1.

Palting v san Jose Petrolium, Inc 18 Scra 924(1966)

G.R. No. L-14441 December 17, 1966

PEDRO R. PALTING, petitioner,

vs.
SAN JOSE PETROLEUM INCORPORATED, respondent.

BARRERA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the order of August 29, 1958, later supplemented and amplified by
another dated September 9, 1958, of the Securities and Exchange Commission denying the
opposition to, and instead, granting the registration, and licensing the sale in the Philippines, of
5,000,000 shares of the capital stock of the respondent-appellee San Jose Petroleum, Inc. (hereafter
referred to as SAN JOSE PETROLEUM), a corporation organized and existing in the Republic of
Panama.

On September 7, 1956, SAN JOSE PETROLEUM filed with the Philippine Securities and Exchange
Commission a sworn registration statement, for the registration and licensing for sale in the
Philippines Voting Trust Certificates representing 2,000,000 shares of its capital stock of a par value
of $0.35 a share, at P1.00 per share. It was alleged that the entire proceeds of the sale of said
securities will be devoted or used exclusively to finance the operations of San Jose Oil Company,
Inc. (a domestic mining corporation hereafter to be referred to as SAN JOSE OIL) which has 14
petroleum exploration concessions covering an area of a little less than 1,000,000 hectares, located
in the provinces of Pangasinan, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, La Union, Iloilo, Cotabato, Davao and Agusan.
It was the express condition of the sale that every purchaser of the securities shall not receive a
stock certificate, but a registered or bearer-voting-trust certificate from the voting trustees named
therein James L. Buckley and Austin G.E. Taylor, the first residing in Connecticut, U.S.A., and the
second in New York City. While this application for registration was pending consideration by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, SAN JOSE PETROLEUM filed an amended Statement on
June 20, 1958, for registration of the sale in the Philippines of its shares of capital stock, which was
increased from 2,000,000 to 5,000,000, at a reduced offering price of from P1.00 to P0.70 per share.
At this time the par value of the shares has also been reduced from $.35 to $.01 per share.1

Pedro R. Palting and others, allegedly prospective investors in the shares of SAN JOSE
PETROLEUM, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission an opposition to registration and
licensing of the securities on the grounds that (1) the tie-up between the issuer, SAN JOSE
PETROLEUM, a Panamanian corporation and SAN JOSE OIL, a domestic corporation, violates the
Constitution of the Philippines, the Corporation Law and the Petroleum Act of 1949; (2) the issuer
has not been licensed to transact business in the Philippines; (3) the sale of the shares of the issuer
is fraudulent, and works or tends to work a fraud upon Philippine purchasers; and (4) the issuer as
an enterprise, as well as its business, is based upon unsound business principles. Answering the
foregoing opposition of Palting, et al., the registrant SAN JOSE PETROLEUM claimed that it was a
"business enterprise" enjoying parity rights under the Ordinance appended to the Constitution, which
parity right, with respect to mineral resources in the Philippines, may be exercised, pursuant to the
Laurel-Langley Agreement, only through the medium of a corporation organized under the laws of
the Philippines. Thus, registrant which is allegedly qualified to exercise rights under the Parity
Amendment, had to do so through the medium of a domestic corporation, which is the SAN JOSE
OIL. It refused the contention that the Corporation Law was being violated, by alleging that Section
13 thereof applies only to foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines, and registrant was
not doing business here. The mere fact that it was a holding company of SAN JOSE OIL and that
registrant undertook the financing of and giving technical assistance to said corporation did not
constitute transaction of business in the Philippines. Registrant also denied that the offering for sale
in the Philippines of its shares of capital stock was fraudulent or would work or tend to work fraud on
the investors. On August 29, 1958, and on September 9, 1958 the Securities and Exchange
Commissioner issued the orders object of the present appeal.

The issues raised by the parties in this appeal are as follows:

1. Whether or not petitioner Pedro R. Palting, as a "prospective investor" in respondent's

securities, has personality to file the present petition for review of the order of the Securities
and Exchange Commission;

2. Whether or not the issue raised herein is already moot and academic;

3. Whether or not the "tie-up" between the respondent SAN JOSE PETROLEUM, a foreign
corporation, and SAN JOSE OIL COMPANY, INC., a domestic mining corporation, is
violative of the Constitution, the Laurel-Langley Agreement, the Petroleum Act of 1949, and
the Corporation Law; and

4. Whether or not the sale of respondent's securities is fraudulent, or would work or tend to
work fraud to purchasers of such securities in the Philippines.

1. In answer to the notice and order of the Securities and Exchange Commissioner, published in 2
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, for "any person who is opposed" to the petition
for registration and licensing of respondent's securities, to file his opposition in 7 days, herein
petitioner so filed an opposition. And, the Commissioner, having denied his opposition and instead,
directed the registration of the securities to be offered for sale, oppositor Palting instituted the
present proceeding for review of said order.

Respondent raises the question of the personality of petitioner to bring this appeal, contending that
as a mere "prospective investor", he is not an "Aggrieved" or "interested" person who may properly
maintain the suit. Citing a 1931 ruling of Utah State Supreme Court2 it is claimed that the phrase
"party aggrieved" used in the Securities Act3 and the Rules of Court4 as having the right to appeal
should refer only to issuers, dealers and salesmen of securities.

It is true that in the cited case, it was ruled that the phrase "person aggrieved" is that party
"aggrieved by the judgment or decree where it operates on his rights of property or bears directly
upon his interest", that the word "aggrieved" refers to "a substantial grievance, a denial of some
personal property right or the imposition upon a party of a burden or obligation." But a careful
reading of the case would show that the appeal therein was dismissed because the court held that
an order of registration was not final and therefore not appealable. The foregoing pronouncement
relied upon by herein respondent was made in construing the provision regarding an order of
revocation which the court held was the one appealable. And since the law provides that in revoking
the registration of any security, only the issuer and every registered dealer of the security are
notified, excluding any person or group of persons having no such interest in the securities, said
court concluded that the phrase "interested person" refers only to issuers, dealers or salesmen of
securities.

We cannot consider the foregoing ruling by the Utah State Court as controlling on the issue in this
case. Our Securities Act in Section 7(c) thereof, requires the publication and notice of the
registration statement. Pursuant thereto, the Securities and Exchange Commissioner caused the
publication of an order in part reading as follows:
 . . . Any person who is opposed with this petition must file his written opposition with this
Commission within said period (2 weeks). . . .

In other words, as construed by the administrative office entrusted with the enforcement of the
Securities Act, any person (who may not be "aggrieved" or "interested" within the legal acceptation
of the word) is allowed or permitted to file an opposition to the registration of securities for sale in the
Philippines. And this is in consonance with the generally accepted principle that Blue Sky Laws are
enacted to protect investors and prospective purchasers and to prevent fraud and preclude the sale
of securities which are in fact worthless or worth substantially less than the asking price. It is for this
purpose that herein petitioner duly filed his opposition giving grounds therefor. Respondent SAN
JOSE PETROLEUM was required to reply to the opposition. Subsequently both the petition and the
opposition were set for hearing during which the petitioner was allowed to actively participate and did
so by cross-examining the respondent's witnesses and filing his memorandum in support of his
opposition. He therefore to all intents and purposes became a party to the proceedings. And under
the New Rules of Court,5 such a party can appeal from a final order, ruling or decision of the
Securities and Exchange Commission. This new Rule eliminating the word "aggrieved" appearing in
the old Rule, being procedural in nature,6 and in view of the express provision of Rule 144 that the
new rules made effective on January 1, 1964 shall govern not only cases brought after they took
effect but all further proceedings in cases then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of the
Court their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former
procedure shall apply, we hold that the present appeal is properly within the appellate jurisdiction of
this Court.

The order allowing the registration and sale of respondent's securities is clearly a final order that is
appealable. The mere fact that such authority may be later suspended or revoked, depending on
future developments, does not give it the character of an interlocutory or provisional ruling. And the
fact that seven days after the publication of the order, the securities are deemed registered (Sec. 7,
Com. Act 83, as amended), points to the finality of the order. Rights and obligations necessarily arise
therefrom if not reviewed on appeal.

Our position on this procedural matter — that the order is appealable and the appeal taken here is
proper — is strengthened by the intervention of the Solicitor General, under Section 23 of Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, as the constitutional issues herein presented affect the validity of Section 13 of
the Corporation Law, which, according to the respondent, conflicts with the Parity Ordinance and the
Laurel-Langley Agreement recognizing, it is claimed, its right to exploit our petroleum resources
notwithstanding said provisions of the Corporation Law.

2. Respondent likewise contends that since the order of Registration/Licensing dated September 9,
1958 took effect 30 days from September 3, 1958, and since no stay order has been issued by the
Supreme Court, respondent's shares became registered and licensed under the law as of October 3,
1958. Consequently, it is asserted, the present appeal has become academic. Frankly we are
unable to follow respondent's argumentation. First it claims that the order of August 29 and that of
September 9, 1958 are not final orders and therefor are not appealable. Then when these orders,
according to its theory became final and were implemented, it argues that the orders can no longer
be appealed as the question of registration and licensing became moot and academic.

But the fact is that because of the authority to sell, the securities are, in all probabilities, still being
traded in the open market. Consequently the issue is much alive as to whether respondent's
securities should continue to be the subject of sale. The purpose of the inquiry on this matter is not
fully served just because the securities had passed out of the hands of the issuer and its dealers.
Obviously, so long as the securities are outstanding and are placed in the channels of trade and
commerce, members of the investing public are entitled to have the question of the worth or legality
of the securities resolved one way or another.

