Masterscriptie Wouter Klijnsoon PDF

Wouter
Klijnsoon
Student number: 2555962
VU University Amsterdam
Faculty of Law

Master Thesis Criminology

A Situational Analysis of Opportunity-Reducing
Prevention Measures Against Contemporary
Somali Maritime Piracy on Ships in the High Risk
Area: Technoprevention or Armed Guardianship?

Internship attachment at the IMO
Maritime Knowledge Centre
Supervisor: Berty Louis Nayna

16 December 2015
First supervisor: Prof. Dr. Wim Huisman
Second supervisor: Prof. Dr. Henk Elffers
Wouter Klijnsoon

- This page is intentionally left blank -

2

Wouter Klijnsoon
Acknowledgements

The author wishes to express his gratitude to Wim Huisman and Henk Elffers for their
support and comments on earlier drafts of this study.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the fourteen conducted interviews within this
study have been fully recorded and transcribed. However, these texts have not been
included within this document due to confidentiality reasons.

Those who are interested and wish to get access to the transcribed interviews are
welcome to contact the author by the following contact details:

Wouter Klijnsoon
Tel: +31 641 619 114
E-mail: wouter.klijnsoon@gmail.com

A pirate keeps watch on the coastline near Hobyo in northeastern Somalia in 2010
(Dahir, 2012).

3

Wouter Klijnsoon
Summary

The amount of successful piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia has been declining in
recent years, which is mainly contributed to three initiatives: the presence of naval
forces in the region, the Best Management Practices (BMP4), and the deployment of
armed guards on vessels that transit the High Risk Area. However, with Somalia still
being considered a failed state and with the piracy infrastructure still in place,
Contemporary Somali Maritime (CSM) piracy continues to pose a significant threat to
international shipping. Particularly when the naval presence declines in the near future
due to other priorities, the shipping industry needs to rely on its own protection
capacities.
In an attempt to protect vessels that transit the High Risks Area, the industry can
make use of several anti-piracy measures, which generally fall into two categories:
technoprevention or armed guards. However, due to economic and operational reasons,
the latter one is often provided by private contractors. Yet not everybody agrees about a
privately armed response due to several associated risks and a legal ambiguity. Indeed,
the Kingdom of the Netherlands has not legalized the utilization of private armed guards
on Dutch vessels.
In an attempt to contribute to safer transits through the High Risk Area, while
also aiding in the discussion about whether to rely on technoprevention or armed
guards, this study carries out a situational analysis of possible anti-piracy prevention
methods that can be utilized on vessels that transit the High Risk Area. Situational Crime
Prevention is a strategy that has the goal of reducing criminality by making the
opportunity to carry out criminality less attractive and more risky through manipulation
of the situation and the interaction between the offender and the target. Therefore, the
research question maintained in this study is:

What are the most promising and feasible measures in terms of technoprevention and/or
armed guardianship that can be included in a ship’s layered defense system in order to
provide Contemporary Somali Maritime Piracy less opportunity to carry out its activities in
the High Risk Area?

This question is approached on the basis of three kinds of data: academic
literature, general public reporting and fourteen interviews with key informants. The
interview respondents were selected by convenience sampling and snowball sampling
on the basis of their involvement in countering piracy off the coast of Somalia. Their
corresponding organizations consisted of shipping companies, Private Maritime
Security Contractors (PMSCs), interest groups, and governmental organizations. These
interviews were fully recorded and transcribed, before the relevant data was coded in
such a way that the topics and statements could easily be analysed.
In an attempt to arrive at the most promising and feasible anti-piracy measures,
this study makes use of a systematics that is inspired on the stages of the Action
Research Methodology and follows four stages. Chapter 3 contains the first stage of this
systematics, and consists of an analysis of the nature and dimensions of the specific
crime problem. It shows that the offenders use a well-organized sophisticated piracy
infrastructure that makes good use of the opportunities that a ‘’failed state’’ such as
Somalia has to offer the poor and desperate seeking greater fortune. Indeed, what
started out as an attempt by local fishermen to safe their depleted and poisoned seas
developed into a highly profitable international criminal enterprise.
The second stage of the systematics calls for an analysis of the situational
conditions that permit or facilitate the commission of the crime. Important is that it
shows that the most essential element of the hijacking procedure is for the pirates to get
4

Wouter Klijnsoon
aboard of the targeted vessel. Without setting foot on the ship it is virtually impossible
for the pirates to take over the ship and keep the crew hostage for ransom. Be that as it
may, ship owners have been largely unwilling to invest more time and resources into
securing their vessels, both because of the costs of doing so and the relatively low
probability of being attacked.
The third stage of the systematics consists of a systematic study of possible
means of blocking opportunities for CSM piracy. It discusses the utilization, costs, pros
and cons of the following twenty-one anti-piracy measures: Anti-climb barriers, Ballistic
protection, Electric fences, Freeboard, LRADs, Propeller entanglement systems, Razor wire,
High-powered searchlights, Water canons, Control access routes, Rerouting, Maneuvering,
Speed, Group transit, Remote access, Increased vigilance, Local law enforcement,
Multinational Naval Taskforce, PMSCs, Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs), and
Citadels. It shows that there are a wide variety of measures with varying human
involvement. In addition, prices vary enormously.
The fourth and final stage focuses on answering the research question and thus
provides a recommendation about the most promising, feasible and economic anti-
piracy measures to be implementing on vessels transiting the High Risk Area. Chapter 6
shows that the industry tends to lean towards the usage of armed guards, without much
concern for technoprevention options that go any further than the basic ones that are
described in the BMP4. Nonetheless, the chapter also shows that combinations of anti-
piracy technoprevention measures are similar in their expected deterring effect as
armed guardianship. On the other hand, in some situations technoprevention seems less
feasible than armed guardianship, while armed guardianship bears significantly more
risks for death or injury than non-lethal technoprevention measures.
Considering that properly implemented technoprevention measures and armed
guardianship seem both capable of deterring potential offenders, the final chapter 7 sets
out that the shipping industry should ideally rely solely on technoprevention due to the
lethal risks of armed guardianship and its legal ambiguity. The following combination of
technoprevention measures are therefore concluded to be the most promising:
Increased Vigilance, reactive Maneuvering, Control Access Routes, High-Powered
Searchlights, Anti-Climb Barriers, Propeller Entanglement Systems and Citadels.
Be that as it may, due to economical and feasibility shortcomings of some
technological measures nowadays, it is necessary to conclude that in some situations it
could be necessary to recommend a combination of technoprevention and armed
guardianship. In this case, both the High-Powered Searchlights and the Propeller
Entanglement Systems could be exchanged with a VPD or as a last resort with a highly
certified PMSC.
However, even though experience shows it is capable of offering a successful
deterrent against potential threats, the inclusion of armed guardianship should be a
short-term solution, whereas the future emphasis should lie solely on technoprevention
and its development. In conclusion, approaching the fight against CSM piracy from a
multilayered method that is suggested by SCP and based on a vessel’s inherent self-
protection measures is likely to offer the greatest potential of taking away the
opportunities for CSM piracy in the HRA.

5

Wouter Klijnsoon
Contents

Acknowledgements

Summary

Contents

Abbreviations

I Introduction 11

1.1 Contemporary Somali Maritime Piracy 11
1.2 Situational approach 12
1.3 Anti-piracy measures 13
1.4 This study 14

II Situational Crime Prevention & Research Methodology 16

2.1 Situational Crime Prevention 16
2.2 The opportunity structure for CSM piracy 18
2.3 Twenty-five opportunity-reducing techniques 20
2.4 Reporting problems of piracy incidents 21
2.5 Action Research Methodology 22
2.6 Method 23
2.6.1 Respondents 24
2.6.2 Materials 26
2.6.3 Variables 26
2.6.4 Procedures 27
2.7 Conclusion 29

III Situational analysis of Contemporary Somali Maritime Piracy: 30
the nature and dimensions of the crime problem

3.1 What is piracy? 30
6

Wouter Klijnsoon
3.2 Development of Contemporary Somali Maritime piracy 31

3.3 Who are these pirates and what motivates them? 34
3.4 Level of organization and links to terrorism 36
3.5 Modus operandi of Contemporary Somali Maritime piracy 37
3.5.1 Before the attack 37
3.5.2 The attack 40
3.5.3 After the attack 41
3.6 Conclusion 42

IV The situational conditions that permit or facilitate the 44
commission of Contemporary Somali Maritime piracy

4.1 Place managers in the region: the failed state 44
4.2 Offenders: opportunities for piracy 45
4.3 Target: security gaps 46
4.4 Conclusion 47

V Systematic study of possible means of blocking opportunities 48
for Contemporary Somali Maritime piracy

5.1 Increase the effort 48
5.1.1 Target harden 49
5.1.1a Anti-climb barriers 51
5.1.1b Ballistic protection 52
5.1.1c Electric fences 53
5.1.1d Freeboard 53
5.1.1e Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) 54
5.1.1f Propeller entanglement system 55
5.1.1g Razor wire 57
5.1.1h High-powered searchlights 58
5.1.1i Water cannons 59
5.1.2 Control access to facilities 59
5.1.2a Control access routes 60
5.1.3 Deflect offenders 61
5.1.3a Rerouting 62
5.1.3b Maneuvering 62
7

Wouter Klijnsoon
5.1.3c Speed 63
5.1.4 Concluding notes on measures that increase the effort 64

5.2 Increase the risks 64
5.2.1 Extend guardianship 65
5.2.1a Group transit 66
5.2.1b Remote access 66
5.2.1c Increased vigilance 67
5.2.2 Utilize place managers 68
5.2.2a Local law enforcement 68
5.2.2b Multinational Naval Task Force 69
5.2.3 Strengthen formal surveillance 71
5.2.3a Private Maritime Security Contractor (PMSC) 72
5.2.3b Vessel Protection Detachment (VPD) 77
5.2.4 Concluding notes on measures that increase the risks 79

5.3 Reduce the rewards 80
5.3.1 Conceal targets 80
5.3.1a Citadel 80
5.3.2 Concluding notes on measures that reduce the rewards 82

5.4 Conclusion 83

XI The most promising, feasible and economic anti-piracy measures 84
to implement in a layered defense system

6.1 The industry 84
6.2 Layered defense system 86
6.3 The most promising, feasible and economic anti-piracy measures 87
6.3.1 Technoprevention 88
6.3.1a Layer 2: anticipation through technoprevention 88
6.3.1b Layer 3: discouragement in approach through 89
technoprevention
6.3.1c Layer 4: anti-boarding through technoprevention 90
6.3.1d Layer 5: obstruction onboard through 91
technoprevention
8

Wouter Klijnsoon
6.3.2 Armed guardianship for layer three and four 92

6.4 Conclusion 94

XII Conclusions and a glimpse of the future 95

7.1 Discussion 95
7.2 Implications 97
7.3 Limitations 99
7.4 Directions for future research 100
7.5 Conclusion 102

Appendix I Literature 103
Appendix II Example of interview topic list 117
Appendix III Codes and their prevalence 118
Appendix IV Certificate of research internship at the International Maritime 121
Organization (IMO)

9

Wouter Klijnsoon
Abbreviations

Ø ARM – Action Research Methodology
Ø AIS - Automatic Identification System
Ø BMP4 - Best Management Practices version 4
Ø CPTED - Crime Prevention Through Environmental design
Ø CSM - Contemporary Somali Maritime
Ø DCOC - Djibouti Code of Conduct
Ø GPF - Global Policy Forum
Ø HRA - High Risk Area
Ø IFSMA - International Federation of Shipmasters Association
Ø IMB - International Maritime Bureau
Ø IMO - International Maritime Organization
Ø KVNR - Koninklijke Vereniging van Nederlandse Reders
Ø MSC - Maritime Security Committee
Ø MSCHOA – Maritime Security Center Horn of Africa
Ø MNTF - Multinational Naval Task Force
Ø PMSC - Private Maritime Security Contractor
Ø RPG - Rocket Propelled Grenade
Ø SCP - Situational Crime Prevention
Ø VPD - Vessel Protection Detachment

Indian Ocean
10

Wouter Klijnsoon
Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Contemporary Somali Maritime Piracy

In 2009, in the international waters of the Gulf of Aden, Somali pirates aggressively
attacked several ships. Among them were the side dump stone vessel Pompeii sailing
under Belgian flag and two container ships that were sailing under the flag of the Dutch
Antilles: the Samanyolu and the Marathon. The crew of the Pompeii - two Belgians, a
Netherlander, four Croats and three Filipinos – were released after 71 days of tough
negotiations and when ransom was paid (Law, 2012). The attack on the Marathon
resulted in casualties: one crewmember died of gunshot wounds and another was
seriously injured. After a couple of weeks, the Marathon’s crew was also released when
a ransom was paid. The Samanyolu on the other hand managed to escape its attackers
when the crew defended the ship and the Danish Navy hastened to the scene and
rounded up the five pirates (‘’Vijf jaar cel voor Somalische piraten’’, 2010). These cases
made one thing clear: in order to offer resistance against contemporary maritime piracy
and not to fall victim of being hijacked and held for ransom, ships need to defend
themselves. According to some by whatever means necessary.
Fighting crime on the high seas has some problems. Resources are less
accessible then on land, the high seas are enormous and these areas are often a no mans
land (Felson, 1994). These factors make it easier to carry out criminal activities and
make it harder to investigate and prevent crime (Shane & Magnuson, 2014). Although
contemporary maritime piracy has mainly developed since the nineties in the waters of
Southeast-Asia and East and West Africa, most international attention has been focussed
on attacks carried out in and near the coastal waters of the Federal Republic of Somalia.
This is not surprising, given the fact that maritime pirates from Somalia were
responsible for the majority of piracy incidents between 2001 and 2010, along with the
less aggressive maritime pirates from Indonesia (Twyman-Ghoshal & Pierce, 2014).
However, with a recorded number of 219 attacks in 2010, the number of incidents
reached unprecedented levels and Somali pirates were responsible for 49% of the total
recorded maritime piracy incidents worldwide (IMB, 2011). And with 12% of the worlds
oil usage and 80% of the international maritime trade with Europe passes the Gulf of
Aden, representing an estimated 72,600 transits a year, the results of these attacks are
devastating for important shipping lanes (US National Security Council, 2009; OBP,
2014). Indeed, at the beginning of the heyday of Contemporary Somali Maritime (CSM)
Piracy, Middleton (2008) stated that contemporary maritime piracy was the biggest
threat for the international shipping security since the end of World War II. And since
modern pirates use more force, become smarter and reach a greater range than ever,
the end of this security threat is not yet in sight (Chalk, 2009).
Maritime piracy continues to pose a significant threat to international interests,
international shipping and the international trade. Contemporary maritime piracy
undermines confidence in important shipping lanes; it weakens or undermines laws of
various countries; it threats legitimate incomes and resources needed to rebuild
Somalia; it is responsible for a rise of maritime insurance rates; it creates additional
risks for environmental damage (Shane & Magnuson, 2014); it endangers the lives of
seafarers because they can get hurt, killed or they can be held hostage for ransom (US
National Security council, 2007). Moreover, the total costs that contemporary maritime
piracy entails are estimated at $7-$12 billion a year (Bowden, 2010). But perhaps more
problematic is the supposed relationship between maritime piracy, failed states and
organised terrorism (Dahlvang, 2006; Murphy, 2007; Young & Valencia, 2003). Ransom
11

Wouter Klijnsoon
paid to Somali pirates can be used to sponsor Islam militants like Al Qaeda, al Shabaab
(Lough, 2011), Boko Haram (Lay & Johnston, 2014) and perhaps Islamic State as well.
Indeed, Al Qaeda recently urged its followers to conduct attacks on Western economic
interests at strategic sea-lanes, such as the Strait of Malacca. According to Singaporean
Navy Rear-Admiral Lay Chung Han, terrorists could hijack a fuel tanker and turn it into a
floating bomb. Indeed, Lai stated that it would be a challenge to distinguish between a
pirate attack and a terror incident in the sea-lanes (Jianyue, 11 may 2015).
However, since the rise of Somali maritime piracy and cases such as the Pompeii,
the Samanyolu and the Marathon, the shipping industry has not been idle. Multinational
Naval Task Forces (MNTF) such as NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield and European Union
Operation Atalanta concentrated in this area, along with self-protective measures taken
by the international community and the merchant shipping industry has forced the CSM
piracy activity out into the Arabian Sea and beyond. According to maritime intelligence
company Dryad Maritime (Dryad Maritime, 2015), the last confirmed vessel to be fired
upon by suspected Somali pirates in the Indian Ocean was in February 2014.
However, the threat posed by Somali maritime pirates is still very real. And
although recent figures indicate otherwise, it seems that the security issue is not solved
yet. Indeed, during the 95th Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) meeting of the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) in June 2015, the Committee was reminded
that the situation in the Indian Ocean remained uncertain with the real possibility of a
resurgent pirate threat (IMO, 2015a). Moreover, in 2014 the minister of foreign affairs
of The Netherlands, mister Timmermans, wrote to the House of Representatives in The
Netherlands that the threat of CSM piracy has by no means disappeared: ‘’pirates and
underlying criminal networks stay active and root causes of maritime piracy are still very
present within the country of Somalia’’ (Groenendijk, 2014).
Peter Cook (2015), Chief Executive Officer of the Security Association for the
Maritime Industry (SAMI), compared the success of the fight against CSM piracy very
appropriate with a three-legged stool: first there is the presence of naval forces in the
area; second are the self-protective measures; third is the implementation of armed
guards. If you take away one of the stool’s legs, it will fall over. This would mean the re-
emergence of CSM piracy back to the scale it used to be several years ago. Indeed,
because of the lack of piracy incidents in the last year and due to the increasing turmoil
in the world, it is a realistic near-future scenario that the naval presence will develop
other priorities than protecting the merchant navy against CSM piracy. Last year, NATO
aborted Operation Ocean Shield whereas the Netherlands decided to carry on with EU
Operation Atalanta until the end of 2015, which has an EU mandate until the end of
2016. Currently it is uncertain whether the mandate will be extended after 2016, while
the Dutch government has announced that it will reduce all of its navy presence in the
region (Van der Veen, 2015). However, by using mister Cooks’ metaphor, the declining
priority of protecting against CSM piracy could mean the stool has to stand on two legs,
which would mean that the shipping industry will be on its own.

1.2 Situational approach

Because of the complexity of the fight against CSM piracy through traditional law
enforcement and prosecution efforts, and because of the enormous size of the working
area of these pirates, it might be that a preventative situational approach can provide a
solution in protecting the merchant fleet. The Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) theory
comes from environmental criminology and is a situational approach on criminality. SCP
focuses on individuals or small groups of individuals that come together in a specific
area and form chemistry suitable for creating criminality. In turn, this chemistry creates
an opportunity for criminality when a motivated offender (the pirate) comes together in
time and space with a suitable target (the ship) in the absence of competent
12

Wouter Klijnsoon
guardianship (weak or absent controllers on or near the ship). Such a micro-level

approach changes the subject of analysis from a comprehensive analysis of the
phenomenon to the incident itself. This can result in valuable knowledge about the
relationship between places, victims and offenders, and about how individuals and
organisations shape their activities within these situations. When these systematic
patterns and relationships are known, specific prevention techniques can be developed
in order to prevent the specific form of crime (Shane & Magnuson, 2014).
SCP is a strategy that has the goal of reducing criminality by making the
opportunity to carry out criminality less attractive and more risky through manipulation
of the situation (Clarke, 1995; 1997). However, the international community and
merchant navy already make consciously or unconsciously use of the general ‘toolkit’ of
SCP techniques for quite some time now (Clarke & Eck, 2005). These prevention
methods that are used against CSM piracy could be categorized within the SCP theory in
different categories, whereby the effectiveness of these methods could be compared in a
consistent and systematic manner (Bryant, 2014; Shane & Magnuson, 2014).

1.3 Anti-piracy measures

As mentioned before, the merchant fleet protects itself against CSM piracy by making
use of several different SCP strategies. Ships trying to protect themselves in a high-risk
area (HRA) of piracy attacks most commonly make use of the Best Management
Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy (BMP4). By creating the BMP4, in
cooperation with the industry, the UK Maritime Trade Operations (2011) has prepared a
set of defensive techniques that focus on planning and operationalizing. These
situational defensive measures are developed in the course of several years and are
based on experiences and collected data (Leavy, 2011). Indeed, Rengelink (2012) states
that the measures proposed by the BMP4 are consistent with the five categories of the
SCP theory that will be discussed in chapter 2. An example of applying SCP measures on
ships is the use of barriers along the side of the vessel, which increases the efforts for
pirates to climb on board (Chalk, 2008; IMO, 2011; Rengelink, 2012; Shortland &
Vothknecht, 2011). In this study, these kinds of technological self-protective measures
are termed technoprevention.
One notable protection method proposed by the BMP4 is that when a ship enters
a high-risk area like the Gulf of Aden, the shipping company can consider using on-board
armed Private Maritime Security Contractors (PMSC). These teams can react directly on
a (threat of a) pirate attack. And according to some it is just another way to increase the
risk for failure of the maritime pirates. However, not everybody agrees about a privately
armed response (Bryant et al., 2013; Rengelink, 2012). Nevertheless, the IMO has
created guidelines for the utilisation of PMSCs in high-risk areas, a regulatory ISO
Standard is created (ISO 28007-1) and the BMP4 states that experienced and competent
PMSCs could be a valuable addition to the BMP (IMO, 2011).
However, the presence of on-board weaponry is not allowed by each flag state,
which makes the usage of armed PMSCs in some countries illegal. For example, although
the Dutch navy provides protection by the state in the form of armed military Vessel
Protection Detachments (VPDs) for highly vulnerable ships, it is not permitted to hire
armed PMSCs in The Netherlands. The Dutch government believes their monopoly on
violence is more important and the protection of citizens is the responsibility of the
state. But according to chairman of the Royal Dutch Ship-owners Association (KVNR)
Tineke Netelenbos, the measures proposed by the BMP4 are not sufficient to protect a
ship against an armed attack by maritime pirates. She states that the attacked Dutch
ship Flintstone was the target of Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG), and that no BMP
could cope with such attacks (G4S, 2013).
13

Wouter Klijnsoon
Armed PMSCs could increase the safety of commercial ships because they
provide protection on the spot, which creates the possibility to act directly on a threat of
or an actual attack of pirates. However, the usage of this kind of protection could
potentially increase the use of violence by pirates during an attack, which creates risks
for the safety of innocent civilians. Also, it violates national and international laws
whereas some governments believe that their monopoly on violence is too important
(Fitzsimmons, 2013; Groenendijk, 2014). Finally, many private contractors are known
to be ‘quick on the trigger’ when they feel threatened (Broder & Johnston, 2007).
Therefore the usage of armed PMSCs on board of ships remains highly controversial
with surprisingly little research on its added value on the self-protection measures as
are recommended in the BMP4.

1.4 This study

Indeed, overall exceptionally little research about the operationalizing and impact of
prevention methods against CSM piracy has been performed (e.g. Bryant et al., 2013).
The nature and extent of maritime piracy in previous research was approached from
different perspectives where the main focus was on the macro-level of maritime piracy.
For example, a relatively significant amount of descriptive research on contemporary
piracy and its development (e.g. Chalk, 2010; Sullivan, 2010) has been performed.
However, such research does not contribute to the micro-level knowledge about the
interactions between victims (ships), offenders (pirates) and its context. Shane &
Magnuson (2014) state that maritime criminology has focused most of its research on
juridical, political, geographical and economic effects of maritime piracy, and barely on
criminal prevention. According to them, micro-level research focussing on situational
factors, especially the interaction between people and its situational setting would yield
the most useful analysis in the prevention of maritime piracy.
Perhaps more important, systematically comparing the use of technoprevention
versus armed guardianship with the aim of protecting ships against CSM piracy has
never been done before. This issue might be more relevant than ever, since after much
lobbying of the KVNR, the government of The Netherlands is about to look into the
possibility of legalizing the usage of PCSMs on ships sailing under the Dutch flag
(‘’Particuliere beveiligers op koopvaardijschepen mogelijk’’, 2015).
The main objective of this study is carrying out a situational analysis of
prevention methods against CSM piracy on or near ships in the high-risk area. Therein
the focus will be on comparing opportunity-reducing techniques in terms of their
usefulness in taking away the opportunity of CSM piracy to carry out their criminal
activity. This also offers the opportunity to compare the usefulness of technoprevention
with the controversial usage of armed guardianship. Therefore, the research question
maintained in this study is:

armed guardianship that can be included in a ship’s layered defense system in order to
provide Contemporary Somali Maritime Piracy less opportunity to carry out its activities in
the High Risk Area?

In an attempt to answer this question, this study will make use of a systematics
that is inspired on the first four stages of the standard methodology for a situational
project: the Action Research Methodology (ARM; Clarke, 1997). This is a model in which
researchers and practitioners work together to analyse and define the problem, to
identify and try out possible solutions, to evaluate the results and, if necessary, to repeat
the cycle until success is achieved (Lewin, 1947). However, the focus of this study is to
discover the most promising and feasible anti-piracy measures, whereas the actual
14

Wouter Klijnsoon
implementation is beyond this study’s reach. Therefore, the ARM will only be used as an
inspiration to help establishing a systematics that compares all possible anti-piracy
solutions in an attempt to arrive at the options that are expected to be most suitable in
the fight against CSM piracy based on a cost/benefit analysis. It is essential to follow a
narrow systematics because of the vast range of possible anti-piracy solutions and ideas
that make it hard to see the wood for the trees. Moreover, this methodology offers an
approach that keeps the bigger picture of the problem in mind, which is important
because of the complexity of CSM piracy and the current situation of Somalia being a
failed state.
In addition to a literature review, interviews with key informants in the security
issue will be held in order to collect information on opportunity reducing techniques on
ships in the HRA against CSM piracy. The method of carrying out interviews enables this
study to consult a broad range of experts that can inform on prevention methods against
CSM piracy from their own professional perspective.
The following chapter 2 will effectuate a theoretical foundation of the Situational
Crime Prevention Theory used in this study. Also, this chapter will focus on the applied
methods in search of answering the main research question outlined above. Chapter 3
contains the first stage of the ARM-inspired systematics and will focus on the nature and
dimensions of the crime problem. Among others, this section will discuss definitions of
piracy, the development of CSM piracy, their motivations and their modus operandi. The
following chapter 4 will focus on the second stage of the ARM-inspired systematics,
wherein the situational conditions that permit or facilitate the commission of maritime
piracy off the coast of Somalia will be analysed. The third stage, which will be discussed
in chapter 5, consists of a systematic study of the possible means for blocking the
opportunities to carry out the particular crime. By using the SCP opportunity-reducing
techniques matrix developed by Cornish & Clarke (2003), the prevention methods will
be systematically discussed in terms of their practical usage, impact and pros and cons.
Chapter 6 contains the fourth and final stage of the ARM-inspired systematics: an
analysis and discussion of the most promising, feasible and economic measures in a
layered defense system. The final chapter 7 concludes with a discussion on these
measures and recommends combinations for vessels transiting the HRA. Furthermore,
the chapter offers a critical review of this study, discusses its limitations and offers
recommendations for future research.

15

Wouter Klijnsoon
Chapter 2

Situational Crime Prevention & Research Methodology

Many criminological theories try only to explain why some people become delinquent or
criminal. Whether biological, psychological or sociological in approach, these theories
are dispositional because they seek to explain a general disposition or tendency to
commit crime. However, crime is an act, and therefore it might be that it can only be
explained in terms of the interaction between the criminal motivation and the situation
that provides the opportunity for crime to occur (Clarke, 2008).
Moreover, whatever the reasons are for committing piracy, the reality remains
that the shipping industry suffers from the attacks and the hijackings that occur off the
coast of Somalia. These companies can do little when it comes to tackling root causes in
the failed state of Somalia, but what they can do is adjust the situation on their own
ships to their advantage.
With this approach in mind, the following chapter starts by setting out a
theoretical foundation on how one could make use of the criminological theory of
situational crime prevention with the goal of countering CSM piracy. It will be shown
how the different elements in the piracy phenomenon relate to each other and how
these elements could be influenced by the implementation of focused techniques that
adjust the opportunity for crime.
In addition, the following chapter sets out what research methodology is applied
in the current study. It will be discussed that research on the piracy problem can be both
quantitative and qualitative in nature, but that due to weak and skewed piracy statistics
a qualitative approach is preferred. Moreover, this chapter discusses how the Action
Research Methodology was used as an inspiration in the search for the most promising,
feasible anti-piracy measures to be implemented on vessels off the coast of Somalia. And
finally, since various sources of information were consulted in the search for these
measures, an overview of the methodology that was used to acquire this information
will be provided at the end of the chapter.

