded as passive absorbers of information at Columbia attended the 1939 American
from a teacher or a textbook. In Dewey’s Philosophical Association dinner that honored
school, students were to be active learners, Dewey’s eightieth birthday:
pursuing their interests within the limits estab-
lished by the teacher and curriculum. As he When Dewey was eighty, he engaged in a
observed a few years later, in traditional edu- debate, at a meeting of the American
cation “the tendency is to reduce the activity of Philosophical Association, with his old friend
mind to a docile or passive taking in of the and Columbia colleague, William Pepperell
material presented – in short to memorizing, MONTAGUE, in the course of which Montague
with simply incidental use of judgment and of complimented him for his life-long effort to
active research. As is frequently stated, acquir- practicalize intelligence. Dewey replied quietly
ing takes the place of inquiring” (Democracy but firmly that Montague was taking a
and Education, 1916). As children developed narrow, inbred view – a philosopher’s trade-
into adults, he hoped that they would become union view, he implied – of what he, Dewey
active learners and inquirers, intelligently had tried to accomplish. His effort had not
capable of modern experimental science. been to practicalize intelligence but to intel-
Intelligence for Dewey is the use of indirect lectualize practice. (quoted in Eldridge 1998,
action (or means) to accomplish that (an end) p. 5)
which cannot be seized directly. Science, or
directed experimental inquiry, is an intensifica- To understand intelligent practice, begin with
tion of the natural process of experimental our engagement in practices, our ongoing activ-
learning. He wrote: “The organism is a part of ities. These activities, what Dewey elsewhere
the natural world; its interactions with it are terms “habits,” came about to meet some need,
genuine additive phenomena. When, with the but over time they cease to be appropriate to
development of symbols, also a natural occur- our changing needs. Thus we need to rethink
rence, these interactions are directed towards what we are doing, to make sure that there is
anticipated consequences, they gain the quality a match between means and ends. The method
of intelligence … ” (1929). Dewey was not just whereby we make our practices more intelligent
a pragmatist; he was a pragmatic naturalist. His is inquiry. The philosopher’s task is not to take
instrumentalism was set within a naturalistic (as reason and try to figure out how to apply it –
opposed to supernaturalistic) context. He valued the practicalizing intelligence approach rejected
science not only for what it could teach us about by Dewey. Rather, the philosopher’s job is to
inquiry but also for its results. The world identify the significant disjunctions between
described by science, both physical and social, our needs, habits, and objectives and to help us
was world enough for the secular Dewey, where rethink what we are doing. She can assist in the
“secular” means “having to do with this world” intellectualizing of practice.
and not “anti-religious.” This is no easy task, for the cultural deposits
This understanding of learning and orientation in our thinking are deeply buried and not easily
toward science led Dewey not only into con- recovered, examined, or changed. Often they
flicts with traditionalists generally but with phi- are firmly embedded in our moralities and reli-
losophy as traditionally understood. It was no gions and imbued with an absoluteness and
longer philosophy’s task to describe reality and sacredness that elicits a do-not-touch attitude.
to access that reality by reason. Philosophy But Dewey thought that nothing was beyond a
should become “a method, cultivated by philoso- possibly transforming investigation. The task of
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DEWEY
philosophy is to identify these tensions in Rorty concludes, “Dewey’s mistake … was the
society where a no longer fully effective practice notion that criticism of culture had to take the
needs a transformation. Such tensions exem- form of a redescription of ‘nature’ or ‘experi-
plify the tension between ideal and actual that ence’ or both” (Rorty 1982, p. 85). For Rorty,
Dewey took to be central to philosophy. But such descriptions are attempts to speak from a
“ideal” did not mean for Dewey something neutral vantage point about what is, whereas
that was perfect or timeless. Rather, something pragmatism requires that one speak from a
was ideal if it was a “generalized end-in-view.” particular perspective.
It arises naturally and is cultivated by us. It is More damaging to Dewey’s effort to trans-
our making-desirable that which naturally form experience is the charge that a Deweyan
occurs. democracy requires citizens who are more
A third Deweyan ideal, in addition to science capable of critical thinking than Dewey’s critics
and intelligence, is democracy. He sought the think is possible. One does not have to sub-
sort of social structure that enables individuals scribe to the doctrine of original sin or be
to flourish, not just for the sake of the individ- cynical about human potential to be skeptical
uals but for the group as well. He was willing about the possibilities of social intelligence, for
to consider many different procedures as we have much evidence of people every day not
“democratic,” provided they were inclusive of matching up ends and means and suffering as
people’s interests and they enabled the group a result. But Dewey was not the optimist that
and its members to flourish. He did think that he is sometimes portrayed to be. It is true that
open and free communication was important, he was hopeful that we could improve our
as was the explicit embrace of the method of practices, as his continuing attention to educa-
experimental inquiry that he championed. tion and science suggests. But his hope was one
Democracy for Dewey was a social instantia- that recognized the stupidity of which we are
tion of intelligence, for an ideally democratic capable.
group would be engaged in resolving its To conclude his 1930 autobiographical
tensions through the deliberate reconstruction essay, “From Absolutism to
of its experience. Experimentalism,” Dewey said, “I do not
Although Dewey’s ideas have enjoyed expect to see in my day a genuine, as distinct
interest in recent decades, thanks in no small from a forced and artificial, integration of
part to Richard RORTY, they continue to be thought. But a mind that is not too egotisti-
questioned, not least of all by Rorty. What cally impatient can have faith that this unifi-
Rorty finds valuable is Dewey’s anti-essential- cation will issue in its season. Meantime a
ism, anti-foundationalism, and frank con- chief task of those who call themselves
structivism. Dewey’s “pragmatism,” writes philosophers is to help get rid of the useless
Rorty, “was, as Hilary PUTNAM [another lumber that blocks our highways of thought,
prominent neo-pragmatist] has said, an ‘insis- and strive to make straight and open the paths
tence on the supremacy of the agent point of that lead to the future. Forty years spent in
view’” (Rorty 1999, p. 88). Rorty also has said wandering in a wilderness like that of the
that pragmatism is “a doctrine of the relativity present is not a sad fate – unless one attempts
of normative judgments to purposes served,” to make himself believe that the wilderness is
standing with Dewey against the traditionalist after all itself the promised land.” (1930, pp.
critics. But Rorty thinks that Dewey’s idea of 26–7) Dewey found life full of possibilities as
method is “vacuous,” and that the linking of well as perils. He chose to overcome some
naturalism with pragmatism makes the mistake difficulties and exploit the possibilities, and
of doing metaphysics by trying to describe recommended that we do the same.
reality as such. In “Dewey’s Metaphysics”
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DEWEY

Leibniz’s New Essays Concerning the Dewey’s papers are at Southern Illinois
Human Understanding (Chicago, 1886). University, Carbondale. Collections of
Psychology (New York, 1887; 2nd edn 1889; writings about Dewey are at the Center for
3rd edn 1891). Dewey Studies in Carbondale.
“The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology,” “From Absolutism to Experimentalism,” in
Psychological Review 3 (1896): 357–70. Contemporary American Philosophy:
The School and Society (Chicago, 1899). Personal Statements, ed. G. P. Adams and
Ethics, with James H. Tufts (New York, W. P. Montague (New York, 1930), vol. 2,
1908; 2nd edn 1932). pp. 13–27.
How We Think (Chicago, 1910; 2nd edn Intelligence in the Modern World: John
1933). Dewey’s Philosophy, ed. Joseph Ratner
The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and (New York, 1939).
Other Essays (New York, 1910). The Early Works, 1882–1898, 5 vols
Democracy and Education (New York, (Carbondale, Ill., 1967–72).
1916). The Middle Works, 1899–1924, 15 vols
Essays in Experimental Logic (Chicago, (Carbondale, Ill., 1976–83).
1916). The Later Works, 1925–1953, 17 vols
Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York, (Carbondale, Ill., 1981–90).
1920). Lectures on Ethics, 1900–1901, ed. Donald F.
Human Nature and Conduct: An Koch (Carbondale, Ill., 1991).
Introduction to Social Psychology (New The Essential Dewey, 2 vols (Bloomington,
York, 1922; 1930). Ind., 1998).
Experience and Nature (La Salle, Ill., 1925; Principles of Instrumental Logic: John
2nd edn 1929). Dewey’s Lectures in Ethics and Political
The Public and Its Problems (New York, Ethics, 1895–1896, ed. Donald F. Koch
1927). (Carbondale, Ill., 1998).
The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the The Correspondence of John Dewey, 3 CD-
Relation of Knowledge and Action (New ROM discs, ed. Larry A. Hickman
York, 1929). (Charlottesville, Virg., 1999–2005).
Individualism, Old and New (New York,
1930). Further Reading
Philosophy and Civilization (New York, Amer Nat Bio, Amer Phils Before 1950,
1931). Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, Bio Dict Psych,
Art as Experience (New York, 1934). Bio 20thC Phils, Blackwell Amer Phil,
A Common Faith (New Haven, Conn., Blackwell Comp Phils, Blackwell Comp
1934). Prag, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp
Liberalism and Social Action (New York, Amer Thought, Dict Amer Bio, Encyc Amer
1935). Bio, Encyc Ethics, Encyc Psych, Encyc
Experience and Education (New York, Social Behav Sci, Oxford Comp Phil, Nat
1938). Cycl Amer Bio v40, Pres Addr of APA v1,
Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York, Proc of APA v26, Routledge Encycl Phil,
1938). Who Was Who in Amer v3, Who’s Who in
Freedom and Culture (New York, 1939). Phil
Theory of Valuation (Chicago, 1939). Alexander, Thomas M. John Dewey’s Theory
Knowing and the Known, with Arthur F. of Art, Experience, and Nature: The
Bentley (Boston, 1949). Horizons of Feeling (Albany, N.Y., 1987).
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DEWEY
Boydston, Jo Ann, ed. Guide to the Works (1925): 673–88.

of John Dewey (Carbondale, Ill., 1970). Schilpp, Paul A., ed. The Philosophy of
Burke, Tom. Dewey’s New Logic: A Reply John Dewey (Evanston, Ill., 1939; 3rd
to Russell (Chicago, 1994). edn, La Salle, Ill., 1989). Contains
Campbell, James. Understanding John Dewey’s autobiography and a
Dewey (Chicago, 1995). bibliography of his writings.
Coss, John J., ed. Essays in Honor of John Shook, John R. Dewey’s Empirical Theory
Dewey (New York, 1929). of Knowledge and Reality (Nashville,
Dykhuizen, George. The Life and Mind of Tenn., 2000).
John Dewey (Carbondale, Ill., 1973). Sleeper, R. W. The Necessity of
Edel, Abraham. Ethical Theory and Social Pragmatism: John Dewey’s Conception
Change: The Evolution of John Dewey’s of Philosophy (New Haven, Conn., 1986;
Ethics, 1908–1932 (New Brunswick, Urbana, Ill., 2001).
N.J., 2001). Tiles, J. E. Dewey (London, 1988).
Eldridge, Michael. Transforming Welchman, Jennifer. Dewey’s Ethical
Experience: John Dewey’s Cultural Thought (Ithaca, N.Y., 1995).
Instrumentalism (Nashville, Tenn., 1998). Westbrook, Robert B. John Dewey and
Garrison, James. Dewey and Eros: Wisdom American Democracy (Ithaca, N.Y.,
and Desire in the Art of Teaching (New 1991).
York, 1997).
Hickman, Larry A. John Dewey’s Michael Eldridge
Pragmatic Technology (Bloomington,
Ind., 1990).
Hook, Sidney. John Dewey: An Intellectual
Portrait (New York, 1939).
———, ed. John Dewey: Philosopher of
Science and Freedom (New York, 1950). DeWOLF, Lotan Harold (1905–86)
Levine, Barbara, ed. Works about John
Dewey, 1886–1995 (Carbondale, Ill., L. Harold DeWolf was born on 31 January
1996). 1905 in Columbus, Nebraska. DeWolf
Martin, Jay. The Education of John Dewey: followed the path of his father, Rev. Dr.
A Biography (New York, 2002). Lotan R. DeWolf, to become a pastor in the
Morgenbesser, Sidney, ed. Dewey and His Methodist Episcopal Church. DeWolf earned
Critics: Essays from the Journal of his BA degree from Nebraska Wesleyan
Philosophy (New York, 1977). University in 1924. DeWolf pursued theo-
Rockefeller, Steven C. John Dewey: logical studies at Boston University where he
Religious Faith and Democratic received his STB in 1926. He received the
Humanism (New York, 1991). Borden Parker Bowne Fellowship in
Rorty, Richard. Consequences of Philosophy at Boston University in 1933–4,
Pragmatism (Minneapolis, 1982). and received his PhD in philosophy in 1935
———, Philosophy and Social Hope studying under Edgar Sheffield BRIGHTMAN.
(London, 1999). His dissertation was titled “Premises of the
Ryan, Alan. John Dewey and the High Tide Arguments Concerning Immortality in Thirty
of American Liberalism (New York, Ingersoll Lectures (1896–1934).” After grad-
1995). uating, DeWolf served as a Methodist
Santayana, George. “Dewey’s Naturalistic minister in Nebraska and Massachusetts from
Metaphysics,” Journal of Philosophy 22 1926 to 1936.
636
DeWOLF
DeWolf’s teaching career began in 1934 in and support to issues related to the criminal
the philosophy department at Boston justice system in the United States. DeWolf
University where he taught until 1944, when believed that the focus of the criminal justice
he joined the faculty of Boston University system should be on social defense and restora-
School of Theology as professor of systematic tion rather than on punishment and retribution.
theology. DeWolf taught twice in Central and He was particularly concerned with reforming
East Africa, in 1955–6 and 1962–3. His most socioeconomic structures that made crime more
well-known student at Boston University was likely in society. DeWolf argued that compen-
Martin Luther KING, Jr. DeWolf was King’s sation of victims and rehabilitation of offenders
primary teacher and mentor at Boston were keys to restorative justice and reconcilia-
University. King remained in contact with tion, with the general goal of contributing to a
DeWolf throughout his life (their letters are in mutually caring community.
King’s Papers), and DeWolf spoke at King’s
funeral. In 1965 DeWolf became Dean of BIBLIOGRAPHY
Wesley Theological Seminary in Washington, The Religious Revolt Against Reason (New
D.C., where he served until his retirement in York, 1949).
1972. A Theology of the Living Church (New
A third-generation Boston personalist, York, 1953).
DeWolf accepted the personalistic principle Trends and Frontiers of Religious Thought
that all human persons, regardless of their dif- (Nashville, Tenn., 1955).
ferences, are of sacred worth, created and The Case for Theology in Liberal Perspective
loved by the Supreme Person, God. DeWolf (Philadelphia, 1959).
found in Boston personalism a network of The Enduring Message of the Bible (New
reason within which to express his Christian York, 1960).
faith. DeWolf viewed reason and faith, not as Present Trends in Christian Thought (New
contradictory, but as mutually reinforcing and York, 1960).
challenging one another. Teaching Our Faith in God (New York,
Along with Walter M UELDER , DeWolf 1963).
helped Boston personalism to become more Responsible Freedom: Guidelines to
communitarian in its focus. DeWolf empha- Christian Action (New York, 1971).
sized the connection of individual persons Crime and Justice in America: A Paradox of
with their communities. He recognized that Conscience (New York, 1975). Abridged
human individuals are involved in reciprocal edn, What Americans Should Do About
relations in communities and that respect for Crime (New York, 1976).
the sacred worth of individual persons Eternal Life: Why We Believe (Philadelphia,
requires careful attention to social health and 1980).
social justice in human communities. This
insight led DeWolf to formulate three princi- Other Relevant Works
ples of community that have been incorpo- DeWolf’s papers are at Boston University
rated into the moral law tradition of Boston and Wesley Theological Seminary.
personalism. These principles focus on the “The Influence of Prayer on God and Man,”
values of cooperation, social devotion, and in Healing: Human and Divine, ed. Simon
promoting ideal community. Doniger (New York, 1957), pp. 144–61.
Although he was critically engaged with “How My Mind Has Changed,” in How My
numerous social justice issues, DeWolf was Mind Has Changed, ed. Harold Fay
especially interested in applying the commu- (Cleveland and New York, 1961), pp.
nitarian personalist ideals of mutual caring 133–47.
637
DeWOLF
“Public and Private Dimensions of Ethical take up the position of associate professor in
Responsibility,” in Toward a Discipline of philosophy at the University of Virginia in
Social Ethics: Essays in Honor of Walter 1971. She was promoted to full professor of
George Muelder, ed. Paul Deats, Jr. philosophy in 1982, and currently is the
(Boston, 1972), pp. 275–94. William R. Kenan Jr. Professor of Philosophy
“Martin Luther King, Jr. as Theologian,” and Professor of Law. During her time at the
Journal of the Interdenominational University of Virginia, Diamond has also
Theological Center 4 (Spring 1977): 1–11. been a visiting professor at Princeton
“Ethical Implications for Criminal Justice,” University and the Alfred North Whitehead
in The Boston Personalist Tradition on lecturer at Harvard University.
Philosophy, Social Ethics, and Theology, Diamond is recognized for her work on
ed. Paul Deats and Carol Robb (Macon, Wittgenstein, Frege, the philosophy of
Georgia, 1986), pp. 221–36. language, moral philosophy, and philosophy
and literature. Her reputation as a
Further Reading Wittgenstein scholar, in particular, has estab-
Who’s Who in Phil lished the University of Virginia as an impor-
Burrow, Rufus, Jr. Personalism: A Critical tant location for graduate students and
Introduction (St. Louis, 1999). researchers wishing to study his philosophy.
Neufer, P. Dale. A Critical Analysis of the In writing about her early philosophical influ-
Systematic Theology of Lotan Harold ences in “On Wittgenstein” (2001), Diamond
DeWolf. ThD dissertation, Iliff School of claims that even though she had some
Theology (Denver, 1972). acquaintance with Wittgenstein’s philosophy
during her years at university, she could make
Mark Y. A. Davies little sense of it at that time. Her proper intro-
duction to his philosophy came when she
spent the summers of 1965 and 1966 in a hut
in Norway reading his work. Diamond
credits the work of three philosophers in par-
ticular – G. E. M. Anscombe, Stanley Cavell,
DIAMOND, Cora Ann (1937– ) and Rush Rhees – with helping her under-
stand Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophy
Cora A. Diamond was born on 30 October in her early days of studying his work.
1937 in New York City. She attended In the late 1960s Diamond was asked by
Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania and Rush Rhees to edit notes taken by students
graduated with a BA in 1957. She was a who attended Wittgenstein’s lectures in 1939.
Woodrow Wilson fellow in 1957–8, and then These notes were subsequently published in
went to England where she studied at Oxford 1976 as Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the
University, earning a BPhil in 1961. Her pro- Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge,
fessional career began in 1961, when she 1939. During the 1970s and 1980s, Diamond
taught for a year as an assistant lecturer in published a series of articles which were col-
philosophy at the University of Wales, lected for The Realistic Spirit (1991). Even
Swansea. In 1962–3 she held a position as though the essays in this collection were
assistant lecturer in philosophy at the written at different times and are on a range
University of Sussex in England. From 1962 of subjects in language, epistemology, and
to 1971, she was lecturer in moral philosophy ethics, The Realistic Spirit needs to be read as
at the University of Aberdeen in Scotland. an organic whole. There is a way of thinking,
Diamond returned to the United States to “the realistic spirit,” that underlies and
638
DIAMOND
connects each essay. In essence, the realistic rules for what must be the case prior to an
spirit is a resistance to the metaphysical examination of what we actually do, but we
mythology that postulates that there is some must also be wary of making what we see fit
thing beyond what we perceive as real, a single paradigm. This attention is also
whether it be matter, our own inner states, or central to ethical thinking. Someone is not
some such thing. Furthermore, this thing is necessarily persuaded of the problems in their
required to explain what we perceive as real. thinking through the force or completeness of
Diamond’s claim that this way of thinking an argument, but rather they are shown
is mistaken is not because it is overinvolved something about their way of thinking: some-
or unnecessary as an explanation. Instead, thing new or some already present aspect of
she is saying that the mistake is a loss of it is brought to their attention.
attention to the way things are. In trying to However, there are differences between
look beyond the way things are, we not only Diamond’s philosophical interests and
miss the details but fail to recognize them as approach and those of Wittgenstein. Unlike
important. Diamond offers instead a different Wittgenstein, Diamond holds that philoso-
philosophical “attitude” of the realistic spirit phy cannot be done without the context of
to the world. This realistic spirit is not an the history of the discipline, and she is also
alternative or competing theory of reality. It more involved in philosophical conversations
does not provide an answer in this way, as with her contemporaries. Diamond also
this would be to keep the same metaphysical demonstrates a greater interest than
question or requirement that demands some- Wittgenstein in “applied” issues, in particu-
thing that philosophically we cannot have. lar in her essays that consider our treatment
For Diamond, to take on this philosophical of animals. While her approach to these
attitude is to commit ourselves to paying “applied” issues is not aimed at conversion
attention, specifically to focusing our atten- through argument, it is clear that in bringing
tion both on what we say and on our prac- to our attention our attitudes to animals she
tices within this world. Describing this world is providing a practical critique of our current
and the particulars of this world, especially way of life.
the features of our moral life, is a task of Since the publication of The Realistic Spirit,
getting it right. But, for Diamond, getting it many of Diamond’s publications have been
right is not about seeing the truth beyond the on Wittgenstein or early analytic philosophy.
real, or capturing and simplifying the world This is in part a reflection of the fact that
through explanatory theories. Getting it right much of her work in the 1990s has been for
is an ethical task in itself requiring integrity, invited conferences and collections of articles.
honesty, commitment to truth, and courage. However, this does not indicate the full
It is also, in a sense, an aesthetic task. Indeed, spectrum of her current philosophical inter-
one of the distinct characteristics of ests. For example, in an interview in 1999
Diamond’s work is her use of novels and with The Harvard Review of Philosophy, she
poetry to express attitudes that are relevant to expressed a desire to do some work on the
or part of her philosophical thinking about a subject of truth, including moral truth. This
particular issue. interest can be seen to inform some of her
The influence of Wittgenstein’s philosophy more recent work, including two of her
on Diamond’s thinking in The Realistic Spirit newest publications: “Truth Before Tarski”
is clear. For both Diamond and Wittgenstein, (2002) and “Unfolding Truth and Reading
the philosopher must pay attention to our Wittgenstein” (2003).
ways of thinking and acting: what we actually
do. Not only must we be wary of laying down
639
DIAMOND
BIBLIOGRAPHY Goldfarb and Sabina Lovibond,” Journal

“Mr Goodman on Relevant Conditions and of Philosophical Research 22 (1997):
the Counterfactual,” Philosophical 75–86.
Studies 10 (1959): 42–4. “How Old Are Those Bones? Putnam,
“Secondary Sense,” Proceedings of the Wittgenstein and Verification,”
Aristotelian Society 67 (1967): 189–208. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
“Eating Meat and Eating People,” suppl. 73 (1999): 99–134.
Philosophy 53 (1978): 465–79. “How Long Is the Standard Meter in
“Hommage ou Dommage?” Philosophy 58 Paris?” in Wittgenstein in America, ed.
(1983): 73–88. Timothy McCarthy (Oxford, 2001), pp.
“Rights, Justice and the Retarded,” in 104–39.
Ethics and Mental Retardation, ed. “On Wittgenstein,” Philosophical
Loretta Kopelman (Dordrecht, 1984), pp. Investigations 24 (2001): 108–15.
57–64. “Truth Before Tarski,” in From Frege to
“The Dog That Gave Himself the Moral Wittgenstein: Perspectives on Early
Law,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13 Analytic Philosophy, ed. Erich Reck
(1988): 161–79. (Oxford, 2002), pp. 252–79.
“Losing Your Concepts,” Ethics 98 (1988): “What If X Isn’t the Number of Sheep?
255–77. Wittgenstein and Thought-experiments in
“Rules: Looking in the Right Place,” in Ethics,” Philosophical Papers 31 (2002):
Wittgenstein: Attention to Particulars, ed. 227–50.
D. Z. Phillips and P. Winch (Basingstoke, “What Time Is It on the Sun?” in
UK, 1989), pp. 12–34. Philosophers in Conversation: Interviews
The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, from the Harvard Review of Philosophy,
Philosophy, and the Mind (Cambridge, ed. S. Phineas Upham (London and New
Mass., 1991). York, 2002).
“Ethics, Imagination and the Method of “The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus,” in Bilder der of Philosophy,” Partial Answers 1 (June
Philosophie, Wiener Reihe 5, ed. R. 2003): 1–26.
Heinrich and H. Vetter (Vienna, 1991). “Unfolding Truth and Reading
“Martha Nussbaum and the Need for Wittgenstein,” Sats 4 (2003): 24–58.
Novels,” Philosophical Investigations 16 “Finding One’s Way into the Tractatus,”
(1993): 128–53. Sats 4 (2003): 165–82.
“Truth: Defenders, Debunkers, Despisers,”
in Commitment to Reflection, ed. Leona Other Relevant Works
Toker (New York, 1993), pp. 195–221. Ed., Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the
“Wittgenstein, Mathematics, and Ethics: Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge,
Resisting the Attractions of Realism,” in 1939: From the Notes of R. G.
The Cambridge Companion to Bosanquet, Norman Malcolm, Rush
Wittgenstein, ed. Hans Sluga (Cambridge, Rhees, and Yorick Smythies (Ithaca,
UK, 1996), pp. 226–60. N.Y., 1976).
“Consequentialism in Modern Moral Ed. with Jenny Teichman, Intention and
Philosophy and in ‘Modern Moral Intentionality: Essays in Honour of G. E.
Philosophy’,” in Human Lives: Critical M. Anscombe (London, 1979).
Essays on Consequentialist Bioethics, ed.
David Oderberg (New York, 1997). Further Reading
“Realism and Resolution: Reply to Warren Goldfarb, Warren. “Metaphysics and
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DICKIE
Nonsense: On Cora Diamond’s ‘The tributions to aesthetics, however. In 1988 he

Realistic Spirit’,” Journal of proposed and defended a novel account of aes-
Philosophical Research 22 (1997): thetic evaluation, and in 1996 he presented
57–73. an analysis of eighteenth-century British aes-
Lovibond, Sabina. “The ‘Late Seriousness’ thetic theory as the basis for his own Humean
of Cora Diamond,” Journal of theory of taste. He has been a frequent com-
Philosophical Research 22 (1997): mentator on developments in the field of aes-
43–55. thetics, and has occupied various leadership
Vilhauer, Ben. “On a Tension in Diamond’s roles in the American Society for Aesthetics,
Account of Tractarian Nonsense,” culminating in his Presidency (1993–4).
Philosophical Investigations 26 (2002): Dickie’s attack on the aesthetic attitude
230–38. theory was driven by skepticism about its cog-
nitive claims. He came to believe that there
Catherine Villanueva Gardner was no singular, identifiable state of mind
involved in the aesthetic engagement of this or
that person with this or that object. As he saw
it, attention could be trained on objects for an
endless variety of reasons. No common quality
can be shown to run through all forms of
DICKIE, George Thomas (1926– ) attention properly trained on objects of aes-
thetic interest. For this reason, it would be
George Dickie was born 12 August 1926 in pointless or misleading to say that aesthetic
Palmetto, Florida. Prior to his college educa- experience was predicated on the maintenance
tion, he served in the Marine Corps from 1944 of a certain state of mind. Lapses of aesthetic
to 1946. He received his BA from Florida State attention, taken by aesthetic attitude theorists
University in 1949 and his PhD in philosophy to indicate a failure to engage the right attitude,
from the University of California at Los can be equally well explained as inattention or
Angeles in 1959. He began teaching in 1956 at misdirected attention.
Washington State University, and after a brief Some versions of the aesthetic attitude
stay at the University of Houston, went to the theory (such as Jerome STOLNITZ’s) required
University of Illinois at Chicago in 1965, where that successful aesthetic attention be disinter-
he taught for thirty years. After a long and ested, and that disinterestedness implied a
distinguished career he became professor detachment from both cognitive and critical
emeritus in 1995 and returned to Florida for claims regarding the object in question. Dickie
his retirement. rejected this view, claiming both that there
Dickie is the dominant advocate of two lines was no conceptual incompatibility among aes-
of argument central to the development of thetic, critical, and cognitive claims in appre-
modern aesthetics. First is his adamant oppo- ciation of a given object and that empirical
sition to the claim, prominent in some early evidence (for example, the experience of
twentieth-century views, that aesthetic experi- watching a movie and writing down critical
ence is predicated on a special state of mind, notes) runs counter to the claims of detach-
the so-called “aesthetic attitude,” and that ment. In arguing that there is no one kind of
lacking that state of mind, a proper apprecia- experience that people have in engaging art
tion of an aesthetic object could not be had. works or natural objects of aesthetic interest,
Second is his defense of the institutional theory, Dickie did not deny that there are such things
a definitional account of the nature of art. as aesthetic experiences, nor that they are set
These are by no means his only important con- off from other experiences in their valuable
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DICKIE
qualities. Rather, he denied that one’s access to addition to history and theory. People playing
these qualities is predicated on disinterested- important roles in social institutions involving
ness or any other special state of mind distin- art were thereby members of the artworld.
guishable from all other states of mind as the Dickie also allowed that anyone who took
aesthetic attitude. He concluded that the aes- himself to be a member of the artworld was
thetic attitude is a myth. thereby made a member. The status of some-
In his landmark exposition of the thing as an artwork or not was a function of
Institutional Theory in Art and the Aesthetic the deeming behavior of an art-involved,
(1974), earlier found in “Defining Art” (1969), informed populace, rather than anything
Dickie developed a definition of “art” meant explicitly presented in the work itself.
to respond to (while taking into account the The great virtue of Dickie’s theory was that
salient virtues of) the anti-definist tendency in it made it possible to settle questions of art-
aesthetic theory that had been advanced by candidacy without reliance on any dubious
Morris WEITZ and Paul ZIFF among others, criterion of recognition based on content. It
following the lead of Ludwig Wittgenstein. acknowledged that art in a social setting is
His proposed definition aimed to avoid the one of those grand institutions that make us
traditional mistake of identifying qualities even as we make them and that requires a
common and peculiar to all objects worthy of coordination of parts and a cooperation
the title “art.” The by-now obvious problem among participants to succeed. To some of its
with all such efforts is that the term “art” is critics, however, the theory seemed either
essentially contested and importantly elastic vague (on the issues of what makes conferral
in its conceptual range. But the process by successful and what acting on behalf of
which things come to be understood as consists in) or overly dependent on formal-
artworks is not itself indefinite in the way art sounding actions (status conferral might seem
content is indefinite. Instead, as Dickie akin to christening) alien to artistic practice.
observed, it is a product of complex institu- Responding to these criticisms, Dickie devised
tions in which there are rules and roles, expec- a second, improved version of the Institutional
tations and responsibilities, all of which make Theory in which the definition of art is reduced
up a context of recognition and appraisal. to a simpler phrase: “A work of art is an
In 1964 Arthur DANTO published “The artifact of a kind created to be presented to an
Artworld,” laying out the idea that there is artworld public.” In this version of the theory,
“something the eye cannot decry – an atmos- the artist is taken to be a person making works
phere of artistic theory, a knowledge of this with understanding, the public is taken to be
history of art” that is involved in taking things a set of persons who are prepared in turn to
to be artworks in the peculiar setting of our understand the artworks made, and the
social understandings. Dickie refined this idea artworld is taken to be the totality of all
in making it a central element in his own insti- artworld systems, including frameworks
tutional theory of art. As he formulated it in peculiar to the presentation of drama, painting,
Art and the Aesthetic, a candidate object is a dance, etc. (1984, pp. 80–82).
work of art if, and only if, it is “an artifact a The chief advantage of the new formulation
set of the aspects of which has had conferred over its predecessor is that it makes art status
upon it the status of candidate for appreciation something achieved, rather than bestowed.
by some person or person acting on behalf of The business of status achievement is viewed as
a certain social institution (the artworld)” something more like the basis of recognition
(1974, p. 34). Dickie’s version of the artworld given new meanings in the modern-style dic-
element incorporated personnel and a host of tionary than like the acknowledgment of mas-
institutional roles and modes of interaction in terworks by medieval art guilds. There is no
642
DICKIE
longer any hint of formal acts of status- in their complex interactions. On this point,
bestowal, and yet status decidedly comes to be Dickie pursues a comparison-matrix approach
acknowledged within the social setting. The pioneered by Bruce Vermazen, but construes
social setting of art is something Dickie now all the value-weights in strictly instrumental
speaks of as the “art circle,” an interactive, terms. In his view, the key determining factor
mutually reinforcing relation between artists, in assigning weight is the capacity of proper-
audiences, and all the ancillary participants in ties involved to produce an experience valuable
the process of artistic production and perfor- to the person experiencing it, either intrinsi-
mance. Moreover, the theory itself involves a cally or as a means to other valuable experi-
kind of circularity, in that the terms art and ences. He denies that there is any further basis
artworld and the understanding required of on which strong evaluations such as “X is
artists and audiences cannot be defined inde- good” or “X is bad” are justified. In this
pendently of each other. But Dickie argues approach, some qualities are acknowledged
that this circularity is not vicious, in that it to have greater weight than others (e.g.,
simply reflects the way in which the practices Monroe BEARDSLEY’S central aesthetic values of
of artistic production, presentation, and per- unity and complexity are taken to have par-
formance are inflected, or deeply interdepen- ticularly great weight). But the weights of these
dent, in our culture and unintelligible without and all other values may vary from instance to
reference to their mutual reliance. instance, individual to individual. It is in this
Dickie’s theory of art evaluation is presented sense that Dickie’s theory is true to its Humean
as disconnected from his institutional theory of roots in combining instrumentalism, rela-
art. This reflects his acceptance of Weitz’s tivism, and common sense while remaining
claim that maintaining the distinction between open to the prospect of the calculative com-
criteria of recognition and criteria of evaluation parative measurement of values.
is a central obligation of modern aesthetic Dickie’s allegiance to Hume is further
theory. Dickie’s approach is to identify the expressed in The Century of Taste (1996), an
seven most plausible accounts of artistic value historical survey and critical commentary on
(ranging from David Hume’s to J. O. the philosophical shift from objective to sub-
Urmson’s) and glean from them the accept- jective standards of taste in the eighteenth
able elements while discarding the flaws. The century. After examining the accounts of aes-
account that results from this distillation turns thetic judgment proposed by Francis
out to be a view closer to Hume’s than to any Hutcheson, Alexander Gerard, Archibald
of the more recent rivals. He distinguishes Alison, Immanuel Kant, and Hume, he argues
between positive and negative criteria of aes- that Hume’s theory of taste is far superior to
thetic value on the basis of detachment: a the others. Hutcheson’s and Kant’s theories
property of a work of art is positive if in iso- fail because they attend exclusively to a single
lation from other properties it is valuable, and property (uniformity in variety for Hutcheson,
otherwise negative. Among the properties that purposiveness without purpose for Kant) as
Dickie takes to be positive counters are unity, contributing to beauty. Gerard’s and Alison’s
complexity, and elegance. Negative counters theories fail in the opposite way, by deploying
are such qualities as garishness, disharmony, association in a way that makes any object
and incoherence. Identifying positive and you please beautiful, or sublime, and so on,
negative properties is only the first step, rendering these ascriptions meaningless. As
however, in reckoning comparative valuations Dickie sees it, the unique appeal of Hume’s
of aesthetic objects. In addition, it is necessary approach lies in its willingness to recognize a
to assign number values, or something very variety (but not an infinite variety) of factors
much like them, to combinations of properties as beauty-making characteristics, together with
643
DICKIE
the admission that a given object can have Aesthetic,” Theoria 39 (1973): 153–70.
some of these objects – even several of them – Art and the Aesthetic (Ithaca, N.Y., 1974).
without necessarily thereby becoming beauti- “Art and the Romantic Artist,” in Essays on
ful. Here, the position which Dickie applauds Aesthetics: Perspectives on the Work of
in Hume parallels a popular line of analysis in Monroe C. Beardsley, ed. J. Fisher
modern ethics. The qualities that make a (Philadelphia, 1983), pp. 99–108.
person a morally good man or woman are The Art Circle: A Theory of Art (New York,
various but not endlessly various; they are 1984).
commonsensically recognizable; and they may “The New Institutional Theory of Art,” in
be present in a given person without adding up Proceedings of the 8th International
in such a way as to entail moral approbation. Wittgenstein Symposium (Vienna, 1984),
Throughout his career, Dickie has elabo- pp. 57–64.
rated his own position by carefully examining “Beardsley, Sibley, and Critical Principles,”
positions previously advanced by prominent Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 41
philosophers and spelling out the basis of his (1987): 229–37.
differences from their views, as well as the Evaluating Art (Philadelphia, 1988).
implications of these differences. This tech- “A Tale of Two Artworlds,” in Danto and
nique might lead the casual reader to conclude His Critics, ed. Mark Rollins (London,
that Dickie is the philosophical opponent of 1993), pp. 73–8.
those from which he distances himself. But “The Intentional Fallacy: Defending
this is not the case. Dickie is always careful to Beardsley,” with Kent Wilson, Journal of
credit the thinkers he criticizes for their good Aesthetics and Art Criticism 53 (1995):
ideas and for advancing philosophical reflec- 233–50.
tion to the point where subsequent reflection The Century of Taste: The Philosophical
can lead to further progress. Several recent Odyssey of Taste in the Eighteenth
essays make it abundantly clear that this is Century (Oxford, 1996).
especially true of Dickie’s response to the work “Art and Value,” British Journal of
of Monroe Beardsley, many of whose views he Aesthetics 40 (2000): 228–41.
is at pains to reject, but to whom he also “The Institutional Theory of Art,” in
acknowledges a substantial philosophical Theories of Art Today, ed. Noël Carroll
indebtedness. (Madison, Wisc., 2000), pp. 93–108.
Art and Value (Oxford, 2001).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
“Is Psychology Relevant to Aesthetics?” Further Reading
Philosophical Review 71 (1962): 285–302. Bio 20thC Phils
“The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude,” Beardsley, Monroe. “Is Art Essentially
American Philosophical Quarterly 1 Institutional?” in The Aesthetic Point of
(1964): 56–65. View, ed. Michael Wreen and Donald
“Defining Art,” American Philosophical Callen (Ithaca, N.Y., 1982), pp. 125–43.
Quarterly 6 (1969): 252–8. Carroll, Noël. Beyond Aesthetics:
Aesthetics: An Introduction (Indianapolis, Philosophical Essays (Cambridge, UK,
1971). Revised as Introduction to 2001).
Aesthetics: An Analytic Approach Danto, Arthur. “The Artworld,” Journal of
(Oxford, 1997). Philosophy 61 (1964): 571–84.
“Psychical Distance: In a Fog at Sea,” British Davies, Stephen. Definitions of Art (Ithaca,
Journal of Aesthetics 13 (1973): 17–29. N.Y., 1991).
“Taste and Attitude: The Origin of the Yanal, Robert, ed. Institutions of Art:
644
DIETRICH
Reconsiderations of George Dickie’s he taught at Nyack Military Academy. In the

Philosophy (University Park, Penn., 1994). summer, he secured a position as private sec-
retary to Jonathan Thorne of New York, who
Ronald Moore was a multimillionaire.
In the fall of 1902 he had his finances in
order and was able to resume his graduate
education. He entered the Eastern
Theological Seminary of the Reformed
Church, located down the street from his
DIETRICH, John Hassler (1878–1957) college. With the exception of his professor of
church history, who exposed him to the
John H. Dietrich was born on 14 January German theories of historical criticism, he
1878, in a farmhouse near Chambersburg, did not find his seminary courses challenging.
in Franklin County, Pennsylvania. His After three years, he was the head of his class,
parents were German-Swiss whose ancestors and as such was invited to write a paper on
had immigrated to that isolated part of the “The Significance of the Death of Christ” to
state in 1710. They were members of the be read at the graduation exercises.
Reformed Church, which originated from the Apparently he stated rather clearly in his
efforts of the Swiss reformer, Ulrich Zwingli. paper that Jesus had died the death of a
Dietrich was named after the local minister, martyr, but he was not a god dying for the
Jacob Hassler, who later encouraged him to sins of the world, and the obligation of the
become a minister. At age fifteen, he entered Christian was to emulate Jesus’ moral and
Mercersburg Academy, which was four miles spiritual example. When the paper was
from his home. Because his family did not finished, he had his favorite professor read it.
have the money for room and board so he The professor acknowledged that it was an
could live on campus, he had to walk the excellent paper and he was in general agree-
round trip to the Academy each day. He also ment with the conclusions; but he requested
had to compensate his parents for his tuition that Dietrich tone the paper down because a
fees by performing odd jobs around the farm. number of older clergymen would be present
Even with these hardships, he completed the at the reading, and would be greatly disturbed
four-year course in three years and gradu- by it. The paper was revised, but Dietrich
ated valedictorian of his class in 1896. lost respect for his professor.
In the fall of 1896 Dietrich entered Franklin Immediately after graduation from Eastern
and Marshall College in Lancaster, Theological Seminary in 1905, Dietrich
Pennsylvania. During his freshman year, he became the minister of St. Mark’s Memorial
was exposed to Darwin’s theory of evolu- Church in Pittsburgh. For the first couple of
tion, which he accepted immediately, and he years the church experienced steady growth
read essays of Emerson, which he did not and things went smoothly. However, in time
immediately care for but enjoyed in later life. a number of factors coalesced and their
His favorite subjects were Greek and Latin, combined effect forced Dietrich to leave the
and he graduated in 1900 with a BA degree. ministry of the Reformed Church. Most were
Not having the resources to continue his edu- petty issues, but the more serious one was
cation, he taught one semester at Mercersburg concern in the Allegheny Classis about
Academy, unsuccessfully sought employment Dietrich’s unorthodox doctrine. In fact, he
in Philadelphia, sold encyclopedias in New had become a theistic Protestant liberal. In his
York, and worked in a fresh air camp north sermons, he often set orthodox doctrine off
of the city. During the school year 1901–02 and compared it with liberal thinking, so that
645
DIETRICH
his growing congregation could see clearly services. In a sense, he saw the church as a
the issues involved. The Allegheny Classis set kind of continuing educational center for
up a committee to determine whether adults, and his sermons became well-prepared
Dietrich should be tried for heresy. The con- hour-long lectures. Crowds came in 1914 to
clusions reached by the committee were that hear him lecture on the various nations
he did not believe in the infallibility of the involved in World War I, and in 1915 he came
Bible, nor in the virgin birth and the deity of out strongly for family planning in a sermon
Jesus, nor in the traditional understanding of entitled, “The Right to Be Well Born.” More
the atonement. In addition, he accepted the and more, he moved away from liberal theism
theory of evolution and even revised the to a kind of “naturalistic humanism.” He later
worship service so that the Apostles’ Creed said of this change in his thinking, “Then I
was deleted and secular readings were incor- came out into Unitarianism, but at first a fairly
porated. The recommendation of the com- conservative and theistic Unitarian. And finally
mittee was that he be indicted for heresy. A I reached a point where my mind was satisfied
trial date was set for 10 July 1911. Under the only by a wholehearted acceptance of
circumstances Dietrich refused to defend Naturalism and what has come to be known
himself and resigned from the church before as Humanism.”
an actual trial was held. As Dietrich developed his religious
In looking back on this period, Dietrich humanism, it became a “religion without
said, “I started out as an orthodox Christian God” and without a doctrine of personal
minister, teaching the doctrines which center immortality. He viewed the universe as an
about the Apostles’ Creed. I gradually went eternally contained system that was indiffer-
through the stage known as Modernism, or ent to the human enterprise. Humans created
liberal orthodoxy, during which period I most of their problems, and it was they who
resorted to reading new meanings into the must solve them. He therefore shifted the
old phrases, trying to make them fit the new emphasis of religion from theological specu-
knowledge.” lation to moral responsibility and moral
Dr Walter L. Mason, minister of the First living.
Unitarian Church in Pittsburgh, was favor- After a very successful ministry in Spokane,
ably impressed with Dietrich’s intelligence on 1 November 1918 Dietrich became the
and leadership qualities, and persuaded him minister of the First Unitarian Society of
to apply for ministerial fellowship in the Minneapolis, a church which Professor
American Unitarian Association. Zuebun of the University of Chicago would
In 1911 Dietrich became the minister of later describe as “an organization in whose
the First Unitarian Society of Spokane. In nest had been hatched most of the liberal and
1913–14 he gave lectures to his rapidly reform legislation of the state of Minnesota.”
growing congregation on comparative reli- As a Unitarian minister Dietrich became
gions. As a result, he began to question his one of the principal leaders of the humanist
liberal view of Jesus as the greatest spiritual movement within the American Unitarian
leader of all history. He came to believe that Association. He met Curtis W. REESE, the
the world owed a great debt to such figures as minister of the Des Moines Church, in 1917
Buddha, Confucius, the Hebrew prophets, when the Western Unitarian Conference was
and the ancient Greek philosophers. He also held there. They discovered that Reese had
embraced the “scientific method” as the most been preaching a type of religion that was
effective means for arriving at truth. He began similar to Dietrich’s humanism. However,
to refer to prayer as “aspiration” and once Reese called his point of view “the religion of
again employed secular readings in his democracy.” It was out of this chance
646
DIETRICH
meeting that the religious humanist loss, and on 30 January 1933 he married a
movement within Unitarianism was born. young widow, Margaret Winston, a writer
Later Reese became Secretary of the Western and a poet. Later in the same year, he was
Unitarian Conference, promoting humanism awarded a Doctor of Divinity degree by
from his administrative position, whereas Meadville Theological School.
Dietrich was a leader and preacher of In 1935 Dietrich announced to his congre-
humanism from his pulpit in Minneapolis. gation that the time had arrived for him to
By 1921 they had precipitated the resign from his pulpit and active ministry,
humanist–theist controversy in the American and this became effective in 1938. He thought
Unitarian Association. It took over a decade that too many ministers held on to their posi-
and a half for Unitarians to decide that they tions after they lost their effectiveness, and he
could tolerate humanists, not only in their did not want this to happen to him or his con-
church pews, but in their pulpits as well. gregation. In 1941, he and his wife moved to
In 1925 Minnesota, like many states, expe- Berkeley, California, where Dietrich died on
rienced repercussions from the Scopes Trial 22 July 1957.
about the teaching of evolution. Dr William Perhaps Dietrich’s greatest contribution to
B. Riley was minister of the First Baptist American religious thought was that he was
Church in Minneapolis and National the “father of religious humanism,” and from
President of the Christian Fundamentalist his thought have sprung directly or indirectly
Association. He attempted in the fall of 1925 a number of institutions, such as the
to have legislation passed which would American Humanist Association, Friends of
prevent the teaching of evolution in public Religious Humanism, and the Humanist
institutions in the state. Dietrich organized a Institute. Dietrich once said, “So far as I
committee of the more progressive ministers, know, I was the first minister in the Unitarian
and they defeated the legislation. Church, if not in America, not who has
As Dietrich’s congregation grew, in acknowledged the truth of Humanism, but
December 1925 the First Unitarian Society who has frankly and publicly accepted it,
moved to the Garrick Theater in order to making it the basis of my regular pulpit
accommodate the larger numbers. The fol- teaching as well as for the arrangement of
lowing year his services began to be broadcast our devotional service, and who has
over radio. Through the years his sermons attempted something like a reconstruction of
were published and mailed to those who sub- religion in harmony with it.”
scribed to them. In 1927 a collection of
sermons given to combat the movement to BIBLIOGRAPHY
ban the teaching of evolution in the public The Present Crisis in Religion
schools was published under the title The (Minneapolis, 1922).
Fathers of Evolution. From that same year, The Fathers of Evolution (Minneapolis,
The Humanist Pulpit came out every month, 1927).
containing a single address. At the end of Unitarianism and Humanism? Humanist
each church year these twelve to fifteen Sermons (Chicago, 1927).
sermons were published in book form under The Significance of the Unitarian
the same title, The Humanist Pulpit. Movement (Boston, 1927).
There was not only success but also tragedy The Humanist Pulpit, 7 vols (Minneapolis,
for Dietrich. His wife, Louise, who had borne 1927–37).
him a son while they were in Spokane and Humanism (Boston, 1934).
another in Minneapolis, died of cancer on The Humanist Pulpit, vol. 8 (Minneapolis,
22 February 1931. In time he overcame his 1936).
647
DIETRICH
“Humanism,” in Varieties of American Human Brain Work: A Renewed Critique of

Religion, ed. Charles S. Braden (Chicago, Pure and Practical Reason by a Manual
1936). Worker (1869), and articles about economics
“The Inevitability of Humanism,” and communism that attracted Marx’s atten-
University Review 3 (Summer 1937): tion. After returning to Germany, Dietzgen
243–4. was a delegate to The Hague International
Ten Sermons: What If the World Went Congress in 1872, and was later imprisoned
Humanist? ed. Mason Olds (Yellow for defending socialism in Cologne. Continued
Springs, Ohio, 1989). persecution sent him back to the US perma-
nently in 1884, and by 1886 he arrived in
Further Reading Chicago to take advantage of a more liberal
Amer Nat Bio, Who Was Who in Amer v6 atmosphere and exciting labor politics. He
Dakin, Arthur Hazard. Man the Measure: sided with the more anarchist elements of
An Essay in Humanism as Religion American socialism, publishing in the Arbeiter-
(Princeton, N.J., 1939). Zeitung and other short-lived newspapers. He
Lamont, Corliss. The Philosophy of wrote his final books and essays in Chicago,
Humanism, 5th edn (New York, 1967). where he died on 15 April 1888. He was
Olds, Mason. American Religious buried next to the martyrs of the 1886
Humanism (Minneapolis, 1996). Haymarket riot.
Winston, Charleton. This Circle of Earth: Dietzgen’s early writings followed the same
The Story of John H. Dietrich (New course as Marx’s empiricism and materialism,
York, 1942). and they agreed with Ludwig Feuerbach that
science should replace speculative metaphysics.
Wesley Mason Olds His democratic politics resulted in a similarly
democratic epistemology, by holding that no
privileged class held a monopoly on rational-
ity or thought. Everyone begins from their
own experiences of the world and by induction
forms general ideas for reasoning. Moral
DIETZGEN, Peter Joseph (1828–88) thought proceeds by the same logic, deter-
mining the value of ends in light of wider con-
Joseph Dietzgen was born on 9 December sequences. Akin to utilitarianism’s concern for
1828 in Blankenberg, Prussia. After high the common good, and approaching John
school in nearby Cologne, his continued DEWEY’s moral theory which rejects final ends,
reading of philosophy and economics, includ- Dietzgen postulated a genuine science of
ing Karl Marx, converted him to socialism. morals that could critique all social norms and
After the 1848 revolution he spent almost three laws in light of the larger needs of human
years traveling across the United States, and welfare.
returned to join his father’s tannery. Still Dietzgen’s late writings abandon material-
reading philosophy and seeking better financial ism for a kind of organic pantheism that
opportunities, he moved his growing family to would transcend the materialist-idealist
Montgomery, Alabama in 1859. Frightened dispute. Inspired by Spinoza, German mysti-
by mob violence on the eve of the Civil War, cism, and Hegel’s rationalism, Dietzgen
he again returned to Germany to run his refined several a priori arguments for an
father’s tannery. In 1864 he accepted a absolute god in dialectical process with the
position managing a tannery in St. Petersburg, world. These metaphysical speculations
Russia. There he published The Nature of gained no lasting readership. His writings on
648
DONAGAN
social theory and politics, many gathered (Oxford, 1984).

together in volumes that remained in print for Strüning, Horst-Dieter, ed. “Unser
decades, were treasured by many later Philosoph” Josef Dietzgen (Frankfurt am
American and European socialists. Main, 1980).
Thomas, Viktor. Das Erkenntnisproblem
BIBLIOGRAPHY (Stuttgart, 1921).
Das Wesen der menschlichen Kopfarbeit
(The Nature of Human Brain Work: A John R. Shook
Renewed Critique of Pure and Practical
Reason by a Manual Worker) (Hamburg,
Germany, 1869).
Streifzüge eines sozialisten in das gebiet der
erkenntnisstheorie (Excursions of a
Socialist into the Domains of DONAGAN, Alan Harry (1925–91)
Epistemology) (Zürich, 1887).
Alan Donagan was born on 10 February 1925
Other Relevant Works in Melbourne, Australia. He completed his MA
The Nature of Human Brain Work was degree at the University of Melbourne in 1951
translated and published with transla- and his B.Phil. at Exeter College, Oxford in
tions of The Positive Outcome of 1953, under the supervision of William Neale
Philosophy (1887) and Letters on Logic and Gilbert Ryle. Although Donagan taught
(1890–93) in a single volume titled The philosophy during the late 1940s and early
Positive Outcome of Philosophy, ed. 1950s at the University of Western Australia
Eugene Dietzgen and Joseph Dietzgen, Jr. and Canberra University College, most of his
(Chicago, Ill., 1906). academic life was spent in the United States,
Dietzgen, Eugene, and Joseph Dietzgen, Jr., teaching philosophy first at the University of
eds. Some of the Philosophical Essays on Minnesota from 1953 to 1961, then Indiana
Socialism and Science, Religion, Ethics, University from 1961 to 1966, the University of
Critique-of-reason and the World-at-large Illinois at Urbana from 1966 to 1970, the
(Chicago, Ill., 1906). University of Chicago from 1970 to 1984, and
Dietzgen, Eugene, ed. Joseph Dietzgens California University of Technology from 1984
Sämtliche Schriften, 3 vols (Weisbaden, until his death. Donagan died on 29 May 1991
Germany, 1911). in Pasadena, California.
Donagan’s early work was in the philoso-
Further Reading phy of history. His first book was on the later
Amer Nat Bio philosophy of R. G. Collingwood, and he was
Dietzgen, Eugene. “Joseph Dietzgen: A a prominent contributor to the debate that
Sketch of His Life,” in Some of the arose in the late 1950s and the 1960s con-
Philosophical Essays on Socialism and cerning the nature of historical explanation
Science, Religion, Ethics, Critique-of- and the role of the deductive–nomological
reason and the World-at-large (Chicago, model associated with Karl Popper and Carl
Ill., 1906). HEMPEL. Donagan also published extensively
Huck, Gerhard. Joseph Dietzgen, on topics in the history of philosophy, partic-
(1828–1888): ein Beitrag zur ularly rationalist thought and the philosophy
Ideengeschichte des Sozialismus im 19. of Baruch Spinoza. He also wrote about Ludwig
Jh. (Stuttgart, 1979). Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell, John Stuart Mill,
Rée, Jonathan. Proletarian Philosophers and others.
649
DONAGAN
It was in moral philosophy, however, that BIBLIOGRAPHY

Donagan’s main energies were concentrated The Later Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood
and in which he had his major influence. In (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1962; 2nd edn,
The Theory of Morality (1977), Donagan Chicago, 1985).
aimed to provide a rational underpinning for The Theory of Morality (Chicago, 1977; 2nd
the “common morality” that is to be found in edn 1979).
Judaeo-Christian moral thinking. This project Human Ends and Human Actions: An
was continued in a number of essays, a number Exploration in St. Thomas’s Treatment
of which focus on Kant’s moral philosophy. (Milwaukee, Wisc., 1985).
Donagan held that morality can be deduced Choice: The Essential Element in Human
from a single principle that is best expressed in Action (London and New York, 1987).
terms of the Kantian injunction to treat all Spinoza (Chicago, 1989).
rational creatures as ends rather than means The Philosophical Papers of Alan Donagan,
(an injunction that Donagan argued was not 2 vols, ed. Jeff E. Malpas (Chicago, 1994).
equivalent, Kant’s own claims to the contrary, Reflections on Philosophy and Religion, ed.
to that which follows from the requirement Anthony N. Perovich (Oxford, 1999).
that moral judgments be universalizable). On
this basis, Donagan denied the existence of Other Relevant Works
moral dilemmas, arguing for the rational con- Ed., Essays in the Philosophy of Art, by R. G.
sistency of all moral judgments, and arguing Collingwood (Bloomington, Ind., 1964).
that such judgments are objectively true in the Ed. with Barbara Donagan, Philosophy of
same fashion as are judgments relating to History (New York, 1965).
matters of fact.
Committed to a view of philosophy as a Further Reading
practical, rather than narrowly theoretical Bio 20thC Phils, Encyc Ethics, Pres Addr of
activity, Donagan had a strong interest in APA v9, Who Was Who in Amer v10
issues at the intersection of ethics and the “A Memorial Symposium in Honor of Alan
public sphere, making significant contribu- Donagan,” Ethics 104 (October 1993).
tions to topics in medical and legal ethics. In Essays on Donagan including memorials
addition, Donagan’s work in moral philosophy and a bibliography of his writings.
gave rise to a theory of action based around the Boyle, Joseph M., Jr. “Aquinas, Kant, and
idea of action as essentially an intervention or Donagan on Moral Principles,” New
abstention from intervention in the natural Scholasticism 58 (1984): 391–408.
course of events that is itself causally based in Curley, Edwin. “Donagan’s Spinoza,” Ethics
the agent’s capacity to choose – a theory that 104 (1993): 114–34.
owed much to Aristotle as well as to contem- Davenport, John. “Deontology and Alan
porary theorists such as Donald DAVIDSON and Donagan’s Problem of Exception-Rules,”
Roderick C HISHOLM . Donagan’s work in Analysis 55 (1995): 261–71.
moral philosophy and action, which drew Leach, James J. “The Logic of the Situation,”
heavily on traditional Christian thought, Philosophy of Science 35 (1968): 258–73.
extended naturally into theology and the phi- Levine, Susan. A Critical Analysis of Some of
losophy of religion. Donagan published a the Limitations on the Scope of Moral
number of essays in these areas, including the Prohibitions Suggested by Two Quasi-
philosophy of Aquinas, whose ideas provided absolutist Moral Theorists. PhD disserta-
an important additional source for Donagan’s tion, Brown University (Providence, R.I.,
thinking on morality and action. 1982).
Sellars, Wilfrid. “Reply to Alan Donagan on
650
DONNELLAN
‘My Views on “Determinism and x is bald.” Donnellan argues that in natural lan-
Freedom”’,” Philosophical Studies 27 guages, there are actually two different kinds of
(1975): 149–84. uses of definite descriptions. Russell’s analysis
Stout, Jeffrey. “The Philosophical Interest of picks out the “attributive” use of definite
the Hebrew-Christian Moral Tradition,” descriptions. When we use a definite descrip-
Thomist 47 (1983): 165–96. tion (“the F”) this way, we mean to make state-
Tollefsen, Christopher. “Donagan, Abortion, ments about the unique entity x that is F.
and Civil Rebellion,” Public Affairs However, Donnellan notes that we also some-
Quarterly 11 (1997): 303–12. times use definite descriptions “referentially” to
Westphal, Merold. “Donagan’s Critique of pick out a given entity and say something about
‘Sittlichkeit’,” Idealistic Studies 15 (1985): it. To see this, imagine you are at a party where
1–17. virtually everyone is drinking beer. However,
you and your friend are observing a man in a
Jeff Malpas corner of the room holding a martini glass.
Unbeknownst to you, the man’s glass is filled
with water. You turn to your friend and ask,
“Who is the man drinking a martini?” Suppose
further that your friend knows that the man in
question is Fred and that Fred’s glass is filled
DONNELLAN, Keith Sedgwick (1931– ) with water. According to the Russellian attribu-
tive analysis, such a question would amount to
Keith Donnellan was born on 25 June 1931 in asking for the identity of the one and only one
Washington, D.C. He began his studies at the man drinking a martini. But the presupposition
University of Maryland, then transferred to that there is a man drinking a martini is false,
Cornell University where he earned his BA in and so there should be no answer to the
1953, MA in 1954, and PhD in philosophy in question. But your friend can, and in normal
1961. His dissertation was on “C.I. Lewis and circumstances will, answer your question.
the Foundations of Necessary Truth.” Donnellan concludes that even though there is
Donnellan taught philosophy at Cornell from no unique thing that satisfies the definite
1958 to 1970, becoming full professor in 1967. description, there is nothing defective about
In 1970 he joined the philosophy department at the use of the phrase “the man drinking a
the University of California at Los Angeles, martini.” This referential use of the phrase
and taught there until becoming professor enables your friend to answer your question.
emeritus in 1994. Donnellan’s position on definite descriptions
Donnellan’s work is mainly in the philosophy provoked a long and lively debate about the
of language, with an emphasis on the connec- distinction between semantics and pragmatics,
tions between semantics and pragmatics. His where the theory of meaning ends and the
most influential work was his 1966 paper theory of how we use language in practical cir-
“Reference and Definite Descriptions.” He cumstances begins. Much of Donnellan’s later
challenges the canonical view, due to Bertrand work was devoted to this broad issue, along
Russell, about definite descriptions. Russell had with other issues concerning the foundations of
argued that the proper semantic treatment of a language.
definite description such as “the present king of
France” was quantificational. Thus, a sentence BIBLIOGRAPHY
like “the present king of France is bald” should “Necessity and Criteria,” Journal of
be analyzed as “There exists one and only one Philosophy 59 (1962): 647–57.
entity x that is the present king of France, and “Knowing What I Am Doing,” Journal of
651
DONNELLAN
Philosophy 60 (1963): 401–9. 511–24.

“Reference and Definite Descriptions,” Jeshion, Robin. “Donnellan on Neptune,”
Philosophical Review 75 (1966): 281–304. Philosophy and Phenomenological
“Putting Humpty Dumpty Together Again,” Research 63 (2001): 111–35.
Philosophical Review 77 (1968): 203–15. Kripke, Saul. “Speaker’s Reference and
“Proper Names and Identifying Semantic Reference,” in Midwest Studies
Descriptions,” Synthese 12 (1970): in Philosophy 2 (1977): 6–27.
335–58. Searle, John. “Referential and Attributive,”
“Speaking of Nothing,” Philosophical The Monist 62 (1979): 190–208.
Review 74 (1974): 3–31. Soames, Scott. “Donnellan’s
“The Contingent A Priori and Rigid Referential/Attributive Distinction,”
Designation,” Midwest Studies in Philosophical Studies 73 (1994): 149–68.
Philosophy 2 (1977): 12–27. Expanded
version in Contemporary Perspectives on Kent Johnson
the Philosophy of Language, ed. Peter
French et al. (Minneapolis, 1979), pp.
45–60.
“Speaker Reference, Descriptions and
Anaphora,” in Syntax and Semantics, vol.
9: Pragmatics, ed. Peter Cole (New York, DOUGHERTY, Jude Patrick (1930– )
1978), pp. 47–68.
“Intuitions and Presuppositions,” in Radical Jude P. Dougherty was born on 21 July 1930 in
Pragmatics, ed. Peter Cole (New York, Chicago, Illinois. He received his education from
1978), pp. 129–42. Catholic University of America, earning his BA
“Kripke and Putnam on Natural Kind in 1954, his MA in 1955, and his PhD in 1960.
Terms,” in Knowledge and Mind, ed. Carl While completing his dissertation on “Recent
Ginet and Sidney Shoemaker (Oxford, American Naturalism: A Critique” with profes-
1983), pp. 84–104. sor Charles A. Hart, he taught as an instructor
“Belief and the Identity of Reference,” of philosophy at Marquette University in 1957–8
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14 (1989): and at Bellarmine College in Kentucky starting
275–88. in 1958. In 1966 Dougherty was appointed
“Genuine Names and Knowledge by associate professor of philosophy at Catholic
Acquaintance,” Dialectica 44 (1990): University of America, and the next year he
99–112. became Dean of the School of Philosophy
“There Is a Word for That Kind of Thing: An there, the first layman to hold that office. He
Investigation of Two Thought was promoted to full professor of philosophy
Experiments,” in Philosophical in 1976, and continued to serve as Dean until
Perspectives 7 (1993): 155–71. his retirement in 1999. As Dean Emeritus, he
“Burge Thought Experiments,” in Reflections remains very active in scholarship and the
and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of profession.
Tyler Burge, ed. Martin Hahn and Bjørn Dougherty has long been one of the most
Ramberg (Cambridge, Mass., 2003). prominent American Catholic philosophers. He
has published several books and over one
Further Reading hundred articles in the areas of theology, meta-
Bio 20thC Phils physics, ethics, social and political philosophy,
Devitt, Michael. “Donnellan’s Distinction,” the philosophy of law, the philosophy of science,
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1981): and the history of American philosophy. He has
652
DOUGLAS
been editor of the Review of Metaphysics since Other Relevant Works

1971. He has been President of the Metaphysical “Lessons from the History and Science of
Society and the American Catholic Philosophical Technology,” Studies in Philosophy and the
Association. He has received many honors, History of Philosophy 4 (1967): 34–50.
including the title Knight of the Order of St. “Dewey and the Value of Religion,” New
Gregory and the Benemerenti Medal bestowed Scholasticism 51 (1977): 303–27.
by Pope John Paul II; the Cardinal Wright “Potentiality from Aristotle to Rescher and
Award from the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars; Back,” in The Philosophy of Nicholas
and the Aquinas Medal from the American Rescher, ed. Ernest Sosa (Dordrecht, 1979),
Catholic Philosophical Association. He is one of pp. 109–22.
the two North American fellows of the Pontifical Ed., The Good Life and Its Pursuit (New
Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas. York, 1984).
The essays collected in Dougherty’s Western “The Thomistic Element in the Social
Creed, Western Identity: Essays in Legal and Philosophy of John Paul II,” Proceedings of
Social Philosophy (2000) are organized into the American Catholic Philosophical
three parts. The first part contrasts the views of Association 60 (1986): 156–65.
Karl Marx and John DEWEY with those of “Christian Philosophy: Sociological Category
Jacques MARITAIN and John Courtney MURRAY or Oxymoron?” The Monist 75 (1993):
concerning the role of religion in society. The 283–90.
second part discusses the nature of the law and “The Failure of Positivism and the Enduring
the relation between civil law and natural law, Legacy of Comte,” in Recovering Nature:
on topics in responsibility and punishment. The Essays in Natural Philosophy, Ethics, and
third part contains essays on faith and reason, in Metaphysics in Honor of Ralph McInerny,
relation to such figures as Edith Stein, Maritain, ed. Thomas Hibbs and John O’Callaghan
and John Paul II. Jacques Maritain: An (Notre Dame, Ind., 1999), pp. 25–36.
Intellectual Profile (2003) is a thorough intro- “Moral Aspects of Immigration Policy,” in
duction, providing an understanding and evalu- Immigration und Integration, ed. Anton
ation of many important aspects of Maritain’s Rauscher (Berlin, 2003), pp. 41–8.
philosophy from metaphysics and epistemology
to social and political theory. Dougherty’s most Further Reading
recent book, The Logic of Religion (2003), “Dougherty, Jude Patrick,” in Directory of
surveys selected classical, medieval, and modern American Scholars, 10th edn (Detroit,
thinkers, including some Eastern representatives, 2002), vol. 4, p. 101.
on the nature of religion and its relationship
with reason. John R. Shook
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Recent American Naturalism: A Critique
(Washington, D.C., 1960).
Western Creed, Western Identity: Essays in
Legal and Social Philosophy (Washington, DOUGLAS, William Orville (1898–1980)
D.C., 2000).
Jacques Maritain: An Intellectual Profile William O. Douglas was born on 16 October
(Washington, D.C., 2003). 1898 in Maine, Minnesota. The family moved
The Logic of Religion (Washington, D.C., early in his life to Cleveland in eastern
2003). Washington, and his father, a missionary for
the Presbyterian Church, died when Douglas
653
DOUGLAS
was six. Struck by abject poverty and tempo- right to use contraceptives because penumbras
rary infantile paralysis from polio, his child- emanate from certain explicit constitutional
hood was a series of arduous challenges. provisions. During the tumultuous 1960s he
Douglas attended Whitman College, which wanted to ensure that those groups not afforded
was interrupted by uneventful military service, protection by other governmental agents could
and graduated with a BA in 1920. He taught turn to the courts to redress their grievances. In
school for two years and then attended Adderly v. Florida (1966), for instance, Douglas
Columbia University Law School. After grad- dissented against the majority’s decision uphold-
uating second in his class with his JD in 1925, ing a conviction of student protestors who
Douglas worked for two years at a prominent gathered at a local jail to express their discon-
Wall Street Law Firm, Cravath, de Gersdoff, tent with segregation policies and related arrests.
Swaine, and Wood. In 1927 he became a full- He declared that the Constitution, not a gov-
time law professor at Columbia University, ernment official, must be the ultimate arbiter of
and then from 1928 to 1939 he was Sterling the time and place of the gathering if the protest
Professor of Law at Yale University, specializ- was peaceful.
ing in the field of corporate law. After serving for thirty-six years and seven
Like many of his generation, Douglas sup- months on the Supreme Court, Douglas had to
ported President Franklin Roosevelt’s New retire in 1975 because of a stroke. He died on
Deal policies, which aroused his interest in 19 January 1980 in Washington, D.C. He not
working for the Securities and Exchange only had strong philosophical predilections as
Commission. In 1936 he became a member of a justice, but also was an author of numerous
the SEC and later served as Chairman. manuscripts, ranging on topics from his expe-
Rewarding his loyalty toward the New Deal, riences traveling in central Asia and Russia to
in 1939 President Roosevelt selected Douglas conservation and the environment to democ-
to replace Associate Justice Louis BRANDEIS on racy. He will be most remembered, however,
the Supreme Court of the United States. as a constitutional guardian of civil rights and
Drawing on his experiences as a law profes- liberties.
sor and on the SEC, Douglas’s early New Deal
decisions in business regulation struck a fair BIBLIOGRAPHY
balance between the company and consumer, as Stare Decisis (New York, 1949).
evidenced by Federal Power Commission v. Strange Lands and Friendly People (New
Hope Natural Gas Company (1944). Douglas, York, 1951).
however, is best known for his strong libertar- An Almanac of Liberty (New York, 1954).
ian views protecting the powerless and down- Russian Journey (New York, 1956).
trodden. Regarding free speech in Dennis v. The Rights of the People (Garden City,
United States (1951), for example, Douglas dis- N.Y., 1958).
sented against the majority that upheld the con- America Challenged (Princeton, N.J.,
viction of several Communist Party members’ 1960).
actions under the Smith Act (1940). He, in A Living Bill of Rights (Garden City, N.Y.,
contrast, believed that free speech should be 1961).
tested in a free market and mused that the most Democracy’s Manifesto (New York, 1962).
valued ideas would flourish. Although not The Anatomy of Liberty: The Rights of
expressly mentioned in the Constitution, he also Man without Force (New York, 1963).
was a strong advocate for the right to privacy. Mr. Lincoln & the Negroes: The Long
In Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), Douglas, Road to Equality (New York, 1963).
speaking on behalf of the Court, held that the A Wilderness Bill of Rights (Boston, 1965).
right to privacy encompassed a married couple’s Points of Rebellion (New York, 1970).
654
DOUGLASS
International Dissent: Six Steps to World DOUGLASS, Frederick (1818–95)

Peace (New York, 1971).
Go East, Young Man: The Early Years, the Frederick Douglass was born Frederick
Autobiography of William O. Douglas Augustus Washington Bailey in February 1818
(New York, 1972). near Easton, Maryland. Douglass escaped from
The Three-hundred Year War: A Chronicle slavery in 1838, settled in New Bedford,
of Ecological Disaster (New York, 1972). Massachusetts, and changed his surname to
The Court Years, 1939–1975: The Douglass. William Lloyd GARRISON, the out-
Autobiography of William O. Douglas spoken leader of the Anti-Slavery Society, hired
(New York, 1980). him in August 1841 as a lecturer to speak in
northern states and sell subscriptions to
Other Relevant Works Garrison’s newspaper The Liberator. Douglass
Douglas’s papers are in the Library of published Narrative of the Life of Frederick
Congress. Douglass, an American Slave in 1845. To avoid
The Douglas Opinions, ed. Vern being seized as a fugitive, he agreed to purchase
Countryman (New York, 1977). his freedom from slavery in 1846. He began
The Douglas Letters: Selections from the publication of his own newspaper, the North
Private Letters of Justice William O. Star, in 1847. He addressed the first women’s
Douglas, ed. Melvin Urofsky and Philip rights convention in 1848, supporting women’s
E. Urofsky (Bethesda, Md., 1987). right to vote as an essential part of their
movement.
Further Reading Before 1850 Douglas was a pacifist. The
Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Fugitive Slave law of 1850 changed him.
Comp Amer Thought, Dict Amer Bio, Douglass, with a number of other Boston abo-
Encyc Amer Bio, Who Was Who in Amer litionists, provided money for John Brown’s
v7 raid on Harper’s Ferry in 1859. He maintained
Ball, Howard, and Phillip J. Cooper. Of that the way to prevent the taking of fugitives
Power and Right: Hugo Black, William is to make a few dead fugitive catchers. As an
O. Douglas, and America’s unofficial advisor to President Abraham
Constitutional Revolution (Oxford, Lincoln during the US Civil War, Douglass per-
1992). suaded Lincoln to make emancipation a major
Epstein, Leon D. “Justice Douglas and Civil war goal and to allow black enlistment in the
Liberties,” Wisconsin Law Review Union Army. Douglass believed that military
(January 1951): 125–57. service would allow black men to demonstrate
Murphy, Bruce A. Wild Bill: The Legend their patriotism and manhood, winning
and Life of William O. Douglas (New equality as well as ending slavery. After the
York, 2003). Civil War, Douglass was appointed to admin-
Wasby, Steven L., ed. “He Shall Not Pass istrative posts, including US Marshal for the
This Way Again:” The Legacy of Justice District of Columbia (1877–81) and US
William O. Douglas (Pittsburgh, 1990). Minister to Haiti (1889–91). Douglass died on
Contains a bibliography of Douglas’s 20 February 1895 in Washington, D.C.
writings. Many consider Frederick Douglass the most
Simon, James. Independent Journey: The influential African American of the nineteenth
Life of William O. Douglas (New York, century. Douglass understood that the struggle
1980). for emancipation and equality demanded
forceful, persistent, and unyielding agitation.
John R. Hermann And he recognized that the African American
655
DOUGLASS
must play a conspicuous role in that struggle. The Frederick Douglass Papers: Speeches,
Douglass was an ardent advocate of American Debates, and Interviews, 5 vols, ed. John
individualism, as seen in his often-repeated W. Blassingame (New Haven, Conn.,
lecture “Self-Made Men.” He considered the 1979–92).
very idea of prejudice utterly revolting. He Autobiographies (New York, 1994).
deplored it in all of its manifestations, whether The Oxford Frederick Douglass Reader, ed.
based on religion, class, color, race, or sex, William L. Andrews (Oxford, 1996).
considering it a “moral disorder” and “conse-
quence of a diseased imagination.” Prejudice Further Reading
was irrational, evil, unnatural, and unjust. Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
Douglass made a career of agitating the Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer
American conscience. He devoted most of his Thought, Dict Amer Bio, Encyc Amer Bio,
time to the cause of equal rights for African Nat Cycl Amer Bio v2
Americans. Davis, Reginald F. A Critical Analysis of
Douglass also spoke and wrote on behalf of Selected Theories of the Philosophical and
a variety of reform causes: women’s rights, tem- Theological Development of Frederick
perance, peace, land reform, free public educa- Douglass. PhD dissertation, Florida State
tion, and the abolition of capital punishment. University (Tallahassee, Fla., 1997).
Douglass’s importance as a thinker derives from Duberman, Martin. The Antislavery
his insight into the complex interrelationship Vanguard: New Essays on the Abolitionist
between the African American and the European (Princeton, N.J., 1965).
American. For example he battled against white McFeely, William S. Frederick Douglass
southern attempts to deport blacks to Africa. (New York, 1991).
His central intellectual struggle was to resolve the Quarles, Benjamin. Frederick Douglass
dynamic tension between his identities as a black (Washington, D.C., 1948).
man and as an American. Douglass’s positions
were the foundation of “Negro” middle-class Donald L. Brown
identity and conceptions of community respon-
sibility, symbolized by the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People and the
Urban League.
BIBLIOGRAPHY DRAKE, Durant (1878–1933)

Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass,
an American Slave (New York, 1845; New Durant Drake was born on 18 December 1878
Haven, Conn., 1999). in Hartford, Connecticut. Drake was educated
My Bondage and My Freedom (New York, at Harvard, where he received his BA degree in
1855; New Haven, Conn., 2003). 1900 and his MA degree in 1902. At Harvard,
Life and Times of Frederick Douglass Drake was influenced by William JAMES ,
(Hartford, Conn., 1881). George SANTAYANA, Josiah ROYCE, George
PALMER, and Dickinson MILLER, while his reli-
Other Relevant Works gious bent also led him to the Divinity School.
Douglass’s papers are at the Library of He pursued his doctoral studies at Columbia
Congress. University, where he received his PhD in phi-
Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 5 losophy in 1911, writing his dissertation on
vols, ed. Phillip S. Foner (New York, “The Problem of Things in Themselves.” At
1950–75). Columbia he was introduced to John DEWEY,
656
DRAKE
F. J. E. WOODBRIDGE, and William MONTAGUE, adopted the term “essence” to designate the
whose philosophical theories, although alien datum, also called the “describable somewhat.”
to his earlier thinking, “eventually penetrated” The unity of purpose which underlay Drake’s
his consciousness, which was especially epistemological and metaphysical enterprise
impressed also by the writings of Charles A. was his meliorism. He sought to articulate and
STRONG. In 1911–12 Drake taught philosophy diffuse a method of intelligence and experience
at the University of Illinois. In 1912 he was among humans so that they could escape
appointed professor of philosophy and religion unnecessary unhappiness and instead attain,
at Wesleyan University in Connecticut; the by the art of living, the rich and adventurous
Bible was among the subjects he taught. In happiness of which they are capable. His was
1915 he was appointed professor of philosophy a naturalistic, utilitarian morality. Drake had
at Vassar College, a position he held until his great sympathy for the definition of value as
death on 15 November 1933 in Poughkeepsie, any object of interest or desire, with the proviso
New York. that it is necessary to learn what to desire.
In epistemology and metaphysics Drake was Experience or experiment confirms some
a critical realist, and in ethics and philosophy objects worthy, others worthier, and still others
of religion he was a meliorist. Critical realism worthless. Intelligence joins experiment as the
followed new realism as the second major method for constructing the art of living.
movement in American realism in the twentieth Religion, too, falls within the art of living.
century, and Drake played a major role. Rejecting the supernatural and skeptical of tra-
Although in his Problems of Things in ditional religions, Drake nonetheless embraced
Themselves (1911) he took the position of epis- a humanistic religion, believing in God as a
temological dualism, separating the cognitive transcendent essence, the Ideal Good, and as an
state in mind from the object for knowledge immanent power in each of us to make for
external to the mind, he was persuaded by the righteousness.
new realists that what we are aware of or
perceive when our perception is accurate are the BIBLIOGRAPHY
real things themselves. Problems of Things in Themselves (Boston,
In 1916 Drake conceived the idea of a coop- 1911).
erative volume to present a more accurate real- Problems of Conduct: An Introductory
istic epistemology than that advanced by the Survey of Ethics (Boston, 1914).
new realism. Six other American philosophers Problems of Religion: An Introductory
joined him – Santayana, Strong, A. O. LOVEJOY, Survey (Boston, 1916).
J. B. PRATT, A. K. ROGERS, and R. W. SELLARS. Shall We Stand by the Church? A
The volume Essays in Critical Realism Dispassionate Inquiry (Boston, 1920).
appeared in 1920, with Drake’s contribution as “The Approach to Critical Realism,” in
the lead essay. Essays in Critical Realism: A Co-operative
Because, unlike the new realist, the critical Study of the Problem of Knowledge
realist acknowledges that some cognitive states (London, 1920), pp. 3–34.
are susceptible to error, he maintains that the America Faces the Future (New York, 1922).
cognitive situation is a triadic relation between Mind and Its Place in Nature (New York,
a knower, an independent object of knowl- 1925).
edge, and the datum of experience, that of New Morality (New York, 1928).
which we are aware. While the datum may be Invitation to Philosophy (Boston, 1933).
identical with the independent object of knowl-
edge, there is no guarantee that it is. Drake, Other Relevant Works
along with Santayana, Strong, and Rogers, “The Philosophy of a Meliorist,” in
657
DRAKE
Contemporary American Philosophy: 1976 until retiring in 1985, Dray was profes-
Personal Statements, ed. G. P. Adams and sor of philosophy at the University of Ottawa.
W. P. Montague (New York, 1930), vol. 1, Dray’s doctoral thesis provided the basic
pp. 277–97. themes for much of the rest of his published
work. Carl HEMPEL and Karl Popper had
Further Reading insisted that historical explanations, like sci-
Bio 20thC Phils, Who Was Who in Amer v1 entific explanations elsewhere, proceed by
Blanshard, Brand, The Nature of Thought showing that one could deduce the explanan-
(New York, 1939), vol. 1, pp. 416–44. dum from a description of circumstances and
Harlow, Victor E. Bibliography and Genetic a universal law of nature. Dray argued that
Study of American Realism (Oklahoma many historical explanations do not need laws,
City, Okla., 1931). some are based on showing how actions are
Klausner, Neal W. “Three Decades of the rational, and others explain by showing
Epistemological Dialectic,” Philosophy of “what” happened, or “why.” His concern, he
Science 14 (1947): 20–43. states, is to examine the logic of historical
Laird, John, A Study of Realism (Cambridge, explanation, not engage in epistemology or
UK, 1920). philosophy of science. R. G. Collingwood’s
Sellars, Roy Wood. Reflections on American theories about history as reenactment were
Philosophy from Within (Notre Dame, also in the background, but worked out in
Ind., 1969). ways that did not appeal to inner working of
Schneider, Herbert W. Sources of thought that made historical writing seem arbi-
Contemporary Philosophical Realism in trary or subjective. Dray was arguing for a
America (Indianapolis, 1964). middle ground between positivistic theories
and those accused of philosophical idealism.
Andrew J. Reck In general, Dray does not begin from general
normative principles about what history
should be like, but rather from an examination
of actual writings of historians to find the con-
ceptual structures of their explanations and of
their accounts of what happened. Dray’s
DRAY, William Herbert (1921– ) studies of particular examples yield a variety of
explanatory patterns. Some use causal
William H. Dray was born on 23 June 1921 in concepts, some collect events together to show
Montréal, Canada. He received his BA from “what” happened, some show how an event
the University of Toronto in 1949. He then was “possible,” and so on. In his later writings,
attended the University of Oxford where he Dray moves on from explanation to see what
received another BA in philosophy, politics, can be said about the role of values in history,
and economics in 1951, an MA in 1955 and a about objectivity and subjectivity, human
D.Phil. in philosophy in 1956. At Oxford he freedom and determinism. In each case his
studied with W. H. Walsh, whose views were interest is in the particular way in which these
a continuing influence on his work. In 1956 matters affect the specific piece of historical
Dray became an assistant professor of philos- writing. For that reason, Dray’s detailed
ophy at the University of Toronto, and was analysis of ways of explaining, influenced by
promoted up to full professor. In 1968 he H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honoré’s Causation
became chair of the philosophy department at and the Law, resists simple summary. Dray
Trent University in Ontario, serving until thinks that there are legitimate, nondeductive
1973, and teaching at Trent until 1976. From forms of causal explanation, that history is
658
DREBEN
not an autonomous discipline with its own DREBEN, Burton Spencer (1927–99)
independent logic, and that narrative struc-
ture and identification of matters as valuable Burton Dreben was born on 26 September
do not impugn a reasonable objectivity. His 1927 in Boston, Massachusetts. He graduated
influence can be felt in the way in which phi- from Boston Latin School in 1945. He attended
losophy of history is disinclined to tackle huge Harvard, receiving his BA in 1949 and MA in
epistemological issues. philosophy in 1955. Dreben was a professor of
philosophy at the University of Chicago in
BIBLIOGRAPHY 1955–6, at Harvard University from 1956 to
Laws and Explanation in History (London, 1990, and at Boston University from 1991 until
1957). his death on 11 July 1999 in Boston,
Philosophy of History (Englewood Cliffs, Massachusetts. He was a member of Harvard’s
N.J., 1964; 2nd edn 1993). Society of Fellows from 1952 to 1955, a
Perspectives on History (London, 1980). Fulbright Fellow at Magdalen College, Oxford
On History and Philosophers of History in 1950–51, a Guggenheim Fellow in 1957–8,
(Leiden, 1989). and in 1963 was elected to membership in the
History as Re-enactment: R. G. American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He
Collingwood’s Idea of History (Oxford, was Harvard’s Dean of the Graduate School of
1995). Arts and Sciences from 1973 to 1976. Dreben
was an editor of The Journal of Symbolic Logic
Other Relevant Works from 1967 to 1976.
Ed., Philosophical Analysis and History Dreben’s main philosophical interests were
(New York, 1966). mathematical logic, the history of analytic phi-
Ed. with L. Pompa, Substance and Form in losophy, and especially the philosophy of W. V.
History: A Collection of Essays in QUINE. Quine used Dreben unceasingly as a
Philosophy of History (Edinburgh, sounding board for his philosophical ideas. In
1981). grateful acknowledgement of this, Quine ded-
Ed. with W. J. van der Dussen, The icated his 1990 book, Pursuit of Truth, as
Principles of History, and Other Writings follows: “TO BURT DREBEN, firm friend and
in Philosophy of History, by R. G. constructive critic down the decades.”
Collingwood (Oxford, 1999). Though Dreben was an expert on the history
of analytic philosophy and on Quine’s philos-
Further Reading ophy, he published very little. Much of what he
Canad Encyc knew regarding analytic philosophy and Quine
Van der Dussen, W. J., and Lionel is lost with his passing. Luckily, all is not lost,
Rubinoff, eds. Objectivity, Method, and for he produced several excellent and faithful
Point of View: Essays in the Philosophy students, including Richard Creath, Michael
of History (Leiden, 1991). Volume in Friedman, Warren Goldfarb, W. D. Hart, Peter
honor of Dray, containing a bibliography Hylton, Daniel Isaacson, Miriam Solomon,
of his writings. Alan Richardson, and Thomas Ricketts. It is
probably close to the mark to say that Dreben’s
William R. Abbott students represent his greatest philosophical
legacy.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
“On the Completeness of Quantification
Theory,” Proceedings of the National
659
DREBEN
Academy of Science of the United States of Further Reading

America 38 (1952): 1047–52. Putnam, Hilary. “Reply to Burton Dreben,”
“False Lemmas in Herbrand,” with S. O. Philosophical Topics 20 (1992): 393–9.
Aanderaa and P. B. Andrews, Bulletin of Rawls, John. “Afterward: A Reminiscence,”
the American Mathematical Society 69 in Future Pasts: The Analytic Tradition in
(1962): 699–706. Twentieth-century Philosophy, ed. Juliet
“The Craig Interpolation Lemma,” with Floyd (Oxford, 2001), pp. 417–30.
Hilary Putnam, Notre Dame Journal of
Formal Logic 8 (1967): 229–33. Roger F. Gibson
“Herbrand-Style Consistency Proofs,” with J.
S. Denton, Jr., in Intuitionism and Proof
Theory, ed. A. Kino, J. Myhill, and R. E.
Vesley (Amsterdam, 1970), pp. 419–33.
The Decision Problem: Solvable Classes of
Quantificational Formulas, with Warren DRETSKE, Frederick Irwin (1932– )
D. Goldfarb (Reading, Mass., 1979).
“Quine,” in Perspectives on Quine, ed. Fred Dretske was born on 9 December 1932 in
Robert Barrett and Roger Gibson (Oxford, Waukegan, Illinois. In 1954 he received a BA
1990), pp. 81–95. in electrical engineering from Purdue
“Tautology: How Not to Use a Word,” with University. He then received his MA in 1958
Juliet Floyd, Synthese 87 (1991): 23–49. and PhD in philosophy in 1960 from the
“Putnam, Quine – and the Facts,” University of Minnesota, writing a dissertation
Philosophical Topics 20 (1992): 293–315. on the philosophy of time under May
“In Mediis Rebus,” Inquiry 37 (1994): BRODBECK. Dretske’s first academic appoint-
441–7. ment was teaching philosophy at the University
“Cohen’s Carnap, or Subjectivity Is in the of Wisconsin beginning in 1960, where he rose
Eye of the Beholder,” in Science, Politics to the rank of full professor. At Wisconsin he
and Social Practice: Essays on Marxism was particularly close to fellow philosophers
and Science, Philosophy of Culture and the Berent Enç, Elliott Sober, and Denis Stampe,
Social Sciences in Honor of Robert S. and they made Wisconsin a center for philo-
Cohen, ed. K. Gavroglu, J. Stachel, and M. sophical naturalism, theories of biological
W. Wartofsky (Dordrecht, 1995), pp. function, and causal/functional theories of the
27–42. mind. Dretske was President of the American
“Quine and Wittgenstein: The Odd Couple,” Philosophical Association Western Division in
in Wittgenstein and Quine, ed. R. 1984–5. In 1988 he went to Stanford
Arrington and H. Glock (London and New University, where he was the Bella and Eloise
York, 1996), pp. 39–61. Mabury Knapp Professor of Philosophy and
“Hilbert and Set Theory,” with A. Kanamori, also served for a time as chair of the depart-
Synthese 110 (1997): 77–125. ment. He became professor emeritus in 1998,
“On Rawls and Political Liberalism,” in The and in 1999 he became a senior research
Cambridge Companion to Rawls, ed. scholar at Duke University.
Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, UK, 2003), Dretske’s first book, Seeing and Knowing
pp. 316–46. (1969), deals with the question of what is
“Quine on Quine,” in The Cambridge required to know that something is the case on
Companion to Quine, ed. Roger Gibson the basis of what is seen. He rejected the widely
(Cambridge, UK, 2004), pp. 287–93. held view of the time that knowledge is some
variant on the theme of justified true belief.
660
DRETSKE
Knowledge requires true belief, but inner justi- but only some subset of these. An important
fications are not typically used in gaining consequence of this approach is that it allows
knowledge from the senses, nor are they nec- one to know that P, and that P entails Q,
essary for gaining such knowledge, according to without being able to know that Q – for to
Dretske. He was in the forefront of what came know that Q might require being able to rule
to be known as the “naturalized epistemol- out relevant alternatives that are not relevant to
ogy” movement. The theory of knowledge pre- knowing P. For instance, I can see that your
sented in Seeing and Knowing held that for a shirt has a tear, and know that, if your shirt has
subject S to be able to see that an object b has a tear, then existence is not merely a dream,
property P is (i) for b to be P, (ii) for S to see b, without seeing that existence is not merely a
(iii) for the conditions under which S sees b to dream, since seeing that requires existence to
be such that b would not look the way it now look some way that it would not, under the cir-
looks to S unless it were P, and (iv) for S, believ- cumstances, if it were merely dreamt, and of
ing that conditions are as described in (iii), to course there is no such appearance for exis-
take b to be P (1969, pp. 78–93). For example, tence to have.
for a person to see that your shirt is torn – to In addition to its interest as a contribution to
know, by seeing, that it is torn – is for that the theory of knowledge, Seeing and Knowing
person to see your shirt under conditions such is also interesting for the way in which it pre-
that it would not look the way it does if your figures the themes which dominate Dretske’s
shirt were not torn, and for that person to other philosophical projects. In its disinterest in
believe that your shirt is torn on that basis. epistemic justification and the norms sur-
Dretske’s principal innovation occurs in con- rounding belief, it prefigures Dretske’s natu-
dition (iii), which requires, not that it be impos- ralism: not so much a specific doctrine as a
sible for your shirt to look torn when it is not, commitment to providing philosophical
but that it be impossible in the given circum- theories which wear on their sleeves their con-
stances. Dretske has in mind something like tinuity with the natural sciences. Seeing and
the following idea: if you are standing in such Knowing also prefigures Dretske’s work in the
odd shadows that one such shadow might well philosophy of mind. Both consciousness and
have looked just like a tear to me, then even belief would go on to receive book-length treat-
though I see a tear in your shirt I cannot come ments from Dretske (discussed below).
to have knowledge that you have a tear in your Likewise, the task of distinguishing conscious-
shirt. At most, I am lucky to be right. But if you ness and belief, and arguing for their distinct-
are not standing in odd shadows (and are not ness, would continue to occupy Dretske into
the owner of shirts painted with imitation tears, the 1990s. Perhaps most importantly, Dretske’s
and so on), then I can see that your shirt is condition (iii) on knowledge is the first appear-
torn, so long as I notice how your shirt looks ance in his writings of any gesture at natural
and form appropriate beliefs as a result. The information, though as yet only in obscure
problem for the philosopher who would hold form.
such a view is to specify which unrealized pos- Dretske’s next book, Knowledge and the
sibilities are relevant for determining whether or Flow of Information (1981), returns to the
not your shirt could have looked that way to topic of knowledge gained via perception, but
me under those circumstances without being does so with new ambitions. Dretske had
torn. Now known as the problem of specifying become convinced that the concept of natural
the relevant alternatives, an active literature in information was central to his understanding of
epistemology has grown up around this idea knowledge, but that, once understood, it also
that to know something requires, not that one opened the way to a naturalistic theory of
be able to rule out all possible sources of error, belief. Information, understood in Dretske’s
661
DRETSKE
sense, is something that exists as an objective Dretske’s work on belief begins in the last
and mind-independent feature of the natural third of Knowledge and the Flow of Information,
world. It is even something that can be quanti- but takes on its mature form in the book that
fied, following Claude Shannon and Warren followed, Explaining Behavior (1988), where it
Weaver. Dretske offers the following theory of meets up with theories of desire, action, and
information: A signal r carries the information reason-based explanation. Against such philoso-
that s is F = The conditional probability of s’s phers as Donald DAVIDSON, Dretske holds that
being F, given r (and k), is 1 (but, given k alone, actions are the causing of movements by mental
less than 1) (1981, p. 65). Thus, for the fact that states, rather than the movements themselves.
a given maple leaf is red (r) to carry the infor- Action is thus a partly mental process itself, not
mation that fall (s) has arrived (is F) is for the a mere product of a mental process. For the
probability that fall has arrived, given that the meaning (the content) of a belief to explain an
maple leaf is red (and given my background action, on this view, is for the content of the
knowledge of the world, k), to be one (but less belief to explain why it is that the mental state is
than one given just my background knowl- part of a process that leads to the movement it
edge). A difficulty with Dretske’s characteriza- does. Here Dretske’s interest in information
tion of information is that, given his naturalis- makes its appearance in the theory: a belief that
tic ambitions for the notion of information, no P is a brain state that has been recruited (through
appeal to background knowledge should operant conditioning) to be part of movement-
appear in the theory of information, since infor- causing processes because of the fact that it did,
mation is meant to be prior to knowers. But this when recruited, carry the information that P.
difficulty is fairly readily resolved by the Being recruited because of carrying information
excision of k from the theory, and later treat- is sufficient for having the function of carrying
ments of information (or “indication” or that information, on Dretske’s view, and having
“natural meaning”) by Dretske do not rely on the function of carrying information is sufficient
background knowledge. for representation. Beliefs are thus mental repre-
From his theory of information, Dretske sentations that contribute to movement produc-
develops a theory of knowledge and a theory tion because of their contents (saying P is why the
of belief. His theory of knowledge is funda- brain state is recruited to cause movement), and
mentally quite similar to that of Seeing and so form components of the process known as
Knowing, but now instead of appealing to the acting for a reason.
specific fact that an object would not look the An important feature of Dretske’s account of
way it does were it not F, Dretske has the belief is that, although brain states are recruited
resources to appeal to the idea that the visual to control action because they carry informa-
state of the observer carries the information tion, there is no guarantee that they will continue
that the object is F. Conscious “looks” are to do so. Yet, once they have been recruited for
thus put aside in favor of information- carrying information, they have the function of
bearing, a less mysterious relation, but one carrying information, and continue to have that
which plays the same role in the theory of function even if they no longer carry information.
knowledge. The reformulated theory holds This is how misrepresentation enters the world,
that knowledge is belief supported by infor- on Dretske’s view. A state that carries informa-
mation that certifies the truth of the belief. As tion cannot be wrong so long as it carries infor-
before, such certification is not guaranteeing mation: having information that P guarantees
absolutely as such, but in the sense of guar- (within relevant possibilities) that P. But Dretske
anteeing absolutely among relevant alterna- recognizes that an important fact about genuine
tives, with context determining which alter- representations is that they are capable of mis-
natives are relevant. representation, and so he stresses that although
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DRETSKE
brain states can carry information, they may of thinking. Experienced redness is redness, a
cease to, and then brain states with the function purely physical property of certain objects, which
of carrying specific information will fail to is experienced. Roughly, to experience some-
perform their functions, and so misrepresent. thing as a precise shade of red is to have an expe-
Dretske next turned to the nature of con- rience that “says” the object is that very shade of
sciousness, defending a representational theory in red. “Saying,” in this case, is simply a matter of
Naturalizing the Mind (1995). Between the rep- the experience being a mental representation,
resentational theory of belief, desire, and action the content of which is that the object is the
in Explaining Behavior and the representational precise shade of red in question. A little more is
theory of consciousness found in Naturalizing the required, of course: not every mental represen-
Mind, Dretske aims to give full support to what tation in one’s head is an experience. But this little
he calls the “Representational Thesis.” This is the more is not the “hard” part of consciousness.
claim that (1) all mental facts are representa- The mental representations that are our experi-
tional facts, and (2) all representational facts are ences are those whose functions come from
facts about informational functions (1995, p. natural selection and whose connections to the
xiii). In seeking to extend representationalism to rest of the brain allow their information to be
encompass consciousness, Dretske does not give taken up into belief. When these conditions are
up on his view, first expressed in Seeing and met, then the contents of these mental repre-
Knowing, that there is a fundamental difference sentations are the contents of consciousness.
between seeing something and seeing that some- What it is like to experience a fine French
thing is the case, i.e., between seeing and believ- chocolate is to represent that one’s mouth
ing. He nonetheless attempts to describe a deep contains a sweet (in a specific way, to a specific
underlying unity between consciousness and degree), bitter (likewise specific) substance,
belief in representational terms. In Explaining giving off specific odors and presenting a
Behavior, Dretske holds that when a brain state specific sticky smooth surface to the tongue
acquires, through learning, the function of and palate, and so on.
carrying information, then it becomes a mental Dretske is also a leading proponent, along
representation suited to being a belief. In with David Armstrong and Michael Tooley, of
Naturalizing the Mind he extends his the view that laws of nature are relations among
taxonomy of representational types and holds universals, and he has contributed to discussions
that when a brain state acquires, through of explanation and events. He has recently
natural selection, the function of carrying returned to active work in epistemology, working
information, then it is also a mental represen- on a puzzle about knowledge of one’s own con-
tation, but one suited (with certain provisos) to sciousness. If perceptual knowledge is belief that
being a state of consciousness. is sustained by information-bearing perceptual
The very idea that representations might states, then do we have perceptual knowledge of
explain consciousness may seem obscure. It is our own states of consciousness? Since we do not
true that our senses tell us about the world, and see or hear our mental representations (they are
so might be said to represent it to us, but it has what we see and hear with, on Dretske’s view),
seemed obvious to many that the way in which it seems that we have no perceptual knowledge
they represent the world, via qualities such as of our own consciousness. But surely we do not
experienced redness, saltiness, or roughness, go only know that we are conscious by careful rea-
beyond what they represent. Many would say soning and argument! This puzzle’s resolution
that the redness that appears in consciousness is would bring Dretske full circle, completing the
just the mind’s way of presenting a physical naturalistic program for knowledge with which
property that is not red in the same sense. In he launched his career.
Naturalizing the Mind, Dretske rejects this sort
663
DRETSKE
BIBLIOGRAPHY “Norms, History and the Mental,”

Seeing and Knowing (Chicago and London, Philosophy suppl. 49 (2001): 87–104.
1969). “Externalism and Self-knowledge,” in New
Knowledge and the Flow of Information Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-
(Cambridge, Mass., 1981; Stanford, Cal., knowledge, ed. Susana Nuccetelli
1999). (Cambridge, Mass., 2003), pp. 131–42.
Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of “Skepticism: What Perception Teaches,” in
Causes (Cambridge, Mass., 1988). The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, ed.
Naturalizing the Mind (Cambridge, Mass., Steven Luper (Aldershot, UK, 2003), pp.
1995). 105–18.
Perception, Knowledge, and Belief: Selected
Essays (Cambridge, UK, 2000). Further Reading
Bio 20thC Phils, Oxford Comp Phil, Pres
Other Relevant Works Addr of APA v9
“Observational Terms,” Philosophical Fodor, Jerry. “Semantics: Wisconsin Style,”
Review 73 (1964): 25–42. Synthese 59 (1984): 231–50.
“Perception from an Epistemological Point of Foley, Richard. “Dretske’s ‘Information-theo-
View,” Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): retic’ Account of Knowledge,” Synthese 70
584–90. (1987): 159–84.
“Laws of Nature,” Philosophy of Science 44 Kim, Jaegwon. “Causation, Emphasis, and
(1977): 248–68. Events,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2
“Chisholm on Perceptual Knowledge,” (1977): 100–103.
Grazer Philosophische Studien 7/8 (1979): Lycan, William G. “Dretske on the Mind’s
253–69. Awareness of Itself,” Philosophical Studies
“The Intentionality of Cognitive States,” 95 (1999): 125–33.
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1980): McLaughlin, Brian, ed. Dretske and His
281–94. Critics (Cambridge, Mass., 1991). Contains
“Machines and the Mental,” Proceedings and a bibliography of Dretske’s publications.
Addresses of the American Philosophical Mele, Alfred. “Dretske’s Intricate Behavior,”
Association 59 (September 1985): 23–33. Philosophical Papers 20 (1991): 1–10.
“Misrepresentation,” in Belief, ed. Radu Niiniluoto, Ilkka. “Dretske on Laws of
Bogdan (Oxford, 1986), pp. 17–36. Nature,” Philosophy of Science 45 (1978):
“Can Intelligence Be Artificial?” Philosophical 431–9.
Studies 71 (1993): 201–16. Shope, Robert. The Analysis of Knowing: A
“Dretske, Fred,” in A Companion to the Decade of Research (Princeton, N.J.,
Philosophy of Mind, ed. Samuel 1983).
Guttenplan (Oxford, 1994), pp. 259–65. “Symposium on Explaining Behavior:
“Dretske’s Awful Answer,” Philosophia 24 Reasons in a World of Causes,” Philosophy
(1995): 459–64. and Phenomenological Research 50 (1990):
“Phenomenal Externalism,” Philosophical 783–839.
Issues 7 (1996): 143–58. Williams, Michael. “Dretske on Epistemic
“Machines, Plants and Animals: The Origins Entitlement,” Philosophy and
of Agency,” Erkenntnis 51 (1999): 19–31. Phenomenological Research 60 (2000):
“Entitlement: Epistemic Rights without 607–12.
Epistemic Duties?” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 60 (2000): Reinaldo Elugardo
591–606.
664
DREYFUS
DREYFUS, Hubert Lederer (1929– ) empiricism and idealism have elevated the
notion of “representation” far above its proper
Hubert L. Dreyfus was born on 15 October role in learning. Expertise arrives when neither
1929 in Terre Haute, Indiana. He received his representations of one’s goal, or of means to
education at Harvard University, earning the achieve it, occupy one’s attention. The
BA with highest honors in philosophy in 1951, ordinary knowledge of common sense is
and joined Phi Beta Kappa. Dreyfus then grounded on accumulated living that provides
earned his MA in 1952, and a PhD in philos- for a meaningful environment, in which the
ophy in 1964. His dissertation was titled agent can immediately assess the relevance of
“Husserl’s Phenomenology of Perception.” contextual features of novel situations. The
Dreyfus studied at the University of Freiburg representational theory, for which the mind is
on a Harvard Sheldon traveling fellowship in a logical calculator of symbols representing
1953–4; traveled to the Husserl Archives at the external matters, is entirely false to the nature
University of Louvain on a Fullbright of lived experience.
Fellowship in 1956–7; and went to the Ecole During the mid 1960s Dreyfus witnessed
Normale Supérieure in Paris on a French gov- the beginnings of Artificial Intelligence at the
ernment grant in 1959–60. Rand Corporation, in the pioneering work of
Dreyfus began his teaching career at Allen NEWELL and Herbert SIMON. Dreyfus
Brandeis University as instructor in philosophy immediately launched a thorough attack on
from 1957 to 1959, and then was assistant AI’s basic principle that the brain’s intelligence
and associate professor of philosophy at is similar to the computer’s logical manipula-
Massachusetts Institute of Technology from tion of discrete symbols. According to Dreyfus,
1960 to 1968. In 1968 he became associate AI is the newest mechanical manifestation of
professor of philosophy at the University of the rationalist tradition in philosophy, because
California at Berkeley, and was promoted to they both view the mind as essentially rational,
full professor in 1972. Since 1994 Dreyfus has representational, and rule-governed. In his
been professor of philosophy in the Graduate earlier writings he suggested that the brain’s
School at Berkeley, and added a joint appoint- analog operations could never be duplicated by
ment in the rhetoric department in 1999. He the computer’s digital processes. In more recent
has directed several NEH summer institutes, writings, he has suggested that neural networks
received grants and fellowships from the NSF, may have some potential for modeling actual
ACLS, the Guggenheim fund, and taught as a human learning. However, like his Berkeley
visiting professor at many universities. In 2003 colleague John SEARLE, Dreyfus takes the very
he was the Spinoza Lecturer at the University limited success of AI as confirmation that it has
of Amsterdam. He became a fellow of the contributed very little to the understanding of
American Academy of Arts and Sciences in consciousness.
2001, and served as President of the Pacific
Division of the American Philosophical BIBLIOGRAPHY
Association in 2004–5. What Computers Still Can’t Do: A Critique
The phenomenologies of Husserl, of Artificial Reason (Cambridge, Mass.,
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and other conti- 1972; 2nd edn 1979).
nental philosophers have dominated Dreyfus’s Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and
scholarly attention. Of particular interest to Hermeneutics, with Paul Rabinow
him is how phenomenological explorations of (Brighton, UK, 1982; 2nd edn, Chicago,
learning, understanding, and intelligence 1983).
contrast favorably with the excessively ratio- Mind Over Machine: The Power of Human
nalistic traditions of modern philosophy. Both Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the
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DREYFUS
Computer (New York, 1986). Inquiry 42 (1999): 49–78.

Being-in-the-world: A Commentary on “A Merleau-Pontyian Critique of Husserl’s
Heidegger’s Being and Time (Cambridge, and Searle’s Representationalist Accounts
Mass., 1991) of Action,” Proceedings of the
Thinking in Action: On the Internet Aristotelian Society 100 (2000):
(London and New York, 2001). 287–302.
Ed. with Mark Wrathall, Heidegger
Other Relevant Works Reexamined, 4 vols (London and New
“Alchemy and Artificial Intelligence,” Rand York, 2002).
Corporation paper P3244 (Santa “Intelligence without Representation:
Monica, Cal., 1966). Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Mental
“Phenomenology and Artificial Representation,” Phenomenology and the
Intelligence,” in Phenomenology in Cognitive Sciences 1 (2002): 367–83.
America, ed. James Edie (Chicago, 1967), “Taylor’s (Anti-)Epistemology,” in Charles
pp. 31–47. Taylor, ed. Ruth Abbey (Cambridge, UK,
“Phenomenology and Mechanism,” Noûs 5 2004), pp. 52–83.
(1971): 81–96.
“Holism and Hermeneutics,” Review of Further Reading
Metaphysics 34 (1980): 3–24. Cooper, David E. “Inverting the Image:
Ed., Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Dreyfus’s Commentary on Heidegger,”
Science (Cambridge, Mass., 1982). Inquiry 35 (1992): 233–48.
“Husserl’s Epiphenomenology,” in Malpas, Jeff, and Mark A. Wrathall, eds.
Perspectives on Mind, ed. Herbert Otto Essays in Honor of Hubert L. Dreyfus, 2
and James Tuedio (Dordrecht, 1988), pp. vols (Cambridge, Mass., 2000).
85–106. Pylyshyn, Zenon. “Minds, Machines, and
“Towards a Reconciliation of Phenomenology: Some Reflections on
Phenomenology and A.I.,” with Stuart Dreyfus’ “What Computers Can’t Do’,”
Dreyfus, in The Foundations of Artificial Cognition 3 (1974–5): 57–77.
Intelligence: A Sourcebook, ed. Derek Rorty, Richard. “Not All ‘That’ Strange: A
Partridge and Yorick Wilks (Cambridge, Response to Dreyfus and Spinosa,”
UK, 1990). Inquiry 42 (1992): 125–8.
“Action and the First Person,” with Jerome
Wakefield, in John Searle and His Critics, John R. Shook
ed. Ernest Lepore and Robert Van Gulick
(Oxford, 1990).
“Searle’s Freudian Slip,” Behavioral and
Brain Sciences 13 (1990): 603–604.
“Heidegger’s Hermeneutic Realism,” in The
Interpretive Turn: Philosophy, Science, DU BOIS, William Edward Burghardt
Culture, ed. David R. Hiley, James F. (1868–1963)
Bohman, and Richard Shusterman
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1991). W. E. B. Du Bois was born on 23 February
Ed. with Harrison Hall, Heidegger: A 1868 in Great Barrington, Massachusetts. He
Critical Reader (Oxford, 1992). graduated valedictorian from his high school in
“Coping with Things in Themselves: A 1884 and then attended Fisk University in
Practice-based Phenomenological Basis of Nashville, Tennessee from 1885 to 1888,
Robust Realism,” with Charles Spinosa, earning his BA in 1888, and spending summers
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DU BOIS
teaching in African-American schools in the National Association for the Advancement

Nashville’s rural areas. It was at Fisk where he of Colored People (NAACP) from 1910 to
first experienced black higher education and the 1934. In 1934 he resigned from the NAACP
indignities of legalized racial segregation of the and returned to his academic position at
American South. The social practices of segre- Atlanta University, where he taught from 1934
gation were commonly referred to as “Jim to 1944. He returned to the NAACP in 1944 as
Crow” and were present in segregated, separate head of research on the African disapora in a
institutions such as education, housing, trans- concerted effort to legitimize the status of
portation, restaurants, and medicine. Fisk former colonies in the new postwar world
provided Du Bois with a life-changing experi- order. He was dismissed from his duties at the
ence of his people, their shared fate, problems, NAACP in 1948 over ideological disputes. He
and strengths. He began a lifelong defense of eventually became the target of anti-communist
the leaders of the black community, whom he witch-hunters and in 1951 he was tried and
called “the talented tenth.” acquitted of a federal charge of failing to
In 1888 Du Bois entered Harvard University, register as an agent of a foreign government.
earning a second BA in 1890 majoring in Although Du Bois was cleared of all charges,
history and graduating cum laude. He was the trial cost him his savings, his reputation,
introduced to pragmatism by William JAMES in and his fundamental faith in American institu-
psychology. Du Bois recounts that in many tions. This disillusionment with the United
ways he was an outsider at Harvard and he States, however, gave way to an optimistic and
made few friends there. In 1891 he earned an hopeful view of African life and culture. In
MA and from 1892 to 1894 he pursued 1960 he moved to Ghana, on the west coast of
graduate studies in history and economics at the Africa, where he was a major intellectual and
University of Berlin on a Slater Fund political symbol for the new state. Du Bois died
Fellowship. He worked with Max Weber, the on 27 August 1963 in Accra, Ghana, on the eve
great interpretive sociologist, and became one of the important civil rights milestone: the
of his few American students. Upon his return March on Washington led by Martin Luther
to the United States, he taught Greek and Latin KING, Jr.
at Wilberforce University in Ohio for two years In 1903 Du Bois observed that “the problem
during 1894–6 while he finished his doctoral of the twentieth century is the problem of the
dissertation on “The Suppression of the African color line” (p. 7), and this problem was the
Slave Trade in the United States of America, center of his ideas and lifework. He became one
1638–1870,” which was published in 1896. of the greatest intellectuals of the twentieth
He received his PhD in history from Harvard in century, embracing the worldwide experience
1895, becoming the first black to receive of Africans and their descendants, especially
Harvard’s doctorate. His dissertation signaled those kidnapped and sold into slavery in the
the pattern of many of his interests: the African New World. Du Bois was conscious of his
diaspora, history, economics, and American racial and ethnic lineage, tracing it back to free
race relations. Negroes who had settled in Great Barrington,
Du Bois was first a professor of classics and Massachusetts in the early 1700s. Throughout
modern languages for two years at Wilberforce his life he meticulously studied his ancestry
University in Ohio, and then an assistant from both its African and European (primarily
instructor in sociology at the University of Dutch) roots and was thankful that he was not
Pennsylvania in 1896–7. He accepted a position descended from Anglo-Saxons. He was
as professor of economics and history at ambivalent toward whites most of his life.
Atlanta University where he taught from 1898 Du Bois’s experience at Wilberforce
to 1910, before leaving academia to work for University helped to prepare him for a profes-
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DU BOIS
sional role in mainstream academic sociology. and as he (1903, p. 7) wryly wrote: “being a
Though this institution had been established in problem is a strange experience.” Du Bois calls
1852 for the education of African Americans, the experience generated by the color line “the
Du Bois felt he was never admitted as a full col- Veil” and allowed his readers to walk with
league by the white male establishment. Finding him within it. He did this symbolically through
the religious mission of the Methodist college the sorrow songs that introduce each chapter.
restrictive and unsatisfactory, he accepted a One way to address these concerns was to
position at the University of Pennsylvania, work for gradual change, like Booker T.
where he used his sociological skills to survey WASHINGTON, but Du Bois rejected this path.
economic and social conditions in the black His unflinching criticism of Washington created
community. He lived in a social settlement and a public debate about how to fight discrimina-
his book was modeled on that of Hull-House tion that continues to this day. Du Bois reflected
Maps and Papers (Residents of Hull-House, on entering Fisk University, the Jim Crow
1895) and initiated a lifelong alliance with world of the South, and teaching children who
many of the white female sociologists who must endure its cruelty. He described his travels
worked in community settings. Du Bois and through the Black Belt, Jim Crow railway cars,
Isabel Eaton, a Quaker, former Hull-House and the plantations that dotted the landscape
resident, and contributor to Hull-House Maps and continued the peculiar legacy of slavery
and Papers, produced the monumental study of through tenant farming.
The Philadelphia Negro (1899), which set the Du Bois revealed how the “faith of our
standard for urban studies of black communi- fathers” was a communal heritage. Music and
ties in the United States. Du Bois did not enjoy lyrics created a heritage from the past that lives
life in a social settlement and he soon moved on in the present. This faith was tested by the
to Atlanta University in 1898. death of Du Bois’s first (and only) son,
While at Atlanta he sponsored studies on a Burghardt, who was refused medical care
series of institutions, such as business, art, the because of the color line. Du Bois’s keening
church, and communities, which generated cry against the evil that killed his baby is a
social networks and extensive scholarship on heart-wrenching paean to lost hope and love.
the black community. They established the Men survived and triumphed behind the Veil,
ideal model for investigations in each of these nonetheless, and the African-American leader
topics for many decades. Between 1898 and was the key to ending the color line. Ordinary
1904 the US Department of Labor sponsored people could be extraordinary, too. Their path
four demographic studies of the black South may be hard, but their triumphs cause joy and
conducted by Du Bois. These inquiries also celebration.
established precedents to document the patterns This book and succeeding books employ a
of settlement, income, and distribution which number of pragmatist assumptions including an
dramatically shaped the lives of African emphasis on education for the community and
Americans. not just for the elite; the genesis of the self;
Du Bois’s first autobiography was The Souls intellectual activity that is problem-oriented
of Black Folk (1903). It is the passionate and and processual; a belief that social science is
eloquent story of an individual, W. E. B. Du useful in a democracy; and a perspective stress-
Bois, and a group, African Americans. Du Bois ing the union of opposites (as opposed to
could not separate himself from his world that dichotomizations). Du Bois particularly drew
was divided by a color line: one part was priv- on the pragmatism of James and his concept of
ileged and white, and it exploited the other “the self” as a divided, doubled, sense of
part that was black. As an African American, “twoness.” James’s pragmatist understanding
Du Bois both studied this dilemma and lived it, of “consciousness” with its corollary divisions
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DU BOIS
is also intellectually important. In addition, Du the feminist pragmatism of the women of Hull
Bois supported Fabian socialism during this House.
era, with a focus on state programs to provide From the inception of the NAACP, Du Bois
minimal resources for health, housing, employ- was one of its leaders and became the founding
ment, and education. Although Du Bois later editor of its journal The Crisis. This new job
claimed he was not a socialist until the 1930s, necessitated his resignation from Atlanta
this is not entirely true. University and a turn from the academy to a
The Souls of Black Folk is a literary master- national, multi-dimensional public role as an
piece that articulates the cost of hatred and the intellectual, leader, and journalist in New York
power to resist it. Although it has never been City. In this position he built a national per-
out of print, it was especially important in the spective on events affecting the lives of blacks
1960s when it helped inspire the American civil throughout the United States. In a Herculean
rights struggle. Du Bois continued to tell his life achievement, Du Bois produced a monthly
story and the story of a people during the rest journal filled with the latest news, editorial cri-
of his long, productive life. The Souls of Black tiques of it, and essays written by national
Folk is unique in its passion and eloquence, leaders. Literary figures submitted fiction and
however. poetry on the black experience. The Crisis
While at Atlanta University he founded two shaped the lives of blacks throughout the
journals: The Moon Illustrated Weekly (1905) country, giving them news, hope, and cogent
and The Horizon: A Journal of the Color Line analyses. Du Bois maintained the journal with
(1907). In 1905 he also helped to establish the little overview or restraint from the NAACP
Niagara Movement, comprised of black men despite continual efforts by the organization’s
who were part of the talented tenth and directors to do so. The great popularity of the
demanding full equality. This group opposed magazine and its financial success mitigated
Booker T. Washington’s gradual approach and against their firing the independent Du Bois.
political machine, and they built an alternative Du Bois published his second autobiograph-
network of militant “race men.” ical book Darkwater in 1920. His most impor-
In 1908 Du Bois’s life was altered by a race tant concepts here revolve around his discus-
riot in Springfield, Illinois. This event sparked sion of “white folks” and the study of white
a “Call” for a national organization to fight for racism. He also analyzed “the damnation of
civil rights for African Americans. Over forty women” and the mythic “Great Mother” in a
leaders signed the Call, including Du Bois, major feminist statement about black women.
which led to a conference in 1909 and the Du Bois included fiction in this book, preced-
founding of the National Association for the ing the development of the Harlem Renaissance
Advancement of Colored People. This organi- which occurred a few years later and in which
zation changed Du Bois’s life and career. Du Bois played an important, often critical
By the end of this first phase of his life and role.
work, Du Bois had established his interests in Du Bois expanded his dramatic interests with
the “talented tenth.” He had studied the struc- his production of the mammoth pageant, The
ture of the slum in Philadelphia, the history of Star of Ethiopia. This three-hour play required
slavery, the Reconstruction era, and emanci- a cast of hundreds and was performed three
pation. He had used sophisticated methodolo- times beginning in 1916. Du Bois also wrote
gies ranging from demographic data, inter- novels during this period and explored
views, mapping techniques, and theoretical numerous themes of love and romance outside
analyses. He had pioneered his autobiograph- his usual non-fictional “news-reporting” and
ical, experiential style of analysis, adapting the comment. His leadership of a worldwide, pan-
strengths of Weber’s interpretive sociology with African movement also emerged during these
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DU BOIS
busy and fruitful years and continued through- munism. The rest of this autobiography
out the rest of his life. explained how and why he made this decision
With the Great Depression, beginning in so late in life and in opposition to the training
1929, the economic fate of African Americans and pressures of American capitalism. This nar-
became direr and Du Bois increasingly rative portrayed his life as an inevitable advance
despaired of achieving social justice and toward communist ideals and praxis.
equality. After many years of conflict over who The most gripping portion of the
controlled The Crisis, its policies, content, and Autobiography is Du Bois’s clear description of
editorials, in 1934 Du Bois left the NAACP his trumped-up indictment and persecution by
and returned to Atlanta University and the the US Government during the McCarthy era.
teaching of sociology. Du Bois quickly reen- Du Bois’s Autobiography reflects not only his
tered the academic world and a Marxist, disillusionment with the United States,
conflict perspective characterized this next however: it is an optimistic and hopeful view of
major era in his life. Bitterness and discour- African life and culture. Du Bois subtitles this
agement over American capitalism and race autobiography “a soliloquy,” to speak to the
relations permeated much of his work. generations that follow him. One sign of his
Two of Du Bois’s most important books estrangement from America is the fact that this
during this period are Black Reconstruction volume was published first in Russian in
(1935) and his autobiographical Dusk of Dawn Moscow. The first English edition, posthu-
(1940). In Black Reconstruction, Du Bois mously published in 1968, was by International
analyzed the blunders of Reconstruction and Publishers, a well-known voice for Marxist and
the scholarly literature that distorted that Soviet-oriented books written in English. The
history. He examined the failure of democracy Autobiography has been reprinted many times,
and the bankrupt economy that prevented the but it remains his least popular autobiography.
attainment of full citizenship for black people. This relative obscurity is at least partially due
His new autobiography continued these themes to his despair over all Americans, black and
and sharply criticized “white folk” and their white, and total rejection of capitalism which
corrupt “white world.” In contrast to the contrasts dramatically with his other autobi-
strengths of the “gifts of black folk” which he ographies and popular role as an antagonist of
praises, white racism delayed the coming of white racism and unflinching supporter of the
morning and the “dusk of dawn.” American black community and its institutions. This last
class structure echoed and reinforced racial seg- autobiography, like the three that preceded it,
regation similar to a feudal pattern of class and is a heroic narrative presenting Du Bois as an
interpersonal relations. This angry and disillu- often lonely and embattled warrior with few
sioned analysis is often used in conjunction friends and fewer resources other than his mind
with contemporary social movements based and pen. This makes for a gripping drama, but
on interracial conflict. To his deep sorrow, he not necessarily an accurate portrayal of his life,
assessed the American people, including blacks, allies, institutional power, or accomplishments.
to be too corrupt and cowardly to come to his The veracity of Du Bois’s recollections con-
aid. This precipitated another major change in cerning both his enemies and friends cannot be
his life and ideas. decided on the selected, carefully crafted images
Du Bois published his final self-reflection in of himself and his intellectual journeys.
1963, The Autobiography of W. E. B. Du Bois. Du Bois’s second wife, Shirley Graham Du
The first five chapters related his travels to Bois, wrote a book (published in 1971) about
Europe, the Soviet Union, and China after the events covered in The Autobiography, but
1958. After he observed the accomplishments her account is of their shared lives, her view of
of socialist nations, he finally converted to com- Du Bois, and these events from her perspective.
670
DU BOIS
Although her prose lacks the power of Du studying African Americans in sociology called
Bois’s, her narrative is more romantic, popu- the Chicago School of race relations, because
larly written, and accessible to the general Park was a follower of the ideas of Washington.
reading public. This is part of the “Veil of sociology” which con-
Herbert Aptheker, a Marxist scholar and tinues to support a complex pattern of hiding the
loyal friend of Du Bois, edited a large number discipline’s elaboration, defense, and mainte-
of books that radically increase the availability nance of racism and sexism which is analyzed in
of Du Bois’s more obscure writings. Aptheker depth by Mary Jo Deegan (2002). In 1971 the
edited and annotated volumes on Du Bois’s American Sociological Association gave its first
correspondence, book reviews, short essays, Du Bois-Johnson-Frazier award, officially
and organizational documents (1973, 1976, honoring Du Bois’s work for the first time.
1978). The women of Du Bois’s family socialized
Most studies of Du Bois adopt his autobio- him into his African and American world views
graphical view of himself, with an emphasis and he wrote often about them in his four auto-
on that found in Dusk of Dawn. Eliot M. biographies and other essays. He was a feminist,
Rudrick’s books (1960, 1968) represent this which allowed him to work successfully with
important literature that inspires many com- both white and black women on a number of
munity activists and scholars. Adolph L. Reed, important issues. He failed to acknowledge these
Jr. (1997) analyzes Du Bois’s relation to alliances in his writings, however, as Nellie
Fabianism and the color line, but this book McKay (in Andress 1985) documents for black
lacks a critical understanding of the subject, women and Deegan (2002) documents for white
topic, and historical context. David Levering women. Lewis (2000), in his second volume on
Lewis (1993, 2000) has written a lengthy, two- Du Bois’s life from 1919 until 1963, provides
volume biography of Du Bois that draws on the considerable evidence for his interpretation of
archival documents of Du Bois, many of which Du Bois as a womanizer. But this information is
are found in the Du Bois microfilm from the disconnected often from Du Bois as a colleague
University of Massachusetts at Amherst, as well to and intellectual influence on women, so this
as from interviews of many of Du Bois’s important area of ideas and professional patterns
friends, family, and colleagues. Although Lewis is yet to be explored.
provides a much-needed corrective of the schol- The deep animosity between Du Bois and
arship that unquestioningly accepts much of Washington has been replicated in dichotomized
Du Bois’s self-reflections, his biography is not positions and scholarship on the two men. Their
a strong intellectual analysis of the over- work is debated and analyzed in a huge literature
whelming and massive literature created by Du on the “Washington–Du Bois Controversy,”
Bois. Cornel West (1989), in contrast, brings Miller’s (1994) annotated twenty-three-page bib-
Du Bois into significant contemporary debates liography on this vast scholarship which largely
on pragmatism and religion. Some editors accepts Du Bois’s view of Washington as
(Clarke et al. 1970) of Freedomways compiled cowardly, cruel, power-hungry, and an agent of
an important set of articles, essays, and white racism. In 1961 Du Bois discussed his life
memoirs that reflected on Du Bois’s life and his and ideas in an interview with Moses Asch,
impact upon the authors, including Martin which covers several of the major topics detailed
Luther King, Jr. in Du Bois’s Autobiography, but more succinctly
The failure of sociologists adequately to and conversationally than that found in the
acknowledge the significance of Du Bois is dis- lengthy volume.
cussed by Dan S. Green and Edwin D. Driver Because of the national and international sig-
(1978). Du Bois was particularly ostracized by nificance of Du Bois’s role as a black leader, his
Robert E. Park, the leader of the major group work as a creative writer and powerful editor,
671
DUB OIS
and his centrality to initiating the Du W. E. B. Du Bois Speaks: Speeches and

Bois–Washington debate, it is important to Addresses, 2 vols, ed. Philip Foner (New
stress that Du Bois developed and executed a York, 1970).
series of brilliant, systematic sociological inves- W. E. B. Du Bois: A Reader, ed. Meyer
tigations of African-American life. Du Bois’s Weinberg (New York, 1970).
unrelenting drive to live an intellectual life, to The Correspondence of W. E. B. Du Bois, 3
teach the “talented tenth” of Black America, vols, ed. Herbert Aptheker (Amherst,
and to destroy white myths and misapprehen- Mass., 1973–8).
sions about African Americans by means of The Oxford W. E. B. Du Bois Reader, ed.
careful research gives coherence and meaning to Eric J. Sundquist (Oxford, 1996).
his accomplishments.
Further Reading
BIBLIOGRAPHY Amer Nat Bio, Blackwell Amer Phil,
The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer
to the United States of America, Thought, Dict Amer Bio, Encyc Amer Bio,
1638–1860 (New York, 1896). Encyc Social Behav Sci, Nat Cycl Amer
The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study. Bio v13, Who Was Who in Amer v4
Together with a Special Report on Andress, Lillian, ed. Critical Essays on W. E.
Domestic Service by Isabel Eaton B. Du Bois (Boston, 1985).
(Philadelphia, 1899). Aptheker, Herbert. W. E. B. Du Bois and the
The Souls of Black Folk (Chicago, 1903). Struggle Against Racism in the World
Darkwater: Voices from Within the Veil (New York, 1983).
(New York, 1920). Clarke, John Henri, et al., eds. Black Titan,
Black Reconstruction in America: An Essay W. E. B. Du Bois: An Anthology by the
Toward a History of the Part Which Black Editors of Freedomways (Boston, 1970).
Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Deegan, Mary Jo. Race, Hull-House, and the
Democracy in America, 1860–1880 (New University of Chicago: A New Conscience
York, 1935). Against Ancient Evils (Westport, Conn.,
Dusk of Dawn: An Essay Toward an 2002).
Autobiography of a Race Concept (New Du Bois, Shirley Graham. His Day is
York, 1940). Marching On (Philadelphia, 1971).
World and Africa: An Inquiry into the Part Green, Dan S., and Edwin D. Driver, W. E.
Which Africa Has Played in World History B. Du Bois on sociology and the Black
(New York, 1947). Community (Chicago, 1978).
The Autobiography of W. E. B. Du Bois: A Lewis, David Levering. W. E. B. Du Bois:
Soliloquy on Viewing My Life from the Biography of a Race, 1868–1919 (New
Last Decades of Its First Century (New York, 1993).
York, 1968). ———, W. E. B. Du Bois: The Fight for
Equality and the American Century (New
Other Relevant Works York, 2000).
Du Bois’s papers are at the University of Miller, Jan. “Annotated Bibliography of the
Massachusetts, Amherst, Mass. Washington–Du Bois Controversy,”
W. E. B. Du Bois: A Recorded Journal of Black Studies 25 (1994):
Autobiography, interview by Moses Asch 250–72.
(New York, 1961). Reed, Adolph L., Jr. W. E. B. Du Bois and
The Seventh Son, Vol. 1, ed. Julius Lester American Political Thought (New York,
(New York, 1970). 1997).
672
DuBOSE
Rudwick, Eliot M. W. E. B. Du Bois: A professor of moral science from 1871 to 1894,

Study in Minority Group Leadership and professor of New Testament language and
(Philadelphia, 1960). interpretation from 1894 to 1908. He also
———, W. E. B. Du Bois: Propagandist of was Dean of the university’s theology depart-
the Negro Protest (New York, 1968). ment while lecturing on biblical exegesis.
West, Cornel. The American Evasion of Generations of students called DuBose the
Philosophy (Madison, Wisc., 1989). “Sage of Sewanee,” because he was a father
figure to them and earned their affection by
Mary Jo Deegan showing kindly interest in them while demand-
ing their respect as well by challenging their
minds through stimulating lectures and
seminars. He became a fixture in Episcopalian
thought and education throughout the South
as well as the rest of the nation.
DuBOSE, William Porcher (1836–1918) In trying to assimilate Christian doctrine to
contemporary thought, DuBose has been
DuBose was born into the southern gentry on described as a “liberal catholic modernist.”
11 April 1836 on a plantation near His emphasis on changing conceptions within
Winnsboro, South Carolina. He attended local traditional categories placed him in the fore-
schools and in 1855 graduated as ranking front of those seeking to revitalize orthodoxy.
cadet officer from the state’s military academy, Concentrating on soteriology as his specialty,
better known as “The Citadel.” He then DuBose spoke of God’s movement human-
obtained an MA degree from the University of ward through incarnation in Christ. Human
Virginia in 1859 and began classes at a newly efforts Godward were aided by the Church, in
established Episcopal seminary located at the sacraments, and in ethical endeavor.
Camden in his native state. When the Civil Christian living was a process in which human
War began in April of 1861, he temporarily beings could realize in their lives the reality of
abandoned theological studies and joined the how divine life was actualized in Christ. Thus
Confederate army. Serving first as adjutant to life was a process, a personal transformation
his former college commandant and after being that followed evolutionary lines of progress.
exchanged as a prisoner with several wounds, God’s activity in the world was not obscured
he was ordained a deacon in 1863 and spent by the process of evolution, and His redemp-
the rest of the war as a chaplain. Upon return- tive power was not impaired by the fact that it
ing home to Winnsboro, DuBose worked at St. was visible mainly through human life, an
John’s Episcopal Church for two years. During imperfect reflection of divine purpose.
those same years he volunteered to help at a Still speaking of salvation, DuBose did not
nearby mission called St. Stephen’s Chapel. It subscribe to a vicarious death as a substitute
is unclear whether DuBose functioned in the for sinners’ failings. He held to a more modern
capacity of deacon or priest during those years, interpretation of human nature that required
but by 1868 he had definitely been ordained people to pay for their own misdeeds and thus
into the priesthood when he became rector of actualize the redemptive reconciliation that
Trinity Church in Abbeville, South Carolina. God had made possible in Christ’s resurrec-
In 1871 DuBose moved to Tennessee and tion. Largely through studying St. Paul, he
began an association with the University of stressed the universal, humanistic qualities of
the South at Sewanee that lasted for more than Christianity rather than the rigid formalism
forty-five years. Over the course of those so often found in creedalist, fundamentalist
decades he was chaplain from 1871 to 1883, orientations. Christian progress toward salva-
673
DuBOSE
tion for him was part of a single scheme where Who Was Who in Amer v1
natural, rational, and divine truth formed an Bratton, Theodore D. The Life and
organic whole. His appreciation of New Thought of the Reverend William
Testament authority and the catholic witness Porcher DuBose (New York, 1936).
of ecumenical churches, from Apostolic times Murray, John O. F. DuBose as a Prophet
forward, came from recognizing that truth is a (London, 1942).
corporate possession, part of a never-ending
process wherein no single person comprehends Henry Warner Bowden
it entirely. As teacher and author DuBose
urged thoughtful believers to determine their
private faiths within ecclesiastical and sacra-
mental contexts. He continuously pursued
greater understanding of God’s revelation and
sought to understand more perfectly that DUCASSE, Curt John (1881–1969)
portion of the truth that was in his grasp.
Though professor emeritus after 1908, he con- Curt Ducasse was born on 7 July 1881 in
tinued to be active until his death on 18 August Angoulême, France. He emigrated to Mexico
1918 in Sewanee, Tennessee. in 1900 and eventually moved to the United
States as a young man in pursuit of business.
BIBLIOGRAPHY He discovered philosophy at the age of twenty-
The Soteriology of the New Testament four when he acquired a book on George
(New York, 1892). Berkeley, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant.
The Ecumenical Councils (New York, His interest in philosophy led him to the
1897). University of Washington where he received
The Gospel in the Gospels (New York, his BA in 1908 and then to Harvard, where he
1906). studied under Josiah ROYCE and received his
The Gospel According to St. Paul (New PhD in 1912. He taught at the University of
York, 1907). Washington from 1912 to 1926. During this
High Priesthood and Sacrifice: An time he met Mable Lisle, a noted Seattle artist,
Exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews whom he married in 1921. Ducasse became
(New York, 1908). professor of philosophy at Brown University in
The Reason of Life (New York, 1911). 1926 and remained there until his retirement
Turning Points in My Life (New York, in 1958. He served as chair of the department
1912). of philosophy from 1930 to 1951 and served
as acting dean of the Graduate School from
Other Relevant Works 1947 to 1949. Ducasse died on 3 September
DuBose’s papers are at the University of the 1969 in Providence, Rhode Island.
South in Sewanee, Tennessee. Ducasse is perhaps best known today for
A DuBose Reader, ed. Donald S. being one of the first champions of analytic
Armentrout (Sewanee, Tenn., 1984). method before it came to dominate English-
William Porcher DuBose: Selected speaking universities. Roderick CHISHOLM was
Writings, ed. John Alexander (New York, one of Ducasse’s more famous students. His
1988). essays typically begin by carefully reviewing
and clarifying the definitions of terms like
Further Reading “cause,” “art,” and “mental.” Ducasse then
Amer Nat Bio, Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer shows how philosophical debates over these
Religious Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v18, terms arise out of misunderstandings of their
674
DUCASSE
definitions. Ducasse’s interests were remark- Ducasse also opposed Gilbert Ryle in uphold-
ably broad, and he influenced virtually every ing a dualist–interactionist concept of
area of philosophy. His most noteworthy pub- mind–body relations. He argued that there is a
lications were in the areas of causation, free fundamental difference between the things
will, mind–body dualism, and philosophy of described by mental or psychical terms and
art and aesthetics. He served as chair of the physical or material terms. Physical terms refer
founding committee for the Association for to properties that are perceptually public,
Symbolic Logic and as President of such whereas mental terms denote properties that are
diverse organizations as the American Society inherently private. I can inform you, for example,
for Aesthetics, the Philosophy of Science that I am currently remembering a dream I had
Association, and the Eastern Division of the last night by using perceptually public words, be
American Philosophical Association they spoken or written. But my memory of this
(1939–40). Ducasse also maintained a lifelong dream itself cannot, in principle, be shared.
interest in parapsychology and paranormal Ducasse held that there was an irreducible dif-
activity, a somewhat surprising interest given ference between mental and physical language.
his work in the philosophy of science and com- Ducasse’s most lasting contributions were in
mitment to analytic method. the areas of aesthetics and the philosophy of art.
Some of Ducasse’s most important publica- Ducasse brought his interest in analytic method
tions were on causation. Ducasse argued against to his discussions of art and aesthetics. He felt
Humean critiques of causality. Ducasse held that the main task of the philosopher of art is not
that Humeans were wrong to hold that causal to propose theories of art or to comment on
relations are unobservable and to insist that what qualities make one artwork superior to
causality is simply the constant conjunction of another, but simply to analyze, define, and dis-
a pair of events in nature. He felt that a correct ambiguate the terms we use in discussing art.
definition of “cause,” one that adhered to its Ducasse believed in the importance of prefacing
actual linguistic use, would show that causal any philosophic discussion of art by developing
relations are observable. He tried to show that rigorous definitions for terms like “art,” “aes-
we typically use the word “cause” in English to thetic,” and “aesthetics.”
identify a relationship between a pair of Ducasse defined art neither as a particular
changes, call them P and R, in which P ends at class of objects nor as a property of objects but
the same time and environment as R and no as a type of activity. He defined art in a 1946
other changes occur in this environment during address to the American Society for Aesthetics
this time. Roughly, we typically say that P as all activity that aims to create objects
causes R when P only occurs immediately intended for aesthetic contemplation. He iden-
before R in the immediate environment of R. tified aesthetic contemplation with a psycho-
Ducasse argued on the basis of this definition logical attitude in which one takes up a stance
that causal relations are observable. Hume was of receptivity to the sensible qualities of some
right to note that they are not observable in the object and in which one’s interest is devoid of
same way as sensations like color or odor, but all scientific, theoretical, or practical concerns.
we observe them whenever we perceive a He first elaborated this view of art as an
change take place immediately before and in the activity in his 1929 book, The Philosophy of
immediate environment of another change. He Art. Ducasse spent the early chapters of his
also noted on the basis of this definition that book taking stock of several views of art, such
Humeans were wrong to treat causality as a as Leo Tolstoy’s expressivism, Freudian views
matter of recurrent pairs of events in nature. of art as wish fulfillment, and the general
Our typical English usage of “cause” refers to equation of art with the creation of beauty. He
single cases of change sequences. drew from some of these perspectives but ulti-
675
DUCASSE
mately found them all to be unsatisfactory. He The Philosophy of Art (New York, 1929).
defined art as creative activity that aims at the Philosophy as a Science: Its Matter and Its
self-objectification of an artist’s feelings. An Method (New York, 1941).
object is a work of art when it results from an Art, the Critics, and You (New York, 1944).
activity in which an artist seeks to create some- Nature, Mind, and Death (La Salle, Ill.,
thing that is capable of being contemplated by 1951).
herself or others that will yield back to her the A Philosophical Scrutiny of Religion (New
feeling of which is the attempted expression. York, 1953).
Ducasse’s view of art occasionally sounds A Critical Examination of the Belief in a Life
similar to ideas in Immanuel Kant and other after Death (Springfield, Ill., 1961).
formalist aesthetic theories, but he was quite Truth, Knowledge and Causation (New
critical of Clive Bell’s formalism. He felt that York, 1968).
Bell’s notion of significant form was unhelpful.
Bell held that all art combines things like line, Other Relevant Works
color, and so on, together so as to produce aes- Ducasse’s papers are at Brown University.
thetically moving forms, referring to this distin- “On the Nature and Observability of the
guishing characteristic of art as “significant Causal Relation,” Journal of Philosophy
form.” Ducasse argued that Bell could not 23 (1926): 57–68.
advance beyond simply applying this label to “Aesthetics and Aesthetic Activities,”
the combinations of lines, color, and so on, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 5
found in art, so significant form is just whatever (1947): 165–76.
it is about these combinations that leads us to call “In Defense of Dualism,” in Dimensions of
them artistic. Ducasse’s analysis of art also led Mind, ed. Sidney Hook (New York,
him to construe the class of art objects more 1960), pp. 85–9.
broadly than other authors. He was willing to “Minds, Matter and Bodies,” in Brain and
include decorative arts, fashion, personal style, Mind, ed. J. R. Smythies (London, 1965),
and cosmetics in the category of art since they pp. 81–109.
result from activities that aim at creating objects
of aesthetic contemplation. Further Reading
Ducasse was an extremely well-rounded Amer Nat Bio, Bio 20thC Phils, Nat Cycl
philosopher. He made significant contributions Amer Bio v55, Oxford Comp Phil, Pres
to virtually every area of philosophy: meta- Addr of APA v4, Proc of APA v42,
physics, epistemology, aesthetics, philosophy of Routledge Encycl Phil, Who Was Who in
language, and philosophy of science. He also Amer v5, Who’s Who in Phil
struggled to ensure that his writings were lucid Dommeyer, F. C., ed. Current Philosophical
and accessible. In his first book Ducasse sum- Issues: Essays in Honor of Curt John
marized the values he prized in his work: “there Ducasse (Springfield, Ill., 1966). Contains
is at least one article of my methodological creed a bibliography of Ducasse’s writings.
which has obsessed me so constantly that I feel Hare, Peter H., and Edward H. Madden.
that I must have come somewhere near living up Causing, Perceiving and Believing: An
to it, namely, that every assertion made is to be Examination of the Philosophy of C. J.
sufficiently clear and precise to be capable of Ducasse (Dordrecht, 1975).
being definitely disproved if false” (1924, p. 72).
Joshua Shaw
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Causation and the Types of Necessity
(Seattle, Wash., 1924).
676
DUMONT
DUMONT, Fernand (1927–97) science; more precisely of economics (1970),

sociology (1973), and theology (1988). He
Fernand Dumont was a philosopher deeply proposed an original theory of culture (1968,
inspired by sociology, a discipline he taught 1981, 1987) written in philosophical rather
all his life at Université de Laval in Québec, than in strict sociological terms, and he wrote
Canada, and above all, he was a great intel- strong works in sociology as well as inspired by
lectual in the French tradition and a recog- philosophy (1974, L’Avenir de la mémoire,
nized master for generations of students. He 1995). He also edited (alone or with col-
was French Canada’s foremost intellectual leagues) seventeen other books on ideologies,
for over forty years. youth, religion, culture, including a handbook
Fernand Dumont was born on 24 June on medical anthropology and another on
1927 in Montmorency, a small working-class social problems. All these books are related to
town near Québec City, and he died on 1 his personal perspective which consists of inter-
May 1997 in Québec City. He received his preting the contemporary world; many of them
education at Petit Séminaire de Québec are case studies that illustrate the fruitfulness
(receiving a BA), and at Université de Laval of his thoughts. He founded a research institute
where he studied social sciences. He later on culture (Institut Québécois de Recherche
went to Paris and registered at La Sorbonne sur la Culture), and a multidisciplinary schol-
to study sociology, psychology, epistemol- arly review Recherches Sociographiques (with
ogy, and philosophy with Georges Gurvitch, Y. Martin and J.-C. Falardeau) on Québec
Lucien Goldman (his doctoral thesis supervi- studies.
sor), and Gaston Bachelard. He received the The son of a textile worker, he experienced
certificat d’études supérieures en psycholo- in his life the distance between social classes,
gie générale et psychologie sociale, and a PhD and between high and popular cultures, as
in sociology from the University of Paris in revealed by the title of his autobiography
1967. In 1955 Dumont was appointed pro- (1997). He wrote that he has been unable to
fessor of sociology at Université de Laval, leave school. “The real function of the school,
and he held this position until his death. He from the primary level to University, is to
became the Director of the department of put apart, to transplant the child in another
sociology and anthropology in 1963, and world, far from pretending to initiate
Director of the Institut supérieur des sciences someone in life. Such a distance generates self
humaines in 1967. consciousness.” (p. 186) Distance is a key
Over the years Dumont achieved interna- word that helps us to understand Dumont’s
tional recognition for his works on culture, conception of culture as horizon and milieu,
religion, and epistemology of science. He developed in his master book Le Lieu de
occasionally taught at École des Hautes l’homme (1968).
Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris and Dumont distinguishes between primary
served as President of the International culture and secondary culture (culture
Association of French-speaking Sociologists. première and culture seconde), not to be
Dumont received many prestigious awards: confused with popular and high cultures. The
the Molson and the Governor General primary culture is a milieu, a set of models
awards in Canada, the Leon Gérin and the that orient daily life. Men and women are
Prix David awards in Québec, to mention a closely embedded in complex social networks,
few. they make things, they build villages and
Dumont authored sixteen books; it is diffi- cities, and they raise a family. But they are not
cult to classify his works in precise terms or confined to their milieu, because they are able
areas. He contributed to epistemology of to take some distance, to interpret the world,
677
DUMONT
to build a secondary culture. Individuals of ideology as deformed image of reality or as

develop a historical consciousness, they fausse conscience. The purpose of an ideology
adhere to ideologies, they create knowledge, is not to develop knowledge about the world
they develop cultural works that incarnate a but to provide meaning to collective action.
significant world, they communicate with In his works, Dumont distinguishes truth
others, and build shared values. Ideologies, and relevance, a distinction that allows him to
artists’ productions, and learned works are separate science from ideology. Truth refers
different modes of production of culture. to scientific knowledge, thoughts, opera-
Dumont proposed the concept of dédouble- tionalization, objectivity. Relevance refers to
ment, a French word which characterizes the what makes sense for individuals, and
construction process by creating a distance. Dumont also believes that knowledge should
Dumont (1981) distinguishes three modes have some sense for individuals. In this
of thought: that of operation, of action, and respect, one can speak of the relevance of
of interpretation. Dumont’s writings belong science and knowledge, an aspect important
to the interpretation mode of thought where for him in social sciences and philosophy.
the subject recognizing his own singularity Dumont contributes in his works to the
brings to the world a meaning inscribed in study of social change in French Canada, and
rituals and production. For Dumont, society especially the emergence of Québec as a
is not like an inert material because we have global society inside Canada. He proposed
an experience of it. “La société n’est pas important conceptual tools for the study of all
analogue de la matière inerte. Nous ne la global societies, a classic concept of the
percevons pas, nous en avons l’expérience.” French school of sociology. All societies must
Society is not a system, but a set of practices develop political institutions: modes of polit-
of interpretation (often in conflicts) that are ical and economic regulation that define a
working toward its own integration. This political community. But societies are also
perspective leads Dumont (1974) to the study structured as people grouping by common
of ideologies. Ideologies are different defini- reference (not to be confused with a reference
tions of a situation and are oriented toward group). This approach is illustrated in his
social action. In that sense, ideologies are theory of the nation. Instead of defining the
symbolic productions different from myths; nation by referring to properties or objective
myths mix up two different temporalities traits (in the tradition of beginning twentieth
(past and present) but ideologies, on the century, as illustrated by André Siegfried), he
contrary, separate them. This separation suggested to characterize it as a constructed
characterizes also history as discipline, where reference, based on social mechanisms like
each new generation feels the obligation to ideologies, historiography, literature. “A
rewrite national history. For Dumont, social nation is above all the social construction of
conditions are open to diverse readings, but its members.” (Raisons communes, 1995, p.
ideologies bring out different meaning 94–5) For Dumont, social classes, defined as
because of the different situations or view- a community of situations in society, are also
points of their producers. This is a major an important grouping by common reference.
aspect to Dumont’s contribution to the Frontiers, more than internal characteristics,
analysis of the ideological phenomena. He are structuring social classes. But these fron-
speaks of a plurality of definitions but also of tiers are not mainly given by objective criteria
a plurality of définiteurs (which may be trans- like occupation or income. These criteria
lated as defining subject) often in conflict. In must be transformed into signs – must be
this perspective, one cannot speak of the end interpreted – and social classes are in this
of ideology and he takes issue with the notion perspective cultural form. “Language, rituals,
678
DUMONT
all kinds of discourses contribute to integrate with Yves Martin (Québec, 1963).
us in a nation, a cultural group, a political Pour la conversion de la pensée chrétienne
community, a class, a generation. They offer (Montréal, 1964).
tools to develop our behaviour and thoughts, Le Lieu de l’homme. La culture comme
but also to develop a reference that locates us distance et mémoire (Montréal, 1968).
in history that gives a shared identity.” (p. La Dialectique de l’objet économique
100) (Paris, 1970).
Dumont wrote a scholarly masterpiece on La Vigile du Québec (Montréal, 1971).
the transformation of the French Canadian Trans., The Vigil of Quebec (Toronto,
nation and the development of the Québec 1974).
society, a book not only on the emergence of Chantiers. Essais sur la pratique des
a new and original society in North America, sciences de l’homme (Montréal, 1973).
but also a study which will help to understand Les Idéologies (Paris, 1974).
and interpret national identity in the con- L’Anthropologie en l’absence de l’homme
temporary world (1993). Dumont states that, (Paris, 1981).
from time to time, all societies have to rebuild Le Sort de la culture (Montréal, 1987).
their own foundations in order to recognize L’Institution de la théologie (Paris, 1988).
the emergence of new realities. The process is Genèse de la société québécoise (Montréal,
clearly at work in contemporary Europe, for 1993).
example. French Canada offers an exemplar Raisons communes (Montréal, 1995).
case of this process of refoundation. The L’Avenir de la mémoire (Québec, 1995).
result is emergence of different new national Une foi partagée (Montréal, 1996).
entities in New England’s former petits La Part de l’ombre. Poèmes 1952–1995
Canadas, fragmented French Canadian com- (Montréal, 1996).
munities and contemporary nation québé- Récit d’une émigration (Montréal, 1997).
coise. Many of his writings help to distin- Un Témoin de l’homme. Entretiens colligés
guish often confused concepts: nationalism, et présentés par Serge Cantin (Montréal,
national sentiment, patriotism, civic culture. 2000).
In the last years of his life, Dumont wrote
a fascinating and very personal book, both a Further Reading
sociological analysis of religion in contem- Dumais, Alfred. “Fernand Dumont,
porary societies and an essay on faith (Une foi sociologue,” Laval Théologique et
partagée, 1996). He also prepared the final Philosophique 55 (1999): 3–18.
edition of all the poems he wrote during his “Fernand Dumont,” Voix et images 27
life (La Part de l’ombre. Poèmes 1952–1995, (Autumn 2001). Issue devoted to
1996) and he had time to complete the Dumont.
writing of his memoirs (1997). Philosopher Gagnon, Nicole. “Fernand Dumont et la
and sociologist, Dumont was an unclassifi- conscience historique,” Possibles 18
able great writer. (1994): 126–36.
As few publications of Dumont are avail- Langlois, Simon, and Yves Martin, eds.
able in English, Weinstein’s Culture Critique: L’Horizon de la culture. Hommage à
Fernand Dumont and New Quebec Sociology Fernand Dumont (Québec, 1995).
(1985) will help to introduce readers to his Contains a bibliography of Dumont’s
thought. writings.
Lucier, Pierre. La Foi comme héritage et
BIBLIOGRAPHY projet dans l’œuvre de Fernand Dumont
L’Analyse des structures sociales régionales, (Québec, 1999).
679
DUMONT
“Mémoire de Fernand Dumont,” Duncan is recognized as the first American

Recherches sociographiques 42, 2 (2001). dancer to develop a philosophy of dance,
Issue devoted to Dumont. though her formal dance training was as
“Présence de Fernand Dumont,” Carrefour sporadic as her education. She had a limited
21, 1 (1999). Issue devoted to Dumont. exposure to the Delsarte Method, burlesque
“Présence et pertinence de Fernand forms, social dances, and ballet. She believed
Dumont,” Bulletin d’histoire politique 9 the body was a vital, kinetic energy, not to be
(Autumn 2000). Special issue devoted to confined or limited to a codified movement
Dumont. vocabulary. The body was the tool through
Warren, Jean-Philippe. Un Supplément which the sentiments and thoughts of the soul
d’âme. Les intentions primordiales de were expressed. She believed the solar plexus
Fernand Dumont (1947–1970) (Québec, was the driving force of movement.
1998). Duncan joined the Augustin Daly Company
Weinstein, Michael A. Culture Critique: in Chicago in 1895 to 1898, and performed in
Fernand Dumont and New Québec Chicago, New York City, and London. After
Sociology (New York, 1985). leaving Daly, she began performing primarily as
a solo artist throughout the United States,
Simon Langlois Europe, Russia, and Egypt. She was inspired by
the music of such composers as Ludwig van
Beethoven, Richard Strauss, and Richard
Wagner and moved to their scores with
abandon. She performed barefooted, with loose
hair, and dressed in revealing free-flowing
DUNCAN, Isadora (1878–1927) Greek-style tunics. In Grunewald, a suburb of
Berlin, she began to develop her theories of
Isadora Duncan, credited as being the dance education and in 1904 she assembled
“mother of modern dance,” consistently her famous dance group, now known as the
broke from the social, political, and artistic Isadorables. Duncan encouraged her students
conventions of her time. Her birth name and to run and skip, to study the movement quality
date are in question. It is documented that of nature and to respond to its rhythms.
her given name was either Dora Angela Duncan’s tours to Russia (1905–1907) were
Duncan or Angela Isadora Duncan, born on revolutionary in the art scene. A country
either 27 May 1878 or 26 May 1877 in San steeped in the ballet tradition was greatly
Francisco, California. She died tragically on swayed by her spiritual and pure movement
14 September 1927 in Nice, France, in a freak aesthetic. Before long, master choreographers
automobile accident in which her own shawl and performers like Mikhail Fokine, Nadezhda
became entangled in the tires of her convert- Pavlova, and Vaslav Nijinsky began to show
ible, strangling her. Her father Joseph Charles, evidence of Duncan’s conventions in their own
an unsuccessful banker, connoisseur of the works. In 1921 her relationship with Russia
arts, and poet, abandoned the family leaving ended badly, when the government failed to
them penniless and constantly eluding credi- fulfill a promise to support her and her school.
tors. Her mother, Dora Gray, a music teacher Her final years were spent in Berlin and Paris.
and pianist, educated her four children and Duncan was motivated by love and art. She
introduced them to the arts. Duncan was an was an outspoken feminist adamantly opposed
avid reader, and particularly influenced by to marriage, critical of social conventions and
Greek art and the works of Walt WHITMAN a political radical. She thought nothing of
and Friedrich Nietzsche. bringing her political speeches to the stage
680
DUNLAP
before her performances. Her lifestyle and free- DUNLAP, Knight (1875–1949)
spoken approach to politics resulted in a
pendulum effect in her career and financial Knight Dunlap was born on 21 November
status. Duncan created many works in her 1875 in Diamond Spring, California. He
lifetime, most notably Blue Danube, Funeral studied psychology at the University of
March, and Symphonie Pathetique. She California at Berkeley with George M.
authored The Dance (1909), and My Life STRATTON, receiving his PhB in 1899 and LM
(1927), and a collection of her writings, The Art in 1900. Dunlap then studied with Hugo
of the Dance, was published posthumously in MÜNSTERBERG at Harvard University, obtaining
1928. the MA in 1901 and PhD in psychology in
1903. From 1904 to 1906 Dunlap was an
BIBLIOGRAPHY instructor of psychology. In 1906 he followed
The Dance of the Future (New York, 1908). Stratton to the psychology department at Johns
The Dance (New York, 1909). Hopkins University, and remained there for
My Life (New York, 1927). thirty years as professor of experimental psy-
The Art of the Dance, ed. Sheldon Cheney chology, serving as department chair for much
(New York, 1928). of that time. His more famous colleague at
Johns Hopkins was John B. WATSON. In 1936
Other Relevant Works Dunlap became a professor of psychology at
Isadora Speaks: Writings and Speeches of the University of California at Los Angeles,
Isadora Duncan, ed. Franklin Rosemont from which he retired in 1946. Dunlap was
(San Francisco, 1981; Chicago, 1994). President of the Southern Society for
Philosophy and Psychology in 1920, and the
Further Reading American Psychological Association in 1929.
Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, He died on 14 August 1949 in Columbia,
Dict Amer Bio, Encyc Amer Bio, Nat Cycl South Carolina.
Amer Bio v22, Who Was Who in Amer v4 Dunlap was a skeptical, iconoclastic psy-
Blair, Fredrika. Isadora: Portrait of the Artist chologist who worked hard to divorce philos-
as a Woman (New York, 1986). ophy from psychology during the first two
Dillan, Millicent. After Egypt: Isadora decades of the twentieth century. Though one
Duncan and Mary Cassatt (New York, of his first publications was a theory of the syl-
1990). logism, he did not continue as a philosopher.
Kurth, Peter. Isadora: A Sensational Life Instead, he used his philosophical knowledge to
(Boston, 2001). discredit and discard those views at variance
MacDougall, Allan R. Isadora: A with his version of functionalism. Among his
Revolutionary in Art and Love choices for pruning was psychology’s Cartesian
(Edinburgh, 1960). heritage, which for Dunlap led to much of what
Terry, Walter. Isadora Duncan: Her Life, was impeding the growth of scientific psychol-
Her Art, Her Legacy (New York, 1963). ogy: introspection, images, and mental-content
psychology. To replace this, Dunlap urged a
Jennifer Tsukayama theory based on responses instantiated in the
brain as “transit patterns,” in which connec-
tions between external reality and internal
mental activity were developed through
learning. This can be seen now as anticipatory
of many later developments in psychology, but
in his day Dunlap was just one of many psy-
681
DUNLAP
chologists proposing similar systems which had Louis, 1925).

to wait for more sophisticated neurology and Social Psychology (Baltimore, Md., 1925).
learning theory for their support. Habits: Their Making and Unmaking (New
Dunlap was an enthusiastic proselytizer for York, 1932).
scientific psychology and an equally enthusias- The Dramatic Personality of Jesus
tic debunker of what he perceived as its (Baltimore, Md., 1933).
enemies. Chief among these was mysticism, Civilized Life: The Principles and Application
which he defined as knowledge beyond intellect of Social Psychology (Baltimore, Md.,
and perception. He had no interest in the pos- 1934).
sibility of mental states beyond the ordinary, Personal Adjustment (New York, 1946).
and had a special animosity toward Freud and Religion, Its Functions in Human Life: A
Freudians, equating the scientific value of their Study of Religion from the Point of View
views and practices with that of telepathy. A of Psychology (New York, 1946).
person of few nuances, Dunlap was public,
opinionated, and outspoken about subjects Other Relevant Works
ranging from clothing styles to discourteous Dunlap’s papers are at the Archives of the
driving. But he was not notably consistent: for History of American Psychology,
instance, though a confirmed foe of mysticism, University of Akron.
he wrote a creditable survey of the psychology “A Theory of the Syllogism,” University of
of religion which commended a personal California Publications in Philosophy 1
survival view of immortality. Dunlap allowed (1904): 227–36.
more eugenic views into his published writings “The Case against Introspection,”
than many psychologists of his era, but even Psychological Review 19 (1912): 404–13.
that had ambiguous effects. On the one hand, “The Theoretical Aspect of Psychology,” in
in 1940, he announced that studies of familial Psychologies of 1925, ed. Carl Murchison
heredity such as those of H. H. Goddard are (Worcester, Mass., 1926), pp. 309–29.
dead. On the other, reaction against the eugenic “Response Psychology,” in Psychologies of
theory of beauty and reproductive success con- 1930, ed. Carl Murchison (Worcester,
tained in Dunlap’s Personal Beauty and Racial Mass., 1930).
Betterment (1920) was among the factors that “Knight Dunlap,” in A History of
led Evelyn Hooker, a 1932 Johns Hopkins Psychology in Autobiography, vol. 2, ed.
graduate, to become a proponent of an inclu- Carl Murchison (Worcester, Mass., 1932),
sive gay and lesbian psychology. Dunlap’s con- pp. 35–61.
tradictions illustrate the tensions inherent in “Antidotes for Superstitions Concerning
the development of psychology of that period. Human Heredity,” Scientific Monthly 51
(1940): 221–5.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A System of Psychology (New York, 1912). Further Reading
On Outline of Psychobiology (Baltimore, Amer Nat Bio, Bio Dict Psych by Zusne,
Md., 1914). Encyc Psych, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v39,
Mysticism, Freudianism, and Scientific Who Was Who in Amer v2
Psychology (St. Louis, 1920). Boxer, Andrew M., and Joseph M. Carrier.
Personal Beauty and Racial Betterment (St. “Evelyn Hooker: A Life Remembered,”
Louis, 1920). Journal of Homosexuality 36 (1998):
The Elements of Scientific Psychology (St. 1–17.
Louis, 1922). Dorcus, Roy M. “Knight Dunlap:
Old and New Viewpoints in Psychology (St. 1875–1949,” American Journal of
682
DUPRÉ
Psychology 63 (1950): 114–19. He is a member of the American Academy of

Kornfeld, Alfred D. “Contributions to the Arts and Sciences and a foreign member of
History of Psychology: Achievement, the Royal Belgian Academy of Arts, Sciences,
Eminence, and Histories of Psychology: and Letters. He was honored with honorary
The Case of Knight Dunlap,” doctorates from several universities.
Psychological Reports 68 (1991): 368–70. Dupré has written over a dozen books and
Moore, Kate Gordon. “Knight Dunlap: has edited another five. He has published over
1875–1949,” Psychological Review 50 200 articles in a variety of scholarly journals
(1949): 309–10. and books, illustrating the breadth of his
Zenderland, Leila. Measuring Minds: Henry knowledge and the expanse of his scholarship.
Herbert Goddard and the Origins of Some of his books have been translated into
American Intelligence Testing (New York, Dutch, French, German, Polish, Spanish,
1998). Chinese, and Korean.
The main subjects of his writing have been
David C. Devonis social ethics (especially concerning Marxism),
philosophy of religion, and philosophy of
culture. His early work shows a strong influ-
ence of G. W. F. Hegel and Karl Marx. After
1972, Ernst Cassirer’s influence became more
pronounced, as he moved toward a symbolic
DUPRÉ, Louis Karel (1925– ) analysis of the religious act and of the devel-
opment of cultural processes. Early and late,
Louis Dupré was born on 16 April 1925 in Dupré’s method shows the strong impact of
Veerle, Belgium. He received a PhD in philos- Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology undergone
ophy from the Catholic University of Louvain during his philosophical formation.
in 1952. His doctoral dissertation on the Increasingly his cultural analysis has moved
starting point of Marxist philosophy was pub- in an ontological direction. The crucial transi-
lished two years later under a government tion for him is that from Immanuel Kant to the
grant. In 1958, he emigrated to the United great German idealists Johann Fichte, Friedrich
States and later became a naturalized citizen in Schelling, and Hegel.
1966. He taught philosophy at Georgetown Dupré has also written a number of shorter
University in Washington, D.C., from 1958 to works on spiritual life and mysticism, analyz-
1972, rising through the ranks from an instruc- ing the modern problematic of regaining a
tor to full professor. In 1973 he became the T. sense of transcendence in a secularized world.
Lawrason Riggs Professor in Philosophy of He argues that modern believers have no
Religion at Yale University, remaining until choice but to embrace an inward spiritual turn,
his retirement in 1998. similar to the one the mystics took, as they find
Dupré has lectured at universities in the themselves in the desert of modern atheism.
United States, Belgium, The Netherlands, In his trilogy on the evolution of modern
Ireland, and Italy. He was President of the culture – Passage to Modernity (1993), The
American Catholic Philosophical Association Enlightenment and the Intellectual
in 1971 and President of the Hegel Society of Foundations of Modern Culture (2004), and a
America in 1972–3. His many national and third volume on Romanticism (not completed
international honors include Yale’s Phi Beta at the time of this writing) – Dupré discusses
Kappa Award as Teacher of the Year in 1996, how the classical synthesis of cosmos, gods,
and the Aquinas Medal from the American and humans, expanded yet basically main-
Catholic Philosophical Association in 1997. tained through the Middle Ages, began to be
683
DUPRÉ
subverted in nominalist thought. It still Religious Mystery and Rational Reflection:

survived, though heavily transformed, in the Excursions in the Phenomenology and
modern stages of the early Italian Humanism, Philosophy of Religion (Grand Rapids,
Renaissance, and Baroque periods. Here the Mich., 1998).
human individual moved to the foreground, Symbols of the Sacred (Grand Rapids,
yet the synthesis remained solidly anchored in Mich., 2000). Contains selections from
a transcendent basis. In the post-Cartesian The Other Dimension and Transcendent
period it collapsed, when human reason Selfhood.
became the sole source of meaning and value. The Enlightenment and the Intellectual
The postmodern reaction against Foundations of Modern Culture (New
Enlightenment rationalism still remains Haven, Conn., 2004).
grounded in Enlightenment principles. These
three works combine theology, history, and Other Relevant Works
the arts in a philosophical analysis of the Ed. with Francis Eterovich et al., Approaches
problems of modern culture. to Morality: Readings in Ethics from
Classical Philosophy to Existentialism
BIBLIOGRAPHY (New York, 1966).
Het vertrekpunt der marxistische Ed., Faith and Reflection by Henry Duméry,
wijsbegeerte: De kritiek op Hegels trans. S. McNiernery and M. B. Murphy
staatsrecht (Antwerp, Belgium, 1954). (New York, 1968).
Kierkegaard As Theologian: The Dialectic of “Mysticism,” in The Encyclopedia of
Christian Existence (New York, 1963). Religion, ed. Mircea Eliade (New York,
Contraception and Catholics: A New 1987), vol. 10, pp. 245–61.
Appraisal (Baltimore, Md., 1964). Ed. with James Wiseman, Light from Light:
The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism An Anthology of Christian Mysticism
(New York, 1966). (New York, 1988).
The Other Dimension: A Search for the Ed. with Don Saliers, Christian Spirituality
Meaning of Religious Attitudes (New III: Post-Reformation and Modern (New
York, 1972). York, 1989).
Transcendent Selfhood: The Loss and Ed., Nicholas of Cusa. Special Issue:
Rediscovery of the Inner Life (New York, American Catholic Philosophical
1976). Quarterly 64 (1990).
A Dubious Heritage: Studies in the “Postmodernity or Late Modernity?
Philosophy of Religion after Kant (New Ambiguities in Richard Rorty’s Thought,”
York, 1977). Review of Metaphysics 47 (1993):
The Deeper Life: An Introduction to 277–95.
Christian Mysticism (New York, 1981). “Cultural Variety and Metaphysical Unity,”
Marx’s Social Critique of Culture (New in The Practice of Cultural Analysis, ed.
Haven, Conn., 1983). Mieke Bal (Stanford, Cal., 1999), pp.
The Common Life: The Origins of 255–67.
Trinitarian Mysticism and Its Development
by Jan Ruusbroec (New York, 1984). Further Reading
Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Casarella, Peter, and George Schner, eds.
Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture (New Christian Spirituality and the Culture of
Haven, Conn., 1993). Modernity: The Thought of Louis Dupré
Metaphysics and Culture (Milwaukee, Wisc., (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1998).
1994). Levesque, Paul J. Symbols of Transcendence:
684
DURANT
Religious Expression in the Thought of Labor Temple School. A publisher attending

Louis Dupré (Louvain, Belgium, 1997). Durant’s lecture on Plato was so impressed
Contains a bibliography of Dupré’s that he asked Durant to write it out for publi-
writings. cation. Out of this and subsequent lectures and
essays grew The Story of Philosophy (1926).
Paul J. Levesque This survey of the history of philosophy quickly
and unexpectedly became an extraordinary
best-seller, passing two million copies in just a
few years (and it is still in print in many lan-
guages), enabling Durant to retire from
teaching in 1927. Durant’s next book,
DURANT, William James (1885–1981) Transition: A Sentimental Story of One Mind
and One Era, was published in 1927, in which
Will Durant was born on 5 November 1885 in he detailed his intellectual evolution, from
North Adams, Massachusetts. His early edu- Catholicism and socialism, to Spinoza and
cation was by Catholic nuns and priests in Darwin and the problems that can attend the
parochial schools and later in the Jesuit college loss of one’s religious faith. In 1929, Durant’s
of St. Peter’s in Jersey City, where he received The Mansions of Philosophy was published, in
the BA in 1907. He entered the seminary at which his views on logic and epistemology,
Seton Hall in 1909, but withdrew in 1911 after metaphysics, ethics, politics, aesthetics, religion,
reading Spinoza’s Ethics and losing his faith in and history were presented.
organized religion. He agreed to continue for From 1930 to 1975, Durant devoted
two years further at Seton Hall as professor of himself to the concept of history as a form of
Latin, French, English, and geometry. After philosophy, resulting in the creation of the
Durant passed from this quiet seminary, he eleven-volume Story of Civilization, for which
traveled in the most radical circles in New he was awarded the Pulitzer Prize (1968) and
York, and from 1911 to 1913 he was employed Medal of Freedom (1977). Durant died on 7
as the sole teacher of the Ferrer Modern School, November 1981 in Los Angeles, California.
an experiment in libertarian education. Durant His last book, Heroes of History, published
resigned his post when he fell in love and posthumously in 2001, represented his final
married one of his pupils, Ariel, in 1913. From attempt to present history as “philosophy
1913 to 1917, he took graduate work at teaching by examples.”
Columbia University, specializing in philosophy
under F. J. E. WOODBRIDGE and John DEWEY. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Durant’s dissertation, “Philosophy and the Philosophy and the Social Problem (New
Social Problem,” expanded on Dewey’s prag- York, 1917).
matic view that philosophy should concern The Story of Philosophy: The Lives and
itself with social utility, rather than with issues Opinions of the Greater Philosophers
of epistemology. He received the PhD in 1917, (New York, 1926).
and taught philosophy at Columbia University Transition: A Sentimental Story of One Mind
for half a year. and One Era (New York, 1927).
During his graduate studies, Durant had The Mansions of Philosophy: A Survey of
begun lecturing on history, literature, biology, Human Life and Destiny (New York,
psychology, and philosophy at Labor Temple 1929). Revised as The Pleasures of
on Second Avenue in New York. Durant Philosophy (New York, 1953).
prepared and delivered these lectures twice a “An Amateur’s Philosophy,” in American
week for thirteen years, and founded there the Philosophies Today and Tomorrow, ed.
685
DURANT
Horace M. Kallen and Sidney Hook (New University in 1967, and Case lecturer at Case
York, 1935). Western Reserve University in 1967. In 1969
The Story of Civilization, with Ariel Durant, Dworkin went to England as Chair of
11 vols (New York, 1935–75). Jurisprudence at the University of Oxford, suc-
The Lessons of History (New York, 1968). ceeding H. L. A. Hart, and he held this chair
A Dual Autobiography, with Ariel Durant until 1998. He was also Fellow of University
(New York, 1977). College, Oxford, during this time.
Heroes of History (New York, 2001). Dworkin returned to America to teach at
The Greatest Minds and Ideas of All Time, Princeton University in 1974, and then became
ed. John Little (New York, 2002). professor of law at New York University in
1975, while continuing to hold his chair at
Further Reading Oxford. Dworkin has also served as Rosenthal
Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, lecturer at Northwestern University in 1975,
Comp Amer Thought, Who Was Who in academic freedom lecturer at the University of
Amer v7, Who’s Who in Phil Witwatersrand in South Africa in 1976, profes-
Frey, Raymond. William James Durant: An sor-at-large at Cornell University during
Intellectual Biography (Lewiston, N.Y., 1976–82, visiting professor of philosophy and
1991). law in 1977 and visiting professor of philosophy
during 1979–82 at Harvard University, and as
John Little Roscoe Pound Lecturer at the University of
Nebraska in 1979. At present he holds joint
appointments as Frank Henry Sommer Professor
of Law and professor of philosophy at New
York University, as well as Quain Professor of
Jurisprudence at University College London
DWORKIN, Ronald Myles (1931– ) (since 1998), and he works with philosophers
and lawyers at both institutions. Additionally,
Ronald M. Dworkin was born on 11 December Dworkin served as a delegate to the Democratic
1931 in Worcester, Massachusetts. He received National Convention in 1972 and 1976. He is
a BA degree from Harvard University in 1953, a member of Democrats Abroad, serving as
another BA and an MA from the University of Chair during 1972–4, the Democratic Charter
Oxford in 1955 and the LL.B. from Harvard in Commission, the Programme Committee of the
1957. For the next year he served as Harvard Ditchley Foundation, and is a consultant on
Law School clerk for Judge Learned HAND at human rights to the Ford Foundation. He has
the United States Court of Appeals for the received honorary degrees from Yale University,
Second Circuit in Manhattan. Dworkin then Williams College, and John Jay College of
became an associate at the Sullivan & Criminal Justice, and is a fellow of the British
Cromwell law firm in New York in 1958 and Academy and the American Academy of Arts
was admitted to the bar in 1959. and Letters.
Dworkin’s academic career started as assis- Dworkin’s groundbreaking work in the phi-
tant professor of law at Yale University in losophy of law and in legal theory will be a
1962. He was promoted to professor in 1965, major influence for years to come in the United
and was Wesley N. Hohfeld Professor of States as well as the United Kingdom. Lauded
Jurisprudence in 1968–9. In addition, he was by liberals and respected by conservatives for
visiting professor of philosophy at Princeton his expertise in and contributions to jurispru-
University in 1963, Gauss seminarian in dence, as well as for the originality of his liberal
1965–6, visiting professor of law at Stanford views, Dworkin has gone from “the Yank at
686
DWORKIN
Oxford” to a world-renowned figure in con- with one’s ability to share in the national pros-
temporary legal theory and political philoso- perity. His theory also entails a certain perspec-
phy. Honored by philosophers, political scien- tive on life, as one is responsible toward society
tists, and legal experts, he has published a to assist the maintenance of the legal system by
number of books and numerous articles in following the laws set forth. Within this illus-
various journals and law reviews. Dworkin’s tration, Dworkin exemplifies an important
scope crosses a number of different disciplines; overlap between law and ethics. Equality is also
he weaves together sophisticated legal, political, defined in terms of the equal concern for the
and philosophical theories and inquiries with a interests and well-being of all citizens within a
great deal of clarity. His extensive work in the community. Further, he identifies constitutional
New York Review of Books is also notable – he law as the greatest current concern in judicial
published eighty articles there between 1968 affairs. This concern, according to Dworkin, lies
and the spring of 2003 – as is his work for the in two parts. The first deals with the topic of the
United States Congress on legal aspects of liberty a citizen holds in a democracy. He claims
Alzheimer’s disease. His debates with H. L. A. that we must find the line that separates the
Hart and Catherine MacKinnon, and his com- majority’s rights to determination and the rights
mentary on the 2000 US presidential election of the individual that the majority may not deter-
have also garnered interest toward his work. mine. Second, Dworkin claims that constitu-
Dworkin’s major writings bring together the tional law must also deal with a clear conception
views of influential judges, philosophers, and of equality that can be set as a reachable goal. A
politicians in sophisticated analyses, which gen- major issue in this debate from Dworkin’s per-
erally deal with important contemporary issues spective is found in the distribution of wealth and
such as constitutional law. His observations opportunity.
often include a detailed account of the political The greater portion of his major works con-
and social implications of defective past and tributes additions of a moral perspective to
present practices, as well as advice on the various aspects of the American legal system.
improvement of our present conditions. However, his distinction between the “inside-
Dworkin’s account of law is directly connected out” and “outside-in” relationships between
to a view of moral principles, to an ethics. In theory and practice may also prove to be quite
holding onto the democratic ideal of equality as influential to the more general philosophical
a fundamental virtue, he advances a theory of world. In explaining his methods of approach
interpretation of law that rests on a moral base. in Sovereign Virtue (2000), Dworkin may have
His addition of integrity as a means for inter- uncovered the solution to the contemporary
preting law is as admirable as it is inspirational. philosophical debate over theory and practice.
After pointing out the shortcomings of more According to Dworkin, one manner of inquiry,
traditional and present ruling methods of inter- which he labels the inside-out approach, begins
pretation, Dworkin builds a theory rooted in with a controversial issue and works toward a
the foundation of morality with integrity and structure of theory. On the other hand, one
equality at its core. Additionally, he hopes to may begin with theory and seek to apply it by
promote a system that would increase the con- some practical means later. This is his illustra-
sistency and fairness of verdicts made by judges tion of the outside-in approach. This distinction
by rooting their decisions in a moral framework. drawn by Dworkin certainly will have
Dworkin always stands up for the rights of the American pragmatists scratching their heads
individual, but never in a blind or unqualified over their blur of any concrete distinction
fashion. between theory and practice at all.
Rather than leave the ideal of equality as vague Dworkin’s first book, Taking Rights
and undefined, Dworkin expresses a connection Seriously (1977), was both highly acclaimed
687
DWORKIN
and controversial. In it, he deems the “ruling tions regarding the distribution of wealth in a
theory” of law as defective. According to society of equal individuals.
Dworkin, this ruling theory is made up of two Dworkin’s A Matter of Principle (1985)
distinct parts: legal positivism and utilitarian- includes the roots of much of the work that
ism. Both of these parts fail in their treatment would follow it. For example, here we find an
of individual rights. He argues that the phe- illustration of the practice of adjudication as
nomenological failure of legal positivism is primarily an issue not of policy, but of princi-
found in its view that individuals have rights, ple. Additionally, Dworkin includes a good
but only to the extent that they have been deal of discussion on and explanation of his
created by law or social practice in some conception of liberalism. Each essay in this
explicit manner. On the other hand, the utili- work deals with important issues of political
tarianism of Jeremy Bentham completely denies philosophy and legal theory. In this book,
the existence of natural rights altogether. In Dworkin claims to combine practical problems
response to the inadequacies of their combined with philosophical theory. The collection
effect, Dworkin provides his own “liberal demonstrates a number of contexts in which he
theory of law,” by which individual rights are advances the relationship between moral prin-
not distinguished by or demanded in relation to ciple and law. Other topics in these essays deal
liberty, but are determined in relation to with discrimination (both academic and
equality. The impact of this step is tremendous, employment), methods of adjudication, cen-
as it defuses the longtime conflict between sorship, and the freedom of the press.
liberty and other important values. Rights, Dworkin’s 1986 book Law’s Empire
according to Dworkin, are not always had provides a further point of view on law with a
merely because of explicit legislation; they exist heavy philosophical slant as well as a detailed
prior to such action and the justification for analysis on interpretation of law. The primary
these rights is found in equality. He identifies an topic of his discussion revolves around his
ethical basis as the fundamental purpose of all answer to the question over the ability of law
law, which is the equal treatment of all citizens to rule based on the silence, lack of clarity, and
within a community. In addition, Dworkin ambiguity of law books. Judges, according to
applies his theory to several important court Dworkin, do not merely apply past legal deci-
cases and deals with social issues such as civil sions to present cases – they must also interpret
disobedience, reverse discrimination, and the these past decisions as well. After dismissing the
controversial aspects of rights. contemporary conventionalist and pragmatist
His defense of liberalism in his 1983 points of view on the interpretation of law
“Neutrality, Equality, and Liberalism” based on their shortcomings, Dworkin provides
advances his view that certain important ideals his alternative view of “law as integrity.” The
are not in conflict with each other. In this case, conventionalist method is too rooted in tradi-
he deals with the importance of the neutrality tion and the established authority for
of government regarding affairs of personal Dworkin’s taste, while the pragmatist perspec-
morality and the responsibility of the govern- tive is so disconnected that one may interpret
ment to reduce economic inequality. In this the law in a manner that suits the individual’s
essay, Dworkin provides his argument against advantage. In constructing a method by which
the conception of a moral majority, as made the past may be read into the future regarding
famous by the Reverend Jerry Falwell, for legal decisions, Dworkin illustrates a further
example, and the economic views of the “New injection of morality into the legal system.
Right.” In addition, he clarifies the meaning of In Life’s Dominion (1993), Dworkin
the term “liberalism” by explicating its princi- channels his attention on the issues of abortion
ples noted above, and raises important ques- and euthanasia. Regarding the 1973 case of
688
DWORKIN
Roe v. Wade, Dworkin maintains that by detailed view of how collective action relates to
deciding the Texas law against abortion was the decisions made based on interpretations of
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court, which he the Constitution. It is clear that his influence in
notes is an appointed and unelected branch of the future of legal interpretation will be mon-
government, in effect made law. In this work, umental. This work also deals with important
Dworkin sifts through the rhetoric of both sides social issues such as abortion, euthanasia, affir-
of the issue of abortion, provides an analysis mative action, race, homosexuality, and free
that is both philosophic and scientific, and speech, while analyzing major decisions such as
relates this all to constitutional law. From his Roe v. Wade, the Cruzan case, and the New
perspective, abortion is not a matter that rests York Times v. Sullivan. The inclusion of his
on the rights of the fetus, but on the intrinsic debate with Catherine MacKinnon over the
value of human life. Not only does Dworkin legality of pornography also is noteworthy, as
shed new light on this issue that includes impor- is his discussion of the defeat of Judge Robert
tant constitutional and political implications, he Bork and the nomination of Judge Clarence
also defuses the religious controversy that has Thomas.
dominated the debate over abortion and Dworkin ends Freedom’s Law on a personal
replaced it with philosophic debate. Dworkin note, with a tribute to Judge Learned Hand. In
further compares the question of abortion with the 1890s, Hand studied philosophy with
that of euthanasia and again provides a detailed George S ANTAYANA , Josiah R OYCE , and
philosophical discussion on human life, high- William JAMES at Harvard. Hand, a liberal who
lighting the social and political implications of would turn off the lights in his own and other
euthanasia. According to his view, the debate judges’ chambers before leaving for the day in
over euthanasia must include recognition for order to save the taxpayers’ money, was a great
respect for the choice of the patient, his or her influence on Dworkin and deeply respected by
best interests, and the intrinsic value of human him. This is evident from chapter 17, “Learned
life. In addition, Dworkin echoes his perspective Hand.” Further, Dworkin identifies Hand as
of ethical individualism, i.e., the view that one of the best judges the United States has
humans have a moral responsibility to actual- ever had in Law’s Empire. In addition to Hand,
ize their potential to the fullest and make some- Dworkin also often refers to Isaiah Berlin and
thing good out of life. John RAWLS in his writings, and he has been
His 1996 work Freedom’s Law provides influenced by the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg
additional suggestions for a stronger bond Gadamer.
between ethics and the legal system in order to His 1996 essay “We Need a New
enhance the latter. In this book, Dworkin Interpretation of Academic Freedom” exposes
advances his perspective of the American the depth and scope of Dworkin’s work. Not
Constitution and the interpretation of this only has he contributed a great deal to politi-
document by Supreme Court Judges in the cal philosophy and jurisprudence, he also has
United States. Claiming that Americans are provided an insightful analysis of academic
confused over the meaning of the Constitution freedom with important suggestions as to how
and the procedures for its interpretation, this liberty ought to be interpreted. In this essay,
Dworkin analyzes different methods. The he maintains a strong connection between
moral reading of the Constitution that he rec- ethical individualism and academic freedom.
ommends preserves the ideals that he deems are This connection gives rise to certain duties to be
found in any real democracy, by which certain upheld by the citizens of a community.
types of constitutional clauses are seen as According to Dworkin, citizens have direct
“moral principles.” In his observations on rep- responsibilities to speak out for that which they
resentative government, Dworkin provides a believe to be true, and to not declare what they
689
DWORKIN
believe false. His view of ethical individualism His latest offering to the American legal
demands that each person live life in a thought- system is found in A Badly Flawed Election
ful manner. Academic freedom, he claims, relates (2002), a collection of essays Dworkin edited,
to the responsibility to preserve independence in with contributions by him, Judge Richard
our culture. However, he admits that this POSNER, Arthur SCHLESINGER, Jr., and Lawrence
freedom may be compromised only when Tribe, among others. Dworkin claims that the
another value of greater importance or urgency situation was completely mishandled and refers
must be protected, and illustrates lines that to the Supreme Court’s decision as “pragmatic
academic freedom must not cross in regards to adjudication.” However, he not only critically
free speech. His “DeFunis v. Sweatt,” which analyzes the results of the 2000 election and the
includes discussion on equal treatment of citizens fallout from the decision, but also provides
by institutions of higher education, is also an suggestions for election reform to insure that
important contribution to the academic world. such an unprecedented fiat and national fiasco
Dworkin’s Sovereign Virtue (2000) provides will never happen again.
a further inquiry into the subject of equality
among citizens. In it he returns to a number of BIBLIOGRAPHY
themes from his previous writings. The expan- Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.,
sion of his view of equality presented in his first 1977).
book Taking Rights Seriously is quite notable. The Philosophy of Law (Oxford, 1977).
Dworkin identifies equality as the fundamental A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, Mass.,
virtue to any democracy and as key for the legit- 1985).
imacy of any form of government. In this work, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Mass., 1986).
he explores different models of equality, such as A Bill of Rights for Britain (London, 1990).
that of welfare and resources, and illustrates Foundations of a Liberal Equality (Salt Lake
equality of resources as the more desirable City, Utah, 1990).
model. Equality is properly defined in terms of Life’s Dominion: An Argument about
the equality of concern over the citizens of a Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual
community according to Dworkin. Since “indis- Freedom (New York, 1993).
criminate equality” is never an acceptable Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the
practice, he maintains that society should set American Constitution (Cambridge, Mass.,
out as a goal the equal concern for all and notes 1996).
the implications this view would have on the Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of
making and enactment of law. He also returns Equality (Cambridge, Mass., 2000).
to an examination of the relationship between
equality and liberty, again rejecting the tradi- Other Relevant Works
tional view that these two ideals are exclusive of “On Not Prosecuting Civil Disobedience,”
one another and in direct conflict with each New York Review of Books (6 June 1968):
other. In addition, Dworkin includes another 14–21.
primary message from his prior works: his “DeFunis v. Sweatt,” in Equality and
theory of ethical individualism. The responsi- Preferential Treatment, ed. Marshall
bility each person holds for the success of their Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas
life and the choices they make is an integral Scanlon (Princeton, N.J., 1977), pp.
acknowledgment for the advancement of society. 63–83.
Dworkin further treats current social issues such “The Bakke Decision: Did it Decide
as campaign finance reform, health care, genetic Anything?” The New York Review of
experimentation, and affirmative action, among Books (17 August 1978): 20–25.
others, in this work. “Neutrality, Equality, and Liberalism,” in
690
DWORKIN
Liberalism Reconsidered, ed. Douglas Forsyth, Murray G., H. M. A. Keens-Soper,

MacLean and Claudia Mills (Totawa, N.J., and Maurice Keens-Soper, eds. Political
1983), pp. 1–11. Classics: Green to Dworkin (Oxford,
“Pragmatism, Right Answers, and True 1996).
Banality,” in Pragmatism in Law and George, Robert P. Making Men Moral: Civil
Society, ed. Michael Brint and William Liberties and Public Morality (Oxford,
Weaver (Boulder, Col., 1991), pp. 359–88. 1993).
“We Need a New Interpretation of Academic Gordon, Richard, and Richard Wilmot-
Freedom,” in The Future of Academic Smith, eds. Human Rights in the United
Freedom, ed. Louis Menard (Chicago, Kingdom (Oxford, 1997).
1996), pp. 181–98. Guest, Stephen. Ronald Dworkin (Stanford,
Ed., A Badly Flawed Election: Debating Bush Cal., 1991).
v. Gore, the Supreme Court, and American Honeyball, Simon, and James Walter.
Democracy (New York, 2002). Integrity, Community and Interpretation:
Ed. with Mark Lilla and Robert Silvers, The A Critical Analysis of Ronald Dworkin’s
Legacy of Isaiah Berlin (New York, 2002). Theory of Law (Aldershot, UK, 1998).
“The Court and the University,” New York Hunt, Alan and Andrew Altman, eds.
Review of Books (15 May 2003): 8–11. Reading Dworkin Critically (New York,
1992).
Further Reading Posner, Richard. Overcoming Law
Bio 20thC Phils, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, (Cambridge, Mass., 1995).
Encyc Ethics, Oxford Comp Phil, Scalia, Antonin. A Matter of Interpretation:
Routledge Encycl Phil Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton,
Burley, Justine, ed. Dworkin and His Critics N.J., 1997).
(Malden, Mass., 2004).
Cohen, Marshall. Ronald Dworkin and Jeffrey R. Post
Contemporary Jurisprudence (Totawa,
N.J., 1984).
691
E
EARLE, William Alexander, Jr. (1919–88) books. In Objectivity (1955) Earle presents a
phenomenological account of objectivity.
William Earle was born on 18 February 1919 in Seventeen years later, in The Autobiographical
Saginaw, Michigan. In 1941 he received his BA Consciousness (1972), he gives an existentialist
from the University of Chicago. In 1948, after account of subjectivity. In his next two books,
having served in the army during World War II, Mystical Reason (1980) and Evanescence
he received a PhD from the University of Aix- (1984), Earle returns to the transcendental ego,
Marseilles where he had studied on a Rockefeller which had been abandoned by phenomenolo-
Fellowship. In 1953, under the direction of gists and existentialists alike, treating it as indis-
Charles HARTSHORNE, he received a PhD in phi- pensable for the understanding of both objec-
losophy from the University of Chicago, writing tivity and subjectivity. In Mystical Reason, Earle
a dissertation titled “Thought and Its Object.” In moreover paired the transcendental ego with
1948, Earle joined the philosophy department at the ontological argument, claiming that the tran-
Northwestern University, where he stayed until scendental ego is “God thinking Himself, the
his retirement. During this period, he was a self-awareness of absolute reality.” (1980)
visiting professor at Yale, Harvard, and An accomplished filmmaker and photogra-
Stanford. He received an ACLS Fellowship in pher, Earle was deeply interested in the philos-
1959 and a Carnegie Foundation Grand for ophy of film, resulting in 1987 in A Surrealism
research in the Far East in 1965. Earle died on of the Movies, a book on the aesthetics of film.
16 October 1988 in Evanston, Illinois. In this book Earle sides with the running critique
Earle was one of the first proponents of exis- of surrealist filmmakers against what he con-
tentialism and phenomenology in the United sidered the ineffable boredom of cinemato-
States. He was one of the founders of the Society graphic realism. Imaginary Memoirs (privately
for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, published) is Earle’s autobiography. The first
and general editor of Studies in Phenomenology volume, covering the years 1919 to 1960, details
and Existential Philosophy. Together with John much of Earle’s student life at Chicago and his
D. Wild and James M. Edie, Earle played a key professional career, whereas the last two volumes
role in the Northwestern graduate program in contain travel logs from 1965 to 1978.
philosophy, which became a stronghold of con-
tinental philosophy in the United States. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Earle sought to reconnect contemporary con- Objectivity: An Essay in Phenomenological
tinental thought with its roots, especially the Ontology (Chicago, 1955).
rationalism of Descartes and Spinoza, and the The Autobiographical Consciousness
transcendental philosophy of Kant and Hegel. (Chicago, 1972).
The core of Earle’s thought is laid out in four Public Sorrows and Private Pleasures
692
EASTMAN
(Bloomington, Ind., 1976). American Indian at the start of the twentieth

Mystical Reason (Chicago, Ill., 1980). century, Eastman became a leading voice for
A Surrealism of the Movies (Chicago, Ill., tribal rights. Like B LACK E LK , Gertrude
1987). BONNIN, and Luther STANDING BEAR, who
Evanescence: Peri-phenomenological Essays were all born and/or raised as Sioux in the
(Chicago, Ill., 1984). Dakota Territories in the 1860s and 1870s,
Eastman tried to preserve and record his Indian
Other Relevant Works culture, traditions, and ways of thought.
“The Paradox and Death of God,” in Eastman’s mother died when he was an
Christianity and Existentialism, with James infant, and he was separated from his father at
M. Edie and John D. Wild (Evanston, Ill., the age of four when the Minnesota Uprising
1963). of 1862–3 forced several members of his
The Autobiographical Conciousness family into exile. His uncle and grandmother
(Evanston, Ill., 1982). escaped US troops by going to North Dakota
Imaginary Memoirs, 3 vols, with drawings by and Manitoba, taking young Charles with
Corban LePell (Evanston, Ill., 1986). them, while his father stayed behind. By the
time the family was reunited eleven years later,
Further Reading his father had converted to Christianity and
Proc of APA v63, Who Was Who in Amer encouraged Charles and his brother John to be
v9 educated at white schools.
The Life of the Transcendental Ego: Essays After graduating from medical school,
in Honor of William Earle, ed. Edward S. Eastman was a US government physician at
Casey and Donald V. Morano (Albany, Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota from
N.Y., 1986). Contains a bibliography of 1890 to 1893, where he witnessed the
Earle’s writings. Wounded Knee massacre and treated those
who survived this horrific event. He served
Cornelis de Waal the government in other capacities as well. He
was the physician at the Crow Creek
Reservation, an analyzer of the allotment of
tribal lands, and an inspector of reservations.
Eastman taught for a short time at the
Carlisle Indian Training School, an institution
EASTMAN, Charles Alexander known for its rigid military style of discipline
(1858–1939) and forced assimilation policies. After teaching
at the school, Eastman became a proponent of
Charles A. Eastman was born on 19 February partial assimilation, allowing individual Native
1858 in the Santee Reservation near Redwood American people to pick and choose which
Falls, Minnesota. His father was Ite Wakanhdi customs and practices of white culture they
Ota “Many Lightnings” (Jacob) Eastman, a wished to adopt. Years later, he was among the
Wahpeton Sioux, and his mother was founders of the Society of American Indians in
Wakantan Kanwin “the Goddess” (Mary 1911, through which he lobbied for Indian
Nancy) Eastman. In 1862 Charles received the citizenship and decried the poor living condi-
name “Ohiyesa,” meaning “the Winner.” tions on Indian reservations. In 1933 he was
Eastman was educated at Dartmouth College recognized with the first Indian Council Fire
where he received his BS in 1887, and then he achievement award in 1933 for his efforts to
graduated from Boston University School of encourage understanding between Indians and
Medicine in 1890. As the most educated non-Indians. He wrote a number of works on
693
EASTMAN
Native American issues, some with his wife BIBLIOGRAPHY

Elaine Goodale, a poet whom he married in Indian Boyhood (New York, 1902;
1891. Eastman died on 8 January 1939 in Lincoln, Nebr., 1991).
Detroit, Michigan. Red Hunters and the Animal People (New
Eastman was part folklorist, retelling tradi- York, 1904; New York, 1976).
tional tales and shedding light on their Old Indian Days (New York, 1907;
meaning. He was also part apologist, explain- Lincoln, Nebr., 1991).
ing to his white audience where the roots of The Soul of the Indian (Boston, 1911;
traditional beliefs and practices lie, and encour- Lincoln, Nebr., 1980).
aging respect of Native American world views. The Indian To-day: The Past and Future of
In his most theoretical work, The Soul of the the First American (Garden City, N.Y.,
Indian (1911), Eastman describes common 1915; New York, 1975).
practices in Native American life and explains From the Deep Woods to Civilization:
their rationale. The sweatlodge and vision Chapters in the Autobiography of an
quest, for example, are similar to Christian Indian (Boston, 1916; Mineola, N.Y.,
rites, like confession and communion. They 2003).
prepare the seeker for spiritual renewal and Indian Heroes and Great Chieftains
enlightenment. Native Americans are silent (Boston, 1918; Mineola, N.Y., 1997).
about these and other spiritual practices, Light on the Indian World: The Essential
because they believe them to be deeply Writings of Charles Eastman (Ohiyesa),
personal experiences in which the Great Spirit ed. Michael Fitzgerald (Bloomington,
communicates to each person individually. A Ind., 2002).
vision quest is shared only when the seeker
considers it to be of importance to the larger Further Reading
community. Amer Nat Bio, Who Was Who in Amer v4
In The Soul of the Indian Eastman makes Hertzberg, Hazel W. The Search for an
insightful observations about the ways in American Indian Identity (Syracuse,
which Native American life and belief systems N.Y., 1971).
are in some ways vastly different from and in Miller, David R. “Eastman, Charles
others surprisingly similar to those of Christian (Ohiyesa),” in Encyclopedia of North
Euro America. But it is also clear that as a American Indians, ed. Frederick Hoxie
well-educated and assimilated person, his (Boston, 1996).
observations were made through a Euro- Tedlock, Dennis, and Barbara Tedlock, eds.
American lens, and perhaps even through early Teachings from the American Earth:
American philosophical idealism. He main- Indian Religion and Philosophy (New
tains, for instance, that there is a sharp divide York, 1975).
between the spiritual and the physical realms Wilson, Raymond. Ohiyesa: Charles
in Native American thought. While on a vision Eastman, Santee Sioux (Urbana, Ill.,
quest, an individual subdues the flesh by 1983).
fasting so that he can gain access to and
strengthen the soul. The soul is “pure spirit” Dorothy Rogers
for Eastman, and is concerned “only with the
essence of things.” All of the ceremonies and
charms that Native Americans employ are
completely symbolic for them, serving in a
sense as a “material or physical prayer.”
694
EDDY
EDDY, Mary Baker (1821–1910) God, the divine Mind, and that Life, Truth,
and Love are all-powerful and ever-present;
Mary Baker Eddy, founder of the First Church that the opposite of Truth – called error, sin,
of Christ Scientist, popularly known as sickness, disease, death – is the false testimony
Christian Science, was born on 16 July 1821 in of false material sense, of mind in matter.”
Bow, New Hampshire, and died on 3 Between 1866 and 1875 Eddy moved from
December 1910 in Pleasant View, near household to household, setting up classes and
Concord, New Hampshire. The Baker family relationships with students and writing Science
was Congregationalist, and Eddy reflected in and Health. All the while she was working
later years about the dual influence of her out the implications for Christianity of her
father’s stern Calvinism and the more love- basic claim that matter is ultimately illusion.
oriented piety of her mother. Her formal edu- She published the results in 1875 in the first
cation – minimal, but not unusual for a child edition of Science and Health with Key to the
of her time, gender, class, and rural location – Scriptures, the primary text, along with the
began in one-room district schools, was inter- Bible, of Christian Science. By 1879 it was
rupted frequently by illness, and concluded clear to Eddy that her original hope of reform-
after a year or two of “academy.” Her learning ing Christianity in light of her teachings would
was occasionally supplemented by tutoring not be realized due to hostility from the estab-
from her brother Albert, home from lished churches, and she founded a church of
Dartmouth College. She married in 1843 and her own. The Manual of the Mother Church
was widowed eighteen months later before her (1895) – the small book that to this day pre-
son was born. During the years between 1844 scribes the structure, governance, and order
and 1866, Eddy lived in a variety of places of worship of Christian Science – quotes
and depended largely on the charity of relatives Eddy’s motion at the 12 April 1879 meeting of
and friends. She gave up custody of her son, the Christian Science Association: “To
entered a lengthy, unhappy marriage with an organize a church designed to commemorate
itinerant dentist and sought treatment - the word and works of our Master, which
hydropathy, homeopathy, mesmerism - for should reinstate Christianity and its lost
persisting physical and emotional ills. In 1862 element of healing.” The Manual specified that
she entered treatment with Phineas Parkhurst the Bible and Science and Health, rather than
Quimby – a Portland, Maine, mesmerist healer human persons, would be the pastors of the
– which association furthered her already Church.
developing conviction that disease was related Over the next thirty years, Eddy continued
to thought. to revise and issue more than fifty new editions
In February 1866, two weeks after of Science and Health; to publish other books,
Quimby’s death, Eddy experienced healing among them Unity of Good and Unreality of
from the injuries of a fall on the ice in Lynn, Evil (1887) and Christian Science: No and Yes
Massachusetts, while reading a gospel story (1891); and to institutionalize Christian
about one of Jesus’s healings. With physical Science through a series of organizations, de-
healing came a “glimpse” of the metaphysi- organizations, and reorganizations. She char-
cal/theological claim on which Christian tered the Massachusetts Metaphysical College
Science is based, a glimpse Eddy describes in in 1881 (and dissolved it in 1890), established
Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures the Journal of Christian Science in 1883, and
(1875): “When apparently near the confines of formed the National Christian Scientist
mortal existence, standing already within the Association in 1886 (adjourned for three years
shadow of the death-valley, I learned these in 1890). The Church was formally de-orga-
truths in divine Science: that all real being is in nized in 1890 and reorganized in 1892. The
695
EDDY
edifice of the Mother Church in Boston was about evil and suffering and what, if anything,
built in 1894, and Eddy founded the Christian God has to do with creating or permitting it.
Science Monitor in 1908. The philosophical claim that matter does not
By the time of her death in 1910, through participate in reality provided the theoretical
her leadership, her publications and the gov- bridge to what Eddy called a “new departure”
ernance structure she had put in place, Eddy in Christianity. At the same time, it imposed on
had assured her ongoing doctrinal authority her the very large task of reinterpreting the
over the Church of Christ, Scientist, and its traditional categories of Christian theology
persistence after her death, in contrast with such as God, human nature, creation, Jesus,
the fate of many new religions upon the death atonement, sin, and prayer. She needed, as
of their founders. A bare facts rendition of the well, to point out the significance of these rein-
institutionalization process of Christian terpretations for the spiritual healing method
Science, while accurate, does not indicate the she was developing.
conflict-ridden nature of that history: law suits, Denying the reality of matter and claiming
fallings-out with former students and rivals, that Spirit is All made it possible for Eddy to
and ridicule by both religious and cultural dissociate God from the creation of the
critics (most popularly known among critics is material world and thus to relieve God of
Mark TWAIN’S Christian Science, published in responsibility for sin and suffering.
1907). Suffice it to say that some of the more Repudiating the doctrine of original sin as key
tumultuous aspects of Mary Baker Eddy’s to understanding the human condition and
history had the functional effect of solidifying replacing it with the interpretation of
her authority and of clarifying the distinctive- humankind as the perfect reflection of
ness of Christian Science healing in comparison Spirit/God narrowed the obligation of
with various other “mind cure” movements. Christians from doing to knowing. Knowing
The church Eddy founded, the convictions the spiritual fact that humankind is already
about the nature of God and of the reality perfect brought about physical and spiritual
upon which its world view is constructed, and healing, though this healing was not the
the spiritual healing method at its core, all primary goal of Christian Science but a by-
derive from her claim that “there is no reality product. Healing, in turn, offered a demon-
in matter.” At one level this is a philosophical stration of the truth of Christian Science and
claim, and because of her insistence on matter reinforced Eddy’s understanding of science as
as ultimately illusory and reality as Spirit or a method of testifying to the universality of
Mind, she has often been labeled a philosoph- divine law and to the absolute certainty with
ical idealist. In a broad sense, that label is which Christian Science claims it can be
accurate; but only up to a point, because it applied.
obscures the dual fact that this category was Placing Mary Baker Eddy and Christian
likely not part of Eddy’s self-understanding Science within American philosophical history
and that her philosophical claim about the and thought is a challenge. The thinkers and
nature of reality functioned primarily as a practitioners who influenced her and whom
bridge to her theological world view. She was she likewise influenced are a combination of
not, for example, indebted to Hegel or mainstream and non-mainstream thinkers. She
Berkeley, as some of her critics have claimed. was a creative but eclectic grassroots thinker
At bottom, no matter the extent to which she who drew over a period of many years from
focused on the nature of reality, Mary Baker multiple sources in order to construct her
Eddy was plagued not so much by philosoph- world view. Eddy was not part of the lineage
ical questions but by the issue of theodicy – the of male academic and ministerial philosophers
part of theology that focuses on questions who have shaped the outlines and insights of
696
EDDY
mainstream American philosophical thought. Scottish common sense realism and thus the
Concepts like philosophical idealism were not evidence of the senses, but embraced nonethe-
available to her by means of traditional, less her own understanding of a scientific
academic, mentor trajectories but found their method that spoke of spiritual facts and
way into her thought more indirectly, often insisted upon the need for a demonstration of
filtered through the medium of popular truth. She shared the conviction of American
culture. A further difficulty in thinking about theological and philosophical pragmatists that
her contributions to American philosophy lies ideas have consequences. She was indebted to
in the fact that scholarly response to her has Quimbian mesmerism, although the extent of
been more polarized than dispassionate. The that indebtedness is a source of ongoing and
phenomenon of “dueling biographies” persists often acrimonious debate. She had experience
to the present. with a variety of alternative healing methods
Neither an academic nor a cleric, Eddy was and religious groups such as Spiritualism and
a primary participant in the alternative philo- Theosophy, but she eventually rejected them
sophical and religious thought and religious vehemently, along with “animal magnetism”
movements described variously as “mind (another term for mesmerism) as being too
cure,” “positive thinking,” and New Thought. materialistic. She understood evil as error,
These groups are often referred to as making rather than as a kind of substantive entity. In
up the metaphysical tradition in American The Varieties of Religious Experience, William
religion, although “metaphysical” takes on a James – who calls Christian Science “the most
particular meaning among them, and there is radical branch of mind cure” – considers this
no direct and certainly no sustained connection stance “a bad speculative omission.” As
with the Metaphysical Club of Cambridge, Stephen Gottschalk – a Christian Scientist and
whose mostly Harvard-educated members one of her most sophisticated interpreters –
were characterized by William JAMES as “none points out, Eddy was not a systematic thinker
but the very topmost cream of Boston either philosophically or theologically. On the
manhood.” In Science and Health, Eddy other hand, although she denied the ultimate
asserts that “Metaphysics is above physics, reality of evil and sin, there is no lack of ref-
and matter does not enter into metaphysical erence to the tragic elements of life in her
premises or conclusions. The categories of writings.
metaphysics rest on one basis, the Divine From Eddy’s own perspective she was a
Mind. Metaphysics resolves things into lifelong Christian who had “discovered” (a
thoughts and exchanges the objects of sense for term that is important to Eddy) through reve-
the ideas of Soul.” lation and experience the true nature of reality,
A useful strategy for placing her within the of Jesus’s ministry as a healer, and of
framework of American philosophy is to take Christianity as a healing religion. No matter
one of two different tactics. One tactic is to the extent to which religious critics labeled
stand apart from her and point to those philo- Christian Science heretical, Eddy described
sophical and theological thinkers and worl herself in Science and Health as grounded in
views from whom she drew, directly or indi- Scripture and dependent “unreservedly on the
rectly, or which she rejected. The other tactic teachings of Jesus. Other foundations there
is to portray Eddy’s self-perception. From the are none.” And, whatever the convergence of
outside vantage point, one could say that she vocabularies between Christian Science and
belongs within the general classification of other mind-cure movements, Eddy insisted
philosophical idealism and that she drew from that Christian Science did not hold that sin or
both Calvinism and Emersonian transcenden- sickness were actual conditions that needed to
talism. By implication, at least, she rejected be healed through the application of thought
697
EDDY
but, rather, erroneous belief about the nature Poems (Boston, 1910).
of reality. Prose Works Other than Science and Health
Finally, it is not insignificant that Mary with Key to the Scriptures (Boston, 1925).
Baker Eddy was a woman. She offers an his-
torical example of a person who had no access Further Reading
to positions of leadership in either academy or Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
church and therefore no public forum other Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer
than what she eventually constructed for Thought, Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer
herself. She was consumed, nonetheless, with Religious Bio, Encyc Amer Bio, Encyc
the kinds of theoretical and existential ques- Relig, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v3, Who Was
tions that are addressed in these institutions Who in Amer v1
but outside them as well in more popular ways. Gill, Gillian. Mary Baker Eddy (Reading,
With resources available in her nineteenth- Mass., 1998).
century American culture, she put together a Gottschalk, Stephen. The Emergence of
world view that was sufficiently coherent to Christian Science in American Religious
support a new denomination and to inspire the Life (Berkeley, Cal., 1973).
formation of a number of other groups, among Judah, J. Stillson. The History and
them Religious Science, Divine Science, and Philosophy of the Metaphysical
the Unity School of Christianity. Taken Movements in America (Philadelphia,
together, the two facts of her isolation from the 1967).
major meaning-granting institutions of her Peel, Robert. Mary Baker Eddy: The Years
culture and her founding of a new religious of Discovery (New York, 1966).
movement that persists to the present are a ———, Mary Baker Eddy: The Years of
compelling example of the theological and Authority (New York, 1971).
philosophical creativity that has flourished in ———, Mary Baker Eddy: The Years of
American culture and history. Trial (New York, 1977).
BIBLIOGRAPHY Mary Farrell Bednarowski

