Indian Institute of Management

Ahmedabad IIMA/F&A0529

IndusInd Bank (A)

A Turnaround Story
Sometime in early 2007, Romesh Sobti, Managing Director of the Indian operations of ABN
Amro, a Dutch bank that subsequently merged with Royal Bank of Scotland, was
approached by the Hinduja Group, the leading shareholders in IndusInd Bank. The Group
wanted Sobti and his key colleagues- the heads of operations, wholesale banki g, retail
banking and risk management – to move to IndusInd Bank and assume the reins of top
management.

Sobti and his colleagues carefully pondered the offer. IndusInd bank was in poor shape. At
the same time, having spent over 25 years in banking, the team sensed that they had been
presented an entrepreneurial opportunity. Before taking the plunge, however, they needed
to figure out what the problems at the bank were. They also needed to have a clear plan of
action for turning around the troubled bank.

Background

IndusInd Bank commenced operations in 1994. It was one of nine private banks licensed
after banking sector reforms were initiated in 1993-94. This category of banks, labelled as
‘new private sector banks’, was distinct from ‘old private banks’ which had been licensed
before the onset of banking reforms. IndusInd was unique as it was the first bank in India to
be set up by non-resident Indians (NRIs), mainly the well-known Hinduja Group.

The bank started off by focusing on mid-corporate and small and medium enterprises (SME)
lending. The rationale for this approach was in line with the approach taken by most of the
new private banks. Retail banking required substantial investment in a branch network.
Lending to large corporates required a bank to be able to lend large volumes and at a
competitive cost. For a new bank, neither was easy to accomplish. In contrast, giving loans
to SMEs was attractive because these fetched a higher yield, which would cover the higher
costs of funds of a new bank relative to established banks.

In the late 1990s, as the Indian economy was opened up further to foreign competition, there
was a shakeout in the SME sector. Hundreds of SMEs went under and banks which were
exposed to them ended up facing large losses. Most new private sector banks faced this
predicament. IndusInd Bank was no exception.

Many of the new private banks that failed were merged with other healthier banks. For
example, Centurion Bank and Times Bank were merged with HDFC Bank; Global Trust
Bank was merged with Oriental Bank of Commerce (a public sector bank). IndusInd Bank
too was saddled with a high level of non-performing assets. The Hinduja Group, the
principal private shareholder in the bank chose to adopt a different approach to revive the
bank. In 2004, they merged IndusInd Bank with their Non-banking Financial Company

Prepared by Professor T T Ram Mohan, Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad. The author was
on the board of directors of IndusInd Bank during the period 2006-14.
Cases of the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, are prepared as a basis for classroom
discussion. They are not designed to present illustrations of either correct or incorrect handling of
administrative problems.
© 2015 by the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad.
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(NBFC), Ashok Leyland Finance (ALF), which had turned out to be highly successful in the
area of automobile loans, notably commercial vehicle financing. Apart from recapitalising
IndusInd Bank, the merger brought a large portfolio of high-yielding vehicle loans. It
created a substantial retail portfolio and hence a more diversified asset portfolio for the
merged entity.

Indian Banking Industry

Banks in India are categorized as scheduled banks and non-scheduled banks, where the
former are included in the second schedule of the RBI Act 1934. Scheduled commercial
banks are further classified as public sector banks, private sector banks, and foreign banks.

The banking system had been dominated by public sector banks since the nationalisation of
banks in 1969. However, unlike in many other sectors of the economy in the past, there was
always a measure of competition to state-owned players from both domestic and foreign
banks. Consequent to reform of the banking sector which commenced in 1993-94, the policy
had been to gradually increase the presence of private players instead of privatising the
government-owned ones (something that was politically difficult to accomplish and
required amendment of various statutes).

Public sector banks are scheduled commercial banks with significant Government of India
shareholding and constitute the largest category in the Indian banking system. By the end of
March 2007, there were 19 nationalised banks and the State Bank of India and its seven
associate banks. In the fiscal year 2007-08 (April-March), public sector banks in India
accounted for 73% of bank credit and 74% of deposits.1

As part of the banking reform process and in order to introduce more competition in the
banking sector, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) permitted entry of a new set of private
players into the banking system in fiscal 1994. This resulted in the emergence of nine banks,
known as known as ‘New Private Sector Banks’. In March 2007, the private sector banks
accounted for 21% of credit outstanding and 2 % of deposits.