2.1 Situational Crime Prevention

Situational crime prevention departs radically from most criminology in its orientation
(Clarke, 1980; Clarke and Mayhew, 1980). Instead of analyzing the circumstances giving
rise to specific kinds of crime, it introduces discrete managerial and environmental
changes to reduce the opportunity for those crimes to occur. Therefore, it is focused on
the settings for the criminal event, rather than upon those committing criminal acts and
the source of criminal motivation. Moreover, it seeks not to eliminate criminal or
delinquent tendencies through improvement of society or its institutions, but to make
criminal action less attractive to offenders (Clarke, 1997). And instead of detecting and
sanctioning offenders, it seeks to prevent the occurrence of crime. The situational
approach asks how crimes occur and what situational factors can be manipulated to
prevent them from recurring in the future.
Situational prevention is rooted in several environmental criminological
theories, such as the rational choice perspective, routine activity theory, and crime
pattern theory (Clarke, 2008). The birth of the perspective can be traced to Ronald V.
Clark, who began to develop the ideas that would later form the basis of the situational
approach while working in the Home Office Research Unit, the British government’s
criminological research department, during the 1960s and 1970s (Clarke & Cornish,
1983). Clarke and colleagues were investigating why some juvenile correctional
facilities had higher rates of re-offending than other facilities. During this research they
16

Wouter Klijnsoon
found that the situational and environmental characteristics of the correctional

institutions were stronger predictors of misbehavior than the background or
personality factors of the juveniles (Tizzard, Sinclair, & Clarke, 1975).
Around the same time in the United States, the relationship between situational
variables and crime was also receiving attention. Especially the concept of Crime
Prevention Through Environmental design (CPTED) draws attention to the role that
physical environments play in helping to encourage or inhibit criminal activity (Ray,
1971). In addition, ‘’problem-oriented policing’’ developed as a way to approach specific
crime problems, constructs practical responses, and measures the effectiveness of police
efforts (Goldstein, 1979). These developments contributed to the elaboration of the
situational crime prevention theory by Clarke.
According to Clarke (1997), situational prevention consists of ‘’opportunity-
reducing measures that are directed at highly specific forms of crime, involve the
management, design or manipulation of the immediate environment in as systematic and
permanent way as possible, make crime more difficult and risky, or less rewarding and
excusable as judged by a wide range of offenders’’. Recent work has also incorporated the
notion of controlling situational precipitators of crime, or removing situational factors
that tend to call for criminal responses (Wortley, 2001). Several assumptions and
features of this definition of situational prevention will be examined.
First, since the situational determinants of any specific category of crime are
different from those of another one, a situational prevention project will only succeed if
it is focused on a highly specific category of crime. An example is focusing on juvenile
joyriding, instead of focusing on a broader category such as juvenile delinquency or car
thefts. In addition, it may be that the crime is committed for different motives, by
different offenders and with different resources and skills. Therefore, successful
preventative measures against CSM piracy in east Africa may be unsuccessful when
applied to a different type of piracy, such as committed in the Strait of Malacca or in
western Africa. This also implies that committing a specific form of crime consists of a
linked series of specific steps (Cornish, 1994). Therefore, in order to tackle the crime in
question, instead of delving into general information such as the offender’s background,
for situational crime prevention it is essential to concentrate on the specific modus
operandi of the crime in question (Decker, 2005). Understanding how a crime is
committed helps in finding points of intervention to make the crime more difficult, risky
or less rewarding (Clarke, 2008).
Second, the definition implies that changing the environment is designed to
affect the considerations that are made by potential offenders about the expected costs
and benefits when committing particular crimes, which also implies rationality. Indeed,
following Cornish and Clarke’s formulation of the rational choice perspective, a decision
is made to do so every time a crime is committed. Following Taylor, Walton and Young
(1973), nobody is compelled to commit crime: ‘’discrimination and disadvantage do not
force robbers to go through the doors of a bank; rather, robbers choose to rob banks
because they want money’’. Therefore, people commit crimes because they judge this will
bring them some benefit. Whether they choose to commit crime depends on a rough
calculation of their perception of the chances of obtaining the reward and the risks of
failure (Clarke, 2008). Moreover, if people choose to commit crime, it follows that a
possible choice can also be made in order to avoid the crime when the circumstances
are unfavorable. Therefore, the main objective of situational crime prevention is the
creation of unfavorable circumstances and altering the offender’s perception of the costs
and benefits that are associated with a particular crime in order to discourage them
from committing the offense.
Third, one overriding principle of situational crime prevention is that preventive
measures should change the ‘near’ situational causes of crime, rather than the ‘distant’
dispositional causes. This assertion is rooted in the theoretical assumptions of routine
17

Wouter Klijnsoon
activity theory, which states that a crime will occur if a target and offender cross in a
place that lacks an effective guardian, handler, or manager (Felson, 2002). It assumes
that crimes happen in particular physical locations and at particular times. In addition,
changing near causes is more likely to succeed in reducing crime because the link
between cause and effect is more direct and therefore achieves a more immediate effect
on crime than when trying to change ‘distant’ causes (Clarke, 2008). Moreover, not
every cause of a crime needs to be removed for prevention to succeed because it is often
enough to remove one small but key element that shapes the opportunity for
criminality.
Fourth, the definition is a general one that does not specify any particular
category of crime. Rather, situational prevention should be applicable to every kind of
crime. It is not only suitable for opportunistic offenses, but also for more calculated
offenses (Clarke, 1997). Mainly it has been applied to predatory criminality with direct
contact (Felson, 2002), also known as street criminality. However, the theory is on the
rise and has been successfully applied on different criminal activities, such as burglary
(Brantingham & Brantingham, 1975; Reppetto, 1974; Scarr, 1973), car theft (Wilkins,
1964), poaching (Lemieux & Clarke, 2009; Petrossian & Clarke, 2014; Pires & Clarke,
2011, 2012), organized crime (Bullock, Clarke, & Tilley, 2010), and also on maritime
piracy (Rengelink, 2012; Bryant et al., 2013; Shane & Magnuson, 2014).

2.2 The opportunity structure for CSM piracy

Piracy is just like all other crimes the result of motivated offenders seizing the criminal
opportunities they encounter. Some highly motivated offenders may seek out criminal
opportunities, while other may come across them by accident and seize them anyway.
But in either case it is the existence of criminal opportunities that is a requirement for
criminal success. For example, a highly motivated pirate will never be successful if he
cannot find a suitable ship to hijack or gain access to the seas where these ships sail.
As shortly mentioned at the third point in the previous section, it is the ‘near’
situational causes of crime that is the focus of situational crime prevention, instead of
the ‘distant’ causes. And when drawing from the routine activity approach, the creation
of criminal opportunities can be seen as an interaction between three groups: offenders,
victims/targets and guardians (Cohen and Felson, 1979). Moreover, according to this
approach, the opportunities for crime are highest when victims/targets and offenders
meet in time and place in the absence of capable guardians. In this case the capable
guardians are individuals or a group of individuals that are capable of protecting the
victims/targets against the motivated offenders. By using a basic crime triangle this is
visualized in Figure 2.1, while Figure 2.2 shows this same crime triangle for CSM piracy
off the coast of Somalia. In both the triangle there is an absence of guardians, indicating
offenders are likely to be successful in these situations (Lemieux, 2014).
The Problem Analysis Triangle (see Figure 2.3; Clarke and Eck, 2005) is an
extended crime triangle, which offers a better visualization between victims, guardians
and offenders. In this triangle, the inner triangle is the same as the basic crime triangle
as shown in Figure 2.1. However, the extended triangle has an added outer triangle to
show how the presence of other individuals or groups of individuals might reduce
criminal opportunities. Perhaps more important, it shows if there are guardians
available to protect potential targets or victims. The other individuals that are included
in this outer triangle, handlers and place managers, have been added to better describe
the groups that are responsible for preventing crime (Felson, 1986; Eck, 1994).
By using CSM piracy as an example, Figure 2.4 shows how each element of the
extended crime triangle is related to the presence or absence of the opportunity for
criminality. In this example, the guardian takes the form of Self-Protection Measures
18

Wouter Klijnsoon
implemented on ships, such as described in the BMP4, the more sophisticated

applications and armed security.

The pirate’s handler is someone capable of influencing his behavior through
informal social control, which in the case of CSM piracy are often local clan members
(Felson, 1987; Kraska & Wilson 2009; Rinehard, 2011). In addition, a handler could be
any individual who is respected by the offender, such as parents, friends and spouses
(Lemieux, 2014). The influence of handlers on Somali pirates was clearly shown by an
UNODC (2015) survey that was conducted among 66 Somali inmates accused of piracy
in Hargeisa prison in Somaliland, Bosasso Prison in Puntland and Montagne Posee
Prison in the Seychelles. It reported that family and community pressures appeared to
be very important to people leaving piracy. Moreover, for those pirates who knew
someone who left piracy, the dominant reason was family or community pressure.
Finally, the place manager is the individual or group of individuals responsible
for controlling the space where the crime occurs (Eck and Weisburd, 1995). In this case,
it is not simple to determine who is responsible for protecting these waters since the
high seas are beyond territorial waters and therefore not bound by a state. However,
due to a lack of sufficient local law enforcement, after the rise of CSM piracy it was the
Multinational Naval Task Force (MNTF) that got assigned to protect these waters.
This extended crime triangle gives a more complete overview of how the actions
of many individuals, and not just the victims and offenders, play an important role in
piracy opportunity structures off the coast of Somalia. When considering the options for
reducing the opportunities for CSM piracy, it is the application of guardians that stands
19

Wouter Klijnsoon
out as the most direct way to protect the victims or targets. This is also where there are
opportunities for the merchant fleet to protect itself against CSM piracy and in turn
become less suitable to be targeted.

2.3 Twenty-five opportunity-reducing techniques

When moving to the practical application of Situational Crime Prevention, the approach
offers five general crime prevention categories that cover twenty-five opportunity-
reducing techniques (Cornish & Clarke, 2003). The five categories are focused on
techniques that increase the degree of effort necessary to carry out the offense; increase
the risk of detection prior to, during, or after the completion of the criminal act; reduce
the rewards that can be obtained by engaging in the offense; reduce situational
conditions that may provoke an unplanned criminal action; and remove the offender’s
ability to make excuses that justify criminal actions or that absolve the offender from
responsibility (Benson & Madensen, 2007). These five general principles are meant to
operate from the perspective of a reasonable person and therefore depend on the
offender’s perceptions of the efforts, risks, rewards, provocations, and justifications that
a particular situation can offer.
As shown in table 2.1, each of the five categories offers five specific techniques
that in some way aim to alter the environment for crime, offender rationality or the
victim-offender-guardian interactions. The twenty-five opportunity-reducing techniques
can be used as an analytical tool to assist in the construction of potential strategies in
order to prevent or reduce specific crime problems. In addition, it provides a framework
that encourages approaching the crime problem systematically and think about how
existing opportunity structures can be altered to make an offense seem less attractive to
potential offenders (Benson & Madensen, 2007).
For a better understanding of the application of the Situation Crime Prevention
matrix, one of the opportunity-reducing techniques will be discussed and applied on
maritime piracy. For example, the first category of increasing the perceived efforts
focuses on making the necessary efforts higher to commit the crime, and thereby
influences the cost-benefit analysis of a potential offender. This category includes
measures of controlling access to specific areas with the goal of excluding potential
offenders from the places they need to commit the intended crime, which is shown in
Table 2.1 as number two of the twenty-five opportunity-reducing techniques. Real and
symbolic barriers that increase the perceived effort to commit a crime can inform the
offender that a given area is restricted. This method has been successfully used to
reduce theft and assault (Wallis & Ford, 1980), workplace homicide (Loomis, Marshall,
Wolf, Runyan, & Butts, 2002), gun violence (Sherman & Rogan, 1995), aircraft hijacking
(Landes, 1978), and robbery (Guerette & Clarke, 2003).
When looking at maritime piracy, gaining access to a ship is the first step in
committing maritime piracy. When vessels are anchored, the pirates can get access by
climbing the mooring ropes or the anchor chain, which can provide direct access to the
ship and its crew and cargo. Whereas when a ship is drifting or sailing, the pirates have
to take additional measures to gain access to the ship, for example the usage of ladders
and grappling hooks. Nevertheless, in both situations the vessel may invite potential
pirates by outwardly displaying signs of deficient security. Given that the pirates need to
get access to the ship, and therefore breach the outer perimeter of the ship, the physical
security in the entry areas could be the first line of defense. This defense relies upon the
ability to influence the offender’s decisions that precede the act, which may be
influenced by environmental cues of the built environment.

20

Wouter Klijnsoon
Table 2.1 The twenty-five opportunity-reducing techniques of Situational Crime Prevention

(Cornish & Clarke, 2003)
Increase the effort Increase the Reduce the Reduce Remove
risks rewards provocations excuses
1. Target harden 6. Extend
11. Conceal 16. Reduce 21. Set rules
Guardianship targets frustrations and
stress
2. Control access to 7. Assist natural 12. Remove 17. Avoid disputes 22. Post
facilities surveillance targets instructions

3. Screen exits 8. Reduce 13. Identify 18. Reduce 23. Alert
anonymity property emotional arousal conscience

4. Deflect offenders 9. Utilize place 14. Disrupt 19. Neutralize peer 24. Assist
managers markets pressure compliance

5. Control 10. Strengthen 15. Deny 20. Discourage 25. Control
tools/weapons formal benefits imitation drugs and
surveillance alcohol

2.4 Reporting problems of piracy incidents

Several criminological studies have approached the piracy problem with a quantitative
analysis by making use of data that is acquired from publicly available reports such as
those provided by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center
(e.g. Bryant et al., 2013; Shane & Magnuson, 2014). Indeed, drawing conclusions from
reported piracy incidents is an obvious research approach because it offers the
opportunity to make use of a wide range of information about successful and
unsuccessful piracy attacks worldwide, such as implemented protection measures and
situational factors like weather conditions. However, as will be elaborated below, these
figures are known to be weak and skewed.
First, many incidents of piracy and robbery at sea are not recorded at all
(Murphy, 2007). Indeed, the IMB (2007) estimates that 75% of the maritime attacks
worldwide are not formally reported. Since the IMB depends fully upon self-reporting,
their figures are self-selected (Murphy, 2010). For shipping companies there are several
motives to think of for keeping quiet and not reporting a threat, attempt or an actual
attack of piracy: to avoid damaging their reputations, to prevent crew demands for
additional pay, or to avoid the expense incurred by a ship’s delay during an investigation
(Murphy, 2007). Several shipping companies even wrote into their manuals of
procedure that piracy attacks should not be reported at all (Chalk, 1997). Other reasons
for underreporting could be that the witnesses are dead or the victims are intimidated
and kept silent by the kidnappers (Grissim, 1997; Murphy, 2007).
Second, while commercial vessels are able to report piracy incidents to various
regional and international reporting bodies, local and regional vessels have less capacity
to do so (Zech, 2014). In addition, there are concerns that, if an incident is reported
locally, the national reporting office may not pass it on to the international center
because of unwillingness to be branded as an area with a piracy problem (Murphy,
2007).
Third, since counting piracy incidents depends on how the crime is defined, the
differing definitions affect reporting. As will be shown in chapter 3, there are many
different definitions about piracy, and this lack of consistency adds to the reporting
problem. In addition, different reporting centers use different piracy clusters. For
21

Wouter Klijnsoon
example, the IMB organizes piracy by country, which obscures the mobility of pirates
and hides regional patterns. In contrast, the IMO reports its figures by using large
regions that hides the contribution of each individual country. The results of the
different definitions and the inconsistent clustering of piracy is made clear in table 2.2,
which shows a comparison of the number of worldwide piracy attacks that are reported
by both the IMB and the IMO between 1996 and 2005.
Fourth, it is virtually impossible to draw a causal relationship between reported
incidents and factors that are expected to influence CSM piracy, such as implemented
anti-piracy measures or weather conditions. This is because the conditions are not
controlled, and this lack of control makes it impossible to conclude anything about the
cause and effect. Moreover, directionality and the influence of a potential ‘third variable’
cannot be concluded on the basis of the provided data of piracy incident reports.
These points about piracy statistics underscore the problems that a quantitative
approach on CSM piracy has to deal with. And after debunking a seemingly logical
research approach, as will be shown in the remainder of the current chapter, this study
has chosen a qualitative approach that is not dependent on piracy incident data that is
provided by reporting centers such as the IMB.

Table 2.2 Number of reported piracy attacks of the
IMB and the IMO in 1996-2005 (Murphy, 2010).

Year IMB No. Attacks IMO No. Attacks
1996 228 183
1997 247 305
1998 202 193

1999 300 283

2000 469 501
2001 335 335
2002 370 422
2003 445 341
2004 329 322

2005 276 249

2.5 Action Research Methodology

This study approaches the protection problem of the merchant fleet against CSM piracy
by applying a step-by-step methodology that is based on the first four stages of the
action research model. This methodology is a tool that enables researchers to analyze
and define the crime-problem by using a systematic step-by-step process to identify and
compare possible measures of blocking crime opportunities in order to implement the
most promising and feasible measures. Even though this current study will not conduct
the full 5-stage process, the Action Research methodology might offer the needed
solution in finding a way in the chaos of the possible anti-piracy measures that are
available, and in turn compare these measures and offer recommendations to the
industry about useful measures against CSM piracy.
Action Research methodology bridges the divide between research and practice.
Instead of a two-stage process in which research is carried out first by researchers and
where practitioners apply the generated information in a separate second stage, the two
processes of research and action are integrated. Indeed, the action research usually
starts from the practical questions arising from concerns in everyday work (article
ARM). Moreover, the investigation takes place in the workplace and no effort is made to
22

Wouter Klijnsoon
‘control’ the research context or design an ‘experiment’. Rather than specific ‘findings’ or
‘outcomes’, action research generates what Elliott (1991) calls ‘practical wisdom’ and
Dreyfus (1981) and Elliott (1993) call ‘situational understanding’. An important part of
this methodology is usually in the form of specific insights, which the action researcher
uses as the basis for practical action steps to make improvements in the situation that is
being researched (Somekh, 1995).
Moreover, the validity of action research is tested by evaluating the impact of the
practical steps taken in a continuous process of data collection, reflection and analysis,
interpretation, action and evaluation (Altrichter & Posch, 1989). Furthermore, action
research has a highly pragmatic orientation. According to Somekh (1995), the
methodology uses many of the same methods and techniques as traditional qualitative
research (e.g. Miles & Huberman, 1984; Strauss & Corbin, 1990), while the aim of action
research is always to make the best possible use of these tools within the constraints of
the workplace, such as limited time.
In order to arrive in a systematic manner at the needed recommendation about
promising and feasible measures against CSM piracy, this study is inspired by the
following five stages of a situational prevention project, which is clearly influenced by
the action research paradigm (Gladstone, 1980):

1. Collection of data about the nature and dimensions of the specific crime
problem.
2. Analysis of the situational conditions that permit or facilitate the commission of
the crimes in question.
3. Systematic study of possible means of blocking opportunities for these
particular crimes, including analysis of costs.
4. Implementation of the most promising, feasible and economic measures.
5. Monitoring of results and dissemination of experience.

However, this five-stage methodology is usually carried out by people that are
directly concerned with the real-life situation that is being researched. Indeed, not being
directly concerned with the security issue of CSM piracy can make the actual
implementation of anti-piracy measures and monitoring the results very difficult due to
a lack of viable opportunities or necessary connections to do so. In addition, the focus of
this study is to discover the most promising and feasible anti-piracy measures, whereas
the actual implementation is beyond this study’s reach.
This is why this study’s systematic methodology is inspired on the ARM, and
should not be confused with a complete implementation of the five stages. However, the
first three stages enable a systematic study of the crime problem and the possibilities of
blocking attacks. And more important, applying the first three stages of the Action
Research Methodology on the CSM piracy problem allows this study to develop
recommendations about the measures that should be implemented if the fourth stage
would be conducted in practice. However, it cannot be stressed enough that this study
has only been inspired by the ARM, and follows a so-called ‘’ARM-inspired systematics’’
that follows the first four stages of the ARM to arrive at recommendations about the
most promising an feasible anti-piracy measures, whereas the actual implementation in
the fourth stage remains absent in the ARM-inspired systematics and thus in this study.

2.6 Method

This study was designed to be a qualitative explorative research, and to be as complete
as possible it comprised three elements. The first element consisted of existing academic
literature on the piracy problem. These were obtained from two databanks: the VU
University Amsterdam library and the Maritime Knowledge Centre of the IMO in
23

Wouter Klijnsoon
London. Examples of keyword that were used when searching these databanks were:
‘’Piracy’’, ‘’Somali’’, ‘’Prevention’’, ‘’Situational Crime Prevention’’, and ‘’Private Maritime
Security’’.
The second element consisted of general public reporting about the piracy
problem, such as official governmental and company reports, newspaper articles,
documentaries, and discussions on social media. In addition, a research internship at the
IMO has provided many official documents, reports and books on the matter.
The third element consisted of face-to-face interviews with key informants in
the CSM piracy problem. In this study, most emphasis was on the interview-element
because of its profoundness and current relevance. In addition, interviews provided the
opportunity for consulting a wide range of experts, with each of them capable of
shedding light on the security issue from their expertise, which also added in the
completeness of the matter. Finally, it offered the flexibility of subsequent questioning
when needed. To establish a better understanding of these interviews, the remainder of
this chapter focuses on the interviews and on how they were conducted.

2.6.1 Respondents

The respondents were selected on the basis of their involvement in countering CSM
piracy off the coast of Somalia and the expected knowledge and experience they could
provide in this study. It was attempted to collect a sample where each party involved in
the prevention of piracy was covered at least once. This meant the following types of
organizations: shipping companies, PMSCs, navies, responsible Ministries, the IMO,
interest groups, companies that provide anti-piracy technoprevention measures, and
local law enforcement. Moreover, the respondents needed to have a relevant position
within these organizations so that they were directly involved with prevention of CSM
piracy. Involvement could consist of being involved in dealing with piracy as one activity
among others, such as an operations manager, while other respondents could work at
an organization that specifically developed anti-piracy tools or had actual experience
with Somali pirates.
The face-to-face interviews with key informants were held with a total of fifteen
respondents, who contributed to a total of fourteen conducted interviews in this study.
However, it needs to be noted that two respondents both provided two interviews. As
table 2.3 shows, these respondents were professionally active in a variety of
organizations: shipping companies, interest groups, the navy, the IMO, the Dutch
ministry that is responsible for maritime security, a PMSC, a private company that
developed anti-piracy technoprevention measures, and a shipyard. In addition, the
functions of these respondents were expected to be sufficiently specialized and relevant
for this study’s focus.
The focus of this study was on prevention methods against CSM piracy for
international shipping. Indeed, since the HRA contains several international shipping
lanes that are generally used by all flag states, there was no specific aim at certain
nationalities. However, it needs no be noted that out of these respondents, ten
respondents had the Dutch nationality, three had the UK nationality, one had the Belgian
nationality and one had the South-Korean nationality. Therefore it seems that there is an
unbalanced distribution of respondent’s nationalities, with a large part of them having
the Dutch nationality. However, due to a focus on international shipping, combined with
a great emphasis on the illegality of PMSCs in the Netherlands, this unbalanced
distribution was not considered a problem. In contrast, due to the current relevance in
the country, the Dutch respondents were expected to provide interviews that contained
a clear opinion about the matter whether and why PMSCs should be allowed or not, and
if so how they should be regulated. The other nationalities were considered a
24

Wouter Klijnsoon
convenient addition that provided in-depth knowledge about the international aspect of
the security issue.
However, with only one responding PMSC, this type of organization is relatively
poorly represented in the sample, particularly when considering its importance in this
study. Unfortunately, none of the approached PMSCs were willing to cooperate, except

Table 2.3 Interview respondents with date of interview and working function within their
organization
Interview No. Organization Date Respondent
1. Royal Association of 1 May 2015 Dhr. Martin Dorsman (NL)
Netherlands Shipowners Managing Director
2. Damen Shipyards 8 May 2015 Dhr. Lucas Zaat (NL)
Manager design & Proposal

Dhr. Wim Boerma (NL)
Manager Design & Proposal High
Speed Craft

Dhr. Mark Couwenberg
Designer and proposal engineer
offshore & transport

Dhr. Ivo Maat
Project leader shipbuilding offshore
& transport

3. Westmark BV 27 May 2015 Dhr. Maurits Westerbeek van Eerten
(NL)
Technical Director
4. Westmark BV 7 August 2015 Dhr. Maurits Westerbeek van Eerten
(NL)
Technical Director
5. ESS&SA 28 May 2015 Ms. Nina Vlasova (NL)
Security Consultant
6. NATO Operation Ocean 18 June 2015 Mr. Michiel Hijmans (NL)
Shield Commodore (RNLN)(ret)
7. DEME 23 June 2015 Theo van de Kerckhove (BE)
Chief Operating Officer
8. Anonymous Dutch 26 June 2015 Anonymous Manager Operations
shipping company (NL)
9. Anonymous international 15 July 2015 Anonymous Secretary General (UK)
maritime interest group
10. Security Association for 16 July 2015 Dhr. Peter Cook (UK)
the Maritime Industry Chief Executive Officer
(SAMI)
11. Security Association for 21 July 2015 Dhr. Peter Cook (UK)
the Maritime Industry Chief Executive Officer
(SAMI)
12. International Maritime 31 July 2015 Dhr. Helio Vicente (UK)
Organization Associate Professional Officer
Maritime Safety Division
13. Hanjin Shipping 31 July 2015 Dhr. Hun Kim (KOR)
Shipping engineer
14. Dutch Ministry of 7 October 2015 Dhr. Bastiaan Maltha (NL)
Infrastructure and the Coordinator Cluster Maritime
Environment Security
25

Wouter Klijnsoon
for one. Fortunately the PMSC-interest group SAMI filled some of the missing links by
providing two interviews, which established some balance to the sample.
Likewise, there was no coverage of local law enforcement in the sample due to
the limited reach of this study. However, this should not allow for insuperable problems
due to this study’s narrow focus on anti-piracy methods on and near the vessel. Be that
as it may, the absence of such a key player in the fight against CSM piracy and the
possible consequences for this study’s reliability will be elaborated in chapter 7 as well.
Finally, it should be noted that this study did not aim at keeping a balanced
gender distribution. Nonetheless, the sample consisted of fourteen males compared to
one female, which appeared unbalanced. However, it seemed plausible that this
distribution offered a representative sample of the population of a largely male technical
workforce in the maritime industry (Bailyn, 1987).

2.6.2 Materials

To remain flexible and able to include unforeseen emerging topics, the interviews were
conducted on a semi-structured basis. This meant that topics were fixed in advance, but
the questions and their sequence depended on the respondent’s reaction. Prior to every
interview it was estimated to what specific area of the CSM piracy problem the
respondent could contribute and what information could be provided. Based on these
assumptions, a topic list was prepared with generally speaking around five overarching
themes with each of them subsequently containing two to five more specific subjects or
questions. The interviews consisted of topics such as counter piracy-related activities of
the respondent or its organization; usage of prevention measures; deployment of
PMSCs; impact of measures; arising problems when countering CSM piracy; the
expected development of (countering) CSM piracy. An example of a topic list that was
used during one of the interviews can be found in Appendix 2. Finally it should be noted
that out of the fourteen interviews, nine were conducted in Dutch and five were
conducted in English.
All interviews were recorded with the application ‘’Voice Memos’’ on an Apple
iPhone 5 and subsequently transcribed by using VLC Media Player in combination with
Microsoft Office Word. The coding process was done with the help of QSR International’s
(2014) qualitative data analysis software NVivo for Mac.

2.6.3 Variables

Since the research question that is maintained in this study focuses on the fourth stage
of the Action Research methodology, it is important to clarify the three variables
‘promising’, ‘feasible’ and economic. In turn, this will offer guidance for the discussion
on the measures in chapter 6, because these three factors should be reflected in the
recommended anti-piracy measures.
The most ‘promising’ measures should be those measures that are expected to
offer the biggest deterrent against the pirates. In other words, these measures should
exceed other measures in their capability of influencing the cost-benefit analysis of a
potential offender in such a way that it reduces the prevalence of CSM piracy. Moreover,
the information in chapter 3 on the nature and dimensions of CSM piracy and the
analysis of the situational conditions that permit or facilitate the commission of CSM
piracy in chapter 4 are expected to provide a directional framework for the goals that
the anti-piracy measures should have.
The most ‘feasible’ measures should be those measures that are realistic and
operational efficient. It is therefore necessary to establish a framework of the
considerations, believes and preferences that the shipping industry currently has about
26

Wouter Klijnsoon
anti-piracy measures and the possibilities that are available. Furthermore it should be
noted that the anti-piracy measures should also be feasible in terms of its legality.
Obviously, the most economic measures should be those measures that are
economically beneficial or at least feasible. Indeed, economic feasibility is closely
connected with a measure’s general feasibility. However, in combination with other
feasibility values and the measure’s promising nature, this does not necessarily mean
that the most cost-effective measures are most promising or suitable.

2.6.4 Procedures

The selection of respondents was done on the basis of convenience sampling in
combination with snowball sampling. The interviews 1, 2, 7 and 8 (see table 2.3) were
arranged with the help of a personal connection of this study’s author. Prior to
approaching these respondents, this personal connection informed the respondent
about a potential request to take part in an interview and checked if the respondent had
any objections. Subsequently these respondents were approached by email with
information about the conducting research, the expected benefits of an interview within
their company and the official request for an interview. In addition it was mentioned
that the interview was expected to take more or less one hour to conduct. Due to the
working area of this personal connection, these interviews resulted in six Dutch
respondents and one Dutch speaking Belgian respondent.
Furthermore, the interviews 3, 4, 5 (see table 2.3) were arranged after their
corresponding organizations were initially approached by sending a similar email with
additional information about the reasons for approaching their specific organization and
a formal request to conduct an interview. The corresponding organization of interviews
3 and 4 was selected on the basis of a recommendation of a participant in the conference
‘Fighting Piracy in the 21st century: lessons from the Netherlands’ on 23 April 2015 at
VU University Amsterdam. The corresponding organization of interview 5 was selected
on the basis of a recommendation of the author’s thesis supervisor, also at VU University
Amsterdam.
In addition, in July 2015, a research internship was undertaken in London at the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), a specialized agency of the United Nation.
This offered the opportunity to come into contact with world-experts in the field of
maritime security and maritime piracy, and provided the opportunity to conduct the
interviews 12 and 13.
Finally, the remaining interviews 6, 9, 10, 11, and 14 (see table 2.3) were
arranged as the result of snowball sampling. This method established a study sample
through referrals that were made among people who shared or knew of others who
possessed some characteristics that were of interest for this study. According to
Biernacki & Waldorf (1981), this method is particularly applicable when the focus of the
study is on a sensitive issue or requires the knowledge of insiders to locate possible
respondents. Indeed, snowball sampling offered the opportunity to come into contact
with key informants in the highly specialized working area that countering CSM piracy
seems to be. In this way, the opportunity for interview 6 arose after interview 3, the
interviews 10 and 11 after interview 5, and the interviews 9 and 14 were made possible
due to contacts that were made during the research internship at the IMO. After these
14 interviews were conducted, it was expected that the themes were sufficiently
covered and that the sample of respondents established sufficient data saturation for
this study to conclude which anti-piracy measures would be the most promising and
feasible.
Before the start of each interview, the respondent was offered an explanation
about the approach, the methods, the goals of this study, and the expected benefits of
the interview. In addition, the respondent was asked for consent about fully recording
27

Wouter Klijnsoon
the interview. It was stated that the respondents would receive a fully transcribed
interview of everything that was said, and that they would be given the opportunity to
indicate if they wanted to anonymize their interview.
After they gave their consent, the recording and the interview started. First a
topic of the topic list (see appendix II for an example) was broached with a subsequent
general question. Dependent on de respondent’s answers, follow-up questions were
asked until the topic was sufficiently dealt with. For example, during an interview with
the Chief Operating Officer of a major maritime dredging company in Belgium, the topic
‘Technoprevention against CSM Piracy’’ was brought up, with a follow-up question of
the company’s experiences with such measures. When this question was answered and
specific prevention measures that were implemented by the company came up, follow-
up questions on these specific measures followed, such as reasons for choosing these
specific measures and incorporated downsides.
The average length of the conduced interviews was 63 minutes, but ranged from
one interview that took twenty minutes to another interview that took a bit more than
two hours. After the interview was conducted, the respondent was thanked for his or
her cooperation and reminded that they would receive a fully transcribed version of the
interview and would be asked for their consent before the interview would be included
in this study. Subsequently, the recordings of all that was spoken were fully transcribed.
The recordings were replayed at sixty percent of the original speed, while the author
typed along.
As agreed, the transcribed interviews were sent to the corresponding
respondents to let them know what information would be used in the study and if they
agreed with the document. In turn, the respondents of interview 5 and 14 wanted to
make some adjustments to clarify their position, which did not interfere with the
objective content of the interview. However, two other respondents, those of interview
8 and 9, decided that they preferred that their interview would not be published and
that they wanted to remain anonymous as a respondent. Furthermore, it should be
noted that the remaining twelve transcribed interviews were not attached to this study
in an appendix. However, those who are interested could request the documents from
the researcher (see acknowledgements).
The relevant information of the transcribed interviews was filtered and
categorized by coding relevant information with the help of QSR International’s (2014)
qualitative data analysis software NVivo for Mac. This software enabled the user to
assign several codes, which were called ‘Nodes’, to parts of the texts. The parts of the
texts that got the similar codes assigned were combined in one text file, providing a
clear overview of the many statements, experiences and information that was found on
specific subjects.
Initially there were 40 codes created, which covered all 25 opportunity-reducing
techniques of Cornish and Clarke (2003) and some general overarching categories such
as ‘the future of piracy’, ‘general statements about costs’, and ‘general information on
what companies want and do’. Subsequently, each interview was being read while the
relevant parts of the contents got assigned one or more codes. During this process there
were new codes added to the coding list once relevant information arose that required
new codes, such as specific anti-piracy methods. Subsequently the amount of codes was
extended to a total of 147 codes. The total amount of assigned codes was 959. The
maximum amount that one code got assigned was 92 times, while the average
prevalence was 6.5 times per code. However, there were 33 codes that appeared zero
times within the texts, and thus these codes were not used in the data. The full list of
codes and its prevalence can be found in appendix III.
The result of the coding procedure was a clear overview of all the relevant
information that was categorized per code, and thus per topic, which also contained
information about its source. This overview aided in the interpretation of the data and
28

Wouter Klijnsoon
in turn to draw conclusions about the many anti-piracy measures and their usage, pros
and cons.