Science and Health with Key to the
Scriptures (Boston, 1875; 2nd edn 1891;
3rd edn 1910).
Unity of Good and Unreality of Evil
(Boston, 1887).
Christian Science: No and Yes (Boston, EDEL, Abraham (1908– )
1891).
Retrospection and Introspection (Boston, Abraham Edel was born on 6 December 1908
1892). in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He received his
Manual of the Mother Church (Boston, BA in 1927 and his MA in 1928 from McGill
1895). University, a BA from the University of Oxford
Miscellaneous Writings, 1883–1896 (Boston, in 1930, and a PhD from Columbia University
1897). in 1934, where he came under the strong influ-
The First Church of Christ, Scientist, and ence of John DEWEY’s pragmatism and natu-
Miscellany (Boston, 1913). ralism. He was a member of the philosophy
department of City College of New York from
Other Relevant Works 1931 to 1973, and a distinguished professor of
Eddy’s papers are at the First Church of the CUNY Graduate School during 1970–73.
Christ, Scientist, in Boston. Since his retirement he has been a research pro-
698
EDEL
fessor of philosophy at the University of natural facts. He also claims that, in theory, the
Pennsylvania. He has held visiting appoint- problem of verification or proof in ethics is no
ments at Columbia University, University of different than the problem of proof in any other
California at Berkeley, Swarthmore College, field. There are no special or peculiar methods
and Case Western Reserve University among of verification for ethics as compared with other
others. Edel was an associate at the National factual claims. Naturalism in ethics, which Edel
Humanities Center (1978–9); senior fellow at favors, does not imply that the problems of
the Center for Dewey Studies (1981–2); recip- ethics are simple or easy. It certainly does not
ient of the Butler Silver Medal from Columbia imply that a naturalistic moral philosophy can
University (1959); and a Guggenheim Fellow reach a finality or completeness by laying down
(1944–5). He has been Vice President of the fixed principles. A naturalistic moral philoso-
Eastern Division of the American Philosophical phy must remain open and cannot stop short of
Association (1972–3); President of the fashioning a whole conception of good indi-
American Society of Value Inquiry (1984); and viduals functioning well in a good society.
President of the American Section of the In his first large-scale work Ethical Judgment:
International Association of Philosophy of Law The Use of Science in Ethics (1955), Edel dis-
and Social Philosophy (1973–5). In 1995 Edel cusses at length the problem of ethical relativ-
received the Herbert W. Schneider Award for ity. This, he finds, is not a simple problem. It
contributions to the understanding and devel- has what he terms many strands or elements,
opment of American philosophy from the that morality is a human product, that every-
Society for the Advancement of American thing changes, that cultural diversity exists,
Philosophy. that ethics depends on variable attitudes or
For well over fifty years Abraham Edel has emotions, etc. If everything in life is contingent
explored ethical theory and moral practice in and temporal, does this mean that ethical judg-
his extensive writings. He is the author of ments must be arbitrary or even indeterminate?
numerous works in moral philosophy and col- Does this mean that ethics reduces to expedi-
laborated with Yervant H. KRIKORIAN, his wife ency where there can be no solid or rational
May M. Edel, and Elizabeth FLOWER in works answers or results that can be counted on? Edel
on philosophy and ethics. In all his works he with his naturalism is willing to forgo absolute,
shows a commitment to empirical and scientific final or a priori conclusions for ethics. If ethics
methods which he believes are fruitful toward is to truly apply to the world then its theories
the illumination of ethics. In his 1944 essay on must somehow be tested by experience. Ethics,
“Naturalism and Ethical Theory” he tries to he claims, must make use of science and like
show the superiority of empirical and scien- science be willing to modify its methods and
tific methods for ethics to otherwise unempir- correct its mistakes. This implies that ethical
ical methods of intuition and introspection or judgments are not simply arbitrary but, like
what he calls the apprehension of “essences.” those of science, they are or can be made careful
The value of empirical and scientific method- and rational. Carefulness is itself a scientific
ologies for ethics is that they can be tested, cor- and a moral virtue, testable by its usefulness.
rected, and therefore improved. In answer to Likewise honesty is a value not merely in a
the question whether there are any unique or moral sense, but also in an intellectual sense.
distinctively ethical statements, he alleges that This agrees with Edel’s basic point that moral
there are not. Ethical assertions always have a values are not special or peculiar. Moral values
direct or implied reference to actions or events permeate and are relevant to all human endeav-
of the natural world. There are no ethical ors.
“essences” as separated or isolated from Edel’s 1963 Method in Ethical Theory carries
natural qualities and situations of empirical or further his earlier studies to work out, as he
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EDEL
says, a methodological approach for ethical Ethics, Science, and Democracy: The
theory that attempts to be both critical and Philosophy of Abraham Edel. Many recog-
comprehensive, one that will attempt to do nized scholars including H. S. THAYER, Ralph
justice to the factual as well as the normative W. Sleeper, Elizabeth Flower, and Edmund
functions of ethics. That ethics must be both PINCOFFS offered discussions of central ideas in
descriptive and prescriptive, empirical and val- Edel’s philosophy over the years.
uational or normative, raises the so-called
fact–value or is–ought questions. Is there a gap BIBLIOGRAPHY
between fact and value or between what is the “The Logical Structure of Moore’s Ethical
case and what ought to be the case? Like the Theory,” in The Philosophy of G. E.
problem of relativity in ethics the fact–value or Moore, ed. Paul Schilpp (New York,
is–ought problem has many different strands or 1942), pp. 137–76.
dimensions. Edel does not believe that we can “Naturalism and Ethical Theory,” in
either evade this problem or simply solve it Naturalism and the Human Spirit, ed. Y.
once and for all. His own extensive work is a H. Krikorian (New York, 1944), pp.
demonstration of the need to face anew the 65–95.
problem of how suitable methods can be The Theory and Practice of Philosophy (New
devised which can make piecemeal but not York, 1946).
wholesale progress toward both better theories Ethical Judgment: The Use of Science in
and better applications. Here Edel shows the Ethics (Glencoe, Ill., 1955).
great influence of Dewey’s experimental natu- Anthropology and Ethics, with May Edel
ralism, in his attempt to solve the problems of (Springfield, Ill., 1959).
ethical methodology. Edel, along with his Contemporary Philosophic Problems, with
strong interest in ethics, also kept up an abiding Y. H. Krikorian (New York, 1959).
interest in Aristotle. His dissertation at Science and the Structure of Ethics (Chicago,
Columbia was on Aristotle’s theory of the 1961).
infinite. Subsequently, he published two books Method in Ethical Theory (Indianapolis,
on Aristotle’s philosophy in 1967 and 1982. 1963).
Edel also continued his interest in Dewey. In Aristotle (New York, 1967).
2001 he published Ethical Theory and Social Analyzing Concepts in Social Science (New
Change: The Evolution of John Dewey’s Brunswick, N.J., 1979).
Ethics. In his presidential address to the Exploring Fact and Value (New Brunswick,
American Society for Value Inquiry in 1984, N.J., 1980).
Edel takes up the question of the relation Aristotle and his Philosophy (Chapel Hill,
between ethical theory and moral practice. Like N.C., 1982).
Dewey, he insists that false separations or false “Ethical Theory and Moral Practice: On the
dualisms, between what might be considered Terms of Their Relation,” in New
true or valid in theory and false or unworkable Directions in Ethics: The Challenge of
in practice, must be seen as impediments and Applied Ethics, ed. J. P. DeMarco and R.
not as final positions. Theories must be kept M. Fox (New York, 1986), pp. 317–35.
open to examine new opportunities of inquiry. Ed. with Elizabeth Flower and Finbarr
Practices must be also kept open to do better O’Connor, Morality, Philosophy, and
justice to the actual situations to which they Practice: Historical and Contemporary
apply. As Edel says at the end of his address, the Readings and Studies (Philadelphia, 1989).
full work of a more mature moral philosophy Relating Humanities and Social Thought
remains to be done. (New Brunswick, N.J., 1990).
In 1987 Edel was honored with book called The Struggle For Academic Democracy:
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EDELMAN
Lessons from the 1938 “Revolution” in Graduate Studies. In 1972 Edelman shared the
New York’s City Colleges (Philadelphia, Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine with
1990). British biochemist Rodney Porter for their dis-
In Search of the Ethical: Moral Theory in coveries concerning the chemical structure of
Twentieth-century America (New antibodies, an important consequence of which
Brunswick, N.J., 1993). is being able to prevent the body from rejecting
Critique of Applied Ethics: Reflections and transplanted organs. Edelman left Rockefeller
Recommendations, with Elizabeth Flower University in 1992 to become chair of neurobi-
and Finbarr W. O’Connor (Philadelphia, ology at the Scripps Research Institute in La
1994). Jolla, California. Over his distinguished career,
Ethical Theory and Social Change: The he has written and co-authored over 300 journal
Evolution of John Dewey’s Ethics, articles and holds memberships in many learned
1908–1932 (New Brunswick, N.J., 2001). societies.
Edelman’s more recent interest in neurobiol-
Further Reading ogy makes his work philosophically important.
Who’s Who in Phil Edelman rejects several central tenets of con-
Horowitz, H. L., and H. S. Thayer, eds. temporary cognitive science, particularly “func-
Ethics, Science, and Democracy: The tionalism,” the view that the mind can be studied
Philosophy of Abraham Edel (New at a level that abstracts away from the brain, as
Brunswick, N.J., 1987). a physical symbol system, independent of its
physical instantiation. On Edelman’s view, func-
Guy W. Stroh tionalism is not biologically plausible. According
to his Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, or
Neural Darwinism, during development neurons
cluster into groups through selective competition
under biological constraints. The groups further
develop through biochemical changes resulting
EDELMAN, Gerald Maurice (1929– ) from environmental interactions, which alter the
strength of connections between the neurons
Gerald Edelman was born on 1 July 1929 in within the groups. The parallel activities of
New York City. In 1950 he earned his BSc distinct groups of neurons are coordinated
degree, magna cum laude, in chemistry from through re-entrant pathways – channels of com-
Ursinus College in Pennsylvania. He then munication – between the groups. Re-entry
studied at the Medical School of the University makes possible coherent responses to diverse
of Pennsylvania, receiving his MD degree and inputs, resulting in our psychological catego-
the University’s Spencer Morris Award in 1954. rizations of the world. Given the high degree of
For the next year he was a Medical House variability among individual brains even among
Officer at the Massachusetts General Hospital. genetically identical twins, and Edelman’s meta-
From 1955 to 1957 he practiced general physical view that the world does not come
medicine as a Captain in the US Army Medical labeled for categorization, he concludes that our
Corps. He then pursued graduate studies at representations are not symbols with the same
the Rockefeller Institute under Henry Kunkel, fixed content for all individuals, as the physical
receiving his PhD in biochemistry and immunol- symbol system hypothesis requires. Rather, our
ogy in 1960. Edelman remained at the representations share a kind of Wittgensteinian
Rockefeller Institute as a professor of biochem- family resemblance.
istry, and also serving as Assistant Dean Edelman also uses the notion of “re-entry” to
(1960–63) and Associate Dean (1963–6) of explain consciousness. The limbic-brain stem
701
EDELMAN
system, which controls bodily functions, is a Further Reading

kind of value system for a creature; the thala- Cambridge Dict Amer Bio
mocortical system is responsible for catego- “Gerald M. Edelman – Biography,” Les Prix
rization. The evolution of re-entrant paths Nobel en 1972 (Stockholm, 1973).
between these systems makes new events sig- Franzwa, Gregg E. “Ontological Assumptions:
nificant or meaningful to a creature by relating Descartes, Searle, and Edelman,”
them to its past events. Conscious experience Philosophy in the Contemporary World 4
is a kind of “remembered present” in which (1997): 14–18.
perceptual signals are conceptually categorized
by value-laden memories. Uniquely human Christopher Viger
consciousness arises from the evolution of a
symbol memory that makes it possible to cat-
egorize conscious experiences themselves in
relation to an enduring self, developed through
social and linguistic interactions.
EDIE, James Murphy (1927–98)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The Mindful Brain: Cortical Organization James Edie was born on 3 November 1927 in
and the Group-selective Theory of Higher Grand Forks, North Dakota. He received his
Brain Function, with Vernon B. BA from Saint John’s University in
Mountcastle (Cambridge, Mass., 1978). Minnesota, studying philosophy and classics.
Neural Darwinism: The Theory of Neuronal He then received his STB and STL degrees at
Group Selection (New York, 1987). Athenaeum Anselmianum in Rome, and the
Topobiology: An Introduction to Molecular PhB, PhL, and PhD (1958) degrees from the
Embryology (New York, 1988). University of Louvain in Belgium. From 1958
The Remembered Present: A Biological to 1960 Edie taught philosophy at Hobart
Theory of Consciousness (New York, and William Smith Colleges. From 1961 until
1989). his retirement in 1993 he taught philosophy
Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of at Northwestern University, and served as
the Mind (New York, 1992). chair from 1970 to 1977. Edie died on 21
A Universe of Consciousness: How Matter February 1998 in Sarasota, Florida.
Becomes Imagination, with Giulio Tononi Fluent in six languages, Edie taught courses
(New York, 2000). in phenomenology, ancient and medieval phi-
Wider than the Sky: The Phenomenal Gift of losophy, the philosophy of theater, the phi-
Consciousness (New Haven, Conn., losophy of William JAMES, and Russian phi-
2004). losophy. Edie was a founding member and
guiding spirit of the Society for
Other Relevant Works Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy.
Ed. with W. Einar Gall and W. Maxwell In addition to publishing many articles,
Cowan, Signal and Sense: Local and books, and translations, he helped inaugu-
Global Order in Perceptual Maps (New rate and edit Studies in Phenomenology and
York, 1990). Existential Philosophy published by
“Building a Picture of the Brain,” Daedalus Northwestern University Press, a book series
127 (Spring 1998): 37–69. that continues to set high standards of schol-
Ed. with Jean-Pierre Changeux, The Brain arly work.
(New Brunswick, N.J., 2001). Strongly influenced by Etienne GILSON
while studying ancient and medieval philoso-
702
EDMAN
phy at Louvain, Edie also studied Edmund Other Relevant Works

Husserl, especially his Logical Investigations. “Faith as Existential Choice,” and “The
This study was responsible for focusing his Absence of God,” in Christianity and
philosophical interests in epistemology and Existentialism (Evanston, Ill., 1963), pp.
the philosophy of language. He was attracted 2–39, 113–48.
to Gilson’s idea that the history of philosophy “Notes on the Philosophical Anthropology of
is a “laboratory” in which the consequences of William James,” in An Invitation to
ideas are tested for confirmation or disconfir- Phenomenology: Studies in the Philosophy
mation. Edie’s “laboratory” experimented crit- of Experience, ed. James M. Edie (Chicago,
ically with the backbone of his philosophical 1965), pp. 7–16, 110–32.
interests that ranged from Plato and Aristotle to Ed., Phenomenology in America: Studies in the
Augustine and Aquinas, from Descartes and Philosophy of Experience (Chicago, 1967).
Leibniz to Hume and Kant, and from Husserl “William James and Phenomenology,” Review
to Sartre. In the light of Husserl, Edie finally of Metaphysics 23 (1970): 481–526.
added William James, in whose Varieties of “The Genesis of a Phenomenological Theory
Religious Experience he discovered “the first of the Experience of Personal Identity:
and really the only phenomenology of religious William James on Consciousness and the
experience” (1989). Self,” Man and World 6 (1973): 322–40.
Edie’s interests found their critically “Self-Presentation,” in Analecta Husserliana,
unifying expression in a phenomenology of vol. 26: American Phenomenology: Origins
language. Here he was influenced by Maurice and Developments, ed. E. F. Kaelin and C.
Merleau-Ponty’s structuralism which influ- O. Schrag (Dordrecht, 1989), pp. 207–11.
enced him to see language as an instrument
for turning away from perceptual experience, Further Reading
and towards the meant and meaning, to Proc of APA v72
words and sentences, to the linguistic a priori Wachterhauser, Brice R., ed. Phenomenology
and linguistic truth in relation to experience, and Skepticism: Essays in Honor of James
then to the universal eidetics of language, and M. Edie (Evanston, Ill., 1996). Contains a
finally to the outfittings of prelinguistic expe- bibliography of Edie’s writings.
rience and the transcendental field of the life- Wilshire, Bruce. Fashionable Nihilism: A
world. Edie made equally significant excur- Critique of Analytic Philosophy (Albany,
sions into metaphysics and theories of per- N.Y., 2002), pp. 73–81.
ception, science, and history that bridged and
integrated phenomenology with numerous Fred Kersten
other kinds of philosophical and scientific
inquiry.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Speaking and Meaning: The Phenomenology
of Language (Bloomington, Ind., 1976). EDMAN, Irwin (1896–1954)
Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology. A Critical
Commentary (Bloomington, Ind., 1987). Irwin Edman was born on 28 November 1896
William James and Phenomenology in New York City. His academic training took
(Bloomington, Ind., 1987). place entirely at Columbia University; he
Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy of Language: received his BA in 1917 and his PhD in phi-
Structuralism and Dialectics (Washington, losophy in 1920. Edman was exposed to
D.C., 1987). American pragmatism and naturalism during
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EDMAN
his education at Columbia, studying with John spatial form, movement, or literary language to
DEWEY and befriending George SANTAYANA. focus her audience’s attention on different
He was then invited to join the faculty at aspects of experience. This analysis of art led
Columbia, and was professor of philosophy Edman to place art on par with philosophy as
from 1920 until his death on 4 September a means for reaching knowledge of the world.
1954 in New York City. The philosopher constructs theories on the
Edman was especially renowned for his basis of definitions and demonstrations that
ability to give unusually clear, accessible for- supply us with a useful “vision of life.” Edman
mulations of complex philosophic ideas. held that the artist accomplishes a similar
Edman used this gift to great effect in his more “commentary on life” through the perfor-
popular writings for magazines like Harpers, mances and objects she creates. The artist and
where he sought to communicate philosophi- philosopher both try to clarify the “mystery”
cal ideas to lay audiences, and in the intro- of experience by bringing experience into
ductions he contributed to translations of sharper attention for us, and simply use dif-
Plato, Epicurus, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, ferent media to achieve this result.
and Schopenhauer. Edman loved teaching, and
was remembered after his death for his skills as BIBLIOGRAPHY
a teacher. “Such was his extraordinary skill Human Traits and Their Social Significance
and zest and charm in expounding ancient (New York, 1920).
wisdom illuminated by modern insights and The World, the Arts and the Artist (New
tasteful wit,” a 1954 memorial remarked, York, 1928).
“that he had become a living symbol of the Adam, the Baby, and the Man from Mars
ideal teacher of the humanities.” (Boston, 1928).
Edman retained a measure of independence The Contemporary and His Soul (New
from pragmatism, and never developed a York, 1931).
comprehensive philosophic system. He tended The Mind of Paul (New York, 1935).
to focus instead on showcasing his essayist’s Four Ways of Philosophy (New York,
wit in shorter occasional pieces. His philo- 1937).
sophical interests were also quite diverse, Philosopher’s Holiday (New York, 1938).
ranging from history of philosophy to phi- Arts and the Man: A Short Introduction to
losophy of religion (The Mind of Paul, 1935), Aesthetics (New York, 1939).
to political philosophy (Candle in the Dark, Candle in the Dark: A Postscript to Despair
1939; Fountainheads of Freedom, 1941) to (New York, 1939).
pedagogy and the goals of philosophic Fountainheads of Freedom: The Growth of
inquiry (Four Ways of Philosophy, 1937; the Democratic Idea (New York, 1941).
Philosopher’s Quest, 1947). His great love, Landmarks for Beginners in Philosophy
however, was aesthetics. (New York, 1941).
Edman saw the fine arts as a manifestation Philosopher’s Quest (New York, 1947).
of a greater human impulse to interpret expe- Under Whatever Sky (New York, 1951).
rience. He sometimes cited William JAMES’s
characterization of experience as a “big Other Relevant Works
blooming buzzing confusion” to explain his Ed. with Sidney Hook, American Philosophy
view of art. Art is the name for the human Today and Tomorrow (New York, 1935).
longing to clarify the “buzzing confusion” of Ed., The Philosophy of Santayana: Selections
experience by intensifying certain aspects of it. from the Works of George Santayana
Edman saw the fine arts as a vivid expression (New York, 1936).
of this impulse. The artist uses color, sound, Ed., John Dewey: His Contribution to the
704
EDWARDS
American Tradition (Indianapolis, 1955). Edwards attempted to combine objective or

The Uses of Philosophy: An Irwin Edman scientific naturalism, as in John DEWEY, and
Reader, ed. Charles Frankel (New York, emotivism, as in Charles STEVENSON and others.
1955). When we claim that a person or action is good,
according to Edwards, our approval of certain
Further Reading objective qualities of that person or action is
Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, what determines our moral judgment. But
Dict Amer Bio, Proc of APA v28, Nat when we judge that the person or action is
Cycl Amer Bio v44, Who Was Who in good we are referring to the qualities of each
Amer v3, Who’s Who in Phil and not to our approval of them. This,
In Memoriam: Irwin Edman, 1896–1954 Edwards claims, is the most important point of
(New York, 1954). Collection of memori- his theory. His agreement with emotivism is
als to Edman. that the referent of a moral judgment is deter-
mined by the judger’s attitude, but his agree-
Joshua Shaw ment with naturalism is his claim that the
referent of a moral judgment is not the judger’s
attitude but the natural facts or qualities of the
action or situation that is presented for
approval. This distinction, Edwards admits, is
a fine one but, nevertheless, important. It allows
EDWARDS, Paul (1923– ) him to agree with Dewey and naturalism in
claiming that moral judgments are cognitively
Paul Edwards was born 2 September 1923, in significant since they must contain a reference
Vienna, Austria, and later became a naturalized to empirical facts that can be, and need to be,
United States citizen. Edwards received his edu- verified.
cation at the University of Melbourne (BA 1944, At the same time, this distinction allows him
MA 1947), and at Columbia University (PhD in to agree with Stevenson and the emotive theory
philosophy 1951). He held appointments at the in claiming that an act of approval or evalua-
University of Melbourne (1945–7) and New tion must be made or determined by some indi-
York University (1949–66). Since 1966 he has vidual, otherwise no moral or value judgment
been a professor of philosophy at Brooklyn would be involved. Edwards also goes beyond
College of the City University of New York, Stevenson’s emotive theory on a number of
where he is presently professor emeritus. He has other points. For one, he argues that it is
held visiting positions at Columbia University, possible to give reasons for moral judgments
the University of California, Berkeley, and the that surpass mere causal factors. Stevenson
New School of Social Research. In 1964–5 he could only allow giving reasons or presenting
was a Guggenheim Fellow. evidence for moral judgments to have the effect
In his 1955 book, The Logic of Moral of having an influence, or persuading people to
Discourse, Edwards developed a metaethical agree, not in proving or validating the moral
analysis that combines naturalism with emo- judgment. Edwards’s view, by contrast, is a
tivism, theories ordinarily regarded as incom- form of cognitivism and can allow us to speak
patible, claiming they can, and need to be, of confirming reasons or evidence for moral
combined. Edwards’s book was dedicated to judgments which depend on not how well they
Ernest NAGEL and contained an introduction by persuade individuals, but which themselves can
Sidney HOOK. Both Nagel and Hook were probe tested logically and empirically to determine
ponents of philosophical naturalism. Rejecting their validity or cogency. Also, Edwards argued
intuitionism and all forms of subjectivism, that moral disputes can be settled in a number
705
EDWARDS
of ways, not simply if both parties arrive at Edwards responds directly to Moore’s chal-
the same view, whether that view has been lenge by showing that there is a clear sense in
proven or not. Edwards claimed that moral which moral ought-statements may be based on
judgments do have emotive or expressive statement of facts. To say that it is morally
meaning, but that factual or referential good to be honest, or that we ought to be
meaning is not incidental to the character of honest because honesty is useful in promoting
the judgment. He gives the example of judging well-being, makes perfectly good sense. As a
that someone is a good person. This judgment naturalist in ethics, Edwards cannot allow that
is moral not only because it expresses the good is nonnatural, nontemporal, or uncondi-
feeling or emotion of approval, but equally tional. Anything good in ethics, or anything
because it refers to such morally relevant and good at all, will have conditions that are subject
observable qualities as kindness, gentleness, to time and change. For Edwards, the so-called
lack of envy, etc., and not to such morally naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy in name only.
irrelevant qualities as the person’s income or Emotions, desires, interests, etc., are all relevant
physical appearance. to ethics since without them there would not be
As Sidney Hook mentions in his introduction ethics or value judgments at all.
to Edwards’s book, it is noteworthy that Edwards served as editor-in-chief of the
Edwards confronts directly important criticisms eight-volume Encyclopedia of Philosophy pub-
or objections to his own position. Edwards lished in 1967. Over the years this reference
responds to the so-called “naturalistic fallacy” work has perhaps been more widely used than
which G. E. Moore had made famous in his any other reference work in philosophy. As
objections to any naturalistic ethics in Principia editor, Edwards was quite candid about his
Ethica (1903). This is a hurdle, as Hook says, preference for the empirical and analytic tradi-
which must be cleared by any cogent analysis tion of Anglo-Saxon philosophy which con-
of ethics which claims to be naturalistic. Moore trolled his chosen topics and space allotments
had claimed that the concept good is the most of the work. Edwards also served as general
fundamental or important in ethics, and further editor for the Library of Philosophical
that this concept is indefinable. Moore also Movements.
alleged that while the notion of yellow is inde- In his other writings, on Martin Buber and
finable and natural, the quality of good is inde- Martin Heidegger, Edwards is extremely
finable and nonnatural. Good, unlike yellow, critical of what he considers a lack of clarity
does not occur in time and is not a natural and a tendency to provoke mystery by obscure
property or quality. To suppose that good and invented terminology. For Edwards, clarity
means pleasure, interest, desired, etc., is a is always a virtue in philosophy, and so is
fallacy since good is indefinable, and cannot be honesty. He is always in favor of trying to
identified with natural or psychological quali- judge a philosophy on moral grounds. This he
ties or feelings which occur in time. For Moore, believes is consistent with his metaethical view
we cannot give factual reasons why anything is that moral judgments are fundamentally factual
morally good. We cannot say that honesty is and emotive.
good because it is desired, approved, preferred,
or is useful in promoting happiness. This is a BIBLIOGRAPHY
source of the famous is–ought problem in “Bertrand Russell’s Doubts about
modern ethics. If good is what ought to be, or Induction,” Mind 58 (1949): 141–63.
what ought to be done – then to give any “Necessary Propositions and the Future,”
factual reasons for this will be inappropriate, Journal of Philosophy 46 (1949): 155–7.
since factual reasons are conditional, while The Logic of Moral Discourse (Glencoe, Ill.,
good, as independent of time, is unconditional. 1955).
706
EINHORN
Buber and Buberism: A Critical Evaluation a rabbinical diploma at the age of seventeen in
(Lawrence, Kan., 1969). 1826. Things took a sharply different turn
Heidegger and Death: A Critical Evaluation after that, however, when he began espousing
(La Salle, Ill., 1979). liberal ideas studying philosophy at secular
Voltaire: Selections (New York, 1989). universities in Erlangen, Würzburg, and
Reincarnation: A Critical Examination Munich. Controversial views delayed for ten
(Amherst, Mass., 1996). years his appointment as a rabbi, but he served
several congregations in Germany and
Other Relevant Works Hungary between 1842 and 1855. During that
Ed. with Arthur Pap, Modern Introduction to time he had formulated theological and philo-
Philosophy: Readings from Classical and sophical bases for a “scientific study” of
Contemporary Sources (Glencoe, Ill., Judaism and thus the means for advocating
1957). adjustments in Jewish life to modern cultural
Ed., Bertrand Russell: Why I Am Not a conditions.
Christian, and Other Essays on Religion In 1855 Einhorn emigrated to the United
and Related Subjects (London, 1957). States in search of greater freedom to express
“Hard and Soft Determinism,” in himself. As rabbi of Har Sinai synagogue in
Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Baltimore, Maryland, he helped bring Reform
Modern Science, ed. Sidney Hook (New Judaism to America and provided the
York, 1958), pp. 117–25. movement with vigorous leadership for two
Ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 8 vols decades. His outspoken attacks on slavery
(New York, 1967). aroused local opposition, and he left Baltimore
Ed., Immortality (Amherst, Mass., 1997). in 1861 to escape mob violence. The rest of his
career was with noted congregations in
Further Reading Philadelphia from 1861 to 1866, and New
Bio 20thC Phils, Oxford Comp Phil York City from 1866 until 1879.
Stroh, Guy W. American Ethical Thought Einhorn was convinced that Judaism was
(Chicago, 1979), chap. 7. essentially a moral law, stemming from the
Urmson, J. O. The Emotive Theory of Ethics days of Moses but unfolding progressively up
(New York, 1968). to contemporary times. Scientific study of such
Wellman, Carl. The Language of Ethics ideas that became refined over time could
(Cambridge, Mass., 1961). determine which aspects were still valid and
which outdated, simultaneously avoiding the
Guy W. Stroh unthinking naïveté of traditionalists as well as
the dismissive scorn of rationalists. For
Einhorn, Judaism was a living, growing faith,
one that evolved beyond old patterns because
it sought always to embody the spirit rather
than the letter of divine revelation. His hope
EINHORN, David (1809–79) was that modernizing reforms would recapture
the essence of perennial truths and move
David Einhorn was born on 10 November beyond unquestioning conformity to an
1809 in the town of Dispeck in the Bavarian orthodox cultus, much as one distinguishes
area of Germany. He proved to be an excep- kernels of grain from the husks that no longer
tional student in the traditional Jewish educa- serve any valuable purpose.
tional programs of his village and at the Taking a more radical stance within Judaism
Talmudic Academy in Fürth where he attained than many of his liberal colleagues, Einhorn
707
EINHORN
urged that several traditional practices be by the Rabbinical Conference that convened
abandoned. He refused, for instance, to accept there, rejected all concern for restoring Jews to
the Talmud as containing the authoritative Palestine or for establishing an independent
interpretation of Scripture. He also sought to state there. Einhorn’s attempts to align Jewish
cease relying on Hebrew as the proper allegiance with contemporary times departed
language for religious understanding, arguing significantly from what many with more
instead that German was preferable by far as Orthodox opinions regarded as essentials of
the best vehicle for Reform Judaism. To that their faith. But the reforming advocate pursued
end in 1856 he produced the Olat Tamid, a his convictions with zeal and eloquence, not
shortened and modified version of the tradi- retiring from an active ministry until a few
tional Hebrew prayer book, translated into months before his death. Einhorn died on 2
German with all references to sacrifices elimi- November 1879 in New York City. His son-
nated and many new prayers added. This in-law, Kaufmann K OHLER , continued
popular volume was expanded several years Einhorn’s work as President of Hebrew Union
later and became the basis for the Union College in Cincinnati.
Prayer Book (1892 and 1895), a compromise
volume which served as a common denomi- BIBLIOGRAPHY
nator for Reform congregations throughout Princip des Mosaismus und dessen
the country, Verhältnis zum Heidenthum und
Because Einhorn wanted to reinvigorate the Rabbinischen Judenthum (Leipzig, 1854).
believing heart of Judaism rather than bolster Ausgewählte Predigten und Reden, ed.
any behavioral particulars, he found ceremo- Kaufmann Kohler (New York, 1880).
nial laws to be outdated. He ignored dietary
restrictions derived from bygone ages, and he Further Reading
regarded the old categories that forbade work Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
on the Sabbath with similar indifference. Many Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer Religious Bio,
of these ideas reached a wider audience Nat Cycl Amer Bio v12
between 1856 and 1862 when he published his Cohen, Bernard N. “David Einhorn, Some
most important sermons and topical views, Aspects of His Thinking,” in Essays in
especially those regarding abolitionism, in American Jewish History (Cincinnati,
Sinai, a German-language monthly which he Ohio, 1958).
had established. Kandel, Martin. “David Einhorn,” in The
Probably the most controversial aspect of Universal Jewish Encyclopedia (New
Einhorn’s thought, and that of Reform York, 1939–43), vol. 4, pp. 27–8.
Judaism in general, pertained to Messianism Kohler, Kaufmann, ed. David Einhorn
and the restoration of Israel. In 1869 he was Memorial Volume: Selected Sermons and
instrumental in having a rabbinical conference Addresses (New York, 1911).
in Philadelphia declare messianic hope to be a Temkin, Sefton D. “Einhorn, David,”
universalistic expectation rather than a nation- Encyclopedia Judaica (New York, 1971),
alistic prerogative. Israel’s dispersion around vol. 6, p. 531.
the globe was declared a fulfillment of the
chosen people’s mission, not a frustration of it. Henry Warner Bowden
This position of regarding the Diaspora as
opportunity instead of tragedy laid the ground-
work for another landmark manifesto of
Reform Judaism. In 1885 the “Pittsburgh
Platform,” a comprehensive statement issued
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EINSTEIN
EINSTEIN, Albert (1879–1955) Einstein’s reputation within the scientific

community was well established by 1909,
Albert Einstein was born on 14 March 1879 in when Hermann Minkowski put the ideas of
Ulm, Württemberg, Germany, and died on 18 special relativity in a more geometrical format,
April 1955 in Princeton, New Jersey. Though thus making Einstein’s theory more intuitive to
educated in Judaism, initially at home and later other physicists. Einstein resigned from the
at the Luitpold Gymnasium, Einstein’s ethnic patent office in 1909 and took up a post at the
and religious heritage was not the centerpiece of University of Zürich as a “professor extraor-
his personal or family life. He spent his child- dinary.” By 1914 he had moved on to become
hood in Munich, and remained there even after a professor of physics at the University of
his family moved to Milan in 1894. In 1895 he Berlin as well as the Director of the Kaiser
failed an entrance examination that would have Wilhelm Physical Institute. He was awarded
permitted him to enter into a course of study in the Nobel Prize in physics in 1921, “for his
electrical engineering at the Eidgenössische services to Theoretical Physics, and especially
Technische Hochschule (the Swiss Federal for his discovery of the law of the photoelec-
Polytechnic School, “ETH”) in Zürich. Not tric effect” (Nobel Prize Organization 1967, p.
willing to give up on ETH, he entered secondary 477). When he returned to Berlin in 1914, he
school in Arrau, Switzerland as a route into also resumed his German citizenship.
ETH. In 1896 he did gain entrance to ETH, in However, he renounced this for a second time
a course of studies directed toward his becoming in 1933 as a response to the political situation
a teacher of mathematics and physics. That same in Germany, and moved to the United States.
year, he renounced his German citizenship and He became a professor of theoretical physics at
remained stateless for several years. He received the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton,
his diploma from ETH in 1901, the same year he New Jersey in 1933, and was associated with
also accepted Swiss citizenship. Unable to find Princeton University until the end of his life. He
anything better than temporary and short-term added US citizenship in 1940 to his Swiss cit-
teaching positions, Einstein was eventually able izenship. Even after his retirement from
to secure a job as a “technical expert third class” Princeton in 1945, Einstein continued to work
in the Swiss patent office in Berne. But even that on the unification of physics, focusing his
job came about only because of the help of the attention on geometrical solutions until his
father of his close friend from ETH, Marcel death in 1955. But the problems proved largely
Grossmann. intractable, and he made few additional con-
Einstein worked in the patent office from tributions to physics in his later years.
1902 until 1909, all the while continuing his Evaluating Einstein’s philosophical contri-
own studies. In 1905 he received his doctorate butions is an oddly difficult task. Einstein, of
in physics from the University of Zürich, after course, was not trained in philosophy, and much
writing a thesis (dedicated to Marcel of the philosophical content of his thought is
Grossmann) on the determination of molecu- either expressed in fairly superficial forms or
lar dimensions. This was a year of singular must be teased out of the physical researches
importance for Einstein’s thought and devel- that dominated his thought. But of even greater
opment, often called his annus mirabilis difficulty here are the many layers of public per-
because he published a series of papers on ception of Einstein and his work, layers to which
physics any one of which would have been he was himself a very conscious contributor.
revolutionary, including the introductions of Einstein the icon stands in the way of uncover-
special relativity, work on Brownian motion, ing Einstein the thinker. There is, on the one
and his paper on the photoelectric effect, which hand, a kind of adoration of him that scarcely
demonstrated the particulate nature of light. brooks any manner of criticism. As recently as 3
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EINSTEIN
January 2000, Time magazine named him its In particular, what role did the (now) famous
“Man of the Century”; this was his fourth Time “Michelson–Morley” experiment (the so-
cover. On the other hand, there are those who called “ether drift” experiment which
would demonize him as a man of relatively little attempted, but failed, to measure the difference
originality who often plagiarized those ideas for in the speed of light due to the earth’s
which he became most famous. movement through the theoretically postulated
It is true that many people helped Einstein, ether) have on Einstein’s thought? Einstein
while seldom receiving explicit credit in his pub- himself was not consistent on this matter. At
lications. Thus, Marcel Grossmann and perhaps different times and in different places, his
Mileva Maric (Einstein’s first wife) provided answer ranged from the centrally important to
considerable assistance in the development of the inconsequential. However, a more sub-
special relativity, while Michele Besso (another stantial clue can be found in his 1905
friend from ETH) worked extensively on the “Electrodynamics” essay itself.
mathematics of general relativity. None of these The opening paragraph of this article makes
persons received any sort of acknowledgment in no mention of the experimental situation of the
the relevant papers, which were published in day. Rather, the entire focus is on the break-
Einstein’s name. Yet none of them ever chal- down in the symmetry of how the older,
lenged Einstein’s originality or asserted any role Newtonian style of mechanics described elec-
for themselves in the development of his physical tromagnetic phenomena versus that of
theories. Given Einstein’s later prominence as a Maxwell’s more recent theory. In the second
public figure, they and others certainly had the paragraph, Einstein makes a passing reference
opportunity to do so had they felt themselves to “the unsuccessful attempts to discover any
wronged. So, although this is a matter which motion of the earth relative to the ‘light
might require rethinking in light of future schol- medium’” (1952, p. 37). But Einstein gives
arship, there seems little reason at this time to absolutely no specifics regarding which exper-
challenge the genuineness of Einstein’s contri- iments he is referring to, nor does he ever
butions. return to the subject in that paper. Rather, his
Something of the nature of his originality can focus remains exclusively on this issue of
be seen in his development of special relativity. symmetry breakdown within the older theory,
His article “On the Electrodynamics of Moving and ways of correcting it. Gerald Holton
Bodies” (in 1952, pp. 37–65) is one of the series observes that Einstein could easily have had in
of extraordinary pieces that he wrote within a mind “any two or more of at least seven exper-
few weeks of each other and published in 1905. iments” (Holton 1973, p. 302). And this, of
Many of the basic ideas in this paper had course, is predicated upon the less than con-
appeared in the works of earlier thinkers, though vincing assumption that Einstein had any par-
Einstein was not aware of the most recent devel- ticular experiments in mind at all, rather than
opments by people such as H. A. Lorentz. just a commonly known fact that such exper-
Nevertheless, what was most important in iments had failed.
Einstein’s contribution was his synthesis of these This is an example of the powerful inclina-
disparate ideas. In this paper, he united into a tion toward a kind of rationalism found
coherent whole the ideas of ordinary mechanics throughout Einstein’s work. Although it is cer-
and James Clerk Maxwell’s electromagnetic tainly the case that he never denied the impor-
theory, something which had not been done tance of empirical adequacy, what stands out
before. in Einstein’s scientific work is his commitment
To what extent did the experimental to such things as the unification of ideas,
findings of Einstein’s day contribute to the logical coherence, aesthetic matters such as
development of the special theory of relativity? the symmetry of the internal relations of a sci-
710
EINSTEIN
entific theory, and so on. All of these factors traditional privileging of Euclidean geometry,
stand out in his 1905 paper on special relativ- which Kantian thought went so far as to
ity. We see it again, for instance, in a letter declare to be the absolutely necessary form of
from 1914 to his friend Michele Besso, who physical or intuitive space, came to be chal-
provided Einstein with extensive assistance in lenged on empirical and scientific grounds.
the work leading up to the 1916 paper that Another major aspect of Einstein’s philo-
introduced general relativity, “The Foundation sophical contributions is the challenge to a
of the General Theory of Relativity” (1952, pp. priorism. This is a line of thought that was
111–64). Referring to the gravitational field developed less by Einstein than by other
equations that had been developed in his paper philosophers such as Hans REICHENBACH.
from 1911, “On the Influence of Gravitation Reichenbach argued against any form of a
on the Propagation of Light” (1952, pp. priorism, and took Einstein’s theories as
99–108), Einstein told Besso that he was demonstrating the untenability of any such
entirely satisfied with the correctness of the position (Reichenbach 1957, p. 37ff).
whole system, and did not care whether the However, other readings of Einstein’s theories
observations of the solar eclipse succeeded or came to different conclusions. Ernst Cassirer,
not. “The logic of the thing is too evident,” for example, in a text that Einstein himself
Einstein stated (1987, vol. 5, 1993 p. 604). read and commented on prior to publication,
Additional examples are readily multiplied saw in Einstein’s work the confirmation of a
throughout Einstein’s work; his confidence deeper principle of relationalism that served as
rarely resulted in failure. The observation of a kind of validation of a neo-Kantian reading
the solar eclipse which Einstein specifically of relativity (Cassirer 1953, p. 349f). Einstein
mentions in his letter was originally scheduled himself came to insist on a kind of relational
to take place in August 1914. It finally interpretation of space as necessitated by rel-
occurred in 1919, when Arthur Eddington ativity. “[S]pace-time is not something to
led an expedition to the Atlantic Ocean near which one can ascribe a separate existence,
Africa to take measurements of the deflec- independently of the actual objects of physical
tion of starlight around the limb of the sun reality. Physical objects are not in space, but
during a solar eclipse visible there. these objects are spatially extended.” (1961, p.
Eddington’s announcement that his observa- vii, original emphasis) But this raises other
tions provide a spectacular confirmation of problems with Einstein’s approach.
general relativity secured Einstein’s scientific Alfred North WHITEHEAD identified part of
and popular fame. the problem as one of confusing a general prin-
Throughout his later work Einstein took a ciple with its particular application (Whitehead
robustly geometrical approach to problems of 1922, p. 3f). The special and general theories
physics, which again exemplifies the rational- of relativity represent particular applications of
ism of his approach. For him, that solution was relational philosophy, but they are not them-
most likely to be true which could be elegantly selves the enunciation of that general principle.
couched in geometrical terms. This is certainly In attempting to ground the relational structure
manifest in his development of general rela- of space and time in that of objects, Einstein
tivity, which in turn came to be viewed as one creates more problems than he solves. If the
of his central contributions to philosophy. In objects are changeless, then time cannot be
general relativity, contingent relations of distilled from any set of relations between
physics and formal relations of geometry are them; if they do undergo change, then time
effectively merged into one another, so that the does not emerge as a relational property from
geometrical structures of physical space have them because it is presupposed in their very
no a priori characteristics. This meant that the definition. Hence, Whitehead argued, a deeper
711
EINSTEIN
principle is needed to make sense of these rela- Making sense of human experience within
tional structures. the context of his scientific rationalism and
Another problem Whitehead identified was realism was a problem that troubled Einstein.
peculiar to general relativity. Because this theory He was an enormously humane individual.
collapses the geometry of space into the con- Although he was never an adherent of any
tingent physical arrangements of matter and religious orthodoxy, he was a firm believer in
energy, there is no way of knowing in advance a creative, loving, and intelligent God. A
the logical relations of spatial congruence lifelong pacifist, he was also a firm believer in
needed to give meaning to spatial measure- the essential roles of passion and imagination,
ments. But the only way one can know these both in life in general and in the development
contingent physical facts is by making careful of scientific thought in particular. But it is dif-
and precise measurements, measurements which ficult to reconcile a meaningfully creative role
presuppose the prior knowledge of the relevant for passion and imagination with the rigidly
congruence relations of space which permit such mathematical determinism of Einstein’s scien-
measurements to be meaningfully conducted. tific theories. Nature within an Einsteinian
One is thus left with a situation of having to universe is a Parmenidean block in which all
know everything before one can know anything change is an illusion due to the limitations of
(Whitehead 1922, p. 29f). This “measurement human perception. For nature itself, all of
problem of cosmology” (not Whitehead’s reality is already there in the four-dimensional
phrase) has not been addressed by science, and mathematical manifold of space–time. Passion
is rarely attended to within philosophy. and imagination are simply effluvia of exis-
Although earlier in his life Einstein expressed tence, incapable of making any real contribu-
some interest in Ernst Mach’s positivistic tions to the world, because that which is real
methodology in interpreting science, by the is already determined. In addition, there does
time he was working on general relativity not appear to be much room for God in such
Einstein had abandoned this philosophical a scheme of things.
approach (Holton 1973, p. 223f). Aside from Einstein’s philosophical legacy is a great deal
his explicit statements on the subject, his larger more problematic than his scientific reputa-
theory of nature emerges on its own. Einstein tion might indicate. His philosophy of nature
is essentially a realist about the mathematical is all but irreconcilable with his belief in the
structures of which his formal theories are vital reality of human passion and imagination.
composed. Space is not the space of experience, This philosophy of nature has been rigidified
but a direct correlate of the idealized mathe- into a largely unchallenged dogma throughout
matical forms used to represent it in physical much of the scientific community, with the
theories. This view is also quite prevalent in the enormous successes of Einstein’s physical
physical sciences today. But it is certainly prob- theories contributing to this ossification. Yet
lematic. The idealized structures of mathe- the success of these theories within the physical
matics are quite alien with respect to human sciences neither necessitates nor validates any
experience. Unextended points of space and specific philosophical interpretation of nature.
durationless instants of time are not to be Other approaches are arguably at least possible
found there. Yet these are the kinds of mathe- which do no violence to empirical science, but
matical entities to which nature is presumed to which do not simply equate nature with the
correspond directly. No clear path is indicated mathematical formalisms used to represent it,
in Einstein’s thought as to how experience on and thus do not leave the connection between
the one hand, and the mathematical idealiza- human experience and nature as problematic
tions which describe the real on the other, are as happens with Einstein’s philosophical ideas.
to be brought together.
712
EISELE
BIBLIOGRAPHY and Einstein’s Theory of Relativity (New

“Über einen die Erzeugung und York, 1953).
Verwandlung des Lichtes betreffenden Clark, Ronald W. Einstein: The Life and
heuristischen Gesichtspunkt,” Annalen Times (New York, 1971).
der Physik 17 (1905): 132–48. Holton, Gerald. Thematic Origins of
“Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Körper,” Scientific Thought: Kepler to Einstein
Annalen der Physik 17 (1905): 891–921. (Cambridge, Mass., 1973).
“Über den Einfluss der Schwekraft auf die Reichenbach, Hans. The Philosophy of
Ausbreitung des Lichtes,” Annalen der Space and Time, trans. Maria
Physik 35 (1911): 898–908. Reichenbach and John Freund (New
“Grundlage der allgemeinen York, 1957).
Relativitätstheorie,” Annalen der Physik Nobel Prize Organization. Nobel Lectures:
49 (1916): 769–822. Physics (New York, 1967).
The World As I See It, trans. Alan Harris Schilpp, Paul A., ed. Albert Einstein:
(New York, 1934). Philosopher–Scientist (Evanston, Ill.,
The Evolution of Physics: The Growth of 1949; 3rd edn, La Salle, Ill., 1970).
Ideas from Early Concepts to Relativity Contains Einstein’s autobiography and
and Quanta, with Leopold Infeld (New bibliography.
York, 1938). Whitehead, Alfred North. The Principle of
The Principle of Relativity, trans. W. Relativity with Applications to Physical
Perrett and G. B. Jeffrey (Mineola, N.Y., Science (Cambridge, UK, 1922).
1952).
Ideas and Opinions, ed. Carl Seelig (New Gary L. Herstein
York, 1954).
The Meaning of Relativity, 5th edn, trans E.
P. Adams et al. (Princeton, N.J., 1956).
Einstein on Peace, ed. Otto Nathan and
Heinz Norden (New York, 1960).
Relativity: The Special and the General EISELE, Carolyn (1902–2000)
Theory, trans. R. W. Lawson (New
York, 1961). Carolyn Eisele was born on 13 June 1902 in
the Bronx, New York, and died on 15 January
Other Relevant Works 2000 in New York City. The only daughter of
Einstein’s papers are at the Hebrew Rudolph and Caroline Wüst Eisele, she
University in Jerusalem. attended Hunter College High School in New
Out of My Later Years (Totowa, N.J., York City before entering Hunter College in
1950). 1919. Although hoping to specialize in physics,
The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein, 25 she found the offerings at Hunter limited, and
vols planned, ed. John Stachel et al. opted instead for mathematics while taking
(Princeton, N.J., 1987– ). courses in physics and chemistry as well. She
graduated with a BA and honors, Phi Beta
Further Reading Kappa, in 1923. Eisele then began her graduate
Amer Nat Bio, Bio 20thC Phils, Cambridge studies in mathematics at Columbia University,
Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer Bio, Encyc where she later counted it as her good fortune
Amer Bio, Routledge Encycl Phil, Who to have taken David Eugene Smith’s famous
Was Who in Amer v3 course on the history of mathematics, in
Cassirer, Ernst. Substance and Function addition to other courses with Cassius J.
713
EISELE
KEYSER. After receiving her MA in mathe- serious research. Eisele then received a letter
matics and education in 1923 (with an from the science editor of Princeton University
emphasis on history of mathematics), she con- Press suggesting she write a book for the Press
tinued her graduate study, spending several on Peirce, whereupon she then wrote to W. V.
summers at the University of Chicago and QUINE of Harvard’s philosophy department,
later at the University of Southern California. asking about the availability of Peirce manu-
Unfortunately, due to illness and increasing scripts there. Not only was the response from
responsibilities for her parents at home, she Harvard positive, but in 1952 she received a
never completed a doctorate. grant from the American Philosophical Society
Eisele was offered a position teaching math- to support her research on Peirce in both
ematics at Hunter College immediately upon Cambridge and Washington. Among Peirce’s
her graduation. Her teaching career in the works that particularly attracted Eisele’s atten-
department of mathematics and statistics tion were the many studies he presented to the
spanned nearly fifty years, from 1923 until American Academy of Sciences, in particular
her retirement in 1972, with a promotion to one entitled “On Two Map-Projections of the
full professor in 1965. Her early interest in Lobatschewskian Plane,” which Peirce had
differential geometry (which she studied at never printed, but which Eisele wrote up as a
Chicago) would later prove both prophetic separate article, “The Quincuncial Map-
and useful when she turned to study similar Projection of Charles S. Peirce” (1963). She
aspects of the mathematics of pragmatist also realized that serious study of Peirce’s
Charles S. PEIRCE several decades later. Just original contributions to American science
after World War II, she was asked to teach the while a member of the Coast Survey had yet to
mathematics department’s course on history of be undertaken.
mathematics. In order to prepare, she obtained Eisele’s edition of Peirce’s New Elements of
a semester’s sabbatical from Hunter in 1947 to Mathematics, comprised of volumes devoted
gather primary sources in Columbia’s archives to “Arithmetic,” “Algebra and Geometry,”
for the history of mathematics, including many “Mathematical Miscellanea” (which required
rare works that had been amassed by George two books), and “Mathematical Philosophy,”
Plimpton. Plimpton, a publisher, was the head was published with a subvention from the
of Ginn and Company, and his magnificent Dewey Foundation in 1976. This was also the
collection now forms, with the D. E. Smith year in which the Peirce Bicentennial
library, an important repository of works on International Congress was held. Eisele com-
history of mathematics in New York City. It mitted herself to the congress with great energy
was during her examination of the materials at to insure its success as the first international
Columbia that Eisele happened by chance to meeting to be devoted entirely to Peirce. In
find a book that Peirce had been asked to addition to securing the cooperation of the
evaluate for Plimpton. Peirce’s handwritten Dutch academic community and negotiating
comments on the Liber Abaci fell into her approval of the Congress as an official inter-
hands as she opened the volume for careful national event of the US bicentennial celebra-
inspection. Peirce had thought the manuscript tions that year, she also engaged the help of the
so important that he even made a special pre- cultural attaché at the American Embassy. Not
sentation on the subject to members of the only did the Peirce Congress result in a volume
American Mathematical Society at its annual of proceedings that appeared in 1981, but in
meeting in 1894. His letter made such an the meantime, a volume of Eisele’s own papers
impression on Eisele that she wrote an account appeared in 1979.
of her discovery, “The Liber Abaci” (1951), Eisele was concerned that most readers
and decided that Peirce was worthy of more would not appreciate the role mathematics
714
EISELE
had played in Peirce’s life and works, and of the origins of pragmatism came to the atten-
therefore she was determined to produce a tion of the scholarly world in a new way. Eisele
new work, to make clear how his mathemati- was almost single-handedly responsible for
cal stance is essential to an understanding of his setting the record straight in sofaras the extent
philosophy. This effort would lead to Eisele’s and importance of Peirce’s thinking in mathe-
last major contribution to Peirce studies, her matics and logic were essential to the formu-
two volumes devoted to Historical Perspectives lation and development of his ideas concerning
on Peirce’s Logic of Science: A History of pragmatism. For the philosophy of science gen-
Science (1985). erally, Eisele’s writings offer much in the way
When Eiesle retired from Hunter College in of insight thanks to Peirce’s own interest in this
1972, she was elected to the Hunter Hall of subject. Especially noteworthy in this respect is
Fame in recognition of her outstanding the volume of her own essays on Peirce and
achievements. By then, she had made many history of science, Studies in the Scientific and
contributions, not just to the field of Peirce Mathematical Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce
studies, but to the professionalization of the (1979), for it was through examples from the
history of science as a discipline. Eisele was history of science that Peirce sought to illumi-
President of the Charles S. Peirce Society from nate the ways in which science progresses, and
1973 to 1975. She was a founding member of the nature of the knowledge that science can
the Metropolitan New York Section of the achieve.
History of Science Society, which she served
for nearly a decade as treasurer. From 1959 to BIBLIOGRAPHY
1962, Eiesle served as an elected member of the Ed., The New Elements of Mathematics by
national Council of the History of Science Charles S. Peirce, 5 vols (The Hague,
Society, and also served on the board of direc- 1976).
tors of the George Sarton Memorial Studies in the Scientific and Mathematical
Foundation. In 1988 she was made an Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce, ed.
honorary life member of the Metropolitan Richard M. Martin (The Hague, 1979).
New York Section of the History of Science Historical Perspectives on Peirce’s Logic of
Society. Later, this group consolidated in the Science: A History of Science (Berlin,
early 1990s with the History and Philosophy 1985).
of Science Section of the New York Academy
of Sciences. A fellow of the Academy, in 1985 Other Relevant Works
she was the recipient of its Behavioral Sciences, Eisele’s papers are at the Institute for
History and Philosophy of Sciences award. In American Thought at Indiana University
1972 she was made a consulting member of – Purdue University Indianapolis.
the Centro Superiore di Logica e Sciencze “The Liber Abaci,” Scripta Mathematica 17
Comparate at the University of Bologna. Other (1951): 236–59.
honors included the award of a Doctor of “Peirce and the History of Science,” Year
Humanities degree honoris causa in 1980 by Book of the American Philosophical
Texas Tech University, where she was also a Society (1954): 353–8.
member of the University’s Institute for Studies “A Nineteenth Century Man of Science,”
in Pragmatism. In 1982 she received another Scripta Mathematica 24 (1959): 305–24.
Doctor of Science degree honoris causa from “The Quincuncial Map-Projection of
Lehigh University. Charles S. Peirce,” Proceedings of the
It was due to Eisele’s scholarship devoted American Philosophical Society 107
primarily to Peirce’s mathematics that its (1963): 299–307.
importance for a satisfactory understanding “The Influence of Galileo on Peirce,” in
715
EISELE
Atti del Simposio su “Galileo Galilei Spiru Haret high school where he developed an
nella storia e nella filosofia della scienze” interest in the natural sciences, particularly
(Firenze-Pisa, 14–16 Settembre 1964) entomology and botany, but where he also
(Florence, Italy, 1964), pp. 321–4. failed courses in Romanian, French, and
“Peirce’s Philosophy of Mathematical German. This failure seems to have impelled
Education,” in Studies in the Philosophy him to greater effort and he became a vora-
of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Edward C. cious reader. Eliade began to write imaginative
Moore and Richard S. Robin (Amherst, fiction at the age of twelve, although his first
Mass., 1964), pp. 51–75. publication, at the age of fourteen, was a
“The Search for a Method,” Transactions natural science piece concerning a wasp preda-
of the Charles S. Peirce Society 11 tory upon the Chinese silkworm. That same
(1975): 149–58. year, in the same Journal of Popular Science
and Travels, he published his first autobio-
Further Reading graphical fragments, one of which consisted
Proc of APA v74, Who Was Who in Amer largely of the narration of a peasant legend
v14 told by a local guide. His first published work
Ketner, Kenneth L. “Carolyn Eisele’s Place of imaginative fiction, “How I Found the
in Peirce Studies,” Historia Mathematica Philosopher’s Stone,” came later in 1921. By
9 (1982): 326–32. the end of high school his interests had moved
from natural science to literature and philos-
Joseph W. Dauben ophy and he determined to study philology
and philosophy at university. His autobio-
graphical fiction indicates a youth of a mod-
ernist, scientific bent, convinced of the impor-
tance of both traditional religions and folk
traditions but unable to accept mysteries or
ELIADE, Mircea (1907–86) dogmas surpassing rational explanation. His
American biographer, M. L. Ricketts, suggests
Mircea Eliade was born in Bucharest, that “Perhaps Eliade’s real ‘religion’ at this
Romania, on 13 March 1907. Although time could be said to have been faith in the
Romanian records give his date of birth as 28 unlimited power of the disciplined will ….
February, this is according to the Julian Although he has denied being influenced at
calendar, since the Gregorian calendar was this time by Nietzsche … Eliade nourished a
not adopted in Romania until 1924. Eliade’s deep, secret wish to become a kind of
Orthodox Christian family celebrated his ‘superman,’ to control his own will” (Ricketts
birthday on the Day of the Forty Martyrs, 1988, p. 72).
which is 9 March by the Julian calendar, and This passion for self-discipline must have
Eliade himself gave that date as his birthday. been active when Eliade read the five-volume
Eliade died on 22 April 1986 in Chicago, Geschichte des Altertums by Edward Meyer
Illinois. (despite his high school difficulty with
Eliade’s family, including an elder brother German), and again during his seventeenth or
and younger sister, was city dwelling and eighteenth year when he encountered the his-
middle class, separated from their peasant torians of religions, Raffaele Pettazzoni and
roots by two generations. His father had James Frazer (he taught himself both Italian
changed his own surname from Iremia and English so as to read them in the original).
(Jeremiah) to Eliade in 1899. Mircea attended In 1925 Eliade enrolled in the department of
the Strada Mântuleasa primary school and the philosophy of the University of Bucharest.
716
ELIADE
There he was greatly influenced by Nae herself, in the form of her own novel refuting
Ionescu, an assistant professor of logic and Eliade’s claim to sexual intimacy (It Does not
metaphysics and an active journalist with a Die, 1976). Maitreyi was Eliade’s third novel
keen interest in both science and religion. One and he was to publish a total of ten novels by
of Ionescu’s principle tenets was the “separa- 1940. He also successfully submitted his
tion of planes” in which the theological, meta- analysis of Yoga as his doctoral thesis at the
physical, and scientific planes were seen, not as Bucharest philosophy department in 1933.
hierarchical as by Auguste Comte, but as Published in French as Yoga: Essai sur les
mutually exclusive and irreducible one to origines de la mystique Indienne (Paris, 1936)
another. Ionescu’s tenet may well be the source this was revised and became one of his major
of Eliade’s celebrated “irreducibility of the works, Yoga, Immortality, and Freedom
sacred,” but the latter may also be related to (1954). Also in 1933 he began living with Nina
Immanuel Kant’s nonreductionistic philoso- Mareş, a single mother and secretary at the
phy of pure reason, practical reason, and aes- telephone company, and they married in
thetic judgment. October 1934. As Nae Ionescu’s assistant at
Eliade’s thesis of 1928 examined the university of Bucharest, Eliade lectured,
“Contributions to Renaissance Philosophy” among other things, on Aristotle’s Metaphysics
including Marsilio Ficino, Pico della and Nicholas of Cusa’s Docta Ignorantia.
Mirandola, and Giordano Bruno, and the Ionescu was a significant influence on Eliade
influence of Renaissance humanism seems to and on other young Romanian intellectuals in
have been at work in his turn to India to “uni- their support for the ultra-rightist movement,
versalize” the “provincial” philosophy of the Legion of the Archangel Michael, founded
Western Europe. Having earned his licentiate by Corneliu Zelea Codreanu in 1927. Between
degree and being awarded a grant from the 1936 and 1938 Eliade wrote journalistic
Maharaja of Kassimbazar to study in India, articles in support of this group and claims
Eliade sailed east that same year. He studied have been made that he ran for public office
Sanskrit and philosophy at the University of with the legionary party, but decisive evidence
Calcutta under Surendranath Dasgupta, a is still lacking. He was imprisoned as a result
Cambridge-educated Bengali, author of the of his support, but he was released without
five-volume History of Indian Philosophy charges after four months. After 1938 Eliade
(Calcutta, 1922–55). In 1930, however, Eliade no longer gave any public support to the
was expelled from Dasgupta’s home under Legion. His legionary connections have led to
suspicion of some romantic liaison with accusations of fascism and anti-Semitism, but
Dasgupta’s daughter, Maitreyi. He traveled the evidence is contradictory.
around India, visiting sites of religious interest, In 1940 Eliade was appointed to the
participating in the famous Kumbh-Mela Romanian Legation in London by the incum-
festival at Allahabad, and staying for three bent fascist-royalist government. When
months at the Svarga ashram at Rishikesh, at Romania entered the war as a German ally he
the time headed by swami Shivananda. was sent to Portugal where he served the
Eliade returned to Bucharest in 1932 and the Romanian office of Press and Propaganda. His
publication of his novel, Maitreyi, in 1933 wife, Nina, died of cancer in Portugal in 1944.
assured his status as a best-selling novelist in After the cessation of hostilities, in 1945,
his native land. An apparently realistic account Eliade moved to Paris where Georges Dumézil,
(including the actual street address and tele- a scholar of comparative mythology, found
phone number of the house in Calcutta) of his him a part-time post at the Sorbonne teaching
supposed liaison with Maitreyi, this novel later comparative religion. From this time on most
occasioned a response from Maitreyi Devi of Eliade’s scholarly work was composed in
717
ELIADE
French. In Paris Eliade met his second wife, arouse the scholar’s suspicions.” (1969, p. 45)
Christinel, also a Romanian, whom he married On similar grounds Eliade seems to have
in 1950. His second marriage, like his first, thought it best not to advertise his own literary
remained childless. accomplishments to the Anglophone reader-
At the prompting of Joachim WACH, a ship of his history of religions work, and such
scholar of religion at the University of Chicago, dissimulation about his past is apparent at
Eliade was invited to give the 1956 Haskell several junctures. Particularly in the case of
Lectures at that institution on “Patterns of his political sympathies of the late 1930s
Initiation.” These were published as Birth and Eliade’s dissimulation has made his past diffi-
Rebirth (1958). On Wach’s death in 1958, cult to reconstruct and the object of consider-
Eliade was invited to assume the chair of the able contention.
history of religions department in Chicago. Whatever his stature as a novelist or the
There he stayed until his own death in 1986, truth about his earlier life, at the University of
publishing extensively on the history of reli- Chicago, Eliade was a member of the com-
gions and continuing to write fiction in mittee on social thought; he led the journals
Romanian. Although his fiction remained History of Religions and The Journal of
largely unpublished in English there are some Religion; and he was editor-in-chief of
significant exceptions, including the novel he Macmillan’s Encyclopedia of Religion (1987).
regarded as his chef d’oeuvre, The Forbidden Through these activities as well as his contin-
Forest (1978). From the time of his early novels ued publication in the history of religions and
and short stories in Romania, Eliade’s fiction his tuition of a generation of successful
utilized a dialectic of realism and fantasy com- scholars of religion, he was, from the early
parable to “magic realism.” He commonly 1960s through the mid 1970s, the most influ-
wrote in a realist style into which he gradually ential single figure in establishing the history of
introduced fantastic elements until the world of religions as an academic discipline in the
the commonplace became transformed into United States.
some mythic realm. Some of his work, Despite this focus on the history of religions,
however, was more directly fantastic. Un Om Eliade maintained a philosophical agenda,
Mare (“A Great Man,” in Fantastic Tales, although he never explicitly systematized his
1969), for example, had its protagonist grow position. There has been considerable dis-
to enormous size. Another, Domnişoara agreement over the value of his thought, some
Christina (“Mistress Christina,” in Mystic seeing it as a crucial contribution to our under-
Stories, 1992) was a vampire story. Other standing of religion, and some seeing him as an
novels are apparently realistic, as is his obscurantist proposing unacceptable norma-
Forbidden Forest. One novel, Nuntā în cer tive assumptions. In Cosmos and History: The
(Marriage in Heaven, 1938) was translated Myth of the Eternal Return (1954) – a book he
into Italian and won the Elba-Brignetti prize considered subtitling Introduction to a
for the best foreign language novel in Italian in Philosophy of History – Eliade differentiated
1983. His Maitreyi became a French language between religious and nonreligious humanity
film starring Hugh Grant. by applying Henri Bergson’s distinction
Although translation into English has been between perceptions of time (Essai sur les
partial at best, most of his fiction is available données immédiates de la conscience, 1889).
in French. Concerning the Scottish historian of Eliade contended that the perception of time as
religions, Andrew Lang, Eliade wrote that “he a homogeneous, linear, and unrepeatable
had the misfortune to be an excellent and ver- medium is a peculiarity of “modern,” nonre-
satile writer, and author, among other works, ligious humanity. “Archaic” or religious
of a volume of poetry. And literary gifts usually humanity (homo religiosus), in comparison,
718
ELIADE
apprehends time as heterogeneous, divided can be identified as simultaneously a structure

between linear, profane time and cyclical and of consciousness and the source of significance,
reactualizable, sacred time, called by Eliade, meaning, power, and Being. Its manifestations
illud tempus (Latin for “that time”). Myths can be seen as appearances of the holy, of
and rituals give repeated access to this sacred power, or of Being (hierophanies, cratopha-
time (“the eternal return”) and thus protect nies, or ontophanies), just as, for Kant, space
religious humanity against the “terror of and time are irreducibly perceived as external
history,” a form of existential anxiety in which continua, although they are identified as the a
the absolute “givenness” of historical time priori postulates of the understanding. It is
causes helplessness. Eliade undermined his surely no coincidence that the title of Eliade’s
own distinction, however, insisting that non- major work, Yoga, Immortality, and Freedom,
religious humanity in any pure sense is nonex- echoes the ideas of pure reason that for Kant
istent and that religiousness, understood in become the postulates of practical reason:
this way, is ubiquitous. Myth and illud tempus, God, Immortality, and Freedom.
the temporal continuum of mythic event, still Eliade’s identification of the sacred and the
exist, although concealed, in the world of real places individual human apprehension of
“non-religious” humanity and there is no the sacred and of the real on equal footing,
“solution of continuity between the archaic rather than privileging either sort of appre-
mind and scientific ideologies of the nineteenth hension. Eliadean history of religions does not
century” (The Quest, 1969, p. 41). Eliade set begin with the presumption of exhaustive
himself against “the historicistic position, in all knowledge of what “the real” actually is, and
its varieties and shapes – from Nietzsche’s is thus consonant with much recent critical
‘destiny’ to Heidegger’s ‘temporality’” theory and encourages openness to alternative
(Cosmos and History, 1954, p. 152). He belief systems. Insofar as mythical entities and
regarded the attempt to restrict “real” time to events have a real effect on the existential sit-
historical time alone as an unacceptable reduc- uation of believers they are real and sacred
tion and he considered, for example, the athe- entities and events.
istic existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre to be The philosophical influences on Eliade from
arid and hopeless. Kant through Otto and others are yet to be
Eliade defined religion in terms of traced with real precision. Eliade’s The Sacred
humanity’s relation to the “sacred,” and the and the Profane (1959) – first published in
precise nature of his concept of the sacred has German as Das Heilige und das Profane in 1957
also been the subject of contention. Some see – was explicitly written in response to Otto’s
it as corresponding to a conventional concept Das Heilige (1918), but Eliade goes beyond Otto
of deity, or to Rudolf Otto’s ganz andere in describing the dialectic of the sacred and the
(“wholly other”) – an ontologically indepen- profane. He insists that believers are prepared by
dent reality. Others have detected a closer their lived experience and religious background
resemblance to Émile Durkheim’s social to experience hierophany, the apprehension of
sacred. Eliade identifies the sacred and the real, the real/sacred in the historical/profane. In
yet states repeatedly, “the sacred is a struc- Eliade’s analysis any historical entity could be
ture of human consciousness” (The Quest, apprehended as such a hierophany with appro-
1969, p. i; History of Religious Ideas, 1978, p. priate preparation, and all hierophany must be
xiii). This combination seems to support the mediated by historical realities. His conclusion is
latter interpretation – both the sacred and the that all beings reveal, but at the same time
real are social constructions – and is reminis- conceal, the nature of Being.
cent of Kant’s identification of reality as a In Eliade’s quest to recover the meanings of
category of the understanding. Thus the sacred hierophanies for those who apprehend them he
719
ELIADE
attempts to analyze and understand religious Le Chamanisme et les techniques archaïques

data by applying concepts from the German de l’extase (Paris, 1951). Trans. W. Trask
hermeneutical tradition going back to as Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of
Schleiermacher and Dilthey and continued by Ecstasy (London, 1964).
Wach and Gerardus van der Leeuw. Eliade Images et symboles: essays sur le symbolisme
agrees with them that religious data are intel- magico-religieux (Paris, 1952). Trans. P.
ligible because, as human expressions, they Mairet as Images and Symbols: Studies in
are in accord with our own experience. Religious Symbolism (London, 1961).
Although he is most often identified as a phe- Yoga immortalité et liberté (Paris, 1954).
nomenologist of religion he frequently insisted Trans. W. Trask as Yoga, Immortality and
that he was a phenomenologist only insofar as Freedom (London, 1958).
he sought to discover the meanings of reli- Forgerons et alchimistes (Paris, 1956). Trans.
gious data. His hermeneutical phenomenol- Stephen Corrin as The Forge and the
ogy is most evident in his morphological Crucible (London, 1962).
approach in Patterns in Comparative Religion Mythes, rêves, et mystères (Paris, 1957).
(1958), where he groups religious phenomena Trans. P. Mairet as Myths, Dreams and
ahistorically by structural themes such as water Mysteries: The Encounter between
symbolism or the symbolism of the center. Later, Contemporary Faiths and Archaic
he attempted to complement that methodology Realities (London, 1960).
with the chronological organization of his Naissances mystiques (Paris, 1959). Trans.
History of Religious Ideas (1978–85). However, W. Trask as Birth and Rebirth: The
in considering Eliade’s sources and influences, Religious Meanings of Initiation in
one should bear in mind that he considered, to Human Culture (London, 1958); also pub-
give just one example, the first/second-century lished as Rites and Symbols of Initiation:
Indian Buddhist, Nagarjuna, to have produced The Mysteries of Birth and Rebirth (New
“one of the most original ontological creations York, 1975).
known to the history of thought” (History of Méphistophélès et l’androgyne (Paris, 1962).
Religious Ideas, 1982, p. 225). Eliade’s openness Trans. J. M. Cohen as The Two and the
to the influence of Asian philosophy should not One (Chicago, 1965).
be ignored, nor should his origins in an Eastern Aspects du mythe (Paris, 1963). Trans. W.
Orthodox Christian environment, which also Trask as Myth and Reality (New York,
clearly influences his understanding. Eliade’s 1963).
greatest contribution to the contemporary under- “Yoga and Modern Philosophy,” Journal of
standing of religions may be his combining all of General Education 2 (1963): 124–37.
these influences in a pluralistic philosophy of Le Sacré et le profane (Paris, 1965). Trans.
religion that manages to take all religious tradi- Eva Moldenhauer as Das Heilige und das
tions seriously as genuine expressions of real Profane (Hamburg, 1957); trans. W.
existential situations. Trask as The Sacred and the Profane: The
Nature of Religion (London, 1959).
BIBLIOGRAPHY “Historical Events and Structural Meaning
Le Mythe de l’éternel retour (Paris, 1949). in Tension,” Criterion 6 (1967): 29–31.
Trans. W. Trask as Cosmos and History: The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion
The Myth of the Eternal Return (Chicago, 1969).
(Princeton, N.J., 1954). “The Sacred in the Secular World,” Cultural
Traité d’histoire des religions (Paris, 1949). Hermeneutics 1 (1973): 101–13.
Trans. R. Sheed as Patterns in Histoire des croyances et des idées religieuses
Comparative Religion (London, 1958). I: de l’âge de la pierre aux mystères
720
ELIADE
d’Éleusis (Paris, 1976). Trans. W. Trask as Raffaele Pettazzoni (Paris, 1994).

A History of Religious Ideas, vol. I: From “The Unpublished Correspondence between
the Stone Age to the Eleusinian Mysteries Mircea Eliade and Stig Wikander
(Chicago, 1978). (1948–1977): Parts I–III,” ed. Mihaela
Histoire des croyances et des idées religieuses Timuş and Eugen Ciurtin, Archaeus:
II: de Gautama Bouddha au triomphe du Études d’histoire des religions 4 (2000):
christianisme (Paris, 1978). Trans. W. 157–85; 4 (2000): 179–211; 5 (2001):
Trask as A History of Religious Ideas, vol. 75–119.
II: From Gautama Buddha to the Mircea Eliade: A Critical Reader, ed. Bryan
Triumph of Christianity (Chicago, 1982). Rennie (London, 2005).
Histoire des croyances et des idées religieuses
III: de Mahomet à l’âge des reformes Further Reading
(Paris, 1983). Trans. A. Hiltebeitel and D. Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio,
Apostolos-Cappadona as The History of Encyc Social Behav Sci, Encyc Relig, Who
Religious Ideas, vol. III: From Was Who in Amer v9
Muhammad to the Age of the Reforms Allen, Douglas. Structure and Creativity in
(Chicago, 1985). Religion: Hermeneutics in Mircea Eliade’s
Editor-in-chief, The Encyclopedia of Phenomenology and New Directions (The
Religion (New York and London, 1987). Hague, 1978).
———, Myth and Religion in Mircea Eliade
Other Relevant Works (New York, 1988).
Maitreyi (Bucharest, Romania, 1933). Trans. Allen, Douglas, and Denis Doeing. Mircea
Alain Guillermou as La Nuit Bengali Eliade: An Annotated Bibliography (New
(Lausanne, Switzerland, 1950); trans. York, 1980).
Catherine Spencer as Bengal Nights Baird, Robert D. “Phenomenological
(Chicago, 1994). Understanding: Mircea Eliade,” in
Domnişoara Christina (Bucharest, Romania, Category Formation and the History of
1936). Trans. Ana Cartianu as Mistress Religion (The Hague, 1971).
Christina (Boulder, Col., 1992). Cave, John D. Mircea Eliade’s Vision for a
Pe Strada Mântuleasa (Paris, 1968). Trans. New Humanism (Oxford, 1992).
M. P. Stevenson as The Old Man and The Devi, Maitreyi. It Does Not Die. A Romance
Bureaucrats (Notre Dame, Ind., 1979). (Calcutta, 1976; Chicago, 1994).
Fantastic Tales (London, 1969). Dudley, Guilford, III. Religion on Trial:
Noaptea de Sânziene (Paris, 1971). Trans. A. Mircea Eliade and His Critics
Guillermou as Forêt interdite (Paris, (Philadelphia, 1977).
1955); trans. M. L. Ricketts and M. P. Handoca, Mircea. Mircea Eliade:
Stevenson as The Forbidden Forest (Notre Biobibliografie (Bucharest, Romania,
Dame, Ind., 1978). 1997).
Tales of the Sacred and Supernatural Laignel-Lavanstine, Alexandra. Cioran,
(Philadelphia, 1981). Eliade, Ionescu: L’oubli du fascisme
Two Strange Tales (London, 1986). (Paris, 2002).
Youth without Youth: Three Fantastic Olson, Carl. The Theology and Philosophy
Novellas (Columbus, Ohio, 1988). of Eliade (New York, 1992).
Mystic Stories: The Sacred and the Profane Paden, William. “Before the Sacred became
(New York, 1992). Theological: Rereading the Durkheimian
L’histoire des religions a-t-elle un sens?: Legacy,” in Religion and Reductionism:
Correspondance 1926–1959, with Essays on Eliade, Segal, and the Challenge
721
ELIADE
of the Social Sciences for the Study of As a critic and a philosopher of literature,
Religion, ed. T. A. Idinopulos and E. Eliot’s work reflects his early study of Bradley,
Yonan (Leiden, 1994), pp. 198–209. though it is not constrained by that study. His
Rennie, Bryan. Reconstructing Eliade: early and perhaps most influential critical work
Making Sense of Religion (Albany, N.Y., on the nature of poetry and the project of criti-
1996). cism shows the influence of Bradleyan
———, ed. Changing Religious Worlds: The idealism, while at the same time it shows
Meaning and End of Mircea Eliade marks of a resurgent empiricism inspired by
(Albany, N.Y., 2000). Eliot’s interactions with Bertrand Russell.
Ricketts, Mac L. Mircea Eliade: the Essays of this vintage were collected in The
Romanian Roots, 2 vols (New York, Sacred Wood (1920), the most prominent of
1988). which is “Tradition and the Individual
Webster, A. F. C. “Orthodox Mystical Talent.” In that essay, Eliot proposes a
Tradition and the Comparative Study of program for understanding poetry, the central
Religion: An Experimental Synthesis,” motivation of which is the historical contex-
Journal of Ecumenical Studies 23 (1986): tuality of all poetry of high merit. In order to
621–49. write poetry responsibly, a poet must incor-
porate knowledge of the past and the tradition
Bryan S. Rennie of poetry of the past in such a way as to reflect
awareness of the presence of the past in the
present. This allows the poet to become part of
the tradition without merely copying what has
gone before. Just as mere copying cannot be a
viable program for creating genuine art, neither
ELIOT, Thomas Stearns (1888–1965) can innovation, Eliot maintains, irrespective of
tradition. This rejection may rely on some-
T. S. Eliot was born on 26 September 1888 in thing like a view of the general contextuality of
St. Louis, Missouri. He was educated at all linguistic utterance (and thus the impossi-
Harvard (BA in 1909 and MA in English in bility of genuine isolation from tradition). The
1910), the Sorbonne, Marburg (briefly), and imperative is to cultivate what Eliot calls the
Oxford. After establishing residence in England historical sense, so that the poet can write
in 1914, he completed a Harvard dissertation in impersonally, allowing tradition to work itself
philosophy under the direction of Josiah ROYCE out through the individual talent.
titled “Experience and the Objects of All of Eliot’s critical work in literature is
Knowledge in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley,” directed along these lines, viewing literature as
but he never received the PhD because he could indicative of culture more broadly. In his early
not return to America in 1916 to defend the dis- work, however, the criterion of impersonality
sertation. After working as a bank clerk, he was thought to extend not only to the poet but
held a series of positions in publishing, as assis- also to the critic, whose sole responsibility it
tant editor of the Egoist, as editor of the was to provide historical information relevant
Criterion, and as editor and eventually a to particular pieces of literature, enabling the
Director at Faber & Faber publishing house. His audience to access the poet’s historical sense.
major works of poetry are “The Love Song of Later, in The Use of Poetry and the Use of
J. Alfred Prufrock,” The Waste Land, Ash Criticism (1933), he revised his view of criti-
Wednesday, and Four Quartets. Eliot was cism to regard the variation of needs for criti-
awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1948. cism across various eras. Where he had once
He died on 4 January 1965 in London, England. regarded the historical sense relevant in litera-
722
ELY
ture as importantly objective, he began later to Cultural Divide (Chicago, 2003).

regard it as something liable to reinterpretation Gallup, Donald. T. S. Eliot: A Bibliography
according to the specific needs of varying (New York, 1947; rev. edn 1969).
cultures. Schusterman, Richard. “Eliot as
Philosopher,” in The Cambridge
BIBLIOGRAPHY Companion to T. S. Eliot (Cambridge,
The Sacred Wood (London, 1920). UK, 1994), pp. 31–47.
For Lancelot Andrewes (London, 1928).
Selected Essays 1917–1932 (London, 1932). Kyle Broom
The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism
(London, 1933).
Essays Ancient and Modern (London, 1936).
The Idea of a Christian Society (London,
1939).
Notes Towards the Definition of Culture ELY, Richard Theodore (1854–1943)
(London, 1948).
On Poetry and Poets (London, 1957). Richard T. Ely was born on 13 April 1854 in
Ripley, New York, and died on 4 October
Other Relevant Works 1943 in Old Lyme, Connecticut. He grew up
Collections of Eliot’s papers are at Harvard in Fredonia in western New York, where his
University, the New York Public Library, mother, a regional artist, taught at Fredonia
and Cambridge University. Normal School. He first attended Dartmouth
Prufrock and Other Observations (London, College and then Columbia University where
1917). he received his BA in 1876 and his MA in
The Waste Land (London, 1922). 1879. He held a fellowship at Columbia during
Poems 1909–1925 (London, 1925). 1876–9, which enabled him to study in
Ash Wednesday (London, 1930). Germany at Halle and Heidelberg universi-
Murder in the Cathedral (London, 1935). ties. Although he originally intended to study
Collected Poems 1909–1935 (London, philosophy in Germany, he soon switched to
1936). economics, earning his PhD degree at
East Coker (London, 1940). Heidelberg under Karl Knies. He also worked
The Dry Salvages (London, 1941). for a year at the Royal Statistical Bureau in
Little Gidding (London, 1942). Berlin during 1879–80.
Complete Poems and Plays (New York, Ely was one of the earliest professors
1952). appointed to the faculty at the new Johns
To Criticize the Critic, and Other Writings Hopkins University in Baltimore, founded on
(New York, 1965). the German model in 1876, and designed pri-
The Waste Land and Other Writings (New marily to train academic professionals. He was
York, 2002). appointed professor of political economy in
1881, imbued with a passion for developing
Further Reading specialists in the emerging branches of eco-
Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, nomics. He taught many of the men who went
Comp Amer Thought, Dict Amer Bio, on to teach at the new public universities
Routledge Encycl Phil, Who Was Who v4 created by the Morrill Land Grant Act of
Ackroyd, Peter. T. S. Eliot: A Life (New 1862. Among his graduate students was
York, 1984). Woodrow Wilson, later President of the United
Chinitz, David E. T. S. Eliot and the States. More of his students include sociologist
723
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Albion W. S MALL , economists John R. economic development: this was known as the
COMMONS and Edward A. ROSS, and histo- historical school. Of all the young, German-
rian Frederick Jackson Turner. trained economists, Ely was the most radical,
Although a dedicated professional econo- believing that laissez-faire had to be con-
mist, Ely was also a great believer in reaching strained, in the interests of fairness and the public
the public. While at Johns Hopkins he brought good.
out a succession of books in the emerging In 1885 the young economists, prominent
branches of economics that were also intended among them Ely, John Bates CLARK and Henry
to be read by the educated citizen. His first Carter Adams, came together at Saratoga to
book, French and German Socialism, appeared found their own professional organization, the
in 1883 and described the many thinkers of the American Economic Association. Several orga-
preceding century who had contributed ideas nizational plans were proposed, but the most
to European socialism. The Labor Movement structured was that prepared by Ely, and his
in America (1886) was in a sense an extension was the plan adopted, with one important excep-
of the earlier work, describing various labor tion. Ely had prepared a statement of principles,
organizations in the United States. Taxation in which specifically attacked the doctrine of
American States and Cities (1889) described in laissez-faire; the other young economists, less
detail different methods of taxation used in radical in their thinking than Ely, tabled his
the United States since its creation. Although statement of principles. Although other parts of
his An Introduction to Political Economy the statement were adopted by the AEA, the
(1889) was by no means the first general rejection of laissez-faire was omitted.
account of the operation of the economy, it Notwithstanding, Ely became the secretary of the
was intended as much as a popular account as new AEA, a post he occupied until 1892 and
a professional textbook, and was the basis of which gave him considerable control of the oper-
his widely disseminated Outlines of Economics ations of the AEA, particularly its vigorous pub-
(first edition, 1893), which went through six lications program.
editions and sold over 300,000 copies. It was Concurrently with teaching at Hopkins, Ely
used as a textbook in economics courses in pursued his campaign to bring economics to the
many colleges and universities for over three larger population. His primary vehicle, aside
decades. from his books, was the Chautauqua Institution,
Ely was one of a cadre of young, mostly a religious summer school founded by Methodist
German-trained economists, who disputed the Bishop John H. Vincent in 1876, in Chautauqua,
reigning economic orthodoxy stemming from New York, not far from Ely’s childhood home.
the English classical economists, Adam Smith, Ely was a regular lecturer at the summer school
David Ricardo, James Mill and his son, John and his Introduction to Political Economy, pub-
Stuart Mill. The central principle of classical lished in 1889 by the Chautauqua Press, was
economics was the idea that the market deter- intended to be a kind of textbook for the lectures
mined values and that it worked best when he gave. Chautauqua enabled him to link the
unencumbered: the doctrine of laissez-faire. doctrines of economics with the principles of
By the late nineteenth century, however, it Christianity, most notably the second com-
became clear that unencumbered markets gave mandment, “do unto others …” But Ely was not
too much power to capital and the men who in harmony with the other young academic econ-
controlled it, vis-à-vis labor and those who omists, who wished to restrict their work to
had only their labor to sell. Besides, the academia; and Ely’s action, in scheduling the
Germans who had taught the young econo- 1892 meeting of the AEA at Chautauqua, led to
mists held that circumstances, as embodied in a split with his fellow AEA members and to his
history, played a major role in determining resignation as the secretary of the AEA.
724
ELY
In 1892 Ely left the Johns Hopkins approach to economics while he was still at
University to become a professor of econom- Hopkins, with his appointment to, first, the
ics at the University of Wisconsin. Wisconsin, Baltimore, and then the Maryland Tax
one of the many growing land-grant state uni- Commissions. He gathered data not just from
versities, gave him the opportunity to develop Maryland but from many other states and
the program in economics at a time when the communities, and this information formed the
progressive movement, especially in Wisconsin, basis for his book on Taxation in American
created an unusually congenial climate for his States and Cities, replete with data comparing
anti-laissez-faire views. For most of his career the systems of taxation used in many parts of
at Wisconsin, he enjoyed the support of the the United States. Although he himself added
administration of the university and the polit- much new information to his works on eco-
ical climate of the state. Although he continued nomics, Ely complained throughout his life
to develop his views as a professional econo- that information remained inadequate for
mist, a good deal of his time was devoted to really sound judgments.
building up the program in the social sciences. Ely’s radicalism was early challenged at the
Because those who shared his anti-laissez-faire University of Wisconsin. One Oliver E. Wells,
views often encountered opposition at more a relatively unknown politician who had won
conservative institutions, Ely was able to bring election to the post of Superintendent of Public
Wisconsin a group of young economists and Instruction, in 1894 accused Ely of propagat-
sociologists who had been dismissed from the ing socialist ideas at the university, and of
faculty elsewhere. Two of the most notable of taking direct part in some strike action at a
these men were his former student, Edward A. local printing plant in Madison, the state
Ross (spectacularly fired from the faculty at capital. Wells made his accusation public in a
Stanford in 1901), who established sociology letter published in The Nation, subsequently
as an integral part of the economics program, reprinted in the New York Post in July 1894,
and John R. Commons, who became the pre- while Ely was out of town lecturing at
eminent specialist in labor issues. Ely devoted Chautauqua. The accusations received
much time to raising money for the assort- national notice, at a moment of significant
ment of special lectures and fellowships that labor unrest throughout the country. The offi-
were an integral part of the program at cials at the university determined that the only
Wisconsin. recourse was a formal trial to be conducted by
One of Ely’s important departures from clas- the Board of Regents of the University. Ely’s
sical economists was his belief that a full under- friends at Wisconsin rallied around him, and
standing of economics had to arise from his lawyer was able to refute all the accusations
detailed factual studies of actual conditions. He in detail. Ely was exonerated by the Regents,
referred to this idea as “look and see,” and in their decision they issued that famous
although he was always ready to acknowledge defense of academic freedom: “Whatever may
that he got the idea from an earlier, little- be the limitations which trammel inquiry else-
known American economist, Richard Jones, where we believe the great state University of
author of The Distribution of Wealth and the Wisconsin should ever encourage that contin-
Sources of Taxation, which had appeared ual and fearless sifting and winnowing by
around 1830. “Look and See” as a methodol- which alone the truth can be found.”
ogy also owed much to the emergence of sta- Despite the public defense, the trial had a
tistics in the mid-nineteenth century, and the sobering effect on Ely. He gave up appearing
collection of statistics on social and economic at Chautauqua, and his work focused more
developments by many states, most notably than ever on investigating actual conditions
Massachusetts. Ely himself began this in the operation of the economic system. He
725
ELY
dug into the details of monopolies and trusts, difficult. Ely moved part of the Institute to New
publishing a book on the subject in 1900. But York City in 1932, and formally resigned from
a major effort appears to have been devoted to Northwestern in 1933; that part of the Institute
studying the interrelationship between remaining at Northwestern gradually dwindled
property and contract, on the one hand, and over the next few years. Ely lived in New York
the distribution of wealth on the other. He City for the rest of his life, continuing his inde-
carried out an exhaustive search of court pendent research and publishing. He was made
judgments, especially those of the United States an honorary professor at Columbia University
Supreme Court, and showed in his two-volume in 1937.
work, Property and Contract in Their Relation Ely’s career was in part a reflection of his
to the Distribution of Wealth (1914) the own background and native abilities, but in
importance of the law in defining economic large measure he was a product of his times.
relationships. He resumed his close relations Reaching maturity in the last quarter of the
with other professional economists, and he nineteenth century, his career responded to the
was elected President of the American first great wave of industrialization, with its
Economic Association in 1900. creation of great corporate entities and masses
Ely was also instrumental in developing land of workers. The times also saw the prolonged
economics as a branch of the discipline. depression of 1873–93, with the resulting unrest
Agricultural economics was first taught at among working classes, who lacked, any social
Wisconsin in 1902, when Henry C. Taylor safety net. Ely’s own fervent Christian beliefs,
offered a course on the subject. But land eco- combined with his “look and see” approach to
nomics in a larger sense became the focus of existing conditions, sparked his sympathy for
Ely’s later career. In 1920 he founded the problems of labor. At the same time his
Wisconsin’s Institute for Research in Land own analysis of economic forces led him to rec-
Economics, and was successful in getting ognize that the economy relied on input from a
funding for it from outside the university. The variety of factors, capital, labor, and land being
Institute developed a special course for real the primary ones. He came to realize that dis-
estate agents, which helped professionalize tribution of wealth was to a large extent the
those working in this field. In 1923 the basis for human well-being, and that through
Institute was rechristened the Institute for the distribution of wealth, man, to him the
Research in Land Economics and Public measure of all things, could be best served.
Utilities. In 1925 the Institute began publica- In rejecting laissez-faire as the best way of
tion of the Journal of Land and Public Utility achieving the well-being of all members of
Economics. society, Ely also rejected the deductive reason-
This new focus led to Ely’s last career ing that was essential to classical economics.
change, when he left Wisconsin in July 1925 to His “look and see” policy led him inevitably to
move himself and the Institute to inductive approaches, developing the “law”
Northwestern University. Although relations from the data on actual conditions. In this he
with the regular economics department were was merely reflecting the scientific and profes-
cordial, difficulties arose over financing – the sional bias of his times: the belief, since Darwin,
private sources Ely solicited either wanted to that intensive investigation of the facts could
give their financial aid directly to reveal the rules by which the system worked.
Northwestern, or suggested that it was This approach, which came to be called “insti-
Northwestern’s responsibility to cover the tutional” economics, has since become just a
costs of the Institute. When the great depres- part of the methods used by the professionals
sion began in 1929, and especially in the who form the discipline of economics.
1930s, private financing became even more
726
EMERSON
BIBLIOGRAPHY Ely in American Life (Lexington, Kent.,

French and German Socialism in Modern 1966).
Times (New York, 1883).
The Labor Movement in America (New Nancy M. Gordon
York, 1886).
Taxation in American States and Cities
(New York, 1888).
An Introduction to Political Economy
(New York, 1889).
Outlines of Economics (New York, 1893). EMERSON, Ralph Waldo (1803–82)
Socialism: An Examination of Its Nature,
Its Strength and Its Weakness, with Ralph Waldo Emerson was born on 25 May
Suggestions for Social Reform (New 1803 in Boston, Massachusetts, to William
York, 1894). and Ruth Haskins Emerson. Emerson’s father,
Monopolies and Trusts (New York, 1900). a well-respected Federalist and Unitarian
Property and Contract in Their Relation to minister, died in 1811, so the young Emerson
the Distribution of Wealth, 2 vols (New lived with his mother and four brothers.
York, 1914). Emerson’s aunt, Mary Moody Emerson, who
Elements of Land Economics, with Edward was deeply mystical and rather morose,
W. Morehouse (New York, 1924). became an early intellectual influence on him.
Hard Times – The Way In and the Way She introduced her nephew to literature that
Out (New York, 1931). incited and inspired him for the rest of his life,
including Plato, Plotinus, Marcus Aurelius,
Other Relevant Works Samuel Taylor Coleridge, William Ellery
Ely’s papers are at the University of Channing, John Locke, Lord Byron, John
Wisconsin. Milton, and William Shakespeare. After
Ground Under Our Feet: An attending Boston Latin School from 1812 to
Autobiography (New York, 1938). 1817, Emerson entered Harvard College at
the age of fourteen, where he studied German
Further Reading philosophy with Edward Everett and George
Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, Ticknor. Levi Frisbie and Levi Hedge intro-
Comp Amer Thought, Dict Amer Bio, duced Emerson to Scottish Common Sense
Dict Amer Religious Bio, Dict philosophy. While at Harvard, Emerson began
Economics, Encyc Amer Bio, Nat Cycl a journal, which he named “Wide World.” In
Amer Bio v9, Who Was Who in Amer v2 retrospect, this marked the birth of a project
Everett, John R. Religion in Economics: A that would last for half a century. In time, the
Study of John Bates Clark, Richard Ely journal entries would serve as the first site of
and Simon Patten (New York, 1946). intellectual investigation and a repository from
Furner, Mary O. Advocacy & Objectivity: which he could extract prose to serve more
A Crisis in the Professionalization of public and published forms.
American Social Science (Lexington, After graduating from Harvard with his BA
Kent., 1975). in 1821, Emerson taught elementary school
Miller, Harold L., ed. The Richard T. Ely with his brother William. By 1825, however,
Papers: Guide to a Microfilm Edition he resumed his own studies with training for
(Madison, Wisc., 1986). the Unitarian ministry at the recently founded
Rader, Benjamin G. The Academic Mind Harvard Divinity School. He was approbated
and Reform: The Influence of Richard T. to preach, and in 1827 he began to do so in
727
EMERSON
Boston and nearby towns. On a visit to of divinity, history, and individual identity.
Concord, New Hampshire, he met Ellen He employs Kantian terminology, which came
Louisa Tucker, whom he married in 1829, the to him by way of Coleridge, with a rigor, com-
same year he was invited to fill the pulpit of the pactness, and innovation that lead many to
Second Church in Boston. In his preaching, cite this short book as a founding document of
Emerson addressed the still urgent conflicts transcendentalist thinking. Emerson moved
between orthodox Calvinists and liberal away from overtly Christian language, and
Unitarians. The debate centered on the degree toward ideas that are more generic and con-
to which an individual is responsible for his ceptually fluid, but also more concretely philo-
own salvation. Emerson gave sermons that sophical. For example, where he had a keen
emphasized the role of ethical conduct in lieu interest in the life of Jesus as an exemplar, he
of reliance on saving grace. He denied the now broadens his interest to include human
Calvinist theology of human depravity, and conduct widely construed. In Nature, he takes
affirmed Jesus as a moral exemplar fit to guide this to an extreme, since he argues that nature
human life. The purpose of scripture, therefore, provides a “discipline” for the moral life, and
is practical; it helps one respond to the question that its lessons are coextensive with the deepest
Emerson recurrently asked of himself: “How wisdom of human performance and per-
shall I live?” fectibility: “Nature, in its ministry, is not only
Ellen died of tuberculosis in early 1831. In the material, but is also the process and the
addition to coping with this loss, Emerson con- result.” (1983, p. 12) The source of this
tinued to doubt his adaptability to the ministry. instruction provides a moral foundation for the
In the summer of 1832, he confessed, “I have network of criticisms and commentaries
sometimes thought that in order to be a good Emerson will develop in the coming years,
minister it was necessary to leave the ministry.” since it reinforces the idea that human life
Later the same year, Emerson asked the leaders should not remain beholden to the past or
of his congregation if he could refrain from bounded by custom and dogma. Rather, the
administering the Eucharist, and wrote “The infinitude of nature entails the scope of human
Lord’s Supper” to explain his objection to the possibility in thought and action. For Emerson,
doctrine of Transubstantiation. Emerson this meant revelation is based on private
resigned from the Church when his request was insight, and redemption is a matter of human
denied. In December 1832, he boarded a ship to imagination and will.
Europe, where he met Coleridge and William In August 1837, Emerson delivered “The
Wordsworth, and, by way of John Stuart Mill, American Scholar,” an oration to the Phi Beta
he was introduced to Thomas Carlyle, who Kappa Society at Harvard. Invited to speak
became a lifelong friend and correspondent. before a class of graduating seniors, and the
Upon returning to Boston, Emerson embarked academic community that supported them,
on a career of public lecturing. Soon after, he Emerson used the occasion to assess the
married Lydia Jackson, with whom he had two current state of American thinking. Part of the
daughters and a son who lived to maturity. query involved speculation on whether there
Emerson bought a house in Concord, was such thinking to speak of. The scholar, as
Massachusetts, and lived there with his family “Man Thinking,” should be dedicated to
for the rest of his life. The year 1836 proved thinking his own thoughts, and in that process
tumultuous for Emerson; his beloved brother aware of three primary influences on his
Charles died, his first book Nature was pub- thinking: nature, the past in the form of books,
lished, and his first son Waldo was born. and the future in the prospect of action (1983,
In Nature, Emerson blends his interest in p. 12). The first influence is familiar to readers
Plato and Stoic philosophy with reconceptions of Nature, the second deals with the stultifying
728
EMERSON
effects of inheriting stale opinions from others, variety of themes and problems, many of
and the third outlines a vision for a kind of which developed thoughts already present in
thinking that achieves itself only through earlier work, including a fair portion of
action. Action is predicated on “self-trust,” material written in his extensive journals. “Self-
the abiding inner quality that sustains and Reliance” remains a striking and enduringly
converts these influences to the benefit of vital essay, perhaps because it stages so effec-
thinking (1983, p. 63). tively the debate between interior inspiration
The next summer, the seniors at the Divinity and external influence. Does living with others
School in Cambridge, Massachusetts, invited necessitate that my integrity and identity will
Emerson to offer a graduation address. Where, be compromised? Can I learn from others how
in “The American Scholar,” he critiques habits to be who I am, and yet be myself? Emerson
of thinking in general terms, in the “Address” mediates the apparent paradox of education by
he advances a more specialized version of the arguing for trust in the “aboriginal Self,”
earlier appraisal. In particular, he raises doubts which he cites as the principal guide for nego-
about orthodox Christian faith and the impli- tiating attempted coercion by others (1983, p.
cations of believing in miracles. Christianity 268). “Insist on yourself; never imitate.”
errs by making truth seem an established fact (1983, p. 278) Similar to a stoic handbook, this
of prior history, and thereby making God seem essay comprises a set of reflections on what it
distant, “as if God were dead” (1983, p. 83). means to retain individual integrity in the midst
Emerson contends that God is an immanent of society, and recommendations for how to
fact of human life, and that such presence is preserve it. Importantly, however, and in
only perceptible when each person draws from keeping with the romantic thinking that had
“the religious sentiment” that abides within influenced him, he does not present nature as
(1983, p. 76). He told an audience saturated an antagonistic external force. On the
with years of theological training, and on the contrary, nature is an outer means for per-
cusp of entering the Christian ministry: “Let ceiving one’s most privileged and pristine
me admonish you, first of all, to go alone; to interior character. Emerson’s conceptual sym-
refuse the good models, even those which are pathies lie with a blend of physics and ethics.
sacred in the imagination of men, and dare to Meanwhile, the social context remains under
love God without mediator or veil.” (1983, p. suspicion as a force of potentially hazardous
88) There is no reason to love God through manipulation.
something else, since he is already fully present Early in 1842, Emerson was devastated by
in every heart. The reaction from the Address the loss of his first son, Waldo, who died of
at the Divinity School was severely negative. scarlet fever at age five. He conveyed his grief
Already separated from the Church, Emerson in letters to family and friends, among them
was now effectively banned from the academy; Margaret Fuller, who later the same year
he wouldn’t be invited back to Harvard until handed over the editorship of the transcen-
1866, when he was old and famous. Surviving dentalist journal, The Dial, to Emerson. While
partly on an inheritance from his first wife, he editing the periodical, Emerson worked on his
continued to lecture publicly to make up the second series of essays, which was published in
difference. A lecture circuit was developing to 1844.
meet the demand of this forum, and Emerson Essays: Second Series continues the format
kept pace by writing during the winter and of the first set of essays. Like the first collec-
giving speeches during the summer. tion, the topics, however varied, hang together
In 1841, Essays was published in Boston. In along dominant conceptual lines. Emerson
the tradition of great essayists from Seneca to focused perspicuous attention on the nature of
Montaigne to Bacon, Emerson wrote on a human interiority: what makes us who we are,
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EMERSON
and how we express that nature. In the second for self-representation in their creative works,
series, there is an enhanced appreciation of reveal the promise latent in each of us. In the
external facts and circumstances, among them “Address,” Emerson said that “Truly
the challenges that emerge in human engage- speaking, it is not instruction, but provoca-
ment (such as with manners and politics), and tion, that I can receive from another soul.”
that bear down upon us without consultation (1983, p. 79) In the opening essay of this book,
or negotiation (such as with somatic finitude “Uses of Great Men,” Emerson reaffirms the
and mortality). In the earlier Essays, Emerson notion that when we heed the fantastic pro-
dwelled on the benevolence of nature. Now he ductions of the imagination, we learn the
gives nature a more sober assessment; its gifts lesson of self-trust even as we see it confirmed
are not bestowed without a demand for rein another: when his imagination wakes, “a
compense. Before, Emerson had emphasized man seems to multiply ten times or a thousand
the analogical quality of the natural and times his force. It opens the delicious sense of
human relation. In these essays, the analogical indeterminate size, and inspires an audacious
relation is depicted as a trade that can have mental habit. We are as elastic as the gas of
severe costs. In “Experience,” Emerson sets gunpowder, and a sentence in a book, or a
the terms of his revaluation, specifically the word dropped in conversation, sets free our
link between fate and freedom, skepticism and fancy, and instantly our heads are bathed with
belief. galaxies, and our feet tread the floor of the
In 1846 Emerson published his Poems. “The Pit.” (1983, p. 622) Thus, these representative
Sphinx,” which leads the compilation, returns men – Plato, Swedenborg, Montaigne,
to ideas of unity and identity found in Nature Shakespeare, Napoleon, and Goethe – are not
and the first series essays “History,” “Spiritual exemplars for us to imitate, but examples of
Laws,” and “The Over-Soul.” Other impor- what resistance to imitation may produce.
tant poems include “The Rhodora,” “The Their genius was not in copying others, but in
Humble Bee,” “Blight,” and “Threnody,” the being themselves. Likewise, the only version of
last of which is a meditation on young Waldo imitation we should allow ourselves is that
in the wake of his death. which supports us in the pursuit of our own
Emerson returned to England in 1847, this projects and positions. To seek, accept, or
time accepting an invitation to lecture. His sustain more than provocation from another
experiences on this trip, along with those from may lead to one’s peril.
his first voyage, became the basis for English Emerson was crestfallen by Daniel Webster’s
Traits, published nearly a decade later in 1856. support of the Fugitive Slave Law in 1851,
In the course of his travels, Emerson spent and publicly denounced him for it. By the mid
time with Dickens, Wordsworth, Tennyson, 1850s, Emerson spoke more explicitly and
and Harriet Martineau, and refreshed his com- widely on anti-slavery issues. Though he was
munion with Carlyle. In Paris, he met Alexis de slow to voice his derision, and doubted his
Tocqueville. Upon returning to America, authority to relate it to the public, he made an
Emerson continued to lecture widely, includ- unambiguous bid toward reform. In his
ing a series entitled “Mind and Manners in the “Lecture on Slavery” in 1854, he writes that
Nineteenth Century,” in which he reflected on the institution is an evil equal to cholera or
his recent time abroad. typhus that has resulted from Americans’
Following up on the idea that Jesus is a superficial grasp of their own values.
fitting moral exemplar, but not the only one, Emerson’s capacity for culture critique, and
Emerson published Representative Men in his contribution to social reform movements
1850. The book stands as a report on the char- began with his protest against the Jacksonian
acter of individual men who, in their talent plan to relocate the Cherokee Indians. By
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EMERSON
1855, Emerson was adapting the same princi- absence. There were only a few highlights
ples he used to reprimand slavery and the mis- among the poems, and the address was more
treatment of Native Americans to the purpose a ceremony for Harvard’s reclamation of an
of establishing the rights of women. In a speech exile than an occasion for Emerson to brand a
before a Women’s Rights Convention, he new revolution.
declared his support that women be given “one In 1870 Emerson published Society and
half of the world” through equal rights. Solitude, a collection of essays that were given
In 1860 Emerson published The Conduct of as lectures in 1858 and 1859. That same year,
Life, which joins issues from the first two series he was chosen as an Overseer of Harvard
of Essays with his more developed political College, and invited to deliver a series of
writings from the 1850s. “Fate” is among the lectures on philosophy. Emerson’s course of
finest illustrations of such work, in which sixteen lectures, “The Natural History of
Emerson comments on the nature of human Intellect,” was sparsely attended in the first
freedom. The triumvirate of players that date year, and retracted the second. Despite this,
to his earliest essays – nature, society, and the James Elliot CABOT, Emerson’s biographer,
individual – receive a fresh review, if with a attested that Emerson judged this work the
familiar sense of disquiet. The question placed most important of his life. This assessment
at the book’s outset – “How shall I live?” – seems fitting given that his ambition for the
exposes the high stakes of one’s conception of course was a rigorous summary and systematic
freedom. In “Fate,” Emerson posits freedom as outline of ideas in development for nearly forty
the signature antagonism of human conduct: years. In 1871, Emerson traveled to California
“And though nothing is more disgusting than by train and met with naturalist John Muir. In
the crowing about liberty by slaves, as most 1872, the family home in Concord was
men are, and by the flippant mistaking for damaged by fire, but Emerson’s original manu-
freedom of some paper preamble like a scripts were spared from destruction. By the
‘Declaration of Independence,’ or the statute generous support of friends, Emerson traveled
right to vote, by those who have never dared to Europe for the third time, and to Egypt in
to think or to act, yet it is wholesome to man the company of his daughter, Ellen, while his
to look not at Fate, but the other way.” (1983, house was repaired at their expense. Emerson
pp. 953–4) spent time with Henry James, Jr. in Paris, and,
While lecturing on “American Civilization” in England he saw his friend Carlyle for the last
in Washington, D.C., in 1862, Emerson met time.
with President Abraham Lincoln, and thought In 1875 Emerson’s Letters and Social Aims
well of him. Later the same year, Emerson was published. It contains, among other things,
gave a generous speech, “The President’s his 1867 Harvard oration, “Quotation and
Proclamation,” in which he declared that Originality,” “Persian Poetry,” and
Lincoln “has been permitted to do more for “Immortality.” Though much of the material
America than any other American man.” Also was written in the 1860s and later revised,
in 1862, Emerson mourned the loss of his some of the pieces in this collection possess
friend, Henry David Thoreau: “The country material from as early as 1839. A third book
knows not yet, or in the least part, how great of poetry, Selected Poems, was published in
a son it has lost.” (1983, p. 1133) Emerson’s 1876. And in 1878, Emerson delivered a
second book of poetry, May-Day and Other eulogy on Carlyle, which turned out to be his
Pieces, was published in 1867, the same year final public presentation. Emerson died on 27
he delivered a second Phi Beta Kappa oration April 1882 in Concord, Massachusetts.
at Harvard, “The Progress of Culture,” thus Emerson’s work has received appreciable, if
closing the circle on his twenty-nine year varied and inconsistent, attention from the
731
EMERSON
academy. Early biographies by Cabot and BIBLIOGRAPHY

Oliver Wendell H OLMES emphasized Nature (Boston, 1836).
Emerson’s presence in a genteel tradition of An Address Delivered Before the Senior
thinking, but this sentiment was soon lam- Class in Divinity College, Cambridge
pooned by George SANTAYANA. William JAMES Sunday Evening, 15 July 1838 (Boston,
and John DEWEY were steadfast in their praise 1838).
of Emerson’s contribution to philosophy. Essays (Boston, 1841; 1884).
James said there was never such a “fastidious Essays, Second Series (Boston and London,
lover of significance and distinction,” and 1844; 1884).
Dewey avowed that he had never known a Orations, Lectures, and Addresses (London,
writer “whose movement of thought is more 1844).
compact and unified” (Konvitz and Whicher Poems (Boston and London, 1847).
1962, pp. 22, 24). Emerson also had the admi- Enlarged edn, Selected Poems (Boston,
ration of Europeans, among them Friedrich 1876). Enlarged edn, Poems (Boston,
Nietzsche, who wrote his first essays with 1884).
Emerson’s nearby, and kept them as his com- Nature, Addresses, and Lectures (Boston,
panion throughout his life. Robert Musil and 1849; 1884).
Maurice Maeterlinck also registered their Representative Men: Seven Lectures (Boston
affection for Emerson. and London, 1850; 1884).
In recent decades, Emerson’s work has English Traits (Boston and London, 1856;
received more attention from within academic 1884).
departments of philosophy, and English, The Conduct of Life (Boston and London,
among others. New biographies have offered 1860; 1884).
revised portraits, thereby complicating the May-Day and Other Pieces (Boston and
polished, sometimes simplified sketches from London, 1867).
earlier years. Coupled with extensive contri- Society and Solitude: Twelve Chapters
butions from a diverse range of scholars, (Boston and London, 1870; 1884).
Emerson’s work has become more fundamen- Letters and Social Aims (Boston and
tal and essential to humanistic approaches to London, 1876; 1884).
nineteenth-century thought, and its implica- Lectures and Biographical Sketches (Boston
tions for present-day scholarship. Work by and London, 1884).
Cornel West and Stanley CAVELL, for instance, Miscellanies (Boston and London, 1884).
has contributed to a philosophical under- Complete Works, “The Riverside Edition,”
standing of Emerson’s role in founding 12 vols, ed. James Elliot Cabot (Boston
American thinking. This has involved over- and London, 1884, 1893). The twelve
coming the repression of Emerson, and the volumes are listed by title above.
exposition of a brand of value theory known Natural History of Intellect and Other
as moral perfectionism. Cavell, along with an Papers (Boston, 1893).
expanding contingent of scholars, continues The Complete Works of Ralph Waldo
to explore this habilitation and its many fecund Emerson, “The Centenary Edition,” 12
implications. At the time of Emerson’s bicen- vols, ed. Edward Waldo Emerson (Boston,
tenary, conferences were held in departments 1903–1904).
of philosophy, among other venues, leading
one to speculate with some confidence that Other Relevant Works
Emerson’s third century may witness the con- Emerson’s papers are at Harvard University.
tinued proliferation of critical philosophical The Letters of Ralph Waldo Emerson, 10
inheritance of his work. vols, ed. Ralph L. Rusk and Eleanor M.
732
EMERSON
Tilton (New York, 1939–95). eds. Critical Essays on Ralph Waldo

The Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks Emerson (Boston, 1983).
of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. William H. Cabot, James Elliot. A Memoir of Ralph
Gilman et al. (Cambridge, Mass., Waldo Emerson, 2 vols (Boston and New
1960–82). York, 1888).
The Correspondence of Emerson and Carpenter, Frederick I. Emerson and Asia
Carlyle, ed. Joseph Slater (New York, (Cambridge, Mass., 1930).
1964). Cavell, Stanley. Conditions Handsome and
The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo Unhandsome: The Constitution of
Emerson, ed. Robert E. Spiller et al. Emersonian Perfectionism (Chicago,
(Cambridge, Mass., 1971–). 1990).
Emerson in His Journals, ed. Joel Porte ———, Philosophical Passages: Wittgenstein,
(Cambridge, Mass., 1982). Emerson, Austin, Derrida (Oxford, 1995).
Ralph Waldo Emerson: Essays and Lectures, ———, Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes,
ed. Joel Porte (New York, 1983). ed. David Justin Hodge (Stanford, Cal.,
The Complete Sermons of Ralph Waldo 2003).
Emerson, ed. Albert von Frank et al. Goodman, Russell B. American Philosophy
(Columbia, Miss., 1989–92). and the Romantic Tradition (New York,
Ralph Waldo Emerson: Collected Poems 1985).
and Translations, ed. Harold Bloom and Gougeon, Len. Virtue’s Hero: Emerson,
Paul Kane (New York, 1994). Antislavery, and Reform (Athens, Georgia,
Emerson’s Antislavery Writings, ed. Len 1990).
Gougeon and Joel Myerson (New Haven, Hodder, Alan D. Emerson’s Rhetoric of
Conn., 1995). Revelation: Nature, the Reader, and the
The Selected Letters of Ralph Waldo Apocalypse Within (University Park, Penn.,
Emerson, ed. Joel Myerson (New York, 1989).
1997). Hodge, David Justin. On Emerson (Belmont,
Cal., 2002).
Further Reading Holmes, Oliver Wendell. Ralph Waldo
Amer Nat Bio, Amer Phils Before 1950, Emerson (Boston, 1885).
Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, Blackwell Kateb, George. Emerson and Self-reliance
Comp Phils, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, (Thousand Oaks, Cal., 1995).
Comp Amer Thought, Dict Amer Bio, Dict Konvitz, Milton R., ed. The Recognition of
Amer Religious Bio, Encyc Amer Bio, Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Criticism
Encyc Ethics, Encyc Relig, Nat Cycl Amer Since 1837 (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1972).
Bio v3, Oxford Comp Phil, Routledge Konvitz, Milton R., and Stephen E. Whicher,
Encycl Phil eds. Emerson: A Collection of Critical
Allen, Gay Wilson. Waldo Emerson: A Essays (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1962).
Biography (New York, 1981). Myerson, Joel. Ralph Waldo Emerson: A
Baker, Carlos. Emerson Among the Descriptive Bibliography (Pittsburgh,
Eccentrics: A Group Portrait (New York, Penn., 1982).
1996). Myerson, Joel, and Robert E. Burkholder.
Bloom, Harold. Ralph Waldo Emerson (New Emerson: An Annotated Secondary
York, 1985). Bibliography (Pittsburgh, Penn., 1985).
Buell, Lawrence. Emerson (Cambridge, Poirier, Richard. The Renewal of Literature:
Mass., 2003). Emersonian Reflections (New York,
Burkholder, Robert E., and Joel Myerson, 1987).
733
EMERSON
Porte, Joel. Emerson and Thoreau: analyst. There he came into close association
Transcendentalists in Conflict with the psychologist Henry MURRAY and his
(Middletown, Conn., 1966). Harvard Psychological Clinic, and was deeply
———, Representative Man: Emerson in His influenced by the ideas of William JAMES. From
Time (Oxford, 1979). 1934 to 1935 he held various minor staff
Porte, Joel, and Saundra Morris, eds. The appointments in Boston, including some con-
Cambridge Companion to Emerson nected with Harvard University. He worked
(Cambridge, UK, 1999). at the School of Medicine and the Institute of
Richardson, Robert D. Emerson: The Mind Human Relations at Yale University from 1936
on Fire (Berkeley, Cal., 1995). to 1939.
Robinson, David. Emerson and the Conduct Moving to California in 1939, he adopted
of Life: Pragmatism and Ethical Purpose the last name Erikson, keeping the middle initial
in the Later Work (New York, 1993). of ‘H’ for Homburger. He remained in Berkeley
Santayana, George. George Santayana’s until 1951, serving for a few years as a research
America: Essays on Literature and associate at the Institute for Child Welfare and
Culture, ed. James Ballowe (Urbana, Ill., from 1949 to 1951 as a member of the psy-
1967). chology faculty at the University of California
Stack, George. Nietzsche and Emerson: An at Berkeley. From 1951 to 1960 his primary
Elective Affinity (Athens, Ohio, 1992). appointment was on the senior staff of the
Van Leer, David. Emerson’s Epistemology: Austen Riggs Center in Stockbridge,
The Argument of the Essays (Cambridge, Massachusetts. From 1960 to 1970 he was
UK, 1986). professor of human development and lecturer
West, Cornel. The American Evasion of on psychiatry at Harvard. Erikson died on 12
Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism May 1994 in Harwich, Massachusetts.
(Madison, Wisc., 1989). Childhood and Society (1950) was Erikson’s
first well-known book, in which he presents a
David Justin Hodge basic conceptual framework for human devel-
opment. His system was deeply influenced by
the ego psychology of Anna Freud, Heinz
Hartmann, and others who viewed the ego as
more autonomous than did Sigmund Freud.
Erikson also included diverse cultural influ-
ERIKSON, Erik Homburger (1902–94) ences on human development under the influ-
ence of anthropologists, particularly Margaret
Erik Erikson was born as Erik Abrahamsen on M EAD , Ruth B ENEDICT , and H. Scudder
15 June 1902 near Frankfurt, Germany. His Mekeel. The central idea of his view of human
father (name unknown) abandoned his mother, development is that, by analogy to the princi-
Karla Abrahamsen (a Danish Jew), before his ple of epigenesis according to which the human
birth. He grew up in Karlsruhe, Germany, in embryo develops stage by stage, adding new
the home of his stepfather, Dr. Theodore organs according to a pre-established sequence,
Homburger, and Erik’s last name became the human being also develops in eight succes-
Homberger. He was trained as a psychoanalyst sive stages. Each stage unfolds as the successive
under the guidance of Anna Freud, and was maturation of physical, cognitive, and social
awarded full membership of the Vienna capacities prompts the individual to interact
Psychoanalytic Society in 1933. After emigrat- with a widening social sphere. Under the joint
ing to the United States with his wife Joan in impact of growing inner needs and capacities
1933, he set up practice in Boston as a child on the one hand, and differing stage-specific
734
ERIKSON
social opportunities and challenges shaped by of adulthood – became almost equally popular.
the culture on the other, the individual nego- Erikson always opted for elaborate descrip-
tiates a series of developmental tasks. While tion, rather than precise definition, of the
the successful completion of stage-specific crucial term “identity.” Deriving insights from
tasks contributes to the health and vitality of clinical experience, observations of normal and
the individual, the lack of success results in a competent youth in longitudinal research, and
deficiency. in-depth studies of exceptional individuals,
Erikson’s model of development is described Erikson presented a rich image of challenges
in terms of dialectical pairs of positive and and triumphs in the process of the growth of
negative outcomes typical of each stage: (1) personality. A detailed account of this process
trust versus mistrust, (2) autonomy versus is offered in Identity, Youth and Crisis (1968),
shame, (3) initiative versus guilt, (4) industry and a revised version of his theory of develop-
versus inferiority, (5) identity versus role con- ment is presented in The Life Cycle Completed
fusion, (6) intimacy versus isolation, (7) gener- (1982). His last major work, called Vital
ativity versus stagnation, and (8) integrity Involvement in Old Age (1986), was based on
versus despair. Each stage is considered to be longitudinal studies of persons followed
critical for the development of a senses of trust through the decades into their eighties.
versus mistrust and the like. The sense of trust, An additional and significant aspect of
autonomy, and so on involve largely precon- Erikson’s work involves in-depth studies of
scious and pervasive attitudes, which manifest great historical figures such as Martin Luther
themselves in experience and in behavior. The (Young Man Luther, 1958), Mahatma Gandhi
outcome of each stage is not an either/or affair; (Gandhi’s Truth, 1969), and Thomas Jefferson
nor is the negative side totally undesirable. A (Dimensions of a New Identity, 1974). While
sense of mistrust, for instance, is desirable, for his analysis depends heavily on the use of psy-
its total lack would make a person vulnerable choanalytic insights, throughout this series of
to potentially dangerous encounters. The stages studies Erikson develops his idea of the “com-
are not fixed chronological segments of the life plementarity of history and life history.” He
cycle, nor does a person miss the mark if a spells out this idea in Life History and the
stage-specific task is not mastered during an Historical Moment (1975), and mentions the
appropriate period; a person could compen- work of the historian and philosopher R. G.
sate for a deficiency at a later time. Collingwood in this context. This type of work
Erikson continued to articulate, elaborate, has often been called “psychohistory.” As a
and revise his developmental model throughout person and a scholar he inspired two bio-
his career. In an essay called “The Problem of graphical works, one written by a psychologist
Ego-identity” (1956), he provided a detailed and the other by a historian (Coles 1970,
account of late adolescent development of the Friedman 1999).
sense of identity and of difficulties encountered Erikson’s book on Gandhi won a Pulitzer
in the process of identity formation. Erikson Prize and a National Book Award. Mainstream
coined the term “identity crisis” to describe academic psychology in America has recog-
such difficulties, and suggested that these were nized Erikson’s contributions in two main
normative rather than pathological. His graphic areas: developmental psychology and theories
and convincing portrayal of the difficulties in of personality. Yet even sympathetic critics like
the process of identity formation led to the Hall and Lindzey spoke guardedly about the
popularization of the term “identity crisis.” Its validity of his theory, admitting only that it
companion term “moratorium” – meaning “appears to have face validity, that is, it seems
time taken to complete identity formation to ring true to the average reader” (1978, p.
without the burden of common responsibilities 108). More recently, a group of psychologists
735
ERIKSON
have marshalled empirical evidence support- “The Problem of Ego-identity,” Journal of

ing various propositions based on Erikson’s the American Psychoanalytical Association
theory of ego-identity formation (Marcia et al. 4 (1956): 56–121.
1993). In the seventies his ideas about wom- Young Man Luther (New York, 1958).
anhood were strongly criticized by several Identity, Youth and Crisis (New York,
feminist authors (such as Millett 1970, Janeway 1968).
1971). Gandhi’s Truth: On the Origins of Militant
In an atmosphere of academic psychology Nonviolence (New York, 1969).
dominated by the natural science model with a Dimensions of a New Identity: The Jefferson
focus on minute stimulus-response units of Lectures in the Humanities (New York,
analysis, Erikson developed a distinctive 1974).
approach grounded in the humanities and Life History and the Historical Moment
focused on the human being throughout the (New York, 1975).
entire life history viewed as a single unit. His “Galilean Sayings and the Sense of ‘I’,” Yale
conceptual framework is deceptively simple as Review 70 (1981): 321–62.
it focuses on lived experience of people, and The Life Cycle Completed (New York,
uses common words often endowed with deep, 1982).
technical meanings. A central issue of his Vital Involvement in Old Age: The
inquiry into human nature is the age-old philo- Experience of Old Age in Our Time, with
sophical problem of identity: what, if anything, Joan M. Erikson and Helen Q. Kivnick
remains the same in a sea of change, in the (New York, 1986).
myriad aspects of human life? His initial answer
to this issue was distinctly Kantian. Thus, in Other Relevant Works
Identity, Youth and Crisis, he speaks of “an ‘I,’ Erikson’s papers are at Harvard University.
an observing center of awareness and of Ed., Adulthood: Essays (New York, 1978).
volition, which can transcend and must survive Erik H. Erikson: A Way of Looking at
the psychosocial identity” (1968, p. 135). Later, Things: Selected Papers from 1930 to
in Vital Involvement, he describes the “I” as a 1980, ed. Stephen Schlein (New York,
“center of awareness in the center of the 1987). Contains a bibliography of
universe” that allows all humans to experience Erikson’s writings.
a “‘We’ on a universal level” (1986, p. 52). In The Erik Erikson Reader, ed. Robert Coles
one of his last essays, “Galilean Sayings and the (New York, 2000).
Sense of ‘I’,” (1981) he turns to religion and
mysticism alluding to God’s answer to Moses’s Further Reading
question to Him as to who He was: “I AM Amer Nat Bio, Bio Dict Psych, Cambridge
THAT I AM.” Erikson refers in this context to Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer Thought,
the biblical expression “Kingdom of God in Encyc Amer Bio, Encyc Psych, Encyc
everyone’s heart,” and also to the mystical Social Behav Sci, Who Was Who in Amer
experience of Meister Eckhart. According to v11
Paranjpe (1998), these ideas are parallel to the Coles, Robert. Erik H. Erikson: The Growth
concept “Atman” in Indian philosophy as a of His Work (Boston, 1970).
center of experience disclosed in transcenden- Friedman, Lawrence J. Identity’s Architect: A
tal states of awareness. Biography of Erik H. Erikson (New York,
1999).
BIBLIOGRAPHY Hall, C. S., and G. Lindzey. Theories of
Childhood and Society (New York, 1950; Personality, 3rd edn (New York, 1978).
2nd edn 1963). Janeway, E. Man’s World, Woman’s Place: A
736
ETZIONI
Study of Social Mythology (New York, Professor at the Harvard Business School
1971). during 1987–9; and has been a visiting lecturer
Marcia, J. E., A. S. Waterman, D. R. at many universities. Etzioni was the founding
Matteson, et al., eds. Ego Identity: A President of the International Society for the
Handbook for Psychosocial Research Advancement of Socio-economics in 1989–90,
(New York, 1993). and he was President of the American
Millett, K. Sexual Politics (New York, 1970). Sociological Association in 1994–5. In 1990
Paranjpe, A. C. Self and Identity in Modern Etzioni founded the Communitarian Network,
Psychology and Indian Thought (New and edited its journal, The Responsive
York, 1998). Community: Rights and Responsibilities, from
Roazen, Paul. Erik H. Erikson: The Power 1991 to 2004. In 2001 Etzioni was awarded
and Limits of a Vision (New York, 1976) the John P. McGovern Award in Behavioral
Zock, Hetty. A Psychology of Ultimate Sciences, and the Officer’s Cross of the Order
Concern: Erik H. Erikson’s Contribution of Merit by the German government.
to the Psychology of Religion (Amsterdam, Etzioni has published over twenty books on
1990). a variety of social, economic, and political
topics and problems. His general political
Anand C. Paranjpe position has received the label of “communi-
tarianism,” and is allied with the theories of
such social theorists as Robert BELLAH and
Charles TAYLOR, along with the similar views
of Philip SELZNICK, Michael WALZER, and
Michael Sandel. Against what is perceived as
ETZIONI, Amitai Werner (1929– ) excessive individualism in modern social and
political theory, communitarians stress how
Amitai Etzioni was born as Werner Falk on 4 membership in communities are the primary
January 1929 in Köln, Germany. He later basis for life and politics. By reversing indi-
selected his Hebrew name. In 1935 he and his vidualism’s priorities, the communitarian
family escaped Germany to live in Palestine emphasizes responsibilities over rights and
(later Israel). He received his BA in 1954 and social order over freedom of choice. In
MA in 1958 from Hebrew University in Etzioni’s model of communitarianism, people
Jerusalem. He emigrated to the United States, should respect each other’s dignity and
where he received his PhD in sociology from autonomy, to be sure, but the classical liberal
the University of California at Berkeley in theory of rights is insufficient to provide for
1958. He was appointed instructor of sociol- strong communities because it encourages self-
ogy at Columbia University in 1958 and was ishness over communal bonds and mere rights
soon promoted up to full professor by 1967. do not generate shared moral values. Multiple
He was chair of the sociology department from kinds of overlapping communities should
1969 to 1971. Since 1980 Etzioni has been simultaneously exist with society, permitting
University Professor at George Washington the kind of cultural diversity which encourages
University in Washington, D.C., and he is also people to share in, and change allegiance to,
the Director of the Institute for more than one social group.
Communitarian Policy Studies. The Communitarian Platform, designed and
Etzioni was a guest scholar at the Brookings endorsed by Etzioni, summarizes his political
Institution in 1978; a senior advisor to the aims and perspective. The Platform’s Preamble
Carter Administration during 1979–80; the begins as follows: “American men, women,
Thomas Henry Carroll Ford Foundation and children are members of many communi-
737
ETZIONI
ties – families; neighborhoods; innumerable BIBLIOGRAPHY

social, religious, ethnic, work place, and pro- The Hard Way to Peace: A New Strategy
fessional associations; and the body politic (New York, 1962).
itself. Neither human existence nor individual Winning Without War (Garden City, N.Y.,
liberty can be sustained for long outside the 1964).
interdependent and overlapping communities Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs,
to which all of us belong. Nor can any com- N.J., 1964).
munity long survive unless its members Political Unification: A Comparative Study
dedicate some of their attention, energy, and of Leaders and Forces (New York,
resources to shared projects. The exclusive 1965).
pursuit of private interest erodes the network Studies in Social Change (New York,
of social environments on which we all 1966).
depend, and is destructive to our shared exper- The Active Society: A Theory of Societal
iment in democratic self-government. For these and Political Processes (New York,
reasons, we hold that the rights of individuals 1968).
cannot long be preserved without a commu- Demonstration Democracy (New York,
nitarian perspective. A communitarian per- 1971).
spective recognizes both individual human Genetic Fix: The Next Technological
dignity and the social dimension of human Revolution (New York, 1973).
existence. A communitarian perspective rec- Social Problems (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,
ognizes that the preservation of individual 1976).
liberty depends on the active maintenance of An Immodest Agenda: Rebuilding America
the institutions of civil society where citizens before the 21st Century (New York,
learn respect for others as well as self-respect; 1983).
where we acquire a lively sense of our personal Capital Corruption: The New Attack on
and civic responsibilities, along with an appre- American Democracy (New York, 1984).
ciation of our own rights and the rights of The Moral Dimension: Toward a New
others; where we develop the skills of self-gov- Economics (New York, 1988).
ernment as well as the habit of governing our- A Responsive Society: Collected Essays on
selves, and learn to serve others – not just self.” Guiding Deliberate Social Change (San
For Etzioni, democracy is the best form of Francisco, 1991).
government provided that the government is The Spirit of Community (New York,
empowered to aid the formation and mainte- 1993).
nance of healthy communities of shared values The New Golden Rule: Community and
and ways of life. Unlike majoritarians (or Morality in a Democratic Society (New
assimilationists), communitarians do not rec- York, 1996).
ommend social uniformity and conformity to The Limits of Privacy (New York, 1999).
achieve greater social order and cohesion. Like The Monochrome Society (Princeton, N.J.,
the social pragmatists, such as John DEWEY, 2001).
communitarians expect that public institutions, My Brother’s Keeper: A Memoir and a
such as schools, should teach the fundamental Message (Lanham, Md., 2003).
moral values needed in a pluralistic democ- From Empire to Community: A New
racy: respect for the dignity of all, toleration of Approach to International Relations
ethnic and religious diversity, and the citizen- (New York, 2004).
ship skills needed for civic and political life.
Further Reading
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio
738
EVANS
Antonides, Gerrit, Wil Arts, and W. Fred Commanding Officer of a US Naval V-12 unit
van Raaij, eds. The Consumption of at Hobart and William Smith Colleges from
Time and the Timing of Consumption, 1943 to 1945. During his long career Evans was
Toward a New Behavioral and Socio- visiting professor at Boston University, the
economics: Contributions in Honor of University of Wisconsin, and other colleges. He
Amitai Etzioni (Amsterdam, 1991). was Secretary-Treasurer of the Western Division
Delaney, C. F., ed. The Liberalism– of the American Philosophical Association
Communitarianism Debate: Liberty and during 1940–42. He retired from teaching in
Community Values (Lanham, Md., 1965, and died on 12 March 1979 in Columbus,
1994). Ohio.
Drummond, Helga. Power and Involvement Evans’s first book, New Realism and Old
in Organizations: An Empirical Reality (1928), criticizes the new realism
Examination of Etzioni’s Compliance movement and its doctrine of the externality of
Theory (Aldershot, UK, 1993). relations for falling into the same philosophical
Frohnen, Bruce. The New Communitarians errors of formalism, equivocation, and dogma-
and the Crisis of Modern Liberalism tism that new realism accuses older systems of
(Lawrence, Kan., 1996). harboring. New realism’s naturalism and evo-
Bell, Daniel. Communitarianism and Its lutionism falls short of supporting an adequate
Critics (Oxford, 1993). conception of both the person and of God.
Phillips, Derek. Looking Backward: A Evans’s preferred standpoint is personal idealism
Critical Appraisal of Communitarian combined with a transcendental supernatural-
Thought (Princeton, N.J., 1993). ism. In “Current Epistemology and
Contemporary Ethics” (1928), he argues that
John R. Shook both moral objectivity and human freedom
require the existence of God, the supreme spirit,
who supplies absolute moral ideals for free
human reason to obey.
A Free Man’s Faith (1949) reveals that Evans
is not interested in returning to stern Calvinism
EVANS, Daniel Luther (1895–1979) and Puritanism, but rather a liberal religion that
places personal revelatory experiences as central
D. Luther Evans was born on 2 April 1895 in to faith. Evans goes so far as to claim that this
Columbus, Ohio. He was educated at Ohio State kind of religious experience, our “communion
University, where he received his BA in 1917, with God,” supplies not only faith and moral
MA in 1920, and PhD in philosophy in 1923. motivation but also gives the only evidence for
His dissertation was titled “The Status of Values God’s existence.
in New Realism.” In 1922 he joined his profes-
sor Joseph A. LEIGHTON on the philosophy BIBLIOGRAPHY
faculty at Ohio State. From 1925 to 1928 he was New Realism and Old Reality: A Critical
a professor of philosophy at Ohio Wesleyan Introduction to the Philosophy of the
University, and then he was Compton Professor Realists (Princeton, N.J., 1928).
of Philosophy and department chair at the Fundamentals of Philosophy, with Walter
College of Wooster in Ohio from 1928 to 1938. S. Gamertsfelder (New York, 1930).
In 1938 Evans returned to Ohio State as pro- Logic: Theoretical and Applied (Garden
fessor of philosophy and also was Junior Dean City, N.Y., 1937).
of the College of Arts and Sciences from 1938 to Essentials of Liberal Education (Boston,
1943. During World War II, he was 1942).
739
EVANS
A Free Man’s Faith (Oxford, 1949). 1853 to 1857 but was denied tenure because
Elements of Logic (Dubuque, Iowa, 1957). he was a Unitarian. Bowdoin later made
amends by granting their notable alumnus the
Other Relevant Works DD and LLD degrees. He ministered at the
“The Reactions of a Religionist to Independent Congregational Church in
Behaviorism,” Journal of Religion 4 Bangor, Maine, from 1859 to 1869. His
(1924): 347–60. writings of this period, particularly The Science
“Current Epistemology and Contemporary of Thought (1869), led to his call to the Bussey
Ethics,” Philosophical Review 37 (1928): Professorship of Theology, New Testament
353–9. Criticism, and Interpretation at Harvard in
“The Persistent Claims of Humanism,” 1869. In 1878 he also became Dean of the
Journal of Religion 17 (1937): 263–72. Divinity Faculty at Harvard, and he held these
“Two Intellectually Respectable positions until his death on 16 October 1900
Conceptions of God,” Philosophy and in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Phenomenological Research 10 (1950): Hegelian logic was, as Everett acknowl-
572–7. edged, a formative and lasting influence on
“The Difference Between Getting Truth and his thought. Yet Everett’s own thought was
Getting Wise,” Philosophy and anchored to roots in the real, empirical world;
Phenomenological Research 22 (1962): the “outer world” is often his term, where the
360–65. most intense of human experience must origi-
nate. His outlook finds expression in his essay
Further Reading “The Philosophy of the Sublime” (in the col-
Proc of APA v53, Who’s Who in Phil lection Immortality and Other Essays, 1902),
Bertocci, Peter. “Evans’s A Free Man’s where he contrasts Kant and Hegel: “It is a
Faith,” Philosophy and little singular that Kant, who experienced so
Phenomenological Research 11 (1950): intensely the character of the sublime, should
124–6. have failed to perceive its real nature, while
Hegel, who stated somewhat more truly the
John R. Shook relation in which this sense stands to the outer
world, should appear to have been utterly
devoid of the actual experience of it, so far, at
least, as anything but intellectual and spiritual
realities are concerned.”
His intellectual strength was not in philo-
EVERETT, Charles Carroll (1829–1900) sophical originality, but in exposition, applica-
tion, and effective teaching. He was nonetheless
Charles Carroll Everett was born on 19 June an innovator in comparative religions. In 1872
1829 in Brunswick, Maine. He was cousin to he offered the first course on Asian religions at
the statesman and orator Edward Everett, with Harvard and, evidently, the first in the United
whom he carried on an extensive correspon- States. His twenty-one years of service as Dean
dence. He graduated with his BA from put his stamp on the Harvard Divinity School
Bowdoin College in 1850, where he studied into the early twentieth century. Unitarian
medicine. From 1851 to 1852, he studied in thought and life benefited greatly from his
Berlin under Hegel’s successor, Georg Andreas lectures, pamphlets, and courses.
Gabler. He earned his divinity degree at Everett was an early contributor to the
Harvard in 1859. Everett taught languages dialogue between science and religion. He
and was librarian at Bowdoin College from addresses the outlook of those who find the
740
EVERETT
two in opposition and mutual exclusion and he Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, Dict Amer Bio,
seeks to allay the anticipation or fear of those Nat Cycl Amer Bio v9, Who Was Who in
who see science diminishing the place of faith. Amer v1
He proposes that science and religion represent Gilman, Nicholas P. “Charles Carroll
complementary and necessary aspects of the Everett,” The New World 9 (1900):
same knowledge. Religion and its faith 724–6.
promote ethical goodness; while science Good, James A. “Introduction to Charles
pursues the rule and order of the natural Carroll Everett’s The Science of Thought,”
world. He develops his argument in “The Faith in The Early American Reception of
of Science and the Science of Faith,” in which German Idealism, vol. 5 (Bristol, UK,
he concludes with the image, “[They are]…like 2002), pp. v–xvi.
an elder and younger brother approaching Peabody, Francis G. Reminiscences of
together the home they love. One walks with Present-day Saints (New York, 1927).
quiet and sober tread; the other leaps and Toy, Crawford H. “Charles Carroll
dances along the way.” In his critical essay, Everett,” The New World 9 (1900):
“Spencer’s Reconciliation of Science and 714–24.
Religion,” he finds the fallacies in Spencer’s
system in the “points of germination” from Jon Taylor
which a perfect theology will grow through
contact with the insights of empirical science.
Everett stands on the religious side of the
debate; but his appreciation for the scientific
side is evident.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The Science of Thought: A System of Logic EVERETT, Walter Goodnow (1860–1937)
(Boston, 1869; 2nd edn 1882). Reprinted
in The Early American Reception of Walter Goodnow Everett was born 21 August
German Idealism, vol. 5, ed. James A. 1860 in Rowe, Massachusetts, to Samuel P. and
Good (Bristol, UK, 2002). Aleesta Goodnow Everett. He studied at Brown
Fichte’s Science of Knowledge: A Critical University where he received the BA in 1885. In
Exposition (Chicago, 1884). that year he was appointed tutor in Latin and
Poetry, Comedy and Duty (New York, Greek, and in 1889 he was promoted to instruc-
1888). tor. He earned his MA in 1888, and the PhD in
Ethics for Young People (Boston, 1891). philosophy in 1895, dividing his time between
The Gospel of Paul (Boston, 1893). studying, tutoring, and lecturing.
Essays, Theological and Literary (Boston, In 1894 Everett became associate professor of
1901). philosophy at Brown, succeeding James Seth
The Psychological Elements of Religious who had returned to his native Scotland. After
Faith, ed. Edward Hale (New York, a year of postgraduate studies in Strasburg and
1902). Berlin, in 1896 he became chair of Brown’s phi-
Immortality and Other Essays (Boston, losophy department, and in 1899 he was named
1902). professor of philosophy and natural theology.
Theism and the Christian Faith, ed. Edward Shortly afterward, he was promoted to Romeo
Hale (New York, 1909). Elton Professor of Natural Theology, a position
he held until his retirement in 1930, having been
Further Reading department chair for thirty-four years. Curt John
741
EVERETT
DUCASSE assumed both the chair and the Elton Moral Values: A Study of the Principles of
Professorship (more recently held by Ernest Conduct (New York, 1918).
SOSA), and Ducasse would lead the department “The Problem of Progress,” Philosophical
for another twenty-one years, accumulating Review 32 (1923): 125–53.
perhaps an unmatched duration of philosophy “The Uniqueness of Man,” University of
department leadership for over half a century by California Publications in Philosophy 16
only two philosophers. (1932): 1–27.
Everett also served as Acting President of
Brown University during 1912–13. In 1921 he Other Relevant Works
was sent to the Allied Congress of Philosophy in “In vestigiis veritatis,” in Contemporary
Paris as a delegate of the American Philosophical American Philosophy: Personal
Association. He was President of the Eastern Statements, ed. G. P. Adams and W. P.
Division of the American Philosophical Montague (New York, 1930), vol. 1, pp.
Association in 1922–3. In retirement he lectured 329–53.
at numerous universities, including the University
of California at Berkeley where he gave the 1931 Further Reading
Howison Lecture on “The Uniqueness of Man,” Pres Addr of APA v3, Who Was Who in
and the 1934 Foerster Lecture on the Amer v1
Immortality of the Soul, titled “The Life of the Barry, Jay. Gentlemen Under the Elms
Spirit.” In his final years he stayed close to the (Providence, R.I., 1982).
Berkeley campus. Warmly remembered by his Bronson, Walter C. The History of Brown
students as a dedicated and caring teacher, University (Providence, R.I., 1914).
Everett died on 29 July 1937 in Berkeley, Tsanoff, Radoslav A. Ethics, rev. edn (New
California. York, 1955).
In 1918 Everett published Moral Values, a
widely read book on ethics that was reprinted in David L. Davis
Japanese translation in 1930. In that work he
sought to develop a science of ethics that was
relevant and applicable to all of life. Everett clas-
sified values into only eight categories: (1)
economic values, (2) bodily values, (3) value of
recreation, (4) value of association, (5) character EZORSKY, Gertrude (1926– )
values, (6) aesthetic values, (7) intellectual values,
and (8) religious values. He also made numerous Gertrude Ezorsky was born on 5 July 1926 in
contributions to journals, dictionaries, and ency- Brooklyn, New York. She attended Brooklyn
clopedias of philosophy. Everett took a liberal College, where she earned her BA degree in
and humanistic approach to the relation between 1947. Ezorsky received the MA (1955) and
religion and morality. PhD (1961) degrees in philosophy from New
York University, as well as an additional MA
BIBLIOGRAPHY (1969) from Wolfson College, Oxford. She
“The Evaluation of Life,” Philosophical taught philosophy at Brooklyn College for her
Review 7 (1898): 382–93. entire career, from 1964 to 1995. She also
“The Concept of the Good,” Philosophical jointly served on the faculty of the Graduate
Review 7 (1898): 505–17. Center of the City University of New York.
“The Relation of Ethics to Religion,” Her substantial publication record dates from
International Journal of Ethics 10 (1900): the mid 1960s and extends into the 1990s. she
479–93. is presently professor emerita of philosophy.
742
EZORSKY
In the late 1960s she contributed to a number erudite discussion of privacy rights and inva-
of works edited by Sidney HOOK. These contri- sions of privacy in the modern American work-
butions tended to be on such mainstream philo- place.
sophical themes as pragmatic philosophy,
theories of knowledge and science, and the rela- BIBLIOGRAPHY
tionship of language to philosophy. By the early “Wishing Won’t – But Wanting Will,” in
1970s she was debating Hook and others in the Dimensions of Mind, ed. Sidney Hook
popular press over the role of women in univer- (New York, 1960), pp. 252–8.
sity life. In a 1974 contribution to the New York “The Performative Theory of Truth,” in
Review of Books, replying to an earlier piece by Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul
Hook, she advocated for the sex discrimination Edwards (New York, 1967), pp. 88–90.
complaint filed by the Women’s Equity Action “A Note on Metaphysics and Language,”
League, which asked that the 1968 Executive Language and Philosophy, ed. Sidney Hook
Order banning sex discrimination by federal (New York, 1969), pp. 291–2.
contractors be enforced against universities. At “Retributive Justice,” Canadian Journal of
about the same time her scholarly focus turned Philosophy 1 (1972): 365–8.
to the philosophy of the law. There followed, in “The Fight over University Women,” New
quick succession, works on rights and punish- York Review of Books (16 May 1974):
ment; bioethics and human rights; crime; and the 32–9.
American criminal justice system. “It’s Mine,” Philosophy of Public Affairs 3
In 1991 Ezorsky turned her prolific pen to a (1974): 321–30.
defense of affirmative action. In Racism and “Hiring Women Faculty,” Philosophy and
Justice she argued that, from the post- Public Affairs 7 (1977): 82–91.
Reconstruction period to the present, racist prac- “The Right to Punish,” in Bioethics and
tices have continued to transmit and reinforce the Human Rights: A Reader for Health
consequences of slavery. While the slim volume Professionals, ed. Elsie Bandman and
uses recent studies and legal opinions, old and Bertram Bandman (Boston, 1978), pp.
new, its primary focus is on the ethics and 251–2.
morality of affirmative action as against the sta- “War and Innocence,” Public Affairs
tistical data pro and con the practice. Quarterly 1 (1987): 111–16.
Another work that is emblematic of what Racism and Justice: The Case for Affirmative
might be termed this third period in her scholarly Action (Ithaca, N.Y., 1991).
career (the first being contributions to traditional
topics in philosophy, the second being significant Other Relevant Works
contributions to the philosophy of law and Ed., Philosophical Perspectives on Punishment
justice) is her 1987 Moral Rights in the (Albany, N.Y., 1972).
Workplace. Her approach is set forth with Ed. with James Nickle, Moral Rights in the
typical clarity, arguing that it would be conve- Workplace (Albany, N.Y., 1987).
nient if we could begin a paper on privacy rights
in employment by citing a commonly accepted Further Reading
definition of privacy and then proceeding to Parent, W. A. “The Whole Life View of
apply that definition to employment situations. Criminal Desert,” Ethics 86 (1976):
She then takes as her jumping-off point the 350–54.
seminal 1890 law review article co-authored by
Louis Brandeis and the US Supreme Court’s James O. Castagnera
landmark 1965 decision, Griswold v.
Connecticut. On this foundation she builds an
743
F
FACKENHEIM, Emil Ludwig (1916–2003) Fackenheim’s first essays, starting from the
mid 1950s, explored the nature and viability of
Emil L. Fackenheim was born on 22 June 1916 Judaism in the modern world. He was greatly
in Halle, Germany, and died on 19 September influenced by the two twentieth-century
2003 in Jerusalem, Israel. In 1935, two years German-Jewish philosophers, Franz Rosenzweig
after the seizure of power by Hitler, and Martin Buber, as well as the nineteenth-
Fackenheim decided to protest the growing century Danish Christian philosopher, Søren
hatred of Jews by going to Berlin to study Kierkegaard. Fackenheim saw all three of these
Judaism. He studied for his rabbinical ordina- figures as powerfully arguing for the importance
tion at the Hochschule fur die Wissenschaft des and philosophical legitimacy of a commitment to
Judentums. His study was interrupted with his God’s revelation as a foundation for the reli-
arrest the day after Kristallnacht, the brutal gious life of individuals and communities as well
attack by the Nazis on Jewish persons and as for formulating a critique of modernity.
property in November 1938. Since the gov- Agreeing with Rosenzweig and Buber,
ernment’s policy was still at that time the Fackenheim argued against the then dominant
expulsion of Jews, rather than their physical view of many liberal Jewish thinkers that the
extermination, Fackenheim was sent to the concept of revelation was both antiquated and
proto-concentration camp at Sachsenhausen. irrelevant. He insisted that a Judaism without a
Upon the guarantee of his intention and ability belief in God’s past revelations was meaningless,
to leave Germany, he was released from and that the experience of revelation was still
Sachsenhausen in February 1939. Passing his open to Jews in the present.
rabbinic exams that year, he left for Scotland In the early 1960s the topic of the Holocaust
and was admitted to the doctoral program at took on more and more importance in his essays.
the University of Aberdeen. With the outbreak He began to suspect that the unprecedented chal-
of the war, he was interned as an enemy alien lenge of the Holocaust to the possibility of rev-
for a total of twenty months, first in Britain elation in the present undermined Rosenzweig’s
and then in Canada. Released from the intern- view that no event in history could deeply affect
ment camp outside of Montréal in December Jewish faith. He also saw Buber’s anguishing
1941, he attended the University of Toronto notion of God’s “eclipse” during the Holocaust
and received his PhD in philosophy in 1945. as an inadequate response.
He was a professor of philosophy at the Two books of 1968, The Religious Dimension
University of Toronto from 1948 to 1981. In in Hegel’s Thought, and Quest for Past and
1983, Fackenheim went to Israel and taught at Future, marked the end of the first period of
the Hebrew University in Jerusalem until his Fackenheim’s work. While publishing essays on
death. Jewish thought during this time, he had also
744
FACKENHEIM
been concerned with the issues of reason, reve- a fragmentary response which followed that of
lation, and authority in medieval and modern the Jewish people must be formulated.
philosophy. He was particularly interested in Fackenheim’s most famous statement, the for-
the philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel. While never mulation of a new “614th commandment”
a Hegelian, Fackenheim admired Hegel’s added to Sinai’s traditional commandments, was
attempt to bring together, through the concept that “Jews are forbidden to hand Hitler posthu-
of Absolute Spirit, reason and revelation, the mous victories. They are commanded to survive
universal and the particular, eternity and history, as Jews, lest the Jewish people perish.” (1970, p.
and the religious and the secular. The Hegel 84) Through this Fackenheim responded by way
book concluded that “the Hegelian middle” of midrash, that rabbinic form of interpretative
could not succeed, but that the effort to under- story, suggesting that God’s commanding
stand the dialectical relationships between the presence has been felt by Jews through their
different features of human existence should not conscious and unconscious recognition that
be abandoned. Quest for Past and Future Jewish survival is a sacred duty. Fackenheim’s
brought together Fackenheim’s early essays on collection of essays, The Jewish Return Into
Jewish faith and Judaism. Fackenheim’s own History (1978), extended his “vulnerability to
introduction to the collection, “These Twenty history” to include the establishment of the State
Years: A Reappraisal,” chronicled the develop- of Israel. He held that although there was no
ment of his thought but also critiqued it in two causal link between the Holocaust and Israel, it
areas. First, he now found that the Jewish thinker is only because of the latter that Jews can face the
could only address problems of contemporary former, through a dual tale of destruction and
life based on a prior commitment to “the singled- fragmentary redemption.
out condition” of the Jew, that is, to both the The parallel studies of Jewish philosophy and
covenant between God and the Jewish people general philosophy were first integrated in
and to the particularities of Jewish existence in Encounters Between Judaism and Modern
history. Second, he recognized that he had not Philosophy (1973), in which Fackenheim
fully faced the “scandal” of Auschwitz, even brought them together through the critical
though Jews throughout the world had encounter between such modern philosophers as
answered the threat of Jewish extinction by con- Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger with Jewish philos-
tinuing to live as Jews and to have Jewish ophy and faith. His self-described “magnum
children. opus” of 1982, To Mend the World, continued
God’s Presence in History (1970) showed a this mutual engagement as well as adding to the
major advance in Fackenheim’s effort, which resources that Fackenheim brought to the
had started in 1967, to seriously respond to the struggle with the meaning of the Holocaust. He
Holocaust. He saw the challenge of the insisted that the Holocaust demonstrated the
Holocaust to Jewish faith as unprecedented, in vulnerability to history not only of Jewish faith
his words: “the God of Israel cannot be God of but also of philosophy. Following Theodor
either past or future unless He is still God of the ADORNO’s notion that where the Holocaust is,
present” (1973, p. 137). He meant that faith in thought is paralyzed, Fackenheim explained that
God’s direction of history, or in history’s mean- this “unique” event was so radically evil and
ingfulness, cannot restrict itself to the past – the extreme, beyond all earlier comprehension of
world of the Bible, or to the future – the the nature of humans, that it could not be
Messianic Age. If God cannot be connected in explained or assimilated. Further, according to
some way to this most momentous event of Fackenheim, since one of modern philosophy’s
Jewish history, then the God of history is totally greatest figures, Martin Heidegger, not only
lost. While Fackenheim insisted that no clear, failed to contest the Nazi’s world of terror, but
direct meaning for the event could be identified, initially supported it, the viability of not just reli-
745
FACKENHEIM
gious faith but philosophic reason had been put Other Relevant Works
into question. Fackenheim found that Judaism, Metaphysics and Historicity (Milwaukee,
Christianity, and philosophy could be sustained Wisc., 1961).
today because the seeds for their mending were What is Judaism: An Interpretation for the
already planted at that time. Some acts of resis- Present Ages (New York, 1987).
tance in the name of philosophy and also of The Jewish Bible After the Holocaust: A Re-
Christianity that testified to the sacredness of Reading (Bloomington, Ind., 1990).
all human life, showed that they could sustain Jewish Philosophers and Jewish Philosophy
themselves then and had the right to continue (Bloomington, Ind., 1996).
now. In terms of Judaism, Fackenheim offered a The God Within: Kant, Schelling, and
new midrash that saw valiant acts of resistance Historicity (Toronto, 1996).
as a tikkun or partial mending, directly or indi-
rectly testifying to God’s saving Presence even at Further Reading
that time. Bio 20thC Phils, Canad Encyc, Routledge
Fackenheim once defined Jewish philosophy Encycl Phil
as “a disciplined, systematic encounter between Morgan, Michael. The Jewish Thought of
the Jewish heritage and relevant philosophy” Emil Fackenheim: A Reader (Detroit,
(1996, p. 186). At first he pursued the study of 1987).
Jewish philosophy and general philosophy sep- Oppenheim, Michael. What Does Revelation
arately, but soon brought them into critical Mean for the Modern Jew? (Lewiston, N.Y.,
engagements with each other. It was the 1985).
exposure of both to the nova of twentieth- Seeskin, Kenneth. “Emil Fackenheim,” in
century history, the Holocaust and the estab- Interpreters of Judaism in the Late
lishment of the state of Israel, that represents Twentieth Century, ed. Steven Katz
Fackenheim’s most important contribution to (Washington, 1993).
both disciplines.
Michael Oppenheim
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The Religious Dimension in Hegel’s Thought
(Bloomington, Ind., 1968).
Quest for Past and Future: Essays in Jewish
Theology (Bloomington, Ind., 1968).
God’s Presence in History: Jewish Affirmation FAIRCHILD, James Harris (1817–1902)
and Philosophical Reflections (New York,
1970). James Harris Fairchild was born on 25
Encounters Between Judaism and Modern November 1817 in Stockbridge, Massachusetts.
Philosophy: A Preface to Future Jewish Shortly after his birth his family moved to Ohio
Thought (New York, 1973). and settled on a farm near the present site of
The Jewish Return Into History: Reflections in Oberlin College. In 1834 Fairchild entered the
the Age of Auschwitz and a New Jerusalem freshman class at Oberlin, supporting himself by
(New York, 1978). working for five cents an hour in a sawmill. He
To Mend the World: Foundations of Future received his BA in 1838, served as tutor of Greek,
Jewish Thought (New York, 1982). Latin, and Hebrew at Oberlin from 1839 to
An Epitaph for German Judaism: From Halle 1842, was professor of languages from 1842 to
to Jerusalem (Madison, Wisc., 2004). 1847, and became chair of mathematics and
natural philosophy in 1847. In 1858 he was
named professor of systematic theology and
746
FAIRCHILD
moral philosophy. Fairchild acquired a reputa- BIBLIOGRAPHY

tion as an able teacher and was admired by Educational Arrangements and College Life at
many. He was a trustee, faculty Chairman, and Oberlin (New York, 1866).
upon President Charles Finney’s resignation, he Moral Philosophy, or the Science of
was elected President in 1866. Oberlin was Obligation (New York, 1869).
having financial problems and had only nine Woman’s Right to the Ballot (Oberlin, Ohio,
professors. In 1889 when he stepped down from 1870).
the presidency, the college had twenty-three pro- Needed Phases of Christianity (Oberlin, Ohio,
fessors, a property value of one million dollars, 1874).
and a reputation as a leading college. Fairchild The Doctrine of Sanctification at Oberlin
traveled to Palestine, Egypt, and Europe in 1871, (Boston, 1876).
and in 1884 to Hawaii. He continued to teach Oberlin, the Colony and the College,
as professor of theology until 1898 and as pro- 1833–1883 (Oberlin, Ohio, 1883).
fessor emeritus until his death. Fairchild died on Elements of Theology, Natural and Revealed
19 March 1902 in Oberlin, Ohio. (Oberlin, Ohio, 1892).
Fairchild published Moral Philosophy, or the
Science of Obligation (1869), Oberlin, the Other Relevant Works
Colony and the College (1883), Elements of Fairchild’s papers are at Oberlin College,
Theology, Natural and Revealed (1892), as well Ohio.
as numerous religious and historical sermons, “The Duty of Religion as Known to Every
monographs, and reviews. He was a leader in the Man.” A sermon delivered before the
promotion of coeducation and corresponded Young Men’s Christian Association of the
with Susan B. ANTHONY and Lucy STONE. University of Michigan (Cleveland, Ohio,
In Moral Philosophy, Fairchild discusses many nd).
topics including virtuous action, sinful action, “Coeducation of the Sexes,” American Journal
particular vices and virtues, conscience, duty, of Education 17 (1868): 385.
government, and rights. According to Fairchild, Ed., Finney’s Lectures on Systematic Theology
a virtuous action is reasonable and is also one we (Oberlin, Ohio, 1878).
normally approve of. A sinful action is one which “Grandfather’s Story”: An Autobiography
we normally condemn, for example, a failure to (Oberlin, Ohio, 1906). Reprinted as
meet one’s obligation or a refusal to be benevo- Country Boy: Growing Up in Northern
lent. When discussing government, Fairchild dis- Ohio in the 1820s, ed. Geoffrey Blodgett
cusses divine government and civil government. (Elyria, Ohio, 1993).
The head of the divine government is God. God
is the absolute monarch and receives no counsel. Further Reading
The law, which God enforces in the divine gov- Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
ernment, is the moral law of nature and reason. Dict Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v2,
Governments that are led by human beings can Who Was Who in Amer v1
be legitimate or corrupt. Fairchild emphasized Swing, Albert T. James Harris Fairchild; or,
the religious unity of the universe. Sixty-Eight Years with a Christian College
Fairchild was described as a man who enjoyed (New York, 1907).
being with young people, related well to their
questions, and comprehended their difficulties. Hani Morgan
He had a reputation for being candid and
tolerant and was known to have skill in inspir-
ing students.
747
FALK
FALK, Werner David (1906–91) and occasionally teaching. Falk died on 11

October 1991 in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
W. David Falk was born on 25 April 1906 in Falk’s contributions to philosophy centered
Berlin, Germany. His Jewish parents were Dr. on ethical theory, especially concerning the
Fritz Falk and Charlotte Betty Cassirer, a analysis of moral language, the functioning of
cousin of philosopher Ernst Cassirer. Falk practical reason, the nature of value, and the
received a PhD summa cum laude in political “is-ought” problem. Falk opposed the view,
economy at the University of Heidelberg in attributed to G. E. Moore, that the property of
1932, but he soon moved to England to escape goodness is objectively external to people,
the growing Nazi oppression. He was a arguing instead for a relational view in which
research scholar at the London School of goodness is the capacity of a thing to arouse a
Economics from 1933 to 1936, and then favorable judgment by a person who has full
earned an MA in philosophy from Oxford and dispassionate knowledge of what that
University in 1938. From 1938 to 1946 he thing is like.
was a lecturer in philosophy at New College, For Falk, a judgment of moral obligation is,
Oxford, and was acting head of the moral phi- ideally, the result of one’s further evaluation of
losophy department at the University of what one must do, after a situation has been
Aberdeen, Scotland in 1946–7. He then considered from all possible perspectives. As
returned to Oxford as a research fellow at Falk claimed to have found in David Hume,
Nuffield College from 1947 to 1950. In 1950 and as John DEWEY urged as well, morality is
Falk became reader in philosophy at the not simply a matter of instrumental reasoning
University of Melbourne, Australia, and also since alternative means to ends, as well as alter-
received an MA from Melbourne in that year. native ends, must be hypothetically and imag-
In 1957–8 Falk was a visiting professor at inatively considered. This “internalist” theory
the University of Michigan, and decided to of a categorical practical necessity supplies the
remain in the United States. He was visiting needed rational motivation to act. Moral dis-
professor at Brown University in 1958 and at agreement arises from the failure of everyone
the University of Illinois in 1959; professor of fully to undergo this process of reflection.
philosophy at Wayne State University from Against excessive rationalism in ethics, Falk
1959 to 1962; and professor of philosophy at cannot agree that there could be moral truths
Syracuse University in 1962–3. In 1963–4 he apart from our best efforts to know them. He
was a visiting professor at the University of also opposed another ethical theory influential
North Carolina, brought by department chair in the mid-twentieth century, R. M. Hare’s
E. Maynard ADAMS who was seeking interna- prescriptivism, because a moral judgment
tional representation in the department. In cannot be merely a matter of recommending
1964 Falk was named the first James Gordon that a certain action be performed.
Hanes Professor of Philosophy. In 1965 he
became chair of the philosophy department, BIBLIOGRAPHY
serving until his retirement in 1975. During his “Morals without Faith,” Philosophy 19
tenure as chair, he brought North Carolina’s (1944): 3–18.
philosophy department to national prominence “Obligation and Rightness,” Philosophy 20
and inaugurated the annual Chapel Hill (1945): 129–47.
Philosophy Colloquium. In his retirement he “‘Ought’ and Motivation,” Proceedings of
was a fellow at the National Humanities the Aristotelian Society 48 (1948):
Center in Research Triangle Park, North 111–38.
Carolina, and continued to be an active “Moral Complexity,” Ethics 66 (1956):
presence in the philosophy department, writing 123–31.
748
FARBER
“Morality and Convention,” Journal of including Martin Heidegger, Ernst Zermelo, and
Philosophy 57 (1960): 675–84. Karl Jaspers. However, Farber returned to
“Action-guiding Reasons,” Journal of Harvard to complete his desired PhD in 1925
Philosophy 60 (1963): 702–18. with a dissertation on “Phenomenology as a
“Hume on Practical Reason,” Philosophical Method and as a Philosophical Discipline.” The
Studies 27 (1975): 1–18. readers were Alfred North WHITEHEAD, Raphael
“Hume on Is and Ought,” Canadian DEMOS, and Ralph B. PERRY. Before his second
Journal of Philosophy 6 (1976): 359–78. visit to Germany in 1926 he taught a year at
Ought, Reasons, and Morality: The Ohio State University. From 1927 to 1974,
Collected Papers of W. D. Falk (Ithaca, Farber spent forty-seven years of his distin-
N.Y., 1986). guished career as professor of philosophy at
“Humanism,” Personalist Forum 5 (1989): State University of New York at Buffalo. For
69–81. a three-year span from 1961 to 1964 he also
was chair of the philosophy department at the
Further Reading University of Pennsylvania. He was President
Proc of APA v66 of the American Philosophical Association
Baier, Kurt. “Reasons for Doing Eastern Division in 1963–4. Farber died on
Something,” Journal of Philosophy 61 24 November 1980 in Minneapolis,
(1964): 198–202. Minnesota.
Falk, Jeanette L. “‘Carolina’ Vignettes: W. Farber’s reputation as a leading contributor
David Falk, Philosopher,” in They Fled to phenomenology rests in part on his early
Hitler’s Germany and Found Refuge in work, The Foundation of Phenomenology
North Carolina, ed. H. A. Landsberger (1943), an extensive commentary on Husserl’s
and C. E. Schweitzer (Chapel Hill, N.C., Logical Investigations which many in the
1996), pp. 69–74. English-speaking world regarded as the cen-
Piker, Anthony. “W. D. Falk’s Alternative terpiece of Husserl’s philosophy. But the
to Moral Realism and Anti-Realism,” public perception of Faber’s role for phe-
Auslegung 20 (1995): 100–105. nomenology was shaped largely through his
lifelong editorship of the journal Philosophy
John R. Shook and Phenomenological Research, the organ of
the International Phenomenological Society
that Farber founded in 1940. He was its only
elected President until his death.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
provided, especially during World War II and
FARBER, Marvin (1901–80) following years, a vital professional outlet for
numerous refugee scholars from Europe.
Marvin Farber was born on 14 December 1901 However, practical considerations of the time
in Buffalo, New York. He was the eldest son of and Farber’s own advocacy of pluralism in
Simon and Matilda Goldstein Farber who had philosophical method obliged the journal to
fourteen children, five of whom were eventually accommodate more and more articles unre-
listed in Who’s Who in America. After receiving lated to phenomenology. Farber, on his part,
his BS at Harvard in 1922, Farber studied for grew increasingly critical of the hybrid charac-
two years in Freiburg and Heidelberg. He visited ter of the “phenomenological movement.” He
Edmund Husserl twice in 1923, was accepted as abhorred the popular but “unscientific” exis-
a PhD candidate by Husserl, and also studied tentialist phenomenology of Scheler and
with other prominent German philosophers Heidegger and eventually distanced himself
749
FARBER
from what he called the “subjective idealism” York at Buffalo, New York.
of Husserl himself. Ed., Philosophic Thought in France and the
In a conscious opposition to Husserl’s critique United States (Albany, N.Y., 1968).
of “natural attitude,” Farber often characterized
his own position as “naturalism,” intending the Further Reading
materialism of Karl Marx, which remained Amer Nat Bio, Bio 20thC Phils, Pres Addr of
Farber’s philosophical ideal throughout his life. APA v7, Proc of APA v55, Who’s Who in
But there was in him an almost equally strong Phil
streak of enthusiasm for logical and mathe- Cho, Kah Kyung, ed. Philosophy and Science
matical sciences. If he was drawn to phenome- in Phenomenological Perspective
nology for some time, it was mainly because he (Dordrecht, 1984).
admired the descriptive rigor in Husserl’s logical Cho, Kah Kyung. “Marvin Farber in
analysis of conscious experience. Farber realized memoriam: Sein Leben und Wirken für die
soon enough that there was no bridge leading Phänomenologie in USA,”
from the recess of subjectivity to a socially and Phänomenologische Forschungen 12
materially beneficial praxis. Thus what the title (1984): 145–72.
of his posthumously published book, The Riepe, Dale, ed. Phenomenology and
Search for an Alternative (1984), implied was Naturalism: Essays in Honor of Marvin
not a promise of a new beginning, but rather a Farber (Albany, N.Y., 1973). Contains a
retrospective account of an outcome long since bibliography of Farber’s writings.
decided in favor of Marxism.
Kah Kyung Cho
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Phenomenology as a Method and as a
Philosophical Discipline (Buffalo, N.Y.,
1928).
The Foundation of Phenomenology: Edmund
Husserl and the Quest for a Rigorous FARIS, Ellsworth (1874–1953)
Science of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.,
1943; 3rd edn, Albany, N.Y., 1967). Ellsworth Faris was born 30 September 1974 in
Naturalism and Subjectivism (Springfield, Ill., Salem, Tennessee. He received both his BA in
1959; 2nd edn, Albany, N.Y., 1968). 1894 and his MA in 1896 from Add-Ran
The Aims of Phenomenology: The Motives, University in Waco, Texas (now Texas
Methods, and Impact of Husserl’s Thought Christian University). He spent seven years as a
(New York, 1966). missionary in the Belgian Congo for the Foreign
Phenomenology and Existence: Toward a Christian Missionary Society of the Disciples
Philosophy within Nature (New York, of Christ. He spent one year studying at the
1967). University of Chicago in 1901–1902 before
Basic Issues of Philosophy: Experience, going back to the Congo until ill health forced
Reality and Human Values (New York, him to return home in 1904. He taught philos-
1967). ophy, sacred history, and psychology at Texas
The Search for an Alternative: Philosophical Christian University from 1904 to 1911, before
Perspectives of Subjectivism and Marxism pursing graduate studies in psychology at the
(Philadelphia, 1984). University of Chicago, where he received the
PhD in psychology in 1914. He was hired by
Other Relevant Works Iowa State University but returned to the
Farber’s papers are at State University of New University of Chicago in 1915. A year later he
750
FARIS
joined Iowa’s faculty teaching in the psychology social psychology of George Herbert MEAD, as
department and serving as Director of the Iowa well as the writings of Charles H. COOLEY, W.
Child Welfare Research Station during I. THOMAS, and Vilfredo Pareto. At Chicago,
1916–19. Faris developed a multidisciplinary approach
Faris returned to Chicago in 1919 when he to sociological inquiry and was an important
accepted a sociology appointment in the soci- bridge between the established qualitative,
ology department, and was promoted up to full ethnographical approach used by Robert PARK
professor. He served as chair of the sociology and the emerging quantitative, statistical
and anthropology department from 1925 to approach favored by William F. Ogburn.
1939, taking over duties from Albion SMALL Among his other philosophical interests
and maintaining Chicago’s preeminence in the evident in his social psychology notable is his
field as sociology became an independent contribution to the study of the nature of human
department. He was editor of the American values. In his two essays “The Concept of Social
Journal of Sociology from 1926 to 1936 and Attitudes” (1925) and “Social Attitudes”
was elected President of the American (1931), Faris follows up suggestions in Mead’s
Sociological Society, later called the American work to offer an alternative to instinct and
Sociological Association, in 1937. Faris retired desire theories of value, which were the linger-
in 1939 but continued to remain active teaching, ing remnants of individualistic psychology and
researching, and publishing. He was involved in philosophy. A value is essentially an attitude,
two international research projects, the first in which is defined as “an acquired predisposition
Central America and Mexico in 1947 and the to ways or modes of response, not to particular
second in the Belgian Congo and Uganda in acts except as, under special conditions, these
1949. He was distinguished professor of soci- express a way of behaving.” Faris argues that
ology at Texas Christian University from 1949 values are irreducibly social and have two
to 1950, and at the University of Utah in 1951. dimensions: an objective dimension and an atti-
Faris died on 19 December 1953 in Lake Forest, tudinal dimension. Values are objectively
Illinois. oriented judgments about external things, and
Faris’s scholarship includes a book of his not reports of internal states, although they also
lectures titled The Nature of Human Nature serve to express positive or negative feelings
(1937), and chapters in Burgess’s Personality about those things. Values are primarily social,
and the Social Group (1929), Smith’s Essays in however, because their existence and modifica-
Philosophy (1929), and Young’s Social tion is entirely conditioned by social situations
Attitudes (1930). He authored over forty articles of learning.
contributing to the emerging sociological field of
social psychology. During his tenure as chair of BIBLIOGRAPHY
sociology at the University of Chicago, Faris “The Mental Capacity of Savages,”
was responsible for creating a separate anthro- American Journal of Sociology 23
pology department in 1929, and for hiring (1918): 603–19.
several prominent Chicago graduates such as “Ethnological Light on Psychological
Louis Wirth and Herbert BLUMER. Problems,” Publications of the American
Writing on social evolution, Faris advocated Sociological Society 16 (1921): 113–20.
the term “preliterate societies” to replace the “Social Evolution,” in Contributions of
older label of “primitive societies,” which was Science to Religion, ed. Shailer Mathews
an important step in making social science ter- (New York, 1924).
minology more value-free and less ethnocen- “Pre-literate Peoples: Proposing a New
tric. He also is credited with refining the Term,” American Journal of Sociology
attitude-value concept and for interpreting the 30 (1925): 710–12.
751
FARIS
“The Concept of Social Attitudes,” Journal FEFERMAN, Solomon (1928– )

of Applied Sociology 9 (1925): 404–9.
“The Sect and the Sectarian,” Publications Solomon Feferman was born on 13 December
of the American Sociological Society 22 1928 in New York City. He was educated at
(1927): 144–59. the California Institute of Technology from
“Attitudes and Behavior,” American which he received his BS in mathematics in
Journal of Sociology 34 (1928): 271–81. 1948, and the University of California at
“Current Trends in Social Psychology,” in Berkeley from which he received his PhD in
Essays in Philosophy by Seventeen mathmatics in 1957. His doctoral advisor was
Doctors of Philosophy of the University Alfred TARSKI. Ferferman has taught mathe-
of Chicago, ed. Thomas V. Smith and matics and philosophy at Stanford University
William K. Wright (Chicago, 1929), pp. since 1956. He was promoted to full professor
119–33. in 1968, and was chair of the mathematics
“Social Attitudes,” in Social Attitudes, ed. department from 1985 to 1992. He retired in
Kimball Young (New York, 1931). 2004.
“The Primary Group: Essence and He has worked primarily in proof theory
Accident,” American Journal of and foundations of mathematics, and in model
Sociology 38 (1932): 41–50. theory, especially to first-order arithmetic and
The Nature of Human Nature, and Other fragments and second-order and higher-order
Essays in Social Psychology (New York, arithmetic and fragments, and recursion-theo-
1937). retic model theory, becoming increasingly inter-
ested in philosophy and history of logic in later
Other Relevant Works years.
Faris’s papers were lost, but some lecture In “Systems of Predicative Analysis” (1964),
notes are the Philip Morris Hauser Feferman made use of his technique, developed
Papers at the University of Chicago. in his “Transfinite Recursive Progressions of
Some Faris correspondence is in the Axiomatic Theories” (1962) of building up a
Frank H. Hankins Papers at Smith set-theoretic hierarchy Z* in stages, where at
College in Massachusetts. each stage one could assume the consistency of
Intelligent Philanthropy, with Ferris F. earlier stages. For example, he could “define”
Laune and Arthur J. Todd (Chicago, a sequence of theories:
1930).
0
Z = ZF
Further Reading Za+1 = Za ∪ {Con(Za)}
Amer Nat Bio, Who Was Who in Amer v3 Zb = ∪ Za , (∀a) (a<b)
Faris, Robert E. L. Chicago Sociology, Z* = ∪ Zb
1920–1932 (Chicago, 1970).
Hinkle, Roscoe. Developments in American Feferman treated impredicative definitions
Sociological Theory, 1915–1950 within this hierarchy of theories, rather than
(Albany, N.Y., 1994). within a Russellian hierarchy of types for a
Odum, Howard W. American Sociology: single system.
The Story of Sociology in the United As editor-in-chief of the Collected Works of
States through 1950 (London, 1951). Kurt Gödel, Feferman became a close associate
———, “Ellsworth Faris 1874–1953,” and friend of Jean VAN HEIJENOORT and devel-
Social Forces 33 (1954): 101–103. oped his own interest in the history of mathe-
matical logic and foundations of mathematics.
Jean Van Delinder To the biography by his wife, Anita Burdman
752
FEIBLEMAN
Feferman, of van Heijenoort, he contributed an Other Relevant Works

appendix on van Heijenoort’s scholarly work, Ed. with K. Jon Barwise, Model-theoretic
and later collaborated with her on a study of Logics (Berlin and New York, 1985).
Tarski’s life and work. In discussing the con- Ed., Collected Works, 5 vols, by Kurt
tributions of Jean van Heijenoort, Feferman Gödel (Oxford, 1986–2003).
(1993, p. 383) had noted the particular value “Jean van Heijenoort (1912–1986),” with
which van Heijenoort placed on Herbrand’s Anita B. Feferman, in Logic Colloquium
Fundamental Theorem as one of the “deepest ’85, ed. Paris Logic Group (Amsterdam,
results in logic,” even in light of its known 1987), pp. 1–7.
defects and despite the more subdued assess- “Jean van Heijenoort’s Scholarly Work,
ments of other logicians. At the same time, 1948–1986,” in Politics, Logic, and
Feferman noted that the Fundamental Theorem Love: The Life of Jean van Heijenoort, by
has had a crucial impact on further develop- Anita B. Feferman (Boston and Wellesely,
ments, and it is presumably at least in part to Mass., 1993), pp. 371–90.
John Alan Robinson’s resolution method that Ed., The Collected Works of Julia
he refers in stating (1993, p. 383) that Robinson (Providence, R.I., 1996).
Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem has “been
used in recent years as the basis for one Further Reading
approach to automated deduction.” This con- Sieg, Wilfried, Richard Sommer, and
nection dates back to at least the late 1950s, in Carolyn Talcott, eds. Reflections on the
the work of Hao WANG. Foundations of Mathematics: Essays in
Honor of Solomon Feferman (Urbana, Ill.
BIBLIOGRAPHY and Natick, Mass., 2002).
“Arithmetization of Metamathematics in a
General Setting,” Fundamenta Irving H. Anellis
Mathematicae 49 (1960): 35–92.
“Transfinite Recursive Progressions of
Axiomatic Theories,” Journal of
Symbolic Logic 27 (1962): 259–316.
The Number Systems: Foundations of
Algebra and Analysis (Reading, Mass., FEIBLEMAN, James Kern (1904–87)
1964; 2nd edn, New York, 1989).
“Systems of Predicative Analysis,” Journal James K. Feibleman was born 13 July 1904 in
of Symbolic Logic 29 (1964): 1–30; 33 New Orleans, Louisiana, and died on 14
(1968): 193–220. September 1987 in Houston, Texas. He grew
“Lectures on Proof Theory,” in Proceedings up in New Orleans, where his father was a
of the Summer School in Logic, Leeds, successful businessman. His parents were
1967, ed. M. H. Löb (Berlin and New Reformed Jews, although in his family religion
York, 1968), pp. 1–107. “was not a highly organized affair.” At age
“Proof Theory: A Personal Report,” in nineteen, he spent his last year of preparatory
Proof Theory, ed. Gaisi Takeuti education at the Horace Mann School in New
(Amsterdam, 1987), pp. 447–85. York City. He then attended the University of
In the Light of Logic (Oxford, 1998). Virginia, but dropped out after less than six
Truth and Consequences: The Life and months due to illness and returned to New
Logic of Alfred Tarski, with Anita Orleans to learn the family business, motivated
Burdman Feferman (Cambridge, UK, by an obligation Feibleman felt to his family.
2005). Business led him to philosophy; with a close
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FEIBLEMAN
associate, Julius Friend, he sought a better under- contributions to the study of the history of phi-
standing of the culture of business in Depression- losophy was an early book in which he set forth
era America. Their concern with technology led Peirce’s philosophical ideas as a unified system of
them to study contemporary physics, then the thought. Like Peirce and Whitehead, Feibleman
history of physics, and then the history of phi- was a system-builder. He published a staggering
losophy. They began collaborating on a number number of articles and books, and he viewed at
of books and articles. In the first, Science and the least twenty-one of his book-length works of
Spirit of Man (1933), they argued that “every- philosophy – of which there are more than thirty
thing that physics regarded detachedly really – as components of a single, comprehensive
belong[s] to the human being as an attribute.” system. Those books range across many differ-
Moving away from that initial, less realist view ent areas, including metaphysics, epistemology,
to a more realist position, they wrote The philosophical logic, ethics, aesthetics, political
Unlimited Community (1936) and What Science philosophy, philosophical psychology, sociol-
Really Means (1937). ogy and anthropology, and others.
In 1943, despite the fact that Feibleman had Feibleman’s system reflects his belief that “the
no college degree, Tulane University offered him purpose of a philosophy … is to find the nature
his first academic position as acting assistant of the universe of all universes while at the same
professor of English, hired to teach naval officers time saving the facts, to account for every type
in training. In 1945 he transferred to the philos- of detail in the world as well as to seek out
ophy department. In 1951 he became head of the reasons for the very existence of such detail. A
philosophy department in the College of Arts philosophy is a scale-model of all that we can
and Sciences. In 1957 he became chair of the uni- describe from our experience or imagine, a
versity department of philosophy. Upon his model based on an ontological system.” (1951)
retirement from that position in 1969, he was He viewed ontology as “the most important
named to the W. R. Irby Chair in Philosophy. branch of philosophy” (1952), and his own
From 1958 to 1967 he was also special lecturer ontology as the foundation of his system.
in the Louisiana State University Medical School Feibleman set forth his ontological theory, which
department of psychiatry. In 1974 Feibleman he called axiologic realism, in his near 800-page
became the first A. W. Mellon Professor in the magnum opus Ontology (1951). That work cul-
Humanities at Tulane, and retired in 1975. In minates in a list of 599 “postulates” of axiologic
spring 1976 he served as Barry Bingham realism, systematically arranged in a way that
Professor in the Humanities and Philosophy at recalls Spinoza’s Ethics and Wittgenstein’s
the University of Louisville. Tractatus. Only the barest sketch of that system
In 1952 Feibleman co-founded Tulane Studies can be given here.
in Philosophy, an annual publication which he The central claim of axiologic realism is that
edited for nearly two decades. He was President there are only three fundamental categories or
of the Charles S. Peirce Society in 1948–9, ontological universes: (1) essence or possibility,
President of the New Orleans Academy of (2) existence or actuality, and (3) destiny or tele-
Sciences in 1958–9, and President of the ology. Feibleman describes essence or possibility
Southwestern Philosophical Society in 1980–81. along the lines of Plato’s Sophist, as “the power
He was an honorary member of Phi Beta Kappa to affect or be affected.” The universe of essence
and received honorary doctoral degrees from thus consists of “the total of all items having the
Rider College, Tulane University, and the power to affect or to be affected taken together.”
University of Louisville. It is “a universe of pure being … governed by
Like his contemporary Charles HARTSHORNE, determination and law” (1951). It is also the
Feibleman was deeply influenced by Charles realm of both universals and values; thus,
PEIRCE and A. N. WHITEHEAD. Among his many Feibleman’s ontology commits him to realism
754
FEIBLEMAN
about universals (in other words, a “realism” in Feibleman intended his system, especially his
the sense in which it is opposed to nominalism) ontology, to be compatible with both empiri-
and to realism about values (hence the name cism and the discoveries of modern natural
“axiologic realism”). science. He believed that in denying the possi-
Individual “exemplars” of values and uni- bility of metaphysics, logical empiricism had
versals belong to the second universe, that of gone too far, holding that it is possible to con-
existence or actuality. These terms describe that struct an elaborate speculative metaphysics con-
which “exercises the power of affecting or sistent with the spirit and methods of science
being affected,” so this second universe and empiricism. He was careful to deny that
“include[s] the total of all items exercising the there was anything mystical about his concept
power to affect or to be affected taken of destiny, and he held that “[t]he test of which
together”; further, “it is a universe of mutual universals are real is the business of the logical
interaction [and] is governed by the conditions and empirical sciences.” Indeed, he described
laid down by the universe of essence” (1951). his own ontology as an empirical metaphysics.
But it not completely governed, since “chance He saw himself as engaged in the Peircean
or accident” influences actual goings-on. The project of developing a “prope-positivism”
universe of existence is “simply nature,” the which would broaden traditional positivism
natural universe. It is spatiotemporal, but is by reconciling the natural, empirical sciences
nonetheless not limited to the physical (nor is with metaphysics. He was inspired by Peirce’s
the physical limited to actuality): “Much is attempt to develop what Peirce called a “sci-
physical that is not actual: meteors which have entific” metaphysics. Near the end of his life,
disintegrated in the past, planets which will be Feibleman urged philosophers to allow their
formed in the future. And much is actual that work to be influenced by science, rather than
is not physical: Plato’s fame, the beauty of merely commenting on, or attempting to eluci-
Cézanne’s paintings.” Unlike the “persistent,” date, the findings of science as logical posi-
unchanging realm of possibility, the realm of tivism did. He felt that if philosophers were to
actuality is “transient,” ever-changing. But look at philosophy from the standpoint of
despite this, it is no less real than the realm of science, then new, and perhaps radically dif-
possibility. Feibleman’s ontology commits him ferent, philosophical ideas might be brought
to a form of modal realism according to which forth.
the universes of the actual and the possible are In addition to numerous books and articles
equally real and constitute a “two-story aimed at academic readers, Feibleman pub-
world.” lished a number of philosophy books for a
As that phrase suggests, Feibleman’s third wider audience. One of these, Understanding
universe is not on a par with the others. Destiny Philosophy: A Popular History of Ideas (1973),
or teleology is “an interim universe” consti- was serialized in the New York Post. His inter-
tuted by “the direction and movement of exis- ests and skills as a writer extended well beyond
tence toward essence, or … of actuality toward philosophy. While in high school, he began
possibility.” The universe of actuality is contributing poems and stories to the Double
“incomplete,” in that it is not wholly system- Dealer, a New Orleans literary magazine co-
atic. It contains “internal contradictions, chance founded by Julius Friend that also published
occurrences, disvalues.” But possibility is “a works by William Faulkner (of whom
complete system” toward which actuality is Feibleman was an acquaintance) and Sherwood
continually moving, and destiny is just this Anderson (with whom Feibleman was friends).
tendency of actuality to move in such a way. It He published a number of novels and many col-
is “the active principle weaving together” of the lections of poetry, and his Collected Poems
primary universes of possibility and actuality. were published in 1974. His literary talents
755
FEIBLEMAN
were shared by his son, Peter S. Feibleman, a The Institutions of Society (London, 1956).
successful novelist and playwright, and his Inside the Great Mirror: A Critical
second wife, Shirley Ann Grau, a writer of Examination of the Philosophy of Russell,
short stories and novels and winner of the Wittgenstein, and Their Followers (The
Pulitzer Prize for The Keepers of the House in Hague, 1958).
1964. The Pious Scientist: Nature, God, and Man
Perhaps because he entered the profession in Religion (New York, 1958).
of philosophy without a college degree, during Religious Platonism: The Influence of
most of his academic career Feibleman was rel- Religion on Plato and the Influence of
atively isolated from the community of profes- Plato on Religion (New York, 1959).
sional philosophers. This sometimes resulted in Foundations of Empiricism (New York,
his ignorance of others’ work on the very 1962).
problems with which he was concerned. It also Mankind Behaving: Human Needs and
resulted in other philosophers being ignorant of Material Culture (Springfield, Ill., 1963).
Feibleman’s work, despite the remarkable Moral Strategy: An Introduction to the Ethics
quantity of his published work, much of which of Confrontation (The Hague, 1967).
appeared in first-rank philosophy journals. In The Reach of Politics: A New Look at
his introduction to The Two-Story World Government (New York, 1969).
(1966), a collection of Feibleman’s philosoph- The New Materialism (The Hague, 1970).
ical writings, Huntington Cairns wrote that The Quiet Rebellion: The Making and
Feibleman’s work “has been unduly neglected, Meaning of the Arts (New York, 1972).
almost, in fact, to a scandalous degree. No Scientific Method: The Hypothetico-
other philosopher who has written so widely Experimental Laboratory Procedure of the
and with the insight of Professor Feibleman Physical Sciences (The Hague, 1972).
has been given such scant attention.” (1966) The Stages of Human Life: A Biography of
Contemporary philosophers working in the Entire Man (The Hague, 1975).
myriad areas spanned by his system seem not Adaptive Knowing: Epistemology from a
to be influenced by, concerned with, or even Realistic Standpoint (The Hague, 1976).
aware of his work. This is surprising, given his Assumptions of Grand Logics (Boston,
prolificacy, the length of his career in academe, 1979).
his many professional honors and achieve- Technology and Reality (Boston, 1982).
ments, and the unusual depth and breadth of From Hegel to Terrorism, and Other Essays
his philosophical system. on the Dynamic Nature of Philosophy
(Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1985).
BIBLIOGRAPHY Justice, Law, and Culture (Boston, 1985).
In Praise of Comedy: A Study in Its Theory Education and Civilization (Boston, 1987).
and Practice (New York, 1939).
An Introduction to Peirce’s Philosophy Other Relevant Works
Interpreted as a System (New York, 1946). Feibleman’s papers are at Southern Illinois
The Revival of Realism: Critical Studies in University, Carbondale.
Contemporary Philosophy (Chapel Hill, Science and the Spirit of Man: A New
N.C., 1946). Ordering of Experience, with Julius Friend
The Theory of Human Culture (New York, (London, 1933).
1946). The Unlimited Community: A Study of the
Aesthetics: A Study of the Fine Arts in Possibility of Social Science, with Julius
Theory and Practice (New York, 1949). Friend (London, 1936).
Ontology (Baltimore, Md., 1951). Christianity, Communism and the Ideal
756
FEIGL
Society: A Philosophical Approach to 1968), chap. 7.