But more fundamental than this consideration, we agree with the late Senator Claro M. Recto, who
appeared as amicus curiae in this case, that while apparently the immediate issue in this appeal is
the right of respondent SAN JOSE PETROLEUM to dispose of and sell its securities to the Filipino
public, the real and ultimate controversy here would actually call for the construction of the
constitutional provisions governing the disposition, utilization, exploitation and development of our
natural resources. And certainly this is neither moot nor academic.

3. We now come to the meat of the controversy — the "tie-up" between SAN JOSE OIL on the one
hand, and the respondent SAN JOSE PETROLEUM and its associates, on the other. The
relationship of these corporations involved or affected in this case is admitted and established
through the papers and documents which are parts of the records: SAN JOSE OIL, is a domestic
mining corporation, 90% of the outstanding capital stock of which is owned by respondent SAN
JOSE PETROLEUM, a foreign (Panamanian) corporation, the majority interest of which is owned by
OIL INVESTMENTS, Inc., another foreign (Panamanian) company. This latter corporation in turn is
wholly (100%) owned by PANTEPEC OIL COMPANY, C.A., and PANCOASTAL PETROLEUM
COMPANY, C.A., both organized and existing under the laws of Venezuela. As of September 30,
1956, there were 9,976 stockholders of PANCOASTAL PETROLEUM found in 49 American states
and U.S. territories, holding 3,476,988 shares of stock; whereas, as of November 30, 1956,
PANTEPEC OIL COMPANY was said to have 3,077,916 shares held by 12,373 stockholders
scattered in 49 American state. In the two lists of stockholders, there is no indication of the
citizenship of these stockholders,7 or of the total number of authorized stocks of each corporation, for
the purpose of determining the corresponding percentage of these listed stockholders in relation to
the respective capital stock of said corporation.

Petitioner, as well as the amicus curiae and the Solicitor General8 contend that the relationship
between herein respondent SAN JOSE PETROLEUM and its subsidiary, SAN JOSE OIL, violates
the Petroleum Law of 1949, the Philippine Constitution, and Section 13 of the Corporation Law,
which inhibits a mining corporation from acquiring an interest in another mining corporation. It is
respondent's theory, on the other hand, that far from violating the Constitution; such relationship
between the two corporations is in accordance with the Laurel-Langley Agreement which
implemented the Ordinance Appended to the Constitution, and that Section 13 of the Corporation
Law is not applicable because respondent is not licensed to do business, as it is not doing business,
in the Philippines.

Article XIII, Section 1 of the Philippine Constitution provides:

SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of this
Government established under this Constitution. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

In the 1946 Ordinance Appended to the Constitution, this right (to utilize and exploit our natural
resources) was extended to citizens of the United States, thus:

Notwithstanding the provisions of section one, Article Thirteen, and section eight, Article
Fourteen, of the foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity of the Executive Agreement
 entered into by the President of the Philippines with the President of the United States on the
fourth of July, nineteen hundred and forty-six, pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth
Act Numbered Seven hundred and thirty-three, but in no case to extend beyond the third of
July, nineteen hundred and seventy-four, the disposition, exploitation, development, and
utilization of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines, and the operation of public utilities shall, if open to any person,
be open to citizens of the United States, and to all forms of business enterprises owned or
controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States in the same manner as to,
and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporations or
associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines (Emphasis supplied.)

In the 1954 Revised Trade Agreement concluded between the United States and the Philippines,
also known as the Laurel-Langley Agreement, embodied in Republic Act 1355, the following
provisions appear:

ARTICLE VI

1. The disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of all agricultural, timber, and
mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils,
all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural resources of either Party, and
the operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the other
Party and to all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by
citizens of such other Party in the same manner as to and under the same conditions
imposed upon citizens or corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the
Party granting the right.

2. The rights provided for in Paragraph 1 may be exercised, . . . in the case of citizens of the
United States, with respect to natural resources in the public domain in the Philippines, only
through the medium of a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines and at least
60% of the capital stock of which is owned or controlled by citizens of the United States. . . .

3. The United States of America reserves the rights of the several States of the United States
to limit the extent to which citizens or corporations or associations owned or controlled by
citizens of the Philippines may engage in the activities specified in this Article. The Republic
of the Philippines reserves the power to deny any of the rights specified in this Article to
citizens of the United States who are citizens of States, or to corporations or associations at
least 60% of whose capital stock or capital is owned or controlled by citizens of States, which
deny like rights to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations which are
owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)

Re-stated, the privilege to utilize, exploit, and develop the natural resources of this country was
granted, by Article XIII of the Constitution, to Filipino citizens or to corporations or associations 60%
of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. With the Parity Amendment to the Constitution, the
same right was extended to citizens of the United States and business enterprises owned or
controlled directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States.

There could be no serious doubt as to the meaning of the word "citizens" used in the aforementioned
provisions of the Constitution. The right was granted to 2 types of persons: natural persons (Filipino
or American citizens) and juridical persons (corporations 60% of which capital is owned by Filipinos
and business enterprises owned or controlled directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States).
In American law, "citizen" has been defined as "one who, under the constitution and laws of the
United States, has a right to vote for representatives in congress and other public officers, and who
is qualified to fill offices in the gift of the people. (1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 490.) A citizen is —

One of the sovereign people. A constituent member of the sovereignty, synonymous with the
people." (Scott v. Sandford, 19 Ho. [U.S.] 404, 15 L. Ed. 691.)

A member of the civil state entitled to all its privileges. (Cooley, Const. Lim. 77. See U.S. v.
Cruikshank 92 U.S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588; Minor v. Happersett 21 Wall. [U.S.] 162, 22 L. Ed.
627.)

These concepts clarified, is herein respondent SAN JOSE PETROLEUM an American business
enterprise entitled to parity rights in the Philippines? The answer must be in the negative, for the
following reasons:

Firstly — It is not owned or controlled directly by citizens of the United States, because it is owned
and controlled by a corporation, the OIL INVESTMENTS, another foreign (Panamanian) corporation.

Secondly — Neither can it be said that it is indirectly owned and controlled by American citizens
through the OIL INVESTMENTS, for this latter corporation is in turn owned and controlled, not by
citizens of the United States, but still by two foreign (Venezuelan) corporations, the PANTEPEC OIL
COMPANY and PANCOASTAL PETROLEUM.

Thirdly — Although it is claimed that these two last corporations are owned and controlled
respectively by 12,373 and 9,979 stockholders residing in the different American states, there is no
showing in the certification furnished by respondent that the stockholders of PANCOASTAL or those
of them holding the controlling stock, are citizens of the United States.

Fourthly — Granting that these individual stockholders are American citizens, it is yet necessary to
establish that the different states of which they are citizens, allow Filipino citizens or corporations or
associations owned or controlled by Filipino citizens, to engage in the exploitation, etc. of the natural
resources of these states (see paragraph 3, Article VI of the Laurel-Langley Agreement, supra).
Respondent has presented no proof to this effect.

Fifthly — But even if the requirements mentioned in the two immediately preceding paragraphs are
satisfied, nevertheless to hold that the set-up disclosed in this case, with a long chain of intervening
foreign corporations, comes within the purview of the Parity Amendment regarding business
enterprises indirectly owned or controlled by citizens of the United States, is to unduly stretch and
strain the language and intent of the law. For, to what extent must the word "indirectly" be carried?
Must we trace the ownership or control of these various corporations ad infinitum for the purpose of
determining whether the American ownership-control-requirement is satisfied? Add to this the
admitted fact that the shares of stock of the PANTEPEC and PANCOASTAL which are allegedly
owned or controlled directly by citizens of the United States, are traded in the stock exchange in
New York, and you have a situation where it becomes a practical impossibility to determine at any
given time, the citizenship of the controlling stock required by the law. In the circumstances, we have
to hold that the respondent SAN JOSE PETROLEUM, as presently constituted, is not a business
enterprise that is authorized to exercise the parity privileges under the Parity Ordinance, the Laurel-
Langley Agreement and the Petroleum Law. Its tie-up with SAN JOSE OIL is, consequently, illegal.

What, then, would be the Status of SAN JOSE OIL, about 90% of whose stock is owned by SAN
JOSE PETROLEUM? This is a query which we need not resolve in this case as SAN JOSE OIL is
not a party and it is not necessary to do so to dispose of the present controversy. But it is a matter
that probably the Solicitor General would want to look into.
There is another issue which has been discussed extensively by the parties. This is whether or not
an American mining corporation may lawfully "be in anywise interested in any other corporation
(domestic or foreign) organized for the purpose of engaging in agriculture or in mining," in the
Philippines or whether an American citizen owning stock in more than one corporation organized for
the purpose of engaging in agriculture or in mining, may own more than 15% of the capital stock
then outstanding and entitled to vote, of each of such corporations, in view of the express prohibition
contained in Section 13 of the Philippine Corporation Law. The petitioner in this case contends that
the provisions of the Corporation Law must be applied to American citizens and business enterprise
otherwise entitled to exercise the parity privileges, because both the Laurel-Langley Agreement (Art.
VI, par. 1) and the Petroleum Act of 1948 (Art. 31), specifically provide that the enjoyment by them of
the same rights and obligations granted under the provisions of both laws shall be "in the same
manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or
corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines." The petitioner further
contends that, as the enjoyment of the privilege of exploiting mineral resources in the Philippines by
Filipino citizens or corporations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines (which corporation
must necessarily be organized under the Corporation Law), is made subject to the limitations
provided in Section 13 of the Corporation Law, so necessarily the exercise of the parity rights by
citizens of the United States or business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by
citizens of the United States, must equally be subject to the same limitations contained in the
aforesaid Section 13 of the Corporation Law.