2.7 Conclusion

Situational prevention departs from most criminological theories because of its
pragmatic and direct approach to crime. It consists of twenty-five opportunity-reducing
measures that make highly specific criminal activities more difficult and risky, or less
rewarding and excusable as perceived by the offender, by systematically managing,
designing or manipulating the immediate environment. These techniques are
categorized by five general categories: increase the effort; increase the risks; reduce the
rewards; reduce provocations; remove the excuses.
In search of the most promising, feasible and economic measures to be installed
on or near ships, this study follows a four-stage systematics that is inspired on the five
steps of the Action Research Methodology, and does so on the basis of the following
three kinds of data: academic literature, general public reporting and interviews with
key informants.
This chapter has offered a theoretical background and methodology that enables
a practical approach to the problem of CSM piracy. However, before setting out and
discussing the anti-piracy measures, a thorough understanding of the nature and
dimensions of CSM piracy is necessary to be able to put those measures into context,
which will be established in the following chapter 3.

29

Wouter Klijnsoon
Chapter 3

Situational analysis of Contemporary Somali Maritime
piracy: the nature and dimensions of the crime problem

Most people hold romantic ideas of pirates and stowaways, such as visions of a
swashbuckling Sir Francis Drake recommended by CE assaulting a Spanish galleon.
Unfortunately, these visions are not reflective of the reality of contemporary maritime
piracy. Moreover, before going into details of the possibilities of prevention against CSM
piracy, it is important to first analyze the context of where the measures are applied.
When trying to protect oneself against a criminal activity, it is necessary to know against
what person or group of persons the protection methods are focused in order to be
effective. This chapter is the first stage in the ARM-inspired systematics that is followed
in this study and contains a collection of data about the nature and dimensions of the
specific crime problem. Therefore, a working definition will be determined, the
developments of the rise of Somali maritime piracy will be set out, and a thorough
review of the modus operandi of Somali maritime piracy will be provided.

3.1 What is piracy?

While not politically motivated in itself, piracy has always been linked to prevailing
political conditions and the expression of state power or, more commonly, state
weakness. This connection has meant that common notions of piracy have rarely been
applied uniformly or unambiguously. Activities that are called piracy in one place at one
time perform ‘legitimate’ functions for states at others, as in the case of privateering
(Murphy, 2007). Because of this wide range of definitions it is important to first clarify
what definition will be maintained in this study. An applicable definition must be
adopted that is narrow enough to only take in account the type of crime that the
seafarers and shipping companies in this study have to cope with, but also needs to be
one that is flexible enough to make sure the protective measures recommended in this
study are applicable for as many seafarers as possible within the region.
Often the term piracy is used in an informal manner, as opposed to a technically
legal one. For example, the BMP4 (IMO, 2011) does not distinguish between what is
armed robbery and what is piracy, where the term ‘piracy’ includes:

all acts of violence against ships, her crew and cargo. This includes armed robbery
and attempts to board and take control of the ship, wherever this may take place.

This informal manner is due to the fact that the definition of piracy, as traditionally
defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), is a very
narrow one (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2014). Article 101 of the 1982 UNCLOS defines
piracy as follows:

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private
aircraft, and directed
I. on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or
property on board such ship or aircraft;
II. against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any state;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft
with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
30

Wouter Klijnsoon
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-

paragraph (a) of (b) (IMO, 2015b)

However, many important attacks that are discussed in reports such as ‘the state of
maritime piracy 2014’ by Oceans Beyond Piracy (2014), are in fact ‘’armed robbery’’ at
sea, or a related form of maritime crime, because they occurred within the territorial
waters of a coastal state. The IMO Resolution A.1025(26) defines armed robbery against
ships as the following (IMO, 2010):

Any act which:

I. includes any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of
depredation, or threat thereof, as well as an act inciting or
intentionally facilitating such illegal acts;
II. was not an act of piracy as defined under UNCLOS;
III. was committed for private ends; and,
IV. occurred within a State’s internal waters,
archipelagic waters, or territorial sea (12nm).

Ultimately, the only distinction between these two definitions is
where the act occurred (see Figure 4.1). While this distinction has
important considerations for the legal structure governing the crime
and the institutions that react on the crime, this discussion is less
relevant in this study because the fact remains that Somalia
currently does not have a functional government or effective law
enforcement. Therefore, the current situation of Somalia being called
a ‘failed state’ makes the 12nm difference of territorial waters or
high seas irrelevant, especially when it comes to self-protective
measures on ships on the high seas. Consequently this study will
adopt the definition used by the IMB, which is wider than the one
adopted under the UNCLOS but more focused on Somali maritime
piracy than the definition used in the BMP4. The IMB (2007) defines
piracy as: Figure 4.1 Diagram of the
various regions of the ocean
an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the over which a State may
apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with exercise sovereignty
the apparent intent or capability to use force in furtherance of (Eoearth, 2015)
the act.

3.2 Development of contemporary Somali maritime piracy

Professionals in the shipping industry commonly joke around about piracy being the
second oldest profession in the world, but the first acts of piracy truly can be traced
back over 3000 years. According to McNicholas (2008), the earliest acts of piracy were
done by seafaring raiders that lived around 1200 B.C. who sailed to the eastern shores of
the Mediterranean where they caused political unrest. But perhaps more memorable in
recent history were the two centuries from 1500 to 1700 when the pirates Sir Francis
Drake, Captain Kidd, and Captain Morgan attacked galleons and coastal cities, and
Edward ‘’Blackbeard’’ Teach and Bartholomew ‘’Black Bart’’ Roberts terrorized the seas
and became icons of piracy. Indeed, McNicholas (2008) argues that piracy was even a
military tactic in the early days of the United States, some 200 years ago. During the
American Revolutionary War, colonial ship owners took part in a concept called
privateering. This allowed privately owned vessels to attack and seize British vessels
31

Wouter Klijnsoon
while they kept a substantial share of the profits. John Paul Jones, the founder of the
American naval tradition, was even referred to as a ‘pirate’ by the British Navy.
Clearly piracy is not a new phenomenon. Moreover, the re-emergence of piracy
in the 1980s did not come as a big surprise in retrospect, because by the early 1980s a
decade or more had passed since the colonial empires had been replaced by young
states with less security capacity, different political agendas, and new economic
priorities (Murphy, 2010). And as a consequence of the consolidation of manufacturing
in Asia, there has been a massive increase in sea traffic over the last ten years. In
addition to congestion, chokepoints in sea-lanes exist at a number of strategic locations,
forcing ships to slow down, which created piracy hot spots (Bryant et al, 2013).
Therefore, the driving forces behind the recent rise of contemporary maritime piracy
were both developmental and opportunistic in nature (Chalk, 2008; 2010). One would
only need a failed state without a functional government such as Somalia to provide a
ready supply of would-be pirates, a supply chain for illegal weapons and the opportunity
to anchor hijacked ships closely to shore without being bothered.
Piracy off the coast of Somalia is an extreme case of crime managing to thrive
and profit from the absence of a guardian (Rengelink, 2012). Moreover, the emergence
of CSM piracy, coupled with several high profile kidnappings, has captured international
attention. And in the period of 2005 to 2008, pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden,
containing one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world, increased by a factor of nine
(Bryant et al, 2013). Moreover, according to Chalk (2009), CSM pirates operate with
increasing violence, sophistication and reach.
Although its precise origins are unclear, the problem of Somali maritime piracy
began in the early 1990s as an aspect of the generalized disorder that followed the
overthrow of the socialist dictator Muhammad Siad Barre by clan-based warlords. As a
consequence, the land was split three ways politically between the break-away republic
of Somaliland that abuts Djibouti in the northwest, the break-away region of Puntland
that abuts Djibouti in the northeast, and the south which is nominally controlled by the
UN-recognized Transitional Federal Government, but is actually divided between
various warlords (Murphy, 2010).
Much of the Somali maritime piracy appears to have its roots in fishing disputes.
The absence of any effective authority that operates along Africa’s longest national
coastline has meant that fishing vessels from Europe and East Asia could exploit the
area’s rich marine resources at the expense of local fishermen, causing dangerous
tensions (Coffen-Smout, 1998). It is argued that the main source of piracy in the region
are armed groups, formed by local fishermen in response to unregulated fishing by
foreign fishing vessels, which subsequently became pirate gangs (Khalif, 2005; Von
Hoesslin, 2006). And although some yachts were seized in the 1950s in the Gulf of Aden
and held for ransom, after 1989 the pace and scope of maritime predation steadily
increased (Anderson, De Wijk, Haines & Stevenson, 2009).
Somali waters are rich in fish and shellfish thanks to the periodic upwelling of a
nutrient-rich current. But after 1991, there was no force to protect these fishing grounds
that according to the UNCLOS were territorial waters of Somalia. The foreign vessels
moved in aggressively to catch tuna, shark and ray fins, lobster, shrimp and whitefish.
According to Eklöf (2009), the once thriving Somali fisheries industry had deteriorated
into a ‘’free-for-all’’ among the world’s fishing fleets. And for over a decade, hundreds of
vessels from various flag states have continuously fished Somali waters in an
unreported and unregulated manner. Also, foreign companies dumping radioactive and
chemical waste in Somali territorial waters have depleted fish stocks further.
Subsequently, as a response to the illegal fishing and dumping of toxic waste, the Somali
Fishermen made out that they had to protect what they termed the traditional
ownership rights of local fishermen to certain waters. Indeed, in their opinion they were
carrying out legitimate coastguard tasks by doing so.
32

Wouter Klijnsoon
The UN Monitoring Group suggested in its 2006 report that relatively

unsophisticated activity took place along the whole length of the Somali coast during the
1990s. It described what occurred as ‘armed sea robberies’ rather than piracy, in an
effort to distinguish it from the more organized activity that arose in the early 2000s.
Back then the demands were not for money, but replacements nets, diesel fuel and
caught fish. The foreign fishermen often responded by offering money and even began
to offer payments in advance (murphy, 2011). At the same time, Somaliland started
issuing fishing licenses and impounding vessels that attempted to fish without one.
Warlord groups in the south began to copy this practice and hired local fishermen to
intimidate or blackmail those who did not pay them (Eklöf, 2009). Since then, Somali
pirates have had no hesitation in claiming that their purpose has been to defend the
country’s fishing grounds and to prevent toxic waste dumping. Often they have justified
their activities as restitution for the theft and destruction foreigners have brought to
Somali’s natural resources. For example, Januna Ali Jama, a spokesman for the pirate
group that hijacked the MV Faina, told reporters: ‘The Somali coastline has been
destroyed, and we believe this money is nothing compared to the devastation that we
have seen on the seas’ (Abdullahi, 2009).
Presumably, Somali piracy evolved out of this defensive response to foreign
exploitation, but to what extent Somali fishermen turned their skills to piracy is unclear.
Three theories will be discussed that could explain this transition (Murphy, 2007). First
there is the ‘evolutionary explanation’, which states that once fishermen realized how
much money foreign interests were prepared to pay for the return of fishing boats and
crews, they abandoned fishing in order to exploit this more lucrative line of work.
According to a Somali diplomat ‘’it is true that the pirates started to defend the fishing
business, but then they got greedy’’(Gettleman, 2008). Over time these groups turned to
non-fishing vessels, which turned out to provide even higher ransoms. A second theory
is the ‘adaptive explanation’, which states that once the warlords began selling fishing
concessions, and in some cases providing the foreign boats with armed guards, the
protection groups turned their attention to unarmed commercial vessels as the only
option left open for them to make a living (Khalif, 2005; Coffen-Smout, 2006). The third
theory is the ‘complicity explanation’, which states that some fishermen, recognizing
economic reality, sold their services as boat handlers to warlord groups who then
supplied the equipment and the men who actually boarded and captured the foreign
ships (International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast, 2008).
Whatever theory is true, as shown in Figure 4.2, the reality remains that in the
last years the Somali pirates attacked thousands of seafarers. However, although there
was a rapid increase of Somali maritime piracy after 2006, the figures shown in Table
4.1 suggest a steady decline in actual and attempted attacks after the heyday years in
2012. The escalation of armed attacks by CSM pirates triggered unprecedented counter-
piracy action on both the part of the international community and the shipping industry
itself. And according to the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS, 2015), the reduction
in attacks has been attributed to the combined success of self-protective measures taken
by shipping companies, the continued use of PMSCs, and the protection provided by
military vessels in the region. This makes many believe that worrying about CSM pirates
attacking theirs ships is from past times. And indeed, Figure 4.2 makes it seem that the
security issue is solved, when comparing the numbers from 2014 against those from
2011.
However, as mentioned before, during the 95th session of the Maritime Security
Committee of the IMO, the Committee was reminded that the situation in the Indian
Ocean remained uncertain with the real possibility of a resurgent pirate threat (IMO,
2015). And in their 2015 annual review, the ICS stresses the fact that the future
maintenance of current levels of military protection against Somali maritime piracy may
become problematic due to competing pressures on navies due to the political situation
33

Wouter Klijnsoon
in the Middle East and elsewhere. Indeed, the current mandate for the EUNAVFOR
intervention is set to expire in 2016 (Bartlett, 2015). This might indicate that the
industry is cheering to soon. And more importantly, this reduction in naval presence
necessitates an increasing reliance on a ship’s own protection measures. Moreover, in
contrast to place managers such as MNTFs that are patrolling some areas in the region,
increased guardianship measures are in place for the entire transit of the HRA (Brown,
2012). Indeed, in a context of a vast place where management is difficult, target-based
prevention on the vessel might be more successful in prevention against piracy than
place-based prevention.
It is clear that after the slow but steady rise of Somali maritime piracy, it has
suffered an enormous blow after it got worldwide attention. But as long as the root
causes on land are not solved, as long as there is no stable government in Somalia, as
long as there are opportunities for piracy, and as long as the piracy infrastructure is in
place, no seafarer or shipping company should lower their guard. However, before
addressing this issue, it is important to understand who these criminals are, why they
carry out this criminal activity and most importantly how they operate.

4500 4185
3863 Seafarers attacked with qirearms
4000
Seafarers on vessels boarded by pirates
Number of piracy threats
3500 Seafarers taken hostage

3000
2500
2000
1432
1500 1090 968 851
1000 555 486
381 349
500 60 60 170 18 17
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Figure 4.2 Human cost of CSM piracy in the HRA from 2010 to 2014 (Oceans Beyond
Piracy, 2014)

Table 4.1 Locations of actual and attempted attacks by Somali Maritime pirates from
2006 to 2014 (IMB, 2011; 2015)
Locations 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Gulf of Aden 10 13 92 117 53 37 13 6 4
Red Sea 15 25 39 13 2 4
Somalia 10 31 19 80 139 160 49 7 3
Arabian Sea 2 4 1 2
Indian Ocean 1
Oman 3 4 1
Total at year end 22 51 111 218 220 236 75 15 11

3.3 Who are these pirates and what motivates them?

Somali pirates don’t wear eyes patches, and instead of swords they have Rocket-
Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and AK-47s. According to BBC Somali analyst Mohamed
Mohamed, the pirates are a combination of ex-fisherman, ex-militia, and computer
geeks. Obviously there is no use of hijacking a huge ship if you don’t know how the radio
works and therefore can’t demand your ransom. Also, pirates have to know how to use
34

Wouter Klijnsoon
GPS (Zijlma, n.d.). The pirate groups operating off the coast of Somalia vary by size and
complexity, ranging from small entities that consist of one or two personnel and a skiff,
to larger organizations of several hundreds. Gangs generally form around a respected
leader who recruits from a single clan, although several gangs are known to have
recruited across lineage lines to ensure they have the best and most experienced pirates
available. The costs of the operations are usually borne by the leader, shared among the
members, or met by outside investors (Chalk, 2010).
Although some still claim they patrol their seas against illegal fishing and
dumping toxic wasters, it is not hard to imagine what also motivates the piracy business.
The profits made from hijacking ships off the coast of Somalia could be a significant
incentive for poor fishermen living in a war-torn African country. And it seems that
successful pirates live well, marry beautiful women, drive big cars, build big houses and
buy increasingly sophisticated weapons. Furthermore, Somali pirates nowadays have
accountants, lend money to businessmen and are basically running the economy of the
autonomous region of Puntland. A BBC report in January 2012 even claims that pirates
have boosted the Somali economy significantly, although not all of it went to the coastal
communities (Zijlma, n.d.). According to some estimates, Somali maritime pirates in
2008 profited as much as $150 million, making piracy Somalia’s biggest industry at the
time. This makes it hard to image that CSM piracy once started out as a Robin Hood
complex with the excuse of carrying out a legitimate coastguard task. Indeed, the way of
looking at the hijacking as a road tax seemed to be outdated when in late 2008 a group
of pirates demanded $25 million for the release of a seized Ukrainian freighter full of
weapons. Sugule Ali, a member of the pirate crew, told a reporter: ‘’we only want the
money’’ (Axe, 2009).
The motivations of Somali pirates are clearly shown in a survey carried out by
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2015) under Somali ex-pirates in prison.
Here the ex-pirates themselves state that poverty was a major driver in joining piracy.
And although concerns about illegal fishing sometimes remain a justification for piracy,
the economic motives were cited at least just as much. As shown by some of the
following quotes from prisoners, piracy was often done out of necessity and lack of
other alternatives. However, one has to keep in mind that it is uncertain if these excuses
and justifications were indeed the reasons to join piracy before they carried out the
criminal activity, or if the neutralizations were invented as excuses and justifications
after they were caught. This is a viable option since neutralization frees the delinquent
from the moral bind of the law so that he or she may now choose to commit the crime
(Lanier & Henry, 2010). Indeed, neutralizations are clearly shown by the following
statements of the imprisoned pirates (UNODC, 2015): ‘’I was out of money so that I
decided to join the pirates in order to get food’’, ‘’My family is poor, so that’s why I joined
the pirates’’, ‘’I joined the pirates for resentment and anger for the western illegal fishing
for the Somali coasts’’, and ‘’Illegal fishers caused us to be pirate’.
However, although Somali pirates may have few opportunities in their country
to obtain the riches that piracy may afford them, research does not suggest that Somali
pirates have an atypical risk profile that causes them to be unconcerned with the costs
of their activities. Unlike for example suicide bombers, Somali pirates do take
precautions to minimize risks and avoid the seas at its roughest and ships they know are
protected by armed guards (Dutton, 2014). In addition, in the same way as Colombia
transformed from being the largest cocaine producer in America into being the largest
oil palm producer, mainly because of the expanding national and international biofuel
market (DNP, 2010; Castiblanca, Etter & Aide, 2013; UNODC, 2014), when confronted
with legal opportunities that can adjust the relative deprivation, the pirates might
change their way of making a living into a legal one. In addition, there is reason to
believe that even though Somali pirates may be poor, they would eschew their illegal
35

Wouter Klijnsoon
activities if confronted with a credible threat of certain and severe sanctions or if legal
alternatives arise (Dutton, 2014).

3.4 Level of organization and links to terrorism

In one of the most famous books written about piracy, The History of Piracy, Philip
Gosse describes a pirate cycle: ‘’first a few individuals from the inhabitants of the poorer
coastal lands would band together in isolated groups and attack only the weakest
merchantmen. Next would come the period of organization, when the big pirates either
swallowed up the little pirates or drove them out of business. When these organizations
reached the size of independent states, what had been piracy then for a time became war,
until one side defeated the other, reducing the defeated once again to the status of
outlaws’’ (Gosse, 2007). Although Gosse didn’t necessarily focus on contemporary
piracy, it is arguable that the main factors that encourage contemporary pirate gangs to
form have remained for a large part consistent over time. In Gosse’s model, piracy is the
source of the wealth that enables pirate gangs to expand to the point where they reach
the political or symbiotic stage, which is precisely what happened in Somalia, where
piracy is an important source of income for some warlords (Murphy, 2011).
According to Murphy, (2010), Lupsha’s developmental model (1995) on
organized crime, which suggests three stages, are similar to Gosse’s cycles: the
‘’predatory’’ stage epitomized by street gangs which engage in extortionate violence,
using its proceeds largely for their own consumption; the ‘’parasitical’’ stage, in which
gangs become more organized and create a network capable of providing a range of
illicit products and services on a scale large enough to justify the corruption of officials
and the influencing of elections; and finally the ‘’symbiotic’’ stage where syndicates
exists alongside legitimate businesses and state actors in a mutually beneficial
relationship.
Indeed, according to Murphy (2011), piracy is always an organized crime
because of the exigencies of maritime operations. Case studies of piracy incidents in the
past decade reveal increasing sophistication in tactics and equipment and in addition
highlight the high level of logistics and international coordination that is accomplished
by these international criminals. The vast amount of cases where ships are being seized
for the sole purpose of holding the crew hostage in order to negotiate a ransom
illustrate the well-developed level of planning, preparation, international coordination
and capabilities of these pirate organizations (McNicholas, 2008).
However, although the similarity between CSM piracy and general organized
crime doesn’t necessarily mean that the government of the Federal Republic of Somalia
should instantly copy the RICO act used in the United States to fight organized crime, it
does mean that the vast range of research done on fighting organized crime by using the
Situational Crime Prevention approach and corresponding opportunity reducing
techniques might offer lessons for fighting understudied organized piracy. The level of
organization of CSM piracy might for example implicate that the real perpetuators are
very hard, if not impossible to catch. By way of illustration, some Italian mafia groups
have developed an internal ranking system in order to protect the bosses, coupled with
a subdivision between a higher and a lower section, where only the older, higher-
ranking members have access to the former (Paoli, 2003). This could imply that even if
the pirates, by Murphy (2010) called the ‘’dumb infantry’’ in these operations, are
caught, the implemented hierarchy in combination with the complexity of international
extradition coupled with the fact that the act of piracy itself would have been carried out
in international waters, would mean that these organizing masterminds are hard to
catch and immune for prosecution. In addition, while failed states like Somalia can
provide pirates with useful sanctuary and secure operating bases, according to Murphy
(2010) they are very unlikely to be the headquarters of the organizing minds, which
36

Wouter Klijnsoon
makes prosecution even harder. As a consequence, the reality remains that the shipping
industry needs to be able to fall back on effective prevention methods.
While there appears to be some similarities between organized crime and CSM
piracy, this is not necessarily the case for a frequently heard possible link between
piracy and terrorism. Ever since the attacks of 9/11 triggered worries about other large-
scale terrorist attacks, the question has been asked if wherever piracy, terrorism and
Islam occur at the same time and in the same place, pirates and terrorists work together.
For example, it could be possible for terrorists to fund their operations by committing
acts of piracy. And it is worth noting that, as demonstrated by IMB statistics on piracy,
many piracy cases, especially those incidents where crews are shot and the weapons
used are of military grade, occur in the waters of African countries that have a high level
of radical Islamic activity (McNicholas, 2008). Indeed, terrorist organization Al Qaeda
had recently urged its followers to conduct attacks on Western economic interests at
strategic sea-lanes. Terrorists could hijack a fuel tanker, for example, and turn it into a
floating bomb (Jianyue, 2015).
However, according to Murphy (2011), no demonstrable connection has been
established so far. This does not mean it is not happening, or that pirates and terrorists
might know each other, but there is simply no evidence that they have worked together,
exchanged information or taught each other the tricks of their trades (United Nations,
2009). It is not surprising that so far no link has been found. First off, the reality remains
that no jihadist group, including al Qaeda, has so far gained any domestic following in
Somalia. Interest groups and even sub-clans shift their allegiance in the light of current
advantage. And what can appear to be a jihadist group one day can be different on
another if the circumstances have changed. Moreover, with the exception of family and
clan ties, almost all loyalties in Somalia are provisional (Watts, Shapiro & Brown, 2007).
The second reason is the fact that, as mention before, nowadays the pirates are in it for
the money, not for political believes or to change the world. Therefore it could be
possible that the pirates work for a terrorist organization for a short time, but when
another opportunity arises, nothing will stop them from changing organizations.
With terrorism always lurking and the continuing threat of terrorist
organizations like Islamic State and al Qaeda, the importance of the set of security
measures for ships and port facilities that are adopted within the International Ship and
Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code has not evaporated. However, the lack of evidence that
links terrorism to piracy does imply that in order to be most effective, instead of
responding to unsubstantiated rumors, the prevention methods that are directed at CSM
pirates should keep doing what they are designed to do.

3.5 Modus operandi of Contemporary Somali Maritime piracy

Outlining a crime script makes it possible to break the offence down into a chain of
actions, and subsequently to identify the points in the chain at which it can be disrupted
by timely intervention (Rengelink, 2012). Therefore the following section will describe
the actions taken, all the way from preparations and picking the targets to negotiating
ransom and money flows.

3.5.1 Before the attack

Funding for the operations come from a variety of sources, ranging from individuals
who provide all the equipment and consumables, investment groups that take shares in
individual ventures in much the same way that merchants used to buy shares in ship
cargoes in the early times of shipping, to cases where an owner allocates places in his
boat to men who can contribute food or guns and whose eventual reward is determined
on whatever they have provided (Murphy, 2011). In Haradheere there even seems to
37

Wouter Klijnsoon
exist a stock exchange that attracts a wide range of potential investors. In 2009 a Somali
pirate told a reporter that it had proven to be an excellent way of involving the local
community: ‘’The shares are open to all, and everyone can take part, whether personally
at sea or on land by providing cash, weapons or useful materials. We have made piracy a
community activity’’ (Hansen, 2009; Lederer, 2009).
The more established pirate leaders pick the crew. Most groups consist of twelve
to thirty-five individuals working for themselves on a ‘no prey, no pay’ basis. This also
applies for the suppliers of food and other services needed while the ship is being held
for ransom to be paid (Hansen, 2009). Some groups are composed of various specialists:
planners, fisherman who serve as kippers, attack and security units, negotiators, and
recruitment officers. The pirates are thought to undergo training in fighting techniques,
communication skills, tactics and information gathering. These training sessions are
probably given by Al-Shabaab and by instructors from Pakistan, Bengal, Yemen,
Indonesia, Iraq and Sudan (Childress, 2010). Furthermore, often there is cross-clan
recruitment because this makes it easier to anchor a hijacked ship off the territory of
another clan. It could also be helpful when dealing with the authorities. Research by the
UN Monitoring Group on Somalia (2010) shows that important officials of Puntland,
among them the president, the minister of foreign affairs and the minister of national
security, received piracy-related money. About thirty percent of the ransom paid for
hijacked ships and crew disappears in the pockets of officials in Puntland (AIV, 2010).
Furthermore it is estimated that about 1400 Somalia’s are directly involved in piracy off
the coast of Somalia (AIV, 2010).
Generally speaking, piracy is not a global problem, but a local one. Contemporary
pirates cross local borders, for example from Indonesia to Singapore, but only rarely do
they travel further and exploit opportunities regionally (Murphy, 2010). However, as
Figure 4.3 shows, this makes CSM piracy stand out from other piracies. Initially, the
pirates only operated in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, in the vicinity of Somalia.
But as shown in Figure 4.3, they have extended their range and are active even as far
away as 1200 sea miles from Mogadishu (IMB, 2009). The area where pirate activity or
Figure 4.3 Hijackings by year carried Figure 4.4 Previous HRA as adopted in
out by Somali maritime pirates (Oceans the BMP4 since 2011 and the newly
Beyond Piracy, 2012a). revised smaller HRA adopted on 1
December 2015.
38

Wouter Klijnsoon
attacks have been taken place is defined as the High Risk Area (HRA). In the BMP4, the
HRA was an area bounded by Suez and the Strait of Hormuz to the North, 10°S and 78°E,
and attacks have taken place at most extremities of the HRA. However, since 1
December 2015 the HRA has been revised and made smaller due to declining activities
near the Indian shore and in the Red Sea (see Figure 4.4). Nonetheless, it is advised that
extra precautions, prevention methods and extra insurance policies are implemented
when entering this specific area (IMO, 2011; Maritime Cyprus, 2015).
Somali pirates are usually well armed with access to a wide assortment of
combat weaponry, including assault rifles, heavy and light machine guns, anti-slip
ordinance and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs). Most of these arms are bought from
illegal bazaars in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan where munitions are both plentiful and
relatively cheap. According to a Mogadishu-based trader, one alleged pirate transaction
in May 2008 included 10 AK-47s and 140 boxes of ammunition; eight PK machine guns
and 190 boxes of ammunition; four RPGs and 60 rounds; two DShK heavy machine guns
and 200 boxes of ammunition; and 60 hand grenades (Schiemsky, 2009). Furthermore,
profits are not simply spent on indulgence, but some limited investments are made in
GPS systems, satellite phones, night-vision goggles and ship identification units,
although this is rare (Meade, 2008; Hansen, 2009).
The pirates attack in skiffs, which are simple but fast-moving seven to eight
meters long open boats (Rengelink, 2012). Given the distance from land at which the
hijacks are made, it is necessary to transport two or three skiffs to the search area by
using mother ships, often old Russian trawlers, that are sufficiently anonymous to be
able to merge with ordinary shipping traffic and big enough to carry two to three skiffs
(Hand, 2007). These motherships have been hijacked by the pirates and usually have
their own crew onboard as hostages. Motherships are used to carry pirates, fuel, and
attack skiffs to enable pirates to operate over a larger area and are significantly less
affected by the weather. The attack skiffs are often towed behind the mothership, but
when the size of the mothership allows, skiffs are being carried onboard and
camouflaged to reduce chances of interdiction by naval and military forces (IMO, 2011).
Often the motherships are also equipped with communication and navigation
equipment.
Most gangs simply pick targets according to their size, calculated vulnerability
and ransom-generating potential by gazing over the horizon with binoculars. Their
vulnerability includes physical characteristics like low free board, slow speed (generally
less than 15 knots), and the absence of on-board defensive measures (Chalk, 2010).
Besides gazing over the horizon, pirates are also thought to obtain information about
potential ships by using the Automatic Identification System (AIS) or informants
(Schiemsky, 2009). The biggest gangs supposedly have informants in Mombasa, where
ships have to file paperwork stating what they are carrying and where they are going.
According to a Mombasa business leader, spies inside the Kenyan maritime agencies
pass along this information to pirate bosses for a price. Pirates are also in contact with
corrupt officials in northern Somalia, where they turn a blind eye to the international
crime flourishing in the region of Puntland in exchange for a cut of the profits (Axe,
2009). Indeed, there is also evidence that expatriate Somalis living in Kenya, Saudi
Arabia and throughout the Persion Gulf may be selling information to the pirates about
ships that have docked in those regions and may be heading toward pirate-infested
areas (Baldauf, 2008).
The pirates are known to give priority to ships from Europe because they
supposedly deliver bigger ransom (Rice & Hassan, 2008). However, although some
worry about cruise ships being hijacked for their amount of potential hostages, most
pirates are not interested in them because these vessels are fast and the freeboard is
quite tall. Also there is a higher chance of a military response with that many civilians on
39

Wouter Klijnsoon
board. In contrast, a small isolated crew on a tanker or cargo ship seems a more suitable
target to attack.