Modern Politics, with Julius Friend “The Systematic Philosophy of James K.
(London, 1937). Feibleman,” Studium Generale 24 (July
What Science Really Means: An Explanation 1971). Issue on Feibleman, including his
of the History and Empirical Method of replies to participants.
General Science (London, 1937). Whittemore, Robert C., ed. “The Reach of
Positive Democracy (Chapel Hill, N.C., Philosophy: Essays in Honor of James K.
1940). Feibleman,” Tulane Studies in Philosophy
The Long Habit: A Novel (New York, 1948). 25 (1977). Contains a bibliography of
Philosophers Lead Sheltered Lives: A First Feibleman’s works.
Volume of Memoirs (London, 1952).
Biosocial Factors in Mental Illness Robert Lane
(Springfield, Ill., 1962).
The Two-Story World: Selected Writings of
James K. Feibleman, ed. Huntington
Cairns (New York, 1966).
The Way of a Man: An Autobiography of
James K. Feibleman (New York, 1969). FEIGL, Herbert (1902–88)
Great April (New York, 1971).
Understanding Philosophy: A Popular Herbert Feigl was the founder and Director of
History of Ideas (New York, 1973). the Minnesota Center for the Philosophy of
Collected Poems (New York, 1974). Science at the University of Minnesota. The
Understanding Civilizations: The Shape of Minnesota Center was the first successful
History (New York, 1975). American institution maintained by public and
Understanding Oriental Philosophy: A private funding which was dedicated to the
Popular Account for the Western World philosophy of science. Along with Feigl’s own
(New York, 1976). writing and teaching, he published the mono-
Understanding Human Nature: A Popular graphic series Minnesota Studies in the
Guide to the Effects of Technology on Philosophy of Science, and the journal
Man and His Behavior (New York, 1977). Philosophical Studies which Feigl established
Ironies of History: Leaders and Misleaders of with Wilfred SELLARS. The Minnesota Center
Humankind (New York, 1980). strongly contributed in the 1950s and 1960s to
Conversations: A Kind of Fiction (New York, the establishment of philosophy of science as
1982). a subdiscipline of academic philosophy and
“Presidential Address: The Third Sophistic,” profession within American intellectual life.
Philosophical Topics 13 (1985): 7–18. Feigl was born on 14 December 1902 in
The Destroyers: The Underside of Human Reichenberg, Austria. His youthful interests
Nature (New York, 1987). in science and philosophy (Albert EINSTEIN and
Moritz Schlick were strong influences) led him
Further Reading to study at the University of Vienna, where he
Amer Nat Bio, Bio 20thC Phils, Proc of APA became a student of Schlick. Through Schlick,
v61, Who’s Who in Phil Feigl became acquainted with the Vienna
Reck, Andrew J. “James Kern Feibleman: Circle of philosophers and scientists who
Axiological Realism and Ontological helped articulate a positivistic scientific phi-
Positivism,” in The New American losophy, or “logical empiricism,” in the early
Philosophers: An Exploration of Thought twentieth century. After completing his dis-
since World War II (Baton Rouge, Louis., sertation in probability theory, titled “Zufall
757
FEIGL
and Gesetz” (or “Chance and Law”), Feigl the American Association for the
received his PhD in philosophy and physics Advancement of Science. Feigl also was on the
from Vienna in 1927. editorial board of Philosophy of Science and
Feigl emigrated to the United States in 1930. served as President of the American
He arrived a few years before Rudolf CARNAP, Philosophical Association Western Division in
Hans REICHENBACH, Philipp FRANK, and other 1962–3. He was a visiting professor at many
members and associates of Schlick’s Vienna universities and was elected to membership in
Circle began arriving in the mid 1930s. After the American Association for the
spending a year at Harvard in 1930–31 as a Advancement of Science and the American
Rockefeller research scholar, he took a per- Academy of Arts and Sciences.
manent position in philosophy at the Feigl’s success in building the profession of
University of Iowa in 1931. There Feigl helped philosophy of science in the United States can
introduce scientific philosophy to American be usefully compared to the efforts of his senior
philosophers both by hosting colleagues from colleague from Vienna, Philipp Frank, who
the Vienna Circle (such as Otto Neurath) as similarly was a devotee of Einstein and began
they toured the Midwest, and by co-authoring his philosophical career studying problems sur-
with American Albert Blumberg (a fellow rounding causation and scientific law. While
student of Schlick) the famous paper “Logical Feigl was establishing the Minnesota Center,
Positivism: A New Movement in European Frank received funds from the Rockefeller
Philosophy.” In this paper, Feigl and Blumberg Foundation to establish his Institute for the
gave the new movement its first widely Unity of Science in Boston within the American
accepted name. However, “logical positivism” Academy of Arts and Sciences. In the early
with its foundationalist and phenomenalist 1950s Frank and Feigl undertook parallel
overtones was soon rejected by many in favor projects as they pioneered the current practice
of “logical empiricism.” Feigl helped intro- of organizing professional conferences and
duce the work of the Vienna Circle and its publishing books and collections of essays
Wittgensteinian connections to American resulting from them (see, for example, Frank
philosophers. Within a few years, young 1957). Unlike Feigl, however, Frank aimed to
American philosophers such as W. V. QUINE, establish scientific philosophy not as a branch
Charles W. M ORRIS , and Ernest N AGEL of academic philosophy but rather as a branch
traveled to Europe to meet firsthand the of science. While Feigl’s series of publications
philosophers introduced by Feigl and was called Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy
Blumberg. of Science, for example, Frank adopted Otto
Feigl moved to Minnesota in 1940 to Neurath’s crusade against the word “philoso-
become professor of philosophy, and he con- phy” and gave his short-lived series the title
tinued to build and stabilize the field of phi- “Contributions to the Analysis and Synthesis
losophy of science. Besides founding of Knowledge.” As a devotee of the unity of
Philosophical Studies in 1950 and the science, Frank envisioned scientific philoso-
Minnesota Center in 1953, he edited several phy as a project diffused among – and thus
texts and anthologies that soon became helping to connect – existing areas of science,
standard reading for students of philosophy of philosophy, and humanities and also as a
science (Feigl and Sellars 1949; Feigl and project capable of engaging and influencing
Brodbeck 1953; Feigl and Maxwell 1959). public debates about science and values in
Some of these anthologies were proceedings of science and society. Tensions between these
conferences and workshops that he organized different styles of leadership in philosophy of
at the Minnesota Center or within national science are evident in Frank’s and Feigl’s cor-
meetings sponsored by organizations such as respondence at the time (Reisch 2005).
758
FEIGL
The cold war years of the 1950s were more albeit one that took inspiration from better-
favorable to a professionalism such as Feigl’s known identities within scientific theory, such as
than to interdisciplinary projects like Frank’s. thermal temperature and specification of the
Those projects that reached back to the early average kinetic energy of molecules in a gas
Vienna Circle’s efforts to reign in the metaphys- (1958). In the influential 1963 volume The
ical excesses of traditional philosophy and to Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, Feigl and Carnap
promote science and scientific thinking as part of further articulated the parameters of mind–body
a broadly modern and socialist approach to life identity theory and different versions of the thesis
and society were too political for the anti-com- of physicalism and the reducibility of mental
munist atmosphere on most campuses in the phenomena to physical phenomena that
1950s and 60s. While Feigl’s Minnesota Center continue to organize debate and research in phi-
grew in influence, Frank’s Institute declined. losophy of psychology.
Rumors about Frank’s interests in Soviet phi-
losophy and politics circulated in the profession, BIBLIOGRAPHY
and by 1952 he was investigated by the FBI as “Logical Positivism: A New Movement in
a possible subversive. After Frank’s death in European Philosophy,” with Albert
1966, Feigl succeeded him as President of the Blumberg, Journal of Philosophy 28 (1931):
Institute for the Unity of Science in 1967, which 281–96.
was soon dissolved in 1970 and absorbed into “The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’,” Minnesota
the Philosophy of Science Association. Feigl Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2
retired from his philosophy position and from (1958): 370–497.
the directorship of the Minnesota Center in “Empiricism at Bay?” in Methodological and
1971. He died on 1 June 1988 in Minneapolis, Historical Essays in the Natural and Social
Minnesota. Sciences, Boston Studies in the Philosophy
In his retirement, Feigl continued to publish of Science, vol. 14, ed. Robert S. Cohen and
essays concerning physicalism and the Marx W. Wartofsky (Dordrecht, 1974), pp.
mind–body problem and published a collection 1–20.
of his essays in 1980. This collection reflects “No Pot of Message,” in Mid-twentieth
Feigl’s body of research divided mainly among Century Philosophy: Personal Statements,
four problem areas: induction and probability, ed. Peter A. Bertocci (New York, 1974), pp.
realism, empiricism, and the mind–body 120–39.
problem. Feigl is perhaps best remembered for Inquiries and Provocations: Selected Writings,
the last two areas. In the debates surrounding 1929–1974, ed. Robert S. Cohen
empiricism in the 1950s and 1960s, he defended (Dordecht, 1980).
a logical empiricist model of scientific theory as
an axiomatic system and built upon some Other Relevant Works
workable distinction between statements true Feigl’s papers are at the University of
by virtue of meaning (or analytically true) and Minnesota and in the Archives of Scientific
those whose truth depends on empirical cir- Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh.
cumstances (synthetic truths). Feigl thus retained, Ed. with Wilfrid Sellars, Readings in
against influential protests from Quine (1951), Philosophical Analysis (New York, 1949).
an analytic-synthetic distinction. Feigl also Ed. with May Brodbeck, Readings in the
retained, against the counsel of Carl HEMPEL Philosophy of Science (New York, 1953).
(1950), the viability of a criterion of empirical Ed. with Grover Maxwell, Current Issues in
meaningfulness. the Philosophy of Science (New York,
Feigl’s work on the mind–body problem 1959).
featured an identification of mind with brain,
759
FEIGL
Further Reading Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences in

Amer Nat Bio, Pres Addr of APA v7, Proc California. He also spent one year as a liberal
of APA v62, Who’s Who in Phil arts fellow at Harvard University Law School
Hempel, Carl. “Problems and Changes in in 1963–4. Feinberg left Princeton in 1966
the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning,” and taught at the University of California at
Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11 Los Angeles before he was appointed profes-
(1950): 41–63. sor of philosophy at Rockefeller University
Quine, W. V. “Two Dogmas of from 1967 to 1977. In 1975–6 he was the
Empiricism,” Philosophical Review 60 Walter E. Meyer Visiting Professor, New York
(1951): 20–43. University School of Law. Feinberg joined the
Reisch, George. How the Cold War University of Arizona in 1978 as professor of
Transformed Philosophy of Science philosophy and law. In 1981–2 Feinberg
(Cambridge, UK, 2005). served as President of the American
Savage, Wade. “Herbert Feigl: Philosophical Association Pacific Division. He
1902–1988,” Proceedings of the 1988 was named Regents, Professor of Philosophy at
Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Arizona in 1988 and held that position until
Science Association, vol. 2 (East Lansing, retiring in 1994. Feinberg died on 29 March
Mich., 1988), pp. 15–22. 2004 in Tucson, Arizona.
Sturma, Dieter. “Reductionism in Exile? Feinberg engaged in an extended philo-
Herbert Feigl’s Identity Theory and the sophical inquiry that continued for four
Mind–Body Problem,” Grazer decades. This scholarship applies rigorous
Philosophische Studien 54 (1998): analytic method to conceptual and normative
71–87. questions arising in the philosophy of law as
well as in the broader range of moral philoso-
George A. Reisch phy. Most of the central works in this evolving
body of scholarship are collected in eight
volumes. Four of these eight volumes contain
collections of essays published during each of
the four decades of the extended inquiry. The
other four volumes comprise the highly inte-
FEINBERG, Joel (1926–2004) grated analysis that constitutes The Moral
Limits of the Criminal Law (1984–8).
Joel Feinberg was born on 19 October 1926 in Doing and Deserving (1970) contains a
Detroit, Michigan. He graduated from high series of essays originally published during the
school in 1944, briefly attended the University first decade of Feinberg’s career. These essays
of Illinois and then joined the army, where he emphasize the application of the analytic
served in an officer training program in method to a series of problematic concepts
Chicago. At the end of World War II, he left that are central to law and to morality. These
the army in 1946 and went on to earn three include, for example, desert, responsibility,
degrees in philosophy from the University of justice, punishment, and causation. These
Michigan: a BA in 1949, an MA in 1951, and chapters provide penetrating conceptual
a PhD in 1957. In 1955 he began teaching at analyses and normative arguments that clarify
Brown University as an assistant professor of the meaning and legitimate functions of these
philosophy. Feinberg moved to Princeton concepts in law. Some chapters in this volume
University in 1957 as associate professor of draw attention to the relationship between the
philosophy, teaching there until 1966. In legal applications of these morally relevant
1960–61 he was a fellow of the Center for concepts and the corresponding moral appli-
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FEINBERG
cations to non-legal individual lives and rela- issues and institutions. The essay addressing
tionships. These essays advance our under- wrongful life, for example, applies the con-
standing of the significance of these concepts ceptual analysis of harm and the liberal harm
and related principles for the extra-legal moral principle to the evaluation of various types of
lives of individuals and of communities. civil or criminal liability for prenatal harming.
Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty Similarly, a three-chapter sequence confronts
(1980) continues the application of analytic a series of analytic and normative challenges to
method to questions arising in legal and moral the recognition of moral rights, and the final
philosophy. Its emphasis shifts from explicitly essay in this sequence applies a conception of
legal concepts and applications to the concepts moral rights to the process of constitutional
and principles of political philosophy that interpretation.
provide the normative foundation for legal Other chapters apply the liberal harm prin-
institutions. One chapter addresses, for ciple to legal doctrines that raise difficult ques-
example, the idea of a free person as one who tions regarding the interpretation and appli-
possesses independent standing in a society cation of that principle. These include, for
and as one who manifests certain virtues of example, legal doctrines that place limits on
character. Other essays examine the meaning freedom of expression or establish a legal duty
and significance of central concepts of politi- to rescue. Two essays examine a series of argu-
cal philosophy including liberty, harm, duty, ments that have been advanced as justifica-
rights, and justice. Some of these chapters criti- tions for the legal prohibition of voluntary
cally examine the application of these concepts euthanasia. These chapters also pursue a more
to difficult moral and legal questions such as general project, however, in that they provide
those addressing euthanasia, abortion, and the a critical analysis of the reasoning that
attribution of rights to animals or to unborn purports to justify reliance upon categorical
generations. Others address the defensible rela- rules rather than evaluating the merits of each
tionship between the individual and the state case because these rules are expected to
by exploring purported justifications for the provide an institutional means to avoiding
state exercise of coercive force through more severe or frequent errors.
criminal punishment. Collectively, these essays The essays in this collection reveal a pattern
contribute to a developing conceptual and of reciprocal enrichment between legal and
moral foundation for legal institutions that political philosophy. Careful analysis of
embody liberal principles of political morality. concepts and arguments from political philos-
Freedom and Fulfillment (1992) continues ophy is brought to bear on questions regard-
this process of integrating philosophy of law ing the most defensible formulation and appli-
with political philosophy. As compared to cation of legal institutions. In a complimentary
those written in the previous decade, however, fashion, addressing difficult legal applications
the essays in this volume reveal a greater of underlying principles of political morality
emphasis on the application of conceptual promotes more precise formulation and
analysis and moral argument to specific legal defense of those principles. The final two
institutions and practices. The explicit chapters of this volume depart from this
emphasis shifts from clarifying the central prin- pattern, however, in that they redirect atten-
ciples of political philosophy to articulating tion away from legal and political philosophy
the form and boundaries of legal institutions and toward the meaning of individual human
consistent with these principles. Some chapters lives. These essays address the significance of
carry over projects begun in the prior decade the absurd in the struggle to understand the
by applying the previous analyses of general meaning of a human life from the perspective
concepts and principles to more specific legal of the individual human being who defines
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FEINBERG
and pursues that life. These chapters remind of attempt. Thus, these essays focus attention
the reader that legal institutions and philo- on the complex interaction among legal insti-
sophical analysis draw their significance from tutions, the principles of political philosophy
the role they can play in the human lives of underlying these institutions, and the moral
those who pursue them and are affected by lives of the individuals who participate in them.
them. Collectively, these four volumes represent
Problems at the Roots of Law (2003) con- an emerging approach to legal and moral phi-
tinues the extended integration of legal and losophy that applies the analytic method to
political philosophy contained in the first three enhance our understanding of morally defen-
volumes. Some of these essays provide con- sible legal institutions, the underlying principles
ceptual analysis of abstract concepts of polit- of political philosophy, and the meaning and
ical philosophy, including moral rights and experience of individual human lives. Two
intrinsic value. Other chapters reflect the shift characteristics permeate this developing body
in emphasis toward the perspective of the indi- of work. First, this scholarship examines philo-
vidual suggested in the last two chapters in sophical questions relevant to law in a manner
Freedom and Fulfillment. One essay, for that accurately represents and clarifies the legal
example, addresses the ongoing debate regard- rules, principles, and institutions at issue and
ing natural law and positivism by directing simultaneously informs the broader questions
attention toward the obligations of judges and of political and individual morality raised by
jurors who must discharge their responsibilities these legal practices. Thus, it addresses impor-
in the context of the German experience of tant moral questions arising in the individual,
Nazism or of the American experience of collective, and institutional strands of human
slavery. Similarly, chapter six presents an life, and it clarifies the relationships among
extended analysis of evil, including literary these strands. Second, it applies rigorous
and philosophical conceptions of evil. This analytic method while maintaining unusual
analysis addresses evil as a property of crimes sensitivity to the personal experience of indi-
and as a property of the evil-doer’s character. vidual human lives and of human relation-
It includes discussion of certain crimes and ships. Thus, it maintains penetrating analytic
criminals that apparently blur the distinction rigor without sacrificing cogent relevance to
between “mad” and “bad” in that they tend to the human experience. The four volumes that
elicit judgments that they are both wicked and comprise The Moral Limits of the Criminal
“sick.” Law provide an exemplar of scholarship man-
Other essays examine problematic aspects of ifesting these characteristics.
the law of criminal attempts and of entrapment The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law
in a manner that addresses ongoing debate consists of Harm to Others (1984), Offense to
regarding the most defensible formulation and Others (1985), Harm to Self (1986), and
justification for provisions of these types. These Harmless Wrongdoing (1988). These four
chapters advance our understanding of these volumes contain an extensive analysis of the
ongoing doctrinal questions, but they also legitimate bases for the state’s exercise of
draw attention to the interpretations of coercive force against the individual through
criminal responsibility revealed by these doc- criminal prohibition and punishment. Feinberg
trines. They include discussion of the relation- advances a moderate version of the classic
ship between circumstances and individual liberal thesis that justifies criminal prohibition
dispositions contemplated by the law of and punishment of conduct that causes or
entrapment as well as exploration of the defen- threatens harm or serious offense to others. He
sible measure of criminal culpability revealed rejects as unjustifiable criminal prohibition or
by sentencing practices associated with the law punishment of individual conduct that causes
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FEINBERG
only minor offense to others or harm to self. volumes, however, in that it rejects a broad
He also rejects the state’s authority to crimi- interpretation of the offense principle that
nally prohibit or punish harmless wrongdoing, threatens to undermine any substantial con-
understood as immoral conduct that does not straints on the state’s authority to criminalize
cause harm or serious offense to others. and punish. The two chapters that discuss
The argument contained in these four various bases for the application of the
volumes presents an extended philosophical criminal law to pornography, for example,
analysis that integrates the individual, political, carefully differentiate arguments for the
and legal components of the comprehensive criminal prohibition of pornography based
moral experience. It is useful to think of this on the harm, offense, paternalistic, and moral-
analysis as progressing through successive two- istic principles. These chapters demonstrate
volume stages. Harm to Others and Offense to the reciprocal pattern of analysis revealed in
Others present the positive thesis in that they much of Feinberg’s scholarship in that they
articulate and defend the argument for the provide careful examination of law that clar-
legitimacy of criminal prohibition and pun- ifies and defends the broader normative frame-
ishment by the state of conduct that harms or work contained in The Moral Limits of the
causes wrongful offense to others. Harm to Criminal Law, and they make use of that
Self and Harmless Wrongdoing then confront analysis to advocate a defensible position
and reject paternalism and legal moralism as regarding the legal response to pornography.
two credible challenges to the liberal thesis Harm to Self shifts the emphasis from the
advanced in the first two volumes. defense of the positive thesis to the rejection of
Harm to Others exemplifies the precise, the paternalistic justification for criminal pro-
subtle application of conceptual analysis that hibition and punishment. It also draws atten-
characterizes Feinberg’s scholarship. This tion to more general questions about the defen-
volume distinguishes various senses of harm sible relationship between the individual and
and limits the harm principle to those harms the state. The core of this volume involves a
that constitute wrongful setbacks to interests. precise analysis of individual autonomy with
In clarifying the most defensible interpretation particular attention to autonomy as personal
of harm for the purpose of the harm principle, sovereignty. This conceptual analysis provides
this volume confronts borderline cases that the foundation for inquiry into the limits of
present difficult questions regarding the defen- state authority to exercise coercive force
sible boundaries between individual liberty through the criminal law. Thus, it integrates
and justifiable state coercion through the appli- the individual and institutional domains of
cation of the criminal law. These include, for moral philosophy. It applies this integrated
example, questions regarding the possibilities analysis to some particularly troubling ques-
that persons can be harmed by their own death tions for the liberal thesis, such as those involv-
or by events that occur after their death. The ing slavery contracts and voluntary euthanasia.
discussion of these difficult questions exem- Harmless Wrongdoing completes the
plifies the integration of conceptual and nor- negative component of the argument in that it
mative analysis that permeates the entire work. rejects legal moralism as a challenge to the
Offense to Others provides the second part liberal position. It also continues the integra-
of the positive liberal thesis in that it articulates tion of the individual and institutional domains
and defends a conception of wrongful offenses of moral philosophy in that the argument for
that justifies state prohibition and punishment the rejection of legal moralism does not
through the criminal law. This volume also purport to establish a boundary between law
represents a transition to the negative part of and morality. Rather, it recognizes that the
the argument contained in the third and fourth criminal process constitutes a “great moral
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machine” (1988, p. 155) that enforces criminal Further Reading

prohibition through the application of pun- Bio 20thC Phils, Oxford Comp Phil, Pres
ishment with the expression of condemnation Addr of APA v9
inherent in punishment. As presented here, the Coleman, Jules L. and Allen Buchanan, eds.
liberal position does not separate law and In Harm’s Way: Essays in Honor of Joel
morality. Rather, it defines public and non- Feinberg (New York, 1994). Contains a
public domains of morality and limits the legit- bibliography of Feinberg’s writings.
imate jurisdiction of the criminal law to the Martin, Rex. “The Development of
public domain. This interpretation recognizes Feinberg’s Conception of Rights,”
that complete human lives extend across the Journal of Value Inquiry 16 (1982):
individual and institutional domains, and it 29–45.
seeks to preserve the significance of each while
allowing the integration of the two. Thus, it Robert F. Schopp
reflects the central characteristics of Feinberg’s
extended body of scholarship in that it repre-
sents a rigorous yet sensitive approach to the
study of ethics as characterized by Socrates as
“no small matter, but how we ought to live.”
FERM, Vergilius Ture Anselm (1896–1974)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory Vergilius Ferm was born on 6 January 1896 in
of Responsibility (Princeton, N.J., 1970). Sioux City, Iowa. His parents, Olof Wilhelm
Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Ferm and Augusta Mathilda Slattengren, had
1973). emigrated separately, he by himself and she
Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty: with her kin, to the United States from the
Essays in Social Philosophy (Princeton, provinces of Nerike and Småland in Sweden,
N.J., 1980). respectively. After the death of his father, who
The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: was a minister of the Lutheran Church’s
Harm to Others (Oxford, 1984). Swedish Augustana Synod, the family moved to
The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Chicago, where Vergilius graduated from Lake
Offense to Others (Oxford, 1985). View High School in 1913. He earned the BA
The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: (1916) and BD (1919) degrees from Augustana
Harm to Self (Oxford, 1986). College and Seminary in Rock Island, Illinois.
The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: During this period, he learned to play the
Harmless Wrongdoing (Oxford,1988). trumpet and the piano, enjoying his skill at
Freedom and Fulfillment: Philosophical improvisational jazz. During a Lutheran pas-
Essays (Princeton, N.J., 1992). torate in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, he studied with
Problems at the Roots of Law: Essays in G. T. W. PATRICK and Edwin STARBUCK at the
Political and Legal Theory (Oxford, University of Iowa, where he discovered his
2003). “calling” to philosophy, religious inquiry, and
teaching, though he continued preaching
Other Relevant Works throughout his life. Supporting his family by
Ed., Moral Concepts (Oxford, 1969). pastorates at Ansonia and West Haven,
Ed., The Problem of Abortion (Belmont, Connecticut, he received the MA (1923) and
Cal., 1973; 3rd edn 1997). PhD (1925) in philosophy from Yale
Ed., with Hyman Gross, Philosophy of Law University, the latter under his mentor and
(Encino, Cal., 1975; 7th edn 2003). advisor Douglas Clyde MACINTOSH, whom he
764
FERM
described as “one of my best professors without contact with those of other faiths enabled him
the embroidery of an outgoing personality” to write presciently, “We in our time, are faced
(1971, p. 108). to exchange experiences with other religions of
In 1926–7 Ferm taught at Albright College in whatsoever the name and capitulate on the
Reading, Pennsylvania. His career in teaching, long-standing platform that religious truths are
however, was spent almost entirely at the the copyrights of only one religion – there being
College of Wooster in Ohio, where he was a Divinity that casts its influence among all the
associate professor of philosophy (1927–8), sons of men.” (1971, p. 171)
professor of philosophy (1928–38), and then
Compton Professor of Philosophy and head of BIBLIOGRAPHY
the department (1938–64). Many yearlong sab- The Crisis in American Lutheran Theology
batical leaves were spent at the family’s beloved (New York, 1927).
summer home at Mercer Lake, Wisconsin, First Adventures in Philosophy (New York,
where he studied, corresponded, and wrote 1936).
and edited books (thirty in all). After his retire- First Chapters in Religious Philosophy (New
ment in 1964, Ferm was a visiting professor at York and London, 1937).
Sweet Briar College (1964–5), Heidelberg “Theology and Religious Experience,” in The
College (1966), Wake Forest University Nature of Religious Experience, ed. Julius
(1965–8), where he was also acting chair of the Bixler, Robert Calhoun, and H. Richard
philosophy department, and Ashland College Niebuhr (New York, 1937).
(1968–72). What Can We Believe? (New York, 1948).
Of Ferm, W. E. Garrison wrote, “there is Toward An Expansive Christian Theology
no more competent man to [update the (New York, 1964).
churches] than Vergilius Ferm, who besides Cross-Currents in the Personality of Martin
being the author of thoughtful books of his Luther: A Study in the Psychology of
own, is an experienced editor of symposiums Religious Genius (North Quincy, Mass.,
and encyclopedias …” (Garrison 1953, p. 448). 1972).
Ferm’s Memoirs of a College Professor (1971) Philosophy Beyond the Classroom (North
reviewed his career as an editor, his voluminous Quincy, Mass., 1974).
correspondence with prominent world author-
ities, his theological views, the “shenanigans” Other Relevant Works
of college officialdom, and his “bad boy” status Ed., What Is Lutheranism? A Symposium in
in ecclesiastical and theological circles. He Interpretation (New York, 1930).
described his impressions of the latter in his Ed., Contemporary American Theology:
presidential address in 1945 to the American Theological Autobiographies, 2 vols (New
Theological Society Eastern Division titled York, 1932–3).
“Oceanic Christianity.” Philosophy Beyond Ed., Religion in Transition (London, 1937).
the Classroom (1974) brought together seven- Ed., An Encyclopedia of Religion (New
teen sermons and twenty-two published articles York, 1945).
and addresses. These books, along with First Ed., Religion in the Twentieth Century (New
Chapters in Religious Philosophy (1937), What York, 1948).
Can We Believe? (1948), and Toward An Ed., A History of Philosophical Systems
Expansive Christian Theology (1964), provide (New York, 1950).
access to Ferm’s constructive theistic natural- Ed., Forgotten Religions: Including Some
ism, his careful attention to theological method Primitive Living Religions (New York,
as an aspect of philosophy, and his belief in the 1950).
everlasting spiritual life of persons. His wide Ed., The American Church of the Protestant
765
FERM
Heritage (New York, 1953). himself with odd jobs then entered the
Ed., The Protestant Credo (New York, University of Barcelona, receiving his BA in
1953). 1932 and his Licenciado en Filosofía in 1936.
Their Day Was Yesterday (New York, 1954). He enlisted in the Loyalist army for the Spanish
Ed., An Encyclopedia of Morals (New York, Civil War, served as an intelligence clerk, and
1956). escaped across the Pyrenees in 1939. During his
Inside Ivy Walls: Observations from a exile he lived three months in Paris, then from
College Professor’s Notebook (New York, 1939 to 1941 in Havana, Cuba, and from 1941
1964). to 1947 in Santiago, Chile, where he was
Memoirs of a College Professor: Telling It Professor of Philosophy at the University of
Like It Was (North Quincy, Mass., 1971). Chile.
A Guggenheim Fellowship from 1947 to
Further Reading 1949 brought Ferrater to the United States,
Proc of APA v48, Who Was Who in Amer where he lived in New York City, Princeton,
v6, Who’s Who in Phil and Baltimore. Bryn Mawr College hired him
Garrison, W. E. “Bird’s Eye View,” Christian to teach both philosophy and Spanish literature
Century 70 (1953): 448–9. in 1949, and promoted him to associate pro-
fessor of philosophy in 1951, professor of phi-
Edgar A. Towne losophy in 1955, and Fairbank Professor in
the Humanities in 1974. He retired in 1981. A
naturalized American citizen since 1960, he
lived in southeastern Pennsylvania the rest of
his life, but traveled widely. He died on 30
January 1991 while visiting Barcelona, Spain.
FERRATER MORA, José María (1912–91) Always modest, gracious, charming, and
sophisticated, Ferrater was a popular teacher,
José (or Josep) Ferrater Mora was the most careful thinker, attentive listener, and witty
important Catalan philosopher since Ramon conversationalist. His subtle humor was leg-
Llull in the thirteenth century. He was born on endary. His graduate students at Bryn Mawr
30 October 1912 in Barcelona, Spain. Along considered him nearly omniscient. At the first
with José Ortega y Gasset, Miguel de Unamuno, session of his graduate seminar on Immanuel
Xavier Zubiri, and George SANTAYANA, Ferrater Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Ferrater
was one of the most influential Spanish philoso- would take the class to Canaday Library and,
phers of the twentieth century. He achieved without notes, expound upon every mono-
success not only in all areas of philosophy, espe- graph in the secondary literature on Kant that
cially symbolic logic, speculative thinking, phi- could be found on those shelves. Paul
losophy of language, and history of philosophy, EDWARDS’s Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967)
but also as a journalist, encyclopedist, photog- and Robert AUDI’s Cambridge Dictionary of
rapher, film maker, novelist, short story writer, Philosophy (1995) are valuable reference
social critic, and litterateur. He was a familiar works, but what Edwards and Audi accom-
television and newspaper personality throughout plished as editors with all-star teams of
the Spanish-speaking world, much more a scholars, Ferrater accomplished single-
household name there than any American handedly as author. His Diccionario de
philosopher has ever been in the English- filosofia first appeared in 1941 and went
speaking world. through six editions during his lifetime.
After secondary education at the Colegio de Abridged versions have been translated into
Santa Maria del Collell, Ferrater supported English and several other languages.
766
FERRATER MORA
Although Ferrater wrote hundreds of articles, that experience. Despite this and several other
he confined his speculative writing mostly to debts to Heidegger, integrationism is not a form
books because he believed that the purpose of of existentialism, since, if it were, it would be
articles, being too short to support examining just one doctrine among others. Integrationism
nuances in sufficient depth and interrelation, is intends to be overarching, beyond and com-
to convey facts. He judged that only five of his prising all doctrines. If this sounds like
works were essential to understand his thought: Hegelianism, then one need only remember
El ser y la muerte (Being and Death, 1962); El that G. W. F. Hegel tried to accomplish sys-
ser y el sentido (Being and Meaning, 1967), tematically what Ferrater tried to accomplish
revised and retitled as Fundamentos de filosofía non-systematically, namely, the dynamic unity
(Fundamentals of Philosophy); Cambio de of all thought.
marcha en filosofía (Shifting Gears in Ferrater enjoyed speculating on the future
Philosophy, 1974); Indagaciones sobre el of philosophy. Citing the provocative nature of
lenguaje (Investigations on Language, 1970); their thought, the extensiveness of their per-
and El hombre en la encrucijada (Man at the ception, and especially the open-endedness of
Crossroads, 1952), revised and retitled as Las their inquiry, Ferrater predicted in the 1980s
crisis humanas (Human Crises). that the twentieth-century philosophers who
Ferrater called his philosophy “integra- would most likely still be read one hundred
tionism.” It is neither a system nor an ideology, years hence were Heidegger and Ludwig
but a method of overcoming dualisms and dis- Wittgenstein. While Ferrater’s appreciation of
agreements through philosophical comprehen- Heidegger is evident throughout his works, his
sion of the opposing positions and with a admiration for Wittgenstein is best demon-
healthy dose of irony. It is universally critical, strated in his article, “Wittgenstein: A Symbol
even self-critical, self-sustaining, and almost of Troubled Times,” in Philosophy and
dogmatically non-systematic. Ferrater’s Phenomenological Research (1953).
absolute rejection of dogmatism was the closest Beginning with films in 1967, short stories in
that he ever came to either absolutism or dog- 1979, and novels in 1982, Ferrater often
matism. This rejection does not make integra- expressed his philosophy as fiction. He claimed
tionism an unprincipled relativism; rather, it is that these works were just non-philosophical
grounded in the fundamental belief that every tales, yet they are much deeper than that. He
careful thinker has something important to say published five novels and a collection of short
and is worth an honest hearing. Above all, inte- stories and made dozens of films. Three of his
grationism is characterized by its openness, tol- novels are set in the fictional island of Corona
erance, and synthesizing potential. Given off the east coast of the United States. Several
Aristotle’s veneration of the middle way, of his short stories evolved from his films. Five
Ferrater’s thought might be described as an of his films were original stories that used Bryn
ironic Aristotelianism. Mawr and Haverford students and faculty,
Integrationism involves an ontology for including himself, as actors. Everydayness
which the problem of death is central. Death (1970) took its cue from Heidegger’s concept of
means that all thought is transitory and must Alltäglichkeit and won an award in 1973 at the
constantly be revised as thinkers come and go. International Film Festival in Rochester, New
Moreover, following Martin Heidegger, York. The Heartache and the Thousand
Ferrater asserts that death is the defining Natural Shocks (1978), arguably his best film,
element of a life and the most intensely private explored the tension between love and
experience. Thus all thought is colored by the academia. Other titles include A Hero of Our
fact of each thinker’s mortality, and at the same Time (1969), Back to the Firing Squad (1971),
time hidden from others by the particularity of and The Call (1973). Playing a cameo role in
767
FERRATER MORA
one of these films, Ferrater found himself sitting 1971).

under a sign that read, “Positively No Las crisis humanas (Estella, 1972).
Smoking,” to which he replied as he lit up, Cambio de marcha en filosofía (Madrid,
“Negatively, some smoking.” 1974).
Cine sin filosofías (Madrid, 1974).
BIBLIOGRAPHY De la materia a la razón (Madrid, 1979).
Cóctel de verdad (Madrid, 1935). Ética aplicada: Del aborto a la violencia,
Diccionario de filosofia (México City, 1941; with Priscilla Cohn (Madrid, 1981).
7th edn, Barcelona, 1994). El mundo del escritor (Barcelona, 1983).
Unamuno: Bosquejo de una filosofía (Buenos Modos de hacer filosofía (Barcelona, 1985).
Aires, 1944). Voltaire en Nueva York (Madrid, 1985).
Cuatro visiones de la historia universal Hecho en Corona (Madrid, 1986).
(Buenos Aires, 1945). Ventana al mundo (Barcelona, 1986).
La ironía, la muerte y la admiración El juego de la verdad (Barcelona, 1988).
(Santiago, Chile, 1946). Regreso del infierno (Barcelona, 1989).
El sentido de la muerte (Buenos Aires, 1947).
Helenismo y Cristianismo (Santiago, Chile, Other Relevant Works
1949). Ferrater Mora’s papers are at the University
El hombre en la encrucijada (Buenos Aires, of Girona, Spain.
1952). “Wittgenstein: A Symbol of Troubled
Lógica matemática, with Hugues Leblanc Times,” Philosophy and Phenomenological
(Mexico City, 1955) Research 14 (1953): 89–96.
Ortega y Gasset: An Outline of His
Philosophy (London, 1956). Further Reading
Man at the Crossroads (Boston, 1957). Oxford Comp Phil, Proc of APA v64
La filosofía en el mundo de hoy (Madrid, Cohn, Priscilla, ed. Transparencies:
1959). Philosophical Essays in Honor of José
Philosophy Today: Conflicting Tendencies in Ferrater Mora (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.,
Contemporary Thought (New York, 1981). Contains a bibliography of Ferrater
1960). Mora’s writings.
The Idea of Man: An Outline of Giner, Salvador, and Esperanza Guisán, eds.
Philosophical Anthropology (Lawrence, José Ferrater Mora: el hombre y su obra
Kan., 1961). (Santiago, Chile, 1994).
On Miguel de Unamuno’s Idea of Reality Nieto, Carlos. La filosofía en la encrucijada:
(Groningen, 1961). perfiles del pensamiento de José Ferrater
El ser y la muerte: Bosquejo de filosofía inte- Mora (Barcelona, 1985).
gracionista (Madrid, 1962). Terricabras, Josep-Maria. “Josep Ferrater
Unamuno: A Philosophy of Tragedy Mora: An Integrationist Philosopher,”
(Berkeley, Cal., 1962). Man and World 26 (1993): 209–18.
Being and Death: An Outline of Terricabras, Josep-Maria, ed. Three Spanish
Integrationist Philosophy (Berkeley, Cal., Philosophers: Unamuno, Ortega, Ferrater
1965). Mora (Albany, N.Y., 2003).
El ser y el sentido (Madrid, 1967).
La filosofía actual (Madrid, 1969). Eric v. d. Luft
Indagaciones sobre el lenguaje (Madrid,
1970).
Las palabras y los hombres (Barcelona,
768
FERRÉ
FERRÉ, Frederick Pond (1933– ) Ferré combines his concerns for personalism,
religion, and environmental ethics through
Frederick Ferré was born on 23 March 1933 in what he calls the “postmodern science of
Boston, Massachusetts, to Nels F. S. Ferré and ecology.” Unlike the reductionist and mecha-
Katharine Pond Ferré. He grew up in Newton, nist values of modern science’s world model,
Massachusetts where his father was professor of ecology emphasizes the natural features of
Christian theology at Andover-Newton interrelatedness and purposiveness necessary
Theological Seminary. He attended Oberlin for explanations of life. Philosophy of science
College in 1950–51 and then went to Boston and technology must follow the lead of eco-
University where he received his BA in history logical thinking, as Ferré has explored in many
summa cum laude in 1954. He received an MA writings. Religion must likewise follow the
in philosophy of history from Vanderbilt postmodern path of scientific knowledge to
University in 1955, and did theological studies satisfy the intellect, and there is no necessary
in 1955–6 at Vanderbilt University Divinity conflict between much of Christian doctrine,
School. He then received a Fulbright Fellowship including the Trinity, and the new science.
for 1956–8 for further graduate study in However, Ferré admits that while anthropo-
Scotland. He earned his PhD in philosophy in morphic conceptions of God should not be
1959 from the University of St. Andrews, eliminated, it may be that the divine is not
writing a dissertation on “The Linguistic theistic.
Feasibility of Theistic Proofs in British Like his philosophy professor at Boston,
Discussion 1945–1955.” personalist Peter BERTOCCI, Ferré has sought a
In 1958–9 Ferré was visiting assistant pro- community-oriented type of personalism that
fessor of philosophy at Vanderbilt University. would overcome the human-centered view of
From 1959 to 1962, he was assistant professor value. He has appealed to the process philos-
of religion at Mount Holyoke College in ophy of A. N. WHITEHEAD for inspiration, to
Massachusetts. In 1962 he became associate formulate a “personalistic organicism” that
professor of philosophy at Dickinson College in offers a non-reductive and pluralistic natural-
Pennsylvania, was promoted to full professor in ism that explains the emergence and preserva-
1967, and held the title of Charles A. Dana tion of consciousness. This personalistic
Professor of Philosophy at Dickinson from 1970 organicism would overcome value subjectivism
to 1980. From 1980 until retiring in 1998, Ferré by placing partial responsibility for objective
was professor of philosophy at the University of value on environing conditions. Ferré proposes
Georgia. He served as head of the department to overcome the divide between intrinsic value
of philosophy and religion from 1980 to 1984 and instrumental value by taking the wider
(taking over leadership in the aftermath of ecological perspective of all of life’s evolving
William T. BLACKSTONE’s death in 1977), and and growing interdependent values. Placing
then was head of the newly independent phi- supreme value in neither human persons alone
losophy department from 1984 to 1988. Ferré (resulting in environmental devastation), nor in
was also the chair of the faculty of environ- the environment as a whole (excessively
mental ethics from 1984 to 1991. He was active devaluing human ends), Ferré overcomes such
in the American Association of University dichotomies by emphasizing each organism’s
Professors and served on its National Council pursuit of value in harmony with all others.
from 1973 to 1976. He was President of the From this wider, more inclusive cosmological
American Theological Society in 1976–7, perspective, Ferré suggests that metaphysics
President of the Society for Philosophy of returns to its axiological roots by using eco-
Religion in 1985–6, and President of the logical categories of creativity, homeostasis,
Metaphysical Society of America in 2003–4. and holism. These categories in turn suggest a
769
FERRÉ
supreme aesthetic perspective. This organis- (New York, 1982).

mic cosmology, he suggests, therefore should Ed. with Rita Mataragnon, God and
be labeled “kalogenic” (beauty-creating). Global Justice (New York, 1985).
“Moderation, Morals, and Meat,” Inquiry
BIBLIOGRAPHY 29 (1986): 391–406.
Language, Logic, and God (New York, “Nels F. S. Ferré on Ultimate Reality and
1961). the Meaning of Human Life,” Ultimate
Exploring the Logic of Faith: A Dialogue Reality and Meaning 9 (1986): 103–16.
on the Relation of Modern Philosophy to “Theodicy and the Status of Animals,”
Christian Faith, with Kent Bendall (New American Philosophical Quarterly 23
York, 1962). (1986): 23–34.
Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion (New Ed. with Carl Mitcham, Ethics and
York, 1967; London, 1968). Technology (Greenwich, Conn., 1989).
Shaping the Future: Resources for the Post- Ed. with Peter Hartel, Ethics and
Modern World (New York, 1976). Environmental Policy: Theory Meets
Philosophy of Technology (Englewood Practice (Athens, Georgia, 1994).
Cliffs, N.J., 1988; 2nd edn, Athens, “Personalistic Organicism: Paradox or
Georgia, 1995). Paradigm?” Philosophy 36 suppl. (1994):
Hellfire and Lightning Rods: Liberating 59–73.
Science, Technology and Religion “Value, Time, and Nature,” Environmental
(Maryknoll, N.Y., 1993). Ethics 17 (1995): 417–31.
Being and Value: Toward a Constructive “Keeping it Together: Holistic Reflections
Postmodern Metaphysics (Albany, N.Y., from a ‘Natural Analyst’,” in Religious
1996). Experience and Ecological
Knowing and Value: Toward a Responsibility, ed. Donald Crosby and
Constructive Postmodern Epistemology Charley Hardwick (New York, 1996),
(Albany, N.Y., 1998). pp. 3–22.
Living and Value: Toward a Constructive “Persons in Nature: Toward an Applicable
Postmodern Ethics (Albany, N.Y., 2001). and Unified Environmental Ethics,”
Ethics and the Environment 1 (1996):
Other Relevant Works 15–25.
“The Definition of Religion,” Journal of the “Theism and Technology,” in A
American Academy of Religion 38 Companion to Philosophy of Religion,
(1970): 3–16. ed. Philip Quinn and Charles Taliaferro
“Toward Transformational Theology: A (Oxford, 1997), pp. 442–9.
Dialogue with My Father,” Religion in “Personalism and the Dignity of Nature,”
Life 47 (1978): 6–22. in Personalism Revisited: Its Proponents
“Brand Blanshard on Reason and Religious and Critics, ed. Thomas O. Buford and
Belief,” in The Philosophy of Brand Harold H. Oliver (Amsterdam, 2002),
Blanshard, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (La Salle, pp. 104–22.
Ill., 1980), pp. 908–43. “Value Judgments, God, and Ecological
“Science, Religion and Experience,” in Ecumenism,” in Philosophy of Religion
Experience, Reason and God, ed. Eugene for a New Century: Essays in Honor of
Long (Washington, D.C., 1980), pp. Eugene Thomas Long, ed. Jeremiah
97–111. Hackett and Jerald Wallulis (Dordrecht,
Ed. with Joseph Kockelmans and John E. 2004), pp. 105–32.
Smith, The Challenge of Religion Today
770
FEUER
Further Reading had edited a standard edition of Marxist

Cheney, Jim. “Naturalizing the Problem of writings in 1959, he offended many leftists
Evil,” Environmental Ethics 19 (1997): and radicals of the 1960s with his book The
299–313. Conflict of Generations (1969), which
“Reflections on Frederick Ferré’s Living analyzed student movements around the world
and Value,” American Journal for as examples of Freudian and Oedipal rebel-
Theology and Philosophy 23 (January lions against authority. Feuer’s break with the
2002). Special issue about Ferré, New Left in the 1960s was itself perhaps one
including his responses. instance of a rebellious pattern in his career
and anticipated by his own break with the
John R. Shook socialism of his youth. Though as late as 1942
he was writing spirited essays about class
struggle and ideology in the Marxist journal
Science & Society, he later followed the ideo-
logical trajectory of other former leftist
philosophers (such as John DEWEY, Sidney
FEUER, Louis Samuel (1912–2002) HOOK, and Horace KALLEN) and emphatically
rejected philosophical or broadly intellectual
Lewis Samuel Feuer was a philosopher with views sympathetic to socialism or the Soviet
interests in Spinoza, the sociology and history Union.
of science, and the psychological roots of By the end of the 1950s, however, Feuer
ideology and ideological conflict. He was born was not content with the widespread depoliti-
on 7 December 1912 in Manhattan and raised cization of professional philosophy. In 1959,
on the Lower East Side of New York City. He presaging his growing work as a sociologist
was a student of Morris COHEN at City College and historian of science, he wrote to a sympa-
of New York, where he earned a BS in 1931. thetic Kallen: “I find myself rather bored by the
He then attended Harvard, where he earned an verbal exercises which constitute modern
MA in 1932 and a PhD in philosophy in 1935. academic philosophy. More and more, I find
After serving in the US Army during World myself writing about problems in the social
War II, he became an instructor of philosophy sciences with a mixture of empirical and philo-
at Vassar College in New York in 1946 and sophical concern.” (Feuer to Kallen, 23 March
was soon promoted up to associate professor. 1959)
In 1951 he became assistant professor of phi- In the second half of his career, Feuer’s
losophy and sociology at the University of concerns led him to write books about the
Vermont, and he taught there until 1957 when history of science and scientific creativity and
he accepted an appointment as professor of psychoanalysis and ethics. He continued to
philosophy and social science at the University write about political history and philosophy,
of California at Berkeley. From 1966 to 1976 but with an explicitly anti-Soviet, anti-social-
Feuer was professor of sociology at the ist emphasis.
University of Toronto, and from 1976 until
1988 he was University Professor of Sociology BIBLIOGRAPHY
and Humanities at the University of Virginia. Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism (Boston,
He died on 24 November 2002 in Newton, 1958).
Massachusetts. The Scientific Intellectual: The
At Berkeley, Feuer made his reputation as a Psychological and Social Origins of
controversial intellectual. Though he sup- Modern Science (New York, 1963; 2nd
ported the early free speech movement and edn 1992).
771
FEUER
The Conflict of Generations: The Character Further Reading

and Significance of Student Movements Agassi, Joseph. “The Zeitgeist and
(New York, 1969). Professor Feuer,” Philosophy of the
Marx and the Intellectuals: A Set of Post- Social Sciences 7 (1977): 251–3.
Ideological Essays (Garden City, N.Y., Hook, Sidney, William L. O’Neill, and
1969). Roger O’Toole, eds. Philosophy, History,
Psychoanalysis and Ethics (Westport, and Social Action: Essays in Honor of
Conn., 1970). Lewis Feuer (Dordrecht, 1988). Contains
Einstein and the Generations of Science Feuer’s autobiography and bibliography
(New York, 1974). of writings.
Ideology and the Ideologists (New York
and Oxford, 1975). George Reisch
The Case of the Revolutionist’s Daughter:
Sherlock Holmes Meets Karl Marx
(Buffalo, N.Y., 1983).
Imperialism and the Anti-imperialist Mind
(Buffalo, N.Y., 1986).
Varieties of Scientific Experience: Emotive FEYERABEND, Paul Karl (1924–94)
Aims in Scientific Hypotheses (New
Brunswick, N.J., 1995). Paul K. Feyerabend was born on 13 January
1924 in Vienna, Austria, and died on 11
Other Relevant Works February 1994 in Genolier, near Geneva,
Feuer’s papers are at Brandeis University in Switzerland. As the only child in a middle-class
Massachusetts. family, he grew up in the aftermath of World
Ed., Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Basic War I in Vienna under difficult economic con-
Writings on Politics and Philosophy ditions. Feyerabend was an excellent student
(New York, 1959). who loved to read. He had many diverse inter-
“Ethics and Historical Materialism,” ests including mathematics, physics, and astron-
Science & Society 6 (1942): 242–72. omy, as well as the arts, theater, and music. He
“Materialism, Idealism and Science,” learned to play the accordion and the violin,
Philosophy of Science 15 (1948): 71–5. and took singing lessons. He enjoyed opera
“What is Philosophy of History?” Journal and fostered a lifelong love for music and
of Philosophy 49 (1952): 329–40. theater. In 1942 he was drafted into the labor
“Political Myths and Metaphysics,” service, and then into the German army. In an
Philosophy and Phenomenological attempt to avoid combat, he volunteered for
Research 15 (1955): 332–50. officer’s school. However, he was sent to the
“Letter from Lewis S. Feuer to Horace Russian front as a sergeant in 1943. In that year
Kallen, 23 March, 1959,” in the Horace his mother committed suicide – an event that
Kallen Papers, quoted courtesy of the haunted him in his later life. In 1944 he was
Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the promoted to lieutenant and was put in
American Jewish Archives, Hebrew command of a company of soldiers, and
Union College, Jewish Institute of received the Iron Cross for leadership in battle.
Religion, Cincinnati, Ohio. In January of 1945 he was shot in the spine by
“The Genetic Fallacy Re-examined,” in a machine gun and was paralyzed from the
Sidney Hook: Philosopher of Democracy waist down for the rest of his life, able to walk
and Humanism, ed. Paul W. Kurtz only with crutches. Because he periodically
(Buffalo, N.Y., 1983). suffered from intense pain, he took ever-
772
FEYERABEND
increasing amounts of painkillers. Decades later club meeting. They discussed the reality of the
many of his lectures were given under the influ- external world – a subject that fascinated and
ence of heavy doses of drugs. In his autobiog- occupied Feyerabend throughout his carrier.
raphy, he says that the events that happened to In the same year Feyerabend met Bertolt Brecht
him during and before the war always seemed and was offered the opportunity to become a
strange, distant, and difficult to recall. production assistant. He declined. Later, he
After the war, Feyerabend was able to secure described this as one of the greatest mistakes of
a fellowship (as he had never been a member of his life. In 1951 Feyerabend received his PhD in
the Nazi party) that he used to study theater philosophy at Vienna for a thesis on the theory
science and take singing lessons at the Weimar of basic statements. The thesis criticizes the
Music Academy. In 1946 he began studying neutral foundation observation reports sup-
history and sociology at the University of posedly play in supporting knowledge accord-
Vienna. He then transferred to mathematics, ing to logical positivism. He then applied and
physics, and astronomy, and eventually earned received a British Council scholarship to study
an MA in astronomy. He also attended phi- under Ludwig Wittgenstein at Cambridge.
losophy and theology lectures. His general Wittgenstein died before Feyerabend arrived, so
attitude was positivistic: the empirical sciences Feyerabend went to the London School of
were the basis of all knowledge, and non- Economics to study under Popper instead. In
empirical enterprises were either logic or 1953 Feyerabend declined Popper’s offer to
nonsense. As an active participant at both become his assistant, and instead returned to
academic and cultural events, he quickly earned Vienna, where he became Arthur Pap’s assis-
the reputation of being wherever interesting tant. In 1955 he began teaching philosophy as
things were going on. a lecturer at the University of Bristol. In 1958
In 1948, in what Feyerabend described in Feyerabend began as a guest professor at the
his autobiography as the most decisive step of University of California at Berkeley, and in
his life, he accepted an invitation to work for 1959 he accepted the offer of a permanent
the Austrian College Society. As a result he position. He also became a US citizen.
traveled for the first time to the Alpbach Forum Although he had a remarkable number of other
where he met Karl Popper (and his first wife visiting teaching positions over the course of his
Edeltrud). Popper was an immense influence on unusually dynamic career (for example at
his intellectual development. In light of the Auckland, Berlin, Brighton, Hamburg, Kassel,
Duhemian argument, appropriated by Popper, London, Yale, and Zurich), he remained a pro-
that general theories cannot be induced from fessor of philosophy at Berkeley until he retired
empirical laws because empirical laws logically in 1990. He then lived in Austria and
contradict general theories, Feyerabend fell for Switzerland during the remainder of his life.
Popper’s falsificationism: the scientific method Feyerabend’s intellectual development can
relies on deductive, not inductive, reasoning. be roughly divided into five phases. In the
Sometime in the mid to late 1960s Feyerabend 1950s he worked on Wittgenstein’s philoso-
began to become increasingly critical of Popper phy and made a name for himself primarily in
and his ideas, to the point where he even even- the philosophy of quantum mechanics. In the
tually published severe professional and some- 1960s he mainly argued against various aspects
times even personal criticisms of him. of logical empiricism. His most influential idea
In 1949 Feyerabend became the leader of a from this period is the incommensurability
student philosophy club called the “Kraft thesis, according to which successive scientific
Circle” after his PhD supervisor Viktor Kraft, theories have no logical relations. Because he
who had been a member of the Vienna Circle. often used ad hominem arguments, or
Feyerabend invited Ludwig Wittgenstein to a immanent criticisms, which temporarily adopt
773
FEYERABEND
the positions under attack in order to make developing alternatives to established points of
effective criticisms, his ideas have often been view. Accordingly, Feyerabend rejected both
misunderstood. In the 1970s Feyerabend began the logical empiricist and Popperian models of
to challenge the idea of universally valid theory testing according to which theories are
methodological rules, arguing for “epistemo- tested against neutral facts. Feyerabend argued
logical anarchism.” In 1976 Feyerabend began for a pluralistic test-model according to which
to endorse relativism and address cultural and theories compete against each other and the
political issues related to science. In this phase, facts as interpreted from some theoretical per-
in a reversal from his earlier views, Feyerabend spective.
began to challenge the assumption that scien- In a 1962 landmark essay, “Explanation,
tific knowledge and the culture it supports is Reduction and Empiricism,” Feyerabend intro-
superior to other forms of life. In the 1990s duced the term “incommensurability” which
Feyerabend retracted his relativist views and his would become the focal point of debates con-
work adopted a humanist tone. Throughout his cerning realism and rationality. The term
career, many of his main arguments were aimed incommensurability was intended to capture
at promoting pluralism in the pursuit of knowl- an idea that he had been developing for about
edge. a decade. The basic idea is that scientific
In the 1950s, in addition to Popper, advance is not a steady accumulation of more
Feyerabend was heavily influenced by Niels and more facts, or a steady improvement of
Bohr and David BOHM. His early work on existing theories. Instead, scientific advance
quantum mechanics, specifically on Bohr’s involves dramatic theoretical breaks in which
thesis of complementarity, helped to shape his older theories are replaced by new ones. Old
views on man’s relationship to the external “facts” are also reinterpreted according to the
world. Feyerabend developed a kind of neo- new theories. Feyerabend introduced the term
Kantian metaphysical view according to which “incommensurable concepts” in the context of
the world we experience is shaped by the criticizing Ernest NAGEL’s theory of reduction
theories that we use to interpret it. He argued and the HEMPEL-OPPENHEIM theory of expla-
that as science advances, we should correct nation. Feyerabend argued that in the course of
more our primitive ideas that are based on the major theoretical advances, the meanings of
misleading perspective of “common sense.” In the main descriptive terms change, and thus
particular, Feyerabend argued that the idea of consecutive scientific theories have no logical
an objective, independent reality should be relations. Exemplifying an often-repeated two-
given up as a metaphysical mistake. In discus- prong argumentative strategy, Feyerabend
sions with Bohm, Feyerabend discovered the argued that these theories of reduction and
case of Brownian motion, which he used to explanation fail as accurate descriptions of
illustrate his main argument for pluralism. actual scientific advance, and they are also
Feyerabend argued that an investigation of the undesirable as norms governing scientific
observational consequences of the phenome- practice because if enforced, they would stifle
nological theory of thermodynamics by itself progress.
could not have led to the discovery that Feyerabend met Thomas KUHN in Berkeley
Brownian motion refutes the second law of around 1960. The two worked together closely
thermodynamics. Direct measurements are in 1960 and 1961. Kuhn’s influential The
physically impossible. Instead, measurements Structure of Scientific Revolutions was also
based on an alternative theory, statistical ther- published in 1962, and it introduced the term
modynamics, were needed to prove the incommensurability (although with a
anomaly. More generally, he argued that some somewhat different emphasis). The two worked
facts exist which cannot be discovered without together to help transform the professional phi-
774
FEYERABEND
losophy of science from a discipline preoccu- ical rule, for example avoid ad hoc hypotheses,
pied with logic to what is now known as the there exist episodes in the history of science in
historical philosophy of science. which the rule was broken for the sake of
Many of Feyerabend’s views up until the progress. He tried to capture his ideas by devel-
1970s share a distinctive characteristic. His oping a position he called “epistemological
pragmatic theory of observation, contextual anarchism” which has been associated with
theory of meaning, and views on realism all the slogan “Anything goes.” For these reasons,
invert the standard empiricist creed. Instead of he has often been misinterpreted as arguing
a bottom-up model according to which we that science is entirely irrational, and has
begin with common-sense observations and become widely known as the “anything goes”
experience and then build up theoretical philosopher. However, “anything goes” was a
systems about them, Feyerabend argued for a sarcastic jibe at those keen to save the idea of
top-down view according to which our theo- universally binding methodological rules. If
retical ideas shape our observations, our there is such a universal rule in science, then it
concepts, and our interpretation of the nature is that “anything goes.”
of the world. Scientific theories do not merely Although Feyerabend tried to correct many
systematize our common-sense views, but also such misinterpretations of his ideas in a series
correct them. of sometimes scathing responses to reviews, he
Events of the late 1960s had several dramatic continues to be perceived as a champion of
effects on Feyerabend’s intellectual develop- postmodernist rejections of the notion of ratio-
ment. As increasing numbers of minorities nality. Against Method concludes with a brief
attended Berkeley, Feyerabend came to see his development of some political consequences of
assigned role as that of a cultural imperialist his main thesis. The book provoked extremely
teacher whose job it was to spread Western mixed reactions. By some it has been dismissed
rationality. Consequently, he began to question as a terrible book, while by others it is cele-
the supposed superiority of science over other brated as one of the best books ever written in
more traditional cultures, and he began to the philosophy of science. It was extensively
investigate the rise of rationality in ancient reworked and republished twice in English,
Greece. These two themes play out in his major and there are also several German editions,
publications in the 1970s and 80s. which differ significantly both from each other,
In 1975 Feyerabend published Against as well as from the three English editions.
Method. This book propelled his fame far Feyerabend called Against Method a “collage,”
outside of philosophy. The book was origi- more like a personal letter to his friend Imré
nally planned as half of a book, For and Lakatos than a proper book.
Against Method, co-authored by his best friend In 1976 Feyerabend first began explicitly to
Imré Lakatos. However, in 1974 Lakatos unex- endorse relativism. In 1978 he published
pectedly died. Feyerabend’s contribution was Science in a Free Society, which further
published by itself. The main thesis of the book develops the political consequences of his “epis-
(which was developed in a long essay published temological anarchism,” and contains several
already in 1970) challenges the traditional idea responses to reviews of Against Method. This
of the Scientific Method as a set of universally period marks a major transition in his philo-
binding methodological rules that delineate sophical outlook. In the first half of his career,
how to do science properly. Feyerabend argued Feyerabend always assumed the superiority of
that there are no such universal rules in science. the empirical sciences in producing knowledge.
Instead, methodological rules have only a But now he began to ask, “What’s so good
limited validity. He claimed that for any about science?” His publications take on an
possible candidate of a universal methodolog- increasing political character, leaving behind
775
FEYERABEND
the often more technical and abstract consid- philosophers, great scientists must appear to be
erations of his earlier career. In 1981 unscrupulous opportunists willing to disregard
Feyerabend published the first two volumes of the rules. This characterization fits Feyerabend
his collected papers. In addition to some new himself in many respects. For example, he never
material, almost all of the extensive praise and set out a single, coherent philosophical theory
acknowledgments to Popper in the original of his own, but instead practiced the pluralis-
versions were systematically removed. They tic approach that he preached. Furthermore, by
were mostly replaced with acknowledgments to drawing from his extensive reading, he broke
Pierre Duhem and John Stuart Mill. In 1984 with tradition and brought a wide range of
Feyerabend set out the view that in science, otherwise esoteric subjects, such as the history
like in art, there is no progress, only change. of witchcraft, voodoo, and the arts, to bear on
Feyerabend repeatedly reflected on the arts and issues in the philosophy of science.
their relation to science throughout his career. In 1989 Feyerabend married Grazia Borrini,
He even argued that the theater, and not essays, who was a great inspiration to him. After he
is the better medium to treat philosophical retired, Feyerabend attempted a last philo-
issues. Farewell to Reason (1987) collects many sophical book that he had promised Grazia to
of Feyerabend’s publications that appeared write. The Conquest of Abundance investigates
between 1981 and 1987 in which he repeatedly how we create an “objective” reality out of the
argues for relativism. richness of being. Although the book was never
As his career progressed, Feyerabend was finished, several reworked copies of the first few
increasingly critical of professional philosophy chapters were compiled and published posthu-
of science, especially its inclination toward mously together with a collection of pieces he
abstraction. In 1970 he published a paper wrote towards the end of his career. In these
entitled “Philosophy of Science: A Subject with latter works, Feyerabend retracted his views
a Great Past,” pointedly implying that it had no on relativism and cultural incommensurability
future. At a conference in 1972, Feyerabend arguing that “potentially every culture is all
delivered a paper entitled “Philosophy of cultures.” Instead of viewing cultures as closed
Science – A Thus Far Unknown Form of units which can only be evaluated on their own
Insanity?” which argued that professional phi- standards, Feyerabend argued that they can
losophy of science had completely lost touch benefit from interaction, and they can indeed be
with actual scientific practice. By the end of evaluated from an outside, humanitarian per-
the 1980s Feyerabend contemptuously asked, spective. Before he died in 1994, he finished his
“Who Needs the Philosophy of Science?” and autobiography, Killing Time, on his deathbed.
in the 1990s, in “Concerning an Appeal for This poignant tale of an extraordinary life has
Philosophy,” he publicly rejected a call for been an inspiration outside the bounds of
money for education in philosophy, arguing it academia.
would be better spent elsewhere. Feyerabend will be remembered as an influ-
Feyerabend demonstrated a remarkable ential critic of positivism and empiricism, and
ability to adapt to changing interests and atti- as a co-founder of the notion of incommensu-
tudes over half a century: the positivism of the rability. He will continue to be revered as
1950s, the historization of the philosophy of champion of pluralism, who reshaped widely
science beginning in the early 1960s, the radical held views on the scientific method, and who
student movements in Berkeley in the late argued that scientific progress needs to be pro-
1960s, the relativism boom in the late 1970s tected from dogmatism through the prolifera-
and 1980s, and his more compassionate, tion of a plurality of competing views. His chal-
humanitarian outlook in the 1990s. In Against lenges to the objectivity of science continue to
Method Feyerabend argued that to systematic be fertile as a founding force for the mounting
776
FEYERABEND
postmodernist movement in the philosophy of a bibliography of Feyerabend’s writings.

science and in the newer discipline of science
studies. Together with Popper, Kuhn, and Other Relevant Works
Lakatos, he was one of “The Big Four” Feyerabend’s papers are at the University of
philosophers of science of the second half of the Konstanz, Germany.
twentieth century. “An Attempt at a Realistic Interpretation of
Experience,” Proceedings of the
BIBLIOGRAPHY Aristotelian Society 58 (1958): 143–70.
“Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism,” “Complementarity,” Proceedings of the
in Scientific Explanation, Space and Time, Aristotelian Society Supplementary
ed. Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell Volume 32 (1958): 75–104.
(Minneapolis, 1962), pp. 28–97. “How to be a Good Empiricist: A Plea for
“Problems of Empiricism,” in Beyond the Tolerance in Matters Epistemological,” in
Edge of Certainty: Essays in Philosophy of Science. The Delaware
Contemporary Science and Philosophy, ed. Seminar Vol. 2, ed. B. Baumrin (New
R. G. Colodny (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., York, 1963), pp. 3–39.
1965), pp. 145–260. “Problems of Empiricism, Part II,” in The
“Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Nature and Function of Scientific Theories,
Theory of Knowledge,” in Analysis of ed. R. G. Colodny (Pittsburgh, 1970), pp.
Theories and Methods of Physics and 275–353.
Psychology, ed. M. Radner and S. “Philosophy of Science: A Subject with a
Winokur (Minneapolis, 1970), pp. Great Past,” in Historical and
17–130. Philosophical Perspectives of Science, ed.
Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic R. Stuewer (Minneapolis, 1970), pp.
Theory of Knowledge (London, 1975; 2nd 172–83.
edn 1988; 3rd edn 1993). “Die Wissenschaftstheorie – eine bisher
Science in a Free Society (London, 1978). unbekannte Form des Irrsinns?”
Realism, Rationalism and Scientific Method. (Philosophy of Science – A Thus Far
Philosophical Papers Volume 1 Unknown Form of Insanity) in Natur und
(Cambridge, UK, 1981). Geschichte. X. Kongress für Philosophie,
Problems of Empiricism: Philosophical ed. K. Hübner and A. Menne (Hamburg,
Papers Volume 2 (Cambridge, UK, 1981). 1973), pp. 88–124.
Farewell to Reason (London, 1987). “Progress and Reality in the Arts and in the
Three Dialogues on Knowledge (Oxford, Sciences,” in Progress in Science and Its
1991). Social Conditions, ed. T. Ganelius
Killing Time: The Autobiography of Paul (Oxford, 1986), pp. 223–33.
Feyerabend (Chicago, 1995). “Art as a Product of Nature as a Work of
Conquest of Abundance: A Tale of Art,” World Futures 40 (1994): 87–100.
Abstraction versus the Richness of Being, “Concerning an Appeal for Philosophy,” in
ed. Bert Terpstra (Chicago, 1999). Common Knowledge, ed. J. M. Perl
For and Against Method: Including Lakatos’s (Oxford, 1994), pp. 10–13.
Lectures on Scientific Method and the “Two Letters of Paul Feyerabend to Thomas
Lakatos–Feyerabend Correspondence, ed. S. Kuhn on a Draft of The Structure of
Matteo Motterlini (Chicago, 1999). Scientific Revolutions,” ed. P. Hoyningen-
Knowledge, Science and Relativism. Huene, Studies in History and Philosophy
Philosophical Papers Volume 3, ed. J. of Science 26 (1995): 353–87.
Preston (Cambridge, UK, 1999). Contains
777
FEYERABEND
Further Reading (Aldershot, UK, 1994).

Amer Nat Bio, Oxford Comp Phil, van Fraassen, Bas C. “Sola Experientia?
Routledge Encycl Phil Feyerabend’s Refutation of Classical
Achinstein, Peter. “On the Meaning of Empiricism,” Philosophy of Science
Scientific Terms,” Journal of Philosophy Supplement 64 (1997): 385–95.
61 (1964): 497–509. Zahar, E. “Feyerabend on Observation and
Andersson, Gunnar. Kritik und Empirical Content,” British Journal for the
Wissenschaftsgeschichte: Kuhns, Lakatos’ Philosophy of Science 33 (1982): 397–409.
und Feyerabends Kritik des kritischen
Rationalismus (Tübingen, Germany, Eric Oberheim
1988).
Couvalis, George. Feyerabend’s Critique of
Foundationalism (Aldershot, UK, 1989).
Farrell, Robert P. Feyerabend and Scientific
Values (Dordrecht, 2003).
Gellner, Ernest. “Beyond Truth and FINDLAY, John Niemeyer (1903–87)
Falsehood,” British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 26 (1975): 331–42. John N. Findlay was born on 25 November
Koertge, N. “For and Against Method,” 1903 in Pretoria, South Africa, to John Hudson
British Journal for the Philosophy of Lamb Findlay, an attorney, and Elizabeth Aletta
Science 23 (1972): 274–90. (Niemeyer) Findlay. He was educated at home
Lamb, D., G. Munévar, and J. Preston, eds. by a governess and at a primary school in
The Worst Enemy of Science? Essays in Pretoria, mastering Dutch, French, and German
Memory of Paul Feyerabend (New York, at a young age. By the age of seven, Findlay
2000). became a dedicated vegetarian out of a sense of
Laudan, Larry. “For Method; or, Against compassion for and identity with all living
Feyerabend,” in An Intimate Relation: things; this decision became fundamental to his
Studies in History and Philosophy of mature philosophical reflections. At age twelve
Science, ed. J. Brown et al. (Dordrecht, he began attending Boy’s High School in
1989), pp. 299–318. Pretoria, where he excelled in his studies,
Maia Neto, J. “Feyerabend on the Authority learning Latin and Greek and developing a love
of Science,” Studies in History and of literature, poetry and acting. In 1919, as he
Philosophy of Science 24 (1993): 687–94. began undergraduate studies at Transvaal
Munévar, G., ed. Beyond Reason: Essays on University College, he became fascinated with
the Philosophy of Paul Feyerabend the Theosophical Society’s blend of Oriental
(Dordrecht, 1991). religious beliefs, which developed into a serious
Oberheim, E., and P. Hoyningen-Huene. study of Hindu, Buddhist, and Neoplatonist
“Incommensurability, Realism and writings. Findlay earned a BA at Transvaal in
Metaincommensurability,” Theoria 12 1922 and an MA in 1924. He was awarded a
(1997): 447–65. Rhodes Scholarship and went to Balliol College,
———, “Feyerabend’s Early Philosophy,” Oxford, in the middle of 1924. At Balliol he
Studies in the History and Philosophy of earned another BA with first class honors in
Science 31 (2000): 363–75. Literae Humaniores (classics, ancient history,
Preston, John. Feyerabend: Philosophy, and philosophy) in 1926 and an MA in 1930.
Science and Society (Cambridge, UK, From there Findlay went to the University of
1997). Graz, where he earned a PhD in philosophy in
Sankey, H. The Incommensurability Thesis 1933.
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FINDLAY
Findlay had a long and distinguished love of Eastern thought, Neoplatonism, and
academic career. He was professor of philos- Hegel. He claimed that he was unimpressed by
ophy at the University of Otago in New “the last breathings of Oxford idealism,”
Zealand from 1933 to 1944. During those largely because he had already developed a
years, he befriended Karl Popper, “then a philosophical position of his own by the time
refugee teacher of philosophy,” and married he arrived at Balliol (“My Life,” 1985, p. 16).
Aileen May Davidson in 1941, with whom he During his doctoral studies in Germany, he
had a son and a daughter. Findlay taught at thoroughly immersed himself in the philoso-
Rhodes University in South Africa in 1945; phies of Meinong, Husserl, and Hegel. This
the University of Natal in South Africa from research led to the publication of his first book,
1946 to 1948; King’s College, University of Meinong’s Theory of Objects and Values
Durham in England from 1948 to 1951; and (1933). He met Ludwig Wittgenstein in
King’s College, University of London from February 1930, and reminisced “that his
1951 to 1966. Findlay then emigrated to the words, remote from philosophical cliché,
United States where he lived for the rest of his seemed to instill wisdom itself into the soul”
life. He was Clark Professor of Metaphysics at (“My Life,” 1985, p. 21). While on sabbatical
Yale University from 1967 to 1972, and leave in 1939, he was able to attend
University Professor of Philosophy at Boston Wittgenstein’s seminar on memory and to
University from 1972 to 1987. He also held spend more time in one-on-one conversation
numerous visiting appointments. He was a with him. Although Wittgenstein’s power over
visiting professor at Carleton College in his students and peers is well known, Findlay
Minnesota in 1961; the University of Texas at managed to maintain critical distance and, in
Austin from 1962 to 1963; the University of later years, commented on the “amateur intro-
Kyoto in 1964; and again at the University of spection … of Wittgenstein and Ryle” (“My
Texas at Austin from 1966 to 1967. Life,” 1985, p. 12).
Additionally, he was the Gifford Lecturer at Although much of Findlay’s early work was
the University of St. Andrews in Scotland shaped by Wittgensteinian assumptions, even
during 1964–6. Findlay died on 27 September then continental philosophers who were
1987 in Boston, Massachusetts. neglected in British universities influenced
Findlay’s intellectual development was Findlay’s thought. He eventually turned away
unusual for the time in which he lived and from Wittgenstein’s anti-metaphysical, lin-
provides ample evidence of the independence guistic approach, arguing that philosophical
of his mind. Under the influence of Hegel’s problems are more than linguistic confusions.
Logic, Bergson’s Creative Evolution, Under the influence of Plato and Hegel,
Neoplatonism, Hinduism, and Buddhism, Findlay believed that philosophical problems
Findlay developed a “philosophical cosmol- “are deep and irremovable difficulties which
ogy” during his college years that he never have their roots in the articulation of being,
abandoned. As he explained, “this is the view and not primarily in that of human language,
that this dirempted, vanishing, particularized and which point … to completions of reality
zone of sensuous being … is only the outer- and experience which go far beyond what we
most surface of a series of sectors leading from ordinarily perceive or conceive” (“My
the sensuous and particularized to a central Encounters with Wittgenstein,” 1985, pp.
point of absolute simplicity, where all things 68–9).
‘come together’ in unity and are contained, Although Findlay applauded Wittgenstein’s
not in separate existence, but in an eminent efforts to place strictures on what can be said
concentration of pure power” (“My Life,” meaningfully because of the framework within
1985, p. 10). Findlay also never abandoned his which discourse operates, he also believed
779
FINDLAY
Wittgenstein indicated that metaphysics has a scendental illusion to disappear, he argued, we

proper role. As he explains, “Wittgenstein had should not dismiss our life in the cave as
provided the germ of a true analysis of meta- meaningless.
physics as the search for a new notation that Findlay’s belief in this epistemological
would remove the cramps produced in distance between our minds and the thing-in-
ordinary diction and would satisfy a variety of itself was inspired by Brentano, Meinong, and
deep conceptual and linguistic needs. He inves- Husserl, all of whom emphasized intentional-
tigated the values which might lead meta- ity. Rather than a passive recipient of objects,
physicians to diverge from ordinary ways and consciousness modifies and shapes what it
which were not, on his view, at all pathologi- encounters, rearranging and redirecting expe-
cal or demanding therapy.” (p. 175) Findlay rience in the light of our specific goals. We are
sought a unifying, mystical vision that gives conscious of contents, but also conscious that
meaning to human existence. In Hegel: A Re- contents are real. Nonetheless, our intention-
examination (1958) he argued for significant ality shapes our understanding of reality and
commonalities between Wittgenstein and creates distance between our minds and the
Hegel, both of whom emphasize the social and thing-in-itself. Findlay’s acceptance of this
historical nature of language. Findlay also emphasis on intentionality led to what he
maintained that rather than a transcendent called speleology, the delineation of the cave
metaphysics, Hegel offers an innovative per- that is the human condition.
spective on everyday experience by way of a In his ethical writings, Findlay sought to
“dialectical study of Categories” according to articulate the basis of a positive moral phi-
which we see the world and according to the losophy focused upon axiology, and to foster
way the world essentially is. Findlay believed a well-rounded philosophical approach that is
this was the proper role of philosophy; it must neither dogmatic nor myopic. The ultimate
reorient everyday experience by articulating a goal of philosophy, for Findlay, was the inte-
speculative vision of the whole of reality that gration of metaphysics and ethics. The foun-
gives meaning to our lives. dation of Findlay’s moral philosophy lies in
In 1961 Findlay published Values and mystical, transcendental Platonism in which
Intentions in which he elaborated in great being and value are inseparable. It is this
detail the interrelatedness of the cosmos and Platonic inseparability of ontology from
human moral orders. Findlay believed that axiology that furnishes the ground for his
Kant’s thing-in-itself is the transcendental repudiation of radical skepticism and nihilism.
source of the relations among things as they Findlay believed that moral philosophy should
appear to the senses. This phenomenological not identify or enhance human anxiety and
insight should not lead us to disdain phe- guilt as existentialism had done. Rather, moral
nomenal knowledge as false or illusory, philosophy should point to the light of
Findlay maintained, but to truly discover how Platonic goodness that beams from beyond
things regularly appear to us. Findlay believed the cave of the human condition, to the benefit
that there must be an inner law of the mind of all people. The light of goodness, for
that translates its affections, according to the Findlay, is the source of human life and the
thing-in-itself, into instances of sensible qual- unity of all existence. Despite his reliance on
ities spatially and temporally arranged. transcendent Platonism, Findlay argues in The
Despite his conviction that we are epistemo- Discipline of the Cave (1966) and The
logically removed from the thing-in-itself, Transcendence of the Cave (1967) that it finds
making this world a “cave,” Findlay stressed its highest fulfillment in an immanent
the meaningfulness of the phenomenal world. Hegelian method and Husserlian phenome-
Although we cannot expect the Kantian tran- nology.
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FINDLAY
Findlay argues that philosophers should play understood only within a mystical vision of the
the role of speleologists, utilizing Husserl’s whole. The Hegelian absolute, the Platonic
phenomenological method to describe our life transcendent good, has value only if it is
within the cave. Husserl’s phenomenology is worked out in the contingent terms of practi-
limited, however, because it only describes cal philosophy, which involves the welfare of
things as they are presented to us and does the community as well as of the individual.
not provide us with a methodology that can Findlay confesses that, rather than being a
transform our cave life. By contrast, Hegel’s Hegelian, he is ultimately a Platonist. Findlay
dialectic not only shows how things are in the used Hegel’s immanent method only to estab-
cave, but also how they undergo perpetual lish the Platonic otherworldliness that Hegel
revisions and how we can flee from the cave to dissolved.
the world beyond it. The primary merit of Findlay was a noble lover of Socratic
Hegel’s dialectical thinking is that things are wisdom and an ecumenical philosopher of
seen as dynamic rather than static. Findlay religion, committed both intellectually and
argues that as we go through the perpetual, experientially to the transcendence of univer-
dialectical revision of things we perceive in the sal truth. He was a remarkably comprehensive
cave, we are led beyond it. Findlay argued that philosopher in an age of narrow specializa-
there is a dynamic spirit of goodness at work tion. Findlay studied major works throughout
in the world, and that there is also a timeless the history of Western and Eastern thought, as
pattern of goodness, the absolute, that is the well as contemporary Anglo-American and
source and origin of all things. He spoke of this continental thought, and perceptively injected
absolute as the Platonic good that illuminates insights he gleaned from them into contempo-
the world beyond the cave, but that also lends rary philosophical debates, writing with excep-
some illumination within the cave. He argued tional literary skill.
that knowledge of values is the highest knowl-
edge, so knowledge of the absolute, the unity BIBLIOGRAPHY
of all values, is the pinnacle of all knowledge Meinong’s Theory of Objects and Values
because it is comprehensive knowledge of the (London, 1933; 1963).
good. On Findlay’s reading, Hegel maintains Hegel: A Re-examination (New York, 1958).
that the contingencies of the cave should not be Values and Intentions: A Study in Value-
dismissed in favor of the absolute because they theory and Philosophy of Mind (London
are a necessary foil that propels us beyond the and New York, 1961).
cave. Although the absolute is that to which we Language, Mind and Value: Philosophical
ultimately look beyond the cave, without the Essays (London, 1963).
contingencies of the cave, the absolute would The Discipline of the Cave (London and
lose its meaning. Efforts to do away with the New York, 1966).
life of the cave will not lead us out of it, The Transcendence of the Cave (London,
because we must go through it. 1967).
Findlay’s speleology is at once both other- The Systematic Unity of Value (Lawrence,
worldly and this-worldly. But the otherworldly Kan., 1968).
realm in which the absolute resides can be Ascent to the Absolute: Metaphysical Papers
known only speculatively or mystically. He and Lectures (London, 1970).
argues that there can be no rationale for Axiological Ethics (London, 1970).
morality apart from mysticism. Morality Psyche and Cerebrum (Milwaukee, Wisc.,
without mysticism is inevitably one-sided 1972).
because the meaning of the dilemmas and Plato: The Written and Unwritten Doctrines
absurdities of practical, moral life can be (New York, 1974).
781
FINDLAY
Plato and Platonism: An Introduction (New Further Reading

York, 1978). Who Was Who in Amer v9, Who’s Who in
Kant and the Transcendental Object: A Phil
Hermeneutic Study (Oxford, 1981). Bockja, Kim. Morality as the End of
Wittgenstein: A Critique (London, 1984). Philosophy: The Teleological Dialectic of
the Good in the Moral Philosophy of J. N.
Other Relevant Works Findlay (Lanham, Md., 1999).
“Morality by Convention,” Mind 53 (1944): Cohen, Robert S., Richard M. Martin, and
142–69. Merold Westphal, eds. Studies in The
“Can God’s Existence be Disproved?” Mind Philosophy of J. N. Findlay (Albany, N.Y.,
57 (1948): 176–83. 1985). Contains Findlay’s autobiography,
“Recommendations Regarding the Language bibliography, and comments on the essays.
of Introspection,” Philosophy and Harris, Errol E. “John Niemeyer Findlay
Phenomenological Research 9 (1948): (1903–1987),” Owl of Minerva 19
212–36. (1988): 252–3.
“Probability Without Nonsense,” Macintyre, Alasdair. “John Niemeyer
Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1952): 218–39. Findlay,” Bulletin of the Hegel Society of
“The Justification of Attitudes,” Mind 63 Great Britain 16 (1987): 4–7.
(1954): 145–61. Marchetto, Michele. Impersonal Ethics:
“The Logic of Bewusstseinslagen,” John Niemeyer Findlay’s Value-theory
Philosophical Quarterly 5 (1955): 57–68. (Aldershot, UK, 1996).
“The Methodology of Normative Ethics,” Werkmeister, W. H. “Volition, Intention,
Journal of Philosophy 58 (1961): 757–64. and Values,” in Historical Spectrum of
“The Logic of Ultimates,” Journal of Value Theories, vol. 2: Anglo/American
Philosophy 64 (1967): 571–83. Group (Lincoln, Neb., 1973), pp.
“Hegel and the Philosophy of Physics,” in 198–225.
The Legacy of Hegel: Proceedings of the
Marquette Hegel Symposium, 1970, ed. J. Bockja Kim
J. O’Malley et al. (The Hague, 1970), pp.
72–89.
Trans., Logical Investigations, by Edmund
Husserl (London and New York, 1970).
“Thoughts on the Gnosis of St. John,”
Religious Studies 17 (1982): 441–50. FINE, Arthur Isadore (1937– )
“An Ontology of Senses,” Journal of
Philosophy 79 (1982): 545–51. Arthur Fine was born on 11 November 1937
“My Life,” in Studies in The Philosophy of in Lowell, Massachusetts. He left high school
J. N. Findlay, ed. Robert S. Cohen, after his junior year to take advantage of the
Richard M. Martin, and Merold Westphal early entrance program at the University of
(Albany, N.Y., 1985), pp. 1–51. Chicago where he studied physics, philoso-
“My Encounters with Wittgenstein,” in phy, and mathematics, graduating in 1958
Studies in The Philosophy of J. N. Findlay, with a BS degree in mathematics. He subse-
ed. Robert S. Cohen, Richard M. Martin, quently earned the MS degree in mathematics
and Merold Westphal (Albany, NY, from Illinois Institute of Technology in 1960
1985), pp. 52–69. with a thesis on generalized covering theorems,
results he later extended to a new equivalent to
the axiom of choice. His supervisor was Karl
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FINE
Menger, of Vienna Circle fame, who introduced as engaged with aspects of practical living, and
him to the mathematics and conceptual myster- suggests as a rule of thumb that good philos-
ies of the quantum theory. Fine returned to the ophy of science always connects with ongoing
University of Chicago for graduate study in phi- scientific practice. As generations of his
losophy, earning the PhD in 1963. He worked graduate students have learned, he rejects the
with Henry Mehlberg and Dudley Shapere in two cultures picture, with its neat division of
philosophy and Gregor Wentzel in physics, labor into humanistic versus scientific
writing a thesis on realism and the quantum inquiries. He also rejects the reductionism asso-
theory of measurement. During 1966–7 he was ciated with W. V. QUINE’s philosophy accord-
a postdoctoral fellow at the University of ing to which, when science has had its say,
Cambridge, supervised by Mary Hesse. there will be nothing left over for philosophy,
Fine was assistant professor of mathematics or at any rate nothing very important. In reject-
and philosophy at the University of Illinois at ing grand dualisms, Fine’s thinking is broadly
Chicago from 1961 to 1963, and assistant pragmatic.
professor of philosophy at the University of In the 1970s to early 1980s, Fine wrote a
Illinois at Urbana 1963 to 1965. In 1966–7 he series of papers on the foundations of physics,
was a National Science Foundation Fellow. concentrating mostly on conceptual problems
From 1967 to 1972 he was associate and full of the quantum theory. These include impor-
professor of philosophy at Cornell University. tant papers on the quantum measurement
In 1972 he returned to University of Illinois at problem, where he extended the theory of mea-
Chicago where he taught philosophy from surement to prove a general “no-go” theorem
1972 to 1982. He then became professor of (the “insolubility theorem”). He then turned to
philosophy at Northwestern University, and the use of probability in quantum theory and
from 1985 to 2001 he held the title of John to its connection with hidden variables, begin-
Evans Professor of Philosophy at ning an examination of the no-hidden-vari-
Northwestern. In 2001 he became professor of ables theorems of John Bell, Simon Kochen,
philosophy at the University of Washington. and Ernst Specker. Fine’s analysis uncovered a
Fine also held visiting appointments at several probability structure underlying these
universities including University of London, theorems whose modification allows for
Stanford, University of California at Los hidden variables (including his “prism
Angeles, and the University of Chicago. He models”). This analysis led him to examine
was President of the Philosophy of Science the locality conditions behind the Bell theorem,
Association during 1987–9, and President of and to disentangle plausible physical con-
the Central Division of the American straints involving local causality from more
Philosophical Association in 1997–8. arbitrary constraints employed in the proof. A
Early in his career Fine divided his research central issue here is the question of whether
between technical issues that arise concretely in outcomes that are physically independent need
scientific practice and general issues related to also be stochastically independent. Fine chal-
the traditional problems of philosophy and lenged that connection by introducing the
philosophy of science. These agendas were notion of random events that (nevertheless)
always connected since, from the beginning, he occur in harmony. These issues remain con-
has tried to show how important aspects of troversial. One issue, however, was settled by
science can profitably be seen as engaged with his work which demonstrated that the Bell
philosophy, and vice versa. He conceives of inequalities are both necessary and sufficient
science as a reflective enterprise that integrates for the existence of certain joint probabilities.
recognizably philosophical elements with tech- In tandem with this work in foundations,
nical ones. Conversely, he regards philosophy Fine also produced a series of articles respon-
783
FINE
sive to the issues concerning scientific change oped in the very next letter. These issues, and
raised by the work of Thomas KUHN and others, are discussed in Fine’s The Shaky Game
Stephen TOULMIN. He argued that “commen- (1992). Fine examines Einstein’s attitude
surability” was not attainable from the Saul toward the quantum theory and Einstein’s phi-
K RIPKE and Hilary P UTNAM treatment of losophy of science more generally. He argues
general terms without a background assump- that the realism espoused by Einstein was not
tion of scientific progress. But this is question- the sort of doctrine that philosophers would
begging, since the comparison of successive call by that name, but was rather of an essen-
theories was supposed itself to provide a tially motivational sort.
demonstration of scientific progress. Instead Fine’s integration of original historical
Fine argued for a local notion of reference, research with philosophical reflection was
one that is coarse-grained (or approximate in taken up by other philosophers of science and
a sense that he spelled out), contextual, and is now a standard part of the discipline. At the
good enough for certain purposes. This leads same time, he rejected the reigning realist
to a context-relative conception of referential orthodoxy in philosophy of science, not
stability that allows for theory comparison turning toward anti-realism but toward a
within limited domains. Fine’s crucial idea is deflationary stance he calls “the natural onto-
that of concepts from disparate discourses logical attitude” (NOA), and which he likes to
having context-relative extensions that locally describe in Zen-like language as “a third way.”
“overlap.” These are similar to the “shared He emphasizes that NOA is not a philosoph-
concepts” in Putnam’s later pluralism and to ical position, like realism or constructive
concepts negotiated in the “trading zones” empiricism, but rather an attitude one can take
described in the work of historian Peter toward ongoing scientific practice and its
Galison. results. Roughly, the idea is not to bring a pre-
In the 1980s and 90s Fine’s research took a formed philosophical agenda to understanding
historical turn. He began investigations into (or “interpreting”) science, but to approach
the later thought of Albert EINSTEIN, especially science and the significance of its results from
Einstein’s ideas concerning the quantum the perspective of a participant and in terms
theory. This occurred just as the Einstein that would arise naturally within that per-
papers were being collected for eventual pub- spective. Fine understands this as a way of
lication. Fine was among the first to read looking at science in its particularity, rather
through the unpublished correspondence. than imposing global interpretations. To the
Among his discoveries here was a remarkable frustration of some critics, Fine does not argue
correspondence between Einstein and Erwin for the adoption of NOA. He thinks any such
Schrödinger in the summer of 1935. argument would presuppose an essentialist
Stimulated by the publication in 1935 of the conception of science, which NOA itself
later famous paper by Einstein, Boris Podolsky, rejects. (The “natural” in NOA is not essen-
and Nathan Rosen (“EPR”), Einstein and tialist but, as Fine likes to quip, it is the
Schrödinger discussed their respective views California natural; no additives, please). In
on the quantum theory. Fine pointed out that support of NOA, Fine deploys two strategies.
early in the exchange Einstein noted that One promotes the legitimacy of inductive
Podolsky actually wrote the EPR paper and argument in philosophy, and then points to the
that Podolsky’s text obscured what Einstein history of failures of the grand-theory agenda
regarded as the central points. Later in the that philosophy inherited from neopositivism
correspondence Einstein produced an example (theories of explanation, confirmation, causal-
similar to the famous “cat paradox” of ity, reference, and even theories of theories).
Schrödinger, which Schrödinger then devel- The second way involves examining critically
784
FINE
the best-looking arguments brought in support even a deflationist one. Instead he regards truth
of NOA’s rivals to show why they are not as a semantic primitive in a way that aligns him
compelling. Fine suggests that the best way to with Donald DAVIDSON or, after they moved
appreciate the virtues of NOA, as for any away from idealized consensus pictures, with
attitude, is to try it out. Putnam and Richard RORTY.
Fine’s critical examination of support for Fine’s recent work continues on NOA-
realism begins with an examination of the related themes with a study of objectivity.
explanationist defense, inherited from the J. C. Distinguishing what is objective from what is
C. Smart and Hilary Putnam claim that unless real (or true), in his hands objectivity is trust-
realism is correct, science’s ability to produce making, not real-making, and becomes “that
good explanations would be miraculous. Fine in the process of inquiry which makes for trust
points out that a central disagreement between in the outcome of inquiry.” This pragmatic
realism and anti-realism concerns whether conception allows objectivity to apply as well
good explanations need to be true. Anti-realists to the study of the mind and human affairs as
challenge the legitimacy of an inference to the it does to the natural sciences. He has also
truth of the best explanation, and therefore to taken a critical look at social constructivism
infer realism as the best explanation for the and at relativism, where he winnows out a
success of science would simply beg the positive agenda related to NOA. In the con-
question against anti-realism. Further, he notes structivist case the diachronic perspective of the
that if there actually were a good realist expla- participant (the scientist as agent) provides
nation for why science is successful (assuming connections to NOA and in the case of rela-
it is), it would be based on a realist conception tivism he focuses on its anti-foundationalism.
according to which science tells us the truth Fine also finds NOA-like themes in the free will
about an external world. But Fine argues that debate, where he argues that if determinism is
any such explanation could be trumped by an incompatible with free will then so is indeter-
instrumentalist who replaces the correspon- minism; and in the nature–nurture contro-
dence notion of truth with the pragmatic versy, where NOA suggests a perspective on
notion of general reliability. Thus if there were causal modeling that undermines the
a good argument for realism, along these lines, dichotomy between nature and nurture.
there would be an equally good (perhaps Notable among his recent work in philosophy
better) instrumentalist argument. The converse of physics is a proposal for solving the
is also true. Indeed Fine claims a metatheorem quantum measurement problem. His proposal
according to which any argument drawn from introduces “selective interactions” that become
scientific practice that appears to support one available in a pragmatic approach to the inter-
side in the realism/instrumentalism debate can action formalism. He has also carried out
be converted to one that appears to support the investigations into Bohmian mechanics
other side as well. He concludes that the (showing it open to pluralism and not just a
realism–anti-realism issue is a pseudo-question, simple realism), quantum separability (he
in something like the sense that Rudolf CARNAP shows it to be compatible with entanglement),
and Otto Neurath suggested, and that we and the emergence of classicality via decoher-
should move beyond it. ence. Fine’s work continues to range over the
One of the most interesting aspects of NOA, formal sciences, the natural sciences, and the
and one that distinguishes it from similar post- human sciences where, to adapt a famous
positivist and postmodern proposals, is its remark of William JAMES, it leaves the trail of
insistence that truth-talk is not eliminable. a philosopher over all.
While Fine takes a deflationary attitude toward
truth, he rejects any general account of truth,
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FINE
BIBLIOGRAPHY “Measurement and Quantum Silence,” in

“Consistency, Derivability, and Scientific Correspondence, Invariance and
Change,” Journal of Philosophy 64 Heuristics, ed. Steven French and
(1967): 231–40. Harmke Kamminga (Dordrecht, 1993),
“On the General Quantum Theory of pp. 279–94.
Measurement,” Proceedings of the “The Viewpoint of No-one in Particular,”
Cambridge Philosophical Society 65 Proceedings and Addresses of the
(1969): 111–22. American Philosophical Association 72
“Insolubility of the Quantum Measurement (1998): 9–20.
Problem,” Physical Review D 2 (1970): “The Scientific Image Twenty Years Later,”
2783–7. Philosophical Studies 106 (2001):
“On the Completeness of Quantum 107–22.
Theory,” Synthese 29 (1974): 257–89.
“How to Compare Theories: Reference and Other Relevant Works
Change,” Noûs 9 (1975): 17–32. “Explaining the Behavior of Entities,”
“Interpreting Science,” in Proceedings of Philosophical Review 75 (1966):
the 1988 Biennial Meeting of the 496–509.
Philosophy of Science Association, vol. 2 “Covering Theorems and the Axiom of
(East Lansing, Mich., 1988), pp. 3–14. Choice,” Proceedings of the American
“Correlations and Physical Locality,” in Mathematical Society 19 (1968): 787–8.
Proceedings of the 1988 Biennial Meeting “Some Conceptual Problems of Quantum
of the Philosophy of Science Association, Theory,” in Paradoxes and Paradigms:
vol. 2 (East Lansing, Mich., 1988), pp. The Philosophical Challenge of the
535–56. Quantum Domain, ed. R. G. Colodny
“Hidden Variables, Joint Probability and (Pittsburgh, 1972), pp. 3–31.
the Bell Inequalities,” Physical Review “Do Correlations Need to be Explained?”
Letters 48 (1982): 291–5. in Philosophical Consequences of
“Joint Distributions, Quantum Correlations Quantum Theory, ed. James Cushing and
and Commuting Observables,” Journal of Ernan McMullin (Notre Dame, Ind.,
Mathematical Physics 23 (1982): 1989), pp. 175–94.
1306–10. “Piecemeal Realism,” Philosophical Studies
The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism and 61 (1991): 79–96.
The Quantum Theory (Chicago, 1986; “Indeterminism and the Freedom of the
2nd edn 1996). Will,” in Philosophical Problems of the
“Unnatural Attitudes: Realist and Internal and External Worlds: Essays on
Instrumentalist Attachments to Science,” the Philosophy of Adolf Grünbaum, ed.
Mind 95 (1986): 149–79. John Earman et al. (Pittsburgh, 1993),
“With Complacency or Concern: Solving pp. 551–72.
the Quantum Measurement Problem,” in “Bohr’s Response to EPR,” with Mara
Kelvin’s Baltimore Lectures and Modern Beller, in Niels Bohr and Contemporary
Theoretical Physics: Historical and Philosophy, ed. J. Faye and H. Folse
Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Robert (Dordrecht, 1993), pp. 1–31.
Kargon and Peter Achinstein (Cambridge, Ed. with James Cushing and Sheldon
Mass., 1987), pp. 491–506. Goldstein, Bohmian Mechanics and
“Causes of Variation: Disentangling Nature Quantum Theory: An Appraisal
and Nurture,” Midwest Studies in (Dordrecht, 1996).
Philosophy 15 (1990): 94–113. “Quantum Life: Interaction, Entanglement,
786
FINGARETTE
and Separation,” with Eric Winsberg, in the United States Army, earning the rank of
Journal of Philosophy 100 (2003): 80–97. lieutenant and working in the Pentagon for the
Army General Staff in the Information-
Further Reading Education group. Early in 1945, and still in
Pres Addr of APA v10 the Army, he married Leslie Swabacker.
Blackburn, Simon. “Realism: Deconstructing Fingarette returned to UCLA in 1946, com-
the Debate,” Ratio 15 (2002): 111–33. pleting his BA in 1947 and PhD in 1949 in
Ehrlich, Phillip, and Roger Jones, eds. The philosophy. His daughter, Ann Fingarette
Natural Ontological Attitude Refined Hasse, was born in 1947 and trained as a
(Oxford, 2005). lawyer, later co-authoring with her father
Kukla, André. Studies in Scientific Realism Mental Disabilities and Criminal Responsibility
(Oxford, 1998). (1979). Fingarette began teaching at the
Muller, Thomas, and Tomasz Placek. University of California at Santa Barbara in
“Against a Minimalist Reading of Bell’s 1948, where he remained until his retirement in
Theorem: Lessons from Fine,” Synthese 1990. Among many other honors he was the
128 (2001): 343–79. first American philosopher to be Romanell–Phi
Rorty, Richard. “A Pragmatist View of Beta Kappa Professor of Philosophy; a William
Contemporary Analytic Philosophy,” in James Lecturer in Religion at Harvard
The Pragmatic Turn in Philosophy: University; and a Lewis Law Scholar at
Contemporary Engagements Between Washington and Lee University. In 1976–7 he
Analytic and Continental Thought, ed. served as President of the Pacific Division of the
William Egginton and Mike Sandbothe American Philosophical Association.
(Albany, N.Y., 2004). Fingarette’s work is centrally concerned with
Saurez, M. “Quantum Selections, the notion of responsibility. He thinks respon-
Propensities and the Problem of sibility “a root constitutive element of our idea
Measurement,” British Journal for the of humanity and what it is to be a person”
Philosophy of Science 55 (2004): 219–55. (1967, p. 14). Rejecting emotivist and analytic
Szabó, L. E. “On Fine’s Resolution of the fashions of mid-twentieth-century moral phi-
EPR-Bell Problem,” Foundations of losophy, Fingarette found an interest in psy-
Physics 30 (2000): 1891–1909. choanalytic theory and the idea that self-knowl-
Van Fraassen, Bas C. “Constructive edge could transform a life – an interest which
Empiricism Now,” Philosophical Studies led to existentialist literature and the ideas of
106 (2001): 151–70. karma and enlightenment in Eastern philoso-
phy. Psychoanalytic theory holds that “the
Philip Ehrlich patient must accept responsibility for traits and
actions of his which are the inevitable results of
events over which he had no control and of
actions which he did not consciously control”
(1963, p. 163). This concern with responsibil-
ity is iterated throughout Fingarette’s work.
FINGARETTE, Herbert (1921– ) According to his original account, self-decep-
tion results from a person’s failure to spell out
Herbert Fingarette was born on 20 January “some features of his engagements in the
1921 in Brooklyn, New York. While still in world” (2000, p. 46), a failure for which the
high school his family moved to Los Angeles person is responsible. In Confucius: The Secular
where he entered the University of California at as Sacred (1972) he recounts the Confucian
Los Angeles. He left before graduating to serve idea that accepting responsibility imposed by
787
FINGARETTE
engagement in a culture’s practices promotes Bockover, Mary, ed. Rules, Rituals and
power to create deep meaning. Such accep- Responsibility: Essays Dedicated to
tance Confucius describes as “holy ritual” and Herbert Fingarette (Chicago, 1991).
“sacred ceremony.” Fingarette finds that
Confucian concerns with acceptance and com- Richard Liebendorfer
mitment tread common ground with themes in
the work of John Austin and Ludwig
Wittgenstein. His books The Meaning of
Criminal Insanity (1972) and Mental
Disabilities and Criminal Responsibility explore
legal and moral complexities with attributions FIRTH, Roderick (1917–87)
of responsibility to the insane and mentally
disabled. One such mental disability is alco- Roderick Firth was born on 30 January 1917
holism. In Heavy Drinking (1988) Fingarette in Orange, New Jersey. He attended Haverford
argues that heavy drinkers must accept respon- College and earned his BA in 1938. He then
sibility for their addiction and that this may completed his PhD in philosophy at Harvard in
require reconstruction of their way of life. 1943. Firth’s dissertation, written under C. I.
Themes in Death: Philosophical Soundings LEWIS, was titled “Sense-Data and the Principle
(1996) both extend and depart from of Reduction.” From his growing Quaker con-
Fingarette’s earlier work, wherein he provides, victions he asked for conscientious objector
along with thoughts on death by Tolstoy, status; he was eventually classified as unable to
Hume and Freud, an original meditation on the serve in the US Army because of a heart
meaning of life and death. He claims that murmur. Firth was instructor of psychology
acceptance of the multiplicity of meanings is a and philosophy at the College of William and
“wonderfully distinctive feature of human Mary from 1943 to 1945 (the college resisted
nature” (1996, p. 87). calls for dismissing Firth due to religious con-
victions against war), and then was a professor
BIBLIOGRAPHY of philosophy at Swarthmore College from
The Self in Transformation (New York, 1945 to 1953. He joined the philosophy faculty
1963). at Harvard in 1953, where he was professor of
On Responsibility (New York, 1967). philosophy until his death. He was awarded a
Self-deception (London, 1969; rev. edn Guggenheim Fellowship in 1952–3; an
Berkeley, Cal., 2000). American Council of Learned Societies
Confucius: The Secular as Sacred (New York, Fellowship in 1959–60; and two fellowships at
1972). the Center for Advanced Studies in the
The Meaning of Criminal Insanity (Berkeley, Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University in
Cal., 1972). 1964–5 and 1967–8. He was President of the
Mental Disabilities and Criminal Eastern Division of the American Philosophical
Responsibility, with Ann Fingarette Hasse Association in 1980–81. Firth died on 22
(Berkeley, Cal., 1979). December 1987 in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Heavy Drinking (Berkeley, Cal., 1988). Firth made a variety of contributions to phi-
Death: Philosophical Soundings (Chicago, losophy, mostly in epistemology but also in
1996). ethics. Some of his work in both these fields
Mapping Responsibility (Chicago, 2004). anticipates later developments. Without
question, Firth’s most significant contribution
Further Reading lies with his subtle and complex defense of
Pres Addr of APA v8 “phenomenalism” and epistemic foundation-
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FIRTH
alism against various objections, a defense knowledge and perception, and sought, in one
which often featured innovative and complex way or another, to make perception more
responses to pressing objections. Although both “direct” than traditional epistemological views
phenomenalism and foundationalism eventu- had made it seem. Doing away with sense data
ally fell out of favor with the majority of epis- was one alternative and the phenomenalism
temologists and philosophers of mind in the was thought to be vulnerable precisely because
years following his presentation of these posi- it seemed to give a false picture of experience.
tions, Firth’s articulation and defense of the Besides these tasks, the philosophers and psy-
positions retains some interest. chologists who were constructing new theories
Although Firth’s defense can be found in of perception also faced the problem of dealing
many of his papers, his most extended exposi- with the many arguments for sense data, such
tion of phenomenalism comes from his 1949 as the argument from illusion, in terms that
Mind articles on “Sense Data and the Percept did not end up positing something very much
Theory.” In those articles, Firth responds to like sense data.
many of the traditional objections to sense data, Firth believed that even though the criticisms
such as the objection that a sense datum epis- directed at the implied phenomenology of the
temology involves a false phenomenology. One phenomenalist position were significant, it was
of the most important objections was that the not clear how the newer theories of perception
phenomenalist view of experience implies that – like that of the Gestalt psychologists and the
experiences, constituted as they are on the phe- phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and
nomenalist view by the occurrence of sets of William JAMES – represented any real episte-
sense data, are only indirectly related to mological advance over the kinds of epistemo-
whatever it is those sense data can be said to logical facts that sense data theories were
represent. But experience itself seems to be of designed to address. Indeed, given Firth’s own
objects; the sense data themselves seem to be view that a sense data epistemology was more
invisible or transparent, in a sense. The phe- or less the basic epistemology of traditional
nomenalist description of experience appears to philosophy, the failure of the newer theories of
obscure this and also appears unable to explain perception to provide adequate responses to
why experience ought to be this way. the kinds of arguments that motivated talk of
Firth’s own exposition of the objections sense data in the first place rendered their use-
against phenomenalism and his detailed dis- fulness for philosophical purposes question-
cussion of how to formulate the phenomenal- able. Once these theories were adjusted so as to
ist position are particularly noteworthy, dis- accommodate the phenomena that originally
tinguishing different ways in which phrases like motivated sense data epistemologies, Firth
“directly perceive” and “direct awareness” are thought that their proponents would arrive at
used and with what implications. Indeed, the more or less the same place as sense data
article is as notable for its detailed exposition of theories.
the objection as well as its defense of the phe- In another important paper, “Radical
nomenalist position. Empiricism and Perceptual Relativity” (1950),
Although these criticisms had been around a Firth takes up an argument of Roderick
while, they had, when Firth was writing, been CHISHOLM directed against C. I. Lewis’s version
revived by a group of philosophers and psy- of phenomenalism. Lewis had argued that, on
chologists who were developing new theories of the phenomenalist position, statements about
perception and exploring their epistemic con- physical objects entail certain complex condi-
sequences. Most of these theories sought to do tional statements about sense data. The
away with sense data as unnecessary go- antecedent of such a conditional would be
betweens between the mind and the objects of given using the vocabulary of physical objects
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FIRTH
and the consequent would be a description of appeared to differ. Chisholm’s view was that
experience in sense data terms. Chisholm notes epistemic terms and phrases like “adequate
that one could conjoin to any such physical evidence” and “reasonable belief” are to be
object statement in the antecedent of such a analyzed in terms of an ethical notion of wor-
conditional another statement about physical thiness to believe. Thus, to say that I have
objects that would entail the falsity of the adequate evidence for some proposition p is
alleged entailed statement about sense data equivalent to saying that p is more worthy of
without contradiction. my belief than not-p.
Firth’s response to Chisholm involves a dis- Firth described a number of subtle ambigu-
cussion of how a phenomenalist ought to deal ities between ethical and epistemic terms that
with the meaning and pragmatics of condi- make Chisholm’s claims more compelling than
tionals like the ones that Lewis deployed, they perhaps should appear. In addition, Firth
arguing, in effect, that given the complexity of observes that identifying epistemic and ethical
the relation between sets of experiences and terms would render explanations of the sort “p
physical object statements and how physical is more worthy of my belief that not-p because
object statements are vastly outnumbered by my evidence for p is adequate” as vacuous,
statements about experiences, the least mis- given Chisholm’s analysis of the phrase
leading that could be said by the phenomenal- “adequate evidence”. For Firth this did not
ist in the situation Chisholm describes would be mean that there was no relationship at all
that the kinds of conditionals the arguments between the notions of justification as they
attacks are false. Given the complexity of the figure in ethical and epistemic contexts. In some
relation between descriptions of experience in of his later papers, Firth explored how ethical
terms and sense data and descriptions of and epistemic notions are related, describing the
physical objects, the phenomenalist position different sorts of merits that a belief could have,
actually predicts how our intuitions about such as whether a false belief could have instru-
certain conditionals ought to fall, together with mental value in motivating beneficial actions
certain views about the pragmatics and and the acquisition of true beliefs and so on.
meanings of physical object statements. Firth also wrote a well-known defense of the
Firth’s defense of phenomenalism made Ideal Observer theory of the meaning of ethical
several crucial distinctions that were picked up statements. The point of these theories was to
by other writers. Most importantly, Firth give an analysis of the meaning of ethical state-
argued that phenomenalist claims need not be ments in terms of the reactions of either certain
voiced as replacing material object statements real or imagined creatures. Thus, one might
with statements about sense data. Rather, the analyze the meaning of a statement like “action
phenomenalist could make his claims using the x is good” in terms of how God might react to
vocabulary of “looks as if.” One thus need not it. The Ideal Observer theory of the meaning of
try to replace claims about material objects ethical statements proceeds by analyzing state-
using only terms denoting sense data in order ments like x is P – where P is an ethical predi-
to state the phenomenalist view. cate – as meaning something like “Any Ideal
Besides his work in epistemology, Firth also Observer would react to x in such and such a
made important contributions to debates about way under such and such conditions.” This
the relationship between epistemic and ethical analysis needs, among other things, to spell out
notions of justification and the extent to which what the relevant characteristics of an ideal
they overlap. For example, in response to observer are. Firth gives the following list: he
Chisholm’s view that ethical and epistemic must be omniscient with respect to the non-
notions of justification are the same, Firth moral facts, have unlimited powers of imagi-
pointed out several ways in which they native projection, be disinterested, dispassion-
790
FIRTH
ate, and consistent, and be otherwise, a 53 (1956): 732–8.

“normal person.” One objection is that it is not “Chisholm and the Ethics of Belief,”
clear how any creature meeting a majority of Philosophical Review 68 (1959): 493–506.
these criteria could be a “normal person,” and “Austin and the Argument from Illusion,”
hence it is not clear what relation their judg- Philosophical Review 73 (1964): 372–82.
ments would have to the moral judgments of “Coherence, Certainty and Epistemic
human beings or even whether they would be Priority,” Journal of Philosophy 61 (1964):
moral agents at all. Firth’s position was thus 545–56.
criticized as being too divorced from anything “The Anatomy of Certainty,” Philosophical
resembling a human being. In particular, it is Review 76 (1967): 3–27.
hard to see what the relevant relations are “The Men Themselves: Or the Role of
between such a disinterested observer and Causation in Our Concept of Seeing,” in
human agents with their large and often Intentionality, Minds, and Perception: A
complex set of interests, a complaint made by, Symposium, ed. Hector-Neri Castañeda
among others, Richard BRANDT. (Detroit, 1967), pp. 357–82.
Firth’s importance to contemporary “Lewis on the Given,” in The Philosophy of
American philosophy lies largely with his for- C.I. Lewis, ed. P.A. Schilpp (La Salle, Ill.,
mulation and defense of phenomenalism, a 1968).
position that can be traced back to George “On Being in the Mind,” Philosophic
Berkeley’s views and which played a signifi- Exchange 1 (Summer 1971): 45–50.
cant role in twentieth-century American phi- “Sense Experience,” in Handbook of
losophy through the influence of such philoso- Perception, ed. E. C. Carterette and M. P.
phers as C. I. Lewis. Although many aspects of Friedman (New York, 1974), vol. 1, chap.
phenomenalism and foundationalism have been 1.
abandoned in contemporary discussions, the “Are Epistemic Concepts Reducible to
tools that Firth used to formulate and defend Ethical Concepts,” in Values and Morals:
the position retain interest for contemporary Essays in Honor of William Frankena,
discussion. Many of his other papers, particu- Charles Stevenson, and Richard Brandt,
larly those concerning the relations between ed. Alvin Goldman and Jaegwon Kim
ethics and epistemology, contain valuable dis- (Dordrecht, 1978).
cussions that anticipate later developments in “Epistemic Merit, Intrinsic and
epistemology, such as virtue epistemology. Instrumental,” Proceedings and Addresses
of the American Philosophical Association
BIBLIOGRAPHY 55 (September 1981): 5–23.
“Sense Data and the Percept Theory,” Mind “A Reply to Lectures by Wilfrid Sellars,” The
58 (1949): 434–65; 59 (1950): 35–56. Monist 64 (1981): 91–101.
“Radical Empiricism and Perceptual Radical Empiricism: Essays and Lectures, ed.
Relativity,” Philosophical Review 59 John Troyer (Lanham, Md., 1999).
(1950): 164–83, 319–31. Contains almost all of Firth’s publications
“Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer,’ and some other writings.
Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 12 (1952): 317–45. Further Reading
“Reply to Professor Brandt’s ‘The Definition Amer Nat Bio, Pres Addr of APA v9, Who
of an “Ideal Observer” Theory in Ethics’,” Was Who in Amer v9
Philosophy and Phenomenological Heil, John. “Reliability and Epistemic
Research 15 (1955): 414–21. Merit,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy
“Ultimate Evidence,” Journal of Philosophy 62 (1984): 327–38.
791
FIRTH
“Roderick Firth: His Life and Work,” professorships, including two years at Texas
Philosophy and Phenomenological Tech University, Fisch collaborated with
Research 51 (1991): 109–47. Contains Edward Moore in establishing the Peirce
essays by John Rawls, Roderick Chisholm, Edition Project at Indiana University–Purdue
Robert Shope, Richard Brandt, Hilary University in Indianapolis in 1975. He served
Putnam, and a bibliography of Firth’s pub- the Peirce Project for another sixteen years, for
lications. most of that time as General Editor.
Sellars, Wilfrid. “Givenness and Explanatory Fisch traveled abroad for research and
Coherence,” Journal of Philosophy 70 teaching in Italy (1939, 1950–51), India (1958),
(1973): 612–24. and Japan (1958–9), with support of Fulbright
Taliaferro, Charles. “Relativising the Ideal fellowships and the State Department. He rep-
Observer Theory,” Philosophy and resented the University of Illinois at the first
Phenomenological Research 49 (1988): meeting of the International Association of
123–38. Universities in 1950 and served on its admin-
istrative board until 1955. He was President of
Daniel Blair the Western Division of the American
Philosophical Association in 1955–6, and he
chaired the executive board of the APA from
1956 to 1958.
Fisch considered his greatest service to phi-
losophy to be his introduction to the English-
FISCH, Max Harold (1900–1995) speaking world of the great eighteenth-century
Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico, through
Max H. Fisch was born on 21 December 1900 his translations with Thomas Bergin of Vico’s
in Elma, Washington, and died on 6 January Autobiography and New Science, which
1995 in Los Angeles, California. A leading his- included lengthy and masterful introductions
torian of philosophy and science, he studied by Fisch. For this work he was accorded knight-
Greek and Latin in high school in San hood by the government of Italy in 1976. Vico’s
Francisco, and earned a BA in philosophy at great insight was that philosophy had origi-
Butler College in 1924 and a PhD in philoso- nated as an internalization of the discussions
phy at Cornell University in 1930. In 1928 he and debates in the marketplaces, public assem-
married Ruth Bales, who became his invaluable blies, and law courts of ancient Greece. Fisch’s
collaborator in his scholarly researches until interest in Vico was an outgrowth of his
her death in 1974. He taught philosophy at doctoral work on the influence of Stoicism on
Western Reserve College from 1928 to 1943, Roman law, which he published as “Alexander
when he became curator of the Rare Books and the Stoics” in 1937.
Collection of the US Army Medical Library, Fisch’s teaching of American philosophy led
where he produced a book and articles on the to his first textbook in 1939. He became much
history of medicine in the Renaissance. Fisch better known for the influential essay in which
joined the philosophy department of the he described the “classic period” of American
University of Illinois at Urbana in 1946, serving philosophy: his introduction to Classic
until his age-mandated retirement in 1969. American Philosophers (1951), which was a
There he directed the graduate theses of dozens standard textbook in the field for several
of students in the fields of social philosophy, decades. Fisch identified the two most central
American philosophy, and ancient philosophy; problems of American philosophy as the nature
many of his students have achieved scholarly of human community and the nature of science,
distinction. After several visiting distinguished and he offered a brilliant exposition of the
792
FISCH
American approach to their solution (see also ception of truth as the long-run consensus of
1986). the community of inquirers. Fisch interpreted
Fisch is most renowned for his scholarship on Peirce’s pragmatism as the lesson in logic taught
one of the “classic” American philosophers, by Darwin’s work, and he also described it as
Charles S. PEIRCE. His work intensified in 1959 Peirce’s recipe for making our ideas scientifi-
when the Harvard philosophy department cally testable. His explanations of Peirce’s later
invited him to write an intellectual biography of arguments for pragmatism are particularly illu-
Peirce. Fisch soon realized that the 60,000 minating. The single most characteristic trait of
pages of Peirce’s manuscripts, if arranged Peirce’s thought, Fisch eventually concluded,
chronologically, would present the opportu- was his lifelong reliance on a general theory of
nity for an understanding of the development signs as its framework. The process of sign
of the most original and most versatile intellect interpretation was for Peirce irreducibly social,
that the Americas have so far produced. The triadic, and continuous (1986, p. 279). All of
preparations for and production of a new Fisch’s essays emphasized the need for the full
chronological and more comprehensive edition context of Peirce’s work as mathematician, sci-
of Peirce’s writings accompanied the bio- entist, and historian of science, in order to
graphical work, much of which he published as understand the development of his philosophy.
introductions to the first three volumes of the Fisch has also made important but somewhat
Writings of Charles S. Peirce (1982–6). Other neglected contributions to social philosophy.
important results of Fisch’s developmental Reflecting the influence of his mentor Elijah
approach were published in more than two JORDAN and also John DEWEY, Fisch proposed
dozen other essays, most reprinted in Peirce, that institutions, rather than abstractions, as A.
Semeiotic, and Pragmatism (1986). N. WHITEHEAD had said, are the proper objects
Fisch brought to his study of Peirce the same of critical evaluation for philosophers. Fisch
methods and perspectives he had used in his intended this definition of philosophy to include
other studies – emphasis on historical context all the work that was currently considered phi-
and chronology, meticulous attention to detail, losophy, but he wished to broaden the horizon
extensive use of unpublished sources, and of the profession, in order to establish closer
tracing intellectual development and multiple connections with the social sciences, and he
connections with other thinkers and the proposed concrete measures for doing so. Fisch
broader sweep of human civilization. He predicted that if professional philosophers were
argued that Peirce followed the logical princi- unwilling or unable to supply the value theories
ple of first adopting nominalism and then needed by the social sciences, others would
accepting a realistic position only when com- step in to do so (1956). In the autobiographi-
pelled to do so by the inadequacy of nominal- cal dialogue “The Philosophy of History” (in
ism. Peirce advanced step by step from his Tursman 1970), Fisch explored the nature of
initial nominalism toward a complete realism, historical objectivity, finding its basis in the
accepting real possibility and eventually real network of institutions and practices which
continuity. Fisch concluded that Peirce stopped allow fellow inquirers to verify or correct one
short of complete realism, and he planned an another’s work.
essay entitled “Peirce’s Lifelong Nominalism” One of Fisch’s most remarkable theses was
(1986, p. 355n47). Fisch showed the probable that Aristotle never conceived of any science or
influence of Epicurus’s “swerve” of atoms on discipline of ethics. Aristotle himself consid-
Peirce’s introduction of absolute chance to ered his writings now called “ethics” to be part
explain the origin of laws of nature in habit- of politics or political science, better translated
taking. He emphasized that Peirce’s experi- as “poliscraft,” by analogy with “statecraft.”
ences as a working scientist influenced his con- Poliscraft focused solely on the politically inde-
793
FISCH
pendent city-state as the necessary condition for “The Poliscraft,” in Philosophy and the
human flourishing, and encompassed all of the Civilizing Arts: Essays Presented to
institutions and practices of the polis. To Herbert Schneider, ed. J. P. Anton and C.
extract an “ethics” from the writings of Plato Walton (Athens, Ohio, 1974).
and Aristotle is to attempt to understand “Croce and Vico,” in Thought, Action and
human goodness without due consideration Intuition, ed. L. M. Palmer and H. S.
for the institutional means of its realization, Harris (Hildesheim and New York, 1975),
and this is bound to fail. Fisch defended this pp. 184–233.
claim and broached some of its far-reaching “What has Vico to Say to Philosophers of
implications in “The Poliscraft” (1974) and in Today?” Social Research 43 (1976):
unpublished papers. 399–409.
Fisch’s scholarship was remarkable for its Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism: Essays by
combination of breadth of vision with depth of Max H. Fisch, ed. Kenneth Ketner and
historical detail, of sympathetic understanding Christian Kloesel (Bloomington, Ind.,
and clear analysis with critical acumen based on 1986). Includes a biographical sketch and
his strong commitment to social values. bibliography of Fisch’s publications.

“Alexander and the Stoics,” American Fisch’s papers are at the University of Illinois
Journal of Philology 58 (1937): 59–82, at Urbana-Champaign, and the Peirce
129–51. Edition Project at Indiana
“Vico on Roman Law,” in Essays in Political University–Purdue University at
Theory Presented to George H. Sabine, ed. Indianapolis.
Milton Konvitz and Arthur Murphy Ed. with P. R. Anderson, Philosophy in
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1948), pp. 62–88. America: From the Puritans to James (New
“The Academy of the Investigators,” in York, 1939).
Science, Medicine, and History: Essays on Trans. with Thomas Bergin, The
the Evolution of Scientific Thought and Autobiography of Giambattista Vico, with
Medical Practice Written in Honour of introduction (pp. 1–107) by Fisch (Ithaca,
Charles Singer, ed. E. A. Underwood N.Y., 1944; rev. edn 1963).
(Oxford, 1953), vol. 1, pp. 521–63. Trans. with Thomas Bergin, The New
“The Critic of Institutions,” Proceedings and Science of Giambattista Vico (Ithaca, N.Y.,
Addresses of the American Philosophical 1948; rev. edn 1961).
Association 29 (1956): 42–56. Ed., Classic American Philosophers (New
“The Idea of Institution in the Major York, 1951; 2nd edn 1966; 3rd edn 1996).
Religions,” Proceedings of the IXth Ed., Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A
International Congress for the History of Chronological Edition, vols 1–3
Religions (Tokyo, 1960), pp. 513–18. (Bloomington, Ind., 1982–6).
“Was There a Metaphysical Club in
Cambridge?” in Studies in the Philosophy Further Reading
of Charles Sanders Peirce, Second Series, Pres Addr of APA v6, Who Was Who in
ed. Edward C. Moore and Richard S. Amer v12, Who’s Who in Phil
Robin (Amherst, Mass., 1964), pp. 3–32. Madden, Edward H. “Max H. Fisch:
“Dewey’s Critical and Historical Studies,” in Rigorous Humanist,” Transactions of the
Guide to the Works of John Dewey, ed. Jo Charles S. Peirce Society 22 (1986):
Ann Boydston (Carbondale, Ill., 1970), pp. 375–96.
306–38. Roberts, Don D. “The Well-Tempered Critic
794
FISKE
of Institutions,” Transactions of the sophisticated. These insights, and Fiske’s

Charles S. Peirce Society 22 (1986): application of evolution to the study of lin-
397–415. guistics, history, religion, and philosophy
Tursman, Richard, ed. Studies in Philosophy was stimulated by his accidental discovery in
and in the History of Science: Essays in a Boston bookstore of the writings of
Honor of Max Fisch (Lawrence, Kan., Herbert Spencer. He became an enthusiastic
1970). adherent to the Spencerian conception of
evolution as a means of explaining all the
William Davenport multifarious phenomena of the natural,
social, spiritual, and intellectual phenomena
and developments of the universe.
Fiske entered Harvard Law School, and
was awarded his LL.B. degree in 1865. In
Boston, he passed the Suffolk bar examina-
FISKE, John (1842–1901) tion and very briefly established himself as an
attorney. Before long, however, his intellec-
Edmund Fisk Green was born on 30 March tual interests predominated and he turned
1842 in Hartford, Connecticut. At his grand- to philosophy and theology, making his
mother’s request, he changed his name to career as an educator, lecturer, and writer.
John Fiske in 1855 after his mother remar- His interests in philosophy were exhibited
ried. He died on 4 July 1901 in East while still a student, and when caught
Gloucester, Massachusetts, where he had reading a volume of the work of Auguste
gone to escape the heat and humidity of the Comte during services in the Harvard
Cambridge summer. He was an historian, Chapel, he was subjected to disciplinary
philosopher, and popularizer of science, action by the Harvard faculty. He became an
delivering lectures on history and on enthusiastic adherent of Comte’s positivism,
Darwinism to large audiences of laymen. His finding in it a rational, scientific, and sys-
fame led to the naming of Mt. Fiske, a tematic conception of the universe. His
13,500-foot mountain in California, by T. S. earliest efforts were aimed at a reconciliation
Solomons in 1895. of the science of his era, including especially
Fiske attended Harvard College, enrolling the theory of evolution, with the tenets of the
in 1860 as a sophomore, and graduating Congregationalist theology, which he prac-
with his BA in 1863. At first planning to ticed. Having little success in achieving that
work in philology, he studied the basics of goal, he came to reject Christianity.
twelve languages, but soon turned to history Fiske was an early adherent of Darwinism,
and philosophy, reading in these subjects on and deeply influenced in particular by
his own while taking classes. His study of Spencer’s philosophical generalization of
languages bore fruition in his publication of Darwin’s theory of evolution. His first
“The Evolution of Language,” in the North writings on Spencer’s adaptation of Darwin’s
American Review. Fiske argued that the clas- theory of evolution date from 1860, making
sificatory scheme which philologists had con- him one of the earliest American defenders of
structed on the family relationships of the Darwin with Chauncey WRIGHT. In consid-
world’s languages as known in the nineteenth ering the philosophical and theological impli-
century also indicated the gradual evolution cations of natural science, Fiske declared
of those languages, from the more primitive, himself to be an “infidel,” by which he meant
such as Chinese, to the Indo-European lan- a non-Christian. Literary historian Van Wyck
guages, as more civilized, complex, and Brooks went so far as to say of Fiske that
795
FISKE
“Evolution was for him a new religion” evolution. His most important philosophical
(Brooks and Bettmann 1956, p. 157). work, Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, was
Because of his reputation as an agnostic or based upon his Harvard lectures, delivered
atheist, Fiske was denied an academic chair at from 1869 to 1871. In the Outlines, the
Harvard, although he served on the Harvard posthumously published 1902 edition of
faculty and in various other capacities. From which included an “Introduction” by Josiah
1869 to 1871 he served as university lecturer ROYCE, Fiske expressed the opinion that in
on philosophy at Harvard, and in 1870 he time Spencer’s law of evolution would come
was appointed instructor in history. In to be recognized as having greater impor-
1869–70, at the invitation of Charles William tance even than Newton’s theory of gravity,
Eliot, Harvard’s new President, Fiske deliv- arguing that Spencer’s law was of ultimately
ered a series of lectures at Harvard on greater import because it was the “first gen-
Comte’s positivism. In 1872 he became assis- eralization concerning the concrete universe
tant librarian, and served in that capacity at as a whole.” Like Spencer, Fiske sought to
the Harvard library until 1879, when he apply the theory of evolution to all spheres,
resigned his position. While working at the not merely to the biological, but to every
library, he continued his research and writing; aspect of the universe and existence. Science,
much of his writing in these years consisted of Fiske held, had been little more than a dis-
rewriting his earlier works, and his Harvard connected collection of facts and rules, devoid
lectures, to eliminate the Comtian positivism of a coherent and unifying system of govern-
and replace it with Spencerian evolutionism. ing truths. Spencer’s positivism, based upon
In 1873 Fiske traveled in England for a the doctrine of evolution, had, finally,
year, conversing about evolution and his own provided a conception of the unity of nature
philosophy of evolutionism with Spencer, with causality as its unifying principle and a
Charles Darwin, geologist Charles Lyell, and web of causation binding together all of these
biologist Thomas Henry Huxley. It was on facts.
the basis of the revisions of his previous Fiske argued that the human brain contin-
works, in which positivism was replaced by ued to evolve long after the human body
evolutionism, and from the criticisms and reached its finished state of growth, and that
comments of these men, that Fiske’s Outlines that was the reason why a considerably more
of Cosmic Philosophy Based on the Doctrine prolonged infancy was required for humans
of Evolution, with Criticisms on the Positive than for other species. These evolutionary
Philosophy (1874) emerged. In 1879 he was views on the significance of the prolonged
elected to a six-year term on Harvard’s Board dependency of humans were expressed in the
of Overseers, and was reelected to a second posthumously published The Meaning of
six-year term in 1885. He was also strongly Infancy (1909). He held that the human brain
influenced by Charles PEIRCE and pragma- would continue to evolve and that, therefore,
tism. Fiske was among those added to the human progress would continue.
Harvard faculty by Eliot upon his appoint- Besides lecturing on Darwinism at
ment as President in 1869 with the goal, as Harvard, Fiske lectured on positivism. He
described in “A History of Harvard College,” was noted for his ability to simplify and make
to “transform the relatively small provincial readily comprehensible the most complex,
College into a modern university.” obscure, and abstruse ideas, yet doing so
Fiske was an enthusiastic advocate of without sacrificing the intellectual substance
Darwin’s theory of biological evolution and of the theories he was discussing, which were
especially of Spencer’s philosophical applica- presented in a methodical, orderly train of
tions and development of a general theory of thought. In his popular lectures on science
796
FISKE
across the country, he was noted for his ebul- political and religious culture were combined
lient, entertaining style. It was said of him in this manner through a study of history
that he was a “master-performer” and that was found in The Beginnings of New
his popular lectures on science, labeled the England, or, The Puritan Theocracy in Its
“Fiske season,” “rivaled the feats of Barnum” Relation to Civil and Religious Liberty
(Brooks and Bettmann 1956, p. 157). (1889). His many books on American history
Fiske was a close friend of both Chauncey dealt primarily with the colonial, revolution-
Wright and Charles Peirce, and in Darwinism ary, early republic, and Civil War periods.
and Other Essays (1879), he showed himself Fiske’s approach throughout was that of the
to be a pragmatist. This work included an intellectual and cultural historian, in search of
appreciation of Wright (1879, pp. 78–109). the leading ideas and ideals that provided the
Along with Peirce, Wright, Francis motivation, justification, or expression of
Ellingwood ABBOT, and several others, Fiske political evolution. Intellectual and cultural
was a member of the “Metaphysical Club” history led him to study the lives of such
that met at various Cambridge homes for leaders as George Washington, seeking
philosophical discussions during the early and through political biography to examine the
mid 1870s. It was at the Metaphysical Club leading ideas of the men and the times. He
that Peirce first formulated his conception of also wrote a biography of chemist, publisher
pragmatism (Wiener 1949). Although cor- and popular science writer Edward L.
roboration of Peirce’s assertion is scant, the Youmans (1894).
group was important in establishing The best example of Fiske’s approach to
Darwinism in American intellectual life, and history through its leading ideas and ideals is
as both a crucial component of pragmatism found in his essays on the history of science
and a crucial influence on its development. and of those men who contributed to the
Fiske’s interests also included history and development of science. This can be seen in A
philosophy of history. Beginning in 1881 Century of Science (1899), in which Fiske
Fiske lectured annually on American history discussed the developments of the nineteenth
at Washington University in St. Louis, and century. It also appears in Essays, Historical
beginning in 1884 he was professor of and Literary (1902), which, in addition to
American history at Washington University containing his musings on history, philosophy
for several years, visiting for two months each of history, and historiography in the essay
year while living in Cambridge the rest of the “Old and New Ways of Treating History,”
year. He also lectured at many other univer- includes essays on “John Milton,” “Herbert
sities and gave popular lectures in history Spencer’s Service to Religion,” and
across the country, and was renowned in his “Evolution in the Present Age.”
day for his delivery. He sought to understand In the essays collected in Excursions of an
political history against the backdrop of intel- Evolutionist (1883) and The Miscellaneous
lectual history, and saw the evolution of ideas Writings (1902), Fiske applied evolutionary
as driving factors in the evolution of political theory and his pragmatic conception of religion
culture: for example, in American Political to social and anthropological themes, including
Ideas Viewed from the Standpoint of mythology, psychology, and linguistics, exam-
Universal History (1885) and Civil ining social evolution, religion, and the nature,
Government in the United States Considered origin, and growth of language. In his histori-
with Some Reference to Its Origins (1890). cal writings, Fiske undertook to demonstrate
The best of his works combined political and that American civilization was the most devel-
intellectual history with the theme of evolu- oped, arguing that, while English historians of
tion connecting them. An example in which the era pointed to the British institution of
797
FISKE
parliamentary government as evidence that Fiske can best be described as a philosopher

the Anglo-Saxon was the most evolutionar- of history and of human existence who
ily advanced of civilizations, America had exploited the Spencerian conception of evolu-
gone even beyond Britain in developing its tion, applied well beyond the biological sphere,
democracy. to seek the purpose of human existence.
For Fiske, the interest in political and intel-
lectual history was an outgrowth of his interest BIBLIOGRAPHY
in, and an effort to understand, human devel- Myths and Mythmakers: Old Tales and
opment and civilization in evolutionary terms. Superstitions Interpreted by Comparative
In The Unseen World and Other Essays Mythology (Boston, 1872).
(1876), The Destiny of Man, Viewed in the Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy Based on
Light of His Origin (1884), in Through the Doctrine of Evolution, with
Nature to God (1899), and in Life Everlasting Criticisms on the Positive Philosophy, 2
(1901), he sought for the religious or spiri- vols (Boston and London, 1874).
tual meaning of human existence, as eluci- The Unseen World and Other Essays
dated and unfolded in the biological world as (Boston, 1876; 2nd edn 1902).
driven by evolution. The concern in these Darwinism and Other Essays (New York,
works is spiritual values, such as the immor- 1879; 2nd edn 1885).
tality of man and, especially, The Destiny of The Destiny of Man, Viewed in the Light of
Man and Life Everlasting. This theme is also His Origin (Boston, 1884).
treated in Through Nature to God, which Excursions of an Evolutionist (Boston,
treats the themes of good and evil, the nature 1883).
and significance of love and self-sacrifice, and Darwinism and Other Essays (New York,
the reality of religion, in an effort to under- 1879; 2nd edn 1885).
stand which universal truths and values American Political Ideas Viewed from the
religion presents. In The Idea of God as Standpoint of Universal History (New
Affected by Modern Knowledge (1886), Fiske York, 1885).
examines the conception of God and attempts The Idea of God as Affected by Modern
to preserve from a rationalistic and scientific Knowledge (Boston, 1886).
perspective the spiritual substance of religios- The Critical Period of American History,
ity and its values, thus developing a rational 1783–1789 (Boston, 1888).
theology that would justify and preserve the The Beginnings of New England, or, The
human value and ethical core of religion while Puritan Theocracy in Its Relation to Civil
defending Darwinian evolution. and Religious Liberty (Boston, 1889).
Psychologist and philosopher G. Stanley Civil Government in the United States,
HALL, who became acquainted with Charles Considered with Some Reference to Its
Peirce when both were on the faculty of the Origins (Boston, 1890; 2nd edn 1898;
Johns Hopkins University, wrote in his auto- 3rd edn 1902).
biography that “Charles Peirce had been for The American Revolution, 2 vols (Boston
years at the Hopkins occupying a tentative and New York, 1891).
position, one of the ablest and most original The Discovery of America, with Some
philosophic minds this country has ever Account of Ancient America and the
produced, and I think at one time an intimate Spanish Conquest (Cambridge, Mass.,
friend of Chauncey Wright (1830–1875) and 1892). 2nd edn, The Discovery and
John Fiske, two of the most brilliant men in the Colonization of North America (Boston,
Harvard circle though not on the faculty.” 1905).
(Hall 1923, p. 226) A Century of Science, and Other Essays
798
FITCH
(Boston, 1899). Brooks, Van Wyck, and Otto L. Bettmann.

Through Nature to God (Boston, 1899). Our Literary Heritage: A Pictorial
The Dutch and Quaker Colonies in History of the Writer in America (New
America (Boston, 1900; 2nd edn 1903). York, 1956).
The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War Davis, Andrew M. John Fiske (Boston,
(Boston, 1900). 1902).
Life Everlasting (Boston, 1901). Hall, G. Stanley. Life and Confessions of a
Colonization of the New World, ed. John Psychologist (New York and London,
Henry Wright (Philadelphia and New 1923).
York, 1902). Pannill, H. Burnell. The Religious Faith of
Essays, Historical and Literary (New York, John Fiske (Durham, N.C., 1957).
1902). Perry, Thomas S. John Fiske (Boston,
New France and New England (Boston, 1906).
1902). Powell, Lawrence Clark. John Fiske:
Bookman (New York, 1941).
Other Relevant Work Roberts, Jon H. Darwinism and the Divine
Fiske’s papers are at Huntington Library in in America (Notre Dame, Ind., 2001).
San Marion, California, the Library of Saum, Lewis O. “John Fiske and the West,”
Congress, and Harvard University. Huntington Library Quarterly 48 (1985):
Ed. with James Grant Wilson, Appleton’s 47–58.
Cyclopaedia of American Biography, 6 Saunders, Jennings B. “John Fiske,” in The
vols (New York, 1886–9). Marcus W. Jernegan Essays in American
Edward Livingston Youmans, Interpreter Historioghraphy, ed. William Hutchinson
of Science for the People, A Sketch of His (Chicago, 1937), pp. 144–70.
Life with Selections from His Published Wiener, Philip P. Evolution and the
Writings (New York, 1894). Founders of Pragmatism (Cambridge,
The Historical Writings of John Fiske, 12 Mass., 1949).
vols (Boston, 1902). Winston, George P. John Fiske (New York,
The Miscellaneous Writings of John Fiske, 1972).
with Many Portraits of Illustrious
Philosophers, Scientists, and Other Men Irving H. Anellis
of Note, 12 vols (Boston, 1902).
The Meaning of Infancy (Boston, 1909).
The Life and Letters of John Fiske, 2 vols,
ed. Joseph Spencer Clark (Boston and
New York, 1917).
The Letters of John Fiske, ed. Ethel Fisk FITCH, Frederic Brenton (1908–87)
(New York, 1940).
Frederic B. Fitch was born on 9 September
Further Reading 1908 in Greenwich, Connecticut. He
Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, attended Yale University, from which he
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer earned his BA in 1931 and his PhD in phi-
Thought, Dict Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer losophy in 1934. From 1934 to 1937 he did
Bio v3, Who Was Who in Amer v1 postdoctoral study on a fellowship and a
Berman, Milton. John Fiske: The Evolution research assistantship at the University of
of a Popularizer (Cambridge, Mass., Virginia. He returned to Yale in 1937 to join
1961). the philosophy faculty, where he taught for
799
FITCH
the rest of his career. He was an active paradox similar in structure to the Russell
member of the Association for Symbolic paradox (and which we know as the Curry
Logic, serving as its Vice President from 1956 paradox), which is, after all, derivable in the
to 1959 and President from 1959 to 1962. Curry–Hindley–Seldin system of combina-
From 1974 until his retirement in 1977, he tory logic. This accounts for Fitch’s interest in
held Yale’s title of Sterling Professor of issues of the properties of logical systems, in
Philosophy. Fitch died on 18 September 1987 particular such properties as consistency.
in New Haven, Connecticut. In his work on modal logic, Fitch pioneered
Fitch worked primarily in combinatory the use of tree proofs, the analytic tableaux of
logic, authoring an undergraduate-level Raymond M. SMULLYAN. Smullyan’s doctoral
textbook on the subject (1974), but he also student Melvin Chris Fitting in his paper
made significant contributions to intuitionism “Tableau Methods of Proof for Modal
and modal logic. He was interested in the Logics” (1972) borrowed Saul KRIPKE’s work
problem of the consistency, completeness, in two 1963 papers that present a semantic
categoricity, and constructivity of logical model-theoretic approach to modal logics, as
theories, especially of nonclassical logics, and adapted by Fitch in his 1966 abstract on
contributed to the foundations of mathemat- “Tree Proofs in Modal Logic,” and applied it
ics and to inductive probability. He dealt with to Smullyan trees. Fitting’s 1983 book Proof
the theory of reference in “The Problem of the Methods for Modal and Intuitionistic Logics
Morning Star and the Evening Star” (1949). is a textbook for applying semantic tableaux
Fitch was an early advocate of combinatory to modal and intuitionistic logic. Fitch also
logic, developed in America by Haskell contributed to deontic logic.
CURRY, Robert Feys, Dana SCOTT, J. Roger Fitch continued through the years to
Hindley, and Jonathan P. Seldin. question the consistency of the calculus of
Combinatory logic is constructed as an exten- the second edition of Bertrand Russell and A.
sion of the concept of the Sheffer stroke to N. WHITEHEAD’s Principia Mathematica (in
first-order functional calculus. In 1924 Moses 1974), just as, at the outset of his career, he
Schönfinkel presented a universal connective defended that of the ramified Principia system
U of mutual exclusivity which reduces all without the Axiom of Reducibility, but with
functions to single-valued functions and treats the Axioms of Infinity, Extensionality, and
the values of these functions as truth-values. Choice, of the first edition (in 1938). Fitch’s
Thus, for a binary relation F(x, y), we con- textbook Symbolic Logic (1952) uses a
struct the single-valued function fX(y); and variant of the popular natural deduction tech-
for classes F and G of this system, we rewrite nique; in common with the natural deduc-
UFG as (UF)G, which is to be translated as “F tive system used by W. V. QUINE and others,
and G are mutually exclusive (classes).” it was a deductive zero-order system, based
Moreover, we define the usual logical con- upon rules of substitution and without any
nectives of propositional calculus in terms of rules specifying axioms. Proofs are begun
U, and eliminate the variables of first-order, with assumptions and the consequences of
and even higher-order, functional calculi, by these assumptions are obtained by discharg-
adjoining the constancy function C, defined ing the assumptions by conditionalization.
as (Cx)y, and the fusion function S, defined as In 1969 Fitch and Robert Feys prepared a
((Sx)y)z) = (xz)(y, z), and identity. We thus dictionary of symbols of mathematical logic,
obtain a string of concatenated terms, given in an effort to standardize notation, but they
by J, where S = JJ, C = JS, and U = JC. The did not provide a history of the notation in
problem of the consistency of combinatory their dictionary. Later, Fitch joined with other
logic arises because of the appearance of a logicians of the Yale University philosophy
800
FITCH
department, including in particular Allan (1963): 135–42.

Ross ANDERSON, Ruth Barcan MARCUS, and “Universal Metalanguages for Philosophy,”
Richard Milton M ARTIN , to produce the Review of Metaphysics 17 (1964):
Logical Enterprise (1975), which describes a 396–402.
full range of logical systems and philosophi- “Tree Proofs in Modal Logic,” Journal of
cal applications of logic. Symbolic Logic 31 (1966): 152.
One of Fitch’s few direct contributions to “Natural Deduction Rules for Obligation,”
epistemology concerns the debate between American Philosophical Quarterly 3
verificationism and realism. Verificationism (1966): 1–12.
holds that all truths are knowable, but in a “A Theory of Logical Essences,” The
1963 article Fitch offered a proof that from Monist 5 (1967): 104–9.
the proposition that all truths are knowable “A Complete and Consistent Modal Set
it can be concluded that all truths are known. Theory,” Journal of Symbolic Logic 32
Unless it is possible that some truths are both (1967): 93–103.
known and not known, his proof would be a “A Revision of Hohfeld’s Theory of Legal
reason to reject verificationism since we obvi- Concepts,” Logique et Analyse 10
ously do not know all truths. The validity (1967): 269–76.
and implications of his “paradox of knowa- “Natural Deduction Rules for English,”
bility” continue to be a matter of debate in Philosophical Studies 2 (1973): 89–104.
epistemology. Elements of Combinatory Logic (New
Fitch also contributed to philosophy of Haven, Conn., 1974).
logic and language, working in natural deduc- “Combinatory Logic and Negative
tion and formulating rules of inference using Numbers,” in Logical Enterprise, with
natural deduction for natural languages, for Allan Ross Anderson et al. (New Haven,
example in “Universal Metalanguages for Conn., 1975), pp. 265–77.
Philosophy” (1964 ) and “Natural Deduction “Toward Proving the Consistency of
Rules for English” (1973). Among his unpub- Principia Mathematica,” in Bertrand
lished manuscripts are “A Correlation Russell’s Philosophy, ed. George
Between Modal Reduction and Properties of Nakhnikian (London, 1974), pp. 19–27.
Relations” and “The Relation Between
Natural Languages and Formal Languages,” Other Relevant Works
which are in his papers at Yale University. Fitch’s papers are at Yale University.
Ed. with Robert Feys, Dictionary of
BIBLIOGRAPHY Symbols of Mathematical Logic
“The Consistency of the Ramified (Amsterdam, 1969).
Principia,” Journal of Symbolic Logic 3
(1938): 140–49. Further Reading
“The Problem of the Morning Star and the Proc of APA v61, Who’s Who in Phil
Evening Star,” Philosophy of Science 6 Beall, J. C. “Fitch’s Proof, Verificationism,
(1949): 137–41. and the Knower Paradox,” Australian
Symbolic Logic: An Introduction (New Journal of Philosophy 78 (2000): 241–7.
York, 1952). Berry, George D. W. “On Quine’s Axioms
“Definition of Negation in Extended Basic of Quantification,” Journal of Symbolic
Logic,” Journal of Symbolic Logic 19 Logic 6 (1941): 23–7.
(1954): 29–36. Curry, Haskell B. “Grundlagen der
“A Logical Analysis of Some Value Kombinatorischen Logik,” American
Concepts,” Journal of Symbolic Logic 28 Journal of Mathematics 52 (1930):
801
FITCH
509–36, 789–834. (1911–12). In 1915 he joined the philosophy

Curry, Haskell B., and Robert Feys. department at Princeton University, where he
Combinatory Logic (Amsterdam, 1958). was a colleague of Charles HENDEL, Jr. He held
Fitting, Melvin C. “Tableau Methods of the chair of Stuart Professor of Ethics from
Proof for Modal Logics,” Notre Dame 1917 until his retirement in 1935. He was
Journal of Formal Logic 13 (1972): President of the American Philosophical
237–47. Association Eastern Division in 1934–5. Fite
Kripke, Saul A. “Semantical Analysis of died on 23 June 1955 in Philadelphia,
Modal Logic I, Normal Modal Propo- Pennsylvania.
sitional Calculi,” Zeitschrift für mathe- From his earliest writings Fite espoused a
matische Logik und die Grundlagen der strong form of individualism in his basic
Mathematik 9 (1963): 67–96. approach to philosophy and life. This became
———, “Semantical Considerations on a recurrent theme which he developed in his
Modal Logic,” Acta Philosophica Individualism (1911) and in Moral Philosophy:
Fennica 16 (1963): 83–94. The Critical View of Life (1925). He used the
Quine, W. V. Mathematical Logic (New term “morality” to cover all that is important
York, 1940). in human character and personality. He
Schönfinkel, Moses. “Über die Bausteine claimed each of us stands for something than
der mathematischen Logik,” ed. Heinrich which nothing can be assumed by him to be
Behmann, Mathematische Annalen 94 better. That something, that most important
(1924): 305–16. thing in life, is the true meaning of morality.
Siemans, David F., Jr. “Fitch-style Rules for The examination of your own life – the
Many Modal Logics,” Notre Dame examined life – is not only necessary for indi-
Journal of Formal Logic 18 (1977): viduality and morality, it is also, according to
631–6. Fite, sufficient.
Fite distinguishes two broad classes of ethical
Irving H. Anellis theories: absolutistic or authoritarian, and
humanistic or libertarian, in which morality is
derived from human nature and human choice.
He describes his own view as humanistic. This
view does not ground ethics or the moral life on
some external law or principle of rightness or
FITE, Warner (1867–1955) duty, but rather insists that any genuine ethics
or moral life can only be grounded in the
Warner Fite was born 5 March 1867 in critical thinking of the individual who lives by
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He graduated with and stands by that life. Fite does not see how
a BA from Haverford College in 1889 and any moral philosophy can be both moral and
received his PhD in philosophy from the also a matter of obedience or obligation. Here,
University of Pennsylvania in 1894. He taught he insists, we are faced with an antinomy or
at Williams College where he also served as paradox which defines the orthodox view of
Dean of the faculty during 1895–7. He was an morality, as well as the longstanding view of
instructor at the University of Chicago from Kantian morality. To break this antinomy or
1897 to 1901, and then did postgraduate study conflict, we do not have to vacate morality,
in philosophy at the universities of Berlin and we only have to reject the view that morality is
Munich for two years. Fite was an instructor at externally imposed and thereby adopt the view
the University of Texas (1903–1906), Indiana of individualism: that morality is individually
University (1906–1908), and Harvard developed by each person doing his or her own
802
FLETCHER
critical thinking or reflection. University (New York, 1959).

Warner Fite was a personal friend of the
Spanish philosopher Miguel de Unamuno, Guy W. Stroh
whose novel Mist he translated in 1928. In his
last published work Jesus, The Man (1946),
Fite characterizes Jesus as a human personality,
a superior preacher, but not authoritarian or
supernatural in his moral insights.
FLETCHER, Joseph Francis, III (1905–91)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
An Introductory Study of Ethics (New York, Joseph Fletcher was born on 10 April 1905 in
1903). Newark, New Jersey, and died on 28 October
Individualism: Four Lectures on the 1991 in Charlottesville, Virginia. Minister,
Significance of Consciousness for Social educator, and author, he was ordained as an
Relations (New York, 1911). Episcopal priest in 1929. He taught Christian
“Pragmatism and Truth,” Philosophical ethics and pastoral theology at the Episcopal
Review 23 (1914): 506–24. Theological School from 1944 to 1970 and
Birth-Control and Biological Ethics, National medical ethics at the University of Virginia
Birth Control League pamphlet (New from 1970 to 1977. His 1954 book Morals
York, 1916). and Medicine provoked considerable scholarly
Moral Philosophy: The Critical View of Life debate about euthanasia, sterilization, and arti-
(New York, 1925). Republished as The ficial insemination. His 1966 book Situation
Examined Life: An Adventure in Moral Ethics: The New Morality caused much con-
Philosophy (Bloomington, Ind., 1957). troversy in the academic world and also in the
The Living Mind: Essays on the Significance popular press. In 1974 he was named
of Consciousness (New York, 1930). Humanist of the Year by the Southern Medical
The Platonic Legend (New York, 1934). Association. He was a founding member of
“The Philosopher and His Words,” numerous societies including the Planned
Philosophical Review 44 (1935): 120–37. Parenthood Foundation, the Society for the
Jesus, the Man: A Critical Essay (Cambridge, Right to Die, and the Soviet American
Mass., 1946). Friendship Society.
Fletcher’s Situation Ethics was an unusual
Other Relevant Works book, becoming a best-seller and widely dis-
Fite’s papers are at Princeton University. cussed in the mass media by Time, Newsweek,
Trans., Mist (Niebla): A Tragiocomic Novel, and other venues. It opened up a series of
by Miguel de Unamuno (New York, popular and academic debates on the whole
1928). topic of the proper methods for ethics. In this
work, and in others, Fletcher focused atten-
Further Reading tion on many topics in medical and sexual
Amer Nat Bio, Dict Amer Bio, Pres Addr of ethics: euthanasia, birth control, abortion,
APA v4, Proc of APA v29, Who Was Who genetic control, etc. His main purpose was to
in Amer v3, Who’s Who in Phil remove ethics from purely abstract and general
Burr, John R. Three Dimensions of discussion, and to focus attention on the
Philosophic Intelligence; Private, Public, specific and variable situations of life where
and Visional, in the Philosophies of ethics really goes on. There were antecedents
Warner Fite, John Dewey, and George for this. In Germany, Eberhard Grisebach’s
Santayana. PhD dissertation, Columbia book Gegenwart: eine kritische Ethik (1928)
803
FLETCHER
called attention to the importance of concrete selves. Agape, he alleges, is not a matter of
situations for any religious ethics, where each mere interest or a means to something else. It
moral problem is actually unique and can be is intrinsically good. But he also claims that
solved only by one who is concretely con- agape is compatible with reason or calculating
fronted with the problem. Earlier than this, the consequences. It is not the same as impulsive-
American pragmatist, John DEWEY, in his 1920 ness, dogmatism, or pure subjective feeling.
work Reconstruction in Philosophy, clearly Fletcher claims his situation ethics is superior
emphasized the need for a truly situational to all forms of antinomianism, including the
approach to any moral life. Dewey argued that existentialism of the French philosopher Jean-
we cannot seek or attain health, wealth, edu- Paul Sartre. Fletcher believes that moral deci-
cation, or justice in general. Action he claimed sions can be justified, and in fact need to be jus-
is always specific, individualized, unique, or tified, by appealing to anticipated conse-
situational. quences. Ethical rules or principles are accept-
Fletcher was aware of the efforts of Dewey able as long as they are pragmatically and rel-
and others which emphasized the need for a atively used. No principle of agape tells anyone
truly situational ethics. Fletcher claims that his how to use this love in each and every situation.
own situation ethics is able to accommodate Christian love, as Fletcher sees it, is not opposed
several important other perspectives including to prudence or justice. Prudence and careful cal-
relativism, pragmatism, and utilitarianism. culation, he claims, give love the carefulness it
Moral situations are always relative to change, needs.
time, and place, and must be judged in terms of Fletcher is fond of giving examples of what
their practical consequences for the greatest he means by careful calculation and decision-
good or happiness of the greatest number of making. His examples often involve rather
people. Fletcher sets out to show that situation extreme situations. He offers the following
ethics is a kind of middle position between example: if we can only carry one person from
mere rule following or moral legalism on the a burning building, where the choice is between
one hand, and antinomianism, or a purely saving one’s father or a scientist who has dis-
spontaneous view where rules are abandoned covered a cure for a widespread fatal disease,
entirely on the other. Situation ethics, he claims, Fletcher says that we should save the scientist
is superior to both. It can accept rules or laws since, according to the agapeic calculus, this
for ethics, but only insofar as they are treated choice involves the greater good. By saving the
as flexible, capable of being modified as needed, scientist, who is able with his knowledge to
for every specific situation. save many other people, we serve the greater
Fletcher believes that moral legalism is wrong good. This example and other cases Fletcher
because it sets rules above people and the cites have produced much controversy and criti-
specific situations in which they have to act. cism of his views. No doubt, by using such
Fletcher is critical of all major Western reli- extreme cases as he does, Fletcher has suc-
gious traditions as being too legalistic by relying ceeded in getting his many readers to think
on strict or absolute rules. Fletcher does, seriously about the problems of ethics. His
however, allow one absolute in ethics. Love, he influence has been both positive and negative.
claims, is always absolutely good; but love is On the positive side, he has contributed to the
not a law or abstract principle. Love, in a truly growing concern in recent ethics with all the
moral or religious sense, involves a personal problems of applied social ethics, medical
concern or caring about people and their needs. ethics, abortion, euthanasia, capital punish-
Here, he distinguishes love as agape from love ment, etc. On the negative side, his critics have
as mere eros or desire. Agape involves a deep been quick to call attention to what seem like
caring and respect for persons as ends in them- simplistic or premature solutions to otherwise
804
FLEW
complex problems. By provoking as much con- Journal of the American Geriatric Society
troversy as he has, Fletcher’s work is clearly a 35 (1987): 676–82.
stimulus for more and better thought about “Humanism and Theism in Biomedical
what ethics can do and what it cannot do. Ethics,” Perspectives in Biology and
Situation ethics, as he conceives it, offers only Medicine 31 (1987): 106–16.
a method for approaching the ongoing choices “Euthanasia in the Courts,” Euthanasia
or decisions of the moral life; it does not Review 2 (Fall 1987): 15–22.
pretend to offer a fixed and final solution.
Absolute security, fixity, or complacency are Further Reading
not to be found, or expected, in any real or Bennett, John C., et al. Storm over Ethics
concrete moral life, or theory about life. (Philadelphia, 1968).
Cox, Harvey, ed. The Situation Ethics
BIBLIOGRAPHY Debate (Philadelphia, 1968).
The Church and Industry, with Spencer Cunningham, Robert L., ed. Situationism and
Miller (New York, 1930). the New Morality (New York, 1970).
Christianity and Property (Philadelphia, Davitt, Thomas E. Ethics in the Situation
1947). (New York, 1970).
Morals and Medicine (Princeton, N.J., 1954). Ramsey, Paul. Deeds and Rules in Christian
William Temple: Twentieth-Century Ethics (New York, 1967).
Christian (New York, 1963). Robinson, John. Honest to God
Situation Ethics: The New Morality (Philadelphia, 1963).
(Philadelphia, 1966). Stroh, Guy W. American Ethical Thought
Moral Responsibility: Situation Ethics at (Chicago, 1979), chap. 7.
Work (Philadelphia, 1967). Vaux, Kenneth, ed. Joseph Fletcher: Memoir
Hello Lovers: An Introduction to Situation of an Ex-Radical, Reminiscence and
Ethics, with Thomas Wassmer, ed. W. E. Reappraisal (Louisville, Kent., 1993).
May (New York, 1970).
Situation Ethics – True or False, with John Guy W. Stroh
W. Montgomery (Minneapolis, Minn.,
1972).
The Ethics of Genetic Control: Ending
Reproductive Roulette (New York, 1974).
Humanhood: Essays in Biomedical Ethics
(Buffalo, N.Y., 1979). FLEW, Antony Garrard Newton (1923– )
Other Relevant Works Antony Flew was born on 11 February 1923

“Medicine and Criteria of Human Nature,” in Ealing, London, England. He attended St.
in Science, Medicine and Man 1 (1973): Faith’s Preparatory School, Kingswood School,
93–102. and St. John’s College, Oxford, where he
“Situation Ethics and Watergate,” Theology earned a BA in 1947 and an MA in 1949. He
Today 31 (1975): 343–5. won Oxford’s annual university prize in phi-
“Fetal Research: Pragmatists and losophy – the John Locke Scholarship in
Doctrinaires,” Hastings Center Report 5 Mental Philosophy – in 1948. He later earned
(1975): 11–46. a D.Litt. from the University of Keele in 1974.
“Feeding the Hungry: An Ethical Appraisal,” Flew was lecturer in philosophy at Christ
Soundings 59 (1976): 52–69. Church, Oxford, in 1949–50, and a lecturer in
“Medical Resistance to the Right to Die,” moral philosophy at King’s College, University
805
FLEW
of Aberdeen, from 1950 to 1954. Flew then shows that linguistic philosophy is as old as
went to the University of Keele, where he was philosophy itself, with pride of place for
professor of philosophy from 1954 to 1974. Aristotle, and significant contributions by
Flew’s next appointment was professor of phi- Hume, Kant, and J. S. Mill, among others.
losophy at the University of Reading, from Attention to ordinary language helps clarify
1973 to 1982. After taking early retirement philosophical disputes and may suggest means
from Reading in 1982, Flew had a half-time of resolution, as in the famous Argument of the
position as professor of philosophy at York Paradigm Case, which shows that indicating a
University in Toronto, teaching there during paradigm case eliminates arguments that no
the spring semesters from 1983 to 1985. such case is possible.
During the period from the mid 1950s to the For Flew, linguistic philosophy demands
early 1990s, Flew spent many semesters as a consistency and good reasoning in all intellec-
visiting professor in the United States and tual work (Thinking About Thinking, 1975).
Canada, totaling about ten cumulative years The meaning of a word may evolve over time,
that made a considerable impact on the course but at any point in time meaningful discourse
of North American philosophy and graduate requires the possibility of inclusion and exclu-
education. Among the universities he visited sion. To the notion of contradiction Flew adds
are Minnesota, New York University, Karl Popper’s methodology of falsification,
Swarthmore, Pittsburgh, Maryland, Buffalo, the view that one falsifying instance disproves
Southern California, Calgary, University of a theory though confirming instances do not
California at San Diego, and Bowling Green. prove it. Contradiction and falsification har-
Flew also was Gifford Lecturer at the moniously complement Flew’s ordinary
University of St. Andrews in 1986–7. language analysis.
For more than fifty years, Flew has made A good example of this methodology in
contributions in linguistic, historical, political, action is Flew’s short essay, “Theology and
sociological, moral, and theological scholar- Falsification” (1950), where he demonstrates
ship. His strident libertarianism, championship that claims about the nature and existence of
of free markets, atheistic humanism, and God change in the face of criticism through the
advocacy of the right to assisted suicide have addition of qualifications to the original claims.
been influential on matters of public policy. A fair application of the falsification challenge
His large output in a variety of fields has made – an account of what would constitute clear
him a well-known, accessible, and controver- disproof of any claim – would limit such qual-
sial philosopher. ifications and show that theological claims are
Flew pursued linguistic philosophy, follow- not provable. Thus, theological disputes are
ing in the tradition of Bertrand Russell, Ludwig not factual disputes. The argumentative lesson
Wittgenstein, and Friedrich Waismann. He is that progress in philosophy comes only
was deeply influenced by his Oxford mentors, through the assertion and defense of poten-
Gilbert Ryle and John Austin. The advantages tially falsifiable claims. Flew’s linguistic phi-
of linguistic philosophy were documented and losophy is argumentative and empirical, falling
disseminated in his three great methodological well within the tradition of British philosophy
collections: Logic and Language, first and from Thomas Hobbes to A. J. Ayer.
second series (1951 and 1953), and Essays in As Flew argues, the burden of proof in the
Conceptual Analysis (1956). These were matter of God's existence is on the theist, so
among the first and most influential collec- disbelief has argumentative presumption. In
tions of contemporary essays around a central The Logic of Mortality, his 1986 Gifford
methodological theme. In “Philosophy and Lectures (1987), Flew shows that "personal
Language” (1955), a powerful mea culpa, he survival of death" and "personal immortal-
806
FLEW
ity" are self-contradictory expressions. As we sciences is often compromised by illicit

understand those expressions, personal assumptions or poor reasoning. The social
survival of death is impossible, since person- sciences suffer from all of the justification
hood, as we understand it, requires our problems of the natural sciences, and more,
physical and social being. Memory can reveal including covert political agendas and
but cannot constitute personal identity. People question-begging readings of evidence. The
are creatures of flesh and blood. The usual antidote to these maladies, Flew urges, is
indices of death demonstrate that a person is uncompromising honesty and integrity in
unequivocally dead, and thus lacks continuous social science research.
mental properties. The very meaning of per- Flew believes our greatest moral responsi-
sonhood relies on this notion. Arguments bility is to each other, now and in our
about personal survival of death equivocate at embodied future, and not in some theoretical
the very least, but also are self-defeating. eternity. This responsibility requires that we
Although never tempted by traditional work to make this world just, safe, rational,
Christianity or theism, recently Flew has free, and secure; we must not sacrifice our
become more comfortable with the idea of a human future for the hope of a better imma-
divinely intelligent creator responsible for the terial future. With attention to language, to
universe and for the first life on earth. In the cogent reasoning, to freedom of inquiry, and to
third edition of his book God and Philosophy empirical evidence, progress is possible in phi-
(2005), Flew expresses greater respect for tele- losophy. Ordinary language, logic, and empiri-
ological arguments for God, such as the intel- cism yield a powerful methodological
ligent design argument. approach to issues in philosophy, theology,
Flew believes democratic principles and and the social sciences.
personal autonomy offer the best environment
for free inquiry. For Flew, this fact leads to lib- BIBLIOGRAPHY
ertarianism and to arguments against enforced A New Approach to Psychical Research
political equality, unjustified governmental (London, 1953).
regulation, and centralized economies. Flew’s Hume’s Philosophy of Belief: A Study of His
libertarianism attempts to maximize political First Inquiry (London, 1961).
freedom, personal choices that do no harm, God and Philosophy (New York and
and free markets. For Flew, justice comes from London, 1966). 2nd edn, God: A Critical
eliminating barriers to personal and economic Enquiry (La Salle, Ill., 1984). 3rd edn,
freedom, not from reverse discrimination or God and Philosophy (Amherst, N.Y.,
other unequal attempts to establish common- 2005).
ality. The state violates its social contract when Evolutionary Ethics (London, 1967).
it places barriers, however well intentioned, Crime or Disease? (London, 1973).
in the way of intellectual or economic attain- Reprinted as Crime, Punishment and
ment. The marketplace of ideas must always be Disease (New Brunswick, N.J., 2002).
unregulated, and the commercial marketplace Thinking About Thinking (London, 1975).
must be unregulated except for the most Also published as Thinking Straight
extreme contingencies. (Buffalo, N.Y., 1977); rev. edn, How to
Investigations of human nature risk violat- Think Straight (Buffalo, N.Y., 1998).
ing Hume’s is/ought, fact/value distinction, The Presumption of Atheism and Other
described by G. E. Moore as “the naturalistic Philosophical Essays on God, Freedom,
fallacy.” Flew discusses this problem in and Immortality (London, 1976).
Thinking About Social Thinking (1985), where Sociology, Equality and Education:
he warns that the search for truth in the social Philosophical Essays in Defense of a
807
FLEW
Variety of Differences (London, 1976). “Can an Effect Precede Its Cause,”

A Rational Animal and Other Philosophical Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
Essays on the Nature of Man (Oxford, suppl. 28 (1954): 45–62.
1978). Ed. with Alasdair MacIntyre, New Essays in
Politics of Procrustes: Contradictions of Philosophical Theology (London, 1955).
Enforced Equality (Buffalo, N.Y., 1981). Ed., Essays in Conceptual Analysis (London,
Darwinian Evolution (London, 1984; 2nd 1956).
edn, New Brunswick, N.J., 1997). Ed., Body, Mind, and Death (London,
Thinking About Social Thinking (Oxford, 1964).
1985; 2nd edn, London, 1991). Ed., A Dictionary of Philosophy (New York,
David Hume: Philosopher of Moral Science 1979; 2nd edn 1999).
(Oxford, 1986). Ed., Readings in the Philosophical Problems
The Logic of Mortality (Oxford, 1987). Rev. of Parapsychology (Buffalo, N.Y., 1987).
edn, Merely Mortal? Could You Survive “The Legitimation of Factual Necessity,” in
Your Own Death? (Buffalo, N.Y., 2000). Faith, Scepticism and Personal Identity: A
Agency and Necessity, with Godfrey Vesey Festschrift for Terence Penelhum, ed. J. J.
(Oxford, 1987). MacIntosh and H. A. Meynell (Calgary,
Power to the Parents: Reversing Educational Alberta, 1994), pp. 101–17.
Decline (London, 1987). “Social Democracy and the Myth of Social
Equality in Liberty and Justice (London, Justice,” in Libertarians and Liberalism:
1989; New Brunswick, N.J., 2001). Essays in Honor of Gerard Radnitzky, ed.
Atheistic Humanism: The Prometheus Hardy Bouillon (Aldershot, UK, 1996),
Lectures (Buffalo, N.Y., 1993). pp. 170–83.
Shephard’s Warning: Putting Education “Russell, Wittgenstein, and Cogito ergo
Back on Course (London, 1994). sum,” in Bertrand Russell on Nuclear
Philosophical Essays, ed. John Shosky War, Peace, and Language, ed. A.
(Oxford, 1998). Contains Flew’s Schwerin (London, 2002), pp. 59–71.
autobiographical “Philosopher’s
Apology,” pp. 183–208. Further Reading
Social Life and Moral Judgment (New Allen, R. T. “Flew, Marx and Gnosticism,”
Brunswick, N.J., 2003). Philosophy 68 (1993): 94–8.
Ethics and Public Policy, ed. John Shosky Colwell, Gary. “The Flew-Nielsen
(Oxford, 2003). Challenge: A Critical Exposition of Its
Does God Exist? The Craig–Flew Debate, Methodology,” Religious Studies 17
with William L. Craig (Aldershot, UK, (1981): 323–42.
2004). Evans, C. Stephen. Philosophy of Religion:
Resurrected? An Atheist and Theist Thinking About Faith (Downers Grove,
Dialogue, with Gary Habermas (Lanham, Ill., 1985).
Md., 2005). Kurtz, Paul W. “Has Mr Flew Abandoned
‘The Logic of Ordinary Use’?”
Other Relevant Works Philosophical Studies 9 (1958): 73–7.
“Locke and the Problem of Personal Lycan, William G. “Flew on Mind/Brain
Identity,” Philosophy 26 (1951): 53–68. Identity and the Cartesian Framework,”
Ed., Logic and Language, First Series Journal of Critical Analysis 5 (1974):
(Oxford, 1951). 56–64.
Ed., Logic and Language, Second Series Purtill, Richard L. “Flew and the Free Will
(Oxford, 1953). Defence,” Religious Studies 13 (1977):
808
FLEWELLING
477–83. and already successful, but this new charge

Wallace, R. C. “Hume, Flew, and the offered a second career as an educator. Apart
Miraculous,” Philosophical Quarterly 20 from time spent teaching for the US Army in
(1970): 230–43. France (1918–19) and several visiting appoint-
ments and extended trips abroad, Flewelling
John Shosky remained at USC as Director until his retire-
ment in 1945, and continued his editing work
and other duties until the year before his death.
Flewelling’s importance to American phi-
losophy resides in several different domains,
but his philosophical ideas and writings rank
FLEWELLING, Ralph Tyler (1871–1960) perhaps lower on the list than his amazingly
successful endeavors in building the School of
Ralph Tyler Flewelling was born on 23 Philosophy of USC, with its world-class
November 1871 near DeWitt, Michigan, and faculty, and its impressive Hoose Library of
died on 31 March 1960 in Glendale, Philosophy. Notable also was Flewelling’s
California. His parents, Francis Tyler and service to the American Philosophical
Mary Flewelling were devout Methodists, but Association and other professional and learned
they named their son after Ralph Waldo societies, but perhaps most important of all
EMERSON. His father had been a school teacher was his founding and editing work with the
before deciding to become a farmer. Flewelling journal The Personalist (the name became
married Jennie Carlin in 1893 and raised a Pacific Philosophical Quarterly in 1980).
son and a daughter. He was educated at the The University of Southern California was a
University of Michigan (1890–92), Alma young Methodist institution at the time
College in Michigan (BA 1895), Garrett Flewelling arrived. Philosophy courses had
Biblical Institute at Northwestern University been taught up to that time by the honored and
(1895), and finally Boston University (STB venerable James Harmon Hoose. When Hoose
1902, PhD in philosophy 1909). At Boston retired, the trustees and President Bovard saw
Flewelling studied under Borden Parker an opportunity in the area of philosophy in the
BOWNE whose personalist philosophy provided West, especially at the graduate level, and was
the foundation for Flewelling’s thought and seeking an appropriate Methodist to create it.
philosophical projects throughout his career. Flewelling’s pedigree and achievements fit the
During his theological and philosophical need, but the resources of the university were
training Flewelling served as pastor of several slim. A fortuitous event led to the resources
Methodist churches. His series of sermons in needed. In 1919 Flewelling offered a seminar
Osterville on Cape Cod became his first pub- in personalism that was attended by Seely
lished book, Christ and the Dramas of Doubt: Greenleaf Mudd, who was interested in phi-
Studies in the Problem of Evil (1913), and losophy but had been disappointed in the
established his reputation, receiving favorable courses he attended at Stanford and other insti-
attention from Nobel Laureate Rudolf Eucken. tutions. He became excited about Flewelling’s
Flewelling was eventually appointed to the personalism and work at USC and encour-
historic Harvard Street Church in Cambridge, aged his father, Colonel Seely Wintersmith
and from there accepted the call in 1917 from Mudd, to attend with him. The Mudds had
the University of Southern California to come become enormously wealthy in copper mines
to build its philosophy program as professor of and were of a philanthropic nature. Over the
philosophy and Director of the School of years the Mudd family would provide
Philosophy. Flewelling was forty-five years old Flewelling with the principal gifts that created
809
FLEWELLING
the School of Philosophy, the Hoose Library, was no antiquarian in his approach to philos-
the journal The Personalist, and finally the ophy, but he did believe a command of the
Mudd Memorial Hall of Philosophy. history of philosophy was essential to its
Flewelling had a talent for fundraising and proper progress in the present. However, his
never failed to build upon what the Mudd’s efforts to acquire an antiquarian collection for
provided, bringing credit to the family, the the Hoose Library, particularly manuscripts,
university, and himself. Flewelling set about incunabula and European philosophy
building a world-class faculty, attracting 1700–1850, indicates a sense that the scholarly
Heinrich Gomperz from Vienna, Herbert reputation of a library is something apart from
Wildon CARR from the University of London, the reputation of its faculty and students.
and F. C. S. Schiller from Oxford, J. H. Flewelling was assiduous and perhaps even a
Muirhead from the University of Birmingham, little opportunistic in acquiring rare treasures
and R. F. Hoernlé of South Africa, among for the library, especially from Europe when
others. He established fellowships to attract the economic conditions there made it possible to
most able graduate students, and provided a obtain items that in better times would have
broad and humanistic vision for the school. been prohibitively expensive. Over the decades
The generations of PhDs who graduated under he built the finest philosophy library in the
Flewelling’s directorship became successful and American West and became himself a leg-
influential in American philosophy, such as endary collector and a living force in the anti-
Philip P. W IENER and William Henry quarian book world. Interestingly, he seems
W ERKMEISTER . The vision of the school not to have had any great love of books, just
Flewelling provided was of pluralistic person- an acute eye for them.
alism, religiously liberal, humane and literate, An integral part of the plan for building the
interdisciplinary, and engaged with the latest School of Philosophy at USC was its journal,
science. The USC School of Philosophy The Personalist, a quarterly journal of philos-
retained that character until shortly after ophy, theology, and literature. Each issue con-
Flewelling’s death when the university’s efforts tained Flewelling’s own editor’s pages, called
to break with the Methodist Church upset the “The Lantern of Diogenes” after 1931, and
delicate balance, resulting in the creation of the was often humorous. In the pages of the
Claremont School of Theology. journal, philosophers and other humanistic
Flewelling was responsible for establishing scholars discussed contemporary events,
the Hoose Library of Philosophy. Among the serious technical philosophy, and fed their
first efforts he undertook at USC was to souls on excellent contemporary poetry. Few
provide a library suitable for the graduate publications have ever attempted such a range
study of philosophy. The initial idea had been at such a high level of discourse. Flewelling’s
to raise money from subscriptions by the idea was to create a publication that was above
former students of James Harmon Hoose. the level of discourse of any popular magazine,
Some subscriptions did come in and the col- but was no less edifying to the readers who
lection began. It was, however, an initial gift by wanted to remain abreast of the best creative
the Mudd family in 1922 of $10,000, as part thinking that was occurring in their time. The
of an effort to raise $40–60,000, that really idea was to bridge the gap between the
enabled the collection to become a serious academy and the public, and many contribu-
endeavor. Flewelling was shrewd and astute in tors were therefore not academicians. The
his acquisitions, gaining not only those titles philosophical center of the journal was per-
that were needed for up-to-date studies, but sonalism, which Flewelling promoted tirelessly.
also rare and antique editions and titles that he The journal first appeared in April 1920 and
knew would give the library a reputation. He continued more or less in its original format
810
FLEWELLING
until 1979. Flewelling remained chief editor with a supreme person at the head. Personality
until 1959. After the troubles between USC is in effect the primary idea, and nature is a
and the Methodist Church, which efffectively derivative idea.” (1926, p. 12) Like Bowne
removed the bridge between philosophy and and other personalists, Flewelling embraces
theology historically present in the university, an objective view of knowledge and the
The Personalist began to narrow its scope and universe, but unlike them, Flewelling did not
to publish academic philosophy only, gradu- deny the existence of the impersonal. His
ally only in the analytic methodology, which encounter with the philosophy of Henri
was effectively its only mission when it Bergson when he was in France with the US
changed its name to Pacific Philosophical Expeditionary Forces left a permanent mark.
Quarterly in 1980. Therefore, Flewelling’s The lasting imprint of Bergson’s thought was
journal is a matter for the history of philoso- to lead Flewelling to embrace temporalism in
phy at this point, not a part of his ongoing a way that Bowne had not. In some ways,
legacy. therefore, Flewelling’s modification of Bowne’s
The philosophical perspective that informed personalism parallels that of Edgar S.
all of this activity was the Boston University BRIGHTMAN, another student of Bowne in the
strain of American personalism. Flewelling same generation, but where Brightman
was always quick to point out that philo- acquired his temporalist turn from his study of
sophical personalism was not something Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and, after
peculiar to Boston University or the United 1929, Alfred North WHITEHEAD, Flewelling’s
States, commonly citing lists not of Bostonians temporalism was Bergsonian. Since Brightman
but of French, German, and even historical was interested in method and system, his took
thinkers who held the general viewpoint a metaphysical and epistemological turn in
(sometimes without the name “personalism”). seeking a ground for his temporalism.
Together with George Holmes HOWISON at Flewelling was less enamored of method and
the University of California at Berkeley, more concerned with character; hence his
Flewelling is generally credited as a key thought took a moral, religious, cultural, and
founder of the “California School of humanistic turn. Flewelling was, then, a moral
Personalism,” although Howison’s and idealist who held that the sciences do not
Flewelling’s philosophies were really very dif- provide the best clues to the character of
ferent. Howison really represented a modified ultimate reality, rather, the structure of the
Kantian philosophy of an earlier generation, real was more reliably available in the most
while Flewelling’s really incorporated a sense complex and the highest developments of indi-
of the new turn in the sciences toward tempo- viduality, and these are to be found in moral
ralism. Flewelling’s own personalism was and religious exemplars. Thus, Flewelling’s
expounded in voluminous writings. Apart orientation on the possibility of knowledge is
from his quarterly contributions in articles, that the person best able to “know” is the one
editor’s pages and book reviews to The who is most morally developed. As science
Personalist, between 1920 and 1959, literally advances, it moves towards better under-
hundreds of articles and reviews which would standing of the Cosmic Person whose activities
fill several volumes, he authored fifteen books, are the data available for study by any science.
another fifty or so articles, especially for The There is in Flewelling’s philosophy great
Science of Mind and The Methodist Review, emphasis given to creativity, and the develop-
and contributed to several encyclopedias. ment of creative personality is the normative
Flewelling’s personalism is briefly stated as task set upon each individual. Purposive intel-
follows: “As a metaphysical theory it is the ligence, individual and cosmic, is the proper
conception of reality as a world of persons guide to creative activity. Flewelling opposed
811
FLEWELLING
scientism with all his strength, believing that Angeles, 1928).

the worship of scientific knowledge bereft of Reflections on the Basic Ideas of East and
moral insight was a great menace to the future. West: A Study in Cultural Contrasts
The final test of the value of science was its (Peiping, China, 1935).
service to the moral improvement of persons, The Survival of Western Culture: An
and it must be vigilantly held to account by this Inquiry into the Problem of Its Decline
ideal, in each generation, lest science fall into and Resurgence (New York, 1943).
disvalue through serving itself in disservice of El Sentido Cristiano del la Vida (Buenos
humanity. Science could produce no morally Aires, 1944).
worthy ends of its own. Truth for Flewelling is The Things that Matter Most: An Approach
a kind of value, inseparable from a broader to the Problems of Human Values (New
faith in the capacity of persons to improve York, 1946).
their moral and spiritual condition. Winds of Hiroshima (New York, 1946).
Flewelling lived out his own philosophical Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures
creed in a life of continuous service. He (Stockton, Cal., 1951).
traveled the world, published and spoke in The Person; or, the Significance of Man
several languages, lent his name and voice to (Los Angeles, 1952).
humanitarian causes, and while he was very
much a realist about human faults and Other Relevant Works
tendency to misuse freedom, he continually Flewelling’s papers are at the University of
promoted hope and optimism about the Southern California.
prospects of persons. Flewelling was in many The Forest of Yggdrasil (Los Angeles,
ways a goodwill ambassador of the University 1962). Flewelling’s autobiography.
of Southern California, the United States, and
American philosophy. He was a tireless, wise Further Reading
and visionary administrator. Among the many Nat Cycl Amer Bio v51, Pres Addr of
organizations he served were the Pacific APA v4, Proc of APA v35, Who Was
Division of the American Philosophical Who in Amer v5, Who’s Who in Phil
Association, of which he was President in Gacka, Bogumi. Bibilography of American
1938–9, the British Institute of Philosophical Personalism (Lublin, 1994), pp. 87–184.
Studies, the American Scientific Association, Nethery, Wallace. Dr. Flewelling and the
Phi Beta Kappa, and Phi Kappa Phi. Hoose Library: Life and Letters of a Man
and an Institution (Los Angeles, 1976).
BIBLIOGRAPHY Porter, Jenny Lind. “Yours Faithfully,
Christ and the Dramas of Doubt: Studies in Ralph Tyler Flewelling,” The Personalist
the Problem of Evil (New York, 1913). 42 (1961): 293–302.
Personalism and the Problems of Werkmeister, William H. “Ralph Tyler
Philosophy (New York, 1915). Flewelling,” in A History of
Philosophy and the War (New York, Philosophical Ideas in America (New
1918). York, 1949), pp. 318–24.
Bergson and Personal Realism (New York,
1920). Randall E. Auxier
The Reason in Faith (New York, 1924).
Creative Personality: A Study in
Philosophical Reconciliation (New York,
1926).
The Uses of a School of Philosophy (Los
812
FLOWER
FLOWER, Elizabeth Farquhar (1914–95) A distinct characteristic of Flower’s thought

was her integrationist or holistic approach
Elizabeth Flower was born on 28 April 1914 to philosophical and social problems. The
in Atlantic City, New Jersey, and died on 26 tendency to view concepts, theories, and dis-
June 1995 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. One courses as more co-constitutive than mutually
of the pioneering women in philosophy in exclusive permeates every dimension of her
the United States, Flower spent most of her work. In both her approach to the develop-
career writing and teaching on ethics and ment of critical thought in North America
American philosophy at the University of and in her critique of applied ethics, Flower
Pennsylvania. After receiving a BS in chem- gave a laudable attempt to synthesize knowl-
istry from Wilson College in Pennsylvania, edge and concepts from varying disciplines
she studied philosophy at Pennsylvania with and discourses. This resulted, in part, from
Edgar A. SINGER and became an instructor in her appreciation of Scottish realism, which
1937. Upon completing her PhD in philoso- had developed a unique epistemology
phy in 1939, she received a regular appoint- composed of both physiology and psychol-
ment in the philosophy department and ogy. She also maintained an appreciation for
became one of the first women in the United psychology and sociology in approaches to
States on the philosophy faculty of a major ethical questions. Crossing disciplines and
university. In 1956 she became the first analyzing concepts and phenomena from
tenured woman in the philosophy depart- multiple discursive locations reflect not only
ment at Pennsylvania, and taught there until her professional training, but also her com-
retiring in 1985. She was also Truax mitment to scholarly excellence.
Professor at Hamilton College, and was a Flower’s best-known work is A History of
visiting professor at Barnard College, San Philosophy in America (1977), co-written
Marcos in Peru, and the National Universities with Murray M U R P H E Y . Considered a
of Colombia, Chile, and Guatemala. She standard in the field now, its two volumes
joined work camps and met with Spanish outline the history of American critical
Republican intellectuals and philosophers thought in a different framework from the
while working with the American Friends one that had been conventionally employed.
Service Committee early in her career. Flower Rather than offering the well-worn narrative
was a fellow of the National Humanities of science and philosophy struggling tri-
Center in 1978–9 and a senior fellow at the umphantly against the bane of dogma and
Center for Dewey Studies in 1981–2. She was faith, the work emphasized the discursive
named Woman of the Year by the Society influences and exchanges, as well as the con-
for Women in Philosophy in 1987, and with flicts, between religion, science, and philoso-
her husband Abraham EDEL she received the phy. In their account, contemporary prag-
Herbert W. Schneider Award of the Society matism has its deepest roots in thinkers who,
for the Advancement of American Philosophy influenced by Scottish realism, sought to syn-
in 1995. thesize theology, empiricism, and evolution-
Flower was well known for her leadership ary theory. Much of the Puritans’ thought
role in resurgent interests in ethics in con- was compatible with the discoveries of
temporary American critical thought. Newton and Darwin, for they conceived the
Refocusing disciplinary interests in ethics was scientific method as a tool for understanding
no easy task, since much of twentieth-century and appreciating God’s ingenuity. The ideas
philosophy had turned away from moral phi- of the transcendentalist Ralph Waldo
losophy and aesthetics to other subjects like EMERSON and his successors in the idealist
language, science, knowledge, and logic. tradition, such as Josiah ROYCE, mediated
813
FLOWER
between science and religion in an effort to effected by centuries of civil strife and polit-
present a unified world view. Flower viewed ical struggles, which Flower chronicled with
the development of critical thought in erudition and style. Consequently, the por-
America as a discourse that synthesized (and traitures of philosophy in the US, Mexico,
reconciled) scientific discoveries and religious and Latin America that emerge chart the
concerns. complex relations among discursive practices,
A phenomenon that is hardly mentioned in political interests, institution building, and
other chronicles of American philosophy but transcultural influence. Flower’s studies of
was explored extensively by Flower and philosophy in these cultures were among the
Murphey is the infusion of Scottish ideas into earliest attempts by an American philosopher
American critical thought. The Scottish tra- to chronicle the development of critical
dition helped rescue ethics from Puritan thought south of the border in a systematic
dogma and legitimate it as a secular field of study of regional figures and politics.
study called moral science. American philoso- Flower was particularly concerned with
phers found the realists’ emphasis on the science’s relationship to ethics, of the descrip-
empirical sciences insightful and refreshing, tive to the normative, of theory to practice,
for they were more interested in how knowl- and the possibility of a moral agenda for
edge is acquired than the continental concerns ethical theory. The integrationist tendency of
with the validity of knowledge. John DEWEY her approach to philosophical problems con-
and C. I. LEWIS figured prominently in their tinues in this area as well, as she thought that
portraiture of American philosophy, as they the fact/value and theory/practice dichotomies
went on to develop full-scale theories of valu- had been exaggerated, and that many more
ation and to treat ethics like an empirical dis- points of overlap exist between them.
cipline governed by scientific methods and Normative judgments are inescapably
models. Their detailed portrait of the St. grounded in scientific concepts while scientific
Louis Hegelians’ appropriation of Schelling knowledge is value-laden. In bridging the gap
and Hegel, moreover, also demonstrates between fact and value, Flower demonstrates
appreciation for the infusion of continental her roots in American pragmatism, which
ideas into American critical thought, which was born out of her conviction that profes-
other accounts until then had left largely sional philosophers should engage problems
unexplored. of the larger world outside the university. She
Flower supplemented discussions of note- was known for her quiet social activism and
worthy figures with details of the social for integrating it into her coursework in ethics
contexts (institutions, ideologies, and and social policy. In this way, she maintained
networks of influence) in which knowledge the importance of examining historical
and truth are produced. Her approach chron- context during a period when many American
icles a culture’s history of ideas with the philosophers considered history irrelevant.
concrete textures of human choice, random While working with the American Friends
chance, and politics, and was used again in Service Committee in Mexico, for example,
discussing the influences of scholasticism, Flower staged a production of Aristophanes’
positivism, realism, and idealism in Mexico Lysistrata, which helped settle a decades-long
and Latin America in the Principales dispute between two local villages.
Tendencias de La Filosofia Norteamericana Flower’s work is not easily categorized into
(1963), co-authored with Murphey, and the rights/duty, goods/means, or
other studies of philosophy in the Americas. character/virtue schools of moral thought of
The development and reception of critical Kant, Bentham, or Plato. Yet, her concern
thought in Mexico and Latin America were with specific problems in ethics yielded
814
FLOWER
unique contributions to the field. Her reversal support and euthanasia raise questions that
of approaches and suspicion of dichotomies require consideration of issues of human psy-
formed part of her skepticism toward the dis- chology, religious faith, and patient/family
ciplinary tendency to debate the universal rights and duty. Knowledge produced outside
sovereignty of ethical models, for none, she the field is indispensable to ethical delibera-
believed, could cover every facet of civilization, according to Flower. Further, moral
tion. Rather than debate the merits of a issues are more complex than they had been
rights, utilitarian, or virtue model, she a century earlier, due to the rapid develop-
thought it was more productive to allow the ment of technology. At the turn of the last
situation to determine which moral theories century, ethicists concerned themselves with
and concepts are most fitting for delibera- questions about whether a doctor should
tion. She preferred reversing conventional disclose terminal illness to patients. Today,
approaches to moral problems by diagnosing ethicists struggle with different problems,
the problem first and then drawing from such as genetic cloning, organ transplant, the
ethical theories rather than applying theories manufacture of biochemical weapons, and
to problems. This allowed her to displace the the use of fetal tissue for medical research.
theory–practice dichotomy so pervasive in Flower thought that we have yet to adapt to
Western moral philosophy and to recast the the rapidity of change that is characteristic of
investigation of ethical theories in terms of contemporary life, and that new moral
their “stable” and “problematic” elements: methods need to be developed to deal with
“It introduces the theory–practice relation at these increasingly complex problems in our
the outset and it opens the door to issues that world.
are too infrequently attended to, especially Flower believed that ethical theory should
the socio-historical dimension of moral quan- not only detail the dimensions of its frame-
daries … . They point beyond the question of work, but also investigate the “emphases,
the truth of theories to questions of the commitments, and choices” into which it
adequacy of the theory in solving particular invests (1987, p. 28). Following the work of
problems, practical as well as theoretical.” Edel, she argued for the use of discourse
(1994, p. 62) analysis as a critical tool in evaluating the
Flower saw merit in an interdisciplinary cultural assumptions, investments, and reflec-
approach to problems of value and method in tions embedded in moral lexicons. For her,
relation to law, education, and social theory. the language used in moral discourse was not
She believed that ethics benefited from the transparent, but rather was socially and his-
social and psychological sciences for increased torically specific, reflecting the crises,
knowledge of a rapidly changing and increas- concerns, and power relations of a society.
ingly complex world. The continuing drive of Metaphors of moral theories were thus a rich
disciplinary specialization, including the con- source of information about their structure
comitant dispersion and fracturing of knowl- and value for ethicists (1987, p. 49).
edge, constitutes a problem for moral phi- In Critique of Applied Ethics (1994), co-
losophy whose contours and objects of authored with Edel and Finbarr W.
analysis are no longer as easily distinguishable O’Connor, Flower evaluated ethical theories
from other spheres of life as classic moral formulated since the Enlightenment in order
philosophy had defined. Flower explores to suggest which might serve as tools of
issues in a variety of professions, public applied ethics and how knowledge and
policies, and personal experience to illustrate personal experience figure in moral delibera-
the strengths and drawbacks of the application. She explored the moral lexicons of util-
tion of ethics in modern life. Artificial life itarian, ontological, and virtue theories, for
815
FLOWER
example, and their implication for solving framework of conceptual possibilities in

moral problems today. Flower had a keen ethical inquiry. The relations and attitudes
interest in the underlying influences on the of situations involving normative judgments
practice of ethics, especially the ways in which are more varied and nuanced than the ana-
moral problems are diagnosed and their lytical capacity of Kant’s binary. Flower
contexts established. To this end, she opted for Edel’s phenomenology of types of
analyzed a number of elements that factored moral rules – must-rules, always-rules, break-
into deliberation. She was especially inter- only-with-regret-rules, and for-the-most-part-
ested in the constitutive power or “instru- rules – over categorical imperatives. These
mental characterization” of language: that is, allow for the gleaning of more information
by the ways in which words effected the about moral dilemmas, for more is at stake
human cognitive apparatus’s comprehension than simply doing one’s duty. Flower did not
of moralities and moral dilemmas (1994, p. want to dispense with the universal alto-
104). For word choices help determine which gether, however, for she believed it is applic-
paths of ethical inquiry are pursued, rather able in certain situations.
than others, and hence influence the outcome Flower’s suspicion of dichotomies extended
of ethical deliberation (1994, p. 102). “We to her analysis of social policies on education,
need, therefore, to attend to how we identify, organizational and institutional structures,
classify, and recognize a problem, and how and pedagogical and instructional practices.
we come to see that it is a problem, as a nec- She criticized the culture wars of the late
essary preliminary to the search for solution, 1970s for obfuscating the more fundamental
resolution, or answer.” (1994, p. 102) Here, issues at stake. Democratizing funding for
Flower relied heavily on William JAMES’s psy- arts and humanities education through insti-
chology of perception: all conception is struc- tutions like the National Endowment for the
tured by purpose and interest, and thus is Humanities and the National Endowment for
perspectival. This means that there are alter- the Arts makes art and culture accessible to
native ways of structuring experience in the broader public. Her discourse analysis is
regard to other purposes and interests (1994, notable again as an effective strategy in
pp. 94, 105). engaging problems of valuation and social
For Flower, all ethical concepts are poten- policy, allowing her to unpack rhetorical slip-
tially useful in formulating ethical problems. pages and conceptual sophistries and refor-
Flower saw no reason why we should privi- mulate the issues at hand. In clarifying the
lege one term like the good or character over categories of interests, objectives, costs, and
another such as right (or vice versa) in a quest potential gains of democratizing funding, she
for a unified system that could then be broadened the horizon of the critical issues
applied to all life situations. Rather, she involved beyond the binary structure onto a
thought it was more effective for moral delib- plethora of issues that had been obscured.
eration to build up “an inventory of resources Flower’s thought spanned a range of
from the theoretical reservoir,” and to attend diverse topics, treating concerns in ethics,
to the different ways that each family of education, and the history of ideas. She wrote
concepts structures moral problems and paves and taught on as many social issues concern-
the way for ethical judgment. ing the general public as she did on the theo-
Flower’s critique of the terms also led her retical matters appealing to professional
to suggest alternatives for several. She dis- philosophers. Influenced by Dewey and
placed the sharp distinction of Kant’s Royce, as well as the Scottish realists, Flower
right/wrong binary with the concept of moral played an important role in refocusing atten-
guidance, and presented a broader heuristic tion on ethics in contemporary American phi-
816
FODOR
losophy. Her work on Mexican and Latin Centuries of Philosophy in America, ed.
American philosophy is some of the earliest Peter Caws (London, 1980).
exploration of critical thought in these “A Moral Agenda for Ethical Theory,” in
cultures by a philosopher in the United States. Value, Science and Democracy: The
Philosophy of Abraham Edel, ed. Irving
BIBLIOGRAPHY L. Harowitz and H. Stanley Thayer (New
Principales Tendencias de La Filosofia Brunswick, N.J., 1987).
Norteamericana, with Murray Murphey
(Washington, D.C., 1963) Further Reading
A History of Philosophy in America, with Bio 20thC Phils, Proc of APA v69, Who’s
Murray Murphey (New York, 1977). Who in Phil, Women Phils
Critique of Applied Ethics, with Abraham Murphey, Murray G., and Ivar Berg, eds.
Edel and Finbarr W. O’Connor Values and Value Theory in Twentieth
(Philadelphia, 1994). Century America: Essays in Honor of
Elizabeth Flower (Philadelphia, 1988).
Other Relevant Works Contains a bibliography of Flower’s
“Two Applications of Logic to Biology,” in writings.
Philosophical Essays in Honor of Edgar
A. Singer, ed. Francis P. Clarke, and Angela L. Cotten
Milton C. Nahm (Philadelphia, 1942).
“The Mexican Revolt against Positivism,”
Journal of the History of Ideas 10
(1949): 115–29.
“Philosophies of History,” in A History of
Philosophical Systems, ed. Vergilius Ferm FODOR, Jerry Alan (1935– )
(New York, 1950).
“Comments on the Ethical Theory of Edgar Jerry Fodor was born on 22 April 1935 in New
A. Singer,” Philosophy of Science 21 York City. He earned his BA summa cum laude
(1954): 1–8. from Columbia University in 1956. He then
“Commitment, Bias, and Tolerance,” in attended Princeton University and received his
Cultural Pluralism and the American PhD in philosophy in 1960, working with
Idea, ed. Horace M. Kallen (Philadelphia, Hilary PUTNAM. During 1959–60 Fodor was a
1956). philosophy instructor in the humanities depart-
“Edgar J. Singer, Jr., on Contentment,” ment at Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Journal of Philosophy 54 (1957): (MIT). In 1960–61 he attended the University
576–84. of Oxford as a Fulbright Fellow. Fodor
“Some Present Day Disagreements in Moral returned to MIT in 1961 as an assistant pro-
Philosophy,” in Aspects of Value, ed. fessor in the humanities department, where
Frederick C. Gruber (Philadelphia, Noam CHOMSKY was an influential colleague.
1959). In 1963 he became an associate professor in the
“The Unity of Knowledge and Purpose in departments of philosophy and psychology at
James’ View of Action,” in The MIT, and was promoted to full professor in
Philosophy of William James, ed. Walter those departments in 1969. Fodor left MIT in
Corti (Hamburg, Germany, 1976). 1986 to become Distinguished Professor at the
“Some Interesting Connections between the City University of New York Graduate Center.
Common Sense Realists and the In 1988 he became the State of New Jersey
Pragmatists, especially James,” in Two Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University,
817
FODOR
a position he still holds. From 1988 to 1994 he a mental event is identical with an instance or
remained with the CUNY Graduate Center as tokening of a physical event, but the mental
an adjunct professor, where his wife, Janet event type is not identical with any physical
Dean Fodor, with whom he has collaborated, event type. An advantage of token physicalism
is a professor of linguistics. Fodor was a New over type physicalism, the view that mental types
York State Regents’ Fellow; a Woodrow are identical with physical types, is that mental
Wilson Fellow; a Chancellor Greene Fellow; a types can be multiply realized. Since the physical
Fulbright Fellow; a Guggenheim Fellow, and a instantiations of mental types in humans are
Fellow of the Center for the Advanced Study in undoubtedly neurological, anything that does
the Behavioral Sciences. He is also a member of not have a human central nervous system cannot
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. have mental states, according to type physical-
He has written over one hundred articles and ism. Token physicalism allows for any number
over a dozen books, many of which are short, of physical realizations of minds; what makes
penetrating analyses of specific issues. something a mental state is its relations, nomic
Fodor’s views in philosophy of mind, phi- and computational in this case, regardless of its
losophy of language, philosophical psychol- physical realization.
ogy, and cognitive science have profoundly The argument from multiple realizability is
influenced the course of research in these areas. an instance of how Fodor sees the special
With remarkable clarity and consistency over sciences, such as geology, biology, and psy-
the years, Fodor has offered one of the most chology, generally. Suppose it is a law of a par-
elaborate accounts of the mind: how it is struc- ticular special science that P causes Q, ceteris
tured and how it works. He has also vigor- paribus. The unity of science requires that the
ously challenged positions he deems to be implementing mechanism for every law is a
explanatorily inadequate, including behavior- physical regularity (assuming some kind of ide-
ism, connectionism, and cognitive neuroscience. alized physics as the basic science). In that case,
The clarity of his critiques has helped set the physical events that are tokenings of P cause
agenda in much of the subsequent debate. other physical events that are tokenings of Q.
The cornerstone of Fodor’s philosophy is the However, types in the special sciences do not
language of thought hypothesis (LOT). LOT reduce to physical types. The distinct tokenings
itself is tied to two other views Fodor espouses, of P or Q are a disparate disjunction of physical
namely the representational theory of mind events having nothing in common except that
(RTM) and the computational theory of mind they are tokenings of the same special science
(CTM). According to RTM, thinking is a event. Thus every instance of P causing Q is an
sequence of activating or “tokening” mental rep- instance of some basic science law, but differ-
resentations having meaning or content. For ent laws in different instances. Then assuming
example, we think about dogs by tokening a rep- that laws relate types, taken together the dif-
resentation whose content is the property of being ferent implementing laws do not form a new
a dog. What we think about dogs will depend on law of the basic science, guaranteeing the
what other representations are tokened. autonomy of the special science. Furthermore,
Providing an account of the mind consistent it need not be the case that every tokening of P
with the dominant materialist world view is causes a tokening of Q. These cases constitute
known as the “naturalization” of the mind. the exceptions to the special science law, in
Though they need not be, Fodor takes mental virtue of which they are ceteris paribus laws.
representations to be material entities, so for The laws of the basic science, on the other
him RTM is a materialist theory. His particular hand, are exceptionless (1974).
version of materialism is called token physical- According to RTM, thinking is a sequence of
ism, meaning that every instance or tokening of tokening mental representations. Of course,
818
FODOR
tokening arbitrary mental representations is that can think that Daniel is taller than George
not thinking. There must be some principle can also think that George is taller than Daniel,
making the sequence coherent. The computa- irrespective of which thought, if either, happens
tional theory of mind (CTM) specifies the kinds to be true. In addition to being systematic our
of sequences that constitute thinking, following minds are representational systems enabling us
Alan Turing’s insight that representations with to think an indefinite number of thoughts, just
logical structure can be mechanically trans- as we can understand and produce arbitrarily
formed in such a way that if the initial repre- many novel sentences of a language we speak,
sentation is true then the transformed repre- limited only by cognitive resources such as
sentation is also true. This is possible because memory.
representations have two key features: content, The systematicity and productivity of natural
what they are representations of, and syntax, languages are explained by their composition-
their physical characteristics by which they can ality. There are rules for combining words into
be identified. Turing’s insight was that trans- sentences and simple sentences into more
formations sensitive only to the syntax of rep- complex ones. The meaning of a sentence is
resentations can be truth preserving when the determined by the meaning of the words and
representations are semantically interpreted. how they are put together. Since some of the
For example, we can transform “R & S” to rules are recursive, we finite human beings can
“R.” Regardless of the content of ‘R & S’, if it produce an indefinite number of sentences,
is true, then the resulting representation, “R,” explaining productivity. Also since complex
must be true. While the transformations are expressions are made from their parts and rules
sensitive to only the local syntax of the repre- for combining them, if we can state a relation
sentation being transformed, the sequence of we must be able to state it with the relata inter-
transformations is semantically coherent changed. If we can combine “a,” “R,” and “b”
because each follows logically from the to form “aRb,” we must be able to combine
previous one. Such transformations are called them to form “bRa,” since both expressions use
computations. CTM is the theory that the the same parts and the same rules for combin-
admissible sequences of mental representations ing those parts. Fodor reasons that since com-
constituting thinking are computations. In the positionality is the only explanation we have
overall project of naturalizing the mind, CTM for how we finite beings can have languages
is invoked to explain how thinking can be that are systematic and productive, therefore
purely mechanistic. the medium of thought must also be composi-
Fodor uses language as a window to the tional, thereby explaining the systematicity and
mind. Since we use language to express our productivity of thought, and thus the medium
thoughts, Fodor infers that certain universal of thought must be a language. Fodor takes sys-
characteristics of natural languages, those lan- tematicity and productivity as the benchmarks
guages we speak such as English or Spanish, are for an adequate theory of mind. His main chal-
also characteristic of our thoughts. lenge to connectionists is that they are unable
Systematicity is the property of a representa- to account for the systematicity of human
tional system that if two things can be repre- thought because their representations do not
sented as being related, then they can be rep- have constituent structure (1988; Macdonald
resented as changing roles in the same relation; and Macdonald 1995).
i.e., if “a” can be represented as being related Fodor’s LOT hypothesis includes two more
to “b” (aRb) then “b” can be represented as claims. First, the language of thought is innate
being related to “a” (bRa). Systematicity is a and distinct from any of our natural languages.
property of what can be represented regardless Fodor’s reasoning for this claim follows from
of the truth of those representations. Minds considerations of how first languages are
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FODOR
acquired. He argues that we cannot learn a have to derive every result from first princi-
predicate such as “is a dog” unless we can ples, natural language terms could serve as
already think about dogs. Roughly, what we mnemonics for mentalese expressions. In this
learn is that the English term expresses our case, learning a natural language would allow
thoughts about dogs, which on RTM means us to learn other natural language terms we
that a natural language representation applies could not otherwise learn, and it would allow
when and only when some mental representa- us to think thoughts we could not otherwise
tion coextensive with it is tokened. Since we think.
must use mental representations to learn our An important challenge for materialism and
first language, we must already know them naturalizing the mind is known as Brentano’s
and they cannot be natural language represen- Problem, which asks for an account of how we
tations. Parallel reasoning suggests that the can think of abstract, absent, or fictitious
innate representational system must be at least things. It is fairly plausible that when we are in
as rich as any language we could learn, since if sensory contact with something we can have
there were some predicate not expressible in the thoughts about that thing. However, by the
mental language we could not learn it. Again, very nature of abstract, absent, or fictitious
to learn any predicate we must be able to use things, we cannot sense them or be related to
a term that is coextensive with it. If the predi- them in a way permitted by materialism that
cate is not among the first we are learning in would plausibly make them the content of our
our natural language we might learn it in terms thoughts. For example, the weak gravitational
of other coextensive natural language predi- forces between someone and say the CN Tower
cates we have already learned. But these too in Toronto, are not enough to make it the
must have been learned and the chain traces content of her thoughts, since they are rela-
back eventually to the first terms we learn. tively stable whether she is thinking of the CN
Since we learn them via innate coextensive Tower or not.
predicates, there is an innate mental represen- Fodor’s materialist version of RTM provides
tation for any term of the natural language we a solution to Brentano’s Problem by having
can learn (1975). The language of thought for representations stand in for the things they rep-
which Fodor argues has come to be known as resent. Our thoughts about something are not
“mentalese.” under the direct influence of that thing. We
Many theorists feel that Fodor’s strong need not experience it to think about it since its
nativism does not account for the cognitive representation can be tokened by something
advantages we enjoy over other creatures in else in the world or by another mental repre-
virtue of being language users. Not only does sentation. All that is required for us to think
Fodor not deny such cognitive advantages, he about something, according to RTM, is that we
explicitly argues how they might come about token a mental representation of it, however
on his view (1975, p. 82–6). Formally, men- that comes about. Since mental representations
talese and natural languages might be equiva- are material things and thinking is just trans-
lent in that what can be computed in one formations of representations, the process is
system can be computed in the other. However, admitted by materialism. We need only token
which computations we can perform with each a representation with the appropriate content
system need not be the same. In particular, if we to think about the abstract, absent, fictitious, or
were able to perform more computations in a anything else for that matter. So how does a
natural language than in mentalese, learning a representation have the appropriate content?
natural language would have cognitive advan- How is it that any material thing has meaning
tages. Just as in formal systems we introduce and in virtue of what does it have that
new terms as mnemonics so that we do not meaning? A complete materialist solution to
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FODOR
Brentano’s Problem requires a materialist doghood. What makes it a “dog” representa-

account of content. Fodor’s naturalistic account tion, on Fodor’s view, is an asymmetric depen-
of content is a nomic-informational theory. It dence between the nomic connections. If the
has changed over the years, but the changes are nomic connection of the syntactic type with
mostly additions. He initially argued for foxhood depends on its connection with
narrow content, in which meaning is entirely in doghood in the sense that if the latter were
the head. Fodor reasoned from CTM that rep- broken the former would be also, but not vice
resentations can be individuated according to versa, the representation is a “dog” represen-
their computational role. The narrow content tation (1990).
of a mental representation is given by that com- It is important to emphasize that asymmet-
putational role, much as distinct signs in a ric dependence is a condition on nomic con-
formal system can be given an interpretation nections and not actual causal histories. Many
according to their role in derivations within adherents of RTM take it to be the fact that you
the system. interact with H2O whereas your twin interacts
The notion of narrow content runs into with XYZ, which explains the difference in the
certain difficulties, most notably Hilary content of your thoughts. Fodor explains the
Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment. In difference in terms of counterfactuals. In all
his 1975 essay “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’,” nearby possible worlds, water, i.e., H2O and
Putnam argues that “meaning ain’t in the head” not XYZ would cause your “water” tokens, so
by considering a Twin Earth, identical to ours your thoughts are about water. Thus it is how
in every respect except that twin water is made the world is built, and how we are built, in
of XYZ, which is chemically distinct from particular how we are disposed to interact with
H2O. You and your twin are in exactly the that world, that explains the contents of our
same internal state when you think about water thoughts (The Elm and the Expert, 1994, and
and your twin thinks about twin water, but other writings). Appealing to nomic connec-
your thoughts are about different things. As a tions gives Fodor the added benefit of having a
result, the internal state cannot be all there is to ready response to Brentano’s Problem, which
content. Fodor addresses Putnam cases by requires of RTM a materialist theory of content
taking an externalist stance. Representations to account for the very things we are not, and
continue to have a computational role by which in some cases cannot be, causally related to.
they are individuated as syntactic types; Since actual causal histories are not relevant for
however, their nomic connections to the world determining the content of our representations
determine their content. If it is a law that on Fodor’s view, we can have representations
instances of a particular property cause token- about absent, abstract, or even fictitious
ings of a syntactic type, then the semantic entities. To have a “unicorn” representation,
content of that syntactic type is that property. for example, one merely requires a syntactic
Roughly, instances of the property of being a structure that would be reliably tokened by
dog reliably cause “dog” tokens (1987, 1990). unicorns if there were any. That there are not
The earlier account of narrow content deter- any unicorns does not change the story. Simply
mined by computational relations has become by tokening your “unicorn” representation you
an account of individuation augmented by an can have thoughts about unicorns.
externalist semantics in terms of nomic rela- The various aspects of Fodor’s philosophy
tions. A problem for causal theories of content, come together in his theory of concepts.
known as the disjunction problem, is that Concepts are the constituents of thoughts for
several properties can reliably token the same Fodor; they are mental representations that
syntactic type. For example, foxhood might compose, explaining systematicity and pro-
reliably token the same syntactic type as ductivity. They are mental particulars with a
821
FODOR
syntax that allows them to be mental causes to have a concept from how we come to have
and effects, so mental causation is unproblem- the concept. He allows that getting some
atically physical on this view. They are also concepts may require having others. But having
categories for things in the world. The things the concept consists only in having a tokened
that fall under a concept are those that instan- mental representation with the right nomic rela-
tiate the property to which it is nomically tions.
related by the asymmetric dependence condi- Fodor’s nativism has been severely criticized.
tion. Most concepts are complex; we learn DOG might be innate but what about CAR-
them by learning to compose their constituents. BURETOR? On Fodor’s latest view, concepts
Primitive concepts, however, the basic symbols are not innate. Though this may seem to be a
in the language of thought, are unlearned. radical departure from his earlier views, little
Furthermore, lexical concepts have no internal has changed. Syntactic structures that stand in
structure. “Informational semantics is atom- nomic relations to properties in the world are
istic; it denies that the grasp of any intercon- innate. When these structures are activated we
ceptual relations is constitutive of concept pos- acquire the concept. Activation can result from
session” (Concepts, 1998, p. 71, emphasis in learning or it can be triggered, as must be the
original). Having the concept BACHELOR is case for primitive concepts. So while CARBU-
constituted by having a syntactic structure that RETOR is not innate, our minds are such that
is nomically connected to bachelors. Though causally interacting with a carburetor could
there is clearly a relation between the concept make it salient – i.e., represented – hence the
BACHELOR and the concept UNMARRIED, content of our thoughts. Slugs likely do not
grasping it is not constitutive of possessing have such minds.
either concept. Different syntactic structures can stand in
Fodor’s reason for being an atomist is that it the same nomic relations to properties in the
allows concepts to be public. If concepts are world; they can have the same extensional
conceived holistically, then each person will content. However, differences between the syn-
have different concepts and even a single indi- tactic structures give them different computa-
vidual will have different concepts at different tional roles. They are different modes of pre-
times, because our grasp of interconceptual sentation of extensional content, reflecting the
relations is always changing with our experi- heterogeneity of human thought that does
ence. But if we all have different concepts, there result from our actual causal histories. We all
are no generalizations about us concerning the have the same concepts because our syntactic
contents of our thoughts, precluding much of structures are nomically related to the same
cognitive psychology. With eliminativism as properties, but we have our concepts differ-
the alternative, atomism is not negotiable for ently; we are disposed to make different infer-
Fodor. ences, because syntactic differences in our
Fodor explains concept possession in terms concepts determine novel causal relations
of “locking on” to properties. We are locked on between them.
to a property when we have tokened a mental RTM, CTM, and LOT attempt a complete
representation with that property as its content. account of the mind and its structure. This is
The usual way of locking on to some property only part of the story, however, and perhaps a
is to experience stereotypical instances of it, small part at that, according to Fodor. Fodor
but this is not the only way. Possessing some distinguishes highly specialized functional units
concepts may help us acquire others, such as of the mind, called modules, from central pro-
abstract concepts or concepts of fictitious cessing. Modules are extremely fast because
things. Note that this does not contradict they are informationally encapsulated: the
atomism because Fodor distinguishes what it is information they process is domainly specific.
822
FODOR
Central cognition, on the other hand, is where Mass., 1987).

in the mind any information can influence the A Theory of Content and Other Essays
processing of any other information. Examples (Cambridge, Mass., 1990).
of modules are sensory systems and language Holism: A Shopper’s Guide, with Ernest
processing. Evidence for the modularity of early Lepore (Oxford, 1992).
vision, for example, is given by the fact that, The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its
despite recognizing a visual illusion and Semantics (Cambridge, Mass., 1994).
knowing how it is produced, we still see the Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went
effect; we cannot use our knowledge to see Wrong (New York, 1998).
through the illusion (Pylyshyn 2003). Fodor’s In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on
view is that he has given an account of modular Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of
thinking only (1983, 2000). His reasoning is Mind (Cambridge, Mass., 1998).
that computations are sensitive only to the local The Mind Doesn’t Work that Way: The
syntax of a representation. But then to deter- Scope and Limits of Computational
mine, say, the simplicity of a statement, a Psychology (Cambridge, Mass., 2000).
typical central process, requires computing its The Compositionality Papers, with Ernest
local syntactic relations to every other repre- Lepore (Oxford, 2002).
sentation. We would have to perform compu- Hume Variations (Oxford, 2003).
tations over all of our representations in just a
few hundred milliseconds, which even with Other Relevant Works
massively parallel processing is utterly implau- “What Do You Mean?” Journal of
sible. Understanding central cognition is simply Philosophy 57 (1960): 499–506.
beyond our conceptual resources at present, Ed. with Jerrold Katz, The Structure of
according to Fodor. Language: Readings in the Philosophy of
Fodor’s views have shaped the landscape of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964).
research on the mind. Theorists define and “Three Reasons not to Derive ‘Kill’ from
better understand their own views by con- ‘Cause to Die’,” Linguistic Inquiry 1
trasting them with Fodor’s. His profound influ- (1970): 429–38.
ence in philosophy of mind and the mind “Special Sciences,” Synthese 28 (1974):
sciences is likely to be a lasting one. 97–115.
“Propositional Attitudes,” The Monist 61
BIBLOGRAPHY (1978): 501–23.
Psychological Explanation (New York, “Fodor’s Guide to Mental Representation,”
1968). Mind 94 (1985): 76–100.
The Language of Thought (Cambridge, “Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture:
Mass., 1975). A Critical Analysis,” with Zenon Pylyshyn,
“Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Cognition 28 (1988): 3–71.
Research Strategy in Cognitive Science,” “Making Mind Matter More,” Philosophical
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980): Topics 67 (1989): 59–79.
63–109. “Fodor, Jerry A.,” in A Companion to the
Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Philosophy of Mind, ed. Samuel
Foundations of Cognitive Science Guttenplan (Oxford, 1994), pp. 292–300.
(Cambridge, Mass., 1981). “Deconstructing Dennett’s Darwin,” Mind
The Modularity of Mind (Cambridge, Mass., and Language 11 (1996): 246–62.
1983). “The Red Herring and the Pet Fish,” with
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in Ernest Lepore, Cognition 58 (1996):
the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, 253–70.
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FODOR
“All at Sea in Semantic Space: Churchland on and Phenomenological Review 54 (1994):

Meaning Similarity,” Journal of 847–55.
Philosophy 96 (1999): 381–403.
“Language, Thought and Compositionality,” Christopher Viger
Philosophy suppl. 48 (2001): 227–42.
Further Reading
Bio Dict Psych, Bio 20thC Phils, Blackwell
Analytic Phil, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio,
Oxford Comp Phil, Routledge Encycl Phil FOGELIN, Robert John (1932– )
Cain, M. J. Fodor: Language, Mind, and
Philosophy (Cambridge, UK, 2002). Robert J. Fogelin was born on 24 June 1932 in
Chalmers, David J. “Connectionism and Congers, New York. His father, Carl Fogelin,
Compositionality: Why Fodor and was a sheet metal worker and musician; his
Pylyshyn were Wrong,” Philosophical mother, Florence Sandberg, a homemaker and,
Psychology 6 (1993): 305–19. after the death of her husband, a civil servant
Chomsky, Noam. Rules and Representations whose sharp mind carried her rapidly up
(New York, 1980). through the ranks. Fogelin received his BA in
Churchland, Paul M. “Conceptual Similarity philosophy at the University of Rochester in
across Sensory and Neural Diversity: The 1955. His graduate studies took him to Yale,
Fodor/Lepore Challenge Answered,” and there he received his MA in 1957 and his
Journal of Philosophy 95 (1998): 5–32. PhD in philosophy in 1960, writing his disser-
Davidson, Donald. “Radical Interpretation tation under the supervision of Brand
Interpreted,” Philosophical Perspectives 8 BLANSHARD and the unofficial guidance of Alan
(1994): 121–8. Ross ANDERSON. He was an assistant and asso-
Dennett, Daniel C. “Granny Versus Mother ciate professor of philosophy at Pomona
Nature – No Contest,” Mind and College from 1958 to 1966. In 1966 Fogelin
Language 11 (1996): 263–9. returned to Yale as associate professor, and in
Loewer, Barry, and Georges Rey, eds. 1970 was promoted to full professor of phi-
Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics losophy. In 1980 he left Yale to join Dartmouth
(Oxford, 1991). College where he became the Sherman Fairchild
Macdonald, Cynthia, and Graham Professor in the Humanities. He retired in
Macdonald, eds. Connectionism 2001, and presently lives in White River
(Cambridge, Mass., 1995). Junction, Vermont, with Florence Clay Fogelin,
Preti, Consuelo, and Victor Velarde-Mayol. a published poet and his wife for more than
On Fodor (Belmont, Cal., 2001). forty years.
Pylyshyn, Zenon. Seeing and Visualizing: It’s Fogelin is best known for his work on
Not What You Think (Cambridge, Mass., Wittgenstein’s philosophy and for his studies of
2003). skepticism. From the two he fashions a con-
“Review Essays of Concepts: Where temporary view amounting to a revival of the
Cognitive Science Went Wrong,” Mind Pyrrhonian skeptical philosophy. But he was
and Language 15 (2000): 299–349. not always such a skeptic. Fogelin’s Yale dis-
Followed by Fodor’s “Replies to Critics,” sertation, “The Definition of Ethical Terms,”
pp. 350–74. defends a theory of ethical statements on which
Searle, John R. “The Connection Principle such statements are often “cognitive” or
and the Ontology of the Unconscious: A genuine assertions because they put forward
Reply to Fodor and Lepore,” Philosophy truth-claims. This theory opposed powerful
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FOGELIN
trends of noncognitivism about ethical state- has factual content, although it is context that
ments then being advanced by such philoso- determines just what the relevant facts are in a
phers as A. J. Ayer, R. M. Hare, and P. H. given case. The statement itself says only
Nowell-Smith, who had argued that ethical whether there are such facts. Still, the depen-
statements make no factual claims and cannot dence of ethical statements upon the facts
be true or false. makes them subject to evaluation for truth or
Soon after his arrival at Pomona College, falsity.
Fogelin met Richard POPKIN, who was teaching Fogelin calls statements that function in this
at nearby Claremont Graduate School. Popkin way “warrant statements” and proposes an
introduced Fogelin to the ideas of Sextus account of warrant statements that can be
Empiricus and the Pyrrhonian philosophy that modified to fit a range of types of expression,
Sextus records in Outlines of Pyrrhonism. At including epistemic terms, perception terms,
about the same time Fogelin had also found his modal terms, and value terms. The analysis
way, through the works of J. L. Austin, to the divides warrant statements into two parts, a
writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Thus warrant component (that makes a claim about
Fogelin’s education in classical skepticism evidential backing) and a material component
began alongside his first reading of (a particular statement, action or choice). For
Wittgenstein. This first exposure to instance, the statement “X knows that the king
Wittgenstein was already unusual, as it was is in check” is broken down into the warrant-
received not from the hands of initiates but carrying operator “X knows that” and the
rather from a relatively isolated study of statement “The king is in check.” The warrant
Wittgenstein’s writings. Such independence component then can be given precise analysis,
from the tradition allowed Fogelin the freedom to be determined by the particular subject
of perspective to see Wittgenstein not only as a matter. On the account of “knows that” which
philosopher deeply skeptical of philosophy itself Fogelin offers, the full analysis in this case yields
but also as a skeptical philosopher of a partic- “X commands adequate grounds for the state-
ular, identifiable sort: a Pyrrhonian skeptic. ment: ‘The king is in check’.” The knowledge
But that view of Wittgenstein was not to claim is true or false depending on whether X
blossom immediately, and Fogelin’s first book, in fact has such grounds for the statement.
Evidence and Meaning (1967), is still mostly Similar analyses can be provided for “X sees
innocent of the Pyrrhonism yet to come. The that p,” “It is possible that p,” “It is permitted
book draws upon the earlier dissertation’s that p,” and so on.
analysis of ethical statements, according to Fogelin suggests that some traditional
which the function of a value judgment is to disputes in philosophy are encouraged by the
indicate the evidential backing or “warrant” for failure of the disputants to recognize that
some further statement, action, or decision. certain statements are warrant statements. For
This allows an instructive analysis of ethical instance, when the error theorist about ethics
statements. For example, “X is good” becomes squares off against the moral intuitionist, both
“There are adequate grounds for choosing X.” agree that the term “good” in typical ethical
“S ought not to do A” is analyzed as “There are statements is used to ascribe an alleged moral
adequate grounds for saying to S, ‘Don’t do property – say, Goodness – to something. Their
A!’.” Ethical statements can support prescrip- dispute concerns whether in fact there is any
tions or imperatives, not by being equivalent to such property. Fogelin’s warrant-statement
them but by noting the grounds one has for analysis forestalls this dispute. Ethical state-
making them. Normally, the relevant grounds ments do not attempt to ascribe a property of
indicated by the statement will involve an Goodness at all. Instead, they indicate the
appeal to facts. An ethical statement therefore degree of factual backing one has for, say,
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FOGELIN
choosing something or praising it. Thus the proceed in philosophy; for example, whether to
opposing sides of the traditional debate both propose nontraditional theories of meaning to
suffer from a misunderstanding of the actual replace failed traditional ones or whether
function of ethical language. Once the misun- simply to loosen the grip of the desire to for-
derstanding is cleared away, the dispute is dis- mulate unified theories of meaning. He high-
solved. Traces of Fogelin’s Austinian youth are lighted the therapeutic orientation of
visible here as well as in the book’s discussion Wittgenstein’s philosophy, calling attention to
of the language of argument. Fogelin provides Wittgenstein’s attempts to allay the impulse
a sensitive analysis of some of the informal towards nonsensical metaphysics as a response
rules governing conversation, including one he to philosophical puzzlement by uncovering the
calls the rule of strength: Make the strongest source of the puzzlement and showing it to be
claim you can reasonably defend! In the same an illusion. It was a view of philosophy Fogelin
year in which Evidence and Meaning appeared, found illuminating and persuasive.
Paul GRICE would give his celebrated William The watershed in Fogelin’s own philosophi-
James Lectures, in which he outlines a detailed cal development was to be reached just a few
analysis of the informal rules governing con- years later, when he identified an ancient tra-
versation. The rule doing the most work in dition in philosophy to which Wittgenstein
Grice’s theory is the rule of quantity, and it belongs, a tradition that Fogelin would find
corresponds exactly to Fogelin’s rule of worth defending himself. In “Wittgenstein and
strength. Although he did not continue to Classical Skepticism” (1981), and later in the
publish directly on the topic, Fogelin’s interest second edition of Wittgenstein (1987), Fogelin
in conversational rules would be an abiding connected Wittgenstein and the Pyrrhonian
element in his thought. skeptical tradition. Pyrrhonian skepticism, as
In his return to Yale, Fogelin’s teaching Fogelin interprets it, is aimed at philosophy
duties brought him to the study of David itself and especially at philosophical theories
Hume and continued his education in skepti- that parade as new forms of knowledge. Beliefs
cism. On a trip to London, Fogelin was and claims belonging to common life are left
recruited by Ted Honderich to author a untouched by the Pyrrhonist, but philosophical
volume for the new Routledge and Kegan Paul theories that purport to “ground” them, or
series The Arguments of the Philosophers. His perhaps to replace them, are subjected to a dis-
Wittgenstein (1976) was lauded for its clarity tinctive style of criticism. The theories are crit-
and insight and became hugely influential for icized from within: the very sorts of arguments
its interpretation of the private-language marshaled in the campaign to establish some
argument as a “skeptical paradox” for which philosophical theory are turned against that
Wittgenstein proposes a “skeptical solution.” philosophy itself. The Pyrrhonist advances no
Still, it was not without its critics. In particu- positive philosophical doctrine but only
lar, Fogelin’s portrayal of Wittgenstein’s later borrows the instruments of philosophy as a
philosophy as being involved in an attempt to temporary measure, discarding them along
develop a constructivist semantics for language, with the dogmatic philosophy they are used to
and as hostile to science and to causal expla- destroy. Not even skepticism remains in the
nations of various natural phenomena, struck wake of the Pyrrhonian critique, for it destroys
some as a misreading. Nor was Fogelin’s will- itself as well, which is its purpose. What the
ingness to state the private-language argument Pyrrhonist seeks is escape from philosophy and
in detail and to call its cogency into question the aporia it provokes. The aim of Pyrrhonian
popular with all readers. What Fogelin saw in inquiry is the peace of mind that comes with
Wittgenstein, however, was a series of partially escape. And here the link with Wittgenstein’s
submerged, competing conceptions of how to conception of his own approach in philosophy
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FOGELIN
is clear: “The real discovery is the one that In contrast to such dogmatic epistemologies,
makes me capable of stopping doing philoso- his neo-Pyrrhonian approach attempts only to
phy when I want to. The one that gives philos- describe our actual practices of making and
ophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by assessing knowledge claims, and seeks to under-
questions which bring itself into question.” stand what it is about those practices that gives
(Philosophical Investigations, §133) rise to the specter of skeptical refutation of
The new chapter of Pyrrhonism that Fogelin ordinary knowledge claims. An analysis of
finds in Wittgenstein – the neo-Pyrrhonian phi- knowledge, taken in this merely descriptive
losophy – is one that adds substantially to the way, is readily proposed. “X knows that p”
ancient tradition. The traditional Pyrrhonist means that X justifiably believes that p on
ambition was simply to produce suspension of grounds that establish the truth of p. Of the
belief with respect to philosophical theories by tendency for knowledge claims to be undercut
undermining them with their own arguments. at the hands of epistemology, Fogelin offers a
The new Wittgensteinian Pyrrhonist seeks diagnosis. He suggests that the rules governing
further to quiet philosophical torment by the ordinary practice of epistemic appraisal
exposing its original sources and making clear allow one to raise the level of scrutiny to which
how philosophical perplexity arises in the first various knowledge claims might be subjected.
place. And it is this neo-Pyrrhonian programme At higher levels, more stringent demands are
that Fogelin puts into action. In Pyrrhonian made on one’s evidence in order to be able to
Reflections on Knowledge and Justification claim to know a particular fact. One must be
(1994), Fogelin carries out a neo-Pyrrhonian able to rule out ever more potential defeaters to
critique of contemporary epistemologies and one’s claim to know. But virtually no claim
their various attempts to formulate an analysis can meet these demands if the level of scrutiny
of knowledge and a theory of epistemic justifi- is raised indefinitely. What philosophical
cation. Contemporary epistemology, he argues, theories mistakenly aim for is a form justifica-
is still grappling with a Pyrrhonian challenge tion that will shield some of our ordinary
codified in Agrippa’s modes: to show how one’s knowledge claims no matter how high the level
beliefs are justified without either falling into a of scrutiny should be raised. No proposed form
vicious infinite regress, moving in a circle to pre- of justification seems close to achieving this,
suppose the justification of the beliefs in however. In ordinary life the rules of epistemic
question, or coming to rest at some arbitrary appraisal are not pushed to such extremes and
point with beliefs that are themselves not so do not yield the skeptic’s verdict that almost
shown to be justified. The challenge is raised by nothing is known. Yet reflection alone can raise
the very philosophical theories that attempt to the level of scrutiny, and if pursued to the limit,
meet it – foundationalism, internalist and such reflection drives one into skepticism,
externalist coherentism, subjunctive analyses, against which dogmatic epistemology offers no
and so on – but it is in fact unanswered by relief. And it is precisely this sort of unrestricted
them, and so those theories fail on their own reflection that is distinctive of philosophy. By
terms. The totality of the strength of each par- contrast, ordinary cases of epistemic appraisal
ticular theory of epistemic justification, Fogelin are motivated by specific ordinary concerns
suggests, is exhausted in the weaknesses of its and come to rest once those concerns have been
rivals. No dogmatic epistemology can claim addressed. Kept in check by life’s actual
good credentials of its own, and none is a concerns, and unbothered by philosophy, the
match for skepticism. He concludes that in impulse to engage in theorizing about ideal-
epistemology “things are now largely as Sextus ized forms of justification is allowed to sleep
Empiricus left them almost two thousand years and the philosophical problem of epistemic jus-
ago” (1994, p. 11). tification no longer intrudes upon us. With this
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FOGELIN
understanding, Fogelin’s neo-Pyrrhonian (Cambridge, UK, 1993).