The third category of banks in India was foreign banks. In March 2008, there were 28 foreign
banks with 229 branches operating in India. They accounted for about 6% of deposits and
7% of credit in the system. Foreign banks were subject to severe restrictions on the branches
they could open. As a result, they catered mainly to high net worth individuals in large cities
and top end corporates. They also focused on the government debt market, foreign
exchange, and offshore finance.

INDUSIND BANK

IndusInd Bank had two main business groups: retail banking and wholesale banking. 2 Each
of these groups had several products and activities.

Retail Banking

 Financing of vehicles, including commercial vehicles, two-wheelers, three-wheelers,

cars (including used cars), construction equipment, and multi-utility vehicles.
 Deposits and loans (personal as well as business) and services such as online bill
payments.
 Wealth management focused on high net worth individuals (HNIs) and non-
resident Indians (NRIs).
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 Distribution of third-party products such as mutual fund and insurance.

Wholesale Banking

 Corporate and institutional banking catered to small-cap, mid-cap, and large corporates
including private, public, and government enterprises. This division had two
verticals: one which acquired credit relationships through the sale of funded and
non-funded products and another that acquired non-credit relationships through the
sale of liability products, transaction products, treasury products, and trade
processing. The division also originated retail business from employees of its
corporate customers through salary accounts, sale of loans to employees, and sale of
mutual fund and insurance products to them. The corporate division also provided
cash management services that were intended to reduce the realisation time of
cheques of customers from sales and distribution channels.
 Treasury and international operations was responsible for the bank’s funding, asset
liability management
 Capital and commodity markets provided banking services to the capital and
commodity exchanges. These included funded facilities, guarantees in favour of the
exchanges, maintenance of depository participant pool accounts, etc.
 Investment banking and merchant banking undertook act vities such as raising debt for
companies and merger and acquisition (M&A) advisory.

Details of assets and liabilities, including the break-up of the portfolio of the vehicle finance
division, which accounted for 69% of the total assets, are provided in Exhibits 1 to 4.

Post-merger Performance and Issues

The merger with ALF might have been expected to help IndusInd shake off the legacy of
bad loans and create a basis for sustained growth on a stronger asset portfolio. However, the
bank was impacted by several adverse factors. In 2004-05, profit after tax declined due to a
sharp increase in operating expenses. The merger with ALF in 2004 resulted in branch and
staff expansion and consequently an increase in operating expenses.

In 2005-06, the bank’s performance deteriorated sharply. Following the merger,

securitisation of the vehicle portfolio had been an important source of income for the bank.
In January 2006, the RBI amended the rules on securitisation to disallow ‘upfronting’ of
income, that is, the proceeds of securitisation could not be counted as income in the years in
which securitisation was done, as was the case earlier; these were to be amortised over the
life of the assets.

Secondly, the cost of deposits started rising given the scramble amongst banks to fund rising
credit growth on the back of strong economic growth. This was reflected in a decline in NIM
from 2.7% in 2004-05 to 1.9% in 2005-06. Thirdly, the bank had been engaged in expanding
its branch network. This involved expenses in acquiring new premises, furnishing them, and
hiring people. The cumulative impact of these factors was that profit after tax plummeted to
Rs 36.8 crore from the previous year’s Rs 210 crore.

In 2006-07 and 2007-08, the net interest margin (NIM) came under further pressure following
the change in the RBI’s interest rate stance. For three years prior to 2005-06, the RBI had been
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lowering its policy rate. In January 2007, the RBI chose to raise the repo rate (whic h is a
short-term rate at which banks borrow from the RBI) by 25 basis points, commencing a cycle
of hardening interest rates that was to continue until the failure of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008.

The rise in the policy rate exposed a basic weakness in the IndusInd model during a regime
of rising interest rates. Nearly two-third of the bank’s asset portfolio comprised the vehicle
portfolio on which interest rates were fixed for about three years. Hence, interest income
would not rise following a rise in interest rates.