In view of the conclusions we have already arrived at, we deem it not indispensable for us to pass
upon this legal question, especially taking into account the statement of the respondent (SAN JOSE
PETROLEUM) that it is essentially a holding company, and as found by the Securities and
Exchange Commissioner, its principal activity is limited to the financing and giving technical
assistance to SAN JOSE OIL.

4. Respondent SAN JOSE PETROLEUM, whose shares of stock were allowed registration for sale
in the Philippines, was incorporated under the laws of Panama in April, 1956 with an authorized
capital stock of $500,000.00, American currency, divided into 50,000,000 shares at par value of
$0.01 per share. By virtue of a 3-party Agreement of June 14, 1956, respondent was supposed to
have received from OIL INVESTMENTS 8,000,000 shares of the capital stock of SAN JOSE OIL (at
par value of $0.01 per share), plus a note for $250,000.00 due in 6 months, for which respondent
issued in favor of OIL INVESTMENTS 16,000,000 shares of its capital stock, at $0.01 per share or
with a value of $160,000.00, plus a note for $230,297.97 maturing in 2 years at 6% per annum
interest,9 and the assumption of payment of the unpaid price of 7,500,000 (of the 8,000,000 shares
of SAN JOSE OIL).

On June 27, 1956, the capitalization of SAN JOSE PETROLEUM was increased from $500,000.00
to $17,500,000.00 by increasing the par value of the same 50,000,000 shares, from $0.01 to $0.35.
Without any additional consideration, the 16,000,000 shares of $0.01 previously issued to OIL
INVESTMENTS with a total value of $160,000.00 were changed with 16,000,000 shares of the
recapitalized stock at $0.35 per share, or valued at $5,600,000.00. And, to make it appear that cash
was received for these re-issued 16,000,000 shares, the board of directors of respondent
corporation placed a valuation of $5,900,000.00 on the 8,000,000 shares of SAN JOSE OIL (still
having par value of $0.10 per share) which were received from OIL INVESTMENTS as part-
consideration for the 16,000,000 shares at $0.01 per share.

In the Balance Sheet of respondent, dated July 12, 1956, from the $5,900,000.00, supposedly the
value of the 8,000,000 shares of SAN JOSE OIL, the sum of $5,100,000.00 was deducted,
corresponding to the alleged difference between the "value" of the said shares and the subscription
price thereof which is $800,000.00 (at $0.10 per share). From this $800,000.00, the subscription
price of the SAN JOSE OIL shares, the amount of $319,702.03 was deducted, as allegedly unpaid
subscription price, thereby giving a difference of $480,297.97, which was placed as the amount
allegedly paid in on the subscription price of the 8,000,000 SAN JOSE OIL shares. Then, by adding
thereto the note receivable from OIL INVESTMENTS, for $250,000.00 (part-consideration for the
16,000,000 SAN JOSE PETROLEUM shares), and the sum of $6,516.21, as deferred expenses,
SAN JOSE PETROLEUM appeared to have assets in the sum of $736,814.18.

These figures are highly questionable. Take the item $5,900,000.00 the valuation placed on the
8,000,000 shares of SAN JOSE OIL. There appears no basis for such valuation other than belief by
the board of directors of respondent that "should San Jose Oil Company be granted the bulk of the
concessions applied for upon reasonable terms, that it would have a reasonable value of
approximately $10,000,000." 10 Then, of this amount, the subscription price of $800,000.00 was
deducted and called it "difference between the (above) valuation and the subscription price for the
8,000,000 shares." Of this $800,000.00 subscription price, they deducted the sum of $480,297.97
and the difference was placed as the unpaid portion of the subscription price. In other words, it was
made to appear that they paid in $480,297.97 for the 8,000,000 shares of SAN JOSE OIL. This
amount ($480,297.97) was supposedly that $250,000.00 paid by OIL INVESMENTS for 7,500,000
shares of SAN JOSE OIL, embodied in the June 14 Agreement, and a sum of $230,297.97 the
amount expended or advanced by OIL INVESTMENTS to SAN JOSE OIL. And yet, there is still an
item among respondent's liabilities, for $230,297.97 appearing as note payable to Oil Investments,
maturing in two (2) years at six percent (6%) per annum. 11 As far as it appears from the records, for
the 16,000,000 shares at $0.35 per share issued to OIL INVESTMENTS, respondent SAN JOSE
PETROLEUM received from OIL INVESTMENTS only the note for $250,000.00 plus the 8,000,000
shares of SAN JOSE OIL, with par value of $0.10 per share or a total of $1,050,000.00 — the only
assets of the corporation. In other words, respondent actually lost $4,550,000.00, which was
received by OIL INVESTMENTS.

But this is not all. Some of the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation of respondent SAN JOSE
PETROLEUM are noteworthy; viz:

(1) the directors of the Company need not be shareholders;

(2) that in the meetings of the board of directors, any director may be represented and may
vote through a proxy who also need not be a director or stockholder; and

(3) that no contract or transaction between the corporation and any other association or
partnership will be affected, except in case of fraud, by the fact that any of the directors or
officers of the corporation is interested in, or is a director or officer of, such other association
or partnership, and that no such contract or transaction of the corporation with any other
person or persons, firm, association or partnership shall be affected by the fact that any
director or officer of the corporation is a party to or has an interest in, such contract or
transaction, or has in anyway connected with such other person or persons, firm, association
or partnership; and finally, that all and any of the persons who may become director or officer
of the corporation shall be relieved from all responsibility for which they may otherwise be
liable by reason of any contract entered into with the corporation, whether it be for his benefit
or for the benefit of any other person, firm, association or partnership in which he may be
interested.

These provisions are in direct opposition to our corporation law and corporate practices in this
country. These provisions alone would outlaw any corporation locally organized or doing business in
this jurisdiction. Consider the unique and unusual provision that no contract or transaction between
the company and any other association or corporation shall be affected except in case of fraud, by
the fact that any of the directors or officers of the company may be interested in or are directors or
officers of such other association or corporation; and that none of such contracts or transactions of
this company with any person or persons, firms, associations or corporations shall be affected by the
fact that any director or officer of this company is a party to or has an interest in such contract or
transaction or has any connection with such person or persons, firms associations or corporations;
and that any and all persons who may become directors or officers of this company are hereby
relieved of all responsibility which they would otherwise incur by reason of any contract entered into
which this company either for their own benefit, or for the benefit of any person, firm, association or
corporation in which they may be interested.

The impact of these provisions upon the traditional judiciary relationship between the directors and
the stockholders of a corporation is too obvious to escape notice by those who are called upon to
protect the interest of investors. The directors and officers of the company can do anything, short of
actual fraud, with the affairs of the corporation even to benefit themselves directly or other persons
or entities in which they are interested, and with immunity because of the advance condonation or
relief from responsibility by reason of such acts. This and the other provision which authorizes the
election of non-stockholders as directors, completely disassociate the stockholders from the
government and management of the business in which they have invested.

To cap it all on April 17, 1957, admittedly to assure continuity of the management and stability of
SAN JOSE PETROLEUM, OIL INVESTMENTS, as holder of the only subscribed stock of the former
corporation and acting "on behalf of all future holders of voting trust certificates," entered into a
voting trust agreement12 with James L. Buckley and Austin E. Taylor, whereby said Trustees were
given authority to vote the shares represented by the outstanding trust certificates (including those
that may henceforth be issued) in the following manner:

(a) At all elections of directors, the Trustees will designate a suitable proxy or proxies to vote
for the election of directors designated by the Trustees in their own discretion, having in mind
the best interests of the holders of the voting trust certificates, it being understood that any
and all of the Trustees shall be eligible for election as directors;

(b) On any proposition for removal of a director, the Trustees shall designate a suitable proxy
or proxies to vote for or against such proposition as the Trustees in their own discretion may
determine, having in mind the best interest of the holders of the voting trust certificates;

(c) With respect to all other matters arising at any meeting of stockholders, the Trustees will
instruct such proxy or proxies attending such meetings to vote the shares of stock held by
the Trustees in accordance with the written instructions of each holder of voting trust
certificates. (Emphasis supplied.)

It was also therein provided that the said Agreement shall be binding upon the parties thereto, their
successors, and upon all holders of voting trust certificates.

And these are the voting trust certificates that are offered to investors as authorized by Security and
Exchange Commissioner. It can not be doubted that the sale of respondent's securities would, to say
the least, work or tend to work fraud to Philippine investors.

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the motion of respondent to dismiss this appeal,
is denied and the orders of the Securities and Exchange Commissioner, allowing the registration of
Respondent's securities and licensing their sale in the Philippines are hereby set aside. The case is
remanded to the Securities and Exchange Commission for appropriate action in consonance with
this decision. With costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Solicitor General for whatever
action he may deem advisable to take in the premises. So ordered.
2. Mead V. McCullough, 21 Phil 95 (1911)

G.R. No. 6217 December 26, 1911

CHARLES W. MEAD, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
E. C. McCULLOUGH, ET AL., and THE PHILIPPINE ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, defendant-appellants.