3.5.2 The attack

A typical Somali piracy attempt reported by for example IMB or MSCHOA reads like this:

11.04.2009: 1240 UTC: Posn: 00:18:2N – 051:443E, about 285 nm east of Mogadishu,
Somalia. Eight pirates armed with guns and RPGs in two skiffs, launched by a pirate
mother vessel, attack a container ship underway. Master increased speed to 22.8 knots and
the skiffs followed at 23.5 knots. They approached very close and fired upon the ship.
Master made evasive maneuvers and prevented the boarding (Zijlma, n.d.).

OSS Maritime Security Team supervisors - who reportedly have repelled dozens
of pirate attacks – state that if a pirate is attacking a vessel while underway, as is usually
the case in CSM piracy, it is generally accomplished by the high-speed small craft
approaching from an angled position and sweeping in along the hull at the aft (Kucera,
2006). Indeed, according to the BMP4, usually two small high-speed (up to 25 knots)
open boats or skiffs are used in attacks, often approaching from either quarter or the
stern (IMO, 2011). Skiffs are frequently fitted with two outboard engines or a larger
single engine and are operated by four or five pirates (Ding, 2010).
If the pirates are spotted, the pirates force the ship to a standstill by threatening
violence, and they use small arms fire and RPGs in an effort to intimidate Masters of
ships to reduce speed and stop to allow the pirates to board the ship. The use of these
weapons is generally focused on the bridge and accommodation area (IMO, 2011). And
although firing any sort of weapon from a moving boat with any accuracy is extremely
difficult, the threat of it is very intimidating to the crew. The aim of the shooting is
therefore mainly intimidation and generally the pirates fire the RPGs over or alongside
the ship (Rengelink, 2012).
The pirates allow themselves about 30 to 45 minutes to gain control of the ship,
but successful attacks are usually completed in 15 minutes or less (Middleton, 2008;
Ding, 2010; Rengelink, 2012). Somali pirates seek to place their skiffs alongside the ship
being attacked to enable one or more armed pirates to climb onboard. Once the craft is
alongside, a long lightweight ladder is raised to the deck or a long hooked pole with a
knotted climbing rope is thrown up and hooked. This enables the pirates to climb up the
side of the vessel being attacked (IMO, 2011). Indeed, quick pirates can be on deck in
only a few minutes (Kucera, 2006). And as a rule, the first to board a ship receives
considerable social prestige. In the words of one gang member: ‘’when you capture a
ship people welcome you like a president’’ (Hansen, 2009).
It seems that the most essential element in hijacking a vessel is getting on board
of the vessel, because not boarding the ship makes it virtually impossible for the pirates
to carry out their criminal activity. But if they do succeed in getting onboard, the pirates
generally make their way to the bridge to try to take control of the vessel. Once on the
bridge, the pirates take the crew hostage and demand that the ship slows down or stops
to enable further pirates to board. Subsequently they will issue a ransom demand to the
vessel’s owners and operators while they sail it toward a Somali port (Sörenson, 2008;
Weir, 2009; Ding, 2010; Onuoha, 2010; Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation, 2011).
Attacks have taken place at most times of the day. However, many pirate attacks
have taken place early in the morning, at first light. Attacks have also occurred at night,
particularly clear moonlit nights, although nighttime attacks are less common (IMO,
2011). Incidents also closely mirror seasonal weather conditions, following the
transition between the northeastern and southwestern monsoon periods (CMF, 2009).
40

Wouter Klijnsoon
The weather conditions in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean deteriorate twice each
year: the months of June, July and August provide the poorest weather for piracy while
the condition in December, January and February are less extreme, but can still be
qualified as poor by the pirates (Sheikh, 2009). The risks of being hijacked are
accordingly highest in spring and autumn.

3.5.3 After the attack

Once a ship has been taken hostage, it is sailed to Somali coastal waters and anchored off
the coast. The pirates hold the ship and the crew captive until the negotiations with the
shipping company have been successful. The average duration of such hostage-holding
incidents is 100 days (Colijn, 2008; Rengelink, 2012), but it is not uncommon that
hostages are held in captivity for a longer period of time. For example, in October 2014,
seven hostages from MV Asphalt Venture were released after 1,492 days in captivity; in
February 2015, four hostages from FV Prantalay 12 were released after being held for
1,774 days and in June 2015, 26 hostages from FV Naham 3 still remain in captivity after
1,114 days in captivity (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2015).
Usually Somali pirates avoid harming crew or causing damage to a captured ship
because the basic objective of a hijack is to obtain as large a ransom payment as possible
(Chalk, 2010). And in most cases the hostages are treated well, are commonly fed goat’s
meat and are more or less free to walk around on parts of the ship during captivity
(Gettleman, 2009; Law, 2012). It is even suggested that Somali pirates have a code of
conduct that they are expected to follow and includes severe penalties for non-
compliance (Wadhams, 2010). The self-declared pirate boss Asad ‘Booyah’ Abdulahi
even told reporters: ‘’we make friends with the hostages, telling them that we only want
money, not to kill them. Sometimes we even eat rice, fish, pasta with them. When the
money is delivered to our ship we count the dollars and let the hostages go’’ (Rice &
Hassan, 2008). However, 11 escaped hostages from MV Albedo in June of 2014 brought
new information to light about the inhumane treatment inflicted by their captors
including murder, brutal beatings, and torture (AFP, 2014). Shortly after the crew was
taken hostage, the pirates followed through on their threat to kill crewmembers if the
ship owner did not meet their ransom demands and Raju Prasad was murdered in front
of the rest of the crew (AFP, 2014; Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2015). Some of the crew of MV
Albedo ‘’were beaten with gun butts or locked in containers’’ while others were forced to
call family members and then beaten while on the phone (Freeman & Planz, 2014). More
common seems to be the psychological abuse of seafarers designed to terrify or degrade
them. In addition, the nature of the hostage experience endured by seafarers makes that
they are subjected to continued indirect psychological abuse. This includes treatment
that is likely to cause fear, distress, and emotional upset, including deprivation from
family and the fear and uncertainty that come with the unknown duration of the hostage
experience (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2015).
After pirates have seized a ship, navies rarely attempt to retake it, because
hostages could be hurt in the process. And indeed, as shown by Figure 4.5, more than
twice as many hostages are killed in rescue or escape attempts when compared to those
that either died by the hands of pirates or because of malnutrition or diseases. This
means that rescue in most cases can only be accomplished through the payment of
ransom. The pirates conduct their negotiations from on board the captive ship, using
the ship’s satellite telephone (Sörenson, 2008; Weir, 2009; Ding, 2010; Onuoha, 2010;
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, 2011; Law, 2012). These
negotiations are generally made through a third party communicator who generally has
no direct organizational connection to the pirates but typically comes from the same
clan (Chalk, 2010).
41

Wouter Klijnsoon
Ransom for hostages has steadily increased as larger vessels have been seized,
but has skyrocketed in recent years. In 2006 it was only a couple of hundred thousands
US dollars, whereas in 2011 it is as high as five million US dollars (Middleton, 2008).
Moreover, when it comes to paying the ransom, the pirates usually arrange for the
shipping company to use an airplane to drop the money somewhere in the water near
the ship. This occurs after the shipping company, or the organization to which it has
handed over the task, has received evidence that all the crewmembers are alive. Shortly
after the money has been dropped and checked, the pirates leave the captive ship
(Rengelink, 2012).
It is hard to establish how the ransom is distributed and what is done with it
once it has entered the country, because Somalis traditionally seem to base everything
on trust (Hunter, 2008). The ‘foot soldiers’ who conduct the actual hijackings in most
cases get relatively little of the ransom, although the amounts quoted in the press are a
fortune by local Somali standards: it is suggested that a pirate gunmen could earn
between $10,000 and $30,000 per year, while a pirate calling himself Muse claimed to
have made $90,000 which he blew on cars and women in two months (Spurrier, 2008;
Rice, 2008; Kennedy, 2008). Local people are almost certainly paid a share either to
tolerate the pirates’ presence, for services and supplies, or for guarding the vessel
(‘’Tension in Coastal Town After Pirate Clashes, 2008).
The bulk of the money seems to go elsewhere. The Dubai connection, and other
indications, suggested that business interests based outside Somali, who are almost
certainly connected to senior Somali political figures, are financing and ultimately
benefiting from the hijackings (Rice, 2008). Part of the money seems to be invested, both
in Somalia and abroad, such as Kenya, the United Arab Emirates, other states in the
Persian Gulf, and perhaps even in Europe (Kareithi, 2009; Schiemsky, 2009; Sengupta &
Howden, 2009; Rengelink, 2012). And according to Andrew Mwangura, the proceeds
that are not spent by the pirates and their commanders on cars and drugs are invested
by the local warlords and their business partners in various ventures such as illegal
fishing and human trafficking, the charcoal trade, mining, and the production and
distribution of the local narcotic known as khat (West, 2007). In addition, as mention
before, although it has been asserted frequently there is no evidence that al Qaeda
‘dominates’ CSM piracy, or even takes a share of the profits (McElroy, 2007).

3.6 Conclusion

Even though the pirates in Somalia and malnutri-
their business model have suffered an tion or
enormous blow after the heydays of 2011, disease in
which is illustrated by a revised smaller captivity
HRA, the declining naval presence in the 23% Killed in
HRA and the decreasing attention this rescue or
threat is getting nowadays might indicate a escape
worrisome future when it comes to killed by attempt
defending the merchant navy against piracy pirates 54%
attacks off the coast of Somalia. These 23%
groups appear to use a well-organized
sophisticated piracy infrastructure that
makes good use of the opportunities that a
failed state such as Somalia has to offer the
poor and desperate seeking greater fortune. Figure 4.5 Hostage deaths in 2011
Moreover, what started out as an attempt by (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2012a)
local fishermen to safe their depleted and
42

Wouter Klijnsoon
poisoned seas developed into a highly profitable criminal enterprise.

As was shown, the most essential element of the hijacking procedure is for the
pirates to get aboard of the attacked ship. Without setting foot on the vessel it is
virtually impossible for the pirates to take over the ship and keep the crew hostage for
ransom. And fortunately precisely this part of the process allows for intervention by the
merchant navy itself. Increasing the costs of carrying out piracy by increasing the risks
and efforts that the pirates have to face might offer enough deterrence to redirect them
away from the ships. By exploring the nature and dimensions of this criminal activity,
this chapter has been the first step in the search for means of blocking opportunities for
these particular criminals. The following chapter elaborates on the Somali piracy
phenomenon and sets out the second stage of the ARM-inspired systematics by focusing
on the situational conditions that permit or facilitate the commission of CSM piracy.

43

Wouter Klijnsoon
Chapter 4

The situational conditions that permit or facilitate the
commission of Contemporary Somali Maritime piracy

When blocking the opportunities to commit a specific form of criminality it is important
to understand what factors enabled the criminal activity to rise up and flourish. Methods
that are designed to protect against piracy are more likely to succeed in influencing the
opportunity to commit crime when it is focused on taking away one or more of the
factors that enable piracy to exist. Moreover, according to Murphy (2007), ‘piracy is a
low-risk criminal activity that pays well and occurs for one overriding reason:
opportunity’. However, piracy is only sustainable in places that offer a combination of
rewarding hunting grounds, moderate to low levels of risk and proximate safe havens
(Gottschalk & Flanagan, 2000). And ‘with little functioning government, long and isolated
beaches and a population that is both desperate and used to war, Somalia is the perfect
environment for piracy to thrive’ (IMB, 2010). However, even though poverty is often
cited as the main motivator, this is too simplistic. Indeed, the underlying causal factors
for the rise of piracy off the coast of Somalia are complex and multifaceted.
Chapter 2 discussed the opportunity structure for crime and the extended crime
triangle was applied on CSM piracy off the coast of Somalia. It provided a visual
overview of the actors that are involved in creating the opportunity for CSM piracy and
in addition what actors influence them. The following chapter builds on this opportunity
structure and discusses several underlying drivers that feed CSM piracy and enable it to
flourish. This chapter is the second stage of the ARM-inspired systematics and discusses
the situational conditions that permit or facilitate the commission of CSM piracy. This
chapter first focuses on opportunities in the region for CSM piracy due to a lack of viable
place managers, which will be followed by the offender and the target. In turn, this will
offer direction for chapter 6 when searching for possible means to block the pirates and
take away their opportunity to hijack the vessels in the High Risk Area.

4.1 Place managers in the region: the failed state

The Global Policy Forum (GPF) defines failed states as states that usually can no longer
perform basic functions such as education, security, or governance due to fractious
violence or extreme poverty. Within this power vacuum, people fall victim to competing
factions and crime, and sometimes the United Nations or neighboring states intervene to
prevent a humanitarian disaster. However, according to the GPF, states fail not only
because of internal factors. Foreign governments can also knowingly destabilize a state
by fueling ethnic warfare or supporting rebel forces, causing it to collapse (‘’Failed
States’’, 2015).
The Federal Republic of Somalia ranks a close second, just after South Sudan, on
the Fragile States Index 2015, an annual ranking of 178 nations based on their levels of
stability and the pressures they face. With leaving other war-torn countries such as
Afghanistan (8th place), Syria (9th place), and Iraq (12th place) behind, it demonstrates
the troubling state in which this country still finds itself (Fund For Peace, 2015).
Moreover, the responsible factors that define Somalia as a failed state greatly influence
the thriving of piracy in this country.
Perhaps most fundamental for the piracy problem is the lack of a viable
sovereign entity in Somalia. Experts agree that the scale and prevalence of maritime
piracy off the coast of Somalia is, at root, an extension of the land-based violence,
lawlessness, and general poverty that has plagued Somalia since the fall of the Said
44

Wouter Klijnsoon
Barre dictatorship in 1991 (Chalk, 2010). And the consequential legal and jurisdictional
weakness and the under-funded law enforcement and inadequate security help to
reduce the risks run by pirates (Murphy, 2007).
States typically have coast guards and police operating in their waters to counter
maritime criminality. However, due to inadequate state funding and training of police,
coast guards and navies, the pirates are allowed to have the freedom to operate. Indeed,
according to Murphy (2007), piracy requires lax as well as under-resourced law
enforcement to flourish. Because of the state weakness and the absence of a sovereign
power, a widespread unwillingness to take action against piracy has formed the typical
backdrop to the events off the coast of Somalia. Moreover, law enforcement at sea is
expensive because of the huge sea areas to be protected and the sophisticated
equipment needed in doing so (Murphy, 2007).
Therefore there was no Somali coastguard at all until the European Union
started training a handful of Somali coastguards within the EU-mission EUCAP Nestor in
2012. This lack of local law-enforcement offered the motivated pirates all the time and
space they needed to anchor their hijacked vessels near the Somali coastline while
negotiating ransom from the ship owners. In contrast to piracy and armed robbery off
the coast of Nigeria, where the police or coastguard eventually will turn up, at least until
2012 nobody would bother the Somali pirates in their criminal endeavors. However, one
should not expect that the handful of new Somali coastguards will make an immediate
difference, but at least it is a start.
However, as mentioned before, the Multinational Naval Taskforce currently acts
as an interim place manager. And although they have been relatively successful as a
Place Manager in repelling CSM piracy off the coast of Somalia, their future is uncertain.
Due to economic pressures, the increasing turmoil in the world and the declining
priority of piracy, the future naval presence in the area remains uncertain.

4.2 Offenders: opportunities for piracy

Another consequence of being a failed state is the subsequent poverty, which is also
contributing to the piracy problem. The state weakness impedes the growth of
legitimate industries and incentivizes young men to turn to piracy (Herbert, 2013). In a
country where the average person earns less than $2 a day, the promise of rewards from
hijackings have become increasingly difficult to resist. This is especially true for local
fishermen, many of whom, as mention before, complain that it has become increasingly
difficult and expensive to make a living due to the depletion of fish stocks from poaching
and illegal dumping of toxic waste (Gettleman, 2009; Hansen, 2009).
In addition the willingness of ship owners to pay ransom exacerbates the
situation of piracy in Somalia. Most companies want to arrive at a negotiated settlement
with the pirates as quickly as possible, both to ensure against the loss of vessels, cargo,
and crew, and to minimize the time that the carrier is out of service and not making
money (Chalk, 2010). On top of that it is not uncommon that the insurance company
pays the ransom, a factor that can ease the negotiations. Therefore, for many pirates the
prospect of such profits far outweighs the risks involved of being caught or confronted
by naval and coastguard patrol boats, especially when considering the small presence of
these patrols. In addition, the potential pirates are provided with numerous
opportunities that aid them in their criminal activity.
As mentioned before, there has been a massive increase in sea traffic over the
last ten years because of the consolidation of manufacturing in Asia. In addition, several
chokepoints in sea-lanes exist at several strategic locations, forcing ships to slow down,
which in turn create piracy hot spots (Bryant et al, 2013). Ships slowing down makes
them also easier to board and less able to take evasive actions such as fishtailing to
destabilize the pirate vessels or speeding up to lose it (Murphy, 2007). On top of that,
45

Wouter Klijnsoon
the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, brought about by civil war combined with a series of
devastating droughts, triggered a major international relief effort that at its height
resulted in the delivery of 32,000 tons of emergency aid each month (Chalk, 2010).
These humanitarian relief vessels provided a supply of vulnerable and tempting targets
that pirates could quickly capitalize on. Indeed, one of these hijacked ships carrying
humanitarian relief supplies was the MV Maersk Alabama, made famous by the film
adaptation ‘’Captain Philips’’. The enormous supply of potential ships to hijack off the
coast of Somalia offered the pirates the suitable targets needed when making profits
through criminal means.
The ready availability of light weapons in wider East Africa also contributes to
the opportunity for carrying out maritime piracy. These weapons generally originate
from unregulated arms bazaars in former and on-going conflict zones. They are widely
available, cheap, readily transportable, easy to handle, and durable. According to Chalk
(2010), these munitions are perfectly suited to the designs of Somali piracy groups,
providing them with the necessary hardware to take on, seize, and hold even the largest
ocean-going container vessels. The firepower that is currently available to pirates has
prompted some resistance in 2009 on the part of the shipping industry to arm crews or
hire professional guards, because this might provoke a weapon race and escalate what
has been a relatively non-violent phenomenon in terms of deaths and injuries (Chalk,
2010). Nevertheless, as will be discussed later, nowadays it is relatively common for
shipping companies to hire armed security in order to provide lethal resistance to the
attacking pirates.
Finally, research shows that the pirate’s local clan members are often handlers
that are capable of influencing their behavior through informal social control (Kraska &
Wilson, 2009). However, because of the tight clan-based social structures in Somalia and
the conditions that make traveling there unsafe, it is difficult for outsiders to influence
handlers directly and have a positive effect on the prevalence of CSM piracy.
Nevertheless, under the Djibouti Code of Conduct, a number of promising land-based
initiatives have been taken to influence handlers, such as community-based
interventions and the introduction of a criminal justice system in Somalia and
neighboring nations. Time will tell the impact of such measures on the prevalence of
CSM piracy.

4.3 Target: security gaps

On top of the absence of a functioning coastguard and police that is capable of guarding
their seas, the ready availability of suitable targets and the necessary means widely
available, many of the vessels that pass through the Gulf of Aden each year lack even the
most rudimentary safety measures, both passive and active. In addition the onboard
security protocols are generally not practiced or understood by the crew, if they exist at
all (Chalk, 2010). Shortcomings of this kind can be problematic because the most
essential element of the hijacking procedure is for the pirates to get aboard of the
targeted vessel. Without getting access to the bridge, the targeted vessel cannot be
hijacked. However, gaps in a ship’s resilience against CSM piracy reduces the risks and
efforts on the part of the pirates to get onboard the ship, and therefore adds to the
opportunity of making profits by performing piracy.
This state of affairs does not count for all ship owners, but for many it reflects
their mindset. Owner operators have been largely unwilling to invest more time and
resources into hardening their vessels, both because of the costs of doing so and the
relatively low probability of being attacked, which used to be less than 0.5 percent when
measured against the number of transits in any given year, and declined in the last two
years (Chalk, 2010). And even though the implementation of the BMP4 is mandatory up
46

Wouter Klijnsoon
to a certain level, it is uncertain if shipping companies look any further than the
obligated most rudimentary BMP practices.
In addition, developments in maritime navigation as well as a desire to reduce
operating costs have encouraged a trend toward so-called ‘’skeleton’’ crews. Many of the
vessels sailing in the High Risk Area have no more than 20 to 26 mariners on board. And
while this is certainly efficient, the reduction in manpower both reduce the options for a
joint response with anti-piracy measures while it makes the task of gaining control of
ships that much easier for the pirates (Chalk, 2010). This development, in combination
with short term thinking, touches perhaps the biggest security gap in the piracy
problem: the unwillingness among many ship owners to properly invest in a long term
security plan onboard ships transiting the HRA (Westerbeek van Eerten, personal
communication, 7 August 2015).

4.4 Conclusion

There are several underlying factors that contribute to the opportunity structure of
carrying out CSM piracy off the coast of Somalia. First and foremost is the lack of capable
local place managers because of the malfunctioning government of the Federal Republic
of Somalia. Since the fall of dictator Said Barre in 1991 there has been no police or
formal coastguard in place that is able to hold the pirates accountable for their activities.
And despite EUCAP Nestor trying to turn this around by training Somali coastguards, the
HRA still exists because of the piracy threat. Second, the lack of legitimate industries and
the country’s widespread poverty, combined with the willingness to pay huge amounts
of ransom, has provided a motivated offender in the form of a pirate. Third, the
enormous amount of vessels passing by each year, with many of them lacking basic
security measures, the suitable target completes the basic opportunity triangle that
allows piracy to thrive off the coast of Somalia.
However, it has to be noted that the reach of anti-piracy measures in this study
is bound to the vessel and its surroundings and the capabilities of ship owners to protect
themselves against CSM piracy. Indeed, due to the uncertain future of the MNTF
presence and the difficulty of solving root causes and handler influence, in the end the
protection against CSM piracy might come down to the merchant fleet anyway.
An appropriate guardian that is capable of providing a direct defense against the
attackers can influence the suitability of a target, and in turn take away the opportunity
to carry out CSM piracy. This chapter discussed several opportunities for potential
offenders to commit piracy. However, guardianship that is directed at these
opportunities can be established in many different ways and by a combinations of many
different methods, as will be shown in the following chapter. To provide guidance in the
search for the implementation of promising and feasible measures, the following
chapter consists of the third stage of the ARM-inspired systematics and sets out an
overview of the possible means of blocking the opportunities for CSM piracy. This offers
space to discuss the different possible protection measures and their costs, advantages
and downsides.

47

Wouter Klijnsoon
Chapter 5

Systematic study of possible means of blocking
opportunities for Contemporary Somali Maritime piracy

The increasing turmoil in the world and the declining priority of piracy causes concerns
about the naval presence in the HRA to counter CSM piracy. Indeed, in November 2015
it was announced that the Dutch Royal Navy would reduce its deployment in the area,
starting in 2016. Therefore there is reason to believe that, as discussed before, it might
come down to the merchant fleet to protect themselves against CSM pirate attacks.
When looking at the crime triangle set out in Chapter 2, an appropriate guardian is
needed that is capable of providing a sufficient defense against potential attackers and
can take away their opportunity for crime. However, as mentioned before, due to the
enormous size of the place, where management is difficult by place managers such as
MNTFs, target-based prevention might be more successful in fighting piracy than place-
based prevention. Indeed, increased guardianship measures on vessels are in place for
the entire transit, in sharp contrast to the limited area that is patrolled by place
managers.
In an effort to find this appropriate guardian, the following chapter is the third
step of the ARM-inspired systematics. This chapter offers a systematic empirical study of
possible means of blocking opportunities for CSM piracy, and includes an analysis of the
costs that are involved. The twenty-five opportunity-reducing techniques as set out in
Table 2.1 will be used as an analytical tool to assist in systematically analyzing and
categorizing all known potential anti-piracy measures.
These measures will be categorized on the basis of the way it is supposed to
influence the potential offender’s decision-making whether to attempt to commit the
crime or not. First, the measure and its functionality will be set out, followed by data
about the costs and a summary of corresponding benefits and disadvantages of the
measure. Each discussed opportunity-reducing technique will also contain a table that
offers a short overview of the discussed data.
However, it should be noted that there is some unavoidable overlap among
categories. For example, measures that increase the necessary effort for a crime can
potentially also increase the risks for apprehension. Therefore, if necessary,
considerations for measure placement will be provided. On the other hand, the
following chapter will show that not all twenty-five opportunity-reducing techniques
can be filled with the discovered anti-piracy measures. Indeed, the anti-piracy measures
on and near vessels transiting the HRA all seem to aim at the first three categories of the
matrix that was developed by Cornish & Clarke (2003). In fact, most of them aim at the
first two categories, with the exception of one measure. This unbalanced distribution
will be further elaborated at the end of the chapter.

5.1 Increase the effort

The first of the five general crime prevention categories is ‘Increase the effort’. The
opportunity-reducing techniques in this category focus on making the necessary efforts
higher to commit the crime, and thereby influence the cost-benefit analysis of a
potential offender. In order to take a ship captive, the pirates have to gain access to the
ship. So increasing the efforts for the pirates by implementing defensive measures, such
as those described in the BMP4 and the more sophisticated ones that are undertaken by
shipping companies and ship’s crews, primarily fall within this category (Rengelink,
2012). In other words, by increasing the perceived effort to carry out piracy, the pirates
48

Wouter Klijnsoon
have to go to greater lengths to approach the ship and force their way aboard, which
might influence the decision of a potential pirate to attack a vessel.

5.1.1 Target Harden

According to Clarke (1997), an obvious and often highly effective way of reducing
criminal opportunities is to obstruct the potential offender by physical barriers through
the use of locks, safes, screens or reinforced materials. For example, transparent screens
to shield bus drivers in London significantly reduced assaults (Poyner, Warne, Webb,
Woodall, & Meakin, 1988) and the introduction of steering locks on cars in Germany in
1963 produced a substantial decline in the rate of car theft (Webb, 1994).
As will be elaborated bellow, target hardening measures to prevent against
piracy off the coast of Somalia come in a variety of options. These options range from
passive and non-lethal measures aimed at discouraging the pirates, such as physical
barriers and wires, to more active responses that might actually obstruct the pirates’
attempts to approach and enter the ship, such as acoustic instruments and water
cannons.

Table 5.1 Target hardening anti-piracy measures and the accompanied costs, pros and cons.
Measure What is it Costs Pros Cons

Anti-climb Physical barriers that - Plastic Plastic-barrier
- Ladders and ropes cannot - Physical barriers could
barriers increase the height and per meter: €235 grapple the freeboard. make evacuating more
difficulty of climbing onto - Aluminum Seabock - Successfully tested by difficult
the side of a ship, such as per meter: €270 mountaineers. - Gaps between units
the Plastic-barrier and - Seabocks are easy to store impair the utility of the
Seabock. This measure is due to a folding whole system.
expected to be highly mechanism. - Plastic Plastic-barrier is
effective in keeping - Seabock has louvres that bulky and uneasy to
intruders from entering the allow for visibility and store while not being
vessel. limits wind influences used.
- Integratable into the hull
of the ship.

Ballistic Plates/doors/hatches that - RPG shield per m2: - Assures the crew safety - Difficult and expensive
protection are impenetrable by €1,700 against bullets and RPGs. to install in floors and
weaponry that is utilized by - Ballistic door: €3,200 - Prevents pirates from ceilings.
Somali pirates, such as AK- Ballistic hatch: €4,000 entering designated - Expensive to install in
47s and RPGs. It seems areas. big areas such as the
plausible that this is an - Hatches and doors are ships bridge.
effective measure to keep interchangeable among - The possibility exists
the pirates from entering ships. that the pirates
certain designated areas. circumvent the system.