At the same time, nearly 85% of the funding happened through what were called ‘bulk
deposits’- these were deposits acquired from corporates at negotiated interest rates that
were different from the ‘card rates’ charged for retail deposits. In other words, the bank
faced a classic asset-liability mismatch. This meant that the bank’s NIM would take a beating
whenever interest rates rose. Sure enough, the NIM declined to 1.4% in 2006-07 and 1.5% in
2007-08.

Apart from hardening of interest rates, profits came under pressure thanks to the Bank’s
decision not to undertake securitisation business and because of higher operating expenses
on branch expansion. A decline in provisions helped the net profit rise modestly to Rs 68
crore and Rs 75 crore in the two years respectively from the low of 2005-06.

Exhibits 5 and 6 provide key elements of the profit and loss account and balance sheet
respectively. Exhibit 7 captures key performance indicators for the bank and how these
compared with the average for new private banks.

Turnaround Challenge

Sobti recalled a meeting with an RBI official before joining the Bank. “The Bank is an outlier”
said the RBI official. “We don’t know if this is an NBFC or a Bank?” Sobti decided to address
this concern head on. He needed to get people to see IndusInd as a bank. The two parts of
the bank – the original bank and the NBF that had merged with it- had to be integrated
and the synergies in the two parts must become clear to customers, investors, analysts, and
the regulator.

Sobti and his colleagues weighed the challenge of turning around the bank. Banks needed to
lend at a competitive price. To do so, they needed the low-cost deposits provided by Current
and Savings Accounts (CASA). The CASA at IndusInd was abysmally low: just 14% of total
deposits. The rest, as mentioned earlier, came from bulk deposits which were costly and
exposed the bank to repricing risk.

IndusInd was unable to raise the proportion of CASA deposits because that required a large
enough branch network, technology that customers found attractive, and a broad suite of
products. Creating a branch network and the right technology required investment.
Investment flows f om profits – some of the profit could be ploughed back into branches -
and profit could help raise capital from investors who were willing to buy a company’s
equity. So, here was a chicken-and-egg situation. A high CASA required capital but capital
would not be forthcoming unless there was profit, which required CASA!

How many branches would be good enough to make reasonable profit? IndusInd’s network
of 180 branches paled before not only those of public sector banks but also the leading
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private sector banks (see Table I below). How could IndusInd hope to attract retail
customers in adequate numbers with so few branches?

Table 1: Comparison of branch network

Bank Number of Branches as of March 31, 2008

Axis 651
HDFC 761
ICICI 1,262
IndusInd 180
Source: Annual Reports

Sumant Kathpalia, Head of Consumer Banking at ABN Amro, felt that there was no need to
be unduly pessimistic. He observed, “We have been making decent profit at ABN Amro
with around 30 branches - 180 branches is a lot more than that.” H noted that the branches
were doing a lot of operational activity that could be restructured by moving several
activities into central processing hubs. The bank had 1.2 mn retail accounts (of which half
were dormant) and 1.4 mn vehicle accounts.

Kathpalia said, “We should be extracting more productivity from our operations and freeing
the branches to focus on revenue generating activities and customer service.” Also, some
items like managing the servicing of the ATM network were capable of being outsourced.
Centralization created potential gains in standardising work processes and digitizing some
of these processes for cost efficiencies, faster turn-around times, and increased non branch
delivery to customers.

Paul Abraham, Head of Operations, noted that since many of the branches had come from
the merger with ALF, they were in transport hubs, which were not the right places for most
retail activities. In many places, the retail, vehicle, and corporate divisions operated from
separate premises. Abraham said, “There are nearly 50,000 accounts with balances of over
Rs 50,000. We should be deepening these relationships.” Transaction banking, which
involved activities such as managing initial public offerings (IPOs), providing cash
management services, and collecting revenues on behalf of government (such as income
tax), also had potential for increasing CASA. Tapping NRI funds and going in for retail fixed
deposits could help lower the cost of funds.