Haussermann, Cohn & Fisher and A. D. Gibbs for plaintiff.

James J. Peterson and O'Brien & DeWitt for defendant McCullough.

TRENT, J.:

This action was originally brought by Charles W. Mead against Edwin C. McCullough, Thomas L.
Hartigan, Frank E. Green, and Frederick H. Hilbert. Mead has died since the commencement of the
action and the case is now going forward in the name of his administrator as plaintiff.

The complaint contains three causes of action, which are substantially as follows: The first, for
salary; the second, for profits; and the third, for the value of the personal effects alleged to have
been left Mead and sold by the defendants.

A joint and several judgment was rendered by default against each and all of the defendants for the
sum of $3,450.61 gold. The defendant McCullough alone having made application to have this
judgment set aside, the court granted this motion, vacating the judgment as to him only, the
judgment as to the other three defendants remaining undisturbed. 1aw phi 1.net

At the new trial, which took place some two or three years later and after the death of Mead, the
judgment was rendered upon merits, dismissing the case as to the first and second causes of action
and for the sum of $1,200 gold in the plaintiff's favor on the third cause of action. From this judgment
both parties appealed and have presented separate bills of exceptions. No appeal was taken by the
defendant McCullough from the ruling of the court denying a recovery on his cross complaint.

On March 15, 1902, the plaintiff (Mead will be referred to as the plaintiff in this opinion unless it is
otherwise stated) and the defendant organized the "Philippine Engineering and Construction
Company," the incorporators being the only stockholders and also the directors of said company,
with general ordinary powers. Each of the stockholders paid into the company $2,000 mexican
currency in cash, with the exception of Mead, who turned over to the company personal property in
lieu of cash.

Shortly after the organization, the directors held a meeting and elected the plaintiff as general
manager. The plaintiff held this position with the company for nine months, when he resigned to
accept the position of engineer of the Canton and Shanghai Railway Company. Under the
organization the company began business about April 1, 102. itc-alf

The contract and work undertaken by the company during the management of Mead were the
wrecking contract with the Navy Department at Cavite for the raising of the Spanish ships sunk by
Admiral Dewey; the contract for the construction of certain warehouses for the quartermaster
department; the construction of a wharf at Fort McKinley for the Government; The supervision of the
construction of the Pacific Oriental Trading Company's warehouse; and some other odd jobs not
specifically set out in the record.

Shortly after the plaintiff left the Philippine Islands for China, the other directors, the defendants in
this case, held a meeting on December 24, 1903, for the purpose of discussing the condition of the
company at that time and determining what course to pursue. They did on that date enter into the
following contract with the defendant McCullough, to wit: 1awphil.net

For value received, this contract and all the rights and interests of the Philippine Engineering
and construction Company in the same are hereby assigned to E. C. McCullough of Manila,
P. I.

(Sgd.) E. C. McCULLOUGH,
President, Philippine Engineering and
Construction Company.

(Sgd.) F. E. GREEN, Treasurer.

(Sgd.) THOMAS L. HARTIGAN, Secretary.

The contract reffered to in the foregoing document was known as the wrecking contract with the
naval authorities.

On the 28th of the same month, McCullough executed and signed the following instrumental:

For value received, and having the above assignment from my associates in the Philippine
Engineering and Construction Company, I hereby transfer my right, title, and interest in the
within contract, with the exception of one sixth, which I hereby retain, to R. W. Brown, H. D.
C. Jones, John T. Macleod, and T. H. Twentyman.

The assignees of the wrecking contract, including McCullough, formed was not known as the "Manila
Salvage Association." This association paid to McCullough $15,000 Mexican Currency cash for the
assignment of said contract. In addition to this payment, McCullough retained a one-sixth interest in
the new company or association.

The plaintiff insists that he was received as general manager of the first company a salary which was
not to be less than $3,500 gold (which amount he was receiving as city engineer at the time of the
corporation of the company), plus 20 per cent of the net profits which might be derived from the
business; while McCullough contends that the plaintiff was to receive only his necessary expenses
unless the company made a profit, when he could receive $3,500 per year and 20 per cent of the
profits. The contract entered into between the board of directors and the plaintiffs as to the latter's
salary was a verbal one. The plaintiff testified that this contract was unconditional and that his salary,
which was fixed at $3,500 gold, was not dependent upon the success of the company, but that his
share of the profits was to necessarily depend upon the net income. On the other hand, McCullough,
Green and Hilbert testify that the salary of the plaintiff was to be determined according to whether or
not the company was successful in its operations; that if the company made gains, he was to receive
$3,5000 gold, and a percentage, but that if the company did not make any profits, he was to receive
only his necessary living expenses.

It is strongly urged that the plaintiff would not have accepted the management of the company upon
such conditions, as he was receiving from the city of Manila a salary of $3,500 gold. This argument
is not only answered by the positive and direct testimony of three of the defendants, but also by the
circumstances under which this company was organized and principal object, which was the raising
of the Spanish ships. The plaintiff put no money into the organization, the defendants put but little:
just sufficient to get the work of raising the wrecks under way. This venture was a risky one. All the
members of the company realized that they were undertaking a most difficult and expensive project.
If they were successful, handsome profits would be realized; while if they were unsuccessful, all the
expenses for the hiring of machinery, launches, and labor would be a total loss. The plaintiff was in
complete charge and control of this work and was to receive, according to the great preponderance
of the evidence, in case the company made no profits, sufficient amount to cover his expenses,
which included his room, board, transportation, etc. The defendants were to furnish money out of
their own private funds to meet these expenses, as the original $8,000 Mexican currency was soon
exhausted in the work thus undertaken. So the contract entered into between the directors and the
plaintiff as to the latter's salary was a contingent one.

It is admitted that the plaintiff received $1.500 gold for his services, and whether he is entitled to
receive an additional amount depends upon the result of the second cause of action.

The second cause of action is more difficult to determine. On this point counsel for the plaintiff has
filed a very able and exhaustive brief, dealing principally with the facts.

It is urged that the net profits accruing to the company after the completion of all the contracts
(except the salvage contract) made before the plaintiff resigned as manager and up to the time the
salvage contract was transferred to McCullough and from him to the new company, amounted to
$5,628.37 gold. This conclusion is reached, according to the memorandum of counsel for the plaintiff
which appears on pages 38 and 39 of the record, in the following manner:

Profits from the construction of warehouses for the $6,962.54

Government

Profits from the construction of the wall at Fort 500.00

McKinley

Profits from the inspection of the construction of 1,000.00

the P. O. T. warehouse

Profits obtained from the projects (according to 1,000.00

Mead's calculations)

Total 9,462.54

In this same memorandum, the expense for the operation of the company during Mead's
management, consisting of rents, the hire of one muchacho, the publication of various notices, the
salary of an engineer for four months, and plaintiff's salary for nine months, amounts to $3,834.17
gold. This amount, deducted from the sum total of profits, leaves $5,628.37 gold.

Counsel for the plaintiff, in order to show conclusively as they assert that the company, after paying
all expenses and indebtedness, had a considerable balance to its credit, calls attention to Exhibit K.
This balance reads as follows:

Abstract copy of ledger No. 3, folios 276-277. Philippine Engineering and Construction
Company.
Then follow the debits and credits, with a balance in favor of the company of $10,728.44 Mexican
currency. This account purports to cover the period from July 1, 1902, to April 1, 1903. Ledger No. 3,
above mentioned, is that the defendant McCullough and not one of the books of the company.

It was this exhibit that the lower court based its conclusion when it found that on January 25, 1903,
after making the transfer of the salvage contract to McCullough, the company was in debt $2,278.30
gold. The balance of $10,728.44 Mexican currency deducted from the $16,439.40 Mexican currency
(McCullough's losses in the Manila Salvage Association) leaves $2,278.30 United States currency at
the then existing rate of exchange. In Exhibit K, McCullough charged himself with the $15,000
Mexican currency which he received from his associates in the new company, but did not credit
himself with the $16,439.40 Mexican currency, losses in said company, for the reason that on April
1, 1903, said losses had not occurred. It must be borne in mind that Exhibit K is an abstract from a
ledger.

The defendant McCullough, in order to show in detail his transactions with the old company,
presented Exhibits 1 and 2. These accounts read as follows:

Detailed account of the receipts and disbursements of E. C. McCullough and the Philippine
Engineering and Construction Company.

Then follow the debits ad credits. These two accounts cover the period from March 5 1902, to June
9, 1905. According to Exhibit No. 1, the old company was indebted to McCullough in the sum of
$14,918.75 Mexican currency, and according to Exhibit No. 2 he indebtedness amounted to
$6,358.15 Mexican currency. The debits and credits in these two exhibits are exactly the me with the
following exceptions; I Exhibit No. 1, McCullough credits himself with the $10,000 Mexican currency
(the amount borrowed from the bank and deposited with the admiral as a guarantee for the faithful
performance of the salvage contract); while in Exhibit No. 2 he credits himself with this $10,000 and
at he same time charges himself with this amount. In the same exhibit (No. 2) he credits himself with
$16,439.40 Mexican currency, his losses in the new company, received from said company.
Eliminating entirely from these two exhibits the $10,000 Mexican currency, the $15,000 Mexican
currency, and the $16,39.40 Mexican currency, the balance shown in McCullough's favor is exactly
the same in both exhibits. This balance amounts to $4,918.75 Mexian currency.