Electrified A fence or barrier is - Average costs of - Deterrent effect of both - Dangers for crew.
fences installed on essential places electric barriers on a the electrified barriers - Legality is unknown.
of the vessel in an attempt ship per year: €1,400 and the warning signs. - Increases the risk of fire.
to deter pirates. The effect
on keeping intruders from
entering the vessel remains
unknown.
Freeboard The height of a ship’s - Costs of heightening - Minimum freeboards of - Not a viable option to
freeboard influences the freeboards are eight meters have a much retrofit the height of the
effort that pirates have to unknown greater chance of freeboard.
make when climbing a ship. escaping piracy attempts.
Experience shows that a - Anti-piracy freeboard
minimum freeboard of more heights can be
than eight meters is an incorporated in a ship’s
effective anti-piracy design.
measure.
49

Wouter Klijnsoon
Long Range Systems capable of - Costs for LRADs vary - Deflects offender in a - Can be undermined by
Acoustic confusing, disorientating between €11,000 and non-lethal manner. wearing heavy-duty ear
Devices and distressing potential over €100,000. - Hard to eliminate by protection.
(LRADs) offenders by sending weapons fire. - Can be bypassed when
unidirectional sound - Multifunctional as a using multiple skiffs
bundles that succeed the loudspeaker. approaching from
pain threshold. The effect on different directions.
keeping pirates from - Manual systems could
approaching the vessel carry dangers for the
remains uncertain, but there operating crewmembers
are reasons to believe that - Legality of LRADs is
these systems are not very unknown since there is
effective. no regulation.
Propeller Creates a safety zone along - P-trap Swivelboom - Takes away the pirates’ - One shipping company
entanglement the sides of a vessel by (most versatile opportunity to climb stated it doesn’t fit on
system dragging lines through the variation): €38,500- aboard the side of a their offshore vessels.
water that are capable of €42,500 sailing vessel. - Could undermine
disabling a skiff’s engine by - Alternative Swivel - Suitable for every ship operationalization of the
immobilizing the propeller. (for containerships): - Potential of development vessel
Tests show that these €32,500 is high. - Fragile during bad
systems are highly effective - Rental options for - Somali fishermen can weather conditions
in eliminating a skiff’s 30% of the purchase make fishing nets out of - Lack of defense at bow
propeller. price used wires. and stern
- Lines: €0,25 per - Raises fuel costs by
meter 0,25%

Razor wire The deployment of razor - Normal razor wire: - Usefulness has been - Lower quality razor
wires around a vessel has a €3.8 per meter proven in practice wire is unlikely to be
deterrent and delaying (lifespan 2 years) - Highly visible deterring effective.
effect on potential offenders - Robust razor wire effect - Normal razor wire is
because it carries deadly barrier: €345 per two - Seriously impairs commonly thrown
razorblades that cut meters (lifespan 10 climbing overboard.
through everything and years) - Utilization of razor wire
make climbing a vessel bears dangers for the
more difficult. Its impact crew.
seems to vary and is - Impairs operationally
dependent on the quality and emergency
and sophistication, but it responses.
can be highly effective.
High-powered Lights that produce an - 200 million candelas - Impairs sights for up to - Welding goggles
Searchlights extreme amount of light, searchlights on both 30 minutes. undermine the effect.
which can be used to detect sides: €50,000. - Impairs coordination and - Legality of lasers and
potential intruders and - 12 million candelas direction when trying to stroboscopes is
impair their vision from a handheld searchlight: approach the vessel. unknown since there is
great distance. These unknown - Shows the potential no regulation.
systems seem likely to be - Automatic searchlight offenders they are
quite effective in impairing with lasers: noticed.
coordination of approaching €190,000+
threats.
Water cannons Water is sprayed or shot to - No extra costs for fire - Increases the effort to - Not each ship is suitable
make it more difficult to hoses or ballast climb onboard - Effectiveness is
climb onboard and to flood pumps - Capable of flooding the impaired when bigger
the attacking skiff. - Water cannons on attacking skiffs ships are used
Meanwhile it damages the both sides of the - Potential for development - Fixed positions or
engines and electrical vessel: €23,000 to use boiling water or automatic systems are
systems of the skiff. tear-gas necessary because of
Designated systems seem the exposed positions
likely to be quite effective in during manual
increasing the effort to operations.
climb onboard.
50

Wouter Klijnsoon
5.1.1a Anti-climb barriers

As was discussed in chapter 3, pirates typically use long lightweight hooked ladders,
grappling hooks with rope attached and long hooked poles with a climbing rope
attached to board vessels underway (IMO, 2009). In an attempt to make it as difficult as
possible for the pirates to gain access to vessels, shipping companies can install various
types of physical barriers in order to increase the height and difficulty of any climb for
an attacking pirate. The BMP4 recommends that prior to installing any physical barrier,
a thorough survey should be conducted to identify areas vulnerable to pirates trying to
gain access.
Anti-climb barriers along the side of the ship come in a wide range of varieties.
For example, an oil major uses the so-called Plastic-barrier around their ships, which is
shown in Figure 5.1. This is a system that looks like a P along the freeboards, with the
idea that the pirates cannot put their ladders on the ship (Cook, Personal
Communication, 16 July 2015). Another type of anti-climb barrier is shown in Figure 5.2.
This shows the Dutch made anti-intrusion barrier called Seabock, which consists of a
linear series of metal parts that together form a triangle shaped extension at the
freeboard of the vessel. The hardened, light alloy plates fit into each other and provide a
strong and solid construction that makes in hard to climb the freeboard of a sailing ship.
It is unknown to what extent the global shipping industry utilizes physical barriers
along the side of active ships in the HRA. However, costs of a plastic Plastic-barrier are
estimated at around €235 per meter while the aluminum Seabock is estimated at about
€270 per meter (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 7 August 2015).
Installing physical and visible anti-climb barriers along the side of a ship that is
sailing in the HRA bears several benefits. Since ladders and ropes cannot grapple onto
these devices, it becomes virtually impossible for pirates to climb ships at places where
these barriers are installed. Moreover, specifically the Seabock system bears several
advantages: because of a folding mechanism that allows the system to stay alongside the
railing there is no additional storage needed when not in use; the integrated louvers
provide sight from the deck on potential intruders while also limiting wind influences;
during a test, mountaineers failed in climbing over or around these barriers, which
shows its utility (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 27 May 2015). In
addition, there are reasons to believe that a system such as the Seabock could be
integrated into the hull of a ship, which offers potential since the IMO prefers systems
that are integrated into the design of a ship instead of a retrofit design.
When looking at the disadvantages of these anti-climb barriers it is obvious that
these systems only work when they are installed properly and to the full extend of the
Figure 5.1 Anti-climb barrier called ‘’Plastic- Figure 5.2 Anti-climb barrier
barrier’’ (Westerbeek van Eerten, 2015) called ‘’Seabock’’ (Westerbeek
van Eerten, 2015)
51

Wouter Klijnsoon
freeboard. If gaps exist between two or more barriers, the utility of these systems
disappears. Holes can be picked up by other systems such as razor wire, but there is
reason to believe that its effectiveness would decline. In addition, a disadvantage of the
Plastic-barrier when compared to systems with folding mechanisms such as the Seabock
is that the plastic Plastic-barrier is quite bulky and hard to store during the time it is not
being used (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 27 May 2015). Finally,
according to Bellamy (2009), installing physical barriers on commercial vessels could be
problematic because they can make it more difficult for the vessel’s crews to evacuate in
case of an emergency.

5.1.1b Ballistic protection

During a piracy attack it does happen that shots are fired, with the bridge as a usual
focus for any attack (Zaat, Boerma, Couwenberg & Maat, Personal Communication, 8
May 2015). In the initial part of the attack, pirates direct weapon fire at the bridge to try
to coerce the ship to stop. Moreover, if the pirates are able to board the vessel, they
usually try to make for the bridge to enable them to take control of the ship or the
accommodations and the mess room in order to take crewmembers hostage (IMO,
2011). Because these pirates are often in the possession of heavy weaponry such as AK-
47 or RPGs, considerations could be given to hardening essential sections, and thereby
making it harder to enter these areas of the ship by installing ballistic protection on
vulnerable places such as the side and rear of the bridge, the bridge wings or certain
doors. Moreover, sometimes ship owners decide that it is necessary to install ballistic
protection in the floors or ceilings in certain areas (Zaat et al., Personal Communication,
8 May 2015).
If ballistic protection is applied on a ship in the hope to protect the crew during a
piracy attack off the coast of Somalia, this usually concerns a Caliber Level 1. This level
holds up to AK-47s rounds, which forms the biggest threat of weapons used by Somali
pirates. Moreover, one cannot break it either by using tools like axes or crowbars
(Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 7 August 2015). If this Caliber Level
is installed it consists of a 6 mm steel plate, which denotes one of the lighter calibers.
The next levels 2 or 3 consist of 20 mm steel plates and are designed at holding up
against RPGs (Zaat et al., Personal Communication, 8 May 2015). Levels beyond caliber
1 are a viable option to use on essential doors or if the safe room borders on the outside
of the ship. If installed on a door it can be compared to RPG Shields that are installed on
tanks (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 7 August 2015).
It is unknown to what extent the global shipping industry utilizes ballistic
protection on active ships in the HRA. However, the costs of RPG shields are estimated at
about €1.700 per square meter, the costs of a ballistic protected door at about €3.200
and the costs of a ballistic hatch at about €4.000 (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal
Communication, 7 August 2015).
The first and foremost benefit of installed ballistic protection is the fact that, if
installed properly, it assures the crew that fired shots cannot reach them. If installed at
the bridge this implies that the vessel can keep sailing when it is under fire. In addition,
when installed in doors or hatches it assures the crew that, if pirates would succeed in
entering the vessel, they cannot force their way into certain designated areas. In
addition, ballistic hatches or doors can be exchangeable among ships. This implies that
shipping companies don’t have to purchase a copy for each of their vessels, but exchange
them between different ships that are planning a voyage through the HRA (Westerbeek
van Eerten, Personal Communication, 7 August 2015).
A disadvantage of ballistic protection in the floor is the problem of installing
these plates at places where the necessary cabling needs to get through. Due to this
problem the prices for protected floors can rise dramatically (Zaat et al., Personal
52

Wouter Klijnsoon
Communication, 8 May 2015). Moreover, if one would apply ballistic protection on the
whole bridge it could become an expensive investment due to the fact that the ship’s
bridge is generally bigger than at least 30 square meters (Westerbeek van Eerten,
Personal Communication, 7 August 2015). Finally, if the pirates are determined enough
they could theoretically use a cutting torch to cut a hole next to a ballistic door or hatch
in order to allow themselves entrance to the areas (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal
Communication, 27 May 2015).

5.1.1c Electric fences

The BMP4 states that implementation of electrified fences or barriers can be
appropriate and effective for some types of vessels to deter attackers or delay boarding
(IMO, 2009). When installed it is recommended that warning signs of the electrified
fence or barrier are displayed, whereas the inward facing signs are in English or in the
language of the crew, while the outward facing signs are in Somali (IMO, 2011). Figure
5.3 is an example of a warning sign in Somali, which states: DANGER HIGH VOLTAGE
ELECTRIC BARRIER.
There is reason to believe that in 2011 there were between 2100 and 6300 ships
sailing with electrified barriers installed. Moreover, in the same year the average costs
to have such a system on a ship were estimated at about €1,400 per year (Oceans
Beyond Piracy, 2015)
In addition to the deterrent effect that an electrified
barrier could have, the advantage of having outward facing
warning signs might be considered as an extra deterrent as well,
even if no part of the barrier is actually electrified (IMO, 2011).
However, the downside of these electrified systems is the
obvious dangers that are involved for the crew if unaware of its
existence or uncareful behavior. In addition, the legality of non-
lethal weapons of this kind is unknown (Westerbeek van Eerten,
Personal Communication, 27 May 2015). For example, it is not
unthinkable that an attacker develops heart failure when coming
Figure 5.3 Example of a
into contact with electrified systems. Finally, these systems could
warning sign in Somali, which
increase the risk of fire on vessels transporting flammable cargo
states: DANGER HIGH
(Middleton, 2008; Bellamy, 2009). Therefore the BMP4 does not
VOLTAGE ELECTRIC BARRIER
recommend these systems for hydrocarbon carrying vessels
(IMO, 2011).
(IMO, 2011).

5.1.1d Freeboard

Although it is not a designated anti-piracy measure, the height of a ship’s freeboard does
influence the effort that a pirate needs to make when boarding a ship. And it is likely
that pirates will try to board the ship that is being attacked at the lowest point above the
waterline, making it easier for them to climb onboard. Indeed, experience suggests that
vessels with a minimum freeboard that is greater than eight meters have a much greater
chance of successfully escaping a piracy attempt than those with freeboards shorter
than eight meters (IMO, 2011). Until now this is one of the fortunate reasons why cruise
ships have never been successfully hijacked (Hijmans, Personal Communication, 18 June
2015). Therefore, when designing ships that are to be sailing through areas that are
known to contain active pirates, ship designers could adjust the height of the freeboard
accordingly.
However, the costs of adjusting the freeboard so that it is greater than eight
meters are dependent on many other factors of the vessel, which is why it is more or
less impossible to determine the average costs. In addition, there is reason to believe
53

Wouter Klijnsoon
that retrofitting the height of the freeboard is not a viable option for many ships.
Moreover, the BMP4 (IMO, 2011) also states that a large freeboard alone may not be
enough to deter a pirate attack, and thus further protective measures should be
considered.

5.1.1e Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD)

Sophisticated anti-boarding devices called Long Range Acoustic Devices (LRADs) are
able to produce an enormous amount of directional sound and are designed to confuse,
disorientate and distress potential intruders from a distance of the ship (GAC, 2015).
These systems enable the crew to direct sound bundles that are above the pain
threshold from a large distance onto a target such as a pirate skiff. These systems
produce sounds that range between 130-160 dB. So keeping in mind that F16 jets
produce 125 dB, and every 3 dB above this amount triples the intensity of the sound, it
gives an idea of the impact these systems can bring about (Westerbeek van Eerten,
Personal Communication, 7 August 2015).
To give an example of one of these systems, the Extreme Acoustic Hailing Device
is shown in Figure 5.4. This particular system can produce up to 136 dB at one meter,
and is able to cover a distance of more than 800 meters using speech transmission. In
addition, it is tested to meet ratings for extreme maritime and military environments
and conditions (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 7 August 2015).
According to a major producer of LRADs, these devices are less commonly used
in 2014 than in the years before (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2015). However, the costs of
LRADs can go up to more than €100,000, while cheaper ones start at €11,000
(Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 7 August 2015). In addition, one
respondent pointed out that it is possible to rent LRADs when preferred, which lowers
short-term costs. Moreover, when in 2011 between 2,100 and 6,300 ships were sailing
with LRADs, it is reported that shipping companies paid an average of €20,000 per ship
a year to have these devices installed (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2015).
The first benefit of the implementation of LRADs on vessels that are sailing
through the HRA is that these systems are capable of deflecting offender in a non-lethal
way. Even though not all respondents agreed, there is reason to
believe that these systems do succeed in holding off Somali pirates
(Van de Kerckhove, Personal Communication, 23 June 2015). Several
respondents (e.g. Vlasova, Personal Communication, 28 May 2015;
Cook, Personal Communication, 16 July 2015) brought up the
common argument that shooting at these systems easily eliminates
them. However, just like the Extreme Acoustic Hailing Device, many of
these systems have an option for bulletproof fronts (Westerbeek van
Eerten, Personal Communication, 7 August 2015). However, even
without this option one respondent pointed out that it is
exceptionally hard to target and hit these small systems from a
distance while sailing a skiff on the high seas (Hijmans, Personal
Communication, 18 June 2015). In addition, a nice extra feature of
these systems is its utility as a loudspeaker, which creates the
possibility of an extra deterrent by being able to warn potential
offenders in their own language about the installed security measures
on the vessel (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 27
May 2015). Figure 5.4 Long Range
When looking at the disadvantages, according to Bellamy Acoustic Device called
(2009) the unidirectional LRADs can easily be undermined by ‘’Extreme Acoustic Hailing
wearing heavy-duty ear protection or by attacking a target vessel Device’’ (Westerbeek van
with multiple skiffs approaching from different directions at the Eerten, 2015)
54

Wouter Klijnsoon
same time. Indeed, after using an LRAD against a potential threat, one member of a
Britisch PSMC stated: ‘’we thought it would make the pirates back off, but they just
laughed. It was a total waste of time’’ (Boniface, 2008). Secondly, one respondent pointed
out that just like many other technological non-lethal methods, if crewmembers operate
these kinds of systems manually they are at risk (Maltha, Personal Communication, 7
October 2015). Although these devices work unidirectional, which means that persons
outside of the sound bundle hear almost nothing, the attackers can still fire rounds at
them. Thirdly, since there is no regulation about the usage of LRADs, its legality is
unknown. Indeed, these systems are capable of killing a human when coming to close
due to internal stress that can cause heart failure (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal
Communication, 7 August 2015). Fourthly, one respondent stated that systems like
LRADs are very sensitive for maintenance because they are quite fragile (Van de
Kerckhove, Personal Communication, 23 June 2015). Finally, it needs to be noted that
one respondent stated that systems with such a price tag would never catch on in the
current economic climate because the shipping industry is trying to cut costs on nearly
everything (Vlasova, Personal Communication, 28 May 2015).

5.1.1f Propeller entanglement system

Propeller entanglement systems are designed to keep approaching vessels physically at
a distance and otherwise disable the engine by immobilizing the propeller. Next to being
a visible deterrent for pirates, these systems are capable of neutralizing potential
offenders in a non-lethal and passive manner. The award winning Dutch ‘’P-trap’’, which
is visualized in Figure 5.5, shows the potential of these systems. This particular device is
a passive anti-piracy measure that creates a safety zone around the sides of a vessel by
spreading a comprehensive system of trailing nylon lines along the entire length of the
ship (GAC, 2015; Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 27 May 2015).
Between fifteen and twenty lines are installed on a spreader bar, which is lowered to the
waterline of both sides of the vessel. And instead of neutralizing the potential offender,
this system neutralizes the pirates’ necessary tools by the means of a breakaway
connection that releases the line once a propeller caught it (Westerbeek van Eerten,
Personal Communication, 7 August 2015). Subsequently the pirate skiff is quickly lost
when the vessel remains a steady speed.
The variant that is shown in Figure 5.6, the so-called Swivelboom, is currently
the most commonly applied type of P-traps on ships. The system is deployed by the
crew prior to entering the HRA, offers a passive defense during the voyage, and is easily
pulled up and stored when entering port or when leaving the HRA. Moreover, the
system can be re-used during a subsequent visit to the HRA (Hijmans, Personal
Communication, 18 June 2015; Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 7
Figure 5.6 Example of a P-trap

Figure 5.5 Propeller entanglement system system called ‘’The
called ‘’P-trap’’ (Westerbeek van Eerten, Swivelboom’’ (Westerbeek van
2015) Eerten, 2015).
55

Wouter Klijnsoon
August 2015). Finally it needs to be noted that although one responding shipping
company stated that these systems are not suitable for their specialized offshore vessels
(Van de Kerckhove, Personal Communication, 23 June 2015), the developer of this
particular system contradicts this statement by saying: ‘’it can be fitted on any ship’’. In
addition he stated that ‘’if we are able to successfully install a P-trap on a 30m fishing
boat, these systems can be successfully deployed on any ship’’. And finally concluded by
stating the following: ‘’I am not saying one size fits all, but this defense system is applicable
for any ship’’ (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 7 August 2015).
Currently there have been 17 vessels equipped with the ‘’P-trap’’ system.
However, it needs to be acknowledged that since 2012 there have been no ship added to
this list due to the Dutch government that allowed the deployment of military protection
teams onboard Dutch ships.
Nevertheless, the most versatile and commonly used variant is the ‘Swivel
system’, which reportedly costs between €38,500 and €42,500 (Westerbeek van Eerten,
Personal Communication, 7 August 2015). In addition, the ‘Alternative Swivel system’,
which is specifically designed to use on containerships, is a bit less sophisticated and
costs around €32,500. Moreover, the developer also offers these systems on a rental
basis for about 30% of the purchase price. In addition it needs to be noted that the
developer pointed out that, once the shipping industry orders more of these system, the
costs can go down to €25,000 a ship. However, once this investment has been made, the
operational costs consist of the line packages that need to be replaced every now and
then. Since these lines go for about €0.24 per meter, the average costs of a new package
is about €1,000, but is dependent on the size of the vessel (Westerbeek van Eerten,
Personal Communication, 27 May 2015).
As an anti-boarding system that focuses on immobilizing the pirates’ propeller,
the benefit of such a system is that it offers a non-lethal safeguard against multiple and
simultaneous attacks while staying active without crew involvement. This system makes
it nearly impossible for the pirates’ skiff to keep continues speed while trying to climb
aboard the vessel (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 27 May 2015;
Hijmans, Personal Communication, 18 June 2015). Moreover, the system acted
accordingly when it immobilized four approaching skiffs during a test in cooperation
with the Dutch navy (Hijmans, Personal Communication, 18 June 2015). Secondly, there
is reason to believe that with the right amount of investments, these systems are
capable of development to tackle more sophisticated systems like jet boats. In addition,
propeller entanglement systems have the potential of integrating into the hull of a ship,
just like physical barriers. Thirdy, the developer of these systems stated that they are
planning to sent used ropes to Somalia in an attempt to provide Somali fishermen with
fishing nets (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 27 May 2015).
It is worth noting that, unlike commonly stated, these systems don’t have a
negative impact on navigation or speed (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal
Communication, 7 August 2015). In addition, several tests debunked the common
expectation that the lines would immobilize the ship’s own propeller. It is also worth
noting that a German study that was undertaken by the Deutsche Bundespolizei in
cooperation with German shipping companies concluded that the best anti-piracy
measure is a combination of a propeller entanglement system in combination with a
proper citadel safe room (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 7 August
2015).
When examining the disadvantages of these system, one responding shipping
company was very clear by stating that after a risk analysis they concluded that these
system don’t work because of several reasons: they don’t fit on their vessels; it is at the
expense of the operationally; and during bad weather conditions it would break down
(Van de Kerckhove, Personal Communication, 23 June 2015). In addition this
respondent did not believe that these systems would stop the pirates from attacking
56

Wouter Klijnsoon
their vessels. Another disadvantage of the ‘’P-trap’’ could be the lack of protection on the
bow and stern of a vessel, which necessitates added defensive measures (Westerbeek
van Eerten, Personal Communication, 27 May 2015). Finally, when something is dragged
through the water the fuel costs rise due to the created friction, which is estimated at an
added 0,25% of extra fuel with a ‘’P-trap’’.

5.1.1g Razor wire

One compulsory defensive measure that is prescribed by the BMP4 is the
implementation of razor wire when sailing through the HRA (Westerbeek van Eerten,
Personal Communication, 27 May 2015). Because razor wire is designed to have a
piercing and gripping action, the implementation creates an effective barrier around the
vessel when carefully deployed. It is also recommended that care should be taken when
appropriate razor wire is selected because the types and quality in terms of wire gauge
and frequency of barbs will vary considerably (IMO, 2011).
The BMP4 recommends using two types of razor wire protection. First off there
is concertina razor wire, where the linked spirals supposedly make it more effective
than simpler straightforward razor wire. This wire should have coil diameters of
approximately 170 mm or 980 mm, which are made of high tensile wire that make it
difficult to cut with hand tools. The second type, which is said to be particularly
effective, is a robust razor wire barrier. These barriers are constructed outboard of the
ship’s structure, and therefore also makes it more difficult for pirates to hook on their
boarding ladder or grappling hooks (IMO, 2011). Systems like those shown in Figure 5.7
contain extremely sharp razor blade-like edges and are commonly used to secure land-
based perimeters such as nuclear and high detention facilities (Westerbeek van Eerten,
Personal Communication, 7 August 2015). It is known to be extremely deadly and cuts
through everything the potential offenders could use, such as heavy-gloves or blankets
(Hijmans, Personal Communication, 18 June 2015).
Because the implementation of razor wire is a mandatory requirement made by
the BMP4, it is heavily used in the industry. Indeed, one respondent stated that before a
PMSC is about to set sail on a customer’s ship, their team leader will always check if the
appropriate razor wire is in place (Vlasova, Personal Communication, 28 May 2015).
Commonly used straightforward razor wire costs about €3.8 per meter. As the
implementation varies from single to triple layers around a ship, the total cost per vessel
is estimated to be between €2,000 and €5,700 (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2015). It is stated
that these systems have an estimated lifespan of two years. In addition, the more
sophisticated reusable robust razor wire barrier is estimated at a cost of €345 for every
two meters. However, it has to be noted that these systems are promised a lifespan of 10
years (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 7 August 2015).
It is important to note that several
respondents stated that the utilization of
proper razor wire as a countermeasure
against CSM piracy could be extremely
effective in countering pirates (Westerbeek
van Eerten, Personal Communication, 7
August 2015; Vlasova, Personal
Communication, 28 May 2015). Obviously the
first benefit is the deterring effect razor wire
could have, especially because it is highly
visible for the potential offenders. Secondly, it Figure 5.7 Example of a re-usable razor
seriously impairs climbing onboard a vessel, wire system (Westerbeek van Eerten, 2015).
and therefore significantly extends the time
that an attack takes (Vlasova, Personal
57

Wouter Klijnsoon

When examining the possible disadvantages of the implementation of razor
wire, it first needs to be noted that the BMP4 specifically states that ‘lower quality razor
wire is unlikely to be effective’ (IMO, 2011). That having said, the first disadvantage is the
danger it bears for the crew. The BMP4 highly recommends using personal protective
equipment to protect hands, arms and faces when deploying the razor wire. In addition,
one respondent warned that some razor wire could be dangerous for the crew because
those blades are highly lethal and accidents can happen (Westerbeek van Eerten,
Personal Communication, 7 August 2015). Secondly, normal razor wire is commonly
thrown overboard after using it, which has a negative impact on the seas (Westerbeek
van Eerten, Personal Communication, 27 May 2015; Hijmans, Personal Communication,
18 June 2015). However, nowadays the reusable variants are commonly available
(Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 27 May 2015). Thirdly, the
deployment of razor wire contradicts the idea of having everything on a vessel easily
accessible because of operationalization and in case of an emergency. However, this
problem can be solved by the deployment of reusable razor wire. For example, the
robust razor wire barrier is a system that is quickly retractable, portable and deployable
(see Figure 5.7; Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 27 May 2015).

5.1.1h High-powered searchlights

High-powered searchlights are devices that produce an extreme amount of focused light
and are designed to detect potential intruders or impair their vision from a distance.
Even from a distance of two kilometers, it is impossible to look directly at the 200
million candelas these systems can produce. In addition, because it impairs coordination
it can become very difficult for the potential offenders to distinguish between the
specific parts and the location of the vessel. And finally it serves as a discouraging
method by making sure the potential offenders know they have been spotted and cannot
attempt an unexpected approach (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 27
May 2015).
Just like many other anti-piracy measures, high-powered searchlights come in a
wide variety of designs and strengths. A general device that is purposely designed to
counter pirates is the Xenon 3000W searchlight, which is capable of reaching 14
kilometers. Moreover, due to cooling chambers and fans it is capable of continuous
operation without any downtime. Up to nine devices can be controlled simultaneously
from a wireless control panel. When installing these system for both sides of the vessel
it will cost about €50,000 (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 7 August
2015). There is also the less sophisticated handheld searchlight, which still produces 12
million candelas. These devices are reported to be a bit cheaper though (Westerbeek
van Eerten, Personal Communication, 27 May 2015). In addition, the upgraded versions
that are both fully automatic and carry a laser option cost more than €190,000. Finally,
when trying to counter pirates by the usage of light, it is possible to use purpose made
stroboscopes in order to confuse intruders. These systems can go from €2,500 each
(Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 7 August 2015).
Probably the biggest benefit of high-powered searchlights is the dazzling effect
of the bright lights, which can seriously impair sight for up to 30 minutes (Westerbeek
van Eerten, Personal Communication, 27 May 2015). In addition it is promised that
these systems are made from a corrosion resistance material that offers a long lifetime
and is easy to operate (GAC, 2015). Finally, just like LRADs these devices are relatively
small and therefore hard to eliminate by shooting rounds at them from a distance
(Hijmans, Personal Communication, 18 June 2015).
If the only defense mechanism against CSM piracy is the implementation of high-
powered searchlights, a serious disadvantage these systems could have is the danger of
58

Wouter Klijnsoon
pirates that are wearing welding goggles, making them more or less immune to being
dazzled by the light (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 27 May 2015). In
addition, although bright searchlights are commonly used at the high seas, when it
comes to the utilization of lasers or stroboscope there are no regulations at all. Since
lasers can cause permanent blindness while stroboscopes can evoke epileptic attacks,
the industry has to be cautious with such devices (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal

5.1.1i Water cannons

The use of water spray systems has been found to be effective in deterring or delaying
pirates attempting to board a vessel. The use of water can make it difficult for a pirate
skiff to remain alongside and also makes it significantly more difficult for a pirate to try
to climb onboard (IMO, 2011). Not only does the attacker have to fight against the jet of
water, but also the flow may swamp the attacking skiff and damages the engines and
electrical systems. There are several different options available to do so, but water
pressures of 80 lb per square inch and above have deterred and repulsed attacks (IMO,
2009).
Some ships simply prepare their fire hoses when entering the HRA, so that they
can direct them at the intruders if necessary (Cook, Personal Communication, 21 July
2015; Anonymous respondent, Personal Communication, 15 July 2015). Where possible
to do so, ships sometimes utilize their ballast pumps to flood the deck with water, which
provides a highly effective water curtain over the ship’s side. This may be achieved by
allowing ballast tanks to over-flow on to the deck (IMO, 2011). Another way of using
water in an attempt to counter pirates is by implementing water cannons. These water
cannons are designed to deliver water in a vertical sweeping arc, which therefore is
capable of protecting a greater part of the hull or to target potential offenders from a
greater distance. These systems are capable of shooting 80 liters of water per second up
to a distance of 100 meters (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 27 May
2015). This implies that it is possible to fill a skiff with water in a matter of seconds.
Installing these water cannons on both sides of a vessels costs about €23,000.
On top of the mentioned benefits of these systems there is reason to believe they
have the potential to be developed into even more sophisticated devices. For example,
one shipbuilding company mentioned the possibility of linking automatic water cannons
to infrared cameras for early detection or of increasing the deterrent effect by adding
tear-gas or boiling water (Van de Kerckhove, Personal Communication, 23 June 2015).
However, one downside of the usage of water as an anti-piracy measure is the
fact that not all ships are suitable to use water cannons because of a lack of pump
capacity (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 27 May 2015). In addition,
these systems are less effective when the intruders make us of bigger ships that are,
unlike small skiffs, not filled with water that quickly (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal
Communication, 27 May 2015). Finally, the BMP4 does not recommend manual
operation of hoses and cannon, as this is likely to place the operator in a particularly
exposed position (IMO, 2011). Therefore it is necessary to either put the hoses in fixed
positions to cover likely pirate access router or invest in automatic systems.