Abraham observed, “Some of the branches operate out of the upper storey of a building- we
all know they should be on the ground floor with easy access to the retail depositor. In many
branches, the vehicle sales force is in the front portion of the branch while the consumer
banking people sat at the rear. It won’t cost a lot to rejuvenate a few branches, to start with.
The important thing is to get the people, products and places right.” There was work to be
done on balancing assets and liabilities. Sobti said, “The asset book is all wrong. They have
65% of the asset side that is at fixed rate while most of the liability is at floating rate. We
need a hig er proportion of loans that are re-priceable. And we need to make the liability
side less floating.”
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Sobti turned to Suhail Chander, the head of corporate banking. “Do we have pricing power
at all?” Chander said, “No, we don’t. We will need to gradually build the corporate
franchise through short term working capital products and good service. We need to focus
on recovery of bad loans so that capital is freed to generate the required reallocation to new
clients; we will have to weed out the old and bring in a new client base using our existing
relationships. Building a quality working capital book will help de-risk the asset liability
mismatch.”

The corporate asset book at the bank was too heavily weighted in favour of large corporates-
nearly 45% of total credit. Mid-caps were 30% and SMEs a mere 25%. It was possible to
increase the yield on the corporate book by changing the weights. The vehicle finance
division faced a similar issue: low-yielding commercial vehicles made up 30% of the total
book

IndusInd was not generating enough fee income from both corporate and retail customers.
As shown in the Table II below, the ratio of fee income to total inc me for the bank
compared poorly with that of its peers. For instance, cor orate custome s need ed to be sold
forex products; instead, the global markets division was largely confined to proprietary
trading. There was scope for being part of management of IPOs (which provided large
amounts of float). Cash management was another neglected area- even the collection of
cheques issued to the vehicle division was being outsourced to other banks. The bank did
not provide any investment banking facilities to its customers, such as raising debt for SMEs.
Loan syndication was an unexploited revenue stream.

Table II: Fee Income and Total Income at peer banks (2007-08)

Rs in crore Axis HDFC ICICI IndusInd

Fee income (Commission, exchange and brokerage) 1,321 1,715 5,605 85
Total Income 4,381 7,511 16,115 598
Fee income/ 30.2% 22.8% 34.8% 14.2%
Total Income
Source: Annual Reports

On the retail side, the bank had not tapped the potential for selling life insurance; other
private banks had made the most of the opportunities for selling insurance linked to the
equity market. Another obvious possibility, selling vehicle and accident insurance to vehicle
division customers, had been ignored. At ABN Amro, Sobti and his team had a good
relationship with Aviva, the UK insurer. Kathpalia wondered, “I don’t know why they
aren’t selling wealth management products to high net worth individuals.” He added, “I see
that the bank’s customers for vehicle finance are going to others when they wanted to buy
second-hand vehicles.”

The bank’s operating costs needed to be brought down. There was no reason for vehicle
finance, retail, and corporate divisions to operate out of different offices, as they did in many
places. Procurement was scattered across many parts of the branch and so were many
operating units. Branches did everything, whether a retail, corporate or SME walked in.

The bank’s declining financial indicators meant that the regulator eyed it with disapproval.
The promoter’s stake was above the statutory maximum of 10% stipulated by the regulator-
and this too was viewed as a negative. There was little coverage by analysts and investment
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banks. More needed to be done in respect of recovery of NPAs. A settlement with a large
industrial house in an exposure worth around Rs 150 crore was pending.

There were issues of risk management as well. The risk management function appeared to
be diffused across the bank. Kalapathi Sridhar, who looked after risk management at ABN
Amro, observed, “Risk and business are not properly segregated and they still operate in the
PSU (public sector undertaking) bank model with branches headed by senior managers from
business undertaking various risk management functions like credit approval,
documentation, disbursal, etc. It is inappropriate to have this conflicted risk management
approach. We need to find a way to centralize risk management whilst ensuring quick turn-
around times for loan proposals.”

There were organisational issues. Wholesale banking and global markets wer headed by
the same person- this meant that global markets lacked the necessary foc s. Corporate
banking was one vertical- this meant that segments within it, such as large c rporates, SMEs
and companies that provided only liabilities, did not get the necessary focus they needed.

Retail banking and the vehicle division were two different verticals within the bank, each
with its own support structure, although both had to do with consumer banking. Branches
were engaged in several activities: gathering deposits, operation , and making corporate
loans. IT was not properly linked to operations- for instance, the bank lacked automated
front end branch processing which enabled the branch to see all the products purchased by a
customer. HR was housed across different business units.

The bank had different business units (BUs), namely, Retail, Vehicle Finance Division, SME
and Corporate & Institutional banking. These BUs had their own distribution network and
structure. Different BUs had different definitions of zones. In certain cases, they operated
from different premises in the same location.