According to McCullough's accounts in Exhibits 1 and 2 the profits derived from the construction of
the Government warehouse amounted to $4,005.02 gold, while the plaintiff contends that these
profits amounted to $6,962.54 gold. The plaintiff, during his management of the old company, made
a contract with the Government for the construction of these are house and commenced work. After
he resigned and left for China, McCullough took charge of and completed the said warehouse.
McCullough gives a complete, detailed statements of express for the completion of this work,
showing the dates, to whom paid, and for what purpose. He also gives the various amounts he
received from the Government with the amounts of the receipt of the same. On the first examination,
McCullough testified that the total amount received from the Government for the construction of
these warehouse was $1,123 gold. The case was suspended for the purpose of examination the
records of the Auditor and the quater master, to determine the exact amount paid for this work. As a
result of this examination, the vouchers show an additional amount of about $5,000 gold, paid in
checks. These checks show that the same were endorsed by the plaintiff and collected by him from
the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. This money was not handled by McCullough and
as it was collected by the plaintiff, it must be presumed, in the absence of proof, that it was
disbursed by him. McCullough did not charge himself with the $2,5000 gold, alleged to have been
profits from the construction of the wall at Fort McKinley, the inspection of the construction of the P.
O. T. warehouse, and other projects. This work was done under the management of the plaintiff and
it is not shown that the profits from these contracts ever reached the ands of McCullough.
McCullough was not the treasurer of the company at that time. The other items which the plaintiff
insist that McCullough had no right to credit himself with are the following:

Date To whom paid. Amount (Mex. currency).

Jan. 30, 1903 Green $2,000.00

Feb. 2, 1903 McCullough 1,300.00

Feb. 2, 1903 Green 1,027.92
Feb. 19, 1905 P. O. T. Co. note 2,236.80

May 23, 1905 Hilbert 1,856.02

June 9, 1905 Hartigan 1,225.00

McCullough says that these amounts represents cash borrowed from the evidence parties to carry
on the operations of the old company while it was trying to raise the sunken vessels. There is no
proof to the contrary, and McCullough's testimony on this point is strongly corroborated by the fact
that the work done by the company in attempting to raise theses vessels was it first undertaking. The
company had made no profits while tat work was going on under the management of the plaintiff, but
its expenses greatly exceeded that of the original $8,000 Mexican currency. It was necessary to
borrow money to continue that work. These amounts, having been borrowed, were outstanding
debts when McCullough took charge for the purpose of completing the warehouses and winding up
the business of the old company. These amounts do not represent payments or refunds of the
original capital. McCullough did not credit himself with any amount for his services for supervising
the completion of the warehouses, nor for liquidating or winding up the company's affairs. We think
that the amount of $4,918.75 Mexican currency, balance in McCullough's favor up to this point,
represents a fair, equitable, and just settlement.

So far we have referred to the Philippine Engineering and Construction Company as the "company,"
without any attempt to define its legal status.

The plaintiff and defendants organized this company with a capital stock of $100,000 Mexican
currency, each paying in on the organization $2,000 Mexican currency. The remainder, $9,000,
according to the articles of agreement, were to be offered to the public in shares of $100 Mexican
currency, each. The names of all the organizers appear in the articles of agreement, which articles
were duly inscribed in the commercial register. The purpose for which this organization was affected
were to engage in general engineering and construction work, and operating under the name of the
"Philippine Engineering and Construction Company." during its active existence, it engaged in the
business of attempting to rise the sunken Spanish fleet, constructing under contract warehouses and
a wharf for the United States Government, supervising the construction of a warehouse for a private
firm, and some assay work. It was, therefore, an industrial civil partnership, as distinguished from a
commercial one; a civil partnership in the mercantile form, an anonymous partnership legally
constituted in the city of Manila.

The articles of agreement appeared in a public document and were duly inscribed in the commercial
register. To the extent of this inscription the corporation partook of the form of a mercantile one and
as such must e governed by articles 151 to 174 of the Code of Commerce, in so far as these
provisions are not in conflict with the Civil Code (art. 1670, Civil Code); but the direct and principal
law applicable is the Civil Code. Those provisions of the Code of Commerce are applicable
subsidiary.
This partnership or stock company (sociedad anonima) upon the execution of the public instrument
in which is articles of agreement appear, and the contribution of funds and personal property,
became a juridicial person — an artificial being, invisible, intangible and existing only in
contemplation of law — with the power to hold, buy, and ell property, and to use and be sued — a
corporation — not a general copartnership nor a limited copartnership. (Arts. 37, 38,1656 of the Civil
Code; Compania Agricola de Ultimar vs. Reyes et al., 4 Phil. Rep., 2; and Chief Justice Marshall's
definition of a corporation, 17 U. S., 518.)

The inscribing of its articles of agreement in the commercial register was not necessary to make it a
juridicial person — a corporation. Such inscription only operated to show that it partook of the form of
a commercial corporation. (Compania Agricola de Ultimar vs. Reyes et al., supra.)

Did a majority of the stockholders, who were at the same time a majority of the directors of this
corporation, have the power under the law and its articles of agreement, to sell or transfer to one of
its members the assets of said corporation?

In the first article of the statutes of incorporation it is stated tat by virtue of a public document the
organizers, whose names are given in full, agreed to form a sociedad anonima. Article II provides
that the organizers should be the directors an administrators until the second general meeting, and
until their successors were duly elected and installed. The third provides that the sociedad should
run for ninety-nine years from the date of the execution of its articles of agreement. Article IV sets
forth the object or purpose of the organization. Article V makes the capital $100,000 Mexican
currency, divided into one thousand shares at $100 Mexican currency each. Article VI provides that
each shareholder should be considered as a coowner in the assets of the company and entitled to
participate in the profits in proportion to the amount of his stock. Article VII fixed the time of holding
general meetings and the manner of calling special meetings of the stockholders. Article VIII
provides that the board of directors shall be elected annually. Article IX provides for the filing of
vacancies in the board of directors. Article X provides that "the board of directors shall elect the
officers of the sociedad and have under is charge the administration of the said sociedad." Article XI:
"In all the questions with reference to the administration of the affairs of the sociedad, it shall be
necessary to secure the unanimous vote of the board of directors, and at least three of said board
must be provides that all of the stock, except that which was divided among the organizers should
remain in the treasury subject to the disposition of the board of directors. Article XIII reads: "In all the
meetings of the stockholders, a majority vote of the stockholders present shall be necessary to
determine any question discussed." The fourteenth articles authorizes the board of directors to adopt
such rules and regulations for the government of the sociedad as it should deem proper, which were
not in conflict with its statutes.

When the sale or transfer heretofore mentioned took place, there were present four directors, all of
whom gave their consent to that sale or transfer. The plaintiff was then about and his express
consent to make this transfer or sale was not obtained. He was, before leaving, one of the directors
in this corporation, and although he had resigned as manager, he had not resigned as a director. He
accepted the position of engineer of the Canton and Shanghai Railway Company, knowing that his
duties as such engineer would require his whole time and attention and prevent his returning to the
Philippine Islands for at least a year or more. The new position which he accepted in China was
incompatible with his position as director in the Philippine Engineering and Construction Company, a
corporation whose sphere of operations was limited to the Philippine Islands. These facts are
sufficient to constitute an abandoning or vacating of hid position as director in said corporation. (10
Cyc., 741.) Consequently, the transfer or sale of the corporation's assets to one of its members was
made by the unanimous consent of all the directors in the corporation at that time.
There were only five stockholders in this corporation at any time, four of whom were the directors
who made the sale, and the other the plaintiff, who was absent in China when the said sale took
place. The sale was, therefore, made by the unanimous consent of four-fifths of all the stockholders.
Under the articles of incorporation, the stockholders and directors had general ordinary powers.
There is nothing in said articles which expressly prohibits the sale or transfer of the corporate
property to one of the stockholders of said corporation.

Is there anything in the law which prohibits such a sale or transfer? To determine this question, it is
necessary to examine, first, the provisions of the Civil Code, and second, those provisions (art. 151
to 174) of the Code o ] Commerce.

Articles 1700 to 1708 of the Civil Code deal with the manner of dissolving a corporation. There is
nothing in these articles which expressly or impliedly prohibits the sale of corporate property to one
of its members, nor a dissolution of a corporation in this manner. Neither is there anything in articles
151 to 174 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits the dissolution of a corporation by such sale or
transfer.

The articles of incorporation must include:

xxx xxx xxx

The submission to the vote of the majority of the meeting of members, duly called and held,
of such matters as may properly be brought before the same. (No. 10, art. 151, Code of
Commerce.)

Article XIII of the corporation's statutes expressly provides that "in all the meetings of the
stockholders, a majority vote of the stockholders present shall be necessary to determine any
question discussed."

The sale or transfer to one of its members was a matter which a majority of the stockholders could
very properly consider. But it i said that if the acts and resolutions of a majority of the stockholders in
a corporation are binding in every case upon the minority, the minority would be completely wiped
out and their rights would be wholly at the mercy of the abuses of the majority.