5.1.2 Control access to facilities

Access control refers to measures that are intended to exclude potential offenders from
places such as offices, factories, apartment blocks and ships. However, Clarke (1997)
states that many of these measures’ preventive nature may be as lengthy as that of
target hardening. Indeed, there is an overlap between the first two cells of the category
of increasing the effort, and all the anti-piracy measures that were categorized and
59

Wouter Klijnsoon
discussed in section 5.1.1 on target hardening are also, at least in part, applicable within
the cell of controlling access to facilities since their main purpose is to prevent pirates
from entering the ship. However, the target hardening measures are valued to add more
to the security than simply controlling access to the vessel. For example, the measures
within section 5.1.1 on target hardening add clear (visual) deterrents and enable a more
active response. Therefore, although all of the previously discussed measures that
harden the target are also in place to prevent the offenders from entering the vessel, the
following section on controlling access to facilities will focus only on those measures
that are solely in place to passively refrain the pirates from making use of designated
access points on the vessel such as doors and stairs.

Table 5.2 Control access to facilities anti-piracy measures and the accompanied costs, pros and
cons.
Control Access to the bridge, - Unknown - If the pirates cannot get to - The situation worsens
access accommodation and the bridge and machinery when crewmembers
routes machinery spaces could room, they cannot control are trapped inside.
be properly secured by the ship. - Controlling accesses
using locks, fences, - If the pirates cannot get to can be in conflict with
withdrawal-ladders, the crew, they cannot emergency response
redesigned entrances keep them as hostages. capabilities.
and exits. If
implemented properly it
could be effective in
keeping intruders from
entering designated
areas.

5.1.2a Control access routes

The BMP4 emphasizes the importance of controlling access routes to deter or delay
pirates who have managed to board a vessel and are trying to enter accommodation or
machinery spaces. If pirates do gain access to the upper deck of a vessel, they will be
tenacious in their efforts to gain access to the accommodation section and in particular
the bridge. Therefore it is recommended that significant effort is expended prior to
entering the HRA to deny the pirates this access (IMO, 2011).
It is recommended by the BMP4 that all doors and hatches that provides access
to the bridge, accommodation and machinery spaces should be properly secured and
that, once secured, a designated and limited number are used for routine access when
required (IMO, 2011). First, shipping companies can use normal locks that deny access
from the outside (Kim, Personal Communication, 31 July 2015). Second, one responding
shipping company reported the use of fences to add in the security of certain doors (Van
de Kerckhove, Personal Communication, 23 June 2015). Third, this same respondent
reported withdrawal of ladders and stairs, which is also recommended by the BMP4
(IMO, 2011). Fourth, one respondent emphasized the possibilities of redesigning the
accommodation, entrances and exits so that the pirates cannot get in but the crew can
get out (Anonymous respondent, Personal Communication, 26 June 2015).
There is reason to believe that many shipping companies implemented
measures to control access routes, but to what extend is unknown (Van de Kerckhove,
Personal Communication, 23 June 2015; Kim, Personal Communication, 31 July 2015).
In addition, the costs involved in implementing locks, fences, withdrawal-ladders and
redesigned entrances and exits are unknown. Moreover, it is important to recognize that
the primary consideration should be to ensure the safety of the crew. So care should be
taken, when formulating measures to prevent external access to accommodation, that
crewmembers will not be trapped inside and should be able to escape in the event of
60

Wouter Klijnsoon
another type of emergency, such as fire (IMO, 2011). One respondent noted that not
every door could be simply seal welded. There has to be a balance between emergency
response capabilities and security against piracy threats (Dorsman, Personal

5.1.3 Deflect offenders

Hope (1985) has suggested that crowds of drunken young people on the streets at
closing time could be reduced by avoiding the concentration of licensed premises in
particular parts of a city. Moreover, Scheduling the last bus to leave immediately after
pub closing time is intended to interfere with the traditional closing time brawl (Clarke,
1997). These are two examples of deflecting offenders away from crime targets, which is
a situational technique that is suggested by the routine activity theory. More
importantly, this same technique could offer possibilities when searching for measures
to block the opportunities for Somali pirates, since the pirates cannot hijack a targeted
vessel if they cannot reach it. Therefore the following section examines the opportunity-
reducing technique of deflecting offenders by rerouting, increased speed and
maneuvering.

Table 5.3 Anti-piracy measures that deflects offenders and the accompanied costs, pros and cons.
Rerouting Ships have the - Total costs of rerouting - Significant reduced chances - Higher costs could
opportunity of rerouting in 2011: €543 million of being attacked by Somali make rerouting
in an attempt of - Costs for a cargo ship pirates. impossible
deflecting potential on the Persian Gulf- - Longer traveling times
offenders, which is an Southern India route: - Greater distances to
effective solution €3,500 cover
because it takes the - Costs for a tanker on - Increased fuel
pirates’ opportunity the Persian Gulf- expenditure
away to reach the ship. Southern India route:
€5,000
Maneuvering There are four - Not applicable - Maneuvering measures have - Maneuvering measures
subsequent the capacity of deflecting are not always
maneuvering measures potential offenders in a free applicable.
to be implemented in and non-dangerous manner. - Detection is mandatory
case of a suspected - Early detection software in for success.
approach that could turn combination with - Substantial amounts of
out to be effective in maneuvering measures helm significantly
countering pirates: could offer a useful reduce speed.
- Avoid being methodology in deflecting
detected potential offenders.
- Step aside
- High speed
escape
- Delay boarding
Speed Experience shows that - Total cost of increased - Using increased speeds to - Increased fuel
outrunning attacks is a speed in the Western deter pirate attacks has consumption
successful preventive Indian Ocean region in proven to be effective. significantly increases
measure because pirates 2014: €534 million - Due to the high speed of costs.
are thought not to be - Average daily excess some ships (25+ knots), - The possibility exists
capable of boarding fuel cost per vessel: some respondents believe that pirates develop
vessels speeding above €11,357 these ships don’t need added tactics to be capable of
18 knots. anti-piracy measures. boarding vessels
moving faster than 18
knots.
- Many ships are not
capable of getting up to
18 knots.

61

Wouter Klijnsoon
5.1.3a Rerouting

The reason why no cruise ship has even been hijacked by Somali pirates is simply due to
the fact that these ships never set sail to destinations such as the Seychelles. They simple
avoid the HRA because of the threat of Somali piracy. Indeed, the IMO recommends that
if at all possible, ships should be routed away from areas where attacks are known to
have taken place and, in particular, seek to avoid bottlenecks (IMO, 2009). In addition it
is recommended that when deciding on a ship’s route, the company should take into
consideration the type of ship, the size and maximum speed as well as the freeboard and
the dangerous nature of the cargo (IMO, 2009). Moreover, figures show that especially
faster ships more often chose the direct route, while slower ships more often reroute
(U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration, 2011). Using speed as an
anti-piracy measure will be elaborated bellow at section 5.1.3c.
According to Oceans Beyond Piracy (2015), when the threat from piracy was at
its peak, many vessels transiting the Western Indian Ocean region attempted to reduce
their exposure to the threat of piracy through the implementation of extensive rerouting
practices. These practices included rounding the Cape of Good Hope to the south or
keeping close to the coast of the Indian subcontinent and Arabian Peninsula to the
north. However, it is reported that with the decline of reported piracy incidents in the
region, vessels have gradually returned to traveling along the shortest route, closer to
Somalia (‘’Changes in shipping routes and speed’’, 2015). In 2014, ship owners decided
that traveling an additional 600 nm to avoid sailing straight through the HRA was not
worth it when considering the number of reported incidents (Oceans Beyond Piracy,
2015).
Taking alternative routes increases the chance of avoiding known areas of pirate
activity, but generally results in higher costs due to longer travel times, greater
distances, and the accompanying increase in fuel expenditure (Oceans Beyond Piracy,
2015). In 2011 the total rerouting costs were estimated at €543 million (Oceans Beyond
Piracy, 2012). In addition it is estimated that in 2014 the estimated rerouting costs for
ships travelling the Persian Gulf-Southern India route is over €14 million in total. This
comes down to an estimated €3,500 per 120-200m Cargo ship and €5,000 per 120-
200m tanker per transit (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2015). Furthermore, current costs for
rerouting along the Gulf of Aden to South India, in an attempt of avoid sailing straight
through the HRA, are unknown.
Clearly the first and foremost disadvantage of rerouting are the additional costs
because of the extended travel times and the greater fuel consumption. Indeed, in a
Greek study several Greek shipping companies stated that due to the extra costs,
rerouting is usually impossible. However, in the same study 49% of the participating
shipping companies stated they believed ‘’avoiding high-risk areas’’ to be ‘’extremely
effective’’ (Bountri & Giziakis, 2013).

5.1.3b Maneuvering

According to the PROMERC Project (‘’PROMERC’’, 2015), there are four counter measure
maneuvers that can be activated against suspected vessels and pirates. The first
maneuvering measure is trying to avoid being detected. In an attempt of aiding in this
first step, currently research is being done on a system that is supposed to recognize
certain behaviors and determine if vessels in the area could be considered as potential
piracy ships (Maltha, Personal Communication, 7 October 2015). This would enable an
early warning about possible hostiles and offers the opportunity of an early
maneuvering response.
Which leads to the second maneuvering measure of stepping aside. Where
possible, the BMP4 recommends altering course away from potential approaching skiffs
62

Wouter Klijnsoon
and/or motherships. Moreover, when sea conditions allow, it should be considered

altering the course to increase an approaching skiffs exposure to wind and waves (IMO,
2011). If the suspected vessel responds on the course change, the intentions can be
considered hostile (‘’PROMERC’’, 2015).
The third maneuvering measure is a high-speed escape. Once hostiles have been
detected, trying to out speed them has proven to be a successful option. However, the
anti-piracy measures that speed has to offer will be elaborated in the following section
5.1.3c.
The final maneuvering measure is trying to delay boarding. Provided that
navigational safety allows, the IMO (2009) recommends masters to consider ‘’riding off’’
attackers’ craft by heavy wheel movements and turning into wind in an attempt of
loosing attackers from either side of the ship. The effect of the bow wave and wash may
deter would-be attackers and make it difficult for them to attach ladders or grappling
hooks on the ship.
However, heavy wheel movement should only be used when attackers are
alongside and boarding is imminent. Furthermore, maneuvers of this kind should not be
used in confined or congested waters or close inshore or by ships constrained by their
draught (IMO, 2009). In addition, substantial amounts of helm that is too early is not
recommended, as these are likely to significantly reduces a vessel’s speed (IMO, 2011).
Finally it should be noted that there are no known significant costs involved in using
maneuvers in an attempt of loosing pirates.

5.1.3c Speed

According to the IMO (2009), experience shows that outrunning attacks may be an
appropriate preventive maneuver. This is the reason why one respondent reported he
was not nervous or scared when Somali pirates approached and checked out the cargo
ship where he was working as an engineer, partly because he knew the pirates could not
hijack them because they were sailing to fast (Kim, Personal Communication, 31 July
2015). Indeed, another respondent noted that no pirate attack has ever been completed
on a ship travelling faster than 18 knots (Cook, Personal Communication, 16 July 2015).
Therefore the BMP4 recommends ships to proceed at Full Sea Speed, or at least 18 knots
where they are capable of greater speed, throughout their transit of the HRA.
Particularly when any suspicious vessel has been identified, it is very important to
increase to maximum safe speed as quickly as possible in order to try increasing the
distance from the potential attackers (IMO, 2011).
Just like vessels are gradually returning to travelling along the shortest route
instead of rerouting, vessels are starting to sail again at normal speed (‘’Changes in
shipping routes and speed’’, 2015). The number of cargo vessels using increased speed
in the Western Indian Ocean region decreased in 2014 when compared to 2013 by 10%,
while the number of tankers using increased speeds decreased by 6% (Oceans Beyond
Piracy, 2015). However, increased speed remains a significant way to avoid pirate
attacks. It is estimated that 59.2% of all the vessels that transit the HRA increases its
speed when entering the HRA. The cost of the usage of increased speed in 2014 was
€534 million. More specifically, this accounts for an average daily excess fuel cost of
€11,357 per vessel steaming at increased speed through the Western Indian Ocean
region (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2015).
Using increased speeds to deter pirate attacks has proven to be effective (Oceans
Beyond Piracy, 2015). One respondent stated: ‘’if a ship travels faster than 18 knots, the
likelihood of a pirate to get on to the ship is significantly reduced because of the
hydrostatic pressure around the ship’’. ‘’This does not allow a small boat to push in because
of the forces of nature’’. ‘’So it is very difficult to get in with a light skiff such as those used
by Somali pirates’’ (Cook, Personal Communication, 16 July 2015). In addition,
63

Wouter Klijnsoon
responding shipyard stated that because their ships could sail up to 30 knots, and at
least 25 knots, there were not added anti-piracy measures needed. Their ships were
always faster than those of the pirates (Zaat et al., Personal Communication, 8 May
2015).
However, this tactic is not without economic consequence, as increased fuel
consumption significantly increases costs. Therefore, some shipping companies decide
to take other measures, like rerouting or hardening of the vessel. Another disadvantage
is noted by the BMP, where it is states that the possibility exists that pirate tactics and
techniques may develop to enable them to board ships moving faster than 18 knots
(IMO, 2011). However, many ships are not capable of getting up to 18 knots because
they are simply not designed to. Therefore, using increased speeds to deter pirate
attacks is not always a possibility.

5.1.4 Concluding notes on measures that increase the effort

This section has shown that many different anti-piracy measures are possible if a ship
owner wants to increase the perceived efforts that a pirate has to undertake to hijack a
vessel, which hopefully would influence their cost-benefit analysis in a positive way.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that there will probably be even more measures that
hit the market in the upcoming years. Moreover, with the exception of the measures that
are to deflect the offenders, all other effort-increasing measures are based on physical
technologies or adjustments, and therefore fall in the category of technoprevention. It is
safe to state that these measures are generally legit and non-lethal, which does not
always apply for other anti-piracy measures such as the implementation of armed
guards.
However, it has also been shown that costs of these measures vary enormously.
For example, even though they are supposed to offer a similar deterring effect, simple
old-fashioned razor wire cost €3.8 per meter, while robust razor wire barriers cost
€345. Indeed, some highly advanced LRADs cost more than €100,000, even though it is
also supposed to increase the effort for pirates like razor wire does.
Furthermore, when looking at the disadvantages of the technoprevention
measures, it is reasonable to think that the pirates could invent a countermeasure for
every technological measure. Indeed, chapter 3 showed that pirates are often well aware
of the situation, which implies that technoprevention should always need to be one step
ahead in order to be effective. However, even circumvented measures still increase the
necessary efforts needed to board and hijack a vessel.
Finally, it is not unthinkable that all the measures that increase the effort
frustrates the potential offenders and results in countermeasures if they would succeed
in hijacking the vessel. Chapter 3 showed that the pirates use little violence after a
successful attack. However, especially those measures that offer health risks for the
pirates, such as the creation of wash by maneuvering, the powerful lights that impair
sights, or those measures that destroys their equipment could potentially cause anger
and result in increased violence.

5.2 Increase the risks

The second of the five general crime prevention categories is ‘Increase the Risks’. The
opportunity-reducing techniques in this category focus on increasing the risks that are
involved when committing the crime. Risk is associated with increasing the chance of
being apprehended, identified or in the case of countering CSM piracy, being killed
(Shane & Magnuson, 2014). This also includes raising the prospect that pirates will be
seen by someone who is likely to take action. Perceived risks involve a cost-benefit
analysis by the offender, which is informed by the qualities of the target that make it
64

Wouter Klijnsoon
more or less attractive (Felson & Clarke, 1998). Therefore, the goal of the following
measures is to ultimately deter the pirates because the perceived risks are not worth the
potential profit.

5.2.1 Extend guardianship

Cohen and Felson showed that the increase in residential burglary during the 1960s and
1970s was partly due to the increasing numbers of women working outside the home.
This meant that for much of the day, many homes had no capable guardians (Clarke &
Eck, 2005). Indeed, research shows that burglars prefer to commit their crimes during
work hours when people are likely to be out. Therefore many people choose to ‘extend’
the guardianship of their house by cancelling their newspapers and by informing their
neighbors when they go on holidays. The same idea goes for the suggestion to go out in a
group at night, where the group functions as an extended guardian of the individual.
Similarly, routine precautions are also known to increase the risks for potential
offenders to be apprehended because it functions as extended guardianship (Cornish &
Clarke, 2003).

Table 5.4 Extend guardianship as anti-piracy measures and the accompanied costs, pros and cons.
Group transit Group transits are - Specific costs are unknown, - Reduced individual - Adjustments to
convoys of vessels but delays might happen. vulnerability. passage plans could
transiting the HRA - Greater warship presence be impractical or
together at the same in the nearby area. cause delays.
speed. Often these - Masters might dislike
convoys are assisted subordination to an
by warships for overall convoy leader.
maximum protection,
which would make
them likely to be
effective.
Remote Remote access allows - Unknown - In case of an attack, the - While the technique
access for on shore status crew only has to hide grows slowly, these
readings of a sailing while it is controlled from systems are still in
vessel. It has the shore. development.
potential to develop - Pirates cannot control the - Questionable if
into more advanced vessel if people on shore remote access
monitoring and are in control. systems will become
remote control of a - Reduced crewmembers reliable enough for
vessel. However, the or unmanned ships full dependability.
current state of the remove the pirates’ - Current regulations
technology probably targets. do not allow remote
does not make them access and taking
that effective. control from shore.
Increased Increased vigilances - Besides regular man-hours - Increased vigilance allows - None.
vigilance are precautions that there are no additional costs. for a more effective and
prepares for potential - Some ship owners need to quicker response in case
piracy threats. There invest in surveillance and of a potential threat,
are four measures to detection equipment if not which could also deter
be considered: already in place. pirates.
planning, showing - Research has shown that
awareness, training, watch keeping is the most
and watch keeping. important anti-piracy
These are known to be measure.
very effective in
prevention of piracy.
65

Wouter Klijnsoon
5.2.1a Group transit

Just like people should not go out alone at night, but rather go in a group, the BMP4
suggests group transits through the HRA. The Maritime Security Center Horn of Africa
(MSCHOA) offers the coordination of grouping vessels together by speed for maximum
protection. This way the vessels can keep an eye out for each other. In addition, naval or
military forces often assist these convoys, or are at least in the area to assist if necessary
(IMO, 2011). The prevalence of sailing in convoys in an attempt to counter piracy is
unknown. However, one responding shipping company reported to have indeed sailed
in both a Chinese convoy and a South Korean convoy, where the coordinating
government assists the convoy with a warship that is sailing along (Zaat et al., Personal
When taking part of a group transit, adjustments to passage plans need to be
made to conform to MSCHOA. In addition, ships have to carefully time their arrival to
avoid a slow speed approach to the forming up point or avoid waiting there, which
would make them particularly vulnerable to pirates (IMO, 2011). These measures could
make convoys impractical or cause delays. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that
there might be psychological resistance on the part of some Masters that their individual
authority has to be subordinated to an overall convoy leader (Erdos, 2010).

5.2.1b Remote access

One reporting shipyard started talking about using remote access systems onboard in
the fight against CSM piracy (Zaat et al., Personal Communication, 8 May 2015).
Currently, remote access systems are in place to show the engineers on shore how the
ship and its systems are behaving, and also offers an additional check for the ship
owner. However, these systems have the potential to develop into a highly effective anti-
piracy measure in terms of extending the guardianship of the vessel to the people on
shore. In its simplest form, these systems enable the ship owners to use closed-circuit
television to keep an eye at their ship and its crew in case of a hijack.
However, remote access has much more potential. For instance, there are ideas
about using remote access systems to shut down entire ships without onboard human
involvement. If such a system is in place, it enables the crew to hand over the control of
the ship to the people on shore. So if the pirates succeed in boarding the vessel, the crew
can be safely hidden while the ship is being shut down from shore, which unable the
pirates to hijack it and sail it to shore (Zaat et al., Personal Communication, 8 May 2015).
Indeed, by developing these systems even further it might become possible to start
sailing unmanned ships, or at least reduce crewmembers (Westerbeek van Eerten,
Personal Communication, 7 August 2015). However, because remote access systems are
still largely in development, costs for implementation against CSM piracy are currently
unknown.
Currently the biggest disadvantage of remote access systems for ships is the fact
that it is still in development. However, one respondent stated the technique does exist,
and it is growing slowly (Zaat et al., Personal Communication, 8 May 2015). But until
now it is only capable of transmitting status reports to the technicians on shore. In
addition, it is questionable if remote access systems will become reliable enough to
become truly dependent on them. Systems often need to be reset or experiences
interferences. For example, two respondents felt that systems for navigation are not yet
trustworthy enough to fully depend on them (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal
Communication, 7 August 2015; Maltha, Personal Communication, 7 October 2015).
Another disadvantage are the current regulations, which will not allow full remote
access and taking control from shore (Zaat et al., Personal Communication, 8 May 2015).

66

Wouter Klijnsoon
5.2.1c Increased vigilance

Increasing the vigilance for potential attacks of pirates in the HRA is a way of extending
the guardianship because this way the actual guarding of the vessel also takes place
prior to signs of a threat, and therefore allows for a more effective and quicker response,
which can also have a deterring effect on the potential offenders. The following section
will discuss four specific measures that can increase vigilance in a way to extend
guardianship to increase the offender’s perceived risks.
The first measure to ensure increased vigilance is planning. The most important
element of planning a transit through the HRA is the risk assessment. Prior to transiting
the HRA, the BMP4 advises ship operators and Masters to carry out a thorough risk
assessment to assess the likelihood and consequences of piracy attacks to the vessel,
based on the latest available information that is provided by MSCHOA, NATO, UKMTO,
IMB and the IMO (IMO, 2011). This risk assessment should ‘’identify measures for
prevention, mitigation and recovery, which will mean combining statutory regulations
with supplementary measures to combat piracy’’ (IMO, 2011). In addition, the IMO
advises to include the risks that may be faced, the ship’s size, freeboard, maximum
speed, type of cargo, the number of crew members available, their proficiency and
training, the ability to establish secure areas onboard the ship and any surveillance and
detection equipment that has been provided (IMO, 2009). Moreover, it is important that
the risk assessment is ship and voyage specific and not generic. Finally, the Master
should ensure that the anti-piracy measures are in place prior to entry into the HRA
(IMO, 2011).
The second measure of increased vigilance is showing potential pirates that the
vessel is aware of potential threat and what security measures are in place on the vessel.
There is reason to believe that some shipping companies actively publicize what vessel
is protected and how this is done. This can be done on the Internet, but also by
transmitting information through the AIS. This way, everybody knows that the vessel is
not an easy target. Another way of showing vigilance is making sure that house keeping
is in order. By making sure that everything is in order and works, including navigation
lights for example, shows the potential offenders that the crew is well organized.
A significant third measure of increased vigilance is training. The BMP4
recommends that prior to entry into the HRA, the crew should be fully briefed on the
preparations and a drill should be conducted. One respondent with experience of
transiting the HRA stated: ‘’when we saw pirates, I was not scared. This is because we
always exercise. The most important measure against piracy is education. You should not
be nervous when you see pirates, just follow the procedures. Training is the most important
part’’ (Kim, Personal Communication, 31 July 2015). In addition to trainings, the ship
security plan should be reviewed and all personnel should be briefed on their duties,
including familiarity with the alarms and procedures (IMO, 2011). Moreover, if PMSCs
or VPDs are onboard during the transit, the IMO recommends that they should assure
that the Master and the crew is familiar with the role of the onboard security team (IMO,
2012a).
The fourth and final measure to offer increased vigilance is watch keeping. The
IMO states that early detection of suspected attacks must be the first line of defense
against piracy. Indeed, watch keeping seems one of the most important component to
preventing attacks, because advance warning of a possible attack offers the opportunity
to implement responsive security measures and alert other ships and the coastal
authorities (IMO, 2009). The BMP4 states that early detection can be accomplished by
providing additional lookouts for each watch, by providing appropriate surveillance and
detection equipment and maintain a careful radar watch and by ensuring that there are
sufficient binoculars available (IMO, 2011).
67

Wouter Klijnsoon
Finally, it is assumed that there are no significant additional costs of increasing

vigilance. Costs for planning, increased training and increased watch keeping are based
on usual man-hours. However, perhaps some ship owners need to invest in surveillance
and detection equipment if these were not already in place.

5.2.2 Utilize place managers

The extended crime triangle that was discussed in Chapter 2 showed how place
managers could influence crimes that occur in certain places. In other words, place
managers are the individuals or group of individuals that are responsible for controlling
the space where the crime occurs (Eck & Weisburd, 1995). For example, in addition to
their primary function, some employees also perform a surveillance role because of
their position. These place managers could be shop assistants, hotel doormen, parking
lot attendants and train conductors (Clarke, 1997). In addition, a two-thirds reduction in
offenses at a parking lot in England followed the employment of attendants to cover
high risks periods of the day (Laycock & Austin, 1992).
The following section discusses how place managers can also be implemented
on the high seas in an attempt to control piracy. Even though this study focuses on
measures that can be taken on or near a ship, due to their significant influence on the
security issue it is important to elaborate on the current place manager situation as well.
However, since piracy occurs in international waters it is not easy to determine who is
responsible for controlling this space. In addition, place management is extremely
difficult to conduct in international waters because the HRA is so vast that complete
protective coverage is not feasible. However, due to a lack of local law enforcement, it
has been mainly the Multinational Naval Task Forces that try to control these waters.

Table 5.5 Utilize place managers as anti-piracy measures and the accompanied costs, pros and cons.
Local law Counter-piracy - Budget of 2014 for - Sufficient local law - The security
enforcement organizations attempt to EUCAP NESTOR: enforcement could situation in the
build capacity in the region $14,685,751 significantly increase the region impedes
and train local law - Budget of 2014 for risks for pirates and take development.
enforcement so that the DCOC: $2,848,000 away their opportunity
region itself is capable of - Budget of 2014 for for piracy.
countering piracy, which UNODC: $11,760,000 - These organizations
would help mitigating root actually build capacity
causes of CSM piracy. instead of donating
money to do so.
MNTF Warships, helicopters and - Total naval costs in - The MNTF offers place - The size of the area
maritime patrol airplanes 2014: €700 million. managers in that has to be
act as place managers in the - Costs for Dutch international waters. covered is too vast
HRA and protect the contribution to EU - The MNTF is reported as to completely
merchant navy by deterring NAVFOR Operation being the biggest protect, which can
and disrupting pirate Atalanta in 2015: €13,9 deterrent for pirates. result in the nearest
activities, which are known million. - A rapid MNTF response warship being two
to be very effective if they forces the pirates to be days away.
are nearby. quick or otherwise leave. - MNTF presence for
the upcoming years
is uncertain.

5.2.2a Local law enforcement

CSM piracy seems to be an extreme case of crime that manages to thrive and profit from
the absence of a capable guardian (Rengelink, 2012). Moreover, as was discussed in
chapter 4, the lack of sufficient law-enforcement offers the motivated offenders the
68

Wouter Klijnsoon
opportunity they need to hijack vessels and keep them for ransom. However, there is an
increasing expenditure of counter-piracy organizations that is committed to addressing
the root causes of piracy and support capacity building (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2015).
The following section will focus on three important counter-piracy organizations that
play a large role in capacity building and addressing the root causes of piracy by
increasing local law enforcement.
EU-mission EUCAP NESTOR started in 2012 and is a regional maritime capacity
building mission in the Horn of Africa. Its mission is to increase the maritime security
capacity in the region so that they are capable of countering piracy themselves. This
consists of training coast guards and maritime police and of strengthening the local legal
system (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2014).
In addition, the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCOC) is an IMO initiative that was
signed in 2009 and expanded to a total of 20 signatory countries in the region. It
provides a framework for capacity building in the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian
Ocean to combat the threat of piracy. Moreover, in 2014 the signatory states agreed on
the need for development of a mechanism to allow the region to drive and implement its
own counter-piracy strategy (‘’New Implementation Structure for Djibouti Code of
Conduct’’, 2014). Especially training of coastal guards and experts has been a major
focus and achievement of the DCOC and has helped increase awareness and attention for
counter-piracy significantly (Bueger & Saran, 2012). The Djibouti Training Center is
used to get personnel from the region to come in and train them so that they are
effectively able to secure the region (Vicente, Personal Communication, 31 July 2015).
Finally, the UNODC’s Maritime Crime Program works in the region to implement
capacity building activities, support regional prosecuting states and started the Piracy
Prisoner Transfer Program to build the capability for housing piracy-related prisoners
in Somalia and throughout the region. The UNODC is also building capacity for the
Federal Government of Somalia to create an effective criminal justice system to respond
to piracy crimes (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2015). The budget for EUCAP NESTOR in 2014
was $14,685,751 and that of the DCOC was $2,848,000. The UNODC’s budget for 2014
was estimated at $11,760,000.
A clear benefit of these counter-piracy organizations is that if they do succeed in
developing sufficient local law enforcement, it significantly increases the risks for
pirates when they anchor hijacked vessels off shore. Indeed, it could even take away
their opportunity for crime. Secondly, these organizations actually build capacity in the
region instead of donating money to let somebody else do this. One respondent pointed
to the fact that a lot of the donated money is often lost in the process due to corruption
(Hijmans, Personal Communication, 18 June 2015). However, instead of donating
money, these organizations themselves take action.
One notable disadvantage of setting up and training local law enforcement is the
state of security in the region, which impedes development. For example, the security
situation in Somalia remains a challenge and also limits the freedom of movement of
these organizations and their missions (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2014).