reaches peace of mind. “Wittgenstein’s Critique of Philosophy,” in
The Cambridge Companion to
BIBLIOGRAPHY Wittgenstein, ed. Hans Sluga and David
Evidence and Meaning: Studies in Analytic Stern (Cambridge, UK, 1996).
Philosophy (London, 1967). “Quine’s Limited Naturalism,” Journal of
Wittgenstein (London, 1976; 2nd edn 1987). Philosophy 94 (1997): 543–63.
Hume’s Skepticism (London, 1985). “David Lewis on Indicative and Subjunctive
Figuratively Speaking (New Haven, Conn., Conditionals,” Analysis 58 (1998): 286–9.
1988). “The Sceptic’s Burden,” International
Philosophical Interpretations (Oxford, 1992). Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (1999):
Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and 159–72.
Justification (Oxford, 1994). “Contextualism and Externalism: Trading in
Berkeley and the Principles of Human One Form of Skepticism for Another,”
Knowledge (London, 2001). Skepticism, Philosophical Issues 10 (2000):
Walking the Tightrope of Reason: The 43–57. Fogelin’s replies, pp. 86–93.
Precarious Life of a Rational Animal (New “Why Obey the Laws of Logic?”
York, 2003). Philosophical Exchange 32 (2002): 19–29.
A Defense of Hume On Miracles (Princeton, “Two Diagnoses of Skepticism,” in The
N.J., 2003). Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, ed. Steven
Luper (Aldershot, UK, 2003), pp. 137–47.
Other Relevant Works “The Skeptics are Coming! The Skeptics are
“Blanchard’s Reasons and Goodness,” Coming!” in Pyrrhonian Skepticism, ed.
Review of Metaphysics 17 (1963): 91–7. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Oxford, 2004).
“Wittgenstein and Intuitionism,” American
Philosophical Quarterly 5 (1968): 267–74. Further Reading
“Three Platonic Analogies,” Philosophical Bio 20thC Phils, Oxford Comp Phil
Review 80 (1971): 371–82. “Symposium on Pyrrhonian Reflections on
Understanding Arguments: An Introduction Knowledge and Justification,” Philosophy
to Informal Logic (New York, 1978). and Phenomenological Research 57
“When I Look at a Tomato there is much I (1997): 395–425.
cannot See,” The Monist 64 (1981): Rosenberg, Jay F. “Scrutinizing a Trade,”
100–123. Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 58–66.
“Wittgenstein and Classical Skepticism,” Villanueva, Enrique. “What Has
International Philosophical Quarterly 21 Contextualism to Do with Skepticism?”
(1981): 3–15. Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 67–71.
“The Tendency of Hume’s Scepticism,” in Williams, Michael. “Fogelin’s Neo-
The Skeptical Tradition, ed. Miles Pyrrhonism,” International Journal of
Burnyeat (Berkeley, Cal., 1983), pp. Philosophical Studies 7 (1999): 141–58.
397–412.
“Wittgenstein on Identity,” Synthese 56 Samuel S. Levey
(1983): 141–54.
“Hume and Berkeley on the Proofs of Infinite
Divisibility,” Philosophical Review 97
(1988): 47–69.
“Hume’s Skepticism,” in The Cambridge
Companion to Hume, ed. David F. Norton
828
FØLLESDAL
FØLLESDAL, Dagfinn Kaare (1932– ) analytic philosophy, including the functions of

mind, the indeterminacy of translation, the
Dagfinn Føllesdal was born on 22 June 1932 in social nature of language, and the externalist
Asxiu, Norway. He studied mathematics, view of meaning. He has argued against causal
mechanics, and astronomy at the University of theories of reference, and for the significance of
Oslo where he received the Cand.mag. degree the intentionality and normativity of con-
in 1953, and mathematics at the University of sciousness.
Göttingen. He spent two years studying ionos-
pheric physics before entering Harvard BIBLIOGRAPHY
University’s graduate program in philosophy. “Quantification into Causal Contexts,” in
He completed his PhD there in 1961, and Boston Studies in the Philosophy of
taught philosophy and logic at Harvard until Science (Dordrecht, 1965), pp. 263–74.
his return to Oslo in 1967. Since 1967 he has “Knowledge, Identity and Existence,”
been professor of philosophy at the University Theoria 33 (1967): 1–27.
of Oslo, and since 1968 has also been profes- “Interpretation of Quantifiers,” in Logic,
sor of philosophy at Stanford University. In Methodology and Philosophy of Science,
1976 he became C. I. Lewis Professor of ed. B. van Rootsellar and J. F. Stall
Philosophy at Stanford. (Amsterdam, 1968), pp. 271–81.
Among the lectures Føllesdal has given are: “Quine on Modality,” in Words and
the Hägerström Lectures (University of Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V.
Uppsala), the Wolfson College Lecture (Oxford Quine, ed. Donald Davidson and Jaakko
University), the Gurwitsch Lecture (New Hintikka (Dordrecht, 1968), pp. 175–85.
School for Social Research), and the Alfred “Husserl’s Notion of Noema,” Journal of
Schutz Lecture (American Philosophical Philosophy 66 (1969): 680–87.
Association). Føllesdal is a member of the “Indeterminacy of Translation and Under-
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and determination of the Theory of Nature,”
a member of Academia Europea and the acad- Dialectica 27 (1973): 289–301.
emies of science in Norway, Finland, Denmark, “Meaning and Experience,” in Mind and
and Sweden. He was President of the Language: Wolfson College Lectures 1974,
Norwegian Academy of Science, 1993, 1995, ed. S. Guttenplan (Oxford, 1975), pp.
and 1997. In addition, Føllesdal was a 25–44.
Guggenheim Fellow, a Santayana Fellow, a “Hermeneutics and the Hypothetico-deduc-
fellow of the American Council of Learned tive Method,” Dialectica 33 (1979):
Societies, a member of the Institute for 319–36.
Advanced Study at Princeton, a fellow at the “The Status of Rationality Assumptions in
Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Interpretations and in the Explanation of
Sciences at Stanford, a Wissenschaftskolleg Action,” Dialectica 36 (1982): 301–16.
fellow, and a fellow at the Center for Advanced “Essentialism and Reference,” in The
Studies, Oslo. Philosophy of W. V. Quine, ed. Paul
Føllesdal’s primary research interests include Schilpp and Lewis Hahn (La Salle, Ill.,
philosophy of language and phenomenology, 1986), pp. 97–113.
while his secondary interests include philosophy “Indeterminacy and Mental States,” in
of science, philosophy of action, and ethics. Perspectives on Quine, ed. Robert Barrett
He has been influenced by W. V. QUINE’s phi- and Roger Gibson (Oxford, 1990), pp.
losophy on the one hand and by Edmund 98–109.
Husserl’s on the other. Føllesdal has made “In What Sense is Language Public?” in On
important contribution to major issues in recent Quine: New Essays, ed. P. Leonardi and
829
FØLLESDAL
M. Santambroglio (Cambridge, UK, 1995), 138–47.

pp. 427–46. Langsdorf, Lenore. “The Noema as
“Mind and Meaning,” Philosophical Studies Intentional Entity: A Critique of
94 (1999): 139–49. Føllesdal,” Review of Metaphysics 37
Referential Opacity and Modal Logic (1984): 757–84.
(London and New York, 2004).
Roger F. Gibson
“Phenomenology,” in Handbook of
Perception, ed. E. C. Carterette and M. P.
Friedman (New York, 1974), vol. 1, pp.
377–86.
“Brentano and Husserl on Intentional FOLLETT, Mary Parker (1868–1933)
Objects and Perception,” Grazer
Philosophische Studien 5 (1978): 83–94. Mary Parker Follett was born on 3 September
“Sartre on Freedom,” in The Philosophy of 1868 in Quincy, Massachusetts. She was
Jean Paul Sartre, ed. Paul Schilpp and educated first at Thayer Academy, where she
Lewis Hahn (La Salle, Ill., 1981), pp. developed an interest in philosophy. Four years
392–407. after graduating in 1888, she entered Harvard’s
“Causation and Explanation: A Problem in Annex, soon to become Radcliffe College. There
Davidson’s View on Action and Mind,” in she studied English, political economy, and
Actions and Events: Perspectives on the history. She also studied abroad at Cambridge
Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. (Newnham) from 1890 to 1891. Follett received
Ernest Lepore and Brian McLaughlin her BA summa cum laude from Radcliffe in
(Oxford, 1985), pp. 311–23. 1898, having already published her first book,
“Von Wright’s Modal Logic,” in The The Speaker of the House of Representatives
Philosophy of Georg Henrik von Wright, (1896). She was a social worker and political
ed. Paul Schilpp and Lewis Hahn (La Salle, activist in Boston for many years. She lived in
Ill., 1989), pp. 539–56. England during the last five years of her life.
“Gödel and Husserl,” in From Dedekind to Follett died on 18 December 1933 in Boston,
Gödel: Essays on the Development of the Massachusetts.
Foundations of Mathematics, ed. Jaakko Follett read Latin, Greek, French, and
Hintikka (Dordrecht, 1995), pp. 427–46. German and her early philosophical interests
Ed., The Philosophy of Quine, 5 vols (New and training were in the idealist tradition. Yet
York, 2000–2001). she also admired William JAMES’s pluralism,
“Quine on Modality,” in The Cambridge and her own writings merged both views. Her
Companion to Quine, ed. Roger Gibson holistic vision of society as a complex interactive
(Cambridge, UK, 2004), pp. 200–213. unity, and her assertion that the individual
found an identity only within group activities
Further Reading had similarities with ideas of the American prag-
Oxford Comp Phil matist George Herbert MEAD, a contemporary
Banchetti, Marina-Paola. “Føllesdal on the sociologist/philosopher.
Notion of the Noema: A Critique,” Follett spearheaded community centers in
Husserl Studies 10 (1993–4): 81–95. Boston’s poorer neighborhoods and developed
Hintikka, Jaakko. “Existence and Identity in evening educational and recreational programs
Epistemic Contexts: A Comment on and departments of vocational guidance in the
Føllesdal’s Paper,” Theoria 33 (1967): local schools. This extended use of school build-
830
FOLLETT
ings became a social movement and a national tional expertise than from hierarchical position,
example. We might see Follett as a typical she believed that labor could participate in cor-
example of a progressive social thinker in that porate decisions. Many of her ideas were
she favored social planning and “control,” and adopted by those considering new non-coercive
used her time and inheritance to pursue social forms of management and social relations in
projects. However, she was also often critical of both the United States and Great Britain, thus
American progressivism’s reliance on an expan- extending her influence well beyond the halls of
sion of the suffrage to improve society, dis- academe.
missing “ballot-box democracy” as feeble since
it left power relations unchanged. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Her second book, The New State (1918), The Speaker of the House of
began as a report on her community activities, Representatives (New York, 1896).
but developed into a more theoretical work The New State: Group Organization, the
exploring group dynamics. Follett maintained Solution of Popular Government (New
that the state was the highest expression of York, 1918).
human endeavor, and that creativity and Creative Experience (New York, 1924).
freedom were generated from organized social Freedom and Co-ordination: Lectures in
interaction of individuals not merely persua- Business Organization, ed. L. Urwick
sion of the masses. Her next book, Creative (London, 1949).
Experience (1924), examined sociopolitical Dynamic Administration: The Collected
behavior in terms of the “wholes” of Gestalt Papers of Mary Parker Follett, ed. Henry
psychology. Friendly with industrialists and per- C. Metcalf and L. Urwick (New York,
ceiving industrial management as a central 1941).
modern concern, she also lectured extensively Mary Parker Follett, Prophet of
on that topic. Management: A Celebration of Writings
One of Follett’s most distinctive notions was from the 1920s, ed. Pauline Graham
that of “integration,” and she applied it to both (Boston, 1995).
her political theories and to business manage-
ment. Conflict is inevitable, yet it might serve as Further Reading
a forum for imaginative solutions and human Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio,
progress. Three possible approaches to conflict Dict Amer Bio, Who Was Who in
are domination, compromise, or integration. Amer v5
Domination leaves one party dissatisfied; com- Fry, Brian R. Mastering Public
promise often leaves all parties dissatisfied. Administration: From Max Weber to
Neither effect a qualitative change in actors’ Dwight Waldo (Chatham, N.J., 1989).
views. Integration involves reexamining Graham, Pauline, ed. Mary Parker Follett:
motives. Often disputants do not want mutually Prophet of Management (Cambridge,
exclusive ends. Therefore it is possible for a Mass., 1995).
solution to deliver desired ends to all. To give an Tonn, Joan C. Mary Parker Follett:
example: someone wishes to close an open and Creating Democracy, Transforming
drafty library window; another wants fresh air. Management (New Haven, Conn., 2003).
Follett’s “integration” would shut the first Wren, Daniel A., and Ronald G.
window while opening another in a different Greenwood. Management Innovators:
room, permitting air to circulate. Follett saw The People and Ideas that Have Shaped
this as a new sort of solution which introduces Modern Business (New York, 1998).
a new, non-traditional leadership style. Arguing
that a more natural authority derives from func- Evelyn Burg
831
FOLTZ
FOLTZ, Clara Shortridge (1849–1934) Angeles. Many of her initiatives benefited

women, such as laws that allowed them to act
Clara Shortridge Foltz was one of the first as executors and administrators of estates and
women to study and practice law in the United to serve as notaries. She also successfully
States. In both her practical and her written argued for the appointment of a jail matron for
work, she focused on legal reform and women’s female prisoners in San Francisco. Foltz con-
rights. She was born on 16 July 1849 in tributed to the Chicago Legal News, a peri-
Lafayette, Indiana to Talitha Cumi Harwood odical edited by Bradwell. From 1916 to 1918,
and Elias Willets Shortridge, a minister who Foltz published a periodical devoted to
later became a lawyer. Her brother, Samuel M. women’s issues, The New American Woman,
Shortridge, became a United States senator in and wrote a monthly column for its pages
California. She was educated by private tutors as entitled “The Struggles and Triumphs of a
a child, and attended Mt Pleasant Seminary in Woman Lawyer.” She also edited the San
Iowa. She then became a teacher herself in Diego Daily Bee in the late 1880s and early
Illinois before eloping, at the age of fifteen, with 1890s. Foltz died on 2 September 1934 in Los
Jeremiah Foltz. During hard years on an Iowa Angeles, California.
farm, she bore four children.
Foltz’s career came only after her early BIBLIOGRAPHY
marriage took her to California and then ended “The Matter of Goodell,” Wisconsin Law
in divorce. Clara began pursuing a legal appren- Journal 39 (1875): 232, 245–6.
ticeship with lawyers in San Jose, California. She “Public Defenders – Rights of Persons
succeeded in getting a placement with C. C. Accused of Crime – Abuses Now
Stephens and immediately began to work to Existing,” Albany Law Journal 48
change the California statute that barred women (1893): 248.
from practicing law. Foltz worked as a lawyer for “Public Defenders,” Chicago Legal News
several years before she was actually able to 25 (1893): 431.
attend law school, however. Foltz was admitted “The Evolution of Law,” Chicago Legal
to the California bar in 1878, joining Myra News 25 (12 August 1893).
B RADWELL as one of the first women “Duties of District Attorneys in
lawyers. When Hastings College refused to admit Prosecutions,” Criminal Law Magazine
her to its law school in the mid 1880s, she took 18 (1896): 415.
her case to court and won access to the school in “Public Defenders for Criminals,”
a decision ordering Hastings to admit women on American Law Review 31 (1897): 393.
the same terms as men (54 Calif. 28).
After studying at Hastings from 1888 to 1890, Further Reading
she was granted the right to argue before the US Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
Supreme Court in 1890. As a lawyer, Foltz ini- Who Was Who in Amer v5
tiated the legal reforms she advocated in her Avey, Sharon. The Lady Lawyer: Clara
written work. She was the author of one of Shortridge Foltz (Fullerton, Cal., 2001).
California’s first prison parole laws in 1893, Babcock, Barbara Allen. “Reconstructing
and in 1921 she wrote California’s statute to the Person: The Case of Clara Shortridge
authorize the appointment of public defenders Foltz,” Biography: An Interdisciplinary
for those who could not afford legal representa- Quarterly 12 (1989): 5–16.
tion. ———, “Clara Shortridge Foltz:
A feminist all of her professional life, Foltz Constitution Maker,” Indiana Law
was involved in many women’s organizations, Journal 66 (1991): 849–940.
including the Votes for Women Club in Los ———, “Clara Shortridge Foltz: ‘First
832
FONTAINE
Woman’,” Valparaiso University Law Fontaine left Southern in 1942, in the middle
Review 28 (Summer 1994): 1231–85. of World War II. He briefly worked in the
King, Deborah. “Clara Shortridge Foltz: Angel Chester shipyards as part of a work force chal-
and Revolutionary,” Hastings Women’s lenging segregated employment but soon enlisted
Law Journal 11 (Summer 2000): 179–219. in the US Army where he did vocational coun-
Morello, Karen Berger. The Invisible Bar: The seling and, more important, became acquainted
Woman Lawyer in America, 1638 to the with Nelson GOODMAN, who began teaching
Present (New York, 1986). philosophy at Pennsylvania in 1946. At the same
Shuck, Oscar T. History of the Bench and Bar time, Morgan State College in Baltimore,
of California (San Francisco, 1901). Maryland, called Fontaine to chair its depart-
ment of philosophy and psychology, but a year
Dorothy Rogers later he was asked to replace Goodman, who
went on leave in 1947–8. Pennsylvania repeated
the arrangement in 1948–9, and in 1949 he was
appointed assistant professor of philosophy. He
was tenured in 1958, and promoted to associate
professor in 1963, holding that position until his
FONTAINE, William Thomas Valeria death. He was the first African American to
(1909–68) teach philosophy at any Ivy League university,
and for a long time he was the only one.
William Thomas Fontaine was born on 2 Fontaine had begun to work on problems of
December 1909 in Chester, Pennsylvania, an counterfactuals, which had made Goodman
industrial town on the Delaware River, south of famous, but his writing was interrupted by a
Philadelphia. He received a BA from Lincoln long fight with active tuberculosis, which even-
University in 1930, and an MA in 1932 and PhD tually killed him. But from 1955 through the mid
in philosophy in 1936 from the University of 1960s, when the disease was in remission, he
Pennsylvania, respectively. At Pennsylvania he returned to issues of race, writing on the ethics
worked with Edgar A. SINGER and Francis Clarke, of segregation. Pragmatism and Fontaine’s color
and wrote a dissertation on Boethius and Bruno. had sensitized him to the subjectivity of social
He maintained an interest in ancient, medieval, knowledge, and to the social locus of the
and early modern philosophy, but in the summer knower. But in the context of the analytic phi-
of 1933 he had also studied at Harvard, where he losophy that dominated the profession, his
was introduced to the ideas of the conceptual concerns were barely recognized as being philo-
pragmatism of C. I. LEWIS, and pragmatic orien- sophical. By the 1960s he was a reflective
tations thereafter dominated his outlook. observer of the movement for African colonial
Fontaine taught a variety of courses part-time independence, the black Diaspora, and Pan
at Lincoln while earning his doctorate, including Africanism. Some of these interests congealed in
an innovative one on black history, but in 1936 Reflections on Segregation, Desegregation,
he accepted a position at Southern University in Power, and Morals, his book written in 1967,
Scotlandville, Louisiana, and during his six years the year before his death. Fontaine died on 29
there he wrote a series of essays on racial issues. December 1968 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
These articles combined a relativist approach to
cultural knowledge indebted to the pragmatists BIBLIOGRAPHY
with an understanding of how cultural views Fortune, Matter and Providence: A Study of
were a product of social position, in the manner Ancius Severinus Boethius and Giordano
of European sociologists of knowledge like Karl Bruno (Scotlandville, La., 1939).
Mannheim. “The Mind and Thought of the Negro of
833
FONTAINE
the United States as Revealed in inspired countless students to undertake a

Imaginative Literature, 1876–1940,” creative engagement with American philoso-
Southern University Bulletin 28 (March phy. He opened Fontinell to nothing less than
1942): 5–50. the open universe of radical possibility so
“Social Determination in the Writings of vividly depicted and vigorously defended by
American Negro Scholars,” American Ralph Waldo EMERSON, William JAMES, and
Journal of Sociology 49 (1944): 302–13. John DEWEY, a universe in which religion can
“Segregation and Desegregation in the become once again a “live option” even for
United States: A Philosophical Analysis,” the empirically oriented philosopher.
Présence Africaine 8–10 (1956): 154–73. Fontinell served as chair of his department at
“The Means End Relation and its both New Rochelle (1958–61) and at Queens
Significance for Cross-cultural Ethical (1966–72). Fontinell also served as an associ-
Agreement,” Philosophy of Science 25 ate editor for Cross Currents. After his retire-
(1958): 157–62. ment in 1991, he has continued a life of reading
Reflections on Segregation, Desegregation, and reflection.
Power, and Morals (Springfield, Ill., The titles of Fontinell’s two books indicate
1967). his main concerns. The subtitles are, in a dif-
ferent way, equally significant. The first, pub-
Further Reading lished in 1970, is titled Toward a
Proc of APA v43 Reconstruction of Religion: A Philosophical
Probe. The second, published in 1986 and
Bruce Kuklick reissued in 2000, is titled Self, God, and
Immortality: A Jamesian Investigation. These
two works add up to a significant contribution
to the advancement of American philosophy,
for several distinct reasons. In these works,
Fontinell offers an insightful reading of central
FONTINELL, Eugene (1924– ) figures in the pragmatic tradition (most notably
James and Dewey), but also draws upon such
Eugene Fontinell was born on 22 May 1924 in thinkers as Susanne K. LANGER and John H.
Scranton, Pennsylvania. He received his BA in RANDALL, Jr. As an interpreter of American
1948 from the University of Scranton. He texts, thinkers, and traditions, Fontinell makes
received his MA in 1950 and his PhD in phi- a notable contribution to American thought.
losophy in 1957 from Fordham University. But his interpretations are put forth as aids to
Fontinell began teaching philosophy at Iona probing, from a novel angle, perennial philo-
College (1951–4) and then moved to the sophical questions.
College of New Rochelle. In 1961 he took his Toward a Reconstruction of Religion is truly
third and final position in the philosophy what its subtitle promises. It opens with a
department of Queens College of City parable about isolated islanders who are thrust
University of New York. His colleagues at beyond their cultural insularity by encounters
Queens included John J. MCDERMOTT, Peter with individuals who exemplify other ways of
Manicas, and Ralph W. Sleeper, also important living. The spirit of Jamesian pluralism
contributors to the study of American thought. pervades this work of pragmatic reconstruc-
Fontinell had known McDermott from his time tion, just as the demand defining pragmatic
at Fordham, where both studied with Robert empiricism informs this reconstruction at every
Pollock, a gifted teacher who possessed a deep turn. This is the demand, in the first instance,
familiarity with American thought. Pollock to frame our questions in explicitly experiential
834
FONTINELL
terms and, subsequently, to formulate our destructive bid for illusory happiness entailing
answers only on the basis of what experience the complete forfeiture of any possibility of
discloses. In Toward a Reconstruction of genuine happiness; moreover, an ignoble with-
Religion the investigation moves from the drawal from the actual world of transient
opening parable to a detailed sketch of how affairs).
contemporary experience bids us to envision Fontinell was vital to the recovery of
the world as a scene of open-ended processes. American pragmatism at a time when James,
Fontinell probes into the pragmatic meaning of Dewey, and other pragmatists were being
religious truth, morality, and finally religion. eclipsed by positivists, analysts, existentialists,
Drawing heavily upon James and Dewey, he and others. Furthermore, he developed insights
offers pragmatic reconstructions of what is vital derived from James and Dewey into a philos-
and viable in traditional Christianity, but is ophy of religion principally addressed to reli-
unhesitant in noting what is, at this historical gious persons, above all ones reluctant to
juncture, stultifying and untenable. After care- abandon their traditional faith but unwilling to
fully interpreting their texts, he imaginatively maintain their religious convictions by appeals
uses their insights for his own purposes, includ- to anything but their lived experience. After
ing a defense of religion in which the ecclesia or John E. SMITH, no one has done more than
church (conceived as a community of wor- Fontinell to bring into sharp focus the abiding
shippers rooted in a history and embodied in relevance of American pragmatism to religious
institutions) plays a much more central and questions. These questions pertain to how the
prominent role than in the accounts offered by self can most authentically relate to itself as
James and Dewey. well as to ones concerning how to envision the
Self, God, and Immortality is also a philo- nature of divinity (with James, Fontinell opts
sophical probe deeply indebted to the singular for a finite God) and how to assess the
genius of James, as its subtitle makes clear. But, prospects for personal immortality. Fontinell’s
in a manner decidedly influenced by Dewey, works are deeply rooted in the American prag-
emphasis is placed by Fontinell on the self as a matism tradition, animated by the experiential
being at once constituted by its relationships to revelations and inextinguishable doubts so
others, and yet irreducibly unique as a center of evident in James’s Varieties of Religious
action and innovation. Fontinell uses James’s Experience and A Pluralistic Universe, as well
metaphor of overlapping, processive “fields” as as Dewey’s A Common Faith and Experience
one of his principal ways of giving expression and Nature.
to this conception of the self. The field-self
“participates in and is constituted by a range of BIBLIOGRAPHY
fields, some of which can be designated ‘wider’ Toward a Reconstruction of Religion: A
in relation to the identifying ‘center’ of the indi- Philosophical Probe (Garden City, N.Y.,
vidual self” (1986, p. 132). This Jamesian 1970).
Investigation is, more than anything else, an Self, God, and Immortality: A Jamesian
attempt to probe two possibilities. The first is Investigation (Philadelphia, 1986; New
that the finite, mortal human self might be con- York, 2000).
stituted in a transformative manner by a rela-
tionship to a transcendent yet finite God. The Other Relevant Works
second is that that the longing for personal “James’s Pragmatic Personalism,” in
immortality might be other than what Frontiers in American Philosophy, vol. 2,
Nietzsche, Freud, and a host of other contem- ed. Robert Burch (College Station, Tex.,
porary thinkers have claimed this longing to be 1996), pp. 356–64.
(a thoroughgoing betrayal of human life – a “Theistic Religion; Energizing or
835
FONTINELL
Deenergizing?” Contemporary Philosophy became full professor at UCLA, where she was
19 (January–April 1997): 26–32. appointed the first holder of the Gloria and
“James: Religion and Individuality,” in Paul Griffin Chair in Philosophy in 1988. In
Classical American Pragmatism: Its 1982–3 she was President of the Pacific
Contemporary Vitality, ed. Douglas Division of the American Philosophical
Anderson, Carl Hausman, and Sandra Association. She has the rare distinction of
Rosenthal (Urbana, Ill., 1999). being a fellow of both the British Academy and
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Further Reading Best known for her essays collected in Virtues
Colapietro, Vincent. “Beyond Doubt: and Vices (1978) and numerous other articles
Tradition, Narrative, and Processive in professional journals and literary reviews, she
Faith,” Cross Currents 39 (1989): 83–90. has lectured widely in the United States and
Lauder, Robert E. “Fontinell’s Self, God, and Great Britain, as well as in other major cities of
Immortality,” Contemporary Philosophy the world. Although she retired from UCLA in
24 (May–August 2002): 26–32. 1991, she continues to be a productive writer
and active participant in philosophical discus-
Vincent M. Colapietro sions of ethics. Her recent books include
Natural Goodness (2001) and Moral
Dilemmas (2002).
In a collection of essays in her honor,
Rosalind Hursthouse declares Foot the most
distinguished modern exponent of virtue ethics
FOOT, Philippa Ruth (1920– ) (Hursthouse et al. 1995, p. 74). Following in
the tradition of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas,
Throughout a philosophical career spanning Foot herself insists that a sound moral philos-
more than half a century, Philippa Foot has ophy should start from a theory of the virtues
been acclaimed for her rigorous, original, and and vices. Accordingly, her important collection
inspirational scholarship and teaching. She was entitled Virtues and Vices begins with an
born Philippa Ruth Bence on 3 October 1920 analysis of the concept of virtue: how virtues
in Owston Ferry, England, to William Sydney benefit and whom; how they differ from talents
Bence and Esther Cleveland Bosanquet and skills in being tied to the human will; and
(daughter of US President Grover Cleveland). how virtues as correctives are linked to the
She received her BA (1942) and MA (1946) peculiar features and deficiencies of human
from Somerville College, Oxford, where G. E. nature. For example, if human beings were
M. Anscombe was a major influence on her. never fearful in the face of danger, courage
She married Michael Foot in 1945. She stayed would not be seen as a virtue at all. Insofar as
at Somerville to teach philosophy for many Foot claims that what counts as virtues and
years in various positions: lecturer in philoso- vices depends on what human nature is like, her
phy (1947–50), tutorial fellow (1950–69), vice- virtue ethics can be labeled naturalistic.
principal (1967–9), and then became a senior According to Foot, “Virtues are in general ben-
research fellow (1970–88). Beginning in the eficial characteristics, and indeed ones that a
1960s, Foot also held visiting professorships at human being needs to have, for his own sake
American universities, including Cornell, and that of his fellows.” (1978, p. 3) While the
University of California at Los Angeles, cardinal virtues of courage, temperance, and
University of California at Berkeley, wisdom benefit both the agent and others,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, New charity and justice may sometimes require that
York University, and Princeton. In 1976 Foot agents sacrifice their own happiness for the
836
FOOT
sake of others. How the virtue of justice relates opting for death for the sake of the one who is
to self-interest is a recurrent problem for Foot to die” (1978, p. 34). Claiming that human
insofar as it raises the question of why one life itself is a good but leaving open the possi-
should act morally if one’s self-interest is at bility that it is not always so, Foot carefully
odds with the requirements of justice. examines the various distinctions brought up in
Besides analyzing the concept of virtue in a connection with euthanasia: active versus
general way, Foot is known for her work on passive, voluntary versus involuntary, and
specific moral issues, notably abortion and killing versus letting die. Whether an act of
euthanasia. Her 1967 essay on “The Problem euthanasia is justified will depend on its relation
of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect” to the virtues of charity and justice. If an act is
does not come to any general conclusions about uncharitable, and hence not good for the
the moral permissibility of abortion. However, person who dies, then the act is unjustified.
in this essay she challenges the doctrine of Foot offers an interesting discussion of the com-
double effect as a theory for resolving the complicated relation between a subject’s own view
peting interests in cases of abortion. Is it of her life and what makes a life good or bad.
morally permissible to inflict injury, even death, She also points out that while one always has
on an innocent to save another, perhaps even a right not to be killed, one does not always
many others? What shall we say of the judge have a right to life-prolonging or life-ending
who under pressure from rioters frames an procedures. She offers a nuanced discussion of
innocent person to save the lives of five when such rights obtain that shows moral judg-
hostages? Or the trolley driver who steers his ments demand careful inspection of the details
runaway engine away from a track where five and circumstances involved in each case.
men are standing onto a track where there is The connection between facts and values is
only one? Despite its initial appeal, Foot argues a major theme in Foot’s persistent opposition
that the doctrine of double effect is not the to emotivism and prescriptivism in ethics. She
most useful theory for dealing with such herself characterizes this opposition as “a
dilemmas. While the doctrine of double effect painfully slow journey … away from theories
invokes a distinction between intention in a that located the special character of evalua-
direct or strict sense and what is foreseen as a tions in each speaker’s attitudes, feelings, or
result of the intended action, Foot thinks that recognition of reasons for acting” (1978, p.
a distinction between positive and negative xiv). Her early essays “Moral Arguments”
rights, with correlative positive and negative (1958) and “Moral Beliefs” (1958) attack the
duties, is better suited to handling these con- alleged fact/value split, the claim that there is no
flicts without having to invoke any utilitarian logical connection between statements of fact
principle of greater good. The judge who con- and statements of value, and thus that argu-
siders framing an innocent person weighs the ments about moral issues can always break
negative duty of avoiding harm against the down even when disputants agree about
positive duty of providing aid. In this case, matters of fact. The fact/value dichotomy with
killing the innocent to save others abuses the its serious implications for moral reasoning
negative duty to avoid inflicting injury. The was made famous by David Hume, endorsed
driver of the runaway trolley, on the other by G. E. Moore, and developed by other twen-
hand, weighs two negative duties – not harming tieth-century critics of naturalistic ethics such as
the five and not harming the one – and so may Charles STEVENSON, A. J. Ayer, and R. M.
reasonably abide by that duty which causes Hare. Following Ludwig Wittgenstein, Foot’s
the least injury possible. tactic in opposing these forms of ethical
In her 1977 essay “Euthanasia,” she defines noncognitivism is to look at how evaluative
euthanasia as an act “of inducing or otherwise terms are used in ordinary circumstances to
837
FOOT
see if the evaluative terms can be separated farmers. An object is not good because it is
from descriptive factual content. For example, chosen but rather because of what it is chosen
consider the term “rude.” To call someone for. Choosing is not like pointing at something
rude, she claims, there must be some reference but more like a “picking out for a role, which
to disrespect or offense against norms of has a ground” (1978, p. 143). If the point of an
behavior that can be pointed to as evidence for activity has to do with common interests, needs,
the person’s rudeness. One cannot simply call and desires of those who engage in it, reasons
someone rude for walking slowly up to an for the choice can be offered and discussed.
English front door, she says, or for behaving However, the fact that something is good does
totally conventionally. There are criteria of not mean one necessarily has a reason to choose
correct usage of concepts, and a failure to it. A knife may be a good knife, but if one has
follow those criteria is a failure to use the no use for cutting, one will not have reason to
concept at all. To the claim that calling a piece choose it. The choices of the speaker, she con-
of behavior rude is simply expressing one’s cludes, are neither a necessary nor a sufficient
attitude, Foot responds that one’s attitude in condition for the use of the term good. But if
this case presupposes beliefs about certain con- this is so, she admits, it may be the case that
ditions being fulfilled (1978, p. 103). Consider particular speakers or agents not only have no
another example. The claim “this is dangerous” reason to choose good things like good cars or
has a warning function, similar to how “this is good knives but also have no reason to choose
good” allegedly has a commending function, at good actions and good character traits.
least according to the emotivists and prescrip- Without sharing the standard needs, desires,
tivists. But not anything at all can be called and interests of others in one’s social group, one
dangerous, she notes, or have this warning may have no apparent reason to act morally at
function: it is logically impossible to warn all.
about something not thought of as threatening Foot develops this latter point in her famous
evil, while the assertion of danger requires some essay on “Morality as a System of Hypothetical
evidence. Her general point is that one “who Imperatives” (1972). For morality as for eti-
uses moral terms at all, whether to assert or quette, she claims, certain behavior may be
deny a moral proposition, must abide by the required, not merely recommended, but that it
rules for their use, including the rules about is required still leaves open the question, why
what shall count as evidence for or against the should I do what I am required to do? For her,
moral judgment concerned” (1978, p. 105). Kant’s famous categorical imperative is an
For her, the use of evaluative terms like “good” empty slot; all imperatives depend for their
is internally related to their objects, and thus efficacy or bindingness on people’s interests or
not merely to the feelings or attitudes of the desires. In her “Reply to Professor William
speaker. Frankena” (1975), she reiterates: “Moral judg-
Her essay on “Goodness and Choice” (1961) ments are, I say, hypothetical imperatives in
continues to pry apart the alleged connection the sense that they give reasons for acting only
between the use of value terms and the feelings, in conjunction with interests and desires. We
attitudes, and choices of speakers or agents. cannot change that though we could keep up
She considers how the term good is internally the pretence that it is otherwise.” (1978, p.
related or connected to such things as knives, 177) To the charge that her position under-
cars, horse-riders, and farmers. The ascription mines morality, Foot retorts that “a morality of
of the term good in these cases depends on ful- hypothetical imperatives is not a morality of
filling certain objective criteria, whether in inclination; resolution and self-discipline being
terms of function or purpose, as for cars and at least as necessary to achieve moral ends as to
knives, or social practices, as for riders and achieve anything else” (1978, p. 170). On this
838
FOOT
view, then, morality is still very much con- opment, scholars now writing on Foot’s philo-
nected with the practice of virtues, though the sophical career divide her work into early,
rationality of acting virtuously is, according to middle, and recent (for example Gavin
Foot at this stage in her thinking, quite contin- Lawrence, in Hursthouse et al. 1995). Early
gent. Foot attacked the fact/value dichotomy, but
If reasons for acting morally cannot be still held that moral considerations provide
located in some universal, binding for each and reasons for acting for each and every person.
every person, nevertheless Foot’s investigations Middle Foot – regarding morality as a system
consistently show that moral judgments and of hypothetical imperatives – argued against
evaluations must be located in a social dimen- the necessary rationality of moral action. In
sion. Recall that her early essays argued that the her 2001 book Natural Goodness, Foot herself
use of evaluative terms depends on social norms labels this view of morality “indigestible” (p.
entailing descriptive evidence. Contrary to the 59). Recent Foot now claims that acting
prevailing doctrines of contemporary analytic morally is acting rationally, and practical ratio-
ethics, her essay on “Approval and nality itself is necessarily tied to human
Disapproval” (1977) again highlights the social goodness. “I want to say, baldly, that there is
in contrast to the individualistic character of no criterion for practical rationality that is not
morality. Just as concepts of voting and derived from that of goodness of the will”
banking require social institutions and con- (2001, p. 11). But her view here is decidedly not
ventions for their use, so too “it is no more Kantian. Influenced by her philosophical
possible for a single individual, without a mentors – Aquinas, Wittgenstein, and Elizabeth
special social setting, to approve or disapprove Anscombe – but also by contemporary philoso-
than it is for him to vote” (1978, p. 191). For phers and colleagues such as Warren Quinn,
example, while I may hold an opinion about Rosalind Hursthouse, Michael Thompson, and
the proposed marriage or move of my next- Gavin Lawrence, Foot articulates a thorough-
door neighbor, I am in no position, in the role going naturalistic ethics grounded in facts about
of being merely a neighbor, to approve or dis- human life. “To determine what is goodness
approve these actions. “I approve” is a perfor- and what defect of character, disposition and
mative requiring specific social settings and choice, we must consider what human good is
conventions. To the ethical noncognitivist’s and how human beings live: in other words,
objection that approval and disapproval are what kind of a living thing a human being is.”
merely attitudes that anyone can have about (2001, p. 51) Returning to the vexing question
anything, Foot replies that “the attitudes of of why a person should follow the dictates of
approval and disapproval would not be what justice even when they conflict with self-interest
they are without the existence of tacit agree- or desires, Foot can now say that the just
ment on the question of who listens to whom person recognizes certain considerations, such
and about what. On this view where we have as the fact of a promise or a neighbor’s need, as
approval or disapproval we necessarily have powerful and even compelling reasons for
such agreements ….” (1978, p. 198) Summing acting. Recent Foot, then, has freed herself
up her argument, she claims that if the expres- from the dominant philosophical prejudice that
sion of approval and disapproval is part of the only desires or self-interest can motivate or
complex phenomenon we call morality, and if serve as reasons for acting. But in the face of the
approval and disapproval are essentially social fantastic diversity of human lives, can one argue
in presupposing determinate social practices persuasively for a common human good? In her
and backgrounds, then morality itself is essen- 1978 Lindley Lecture on “Moral Relativism”
tially social (1978, p. 207). Foot had already pointed in the direction of her
To take account of her philosophical devel- recent work on Natural Goodness: “Granted
839
FOOT
that it is wrong to assume identity of aim and unfounded. For example, she does not
between peoples of different cultures; never- believe that most instances of human sympathy
theless there is a great deal that all men have in or compassion are motivated by malice, jealousy,
common. All need affection, the cooperation of or resentment against the more powerful, so she
others, a place in a community, and help in cannot accept his overall attack on the ethics of
trouble. It isn’t true to suppose that human compassion. Furthermore, she says, “those who
beings can flourish without these things ….” take Nietzsche’s attack on morality as an
(1979, p. 16) Understanding the conditions of edifying call to authenticity and self-fulfillment
being human is essential to understanding are deluding themselves”: for her Nietzsche’s
human goodness and thus the dictates of refusal to call actions of rape, torture, or cruelty
morality and the ideals of virtue, or what Foot intrinsically wrong or evil cannot be tolerated in
now calls “natural normativity.” To the objec- the name of individual inspiration or cultural
tion that practical rationality is simply the playfulness. In the end, she claims, “Nietzsche fell
pursuit of happiness, she responds with a into the philosophers’ trap of inventing a gener-
nuanced analysis of happiness as a protean alizing theory [of will to power] largely unsup-
concept that cannot be simply identified as the ported by observation. It is common to think of
human good. Too many examples of those him as a wonderful psychologist, but at this
willing to sacrifice happiness for justice, honor, point I think that he was not.” (2001, p. 113)
or some other virtue tell against the claim that Summing up a philosophical career as bril-
happiness is to be identified with the human liant and subtle as Philippa Foot’s is extremely
good and thus with the goal of a practically difficult. Nevertheless, in terms of her own
rational agent. To the claim that genuine hap- metaphor of the journey, certain markers
piness consists in a life of virtue, Foot demurs, appear constant: her opposition to emotivism,
for that view allows too little room for the prescriptivism, utilitarianism, and Kantianism;
genuine tragedy that may lie in a moral choice. her advocacy of naturalism and virtue ethics;
Reviewing Philippa Foot’s philosophical and her use of distinctions from Aquinas and
work as whole, one is struck not only by the tactics from Wittgenstein. Her preoccupation
brilliance of her analyses and examples but with the rationality of moral judgment and
also by the fact that she is forever willing to action stretches across the other concerns, and
change or modify her position in response to takes various turns during her career, as we
sound argument. She does not flinch from the have seen. In addition to the substantive con-
challenge of opposing views, nor does she tributions Philippa Foot has made to ethics,
hesitate to expose recalcitrant philosophical the imaginative vitality and rigor of her philo-
prejudices. The feisty character of her work is sophical voice will continue to influence her
further demonstrated by the fact that for many readers, colleagues, and students: she has
decades she was among the very few Anglo- shown that philosophy in its most genuine
American analytic ethicists to engage seriously sense is indeed a dialogue in search of truth.
and critically with the writings of Friedrich
Nietzsche, the self-proclaimed immoralist. Foot BIBLIOGRAPHY
admires Nietzsche’s “daring, his readiness to “Moral Arguments,” Mind 67 (1958):
query everything … his special nose for vanity, 502–13.
for pretense, for timid evasion,” yet in the end “Moral Beliefs,” Proceedings of the
it is his psychology she finds unconvincing. Aristotelian Society 59 (1958): 83–104.
While she grants Nietzsche’s genius in exposing “Goodness and Choice,” Proceedings of the
hidden motivations, foreshadowing the depth Aristotelian Society Supplement 35 (1961):
psychology elaborated later on by Freud, some 45–60.
of his observations, she claims, are overblown “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine
840
FOSTER
of Double Effect,” Oxford Review 5 Further Reading

(1967): 5–15. Blackwell Analytic Phil, Encyc Ethics,
“Morality as a System of Hypothetical Oxford Comp Phil, Pres Addr of APA v9
Imperatives,” Philosophical Review 81 Hursthouse, Rosalind. On Virtue Ethics
(1972): 305–16. (Oxford, 1999).
“Nietzsche: The Revaluation of Values,” in Hursthouse, Rosalind, Gavin Lawrence, and
Nietzsche: A Critical Collection of Essays, Warren Quinn, eds. Virtues and Reasons:
ed. R. Solomon (New York, 1973), pp. Philippa Foot and Moral Theory: Essays in
156–68. Honour of Philippa Foot (Oxford, 1995).
“Approval and Disapproval,” in Law, Korsgaard, Christine. “Skepticism about
Morality and Society: Essays in Honour of Practical Reason,” Journal of Philosophy
H. L. A. Hart, ed. P. M. S. Hacker and J. J. 83 (1986): 5–25.
Raz (Oxford, 1977), pp. 229–46. MacIntyre, Alasdair. “Virtues in Foot and
“Euthanasia,” Philosophy and Public Affairs Geach,” Philosophical Quarterly 52
6 (1977): 85–112. (2002): 621–31.
Virtues and Vices, and Other Essays in McDowell, John. “Are Moral Requirements
Moral Philosophy (Berkeley, Cal., 1978; Hypothetical Imperatives?” Proceedings of
Oxford, 2002). the Aristotelian Society 52 (1978): 13–29.
“Utilitarianism and the Virtues,” Proceedings Williams, Bernard. Ethics and the Limits of
and Addresses of the American Philosophy (London, 1985).
Philosophical Association 57 (November
1983): 273–83. Jocelyn Hoy
Natural Goodness (Oxford, 2001).
Moral Dilemmas and Other Topics in Moral
Philosophy (Oxford, 2002).

“When Is a Principle a Moral Principle?” FOSTER, George Burman (1857–1918)
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 28
(1954): 95–111. George Burman Foster was born on 2 April
Ed., Theories of Ethics (Oxford, 1967). 1857 in Alderson, Monroe County, in Virginia
“Morality and Art,” Proceedings of the (now West Virginia). Foster attended Shelton
British Academy 56 (1970): 131–44. College in West Virginia, and was ordained to
“Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma,” the Baptist ministry in 1879 when he gradu-
Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983): 379–98. ated. He received the BA and MA degrees at
“Nietzsche’s Immoralism,” New York West Virginia University in 1883 and 1884. In
Review of Books 38 (13 June 1991): 1884 he married Mary Lyon, whose father,
18–22. Franklin Smith Lyon, was professor of English,
Ed., Morality and Action: Collected Papers of Vice President, and later Acting President at
Warren Quinn (Cambridge, UK, 1993). West Virginia. After graduating with a divinity
“Rationality and Virtue,” in Norms, Values, degree from Rochester Theological Seminary in
and Society, ed. H. Pauer-Studer 1887, Foster became pastor of the First Baptist
(Dordrecht, 1994), vol. 2, pp. 205–16. Church of Saratoga Springs, New York.
“Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Reputed as he was among Baptists as a skillful
Mistake?” Oxford Journal of Legal preacher and intellectual prodigy, two new
Studies 15 (1995): 1–14. Baptist universities sought him for their facul-
ties. McMaster University in Toronto financed
841
FOSTER
his study in Germany at Göttingen and Berlin minimum that was sure than a maximum that
during 1891–2, after which he joined its faculty was not” (1909, p. xi). As a Baptist believer in
to teach philosophy, psychology, and logic. the soul’s liberty, he rejected the coercion of
Denison University also conferred the PhD creeds, yet he insisted on “the personal need of
degree on Foster. At the same time, William intellectual convictions with reference to reli-
Rainey Harper, President of the University of gious realities” (Nash 1923, p. 38). He saw
Chicago, sought him for the faculty of its the need for “the synthesis of the stability of
Divinity School. Foster did move to Chicago to doctrine sufficient for church work, and the
join the Chicago Divinity School in 1895 and movement of science sufficient in that field …”
rose to the position of professor of systematic (“Religious Teaching,” 1897, p. 109). All who
theology. He was made professor of philosophy knew Foster, friends and foes alike, testified
of religion in 1905, and he held this position that he was a man of integrity, great intelli-
until his death on 22 December 1918 in gence, and a kind spirit. These were the quali-
Chicago, Illinois. ties that energized his passionate and uncon-
The University of Chicago was committed to summated search for the meaning of “the God-
keeping ties to its Baptist constituency and to idea.” In their passion, self and faith contribute
disseminating to churches the new knowledge to the certainty and realization of God as an
of the sciences and the historical and textual inner spiritual reality. Foster says, in a way rec-
criticism of the Bible. Foster participated in the ognizably contemporary to persons who are
annual Baptist Congresses and regional inquiring into the meaning of God today, “in
“Ministers’ Meetings” and corresponded with this new world [of modern science] the oppo-
regional and national Baptist newspapers. In sition of human and divine is overcome, and all
doing so, he drew himself into controversy over is human and all is divine at one and the same
his liberal theological views. To quell the time” (1906, p. 147). Foster’s contemporaries
uproar, in 1905 he agreed to be transferred recognized that his struggle for a new and
from the Divinity School to the department of credible theism was an authentic, inner, spiri-
comparative religion, as professor of the phi- tual one. His most recent interpreters, however,
losophy of religion. He preached regularly in debate whether he was an orthodox Christian
Baptist and Unitarian churches, including the theist, a theist at all, a humanist, a religious
congregation which he and his wife joined in humanist, or a religious naturalist. Foster’s
1896, the Hyde Park Baptist Church, now the primary aim was investigating the plausibility
Hyde Park Union Church, in Chicago. At the of faith in a theology of culture.
time of his death he was preaching regularly in
the Unitarian Church in Madison, Wisconsin. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Despite the storms of controversy that engulfed “The Theological Training for the Times,”
Foster, at his death he remained a member in Biblical World 9 (1897): 23–5.
good standing of his own congregation and a “Religious Teaching and the Denomination,”
minister in good standing in the Northern Proceedings of the Baptist Congress at
Baptist Convention. Memorial services were Chicago, Ill. 15 (1897): 107–109.
held in Mandel Hall at the University of “The Influence of the Life and Teaching of
Chicago and downtown at the Garrick Theatre, Jesus on the Doctrine of God,” Biblical
where Foster’s friend and public debater, World 11 (1898): 306–18.
Clarence Darrow, addressed the mourners. “Kaftan’s Dogmatik,” American Journal of
Foster relentlessly pursued intellectual Theology 2 (1898): 802–27.
integrity for faith as a dynamic, living process. The Finality of the Christian Religion
Faith, he said, is a task and an achievement as (Chicago, 1906).
well as a gift. He “would rather have a “Pragmatism and Knowledge,” American
842
FOSTER
Journal of Theology 11 (1907): 591–6. Further Reading

The Function of Religion in Man’s Struggle Amer Nat Bio, Dict Amer Bio, Nat Cycl
for Existence (Chicago, 1909). Amer Bio v18, Who Was Who in Amer v1
“Concerning the Religious Basis of Ethics,” Arnold, C. Harvey. “The Death of God –
American Journal of Theology 12 (1908): ’06: George Burman Foster and the Impact
211–30. of Modernity,” Foundations: A Baptist
“What is a Baptist Church?” Proceedings of Journal of History and Theology 10
the Baptist Congress at Chicago, Ill. 30 (1967): 331–53.
(1912): 66–8. ———, God Before You and Behind You:
“The Philosophy of Feminism,” The Forum The Hyde Park Union Church Through a
52 (1914): 10–22. Century (Chicago, 1974), pp. 145–232.
“The Contribution of Critical Scholarship to Axel, Larry E. God or Man at Chicago: The
Ministerial Efficiency,” American Journal ‘Chicago School’ of Theology with Special
of Theology 20 (1916): 161–78. Reference to the Issue of Antecedents and
The Function of Death in Human Experience to the Roles of G. B. Foster, E. S. Ames,
(Chicago, 1919). and H. N. Wieman. PhD dissertation,
Christianity in Its Modern Expression, ed. Temple University (Philadelphia, 1976),
Douglas Clyde Macintosh (New York, pp. 152–76.
1921). ———, “Conflict and Censure: The
Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. Curtis W. Reese Religious Odyssey of George Burman
(New York, 1931). Foster,” in Alone Together: Studies in the
History of Liberal Religion, ed. Peter
Other Relevant Works Kaufman and Spencer Lavan (Boston,
Foster’s papers are at the University of 1978), pp. 91–101.
Chicago, the American Baptist Historical Dorrien, Gary. The Making of American
Society in Rochester, N.Y., and the Liberal Theology: Idealism, Realism, and
Canadian Baptist Archives in Hamilton, Modernity 1900–1950, vol. 2 (Louisville,
Ontario. Kent., 2003), pp. 151–81.
“Nietzsche and the Great War,” Sewanee Gragg, Alan. George Burman Foster:
Review 28 (1920): 139–51. Religious Humanist (Danville, Virg.,
“An Unpublished Interview with the Late Dr. 1978).
George Burman Foster on the Future of Nash, J. V. “A Twentieth Century
Religion,” with J. V. Nash, Open Court 37 Emancipator,” Open Court 36 (1922):
(1923): 37–9. 321–31.
“Nietzsche and Wagner,” Sewanee Review Peden, W. Creighton. The Chicago School:
32 (1924): 15–29. Voices in Liberal Religious Thought
“Maeterlinck and the Spirit of (Bristol, Ind., 1987), pp. 24–43.
Romanticism,” ed. J. V. Nash, Open Peden, W. Creighton, and Jerome A. Stone,
Court 38 (1924): 65–75. eds. The Chicago School of Theology:
“Ibsen’s Philosophy of Religion,” ed. J. V. Pioneers in Religious Inquiry, vol. 1
Nash, Open Court 38 (1924): 193–205. (Lewiston, N.Y., 1996), pp. 1–59.
“The Message of Bjornson,” ed. J. V. Nash, Smith, Gerald Birney. “George Burman
Open Court 38 (1924): 321–31. Foster,” Biblical World 53 (1919): 181–3.
“The Ethics of the Wage,” Sewanee Review Stone, Jerome A. “The Line Between
29 (1931): 39–43. Religious Naturalism and Humanism: G.
B. Foster and A. E. Haydon,” American
Journal of Theology and Philosophy 20
843
FOSTER
(1999): 217–40. results by selectively choosing among diverse

Towne, Edgar A. “A ‘Singleminded’ relevant laws and prior interpretations. His
Theologian: George Burman Foster at 1930 Law and the Modern Mind undermines
Chicago,” Foundations: A Baptist Journal the immature notion that the law is fixed and
of History and Theology 20 (1977): stable and that judges aim at rigidly predictable
36–59, 163–80. decisions based on facts alone. Although we
may want to believe that justice is paternalis-
Edgar A. Towne tically infallible, Frank detailed the many ways
that judges not only may, but must, go well
beyond applicable laws and facts to reach any
decision. He embraced the necessary conclu-
sion that most complex judicial decisions are
quite unpredictable because the judge’s
FRANK, Jerome New (1889–1957) personal convictions and social viewpoints
play a large role. Frank encouraged the study
Jerome Frank was born on 10 September 1889 of the social sciences as potentially relevant to
in New York City. He graduated from high a better understanding of the complex rela-
school at sixteen; after three years at the tions between the judicial process and wider
University of Chicago he received the BA in society.
1909, and by 1912 he earned the JD degree, The wider implications of Frank’s legal phi-
having earned the highest grades ever achieved losophy seriously challenge another wide-
at the University of Chicago Law School. He spread conviction that the judiciary is largely
had a law practice in Chicago from 1912 to immune from political or economic influence.
1929 and then he moved to New York City. Some critics have argued that Frank’s exposure
He joined the Roosevelt administration’s New of the lack of judicial independence underesti-
Deal, serving on agricultural and finance com- mates the primacy of law and hence under-
missions. He was Chairman of the Securities mines democracy itself. However, by exposing
and Exchange Commission from 1939 to the susceptibility of the judicial system to
1941. He was appointed to the US Court of manipulation by deep social struggles over
Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1941, and he wealth and power, Frank hoped for a deeper
served until his death on 13 January 1957 in and stronger democracy. His legal realism
New Haven, Connecticut. helped to prepare the way for the Critical Legal
Frank’s many influential opinions helped to Studies movement of the 1970s.
shape subsequent Supreme Court decisions,
expanding the protection of civil rights and BIBLIOGRAPHY
liberties against infringements of government Law and the Modern Mind (New York,
power. He justified his understanding of the 1930).
Constitution in light of his rejection of the Save America First: How to Make Our
simplistic notion that the legislature designs Democracy Work (New York, 1938).
laws while judges apply them. This legal phi- If Men Were Angels: Some Aspects of
losophy came to be called “legal realism” Government in a Democracy (New York,
which was a small but formidable movement 1942).
against legal formalism throughout the twen- Fate and Freedom: A Philosophy for Free
tieth century. Frank drew upon the pragma- Americans (New York, 1945).
tism of William JAMES, John DEWEY, and Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in
Oliver Wendell HOLMES, Jr. to argue that American Justice (Princeton, N.J., 1949).
judges can and should justify their desired
844
FRANK
Other Relevant Works science and scientific theory, and encouraged

Most of Frank’s papers are at Yale practical engagements with science and the
University. public. Frank was active, for example, in
“A Conflict With Oblivion: Some Viennese adult education, while his brother,
Observations on the Founders of Legal architect Josef Frank, was a central member of
Pragmatism,” Rutgers Law Review 9 Josef Hoffman’s Austrian Werkbund and
(1954): 425–63. architect of Neurath’s Social and Economic
Kristein, Barbara F., ed. A Man’s Reach: Museum in Vienna.
The Philosophy of Judge Jerome Frank In 1912 Frank left Vienna for Prague, where
(New York, 1965). he succeeded Albert EINSTEIN (at Einstein’s
invitation) as professor of theoretical physics at
Further Reading the German University. While Frank’s official
Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, work in Prague was in physics, he remained
Dict Amer Bio, Who Was Who in connected to logical empiricism as it was devel-
Amer v3 oping in the Vienna Circle around Moritz
Glennon, Robert J. The Iconoclast as Schlick in the 1920s. Frank remained in close
Reformer: Jerome Frank’s Impact on contact with the Circle’s members, especially
American Law (Ithaca, N.Y., 1985). Rudolf CARNAP who came to the German
Rosenberg, J. Mitchell. Jerome Frank: Jurist University in 1931. In 1929 Frank organized
and Philosopher (New York, 1970). within a meeting of the German Physical
Volkomer, Walter E. The Passionate Society a conference on the “Epistemology of
Liberal: The Political and Legal Ideas of the Exact Sciences” at which Frank, Carnap,
Jerome Frank (The Hague, 1970). Hahn, Neurath, Hans REICHENBACH, and
Herbert FEIGL gave talks that first introduced
John R. Shook the new scientific philosophy of the Vienna
Circle (and Reichenbach’s Berlin-based Society
for Empirical Philosophy) to established sci-
entists. The reception, Frank later recalled,
was less than warm, since the physicists and
mathematicians assembled “did not particu-
FRANK, Philipp (1884–1966) larly like the idea of combining this serious
scientific meeting with such a foolish thing as
Philipp Frank was born on 20 March 1884 in philosophy” (1949, p. 40).
Vienna, Austria. He studied physics and math- Frank continued to promote logical empiri-
ematics at the universities of Göttingen and cism to working scientists, the educated public,
Vienna. At Vienna, he studied with Ludwig and scholars in the humanities after his emi-
Boltzmann and received his PhD in theoretical gration to the United States in 1938. In 1939
physics in 1907. While lecturing in physics at he began teaching for one semester each year
Vienna from 1910 to 1912, he was a regular at Harvard University as a lecturer in physics
member of the so-called First Vienna Circle and mathematics, and lectured at many other
with Richard VON MISES, Hans Hahn, and universities on alternate semesters. He retired
Otto Neurath. During the remainder of his from teaching at Harvard in 1954 and took
career, he remained linked to Neurath in various visiting positions, as he continued to
several ways. He shared Neurath’s activist con- promote the unity of science and the cultural
ception of scientific philosophy, which and social roles philosophy of science should
shunned excessive formalism, emphasized the play. He died on 21 July 1966 in Cambridge,
instrumental and conventional aspects of Massachusetts.
845
FRANK
Beginning in 1940 Frank regularly attended synthesis of Machism and empiricism. Though
the annual Conferences on Science, Philosophy not specifically because of Lenin’s attack, one
and Religion in New York City where he theme of Frank’s subsequent career was his
defended science and scientific philosophy to defense of Ernst Mach against the common
the many intellectuals who regarded science as misinterpretation that Mach’s phenomenalism
disconnected from, if not dangerous to, human entailed an ontological claim (usually that the
culture (see 1950). After World War II and world somehow consists in sensations). Frank
Neurath’s death in 1945, Frank joined Rudolf also championed Mach as an important pre-
Carnap and Charles MORRIS, who had edited cursor to the Unity of Science Movement: “If
the International Encyclopedia of Unified we demand of science an economical repre-
Science with Neurath, as a leader of the Unity sentation of our experiences, that is, a repre-
of Science Movement. With Rockefeller sentation by a unified system of concepts, we
funding arranged by Warren Weaver, Frank must admit only propositions that are
established a new Institute for the Unity of reducible to propositions containing only per-
Science in 1936 within the American Academy ception terms as predicates. This is the real
of Arts and Sciences in Boston, serving as its meaning of Mach’s doctrine that all proposi-
President until 1965. At the same time, he suc- tions of science deal with perceptions.” (1949,
ceeded William Malisoff as President of the p. 84) On this view, Mach’s phenomenalism
Philosophy of Science Association. The insti- was not a metaphysical theory of the world but
tute sponsored colloquia and conferences but instead an attempt to explicate the unity of
lost its funding from the Rockefeller the sciences by way of eliminating spurious,
Foundation in the mid 1950s. In this respect, unscientific metaphysical statements.
Frank’s organizational efforts were less suc- Frank also defended Mach as a guiding spirit
cessful than those of others, such as Herbert behind logical empiricism’s critique of meta-
Feigl, whose Minnesota Center for the physics and pseudoscience. In writings to a
Philosophy of Science has survived Frank’s variety of audiences, including scientists,
institute to the present day. philosophers and theologians and humanists
Frank’s specialty in mathematics was dif- prominent in the CSPR, Frank championed
ferential equations. In philosophy of science, he logical empiricism as a universally valuable
contributed to several areas. His first was project seeking to understand how experience
theory of causality. His early paper and theory – those of science, theology, ethics,
“Kausalgesetz und Erfahrung” (“Experience or other areas – relate to and interact with
and the Law of Causality”, 1949) offered a each other. In the same spirit, Frank aggres-
conventionalist interpretation of physical sively criticized misinformed popularizations
causality (following Henri Poincaré). Causal that sought to marshal developments in science
laws do not so much govern our experience of (usually in quantum theory or relativity theory)
the world, Frank argued, as guide us in select- as justification for politically manipulative
ing those successions of events that we choose claims about freedom of the will, biological
to regard as paradigms of causation. Einstein vitalism, or “spiritualism” in modern science
took notice of Frank’s paper and it led to (see 1941 and 1950, p. 74).
Frank’s invitation to Prague, their subsequent Frank’s interest in conventionalism con-
friendship, and Frank’s later role as a biogra- nected to his interest in sociology and the
pher of Einstein (1947). dynamics of theory choice. He promoted the
Vladimir Lenin also took notice and dis- view (associated usually with Pierre Duhem,
missed Frank in his Materializm i empiriokri- Neurath, and W. V. QUINE) that evidence log-
titsizm (Materialism and Empirio-criticism, ically constrains choices of scientific theories
1909), a polemic against Marxists seeking a only to families of theories, each of which are
846
FRANK
consistent with specific evidence but which and to oppose the view that no such influ-
can be in other respects quite different from ences existed, this misunderstanding was
each other. In such cases, Frank argued, dif- ironic. It is also ironic (though for different
ferent kinds of values held consciously or reasons) that as a leader in Boston-area science
unconsciously by a scientist or prominent in his studies, Frank was succeeded by Thomas
or her culture can and often do influence KUHN with whom he shared the view that
theory choice and, in turn, the direction of science’s history is punctuated by revolution-
scientific research. This insight served as his ary periods and that any valid philosophy of
justification for promoting research in sociol- science must accept these as data. “The history
ogy of science within the Institute for the of science,” Frank wrote, “is the workshop of
Unity of Science. “To understand that the the philosophy of science.” (1949, p. 278) Yet,
observed facts do not determine scientific doc- in Kuhn’s influential Structure of Scientific
trines unambiguously is the most important Revolutions (1970), the history of science
prerequisite for understanding the role played counsels against unity of science and instead
by sociological factors in the acceptance of emphasizes the natural specialization of sci-
scientific doctrines.” (1951, p. 19) This entific knowledge and terminology within indi-
interest clearly informs the title of the popular vidual paradigms. Paradigms are divided typ-
volume, edited by Frank, titled The Validation ically by (alleged) incommensurabilities of
of Scientific Theories (1957), which remains language and meaning that tend to isolate sci-
one of his best-remembered contributions to entists from their revolutionary predecessors,
philosophy of science. from contemporaries in competing research
Recent interest in Frank concerns the dis- programs, and from the general public.
parity between his prominence in the 1940s
and early 50s and the subsequent obscurity of BIBLIOGRAPHY
his project and writings (Uebel 1998; Reisch Das kausalgesetz und seine grenzen
2005). Frank is now understood as remaining (Vienna, 1932). Trans., The Law of
committed to early Vienna Circle ideals of Causality and its Limits, ed. Robert S.
public “enlightenment” during a time when Cohen (Dordrecht, 1998).
they were tarnished by their past political asso- Between Physics and Philosophy
ciations with socialism and Marxism. His con- (Cambridge, Mass., 1941). 2nd edn,
tributions were also eclipsed by the growing Modern Science and Its Philosophy
institutional dominance of analytic and natural (Cambridge, Mass., 1949).
language styles of philosophy that aimed less Foundations of Physics (Chicago, 1946).
to explicate and popularize scientific theory Einstein: His Life and Times (New York,
and more to clarify ordinary usages and 1947).
meanings of concepts. The philosophers of the Relativity: A Richer Truth (Boston, 1950).
Frankfurt School who sought to continue Philosophy of Science: The Link between
social and cultural engagements during and Science and Philosophy (Englewood
after the Cold War also helped obscure Frank’s Cliffs, N.J., 1957).
project. In perhaps its most famous form, this
critique held that logical empiricism was anti- Other Relevant Works
progressive and anti-humanistic for promoting Frank’s papers are at Harvard University.
a conception of human thought and existence Ed. with Richard von Mises, Die
as technical and “one dimensional” (see Differential- und Integralgleichungen der
Marcuse 1964). Given that Frank desired to Mechanik und Physik, (Braunschweig,
promote the study of science’s social and Germany, 1925).
cultural connections and mutual influences, Ed., The Validation of Scientific Theories
847
FRANK
(Boston, 1957). FRANKEL, Charles (1917–79)

“The Logical and Sociological Aspects of
Science,” Proceedings of the American Charles Frankel was born on 13 December 1917
Academy of Arts and Sciences 80 (1951): in New York City. He received his BA in 1937
16–30. from Columbia University. From 1942 to 1946,
he served in the US Navy during World War II.
Further Reading Returning to Columbia, he received his PhD in
Amer Nat Bio, Dict Amer Bio, Who Was philosophy in 1946. From the position of assis-
Who in Amer v7, Who’s Who in Phil tant professor in Columbia’s philosophy depart-
Cohen, Robert S., and Marx W. Wartofsky, ment beginning in 1947, Frankel advanced to
eds. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of full professor in 1956 and then to Old Dominion
Science, vol. 3: In Memory of Philipp Professor of Policy and Public Affairs in 1970,
Frank (New York, 1965). and he held this position until his death. Frankel
“Frank, Phillip,” in Dictionary of Scientific died on 10 May 1979 in Bedford Hills, New
Biography, vol. 5 (New York, 1972), pp. York.
122–3. Contains a bibliography of Although Frankel’s consistent focus as a
Frank’s writings. scholar was upon political philosophy, he moved
Holton, Gerald. “Ernst Mach and the beyond scholarship to the domain of public
Fortunes of Positivism in America,” Isis affairs in which he held a succession of significant
83 (1992): 27–60. public positions, among them: Director of the
Holton, Gerald, et al. “In Memory of New York State Civil Liberties Union
Philipp Frank,” Philosophy of Science 35 (1960–65); Co-chairman of the National
(1968): 1–5. Assembly for Teaching Principles of the Bill of
Kegley, Charles W. “Reflections on Philipp Rights (1962–5); Assistant Secretary of State for
Frank’s Philosophy of Science,” Educational and Cultural Affairs (1965–7); a
Philosophy of Science 26 (1959): 35–40. founder of the International Council on the
Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Future of the University (1970); and the first
Revolutions (Chicago, 1962). President and Director of the National
Lenin, Vladimir I. Materializm i Humanities Center (1978).
empiriokrititsizm (Moscow, 1909). Throughout his career in philosophy and
Trans., Materialism and Empirio- public affairs, there is reflected Frankel’s perva-
Criticism (New York, 1927). sive liberal optimism. Frankel advocated a
Marcuse, Herbert. One Dimensional Man staunch liberalism in which rational, democra-
(Boston, 1964). tic problem-solving and scientific testing of the
Parrini, Paolo, ed. Logical Empiricism: consequences combine with goodwill to
Historical and Contemporary overcome bias and greed and lead to an increas-
Perspectives (Pittsburgh, 2003). ingly benevolent society and continuous histor-
Reisch, George A. How the Cold War ical progress. In place of “an official canon” of
Transformed Philosophy of Science liberalism, Frankel offers only “the working
(Cambridge, UK, 2005). principles of practical liberalism.” For liberalism,
Uebel, Thomas E. “Enlightenment and the he argues, religious and political beliefs are
Vienna Circle’s Scientific World- “private affairs,” but “without political signifi-
Conception,” in Philosophers on Education: cance” (2002, pp. 29–30). As for liberalism itself,
Historical Perspectives, ed. Amelie Rorty it “stands for a general predisposition in favor of
(London 1998), pp. 418–38. reform,” Frankel claims, and it achieves this
goal by distributing power by parliamentary
George Reisch institutions and civil liberties and recently by the
848
FRANKEL
reform of subjecting group membership to the operation, yet Frankel persists in failing to make
individual’s choice. Despite the absence of an any recognition or denunciation of the greatest
“official liberal ideology,” liberals accept “intel- evils of modernity.
lectual aspects of reform: objectivity, scientific How was this undaunted, exuberant liberal
method, relativism and intellectual progress. optimism possible for Frankel together with his
Truth is not denied, here, but is viewed as stern deliberate silence on the evils of his time?
dubitable, and subject to scientific testing.” How was this optimism possible for Frankel,
(2002, p. 41) growing up in New York City’s mean streets; or
With the development of science and the in the aftermath of his experience of the devas-
power of technology, liberalism perceives human tation of war as a navy lieutenant in World War
beings as making their own history and con- II; or after the Holocaust and the Gulag had
trolling their destiny, and provides an image of evolved into unbearable atrocities; or in the face
America as the “most modern, technological, of the violence of the Vietnam War; or of the
and democratic of countries in the total design student uprising of 1968 and in 1970; and of the
of world history” (2002, p. 47). onset of the Cold War?
Beyond the defense of a specific version of But in 1979 it was with happiness and a sense
American liberalism, Frankel’s scholarly and of fulfillment that Frankel saw his plan for a
political contributions are continuous with his- National Humanities Center become a reality.
torical attempts to achieve an articulation of an The dedication of the Center was a moving
American public philosophy. His defense, tribute to its goal of connecting the worlds of
however, of optimistic liberalism from the per- scholarship and politics, the model for which
spective of a narrow, reduced naturalistic prag- can be found in the life of Charles Frankel. Back
matism of piecemeal problem-solving and his at Columbia the week following the dedication,
dismissal of political and religious beliefs as Frankel’s buoyant optimism asked Quentin
private affairs lead him to four deliberate and Anderson whether he really believed in evil.
controversial decisions. First is the deletion of the Anderson replied in the affirmative. Before the
inalienable rights and constitutional structure of week ended, Charles Frankel and his wife Helen
government of the American Founders. With were brutally murdered in their home in Bedford
this deletion, the public philosophy of America Hills, New York. How, for such liberal
loses its identity. Second, the erasure of theory in optimism, was such evil possible? Have we not
favor of pragmatic problem-solving fails to see learned that a liberalism focused upon the prag-
the revolutions of modernity itself and the liber- matic management of piecemeal problems lacks
alism arising within it; and to the failure to the conceptual and moral capability to identify
mention the liberalism of America’s own philo- as evil the gross violations of human life in the
sophic pragmatism (PEIRCE, ROYCE, JAMES, Holocaust and the Gulag?
DEWEY); and discredits its philosophy, along
with religion, as mere matters of personal choice. BIBLIOGRAPHY
With this erasure, an American liberal public The Faith of Reason (New York, 1948).
philosophy loses its philosophic grounding. The Case for Modern Man (New York, 1956).
Third, the dismissal of religious conceptions for 2nd edn, The Case for Modern Liberalism
failing to meet the narrow tests of empirical ver- (New Brunswick, N.J., 2002).
ifiability and effective consequences deletes the The Golden Age of American Philosophy
persistent role of religious beliefs in personal (New York, 1960).
needs and a variety of religious organizations. The Democratic Prospect (New York, 1962).
Fourth, in 1955 the Nuremberg Trials of The Love of Anxiety, and Other Essays (New
Holocaust perpetrators had ended less than a York, 1965).
decade earlier, and the Gulag was still in full Pleasures of Philosophy (New York, 1972).
849
FRANKEL
Human Rights and Foreign Policy (New York, with Roy Wood SELLARS and C. H. Langford,
1978). and received his MA in philosophy in 1931.
For a few years he was a doctoral candidate at
Other Relevant Works the University of Michigan but, after passing
Ed., The Golden Age of American Philosophy his required exams, he went to Harvard,
(New York, 1960). attracted by such luminaries as Ralph Barton
The Neglected Aspect of Foreign Affairs: PERRY, Alfred North WHITEHEAD, and C. I.
American Educational and Cultural Policy LEWIS. He received the Harvard MA in 1935,
Abroad (Washington, D.C., 1966). spent the 1935–6 academic year at the
Education and the Barricades (New York, University of Cambridge working with G. E.
1968). Moore, and returned for a PhD in 1937 from
High on Foggy Bottom: An Outsider’s Inside Harvard.
View of the Government (New York, Frankena joined the University of Michigan
1969). faculty as an instructor in 1937 and attained
Ed., Controversies and Decisions: The Social the rank of assistant professor (1940), associ-
Sciences and Public Policy (New York, ate professor (1946), professor (1947–78),
1976). chair of the department (1947–61), and was
“John Dewey’s Social Philosophy,” in New professor emeritus (1978–94). He also held
Studies in the Philosophy of John Dewey, visiting positions at Columbia, Princeton,
ed. Steven M. Cahn (Hanover, N.H., 1977). Harvard, and Tokyo Universities. A member
of Phi Beta Kappa and Phi Kappa Phi, he was
Further Reading a trustee of Chatham College (1961–94),
Amer Nat Bio, Proc of APA v52, Who Was Cairns Lecturer for the American
Who in Amer v7 Philosophical Association (1974), and
Agresto, John, and Peter Riesenberg, eds. The received the University of Michigan
Humanist as Citizen (Chapel Hill, N.C., Distinguished Faculty Achievement Award
1981). A memorial volume to Frankel. (1965), and the Warner G. Rice Humanities
Blanshard, Brand. “The Case for Modern Award from the University of Michigan
Man,” Saturday Review (17 March 1956): (1978). He served as chair of the Council for
12. Philosophical Studies; was President of the
American Philosophical Association Western
Thelma Z. Lavine Division (1965–6), chaired its board of direc-
tors (1963–5), and delivered the 1974 Carus
Lectures to the APA. He was a member of the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences and
the National Academy of Education.
Additionally, he held fellowships from the
FRANKENA, William Klaas (1908–94) Center for Advanced Study of Behavioral
Science, the Guggenheim Foundation, the
William Frankena was born Wibe Klaas Rockefeller Foundation, and the National
Frankena on 21 June 1908 in Manhattan, Endowment for the Humanities.
Montana, and died 22 October 1994 in Ann Frankena’s first published essay, “The
Arbor, Michigan. He grew up in a Dutch Naturalistic Fallacy” (1939), was a powerful
Reformed community in western Michigan, assault on G. E. Moore’s treatment of the nat-
and received his BA from Calvin College in uralistic fallacy. By his 1976 “Concluding
1930. He then became a graduate student at More or Less Philosophical Postscript,” in
the University of Michigan, where he studied Perspectives on Morality, he considered
850
FRANKENA
himself a “cognitivist,” taking a naturalistic actions, judgments, decisions, etc., on other

attitude about good, and an intuitionist stance people.
about ought. In his 1939 essay Frankena held According to some moralities such as utili-
that Moore begs the question in his claim that tarianism, what we do will be rightly judged by
naturalists commit a fallacy in defining good how much good or harm we bring to others. In
in terms of such natural properties as desire, Frankena’s view ethical systems, at least some
pleasure, interest, etc. Frankena claims the so- of them, are teleological or, perhaps better,
called naturalistic fallacy is not a logical consequentialist in that we judge them by the
fallacy, since Moore simply assumes and does good or harm that they are designed to either
not prove that good is both nonnatural and forestall or cause. As Frankena says, the ethics
indefinable. of some moral philosophers are teleological.
Frankena’s interests then broadened to emo- On the other hand, he rightly notes that other
tivism, the philosophy of education, ethics moral systems are deontological, in that con-
and religion, and other areas. In 1963 he sequences do not figure in. For example, a
authored a noteworthy introductory text, person has at least a prima facie obligation to
Ethics. Later he considered the importance of keep a promise regardless of the consequences.
virtue ethics, a topic of great debate in recent Similar remarks would apply to our verdict of
decades. Perhaps the resurgence of interest in the rightness of actions when they involve truth-
virtue ethics can be traced to a debate between telling, the promotion of fairness, etc. Frankena
Frederick Carney, Stanley HAUERWAS, and called his theory a “mixed deontological
Frankena in the Journal of Religious Ethics in ethics,” precisely because he believed it merged
1973. Carney held that ethics having to do virtues with moral obligations – a kind of syn-
with actual behavior, i.e. normative ethics, thesis of Aristotle and Kant. This concern with
was far more important than what is today deontological and consequentialist conceptions
called “virtue” ethics, with its emphasis on the of ethics reappears in his concept of “Gens,” as
moral attributes of individuals. Frankena did discussed below.
not deny the importance of character traits in In subsequent writings Frankena continued
ethics, but alone they do not generate stan- to work for some kind of definition of morality.
dards of ethical behavior. With norms and His comments are plausible and in line with our
virtues together, he says, we are able to act in ordinary intuitions about morality. He calls
a morally correct way. Attempting to pin morality a kind of “action-guide” which, along
down his conception of morality even further with facts about the world, ourselves, etc., can
he suggests, like Kurt BAIER and Stephen lead us to certain actions and not others. There
TOULMIN, that moral judgments are based on are numerous other action-guides which usually
reasons of different kinds. In some cases the have little or no connection with morality,
basis for a moral judgment may be conse- though they can overlap on occasion. An
quentialist in nature, while others base moral example of one of the nonmoral life-guides
decisions on the wishes, desires, etc., of the might be etiquette. It is certainly a violation of
agent. In this more specific concept of etiquette, in some quarters, to belch in public,
morality, decisions about goodness, actions, but that is not the sort of thing one normally
people’s qualities, etc., come into play because considers unethical or immoral. Frankena
we believe these will affect human beings in points out that having a “morality” has more
various ways. How our actions affect others than one usage, some of them quite broad. We
has to be considered for its own sake and not, can refer to a person’s morality even if the
for example, for its utility in bringing about code he goes by is wholly at variance with
some end. This is so because morality, almost what civilized people would call moral
by definition, has to do with the effects of our behavior. Thus, even if a person’s morality
851
FRANKENA
includes stealing, cheating, etc., there remains insofar as deontological theories, such as
a use of morality where we say, “that is that Kant’s, demand respect for the intrinsic worth
person’s morality.” There is also a sense of of all individuals and treating them equally.
morality where we say of a person or a society He admits that these principles are not uni-
that it is “amoral,” although they might well versal or absolute and that in any given moral
have a set of rules for guiding their behavior. choice it may be difficult to determine which
This could be the case if the rules were entirely principle takes precedence. He further argues
oriented towards survival, and the interest of that personal ethics and correct analysis show
others in the society played no role whatso- that there are only two fundamental Gens.
ever, as in the African mountain people studied The first is what he calls a principle of benef-
by anthropologist Colin Turnbull. To have a icence that he thinks grounds nonegoistic con-
morality, even in the widest sense of the term, sequentialist theories such as utilitarianism
it is essential to have some values, meaning which base moral judgments on doing no
that the person or society does hold some harm and acting for the good. But there is
beliefs about what is right or wrong, even if also a principle of justice which he thinks
they are wildly askew of what we would ordi- underlies deontological theories of morality.
narily call moral values. Such theories urge us to recognize the intrin-
An important step in Frankena’s conception sic value of all persons and to treat all equally.
of morality is what he calls “Gens” – or general Frankena adds that these principles are not
ethical statements – which include both justice absolute, since they may come into conflict in
and beneficence. As he asks: What is, or should some situations, and there is no formula for
be, the content of morality? What Gens should determining which take precedence.
it recognize? What Gens should we live by and Some of the above remarks might suggest that
teach to the young? What is right and who is Frankena does not believe that any real certainty
good? He goes on to explain that issues regard- is possible in morality. Some scholars believe,
ing the nature of morality are metamoral, however, that Frankena very much believes that
regardless of whether they involve normative moral certainty is possible. Part of his view of
questions or not. Still, queries about content ethics is the idea that morality is independent of
must be considered first-order. As for the evi- religion, as well as other areas of human inquiry,
dential status of Gens, Frankena maintains that such as science. Frankena seems to defend this
they are neither self-evident nor a priori. How idea in his 1973 essay “Is Morality Logically
are we to determine what the basic Gens (prin- Dependent on Religion?” According to
ciples) of morality are or should be? We are to Frankena, morality is an autonomous inquiry.
do so by taking the moral point of view, and But Frankena also objects to the notion that
getting as clear as we can about all relevant religion plays any role in morality because
facts. He continues by saying that any Gens religion would rule out certainty in moral judg-
that might emerge from such an analysis cannot ments. Some critics say Frankena is unrealistic in
be self-evident or a priori. Part of determining demanding moral certainty in ethics because, in
the basic Gens of morality involves trying to the real world, the conditions needed for making
elucidate a personal morality and then deter- “absolutely certain” moral judgments do not
mining which Gens we should try to inculcate exist. The issue of moral certainty is important
in society (as in the rearing of children). in Frankena’s work and is important in and of
Frankena takes pains to argue that a purely itself.
utilitarian or consequentialist approach is not Beyond such epistemic questions, Frankena
sufficient, though it is part of the answer. Also also asks, “Why is it that one should be
needed, however, is a principle of justice which moral?” This question is important because
is at the core of deontological theories of ethics, acting morally could involve some sacrifice on
852
FRANKENA
one’s part, and be against one’s interests. By way of further clarification, Frankena
Frankena takes issue with the simplistic way asks what a person might do from the view-
this question is usually meant, i.e., what reasons point of the “ideal observer,” if he had full
might exist for acting morally in a particular knowledge of all the factors involved in a
case. According to him, the question could decision and was completely in control of his
involve more than this; it might be asking for faculties. A choice made under such conditions,
a rational basis for acting morally. And this is he argues, would be a paradigm case of acting
the sense of the question that Frankena focuses rationally and is in fact what being rational
on. He points out that “should” doesn’t always means. Frankena considers the case where
have a moral sense. One could say that at a someone is faced with a choice, and asks
dinner party you should not wipe your mouth himself what the rational course of action could
with your sleeve, where the “should” could be, taking into account such things as morality,
hardly be said to have a moral meaning but is prudence, etc. This person is asking what
only a matter of etiquette. It would be decidedly would be the right choice, assuming he was in
odd to say that wiping your mouth with your possession of his faculties and knew himself
sleeve is an immoral act. Similarly, “should” is very well. Frankena contends that something is
not being used in a moral sense if I say you rational for one to choose if one would choose
should flatter your boss because he likes flattery it under those conditions.
and doing so might help you get a raise. Frankena was among the most thoughtful
Frankena suggests that there is a sense of and insightful philosophers of our age. A sig-
“should” that is beyond morality, taking prece- nificant testimony to his importance as a
dence over the ordinary moral use of “should,” philosopher is that several of his essays
which implies being reasonable. He explains appeared in the July 1981 issue of The Monist.
that what we need is a “should” that is not only This distinguished journal has only twice
nonmoral but also an important way beyond focused an entire issue on the ideas of a living
morality, one that puts us in a position to say thinker, the other being Wilfrid S ELLARS.
that we should or should not be moral, one that Frankena was a man of broad interests; he was
takes priority over any moral “should” in cases an enthusiastic amateur ornithologist, as well as
of conflict. In his view, there is a sense of an enthusiast for environmental issues and a
“should” which means being “rational.” lover of nature.
Therefore, “Why should I be moral?” equates
to “Is it rational to be moral?” BIBLIOGRAPHY
Frankena tries to further clarify such ques- “The Naturalistic Fallacy,” Mind 48 (1939):
tions by analyzing what it means to act ratio- 464–77.
nally. He surmises that a traditional answer to “Obligation and Value in the Ethics of G. E.
this question is that to act rationally means to Moore,” in The Philosophy of G. E.
act self-interestedly, or for one’s own welfare or Moore, ed. Paul Schilpp (La Salle, Ill.,
benefit. His counter-argument is that this is 1942), pp. 91–110.
not what morality involves and could not Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963).
possibly equate to self-interest. The problem is Three Historical Philosophies of Education:
that morality often requires actions counter to Aristotle, Kant, Dewey (Chicago, 1965).
one’s own best interest. Frankena points out The Concept of Morality (Boulder, Col.,
that the common notion that acting morally is 1967).
rational only when it is for our own happiness Three Questions about Morality (La Salle,
is not necessarily true, because it is a fact that Ill., 1974).
people are capable of acting for the good of Perspectives on Morality: Essays by William
others, and not just selfishly. K. Frankena, ed. K. E. Goodpaster (Notre
853
FRANKENA
Dame, Ind., 1976). 271–92.

Thinking about Morality (Ann Arbor, Mich., Foot, Philippa. “William Frankena’s Carus
1980). Lectures,” The Monist 64 (1981): 305–12.
“The Ethics of Right Reason,” The Monist Goldman, Alvin I., and Jaegwon Kim, eds.
66 (1983): 3–25. Values and Morals: Essays in Honor of
“Moral-Point-of-View Theories,” in Ethical William Frankena, Charles Stevenson and
Theory in the Last Quarter of the Richard Brandt (Dordrecht, 1978).
Twentieth Century, ed. Norman E. Bowie Contains a bibliography of Frankena’s
(Indianapolis, Ind., 1983), pp. 39–79. writings.
Warnock, G. J. “Comments on Frankena’s
Other Relevant Works Three Questions,” The Monist 63 (1985):
Frankena’s papers are at the Bentley 85–92.
Historical Library, University of Michigan.
Ed., Philosophy of Education (New York, Anthony Serafini
1965).
“G. H. von Wright on the Theory of Morals,
Legislation and Value,” Ethics 76 (1966):
131–6.
Some Beliefs about Justice (Lawrence, Kan.,
1966). FRANKFURT, Harry Gordon (1929– )
“Education,” in Dictionary of the History of
Ideas, vol. 2, ed. P. P. Weiner (New York, Harry Frankfurt was born in Langhorne,
1973). Pennsylvania, on 29 May 1929, and while he
“Is Morality Logically Dependent on was still an infant his family relocated to
Religion?” in Religion and Morality, ed. G. Brooklyn, New York. The family remained in
Outka and J. P. Reeder (Garden City, Brooklyn for ten years before moving again,
N.Y., 1973), pp. 195–317. this time to Baltimore, Maryland, where
“The Ethics of Love Conceived as an Ethics Frankfurt finished high school and enrolled in
of Virtue,” Journal of Religious Ethics 1 Johns Hopkins University. He obtained his BA
(1973): 21–36. from Johns Hopkins in 1949, and spent the
Ed. with John T. Granrose, Introductory next two years doing graduate work at Cornell
Readings in Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., University before returning to Johns Hopkins,
1974). receiving his MA in 1953 and PhD in philoso-
“Moral Philosophy and World Hunger,” in phy in 1954.
World Hunger and Moral Obligation, ed. From 1954 to 1956 Frankfurt served in the
W. Aiken and H. La Follete (Englewood US Army. From 1956 to 1962, Frankfurt
Cliffs, N.J., 1977), pp. 66–84. taught at Ohio State University, first as instruc-
Ed., The Philosophy and Future of Graduate tor, then as assistant professor. He taught at
Education (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1980). State University of New York at Binghamton
for a year before moving to Rockefeller
Further Reading University in 1963. Frankfurt remained at
Amer Nat Bio, Bio 20thC Phils, Encyc Rockefeller University for eleven years,
Ethics, Oxford Comp Phil, Pres Addr of becoming chair of the philosophy department
APA v7, Proc of APA v68, Who’s Who in in 1965. Frankfurt also taught at Yale
Phil University, both in the School of Law as a
Brandt, Richard. “William Frankena and the lecturer from 1981 to 1989, and in the philos-
Ethics of Virtue,” The Monist 64 (1981): ophy department as a professor from 1976 to
854
FRANKFURT
1989, where he served as chair of the depart- freedom and responsibility. While his interest in
ment from 1978 to 1987. From 1990 to 2002 the will and the volitional structure of human
he was professor of philosophy at Princeton beings remains central to his thinking,
University, where he is now emeritus professor. Frankfurt’s most recent work attempts to deal
He has also held visiting appointments at the with those constraints upon the will which
University of California at Los Angeles, the make autonomy possible.
University of Pittsburgh, Vassar College, and Thirdly, in his work on Descartes, Frankfurt
All Souls College, Oxford. In addition to his advocates the controversial position that
teaching, Frankfurt has been President of the Descartes gives up his quest to find an unshak-
American Philosophical Association Eastern able foundation of knowledge in the external
Division (1991–2). He has twice received the world, and instead finds satisfaction in his ability
National Endowment for the Humanities to offer a rational description of the world, even
Fellowship (1981–2 and 1994) and in 1993 he if it is impossible to know whether or not such
was awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship. He is a description corresponds to the world. As
a fellow in the American Academy of Arts and Frankfurt writes, “Descartes’s theory of knowl-
Sciences and was awarded a Romanell–Phi Beta edge is grounded in his recognition that we
Kappa Professorship in Philosophy simply cannot help believing what we clearly
(1999–2000). and distinctly perceive. For him, the mode of
Although Frankfurt’s philosophical output necessity that is most fundamental to the enter-
covers a wide range, including essays on topics prise of reason is not logical but volitional – a
as seemingly diverse as the rigorous analysis of necessitation of the will.” (1999, p. ix)
the concept “bullshit” to speculations con- Classical debates on the question of free will
cerning God’s creation of the world, we may and moral responsibility often begin with the
indicate three consistent areas of interest in assumption that an agent cannot be held
Frankfurt’s work. In all of these areas we find responsible in situations where he could not
Frankfurt’s insight that the will, more than have done otherwise. This assumption is
reason, is the essential feature of human nature referred to as the “principle of alternate possi-
and our understanding of ourselves. The early bilities.” Situations wherein the agent performs
period of Frankfurt’s philosophical investiga- an action due to coercion are thought to
tions centers on questions concerning objectiv- provide examples of this assumption. Against
ity, skepticism, and the foundations of knowl- this seemingly obvious assumption, Frankfurt
edge. Frankfurt’s dissertation, entitled “The argues that in certain situations the fact that an
Essential Objectivity of What is Known,” and agent could not have acted otherwise may be
his work on Descartes reflect these concerns. perfectly compatible with his moral responsi-
The second area of inquiry which arises in bility. In some situations, the fact that the agent
Frankfurt’s work focuses on questions relating could not have done otherwise may have no
to morality, notably such problems as free will bearing on why the agent chose to act as he did.
and responsibility. In this area Frankfurt What is important in assigning moral respon-
attempts to elaborate adequate notions of sibility, according to Frankfurt, is the formation
freedom and personal ideals, not to provide a of the agent’s will. An agent may be held
theory of moral obligations and rights. While morally responsible, even if he could not have
beginning with questions of morality, acted otherwise, insofar as he identifies with the
Frankfurt’s thought moves into areas of meta- action. In situations wherein an agent forms his
physics and philosophy of mind. Taking will with respect to a specific action, and under-
volition as central to an understanding of what takes the action he wants to undertake, the
it means to be human, Frankfurt’s second area fact that he could not have done otherwise
of inquiry focuses primarily on questions of would play no constitutive role in the formation
855
FRANKFURT
of the agent’s will. Indeed, the agent may unthinkable to violate. Thus one’s love or
never be made aware that he could not have ideal places a constraint upon the will. But the
acted otherwise. What is motivating the agent opposite situation, loving nothing, or having
to act is not the fact that he could not have no ideals is not an indication of freedom
done otherwise, but his identification with the according to Frankfurt. Far from being free,
action, that is, the action is being motivated by the person who loves nothing or has no ideals
a will which the agent recognizes as his own. lacks personal identity. These people are
In these situations, although he could not have “amorphous.” If autonomy means being
acted otherwise, the agent is morally respon- “self-regulating,” it follows that only a being
sible for his actions. Thus, Frankfurt agues which has a personal identity, which is a self,
that determinism need not be incompatible is capable of autonomy. Constraints then,
with moral responsibility. This underscores a when grounded in a person’s own nature, are
deeper point that Frankfurt makes about the necessary prerequisite of autonomy.
freedom of the will. Freedom of the will is The value of Frankfurt’s work lies not only
not simply a matter of doing what we want to in his penetrating insights into the structure of
do. To assume that having a free will simply the will, but also in his sustained effort to
means having the ability to do what we want bring a rigorous style of analysis to bear on
to do is to conflate freedom of the will with problems which one “can recognize and
freedom of action. But as Frankfurt points appreciate as a professional philosopher but
out, although an animal may be free to run in also – and particularly – as a human being
any direction it wants, we would not assign a trying to cope in a modestly systematic
free will to the animal. Freedom of the will, manner with the ordinary difficulties of a
according to Frankfurt, is a question of having thoughtful life” (1999, p. x).
the will that one wants to have. One’s will is
free insofar as it is the will that one wants to BIBLIOGRAPHY
have. Thus, a free will is one whose structural Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen: The
organization displays a coherence between Defense of Reason in Descartes’s
one’s second-order volitions and one’s first- “Meditations” (Indianapolis, 1970).
order desires. While one may be ambivalent Leibniz: A Collection of Critical Essays
about one’s second-order volitions, the (Notre Dame, Ind., 1976).
“wanton” lacks these second-order volitions The Importance of What We Care About
entirely and is moved solely by first-order (Cambridge, UK, 1988).
desires. Necessity, Volition, and Love (Cambridge,
Frankfurt’s recent writings address the UK, 1999).
concept of autonomy. Common sense seems
to suggest that one cannot be autonomous if Other Relevant Works
there are constraints placed upon the will. “Realism and the Objectivity of
Not only does Frankfurt reject this position, Knowledge,” Philosophical Quarterly 7
but he goes further, arguing that certain con- (1957): 353–8.
straints not only do not limit one’s autonomy, “The Dependence of Mind,” Philosophy
but may in fact facilitate it. This is true in and Phenomenological Research 19
those cases where the constraints placed on a (1958): 16–26.
person’s will are grounded in the person’s “Memory and the Cartesian Circle,”
own nature. An example of this is when we Philosophical Review 71 (1958): 504–11.
act out of love. To love something, or to have “Peirce’s Account of Inquiry,” Journal of
an ideal, is to recognize a limit to one’s will – Philosophy 55 (1958): 588–92.
one’s love or ideal is that which it would be “Peirce’s Notion of Abduction,” Journal of
856
FRANKFURTER
Philosophy 55 (1958): 593–7. the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: A

“Meaning, Truth, and Pragmatism,” Further Look,” Philosophical Perspectives
Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1960): 14 (2000): 181–201.
171–6. Widerker, David, and Michael McKenna,
“Philosophical Certainty,” Philosophical eds. Moral Responsibility and Alternative
Review 71 (1962): 303–27. Possibilities (Aldershot, UK, 2003).
“Descartes’s Validation of Reason,”
American Philosophical Quarterly 2 Louis J. Colombo
(1965): 149–56.
“Functional Analyses in Biology,” with
Brian Poole, British Journal of Philosophy
of Science 17 (1966): 69–72.
“The Anarchism of Robert Paul Wolff,”
Political Theory 1 (1973): 405–14. FRANKFURTER, Felix (1882–1965)
“Les Desordres du Rationalisme,” in Le
Discourse et sa Methode, ed. N. Grimaldi Felix Frankfurter was born on 15 November
and J. L. Marion (Paris, 1987), pp. 1882 in Vienna, Austria. In 1894, when he
395–411. was twelve, his family emigrated to the United
“Duty and Love,” Philosophical States and settled in New York City’s Lower
Explorations 1 (1998): 4–9. East Side. He combined the high school and
“Gleichheit und Achtung,” Deutsche college degrees in a single set of courses and
Zeitschrift fur Philosophie 47 (1999): graduated with a BA from the College of the
3–11. City of New York in 1902. He spent one year
working in New York’s tenement house com-
Further Reading mission before he entered Harvard Law School,
Bio 20thC Phils, Oxford Comp Phil, Pres graduating with a law degree in 1906. He
Addr of APA v10 became the first Jewish lawyer hired by the
Blum, Alex. “The Kantian versus prominent New York firm of Hornblower,
Frankfurt,” Analysis 60 (2000): 287–8. Byrne, Miller, and Potter in 1906, but when he
Buss, Sara, and Lee Overton, eds. Contours was advised that his advancement in the firm
of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry would be contingent upon changing his name,
Frankfurt (Cambridge, UK, 2002). Frankfurter decided to go into public service.
Della Rocca, Michael. “Frankfurt, Fischer From 1906 to 1911 Frankfurter worked as
and Flickers,” Noûs 32 (1998): 99–105. an Assistant US Attorney for the Southern
Fischer, John Martin. “Frankfurt-type District of New York under Henry Lewis
Examples and Semi-compatibilism,” in Stimson, who had been named US Attorney
The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, ed. by President Theodore Roosevelt. In 1911
Robert Kane (Oxford, 2002), pp. Stimson was appointed Secretary of War by
281–308. President Taft and took Frankfurter with him
Mele, Alfred R., and David Robb. to Washington, D.C. as his special assistant.
“Rescuing Frankfurt-style Cases,” Frankfurter was put in charge of the Bureau of
Philosophical Review 107 (1998): Insular Affairs, which had jurisdiction over the
97–112. nation’s foreign territories. Stimson also
Schnall, Ira M. “The Principle of Alternate worked to find the funds for Harvard to hire
Possibilities and ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’,” Frankfurter as an assistant professor of law.
Analysis 61 (2001): 333–40. Frankfurter was hired in 1914, becoming the
Widerker, David. “Frankfurt’s Attack on first Jew on its law faculty. While at Harvard,
857
FRANKFURTER
he helped to found The New Republic in 1914 Supreme Court under three nineteenth-century
with Herbert CROLY, Walter LIPPMANN, and chief justices (The Commerce Clause under
Learned H AND . Frankfurter remained at Marshall, Taney and Waite, 1937). The general
Harvard until 1917, when he returned to tone of the work, derived from controversies
Washington as a special assistant to the new contemporary to its composition, was one of
Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker. opposition to any restricted reading of the
After the American declaration of war commerce clause that might create arbitrary
against Germany in 1917, Frankfurter became formalist boundaries to federal regulation of the
secretary and legal counsel to the Mediation economy. Frankfurter was a jurisprudential
Commission, a combined labor–manage- realist: he believed that judges and justices
ment–government effort to mend the growing inevitably make law; they do not simply
rift between key defense workers and employ- discover and apply it. He was also an advocate
ers. In the 1917 strike at the copper mine in of judicial restraint: the view that courts should
Brisbee, Arizona, Frankfurter was more sym- not interpret the fundamental law, the consti-
pathetic to the employees’ grievances than man- tution, in such a way as to impose sharp limits
agement, earning the lasting enmity of conser- upon the authority of the legislative and exec-
vatives. While serving as the Chairman of the utive branches. On the bench this meant that he
War Labor Policies Board, Frankfurter became was in general willing to uphold the actions of
acquainted with Franklin D. Roosevelt, then those branches against constitutional challenges
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. so long as they do not “shock the conscience.”
After the war, Frankfurter returned to his Despite his outspoken opposition that dis-
law position at Harvard. When Roosevelt tinguished between some constitutional clauses
became US President in 1932, Frankfurter and others – and, even in the construction of
turned down an invitation to be Solicitor specific clauses, distinguished between some
General of the United States, preferring to rights and others – a hierarchy of rights position
remain at Harvard training the next generation emerged while he was on the Supreme Court.
of lawyers. Frankfurter helped to found the This position put rights on different “tiers,”
American Civil Liberties Union in 1920. He leaving the court very likely to find legislation
also immersed himself in controversial cases or executive action unconstitutional if it
such as trying to save the lives of Nicola Sacco infringes on higher-tier rights (such as the
and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, two Italian-born freedom of political dissent), yet very unlikely
anarchists sentenced to death on charges of to do so if the action merely infringes on lower-
robbery and murder. tier rights, (such as freedom of contract or com-
President Roosevelt nominated Frankfurter mercial speech). In a concurring opinion in
to the Supreme Court of the United States on 1949, Frankfurter complained that such a
5 January 1939, and the Senate confirmed the ranking of rights “expresses a complicated
appointment twelve days later. After twenty- process of constitutional adjudication by a
three years of service, he retired on 28 August deceptive formula … . Such a formula makes
1962. Frankfurter died on 22 February 1965 in for mechanical jurisprudence.”
Washington, D.C. Frankfurter is also known for helping Chief
Frankfurter was influenced by his mentor, Justice Earl Warren build a unanimous decision
Oliver Wendell HOLMES, Jr., who, like Justice to strike down racial segregation in public
Louis BRANDEIS, was known for dissenting schools in Brown v. Board of Education in
against the orthodoxies of their time. Before 1954. He had a strong belief in cultural assim-
being appointed to the Supreme Court, ilation for all Americans, and thought that
Frankfurter published an analysis of the talent and intelligence counted more than race
commerce clause decisions of the United States or religion. Among scholars, he has especially
858
FREI
influenced Alexander Bickel, Raul Berger and Times: The Reform Years (New York,
Louis Luskey; while among Supreme Court 1982).
justices, John Paul Stevens in many respects Silverstein, Mark. Constitutional Faiths: Felix
adopted his mantle. Frankfurter, Hugo Black, and the Process
of Judicial Decision Making (Ithaca, N.Y.,
BIBLIOGRAPHY 1984).
The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti: A Critical Urofsky, Melvin I. Felix Frankfurter: Judicial
Analysis for Lawyers and Laymen (Boston, Restraint and Individual Liberties (Boston,
1927). 1991).
The Business of the Supreme Court: A Study
in the Federal Judicial System, with James Christopher Faille
Landis (New York, 1927).
The Labor Injunction, with Nathan Greene
(New York, 1930).
The Public and Its Government (New Haven,
Conn., 1932).
The Commerce Clause under Marshall, FREI, Hans Wilhelm (1922–88)
Taney and Waite (Chapel Hill, N.C.,
1937). Hans W. Frei was born on 29 April 1922 in
Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court Breslau, Germany. Both his parents were
(Cambridge, Mass., 1938). physicians: his father, Wilhelm Siegmund, was
a venereologist who invented the “Frei test”
Other Relevant Works for certain venereal diseases, and his mother,
Frankfurter’s papers are at the Library of Magda (née Frankfurther) was a pediatrician.
Congress and Harvard Law School. They were thoroughly secularized Jews, but, in
The Constitutional World of Mr. Justice a practice common at the time, they had their
Frankfurter: Some Representative children baptized as Lutherans in hopes of
Opinions, ed. Samuel J. Konefsky (New avoiding problems with anti-Semitism. In later
York, 1949). years, Frei used to remark with a smile, “And
Felix Frankfurter Reminisces (New York, in my case the baptism took!”
1960). When the Nazis came to power, Frei was
Of Law and Life and Other Things that sent to a Quaker school in England, and then
Matter: Papers and Addresses of Felix in 1938 the whole family fled to the United
Frankfurter, 1956–1963, ed. Philip B. States. They had little money, and his father
Kurland (Cambridge, Mass., 1965). endured a long period of serious illness. The
Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court: only college scholarship Frei could find was,
Extrajudicial Essays on the Court and the improbably, to study textile engineering at
Constitution, ed. Philip B. Kurland North Carolina State University. He took what
(Cambridge, Mass. 1970). he could get, and graduated with his BS in
1942, the year before his father died.
Further Reading It is not clear when Frei became a believing
Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Christian. On several occasions much later in
Comp Amer Thought, Dict Amer Bio, life, he remarked on a childhood experience of
Who Was Who in Amer v4 seeing a picture or statue of Jesus on the cross
Baker, Liva. Felix Frankfurter (New York, and suddenly “knowing that it was true.” In
1969). any event, by his college years he was involved
Parrish, Michael. Felix Frankfurter and His in the Baptist Church and active in a Christian
859
FREI
student group. He was deeply impressed when biblical narratives could be true only if they
he attended a lecture at North Carolina State somehow fit into that world. Theologians
by H. Richard NIEBUHR, and subsequent cor- accomplished the fit in two ways. Some argued
respondence led to an invitation from Niebuhr that at least parts of the Bible were true
to come to Yale Divinity School. Frei com- because the investigations of critical historians
pleted his BD degree there in 1945 and then could establish their truth – a project that con-
spent two years as minister of a Baptist church tinues down to, in extreme form, the work of
in the small town of North Conway, New the Jesus Seminar today. Others thought the
Hampshire. Bible true in that it presented valuable moral
He came to admire the greater doctrinal lessons – again a view with supporters still
freedom of the Episcopal Church and to think today.
that his own calling might be academic rather Either way of establishing biblical truth, Frei
than pastoral, so he returned to Yale in 1947 argued, distorted the meaning of the Gospel
as an Episcopal doctoral student. He married texts in particular. After all, perhaps their most
Geraldine Frost Nye in 1948, and they had obvious feature is that they are narratives. Frei
three children. Frei was ordained an Episcopal recognized that the Bible contains non-narra-
priest in 1952, and took teaching jobs at tive texts as well, but narrative seemed to him
Wabash College from 1950 to 1953 and at the its dominant genre. As in a realistic novel, we
Episcopal Seminary of the Southwest from learn about characters through a series of inci-
1953 to 1956. During these years he com- dents – their identities are narrated. As Frei
pleted his very long dissertation on “The learned from New Critics, and especially from
Doctrine of Revelation in the Thought of Karl Erich Auerbach’s remarkable book Mimesis,
Barth, 1909–1922: The Nature of Barth’s this is simply how realistic narratives express
Break with Liberalism,” and received his PhD their meaning. But, if the truth of the Gospels
in theology in 1956. In that year Frei joined lies in the eternal moral lessons they teach,
Yale Divinity School as a faculty member, and then their meaning is not about characters at
he was a professor of theology at Yale until his all. Similarly, if their truth lies in the historical
death. Publications came slowly, but early on kernels we can retrieve, then the shape of the
he established himself as a popular teacher. narratives is not part of their meaning.
His influence around the university grew Starting with apologetic worries about the
steadily, and he served an important term as truth of these texts thus inevitably distorts
chair of the Yale religious studies department their meaning. If we want to avoid misinter-
from 1981 to 1984. Frei died on 12 September preting them, Frei argued, then we should start
1988 in New Haven, Connecticut. with meaning. More than anything else, in
Long reflection on hermeneutics led in 1974 these narratives we learn who Jesus is by
to the publication of Frei’s greatest book, The reading stories about him (and, since Jesus is
Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, a study of biblical God’s self-revelation, we thereby learn about
interpretation in the eighteenth and nineteenth God). The truth of the stories lies, not in the
centuries. Until the late seventeenth century, he historical accuracy of particular details, but in
argued, most Christian writers took the biblical the way the stories capture Jesus’ identity – just
narratives to define the shape of the world “in as a telling anecdote, even if exaggerated, can
which we live and move and have our being.” capture the identity of the person it presents.
Our lives had meaning to the extent that they (This does not rule out the possibility that
fit into that biblical framework. Then the some particular historical claims may be so
pattern began to reverse – it was increasingly central to the picture the stories render that we
the world of our experience, our getting and would have to claim truth for them.) As Karl
spending, that defined “reality,” and the Barth did, particularly in the later volumes of the
860
FREI
Church Dogmatics, Frei claimed that Christian reading of Wittgenstein), theology is purely a
theology functions best when it tells the biblical sort of exercise in descriptive ethnography:
stories and opens them up to include as much of Christians act and speak in particular ways, and
the world as it can manage. theology describes the rules of their acting and
In The Identity of Jesus Christ, published first speaking. Type 2 theologians (Rudolf Bultmann,
as a series of articles in 1967 and then in book Wolfhart Pannenberg, David Tracy, and other
form in 1975, Frei put his hermeneutical theory theological liberals, but also conservatives like
into practice, showing how the Gospels present Carl F. H. HENRY) start with general philo-
Jesus as an unsubstitutable individual in a way sophical questions but include more Christian
that literary treatments of Jesus or “Christ particularity than type 1. Type 3 (Friedrich
figures” or Gnostic Gospels fail to do. He was Schleiermacher, Paul TILLICH) seeks a balance
influenced by Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of between internal Christian description and philo-
Mind, arguing that a person’s identity is not sophical presuppositions. Type 4 (Karl Barth,
essentially some mysterious inner entity, forever Frei himself) gives a priority to Christian self-
hidden to one degree or another from the outside description, but is willing to engage in ad hoc
world, but much more centrally defined by the apologetics, making connections as they arise
words and deeds and sufferings that make up the with non-theological conversations.
pattern of one’s life. The typology made at least three interesting
Frei’s work in hermeneutics and Christology points. First, both most liberals and many con-
served as a paradigm for what his Yale colleague servative apologists turn out to fit in the same
George LINDBECK later christened “post-liberal group: they are beginning with philosophy and
theology.” Frei emphasized reading the Bible as trying to make arguments for Christianity.
primarily a narrative text that presented the Second, Barth and Schleiermacher, often thought
identity of Jesus and of God. And he thought of as polar opposites, turn out to be near neigh-
that Christians should seek to understand the bors. Third, in one sense the extremes come
world by beginning with those biblical narratives round to touch each other, for the type 5 the-
and trying to fit as much as possible within their ologians, paradoxically, base their refusal to
framework rather than beginning with some engage in any philosophical argument on a
other framework derived from philosophy, con- philosophical argument, Wittgenstein’s supposed
temporary culture, or one’s own experience, and claim that a language game cannot be criticized
trying to fit the biblical narratives into it. from outside the form of life with which it is
In lectures delivered in the 1980s at Yale, associated. (Like Frei, I am noting the appeal
Birmingham, and Princeton, and published after these theologians make to Wittgenstein without
his death as Types of Christian Theology (1992), claiming that they interpret Wittgenstein cor-
Frei located his theological approach within an rectly.) It is thus type 4 that best preserves the
original typology of Christian theology, laying integrity of Christian theological discourse – and
out options along a scale between two extremes. Barth’s Church Dogmatics and Frei’s own work
At one end (type 1: Immanuel Kant, Gordon offer examples of how it can also most faithfully
KAUFMAN) were those who thought of theology interpret scriptural narrative texts.
purely in an academic context, as a subdisci- Near the end of his life, Frei was rethinking
pline of the grand intellectual project of philos- some of his conclusions. Partly because of the
ophy. Human beings try to understand the influence of Auerbach and the New Critics, he
world; theologians are assigned to understand had earlier maintained that treating the Bible
the aspects of the world related to God and as centrally realistic narrative was the way of
religion; Christian theology is one case among reading it most faithful to the character of the
others. At the other extreme (type 5: D. Z. texts themselves. In an important later article,
Phillips and others influenced by a certain “The ‘Literal Reading’ of Biblical Narrative
861
FREI
in the Christian Tradition: Does It Stretch or BIBLIOGRAPHY

Will It Break?” (delivered as a lecture in 1983, “Niebuhr’s Theological Background,” and
first published in 1986, and reprinted in “The Theology of H. Richard Niebuhr,”
Theology and Narrative, 1993), he backed off in Faith and Ethics: The Theology of H.
from insisting that the texts themselves imply Richard Niebuhr, ed. Paul Ramsey (New
one best reading and defended his argument York, 1957), pp. 9–116.
for realistic narrative on the grounds that this The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in
was the way the primary community that has Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century
used the text, the Christian churches, has char- Hermeneutics (New Haven, Conn.,
acteristically read it. One sees the influence of 1974).
deconstructionism and reader response The Identity of Jesus Christ: The
theories at work here, as well as the ideas of Hermeneutical Basis of Dogmatic
Frei’s colleague David Kelsey. Theology (Philadelphia, 1975).
Frei was always nervous about being iden- Types of Christian Theology (New Haven,
tified as the founder of a “school,” though he Conn., 1992).
was an amazingly gracious and immensely Theology and Narrative: Selected Essays
influential teacher. In particular, while he (New York, 1993).
wanted to maintain that, whether because of
the character of the texts themselves or of the Other Relevant Works
community that has principally read them, Frei’s papers are at Yale University.
narrative provided the best category to use in “David Friedrich Strauss,” in Nineteenth
interpreting many biblical texts, he resisted Century Religious Thought in the West,
broader claims about narrative as the key vol. 1, ed. Ninian Smart et al.
category for interpreting any text, any reli- (Cambridge, UK, 1985), pp. 215–60.
gious text, or human experience generally.
Thus the term “narrative theology” (which Further Reading
has the added problem that it leaves open the Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio,
question of whether theology should start with Dict Amer Bio, Who Was Who in Amer
the biblical narratives or the narratives of our v3
experience) particularly unnerved him. Campbell, Charles L. Preaching Jesus: New
Frei’s work certainly opened up new study Directions for Homiletics in Hans Frei’s
of Karl Barth, particularly encouraging Postliberal Theology (Grand Rapids,
approaches to Barth that engaged with the Mich., 1997).
wider postmodern context, from anthropol- Demson, David E. Hans Frei and Karl
ogy to literary criticism – “ad hoc apologetics” Barth: Different Ways of Reading
at its best. Postmodern critiques opened up Scripture (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1997).
new possibilities for sympathy with a theo- Green, Garrett, ed. Scriptural Authority and
logical approach like Frei’s and Barth’s that Narrative Interpretation (Philadelphia,
does not subsume theology under a larger 1987).
philosophical project. Pushed further, Lee, David. Luke’s Story of Jesus:
however, postmodern critiques undercut Theological Reading of Gospel Narrative
beliefs about an overall Christian meta-narra- and the Legacy of Hans Frei (Sheffield,
tive and a single best way of interpreting it UK, 1999).
that was central to both their theologies. Frei’s Lindbeck, George A. The Nature of
work thus presupposes an ability to go part Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a
way on the postmodern project without going Postliberal Age (Philadelphia, 1984).
all the way. Loughlin, Gerard. Telling God’s Story:
862
FRIEDMAN
Bible, Church, and Narrative Theology Friedman has been a senior research fellow at
(Cambridge, UK, 1996). the Hoover Institution in Stanford, California
since 1977.
William C. Placher Friedman was a leading figure of the second
“Chicago School” of economics, favoring free
market libertarianism over existing Keynesian
economic policies. He argued for the impor-
tance of controlling the money supply as not
only an instrument of government policy but
FRIEDMAN, Milton (1912– ) also as a determinant of business cycles and
inflation. Friedman’s most influential teachers
Milton Friedman was born on 31 July 1912 in were Arthur F. Burns at Rutgers, Henry
Brooklyn, New York. He studied economics Schultz at Chicago, and Harold Hotelling and
and mathematics at Rutgers University, grad- Wesley C. Mitchell at Columbia. From Burns
uating with a BA in economics in 1932. He and Mitchell, Friedman learned techniques of
then earned an MA in economics from the business cycle analysis which he later used in
University of Chicago in 1933 and a PhD in work for the National Bureau of Economic
economics from Columbia University in 1946. Research. They also influenced his belief in
His graduate studies included mathematics the importance of measurement in the social
and theoretical statistics in addition to eco- sciences. From Schultz and Hotelling,
nomics. Between 1935 and 1946 Friedman Friedman was trained in bringing mathemati-
worked as an economist and statistician for cal and statistical reasoning to economic data.
several government agencies. He also worked Friedman’s philosophical contributions are in
for the National Bureau of Economic economic methodology and political philoso-
Research from 1937 to 1981, and taught at phy. His most important publications in these
Columbia University, the University of areas are “The Methodology of Positive
Wisconsin and the University of Minnesota. Economics” and Capitalism and Freedom (with
He was professor of economics at the Rose D. Friedman, 1962). Methodologically,
University of Chicago from 1946 to 1976, Friedman emphasized the importance of
and he currently is the Paul Snowden Russell testing economic theory empirically, and doing
Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus of so with data other than those from which the
Economics. theory is derived. His ideas were developed in
Friedman was awarded the Nobel Prize in reaction to a trend in the 1940s toward
Economics in 1976. He served as President of growing mathematical abstraction in eco-
the American Economic Association, the nomics. Friedman developed positivist sensi-
Western Economic Association, and the Mont bilities from his teachers and from his work
Pelerin Society. Friedman is a member of the experience in economics and applied statistics
American Philosophical Society and the for the National Bureau of Economic Research
National Academy of Sciences. Other honors and the National Research Defense Council.
include the Presidential Medal of Freedom In “The Methodology of Positive
and the National Medal of Science, both Economics” Friedman criticized two attempts
awarded in 1988. He has served as economic to circumvent the difficulties of testing theory
advisor to several Republican presidential can- in a field such as economics, where labora-
didates: Barry Goldwater (1964), Richard tory controls are not practicable. These are to
Nixon (1968, 1972), and Ronald Reagan rely solely on standards of logic and mathe-
(1980). President Reagan named him to his matics and forgoing testing altogether, or to
Economic Policy Advisory Board in 1981. test empirically by evaluating how realistic a
863
FRIEDMAN
theory’s premises are rather than testing by its economy through control of the money supply
predictions. Friedman argued that reliance on and interest rates. Friedman’s best-known
mathematical reasoning and formal logic book, A Monetary History of the United
leaves economics arid, disconnected from the States, 1867–1960, developed a theory of the
everyday world of economic problems such Great Depression that emphasized the impor-
as business cycles and taxes, and that attempts tance of money supplies and real interest rates,
to test theory empirically by realistic premises arguing that ill-timed and poorly considered
are futile. Theories provide simplifying gener- government intervention in the free market
alizations from a mass of facts, and as such deepened the depression and delayed the
necessarily abstract from reality. Useful recovery. Friedman, along with a number of
theories therefore cannot be fully descriptive affiliated economists, consistently criticized
representations of the facts. However, theories New Deal and Great Society programs aimed
yield predictions about facts that are not yet at managing the economy, viewing them as
observed. So the only valid test of a theory is uneconomic hindrances to free market adjust-
the consilience of its predictions with observed ments.
evidence. Friedman was a highly influential and con-
Friedman’s interest in political philosophy sistent critic of government spending who
was kindled at the 1947 meeting of European doubted the efficacy of social programs. He
and American liberals at Mont Pelerin, was also an architect of and apologist for late
Switzerland. Until that time Friedman’s inter- twentieth-century downsizing of government
ests were mostly in economic and statistical and the dismantling of the welfare state. While
analysis. There is no evidence that he had an Friedman served as an economic advisor to
articulated ideology. At Mont Pelerin the Reagan administration, he maintained
Friedman met F. A. HAYEK, who had gained close ties to business leaders and politicians
notoriety as author of The Road to Serfdom, interested in the deregulation of the American
and Karl Popper, to whose philosophy of economy. Monetarism became an important
science Friedman’s ideas on testing theory bore policy weapon to criticize and substantially
a resemblance. Friedman soon became active discredit Keynesian management of the
as an apologist for capitalism. Following the American economy through spending and tax
Great Depression and World War II, with policy. Friedman’s monetarism led to a height-
intellectuals enamored of socialism, support ened focus upon the office of the Federal
for economic liberties waned. However, faith Reserve Chairman, the primary person respon-
in democracy with its requirements of political sible for changes in monetary policy and hence
and civic liberties remained strong. Friedman the growth rate of the economy.
made the case for capitalism and economic
liberty in terms intended to appeal to those BIBLIOGRAPHY
who placed little value on economic liberty Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago,
itself, arguing that ownership rights to 1953).
property and to the income from one’s labor A Theory of the Consumption Function: A
and property are necessary for maintaining Study by the National Bureau of
political and civic liberties. Economic Research, New York
Friedman is most widely known for his (Princeton, N.J., 1957).
influence over and participation in the late Capitalism and Freedom, with rose D.
twentieth-century restructuring of the Friedman (Chicago, 1962).
American economy. Friedman’s work clari- A Monetary History of the United States,
fied “monetarism” as an approach to the man- 1867–1960 (Princeton, N.J., 1963).
agement of the American (and later global) The Optimum Quantity of Money and
864
FRIES
Other Essays (Chicago, 1969). 1925 and a PhM in 1927. He taught chemistry
Monetary Statistics of the United States: at Wisconsin in 1925–7, and English at New
Estimates, Sources, Methods, with Anna Mexico Military Institute in 1927–8. Returning
J. Schwartz (New York, 1970). to Wisconsin, he was Assistant Dean in the
Monetary Trends in the United States and College of Letters and Science in 1929–30 while
the United Kingdom, their Relation to studying philosophy. He received his PhD in
Income, Prices, and Interest Rates, philosophy in 1934, writing a dissertation on
1867–1975, with Anna J. Schwartz “The Development of Dewey’s Utilitarianism.”
(Chicago, 1982). From 1930 to 1937 Fries taught philosophy
Monetarist Economics (Oxford, 1991). and psychology at Lawrence College. In 1937
he joined Wisconsin’s philosophy department
Other Relevant Works as a lecturer. He was tenured in 1947 and
Free to Choose, with Rose D. Friedman appointed professor of philosophy in 1948,
(New York, 1980). teaching until his death on 21 September 1951
Tyranny of the Status Quo, with Rose D. in Madison, Wisconsin.
Friedman (New York, 1984). Besides various academic leadership posi-
Two Lucky People: Memoirs, with Rose D. tions, in 1938–9 he supervised the “In-Service
Friedman (Chicago, 1998). Training Program” of the State Bureau of
Personnel, an apprenticeship program for the
Further Reading State’s civil service. The experience acquired in
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer these administrative appointments fitted well
Thought, Dict Economics, Encyc Amer into his abiding interest in public administra-
Bio tion, management, and the philosophy of social
Selden, Richard T., ed. Capitalism and planning, and for some years prior to his pre-
Freedom, Problems and Prospects: mature death from cancer he was investigating
Proceedings of a Conference in Honor of the relationship of perception to social inquiry.
Milton Friedman (Charlottesville, Virg., In 2001 Leo Molinaro, a former student of
1975). Fries, received Fries’s book manuscript on
Trebach, Arnold S. and Kevin B. Zeese, eds. “Foundations of Experimental Planning,” from
Friedman & Szasz on Liberty and Drugs: Fries’s daughter. The topic of this unpublished
Essays on the Free Market and book is central to two of Fries’s most significant
Prohibition (Washington, D.C., 1992). essays, “Varieties of Social Planning” (1947)
Wood, John C. and Ronald N. Woods, eds. and “Social Planning” (1952).
Milton Friedman: Critical Assessments, 4 Fries was a pragmatist, in the tradition devel-
vols (London, 1990). oped by John DEWEY and Max OTTO. He
worked, in his own individual way, on topics
J. Daniel Hammond closely connected with what Otto called
Scientific Humanism. Fries published some fifty
essays and fourteen reviews. Although his early
work was on problems of metaphysics and per-
ception, he was always interested in philosophy
of science. He also developed an abiding
FRIES, Horace Snyder (1902–51) interest in social philosophy, with an emphasis
on experimental social planning – on which he
Horace Fries was born on 22 October 1902 in was an acute innovator – and on bridging the
Richland Center, Wisconsin. He attended the gap between science and value. These topics are
University of Wisconsin, receiving a PhB in central to his “Foundations of Experimental
865
FRIES
Planning,” in which his views are keenly and Other Relevant Works
thoroughly worked out. “Foundations of Experimental Planning,”
unpublished manuscript (1951?).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
“Some Attitudes and Considerations and a Further Reading
Biological Argument for Proc of APA v25, Who’s Who in Phil
Epiphenomenalism,” Journal of
Philosophy 26 (1929): 626–34. Marcus G. Singer
“On the Spatial Location of Sensa,”
“The Appeal of Communism,” New
Humanist 9 (Summer 1936): 97–102.
“On an Empirical Criterion of Meaning,”
Philosophy of Science 3 (1936): 143–51. FRINGS, Manfred Servatius (1925– )
“The Functions of Whitehead’s God,” The
Monist 46 (1936): 25–58. Manfred Frings was born on 27 February 1925
“The Method of Proving Ethical Realism,” in Cologne-Lindenthal, Germany, the third son
Philosophical Review 46 (1937): 485–502. of Gottfried and Maria Frings. He attended a
“Method in Social Philosophy,” Journal of Catholic elementary school and lived near a
Social Philosophy 3 (1938): 325–41. Jewish community among whom he formed
“Physics: A Vicious Abstraction,” Philosophy significant friendships that shaped his later
of Science 6 (1939): 301–8. antipathy towards Nazism. The intense
“Science, Ethics and Democracy,” Journal of bombing of Cologne during World War II
Social Philosophy 6 (1941): 302–25. destroyed both his school and home, and at one
“Virtue is Knowledge,” Philosophy of point he had to rescue his mother from under
Science 8 (1941): 89–99. the rubble of their house. Drafted near the end
“On the Unity and Ethical Neutrality of of the war, he was captured by American forces
Science,” Journal of Philosophy 39 (1942): and did office work outside POW camps near
225–34. Rouen, France, where he made the first of
“Science and the Individual,” Antioch many lifelong friendships with Americans.
Review 2 (1943): 591–611. After World War II, Frings attended the
“Ethical Objectivity Through Science,” University of Cologne, where he studied phi-
Philosophical Review 52 (1943): 553–65. losophy, English, and French philology. He
“Science and the Foundations of Freedom,” earned his doctorate in philosophy in 1953. In
Journal of Philosophy 41 (1944): 113–26. 1958 he received a teaching position in philos-
“A Methodological Consideration,” Journal ophy at the University of Detroit, realizing his
of General Psychology 33 (1945): 11–20. ambition to emigrate to the United States. In
“Varieties of Social Planning: An Effort 1962 he accepted an appointment at Duquesne
Toward Orchestration,” in Freedom and University. Then, from 1966 until his retire-
Experience, ed. Sidney Hook and Milton ment in 1992, he taught at DePaul University.
Konvitz (Ithaca, N.Y., 1947), pp. 3–24. After his retirement he continued to teach in a
“Logical Simplicity,” Philosophy of Science part-time position at the University of New
17 (1950): 207–28. Mexico. He has served as a visiting professor
“Social Planning,” in The Cleavage in Our and lecturer at the universities of Cologne,
Culture, ed. Frederick Burkhardt (Boston, Freiburg, Oxford, and the Sorbonne. He has
1952), pp. 81–104. been widely respected for his work, personal
integrity, and thoughtfulness towards others.
866
FRINGS
At DePaul in 1966, Frings initiated the “Existence through Resistance between Man,
annual International Heidegger Conference. World, and God,” in American
He was one of six scholars chosen by Martin Phenomenology: Origins and
Heidegger to be the initial editors of Developments, ed. Eugene F. Kaelin and
Heidegger’s collected works. He edited Calvin O. Schrag (Dordrecht, 1989), pp.
Heidegger’s 1942–4 lectures on Parmenides 212–15.
and Heraclitus (volumes 54 and 55 of that col- Max Scheler: A Concise Introduction into the
lection), and was honored by him in personal World of a Great Thinker (Pittsburgh,
meetings in Freiburg. From 1970 Frings served 1965; 2nd edn, Milwaukee, Wisc., 1996).
as editor of the Gesammelte Werke of Max The Mind of Max Scheler: The First
Scheler, a task completed with the publication Comprehensive Guide Based on the
of volume 15 in 1997. He also was President of Complete Works (Milwaukee, Wisc., 1997).
the International Max Scheler Society. Life Time: Max Scheler’s Philosophy of Time,
The primary focus of Frings’s career was A First Inquiry and Presentation
Scheler’s phenomenology of values, ethics, (Dordrecht, 2003).
sociology of knowledge, political theory, and
philosophy of time. Among his major contri- Other Relevant Works
butions are his legitimation of Scheler’s phe- Ed., Heidegger and the Quest for Truth
nomenology as a credible and illuminating (Chicago, 1968).
alternative to Edmund Husserl’s, most notably Ed., Max Scheler (1874–1928): Centennial
in his The Mind of Max Scheler (1997), and his Essays (The Hague, 1974).
clarification of the relationship between Scheler “Nothingness and Being: A Schelerian
and Heidegger in Person und Dasein (1969). In Comment,” in Radical Phenomenology:
the latter work, Frings endeavored to go beyond Essays in Honor of Martin Heidegger
the limited role given to the experience of values (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1978).
in Heidegger’s ontological preoccupations, and “Social Temporality in George Herbert Mead
beyond Scheler’s own unfinished metaphysics and Scheler,” Philosophy Today 27 (1983):
by using Scheler’s phenomenology of repentance 281–9.
(Reue) to explicate the ontological foundations “The Structure of Social Communality,” in
of ethics. Also notable is Frings’s contribution to Philosophy and Science in
the phenomenology of absolute time in Life Phenomenological Perspective, ed. Kah
Time: Max Scheler’s Philosophy of Time (2003). Kyung Cho (Dordrecht, 1984).
He has published well over a hundred articles, “Max Scheler: The Human Person in Action
edited twenty-four books, and his publications and in the Cosmos,” in Phenomenology
have been translated into Chinese, French, World Wide, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka
Japanese, and German. He was granted a private (Dordrecht, 2002).
audience with Pope John Paul II, himself an
accomplished Scheler scholar. Further Reading
Nota, John H. “Fring’s Max Scheler,”
BIBLIOGRAPHY Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Person und Dasein: Zur Frage der Ontologie 27 (1966): 119–20.
des Wertseins (The Hague, 1969). Smith, F. J. “Fring’s Person und Dasein,”
Zur Phänomenologie der Lebensgemeinschaft: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Ein Versuch mit Max Scheler (Meisenheim, 33 (1972): 292–3.
Germany, 1971).
Philosophy of Prediction and Capitalism Philip Blosser
(Dordrecht, 1987).
867
FROMM
FROMM, Erich Pinchas (1900–1980) Alanson White Institute, the New York branch
of the Washington School of Psychiatry, and
Erich Fromm was born on 23 March 1900 in worked with Harry Stack SULLIVAN. From 1945
Frankfurt, Germany, and died on 18 March to 1947 he taught psychology at the University
1980 in Muralto, Switzerland. Fromm’s of Michigan, and was the Terry Lecturer at
parents, Naphtali and Rosa Fromm, had a Yale in 1948–9. In 1950 Fromm moved to
troubled relationship, and the unhappy Mexico City, where he joined the Medical
marriage resulted in Fromm becoming a dis- Faculty of the National Autonomous
tressed, highly anxious child. Growing up, University, teaching there until 1965. He
Fromm spent time with a beautiful female founded the Mexican Institute of
artist, who was a friend of the family. When Psychoanalysis in 1963. In addition to his work
Fromm was twelve, the woman’s father died, in Mexico, Fromm was an occasional visiting
and she, grief-stricken by the event, committed professor at Michigan State University from
suicide immediately following his death. This 1957 to 1961, and became an adjunct profes-
traumatic episode, along with World War I, sor of psychology at New York University in
became the impetus for Fromm’s obsession 1962. During the 1960s and 1970s Fromm
with questions concerning the apparent irra- traveled and lectured across the US and Europe,
tionality of human behavior, an irrational and also spent much time in Switzerland, where
nature that, to Fromm, seemed extremely per- he died in 1980.
vasive in the behavior of the masses. After becoming interested in Karl Marx’s
Fromm began studying jurisprudence at the social philosophy, Fromm began to feel that
University of Frankfurt am Main, but in 1919 Freud was incorrect in placing so much
he attended the University of Heidelberg, where emphasis on the repression of sexual desires
he changed his major to sociology. In 1922, and that socioeconomic factors played a more
under the supervision of Alfred Weber, Fromm crucial role in the origin of modern-day
received his PhD in sociology from Heidelberg. neurosis. Thus, Fromm’s psychological and
Following the completion of his doctorate, philosophical system developed into a synthe-
Fromm began focusing on psychology and sis of aspects of Marxism and Freud’s psycho-
studied psychoanalysis at the University of analysis. Fromm’s original ideas about the
Munich in 1923 and 1924. In 1925 he started human mind and human behavior began to
his own clinical practice, and in 1927 he helped flourish during the 1920s, when he was
organize the Frankfurt Psychoanalytic Institute. appointed as leader of the Frankfurt Institute of
By 1930 he had finished his psychoanalytical Social Research’s social psychological division.
training in Berlin at the Psychoanalytical The Frankfurt Institute was comprised of
Institute and joined the Institute for Social leftist intellectuals, including Max
Research in Frankfurt. HORKHEIMER, Theodor ADORNO, and Herbert
During the rise of Hitler’s Nazi regime, MARCUSE. They sought to construct a “critical
Fromm emigrated from Germany and arrived theory” of society which would revise and
in New York City in 1934. He taught at the update Marxism in a manner that would
Institute for Social Research, the relocated provide guidance for potential future revolu-
Frankfurt Institute affiliated with Columbia tions. During his time at the Frankfurt Institute
University, from 1934 to 1939. Fromm was a (which became known as the Frankfurt
guest lecturer at Columbia during 1939–42; School), Fromm surveyed blue-collar Germans,
he lectured at New School for Social Research in an attempt to catalogue authoritarian or
beginning in 1941; and he was a part-time pro- protofascist traits. The results of the survey led
fessor at Bennington College in Vermont in Fromm to believe that workers’ allegiance to
1942. In 1943 he helped to found the William the left was hindered by conformist and sado-
868
FROMM
masochistic attributes which made them more become the masochists. As the masochists
likely to support a dictatorship. receive the pain afflicted by the sadist, feelings
The findings of Fromm’s survey proved to be of powerlessness grow as personal autonomy
prophetic as Hitler’s dictatorship began to take atrophies. Fromm hypothesized that social con-
form in the 1930s, and subsequently, the ditions, such as those seen in a capitalist society,
Frankfurt Institute and Fromm, who was a rob individuals of psychological needs, a
Jew, moved to Columbia University in New robbery that becomes perversely manifested
York City. In 1933 Fromm worked briefly at through acts of violence toward others.
the Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute, where he Believing that modern culture was to blame
met renowned psychologist Karen Horney. for the violence witnessed around him and with
Horney’s ideas about sexuality impressed the fear of nuclear war spreading, Fromm aided
Fromm, while he influenced her thoughts con- in starting a peace group called SANE
cerning social influences on behavior. After (National Committee for a Sane Nuclear
leaving Columbia, Fromm also left the Policy) in 1957. He became a political
Frankfurt Institute, apparently over a dispute advocate, meeting with US leaders to discuss
caused by conflicting ideas about the impor- the Cold War, visiting Europe to talk about US
tance of Freud. He became a citizen of the foreign policy, writing election platforms for the
United States in 1940, and one year later, pub- American Socialist Party, marching for civil
lished the book that would bring him national rights, and so on. All the while he continued to
acclaim. be a prolific writer, publishing several books
Escape from Freedom (1941) was Fromm’s that added to the themes presented in Escape,
seminal work which delineated his ideas about and his popularity grew throughout the 1960s
society’s role in shaping the masses into con- and 1970s.
formists. While most of Fromm’s colleagues
from Frankfurt wrote in a jargon-filled prose BIBLIOGRAPHY
inaccessible to the lay reader, Fromm possessed Escape from Freedom (New York, 1941).
a talent for writing with lucidity and clarity, Man For Himself: An Inquiry into the
which helped make the book a success, with Psychology of Ethics (New York, 1947).
over twenty-five printings to date. As a propo- Psychoanalysis and Religion (New Haven,
nent of Marx’s philosophy, Fromm felt that 1950).
the workers of his time, especially those living The Forgotten Language: An Introduction to
in a capitalist system, had become alienated the Understanding of Dreams, Fairy Tales
from their jobs, as well their communities. As and Myths (New York, 1951).
the influence and purpose provided by culture The Sane Society (New York, 1955).
and religion fade in a democratic society, man The Art of Loving (New York, 1956).
is left in a state of psychological dissonance Sigmund Freud’s Mission: An Analysis of His
and struggles to find personal identity and Personality and Influence (New York,
meaning for his life. To ameliorate these 1959).
feelings, modern man seeks out the approval of Beyond the Chains of Illusion: My Encounter
his society by conforming to the rules and with Marx and Freud (New York, 1962).
values established by it. Slowly, almost all traces The Dogma of Christ and Other Essays on
of genuine individualism are lost as he feigns Religion, Psychology and Culture (New
respect for things he does not truly believe, for York, 1963).
the sake of emotional and financial protection. The Heart of Man: Its Genius for Good and
According to Fromm, if a democratic politi- Evil (New York, 1964).
cal system is thought of as a sadist, then those The Crisis of Psychoanalysis (New York,
who submit to it, despite their true feelings, 1970).
869
FROMM
The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness a prominent figure in the history of Latin

(New York, 1973). American philosophy, had a great influence
To Have or to Be? (New York, 1976). on him. Romero’s concern to provide a richer
and non-reductionistic view of human beings
Other Relevant Works is a concern that is implicit in all of Frondizi’s
The Erich Fromm Archives are in Tübingen, work. But Frondizi’s relation with North
Germany. American philosophers was also key to his
Erich Fromm Gesamtausgabe, 12 vols, ed. philosophical development. He won a schol-
Rainer Funk (Munich, 1999). Vol. 10 arship for advanced studies at Columbia
contains a bibliography of Fromm’s University in New York, making him the first
writings. Argentine to study philosophy in the United
States. Although his scholarship was for
Further Reading Columbia he wanted to study at Harvard and his
Amer Nat Bio, Bio Dict Psych, Comp Amer wishes were granted. Frondizi entered Harvard
Thought, Encyc Amer Bio, Encyc Psych and studied with A. N. WHITEHEAD, C. I. LEWIS,
Burston, Daniel. The Legacy of Erich Fromm R. B. PERRY, W. KÖHLER, and William HOCKING.
(Cambridge, Mass., 1991). From Whitehead he learned the view of reality
Funk, Rainer. Erich Fromm: The Courage to as process and organic unity. From Köhler he
be Human (New York, 1982). became acquainted with the concept of Gestalt,
Jay, Martin. The Dialectical Imagination: A which was useful in the development of his own
History of the Frankfurt School and the original philosophy. Throughout his life Frondizi
Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950 remained in a constant dialogue with philoso-
(Berkeley, Cal., 1973). phers from all the Americas. This contributes to
Landis, Bernard, and Edward S. Tauber, eds. the richness of his philosophy and makes him
In the Name of Life: Essays in Honor of one of the first philosophers to become truly
Erich Fromm (New York, 1971). Pan-American.
Schaar, John H. Escape from Authority: The In 1937 Frondizi returned to Argentina to
Perspectives of Erich Fromm (New York, become one of the founding members of the
1961). College of Humanities in the Universidad
Nacional de Tucuman. He remained there
Daniel Trippett until 1946, with a one-year interruption in
1943–4, when he won a scholarship for post-
graduate work at the University of Michigan
in Ann Arbor. There he worked closely with
Roy Wood SELLARS and De Witt H. PARKER. In
Tucuman and in Michigan Frondizi wrote his
FRONDIZI, Risieri (1910–83) first book, El punto de partida del filosofar
(1945). In that essay he defended a thesis that
Risieri Frondizi was born on 20 November he never abandoned and that is at the heart of
1910 in Posadas, the capital of the Province of his philosophy: experience is the necessary
Misiones, Argentina. His brother, Arturo point of departure and permanent reference of
Frondizi, became President of Argentina, all genuine philosophizing. Verbal adherence
serving from 1958 to 1962. Frondizi studied to experience by a theory is not enough to
philosophy and law at the Instituto Nacional make it empirical. To avoid the mistakes of
del Profesorado in Buenos Aires, where his modern philosophy we must aspire for a
teachers were Angel Vassallo, Luis Juan “total” and “integral” empiricism that is able
Guerrero, and Francisco Romero. The latter, to put aside our theories and describe experi-
870
FRONDIZI
ence as it is actually lived. It is necessary to From Yale, Frondizi went to the University
determine clearly what is meant by experience of Puerto Rico, where he offered seminars and
and to develop a general view of experience. began to work on his philosophy of values
Experience is a process constituted by my self, and education. In 1952 he worked at the
my activity, and the objects that this activity is Institute of Philosophy of the University of
concerned with. A general philosophy of expe- Rome. In 1955 he returned to Argentina,
rience must proceed to study each of these where he was appointed as Chairman of the
elements without making the mistake of for- Institute of Philosophy at the University of La
getting that they are given as part of an indi- Plata. In 1957 he published ¿Que son los
visible totality. Frondizi embarked upon this Valores?, a book that would be translated,
project and culminated in books about the revised, and expanded in subsequent editions.
self, value, and education. In this book the main objectivist and subjec-
As an academic Frondizi was admired for his tivist doctrines are presented and analyzed.
integrity and stance against threats to freedom The way to overcome the antithesis between
of thought. In 1946 he was illegally dismissed these two doctrines is to question their shared
from his teaching post in Argentina and then starting point and the way the problem is
imprisoned when he rightfully protested. After posed. They both start with an abstraction
regaining his freedom he was invited by writer and not with value as it is experienced. Value
Mario Picon to found another college of is better conceived as a Gestalt quality. This
humanities at Venezuela’s Universidad Central. means that it is a quality that depends on, but
In 1948 he accepted an invitation to spend a cannot be reduced to the empirical qualities.
semester at the University of Pennsylvania. This is how Frondizi takes care of G. E.
Because of a military coup in Venezuela, Moore’s concern about the relation of good to
instead of returning to the Universidad Central natural qualities. A value is a synthesis of
he accepted in 1949 a post offered to him by objective and subjective contributions that
Brand BLANSHARD at Yale University. At Yale, emerges and has meaning in concrete human
he wrote Substancia y funcion en el Problema situations.
del yo (1952), and a year later it was pub- In 1957 Frondizi was elected Dean and later
lished in English. This book was well received. President of the Universidad de Buenos Aires.
Frondizi provides a critical evaluation of the He made substantial educational reforms,
modern philosopher’s attempt to provide an including the establishment of the University
adequate theory of the self. Modern philoso- Press of Buenos Aires, which by the end of his
phy seems to force us to choose between a sub- administration in 1962 had published eight
stantial self and no self at all. The quarrel million volumes. He played an important role
between atomism and substantialism is due to a in establishing the first journals, classes, and
non-empirical starting point where each con- organizations dedicated exclusively to philo-
centrates on one aspect of the self to the exclu- sophical inquiry in many places in Latin
sion of the other. The changing aspect of the self America.
is not incompatible with its unity and continu- In 1964 Frondizi was invited to the Institute
ity. The self is a complex unity undergoing a of Advanced Studies in Princeton, New Jersey.
constant process. It is not something that can be In 1965, because of a military coup in
divided in pieces but an organic unity that is Argentina, he resigned from all his posts in
dynamic and structural. This unity is not one the Universidad de Buenos Aires. He was then
that transcends the empirical world. The relation offered several positions abroad. He taught
between the self and the elements that constitute philosophy at the University of California at
it is the same sort of relation that contemporary Los Angeles from 1966 to 1968, the University
psychology refers to as a Gestalt. of Texas in 1969–70, and Southern Illinois
871
FRONDIZI
University at Carbondale from 1970 to 1979. Trans., Solomon Lipp, What is Value?
He was later appointed to a visiting position in An Introduction to Axiology (La Salle,
Baylor University in Texas. He died on 23 Ill., 1962; 2nd edn 1971).
February 1983 in Waco, Texas. La Universidad en un Mundo de Tensiones:
Frondizi was a prolific writer and con- Misión de las Universidades en America
tributed to numerous philosophic journals in Latina (Buenos Aires, 1971).
both Europe and America. He was concerned Introducción a los problemas
about the inadequacy of communication of fundamentales del hombre (Mexico City,
philosophical ideas between North America 1977).
and Latin America. He wrote articles about the Ensayos filosóficos (Mexico City, 1986).
state of philosophy in Latin America and about
the need for these two American philosophies Other Relevant Works
to complement each other. “Contemporary Argentine Philosophy,”
Frondizi acquired an international reputa- Philosophy and Phenomenological
tion. He was an honorary professor of several Research 4 (1943): 180–85.
Latin American Universities. He was a philoso- “On the Unity of the Philosophies of the
pher with a rich diverse philosophical back- two Americas,” Review of Metaphysics 4
ground and a broad outlook or scope. His (June 1951): 617–24.
philosophy resists the ordinary classifications “Value as a Gestalt Quality,” Journal of
in part because his influences are so diverse. He Value Inquiry 6 (1972): 163–84.
acquired from his North American education “Sartre’s Early Ethics: A Critique,” in The
the type of clarity and rigor that we know Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, ed. Paul
today as analytic philosophy. But he was A. Schilpp (La Salle, Ill., 1981), pp.
critical of how often philosophical analysis 371–91.
can get in the way of adequacy or faithfulness
to concrete everyday experience. He criticized Further Reading
the scientistic approach to philosophy as much Proc of APA v56
as the poetic-religious conception for being Gracia, Jorge J. E. “Frondizi’s Theory of
one-sided and narrow. The constant reference the Self as a Dynamic Gestalt,” The
to experience is the only way to avoid the Personalist 57 (1976): 64–71.
reductionism and single-mindedness that have Gracia, Jorge J. E., ed. Man and His
plagued philosophy. Philosophy must be Conduct: Essays in Honor of Risieri
faithful to the richness and variety present in Frondizi (San Juan, Puerto Rico, 1980).
human experience. This was an underlying Hartman, Robert S. “Risieri Frondizi on
goal that pervaded all of Frondizi’s work. the Nature of Value,” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 22 (1961):
BIBLIOGRAPHY 223–32.
El Punto de Partida del Filosofar (Buenos
Aires, 1945; 2nd edn 1957). Gregory Fernando Pappas
Substancia y función en el problema del yo
(Buenos Aires, 1952).
The Nature of the Self: A Functional
Interpretation (New Haven, Conn.,
1953; Carbondale, Ill., 1971).
¿Que son los Valores? Introducción a la
Axiología (Mexico City, 1958; 2nd edn
1962; 3rd edn 1968; 4th edn 1972).
872
FROTHINGHAM
FROTHINGHAM, Octavius Brooks them. His engaging, challenging sermons were

(1822–95) printed in newspapers, periodicals, and pam-
phlets. In his mental ventures that ranged widely
Octavian Frothingham was born on 26 through literature, politics, and different reli-
November 1822 in Boston, Massachusetts, at a gious systems Frothingham’s beliefs moved
time when Unitarianism was still young enough increasingly beyond the generally accepted
to affect the rest of New England as a vibrant bounds of Unitarianism. He made little distinc-
theological movement. Since his father was a tion, for example, between such categories as
Unitarian minister, it seemed natural enough nature and the supernatural. Many nineteenth-
for Octavius to receive his BA from Harvard century liberal thinkers shared this perspective,
College (1843) and a BD from its Divinity and Frothingham represented that widespread
School (1846) in preparation for a pastoral group when he saw little difference between
career. This training inculcated commonplace divinity and humanity. Human beings existed as
Unitarian ideas in him, and for the first thirty a combination of infinite and finite, or animal,
years of his life one finds little more than placid influences. Problems occurred when animal
acceptance of his denomination’s central instincts prevailed, and salvation from this sin
emphases. The first sign of real change came was in the pursuit of high ideals that were still
with the issue of slavery, specifically the Fugitive present in people, a striving for moral improve-
Slave Law. Frothingham had been pastor of ment that would enhance both personal growth
North Church in Salem, Massachusetts, since and community welfare. Guidelines for identi-
1847, but in 1854 he drew a great deal of atten- fying ideals and examples of moral effort could
tion to himself by preaching against northern be found in all cultures around the globe.
compliance with pro-slavery legislation. He By 1865 denominational conservatives had
denounced in ringing terms any form of become concerned enough about doctrinal
Christianity that acquiesced in abetting slavery erosion to form the National Conference of
in any form. Many in his congregation remained Unitarian Churches, an organization with enough
unmoved by his ardent advocacy, or they took authority to compose a written creed for use as
umbrage at it, so much so that he decided to a standard among constituent congregations.
leave that church a few months thereafter. Frothingham balked at such attempts to control
During those latter days Frothingham refused to free inquiry in search of truth wherever it could
serve communion to anyone lest he imply that he be found. He opposed all forms of religious dog-
cooperated with the morally inert portion of his matism, any claim from a centralized power that
flock. He never served communion again it had determined final truths and had the right
throughout his career, judging it to be too to impose them on an individual’s beliefs. Thus
divisive an issue. he was acknowledged as a pioneer and leader
Frothingham moved to other pastorates on the among radicals in the Unitarianism of his day
strength of his reputation as zealous reformer because he championed open inquiry into spiri-
and eloquent speaker. For a time in Jersey City tual matters. In 1867 he helped establish the Free
(1855–9) and then at the Third Unitarian Society Religious Association and served until 1878 as its
in New York City (1859–79), he rose to first President. The group stood on principles of
eminence within the more liberal wing of his free search for truth, not on any set of specific
denomination. His congregation represented his tenets as requisite beliefs. Members of this asso-
own mental and spiritual prerogatives, ciation avowed that they did not intend to form
composed as it was of cosmopolitan minds with a new religious sect, but they eventually broke
varied tastes and freethinkers who went beyond with Unitarianism altogether.
comfortable traditions in search of truth For ten years, from 1870 to 1880,
wherever it could be found in the world around Frothingham edited The Index, an official organ
873
FROTHINGHAM
of the association, wherein he continually Frothingham and the New Faith (New
denounced all attempts to impose creedal restric- York, 1876).
tions on free minds. In 1879 poor health forced
him to retire from vigorous activities. After a Henry Warner Bowden
year’s convalescent tour of Europe he settled in
Boston again and continued a modest literary
output for another fifteen years. In his later
writings he affirmed that all forms of truth should
be honored when attained through serious,
honest effort, and that pure religion could result FRYE, Herman Northrop (1912–91)
from untrammeled search for divine wisdom
found to some extent in all viewpoints. He died Northrop Frye was born on 14 July 1912 in
on 27 November 1895 in Boston, Massachusetts. Sherbrooke, Québec, Canada. He graduated
from Victoria College of the University of
BIBLIOGRAPHY Toronto, receiving the BA with honors in phi-
Story of the Patriarchs (Boston, 1864). losophy and English in 1933. He attended
The Religion of Humanity (New York, 1873). Merton College, Oxford, receiving his MA in
Transcendentalism in New England: A English in 1940. In 1939 he joined the English
History (New York, 1876). department at Victoria College, University of
The Cradle of Christ: A Study of Primitive Toronto, and remained there for the rest of his
Christianity (New York, 1877). life. Frye published twenty-eight books and
Boston Unitarianism, 1820–1850: Study of edited fifteen; he published over 150 essays,
the Life and Work of Nathaniel Langdon chapters and articles. He received many prizes
Frothingham (New York, 1890). and honors from Canadian academia in the
Recollections and Impressions, 1822–1891 humanities, and held thirty-eight honorary doc-
(New York, 1891). torates from universities around the world. He
died in Toronto, Ontario, on 23 January 1991.
Other Relevant Works Frye achieved distinction primarily as one of
Frothingham’s papers are at the Library of the foremost literary critics of the twentieth
Congress, the Massachusetts Historical century, and his more philosophical work
Society, Harvard University, and Princeton involved his reflections on criticism as a disci-
University. pline. Frye’s major theoretical work, Anatomy of
Life of Theodore Parker (New York, 1874). Criticism (1957), came relatively early in his
Gerrit Smith: A Biography (New York, 1878). career as the second book he wrote. He was
George Ripley (Boston, 1882). thereafter, in A. C. Hamilton’s words, “remark-
Memoir of William Henry Channing (Boston, ably stubborn in preserving his critical principles
1886). unchanged” (1990, p. xi).
Frye presented his theory of criticism in the
Further Reading waning days of the so-called New Criticism, a
Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, method of intensely close reading of individual
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer Bio, literary texts. Frye aimed to make literary criti-
Dict Amer Religious Bio, Nat Cycl Amer cism “scientific”; not that criticism should adapt
Bio v2 the methods of the natural or social sciences,
Caruthers, J. Wade. Octavius Brooks but that criticism must be based on knowledge
Frothingham: Gentle Radical (Tuscaloosa, and reasoning. Criticism should become an orga-
Ala., 1977). nized body of knowledge though the organizing
Stedman, Edmund C. Octavius Brooks principles must be drawn from literature itself,
874
FULLER
and not imported from theology, or philoso- BIBLIOGRAPHY

phy, or politics, or science (1957, pp. 6–11). Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton, N.J., 1957).
In order to achieve this goal of being scientific, The Educated Imagination (Toronto, 1963).
Frye believed that criticism needs a conceptual The Great Code: The Bible and Literature
framework which it alone possesses. Criticism (New York, 1982).
seems to be badly in need of a coordinating prin- Northrop Frye on Shakespeare (Markham,
ciple, a central hypothesis which will see the Ont., 1986).
phenomena it deals with as parts of a whole. The Words with Power: Being a Second Study of
critic must assume there is an order in literature “The Bible and Literature” (New York,
which criticism properly organized reveals. The 1990).
organizing scheme which Frye proposed The Collected Works, ed. Alvin A. Lee
involved four elements, a theory of each of (Toronto, 1996).
modes, symbols, myths, and genres. Of these, the
theory of myth is the most important, because it Further Reading
is the “most abstract and conventionalized of all Who Was Who in Amer v10
literary modes” (1957, p. 134). Symbol, Frye Ayre, John. Northrop Frye: A Biography
interprets narrowly as any unit of any literary (Toronto, 1989).
structure that can be isolated for critical attention Cook, David. Northrop Frye: A Vision of the
(1957, p. 71). The polysemous character of New World (Montréal, 1985).
meaning implies that the organizing principle of Denham, Robert D. Northrop Frye: An
criticism cannot be at the level of symbol. Only Annotated Bibliography of Primary and
myth has the required generality and abstract- Secondary Sources (Toronto, 1987).
ness. Frye takes the myths of the Judaeo- Gorak, Jan. The Making of the Modern
Christian Bible and of classical mythology to Canon: Genesis and Crisis of a Literary
form the core of the conceptual framework or Idea (London, 1991).
organizing principle for literature. The struc- Hamilton, A. C. Northrop Frye: Anatomy of
tural principles of literature are as closely related His Criticism (Toronto, 1990).
to mythology and comparative religion as those Lee, Alvin A., and Robert D. Denham, eds.
of painting are to geometry (1957, pp. 15–17, The Legacy of Northrop Frye (Toronto,
71, 134–5). The title of The Great Code: The 1994).
Bible and Literature (1982) is deliberate: Frye is
not presenting the Bible as literature, but the Roger A. Shiner
Bible and literature. He is concerned with how
the mythology of the Bible taken as a conceptual
framework for criticism structures, and so
permits, the understanding and appreciation of
literature.
Frye might seem an easy target in diverse and FULLER, Lon Luvois (1902–78)
multicultural times, but that would be a mistake.
There is ample testimony that he interpreted Lon Fuller was born on 15 June 1902 in
myth inclusively; that his political sensibilities Hereford, Texas. He earned his BA (1924) and
were social-democratic; and that he was, JD (1926) at Stanford University. He was
although certainly in the academy, not of it. He instructor of law at University of Oregon Law
did not hesitate to write for a non-academic School (1926–8), instructor of law at University
audience, and he once said that his true academic of Illinois College of Law (1929–31), and pro-
home was the undergraduate lecture hall, not the fessor of law at Duke University (1931–40). He
graduate supervision. then went to Harvard Law School where he
875
FULLER
was visiting professor of law (1939–40), pro- his plans and proposed actions and rationally
fessor of law (1940–48), and Carter Professor evaluate and predict how they will be received
of Jurisprudence (1948–72). He died on 8 April by and impact the activities of his fellows. His
1978 in Cambridge, Massachusetts. examples are drawn from the law of contract,
At a time when legal positivism was quasi-contract, and tort, the acceptance of
dominant, which demanded the separation of which in American society today represents the
morality from law, Fuller championed the fruit of a centuries-old struggle to reduce the
seemingly antiquated notions of natural law role of the irrational in human affairs.
theory. His assault began in 1964 with his
famous and controversial work, The Morality BIBLIOGRAPHY
of Law, which argued that law and morality The Law in Quest of Itself (Chicago, 1940;
were intimately intertwined. He claimed that Boston, 1966).
the positivist sees law as a one-way projection The Problems of Jurisprudence (Brooklyn,
of authority, emanating from an authorized N.Y., 1949).
source and imposing itself on the citizen. It “Positivism and Fidelity to the Law – A
does not discern as an essential element in the Reply to Professor Hart,” Harvard Law
creation of a legal system any tacit cooperation Review 71 (1958): 630–72.
between lawgiver and citizen – morally or The Morality of Law (New Haven, Conn.,
immorally, justly or unjustly. 1964).
For Fuller, the Supreme Court 1973 Legal Fictions (Stanford, Cal., 1967).
abortion-rights decision Roe v. Wade was a Anatomy of the Law (New York, 1968).
perfect example of the limitations of the posi-
tivist school of legal thought. A classic example Other Relevant Works
of the positivist approach, the Court’s opinion Fuller’s papers are at Harvard University Law
focuses almost exclusively upon the issue of School.
“who decides” whether a woman may have Basic Contract Law (St. Paul, Minn., 1947;
an abortion. It ignores the issue of whether or 7th edn 2001).
not a human life is destroyed, much less the Winston, Kenneth I., ed. The Principles of
subsidiary question of who, if anyone, has a Social Order: Selected Essays of Lon L.
moral obligation to protect such a life. Fuller (Durham, N.C., 1981). Contains a
If Fuller is a champion of natural law, it is bibliography of Fuller’s publications.
most definitely natural law in a secularized and
updated form. His approach emphasizes cus- Further Reading
tomary law, by which he means rules which Bio 20thC Phils, Encyc Ethics, Routledge
have evolved spontaneously from the adjudi- Encycl Phil, Who Was Who in Amer v7
cation and arbitration of legal disputes. Bechtler, Thomas W., ed. Law in a Social
Consequently, he endorsed the thinking of the Context: Liber Amicorum Honouring
Italian philosopher Bruno Leoni that, Professor Lon L. Fuller (Deventer, The
“Individuals make the law, insofar as they Netherlands, 1978).
make successful claims.” The law is a dynamic MacLeod-Cullinane, Barry. “Lon L. Fuller
enterprise that is at home in the American and the Enterprise of Law,” Legal Notes
market economy. A society of economic traders No. 22 (London, 1995).
is the social order most likely to foster the con- Strahan, Thomas W. “The Natural Law
ditions that make a duty most understandable Philosophy of Lon L. Fuller in Contrast to
and most palatable to the man who owes it. Roe v. Wade and Its Progeny,” in
For Fuller the law also provides a chart or Association for Interdisciplinary Research
roadmap with which the individual can orient in Values and Social Change, vol. 15, no. 4
876
FULLERTON
(Washington, D.C., 2000). the terms of the gift and gave the chair to the
Summers, Robert S. Lon L. Fuller (Stanford, philosophy department. Fullerton later served
Cal., 1984). as Dean of the Philosophy Department in
Witteveen, W. J., and W. van der Burg, eds. 1889–90, Dean of the College from 1894 to
Rediscovering Fuller: Essays on Implicit 1896, and Vice Provost of the University from
Law and Institutional Design (Amsterdam, 1894 to 1898. In 1904 Fullerton became pro-
1999). fessor of philosophy at Columbia University.
Students of his include Warner FITE and Edgar
James O. Castagnera Arthur SINGER. Fullerton was President of the
American Psychological Association in 1896.
In 1913 Fullerton went on leave from
Columbia to lecture as an exchange professor
at the universities of Vienna, Graz, Innsbruck,
Cracow, and Lemberg. The following year,
FULLERTON, George Stuart (1859–1925) Emperor Franz Joseph appointed him as an
honorary professor at the University of Vienna.
George Stuart Fullerton was born on 18 August When World War I began, Fullerton was
1859 in Futteghur, India, to the Reverend detained in Austrian and German prison
Robert Stewart Fullerton and Martha White camps for four years. His position with
Fullerton, who lived there as missionaries. In Columbia officially ended in 1917. A frail man
1875 he entered the University of Pennsylvania, who was partially paralyzed after an attack of
earning his BA in 1879 and his MA in philos- inflammatory rheumatism in his boyhood,
ophy in 1882. He subsequently studied in the Fullerton never recovered from the hardship
divinity schools at Princeton in 1879 and Yale and starvation he suffered in the camps. After
from 1880 to 1883, receiving his divinity degree returning to the US, he was a part-time lecturer
from Yale in 1883. Later he was ordained in in philosophy at Vassar College. With his
the Episcopal Church. In 1892 Muhlenberg health deteriorating, Fullerton committed
College conferred the honorary PhD degree suicide on 23 March 1925 in Poughkeepsie,
upon him, and in 1900 he received a Doctor of New York.
Laws degree from the same institution. Fullerton was a prominent early defender
In 1883 Fullerton became an instructor of of realism against the dominant idealism in
philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania, American philosophy. The central purpose of
replacing the recently deceased Charles On Spinozistic Immortality (1899) is to
Porterfield Krauth who had been the professor examine the eternity Spinoza ascribed to the
of moral and intellectual philosophy since human mind. Fullerton gives Spinoza a realis-
1868. Fullerton became an adjunct professor in tic reading, which carries through in his own
1885 and the Adam Seybert Professor of philosophy. Since he rejected the notion of
Intellectual and Moral Philosophy in 1887. substance, he can be properly called a phe-
The Seybert chair had just been established nomenalistic realist: all real objects are as they
through the estate of Henry Seybert with the appear. A System of Metaphysics (1904)
condition that its holder investigate claims of explains his established views. For Fullerton,
psychic phenomena. Fullerton was secretary of objects are perceived directly but they are
the commission that was appointed to review always perceived under particular conditions
the relevant literature and to examine self-pro- so that one never perceives the object as such.
claimed psychics. Having found no evidence of Observers who give conflicting accounts see
psychic phenomena, the university trustees the object under different conditions. For
determined that the investigation had satisfied Fullerton these conditions are objective, which
877
FULLERTON
allows him to deny that his views commit him FULTON, James Street (1904–97)
to subjectivism.
James Street Fulton was born on 29 August
BIBLIOGRAPHY 1904 in Columbia, Tennessee. After earning
The Conception of the Infinite and the his BA from Vanderbilt University in 1925, he
Solution of the Mathematical studied for a year in Germany at Göttingen
Antinomies: A Study in Psychological University, and then returned to Vanderbilt
Analysis (Philadelphia, 1887). for his MA in 1929. He earned his PhD in
A Plain Argument for God (Philadelphia, philosophy from Cornell University in 1934,
1889). writing a dissertation on “Five Theories of
On Sameness and Identity: A Truth.” After graduation, he taught philoso-
Psychological Study Being a phy at McGill University in Montréal from
Contribution to the Foundations of a 1934 to 1943, and served in the Canadian
Theory of Knowledge (Philadelphia, Navy during World War II from 1943 to
1890). 1945. Fulton’s association with Rice
On the Perception of Small Differences: University in Texas began in 1946, when he
With Special Reference to the Extent, was hired as assistant professor of philosophy
Force and Time of Movement, with by Radoslav TSANOFF. Fulton was promoted
James McKeen Cattell (Philadelphia, to full professor in 1952, and served as chair
1892). of Rice’s philosophy department from 1956
On Spinozistic Immortality (Philadelphia, to 1968. He retired in 1974, and died on 31
1899). March 1997 in Bellaire, Texas.
A System of Metaphysics (New York, Fulton was an important and widely
1904). respected teacher, scholar, and leader at Rice.
An Introduction to Philosophy (New During his chairing of Rice’s philosophy
York, 1906). department, graduate studies and a doctoral
The World We Live In: Or, Philosophy program began. Under his leadership as the
and Life in the Light of Modern first Master of Will Rice College, the college
Thought (New York, 1912). system began and evolved at Rice University
Germany of Today (Indianapolis, 1915). during the 1950s and 1960s. He was a
A Handbook of Ethical Theory (New member of several academic societies; he par-
York, 1922). ticipated in the University of New Mexico
Taos Aesthetics Institute for several years,
Further Reading and served as President of the Southwestern
Bio Dict Psych by Zusne, Dict Amer Bio, Philosophical Society in 1957.
Nat Cycl Amer Bio v12, Who Was Who Fulton’s philosophical orientation tended
in Amer v1 towards idealism, defending the superior
Miller, Dickinson S. “Fullerton and reality of lived values by each person, against
Philosophy,” The New Republic (13 the anti-personalist “objective” science and
May 1925): 310–12. naturalism. His book Science and Man’s
Singer, Edgar A., Jr. “George Stuart Hope (1954) attempts to show the limita-
Fullerton,” Journal of Philosophy 22 tions of science for both understanding reality
(1925): 589–96. and justifying itself. Value-neutral science is
blind to the existence of values and the
Cornelis de Waal human hope that life is good, and science
cannot explain why its pursuit of truths
should be valuable. Science is embedded in
878
FULTON
the cultural environment, and both its Further Reading

methods and knowledge production is deter- Proc of APA v72
mined by culture. Science is therefore so Gurwitsch, Aron. “James Street Fulton’s
dependent on its wider culture that it cannot ‘The Cartesianism of Phenonemology’,”
be expected to help lead that culture’s evolu- Philosophy and Phenomenological
tion. The task of rationally considering value Research 2 (1942): 551–7.
is philosophy’s responsibility, and science’s Kolenda, Konstantin, ed. Creativity and
value lies in its expansion of creative person- Openness: Essays in Honor of James
ality. Street Fulton (Houston, Tex., 1975).
“Symposium Honoring James Street
BIBLIOGRAPHY Fulton,” Southwestern Journal of
“The Cartesianism of Phenomenology,” Philosophy 6 (Winter 1975): 7–30.
Philosophical Review 49 (1940):
285–308. John R. Shook
“Our Knowledge of One Another,”
Philosophical Review 51 (1942):
456–75.
“Science and the Naturalization of Man,”
The Personalist 30 (1949): 376–84.
Science and Man’s Hope (New York,
1954).
“Computing Machines and Minds,”
Philosophy Today 1 (1957): 207–13.
879
G
GALBRAITH, John Kenneth (1908– ) Galbraith served as Chair of Americans for
Democratic Action from 1967 to 1969. He
John Kenneth Galbraith was born on 15 has received over forty-five honorary degrees
October 1908 in the Scottish farming com- from universities around the world, including
munity of Iona Station, Ontario, Canada. He the University of Oxford, Moscow University,
received a BS from the Ontario Agricultural and the University of Paris. He was elected
College (now the University of Guelph) in President of the American Economic
1931. He received an MS in 1933 and a PhD Association in 1972. In 1997 he was inducted
in agricultural economics in 1934 from the into the Order of Canada, and received the
University of California at Berkeley. Galbraith Robert F. Kennedy Book Award for Lifetime
accepted a position teaching economics at Achievement. He was awarded the Presidential
Harvard University, and taught there from Medal of Freedom from the US Government in
1934 to 1939. In 1937 he traveled to the 2000. Galbraith currently lives with his wife,
University of Cambridge to study with John Catherine, in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Maynard Keynes, and became a strong sup- As a Keynesian economist, Galbraith favored
porter of the principles of Keynesian econom- government spending to reduce unemployment
ics. He returned to the US in 1939, and taught and stressed using more of the nation’s wealth for
economics at Princeton University in 1939–40. public services, and less for private consump-
In 1941 he entered government service tion. As a modern “American Institutionalist,” he
working as Deputy Head of the Office of Price worked within the tradition of Thorstein VEBLEN
Administration, which set price controls during and John R. COMMONS in emphasizing the con-
World War II. In 1945 he was asked to carry tingency of historical, social, and institutional
out a survey of allied and United States strate- factors over absolute “laws” comprising
gic bombing during World War II, and he con- “economic behavior.” Galbraith continues to
cluded that the US bombing of Germany did provoke criticism from mainstream economists,
not help to shorten the war. He also served as like Milton FRIEDMAN, for challenging the hege-
an editor of Fortune Magazine from 1943 to monic ideology of the “free market.” Beginning
1948. Galbraith was appointed professor of with American Capitalism (1952), he attrib-
economics at Harvard in 1949, where he uted American postwar success to the low infla-
remained until 1961 when he was appointed tion provided by price controls as benefiting
Ambassador to India, serving until 1963. He not the average consumer but rather aiding in
rejoined the Harvard faculty in 1963 and the growth of large, industrial firms and their
remained there until his retirement in 1975, ability to wield oligopolistic power. Like Veblen
when he was named Paul M. Warburg and Frank KNIGHT, Galbraith attacked the myth
Professor Emeritus of Economics. of “consumer sovereignty” by focusing more
880
GALBRAITH
closely on the qualitative rather than the quan- BIBLIOGRAPHY

titative aspects of economic progress. Many of American Capitalism, the Concept of
his critics were quick to accuse him of chal- Countervailing Power (Boston, 1952).
lenging core American values of individual The Great Crash (Boston, 1955).
freedom and choice. Economics and the Art of Controversy
In The Affluent Society (1958), Gailbraith (New Brunswick, N.J., 1955).
highlighted the sharp contrast between the The Affluent Society (Boston, 1958).
paucity of services in the public sector, and The Liberal Hour (Boston, 1960).
the abundance of private wealth. He attributed The New Industrial State (Boston, 1967).
this gap to the lack of any “countervailing” Money: Whence It Came, Where It Went
institutions strong enough to check the growth (Boston, 1975).
and potential abuse of these large corpora- The Age of Uncertainty (Boston, 1977).
tions. Galbraith argued for the need of a The Nature of Mass Poverty (Cambridge,
“countervailing power” to be built from gov- Mass., 1979).
ernment regulation and a coalition of private- The Voice of the Poor: Essays in Economic
sector interests among trade unions, supplier and Political Persuasion (Cambridge,
and consumer organizations. Further, the Mass., 1983).
large-scale, high-tech nature of corporate The Anatomy of Power (Boston, 1983).
activity demands a close-knit relationship Economics in Perspective: A Critical
between business and government, which History (Boston, 1987).
works to consolidate power in the hands of the The Culture of Contentment (Boston,
corporate bureaucracy by means of “political 1992).
capture” (1967). He saw a way to check this The Good Society: The Humane Agenda
growing menace through public education, the (Boston, 1996).
political process and stressing the provision of The Economics of Innocent Fraud: Truth
public goods over private gain. for Our Time (Boston, 2004).
In The Good Society: The Humane Agenda
(1996), Galbraith made the case for a more Other Relevant Works
equitable distribution of resources to lessen The Triumph: A Novel of Modern
the atrocities associated with poverty, arguing Diplomacy (Boston, 1968).
that the absence of money denies a person Ambassador’s Journal (Boston, 1969).
liberty. In his most recent work, The A China Passage (Boston, 1973).
Economics of Innocent Fraud: Truth for Our A Life in Our Times (Boston, 1981).
Time (2004), he examines the underlying Capitalism, Communism and Coexistence:
dynamics behind the growing tendency among From the Bitter Past to a Better Prospect,
institutional authorities to misrepresent the with Stanislav Menshikov (Boston,
truth in subtle but pervasive ways. Gailbraith’s 1988).
influence among economists has been tacitly A Tenured Professor (Boston, 1990).
acknowledged in James M. BUCHANAN’s work A Journey Through Economic Time: A
on political capture and “public choice” eco- Firsthand View (Boston, 1994).
nomics; in Herbert A. SIMON and the “new” Letters to Kennedy (Cambridge, Mass.,
institutionalist critique of the objectives and 1998).
conduct of the firm; and the renewed interest Name-dropping: From F. D. R. On
in the failure of consumer sovereignty by (Boston, 1999).
people like Tibor de Scitovsky.
Further Reading
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer
881
GALBRAITH
Thought, Dict Economics, Encyc Amer studying theology at the University of

Bio Göttingen in 1882 he was a student of Paul
Bowles, Samuel, Richard Edwards, and Haupt, and in 1883 he studied psychology
William G. Shepherd, eds. with Wilhelm Wundt at the University of
Unconventional Wisdom: Essays on Leipzig. While at the University of Heidelberg
Economics in Honor of John Kenneth in 1884 he studied with Kuno Fischer but did
Galbraith (Boston, 1989). not receive a PhD. He did receive an MA from
Hession, Charles H. John Kenneth Amherst College in 1885.
Galbraith and His Critics (New York, Gardiner joined the faculty of Smith College
1972). in Massachusetts in 1884 as instructor in
Keaney, Michael, ed. Economist with a mental and moral philosophy, replacing pro-
Public Purpose: Essays in Honour of fessor Moses Stuart Phelps. Except for one
John Kenneth Galbraith (London, 2001). year of teaching in 1891–2 at Amherst College
Scitovsky, Tibor de. Human Desire and as an instructor of psychology, Gardiner spent
Economic Satisfaction: Essays on the his entire career as professor of philosophy at
Frontiers of Economics (New York, Smith College. Upon his retirement in 1924, he
1986). was given an honorary doctorate. He was
Sharpe, Myron E. John Kenneth Galbraith working on writing a history of Smith College
and the Lower Economics (White Plains, at the time of his death. The work was never
N.Y., 1974). completed because Gardiner was stuck by a car
Simon, Herbert A. An Empirically Based and died shortly afterwards on 29 December
Microeconomics (Cambridge, UK, 1927 in Northampton, Massachusetts.
1997). Gardiner was involved in many highly
Stanfield, James Ronald and Jacqueline respected institutions. He was Vice President of
Bloom Stanfield, eds. Interviews with the Nonotuck Savings Bank, and succeeded
John Kenneth Galbraith (Jackson, Miss., Calvin Coolidge as Secretary of the Board of
2004). Trustees of the People’s Institute. He was also
a member of the American Association for the
Charles Gattone Advancement of Science, and one of the
founding members of the American
Philosophical Association of which he served
as President from 1907 to 1908, as well as
being the first secretary and treasurer of the
association. In addition to his ties to philo-
GARDINER, Harry Norman (1855–1927) sophical institutions, Gardiner was an early
member of the American Psychological
Harry Norman Gardiner was born on 6 Association, he was an advisory editor of the
November 1855 in Norwich, England. After Psychological Review, and he regularly con-
completing grammar school, Gardiner went tributed evaluations and reviews concerning
into business in England for four years. He emotion to the Psychological Bulletin. Two of
emigrated to the United States in 1874 to his significant articles concerned the psychol-
attend Amherst College and graduated with a ogy and emotions found in ancient philosophy.
BA and high honors in 1878. After graduating, He wrote extensively about the works of
he taught for one year at an academy in Glens Jonathan EDWARDS, and contributed articles to
Fall, New York. Gardiner went on to study at the Encyclopaedia Britannica and James Mark
Union Theological Seminary from 1879 to BALDWIN’s Dictionary of Philosophy and
1882. He then studied in Germany; while Psychology.
882
GARMAN
Gardiner’s writings, teaching style, and and Aristotle,” Philosophical Review 27

beliefs avoided strict dogmatism. He encour- (1918): 469–88; 28 (1919): 1–26.
aged his students to discover their own “Affective Psychology in Ancient Writers
meaning in the philosophical works they read, after Aristotle,” Psychological Review 26
rather than impose his own views upon them. (1919): 204–29.
Gardiner was heavily influenced by ancient “The First Twenty-Five Years of the
philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle but American Philosophical Association,”
also had affinities for the idealists Josiah Philosophical Review 35 (1926): 145–58.
ROYCE, F. H. Bradley, and Bernard Bosanquet,
but it could not be said that he was a disciple Further Readings
of any one of these thinkers. His studies in Dict Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v21,
Germany and America gave him a unique Proc of APA in Phil Rev v38, Who Was
philosophical standpoint; while his work in Who in Amer v1
Germany may have swayed him towards Cutler, Anna A. “Professor Harry Norman
accepting idealism, he rejected typical idealist Gardiner as Teacher and College
denials of the reality of time and space, and Officer,” Journal of Philosophy 25
rejected any reduction of the world to private (1928): 79–80.
consciousness. Concerning the meaning of Bakewell, Charles M. “Harry Norman
“truth,” Gardiner agreed with the pragmatists Gardiner,” Philosophical Review 37
that we can only gauge or test the truth by (1928): 203–209.
examining its serviceableness in use. However, “Tributes Given at a Memorial Service, 19
he still accepted the notion of universal and February 1928,” The Smith Alumnae
objective truths that cannot be defined merely Quarterly 19 (May 1928): 262–9.
by relative usefulness. Gardiner believed that
truth was not just something that “works” in Daniel Trippett
reality, but rather that truth is an indispensable
component of a harmonious working of a
world ordered by rationality and social com-
munion.
BIBLIOGRAPHY GARMAN, Charles Edward (1850–1907)

The Early Idealism of Jonathan Edwards
(New York, 1900). Charles Garman was born on 18 December
Ed., Jonathan Edwards: A Retrospect (New 1850 in Limington, Maine, to Reverend John
York, 1902). H. Garman and Elizabeth Bullard Garman.
Ed., Selected Sermons of Jonathan Edwards He received a BA degree with honors from
(New York, 1904). Amherst College in 1872. He was a high
Feeling and Emotion: A History of school principal in Ware, Massachusetts,
Theories, with Ruth Metcalf and John before going to Yale Divinity School, where he
Beebe-Center (New York, 1937). earned a BD degree in 1879. Garman returned
to Amherst to take over some of the responsi-
Other Relevant Works bilities for teaching philosophy from President
Gardiner’s papers are at Smith College in Julius H. SEELYE. Garman was Walker instruc-
Northampton, Massachusetts. tor in mathematics (1880–81); instructor in
“The Problem of Truth,” Philosophical philosophy (1881–2); associate professor of
Review 17 (1908): 113–37. moral philosophy and metaphysics (1882–9);
“The Psychology of the Affections in Plato professor of mental philosophy (1889–92);
883
GARMAN
and professor of moral philosophy and meta- Other Relevant Works

physics from 1892 until his death. In 1896 Garman’s papers are at Amherst College,
Amherst awarded him the honorary DD degree. Massachusetts.
Garman died on 9 February 1907 in Amherst,
Massachusetts. Further Reading
Beloved as a professor at Amherst, Garman Amer Nat Bio, Dict Amer Bio, Nat Cycl
did not publish any books or articles, but he did Amer Bio v23, Who Was Who in Amer v1
produce a series of almost one hundred study Dyer, Walter A. “Garman of Amherst:
pamphlets for use by his students. Some Charles Edward Garman,” in Great
members of the Amherst community criticized Teachers, Portrayed by Those Who
Garman for his allegedly subversive teaching Studied Under Them, ed. Houston
style because he rejected rote memorization, Peterson (New Brunswick, N.J., 1946).
instead encouraging his students to think Tufts, James H., et al., eds. Studies in
through philosophical issues for themselves and Philosophy and Psychology, by Former
reach their own conclusions. Many of his Students of Charles Edward Garman, in
students went on to graduate study and had Commemoration of Twenty-Five Years of
prominent careers in philosophy. Service as Teacher of Philosophy in
Profoundly influenced by British neo- Amherst College (Amherst, Mass., 1906).
Hegelianism, Garman consistently emphasized a Waterhouse, J. A. Calvin Coolidge Meets
religious perspective on all philosophical issues, Charles Edward Garman (Rutland,
the world, and values. In addition to philosophy, Vermont, 1984).
Garman was also very interested in the latest
developments in psychology, which he incorpo- James A. Good
rated into his courses at every opportunity. He
even managed to persuade the Amherst trustees
to provide funding for a psychological labora-
tory. Garman’s interest in developmental psy-
chology was reflected in his teaching methods,
because he sought to instill in students an ability GARNETT, Arthur Campbell (1894–1970)
to continually learn and think for themselves
and to become future teachers. Arthur C. Garnett was born on 20 October
During his tenure at Amherst, Garman’s 1894 in Port Victoria, South Australia, on an
courses were always amongst the most popular aboriginal reservation. Garnett attended the
at Amherst. His students respected his teaching College of the Bible in Melbourne, and then
and character so much that he exercised a strong, entered the University of Melbourne where he
and often lifelong, influence on them. In 1906, received his BA in 1920 and his MA in 1922.
and again in 1909, some of Garman’s students Through the YMCA he taught English at a
compiled books of essays, reminiscences, and school in Yumanfu, China, in 1921. After his
unpublished writings dedicated to their philos- graduation Garnett was ordained into the
ophy teacher. ministry of the Disciples of Christ. He served
churches in South Australia and was briefly a
BIBLIOGRAPHY missionary in China. In 1924 Garnett joined
Letters, Lectures and Address of Charles the University of Adelaide, South Australia, as
Edward Garman: A Memorial Volume, a lecturer in philosophy. The following year he
Prepared, with the Coöperation of the Class received his LittD from the University of
of 1884, Amherst College (Boston, 1909). Melbourne with the thesis “The Problem of
Personality in the Light of Recent Psychology.”
884
GARNETT
In 1928 Garnett published Instinct and The Moral Nature of Man: A Critical
Personality, based partly on research he con- Evaluation of Ethical Principles (New
ducted while he was at the University of York, 1952).
London. In the same year he moved to the Can Ideals and Norms be Justified?
United States where he became professor of (Stockton, N.J., 1955).
philosophy at Butler University in Indianapolis. Religion and Moral Life (New York, 1955).
He stayed at Butler until 1935. After a brief Contemporary Thought and the Return to
return to Adelaide, Garnett joined the Religion (Lexington, Kent., 1960).
Transylvania University in Kentucky as visiting Ethics: A Critical Introduction (New York,
professor. He became professor of philosophy 1960).
at the University of Wisconsin in 1937, remain- The Perceptual Process (Madison, Wisc.,
ing there until his retirement in 1965. He was 1965).
chair of the philosophy department from 1950
to 1953. He was President of the Western Other Relevant Works
Division of the American Philosophical “Freedom and Responsibility in Moore’s
Association in 1960–61. After his retirement he Ethics,” in The Philosophy of G. E.
taught at Texas Christian University until 1969. Moore, ed. Paul Schilpp (Evanston, Ill.,
Garnett died on 19 September 1970 in Fort 1942).
Worth, Texas. “Naturalism and the Concept of Matter,”
At Wisconsin, Garnett developed a liberalis- Journal of Philosophy 45 (1948): 477–89.
tic theism not unlike that of William JAMES, “A Naturalistic Interpretation of Mind,”
which he expressed in A Realistic Philosophy of Journal of Philosophy 45 (1948):
Religion (1942) and God in Us (1945). In 1949 589–603.
he published Freedom and Planning in “Freedom and Creativity,” Proceedings and
Australia. Garnett developed his ethical views Addresses of the American Philosophical
in Reality and Value (1937) and The Moral Association 34 (1961): 25–39.
Nature of Man (1952). His views on religion
and morality culminate in Religion and the Further Reading
Moral Life (1955). Garnett maintained that Pres Addr of APA v7, Proc of APA v44,
although our ethical insights do not depend on Who’s Who in Phil
religion, only a theistic faith can give us the Damer, Thomas E. Value in the Thought of
energy needed to lead the moral life. Peter A. Bertocci and A. Campbell
Garnett: A Comparison of Two Theistic
BIBLIOGRAPHY Theories. PhD dissertation, Boston
Instinct and Personality (New York, 1928). University (Boston, 1970).
The Mind in Action: A Study of Motives and Walhout, Donald. “Garnett’s New Analysis
Values (London, 1931). of Ethical Concepts,” Ethics 75 (1965):
Reality and Value: An Introduction to 132–40.
Metaphysics and an Essay on the Theory Werkmeister, W. H. “Volition, Intention,
of Value (New Haven, Conn., 1937). and Values,” in Historical Spectrum of
A Realistic Philosophy of Religion (Chicago, Value Theories, vol. 2: Anglo/American
1942). Group (Lincoln, Neb., 1973), pp.
God in Us: A Liberal Christian Philosophy of 198–225.
Religion for the General Reader (Chicago,
1945). Cornelis de Waal
Freedom and Planning in Australia
(Madison, Wisc., 1949).
885
GARNETT
GARNETT, Christopher Browne, Jr. Maryland from 1960 to 1964. Based upon his
(1906–75) extensive experience teaching the deaf at
Gallaudet, he published books about deaf
Christopher B. Garnett, Jr. was born on 23 teaching methods and lectured on teaching philo-
December 1906 in Richmond, Virginia. He sophical concepts to the deaf. Garnett’s books
received his BS from Princeton University in Wisdom in Conduct: An Introduction to Ethics
1927, and then did graduate study at Stanford (1940) and The Quest for Wisdom: An
University during the summers of 1927 and Introduction to Philosophy (1942) were widely
1928, and at the University of Göttingen in used philosophy texts. Garnett died on 21
Germany during the summers of 1930 and November 1975 in Washington, D.C.
1931. He received a PhD in philosophy in 1932,
and also a Litt.D. in 1936, from the University BIBLIOGRAPHY
of Edinburgh. In 1931 Garnett was hired as an “Kant’s Theory of Intuitus Intellectualis in the
instructor in philosophy at George Washington Inaugural Dissertation of 1770,”
University in Washington, D.C. He was rapidly Philosophical Review 46 (1937): 424–32.
promoted, reaching full professor in 1936. From “Negativity and Ethicism in Ethics,” Journal
1942 to 1944 he also was acting Dean of the of Philosophy 35 (1938): 263–9.
Liberal Arts College, and Dean of the Junior The Kantian Philosophy of Space (New York,
College in 1944–5. He also taught philosophy 1939).
during the summers of those years at City “Philosophy and the Social Tendencies of the
College of New York, and lectured on citizen- Present,” Social Science 16 (1941): 327–31.
ship and philosophy at Mt Vernon Seminary in Socrates: An Essay in Contemporary Political
Washington during 1937–45. Thought (New York, 1968).
At the end of World War II in 1945, Garnett Taste: An Essay in Critical Imagination (New
left teaching to join the administration of the York, 1968).
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration in Shanghai, China. He made a Other Relevant Works
brief return to the United States in 1947–8 to Wisdom in Conduct: An Introduction to
teach at Wesleyan University in Connecticut. In Ethics (New York, 1940).
1948 he became a cultural affairs officer of the The Quest for Wisdom: An Introduction to
American Military Government in Berlin, Philosophy (1942).
Germany, and from 1949 to 1952 he was chief Ed., The Exchange of Letters between Samuel
of the education and cultural relations branch of Heinicke and Abbé Charles Michel de
the Office of the US High Commissioner for l’Epée: A Monograph on the Oralist and
Germany in Berlin. In this capacity Garnett Manualist Methods of Instructing the Deaf
helped to secure the establishment of the in the Eighteenth Century (New York,
American Memorial Library and the Free 1968).
University of Berlin. In 1952–3 Garnett was a Ed., So You Find Your Child Is Deaf: The Art
cultural officer in the US Foreign Service in of Instructing the Infant Deaf and Dumb,
Saigon, Vietnam. by John Pauncefort Arrowsmith
Returning to academia, Garnett accepted the (Washington, D.C., 1968).
positions of professor of philosophy and chair of
the newly established philosophy department at Further Reading
Gallaudet College in Washington, D.C. in 1954, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v62, Proc of APA v49
and he held these positions until his death. In
addition, he lectured at the American University John R. Shook
from 1957 to 1969, and at the University of
886
GARRISON
GARRISON, William Lloyd (1805–79) Despite his pacifism, he supported the Union
in the Civil War and strongly defended
William Lloyd Garrison was born on 10 Lincoln’s policies abolishing slavery, particu-
December 1805 in Newburyport, Massa- larly after 1862 when the president issued his
chusetts, and he died on 24 May 1879 in New preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. When
York City. Raised in a Baptist household, he the Civil War ended, Garrison urged the AASS
was largely self-educated and held several to disband, which it voted against doing until
apprenticeships, including one in 1818 to a 1870 when he resigned his membership. This
printer, and in the 1820s he edited a series of action and the closing of The Liberator in
newspapers in Massachusetts and Vermont. December 1865 ended the major part of his
During 1829–30 he came to reject the idea of career.
the colonization of blacks outside the United Historians differ on Garrison’s influence. He
States – which he had previously supported – was the greatest publicist of immediatism and
and demanded the immediate, uncompensated radical abolition, but other abolitionists may
abolition of slavery, equality for blacks, and the have been more successful in persuading
creation of a biracial society. These were Americans to support emancipation.
policies which he championed in his famed,
weekly abolitionist newspaper The Liberator BIBLIOGRAPHY
which he began in Boston on 1 January 1831 Thoughts on African Colonization (Boston,
and continued until 29 December 1865, after 1832; New York, 1968).
the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment Selections from the Writings and Speeches of
which formally abolished slavery throughout William Lloyd Garrison (Boston, 1852;
the United States. Garrison stressed that slavery New York, 1968).
was a sin and a moral issue. A pacifist, he con-
demned violence and appeals to threats of Other Relevant Works
violence, seeking to use moral suasion to Garrison’s papers are located at the Boston
persuade Americans to support emancipation. Public Library, Smith College Library, and
In 1832 Garrison helped to found the New the American Antiquarian Society in
England Anti-Slavery Society. In December Worcester, Massachusetts.
1833 in Philadelphia, he participated in the Documents of Upheaval: Selections from
creation of the American Anti-Slavery Society William Lloyd Garrison’s The Liberator,
(AASS), which included blacks and women and 1831–1865, ed. Truman Nelson, (New
used peaceful moral suasion to win support York, 1966).
for immediatism – the immediate uncompen- William Lloyd Garrison, ed. George M.
sated abolition of slavery. In 1840 the Society Frederickson (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,
split over several issues, including whether to 1968).
engage in political action, which Garrison The Letters of William Lloyd Garrison, 6
opposed, and the role of women in the vols, ed. Walter M. Merrill (Cambridge,
movement, which Garrison strongly supported Mass., 1971–81).
(he campaigned for various reforms, including William Lloyd Garrison and the Fight
temperance and women’s rights). Thereafter Against Slavery: Selections from The
Garrison controlled the small organization (he Liberator, ed. William E. Cain (Boston,
was President from 1843 to 1865) but the 1995).
Society was a distinct minority within the larger
abolitionist movement. In the 1840s and 1850s Further Reading
he vigorously opposed racial segregation in Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
various campaigns. Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer
887
GARRISON
Thought, Encyc Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer His achievements include four books, some
Bio v2 seventy articles and two dozen reviews. The
Kraditor, Aileen S. Means and Ends in focus of his writing has been on the work of
American Abolitionism: Garrison and His Kant, Wittgenstein, and Derrida, and on
Critics on Strategy and Tactics, 1834–1850 problems about violence, philosophy of
(New York, 1969). language, social and political philosophy, and
Mayer, Henry. All on Fire: William Lloyd ethics. Garver has, among other views, insisted
Garrison and the Abolition of Slavery that proper limits have to be recognized so that
(New York, 1998). the error, for example, of making constitutive
Merrill, Walter M. Against Wind and Tide: A use of regulative ideas is not made. This recog-
Biography of William Lloyd Garrison nition of proper limits is a critical element in his
(Cambridge, Mass., 1963). evaluation of Derrida. The latter does not rec-
Rogers, William B. We Are All Together ognize the distinction between constitutive and
Now: Frederick Douglass, William Lloyd regulative rules, an important lesson from Kant,
Garrison and the Prophetic Tradition and exemplified by Wittgenstein.
(New York, 1995). His work in ethics and political theory has
Stewart, James B. William Lloyd Garrison been informed by his many scholarly and public
and the Challenge of Emancipation activities. Interdisciplinary activities have
(Arlington Heights, Ill., 1992). included organizations on modern German
Thomas, John L. The Liberator, William studies, human rights law and policy, and coop-
Lloyd Garrison: A Biography (Boston, eration and conflict studies, the last of which he
1963). founded. Outside the academy, Garver has
been active with the Quakers. He has been in
John W. Hillje prison for draft refusal, and taken a case to
the Supreme Court (385 US 589) for refusing
to sign a New York State anti-Communist cer-
tificate, the so-called Feinberg Certificate. He
has long been active with Buffalo Friends
Meeting, Alternatives to Violence Project,
GARVER, Newton (1928– ) Friends World Committee, Quaker Bolivia
Link, and with Friends in Bolivia. He is sought
Newton Garver was born on 24 April 1928 in after in Quaker gatherings for the clarity and
Buffalo, New York. He began his education at precision of his comments, which help the
Deep Springs College and earned degrees from reflections move along firmer paths.
Swarthmore College (BA 1951), the University
of Oxford (BPhil 1953), and Cornell University BIBLIOGRAPHY
(PhD 1965) with a dissertation supervised by “On the Rationality of Persuading,” Mind 69
Max BLACK. He taught at the National College (1960): 389–96.
of Choueifat (Lebanon), at Cornell, and at “Varieties of Use and Mention,” Philosophy
Minnesota, before joining the philosophy faculty and Phenomenological Research 26
at the State University of New York at Buffalo (1965): 230–38.
in 1961. He was promoted to full professor in “Die Lebensform in Wittgensteins
1971, became SUNY Distinguished Service ‘Philosophischen Untersuchungen’,”
Professor in 1991, and retired in 1995. He has Grazer Philosophische Studien 21 (1984):
had visiting appointments at Michigan, Friends 33–54.
World College, Rochester, Northwestern, San “Neither Knowing Nor Not Knowing,”
Diego State, and Pendle Hill. Philosophical Investigations 7 (1984):
888
GARVEY
206–24. (1977): 339–51.