Generally speaking, the voice of a majority of the stockholders is the law of the corporation, but there
are exceptions to this rule. There must necessarily be a limit upon the power of the majority. Without
such a limit the will of the majority would be absolute and irresistible and might easily degenerate
into an arbitrary tyranny. The reason for these limitations is that in every contract of partnership (and
a corporation can be something fundamental and unalterable which is beyond the power of the
majority of the stockholders, and which constitutes the rule controlling their actions. this rule which
must be observed is to be found in the essential compacts of such partnership, which gave served
as a basis upon which the members have united, and without which it is not probable that they would
have entered not the corporation. Notwithstanding these limitations upon the power of the majority of
the stockholders, their (the majority's) resolutions, when passed in good faith and for a just cause,
deserve careful consideration and are generally binding upon the minority.

Eixala, in his work entitled "Instituciones del Derecho Mercantil de España," speaking of sociedades
anonimas, says:

The resolutions of the boards passed by a majority vote are valid . . . and authority for
passing such resolutions is unlimited, provided that the original contract is not broken by
them, the partnership funds not devoted to foreign purposes, or the partnerships
 transformed, or changes made which are against public policy or which infringe upon the
rights of third persons.

The supreme court of Spain, in its decision dated June 30, 1888, said:

In order to be valid and binding upon dissenting members, it s an indispensable requisite that
resolutions passed by a general meeting of stockholders conform absolutely to the contracts
and conditions of the articles of the association, which are to be strictly construed.

That resolutions passed within certain limitations by a majority of the stockholders of a corporation
are binding upon the minority, is therefore recognized by the Spanish authorities.

Power of private corporation to alienate property. — This power of absolute alienability of

corporate property applies especially to private corporations that are established solely for
the purpose of trade or manufacturing and in which he public has no direct interest. While
this power is spoken of as belonging to the corporation it must be observed that the
authorities point out that the trustees or directors of a corporation do not possess the power
to dispose of the corporate property so as to virtually end the existence of the corporation
and prevent it from carrying on the business for which it was incorporated. (Thompson on
Corporation, second edition, sec. 2416, and cases cited thereunder.)

Power to dispose of all property. — Where there are no creditors, and no stockholder
objects, a corporation, as against all other persons but the state, may sell and dispose of all
its property. The state in its sovereign capacity may question the power of the corporation to
do so, but with these exceptions such as a sale is void. A rule of general application is that a
corporation of a purely private business character, one which owes no special duty to the
public, and is not given the right of eminent domain, where exigencies of its business require
it or when the circumstances are such that it can no longer continue the business with profit,
may sell and dispose of all its property, pay its debts, divide the remaining assets and wind
up the affairs of the corporation. (Id., sec. 2417.)

When directors or officers may dispose of all the property. — It is within the dominion of the
managing officers and agents of the corporation to dispose of all the corporate property
under certain circumstances; and this may be done without reference to the assent or
authority of the stockholders. This disposition of the property may be temporarily by lease, or
permanently by absolute conveyance. But it can only be done in the course of the corporate
business and for the furtherance of the purposes of the incorporation. The board of directors
possess this power when the corporation becomes involved and by reason of its
embarrassed or insolvent condition is unable either to pay its debts or to secure capital and
funds for the further prosecution of its enterprise, and especially where creditors are pressing
their claims and demands and are threatening to or have instituted actions to enforce their
claims. This power of the directors to alienate the property is conceded where it is regarded
as of imperative necessity. (If., sec. 2418, and case cited.)

When majority stockholder may dispose of all corporate property. — Another rule that
permits a majority of the stockholders to dispose of all the corporate property and wind up
the business, is where the corporation has became insolvent, and the disposition of the
property is necessary to pay the debt; or where from any cause the business is a failure, and
the best interest of the corporation and all the stockholders require it, then the majority have
clearly the power to dispose of all the property even as against the protests of a minority. It
would be a harsh rule that could permit one stockholder, or any minority of the stockholders,
to hold the majority to their investment where the continuation of the business would be at a
 loss and where there was no prospect or hope that the enterprise could be made profitable.
The rule as stated by some courts is that the majority stockholders may dispose of the
property when just cause exists; and this just cause is usually defined to be the
unprofitableness of the business and where its continuation would be ruinous to the
corporation and against the interest of stockholders. (Id., sec. 2424, and cases cited.)

Nothing is better settled in the law of corporations than the doctrine that a corporation has
the same capacity and power as a natural person to dispose of the convey its property, real
or personal, provided it does not do so for a purpose which is foreign to the objects for which
it was created, and provided, further, it violates no charter or statutory restriction, on rule of
law based upon public policy. . . .This power need not be expressly conferred upon a
corporation by its charter. It is implied as an incident to its ownership of property, unless
there is some clear restriction in this charter or in some statute. (Clark and Marshall's Private
Corporations, sec. 152, and cases cited.)

A purely private business corporation, like a manufacturing or trading company, which is not
given the right of eminent domain, and which owes no special duties to the public, may
certainly sell and convey absolutely the whole of its property, when the exigencies of its
business require it to do so, or when the circumstances are such that it can no longer
profitably continue its business, provided the transaction is not in fraud of the rights of
creditors, or in violation of charter or statutory restrictions. And, by the weight of authority,
this may be done a majority of the stockholders against the dissent of the minority. (Id., sec.
160, and cases cited.)

The above citations are taken from the works of the most eminent writers on corporation law. The
citation of cases in support of the rules herein announced are too numerous to insert.

From these authorities it appears to be well settled, first, that a private corporation, which owes no
special duty to the public and which has not been given the right of eminent domain, has the
absolute right and power as against the whole world except the state, to sell and dispose of all of its
property; second, that the board of directors, has the power, without referrence to the assent or
authority of the stockholders, when the corporation is in failing circumstances or insolvent or when it
can no longer continue the business with profit, and when it is regarded as an imperative necessity;
third, that a majority of the stockholders or directors, even against the protest of the minority, have
this power where, from any cause, the business is a failure and the best interest of the corporation
and all the stockholders require it.

May officer or directors of the corporation purchase the corporate property? The authorities are not
uniform on this question, but on the general proposition whether a director or an officer may deal
with the corporation, we think the weight of authority is that he may. (Merrick vs. Peru Coal Co., 61
Ill., 472; Harts et al. vs. Brown et al., 77 Ill., 226; Twin-Lick Oil Company vs. Marbury, 91 U.S., 587;
Whitwell vs, Warner, 20 Vt., 425; Smith vs. Lansing, 22 N.Y., 520; City of St. Loius vs. Alexander, 23
Mo., 483; Beach et al vs. Miller, 130 Ill., 162.)

While a corporation remains solvent, we can see no reason why a director or officer, by the authority
of a majority of the stockholders or board of managers, may not deal with the corporation, loan it
money or buy property from it, in like manner as a stranger. So long as a purely private corporation
remains solvent, its directors are agents or trustees for the stockholders. They owe no duties or
obligations to others. But the moment such a corporation becomes insolvent, its directors are
trustees of all the creditors, whether they are members of the corporation or not, and must manage
its property and assets with strict regard to their interest; and if they are themselves creditors while
the insolvent corporation is under their management, they will not be permitted to secure to
themselves by purchasing the corporate property or otherwise any personal advantage over the
other creditors. Nevertheless, a director or officer may in good faith and for an adequate
consideration purchase from a majority of the directors or stockholders the property even of an
insolvent corporation, and a sale thus made to him is valid and binding upon the minority. (Beach et
al. vs. Miller, supra; Twin-Lick Oil Company vs. Marbury, supra; Drury vs. Cross, 7 Wall., 299;
Curran vs. State of Arkansas, 15 How., 304; Richards vs. New Hamphshire Insurance Company, 43
N. H., 263; Morawetz on Corporations (first edition), sec. 579; Haywood vs. Lincoln Lumber
Company et al., 64 Wis., 639; Port vs. Russels, 36 Ind., 60; Lippincott vs. Shaw Carriage Company,
21 Fed. Rep., 577.)

In the case of the Twin-Lick Oil Company vs. Marbury, supra, the complaint was a corporation
organized under the laws of West Virginia, engaged in the business of raising and selling petroleum.
It became very much embarrased and a note was given secured by a deed of trust, conveying all the
property rights, and franchise of the corporation to William Thomas to secure the payment of said
note, with the usual power of sale in default of payment. The property was sold under the deed of
trust; was bought in by defendant's agent for his benefit, and conveyed to him the same year. The
defendant was at the time of these transactions a stockholder and director in the company. At the
time the defendant's money became due there was no apparent possibility of the corporation's
paying it at any time. The corporation was then insolvent. The property was sold by the trustee and
bough in by the defendant at a fair and open sale and at a reasonable price. The sale and purchase
was the only mode left to the defendant to make his money. The court said:

That a director of a joint-stock corporation occupies one of those fiduciary relations where his
dealings with the subject-matter of his trust or agency, and with the beneficiary or party
whose interest is confided to his care, is viewed with jealousy by the courts, and may be set
aside on slight grounds, is a doctrine founded on the soundest morality, and which has
received the clearest recognition in this court and others. (Koehler vs. Iron., 2 Black, 715;
Drury vs. Cross, 7 Wall., 299; R.R. Co. vs. Magnay, 25 Beav., 586; Cumberland Co vs.
Sherman, 30 Barb., 553; Hoffman S. Coal Co. vs. Cumberland Co., 16 Md., 456.) The
general doctrine, however, in regard to contracts of this class, is, not that they are absolutely
void, but that they are voidable at the election of the party whose interest has been so
represented by the party claiming under it. We say, this is the general rule; for there may be
cases where such contracts would be void ab initio; as when an agent to sell buys of himself,
and by his power of attorney conveys to himself that which he was authorized to sell. but
even here, acts which amount t a ratification by the principal may validate the sale.