5.2.2b Multinational Naval Task Force

The international community delivers with a permanent presence of marine ships,
helicopters and maritime patrol airplanes in the HRA an important contribution to
securing international shipping in this area (AIV, 2010). Moreover, due to a lack of
capable local law enforcement, the Multinational Naval Task Force (MNTF) has taken up
the duty of guarding the space where the pirates carry out their activities. Indeed, the
MNTF has become the main place manager of the HRA. These international naval
coalitions are reported to be a crucial pillar in suppressing piracy in the HRA in 2014
69

Wouter Klijnsoon
(Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2015). The different operations and the participating countries
in 2014 are shown in Table 5.6.
These forces are mainly tasked with deterring and disrupting pirate activities by
showing a navy presence and if necessary responding actions. If a merchant ship is
attacked, the MNTF first respond with a helicopter and subsequently with a ship. One
responding retired NATO Commander stated: ‘’if a merchant ship is capable of keeping
the pirates off the ship for about 30-45 minutes, we could be there’’ (Hijmans, Personal
Communication, 18 June 2015). Indeed, there is reason to believe that the pirates know
the navy will target them if they do not immediately succeed in hijacking the targeted
vessel in (Zaat et al., Personal Communication, 8 May 2015). Moreover, by means of
extended self-defense the navy is allowed to utilize violence if necessary.
Another task of the MNTF is protecting highly vulnerable merchant vessels, as
was discussed in section 5.2.1a on group transits. And finally, one respondent reported
that the MNTF tries to locate pirate dhows and stop them or if necessary eliminate them
when they leave the Somali coast (Dorsman, Personal Communication, 1 May 2015).

Table 5.6 Counter-Piracy Naval Deployments in the HRA that are part of the MNTF (Oceans
Beyond Piracy, 2015)
EU NAVFOR Operation NATO Operation CMF CTF 151 Operation Independent
Atalanta Ocean Shield Copper Deployers
Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Italy, Australia, Denmark, South Africa, China, India,
France, Germany, Netherlands, New Italy, Japan, Mozambique, Japan, Russia,
Greece, Italy, Latvia, Zealand, Spain, Netherlands, New Tanzania South Korea, Iran,
Luxembourg, Turkey Zealand, Pakistan, United Kingdom
Montenegro, Saudi Arabia,
Netherlands, New Singapore, South
Zealand, Serbia, Spain, Korea, Thailand,
Ukraine Turkey, United Arab
Emirates, United
Kingdom, United
States

The total naval costs in 2014 are estimated at €700 million (Oceans Beyond
Piracy, 2015). However, the expenses of participating in the international missions are
borne by the participating countries themselves, as each country pays the operating
costs of its own vessels and assets. To give an indication about these participating costs,
it is estimated that the Netherlands will spend €13,9 million in 2015 to contribute to EU
NAVFOR Operation Atalanta (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2014).
The first benefit of the MNTF that has to be noted is that it acts as a place
manager in a place that did not have an obvious place manager like local law
enforcement. At least not until the counter-piracy organizations started capacity
building and coastguard training in recent years. Another benefit is the significant
deterring effect that the presence of navy ships has on potential offenders. A UNODC
survey among Somali ex-pirates that were imprisoned in the region frequently reported
that the international naval presence was a serious concern and a significant
contribution to deterring pirates. Indeed, international navies, more than any other
counter-piracy activity, were listed as the primary deterrent (UNODC, 2015). A
responding retired NATO commander stated: ‘’when we were in the neighborhood, the
pirates disappeared because they knew they would never win‘’ (Hijmans, Personal
Communication, 18 June 2015). A third and final benefit of the MNTF is that many anti-
piracy measures are not always necessary as long as there is military presence that is
able to respond in a reasonable amount of time. Moreover, the pirates know that if they
don’t want to become a military target, they need to be quick. And if a merchant ship
70

Wouter Klijnsoon
stops the engines and cuts off the power, while they keep themselves hidden in a safe
location, the pirates cannot do anything else than leave (Zaat et al., Personal
The first disadvantage of the MNTF as a place manager in the HRA is that due to
the expanse of the HRA, which is so vast that complete protective coverage might not be
feasible by the MNTF, place management is extremely difficult on these waters. Indeed,
psychologist Erdos (2010) noted that the naval task forces might lead to a feeling of
false security and complacency by some masters. Just because there is a naval presence
in the area, this does not make any specific area completely safe. Oceans Beyond Piracy
reported that in 2014 there were 20 vessels patrolling an area that is seven times as big
as Western Europe, making complete protection of the extensive shipping traffic in the
area an impossible task (AIV, 2010; Dorsman, Personal Communication, 1 May 2015).
Finally, one respondent pointed to the fact that it can take up to two days before a
warship is able to reach a vessel that is under attack, which calls for at least some
initiatives by the merchant navies themselves (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal
Another disadvantage of the MNTF is its uncertain future as a place manager in
the area. The current mandate for NATO and EUNAVFOR intervention is set to expire in
2016. However, because of budgetary pressures and different priorities due to the
increasing turmoil in the world, there are reasons to suspect that states may provide
fewer naval resources in the fight against CSM piracy in the upcoming years (Dutton,
2014; Maltha, Personal Communication, 7 October 2015). Indeed, in October 2015 it was
reported that the Dutch contribution will be reduced because the vessels are needed
elsewhere (NRC 24 October 2015). One respondent stated that this decline is
problematic because the playing field will increase again and the dhows will not be
detected as often as they used to be (Dorsman, Personal Communication, 1 May 2015).
As mentioned before, the MNTF has been very successful in deterring pirates. However,
even though some would make the argument that PMSCs would still be onboard ships,
and that this will probably keep it in check, many others believe that piracy would rise
again if the MNTF would leave tomorrow (Van de Kerckhove, Personal Communication,
23 June 2015; Anonymous respondent, Personal Communication, 26 June 2015;
Anonymous respondent, Personal Communication, 15 July 2015; Vicente, Personal
Communication, 31 July 2015; Maltha, Personal Communication, 7 October 2015).

5.2.3 Strengthen formal surveillance

Clarke (1997) stated that formal surveillance is usually provided by persons whose
main function is to provide a deterrent threat to potential offenders, such as police,
security guards or store detectives. Moreover, formal surveillance on vessels transiting
the HRA is offered by two specific groups of security guards: Private Maritime Security
Contractors and Vessel Protection Detachments. Simply put, by carrying arms, these
groups of people supposedly offer more or less the same method of deterring potential
offenders from trying to enter a vessel and hijack it. However, huge differences exist
between the two. Whereas the first one is a controversial private commercial industry,
the second one is an expensive inflexible military operation that is run by the
government.
It needs to be noted that both PMSCs and VPDs also harden the vessel against
pirates, in addition to strengthening the formal surveillance on the vessel. However, in
an attempt to make a clear distinction between technoprevention and prevention
through armed guardianship, it has been decided to categorize armed guardianship in
the following section. The following section on the strengthening of formal surveillance
will set out both groups of security guards in an effort to offer an overview of the
possibilities.
71

Wouter Klijnsoon
In contrast to the other anti-piracy measures that are discussed in this chapter,
the following section will contain four additional headings. This decision has been made
in an attempt to keep an overview of the extended information that is necessary to
adequately discuss the usage of PMSCs as an anti-piracy measure.

Table 5.7 Strengthen formal surveillance measures in terms of PMSCs and VPDs as anti-piracy
measures and the accompanied costs, pros and cons.
PMSC Three to four private armed - Total costs in 2014: - The presence of weapons - Many unreported
guards are onboard during a €560 million to €640 can have a deterring effect mistakes are made due
transit through the HRA and million. because it increases the to lack of expertise and
offer an additional layer of - Average cost for 3- pirate’s risks for injury or official reporting
protection against potential men team per HRA death. systems.
pirates by providing armed transit: €18,702 - PMSCs are operationally - There is no consistent
security, security advice, - Average cost for 4- flexible. international
hardening, monitoring and men team per HRA - PMSCs offer a secure state legislation for proper
crisis management. Their transit: €24,374. of mind for the crew. supervision and
presence has a deterrent effect - Ships from flag states that enforcement.
on potential pirates because it allow PMSCs are less - The first priority of
increases the risks for suitable targets than those PMSCs is to earn
apprehension or injury. Even who don’t. money, instead of
though not every organization protecting seafarers
is certified or accredited by against pirates.
governments or the ISO, the - Due to competitive
ones that are certified are pricing, the PMSC
expected to follow certain quality has significantly
operational procedures and are declined.
compliant with the (legal) - Armed guards are
requirements. Moreover, the illegal in several
Rules for the Use of Force countries.
should be based on self- - Armed PMSCs could
defense. There has never been escalate in an arms
any report of a hijacked ship race that influences the
that carried PMSCs onboard. black market.
VPD Teams of six to twelve military - Ship owner’s cost per - The deterring effect is - VPDs are operationally
soldiers that travel aboard transit for an 11-men assumed to keep potential inflexible.
vulnerable merchant vessels VPD: €105,000 intruder at a distance of - Not every flag state has
that are on transit through the - Government’s cost 400-500 meters. sufficient military
HRA. They offer a deterring per transit for an 11- - The government retains capacity to offer its
effect by showing or firing men VPD: €105,000 the monopoly on the use of merchant fleet enough
weapons if necessary. Their - Total cost per transit force. VPDs.
Rules of Engagement are based for an 11-men VPD: - VPDs use automatic heavy - VPDs often are too
on self-defense. Similar to €210,000 weapons of war. large to accommodate.
PMSCs, there has never been
any report of a hijacked ship
that carried VPDs onboard.

5.2.3a Private Maritime Security Contractor (PMSC)

How they work
It has been stated by several respondents that there has never been any successful
piracy attack of a vessel sailing with armed guards onboard (Dorsman, Personal
Communication, 1 May 2015; Hijmans, Personal Communication, 18 June 2015; Maltha,
Personal Communication, 7 October 2015). Therefore, many stakeholders involved with
Somali piracy are convinced that the use of armed guards onboard is the most effective
way of protection against this security threat (Vicente, Personal Communication, 31 July
2015). It has to be noted though that the BMP4 strongly emphasizes the fact that if
72

Wouter Klijnsoon
armed PMSCs are to be used, they must be seen as an additional layer of protection, not
as an alternative to the BMP. One responding PMSC confirms this, by saying: ‘the first
layer of defense is hardening of the vessel, after which we follow’ (Vlasova, Personal
When the initial security assessment results in the shipping company deciding to
hire armed guards, the shipping company sends a formal request with routing details,
size and type of ship, its speed and freeboard, the owner’s risk assessment, and the
agreed duties of the team to a PMSC (IMO, 2012a). If agreed, the private guards usually
board the vessel at the start of the HRA (Vlasova, Personal Communication, 28 May
2015). The security equipment is boarded in ports like Port of Galle or Suez Port, or
from the so-called floating armories, which are ships outside territorial waters that are
used as storage facilities. One responding PMSC reported that in addition to providing
armed security, their services include security advice, hardening, monitoring and crisis
management (Vlasova, Personal Communication, 28 May 2015). In 2014 roughly 50% of
the PMSCs used 4-guard teams while 50% used 3-guard teams (Oceans Beyond Piracy,
2015). However, according to one respondent, the size of a four men team is based on
the commercial imperative, and it is the minimum it should be (Cook, Personal
Communication, 16 July 2015). The responding PMSC also reported to work with 4-
guard teams due to a specific setup that provides 360 degrees observation and
monitoring from the bridge with watch keeping shifts of 2-guard teams, regardless of
ship size (Vlasova, Personal Communication, 28 May 2015).
Even though there are no international set rules or requirements that a PMSC
must adhere, there are several guidelines, standards and accreditations that indicates a
value judgment about different PMSCs, their working methods, compliance and
transparency. Especially the ISO norm 28007-1 is seen in the industry as a proper
certification of quality, and also worked as a framework for several European countries
when they were drafting their own accreditation (Dorsman, Personal Communication, 1
May 2015). The norm offers a risk-based quality management system with mandatory
requirements for the security of operations and activities that are conducted by the
PMSCs, including legal and compliance procedures (ISO, 2015). Moreover, to claim
compliance with the guidelines and get certified, all the requirements that are set out
should be complied with.
Although it needs to be noted that not every PMSC is officially certified by
industry standards such as the ISO 28007 or governmental accreditations, the ones that
are certified and subsequently are expected to follow procedures are also expected to
have a detailed and documented response plan that is based on a layered defense
system in case of a suspected approach (IMO, 2012). This plan is based on Rules for the
Use of Force (RUF), which are rules for using force as a lawful last resort in a self-
defense situation (Cook, Personal Communication, 21 July 2015). The ISO 28007 expects
a graduated deterrent approach to protect personnel and assets, which should be
reasonable and necessary, including non-lethal options and warning shots.
To put this into perspective, the ISO 28007 mandatory steps will be set out by
showing how one responding PMSC has applied those steps in their response plan
(ESS&SA, 2015). The first phase consists of observations, where two team members
always keep watch on the bridge to monitor for potential threats. If a potential threat
arises, the team leader will be informed and all team members will be on standby. The
second phase consists of an assessment to determine if there is indeed a piracy threat,
what kind of pirates the team is dealing with and what the situation is in terms of
weather etc. The following third phase is meant to discourage the potential offenders by
performing maneuvers and launching a flare to let the potential offender know they
have been spotted. Defensive measures will be checked and activated, firearms will be
loaded, heat cameras will be activated and the crew will be assembled on the bridge.
Failure to react on a second flare marks it as an official piracy attack, which is followed
73

Wouter Klijnsoon
by the fourth phase, which consists of assembling the crew at a muster location. This is
followed by the fifth phase, in which the Rules for the Use of Force are invoked by the
team leader, carried arms will be demonstrated to the potential offenders and a first
warning shot will be fired 50m above the pirate skiff. The next phase six consists of a
head count of the crew and the entering of the citadel. Along with the crew, some guards
will enter the citadel as well. The following seventh phase starts by a second warning
shot 50m in the water in front of the skiff. If the pirates approach the ship at 150m, a
third warning shot will be fired at 50m in front of the skiff. If the pirates approach the
vessel by 100m, the team enters the eight phase of disabling fire and disabling the
engine. If the pirates enter the vessel, the final lethal phase is entered. In this phase the
guards are expected to never shoot at vital body parts. The IMO (2012b) recommends
that in the event that the guards use force, the team leader should photograph, log,
report and collate contemporaneous written statements from guards present at the
incident in anticipation of legal proceedings.
It cannot be emphasized enough that the ISO 28007 requires that any use of
lethal force can only happen in self defense and defense of others if there is an imminent
threat of death or serious bodily harm, and should be reasonable and necessary to deter
the threat. Moreover, the response plan should reflect that it is the team leader who
advises the Master that it is necessary to invoke the Rules for the Use of Force. This is
mandatory, since this provides a legal framework under which it is the team leader who
is responsible for the actions of the PMSC, instead of the Master of the ship. According to
SOLAS, the Master is responsible for everything that happens on his or her ship.
However, when the so-called ‘’Guardcon’’ contract is followed by properly invoking the
Rules for the Use of Force, the guards are responsible for their actions if the Master does
not intervene and only keeps looking after the safety and navigation of the vessel. This
implies that if one of the team members commits murder and there is no joint
enterprise between the guard and the Master, in theory there is a sufficient legal air gap
between the Master and the guard so that the Master is not found criminally responsible
for what happened. However, this has not yet been tested in court (Cook, Personal
Communication, 21 July 2015). Guardcon is developed this way because there is reason
to believe Master don’t necessarily have the technical expertise to be able to make the
decision of when and how to shoot.

Usage and costs
The use of armed guards is a widely employed method for protecting vessels against
pirates in the HRA. It is estimated that in 2014 between 35% and 40% of the vessels
transiting the HRA used armed guards onboard to strengthen their security against CSM
piracy, which accounts for 25,410 to 29,040 transits (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2015). In
January 2011 the Danish Shipowner Association changed position to recommend armed
guards as an anti-piracy measure. In February 2011, The International Chamber of
Shipping, representing 80% of the world’s merchant navy, also changed its
recommendations on armed guards onboard vessels sailing through the HRA (Struwe,
2012). The UK government followed in September 2011 by lifting the ban on PMSCs for
British vessels (Department of Transport, 2011). Several other countries have
subsequently lifted the ban on armed PMSCs onboard their vessels (Brown, 2012).
However, one respondent noted that there are simply too many possibilities
when it comes to anti-piracy measures. And because many ship owners like to do it the
easy way, they simply use PMSCs onboard their vessels (Vicente, Personal
Communication, 31 July 2015). Nonetheless, the IMO states that the carriage of such
personnel and their firearms and security-related equipment is subject to flag State
legislation and policies and it is a matter for flag States to determine if and under which
conditions this will be authorized (IMO, 2012c). In this context, the Kingdom of the
Netherlands denies the usage of PMSCs due to beliefs about the State’s monopoly on the
74

Wouter Klijnsoon
use of force (Dorsman, Personal Communication, 1 May 2015). In contrast, to offer the
same security as PMSCs are believed to offer, the Netherlands offer VPDs, as will be
elaborated in the following section 5.2.4b. Nevertheless, as will be shown, VPDs
encounter problems when compared to PMSCs. This has resulted in a strong PMSC lobby
and the illegal deployment of PMSCs on Dutch vessels (Dorsman, Personal
Communication, 1 May 2015). Moreover, there is reason to believe that some Dutch
shipping companies solely deploy armed guards on their under the Dutch flag sailing
ships, while the legally available VPDs are a clear exception.
Total armed guard costs in 2014 are estimated to be between €560 million and
€640 million (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2015). Average cost for a three-men team is
€18,702 per transit while the average cost for a four-men team is €24,374 per transit.
This means that private security costs dropped by 22% in 2014, which is contributed to
a shift away from all-British teams and toward smaller multinational three-man teams
instead of four-men teams. Dirk Siebels explains these observations: ‘’Over the course of
2014, there has been a clear trend to teams with three rather than four armed guards.
Moreover, where we have seen security personnel from the UK dominating the market in
the past, that is no longer the case. There are still a lot of British guards, but other nations
are catching up fast, most notably Greece and India. This development can partly be linked
to the general structure of the shipping industry, yet ship operators are also keen to
employ more guards from various – perceived – low-cost countries. While the nationality
alone does not say anything about the training levels of individual guards, smaller teams
and more guards from outside the UK are important indicators for the financial pressures
the private security industry has to work under’’ (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2015). This
development is not surprising, as one respondent stated that some shipping companies
purely focus on the price of a PMSC, instead of taking compliance, liability and reliability
into account. In some cases the commercial compass overrides the moral compass
(Cook, Personal Communication, 16 July 2015; Cook, Personal Communication, 21 July
2015).

Benefits of PMSCs
Several Dutch shipping companies believe that applying self-protection measures and
compliance with the BMP4 alone will not deter the pirates enough. However, they
believe that the presence of armed guards onboard would deter the pirates; the
demonstration of guns alone is believed to work de-escalating and make the pirates turn
around. Moreover, they believe that only weapons are capable of countering the heavy
weapons, such as RPGs, that are being used by the pirates. In other words, proponents of
armed PMSCs state that only weapons are capable of keeping pirates from attacking a
vessel, while all other self-protection measures are only capable of complicating or
delaying attacks instead of preventing them (AIV, 2010). Whether this is true or not,
many respondents state there has never been a reported ship with armed guards that
was successfully hijacked (Dorsman, Personal Communication, 1 May 2015; Vlasova,
Personal Communication, 28 May 2015; Vlasova, Personal Communication, 28 May
2015; Maltha, Personal Communication, 7 October 2015). Indeed, one respondent even
stated that armed guards have a 100% record of success (Cook, Personal
Communication, 16 July 2015). Finally it is worth noting that one responding shipping
company was positive when asked about their experiences while one responding PMSC
stated that their customers are generally positive about their services.
Moreover, PMSCs are considered to be exceptionally flexible in several ways.
First, they can go to the vessel and therefore won’t have to be picked up in port, which
save an additional port call (Dorsman, Personal Communication, 1 May 2015). Secondly,
in contrast to military soldiers, private guards don’t need any diplomatic clearance to
enter a country or fly over it (Cook, Personal Communication, 16 July 2015). This also
enables the shipping company to change destinations while guards are onboard
75

Wouter Klijnsoon
(Dorsman, Personal Communication, 1 May 2015). Thirdly, since private guards only
work in teams that consist of a maximum of four persons, it is usually not necessary to
create additional accommodations but simply use the accommodations that are
available (Cook, Personal Communication, 16 July 2015).
In addition to keeping pirates off a ship, PMSCs might offer the crew a secure
state of mind. So if something might happen, they are there to protect the crew. Indeed,
according to one respondent, the crew is already used to a certain measure of safety,
which makes it hard to imagine sailing without PMSCs onboard (Vlasova, Personal
Finally, one respondent pointed at a final advantage of allowing PMSCs onboard
of Dutch vessels. Each European country allows PMSCs onboard of their vessels, which
implies that virtually all ships sailing through the HRA use private armed guards, except
for the Netherlands (Maltha, Personal Communication, 7 October 2015). However, there
are reasons to believe that Somali pirates know which vessels carry armed guards and
which aren’t. Therefore, if Dutch shipping companies obey the law and therefore sail
without PMSCs, it can be expected that the pirates specifically start targeting Dutch
vessels because they are perceived as easy targets.

Disadvantages of PMSCs
The first disadvantage that needs to be noted about the utilization of PMSCs in the fight
against CSM piracy is the unfortunate fact that many unreported mistakes are being
made by these private guards, with innocent casualties as a result. As one respondent
put it: ‘’these guys with guns are not always properly trained and some of them shoot at
everything that moves. Djibouti alone had more than 300 PMSCs operating in the region.
Many of them don’t have a clue what there are doing’’ (Hijmans, Personal
Communication, 18 June 2015). This lack of knowledge about pirates is also shown by
the following example. Many Yemeni fishermen are active in the Strait of Bab el Mandeb
by fishing in the churned-up waters that merchant ships produce. If guards are not
aware of this method, they only see some skiffs approaching their vessel, which makes
them think they are pirates. Subsequently, the guards shoot at the skiffs and kill
innocent fishermen because they have been mistaken for pirates (Hijmans, Personal
Communication, 18 June 2015). Moreover, many ships have been found covered in
blood and wrecked with bullet holes, without signs of weapons or hijacking tools
(Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 27 May 2015; Hijmans, Personal
Communication, 18 June 2015). Indeed, there is reason to believe that many private
guards shoot at skiffs, sink them and leave. Officially they have the task of taking these
alleged pirates onboard, but apparently this does not always happen. However, due to a
lack of official reporting systems like the military has, it is often impossible to track
down what happened and who were responsible (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal
Which leads to the second disadvantage of PMSCs as an anti-piracy measure,
which is a lack of consistent international legislation. Even though many countries
developed their own accreditation and the ISO developed a standard, this does not
necessarily imply sufficient international governmental supervision and enforcement if
things go wrong. In contrast to the military, which have a protocol about reporting and
subsequent research if appropriate, these measures are not always in place in the case
of PMSCs. One respondent compared this self-regulation of the PMSC-industry with a
butcher approving of his own meat, while PMSC-legislation is about a ‘’license to kill’’
(Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 7 August 2015).
The priorities of a PMSC point at a third disadvantage, since the first and
foremost priority of a private security company is to earn money. That is why they exist
as a company. This is in sharp contrast to marines, who have only one priority, which is
protecting the crew. One respondent shared this concern: “no matter how well you are
76

Wouter Klijnsoon
certified, there is always some interdependence with earning money that I put into
question’’ (Hijmans, Personal Communication, 18 June 2015). In addition, since PMSCs
work on the basis of profits, it is not unthinkable that they would shift their focus on
those areas that offer the highest profits. This implies that the first ones to go would be
the highest quality PMSCs, and after the competition keeps increasing there will be more
and more companies available with less quality (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal
This touches another disadvantage the PMSC industry has witnessed in recent
years, which is the race to the bottom in pricing. This has left some ship owners and
charters spending money on ineffective or even unsafe armed solutions because they
charged the least (‘’Dryad Maritime’’, 2015). In other word, the price of armed provision
has been driven down to the extent that in many cases very inexperienced teams of men
with varying degrees of competency, while many of the experienced guys who
understood the need for self-protection measures in a multi-layered approach have left
the industry (Rider, 2015). Indeed, the experienced guys will take a job that still pays
well (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 7 August 2015). This leaves
behind the trigger-happy cowboys and the cheapest soldiers from for example
Bangladesh or Nigeria (Hijmans, Personal Communication, 18 June 2015; Westerbeek
van Eerten, Personal Communication, 7 August 2015). These ‘’Cowboy companies’’ are
known to lack in quality, discipline and experience (AIV, 2010). A respondent stated:
‘’some shipping companies purely focus on the price, and when you only focus on the price
you get what you pay for’’ (Cook, Personal Communication, 16 July 2015). Brooks
(‘’Dryad Maritime’’, 2015) compared this to buying a cheap parachute by saying ‘’either
do it properly or don’t waste your money’’.
A fifth disadvantage of armed guards is its illegality in several countries, such as
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Nigeria and several Southeast-Asian countries. This
illegality can have severe consequences. Dutch vessels carrying weapons violate the
Arms and Ammunition Act (Wet Wapens en Munitie), which is known to happen on a
regular basis (AIV, 2010; Dorsman, Personal Communication, 1 May 2015; Hijmans,
Personal Communication, 18 June 2015). The first implication is that if something goes
wrong, this will not be reported and it will be unknown what happened or who is
responsible (AIV, 2010). The second implication is that, if Dutch shipping companies
decide to illegally hire PMSCs for whatever the reason, the only companies that are
willing to offer their services are the ‘’cowboy companies’’. The qualified accredited
companies with ISO standards are too afraid to lose their license if they illegally offer
their services, which implicates that only the bad companies are the ones available.
Finally, opponents of PMSCs state that armed PMSCs increase the risk of armed
confrontations, an escalation of violence and a civil arms race at sea (AIV, 2010). As was
discussed in Chapter 3, the business model of Somali pirates used to be responsible for
relatively few lethal casualties. However, one respondent pointed at the fact that the
amount of deaths has been increasing due to the escalation of violence and gunfights. In
addition, many weapons are thrown overboard because several ports don’t allow the
possession of arms, which in turn influences the black market of weaponry (Westerbeek
van Eerten, Personal Communication, 27 May 2015; 7 August 2015).

5.2.3b Vessel Protection Detachment (VPD)

Many believe that the government has the constitutional duty to provide its vessels a
sufficient degree of protection against piracy. As mentioned in section 5.2.2c on the
MNTF, many navies aid in this protection by carrying out patrols and escorts. In
addition, some navies occasionally provide military teams onboard of highly vulnerable
ships (Adviescommissie gewapende particuliere beveiliging tegen piraterij, 2011).
Vessel Protection Detachments (VPD) are teams of soldiers that travel aboard merchant
77

Wouter Klijnsoon
vessels while they transit the HRA (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2015). However, the only
ships that qualify for VPDs are those special cases that MSSCHOA has determined as
insufficiently protected by preventive protection measures and are not capable of taking
part of a group transit, even though the BMP4 has been properly applied (AIV, 2010).
Each VPD request and its corresponding risk analysis will be individually reviewed
(Dorsman, Personal Communication, 1 May 2015).
In their way of keeping potential offenders from approaching a vessel, by
showing or firing weapons the VPDs supposedly offer the same deterring protection as
PMSCs offer. Indeed, the VPDs Rules of Engagement are also based on self-protection,
whereas the use of force will be applied in a proportional and subsidiary manner
(Ministerie van Defensie, 2011). Current VPD team compositions vary from six to twelve
persons, while the Dutch Royal Navy usually deploys VPD teams of eleven soldiers (Van
de Kerckhove, Personal Communication, 23 June 2015; Cook, Personal Communication,
16 July 2015). Moreover, racks are built because VPDs need to have three to four
onboard positions to allow crossfire. These racks are also used to put artillery on and to
use as a shelter if necessary (Anonymous respondent, Personal Communication, 26 June
2015).
It needs to be noted that VPDs are not commonly used, mainly due to significant
disadvantages that will be elaborated below and the high total costs when compared to
PMSCs (Cook, Personal Communication, 21 July 2015). In addition, there is reason to
believe that those shipping companies that want armed guards onboard their vessels
almost always make use of PMSCs, whereas VPDs are a clear exception. In 2011, the
Dutch navy supplied a total of 12 VPD transits, which rose to 32 VPD transits in 2012. In
2014, the Royal Dutch navy deployed its 100th VPD onboard a merchant vessel (‘’100e
beveiligingsteam’’, 2014).
A ship owner is required to contribute €5,000 per day for VPD deployment,
which is estimated to be half of the total costs. This means the government covers an
additional €5,000 per day (Dorsman, Personal Communication, 1 May 2015; Oceans
Beyond Piracy, 2015). VPDs have an average three week deployment (Van Ginkel et al.,
2013), which means the costs for an eleven-men VPD are €105,000 for both the ship
owner and the government, bringing the total cost for a VPD transit at €210,000.
Before zooming in on the benefits that come with the usage of VPDs, it needs to
be noted that the BMP4 states that subject to risk analysis, careful planning and
agreements, the provision of military VPDs deployed to protect vulnerable shipping is
the recommended option when considering armed guards (IMO, 2011). This principle is
underlined by several respondents, stating: ‘’VPDs, unless’’, showing a clear preference
for VPDs if feasible enough (Dorsman, Personal Communication, 1 May 2015; Maltha,
Personal Communication, 7 October 2015).
The first and foremost benefit of having a VPD onboard a vessel is its deterring
effect on potential offenders and the assumed capability of keeping potential intruders
on a distance of at least 400 to 500 meters (Van de Kerckhove, Personal Communication,
23 June 2015). Secondly, VPDs boast a ‘’100% success rate’’ (Oceans Beyond Piracy,
2015), which is confirmed one respondent who stated: ‘’there has never been a vessel
hijacked that was escorted by a VPD because the pirates leave immediately when they see
the soldiers’’ (Hijmans, Personal Communication, 18 June 2015). Thirdly, a specific
benefit of deploying VPDs is that the government retains the monopoly on the use of
force, instead of sharing it with the private sector. One responding shipping company
confirms this by stating: ‘’I’m not saying PMSCs are worse than VPDs, but if something bad
does happen, legally you’re better off with a VPD’’ (Van de Kerckhove, Personal
Communication, 23 June 2015). Another respondent adds to this by saying: ‘’accidents
happen, but VPDs are supported by the diplomatic channels of the government’’
(Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 7 August 2015). Fourthly, in contrast
to the private sector, VPDs are allowed to utilize automatic weapons of war. VPDs carry
78

Wouter Klijnsoon
heavy arms that are specifically designed for various ranges. Finally it has to be noted
that, contrary to some believes (Dorsman, Personal Communication, 1 May 2015), one
responding shipping company reported to experience sufficient availability and delivery
of VPDs by the Dutch Royal Navy (Van de Kerckhove, Personal Communication, 23 June
2015).
The first disadvantage of VPDs is its lack of operational flexibility. The merchant
navy is not scheduled three months in advance, but shipping companies hunt down
cargo and contracts. This means it is not uncommon to schedule transits two days in
advance (Dorsman, Personal Communication, 1 May 2015). However, soldiers and
military equipment need diplomatic clearance for every country they pass when flying
to the start of the transit, which takes at least six weeks to arrange (Dorsman, Personal
Communication, 1 May 2015; Cook, Personal Communication, 16 July 2015). Therefore,
the tight schedule of the diplomatic clearances of VPDs sometimes clashes with dynamic
shipping. That is why the Royal Association of Netherlands Shipowners (KVNR) is
convinced that VPDs cannot work in all cases, with which the Dutch Cabinet agrees
(Dorsman, Personal Communication, 1 May 2015; Maltha, Personal Communication, 7
October 2015). A second disadvantage of VPDs is the fact that not every nation has
sufficient capacity to offer its merchant navy VPDs, which is clearly shown by the fact
that none of the open registries have oceanic navies, which is 80% of all flag states
(Cook, Personal Communication, 21 July 2015). However, one respondent noted that for
example the Netherlands has a oceanic navy while it is a small flag state, which means
they are in a position to provide a relative large number of VPDs to their merchant fleet
(Sami 1 Ref.4). A third commonly noted disadvantage is the VPD team size, which is
reported to be too large to accommodate. While a four-men PMSC team is based on the
commercial imperative, the likelihood is that a VPD team is bigger due to more
redundancy and the requirement for a surgical team (Cook, Personal Communication,
16 July 2015). However, each ship is licensed, inspected and classified to carry a certain
number of people, which is usually somewhere between 16 and 20 people. Therefore, if
an additional six to twelve persons are put onboard, there would not be enough
accommodation and lifeboats, which means that the ship has to be re-inspected and
reclassified (Cook, Personal Communication, 16 July 2015).

