CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW individuals who are neither truly 'male' nor truly 'female'.
individuals who are neither truly 'male' nor truly 'female'." The current state of Philippine statutes
TITLE: PHILIPPINE AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
I. Kinds and Hierarchy of Rights
1. REPUBLIC vs JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN
G.R. No. 166676. September 12, 2008.]
Doctrine: Right to Liberty (Pursuit of Happiness)
FACTS:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law
and seeking a reversal of the Decision 1 dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries
in Cagandahan's birth certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to
"Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to "male".
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female
in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics
and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where
persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she
was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an
ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that
her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or
menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind
and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be
corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed
from Jennifer to Jeff.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of
the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr.
Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that respondent's condition is known as CAH. He
explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones,
her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs — female and male. He
testified that this condition is very rare, that respondent's uterus is not fully developed because of
lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that respondent's
condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender because respondent has made
up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous
to her. The RTC granted respondent's petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005.
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the
abovementioned ruling.
ISSUES:
Whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical
condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff", under Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court.
HELD:
NO. In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. "It has been
suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a 'no-man's land' for those
apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is
not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid
classification.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having
reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of
himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It
is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest
or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of
a male.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter
so innately private as one's sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to
undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. Respondent is the one who
has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of
happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses
of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence
of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent" and in the absence of evidence to show that
classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to
protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent's position and his
personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual
deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent's congenital
condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We
cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life
easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.
WHEREFORE, the Republic's petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Jr. and Brion, JJ., concur.
2. PBM Employees vs PBM stark reality — abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973 officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found
themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to
DOCTRINE: Supremacy of human rights over property rights individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or
adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized
The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the primacy of
rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic grievances — over property rights has been sustained. To regard the demonstration against
establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and
affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from
so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective
protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as
employees. well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly
and of petition. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are
FACTS: reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the Issue raised by the demonstration
is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial
union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged
petitioners. Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner police persecution.
Union. Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at
Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. PBMEO thru
Pagcu confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be
cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that
the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or
dispute with Management. The Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel
manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed
by the Constitution but emphasized that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly
prejudice the normal operation of the Company. Workers who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly, the officers present who are the organizers of the
demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed, because
such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal
strike.

Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not
be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts
should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, filed a charge
against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, for a violation of Republic
Act No. 875 (Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.'
Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assembly was violated.

HELD:

YES. It was to the interest of herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up
the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or
peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity
as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees
with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of
assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and
laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the
weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic
human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of
the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea
for the preservation merely of their property rights. The employees' pathetic situation was a
3. ERMITA- MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS VS CITY MAYOR
G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967
DOCTRINE:
The mantle of protection associated with the due process does not cover petitioners. This
particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public
morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by
anything of substance. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely
enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals.
The ordinance, having enacted by councilors, who must, in the very nature of things, be familiar
with the necessities of their particular municipality or city and with all the facts and circumstances
which surround the subject and necessitates action, must be presumed to be valid and should not
be set aside unless there is a clear invasion of personal property rights under the guise of police
regulation.
NO, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental
character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of
the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has
hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and
substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. The councilors must, in
the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with
all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local
legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are
essential to the well-being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative
action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police
regulation. It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity
for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is
not the case here.

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
FACTS: practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included
as annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution,
The petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators questions the validity of Ordinance no. adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide
4760 enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila, approved by then Vice-Mayor Astorga, acting a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal
Mayor of the city at that time. The ordinance regulated the motels, in so far as the petitioners haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the
claimed, that it is unreasonable and violative of due process as it would impose annual fees of clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these
P6,000 and P4,500 to first and second classes motels, respectively. The provision in the same transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to
section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to
hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the
letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from
in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city
and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack
of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport
number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it
up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound together. Among others,
it is also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses
would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly
authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only
for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain,
and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-
incrimination; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less
than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common
inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack
of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the
penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would,
cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing the
destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is once again a transgression of the
due process clause. The RTC granted the petition for Preliminary Injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether Ordinance No. 4760 is violative of due process which should be declared null and void