The present case is not one of that class. While it is true that the defendant, a s a director of
the corporation, was bound by all those rules of conscientious fairness which courts of equity
have imposed as the guides for dealing in such cases, it can not be maintained that any rule
forbids one director among several from loaning money to the corporation when the money is
needed, and the transaction is open, and otherwise free from blame. No adjudged case has
gone so far as this. Such a doctrine, while it would afford little protection to the corporation
against actual fraud or oppression, would deprive it of the air of those most interested in
giving aid judiciously, and best qualified to judge of the necessity of that aid, and of the
extent to which it may safely be given.

There are in such a transaction three distinct parties whose interest is affected by it; namely,
the lender, the corporation, and the stockholders of the corporation.

The directors are the officers or agents of the corporation, and represent the interests of the
abstract legal entity, and of those who own the shares of its stock. One of the objects of
creating a corporation by law is to enable it to make contracts; and these contracts may be
 made with its stockholders as well as with others. In some classes of corporations, as in
mutual insurance companies, the main object of the act of the incorporation is to enable the
company to make contracts which its stockholders, or with persons who become
stockholders by the very act of making the contract of insurance. It is very true, that as a
stockholder, in making a contract of any kind with the corporation of which he is a member, is
in some sense dealing with a creature of which he is a part, and holds a common interest
with the other stockholders, who, with him, constitute the whole of that artificial entity, he is
properly held to a larger measure of candor and good faith than if he were not a stockholder.
So, when the lender is a director, charged, with others, with the control and management of
the affairs of the corporation, representing in this regard the aggregated interest of all the
stockholders, his obligation, if he becomes a party to a contract with the company, to candor
and fair dealing, is increased in the precise degree that his representative character has
given him power and control derived from the confidence reposed in him by the stockholders
who appointed him their agent. If he should be a sole director, or one of a smaller number
vested with certain powers, this obligation would be still stronger, and his acts subject to
more severe scrutiny, and their validity determined by more rigid principles of morality, and
freedom from motives of selfishness. All this falls far short, however, of holding that no such
contract can be made which will be valid; . . . .

In the case of Hancock vs. Holbrook et al. (40 La. Ann., 53), the court said:

As a strictly legal question, the right of a board of directors of a corporation to apply it

property to the payment of its debts, and the right of the majority of stockholders present at a
meeting called for the purpose to ratify such action and to dissolve the corporation, can not
be questioned.

But were such action is taken at the instance, and through the influence of the president of
the corporation, and were the debt to which the property is applied is one for which he is
himself primarily liable, and specially where he subsequently acquires, in his personal right,
the proerty thus disposed of, such circumstances undoubtedly subject his acts to severe
scrutiny, and oblige him to establish that he acted with the utmost candor and fair-dealing for
the interest of the corporation, and without taint of selfish motive.

The sale or transfer of the corporate property in the case at bar was made by three directors who
were at the same time a majority of stockholders. If a majority of the stockholders have a clear and a
better right to sell the corporate property than a majority of the directors, then it can be said that a
majority of the stockholders made this sale or transfer to the defendant McCullough.

What were the circumstances under which said sale was made? The corporation had been going
from bad to worse. The work of trying to raise the sunken Spanish fleet had been for several months
abandoned. The corporation under the management of the plaintiff had entirely failed in this
undertaking. It had broken its contract with the naval authorities and the $10,000 Mexican currency
deposited had been confiscated. It had no money. It was considerably in debt. It was a losing
concern and a financial failure. To continue its operation meant more losses. Success was
impossible. The corporation was civilly dead and had passed into the limbo of utter insolvency. The
majority of the stockholders or directors sold the assets of this corporation, thereby relieving
themselves and the plaintiff of all responsibility. This was only the wise and sensible thing for them to
do. They acted in perfectly good faith and for the best interests of all the stockholders. "It would be a
harsh rule that would permit one stockholder, or any minority of stockholders to hold a majority to
their investment where a continuation of the business would be at a loss and where there was no
prospect or hope that the enterprise would be profitable."
The above sets forth the condition of this insolvent corporation when the defendant McCullough
proposed to the majority of stockholders to take over the assets and assume all responsibility for the
payment of the debts and the completion of the warehouses which had been undertaken. The assets
consisted of office furniture of a value of less than P400, the uncompleted contract for the
construction of the Government warehouses, and the wrecking contract. The liabilities amounted to
at least $19,645.74 Mexican currency. $9,645.74 Mexican currency of this amount represented
borrowed money, and $10,000 Mexican currency was the deposit with the naval authorities which
had been confiscated and which was due the bank. McCullough's profits on the warehouse contract
amounted to almost enough to the pay the amounts which the corporation had borrowed from its
members. The wrecking contract which had been broken was of no value to the corporation for the
reason that the naval authorities absolutely refused to have anything further to do with the Philippine
Engineering and Construction Company. They the naval authorities) had declined to consider the
petition of the corporation for an extension in which to raise the Spanish fleet, and had also refused
to reconsider their action in confiscating the deposit. They did agree, however, that if the defendant
McCullough would organize a new association, that they would give the new concern an extension
of time and would reconsider the question of forfeiture of the amount deposited. Under these
circumstances and conditions, McCullough organized the Manila Salvage Company, sold five-sixth
of this wrecking contract to the new company for $15,000 Mexican currency and retained one-sixth
as his share of the stock in the new concern. The Manila Salvage company paid to the bank the
$10,000 Mexican currency which had been borrowed to deposit with the naval authorities, and
began operations. All of the $10,000 Mexican currency so deposited was refund to the new company
except P2,000. The new association failed and McCullough, by reason of this failure, lost over
$16,000 Mexican currency. These facts show that McCullough acted in good faith in purchasing the
old corporation's assets, and that he certainly paid for the same a valuable consideration.

But cancel for the plaintiff say: "The board of directors possessed only ordinary powers of
administration (Article X of the Articles of incorporation), which in no manner empowered it either to
transfer or to authorize the transfer of the assets of the company to McCullough (art. 1773, Civil
Code; decisions of the supreme court of Spain of April 2, 1862, and July 8, 1903)."

Article X of the articles of incorporation above referred to provides that the board of directors shall
elect the officers of the corporation and "have under its charge the administration of the said
corporation." Articles XI reads: "In all the questions with reference to the administration of the affairs
of the corporation, it shall be necessary to secure the unanimous vote of the board of directors, and
at least three of said board must be present in order to constitute a legal meeting." It will be noted
that article X statute a legal meeting." It will be noted that Article X placed the administration of the
affairs of the corporation in the hands of the board of directors. If Article XI had been omitted, it is
clear that under the rules which govern business of that character, and in view of the fact that before
the plaintiff left this country and abandoned his office as director, there were only five directors in the
corporation, then three would have been sufficient to constitute a quorum and could perform all the
duties and exercise all the powers conferred upon the board under this article. It would not have
been necessary to obtain the consent of all three of such members which constituted the quorum in
order that a solution affecting the administration of the corporation should be binding, as two votes
— a majority of the quorum — would have been sufficient for this purpose. (Buell vs. Buckingham &
Co., 16 Iowa, 284; 2 Kent. Com., 293; Cahill vs. Kalamazoo Mutual Insurance Company, 2 Doug.
(Mich.), 124; Sargent vs. Webster, 13 Met., 497; In re Insurance Company, 22 Wend., 591; Ex
parte Wilcox, 7 Cow., 402; id., 527, note a.)

It might appear on first examination that the organizers of this corporation when they asserted the
first part of Article XI intended that no resolution affecting the administration of the affairs should be
binding upon the corporation unless the unanimous consent of the entire board was first obtained;
but the reading of the last part of this same article shows clearly that the said organizers had no
such intention, for they said: "At least three of said board must be present in order to constitute a
legal meeting." Now, if three constitute a legal meeting, three were sufficient to transact business,
three constituted the quorum, and, under the above-cited authorities, two of the three would be
sufficient to pass binding resolutions relating to the administration of the corporation.

If the clause "have under in charge and administer the affairs of the corporation" refers to the
ordinary business transactions of the corporation and does not include the power to sell the
corporate property and to dissolve the corporation when it becomes insolvent — a change we admit
organic and fundamental — then the majority of the stockholders in whom the ultimate and
controlling power lies must surely have the power to do so.

Article 1713 of the Civil Code reads:

An agency stated in general terms only includes acts of administration.

In order to compromise, alienate, mortgage, or execute any other act of strict ownership an
express commission is required.

This article appears in title 9, chapter 1 of the Civil Code, which deals with the character, form, and
kind of agency. Now, were the positions of Hilbert, Green, Hartigan, and McCullough that the agents
within the meaning of the article above quoted when the assets of the corporation were transferred
or sold to McCullough? If so, it would appear from said article that in order to make the sale valid, an
express commission would be required. This provision of law is based upon the broad principles of
sound reason and public policy. There is a manifest impropriety in allowing the same person to act
as the agent of the seller and to become himself the buyer. In such cases, there arises so often a
conflict between duty and interest. "The wise policy of the law put the sting of a disability into the
temptation, as a defensive weapon against the strength of the danger which lies in the situation."

Hilbert, Green, and Hartigan were not only all creditors at the time the sale or transfer of the assets
of the insolvent corporation was made, but they were also directors and stockholders. In addition to
being a creditor, McCullough sustained the corporation the double relation of a stockholder and
president. The plaintiff was only a stockholder. He would have been a creditor to the extent of his
unpaid salary if the corporation had been a profitable instead of a losing concern.