The bank could not hope to address these issues without addressing a range of other HR
issues. It needed to attract the right people but could not hope to match base compensation
of competitors. Training was inadequate. Employees were disengaged and at various levels
were not clear about corporate vision and strategy or even their own objectives. The
performance management system was sub optimal.

Sobti told his team, “We have to earn the right to attract investor capital and consequently
make capital decisions that deliver on these expectations. We need to debate whether to
build a universal suite of products for our target segment entirely manufactured in house or
to include distributed products? Do we align growth in the vehicle financing business in line
with CASA development to avoid further mismatches in the book? Can we build an
experiential brand through innovative and responsive customer service and not by large
media spend?”

Business Plan

The team realised that they faced a huge challenge. Corporates went to public sector banks
when they needed large volumes. Retail customers went to public sector banks for asset
products at a low price. Corporate and retail customers went to the large private banks for
better technology and a broad suite of products. Why would anybody want to bank with
IndusInd Bank? Yes, customer service in Indian banking remained neglected and a small
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bank such as IndusInd could differentiate itself through better service and effective
deployment of technology. But this required far superior engagement with the customer.

And yet the team’s assessment of the bank suggested that the potential for a turnaround was
there, given the right management and the right strategy. Sobti accepted the offer to take
over as Managing Director. In March 2008, he presented his business plan for 2008 -11 to the
Board of Directors of IndusInd Bank.

Sobti’s three-year objective was nothing if not audacious: IndusInd Bank aimed to be among
the top three performers amongst private banks on three parameters: profitability,
productivity, and efficiency. Sobti called his ambition as ‘3-3-3 motto’, a tripling of revenues
in three years to gain top three position. This meant that revenues would have to grow from
Rs 591 crore to Rs 1,800 crore and the net profit would rise from Rs 80 crore to Rs 480 crore
as a result.

In terms of the three parameters he had spelt out, the targets for 2011 were as shown in
Table III below:

Table III: Target Growth in Three Years

March 2008 March 2011

Return on assets (%) 0.36 1 08
Return on equity (%) 7.02 19.06
Net interest margin (%) 1.05 3.09
Cost to income ratio (%) 67.04 50.00
Net NPAs (%) 2.48 0.88
Revenue/employee 21 lakh 33 lakh

Board members were impressed. But would Sobti and his team be able to bring it off?

REFERENCES

1. Reserve Bank of India, A Profile of Banks, 2012

2. GDR offer document, June 2008.
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EXHIBIT 1
Break-up of IndusInd Bank’s Assets and Liabilities

(Rs in crore) March 31, March 31, March 31,

2005 2006 2007
Vehicle Finance Advances (Gross) 1,645.024 3,772.044 6,522.063
Less: Provisions 32.745 39.443 39.20
Net Vehicle Finance Advances 1,612.049 3,733.000 6,483.043
Corporate, SME and Other Loans
(Gross) 7,430.078 5,611.091 4,630.055
Less: Provisions 43.515 34.417 29.779
Net Corporate, SME and Other
Loans 7,387.026 5,577.050 4,600.077
Total Net Advances 8,999.075 9,310.046 11,084.020
Investments (Credit Substitutes) 504.074 664.079 897.007
Treasury Investments (Net of
Depreciation) 3,564.043 4,745.011 4,994.059
Total Assets 13,068.092 14,720.037 16,975.086
Retails banking deposits 3,151.000 4,534.094 6,594.049
Corporate banking deposits 9,963.028 10,471.036 11,050.032
Total Deposits 13,114.028 15,006.030 17,644.081
Treasury Borrowings including
subordinate debt 1,082.062 1,174.005 1,438.051
Total Liabilities 14,196.090 16,180.035 19,083.031
Source: IndusInd Bank GDR offer document, June 2008

EXHIBIT 2
Composition of the Retail Loan Products

(Rs in crore) March 31, March 31, March 31,

2005 2006 2007
Commercial Vehicle/ Construction Equipment 1,192 3,030 5,215
Two-wheeler 257 353 648
Personal Loans 50.8 90.1 77.8
Car 197 390 659
Others (including Advances against Deposits/ 532 934 1,896
Specified Securities)
Retail Advances (Gross) 2,228 4,796 8,496
Source: IndusInd Bank GDR offer document, June 2008
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EXHIBIT 3
Disbursement Details