“Structuralism and the Challenge of a Canfield, John V. “Criteria and Method,”
Metaphor,” The Monist 69 (1986): 68–86. Metaphilosophy 5 (1974): 298–315.
“Wittgenstein and the Critical Tradition,” Haller, Rudolf. “Lebensform oder
History of Philosophy Quarterly 7 (1990): Lebensformen: eine Bemerkung zu Newton
227–40. Garvers Interpretation von ‘Lebensform’,”
This Complicated Form of Life: Essays on Grazer Philosophische Studien 21 (1984):
Wittgenstein (Chicago, 1994). 55–64.
Derrida and Wittgenstein, with Seung-chong
Lee (Philadelphia, 1994). Zosimo E. Lee
“Naturalism and Transcendentality: The
Case of Form of Life,” in Wittgenstein and
Contemporary Philosophy, ed. Souren
Teghrarian (Bristol, UK, 1994).
“Philosophy as Grammar,” in The
Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, GARVEY, Marcus Mosiah (1887–1940)
ed. Hans Sluga and David Stern
(Cambridge, UK, 1996), pp. 139–70. Marcus Mosiah Garvey was born on 17
“Politics, Politics, Politics,” International August 1887 in Saint Ann’s Bay, Saint Ann,
Studies in Philosophy 29 (1997): 19–33. Jamaica. Marcus received the entirety of his
“Vagueness and Analysis,” Journal of formal education at a local elementary school.
Philosophical Research 24 (1999): 1–19. In 1901, at age fourteen, Garvey was forced to
“Wittgenstein and George Fox,” in leave the school and was apprenticed by his
Wittgenstein and the Future of Philosophy, godfather, Mr. Burrowes, in the craft of
a Reassessment after 50 Years: Proceedings printing. Like Garvey’s father, Mr. Burrowes
of the 24th International Wittgenstein was well read and had an extensive personal
Symposium (Vienna, 2002). library to which Garvey had constant access
for three years. In 1904, having been suffi-
Other Relevant Works ciently trained, Garvey went to Kingston,
“What Violence Is,” The Nation 206 (24 Jamaica’s capital, to work as a printer.
June 1968): 819–22. Garvey’s ascension as a printer was so rapid
Ed. with Peter Hare, Naturalism and that, three years after arriving in Kingston, he
Rationality (Buffalo, 1986). had become a foreman and master printer.
Ed. with James Brady, Justice, Law and Yet, in the same year of his promotion to
Violence (Philadelphia, 1991). foreman, he was involved in a labor strike
“Pugnacity and Pacifism,” The Acorn 6 called by the printer’s union. Although the
(1991): 7–19. management offered to raise Garvey’s pay, he
Jesus, Jefferson and the Task of Friends, elected to go on strike alongside his fellow
Pendle Hill Pamphlet no. 250 workers. At age twenty, he began to see the
(Wallingford, Penn., 1983). oppression of laborers, particularly black
Nonviolence and Community, with Eric laborers, in the workplace and came to the
Reitan, Pendle Hill Pamphlet no. 322 conclusion that only organized activity and
(Wallingford, Penn., 1995). economic power could effectively improve
their situation. Garvey used his printing skill to
Further Reading develop periodicals such as Garvey’s
Betz, Joseph. “Violence: Garver’s Definition Watchman, La Nationale, and La Prensa, to
and a Deweyan Correction,” Ethics 87 speak on issues regarding organized labor and
889
GARVEY
the mistreatment of black workers in Jamaica tunist, a foreigner, and, because he had little
and South America. In 1912 Garvey went to formal education, as anti-intellectual.
London to learn more and to strategize con- Garvey was convinced that some UNIA pro-
cerning the amelioration of blacks through- fessionals needed to settle in Africa to assist
out the British Empire. There he met Duse with an African rebirth that would create the
Mohammed and was introduced to Pan- conditions for the possibility of worldwide
Africanism. As a result of this meeting, he read African flourishing. This ideology was wrongly
extensively on Africa, and began to reflect criticized by his opponents who charged that
deeply on the colonialization of Africa and the Garvey was simply advocating a mass exodus
African Diaspora. of New World blacks “back to Africa.”
Garvey’s reflection on the African Diaspora Garvey’s dream, while widely heralded, nev-
led Garvey to consider the racial problem in ertheless did not materialize. In January 1922
the United States and the autobiography of he and three associates were arrested for mail
Booker T. WASHINGTON, Up From Slavery. fraud in relation to the stock sold to purchase
Garvey left London in 1914 for Jamaica and the Black Star Line. In 1923 the jury acquitted
established the Universal Negro Improvement the other defendants but sentenced Garvey to
Association and African Communities League five years in prison. In 1925 Garvey’s second
(UNIA). He tried to establish trade schools in wife, Amy Jacques Garvey, published a second
Kingston along the lines of the Tuskegee edition of his Philosophy and Opinions of
Institute in Alabama but his efforts were suc- Marcus Garvey, having edited and published
cessfully opposed by the local black population the first edition in 1923. In 1927 President
who saw such schools as stigmatizing and sep- Coolidge commuted Garvey’s sentence and he
arating. Garvey wrote Booker T. Washington was deported back to Jamaica. He later
regarding the matter and Washington encour- traveled to London, England and established
aged Garvey to visit Tuskegee to obtain first- another UNIA headquarters, but the
hand knowledge. When Garvey arrived in the movement never regained its momentum.
United States in 1916, however, Washington Garvey died on 10 June 1940 in London
had recently died. Yet Garvey, as a distant England.
pupil of Washington, was in a good position to
promote his vision with a Washingtonian BIBLIOGRAPHY
backdrop. Thus, in 1917 he established a The Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus
branch of the UNIA in Harlem, New York. In Garvey, 2 vols, ed. Amy Jacques-Garvey
five years, it is estimated that the organization (New York, 1923–5; 2nd edn 1926).
had as many as six million members in North Marcus Garvey: Life and Lessons, ed.
and South America, the West Indies, and Robert A. Hill and Barbara Bair
Africa. (Berkeley, Cal., 1987).
Garvey taught Pan-Africanism, and his main
agenda included building an economic base Other Relevant Works
to promote worldwide African emancipation. “The Negro’s Greatest Enemy,” Current
He established the Black Star Steamship History 18 (September 1923): 951–7.
Company and the Negro Factory Corporation Garvey’s autobiography.
as well as a weekly publication, The Negro The Poetical Works of Marcus Garvey, ed.
World. While he inherited much of the prestige Tony Martin (Dover, Mass., 1983).
of the Washington era, Garvey also inherited The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro
the criticism of the black intelligentsia, led by Improvement Association Papers, 9 vols,
W. E. B. DU BOIS. Garvey was personally ed. Robert A. Hill (Berkeley, Cal.,
resented by Du Bois and others as an oppor- 1983–95).
890
GASS
Selected Writings and Speeches of Marcus Philosophical Investigation of Metaphor,” with

Garvey, ed. Bob Blaisdell (Mineola, N.Y., Max BLACK. Ludwig Wittgenstein visited
2005). Cornell in 1949, attending a meeting of the
Cornell Philosophy Club, and meeting twice
Further Reading with the graduate students in philosophy. Gass
Amer Nat Bio, Comp Amer Thought, calls this “the most important intellectual expe-
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer rience of my life” (1970, p. 248). The influence
Bio, Dict Amer Religious Bio, Encyc of Wittgenstein, especially his Tractatus Logico-
Amer Bio, Who Was Who in Amer v4 Philosophicus, manifests itself in Gass’s
Clarke, John Henrik, ed. Marcus Garvey emphasis on and celebration of the forms and
and the Vision of Africa (New York, structures of language in literature and poetry.
1974). From 1954 to 1969 Gass taught philosophy at
Cronon, E. David. Black Moses: The Story Purdue University. He then was professor of
of Marcus Garvey and the United Negro philosophy at Washington University in St.
Improvement Association (Madison, Louis from 1969 to 1999, and appointed David
Wisc., 1955). May Distinguished University Professor in
Davis, Lenwood G. and Janet L. Sims. Humanities in 1979. He founded and also
Marcus Garvey: An Annotated directed the International Writers Center in St.
Bibliography (Westport, Conn., 1980). Louis from 1990 until 2001. Gass has received
Garvey, Amy Jacques. Garvey and the Lannan Foundation Lifetime Achievement
Garveyism (New York, 1978). Award (1997), the National Book Critics Circle
Lewis, Rupert and Maureen Warner-Lewis, Award for Criticism (1985 and 1996), and the
eds. Garvey: Africa, Europe, the Pushcart Prize (1976, 1983, 1987, and 1992).
Americas (Trenton, N.J., 1994). Gass calls himself a Methodologist, by which
Martin, Tony. Race First: The Ideological he means that he reformulates the traditional
and Organizational Struggles of Marcus aesthetic problems of fiction, such as point of
Garvey and the United Negro view, character, and theme, as problems of
Improvement Association (Dover, Mass., language. A Methodologist thinks of character
1986). as “the establishment of linguistic centers to
Stein, Judith. The World of Marcus Garvey: which and from which meanings flow” (1996,
Race and Class in Modern Society (Baton p. 51). He or she holds that “thought is con-
Rouge, Louis., 1986). structed out of concepts and interconnections,”
that “imagination involves the management of
Darryl Scriven metaphor,” and that “form is found in the
logic of the language” (1996, p. 51). Gass’s
view of art is formalist: the language of art is
not functional or representational, but purely
formal. Influenced by the symbolists, especially
Paul Valéery, Gass holds that in art, language
GASS, William Howard (1924– ) is transformed from its common use, its instru-
mental nature in representing thought, to some-
William Howard Gass was born on 30 July thing inherently valuable. A sentence viewed
1924 in Fargo, North Dakota. He received his this way is valued for its shape, its sound, and
BA degree in philosophy in 1947 from Kenyon its relationship to other sentences in the rhetor-
College and his PhD in philosophy from ical space of a paragraph. Gass rejects realism
Cornell University in 1953. He studied philos- in his critical essays and in his fictions. He
ophy of language and wrote his dissertation, “A refers to his stories as anti-narrative and his
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GASS
essays as anti-expository. In his view a poet is placeable as the descent from generality of
a maker who constructs an aesthetic object and meaning to the specific style of the writer.
adds it to the world in order for it to become For Gass, a book is a “bodied mind” (1996,
part of someone else’s consciousness. Following p. 339). It is a container of consciousness. Gass
Immanuel Kant’s notion of disinterested examines the elements that are combined to
interest, Gass views the work of art as having create and construct a fictional work, like one
no purpose beyond itself, but instead to be an would the elements of a building. In the essay
object for contemplation. “Transformations” (2002) he develops the idea
In Finding a Form (1996) and elsewhere, that a book is like a building, both materially,
Gass develops an aesthetic theory of language. with covers like massive doors, illuminations
He takes as his departure point the view that a like windows, and in the case of poetry, con-
word is a token, an instance of a pure Platonic taining stanzas or rooms, and experientially.
type. This means that the word the writer uses Like a building, a text exists all at once for Gass:
is a token, a stand-in for the pure word, which ontologically he sees a book as a single concep-
is held to be context-invariant. In this view of tual level, where times are collapsed. In order to
language, meanings are assigned to type-words experience the text, a reader must let herself be
and type-sentences, and any two tokens of an taken on a guided tour by the author. Then the
unambiguous type-sentence are in turn guar- poetic consciousness of the writer, who has
anteed to have the same meaning. Gass seems transformed the “matter” of experience not into
to reject the type/token doctrine of meaning, an object but into a quality of consciousness, and
claiming that words do not have any such inde- ordinary language into poetic language, can
pendent life. Instead, they are to be looked inhabit the awareness of the reader.
upon as foci for relations. Words take on Rainer Maria Rilke influenced Gass’s writing
meaning within their contexts, and meanings about transformations. The cycle of poetic trans-
are also altered by history and use. It is not clear formations begins in the poet’s “inwarding” of
that Gass has rejected the type/token view of matter into mind. Inwarding is not just a process
language altogether. He returns to it in order to of change; it is specifically a change in the quality
capture the transformations of language from of consciousness, an ability to be fully open to
the pure meanings of Platonic forms to the experiencing the world. The second transfor-
unmistakable imprint of a distinct artistic voice, mation takes place in the poet’s transforming
which he calls “Personalized Token Types” ordinary, utilitarian language into poetic
(2002, p. 303). Gass’s philosophical interest language. After the transformation of poetic
then, lies not in justifying or rejecting theories language into a verbal object, which is inserted
of language, but in articulating an aesthetics of into the world, there is sometimes another trans-
poetic language by drawing on theories of the formation – the translation of a poem into
nature of meaning. another language, such as Gass’s translation of
The uniqueness of a text, in which the use of Rilke’s poems from German into English.
language embodies the writer’s mind, is for In Reading Rilke: Reflections on the Problems
Gass, the ideal of great writing. In works that of Translation (1999), Gass formulates a theory
stand the test of time, words lose their gener- of translation embedded in his translations of
ality, and the tokens are non-synonymous and Rilke’s poetry. Translation is not for Gass a
“cemented in their sentential place” (1996, p. form of betrayal, because it has nothing to do
337). The unmistakable materiality of the token with the poet’s intentions. Translation is instead
displays an individuality of style in the written a “transreading,” a reading of a poem with a
language that embodies a uniquely creative recognition of patterns of creative choices, as
imagination. Gass captures the process of opposed to mere understanding of what the
making word-tokens non-synonymous or irre- poem is about. In transreading the translator
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GAUTHIER
realizes why the poet made the formal choices Holloway, Watson. William Gass (Boston,
that create the relations between the elements, 1990).
the verbal movement, the emotions, the Kellman, Steven and Irving Malin. Into The
meaning, and the music that Gass finds to be at Tunnel (Newark, N.J., 1998).
the heart of any art. Saltzman, Arthur. The Fiction of William
Gass has little interest in discussing philo- Gass: The Consolation of Language
sophical views found within a fictional world. (Carbondale, Ill., 1986).
His focus is instead on the fundamental struc-
ture of the work of art, on a recognition of the Britt-Marie Schiller
formal construction of a fictional world.
Reading works that have stood the test of time
reveals the structural elements of those works,
a “rightness of relations” (2002, p. 115), at
the same time as it reveals the experience of a
world wherein the heart is also to be found. GAUTHIER, David Peter (1932– )
Gass’s philosophical commitment is to an
authentic existence of both art and artist, but David Gauthier was born on 10 September
especially of the work of art. 1932 in Toronto, Ontario. He received his BA
at the University of Toronto in 1954. He then
BIBLIOGRAPHY studied at Harvard University, where he
Fiction and the Figures of Life (Boston, received the MA in 1955, and at the University
1970). of Oxford where he received the B.Phil. in 1957
On Being Blue (Boston, 1976). and the D.Phil. in 1961, the latter under the
The World within the Word (New York, supervision of John L. Austin. His main
1978). academic positions as professor of philosophy
The Habitations of the Word (New York, have been at the University of Toronto from
1985). 1958 to 1980, and the University of Pittsburgh
Finding a Form (New York, 1996). from 1980 to 2001, where he became
Reading Rilke: Reflections on the Problems Distinguished Service Professor of Philosophy.
of Translation (New York, 1999). He also held visiting professorships and
Tests of Time (New York, 2002). research appointments at a number of institu-
tions including University of California at Los
Other Relevant Works Angeles; University of California at Berkeley;
Gass’s papers are at Washington University, Princeton University; Australian National
St. Louis, Missouri. University; All Souls College, Oxford; and
Omensetter’s Luck (New York, 1966). École Polytechnique in Paris. Gauthier became
In the Heart of the Heart of the Country a fellow of the Royal Society of Canada in
(New York, 1968). 1979.
Willie Masters’ Lonesome Wife (Evanston, Gauthier’s career has for the most part been
Ill., 1968). confined to the academic world, but he has
The Tunnel (New York, 1995). also had a keen interest in politics, in which he
Cartesian Sonata (New York, 1998). was active early in his career. He was executive
member of various political and pressure
Further Reading groups including: the Toronto Committee for
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio Disarmament; the Committee of Concern for
Hix, H. L. Understanding William H. Gass South Africa; the Canadian Civil Liberties
(Columbia, S.C., 2002). Association; and the Committee for an
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GAUTHIER
Independent Canada. In 1962 he was a candi- Hobbesian moral and political theory and con-
date for election to the Canadian House of temporary game theory have been important
Commons. influences on Gauthier’s thought, even if he
Gauthier’s main contributions to philosophy has, in recent decades, moved away from many
have been in ethics and moral theory, the aspects associated with both traditions.
theory of practical rationality and the formal The most complete statement of his moral
theory of rational choice, political philosophy, theory is given in Morals by Agreement (1986).
and the interpretation of early modern moral He has modified his views in a number of
and political philosophy, especially Hobbes respects since writing this book. Some of his
and Rousseau. He was one of the principal earlier essays, collected in Moral Dealing
theorists – with the philosopher John RAWLS (1990), provide an easier and more accessible
and economist James BUCHANAN – responsible entry into his thought, and some modifications
for the revival of contractarian theory, and was of his theory are introduced in later essays. The
one of the first philosophers to introduce questions taken up in many of his writings on
decision and game theory to moral theory. He Hobbes and Hume are relevant to under-
has written widely in political theory and on a standing his moral theory. Gauthier’s interest in
number of topics in politics, including secession, Rousseau, especially his psychological and bio-
nuclear deterrence, democracy, and public graphical writings, are not necessarily those
reason. He is also the author of a number of one would expect from the creator of Morals
important essays on the work of contempo- by Agreement. Several of his essays on
rary philosophers, such as Rawls, Kurt BAIER, Rousseau, along with some early essays, may be
George GRANT, Amartya SEN, John HARSANYI, seen as exploratory self-critiques.
and T. M. Scanlon. Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement is a theory
Gauthier’s writings on these diverse topics about the nature and rationality of morality.
are, for the most part, connected. From his We may usefully think of the theory as having
earliest work he has been preoccupied by the several parts or elements. The first is an account
question of the rationality of morality – what of the human condition, giving the aim of prac-
reasons do we have to be moral? – and his tical reason, the natural condition of
interest in this question frames his conception humankind, the function of constraints on
of ethics. Gauthier’s identification of morality action. Next is an account of the principles of
with principles and constraints, his conception conduct that rational agents would hypotheti-
of them as conditional on the compliance of cally agree to: a kind of social contract. The
others, and his account of their specific content third element is a revisionist account of practi-
are all shaped by his concern with the ratio- cal rationality essential to the argument aiming
nality of morals. Over several decades he devel- to show that virtually everyone, under normal
oped a contractarian account of morality which circumstances, has reason to accept and to
sought to establish both the principles of abide by the constraints imposed by these prin-
morality and the rationality of acting in accor- ciples. Last, Gauthier argues that the princi-
dance with them. Teaching seventeenth and ples in question are principles of morality.
eighteenth-century moral and political philos- Much of the interest of the theory turns on the
ophy in the late 1950s and early 1960s, details of the account – most of which are inno-
Gauthier came to appreciate Hobbes’s thought, vative and original. But it is important not to
and the first of his many writings on Hobbes, lose sight of the aim and general structure of the
The Logic of Leviathan, appeared in 1969. In theory. Gauthier aims to understand morality
the late 1960s, while a visiting professor at and to ascertain our reasons to be moral, and
UCLA, he was introduced by Howard Sobel to this he proposes to do by an argument which
game theory and to the Prisoner’s Dilemma. takes us from a particular account of the
894
GAUTHIER
human condition to a conception of moral cal, where there would be no need for a rational
principles, emerging from hypothetical agree- morality, and secondly to have us think of
ment to a conception of rationality, according moral principles as designed to resolve exter-
to which we have reason to be moral in the con- nalities and other “market failures.” Given that
ditions in which we typically find ourselves. markets typically presuppose the existence of a
The structures of the overall argument, as well number of constraints on self-seeking behavior
as its ambitions, are important in order to avoid – for instance, a regime of property rights – it
some common misunderstandings of the is not clear what are, if any, the policy impli-
theory. cations of Gauthier’s account of a perfectly
Gauthier follows Hobbes, Hume, and many competitive interaction. The book seems to
others in thinking that humans characteristi- illustrate the theoretical possibility of a
cally find themselves in “the circumstances of “morally free zone,” one in which the con-
justice.” The phrase is from Rawls – who straints of morality would have no place, a
borrows from Hume and H. L. A. Hart, a kind of “moral anarchy.”
summary account of the conditions in which In Morals by Agreement Gauthier defends a
humans typically benefit from cooperation. subjectivist and instrumentalist conception of
These circumstances consist principally in practical rationality, according to which we
scarcity, relative to our needs and wants, our are rational to the extent that our acts
self-bias, and our tendency to favor ourselves maximize the satisfaction of our considered
and those close to us over others. Cooperation preferences. Rationality, in this view, is purely
in these circumstances is mutually beneficial, instrumental; no particular ends are rationally
and it is made possible by our capacity to con- required. In his more recent thinking Gauthier
strain our self-seeking behavior by adhering to has moved away from the subjectivism of this
just principles of action. In Morals by account. It is not necessary for the conclusions
Agreement Gauthier uses the neoclassical that he wishes to defend about morals; the
economic theory of perfectly competitive assumption he needs is that human reasons for
markets to illustrate his conception of the ratio- action are characteristically agent-relative, in
nale for moral constraints. In a perfectly com- that something being a reason for one person
petitive market – the highly idealized markets does not entail it being a reason for others.
of certain branches of neoclassical theory – all Gauthier’s early subjectivist account entails this
agents are rational and self-interested, and all agent-relativity, but it is not necessary for it.
exchanges are mutually beneficial (or Pareto- The presentation of the theory also presup-
improving). In these markets, there is no way of poses that agents considering the terms of inter-
rearranging things so as to improve the situa- action with others reason from the perspective
tion of some without making others worse off. of their own interests – the assumption of “non-
The outcome of perfect competition is a Nash tuism.” But this assumption is not essential to
equilibrium, Pareto-efficient, and in the core. In the theory either, and Gauthier has moved
such a world there is no place, no need, for away from it.
mutually beneficial principles of action; indi- Gauthier argues that agents in the circum-
vidual rational choice, through trade, secures all stances of justice have reason to constrain their
of the benefits available. In real markets, of behavior by accepting and adhering to mutually
course, there are public goods and externalities, advantageous and fair principles of action con-
for example, clean air, congestion, and many ditional on the compliance of others. To deter-
opportunities for mutually beneficial coopera- mine what they are, he considers the principles
tion. But Gauthier’s purpose in referring to per- that suitably characterized rational agents
fectly competitive markets is first to give an would choose were they to consider the
example of a world, even if largely hypotheti- question. Unlike Rawls and others, he imposes
895
GAUTHIER
no “veil of ignorance,” and does not deprive his for the principle of minimax-relative conces-
hypothetical contractors of knowledge of who sion, and it is unclear whether an argument
they are and where they find themselves. And, for it can still be made.
again unlike Rawls and others, he represents Gauthier’s principle of minimax-relative con-
the hypothetical choice situation as a collective cessions is, in fact, only one part of what can be
bargain. The principles selected represent a identified as the second element of his con-
compromise, each person making a concession tractarian theory. He also develops an account
from their maximal claim. The principles of the initial bargaining position, one which is
selected govern the distribution of benefits and highly original and which makes it clear that his
burdens amongst a set of cooperators; they theory is, only in part, a Hobbesian one.
determine the distribution of the cooperative or Gauthier argues that rational agents interacting
social surplus, the gains that cooperation make in a pre-moral state would come to accept
possible. So the talents and assets that are prior certain principles that and, these constrain the
to, or independent of, social cooperation – our baseline or status quo point for the application
natural assets – are not subject to redistribution of the distributive minimax-relative concession
as they are in Rawls’s theory. The fact that principle. His account here is “Lockean” in
some bring more, as it were, to the bargaining appearance and has features similar to Robert
table than others – they are more talented or N OZICK ’s conception of basic rights. But
fortunate – does not imply that others must be Gauthier, inspired by Buchanan’s two-stage
compensated for their lesser natural assets. contractarian political theory, developed in the
Distributive justice is concerned with the coop- latter’s Limits of Liberty, constructs a conven-
erative or social surplus. tionalist argument different from the natural
Gauthier relies on bargaining theory, part of law foundation of Lockean theorists. Gauthier
the theory of games, to determine the principle argues that rational agents, in a pre-moral state,
of distribution that rational agents would select. would constrain their interactions by “a
He defends a principle of minimax-relative con- Lockean proviso” which prohibits bettering
cession, which says that the maximum relative one’s situation through interactions which
concession that anyone must make should be worsen the situation of another. Imagine that
minimal, where relative concession is measured you come to a river and find a bridge which you
by an individual’s maximal and minimal claims may cross provided you pay the builder a small
to the cooperative surplus. The principle says fee. Imagine, also, coming to a mountain pass
that no one may receive a relative benefit which someone prohibits you from crossing
smaller than necessary. Under certain condi- without paying a small fee. Consider the
tions, it requires equal relative concessions. The options you would have faced had neither the
principle does not require interpersonal com- bridge-builder nor the mountain pass toll-col-
parisons of utility; rather, it would have us lector existed; in the first case, there would be
look at an interpersonal comparison of the pro- no bridge for you to use, but, in the second, the
portion of each person’s potential gain from pass would still exist. These simple examples
cooperation that must be conceded. Gauthier’s illustrate the counterfactual test offered by the
principle is similar to the solution to the two- proviso; the mountain pass toll-collector
person bargaining problem, axiomatized by violates the proviso in charging you a fee, but
Ehud Kalai and Meir Smorodinsky. Most game the bridge-builder does not.
theorists find the traditional solution devel- Gauthier uses the proviso to develop an
oped by John N ASH more plausible, and argument for the emergence of limited rights, or
Gauthier himself has come to favor it over his semi-natural rights, which protect each person’s
earlier position. This change of mind undercuts exercise of their own powers. Individuals, prior
the argument offered in Morals by Agreement to agreeing to be governed by a minimax-
896
GAUTHIER
relative concession or other principle, acquire a of rationality. Given that our mode of reason-
right to their natural assets and the fruits of ing, or deliberation itself, affects our prospects,
their labor. These rights are limited, in certain our aims or purposes are sometimes best served
respects, but they constrain the application of by our not seeking to do best at every decision
minimax-relative concession. The latter is point.
applied to an initial bargaining situation in Gauthier’s discussion in Morals by
which agents have these rights. Gauthier’s Agreement is conducted in terms of “disposi-
account and argument is remarkable in that tions to choose” and, specifically, of “con-
he provides, in effect, a prospective, conven- strained maximization,” the disposition to
tionalist case for rights and duties that many cooperate with other cooperators even in cir-
have thought presupposes a natural law frame- cumstances where defecting is more advanta-
work. geous. In his later work Gauthier develops his
Gauthier’s moral theory presented thus far revisionist account of practical rationality, in
offers an account of the nature and the content terms of rational plans and intentions and of
of morality – what morality asks of us and modes of deliberation. If we grant that agents
why. It does not yet establish that we have may do better, in any number of circumstances,
reason to comply with the demands of by acting in ways that are not straightforwardly
morality. Justice often requires that we act in maximizing, the problem is to determine how
ways contrary to our interests or aims – we may acting as a constrained maximizer is rational. In
not steal, cheat or break our word, when this Morals by Agreement, Gauthier assumes that if
would prove advantageous to us or to the our dispositions to choose are rational, then our
causes we defend. As many thinkers from Plato choices determined by these dispositions are
to Philippa FOOT have noted, it often pays to be also rational. A number of theorists have
unjust. Gauthier’s response to this fact, and followed Thomas Schelling in arguing that it is
the problems it poses for the kind of account he often rational to do things that are irrational,
develops, is to argue that we misconceive prac- but they argue that the latter do not, in some
tical rationality, even instrumental rationality, circumstances, cease being irrational. Gauthier
if we think the aim of rationality determines, in thinks that if a course of action is better than
any straightforward way, the manner in which any other in its effects, then it may, under
we should reason or deliberate. The aim of certain conditions, be rational to adopt it, and
rationality is to do as well as possible, but it to intend to carry it out even if some of its
does not necessarily determine our principle of effects are not, from the standpoint of the
decision; for instance, to choose the best alter- moment of execution, the best thing to do in
native at each moment of choice. In terms of the terms of one’s aims or purposes. He seeks,
utility-maximizing conception of rationality, therefore, to establish that if a mode of delib-
which he has accepted until recently, Gauthier eration, or a plan of action, is rational, then
argues that the aim of maximizing utility does acting according to it can be rational, even if so
not mean that we should, at each decision acting requires doing things that are not
point, maximize utility. Instead we should optimal, considered from the standpoint of the
reason in ways which are utility-maximizing. moment of action.
Just as it is sometimes the case that we do best, Principled action constrains one’s action, and
or at least well, by not aiming to do best or it is rational to be so constrained. Thus, if
well, so it may sometimes be that the utility- Gauthier is right, it can be rational to abide by
maximizing course of action is not to maximize certain norms or principles, even when they
utility at each decision point. The point can be require acting in ways that are not best from the
expressed and developed without presupposing standpoint of the time of action. Much of
a utility-maximizing or any particular account Gauthier’s work since Morals by Agreement
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GAUTHIER
has sought to develop, and to defend, his revi- ples, some favoring other principles, others the
sionist account of practical rationality. Some of alternative Rawlsian conception of a hypothet-
his later essays compare his account to those of ical social contract. Gauthier’s revisionist account
Edward McClennen and Michael Bratman and of practical reason is widely viewed as implau-
address the arguments of critics. If all Gauthier sible, both by thinkers influenced by decision-
were to establish – and it would be no small feat theoretic or economic conceptions of rational
– was that we have reason to accept and to choice and by traditional philosophers. Lastly,
abide by certain principles of cooperation, then some have quarreled with Gauthier’s identifica-
he would not have shown that we have reason tion of principles of rational cooperation as
to be moral. The last element of his theory is an moral. Some of these criticisms may rest on mis-
argument, interspersed throughout Morals by understandings of the theory. But others do not.
Agreement, identifying various principles and There are many details of the account that may
dispositions as moral. His argument is, in effect, not be right, as Gauthier himself has argued in
a functional one: the principles and dispositions later essays. The widespread rejection of the revi-
in question resemble familiar moral ones in sionist account of rationality is striking. It is also
important respects. Impartiality seems, to him, to puzzling, as one might think that any moral
be a defining feature of morality, and it is central theorist hoping to establish the rationality of
to the argument he makes for identifying the moral action would need an account of reasons
principles derived from rational interaction and like Gauthier’s that would allow for counter-
bargaining, with those of morality. preferential or principled choice. In this regard,
From an account of the human condition and it is odd that neo-Kantianism, now dominant in
the circumstances of justice, Gauthier develops contemporary American thought, has aban-
a theory of the principles that rational agents doned the attempt to establish the rationality of
would hypothetically agree to, and a revisionist morals, seeking only to secure the accord of
account of practical rationality which would “reasonable” people.
establish the rationality of “principled” behavior. Gauthier’s other writings, especially those
Lastly, he argues that these principles and dis- on important early modern thinkers such as
positions to choose should be identified as moral. Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Rousseau, and Kant,
His theory has been the object of intense critical are important contributions to philosophy,
examination, and each part of the account has independent of the merits of his moral theory.
been criticized. Many contemporary moralists They establish that his concerns, his aims and,
reject his starting point, the account of the cir- to some extent, his style, while contemporary
cumstances of justice. They think that justice in many respects, are also similar to past
speaks, even outside of the context of potential thinkers. He writes, in the opening page of
cooperation. In Gauthier’s view, there is no room Morals by Agreement, “What theory of morals
for moral constraint outside of the context of … can ever serve any useful purpose, unless it
mutual benefit. Even if one relaxes the assump- can show that all the duties it recommends are
tion of mutual disinterest or non-tuism, there also truly endorsed in each individual’s
may be some apparent moral obligations that reason?” This is a thought that, presumably,
have no place in a Hobbesian or Humean frame- would elicit not only Hobbes’s assent, but also
work, for example duties to the infirm or unpro- that of Plato, Kant, and many others.
ductive, to nonhuman animals. And left-leaning
egalitarians will remain dissatisfied with the BIBLIOGRAPHY
restricted scope of distributive justice on Practical Reasoning: The Structure and
Gauthier’s account. Many philosophers and Foundations of Prudential and Moral
decision theorists have quarreled with aspects of Arguments and Their Exemplification in
Gauthier’s contractarian derivation of princi- Discourse (Oxford, 1963).
898
GAYLEY
The Logic of Leviathan: The Moral and Theory (New York, 1990).
Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes Morris, Christopher W. “A Contractarian
(Oxford, 1969). Account of Moral Justification,” in Moral
Morals by Agreement (Oxford, 1986). Knowledge? New Readings in Moral
Moral Dealing: Contract, Ethics, and Reason Epistemology, ed. W. Sinnott-Armstrong
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1990). and M. Timmons (Oxford, 1996), pp.
The Social and the Solitary (Cambridge, UK, 215–42.
2004). Morris, Christopher W., and Arthur
Ripstein, eds. Practical Rationality and
Other Relevant Works Preference: Essays for David Gauthier
“Morality and Advantage,” Philosophical (Cambridge, UK, 2001).
Review 76 (1967): 460–75. Paul, Ellen, et al., eds. The New Social
Ed., Morality and Rational Self-Interest Contract: Essays on Gauthier (Oxford,
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970). 1988).
Ed. with Robert Sugden, Rationality, Justice, Ridge, Michael. “Hobbesian Public Reason,”
and the Social Contract: Themes from Ethics 108 (1998): 538–68.
Morals by Agreement (New York and Vallentyne, Peter, ed. Contractarianism and
London, 1993). Rational Choice (Cambridge, UK, 1991).
“Assure and Threaten,” Ethics 104 (1994):
690–721. Christopher W. Morris
“Public Reason,” Social Philosophy and
Policy 12 (1994): 19–42.
“Commitment and Choice: An Essay on the
Rationality of Plans,” in Ethics,
Rationality, and Economic Behaviour, ed.
F. Farina, F. Hahn, and S. Vannucci GAYLEY, Charles Mills (1858–1932)
(Oxford, 1996), pp. 217–43.
“Political Contractarianism,” Journal of Charles Mills Gayley was born in Shanghai,
Political Philosophy 5 (1997): 132–48. China, on 22 February 1858. The son of Irish-
“Intention and Deliberation,” in Modeling American missionaries, he was educated in
Rationality, Morality, and Evolution, ed. London and Ireland, and moved to Ann Arbor,
P. Danielson (Oxford, 1998), pp. 41–54. Michigan with his great-uncle in 1875, where
“Rethinking the Toxin Puzzle,” in Rational he attended the University of Michigan (BA
Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for 1878). Two years after graduating he returned
Gregory Kavka, ed. J. Coleman and C. to his alma mater to teach Latin. He subse-
Morris (Cambridge, UK, 1998), pp. 47–58. quently took a leave of absence to pursue post-
graduate study for a year at German universi-
Further Reading ties, where he acquired an affinity for the kul-
Bio 20thC Phils, Oxford Comp Phil turhistorische method that was becoming
Boucher, David, and Paul Kelly, eds. The increasingly popular in Germany at the time.
Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls His training culminated in an interest in
(London and New York, 1994). applying an understanding of historical and
Danielson, Peter. Modeling Rationality, cultural trends to literary analysis. Upon his
Morality, and Evolution (Oxford, 1998). return to Michigan, Gayley was charged with
Kraus, Jody S. The Limits of Hobbesian improving the university’s ailing freshman and
Contractarianism (Cambridge, UK, 1993). sophomore English classes. His success at this
Lessnoff, Michael, ed. Social Contract task prompted an offer in 1889 from the
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GAYLEY
University of California at Berkeley to become An Introduction to the Methods and

the head of its English department. Under his Materials of Literary Criticism, vol. 1: The
guidance, Berkeley had one of the leading Bases in Aesthetics and Poetics, with Fred
English departments in the country. Gayley Newton Scott (Boston, 1899).
retired in 1923, and died on 25 July 1932 in “What is Comparative Literature?” Atlantic
Berkeley, California. Monthly 92 (1903): 56–68.
Gayley’s first major work was his most suc- “The Development of Literary Studies during
cessful. The Classic Myths in English Literature the Nineteenth Century,” in Congress of
(1893) began as an adaptation of Bulfinch’s Arts and Science, vol. 3, ed. Howard J.
Age of Fable. He wrote this textbook to accord Rogers (Boston, 1906), pp. 323–53.
with his view that an appreciation of English Plays of Our Forefathers, and Some of the
poetry required familiarity with Norse and Traditions Upon Which They Were
other Germanic myths, in addition to those of Founded (New York, 1907; 2nd edn
Greek and Roman origin. Six years later he pub- 1968).
lished An Introduction to the Methods and
Materials of Literary Criticism (1899), which Other Relevant Works
was widely adopted as an introductory text, in Ed., Representative English Comedies, with
part because of its systematic treatment not only Introductory Essays and Notes: An
of materials and methods, but also of aesthetics Historical View of Our Earlier Comedy,
and comparative literature. Gayley agreed with and Other Monographs by Various
H. M. Posnett, Ludwig Jacobowski, and C. J. Writers, 4 vols (New York, 1903–36).
Letourneau in the view that aesthetic theory
must be substantiated by scientific investigation, Further Reading
and in advocating a more systematic compara- Nat Cycl Amer Bio v23, Who Was Who in
tive approach to the study of literature, includ- Amer v1
ing an analysis of the earlier and less well-docu- Hart, Walter M., et al., eds. The Charles
mented stages of its evolution. Though this Mills Gayley Anniversary Papers:
position initially met with sharp criticism, it Contributed by Former Students of
was soon vindicated by the work of Francis Professor Gayley (Berkeley, Cal., 1922).
Gummere, J. A. Macculloch, and Ezra POUND, Kurtz, Benjamin P. Charles Mills Gayley
among others. (Berkeley, Cal., 1943).
The work that Gayley considered his greatest
contribution was Representative English Evan Moreno-Davis
Comedies, a four-volume set of which he was
chief editor. The project, which spanned nearly
forty years, was an attempt to document the
history of English comedy by means of illus-
trative examples. The significance of this pub-
lication lay not merely in the unearthing and GEERTZ, Clifford James (1926– )
systematization of many previously obscure
writings, but also in Gayley’s general intro- Clifford Geertz was born on 23 August 1926
ductions to each volume, which together in San Francisco, California. After moving to
amount to almost three hundred pages. a small town in northern California, his formal
education began in a rural two-room school-
BIBLIOGRAPHY house. At the age of seventeen he enlisted in the
The Classic Myths in English Literature and US Navy. With the end of World War II, he
in Art (Boston, 1893; 2nd edn 1911). attended Antioch College in Ohio, where he
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GEERTZ
initially majored in English before graduating essays also appeal to lay readers on a scale
in 1950 with a BA in philosophy. On the not seen in anthropology since the days of
advice of an esteemed philosophy professor, Margaret MEAD.
Geertz and his new wife Hildred turned to Interpretive anthropology focuses on the
cultural anthropology and graduate studies in symbolic component of human interaction.
the social relations department at Harvard Inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein, Geertz
University. This newly founded interdiscipli- argued that symbols are not enigmas housed in
nary department included such important the private mind, but instead are clearly
scholars as anthropologists Clyde Kluckhohn, observable in human societies. Even daily inter-
David Schneider, and George Homans, and action in normal public settings contains
sociologist Talcott PARSONS. He completed metaphoric content potentially expressive of a
ethnographic fieldwork in Indonesia and people’s world view and ethos. Quoting
received his PhD in social relations in 1956. Gilbert Ryle, Geertz identified the anthropol-
Geertz was a fellow at the Center for Advanced ogist’s goal as “thick description,” whereby
Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Stanford, the underlying significance of social interaction
California in 1958–9. and behavior is sorted out, and its deeper
From 1958 to 1960 Geertz was assistant symbolic meanings elucidated. He famously
professor of anthropology at the University of illustrated the approach in his essay “Deep
California at Berkeley. In 1960 he went to the Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight” (1971).
University of Chicago, rising to full professor Here he used an apparently mundane compe-
of anthropology by 1964. In 1970 he was tition – highly valued by villagers but outlawed
invited to become professor of social science by the Indonesian state – to explore local
and establish a new social science program at Balinese conceptualizations of self, sociality,
the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, and social status. In this and other studies,
New Jersey. At about the same time he Geertz deserves credit for introducing a gen-
authored The Interpretation of Cultures eration of anthropologists to the views of Ryle,
(1973), a seminal collection of essays that Wittgenstein, Kenneth BURKE, and other little-
established Geertz as a founder, along with appreciated philosophers.
Schneider and Victor Turner, of “symbolic” or Critics cite Geertz’s prescribed method of
“interpretive” anthropology. In 1982 Geertz “reading” culture as a “text” to argue that his
was named Harold F. Linder Professor of conception of culture is overly reified, too
Social Science, and he held that title until bounded, and not sufficiently dynamic. His
retiring in 2000. Geertz also was a Senior approach, they add, neglects social stratifica-
Research Career Fellow of the National tion or how inequality influences cultural pro-
Institute of Mental Health from 1964 to 1970; duction. Proponents counter by pointing to
a visiting professor of history at Princeton Geertz’s use of ideology rather than culture, to
University from 1975 to 2000, and the explain the impact of stratification on colo-
Eastman Professor at Oxford University in nized societies.
1978–9. He has received numerous honorary Geertz influenced to varying degrees a later
doctorates and scholarly awards, and is a generation of postmodern scholars, although
fellow of both the American Academy of Arts for Geertz, culture always remained more real
and Sciences and the British Academy. than most postmodernists would concede. His
Geertz is regarded as one of the preeminent task was to identify and describe culture, even
anthropological theoreticians of the twentieth if we could never objectively know it. In doing
century. His influence extends well beyond so, he reinvigorated the study of culture as
anthropology to disciplines such as philosophy, meaning.
sociology, and history. His elegantly written
901
GEERTZ

“Ritual and Social Change: A Javanese “On the Nature of Anthropological
Example,” American Anthropologist 59 Understanding,” American Scientist 63
(1957): 32–54. (1975): 47–53.
“Form and Variation in Balinese Village “The Way We Think Now: Toward an
Structure,” American Anthropologist 61 Ethnography of Modern Thought,”
(1959): 991–1012. Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts
The Religion of Java (Glencoe, Ill., 1960). and Sciences 35 (1982): 14–34.
“The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Role of a “History and Anthropology,” New Literary
Cultural Broker,” Comparative Studies in History 21 (1990): 321–35.
Society and History 2 (1960): 228–49. “Blurred Genres: The Refiguration of Social
Agricultural Involution, the Processes of Thought,” The American Scholar 49
Ecological Change in Indonesia (Berkeley, (1980): 165–79.
Cal., 1963). “The Social Scientist as Author: Clifford
Peddlers and Princes (Chicago, 1963). Geertz on Ethnography and Social
“Ideology as a Cultural System,” in Ideology Construction,” interview with Gary Olson,
and Discontent, ed. D. Apter (New York, Journal of Advanced Composition 11
1964), pp. 47–76. (1991): 245–68.
The Social History of an Indonesian Town “An Interview with Clifford Geertz,”
(Cambridge, Mass., 1965). interview with Richard Handler, Current
Islam Observed: Religious Development in Anthropology 32 (1991): 603–13.
Morocco and Indonesia (New Haven,
Conn., 1968). Further Reading
“Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight,” Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer
Daedalus 101 (Winter 1971): 1–38. Thought
The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays Inglis, Fred. Clifford Geertz: Culture, Custom
(New York, 1973). and Ethics (Malden, Mass., 2000).
Kinship in Bali, with Hildred Geertz (Chicago, Ortner, Sherry B. “Theory in Anthropology
1975). since the Sixties,” Comparative Studies in
Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society, with Society and History 26 (1984): 126–66.
Hildred Geertz and Lawrence Rosen (New Ortner, Sherry B., ed. The Fate of “Culture”:
York, 1979). Geertz and Beyond (Berkeley, Cal., 1999).
Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-
Century Bali (Princeton, N.J., 1980). Stephen M. Perkins
Local Knowledge: Further Essays in
Interpretive Anthropology (New York,
1983).
“Anti Anti-Relativism,” American
Anthropologist 86 (1984): 263–78.
Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as GENDLIN, Eugene T (1926– )
Author (Stanford, Cal., 1988).
After the Fact: Two Countries, Four Decades, Born on 25 December 1926 in Vienna, Austria,
One Anthropologist (Cambridge, Mass., Eugene Gendlin emigrated to the United States
1995). with his family in 1939, and later added the ‘T’
Available Light: Anthropological Reflections to his name for style. He attended the University
on Philosophical Topics (Princeton, N.J., of Chicago, working with psychologist Carl
2000). Rogers, and after passing exams went directly
902
GENDLIN
into the graduate program. He received his MA phy. It allows us to transcend available assump-
in 1950 and PhD in philosophy in 1958 from tions and models and study each new step of
the University of Chicago. The title of his dis- formulation in the act, noticing how it lifts out
sertation was “The Function of Experiencing in exactly this or that from the greater experiential
Symbolization.” Gendlin was a professor of intricacy. Dipping into the initially inchoate
both philosophy and psychology at the bodily felt sense of a complex situation and
University of Chicago, where he taught from “speaking-from” it rather than from known
1963 until his retirement in 1995. He is also a schemata can allow genuinely new steps
practicing psychotherapist. Gendlin has been forward, especially where routine forms fail (be
honored several times by the American they concepts, theories, social behaviors, etc.).
Psychological Association for his development Gendlin emphasizes that what is new in his
of Experiential Psychotherapy, including being philosophy cannot be said unless the words
presented with the first Distinguished change their meaning as they work newly in
Professional Psychologist of the Year award. their sentences. Indeed, the notion of words
He was a founder and editor of the journal “working newly” is not only one of his basic
Psychotherapy: Theory Research and Practice. themes, but “is an example of itself” (to cite
Gendlin’s work is influenced by the lingering another key formulation): studying how words
pragmatism of the Chicago school, transmit- work requires understanding both “words” and
ted through his teacher Richard MCKEON, and “working” in a particular way. His writings
also by the philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey. accordingly resist summary because they shift
Gendlin’s approach is akin to phenomenology the tradition itself. His work is a major original
in directly accessing lived experience, which he philosophy; his Process Model provides many
characterizes as an open-ended felt intricacy specific concepts in science and psychotherapy;
rather than a primarily cognitive–perceptual and the practical applications of his philoso-
representation of a determinate world. He phy in Focusing are recognized worldwide.
proposes a non-dual ontology featuring intricate However, the ethical–political import of his
pre-thematic life-interactions, irreducible to insistence on the integrity of felt, situational
static patterns, within a non-arbitrarily “respon- bodily experiencing, in its articulable intricacy,
sive” reality, irreducible to any single account. uncancelable concreteness, and precisely
He develops a radically embodied epistemol- textured implying, has yet to be fully appreci-
ogy, explicates many types of relationships ated.
between language and experiential intricacy,
and suggests an intrinsic experiential social BIBLIOGRAPHY
ethics. Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning
Gendlin’s leading notion of a situational (New York, 1962; Evanston, Ill., 1997).
body-sense refers not merely to an anatomical Focusing (New York, 1978; 2nd edn 1981).
body, but to a self-sentient body from which Focusing-Oriented Psychotherapy: A Manual
language emerges as a power of meaning- of the Experiential Method (New York,
making (rather than a repertory of pre-packaged 1996).
meanings). This power can interact with the
implicit intricacy of a felt situation in such a way Other Relevant Works
as to let words come that work freshly to carry “Experiential Phenomenology,” in
the situation forward – not replacing, exhaust- Phenomenology and the Social Sciences,
ing, or freezing its intricacy, but transforming it vol. 1, ed. Maurice Natanson (Evanston,
and readying it for further shifts. This non-arbi- Ill., 1973), pp. 281–319.
trary carrying-forward is crucial in psychother- “Befindlichkeit: Heidegger and the
apy, creative process, and especially philoso- Philosophy of Psychology,” Review of
903
GENDLIN
Existential Psychology and Psychiatry 16 barked in San Francisco and, after failing to
(1978–9): 43–71. strike it rich in the gold fields of the Frazier
“A Philosophical Critique of the Concept of River in Canada, he spent considerable time in
Narcissism,” in Pathologies of the Modern the new state of California. Between his two
Self, ed. David M. Levin (New York, voyages, George learned the printing trade in
1987), pp. 251–304. Philadelphia and, in California, worked as a
“Phenomenology as Non-logical Steps,” in printer and newspaper reporter. George’s
America Phenomenology: Origins and California experiences had a profound effect in
Developments, ed. Eugene F. Kaelin and shaping his ideas on land and its role in the
Calvin O. Schrag (Dordrecht, 1989), pp. economy.
212–15. These travels provided the foundation for
“Thinking Beyond Patterns: Body, Language, George’s self-education and led him to his
and Situations,” in The Presence of Feeling major thesis that land was the critical resource
in Thought, ed. B. den Ouden and M. in causing income inequality and should
Moen (New York, 1991), pp. 21–151. provide the basis for alleviating the resulting
“The Responsive Order: A New Empiricism,” poverty. This self-education, so crucial to the
Man and World 30 (1997): 383–411. development of George’s ideas, was also the
source of his rejection by the traditional
Further Reading academic community that challenged his cre-
Depestele, Frans. “Primary Bibliography of dentials as an economist and social philoso-
Eugene Gendlin,” pher. George received heavy criticism from a
Gesprächspsychotherapie und personzentri- leading American economist, Francis Amasa
erte Beratung 31 (2000): 104–14. Walker, and the legendary British economist,
Levin, David M., ed. Language Beyond Alfred Marshall. However, for the most part,
Postmodernism: Saying and Thinking in he was ignored by the academic economists.
Gendlin’s Philosophy (Evanston, Ill., 1997). With a formal education that stopped at
Contains Gendlin’s replies. seventh grade, George hardly qualified for a
Shea, John J. Religious Experiencing: William university faculty appointment. In his biogra-
James and Eugene Gendlin (Lanham, Md., phy of his father, his son Henry George Jr.
1987). reported that the title of “Professor” was the
only title his father would have cherished. At
Elizabeth A. Behnke the time of an 1877 lecture at the University of
California at Berkeley there was speculation
that the university would establish a chair in
political economy and George would be
named to it. To his great disappointment,
however, that did not occur.
GEORGE, Henry (1839–97) In his travels, George observed a contradic-
tion between the enormous wealth created by
Henry George was born on 2 September 1839 industrialization and growing levels of poverty
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and died on 29 among the working classes. But it was the land
October 1897 in New York City. The relatively use and land policies of California that spurred
short distance between these two cities hides George to find an answer as to the cause of this
the fact that George traveled extensively, having contradiction. His observations crystallized in
shipped out as a cabin boy at the age of sixteen 1871 with the publication of a pamphlet
for a voyage around the world. From a subse- entitled “Our Land and Land Policy, National
quent voyage around Cape Horn, he disem- and State” in which he closely examined
904
GEORGE
California’s land and railroad monopolies. In denied the means by which they could benefit
this pamphlet, George proposed the single tax from the wealth creation of the industrial age.
on land as the fiscal remedy for poverty. This, he reasoned, led to the coexistence of
Further refinement of his thinking on the great poverty in the midst of great wealth.
subject ultimately led to his masterwork, In the tradition of the physiocrats and David
Progress and Poverty. The latter volume was Ricardo, George argued that the high returns
originally self-published in 1879 but shortly resulting from monopoly land ownership and
thereafter found a major New York City pub- its accompanying speculation was an
lisher, Appleton & Co. “unearned increment.” The increasing value of
The observations from his extensive travels land was due, not to the efforts of the owners,
stimulated George to read and comprehend but to progress of society. Though earlier
the classical literature of economics which theories had focused on the rent of farmland,
provided the context for Progress and Poverty. George generalized his theory to urban land as
This, however, was not enough for his critics well. He saw this unearned increment as the
in the academy who always considered him an source of municipal revenues that could and
outsider despite the fact that Progress and should be used for the betterment of the poor
Poverty was an international best-seller that when directed to services such as education,
was estimated to have sold over two million health care, transportation and other aspects of
copies in George’s lifetime. Progress and the urban infrastructure. Thus was the origin
Poverty as well as all George’s other books of the “single tax” theory of municipal finance
remains in print through the efforts of the associated with Henry George. George and
Robert Schalkenbach Foundation. The his followers argued that all taxes on the pro-
Foundation was formed in 1925 and expressly ductive efforts of labor and capital ought to be
created “to teach, expound and propagate” eliminated as both inefficient and unjust. The
the ideas of Henry George. elimination of these taxes would remove a
In seeking to explain the poverty of the major obstacle to work and investment. A tax
working classes, George addressed the distri- on land value, which was socially determined,
bution of income among labor, land, and could not be evaded and the revenues could be
capital. George found the wages-fund theory of dedicated to providing services that would
the classical economists totally inadequate as benefit the poor. The supply of land, which is
an explanation for the share of income going determined by nature, would not be changed
to labor. To George, it was the monopolization by such a tax. George defined land very
of land ownership and land speculation in broadly to encompass not only the surface of
industrial societies that were the root causes of the earth but “all natural materials, forces,
poverty and the economic fluctuations that and opportunities.”
tormented the lives of the impoverished The ideas introduced in Progress and
working classes. The poor were precluded Poverty were further developed and advocated
from access to productive land and relegated to in several books, newspaper articles, pam-
low-paying jobs in the urban centers of indus- phlets, and speeches. He produced subsequent
trializing nations. They were also subjected to volumes on the land question, social issues,
the deleterious effects of the business cycle and free trade as well as a text that integrated
which, in George’s view, was precipitated by his thinking on economics. However, George
the periodic collapse of speculative land values. was not content to leave his positions on the
This situation subsequently led to the working printed page and actively promoted them on
classes living in substandard conditions that both sides of the Atlantic. He was a very
were the breeding ground for the many social popular speaker, especially among the working
problems of the urban ghettos. The poor were classes, and he took his mission for economic
905
GEORGE
justice to all corners of the globe. In the British ment’s role in the economy expanded at all
Isles, he visited Ireland and addressed the Irish levels. Increasingly, governments became com-
land question, a highly sensitive political issue. mitted to income and sales taxes as their major
George subsequently visited England and revenue sources despite the disincentives
served as an advisor to the British government inherent in such an approach.
on land reform issues. As a teen, George had Though the Georgist movement has contin-
stopped in Australia on his first voyage around ued for more than a century after George’s
the world. In 1889, at the height of his popu- death, it has faced monumental political and
larity, an invitation to return led to an economic hurdles which have resulted in
Australian trip in the following year. To this limited adoption of its tax program. The land
day, there is a well-established Georgist lobby in particular has been staunch in its
movement in Australia. In the United States, he opposition. Yet, there have been small politi-
made two runs for mayor of New York City. cal victories for the Georgist movement which
His second-place finish, ahead of Theodore has morphed into a tax program that would
Roosevelt, in the campaign of 1886 is a well- place increased, if not exclusive, emphasis on
documented political story. George died near land value taxation at the municipal level. In
the end of the 1897 mayoral campaign. the US, several Pennsylvania cities and Arden
The single tax policy advocated by George Township in Delaware have implemented tax
had some very famous supporters in the early programs based on George’s recommenda-
part of the twentieth century such as Leo tions. Other examples can be found in scat-
Tolstoy, John D EWEY , Sun Yat Sen, and tered locations around the world.
George Bernard Shaw. It also faced serious The literature on Henry George, Progress
criticisms from mainstream economists such as and Poverty, and the single tax is huge and
Alfred Marshall and Francis Walker. George’s shows little sign of abating. George’s position
position on land was labeled as socialist, com- has been positively acknowledged by many
munist, and Marxist by some. Those who major economists, including several Nobel lau-
accused George of socialism failed to grasp reates, as providing both efficiency and equity.
the distinction between the private ownership From the standpoint of public finance, the
of land, which George unequivocally sup- equity of a tax that was highly progressive and
ported, and the public appropriation of socially could not be avoided as well as the relative sim-
determined land rent through the single tax. plicity of its administration and collection were
George and some of his supporters, most appealing. So too were the improved efficiency
notably the Reverend Edward McGlynn, even and incentive benefits of removing taxes on
ran afoul of the Roman Catholic Church labor and capital.
which misinterpreted George’s position as a In the latter part of the twentieth century, the
socialist attack on private property. McGlynn theory has resurfaced as the Henry George
was even excommunicated, though that Theorem and is recognized as having a much
sanction was rescinded a few years later. greater degree of theoretical robustness, under
George, in The Condition of Labor, was certain conditions, than had been previously
openly critical of Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical, thought. The Georgist tax program is also
Rerum Novarum, which he believed was a seeing increased interest in the former Soviet
veiled attack on his ideas on land and taxation. states and other emerging economies where
Other critics argued that George’s fiscal the land situation is much less encumbered by
remedy for poverty, the single tax, was inca- past arrangements. Furthermore, a line of
pable of providing adequate public revenue. inquiry into the role of George’s ideas relative
This became a much more significant criticism to the physical environment has developed a
in the twentieth century when the govern- “green” movement that encompasses sustain-
906
GEORGE
able development, natural resource use and Reconstruction of Its Principles in Clear
conservation, and energy issues. The elimina- and Systematic Form (New York, 1898).
tion of urban sprawl has been added to
George’s original concern for urban ghettos. Other Relevant Works
Moreover, contemporary Georgists have George’s papers are in the New York Public
further broadened the concept of land use to Library.
include such things as the airwaves, telecom- The Complete Works of Henry George, 10
munication spectrums, and the market for pol- vols (New York, 1904).
lution “rights.” Henry George: Collected Journalistic
The Georgist movement is sustained in the Writings, 4 vols, ed. Kenneth Wenzer
contemporary world through a variety of (New York, 2003).
means. The Robert Schalkenbach Foundation
in New York was created in 1925 to promote Further Reading
George’s social and economic ideas through an Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
extensive publication and research program. Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer
All of George’s writings, as listed in the fol- Thought, Dict Amer Bio, Dict
lowing bibliography, are still in print by the Economics, Encyc Amer Bio, Nat Cycl
Foundation in English and other languages. Amer Bio v4
The Henry George Schools, with locations Andelson, Robert V. Critics of Henry
around the world, teach the essence of Georgist George: A Centenary Appraisal of Their
thought to anyone who is interested. There is Strictures on Progress and Poverty
also the Council of Georgist Organizations, (Rutherford, N.J., 1979).
encompassing dozens of entities around the Barker, Charles A. Henry George (Oxford,
world. These entities espouse all aspects of 1955).
George’s intellectual and policy legacy and cut Gaffney, Mason, and Fred Harrison. The
a wide swathe across the political spectrum. Corruption of Economics (London,
1994).
BIBLIOGRAPHY Geiger, George Raymond. The Philosophy
Progress and Poverty: An Inquiry into the of Henry George (New York, 1933).
Cause of Industrial Depressions and of George, Henry, Jr. The Life of Henry
Increase of Want with Increase of Wealth George (New York, 1900).
(New York, 1879). Giacalone, Joseph, and Clifford Cobb, eds.
The Irish Land Question: What it Involves, The Path to Justice: Following in the
and How Alone it Can Be Settled (New Footsteps of Henry George (Malden,
York, 1881). 2nd edn, The Land Mass., 2001).
Question: Viewpoint and Counterpoint Hudson, Michael, G. J. Miller, and Kris
on the Need for Land Reform (New Feder. A Philosophy for a Fair Society
York, 1884; 3rd edn 1893). (London, 1994).
Social Problems (New York, 1883). Rose, Edward J. Henry George (New York,
Protection or Free Trade: An Examination 1968).
of the Tariff Question, with Especial Thomas, John L. Alternative America:
Regard to the Interests of Labor (New Henry George, Edward Bellamy, Henry
York, 1886). Demarest Lloyd, and the Adversary
A Perplexed Philosopher: An Examination Tradition (Cambridge, Mass., 1983).
of Herbert Spencer’s Utterances on the Wenzer, Kenneth, ed. Land Value
Land Question (New York, 1892). Taxation: The Equitable and Efficient
The Science of Political Economy: A Source of Public Finance (New York and
907
GEORGE
London, 1999). moral theory. His four books on morality, The

Whittaker, John. “Enemies or Allies? Henry Moral Rules (1970), Morality: A New
George and Francis Amasa Walker One Justification of the Moral Rules (1988),
Century Later,” Journal of Economic Morality: Its Nature and Justification (1998),
Literature 35 (1997): 1897–1915. and Common Morality (2004), are tightly
related, as each of the later ones is a revised
Joseph A. Giacalone development of the earlier books. They consti-
tute for Gert a lifework in respect of which he
can be said to be one of the most original and
important ethical theorists of the twentieth
century. In contrast to most other philosophers
with the notable exception of Hobbes, Gert
GERT, Bernard (1934– ) sees morality, or what he now calls “the moral
system” or “common morality,” as being
Bernard Gert was born on 16 October 1934 in entirely concerned with not causing, but rather
Cincinnati, Ohio. He was the only son of Max preventing, alleviating, or eliminating evils or
Gert and Celia Yarnovsky Gert, both of whom harms (these terms are used synonymously),
had immigrated separately to the United States of which there are five: death, pain, disable-
as children with their parents from Lithuania, ment, deprivation of freedom, and deprivation
then under imperial Russian rule. Bernard and of pleasure. Morality, or the moral system, in
his younger sister were raised at their parents’ Gert’s view, has nothing whatever to do with
home in Cincinnati. He attended Walnut Hills the production or increase of positive goods.
High School in Cincinnati, a college prepara- Each of the five evils or harms is recognized
tory school, graduating in 1952. He then as such by all rational persons, and each is
entered the University of Cincinnati and something that it would be irrational to wish
received his BA in 1956. In 1956 he entered upon oneself. Every rational person therefore
Cornell University’s Sage School of Philosophy desires that no one cause any of these harms to
where he received his PhD in 1962, studying him or her or to those within his or her circle
with John RAWLS, Max BLACK, and Norman of concern. The moral rules, of which there
MALCOLM. Gert’s dissertation was on the phi- are ten, are those that one would on pain of
losophy of Thomas Hobbes and this has irrationality have others obey because disobe-
remained a lifelong interest, resulting in such dience would either cause or be likely to cause
works as Man and Citizen (1972) and several evil to oneself or those within one’s circle of
articles and reference entries on Hobbes. Gert concern. The first five rules are rules directly
joined the philosophy department at forbidding the infliction on anyone of one of
Dartmouth College in 1959 and he has the five evils. Thus they are: (1) do not kill, (2)
remained there ever since, becoming professor do not cause pain, (3) do not disable, (4) do not
of philosophy in 1970. He is currently Stone deprive of freedom, (5) do not deprive of
Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy pleasure. The second five rules are those such
with a cross-appointment as Adjunct Professor that if they were not obeyed by others, the like-
of Psychiatry in the Dartmouth Medical School. lihood of oneself or someone within one’s circle
Interestingly, both his daughter Heather Gert of concern suffering one or more of the evils
and his son Joshua Gert are published profes- would be greatly increased. These are: (6) do
sional philosophers, and they have both had an not deceive, (7) keep your promises, (8) do not
influence on his work – perhaps a unique situ- cheat, (9) obey the law, (10) do your duty
ation in the annals of American philosophy! (duties here being understood as those attached
Gert’s major work has been in the field of to one’s social roles and also to certain special
908
GERT
circumstances in which one may find oneself). agents are impartially protected by the moral
The public attitude of any rational person, rules or whether this protection extends to the
i.e., the attitude that calls for and anticipates higher mammals or to potential moral agents
general agreement, even if that attitude is not (such as fetuses); and (4) disagreement on the
expressed or even considered, could only be interpretation of the moral rules.
that these rules are to be obeyed by everyone Whereas obedience to the rules must be
toward everyone, i.e., impartially, taking into understood as a moral requirement, except
account only the beliefs that all rational persons where a violation can be justified on the
must hold, regardless of their religion, ethnic- grounds that more evil would result from obe-
ity, age, sex, or anything else that distinguishes dience in a certain set of circumstances than
them, i.e., regardless of everything but their from violations in these circumstances being
common humanity. While it is not rationally publicly allowed, there are also moral ideals.
required to be moral – the only thing ratio- These have to do with acting so as to prevent,
nally required is not to bring evil on oneself remove, or alleviate evils, and are encouraged
without an adequate reason – it is rationally rather than required. Finally there are multiple
allowed. What this means is that the question moral virtues, which one possesses if one justi-
“Why should I be moral?” requires an answer, fiably follows a moral ideal or a moral rule
of which Gert offers several. beyond the norm. Thus the five harms or evils
The moral attitude towards the moral rules are architectonic of the whole moral system,
is that they are to be obeyed by every person and everything in it is in some way related to
(oneself included) towards all other persons them.
unless a fully informed rational person could An important spin-off from his work in
have an exception publicly allowed, and this ethical theory is his work on the application of
could only be on the grounds that he or she the moral system to medical practice. He has
would suffer or be more likely to suffer one or become deeply and usefully involved in medical
more of the evils if the rule were obeyed in ethics, and he has published considerably in
cases of this kind than if it were violated. this area, usually with collaborators, especially
Importantly, violations are divided into those Charles M. Culver, K. Danner Clouser, and
that are strongly justified and those that are James L. Bernat.
weakly justified. When all fully informed Among the contributions of Gert and his
rational persons would favor a violation, then collaborators to medical ethics are the follow-
that violation is strongly justified; when fully ing. (1) The definition of malady (disease,
informed rational persons disagree on whether injury, headache, etc.) as involving one of the
they would publicly allow a violation, that vio- five evils mentioned above, or a significantly
lation is weakly justified. That some violations increased risk of suffering one of them. (2)
may be only weakly justified explains why, Because of the differences noted above, some
although there can be no disagreement among moral disagreements on medical matters are
fully informed rational persons in the vast unavoidable allowing greater tolerance of the
majority of cases, there remain unresolvable views of others. (3) The account of death as the
moral differences on certain issues. These dis- permanent loss of function of the organism as
agreements may result (1) from differences in a whole, and the total loss of all brain function
the ranking of the evils; (2) differences in beliefs as the criterion of death. (4) The claim that,
about the consequences of everyone under- except in special circumstances (where there
standing such violations to be allowed, such dif- may be allowable disagreement), paternalism
ferences being based on different views about violates at least one of the moral rules. (5) The
human nature or the nature of human soci- suggestion of refusal of food and fluids as an
eties; (3) differences as to whether only moral alternative to physician-assisted suicide. Gert
909
GERT
has argued persuasively that the same moral (1979): 199–210.

system that applies to all other areas of life “Free Will as the Ability to Will,” with
applies to medicine while, because of allowable Timothy Duggan, Noûs 13 (1979):
disagreements, it does not seek to impose 197–217.
answers. “Malady: A New Treatment of Disease,”
with K. Danner Clouser and Charles M.
BIBLIOGRAPHY Culver, Hastings Center Report 11 (June
The Moral Rules: A New Rational 1981): 29–37.
Foundation for Morality (New York, “Ethical Issues in Oncology,” with Charles
1970; rev. edn 1973). M. Culver, Psychiatric Medicine 5 (1987):
Philosophy in Medicine: Conceptual and 389–404.
Ethical Issues in Medicine and Psychiatry, “The Law of Nature as the Moral Law,”
with Charles M. Culver (New York, Hobbes Studies 1 (1988): 26–44.
1982). “Irrationality and the DSM-III-R Definition
“Defining Death in Theory and Practice,” of Mental Disorder,” Analyse und Kritik
with James L. Bernat and Charles M. 12 (1990): 34–46.
Culver, Hastings Center Report 12 “Moral Theory,” in Medical Ethics: A
(February 1982): 5–9. Reader, ed. A. Zucker, D. Borchert, and D.
“Moral Theory and Applied Ethics,” The Stewart (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1992), pp.
Monist 67 (1984): 532–48. 15–22.
“Rationality in Medicine: An Explication,” “Moral Theory and the Human Genome
with K. Danner Clouser, Journal of Project,” in Morality and the New
Medicine and Philosophy 11 (1986): Genetics: A Guide for Students and Health
185–205. Care Providers (Boston, 1996).
Morality: A New Justification of the Moral “An Alternative to Physician-assisted Suicide:
Rules (Oxford, 1988). A Conceptual and Moral Analysis,” with
“Morality, Moral Theory, and Applied and Charles M. Culver and K. Danner Clouser,
Professional Ethics,” Professional Ethics 1 in Physician Assisted Suicide: Expanding
(1992): 5–24. the Debate, ed. M. Battin, R. Rhodes, and
“Moral Impartiality,” Midwest Studies in A. Silvers (New York and London, 1998),
Philosophy 20 (1996): 102–28. pp. 182–202.
Bioethics: A Return to Fundamentals, with “Morally Relevant Features,”
Charles M. Culver and K. Danner Clouser Metaphilosophy 30 (1999): 13–24.
(New York and London, 1997). “Morality and Its Applications,” with K.
Morality: Its Nature and Justification Danner Clouser, in Building Bioethics:
(Oxford, 1998). Conversations with Clouser and Friends
Common Morality: Deciding What To Do on Medical Ethics, ed. L. Kopelman
(Oxford, 2004). (Dordrecht, 1999), pp. 147–82.
“Hobbes on Language, Metaphysics, and
Other Relevant Works Epistemology,” Hobbes Studies 14 (2001):
“Hobbes and Psychological Egoism,” Journal 40–58.
of the History of Ideas 28 (1967): 503–20.
“Justifying Violence,” Journal of Philosophy Further Reading
66 (1969): 616–28. Encyc Ethics
Ed., Man and Citizen. Thomas Hobbes’s De Baier, Kurt, et al. “Symposium on Morality:
Homine (Garden City, N.Y., 1972). Its Nature and Justification,” Philosophy
“The Justification of Paternalism,” Ethics 89 and Phenomenological Research 62
910
GETTIER
(2001): 421–81. it is considered in the Theaetetus and perhaps

Bond, E. J. “Bernard Gert’s Moral System,” accepted in the Meno. The account of knowl-
Metaphilosophy 31 (2000): 427–45. edge in question may be stated as follows. (A)
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, and Robert Audi, S knows that p if and only if (i) p is true, (ii) S
eds. Rationality, Rules, and Ideals: Critical believes that p, and (iii) S is justified in believ-
Essays on Bernard Gert’s Moral Theory ing that p. Alternatively, we may state the third
(Lanham, Md., 2002). clause (with Roderick CHISHOLM) as “S has
Sterba, James P., et al. “Symposium on adequate evidence for p,” or (with A. J. Ayer)
Morality: Its Nature and Justification,” as “S has the right to be sure that p is true.”
Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (2001): Gettier claims that his argument counts against
427–76. all of these versions.
Wellman, Carl. “Gert’s Contribution to The argument proceeds by way of two
Moral Philosophy,” Metaphilosophy 10 counter-examples, each of which purports to
(1979): 315–29. show that the conditions stated in (A) are not
sufficient for knowledge. Each counter-example
E. J. Bond purports to show that a person S can satisfy all
of the three conditions stated with respect to p,
and yet fail to know that p. The first counter-
example is as follows:
Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied

GETTIER, Edmund Lee, III (1927– ) for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has
strong evidence for the following conjunctive
Edmund Gettier was born on 31 October 1927 proposition: (d) Jones is the man who will get
in Baltimore, Maryland. He received his BA the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.
from Johns Hopkins in 1949 and his PhD in Smith’s evidence for (d) might be that the
philosophy from Cornell in 1961. His disser- president of the company assured him that
tation title was “Bertrand Russell’s Theories Jones would in the end be selected, and that
of Belief.” Gettier taught philosophy at Wayne he, Smith, has counted the coins in Jones’s
State University from 1957 until 1967. Then he pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d)
became professor of philosophy at the entails: (e) The man who will get the job has
University of Massachusetts, Amherst, teaching ten coins in his pocket. Let us suppose that
there until his retirement in 2001. Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e) and
Gettier spent many years teaching philosophy accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which
of language, modality, and formal semantics. he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is
He will be remembered in the history of philos- clearly justified in believing that (e) is true.
ophy, however, for his three-page paper “Is But, imagine further, that unknown to Smith,
Justified True Belief Knowledge?” That 1963 he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And,
paper changed the course of epistemology in also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten
the English-speaking world, provoking count- coins in his pocket. (1963, p. 122)
less articles, books, and dissertations on the
nature of knowledge and epistemic justifica- The problem is revealed when we substitute
tion. Perhaps no three pages in the history of (e) for p and Smith for S, then all of the clauses
philosophy have attracted so much attention. of (A) are satisfied. Yet it is clear that Smith
Gettier’s paper challenged a widely held does not know that (e) is true. Smith has no
account of knowledge. As Gettier notes, the idea that he himself will get the job, or that he
account goes at least as far back as Plato, where himself has ten coins in his pocket. Hence the
911
GETTIER
example shows that the conditions stated in Propositional Knowledge,” Journal of

(A) are not sufficient for knowledge. Philosophy 68 (1971): 471–82.
Philosophers have generally agreed, and after Lehrer, Keith, and Thomas Paxson.
1963 there has been an explosion of literature “Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True
on the analysis of knowledge and justification. Belief,” Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969):
Responses in the literature range from minor 225–37.
adjustments to radical revisions of (A); doubts Nozick, Robert. Philosophical Explanations
about the viability of epistemology; and doubts (Oxford, 1981).
about the nature and viability of philosophical Shope, Robert. The Analysis of Knowing: A
analysis. There is no consensus regarding how Decade of Research (Princeton, N.J.,
to respond to Gettier’s paper. 1983).
Skyrms, Brian, “The Explication of ‘X
BIBLIOGRAPHY Knows that p’,” Journal of Philosophy 64
“Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” (1967): 373–89.
Analysis 23 (1963): 121–3. Sosa, Ernest. Knowledge in Perspective
(Cambridge, UK, 1991).
Other Relevant Works Swain, Marshall. “Epistemic Defeasibility,”
“Comments on A. J. Ayer’s ‘The Concept of American Philosophical Quarterly 11
a Person’,” in Intentionality, Minds, and (1974): 15–25.
Perception: Discussions on Contemporary Zagzebski, Linda. “What is Knowledge?” in
Philosophy, ed. Hector-Neri Castañeda The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, ed.
(Detroit, 1967). Ayer’s rejoinder follows. John Greco and Ernest Sosa (Oxford,
1999).
Further Reading
Oxford Comp Phil John Greco
Austin, David F., ed. Philosophical Analysis:
A Defense by Example (Dordrecht, 1987).
Essays in honor of Gettier.
Chisholm, Roderick. “Knowledge as Justified
True Belief,” in Empirical Knowledge, ed.
Paul Moser (Totowa, N.J., 1986). GEWIRTH, Alan (1912–2004)
Dretske, Fred. “Conclusive Reasons,”
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 Isidore Gewirth was born on 28 November
(1971): 1–22. 1912 in Union City, New Jersey. He changed
Feldman, Richard. “An Alleged Defect in his name to Alan when he was eleven because
Gettier Counterexamples,” Australasian he was tired of being called “dizzy Izzy” at
Journal of Philosophy 52 (1974): 68–9. school. Gewirth graduated valedictorian of
Fogelin, Robert. Pyrrhonian Reflections on his class from Memorial High School in West
Knowledge and Justification (New York, New York in January 1930. He then attended
1993). Columbia University, where he received his
Goldman, Alvin. “A Causal Theory of BA in 1934, and was elected to Phi Beta
Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy 64 Kappa in his junior year. He spent the next
(1967): 355–72. two years doing graduate study at Columbia
Goldman, Alvin, “Discrimination and before accepting a Sage Fellowship at Cornell
Perceptual Knowledge,” Journal of University in 1936–7. He was then invited to
Philosophy 73 (1976): 771–91. the University of Chicago as an assistant to
Klein, Peter. “A Proposed Definition of Richard MCKEON, who had been brought
912
GEWIRTH
there the year before by Robert Maynard In two recent works Gewirth applies the
Hutchins. In June 1942 Gewirth was drafted ideas seminally expressed in Reason and
into the army, moving up the ranks from Morality. In The Community of Rights
private to captain in four years. After his (1996) he makes use of his theory of rights to
military service in World War II, he spent attack both libertarianism and communitar-
the academic year 1946–7 at Columbia on ianism, and to defend communities organized
the GI Bill, receiving his PhD in philosophy in around respect for an array of economic,
1948. Starting in 1947 he was a member of social, and political rights. In Self-Fulfillment
the philosophy faculty at the University of (1998), he argues that self-fulfillment requires
Chicago. He served as President of the actualizing our rational capacities, which
Central Division of the American includes adherence to the Principle of Generic
Philosophical Association in 1973–4, and Consistency. Hence, personal flourishing
President of the American Society for Political cannot be achieved at the expense of violat-
and Legal Philosophy during 1981–3. In 1975 ing the rights of others.
he was elected to the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences and was named the Edward BIBLIOGRAPHY
Carson Waller Distinguished Service Marsilius of Padua and Medieval Political
Professor of Philosophy. He retired in 1982, Philosophy (New York, 1951).
and remained active in writing and occasional “The Generalization Principle,”
teaching. Gewirth died on 9 May 2004 in Philosophical Review 78 (1964): 229–42.
Chicago Illinois. “Categorical Consistency in Ethics,”
Gewirth has published works on a range of Philosophical Quarterly 17 (1967):
topics, but is best known for his work in 289–99.
moral theory. In this area, his most important “The Normative Structure of Action,”
work is Reason and Morality (1978), in Review of Metaphysics 25 (1971):
which he seeks to provide a foundation for 238–61.
human rights in the demands of rational con- “The ‘Is-Ought’ Problem Resolved,”
sistency. What distinguishes Gewirth’s Proceedings and Addresses of the
approach is his belief that human action has American Philosophical Association 47
what might be called a “normative struc- (1974): 34–61.
ture.” He argues that, because freedom and Reason and Morality (Chicago, 1978).
well-being are the indispensable conditions “The Basis and Content of Human Rights,”
for the possibility of action, agents implicitly Georgia Law Review 13 (1979):
assert the right to freedom and well-being 1143–70.
whenever they act. Furthermore, in asserting Human Rights: Essays on Justification and
these rights agents implicitly regard the fact Applications (Chicago, 1982).
that they are prospective purposive agents “The Epistemology of Human Rights,”
(that is, beings capable of goal-directed Social Philosophy and Public Policy 1
action) as the sufficient condition for the (1984): 1–24.
ascription of these rights-claims to them- “Economic Rights,” Philosophical Topics
selves. Hence, rational consistency demands 14 (1986): 169–93.
that these rights be extended to every prospec- The Community of Rights (Chicago, 1996).
tive purposive agent. Gewirth thus derives Self-Fulfillment (Princeton, N.J., 1998).
what he calls the Principle of Generic
Consistency: “Act in accord with the generic Other Relevant Works
rights (to freedom and well-being) of your “The Cartesian Circle,” Philosophical
recipient as well as yourself.” Review 50 (1941): 369–95.
913
GEWIRTH
“Clearness and Distinctness in Descartes,” attempted to explain how everyday features of

Philosophy 18 (1943): 19–38. the world – from ground surfaces and objects
Ed., Political Philosophy (New York, to pictures – are perceived. Gibson received a
1965). BS from Princeton University in 1925. He took
“Ethics,” in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th his first course in experimental psychology in
edn (London, 1974), vol. 6, pp. 967–98. his senior year from H. S. Langfeld, who had
“Why Agents Must Claim Rights: A studied with the experimental phenomenologist
Reply,” Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): Carl Stumpf in Berlin.
403–10. After graduating, Gibson remained at
“Action and Rights: A Reply,” Ethics 86 Princeton as one of Langfeld’s graduate assis-
(1976): 288–93. tants, and received his MA in 1926 and PhD in
psychology in 1929. Although Gibson com-
Further Reading pleted his dissertation attacking the Gestalt
Proc of APA v77 theory of perception under Langfeld’s direc-
Bio 20thC Phils, Encyc Ethics, Oxford tion, the strongest intellectual influence during
Comp Phil, Pres Addr of APA v8 his graduate studies was that of the philosoph-
Beyleveld, Deryck. The Dialectical ical behaviorist E. B. HOLT. Holt was a student
Necessity of Morality: An Analysis and of William JAMES and a central figure among
Defense of Alan Gewirth’s Argument to the New Realist philosophers. Holt’s psycho-
the Principle of Generic Consistency logical writings fused the non-dualistic meta-
(Chicago, 1991). physics of James’s philosophy of radical empiri-
Boylan, Michael, ed. Gewirth: Critical cism with a behavioristic focus on action.
Essays on Action, Rationality, and Holt’s distinctive brand of behaviorism was
Community (Lanham, Md., 1999). molar in level of analysis, purposive in moti-
Regis, Edward, ed. Gewirth’s Ethical vational character, and distal in identification
Rationalism: Critical Essays with a Reply of the effective stimulus.
by Alan Gewirth (Chicago, 1984). Gibson’s first teaching appointment was in
Steigleder, Klaus. Grundlegung der the psychology department at Smith College in
normativen Anblick: der Ansatz von Alan 1928. Over the ensuing fifteen years, Gibson
Gewirth (Freiburg, Germany, 1999). taught courses in experimental psychology and
social psychology, and published numerous
Eric Reitan research papers with his students. His most
significant experimental work during this
period concerned perceptual adaptation.
Gibson discovered that prolonged visual inspec-
tion of a curved line results in experiencing the
line as straight; and subsequent examination of
GIBSON, James Jerome (1904–79) a different straight line reveals an after-effect of
apparent curvature in the opposite direction.
James J. Gibson was born on 27 January 1904 What is most significant about these findings is
in McConnelsville, Ohio, and died on 11 that a line might be expected to function as a
December 1979 in Ithaca, New York. He was visual primitive, that is, an elementary sensa-
an experimental psychologist and perceptual tion, on which perceiving processes operate.
theorist whose innovative research and con- Instead, these results suggest that even such a
ceptual contributions opened possibilities for a seemingly basic stimulus attribute as linear-
direct realist epistemology. Gibson developed ity/curvilinearity is a property of a dynamic
an ecological approach to perceiving that perceiver–environment relation. More broadly,
914
GIBSON
this discovery questions a clear-cut objective- optical flow. Not only does this finding enrich
subjective distinction in visual perception. This a consideration of the available visual stimula-
theme recurs throughout Gibson’s writings. tion, but it also confounds the received picture
A significant intellectual influence on Gibson theory of vision.
at Smith was his colleague, the Gestalt psy- Similarly, in the process of designing training
chologist Kurt KOFFKA, whose focus on orga- films for developing skills in aircraft identifica-
nization in perceptual experience heightened tion, Gibson became sensitized to the critical
Gibson’s sensitivity to higher-order relations and often overlooked differences between form
in patterns of sensory stimulation. Moreover, at perception (which involves two-dimensional
this time Gibson married Eleanor Jack, who displays) and object perception (which involves
was to become a highly distinguished psychol- solid objects that typically can be identified from
ogist working primarily in the area of percep- any orientation). This work ultimately led to
tual development. Although they rarely col- Gibson’s later hypothesis that objects are speci-
laborated in a formal manner in their writing fied by invariant structure under transforma-
or research, the Gibsons were lifelong intellec- tion. In the case of both perceiving self-motion
tual partners, and their programs were through optical flow and perceiving objects
mutually supportive and mutually influential. through the detection of unchanging structure in
During the years of World War II, Gibson the context of change, Gibson began to formu-
worked in the psychological research unit of the late an account of sensory stimulation that was
US Air Force, and this period of time was an far richer than any previously offered. The results
extraordinarily rich one in the development of of this research initially appeared in Motion
his thinking. Gibson’s primary responsibility Picture Testing and Research (1948).
was developing selection procedures for After returning to Smith College after the
prospective pilots. An innovative feature of this war, Gibson began writing a book describing
work was the use of motion pictures in pre- this work and its implications. Gibson joined
senting test materials. Utilization of this the psychology faculty of Cornell University in
medium was instrumental in shaping Gibson’s 1949, where he remained until his death. The
ideas about the nature of perceiving because it following year Gibson published The
highlighted for him several qualities of visual Perception of the Visual World, which became
stimulation regularly obscured by the domi- his most broadly influential book among per-
nance of static displays (such as pictures) in ceptual psychologists, even though Gibson
investigations of visual perception. abandoned many of its central assumptions
One important consequence in this regard over the ensuing decades. The most frequently
was Gibson’s exploration of the role of optical cited contribution of this book is the role of
flow in the visual field as information for self- surface texture gradients in distance and object
motion. Perception of one’s own movement perception. Traditionally, the question of per-
has long been treated as based solely on motor ceived object size has been approached without
feedback (kinesthesis) from the limbs – a claim considering characteristics of the background,
that is in keeping with the assumption that the as if objects are located in an empty space. One
proximal stimulus for vision is a stationary of several difficulties created by this conceptu-
retinal image (the so-called “picture theory of alization is that of explaining the perception of
vision”). Gibson’s use of dynamic displays object size, because against a background of
demonstrated in compelling fashion that empty space, perceived object size and per-
moving through the environment generates an ceived distance are confounded. For example,
optical streaming as the world appears to flow how does one distinguish between, on the one
around the perceiver, and that movement of the hand, two objects of different sizes located at
self through the world is specified by this the same distance from an observation point, as
915
GIBSON
compared to, on the other hand, two objects of In the 1950s Gibson engaged in a program of
equal size located at different distances from the research concerning the perception of various
perceiver such that they project sizes equal to properties of surfaces, and this experimental
the first pair? In order to make such relative size work deepened his theoretical analysis of visual
estimates, the perceiver must know how far perception. But three critical advances during
away each object is. But because distance is this period will be mentioned. First, based on
visually indeterminate in empty space, analyt- Eleanor J. Gibson’s earlier work, Gibson and
ically one must either draw upon non-visual Gibson offered an original account of percep-
sensory sources of knowing (as Berkeley tual learning, which refers to the commonplace
famously argued), or invoke some innate process of developing improved perceptual
rational processes (as did Descartes) in order to skills in some domain with experience.
make such a judgment. In either case, visual Perceptual learning usually has been viewed as
experience of size/distance would be derived a process of supplementing intrinsically limited
from supplementing visual input in some stimulus input (for example, through associa-
fashion. The apparent necessity of this move is tive learning). Such a step is in keeping with the
but one reason why theorists have long viewpoint of indirect realism. The Gibsons
assumed that perceivers’ experience of the envi- proposed instead that perceptual learning is
ronment must be indirect. This commonplace the differentiation of structure already present
assumption has been the source of innumerable in the stimulus array. In the course of discov-
now familiar epistemological puzzles. ering heretofore unrealized structure in avail-
Gibson reconceptualized this problem by able sensory stimulation, perceivers engage in
demonstrating that distance perception is not a process of learning more about the world in
typically a matter of judging extent in an empty a direct (that is, unmediated) fashion.
space; rather it is based on perceiving a con- Second, Gibson elaborated his earlier
tinuous, textured surface (for example, the analyses of optical flow by examining its role in
ground) as it extends away from a point of animal locomotion. In a paper entitled
observation. Consequently, the existence of a “Visually Controlled Locomotion in …
higher-order psychophysical correspondence Animals and Men” (1958), Gibson argued that
between texture gradients and retinal stimula- the information in the optical flow field speci-
tion raises the novel possibility that distance is fies speed and direction of movement and can
directly perceived, because the corresponding be utilized by perceivers in guiding locomo-
pattern of stimulation itself specifies distance. tion.
As for relative object size, because surface A third notable advance in Gibson’s program
textures tend to be stochastically regular, and during this period was the empirical investiga-
because objects in a terrestrial environment tion of meaningful, perceivable properties of the
tend to rest on surfaces, objects that are the environment. The clearest expression of this
same size even when located at different dis- work appeared in E. J. Gibson and R. D.
tances from the perceiver will occlude equal Walk’s classic 1960 studies using the visual
amounts of ground texture. In short, relative cliff apparatus, which demonstrated that
object sizes are specified by object/surface rela- crawling babies experience the edge of a surface
tions in the visual field. The epistemological of support as affording falling-off. These
significance of this analysis is that it points to findings run counter to the long-held view that
a way of avoiding the forced move to indirect information for depth/distance is not immedi-
realism, at least in this particular case, because ately available, in which case inexperienced
the perceptual phenomena in question can be perceivers would be unable reliably to detect
accounted for without going beyond the depth at an edge. Indeed, this demonstration of
pattern of available stimulation. awareness of such functionally meaningful
916
GIBSON
properties of the environment at an early age of perceiving. Gibson’s analysis of stimulus

necessitates a re-evaluation of the stimulus infor- information is more fully elaborated, and his
mation available to perceivers. Similarly, with W. treatment of perceiving is further refined, in
Schiff and J. Caviness, Gibson (1962) demon- The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception
strated that an expanding form in the visual field (1979). Among the many notable features of
is perceived as a looming surface that affords this book is Gibson’s explication of the concept
impending collision. Both of these studies of “affordances,” an idea that was anticipated
demonstrate that features of the environment in his earlier writings.
with functional significance are readily perceived. Gibson proposed that what is perceived by
In the early 1960s these threads fused into individuals are the affordances of the environ-
two significant and interrelated concepts – ment. Affordances are functionally significant
“ecological optics” and “perceptual systems” – properties of the environment taken with ref-
that together mark an important shift in erence to an individual, and as such, they are
Gibson’s thinking. Gibson replaced his earlier mutually constituted by properties of both the
higher-order psychophysics, which carries with environment and the perceiver. For example, an
it an assumption that stimulation is imposed on object resting on a ground surface affords
receptor surfaces, with a consideration of how “sitting-on” for an individual if the object’s
the interaction of light and the surface features height falls within a certain range relative to the
of an econiche gives rise to potential stimulus perceiver’s leg length. An object that meets this
information available for an active perceiver to relational criterion (among others) not only
detect. Ecological optics is a program of could function as a seat for this individual, but
analysis that examines how reflected light can it would be perceived as such. In short, affor-
be structured such that it carries information dances are properties of the environment con-
about environmental layout. The concept of a sidered relationally, and they are specified by
perceptual system reciprocally supports eco- information that is scaled relative to a per-
logical optics by taking perceiving to be an ceiver.
embodied activity of an animal. Vision, for With this concept Gibson addresses most
example, is properly considered an action fully his sustained interest in perceived meaning.
system that encompasses exploratory move- For Gibson, meaning is an intrinsic quality of
ments of the whole organism because these perceptual experience, and those views claiming
actions play an essential role in the detection of that meaning must be added to perceptual
stimulus information. To be more specific, experience fail to recognize the richness of the
structure in the array of reflected light can serve stimulus information available to be perceived.
as information specifying stable environmental Meaning is a ubiquitous property of the envi-
properties; and the isolation of this invariant ronment from an ecological perspective.
structure is facilitated by changes conferred on Further, the relational ontology of affordances
the stimulus array from the point of view of an brings to fruition a project that runs through
active perceiver. Hence, the concepts of eco- Gibson’s writings and connects his work back
logical optics and perceptual systems are com- to his intellectual predecessors James and Holt;
plementary facets of a dynamic system of and that project is to develop a realist account
animal-environment reciprocity, and jointly of knowing that overcomes the deeply prob-
reflect the adaptation of species’ perceptual lematic assumption of objective–subjective
capacities within an econiche. dualism. The concept of affordances, and
These innovations are presented in The Gibson’s functional analysis of perceiver–envi-
Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems ronment reciprocity more generally, reflect this
(1966), which as the title indicates emphasizes effort, and in his estimation offer grounds for
Gibson’s ground-breaking conceptualization a direct realist epistemology.
917
GIBSON
BIBLIOGRAPHY James J. Gibson, ed. Edward S. Reed and

“Adaptation, After-Effect and Contrast in the Rebecca Jones (Hillsdale, N.J., 1982).
Perception of Curved Lines,” Journal of
Experimental Psychology 16 (1933): 1–31. Further Reading
Motion Picture Testing and Research. Amer Nat Bio, Bio Dict Psych, Encyc Psych,
Aviation Psychology Research Reports, Who Was Who in Amer v5
No. 7 (Washington, D.C., 1948). Gibson, Eleanor J. Principles of Perceptual
The Perception of the Visual World (Boston, Learning and Development (New York,
1950). 1969).
“Parallax and Perspective during Airplane ———, Perceiving the Affordances: A
Landing,” with P. Olum and F. Portrait of Two Psychologists (Mahwah,
Rosenblatt, American Journal of N.J., 2002).
Psychology 68 (1955): 372–85. Gibson, Eleanor J., and Anne D. Pick. An
“Perceptual Learning: Differentiation or Ecological Approach to Perceptual
Enrichment?” with E. J. Gibson, Learning and Development (New York,
Psychological Review 62 (1955): 32–41. 2000).
“Visually Controlled Locomotion and Visual Gibson, Eleanor J., and Richard D. Walk.
Orientation in Animals and Men,” British “The Visual Cliff,” Scientific American
Journal of Psychology 49 (1958): 182–94. 202 (1960): 64–71.
“Persistent Fear Responses in Rhesus Heft, Harry. Ecological Psychology in
Monkeys to the Optical Stimulus of Context: James Gibson, Roger Barker, and
‘Looming’,” with W. Schiff and J. the Legacy of William James’s Radical
Caviness, Science 136 (1962): 982–3. Empiricism (Mahwah, N.J., 2001).
The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems MacLeod, Robert B., and Herbert L. Pick, Jr.
(Boston, 1966). Perception: Essays in Honor of J. J.
“New Reasons for Realism,” Synthese 17 Gibson (Ithaca, N.Y., 1974).
(1967): 162–72. Michaels, Claire, and Claudia Carello. Direct
“The Change from Visible to Invisible: A Perception (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1981).
Study of Optical Transitions,” with G. Reed, Edward S. James J. Gibson and the
Kaplan, H. Reynolds, and K. Wheeler, Psychology of Perception (New Haven,
Perception & Psychophysics 5 (1969): Conn., 1988). Contains a bibliography of
113–16. Gibson’s publications.
The Ecological Approach to Visual ———, Encountering the World: Toward an
Perception (Boston, 1979). Ecological Psychology (New York, 1996).
Warren, William H. “Perceiving Affordances:
Other Relevant Works Visual Guidance of Stair-Climbing,”
Gibson’s papers are at Cornell University. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
“The Concept of the Stimulus in Human Perception and Performance 10
Psychology,” American Psychologist 16 (1987): 683–703.
(1960): 694–703.
“James J. Gibson,” in A History of Harry Heft
Psychology in Autobiography, vol. 5, ed.
E. G. Boring and G. Lindzey (New York,
1967), pp. 127–43.
“The Information Available in Pictures,”
Leonardo 4 (1971): 27–35.
Reasons for Realism: Selected Essays of
918
GILBERT
GILBERT, Katharine Everett (1886–1952) abstract metalanguage that lay beyond works of
art, but closely related to its object.
Katharine Everett Gilbert was born on 29 July
1886 in Newport, Rhode Island to a Methodist BIBLIOGRAPHY
minister, Thomas Jefferson Everett, and Sue “Hardy and the Weak Spectator,” The
Florence Morrison Everett. She studied philoso- Reviewer 5 (1925): 9–25.
phy at Brown University under Walter “The One and the Many in Croce’s
Goodnow EVERETT and Alexander MEIKLEJOHN, Aesthetic,” Philosophical Review 34
where she received a BA in philosophy in 1908. (1925): 21–33.
She then attended Cornell University where she “Santayana’s Doctrine of Aesthetic
received a PhD in philosophy in 1912. She Expression,” Philosophical Review 35
married English professor Allan H. Gilbert in (1926): 221–35.
1913. At the University of North Carolina she Studies in Recent Aesthetics, with Helmut
taught philosophy as a research fellow from Kuhn (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1927).
1922 to 1930, acting professor in 1928, then “The Relation of the Moral to the Aesthetic
lecturer in philosophy in 1929. She was profes- Standard in Plato,” Philosophical Review
sor of philosophy at Duke University from 1930 43 (1934): 279–94.
to 1951, and she was chair of the department of “Aesthetic Imitation and Imitators in
aesthetics from 1947 to 1948. She served as Aristotle,” Philosophical Review 45
President of the Eastern Division of the American (1936): 558–73.
Philosophical Association in 1946–7, and of the “The Relation between Aesthetics and Art
American Society of Aesthetics in 1947–8. She Criticism,” Journal of Philosophy 35
retired from Duke University in 1951, and died (1938): 289–95.
on 25 April 1952 in Durham, North Carolina. A History of Esthetics , with Helmut Kuhn
The body of Gilbert’s work is centered in the (New York, 1939).
field of aesthetics, spanning such topics as poetry, “Art between the Distinct Idea and the
architecture, history of aesthetics, and dance. Obscure Soul,” Journal of Aesthetics and
She wrote numerous articles on these topics, as Art Criticism 6 (1947): 21–6.
well as several books. Gilbert’s first book, “Recent Poets on Man and His Place,”
History of Esthetics (1939), co-written with Philosophical Review 56 (1947): 469–90.
Helmut Kuhn, followed inquiries and debates on “Seven Senses of a Room,” Journal of
art and beauty from Plato to Croce. It offered an Aesthetics and Art Criticism 8 (1949):
understanding of the questions at the center of 1–11.
the history of aesthetic thought as well as the “Two Levels of Aesthetic Definition,”
answers to these questions. It has been regarded Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 9
as one of the most important books written on (1950): 119–23.
the topic of the history of aesthetics. Gilbert’s Aesthetic Studies: Architecture and Poetry
final work, Aesthetic Studies: Architecture and (Durham, N.C., 1952).
Poetry (1952), collects her most influential
articles, elaborating her views on the language Other Relevant Works
used to describe architectural design, the relation “Ruskin’s Relation to Aristotle,”
between poetry and philosophy, and the differ- Philosophical Review 49 (1940): 52–62.
ence between the art critic and the philosopher “Mind and Medium in Modern Dance,”
of art. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 1
Gilbert’s approach to aesthetics saw the phi- (1941): 106–29.
losophy of art as imbedded between the practice “Recent Catholic Views on Art and Poetry,”
and experience of art. It was not simply an Journal of Philosophy 39 (1942): 654–61.
919
GILBERT
“The Intent and Tone of Mr. I. A. Richards,” discarding its religious mythology. He changed
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 3 again in 1939, upon hearing Reinhold NIEBUHR
(1945): 29–48. sermonize on the crisis of Western civilization
“A Spatial Configuration of Five Recent and the dialectical realism of biblical faith. Gilkey
Poets,” South Atlantic Quarterly 44 later recalled: “Suddenly, as the torrent of insight
(1945): 422–31. poured from the pulpit, my world in disarray
“Architecture and the Poet,” Journal of the spun completely around, steadied, and then
American Institute of Architects 13 (1950): settled into a new and quite firm and intelligible
99–102. structure. I thought to myself, ‘Now I am in
“Clean and Organic: A Study in touch with reality and not with the illusions of
Architectural Semantics,” Journal of the humanistic idealism’” (Musser and Price. 1988,
Society of Architectural Historians 10 p. 7). Gilkey studied Niebuhr’s writings and
(1951): 3–7. converted to his style of Christian realism.
After receiving his BA from Harvard in 1940,
Further Reading he sailed to China to teach English at Yenching
Bio 20thC Phils, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v49, University in Peking, an American/British uni-
Pres Addr of APA v5, Proc of APA v26, versity for Chinese students. At that time, the
Who Was Who in Amer v3, Who’s Who in British were holding on against Hitler, the
Phil American war with Japan was more than a year
Boas, George. “Katharine Everett Gilbert’s away, and the Japanese occupation of eastern
Writings on Aesthetics: A Selective China was in its fourth year. A year later, after
Bibliography,” Journal of Aesthetics and the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, all enemy
Art Criticism 11 (1952): 76–7. nationals in China were placed under house
Nahm, Milton C. “The Relations of arrest by the Japanese occupiers. Gilkey passed
Aesthetics and Criticism,” The Personalist the time reading theology until March 1943,
45 (1964): 362–84. when he was sent to an internment camp in
Shantung province with nearly 2,000 others.
Melanie McQuitty Gilkey’s wartime imprisonment was a forma-
tive personal and intellectual experience. He
expected his relatively well-educated fellow
detainees to be reasonable and cooperative in
working out fair accommodations for families,
adolescents, and people with special needs.
GILKEY, Langdon Brown (1919– ) Instead, he found that nearly everyone in the
camp was much less rational and more selfish
Langdon Gilkey was born on 9 February 1919 than he had anticipated. Gilkey’s reflections on
in Chicago, Illinois. His father, Charles Gilkey, this phenomenon drove him to think more pro-
was a theological liberal and the first Dean of the foundly through Niebuhr’s perspective. The
Chapel at the University of Chicago. His mother, character of humankind’s instinctive will to live
Geraldine Gilkey, was a feminist and national is transformed by human consciousness, he
leader of the YWCA. As a youth, Gilkey reasoned. Only the human mind calculates far-
absorbed the social gospel values and fervent off dangers to human existence and protects the
piety of his parents. Upon entering Harvard self and its loved ones from a wide variety of
College as an undergraduate in 1936, however, negative contingencies. Self-consciousness trans-
he relinquished the religious part of his idealism. forms the human agent’s instinctive will to live
Gilkey reasoned that ethical humanism retained into the aggressive, dynamic, and possessive will
the best parts of his parents’ world view while to power. Human beings are distinctively
920
GILKEY
grasping, alienated, and destructive because the paradoxes of Christian creation mythology must
demands of instinct in human beings are accel- be affirmed against all religious and secular crit-
erated by humankind’s distinctive capacities of icism. Christianity teaches that, before all time,
mind or spirit. Beneath and within the complex God created time out of nothing; that God is
interactions of mind, will, and instinct is a unified eternal yet creates and rules time; that God is
self that determines whether the “higher powers” infinite and unconditioned yet becomes finite
of mind and moral will are to be used creatively and conditioned in Christ; and that God is
or destructively. This intuition of a unifying spir- immanent in the world yet transcends creation.
itual dimension in human life became a founda- Gilkey argued that Christian theology must
tional principle of Gilkey’s later theology, as did sustain the full force of these paradoxes and that
his closely related insight that ordinary “secular” myth is a form of religious language that unites
experience cannot be adequately accounted for the concepts of analogy, revelation, and paradox
on secular grounds. into a single mode of God-language.
After the war ended in 1945, Gilkey entered He allowed that Christianity requires more
Union Theological Seminary in New York City than a symbolic knowledge of its subject but
to study under Niebuhr and Paul TILLICH. He puzzled over the relationship between the his-
knew Niebuhr’s writings thoroughly before he torical foundation of Christianity and its
entered seminary, and Tillich’s theology of mythical or symbolic interpretation. Gilkey’s
ultimate concern gave him a language for his early work invoked the neo-orthodox phrase,
conviction that each person possesses a distinc- “the mighty acts of God in scripture,” but in the
tive, meaning-conferring, unifying spiritual early 1960s he judged that the neo-orthodox
center. He received his PhD in religion from conflation of liberalism and orthodoxy was inco-
Union Theological Seminary in 1954 and began herent. Gilkey taught at the University of
teaching theology at Vanderbilt Divinity School. Chicago Divinity School from 1963 until his
Twentieth-century American theology was retirement in 1989, where he developed his views
predominantly liberal from 1900 to 1935, pre- on modern theology. Neo-orthodox theology
dominantly neo-orthodox/neo-liberal from 1935 used the language of the Bible but did not share
to 1965, and predominantly pluralistic and post- the biblical understanding of God as an inter-
modern from 1965 to 2000. As much as any vening, miracle-making divine agent. It spoke of
twentieth-century American theologian, Gilkey God as “acting” in biblical history but assumed
absorbed and reflected the century’s chief theo- the causal continuum of space/time experience.
logical currents. He was raised in theological Though it appealed to the priority of revelation
liberalism, identified with Niebuhrian “neo- over experience and the activity of God in
orthodoxy” in his early career, developed a history, and thus claimed to represent a third
powerful critique of neo-orthodoxy in the early way in theology, Gilkey concluded that neo-
1960s, and spent most of his career fashioning orthodoxy was actually an incoherent version of
a new kind of theological liberalism that appro- liberalism.
priated postmodern elements. Modern theology needed to reestablish the
In his early career Gilkey embraced Niebuhr’s basis of its claims; Gilkey was finished with
crusade against a fading liberal establishment in neo-orthodox appeals to a revelationist starting
American theology. Though he shunned Karl point. Still drawing heavily on the insights of
Barth as impossibly scholastic, long-winded, and Niebuhr and Tillich, he argued that theology
conservative, Gilkey described himself as a “neo- must adopt some version of Schleiermacher’s
orthodox” theologian in the style of Niebuhr starting point in human experience. His own
and Tillich. His first book, Maker of Heaven and thesis was that religious language is meaning-
Earth (1959), argued that the Christian doctrine ful because human beings cannot escape the
of creation is true as true myth and that the essentially religious character of their humanity.
921
GILKEY
Gilkey observed in Naming the Whirlwind: The His major work, Reaping the Whirlwind,
Renewal of God-Language (1969) that human argued that an adequate interpretation of
beings often find that they can affirm life in history must include not only the methods and
spite of its ambiguities and afflictions; thus, he factors privileged by secular reason, but also a
argued, on the basis of ordinary experience, theological interpretation of the ultimate dimen-
theology is justified in claiming a referent. sions of historical existence. Appropriating
Religious language is a valid form of symbolic Alfred North WHITEHEAD’s dialectic of freedom
discourse about the mystery of life, not merely and destiny, Gilkey proposed that the primary
a function of human nature. If theological ontological structure of historical existence is
language is to be made intelligible to the modern actuality and possibility, not self and world.
secular mind, it must look for the basis of its dis- History moves and is experienced in the inter-
course in secular experience. Theology must play of freedom and destiny, bringing together
discern and explicate the dimension of ultimacy the historical given with the actualization of
in human experience, which is the ground and new possibilities. God is the source of being,
limit of human existence. Gilkey explained that Gilkey maintained, but God’s being should be
the dimension of ultimacy is not what is seen, conceptualized in terms of the Whiteheadian
“but the basis of seeing; not what is known as dialectic of achieved actuality and future possi-
an object so much as the basis of knowing; not bility. Whitehead conceived divine reality as
an object of value, but the ground of valuing; distinct from the more basic reality of creativity;
not the thing before us, but the source of things; Gilkey countered that creativity must be under-
not the particular meanings that generate our stood as constitutive in the power of being that
life in the world, but the ultimate context within is God’s being. With Whitehead, he affirmed
which these meanings necessarily subsist” that God is in dynamic process, but against
(Naming the Whirlwind, 1969, p. 296). The Whitehead, he insisted that God is not subject
dimension of ultimacy manifests itself as the to process, for process implies the passing out of
ground of being and bridges the gap between existence of what has been. God is the ground
Christian faith and modern secular experience. of the possibility of process and the creative
Naming the Whirlwind uncovered dimen- power of being through which the reality of
sions of ultimacy in personal, existential expe- each occasion comes to be; God’s power tran-
rience; Religion and the Scientific Future (1970) scends the finite temporality of destiny and
and Nature, Reality, and the Sacred (1993) freedom; and God “acts” in and through the
looked for dimensions of ultimacy in cognitive secondary causes of destiny and freedom.
experience, especially scientific inquiry; In addition to the influences of Niebuhr and
Shantung Compound (1966) and Reaping the Tillich, which pervade all his work, and
Whirlwind (1976) found dimensions of Schleiermacher and Whitehead, his thinking
ultimacy in social and historical existence; has been strongly influenced by Mircea ELIADE’s
Catholicism Confronts Modernity (1975) and history of religions comparativism, especially
Message and Existence (1979) used the disclo- Eliade’s analyses of myth. In his later career,
sure of ultimacy method to explicate Gilkey’s Gilkey has written almost exclusively in the
constructive position; and Society and the essay form, addressing a wide variety of topics
Sacred (1981) and Through the Tempest (1991) in culture, science, liberation theology, post-
looked for sacral dimensions in various aspects modern criticism, and inter-religious dialogue.
of modern culture. Gilkey explained in Often he cautions about the return of the
Catholicism Confronts Modernity that his work repressed. To the extent that modern secular
sought to synthesize the myths, stories, and culture has de-legitimized or repressed its yearn-
symbols of Christian experience with modern ings for the sacred, Gilkey observes, it has
scientific and philosophical reason. created the conditions under which irrational
922
GILLIGAN
and sometimes malevolent forms of religious “Unbelief and the Secular Spirit,” in The
expression have erupted. Tillich taught that the Presence and Absence of God, ed.
substance of culture is always religious in some Christopher F. Mooney (New York,
form; in the spirit of his teacher, Gilkey warns 1969).
that modern life is not as secular as modern Creationism on Trial: Evolution and God at
intellectuals want to believe and that religion- Little Rock (Minneapolis, 1985).
suppressing societies are bound to unleash back-
lashes of unassimilated religious forms. Further Reading
Dorrien, Gary. The Word as True Myth:
BIBLIOGRAPHY Interpreting Modern Theology (Louisville,
Maker of Heaven and Earth: A Study of the Kent., 1997), pp. 128–86.
Christian Doctrine of Creation (Garden Musser, Donald W., and Joseph L. Price, eds.
City, N.Y., 1959). The Whirlwind in Culture, Frontiers in
How the Church Can Minister to the World Theology: Essays in Honor of Langdon
without Losing Itself (New York, 1964). Gilkey (Bloomington, Ind., 1988).
Naming the Whirlwind: The Renewal of Pasewark, Kyle A., and Jeff B. Pool, eds. The
God-Language (Indianapolis, 1969). Theology of Langdon B. Gilkey:
Religion and the Scientific Future: Reflections Systematic and Critical Studies (Macon,
on Myth, Science, and Theology (New Georgia, 1999).
York, 1970). Walsh, Brian J. Langdon Gilkey: Theologian
Catholicism Confronts Modernity: A for a Culture in Decline (Lanham, Md.,
Protestant View (New York, 1975). 1991).
The Contemporary Explosion of Theology:
Ecumenical Studies in Theology, ed. Gary Dorrien
Michael D. Ryan (Metuchen, N.J., 1975).
Reaping the Whirlwind: A Christian
Interpretation of History (New York,
1976).
Message and Existence: An Introduction to
Christian Theology (New York, 1979). GILLIGAN, Carol Friedman (1936– )
Society and the Sacred: Toward a Theology
of Culture in Decline (New York, 1981). Carol Gilligan was born on 28 November
Gilkey on Tillich (New York, 1990). 1936 in New York City. She received her BA
Through the Tempest: Theological Voyages in literature summa cum laude from
in a Pluralistic Culture (Minneapolis, Swarthmore College in 1958. Becoming inter-
1991). ested in psychology, she pursued advanced
Nature, Reality, and the Sacred: The Nexus studies at Radcliffe College and received her
of Science and Religion (Minneapolis, MA in clinical psychology in 1961. She then
1993). earned her PhD in social psychology from
Blue Twilight: Nature, Creationism, and Harvard University in 1964, writing a disser-
American Religion (Minneapolis, 2001). tation on “Responses to Tempation: An
On Niebuhr: A Theological Study (Chicago, Analysis of Motives.” Gilligan became a
2001). lecturer at the University of Chicago, and then
returned to become a lecturer at Harvard in
Other Relevant Works 1967. During this time she worked closely
Shantung Compound: The Story of Men and with the renowned psychologist Erik ERIKSON.
Women under Pressure (New York, 1966). In the spring of 1969 Gilligan met Lawrence
923
GILLIGAN
KOHLBERG and she joined him in his research the context of the situation, while a theory of
on adolescent moral behavior. The following justice tries to find principles that are discov-
year she also taught one of Kohlberg’s course ered outside of social interaction. Her involve-
sections on moral and political choice. ment in this criticism is why she is known as
In 1971 Gilligan became an assistant pro- the founder of “different voice feminism” or
fessor in the Harvard Graduate School of “difference feminism,” which supports the idea
Education, advancing to associate professor that men and women tend to develop in two
in 1979 and full professor in 1986. She spent distinct and different manners. On this view,
1992–3 teaching at the University of men tend to do moral reasoning according to
Cambridge as Pitt Professor of American laws and justice, while women predominantly
History and Institutions. In 1997 she was reason according to caring and relationships.
appointed to the Patricia Albejerg Graham Both, she argues, should be equally valued
Chair in Gender Studies in Harvard’s Graduate within society.
School of Education. She has been an integral Gilligan has met much criticism from some
part of the Harvard Project on Women’s feminists, who believe that arguing from dif-
Psychology and Girls’ Development that she ference creates more problems and may justify
created. She began teaching as a visiting pro- oppressive actions, and from some psycholo-
fessor at New York University School of Law gists, who worry that Gilligan has used anec-
in 1999. She teaches seminars on law and dotal evidence that is seldom successfully
culture and works with the first-year law duplicated. Nevertheless, Gilligan’s criticisms
students to enrich their sense of the responsi- of prior developmental theories have proven
bilities that are involved in practicing law. In important to moral philosophy, developmen-
2002 Gilligan joined the faculty of New York tal psychology, and feminist thought.
University as a University Professor with the
Graduate School of Education and the School BIBLIOGRAPHY
of Law. “In a Different Voice: Women’s
Gilligan is best known in philosophy for her Conceptions of Self and of Morality,”
criticism of Kohlberg’s stage theory of moral Harvard Educational Review 47 (1977):
development. She felt that his theory was 481–517.
biased against females as Kohlberg’s studies “Justice and Responsibility: Thinking about
seemed to privilege the moral decision-making Real Dilemmas of Moral Conflict and
of males. This was shown by the fact that Choice,” in Toward Moral and Religious
women typically scored no higher than stage Maturity, ed. Christiane Brusselmans et
three, on Kohlberg’s stage theory of moral al. (Morristown, N.J., 1980), pp.
development, while men scored consistently at 223–49.
stage four or higher. Gilligan argued that the In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory
theory viewed individual rights and fair treat- and Women’s Development (Cambridge,
ment as superior to a theory which valued Mass., 1982; 1993).
caring and human relationships. In Gilligan’s Between Voice and Silence: Women and
terms, this is a difference between a theory of Girls, Race and Relationships, with Jill
justice and a theory of care. In her most famous Taylor and Amy Sullivan (Cambridge,
work, In a Different Voice: Psychological Mass., 1995).
Theory and Women’s Development, she The Birth of Pleasure: A New Map of Love
emphasizes the gender differences associated (New York, 2002).
with the two modes of moral thought. A
morality of care emphasizes the relationships Further Reading
formed with others and is often dependent on Hekman, Susan. Moral Voices, Moral
924
GILMAN
Selves: Carol Gilligan and Feminist Moral losophy, although she self-identified as a soci-
Theory (University Park, Penn., 1995). ologist and published in the American Journal
“In a Different Voice,” Journal of Medicine of Sociology. Her father, a librarian, supplied
and Philosophy 23 (April 1998). Special Gilman with book lists (if not money) in order
issue about Gilligan. to advance her education. Self-taught, Gilman
Larrabee, Mary Jeanne, ed. An Ethic of read many of the classic works of social phi-
Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary losophy so as to make a contribution to the
Perspectives (London and New York, progress of humanity, a goal she viewed as
1993). her ultimate calling.
Without the credentials to obtain a formal
John William Bates V academic position, Gilman took her sociology
on the road lecturing to the public on topics
such as the equality of men and women, chil-
drearing, religion, and the home. Gilman’s
social thought was infused with (1) cultural
feminism, the belief in the uniqueness or supe-
GILMAN, Charlotte Anna Perkins riority of feminine cultural values; (2) social
(1860–1935) reform Darwinism, the application of
Darwinian principles of biological evolution to
Charlotte Anna Perkins was born on 3 July the social world; and (3) Fabian socialism, the
1860 in Hartford, Connecticut, to parents conviction that social ills such as poverty and
Frederick Beecher Perkins and Mary A. Fitch crime can be resolved through the systematic
Westcott. Although part of the wealthy application of social scientific laws and demo-
Beecher family, when her parents divorced, cratic ideals. Gilman sought to create a more
Gilman and her older brother were left to be pragmatic sociology that would change society
raised by their mother in relative poverty. She from the bottom up. Additionally, she worked
married twice during her lifetime. Her first with the settlement movement in Chicago,
marriage to Charles Walter Stetson in 1884 including a brief stint at Jane ADDAMS’s Hull-
was dissolved amicably in 1887 after the birth House.
of her only child Katherine Beecher Stetson Although she is intellectually linked to
and consequent emotional collapse, leading to Addams and other sociologists including Lester
a nervous condition that was to plague her WARD, Luther L. Bernard, Edward A. ROSS,
for her entire working life. Although she and Patrick Geddes, Gilman’s ideas remain
attempted to raise her daughter on her own for largely unrecognized. She attempted to negate
several years, Gilman ultimately decided to the sexism advocated by functionalists such
give Stetson primary custody of her only child. as Emile Durkheim and to raise the status of
Her second marriage to her cousin Houghton women. Furthermore, she worked to under-
Gilman in 1900 proved to be much more com- mine the ideas of theorists such as Karl Marx
patible and lasted until Houghton’s death in who viewed social change in terms of conflict.
1934. Gilman was diagnosed with breast Rather, Gilman argued that society would only
cancer in 1932 and committed suicide by chlo- progress with the contributions and coopera-
roform on 17 August 1935 in Pasadena, tion of both men and women.
California. Despite her lack of formal education,
Gilman attended the Rhode Island School of Gilman was a prolific writer and theorist. She
Design, yet this facet of her education was wrote, edited, and published her monthly
largely utilitarian. She did not have any formal journal The Forerunner for seven years from
academic training in either sociology or phi- 1909 to 1917. Her best-known works on “the
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GILMAN
woman question” are The Yellow Wallpaper (January–December 1915). Published sep-
(1892), a fictional account of her first nervous arately as Herland (New York, 1979).
breakdown and consequent therapy, and His Religion and Hers: A Study of the Faith
Women and Economics (1898), a treatise on of Our Fathers and the Work of Our
the unnatural state of women’s economic depen- Mothers (New York, 1923).
dence on men. Today these works are widely
read in the academic areas of women’s studies Other Relevant Works
and feminist theory. The Man-made World Gilman’s papers are at Radcliffe College in
(1911) and His Religion and Hers (1923) are Massachusetts.
institutional accounts of gender relations in the “A Suggestion on the Negro Problem,”
Western world. More specifically, she discusses American Journal of Sociology 14
male domination within the legal system, edu- (1908): 78–85.
cation, religion, the family and so on. The Home “How Home Conditions React upon the
(1903) and Concerning Children (1901) lament Family” American Journal of Sociology
the subordination of women and children in the 14 (1909): 592–605.
home and its consequent impact on men specif- “The Waste of Private Housekeeping,”
ically and society in general, and how home life, Annals of the American Academy of
childrearing, and education can be improved for Political and Social Science 48 (1913):
the good of society. Gilman identified Human 91–5.
Work (1904), a discussion of the importance of “The Housekeeper and the Food Problem,”
specialization and human interdependence, as Annals of the American Academy of
her most important contribution. Political and Social Science 74 (1917):
Gilman’s work was revolutionary for its 123–30.
time and even today. Her belief in the scientific The Living of Charlotte Perkins Gilman
progression of humanity through democracy (New York, 1935).
and the equality of men and women is The Charlotte Perkins Gilman Reader, ed.
laudable. However it must be noted that Ann J. Lane (New York, 1980).
Gilman’s work was severely limited by her Charlotte Perkins Gilman: A Nonfiction
racism. While hints of racism and eugenics are Reader, ed. Larry Ceplair (New York,
present throughout the body of her works, her 1991).
“A Suggestion on the Negro Problem” (1908) The Diaries of Charlotte Perkins Gilman, 2
outlines a specific plan of institutionalized vols, ed. Denise D. Knight
racism aimed at African Americans. Although (Charlottesville, Virg., 1994).
this racism does not discredit the entirety of her With Her in Ourland: Sequel to Herland,
work, it is indicative of the social Darwinist ed. Michael R. Hill and Mary Jo Deegan
thought common during Gilman’s lifetime. (Westport, Conn., 1997).
Social Ethics: Sociology and the Future of
BIBLIOGRAPHY Society, ed. Michael R. Hill and Mary Jo
Women and Economics (Boston, 1898). Deegan (Westport, Conn., 2004).
The Yellow Wallpaper (Boston, 1899).
Concerning Children (Boston, 1901). Further Reading
The Home: Its Work and Influences (New Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio,
York, 1903). Comp Amer Thought, Dict Amer Bio,
Human Work (New York, 1904) Dict Economics, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v13,
The Man-Made World (New York, 1911; Who Was Who in Amer v1
3rd edn 1914). Allen, Polly Wynn. Building Domestic
“Herland,” in The Forerunner 7 Liberty: Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s
926
GILSON
Architectural Feminism (Amherst, Mass., Gilson attended the Catholic Notre-Dame-

1988). des-Champs from 1895 to 1902, but finished
Cannon, Julie Harms, and Adrian De La at the public Lycée Henri IV during
Rosa. “Utopian Feminism and Feminist 1902–1903, attending that year the public
Pedagogy: Charlotte Perkins Gilman and lectures of the Sorbonne’s Lucien Lévy-Bruhl,
the Everyday Classroom,” Quarterly who presented Hume’s philosophy in its full
Journal of Ideology 24 (2001): 1–41. historical context. Gilson later said that he
Hill, Mary A. Charlotte Perkins Gilman: aspired to do for medieval philosophy what
The Making of a Radical Feminist, Lévy-Bruhl had done for Hume. Gilson then
1860–1896 (Philadelphia, 1980). studied philosophy under Emile Durkheim,
Kessler, Carol Farley. Charlotte Perkins Victor Delbos, and Henri Bergson at the
Gilman: Her Progress toward Utopia Sorbonne from 1904 to 1907 during the high
with Selected Writings (Syracuse, N.Y., tide of positivism. For a thesis, “I asked Lévy-
1995). Bruhl to direct me in philosophy. He told me
Lane, Ann J. To “Herland” and Beyond: that I must undertake something positive, that
The Life and Work of Charlotte Perkins speculative philosophy just wouldn’t do. ‘All
Gilman (New York, 1990). right,’ I replied, ‘I will do history of philosophy.
Lengermann, Patricia Madoo, and Jill That’s positive enough, isn’t it’?” (Shook 1984,
Niebrugge-Brandtley. The Women p. 18). Lévy-Bruhl suggested a thesis on the
Founders (Boston, 1998). medieval sources of Descartes, and what
Meyering, Sheryl L., ed. Charlotte Perkins resulted was nothing short of a revolution. “In
Gilman: The Woman and Her Work 1905 Octave Hamelin was still writing that
(Ann Arbor, Mich., 1989). Descartes came after the ancients almost as
Scharnhorst, Gary. Charlotte Perkins though nothing had taken place between them
Gilman (Boston, 1985). and himself.” In 1960 Gilson wrote: “I dis-
tinctly remember the feeling of fear I experi-
Julie Harms Cannon enced on the day when, after holding back my
pen for a long time, I finally wrote this simple
sentence: On all these points the thought of
Descartes, in comparison with the sources
from which it derives, marks much less a gain
than a loss” (The Philosopher and Theology
GILSON, Etienne Henry (1884–1978) 1962, pp. 87–9). So emerged a life’s work:
Gilson had found the undiscovered country
Etienne Gilson was born on 13 June 1884 in of medieval philosophy and would be its
Paris, France, and he died on 19 September explorer.
1978 in Auxerre, France. Gilson was the third Gilson married Thérèse Ravisé in 1908; they
of five sons of Paul Anthelme Gilson and had three children. He taught in lycées while
Caroline Juliette Rainaud. Both families were writing his two theses during the period from
petit bourgeois, Paul’s were Parisian shop- 1907 to 1913. Gilson received his doctorate
keepers and Caroline’s innkeepers in from the Sorbonne in 1913. His university
Burgundy. After Paul suffered a stroke in 1901, career beginning at Lille in 1913–14, where he
“Maman” turned over the shop to her second delivered the lectures on Aquinas that would
son and ran the family until her death in 1937. become Le Thomisme (1919). In World War
She passed on her religiosity, energy, and I he served in the army, was captured, and
ambition to her three younger sons: Etienne; used the time to learn Russian and study
André, a physician; and Maurice, a priest. Bonaventure. The peace settlement gave the
927
GILSON
German University of Strasbourg to the for presenting the philosophies of Bonaventure,

French, who decided to make it a showcase Augustine, Bernard of Clairvaux, Dante, and
with promising young professors, including Duns Scotus. Gilson’s goal was a clear and
Gilson. The German practice of organizing the systematic presentation of the doctrine of an
Faculty of Letters around institutes rather than author, based on his own words and argu-
disciplines was retained, which led to an inter- ments. Letting medieval philosophers speak
disciplinary atmosphere Gilson embraced. for themselves made Gilson a master of the
While at Strasbourg from 1919 to 1921, he lucid and insightful summary, which makes
wrote three books, each arguing in its own his books still vivid portraits, even if each
way for medieval philosophy. chapter began life as that most ephemeral of
Gilson was promoted from Strasbourg to scholarly productions, the lecture.
the Sorbonne in 1921. In 1926 he was Gilson’s second use of history consisted in a
appointed professor of medieval philosophy, synthetic view of a whole historical period. In
launched the journal Archives d’histoire doc- La Philosophie au moyen âge (1922) he
trinale et littéraire du moyen âge, and visited painted a panorama of the age. To show that
North America for the first time. In 1929 there was such a thing as philosophy through-
classes began in the Institute of Medieval out the Middle Ages, he chose central philo-
Studies in Toronto, Canada, co-founded by sophical questions – such as the existence of
Gilson and the Basilian Fathers. Awarded God, human nature, and the sources of
Pontifical status in 1939, Gilson’s Institute was morality – and then he traced the origin, devel-
dedicated to following his interdisciplinary opment, frequent distortion, and sometimes
approach to medieval philosophy. In 1932 he death of philosophical doctrines produced as
joined the Collège de France as the chair of answers. If his studies of individuals show
medieval philosophy. With the exception of the philosophical depth, his histories were
years of World War II, Gilson split his teaching designed to show the breadth of philosophy in
between Paris and Toronto from 1929 to the period. Two complete revisions followed,
1951. In 1946 Gilson was elected to the one in French (1944), the other in English
Académie Française. Resigning his chair at the (1955), after which Gilson turned to the
Sorbonne in 1951, Gilson spent most of his history of modern philosophy.
time in Canada at the Pontifical Institute of Gilson’s third and most distinctive use of
Medieval Studies until 1968. His last visit to history is found in Etudes de philosophie
North America was in 1972. médiévale (1921), modeled on the music he
Gilson’s first book was Le Thomisme loved. Each of the eight studies focuses on a
(1919), which he thought was the least suc- single theme, prominent among them: the
cessful of his early books. A doctrinal study meaning of Christian rationalism, theology’s
covering the full range of Aquinas’s thought, it servant, and Thomism’s historical significance.
came directly from lectures Gilson always This work exhibited the power of Gilson’s
wrote out fully and ahead of time. To set out prose and led to a series of memorable books.
Aquinas’s philosophical “system,” Gilson In each, Gilson used the history of philosophy
followed the “theological order” of his Summa as a sort of laboratory in which he leads the
theologiae – God, creation, human nature, and reader through “metaphysical experiments”
a morality that returned to God – but its where “the proof that [abstract principle] x by
content and argument were fully rational and right implies a, b, c, d is that in fact, in the
philosophical. Its six editions trace Gilson’s course of time, and sometimes after an interval
interpretation of Thomism. But he also moved of centuries, a, b, c, d have finally emerged
outward to other medieval thinkers, using the from it” (quoted in Maurer, “Gilson’s Use of
same theological order as the proper template History in Philosophy,” 1990, p. 43). Each
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GILSON
book contains an overarching thesis proven losophy onto Christianity he produced

with historical evidence, an exercise Gilson theology, so that after the Greek period there
thought not the task of the history of philoso- was no philosophy until the moderns sepa-
phy but of philosophy proper. His Gifford rated it from theology in the sixteenth century.
Lectures on The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy Both Bréhier and Brunschvicg conceived of
(1932) were designed to prove historically his philosophy in the modern way, as an abstract,
thesis of a Christian philosophy in the Middle demonstrative system standing on its own.
Ages, the first of several books on this subject. Maritain and Gilson, for their part, viewed
In Methodical Realism (1936) and Thomist philosophy in more Aristotelian terms, as a
Realism (1939) Gilson took aim at neo- habit existing in a concrete subject, the philoso-
scholastic philosophers who tried to join the pher. Gilson argued from historical fact,
“critical method” with Thomistic realism. pointing out that Christians like Justin the
Such a philosophical accomodation with martyr, Augustine, and Anselm had turned to
modernity produced an incoherent Cartesian “the Bible and the Gospel as sources of philo-
Thomism, Cartesian in using the method of the sophic inspiration,” especially in metaphysics
cogito, but Thomistic in arriving at unsound and above all about the name of God – Ego
conclusions. In 1938 Gilson gave the William sum qui sum – positions he would never
James Lectures at Harvard, The Unity of abandon. Maritain took a “doctrinal”
Philosophical Experience. Taking aim at the approach, distinguishing between the “order of
positivism of his teachers, Gilson attempted specification” that shows philosophy in itself
to show that “metaphysics always buries its is separate from theology, and the order of
undertakers,” by resorting to three “experi- exercise, “its state within the human subject at
ments” – medieval, Cartesian, and modern – the historical period of its making,” where
that had failed to accomplish the attempted Christian philosophy is found.
internment. Gilson’s appreciation of existence The meeting had a great impact and others
(esse) as a distinctive feature of Aquinas’s entered the dispute. Pierre Mandonnet, in
metaphysics led to another series of books, agreement with the positivists, had already
beginning with L’Etre et l’essence (1948) and said that the Middle Ages produced theology,
Being and Some Philosophers (1949), where he not philosophy, with the possible exception
espoused an existential Thomism. of Aquinas. The most stringent criticism,
Three of Gilson’s philosophical doctrines however, came from those seemingly closest to
are especially worthy of mention: Christian Gilson’s position. In 1893, Desiré Mercier had
philosophy, epistemological realism, and exis- created the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie at
tential Thomism. In all three cases Gilson Louvain in order to espouse a new scholasti-
found himself disputing on two fronts: against cism in which the purely philosophical thought
the modern philosophy represented for him of Aquinas would be mastered in order for
by the Sorbonne, and against neo-scholastic neo-scholastic philosophers to engage as equals
philosophy whose emblem was Louvain. with contemporary philosophers, who had no
On 21 March 1931 the Société Française use for religion. The historian Maurice de Wulf
de Philosophie met to debate “The Notion of then discovered in the Middle Ages a common
Christian Philosophy,” with Gilson and scholastic synthesis where, among other
Jacques MARITAIN arguing in favor, and Emile advantages, philosophy already stood clearly
Bréhier and Léon Brunschvicg against. The demarcated from theology. F. Van
dispute was inevitable once Gilson claimed to Steenberghen said “there are Christian philoso-
have found in the Middle Ages a philosophy phers but there is no Christian philosophy,”
created by Christians. Bréhier argued histori- any more than there can be Christian
cally that when Augustine grafted Greek phi- geometry, because if “Christian” is taken as a
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GILSON
specific difference limiting the genus philoso- thought that through clever argument they
phy, this difference turns philosophy into could beat modern philosophy at its own
theology. Gilson’s response lasted for the rest game, because they assumed the critical
of his career and began with The Spirit of method was neutral about results. But his
Medieval Philosophy. There he defined studies of history showed Gilson that the
Christian philosophy as “every philosophy method of critique was not neutral, because it
which, although keeping the two orders [of was merely the other side of the idealistic con-
faith and reason] formally distinct, nevertheless clusions that Descartes’s successors from
considers Christian revelation as an indis- Berkeley to Hegel had drawn. Gilson proposed
pensable auxiliary to reason” (1936, p. 37). an alternative: “I maintain, therefore, that just
Gilson thought the positivists at the Sorbonne as there is in Cartesianism a methodical
and the neo-scholastics at Louvain shared a idealism, the kind that starts with thinking,
common conception of philosophy: to be there can be a methodical realism, the kind that
rational it had to be pure, unaffected by faith. starts with being” (Methodical Realism, 1990,
Gilson’s definition of Christian philosophy is p. 118). The cogito cannot transcend the self
designed precisely to challenge this presuppo- because it is an artificial thought experiment.
sition. Considered as an abstract system, it is Real knowledge always begins in real experi-
true that philosophy cannot argue from faith ence and real experience is always from the
premises; but when looked at historically and beginning experience of the real world.
in the individual philosopher, Christian phi- Gilson’s job was simply to remind neo-scholas-
losophy exists as one habit side by side with the ticism and modern philosophy alike of this
habits of faith and theology, in a kind of sym- fact: “When, therefore, [the idealist] asks the
biotic relationship. In the 1930s Gilson realist how, starting from thought, one can
thought that even while present in the mind of rejoin the object, the latter should instantly
one knower, theology and Christian philoso- reply that it is impossible, and also that this is
phy move down such separate tracks that the principal reason for not being an idealist.
Aquinas “exclud[ed] from theology all neces- Since realism starts with knowledge, that is,
sary demonstrations of purely rational nature” with an act of the intellect which consists essen-
(Reason and Revelation, 1938, p. 78). The tially in grasping an object, for the realist the
problem is that this view pushes the “five question does not present an insoluble
ways” demonstrating God’s existence, for problem, but a pseudo-problem, which is
example, out of theology proper, even though something quite different.” (Methodical
they occur in a book called by its author Realism, 1990, p. 128) Gilson’s defense of a
Summa theologiae. Consequently, Gilson later direct but far from naïve realism was one part
called this view “a very widespread delusion” of an early twentieth-century critique that now
(The Philosopher and Theology, 1962, p. 97), appears to have closed down the era of modern
and concluded that the Christian philosophy of philosophy that ran from Descartes to
Aquinas was an integral part of theology: “his Nietzsche – a critique that included Husserl’s
theology by its very nature includes not only in use of intentionality to overcome the subjective
fact but necessarily a strictly rational philoso- error of beginning philosophy with a solitary
phy” (Thomism, 2002, xiii). Cartesian ego ultimately trapped within itself,
The dispute over Christian philosophy led and Heidegger’s “ontologizing the phenome-
Gilson to a conflict over epistemology, again nological method” in order to point out the
waged on two fronts. Here his immediate equally pernicious error on the objective side,
target was neo-scholastic philosophy, but that of the “eclipse of being.”
behind it stood modern philosophy itself. Neo- Isolated in Paris during World War II,
scholastics like Cardinal Mercier of Louvain Gilson re-edited his major works and reevalu-
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GILSON
ated his understanding of Aquinas. Inspired by whereas in all creatures they are two distinct
the sixteenth-century Spanish commentator principles, as different as substance and
Domingo Bañez and the current philosophy of accident or matter and form. Consequently,
existentialism, he perfected his existential inter- God is the efficient cause bestowing existence
pretation of Aquinas. “As a metaphysics of on all creatures, a properly philosophical
the act of existing, Thomism is not another notion of creation that complements the reli-
existential philosophy, it is the only one.” gious notion of creation at a first moment in
(Thomism, 2002, p. 417) Gilson offered a time. Gilson wrestled for many years with the
twofold argument for this extraordinary claim, question whether the distinction between
first looking at Aquinas’s metaphysics, then essence and esse is a demonstrated conclusion
comparing it with the metaphysics of other or a fundamental principle of metaphysics and
historical figures. finally concluded it is a principle. All argu-
To understand each of the individual things ments for this distinction are dialectical and the
that constitute the universe, Socrates had asked principle can come to any Christian philoso-
“what is it?” – a question designed to uncover pher by reflecting on Exodus 3:14, where God
essence. Plato had recognized hierarchies of told Moses his name was “I am” (Christian
essences and Aristotle had said his categories, Philosophy, 1993, pp. 30–31). Gilson was well
the most general essences of all, are surpassed aware of the temptation to oversell existence:
only by being and unity, the broadest of all “There would be no advantage in making a
notions. Aristotle thus laid down a “charter for great to-do about the act of existing to the
metaphysics” by distinguishing it as a general point of forgetting about the reality of essence,
science of “being as being” different from or even to thinking that this justifies us to
other sciences that cut off a part of being to belittle its importance. Essences are the intelli-
study. Though Aristotle had recognized that gible stuff of the world. That is why ever since
prior to “what is it?” comes the question “is Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, philosophy has
it?” he passed over this point too quickly. been a hunt for essences. The great question is
Aquinas saw that each individual being in the whether we will try to take them alive, or if our
world (Aquinas in Latin: ens, Gilson in French: philosophy will be only a herbarium of dead
étant, and in English: a being) is composed of essences.” (Thomism, 2002, p. 419)
two distinct principles: essence (essentia) and In L’Etre et l’essence and Being and Some
a second principle Aquinas called esse (trans- Philosophers Gilson took his readers on a tour
lated by Gilson as étre in French, but vari- of that herbarium, whose specimens were
ously as being or existence in English). labeled with the names of the great meta-
Existence and essence are real principles cor- physicians of the West. Aquinas’s transcen-
responding respectively to Aristotle’s two ques- dentals provide a ready scheme for cataloguing
tions. But there is a priority between them. their errors. “Being (ens), which first falls into
Aquinas thought esse to be “the act of all acts the mind, as Avicenna said” (De veritate 1.1),
and the perfection of all perfections.” We come has two sorts of attributes subordinate to it:
to understand essence through the first act of transcendental attributes present in all beings
the mind – apprehending concepts; but we (essence, unity, truth, and goodness); and
attain knowledge of existence only in the special modes not present in all beings (sub-
second act of the mind – the judgments that stance and Aristotle’s nine accidents).
produce propositions; a fact that makes our Metaphysicians have committed four kinds of
concept of existence difficult and obscure. error: (1) Parmenides and Platonists through-
These two principles provided Aquinas with a out history have reversed the priority being
sharp distinction between God and creatures, should have over its transcendental attributes,
for in God essence and existence are identical, trying to make “one” or “good” ontologically
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GILSON
prior to being. (2) Aristotle and his medieval translated by L. K. Shook and A. A.
followers Averroes and Siger of Brabant Maurer as Thomism: The Philosophy of
reduced the wider notion of being to one of its Thomas Aquinas (Toronto, 2002).
parts – namely, substance, for Aristotelian La Philosophie au moyen âge (Paris, 1922;
metaphysics is always a metaphysics of sub- 2nd edn 1944).
stance, not of being in its universality. And Saint Thomas d’Aquin (Paris, 1925). Trans.
there have been two ways that essence has Leo Ward as Moral Values and the Moral
eclipsed being. (3) Medieval essentialists like Life (London, 1931).
Avicenna, Scotus, and Suarez recognized the Introduction à l’étude de saint Augustin
composition of essence and existence in beings, (Paris, 1929; 2nd edn 1943). Trans. L. E.
but they misunderstand existence, taking it for M. Lynch as The Christian Philosophy of
a kind of essence. (4) And modern essentialists Saint Augustine (New York, 1960).
from Descartes to Hegel, by beginning in the Etudes sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale
mind, reduced being (ens) to essence, thereby dans la formation du système cartésien
producing gossamer metaphysical systems (Paris, 1930).
completely free of the weight of real existence. L’Esprit de la philosophie mediévale (Paris,
Only Aquinas escapes Gilson’s critique, for 1932). Trans. A. H. C. Downes as The
Aquinas had the good sense to fight the temp- Spirit of Medieval Philosophy (London,
tation to reduce being to something less real 1936; 2nd edn 1944).
than it actually is. Though he is never men- Christianisme et philosophie (Paris, 1936).
tioned, this survey seems to be Gilson’s reply Trans. R. MacDonald as Christianity and
to Heidegger’s critique of Western meta- Philosophy (London, 1939).
physics: Aquinas at least had not forgotten Le Réalisme méthodique (Paris, 1936).
being, and Gilson was determined that Trans. Philip Trower as Methodical
Heidegger’s century would not forget Aquinas. Realism (Front Royal, Virg., 1990).
Gilson’s impact on philosophy was world- The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New
wide – by no means limited to North America. York, 1938).
Of special importance to the New World, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages
however, were his success in transplanting the (New York, 1938).
skills of high European scholarship and the Réalisme thomiste et critique de la
way he made philosophy’s history respectable connaisance (Paris, 1939). Trans. M. A.
– especially its medieval history, and most par- Wauck as Thomist Realism and the
ticularly the thought of Thomas Aquinas. Critique of Knowledge (San Francisco,
1986).
BIBLIOGRAPHY God and Philosophy (New Haven, Conn.,
Le Thomisme: Introduction au système de 1941).
saint Thomas d’Aquin (Strasbourg, 1919; L’Etre et l’essence (Paris, 1948; 2nd edn
2nd edn, Paris, 1922; 3rd edn 1927; 4th 1962).
edn, Le thomisme: Introduction à la Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto,
philosophie de saint Thomas d’Aquin, 1949; 2nd edn 1952).
1942; 5th edn 1944; 6th edn 1965). The Les Métamorphoses de la cité de Dieu
4th edn was translated by E. Bullough as (Louvain, 1952).
The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas The History of Christian Philosophy in the
(Cambridge, UK, 1924); the 5th edn was Middle Ages (New York, 1955).
translated by L. K. Shook as The Christian Painting and Reality (New York, 1957).
Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (New Elements of Christian Philosophy (New
York, 1956); and the 6th edn was York, 1960).
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GILSON
Le philosophe et la théologie (Paris, 1960). Jean Duns Scot: Introduction à ses positions
Trans. C. Gilson as The Philosopher and fondamentales (Paris, 1952).
Theology (New York, 1962).
Introduction à la philosophie chrétienne Further Reading
(Paris, 1960). Trans. A. A. Maurer as Bio 20thC Phils, Encyc Relig, Oxford Comp
Christian Philosophy: An Introduction Phil, Routledge Encycl Phil, Who Was
(Toronto, 1993). Who in Amer v7, Who’s Who in Phil
Introduction aux arts du beau (Paris, 1963). Couratier, M., ed. Etienne Gilson et nous:
Translated as The Arts of the Beautiful La philosophie et son histoire (Paris,
(New York, 1965). 1980).
Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Kant, with Dewan, L. “Etienne Gilson and the Actus
T. Langan (New York, 1963). Essendi,” Maritain-Studies 15 (1999):
The Spirit of Thomism (New York, 1964). 70–96.
Recent Philosophy: Hegel to the Present, FitzGerald, D. “Maritain and Gilson on the
with T. Langan and A. A. Maurer (New Challenge of Political Democracy,” in
York, 1966). Reassessing the Liberal State: Reading
Les Tribulations de Sophie (Paris, 1967). Maritain’s Man and the State, ed. T. Fuller
Linguistique et philosophie (Paris, 1969). (Washington, D.C., 2001), pp. 61–9.
D’Aristote à Darwin et retour (Paris, 1971). Houser, R. E. “Trans-Forming Philosophical
Trans. J. Lyon as From Aristotle to Water into Theological Wine: Gilson and
Darwin and Back Again (Notre Dame, Aquinas,” Proceedings of the American
Ind., 1984). Catholic Philosophical Association 69
(1996): 103–16.
Other Relevant Works Maritain, Jacques. Etienne Gilson:
Gilson’s papers are at the Pontifical Institute philosophe de la chrétienté (Paris, 1949).
of Medieval Studies in Toronto, Canada. Maurer, A. A. “Etienne Gilson,” Christliche
La Liberté chez Descartes et la théologie Philosophie im katholischen Denken des
(Paris, 1913). 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. E. Coreth
Index scolastico-cartésien (Paris, 1913). (Salzburg, 1989), vol. 2, pp. 519–45.
Etudes de philosophie médiévale ———, “Gilson’s Use of History in
(Strasbourg, 1921). Philosophy,” in Thomistic Papers V
La philosophie de saint Bonaventure (Paris, (Houston, 1990), pp. 25–48.
1924). Trans. I. Trethowan and F. J. ———, “Medieval Philosophy and its
Sheed as The Philosophy of St. Historians,” in Being and Knowing
Bonaventure (Paterson, N.J., 1938; 2nd (Toronto, 1990), pp. 461–79.
edn 1943). McCool, Gerald. From Unity to Pluralism:
La Théologie mystique de Saint Bernard the Internal Evolution of Thomism (New
(Paris, 1934). Trans. A. H. C. Downes as York, 1992).
The Mystical Theology of Saint Bernard McCorkell, Edmund J., et al. Mélanges
(London, 1940). offerts à Etienne Gilson (Toronto and
Pour un ordre catholique (Paris, 1934). Paris, 1959).
Héloïse et Abélard (Paris, 1938). Trans. L. McGrath, Margaret. Etienne Gilson: A
K. Shook as Heloise and Abelard (Ann Bibliography (Toronto, 1982).
Arbor, Mich., 1960). O’Neil, C. J. An Etienne Gilson Tribute
Dante et la philosophie (Paris, 1939). Trans. (Milwaukee, Wisc., 1959).
D. Moore as Dante the Philosopher Quinn, J. M. The Thomism of Etienne
(London, 1948). Gilson (Villanova, Penn., 1971).
933
GILSON
Shook, Laurence K. Etienne Gilson is directly recognizable to a person S just in case

(Toronto, 1984). S can know that f obtains on the basis of reflec-
West, J. “Gilson, Maritain and tion alone. Such facts, Ginet argues, will be facts
Garrigou-Lagrange on the Possibility of about S’s current mental states; for example,
Critical Realism,” Maritain-Studies 17 facts of the form “S is confident that p,” or “S
(2001): 49–69. seems to remember that q,” or “S seems to see
that r.”
R. E. Houser Ginet argues that a consequence of his
position is the following: if a person S is justified
in believing that p, then S is justified in claiming
to know that p. For consider: any reason that S
has in favor of believing p, and that thereby jus-
tifies S in believing that p, is also a reason in favor
GINET, Carl Allen (1932– ) of the claim that S knows that p. Likewise, if I
know that p, and hence facts that are directly rec-
Carl Ginet was born on 11 July 1932 in Casper, ognizable to me justify me in claiming that I
Wyoming. He received his BA from Occidental know that p, then I need only reflect on this in
College in 1954 and his PhD in philosophy from order to know that I know that p. With a few
Cornell in 1960. He taught philosophy at Ohio qualifications aside, we can say that justifica-
State University, University of Michigan, and tion and knowledge are transparent in the fol-
University of Rochester, before returning to lowing sense: if one is justified in believing, then
Cornell in 1971 to be professor of philosophy one is justified in believing that one is justified in
until his retirement in 1999. He served as an believing. And if one knows, then one can (by
editor of The Philosophical Review during the reflection alone) know that one knows.
1980s and 90s. According to Ginet, internalism is supported
Ginet has written on various topics in meta- by the following reflections about epistemic jus-
physics, the philosophy of language, and tification. First, S ought to believe that p (or not
Wittgenstein. His most important contributions, believe that p) according to whether S has appro-
however, have been in epistemology and in priate justification. Put another way, S ought to
action theory. In epistemology, he has defended regulate her belief according to her justification.
an internalist account of justification and an But if this is what S ought to do, then it must be
indefeasibility account of knowledge. In action something that S can do. In other words, it must
theory, he has been an important critic of com- be that S can tell whether S has justification in a
patibilism, the view that free action is compati- given case. But this, Ginet argues, requires that
ble with the doctrine that all events have natural justification be entirely a function of what is
causes. In contrast to this view, Ginet has directly recognizable to S. That is the only way
defended an incompatibilist account of free that S could fulfill the relevant obligation.
action, along with a distinctive account of True justified belief is not sufficient for knowl-
“acting for a reason.” edge, however, since one’s justification might
In the theory of knowledge, Ginet has been a be false or misleading. Ginet argues that there
leading proponent of internalism, the view that must be a “fourth condition” on knowledge,
epistemic evaluation is a function of factors that and he proposed that a person S knows p if and
are (in some appropriate sense) “internal” to only if (1) p is true, (2) S believes p with confi-
the knower. Ginet argues that epistemic justifi- dence, (3) S’s confidence is supported by
cation, or the kind of justification required for adequate justification, and (4) there is no truth
knowledge, is entirely a function of facts that are r such that, if r were added to S’s justification,
“directly recognizable” to the knower. A fact f then S would no longer be justified in being con-
934
GINET
fident that p. This sort of account has come to anyone to make it the case that b but not-a.
be known as an “indefeasibility” account of Finally, we can affirm “the fixity of the given
knowledge, since it says, in effect, that knowl- past”: once something happens in the past, it
edge is true justified belief, where S’s justification is not open to anyone to change what
cannot be defeated or undermined in any happened. Ginet argues that the three princi-
relevant way. ples together entail the following: that no
In action theory, the orthodox position has alternative action is open to anyone at any
long been compatibilism: an action can be free time. His argument begins by noting that
even if all events, including human actions, are determinism entails that for any person S who
determined by antecedent natural causes. performs any action a, there will be a truth of
Typically, compatibilists hold that an action is the form “If b then a,” where a describes S’s
free just in case it is caused in the right sort of action and b describes a state of the world
way – that is, by the actor’s own beliefs and before S was even born. Moreover, determin-
desires, as opposed to some external force or ism guarantees that the truth in question
some external manipulation. Against this follows from the laws of nature. But given
orthodox view, Ginet has argued that no sort of “the inescapability of the laws,” it is not open
cause is compatible with free action. The usual to S to change this truth, and given “the fixity
contrast to compatibilism invokes the notion of of the given past,” it is not open to S to change
agent causation, or the idea that free actions are b. But then it is not open to S to change a.
caused by the actor herself, as opposed to some Since the argument is completely general
desire, belief, or other state of the actor. Ginet’s regarding b, a, and S, it follows that it is never
version of incompatibilism is distinctive by open to anyone to perform an alternative
avoiding the notion of agent causation, which he action. Assuming that free action requires that
thinks is less than fully coherent. According to one can perform an alternative, it follows that
Ginet, free actions are not caused at all, either by there is no free action. Of course, Ginet does
the agent or by states of the agent. Ginet argues not accept this conclusion. The point, rather,
that compatibilism is false by proposing that is that the three principles are incompatible
freedom of action requires that more than one with free action. But since “the inescapability
alternative is open to the person acting. But of the laws” and “the fixity of the given past”
determinism, Ginet argues, does not allow for can be taken as givens, it follows that deter-
such alternatives. If everything that happens is minism is incompatible with free action.
determined by antecedent sufficient causes, then Incompatibilism faces problems of its own,
whatever happens has to happen, given those however. Most importantly, if an action is
causes. Once the causes are in place, no alterna- not caused then it is not caused by the actor’s
tives are open. own beliefs and desires, or the actor’s own
This general argument can be explained in reasons. But this too seems incompatible with
greater detail. First, determinism implies the freedom. At the very least, it would seem that
following: for any true description of the world at least some free actions are done for reasons,
a, there is a true description of the world b, but incompatibilism threatens to make even
entirely about the past, such that, given the this impossible. To address this problem,
laws of nature, if b then a. This follows straight- Ginet defends an a-deterministic account of
forwardly from the definition of determinism, “acting for a reason.” It is “a-deterministic”
which says that everything that happens is in the sense that it is compatible with both
determined by antecedent sufficient causes. determinism and indeterminism. Roughly, the
Second, we may affirm “the inescapability of idea is this: A person S performs an action a
the laws.” That is, if it follows from a law of for a reason just in case, by performing a, S
nature that if b then a, then it is not open to intends to accomplish some purpose or fulfill
935
GINET
some desire. For example, S flips the switch in Other Relevant Works
order to turn on the light just in case, by Ed. with Sidney Shoemaker, Knowledge and
flipping the switch, S intended to turn on the Mind: Philosophical Essays (Oxford,
light. Alternatively, S opened the window 1983).
because she wanted to get some fresh air just
in case, by opening the window, S intended to Further Reading
fulfill her desire to get some fresh air. On this Alston, William. “Internalism and
account, to act for a reason is to act with the Externalism in Epistemology,”
right sort of intention. Relatedly, to give a Philosophical Topics 14 (1986): 179–221.
“reasons explanation” for an action is to point Greco, John. “Internalism and Epistemically
out that the action is done with a particular Responsible Belief,” Synthese 85 (1990):
intention, and with the belief that it will fulfill 245–77.
that intention. This is consistent with the Hinton, Beverly K. “A Critique of Carl
action being caused by the intention in Ginet’s Intrinsic Theory of Volition,”
question or by something else. But it does not Behavior and Philosophy 29 (2001):
require that the action is caused. S performs an 101–20.
action for a reason just in case S performs the Lemos, Noah. “High Accessibility and
action with the right sort of intention, whether Justification,” Philosophy and
there are casual antecedents to the intention Phenomenological Research 49 (1989):
and action or not. 463–76.
Marks, Charles E. “Ginet on Wittgenstein’s
BIBLIOGRAPHY Argument against Private Rules,”
Knowledge, Perception, and Memory Philosophical Studies 25 (1974): 261–71.
(Dordrecht, 1975). Mele, Alfred. “Is there a Place for Intention
“Knowing Less by Knowing More,” Midwest in the Analysis of Intentional Action?”
Studies in Philosophy 5 (1980): 151–61. Philosophia 27 (1999): 419–32.
“Contra Reliabilism,” The Monist 68 (1985): O’Connor, Timothy. “Indeterminism and
175–87. Free Agency: Three Recent Views,”
“The Fourth Condition,” in Philosophical Philosophy and Phenomenological
Analysis, ed. D. F. Austin (Dordrecht, Research 53 (1993): 499–526.
1988), pp. 105–19. Sorensen, Roy. “Uncaused Decisions and Pre-
On Action (Cambridge, UK, 1990). decisional Blindspots,” Philosophical
“In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Studies 45 (1984): 51–6.
Possibilities: Why I Don’t Find Frankfurt’s
Argument Convincing,” Philosophical John Greco
Perspectives 10 (1996): 403–17.
“Deciding to Believe,” Knowledge, Truth and
Duty, ed. M. Steup (Oxford, 2001), pp.
63–76.
“Reasons Explanations of Action: Causalist
versus Noncausalist Accounts,” in The GLADDEN, Solomon Washington
Oxford Handbook of Free Will, ed. (1836–1918)
Robert Kane (Oxford, 2001), pp.
386–405. Washington Gladden was born on 11
February 1836 in Pottsgrove, Pennsylvania.
Gladden proudly claimed descent from the
Gladding family, part of the Puritan migra-
936
GLADDEN
tion to Plymouth, Massachusetts, in the 1630s. have said Congregational pastor or editor of
In honor of one of his forebears who had the Independent magazine, but, instead, he
served at Valley Forge, he was given the name simply answered “interpreter.” In addition to
“Washington.” His father, an impoverished literally thousands of essays in journals as
village schoolmaster, died when Washington varied as Scribner’s, The Congregationalist,
(or “Wash” as he was known) was only five. Century, the New York Times, and the Ohio
Upon the remarriage of his mother, “Wash” State Journal, Gladden also found time to write
was sent to live on an uncle’s farm near more than forty books as varied as fiction
Owego, New York. Noticing his nephew’s (Christian League of Connecticut, 1886),
literary ability, the uncle released him from poetry (Ultima Veritas), sermons (Where Does
his obligation to serve until he was twenty- the Sky Begin?, 1904), and social criticism
one, and allowed him at age sixteen to be (Working People and Their Employers, 1885).
apprenticed to the editor of the Owego Most of his “interpreting” occurred from
Gazette. the pulpits of Congregational churches in
His training in the print shop, plus some Brooklyn and Morristown, New York, but
occasional hours in a one-room school and especially at the First Church in Springfield,
the local “preparatory academy,” proved suf- Massachusetts, from 1875 to 1882; and the
ficient for Gladden to be accepted as a sopho- First Church of Columbus, Ohio, from 1882
more at Williams College in rural to 1918. Though offered academic posts, and
Massachusetts in 1856. The collegiate cur- though no stranger to the university podium
riculum was largely limited to the “Five R’s” and the seminary pulpit, Gladden was con-
– or “reading, recitation, ‘rithmetic, rhetoric, vinced that he served best as a “communicator
and religion.” A redemptive influence was of ideas” in the context of the local church. His
provided by the presence of Mark HOPKINS, congregations, especially in Columbus, were
regarded as “one of the four or five great composed of professionals and intellectuals
teachers that America has produced.” He who supported his free and wide-ranging
received his BA in 1859, and for a while he spirit. Gladden even served on the Columbus
attended lectures at the Union Theological City Council.
Seminary in New York City, where he was Both a thinker and a doer, Gladden was
influenced by Professors Roswell D. Hitchcock best remembered as an advocate of liberal
and Henry B. SMITH. Gladden profited from Christianity, and as a champion of the Social
his wide reading, both in his own personal Gospel. Gladden did not come easily to his
library (which came to include many thousand position as America’s major exponent of
volumes) and in public collections (such as the Liberal Protestantism in the Gilded Age. While
famed Astor Library). His broad erudition and he was an heir of the Puritan tradition, with its
extensive public service led to his being recog- threefold emphasis on faith, reason, and
nized with honorary doctorates from three justice, he had been raised in the revivalism and
institutions: a Doctor of Laws degree from the Calvinism that permeated antebellum America.
University of Wisconsin in 1881; a Doctor of Against both he was to revolt, painfully,
Divinity degree from a small Lutheran liberal instead seeking a “broader faith,” and “a free
arts college in Roanoke, Virginia, in 1882; and mind” focused on “justice for all.”
the Doctor of Laws degree from the University Revivalism dominated evangelical
of Notre Dame in 1905. Christianity in the United States from George
For nearly sixty years following his gradua- Whitfield to Billy Sunday. As a child, Gladden
tion from Williams, Gladden won recognition had been told to “get saved.” As a five-year-old
both as a parish minister and a widely-read he heard the evangelist describe “the burning
journalist. Asked to identify himself, he could pit, with sinners trying to crawl up it sides out
937
GLADDEN
of the flames” while “the devils, with pitch- von Harnack invited a new look at the
forks, stood by to fling them back again.” “religion of Jesus,” rather than the one
Gladden recalled “it made me angry” but, “about” him. To reconcile these new findings
when he simply could not have the “right expe- with faith, on the basis of reason, became
rience,” he fell into deep despair. Ready to Gladden’s task – as he inquired, “how much is
embrace atheism as a more humane alternative left of the old doctrines?”
than revivalism, Gladden happened to come For Gladden, the nineteenth century was a
upon the writings of Horace BUSHNELL, who time as exciting for new religious options as the
argued that faith was not “a sudden new Reformation era had been. Clearing a way the
nature” born in a “momentary experience” “cluttered landscape of a collapsed
but, instead, was the result of Christian Calvinism,” in works as Present Day Theology
Nurture (1847). Reading that book convinced (1913), Gladden proposed the new synthesis of
Gladden that Christianity was rational, not liberalism. It was to be anchored in three affir-
emotional; gradual and incremental, not mations. (1) The imminence of God in Nature,
instantaneous; and that it was graceful, not not his transcendence in Space. Gladden con-
wrathful in nature. tended that “God has been abiding in the
Calvinism, since colonial times, had been world and manifesting himself … ever since the
the prevailing influence in all the major morning of the creation.” There could be no
American denominations. A classical Christian “Warfare of Science and Religion” since the
model, it involved “faith seeking understand- God who spoke in apostles and prophets now
ing” on the basis of Scripture and Nature to talked in poets and physicists. (2) The organic
create a synthesis of understanding. Gladden character of human life and nature was a
was persuaded that this Calvinism had to be second confession, for “if … God be imminent
reexamined in light of seven major changes in in the creation, it is evident that the sign of his
the cultural climate: (1) geology now indicated presence must be most clear in humanity.”
a far greater age for the earth than the tradi- Human evolution was a divine revelation,
tional 6,000 years based on genealogies in starting, not with the “fall” of Adam and Eve
Genesis; (2) evolutionary biology convinced but their rise, from the Stone Age to Jesus. In
Gladden that any literal reading of the scrip- the Man of Nazareth, one “pre-eminently the
tural account of human origins was irrational; Teacher,” the self-impartation of God to the
(3) the German “higher criticism” of the Bible species became eminently evident. (3) The
suggested that Scripture had emerged from Christian hope was not “eschatological chaos”
multiple strands of thought, rather than being but the trust that God’s Kingdom would come
“miraculously dictated”; (4) the new psychol- through intelligence, benevolence, and rever-
ogy, expounded by William JAMES, proposed ence. A “Good Society” could result as the
more complex models of human behavior than values of friendship were used to usher in a
“simple sinfulness”; (5) the new economics, realm of right relationships.
articulated by scholars like Richard ELY, These three commitments led to Gladden’s
revealed the interdependence of humans in articulation of the Social Gospel. As the spiri-
society as well as the need for “Corporate tual component of the progressive movement
Salvation”; (6) the comparative religion in the 1890s and early 1900s, it longed to see
movement, identified with Max Müller and “the promise of American life” actualized in
displayed at the World Parliament of Religions four ways. First, the genesis of a broader
in 1893 (in which Gladden participated), democracy was desired, giving more power to
pointed to cooperation and not competition the people; the masses, not the classes, were to
between faith traditions; (7) and the new be trusted and empowered. Second, the birth
history of the origins of Christianity by Adolf of an industrial democracy was to be hastened,
938
GLADDEN
with a concern for the fair distribution of the Where Does the Sky Begin? (Boston, 1904).
goods resulting from mechanized mass pro- Christianity and Socialism (New York and
duction. Third, the dawn of a cooperative, not Cincinnati, 1905).
a competitive, culture was to be welcomed. The New Idolatry, and Other Discussions
For Gladden the future was communitarian, (New York, 1905).
not ruggedly individualistic. Fourth, as a The Church and Modern Life (Boston,
Christian Socialist, Gladden also came to 1908).
embrace pacifism, the nonviolent resistance to The Futility of Force (Columbus, Ohio,
oppression and exploitation. An opponent of 1908).
American entry into World War I, Gladden The Labor Question (Boston, 1911).
asked, along with fellow Social Gospel thinker Present Day Theology (Columbus, Ohio,
Walter RAUSCHENBUSCH, that America become 1913).
a “sanctuary of civilization” in a world The Forks of the Road (New York, 1916).
“embracing holocaust.”
At the time of his death on 2 July 1918 in Other Relevant Works
Columbus, Ohio, Gladden was perhaps Gladden’s papers are in the Ohio Historical
America’s best-known minister, its most ardent Society in Columbus, Ohio.
“apostle of Liberal Christianity,” and its most The Christian League of Connecticut (New
respected “project of Social Justice.” As both York, 1886).
a popularizer and a seminal thinker, Gladden The Cosmopolis City Club (New York,
not only hastened the triumph of liberalism in 1893).
American Protestantism, he also foreshadowed Recollections (Boston, 1909).
the radical theology of the mid twentieth
century with its emphasis on a revisioning of Further Reading
the faith and a restructuring of society. Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
BIBLIOGRAPHY Thought, Dict Amer Religious Bio, Encyc
Working People and Their Employers (New Amer Bio
York, 1885). Dorn, Jacob H. Washington Gladden:
Applied Christianity: Moral Aspects of Prophet of the Social Gospel (Columbus,
Social Questions (Boston, 1887). Ohio, 1967). Contains a bibliography of
Who Wrote the Bible? A Book for the Gladden’s writings.
People (Boston, 1891). Fry, C. George. “The Social Gospel at the
Burning Questions (New York, 1892). Crossroads of Middle America: Solomon
Tools and the Man: Property and Industry Washington Gladden and the First
under the Christian Law (Boston, 1893). Congregational Church of Columbus,
The Church and the Kingdom (New York, Ohio, 1892–1918,” in Perspectives on the
1894). Social Gospel (Lewiston, N.Y., 1999), pp.
Ruling Ideas of the Present Age (Boston, 51–80.
1895). Fry, C. George, and Jon P. Fry. Pioneering a
Social Facts and Forces: The Factory, the Theology of Evolution: Washington
Labor Union, the Corporation, the Gladden and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin
Railway, the City, the Church (New York, (Lanham, Md., 1989).
1897). Fry, C. George, and Joel R. Kurz.
How Much is Left of the Old Doctrines? A Washington Gladden as a Preacher of the
Book for the People (Boston, 1899). Social Gospel, 1882–1918 (Lewiston,
Social Salvation (Boston, 1902). N.Y., 2003).
939
GLADDEN
Knudten, Richard D. The Systematic physical and mental, and his health declined
Thought of Washington Gladden (New seriously after 1976. Gödel died on 14 January
York, 1968). 1978 in Princeton, New Jersey.
Weisenburger, Francis P. Ordeal of Faith, Gödel’s most significant work was mostly in
The Crisis of Church-Going America, logic, mathematical logic, and mathematics.
1865–1900 (New York, 1959). Although he was interested in philosophy
throughout his life and it became a major pre-
C. George Fry occupation from about 1942 on, he published
little philosophy. His impact on philosophy
rests more on his mathematical work, espe-
cially the incompleteness theorems of 1931,
than on his philosophical writing, even when
his publications are augmented by posthumous
GÖDEL, Kurt Friedrich (1906–78) materials.
Gödel’s enduring fame rests primarily on
Kurt Gödel was born on 28 April 1906 in four contributions. First, in his dissertation he
Brünn, Moravia, then part of Austria and now proved the completeness of first-order quan-
Brno, Czech Republic. In 1924 he entered the tificational logic, that is, that if a formula of
University of Vienna, initially to study physics this logic is not formally refutable then there is
but eventually studying mathematics with a model in which it is true, in fact a model
Hans Hahn. He also attended lectures in phi- where the domain of the quantifiers is the
losophy and sessions of the Vienna Circle of natural numbers. Gödel generalized his result
logical positivists including Rudolf CARNAP. to prove that the same holds for denumerable
Gödel completed the PhD in mathematics in sets of formulae and along the way proved the
1929 and qualified as a Privatdozent compactness theorem: if every finite subset of
(unsalaried lecturer) in 1933. He retained that a set of formulae has a model, so does the
position until it was abolished after the Nazi whole set. These theorems, published in 1930,
annexation of Austria in 1938, but lectured are the fundamental theorems of model theory.
only intermittently, in part because of health Second, in his epoch-making paper in 1931,
problems and in part because of visits to the Gödel proved his two incompleteness
United States. He was a visiting member of the theorems. First, he described for a system of
Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, arithmetic based on the simple theory of types
New Jersey in 1933–4, the fall of 1935 (when a formula F that “says of itself that it is
he had to return early), and the fall of 1938, unprovable” and proved that if the system is
after which he taught for a semester at the consistent, then F is unprovable. If in addition
University of Notre Dame and then returned to the system is w-consistent (cannot prove there
Vienna. is a number satisfying some condition while
In January 1940, in the face of concerns refuting it for each individual number), then ¬F
about the war and uncertainty about his is also unprovable, and thus the system is
academic position, Gödel left Vienna with his incomplete. The method was that of arithme-
wife and took up a position at the Institute for tization of syntax, coding symbols of the
Advanced Study, where he remained for the system by natural numbers so that formulae
rest of his life. He became a permanent and proofs could be coded as sequences and so
member in 1946 and professor of mathemat- also as numbers, so that properties such as
ics in 1953. He retired in 1976. During that being a proof of a given formula could be rep-
time he traveled little and never returned to resented by predicates expressible in the
Europe. He had many health problems, both system. Gödel showed that this could be
940
GÖDEL
carried out for first-order arithmetic, so that tivity and cosmology. The connection with
the incompleteness result applies to it as well. Kant is explored in some manuscripts on rel-
Second, if the system satisfies some further ativity theory and Kantian philosophy,
conditions, then if it is consistent the formula probably earlier drafts of 1949 (two are in
expressing the consistency of the system is CW 3).
unprovable. In this sense the consistency of In the 1930s Gödel obtained other signifi-
the system cannot be proved in the system cant results in mathematical logic. Several
itself. papers concern intuitionistic logic and its
Gödel’s third major contribution came in relation to classical logic and modal logic.
the mid 1930s, as he turned his attention to set Most foundationally significant is the transla-
theory. Between 1935 and 1937 he proved of tion of classical logic into intuitionistic, which
the standard systems of set theory, such as implies that if intuitionistic first-order arith-
that of Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF), that if they are metic HA is consistent, then so is classical
consistent, they remain so after the addition of (PA). His interpretation of HA by primitive
the axiom of choice and the generalized con- recursive functionals of finite type, discovered
tinuum hypothesis, a generalization of in 1941 but only published in 1958, intro-
Cantor’s early conjecture that the power of duced a method widely used in postwar work
the continuum is the least uncountable in proof theory.
cardinal. Thus the latter cannot be refuted by Gödel’s first two major results are pillars
standard set-theoretic principles. The proof on which later mathematical logic rests. One
proceeded by constructing an inner model of major step remained to be taken in the 1930s
“constructible sets,” essentially an extension of for mathematical logic to reach maturity: the
Russell’s ramified hierarchy to allow levels of analysis of computability and the proof of
sets indexed by all the ordinals. He proved undecidability results, in particular the unde-
that it is consistent with ZF that all sets are cidability of first-order logic. Gödel partici-
constructible and that this hypothesis implies pated in this development. For example, in his
the axiom of choice and the generalized con- 1934 Princeton lectures, “On Undecidable
tinuum hypothesis. Gödel’s methods proved Propositions of Formal Mathematical
fundamental to later research in set theory. Systems” (in Davis 1965 and CW 1), he pre-
Gödel’s fourth major contribution came in sented the concept of general recursive
the late 1940s, prompted by reflection on function, one of the equivalent notions that
Kant’s conception of the transcendental came to be identified with that of computable
ideality of time. Gödel discovered solutions of total function on the natural numbers.
the field equations of general relativity in However, the decisive steps and results were
which the matter of the universe is in a state of obtained by others, particularly Alonzo
uniform rigid rotation and in which there are CHURCH and A. M. Turing. Gödel recognized
closed time-like curves. The latter raised the the importance of Turing’s analysis. In partic-
theoretical possibility of time travel, but what ular, it enabled him to state his own first
interested Gödel philosophically were solu- incompleteness theorem in what he regarded as
tions in which one could not define an objec- full generality, since it enabled a general defi-
tive global time. He published his results in two nition of formal system (CW 1, p. 369).
papers, as well as a philosophical comment The philosophical impact of Gödel’s logical
(1949), all reprinted in volume 2 of the work can be further discussed here largely in
Collected Works (abbreviated as CW). His connection with his own philosophical
initial models appear not to be physically real- thought. One immediate impact must be men-
istic, but the later ones may be. The work was tioned, however. In the 1920s David Hilbert
influential in the development of general rela- founded proof theory, a branch of mathemat-
941
GÖDEL
ical logic, and proposed to resolve epistemo- of objective truth, independent of provability.
logical questions about mathematics by for- Remarks from the 1930s suggest that it was
malizing fundamental mathematical theories only over time that he came to the complete
and giving a proof of their consistency by a Platonism he avowed in 1944 and later
syntactic analysis of formal proofs. Proofs of writings (see Parsons 1995 and Davis 1998).
consistency were to be carried out by the Gödel nonetheless showed sympathy for
finitary method, which corresponded to the idealism, and sometimes described his philoso-
most elementary constructive methods in arith- phy as idealistic. Although Kant was an impor-
metic. Hilbert’s own statements and the actual tant influence on him, he criticized Kant’s tran-
methods of proof-theoretic work in his school scendental idealism as too subjectivist. But he
encouraged the conclusion that finitary was able to combine ringing expressions of
methods could be captured within a restricted realist conviction with idealist sympathies (see
part of PA. However, Gödel’s second incom- for example the letter to Gotthard Günther of
pleteness theorem implied that such methods 30 June 1954 in CW 4). Concern to reconcile
were not sufficient even to prove the consis- these tendencies was probably a factor leading
tency of PA. This was a very serious blow to him to embark in 1959 on a study of Edmund
Hilbert’s program, and although work in the Husserl’s works and to be favorable thereafter
type of proof theory it inaugurated has con- to Husserl’s views. Evidence of this influence
tinued to this day, its philosophical ambitions from Husserl is in a shorthand draft of an unde-
have had to become more modest. livered lecture, c. 1961, titled “The Modern
Gödel’s own philosophical work reflected Development of the Foundations of
his highly rationalistic temperament as well as Mathematics in the Light of Philosophy” (CW
his training in mathematics and physics. 3, pp. 374–87). See also Tieszen (1998) and
Although the Vienna Circle, especially Carnap, van Atten and Kennedy (2003).
stimulated his interest in logic and founda- Gödel’s Platonism has several elements. One
tions, he reacted against their views. During element, which may underlie his reaction to the
most of his career positive influence came more Vienna Circle, is the insistence that mathe-
from historical figures, especially Leibniz and matical statements have a “real content” as
Kant, than from the philosophical movements opposed to being tautologies or reflections of
of his own day (apart from programs in the convention or the use of language. Such a view
foundations of mathematics). He was aloof need not be realism in a strong sense, and
from the philosophical debates of the postwar Gödel admits that it is compatible with intu-
period and indeed sought to avoid controversy itionism. A second element is the conviction of
of any kind. the inexhaustibility of mathematics, in the
Gödel is widely known for defending a sense that any formal system or even definite
Platonist view and a philosophical conception conceptual framework can in principle be
of mathematical intuition. On the first point, expanded to yield new statements and
he could be described as a realist; in an unsent theorems. This was one of Gödel’s reasons for
reply to a questionnaire in 1975 he described insisting on the generality that the
himself as a “conceptual realist” even since Church–Turing thesis gave to the first incom-
1925 (see CW 4, p. 447). In letters during pleteness theorem. However, he already
1967–8 to Hao WANG (Wang 1974, pp. 8–11; observed in 1931 that his undecidable sentence
CW 5, pp. 396–9, 403–5), he argued that his becomes provable by ascending to higher
realist view contributed significantly to his types. In a 1933 lecture on “The Present
principal discoveries in logic. With respect to Situation in the Foundations of Mathematics”
the incompleteness theorem, what he thought to the Mathematical Association of America
important was the heuristic role of the concept (CW 3, pp. 45–53) he describes in very clear
942
GÖDEL
terms what is now called the iterative concep- Although Gödel believed that the iterative
tion of set. He argues that any procedure for conception of set is free of antinomies, he did
generating sets in this way leads, once clearly regard the antinomies as a serious problem
understood, to a procedure that generates for the foundations of logic. Late in life he
more sets. In the usage of Michael Dummett, maintained that the “intensional paradoxes”
the concept of set is “indefinitely extensible.” (which presumably concerned the notion of
A third element of Gödel’s Platonism, which concept and related notions) remained
emerges only in 1944 and 1947, is his robust unsolved. He seems to have hoped for a type-
defense of set theory, taking its language at face free theory of concepts, and the problem of
value and thus accepting its ontology of sets. devising such a theory that is both strong and
He wrote that the iterative conception captures consistent remains difficult. But it is not clear
Cantor’s set theory “in its whole original how much effort he himself put into devising
extent and meaning” and that it “has never led a formal theory of concepts, or how high a
to any antinomy whatsoever.” In 1947 he priority it was for him. He was, however,
already conjectures that the continuum hypoth- undoubtedly dissatisfied with his own thought
esis (CH) is independent (as Paul Cohen proved about concepts.
in 1963) but holds that set theory, however Gödel’s epistemological views on mathe-
incomplete, describes a “well-determined matics have two distinctive features. First,
reality”; independence of CH would not make already in 1944 he proposed that axioms in
idle the question of its truth. Gödel was already mathematics might be accepted not on the
then interested in strong axioms of infinity (also ground of intrinsic evidence but on the basis of
called large cardinal axioms) and hoped that their consequences. As he later put it, “There
axioms of that type might settle CH. Such might exist axioms so abundant in their veri-
axioms have subsequently played an important fiable consequences, shedding so much light on
role in set theory, but the independence results a whole field, and yielding such powerful
have extended to those proposed so far, so that methods of solving problems that, no matter
it is only in conjunction with axioms of another whether or not they are intrinsically necessary,
kind that they might settle CH. Even the they would have to be accepted at least in the
question whether CH has a determinate truth- same sense as any well-established physical
value remains open. theory.” (1964, CW 2, p. 261) In 1944 this
The fourth and most problematic aspect of was a bold proposal (though with a precedent
Gödel’s Platonism is that his realism extends to in Bertrand Russell), but in time it has come to
concepts as well as mathematical objects. be widely accepted that mathematical evidence
Concepts are objects associated with predi- is to some degree a posteriori in this way. That
cates. One might expect a rationalist like Gödel it is to some degree empirical is a further thesis,
to be a realist about properties and relations. which Gödel did not embrace.
But he had more specific reasons. Concepts Second, Gödel held that what he calls math-
are important to his epistemology as objects of ematical intuition is an essential source of
intuition. Set theory avoids paradox by evidence in mathematics. He famously wrote
allowing that some predicates do not have sets that “we do have something like a perception
as extensions, so that concepts are not of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the
reducible to sets or objects too much like sets. fact that the axioms force themselves upon us
Finally, he took examples of conceptual as being true” (CW 2, p. 268). In his earlier
analysis in mathematics, yielding sharp and philosophical publications there are only
essentially unique concepts (such as that of tenuous indications of this view, but it is fully
computability), to indicate that such concepts avowed in 1964 and developed earlier during
are not man-made. 1953–9 in the six drafts titled “Is Mathematics
943
GÖDEL
Syntax of Language?” (the second and third matical principles are analytic. However, he
versions are in CW 3, pp. 334–62). Intuition, meant by this that they follow from the
as Gödel understands it, is rational evidence. A concepts in them, so that the claim is quite
proposition is a deliverance of intuition if it is compatible with realism. It is probable that
rationally evident by itself (i.e., not inferred). intuition as described above amounts to seeing
The conception is not Kantian; intuition in the how a proposition is made true by the concepts
relevant sense is not spatiotemporal and does constituting it. Of certain strong axioms of
not have the limits of application to mathe- infinity Gödel thought this had not yet been
matics drawn by Kant and later Kantian con- made out, so that whatever plausibility they
ceptions of intuition. It probably derives from might have, we do not know them by intuition.
conceptions of rational evidence in early One idealistic aspect of Gödel’s philosophy
modern philosophers such as Descartes and is his rejection of materialism and mechanism.
Leibniz. Gödel argues that mathematical intu- In his 1951 Gibbs lecture to the American
ition has to be admitted by someone who does Mathematical Society on “Some Basic
not hold a reductionist view such as he attrib- Theorems of the Foundations of Mathematics
uted to Carnap, although his rather expansive and their Philosophical Implications” (CW 3,
view of its scope could not be shared by pp. 304–23), Gödel considered the implica-
someone who does not accept higher set tion of his incompleteness theorem for a mech-
theory. Gödel does not consider an empiricist anist view of the mind. Unlike J. R. Lucas,
view such as W. V. QUINE’s. who argued (1961) that the theorem itself
The above quotation speaks of something implied the falsity of mechanism, Gödel argued
like a perception of the objects of set theory. for a disjunction: “Either … the human mind
Distinctive of Gödel’s view is that he thought infinitely surpasses the powers of any finite
rational evidence of this kind analogous to machine, or else there exist absolutely unsolv-
perception. One argument is from the inex- able diophantine problems,” i.e., problems
haustibility of mathematics, so that in the expressible as whether a Gödel sentence is true
development of mathematics new intuitions or false (CW 3, p. 310). But his view of the
will continue to arise. Another is that we can power of reason made him favor the first
“perceive” concepts more or less clearly. He disjunct. Some of his thoughts on this subject
thought the concept of computability was per- appeared in his lifetime (Wang 1974, pp.
ceived much more clearly after Turing’s 324–6, in a section revised by Gödel).
analysis. It follows that there is no reason to Gödel’s work in general relativity originated
think mathematical intuition infallible. When in reflections on Kant’s view of time. In 1949
axioms of set theory “force themselves on us he expresses the view that general relativity
as being true,” the objects in question are pri- implies that change is “an illusion or appear-
marily concepts, in particular the concept of set ance due to our special mode of perception”
itself, and of course the concept of member- (CW 2, p. 202). Although he admits that in
ship. It is doubtful that intuition of particular some models an objective global time can be
sets plays any significant role in the evidence of defined, he took his own models to imply that
the axioms. whether this is true depends on the mean
Gödel saw a parallel both ontologically and motion of matter, and he seems to have
epistemologically between mathematics and thought that too contingent. But the issue con-
physical theory, and like Quine, one that cerned the place of time in the overall scheme
allowed him to find a place for a posteriori of things. Gödel’s overall view of physical
evidence in mathematics. But Gödel insisted knowledge was cautious but otherwise not
that mathematics has no implications for more anti-realistic than his view of mathe-
physical reality and argued that basic mathematical knowledge. Without going into the
944
GÖDEL
matter, he rejects drawing such conclusions do so. Gödel’s general world view seems to be
from quantum mechanics. In discussing Kant’s of interest mainly as an expression of a genius
idealism in the light of relativity, he suggests of a very particular temperament. Whether
that the former should be modified: “it should others sympathetic with that temperament will
be assumed that it is possible for scientific find his sketches promising remains to be seen.
knowledge, at least partially and step by step,
to go beyond the appearances and approach BIBLIOGRAPHY
the world of things” (CW 3, p. 244). Collected Works, vol. 1: Publications
Gödel held a wide spectrum of philosophi- 1929–1936, ed. Solomon Feferman et al.
cal views and aspired to general system in phi- (Oxford, 1986). In all five volumes,
losophy. The outstanding characteristic of his Gödel’s German writings have facing
world view is rationalistic optimism, evident in English translations.
fourteen theses with which he once summa- Collected Works, vol. 2: Publications
rized his philosophy in a manuscript (Wang 1938–1974, ed. Solomon Feferman et al.
1996, p. 316). He described his philosophy as (Oxford, 1990).
“rationalistic, idealistic, optimistic, and theo- Collected Works, vol. 3: Unpublished
logical” and as “a monadology with a central Essays and Lectures, ed. Solomon
monad” (p. 290). The kinship of this general Feferman et al. (Oxford, 1995).
outlook with Leibniz’s is obvious. Gödel Collected Works, vol. 4: Correspondence
thought it should be possible to found meta- A–G, ed. Solomon Feferman et al.
physics scientifically, with the help of the (Oxford, 2003).
axiomatic method, and later phenomenology Collected Works, vol. 5: Correspondence
as well. Gödel’s more general philosophical H–Z, ed. Solomon Feferman et al.
reflections are almost entirely recorded in (Oxford, 2003).
shorthand notebooks and in his conversations
with Wang. He himself thought he had not Other Relevant Works
worked out his philosophy enough for a more Gödel’s papers are at Princeton University.
systematic exposition. One concrete result, “Die Vollständigkeit der Axiome des
however, was a modal-logical version of the logischen Funktionenkalküls,”
ontological proof in an unpublished paper of Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik
1970 titled “Ontological Proof” (CW 3, pp. 37 (1930): 349–60.
403–4), related to Leibniz’s version of the “Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der
argument. Principia Mathematica und verwandter
What is Gödel’s significance as a philoso- Systeme I,” Monatshefte für Mathematik
pher? Although his views are and will remain und Physik 38 (1931): 173–98.
controversial, he is a major philosopher of “Zur intuitionistischen Arithmetik und
mathematics, where his Platonist and ratio- Zahlentheorie,” Ergebnisse eines
nalist views were developed in the context of mathematischen Kolloquiums 4 (1933):
reflection on his own mathematical work, and 34–8.
the data he appeals to, particularly the incom- The Consistency of the Axiom of Choice
pleteness theorems and the nature of higher set and of the Generalized Continuum
theory, are a challenge for any view. Outside Hypothesis with the Axioms of Set
this area, the views in the philosophy of time Theory (Princeton, N.J., 1940).
developed along with his cosmological models, “Russell’s Mathematical Logic,” in The
his views on minds and machines, and his Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, ed. Paul
version of the ontological argument, have A. Schilpp (Evanston, Ill., 1944), pp.
excited interest and will probably continue to 123–54.
945
GÖDEL
“What is Cantor’s Continuum Problem?” Gödel,” Philosophy 36 (1961): 112–27.

American Mathematical Monthly 54 Malament, David. “‘Time Travel’ in the
(1947): 515–25. Rev. version in Gödel Universe,” in Proceedings of the
Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Philosophy of Science Association, ed.
Readings, ed. Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Peter Asquith and Philip Kitcher (East
Putnam (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964), Lansing, Mich., 1985), vol. 2, pp.
pp. 258–73. 91–100.
“A Remark about the Relationship between Nagel, Ernest, and James R. Newman.
Relativity Theory and Idealistic Gödel’s Proof, 2nd edn (New York,
Philosophy,” in Albert Einstein: 2001).
Philosopher-Scientist, ed. Paul A. Schilpp Parsons, Charles. “Platonism and
(Evanston, Ill., 1949), pp. 557–62. Mathematical Intuition in Kurt Gödel’s
“Über eine bisher noch nicht benützte Thought,” Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 1
Erweiterung des finiten Standpunktes,” (1995): 44–74.
Dialectica 12 (1958): 280–87. Smullyan, Raymond M. Gödel’s
Incompleteness Theorems (Oxford,
Further Reading 1992).
Amer Nat Bio, Bio 20thC Phils, Cambridge Tieszen, Richard. “Kurt Gödel’s Path from
Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer Bio, Oxford the Incompleteness Theorems (1931) to
Comp Phil, Routledge Encycl Phil Phenomenology (1961),” Bulletin of
Davis, Martin, ed. The Undecidable Symbolic Logic 4 (1998): 181–203.
(Hewlett, N.Y., 1965). van Atten, Mark, and Juliette Kennedy.
Davis, Martin. “Why Gödel Didn’t Have “The Philosophical Development of Kurt
Church’s Thesis,” Information and Gödel,” Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9
Control 54 (1982): 3–24. (2003): 425–76.
———, “Review of John Dawson, Logical Wang, Hao. From Mathematics to
Dilemmas,” Philosophia Mathematica 6 Philosophy (London, 1974).
(1998): 116–28. ———, Reflections on Kurt Gödel
Dawson, John W., Jr. Logical Dilemmas. (Cambridge, Mass., 1987).
The Life and Work of Kurt Gödel ———, A Logical Journey: From Gödel to
(Wellesley, Mass., 1997). Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass. 1996).
Ellis, G. F. R. “Contributions of K. Gödel Yourgrau, Palle. The Disappearance of
to Relativity and Cosmology,” in Gödel Time: Kurt Gödel and the Idealistic
’96, ed. Peter Hájek (Berlin, 1996), pp. Tradition in Philosophy (Cambridge, UK,
34–49. 1991).
Goldstein, Rebecca. Incompleteness: The
Proof and Paradox of Kurt Gödel (New Charles Parsons
York, 2005).
Hintikka, Jaakko. On Gödel (Belmont,
Cal., 2000).
Hofstadter, Douglas. Gödel Escher Bach:
An Eternal Golden Braid, 2nd edn (New
York, 1999).
Köhler, Eckehart, et al., eds. Kurt Gödel:
Wahrheit & Beweisbarkeit, 2 vols
(Vienna, 2002).
Lucas, J. R. “Minds, Machines, and
946
GOFFMAN
GOFFMAN, Erving Manual (1922–82) Island Community,” a study based on field

research in the Shetland Islands, a crofting
Erving Manual Goffman was born on 11 community off the coast of Scotland, was
June 1922 in Mannville, Alberta, Canada. later revised and elaborated into The
He received his high school degree from St. Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, pub-
John’s Technical High School in Winnipeg, lished in 1956. This book, quickly regarded
Canada, which he attended from 1936 to as a classic, became one of the most widely
1939. Goffman enrolled in the University of known works by a living sociologist. In this
Manitoba in 1939 and considered a career in small, relatively isolated rural community,
chemistry. In 1942 he left school and went to Goffman discovered what he believed was
work for the National Film Board of Canada the foundation of all social order: the expres-
in Ottawa. He enrolled at the University of sions given and given off by the actor which
Toronto in 1944 where he began taking soci- were designed suitably to impress others
ology classes. He left Canada for the United about an entire range of matters. Thus, self,
States shortly after receiving his BA from the identity, and motive all arose, not from the
University of Toronto in 1945. The remain- culture at large, not from any kind of
der of his formal academic training was at the bequeath from nature, but from and within a
University of Chicago, where he received an dramatic encounter which was evanescent
MA degree in 1949 and a PhD in sociology in and transitory. External and micro-level
1953. Although he owed a debt to Everett C. issues were always subordinate to Goffman
Hughes, perhaps the greatest influence on whose dramaturgical vision was located in
Goffman was the anthropologist W. Lloyd face-to-face encounters, the study of which he
Warner with whom Goffman studied at regarded as fundamental.
Chicago. Goffman worked as an assistant in A prolific writer and influential teacher,
the Division of Social Sciences from 1952 to Goffman influenced a generation of interac-
1953. After Goffman defended his disserta- tionist sociologists, and made the study of
tion, he remained at Chicago, working as a micro-level encounters a respected tradition
research associate for Edward Shils in within sociology. In doing so he also reinvig-
1953–4. From 1954 to 1957, he was at the orated the field tradition of qualitative study
National Institute of Mental Health in in which the researcher engaged in “partici-
Bethesda, Maryland as a visiting scientist. In pant observation,” a method requiring the
1957 Goffman was appointed assistant pro- investigator to go directly to the scene in
fessor of sociology at the University of which human beings are conducting their
California at Berkeley. He became an associ- affairs in order to see the most miniscule
ate professor in 1959, and was full professor features of that life as closely as possible. His
of sociology from 1962 to 1968. Goffman own field ethnologies echoed this theme.
then went to the University of Pennsylvania, Asylums (1961) was based on extensive field
where he was Benjamin Franklin Professor of work at St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in
Anthropology and Sociology from 1968 until Washington, D.C., where he served as an
his death. He was President of the American assistant recreation director while observing
Sociological Association in 1981–2. Goffman and collecting data on how persons come to
died on 20 November 1982 in Philadelphia, be regarded as mentally ill and what happens
Pennsylvania. to them after they do. Stigma: Notes on the
Goffman’s earliest and still best-known Management of Spoiled Identity (1963) was
work was based in part on research he con- a chilling and detailed portrait of the close
ducted for his dissertation at Chicago in ritual connection of “normals” to those with
1953. “Communications Conduct in an visible stigmas. An essay entitled “Where the
947
GOFFMAN
Action is” was based on field work in casinos MEAD, for Goffman the self is not a product
in Las Vegas where Goffman had trained to but a process, not a subjective essence, but an
become a blackjack dealer. Beyond these objective social construction.
occasions where he was literally “in the Individuality is not a personal matter to
field,” there was also a sense in which Goffman, but rather a meaning which
Goffman was always in the field, no matter emerges in relationships with others. To use
what he was studying. Harry Stack S ULLIVAN ’s terminology, a
In his memorial tribute to Goffman, person’s self emerges, is maintained, and is
Pierre Bourdieu hailed him as the “discov- lost only through a process of “consensual
erer of the infinitely small.” If not its dis- validation.” Following the social behaviorism
coverer, Goffman at the very least made of Mead, the self is the meaning of the
legitimate the close observational study of organism, and this meaning, like all others, is
human interaction with all of its flaws, established by the action of that organism
failures, and intrigues. Fascinated by what and the actions of others with respect to it
his teacher Everett C. Hughes had called (Brissett and Edgley 1990). Here Goffman
“mistakes at work,” Goffman carried the shows his pragmatic roots.
study of interactional breakdowns to new At the turn of the century, Mead articulated
dimensions. He was adept at studying what the foundations for a nondualistic, dra-
he called “remedial interchanges,” those sit- maturgical view of self when he wrestled with
uations in which pro-offered selves were the question of how to account for two of the
discredited and thus repaired through the most obvious features of selfhood: continuity
dramaturgical techniques of accounts, and novelty. Previous views of the agency
apologies, and requests. He was also which had seen the self as a kind of “ghost in
intrigued by embarrassment, those situa- the machine” that started the process of
tions in which it becomes clear to the actor action, presumed what the theory sought to
that he or she can no longer sustain a pre- explain: the process of human action. Mead
sented self. These meltdowns in which a resolved the question in an ingenious way. He
pro-offered self goes awry revealed to simply spoke of the self as a meaning as
Goffman the basic underlying communica- opposed to a thing, and as John DEWEY
tive assumptions on which social life is proposed, noted that it always arose as part
based. of a social process. Goffman continues this
Because the self was not, for Goffman, a strand of thought.
thing, but a dramatic effect arising diffusely Goffman’s work is also at times profoundly
from the entire scene in which an act occurs, existential, though devoid of all acknowl-
Goffman was led to a lifelong interest in edgments save for a few solitary references to
how persons present themselves to others. Sartre. Goffman is fascinated in documenting
These presentations of self are moral acts closely those situations in which people expe-
requiring both demeanor, the obligation to rience “close brushes with life,” and the view
“come off” to others, and deference, the he promulgates is that life is a desperate and
obligation to protect the coming off of problematic business in which the precari-
others. Therefore the study of selfhood was ousness of interaction makes it difficult for
not, as generations of scholars caught in the individual to come out of an interaction
Cartesian dualisms believed, the study of better than when he or she went in. Human
the inside of human agents, but rather the beings fashion a self out of what society
way in which these agents interact with the makes available to them, and the imperatives
external world around them. Similarily to of communication cannot be avoided. Just
the pragmatic philosophy of George Herbert as for Sartre, human beings are “condemned
948
GOFFMAN
to freedom, Goffman’s man is “condemned to to sociological theory was in their analysis of

expressiveness.” the basic forms of social order, while method-
A controversial figure – as much for his ologically they were oriented toward a sys-
attitude and style as for his writings – tematic, empirically grounded verstehen.”
Goffman often ridiculed those intellectual Also like Simmel, Goffman’s work was triv-
traditions which studied social life from afar. ialized and dismissed by many of his macro-
In the preface to Relations in Public, Goffman oriented colleagues.
criticized those who emphasize hypotheses- There are ethnomethodological and phe-
and-evidence (1971, p. xvi). Instead, Goffman nomenological readings of Goffman as well,
urged his students to get as close to their especially for Frame Analysis (1974) where he
subject matter as possible. Social life was to asks the question inspired by William JAMES,
be studied directly in social situations, and “under what conditions do we assume of a
nothing substituted for a close association certain content of our thinking that it repre-
with the subject of one’s research investiga- sents reality?” Important for reality as expe-
tions. It is this emphasis on direct methods, rienced by the individual actor is a feeling of
coupled with a preoccupation with the ritual reality in contrast to another feeling or expe-
nature of social life which most closely rience of which we know that it is a dream or
connects Goffman to his Warnerian anthro- a fantasy and therefore not real (1974, p. 2).
pological roots developed at Chicago during By the same token, there are many affinities
his graduate training. between Goffman’s contention that selves are
Locating Goffman within a philosophical multiple with the phenomenology of Alfred
tradition is made difficult by the fact that he SCHUTZ’s conception of “The Life World”
was, as Randall Collins (1986) has suggested, and its “multiple realities.”
adept at concealing his intellectual tracks and Goffman himself, though he seemed to
disassociating himself from any particular ignore all efforts to locate his work within
philosophical tradition. Anthony Giddens any theoretical camp, sometimes talked of
states that “Goffman was by no stretch of the his oeuvre as within the tradition of
imagination a philosopher,” though there is Durkheimian functionalism. But at other
within the confines of his interests a system- times he claimed affinities to symbolic inter-
atic theory of co-presence. Nevertheless, actionism. In The Presentation of Self in
Goffman is subject to multiple philosophical Everyday Life, he acknowledges an obvious
readings. His work shows elements of prag- debt to Kenneth BURKE’s dramatism, and
matism and his symbolic interactionist roots throughout his writings Burke’s “perspective
seem fairly well established, especially his by incongruity” is in evidence. His epistemo-
links to Mead and Charles H. COOLEY. His logical connection to Durkheim seems clear
writings “resonate strongly with some of the as when he distances himself from the
emphases of hermeneutic phenomenology popular social construction of reality
and with the philosophy of the later paradigm by suggesting that while reality is
Wittgenstein.” Many scholars have noted the always socially constructed, “I don’t think
similarity between the neo-Kantian the individual does much of the construct-
Formalism of Georg Simmel and Goffman’s ing.” But he seemed to talk of philosophical
approach. Such a case can easily be made. and theoretical matters only when forced to
As Gerhardt has shown, Goffman was by circumstances, and was more often athe-
familiar with Simmel’s formalism, there are oretical, using insights and understandings
numerous reciprocities between them, their from a variety of theoretical perspectives that
intellectual passage from earlier to later work suited his purpose at the time. So for all his
is surprisingly similar, and “their contribution theoretical acumen, Goffman was not essen-
949
GOFFMAN
tially a theorist nor was he interested in the- Mental Patients and Other Inmates (New
oretical things – particularly “theory talk,” a York, 1961).
form of intellectual aggrandizement which Encounters: Two Studies in the Sociology
he particularly despised. He was primarily of Interaction (Indianapolis, 1961).
an empiricist, an observer, a producer of Stigma: Notes on the Management of
insights, and a conceptual iconoclast who Spoiled Identity (New York, 1963).
rarely strayed from what was in front of his Behavior in Public Places: Notes on the
eyes (1961, p. xii–xiv). Social Organization of Gatherings (New
Seemingly immune to criticism and funda- York, 1963).
mentally aloof from philosophical debates, Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face
Goffman’s body of work succeeds, as Robin Behavior (New York, 1967).
Williams has argued, because of its vulnera- Strategic Interaction (Philadelphia, 1969).
bilities. Such a pragmatic stance toward epis- Relations in Public: Micro-Studies of the
temological concerns is quintessentially Public Order (New York, 1971).
Goffman and has also been argued by such Frame Analysis: Essays on the
contemporary pragmatists as Richard RORTY. Organization of Experience (New York,
According to Tom Burns’s account, based on 1974).
personal conversations, Goffman also took Gender Advertisements (Cambridge, Mass.,
solace from J. L. Austin’s and Ludwig 1979).
Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy as legiti- Forms of Talk (Philadelphia, 1981).
mating his own exploratory rather than
system-building approach (Burns 1992, p. Other Relevant Works
354). Goffman’s papers are in the possession of
In the intellectual world of the 1950s, filled his family.
with those who held the Parsonian and “The Interaction Order: American
Mertonian conception of order which empha- Sociological Association” American
sized shared moral values, Goffman was a Sociological Review 48 (1983): 1–17.
polarity player, showing the other side of The Goffman Reader, ed. Charles Lemert
every theoretical assertion. His connection to and Ann Branaman (Malden, Mass.,
postmodernity can be seen in his attitude, 1997).
which is best expressed as a combination of
irony and absurdity (Trevino 2003). But even Further Reading
there, Goffman’s absence of a central episte- Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio,
mology rebels against the postmodernist’s Encyc Social Behav Sci, Who Was Who
non-epistemological stance. For as he shows in Amer v8
in his last work Forms of Talk (1981), as Burns, Tom. Erving Goffman (London,
long as human beings are forced by social 1992).
circumstances to relate to one another Brissett, Dennis, and Charles Edgley, eds.
through the vehicle of communication, there Life as Theater: A Dramaturgical
will always be some kind of underlying struc- Sourcebook, 2nd edn (New York, 1990).
tured “truth” in the social interactions and Collins, Randall. “The Passing of
relationships we all share. Intellectual Generations: Reflections on
the Death of Erving Goffman,”
BIBLIOGRAPHY Sociological Theory 4 (1986): 106–13.
The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life Ditton, Jason, ed. The View from Goffman
(Edinburgh, 1956). (New York, 1980).
Asylums: Notes on the Social Situation of Drew, Paul, and Anthony Wooton, eds.
950
GOLDMAN
Erving Goffman: Exploring the between a person’s belief and the fact known
Interaction Order (Boston, 1988). by that person, such that this relation tends to
Fine, Gary Alan, and Gregory W. H. Smith, produce more true beliefs. Since the existence
eds. Erving Goffman, 4 vols (London, of that causal relation need not also be known
2000). to the knower, Goldman rejects such an inter-
Riggins, Stephen, ed. Beyond Goffman nalist requirement and instead upholds the
(Bloomington, Ind., 1989). naturalization of epistemology and epistemic
Trevino, A. Javier, ed. Goffman’s Legacy externalism. This type of externalism came to
(New York, 2003). be labeled as “reliabilism” and most reliabilists
have been inspired by Goldman, including a
Charles Edgley few major ones such as D. M. Armstrong,
Robert NOZICK, and Fred DRETSKE.
In Goldman’s reliabilism, elaborated in
“What is Justified Belief?” (1979),
Epistemology and Cognition (1986), and later
books, formulates a kind of foundationalism
GOLDMAN, Alvin Ira (1938– ) by distinguishing higher belief-dependent
processes (such as reasoning) from lower
Alvin I. Goldman was born on 1 October 1938 belief-independent processes such as percep-
in New York City. He received his BA from tion. Perception causes the formation of beliefs
Columbia University in 1960. He then received but can result in knowledge only if a percep-
his graduate degrees from Princeton University: tion results from the most reliable process
his MA in 1962 and PhD in philosophy in available to the knower. Goldman attempts
1965. His teaching career began at the to forestall the sort of skepticism that attacks
University of Michigan as assistant professor of reliabilism (such as brain-in-a-vat scenarios)
philosophy in 1963. After rising to full pro- by requiring that the reliable processes needed
fessor, he left Michigan in 1980 to become for knowledge are reliable in the sort of
professor of philosophy at the University of “normal worlds” that are consistent with our
Illinois at Chicago, where he taught until 1983. general beliefs about the actual world.
From 1983 to 2002 Goldman was Regents Causal processes are also applied to under-
Professor of Philosophy at the University of standing agency in Goldman’s A Theory of
Arizona. He was President of the Pacific Human Action (1970). Against Elizabeth
Division of the American Philosophical Anscombe and Donald DAVIDSON, Goldman
Association in 1991–2. Since 2002 Goldman argues that only some descriptions of an
has been Board of Governors Professor of agent’s behavior can be identified as the same
Philosophy at Rutgers University. intentional action. On his theory, an agent’s
Goldman has published books and articles behavior is a “basic” intentional act only if it
primarily on epistemology, philosophy of was caused in the appropriate way by the
mind, and cognitive science. Like many agent’s knowledge of, and action upon, her
analytic philosophers of his generation, his wants and beliefs.
first efforts in epistemology were directed Placing his confidence in neurological and
towards formulating a solution to the severe cognitive science to help discover the physio-
problems for the “justified true belief” theory logical and psychological processes responsible
of knowledge posed by Edmund GETTIER in for reliable cognition, Goldman has advocated
1963. In “A Causal Theory of Knowing” a close alliance between epistemology and the
(1967) Goldman proposed a view of justifica- cognitive sciences. Like Fred Dretske and some
tion that some type of causal relation holds other philosophers, Goldman has depicted
951
GOLDMAN
information as resulting from the functioning vidual matter, like belief; when a person knows
of a mechanical device complex and as sensitive something, that knowledge is not dependent on
enough to discriminate and register changes in its anyone else knowing it. Other social episte-
environment. The new epistemologist (now mologies are grounded on some types of beliefs
doing “epistemics” according to Goldman) will and knowledge which are never possessed indi-
proceed from the knowledge provided by the vidually, but Goldman only acknowledges this
cognitive sciences and investigate how reliable a possibility without dealing with beliefs had by
process must be to qualify for knowledge. groups.
Especially useful would be cognitive science’s Goldman’s social epistemology considers how
understanding of the more basic or native true beliefs may be maximized over groups or
processes of perception that produce founda- balanced against other social values. “Veritism”
tional knowledge. should be social epistemology’s focus, as the
From Goldman’s own examples, displayed in goal of truth is essential to intellectual pursuits.
Epistemology and Cognition and Philosophical There are five standards for a veritistic social
Applications of Cognitive Science (1993), the practice (1992, p. 195): (1) the reliability of a
new epistemologist will continue to be concerned practice, measured by the proportion of truths
with erecting a theory of knowledge and justifi- over errors in all beliefs produced by the practice;
cation immune from any Gettier-type counter- (2) the power of a practice, in its ability to guide
examples. There are several tensions in this com- knowers to truths that interest them; (3) the
bination of traditional epistemology with cog- fecundity of a practice, its ability to bring large
nitive science but three examples must suffice: (1) numbers of true beliefs to many people; (4) the
reliabilism is satisfied with the production of speed of a practice, how quickly it produces true
beliefs which are more than likely true or close beliefs; and (5) the efficiency of a practice, how
to truth, while “knowledge” has usually required well it economically provides true beliefs.
completely true belief; (2) reliabilism has diffi- Knowledge in a Social World applies these stan-
culty by itself deciding which kinds of knowledge dards to four knowledge practices: science, law,
and learning processes are more relevant and democracy, and education.
valuable to human beings in this actual world, Pathways to Knowledge: Private and Public
while traditional epistemology takes full advan- (2002), consisting of essays published from 1997
tage of our social institutions of knowledge pro- to 2001, continues the exploration of social epis-
duction (what Goldman calls our “epistemic temology informed by cognitive science.
folkways”); and (3) reliabilism is grounded on Goldman suggests that epistemic internalism is
the descriptive conclusions of cognitive science incompatible with the scientific naturalizing of
while epistemology typically has a normative epistemology, while also suggesting that suitably
dimension. Goldman has creatively engaged reformed understandings of the a priori, intu-
these tensions, producing a highly original theory itions, and introspection will remain useful for
of knowledge. cognitive science and epistemology. Richard
In Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive Dawkins’s theory of memes is incorporated in
and Social Sciences (1992) and Knowledge in a Goldman’s social epistemology, along with a
Social World (1999) Goldman’s combination concern for the social pressures and technolog-
of epistemology and cognitive science requires a ical limitations that direct and constrain scientific
division of labor between individual and social research. Here, Goldman’s work intersects that
epistemology. Individual epistemology considers of Philip Kitcher, who urges a more pragmatist
the lone knower, while social epistemology for view of knowledge, and Nicholas RESCHER, who
Goldman considers how knowers come to has applied pragmatism to the economics of
possess and use knowledge in groups. science.
Knowledge itself for Goldman remains an indi-
952
GOLDMAN

A Theory of Human Action (Englewood Bio 20thC Phils
Cliffs, N.J., 1970). Beardsley, Monroe C. “Actions and Events:
Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge, The Problem of Individuation,”
Mass., 1986). American Philosophical Quarterly 12
Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive (1975): 263–76.
and Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass., Corlett, J. Angelo. “Epistemology,
1992). Psychology, and Goldman,” Social
Philosophical Applications of Cognitive Epistemology 5 (1991): 91–100.
Science (Boulder, Col., 1993). Markie, Peter J. “Goldman’s New
Knowledge in a Social World (Oxford, Reliabilism,” Philosophy and
1999). Phenomenological Research 56 (1996):
Pathways to Knowledge: Private and Public 799–817.
(Oxford, 2002). Philosophia 19, no. 2–3 (1989). Special
issue devoted to Epistemology and
Other Relevant Works Cognition.
“A Causal Theory of Knowing,” Journal of Shope, Robert. The Analysis of Knowing: A
Philosophy 64 (1967): 357–72. Decade of Research (Princeton, N.J.,
“Discrimination and Perceptual 1983).
Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy 73 “Symposium on Knowledge in a Social
(1976): 771–91. World,” Philosophy and
Ed. with Jaegwon Kim, Values and Morals: Phenomenological Research 64 (2002):
Essays in Honor of William Frankena, 185–227.
Charles Stevenson, and Richard Brandt Thagard, Paul. “Collaborative
(Dordrecht, 1978). Knowledge,” Noûs 31 (1997): 242–61.
“What is Justified Belief?” in Justification Vermazen, Bruce. “Actions in the Causal
and Knowledge, ed. George Pappas Series,” Philosophical Studies 33 (1978):
(Dordrecht, 1979), pp. 1–23. 287–99.
“Interpretation Psychologized,” Mind and
Language 4 (1989): 161–85. John R. Shook
“Empathy, Mind and Morals,” Proceedings
and Addresses of the American
Philosophical Association 66 (1992):
17–41.
Ed., Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive
Science (Cambridge, Mass., 1993). GOLDMAN, Emma (1869–1940)
“Naturalistic Epistemology and
Reliabilism,” Midwest Studies in Emma Goldman was born on 27 June 1869
Philosophy 19 (1994): 301–20. in Kovno, Lithuania, and died 14 May 1940
“Speech, Truth, and the Free Market for in Toronto, Canada. At the age of thirteen
Ideas,” with James Cox, Legal Theory 2 Goldman moved with her family to St.
(1996): 1–32. Petersburg, where she attended school for six
“Games Lawyers Play: Legal Discovery and months before economic hardship forced her
Social Epistemology,” with William to begin working in the city’s factories. When
Talbott, Legal Theory 4 (1998): 93–163. Goldman was sixteen her father arranged for
“The Mentalizing Folk,” Protosociology 16 her to emigrate to the United States and live
(2002): 7–34. in Rochester, New York. Upon arriving in
953
GOLDMAN
Rochester Goldman worked in textile facto- Berkman aspired to put their revolutionary
ries there for two years before moving to ideals into practice by utilizing “propaganda
New York City in 1889. It was there that by the deed,” a term that refers to using
Goldman’s adherence to the political philos- violent acts as the best means to espousing
ophy of anarchism fully developed, and her one’s political aims. At this time, steelwork-
life as a full-time revolutionary emerged. ers in Homestead, Pennsylvania were
Goldman’s early years spent largely in immersed in a fierce labor struggle with
poverty were crucial to the later maturation industrialist Henry Clay Frick. Goldman and
of her anarchist vision. As a young girl Berkman believed that the assassination of
working in the factories of St. Petersburg, Frick would free the steelworkers and rid the
Goldman was introduced to a novel that had world of a despot. Berkman made an attempt
a significant impact on numerous nineteenth on Frick’s life, but failed. The failed attempt
and twentieth-century Russian revolutionar- cost Berkman a sentence of twenty-two years
ies, including V. I. Lenin and Josef Stalin. in prison. Goldman continued to support
That novel was Nikolai Chernyshevsky’s Berkman after his assassination attempt and
What is to Be Done? This influential work imprisonment, much to the disdain of fellow
introduced Goldman to revolutionary revolutionaries and state authorities. This
thought and practice, and also to the idea of incident would continue to haunt Goldman
equality between the sexes. It was certainly and the anarchist movement more generally
the first stimulus for Goldman’s revolutionary throughout the rest of her revolutionary
philosophizing. Later in Rochester, the career. At the same time, it acted as another
second catalyst in the development of catalyst in the maturation of Goldman’s anar-
Goldman’s political philosophy came with chist philosophy, as she would continue to
the deaths of the “Haymarket Martyrs” of struggle with her views on violence and rev-
Chicago in 1887. The Martyrs were four self- olutionary deeds. For instance, in her “The
proclaimed anarchists accused of throwing a Political Psychology of Violence,” an early
bomb into a group of policemen during a essay in which she defends Berkman,
workers’ rally that had become riotous. Goldman explains political violence as a kind
Though there was no evidence to convict the of natural retaliation against the violence of
Martyrs on this charge, they were all hanged government. However, her viewpoint would
because of their affiliation with anarchism. later change upon witnessing the violence of
Upon hearing of this event, Goldman pro- the Russian Revolution of 1917, and she later
nounced herself a revolutionary, and her renounced terroristic violence as a means to
interest in anarchism began to grow. a revolutionary end.
Goldman’s eventual move to New York During the next decades Goldman concen-
City introduced her to a flourishing anarchist trated on propaganda by way of the written
movement. Here she met German anarchist and spoken word. It is in the essays and
Johann Most, who nurtured Goldman’s anar- speeches of this time that we can perceive the
chist thinking and helped establish her as a fundamentals of Goldman’s anarchist
writer and orator. Goldman’s most important thought. Goldman’s essential task was to
relationship formed in New York City, remove from the masses the idea that anar-
however, was with fellow Russian anarchist chism merely means chaos. To the contrary,
Alexander Berkman. Goldman and she argued, anarchism is a clearly defined
Berkman’s friendship was lifelong, but was theory that is based on societal order. Though
tormented with the trials associated with the most basic premise of anarchism is the
being a revolutionary. The worst of these abolition of the state, it does not imply
trials occurred in 1892 when Goldman and disorder and barbarism. In fact, anarchists
954
GOLDMAN
recognize the need for governance in society. inspiration. Indeed, her lifelong comrade
However, the anarchists envision direct gov- Berkman was primarily an anarcho-commu-
ernance by free individuals rather than state nist, and Goldman was heavily influenced by
governance from above. One of the most the famous Russian anarchist Prince Peter
accessible works that delineates Goldman’s Kropotkin, also an anarcho-communist. In
own conception of anarchism is found in an the anarcho-communist vision, social and
early collection of writings entitled Anarchism economic equality would be achieved through
and Other Essays (1910). the abolition of private property. Economic
In her essay “Anarchism,” Goldman clearly production would take place in decentralized
defines the philosophy: “The philosophy of a communes. The idea of decentralization in
new social order based on liberty unrestricted the economic production process is an impor-
by man-made law; the theory that all forms tant distinction from Marxian communism.
of government rest on violence, and are there- In a Marxian communist society economic
fore wrong and harmful, as well as unneces- production is centralized in the state. An
sary” (1910, p. 50). Based on Goldman’s anarcho-communist society would abolish
writings, one could also add that the new state power, and therefore all economic pro-
social order would be based on the absence of duction would be maintained by free indi-
religion and private property (an institution viduals and the communal institutions they
of capitalism, which would also necessarily be establish. Moreover, the anarcho-communist
abolished). Indeed, government, religion, and vision is just as concerned with the develop-
property were for Goldman the “shackles” of ment of the individual as it is the development
humanity, and only after these were removed of the society, and so no subjugation of the
could humanity be truly free. The only way to individual would occur. The distinctions
remove the shackles, of course, was through between Marxian and anarcho-communism
a social revolution. Once the revolution took would put Goldman at odds with the leaders
place, an anarchist society could fully and supporters of the Russian Revolution of
develop. It is important to note that the new 1917, as we shall see momentarily.
anarchist society was not necessarily consid- Goldman was responsible for another
ered a new stage of social evolution. Rather, breed of anarchist thought known as
according to Goldman, the basic possibilities anarcho-feminism. Indeed, much of what
of anarchism already exist in human nature Goldman has written pertains to the emanci-
and human society; a social revolution is pation of women. Goldman believed this end
merely a means of removing the despotic could be wholly achieved only through
institutions of government, religion, and women’s sexual lives. Accordingly, Goldman
property so that an anarchist society may wrote and spoke a great deal on birth control,
develop naturally. love and marriage, motherhood, and, of
What would Goldman’s anarchist society course, the place of women in an anarchist
look like? There is some contentiousness society. It is important to understand
among scholars concerning the exact philo- Goldman’s distinction between the economic
sophical perspective of anarchism Goldman emancipation of women versus the sexual
maintained. It is safe to conclude that it was emancipation. For Goldman, a woman’s
complex, blending together ideas taken from economic emancipation was important, but it
several modes of anarchist thought known did not represent complete freedom. Instead,
as anarcho-communism, syndicalism, and it merely allowed women to take a larger part
individualism. However, considering the in private property, which was an inhibitor of
timeframe of Goldman’s thought it is likely true freedom. Similarly, the right to vote was
that anarcho-communism was her biggest not the key to fully freeing women. All it did
955
GOLDMAN
was allow women to take place in state insti- an event that she wrote about in Deportation:
tutions and corrupt political processes. The Its Meaning and Menace (1919) and A
full emancipation of woman, Goldman Woman Without a Country (1979), in which
argued, could only emerge when she freed she denounces government for its attack on
within herself her true womanly nature, true democracy. Goldman would partake in
which is largely related to her sexual identity. one last lecture tour throughout the United
That is, every woman must first recognize States before her death, but she would never
herself to be a self-sufficient individual again live within the country’s borders.
endowed with strong tendencies to love, While living in Russia, Goldman and
nurture, and mother. Contrary to the view Berkman participated in the unfolding
that loving another or desiring to be a mother Revolution of 1917. However, Goldman was
is subordination, Goldman believed these to deeply disappointed by its results. Her
be qualities necessary for a woman’s full hap- detailed reaction can be read in such works
piness, and society must be structured so these as My Disillusionment in Russia (1923), My
qualities may be free to emerge. She further Further Disillusionment in Russia (1924),
argued that men and women are not and The Bolshevik Myth (1925). Goldman’s
opposing forces, but rather equal beings that disillusionment was a result of the brutal
must unite as free individuals to create an suppression of anarchist workers by the
anarchist society. Goldman’s feminism is an Bolsheviks. In one particularly important
interesting break from contemporary main- incident, the Kronstadt Rebellion, thousands
stream feminism that focuses so heavily on of anarchist workers were killed and impris-
women’s economic emancipation and politi- oned as they took economic production into
cal power. In fact, it is certain that the their own hands. Whereas the anarchists
modern mainstream feminist movement sought decentralized economic production
could learn something from Goldman’s ideal. in the traditions of anarcho-communism and
Through her ceaseless writing and lectur- syndicalism, the newly emerging Marxist/
ing, Goldman earned a name for herself as a Leninist regime was focused on centralizing
propagandist and revolutionary. However, economic production in the hands of the
this fame and her prior history with Berkman state. Goldman instantly recognized the
in the attempted assassination of Frick also horrors this new state would produce, and
earned Goldman special attention from attacked it through her writing and speeches.
United States authorities. Consequently, she She also attacked the use of terroristic
was frequently referred to as “Red Emma” violence to achieve the ends of a social rev-
and seen as a threat to the “American way of olution, recognizing its failure from her own
life.” In 1917 Goldman launched a particu- experience with Berkman and his attempted
larly fierce attack against the draft and assassination of Frick. Goldman was one of
World War I. This finally gave United States the few revolutionaries of her time who rec-
authorities a significant reason for her arrest. ognized the many misdeeds of the Russian
She was imprisoned for two years for Revolution, and she often found herself
obstructing the war effort. At the end of her shunned by fellow revolutionaries who felt
sentence in 1919, she was deported to Russia the revolution was a great success. Given
with other political dissidents and her old what we now know about the failures of the
friend Berkman. At this time J. Edgar Hoover Soviet regime, it appears that Goldman was
dubbed Goldman “one of the most danger- correct. Indeed, Goldman’s criticism of the
ous women in America.” The deportation Russian Revolution should act as an impor-
had a deep impact on Goldman, as the tant reminder of the horror highly centralized
United States had become her home. It was forms of power can produce.
956
GOLDMAN
After her disappointment with the Russian The Social Significance of the Modern
Revolution, Goldman went abroad. She lived Drama (Boston, 1914).
in numerous European countries but never “The Philosophy of Atheism,” Mother
considered any her true home. During this Earth 10 (1916): 410–16.
time she wrote a significant piece of work Deportation: Its Meaning and Menace
called Living My Life (1931), an autobiog- (New York, 1919).
raphy detailing her life as a revolutionary. My Disillusionment in Russia (London,
Goldman’s last significant political work was 1923).
done during the Spanish Civil War between My Further Disillusionment in Russia
the years 1936 and 1939. The Spanish Civil (Garden City, N.Y., 1924).
War was a unique event in history because it The Bolshevik Myth (New York, 1925).
is the largest social uprising that had anar- Living My Life (New York, 1931).
chists at the fore. During this time Spain was The Place for the Individual in Society
a great bastion of anarchist thought and (Chicago, 1940).
practice, and many anarchist groups arose to
defend their country against the fascist Other Relevant Works
regimes growing throughout Europe. The Goldman’s papers are at the University of
anarchists were able to establish many towns California at Berkeley.
and agricultural centers that were commu- The Traffic in Women and Other Essays on
nally organized. This was the anarchist revo- Feminism, ed. Alix Kates Shulman (New
lution for which Goldman waited her entire York, 1971).
life, and she traveled to Spain to participate A Woman Without a Country (Sanday,
in the anarchist activity. Afterward Goldman Scotland, 1979).
returned to North America and lived in Red Emma Speaks: An Emma Goldman
Toronto. Upon her death in 1940, the United Reader, ed. Alix Kates Shulman (New
States allowed Goldman’s body to be brought York, 1983).
into the country for burial. She was buried in Vision on Fire: Emma Goldman on the
Chicago’s Waldheim Cemetery near the Spanish Revolution, ed. D. Porter (New
Haymarket Martyrs that inspired her earlier Paltz, N.Y., 1983.)
in her life. The Emma Goldman Papers: A Microfilm
Perhaps the most important feature of Edition, 69 microfilm reels (Alexandria,
Goldman’s life and work is her unswerving Virg., 1991).
allegiance to the necessity of human liberty.
Though we may fairly speculate about the Further Reading
possibilities of an anarchist society in the Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio,
modern world, it is, as Goldman called it, “a Comp Amer Thought, Dict Amer Bio,
beautiful ideal.” We will likely never see this Encyc Amer Bio, Routledge Encycl Phil,
ideal come to fruition, but we can use it, and Who Was Who in Amer v4
Goldman’s life, as a reminder that human Drinnon, Richard. Rebel in Paradise: A
liberty must often be fought for, and it should Biography of Emma Goldman (Chicago,
never be taken for granted. 1961).
Falk, Candace, ed. Emma Goldman: A
BIBLIOGRAPHY Guide to Her Life and Documentary
A Beautiful Ideal (Chicago, 1908). Sources (Alexandria, Virg., 1995).
What I Believe (New York, 1908). Glassgold, Peter, ed. Anarchy! An
Anarchism and Other Essays (New York, Anthology of Emma Goldman’s Mother
1910). Earth (Washington, D.C., 2001).
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GOLDMAN
Madison, Charles A. Emma Goldman: A corresponding fellow of the British Academy.