HELD:
4. VICENTE DE LA CRUZ v. EDGARDO L. PARAS,
GR No. L-42571-72, July 25, 1983
DOCTRINES: Police Power; Due Process; Equal Protection Clause
FACTS:
On November 5, 1975, two cases by Vicente dela Cruz, et al for prohibition with preliminary
injunction were filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The grounds alleged follow: "
Ordinance No. 84 is null and void as a municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful business,
occupation or calling. Ordinance No. 84 is violative of the petitioners' right to due process and the
equal protection of the law, as the license previously given to petitioners was in effect withdrawn
without judicial hearing, that under Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, by Presidential
Decree No. 259, the power to license and regulate tourist-oriented businesses including night
clubs, has been transferred to the Department of Tourism.
However, according to the Municipal Council, it is authorized by law not only to regulate but to
prohibit the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, invoking Section 2243 of
the RAC, CA 601, RA Nos. 938, 978 and 1224. The MC also contends that property rights are
subordinate to public interest.
There was the admission of the following facts as having been established: "1. That petitioners
Vicente de la Cruz, et al. in Civil Case No. 4755-M had been previously issued licenses by the
Municipal Mayor of Bocaue to the petitioners; 2. That petitioners had invested large sums of
money in their businesses; 3. That the night clubs are well-lighted and have no partitions, the
tables being near each other; 4. That the petitioners owners/operators of these clubs do not allow
the hospitality girls therein to engage in immoral acts and to go out with customers; 5. That these
hospitality girls are made to go through periodic medical check-ups and not one of them is suffering
from any venereal disease and that those who fail to submit to a medical check-up or those who
are found to be infected with venereal disease are not allowed to work; 6. That the crime rate there
is better than in other parts of Bocaue or in other towns of Bulacan."
Then came on January 15, 1976 the decision upholding the constitutionality and validity of
Ordinance No. 84 and dismissing the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.
The lower court dismissed the petitions. Its rationale is set forth as "Those who lust cannot last.
This in essence is also why this Court, obedient to the mandates of good government, and
cognizant of the categorical imperatives of the current legal and social revolution, hereby [upholds]
in the name of police power the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975,
of the Municipal Council of Bocaue, Bulacan.
ISSUE:
Whether a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, can prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the
operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses and
withdraw licenses previously issued without judicial hearing
HELD:
This Court is, however, unable to agree with such a conclusion and for reasons herein set forth,
holds that reliance on the police power is insufficient to justify the enactment of the assailed
ordinance. It must be declared null and void.
1. Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms as follows: "General power
of council to enact ordinances and make regulations.— The municipal council shall enact such
ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the
morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants
thereof, and for the protection of property therein." It is practically a reproduction of the former
Section 39 of Municipal Code. An ordinance enacted by virtue thereof, is valid, unless it
contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature,
or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in
derogation of common right. Where the power to legislate upon a given subject, and the mode of
its exercise and the details of such legislation are not prescribed, the ordinance passed pursuant
thereto must be a reasonable exercise of the power, or it will be pronounced invalid."
It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general
welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the
corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State." If night clubs were merely
then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity.
In US v Abendan and US v Salaveria, the two leading cases set forth, this Court had stressed
reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as
well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping
exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective
of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not
encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth.
The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather
than by an absolute prohibition. It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there was in this
instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals
desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of the investments made and
salaries to be earned by those therein employed.
2. The decision now under review refers to Republic Act No. 938 as amended. It was originally
enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS
AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS." The first section was amended to include not merely "the power
to regulate, but likewise "prohibit . . ." The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly
as Republic Act No, 938. It is to be admitted that as thus amended, if only the above portion of the
Act were considered, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs.
If that were all, then the appealed decision is not devoid of support in law. That is not all, however.
The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one whit. The exact wording was followed.
The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. There is thus support for the view
advanced by petitioners that to construe Republic Act No. 938 as allowing the prohibition of the
operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The Constitution mandates:
"Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.” Since
there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the
statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club
was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals," in the language of the
Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs," to quote from
Holmes, and to interdict any calling, occupation, or enterprise. In accordance with the well-settled
principle of constitutional construction that between two possible interpretations by one of which
it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the former
is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom
certainly commends itself. We have done so before We do so again.
3. There is reinforcement to the conclusion reached by virtue of a specific provision of the recently-
enacted Local Government Code. 25 The general welfare clause, a reiteration of the
Administrative Code provision, is set forth in the first paragraph of Section 149 defining the powers
and duties of the sangguniang bayan. It read as follows: "(a) Enact such ordinances and issue
such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred
upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort
and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and
general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of
property therein; . . . ." It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of might
clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. That is to comply
with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to
appropriate regulations. To compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result
of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business. During
such time, their employees would undergo a period of deprivation. Certainly, if such an undesirable
outcome can be avoided, it should be. The law should not be susceptible to the reproach that it
displays less than sympathetic concern for the plight of those who, under a mistaken appreciation
of a municipal power, were thus left without employment. Such a deplorable consequence is to be
avoided. If it were not thus, then the element of arbitrariness enters the picture. That is to pay less,
very much less, than full deference to the due process clause with its mandate of fairness and
reasonableness.

4. The conclusion reached by this Court is not to be interpreted as a retreat from its resolute stand
sustaining police power legislation to promote public morals. The commitment to such an ideal
forbids such a backward step. Reference is made by respondents to Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. That was a regulatory measure.
Necessarily, there was no valid objection on due process or equal protection grounds. It did not
prohibit motels. It merely regulated the mode in which it may conduct business in order precisely
to put an end to practices which could encourage vice and immorality,

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the decision of the lower court dated January
15, 1976 reversed, set aside, and nullied. Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of the Municipality of
Bocaue is declared void and unconstitutional. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court
is hereby made permanent. No costs.