Segment FY05 FY06 FY07

Commercial Vehicle/Construction Equipment
Number 52,311 69,117 76,865
Disbursements (Rs in crore) 2,594 3,311 3,960
Two-wheeler
Number 2,05,129 2,27,672 2,39,897
Disbursements (Rs in crore) 604 673 711
Personal Loans
Disbursements (Rs in crore) 37.3 51.8 22.5
Car
Number 21,204 26,761 19,353
Disbursements (Rs in crore) 513 659 471
Source: IndusInd Bank GDR offer document, June 2008

EXHIBIT 4
Segment-wise Yields for Vehicle Finance Division

% of Average
Assets (as of
Vehicle Finance Division
December 31,
2007)
Commercial Vehicles 12.57
Construction Equipment 12.30
Two wheelers 18.90
Car loans 11.50
Source: IndusInd Bank GDR offer document, June 2008
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EXHIBIT 5
IndusInd Bank Profit and Loss Account

(Rs. in crore)
PARTICULARS 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08
I. Income
Interest earned 986.15 1,134.39 1,188.28 1,500.25 1,920.22
Other income 344.93 250.75 226.10 244.13 258 01
Total Income 1,331.08 1,385.14 1,414.38 1,744.38 2,1 8.23
II. Expenditure
Interest expended 669.25 718.89 873.19 1,228.85 1,579.86
Operating expenses 217.14 265.02 316.63 343.96 402.19
Operating Profits 444.69 401.23 224.56 171.57 196.18
Provisions and contingencies 182.62 191.09 187.75 103.36 121.13
Total Expenditure 1,069.01 1,175.00 1,377.57 1,676.17 2,103.18
III.Profit
Net Profit for the year 262.07 210.14 36.81 68.21 75.05
Source: Annual Reports

EXHIBIT 6
IndusInd Bank Balance Sheet

(Rs. in crore)

PARTICULARS 2003 2004- 2005- 2006- 2007-

04 05 06 07 08
Capital and Liabilities
Capital 290 291 291 320 320
Employee Stock Options Outstanding - - - 1
Reserves and Surplus 510 539 576 737 1,029
Deposits 11,200 13,114 15,006 17,645 19,037
Borrowings 2,310 611 535 593 1,095
Other Liabilities and Provisions 775 1,068 1,215 1,633 1,779
Total Liabilities 15,086 15,622 17,623 20,927 23,262

Assets
Cash and Balance with Reserve Bank of India 1,335 636 604 1,021 1,526
Balance with Banks and Mon y at Call and Short 836 519 876 1,574 652
Notice
Investments 4,483 4,069 5,410 5,892 6,630
Advances 7,301 9,000 9,310 11,084 12,795
Fixed Assets 298 325 340 370 625
Other Assets 833 1,074 1,082 986 1,034
Total Assets 15,086 15,622 17,623 20,927 23,262
Source: Annual Reports
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EXHIBIT 7
Key Performance Indicators: IndusInd Bank vs its Peers
RATIOS (in %)
Particulars 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08

CASA Ratio 11.17 10.69 12.87 14.92 15.70

Average for peer private banks* 38.06 41.00 39.04 39.08 42.01
NIM 2.05 2.07 1.09 1.04 1.05
Average for peer private banks 2.06 2.07 2.07 2.08 2.09
ROA 2.10 1.50 0.22 0.34 0.34
Average for peer private banks 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.03
ROE 9.03 6.04 4.03 6.50 6.80
Average for peer private banks 23.02 20.03 16.09 18.00 15.02
Cost to Income 32.81 39.78 58.51 66.72 67.21
Average for peer private banks 44.07 49.04 49.09 50.03 49.09
Net NPA 2.72 2.71 2.09 2.47 2.27
Average for peer private banks 1.01 1.00 0.06 0.07 0.08
Revenue/employee (Rs. in lakhs) 37.82 32.08 22.88 19.73 20.86
Capital Adequacy Ratio (Basel III)
Capital Adequacy Ratio (Basel II) 12.75 11.62 10.54 12.54 11.91

*Averages for HDFC Bank, ICICI Bank, and Axis Bank

Source: Annual Reports