Biographical Sketch (New York, 1947). He was a Guggenheim Fellow in 1945–6. He
Moritz, Theresa, and Albert Moritz. The gave the Sherman Lecture at University of
World’s Most Dangerous Woman: A London, 1953; the Alfred North Whitehead
New Biography of Emma Goldman Lecture at Harvard University, 1962; the John
(Vancouver, 2001). Locke Lectures at University of Oxford, 1962;
Morton, Marian. Emma Goldman and the the Miller Lectures at the University of Illinois,
American Left (New York, 1992). 1974; the Immanuel Kant Lectures at Stanford
Waldstreicher, David. Emma Goldman University, 1976; and the Howison Lecture at
(New York, 1990). University of California, Berkeley, 1985.
Watson, Martha. Emma Goldman (Boston, Goodman was also an art dealer and collec-
1987). tor. He directed the Walker-Goodman art
Wenzer, Kenneth C. Anarchists Adrift: gallery from 1929 to 1940, where he met his
Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman wife, the late artist Katherine Sturgis. He
(St James, NY, 1996). founded the Project Zero Center in 1967, a
Wexler, Alice. Emma Goldman: An Harvard Graduate School of Education
Intimate Life (New York, 1984). research program in arts education that has
done pioneering work in how children use
Wesley Roberts language, symbols, and narrative to express
themselves. Besides his philosophical writings,
Goodman authored several scripts, including
“Hockey Seen,” a multimedia production, and
“Rabbit Run,” a dance version of John
Updike’s novel. Goodman served as Vice
GOODMAN, Henry Nelson (1906–98) President of the Association of Symbolic Logic
from 1950 to 1952, and as President of the
Nelson Goodman was born on 7 August 1906 Eastern Division of the American Philosophical
in Somerville, Massachusetts, and died on 25 Association in 1967–8.
November 1998 in Needham, Massachusetts. Goodman is well known for his contribu-
He attended Harvard University, receiving the tions in aesthetics, epistemology, metaphysics,
BS magna cum laude in 1928 and the PhD in philosophy of science, and philosophy of
philosophy in 1941 under the direction of C. I. language. He challenged traditional under-
LEWIS. The title of his dissertation was “A Study standings of central issues in each of these areas.
of Qualities.” He served in the US Army from Goodman’s work displays the influence of
1942 until 1945. Goodman held philosophy William JAMES, Ernst Cassirer, and Rudolf
positions at Tufts University in 1945–6, and the CARNAP. In Reconceptions in Philosophy
University of Pennsylvania from 1946 to 1964. (1988) Goodman outlines a three-phased
He then was Harry Austryn Wolfson Professor approach to systematically “reconceiving” phi-
of Philosophy at Brandeis University from 1964 losophy that is motivated by problems for tra-
to 1967, before returning to Harvard University ditional views of truth, certainty, and knowl-
as professor of philosophy from 1968 to 1977. edge. The first phase is the recognition that
Goodman published eight books, over one symbols do not merely describe the world, but
hundred articles, and many reviews. enter into the very constitution of what is
Goodman’s major philosophical writings have described or referred to. The second phase con-
appeared in several editions and are translated fronts the consequences of this recognition.
into several languages. He was a fellow of the The third phase examines the deficiency of tra-
American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a ditional philosophic positions in addressing
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GOODMAN
fields of cognition that include the arts as well With the analytic–synthetic distinction gone,
as the sciences (since all fields of cognition rely Goodman holds that there can be more than
on use of symbols). Given a revised under- one version (or, we might say, conceptual
standing of the role of symbols, Goodman scheme) of the world, and these versions cannot
urges the replacement of the notions of truth, be reduced. In this, Goodman and Quine (in his
certainty, and knowledge with those of right- ecumenical mood) agree. They further agree
ness, adoption, and understanding, respectively. that, since there is no neutral description of
In Ways of Worldmaking (1978), and other the world in such cases, the best one can do is
later work, Goodman develops a non-reductive recognize both versions. The chief difference lies
metaphysical position he terms “irrealism.” in the fact that Quine privileges physical (sci-
Irrealism holds that objects, properties, and entific) descriptions of the world. In contrast,
relations result from the active process of fitting Goodman holds that world descriptions from
a representational system and world together. the arts are on an equal footing with those
Irrealism investigates what it means to take from the sciences. The version given by a
seriously the recognition that symbols enter painting by Pablo Picasso informs our under-
into the very constitution of what they describe standing of a world as much as that of a scien-
or refer to. The second of the three stages tific theory by Albert EINSTEIN.
outlined above, irrealism is the result of reject- To suggest that this is the only difference
ing the analytic-synthetic distinction and related between Quine and Goodman is to oversim-
doctrines. It is in this context that Goodman plify the matter. Goodman rejects the notion of
claims there are many worlds “made” or con- a neutral world that grounds all versions (or
structed by us. Irrealism can also be viewed, in conceptual schemes). This, and his commit-
a somewhat different context, as an attempt to ment to the claim that we cannot hold that
offer an alternative that lies mid-way between conflicting versions are true of the same world
anti-realism (or idealism) and realism. In this (since conflicting versions commit one to logical
regard, Goodman’s work shares an affinity contradictions), lead Goodman to conclude
with much of the work of Hilary PUTNAM. that there are many actual worlds. That there
Like W. V. QUINE, Goodman rejects the exis- are many actual worlds, and the further claim
tence of a fixed or unique distinction between that we make or construct such worlds when
analytic and synthetic expressions. Quine, we make versions, has led to some notoriety for
Goodman, and Morton WHITE developed chal- Goodman, at least among those philosophers
lenges to this distinction through a three-way who share his analytic roots and view such
exchange during the 1940s. Goodman, in “On claims as, at best, tenuous metaphors.
Likeness of Meaning,” maintains that no non- Truth, Goodman maintains, is a suitable
repetitive statements are analytic. A repetitive notion in certain linguistic contexts, but should
statement is one of the form ‘p is p’ (e.g., ‘bach- be reconceived as rightness since truth is but an
elors are bachelors’). However, he allows that “occasional ingredient” in rightness. The right-
we can speak of two distinct terms being more ness of a version is a matter of fit and working.
or less similar in meaning. As a result, a non- This conception should not, Goodman main-
repetitive statement may be more or less tains, be viewed as simply “pragmatist.” Fit, on
analytic. While no non-repetitive statement is Goodman’s view, is a fitting of a version into
ever fully analytic, two terms may have a high a world. This contrasts the conception of truth
degree of likeness of meaning, and so may be as correspondence, whereby versions are said
“analytic,” in a given context. For example, by Goodman to be fitted onto an indepen-
“bachelors are unmarried males” may be dently existing world. In fitting a version into
analytic in the context of a specific conversation a world we work within that world and make
about eligible men. adjustments to both the version and world. In
959
GOODMAN
this sense we “construct” worlds. But the world depends upon the history of the production of
(particularly the well-entrenched elements of a the piece; the allographic does not. A painting,
world) has primacy in this process. This latter for example, is autographic. Even though one
characteristic, in Goodman’s view, allows irre- may paint a perfect forgery, the work loses its
alism to avoid becoming an anything-goes rel- value because of the history of the painting’s
ativism. Nonetheless, irrealism is commonly production. In contrast, an allographic work of
criticized as falling into an anything-goes rela- art, like a piece of music, does not lose its value
tivism. The burden is on Goodman to show when produced by someone other than the
that rightness, as he conceives of it, is capable composer, provided the performance of it
of allowing for a plurality of right versions while includes all of the elements required by the
not permitting just any version whatsoever – a score.
difficult task when one rejects any objective or In shifting the study of aesthetics to an exam-
neutral world to do the work. While Goodman’s ination of symbol systems, we can see much of
attempt to replace the notion of correspondence his work in aesthetics as an examination of the
with that of fit is commendable, it is not clear consequences of the recognition of the fact that
that the latter is any less problematic in the end. symbols enter into the constitution of what is
Irrealism – described by Goodman as “a described (the second phase). Goodman sees
radical relativism under rigorous restraints” – is reference as describing the relation between
perhaps best seen as the working out of his symbol and object. In addition to language,
earlier book, The Structure of Appearance symbols (such as graphs, pictures, or sculp-
(1951) and as a continuation of his work in tures) may denote or exemplify an object, albeit
Languages of Art (1968). In The Structure of metaphorically. When a symbol denotes an
Appearance Goodman defends nominalism. object, the direction of fit is from symbol system
According to Goodman, the nominalist, while to object. In contrast, when a symbol is an
recognizing only individuals, can take anything exemplar of an object the direction of fit is
as an individual. Physical particles, phenome- from object to symbol. Since the conditions
nal elements, or ordinary things may all serve as that apply to symbols (syntactic conditions)
the nominalist’s base. Nominalism, as Goodman and the object (semantic conditions) lie on a
sees it, permits a variety of systems (or versions) continuum (as there is no fixed analytic–syn-
under rigorous restraints. As Goodman quips, thetic distinction), therefore the construction or
the book would be better titled Structures of making of a symbol system (version) is the con-
Appearance. struction or making of a realm (world). In this
Goodman’s aesthetics does not approach the sense, the symbol enters the very constitution of
arts through questions of value or appreciation, the object since fit with the object goes both
but rather through epistemology. He examines ways.
the various symbol systems of the arts as means Goodman is also well known for his
of representation. Semantic and syntactic char- “reworking” of Hume’s problem of induction
acteristics of the various symbol systems of the in Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (1954). The “old
arts – rather than causal features – are the focus problem of induction” – as Goodman sees it –
of his aesthetics. Goodman’s nominalism is the problem of “justifying induction” or of
informs and infuses his aesthetics. While his demonstrating universal rules of inductive infer-
nominalist views of art have been criticized and ence given that there is no guarantee that the
are not widely accepted today, they have been future will resemble the past. Goodman
highly influential. suggests that the problem of induction, so
In Languages of Art Goodman distinguishes understood, is not Hume’s problem of induc-
between autographic and allographic art tion. Like many problems of modern philoso-
works. Identification of the autographic phy, Goodman sees this problem as the cause
960
GOODMAN
of “much fruitless discussion.” A fruitful dis- deductive and inductive rules are amended if
cussion of induction must not separate how they yield results we do not wish to accept;
induction is to be justified from how induc- inferences are rejected if they violate rules we
tion takes place. Goodman suggests that Hume are unwilling to amend. Goodman’s own
offered “habit” as a passable answer to the exploration of the riddle introduces the notion
legitimate question of why we should make of “entrenchment” – the idea that we can use
one prediction rather than another – the the extension of a predicate to determine which
question Goodman sees Hume as having raised. hypotheses are confirmed.
Hume’s answer, while perhaps incomplete or There is in all of Goodman’s work a certain
wrong, is according to Goodman on the right spirit of challenging the traditional under-
track insofar as it pertains to the source, and standing of philosophical issues while expand-
not the legitimacy, of predictions about the ing our own understanding of these issues.
future. What Hume’s answer misses, writes While Goodman may be seen as similar to a
Goodman, is that while some regularities do philosopher like Richard RORTY, since he
establish habits others do not; so some predic- rejects traditional problems of philosophy and
tions based on regularities are legitimate while the existence of an independent reality, there is
others are not. a sharp contrast in that Goodman sees this as
Having dissolved the traditional problem of the beginning of philosophy, and not as the
induction, Goodman at once raises “the new end. What is left to do, according to Goodman,
riddle of induction” – the problem of distin- is the difficult work of constructing standards
guishing those predictions or hypotheses that and constructing right worlds.
are law-like and can thus be projected into the
future from those that are not. The riddle is BIBLIOGRAPHY
raised as follows. Suppose that all emeralds The Structure of Appearance (Cambridge,
examined before time t are green. The hypoth- Mass., 1951; 2nd edn, Indianapolis, 1966;
esis that all emeralds are green, then, seems 3rd edn, Dordrecht, 1977).
well confirmed. Goodman notices, however, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (London, 1954;
that by introducing a new predicate, grue, Cambridge, Mass., 1955; 2nd edn,
which applies to things before t that are green Indianapolis, 1965; 3rd edn 1973; 4th edn,
but which are blue if examined after t, our Cambridge, Mass., 1983).
evidence for the hypothesis that emeralds are Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory
grue is just as good as for the hypothesis that of Symbols (Indianapolis, 1968; 2nd edn
emeralds are green. The point of the example, 1976).
and the point of the new riddle of induction, is Problems and Projects (Indianapolis, 1972).
that we have no way of saying which hypoth- Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis, 1978).
esis is law-like and which is accidental. To Of Mind and Other Matters (Cambridge,
favor the hypothesis that all emeralds are green Mass., 1984).
over that which states all emeralds are grue Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts
seems to accept certain regularities with no and Sciences, with Catherine Z. Elgin
good grounds. (Indianapolis, 1988).
Rather than focus on the “old problem of A Study of Qualities (New York, 1990).
induction” – that of justifying inference from
the past (observed) to the future (unobserved) Other Relevant Works
– Goodman focuses on how we decide which Goodman’s papers are at Harvard University.
inductive inferences are good inferences. As “Steps toward a Constructive Nominalism,”
with deductive inference, justification stems with W. V. Quine, Journal of Symbolic
from conformity to rules of inference. Both Logic 12 (1947): 105–22.
961
GOODMAN
“On Likeness of Meaning,” Analysis 10 1992).

(1949): 1–7. Elgin, Catherine Z. With Reference to
“A World of Individuals,” in The Problem of Reference (Indianapolis, 1983).
Universals (Notre Dame, Ind., 1956), pp. ———, The Philosophy of Nelson
13–31. Goodman: Selected Essays, 4 vols (New
“About,” Mind 70 (1961): 1–24. York, 1997).
“The Significance of Der logische Aufbau der Fischer, H. R., and S. J. Schmidt, eds.
Welt,” in The Philosophy of Rudolf Wirklichkeit und Welterzeugung: In
Carnap, ed. Paul Schilpp (La Salle, Ill., memoriam Nelson Goodman (Heidelberg,
1963), pp. 545–58. Germany, 2000).
“Art and Inquiry,” Proceedings and Gardner, Howard. “A Psychological
Addresses of the American Philosophical Investigation of Nelson Goodman’s
Association 41 (1968): 5–19. Theory of Symbols.” The Monist 58
“When Is Art?” in The Arts and Cognition, (1974): 319–26.
ed. David Perkins and Barbara Leondar Gosselin, Mia. Nominalism and
(Baltimore, Md., 1977), pp. 11–19. Contemporary Nominalism: Ontological
“Statements and Pictures,” Erkenntnis 22 and Epistemological Implications of the
(1985): 265–70. Work of W. V. O. Quine and of N.
“Nominalisms,” in The Philosophy of W. V. Goodman (Dordrecht, 1990).
Quine, ed. Lewis Hahn (La Salle, Ill., Handjaras, Luciano. Problemi e progetti del
1986), pp. 159–63. costruzionismo: saggio sulla filosofia di
“Just the Facts, Ma’am,” in Relativism, ed. Nelson Goodman (Milan, 1991).
Michael Krausz (Notre Dame, Ind., 1989), Hausman, Alan, and Fred Wilson. Carnap
pp. 80–85. and Goodman: Two Formalists (Iowa
“Status and System,” Revue Internationale City, 1967).
de Philosophie 46 (1993): 99–139. “The Legacy of Nelson Goodman,” Journal
“Some Reflections on My Philosophies,” of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 58
Philosophia Scientiae 2 (1997): 15–20. (Summer 2000). Special issue on
Goodman.
Further Reading McCormick, Peter J., ed. Starmaking:
Amer Phils 1950–2000, Bio 20thC Phils, Realism, Anti-Realism, and Irrealism
Blackwell Analytic Phil, Blackwell Comp (Cambridge, Mass., 1996).
Phils, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp “More Ways of Worldmaking,” Journal of
Amer Thought, Oxford Comp Phil, Pres Aesthetic Education 25 (Spring 1991).
Addr of APA v7, Proc of APA v72, Special issue devoted to Goodman, with a
Routledge Encycl Phil bibliography of his publications.
“Aesthetics and Worldmaking: An Exchange Morizot, Jacques. La philosophie de l’art de
with Nelson Goodman,” Journal of Nelson Goodman (Nîmes, France, 1996).
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 39 (1981): “The Philosophy of Nelson Goodman,” in
249–80. Symposium of essays about Erkenntnis 12 (1978): 3–179, 181–291.
Goodman. Special issues of essays on Goodman.
D’Orey, Carmo. A exemplificação na arte: “Probing into Reconceptions,” Synthese 95
um estudo sobre Nelson Goodman (1993): 1–128. Special issue on Goodman.
(Lisbon, 1999). Putnam, Hilary. “Reflections on Goodman’s
Douglas, Mary, and David Hull. How Ways of Worldmaking,” Journal of
Classification Works: Nelson Goodman Philosophy 76 (1979): 603–17.
among the Social Sciences (Edinburgh, Quine, W. V. “Goodman’s Ways of
962
GOTSHALK
Worldmaking,” in Theories and Things Philosophies of Samuel Alexander and Ernst

(Cambridge, Mass., 1981), pp. 96–9. Cassirer,” mentored by Harold SMART.
Rudner, Richard S., and Israel Scheffler, eds. In 1927 Gotshalk became a professor of phi-
Essays in Honor of Nelson Goodman losophy at the University of Illinois, where he
(Indianapolis, 1972). taught until his early retirement in 1965. He
Scheffler, Israel. “A Plea For Plurealism,” was chair of the department from 1951 to
Erkenntnis 52 (2000): 161–73. 1961. Gotshalk was President of the Western
Sparshott, F. E. “Goodman on Expression,” Division of the American Philosophical
The Monist 58 (1974): 187–202. Association in 1950–51, and chaired the
“Special Section on Nelson Goodman,” National Board of Officers of the APA in
Erkenntnis 52 (2000): 149–212. 1951–2. He also was President of the American
Stalker, Douglas, ed. Grue! The New Riddle Society for Aesthetics in 1957–9. Gotshalk died
of Induction (Chicago, 1994). on 19 February 1973 in Olney, Illinois.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. “Grue,” Journal of Gotshalk specialized in metaphysics, philos-
Philosophy 63 (1966): 289–309. ophy of art, and value theory. In Structure and
Thürnau, Donatus. Gedichtete Versionen der Reality (1937), he advocates that philosophy is
Welt: Nelson Goodmans Semantik fik- first and foremost a study of first principles
tionaler Literatur (Paderborn, Germany, and focuses on the three elements that in his
1994). view exhaust the real: the continuant, the event,
Wolterstorff, Nicholas. “Are Concept-users and the relation. Continuants are energy
World-makers?” Philosophical systems in process, whereas events are sub-
Perspectives 1 (1987): 233–67. stantives of sorts, and all relations are internal.
In Art and the Social Order (1947), Gotshalk
Brian J. Huschle seeks to integrate the wide variety of theories
that interpret art. In The Promise of Modern
Life (1958), he gives a historical account of
the value principles that are operative in the
modern period. In its sequel, Human Aims in
Modern Perspective (1966), Gotshalk returned
GOTSHALK, Dilman Walter (1901–73) to these principles, arguing that the highest art
is political. Gotshalk was highly concerned
D. Walter Gotshalk was born on 11 September with the present and future of intellectual life.
1901 in Trenton, New Jersey. In 1922 he In The Structure of Awareness (1969), he devel-
received his BA from Princeton, where Warner oped a situational epistemology.
FITE introduced him to philosophy. Before At his death Gotshalk left behind four book-
going to graduate school, Gotshalk became an length manuscripts, including his autobiogra-
instructor in English literature at Mohegan phy A Philosopher in America. In a letter to his
Lake School in New York. After two years lifelong friend Max FISCH, Gotshalk said about
teaching he resumed his education at Cornell his biography: “It should be an interesting
University in 1924, where he wanted to study volume, for while it is an autobiography of an
with James Edwin CREIGHTON. However, due only slightly interesting life, it is an autobiog-
to Creighton’s declining health, Gotshalk took raphy with a purpose – to illustrate the role the
a year-long course on Kant’s first and third cri- philosopher has in 20th century America
tiques with Ernest ALBEE, making a profound (None) and the consequences thereof.”
impact on him. In 1927 Gotshalk received his Gotshalk’s son Richard followed his father to
PhD in philosophy with a dissertation on “The become also a professor of philosophy.
Problem of Mind and Objects in the
963
GOTSHALK
BIBLIOGRAPHY GOUDGE, Thomas Anderson (1910–99)

Structure and Reality: A Study of First
Principles (New York, 1937). Thomas A. Goudge was born on 19 January
Metaphysics in Modern Times: A Present-day 1910 in Halifax, Nova Scotia, and died on 20
Perspective (Chicago, 1940). June 1999 in Toronto, Ontario. After earning
Art and the Social Order (Chicago, 1947). his BA (1931) and MA (1932) at Dalhousie
The Promise of Modern Life (Yellow Springs, University, he was admitted to the Graduate
Ohio, 1958). School of the University of Toronto on a schol-
Patterns of Good and Evil (Urbana, Ill., arship in 1932. At Dalhousie his principal
1963). teacher had been Herbert Leslie STEWART who
Human Aims in Modern Perspective: insisted that his students write well and acquire
Outlines of a General Theory of Value a solid grounding in ancient philosophy and
with Special References to Contemporary British empiricism. Goudge responded very
Social Life and Politics (Yellow Springs, well to this regimen and he published several
Ohio, 1966). articles in student magazines. At Toronto
The Structure of Awareness: Introduction to Goudge came under the influence of George
a Situational Theory of Truth and Sidney BRETT, then head of the department.
Knowledge (Urbana, Ill., 1969). Brett attempted to interest Goudge in the ide-
Twentieth Century Theme: A Philosophical alistic tradition by urging him to read J. H.
Study (Lawrence, Kan., 1971). Muirhead’s The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-
Saxon Thought, but with unexpected results.
Other Relevant Works Muirhead included views of philosophers
Gotshalk’s papers are at the University of opposed to the Hegelian tradition, one of which
Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. was Charles S. PEIRCE. Muirhead emphasized
“Qualities, Relations, and a Paradox of the seminal nature of Peirce’s philosophy, noted
Judgment,” Journal of Philosophy 26 that realists, idealists, and pragmatists had all
(1929): 645–57. found support in it, and stressed how it did not
“Twentieth Century Theme,” Proceedings form a neat system. Goudge was intrigued by
and Addresses of the American both Peirce’s ideas and his failure to develop
Philosophical Association 24 (1951): them into a system. He decided to make a
19–30. careful study of Peirce’s writings to decide
“C. I. Lewis on Esthetic Experience and whether they formed a system. During a year at
Esthetic Value,” in The Philosophy of C. I. Harvard he read the Peirce Collected Papers,
Lewis, ed. Lewis Hahn (La Salle, Ill., edited by Charles HARTSHORNE and Paul WEISS,
1968). and was given access to those not included in
their edition. The results of his study were pre-
Further Reading sented in his dissertation, “The Theory of
Pres Addr of APA v6, Proc of APA v46, Knowledge in Charles S. Peirce.”
Who Was Who in Amer v6, Who’s Who in After receiving his PhD in 1937 and starting
Phil his philosophy teaching career at Toronto the
Petock, Stuart Jay. “Dewey and Gotshalk on next year, Goudge continued to work on Peirce
Criticism,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art until 1950 when he published The Thought of
Criticism 25 (1967): 387–94. C. S. Peirce. In this book he argued that there
were two distinct strands to Peirce’s philoso-
Cornelis de Waal phy: a naturalistic strand deriving from the
British tradition, and a transcendentalist strand
stemming from the German idealists by way of
964
GOULDNER
the New England transcendentalists. Goudge Peirce, ed. Philip P. Wiener and Frederic
showed that the two strands were present in H. Young (Cambridge, Mass., 1951).
Peirce’s work in logic, metaphysics, and the
methods of science. His book was widely dis- Further Reading
cussed and helped to fuel the expanding interest Canad Encyc, Proc of APA v73, Who’s Who
in Peirce’s thought. in Phil
Goudge’s next large project, on which he Slater, John G. Minerva’s Aviary: Philosophy
spent nearly a decade, was a study of the philo- at Toronto 1843–1943 (Toronto, 2005),
sophical problems of biology, published as The chap. 10.
Ascent of Life (1961). Goudge made a careful Sumner, L. W., John G. Slater, and Fred
study of the nature of explanation and theory Wilson, eds. Pragmatism and Purpose:
in biology, and came to the conclusion that Essays Presented to Thomas A. Goudge
biology was a science in its own right and was (Toronto, 1981). Contains a bibliography
not reducible to physics. This book did much of Goudge’s writings.
to establish the philosophy of biology as a sub-
discipline. John G. Slater
Goudge taught at the University of Toronto
from 1938 until his retirement in 1975, except
for two years of service in the Royal Canadian
Navy during World War II. In 1963 he was
appointed chair of the department and served
until 1969. Those were the years of great GOULDNER, Alvin Ward (1920–80)
expansion in institutions of higher learning in
North America, and Goudge made thirty-four Alvin Ward Gouldner was born on 29 July
tenure-stream and tenured appointments 1920 in New York City. He received a BA
during those six years, surely a record among degree from City College of New York in
philosophy departments. At the same time he 1941, and then did graduate study in sociology
presided over the transition of an autocratic at Columbia University, earning an MA in
structure of governance to a democratic one, 1945 and a PhD in 1953. While working on
which included student representatives. His his dissertation under the direction of Robert
early reforms gave the department immunity to Merton, he worked as resident sociologist on
the student unrest that swept the campus the American Jewish Committee from 1945 to
during that decade. Goudge was a founding 1947, and then was an assistant professor in
member of the Canadian Philosophical sociology at the University of Buffalo from
Association and served as its President. In 1957 1947 to 1951. In 1951 and 1952 he worked as
he was elected President of the Charles Sanders a consulting sociologist at Standard Oil
Peirce Society, and in 1955 he was elected a Company in New Jersey, before becoming
fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. associate professor of sociology at Antioch
College from 1952 to 1954. During these years
BIBLIOGRAPHY some of Gouldner’s first scholarly articles were
The Thought of C. S. Peirce (Toronto, 1950). published in such journals as Journal of
The Ascent of Life: A Philosophical Study of Abnormal and Social Psychology, American
the Theory of Evolution (Toronto, 1961). Journal of Sociology, and American
Sociological Review. He studied mathematics,
Other Relevant Works factor analysis, and computers at the
“Peirce’s Theory of Abstraction,” in Studies University of Illinois starting in 1954. In 1959
in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders he became professor and chair of sociology
965
GOULDNER
and anthropology at Washington University in Gouldner is best known for his provocative
St. Louis. He was named Max Weber Research book The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology
Professor in Social Theory in 1967, holding (1970), a stinging critique of the Harvard tra-
that position until his death. He served as dition of American sociology and aimed at
President of the Society for the Study of Social Talcott PARSONS. Gouldner questioned the
Problems in 1962, and in 1963 he founded overall value of sociology and its future as a
and edited the journal Transaction. He also discipline. He also argued that the relentless
taught at the University of Amsterdam from pursuit of objectivity had taken sociology away
1972 to 1976, and founded the journal Theory from its European roots, thus making socio-
and Society in 1974. He died on 15 December logical theory irrelevant. This was a theme he
1980 in Madrid, Spain. would take up and refine later in the pages of
While still in graduate school, Gouldner Theory and Society, that only by practicing
briefly worked on the transplanted Frankfurt “reflexivity” could sociologists really under-
School’s “Studies in Prejudice” project headed stand the world as it now exists. In his final
by Max HORKHEIMER and Theodor ADORNO. work, Two Marxisms (1980), Gouldner
This experience introduced Gouldner to the analyzed the conflict between scientific and
European critical tradition, influencing his later critical Marxism.
scholarship and work encompassing an inter-
national focus in sociological theory, particu- BIBLOGRAPHY
larly in his founding of the journal Theory and Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy
Society. Under Merton’s mentoring, Gouldner (Glencoe, Ill., 1954).
launched his academic career by publishing his Wildcat Strike (Yellow Springs, Ohio,
dissertation simultaneously in two volumes: 1954).
Wildcat Strike and Patterns of Industrial “The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary
Bureaucracy, both published in 1954. Statement,” American Sociological
Gouldner, who had already made a name for Review 25 (1960): 161–78.
himself as a result of his edited volume Studies Notes on Technology and the Moral Order,
in Leadership (1950) as well as a chapter on red with Richard Peterson (Indianapolis,
tape he had written for Merton’s edited volume 1962).
on bureaucracy, established his position among Modern Sociology: An Introduction to the
the intellectual leadership of the field of indus- Study of Human Action, with Helen P.
trial sociology. Gouldner and Joseph Gusfield (New
Gouldner’s Enter Plato (1965) traces the York, 1963).
social origins of social theory to Plato’s scientific Enter Plato: Classical Greece and the
philosophy. Before the appearance of Plato, Origins of Social Theory (New York,
ancient Greek thought was characterized by the 1965).
tragic form, where protagonists in dramatic The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology
plays worked their way through a hostile and (New York, 1970).
difficult world in an attempt to arrive at truths. For Sociology: Renewal and Critique in
Owing much to Friedrich Nietzsche on this Sociology Today (New York, 1973).
point, Gouldner argues that with the appear- The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology:
ance of Plato, Greek thought moves away from The Origins, Grammar, and Future of
psychologism and egoism to a more collectivist Ideology (New York, 1976).
and social form. Science requires agreement The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of
among a group of like-minded thinkers (forged the New Class (New York, 1979).
through the Greek dialectic) in determining the The Two Marxisms: The Ambiguous
truths of the world. Legacy (New York, 1980).
966
GRAHAM
Other Relevant Works Cumnock junior college in 1916. An intensely

Ed., Studies in Leadership: Leadership and reflective and innovative artist, Graham
Democratic Action (New York, 1950). created a movement vocabulary and danced
Trans., Socialism and Saint-Simon (Le philosophical statements that revolutionized
socialisme), by Emile Durkheim (Yellow concert dance traditions at the time. Deeply
Springs, Ohio, 1958). influenced by Asian movement forms, she
drew on principles of yoga to make the floor
Further Reading a partner with the moving body and work in
Amer Nat Bio, Who Was Who in Amer v7 different ways with the spine. Her articulation
Chriss, James J. Alvin W. Gouldner: of the “contraction,” based on an elongation
Sociologist and Outlaw Marxist of the spine and a tense, curving, energy line,
(Aldershot, UK, 1999). when combined with her characteristic
Eldridge, J. “Gouldner, Alvin W. “cupped” hand positions, became a trope of
(1920–1980),” in The IEBM Handbook modernist angst. The strength of her women
of Human Resource Management, ed. M. dancers was also obvious, both in their tech-
Poole and M. Warner (London, 1998), nical training and the characters they por-
pp. 887–91. trayed. She created an aesthetic characterized
Fuhrman, Ellsworth R. “Alvin Gouldner by angular and sharp lines, steep falls, and
and the Sociology of Knowledge: Three pitch turns, that several critics have described
Significant Problem Shifts,” Sociological as “difficult beauty.”
Quarterly 25 (1984): 287–300. After a short period of touring with the
Giddens, Anthony. “Alvin Gouldner and Denishawn Company, Graham first presented
the Intellectuals,” in Social Theory and her choreography on 18 April 1926 at the
Modern Sociology (Cambridge, UK, 48th Street Theater in New York City. Her
1987), pp. 253–74. early work comprised of group works for her
Merton, Robert K. “Alvin W. Gouldner: all-female company such as Heretic (1929),
Genesis and Growth of a Friendship,” which dramatizes the conflict between a rebel
Theory and Society 11 (1982): 915–38. and society, and solos such as Lamentation
“A Symposium on the Legacy of Alvin (1930), which abstracts the state of being in the
Gouldner,” Sociological Quarterly 43 title. The rich metaphorical imagination and
(Winter 2002). A special issue about minimalist design that Graham came to be cel-
Gouldner. ebrated for was already evident in these works.
Her later and major works can be catego-
James J. Chriss rized into two major groups: her Americana,
comprising works like Frontier and
Appalachian Spring, that perform the pio-
neering spirit of early American settlers, and
Primitive Mysteries, which draws on rituals
practiced by American Indians in the
GRAHAM, Martha (1894–1991) Southwest and in Mexico; and her reinterpre-
tations of Greek myths, such as Night Journey,
One of the pioneers of American modern based on the story of Oedipus and Jocasta.
dance, Martha Graham was born on 11 May Deeply influenced by philosophers such as Carl
1894 in Allegheny, Pennsylvania, and died on Jung and Joseph CAMPBELL, these works reveal
1 April 1991 in New York City. Before begin- Graham’s fascination with the relationship of
ning her first formal dance training with the the mythic and the subconscious, and her
Denishawn Company, she graduated from exploration of movement to invoke archetypal
967
GRAHAM
figures. They are also unique in their articula- Jackson, Graham. “The Roots of Heaven:
tion of an “interior landscape,” most often of Sexuality in the Work of Martha
the psychic processes of the strong central Graham,” in Dance Spectrum: Critical
female character with whom she identified and Philosophical Enquiry, ed. D. T.
strongly. Taplin (Waterloo, Ont., 1983), pp. 50–60.
Martha Graham’s work, in establishing a Mille, Agnes de. Martha: The Life and Work
clearly articulated technique and training of Martha Graham (New York, 1991).
methodology, and evolving a movement aes- Polcari, Stephen. “Martha Graham and
thetic permeated with philosophical depth, Abstract Expressionism,” Smithsonian
deeply impacted diverse audiences. Many Studies in American Art 4 (1990): 3–27.
dancers who trained with her and danced in Siegel, Marcia. “The Harsh and Splendid
her pieces came to be celebrated artists and Heroines of Martha Graham,” in Moving
choreographers in their own right. Among History / Dancing Cultures: A Dance
them are Erick Hawkins, her partner and History Reader, ed. A. Dils and A. C.
husband till 1950, Merce Cunningham, Anna Albright (Middletown, Conn., 2001), pp.
Sokolow, Jane Dudley, Bessie Schoenberg, and 307–14.
others. By the time of her death in 1991, she Stodelle, Ernestine. Deep Song: The Dance
was recognized as a seminal figure in American Story of Martha Graham (New York,
modern dance. 1984).
BIBLIOGRAPHY Ananya Chatterjea

“Seeking an American Art of the Dance,” in
Revolt in the Arts, ed. O. Sayler (New
York, 1930), pp. 249–55.
“A Modern Dancer’s Primer for Action,” in
Dance: A Basic Educational Technique,
ed. F. R. Rodgers (New York, 1941), pp. GRAMLICH, Francis William (1911–73)
178–87.
The Notebooks of Martha Graham (New Francis W. Gramlich was born on 12 October
York, 1973). 1911 in Buffalo, New York. He was educated
“I am a Dancer,” in The Routledge Dance at Princeton University, earning his BA summa
Studies Reader, ed. A. Carter (New York, cum laude in 1933, his MA in 1934, and his
1998), pp. 66–71. PhD in philosophy in 1936. His dissertation
“Platform for the American Dance” and was titled “Symbolism and Meaning.” In 1936
“American Document,” in I see America Gramlich was a clinical psychologist with the
Dancing: Selected Readings, ed. M. University of Buffalo, and from 1937 to 1940
Needham (Urbana, Ill., 2002), pp. he was an instructor of mental science and
203–204, 206–15. clinical psychology at Canisius College in
Buffalo, and also a psychologist for the Buffalo
Other Relevant Works public schools.
Blood Memory: An Autobiography (New In 1940 Gramlich was appointed assistant
York, 1991). professor of philosophy at Dartmouth College.
During World War II he served in the US Navy
Further Reading as a psychologist in Idaho, California, and
Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Oregon from 1942 to 1946. In 1946 he
Encyc Amer Bio, Who Was Who in Amer returned to Dartmouth, where he was
v10 promoted to full professor in 1948. He was
968
GRANT
later named Stone Professor of Intellectual and GRANT, George Parkin (1918–88)
Moral Philosophy in 1960, and held this
position until his death. He was chair of the George Grant was born on 13 November 1918
philosophy department for a total of sixteen in Toronto, Canada. He was the son of William
years, serving various terms from 1947 to Lawson Grant, the principal of Upper Canada
1971, and was responsible for rebuilding the College, and the grandson of two more promi-
department after a series of retirements. He nent leaders of education: George Monro
died on 4 June 1973 in Hanover, New Grant, the principal of Queen’s University, and
Hampshire. Sir George Parkin, the founding secretary of the
Gramlich’s courses on “philosophy of Rhodes scholarships. He concentrated on
human nature” and “philosophy of mind” history at Queen’s, earning the BA in 1939.
were among the most popular on campus. He With a Rhodes Scholarship he went to Oxford
also played a very active role in administration to study law. He was in England at the start of
and in a variety of educational programs. His World War II and experienced the Blitz
publications were few, mainly about psycho- bombing attacks of 1940–41. His encounters
logical topics during the beginning of his with C. S. Lewis at Oxford’s Socratic Club
career; he was among the last of that genera- were also memorable. Grant returned to
tion of philosophers who could have success- Canada in 1942 to recover his health and
ful careers at prestigious institutions without ponder the intense religious conversion he had
getting into print. in England. From 1943 to 1945, he was the
national secretary of the Canadian Association
BIBLIOGRAPHY for Adult Education. He turned his academic
“Functions of the Psychologist in the interest to religion, and eventually completed
Neuropsychiatric Unit,” with G. Stouffer, his doctoral thesis, “The Concept of Nature
Jr., Journal of Consulting Psychology 7 and Supernature in the Theology of John
(1943): 211–15. Oman,” and received his D.Phil. from Oxford
“Psychological Studies in Semantics: I. Free in 1950.
Association Reactions to Words, Grant taught philosophy at Dalhousie
Drawings, and Objects,” with University from 1947 to 1960. He then helped
T. Karwoski and F. Arnott, Journal of to found the department of religion and served
Social Psychology 20 (1944): 233–47. as professor of religion at McMaster University.
“A Psychological Study of Stress in Disappointed by his department’s inability to
Service,” Journal of General Psychology lead a humanistic challenge to science’s domi-
41 (1949): 273–96. nance, he returned to Dalhousie in 1980 as a
Ed. with Maurice Mandelbaum and Alan professor of political science, classics, and
Ross Anderson, Philosophic Problems: religion, and remained there until his death.
An Introductory Book of Readings (New He received numerous honors and awards,
York, 1957). including an honorary LLD from Queen’s in
Ed. with Robert E. Dewey and Donald 1976 and the Order of Canada from the
Loftsgordon, Problems of Ethics: A Book Canadian government. Grant died on 27
of Readings (New York, 1961). September 1988 in Halifax, Nova Scotia,
Canada.
Further Reading Grant was Canada’s most important and
Proc of APA v46, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v58 influential philosopher since John WATSON.
Like Watson, Grant applied a religious under-
John R. Shook standing of the human condition in order to
make critical social and political commentary
969
GRANT
on Canada’s destiny. In contrast with Watson’s tional cultures and then restructures them to
creatively metaphysical efforts to improve serve its own needs for mass production and
idealism, Grant never tried substantially to consumption. This “empire of technology”
modify his Christian Platonism and mysticism. cannot be successfully resisted by Canada,
His philosophy presumed the necessity of Grant concluded, since its own cultural roots
grounding all thought upon the eternal and and history are too fragmented and shallow.
absolute foundation of divinely revealed truths. When confronted by an all-powerful “empire
Raised in a Presbyterian family, he joined the of technology” in imperial America, which had
Anglican Church in Canada, and despite sharp early and easily overcome its own internal con-
disagreements, he remained a member his entire servative forces, Canada could only surrender
life. As a public philosopher, he revealed his and link its fate with the United States.
power in his moral mission that was simulta- Grant never found a welcoming political
neously conservative and radical. The conser- home, always remaining outside organized
vative effort was directed towards preserving political parties and movements. Other
Canada’s unique culture from the sweeping Canadian conservatives were dismayed by his
changes brought by capitalism’s technocratic seeming approval of returning to the monarchy,
culture and political liberalism. His radical by his anti-capitalism, and anti-Americanism.
effort was aimed at holding even his own Liberal nationalists welcomed his Canadian
culture responsible for violating Christian prin- nationalism but Grant rejected secularism and
ciples in the pursuit of technology’s tempta- joined the pro-life movement. He was not inter-
tions. He forcefully exposed as delusional the ested in the compromise with technology
notion that morality could be unaffected by offered by unionism and socialism, and social-
alleged neutral technological advancements. ists did not appreciate his traditional
Repulsed by social scientists who supposed that Christianity. His lecturing and writing did
the solution is reformulation of morality and strongly impact the nationalist movement of the
law to fit the new technocratic culture, Grant late 1960s and 1970s, but by the mid 1970s
in his early writings instead attacked technology Grant had already moved on to even larger
and liberalism in the hope of preserving some- issues and themes.
thing of Canada’s traditions. Grant’s collection of essays Technology and
In 1959 Grant published Philosophy in the Empire (1969) and his Massey Lectures Time
Mass Age, which expressed his conviction that as History (1969), more closely examined the
the moral flexibility offered by liberalism is grave faults and fate of modernism and
incompatible with the divine moral truths. Western civilization. Protestantism itself cannot
Grant’s pivotal work was his 1965 Lament for be exempted from responsibility, Grant
a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian decided, in English-Speaking Justice (1974).
Nationalism, in which his hopes for Canada’s The right of personal autonomy over matters of
future were now missing. Sparked by Canada’s conscience that Protestants sought has come
acceptance of nuclear weapons and his rising full circle to its contradiction, because
fury at the United States’s growing hegemony Protestantism became the sort of liberalism of
over North America, Grant predicted Canada’s rights for adults that cannot understand the
demise and absorption into American culture. duty to treat other human beings justly. For
He argued that modern civilization cannot Grant, after individuals are given the right to
tolerate any moral or social structure outside of make their own moral laws and design their
its own technological functioning. Like Martin own churches to match, Christianity becomes
Heidegger, Grant viewed scientific technology impossible. Grant’s particular concern here is
as a cultural solvent and reactive agent that abortion, after the US Supreme Court decreed
first dissolves the social bonds of local tradi- the right to abortion. Liberal justice can only
970
GRANT
mean maximizing rights for political citizens that.” On Grant’s tomb the inscription quotes
and must be blind to the more fundamental St. Augustine: “Out of the Shadows and
justice for the powerless and helpless who lack Imaginings into the Truth.”
political standing. He wrote, “Obviously the
justice of a society is well defined in terms of BIBLIOGRAPHY
how it treats the weak. And there is nothing Philosophy in the Mass Age (Vancouver,
human which is weaker than the foetus.” The 1959; New York, 1960; Toronto, 1995).
inevitable decay and destruction of Western Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of
civilization, already evident in its taste for ever- Canadian Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.,
increasing war and brutality, was nowhere 1965).
more obvious than in its disregard for the Technology and Empire (Toronto, 1969).
unborn. This “culture of violence,” as it has Time as History (Toronto, 1969; 2nd edn
been called elsewhere, will doom the very 1995).
freedom that liberalism promised. He wrote, “If George Grant in Process: Essays and
tyranny is to come in North America, it will Conversations, ed. Larry Schmidt
come cosily and on cat’s feet. It will come with (Toronto, 1978).
the denial of the rights of the unborn and of the English-speaking Justice (Sackville, New
aged, the denial of the rights of the mentally Brunswick, 1974; Notre Dame, Ind.,
retarded, the insane and the economically less 1985).
privileged. In fact, it will come with the denial The Dispossessed: Homelessness in America
of rights to all those who cannot defend them- (Fort Worth, Tex., 1986).
selves. It will come in the name of the cost- Technology and Justice (Toronto, 1986).
benefit analysis of human life.” (1974)
Grant had few philosophical or theological Other Relevant Works
peers who shared his concerns. Of special George Grant: Selected Letters, ed. Christian
interest is the relationship with Charles William (Toronto, 1997).
TAYLOR’s similar call to return to the pre-liberal The George Grant Reader, ed. William
vision of medieval virtues. Also relevant is Christian and Sheila Grant (Toronto,
Stanley HAUERWAS’s Christian criticism of mod- 1997).
ernism’s embrace of injustice and violence. Collected Works of George Grant, ed.
Grant’s last book, Technology and Justice Arthur Davis and Peter Emberley
(1986), was his deepest meditation on the (Toronto, 2000–).
meaning of Christ and Christianity for today.
This book was in part inspired by his matured Further Reading
understanding of the significance of the Cross Canad Encyc
and his reading of the French philosopher Athanasiadis, Harris. George Grant and the
Simone Weil on suffering. Since Christianity Theology of the Cross: The Christian
and modernism are fundamentally opposed, Foundations of His Thought (Toronto,
modernism’s moral and spiritual decay cannot 2001).
be repaired and would cause its collapse. Christian, William. George Grant: A
Grant’s Christian faith kept alive his hope that Biography (Toronto, 1993).
modernism’s replacement would be an Combs, Eugene, ed. Modernity and
improvement. One of his biographers relates Responsibility: Essays for George Grant
how, after being asked why he is so pessimistic, (Toronto, 1983). Contains a bibliography
Grant replied: “I’m not being pessimistic at all. of Grant’s writings.
I think God will eventually destroy this tech- Davis, Arthur, ed. George Grant and the
nological civilization. I’m very optimistic about Subversion of Modernity: Art, Philosophy,
971
GRANT
Politics, Religion, and Education (Toronto, principle at stake is whether the concentration of
1996). wealth into immense multi-generational estates (a
Emberley, Peter C., ed. By Loving Our Own: heritage from England) is compatible with the
George Grant and the Legacy of Lament interests of democracy. Gray’s second book, The
for a Nation (Ottawa, 1990). Rule against Perpetuities (1886), dealt with this
Kroker, Arthur. Technology and the problem at the most general level. He proposed
Canadian Mind: Innis, McLuhan, Grant a clearly defined limitation upon control over
(Montréal, 1984; New York, 1985). property, which was widely adopted with various
O’Donovan, Joan E. George Grant and the modifications by courts and legislators. Gray’s
Twilight of Justice (Toronto, 1984). Select Cases and Other Authorities on the Law
Taylor, Charles. Radical Tories: The of Property (1888–92) applied the quickly
Conservative Tradition in Canada spreading case method to the teaching of property
(Toronto, 1982). law.
Whillier, Wayne, ed. Two Theological Gray is also remembered as one of the earliest
Languages (Lewiston, N.Y., 1990). proponents of what came to be known as “legal
Festschrift for Grant, contains a bibliogra- realism,” which rebelled against the legal for-
phy of Grant’s writings. malism dominant during most of the 1800s in
America and England. With Oliver Wendell
John R. Shook HOLMES, Jr., Gray took into account the methods
by which judges must modify and create law
from the bench. He was a part of a small circle
of friends in Boston that included Holmes, lawyer
Nicholas St. John GREEN, and pragmatists
William JAMES and Charles S. PEIRCE.
GRAY, John Chipman (1839–1915) Gray’s last book, The Nature and Sources of
Law (1909), based on the Carpentier Lectures at
John Chipman Gray was born on 14 July 1839 Columbia Law School in 1908, argued system-
in Brighton, Massachusetts. The half-brother of atically that all law is judge-made law. Legislative
Horace Gray, who became a US Supreme Court statutes should be regarded as only one type of
justice, John also received his BA from Harvard source of law, along with other sources that
in 1859, an LL.B. in 1861, and an MA in 1862. include previous judicial decisions, social expec-
After service in the Union Army during the Civil tations and moral opinions, and views of the
War, Gray practiced law in Boston, helped to public good. Gray also argued that rights are
found the American Law Review in 1866, and neither intrinsic nor natural; for him, rights are
began lecturing at Harvard Law School in 1869. not to be identified directly with our interests,
In 1875 Gray was named to the first Story because they are only means that need to be
Professorship, and in 1883 became the Royall properly adjusted to our ends. His vision of
Professor of Law, a position that he held until political power was historicist, pluralistic, and
retiring in 1913. Gray died on 25 February 1915 diffused; neither constitution, the people, the
in Boston, Massachusetts. legislature, nor judges could be assigned supreme
Gray’s specific area of legal expertise was political authority. Besides Holmes, heirs to
property law, and his deep insights into the tra- Gray’s legal realism include Wesley HOHFELD,
dition and democratic nature of property rights Karl LLEWELLYN, and Jerome FRANK.
were widely influential. His first book, Restraints
on the Alienation of Property (1883), attacked BIBLIOGRAPHY
the innovation of “spendthrift trusts” which Restraints on the Alienation of Property
protect estates from the debts of heirs. The legal (Boston, 1883; 2nd edn 1895).
972
GREEN
The Rule against Perpetuities (Boston, minister of the East Cambridge church, and later
1886; 2nd edn 1906, 3rd edn 1915, 4th was mayor of Cambridge. Green received his
edn 1942). Harvard BA in 1851. He then studied law with
Select Cases and Other Authorities on the Harvard law professor Joseph Story and became
Law of Property, 6 vols (Cambridge, junior partner to Boston lawyer Benjamin
Mass., 1888–92). Franklin Butler. He earned his law degree from
The Nature and Sources of Law (New Harvard in 1861. With the outbreak of the Civil
York, 1909; 2nd edn 1921). War, he enlisted and served as a paymaster.
After the war, he opened his own practice and
Other Relevant Works was appointed as an instructor in mental phi-
Gray’s papers are at Harvard University. losophy at Harvard, where he taught logic, meta-
“The Methods of Legal Education,” Yale physics, psychology, and political economy. The
Law Journal 1 (1892): 159–61. publication of noteworthy articles in the
War Letters, 1862-65, of John Chipman American Law Review led Harvard to appoint
Gray and John Codman Ropes, ed. Green as lecturer in the Law School in 1870. In
Worthington Chauncey Ford (Boston, 1873 he accepted a professorship of law in
1927). Boston University’s new law school, and he also
served as its Acting Dean during 1874–6. He
Further Reading died on 8 September 1876 in Cambridge,
Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, Massachusetts.
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer Green is remembered today by legal histori-
Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v16, Who Was ans for his acute legal mind and key contribu-
Who in Amer v1 tions to advancing legal theory in the areas of
Alexander, Gregory S. “The Dead Hand tort law, negligence, and liability. He is also
and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth remembered for his central role in the creation
Century,” Stanford Law Review 37 of a new American philosophy, because he was
(1985): 1189–266. credited by Charles PEIRCE as being the “grand-
Fisch, Max H. “Justice Holmes, the father” of pragmatism. Peirce recalls how
Prediction Theory of Law, and Green, at meetings of the “Metaphysical Club”
Pragmatism,” Journal of Philosophy 39 in Cambridge during the early 1870s, urged
(1942): 85–97. the definition of a belief as “that upon which a
Gray, Roland. John Chipman Gray man is prepared to act.” This view is traceable
(Boston, 1917). Contains a bibliography to Green’s acquaintance, by way of fellow club
of Gray’s writings. member Chauncey WRIGHT, with the psychol-
ogy of Alexander Bain, and with the legal
John R. Shook theory of James Stephen which was also
familiar to another member, Oliver Wendell
HOLMES, Jr. Against the logical formalism of
that era, Green and Holmes pragmatically
viewed law positively and historically, as a
social institution that has evolved irregularly
GREEN, Nicholas St. John (1830–76) through the many struggles of human experi-
ence. They were both social utilitarians as well.
Nicholas St. John Green was born on 30 March From this perspective, outdated notions of neg-
1830 in Dover, New Hampshire. His father, ligence are difficult to apply in judicial practice,
James D. Green, was in the 1817 class of and so Green proposed that “causing” a harm
Harvard graduates, and became a Unitarian by an act should be replaced with failing rea-
973
GREEN
sonably to anticipate possible harmful conse- Instrumentalism,” American Journal of

quences of an act. He also proposed reforms for Legal History 39 (1995): 443–509.
handling slander and libel, insanity, the legal Menand, Louis. The Metaphysical Club: A
status of minors, and the equal rights of Story of Ideas in America (New York,
women. He described the inferior status of 2001).
women as “the last vestige of slavery.” Peirce, Charles S. “Nicholas St. John Green.”
Proceedings of the American Academy of
BIBLIOGRAPHY Arts and Sciences n.s. 4 (1877): 289–91.
“Proximate and Remote Cause,” American Reprinted in Writings of Charles S. Peirce,
Law Review 4 (January 1870): 201–16. vol. 3, 1872–1878 (Bloomington, Ind.,
“Contributory Negligence on the Part of an 1986), pp. 208–10.
Infant,” American Law Review 4 (1870): Wiener, Philip P. “The Pragmatic Legal
405–16. Philosophy of Nicholas St. John Green,” in
“Insanity in Criminal Law,” American Law Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism
Review 5 (1871): 704–9. (Cambridge, Mass., 1949), pp. 152–71.
“Married Women,” American Law Review 6 See also “Biographical Notes on Nicholas
(1872): 57–74. St. John Green (1835–1876),” pp. 231–4.
“Slander and Libel,” American Law Review
6 (1872): 593–613. John R. Shook
“The Three Degrees of Negligence,”
American Law Review 8 (1874): 649–68.
Ed., Commentaries on the Law of Agency as
a Branch of Commercial and Maritime
Jurisprudence, by Joseph Story, 8th edn
rev. with additions by Nicholas St. John GREENBERG, Clement (1909–94)
Green (Boston, 1874).
Ed., Criminal Law Reports, 2 vols (New Clement Greenberg was born on 16 January
York, 1874–5). 1909 in Bronx, New York, and died in New
York City on 4 May 1994. Educated in the
Other Relevant Works public schools of New York City and Norfolk,
A file for Green is in the biographical folders Virginia, he entered Syracuse University in
(HUG 300) at Harvard University 1926 and graduated Phi Beta Kappa in 1930
Archives. with a BA in English. After graduating
Essays and Notes on the Law of Tort and Greenberg located a full-time position in 1936
Crime, ed. Frederick Green (Menasha, in the Manhattan office of the United States
Wisc., 1933). Civil Service Commission, then the Veterans
Administration, and finally in 1937 in the
Further Reading Appraiser’s Division of the Customs Service in
Nat Cycl Amer Bio v11 the Port of New York. These positions allowed
Fisch, Max. “Was There a Metaphysical Greenberg to devote himself to his calling as a
Club in Cambridge?” in Studies in the writer and a critic of literature and theater.
Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Greenberg was considered by many to be the
Edward C. Moore and Richard S. Robin foremost American art critic of the twentieth
(Amherst, Mass., 1964), pp. 3–32. century. In 1939 he became a contributor to
Hackney, James. “The Intellectual Origins of Partisan Review, a liberal journal devoted to
American Strict Products Liability: A Case cultural, social, and political commentary. The
Study in American Pragmatic following year he was appointed an editor of
974
GREENBERG
the magazine. In 1941 he began writing for Bertold Brecht. In 1939 his essay in the Partisan
The Nation and became its regular art critic Review titled “Avant-Garde and Kitsch” (in
from 1944 to 1949. Though he continued to 1961) attracted attention in both the United
write the regular critical articles for The Nation, States and England; it started his extraordinary
Greenberg accepted the position of managing career as a major art critic. Greenberg asked the
editor of the Contemporary Jewish Record, question: Is it possible for the work of a major
which later was replaced by Commentary. He poet like T. S. ELIOT, a popular song, a Baroque
remained with this magazine as associate editor painting, and a popular magazine cover to be
until 1957. His major book Art and Culture understood as having some meaningful rela-
was published in 1961. tionship to each other? He argued that no uni-
From the end of the 1950s through the 1960s versal aesthetic principles could provide an
Greenberg was a major figure in the burgeon- answer. It is necessary to place that question
ing New York art scene. He was a champion of and others that touched on the extraordinarily
the abstract expressionist movement and had varied forms of cultural expression in the
close personal relations with the artists who response of “the specific – not generalized –
were identified with it. His influence extended individual, and the social and historical
far beyond the Hudson River or the shores of contexts in which that experience takes place”
the Atlantic. Writing essays for the major art (1961, p. 5). Greenberg began his argument
journals in the United States, he lectured with the premise that a healthy society and its
throughout the country at universities and artists were tied together by the unique forms
museums. His advice was sought on exhibi- and cultural concepts that are shaped by
tions and acquisitions by those museums, common social, moral, political, and economic
important galleries, and collectors. Lionized as factors. He believed that this shared culture
a taste-maker and included in many lists of the encouraged the vital communication between
foremost intellectuals in the country, he was the creative producers of the arts and their
also feared because of his power to affect the audiences: these ties were eroded when a
careers of the artists he championed and those society’s values seemed arbitrary and unjustifi-
he neglected. Frequently criticized as he was for able. Instead of having the intellectual, moral,
wielding too much influence on the artists he and emotional support that encourages them to
supported, rumors were circulated that he not explore difficult, controversial ideas and aes-
only directed the completion of some works but thetic forms, artist and writers working in this
even edited and altered some of them. His cultural milieu fell back on previously acquired
critical essays in support of abstract expres- skills and demonstrations of academic virtuos-
sionism, and especially Jackson Pollack, in the ity based on historic precedent.
late 1940s and 1950s, and his later encourage- Greenberg believed that the contemporary
ment in the 1960s of those producing color culture was corrosive, eviscerating the vitality
field paintings, including Morris Louis, and inventive potential of the best of the arts.
Kenneth Noland, and Jules Olitski, significantly Yet, he argued, there are those who resist this
affected their success. With the rise of pop art apparently inevitable decay. He identified these
and the work of other postmodernist image- artists and writers as members of an “avant-
makers in the 1970s, Greenberg’s influence garde” culture that had its historical roots in the
waned. He continued to write, lecture, and development of the bourgeois society of the
publish in important magazines and journals, 1850s and 1860s in Europe. This new social
but the power he once exercised diminished. class, and the economic capitalist system that
Greenberg’s primary critical interest was accompanied it, encouraged the emergence of
directed toward literature and drama. His first creative individuals who no longer found
article for the Partisan Review was devoted to support and inspiration in the decaying power
975
GREENBERG
and culture of the aristocracy. But neither could cultural legacy “among the cultivated of
they accept the demonstrated values of bour- mankind, over the ages, as to what was good
geois capitalism. According to Greenberg, the art and what a developed taste” (1961, p. 13).
so-called Bohemians were isolated from the Kitsch debased genuine culture by producing
Bourgeoisie, but yet they were a product of the watered down, undemanding versions of the
revolution that produced this new social and avant-garde visual and literary arts whose
economic force. The avant-garde (Bohemians) appreciation was limited to those who had
“retiring from public altogether … (seeking) developed the knowledge and taste required
to maintain the high level of their art by both for true aesthetic experiences.
narrowing and raising it to the expression of an The distinction between Kitsch and the avant-
absolute … . ‘Art for art sake’ and ‘pure poetry’ garde was projected into the coeval political con-
appear, and subject matter or content becomes flicts that were erupting throughout the Western
something to be avoided like a plague” (1961, world in 1939. Greenberg argued that the
p. 3). This statement was written two years support of kitsch in the totalitarian regimes of
before the Museum of Modern Art Exhibition Germany, Italy, and Russia was due to the fact
titled Americans 1942 when eighteen artists, that kitsch was the culture of their masses. He
from nine states, showed paintings and sculp- ends his essay with a “jaundiced” assessment of
ture. All but two of the artists represented the capitalist countries: they were in decline, but
produced representational images. still capable of producing avant-garde art which
For the avant-garde artist, Greenberg paradoxically threatens their own existence.
insisted, the aesthetic concerns and images were When Greenberg wrote “Avant-Garde and
to be found in the medium of the work in Kitsch” he was thirty years old. Though he was
progress. Painting was about painting, sculp- extraordinarily well read, his letters to his friend
ture about the making of sculpture. But he Harold Lazarus do not suggest that he was
warned that though this revolutionary art reading extensively in the areas of art history, or
should by its very elitist qualities be an art that aesthetics. There is evidence, however, that he
was supported by the economic and intellectual had taken two courses in art history while a
ruling class, it was in danger of being disowned student at Syracuse. He referred repeatedly in his
by them. He wrote, “Where there is an avant- letters to his art history teacher, Professor Irene
garde, generally we also find a rearguard. True Sargent, and it is clear that she had made a
enough – simultaneously with the entrance of lasting impression on him. Professor Sargent
the avant-garde, a second new cultural phe- became the editor of The Craftsman and in its
nomenon appeared in the industrial West: that first issue Sargent wrote an article in praise and
thing to which the Germans give the wonder- support of William Morris and his aesthetic and
ful name of Kitsch: popular, commercial art social theories. The essays and speeches by both
and literature with their chromeotypes, Morris and Gustav Stickley, who was thought to
magazine covers, illustrations, ads, slick and depend on Sargent’s intellectual and literary
pulp fiction, comics, Tin Pan Alley music, tap strengths, can be felt within Greenberg’s ideas
dancing, Hollywood movies, etc. For some about the relationships between the arts and the
reason this gigantic apparition has been taken social and economic divisions that characterized
for granted.” (1961, p. 9) the culture of the burgeoning industrial revolu-
Greenberg, from an elitist’s position, saw tion. Both Morris and Stickley emphasized the
kitsch as false “ersatz” culture that satisfied need to develop designs that honored the mate-
the needs of the middle class which had little rials, structures and the processes of their man-
preparation for an appreciation of the truly ufacture. Their belief in the ideals of socialism,
fine arts. He believed that there was a historic, their abhorrence of applied design and cheap
general agreement as to the nature of the real imitations of authentic works, are strikingly
976
GREENBERG
similar to Greenberg’s comments about kitsch, entire career. In one way or another it remained
and his insistence on a nonreferential aesthetic a cardinal precept in much of his critical
that derives its formal values from the exploita- writing.
tion of the artist’s materials. There are also Another question that rises repeatedly in
obvious similarities between Greenberg’s for- Greenberg’s aesthetic is the nature and value of
malist emphasis on the work of art as a self-ref- taste. Referring back to Immanuel Kant’s
erential entity and the earlier aesthetic concepts Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, Greenberg
of Roger Fry and Clive Bell. argued that an individual’s taste was intuited
In his second major article, “Towards a and subjective. In a 1978 seminar at Bennington
Newer Laocoon” (1940, in 2000), Greenberg College he defined taste as a directed and devel-
sought to legitimize abstract (non-representa- oped attention. He insisted that it could be stated
tional) art by establishing its historic precedents. but not defended because it was intuited, and the
He argued that by the middle of the nineteenth basis of intuition, in any individual, was beyond
century, out of a need of “self preservation” the knowing. Taste could not be learned, but could
visual arts moved away from what had been its be improved as a result of one’s experience.
primary functions, the representation of the per- Following Kant, Greenberg also insisted that
ceived visual world, and communication of ideas though taste was a personal basis for aesthetic
and feelings. Painting and sculpture had become judgment, ultimately it was also “intersubjec-
a form of visual literature which was “infecting tive,” that over time, a consensus could be
the arts with the ideological struggles of society” reached about the relative merit of unique works
(2000, p. 63). The avant-garde artists shifted of art.
their interests from subject matter to a concern In his late comments on the nature of the arts,
for the formal relationships in the work itself. Greenberg came to conclusions that suggested
Greenberg saw music and its pure non-repre- that many of the aesthetic concepts he espoused
sentational abstract methodology as a central at the beginning of his critical career had devel-
influence on the artists who were moving oped and been revised. Four decades after his
toward an art of pure form. Emphasizing the initial essay in the Partisan Review, responding
primacy of the medium in avant-garde imagery, to the works of Marcel Duchamp, he was
Greenberg went on to stipulate that paintings prepared to state that “All reality, all possibility
and sculptures were physical objects and that it is virtually art.” (1999, p. 158) He insisted,
was the ordered relationships of the physical however, that though anything we choose to
elements in these visual arts that affected the call art is art, there were still distinctions to be
viewer. To use his phrase: “Painting and sculp- drawn between good art and the mediocre; dis-
ture … look what they do. The picture or statue tinctions that depended upon taste and an
exhausts itself in the visual sensation it observer’s ability to assume an act of distancing,
produces.” (2000, p. 67) For the painter, this perceiving an object or event for its own sake as
meant that the two-dimensional flat surface of opposed to any reference it might make to
the canvas and the manipulation of the painting objects or event external to it.
medium on that flat surface, were the essential
primary concerns of the avant-garde artist. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Painting as a referential medium, one that Henri Matisse (New York, 1953).
directed a viewer’s concern to something Art and Culture: Critical Essays (Boston,
outside itself, including the illusion of three- 1961).
dimensional form and space, was no longer a The Collected Essays and Criticism, vol. 1:
legitimate aim of image-making. The exploita- Perceptions and Judgments, 1939–1945
tion and importance of the picture surface was (Chicago, 1986).
a central issue for Greenberg throughout his The Collected Essays and Criticism, vol. 2:
977
GREENBERG
Arrogant Purpose, 1945–1949 (Chicago, at Princeton University in 1923 as an instruc-

1986). tor, and was promoted up to associate profes-
The Collected Essays and Criticism, vol. 3: sor in 1928 and full professor in 1938.
Affirmations and Refusals, 1950–1956 Following the death of colleague Edward G.
(Chicago, 1993). S PAULDING , Greene was named McCosh
The Collected Essays and Criticism, vol. 4: Professor of Philosophy in 1941. In 1946 he
Modernism with a Vengeance, 1957–1969 went to Yale University as professor of phi-
(Chicago, 1993). losophy, teaching there until 1954 when he
Homemade Esthetics (New York, 1999). went to Scripps College in California as its first
The Harold Letters, 1928–1943, The Making professor in the humanities. In 1966 he became
of an American Intellectual (Washington, visiting professor of philosophy at Bowdoin
D.C., 2000). College in Maine. Over the years he was
“Towards a New Laocoon,” in Pollack and awarded honorary degrees by seven colleges,
After: The Critical Debate, ed. Francis and he was made an honorary member of
Franscina (New York, 2000), pp. 60–70. Bowdoin’s Class of 1968 and an honorary
graduate of Bowdoin. Greene died on 13
Further Reading August 1969 in Christmas Cove, Maine.
Amer Nat Bio, Encyc Amer Bio Much of Greene’s dissertation on Kant,
de Duver, Thiery de. Clement Greenberg religion, and deism was used for his introduc-
entre les lignes (Paris, 1996). tion to his 1934 translation of Kant’s Religion
Kuspit, Donald B. Clement Greenberg: Art within the Limits of Reason Alone. Greene also
Critic (Madison, Wisc., 1979). studied Kant’s aesthetics and developed his own
Rubenfeld, Florence. Clement Greenberg: A Kantian aesthetic theory for changing standards
Life (New York, 1997). of taste. The Arts and the Art of Criticism
Wilken, Karen, and Bruce Guenther. Clement (1940) was his first book on aesthetics. For
Greenberg: A Critic’s Collection Greene, “beauty” is the indefinable object of
(Princeton, N.J., 2001). subjective judgments of taste. While indefin-
able, the quality of beauty does have character-
Nathan Knobler istic powers to arouse disinterested yet satisfy-
ingly engrossing responses from human beings.
The beauty of an artifact or natural thing lies in
its formal structure and thus is manifest in a
great many things besides “works of art.” The
work of art must be both beautiful and express
GREENE, Theodore Meyer (1897–1969) an aesthetic content beyond its own existence.
This artistic beauty must be the consideration of
Theodore Meyer Greene was born on 25 any judgment of taste, and has an objective
January 1897 in Constantinople, Turkey (now existence so that judgments of taste may have
Istanbul). He earned his BA from Amherst cognitive and truth value. Greene suggests four
College in 1918. After teaching at the Forman criteria of artistic criticism: quality, perfection,
Teaching College of the University of Punjab truth, and greatness.
in India from 1919 to 1921, he went to the Greene’s later work on aesthetics is marked
University of Edinburgh to study philosophy by its treatment, rare in twentieth-century
with Norman Kemp Smith. He wrote a dis- American philosophy, of the aesthetics and phi-
sertation on “Kant’s Religious Theory and Its losophy of music. His neo-Kantian philosophy
Relation to English Deism,” and received his is summarized in his article “Life, Value,
PhD in philosophy in 1924. He began teaching Happiness” (1956) and his book Moral,
978
GRENE
Aesthetic, and Religious Insight (1957). Sense GRENE, Marjorie Glicksman (1910– )
perception requires rational interpretation, but
science is only one means of rationally organiz- Marjorie Glicksman was born on 13 December
ing experience. Others are morality, art, and 1910 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Her parents
religion, which cannot be replaced by science. were Harry and Edna Kerngood Glicksman. She
entered Wellesley College in 1927 and majored
BIBLIOGRAPHY not in philosophy but in zoology. Although inter-
The Arts and the Art of Criticism ested in philosophy as a teenager, it was not until
(Princeton, N.J., 1940). 1931, after she had graduated with her BA from
Liberal Education Reconsidered Wellesley, that her philosophical studies truly
(Cambridge, Mass., 1953). began. In 1931 she traveled to Germany as an
Our Cultural Heritage (Houston, Tex., exchange student, ending up in Freiburg im
1956). Breisgau. There, she learned her philosophy “at
Moral, Aesthetic, and Religious Insight the feet of Martin Heidegger” (Auxier and Lewis
(New Brunswick, N.J., 1957). 2002, p. 4). She read Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit
Liberalism: Its Theory and Practice (Austin, that summer – partly while at sea, heading home
Tex., 1957). to Madison for the summer recess – and returned
to Germany in the fall of 1932. During the
Other Relevant Works 1932–3 school year she studied with Karl Jaspers
Greene’s papers are at Bowdoin College in in Heidelberg while Heidegger was on leave. The
Maine. spring semester of her studies in Heidelberg were
Trans., Kant: Selections (New York, 1929). cut short by Hitler’s rise to power, and she
Trans. with Hoyt Hudson, Religion within returned to the United States, where she under-
the Limits of Reason Alone, by Immanuel took graduate study in philosophy at Radcliffe,
Kant (Chicago, 1934). “as close as females got in those days to
“A Critical Examination of Mr. Stace’s Harvard” (1995, p. 5).
Solipsism,” Journal of Philosophy 32 Glicksman earned an MA and a PhD in phi-
(1935): 197–216. losophy in 1935 from Radcliffe, writing a dis-
“The Problem of Meaning in Music and the sertation on Existenzphilosophie. She then
Other Arts,” Journal of Aesthetics and traveled to Europe again, this time to Denmark
Art Criticism 5 (1947): 308–13. on a postdoctoral fellowship, where she did
“Life, Value, Happiness,” Journal of work on Kierkegaard. She faced a bleak job
Philosophy 53 (1956): 317–30. market when she returned, as a woman in a
profession dominated by men and suffering
Further Reading the effects of the Depression. She became
Proc of APA v44, Who’s Who in Phil Director of Residence at a junior college in
Edman, Irwin. “Professor Greene’s southern Illinois. After the start of World War
‘Critique of Art’,” Journal of Philosophy II she went to the University of Chicago, where
37 (1940): 449–59. she worked as an assistant and instructor of
Squire, Russel N. The Philosophy of Music philosophy until 1944 when the men began
of George Santayana, Helen Huss returning from the war. She got the job, she
Parkhurst and Theodore Meyer Greene. said, as part of “a noble experiment,” for she
PhD dissertation, New York University was the first woman the department had ever
(New York, 1942). hired (1995, p. 5). While at Chicago, she took
part in Rudolf CARNAP’s seminar, discovering
John R. Shook that she had major misgivings about logical
positivism.
979
GRENE
From 1944 until 1957 she was out of found Heidegger’s philosophy original yet
academia, but by no means exiled from phi- prone to mystification and dogmatism. She
losophy. She had married David Grene in 1939 concluded a later essay on the Freiburg
and lived as a wife, mother, and farmer in philosopher, an essay first published in 1958,
rural Illinois until 1952, when the family with these words: “Behind the cheap rhetoric,
moved to Ireland. Although not affiliated with what is there? The ghost of the Quest for Being
any academic institution during this period, fencing with the ghost of Aristotle. Something,
Marjorie Grene continued to do important but by no means enough.” (1976, p. 70) The
work during this time, most of it related to same sort of appraisal can be found in her
existentialism. It was also during this time that 1957 book Heidegger. More recently, empha-
she met Michael POLANYI, with whom she sizing more than ever Heidegger’s political
would work closely for many years to come. In misdeeds (Grene was in attendance when
1957 she went to Manchester, England, to Heidegger presented a version of his notorious
work as Polanyi’s assistant, helping him to Rektoratsrede at the University of Heidelberg
compose his book Personal Knowledge (1958). in 1933), she finds Heidegger “a worthy suc-
In 1959 Grene held a lectureship at the cessor to Hegel as a master of German philo-
University of Leeds in England. A year later she sophical fraud” (Auxier and Lewis 2002, p.
took up a similar position at Queen’s 549).
University Belfast, Northern Ireland. Having Her skeptical view of existentialism was not
divorced David, in 1965 she moved back to the limited to Heidegger. In Dreadful Freedom: A
United States, becoming a professor of philos- Critique of Existentialism (1948) she criticized
ophy at the University of California at Davis, the other existentialists as well, so in vogue in
a position she held until retiring in 1978. Since the postwar years. At least when he was held
1988 she has been honorary distinguished pro- up to figures such as Sartre, Grene could find
fessor and adjunct professor of philosophy in Heidegger something of value, namely his
and science studies at Virginia Polytechnic anti-Cartesian philosophical perspective. At
Institute and State University. Among many least Heidegger, like Jaspers, refused the exis-
honors, Grene was named a fellow in the tentialist moniker. Though she wrote about
American Academy of Arts and Sciences in them extensively in the 1940s and 1950s, it
1976. was obvious that Grene was no existentialist.
In the years after World War II, Grene was When she returned to academic life, Grene’s
among the first thinkers to introduce American work changed direction. Working closely with
audiences to existentialism. Along with such Polanyi, perhaps the most recognized scien-
notable figures as Hazel BARNES, William tist-turned-philosopher of the time, Grene
B ARRETT , J. Glenn Gray, and Walter became interested in evolutionary theory,
KAUFMANN, she played an important role in the which would culminate in her work on the
postwar American reception of European philosophy of biology. It was also during this
ideas, a process which intellectual historians time that she began working extensively on
have only recently begun to explore in detail. Aristotle, work which led to the publication of
Grene’s writings on Heidegger, for example, A Portrait of Aristotle in 1963. The final com-
were some of the earliest interpretations of his ponent of her intellectual development during
work available in English. this time was the work of French philosopher
Despite having begun her philosophical Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
career “at Heidegger’s feet,” Grene’s relation Reading Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology
to existentialism in general, and Heidegger in of Perception in 1960 was, in her own esti-
particular, has been largely antagonistic. The mation, a kind of “revelation” (Auxier and
second essay she ever published, in 1938, Lewis 2002, p. 20). The work clarified many
980
GRENE
of the anti-Cartesian elements she had reducing them to these historical moments,
absorbed, but not fully appreciated, in her she has helped to make the history of philos-
earlier studies of existentialism. Placing Polanyi ophy more than a mere refuge for antiquari-
and Merleau-Ponty alongside evolutionary anism. Her work on Descartes, including
theory and biology, Grene tried to go beyond Descartes (1985) and Descartes Among the
the Cartesian cogito. In The Knower and the Scholastics (1991), has shown how research
Known (1966), for example, she pointed into the history of philosophy can explore his-
toward a naturalist, contextualist approach to torical themes without denying contemporary
understanding, one which would not try to contexts.
deny or surpass the embedded character of Throughout her career, Grene has helped
existence and knowing. Her work up to the broaden the horizons of American philoso-
present has continued, for the most part, these phy. In this regard, collections such as her
themes. 1976 Philosophy In and Out of Europe reveal
Grene has balanced her interests in the how important a role she has played in the
history of philosophy and the philosophy of development of American thought during the
biology, a field of inquiry which hardly existed latter half of the twentieth century. Although
when she began writing on the subject. She some might argue that her wit has sometimes
pursued both interests in opposition to the gotten the best of her philosophical judgment,
dominance of the Anglo-American tradition her work displays, like that of the best minds
of analytic philosophy, so prominent in the in the American tradition, a common-sense
American academy. In the philosophy of skepticism toward the flights of fancy endemic
biology she has written on everything from to so much philosophical writing. Her thinking
Darwinist theories of evolution to the ecolog- is often a welcome, though far from uncon-
ical psychology of J. J. GIBSON. Without in troversial, rejoinder to the jargon-laden and
any way reducing philosophy to the study of often inconsequential musings of much con-
genes and molecules, without in any way temporary philosophical work. A good
reducing it to the realm of cognitive science – example of this no-nonsense approach to phi-
indeed, in direct opposition to these “reduc- losophy is her most recent book, A
tionist” temptations – she has opened up Philosophical Testament (1995).
fruitful paths in the philosophy of biology. In If there is any thread that unites all of
the 1960s and early 1970s she was preoccu- Grene’s work, from her early writings on exis-
pied with the threat of reductionism. Grene has tentialism to the more recent work in the phi-
always been careful to protect philosophy from losophy of biology, it is her consistent anti-
the encroachment of science (especially so- Cartesianism. It is in this sense, perhaps, that
called “pure sciences” like physics), while she never fully escaped Heidegger’s shadow,
simultaneously highlighting the links between ending up where she began, still in search, like
the two. Much of her philosophical work has Heidegger, of a philosophical starting point
been devoted to such themes in the philosophy other than the Cartesian subject. Although she
of science, including Approaches to a has explored many areas of inquiry along these
Philosophical Biology (1969) and The lines, including existentialism, evolutionary
Understanding of Nature (1974), as well as theory, the work of Merleau-Ponty, and the
numerous important essays and edited philosophy of science, specifically the philoso-
volumes. phy of biology, Grene has focused on the
Grene has combated a different kind of cogito’s ever-elusive context. Her path of
reductionism in her work on the history of thought was thus shaped, almost against her
philosophy. By attempting to place thinkers in will it seems, by her early studies in Freiburg.
their historical contexts without simply In a long and distinguished career, Grene
981
GRENE
has been a pioneer. Barred for many years Ed., Interpretations of Life and Mind:
from the comfort of academic security avail- Essays Around the Problem of Reduction
able to men, she persevered to become one of (New York, 1971).
this country’s most important philosophers. Ed., Spinoza: A Collection of Critical
The first woman to be the subject of a Library Essays (New York, 1973).
of Living Philosophers volume, Grene has Ed. with Everett Mendelsohn, Topics in the
opened up numerous philosophical pathways Philosophy of Biology (Dordrecht,
with her work. With her keen philosophical 1976).
presence and her acerbic wit (which has spared Ed. with Debra Nails, Spinoza and the
few philosophers, both past and present), she Sciences (Dordrecht, 1986).
has left a lasting impact on continental phi- Ed., Dimensions of Darwinism (New York,
losophy, on research in the history of philoso- 1983).
phy, and on the philosophy of biology. Ed. with Roger Ariew, Descartes and His
Contemporaries: Meditations,
BIBLIOGRAPHY Objections, and Replies (Chicago, 1995).
Dreadful Freedom: A Critique of Ed. with David Depew, Philosophy of
Existentialism (Chicago, 1948). Reissued Biology (Cambridge, UK, 2004).
as Introduction to Existentialism
(Chicago, 1948). Further Reading
Heidegger (New York, 1957). Bio 20thC Phils, Pres Addr of APA v8,
A Portrait of Aristotle (Chicago, 1963). Women Phils
The Knower and the Known (New York, Auxier, Randall E. and Lewis E. Hahn, eds.
1966). The Philosophy of Marjorie Grene
Approaches to a Philosophical Biology (Chicago, 2002). Contains Grene’s
(New York, 1968). autobiography and bibliography.
Sartre (New York, 1973). Burian, R. M., and J. C. Pitt, eds. “The
The Understanding of Nature: Essays in the Thought of Marjorie Grene,” Synthese
Philosophy of Biology (Dordrecht, 92 (July 1992). Special issue on Grene.
1974). Cotkin, George. Existential America
Philosophy In and Out of Europe (Baltimore, Md., 2003).
(Berkeley, Cal., 1976). Donagan, Alan, A. N. Perovich, Jr., and M.
Descartes (Minneapolis, 1985). V. Wedin, eds. Human Nature and
Interactions: The Biological Context of Natural Knowledge: Essays Presented to
Social Systems, with Niles Eldredge (New Marjorie Grene on the Occasion of her
York, 1992). Seventy-Fifth Birthday (Dordrecht,
A Philosophical Testament (Chicago, 1986).
1995). Fulton, Ann. Apostles of Sartre:
Existentialism in America, 1945–1963
Other Relevant Works (Evanston, Ill., 1999).
Ed. with Thomas V. Smith, From Descartes
to Kant: Readings in the Philosophy of Martin Woessner
the Renaissance and Enlightenment
(Chicago, 1940).
Ed., Knowing and Being: Essays, by
Michael Polanyi (Chicago, 1969).
Ed., Toward a Unity of Knowledge (New
York, 1969).
982
GRICE
GRICE, Herbert Paul (1913–88) spots on little Jimmy do not really mean
measles, in this first sense of “mean,” if Jimmy
H. P. Grice was born on 15 March 1913 in does not have measles, even if the spots typi-
Birmingham, England. He was educated at cally correlate with measles. Grice called this
Clifton College in Bristol, and then at Corpus first sense of the word “natural meaning.” On
Christi College, Oxford. He read “Greats” at the other hand, there is the sense of “mean”
Oxford, the BA degree that combined classics that pertains to language and communication.
with philosophy, graduating with first class On this second sense, it is words and speakers
honors in 1936. Between 1939 and 1967, Grice which mean. To give a couple of examples,
taught philosophy as lecturer, tutor, fellow and take “The Spanish word ‘rojo’ means red”
then University Lecturer at St. John’s College, (word meaning) and “What he meant by saying
Oxford. His teaching at Oxford was inter- he was thirsty was that you should bring more
rupted by World War II, when he served for whisky” (speaker meaning). And on this sense
five years in the British Royal Navy with active of “mean,” “x means y” is closer to “x
service first in the North Atlantic, and then says/asserts that y,” “x expresses y,” and so
from 1942 in Admiralty Intelligence. Following forth. And when “x means y” is the case, it will
the war, Grice’s fame within philosophy spread usually be true that someone, or some group,
both in England and the United States. In 1967 means something by x. (Compare: the spots
he gave the prestigious William James Lectures on Jimmy do not express anything, and no one
at Harvard, later published in Studies in the meant anything by them.) In this second sense
Way of Words, and in that same year he of “mean,” it can be true that “x means y” even
became a professor of philosophy at University though x obtains when y is not the case. Thus
of California at Berkeley. He was promoted to our speaker might indeed have meant that you
full professor in 1975. Grice was President of should bring more whisky, when in reality you
the Pacific Division of the American should not: his meaning it, in this second sense,
Philosophical Association in 1974–5. In 1980 does not make it so.
he retired, although he continued to teach occa- In “Meaning,” Grice went on to analyze in
sionally until 1986. Grice also held visiting more detail this second sense of “mean,” which
positions at Harvard, Brandeis, Stanford, he called “nonnatural meaning.” His funda-
Cornell, and the University of Washington. mental idea was that for a person to mean
Grice died on 28 August 1988 in Berkeley, something, in this nonnatural sense, was for her
California. to intend to induce some belief in her hearer.
Grice is perhaps best known for two papers, More than that, it was to induce the belief by
“Meaning” of 1957 and “Logic and getting the addressee to recognize the intention
Conversation” of 1975, both reprinted in his to induce a belief: in meaning something, the
Studies in the Way of Words (1989). The article speaker does not merely cause the hearer to
“Meaning” drew attention to two quite differ- have a belief, she overtly gives him a reason to
ent senses of the word “mean.” On the one believe, the reason being that she wants him to
hand, there is the evidential relationship believe. To take the “I’m thirsty” example, the
between, say, a cause and its effect. An example idea would be that the speaker meant in the
of this sense is “Those spots mean measles.” In nonnatural sense that you should bring more
this sense of “mean,” “x means y” is related to whisky amounts to the speaker intended to
“x shows that y,” “x is a symptom of y” and induce in you the belief that you should bring
“x lawfully correlates with y”; more than that, more whisky, and he intended you to come to
a particular claim that “x means y” on this have this belief on the basis of recognizing his
first sense of “mean” can only be true if, when intention to induce it. Thus what a person
the x in question occurred, so did y. Thus those means, in the nonnatural sense, comes down to
983
GRICE
complex mental states of hers, especially inten- implicature would arise if this sentence were the
tions. As for what words and sentences in the only thing said in a letter of reference supporting
language mean, Grice thought that this could Jones’s application to graduate school! In
emerge from what beliefs those expressions were contrast, one would usually implicate that one’s
standardly used to induce. If some sentence S is own finger was broken in saying “I broke a
standardly used by speakers to induce the belief finger,” and one would usually implicate that
that Howard wants ice cream, then S will con- one had exactly one sister in saying “I have one
ventionally mean, in the nonnatural sense of sister.” These are generalized conversational
“mean,” that Howard wants ice cream. Grice implicatures.
held that linguistic meaning emerged, at bottom, Important as Grice’s papers on meaning are,
from human psychology. they are not genuinely the core of his philosophy.
Grice’s “Logic and Conversation” (in Studies The real core is conceptual-linguistic analysis.
in the Way of Words) discusses the divergence There are two facets of conceptual–linguistic
between speaker meaning and word meaning, as analysis, and both were crucial for Grice. First,
these will not always coincide. A speaker might there is the process of analyzing concepts
mean something that the words she utters don’t through careful study of language, which for
mean. The whisky example is a case in point: the Grice, is a philosophical method. Second, there
speaker meant that you should bring more is the product of that process, these being various
whisky, but his words conventionally mean only particular analyses. These are the results of
that he, the user of the sentence, is thirsty – a applying the philosophical method. Grice
mere point of information, and one which does reformed the analyzing method borrowed from
not even say what one is thirsty for. One of the the “ordinary language” school of his Oxford
key lessons of this pioneering work was that peers J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson. According
there are several kinds of “content” attaching to to Grice, to discover what is genuinely revealed
speech episodes. There is the content that derives by careful linguistic description requires a general
from what the sentence used conventionally theory of language and communication, not just
means in the language, and there is the content piecemeal observation. As he puts the point,
that the speaker manages to convey noncon- “Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic
ventionally. Most strikingly, Grice explained nuances which we have detected, we should
how the latter could happen – namely, because make sure that we are reasonably clear what
talk exchanges are a rational, cooperative sort of nuances they are.” (1989, p. 237) His
endeavor. By making use of the audience’s variation on the process/method of conceptual-
expectation that she will cooperate – she will say linguistic analysis is one half of the “core” of his
the most helpful thing she can in the most helpful philosophy. The other half consists in the par-
way – a speaker can get across something more ticular products of conceptual–linguistic
than, or something different from, what she has analysis. These products were not mere exer-
said. cises in lexical semantics, because the aim was
Grice is most famous for drawing attention to to uncover metaphysical reductive emergences
a certain kind of merely conveyed content, which of various kinds: the reduction of meaning, as
he called conversational implicatures. These we have seen, but also of perception, reason,
come in two kinds. There are implicatures which and value. Crucially, the kind of reductive
only attach in very special circumstances, and emergence Grice investigated was conceptual:
there are those which usually attach to the use of very roughly, in “Meaning,” meaning was
these words. To give examples of each, in saying claimed to be conceptually related to inten-
“Jones has beautiful handwriting and his English tions to induce beliefs and actions; in “The
is grammatical” one would not normally impli- Causal Theory of Perception,” perception was
cate that Jones was a poor student. But this held to be conceptually related to the causation
984
GRICE
of sensations; in Aspects of Reason (2001), rea- postulated entities of psychology. To address

soning was held to be conceptually related to this first misleading feature of (1), Grice thinks
(good) transitions between goal-directed states; we should allow that a phrase like “X has a red
and in The Conception of Value (1991), value sense-datum,” as used in the analysis, is really
was said to be conceptually related to an eval- just shorthand for ordinary locutions like “That
uation of whether something carried out its looks red to X,” or “It feels to X as if there is
function well. In every case, the philosophi- a red thing.” The second non-apposite objec-
cally charged kind is shown to emerge by lin- tion is that it is not enough for perceiving M
guistic–conceptual equivalence, as it were, from that M be a cause of a sense datum; for, as is
something else – possibly but not inevitably obvious, when one has a red sense datum due
something more basic. What connects these to a ripe tomato, the retina of the eye also plays
two facets of “the core of Grice’s philosophy” a causal role in giving rise to it, as does the sun;
is that one arrives at these conceptual–linguis- but neither of these things is perceived
tic analyses not via natural science, but by whenever a ripe tomato is. To address this,
applying the aforementioned method/process. Grice notes that what is meant is that the sense
As a result, “conceptual reductive emergence” datum is caused in the right way by M, namely
contrasts with the kind of physical emergence in the way that ripe tomatoes cause red sensa-
that scientists discover a posteriori, for tions. Put more carefully, then, Grice’s view is
example, that getting hotter emerges from (2) An ordinary claim that a person X per-
greater molecular motion. ceives some material object M says that (a)
Consider an example. In Grice’s 1961 paper some present-tense sense-datum statement is
“The Causal Theory of Perception” (in Studies true of X, (b) this statement reports a state of
in the Way of Words) he provides an analysis affairs for which the material object M is appro-
of the ordinary notion of perceiving a material priately causally responsible. Thesis (2) illus-
object. What he was aiming for was neither a trates the product of conceptual–linguistic
scientific hypothesis about how perception analysis, i.e., reductive emergence. But “The
actually occurs, nor a philosophically perspic- Causal Theory of Perception” also illustrates
uous amendment to ordinary talk. To the Grice’s process of analysis, as a method of
contrary, he was aiming for an analysis of our careful inspection not only of linguistic nuances,
existing notion. Simplifying for the purposes of but of what they derive from. In particular, we
illustration, Grice maintained that (1) An discover that perception emerges from causa-
ordinary claim that a person X perceives some tion and statements about “looks,” “appears,”
material object M says that X has a sense and “seems” by looking below the surface of
datum that was caused by M. Thesis (1) could ordinary talk, to see what is responsible for
use some clarification since it can be mislead- the nuances we find. Grice insists that when I
ing by suggesting two objections which are not utter “It looks to me __,” what I strictly and lit-
actually apposite. First, there is a familiar com- erally say can very well be true, even if both
plaint about this kind of appeal to sense data: doubt and denial are absent. To speak this way
we need to say what a sense datum is; and they may be odd, when there is no doubt-or-denial,
seem, at first glance, to be either peculiar philo- but only because it is misleading: it somehow
sophical constructs, or postulated entities of suggests, incorrectly, that there is doubt-or-
the kind scientists introduce. But, continues the denial. More precisely, to employ the term
objection, for Grice they can be neither, because introduced above, there is a generalized con-
(1) is meant to be an account of what ordinary versational implicature of doubt-or-denial that
people mean, when they say things like “Joan attaches to “It looks to me __” claims. But to
saw a green leaf,” and ordinary folks do not conversationally implicate something mislead-
mean to talk about philosophical constructs or ing is not to assert what is false, let alone to
985
GRICE
speak nonsense. Grice makes similar points Thus Grice and Strawson’s first premise is
about “cause.” It may be that speakers con- denied, then for any distinction there would be
versationally implicate that the situation is a serious problem if one could not give non-
unusual, when they describe the cause. But one circular necessary and sufficient conditions for
does not say that the situation is unusual. One’s its application. The distinction would have to
description of the cause of the sense datum be abandoned, even if there was independent
thus is not false, but at most peculiar and mis- reason to accept that distinction. To cite one
leading, if the perception is perfectly normal. example, the only way adequately to explain
Grice’s conceptual–linguistic analysis might the distinction between “true” and “false” is to
be threatened by W. V. QUINE’s rejection of the invoke other words in their family-circle –
analytic–synthetic distinction. Grice’s approach words like “correct,” “statement,” “entails”
is to proceed by analysis of meaning, setting and so forth. So if the analytic–synthetic dis-
aside as irrelevant “factual knowledge” that tinction is suspect on these sorts of grounds, so
clouds our intuitions about meaning – which too is the true–false distinction. But, note Grice
amounts, in effect, to seeking out analytic truths. and Strawson, one can hardly ever provide
The metaphysical emergences he purports to such an exhaustive noncircular definition.
uncover – of meaning, perception, reason, and Given this, if their first premise were false, very
value – are meant to be different from what I few distinctions would be safe. But this is
called above “physical emergence” (for example, absurd. So, since the denial of their first premise
that lightning involves a massive flow of elec- leads to absurdity, their premise must be
trons), because only the latter involves finding accepted. The second premise is that there is
synthetic truths by means of scientific investiga- independent reason for thinking that the
tion. But how can this approach even make analytic–synthetic distinction is real. In support
sense, or its products be correct, if there is no of this, Grice and Strawson note that one can
analytic–synthetic distinction? give an informal explanation of the distinction
Grice responded to Quine’s threat in “In without difficulty. Indeed, precisely because
Defense of a Dogma,” co-authored with his this is possible, philosophers have traditionally
student Peter Strawson (also reprinted in used these words without any problem,
Studies in the Way of Words). Grice and applying “analytic” to roughly the same cases
Strawson read Quine as complaining that one and “synthetic” to roughly the same cases.
cannot give a definition of “analytic” and “syn- More than that, a lay person can easily be
thetic” except by appeal to expressions that trained to make the distinction, and to apply
belong in the same family-circle, such as “nec- “analytic” versus “synthetic” to new cases.
essary,” “logical truth,” and “synonymous.” In Nor is it just that these technical terms can be
light of this, the first premise of Grice and informally explained, and have a use within
Strawson’s reply is that if there is independent philosophy. Rather, these technical words are,
reason for thinking that the analytic–synthetic as Quine also notes, connected to ordinary
distinction is real, then it is not a problem if one ones like “means the same as.” Thus there is a
cannot give noncircular necessary and suffi- pattern of ordinary usage at play, which equally
cient conditions for its application. They defend supports the presumption that the distinction is
this first premise by highlighting an absurd real. The conclusion of the two-premise
consequence if one rejects it. They note, first, argument, obviously, is that it simply is not a
that if this premise were false of the problem that the distinction has not been “ade-
analytic–synthetic distinction, it would have to quately clarified.”
be false when generalized: the analytic–syn- The theoretical motivation for the two
thetic distinction could not be the only one premises relates to Grice’s larger philosophy.
which is threatened if it “cannot be clarified.” Grice takes words to mean what they do
986
GRICE
because of how they are standardly used. But Grice is making an important point about his
then any expression which has a standard use larger project. He is, in effect, conceding that
among a population must equally have a complete reductive analyses, ones that specify
meaning. Now, “analytic” and “means the all necessary and sufficient conditions while
same as” have reliable uses, projecting even to breaking us out of a circle of related concepts,
novel cases. So, say Grice and Strawson, they are simply not to be expected. If the product of
surely have a meaning. What is more, insofar conceptual–linguistic analysis was supposed to
as the relevant community contrasts the use of be reductive analyses of that sort, Grice would
“analytic” and “synthetic,” there is a con- be in trouble, but he never intended such
trasting meaning. Thus there is good reason to results. Conceptual–linguistic analysis involves
think the distinction real. They grant that careful reflection upon the nuances of language
Quine’s writings about the analytic–synthetic use, in light of a theoretical understanding of
divide may show that the distinction cannot the contribution of standing meaning to such
bear all of the weight that certain philoso- nuances, and its product is a statement of rela-
phers have tried to hoist upon it, if it cannot tionships between concepts. Despite Quine’s
be clarified in the way Quine sought. famous attack upon the analytic–synthetic dis-
However, Grice’s larger project does not tinction, the two parts of the “core” of Grice’s
require that “analytic” and “synthetic” be philosophy remain intact.
immune to criticisms of blurriness or unclas-
sifiability. All it requires is that there be a dis- BIBLIOGRAPHY
tinction. Now, it might be that the Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge,
analytic–synthetic divide is supposed to be “a Mass., 1989).
distinction without a difference,” compara- The Conception of Value (Oxford, 1991).
ble to the “distinction” between suns and Aspects of Reason (Oxford, 2001).
stars, or between the brontosaurus and the
apatosaurus. In such cases, one has two dif- Other Relevant Works
ferent terms, but they actually pick out the very Grice’s papers are at University of California,
same thing. Or perhaps there really is only a Berkeley.
pseudo-distinction here, with expressions that “Personal Identity,” Mind 50 (1941):
end up not having any genuine sense at all, 330–50.
comparable to the “distinction” between “Vacuous Names,” in Words and
people with healthy auras versus people with Objections: Essays on the work of W. V.
auras afflicted by the evil eye. But has Quine Quine, ed. Donald Davidson and Jaakko
given us good reason to assimilate “analytic” Hintikka (Dordrecht, 1969), pp. 118–45.
either to “sun”/“star” or to “healthy “Davidson on Weakness of the Will,” with
aura”/“afflicted aura”? Such assimilation is Judith Baker, in Essays on Davidson:
not supported by the points Quine makes Actions and Events, ed. Bruce Vermazen
about how hard it is, while eschewing concepts and Merrill Hintikka (Oxford, 1985), pp.
within their family circle, to give necessary 27–49.
and sufficient conditions for being analytic “Actions and Events,” Pacific Philosophical
versus synthetic. After all, providing such a Quarterly 67 (1986): 1–35.
definition is something we can hardly ever do,
as was noted while supporting the first premise Further Reading
of Grice and Strawson’s argument, that where Amer Phils 1950–2000, Blackwell Analytic
there is independent reason to take the dis- Phil, Blackwell Comp Phils, Oxford Comp
tinction seriously, it does not matter whether Phil, Pres Addr of APA v8
a noncircular definition can be given. Avramids, Anita. Meaning and Mind: An
987
GRICE
Examination of a Gricean Account of GRONLUND, Laurence (1846–99)

Language (Cambridge, Mass., 1989).
Bach, Kent, and R. Michael Harnish. Laurence Gronlund was born on 13 July 1846
Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts in Copenhagen, Denmark. He attended the
(Cambridge, Mass., 1979). University of Copenhagen, graduating with an
Cosenza, Giovanna, ed. Paul Grice’s Heritage MA in 1865 and afterwards studied law. He
(Turnhout, Belgium, 2001). emigrated to the United States in 1867, settling
Grandy, Richard, and Richard Warner, eds. in Chicago. He was admitted to the Chicago
Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Bar in 1869 but soon gave up practicing law in
Intentions, Categories, Ends (Oxford, favor of journalism and radical socialist politics.
1986). Contains a bibliography of Grice’s He published several pamphlets advocating
writings. socialism and then produced his first major
Levinson, Stephen C. Presumptive Meanings: book, The Cooperative Commonwealth in Its
The Theory of Generalized Conversational Outlines: An Exposition of Modern Socialism,
Implicatures (Cambridge, Mass., 2000). in 1884. As a socialist he disagreed with Henry
Mackay, Alfred F. “Professor Grice’s Theory GEORGE’s single tax reform but nevertheless
of Meaning,” Mind 81 (1972): 57–66. supported his 1886 campaign for Mayor of
Martinich, A. P. “Conversational Maxims and New York. After Edward BELLAMY’s widely
some Philosophical Problems,” read book Looking Backward (1888) incor-
Philosophical Quarterly 30 (1980): 215–28. porated many of his ideas, Gronlund began
Neale, Stephen. “Paul Grice and the supporting the Nationalist movement, though
Philosophy of Language,” Linguistics and he was still active in the Socialist Labor Party.
Philosophy 15 (1992): 509–59. By 1891 he was working as a statistician in the
O’Rourke, Michael. “The Scope Argument,” office of Commissioner of Labor Statistics in
Journal of Philosophy 100 (2003): 136–57. Washington, D.C. In 1898 he moved to New
Pigden, Charles. “Two Dogmatists,” Inquiry York City and worked as an editorial writer for
30 (1987): 173–93. the New York Journal. Gronlund died on 15
Rolf, Eckard. Sagen und Meinen: Paul Grices October 1899 in New York City.
Theorie der Konversations-Implikaturen Gronlund was a radical socialist who, unlike
(Opladen, Germany, 1994). Karl Marx, favored socialist reform rather than
Ross, Peter W. “Qualia and the Senses,” the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism. In
Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2001): The Cooperative Commonwealth he articu-
495–511. lated his utopian vision about the dissolution of
Saul, Jennifer. “What Is Said and all government and the natural ascension of
Psychological Reality; Grice’s Project and the “State,” in the form of a cooperative com-
Relevance Theorists’ Criticisms,” Linguistics monwealth governed by a National Board of
and Philosophy 25 (2002): 347–72. Administrators democratically selected by the
Schiffer, Stephen. Meaning (Oxford, 1972). masses. These governors would somehow
Sperber, Dan, and Deirdre Wilson. Relevance administrate “the State” so judiciously that
(Cambridge, Mass., 1986). there would no longer be any need for laws, lit-
Strawson, Peter F. “Intention and Convention igation, or lawyers. His book was influential in
in Speech Acts,” Philosophical Review 73 the United States and England. It strongly influ-
(1964): 439–60. enced Edward Bellamy’s novel Looking
Backward (1888) which popularized
Robert J. Stainton Gronlund’s ideas and brought him so much
attention that Gronlund eventually came
publicly to endorse Bellamy’s Nationalist
988
GRÜNBAUM
movement as the means to a new socialist Favor of Social Democracy, with G. C.

society. Clemens and G. A. Hoehn (Chicago,
Gronlund and Bellamy’s works also inspired 1898).
a practical experiment in socialist utopia called
the Equality Colony in 1897. Located on 600 Further Reading
acres near Puget Sound in Washington State it Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio,
was founded by the political order known as Dict Amer Bio, Encyc Amer Bio, Nat Cycl
the Brotherhood of the Cooperative Amer Bio v11, Who Was Who in Amer v1
Commonwealth. By the fall of 1898 there were Gemorah, Solomon. “Laurence Gronlund –
over 300 people living at Equality, eager to put Utopian or Reformer?” Science and Society
Gronlund’s social philosophy into action. The 33 (1969): 446–58.
colony was governed by a General Assembly – Pittenger, Mark. American Socialists and
a group headed by a president and a board of Evolutionary Thought, 1870–1920
directors who were the elected representatives (Madison, Wisc., 1993).
of various colony “departments” such as lum- Quint, Howard H. The Forging of American
bering, milling, and education. Everyone (both Socialism: Origins of the Modern
men and women) over eighteen were allowed Movement (Columbia, S.C., 1953).
to participate in the weekly town meetings and
to vote on issues affecting colony life. The Jean Van Delinder
colony also incorporated Gronlund’s philoso-
phy of non-competition into its educational
curriculum.
Gronlund’s socialist utopia also included
sexual equality with the hope that women
would be able to pursue intellectual interests the GRÜNBAUM, Adolf (1923– )
same way that men could. Today he is mainly
known for his influence on other contemporary Adolf Grünbaum was born on 15 May 1923
social critics, including Bellamy and socialist in Cologne, Germany. He emigrated to the
union organizer Eugene DEBS. United States in 1938 and entered Wesleyan
University in Connecticut, where he received
BIBLIOGRAPHY his BA in 1943. He then earned an MS in
The Cooperative Commonwealth in Its physics from Yale University in 1948, and
Outlines: An Exposition of Modern stayed at Yale for his PhD in philosophy in
Socialism (Boston and New York, 1884). 1951, writing a dissertation on “The
Reprinted as The Cooperative Philosophy of Continuity.” From 1950 to
Commonwealth (Cambridge, Mass., 1960 Grünbaum taught at Lehigh University,
1965). becoming professor of philosophy in 1955. In
Our Destiny: The Influence of Socialism on 1960 he was appointed Andrew Mellon
Morals and Religion, an Essay in Ethics Professor of Philosophy at the University of
(London, 1891) Pittsburgh, and named the Director of the new
The New Economy: A Peaceable Solution of Center for Philosophy of Science. Grünbaum
the Social Problem (Chicago, 1898). wanted to develop a premier research insti-
tute like Herbert FEIGL’s older Minnesota
Other Relevant Works Center for Philosophy of Science. In 1961
Socialism vs. Tax-Reform: An Answer to Nicholas RESCHER was appointed associate
Henry George (New York, 1887). director, and Grünbaum and Rescher remain
Three in One: A Trinity of Arguments in the current leaders of the Center for
989
GRÜNBAUM
Philosophy of Science as Chair and Vice Chair. ness of theories; rather, he shows how it is an
Grünbaum has also been a research professor objective fact about nature that many metrics
of psychiatry since 1979. In 2003 Grünbaum will permit scientific knowledge. As Hans
resigned from the philosophy department, REICHENBACH also argued, following Albert
although he retained his position as Andrew EINSTEIN, there is no way to determine whether
Mellon Professor of Philosophy of Science. events distant from one another are simulta-
Grünbaum has received numerous honors neous, and Grünbaum points out that there is
and awards. Among them are the Senior US no way to determine whether the movement of
Scientist Award from the Alexander von a measuring rod changes its length. Therefore,
Humboldt Foundation in 1985; Italy’s Fregene measurable time relations, including the direc-
Prize for Science in 1989; the University of tion of time and even the speed of light, must
Pittsburgh’s first Master Scholar and Professor be conventionally stipulated, leading toward
Award in 1989; Yale University’s Wilbur what has been called a “causal theory of time.”
Lucius Cross Medal in 1990; the University of Grünbaum shows, however, that Einstein’s
Konstanz’s honorary doctorate in philosophy theory of general relativity required the
of science in 1995; and the University of concept of absolute space–time. Geometry and
Parma’s Silver Medal in 1998. In 1985 he gave Chronometry in Philosophical Perspective
the Gifford Lectures in Scotland and the (1968) and the second edition of Philosophical
Werner Heisenberg Lecture at the Bavarian Problems of Space and Time (1973) expand
Academy of Sciences, and in 2003 he gave the and modify several of his key arguments for his
Leibniz Lectures at the University of type of conventionalism. Some younger
Hannover. He is a member of the American philosophers of science, including Wesley
Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Académie SALMON and Bas VAN FRAASSEN, were influ-
internationale de philosophie des sciences, the enced by aspects of Grünbaum’s convention-
American Association for the Advancement alist program.
of Science, and a Laureate of the international A corollary to Grünbaum’s treatment of
Academy of Humanism. His achievements time and energy is that there is no reason to
have also been recognized by his election to believe that the universe had a beginning
two terms as President of the Philosophy of (despite the Big Bang hypothesis), and in later
Science Association from 1965 to 1970, and writings he has criticized cosmological argu-
his election as President of the American ments that presume an origin for the universe
Philosophical Association Eastern Division in and a need to explain such an origin by appeal
1982–3. He has recently been elected President to a supernatural cause. His article “The
of the Division of Logic, Methodology and Pseudo-Problem of Creation in Physical
Philosophy of Science of the International Cosmology” (1989) set out his main com-
Union of History and Philosophy of Science for plaints, and more recent articles have devel-
2004–2005, and President of the International oped his anti-theistic cosmology.
Union for the History and Philosophy of Grünbaum was not satisfied with Karl
Science for 2006–2007. Popper’s criterion of falsifiability, holding that
Grünbaum’s first book, Philosophical theory choice was far more complicated than
Problems of Space and Time (1963), elabo- merely making more experiments that might
rates his views that neither space nor time, show a theory to be false. He argued against
being continuous, have intrinsic metrics, and Popper in The Foundations of Psychoanalysis:
therefore that the foundations of physical A Philosophical Critique (1984) that Sigmund
science involving the measurement of time and Freud’s theory of psychoanalysis is indeed fal-
space are conventional. Grünbaum’s conven- sifiable. Of perhaps greater significance is that
tionalism is not aiming to show the arbitrari- Freud, according to Grünbaum, violated many
990
GRÜNBAUM
fundamental principles of scientific reasoning Geometry and Chronometry in

in his defenses of psychoanalysis. In addition, Philosophical Perspective (Minneapolis,
Grünbaum claims, Freud unreasonably argued 1968).
that since his type of therapy by analysis is Observation and Theory in Science, with
uniquely effective, his theory of the develop- Ernest Nagel and Sylvain Bromberger
ment of personality is superior. (Baltimore, Md., 1971).
Grünbaum did not want to move too far in The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A
the opposite direction from Popper’s falsifia- Philosophical Critique (Berkeley, Cal.,
bility toward the sort of relativism that cannot 1984).
find any sufficient reason to prefer one theory Validation in the Clinical Theory of
over another. For example, Grünbaum argued Psychoanalysis: A Study in the
against what he took to be the thesis of Pierre Philosophy of Psychoanalysis (Madison,
Duhem and W. V. QUINE that a theory may Conn., 1993).
always be suitably modified to avoid falsifica- Philosophy of Science in Action: Collected
tion. Grünbaum’s own philosophy of theory Papers, 2 vols (Oxford, 2005).
choice has largely stayed with the limits of the
empiricism of probabalistic inductivism, Other Relevant Works
seeking theories whose ability to explain “Causality and the Science of Human
observed phenomena can best be extended to Behavior,” American Scientist 40 (1952):
explain new phenomena. 665–76.
Grünbaum has been a staunch defender of “Logical and Philosophical Foundations of
naturalism against phenomenalism on the one the Special Theory of Relativity,”
hand and supernaturalism on the other. In American Journal of Physics 23 (1955):
“Causality and the Science of Human 450–64.
Behavior” (1952) and some other writings he “Law and Convention in Physical Theory,”
defends compatibilism. This compatibilism Current Issues in the Philosophy of
holds that all human behavior is open to sci- Science, ed. Herbert Feigl and Grover
entific explanation regardless of whether the Maxwell (New York, 1961), pp. 140–55.
explanation uses deterministic or statistical sci- “Carnap’s Views on the Foundations of
entific laws, and that our feelings of freedom Geometry,” The Philosophy of Rudolf
are irrelevant to the explanatory success of Carnap, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (La Salle, Ill.,
those theories. In addition to criticizing cos- 1963), pp. 599–684.
mological arguments for God, Grünbaum has “Can We Ascertain the Falsity of a
criticized theism on various other grounds, Scientific Hypothesis?” Studium Generale
including arguments that morality grounded 22 (1969): 1061–93.
on divine authority is monstrous and that “The Meaning of Time,” in Essays in
belief in God may be a delusion caused by Honor of Carl G. Hempel: A Tribute on
irrational psychological motives. Grünbaum’s the Occasion of His Sixty-fifth Birthday,
preferred stance is secular humanism. ed. Nicholas Rescher (Dordrecht, 1969),
pp. 147–77.
BIBLIOGRAPHY “Popper’s Views on the Arrow of Time,” in
Philosophical Problems of Space and Time The Philosophy of Karl Popper, ed. Paul
(New York, 1963; 2nd edn, Dordrecht, A. Schilpp (La Salle, Ill., 1974), pp.
1973). 775–97.
Modern Science and Zeno’s Paradoxes “Is the Method of Bold Conjectures and
(Middletown, Conn., 1967; 2nd edn, Attempted Refutations Justifiably the
London, 1968). Method of Science?” British Journal for
991
GRÜNBAUM
the Philosophy of Science 27 (1976): 35 (1999): 19–35.

105–36. Earman, John et al., eds. Philosophical
“Freud’s Theory: The Perspective of a Problems of the Internal and External
Philosopher of Science,” Proceedings and Worlds: Essays on the Philosophy of
Addresses of the American Philosophical Adolf Grünbaum (Pittsburgh, 1993).
Association 57 (1983): 5–31. Horwich, Paul. “Grünbaum on the Metric
“Psychoanalysis and Theism,” The Monist of Space and Time,” British Journal for
70 (1987): 152–92. the Philosophy of Science 26 (1975):
Ed. with Wesley C. Salmon, The 199–211.
Limitations of Deductivism (Berkeley, Jokic, Aleksandar, ed. Philosophy of
Cal., 1988). Physics and Psychology: Essays in Honor
“The Pseudo-Problem of Creation in of Adolf Grünbaum (Amherst, N.Y.,
Physical Cosmology,” Philosophy of 2005).
Science 56 (1989): 373–94. Moreland, J. P. “Libertarian Agency and
“In Defense of Secular Humanism,” Free the Craig/Grünbaum Debate about
Inquiry 12 (Fall 1992): 30–39. Theistic Explanation of the Initial
“The Hermeneutic Versus the Scientific Singularity,” American Catholic
Conception of Psychoanalysis: An Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1997):
Unsuccessful Effort to Chart a via media 539–54.
for the Human Sciences,” in Einstein Robinson, Paul. “Adolf Grünbaum: The
Meets Magritte, ed. D. Aerts, J. Philosophical Critique of Freud,” in
Broekaert, and E. Mathijs (Dordrecht, Freud and His Critics (Berkeley, Cal.,
1999), pp. 219–39. 1993), pp. 179–266.
“A New Critique of Theological Swinburne, Richard. “Reply to
Interpretations of Physical Cosmology,” Grünbaum,” British Journal for the
British Journal for the Philosophy of Philosophy of Science 51 (2000): 481–5.
Science 51 (2000): 1–43. Von Eckardt, Barbara. “Adolf Grünbaum:
“The Poverty of Theistic Cosmology,” Psychoanalytic Epistemology,” in Beyond
British Journal for the Philosophy of Freud: A Study of Modern
Science 55 (2004): 561–614. Psychoanalytic Theorists, ed. J. Reppen
(Hillsdale, N.J., 1985), pp. 353–403.
Further Reading
Bio 20thC Phils, Oxford Comp Phil, Pres John R. Shook
Addr of APA v9
Barrett, William, et al. “A Panel Discussion
of Grünbaum’s Philosophy of Science,”
Philosophy of Science 36 (1969):
331–99.
Cohen, Robert S., and Larry Laudan, eds. GULLIVER, Julia Henrietta (1856–1940)
Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis:
Essays in Honor of Adolf Grünbaum Gulliver was born on 30 July 1856 in
(Dordrecht, 1983). Norwich, Connecticut, to Frances Curtis
Craig, William Lane. “Professor Grünbaum Gulliver and John Putnam Gulliver, a minister,
on Creation,” Erkenntnis 40 (1994): theologian, and later President of Knox
325–41. College in Illinois. Gulliver was one of the first
Garvey, Brian. “Adolf Grünbaum on professional academic women philosophers.
Religious Delusions,” Religious Studies She was part of the first class of Smith College
992
GULLIVER
in Massachusetts, and earned a BA in 1879. Libertarians deny that “the physical law of cau-
After further study with her father she received sation is applicable to volitions” (p. 64). Second,
a PhD in philosophy from Smith College in Ritchie espoused sociological determinism,
1888. Her dissertation was titled “The believing “that it is no more possible that a man
Substitutes for Christianity Proposed by Comte … should act otherwise than he does than that
and Spencer.” Gulliver was the second woman a lily should produce rosebuds” (p. 65). Gulliver
to receive a PhD in philosophy in America, maintained that Ritchie’s approach makes God
preceded by May Preston Slosson in 1880, responsible for all human acts, good and evil. A
and followed by Eliza R ITCHIE in 1889. libertarian point of view allows for at least the
Gulliver also had a year of study with Wilhelm possibility that humans are responsible for their
Wundt at the University of Leipzig during own moral decisions.
1892–3. In 1910 her alma mater awarded her Gulliver lived on the cusp of two eras, and her
the honorary LLD political philosophy illustrates ways in which
Gulliver taught at Rockford Seminary in she sought to balance these two eras and ways
Illinois as head of the department of philoso- of thinking, the conservative neo-Hegelian
phy and biblical literature from 1890 to 1919, idealism of the nineteenth century, and the pro-
and also was its President from 1902 to 1919. gressivism of the early twentieth century. In her
She published several articles in academic and most significant work, Studies in Democracy, she
quasi-academic journals and published two applauds the American ideal of equality. At the
books, a translation of Wundt’s ethics (1894) same time, she cautions that equality is not that
and a discussion of political philosophy, the interests and ideals of all should be identical,
Studies in Democracy (1917). She was one of but there should be a “vital idea of diversity,
the first fifteen women to join the American wealth of varying opportunity” (p. 27). It is
Philosophical Association, founded just after naïve to believe that persons of different races
the turn of the century. Gulliver died on 25 and social classes are meant to be economically
July 1940 in Eustis, Florida. and socially equal in Gulliver’s view, only that
Gulliver’s 1894 response to an article by they are meant to have an equal chance to
Ritchie on free will in the journal Philosophical progress. She also approves of women’s
Review marks the first public debate between increased participation in social and political
two of America’s first academic women life, but for classically conservative and mater-
philosophers. Both influenced by early nalistic reasons: women are the conservators in
American idealism, Gulliver and Ritchie nev- society (while men are the initiators for Gulliver).
ertheless disagreed strongly on the nature of If given the opportunity to influence political
human will and its freedom to choose within life, they will help maintain peace and harmony.
a world that is at least partly fixed and deter- Because they are nurturers and community
mined. Ritchie took the Spinozist point of builders, women will also help bring unity and
view, that the human will is free, but only altruism to an egoistic and atomistic world.
within a deterministic framework. Gulliver did The most difficult matter that Gulliver
not wholly disagree with Ritchie, but believed addresses in Studies in Democracy is that of
that her arguments were flawed and that she how to reconcile “the two ideals of welfare and
represented the views of thinkers like Gulliver freedom.” Here she compares the efficiency
incorrectly. She had two main criticisms of of autocratic socialism in Germany to the
Ritchie. First, the “libertarians” that Ritchie relative inefficiency of democratic capitalism in
criticizes do not misunderstand the nature of America, and notes that the German system
causation. They simply object to a simple def- has many merits. It is an incredibly productive
inition that makes no distinction between and orderly society, with each individual con-
physical causation and “psychical” causation. tributing to the greater good of the whole.
993
GULLIVER
Even so, the sacrifice of individual liberty is not Philosophical Review 3 (1894): 62–7.
worth the efficiency manifested in the “Tito Melema,” New World 4 (December
European nation. America simply needs to 1895): 687–96.
take a few lessons in the development of char- “The Temptation of Mr. Bulstrode: A Study
acter and cooperation that emanate from of the Subconscious Self,” New World 9
Germany’s tightly controlled social, economic, (September 1900): 503–16.
and political environment. This can be done by “Modern Educational Ideals,” Smith
educating and inspiring individuals to aim for College Monthly (December 1903):
the higher good – the good of the community 178–80.
– not simply of each individual self. An “A Basic Principle of Growth,”
American, she maintains, can “attain the full Kindergarten Magazine 18 (1905):
stature of a man through a big-visioned self- 133–40.
direction and self-expression in the larger self Studies in Democracy (New York, 1917).
of the business or the community of which he
forms a part” (p. 97). Other Relevant Works
Gulliver did not specialize in a particular Gulliver’s papers are at Rockford College,
area, but instead wrote several articles on a Illinois.
range of philosophical subjects: the subcon- Trans. with Margaret F. Washburn and
scious, the nature of dreams, religion, and lit- Edward B. Titchener, Ethics: An
erature. While her contributions to philosophic Investigation of the Facts and Laws of
discourse were limited, her contribution to Moral Life, by Wilhelm Wundt (New
philosophy as a profession was considerable. York, 1897).
Gulliver was among the first women in
America to study philosophy at the doctoral Further Reading
level, one of the first female members of the Amer Nat Bio, Who Was Who in Amer v1,
APA, an early woman academic administrator, Women Phils
and an advocate of higher education for Walhout, Donald. “Julia Gulliver as
women. She helped break barriers to the pro- Philosopher,” Hypatia: A Journal of
fessional philosophical world that were based Feminist Philosophy 16 (2001): 72–89.
purely on gender, not ability.
Dorothy Rogers
BIBLIOGRAPHY
“The Psychology of Dreams,” Journal of
Speculative Philosophy 14 (1888):
204–18.
“The Substitutions for Christianity
Proposed by Comte and Spencer,” New GUNTER, Pete Addison Yancy, III (1936– )
Englander and Yale Review 43 (March
1884): 246–61. Pete A. Y. Gunter was born on 20 October 1936
“Shelley – The Poet,” New Englander and in Hammond, Indiana. After a nine-year resi-
Yale Review 52 (February 1890): dence in New York, the family moved to Texas.
138–47. Gunter holds BA degrees in philosophy and lit-
“What Value has Goethe’s Thought of God erature from the University of Texas (1958), a
for Us?” Andover Review 9 (August BA in philosophy from the University of
1891): 133–45. Cambridge (1960), and a PhD from Yale
“Reply to Eliza Ritchie’s ‘The Ethical University (1963). He taught at Auburn
Implications of Determinism’,” University (1962–5) and the University of
994
GUNTER
Tennessee (1965–9). He then moved to North point. He reinterprets Bergson for contempo-
Texas University in 1969, and he has been rary American philosophy in arguing for con-
Regents’s University Professor there since 1987. nectivity between Bergson’s stress on intuition
His honors include membership in Phi Beta and his modifications of simplistic, mechanistic
Kappa (1957), Marshall Scholar (1958–60), science. Gunter shows how these views can be
membership in the Texas Institute of Letters synthesized in an account of sound, reflective life
(1973), and the San Antonio Conservation sciences. Some Mexican and South American
Society Book Award (1998). philosophies, where Bergson is a major influence,
Gunter is best known for his work in envi- have room for this revitalized Bergson. Such
ronmental ethics. His academic and environ- emphases allow for a future-oriented blend of
mental specialties are woven into a complex environmental and economic concerns within a
unity in his teaching, writing, and lobbying for workable land ethic for all the Americas.
more progressive environmental and ecological
stances. His is a major North American voice in BIBLIOGRAPHY
these fields. Gunter’s initiatives have contributed The Big Thicket: A Challenge for
the passage of significant national and state leg- Conservation (Austin, Tex., 1972).
islation protecting green spaces and ecological Henri Bergson: A Bibliography (Bowling
enclaves. He became Chairman of the Big Green, Ohio, 1974).
Thicket Task Force of the Texas Committee on The Big Thicket: An Ecological Reevaluation
Natural Resources in 1992. He linked organiz- (Denton, Tex., 1993).
ing efforts in several environmental fields with a Texas Land Ethics, with Max Oelschlaeger
philosophy of creativity when he alleged in The (Austin, Tex., 1997).
Big Thicket (1993) that working to set up bio- “Bergson and The War Against Nature” in
logical and environmental sanctuaries “allows The New Bergson, ed. J. Mallarkey
man and nature, economics and ecology, to (Manchester, UK, 1999), pp. 168–82.
coexist … . In a world where good causes often
die and honest hopes lose themselves in sheer Other Relevant Works
futility, something lasting and living has been Ed. and trans., Bergson and the Evolution of
actually achieved. People tried, and it mattered.” Physics (Knoxville, Tenn., 1969).
(1993, pp. 167, 189) Ed. with Andrew C. Papanicolaou, Bergson
Gunter has cultivated the philosophy of and Modern Thought: Towards a Unified
science, metaphysics, philosophy of literature, Science (Chur, Switzerland, 1987).
and ecological ethics, with the philosophy of Ed., Creativity in George Herbert Mead
Henri Bergson serving as a departure point for (Lanham, Md., 1990).
richly diverse studies in the work of a score of
leading American and European philosophical Further Reading
personages of the twentieth century. Gunter’s Davis, Harold E. Latin American Thought
literary studies, coupled with his insider’s knowl- (Baton Rouge, La., 1972).
edge of those figures, enable him to configure Grogin, R. C. The Bergsonian Controversy in
their complex philosophical positions with France (Calgary, 1988).
singular brevity and clear effect. Gunter has done Leopold, Aldo. A Sand County Almanac
major service to remove the anti-intellectual label (Oxford, 1989).
which the Anglo-American analytic tradition Stewart, Sharon. Toxic Tour of Texas
often associates with Bergson and his work. (Houston, Tex., 1992).
Gunter’s efforts have been the first steps in
showing that Bergson’s philosophy can con- Bertrand Helm
tribute to a life-centered environmentalist view-
995
GURWITSCH
GURWITSCH, Aron (1901–73) describe what is perceived just and precisely as

it is perceived. This integral percept can then be
Aron Gurwitsch was born on 17 January 1901 explained by internal factors, especially attitude
in Vilnius, Lithuania, which was then part of and past experience, combined with external
Imperial Russia. He was descended from rab- stimulation of the sense organs. Like William
binical scholars on both sides of his family; his JAMES’s “object of thought,” the perceived-as-
Westernizing father owned forests in Ukraine perceived is very like what Husserl called the
and exported timber to Germany before World “noema,” and as we shall see, Gurwitsch’s phe-
War I, when the family fortune was lost. The nomenology is noematically oriented.
family moved to Danzig in 1907, where Gurwitsch’s dissertation, “Phänomenologie
Gurwitsch attended the classical Gymnasium der Thematik und des reinen Ich,” was first
for twelve years. Gurwitsch entered the accepted by Max Scheler, who died before the
University of Berlin in 1919, where he became thesis could be defended, and then by Moritz
a student of Carl Stumpf, who, like Edmund Geiger. It was published in the organ of the
Husserl, was a student of Franz Brentano. Gestalt school, Psychologische Forschung, in
Under Stumpf’s guidance, he studied mathe- 1929 and translated in Gurwitsch’s Studies in
matics and theoretical physics as well as phi- Phenomenology and Psychology (1966).
losophy. After two years, Stumpf sent him to Husserl was quite impressed by it and they met
Husserl at Freiburg University, where he could regularly until 1933.
only stay a semester for bureaucratic reasons, After a year as Geiger’s personal assistant at
but he heard the lectures on Natur und Geist Göttingen, Gurwitsch married Alice Stern and
and considered himself a constitutive phenom- became a research fellow at the Prussian
enologist thereafter. Stumpf next advised study Ministry of Science, Art, and Public Education
with the psychiatrist Kurt Goldstein and the in Berlin, where he essentially completed Die
Gestalt psychologist Adhémar Gelb at the insti- mitmenschlichen Begegnungen in der
tute at Frankfurt for the investigation of the Milieuwelt (although this was only published
after-effects of brain injuries. and translated into English posthumously).
Goldstein’s influence on Gurwitsch is exten- When the National Socialist Party came to
sive, but it was in a lecture by Gelb that he had power in January 1933, Gurwitsch’s fellow-
the insight that the Gestaltist abandonment of ship was canceled because he was a Jew. (Some
the constancy hypothesis was an incipient phe- years later Gurwitsch’s mother was killed at
nomenological reduction. The constancy Auschwitz.)
hypothesis assumes a one-to-one correlation On 1 April 1933, the day of the boycott of
between local stimulations of sense organs, on Jewish shops, Gurwitsch and his wife left
the one hand, and experiential sensations, on Germany without visas for Paris, where he
the other. When the predicted sensations are knew only Alexandre KOYRÉ and Lucien Lévy-
not found in perception, “unnoticed sensa- Bruhl, but he had spoken French since child-
tions” were posited along with a dualism with hood and had a deep appreciation of French
higher factors responsible for the distortion of culture from his father. Alice was soon working
the supposedly true situation with the sensa- alongside Hannah ARENDT in helping Jewish
tions. orphans emigrate to Palestine. In 1933–4
The constancy hypothesis is neither self- Gurwitsch began teaching at L’Institut
evident nor experimentally demonstrable, since d’Histoire des Sciences at the Sorbonne in Paris
it is assumed in any experiment designed to with a series of lectures on Gestalt theory
prove it. But with the constancy hypothesis dis- attended by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who had
missed, there is no need to introduce unno- already read Gurwitsch’s dissertation, and
ticed sensations and higher factors; one can Gurwitsch subsequently lectured on intentional
996
GURWITSCH
psychology, the phenomenology of eideation, Herbert SPIEGELBERG pronounced it the most

and constitutive phenomenology. His posthu- substantial original work produced by a
mously published Esquisse de la phénoménolo- European phenomenologist in the United
gie constitutive is chiefly based on the last of States. Excised from the manuscript was a
these lectures. It is difficult to doubt that Jean- segment of 150 pages posthumously published
Paul Sartre heard of Gurwitsch’s non-egologi- as Marginal Consciousness (1985).
cal conception of consciousness from Merleau- Unfortunately, this text was never expanded to
Ponty. include an Auseinandersetzung with Merleau-
Gurwitsch and Alfred SCHUTZ had been rec- Ponty and Sartre, whom Gurwitsch considered
ommended to each other by Husserl; they his peers in the creative development of phe-
finally met in 1937, and their twenty-year cor- nomenology. These two works are the chief
respondence documents their friendship and sources for the following exposition of his phi-
complementary thinking. Schutz helped losophy.
Gurwitsch evade the Nazis a second time by “Consciousness” has the broad signification
facilitating his emigration to the United States for Gurwitsch that it has for Husserl, and thus
in 1940. He lived on grants and temporary includes valuing and willing, but the emphasis
instructorships at Johns Hopkins University for both is on cognition. They also share the
and elsewhere (Alice worked in a purse factory) project of a theory of the formal, cultural, and
until he became an assistant professor of math- natural sciences that distinguishes constitutive
ematics at the new Brandeis University in 1948. phenomenology from much subsequent
He moved to the philosophy department in concern with human existence and metaphys-
1951. ical themes. Gurwitsch’s phenomenology is
Schutz tried twice unsuccessfully to bring called constitutive because it is focused on how
Gurwitsch to the New School for Social all objects indicate the intentional consciousness
Research. But upon Schutz’s death in 1959, for which they are identical or different,
Gurwitsch became his successor at the New animate or inanimate, experienced in various
School. Working alongside Dorion Cairns, he ways, posited in various ways, and so on, but
taught during a time when phenomenology while Husserl emphasized the noetic side of
was attracting much attention in the US and the the noetico-noematic correlation whereby all
New School was a major center. During this consciousness is consciousness-of, Gurwitsch,
period he composed Leibniz: Philosophie des as mentioned, emphasized all objects as-objects-
Panlogismus and was preparing to write a book of-consciousness.
entitled Reality and Logic. He retired in 1972 Again like Husserl and also like Schutz,
with an additional pension awarded by the Gurwitsch recognized two versions of consti-
German government to compensate for the tutive phenomenology, transcendental and
career denied him by the Nazis. He died on 6 mundane. But like Husserl, he emphasized the
June 1973 in New York City. His wife survived transcendental version, while Schutz found the
until 1996 and facilitated the editing and/or mundane version, phenomenological psychol-
translating of four posthumous volumes of his ogy, sufficient for his purposes. Gurwitsch
writings. There was a Festschrift for Gurwitsch rejected phenomenologically the sensuous
in 1972 and there have been two memorial hyletic data of Husserl and, in addition, he
volumes; a six-volume set of his works in returned to the early James and the early
English is currently in preparation. Husserl by denying that there are egos or I’s
During World War II Gurwitsch began work who engage in consciousness and bestow
on his magnum opus, The Field of meaning on sense data. He was as unable to
Consciousness (appearing first in French in observe reflectively such an alleged subject of
1957, then the English original in 1964). consciousness just as he was unable to observe
997
GURWITSCH
reflectively any dualism of sensations and which are perceptual presentations of the whole
supervenient factors in objects-as-perceived. building. This also holds for looking at it from
Drawing on Wolfgang KÖHLER’s work on within. In this case, the areas of the room
chimpanzees, and later Heidegger’s Sein und behind one’s back and also other rooms and the
Zeit, Gurwitsch emphasizes how objects can outside of the building are vague, just like the
have functions or uses in relation to actions, other side of the building is when it is seen
explains in Gestaltist terms how such uses arise from any one side. While there is thus a multi-
and can change, and holds that objects are plicity of perceptual appearances of the object-
cultural by virtue of having such uses. This not as-seen over against an identical object seen,
only implies that chimpanzees have basic there is also a multiplicity of mental acts or
culture, but defines the subject matter of the experiences over against each identical appear-
cultural sciences, the subject matter of the ance, which one can verify by remaining in one
natural sciences being derived through abstrac- standpoint while shutting and opening one’s
tion from such functions or uses that objects eyes repeatedly; the visual appearance is then
always already have. He thus accepted that the the same, but there are manifold correlative
cultural sciences have priority over the natural seeings. In the technical terminology of phe-
sciences, which was also accepted by Husserl, nomenology, the seeings are noeses while the
Schutz, John DEWEY, and others. appearances are noemata.
To approach Gurwitsch’s description of the More than seeing, however, is involved when
structure of the field of consciousness into one looks at a building. For one thing, it is
theme, context, and margin, it is best to deter- beautiful, plain, or ugly, and thus has value,
mine what a noematic core is for him. This and it is used for some purpose that is referred
core is also called the “what” of consciousness to with such words as “school,” “home,” or
or the noematic Sinn. Since the word “what” “church.” The expressions, “as-looked-at” and
does not have an adjectival form and since the “as-seen” emphasize what Husserlians call
German Sinn can be misleading even when “manners of givenness” (Gegebenheitsweise),
translated as “sense,” the third noun, “core,” which in this case is serious rather than fictive
which can be used as an adjective, is preferable. and perceptual rather than memorial or expec-
The following multi-step approach to the tational. Manners of givenness discernable
noematic core is derived from Husserl’s Ideen reflectively in noemata include perceivedness,
I (1913), but the example – seeing a building – rememberedness, expectedness, clarity, obscu-
is from Gurwitsch: one might remember seeing rity, etc. While Gurwitsch emphasizes the
or expect to see a building, or one might building as-looked-at, what is seen is seen as
imagine or feign seeing it; in addition, one able to be touched, heard, smelled, and tasted;
might touch, smell, taste, or even hear it, for for example, an orange looks tasty. However,
example, when the door is knocked on. But his the full or concrete noema includes not only
analysis focuses on a building-as-seriously- manners of givenness, but also values and uses
looked-at. that correlate with components of valuing and
What one sees in looking at a building is the willing in the correlative noeses. Like Husserl,
whole building – its back and inside vaguely Gurwitsch mentions these non-cognitive com-
included – as it appears from a particular side. ponents of noemata and noeses, but emphasizes
A side does not present itself as something the perceived-as-perceived.
separate, but as a member of a system of Reflection is required to recognize what has
noemata that is what it is in relation to other been described. It contrasts with straightfor-
appearances in the system. If one walks around, ward encountering in which not only the noeses
approaches, and draws away from the building, but also the noemata are, as it were, overlooked
there is a succession of appearances, all of in dealing simply with things, for example,
998
GURWITSCH
going into the house, sitting down at one’s can be described in terms of shapes and colors
desk, and writing a letter. For a noematically- in relation to one another, so that the central
oriented constitutive phenomenologist such as square opening on a vertical surface appears as
Gurwitsch, it is the object-as-encountered that it does in relation to the lateral openings beside
is reflected upon. it, and the oblong opening at one end with the
Noematic characteristics of both the posi- moveable part that can fit it. The same goes for
tional and experiential kinds can be abstracted the surface areas between them: some parts are
from; performing that abstraction yields the terminals and others intervals, one can also
“noematic core,” the core of the noema (which, speak of similarity, equidistantiality, bound-
as already mentioned, is also called the “what” aries, and so on. But throughout, the side from
or “sense”). And a core can be recognized as which this object is looked at refers to the other
identical while the manner of givenness changes sides, including the inside and the top and
from expectedness through perceivedness to bottom sides, so that there is a whole in which
rememberedness (or a value goes from positive the front is what it is in relation to the back,
to negative or the object from having a means- top, etc. This is a different account of a seen
use to having an end-use). Finally, noematic object than is found in Husserl.
cores can be described in what Husserl calls The general structure of the field of con-
“material-ontological” terms such as “thing,” sciousness is also a matter of objects of con-
“shape,” “cause,” “rough,” “hard,” and sciousness reflectively observed and analyzed
“colored,” as well as “formal-ontological” and it culminates Gurwitsch’s distinctive
terms such as “object,” “property,” and “state position. Every total field of objects-as-encoun-
of affairs.” The core of the noema of the tered has three domains. At the center is the
looking at a building might then be described focus of attention that he calls the “theme.”
by saying it is oblong, thirty feet tall, green on This could be the building looked at. Then
the smooth vertical sides, and yellow on top, there is a context of items simultaneously
with nine separate spaces with oblong openings intended-to that is relevant to the theme and
between them inside, and so on, and is of such forms the background against which it stands
a description whether expected, perceived, or out as the center. Gurwitsch calls this relevant
remembered and when believed, valued, and context the “thematic field.” This could be the
willed in whatever ways. surrounding neighborhood, but it might also
Phenomenology can thus clarify much that is be a set of past buildings composing the tra-
usually taken for granted. Yet since Gurwitsch dition to which an architectural type belongs.
rejected some of Husserl’s terms and concepts And then there are other simultaneously
– for example, hyletic data and noetic morph, intended-to items that have no relevancy to
as well as sense “bestowed” by an ego or I – he the theme and thus make up what he calls the
was obliged to develop alternative descriptions. “margin.” In Gestaltist terms, when items are
This he did with Gestaltist terms. This can be marginal they have merely “and-connections”
further illustrated with the building-as-looked- with the theme. Yet they are potential themes
at. The building is a Gestalt, an ensemble of and items of relevancy; for example, a barking
items that mutually support and determine one dog, can become thematic instead of the
another. Each detail exists only at the place at building that thereupon becomes marginal
which it plays the role assigned to it by the within one’s total theme or as relevant to
whole of which it is a part. This is fairly obvious where the dog is heard to be located. If an item
for doors, windows, walls, floors, ceilings, and can cease to be marginal with a change of the
so on, but those terms refer to architectural perceiver’s perspective, it belongs to the
components identified in terms of their use. If “halo” within the margin; otherwise, it is in
uses are abstracted from, the same components the “horizon” there.
999
GURWITSCH
Gurwitsch identifies three constants within Husserl’s positions; offered alternatives for
reality, at least two of which are marginal at a them; and carried transcendental phenome-
given time. These are one’s own body; the inner nology further through the creative use of
time of one’s stream of consciousness; and the Gestaltist notions (notions devised as well as
real world as a whole. All three are marginal borrowed). And indeed he does this to such an
when one thematizes non-real or ideal objects extent that his philosophy can be called
such as theorems when one is thinking mathe- “Gestalt phenomenology.”
matically. But when one of these three is the-
matized, the others will be marginal or relevant. BIBLIOGRAPHY
But for Gurwitsch, what unifies one’s whole Théorie du champ de la conscience, trans.
field with the possible changes exemplified is Michel Butor (Paris, 1957).
the stream of consciousness within which the The Field of Consciousness (Pittsburgh,
consciousnesses of the various and varying 1964).
items are “co-present,” in other words, occur- Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology
ring together, a position that could be expected (Evanston, Ill., 1966).
of a constitutive phenomenologist. The three Phenomenology and the Theory of Science,
constancies of body, inner time, and real world ed. Lester Embree (Evanston, Ill., 1974).
are “orders of existence” (there are ideal orders Die mitmenschlichen Begegnungen in der
as well). An order of existence is made up of Milieuwelt, ed. Alexandre Métraux (Berlin,
items and data referred to through the con- 1977). Trans. Fred Kersten, Human
sciousness of indefinite continuation of context Encounters in the Social World
– as in the context as continuing beyond items (Pittsburgh, 1979).
of immediate relevancy to a given theme, a Marginal Consciousness, ed. Lester Embree
sharp line between a thematic field and the rest (Athens, Ohio, 1985).
of the order of existence being difficult to draw. Esquisse de la phénoménologie constitutive,
For example, other buildings in the neighbor- ed. José Huertas-Jourda (Paris, 2002).
hood can be relevant to the building thema-
tized, but the context of the real world to which Other Relevant Works
the building belongs extends indefinitely in Gurwitsch’s papers are at Duquesne
space, time, and causality, as noematic reflec- University, Pittsburgh. Copies are at the
tion shows. Center for Advanced Research in
Finally, orders of existence have “relevancy Phenomenology at the University of
principles.” For reality in general the relevancy Memphis, Tennessee, and at the
principle is temporality, with both spatiotem- Sozialwissenschaftliches Archiv at the
poral and purely temporal orders being parts of University of Konstanz, Germany.
reality. Streams of consciousness also belong to Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch:
reality in general and make up the intersubjec- Briefwechsel 1939–1959, ed. Richard
tivities correlative to which there is objectivity. Grathoff (Munich, Germany, 1985).
But when consciousness as a temporal order Trans. J. Claude Evans, Philosophers in
presents itself as a purely temporal and inten- Exile: The Correspondence of Alfred
tional order, and thus not as part of the spa- Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch, 1939–1959
tiotemporal world, it can be called “transcen- (Bloomington, Ind., 1989).
dental” and be reflectively seen to ground the
world and the sciences of its aspects, which is Further Reading
a constitutive phenomenological position in Who Was Who in Amer v6, Who’s Who in
philosophy. Phil
Gurwitsch developed objections to some of Embree, Lester, ed. Life-World and
1000
GUTHRIE
Consciousness: Essays for Aron Gurwitsch losophy at the University of Washington. In

(Evanston, Ill., 1972). 1919 he transferred to the new department of
———, “The Phenomenology of psychology where he remained for the rest of
Gurwitsch,” Journal of the British Society his academic career, becoming emeritus pro-
for Phenomenology 12 (May 1981). fessor in 1951 and retiring from teaching com-
Special issue on Gurwitsch with a sec- pletely in 1956. Guthrie also served as Dean of
ondary bibliography. Graduate Studies for several years and was an
———, Essays in Memory of Aron administrator in charge of academic person-
Gurwitsch (Lanham, Md., 1984). nel. In 1945 he was elected President of the
Evans, J. Claude, and Robert S. Stufflebeam, American Psychological Association.
eds. To Work at the Foundations: Essays Guthrie’s theory was the tip of an intellectual
in Memory of Aron Gurwitsch (Dordrecht, iceberg supported by a set of attitudes and
1997). Contains a secondary bibliography. beliefs concerning human communication and
language, the nature of facts and explanations,
Lester Embree and the nature of scientific truth. His disserta-
tion critiqued Russell’s Theory of Types, and
this sojourn into symbolic logic left Guthrie
with the belief that there was no rigorous
deduction or ultimate validity possible. The
laws of logic are conventions; they are not the
GUTHRIE, Edwin Ray, Jr. (1886–1959) laws of thought.
Like Karl Popper, Guthrie objected to naïve
E. R. Guthrie was born on 9 January 1886 in belief in inductive science. While he respected
Lincoln, Nebraska, and died on 23 April 1959 mathematics as a scientific tool, he was critical
in Seattle, Washington. He is best known for of approaches in which the need for quantifi-
his parsimonious one-trial theory of learning. In cation was allowed to dictate research proce-
its broadest sense, however, Guthrie’s theory dure and believed that just as nature does not
was an explanation of mind in terms of the count, human purposes and motives create the
observed plasticity of behavior as adjustment or social constructs known as “facts.”
adaptation. Since science for Guthrie is social discourse,
The oldest of five children born to Edwin one critical test of truth is acceptability, and to
Ray Guthrie, a merchant, and Harriet Louise be acceptable theories must meet the condi-
Pickett, a school teacher, Guthrie graduated tions of general understanding, chief among
from Lincoln High School in 1902. He entered which is observability. Science is the search for
the University of Nebraska in 1903, graduating a body of rules which will serve society by
with his BA and membership in Phi Beta Kappa allowing prediction and control and by facili-
in 1907. In 1910 he received the MA in phi- tating the education of the following genera-
losophy while teaching high school mathemat- tion. Nature is not simple, but simple rules are
ics. With a strong background in classical lan- desirable for education.
guages as well as mathematics and philosophy, Guthrie’s simplified formulation of learning
Guthrie moved from Nebraska to the as a change resulting from a single experience
University of Pennsylvania as a Harrison was based on the principle of association.
Fellow, receiving his PhD in philosophy in 1912 Contiguity, the temporal proximity of stimulus
with a dissertation on the paradoxes of and response, rather than reinforcement, is the
Bertrand Russell. critical factor in habit formation. This was an
In 1914, after teaching high school in elegant explanation of diverse but converging
Philadelphia, Guthrie became instructor of phi- research. Guthrie attributed the theory’s genesis
1001
GUTHRIE
to Stevenson Smith, his mentor in psychology. Cats in a Puzzle Box, with George P. Horton
Smith drew Guthrie’s attention to associative (New York, 1946).
learning during their collaboration on General Educational Psychology, with Francis F.
Psychology in Terms of Behaviour (1921). Powers (New York, 1950).
Smith’s theory of habit formation provided
Guthrie with basic principles that he went on Further Reading
to develop in his best-known work, The Amer Nat Bio, Bio Dict Psych, Encyc Psych
Psychology of Learning, published in 1935. Mueller, Conrad G., Jr., and William N.
While Guthrie had hoped for a general sci- Schoenfeld. “Edwin R. Guthrie,” in
entific theory of psychology, he is best remem- Modern Learning Theory, ed. W. K. Estes
bered for his calculus of habit formation and et al. (New York, 1954), pp. 345–79.
for making learning theory widely accessible Prenzel-Guthrie, P. “Edwin Ray Guthrie:
through his deft use of homely illustrations and Pioneer Learning Theorist,” in Portraits of
his popular textbooks. When learning theory Pioneers in Psychology, vol. 2, ed. G. A.
was eclipsed in the 1950s and 60s, Guthrie Kimble, C. A. Bonaeau, and M.
became simplistically stereotyped as a behav- Wertheimer (Washington, D.C., 1996), pp.
iorist/logical positivist; but by then much of 137–49.
his influence had already been absorbed into Sheffield, Fred. “Edwin Ray Guthrie, Jr.,”
the received body of general psychological American Journal of Psychology 72
understanding. (1959): 642–50. Contains a bibliography
of Guthrie’s writings.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
General Psychology in Terms of Behavior, David O. Clark
with Stevenson Smith (New York, 1921).
The Psychology of Learning (New York,
1935; 2nd edn 1952).

Guthrie’s papers are at the University of
Washington in Seattle.
The Psychology of Human Conflict: The
Clash of Motives within the Individual
(New York, 1938).
1002
H
HACKING, Ian MacDougall (1936– ) Hacking has been a more effective ambassador
for Foucault’s intellectual approach than those
Ian Hacking was born on 18 February 1936 in who have been more explicitly trying to inter-
Vancouver, Canada, the son of Harold E. and pret him for the English-language community
Margaret MacDougall Hacking. After receiv- precisely because he is addressing issues in a
ing a BA from the University of British more analytic way.
Columbia in 1956, he went to the University One of the threads of Foucault’s work that
of Cambridge, from which he received both runs consistently through Hacking’s writing
another BA in 1958 and a PhD in philosophy is the “archeology of ideas.” This appears
in 1962. He remained at Peterhouse College, strongly in his The Emergence of Probability
Cambridge as a fellow for two years. From (1975), which gives an account of how prob-
1964 to 1969 Hacking was associate professor ability came to play so prominent a role in
of philosophy at British Columbia, and from European thought in the seventeenth century
1969 to 1975 he was a university lecturer in and after. The subject remains central to
philosophy at Cambridge. In 1975 he joined Hacking’s work, as witnessed by his later
the philosophy faculty at Stanford University, volumes The Taming of Chance (1990) and
and then in 1982 he was appointed to the An Introduction to Probability and Inductive
faculty of the Institute for the History and Logic (2001). What distinguishes Hacking’s
Philosophy of Science and Technology at the history of probability from other accounts is
University of Toronto, perhaps the most dis- his determination to embed the discussion in,
tinguished philosopher in the history of the not just the intellectual but the political context
Institute. In 2000 he also accepted the Chair of of the period in which Blaise Pascal and G. W.
Philosophy and of the History of Scientific Leibniz were applying mathematical ideas to
Concepts at the Collège de France in Paris. the solution of problems in the sphere of uncer-
He won the Canada Council for the Arts tainty. In his later writings on probability,
Molson Prize in 2001, and he became a Hacking tries to look at the questions being
Companion of the Order of Canada in 2004. asked in the subject rather than concentrating
It is not surprising that Hacking received a on the answers. In particular, his treatment of
position at the Collège de France in view of his figures like David Hume and Karl Popper
long attachment to the work and influence of argues that their treatments of the problem of
the French philosopher Michel Foucault. That induction are not just counters in an abstract
influence has taken many forms, and Hacking game of mathematics or philosophy.
has never claimed that his work exhausts the Hacking’s discussions of logic are informed
possible variety of interpretations of Foucault’s by a historical sense that sometimes takes
work. On the other hand, it is arguable that precedence over what more exclusively ana-
1003
HACKING
lytical philosophers might regard as crucial torical record, he argues that this is prima facie
theoretical issues. When he writes about evidence against that theoretical claim. On the
Bertrand Russell and deduction, his analysis strength of his published writings, Hacking
takes into account the purposes for which has managed to bridge gaps between a conti-
Russell approached deduction. In looking at nental philosopher like Foucault and the ana-
the philosophy of science, his starting point is lytical tradition in which he was brought up
the way in which the scientist makes a differ- and between philosophy and history of science.
ence in the discussions and activity about him While some of his work has been specifically
rather than contemplating the abstract edifice devoted to the subjects in which Foucault was
of “Science.” interested, like mental illness, he has generally
Hacking has been assigned a position among brought Foucault’s slant to settings in which its
the relativist philosophers of science who influence in the English-speaking world had
discount the pretensions of the discipline to any previously been slight.
commanding position above the dispute. As he
demonstrates in his The Social Construction of BIBLIOGRAPHY
What? (1999), this is rather too simple a Logic of Statistical Inference (Cambridge,
picture of someone well aware of the furor UK, 1965).
being created in the name of science and anti- The Emergence of Probability: A
science. Hacking argues that different settings Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about
can require different sorts of orientation Probability, Induction and Statistical
toward social construction and that a univer- Inference (Cambridge, UK, 1975).
sal dissolution of theoretical questions via Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?
social construction is inappropriate. It is true (Cambridge, UK, 1975).
that his views of the role that social construc- Representing and Intervening: Introductory
tion can play are unlikely to find a warm Topics in the Philosophy of Natural
welcome among the scientists best known for Science (Cambridge, UK, 1983).
taking social construction to task, but among The Taming of Chance (Cambridge, UK,
his points is that the context of the scientist 1990).
performing an experiment is different from Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality
the critic and the philosopher standing outside and the Sciences of Memory (Princeton,
observing. N.J., 1995).
One way of characterizing Hacking’s Mad Travelers: Reflections on the Reality
approach to issues of philosophy of science of Transient Mental Illnesses
and philosophy of language together is not (Charlottesville, Virg., 1998).
just that he is interested in history but that he The Social Construction of What?
is interested in prehistory. This has sometimes (Cambridge, Mass., 1999).
led to claims that he is inclined to tell a story Historical Ontology (Cambridge, Mass.,
that would serve as a plausible explanation 2002).
for what happened rather than to produce a
full-fledged account on the basis of the sources Other Relevant Works
available. While such an approach may be “On the Foundations of Statistics,” British
problematic for those approaching the period Journal for the Philosophy of Science 15
as historians of science, it certainly produces a (1964): 1–26.
philosophy that is historically literate. If, for “The Leibniz–Carnap Program for
example, Hacking examines a theoretical claim Inductive Logic,” Journal of Philosophy
such as the possibility of radical mistranslation 68 (1971): 597–610.
and does not see examples of that in the his- A Concise Introduction to Logic (New
1004
HAHN
York, 1972). of Science 62 (1995): 60–69.

“Michel Foucault’s Immature Science,” Resnik, David B. “Hacking’s Experimental
Noûs 13 (1979): 39–51. Realism,” Canadian Journal of
Ed., Scientific Revolutions (Oxford, 1981). Philosophy 24 (1994): 395–411.
“Is the End in Sight for Epistemology?” Seager, William. “Ground Truth and
Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): Virtual Reality: Hacking vs van
579–87. Fraassen,” Philosophy of Science 62
“Do We See Through a Microscope?” (1995): 459–78.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 Slater, John G. Minerva’s Aviary:
(1981): 305–22. Philosophy at Toronto 1843–1943
“The Parody of Conversation,” in Truth (Toronto, 2005), chap. 12.
and Interpretation: Perspectives on the
Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. Thomas Drucker
Ernest Lepore (Oxford, 1986).
“Self-improvement,” in Foucault: A Critical
Reader, ed. David C. Hoy (Oxford,
1986), pp. 235–40.
“Natural Kinds,” in Perspectives on Quine,
ed. Robert Barrett and Roger Gibson HAHN, Lewis Edwin (1908– )
(Oxford, 1993), pp. 129–43.
“On Kripke’s and Goodman’s Uses of Lewis Hahn was born on 26 September 1908
Grue,” Philosophy 68 (1993): 269–95. in Swenson, Texas. He received both his BA
“Searle, Reality and the Social,” History of and MA from the University of Texas at Austin
the Human Sciences 10 (1997): 83–92. in 1929, and his PhD in philosophy from the
“How Inevitable Are the Results of University of California at Berkeley in 1939. At
Successful Science?” Philosophy of Berkeley Hahn studied the Tractatus with
Science suppl. 67 (2000): 58–71. Moritz Schlick of the Vienna Circle and aes-
An Introduction to Probability and thetics with Stephen C. PEPPER, for whom he
Inductive Logic (Cambridge, UK, 2001). also assisted for two years. Hahn’s disserta-
“How ‘Natural’ Are ‘Kinds’ of Sexual tion was “A Contextualistic Theory of
Orientation?” Law and Philosophy 21 Perception.” Hahn taught philosophy at the
(2002): 95–107. University of Missouri, Columbia from 1936 to
1949, and at Washington University, St. Louis,
Further Reading from 1949 to 1963, where he also served as
Bio 20thC Phils, Oxford Comp Phil department chair during that time. He served as
Holcomb, Harmon R., III. “Hacking’s Associate Dean of the Graduate School of Arts
Experimental Argument for Realism,” and Sciences in 1953–4 and as Dean from 1954
Journal of Critical Analysis 9 (1988): to 1963. From 1963 to 1977 Hahn was a
1–12. research professor of philosophy at Southern
Kusch, Martin. “Metaphysical deja vu: Illinois University at Carbondale, where he is
Hacking and Latour on Science Studies now professor emeritus. From 1977 to 1981,
and Metaphysics,” Studies in History and he was distinguished visiting professor at Baylor
Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2002): University. Hahn traveled widely, to China,
639–47. Japan, Taiwan, Russia, and other countries.
Reiner, Richard, and Robert Pierson, He was a member of the US National
“Hacking’s Experimental Realism: An Commission for UNESCO from 1965 to 1967.
Untenable Middle Ground,” Philosophy Hahn edited The Proceedings and Addresses of
1005
HAHN
the APA from 1960 to 1965 and served as co- Other Relevant Works
editor for the first two volumes of The Early Hahn’s papers are at Southern Illinois
Works of John Dewey. Hahn also edited or co- University, Carbondale.
edited volumes for The Library of Living “Metaphysical Interpretation,” Philosophical
Philosophers from 1981 to 2000. Review 61 (1952): 176–87.
Hahn describes his position of contextualism, “What is the Starting Point of Metaphysics?”
which is heavily influenced by Pepper and John Philosophy and Phenomenological
DEWEY, as a “pragmatic naturalistic world view Research 18 (1958): 293–311.
which treats time and change seriously and “Of Shoes and Ships and Sealing Wax, and
takes as its root metaphor patterned events, Cabbages and Kings,” Journal of
things in process, or historical events … the Philosophy 55 (1958): 45–57.
self-sufficient substances of the older substance- “Contextualism and Cosmic Evolution-
attribute metaphysics are replaced by textures” Revolution,” Philosophy Forum 11
(Allen and Handy 2001, p. 129). He distin- (1972): 3–39.
guishes between “practical drive perception,” “Piping Pragmatically,” introduction to vol.
which is used in reflective inquiry to solve 4 of The Middle Works of John Dewey
problems, and “aesthetic drives” which enable (Carbondale, Ill., 1977).
us to take in the “quality of a situation or a “Brand Blanshard’s World View,” in The
texture,” adding that the latter is a “good part Philosophy of Brand Blanshard, ed. Lewis
of what makes life worth living” (p. 130). Hahn (La Salle, Ill., 1980).
Hahn’s contextualism emphasizes pluralism, “Introduction,” to vol. 10 of The Middle
world dialogue, fallibilism, evolution, and edu- Works of John Dewey (Carbondale, Ill.,
cation. Most of his numerous essays are con- 1980).
tained within Enhancing Cultural Interflow Ed., Perspectives on Habermas (Chicago,
(1998) and A Contextualistic Worldview 2000).
(2001).
Further Reading
BIBLIOGRAPHY Allen, Michael W. “Instrumental, Aesthetic,
A Contextualistic Theory of Perception and Pedagogical Aspects of Lewis Hahn’s
(Berkeley, Cal., 1942). Contextualist Vision,” Comprehensive
“Psychological Data and Philosophical Harmony: International Journal for
Theory of Perception,” Journal of Comparative Philosophy and Culture 1
Philosophy 39 (1942): 296–300. (2001): 145–52.
The Elements of Logic, with Cecil H. Miller Allen, Michael W., and Janet E. Handy. “The
(Columbia, Missouri, 1946). Living Philosopher: An Interview with
“A Contextualist Looks at Values,” in Value: Lewis Edwin Hahn on the Occasion of His
A Cooperative Inquiry (New York, 1949). Ninetieth Birthday,” Comprehensive
“Dewey’s Philosophy and Philosophic Harmony: International Journal for
Method,” in Guide to the Works of John Comparative Philosophy and Culture 1
Dewey, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale, (2001): 121–44.
Ill., 1970), pp. 15–60.
Enhancing Cultural Interflow between East Michael W. Allen
and West: Collected Essays in
Comparative Philosophy and Culture, ed.
George C. H. Sun (Mobile, Ala., 1998).
A Contextualistic Worldview: Essays by
Lewis E. Hahn (Carbondale, Ill., 2001).
1006
HALL
HALL, Everett Wesley (1901–60) Brentano in What is Value? excited Bergmann,

who later devoted a book to Meinong and
Everett W. Hall was born on 24 April 1901 in Brentano. However, Hall’s relationship with
Janesville, Wisconsin, to Reverend Walter A. Bergmann worsened, and in 1952 Hall left
Hall and his wife Mathilda Hall. In 1923 he Iowa for the University of North Carolina to
graduated with a BA summa cum laude from become Kenan Professor of Philosophy and
Lawrence College in Wisconsin, and received chair of the philosophy department, positions
his MA in 1925. In 1924 he married Charlotte he held until his death on 17 June 1960 in
Louise Braatz, whom he met while a student; Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
their son Richard also became a philosopher. After arriving at North Carolina, Hall
During 1924–5 he was pastor at a Methodist became one of the most beloved members of its
church in northern Wisconsin, but refused ordi- philosophy department. He continued to
nation. For two summers in 1927 and 1928 he pursue interests outside of philosophy and
studied philosophy at the University of earned a reputation singing the bass solo from
Chicago. Hall obtained his PhD in philosophy Mozart’s Requiem and parts of Handel’s
in 1929 from Cornell University and was twice Messiah. He was an accomplished sailor and
Sage Fellow in Philosophy at Cornell. was commodore of the Ephrim Yacht Club
Hall was a philosophy instructor at Chicago while living in Wisconsin. In addition to his per-
during 1929–31. After leaving Chicago, he manent position at North Carolina, Hall held
taught at Ohio State University in 1931–3, and a number of visiting positions, including a
then became associate professor of philosophy Fulbright to lecture in philosophy at Kyoto
at Stanford University from 1933 to 1941. He University in Japan in 1958–9.
then left for the University of Iowa where he While Hall was an admirer of G. E. Moore
became chair of the philosophy department. with whom he had entered into a correspon-
Gustav BERGMANN was then hired; while there dence, he took exception to Moore’s claim that
are conflicting reports, initially Hall supported “good” was an unanalyzable descriptive term.
Bergmann to the point of approaching the uni- More generally, Hall urges that value be
versity provost, citing Bergmann’s accomplish- regarded as neither a property of facts nor of
ments and talent at philosophy. things, but rather as a semantical notion resem-
While at Iowa, Hall and Bergmann experi- bling truth. Value is a concept of legitimacy
enced a tempestuous relationship which was based on the “fittingness” of the assertion of a
charged in some measure by Bergmann’s value statement. Although intended as a seman-
incendiary personality, matched only by his tical analogue of truth, Hall’s conception
genius. Their relationship has become derives ultimately from Brentano. Just as we
somewhat legendary, but the facts are largely might say, following Alfred TARSKI, that “A is
unclear. In an oral history interview now red” is true if and only if A is red, Hall suggests
archived at the University of Iowa Libraries, that we might with equal propriety say “‘A is
Bergmann credits Herbert FEIGL for enabling good’ is legitimate if and only if A is good.”
his hiring at Iowa, but also speaks highly of This is Hall’s most important contribution to
Hall, mentioning their numerous discussions the discussion of ethical notions. Second in
together with Wilfrid SELLARS, who was also importance is his claim that value statements
at the University of Iowa at that time. Hall’s can be reduced to normative (“ought”) state-
relationship with Bergmann was complex; they ments. Where “A” refers to some universal,
did read each other’s work. Hall’s understand- “A is good” reduces to “For any x, if x exem-
ing of the method of “ideal language” came plifies A, then x ought to exemplify A.”
straight from Bergmann, and there can be little Normatives cannot be reduced to value state-
doubt that Hall’s trenchant comments on ments because value statements fail to capture
1007
HALL
the “requiredness to be exemplified” of nor- unlike English, for example, it does not rely on
mative statements. conventions of any sort. It possesses, however,
Hall rejected the idea of a presuppositionless the semantical feature of reference and refers to
philosophy and held firmly to the belief that all “the very entities symbolized.” The color we see
philosophy relied on a categorical framework refers to the color exemplified by the object
in some form. Central to his thinking was that itself. This was a novel view, one that Sellars
“There are no categorically self-sufficient and found so philosophically interesting that he
self-justifying philosophical systems.” All cate- devoted an entire paper to the subject.
gorial statements are indexed to a philosophi-
cal system, leading to what he called the BIBLIOGRAPHY
“category-centric predicament.” This provided What is Value? (London, 1952).
the basis for his criticisms of, among others, Philosophical Systems (Chicago, 1960).
Gilbert Ryle, whose work on “category Our Knowledge of Fact and Value (Chapel
mistakes,” he felt, betrayed a lack of awareness Hill, N.C., 1961).
that being such a mistake is relative to a cate- Categorial Analysis: Selected Essays of
gorial framework. Everett W. Hall on Philosophy, Values,
While admitting that “ideal language” phi- Knowledge and the Mind, ed. E. Maynard
losophy was methodologically “the best we Adams (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1964).
have,” he faulted it on three counts. First, it is
devoid of value statements; second, it is Other Relevant Works
everyday language and not ideal language that “Some Dangers in the Use of Symbolic Logic
provides the puzzles that drive philosophy; and in Psychology,” Psychological Review 49
third, while the ideal language shows its cate- (1942): 142–69.
gorial commitments this is all it can do. There “The Extra-Linguistic Reference of
was a further problem, one he dubbed the Language,” Mind 52 (1943): 230–46; 53
“lingua-centric predicament.” The predicament (1944): 25–47.
is that there is no escaping language in order to “The Philosophy of G. E. Moore,”
talk about the world. The problem is persua- Philosophical Review 53 (1944): 62–8.
sively illustrated by designation rules for indi- “Justice as Fairness: A Modernized Version
vidual constants of the “ideal” language. of the Social Contract,” Journal of
Consider the second occurrence of “a” in “‘a’ Philosophy 22 (1957): 662–70.
designates a.” How are we to know what it des-
ignates? The only way is to simply restate the Further Reading
semantical rule in which it occurs. To solve the Proc of APA v34, Who Was Who in
problem we would have to substitute for the Amer v4
second occurrence of “a” the very object to Adams, E. Maynard, ed. “Commonsense
which it refers, a very awkward procedure to Realism: Critical Essays on the Philosophy
say the least. According to Hall, the most of Everett W. Hall,” Southern Journal of
immediate access to the world via semantics is Philosophy 4 (Fall 1966).
not through ideal languages but experience Carnap, Rudolf. “Hall and Bergmann on
itself. It was this proposal that distinguished Semantics,” Mind 54 (1945): 148–55.
him from other philosophers of the period and Sellars, Wilfrid. “The Intentional Realism of
caught the attention of Wilfrid Sellars with Everett Hall,” in Philosophical Perspectives
whom he shared an interest in ontology. (Springfield, Ill., 1967), pp. 209–28.
Perceptions, Hall maintained, are in fact sen- Werkmeister, W. H. “Everett W. Hall and
tences, sentences in the natural language of the the Linguistic Approach,” in Historical
mind. What makes the language natural is that Spectrum of Value Theories, Vol. II: The
1008
HALL
Anglo-American Group (Lincoln, Neb., that fit closely not only with James’s interests
1973), pp. 307–31. but also with those of Wilhelm Wundt at
Leipzig.
Steven Bayne With no teaching position available, Hall
returned to Germany, remaining there until
1880. Working in Carl Ludwig’s laboratory of
physiology, he published research with
Johannes von Kries and Hugo Kronecker.
Although he did no research with Wundt, he
HALL, Granville Stanley (1844–1924) took courses in Leipzig during the time when
Wundt’s laboratory was first opened for
G. Stanley Hall was born on 1 February 1844 student research and thereby Hall became
in Ashfield, Massachusetts, and died on 24 Wundt’s first American student.
April 1924 in Worcester, Massachusetts. His Hall returned to America in 1881 and first
parents were teachers and conservative received notoriety not for his psychology but
Congregational Christians. He attended for his lectures comparing German and
Williams College, from which he graduated American education. These lectures were suf-
with a BA in 1867 with the intention of ficiently well received that they led in 1882 to
becoming a minister. After a year at Union a call to Johns Hopkins University, where he
Theological Seminary in New York City, rose to professor of psychology in 1884. At
where he gradually lost interest in orthodox Hopkins, Hall lectured and published on edu-
religion, he spent three years studying in cation and child study, but his passion was
Germany. There he heard lectures by Emil for the psychology laboratory, which he estab-
DuBois-Reymond in physiology and Friedrich lished unofficially in 1883. His laboratory was
Trendelenburg in philosophy. He returned to the first research laboratory in psychology in
America thinking of teaching school, but America, since James’s 1875 founding of his
finding no position, he returned to Union to laboratory at Harvard was for demonstrations
finish his BD degree, which he obtained in in physiology. At Hopkins, Hall also came
1871. into contact with many who would become the
Hall soon found that being a pastor, partic- leaders of American experimental psychology.
ularly after the liberating experience of study He supervised the first doctorate in psychology
in Germany, was less than congenial. After in America, that of Joseph JASTROW. Among
tutoring for a year in New York City, he his students were John DEWEY and James
received an appointment to teach English at McKeen Cattell. Together with William James,
Antioch College in Ohio where he remained George Trumbull LADD, John Dewey, and
until 1875. Intending to return to Germany, he James Mark BALDWIN, Hall was a leader in the
first went to Harvard University where he transition from philosophical to scientific psy-
taught English. While at Harvard he met chology in the 1870s and 80s.
William JAMES and saw his small physiological In 1887 Hall made the first of his great con-
demonstration laboratory. Hall’s position at tributions to the establishment of psychology
Harvard allowed him to take courses in phi- as an independent discipline in America, by
losophy and to pursue a doctoral thesis, which founding and editing The American Journal of
he did under the supervision of James while Psychology. He promoted the “new” experi-
working in the laboratory of the physiologist mental psychology by providing publishing
Henry P. Bowditch. In 1878 Hall received outlets and by employing book and topical
Harvard’s first PhD degree with a thesis on the reviews to condemn the literature of philo-
muscular perception of space. This was a topic sophical psychology that still existed in the
1009
HALL
late 1880s and 90s. Of the early figures in the in life he would come full circle with a book
transition from philosophical to scientific psy- entitled Senescence (1922).
chology in America, he was the most strident in Hall also had a lifelong interest in the study of
his emphasis on scientific psychology and the sex and taught what may have been the first
need to break with the methods of traditional class on sexuality in America. He was a
“armchair” philosophy. champion of evolutionary theory, a view that cut
In 1888 Hall accepted the presidency of the through virtually all his work on development
newly founded Clark University in Worcester, and education. He was an early supporter of
Massachusetts. Clark, based directly on the Sigmund Freud; it was Hall who arranged in
German model, was initially conceived as a 1909 for Freud to make his only visit to the
graduate school devoted to research and schol- United States, to lecture at a meeting in celebra-
arship without an undergraduate college, and tion of the twentieth anniversary of the founding
this design greatly appealed to Hall. In 1892, of Clark University. Freud’s lectures, published
while at Clark, he made another significant by Hall in English translation in the American
contribution to the professionalization of Journal of Psychology, introduced most
American psychology, founding the American Americans, and even most Europeans, to Freud’s
Psychological Association. He was its first psychoanalysis.
President in 1892. Hall’s interest in education continued through-
At Clark, the laboratory in psychology and the out his career, even during his experimental
department of psychology were handed over to interlude, and late in life his interest in religion
the charge of E. C. Sanford, one of Hall’s was revived. He founded the American Journal
students from Johns Hopkins. Although Hall of Religious Psychology and Education in 1904
worked with many graduate students over his and published, among others, Jesus the Christ, in
career, the laboratory for which he had striven the Light of Psychology (1917).
so intensely at Hopkins became of less interest to It is difficult to know where to place Hall in
him as time went on; he found himself deeply the history of philosophy and psychology. He
disappointed by events in the development of the had an early interest in philosophy, but quite
new experimental psychology in America, events publicly turned his back on it during his period
that left him largely isolated from the main- of experimental psychology. While his early
stream. He remained at Clark for the remainder work in this field was of some importance, he
of his career, stepping down as President in abandoned it too quickly for it to achieve long-
1922, two years before his death. term significance. His work on developmental
Intellectually Hall was exceptionally expan- psychology, while important in its day, seems not
sive. His interests in children, sex, psy- to have carried over after his death. Perhaps his
chopathology and education led him far from primary legacy is institutional. The two major
physiology, psychophysics, and introspective journals he founded still exist and are highly
psychology. He had begun publishing in child respected. The society he founded is still the
studies in 1883 with an article in the Princeton primary American psychological organization.
Review entitled “The Contents of Children’s Hall was a promoter, of himself and of his ideas.
Minds on Entering School.” In succeeding years However he was mercurial in his interests, and
he became a well-known figure in the child study perhaps because of this few of his studies or
movement and developed a form of question- publications still exert influence today.
naire that became widely used in child research. Nonetheless it is probably not an overstatement
In 1891 he founded the Pedagogical Seminary, to say that an understanding of the historical
which later became the Journal of Genetic transition from philosophical to scientific psy-
Psychology. His book, Adolescence (1904), was chology in America is impossible without an
widely read and very influential in the field. Late understanding of Hall’s role.
1010
HALPRIN
BIBLIOGRAPHY 1–52.
“The Muscular Perception of Space,” Mind 3 Hogan, John D. “G. Stanley Hall: Educator,
(1878): 433–50. Organizer, and Pioneer Developmental
“American and German Methods of Psychologist,” in Portraits of Pioneers in
Teaching,” Harvard Register 3 (1881): Psychology, vol. 5, ed. G. A. Kimble and M.
319–21. Wertheimer (Washington, D.C., 2003).
“The Contents of Children’s Minds,” Hulse, Stewart H., and Bert F. Green, Jr., eds.
Princeton Review 11 (1883): 249–72. One Hundred Years of Psychological
“Child Study: The Basis of Exact Education.” Research in America: G. Stanley Hall and
Forum 16 (1893): 429–41. the Johns Hopkins Tradition (Baltimore,
Adolescence: Its Psychology and Its Relations Md., 1986).
to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Rosenzweig, Saul. Freud, Jung, and Hall the
Sex, Crime, Religion and Education, 2 vols King-maker: The Historic Expedition to
(New York, 1904). America (1909), with G. Stanley Hall as
Youth, Its Education, Regimen and Hygiene Host and William James as Guest (St. Louis,
(New York, 1906). 1992).
Educational Problems, 2 vols (New York, Ross, Dorothy. G. Stanley Hall: The
1911). Psychologist as Prophet (Chicago, 1972).
Founders of Modern Psychology (New York, Contains a bibliography of Hall’s writings.
1912). Sanford, Edmund C. “G. Stanley Hall,
Jesus the Christ, in the Light of Psychology, 2 1846–1924,” American Journal of
vols (New York, 1917). Psychology 35 (1924): 313–21.
Morale, the Supreme Standard of Life and
Conduct (New York, 1920). Rand B. Evans
Senescence: The Last Half of Life (New York,
1922).

Hall’s papers are at Clark University.
“Philosophy in the United States,” Mind 4 HALPRIN, Anna Schuman (1920– )
(1879): 89–105.
Life and Confessions of a Psychologist (New Anna Halprin was born Anna Schuman on 13
York, 1923). July 1920 in Winnetka, Illinois. A graduate (BA
Health, Growth, and Heredity, ed. Charles E. 1942) and an honorary PhD of the University of
Strickland and Charles Burgess (New York, Wisconsin, she studied under Margaret
1965). H’Doubler, the first to establish a dance major
at a university. Halprin’s work as a choreogra-
Further Reading pher, dancer, and educator has made her a
Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, Bio pioneer of postmodern dance. In 1940 she
Dict Psych, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, married architect Lawrence Halprin (who won
Comp Amer Thought, Dict Amer Bio, the 2002 National Medal of Arts). In Boston
Encyc Amer Bio, Encyc Psych, Encyc Social during 1942 and 1943, Halprin taught children
Behav Sci, Encyc Relig, Nat Cycl Amer Bio of both the wealthy and impoverished, observ-
v39, Who Was Who in Amer v1 ing how the environment impacts movement,
Fisher, Sara Carolyn. “The Psychological and socialization, and childhood development (1955,
Educational Work of G. Stanley Hall,” p. 25), which later influenced her work and
American Journal of Psychology 36 (1925): method of teaching other artists.
1011
HALPRIN
Halprin moved to California in 1945, where national and international awards including three
she established the Marin County Dance Co- MacArthur “Genius” Awards: Yvonne Rainer
Operative (1947–72), the San Francisco Dancer’s (1990), Trisha Brown (1991), and Meredith
Workshop (1955–78), and the Tamalpa Institute Monk (1995). Halprin’s work continues to shape
(1973–present). She founded the Reach Out the direction of dance and dance education.
Program in 1967, the first multicultural dance Halprin is the recipient of a Guggenheim
company, and also created Earth Run in 1981, Fellowship (1970), an American Guild Award
an annual movement ritual performed in thirty- (1980), the Samuel H. Scripps/American Dance
six different countries. The work created in the Festival Award for Lifetime Achievement (1997),
Dancer’s Workshop most informed her philoso- and a grant from the National Endowment for
phies of movement and forged a new approach the Arts (2001).
to modern dance.
The events at Dancer’s Workshop rejected the BIBLIOGRAPHY
academic idea of dance that her contemporaries Moving Toward Life: Five Decades of
Martha GRAHAM, José Limón, Pearl Lang, and Transformational Dance (Hanover, N.H.,
Anna Sokolow were using as the foundation for 1955).
their work. Instead, she combined ideas from Moving Rituals (San Francisco, 1979).
anatomy and psychology to dissolve the bound- Circle the Earth Manual: A Guide for Dancing
aries between the person and the artist to allow Peace with the Planet (Kentfield, Cal., 1984).
access to a myriad of emotions. Halprin used Dance as a Healing Art: Returning to Health
anatomy and kinesiology to create new methods Through Movement and Imagery
of “specific, objective, individual movements” (Mendecino, Cal., 2000).
(Wolf 2000, p. 25). She developed new forms of Moving Toward Life: Five Decades of
dance bringing the physical, spiritual, emotional, Transformational Dance, ed. Rachel Kaplan
and mental functions together in an interdepen- (Hanover, N.H., 1995).
dent relationship. She used untrained dancers,
broke the proscenium, performed outside, inte- Further Reading
grated nudity, collaborated with people of many “Halprin, Anna.” International Encyclopedia
disciplines, and incorporated task-oriented of Dance, ed. Selma J. Cohen (Oxford,
movement into dance. These forms led to revo- 1998).
lutionary uses of dance, specifically, in the Halprin, Lawrence. The RSVP Cycles: Creative
healing and transformational process, the devel- Processes in the Human Environment (New
opment of community, self-realization, com- York, 1969).
munication, and choreographic motivation. Ross, Janice. “Anna Halprin: From Dance Art
These practices, along with the RSVP Cycles to Healing Art,” Dance Magazine 78 (2004):
(developed by her husband), Movement Ritual, 74–7.
Psychokinetic Imagery, and the Five Stages of Wolf, Marina. “Dancing Solo,” Northern
Healing are the primary theoretical foundations California Bohemian (14–20 December
for what is now known as the Halprin Life/Art 2000): 25.
Process.
Halprin believes the primary role of the Jennifer Tsukayama
educator is to generate creativity in others, to be
an objective guide who tells students what to do,
not how to do it. Halprin’s students are credited
with starting the New York City avant-garde
dance movement and founding the Judson
Church Theater. They have received numerous
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HAMILTON
HAMILTON, Edward John (1834–1918) ophy in retirement. Hamilton died on 29

November 1918 in Berlin, Germany.
Edward J. Hamilton was born on 29 Throughout his professional career,
November 1834 in Belfast, Ireland. He emi- Hamilton published a series of pamphlets in
grated to the United States where he attended response to fundamental philosophical ques-
Hanover College in Indiana. Excelling at tions about God and mankind’s role in the
religion, mathematics, and philosophy, he universe. Most of his articles appeared in
received a BA in 1853, and an MA in 1856. He journals such as American Presbyterian Review
briefly went to McCormick Theological and Christian Thought. He also kept a diary of
Seminary in Indiana (which shortly after his thoughts and sermons that he used as note-
became New Albany Theological Seminary), books for his research and future publications.
and Union Theological Seminary in New York Hamilton is best known for his work in logic
City, before attending Princeton Theological and mental philosophy.
Seminary where he graduated in 1858. After
being ordained in the Presbyterian Church, BIBLIOGRAPHY
Hamilton became a pastor at Oyster Bay in A New Analysis in Fundamental Morals
Long Island, New York. He remained there (New York, 1870).
until 1861, after which he returned for a year The Human Mind: A Treatise in Mental
to Ireland to lead a congregation in the town of Philosophy (New York, 1882).
Dromore. Mental Science: A Text-Book for Schools and
During the American Civil War, Hamilton Colleges (New York, 1886).
was chaplain and bookkeeper for the 7th New Christian Thought. Perceptionalism: A
Jersey Infantry of Volunteers in the US Army System of Philosophy (New York, 1891).
from 1862 to 1865. Besides performing reli- The Modalist, or the Laws of Rational
gious services, he kept track of payroll and Conviction: A Textbook in Formal or
wrote correspondence for soldiers who could General Logic (Boston, 1891).
not write themselves. After the war Hamilton The Perceptionalist, or Mental Science: A
spent three years as a pastor in Hamilton, Ohio. University Text-Book (New York, 1899).
From 1868 to 1879 he was Holliday Professor The Moral Law, or the Theory and Practice
of Logic and Mental Philosophy at Hanover of Duty: An Ethical Text-Book (New
College. He received a DD degree from York, 1902).
Monmouth College in 1877. In 1882–3, Münsterberg’s Theory of Immortality (New
Hamilton was acting professor of logic, ethics, York, 1905).
and politics at Princeton College. Perzeptionalismus und Modalismus: eine
From 1883 to 1891 he was professor of intel- Erkenntnistheorie (New York, 1911).
lectual philosophy at Hamilton College. He Erkennen und Schlieszen: eine theoretische
taught a course titled “The Radical Principles Logik auf der Grundlage des
of Mental Science” using his own text, The Perzeptionalismus und Modalismus (New
Human Mind (1882). He unsuccessfully York, 1912).
applied for the chair of logic and metaphysics Rational Orthodoxy: Essays on Mooted
at the University of Toronto in 1889. From Questions (New York, 1917).
1891 to 1893 he served on the staff of Funk’s
Standard Dictionary. In 1894–5 he was pro- Other Relevant Works
fessor of philosophy at Whitworth College, Hamilton’s papers are at Hanover College.
and then he went to Washington State
University where he remained until his retire- Further Reading
ment in 1900. He continued to publish philos- Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, Dict Amer Bio,
1013
HAMILTON
Who Was Who in Amer v1 philosopher A. J. Ayer. Some years after her
Testimonials of the Rev. Edward John death Hampshire married British philosopher
Hamilton, D.D., S.T.D. (Toronto, 1889). Nancy Cartwright. Hampshire died on 13 June
2004 in Oxford, England.
Cornelis de Waal Hampshire received numerous high honors
in both the United Kingdom and the United
States of America. He served as President of the
Eastern Division of the American Philosophical
Association in 1969–70, and as President of the
American Philosophical Association Pacific
HAMPSHIRE, Stuart Newton (1914–2004) Division in 1990–91. He was a member of the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences and
Stuart Hampshire was born on 10 October 1914 the British Academy. He was knighted in 1979.
in Lincolnshire, England. He was educated at In 1960 he gave the British Academy’s Dawes
Repton School and Balliol College, Oxford, Hicks Lecture as well as the Ernest Jones
which he attended from 1933 to 1936, receiving Lecture before the British Psychoanalytic
the BA. In 1936 he was appointed fellow of All Society. In 1964 he gave the De Carle Lectures
Souls College, Oxford, a post he held until 1940 at the University of Otago at Dunedin, New
and then held again from 1955 until 1960. For Zealand. In 1965 he gave the Lindley Lecture
four years during World War II he served as an at the University of Kansas. In 1967 he gave the
intelligence officer in the British government, Howison Lecture at the University of
and he remained in government service until California, Berkeley. In 1972 he gave the Leslie
1947. During the war he studied the espionage Stephen Lecture at Cambridge University. In
and counter-espionage operations of Himmler’s 1976 he gave the Thank-Offering to Britain
Central Command, and at the end of the war he Fund Lectures. In 1996 he gave the Tanner
interrogated some leading Nazis in captivity. In Lecture at Harvard University. In 1997 he took
the summer of 1947, in Paris, he was involved in part in UNESCO’s Universal Ethics Project at
the preparation of the European response to the the Instituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici.
Marshall Plan. Hampshire’s philosophical publications
Hampshire returned to university life in 1947 spanned six decades and range across many
by taking up the post of lecturer at University sub-fields of philosophy, including philosophy
College London, which he held until 1950. For of language, philosophy of mind, aesthetics,
the next five years he was a fellow of New ethics, political philosophy, and the history of
College, Oxford, and then he returned to All philosophy, in particular Spinoza’s rational-
Souls College. In 1960 he succeeded A. J. Ayer ism. In addition to books and articles in
as Grote Professor at University College academic journals he published a large number
London. He taught there until 1963, when he of essays in literary reviews and elsewhere. In
became professor of philosophy at Princeton The New York Review of Books alone he pub-
University. In 1964 he became chair of lished some fifty-five essays from 1964 to 2002,
Princeton’s philosophy department. After seven on topics ranging from Freud and Sade through
years at Princeton, Hampshire moved back to Virginia Woolf and Iris Murdoch to John
Oxford to be Warden of Wadham College in RAWLS and T. M. Scanlon. He was widely
1970. Fourteen years later he again taught in admired for his cultured, humanistic approach
the United States as Bonsall Professor of to analytic philosophy as well as for his elegant
Philosophy at Stanford University from 1984 to writing style.
1990. His first marriage in 1961 was with In Spinoza (1951) Hampshire provides an
Renee Ayer, the former wife of the Oxford economically written and very readable expo-
1014
HAMPSHIRE
sition of Spinoza’s metaphysical determinism ments can be incorrigible; and “Dispositions”

and theory of the mind–body relationship, and (1953); in which he offers an account of human
draws an analogy between Spinoza’s theory of dispositions as differing from dispositional
natural knowledge and modern programs of properties of material things in that a thing can
unified science. Hampshire notes in his intro- have a dispositional property without having
duction to the 1987 edition that it was first manifested it.
published “in the aftermath of logical posi- In Thought and Action as well as subsequent
tivism and in the first high enthusiasm of the works, Hampshire examines the relations
new analytical philosophy.” In retrospect he among knowing, intending, and deciding, and
sees that he had read Spinoza’s theory of inquires into what is and what is not contingent
knowledge “in a too contemporary spirit” and in human thought and experience. In his essay
made some errors of emphasis and balance, “A Kind of Materialism” (1970), he asks how
including underestimating “the peculiarity of a materialist can believe that his thoughts and
Spinoza’s claims for mathematical knowledge feelings are physical and determined, and also,
and the metaphysical implications of these consistently with that belief, try to change them
claims” (1987, pp. 67). for the better and advocate that others do
Thought and Action (1959) is widely likewise. He offers an answer drawn from
regarded as Hampshire’s most important book. Spinoza. The articles in Freedom of Mind and
In it he argues that the self is a necessarily Other Essays (1971), which were published
embodied agent that manipulates and interacts over a period of twenty years, converge upon
with elements of its environment and is free in a common topic: “What are the peculiarities of
virtue of its capacities for reasoning and knowl- the concepts that we use to describe and to
edge, including self-knowledge. Since human criticize the mental states and the performances
beings are capable of articulate, discursive rea- of human beings, as contrasted with the states
soning, they are necessarily capable of identify- and performances of things of other kinds?
ing and categorizing objects. Unlike automata or What are the peculiarities of knowledge that we
even some complex organisms, human beings may possess of our own mental states and atti-
are not passive observers of their surroundings tudes and of the mental states and attitudes of
or of their own mental life, but have the capacity other persons?” (1971, p. vii) In Freedom of the
to form intentions and make decisions, as Individual (1975) Hampshire contrasts non-
distinct from predictions. One can stand back inductive knowledge of the future, which one
from a prediction about one’s own future has in virtue of having formed intentions to
actions; by doing so one changes the situation. act, with inductive knowledge of the future.
And increased self-knowledge can increase one’s Both Hampshire’s approach to the explana-
freedom, Hampshire argues. tion of human dispositions and his approach to
Hampshire criticized behaviorist accounts of ethics are aspects of his more general view that
psychological concepts in a 1950 review of human activities must be understood histori-
Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind. Other cally. The grounds for ascribing dispositions to
early writings on mind include: “The Analogy people are to be found in their past behavior.
of Feeling” (1952); in which he argues that Understanding a person’s dispositions requires
interaction with other physical things and com- knowing how these developed, via generaliza-
munication with other persons are necessary to tion, from responses to specific situations in
a subject’s sense of identity and to self-knowl- early childhood, and how the unconscious
edge; “Self-knowledge and the Will” (1953) memories of those original situations continue
and “On Referring and Intending” (1956); in to play a role in the person’s life. Understanding
which he argues that statements about one’s one’s own dispositions by way of psycho-
intentions and other introspection-based state- analysis can increase one’s control over them,
1015
HAMPSHIRE
and hence can increase one’s freedom. More always seemed to Hampshire “the most plau-
generally, understanding human activities sible and the least shallow in the literature,” as
requires seeing them historically. It also requires he says in his introduction to Morality and
recognizing that the conception of human Conflict (1983, p. 1). In 1949 he published
nature employed in any explanations or moral “Fallacies in Moral Philosophy,” which sup-
evaluations of human activities is itself a ported Aristotle’s conception of moral and
changeable product of history. political judgment. In 1977 he published Two
In a widely reprinted essay on aesthetics, Theories of Morality, a study of the moral
“Logic and Appreciation” (1952), Hampshire theories of Aristotle and Spinoza. Both of these
argues that the difference between art and other theories base morality principally on typically
human activities is such that there can be no human powers of mind, distinguish reason
general rules of critical appraisal. To appreciate from passion and desire, and regard reasoning
works of art one must freely explore them. as the way to make human life better.
Works of art are unique, and aesthetic judg- Hampshire agreed with these views at that
ments are concerned with what is unique, time, but his conception of reason underwent
whereas moral judgments, which consider change, as did his conception of morality. The
whether actions conform to rules and principles, stages of these changes are presented in the
focus on what actions have in common. Since chapters of Morality and Conflict.
aesthetic judgments and moral judgments have Hampshire came to believe that morality is
different purposes, he concludes that there are no inseparable from conflict. He developed this
problems of aesthetics comparable with the view further in Innocence and Experience
problems of ethics. Critics Marcia Cavell and (1989) and Justice Is Conflict (2000). In these
Mary MOTHERSILL contend that he overstates books he also argues that the core of a thin
the case. notion of minimum procedural justice is deriv-
For a full understanding of Hampshire’s able from the need faced by all societies to
views about aesthetics and ethics one must read establish institutions for deliberation and
not only his books but also his literary reviews, decision-making. In the latter book he argues
including those collected in Modern Writers that within a single society there can be con-
and Other Essays (1969). In the introduction flicting moral traditions and at the same time a
Hampshire says he is not one of the philoso- shared political culture within shared institu-
phers who turn to logic and mathematics for tions. Hampshire’s conception of value is a
the full satisfaction of their intellectual needs, form of pluralism. Some critics see his concep-
but instead one of those who “have suspected tion of morality and justice as a form of rela-
that in philosophy, and particularly in moral tivism, a charge he denies. Judith DeCew’s
philosophy and in the philosophy of psychol- arguments provide some support for his denial.
ogy, strict argument is interesting only if it is The main value of Hampshire’s rich body of
also a working out of an imaginative vision” published contributions to the field of philoso-
(1969, p. x). From his earliest writings through phy lies not in conclusive arguments for or
his latest, Hampshire argues that issues in the against particular doctrines but in his philo-
philosophy of language have significant impli- sophical style and in the many insights yielded
cations for ethics. He also argues, in his books by his intelligent, independent-minded
about ethics, that in reflecting on conduct and approach to each of his topics.
character we need to consider vividly presented
cases such as those found in history and in BIBLIOGRAPHY
fiction, in addition to abstract arguments. Spinoza (Harmondsworth, UK, 1951; rev.
Aristotle’s and Spinoza’s accounts of edn 1987).
morality were the two classical accounts that Thought and Action: A New Approach to
1016
HAMPSHIRE
Moral Philosophy and to the Problem of London, 1966).

Freedom of the Will (London, 1959; New “Decision, Intention, and Certainty,” with H.
York, 1960; rev. edn, Notre Dame, Ind., L. A. Hart, Mind 67 (1958): 1–12.
1982). “Spinoza and the Idea of Freedom,”
Freedom of the Individual (London, 1965; Proceedings of the British Academy 46
rev. edn, Princeton, N.J., 1975). (1960): 195–215.
Modern Writers and Other Essays (London, “J. L. Austin,” Proceedings of the
1969). Aristotelian Society suppl. 34 (1960):
Freedom of Mind and Other Essays 1–14.
(Princeton, N.J., 1971). “Disposition and Memory,” International
Two Theories of Morality (Oxford, 1977). Journal of Psychoanalysis 43 (1962):
Public and Private Morality (Cambridge, UK, 59–68.
1978). “Commitment and Imagination,” in The
Morality and Conflict (Cambridge, Mass., Morality of Scholarship, ed. Max Black
1983). (Ithaca, N.Y., 1967).
Innocence and Experience (Cambridge, “A Kind of Materialism,” Proceedings and
Mass., 1989). Addresses of the American Philosophical
Justice Is Conflict (Princeton, N.J., 2000). Association 43 (1970): 5–23.
“The Social Spirit of Mankind,” in Kant’s
Other Relevant Works Transcendental Deductions, ed. Eckart
“Logical Form,” Proceedings of the Forster (Stanford, Cal., 1989), pp. 145–56.
Aristotelian Society 48 (1947): 37–58. “World Governance: A Philosophical View,”
“Subjunctive Conditionals,” Analysis 9 in Global Governance: Ethics and
(1949): 9–14. Economics of the World Order, ed. M.
“Fallacies in Moral Philosophy,” Mind 58 Desai and P. Redfern (London, 1995).
(1949): 466–82.
“Ryle’s Concept of Mind,” Mind 59 (1950): Further Reading
237–55. Oxford Comp Phil, Pres Addr of APA v7
“Multiply General Sentences,” Analysis 10 Bratman, Michael E. Intention, Plans, and
(1950): 73–6. Practical Reason (Cambridge, Mass.,
“Freedom of the Will,” Proceedings of the 1987), chap. 7.
Aristotelian Society suppl. 25 (1951): Cavell, Marcia. “Taste and the Moral
161–215. Sense,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art
“The Analogy of Feeling,” Mind 61 (1952): Criticism 34 (1975): 29–33.
1–12. DeCew, Judith W. “Moral Conflicts and
“Self-Knowledge and the Will,” Revue inter- Ethical Relativism,” Ethics 101 (1990):
nationale de philosophie 7 (1953): 230–45. 27–41.
“Dispositions,” Analysis 14 (1953): 5–11. Delahunty, R. J. Spinoza (London, 1985).
Ed., The Age of Reason: the Seventeenth Dennett, Daniel. “Mechanism and
Century Philosophers (New York, 1956). Responsibility,” in Essays on Freedom of
“Identification and Existence,” in Action, ed. Ted Honderich (London,
Contemporary British Philosophy, Third 1973).
Series, ed. H. D. Lewis (London, 1956), Honderich, Ted. How Free Are You?
pp. 189–208. (Oxford, 2002), chap. 7.
“On Referring and Intending,” Philosophical Hudson, W. D. A Century of Moral
Review 65 (1956): 1–13. Philosophy (New York, 1980), chap. 8.
Ed., Philosophy of Mind (New York and Lovibond, Sabina. Realism and Imagination
1017
HAMPSHIRE
in Ethics (Minneapolis, 1983). lectures. He died on 18 August 1961 in New

Magee, Bryan. Modern British Philosophy York City.
(London, 1971), chap. 1. His friends and Supreme Court justices Oliver
Mothersill, Mary. “‘Unique’ as an Aesthetic Wendell HOLMES, Jr., Louis BRANDEIS, and
Predicate,” Journal of Philosophy 58 Benjamin CARDOZO regarded Hand as the finest
(1961): 421–37. jurist never to have joined them on the nation’s
Murdoch, Iris. “The Idea of Perfection,” Yale highest court. Although most of his decisions
Review 53 (1964): 342–80. (over 4000) concerned the typical lower court’s
Smilansky, Saul. Free Will and Illusion problems with contract law, tort law, and statu-
(Oxford, 2000), chap. 11. tory interpretation, occasionally Hand could
deliver an influential decision on the nation’s
Alyssa R. Bernstein urgent constitutional issues. His moderate stance
on judicial powers and powerfully analytic mind
provided a standard of excellence for writing
reasoned and persuasive opinions. He stood
between legal formalism’s focus on strictly fol-
lowing the plain wording of laws, and legal prag-
HAND, Billings Learned (1872–1961) matism’s emphasis on the power of the judge to
create new law. For statutory interpretation he
Learned Hand was born on 27 January 1872 in stressed the guiding role of determining the
Albany, New York. His father Samuel, along purpose behind a law to assess its meaning for
with two uncles, a grandfather, and his cousin application by a judge to a particular case. In the
Augustus Hand, were lawyers. Hand entered realm of common law Hand formulated useful
Harvard College in 1889 and took advantage of rules for determining negligence. He regularly
its new elective system, selecting economics and condemned judicial activism where he believed
philosophy. Courses with Harvard philosophers judges imported their own social, economic, or
Josiah ROYCE, William JAMES, and George political views into a decision. His 1958 The
SANTAYANA confirmed Hand’s agnosticism and Bill of Rights most completely expresses his
his belief that absolute truth is unattainable. He arguments against judicial activism.
received the Harvard AB and MA degrees in Hand’s preference for judicial restraint
1893. Following his family’s preference for law brought him into conflict with both conservative
school over philosophy, he graduated from and liberal readings of the Constitution. He
Harvard Law School in 1896. He practiced law occasionally objected to what he viewed as ille-
in Albany until 1902 when he moved his practice gitimate expansions of the meaning of the Bill of
to New York City, where he wrote for law Rights, for example, unconvinced that these fun-
reviews, advocated social reforms, and sup- damental rights must always change with the
ported progressive political parties. He continued times. However, his own conviction that no indi-
these pursuits after his judicial appointment to vidual, organization, religion, or government
the US District Court for New York’s Southern has possession of secure truths made him a pas-
District (1909–24), but soon after World War I sionate advocate for freedom of speech. His
he restrained his political engagement. In 1923 decision in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten
he helped to found the American Law Institute. (1917) protected the free speech rights of a
In 1924 President Coolidge appointed Hand to pacifist and socialist magazine, ruling against
the federal Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the widespread notion that protecting the
and he became its chief judge in 1939. He retired nation’s ability to fight a war overrides anyone’s
from the bench in 1951 but continued to assist right to object to the war or to how the nation
the Court, write on legal theory, and give conducts the war. He applied his own creation,
1018
HANSON
the “incitement test,” which permits punish- BIBLIOGRAPHY

ment only of speech that directly causes criminal The Spirit of Liberty: Papers and Addresses of
behavior. Although influenced by Hand, later Learned Hand, ed. Irving Dilliard (New
Supreme Court decisions guided by Justice York, 1952; 3rd edn 1960).
Holmes used a weaker “clear and present The Bill of Rights (Cambridge, Mass., 1958).
danger” test that instead permitted prior restraint The Art and Craft of Judging: The Decisions
of speech that is judged to have potential dan- of Judge Learned Hand, ed. Hershel Shanks
gerous consequences. Contemporary free speech (New York, 1968).
law is much closer to Hand’s original incitement
standard. Other Relevant Works
While his stance on free speech limited the Hand’s papers are at Harvard Law School.
ability of popular opinion to silence minority
views, Hand saw constitutional and representa- Further Reading
tive democracy as the best form of government. Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Bio, Dict
Like Walter LIPPMANN, Hand rejected romanti- Amer Bio, Who Was Who in Amer v4
cizing democratic individualism, fearing an Breuer, Ernest H. Learned Hand, January 27,
anarchy of unrestrained desires that only threat- 1872–August 18, 1961: Bibliography
ens genuine liberty for all. If citizens must carry (Albany, N.Y., 1964).
the burden of self-government, they must take Griffith, Kathryn P. Judge Learned Hand and
the responsibility of humbly seeking the welfare the Role of the Federal Judiciary (Norman,
of all. In May 1944 he gave a now famous Okla., 1973)
speech before reciting the Pledge of Allegiance Gunther, Gerald. Learned Hand: The Man
with 150,000 new citizens in New York City’s and the Judge (New York, 1994)
Central Park. After warning that not legislatures Schick, Marvin. Learned Hand’s Court
and courts but the people are the sources and (Baltimore, Md., 1970).
guarantors of liberty, he offers a tentative vision
of liberty: John R. Shook
What then is the spirit of liberty? I cannot

define it; I can only tell you my own faith.
The spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not
too sure that it is right; the spirit of liberty
is the spirit which seeks to understand the HANSON, Norwood Russell (1924–67)
mind of other men and women; the spirit of
liberty is the spirit which weighs their inter- Norwood Russell Hanson was an Oxford-
ests alongside its own without bias; the spirit educated philosopher and physicist who helped
of liberty remembers that not even a transform professional philosophy of science in
sparrow falls to earth unheeded; the spirit of the late 1950s and 60s. Over the course of a
liberty is the spirit of Him who, near two career in which he taught at Cambridge, Indiana,
thousand years ago, taught mankind that and Yale, Hanson popularized one of the
lesson it has never learned but never quite defining ideas of post-positivist philosophy of
forgotten; that there may be a kingdom science, the notion that scientific observations are
where the least shall be heard and considered “theory-laden,” and promoted the intellectual
side by side with the greatest. (The Spirit of union of history of science and philosophy of
Liberty, p. 190) science.
Hanson was born on 17 August 1924 in
New York City. After service in the US Navy
1019
HANSON
during World War II as a decorated fighter view can be seen as an early revision of what
pilot, he attended the University of Chicago came to be seen as logical empiricist dogma.
where he earned a BA in 1946. He then did His appeals to perception and optical illusions
further study in physics at the University of were designed to suggest that observations and
Columbia, receiving his BS in 1948 and MA in beliefs (and, hence, observational and theoret-
1949. As a Fulbright Scholar during 1950–52, ical languages) were more connected and
Hanson studied philosophy at the universities mutually influencing than previously supposed.
of both Oxford and Cambridge. He was a This debate was revived in the 1980s by Jerry
lecturer in philosophy of science at Cambridge FODOR (Fodor 1984) in ways suggesting that
from 1952 to 1957 while he completed his logical empiricism models were not so naïve as
doctorate there, and he received his PhD in phi- Hanson and his followers came to believe.
losophy in 1956. In 1957 he accepted an This was not Hanson’s only point of attack
appointment from Newton P. STALLKNECHT, on logical empiricist orthodoxy. He also
then chair of Indiana University’s philosophy sought to counteract the profession’s tendency
department. After helping to establish the to study completed, more or less justified sci-
Department of History and Philosophy of entific theories. The title of his Patterns of
Science, Hanson went to Yale University as Discovery was itself a reply to Hans
professor of philosophy in 1963. He is remem- REICHENBACH’s famous distinction between
bered as a flamboyant character. He regularly contexts of discovery and justification, only
traveled in his personal vintage Grumman the last of which Reichenbach took to be the
Bearcat and became known on Yale’s campus proper domain of scientific philosophy. Many
as “the flying professor.” He died while believed that scientific discovery and creativity
piloting his airplane on 18 April 1967 near were phenomena to be studied by psycholo-
Cortland, New York. gists and sociologists, not philosophers.
Though credit is usually given to Thomas Hanson appealed to Charles Sanders PEIRCE’s
KUHN for the idea that scientific perceptions conception of abduction to explain scientific
are influenced or shaped by paradigmatic com- creativity and hypothesis formation as he
mitments, it was Hanson who brought late argued instead that there were patterns in the
Wittgensteinian notions of “seeing” and development and discovery of scientific
“seeing as” into mainstream philosophy of theories (1958). In both history and contem-
science as a tool to help explain disagreement porary sciences such as particle physics (1963),
among scientific observers. “Perhaps,” Hanson Hanson urged philosophers to examine these
wrote in the beginning of his most famous patterns in order to understand science better.
book, Patterns of Discovery, “there is a sense Hanson’s reliance on pre-Galilean physics in
in which two such observers do not see the developing his account of Galileo’s work in
same thing, do not begin from the same data, physics suggests the influence and proximity of
though their eyesight is normal and they are his Indiana history colleague Edward Grant,
visually aware of the same object” (1958, p. 4). whose Source Book in Medieval Science (Grant
Appealing to both gestalt optical illusions and 1974) helped facilitate the growth of history
episodes in the history of astronomy, Hanson and philosophy of science (HPS) as a unified
argued that “seeing is a ‘theory-laden’ under- discipline in the 1960s and 70s. Hanson and
taking. Observation of x is shaped by prior Grant established Indiana’s Department of
knowledge of x” (1958, p. 19). History and Philosophy of Science in 1960.
Because a strict division between observa- This department established a model for HPS
tional and theoretical languages was a programs in other universities and continues to
standard feature of then-dominant logical uphold Hanson’s adaptation of Kant: history
empiricist conceptions of science, Hanson’s of science without philosophy of science is
1020
HANSON
blind; philosophy of science without history of “Is There a Logic of Scientific Discovery?”
science is empty. in Current Issues in the Philosophy of
Hanson was colorful and intellectually Science, ed. Herbert Feigl and Grover
brazen inside and outside philosophy of Maxwell (New York, 1961), pp. 20–35.
science. In the late 1950s and early 1960s he “The Irrelevance of History of Science to
joined other prominent intellectuals who wrote the Philosophy of Science,” Journal of
for popular audiences in magazines such as Philosophy 59 (1962): 574–85.
The Nation. Excerpts from Patterns of “An Anatomy of Discovery,” Journal of
Discovery appeared in the Saturday Review. Philosophy 64 (1967): 321–52.
Outside of his technical contributions, Hanson “The Genetic Fallacy Revisted,” American
also applied philosophy of science to perennial Philosophical Quarterly 4 (1967):
debates about theism and, in particular, for his 101–13.
burden-of-proof argument holding that theists
(and not atheists) need to supply positive Further Reading
evidence for (rather than against) the existence Bio 20thC Phils, Routledge Encycl Phil,
of God (What I Do Not Believe and Other Who Was Who in Amer v4
Essays, 1971, pp. 309–31). While credited Cohen, Robert S., and Marx W. Wartofsky,
with helping to overthrow logical empiricism, eds. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of
Hanson energetically maintained the public Science, vol. 3: In Memory of Norwood
crusade undertaken by early logical empiri- Russell Hanson (Dordrecht, 1967).
cists against scientifically unsound metaphys- Feyerabend, Paul K. “Patterns of
ical beliefs. Discovery,” Philosophical Review 69
(1960): 247–52.
BIBLIOGRAPHY Fodor, Jerry. “Observation Reconsidered,”
Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the Philosophy of Science 51 (1984): 23–43.
Conceptual Foundations of Science Grant, Edward, ed. A Source Book in
(Cambridge, UK, 1958). Medieval Science (Cambridge, Mass.,
The Concept of the Positron: A 1974).
Philosophical Analysis (Cambridge, UK, Grau, Kevin T. “Force and Nature: The
1963). Department of History and Philosophy of
Perception and Discovery: An Introduction Science at Indiana University,
to Scientific Inquiry (San Francisco, 1960–1998,” Isis suppl. 90 (1999):
1969). 295–318.
What I Do Not Believe and Other Essays, Putnam, Ruth Anna. “Seeing and
ed. Stephen Toulmin and Harry Woolf Observing,” Mind 78 (1969): 493–500.
(Dordrecht, 1971). Tibbetts, Paul. “Hanson and Kuhn on
Observation and Explanation: A Guide to Observation Reports and Knowledge
Philosophy of Science (New York, 1971). Claims,” Dialectica 29 (1975): 145–55.
Constellations and Conjectures, ed. Willard
C. Humphreys (Dordrecht, 1973). George A. Reisch

“Uncertainty,” Philosophical Review 63
(1954): 65–73.
“On the Impossibility of any Future
Metaphysics,” Philosophical Studies 11
(1960): 86–96.
1021
HARDIN
HARDIN, Garrett James (1915–2003) Hardin is best known for his 1968 essay,
“The Tragedy of the Commons,” and his later
Garrett Hardin was born on 21 April 1915 in work, “Living on a Lifeboat” (1974); which
Dallas, Texas. He spent much of his youth critically examines the long-term consequences
moving form town to town, but found stability of foreign aid, immigration, and other seem-
in the summers he spent at the family farm in ingly ethical activities. Concerned for the envi-
Missouri, where he would discover many “life ronmental sustainability of the planet, he
lessons” that shaped his later ethical beliefs. At argued against policies and ethical views that
the age of fifteen he won a city-wide contest would increase population and reduce natural
run by the Chicago Daily News with an essay on resources. Through all of his work he discusses
the importance of Thomas Edison, and was “tough love ethics.” His analogy of the lifeboat
awarded a trip east to visit the aging inventor. In is used to argue against sharing resources with
1932 Hardin won both a University of Chicago those in poverty by implying that such sharing
academic scholarship and a dramatic arts schol- will only threaten disaster for all in the long
arship at the Chicago College of Music. A run. In his 1985 Filter’s against Folly he
month’s attendance convinced him that he could expands on his ethical position in distinguish-
not follow both paths simultaneously, and so he ing three filters that must be used in the prac-
abandoned the dramatic scholarship. In 1936 he tical use of ethics: literacy, concerned with
graduated from the University of Chicago with correct use of language; numeracy, an appre-
a BA in zoology, studying under the ecologist W. ciation of quantities; and ecolacy, the study of
C. Allee. He then transferred to Stanford relationships over time.
University, where he obtained his PhD in micro- Hardin has received many honors. In 1973
bial ecology in 1941. His most influential he was elected to the American Academy of
mentors were the microbiologist C. B. van Niel Arts and Sciences and in 1974 to the American
and the geneticist George W. Beadle, who was Philosophical Society. In 1979 he was awarded
later awarded a Nobel Prize. Shortly after grad- the Margaret Sanger Award for his support for
uation Hardin began work at the Carnegie the wider provision of birth control and pop-
Institution of Washington’s Division of Plant ulation limitation. In 1993 he was one of the
Biology, which had a laboratory on the Stanford recipients of the Phi Beta Kappa annual book
campus. For four years he was part of a team prizes for his book Living Within Limits:
investigating antibiotics produced by algae, as Ecology, Economics, and Population Taboos.
well as the future possibility of using cultured Hardin and his wife were members of the
algae as animal food. Hemlock Society and felt very strongly that
In 1946 Hardin resigned his research they wanted to choose their own time to die,
position at the Carnegie Institution to accept which they accomplished on 14 September
an associate professorship at the University of 2003 in Santa Barbara, California.
California’s campus in Santa Barbara. During
the next two decades he devoted much of his BIBLIOGRAPHY
time to developing an ecologically oriented Nature and Man’s Fate (New York, 1958).
course in biology for the general citizen, which “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science
he adapted to closed-circuit television. He was 162 (1968): 1243–8.
appointed full professor of human ecology in Birth Control (New York, 1970).
1963, holding that position until he retired in Exploring New Ethics for Survival: The
1978. His work on population control and Voyage of the Spaceship Beagle (New
immigration reduction was supported by York, 1972).
grants from the Pioneer Fund from 1988 Stalking the Wild Taboo (Los Altos, Cal.,
through 1992. 1973).
1022
HARING
Mandatory Motherhood: The True Meaning between the west and east coast. She received
of “Right to Life” (Boston, 1974). her BA from Bryn Mawr College in 1942. She
“Living on a Lifeboat,” BioScience 24 married Philip S. Haring in 1942 and they
(October 1974): 561–8. later divorced in 1951. Haring received her
The Limits of Altruism: An Ecologist’s View MA in 1943 and PhD in philosophy in 1959
of Survival (Bloomington, Ind., 1977). from Radcliffe College. She began teaching as
Promethean Ethics: Living with Death, an instructor at Wheaton College in 1944–5,
Competition, and Triage (Seattle, 1980). and then taught philosophy at Wellesley
Naked Emperors: Essays of a Taboo-stalker College beginning in 1945 where she pro-
(Los Altos, Cal., 1982). gressed from instructor to full professor. She
Filters against Folly, How to Survive Despite was department chair during 1962–5, 1966–7,
Economists, Ecologists, and the Merely and 1971–2. In 1972 Haring became professor
Eloquent (New York, 1985). of philosophy and chair of the department at
Living Within Limits: Ecology, Economics, the University of Florida, being the first
and Population Taboos (Oxford, 1993). woman to chair a department in Florida’s
The Immigration Dilemma: Avoiding the College of Arts and Sciences. She served as
Tragedy of the Commons (Washington, chair until 1979, and was a visiting professor
D.C., 1995). at Fordham University in the fall of 1979. She
The Ostrich Factor: Our Population Myopia remained at the University of Florida until
(Oxford, 1998). 1999, continuing to teach there part-time after
retirement in 1993. She is currently living in
Further Reading Washington, D.C.
“Tragedy of the Commons?” Science 302 (12 Haring’s professional awards include two
December 2003). Special issue about fellowship prizes from Bryn Mawr as an
Hardin. undergraduate: the Hinchman Prize Fellowship
Callahan, Daniel. “Garrett Hardin’s ‘Lifeboat (1941–2) and the European Fellowship
Ethic’,” Hastings Center Report 4 (1942–3). Also in 1942–3 she was awarded a
(December 1974): 1–4. Josiah Royce Scholarship by Radcliffe. She
Coburn, Robert. “On Feeding the Hungry,” received the Penelope McDuffie Fellowship
Journal of Social Philosophy 7 (1976): from the American Association of University
11–16. Women in 1958–9. With regard to her pro-
Gardiner, Stephen M. “The Real Tragedy of fessional activities, at Wellesley College she
the Commons,” Philosophy and Public was the Director of the Medieval Studies
Affairs 30 (2001): 387–416. Honors Major (1952–5) and Chair of the
College Curriculum Revision Committee
John William Bates V (1962–4). She served as President for the
Association of Realistic Philosophy (1961–3),
and as Secretary for the Metaphysical Society
of America (1951–2 and 1968–71). She was
the President of the Florida Philosophical
Association in 1975. She was active as a
HARING, Ellen Stone (1921– ) member on several national committees during
her career: the Committee for the International
Ellen Stone was born on 5 December 1921 in Exchange of Persons (Fulbright Committee)
Los Angeles, California. Her father was a naval in 1964–8; the Council of Secretaries,
officer, and as a child, she experienced a American Council of Learned Societies in
nomadic-style life, moving several times 1968–71; the Executive Committee, Council of
1023
HARING
Secretaries, of the American Council of Learned HARKNESS, Georgia Elma (1891–1974)

Societies (1970–71); and the Executive
Committee of the Eastern Division of the Georgia Harkness was the first female theolo-
American Philosophical Association (1972–4). gian to teach in Protestant seminaries in the
Haring’s major areas of interest are ancient United States, at Garrett Biblical Institute and
philosophy and metaphysics. She has published Pacific School of Religion. She was a social
a series of three articles on Aristotle in the activist, challenging churches and society to
Review of Metaphysics, entitled “Substantial overcome sexism, racism, and militarism.
Form in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z.” She has Harkness was trained in and taught philoso-
been acknowledged in the prefaces of three of phy, became a Boston personalist and a philo-
Paul Weiss’s books: Modes of Being (1958), The sophical idealist, and then turned to theology in
World of Art (1960), and History: Written and the second half of her career.
Lived (1962). She is an Aristotelian rather than Harkness was born on 21 April 1891 in the
a Platonist; and, for that reason, has been drawn tiny hamlet of Harkness in the Lake Champlain
into some contemporary sciences, particularly area of upstate New York. The town was
those concerned with perception and action. named after her grandfather. The substantial
farm on which she grew up had been in her
BIBLIOGRAPHY father’s family since her Scotch-Irish ancestors
“Substantial Form in Aristotle’s Metaphysics migrated to the area in 1801. Harkness’s father,
Z” Review of Metaphysics 10 (1956): J. Warren, and her mother, Lillie (Merrill)
308–32; 10 (1957): 482–501; 10 (1957): Harkness, were leading citizens of the town
698–713. and church. She and her siblings attended the
“A Twentieth Century Aristotle,” Review of town’s one-room elementary school, which was
Metaphysics 14 (1960): 292–9. located in the same building as their church.
“Aristotle’s Physical Philosophy,” Review of Raised in a conservative evangelical Methodist
Metaphysics 15 (1961): 271–7. Episcopal congregation, Georgia joined the
“The Ontological Principle,” Review of church after what she described as her defini-
Metaphysics, 16 (1962): 3–13. tive conversion at age fourteen and maintained
“Interrogation of Paul Weiss,” in her membership there throughout her life.
Philosophical Interrogations, ed. Sydney Harkness graduated from the nearby
Rome and Beatrice Rome (New York, Keeseville High School at fifteen and received
1964), pp. 259–317. a Regents’ scholarship to attend a university or
“Actualities as Private and Public,” Review of college in New York State. She chose Cornell
Metaphysics 25 (1972): 131–43. University, the state’s leading institution of
“The Theaetetus Ends Well,” Review of higher education, which had opened its doors
Metaphysics 35 (1982): 509–28. to women in 1872. Harkness became active in
“Socratic Duplicity: ‘Theaetetus’ the Student Volunteer Movement, a second
154b1–156a3,” Review of Metaphysics 45 home to her, and took its pledge that, God
(1992): 525–42. willing, she would become a foreign mission-
ary. Over the next several years, her vocational
Further Reading direction changed from missionary service to
“Haring, Ellen Stone,” in Who’s Who in director of religious education in a local church,
America, 58th edn (New Providence, N.J., to college and seminary teaching in philosophy
2004), pp. 2155. of religion, religious education, and practical
theology.
Rebecca Bensen Cain During her years at Cornell, Harkness’s
strongest academic influence was James Edwin
1024
HARKNESS
CREIGHTON, a distinguished philosopher in systems of philosophy of lasting influence devel-

American academic circles who had been oped in the United States. Brightman followed
elected President of the American Philosophical in his footsteps as a second-generation
Association at its founding in 1902. Creighton exponent of Personalism; Harkness was among
believed that philosophy should bring deeper its third-generation representatives.
meaning to everyday life and address present- The essence of this philosophical position
day problems in the home, school, and work lay in its interpretation of personality. The
settings, an approach that Harkness embraced. person is the ultimate reality and personality the
He advanced his own system of speculative fundamental explanatory principle and value of
idealism, which held that the mind can all of life, both human and divine. Harkness
overcome its one-sidedness and correct and gained from Brightman the notion that to be
complete ideas and experiences. To Creighton, practical, in the philosophical sense, necessi-
the free spirit of critical inquiry was the ideal of tates ideals that provide a more convincing
philosophical experience. He was not a philoso- interpretation of the ends, meaning, and values
pher of religion and was not concerned with an of life than the desires, instincts, and habits
understanding of divinity from a Christian per- that motivate a superficial existence.
spective. Belief in a sane world in which indi- Personalism found inexhaustible meaning in
viduals, other selves, social systems, and the life in the relation of human and divine wills.
natural order functioned harmoniously fur- Brightman taught that God is a being of perfect
nished the only basis for rationality. His spec- goodness and purpose and that humans live out
ulative idealism provided Harkness a subse- of an ideal obligation to live by the highest
quent natural entry into Boston personalism. values. Though suffering and tragedy are facts
The two philosophical systems shared common of life, the Personalist believed that finding a
optimistic liberal tenets: the centrality of the deeper meaning can transform tragedy. Because
individual and personality, the ability of the the universe is a friendly place, the hope of
mind to bring truth and freedom to any given transformation is possible. Brightman taught
situation, and confidence in a steady and Harkness that religion is a person’s total
dependable natural and social world. attitude toward what the self considers to be
Creighton’s philosophical map enabled superhuman and worthy of worship or
Harkness to venture forth on her academic devotion. All religious experience aims to
journey and, in time, to move in her own express a person’s attitude toward what is
distinct direction. regarded as the chief value of all values in life.
After graduation with a BA from Cornell in Religion, like philosophy, is practical because it
1912, and before beginning work on her leads people to deeper meaning and purpose in
advanced degrees at Boston University, life. Serving God is the only purpose inclusive
Harkness taught high school in small upstate enough both to sustain the individual and to
New York towns until 1918. She then earned benefit the larger community and world.
one of the first MRE degrees from Boston Taking the advice of Brightman, Harkness
University’s School of Religious Education in wrote her dissertation on “The Relationships
1920, and a MA in philosophy in that year. between Philosophy of Religion and Ethics in
While in her master’s programs, she began the Thought of T. H. Green.” Green, an
taking classes under Edgar S. BRIGHTMAN, pro- Oxford professor in the late nineteenth century,
fessor of philosophy at Boston University, who conceived of God in the same way that the
became her foremost academic mentor. Boston personalists did, through the concept of
Brightman had earned his PhD under Borden self-consciousness. He saw God as a “com-
Parker B OWNE , the founder of Boston pleted self-consciousness, a being of perfect
Personalism, one of the first comprehensive understanding and perfect love, whose life is an
1025
HARKNESS
eternal act of self-realization through self-sac- discover the “true grounds upon which one
rifice”. God’s eternal self-consciousness repro- may believe in and live by moral and spiritual
duces itself in human beings and becomes the ideals.” An ideal, Harkness wrote, is “a con-
foundation for their intellectual and moral lives, viction that something ought to be held before
leading persons to live more purposefully. the mind with sufficient power to motivate
Green defined religion as a “God-seeking effort to bring it to pass” (Recovery of Ideals,
morality” and moral activity as the “repro- 1937, pp. viii, 49). Most people settle for “pru-
duction of God.” The thought of T. H. Green dential adjustment”; they aspire to do nothing
did not attract wide interest; Harkness’s dis- to excess and to maintain a socially respectable
sertation was not published, and only two short character. The Christian, however, should
articles were published from it. However, her aspire to the highest ideal of triumphant
dissertation brought together the work she had religion, the level of active saintliness, demon-
done on philosophical idealism and personal- strating the dynamic union of social action and
ism in her undergraduate and graduate training social passion, sympathy for all persons, and
and defined the philosophy that became the courage to serve the needy. Harkness con-
basis of her life as well as her teaching through- tended that “It is through ideals that we
out the 1920s and 1930s. discover direction and power both to resist
After receiving her PhD at Boston in 1923, temptation and to overcome limitation. If our
Harkness gained her first college teaching ideals are as inclusive as they ought to be, we
position as assistant professor of religious edu- find through them not only personal mastery
cation at Elmira College in upstate New York, but the impetus toward the creation of a society
and taught there in the philosophy department where none need be inhibited by artificial
until 1937. Founded in 1855, it claimed the dis- barriers from living at his best. The function of
tinction of being the first women’s college in the the ideals is both individual and social. In the
United States. Harkness moved to Mount power to live by ideals, whether directed against
Holyoke College as associate professor in the sin or chaos, lies salvation.” (Recovery of
department of history and literature of religion Ideals, 1937, p. 46)
in 1937, remaining there for only two years. To live out of the highest ideals of tri-
Her self-understanding as a teacher and a umphant religion is “both a quest and an
scholar was strongest during the years from achievement” (Religious Living, 1937, p. 1),
1922 to 1939. By 1939, she had begun to she continued. As a person’s life is turned
strongly question the adequacy of her philo- outward to seek the good of others, his or
sophical position and to define herself as a the- her inner life is enriched and deepened. The
ologian rather than as a philosopher of religion. most important thing a person can do is to
Harkness’s philosophy was grounded in the find a way to live religiously. One may at
tenets of triumphant religion or triumphant times be confronted with the inability to do
idealism. The language of triumphant religion the good that he or she wills to do. However,
gave expression to the quest for an ideal of God delivers persons from evil to the para-
philosophical objectivity to enable a person to doxical assurance of victory in Christ. The
live religiously, a position which underlay her person who feels bound by evil should know
writing until she was almost fifty. Harkness’s that one can do all things through Christ. The
commitment to triumphant religion is presented definitive statement of her faith in 1937 is
definitively in four of her books: Conflicts in summarized in these words from The
Religious Thought (1929), The Resources of Recovery of Ideals: “Living in Christ, one
Religion (1936), The Recovery of Ideals (1937), could look the world in the face, do a mighty
and Religious Living (1937). She stated in these work, and know that nothing could daunt
writings that her basic religious concern was to the soul.” (1937, p. 190)
1026
HARKNESS
By 1937, Georgia Harkness had reached a tively, and felt bereft of the presence of God in
crest of professional success that could be her life. Her healing, which occurred gradually
credited to her personal experience of tri- over several years, came from physical treat-
umphant religion. She wrote to Brightman in ment, psychological counseling, personal com-
January that she had experienced a great burst panionship, and theological redirection.
of energy that enabled her to do a prodigious Harkness became professor of applied
amount of fruitful writing and lecturing. theology at Garrett Biblical Institute, a Methodist
However, her words in the last sentence of the seminary in Evanston, Illinois, in 1939. She was
letter were crucial: she stated that she felt she had the first woman in the United States to obtain a
found a reason for living during this period. This theological professorship. She remained there
statement provides the first indication of her until she moved to the Pacific School of Religion
inward questioning, the earliest sign of the onset in Berkeley, California, in 1950. Her years at
of a spiritual depression that would strike to the Garrett provided personal support and profes-
heart of her life’s goal of triumphant living, sional direction as a theologian. In 1945, when
leading her from her philosophical commitment Harkness had come out of her depression, she
to triumphant religion to a theological stance as wrote The Dark Night of the Soul, which grew
an evangelical liberal. Immediately after her out of her understanding of the inseparable con-
surge of energy and purposefulness, the crucial nection between one’s emotional and physical
turning point occurred in Harkness’s spiritual condition and one’s spiritual pilgrimage.
journey. Her work came to a sudden halt when In her maturing theology, she wrote that the
her father became seriously ill. On 1 April 1937, problem of evil, from the standpoint of Christian
on his deathbed, his last words to her were that faith, is resolved in an acceptance of God’s grace,
he knew she had written good books; wise men in a belief that God’s grace is sufficient for all cir-
said they were. But he wished she would write cumstances. She interpreted her former spiritual
more about Jesus Christ. Warren Harkness was goal to live triumphantly as the pride of doing
asking Georgia at that fateful hour to recover the good works for God, which constituted a deep
roots of her Christian faith as an evangelical level of self-centeredness in which a person
Christian and to embrace a more Christ-centered quested “for spiritual blessings through com-
approach to religious truth. The death of her munion with Him not for the love of God but for
father began to release the hold of triumphant one’s own satisfaction” (1945, p. 339). In her
religion over her. In his prodigious activity for the former commitment to triumphal religion,
good of others in his church and community, Harkness had believed that human beings gained
Georgia’s father was her model of triumphant their own spiritual victory, that salvation came
living. She had sought to emulate, on the by the living out of high ideals. Through the
national and international level, his example on redemptive experience at the heart of her dark
the local scene. A life of service to God, the night of the soul, she now knew that the victory
church, and other persons had always shaped was in God’s grace and human acceptance. The
her Christian commitment; however, his death Christian’s rightful faith, she wrote in 1945, is
initiated a lengthy process of change in her voca- that, however dark the night, God’s love sur-
tional motivations. In her late forties, suffering rounds us. The good news is that “there is a way
from her father’s death and the strains of work, forward out of the dark. Such assurance comes
Harkness entered a dark night of the soul that through the God revealed in Jesus Christ. It is the
lasted for almost eight years, from 1937 to 1945. ultimate conviction of Christian faith that there
Over the next decade, clinical depression mani- is no situation in life where spiritual defeat is
fested itself physically, mentally, emotionally, final. We may be defeated but God cannot be.”
and spiritually. She developed serious back Harkness’s evangelical faith was based on the
problems, could not concentrate to work effec- ultimate promise of Christianity, given at Easter
1027
HARKNESS
in the cross and resurrection: “sin can be Jesus (New York, 1950).
forgiven, pain overcome, by the victory of God, The Modern Rival of Christian Faith (New
a victory that is both within and beyond this York, 1952).
earthly scene” (1945, pp. 170–71, 10–12, 178). O Worship the Lord (New York, 1952).
Of her evangelical liberalism, Harkness said: Be Still and Know (Nashville, Tenn., 1953).
“Open always to more truth from whatever The Religious Life (New York, 1953).
source it comes, suspending judgment when nec- The Sources of Western Morality (New York,
essary till relative certainty emerges, resolved to 1954).
live by the truth one has and to let others differ Toward Understanding the Bible (New York,
if their insights lead in another direction, one 1954).
combines tolerance with decisiveness, open- Foundations of Christian Knowledge
mindedness with Christian conviction … . The (Nashville, Tenn., 1955).
greatest word ever spoken about the pursuit of Christian Ethics (New York, 1957).
truth” was Jesus’s: “Ye shall know the truth, and The Providence of God (New York, 1960).
the truth shall make you free.” (1947, p. 49) Beliefs That Count (New York, 1961).
After retiring from Pacific School of Religion The Church and Its Laity (New York, 1962).
in 1961, she lived in Claremont, California with The Methodist Church in Social Thought and
her companion of thirty years, Verna Miller, Action (New York, 1964).
whom she had met in Evanston while on the Our Christian Hope (New York, 1964).
faculty of Garrett Biblical Institute. Harkness What Christians Believe (Nashville, Tenn.,
died on 21 August 1974 in Claremont, 1965).
California. The Fellowship of the Holy Spirit (Nashville,
Tenn., 1966).
BIBLIOGRAPHY Coming of Life: A Study of the Gospel of
The Church and the Immigrant (New York, John, Guide (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1968).
1921). Stability and Change (Nashville, Tenn., 1969)
Conflicts in Religious Thought (New York, The Ministry of Reconciliation (Nashville,
1929). Tenn., 1971).
John Calvin: The Man and His Ethics (New Women in Church and Society: A Historical
York, 1931). and Theological Inquiry (Nashville, Tenn.,
Holy Flame (Boston, 1935). 1971).
The Resources of Religion (New York, 1936). Mysticism: Its Meaning and Message
The Recovery of Ideals (New York, 1937). (Nashville, Tenn., 1973).
Religious Living (New York, 1937). Understanding the Kingdom of God
The Faith by Which the Church Lives (Nashville, Tenn., 1974).
(Nashville, Tenn., 1940). Biblical Backgrounds of the Middle East
The Glory of God (Nashville, Tenn., 1943). Conflict, with Charles F. Kraft (Nashville,
The Dark Night of the Soul (New York, Tenn., 1976).
1945).
Understanding the Christian Faith (New York, Other Relevant Works
1947). Harkness’s papers are at Garrett-Evangelical
Prayer and the Common Life (New York, Theological Seminary and the Claremont
1948). School of Theology, and many letters to E. S.
The Gospel and Our World (New York, Brightman are at Boston University.
1949). “A Spiritual Pilgrimage: Ninth Article in the
Through Christ Our Lord: A Devotional Series ‘How My Mind Has Changed in This
Manual Based on the Recorded Words of Decade’,” The Christian Century 56 (1939):
1028
HARMAN
348–51. HARMAN, Gilbert Helms (1938– )

“If I Make My Bed in Hell,” The Christian
Century 59 (1942): 45–8. Gilbert Harman was born on 26 May 1938 in
Grace Abounding (Nashville, Tenn., 1969). East Orange, New Jersey. He received a BA at
Harkness’s autobiography. Swarthmore in 1960, and a PhD at Harvard in
1964. The title of his dissertation was
Further Reading “Skepticism and the Definition of Knowledge.”
Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Harman has taught philosophy at Princeton
Dict Amer Religious Bio, Proc of APA v48, University since 1963, where he presently is
Who Was Who in Amer v6, Who’s Who in professor of philosophy. He has earned several
Phil honors and awards, including a Guggenheim
Bass, Dorothy C. “Georgia Harkness,” in Fellowship and fellowships from the National
Notable American Women: The Modern Science Foundation, the National Endowment
Period (Cambridge, Mass., 1980), pp. for the Humanities, the American Council of
312–14. Learned Societies, and the James D. McDowell
Carpenter, Dianne E. Georgia Harkness’s Foundation.
Distinctive Personalistic Synthesis. PhD Significant early influences were Richard
dissertation, Boston University (Boston, BRANDT, Noam CHOMSKY, John RAWLS, W. V.
1988). QUINE, H. P. GRICE, Wilfrid SELLARS, and
Deats, Paul, and Carol Rubb, eds. The Boston Donald DAVIDSON. In early work Harman
Personalist Tradition in Philosophy, Social argued against Chomsky’s reasons for intro-
Ethics, and Theology (Macon, Georgia, ducing transformations into generative
1988). grammar and against Chomsky’s position for
Hogue, Harland E. Christian Seed in Western an innate language faculty. But he soon
Soil: A History of Pacific School of Religion changed his mind on both topics.
(Berkeley, Cal., 1965). In semantics Harman rejects any identifica-
Keller, Rosemary S. Georgia Harkness: For tion of meaning with truth conditions while
Such a Time as This (Nashville, Tenn., agreeing that accounts of truth conditions can
1992). Contains a bibliography of shed light on the meanings of logical constants.
Harkness’s writings. His view is that other apparently conflicting
Leiffer, Murray, and Dorothy Leiffer. Enter the theories of meaning are really theories about
Old Portals, Reminiscences: Fifty Years on a different topics: the content of psychological
Seminary Campus, Garrett-Evangelical states, the intended meanings of utterances,
Theological Seminary (Evanston, Ill., 1987). and the significance of speech acts.
Scott, Martha L. The Theology and Social Some of Harman’s work discusses the possi-
Thought of Georgia Harkness. PhD bility of uncovering the logical form of sen-
dissertation, Northwestern University tences in ordinary language. He argues that, if
(Evanston, Ill., 1984). logical principles hold by virtue of form, then
modus ponens is not a principle of logic,
Rosemary Skinner Keller because “if” is a sentence complementizer
rather than a sentential connective. He takes a
stand against nontrivial notions of analyticity
and a priori knowledge but rejects Quine’s
thesis of the indeterminacy of radical transla-
tion. He defends a nonsolipsistic version of
conceptual role semantics and a related func-
tionalist account of psychological states.
1029
HARMAN
Harman also defends the existence of a Ethics (Oxford, 1977).