But as we have said when the sale or transfer under consideration took place, there were three
directors present, and all voted in favor of making this sale. It was not necessary for the president,
McCullough, to vote. There was a quorum without him: a quorum of the directors, and at the same
time a majority of the stockholders.

A corporation is essential a partnership, except in form. "The directors are the trustees or managing
partners, and the stockholders are the cestui que trust and have a joint interest in all the property
and effects of the corporation." (Per Walworth, Ch., in Robinson vs. Smith, 3 Paige, 222, 232;
5 idem, 607; Slee vs. Bloom, 19 Johns., 479; Hoyt vs. Thompson, 1 Seld., 320.)

The Philippine Engineering and Construction Company was an artificial person, owning its property
and necessarily acting by its agents; and these agents were the directors. McCullough was then an
agent or a trustee, and the stockholders the principal. Or say (as corporation was insolvent) that he
was an agent or trustee and the creditors were the beneficiaries. This being the true relation, then
the rules of the law (art. 1713 of the Civil Code) applicable to sales and purchases by agents and
trustees would not apply to the purchase in question for the reason that there was a quorum without
McCullough, and for the further reason that an officer or director of a corporation, being an agent of
an artificial person and having a joint interest in the corporate property, is not such an agent as that
treated of in article 1713 of the Civil Code.
Again, McCullough did not represent the corporation in this transaction. It was represented by a
quorum of the board of directors, who were at the same time a majority of the stockholders.
Ordinarily, McCullough's duties as president were to preside at the meetings, rule on questions of
order, vote in case of a tie, etc. He could not have voted in this transaction because there was no tie.

The acts of Hilbert, Green, Hartigan, and McCullough in this transaction, in view of the relations
which they bore to the corporation, are subject to the most severe scrutiny. They are obliged to
establish that they acted with the utmost candor and fair dealing for the interest of the corporation,
and without taint motives. We have subjected their conduct to this test, and, under the evidence, we
believe it has safely emerged from the ordeal.

Transaction which only accomplish justice, which are done in good faith and operate legal
injury to no one, lack the characteristics of fraud and are not to be upset because the
relations of the parties give rise to suspicions which are fully cleared away. (Hancock vs.
Holbrook, supra.)

We therefore conclude that the sale or transfer made by the quorum of the board of directors — a
majority of the stockholders — is valid and binding upon the majority-the plaintiff. This conclusion is
not in violation of the articles of incorporation of the Philippine Engineering and Construction
Company. Nor do we here announce a doctrine contrary to that announced by the supreme court of
Spain in its decisions dated April 2, 1862, and July 8, 1903.

As to the third cause of action, it is insisted: First, that the court erred in holding the defendant
McCullough responsible for the personal effects of the plaintiff; and second, that the court erred in
finding that the effects left by the plaintiff were worth P2,400.

As we have said, the plaintiff was the manager of the Philippine Engineering Company from April 1,
1902, up to January 1, 1903. Sometimes during the previous month of December he resigned to
accept a position in China, but did not leave Manila until about January 20. He remained in Manila
about twenty days after he severed his connection with the company. He lived in rooms in the same
building which was rented by the company and were the company had its offices. When he started
for China he left his personal effects in those rooms, having turned the same over to one Paulsen.
Testifying on this point the plaintiff said:

Q. To whom did you turn over these personal effects on leaving here? — A. To Mr. Paulsen.

Q. Have you demanded payment of this sum [referring to the value of his personal effects]?
— A. On leaving for China I gave Mr. Haussermann power of attorney to represent me in this
case and demand payment.

Q. Please state whether or not you have an inventory of these effects. — A. I had an
inventory which was in my possession but it was lost when the company took all of the books
and carried them away from the office.

Q. Can you give a list or a partial list of your effect? — A. I remember some of the items.
There was a complete bedroom set, two marble tables, one glass bookcase, chairs, all of the
household effects I used when I was living in the Botanical Garden as city engineer, one
theodolite, which I bought after commencing work with the company.

Q. How much do you estimate to be the total reasonable value of these effects? — A. The
total would not be less than $1,200 gold.
Counsel for the plaintiff, on page 56 of their brief, say:

Mr. McCullough, in his testimony (pp. 39 and 40) admits full knowledge of and participation in
the removal and sale of the effects and states that he took the proceeds and considered
them part of the assets of the company. He further admits that Mr. Haussermann made a
demand for the proceeds of Mr. Mead's personal effects (p. 44).

McCullough's testimony, referred by the counsel, is as follows:

Q. At the time Mr. Mead left for China, in the building where the office was and in the office,
there were left some of the personal effects of Mr. Mead. What do you know about these
effects, a list of which is Exhibit B? — A. Nothing appearing in this Exhibit B was never
delivered to the Philippine Engineering and Construction Company, according to my list.

Q. Do you know what became of these effects? — A. No, sir. I have no idea. I never saw
them. I never heard these effects talked about. I only heard something said about certain
effects which Mr. Mead had in his living room.

Q. Do you know what became of the bed of Mr. Mead? — A. I know there were effects, such
as a bed, washstand, chairs, table, and other things, which are used in a living room, and
that they were in Mr. Mead's room. These effects were sent to the warehouse of the Pacific
Oriental Trading Company, together with the office furniture. We had to vacate the building
where the offices were and we had to take out everything therein. These things were
deposited in the warehouse of the Pacific Oriental Trading Company and were finally sold by
that company and the money turned over to me.

Q. How much? — A. P49.97.

Q. What did you do with this money? — A. I took it and considered it part of the assets of the
company. All of the other effects of the office were sold at the same time and brought
P347.16.

Q. Did Mr. Mead leave anyone in charge of his effects when he left Manila? — A. I think he
left Paulsen in charge, but Paulsen did not take these effects, so when we vacated the office
we had to move them.

Q. Did Paulsen continue occupying the living room where these effects were and did he use
these effects? — A. I do not know because I was in the office for three months before we
vacated.

Q. Don't you know that it is a fact that Mr. Haussermann, as representative of Mr. Mead,
demanded of you and the company the payment of the salary which was due Mr. Mead and
the value of his personal effects? — A. Yes, sir.

As to the value of these personal effects, Hartigan, testifying as witness for the defendant, said:

I think the personal effects were sold for P50. His personal effects consisted of ordinary
articles, such as a person would use who had to be going from one place to another all the
time, as Mr. Mead. I know that all those effects were sold for less than P100, if I am not
mistaken.
The foregoing is the material testimony with reference to the defendant McCullough's responsibility
and the value of the personal effects of the plaintiff.

McCullough was a member of the company and was responsible as such for the rents where the
offices were located. The company had no further use for the building after the plaintiff resigned. The
vacating of the building was the proper thing to do. The office furniture was removed and stored in a
place where it cost nothing for rents. When Hilbert, member of the company, went to the office to
remove the company's office furniture, he found no one in charge of the plaintiff's personal effects.
He took them and stored them in the same place and later sold them, together with the office
furniture, and turned the entire amount over to defendant McCullough.

Paulsen, in whose charge Mead left his effects, apparently took no interest in caring for them. Was
the company to leave Mead's personal effects in that building and take the chances of having to
continue to pay rents, solely on account of the plaintiff's property remaining there? The company had
reason to believe that it would have to continue paying these rents, as they had rented the building
and authorized the plaintiff to occupy rooms therein.

The plaintiff knew when he left for China that he would be away a long time. He had accepted a
position of importance, and which he knew would require his personal attention. He did not gather up
his personal effects, but left them in the room in charge of Paulsen. Paulsen took no interest in
caring for them, but apparently left these effects to take care of them selves. The plaintiff did not
even carry with him an inventory of these effects, but attempted on the trial to give a list of them and
did give a partial list of the things he left in his room; but it is not shown that all this things were there
when Herbert removed the office furniture and some of the plaintiff's effects. The fact that the plaintiff
remained in Manila some twenty days after resigning and never cared for his own effects but left
them in the possession of an irresponsible person, shows extreme negligence on his part. He
exhibited a reckless indifference to the consequences of leaving his effects in the lease premises.
The law imposes on every person the duty of using ordinary care against injury or damages. What
constitutes ordinary care depends upon the circumstances of each particular case and the danger
reasonably to be apprehended.

McCullough did not have anything personally to do with these effects at any time. He only accepted
the money which Herbert turned over to him. He, personally, did not contribute in any way
whatsoever to the loss of the property, neither did he as a member of the corporation do so.

The plaintiff gave an estimate of the value of the effects which he left in his rooms and placed this
value at P2,400. He did not give a complete list of the effects so left, neither did he give the value of
a single item separately. The plaintiff's testimony is so indefinite and uncertain that i t is impossible to
determine with any degree of certainty just what these personal effects consisted of and their values,
especially when we take into consideration the significant fact that these effects were abondoned by
Paulsen. On the other hand, w have before us the positive testimony of Hilbert as to the amount
received for the plaintiff's personal effects, the testimony of Hartigan that the same were sold for less
than P100, and the testimony of McCullough as to the amount turned over to him by Herbert.

So we conclude that the great preponderance of evidence as to the value of these effects is in the
favor of the contention of the defendant. Their value therefore be fixed at P49.97.

For these reasons the judgment appealed from as to the first and second causes of action is hereby
affirmed. Judgment appealed from as to the third cause of action is reduced to P49.97, without
costs.