“language of thought” that includes (but is not Change in View: Principles of Reasoning
limited to) one’s natural language. He argues (Cambridge, Mass., 1986).
that propositions should be construed as Skepticism and the Definition of Knowledge
semantic types instantiated, for example, by (New York, 1990).
various attitudes. He rejects the claim that per- Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity,
ceptual states have an intrinsic qualitative char- with Judith Jarvis Thomson (Oxford,
acter of which one is aware. 1996).
In epistemology, Harman favors a distinction Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (Oxford,
between logic as a theory of implication and 1999).
consistency and the theory of reasoning and Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral
inference: reasoning consists in change in view by Philosophy (Oxford, 2000).
addition and subtraction of beliefs. He empha-
sizes the role of explanatory considerations in Other Relevant Works
reasoning, discusses what kinds of simplicity “The Inference to the Best Explanation,”
considerations are relevant, and discusses prag- Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 88–95.
matic aspects of theoretical reasoning. “Toward a Theory of Intrinsic Value,”
Concerning practical reasoning, Harman Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967):
argues that intentions are self-referential. He 792–804.
distinguishes positive, negative, and conditional “Substitutional Quantification and
intentions, holding that it is inconsistent to Quotation,” Noûs 5 (1971): 213–14.
have intentions that cannot all be carried out Ed. with Donald Davidson, Semantics of
given one’s beliefs, in the way that it is incon- Natural Language (Dordrecht, 1972; 2nd
sistent to have desires that cannot all come edn 1977).
true. Since intentions involve acceptance of a Ed., On Noam Chomsky: Critical Essays
more or less determinate plan, he explains (Garden City, N.Y., 1974).
doing something intentionally in terms of Ed. with Donald Davidson, The Logic of
carrying out that plan. Grammar (Encino, Cal., 1975).
In ethics, Harman defends a form of moral rel- “Moral Relativism Defended,” Philosophical
ativism that allows for moral bargaining as an Review 84 (1975): 3–22.
important part of moral reasoning. He argues “Metaphysical Realism and Moral
that the “fundamental attribution error” shows Relativism,” Journal of Philosophy 79
that people do not differ in respect of character (1982): 568–75.
traits in the way envisioned by virtue ethics. He “Positive versus Negative Undermining in
offers an analysis of intrinsic value and argues Belief Revision,” Noûs 18 (1984): 39–49.
against philosophical appeals to second or higher Ed., Conceptions of the Human Mind: Essays
order desires in order to explain value or in Honor of George A. Miller (Hillsdale,
freedom. He also finds an analogy between lin- N.J., 1993).
guistics and moral philosophy. “Stringency of Rights and ‘Ought’,”
Philosophy and Phenomenological
BIBLIOGRAPHY Research 53 (1993): 181–5.
“Knowledge, Reasons, And Causes,” Journal “Analyticity Regained?” Noûs 30 (1996):
of Philosophy 67 (1970): 841–55. 392–400.
“Logical Form,” Foundations of Language 9 “General Foundations versus Rational
(1972): 38–65. Insight,” Philosophy and
Thought (Princeton, N.J., 1973). Phenomenological Research 63 (2001):
The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to 657–63.
1030
HARPER
“The Future of the A Priori,” in Philosophy HARPER, Frances Ellen Watkins

in America at the Turn of the Century (1825–1911)
(Charlottesville, Virg., 2003), pp. 23–34.
“Skepticism and Foundations,” in The Frances Harper lived in total dedication to
Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, ed. Steven social causes, feminist issues, and the general
Luper (Aldershot, UK, 2003), pp. 1–11. advancement of her race. She was born Frances
Ellen Watkins on 24 September 1825 in
Further Reading Baltimore, Maryland to free parents but she
Bio 20thC Phils, Oxford Comp Phil was orphaned at an early age. She received a
Copp, David. “Harman on Internalism, formal education in a Baltimore school for
Relativism, and Logical Form,” Ethics 92 free blacks, which was founded and run by her
(1982): 227–42. uncle. She took interest in literature at an early
Harding, Sandra. “Harman’s Thoughts,” age. She was fortunate to be a maid to the
Metaphilosophy 8 (1977): 62–71. Armstrongs, a liberal white Baltimore family,
Kupperman, Joel. “The Indispensability of who owned a bookshop and granted her access
Character,” Philosophy 76 (2001): to the family library.
239–50. In 1850 she became the first woman to teach
Lehrer, Keith. “How Reasons Give Us at Union Seminary in Wilberforce, Ohio, and
Knowledge, or the Case of the Gypsy then she taught in Pennsylvania where she was
Lawyer,” Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): involved in the Underground Railroad. In
311–3. 1859 she published “The Two Offers” in an
Millgram, Elijah. “Harman’s Hardness Anglo-African magazine, becoming the first
Arguments,” Pacific Philosophical African American to publish a short story. She
Quarterly 72 (1991): 181–202. married Fenton Harper in 1860, who died in
Pojman, Louis. “Gilbert Harman’s Internalist 1864 after the birth of their daughter. She
Moral Relativism,” Modern Schoolman 68 rededicated herself solely to the advancement
(1990): 19–39. of social causes, which she pursued in both her
Robinson, William S. “Intrinsic Qualities of writing and her many speeches throughout her
Experience: Surviving Harman’s Critique,” long life. She was a speaker at the 1866
Erkenntnis 47 (1997): 285–309. National Women’s Rights Convention, and
Shope, Robert. The Analysis of Knowing: A involved in the National Woman’s Christian
Decade of Research (Princeton, N.J., Temperance Union, the American Association
1983). of Education of Colored Youth, and the
Sorell, Tom. “Harman’s Paradox,” Mind 90 National Association of Colored Women,
(1981): 557–75. serving as its Vice President in 1897. Harper
Sosa, Ernest. “Is Color Psychological or died on 22 February 1911 in Philadelphia,
Biological? Or Both?” Philosophical Issues Pennsylvania.
7 (1996): 67–74. Even though Harper established her repu-
Steinbock, Bonnie. “Moral Reasons and tation in her poetry and fiction (publishing
Relativism,” Journal of Value Inquiry 15 many commercially successful volumes), the
(1981): 157–68. depth and complexity of her philosophy
“Symposium on Moral Relativism and Moral guiding those works gives her prominence as
Objectivity,” Philosophy and an African-American philosopher. Prominent
Phenomenological Research 58 (1998): is the ethical role of aesthetics and race as a
161–222. social construct. Maryemma Graham sees
Harper’s poems as “social protest poetry”
Elizabeth Harman (Complete Poems, 1988, p. lii). Graham
1031
HARPER
situates her at a “critical juncture in the devel- BIBLIOGRAPHY

opment of Afro-American poetry” and as pre- Poems on Miscellaneous Subjects (Boston,
figuring Harlem Renaissance writers like Paul 1854; 2nd edn, Philadelphia, 1857).
Laurence Dunbar, Langston Hughes, Sterling Moses: A Story of the Nile (Philadelphia,
Brown, and also the entire generation of Black 1869).
Arts Movement poets in the 1960s, artists who Iola Leroy, or Shadows Uplifted
renounced “art for art’s sake” (p. liii). Harper’s (Philadelphia and Boston, 1892; 2nd edn
concern both for her race and the ethical role 1893; Oxford, 1988).
of literature is shown in her 1869 poem, Idylls of the Bible (New York, 1975).
“Moses, a Story of the Nile” crafted in the Sketches of Southern Life (Philadelphia,
form of a dialogue between Moses and the 1893).
Egyptian Princess: “I go to join/The Fortunes Complete Poems of Frances E. W. Harper,
of my race, and to put aside/All other bright ed. Maryemma Graham (New York,
advantages, save/The approval of my con- 1988).
science and the meed/Of rightly doing.” A Brighter Coming Day: A Frances Ellen
In her 1892 novel, Iola Leroy, Harper Watkins Harper Reader, ed. Frances
explored further the ethical role of literature in Smith Foster (New York, 1990).
fighting stereotypes and enhancing positive Minnie’s Sacrifice; Sowing and Reaping;
self-image. According to Frances Smith Foster, Trial and Triumph: Three Rediscovered
Harper was “a black woman who advocated Novels (Boston, 1994).
social reform and used her literature to argue
controversial issues” (Iola Leroy, 1988, p. Other Relevant Works
xxxiii). In the same vein, Harper uses Iola “Education and the Elevation of the
Leroy to explore the issue of race as a social Colored Race,” a pamphlet (Philadelphia,
construct. “Passing” as white, as Iola Leroy 1854).
does, is seen as a metaphor for the negotiabil- “Enlightenend Motherhood: An Address by
ity of race. Iola declares, “It is the public Mrs. Frances E. W. Harper, before the
opinion which assigns me a place with the Brooklyn Literary Society,” a pamphlet
colored people” (p. 417). Due to the power (Brooklyn, N.Y., 1892).
and money Iola’s father had amassed, she was “Woman’s Political Future,” in Worlds
assigned a place in the white person’s world. Congress of Representative Women, ed.
Though Harper herself focused on her May Wright Sewall (Chicago, 1894), pp.
fiction and poetry, she also wrote a number of 433–8.
essays on racial equality and women’s rights. “The Afro-American Mother,” in Work
She did not deny the reality of phenotypic dif- and Words of the National Congress of
ference between persons of African and Mothers (First Annual Session) (New
European descents. Her argument was simply York, 1897), pp. 67–71.
that this difference is not essentially given.
According to Leonard Harris, “she envisions a Further Reading
community of self-respecting persons that were Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio,
not confined to living out lives as racial kinds.” Dict Amer Religious Bio
(Harris 2000, p. 53) In this way, she set the Boyd, Melba Joyce. Discarded Legacy:
tone for Alain LOCKE, the prominent African- Politics and Poetics in the Life of Frances
American philosopher of the Harlem E. W. Harper, 1825–1911 (Detroit,
Renaissance, who gave these issues deeper 1994).
attention. Harris, Leonard, ed. Philosophy Born of
Struggle: Anthology of Afro-American
1032
HARRIES
Philosophy from 1917 (Dubuque, Iowa, to justify by modern standards, but is explic-
2000). able in terms of underlying ideals animating
Filler, Louis. “Harper, Frances Ellen the use of space and design.
Watkins,” in Notable American Women In the culmination of his thought on aes-
1607–1950: A Biographical Dictionary thetics, The Ethical Function of Architecture
(Cambridge, Mass., 1971), pp. 137–9. (1997), Harries argues against the modern
Young, Elizabeth. “Warring Fictions: Iola tendency to divorce aesthetic quality from
Leroy and the Color of Gender,” reason and morality. His extensive work on
American Literature 64 (1992): 273–97. German philosophy, especially Hegel and
Heidegger, is applied to the aesthetics problems
Chielozona Eze of the relation between architecture and
ongoing human life. The ethical responsibility
of the architect to exemplify human values
should be matched by the community’s respon-
sibility to experience buildings as centers of
their social lives. “The ethical function of
HARRIES, Karsten (1937– ) Architecture is inevitably also a public
function. Sacred and public architecture
Karsten Harries was born on 25 January 1937 provides the community with a center or
in Jena, Germany. He was educated at Yale centers. Individuals gain their sense of place in
University, receiving his BA in 1958 and PhD a history, in a community, by relating their
in philosophy in 1962. From 1961 to 1963 he dwellings to that center.” (1997, p. 287) The
was an instructor of philosophy at Yale, and Ethical Function of Architecture won the
then he was an assistant professor from 1963 American Institute of Architects 8th Annual
to 1965 at the University of Texas. Harries International Architecture Book Award for
returned to Yale as associate professor of phi- Criticism.
losophy in 1966 and was promoted to full
professor in 1970. He was visiting professor at BIBLIOGRAPHY
the University of Bonn in 1965–6 and 1968–9. The Meaning of Modern Art: A
He was awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship in Philosophical Interpretation (Evanston,
1971–2. During 1987–91 He held the position Ill., 1968).
of Mellon Professor at Yale. He has also served The Bavarian Rococo Church: Between
as department chair from 1973 to 1978 and in Faith and Aestheticism (New Haven,
1987–8. Conn., 1983).
Harries has published primarily on conti- The Broken Frame: Three Lectures
nental philosophy, aesthetics, and metaphysics. (Washington, D.C., 1990).
His first book, The Meaning of Modern Art: A The Ethical Function of Architecture
Philosophical Interpretation (1968), maintains (Cambridge, Mass., 1997).
that art expresses human ideals, and that Infinity of Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.,
understanding a work of art requires under- 2001).
standing the ideal image involved. Each his-
torical period of art expresses the ideals (reli- Other Relevant Works
gious and moral) of the age. Harries’s next “Heidegger and Holderlin: The Limits of
book, The Bavarian Rococo Church: Between Language,” The Personalist 44 (1963):
Faith and Aestheticism (1983), applies this 5–23.
theory to a specific place and time period. The “Two Conflicting Interpretations of
ornamentation characteristic of rococo is hard Language in Wittgenstein’s
1033
HARRIES
‘Investigations’,” Kant Studien 59 (1968): Heidt (New Haven, Conn., 2001), pp.
397–409. 47–73.
“Meta-criticism and Meta-poetry,”
Research in Phenomenology 9 (1979): Further Reading
54–73. Olivier, Bert. “Why a Philosophy of
“Copernican Reflections and the Tasks of Architecture? The Importance of
Metaphysics,” International Harries’s Contribution,” South African
Philosophical Quarterly 23 (1983): Journal of Philosophy 13 (1994):
235–50. 167–74.
“Architecture and Ontology,” in Creativity Spector, Tom. The Ethical Architect: The
and Common Sense: Essays in Honor of Dilemma of Contemporary Practice
Paul Weiss, ed. Thomas Krettek (Albany, (Princeton, N.J., 2001).
N.Y., 1987), pp. 145–61. Wild, John. “Being and Time: A Reply,”
“Poetry as Response: Heidegger’s Step Review of Metaphysics 17 (1964):
Beyond Aestheticism,” Midwest Studies 610–16.
in Philosophy 16 (1991): 73–88.
“Questioning the Question of the Worth of John R. Shook
Life,” Journal of Philosophy 88 (1991):
684–90.
“Beauty, Language and Re-Presentation,”
in Transformations in Personhood and
Culture after Theory, ed. Christie
McDonald and Gary Wihl (University HARRINGTON, Edward Michael, Jr.
Park, Penn., 1994), pp. 61–77. (1928–89)
Ed. with Christoph Jamme, Martin
Heidegger: Politics, Art, and Technology Michael Harrington was born on 24 February
(New York, 1994). 1928 in St. Louis, Missouri, and died on 31
“Herkunft als Zukunft,” in Annäherungen July 1989 in Larchmont, New York. A lifelong
an Martin Heidegger: Festschrift für Catholic, he attended parochial schools, receiv-
Hugo Ott zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. ing the BA from Holy Cross College in 1947,
Hermann Schäfer (Frankfurt am Main, and after attending Yale Law School for one
Germany, 1996), pp. 41–64. year, earned the MA in English literature from
“Descartes and the Labyrinth of the the University of Chicago in 1949. While an
World,” International Journal of undergraduate at Holy Cross, he discovered
Philosophical Studies 6 (1998): 307–30. the writings of G. K. Chesterton, a British
“The Epochal Threshold and the Classical novelist adept at paradox. Returning home to
Ideal: Hölderlin contra Hegel,” in The St. Louis, he took a temporary job as a social
Emergence of German Idealism, ed. worker which started his journey as social
Michael Baur and Daniel Dahlstrom critic and reformer.
(Washington, D.C., 1999), pp. 147–75. After moving to New York, he became an
“Nietzsche’s Labyrinths, Variations on an editor and contributing writer for Catholic
Ancient Theme,” in Nietzsche and “An Worker, joining the Catholic Worker
Architecture of Our Minds,” ed. Movement in 1951. The next year he became
Alexandre Kostka and Irving Wohlfarth a Marxist, and helped to found the Young
(Los Angeles, 1999), pp. 35–52. Socialist League in 1954, becoming its national
“Philosophy in Search of Itself,” in What is chairman in 1955. Harrington worked tire-
Philosophy?, ed. C. P. Ragland and Sarah lessly to spread the organization’s Marxist
1034
HARRINGTON
message by visiting university campuses and con- Organizing Committee, which played an impor-
tributing widely to the organization’s publica- tant role in uniting the interests of labor, liberals,
tion, Young Socialist Challenge. His leadership civil rights and feminist groups within the
roles in American socialism included serving as Democratic Party during the 1970s.
editor and chief of New America, the journal of As a leader of the American socialist
the Socialist Party. He served as chairman of movement, Harrington sought to use a Marxist
the League for Industrial Democracy, the edu- critique to strengthen democracy by pointing
cation component of the American socialist out its political and economic deficiencies. A
movement. He also served as chairman of the prolific writer of political theory, he wrote for
American Socialist Party and was co-founder of Dissent magazine and authored many books on
the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee the importance of Marxism in trying to under-
in 1973. In 1972 he became a professor of polit- stand the dynamics of change in contemporary
ical science at Queens College of the City capitalist societies.
University of New York and in 1988 was named
Distinguished Professor of Political Science, BIBLIOGRAPHY
holding that position until his death. The Other America (New York, 1962).
Harrington’s widely read work, The Other Accidental Century (New York, 1965).
America (1962), raised awareness about the Toward a Democratic Left: A Radical
hidden problem of poverty in the face of Program for a New Majority (New York,
America’s rising affluence. He argued that 1968).
poverty was created by the hidden workings of Socialism (New York, 1972).
American capitalism, which served the economic Twilight of Capitalism (New York, 1976).
interests of its wealthy elites. Harrington’s influ- Fragments of the Century (New York,
ential indictment of how America’s prosperity 1977).
was responsible for perpetuating poverty caught The Vast Majority (New York, 1977).
the attention of both the Kennedy and Johnson Decade of Decision: The Crisis of the
administrations, inspiring many social welfare American System (New York, 1980).
programs of the 1960s. He served as a consultant The Next America: The Decline and Rise of
to Johnson’s War on Poverty, helping to create the United States (New York, 1981).
numerous social agencies and programs aimed at The Politics at God’s Funeral: The Spiritual
ending the persistence of poverty (Aid to Families Crisis of Western Civilization (New
with Dependent Children, Social Security York, 1983).
Disabilities programs, Food Stamp and Head The New American Poverty (New York,
Start programs). 1984).
Harrington disagreed with the New Left’s Taking Sides: The Education of a Militant
condemnation of American liberalism and later Mind (New York, 1985).
failed to unite the old socialist party with Who Rules Boston?: A Citizen’s Guide to
Students for a Democratic Society. He argued Reclaiming the City, 3rd edn
that socialists should work within a re-aligned (Cambridge, Mass., 1986).
Democratic party by encouraging the southern The Next Left: The History of a Future
conservative faction to leave in order to bring (New York, 1986).
about necessary reforms related to civil rights Socialism Past and Future (New York,
and the war on poverty. Though anti-commu- 1989).
nist, he vehemently opposed the Vietnam War as
encouraging colonialism, further distancing Other Relevant Works
himself from the Socialist Party’s leadership. In Harrington’s papers are at New York
1973 he formed the Democratic Socialist University.
1035
HARRINGTON
Fragments of the Century (New York, later named the John Evans Professor of Moral
1973). and Intellectual Philosophy, teaching there
The Long-Distance Runner: An until his retirement in 1976. At present Harris
Autobiography (New York, 1988). is an honorary research fellow at the Center for
Further Reading Philosophy and History of Science at Boston
Amer Nat Bio, Comp Amer Thought, University. Harris was President of the
Encyc Amer Bio, Who Was Who in Metaphysical Society of America in 1968–9
Amer v10 and President of the Hegel Society of America
Isserman, Maurice. The Other American: in 1977–8.
The Life of Michael Harrington (New The most conspicuous achievement of Harris’s
York, 2000). research activities at Kansas and Northwestern
Okroi, Loren J. Galbraith, Harrington, was the publication of two significant works:
Heilbroner: Economics and Dissent in an The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science
Age of Optimism (Princeton, N.J., 1988). (1965) and Hypothesis and Perception: The
Roots of Scientific Method (1970). Over the
James W. Robinson years, along with his original and prevailing the-
oretical interests he also developed a historio-
graphic concern for the thought of the two most
prominent representatives of modern meta-
physics, Baruch Spinoza and G. W. F. Hegel.
Spinoza’s philosophy is reconstructed, inter-
HARRIS, Errol Eustace (1908– ) preted and appropriated by Harris in Salvation
from Despair. A Reappraisal of Spinoza’s
Errol E. Harris was born on 19 February 1908 Philosophy (1973). He convincingly argued for
in Kimberley, South Africa, from a family the thorough cogency, truth and up-to-dateness
immigrated from England. Harris studied phi- of Hegel’s speculative logic in An Interpretation
losophy at Rhodes University College in South of the Logic of Hegel (1983). In retirement his
Africa and at the University of Oxford, where philosophical activity went on uninterrupted,
he obtained a B.Litt. degree with a thesis on giving rise to numerous articles and volumes,
Samuel Alexander and A. N. WHITEHEAD. the most original and important of which is
After serving as an education officer for the Formal, Transcendental, and Dialectical
British Colonial Service and in the British Thinking: Logic and Reality (1987).
Army during World War II, he received his Harris’s crucial epistemological insight is his
PhD in philosophy from the University of the lucid awareness of the insuperable inconsis-
Witwatersrand in 1950, where he became a tency of philosophical empiricism in all its
full professor in 1953. His first important versions worked out by European thought
philosophical work, Nature, Mind and from Locke to the twentieth-century analytic
Modern Science, appeared in 1954. In 1956 philosophers (1954, pp. 117–86, 274–351).
Harris was appointed professor of philosophy The verification principle, upon which empiri-
at Connecticut College and moved to the cism is grounded, is held by Harris to be intrin-
United States, where his philosophical activity sically false because sense-perception is devoid
could prosper unimpeded, gaining growing of immediate self-evidence, depending on an
recognition in the subsequent years. In 1962 interpretative context that is a product of
Harris became Roy Roberts Distinguished thinking’s discursive activity. Furthermore, the
Professor of Philosophy at the University of verification principle is also unable to account
Kansas. In 1966 he became professor of phi- for the empiricist epistemologist’s claim to
losophy at Northwestern University, and was truth for his own doctrine. Empiricism’s
1036
HARRIS
“fallacy” is that “of propounding a theory of and elementary forms are the theoretical per-
knowledge from which, if it is true, the theorist spectives worked out by the natural and
himself must be exempt, and which, if it human sciences, whereas its most concrete,
applies to the theorist himself, must be false” fully blown phase coincides with the self-reflec-
(1979, p. 49). Nor is empiricism able success- tive activity of metaphysical thought. The fun-
fully to overcome the logical antinomies infect- damentals of the metaphysics outlined by
ing the inductive method, by which it usually Harris (see 1965, pp. 451–93) appear to be
tries to explain and justify the genesis and strongly influenced by Spinoza’s rationalistic
validity of the universal form of scientific monism, Hegel’s absolute idealism, R. G.
theories. Finally, the hypothetico-deductive Collingwood’s philosophical logic (especially
method, to which some epistemologists such as by his insightful doctrine of a hierarchically
Karl Popper resort in order to integrate the ordered ontological “scale of forms”), as well
plain shortcomings of the inductive one, is in as by H. H. Joachim’s coherence theory of
truth epistemologically unfruitful, owing to its truth. In an enlightening passage in Nature,
merely analytic and conjectural nature. Mind and Modern Science he tersely summa-
The peculiar character and interest of rizes its fundamental tenets as follows:
Harris’s critique of philosophical empiricism,
however, lies in the fact that he does not The philosophical theory demanded by the
confine himself to refuting it in a purely logico- modern outlook must, accordingly, maintain
immanent way, but also effectively shows that five main theses: (i) that mind is immanent
a careful examination of the theoretical results in all things; (ii) that reality is a whole, self-
achieved by contemporary physics, biology, sufficient and self-maintaining, and that
and experimental psychology, as well as of the coherence is the test of truth of any theory
peculiar procedures of scientific inquiry and about it; (iii) that the subject and object of
discovery, concordantly proves that it is not knowledge are ultimately one – the same
even in harmony with the specific orientation thing viewed from opposite (and mutually
of contemporary science. Science supports a complementary) standpoints; (iv) that events
world view that is relativistic, holistic, and phenomena can adequately be explained
organicistic, teleological, and hierarchical in only teleologically, and (v) that the ultimate
character, and therefore flatly contradicts the principle of interpretation is, in consequence,
(unconfessed) atomistic, mechanical, and plu- the principle of value. (1954, p. 206)
ralistic metaphysical presuppositions of formal
and mathematical logic, wrongly privileged by The third tenet also involves the thesis that
philosophical empiricism. absolute truth and reality, which is as such
Harris’s critique of the naïve realism of posi- the peculiar object of metaphysical thought, is
tivistic epistemology, however – unlike those of identical with logical reason, in other words
other well-known contemporary epistemologists the self-conscious act of systematic thought
such as Popper, Norwood HANSON, Thomas that thinks of it. However, neither formal logic
KUHN, and Paul FEYERABEND – successfully (be it Aristotelian or mathematical logic, see
avoids ending up in a more or less radical form 1963, pp. 26–47) nor the transcendental logic
of relativistic or historicistic subjectivism worked out by Immanuel Kant, J. G. Fichte,
(1954, pp. 29–42) or even scepticism. On the and Edmund Husserl (1987, pp. 89ff) can con-
contrary, Harris pursues the real possibility of sistently grasp the intrinsic essence of such an
the knowledge of objective truth. This, identity. This theoretical task can be accom-
however, would not reveal itself in a static, plished only by dialectical logic. For by sub-
immediate intuition, but rather at the apex of lating into the absolute Idea the very negativ-
a teleological process, whose more abstract ity of finitude, appearance, and error, it alone
1037
HARRIS
can do full justice to the concrete, dynamic tion of natural processes in the light of the dif-
nature of (the identity of) thought and reality, ferent category of inner teleology (1973, pp.
and consequently unfold a logical universe that 126–32). But on the other hand, Harris also
is not simply an aggregate of “bloodless cate- rejects (1973, pp. 49ff) the opposite, mystical
gories,” but is rather a fully actual, self-suffi- or rather “acosmistic” interpretations of the
cient and self-conscious Whole. As a conse- relationship between substance and its attrib-
quence, just as was the case with Hegel, utes, according to which the former would be
Harris’s metaphysics finally turns into a spec- in itself undifferentiated, while the latter would
ulative “logic of construction” and a panen- be nothing more than a contingent product of
theistic theology. man’s finite intellect. Harris on the contrary
Harris’s philosophical historiography starts maintains that Spinoza’s theory of the scientia
from the assumption that the temporal alter- intuitiva clearly shows that Spinoza consis-
nation of different metaphysical doctrines and tently conceives of substance’s self-identity as
systems cannot be regarded – as is instead the intrinsically differentiated into a rational
case with historicism – as a discontinuous system of “individual essences,” and moreover
sequel of subjective opinions, whose validity, that Spinoza’s geometric method is nothing
at best, is confined to the particular epoch in other than the outward dress of an inferential
which they were originally stated. On the procedure that in truth is far more similar to
contrary, he asserts the existence of “eternal the circularity of dialectical method than Hegel
problems in philosophy” (1954, pp. 3), and himself had believed.
conceives of their historical development as a Harris’s interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy
unique, logically necessary, and teleological – unlike that of most of his interpreters and fol-
process, in and through which they progres- lowers in the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
sively achieve a more and more coherent and turies – emphasizes the crucial theoretical role
adequate formulation and solution. played in Hegel’s metaphysical system by the
Philosophical historiography, therefore, is by Naturphilosophie (1954, pp. 241–6). After the
no means a discipline which should confine crisis of the epistemological presuppositions
itself to registering the external philological of the positivistic world view at the end of the
shape of the doctrines taken into consideration, nineteenth century, the natural sciences, from
without stating a judgment of value about whose results the philosophy of nature draws
them. Its peculiar task is rather that of dis- its matter, would have taken a new theoretical
cerning in them the true from the false. The orientation that was radically different from
most original and significant achievements of that of the “Renaissance sciences” (with which
his historiographic activity are certainly those alone, if only for chronological reasons, Hegel
concerning Spinoza’s and Hegel’s metaphysics. and his immediate followers could be
By stressing the crucial relevance of Spinoza’s acquainted), and that would even allow us
doctrines of the infinity of the attribute of the today to discover in them the very “founda-
cogitatio, of the idea ideae and of the intellec- tions of metaphysics.” As a consequence,
tus infinitus dei as an “infinite mode” of Harris outlines something like a “reform” of
Substance (1973, pp. 57, 87ff), Harris under- Hegel’s Naturphilosophie that rejects as
mines the plausibility of the one-sided empiri- obsolete at least three of its main contentions:
cist and materialistic interpretations of (1) that the natural sciences are nothing more
Spinoza’s naturalism. Spinoza’s polemic than the product of the finite intellect’s analytic
against the final causes ought to be under- activity; (2) that owing to the peculiar exter-
stood as referring only to the standpoint of nality and contingency of their theoretical per-
external teleology, and consequently it would spective on nature, it is impossible cogently to
not exclude the possibility of a valid explana- prove the coming to be in it of a unitary
1038
HARRIS
process of real biological evolution; and (3) The Problem of Evil (Milwaukee, Wisc.,
that the “bad infinity” of the spatiotemporal 1977).
form of inorganic nature is clear evidence of its An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel
insuperable self-contradictoriness. According (Lanham, Md., 1983).
to Harris, in fact, Einstein’s theories of special Formal, Transcendental, and Dialectical
and general relativity (1965, pp. 41–63), as Thinking: Logic and Reality (Albany,
well as the contemporary cosmological N.Y., 1987).
theories of the “expanding universe” (1965, The Reality of Time (Albany, N.Y., 1988).
pp. 85–108), involve a plausible conception of Cosmos and Anthropos: A Philosophical
the physical universe as a “finite but Interpretation of the Anthropic
unbounded Whole,” so that it can be safely Cosmological Principle (Atlantic
regarded as an objective embodiment of that Highlands, N.J., 1991).
very category of the infinitum actu, or “true Cosmos and Theos: Ethical and
infinity,” which Hegel had instead confined to Theological Implications of the
the subjectivity of life and spirit. Anthropic Cosmological Principle
(Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1992).
BIBLIOGRAPHY Spinoza’s Philosophy: An Outline (Atlantic
The Survival of Political Man: A Study in Highlands, N.J., 1992).
the Principles of International Order One World or None: Prescription for
(Johannesburg, 1950). Survival (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1993).
“White” Civilization: How It Is Threatened The Spirit of Hegel (Atlantic Highlands,
and How It Can Be Preserved in South N.J., 1995).
Africa (Johannesburg, 1952). The Substance of Spinoza (Atlantic
Nature, Mind and Modern Science (London Highlands, N.J., 1995).
and New York, 1954). The Restitution of Metaphysics (Amherst,
Objectivity and Reason: Inaugural Lecture N.Y., 2000).
(Johannesburg, 1955). Apocalypse and Paradigm: Science and
Revelation through Reason: Reason in the Everyday Thinking (Westport, Conn.,
Light of Science and Philosophy (New 2000).
Haven, Conn., 1958).
The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science Other Relevant Works
(London and New York, 1965). “The Philosophy of Nature in Hegel’s
Annihilation and Utopia: The Principles of System,” Review of Metaphysics 3
International Politics (London, 1966). (1949): 213–28.
Fundamentals of Philosophy: A Study of “Objectivity and Reason,” Philosophy 31
Classical Texts (New York, 1969). (1956): 55–73.
Reprinted as Fundamentals of “Coherence and Its Critics,” Idealistic
Philosophy (London, 1969). Studies 5 (1975): 208–30.
Hypothesis and Perception: The Roots of “Time and Eternity,” Review of
Scientific Method (London and New Metaphysics 29 (1976): 464–82.
York, 1970). “The Problem of Self-Constitution for
Salvation from Despair: A Reappraisal of Idealism and Phenomenology,” Idealistic
Spinoza’s Philosophy (The Hague, 1973). Studies 7 (1977): 1–27.
Perceptual Assurance and the Reality of the “Reason and Rationalism,” Idealistic
World (Worcester, Mass., 1974). Studies 9 (1979): 93–114.
Atheism and Theism (New Orleans, La., “Testament of a Philosophical Dissenter,”
1977). The Carleton Miscellany 17 (Spring
1039
HARRIS
1979): 48–73. Harris became an educator and a clergyman.

“Natural Law and Naturalism,” From 1869 to 1872 he was minister of the
International Philosophical Quarterly 23 High Street Congregational Church in Auburn,
(1983): 115–24. Maine. He was described as a preacher with
“Darwinism and God,” International strong influence and high standards. He then
Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1999): became pastor of the Central Congregational
277–90. Church in Providence, Rhode Island.
In 1883 Harris became a professor of
Further Reading Christian theology at Andover Seminary. At
Amer Phils 1950-2000 the time of his appointment the faculty was
Blanshard, Brand. “On Rationalism: A being largely replaced. In 1884 Harris and four
Reply to Professor Harris,” Idealistic of his colleagues, including William J. TUCKER,
Studies 10 (1980): 95–106. established and edited a monthly periodical,
Christensen, D. E. “Der universelle the Andover Review. Although the periodical
Systemgedanke bei Errol Harris,” Wiener continued to be published until 1894, during
Jahrbuch für Philosophie 8 (1975): 1886 the editors were charged with heresy, and
195–211. they were not acquitted until 1892. Harris
George, Marie I., and Warren Murray. wrote articles and unsigned editorials, and
“New Look at the Anthropic Principle,” some of his writings appeared in two volumes
Reason Papers 19 (1994): 132–45. entitled Progressive Orthodoxy (1886) and The
Grier, Philip T. ed. Dialectic and Divinity of Jesus Christ (1893).
Contemporary Science: Essays in Honor In 1896 Harris described his ethical views in
of Errol E. Harris (Lanham, Md., 1989). Moral Evolution and followed this, in 1897,
Contains Harris’s replies and a with Inequality and Progress. The latter book
bibliography of Harris’s writings. offers a more practical perspective based on
Rinaldi, Giacomo. Saggio sulla metafisica di his interest in social theory. Although Harris
Harris (Bologna, Italy, 1984). praised the importance of equality, he wrote
that inequality among people will always exist
Giacomo Rinaldi as a result of individual differences. Although
people differ in social class and can have more
opportunities based on the class they belong to,
even persons who have the same circumstances
differ from one another. According to Harris,
a Christian and democratic state has to secure
HARRIS, George (1844–1922) each individual his worth so that each person
can be part of the whole. As a citizen each
George Harris was born on 1 April 1844 in person is equal and a child of God. Although
Machias, Maine, and died on 1 March 1922 in men differ in the skills they have, they share
New York City. He was the son of George experiences of sympathy, sorrow, and affec-
Harris, a lumber manufacturer, and Mary Ann tion; and, in this respect, they are alike. Other
Palmer. Robinson Palmer, his grandfather, was topics discussed in Inequality and Progress
a Maine senator. He studied at Washington include variety and progress. According to
Academy, a preparatory school in East Harris, progress produces variety, as can be
Machias. In 1866 he graduated from Amherst observed when comparing savage groups to
College with a BA, and then enrolled at civilized groups.
Andover Theological Seminary, graduating Harris preached at Dartmouth College from
with his BD in 1869. After finishing his studies, 1894 to 1899, and at Harvard University from
1040
HARRIS
1897 to 1899. In 1899 he was elected President HARRIS, Marjorie Silliman (1890–1976)
of Amherst College, where he showed skill in
his administrative ability and gained the support Marjorie Harris was born on 6 June 1890 in
of faculty, staff, and students. He made good Wethersfield, Connecticut, the daughter of
choices when selecting faculty members and was George Wells and Elizabeth Mills Harris. She
praised for the changes he made to the curricu- received her BA from Mount Holyoke College
lum. When Harris retired from the presidency in in 1913, where she was Phi Beta Kappa. From
1912, he was succeeded by Alexander 1913 until 1917 she was an instructor in phi-
MEIKLEJOHN. He received four honorary degrees: losophy at the University of Colorado in
DD from Amherst, 1883; DD from Harvard, Boulder. She then earned a PhD in philosophy
1899; LLD from Dartmouth, 1899; DD from from Cornell University in 1921. Her disser-
Yale, 1901. He published A Century’s Change in tation was titled “The Positive Philosophy of
Religion in 1914 after he retired, which displays Auguste Comte.” In 1921, Harris became an
his sense of humor and describes aspects of his assistant professor of philosophy at Randolph
youth. Macon Woman’s College in Lynchburg,
Virginia. She was promoted to associate pro-
BIBLIOGRAPHY fessor in 1925 and full professor in 1930. She
A Philosophical Treatise on the Nature and also served as department chair until her retire-
Constitution of Man (London, 1876). ment in 1958. Among numerous other pro-
Moral Evolution (Boston, 1896). fessional affiliations, she was a member of the
Inequality and Progress (Boston, 1897). American Philosophical Association, the
A Century’s Change in Religion (Boston, Southern Society for Philosophy and
1914). Psychology (President, 1940), and the Virginia
Philosophical Association (President, 1946).
Other Relevant Works She died on 27 March 1976 in Rocky Hill,
How Much Shall I Give (Boston, 1879). Connecticut.
Sermons by George Harris (Providence, R.I., A recurring, if not the dominant, theme in
1883). Harris’s writing is the vital role of philosophy
The Rational and Spiritual Verification of in penetrating the significance of life and in the
Christian Doctrine (Andover, Mass., 1883). adequate adjustment to it. Though she does
A Bible Study: Christ’s Teaching Concerning not explicitly use instrumentalist language to
Heredity (Boston, 1887). describe this function, her debt to the prag-
matists John DEWEY and George Herbert
Further Reading MEAD is clear. There is also a profound influ-
Dict Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v10, Who ence from Henri Bergson, whose notion of
Was Who in Amer v1 “life” powerfully informs her reflections.
The Andover Heresy. In the Matter of the Philosophy thus is “the art of life,” which
Complaint against Egbert C. Smyth and consists in adopting the attitude summarized
Others, Professors of the Theological by the phrase, sub specie aeternitatis, “from the
Institution in Phillips Academy, Andover. viewpoint of eternity.”
Professor Smyth’s Argument, Together with In her book Sub Specie Aeternitatis (1937),
the Statements of Professors Tucker, Harris, which consists of two chapters on “The
Hincks, and Churchill (Boston, 1887). Function of Philosophy” and “Bergson and
the Art of Life,” Harris identifies this attitude
Hani Morgan with taking an objective stance upon the data
of experience. Such a perspective is morally
inclusive and cognitively generous; it involves
1041
HARRIS
a transcendence of the ego. To the extent that Review 39 (1930): 479–90.

it involves detachment from the push and pull “Bergson’s Conception of Freedom,”
of our narrow and narrowing self-interest, it Philosophical Review 42 (1933): 511–20.
does so not to be free from life but to be free “Symbolic Logic and Esthetics,” Journal of
for life and to attain a more satisfactory adjust- Philosophy 37 (1940): 533–46.
ment to experience. Likewise, philosophy func- “A Transcendent Approach to Philosophy,”
tions by reminding us that we are better able Philosophy and Phenomenological
to achieve that sought-for equilibrium of life by Research 15 (1955): 394–401.
discerning what is implicit in experience rather “Philosophy for Tomorrow,” Philosophy
than imposing our subjective categories – our and Phenomenological Research 24
“selective emphases,” as Dewey would say, (1964): 573–9.
upon experience. These biases, or rigid con- “For Such a Time as This,” Philosophy and
structs for understanding, impoverish our Phenomenological Research 27 (1967):
capacity to make sense of the unpredictable 517–26.
flux of the world. These biases also cripple our
appreciation of that novelty that would Further Reading
nourish and sustain creative responses to Proc of APA v50, Who’s Who in Phil,
living. Women Phils
Philosophy functions as well, according to
Harris, when it disposes us to think experi- Gary S. Calore
mentally, to regard all our beliefs as hypothe-
ses until confirmed – and then never com-
pletely – by actual experience. Finally, philos-
ophy provides us, in a word, consolation, in
enjoining us to accept the inevitable in a
positive manner. HARRIS, Samuel (1814–99)
BIBLIOGRAPHY Samuel Harris was born on 14 June 1814 in

The Function of Philosophy (Lynchburg, East Machias, Maine, and in a fashion typical
Virg., 1927). for youths of his day entered Bowdoin College
Sub Specie Aeternitatis (Ann Arbor, Mich., at the age of fifteen. There, under the tutelage
1937). of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, he acquired
Francisco Romero on Problems of a lifelong appreciation of learning, especially a
Philosophy (New York, 1960). love for literature and modern languages such as
German and French. He graduated with a BA in
Other Relevant Works 1833 and served the following year as Principal
“Comte and James,” Philosophical Review of an academy in Limerick, Maine. Returning to
34 (1925): 154–64. his home town in 1834 he taught at the
“The Aesthetic Theory of Auguste Comte,” Washington Academy for one year, and then
Philosophical Review 36 (1927): 226–36. studied at Andover Theological Seminary from
“If We Have Life, Do We Need 1835 to 1838 to acquire a BD degree, resuming
Philosophy?” Journal of Philosophy 15 thereafter a period of teaching at Washington
(1927): 522–5. Academy for another three years. In 1841 Harris
“The Dilemma of an Experiential was ordained a Congregationalist minister and
Esthetician,” Journal of Philosophy 26 occupied pulpits in Conway (1841–51) and
(1929): 692–5. Pittsfield (1851–5) in Massachusetts. Academic
“Beauty and the Good,” Philosophical pursuits opened new opportunities in 1855
1042
HARRIS
when he began lecturing on theology at Bangor reason is the ground of faith because it discerns
Seminary in his native state. In 1867 he was meaning and purpose in the created world. So
elected the fifth President of Bowdoin College, too was human experience in historical
and also took the position of lecturer in mental contexts another avenue to understanding the
and moral philosophy. Teaching was invigo- divine. People as the divine archetype of ratio-
rating, but administration was onerous, so it nality could know God through observing
was with no little relief that Harris accepted the their own actions. But Harris went beyond
Dwight Professorship of Systematic Theology such eighteenth-century notions by also
at Yale Divinity School in 1871, taking over claiming that a personal God, not just an aloof
primary theology responsibilities duties at Yale clockmaker, revealed Himself in Christ and in
from Theodore Dwight WOOLSEY, and he held the Bible. The ultimate purpose of this revela-
that prestigious chair until his retirement in tion was the salvation of humanity, culminat-
1895. During his retirement, he continued to ing in the Kingdom of Christ. Following classic
work on the second part of his systematic philosophical convictions, he affirmed that to
theology until his death on 25 June 1899 in know the good was to will it. Proper use of
Litchfield, Connecticut. reason kindled understanding, and this mental
Most of Harris’s early written work took the achievement moved the will to emulation.
form of reviews, sermons, addresses, and Christian living led ultimately to perfection.
lectures on current issues like temperance and Human reason could grasp the ends for
anti-slavery. A few of these were printed in which God had created different entities in the
pamphlets that circulated widely. He also pub- world. In light of this knowledge people could
lished articles in the New Englander and decide whether to satisfy demands made by the
Bibliotheca Sacra. But it was not until he was self or to be primarily concerned with serving
sixty-nine years old that he began publishing God and fellow human beings. Self-centered-
serious, lengthy treatises on basic theological ness was Harris’s definition of sin, and salva-
issues. At that point a wider readership began tion consisted of acts that showed a desire to
to appreciate the insights and emphases that serve God and neighbor by rising above ego-
had been apparent to students in classrooms centric selfishness. Using both rational analysis
during prior decades. His ornamental style and intuitive apprehension a person could gain
and penchant for literary allusions often an increasingly deeper grasp of truth and
enriched the rather arid treatment of theolog- goodness, and this deeper knowledge helped
ical propositions that had come to character- the individual to make proper moral choices.
ize much of Congregationalist pedagogy. Harris labeled actions of this latter sort as
Beyond that, pulpit experience and interest in examples of Christian love, the ultimate objec-
evangelical outreach caused him to value com- tive of both theistic and biblical religious ideals.
municating essentials truths which would Harris echoed Enlightenment thought by
affect human life more than articulating a defining human beings as self-determined indi-
series of terms that fit together nicely into a viduals who could understand God and them-
system. In retrospect it is fair to say that Harris selves by rational observation of the created
occupied a transitional position between order. But he also posited the divinity of Christ
Enlightenment categories and those of more and the primacy of scriptural revelation. He
liberal Protestant views becoming more preva- was respectful of Congregationalist theological
lent in his own day. tradition. But he emphasized human freedom,
In laying down a philosophical basis for the capacity of making choices in light of
theology, Harris began with the idea that God rational understanding, further than other
is Absolute Reason, progressively revealing thinkers of his denomination. Harris also stood
Himself in nature and in humanity. Thus on the edge of liberalism by remaining open to
1043
HARRIS
modern scientific findings and by accepting, HARRIS, William Torrey (1835–1909)

warily, at least some tenets of contemporary
biblical criticism. His most recurrent ideas William Torrey Harris, son of Zilpah Davison
affirmed that God influenced human experi- Harris and William Harris, was born on 10
ence in historical contexts and that rational September 1835 in Killingly, Connecticut. As
reflection on that experience led to under- a farm boy he developed a strong interest in
standing, thence to doctrinal formulation. Such deep subjects, an interest that was almost
a basis for proper action made humans capable brought to an end by an accident with a fire-
of living effective lives by loving God and cracker, which left him with only one eye.
others. These emphases in Harris’s teaching Harris studied at Phillips Andover Academy in
and writing blended eighteenth-century theism Andover, Massachusetts. In 1854 he enrolled
and nineteenth-century Christian moralism in at Yale College, where his philosophical inter-
ways that stimulated thought within ests ripened. Restless at Yale, he left in the
Congregationalist circles and beyond. middle of his junior year, traveling to St. Louis
in 1857 to buy farmland for his father and to
BIBLIOGRAPHY seek his fortune. He was hired as instructor at
The Kingdom of Christ on Earth (Andover, Franklin Grammar School in 1858. Also in
Mass., 1874). that year he married Sarah Bugbee, his child-
The Philosophical Basis of Theism (New hood sweetheart. An omnivorous reader,
York, 1883). Harris always carried books in his pockets.
The Self-Revelation of God (New York, By 1858 he owned over 400 books, for which
1887). he developed a classification system foreshad-
God: The Creator and Lord of All, 2 vols owing that of Melvin Dewey. His penchant for
(New York, 1896). foreign languages led him to develop skills in
German, French, Sanskrit, Hebrew, Italian,
Other Relevant Works Spanish, and Portuguese.
Harris’s papers are in the Yale Divinity In 1858 Harris met Henry C. BROKMEYER, a
School Library. German immigrant, at a meeting of a literary
club at the St. Louis Mercantile Library. The
Further Reading fiery Brokmeyer persuaded Harris that he must
Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, study the philosophy of Hegel, and the two
Dict Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v1, men became lifelong friends. Along with a
Who Was Who in Amer v1 couple of associates, Harris commissioned
Brastow, Lewis O. A Memorial Address Brokmeyer to translate Hegel’s Wissenschaft
Commemorative of the Life and Services der Logik into English. Brokmeyer’s disdain
of Samuel Harris (New Haven, Conn., for the grammatical and spelling conventions
1899). of the English language doomed to failure all
Whittaker, Frederick W. Samuel Harris: efforts to publish his translation, but his intel-
American Theologian (New York, 1982). lectual influence on Harris was profound.
Although Brokmeyer and Harris were intense
Henry Warner Bowden students of Hegel’s logic, Brokmeyer convinced
his pupil that he must study the entire Hegelian
corpus in the original language, including
works that were generally neglected by
English-speaking Hegel scholars at the time,
such as the Phänomenoligie des Geistes and
the Philosophie Propädeutik. Brokmeyer
1044
HARRIS
taught Harris to read Hegel in the context of primarily composed of local professionals:
the German neo-humanist tradition initiated public school teachers and administrators,
by Goethe and to interpret his political phi- judges and attorneys. The most important
losophy as a mean between the extremes of the achievement of the Philosophical Society was
revolutionary left-wing Hegelians and reac- the publication of a quarterly journal, The
tionary Prussian conservatism. Brokmeyer Journal of Speculative Philosophy, and Harris
emphasized Hegel’s notion of Bildung, educa- edited its twenty-two volumes from 1867 to
tion that incorporates but also transcends book 1893. The Journal of Speculative Philosophy
learning with the goal of promoting was the first philosophical journal in the
Selbsttätigkeit, self-activity, self-development, English language without a theological or
and self-direction. Within the context of well- denominational agenda. Initially, Harris and
formed social institutions, the individual must his colleagues sought to use the journal to
discover and develop his own unique talents promote the healing and development of
and abilities. Finally, although American tran- American culture, by publishing translations
scendentalism had shaped the thought of both and scholarly studies of the writings of post-
men, their study of the German neo-humanists Kantian German philosophers, German neo-
and Hegel led them to criticize the transcen- humanist literature, as well as Dante,
dentalists’ individualism as destructive of the Shakespeare, and other literary artists. The
social institutions that make individual journal was a cultural endeavor that would
freedom possible. counter the “brittle individualism” of
The philosophical work of Brokmeyer and American thought and culture (“To the
Harris was disrupted by the outbreak of the Reader,” 1867, p. 1). Throughout its brief
Civil War in 1861. A staunch unionist, Harris history, The Journal of Speculative Philosophy
was exempted from military service by his eye evolved beyond its initial purpose, serving as a
injury and remained in St. Louis as principle of vehicle for the innovative philosophical reflec-
Clay School. During the war he worked on a tions of Charles S. PEIRCE, William JAMES, John
translation of Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die DEWEY, Josiah ROYCE, and many other promi-
Philosophie der Geschichte, which helped him nent American and European thinkers.
formulate an Hegelian interpretation of the By 1868 Harris had risen to the position of
conflict. Surrounded by the most appalling superintendent of the St. Louis public school
and lawless guerilla combat of the war, it is system. Under Harris’s leadership, the St. Louis
perhaps unsurprising that Harris concluded public schools rose to national and interna-
that the violent conflict was the result of tional prominence. He drew upon insights he
Americans’ disregard for social institutions, gained from the writings of Hegel, Karl
such as the Constitution, and blind faith in a Rosenkranz, and Freidrich Froebel to reorga-
rather shallow conception of individualism. nize both the school’s curriculum and its man-
In January 1866 Brokmeyer and Harris agement. In partnership with Susan BLOW, in
resumed their philosophical plans by founding 1873 Harris oversaw the organization of the
the St. Louis Philosophical Society with first successful public kindergarten program
Brokmeyer as President and oracle, and Harris in the United States and a normal school for
as Secretary and organizing engine. The teacher training in 1874.
Philosophical Society was part of a larger “St. Harris’s work in the public schools was
Louis Movement,” which included an art club, driven by his conviction that they should rec-
an Aristotle club, a Shakespeare society, the St. oncile post-Civil War Americans by uniting
Louis Academy of Science, the St. Louis oppositions. More concretely, public schools
Philharmonic Society, and the Academy of should educate newly freed slaves, augment
Useful Science. All of these organizations were the self-esteem of poor whites, and poise in
1045
HARRIS
equilibrium the opposing behavioral proclivi- be devoted to the study of the great composers
ties of boys and girls, requiring of both the and their music. Through the Art Society of St.
same curriculum. Harris proclaimed that the Louis, Harris began to acquire autotypes,
idea that boys or girls are unfit for various models, casts, and other reproductions of great
subjects is “a vanishing element” in a pro- art for the city. In 1873 the Art Society
gressive world (quoted in Leidecker 1946, p. acquired huge plaster casts of the “Niobe
266). Harris also rejected a school curriculum Group,” “Venus of Milo,” and other classic
that emphasized quantitative matters, or that sculpture. Harris also acquired original paint-
approached education as rote memorization. ings and decorative art from wealthy families.
He argued that education should elevate the In 1879 Harris moved to Concord,
pupil’s individual style, foster high aspirations, Massachusetts, at the invitation of Bronson
and help students absorb mankind’s literary ALCOTT who had launched the “Concord
and artistic treasures. In short, Harris sought Summer School of Philosophy.” Harris offered
to promote Bildung, or what he called “qual- sophisticated lectures on philosophy, art, and
itative culture,” in the school system: “To literature at the school each summer until it
describe points of law, statesmanship, morality shut its doors in 1888. The school drew over
and other essential interests, we must have 2,000 people in its ten-year existence and,
qualitative culture … [that] cultivates com- according to Denton Snider, Harris “… of all
prehensiveness in the pupil.” (quoted in the lecturers, had personally the most devoted
Leidecker 1946, p. 182) Despite his emphasis band of listeners” (Snider 1920, p. 365).
on qualitative culture, Harris was also one of During his Concord years Harris considered
the first educators to require science courses as himself retired, declining offers for the presi-
part of the curriculum, emphasizing their prac- dency of several major universities. But in 1889
tical benefits. As author of the Appleton’s he accepted President Benjamin Harrison’s
School Readers from 1878 to 1889, Harris’s appointment to the position of United States
views on education were particularly influen- Commissioner of Education, a post he held
tial in the national public school curriculum. until 1906. Commissioner Harris pressed for
Harris was able to convince the Missouri national kindergartens, equality of education
legislature to establish a library school board, for the sexes, the standardization of exams for
and from there he launched into the acquisi- teachers, elevated requirements for medical
tion, directly or through wills, of important and dental degrees, and the creation of open-
private library holdings from scientists, pro- door colleges for all Americans, regardless of
fessors, lawyers, businessmen, and various their means.
organizations. Often he traded lifetime use of From 1890 to 1908 Harris spent his
public school rooms as meeting places in summers at Thomas DAVIDSON’s “Glenmore”
exchange for library donations. Concerts and resort in the Adirondack Mountains at Keene,
lecture series were held to raise funds. New York. Davidson’s “Summer School for
Ultimately, the St. Louis Public School Library the Culture Sciences” brought young immi-
became the St. Louis Public Library, a world- grants from the Lower East Side of New York
class institution. City to study and discuss philosophy, litera-
In his effort to promote Bildung, Harris also ture, language, history, and the social sciences.
brought the arts to the children of St. Louis. He With Dewey, Royce, James, and many other
regarded music as a moral force, claiming that thinkers as their mentors, the group enjoyed
singing together bonded students to one discussion and the exchange of ideas combined
another, and inculcated virtues such as civic with camping, hiking, and outdoor cama-
pride, and the love of nature, home, and raderie. But by 1908 Harris’s health had dete-
family. He also required that one day a week riorated. He and his wife moved to Providence,
1046
HARRIS
Rhode Island, next door to his brother, who United States. Reflecting back on Brokmeyer’s
was a physician. Harris died in Providence on tutelage and The Journal of Speculative
5 November 1909. Philosophy, Harris wrote that Brokmeyer
The most prominent feature of Harris’s “impressed us with the practicality of philos-
thought can be identified by noting that he ophy, inasmuch as he could flash into the ques-
devoted his life to the promotion of both indi- tions of the day, or even into the questions of
vidual and cultural Bildung through what he the moment, the highest insights of philosophy
called “speculative philosophy.” Contrary to and solve their problems.” Harris continued,
current parlance, for Harris, speculative phi- “Philosophy came to mean with us … the most
losophy is concrete philosophy because it is practical of all species of knowledge. We used
contextual thinking. Speculative philosophy it to solve all problems connected with school-
assumes that in order to understand anything teaching and school management. We studied
we must comprehend it in all of its relations. the ‘dialectic’ of politics and political
For Harris, empiricism and “the mathematical parties…But our chief application was to lit-
method” are both abstract thinking because erature and art” (Hegel’s Logic 1890, p. xiii).
they divorce their subject matter from its In addition to his intense study of literature and
context in an effort to isolate and analyze art, Harris’s wide-ranging publications and his
problems. Although speculative philosophy work in education were acts of self-develop-
must always begin with analysis, it is a pre- ment that expressed his and Brokmeyer’s
liminary moment in the dialectical movement reading of Hegel’s speculative thought as a
toward an inclusive vision of the “genetic philosophy of action. Nonetheless, Harris also
development” of the problem within the larger took seriously abstract philosophical issues.
context in which it arose (“The Speculative,” In “‘The Fates’ by Michael Angelo,” which
1867, p. 3). Harris argued that speculative Harris published in 1877, he addresses a trio
philosophy is systematically inclusive of the of philosophical problems that animated much
richness of human culture, and that it alone of his thought, the existence of evil, frailty,
can understand the levels of human achieve- and finitude. These three problems follow from
ment: art, religion, and philosophy. Only spec- one metaphysical and ethical question. If the
ulative philosophy, Harris claimed, can furnish world springs from some one principle, a
a rational basis for an understanding of human metaphysical absolute, that is unaffected by
problems, from the seemingly mundane to the anything else, why would it allow or cause
ethereal. Harris believed speculative philoso- itself to suffer finitude and imperfection as it
phy was needed more than ever in American manifests itself in the particulars of the world?
culture because pre-Civil War individualism That this issue persistently troubled Harris is
had been found wanting and Americans, like evidenced by the fact that he revisited it in
other Westerners, were faced with bewildering 1890 in Hegel’s Logic, where he writes, “The
advancements in the sciences, such as enigma of the world is the existence of evil or
Darwinian biology and thermodynamics, that imperfection … this world is one and is obvi-
required a new world view. Speculative phi- ously under the sway of one principle … how
losophy, he argued, could provide a basis for can it originate or suffer to exist that which
the continuing development of American does not correspond to its perfection?” (1890,
thought and put new scientific theories into pp. 4–5)
systematic and logical form, thereby relating In “‘The Fates’ by Michael Angelo” Harris
them to all aspects of human existence. considers a solution from Eastern philosophy,
Harris’s Hegelian speculative philosophy is which is to hold that all imperfection is mere
not as foreign as one might think to the prag- illusion or Maya. On this view, the apparent
matic modes of thought that soon arose in the imperfection of the world is due to the frailty
1047
HARRIS
of human faculties. But Harris asserts that this concretizes itself in its differentiations. In this
simply shifts the problem to another locus. process the totality gains its own self-realiza-
Why is there imperfection in human thought? tion.
Thus Harris considers a second solution from A high grade of physical complexity is one
Eastern philosophy. The Sankhya Karika, in which the bodily parts are interdependent,
which contains the philosophy of Kapila internally related. Concomitant with this
whom Harris calls the “profoundest of East enhanced complexity is feeling, as the expres-
Indian thinkers,” holds that relief from pain is sion of the concern for preservation of bodily
the object of philosophical inquiry (1877, p. unity. The affective/desiderative will to live is
265). As physical beings we are fated to suffer the first sign of the conflict between freedom
internal bodily pain, pain caused by the inter- and fate, which Harris saw as the attempt to
action of our bodies with other bodies, and subordinate the external to the internal. In the
pain from the unfolding of the world’s history. physical complexity of human beings, thinking
We are fated to suffer from our bodily exis- frees us from the here and now. We choose
tence as much as the earth is fated to change over the span of past, present, and future, thus
seasons. For Kapila, the only relief from gaining our individuality in a way similar to
torment and fate is the pure intellect, the the totality’s self-activity and self-realization.
retreat into the pure thought of the timeless. But we are frail physical beings, subject to the
The counterpart to the Asian doctrine of fate pains noted by Kapila. But Kapila errs, accord-
is the physicalism and determinism of Western ing to Harris, because he forgets that human
science, in which each body is what it is beings can choose associations and prevent or
because of surrounding bodies, whether it be lessen the powers of nature that produce indi-
cells surrounding cells, bodies pervaded by vidual suffering. Human communities form
gravitation, gases, electricity, etc. “The totality vast protective shields against that which the
of surrounding conditions,” Harris writes, individual is powerless. The absolute or totality
“necessitates each and every body to be what differentiates itself into finite forms to achieve
it is … and … naught else” (1877, p. 267). concrete identity and self-realization. As finite
Common to both traditions is the contradic- beings, humans must learn to live together in
tion of physical existence. A body is finite and the array of institutions that protect them from
dependent, yet is also independent in exclud- the vicissitudes of fate and pain. In our
ing other bodies. The answer to the enigma of shielded, institutionalized lives the absolute
finitude, argues Harris, is to see the totality of returns to itself.
existence in the most comprehensive and In Hegel’s Logic, which Harris dedicated to
rigorous manner. The growth and dissipation Brokmeyer, he attempted to do for Hegelian
of bodies in space and time are the result of the philosophy what James had done for psychol-
interaction of forces. Electricity, heat, light, ogy, namely, to present his subject matter to
cohesion, and gravitation are transformed into the educated public. Harris maintains that
one another in nature. But underlying these Hegel’s Logic marks his transition from faith
transformation of forces is one force or energy. in Hegel’s system to a critical reworking of it.
The totality is therefore self-active, self-deter- His first modification is to advance
mining, and free of all imposition and con- Brokmeyer’s suggestion that Hegel’s germinal
straint. Finite bodies arise with various grades thought is the idea of a self-active, self-deter-
of unity in the womb of this totality. The mining, self-conscious first principle. Harris
process moves towards increasing complexity delineates three approaches to Hegel’s system.
and is therefore systematic and methodical. The first, the phenomenological path, proceeds
The totality differentiates itself into countless from sense-certainty through various stadia to
particulars other than itself, and in so doing, the first principle, spirit as self-determining.
1048
HARRIS
The second path is the ontology of logic, which the absolute real “only in the process of
moves from the abstract notions of being and Nature, and his personality actual only in his-
nothing to the self-determining idea. The third torical persons” (Hegel’s Logic, 1890, p. xv).
way, that of Brokmeyer and Harris, is to begin This theory is not only pantheistic, but lends
with self-determination itself. itself to appropriation by Hegel’s atheistic and
Harris defended Hegel’s logic from the criti- anthropological left wing.
cism raised by Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg Harris sought a centrist position in his reli-
that his conception of pure thought purports to gious philosophy, much as he had done in his
be a priori, but in fact smuggles in content political thought, by avoiding extreme left and
from experience by invoking categories, such right-wing interpretations of Hegel’s thought.
as being, nothing, and becoming, that we find Whereas right-wing Hegelians claimed that
in experience. Harris perceptively argues that Hegel preserved and upheld the entire gospel
“there is a line of à priori thinking and a line story, Harris was concerned only to preserve
of à posteriori thinking combined in one, in the doctrine of the trinity. Whereas left-wing
[Hegel’s] logic” (Hegel’s Logic, 1890, p. 132). Hegelians read Hegel as a pantheist or as
Because Hegel successfully overcomes reducing God to the human race in its histor-
Cartesian mind/world dualism, a priori and a ical development, Harris sought to preserve
posteriori are moments or stages of the dialec- the notion of a transcendent God that mani-
tic rather than markers of pre- and post-expe- fests himself in the world.
riential realities. Pure thought is not thought Harris’s impact on American thought and
that is devoid of experiential presuppositions; culture was immense. In addition to his lead-
rather it is thought that recognizes its presup- ership in public education, as a driving force
positions. Rather than a science of the cate- behind The Journal of Speculative Philosophy
gories of being, Hegel’s logic is a science of the and the “Concord Summer School,” Harris
categories according to which we think being. significantly elevated both philological and
The fact that Harris preceded his discussion of philosophical research in the United States. At
Hegel’s logic with five chapters on his Voyage the same time, he promoted a vision of phi-
of Discovery, the Phänomenologie des Geistes, losophy as an endeavor that should change
clarifies his reading of Hegel’s logic. For people’s lives and transform their culture.
Harris, Hegel’s logic begins after a thorough
examination of consciousness in which BIBLIOGRAPHY
thought’s experiential presuppositions are The Spiritual Sense of Dante’s “Divina
identified. Commedia” (New York, 1889).
However, Harris was critical of Hegel’s Hegel’s Logic: A Book on the Genesis of the
doctrine of the Christian trinity which identi- Categories of the Mind: A Critical
fied the absolute with God the Father, nature Exposition (Chicago, 1890).
with God the Son, and spirit with God the Introduction to the Study of Philosophy, ed.
Holy Ghost. Harris objects that Hegel “had Marietta Kies (New York, 1890).
not deduced the logical consequences of his Psychologic Foundations of Education: An
system in the matter of the relation of Nature Attempt to Show the Genesis of the
to the Absolute Idea … . His doctrine of the Higher Faculties of the Mind (New York,
Trinity makes the Second Person, or Logos, to 1898).
be Nature, whereas it should make the Logos
to be eternally a Person like the First, and Other Relevant Works
Nature should be the Procession of the Holy Primary collections of Harris’s papers are at
Spirit.” (Hegel’s Logic, 1890, pp. xiv–xv) the Missouri Historical Society in St.
Hegel went astray, Harris claims, by making Louis, the National Education Society in
1049
HARRIS
Washington, D.C., and the Concord DeArmey, Michael H., and James A. Good,
Public Library, Massachusetts. eds. The St. Louis Hegelians, 3 vols
“Philosophy of History,” Missouri (Bristol, UK, 2001).
Republican (8 October 1861). Dodgson, G. R. “An Interpretation of the St.
“To the Reader,” Journal of Speculative Louis Philosophical Movement,” Journal
Philosophy 1 (January 1867): 1. of Philosophy 6 (1909): 337–45.
“The Speculative,” Journal of Speculative Evans, Henry Ridgley, ed. “A List of the
Philosophy 1 (January 1867): 2–6. Writings of William Torrey Harris,”
“What Shall We Study?” Journal of Report of the Commissioner of Education
Education 2 (September 1869): 1–3. for 1907 (Washington, D.C., 1908), pp.
“The Concrete and the Abstract,” Journal of 37–72.
Speculative Philosophy 5 (1871): 1–5. Fisch, Max H. Peirce, Semeiotic, and
“Theism and Pantheism,” Journal of Pragmatism (Bloomington, Ind., 1986).
Speculative Philosophy 5 (January 1871): Goetzmann, William H., ed. The American
86–94. Hegelians: An Intellectual Episode in the
Ed., A Statement of the Theory of Education History of Western America (New York,
in the United States by Many Leading 1973).
Educators (Washington, D.C., 1874). Good, James A. “A ‘World-Historical Idea’:
“Trendelenburg and Hegel,” Journal of The St. Louis Hegelians and the Civil
Speculative Philosophy 9 (1875): 70–80. War,” Journal of American Studies 34
“Defense of Hegel against the Charge of (2000): 447–64.
Pantheism as Made in Hickok’s Logic of ———, “Introduction,” in The Journal of
Reason,” Journal of Speculative Speculative Philosophy, 1867–1893, vol. 1
Philosophy 9 (1876): 328–34. (Bristol, UK, 2002), pp. v–xx.
“‘The Fates’ by Michael Angelo,” Journal of Harmon, Francis. The Social Philosophy of
Speculative Philosophy 11 (1877): the St. Louis Hegelians (New York, 1943).
265–77. Harris, D. H. A Brief Report of the Meeting
Appleton’s School Readers (New York, Commemorative of the Early St. Louis
1878–89). Movement in Philosophy, Psychology,
“The Definition of Social Science and the Literature, Art and Education (St. Louis,
Classification of the Topics Belonging to 1922).
its Several Provinces,” Journal of Social Leidecker, Kurt. Yankee Teacher: The Life
Science 22 (June 1887): 1–7. of William Torrey Harris (New York,
“The Philosophic Aspects of History,” 1946; 1971).
Papers of the American Historical Pochman, Henry A. New England
Association 5 (1890): 247–54. Transcendentalism and St. Louis
The Aesthetic Element in Education Hegelianism: Phases in the History of
(Milwaukee, Wisc., 1897). American Idealism (Philadelphia, 1948).
———, German Culture in America:
Further Reading Philosophical and Literary Influences,
Amer Nat Bio, Amer Phils Before 1950, 1600–1900 (Madison, Wisc., 1957).
Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, Bio 20thC Schuyler, William. “German Philosophy in
Phils, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp St. Louis,” Bulletin of the Washington
Amer Thought, Dict Amer Bio, Encyc University Association no. 2 (23 April
Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v11, Proc 1904): 72–3.
of APA in Phil Rev v46, Who Was Who in Snider, Denton J. A Writer of Books in His
Amer v1 Genesis (St. Louis, 1910).
1050
HARRIS
———, The St. Louis Movement in metalanguage in which a linguistic theory may
Philosophy, Literature, Education, be stated. In astronomy, for instance, the fun-
Psychology with Chapters of damental entities and relations of the theory
Autobiography (St. Louis, 1920). may (at least in principle) be characterized
without using the very astronomical phenom-
Michael H. DeArmey ena in question. That is, a theory about black
holes can explain how the term “black hole” is
to be used without using either the phenomena
themselves (black holes) or simply assuming a
prior grasp of the relevant terms (for example,
“black hole”). Logically speaking, this would
HARRIS, Zellig Sabbettai (1909–92) be done by using a “metalanguage,” in which
the terms of the theory of astronomy are them-
Zellig Sabettai Harris was born on 23 October selves discussed. In this way the astronomer
1909 in Balta, Ukraine, and died on 21 May can step outside of her theory and ground its
1992 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. His birth crucial terms in other terms. Not so with
name is not known; when his family emigrated language, Harris argues. Like any other scien-
to the United States in 1913, his name for his tific theory, a linguistic theory must explain its
American life was created at the entry point. He crucial terms in a metalanguage. But when a
received his BA (1930), MA (1932), and PhD linguistic theory uses a metalanguage, it is using
(1934) from the Oriental studies department at a language, and is therefore employing the very
the University of Pennsylvania. He began phenomena that constitute the object of study.
teaching linguistics at Pennsylvania in 1931, Moreover, the theory is also assuming a prior
and there in 1946 he founded the first linguis- understanding of the metalanguage and the
tics department in the United States. Among his terms it uses. Since the goal of a linguistic
students who had prominent careers was theory is to understand all natural languages, it
Noam CHOMSKY. He retired in 1979 but occa- will not do to theorize about one natural
sionally lectured at Columbia University for language using another natural language.
some years. He served as President of the Moreover, using an artificial language (such
Linguistic Society of America in 1955. as a formal language of logic or arithmetic)
Harris’s large body of writings spans a will not do, either, since the terms and struc-
diverse range of areas in linguistics, from books tural relations of an artificial language must
detailing various properties of obscure lan- be defined. Although these terms and relations
guages, to books developing the mathematical might themselves be defined in yet a further
aspects of his method of “distributional artificial language (a “meta-metalanguage”),
analysis.” Perhaps his most noteworthy philo- eventually the last of this finite hierarchy of
sophical position was that, like Rudolf CARNAP metalanguages must itself be explained in a
and the members of the Vienna Circle, Harris natural language metalanguage, thus return-
was opposed to the semantic theories of the ing us to the original epistemological problem.
time. But whereas Carnap and others opposed Harris’s own view about language was based
semantic theories on the grounds that inten- on the distributional properties of phonemes.
sional entities were too mysterious, Harris’s He argued at great length that these properties
opposition to the use of straightforwardly could form an adequate theoretical basis for lin-
semantic notions in linguistic theory was driven guistic notions. For instance, the notion of a
by a kind of a priori methodological concern. sentence was defined as a string of phonemes,
Linguistics, Harris argued, was unlike any where the end of that string was a point where
other science in that there is no “external” every phoneme was equally likely to follow
1051
HARRIS
next in the discourse as any other. This can be Hymes, Dell, and John Fought. American
contrasted with, for example, the word bake, Structuralism (The Hague, 1981).
which is far more likely to be followed by the Matthews, Peter. Grammatical Theory in the
phonemes corresponding to –ed or –ing than by United States from Bloomfield to
those corresponding to cat. Chomsky (Cambridge, UK, 1986).
———, “Zellig Sabbettai Harris,” Language
BIBLIOGRAPHY 75 (1999): 112–9.
A Grammar of the Phoenician Language Nevin, Bruce, ed. The Legacy of Zellig
(New Haven, Conn., 1936). Harris: Language and Information into the
Development of the Canaanite Dialects: An 21st Century, 2 vols (Philadelphia, 2002).
Investigation in Linguistic History (New Contains a bibliography of Harris’s
Haven, Conn., 1939). writings.
“The Scope of Linguistics,” American
Anthropologist 49 (1947): 588–600. Kent Johnson
Methods in Structural Linguistics (Chicago,
1951).
“Discourse Analysis,” Language 28 (1952):
1–30.
String Analysis of Sentence Structure (The
Hague, 1962). HARSANYI, John Charles (1920–2000)
Mathematical Structures of Language (New
York, 1968). John Harsanyi was born on 29 May 1920 in
Papers in Structural and Transformational Budapest, Hungary. He shared the Nobel Prize
Linguistics, ed. Henry Hiz (Dordrecht, in Economics of 1994 with John NASH and
1970). Reinhard Selten for his work in game theory.
“A Theory of Language Structure,” Harsanyi was educated in Budapest (at the
American Philosophical Quarterly 13 same high school John V ON N EUMANN
(1976): 237–55. attended) under fairly favorable circumstances
Papers on Syntax, ed. Henry Hiz (Dordrecht, until Germany’s occupation of Hungary. He
1981). was forced to work in a labor unit in 1944,
A Grammar of English on Mathematical because he was of Jewish origin. The Nazis
Principles (New York, 1982). transferred his unit to an Austrian concentra-
Language and Information (New York, tion camp, where, Harsanyi notes, “most of
1988). my comrades eventually perished,” but he
The Form of Information in Science: Analysis escaped before the trip to Austria. He hid in a
of an Immunology Sublanguage Jesuit monastery for some time, and after the
(Dordrecht, 1989). war he switched his study from pharmacy,
A Theory of Language and Information which was the avocation of his parents, to his
(Oxford, 1991). true love of philosophy. He earned a PhD in
The Transformation of Capitalist Society philosophy from the University of Budapest in
(Lanham, Md., 1997). 1947. He left Hungary, which he feared was
becoming increasingly Stalinist, in 1950.
Further Reading Since his doctorate went unrecognized in
Bio 20thC Phils Australia and his English was poor, Harsanyi
Chomsky, Noam. “Logical Syntax and worked in a factory for a time. It was here that
Semantics, their Linguistic Relevance,” he started his formal training in economics,
Language 31 (1955): 136–45. earning his MA degree in economics at the
1052
HARSANYI
University of Sydney in 1953, and a lectureship ism. He claims a rational individual will
at Brisbane. A Rockefeller Fellowship at maximize his expected utility and the way to
Stanford gave him time to earn a PhD in eco- do this, given the morally mandated equiprob-
nomics in 1959 with Kenneth ARROW as his ability model, is to press for maximizing the
supervisor. Arrow returned to Australia to group’s utility. This is just the result that Rawls
take up an attractive research post at the was so famously to deny later in his 1972 A
Australian National University in Canberra Theory of Justice.
where he worked on game theory from 1958 In “Morality and the Theory of Rational
to 1961. Harsanyi then was a professor of Behavior” Harsanyi also reiterated his articu-
economics at Wayne State University from late defense of subjectivism about well-being.
1961 to 1963. In 1964 he went to the He writes that
University of California at Berkeley as a
visiting professor, and soon became a profes- … in deciding what is good and what is bad
sor at the Business School. Later on, his for a given individual, the ultimate criterion
appointment was extended to include a can only be his own wants and his own pref-
position in the economics department at erences. To be sure … a person may irra-
Berkeley as well, and he held these positions tionally want something which is very bad
until his death on 9 August 2000 in Berkeley. for him. But, it seems to me, the only way we
Harsanyi did some of the most important can make sense of such a statement is to inter-
work in economics in the second half of the pret it as a claim to the effect that, in some
twentieth century. His work on games with appropriate sense, his own preferences at some
incomplete information played against other deeper level are inconsistent with what he is
agents earned him a Nobel Prize. However, he now trying to achieve. (1982, p. 55)
was also keenly interested in philosophical
topics and his work was nearly as influential in In contrast to most writers on utilitarianism
the utilitarianism literature as it was in game coming from a background in economics,
theory and economics proper. Harsanyi held that the true version of utilitar-
In the preface to the collection of essays ianism should recommend the promotion of
Utilitarianism and Beyond, Amartya SEN and people’s true (as opposed to actual) prefer-
Bernard WILLIAMS write that they included ences. It was a position of this sort that was to
only two previously published papers. One of become, partially through Harsanyi’s influ-
these papers was Harsanyi’s “Morality and ence, predominant in philosophy. Harsanyi’s
the Theory of Rational Behavior” (1977). work to some extent was an early version of
Several of Harsanyi’s key themes in his work the “full information” desire-based account
on utilitarianism are sounded in this paper. of a person’s good that has taken hold in phi-
First, it reiterated his “equiprobability model” losophy.
argument for utilitarianism that he initially Harsanyi held that the best version of utili-
put forward in the mid 1950s. This is the “fic- tarianism would exclude anti-social prefer-
titious assumption of having the same proba- ences such as malice, envy, and resentment
bility of occupying any possible social (even if these represent true preferences of the
position.” Harsanyi mentions that John individual) from being counted in generating
RAWLS’s use of a very similar idea, apparently the social utility function that deserves moral
independently derived, to different ends was promotion. In a sense then, he did not hold
called by Rawls “the veil of ignorance.” that the “good,” or that which deserves moral
Harsanyi had largely prefigured the Rawlsian promotion, is prior to and independent of the
argumentative strategy, but holds that such “right.” Harsanyi’s view has been influential
an argument justifies a version of utilitarian- and highlights his undogmatic utilitarian
1053
HARSANYI
approach. This paper also reiterates his famous 291–303.

solution for the problem of interpersonal com- “Utilities, Preferences, and Substantive
parisons of utility. He holds that the best Goods,” Social Choice and Welfare 14
solution rests with the “similarity postulate.” (1996): 129–45.
The view is that if we adequately can imagine
ourselves into the shoes of another, with her Further Reading
tastes, background, education, and such, then Cambridge Dict Amer Bio
it is reasonable to assume that the preferences Leinfellner, Werner, and Eckehart Köhler,
I would myself have are and their intensity eds. Game Theory, Experience,
would be the same. This would give us a point Rationality: Foundations of Social
of comparison between the utility scale of Sciences, Economics and Ethics in
myself and another. Honour of John C. Harsanyi (Dordrecht,
Harsanyi’s work in philosophy will be long 1998).
remembered as precise, compelling, and Selton, Reinhard, ed. Rational Interaction:
nuanced. His vision of utilitarianism was Essays in Honor of John C. Harsanyi
complete, influential, and undogmatic. (Berlin, 1992).
BIBLIOGRAPHY David Sobel

Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and
Scientific Explanation (Dordrecht, 1976).
“Morality and the Theory of Rational
Behavior,” Social Research 44 (1977):
623–56. Reprinted in Utilitarianism and
Beyond, ed. Amartya Sen and Bernard HARTMAN, Robert Schirokauer
Williams (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), pp. (1910–73)
39–62.
Rational Behavior and Bargaining Robert Schirokauer was born on 27 January
Equilibrium in Games and Social 1910 in Berlin, Germany. He was educated
Situations (Cambridge, UK, 1977). first as a lawyer, and was a judge in Berlin
Papers in Game Theory (Dordrecht, 1982). when Hitler came to power. He openly criti-
A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection, cized Hitler, had a Jewish father, and escaped
with Reinhard Selten (Cambridge, Mass., Germany in 1932 using a fake passport issued
1988). to “Robert Hartman.” Thereafter, he took the
name. After working in England and Mexico,
Other Relevant Works Hartman entered the United States in 1941. He
“Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics received his PhD in philosophy from
and Interpersonal Comparisons of Northwestern University in 1946. He was a pro-
Utility,” Journal of Political Economy 63 fessor of philosophy at the College of Wooster
(1955): 309–21. in Ohio from 1945 to 1948 and Ohio State
“Bargaining in Ignorance of the Opponent’s University from 1948 to 1956. He was a visiting
Utility Function” Journal of Conflict professor at Massachusetts Institute of
Resolution (1962): 29–38. Technology in 1955–6, and at Yale University in
“Bayesian Decision Theory and Utilitarian 1966. He was Smith Mundt State Department
Ethics,” American Economic Review 48 Research Fellow and Exchange Professor at the
(1978): 223–8. National University of Mexico in 1956–7, and
“Games with Incomplete Information,” from 1957 until his death he was a research
American Economic Review 85 (1995): professor of philosophy at the National
1054
HARTMAN
University of Mexico. From 1968 until his death yields a “hierarchy of value” according to which
Hartman also held an appointment as professor people (intrinsic values) are more valuable than
of philosophy at the University of Tennessee. things (extrinsic values), and things are more
He also held more than fifty lectureships in the valuable than mere ideas (systemic values) of
United States, Canada, Latin America, and things or people. Applying this hierarchy, he
Europe. Hartman died on 20 September 1973 in developed a personality profile, the Hartman
Cuernavaca, Mexico. Value Profile, consisting of nine positive and
Hartman turned to philosophy to understand nine negative value combination items from the
good and evil, especially why evil people three value dimensions, to be ranked from best
promote evil so efficiently while good people to worst. The Hartman Value Profile is now
are so poorly organized for goodness. He pub- widely used by business consultants, counselors,
lished over one hundred articles on value theory psychotherapists, and religious professionals.
in English, German, and Spanish, plus his most
significant book, The Structure of Value (1965). BIBLIOGRAPHY
Several of his books have been published posthu- The Structure of Value (Carbondale, Ill.,
mously by members of the Robert S. Hartman 1965).
Institute for Formal and Applied Axiology in The Knowledge of Good (Amsterdam, 2002).
Tennessee.
G. E. Moore convinced Hartman that “good” Other Relevant Works
cannot be defined “naturally” or empirically. Hartman’s papers are at The University of
However, Hartman discerned that it can be Tennessee, Knoxville.
defined formally as “concept (or standard) ful- Freedom to Live: The Robert Hartman Story
fillment.” Value standards consist of sets of (Amsterdam, 1994).
good-making predicates; something is good if its
properties exist in one-to-one correspondence Further Reading
with the elements of its measuring standard. To Proc of APA v47, Who Was Who in Amer v6
the degree that it fulfills fewer and fewer of these Dicken, Thomas M., and Rem B. Edwards.
good-making predicates, it is “fair,” “average,” Dialogues on Values and Centers of Value
“poor,” or “no good.” Hartman aspired to (Amsterdam, 2001).
create a formal science of value. Edwards, Rem B., ed. Formal Axiology and Its
Hartman recognized three kinds of goodness: Critics (Amsterdam, 1995).
intrinsic, extrinsic, and systemic. In application, Edwards, Rem B. Religious Values and
intrinsically good things – valuable for their own Valuations (Chattanooga, Tenn., 2000).
sakes – are unique persons or centers of con- Edwards, Rem B., and Davis, John W., eds.
scious thinking, feeling, choosing, and valuing. Forms of Value and Valuation: Theory and
Extrinsically good things are useful things in Applications (Lanham, Md., 1991).
public space–time, such as physical objects and Forrest, Frank G. Valuemetrics (Amsterdam,
processes, and social roles and actions. 1994).
Systemically good things – ideas or conceptual
constructs – are principles, laws, rules, logical Rem B. Edwards
and mathematical systems, definitions, and other
formalities. Hartman proffered a rudimentary
formal calculus of value for resolving value
problems, further developed by Frank G. Forrest
in Valuemetrics.
According to Hartman, “better” means
“having more good-making properties.” This
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HARTSHORNE
HARTSHORNE, Charles (1897–2000) and Henri Bergson, buoyed Hartshorne’s

thinking by providing him with a philosophical
Charles Hartshorne (pronounced “hart’s tradition that represented a fresh start in the
horn”) was born on 5 June 1897 in Kittanning, pursuit of metaphysical wisdom. This new tra-
Pennsylvania. He was educated at Yeates dition, which Hartshorne labeled neoclassical
Boarding School and Haverford College where metaphysics, takes account of the failures of
he received his BA in 1917. During World past metaphysical systems without despairing
War I he was a volunteer in the Army Medical of the project of metaphysics.
Corps in France. After the war he went to For Hartshorne, metaphysics is the enter-
Harvard University where he received his PhD prise of discovering a priori truths about exis-
in philosophy in 1923. He then studied for two tence. His method, however, is not the tradi-
years in Europe as a Sheldon Traveling Fellow, tional one of deducing metaphysical theorems
and for the next three years he was an instruc- from self-evident axioms. On the contrary,
tor and research fellow at Harvard. He was A. Hartshorne’s final appeal is to experience. This
N. WHITEHEAD’s assistant and put in charge of is not to say that metaphysical propositions
editing the papers of Charles S. PEIRCE. He was are empirical in the sense that Karl Popper
joined by Paul WEISS in 1927, and their six- gives the term (in other words, falsifiable by
volume edition of the Peirce papers was pub- some conceivable experience). For Hartshorne,
lished in 1931–5. metaphysical propositions are true, if at all, of
Hartshorne was a professor of philosophy at every conceivable experience. His method can
the University of Chicago from 1928 to 1955, be characterized as a reflective equilibrium
and he also held a joint appointment in the between experience, in its widest sense, and
Meadville Theological School from 1933 to hypotheses about the necessary features of exis-
1955. He then taught at Emory University from tence.
1955 to 1962, and University of Texas from Hartshorne insisted that experience not be
1962 to 2000. Hartshorne was President of understood too narrowly; otherwise a meta-
the American Philosophical Association physical statement could be mistaken for an
Western Division in 1948–9, President of the empirical one. He was critical of traditional
Charles S. Peirce Society in 1950–51, and was empiricism, for it privileged sensory experience
also president of numerous other scholarly and compartmentalized sensation and affect. In
organizations. Throughout his career he made his first book Hartshorne argued that sensa-
frequent travels domestically and abroad, and tions exist along an “‘affective continuum’ of
he was an internationally recognized ornithol- aesthetically meaningful, socially expressive,
ogist specializing in oscines; his main research organically adaptive and evolving experience
was published in Born to Sing (1973). He functions.” The twin axes of the theory are (1)
always enjoyed good health and he remained sensory modalities are not isolated from each
productive into his final years. He died on 9 other and (2) every sensation is a feeling, but
October 2000 in Austin, Texas. not every feeling is a sensation. According to
Hartshorne was foremost a metaphysician. (1), the comparison of qualities from different
His dissertation on “The Unity of Being” senses has a biological basis. On Hartshorne’s
presents an unrefined version of his meta- view, to speak of tones as bright, dark, sharp,
physics. Although he never published the work, soft, or sweet is not merely a question of
it anticipated the themes of his mature thinking. analogy. According to (2), there are no sensa-
Hartshorne viewed Peirce and Whitehead as tions devoid of affect. This is most evident in
giving him finer conceptual tools for expressing the sense of touch. The flame’s heat, directly on
ideas to which he had already arrived. Their the skin, is felt as painful. Hartshorne noted
example, along with those of William JAMES that, from an evolutionary standpoint, a bare
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HARTSHORNE
sensation would be an anomaly, for it would of experience. Two things are evident in
have no adaptive utility. Hartshorne’s theory memory. First, the object of a memory is
has the most difficulty accommodating the another experience. Thus, if memories and
sense of sight. Even here, however, it is evident experiences are forms of feeling, then memory
that too much brightness is felt as sharply is a feeling of feeling. Second, memory has a
painful; more diffuse light is felt as soft. temporal structure, for one remembers only
Emotional sensitivity to light also varies, as the what is past. The most concrete way in which
phenomenon of seasonal affective disorder the past continues into the present is in
attests. memory; for instance, a memory can be so
Hartshorne’s critique of empiricism is com- vivid that one relives the original experience.
plemented by his suspicion of anthropomor- Hartshorne held that perception also has a
phism. He denied that “experience” is syn- temporal structure, although the temporal
onymous with “human experience.” Descartes dimension becomes apparent only as a function
bifurcated the world into the human and the of distance and speed. For instance, the delay
nonhuman and he put all experience on the between the lightning flash and the thunder
human side. Cartesian misgivings aside, we increases the further removed one is from the
routinely attribute experience to a variety of lightning strike. According to Hartshorne, an
nonhuman creatures. Hartshorne observed that experience never has itself as an object. As
a dog need not become a man in order to suffer. Bergson insisted, this is true even in dreams. So-
His ornithological studies convinced him that called “external” events are part of the fabric
songbirds have a primitive aesthetic sense that of dreams, for example, an alarm clock is heard
is manifested in the variety of their songs and in a dream as a fire alarm. For Hartshorne, the
the frequencies with which they sing them. object of an experience is always a past event
How far down the evolutionary scale sentience – most concretely, a past experience. If the
extends is a fair question. Hartshorne rejected event is in the immediately preceding moment
as a temporal form of dualism the idea that then there is an illusion of simultaneity of expe-
mind emerges from mere insentient matter. In rience and its objects. For this reason,
this, he was fond of remarking, he could enlist Hartshorne spoke of perception as impersonal
the support of his friend, Sewall Wright, the memory.
great geneticist. Hartshorne followed Leibniz in Psychicalism may seem to be false, for not
understanding experience as a variable that can every object of experience is an experiencing
take an infinite number of values, from the object. Hartshorne argued, however, that naïve
daylight of self-awareness to the dim recesses of sense experience can no more settle this issue
a stupor. for metaphysics than it could reveal the atomic
The relevance of these ideas makes structure of matter for science. He appropriated
Hartshorne’s version of panpsychism, which Leibniz’s distinction between singulars and
he called psychicalism, attractive as a meta- composites. For Hartshorne, only active sin-
physical hypothesis. Hartshorne maintained gulars have experiences, and every active
that the world is a theatre of interactions singular is a composite, but not every compos-
among “active singulars” of varying levels of ite is an active singular. In this way, for
complexity held together by affective bonds. Hartshorne, feeling can be everywhere even
Thus, the most universal values are aesthetic, in though not everything feels, somewhat as vibra-
the root meaning of the term, “feeling” (aes- tion can be everywhere even though not every-
thesis). The most concrete relation among thing vibrates – for example, rocks. With suf-
active singulars is “feeling of feeling,” an ficient complexity, a composite may become an
expression he borrowed from Whitehead. For active singular; a multi-celled zygote is not a
both philosophers, memory provides the model center of feeling, but the baby it becomes is.
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HARTSHORNE
Individual cells may nevertheless have feeling. The relation of cause to effect is mirrored in
Hartshorne believed that each of us has temporal asymmetry. With Whitehead, but
confused perceptions of the feelings of our cells. against Peirce, Hartshorne accepted the atom-
As he was fond of saying, hurt my cells and you icity of becoming. Active singulars are discrete
hurt me. He doubted that plants are active sin- momentary processes. With Peirce, but against
gulars, although their cells may have cell-like Whitehead, he held that possibilities form a
experiences. The inorganic realm is entirely continuum. For Hartshorne, time is “objective
devoid of psychic qualities, but its micro-con- modality.” The past is fully determinate; the
stituents need not be. Here, the “variable” of future is a partially indeterminate field of pos-
experience must be near its limits. sibility; the present is the process of adding
Hartshorne’s talk of the “singulars” that onto the determinateness of the past.
form the substratum of existence as “active” Hartshorne also held that modal distinctions
highlights another feature of his metaphysics. are grounded in temporal becoming. Necessity
The activity in question is a creative activity that is the common element of all temporal alter-
is conditioned, but not wholly determined, by natives; something is not logically possible
the causal nexus from which it is born. In unless it was always possible or becomes
Hartshorne’s view, at the metaphysically basic possible in the fullness of time.
level of active singulars, the chain of cause and Hartshorne argued that psychicalism, inde-
effect can be read backwards but not forwards. terminism, and temporal becoming satisfy his
Hartshorne used the relation between adult criteria of a sound metaphysical theory. A
and child as illustration; the woman includes simpler example of a metaphysical truth is
the girl she once was, but the girl does not “Something exists.” It too is verified by every
include the woman. Put differently, the woman experience and falsified by none (for the expe-
is internally related to the girl but the girl is rience itself would have to exist). For this
externally related to the woman. reason, Hartshorne calls it a metaphysical con-
Determinists claim that the woman’s fusion to ask why there is something rather
genetics, her environment, and every detail of than nothing. Of course, the question is most
her prior experience and behavior dictate that often shorthand for asking why there is a
she could not have been other than she is. universe rather than none at all. Hartshorne
Following Peirce, Hartshorne argued that the also questions this question. May it not be that
strict law-like regularity that determinism this universe is contingent but that it is not
implies is nowhere to be found, nor is it contingent that a universe exists? This was
required by the practice of science. On the indeed Hartshorne’s view. He concluded by
contrary, effects outrun their causes. From the denying that there are merely negative facts.
earliest moments for which there is any What makes a negative existential statement
evidence, the universe has been the womb of a true is something positive (for example, “no
cumulative evolutionary process, staggering in ants in the room” means that every part of the
the variety and diversity of its products. The room is occupied by something other than
degree of novelty can be negligible, as in the ants).
nearly exact repetition of pattern in chemical If it is necessary that something exists, it is a
processes, or it can be dramatic, as in the flow- further question whether it is necessary that
ering of human genius. Hartshorne noted that something contingent exists. Many philoso-
his indeterminism is the mean between the phers affirm a wholly non-contingent divine
contrary extremes of unqualified determinism reality that freely created a contingent universe.
(where causes uniquely determine effects) and A hallmark of Hartshorne’s metaphysics, and
chaoticism (where causal relations are nonex- arguably his signal contribution to philosoph-
istent). ical theology, is that deity necessarily has con-
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HARTSHORNE
tingent aspects. Hartshorne argued that God’s to Hartshorne’s example: whether or not I hear
decision to create is part of God, yet it must be a blue jay, God knows it and God’s knowledge
contingent if it is to be free. Hartshorne also is as contingent as my experience; but, God’s
argued as follows. Consider the conditional, existence and the abstract quality of God
“God knows W entails W” where W is a state- knowing whatever occurs are unaffected by
ment about a contingent occurrence. If the this contingency.
antecedent, God knows W, is necessary then W A theme running throughout Hartshorne’s
must also be necessary, for only a necessary work is that philosophers have been largely
truth can follow from a necessary truth. But W inattentive to the logically possible varieties of
is a statement about a contingency and hence theism. The regnant assumption has been that
is contingent. Thus, it must be contingent that God and the world fall on opposite sides of
God knows that W. ultimate contrasts. According to this “monopo-
The traditional objection to God’s having lar theism,” God is necessary, infinite, eternal,
contingent aspects is premised on God’s sim- etc.; the world is contingent, finite, temporal,
plicity (or, having no parts); any contingency in etc. Hartshorne argues that the possibilities are
God would function as a kind of metaphysical more numerous than this. Consider the neces-
virus infecting the whole of God, so God’s very sary/contingent contrast. It may be the case
existence would be contingent. Hartshorne that God is necessary in all respects (N), con-
denies divine simplicity. His antidote for the tingent in all respects (C), necessary and con-
“virus” is to distinguish the fact that some- tingent in different respects (NC), or neither
thing exists and the manner or state in which it necessary nor contingent (O). Likewise, the
exists. He calls this the difference between exis- world (n, c, cn, o). The eight possibilities for
tence and actuality. Hartshorne observed that God and the world combine to make an
my existing tomorrow is one question; while exhaustive list of sixteen mutually exclusive
my existing tomorrow hearing a blue jay call at options (N.n, N.c, N.cn, N.o; C.n, C.c, C.cn,
noon is another. Existence and actuality are C.o; NC.n, NC.c, NC.cn, NC.o; O.n, O.c,
related asymmetrically – in effect it is a logical O.cn, O.o). Well-known philosophies can be
type difference. From “X hears a blue jay call mapped onto the sixteenfold matrix: N.n is
at noon” one may infer “X exists”; but from classical pantheism; N.cn is Aristotle’s view;
“X exists” one may not infer “X hears a blue O.c is Russell’s atheism; N.c is monopolar
jay call at noon.” theism. The formal possibilities jump to 256
Hartshorne draws the further consequence (16 times 16) if two contrasts are used (for
that the modalities of existence and actuality example, necessity and contingency, eternity
are logically distinct. To be sure, in the case of and temporality). If x equals the number of
the creatures, both actuality and existence are contrasts, then the formally possible doctrines
contingent. My hearing a blue jay at noon and about God and the world equal 16x. Not all
my existence are such that they can fail to be. formal combinations are logically consistent.
Nevertheless, it is possible to conceive of a Nevertheless, the matrices are a useful tool for
being whose actual states are contingent but exploring ignored alternatives.
whose existence is necessary. Medieval philoso- Hartshorne’s matrix clearly expresses his
phers came close to this idea in speaking of the own view (NC.cn), called dipolar theism. God
æviternity of angels, but they did not apply it is in different respects necessary and contin-
to God. Hartshorne says that God is both nec- gent, infinite and finite, eternal and temporal,
essary and contingent, but in different respects: and so on. The qualification “in different
God’s existence is necessary (it cannot not be), respects” saves Hartshorne from inconsistency.
but God’s actual states are contingent (each God’s existence is necessary, infinite, and
could have been different than it is). To revert eternal, whereas God’s actual states are con-
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HARTSHORNE
tingent, finite, and temporal. By conceiving creativity of the creatures can exist. Hartshorne
God as inclusive of the world, Hartshorne pre- develops in considerable detail three conse-
served the contrast between them, establishing quences of these ideas. First, what happens in
a view he calls panentheism (in other words, all- the universe is the product of the joint decisions
in-God). Hartshorne appropriated and updated of God and the creatures. Second, divine power
Plato’s doctrine of the world-soul. God’s cannot guarantee that creaturely decisions coor-
relation to the world is analogous to the dinate to bring about the best possible result.
relation of a person to the cells of his or her Thus, to ask why God causes or allows bad
body. God is the whole; each creature is a things to happen is metaphysical confusion.
fragment of the whole. For Hartshorne, the Third, because creaturely decisions come to be
aim of religion is the acceptance of our frag- in time, God’s knowledge of them comes to be
mentariness. in time. Hartshorne insists that this does not
Another dimension of dipolar theism is the mean that God is not omniscient. God knows
distinction between A (absolute)-perfection and all that is possible to know, but decisions that
R (relative)-perfection. To be A-perfect is to have yet to come to be cannot be known as
be unsurpassable by all others including self; to already accomplished.
be R-perfect is to be unsurpassable by all others Hartshorne’s most widely recognized work is
excluding self. For monopolar theism, God is his revival of the ontological argument for
A-perfect in all respects. For dipolar theism, God’s existence. He was the first to identify two
God is A-perfect in some respects and R-perfect forms of the argument in Anselm’s Proslogion.
in others. For instance, God has the A-perfect He was also the first to present the argument
quality of omniscience (God knows all that is using the formalism of modal logic. According
knowable) and the R-perfect quality of being to Hartshorne, “Anselm’s discovery” is that
responsive to all changes and all values in the the divine existence must be “modally coinci-
universe. Thus, Hartshorne speaks of God as dent” with possibility as such. If God exists,
“the self-surpassing surpasser of all” – a view then God exists necessarily. The ontological
he calls surrelativism. The values of the jay’s argument may be expressed as follows: God’s
song, both for the jay and for me, are also existence is either necessary, impossible, or one
values for God (for in knowing those values possibility among others. Anselm’s discovery
God possesses them). God continues to know eliminates the third alternative. If we assume
those values long after the jay and I are gone. that God’s existence is not impossible then
Hartshorne adopted Whitehead’s expression God’s existence is necessary. If God’s existence
in saying that the values of the world are objec- is necessary, then God exists.
tively immortal in God. This is the only form of Hartshorne denied that Anselm proved
immortality Hartshorne considered thinkable God’s existence. The problem is that Anselm
or desirable. did not show that God’s existence is not impos-
The scholastic philosophers used Aristotle’s sible. Indeed, we have seen that Hartshorne
expression “unmoved mover” to describe God. considers Anselm’s type of “monopolar
Hartshorne, inspired by Abraham HESCHEL, theism” impossible. Hartshorne’s dipolar
calls God “the most and best moved mover.” theism is designed to address the doubt that the
To say that God is a moved mover is to imply concept of deity has consistent meaning. In the
that God is affected by creaturely decisions. final analysis, Hartshorne’s argument for the
Put somewhat differently, what happens in the existence of God is a cumulative case of which
universe is not a unilateral decision of God. the ontological argument is one element. In
Hartshorne goes further: God cannot decide Creative Synthesis, he presented the ontologi-
not to be affected by creaturely decisions. God’s cal proof as one of six strands in a “global
creativity sets the boundaries within which the argument” for God’s existence – the other
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HARTSHORNE
“proofs” are non-empirical versions of the cos- Mistakes (Albany, N.Y., 1984).
mological, design, epistemic, moral, and aes- Creativity in American Philosophy (Albany,
thetic arguments. After Creative Synthesis, N.Y., 1984).
Hartshorne stressed the eliminations of options The Zero Fallacy and Other Essays in
in the sixteenfold matrix as a way of arguing Neoclassical Philosophy, ed. Mohammad
for dipolar theism. Valady (Peru, Ill., 1997).
Because aesthetic values are, for Hartshorne,
the most universal, he conceived the cosmos, at Other Relevant Works
any stage of its evolution, as permeated by Hartshorne’s papers are at the Center for
divine beauty. There is a dynamic beauty of the Process Studies, Claremont School of
universe that God appreciates and to which Theology, California.
God contributes. This is not to deny the Beyond Humanism: Essays in the Philosophy
tragedies and horrific evils that disfigure exis- of Nature (Chicago, 1937).
tence. God too feels these, but is not defeated Reality as Social Process: Studies in
by them. In Hartshorne’s view, the objective Metaphysics and Religion (Boston, 1953).
measure of aesthetic value is a mean between Philosophers Speak of God, with William L.
the double extremes of unity and diversity and Reese (Chicago, 1953).
simplicity and complexity. God is guided by Anselm’s Discovery: A Re-examination of the
these ideals in an everlasting effort to bring Ontological Proof for God’s Existence (La
what is best from both the triumph and Salle, Ill., 1965).
wreckage of our lives. A Natural Theology for Our Time (La Salle,
John B. COBB, Jr. called Hartshorne “a Ill., 1967).
strange and alien greatness.” Hartshorne’s Whitehead’s Philosophy: Selected Essays,
vigorous defense of metaphysics may have 1935–1970 (Lincoln, Neb., 1972).
seemed quixotic in the days when logical pos- Born to Sing: An Interpretation and World
itivism labeled metaphysical statements non- Survey of Bird Song (Bloomington, Ind.,
sensical. In retrospect, it seems almost 1973).
prophetic. Like the greatest metaphysicians he Aquinas to Whitehead: Seven Centuries of
found time for empirical studies. Above all, Metaphysics of Religion (Milwaukee,
Hartshorne sought, without claiming to have Wisc., 1976).
fully achieved, a comprehensive wisdom that Whitehead’s View of Reality, with Creighton
satisfies our rational and emotional demands. Peden (New York, 1981).
Wisdom as Moderation: A Philosophy of the
BIBLIOGRAPHY Middle Way (Albany, N.Y., 1987).
The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation The Darkness and the Light: A Philosopher
(Chicago, 1934). Reflects on His Fortunate Career and
Man’s Vision of God and the Logic of Those Who Made It Possible (Albany,
Theism (Chicago, 1941). N.Y., 1990).
The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception Hartshorne and Brightman on God, Process,
of God (New Haven, Conn., 1948). and Persons: The Correspondence,
The Logic of Perfection (La Salle, Ill., 1962). 1922–1945, ed. Randall E. Auxier and
Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method Mark Y. A. Davies (Nashville, Tenn.,
(La Salle, Ill., 1970). 2001).
Insights and Oversights of Great Thinkers:
An Evaluation of Western Philosophy Further Reading
(Albany, N.Y., 1983). Amer Nat Bio, Amer Phils Before 1950, Bio
Omnipotence and Other Theological 20thC Phils, Oxford Comp Phil, Pres
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HARTSHORNE
Addr of APA v5, Proc of APA v74, Theological Responses (Dordrecht, 1990).
Routledge Encycl Phil, Who Was Who in Viney, Donald W. Charles Hartshorne and
Amer v14, Who’s Who in Phil the Existence of God (Albany, N.Y.,
Hartshorne, Dorothy C., Donald W. Viney 1985).
and Randy Ramal. “Charles Hartshorne: Whitney, Barry L. Evil and the Process God
Primary Bibliography of Philosophical (Toronto, 1985).
Works,” Process Studies 30 (2001):
375–409. Donald Wayne Viney
Cobb, John B., Jr., and Franklin L. Gamwell,
eds. Existence and Actuality:
Conversations with Charles Hartshorne
(Chicago, Ill., 1984).
Dombrowksi, Daniel A. Hartshorne and the
Metaphysics of Animal Rights (Albany, HARVEY, Van Austin (1926– )
N.Y., 1988).
———, Analytic Theism, Hartshorne, and Van A. Harvey was born on 23 April 1926 in
the Concept of God (Albany, N.Y., 1996). Hankow, China. After serving in the United
———, Divine Beauty: The Aesthetics of States Navy in World War II, he received his
Charles Hartshorne (Nashville, Tenn., BA in philosophy from Occidental College in
2003). 1948. He attended Princeton Theological
Ford, Lewis S., ed. Two Process Seminary in 1948–9, and then received his BD
Philosophers: Hartshorne’s Encounter from Yale Divinity School in 1951 and his PhD
with Whitehead (Tallahassee, Fla., 1973). in religion from Yale University in 1957, having
Goodwin, George L. The Ontological studied post-Enlightenment religious thought.
Argument of Charles Hartshorne While at Yale he was profoundly influenced by
(Missoula, Mont., 1978). H. Richard NIEBUHR, from whom he gained an
Hahn, Lewis E., ed. The Philosophy of appreciation for the impact the rise of modern
Charles Hartshorne (La Salle, Penn., historical consciousness had on theology. This
1991). Contains Hartshorne’s autobiogra- influence led to his dissertation, “Myth, Faith,
phy and bibliography. and History,” and to his lifelong interest in the
Kane, Robert, and Stephen H. Phillips, eds. implications of the historical-critical method
Hartshorne, Process Philosophy and for theological formulation. Harvey taught
Theology (Albany, N.Y., 1989). religion at Yale (1952–4), Princeton University
Peter, Eugene. Hartshorne and Neoclassical (1954–8), Perkins School of Theology at
Metaphysics (Lincoln, Neb., 1970). Southern Methodist University (1958–68), the
Reck, Andrew J. The New American University of Pennsylvania (1968–78), and
Philosophers: An Exploration of Thought Stanford University (1978–96). He served as
since World War II (Baton Rouge, Louis., chair of the graduate program in religion at
1968), chap. 9. Southern Methodist University and chair of his
Shields, George W., ed. Process and Analysis: departments at both the University of
Whitehead, Hartshorne, and the Analytic Pennsylvania and Stanford. At Stanford, from
Tradition (Albany, N.Y., 2003). 1985 until his retirement in 1996, he was the
Sia, Santiago. God in Process Thought: A George Edwin Burnell Professor of Religious
Study in Charles Hartshorne’s Concept of Studies.
God (Dordrecht, 1985). Harvey’s first book, A Handbook of
Sia, Santiago, ed. Charles Hartshorne’s Theological Terms (1964), relates traditional
Concept of God: Philosophical and theological terms to their reconceptualization in
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HARVEY
light of issues that have arisen only in the nine- Essence of Christianity and argues that
teenth and twentieth centuries. His much-cele- Feuerbach dropped many of the Hegelian
brated second book, The Historian and the elements of that early work and created a much
Believer (1966), reflects his lifelong concern more powerful “naturalist-existentialist”
with the integrity of religious belief. After a paradigm for the interpretation of religion,
nuanced analysis of the nature of historical which has important parallels in the contem-
reason, he shows how the “morality of porary study of religion. The result is a more
judgment” associated with historical reason critical interpretation of religion. Harvey shows
has created enormous ethical and theological how Feuerbach’s later conception of the nature
problems still unresolved by theologians trying of religion itself requires rejecting efforts by
to reconcile traditional Christian belief with liberal theologians and others to save religious
biblical research. These problems have princi- meaning while avoiding literalistic construc-
pally to do with the relationship between his- tions. As reflected in his writings over the last
torical investigation of the historical Jesus and twenty years of his career, this Feuerbachian
theologically significant claims about him that position represents Harvey’s own final views as
Christianity has traditionally wanted to make. a critical student of religion.
Harvey continued to engage these issues in
many essays throughout his career. The third BIBLIOGRAPHY
printing (1996) of The Historian and the “On Believing What is Difficult to
Believer contains an important new introduc- Understand,” Journal of Religion 39
tion that relates this early book to Harvey’s (1959): 219–31.
mature position. “D. F. Strauss’ Life of Jesus Revisited,”
A common theme in many of Harvey’s Church History 30 (1961): 191–211.
works through about 1980 – including The “Wie Neu ist die ‘Neue Frage nach dem
Historian and the Believer, and especially to be historischen Jesus’?” with S. M. Ogden,
seen in “A Christology for Barabbases” (1976) Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 59
– is his conception of faith based on the biblical (1962): 46–87.
picture of Jesus that is free from explicit his- “How New is the ‘New Quest …’?,” with S.
torical claims which would make faith depen- M. Ogden, in The Historical Jesus and the
dent on the results of historical research. Kergymatic Christ, ed. C. E. Braaten and
Related to Rudolf Bultmann’s notion of justi- R. A. Harrisville (New York, 1964), pp.
fication by faith and to Richard Niebuhr’s 197–242.
“radical monotheism,” this effort is the most A Handbook of Theological Terms (New
theologically significant aspect of Harvey’s York, 1964).
work, but he never developed it beyond sug- “The Historical Jesus, the Kerygma, and the
gestive hints. Christian Faith,” Religion in Life 43
In the later stages of his career, this theme dis- (1964): 430–50.
appeared and the critical side of his work came The Historian and the Believer (New York,
to prominence. Harvey transformed himself 1966; Philadelphia, 1981; Urbana, Ill.,
from theologian into a skeptical student of 1996).
religion, evident in “Nietzsche and the Kantian “Is There an Ethics of Belief?” Journal of
Paradigm of Religious Faith” (1989) and in Religion 49 (1969): 41–58.
his third book, Feuerbach and the “A Christology for Barabbases,” Perkins
Interpretation of Religion (1995), which won School of Theology Journal 29 (1976):
a prize from the American Academy of 1–13.
Religion. The latter work traces Feuerbach’s “The Ethics of Belief Reconsidered,” Journal
intellectual development after his famous The of Religion 59 (1979): 406–20.
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HARVEY
“The Dilemma of the Unbelieving from 1968 to 1970, and a professor of

Theologian,” American Journal of theology at the University of Notre Dame from
Theology and Philosophy 2 (1981): 46–54. 1970 to 1984. Since 1984 Hauerwas has
“Nietzsche and the Kantian Paradigm of taught at Duke University, and is currently
Religious Faith,” in Witness and Existence, Gilbert T. Rowe Professor of Theological
ed. P. E. Devenish and L. Goodwin Ethics at Duke Divinity School and the School
(Chicago, 1989), pp. 140–61. of Law.
Feuerbach and the Interpretation of Religion Hauerwas has published over twenty-five
(Cambridge, UK, 1995). books, including A Community of Character
“Feuerbach on Luther’s Doctrine of (1981), which was named among the one
Revelation,” Journal of Religion 78 hundred most important books on religion in
(1997): 3–17. the twentieth century, and With the Grain of
the Universe: The Church’s Witness and
Further Reading Natural Theology, which were his Gifford
Anderson, Tyson. “Resurrection and Radical Lectures given at the University of St. Andrews
Faith,” Religious Studies 9 (1973): 171–80. in 2001. In that same year, Hauerwas was
Evans, C. Stephen. “Critical Historical named “America’s Best Theologian” by Time
Judgment and Biblical Faith,” Faith and magazine, which is an ironic honor since
Philosophy 11 (1994): 184–206. Hauerwas claims that “best” is not a theolog-
Ferre, Nels F. S. “This Is My Point of ical category but “faithfulness” is. Anyone
Viewing,” Theology Today 18 (1962): interested in the work of Hauerwas should
506–12. begin by reading William Cavanaugh’s “Stan
Hardwick, Charles D. “Rejoinder to Van the Man: A Thoroughly Biased Account of a
Harvey,” Journal of the American Completely Unobjective Person” and Michael
Academy of Religion 66 (1998): 883–6. Cartwright’s “A Reader’s Guide” in The
Hauerwas Reader. Both Cavanaugh and
Charley D. Hardwick Cartwright note that Hauerwas’s “ethics” are
inseparable from his theology; this includes
his recovery of the tradition of virtue and his
philosophy of human action.
A consistent theme throughout Hauerwas’s
work is the inadequacy of much of modern
HAUERWAS, Stanley Martin (1940– ) philosophy because it makes human action
primarily a matter of choice rather than vision.
Stanley Martin Hauerwas was born on 24 July His dissertation, published as Character and
1940 in Pleasant Grove, Texas. His father the Christian Life: A Study in Theological
Coffee Martin Hauerwas was a bricklayer, Ethics (1975), in many ways is a theological
which is important in understanding version of G. E. M. Anscombe’s Intention. In
Hauerwas’s philosophical development. After 1974 Hauerwas wrote that modern moral
receiving his BA in philosophy from philosophers “see all moral agents as inhabit-
Southwestern University in Texas in 1962, he ing the same world of facts; thus they dis-
went on to Yale Divinity School and received criminate between the different types of
a BD in 1965. He did his graduate work at morality only in terms of acts and choices. But
Yale University and received an MA in differences of moral vision or perspective may
theology, an MA in philosophy, and a PhD in also exist.” Then, drawing on Iris Murdoch, he
theology all in 1968. He was assistant profes- argued “our morality is more than adherence
sor of theology at Augustana College in Illinois to universalizable rules; it also encompasses
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HAUERWAS
our experiences, fables, beliefs, images, how they knew they were at the end, they
concepts, and inner monologues” (Vision and would point to the brick and say, “Because
Virtue, 1981, p. 34). He felt no compunction I’ve laid the last brick.” If we asked, “On
for using philosophy to make theological what grounds do you know you have laid the
claims even when philosophers felt such com- last brick?” the bricklayer rightly would not
punction. Thus Hauerwas reads philosophers find us worthy of conversation. He can only
theologically, exposing their strengths and say what he says when a building is finished
weaknesses. He also reads theologians philo- and he can see it. When he says these words
sophically. In Wilderness Wanderings (1997), is as important as that he says them. Getting
his response to the theologian John B. COBB, to the place where he can say them is what
JR. in an essay entitled “Knowing How to Go allows him to say them. In fact, for us to
On When You Do Not Know Where You explain this is for us to say what the brick-
Are” asks where would someone have to stand layer showed. Some things can only be shown,
to know how to use the words Cobb uses? even when they are done so through language.
Hauerwas admits that this essay is unintelligi- But they can be shown through language
ble without some familiarity with Ludwig because there is something to see. As
Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein is always present in Hauerwas often puts the point, “you can only
Hauerwas’s work. A philosopher like act in a world you can see; you can only see
Wittgenstein who begins philosophy with a world you can say.” Hauerwas is a realist,
“Slab!” is compelling to the son of a bricklayer and this is why he knows that thinking begins
who apprenticed with his father. If philosophy and ends in a local particular context. But
helps us situate the language game within our this does not make him an empiricist or a
knowledge of how to go on when someone positivist. The bricklayer does not know the
says “Slab!” as well as the life-form within last brick is laid because a sense impression in
which such a language game is rendered intel- his mind matches some external reality. For
ligible, then Hauerwas’s work is a fascinating instance, an observer could wrongly apper-
exemplification of one of the most interesting ceive that the last brick was laid, thinking the
philosophical movements in the twentieth building finished when it was not. He wrongly
century, for it shows how this philosophical sensed a finished building, but it was an
movement cannot finally discriminate philos- illusion. No such single criterion or set of
ophy from theology if it is to be faithful to its criteria, as empiricism or positivism suggests,
own best insights. allows a bricklayer to know the last brick is
Note for instance Hauerwas’s “retrospec- laid. He knows it is laid because he laid it,
tive assessment” of his development of an which is a shorthand narrative that tells us he
ethics of character: “Back in the days when I was part of a timeful activity of constructing
made an honest living laying brick I learned a building, which is what is meant by the
a great deal from the colorful ways bricklay- term “narrative.”
ers and laborers described their work. For Hauerwas’s philosophy fits what Charles
example, when laying the last brick, tile, or TAYLOR describes as ad hominem practical
stone in a particularly difficult job a bricklayer reasoning. Ad hominem practical reasoning
often says, ‘Man I wish I had started with does not seek neutral or universal criteria to
that one’.” (Hauerwas Reader, p. 75). Of adjudicate among competing positions; for it
course, the “point” here is that one cannot argues that such criteria cannot and do not
start with the last brick; laying the final brick exist. They can only be dangerous illusions
presumes a timeful activity of bricklaying that where someone’s “form of life” is no longer
has now come to an end, and bricklayers recognized as such. All reasoning is, at some
know they are at the end. If we asked them level, ad hominem practical reasoning. That is
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HAUERWAS
a universal claim, but it is neither self-refuting Imagine philosophy departments that offered
nor does it entail relativism. Simply because Christian, Jewish, and Islamic studies taught by
Hauerwas acknowledges, as did all the above- practitioners of those traditions. Hauerwas
mentioned philosophers, that all knowledge often notes, though, that Aquinas,
begins in local, language-laden contexts, does Maimonides and Ibn Sinai would not be able
not entail that truth is confined to those to be hired or tenured in philosophy depart-
contexts. The argument that Hauerwas, any ments today (let alone religion and theology
more than Wittgenstein, assumes fideist com- departments), which clearly shows how unrea-
munities where people live in sectarian cultures sonable they have become. As long as such
is absurd. It says more about the fixation with persons are not hireable in philosophy depart-
foundationalist or mediatonial epistemology of ments, philosophers betray their pursuit of
those who say it than it conveys any knowl- wisdom.
edge of Wittgenstein or Hauerwas’s position. Hauerwas’s work begins with an unapolo-
That someone speaks English with a Texas getic commitment to the Christian faith. As he
twang does not entail that they cannot com- states in his Sanctify Them in the Truth (1998)
municate with Midwestern or Northeastern and elsewhere, he seeks to show “what differ-
English-speakers, let alone French, Spanish, ence being a Christian might make.” Is truth,
or German-speakers as well. Yet communica- then, “what works” for Hauerwas? No,
tion among these groups will require different because truth is finally a gift that calls us
practices, and they may vary according to time toward it rather than being a secure possession
and place. Nevertheless communication is we can identify in us. Truth is Christologically
possible. We know this because we communi- determined. It is discovered in the truthfulness
cate. But to require a priori a theory as to how of faithful discipleship. It is an eschatological
it is or is not possible is to forgo the very prac- goal that is not “clearly known prior to the
tices that make it possible in the first place. undertaking of the journey.” Instead, “we
Inevitably such a theory privileges as neutral learn better the nature of the end by being
and universal a local practice, which now has slowly transformed by the means necessary to
no need to give an account of its privileged pursue it.”
status. The desire for a universal and neutral Hauerwas says that he hopes his work
criterion is akin to those new voice technolo- exhibits that to be a faithful witness is to be a
gies that anchors for news programs undergo living mystery. “It means to live in such a way
in order to disguise the region from which they that one’s life would not make sense if God did
came. Hauerwas’s voice could never be that not exist” (Hauerwas Reader, p. 5). This is
domesticated. why Hauerwas’s work is best understood as an
Hauerwas does not teach, publish, or exercise in practical reasoning. Hauerwas
present philosophy itself as worthy of our lives. depends less on Aristotle for his account of
He requires graduate students to read practical reasoning than he does on the
Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, and often Mennonite theologian John Howard YODER.
does so before urging them to read Holy Hauerwas’s explication of Yoder’s theology
Scripture, but nevertheless Hauerwas’s “phi- has in part to do with the role practical rea-
losophy” has little to no stake in philosophy soning must play in a good performance of
for its own sake. Philosophy is the handmaiden Mennonite church life. This is not to roman-
of theology; for only theology can give us a ticize the Mennonites; they are as corrupt as
telos worthy of our lives: friendship with God. other modern church formations. (Hauerwas
Hauerwas begins and ends with his Christian is no triumphalist when it comes to the con-
faith and thinks philosophy departments ought temporary church.) But it is to show how their
to consider such a conviction “reasonable.” life together makes best sense when it is a life
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HAUERWAS
that risks practical moral reasoning. He based on what the intellect envisions. The intel-
explains this: lect sees the good that elicits the will’s desire.
If the good is mere human preference, moral
Practical moral reasoning is a conversation human action would not exist. All human
of a community that can risk judgment action, since it is always associated with desire,
because of its willingness to forgive. Moral takes place under some quest for the good.
judgments are not deductive applications of The good is inescapable; all action assumes a
universally valid rules, but the confronta- teleological ordering, but not every pursuit
tion of one person by another on matters done in the name of the good is a good pursuit.
that matter for the whole community. What constitutes goodness still needs further
Private wrongs in fact are public matters, specification. Christian moral actions assume
since the very nature of the community and friendship with God in and through Christ as
its moral discourse depends on calling sin, the end that should render our actions intelli-
sin, with the hope of reconciliation. (1988, gible. Such intelligible actions, properly
p. 73) ordered to that end, are virtues.
Hauerwas recovered the importance of the
Note that practical reasoning is inseparable virtues for doing theological ethics. He uses the
from the practices of specific, local communi- virtues to argue against the Protestant doctrine
ties. It does not mean that those communities that strictly distinguishes faith from works.
do not also have theories, doctrines, and uni- For Hauerwas, the virtues provide what is
versal claims. They could not be communities needed to show that faith and works are inter-
without them. But it means that those theories, related and dependent upon one another. In
doctrines, and universal claims matter in order to be faithful one must be formed virtu-
everyday life. They cannot be abstracted from ously within the context of the church. Much
everyday practices. Practice and theory, thereof his work is an explication of the virtues and
fore, meet in the context of concrete local com- the ecclesial context that makes them possible.
munities. Hauerwas has an abiding interest in the impor-
Further key themes in Hauerwas’s thought tance of “character,” (Greek, “hexis,” Latin
include vision, virtue, character, narrative, tra- “habitus”) which results from our virtuous
dition, telos, witness, and church. Vision is a formation. This is his Christian anthropology,
central theme for Hauerwas. Although he which is intimately related to the doctrine of
moved away from some terms found in his sanctification. We have “character” because
early work, such as “experience,” “central God seeks for us to be holy.
metaphor,” and “inner monologues,” the Hauerwas uses Aristotle, Aquinas, and
importance of vision remains. Vision has to do Anscombe to develop his “ethics of charac-
with the take on the world one’s language ter.” It is determined by a notion of practical
makes possible. Language allows us to “see” reason that forms the beliefs, desires, and
such that what we see also allows us to act. intentions of the acting agent. “Character,”
Following the work of Alasdair MACINTYRE, he notes, “is the qualification or determination
Hauerwas recognizes that the most basic form of our self-agency, formed by having certain
of action is not action per se but “intelligible intentions (and beliefs) rather than others”
action,” which is related to telos. (1975, p. 115). In A Community of Character,
A telos is the end for which one acts. he explicitly moves beyond this definition of
Hauerwas follows Aristotle and Aquinas in character and develops the importance of nar-
assuming that the will is not a discrete faculty rative for the purpose of showing how char-
separate from the intellect, but the will is acter is acquired and the necessary conditions
“rational appetite.” Therefore, the will acts for such acquisitions. To understand rightly the
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HAUERWAS
character of a particular agent is to under- Hauerwas’s ecclesiology is in the terms of

stand the narratives that form the particular American pragmatism, whether it is using
agent. William JAMES to develop his use of truth as
As character assumes virtue which assumes truthfulness or arguing with Richard RORTY
a telos which assumes virtue and character, about what constitutes politics. Like the prag-
all these essential themes assume narrative. matists, Hauerwas makes the community –
Although “narrative” could suggest a system- not the individual – the place that Christian
atic ordering of beginning, middle, and end, convictions are justifiable. Hauerwas is
this is not how it functions for Hauerwas’s perhaps a better pragmatist than most prag-
ethics. A good story can begin anywhere; what matists because he always speaks to a partic-
makes it a good story is the development of ular community – a practice that pragmatists
characters and a plot such that the “events” of talk about doing but do not do very often.
the story find their place in a well-told story. The Church thus is not merely an institution,
Hauerwas’s ethics does not begin at a single for Hauerwas, but God’s expression of a story-
place. His work is more like a well-told story. formed community where God’s politics
He uses MacIntyre to argue that human action slowly but decisively take form. This does not
is unintelligible separate from its “narrative” mean that God only works in and through the
wholeness. However, as the term “narrative” Church. Hauerwas is open to other religious
became increasingly popular and used to legit- traditions making similar claims for how God
imate a kind of relativism that verged on solip- works in their communities. Christians, Jews,
sism, Hauerwas became wary of the term’s and Muslims might find common ground
use in contemporary theological ethics and through some common practices and convic-
decided that narrative theology had to take tions, but we do not know this until we
into account specific traditions. converse with each other firmly grounded in
Narratives do not exist separate from the our own traditions. Thus Hauerwas works
institutions and traditions that make them with Rabbi Peter Ochs in the “radical tradi-
possible. Institutions are necessary, but their tion” book series. But Hauerwas will not coun-
purpose is to provide the space and time for tenance the liberal move that assumes one’s
traditional communal discourses where knowl- church location is ornamental to a more fun-
edge and wisdom are presented as goods to be damental religious a priori all “religions” share
embodied. Far from any sectarian leanings, in common. One must be located ecclesially to
Hauerwas remains deeply committed to be part of the conversation. For Christians,
specific institutions such as the university with the social location that allows them to speak
its practices of appointment, promotion, and well about God is the Church. It is the time in
tenure. However, this commitment to and which people “out of every tribe, nation,
advocacy for institutions is not for the institu- tongue and people” (Revelation 5) come
tion per se. It is so that space and time can be together to inhabit a new time, a liturgical
made in which traditional discourse can be time. When it is faithful to its story it will be a
pursued. If an institution does not provide nonviolent school of virtue. Hauerwas fears
space and time for such pursuits, if it becomes that this story-formed community has been
an end in itself, then Hauerwas finds it inca- policed by the democratic institutions that
pable of producing virtue and thus not worthy claim to give us freedom. Thus he writes,
of our lives. The modern nation–state has “Christians have learned to police their con-
become such an institution, which is why victions in the name of sustaining such [demo-
Hauerwas finds participation in the Church – cratic] social orders. They cannot appear in
especially the Eucharist – to be the most sig- public using explicit Christian language since
nificant political act one can perform. that would offend other actors in our alleged
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HAUERWAS
pluralist polity. But if this is genuinely a plu- philosophy, and theology all naturally lead;
ralist society, why should Christians not be we would spin with the grain of the universe.
able to express their most cherished convic-
tions in public?” (1994, p. 93) To refuse this BIBLIOGRAPHY
policing through faithful witness is the heart of Character and the Christian Life: A Study
Hauerwas’s work. in Theological Ethics (San Antonio, Tex.,
For Hauerwas, witness describes the way 1975).
that the church relates to the world. As the Truthfulness and Tragedy: Further
body of Christ, the Church serves the world by Investigations in Christian Ethics (Notre
being a witness to the peace that is only found Dame, Ind., 1977).
in Christ. Hauerwas uses this conception of Vision and Virtue: Essays in Christian
witness to show how the Church is a common Ethical Reflection (Notre Dame, Ind.,
life against those who think that politics is 1981).
constituted outside of the Church. This is most A Community of Character: Toward a
fully developed in his 2001 Gifford Lectures, Constructive Christian Social Ethic
With the Grain of the Universe: The Church’s (Notre Dame, Ind., 1981).
Witness and Natural Theology. The irony The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in
involved in these lectures should not be lost on Christian Ethics (Notre Dame, Ind.,
the reader. The Gifford Lectures were intended 1983).
to advance the cause of “natural theology,” Should War Be Eliminated? Philosophical
which is the very kind of theology that and Theological Explorations
Hauerwas works against. Natural theology (Milwaukee, Wisc., 1984).
normally assumes a universal account of Against the Nations: War and Survival in a
religion separate from any specific, particular Liberal Society (Minneapolis, 1985).
teachings of the faith. Most persons assumed Suffering Presence: Theological Reflections
Hauerwas would attack “natural theology” on Medicine, the Mentally Handicapped,
in his Gifford lectures, but he did just the and the Church (Notre Dame, Ind.,
opposite. He even drew favorably on James, 1985).
but he did so based on a statement of Yoder Christian Existence Today: Essays on
that “people who bear crosses” work “with Church, World, and Living in Between
the grain of the universe.” In other words, (Durham, N.C., 1988).
what is “natural” is not self-evident based on Naming the Silences: God, Medicine, and
observation, but depends upon being able to the Problem of Suffering (Grand Rapids,
see well what God did in the life, crucifixion, Mich., 1990).
resurrection and ascension of Christ. Unleashing the Scriptures: Freeing the Bible
Christians owe it to their non-Christian from Captivity to America (Nashville,
brother and sisters to show them the difference Tenn., 1993).
it makes that “the cross of Christ” is not “inci- Dispatches from the Front: Theological
dental to God’s being” (2001, p. 17). Engagements with the Secular (Durham,
Hauerwas makes his argument for the cen- N.C., 1994).
trality of witnessing to the cross and resurrec- In Good Company: The Church as Polis
tion as the most “natural” way of being in the (Notre Dame, Ind., 1995).
world. If we ever had Hauerwas’s vision, the Christians Among the Virtues: Theological
world would not be the same. We would find Conversations with Ancient and Modern
ourselves spinning in the most natural of all Ethics (Notre Dame, Ind., 1997).
directions, a direction we often fight against Wilderness Wanderings: Probing
but one in which reason, faith, grace, nature, Twentieth-century Theology and
1069
HAUERWAS
Philosophy (Boulder, Col., 1997). Politics as Exemplified by Jurgen

Sanctify Them in the Truth: Holiness Moltmann and Stanley Hauerwas (Notre
Exemplified (Nashville, Tenn., 1998). Dame, Ind., 1995).
After Christendom?: How the Church Is to Wells, Samuel. Transforming Fate into
Behave If Freedom, Justice, and a Destiny: The Theological Ethics of
Christian Nation Are Bad Ideas Stanley Hauerwas (Waynesboro,
(Nashville, Tenn., 1999). Georgia, 1998).
A Better Hope: Resources for a Church
Confronting Capitalism, Democracy, and Jacob Lynn Goodson
Post-modernity (Grand Rapids, Mich., D. Stephen Long
2000).
With the Grain of the Universe: The
Church’s Witness and Natural Theology
(Grand Rapids, Mich., 2001).
Performing the Faith: Bonhoeffer and the
Practice of Nonviolence (Grand Rapids, HAUSMAN, Carl Ransdell (1924– )
Mich., 2004).
Cross-shattered Christ: Meditations on the Carl Hausman was born on 7 December 1924
Seven Last Words (Grand Rapids, Mich., in St. Louis, Missouri. He received his BA from
2005). the University of Louisville in 1949, his MA
from Duke University in 1951, and his PhD in
Other Relevant Works philosophy from Northwestern University in
Ed. with L. Gregory Jones, Why Narrative? 1960. His dissertation on “Creativity and Art”
Readings in Narrative Theology (Grand was supervised by Eliseo VIVAS and revised as
Rapids, Mich., 1989). The Existence of Novelty, published in 1966.
Ed. with John Westerhoff, Schooling Hausman also minored in art history, and his
Christians: “Holy Experiments” in lifelong study of creativity has been informed
American Education (Grand Rapids, by his personal experience as a painter.
Mich., 1992). Hausman spent the majority of his profes-
The Hauerwas Reader, ed. John Berkman sional career at the Pennsylvania State
and Michael Cartwright (Durham, N.C., University, where he was a professor of phi-
2001). losophy from 1967 to 1993. He was Executive
Director of the Foundation for the Philosophy
Further Reading of Creativity in the early 1980s, President of
Kallenberg, Brad. Ethics as Grammar: the Charles S. Peirce Society in 1992, and he
Changing the Postmodern Subject (Notre was a founding editor of the Journal of
Dame, Ind., 2001). Speculative Philosophy in 1987. In 1991
Katongole, Emmanuel. Beyond Universal Hausman was elected as a fellow to the
Reason: The Relation between Religion Pennsylvania State University Institute for Arts
and Ethics in the Work of Stanley and Humanistic Studies. He remains active as
Hauerwas (Notre Dame, Ind., 2000). both a teacher and a scholar.
Nation, Mark Thiessen, and Samuel Wells, Hausman is best known for his contribu-
eds. Faithfulness and Fortitude: In tions to creativity studies and to Charles PEIRCE
Conversation with the Theological Ethics scholarship. In A Discourse on Novelty and
of Stanley Hauerwas (Edinburgh, 2000). Creation, Hausman argued that the phenom-
Rasmusson, Arne. The Church as Polis: enon of creativity could be rendered intelligi-
From Political Theology to Theological ble without being reduced to antecedent con-
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HAVEN
ditions. To this end Hausman sketched a Peirce, ed. Jacqueline Brunning and Paul
theory of metaphor that provided a frame- Forster (Toronto, 1997).
work for explaining the creation of new “The Paradox of Creative Interpretation in
meaning in both the verbal and nonverbal arts. the Arts,” in A Companion to Art
Five years later, in Metaphor and Art, Theory, ed. Paul Smith and Carolyn
Hausman expanded upon this theory by Wilde (Oxford, 2002).
offering a new rendition of the influential inter-
action theory of metaphor, arguing that novel Other Relevant Works
metaphors create not only new meanings but “Eros and Agape in Creative Evolution: A
also new referents of meanings. Metaphor and Peircean Insight,” Process Studies 4
Art won a Choice Book of the Year Award in (1975): 11–25.
1989. Metaphor and Art (Cambridge, UK, 1989).
Hausman is explicit about his affinity with “Value and the Peircean Categories,”
and indebtedness to Peirce. In Charles S. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce
Peirce’s Evolutionary Philosophy (1993), Society 15 (1979): 203–23.
Hausman offered a systematic introduction to “In and Out of Peirce’s Percepts,”
Peirce which emphasized Peirce’s commitment Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce
to an evolutionary realism, a realism in which Society 26 (1990): 271–308.
teleological generality evolves in a process of “Figurative Language in Art History,” in
cosmic creativity. Hausman gave special care The Language of Art History, ed. Salim
to explaining why Peirce understood this Kemal and Ivan Gaskell (Cambridge, UK,
cosmic evolution and creation, in its most 1991).
general features, to be consistent with the
general features of agape or Christian love. Further Reading
Hausman has also stressed the significance of Ridely, Aaron. “Collingwood’s
Peirce’s semiotic notion of the “dynamical Commitments: A Reply to Hausman and
object” for appreciating how the Peircean real Dilworth,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art
places resistance on perception and interpre- Criticism 56 (1998): 396–8.
tation. Hausman saw the various ways that
these Peircean themes could be fruitfully Michael Ventimiglia
applied to creativity studies, and he successfully
integrated each of these notions – develop-
mental teleology, agape, and the dynamical
object – into his study of creativity and
metaphor.
HAVEN, Joseph (1816–74)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
“Art and Symbol,” Review of Metaphysics Joseph Haven was born on 4 January 1816 in
25 (1961): 256–70. Dennis, Massachusetts. He received his BA in
A Discourse on Novelty and Creation (The 1835 and MA in 1838 from Amherst College.
Hague, 1975; 2nd edn, Albany, N.Y., Haven then studied at Union Theological
1984). Seminary in New York City in 1836–7 and at
Charles S. Peirce’s Evolutionary Philosophy Andover Theological Seminary from 1837 to
(Cambridge, UK, 1993; 2nd edn 1997). 1839. He was ordained a minister in 1839 at
“Charles Peirce and the Origin of Ashland, Massachusetts, and served the church
Interpretation,” in The Rule of Reason: there until 1846. In 1840 he married Mary
The Philosophy of Charles Sanders Emerson, the daughter of Ralph Waldo
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HAVEN
EMERSON, with whom he had ten children. For Haven, the understanding of moral
From 1846 to 1850 he was minister of the science depended upon an understanding of
Harvard Church in Brookline, Massachusetts. mental philosophy; moral conduct depended
During this period Haven was the editor of upon the action of mind. The moral faculty
The Congregationalist. was subsumed under the intellect and was
In 1850 Haven became professor of mental part of the mind’s capacity for reasoning.
and moral philosophy at Amherst College, Haven rejected theories that attributed moral
succeeding Henry Boynton S MITH . He judgments to the sensibilities (feelings).
remained at Amherst until 1858, when he was Haven’s moral philosophy was, nonetheless,
appointed professor of systematic theology at a science separate from mental philosophy
the Chicago Theological Seminary. Haven that focused on the laws of conduct and duty.
retired in 1870, but after several years of occa- Haven stressed especially the moral guides
sional teaching, lecturing, and traveling, he appropriate to the political responsibilities of
returned briefly to university service in 1873–4 citizens.
as acting professor of mental and moral phi-
losophy at the first University of Chicago BIBLIOGRAPHY
(which closed in 1885). He received a DD Mental Philosophy (New York, 1857).
from Marietta College in 1859, a DD from Moral Philosophy: Including Theoretical and
Amherst College in 1862, and an LLD from Practical Ethics (Boston, 1859).
Kenyon College in 1862. Haven died on 23 Systematic Divinity (Boston, 1875).
May 1874 in Chicago, Illinois.
Haven wrote the book for which he is best Other Relevant Works
known, Mental Philosophy (1857), as a text A History of Philosophy Ancient and
for use by his students. A second textbook, Modern (New York, 1876).
Moral Philosophy (1859), was also written at Studies in Philosophy and Theology
Amherst for student use as a sequel and sup- (Andover, Mass., 1869).
plement to his Mental Philosophy. A collection
of previously published essays, Studies in Further Reading
Philosophy and Theology (1869), and a Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, Dict Amer Bio,
History of Philosophy (1876) were published Nat Cycl Amer Bio v2
later in his career. Kodama, Seiji. “Life and Work of Y. K. Yen,
Mental Philosophy dealt with a natural the First Person to Introduce Western
science of mind “resting on experience, obser- Psychology to China,” Psychologia: An
vation, and induction – a science of facts, phe- International Journal of Psychology in the
nomena, and laws” for which “the word Orient 34 (1991): 213–26.
Psychology is now coming into use …” (1857,
p. 16). The unitary mind expressed itself Alfred H. Fuchs
through faculties, primarily the tripartite cat-
egories of Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will.
Haven’s intellectual debt, like that of most of
the authors of such texts in this period, was
primarily to John Locke and the Scottish
School of Common Sense. In 1889, Haven’s HAYDON, Albert Eustace (1880–1975)
Mental Philosophy became the first Western
psychology textbook translated into Chinese; Albert E. Haydon was born on 17 January
it had been previously translated into Japanese 1880 in Brampton, Ontario, Canada. He
in 1875 (Kodama 1991). received degrees from McMaster University:
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HAYDON
the BA (1901), B.Th. (1903), BD (1906), and the spiritual world, (2) the belief about God and
MA (1907). The University of Saskatchewan the supernatural being accepted as embodi-
awarded him the MA (1912) ad eundem ments of truth, and (3) the idea that humans are
gradum. Haydon was ordained to the Baptist universally endowed by nature with a capacity
ministry and served Baptist churches in Dresden to apprehend God. He argued that the result in
and Fort Williams, Ontario (1903–18). While the first phase of the scientific study of religion
still serving as a Baptist minister, he became a was inappropriately to judge all “culture reli-
doctoral student at the University of Chicago gions” by these dominant ideas of Christianity.
under George B. FOSTER. He received his PhD From Haydon’s perspective, the key mistake
in theology in 1918 from the University of in past studies was to approach religion as if the
Chicago; his dissertation was “The Conception gods or beliefs were the central focus of
of God in the Pragmatic Philosophy.” Haydon religion. This approach considers primitive
succeeded Foster in 1918 as professor and chair people to hold inferior beliefs and those who
of the department of comparative religion. project gods as supernatural beings to hold a
During his years at Chicago, he aligned himself superior belief.
with both the Unitarian and Ethical Culture tra- Haydon proposed that religion be
ditions. Haydon ministered to the First approached as a social matter concerning the
Unitarian Society of Madison, Wisconsin from life interests of the group, taking into account
1918 to 1923. Haydon retired in 1945, and the social, intellectual, emotional, and physical
then served as Leader of the Chicago Ethical components of the religious complex. Haydon
Society from 1945 to 1955. In 1956 he was defined religion as a way of living in which a
awarded the American Humanist Association’s group functions to acquire a complete and fully
Humanist of the Year award, and McMaster satisfying life. Such a life requires a socially
University awarded him an honorary LLD in accepted set of practical and ideal values, a
1964. Haydon died on 1 April 1975 in Santa social technique for realizing them, and an
Monica, California. understanding of a social relationship with the
Haydon’s contributions to the field of com- extrahuman powers impacting life. In essence,
parative religion are evident in numerous books religion, for Haydon, is a functional coopera-
and articles. He participated in a new era in the tive or shared quest of the “good life” or ideally
study of religions, which sought objectivity and satisfying life.
made an attempt to escape the limitations of When a religion moves beyond a focus on the
apologetics. He offered some “warning human struggle to survive, it becomes, accord-
canons” for those engaged in such study: the ing to Haydon, a “culture religion.” When
necessity of (1) escaping all bias, (2) being sci- religion adopts values that go beyond material
entific, (3) rigidly excluding all a priori ideas, (4) survival, its gods cease being nature gods and
considering every idea and institution within its become gods who help in the realization of
total situational context, and (5) avoiding the these values. Religion changes from the search
use of all jargon, often ending in “-ism.” for a good life in this world to the quest for a
Haydon stressed the need to give specific indi- good life in a future world. With this radical
vidual significance to every element of religious transformation, the goals and characteristics
study, keeping in mind that no single science of religion change. Instead of reinforcing the
can provide a descriptive interpretation of the value of human effort in solving problems,
materials of religion. emphasis is given to inherent human weakness
Haydon argued that the new study of and the tragedy of human effort overwhelmed
religion was hampered by an idea of religion by the forces of evil. Individual immortality
dictated by the patterns of Christianity: (1) the emerges as a new theme, and religion became
idea of a personal relationship with God and the way of achieving it. Haydon postulates the
1073
HAYDON
demise of supernatural religion in modern 1937).

cultures, because the historic deities are no Biography of the Gods (New York, 1941).
longer at home in the intellectual climate of
science and technology and because modern Other Relevant Works
changes in social organization no longer require Materials by and about Haydon are at the
the help of the gods to establish justice and to University of Chicago, the First Unitarian
order society. He pointed out that these cultural Society in Madison, Wisconsin, and the
changes undermine the traditions and institu- Chicago Ethical Humanist Society.
tions related to supernatural gods, with the “What Constitutes A Scientific Interpretation
result that these gods will die. of Religion?” Journal of Religion 6 (1926):
Haydon viewed it as a cruel irony that, as 243–9.
humans are increasingly able to satisfy their “The Definition of Religion,” Journal of
material wants, they lack a religion that can Religion 7 (1927): 125–35.
give direction to their quest. What is needed is “History of Religions,” in Religious Thought
a synthesis of the religious vision, a unifying in the Last Quarter-Century, ed. Gerald B.
goal, to give direction to modern society. The Smith (Chicago, 1927).
role of religion is to summon the intelligence Ed., Modern Trends in World-Religions
and good will available for developing a social (Chicago, 1934).
order in which creative efforts will support “The Interpretation of Religion in the
spiritual or ideal values – values that provide a Western Tradition,” Journal of Religion 16
more satisfying life for all persons and a way of (1936): 153–74.
living to enable the hopes and ideals of the “Christianity and Humanism,” Journal of
modern age to be fulfilled. Religion 21 (1941): 177–9.
For Haydon, a religion for the modern age “Is Scientific Humanism Religious?”
will make it obvious that the human task is here Religious Humanism 2 (1968): 49–51.
on this little planet, because it is here that a “Prolegomena to Method in the Study of
cosmic, value-increasing process has reached a Religion,” Religious Humanism 3 (1969):
level of consciousness and personality. He 158–60.
argued that such a religion is possible if humans
will apply scientific analysis to the problems Further Reading
that hinder the quest for a good life for all. Encyc Relig, Who Was Who in Amer v6,
Haydon believed that the scientific method is Who’s Who in Phil
not a cure-all for the ailments of our individ- Peden, Creighton W. “Albert Eustace
ual–social–economic organism. Nor does this Haydon,” in The Chicago School: Voices
living religion offer the absolute assurance and in Liberal Religious Thought (Bristol, Ind.,
dogma of supernatural religion. However, he 1987), pp. 72–83.
contended that applying the scientific method Wilson, Edwin. “A. Eustace Haydon: Notes
could foster the development of piecemeal solu- by a Former Student,” Religious
tions based on an intelligent ordering of human Humanism 16 (1982): 79–83.
affairs in light of common ideals.
W. Creighton Peden
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The Quest of the Ages (New York, 1929).
Modern Trends in World Religions (Chicago,
1934).
Man’s Search for the Good Life: An Inquiry
into the Nature of Religions (New York,
1074
HAYEK
HAYEK, Friedrich August von socialist ideals acquired as a youth. Early in his
(1899–1992) career, Hayek distinguished himself with his
Prices and Production (1931) and Monetary
Friedrich August von Hayek was born on 8 Theory and the Trade Cycle (1933), in which
May 1899 in Vienna, Austro-Hungary, and he developed the Austrian Business Cycle
died on 23 March 1992 in Freiburg, Germany. theory. This theory postulated that business
Hayek was born into a family of intellectuals; cycles were not the result of structural
he was the oldest of three boys all of whom problems inherent in the market economy but
became professors. His earliest education was rather were a result of credit expansion by
in the field of biology. One can see the con- central banks. In the 1930s the Austrian
nection between the evolutionary view of the Business Cycle Theory became the main rival
world in biology and Hayek’s later work in to Cambridge economist John Maynard
economics, political science, and philosophy. Keynes’s theory that business cycles were the
From 1918 to 1921 he studied at the result of inherent flaws in the unhampered
University of Vienna under Friedrick Weiser. market. It was through his work on business
Hayek, although enrolled as a law student, cycles and capital theory that Hayek first
focused on economics, earning doctorates in gained his reputation as a prominent econo-
1921 and 1923 respectively. After doing post- mist.
graduate work studying economics at New Hayek also made key contributions to the
York University in 1923–4, he was the famous socialist calculation debate, building
Director of the Austrian Institute of Economic on the work of his teacher Ludwig von Mises.
Research from 1927 to 1931. In 1931 he Mises had argued that socialism was impossi-
accepted the Tooke Chair in Economics and ble because of inability of the socialist planners
Statistics at the University of London (London to engage in economic calculation. Without
School of Economics and Political Science). private property, Mises contended, there could
He remained in this position until 1950, be no markets. With no markets there could be
becoming a naturalized British citizen in 1938. no prices and with no prices there could be no
From 1950 to 1962 he was professor of social economic calculation. Hayek further devel-
and moral science at the University of Chicago. oped this argument, claiming that socialism
Upon reaching mandatory retirement age at would ultimately fail because central planners
Chicago, he accepted an economics chair at the could not possess the essential economic
University of Freiburg. He remained at information – the tacit knowledge of time and
Freiburg after retiring in 1968 as professor place – which was dispersed throughout the
emeritus. In 1974 he shared the Nobel Prize for economy and was continually changing. Prices
Economics with the Swedish economic liberal served to economize on this dispersed infor-
Gunnar Myrdal. Hayek was awarded the mation. Following Mises, Hayek argued that
Companion of Honour in Britain in 1984 and this communication mechanism would be
the Medal of Freedom by the United States in missing in the absence of private property and
1991. hence, markets. Hayek’s work on dispersed
In the 1920s Hayek worked for the Austrian knowledge culminated in a series of essays in
government, later accepting a position as the the 1940s, which are collected in Individualism
Director of the Institute for Business Cycle and Economic Order (1948). In addition to the
Research in Vienna. At this time Hayek came aforementioned contributions to the socialist
under the influence of the Austrian economist, calculation debate, his focus on the impor-
Ludwig von Mises. Mises’s work on the social- tance of dispersed knowledge was the foun-
ist calculation and the impossibility of social- dation of Hayek’s later work in political phi-
ism shifted Hayek away from the Fabian losophy.
1075
HAYEK
While the general intellectual climate in the philosophy, and was dedicated to the study of
1930s and 1940s was not overly receptive to spontaneous orders. Spontaneous orders are
Hayek’s work on business cycles and the institutions, economic orders or norms that
socialist calculation debate, this was not the serve a social purpose but which are not the
case in the context of the general public. In result of intentional human planning. The
1944 Hayek published The Road to Serfdom, Scottish philosopher, Adam Ferguson, char-
which was widely recognized throughout the acterized spontaneous orders as “the product
United States and appeared in an abridged of human action but not human design.”
version in Reader’s Digest. Hayek’s argument Hayek spent his career criticizing the notion of
was that socialism, rising in popularity among rational constructivism. He emphasized the
the educated class, had the same essential ability and need for societies to develop insti-
features as fascism. tutions that reflect the experience of past gen-
In addition to his scholarly work, Hayek erations. In contrast, proponents of govern-
also worked to organize intellectuals in the ment planning attempted to destroy these
classical liberal tradition to reinvigorate the orders and replace them with “rational”
movement in support of a free society. He orders. For Hayek, the information and
founded the Mount Pelerin Society in 1946 knowledge necessary for a successful and well-
which had a large influence on economic functioning society is not in the mind of one
policy in the second half of the twentieth individual, but rather is distributed across
century. Active members include such Nobel millions of individual agents. Planning will
Prize winners in economics as Milton ultimately fail because no single mind or group
FRIEDMAN, George Stigler, Ronald Coase, Gary of minds can possess, let alone process, the
Becker, and James BUCHANAN. underlying knowledge and experience of an
Hayek pursued research in areas other than entire society.
technical economics. For example, in 1952 he
published The Sensory Order, a study of psy- BIBLIOGRAPHY
chology and the philosophy of the mind, and Prices and Production (London, 1931).
The Counter-Revolution of Science on the phi- Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle
losophy of science. In his later career, he pub- (London, 1933).
lished his political treatise, The Constitution of The Pure Theory of Capital (Chicago,
Liberty (1960) and his three-volume legal 1941).
study, Law Legislation and Liberty in the years The Road to Serfdom (Chicago, 1944).
spanning 1973 through 1979. In 1988 Hayek Individualism and Economic Order
published The Fatal Conceit, a summary of (Chicago, 1948).
his life’s work focusing on the evolution of The Sensory Order (Chicago, 1952).
society and the errors of “socialists of all The Counter-Revolution of Science
parties.” (Chicago, 1952).
In 1974 Hayek was awarded the Nobel Prize The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago,
in Economics for his work in the theory of 1960).
money and economic fluctuations and his Law Legislation and Liberty, 3 vols
interdisciplinary analysis of economic, social, (Chicago, 1973–9).
and institutional phenomena. Many view his The Fatal Conceit (Chicago, 1988).
work as the dominant influence on the Reagan
revolution in the US and the Thatcher admin- Other Relevant Works
istration in Great Britain. Hayek’s papers are at the Hoover
Hayek’s career drew from the multiple dis- Institution Library and Archives at
ciplines of economics, political science and Stanford University, California.
1076
HEBB
The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, 10 uated with the BA from Dalhousie University
vols, ed. William W. Bartley, III, Peter in 1925 and worked as a primary and sec-
Klein, and Bruce Caldwell (Chicago, ondary school teacher and principal for several
1989– ). years. A persistent interest in psychology led
Hayek on Hayek: An Autobiographical him to part-time graduate study at McGill
Dialogue, ed. Stephen Kresge and Leif University, where he attained the MA in 1932.
Wenar (Chicago, 1994). Finally deciding in 1934 on a full-time career
as a psychologist, he chose to study with Karl
Further Reading Lashley at Chicago, moving with him to
Comp Amer Thought, Dict Economics, Harvard the following year and receiving the
Oxford Comp Phil, Routledge Encycl PhD in psychology there in 1936.
Phil, Encyc Social Behav Sci, Who Was Hebb was a research assistant to Wilder
Who in Amer v10 Penfield at the Montreal Neurological Institute
Barry, Norman P. Hayek’s Social and from 1937 to 1939 and an instructor at
Economic Philosophy (London, 1979). Queens University until 1942, when he
Boettke, Peter J., ed. The Legacy of F. A. rejoined Lashley as a research fellow at the
Hayek: Politics, Philosophy and Yerkes Laboratories for Primate Biology in
Economics, 3 vols (Cheltenham, UK, Florida. In 1947 he returned to a professorship
1999). in psychology at McGill, became department
Buckley, William F., Jr., ed. Essays on chair the following year, and served a term as
Hayek (New York, 1976). University Chancellor from 1970 to 1972. He
Caldwell, Bruce J. Hayek’s Challenge: An retired in 1977, accepting an honorary pro-
Intellectual Biography of F. A. Hayek fessorship at Dalhousie and continuing to write
(Chicago, 2004). until his death.
Ebenstein, Alan O. Friedrich Hayek: A In his apprenticeship as a psychologist, Hebb
Biography (New York, 2001). came into contact with three of the most sig-
Gray, John. Hayek on Liberty (Oxford, nificant neuropsychological theorists of the
1984). first half of the twentieth century: Ivan Pavlov
Kley, Roland. Hayek’s Social and Political (represented by his McGill teachers Boris
Thought (Oxford, 1994). Babkin and Leonid Andreyev), Karl Lashley,
Sciabarra, Chris M. Marx, Hayek, and and Wilder Penfield. In the context of their
Utopia (Albany, N.Y., 1995). research programs he confronted several
Walker, Graham. The Ethics of F. A. problems, among which were the formation of
Hayek (Lanham, Md., 1986). concepts, the localization of memory in the
brain, and the emotional and behavioral effects
Peter J. Boettke of the perception of novelty. His response to
Christopher J. Coyne these was his most important achievement, the
neuropsychological theory synthesized in his
1949 book The Organization of Behavior and
elaborated over the next three decades. Hebb
posited that neurons become linked together
via changes in synaptic activity, forming what
HEBB, Donald Olding (1904–85) he termed “cell assemblies.” While experience
is necessary for the creation of these groupings,
Donald O. Hebb was born on 22 July 1904 in once formed they can function autonomously
Chester, Nova Scotia, Canada, and died on 20 as ideas or memories, and can interact with
August 1985 in Halifax, Nova Scotia. He grad- other cell assemblies, creating what he termed
1077
HEBB
“phase sequences.” A brain organized in this Further Reading

way not only perceives, recognizes, and reacts Amer Nat Bio, Bio Dict Psych, Encyc Cog Sci,
to external stimuli, but can also recognize envi- Encyc Psych, Encyc Social Behav Sci, Who
ronmental novelty and, through internal Was Who in Amer v9
recombination of assemblies, think novel Glickman, S. “Donald Olding Hebb:
thoughts. In short, cell assemblies create the Returning the Nervous System to
mind. Psychology,” in Portraits of Pioneers in
Hebb’s theory has been one of the most Psychology, vol. 2, eds G. A. Kimble, C. A.
fruitful in psychology. Several of its conjec- Bonaeau, and M. Wertheimer (Washington,
tures, especially those regarding synaptic D.C., 1996), pp. 227–44.
change, have been corroborated by later Klein, Raymond M., and Peter W. Jusczyk,
research. From a philosophical standpoint, it eds. The Nature of Thought: Essays in
provides a plausible mechanism for associa- Honor of D. O. Hebb (Hillsdale, N.J.,
tionism, and it has been taken as a point of 1980).
departure for much subsequent theorizing in Milner, Peter. “Donald O. Hebb and the
cognitive science and neurophilosophy. Mind,” in Foundations of Cognitive
Hebb claimed to be only a “stickit philoso- Psychology: Core Readings, ed. Daniel
pher,” but he was adamant about the need Levitin (Cambridge, Mass., 2002), pp.
for psychology to be grounded in philosophy, 831–9.
an unpopular view in his behaviorist times.
He held to monism, determinism, and David C. Devonis
mind–brain identity, insisted that every psy-
chologist take a position on the mind–body
problem, and advocated belief in free choice
between entirely determined courses of action.
Hebb saw the mind as a useful product of evo-
lution and the source of specifically human HECKER, Isaac Thomas (1819–88)
creativity, much as did William JAMES, whom
Hebb acknowledged many times as an influ- Isaac Hecker was born on 18 December 1819 in
ence on his thought. New York City. A Catholic priest, he was the
founder of the Society of Missionary Priests of St.
BIBLIOGRAPHY Paul the Apostle (Paulists). As a philosopher
The Organization of Behavior: A Hecker was primarily interested in demonstrat-
Neuropsychological Theory (New York, ing the compatibility of Christianity and the
1949). culture of the nineteenth century in America,
“What Psychology is About,” American departing from the orthodox Catholic theology
Psychologist 81 (1974): 71–9. based upon Rome’s authority.
Essay on Mind (Hillsdale, N.J., 1980). Hecker only had a few years of public school-
ing in New York City and was raised as a
Other Relevant Works Methodist. His brothers were involved in the
Hebb’s papers are at McGill University. 1830s with the Locofoco movement, inviting
“D. O. Hebb,” in A History of Psychology Boston Unitarian minister Orestes BROWNSON to
in Autobiography, vol. 7, ed. Gardner New York to address factory workers on eco-
Lindzey (San Francisco, 1980), pp. nomics and political reform. Hecker and
273–303. Brownson became friends; Brownson introduced
The Conceptual Nervous System, ed. Warren him to transcendentalism and Henry David
Buchtel (New York, 1982). Thoreau.
1078
HEDGE
In 1844, Hecker became a Roman Catholic, of heretical ideas that some churchmen, espe-
joining the congregation of the Most Holy cially European priests, had attributed to
Redeemer and receiving an education in Hecker.
Belgium and Holland for the priesthood. He
was ordained in London in 1849 and returned BIBLIOGRAPHY
in 1851 to the United States as a missionary Questions of the Soul (New York, 1855).
focused on preaching and writing. Aspirations of Nature (New York, 1857).
Hecker’s philosophical reflections were The Church and the Age (New York, 1887).
influenced by German Romanticism and
Kantian idealism. He made theological argu- Other Relevant Works
ments that confession and absolution were Hecker’s papers are at the Paulist Archives in
simply sacramental expressions of human Washington, D.C.
striving and culture, causing some church The Brownson–Hecker Correspondence, ed.
leaders to fear Hecker’s American pragmatic J. F. Gower and R. M. Leliaert (Notre
approach to theology. Although Hecker was Dame, Ind., 1979).
not initially given permission to found the
Paulists because he lacked the support of his Further Reading
own superior, in 1858 Pope Pius IX allowed Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
Hecker and four Americans to found the Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer
Society of Missionary Priests of St. Paul the Thought, Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer
Apostle, in New York City. The original Religious Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v9
purpose of the order was to convert American Farina, John. An American Experience of
Protestants in particular. Hecker became the God: The Spirituality of Isaac Hecker
leader of the Paulists and held the position of (New York, 1981). Contains a
superior until he died. bibliography of Hecker’s writings.
The Paulists never attracted a numerically Holden, Vincent F. The Early Years of Isaac
significant membership, but Hecker’s order Thomas Hecker, 1819–1844
did produce several important leaders in (Washington, D.C., 1939).
American Catholicism during the twentieth O’Brien, David J. Isaac Hecker: An
century. Hecker’s life and philosophy came to American Catholic (New York, 1992).
fruition in Paulist Press, which later became an
important publisher of materials on liturgy, Robert Wilson-Black
New and Old Testament studies, and other
critical issues in the Church. Hecker estab-
lished Catholic World, a Catholic opinion
journal, in 1865. In 1866 he established Paulist
Press and in 1869 he attended the First Vatican
Council as the theologian of the Baltimore HEDGE, Frederic Henry (1805–90)
archbishop. He was a theological reformer
ahead of his time, as many of his ideas came to Frederick Henry Hedge was born on 12
fruition as church doctrine during the Second December 1805 in Cambridge, Massachusetts
Vatican Council of the early 1960s. to Levi Hedge and Mary Kneeland Hedge.
Hecker died on 22 December 1888 in New His father, Harvard’s first professor of phi-
York City. Hecker’s views became the subject of losophy, and a series of Harvard graduate
a controversy, which finally ended when Pope students privately tutored the rather shy and
Leo XIII’s encyclical Testem Benevolentiae bookish boy throughout his childhood. He
(1899) condemned Americanism as the source demonstrated a talent for languages at an
1079
HEDGE
early age, reading Greek and Latin by age jectivism and tendency toward skepticism,
ten. Hedge passed Harvard’s entrance exam favoring Schelling’s system of objective
at age twelve, but his father sent him to idealism. Yet he never identified himself, in
Germany for a more complete education this essay or any other publication, with a
before he entered Harvard. In Germany he particular school of thought. First and
began to develop a mastery of the German foremost, he was a preacher primarily inter-
language and literature, including Goethe and ested in ethics rather than philosophy or
the German idealists. He returned to the theology, but his principle debt to German
United States in 1822 and entered Harvard as idealism was its opposition to Lockean sen-
a junior in 1823. sationalism and its vision of man and his rela-
Upon graduation with his Harvard BA in tionship to the world. The impact of his
1825, Hedge entered the Harvard Divinity article on American transcendentalism cannot
School where he studied the German higher be overstated. During the next two years, he
criticism of the Bible with George Ticknor. At published highly regarded articles on
the Divinity School, he developed a friendship Emmanuel Swedenborg and on the preten-
with Ralph Waldo E M E R S O N that was sions of phrenology. These articles are gen-
immensely important to both men for the rest erally regarded as the originating statements
of their lives. Within a few years, Hedge was of the American transcendentalist movement.
Emerson’s closest advisor on German thought In 1835 Hedge moved to Bangor, Maine
and, among the American transcendentalists, where he filled the pulpit of the Independent
his knowledge of the German language, lit- Congregational Church. After a protracted
erature, and philosophy earned him the salary dispute, he settled into the position
nickname “Germanicus Hedge.” and was well received. In 1836 he joined with
Hedge graduated from the Divinity School Emerson, Convers Francis, James Freeman
in 1828, received an MA there in 1929, and Clarke, and Amos Bronson ALCOTT in the
in that year he was ordained and installed at first meeting of the informal “Transcendental
the Congregational Church and Society in Club” at the Boston home of George Ripley.
West Cambridge, Massachusetts. The fol- Theodore Parker, Margaret Fuller, Orestes
lowing year he married Lucy L. Pierce. His A. B ROWNSON , Henry David Thoreau,
publishing career began in 1833 with Nathaniel Hawthorne, William Ellery
“Coleridge’s Literary Character,” which Channing, and others, attended subsequent
appeared in the Christian Examiner. The meetings. Among the initiated, the group was
essay was a review of the American editions known as “Hedge’s Club” because it usually
of Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria (1817), met when he was in town, and his mind was
James Marsh’s edition of Coleridge’s Aids to the most philosophically trained. The group
Reflection (1829), and The Friend (1831), as founded its literary organ, The Dial, at his
well as the three-volume London edition of urging, but by the 1840s he was increasingly
Coleridge’s Poetical Works (1829). After a critical of the calls for prompt ecclesiastical
brief discussion of Coleridge’s speculative and theological revolution expressed in it.
powers, Hedge noted his lack of clarity about Although he was among the few ministers
German idealism and displayed a thorough sympathetic to the views of the transcenden-
understanding of the philosophies of Kant, talists, his thought remained moderate
Fichte, and Schelling. Although Kant revolu- enough for him to continue his ministerial
tionized philosophy, he explained, his suc- career.
cessors rightly moved beyond his analytic Hedge published his first major volume in
method and narrow focus on epistemological 1847, Prose Writers of Germany. Much like
problems. Hedge then criticized Fichte’s sub- Fuller’s writings on Goethe in The Dial and
1080
HEDGE
Ripley’s translations of German and French mology. In 1865 he published Reason in

writers in Specimens of Foreign Standard Religion, which established him as the intel-
Literature, Hedge’s Prose Writers of Germany lectual leader of liberal Unitarianism.
is part of the transcendentalists’ effort to Throughout these years, he also managed to
bring foreign masterpieces to the attention publish journal articles too numerous to list
of the American people in order to stimulate and maintained an increasingly busy speaking
original expression by native artists and intel- schedule. He resigned his position in
lectuals. The book is an anthology of excerpts Brookline in 1872, devoting himself to his
from the writings of German writers pre- academic career at Harvard where he was
sented, most for the first time, in English appointed professor of German, a position he
translation. Hedge sought to select “the held until his retirement in 1881.
Classics” of German prose in the sense of Hedge remained active after his retirement,
“writers of the first class” (Prose Writers of lecturing regularly at Alcott’s Concord School
Germany, p. iii). Altogether, the book, which of Philosophy until 1887, speaking on many
went through five editions, included twenty- important occasions, including a notable
eight selections and involved eight transla- eulogy on the death of Emerson in 1882, and
tors besides Hedge. receiving an honorary LLD from Harvard in
In 1849 Hedge accepted an offer for the 1876. In his last philosophical monograph,
pulpit of the Westminster Congregational Atheism in Philosophy (1884), Hedge argued
Society in Providence, Rhode Island. Over that excessive philosophical speculation dan-
the course of his seven years in Providence, he gerously undermines belief in the existence of
received an honorary Doctor of Divinity God. He died on 21 August 1890 in
degree from Harvard and published Christian Cambridge, Massachusetts. Although the
Liturgy, for the Use of the Church (1853) more radical transcendentalists have over-
and, with the assistance of Frederick D. shadowed him, Hedge’s reputation for metic-
Huntington, Hymns for the Church of Christ ulous scholarship and sober presentation of
(1853). He left Providence in 1857 to accept original ideas remains untarnished.
the more prestigious pulpit of the First Parish
of Brookline, Massachusetts. Within a year, BIBLIOGRAPHY
he was appointed lecturer on ecclesiastical Prose Writers of Germany (Philadelphia,
history at the Harvard Divinity School and 1847).
editor of the Christian Examiner, a position Recent Inquiries in Theology, by Eminent
he held until 1861. During his tenure as English Churchmen; Being “Essays and
President of the American Unitarian Reviews” (Boston, 1860).
Association from 1859 to 1862, Hedge was The Primeval World of Hebrew Tradition
widely regarded as an effective leader during (Boston, 1870).
a period of serious internal discord. He dis- Hours with German Classics (Boston,
played an uncanny ability to remain bold and 1876).
daring in his religious writings while rising Ways of the Spirit and Other Essays
above the squabbles of theological factions (Boston, 1877).
within the association. Atheism in Philosophy (Boston, 1884).
In 1860 Hedge published Recent Inquiries Martin Luther and Other Essays (Boston,
in Theology, a collection of essays and 1888).
reviews by English religious thinkers on con-
temporary theological issues. Consistent with Other Relevant Works
his liberal religion, all of the essays opposed Collections of Hedge’s correspondence and
the agnostic implications of Lockean episte- papers are at Harvard University,
1081
HEDGE
Radcliffe College, the Massachusetts where she was the first woman to receive
Historical Society in Boston, and the tenure. Her philosophical work has spanned
Maine Historical Society. the fields of philosophy of science, philosophy
of art, and feminist theory.
Further Reading Her 1971 book, On the Nature and Origin
Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, of Life, examined the competing versions of
Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer Religious Bio, vitalism and mechanism as they were devel-
Nat Cycl Amer Bio v8 oped historically by both scientists and philoso-
Good, James A. “Introduction,” to Prose phers. The book concludes with a perspica-
Writers of Germany, vol. 3 of The Early cious analysis of the basic philosophical issues
American Reception of German Idealism at stake in the debate over the nature of life. In
(Bristol, UK, 2002), pp. v–xvi. the field of aesthetics she is known for her con-
LeBeau, Bryan F. Frederic Henry Hedge: tributions to feminist aesthetics and for her
Nineteenth Century American studies on the nature and purpose of the
Transcendentalist: Intellectually Radical, museum.
Ecclesiastically Conservative (Allison Given her background in both science and
Park, Penn., 1985). aesthetics, Hein was a natural choice to write
Pochmann, Henry A. German Culture in a history and discussion of the Exploratorium,
America: Philosophical and Literary the pioneering interactive science museum in
Influences: 1600–1900 (Madison, Wisc., San Francisco that included in its mission the
1957). integration of science and art. In The
Wells, Ronald Vale. Three Christian Exploratorium: The Museum as Laboratory
Transcendentalists: James Marsh, Caleb (1990), Hein described the various ways science
Sprague Henry, Frederic Henry Hedge and aesthetics have intersected in the San
(New York, 1972). Francisco museum, from the attention given
Williams, George Huntston. Rethinking the to the aesthetic quality of exhibitions to the
Unitarian Relationship with scientific and technological dimensions of the
Protestantism: An Examination of the visual and auditory exhibits designed by pro-
Thought of Frederic Henry Hedge fessional artists.
(Boston, 1949). Hein’s next book, The Museum in Transition
(2000), was an analytical and critical out-
James A. Good growth of her study of the Exploratorium, and
deals with museums dedicated to all types of
subject matter, art, science, history, and tech-
nology. She examines the recent transition from
the traditional idea of the museum as a repos-
itory of rare and/or exemplary objects, to a
HEIN, Hilde Stern (1932– ) more interactive institution dedicated to gen-
erating expansive forms of cultural experience.
Hilde Hein was born on 24 April 1932 in The book not only contains insightful discus-
Cologne, Germany. She received her PhD in sions of the current conflicts over the purposes
philosophy from the University of Michigan of the art museum, but an important chapter on
in 1961 with a dissertation on theories of cre- the role of the aesthetic in all types of museums.
ativity. She subsequently taught at the In addition to editing a major collection of
University of Michigan, Los Angeles State essays on feminist aesthetics, she has written
College, Tufts University, and at College of the several essays on feminist issues in science and
Holy Cross in Massachusetts (1971–2000) aesthetics. Several essays explore the implica-
1082
HELD
tions of feminist aesthetics for feminist theory contributions to such publications as the New
in general. Leader, the Public Interest, and the Nation.
Her first book was a reporter’s account of
BIBLIOGRAPHY contemporary attitudes toward morality. In
On the Nature and Origin of Life (New 1968 Held received her PhD in philosophy
York, 1971). from Columbia University. She was a pro-
The Exploratorium: The Museum as fessor of philosophy at Hunter College of the
Laboratory (Washington, D.C., 1990). City University of New York from 1969 until
“Institutional Blessing: The Museum as retiring in 2001, and also was on the faculty
Canon-maker,” Monist 76 (1993): of the Graduate School of the City University
556–73. of New York after 1977. Held was President
“Refining Feminist Theory: Lessons from of the American Philosophical Association
Aesthetics,” in Aesthetics in Feminist Eastern Division in 2001–2002.
Perspective, ed. Hilde Hein and Carolyn Held’s work in moral, political, and social
Korsmeyer (Bloomington, Ind., 1993), pp. philosophy has its roots in and is always inex-
3–18. tricably linked to a commitment to achieving
“The Role of Feminist Aesthetics in Feminist moral clarity about actual decision-making
Theory,” in Feminism and Tradition in contexts. Throughout her career, Held has
Aesthetics, ed. Peggy Brand and Carolyn defended the usefulness of theory for practice
Korsmeyer (University Park, Penn., 1995), and the objectivity of moral judgment. She
pp. 446–63. has argued that moral theory is more like sci-
“What is Public Art? Place, Time, and entific theory than is typically acknowledged
Meaning,” The Journal of Aesthetics and but has resisted ethical naturalism. She has
Art Criticism 54 (1996): 1–7. argued that just as scientific theories must
The Museum in Transition: A Philosophical withstand the tests of observational experi-
Perspective (Washington, D.C., 2000). ence, so must moral theories withstand the
“tests” of moral experience. This claim is a
Further Reading challenge to such methods as John RAWLS’s
Mullin, Amy. “Adorno, Art Theory, and reflective equilibrium, in which the theorist
Feminist Practice,” Philosophy Today 44 looks back and forth between theoretical
(2000): 16–30. claims and particular judgments about hypo-
thetical decision-making contexts.
Larry Shiner Moral philosophy has long been substan-
tially immersed in a debate between conse-
quentialist and deontological moral theorists,
both sides assuming that a single moral
theory should be adequate for all moral ques-
tions. Held has argued for a “division of
HELD, Virginia Potter (1929– ) moral labor,” in which independent moral
inquiry proceeds in distinct moral realms –
Virginia Held was born on 28 October 1929 the political, the legal, the economic, the
in Mendham, New Jersey. She received her familial. She has also argued that in all realms
BA from Barnard College in 1950 and of moral inquiry, attention to the perspec-
attended the University of Strasbourg and the tives of women is called for to redress its his-
University of Paris before beginning her “first torical absence.
career” as a reporter. Held was on the staff of Held has joined other feminist philosophers
the Reporter from 1954 to 1965 and made in rejecting the dominant contractual model
1083
HELD
of society defended by such heirs to the tra- nations, and ethnic groups, as well as by “col-
dition of Locke, Hobbes, and Kant as John lectivities” defined strictly in terms of the
Rawls and the rational choice theorists, relation in which their members stand to par-
because it presupposes that persons are essen- ticular events or opportunities for action. She
tially independent and motivated predomi- has also argued that a satisfactory account of
nantly by rational self-interest. Held points the moral person requires attention to the
out that persons are actually typically depen- individual’s social location – to her social
dent on others and typically they are signifi- relationships and to the nature of the social
cantly engaged in relationships with others. roles she occupies.
Having rejected the traditional conception of According to Held, cultural structures and
“economic man” as a model for an array of norms are as much in need of philosophical
social relations, Held has explored alternative attention and moral scrutiny as political or
models, most extensively, the relationship legal structures and norms. Recognizing the
between a “mothering person” and a child. social power of the mass media and the way
A mothering person, for Held, is a woman or commercial interests guide and limit the issues
a man who has primary responsibility for the and images presented within them has led
care and development of a child. Rejecting the Held to call for greater economic indepen-
traditional idea that mothering is essentially a dence in the production and distribution of
“natural,” and so less fully human, activity, Held cultural products.
describes it as the very human activity of creating Held has played a substantial role in a
new persons – persons who will speak a number of contemporary philosophical
language, share a culture, and engage in morally debates, arguing, for instance, that in addition
significant activity, thought, and feeling. The to political and civil rights, individuals in a
moral duties involved in being a mother or a sufficiently prosperous society have social
child are not exhausted by negative duties to and economic rights to “a decent life,
“leave others alone.” On this model, theory adequate self-development, and equal liberty”
begins not with uninvolved individuals who (1984, p. 184); that the public good is a
must be brought together in society but with concept with significant content and that at
very involved individuals. A morality based on least some decisions concerning a society’s
this model would be “the morality of being economic activities should be guided by an
responsive to the needs of actual, particular interest in it; that terrorism may be justified
others in relations with us” (“Non-contractual in circumstances of profound injustice, when
Society: A Feminist View,” 1987, p. 133). A it would be reasonable to believe that reject-
political theory based on this model would ing available uses of violence would allow
acknowledge that contractual thinking, while the continuation of serious human rights vio-
possibly appropriate to some domains, is insuf- lations for longer than it would be reasonable
ficient to establish the mutual concern, trust, to ask the victims of those violations to wait
and cooperativeness necessary to hold a society for relief. Held has argued that it is the
together. Held came to believe that while the responsibility of those with power to
concept of justice is not dispensable in moral strengthen or create alternative means of
and political theory, the concept of care is more addressing injustice.
widely applicable and conceptually prior.
The idea that moral thinking is always the BIBLIOGRAPHY
thinking of individuals who are related to The Bewildered Age: A Report on Ethical
others in morally significant ways is central to Attitudes in the U.S. (New York, 1962).
Held’s work. Held has argued that moral The Public Interest and Individual Interests
responsibility may be borne by corporations, (New York, 1970).
1084
HEMPEL
Rights and Goods: Justifying Social Action Inquiry and the Transformation of the
(New York, 1984). ‘Public’ Sphere in Virginia Held’s
Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture, ‘Feminist Morality’,” Hypatia 11 (1996):
Society and Politics (Chicago, 1993). 155–67.
Other Relevant Works Karen Kovach

“Rationality and Social Value in Game-
Theoretical Analyses,” Ethics 76 (1966):
215–20.
“Can a Random Collection of Individuals
Be Morally Responsible?” Journal of
Philosophy 67 (1970): 471–81. HEMPEL, Carl Gustav (1905–97)
“Violence, Terrorism, and Moral Inquiry,”
The Monist 67 (1984): 605–26. Carl Hempel, known as “Peter” by his friends,
“Corporations, Persons, and was one of the youngest of the scientific
Responsibility,” in Shame, philosophers who brought logical empiricism
Responsibility, and the Corporation, ed. from Vienna and Germany to North America
Hugh Curtler (New York, 1987), pp in the 1930s. As a student of Hans
159–81. REICHENBACH, Rudolf CARNAP, Moritz Schlick,
“Non-contractual Society: A Feminist and Friedrich Waismann, Hempel was a
View,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy broad-minded representative of logical empiri-
suppl. 13 (1987): 111–37. cism during the 1930s and 1940s. Yet he was
“Terrorism, Rights, and Political Goals,” in also young enough to have survived logical
Violence, Terrorism, and Justice, ed. R. empiricism. He articulated some of its short-
G. Frey and Christopher Morris comings in the 1950s, helping to prepare for
(Cambridge, UK, 1991), pp. 59–85. the later growth of alternative historicist
Ed., Justice and Care: Essential Readings in approaches in science studies.
Feminist Ethics (Boulder, Col., 1995). Hempel was born on 8 January 1905 in
“The Media and Political Violence,” Oranienburg near Berlin, Germany. He studied
Journal of Ethics 1 (1997): 187–202. mathematics and logic at the University of
“Group Responsibility for Ethnic Conflict,” Göttingen with David Hilbert in 1923–4. After
Journal of Ethics 6 (2002): 157–78. briefly studying at the University of
“Moral Subjects: The Natural and the Heidelberg, he moved to Berlin in 1924, where
Normative,” Proceedings and Addresses he encountered Reichenbach and his Berlin
of the American Philosophical Circle of scientific philosophers. He also
Association 76 (2002): 7–24. studied physics with Max Planck and logic
“Taking Care: Care as Practice and Value,” with John VON NEUMANN until 1928. While
in Setting the Moral Compass: Essays by accompanying Reichenbach to the 1929 con-
Women Philosophers, ed. Cheshire ference on the Epistemology of the Exact
Calhoun (Oxford, 2004), pp. 59–71. Sciences in Prague organized by Philipp FRANK,
Hempel made connections with his future col-
Further Reading leagues in the Vienna Circle with whom he
Bio 20thC Phils would later bring scientific philosophy from a
Haber, Joram G., and Mark S. Halfon. war-torn Europe to the more stable United
Norms and Values: Essays on the Work States.
of Virginia Held (Lanham, Md., 1998). In 1934 Hempel completed his Berlin PhD in
Moody-Adams, Michele M. “Feminist philosophy, writing a dissertation titled
1085
HEMPEL
“Beiträge zur logischen Analyse des attention on the problem of explanation,

Wahrheitsbegriff.” In that year he emigrated to Hempel’s work in explanation was successful
Belgium where he co-authored his first major and influential. Like any idealization, it failed
work in logic with Paul Oppenheim in 1936. to capture aspects of scientific practice and
He emigrated to the United States in 1937 to required modifications to treat cases involving
be Carnap’s postdoctoral student at the statistical generalizations and cases where sci-
University of Chicago. In 1939–40 he taught entific laws remain unknown. Still, the sim-
philosophy at City College of New York. From plicity and clarity of the model and some of its
1940 to 1948 he was professor of philosophy consequences (such as the logical symmetry
at Queens College in New York, and from between explanation of observed facts and
1948 to 1955 he was professor of philosophy prediction of future facts) made it compelling
at Yale University. In 1955 he joined the phi- for a growing profession.
losophy faculty of Princeton University, and Hempel’s model also popularized the unity
was named Stuart Professor of Philosophy in of science and fueled debates about relations
1956, holding that title until becoming pro- between the sciences and humanities. In “The
fessor emeritus in 1973. After holding visiting Function of General Laws in History” (1942)
positions at Hebrew University in Jerusalem in Hempel presented his D-N model as a model
1974, the University of California at Berkeley for historical explanation by arguing that his-
in 1975, and the University of Pittsburgh in torians tacitly appeal to law-like generaliza-
1976, he became University Professor of tions in their accounts of historical events.
Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh in With this “covering law” model of historical
1977 and held that position until 1985. explanation, he suggested that the logical force
Hempel died on 9 November 1997 in of proper scientific and historical explana-
Princeton Township, New Jersey. tions came from the same, logical source. And
Hempel was a member of the American because such historical generalizations were
Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Académie ultimately empirical, as are laws in natural
Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences, the science, he could count his essay as a contri-
American Philosophical Society, and a corre- bution to substantiating the “methodological
sponding fellow of the British Academy. He unity of empirical science” (1942, p. 243) in
was President of the American Philosophical which history and historical sciences could
Association Eastern Division in 1961–2. claim membership. His essay was equally
Hempel contributed to the central debates provocative in fields such as philosophy of
and themes of philosophy of science: proba- biology and philosophy of social science and
bility theory, logic, scientific explanation, remains a classic contribution to philosophy of
induction, semantics, and theory structure. history. Hempel indirectly provided a clear
He is perhaps best known for articulating the voice to often heated debates, arising espe-
“Deductive-Nomological” (D-N) model of cially after World War II and the invention of
scientific explanation in the late 1940s (see nuclear weapons, about the role of scientific
1965, pp. 331–496). On this model, explana- thinking in society and anti-scientific claims
tion consists in the logical deduction of about alleged fundamental differences
descriptions of particular facts we wish to between science and the humanities – differ-
explain from generalizations or laws taken to ences that Hempel and other logical empiri-
hold over those instances. Such laws and cists usually denied.
appropriate background conditions together Other topics in philosophy of science that
constitute the “explanans,” Hempel proposed, Hempel gave canonical treatment include the
from which “explananda” can be logically Theoretician’s Dilemma (why posit abstract
derived. Understood as a schema to focus theoretical concepts at all if the point of
1086
HEMPEL
science is to help us navigate among empirical BIBLIOGRAPHY

phenomena?); the paradoxes of confirmation “Beitrage zur logischen analyse des
(in which a proposition such as “all ravens are wahrscheinlichkeitsbegriffs” (Jena,
black” finds confirmation in any observation 1934).
at all); and the logic of functional explanation Der Typusbegriff im Lichte der neuen
in biology and social science (see, for example, Logik: Wissenschaftstheoretische
1945; 1958; 1959). While Hempel’s work on Untersuchengen zur Konstitutions
these topics generally promoted and sustained forschung und Psychologie, with Paul
logical empiricism, his classic work on the cri- Oppenheim (Leiden, 1936).
terion of cognitive significance (1950, 1951, “The Function of General Laws in
1965) took stock of the increasingly difficult History,” Journal of Philosophy 39
task of formally and adequately specifying the (1942): 35–48.
basic idea of logical empiricism: that properly “A Purely Syntactical Definition of
scientific propositions were cognitively sig- Confirmation,” Journal of Symbolic
nificant whereas those of metaphysics and Logic 8 (1943): 122–43.
pseudoscience were not. Though Hempel “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation,”
never dismissed the purposes such criteria Mind 54 (1945): 1–26, 97–121.
were designed to meet, he helped solidify “Studies in the Logic of Explanation,” with
opinion (perhaps partly because of his logical Paul Oppenheim, Philosophy of Science
empiricist credentials) that finding such a cri- 15 (1948): 135–75.
terion was at least a matter for “further con- “Problems and Changes in the Empiricist
structive work” in philosophy of science, if Criterion of Meaning,” Revue
not a quest that should be abandoned or Internationale de Philosophie 11 (1950):
reconceived. W. V. QUINE shortly afterward 41–63.
published his influential essay “Two Dogmas “The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A
of Empiricism” in 1951, questioning the pos- Reconsideration,” Proceedings of the
sibility of formally distinguishing analytic and American Academy of Arts and Sciences
synthetic sentences, a result that Hempel took 80 (1951): 61–77.
to corroborate his own and similarly ominous Fundamentals of Concept Formation in
verdict about cognitive significance. Empirical Science (Chicago, 1952).
While contributing both to the rise and the “The Theoretician’s Dilemma: A Study in
fall of logical empiricism, Hempel’s career the Logic of Theory Construction,”
nonetheless captures the spirit of that Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of
movement and, in particular, its ability Science 2 (1958): 37–98.
(indeed, its ambition) to avoid scholastic dog- “The Logic of Functional Analysis,” in
matism and, like science, to abandon or Symposium on Sociological Theory, ed.
modify beliefs or hypotheses when relevant Llewellyn Gross (New York, 1959), pp.
evidence from science, logic, or history mounts 271–307.
against them. Though the legacy of logical “Deductive-Nomological vs. Statistical
empiricism is still in question, and is being Explanation,” Minnesota Studies in the
reinterpreted if not resuscitated by some con- Philosophy of Science 3 (1962): 98–169.
temporary philosophers (such as Friedman “Rational Action,” Proceedings and
1991), Hempel’s work and especially the Addresses of the American Philosophical
careful, empiricist attitude it illustrates Association 35 (1962): 5–24.
continue to be respected and emulated. Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other
Essays in the Philosophy of Science (New
York, 1965).
1087
HEMPEL
Philosophy of Natural Science (Englewood 2000).

Cliffs, N.J., 1966). Friedman, Michael. “The Re-Evaluation of
“Maximal Specificity and Lawlikeness in Logical Empiricism,” Journal of
Probabilistic Explanation,” Philosophy Philosophy 88 (1991): 505–19.
of Science 35 (1968): 116–33. Jeffrey, Richard. The Works of Carl Gustav
“Comments on Goodman’s ‘Ways of Hempel,” Erkenntnis 45 (1995): 9–14.
Worldmaking’,” Synthese 45 (1980): Kim, Jaegwon. “Hempel, Explanation,
193–200. Metaphysics,” Philosophical Studies 94
“Turns in the Evolution of the Problem of (1999): 1–20.
Induction,” Synthese 46 (1981): Lennox, James. “In Memoriam: Carl G.
389–404. (Peter) Hempel, 1905–1997,” Biology
“Valuation and Objectivity in Science,” in and Philosophy 14 (1999): 477–80.
Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, Nagel, Ernest, and Henry Kyburg, Jr., eds.
ed. Robert S. Cohen (Dordrecht, 1983), Induction: Some Current Issues
pp. 73–100. (Middletown, Conn., 1963).
Parrini, Paolo, ed. Logical Empiricism:
Other Relevant Works Historical and Contemporary
Hempel’s papers are in the Archives of Perspectives (Pittsburgh, 2003).
Scientific Philosophy at the University of Pitt, Joseph C. “Hempel versus Sellars on
Pittsburgh. Explanation,” Dialectica 34 (1980):
Ed. with R. G. Colodny, Frontiers of 95–120.
Science and Philosophy (Pittsburgh, Putnam, Hilary, Wilhelm K. Essler, and
1963). Wolfgang Stegmüller, eds. Epistemology,
Ed. with Wolfgang Stegmüller and Wilhelm Methodology, and Philosophy of Science:
K. Essler, The Philosophy of Nelson Essays in Honour of Carl G. Hempel on
Goodman (Hamburg, 1978). the Occasion of his 80th Birthday
Selected Philosophical Essays, ed. Richard (Dordrecht, 1985).
Jeffrey (Oxford, 2000). Quine, W. V. “Two Dogmas of
The Philosophy of Carl G. Hempel: Studies Empiricism,” Philosophical Review 60
in Science, Explanation, and Rationality, (1951): 20–43.
ed. James H. Fetzer (Oxford, 2001). Rescher, Nicholas, ed. Essays in Honor of
Carl G. Hempel: A Tribute on the
Further Reading Occasion of His Sixty-fifth Birthday
Amer Phils 1950–2000, Bio 20thC Phils, (Dordrecht, 1969).
Blackwell Analytic Phil, Blackwell Comp Salmon, Wesley C. Four Decades of
Phils, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Encyc Scientific Explanation (Minneapolis,
Social Behav Sci, Oxford Comp Phil, 1989).
Pres Addr of APA v7, Proc of APA v71, ———, “The Spirit of Logical Empiricism:
Routledge Encycl Phil, Who’s Who in Carl G Hempel’s Role in Twentieth-
Phil century Philosophy of Science,”
Davidson, Donald. “Hempel on Explaining Philosophy of Science 66 (1999):
Action,” Erkenntnis 10 (1976): 239–53. 333–50.
Dray, William H. Laws and Explanation in
History (Oxford, 1957). George A. Reisch
Fetzer, James H., ed. Science, Explanation,
and Rationality: Aspects of the
Philosophy of Carl G. Hempel (Oxford,
1088
HENDEL
HENDEL, Charles William, Jr. (1890–1982) gated the principle of causation because he
wanted to explain the world order without an
Charles W. Hendel was born on 16 December appeal to God. Hendel convincingly showed
1890 in Reading, Pennsylvania, and died on 12 that Hume’s claim that we can logically think
November 1982 in Salt Lake City, Utah. He of something existing without a cause was
attended Princeton University (B.Litt. 1913); founded on his desire to show that the existence
Marburg University in Germany (1913–14); of the world does not entail God as its cause.
Collège de France (1914); and returned to Hendel established an important point in
Princeton (PhD in philosophy 1917). He served Hume’s theory of knowledge that was rarely
in the United States Army Infantry as second appreciated by other scholars. From the fact
lieutenant in 1917–18. His first academic posi- that Hume ascribed the idea of cause and effect
tions were at Princeton Preparatory School to the imagination, most critics supposed that
(1919), and as instructor in philosophy at Hume denied the idea of causation. Hendel
Williams College (1919–20). Hendel then was showed this supposition to be false by arguing
assistant professor (1920–26) and associate pro- that though the causal inference is nonrational,
fessor (1926–9) at Princeton University. He went it does not follow that it is arbitrary, because it
to McGill University to become MacDonald may be natural. Habits of thought may faith-
Professor of Moral Philosophy and chair in fully represent facts about the world because
1929, and also was dean of the faculty of arts mental habits sometimes arise out of human
and sciences during 1937–40. He moved to Yale nature working with the nature that is inde-
University to be professor of moral philosophy pendent of us. In other words, ideas of the
and metaphysics in 1940 and chaired the depart- imagination may lead to truth if they are cor-
ment from 1940 to 1945. His title at Yale was roborated by further experience. According to
Clarke Professor of Moral Philosophy and Hendel, Hume’s discovery of the nonrational
Metaphysics from 1943 until his retirement in character of the causal inference is not skepti-
1959. Among his honors were the Gifford cism in the sense of total doubt, but skepticism
Lectureship in natural theology at University of in the sense that one should never be secure in
Glasgow in 1962–3, President of the Eastern having knowledge because one should always
Division of the American Philosophical be looking for further verification. Hendel also
Association in 1940–41, and President of the corrects a view of mind often attributed to
American Society for Political and Legal Hume. Critics regularly conclude that Hume
Philosophy in 1959–61. He was awarded the denied the reality of self. Hendel points out
William C. DeVane medal, Yale Chapter of Phi that Hume was only rejecting a scholastic con-
Beta Kappa; and an honorary MA from Yale in ception of the self as a soul or simple substance.
1940. In its place, Hume offered an analysis of self as
Charles Hendel was a leading Hume scholar. a system of different perceptions, which are
Not only did he edit widely used editions of linked together by the relation of cause and
Hume’s major works, but he also made effect. It is nothing more than an organization
valuable contributions to Hume scholarship. In of different perceptions, habits, and customs
his major work, Studies in the Philosophy of acquired through experience.
David Hume (1925/1963), he integrated the Hendel additionally advanced some inter-
different facets of Hume’s thought and devel- esting ideas concerning Hume’s religious
oped criticisms of Hume that went further than position, which many scholars now accept.
anyone before. Hendel was one of the first Readers of Hume often concluded that he was
scholars to demonstrate that Hume’s major an atheist without faith. In his Dialogues
philosophical works were motivated by theo- Concerning Natural Religion, they see Philo,
logical concerns. He argues that Hume investi- the religious skeptic, as his spokesman who
1089
HENDEL
argues against Cleanthes, the religious dogma- Jean Jacques Rousseau: Moralist, 2 vols
tist, who thinks reason can establish religious (Oxford, 1934; rev. edn New York, 1963).
beliefs. Hendel denies this and argues that both Jean Jacques Rousseau, Citizen of Geneva
characters express Hume’s thinking because both (Oxford, 1937).
represent valid ways of looking at the matter. Philosophy in American Education, with
Philo, the skeptic, is right in showing the defects Brand Blanshard et al. (New York, 1946).
of our reasoning in proving the existence of God. Preface to Philosophy (New York, 1946).
Cleanthes is right in insisting that the theist Civilization and Religion: An Argument about
position, given our nature, is the one we must Values in Human Life (New Haven, Conn.,
accept. Hendel concludes that Hume is Pampilus 1948).
who listens to the arguments on both sides. He The Philosophy of Kant and Our Modern
is not a participant in the debate. Rather, for the World: Four Lectures Delivered at Yale
sake of truth that all views represent, he is University Commemorating the 150th
detached from any personal interest in one char- Anniversary of the Death of Immanuel Kant
acter or the other. Rational proof for or against (Indianapolis, 1957).
God is impossible. Nevertheless, religious belief
is natural in the sense that it is the outcome of Other Relevant Works
human nature. Ed., Selections, by David Hume (New York,
In his discussion of Hume’s theory of causal- 1927).
ity Hendel presented a provocative analysis of Ed., The Myth of the State, by Ernst Cassirer
Hume’s theory of belief, which implies that (New Haven, Conn., 1946).
Hume was an idealist. He argues that Hume Trans. with W. H. Woglom, The Problem of
held the position that things are believed to exist Knowledge: Philosophy, Science, and
only when they are conceived in relation to other History Since Hegel, by Ernst Cassirer (New
objects of perception. Though this is certainly Haven, Conn., 1950).
true of ideas, Hendel goes further and asserts that “Introduction,” to Philosophy of Symbolic
it is also true of impressions – thus suggesting the Forms, by Ernst Cassirer (New Haven,
idealist position that no content of experience Conn., 1953).
can be real unless it is part of a coherent system Ed., David Hume’s Political Essays (New
of other experience. However, for many scholars York, 1953).
this misconstrues Hume’s conception of belief. Ed., An Inquiry Concerning Human
For Hume, the only difference between impres- Understanding: An Abstract of a Treatise of
sions, ideas and beliefs is their respective force Human Nature, by David Hume (New
and vivacity. An idea is a pale copy of an impres- York, 1955).
sion. It becomes a belief when it stands in such Ed., Inquiry Concerning the Principles of
a relation to an impression that the impression Morals, by David Hume (Indianapolis,
communicates its vivacity to the idea. In this 1957).
sense, impressions are not believed, rather, they Ed., John Dewey and the Experimental Spirit
are non-inferentially taken to be true because of in Philosophy (New York, 1959).
their initial force and vivacity. Thus, it would
seem that impressions are real even if they bear Further Reading
no relation to any other content of experience. Pres Addr of APA v5, Who Was Who in
Amer v8, Who’s Who in Phil
BIBLIOGRAPHY Currie, Cecil. “Hendel on Hume’s Atomism,”
Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume Dialogue 3 (1964): 199–307.
(Princeton, N.J., 1925; rev. edn New York,
1963). Richard W. Burgh
1090
HENLE
HENLE, Paul (1908–62) Henle also wrote on the applications of logic,

semantics, scientific method, ethics, and religion.
Paul Henle was born on 12 September 1908 His influence on students was pivotal, leading
in New York City, and was raised in many, such as Arthur BURKS, to undertake
Cleveland, Ohio. Receiving his BA magna studies of pragmatist Charles PEIRCE. Henle also
cum laude from Harvard University in 1929, played a pivotal role in the democratization of
Henle then attended Harvard Law School for the American Philosophical Association while it
a semester before returning to philosophy, was undergoing reorganization.
earning his MA in 1931 and his PhD in 1933.
He studied Kant with C. I. LEWIS and wrote BIBLIOGRAPHY
his dissertation on implication in abstract The Fundamentals of Logic, with Frank Miller
logical systems. Henle was an assistant in Chapman (New York and Chicago, 1933).
philosophy at Harvard until 1934, and then “A Definition of Abstract Systems,” Mind 44
taught at Smith College from 1934 to 1937. (1935): 341–6.
From 1937 until 1942 he was a professor of “A Note on the Validity of Aristotelian
philosophy at the University of Michigan. Logic,” Philosophy of Science 2 (1935):
Henle then served in the US Army from 111–13.
1942 until 1945, working as a crypotogist in “The Status of Emergence,” Journal of
Europe, carrying onto the beaches of Philosophy 39 (1942): 486–93.
Normandy an Enigma machine for decoding “Method in Ethics,” Ethics 54 (1943): 29–40.
German messages. He returned to the “On the Certainty of Empirical Statements,”
University of Michigan after the war for one Journal of Philosophy 44 (1947): 625–32.
year in 1945–6 before going on to “Mysticism and Semantics,” Philosophy and
Northwestern University from 1946 to 1950, Phenomenological Research 9 (1949):
and then he returned to the University of 416–22.
Michigan in 1950 as professor of philoso- “On the Fourth Figure of the Syllogism,”
phy, holding that position until his death. He Philosophy of Science 16 (1949): 94–104.
had a Guggenheim Fellowship in 1948–9 and “Uses of the Ontological Argument”
a Fulbright Fellowship in France in 1954–5. Philosophical Review 70 (1961): 102–9.
He was President of the Western Division of “The Critique of Pure Reason Today,”
the American Philosophical Association in Journal of Philosophy 59 (1962): 225–34.
1953–4. He died during a sabbatical leave
on 27 January 1962 in Paris, France. Other Relevant Works
Henle co-authored a logic textbook with Ed. with Horace M. Kallen and Suzanne K.
Frank Miller Chapman in 1933. He contested Langer, Structure, Method, and Meaning:
the efforts of H. B. SMITH to demonstrate the Essays in Honor of Henry M. Sheffer (New
equivalence of Aristotelian syllogistic and the York, 1951).
classical Boole-Schröder algebra of logic. He Ed., Language, Thought and Culture (Ann
argued in “A Note on the Validity of Arbor, Mich., 1958).
Aristotelian Logic” that it is “difficult to see”
Smith’s system as equivalent to Aristotelian Further Reading
logic. In another work on logic, “On the Pres Addr of APA v6, Proc of APA v35
Fourth Figure of the Syllogism” (1949), he
argued that Aristotle’s arrangement of valid Irving H. Anellis
syllogism was motivated by purely logical
considerations, and not by any effort to follow
the path of actual reasoning.
1091
HENLE
HENLE, Robert John (1909–2000) being. This science must proceed by the epis-
temological realism of Thomism. His later
Robert J. Henle was born on 12 September works, A Meditation about Knowing (1966)
1909 in Muscatine, Iowa. He joined the Jesuit and Theory of Knowledge (1983), expound
order in 1927 and then attended St. Louis this Thomistic epistemology. Henle also
University, earning his BA in 1931, MA in studied Thomistic value theory, ethics, and
1932, licentiate in philosophy in 1935, and legal theory, and applied the Catholic stand-
his STL degree in 1941. He was ordained priest point to issues in political theory and applied
in 1940, and then attended the University of ethics. Many of his important articles are
Toronto during the 1940s, receiving his PhD gathered together in The American Thomistic
in philosophy in 1954. In 1947 Henle became Revival in the Philosophical Papers of R. J.
an assistant professor of philosophy at St. Henle, S.J. (1999).
Louis University, and was promoted up to full
professor in 1958. He also served in various BIBLIOGRAPHY
administrative capacities, and was a trustee Method in Metaphysics (Milwaukee, Wisc.,
from 1949 to 1969. In 1969 Henle became 1951).
President of Georgetown University in Saint Thomas and Platonism: A Study of
Washington, D.C., and held that office until the Plato and Platonici Texts in the
1976. He returned to St. Louis, and from 1976 Writings of Saint Thomas (The Hague,
until his retirement in 1982 he was McDonnell 1956).
Professor of Justice in American Society, A Meditation about Knowing (Columbus,
teaching in the philosophy and law depart- Ohio, 1966).
ments. He died on 20 January 2000 in St. Theory of Knowledge: A Textbook and
Louis, Missouri. Substantive Theory of Epistemology
Henle was an important figure in the revival (Chicago, 1983).
of Thomistic theology and philosophy in the The American Thomistic Revival in the
mid twentieth century. He was the author of Philosophical Papers of R. J. Henle, S.J.
more than 200 articles and many books, includ- (St. Louis, 1999).
ing a series of Latin grammar books that were
widely used. Henle was an editor of the Modern Other Relevant Works
Schoolman from 1945 to 1950. He was an Ed. and trans. with Vernon J. Bourke, De
active member of the American Catholic principiis naturae, by Thomas Aquinas
Philosophical Association, the American (St. Louis, 1947).
Philosophical Association, the Philosophy of “A Thomist on ‘An Experimentalist on
Education Society, and was elected to member- Being’,” Modern Schoolman 35 (1958):
ship in the American Academy of Arts and 133–41.
Sciences. Ed., Systems for Measuring and Reporting
Henle made major contributions to the the Resources and Activities of Colleges
understanding of medieval theology. His book and Universities (Washington, D.C.,
Saint Thomas and Platonism: A Study of the 1967).
Plato and Platonici Texts in the Writings of “A Catholic View of Human Rights: A
Saint Thomas (1956) largely established the Thomistic Reflection,” in The Philosophy
parameters of Thomas Aquinas’s relationships of Human Rights, ed. A. Rosenbaum
to Plato and the neo-Platonists. His Method in (Westport, Conn., 1980), pp. 87–93.
Metaphysics (1951) describes how metaphys- “Transcendental Thomism, A Critical
ical method, quite distinctly from scientific Assessment,” in One Hundred Years of
method, offers an independent science of Thomism, ed. Victor Brezik (Houston,
1092
HENRY
Tex., 1981), pp. 90–116. was appointed professor of intellectual and

“St. Thomas and the Definition of moral philosophy at Bristol College in
Intelligence,” Modern Schoolman 53 Pennsylvania, where he taught for one year.
(1976): 335–46. In 1837 Henry was appointed one of the
“The Basis of Philosophical Realism Re- first four professors at the University of the
examined,” New Scholasticism 56 City of New York (later New York
(1982): 1–29. University), holding the position of professor
“Reflections on Current Reductionism,” of history, belles-lettres, and philosophy, and
New Scholasticism 59 (1985): 131–55. he taught there until 1852. Also in 1837,
Ed. and trans., Saint Thomas Aquinas, the Henry founded the New York Review with
Treatise on Law (Notre Dame, Ind., Francis L. Hawks, which he edited until 1840.
1993). From 1847 to 1850, he edited the Churchman,
a publication of the Protestant Episcopal
Further Reading Church, and served a brief stint as political
Romanell, Patrick. “Henle’s Method in editor of the New York Times. During three of
Metaphysics,” Journal of Philosophy 49 his years at the University of the City of New
(1952): 485–6. York, Henry served as rector of St. Clement’s
Van Cleve, Morris. “Rejoinder to Father Church, New York (1847–50). As the
Henle,” Modern Schoolman 36 (1958): University’s financial condition declined,
57–60. Henry left the institution in 1852. Except for
serving as rector at St. Michael’s Church in
John R. Shook Litchfield, Connecticut (1870–73), for the rest
of his life Henry focused on his literary
projects. Hobart College awarded him the
degree of DD in 1838 and the University of the
City of New York awarded him the LLD in
1879. Henry died on 9 March 1884 in
HENRY, Caleb Sprague (1804–84) Newburg, New York.
In addition to his ministry, educational, and
Caleb Sprague Henry was born on 2 August editorial work, in his writings Henry sought to
1804 in Rutland, Massachusetts, to Silas blend traditional Protestant theology with the
Henry and Dorothy Pierce Henry. He received latest philosophical trends, particularly
the BA from Dartmouth College in 1825, American transcendentalism. To a significant
studied theology at Andover and at Yale, and degree, his Christian transcendentalism was a
was ordained as a Congregational minister on precursor to the Social Gospel of the late nine-
21 January 1829. He held Congregational teenth century. Henry sought to preserve and
pulpits at Greenfield, Massachusetts (1829–31) bolster orthodox Protestant thought, while
and West Hartford, Connecticut (1833–5). An urging the churches to embrace an active social
avid proponent of the peace movement, in ethic. Specifically, he argued that the churches
1834 Henry published Principles and must take a leading role in many of the social
Prospects of the Friends of Peace and estab- and political reform movements of his time,
lished the American Advocate of Peace, the including the abolition of slavery, prison
literary arm of the American Peace Society. reform, and workers’ rights. Henry was a pas-
For unknown reasons, he decided to change sionate champion of freedom of thought in
denominations when he took deacon’s orders higher education in opposition to what he saw
in the Protestant Episcopal Church and was as the doctrinal indoctrination of students that
ordained priest in 1836. In the same year he had been the norm in American colleges. He
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HENRY
also advocated greatly expanded public edu- (Hartford, Connecticut, 1835).

cation to foster free and critical thought among Trans., An Epitome of the History of
all Americans. Philosophy, by Louis Bautain (New York,
1841–2).
BIBLIOGRAPHY Ed., General History of Civilization in
Principles and Prospects of the Friends of Europe, from the Fall of the Roman
Peace. A Discourse Pronounced before the Empire to the French Revolution, by
Hartford County Peace Society, December François Guizot, trans. William Hazlitt
25, 1833 (Hartford, Conn., 1834). (New York, 1842).
The Importance of Exalting the Intellectual Ed., A Manual of Ancient and Modern
Spirit of the Nation, and Need of a History, by William Cooke Taylor (New
Learned Class; a Discourse Pronounced York, 1855).
before the Phi Sigma Nu Society of the
University of Vermont, August 3, 1836 Further Reading
(Burlington, N.J., 1836). Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
Moral and Philosophical Essays (New York, Dict Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v11
1839). Duyckinck, Evert A., and George L.
The Position and Duties of the Educated Duyckinck. “Professor Henry’s Writings,”
Men of the Country (New York, 1840). North American Review 94 (1862):
The True Idea of the University, and Its 525–40.
Relation to a Complete System of Public Frothingham, O. B. Transcendentalism in
Instruction. An Address before the New England (New York, 1959).
Association of the Alumni of the Jones, Theodore F. New York University
University of the City of New York, June 1832–1932 (New York, 1933).
28, 1852 (New York, 1853). Wells, Ronald Vale. Three Christian
Plain Reasons for the Great Republican Transcendentalists: James Marsh, Caleb
Movement (New York, 1856). Sprague Henry, Frederic Henry Hedge
Considerations on Some of the Elements and (New York, 1972).
Conditions of Social Welfare and Human
Progress. Being Academic and Occasional James A. Good
Discourses and Other Pieces (New York,
1861).
Doctor Oldham at Greystones, and his Talk
There (New York, 1860; 3rd edn 1872).
About Men and Things (New York, 1873).
Christian Truth and Modern Opinion (New HENRY, Carl Ferdinand Howard
York, 1874). (1913–2003)
Satan as a Moral Philosopher (New York,
1877). Carl F. H. Henry was born on 22 January
The Endless Future of the Human Race 1913 in Manhattan, New York, to Karl F.
(New York, 1879). and Joanna Vathroder Heinrich, a German
immigrant couple who changed the family
Other Relevant Works name to Henry during the upsurge in anti-
Henry’s papers are at New York University. German sentiment during World War I. As a
Trans., Elements of Psychology, by Victor young man, Carl Henry worked as a newspa-
Cousin (New York, 1834). per reporter and soon became editor of The
Ed., Contemplations, by Matthew Hale Smithtown Star, a weekly newspaper in Long
1094
HENRY
Island. He underwent a religious conversion in 1969 to 1974; served as lecturer at large first
1933, and with a new sense of divine vocation for the Christian relief organization, World
he enrolled in Wheaton College in Illinois, an Vision, and later for Prison Fellowship; held
interdenominational liberal arts college regarded several visiting professorships; wrote volumi-
by many conservative Christians as the “evan- nously; and lectured at seminaries, colleges,
gelical Harvard.” While there, Henry met many and universities throughout the world. In his
of the future leaders of the neo-evangelical later years Henry was a member of Capitol
movement (notably, Billy Graham) in which he Hill Baptist Church in Washington, D.C. In
played a crucial role. Henry also came under the 1977 Henry was named as the leading theolo-
influence of professor Gordon H. CLARK, a con- gian of American evangelicalism by Time
servative Presbyterian philosopher whose thor- magazine. He was President of the Evangelical
oughgoing rationalism left a lasting impression Theological Society during 1967–70, and
on the younger man’s thought. President of the American Theological Society
Henry earned a BA in 1938 and an MA in during 1979–80. In 1989, he delivered the
theology in 1941 from Wheaton. While Rutherford Lectures in Edinburgh, Scotland.
working on the latter degree, Henry enrolled as Henry died on 7 December 2003 in
a student at Northern Baptist Theological Watertown, Wisconsin.
Seminary, a school established amid the mod- In his influential book, The Uneasy
ernist–fundamentalist controversy as a con- Conscience of Modern Fundamentalism
servative alternative to the theologically liberal (1947), Henry helped launch the neo-evangel-
University of Chicago Divinity School. Henry ical movement by calling on fellow conserva-
completed a BD in 1941 and a ThD in 1942 tives to leave behind the excesses of funda-
from Northern. In 1942 Henry joined mentalism. In particular, Henry criticized fun-
Northern’s faculty to teach philosophy of damentalism’s “hyper-separatism,” anti-intel-
religion, and also served as chair of the depart- lectualism, dogmatic intolerance, and with-
ment of philosophy and religion. drawal from cultural and social involvement.
In 1947, Henry was invited to join the He did not call for doctrinal reform since he
founding faculty of Fuller Theological remained theologically fundamentalist, but he
Seminary in Pasadena, California, as a pro- challenged conservatives to adopt an irenic
fessor of theology and Christian philosophy. spirit and to demonstrate greater intellectual
Although occupied with teaching and admin- honesty and rigor.
istrative duties, Henry managed to complete a Henry’s magum opus is his six-volume God,
PhD in philosophy under personalist philoso- Revelation and Authority (1976–83). In that
pher Edgar BRIGHTMAN of Boston University in work, he attempts to establish the epistemo-
1949, write nine books and numerous articles, logical and metaphysical foundations of the
and actively participate in the fledgling neo- conservative evangelical theology he favors.
evangelical movement. The first volume deals with theological prole-
Henry left Fuller after nine years to become gomena; the next three volumes deal with the
the founding editor of the journal Christianity doctrine of revelation; and the final two focus
Today in 1956. Although he was forced out on the doctrine of God. In the course of his
after a sometimes stormy twelve years at the wide-ranging discussion, Henry touches on
journal, Henry had become the leading theo- most traditional topics of systematic theology,
logical commentator among conservative probes key concepts set forth by ancient and
Protestant Christians. In the decades following modern philosophers, skirmishes with non-
his editorship at Christianity Today, Henry evangelical Christian scholars, and comments
taught on the faculty of Eastern Baptist on an array of contemporary intellectual
Theological Seminary in Philadelphia from trends. No work produced within twentieth-
1095
HENRY
century evangelicalism matches the breadth of Non-evangelical theologies and philosophies

learning and intellectual rigor of God, have gone wrong, Henry judges, because they
Revelation and Authority. have all in one way or another rejected biblical
Noting that all human inquiry must begin authority. Although God is revealed in nature,
with unproven assumptions, Henry argues that history, the human mind and conscience, and
Christian theology should begin with the Jesus Christ, Henry emphasizes that the Bible
assumption that the Christian Bible is a written is “the authoritative written record and expo-
deposit of divine revelation. The task of sition of God’s nature and will” (vol. 4, p. 7).
theology is to systematize the contents of this Without the light cast by the biblical text, rev-
revelation, producing an orderly set of propo- elation mediated through other channels
sitions into which extra-biblical knowledge can would be overlooked or misinterpreted. The
be integrated. The resulting system indirectly Bible derives its authority from God, who
verifies the assumption on which it is based by inspired the human authors to record the
its internal consistency and coherence. Non- divine revelation. Henry takes pains to deny
evangelical systems, on the other hand, always that God dictated the words of scripture to
“shelter some marked internal lack of consis- human amanuenses. God superintended the
tency and contradiction” (vol. 1, p. 243) and writing of scripture so that the human authors,
thereby refute themselves. expressing their own thoughts in their distinc-
According to Henry, God’s revelation “is tive styles, set down precisely those words God
rational communication conveyed in intelligible wanted written.
ideas and meaningful words, that is, in concep- An important corollary of biblical inspira-
tual-verbal form” (vol. 3, p. 248). By this claim, tion, Henry maintains, is “biblical inerrancy.”
Henry intends to counter the neo-orthodox con- By this term, he means that the Bible is without
tention that revelation is a nonpropositional, error in everything it teaches, even when its
perspective-altering encounter between God and teachings impinge on historical and scientific
humans. Henry does not deny the validity of the matters. Henry qualifies inerrancy in important
neo-orthodox claim as far as it goes, but he ways. He insists that inerrancy is consistent
insists that the personal encounter between the with the fact that the Bible is written in
divine and the human also conveys informa- common language and lacks modern preci-
tion and doctrine. Were revelation nonpropo- sion when reporting such things as measure-
sitional, he argues, it would be impossible on the ments, statistics, genealogies, and cosmology.
basis of revelation to distinguish good from evil He also concedes that, strictly speaking,
or truth from error. inerrancy can be predicated only of the non-
Because revelation is communicated in extant “autographs” of scripture, though he is
rational propositions, no special spiritual illu- confident that the errors found in copies are
mination is required in order to grasp its minor and do not compromise the overall reli-
contents. Even after the fall of Adam, human ability of the Bible. In response to critics,
beings retain their rational faculties; thus, Henry defends his inerrancy doctrine by
believers and nonbelievers alike can under- proposing ways of harmonizing contradictory
stand God’s revealed truth. This universal biblical passages, attacking the anti-supernat-
accessibility of divine revelation establishes uralist bias of critical biblical scholars, and
humanity’s moral accountability. Henry notes, recommending flexibility in biblical interpre-
however, that although God has revealed tation when ordinary readings of the text con-
himself truly, he has not done so exhaustively. tradict well-established results of contempo-
Even in his revelation, God remains mysteri- rary science.
ous, for “the Revealer transcends his own rev- Henry’s doctrine of God stands within the
elation” (vol. 2, p. 47). mainstream of orthodox Protestant theology.
1096
HERBERG
God is triune, infinite, timelessly eternal, (Waco, Tex., 1976–83).

immutable, omniscient, omnipotent, and The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society
omnipresent. God created the world ex nihilo (Portland, Oregon, 1984).
by divine fiat and rules providently with perfect Twilight of a Great Civilization: The Drift
love and justice. Henry regards each of the toward Neo-paganism (Westchester, Ill.,
divine attributes as involved in every other; 1988).
hence, he refuses to posit a hierarchy in which Toward a Recovery of Christian Belief: The
some attributes are subordinated to others. Rutherford Lectures (Wheaton, Ill., 1990).
Moreover, Henry refuses to distinguish God’s
attributes from his being. “I reject the realistic Other Relevant Works
view,” he says, “that being is a substratum in Confessions of a Theologian: An
which the attributes inhere, an underlying sub- Autobiography (Waco, Tex., 1986).
stance that supports its qualities or predicates”
(vol. 5, p. 119). According to Henry, the Further Reading
doctrine of God is properly derived from the Patterson, Bob E. Carl F. H. Henry (Waco,
Bible, either directly or by rational inference. Tex., 1983).
He rejects traditional but extra-biblical
approaches to defining divine attributes, Paul F. Sands
namely, the ways of negation, eminence, and
causation, because they fail to provide definite,
reliable knowledge of God. True knowledge of
God is univocal, not simply analogical.
Henry’s influence among the most conserv-
ative wing of Protestant evangelicalism remains HERBERG, Will (1901–77)
strong. More progressive evangelicals have in
recent years criticized Henry’s theological Philosopher, political activist, and Jewish
rationalism, his views on the nature of divine thinker, Will Herberg was born on 30 June
revelation, and his defense of biblical 1901 in Liachovitzi, Russia, and died on 26
inerrancy. March 1977 in Chatham, New Jersey. Herberg
emigrated with his family to the United States
BIBLIOGRAPHY in 1904, and he grew up in Brooklyn, New
The Uneasy Conscience of Modern York. He attended the College of the City of
Fundamentalism (Grand Rapids, Mich., New York from 1918 to 1920, but he did not
1947). complete an academic degree and was sus-
Notes on the Doctrine of God (Boston, pended in part due to conflict with a professor
1948). in military studies. Active in communist causes
Remaking of the Modern Mind (Grand in the 1920s, Herberg broke with the
Rapids, Mich., 1948). American Communist party, as did many of
Giving a Reason for Our Hope (Boston, his fellow travelers, over Stalin’s repressive
1949). treatment of dissidents.
Christian Personal Ethics (Grand Rapids, Herberg formed the Independent Labor
Mich., 1957). League of America in the late 1920s, arguing
Aspects of Christian Social Ethics (Grand that worker rights were central to a successful
Rapids, Mich., 1964). American experiment. Herbert was editor of
A Plea for Evangelical Demonstration the journal Revolutionary Age (Workers’ Age),
(Grand Rapids, Mich., 1971). working until 1948 for various groups within
God, Revelation and Authority, 6 vols the larger Marxist–Leninist movement,
1097
HERBERG
although he remained disillusioned with Faith Enacted as History: Essays in Biblical

Trotsky and Stalin. His reading of Reinhold Theology (Philadelphia, 1976).
NIEBUHR’s Moral Man and Immoral Society From Marxism to Judaism: The Collected
(1932) in the late 1940s moved Herberg to Essays of Will Herberg, ed. David G.
join like-minded political realists and the so- Dalin (New York, 1989).
called “Atheists for Niebuhr” in proclaiming
the dangers of absolutist thinking within polit- Other Relevant Works
ical ideologies. If sin consists in outreaching Herberg’s papers are at Drew University in
one’s grasp, according to Herberg and New Jersey.
Niebuhr, then many communist practitioners “From Marxism to Judaism …,”
had done just that with the practical imple- Commentary 3 (January 1947): 25–32.
mentation of Marxist philosophy. Ed., The Writings of Martin Buber (New
Herberg’s “neo-orthodox” turn toward an York, 1956).
appreciation of the theological implications of Ed., Four Existentialist Theologians: A
his political idealism meant a renewed appreci- Reader from the Works of Jacques
ation for his own Jewish tradition, studying at Maritain, Nicolas Berdyaev, Martin
the Jewish Theological Seminary, affiliated with Buber, and Paul Tillich (Garden City,
Columbia University, in the early 1940s. In N.Y., 1958).
1955 he became professor of Judaic studies and Ed., Community, State and Church, by
social philosophy at Drew University in New Martin Buber (Garden City, N.Y., 1960).
Jersey, and held that position until his death.
Herberg’s most lasting influence was his Further Reading
analysis of American religious life at mid Amer Nat Bio, Comp Amer Thought, Dict
century, articulated in Protestant – Catholic – Amer Bio
Jew: An Essay in American Religious Ausmus, Harry J. Will Herberg: From Right
Sociology (1955). He explained how the assim- to Right (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1987).
ilation of religious life into American culture Gnall, Janet M. Will Herberg, Jewish
broadly construed was dangerous as it elevated Theologian: A Biblical-existentialist
an American civic faith above the traditional Approach to Religion. PhD dissertation,
faiths anchored in biblical literature and tra- Drew University (Madison, N.J., 1983).
ditional religious community. In 1961 he
accepted the editorship of the National Robert Wilson-Black
Review, founded by the young conservative
Catholic Yale thinker William F. Buckley.
Herberg taught, lectured, and published
widely, contributing to a body of literature
and thought that represented a renewal of reli-
gious belief among intellectual leaders in HERZOG, Frederick (1925–95)
America’s northeast.
Frederick Herzog was born on 29 November
BIBLIOGRAPHY 1925 in Ashley, North Dakota. Many of his
Judaism and Modern Man: An formative years were spent in Germany. His
Interpretation of Jewish Religion (New father, a German pastor sent by his church to
York, 1951). the Dakotas, took the family back to Germany
Protestant – Catholic – Jew: An Essay in in 1935, and Herzog later studied theology in
American Religious Sociology (Garden Wuppertal and Bonn, Germany, and in Basel,
City, N.Y., 1955). Switzerland, where he became assistant to the-
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HERZOG
ologian Karl Barth and lived in Barth’s house. Herzog’s 1972 book Liberation Theology is
Herzog earned his ThD at Princeton one of the first major publications on this
Theological Seminary with Paul Lehmann in topic. In this book he develops a unique
1953. From 1953 to 1960 he taught systematic approach to questions of liberation through a
theology at Mission House Theological critique of liberalism, individualism, and the
Seminary in Plymouth, Wisconsin. From 1960 intellectual presuppositions of racial segrega-
until his death, Herzog was a professor of sys- tion. Transgressing the boundaries of tradi-
tematic theology at Duke University. Herzog tional theological genres, Herzog rethinks the
died on 9 October 1995 in Durham, North state of the art of theology in both Germany
Carolina. and the United States in conversation with the
Herzog was one of the originators of liber- suffering of African Americans through an
ation theology, a way of thinking about God interpretation of the ancient texts of the Gospel
and the world that takes into account the of John.
margins of society and the underside of history. Herzog’s work is best characterized by his
True to this basic orientation, liberation ongoing concern for the embodiment of
theology did not develop out of one center, or academic insight in the midst of his broaden-
from the top down. It emerged in specific ing analysis of the most severe tensions and
settings, from the bottom up, where theology pressures of life. Instead of focusing on a few
began to encounter the suffering and hope of select symptoms at the center of the debate in
specific groups of people on the margins. Even his field – like the crisis of interpretation, or the
the term of “liberation” theology itself sometimes lamented, sometimes celebrated,
emerged in this way, as it was coined simulta- loss of philosophical foundations – Herzog’s
neously but independently by at least three work picks up a wider set of problems. One of
very different thinkers: Gustavo Gutiérrez, his central concerns has to do with reflections
writing from the Latin American context of on power. In his book Justice Church (1980)
Peru; James CONE, writing from the African- he treads new ground by offering an analysis
American context in the United States; and of power in relation to reflections on Jesus
Herzog, writing from the civil rights struggle in and by reconsidering key figures in theology
North Carolina. The different approaches (particularly Friedrich Schleiermacher, one of
would only meet years later, at the Theology the most influential theologians and philoso-
in the Americas Conference in Detroit in 1976, phers of the nineteenth century). While in his
together with representatives of feminist earlier work the question of power relates
theology, Hispanic theology, and Native more closely to the realm of politics, later on
American theology. Herzog is one of the first theologians to reflect
Trained in the theology centers of Germany, on power in relation to economics. The basic
Switzerland, and the United States, and problem that poses itself for the academy
teaching and writing as a white male theolo- regarding politics and economics is not that
gian in the South of the United States for most academic thought would need to be politi-
of his life, Herzog was a most unlikely partic- cized, but that thought itself is shaped by, and
ipant in the liberation theology project. His drawn into, the force-fields of politics and eco-
work is a witness to the broader relevance of nomics.
liberation theology, with wide-reaching impli- Within the parameters of his own field,
cations for mainline academic sensitivities. Herzog’s work takes up one of the basic chal-
Herzog published the first essay in English that lenges of early twentieth-century dialectical
used the term “theology of liberation” in 1970, theology and develops it further. In settings
a few months before James Cone’s book A where theology and the church are adapting to
Black Theology of Liberation appeared. the dominant powers, the reminder of the dif-
1099
HERZOG
ference between humanity and God, or reversal takes place that has not yet fully
between God and world, can make a signifi- reached the level of consciousness of mainline
cant difference. This is exemplified, for academic thought. Despite their claims to uni-
instance, in the work of his teacher Barth in his versality, intellectual approaches developed in
resistance to the German Third Reich. Going the centers of power shape up as special
beyond Barth, Herzog senses early on that in interest thinking if they pay no attention to the
the North American context the struggle to most severe pressures of life which affect
acknowledge God’s otherness and sovereignty everyone, those in the center and those on the
needs to go deeper. It makes sense only in the margins alike. In addition, the different fault
context of real-life confrontations between lines of marginalization along the lines of class,
black and white, rich and poor, center and gender, and race, are connected in subtle ways.
margin. If those in power are unable to respect In this context, new alliances and connections
to the concerns of the marginalized, if whites need be forged without disregarding vital dif-
are unable to listen to blacks, if the rich do not ferences.
care about the poor, how can they propose Herzog’s work pulls together various strands
truly to respect and listen to God? In one of his of theological reflection on the margins not in
last essays, “Athens, Berlin, and Lima” (1994), order to imitate or supersede them but – as
Herzog formulates the challenge in new ways: exemplified by his last book God-Walk (1988)
“What the theologian needs most is to see – in order to apply them to the reform of
God. Yet God will not be seen where the divine mainline theology and the academy.
can be controlled. The poor, as such, do not
demonstrate God, and yet they are the place BIBLIOGRAPHY
for us to ‘see’ God. How can this be?” No Understanding God: The Key Issue in
doubt, this is a description of one of the least Present-Day Protestant Thought (New
understood dynamics at work in liberation York, 1966).
theology. Rather than giving an exhaustive “Theology of Liberation,” Continuum 7
explanation, Herzog invites new thought by (1970): 515–24.
answering his own question with the observa- Liberation Theology: Liberation in the Light
tion that “the poor cannot be controlled.” If of the Fourth Gospel (New York, 1972).
our approach to other people is determined by Justice Church: The New Function of the
relationships of power and control (even if Church in North American Christianity
well-intentioned), how can we assume that (Maryknoll, N.Y., 1980).
our approach to the divine other would be God-Walk: Liberation Shaping Dogmatics
any different? (Maryknoll, N.Y., 1988).
According to a common misconception, lib- “Athens, Berlin, and Lima,” Theology
eration theologies represent special interests, at Today 51 (1994): 270–76.
best relevant only to limited groups of people, European Pietism Reviewed (San Jose, Cal.,
at worst just another outgrowth of postmod- 2003).
ern pluralism. Yet liberation theology as devel-
oped by Herzog and others understands that, Other Relevant Works
rather than addressing the special interests of “Political Theology,” Christian Century 86
one group, the concern for people on the (1969): 975–8.
margins deals with important parts of reality “God: Black or White? The Upshot of the
which, even though mostly repressed and made Debate About God in the Sixties,” Review
invisible, affect all of humanity. The reality of and Expositor 67 (1970): 299–313.
the margins is not independent from the reality “Pre-Bicentennial U.S.A. in the Liberation
of the center, and vice versa. Here a curious Process,” in Theology in the Americas, ed.
1100
HESCHEL
S. Torres and J. Eagleson (Maryknoll, that trained its students in the techniques of
N.Y., 1976). modern Jewish scientific scholarship.
“New Birth of Conscience,” Theology During the first years of the Third Reich,
Today 53 (1997): 477–84. Heschel sought an academic position outside
“Methodism, Missions, and Money,” in Europe. Among the Polish Jews deported by the
Doctrines and Discipline, ed. D. Nazis in October 1938, he was rescued from
Campbell, W. Lawrence and R. Richey Warsaw just weeks before Germany’s invasion
(Nashville, Tenn., 1999). of Poland in September 1939. He was brought
Theology from the Belly of the Whale: A to the United States by the Hebrew Union
Frederick Herzog Reader, ed. Joerg Rieger College in Cincinnati in March 1940, where he
(Harrisburg, Penn., 1999). Contains a taught Jewish philosophy for five years. Most
bibliography of Herzog’s writings. of his family remained trapped in Nazi-
occupied Europe and perished. In 1945 he
Further Reading joined the faculty of Conservative Judaism’s
Meeks, M. Douglas, Jürgen Moltmann, and Jewish Theological Seminary in New York,
Frederick Trost, eds. Theology and where he served as the Ralph Simon Professor
Corporate Conscience: Essays in Honor of of Jewish Ethics and Mysticism until his death.
Frederick Herzog (Minneapolis, 1999). Active in a variety of political movements
Rieger, Joerg. Remember the Poor: The during the last decade of his life, he achieved
Challenge to Theology in the Twenty-First recognition as one of America’s foremost reli-
Century (Harrisburg, Penn., 1998). gious leaders and as a unique, if sometimes
controversial, voice within the Jewish commu-
Joerg Rieger nity.
Heschel’s earliest scholarship in the 1930s
centered on medieval Jewish philosophy and on
biblical scholarship. His books on Maimonides
(1935) and Don Jizchak Abravanel (1937)
were published in Germany to great acclaim.
HESCHEL, Abraham Joshua (1907–72) His doctoral dissertation, “Das prophetische
Bewusstsein” (1936), was as much a critique of
Abraham Heschel was born on 11 January Protestant biblical scholarship as an analysis of
1907 in Warsaw, Poland, and died on 23 the “prophetic consciousness” and presents a
December 1972 in New York City. The phenomenological analysis of religious experi-
foremost Jewish theologian of the post-World ence based on the writings of the classical
War II era, he also carried out important schol- prophets. His primary criticism was that
arship on biblical, rabbinic, medieval, and scholars treat the prophets in a reductionist
Hasidic Jewish sources. He was the scion of a fashion, analyzing their experiences of divine
distinguished lineage of Hasidic leaders of revelation as examples of psychological disor-
Hasidism, a pietistic movement that developed ders or social conflicts and viewing their
in Eastern Europe during the late eighteenth message as condemnations of Israelite religion
century, and as a young man he received a in a proto-Christian fashion. They ignored the
thorough education in classical Jewish texts. subjective experience of the prophets them-
While studying at the University of Berlin for a selves, as well as the moral challenge they pre-
PhD in philosophy, which he completed in sented, in God’s name, to their communities.
1933, Heschel also attended the Hochschule für Prophetic experience differs essentially from
die Wissenschaft des Judentums (School for religious experience, Heschel argues, because of
the Study of Judaism), Berlin’s liberal seminary the public nature of its proclamation of justice.
1101
HESCHEL
The divine pathos, which he held to be the Authentic faith is more than an echo of a tra-
central biblical teaching about the nature of dition. It is a creative situation, an event.” (Man
God, found its correspondence in prophetic is Not Alone, 1951, p. 164)
sympathy, the prophet’s ability to give voice to Heschel similarly rejected the development
the “silent agony” of the poor and disenfran- within orthodoxy of an expansionist Zionism
chised, while simultaneously speaking in the that demanded a “Greater Israel.” In his book,
name of God. The prophets, according to Israel: An Echo of Eternity (1969), Heschel
Heschel, proclaimed that justice was not merely studied the spiritual meaning of the land of
a political category but the supreme manifes- Israel for Jews, Christians, and Muslims, and
tation of God’s presence and a tool for human insisted that Israel is not sacred in itself – “We
redemption. do not worship the soil” – but is “endowed
Heschel marked his difference from other with the power to inspire” Jews to greater
philosophers of religion by emphasizing that awareness of God’s presence. Political might, he
the starting point of religious faith was neither warned, can become “demonic when detached
proofs for the existence of God nor a human from moral meaning, from moral commit-
psychological need for religion. Rather, he ment.”
writes that faith begins with questions, not cer- In his phenomenological approach, Heschel
tainty, and is reached by cultivating human brought to the fore aspects of Judaism that had
sensibilities, such as awe, wonder, and radical been neglected by modern Jewish philosophy,
amazement, that lead to an awareness of God’s which tended toward rationalist interpretations
presence: “When the soul is not aflame, no that identified Judaism as ethical monotheism.
light of speculation will illumine the darkness Heschel’s phenomenological study The Sabbath
of indifference. No masterly logical demon- (1951) speaks of Judaism as a religion con-
stration of God’s existence or any analysis of cerned with the sanctification of time rather
the intricacies of the traditional God concepts than space. “Six days a week we live under the
will succeed in dispersing that darkness … . tyranny of things of space; on the Sabbath we
Proofs may aid in protecting, but not in initi- try to become attuned to holiness in time. It is
ating certainty; essentially they are explications a day on which we are called upon to share in
of what is already intuitively clear to us.” (Man what is eternal in time, to turn from the results
is Not Alone, 1951, p. 84) of creation to the mystery of creation, from
With language that was deliberately poetic, the world of creation to the creation of the
Heschel recreated what he claimed was central world.” While technology is essential to civi-
to religious language, namely, its allusiveness lization, he writes that humanity might perish,
and openness to multiple meanings, particu- not for want of information but for lack of
larly the intimation, by words, of higher appreciation. Cultivation of the inner life
meanings in the realm of the divine. Literal- remained primary to him: Judaism teaches “not
mindedness, by contrast, was an obstacle to to flee from the realm of space; to work with
faith, he argued. Literal readings of Scripture things of space, but to be in love with eternity.”
and rigid adherence to religious practice led to Toward the end of his life, Heschel com-
what Heschel decried as “religious behavior- pleted a two-volume Yiddish book on a Hasidic
ism.” Religion, he insisted, must continually rebbe, Menachem Mendel of Kotzk, a figure
evolve in practice and interpretation: “A known for his insistence on radical self-aware-
vibrant society does not dwell in the shadows ness, honesty, and sincerity in religious com-
of old ideas and viewpoints; in the realm of the mitment, comparing him with the Danish the-
spirit, only a pioneer can be a true heir. The ologian Søren Kierkegaard. Heschel’s attention
wages of spiritual plagiarism are the loss of to the Kotzker rebbe was a major contribution
integrity; self-aggrandizement is self-betrayal. to scholarship on Hasidism and also reflected
1102
HESCHEL
his political engagement during the late 1960s, out, making God responsive not only to private
particularly his opposition to the war in acts of religious observance, but also to public
Vietnam and his condemnation of the men- acts of social justice.
dacity and hypocrisy of contemporary society. Tracing his theme of divine pathos in post-
Heschel, who wrote that he was a “brand biblical literature, Heschel argued in his three-
plucked from the fire” of the Holocaust, died volume scholarly study of rabbinic theology,
before public discussion of the Holocaust Torah min HaShamayim (1962, 1965, 1990),
reached its height of popularity in the 1970s that many categories of classical Kabbalah are
and 80s, and he has been criticized for not already anticipated in the Talmud and
developing a formal theological response to it. Midrash. In contrast to other studies of
He alludes to the Holocaust frequently and rabbinic theology that portray a unified view-
draws theological conclusions from it, particu- point, Heschel dissected the conflicting view-
larly in his book Who is Man? (1965), which points of the rabbis on central questions of
discusses the degradation of the human in the halakha, revelation, and God. Heschel’s syn-
scientific racism leading up to the Nazi era. thetic theological writings, including God in
Not only survivors, he writes, but all human Search of Man (1955), Man Is Not Alone, and
beings have to recognize that the primary chal- Man’s Quest for God (1954), develop the motif
lenge of Nazism is anthropodicy, how to justify of divine pathos further. He argues that God is
continued faith in humanity in light of the evil in need of human beings and that, properly
committed by human beings: “We have once understood, the Bible revealed itself as God’s
lived in a civilized world, rich in trust and book about humanity, rather than a humanly
expectation. Then we all died, were condemned authored book about God. Prayer, Heschel
to dwell in hell. Now we are living in hell. Our wrote, is not human petition of God, but an
present life is our afterlife.” For Jews, he writes, opportunity to achieve awareness of being chal-
“Auschwitz is in our veins,” and to attempt a lenged by God; indeed, he wrote that prayer
theological explanation, “is to commit a must be “subversive.”
supreme blasphemy.” Heschel’s study of the prophets linked the
Heschel’s most important and original theo- political with the spiritual. Religiosity, he wrote,
logical category, divine pathos, was first devel- was the opposite of callousness. He described
oped in his doctoral dissertation on prophetic “prophetic sympathy” as the ability to hold
consciousness and became central to all of his God and humanity in one thought and at one
later theological writings. Heschel argued that time, resulting in an intense, passionate concern
the central feature of prophetic religiosity was for justice: “prophecy is the voice that God has
the teaching that God responds to human lent to the silent agony, a voice to the plundered
deeds, gaining strength or experiencing injury poor, to the profaned riches of the world.”
in response to the ways human beings treat Making the marginalized of society the center
one another. His formulation is drawn from of their concern, the prophets, Heschel writes,
classical rabbinic and Kabbalistic understand- are “intent on intensifying responsibility”; their
ings of Zoreh Gavoha (divine need), according goal is to abolish indifference. Rather than
to which God voluntarily went into exile with preaching a God of wrath, as some have
the Jewish people and requires redemption charged, the prophets, according to Heschel,
along with them. Each mitzvah, the Kabbalists present God as profoundly emotional and
emphasized, when performed with the proper resonant to humanity, whether in anger, love,
intention, can bring about a reunification or forgiveness; the prophetic God is character-
within God and the redemption of the world, ized above all as compassionate.
both human and divine. Heschel expands the While publication of Heschel’s dissertation in
classical understanding, as Arthur Green points 1935 had brought him to the attention of some
1103
HESCHEL
Bible scholars in America, his work on religion received numerous awards and honorary
first received widespread notice in the United degrees and was often consulted by inter-reli-
States following a glowing review of his first gious organizations and peace groups, as well
major English-language book, Man Is Not as policy organizations concerned with topics
Alone, by the distinguished Protestant theolo- such as aging, education, and medical care.
gian Reinhold NIEBUHR. Heschel’s book, which
was primarily concerned with articulating the BIBLIOGRAPHY
nature of religious experience, demonstrated, Maimonides: Eine Biographie (Berlin, 1935).
Niebuhr wrote, that he was “one of the trea- Die Prophetie (Krakow, 1936).
sures of mind and spirit by which the persecu- Don Jizchak Abravanel (Berlin, 1937).
tions, unloosed in Europe, inadvertently The Earth Is the Lord’s (New York, 1950).
enriched our American culture … . It is a safe Man is Not Alone: A Philosophy of Religion
guess that he will become a commanding and (New York, 1951).
authoritative voice not only in the Jewish com- The Sabbath: Its Meaning for Modern Man
munity but in the religious life of America.” (New York, 1951).
(1951) Like Niebuhr, Heschel became a the- Man’s Quest for God: Studies in Prayer and
ologian with deep commitments to social Symbolism (New York, 1954).
activism. Based on his conviction that the God in Search of Man (New York, 1955).
prophets of Israel form models for Jewish The Prophets (New York, 1962).
behavior today, Heschel came to be best known Torah min HaShamayim be-Aspaklaryah
for his work in the civil rights movement, where shel ha-Dorot, 3 vols (vol. 1, London,
he worked closely with Martin Luther KING, 1962; vol. 2, London, 1965; vol. 3, New
Jr., and as founder of an anti-Vietnam War York, 1990).
organization, Clergy and Laity Concerned Who is Man? (Palo Alto, Cal., 1965).
about Vietnam. He understood his political The Insecurity of Freedom (New York,
work religiously, writing that silence in face of 1966).
the deaths in Vietnam was “blasphemy” and Israel: An Echo of Eternity (New York,
that “in a free society, some are guilty, but all 1969).
are responsible.” A Passion for Truth (New York, 1973).
Heschel also served as the Jewish represen- Kotzk, 2 vols (Tel-Aviv, 1973).
tative to the Second Vatican Council during The Circle of the Baal Shem Tov: Studies in
its deliberations on Catholic–Jewish relations, Hasidism by Abraham J. Heschel, ed.
meeting frequently with Vatican officials, Samuel H. Dresner (Chicago, 1985).
including Augustin Cardinal Bea and Pope Paul Moral Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity:
VI. His approach to interfaith dialogue insisted Essays of Abraham Joshua Heschel, ed.
that the focus should be on matters of faith, Susannah Heschel (New York, 1996).
stressing common problems faced by all reli- Prophetic Inspiration after the Prophets:
gious persons, rather than matters of doctrine Maimonides and Other Medieval
on which religions differ. His work has been Authorities, by Abraham J. Heschel, ed.
widely read by Christian as well as Jewish the- Morris M. Faierstein (Hoboken, N.J.,
ologians, shaping, for example, Jürgen 1996).
Moltmann’s influential discussion of divine suf-
fering. In 1964–5 he served as Harry Emerson Further Reading
Fosdick Visiting Professor at Union Theological Amer Nat Bio, Bio 20thC Phils, Cambridge
Seminary in New York City. A frequent and Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer
popular lecturer at American universities and Religious Bio, Encyc Relig, Who Was Who
synagogues, as well as in Israel and Europe, he in Amer v5
1104
HIBBEN
“Abraham Joshua Heschel: A twenty-fifth service in the Union Army during the Civil
Yahrzeit Tribute,” Conservative Judaism War and died of a fever in 1862. His mother,
50 (Winter/Spring 1998). Special issue on Elizabeth Grier, emphasized education in
Heschel. Hibben’s childhood, and in 1882 he graduated
Green, Arthur. “Three Warsaw Mystics,” in with his BA from Princeton University as the
Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought, vol. class president and class valedictorian. Hibben
13 (Jerusalem, 1996), pp. 1–58. then studied philosophy at the University of
Heschel, Susannah. “Introduction,” in Moral Berlin for one year, after which he returned to
Grandeur and Spiritual Audacity: Essays Princeton to earn the MA at the Princeton
of Abraham Joshua Heschel (New York, Theological Seminary in 1885. For six years he
1996). was an ordained Presbyterian minister in St.
Kaplan, Edward K. Holiness in Words: Louis and Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.
Abraham Joshua Heschel’s Poetics of Piety In 1891 Hibben returned to Princeton as an
(Albany, N.Y., 1996). instructor of logic in 1891. He was awarded the
Kaplan, Edward K., and Samuel H. Dresner. PhD in philosophy in 1893 for his dissertation
Abraham Joshua Heschel: Prophetic “The Relation of Ethics to Jurisprudence.”
Witness (New Haven, Conn., 1998). Hibben proceeded to climb the academic hier-
Merkle, John C. The Genesis of Faith: The archy, becoming an assistant professor of logic
Depth Theology of Abraham Joshua at Princeton in 1894, associate professor of logic
Heschel (New York and London, 1985). in 1897, and Stuart Professor of Logic in 1907.
———, ed. Abraham Joshua Heschel: Hibben served as the President of the American
Exploring His Life and Thought (New Philosophical Association in 1909–10, and in
York, 1985). 1912 he became the fourteenth President of
Moore, Donald J. The Human and the Holy: Princeton, succeeding Woodrow Wilson.
the Spirituality of Abraham Joshua Hibben inherited the presidency of Princeton
Heschel (New York, 1989). at a time of controversy. Like other universi-
Niebuhr, Reinhold. “Masterly Analysis of ties in this period, Princeton was undergoing a
Faith,” New York Herald Tribune Book shift from a provincial institution dedicated
Review 27 (1 April 1951): 12. to theological and social pursuits to an inter-
Perlman, Lawrence. Abraham Heschel’s Idea nationally recognized research center. While
of Revelation (Atlanta, 1989). Hibben furthered Wilson’s introduction of the
Rothschild, Fritz. “Introduction,” in Between preceptorial system, which supplemented
God and Man: An Interpretation of lectures with discussion groups, he disagreed
Judaism from the Writings of Abraham J. with Wilson’s proposal to divide the campus
Heschel (New York, 1965). into quadrangles, a plan that would have elim-
inated the eating clubs that dominated
Susannah Heschel Princeton student life. Although Hibben
refused to eliminate the eating clubs, he
oversaw great changes at Princeton, including
increased faculty participation in university
governance, a doubling of the size of the
faculty, an expansion of the departments of the
HIBBEN, John Grier (1861–1933) natural and social sciences, and the creation of
professional schools of architecture, engineer-
John Grier Hibben was born on 19 April 1861 ing, and public affairs. During his tenure, the
in Peoria, Illinois. His father Samuel was a endowment of the university increased by
Presbyterian minister, who volunteered for nearly four hundred percent. Hibben retired
1105
HIBBEN
from the presidency in 1932. Hibben and his 133–60.

wife died in an automobile accident on 16 “The Test of Pragmatism,” Philosophical
May 1933 while traveling from Elizabeth to Review 17 (1908): 365–82.
Princeton, New Jersey. “The Philosophical Aspects of Evolution,”
Though not known for groundbreaking Philosophical Review 19 (1910): 113–36.
work in philosophy, Hibben was respected for
his knowledge of both the Kantian and Further Reading
Hegelian systems. Hibben published several Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
works, including the popular textbooks Dict Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v33,
Inductive Logic (1896) and Logic: Deductive Pres Addr of APA v1, Who Was Who in
and Inductive (1905). His Hegel’s Logic Amer v1
(1902) was among a very small number of McGilvary, Evander B. “John Grier Hibben,
book-length studies on Hegel in the English Hegel’s Logic,” Philosophical Review 12
language available before 1940. Hibben also (1903): 353–7.
published a book on political philosophy, The
Higher Patriotism (1915), which made a case Greg Eow
both for American military preparedness and
America’s entry into World War I. In philo-
sophical matters, Hibben was opposed to his-
toricist trends, asserting in one essay, “There
are certain ideas which in the history of the
race experience have become established for all HICK, John Harwood (1922– )
time, for all places, and for all persons and
things.” (1911, pp. 146–7) John Hick was born on 20 January 1922 in
Scarborough, England, and grew up in the
BIBLIOGRAPHY Anglican tradition. At age eighteen, while
Inductive Logic (New York, 1896). studying law and in a skeptical stance toward
The Problems of Philosophy: An religion, he experienced an evangelical con-
Introduction to the Study of Philosophy version. He turned towards ordination in the
(New York, 1898). Presbyterian church and the study of philoso-
Hegel’s Logic: An Essay in Interpretation phy and theology. Before receiving an MA in
(New York, 1902). philosophy at the University of Edinburgh in
Logic, Deductive and Inductive (New York, 1948, he served as a conscientious objector in
1905). the Friends’ Ambulance Unit from 1942 to
The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (New 1945 during World War II. In 1950, he
York and London, 1910). received a D.Phil. from the University of
A Defense of Prejudice, and Other Essays Oxford. His dissertation was the basis of his
(New York, 1911). first book, Faith and Knowledge (1957). He
The Higher Patriotism (New York, 1915). then studied theology at Westminster
Self-legislated Obligations: The Godkin Theological College, Cambridge, in 1953. Also
Lectures, 1927 (Cambridge, Mass., 1927). in 1953, he married and was ordained in the
Presbyterian Church of England.
Other Relevant Works From 1956 to 1959, Hick was assistant pro-
Hibben’s papers are at Princeton University fessor of philosophy at Cornell. From 1959 to
and the University of New Hampshire. 1964 he was professor of Christian philosophy
“The Relation of Ethics to Jurisprudence,” at Princeton Theological Seminary. While at
International Journal of Ethics 4 (1894): Princeton, the Presbyterian Synod of New
1106
HICK
Jersey denied his membership application, given at the original discussion, and Hick
thereby threatening his teaching appointment, added a fourth, the Parable of the Celestial
because Hick refused to affirm the doctrine of City, calling for eschatological verification,
the virgin birth. The dispute became bitter and which usually has been seen as integral to that
public but was defused in 1962 when the significant discussion. In light of his later well-
General Assembly ordered his acceptance. known pluralist approach to religion, it is note-
Hick then was lecturer in divinity at the worthy that in that early parable, closer to his
University of Cambridge from 1964 to 1967. evangelical roots, he tended to consider only
In 1967 he became professor of theology at the two outcomes: naturalistic death or encounter
University of Birmingham, in whose pluralis- with the risen Christ in the Celestial City.
tic atmosphere he began to develop his dis- In Evil and the God of Love (1966), Hick
tinctive views on world religions. In 1972 he propounded a major alternative to the
became Governor of Queens College, Augustinian free-will defense in theodicy; this,
Birmingham. In 1979 he became Danforth too, involved a major emphasis on eschatol-
Professor of Philosophy of Religion at ogy. Drawing especially on the early church
Claremont Graduate School in California, father Irenaeus and the modern theologian
from which he retired as emeritus professor in Friedrich Schleiermacher, he delineated a free-
1992. He gave the Gifford Lectures in 1986–7, will defense that did not presuppose perfection
which were the basis for his An Interpretation in the beginning of creation but in the future.
of Religion (1989). He received the Creation thus offers a “soul-making” potential
Grawemeyer Award in 1991. that has to be realized by each individual.
Early in his career, in Faith and Knowledge, Besides being more compatible with the
Hick gave a vigorous defense of a realist, cog- Hebrew story of creation, it offered the advan-
nitive approach to the experience of a tran- tage, as compared to Augustine’s perfectionist
scendent reality, a reality that can nonetheless notion, of being more compatible with evolu-
be experienced or interpreted in a variety of tion and modern science. While many across
ways. He rejected the reductionist claim, the theological spectrum have moved to this
common in that period, that experiences of Irenaean account in its broad outlines, Hick’s
the transcendent could be explained in natu- particular view required universalism because
ralistic terms. His later thought followed a of his sensitivity to the magnitude of human
Kantian direction where the actual experience suffering; if anyone were to be denied the con-
of the transcendent is understood to be expe- summation, Hick believed that creation would
rienced in metaphorical ways as a phenome- be unjustified.
non shaped by various religions and traditions, Yet another eschatological dimension was
even though all point to one and the same added to his theodicy in Death and Eternal
noumenal reality. Life (1976), a book devoted entirely to the
When he was defending a more traditional issue of the afterlife. Hick here further devel-
account of Christian faith against the noted fal- oped his desire to draw on all major world reli-
sification challenge of Antony FLEW in the gions and offered a remarkable synthesis. Still
1950s, he argued that eschatological claims working within an Irenaean person-making
could be verified, and thus be cognitively framework, he argued that since people are
meaningful, even though they might not be usually not very developed at the end of this
capable of falsification (in the case that no one life, they go on to become reincarnated in other
survives death at all). The University worlds many times until they are perfected
Discussion in the 1950s, as it came to be enough to get off the wheel of life. Drawing on
known, dominated philosophy of religion for the Tibetan Book of the Dead, he suggested
a quarter of a century. Three parables were that between lives, people may experience ther-
1107
HICK
apeutic reflection enabling them to take a worship while recognizing legitimacy in other
further step in their next life. The final conways. Hick’s views have been widely cele-
summation of person-making occurs when brated, although he has been criticized for
everyone has become one with God. Hick also offering a synthesis that in effect proposes
offered significant arguments for the coher- another religion, for not doing justice to the
ence of the idea of an afterlife in his “replica unique claims of religions, and for taking a
theory” of identity. Although he did not regard Christian slant, emphasizing love, on the
theistic proofs as necessary for faith, he also essence of religion.
made contributions to the discussion of argu- Beyond his distinctive ideas, Hick conveyed
ments for the existence of God. complex ideas clearly and defended them effec-
Hick further pursued his pluralistic concern tively. His introductions to the philosophy of
for all world religions in his “Copernican rev- religion, to theodicy, to world religions, and to
olution” in religion, for which he is perhaps eschatological issues have been staples for
most well-known. These ideas were launched teaching these subjects even for those who do
in God and the Universe of Faiths (1973) and not agree with his conclusions.
in a book he edited, The Myth of God
Incarnate (1977). In 1986, Hick and Paul BIBLIOGRAPHY
Knitter organized a conference at Claremont Faith and Knowledge: A Modern
that resulted in a book arguing for a theistic Introduction to the Problem of Religious
rather than Christocentric approach to reli- Knowledge (Ithaca, N.Y., 1957; 2nd edn
gious pluralism, The Myth of Christian 1966).
Uniqueness: Towards a Pluralistic Theology of Philosophy of Religion (Englewood Cliffs,
Religions (1987). In the same year, his Gifford N.J., 1963; 2nd edn 1973; 3rd edn 1983;
Lectures drew all of these themes together into 4th edn 1990).
what is perhaps his magnum opus, An Christianity at the Centre (London, 1968).
Interpretation of Religion (1989). Particular 2nd edn, The Center of Christianity (San
religions, he argued, have tended to see them- Francisco, 1978). 3rd edn, The Second
selves as central and absolute and others as Christianity (London, 1983).
peripheral, yet all major religions have Arguments for the Existence of God
produced their full share of saints and sinners. (London, 1970; New York, 1971).
The claim of moral and religious superiority, God and the Universe of Faiths: Essays in
he concluded, is arrogant and unfair to other the Philosophy of Religion (London and
religions. He changed this strategy by placing New York, 1973; 2nd edn, Basingstoke,
the noumenal Real at the center and having all UK, 1987).
religions revolving around it. Concerning Evil and the God of Love (New York, 1966;
Christianity, he argued that historical criticism 2nd edn 1978).
has shown that Jesus did not consider himself Death and Eternal Life (London and New
to be divine in the strong Chalcedonian sense York, 1976; Louisville, Kent., 1994).
and that religious language is largely God Has Many Names: Britain’s New
metaphorical, as is the language of religion in Religious Pluralism (London, 1980).
general. Jesus Christ can be seen as the way to God Has Many Names (Philadelphia, 1982).
God for Christians but not as an exclusive Problems of Religious Pluralism (London
way that is unique from all other religions. and New York, 1985).
The great world religions thus represent dif- An Interpretation of Religion: Human
ferent perspectives on the Real and on the Responses to the Transcendent (New
central religious emphasis of sacrificial love. Haven, Conn., 1989; 2nd edn,
Individuals may affirm their own way of Basingstoke, UK, 2004).
1108
HICKOK
The Metaphor of God Incarnate: Hartshorne, Charles. “John Hick on Logical

Christology in a Pluralistic Age and Ontological Necessity,” Religious
(Louisville, Kent., 1993). Studies 13 (1977): 155–65.
The Fifth Dimension: An Exploration of the Hewitt, Harold, ed. Problems in the
Spiritual Realm (Oxford, 1999). Philosophy of Religion: Critical Studies of
Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion the Work of John Hick (New York,
(Basingstoke, UK, 2001). 1991).
Mathis, Terry R. Against John Hick: An
Other Relevant Works Examination of His Philosophy of
Ed., Faith and the Philosophers (New York, Religion (Lanham, Md., 1985).
1964). Plantinga, Alvin. “Ad Hick,” Faith and
Ed., The Myth of God Incarnate Philosophy 14 (1997): 295–8.
(Philadelphia, 1977). Rose, Kenneth. Knowing the Real: John
Ed. with Paul F. Knitter, The Myth of Hick on the Cognitivity of Religions and
Christian Uniqueness: Towards a Religious Pluralism (New York, 1996).
Pluralistic Theology of Religions Rowe, William L. “Religious Pluralism,”
(Maryknoll, N.Y., 1987). Religious Studies 35 (1999): 139–50.
Ed. with Edmund S. Meltzer, Three Faiths – Sharma, Arvind, ed. God, Truth, and
One God: A Jewish, Christian, Muslim Reality: Essays in Honour of John Hick
Encounter (Albany, N.Y., 1989). (New York, 1993).
A John Hick Reader, ed. Paul Badham
(Philadelphia, 1990). Dan R. Stiver
John Hick: An Autobiography (Oxford,
2003).
Further Reading
Oxford Comp Phil
Cheetham, David. John Hick: A Critical HICKOK, Laurens Perseus (1798–1888)
Introduction and Reflection (Aldershot,
UK, 2003). Laurens Perseus Hickok was born on 29
Davis, Stephen T., ed. Encountering Jesus: A December 1798 in Bethel, Connecticut, and
Debate on Christology (Atlanta, 1988). died on 7 May 1888 in Amherst,
———, ed. Evil and the God of Love: Live Massachusetts. While still in high school, he
Options in Theodicy, 2nd edn (Louisville, opened and taught at a private school in Bethel.
Kent., 2000). In 1818 he entered the junior class of Union
Eddy, Paul R. John Hick’s Pluralist College, graduating with a BA in 1820. He
Philosophy of World Religions (Aldershot, studied theology with mentors William
UK, 2002). Andrews of Danbury and Bennet Tyler of South
Geivett, R. Douglas. Evil and the Evidence Britain, Connecticut. Tyler was an “old school”
for God: The Challenge of John Hick’s Calvinist who later became the President of
Theodicy (Philadelphia, 1993). Dartmouth College. In 1822 Hickok married
Gillis, Chester. A Question of Final Belief: Elizabeth Taylor; they had no children. Hickok
John Hick’s Pluralistic Theory of was ordained in 1824 at the church in Kent,
Salvation (New York, 1989). Connecticut, where he served as pastor until
Goulder, Michael, ed. Incarnation and 1829, when he was called to succeed Lyman
Myth: The Debate Continued (Grand Beecher in the pulpit of the Congregational
Rapids, Mich., 1979). church in Litchfield, Connecticut.
1109
HICKOK
Hickok’s self-education in theology and phi- to the search for the general and universal a
losophy led in 1836 to his appointment as pro- priori principles that govern what must be the
fessor of theology at Western Reserve College in facts of experience. The method for discovering
Ohio. In 1844 he became professor of theology these principles was the exercise of pure reason.
at Auburn Theological Seminary. At Auburn, he For Hickok, science entails identifying the cor-
published his first book, Rational Psychology; relation between the idea (subjective fact of expe-
or, The Subjective Idea and the Objective Law rience) and the universal necessary law, identified
of All Intelligence (1849). In 1852 he became through reason independent of experience. He
professor of mental and moral philosophy and devoted book 2 (around 600 pages) of his
Vice President of Union College. At Union he Rational Psychology to determining the a priori
published a number of important works. These principles consistent with the facts of experience
included A System of Moral Science (1853); for Sense, Understanding, and Reason, the three
Empirical Psychology; or, The Human Mind as faculties of the Intellect, where Intellect was in
Given in Consciousness (1854); Rational turn conceived as one of three modes in which
Cosmology; or, The Eternal Principles and the the mind operates (the others being Sensibility,
Necessary Laws of the Universe (1858); and or Susceptibility, and Will). Intellect encompasses
“Psychology and Skepticism” (1862) which was the mind’s capacity for knowing and is the
written in response to a critical review of his source of all cognition.
revised Rational Psychology. A System of Moral Science, Hickok’s second
Hickok served as Acting President of Union book, followed the pattern set by the Rational
College for several years before being con- Psychology. Rather than being concerned with
firmed as President in March 1866. He detailing examples of moral conduct for
resigned from the presidency and his profes- students, Hickok concentrated instead on the
sorship in 1868, and moved to Amherst, delineation of the ultimate rational principle
Massachusetts, where he continued to write (“the intrinsic excellency of spiritual being” and
and publish on theological subjects. With the a “spirit to act worthily of its spirituality”) that
collaboration of his nephew, Julius Hawley governs moral conduct within the spheres of
SEELYE, President of Amherst College, Hickok personal duties to mankind in general and to
revised his books until his death in 1888. civil, divine, and family government in particu-
The priority that Hickok assigned to rational lar. Civil government, he argued, exerts its
over empirical psychology is evident in the order authority through rewards and punishments,
in which his books were written. The first, divine government through love and loyalty,
Rational Psychology, argued that an empirical and family government through a mixture of
psychology cannot go beyond a description of the two. All three constitute objective moral
the facts of conscious experience and therefore powers. In this text, Hickok demonstrated “his
needs a metaphysical, transcendental ground- independence of current opinion by his outspo-
ing to meet the criterion of a true science. Hickok ken treatment of the theory of the state, which
recognized the domination of British empiricism was conceived in a Hegelian manner”.
in American thought, developed in Locke’s Hickok’s Empirical Psychology elaborated
system as well in the philosophies of Berkeley, the facts of mind as given in experience, tested
Hartley, and Hume (and, in opposition to by individual consciousness and the manifes-
Hume’s skepticism, the Scottish School of tations of collective consciousness in social
Common Sense). However, he believed Locke’s and cultural phenomena such as language.
system to be only a partial philosophy of mind Although Hickok gave pride of place to his
because Locke rejected a priori knowledge. Rational Psychology, it was his Empirical
Hickok welcomed Kant’s investigations into the Psychology that had wide circulation as a
origin and validity of all knowledge and his spur textbook. Written in a style and with content
1110
HICKOK
accessible to students, it attained considerable among alternatives, in the knowledge that an

popularity for use in courses in mental philos- individual is held responsible for the choice
ophy in the antebellum period and, in revised that is made. Thus, for Hickok, the will is free.
form, continued in use until the textbooks of In a concluding chapter of Rational
the “new psychology” replaced the authors of Psychology entitled “The Competency of the
the pre-Civil War era. A chapter on anthro- Human Mind to Attain the End of Its Being,”
pology, in which Hickok discussed the Hickok addressed the end or purpose of the
mind–body relation and the influence of race, human mind, which he believed to conform to
gender, and temperament on mind, distin- the highest good of humanity. While the
guished the Empirical Psychology from other animal portion of mind seeks happiness, the
texts of the pre-Darwinian era. spiritual portion seeks self-approval. The dif-
The description of mind and its processes ficulty of achieving the higher spiritual ends lies
provided by Hickok in the Empirical in the hedonistic animal nature of mind;
Psychology was generally consistent with that achieving spiritual fulfillment rested, Hickok
then being taught in American colleges under concluded, with the coming of a savior. A con-
the influence of the Scottish Common Sense temporary reviewer of Hickok’s first three
School despite differences between Hickok and volumes (Rational Psychology, A System of
the Scottish School in their respective meta- Moral Science, and Empirical Psychology)
physics. For Hickok, the Intellect, the believed them collectively to “represent the
Sensibility or Susceptibility, and the Will are highest attainments in speculative thought
categories of mind that encompass the cogni- which the American mind has yet reached”
tive, conative, and volitional mental processes (Anonymous 1859).
respectively. The Intellect operates through the Hickok’s conviction that rational principles
three faculties of Sense, Understanding, and provide meaning for empirical facts was not
Reason, the primary subjects of his Rational restricted to his psychology. In his Rational
Psychology. The Sense derives cognitions from Cosmology, he relied on reason as the instru-
the senses, identifying the quality and quantity mental human faculty to identify those general
of sensory experience. The Understanding and universal principles for all sciences. As a
connects the qualities and quantities provided philosopher-theologian, Hickok’s rational
by the senses into a conception (e.g., the smell principles were consistent with the notion of a
and color that stimulate the senses may be rational Author in which all facts of experience
understood as a flower); memories, concepts, can be grounded. This was a position that he
associations, and other cognitive processes defended against attacks arguing that his phi-
such as judgment are also considered part of losophy was pantheistic, skeptical, and much
the Understanding. Reason provided the mind too heavily influenced by German transcen-
with the capacity to determine how it per- dental philosophy.
ceives and thinks and is thus the means to Hickok’s psychology was a serious attempt
arrive at a rational psychology. to provide a theory of mind that rested on a
The Susceptibility was considered in two solid metaphysical foundation. His approach
aspects; animal susceptibility included irra- offered an alternative to the empirical psy-
tional, emotional aspects of mind, feelings and chologies that constituted the British tradition
desires, serving survival needs of the individual in American mental philosophy, and fore-
as well as social relationships, while rational shadowed the tension within later scientific psy-
susceptibility included a higher order of chology between an emphasis on empirical fact-
feelings or emotion related to aesthetics, ethics, gathering and the pursuit of theoretical principles
science, and theism. Finally, the Will repre- within which the facts may be understood.
sents the mind’s capacity for making choices
1111
HICKOK
BIBLIOGRAPHY (Bristol, UK, 2002), pp. v–xviii.

Rational Psychology; or, The Subjective Idea Roback, A. A. History of American
and the Objective Law of All Intelligence Psychology (New York, 1952).
(Auburn, N.Y., 1849; 2nd edn, New York
and Chicago, 1861). Alfred H. Fuchs
A System of Moral Science (Schenectady,
N.Y., 1853).
Empirical Psychology; or, The Human Mind
as Given in Consciousness (Schenectady,
N.Y., 1854).
Rational Cosmology; or, The Eternal HIGGINSON, Thomas Wentworth
Principles and the Necessary Laws of the Storrow (1823–1911)
Universe (New York, 1858).
Creator and Creation; or, The Knowledge in Thomas Wentworth Higginson was born on 22
the Reason of God and His Work December 1823 in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
(Boston, 1872). He received the Harvard College BA in 1841.
Humanity Immortal; or, Man Tried, Fallen After graduating from Harvard Divinity School
and Redeemed (Boston, 1872; 2nd edn in 1847, he was soon ordained and became the
1876). minister of the Unitarian church in
The Logic of Reason, Universal and Eternal Newburyport, Massachusetts. His liberal
(Boston, 1875). theology and socially progressive views on abo-
lition, temperance, and rights of laborers
Other Relevant Works caused his dismissal in 1849. After some
Hickok’s papers are at Amherst College. teaching and writing, he was called to the Free
“Psychology and Scepticism,” American Church in Worcester, Massachusetts, where
Theological Review 15 (1862): 391–414. he served from 1852 to 1857. He then orga-
nized abolition societies and wrote anti-slavery
Further Reading tracts until he found an opportunity in 1862 to
Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, command the First Carolina Volunteers, the
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer first federally authorized African-American
Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v7 regiment composed of freed slaves. Higginson
Anonymous. “Dr. Hickok’s Philosophy,” was wounded in battle and left the army in
The Bibliotheca Sacra and Biblical 1864. He devoted the rest of his life to writing
Repository 16 (1859): 253–78. fiction, histories of the US, literary criticism,
Bare, John K. “Laurens Perseus Hickok: and biographies. He continued to support
Philosopher, Theologian, and diverse causes including free immigration and
Psychologist,” in Portraits of Pioneers in civil rights for women and African
Psychology, vol. 3, ed. G. A. Kimble and Americans. He served two terms as a
M. Wertheimer (Washington, D.C., Republican in the Massachusetts legislature
1998), pp. 1–15. from 1879 to 1881, and for many years was
Fay, Jay Wharton. American Psychology President of the Free Religious Association of
before William James (New Brunswick, Boston. Higginson died on 9 May 1911 in
N.J., 1939). Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Good, James A. “Introduction,” to Rational Higginson was an important theological ally
Psychology, by Laurens Perseus Hickok, of Ralph Waldo EMERSON, William Ellery
vol. 4 of The Early American Reception of Channing, and Theodore Parker. His consis-
German Idealism, ed. James A. Good tent defense of religious pluralism and toler-
1112
HIGGINSON
ance did not extend to fundamental issues of tical tests provided in every generation, dif-
human dignity and worth. After the ficult works to be done, crosses to be borne
Compromise of 1850 he spoke out against the – which are “the only true relics of the true
Fugitive Slave Act and helped the Underground cross of Christ, let the Romanists say what
Railroad. He supported the more radical and they will.” By their fruits ye shall know
violent resistance efforts against extending them. I do not see positive marks of any
slavery in the territories. He led the 1854 mob apostolical in churches whose members buy
attacking the Boston Court House to try to free and sell their fellow-members; but I see a
fugitive slave Anthony Burns, and he was one zeal that looks quite apostolical in several
of the “Secret Six” who funded John Brown’s reformatory societies, and even if they do
unsuccessful raid in 1859 on the military reprove rather sharply at times, so did Peter
compound at Harpers Ferry, Virginia. and Paul. In times when doctors of divinity
Higginson also joined feminists Lucy STONE openly offer to sell their brothers in the cause
and Susan B. ANTHONY in their efforts for tem- of slavery, we need not wonder if irregular
perance and women’s suffrage. He encouraged practitioners go so far as to scold their
aspiring women writers, notably poet Emily brothers in the cause of liberty. (1852, pp.
Dickinson whose works he edited and pub- 18–20)
lished after her death, and wrote a useful biog-
raphy of Margaret Fuller. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Higginson was one of the most important Things New And Old: An Installation
thinkers to have bridged the transcendentalist Sermon (Worcester, Mass., 1852).
and progressive eras, leading Protestantism Out-door Papers (Boston, 1863).
away from fundamentalism towards the social Common Sense about Women (Boston,
gospel. In 1852 he stated his often-quoted prin- 1882).
ciples directing this march: Margaret Fuller Ossoli (Boston, 1884).
Concerning All of Us (New York, 1892).
We do not, I trust, undervalue the debt of Cheerful Yesterdays (Boston, 1898).
mankind to the Scriptures. We only claim, Contemporaries (Boston, 1899).
with the most eminent of modern Orthodox Women and the Alphabet: A Series of
critics, the learned and pious Neander, that Essays (Boston, 1900).
the time is come “to distinguish between the John Greenleaf Whittier (New York, 1902).
divine and human in the sacred writings”…. Henry Wadsworth Longfellow (Boston,
It is not possible that any collection of 1902).
various books by various writers at various Part of a Man’s Life (Boston, 1905).
times can be assumed as a whole and so Carlyle’s Laugh and Other Surprises
consulted, without introducing the utmost (Boston, 1909).
confusion into all moral questions. It has
almost come to be a proverb, “You can Other Relevant Works
prove anything out of Scripture.” There are, Higginson’s papers are at Harvard
all told, not less than fifty different sects in University.
this country, each claiming to sustain itself The Writings of Thomas Wentworth
by the Bible, to the exclusion of all others. Higginson, 7 vols (Boston, 1900).
And in all great moral questions, as War, Letters and Journals of Thomas Wentworth
Slavery, Temperance, Capital Punishment, it Higginson, 1846–1906, ed. Mary
is unquestionably far easier to decide what Thacher Higginson (Boston, 1921).
is or is not right, than to ascertain what is or The Complete Civil War Journal and
is not Scriptural … . There are certain prac- Selected Letters of Thomas Wentworth
1113
HIGGINSON
Higginson, ed. Christopher Looby Edmund Husserl at the University of

(Chicago, 2000). Göttingen. He was deeply influenced by
The Magnificent Activist: The Writings of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen, which
Thomas Wentworth Higginson gave him a fundamental philosophical orien-
(1823–1911), ed. Howard N. Meyer tation that he never lost. In Göttingen he also
(Cambridge, Mass., 2000). studied with Husserl’s assistant, Adolf
Reinach, whom he always venerated as a
Further Reading master pedagogue and an exemplary phe-
Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, nomenologist. Scheler lived in Göttingen at
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer this time and shared an apartment with von
Thought, Dict Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Hildebrand, who acknowledged receiving
Bio v1, Who Was Who in Amer v1 much inspiration for his moral philosophy
Edelstein, Tilden G. Strange Enthusiasm: A from his close association with Scheler.
Life of Thomas Wentworth Higginson In 1912 von Hildebrand received his PhD
(New Haven, Conn., 1968). in philosophy from Göttingen, writing a dis-
Higginson, Mary Thacher. Thomas sertation under Husserl entitled “Die Idee der
Wentworth Higginson, The Story of His sittlichen Handlung” (The Idea of Moral
Life (Boston, 1914). Action). Husserl wrote in his evaluation of it:
Mather, Winifred. A Bibliography of “I almost want to say that the genius of Adolf
Thomas Wentworth Higginson von Hildebrand has been inherited by his son,
(Cambridge, Mass., 1906). the author, as a philosophical genius.” He
Meyer, Howard N. Colonel of a Black also said that von Hildebrand “astonishes the
Regiment: The Life of Thomas reader by an incomparably intimate knowl-
Wentworth Higginson (New York, edge of the various formations of affective con-
1967). sciousness and their objective correlates.”
Tuttleton, James W. Thomas Wentworth Recent research at the Husserl archive in
Higginson (Boston, 1978). Louvain has shown that Husserl made
repeated use of von Hildebrand’s dissertation
John R. Shook in his own research.
In 1914 von Hildebrand, who had received
no religious education as a child, converted to
Catholicism under the influence of Scheler, who
had directed von Hildebrand’s attention to the
exemplary Christian existence of the saints. But
HILDEBRAND, Dietrich von (1889–1977) von Hildebrand differed from other Catholic
converts of the time, such as Jacques MARITAIN,
Dietrich von Hildebrand was born on 12 because he felt no obligation to remake himself
October 1889 in Florence, Italy, the son of philosophically into a Thomist. Von Hildebrand
the great German sculptor, Adolf von always kept a critical distance to Thomism,
Hildebrand. He grew up in an extraordinarily developing some of his own phenomenological
rich aesthetic culture and was educated by positions in debate with the followers of Thomas
tutors at home until he began his university Aquinas. But this philosophical distance did not
studies in Munich in 1906. It was in Munich involve any distance from Catholic faith and
that he met philosopher Max Scheler and morals, which von Hildebrand ardently
began the very close friendship with him that embraced.
lasted some fifteen years. Between 1909 and If von Hildebrand was critical of some
1911 he spent several semesters studying with Thomistic teachings, he was much more critical
1114
HILDEBRAND
of the transcendental phenomenology that Dollfuss, he founded a review, Der christliche

Husserl first expressed in his Ideen in 1913. Ständestaat, where he brought his philosophy
Most of the early phenomenologists who studied to bear on the European crisis of the time.
with Husserl in Göttingen – such as Edith Stein, His years in Vienna were tumultuous, living as
Roman Ingarden, Hedwig Martius, and Adolf he did in constant danger of assassination.
Reinach – understood the genius of phenome- But he continued his work in philosophy,
nology to consist in a certain recovery of philo- becoming professor of philosophy at the
sophical realism; they were deeply disappointed University of Vienna in 1935. He completed
with Husserl’s turning away from realism and his important work in epistemology, Der Sinn
they could not follow him in that direction. philosophischen Fragens und Erkennens (On
Von Hildebrand returned to Munich for his the Meaning of Philosophical Questioning
Habilitation, which he completed in 1918 with and Knowing, 1950), which appeared in an
another ethical study, this one entitled expanded form in English in 1960 under the
“Sittlichkeit und ethische Werterkenntnis” title, What is Philosophy? It was also in
(Morality and Ethical Value Knowledge). In Vienna that he wrote his main religious work,
1924 von Hildebrand became associate profes- Die umgestaltung in Christus: über christliche
sor of philosophy at Munich, where he taught grundhaltung (Transformation in Christ: on
until 1933. In the 1920s von Hildebrand, in the Fundamental Attitude of the Christian,
addition to his properly philosophical work, 1940). Works by von Hildebrand like this
began lecturing in Catholic circles on the nature one have on occasion given some people the
of marriage and of the marital intimacy of man impression that he is first of all a religious
and woman. He was one of the first Catholic writer and only secondarily a phenomenolo-
voices to affirm strongly that there is more to gist. But von Hildebrand himself distinguished
marital intimacy than procreation; he insisted sharply between these writings and his
that in their one-flesh union a man and a woman properly philosophical writings, and he
also enact their love in an incomparable way. In insisted that in these latter works he fully
this way he helped to set in motion the develop- acknowledges the rightly understood
ment of Catholic thought on marriage that cul- autonomy of philosophy.
minated in the teaching of Vatican II concerning Von Hildebrand barely escaped Vienna in
the twofold meaning of the marital act, the pro- 1938 when Germany annexed Austria. He
creative and the unitive meaning. Just before spent the next years as a refugee moving
leaving Munich he published his Metaphysik through Switzerland, France, Spain, Portugal,
der Gemeinschaft: Untersuchungen über Wesen and Brazil, until he arrived in New York City
und Wert der Gemeinschaft (Metaphysics of in 1941, aided along the way by the
Community: Investigations into the Essence and Rockefeller Foundation. He was offered pro-
Value of Community, 1930), a work in which he fessorships both at the New School for Social
defends an authentically personalist philosophy Research and at Fordham University. Von
of community against the collectivism that was Hildebrand chose Fordham, where he taught
rising in Germany. philosophy from 1941 until his retirement in
It was the coming to power of Hitler that 1960. While at Fordham, he became one of
drove von Hildebrand from Germany. Even the world’s most prominent Christian philoso-
before Hitler’s 1923 Putsch in Munich, von phers, and Pope Pius XII called him “the 20th
Hildebrand had been a vociferous critic of Century Doctor of the Church.”
National Socialism. In 1933 he had to leave In 1953 von Hildebrand published his major
Germany and went to Vienna, where he tried work in moral philosophy, Christian Ethics,
to rally the intellectual resistance to Nazism. which in the next years was followed by his
With the help of the Austrian chancellor, Morality and Situation Ethics (1972) and his
1115
HILDEBRAND
Graven Images: Substitutes for True Morality enologists had already tried to capture the
(1976). In 1968, Professor von Hildebrand “ecstatic,” outward-thrusting nature of con-
founded the Roman Forum to help advance sciousness with their concept of the intentional-
the Roman Catholic Church in the United ity of consciousness; von Hildebrand thought
States. In his last years he published Das Wesen that this capacity of persons for self-transcen-
der Liebe (The Essence of Love, 1971), a book dence was raised to an altogether higher power
that he had been working towards all his life. in value-response.
He lived in New York until his death on 26 Von Hildebrand did not just recognize a great
January 1977 in New Rochelle, New York. plurality of values but also an ordered whole, a
His widow, the philosopher Alice Jourdain cosmos of value. He gave particular attention to
von Hildebrand, posthumously published his the hierarchical relations obtaining among values
Moralia (1980) and the two volumes of his and also to the relation between values and God.
Ästhetik (1977), a work in which he as master Nor did he just recognize a plurality of possible
phenomenologist draws on the deep artistic value-responses; he distinguished between more
sensibility that he had developed growing up in and less foundational value-responses, and held
Florence in the house of a great artist. that the value-response of reverence is the most
Von Hildebrand’s greatest contributions to fundamental of them all, being the one in which
philosophy lie in his ethics and his concepts of persons open themselves to the world of value
value and value-response. The value of a being and declare their readiness to follow the call of
is for him the intrinsic dignity or nobility or value.
splendor of the being, such as the dignity of a Von Hildebrand held that value-response was
human person. Value expresses for him some- the heart and soul of every moral virtue as well
thing that is not relative to a valuing person but as of most morally worthy actions. As a result he
rather belongs intrinsically or absolutely to was critical of the Aristotelian and the Thomistic
the valuable being. Value differs from the tra- eudaemonism, which he thought stressed the
ditional bonum, which means “beneficial for” pursuit of happiness at the expense of the full
or “perfective of” someone: for something to self-transcendence of value-response. But he was
have value means that it is worthy in itself, close to the Aristotelian–Thomistic tradition in
important in its own right. Of course von stressing the centrality of moral virtue in the
Hildebrand finds a place for bonum in his moral existence of human persons. Von
ethics, but he lays particular stress on value and Hildebrand felt a certain kinship with Kant. He
on our response to value. He is fascinated with entirely agreed with the teaching of Kant that
the way in which certain responses are “due” moral obligation binds not just hypothetically
in justice to certain values. For example, admi- but categorically, a teaching that coheres very
ration is due to a person of great moral stature, well with his own teaching on value-response.
like a Socrates. Adoration is due to God, who But he broke sharply with the formalism of
is worthy of being adored. Veneration is due to Kant’s ethics; he held that most moral obligation
a great saint, who “ought” to be venerated. issues from value and is grounded in value.
The point is not that veneration benefits the On the basis of his philosophy of value, von
saint, or perfects him or her, but that it is due in Hildebrand also made an important contribution
justice to the saint, that it is only fitting and right to the understanding of human freedom, and in
to venerate the saint. Von Hildebrand was par- particular to the ancient question how it is
ticularly taken by the way in which persons tran- possible knowingly to do wrong. To see this we
scend themselves in responding to value; they do must first realize that he did not follow Scheler
not appropriate the valuable being, or bend it to in thinking that we are always only motivated by
their needs, but they affirm it according to its value; not only can we be motivated by bonum,
own intrinsic dignity or splendor. The phenom- as already noted, but we can also be motivated
1116
HILDEBRAND
by what he called the importance of the merely Liturgie und Persoenlichkeit (Salzburg,
subjectively satisfying. We can be in a state of Austria, 1933). Trans., Liturgy and
mind the very opposite of reverence, so that we Personality (New York, 1943).
do not care what has value and calls for an Sittliche grundhatungen (Mainz, Germany,
appropriate response from us, and also do not 1933).
care what is really beneficial or harmful for us: Die umgestaltung in Christus: über
we can be interested instead in what is merely christliche grundhaltung (under pseudo-
subjectively satisfying for us. Now von nym Peter Ott) (Einsiedeln, Switzerland,
Hildebrand teaches that we can find an action to 1940; 3rd edn 1955). Trans.,
be subjectively satisfying which we know to be Transformation in Christ: On the
wrong, and that we can choose that action in Christian Attitude of Mind (New York,
spite of acknowledging its wrongness. We do not 1948).
perform the action under the aspect of bonum, Der Sinn Philosophischen Fragens und
or of value, as has so often been said, but we Erkennens (Bonn, Germany, 1950).
perform it under the entirely different aspect of Fundamental Moral Attitudes (New York,
it being subjectively satisfying for us. In this way 1950).
he exorcizes once and for all the old idea that Christian Ethics (New York and London,
wrongdoing is based on some defect in the intel- 1953). Repr., Ethics (Chicago, 1972).
lect and he makes understandable how its defect Die Menschheit am Scheideweg
is a defect precisely in the will. (Regensburg, Germany, 1955).
But value not only has a central place in von What is Philosophy? (Milwaukee, Wisc.,
Hildebrand’s moral philosophy; it is also central 1960).
to his philosophy of community, his aesthetics, Das Wesen der Liebe, in Gesammelte
his metaphysics, his philosophy of love. Value Werke, vol. 3 (Stuttgart, Germany, 1971).
and value-response form the axis of almost all of Morality and Situation Ethics (Chicago,
his philosophical thought. 1972).
Metaphysik der Gemeinschaft in
BIBLIOGRAPHY Gesammelte Werke, vol. 4 (Stuttgart,
“Die Idee der sittlichen Handlung,” in Germany, 1975).
Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänome- Graven Images: Substitutes for True
nologische Forschung, vol. 3 (Halle, Morality (Chicago, 1976).
Germany, 1916), pp. 126–251. Ästhetik I, in Gesammelte Werke, vol. 5
“Sittlichkeit und ethische Werterkenntnis,” (Stuttgart, Germany, 1977).
in Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänome- Äesthetik II, in Gesammelte Werke, vol. 6
nologische Forschung, vol. 5 (Halle, (Stuttgart, Germany, 1977).
Germany, 1922), pp. 463–602. Moralia, in Gesammelte Werke, vol. 9
Reinheit und Jungfräulichkeit (Munich, (Stuttgart, Germany, 1980).
Germany, 1927). Trans., In Defense of
Purity: An Analysis of the Catholic Ideals Other Relevant Works
of Purity and Virginity (New York, 1931). Hildebrand’s papers are at the International
Metaphysik der Genmeinschaft: Academy of Philosophy in Triesenberg,
Untersuchungen über Wesen u. Wert d. Liechtenstein.
Gemeinschaft (Augsburg, Germany, Gesammelten Werke, 10 vols (Regensburg
1930). and Stuttgart, Germany, 1971–84).
Zeitliches im Lichte des Ewigen: gesammelte
Abhandlungen und Vorträge (Regensburg, Further Reading
Germany, 1932). Crosby, John F, ed. Truth and Value: The
1117
HILDEBRAND
Philosophy of Dietrich von Hildebrand Missouri in 1903, F. C. French arrived to

(New York, 1992). Contains a bibliogra- continue the psychology duties and more psy-
phy of von Hildebrand’s writings. chology instructors were added, and Hinman
———, “Dietrich von Hildebrand: Master was promoted up to full professor of philoso-
of Phenomenological Value-Ethics,” in phy by 1906. By 1908 Wolfe had returned
Phenomenological Approaches to Moral and another philosophy professor, Hartley
Philosophy, ed. John Drummond and Burr ALEXANDER, was added to the depart-
Lester Embree (Dordrecht, 2002), pp. ment. More colleagues arrived during the
475–96. 1920s and 30s: William H. WERKMEISTER and
Schwarz, Balduin, ed. The Human Person O. K. BOUWSMA, and the philosophy depart-
and the World of Values: A Tribute to ment became independent from psychology.
Dietrich Von Hildebrand by His Friends When Alexander left in 1927, Hinman became
in Philosophy (New York, 1960). chair of the department and served in that
Von Hildebrand, Alice, ed. The Soul of a position until his retirement in 1943. The
Lion: Dietrich von Hildebrand, a Nebraska faculty were all leaders of the
Biography (San Francisco, 2000). Western Philosophical Association from its
inception in 1900. Hinman served in various
John F. Crosby offices and eventually was President in
1920–21 after the organization had become
the Western Division of the American
Philosophical Association. He was also active
in the American Association of University
Professors. Hinman died on 18 June 1965 in
HINMAN, Edgar Lenderson (1872–1965) Lincoln, Nebraska.
Hinman was carefully trained in absolute
Edgar L. Hinman was born on 5 September idealism during his education at Cornell, and
1872 in the town of Afton in Chenango idealism remained his basic philosophical
County, New York. He attended Cornell standpoint for the rest of his career. The
University, receiving his BA in 1892 and PhD greater part of his mature studies were directed
in philosophy in 1895. His dissertation on towards philosophy of religion and Eastern
“The Physics of Idealism” was written under philosophy, especially Hinduism. In several
the direction of James E. CREIGHTON and other writings, including his presidential address
idealists. In 1895–6 Hinman was a teaching published in 1921, Hinman elaborated careful
fellow at the University of California at contrasts between Western philosophical ratio-
Berkeley. In 1896 he was appointed instructor nalism and idealism with the Eastern counter-
of philosophy at the University of Nebraska, parts of monistic idealism and mysticism. Of
joining psychologist Harry Kirke Wolfe. special concern for Hinman were the various
Wolfe had founded the philosophy and psy- ways that these pantheistic systems could
chology department at Nebraska in 1886, but attempt to account for the relations between
was fired shortly after Hinman’s arrival in finite growing personalities and God’s perfec-
1897 over an administration dispute. tion.
Hinman had briefly to teach psychology
until Wolfe’s replacement, Cornell graduate BIBLIOGRAPHY
Albert Ross Hill, had arrived, but he was soon The Physics of Idealism (Lincoln, Nebr.,
responsible for most philosophy courses from 1906).
the history of philosophy to metaphysics and “Hegelianism and the Vendanta,” in
philosophy of religion. When Hill went to Philosophical Essays in Honor of James
1118
HINTIKKA
Edwin Creighton, ed. George H. Sabine faculty opponent, Hintikka extended to full
(New York, 1917), pp. 112–32. first-order logic the so-called distributive
“Modern Idealism and the Logos normal forms that von Wright had developed
Teaching,” Philosophical Review 30 for monadic predicate logic. Hintikka received
(1921): 333–51. his PhD in philosophy from Helsinki in 1953.
“Kant’s Philosophy of Law,” in Immanuel Hintikka taught philosophy for one semester
Kant: Papers Read at Northwestern in 1954 at Harvard University. He returned to
University on the Bicentenary of Kant’s Harvard as a junior fellow from 1956 to 1959,
Birth, ed. Edward L. Schaub (Chicago, working in the new field of modal logic. His
1925), pp. 137–54. friends during this period included many later
“Radhakrishnan and the Sung colleagues like Burton D REBEN , Dagfinn
Confucianism,” in The Philosophy of FÖLLESDAL, and Julius Moravcsik. In 1959
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, ed. Paul A. Hintikka was appointed professor of practical
Schilpp (New York, 1952). philosophy (moral and social philosophy) at
the University of Helsinki. In 1964 he also
Further Reading became professor of philosophy at Stanford
Pres Addr of APA v3, Proc of APA v39 University, where Patrick SUPPES and Föllesdal
taught, making it one of the leading centers of
John R. Shook philosophical logic. Hintikka’s new interests
included inductive logic and semantic infor-
mation. In 1965 Hintikka started his work
with D. Reidel’s Publishing Company (later
Kluwer Academic Publishers) in Holland as
the editor-in-chief of the journal Synthese and
HINTIKKA, Kaarlo Jaakko Juhani (1929– ) the book series Synthese Library. This activity,
which has continued until 2002, has placed
Jaakko Hintikka was born on 12 January 1929 Hintikka among the most influential editors
in Vantaa, Finland. His father Toivo had a of philosophical works in the English-speaking
PhD in botany and plant pathology, and his world. He shared his time between Stanford
mother Lempi was an elementary school and Helsinki until 1978.
teacher. After finishing high school in Kerava in In 1970 Hintikka was appointed to a
1947, Hintikka went to the University of research professorship in the Academy of
Helsinki. His major subject was first mathe- Finland which allowed him to establish a
matics, where the most impressive teacher was research group of younger Finnish scholars
professor Rolf Nevanlinna. During that time, working mainly in logic, philosophy of science,
influenced by the charismatic philosopher Eino philosophy of language, and history of philos-
Kaila, Hintikka started to study theoretical phi- ophy. As a teacher and supervisor, Hintikka
losophy as a second major. Already in 1947–8 has been highly influential through the richness
he followed the lectures on logic by the young of his new ideas and research initiatives. Many
professor Georg Henrik von Wright, who soon of the former students of Hintikka have been
became Ludwig Wittgenstein’s successor at appointed to chairs in philosophy, including
Cambridge. Hintikka spent the year 1948–9 as Risto Hilpinen, Raimo Tuomela, Juhani
an undergraduate at Williams College in Pietarinen, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Simo Knuuttila,
Massachusetts. He received the degrees of Veikko Rantala, Juha Manninen, Lauri
Cand. Phil. in 1952, and Lic. Phil. in 1952 Carlson, Esa Saarinen, and Gabriel Sandu.
from Helsinki. In his doctoral dissertation, In 1978 Hintikka divorced his first wife Soili
which he defended with von Wright as the and married American philosopher Merrill
1119
HINTIKKA
Bristow Provence. In that year, Jaakko and relative to the chosen quantificational depth d
Merrill HINTIKKA were appointed to philosophy of the relevant formulas: a depth-d constituent
positions at the Florida State University. is a systematic description of all kinds of
Hintikka resigned from his research position in sequences of d individuals which can be drawn
Finland in 1981, but maintained close cooper- from a universe. Hintikka designed these
ation with Finnish logicians and philosophers. notions for the study of logical proofs, but he
After Merrill’s death in 1987 Hintikka married soon found many applications in several fields
Finnish philosopher Ghita Holmström. In 1990 of philosophy. In 1955 Hintikka defined model
Hintikka became professor of philosophy at sets as a new tool in logical semantics, and
Boston University. constructed a new proof of the completeness of
Besides his activities in research, teaching, first-order logic. In the 1970s he developed
and publication, Hintikka has served in many (with Veikko Rantala) a new system of infini-
important positions in international organiza- tary logic which allows infinitely deep formulas.
tions. He was Vice President of the Association Hintikka’s interest in partially ordered quanti-
for Symbolic Logic from 1968 to 1971; fiers led in the 1980s to a new system of logic.
President of American Philosophical This “independence friendly logic,” or IF-logic,
Association Pacific Division in 1975–6; Vice is still first-order in the sense that quantifiers
President of the Division of Logic, range over individuals, but it is much more
Methodology and Philosophy of Science of the powerful than the traditional Fregean first-
International Union of History and Philosophy order logic, as it allows quantifiers to be infor-
of Science during 1971–5 and President in mationally independent of each other. In The
1975; Vice President of the International Principles of Mathematics Revisited (1996),
Federation of Philosophical Societies from 1993 and in several papers with Gabriel Sandu,
to 1998; President of the Charles S. Peirce Hintikka has argued that the IF-logic consti-
Society in 1997, the chair of the organizing tutes a genuine revolution in logic. Among
committee of the Twentieth World Congress of other things, it puts the incompleteness results
Philosophy in 1998, and the President of the of Kurt GÖDEL and Alfred TARSKI in a new
International Institute of Philosophy from 1999 light, as it is possible to construct a truth defi-
to 2002. Hintikka has been awarded honorary nition for the sentences of IF-logic within the
doctorates in many universities: Liège, Kracow, same language.
Uppsala, Oulu, and Turku. In the area of intensional logic, in 1957
Hintikka’s publications cover an exception- Hintikka – independently of a slightly earlier
ally wide range of topics. During the fifty years proposal by Stig Kanger and a later one by
from 1953 to 2004 he has published thirty- Saul KRIPKE – presented the basic idea of the
seven books or monographs, edited seventeen possible-worlds semantics for modal logic. In
books, and authored more than three hundred Knowledge and Belief (1962), he applied the
scholarly articles in international journals or technique of model sets to lay the foundations
collections. His works can be classified in seven of epistemic and doxastic logic. Later he applied
main areas: mathematical logic, intensional these semantical methods to deontic logic. In
logic, philosophy of logic and mathematics, treating knowledge and perception as proposi-
philosophy of language, philosophy of science, tional attitudes, Hintikka had to face philo-
epistemology, and the history of philosophy. sophical issues concerning quantification into
In mathematical logic, Hintikka’s disserta- modal contexts and the cross-identification of
tion Distributive Normal Forms in the Calculus individuals in different possible worlds. These
of Predicates (1953) showed that each formula topics, which led him into debates with W. V.
in first-order logic can be transformed to a dis- QUINE, Föllesdal, and David LEWIS, are dis-
junction of constituents. This normal form is cussed in Models for Modalities (1969) and
1120
HINTIKKA
The Intentions of Intentionality (1975). Starting the thesis that language is a “universal
with The Semantics of Questions and the medium” whose relations to extralinguistic
Questions of Semantics (1976), Hintikka has reality cannot be expressed in language.
also applied his system of epistemic logic to Hintikka regards this distinction as the
give an account of the logic of questions and “ultimate presupposition” of twentieth-century
dialogues. philosophy. The universal medium view, which
On philosophy of logic and mathematics, leads to the thesis that semantics is ineffable, he
Hintikka realized that his distributive normal finds in Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell,
forms, due to the undecidability of first-order Wittgenstein, and Quine. Martin Kusch (1989)
logic, vindicate “Kantian” themes in the phi- has argued that Edmund Husserl shared the
losophy of logic: constituents provide a tool in calculus view, but Martin Heidegger and Hans-
defending Kant’s thesis that mathematical Georg Gadamer the universal medium view.
truths are synthetic a priori. In his John Locke Hintikka has applied his distributive normal
Lectures given at Oxford University in 1964, forms to many problems in philosophy of
Hintikka argued that logical inferences may be science, among them the definability and iden-
nontrivial or nontautological by increasing tifiability of concepts with respect to theories,
“surface information” when they require the the deductive–nomological model of explana-
introduction of new individuals into consider- tion, and the problem of incommensurability.
ation. Mathematical statements are synthetic in Starting from the observation that constituents
Kant’s sense when they contain surface infor- can be regarded as descriptions of possible
mation. Hintikka has also shown that this idea worlds (relative to the expressive power of a
has interesting connections to the traditional given linguistic framework), Hintikka con-
discussions about analysis and synthesis in structed in 1964 a new system of inductive
geometry (The Method of Analysis, 1974). logic. Unlike Carnap’s system, Hintikka’s
Hintikka’s interest in formal semantics led method allows the assignment of non-zero
him to look at Wittgenstein’s notion of a inductive probabilities to genuinely universal
language-game from a new perspective in phi- statements. He also showed how these proba-
losophy of language. According to Hintikka’s bility measures lead to a natural definition of
program of “logical pragmatics,” semantical semantic information – or depth information in
relations between language and world are man- contrast to surface information – and system-
made and thus dependent on pragmatics. atic power. Hintikka’s ideas have been further
Game-theoretical semantics, which can be developed by, among others, Hilpinen,
applied in a fruitful way in infinitary logic and Tuomela, Pietarinen, Niiniluoto, and Theo
IF-logic, has been developed by Hintikka (with Kuipers.
several collaborators, among them Saarinen, Hintikka employed his theory of proposi-
Carlson, Sandu, and Jack Kulas) into a com- tional attitudes (knowledge, perception) in epis-
prehensive framework for the study of natural temological studies. For example, these appli-
language. Important topics to which this cations have generated new perspectives on
method has been applied include quantifiers Kant’s notion of things in themselves, Russell’s
(every, some, any), pronouns, anaphora, ques- distinction between knowledge by acquain-
tions, and metaphor. Hintikka has generalized tance and knowledge by description, Husserl’s
his semantical work into the conception that phenomenology, and pictorial representation in
language is a “calculus” which can be inter- art. Hintikka’s pioneering studies in epistemic
preted and reinterpreted in various ways. This logic have also recently made a strong impact
view (which can be found in George Boole, in artificial intelligence and cognitive science.
Charles S. PEIRCE, David Hilbert, and the later Hintikka has combined his systematic inter-
Rudolf CARNAP) is contrasted by Hintikka with ests with historical studies which reconstruct
1121
HINTIKKA
and re-evaluate important philosophical doc- Hintikka (Dordrecht, 1989).

trines. His discussions have included Plato’s What If…? Toward Excellence in Reasoning,
notion of episteme and the tradition of with James Bachman (Mountain View,
“maker’s knowledge,” Aristotle’s theory of Cal., 1991).
modality, Descartes’s cogito argument, On the Methodology of Linguistics: A Case
Leibniz’s view on plenitude, Kant’s notion of Study, with Gabriel Sandu (Oxford, 1991).
intuition, Peirce’s theory of reasoning, The Principles of Mathematics Revisited
Wittgenstein’s account of language-games, and (Cambridge, UK, 1996).
Arthur LOVEJOY’s thesis about unit ideas. Ludwig Wittgenstein: Half-truths and One-
and-a-half Truths, Selected Papers, vol. 1
BIBLIOGRAPHY (Dordrecht, 1996).
Distributive Normal Forms in the Calculus of Lingua Universalis vs. Calculus Ratiocinator:
Predicates (Helsinki, 1953). An Ultimate Presupposition of Twentieth-
Two Papers on Symbolic Logic (Helsinki, century Philosophy, Selected Papers, vol. 2
1955). (Dordrecht, 1997).
Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to Language, Truth and Logic in Mathematics,
the Logic of the Two Notions (Ithaca, Selected Papers, vol. 3 (Dordrecht, 1997).
N.Y., 1962). Paradigms for Language Theory and Other
Models for Modalities: Selected Essays Essays, Selected Papers, vol. 4 (Dordrecht,
(Dordrecht, 1969). 1997).
Logic, Language-games, and Information: Inquiry as Inquiry: A Logic for Scientific
Kantian Themes in the Philosophy of Discovery, Selected Papers, vol. 5
Logic (Oxford, 1973). (Dordrecht, 1999).
Time and Necessity: Studies in Aristotle’s Analyses of Aristotle, Selected Papers, vol. 6
Theory of Modality (Oxford, 1973). (Dordrecht, 2004).
Knowledge and the Known: Historical
Perspectives in Epistemology (Dordrecht, Other Relevant Works
1974). “Modality as Referential Multiplicity,”
The Method of Analysis: Its Geometrical Ajatus 20 (1957): 49–64.
Origin and Its General Significance, with “‘Cogito, ergo sum’: Inference or
Unto Remes (Dordrecht, 1974). Performance?” Philosophical Review 72
The Intentions of Intentionality and Other (1961): 3–32.
New Models for Modalities (Dordrecht, “Toward a Theory of Inductive
1975). Generalization,” in Proceedings of the
The Semantics of Questions and the 1964 International Congress for Logic,
Questions of Semantics (Helsinki, 1976). Methodology and Philosophy of Science,
The Game of Language: Studies in Game- ed. Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (Amsterdam,
theoretical Semantics and Its Applications, 1965), pp. 274–88.
with Jack Kulas (Dordrecht, 1983). Ed. with Patrick Suppes, Aspects of Inductive
Anaphora and Definite Descriptions: Two Logic (Amsterdam, 1965).
Applications of Game-Theoretical “The Varieties of Information and Scientific
Semantics, with Jack Kulas (Dordrecht, Explanation,” in Logic, Methodology and
1985). Philosophy of Science, vol. 3, ed. B. van
Investigating Wittgenstein, with Merrill B. Rootselaar and J. F. Staal (Amsterdam,
Hintikka (Oxford, 1986). 1968), pp. 151–71.
The Logic of Epistemology and the “Language-Games for Quantifiers,” in
Epistemology of Logic, with Merrill Studies in Logical Theory, ed. Nicholas
1122
HINTIKKA
Rescher (Oxford, 1968), pp. 46–72. 1987).

Ed., Philosophy of Mathematics (Oxford, Rigal, Elisabeth, ed. Jaakko Hintikka:
1969). Questions de logique et de phenomenology
Ed. with Donald Davidson, Words and (Paris, 1998).
Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Saarinen, Esa, Risto Hilpinen, Ilkka
Quine (Dordrecht, 1969). Niiniluoto, and Merrill Hintikka, eds.
Ed. with Patrick Suppes, Information and Essays in Honour of Jaakko Hintikka on
Inference (Dordrecht, 1970). the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday
Ed., Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Empiricist: (Dordrecht, 1979).
Materials and Perspectives (Dordrecht, Sintonen, Matti, ed. Knowledge and Inquiry:
1975). Essays on Jaakko Hintikka’s Epistemology
“Gaps in the Great Chain of Being: An and Philosophy of Science (Amsterdam,
Exercise in the Methodology of the History 1997).
of Ideas,” Proceedings and Addresses of
the American Philosophical Association 49 Ilkka Niiniluoto
(1976): 22–38.
Ed. with Simo Knuuttila, The Logic of Being:
Historical Studies (Dordrecht, 1986).
Ed., Aspects of Metaphor (Dordrecht, 1994).
“Husserl: The Phenomenological
Dimension,” in The Cambridge HINTIKKA, Merrill Bristow (1939–87)
Companion to Husserl, ed. David Smith
and Barry Smith (Cambridge, UK, 1995), Merrill Hintikka was born Jane Merrill
pp. 78–105. Bristow on 10 March 1939 in Alameda,
California. Her parents were John and
Further Reading Margaret Reynolds Bristow. John Bristow was
Oxford Comp Phil, Pres Addr of APA v8 trained in electrical engineering but by virtue
Auxier, Randall E., and Lewis E. Hahn, eds. of his gifts of persuasion and reconciliation
The Philosophy of Jaakko Hintikka became a professional labor arbitrator. His
(Chicago, 2004). Contains Hintikka’s daughter not only inherited these gifts but also
autobiography and bibliography. took active interest in his line of business, at
Bogdan, Radu J., ed. Jaakko Hintikka one point helping the dealers in Las Vegas
(Dordrecht, 1987). casinos to start their trade union and at
Haaparanta, Leila, Martin Kusch, and Ilkka another point advising one of the first profes-
Niiniluoto, eds. Language, Knowledge, sional baseball players who managed to
and Intentionality: Perspectives on the become a free agent. Jane Bristow, later Merrill
Philosophy of Jaakko Hintikka (Helsinki, Sumners, received her undergraduate educa-
1990). tion at Mills College in California, graduating
Haller, Rudolf, ed. Investigating Hintikka with her BA in 1961 with top honors. She
(Amsterdam, 1995). received her graduate training at Stanford
Kolak, Daniel. On Hintikka (Belmont, Cal., University, where she was awarded a PhD in
2001). philosophy in 1982. After two earlier mar-
Kusch, Martin. Language as Calculus vs. riages, she married a fellow philosopher,
Language as Universal Medium: A Study Jaakko HINTIKKA, in 1978.
in Husserl, Heidegger and Gadamer Merrill Sumners (later Provence) taught phi-
(Dordrecht, 1989). losophy at Mills College from 1964 to 1975,
Niiniluoto, Ilkka. Truthlikeness (Dordrecht, and then taught (as Merrill Hintikka) at
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HINTIKKA
Florida State University from 1979 until her Wittgenstein’s rejection of phenomenological
death. At Florida State she took an active part languages as the underlying forms of our actual
in the governance of the institution. When she discourse in favor of physicalistic ones.
died on 1 January 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida, Not all of Hintikka’s philosophical ideas
she was in her second term as the President of were historical, however, even apart from
the Florida State faculty senate. After her feminism. While a graduate student at
death, the distinguished administrator Dr Stanford, she took a seminar on metaphysics
Werner Baum testified that he had never had with Donald DAVIDSON, who at that time was
as close a working relation with any other still defending the primacy of physical objects
faculty member as he had had with her. as basic particulars. In her term paper, Merrill
While still in graduate school at Stanford, took all arguments Davidson had used for his
Hintikka – then Merrill Provence – put primary claim and modified them so as to
together with three fellow students a guide- become arguments for the primacy of events.
book to analytic philosophy entitled Davidson’s only comment was, “You seem to
Philosophical Analysis: An Introduction to its have discovered a skeleton in my cupboard.”
Language and Techniques, which she updated Later Davidson himself came to defend the
with Samuel Gorowitz in 1979. With Bruce primacy of events.
Vermazen, Merrill Hintikka edited Essays on Her mother’s long-time debilitating illness
Davidson: Actions and Events (1985). In 1983 had thrust on the young Jane Bristow family
she edited with Sandra Harding the pioneering and social responsibilities when she was barely
volume Discovering Reality: Feminist a teenager. She had quickly come to distrust
Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, the rules of behavior that her parents and the
Methodology, and Philosophy of Science. In society around her were trying to impose on
1986 she published a major study of Ludwig her, and instead to rely on her own decisions.
Wittgenstein’s philosophy entitled Although her main philosophical training
Investigating Wittgenstein with her husband under her Stanford professors like Davidson
Jaakko, after having collaborated with him on was primarily analytic, Hintikka found a
a number of joint articles on Wittgenstein. She philosophical articulation and justification of
also co-authored with him a number of papers what her personal experiences had taught her
on other topics, most of which appear in their in the thought of Jean-Paul Sartre, prominently
volume The Logic of Epistemology and the including its emphasis on free decisions. She
Epistemology of Logic (1989). gave a number of lectures on Sartre’s thought,
Hintikka had an intellectual and moral sen- especially on his theory of personal identity,
sitivity that made her an excellent interpreter but she never published any of them. She was
of other philosophers’ thoughts. Her book especially interested in Sartre’s idea that
written jointly with Jaakko on Wittgenstein personal identity is constituted by one’s
offers several new perspectives on the philos- “projects” rather than one’s “essences.”
ophy of this enigmatic thinker. They include However, she did not find this idea (rightly
the interpretation of the simple objects that understood) to be Sartre’s monopoly. Once,
Wittgenstein postulated in his Tractatus she gave a talk to a philosophical audience on
Logico-Philosophicus as being essentially Sartre’s theory of personal identity using
Russellian objects of acquaintance (although copious quotations to illustrate her points.
their logical forms are not). Another well-doc- Only afterwards did she confess that none of
umented interpretational idea in the book the cited passages were from Sartre; they were
concerns Wittgenstein’s transition from his all from Stuart HAMPSHIRE.
earlier to his later thought. The Hintikkas Hintikka also realized keenly both on the
found that a crucial step in this transition was philosophical level and on the personal one
1124
HINTIKKA
that a decision-centered ethic is viable only life she was briefly involved in competitive sports
when combined with an ethic of self-honesty. car racing. She was a well-informed money
She had seen a frightening example of manager. In fact, she was one of the earliest
mauvaise foi in her mother’s denial of her con- private investors in California to write system-
dition. As a consequence, she displayed an atically covered options.
unusual degree of self-awareness, including Hintikka’s greatest achievement nevertheless
both an awareness of the limitations that her was the integration of her personal experiences
situation imposed on her and a recognition of and the decisions she was led to by them with a
her own ends and aims. As Jaakko Hintikka fully articulated philosophical position. In many
has written, if Merrill had been the person in ways her life was determined to an unusual
Sartre’s memorable example of a young degree by her being a highly intelligent and
woman who does not admit to herself the strong woman in a male-dominated field and
reality of her companion’s advances, she would society. This affected deeply her personal rela-
have decided how she wanted the scene to tions, including even her relation to her parents.
develop before the man had a chance to decide One of the most remarkable things she ever said
what he wanted. She was often able to con- to her third husband was, “Jaakko, you are the
ceptualize her own personal decisions in philo- only man in my life who is not afraid of me.”
sophical terms. For one telling example, she What made her personal status especially
cast her relationship with Jaakko as concretely poignant is that she did not excel in virtue of
answering in Sartrean terms the question of the some androgynous special talent but because of
possibility of a genuine we-subject which Sartre qualities that are usually considered characteris-
himself had left in doubt. tically feminine, such as keen emotional and
Hintikka’s Sartrean ethic was also related to intellectual empathy, psychological insight and
her feminism. What she criticized was not merely skills in communication and self-expression. Her
de facto male domination, but the personal experiences prompted her to examine philo-
values that served as its cover story. She attacked sophically the whole spectrum of feminist issues.
what she called the John Wayne syndrome. This While at Mills College, she taught or co-taught
syndrome did not only include the idea of a courses on the status of women in western
strong dominating male, but first and foremost society – the first such courses offered in the
a refusal to acknowledge the falsity of the image state of California. She was one of the original
of a strong man that excludes all inevitable members of the Committee on the Status of
human self-doubts, fears, and emotions. A “John Women in the Profession of the American
Wayne” is morally objectionable, not because he Philosophical Association. She gave lectures to
is a bully, but because he is in bad faith. The different kinds of audiences on women’s issues,
paradigm case in Merrill’s own experience was and through her teaching she provided a role
probably John F. Kennedy, who, according to model to hundreds of young women.
her, “could only be fully himself with his brother Hintikka’s gifts of empathy and communi-
Bobby and then after a couple of stiff whiskies.” cation resulted in circles of friends and
Hintikka had an exceptionally broad range of acquaintances that were extraordinarily wide
interests and talents beyond philosophy. She was and varied. She came to know – often through
both a professional-level chef and a top-level her students and sometimes through her
blackjack player. Severe medical problems pre- father’s connections – major political figures,
vented her in her later life from participating labor and business leaders, including a couple
actively in sports, but she remained an active of famous families like the Hesses and the
fan. At Florida State University, she surprised Guinnesses, athletes and other sports figures,
local sports writers by playing a key role in the at least one major movie star, a leading
selection of a new basketball coach. Earlier in her composer and lots of remarkable but less
1125
HINTIKKA
famous people. A small episode perhaps epit- Niiniluoto, Essays in Honour of Jaakko
omizes her relationships. Once at San Hintikka (Dordrecht, 1979).
Francisco International Airport Merrill literally Ed. with Sandra Harding, Discovering
ran into a black gentleman who apologized Reality: Feminist Perspectives on
and treated Merrill to a cup of coffee. He was Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology,
the famous San Francisco Giants baseball star and Philosophy of Science (Dordrecht,
Willie McCovey. The relationship so started 1983; 2nd edn, Dordrecht, 2003).
culminated, not in a romance, but in Merrill’s Ed. with Bruce Vermazen, Essays on
teaching McCovey writing, reasoning, and Davidson: Actions and Events (Oxford,
argumentation. 1985).

“Wittgenstein on Privacy and Publicity,” Proc of APA v60
with Jaakko Hintikka, in Wittgenstein and
His Impact on Contemporary Thought, Jaakko Hintikka
Proceedings of the Second International
Wittgenstein Symposium, ed. W.
Leinfellner et al. (Vienna, 1978), pp.
351–62.
“The Objects of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus,”
in Language and Ontology, Proceedings HOCHBERG, Herbert Irving (1929– )
of the Sixth International Wittgenstein
Symposium, ed. W. Leinfellner et al. Herbert Hochberg was born on 13 July 1929
(Vienna, 1982), pp. 429–34. in Detroit, Michigan, the son of George and
“Some Remarks on (Wittgensteinian) Lillian Hochberg. The family moved to New
Logical Form,” with Jaakko Hintikka, York City, where his father became the
Synthese 56 (1983): 155–70. managing editor of the left-wing Yiddish news-
“How Can Language Be Sexist,” with paper Morning Freiheit. Hochberg earned his
Jaakko Hintikka, in Discovering Reality: BA in 1950 and MA in 1951 from Wayne State
Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, University. He then received his PhD in phi-
Metaphysics, Methodology, and losophy in 1954 from the University of Iowa,
Philosophy of Science, ed. Sandra Harding writing his dissertation under Gustav
and Merrill Hintikka (Dordrecht, 1983), BERGMANN on the philosophy of W. V. QUINE.
pp. 139–48. He has been a professor of philosophy at
Investigating Wittgenstein, with Jaakko Northwestern University from 1954 to 1961;
Hintikka (Oxford, 1986). Indiana University from 1961 to 1965;
The Logic of Epistemology and the Gothenburg University in Sweden in 1965–6;
Epistemology of Logic: Selected Essays, Ohio State University from 1966 to 1968; and
with Jaakko Hintikka (Dordrecht, 1989). the University of Minnesota from 1968 to
1978. Since 1978 Hochberg has been professor
Other Relevant Works of philosophy at the University of Texas.
Philosophical Analysis: An Introduction to Hochberg has received Guggenheim and
Its Language and Techniques, with S. Fulbright fellowships. To date, he has pub-
Gorowitz, D. Provence, and R. G. lished six books and over one hundred articles.
Williams (New York, 1965; 3rd edn Hochberg’s main contributions have been in
1979). ontology, philosophy of language and mind,
Ed. with E. Saarinen, R. Hilpinen, and I. and the history of analytic philosophy. He was
1126
HOCHBERG
strongly influenced by the early twentieth- Principia Mathematica. To that extent he

century writings of Bertrand Russell, G. E. accepts what Bergmann dubbed the “linguistic
Moore, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Bergmann, turn” and would find it particularly illuminat-
who in the 1940s broke from positivism and ing to discover categorial features and the ref-
affirmed the meaningfulness of metaphysics, erents of the primitive signs of the most
was another strong influence. In this tradition, adequate calculus. He defends Russell’s theory
Hochberg has defended realism about facts of descriptions and Russell’s view that logi-
and universals and the existence of mental cally proper names and primitive predicates
states against the dominant contemporary are labels (tags); the sense of “meaning”
trends of nominalism, idealism, holism, and relevant to ontology is reference.
materialism. Besides being a highly original philosopher,
Taking qualities as universals, he criticizes Hochberg is perhaps the leading commentator
trope (quality-instance) theories, arguing they on Russell, Moore, and the early Wittgenstein.
are absurdly forced to take exactly similar He has also written extensively, often critically,
tropes as grounds for logically independent on Bergmann, Quine, Rudolf CARNAP, Wilfrid
truths expressing their diversity and similarity, SELLARS, Peter Strawson, Nelson GOODMAN,
to take complexes as simples, and cannot, Saul K RIPKE , Donald D AVIDSON , D. M.
without circularity, specify needed similarity Armstrong, Ivar Segelberg, and others.
classes. Universals are not Platonic entities but
are “in” facts that are presented in experience. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Objects are facts with universal monadic qual- Thought, Fact, and Reference: The Origins
ities as terms standing in a Russell-type comp- and Ontology of Logical Atomism
resence relation. Having long rejected (Minneapolis, 1978).
Bergmann’s bare particulars as merely postu- Logic, Ontology, and Language: Essays on
lated objects not found in experience, he points Truth and Reality (Munich, 1984).
out that one can trivially add mere individua- Complexes and Consciousness (Stockholm,
tors as terms, if one construes the problem of 1999).
individuation as requiring individuating items. “Propositions, Truth and Belief: The
His adherence to the Principle of Acquaintance Wittgenstein-Russell Dispute,” Theoria 66
reflects an empiricist bias. (2000): 3–40.
Hochberg agrees with Wittgenstein’s claim in Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein: The
the Tractatus that the world is a collection of Revival of Realism (Egelsbach, Germany,
facts, not things. Facts enable him to secure 2001).
realism and truth as correspondence in oppo- The Positivist and the Ontologist: Bergmann,
sition to idealism and coherence accounts of Carnap and Logical Realism (Amsterdam,
truth. The paradox championed by F. H. 2001).
Bradley is resolved by acknowledging that facts Introducing Analytic Philosophy: Its Sense
are complex but, having logical form, cannot be and Its Nonsense, 1879–2002 (Frankfurt
analyzed into constituents. Employing definite am Main, 2003).
descriptions in an innovative version of a cor-
respondence theory of truth, he acknowledges Further Reading
a basic intentional relation holding between Sellars, Wilfrid. “Hochberg on Mapping,
primitive terms (thought items) and their ref- Meaning, and Metaphysics,” Midwest
erents but not between thoughts and facts. This Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977): 214–24.
avoids possible facts.
Hochberg philosophizes by means of an Larry Lee Blackman
“improved language” of the sort developed in
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HOCKING
HOCKING, Richard Boyle O’Reilly himself. With Frank OPPENHEIM he helped to

(1906–2001) complete the editing of Royce’s lectures on
metaphysics that his father had started decades
Richard Hocking was born on 26 August 1906 earlier. Hocking’s broad interests also encom-
in Berkeley, California. His father, William E. passed the history of philosophy, especially
HOCKING, was professor of philosophy at the Augustine and Hegel, Asian religion and phi-
University of California at Berkeley at that losophy, and continental thought. He was a
time. His mother, Agnes Boyle O’Reilly member of many professional societies. He
Hocking, founded Shady Hill School in was President of the Society for Philosophy of
Cambridge in 1915, after his father became a Religion in 1954 and President of the
professor at Harvard University. Richard went Metaphysical Society of America in 1969. He
to his mother’s school and then Phillips also was a member of the American
Academy in Andover, Massachusetts. He Philosophical Association, the Academy of
earned his BS cum laude in mathematics and Political Science, the Hegel Society of America,
science at Harvard in 1928, and an MA in the Society for Asian and Comparative
1930. He was a laboratory assistant at Philosophy, and the Society for
California Institute of Technology in 1930–31, Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy.
but decided to pursue philosophy. In 1935
Hocking received his PhD in philosophy from BIBLIOGRAPHY
Yale University, and he also had a year of “The Influence of Mathematics on Royce’s
study at the University of Berlin in 1933–4. Metaphysics,” Journal of Philosophy 53
Hocking was instructor of philosophy at the (1956): 77–91.
University of Minnesota from 1935 to 1937, “Royce, Forty Years Later,” Review of
and assistant professor at Williams College Metaphysics 10 (1956): 64–72.
from 1937 to 1940. From 1940 to 1946 he Types of Philosophy, 3rd edn, with William
taught at the University of California, Los E. Hocking (New York, 1959).
Angeles, and from 1946 to 1949 he taught at “Introduction,” in Josiah Royce’s Seminar,
the University of Chicago. In 1949 Hocking 1913–1914, as Recorded in the
became professor of philosophy at Emory Notebooks of Harry T. Costello, ed.
University, at the invitation of Leroy LOEMKER Grover Smith (New Brunswick, N.J.,
to join him in establishing a philosophy 1963).
graduate program. Hocking taught at Emory “Event, Act, and Presence,” Review of
for twenty-one years, retiring in 1970. He was Metaphysics 24 (1970): 39–56.
chair of the department during 1962–6. In “Emergence and Embodiment: A Dialectic
1971 he and his wife, Katherine Ewing within Process,” in The Recovery of
Hocking, who was the Director of the Federal Philosophy in America: Essays in Honor
Theatre in Chicago from 1936 to 1939, of John Edwin Smith, ed. Thomas P.
decided to move to a family home and manage Kasulis (Albany, N.Y., 1997).
a farm in New Hampshire. During his many Other Relevant Works
remaining years Hocking continued to write Ed. with William E. Hocking and Frank
and participate in philosophical societies, com- Oppenheim, Metaphysics, by Josiah
munity organizations, and the Republican Royce (Albany, N.Y., 1998).
Party. He died on 11 March 2001 in Madison,
New Hampshire. Further Reading
Hocking shared his father’s interests in Proc of APA v76
idealism, Josiah ROYCE, and process thought,
and became an accomplished Royce scholar John R. Shook
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HOCKING
HOCKING, William Ernest (1873–1966) Public School, holding that position for four
years while he earned enough money to
William Ernest Hocking was born on 10 continue his education. Hocking chose to
August 1873 in Cleveland, Ohio, and died on attend Harvard University to study with James,
12 June 1966 at his farm near Madison, New although when he enrolled in 1899 James was
Hampshire. Hocking was the only son and the away delivering the Gifford Lectures, which
oldest of five children born to William Francis became The Varieties of Religious Experience
Hocking, a physician, and Julia Carpenter Pratt (1902).
Hocking, a schoolteacher. The family moved At Harvard, Hocking was exposed to a
west to Joliet, Illinois in 1881. Hocking was remarkable collection of philosophers, includ-
raised in a devout Methodist family with daily ing Josiah ROYCE, George SANTAYANA, and
prayer, Bible reading and recitation. Later, the eventually James. Hocking received his BA in
stated purpose of his most influential work, 1901 and his MA in 1902. He traveled to
The Meaning of God in Human Experience, Germany in 1902–3, studying with Wilhelm
was devoted to probing “the nature and worth Windelband and Edmund Husserl, becoming
of religion – what it consists of in the way of fast and lifelong friends with the latter. He
experience, belief, and action; what comes of it returned to Harvard in 1903 and completed the
in the way of support, outlook, and actual pro- PhD in philosophy in 1904, writing his disser-
ductiveness.” (p. 3) Confronting an agnostic tation on “The Elementary Experience of Other
age with the aim of restoring some meaning to Conscious Beings in Relation to the Elementary
worship, prayer, and religious practices that Experiences of Physical and Reflexive Objects.”
were coming to be seen as superstitious or Royce directed the doctoral thesis and its com-
pointless was one of the early goals of pletion corresponded with the publication of
Hocking’s philosophical efforts. He did not Royce’s own Outlines of Psychology. Hocking,
seek to restore the place of these traditional like so many other distinguished Harvard
practices, but rather to reinterpret them in ways products of that generation, such as George
that would make them both intellectually Herbert MEAD, John Elof BOODIN, W. E. B.
respectable and practically efficacious. He also DU BOIS, and Alain LOCKE, was caught in a
reported a conversion experience at the age of battle of giants, among James, Royce and
twelve, including a mystical vision in which he Santayana. In the case of Hocking, Royce was
saw his own soul in the company of a histori- the victor for his philosophical soul, but no
cal procession of such souls. His later engage- student of the three great philosophers ever
ment with and defense of philosophical mysti- wholly shed the influence of any of them. That
cism should be understood as an extension of Hocking should have written on philosophical
this experience. psychology indicates a culmination in his earlier
Hocking finished high school at age fifteen fascination with James’s psychology. Hocking
and worked at various trades to earn money for remained convinced throughout his life that
college, such as surveying, printing, and map- the social sciences could act as a solid guide to
making. His family moved to Newton, Iowa in responsible philosophical reflection, so long as
1893, and from 1894 to 1896 Hocking both strove to be ever more scientific, in the
attended Iowa State College, studying primar- broad sense of German Wissenschaft, rather
ily civil engineering. There he read William than the narrower, reductionist ideas of natural
JAMES’s Principles of Psychology (1890), which science that were gaining in popularity through-
made a great impression on him. He moved in out Hocking’s career. This optimism about the
1896 to Davenport, Iowa, where he taught possibilities for human knowledge was not only
mathematics at Duncan Business College, and a characteristic of Hocking’s thought, but of his
later was made Principal of the Davenport personality, which is often described as tena-
1129
HOCKING
cious in its optimism. Hocking was the product completing the long expected technical meta-
of a progressive and relatively peaceful age, physics he always intended to write. However,
and his optimism should be seen in that light. the practical application of personal idealism
Hocking’s initial appointment after gradua- was perhaps the legacy he was best able to
tion was teaching philosophy at Andover bring forward from the combined influences of
Theological Seminary from 1904 to 1906, James and Royce, and indeed, Hocking well
followed by two years at the University of exceeded his teachers in this effort.
California at Berkeley, where he had been Three other aspects of Hocking’s life deserve
invited by Royce’s and James’s old friend and to be mentioned. Biographical writings about
philosophical sparring partner, George Holmes Hocking commonly place great emphasis on
HOWISON. Howison was an idealist, like Royce, the powerful influence and strong personality
and Hocking’s idealist leanings were reinforced of his wife, Agnes Boyle O’Reilly, to whom
during his years in California. Howison’s com- Hocking was married from 1905 until her
mitment to personalism was more explicit than death in 1955. Agnes was the daughter of an
Royce’s and Hocking’s own later insistence Irish nationalist revolutionary and poet, and she
upon person may have been reinforced by was a staunch Roman Catholic while he was a
Howison’s views. In 1908 Hocking was called devout Methodist. The couple negotiated
to Yale University where he taught philosophy religion as they negotiated everything and
for six years while finishing The Meaning of attended the Episcopal Church. In many ways
God in Human Experience, which appeared in the partnership in life was also a collaboration
1912. This well-received and widely reviewed in Hocking’s work. Second, Hocking was
work resulted in Hocking’s call back to responsible for luring Alfred North WHITEHEAD
Harvard as professor of philosophy in 1914 to Harvard in 1925, a move that changed
where he remained until his retirement in 1943. American philosophy and the history of phi-
Hocking’s service at Harvard was interrupted losophy. Whitehead’s philosophical aspirations
by service in World War I, for which he vol- had not been nurtured in his appointments at
unteered in spite of his age (he turned forty- Cambridge and London, and had Hocking not
three in 1916), and was assigned initially to use drawn Whitehead to Harvard, it is doubtful
his engineering background in France. He was whether Whitehead would have written his
soon reassigned to teach recruits in New most important philosophical work. Hocking’s
England moral issues courses related to sol- conviction that Whitehead ought to write phi-
diering. This endeavor resulted in a book, losophy was an important moment of vision,
Morale and Its Enemies (1918), and marked supported by the ability to see the plan through,
the beginning of a lifelong interest in national all greatly to Hocking’s credit. Third, Hocking’s
and international affairs, regarding which he lifelong friendship with Gabriel Marcel proved
wrote several later books. to be important in terms of keeping European
Hocking’s life was remarkable for tireless phenomenology and existentialism in dialogue
public service. He traveled widely and was with American philosophy. Through Hocking,
sought all over the world as a speaker, served Marcel introduced Royce’s theory of interpre-
on countless committees and commissions and tation and community to European thinkers
very much allowed his writing (some 17 books in 1913, and Royce’s and Hocking’s ideas
and around 270 articles, chapters and reviews) (more than their names) have continued to play
to be guided by these public concerns. His prag- an important role in the years since.
matism is evinced in his willingness to expend Hocking’s philosophical contributions begin
his best energies upon the social, moral, polit- with a perspective on the psychology of per-
ical and religious issues of his day. This habit of ception and range outwards into every branch
serving the common good prevented him from of philosophy. The psychological insight with
1130
HOCKING
so many epistemological consequences is that Hocking’s empiricism is a version of James’s

“feeling is cognitive.” Depending upon what is radical empiricism which requires an attitude of
meant by “feeling” and “cognitive,” Hocking’s openness not only to what is particular in expe-
position may also be understood as similar to rience, but also what is broadly indicated in its
the central insights of Whitehead and Charles outlines. It is natural to alternate between speci-
HARTSHORNE, and it is a view fundamental to ficities and particularities in experience, and
all process philosophy, which stresses that the the generalities to which they point. This “prin-
ground of all experience is the feeling of feeling. ciple of alternation” provides the natural
Events experience each other, feel each other. processes by which feeling is refined into ideas.
This is a place where Hocking certainly inter- Pragmatism plays a more cautionary than con-
sects with that tradition. Indeed, a case can be structive role in Hocking’s thought at this point.
made that Hocking is properly understood as We are enabled by pragmatic criticism to learn
a process philosopher, since he argued that when a generalization has failed to issue in
“idealism fails to work … chiefly because it is practical consequences. As a check on the gen-
unfinished.” He continues: “Unfinishedness is eralization phase of our natural alternation
not in itself a blemish … but there are tolera- between part and whole, pragmatism is invalu-
ble and intolerable kinds of unfinishedness.” able. But pragmatism, according to Hocking,
(1912, pp. x–xi) He argues that until idealism does not contribute much to the construction of
finds a path from the abstract to the concrete, a positive philosophy. Although we can never
its unfinishedness will be intolerable, but when have full understanding of the whole, con-
idealism becomes sufficiently concrete as to structive philosophy requires ideals, and prag-
inform everyday life, it will be unfinished in the matism is ill-equipped to deal with the role of
tolerable sense. Arguably, this is the move that ideals in philosophical speculation, although it
distinguishes process philosophy from idealism. generally tries to make a place for them in
Whether or not Hocking is regarded as a moral life. Where Royce understood how
process philosopher, it is clear that his move in partial experience opened out onto a whole, he
the direction of the concrete is one he attributes was more optimistic about the capacity of
to the role of pragmatism in his thinking. human intelligence to grasp that whole than
Feeling in Hocking’s view is social before it can Hocking’s type of radical empiricism allows.
be individual, and its immediacy just is the Hocking believed that some a priori knowl-
originally undifferentiated orientation of a par- edge was genuine, but not generalizations
ticular perspective upon a broader reality. extending to the whole of reality. James, on the
Individuality develops later, sociality being its other hand, was ruling out any role for a priori
basis. Hence, we are with others before we knowledge, and Hocking believed we could
have selves. And it is others we understand achieve more than he allowed by reasoning
first and foremost in the act of experiencing. upon the particulars of concrete experience and
Our self-understanding, when it comes and generalizing responsibly. This is, methodolog-
such as it is, is a reflection upon what we ically speaking, the middle path Hocking was
understand about others. This is not first or able to negotiate using his insight into the cog-
foremost a cognitive process for Hocking, it is nitive value of feeling. Feeling is not a dead
a process of feeling, a natural process, with end, it is an opening outward onto what is gen-
psychological results. To this extent he follows uinely and immediately there, and taking its
Royce’s notions about the “community of natural course it develops into ideas, which are
interpretation.” Yet Hocking seeks to make generalizations from a unique perspective of
Royce’s account of community and interpre- what is felt.
tation empirical by means of a theory of Hocking came to believe his insight about the
feeling. cognitive value of feeling was an advance on
1131
HOCKING
Royce. He also believed this view about feeling psychologies, in preference for empirical ones.
can be maintained within an idealistic frame- Consequently, Hocking sees the necessity we
work. His case turns upon a view of immedi- seem to discover in logical relations as a neces-
acy that links psychology to metaphysics sity strictly internal to the accounts of logic
through epistemology and attributes to mystical and reason we have offered, highly mediated
experience an unusually significant role in accounts based on our reflection upon experi-
knowing, significant because exemplary. The ence, understood historically, culturally, and
notion of immediacy that Hocking defends symbolically.
depends in a crucial way upon his conception The basis for this view of the mediated char-
of the person, individual existence and the role acter of knowledge is again the cognitive value
of communication in constituting relations of feeling. Hocking argues that feeling always
among persons. These topics inform, in turn, strains to produce ideas: all feelings strive
Hocking’s ethical and political philosophies. toward a sort of self-clarification, and the
What sort of “idealism” issues from the resulting ideas cannot exist alone but depend
claim that “feeling has cognitive value”? This for their very being upon these prior feelings.
view of feeling has many implications. Hocking The sociality of feelings then requires articula-
always took for granted the need for a meta- tion along both a subjective and objective side.
physics of individuality that preserved person- On the subjective side, immediate social feelings
hood and freedom, but he departed from the develop according to an immanent dynamism
logic-driven versions of idealism that were that is the community of interpretation.
dominant in his formative years. Rather, he Subsequent mediated experience, including
took his direction from a more intuitive, knowledge, draws both its content and exis-
concrete, and pragmatic sense of human expe- tence from this immediate social feeling.
rience that first affirms the validity of interper- Among the basic characteristics of immediate
sonal experience and only then seeks a con- feeling, apart from its sociality, are that it is
ceptual understanding that will be maximally personal, plural, communicative, and presup-
consistent with experience and true of it, insofar poses freedom. On the objective side, this view
as language and abstract expression permit. of immediacy requires, in turn, a broader
This account sees logic as the best articulation account of the existing order in which finite
of the ordering activity of the mind, but refuses human beings exist, and a creative role for
to give any logic the status of the necessary them. For this science reason is useful, but
lawgiver of the mind, and even less would logic reason is only one among many principles that
be binding upon the structures of existence. mind employs in understanding and describing
Logic is rather a result of the efforts of finite its reality. In attempting to show how ideas
minds to grasp what they are already doing, are always already present in every feeling, and
and any account of the logic of mental activity lead inexorably to thoughts, Hocking is
would need to be revisable in light of a better obliged, therefore, to explain what the being of
understanding of the powers and limitations of feeling could be, apart from the immediate
finite minds, with the best understanding being experience of it. The ensuing metaphysical
provided by the progress of the social sciences. issues run as follows: Granting that feeling and
Thus, as the project of self-knowledge proceeds desire are social, intentional in structure and
in history and cumulative experience, we issue in thought, why does feeling exist rather
should expect to have to revise our under- than nothing? Granting that no one can
standing of logic. Hocking’s view involves relin- honestly doubt that he or she experiences
quishing the claim that any given logic is the feeling, what creates it? Is feeling one or many,
foundation of all mental activity, and it also ultimately? Is its knowledge-content meaning-
turns away from idealistic and philosophical ful apart from each particular occurrence of
1132
HOCKING
each feeling? If so, what validity supports the overly abstract. It is here that Hocking turns to
claim that it is either one or many? These are mystical experience for assistance. In what
the sorts of questions Hocking would have types of experience may we find the ground of
addressed in the complete metaphysics he an inferential knowledge of the personal reality
promised but never published. He wrote much of the other?
of what was needed to address these questions According to Hocking, the “immediate expe-
for his Gifford Lectures in 1938–9, but his rience of the Real is regarded by the mystics as
revision of them was interrupted by World a somewhat unusual or privileged state of being
War II, and no revision ever brought these … a sort of initiation, after which one is no
writings to a form that satisfied Hocking. His longer an outsider in the world.” (1939, p.
subsequent writings develop more thoroughly 453) More importantly, “the mystic is a radical,
the personal, ethical, and political aspects of his without caution, trimming, or compromise, in
basic stance. his assertion of the essential value of life.”
Hocking addresses with some thoroughness (1939, p. 455) The essential value of life is not
the intersubjective basis for inferring some asserted first as a theoretical principle or a uni-
aspects of the existential order. His account of versal law, but as a practical condition of the
communication and response exemplifies this transformed will of the mystic.
aspect of his thought. We find our own imme-
diate experience fragmentary and incomplete; There is a transition in the will that cannot be
Hocking says: effected by will – for will operates only on
something outside itself – by which one
To anything that appears in our life with the passes into identity with the One which is
character of a response, we instinctively also the Good. It is as if one who has been
attribute outer personality … . God is most saying ‘You’ to another person, now begins
real, undoubtedly, to that person who finds to say ‘We’: in this transition from the second
his prayers responded to; for, to paraphrase person to the first, there is a new element of
Royce’s criterion, response is our best ground identification, without change in the objec-
for believing the social object is real. Upon tive facts of the world. The ineffable reality
this way of reaching the Other Mind … we has to be adequately discerned by an ineffa-
are still left with only an inference of that ble will-attitude. (1939, pp. 464–5)
Other; a faith and not a knowledge of expe-
rience. Even though we say, with Royce, that In this Hocking sees the “essential difference”
reality is nothing else than response (or ful- between his view and previous forms of
filling of meaning), we have not so far as idealism, since “the idealist believes the world
this criterion goes, found that reality personal is a Self,” while “the mystic holds that this
save by probability of high order. We can still knowledge is accurate without being adequate,
speak only of ‘the source of our belief in the or quite deserving the name of knowledge”
reality of our fellow men’, not of an experi- (1939, pp. 465). This philosophical stance
ence of that reality itself. (1912, pp. 248–9) places great importance upon the “will,” and
this idea is what connects Hocking’s meta-
Hocking was not satisfied with a merely infer- physics, method, and theory of knowledge to
ential knowledge regarding the personal char- his ethical and political philosophy.
acter of reality and therefore finds Royce’s One point in which both of Hocking’s
response theory inadequate phenomenologi- teachers, James and Royce, concurred was the
cally, and his logical solution to the problem in centrality of “will” to philosophical under-
his proofs for the existence of God from the standing. Both defended the practical character
reality of error (1885) and ignorance (1895) of all volitional activity, and this is a mark of
1133
HOCKING
the move to pragmatism in this generation. way of the transformation of immediate feeling
Hocking followed James and Royce, but he into cognitively elaborated values. We con-
recognized more clearly than either of them sciously pursue our own moral evolution, and
that the genuine problems with pragmatic vol- we do so in community. A “passion for right-
untarism are the ones Friedrich Nietzsche raised eousness” becomes the creative impetus in
in his accounts of the will to power. Hence, creating a preservative, “a world faith” in
from his earliest ethical writings Hocking which the permanent moral gains of
sought to reinterpret Nietzsche’s “will to humankind are built upon indefinitely.
power” in light of a different metaphysic.
Where Nietzsche had seen in nature a violent BIBLIOGRAPHY
play of primal forces which resulted in nature’s A Union for Ethical Action (Cambridge,
being “dismembered into individuals,” Mass., 1904).
Hocking saw the individual as a union of oppo- The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for
sites that is the product and creative center of Human Happiness (Palo Alto, Cal., 1907).
the development of a quality of will that finds The Meaning of God in Human Experience
its apex in virtuous life and democratic com- (New Haven, Conn., 1912).
munity. The push and pull of individuals Human Nature and Its Remaking (New
against one another is preserved and turned in Haven, Conn., 1918; 2nd edn 1923, 3rd
a creative direction by democratic social orga- edn 1929).
nization, wherein the individuality of each will Morale and Its Enemies (New Haven, Conn.,
is preserved and allowed a creative place in the 1918).
overall growth of community. Hocking The Present Status of the Philosophy of Law
provides an agapic revision of the will to power, and of Rights (New Haven, Conn., 1926).
in which “seeking power” and “loving Man and the State (New Haven, Conn.,
mankind” are not separable, insofar as we seek 1926).
to be providential to one another, or ultimately, The Self, Its Body, and Freedom (New
to stand in God’s place in service to each other. Haven, Conn., 1928).
Power, therefore, exercised in its most creative Types of Philosophy (New York, 1929; 2nd
form, is a kind of service to the other through edn 1939; 3rd edn 1959).
which I gain myself by losing it for the other. The Spirit of World Politics: With Special
Love without power “is not fit to survive,” Studies of the Near East (New York,
Hockings says, placing the truth Nietzsche had 1932).
gleaned about historical Christian reality in a Evangelism: An Address on Permanence and
different light. But there is nothing slavish in the Change in Church and Mission (Chicago,
creative and transformed will to power which 1935).
is power for another rather than mere self- Thoughts on Death and Life (New York,
assertion. In the individualist form “the will to 1937).
power cannot be satisfied in its generality: it The Lasting Elements of Individualism (New
must be satisfied in changing conditions.” Haven, Conn., 1937).
(1918, p. 97) Hence, in seeking to become what Living Religions and a World Faith (New
we are, we are obliged to change our commu- York, 1940).
nities. Hocking therefore holds the individual What Man Can Make of Man (New York,
person to be the creative node that communi- 1942).
ties produce in their evolution and histories, Arab Nationalism and Political Zionism
and which in turn transforms those communi- (Flint, Mich., 1944).
ties, either for better or for worse. Our “vital The Church and the New World Mind, with
circuits” become in ethical life “will-circuits” by others (St. Louis, 1944).
1134
HODGE
Science and the Idea of God (Chapel Hill, in Honor of William Ernest Hocking (The
N.C., 1944). Hague, 1966). Contains a bibliography of
The Immortality of Man (Lancaster, Penn., Hocking’s writings.
1945). Thigpen, Robert B. Liberty and Community:
The Coming World Civilization (New York, The Political Philosophy of William Ernest
1956). Hocking (The Hague, 1972).
The Meaning of Immortality in Human
Experience, including Thoughts on Death Randall E. Auxier
and Life (New York, 1957).
Strength of Men and Nations: A Message to
the U.S. vis-á-vis the U.S.S.R. (New York,
1959).
Other Relevant Works HODGE, Charles (1797–1878)

Preface to Philosophy, with others (New
York, 1946). North America’s most articulate exponent of
Freedom of the Press in America (Leiden, Calvinism in the Victorian Age, Charles Hodge
1947). was born on 27 December 1797 in
Experiment in Education: What We Can Philadelphia. Descended from Scotch-Irish
Learn from Teaching Germany (Chicago, immigrants who had arrived in the New World
1954). in 1730, his father, Hugh Hodge, was a
A William Ernest Hocking Reader, ed. John surgeon, who served in the Continental Army
Lachs and D. Micah Hester (Nashville, during the American Revolution. His mother,
Tenn., 2004). Mary Blanchard, of Huguenot descent, had
the task of raising her son alone, as her
Further Reading husband, while practicing medicine in
Amer Nat Bio, Amer Phils Before 1950, Bio Philadelphia, died of the yellow fever the very
20thC Phils, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, year of his son’s birth. When Hodge was
Dict Amer Bio, Encyc Relig, Nat Cycl fourteen, his mother moved him to Princeton,
Amer Bio v54, Oxford Comp Phil, Pres New Jersey, which was his home for the next
Addr of APA v3, Proc of APA v40, Who sixty-eight years. While in Princeton College
Was Who in Amer v4, Who’s Who in Phil Hodge was converted, and following his grad-
Howie, John, and LeRoy H. Rouner. The uation in 1815, he attended Princeton
Wisdom of William Ernest Hocking Seminary, finishing his studies in 1819. Hodge
(Washington, D.C., 1978). embraced the theology and philosophy of
Luther, A. R. Existence as Dialectical Archibald ALEXANDER, the first professor of
Tension: A Study of the First Philosophy of Princeton Theological Seminary and the
W. E. Hocking (The Hague, 1968). founder of the famed and influential
Robinson, Daniel S. Royce and Hocking, “Princeton Theology,” a view dominant in
American Idealists: An Introduction to Presbyterianism until the 1920s. Coming to
Their Philosophy, with Selected Letters Princeton Seminary at its founding in 1812,
(Boston, 1968). Alexander had stressed a High Calvinism that
Rouner, LeRoy H. Within Human combined the “head religion” of seventeenth-
Experience: The Philosophy of William century Reformed Scholasticism and the “heart
Ernest Hocking (Cambridge, Mass., 1969). religion” of eighteenth-century Pietism.
Rouner, LeRoy H., ed. Philosophy, Religion, Charles Hodge built on his mentor’s ideas, but
and the Coming World Civilization: Essays he never passed beyond them. Called in 1822
1135
HODGE
to teach at Princeton Seminary, and, later, Tholuck is not simply trust in Christ as Savior
becoming Alexander’s successor as professor of and Scripture as a fully reliable revelation; faith
theology, Hodge allegedly boasted that “a new is also a transforming energy that won him
idea never originated in this seminary.” Hodge immortality as a teacher who truly had a
was professor of Oriental and biblical literature pastor’s heart for his students. This model pro-
from 1820 to 1840, professor of exegetical and foundly influenced Hodge, who replicated
didactic theology from 1840 to 1852, and pro- Tholuck’s virtues in his own Princeton class-
fessor of exegetical, didactic, and polemical room. Exposed to the idealism of Immanuel
theology from 1852 until 1877. Hodge died on Kant, Hodge rejected it for the Scottish or
19 June 1878 in Princeton, New Jersey. Common Sense Realism of his own upbringing
Besides the dominant role of Alexander in – which philosophy was articulated at Princeton
Hodge’s intellectual growth, European intel- University by President James MCCOSH, the
lectual influences also had a role. After four last, and perhaps greatest exponent of Scottish
years of teaching scripture at Princeton, Hodge Realism in America.
enjoyed two years (1826–8) of travel and study While at Princeton, Hodge taught more than
in Europe. Time in Paris among the French three thousand ministers, some three genera-
Reformed reinforced his devotion to that sev- tions of Presbyterian pastors. Part of his power
enteenth-century Calvinist scholastic, François was his very appearance, with his curly hair,
Turretin of Geneva. Hodge was indebted to high forehead, and wire-rimmed spectacles,
Turretin for his views on the inerrancy and making him the archetype of the Victorian
infallibility of Scripture. While in Berlin he seminary instructor. Another component of his
encountered the spirituality and theology of the personality, noted one biographer, was his
greatest Reformed theologian of the day, “solid learning,” his thorough “familiarity with
Friedrich Schleiermacher. Though he found contemporary thought,” his “strong certainty,”
Schleiermacher fascinating (he was a com- his “power for clear analytical statement” and,
pelling preacher), Hodge felt that the Berlin above all, the teacher’s art par excellence, “skill
professor had “inverted” the “coin” of in awakening minds.” For a man of “fixed
Calvin’s theology by making human depen- opinions,” Hodge was noteworthy for his
dency central, instead of divine sovereignty. “irenic spirit” and “impeccable civility.”
There is some indication, however, that Hodge Hodge’s thought had four major sources:
was influenced by Schleiermacher’s concern (1) the Reformed Scholasticism of the seven-
for empirical theology. From that concern teenth century, with its primary authority as
Hodge developed his notion of the Scripture (the magisterial principle), and its
Systematician as a “scientist” culling out secondary norms as reason, experience, con-
“facts” from the Bible for “organization” and science, and tradition (the ministerial princi-
“interpretation.” ple); (2) the empirical method of the nineteenth
The most profound impact of Hodge’s century, with its passion for gathering “facts,”
European sojourn came not from Reformed, suggested to Hodge that the Bible was the
but from Lutheran theologians. In Halle, where source of the data to be garnered and synthe-
the “afterglow of Pietism” was still evident, sized by the systematician; (3) the Scottish
Hodge formed a lifelong friend with the Common Sense realism of the time, with its
German exegete, Friedrich August Tholuck. emphasis on accepting appearances at face
Tholuck was profoundly committed to a super- value; and (4) and the motivating passion of
natural understanding of Christianity, to a Christian experience, as evidenced in America’s
recovery of Pauline theology (especially the “Great Awakenings.”
doctrine of justification), and to a re-apprecia- The content of Hodge’s theology was clas-
tion of the though of Martin Luther. Faith for sical Calvinism. He accepted the absolute
1136
HODGE
authority of Scripture, with a doctrine of which, to Hodge, placed far too much
plenary inspiration (“Inspiration extends to emphasis on emotion, neglecting the vital role
everything which any sacred writer teaches as of reason in faith. Fourth, the New Haven
important, as e.g., that Satan tempted our first theology of Nathaniel Taylor, who contended
parents in the form of a serpent”). He relied on for human initiative and responsibility and
the supreme sovereignty of God, who “rules denied “providential decrees,” arguing that
and over-rules” all things; while God “per- man “not only can if he will, but he can if he
mitted” the fall of man, he did not “cause” it. won’t.” Fifth, Edwards Amasa Park and
He believed that humanity, created good, is Andover New England Theology, a modified
now in a “ruined” state, for each soul, created Calvinism. Sixth, the Mercersburg theology of
directly by God, “inherits” from Adam, the Philip SCHAFF and John W. Nevin, who were
“Federal Head” of the species, the “original much in sympathy with theological, liturgical,
sin” resulting in alienation from God. Apart and philosophical movements in the German
from a saving relationship with Jesus Christ United (Lutheran/Reformed) Church, and
(both assent to his intellectual truths and emo- envisioned the complementary nature of
tional trust in his grace), humans are eternally Roman Catholic and Protestant theology
lost. He viewed the new Community, or the (Evangelical Catholic). To Hodge this was a
Church, as composed of those elected by God compromise of the Reformation’s emphasis
for salvation, although Hodge allowed for the on Word Alone (Sola Scriptura), Faith Alone
salvation of unbaptized infants, and he mused, (Sola Fide), and Grace Alone (Sola Gratia).
“we have reason to believe … that the number Hodge advocated his “Princeton Theology”
of the finally lost in comparison with the whole not only in the classroom but in his biblical
number of the saved will be very inconsider- commentaries on Romans (1835), Ephesians
able.” Finally, Hodge held a belief in (1856), and 1 and 2 Corinthians (1857).
“futurity,” or the ultimate uncontested reign of Hodge’s greatest work was his famed three-
God on earth and in heaven, following the volume Systematic Theology (1872–3), still in
return of Christ, to usher in “a new and eternal print and in use in the twenty-first century.
age.” Hodge also wrote a popular study of doctrine
The teachings of Hodge were at odds with six for laypeople (The Way of Life, 1841) as well
other main streams of American religious as a “repudiation” of Darwin (What is
thought. First, Unitarianism, which had captured Darwinism?, 1874). Hodge also edited, after
a sizeable part of the Congregationalist tradition, 1825, the Biblical Repertory and Princeton
including Harvard; for Hodge, the full divinity Review. He wrote more than a hundred and
of Jesus was a “non-negotiable” part of fifty articles for it during his forty-six years as
Christianity. Second, Arminianism and editor. Besides teaching and writing, Hodge
Methodism, then rapidly replacing Calvinism served as Moderator of the “Old School”
as the majority movement in American Presbyterian Church in 1846.
Protestantism. For Hodge, their views were It is almost impossible to overestimate the
flawed in two major respects: the volitional impact of Charles Hodge on American
and the soteriological. The freedom of the thought. He took the Princeton Theology
human will to decide “for” or “against” faith introduced by Alexander and gave it a form
in Christ (an anthropological problem) was and direction that was continued by his suc-
anathema to Hodge. The cooperation of cessor – his son, Archibald Alexander Hodge
human and divine wills in salvation, or syner- – and by Benjamin Breckinridge WARFIELD. As
gism, to Hodge undermined the doctrine of developed by J. Gresham Machen, Princeton
justification. Third, the “new measures” of Theology survived the liberal–fundamentalist
Charles Finney and the Oberlin theology, controversy of the 1920s, finding a new home
1137
HODGE
in Westminister Theological Seminary. Within Barker, William S. “The Social Views of

the Reformed tradition, the heritage of Hodge Charles Hodge (1797–1878): A Study in
continued among conservative evangelicals in 19th-Century Calvinism and
a variety of denominations. Because of his Conservatism,” Covenant Seminary
articulation of a “high view of Scripture” Review 1 (1975): 1–22.
Hodge won a permanent place of honor Danhol, Ralph J. Charles Hodge as
among American evangelicals (as varied as Dogmatician (Goes, The Netherlands,
Missouri Synod Lutherans and Southern 1929).
Baptists). Within the Protestant world, Hodge, Archibald Alexander. The Life of
Hodge’s theology offered a major alternative Charles Hodge (New York, 1880).
to the religious liberalism that came to Hoffecker, W. A. Piety and the Princeton
dominate American religion by the 1920s. Theologians: Archibald Alexander,
Within the intellectual community, Hodge Charles Hodge, and Benjamin Warfield
showed how Calvinism, even for the twentieth (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1981).
century, could still be a valid and vital intel- Noll, Mark A. “The Founding of Princeton
lectual option. Seminary,” Westminister Theological
Journal 42 (1979): 72–110.
BIBLIOGRAPHY ———, ed. The Princeton Theology,
A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans 1812–1921 (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1983).
(Philadelphia, 1835). Salmond, C. A. Princetonians: Charles and
The Way of Life (Philadelphia, 1841). A. A. Hodge: With Class and Table Talk
A Commentary on the Epistle to the of Hodge the Younger (Edinburgh, 1888).
Ephesians (New York, 1856). Sandeen, Ernest R. “The Princeton
An Exposition of the First Epistle to the Theology: One Source of Biblical
Corinthians (New York, 1857). Literalism in American Protestantism,”
An Exposition of the Second Epistle to the Church History 31 (1962): 307–21.
Corinthians (New York, 1857). Wells, David F., ed. Reformed Theology in
Systematic Theology, 3 vols (New York, America: A History of Its Modern
1872–3). Development (Grand Rapids, Mich.,
What is Darwinism? (New York, 1874). 1985).
Wells, Jonathan. Charles Hodge’s Critique
Other Relevant Works of Darwinism (Lewiston, N.Y. 1988).
Hodge’s papers are at Princeton University.
The Constitutional History of the C. George Fry
Presbyterian Church in the United States
of America (Philadelphia, 1840).
Essays and Reviews: Selected from the
Princeton Review (New York, 1857).
Noll, Mark A., ed. Charles Hodge: The Way
of Life and Selected Writings (Grand HOFMANN, Hans (1880–1966)
Rapids, Mich., 1987).
Johann Georg Albert (Hans) Hofmann was
Further Reading born on 21 March 1880 in Weissenburg,
Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, Germany. His formal training in art began in
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Comp Amer 1898, when he enrolled in Moritz Heymann’s
Thought, Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer Munich Art School. In 1903 he befriended
Religious Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v10 department store owner and art collector
1138
HOFMANN
Phillip Freudenberg, who sponsored Hofmann’s contributions continue to remain

Hofmann’s art studies in Paris. While in Paris, influential to the philosophical foundations of
Hofmann attended classes at the Académie de abstract art being done today. Of particular
la Grande Chaumière, where he met fellow importance are Hofmann’s ideas concerning the
artists Henri Matisse, Pablo Picasso, Fernand issues of color and form as primary elements in
Leger, and Georges Braque. In 1910 Hofmann painting that allow for the creation of pictorial
held his first one-man exhibition of paintings space and the illusion of depth through the
at the Paul Cassirier Gallery in Berlin. In 1915 tensions of form and color. Equally important
Hofmann opened the Hans Hofmann Schule are Hofmann’s ideas regarding the relationship
für Bildende Kunst in Munich; among his of positive to negative space in conjunction with
students were Louise Nevelson, Alfred Jensen, form and color, resulting in a sense of “push and
and Ludwig Sander. pull” on a two-dimensional surface.
Hofmann was invited to teach at the
University of California at Berkeley in the BIBLIOGRAPHY
summer of 1930. In 1931 Hofmann returned to Creation in Form and Color: A Textbook for
Berkeley for a second term, where he wrote Instruction in Art, trans. Glenn Wessels
Creation in Form and Color: A Textbook for (1931, unpublished). Rewritten as Das
Instruction in Art, which was a major unpub- Malerbuch: Form und Farbe in der
lished treatise on his philosophy and teaching Gestaltung. Manuscript is at the University
methods concerning art. Hofmann permanently of California, Berkeley.
moved to New York City in 1932, where he The Search For The Real And Other Essays,
opened the Hans Hofmann School of Fine Arts ed. Sara T. Weeks and Bartlett H. Hayes, Jr.
two years later. As a teacher, Hofmann was (Andover, Mass., 1948).
highly repected; he taught such students as Hans Hofmann: New Paintings, catalog for
George McNeil, Burgoyne Diller, and Lee exhibition of 7–25 January 1958 (New
Krasner. Hofmann had his first one-man exhi- York, 1958).
bition in New York City at Peggy Guggenheim’s “Hans Hofmann on Art,” Art Journal 22
Gallery in 1944 and was included in the (1963): 180, 182.
“Contemporary American Painting Exhibition”
at the Whitney Museum of American Art in Other Relevant Works
New York City in 1945. In 1960 Hofmann was “Art in America,” Art Digest 4 (August 1930):
included in the XXX Venice Biennale. Hofmann 27.
died on 17 February 1966 in New York City. “Painting and Culture,” Fortnightly 1 (11
In 1948 Hofmann published a collection of September 1931), pp. 5–7.
writings entitled The Search for the Real. “On the Aims of Art,” trans. Ernst Stolz and
Hofmann’s ideas had an immediate impact on Glenn Wessels, Fortnightly 1 (26 February
abstract art during this time, particularly influ- 1932): 7–11.
encing the “New York School” of abstract
expressionist painters. Hofmann explored the Further Reading
plastic relations that give rise to a vitality that Goodman, Cynthia. Hans Hofmann (New
becomes spiritual. He quoted Spinoza while York, 1986).
urging artists to abandon the banality of the Greenberg, Clement. Hans Hofmann (Paris,
material (1948, p. 62). His statement that “the 1961).
aim of art is to vitalize form” echoes Susanne
LANGER’S definition of art as presentational form Lyle J. Salmi
or forms of feeling.
In both his capacities as painter and teacher,
1139
HOFFER
HOFFER, Eric (1902–83) self-doubt, and insecurity. He concluded that

the absence of a positive self-esteem caused
Eric Hoffer was born on 25 July 1902 in people to search for meaning in their own life
Bronx, New York. He died on 20 May 1983 by becoming obsessed with the mundane
in San Francisco, California. Hoffer’s parents details of other people’s lives. In so doing, they
were immigrants from Alsatian Germany. By became unwitting puppets, blind to how they
the time he was five, Hoffer could both speak were controlled by the malevolent machina-
and read German and English. At the age of tions of “true believers.”
seven, perhaps due to a fall down stairs, he In 1955, responding to calls for more of his
went blind; this was also about the time his historical-philosophical commentary, he
mother died. For the next eight years he lived produced The Passionate State of Mind. In
under the care of a Martha Bauer, a woman 1963 came the book that many consider his
who had accompanied his parents to America. greatest achievement, The Ordeal of Change.
He recovered his sight when he was fifteen, but In 1964 the University of California at
he never attended school. His father died when Berkeley made Hoffer a special guest lecturer.
he was eighteen; Hoffer bought a one-way In 1967, after the appearance of The Temper
train ticket to California with his inheritance. of Our Time that year, he was interviewed by
From 1920 to 1930 he worked at odd jobs Eric Severeid on national television, adding to
and lived in Los Angeles’s skid row. his fame. President Lyndon Johnson was so
Throughout the 1930s he worked as a migrant impressed by his working-class persona and
worker, following the crops up and down philosophy that he invited Hoffer for a visit to
California. Whenever he could, he read books the White House and then named him to the
from lending libraries along the rail lines. In Commission on the Causes and Prevention of
1942, with the war’s job boom, he became a Violence.
longshoreman on the San Francisco water- In retirement Hoffer produced Working and
front and worked there until his retirement in Thinking on the Waterfront (1969), taken
1967. from the journal he kept while a longshore-
In the late 1940s Hoffer began writing a man; First Things, Last Things (1971);
manuscript based on his wide reading and Reflections on the Human Condition (1973);
observations of world events. Amazingly, the In Our Time (1976); and Before the Sabbath
handwritten work was bought and published (1979). These works, like all of his books after
by Harper & Row in 1951 under the title The The True Believer, were collections of essays.
True Believer. It made an immediate stir as The essays were brief, as were the books, the
the seminal work of a day laborer who never result of long periods of reflective thought,
attended school; Hoffer was proclaimed “the honed to literary perfection by a critical and
American Rousseau.” The book analyzed both thirsty mind. He once claimed that every essay
the nature and character of mass movements had one original thought, which could not be
and the people who lead them. said of many entire books. His last book,
In The True Believer, Hoffer recognized the Between the Devil and the Dragon (1982),
central importance of self-esteem to psycho- was an ensemble of the greatest passages from
logical well-being, especially its lack. He saw his long writing career. In 1983 he was
a connection between the negative conse- awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom,
quences of low self-esteem to the rise of total- and when he died later that year, it was pinned
itarian regimes in his own time, such as to the longshoreman’s jacket during the public
Nazism and Stalinism. Hoffer noticed how viewing of his remains. Later that year, his
such governments had been able to secure memoirs, Truth Imagined, were published,
power by capitalizing on individual self-hatred, which Hoffer finished just before he died.
1140
HOHFELD
Hoffer’s work is concerned with twentieth- In Our Time (New York, 1976).
century world events and the evolution of Before the Sabbath (New York, 1979).
American democracy. He focused on human Between the Devil and the Dragon: The
nature, especially the particular breed of Best Essays and Aphorisms of Eric
human being produced by living in the United Hoffer (New York, 1982).
States. He strongly believed in the ability of
men to be productive without the support of Other Relevant Works
governments and especially without leaders. Hoffer’s papers are at the Hoover
He believed that most charismatic leaders were Institution Library and Archives at
“true believers” living in a perpetually pas- Stanford University, California.
sionate state of mind, driven by the desire to “How Natural is Human Nature?”
manipulate their fellow men eventually to their Saturday Evening Post (13 January
own ruin and many times to that of the very 1962): 26–7.
society they believed they were sent to save. He “Whose Country is America?” New York
believed that even greedy American business- Times Magazine (22 November 1970):
men were less dangerous than the “political 30–31.
saviors” of the twentieth century because all “Beware the Intellectual,” Harper’s
businessmen wanted was to make money, Magazine (October 1979): 10–11.
while true believers wanted to control man’s Truth Imagined (New York, 1983).
destiny.
Hoffer was one of the most intelligent of Further Reading
twentieth-century American writers. Whether Amer Nat Bio, Cambridge Dict Amer Bio,
a formal education would have strengthened Who Was Who in Amer v8
his grasp and interpretation of history and Baker, James T. Eric Hoffer (Boston, 1982).
psychology or diminished his creative response Koerner, James D. Hoffer’s America (La
to the events and people he studied so avidly Salle, Ill., 1973).
through personal observation and reading we Tomkins, Calvin. Eric Hoffer: An American
can never know. What remains unchallenged Odyssey (New York, 1968).
is that Hoffer was a monumentally gifted
observer and interpreter of the human condi- James T. Baker
tion, with an original thought in every essay
and in every chapter of every book he wrote.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature
of Mass Movements (New York, 1951). HOHFELD, Wesley Newcomb
The Passionate State of Mind (New York, (1879–1918)
1955).
The Ordeal of Change (New York, 1963). Wesley N. Hohfeld was born on 8 August
The Temper of Our Time (New York, 1879 in Oakland, California. He received his
1967). BA from the University of California at
Working and Thinking on the Waterfront Berkeley in 1901, winning the gold medal for
(New York, 1969). highest possible grades. Hohfeld then went to
First Things, Last Things (New York, Harvard, earning his LL.B. cum laude in 1904,
1971). where he assisted law professor John Chipman
Reflections on the Human Condition (New GRAY. Returning to California, he was a pro-
York, 1973). fessor of law at Stanford University from 1905
1141
HOHFELD
until he left in 1914 to join the faculty of Yale way to defend corporate interests when
Law School. Hohfeld was later named workers petition for organized labor rights. In
Southmayd Professor of Law, the position that addition, by grounding legal rights on personal
he held at Yale until his unexpected death on relations, the traditional category of rights that
21 October 1918 in New Haven, Connecticut. people have toward things (like property) has
Hohfeld was a conduit of transmission for been radically reconstructed. Following
legal realism from his teacher Gray to the next Hohfeld, a property right can be conceived as
generation of legal scholars that includes Karl a bundle of various rights concerning the
LLEWELLYN. Deeply suspicious of legal tradi- owned property, which can be enlarged or
tions and formalisms that vaguely use and diminished by the owner.
confuse fundamental legal concepts such as Both Hohfeld’s judicial methodology and
“right” and “duty,” Hohfeld demonstrated his conclusions about legal rights have been
how an analytical and philosophical jurispru- very influential legal theory and philosophy
dence can clarify and disentangle such of law. Besides invigorating the movement of
concepts. As presented in perhaps his most legal realism, his theories have influenced some
important essay, the two-part article economists, especially John R. COMMONS, and
“Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied several important philosophers including H. L.
in Judicial Reasoning” (1913, 1917), he argued A Hart, Jeremy Waldron, Joseph Raz, and
that a legal “right” of a person has four basic Judith Jarvis THOMSON. The course of debates
and separable meanings that refer to a claim, over the nature of legal and moral rights during
a privilege, a power, or an immunity in relation the twentieth century would have been very
to a second person. A claim is an expectation different without Hohfeld’s contributions.
that some other person(s) will fulfill a certain
duty; a privilege (or liberty) is lacking a certain BIBLIOGRAPHY
duty to another; a power is granted by an “The Individual Liability of Stockholders
authority or statute; and an immunity is having and the Conflict of Laws,” Columbia
an exemption from another’s power. Together Law Review 9 (1909): 492–522; 10
with their counterparts as viewed from the (1910): 283–326, 520–49.
perspective of the second person, namely “The Relations between Equity and Law,”
having a duty, a no-right, a liability, and a dis- Michigan Law Review 11 (1913):
ability, these eight concepts can serve as the 537–71.
most basic components of any more complex “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
legal relationship or situation. Hofheld deftly Applied in Judicial Reasoning,” Yale
categorized seemingly dissimilar legal terms Law Journal 23 (1913): 16–59; 26
together as exemplifying one or another basic (1917): 710–70.
legal concept, and revealed where legal argu- Fundamental Legal Conceptions and Other
mentation had too often become unnecessar- Legal Essays, ed. Walter Wheeler Cook
ily contorted and confused by failing to rec- (New Haven, Conn., 1919; enlarged edn
ognize such commonalities. 1923).
By defining the basic legal concepts exclu-
sively as relations that one person has with Further Reading
another, Hohfeld set himself against any and Amer Nat Bio, Dict Amer Bio, Nat Cycl
all notions of corporate or group or social Amer Bio v27, Who Was Who in
rights. Depending on the context, this indi- Amer v4
vidualistic stance on rights and duties can be Anderson, Alan R. “The Logic of
either a problem for corporations when the Hohfeldian Propositions,” Logique et
state finds business misconduct, or a useful Analyse 13 (1970): 231–44.
1142
HOLLANDS
Brady, James B. “Law, Language, and losophy at Butler University in Indiana from
Logic: The Legal Philosophy of Wesley 1910 to 1913.
Newcomb Hohfeld,” Transactions of the In 1913 Hollands became professor of phi-
Charles S. Peirce Society 8 (1972): losophy and chair of the department of phi-
246–63. losophy and psychology at the University of
Cook, Walter Wheeler. “Hohfeld’s Kansas. He replaced John E. BOODIN, who
Contributions to the Science of Law,” had been Kansas’s philosopher since 1904.
Yale Law Journal 28 (1919): 721–38. Hollands remained chair of the philosophy
Corbin Arthur L. “Jural Relations and department after its separation from psychol-
Their Classification,” Yale Law Journal ogy, and continued in that position until 1946.
30 (1921): 226–38. He served as President of the Western Division
Hart, H. L. A. The Concept of Law, 2nd of the American Philosophical Association in
edn (Oxford, 1994). 1924–5. He was a visiting professor at the
Horwitz, Morton J. The Transformation of University of Missouri during the summer of
American Law 1870–1960: The Crisis of 1924, and at the University of Southern
Legal Orthodoxy (Oxford, 1992). California in 1929–30. He retired from
Perry, Thomas D. “A Paradigm of teaching in 1949, and died on 5 December
Philosophy: Hohfeld on Legal Rights,” 1967 in Tulsa, Oklahoma.
American Philosophical Quarterly 14 Hollands absorbed much of the idealistic
(1977): 41–50. philosophy taught at Cornell during his edu-
Pound, Roscoe. “Legal Rights,” cation there. Arguing that science’s abstrac-
International Journal of Ethics 26 tions of measurable quantities and natural laws
(1915): 92–116. give only a partial perspective on nature,
“Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld,” Yale Law Hollands held that human experience could
Review 28 (1918): 166–8. not be rendered false or non-existent by natu-
ralism. A complete philosophy must take into
John R. Shook full account the qualitative feelings and aes-
thetic values of ordinary experience. The direct
apprehension of nature, in which spirit has its
home, takes a wide variety of forms, including
the religiously mystical experience. Holland
declares in “Nature and Spirit” that “experi-
HOLLANDS, Edmund Howard ences of the mystical type are absolutely fun-
(1879–1967) damental and prior to all developed intelli-
gence” (1925, p. 344).
Edmund H. Hollands was born on 11 January
1879 in Watervliet, near Albany, New York. BIBLIOGRAPHY
He received his education at Cornell “Wundt and the Doctrine of Psychical
University, where he was awarded a PhB in Analysis,” American Journal of
1899, an MA in 1901, and a PhD in philoso- Psychology 16 (1905): 499–518; 17
phy in 1905. His dissertation was entitled “The (1906): 206–26.
System of Schleiermacher as a Philosophy of “Schleiermacher’s Development of
Subjective Consciousness.” He was an instruc- Subjective Consciousness,” Philosophical
tor of philosophy at Cornell in 1905 and 1907 Review 15 (1906): 293–306.
to 1909, and also at Princeton in 1906. In “The Relation of Science to Concrete
1909–10 he taught at Hamilton College in Experience,” Philosophical Review 15
New York, and then he was professor of phi- (1906): 614–26.
1143
HOLLANDS
“Possibility and Reality,” Philosophical preted not as a precursor of twentieth-century

Review 16 (1907): 604–15. existentialism but as a Christian thinker explor-
“Neo-Realism and Idealism,” Philosophical ing human subjectivity in the interest of
Review 17 (1908): 507–17. reviving, reforming, and deepening the life of
“The Externality of Relations,” Journal of the church. In the 1960s Holmer came under
Philosophy 11 (1914): 463–70. the influence of Ludwig Wittgenstein, whom he
“Nature, Reason and the Limits of State read in a distinctive way that saw Wittgenstein’s
Authority,” Philosophical Review 25 affinities with Kierkegaard. He also felt con-
(1916): 645–61. siderable kinship with C. S. Lewis, and wrote
“Some Comments on Instrumentalism,” in a book about him.
Philosophical Essays in Honor of James Holmer’s work shows a preoccupation with
Edwin Creighton, ed. George H. Sabine the nature of theology, its relation to the
(New York, 1917), pp. 214–28. ground-level language of Christian faith, and
“Nature and Spirit,” International Journal the relation of both to the emotions and virtues
of Ethics 35 (1925): 329–45. of the faithful. He did not much like academic
theology because of its tendency either to turn
Further Reading Christianity into a big theory or to exploit it in
Pres Addr of APA v3, Proc of APA v41, the interest of some current social movement.
Who Was Who in Amer v6, Who’s Who Examples of what he took to be real theology
in Phil were the New Testament, the ancient creeds,
the sermons of John Wesley, and the prayers of
John R. Shook Samuel Johnson. He thought Christianity to be
a highly responsible way of understanding the
world, one that was less a world view or theory
about the world than a formation of character
that embedded understanding in passion and
action. A major effort of his work was to
HOLMER, Paul LeRoy (1916–2004) encourage pastors and theologians to aim at
this primitive character-forming use of the tra-
Paul L. Holmer was born on 14 November 1916 ditional language of Christian faith, a use he
in Minneapolis, Minnesota, the son of Swedish found surprisingly little practiced in churches.
Lutheran immigrants. He earned his BA and In addition to courses centered on
MA from the University of Minnesota and a Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein, Holmer taught
PhD in philosophy from Yale University in 1942. courses in philosophical theology that
His dissertation was on “Kierkegaard and the employed little of the traditional literature on
Truth.” Holmer taught philosophy at Gustavus that topic but instead nonreligious papers by J.
Adolphus College in 1944, and taught at the L. Austin, Gilbert Ryle, Peter Strawson, and
University of Minnesota from 1946 to 1958. In other analytic philosophers of the period. In
1960 he accepted a full-time appointment to the the 1960s, well before the current rage of
faculty of Yale Divinity School, where he became virtue ethics and the explosion of philosophi-
Noah Porter Professor of Philosophical cal literature on the emotions, Holmer taught
Theology. After retiring in 1987, Holmer was courses with titles like “Emotions, Passions,
succeeded to the Noah Porter chair by Nicholas and Feelings,” and “Virtues and Vices,” at
WOLTERSTORFF. Holmer died on 29 June 2004 Yale.
in St. Paul, Minnesota. Holmer exercised his influence more
Holmer was influenced early and late by the through teaching and lecturing than through
writings of Søren Kierkegaard, whom he inter- publication. From 1960 to his retirement
1144
HOLMES
Holmer exercised extensive influence on the writer, physician, and Harvard professor Oliver
minds of students and faculty alike at Yale Wendell HOLMES. Holmes Sr.’s intellectual
Divinity School, though not always in ways he pursuits earned him membership in the
himself approved. Among theologians whose Saturday Club, which included Ralph Waldo
work cannot be explained apart from EMERSON, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow,
Holmer’s influence were Brevard Childs, Hans James Russell Lowell, John Greenleaf Whittier,
FREI, Stanley HAUERWAS, George LINDBECK, and Henry JAMES, Sr. Holmes Jr. was a child-
and Don Saliers. Ralph MCINERNY attests to hood friend of William JAMES and his brother
having come under Holmer’s influence at the Henry, and also of Henry ADAMS. Holmes
University of Minnesota. entered Harvard College in 1858. He became
an editor of Harvard Magazine in July 1860,
BIBLIOGRAPHY and in October published essays on Plato and
Theology and the Scientific Study of Religion Albrecht Dürer. During his senior year, he
(Minneapolis, 1961). enlisted as a private in the Union Army, but was
C. S. Lewis: The Shape of His Faith and able to return to Harvard to graduate with his
Thought (New York, 1976). BA in 1861. Holmes was official class poet,
The Grammar of Faith (San Francisco, sharing the prize for excellence in Greek prose
1978). composition. In July 1861 Holmes received a
Making Christian Sense (Philadelphia, commission as first lieutenant in the
1984). Massachusetts 20th Volunteer Infantry and
served three years from 1861 to 1864. He was
Further Reading profoundly affected by his wartime experience,
Bell, Richard H., ed. The Grammar of the intellectually and physically. He was seriously
Heart: New Essays in Moral Philosophy wounded three times, causing him later to
and Theology (San Francisco, 1988). adopt an unsentimental view of life, arguing it
Horst, Mark. “Disciplined by Theology: A was an unending and futile struggle against the
Profile of Paul Holmer,” Christian capricious dictates of fate or chance. He was
Century 115 (12 October 1998): 891–5. mustered out in July 1864 with the rank of
Rollefson, Richard G. Thinking with captain.
Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein: The Holmes entered Harvard Law School in
Philosophical Theology of Paul L. 1864, earning the LL.B. in 1866. He was
Holmer. PhD dissertation, Graduate admitted to the Massachusetts Bar in 1867 and
Theological Union (Berkeley, Cal., 1995). practiced law in Boston. During 1870–71, he
was an Instructor in Constitutional Law,
Robert Campbell Roberts Harvard College. From 1879 to 1873 he was
the editor of American Law Review, and he
also edited the twelfth edition (1873) of Kent’s
Commentaries. Holmes was a member of the
Boston law firm of Shattuck, Holmes &
Munroe from 1873 to 1882. In 1880 Holmes
HOLMES, Oliver Wendell, Jr. (1841–1935) delivered a series of lectures on common law at
the Lowell Institute, which became the basis of
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (he dropped the his famous work The Common Law, published
“Jr.” when his father died) was born on 8 in 1881. This publication earned him an inter-
March 1841 in Boston, Massachusetts. Holmes national reputation. He was named professor
was born into a prominent intellectual family of law at Harvard Law School in 1882, but left
and was named for his famous father, the after one semester when he was appointed to
1145
HOLMES
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. paragraph contains perhaps the most famous
Holmes sat on that court for twenty years from line ever written about law: “The life of the law
1882 to 1899 as Associate Justice, and was has not been logic: it has been experience.”
Chief Justice from 1899 to 1902. In 1902, Remarks like these led legal realists, such as
when Holmes was sixty-one, President Karl L LEWELLYN and Jerome F RANK , to
Theodore Roosevelt appointed him Associate embrace Holmes in the 1920s and 30s. Legal
Justice of the Supreme Court of United States, realism argues that legal concepts are not a
where he sat for almost thirty years, from 4 substantially constraining force in law – regard-
December 1902 to 12 January 1932. Holmes less of what reasons judges offer for their
died on 6 March 1935 in Washington, D.C. opinions, law is determined largely by their
Though Holmes was a member of the personal predilections. This cynicism was taken
Metaphysical Club, a small discussion group to even greater lengths in the 1970s and 80s
founded by pragmatists William James and with the critical legal studies school, or legal
Charles Sanders PEIRCE in 1871, he was not a deconstructionism, which saw no practical
regular member. However, Holmes had much dividing line between law and politics.
in common with pragmatism in his rejection of Some scholars, however, find it a misreading
universal laws or general propositions being to view Holmes as a proto-realist in The
used to decide empirical, concrete cases. Some Common Law, as he did, after all, offer a
scholars also see Holmes as a utilitarian, but to general theory of liability civil and criminal by
Holmes, having sympathies with Social stating that though the law uses the language of
Darwinism, the good was not what served the morality, it necessarily ends in external stan-
greatest number, but what emerged from the dards not dependent on the consciousness of
struggles in the social arena. the individual or on his moral culpability.
In his two important treatises, The Common Similarly, tort liability was imposed when cir-
Law and “The Path of the Law” (1897), cumstances were such as would have led a
Holmes attacked prevailing views of jurispru- prudent man to perceive danger, although not
dence and proposed new conceptions of the necessarily to foresee the specific harm. If a
origin and nature of law. He maintained that man makes a representation, knowing facts
the law could be understood only as a response which by the average standard of the commu-
to the needs of the society that it regulated, nity are sufficient to give him warning that it is
and that it was useless to consider it merely as probably untrue, and it is untrue, he is guilty of
a body of rules developed logically by legal fraud in theory of law whether he believes his
theorists. Holmes also embraced the doctrine of statement or not. Likewise, the formation of a
Social Darwinism, once writing to Felix contract did not depend upon a meeting of the
FRANKFURTER that law should reflect the brute minds, but on the parties’ conduct. Holmes’s
forces or dominant will of the community. For attack on moralism and subjective standards in
example, Holmes believed that even though the law was based in part on his desire for
juries are not especially inspired for the disorder, stability, and predictability in the law.
covery of the truth, they were desirable because Consistent with this desire, Holmes was a
they reflected the wishes and feelings of the legal positivist, viewing law and morality as
community. As a justice, Holmes thought it distinct, and he rejected the concept of natural
more important to sustain the constitutionality rights. Holmes’s legal doctrine was austere,
of laws even if the laws were bad. causing him to advocate “judicial restraint” in
Holmes scholars have called his scholarship the firm belief that popular majorities through
in The Common Law both a landmark work their elected representatives should have their
of legal theory and history as well as difficult, will sustained. He vigorously objected to the
confusing, and “turgid.” The book’s opening nullification of social legislation, such as
1146
HOLMES
minimum wage and hour laws, as unconstitu- no procedure due the employees, the majority’s
tional. From his eloquent opinions in these ruling is said to have been based on a violation
cases he came to be regarded as the Great of the oxymoronic concept of “substantive due
Dissenter. In cases dealing with free speech, process.” Holmes, in his brief dissent, said that
however, Holmes exerted judicial authority. the majority had reached its decision on the
For example, in defense of the First basis of the economic theory of laissez faire,
Amendment, he developed the “clear and though Supreme Court decisions had settled
present danger” rule, to protect the public that the Constitution does not prevent the states
interest from an immediate threat. from interfering with the liberty to contract. In
Holmes’s legal realism is also reflected in his another pithy statement, Holmes stated that
insistence that the court look at the facts in a “the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact
changing society, instead of clinging to worn- Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”
out slogans and formulas. Holmes convinced The post-World War I “red scare” saw
people that the law should develop along with several important free-speech cases reach the
the society it serves. He exercised a deep influ- Supreme Court. In Schenck v. United States
ence on the law through his support of the (1919), the defendant had been convicted of cir-
doctrine of “judicial restraint” which urged culating to military draftees a “document” cal-
judges to avoid letting their personal opinions culated to cause “insubordination.” Holmes
affect their decisions. wrote the majority opinion affirming the con-
During Holmes’s twenty years on the viction, uttering the pithy aphorism: “The most
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, one case stringent protection of free speech would not
brought him brief national notoriety. In his dis- protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a
senting opinion in Vegelahn v. Guntner (1896) theatre and causing a panic.” But he also
that upheld an injunction against labor picketing, strengthened the First Amendment by adding
Holmes argued that employees may combine to that speech may be punished only when it
support their interests by lawful means, even if creates a “clear and present danger.”
doing so constitutes intentional harm to their In Abrams v. United States (1919), a defen-
employer. Holmes’s dissent in Vegelahn v. dant had been convicted of publishing leaflets
Guntner reflected the influences of Social intended to encourage resistance to the US war
Darwinism on his thinking, but it also furthered effort. The Supreme Court again affirmed, but
his unwarranted reputation as a friend of labor this time Holmes dissented, writing that “the
– a reputation that, along with “The Soldier’s ultimate good desired is better reached by free
Faith” speech, influenced Roosevelt to appoint trade in ideas … competition of the market.”
him to the Supreme Court in 1902. Holmes’s marketplace theory of truth may be
While on the Supreme Court, Holmes again contrasted with a defense of freedom of speech
supported labor, though again not out of based on individual rights. In Buck v. Bell
sympathy for workers. In Lochner v. New (1927), his most notorious opinion, Holmes
York (1905), the Court struck down a New upheld a Virginia statute that allowed the ster-
York statute that prohibited employees from ilization of persons deemed mentally deficient.
being required or permitted to work in a bakery Holmes did not even consider any arguments
more than sixty hours a week. The majority for a constitutional right to procreation (a right
found that the statute interfered with the right the Court upheld in 1942), saying it gave him
of contract between employer and employees “pleasure” to uphold the Virginia statute.
and that the right of contract, though not
explicit in the Constitution, is protected by the BIBLIOGRAPHY
Fourteenth Amendment under the “due The Common Law (Boston, 1881).
process” clause. Because the statute violated Speeches (Boston, 1891; 2nd edn 1913).
1147
HOLMES
“The Path of the Law,” Harvard Law Bowen, Catherine Drinker. Yankee from
Review 10 (1897): 457–78. Olympus: Justice Holmes and His Family
Collected Legal Papers, ed. Harold J. Laski (Boston, 1944).
(New York, 1920). Brent, Silas. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.
A Biography (New York, 1932).
Other Relevant Works Frankfurter, Felix. Mr. Justice Holmes and
Holmes’ papers are at Harvard Law School the Supreme Court (Cambridge, Mass.,
and the Library of Congress. 1938).
The Dissenting Opinions of Mr. Justice Gordon, Robert W., ed. The Legacy of
Holmes, ed. Alfred List (New York, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (Stanford,
1931). Cal., 1992).
Representative Opinions of Mr. Justice Grey, Thomas C. “Holmes and Legal
Holmes, ed. Alfred List (New York, Pragmatism,” Stanford Law Review 41
1931). (1989): 787–854.
The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes: His Howe, Mark DeWolfe. Justice Oliver
Speeches, Essays, Letters, and Judicial Wendell Holmes: The Shaping Years,
Opinions, ed. Max Lerner (Boston, 1841–1870 (Cambridge, Mass., 1957).
1943). ———, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes:
The Formative Essays of Justice Holmes: The Proving Years, 1870–1882
The Making of and American Legal (Cambridge, Mass., 1963).
Philosophy, ed. Frederic Rogers Kellogg Konefsky, Samuel J. The Legacy of Holmes
(Westport, Conn., 1984). and Brandeis: A Study in the Influence of
The Essential Holmes: Selections from the Ideas (New York, 1956).
Letters, Speeches, Judicial Opinions, and Menand, Louis. The Metaphysical Club
Other Writings of Oliver Wendell (New York, 2001).
Holmes, Jr., ed. Richard A. Posner Novick, Sheldon M. Honorable Justice: The
(Chicago, 1992). Life of Oliver Wendell Holmes (Boston,
The Collected Works of Justice Holmes: 1989).
Complete Public Writings and Selected White, G. Edward. Justice Oliver Wendell
Judicial Opinions of Oliver Wendell Holmes: Law and the Inner Self (Oxford,
Holmes, 3 vols, ed. Sheldon M. Novick 1993).
(Chicago, 1995).
Henry Cohen
Further Reading
Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio,
Thought, Dict Amer Bio, Encyc Amer
Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Bio v27, Routledge
Encycl Phil, Who Was Who in Amer v1 HOLMES, Oliver Wendell, Sr. (1809–94)
Alschuler, Albert W. Law Without Values:
The Life, Work, and Legacy of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes was born on 29
Holmes (Chicago, 2000). August 1809 in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Baker, Liva. The Justice from Beacon Hill: His father, Reverend Abiel Holmes, was
The Life and Times of Oliver Wendell minister of the First Congregational Church
Holmes (New York, 1991). in Cambridge for nearly four decades.
Biddle, Francis, Mr. Justice Holmes (New Holmes attended Phillips Andover Academy
York, 1942). and then Harvard, receiving the BA in 1829.
1148
HOLMES
He first tried law school and then medical blended with his persuasive prose, was an
school, and after study in Paris he returned to important component of the growing trend in
Harvard Medical School for his degree in 1836. the mid 1800s to react to unstable or aberrant
His private practice and occasional teaching behavior with the healing compassion of the
could not compete with his growing love for doctor instead of the criminal punishment of
writing poetry and public lecturing, both encour- a judge or the spiritual damnation of a
aged by Ralph Waldo EMERSON. Thereafter minister. Holmes educated two generations of
Holmes lived a double life, making many impor- Harvard medical students including William
tant medical contributions (he is credited with JAMES (who became his assistant as instructor
discovering the contagiousness of puerperal fever in anatomy and physiology in 1872) and he
before Pasteur) while publishing and lecturing on anticipated many themes of modern psychol-
science and literature. Despite his frequent travel ogy. Like James, Holmes looked forward to
on the lecturing circuits he found time to raise a the day when medical psychology would
family; his son, the future Supreme Court Justice influence the progress of religion. “Medical
Oliver Wendell HOLMES, JR., was born in 1941. science, and especially the study of mental
In 1847 Holmes was appointed Parkman disease, is destined, I believe, to react to much
Professor of Anatomy and Physiology at greater advantage on the theology of the
Harvard Medical School, where he taught until future than theology has acted on medicine in
his retirement in 1882, and he also served as the past. The liberal spirit very generally pre-
the school’s Dean from 1847 to 1853. He was vailing in both professions, and the good
awarded many honors in his later years, includ- understanding between their most enlight-
ing Harvard University’s Doctor of Laws, ened members, promise well for the future of
Cambridge University’s Doctor of Letters, both in a community which holds every point
Edinburgh University’s Doctor of Laws, and of human belief, every institution in human
Oxford University’s Doctor of Civil Law. hands, and every word written in a human
Holmes died on 7 October 1894 in Boston, dialect, open to free discussion today, to-
Massachusetts. morrow, and to the end of time.” (1883)
An aristocratic version of Benjamin Holmes’s explorations of the hereditary
Franklin, another native Bostonian, Holmes and social causes of character (or lack of
was renowned for his deft satires of many character) cast a new light on the “Brahmin
Puritan doctrines and moral habits. Across his caste” of Bostonian elites as well. Although it
poems, stories, and novels there are many was he who invented the famous description
undercurrents criticizing the narrow conser- of Boston as “the hub of the universe,” and
vatism and parochial Calvinism of his New his home served as a salon to center its intel-
England society. As a prominent free-thinker lectual life, Holmes was in a sense the last
in religious matters, liberal even for a Puritan who excelled in celebrating his
Unitarian, Holmes aroused controversy but culture’s mental superiority while simultane-
always clothed his own views with entertain- ously undercutting its moral right to guide the
ing and epigrammatic wit that remains as religious destiny of America. His absorption
quotable as Franklin or Mark TWAIN. of much of the spirit of transcendentalism
His primary theological targets for scorn resulted in an optimistic view of humanity
were predestination and innate depravity. and a demand that religion serve the heart
From his own vast medical knowledge he rather the head.
appreciated the numerous ills, both physio-
logical and psychological, that can limit or BIBLIOGRAPHY
remove a person’s control over his conduct. Poems (Boston, 1836).
The influence of Holmes’s scientific stature, Homeopathy and Its Kindred Delusions
1149
HOLMES
(Boston, 1842). and Hugo MÜNSTERBERG. Holt began graduate

The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table studies at Harvard in 1897, but left for a year
(Boston, 1858). of military service in 1898 during the
Medical Essays, 1842–1882 (Boston, Spanish–American War. Holt studied medicine
1883). at the University of Freiburg in 1899, and then
Ralph Waldo Emerson (Boston, 1884). psychology at Columbia University with James
McKeen CATTELL, receiving his MA degree in
Other Relevant Works 1900. Holt returned to Harvard for further
The Writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 13 graduate study. After receiving the PhD in psy-
vols (Boston, 1891–2). chology in 1901, Holt was appointed instruc-
The Complete Poetical Works of Oliver tor at Harvard, and subsequently promoted to
Wendell Holmes, ed. Horace Scudder assistant professor in 1905. He resigned his
(Boston, 1908). position in 1918, but was persuaded to return
to teaching as visiting professor of psychology
Further Reading at Princeton University from 1926 to 1936.
Amer Nat Bio, Appleton’s Cycl Amer Bio, Holt died on 25 January 1946 in Tenants
Cambridge Dict Amer Bio, Dict Amer Harbor, Maine.
Bio, Encyc Amer Bio, Nat Cycl Amer Holt’s earliest publications concerned exper-
Bio v2 imental investigations of visual phenomena,
Gibian, Peter. Oliver Wendell Holmes and particularly relationships between visual sen-
the Culture of Conversation (Cambridge, sations and eye movements. Also during this
UK, 2001). period he translated Münsterberg’s historical
Hoyt, Edwin P. Improper Bostonian: Dr. and cultural survey of American life, The
Oliver Wendell Holmes (New York, Americans (1904) for English-speaking audi-
1979). ences. Holt’s major work of this period was
Moore, John T. Life and Letters of Oliver The Concept of Consciousness, which was
Wendell Holmes, 2 vols (Boston, 1896). completed in 1908 (although not published
Oberndorf, Clarence P. The Psychiatric until 1914). The primary aim of this work was
Novels of Oliver Wendell Holmes (New to articulate a metaphysical framework for psy-
York, 1903). chological theory, which in turn would afford
Small, Miriam R. Oliver Wendell Holmes some novel ways of conceptualizing psycho-
(New York, 1962). logical processes. These new formulations were
intended to resolve some longstanding episte-
John R. Shook mological problems connected to the received
views. Toward this end, Holt adapted the con-
ceptual structure of Royce’s idealism to meet
the metaphysical commitments of James’s
radical empiricism. The latter was James’s
project of developing an alternative to the
HOLT, Edwin Bissell (1873–1946) matter–mind dualism of the British empiricists,
on the one hand, and the mentalism of neo-
Edwin B. Holt was born on 21 August 1873 in Kantian varieties of idealism on the other, both
Winchester, Massachusetts. He attended of which placed reality beyond the knower’s
Amherst College in 1892, and subsequently immediate grasp. Through radical empiricism,
enrolled at Harvard University, receiving a BA James sought to develop the groundwork for a
degree in 1896. Holt’s most influential teachers realist epistemology. Holt felt that Royce
at Harvard were William JAMES, Josiah ROYCE, provided a logical system for deriving a suc-
1150
HOLT
cession of hierarchically structured domains of nor exists within the knowing mind; it involves
experience, or “universes of discourse,” that an awareness of properties that are a function
included mathematics, geometry, physics, of the operations of the knower. That is, what
chemistry, and psychology. The differences that is experienced resides in the relationship
exist among these orders of discourse were seen between the knower and the known.
as differences in the functional properties Significantly, from this perspective, perceiving
existing at successive structured levels of a is a direct relation between knower and known,
common substance, rather than differences in rather than being mediated by a mental repre-
substance as found in a dualistic metaphysics. sentation. The commitment to indirect realism
Departing from Royce, however, who envi- that mental representations require is invariably
sioned this common substance to be mind, Holt tainted with the specter of solipsism. Finally,
argued that these domains were all ultimately because consciousness as a cross-section of the
composed of a common ontologically neutral material world is always selective and partial,
“stuff,” along the lines of James’s notion of with further transactions more can be discov-
“pure experience.” Further, Holt proposed that ered about the universe of discourse that is the
these manifolds of structure are externally material world.
related, each logically connected but operating In 1910 Holt collaborated with five other
independently according to different specifi- philosophers, including R. B. PERRY at Harvard
able principles. This framework permitted Holt and W. P. MONTAGUE at Columbia, to produce
to make a case for consciousness as but one of a program for a new philosophical approach
many irreducible domains within a pluralistic they called “The New Realism.” Their initial
universe of ontologically neutral stuff. platform offered an explication and extension
The most significant concept in The Concept of James’s radical empiricist philosophy and a
of Consciousness is that of a “cross-section,” defense of it in the face of criticisms principally
which was inspired by James’s treatment of from idealist quarters. In spite of acknowledged
consciousness in his classic essay “Does differences among this group, what they took
Consciousness Exist?” A cross-section is as common ground was their objection to the
defined as any portion of one manifold that is epistemological claim that a mind can only
articulated by operations specific to a different have direct knowledge of its own mental states.
manifold. For example, perceiving is an oper- They opposed not only Royce’s idealism, but
ation specific to the manifold that is con- also any account of knowing that takes mental
sciousness, and at any particular moment per- representation as its epistemic starting point.
ceiving selectively articulates a portion of the This essay was followed two years later by the
manifold that is the so-called material world. book, The New Realism: Cooperative Studies
Just as a searchlight from a boat at night illu- in Philosophy (1912). In addition to a joint
minates features of a shoreline that exist inde- introductory chapter by the group, each
pendently of the boat, so consciousness selec- philosopher contributed an individual chapter.
tively discriminates some features of the domain The aim of Holt’s chapter was to address what
that is the material world existing indepen- is commonly identified as the fatal challenge to
dently of the psychological order. As the land- any direct realist proposal, namely, the occur-
scape example illustrates, that which is illumi- rence of perceptual illusions. If the world is
nated by the searchlight at any moment is experienced directly, how can one account for
neither dependent on the light for its existence errors in perceptual experience, illusions being
nor exists within the light; rather, it is a function the most dramatic sort? Holt’s reply involved
of the relationship between the two. Likewise, a detailed discussion of illusions from the point
the environment that is perceived is neither of view he developed earlier in The Concept of
dependent on the perceiver for its existence, Consciousness (though published after The
1151
HOLT
New Realism). The core of his argument is as flicting, sometimes repressed motives, as well as
follows: the realist position is “as things are per- replacing broad, generalized responses to the
ceived so they are,” which must be distin- environment with more finely-tuned discrimi-
guished from the claim “as things are so they native ones. Thus, he also saw in Freud’s frame-
really are … . Because while all perceived things work the germ of an ethics of self-realization,
are things, not all perceived things are real the kind of self-improvement that was also to
things.” (1912, p. 358) The realist’s position is be found in some of James’s writings, but which
that while the knower–known relation is direct, for Holt rested on a motor theory of con-
that does mean that it is free of error; directness sciousness. Finally, the doubt that Freud cast on
is to be distinguished from veridicality. Holt the veracity of conscious expression reinforced
illustrates this point with reference to the left- Holt’s conviction that human action was best
right reversal in a mirror reflection, which while understood by observing behavior in its full
producing error is fully explainable within the complexity. Holt can be seen as joining the
conditions of the mirror–perceiver relation. growing behaviorist temper of the times,
Holt attended the 1909 Clark University although adopting a decidedly more complex
lectures given by Sigmund Freud and was and dynamic perspective. Moreover, Holt can
deeply impressed by Freud’s psychodynamic be seen here as anticipating efforts decades
view, principally because it made a compelling later, notably by J. Dollard and N. Miller in the
case for the active and purposive nature of 1950s, to find a compromise between behav-
mind. In perhaps his most widely read book, iorist and psychodynamic approaches.
The Freudian Wish and its Place in Ethics Holt’s behaviorism is distinctive, being both
(1915), Holt argued that the everyday phe- molar and purposive rather than reductionistic
nomena Freud studied, such as slips of the and mechanistic. Holt’s purposive behavior-
tongue, forgetting, and humor, starkly revealed ism resembles John B. WATSON’s approach and
that mind was fundamentally comprised of that of his successors only in a shared posi-
“wishes” for courses of action. As a result, tivistic outlook. His psychological perspective
Freud dramatically demonstrated that the is most fully developed in the “Response and
appropriate analytical unit for psychology was Cognition” essays that are appended to The
a mental function, rather than a static element Freudian Wish. Three interrelated ideas run
of mind (such as a sensation). Psychological through the two essays. First, the appropriate
functions are directed rather than random; they unit of analysis for psychology is the functional
are “specific responses” which the body is relationship between the behaving organism
prepared to execute with regard to some feature and some feature of the environment. Holt
of the environment. Freud was especially rejected the notion that psychological phe-
helpful in showing that everyday actions are nomena are reducible to underlying biological
often best understood as arising from conflict- states of the organism because the psychologi-
ing desires, or from Holt’s perspective, in terms cal domain consists of properties of the
of the joint action of several specific responses organism–environment relation, and as such
innervated concurrently. there are distinctive natural properties mani-
Holt saw Freud’s approach as offering a fested only at that level of analysis. Holt’s
more adequate way of capturing the complex student Edward C. TOLMAN became the most
and dynamic character of organismic func- visible exponent of this view within twentieth-
tioning than the simpler, structural models century psychology. Second, psychology like
erected on an image of the reflex arc which any natural science was to look for lawful func-
were coming into favor. A naturalistic ethics tional relationships between variables within its
follows from this analysis: the development of domain of analysis. In its failure to do so, psy-
character hinges on coordinating often con- chology has been prone to invent fictitious,
1152
HOLT
hidden causes of non-natural character, work, Animal Drive and the Learning Process:
namely, those due to mind in the sense of an An Essay Towards Radical Empiricism (1931).
extended, Cartesian entity. Such mentalistic This work can be seen, in part, as an attempt
fictions can be overcome, and psychology can to provide the biological underpinnings of the
fully embrace a natural science perspective, by philosophical and psychological perspective
looking beyond immediate, antecedent Holt had been developing throughout his
“causes” of behavior, for example, proximal career. He argued as far back as The Concept
stimuli at receptor surfaces. Third, behavior is of Consciousness that psychological phenom-
to be viewed as a “specific, integrated response” ena are emergent functional properties derived
to increasingly distal features of the environ- from material constituents of

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The Dictionary of

Analytic Philosophy Psychology

Ethical Theory and Applied Ethics Realism/Naturalism/Phenomenology

Idealism Social, Political and Legal

Philosophy of Science and Logic

The Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers

© Thoemmes Continuum, 2005

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be

Typeset in Sabon at Thoemmes Continuum.

How to use the Dictionary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xiii

List of contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii

Abbreviations for academic degrees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xlv

Abbreviations for biographical reference works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xlvii

Biographical entries A–Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Name Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2681

It should be remembered, however, that professional philosophers have had no monopoly on

John R. Shook, 2005

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Harry McFarland Bracken Douglas Browning

S. Daniel Breslauer Evelyn Burg

Gregory S. Butler Paul E. Capetz

Thomas A. Byrnes André W. Carus

Kah Kyung Cho Walter H. Conser, Jr.

James J. Chriss Gary A. Cook

David O. Clark Angela L. Cotten

Catherine L. Coghlan Mark Cox

Henry Cohen Christopher J. Coyne

Vincent M. Colapietro Kenneth Cracknell

E. Paul Colella John F. Crosby

Louis J. Colombo Steven Crowell

Hunter Crowther-Heyck David L. Davis

Harry F. Dahms Lawrence J. Dennis

Gerard J. Dalcourt Ione Y. DeOllos

Joseph W. Dauben Claire Detels

David C. Devonis John Drummond

Robin J. Effron Chielozona Eze

Monika Elbert Christopher Faille

Daniel M. Fox Don Garrett

Franklin I. Gamwell Michaela Giesenkirchen

Catherine Villanueva Gardner Patrick J. Gilpin

Emanuel S. Goldsmith Carol C. Gould

James A. Good Dean Graham

James M. M. Good John Greco

Julia Chenot GoodFox Christopher D. Green

Lisa G. Guinn Bruce K. Hanson

Richard B. Gunderman Charley D. Hardwick

Bina Gupta Peter Hewitt Hare

William D. Guthrie Elizabeth Harman

Marty H. Heitz Michael R. Hill

Bertrand Helm John W. Hillje

R. E. Houser Shams Inati

Daniel Howard-Snyder Tyron Inbody

John Howie Nancy K. Innis

Richard T. Hull Jo Ellen Jacobs

David Hunter Megan Jacobs

Paul Hurley Dale Jamieson

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