5.2.4 Concluding notes on measures that increase the risks

As mentioned before, the goal of measures that increase the risk is deterring the pirates
by increasing the perceived risks so that it is not worth the perceived profit. However,
the opportunity-reducing techniques that are designed to increase the risks for the
potential offenders are somewhat more diverse than those that increase the effort.
However, what these measure have in common is that they generally require
more human involvement than technoprevention. In addition, some of these measures,
such as local law enforcement, the MNTF and VPDs, are out of the merchant fleet’s
control. This shows that governments often bear the costs of increasing the risk, instead
of the merchant navy. Furthermore, it seems that within the category of Strengthen
formal surveillance, both PMSCs and VPDs offer the same deterring effect. However, in
contrast to the (sometimes regulated) PMSC market, the utilization of VPDs guarantees
proper governmental involvement with diplomatic capabilities. Finally, it needs to be
noted that the anti-piracy measures that increase the risks could change in the near
future due to the uncertain future of the MNTF, the rise of local law enforcement and the
uncertain legal position of PMSCs,

79

Wouter Klijnsoon
5.3 Reduce the rewards

The rational choice theory implies that offenders commit crime in an attempt to get an
anticipated reward or profit. Therefore, an important part of situation crime prevention
is the understanding of the benefits that are trying to accomplished by the crime and
question, and more important, find a way to reduce or remove those benefits. As such,
removing the rewards that are associated with piracy by eliminating the perceived
benefit may reduce successful attacks, because if the object of the pirate’s desire is
unavailable, then there is little incentive to continue with the crime (Shane & Magnuson,
2014). Moreover, as was shown in chapter 3, it is often the ship’s crew that is the object
of the attack, and not the ship or the cargo it is carrying, since holding the crew hostage
can yield substantial ransom. Reducing or removing the opportunities for the pirates to
get to the crew could make it impossible to carry out CSM piracy.

5.3.1 Conceal targets

Research has shown that car thefts decline when the cars are put in a garage or on a
driveway, instead of simply parking them on the street (Clarke & Mayhew, 1998).
Similarly, many households try to prevent burglary by concealing their valuables
(Clarke & Eck, 2005). Moreover, there is reason to believe that removing a domestic
violence victim to a safe house to avoid an attack is akin to denying pirates the benefit of
kidnapping the crew (Storey, Kropp, Hart, Belfrage & Strand, 2014). If the crew is
mustered to a safe room or so-called ‘citadel’, which will be discussed in the following
section 5.3.1a, then the very object of the crime is removed from harm and may
encourage pirates to abort their attack.

Table 5.8 Conceal targets as anti-piracy measures and the accompanied costs, pros and cons.

Citadel A designated pre-planned area - Unknown - Conceals the target, and - Citadels are only
purpose built into the ship where, therefore reduces the effective if all
in the event of imminent pirate’s chance on the crewmembers are
boarding by pirates, all anticipated rewards. safely inside.
crewmembers will seek - Crew’s successful - Citadels should only be
protection. A citadel is designed citadel entry increases entered with navy
and constructed to resist a the pirate’s risks for a presence in the area
determined pirate trying to gain navy response, and that allows for a rescue
entry for a fixed period of time to therefore need to act response.
allow for a navy rescue response. quickly or leave. - Poorly constructed
With a navy presence in the area, citadels are ineffective
these systems are likely to be and work
effective in keeping the pirates counterproductive.
from reaching the crews. - Citadels protect the
crew, but pirates are
still allowed access to
cargo and
accommodation.

5.3.1a Citadel

A citadel as defined in the BMP4 is ‘’a designated pre-planned area purpose built into
the ship where, in the event of imminent boarding by pirates, all crew will seek
protection. A citadel is designed and constructed to resist a determined pirate trying to
gain entry for a fixed period of time.’’ Citadels are purpose-built emergency strongrooms
where crews can await rescue if pirates succeed in boarding the vessel. If the crew is
capable of cutting off the power while they are concealed away inside a citadel where
80

Wouter Klijnsoon
the pirates cannot reach them, the ship is lying dead in the water. What this means is
that the military response team is more able to act while they know that the crew is safe
inside the citadel, making everybody else is a potential pirate.
However, before elaborating on the citadel as an anti-piracy measure, it is
important to note that, although the citadel may be considered a final safe haven, the
citadel rationale should be part of a layered level of security where approaches to the
citadel are effectively protected by other anti-piracy measures as discussed in this
chapter (‘’Guidance relating to’’, 2011). Moreover, there is reason to believe that
shipping companies work with different levels of security when implementing a citadel.
For example, if there are four levels of security, with each zone of the ship ranging from
level 1 (no security) to level 4 (high security), this would help creating an overview of
the different levels of security around the ship. In addition, this will help clarify where to
put the effort of securing the ship further if necessary.
If after a risk assessment the ship owner decides that a citadel is required, it is
recommended to give consideration to five aspects of the citadel (‘’Guidance relating to’’,
2011). First, the ship owners should think carefully about the citadel location, which
should be difficult for pirates to locate. One responding shipyard reported that they
designed a citadel that was sufficiently hidden away and not recognizable as being a
citadel (Zaat et al., Personal Communication, 8 May 2015). In addition, it is
recommended that the compartment should be able to be fully secured from all
entrances, including hatches and vents. Finally, the location of the compartments must
allow for the ability to deny the pirates access to the vessel’s propulsion so that the ship
cannot go anywhere.
Second, considerations should be given to the survivability time frame.
Hardening and securing accesses to the citadel is an important delaying tactic and gives
an increased time of survivability. In addition, it provides additional time for the crew to
safely reach the citadel in case of an emergency. Moreover, stronger security of the
doors outside the citadel itself potentially means the longer the pirates will take in
breaching them, and thus increasing the possibility that they may give up the attempt to
hijack the vessel.
Third, there are several factors to consider for the construction of the citadel. It
has to be ensured that all access to the citadel is secured against a physical attack, which
implies securing all six sides of the compartment by installing fire retarding and ballistic
resistant measures, as described in section 5.1.1b. As mentioned before, the protection
should be able to withstand AK47s. In addition, pirates have been known in the past to
try and smoke out the crew. Therefore ventilation with a separate power supply and a
concealed outlet should be considered.
Fourth, considerations should be given to the equipment for use within a citadel.
The provision of communications is essential to the citadel, because without guaranteed
communications there can be no consideration of military intervention. Indeed, naval
forces will only board a vessel to release those inside a citadel after confirming that
every crew member is secured inside the citadel by using a self contained, independent
2-way external communication system (IMO, 2011). Sole reliance on VHF is not
sufficient since there is reason to believe that the pirates often jam channel 16. In
addition, the antenna has to be installed in a covert way. Furthermore it is
recommended that the citadel contains long life food and water to last up to al least
three to give days (‘’Guidance relating to’’, 2011; Zaat et al., Personal Communication, 8
May 2015). Finally, a portable chemical toilet may be installed.
However, since these four recommended considerations are general guidelines,
and because every ship is different, the implementation of a sufficient citadel varies
from ship to ship. For example, one respondent noted that during his time as an
engineer at South Korean shipping company Hanjin Shipping, the containerships carried
a portable citadel that was designed as a common container (Kim, Personal
81

Wouter Klijnsoon
Communication, 31 July 2015). However, one respondent noted that far from every
vessel that transits the HRA contains a proper citadel (Vlasova, Personal
Unfortunately citadel usage is not well publicized. This shortage of information
is probably because shipping companies are trying to make sure that their secret
citadels remain secretive in order to prevent potential pirates from knowing how to
circumvent the systems. Therefore the costs of the implementation of citadels remain
unknown in this study.
The main benefit of citadels is that they are indeed successful in keeping the
crew safely hidden until the navies arrive to free the ship from any intruder. Citadels
specifically conceal the very object of the crime, and therefore reduce the chances for
the pirates to collect the anticipated reward. Moreover, as discussed in section 5.2.2b on
the MNTF, once the pirates succeed in boarding a vessel they need to be quick in taking
the crew hostage before a helicopter or warship arrives. Therefore, if crews successfully
conceal themselves inside a citadel so that the pirates cannot find them quick enough,
they need to flee. Moreover, chapter 3 showed that a pirate attack can happen in a short
period of time, but one respondent with experience of sailing through the HRA stated
that his crew could be inside the citadel in less than five minutes if necessary (Kim,
Personal Communication, 31 July 2015). In 2010 there have been 26 reported cases
where pirates have actually boarded vessels, but have been unable to take control
because the vessels crew had successfully sought refuge in a pre-planned citadel
(‘’Guidance relating to’’, 2011). Among them were the Dutch marines of the Hr. Ms.
Tromp who successfully freed the German merchant vessel Taipan from Somali pirates
after the crew retreated into the citadel (AIV, 2010).
The first disadvantage of relying on a citadel as a final safe haven is that they will
only be effective if all crew, security teams and personnel onboard embarked for the
passage are secured within the citadel. In other words, the whole concept of a citadel is
lost if any member of the crew is left outside before the citadel is secured because they
could be taken hostage by the pirates, which makes it impossible for the navy to respond
(‘’Guidance relating to’’, 2011; IMO, 2011; Kim, Personal Communication, 31 July 2015).
This brings us to a second possible disadvantage of citadels. One respondent noted that
the crew should only enter a citadel if they are sure there is a navy presence in the area
(Dorsman, Personal Communication, 1 May 2015). Otherwise the crew is simply
trapped, giving the pirates the opportunity to force the crew out of the citadel by using
smoke for example. A third possible disadvantage of citadels is that poorly constructed
safe rooms are easy to breach and therefore ineffective (‘’Guidance relating to’’, 2011).
There is reason to believe that safe rooms are too often called citadels when it really is
not, which could be counterproductive since it helps the pirates in trapping the crew
together in one place (Bockmann, 2012). Similar to other anti-piracy technological
measures, measures that are purpose built into the ship’s design are supposed to be
more effective than retro-designed measures. And finally, one respondent pointed to a
fourth disadvantage of citadels: even though they might succeed in securing the safety of
the crew, which obviously is the first priority, boarded pirates are still allowed access to
the cargo and the accommodation. Therefore, citadels are capable of concealing the
main targets, but they still allow for the pirates to collect a smaller reward (Hijmans,
Personal Communication, 18 June 2015).

5.3.2 Concluding notes on measures that reduce the rewards

As was mentioned before, reducing the perceived rewards is a way of influencing the
cost-benefit analysis of a potential offender. However, it needs to be noted that even
though the only anti-piracy measure that is incorporated in this section is the usage of
citadels in an attempt of concealing the targets, both rerouting (section 5.1.3a) and using
82

Wouter Klijnsoon
remote access to sail unmanned ships (section 5.2.1b) also influence the pirate’s chance
of collecting the reward. However, they were put in the other sections because their
capability of reducing the rewards is seen as a secondary goal.

5.4 Conclusion

In an attempt to find the most promising, feasible and economic anti-piracy measures
that can be implemented on vessels transiting the HRA, this study follows the four steps
of the ARM-inspired systematics as they were set out in chapter 2. Moreover, by
systematically studying the possible means of blocking opportunities for CSM piracy,
this chapter provided the third step in this methodology.
This chapter discussed twenty-one anti-piracy measures and how they could be
used to reduce the pirate’s opportunities to commit CSM piracy in the HRA. It has been
shown that there are a wide variety of measures with varying human involvement. For
instance, the measures range from purely technological means, such as propeller
entanglement systems, to means that have some human influence, such as directing
searchlights, to anti-piracy measures that simply consists of humans as the protection
measure, as is the case with PMSCs and VPDs. In addition, it has been shown that prices
vary enormously and that every measure, even the most promising ones, contain several
disadvantages.
However, as was briefly mentioned in this chapter’s introduction, not all
categories of the twenty-five opportunity-reducing techniques were covered. There
have been many anti-piracy measures discovered that seem to fit perfectly in the first
three categories of the matrix, while there were no anti-piracy measures found that
fitted the last two categories of ‘Reducing Provocations’ and ‘Removing the Excuses’.
Therefore, the possibility exists that these two categories represent a gap of security
possibilities that the shipping companies have missed. However, this will be further
elaborated in the discussion on future research in chapter 7.
In search of answering this study’s research question, the next step of the ARM-
inspired systematics needs to be taken. This chapter offered a systematic overview of all
possible means that can be utilized when protecting a vessel against CSM piracy.
However, the following chapter will take the next step in an attempt to offer
interpretations of these results that are necessary to draw conclusions about which
opportunity-reducing categories and which anti-piracy measures are promising and
feasible, and which might as well be forgotten.

83

Wouter Klijnsoon
Chapter 6

The most promising, feasible and economic anti-piracy
measures to implement in a layered defense system

In search of the current most promising, feasible and economic anti-piracy measures
that could be implemented on or near a vessel transiting the HRA, this study has taken
several steps. By providing a situational overview of the nature of CSM piracy in chapter
3, the first step was taken. Moreover, this chapter set out how the crime in question is
carried out in order to direct the focus of intervening measures to specific points of the
process of committing the crime. The following chapter 4 built on this information and
focused the attention on the specific situational conditions that permit or facilitate the
crime in question. The subsequent chapter 5 offered a systematic overview of the
possibilities when it comes to measures to reduce the opportunity for pirates to
successfully hijack a vessel in the HRA.
The first three stages have set the stage to take the final step in this research. As
was set out in chapter 2, the fourth stage of the Action Research Methodology consists of
the ‘implementation of the most promising, feasible and economic measures’. However,
due to this study’s focus and its limitations, the actual implementation is beyond this
study’s reach. Which is why it was set out that this study follows the stages in this
study’s ARM-inspired systematics. Moreover, the completion of the first three stages
does allow for a discussion about the value of these measures in terms of how
promising, feasible and economic they are. Therefore, the following chapter combines
the information of the first three stages of the ARM-inspired systematics and in the
fourth stage it discusses recommendations for an actual implementation.
This chapter starts by a discussion of the industry’s perception of prevention
methods against piracy. This will be followed by an explanation about how anti-piracy
measures can be implemented in a layered defense system so that they are used in their
full potency and complement each other. Finally, the chapter will end with a discussion
on what anti-piracy measures that were set out in the previous chapter arrive on top
and meet the requirements for being the most promising, feasible and economic
measures.

6.1 The industry

Interpreting the results of the previous chapter and discussing viable recommendations
about promising anti-piracy measures is impossible without involving the current
situational context of the shipping industry. After all, this is where the measures are to
be implemented. Therefore, the following section attempts to provide an overview of
the current implementation of anti-piracy measures and the considerations, believes
and preferences to do so.
There is a great variation in the implementation of anti-piracy measures among
HRA transits and in the investments that companies are willing to make. Some shipping
companies invest large amounts of money in thorough security, while other companies
do as little as possible. One respondent noted that shipping companies in the
Netherlands and other serious European flag states generally protect their crews
properly against potential threats (Dorsman, Personal Communication, 1 May 2015).
Indeed, the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment state that Dutch
shipping companies in general do their best to protect their vessels. However, it has also
been observed that a minority of these companies fail in taking its responsibilities (AIV,
2010).
84

Wouter Klijnsoon
The price of anti-piracy measures is an important factor when it comes to

choosing measures, if not the most important one (Hijmans, Personal Communication,
18 June 2015). One respondent even stated: ‘’in the end, it is all about costs’’ (Cook,
Personal Communication, 21 July 2015). This is probably influenced by the
competitiveness among companies, which is known to be very important in shipping
(Dorsman, Personal Communication, 1 May 2015). This is clearly stated by another
respondent, who stated: ‘’deciding what measures to take, is simply a sum of the chances
to get hijacked plus the costs. Obviously the crews always come first, until it starts to cost
money. In addition, if the competitor does not think it is necessary to invest in anti-piracy
measures, while you are spending your money, you’re done’’ (Zaat et al., Personal
Another important observation that should be noted is that data in this study
shows that, generally speaking, the shipping industry leans towards the usage of PMSCs
to protect themselves against potential threats. Many in the industry seem convinced
that PMSCs simply offer the best protection available against CSM piracy. Proponents of
PMSCs state that only weapons are capable of deterring pirates, while all other self-
protection measures supposedly only delay or impede attacks (AIV, 2010). Moreover, in
a survey under professionals in the Greek shipping industry, 46% responded that
‘’armed security’’ is an ‘’extremely effective’’ measure against piracy, where another
41% considered it to be ‘’very effective’’ (Bountri & Giziakis, 2013). Furthermore, the
many insurance companies that demand the utilization of PMSCs onboard a ship
transiting the HRA also strengthen this image of PMSC-superiority (Westerbeek van
Eerten, Personal Communication, 27 May 2015). Indeed, one respondent stated that
each argument against PMSCs is countered by people saying ‘’don’t show up with a knife
at a gunfight’’ (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 7 August 2015).
Therefore, an over reliance on armed teams might indicate a tunnel vision that is
promoted by the private industry. Indeed, one respondent held the weapon lobby
responsible for a campaign that only promotes the PMSC market and refuses to look
further (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 27 May 2015). Apparently it
is not uncommon for organizations that specialize in developing technological anti-
piracy measures to be counteracted by the PMSC industry in an attempt of increasing
the acceptability of private armed security, which undermines investments and
developments of anti-piracy measures in terms of technoprevention. To illustrate this,
the developer of the propeller entanglement system ‘’P-trap’’ stated that just before his
company was about to launch their well-tested and promising device onto the market, a
PMSC-provider announced that they had developed a fantastic idea that they were
developing. Subsequently, this PMSC launched some sort of cheap fishing rod that
showed that the system was ineffective, just before the well-tested ‘’P-trap’’ was about
to hit the market. And when it did, the developers of the P-trap were told ‘’yes, but you
are not the first one because such systems already exist, and it does not work’’. Therefore,
the developers already had a bad reputation before their product was launched onto the
market, while the PMSCs could compare their badly developed fishing rod with their
own ‘superior’ services (M. Westerbeek van Eerten, personal communication, 7 August
2015).
Furthermore, the reluctance to embrace technoprevention at the expense of
armed guards is shown by the shipping industry’s prevailing image of technological self-
protection measures. As mentioned before, vessels that transit the HRA are obligated to
implement certain BMP4 measures. Responding shipping companies state that they
indeed implement the rudimentary BMP practices as they are described. However, the
more sophisticated technological anti-piracy measures are used seldom. Some
companies do use them, but not on the scale that it could be (Hijmans, Personal
Communication, 18 June 2015). Three notions need to be pointed out about the
prevailing image of technoprevention against CSM piracy. First, technological solutions
85

Wouter Klijnsoon
are often viewed as very expensive and fragile (Cook, Personal Communication, 16 July
2015; Maltha, Personal Communication, 7 October 2015). However, it has been reported
that many chief Strategy Officers are positive about technological measures.
Nevertheless, ship owners don’t want it to be expensive, which is why management does
not approve of such measures because they do not fit the budget (Cook, Personal
Communication, 16 July 2015). Second, as mentioned before, the shipping industry
believes that technoprevention delays the pirates, instead of countering them. In
addition, many respondents were convinced that the pirates always find a way to bypass
technological self-protection measures, which makes many believe that all these
measures are ineffective in actually preventing CSM piracy attacks. Third, if insurance
companies demand private guards onboard, the prospects for further investments in
self-protection measures decline. Therefore, as one respondent stated, a competitive
and developed market for technological self-protection measures currently does simply
not exist (Westerbeek van Eerten, Personal Communication, 7 August 2015).

6.2 Layered defense system

A layered defense system is a categorization field that consists of layers with
progressively more anti-piracy measures that mutually support each other the closer it
gets to the vessel. In such a system, each layer consists of one or more measures that are
designed to influence a pirate’s cost-benefit analysis from various distances of the ship.
Such a system could start for example with early detection from a great distance and
avoiding procedures, which is followed by different measures the closer the potential
intruder gets to the vessel. Such a system allows for the implementation of anti-piracy
measures that are specifically directed at a particular point of the process of committing
the crime. In addition, it helps creating an overview of the various levels of security
around the vessel. It should be noted that this section could have been included in
chapter 2 on methodology, but because it builds on data from the previous chapters it
has been decided to introduce the defense system in this later chapter.
This research will be operating with five different layers of security against CSM
piracy, which are shown in Table 6.1. The layers range from layer 1 (general anti-piracy
interventions) to layer 5 (obstruction onboard). Each level corresponds with one or two
opportunity-reducing techniques that are provided by the Situational Crime Prevention
theory. Moreover, since all layers mutually support each other, they are equally
important in a security system. Therefore it should be noted that each layer should
contain at least one anti-piracy measure.
Layer 1 consists of general and continual anti-piracy interventions that are
implemented in the area, regardless of any influence of individual shipping companies.
This layer should be fulfilled by measures from the opportunity-reducing technique of
‘utilizing place managers’. Since place managers are the ones responsible for controlling
the area where the crime occurs, those individuals or groups of individuals are in the
position of offering a continual protection against piracy (Eck & Weisburd, 1995).
Initially there are is nobody responsible for safeguarding international water, but if
necessary it should be a governmental responsibility with the necessary diplomatic
opportunities. Therefore, this is a layer that is independent of the initiatives of the
shipping industry, but equally important as other layers since it adds to the situational
context of the crime problem.
Layer 2 is the first layer that is viewed from the individual vessel that is about to
transit the HRA. This layer focuses on the anticipation on potential threats, and
therefore consists of measures such as anti-piracy preparations, vigilance and early
detection. Anti-piracy measures from the categories of ‘deflect offenders’ and ‘extend
guardianship’ should fill this layer, because in an early stage, where there is no specific
86

Wouter Klijnsoon
imminent pirate threat, these opportunity-reducing techniques focus on making the

vessel a less suitable target to attack.
Layer 3 focuses on potential offenders that have been detected and are
approaching the vessel, in spite of the measures of the first two layers. This layer
attempts to further influence the cost-benefit analysis of the potential offender by
increasing the efforts and risks that are perceived to be necessary if the potential
offender wants to reach the targeted vessel. The anti-piracy measures that fall within
the categories of ‘target hardening’ and ‘strengthen formal surveillance’ offer the
greatest potential of discouraging the approach of potential offenders because these
techniques offer a readiness and a physical resilience to potential threats.
Layer 4 is the immediate area around the vessel that specifically aims at
impeding the potential intruders from boarding the vessel. If the potential offenders
resisted layer 4 and succeeded in reaching the vessel up to a critical distance, different
anti-piracy measures from the same categories of ‘target hardening’ and ‘strengthen
formal surveillance’ should be implemented. Therefore, similar to the previous layer,
these opportunity-reducing techniques should be the categories that are best capable of
showing passive and active resilience.
Layer 5 is the final layer that is activated if the pirates break through all the
previous layers and have succeeded in boarding the vessel. Due to imminent dangers,
this critical phase should be solely focused on keeping the pirates away from all
crewmembers. Moreover, the attackers may seek to compensate for the time pressure
and the anger and frustration that have been caused by the anti-piracy measures.
Moreover, they could escalate their threats or the violence they employ. Therefore,
passive anti-piracy measures without human involvement offer the best chances at
keeping the pirates from reaching or injuring the crew. This makes that layer 5 should
consist of measures taken from the categories of ‘control access to facilities’ and ‘conceal
targets’.

Table 6.1 The five defense layers that are utilized with their
corresponding opportunity-reducing techniques
Function Corresponding opportunity-
reducing technique
Layer 1 General anti-piracy interventions Utilize place managers
Layer 2 Anticipation Deflect offenders
Extend guardianship
Layer 3 Discouragement in approach Target hardening
Strengthen formal surveillance
Layer 4 Anti-boarding Target hardening
Strengthen formal surveillance
Layer 5 Obstruction onboard Control access to facilities
Conceal targets

6.3 The most promising, feasible and economic anti-piracy measures

The following section offers interpretations of the results that were set out in the
previous chapter. In turn, these results will be tested against the pirate’s modus
operandi and opportunities, security gaps on ships and the believes and willingness of
the shipping industry. However, as mentioned before, because the first layer is
independent of the influence of the shipping industry, the contribution to ship security
of this layer will not be discussed in the following section.
Moreover, following this study’s research question and due to the special place
that armed guardianship takes in the prevention against CSM piracy, the following
87

Wouter Klijnsoon
section contains separate discussions on measures that can be categorized as

technoprevention and as the utilization of armed guards. However, as mentioned before,
the expected benefits of armed guards will only be applied on the third and fourth layer,
which will be discussed together.
Again, these measures will be valued in terms of their contribution to the
specific defense layer that corresponds with the overarching opportunity-reducing
technique as described in section 6.1. Finally it is important to note that these measures
will be discussed in light of the average vessel transiting the HRA, even though each
situation and risk assessment will be different.

6.3.1 Technoprevention

6.3.1a Layer 2: anticipation through technoprevention

The second layer focuses on making the vessel a less suitable target throughout the
whole HRA by implementing measures that ensure vigilance, awareness and an
anticipation on early detected threats. Chapter 3 showed that the bounded HRA is the
working area of Somali pirates, which is where it is advised to anticipate on potential
threats. Moreover, it was shown that pirates pick their targets based on inside
information about the perceived vulnerability of an approaching vessel. Furthermore,
chapter 4 showed two security gaps in layer 2, which aid in the pirate’s opportunities to
succeed in hijacking a vessel: onboard security protocols are often not practiced or
understood by the crew due to an unwillingness to invest more time into hardening; a
trend toward skeleton crews reduces vigilance and chances on early threat detections.
Measures to counter these problems are searched for in the opportunity-reducing
techniques ‘deflect offenders’ and ‘extend guardianship’, which are shown in tables 5.4
and 5.5.
The first measure that stands out as a promising option within this layer is the
extending guardianship measure increased vigilance (section 5.2.1c). With its four
subsections planning, awareness, training and watch keeping, it is a promising
prevention method because it anticipates on potential threats and it ensures that the
crew is ready to respond. This also enables the vessel to take weather conditions into
account, which was shown to influence the prevalence of incidents. In addition,
increased vigilance supports early detection and lays great emphasis on watch keeping,
which is shown to be of great importance in the second layer. Furthermore, increased
vigilances can be seen as a feasible measure because there are no apparent
disadvantages or costs involved. Therefore, this measure can be viewed as a satisfactory
technique to increase a pirate’s perceived risks in an early stage of a potential attack.
In contrast, even though it is expected that group transits (section 5.2.1a),
another anti-piracy measure that extends guardianship, could offer an increase in a
pirate’s perceived risks, the necessary adjustments to passage plans were one of the
identified drawbacks. This lack of flexibility clashes with dynamic shipping schedules,
which was shown to be an important issue, and therefore can be valued as a less feasible
impracticable measure. On top of that, if the presence of the MNTF declines, which was
shown to be a realistic scenario, group transits loses its functionality.
Another method of extending guardianship that came forward in the previous
chapter was remote access (section 5.2.1b). Results show that this technology has a lot of
potential and could develop into a promising anti-piracy method. However, the current
state of technology, in combination with regulations that don’t approve of it, discourages
implementation of remote access against piracy threats. On top of that, it is not
unthinkable that this technology creates opportunities for cybercrime, making things
only worse.
88

Wouter Klijnsoon
Besides increased vigilance, the only other anti-piracy method that does not bear
any known mandatory additional costs is the measure maneuvering (section 5.1.3b).
This makes it an interesting one, because costs highly influence ship owner’s decision.
Moreover, it comes with few insignificant disadvantages when transiting in the HRA.
However, success of maneuvers leans heavily on a proper implementation of increased
vigilance. Nevertheless, if a ship is successful in detecting potential threats within the
HRA in an early stage, timely maneuvers can be seen as a promising addition to this
layer.
The other two measures that deflect offenders are rerouting (section 5.1.3a) and
speeding (section 5.1.3c). Even though results show that both these measures are
promising in terms of increasing the pirate’s efforts, they are less feasible and economic
than maneuvering. However, continual rerouting and speeding ensures a significant
increase in costs, regardless of an imminent threat. However, both increased speed and
rerouting are already available options that can be temporarily incorporated in the
measure maneuvering in case of an imminent, making reactive speeding or rerouting in
the framework of the method maneuvering more cost effective. In addition, both
speeding and rerouting are less feasible because rerouting requires longer traveling
times while increased speed requires ships getting up to 18 knots, which is not always
possible.
In summary, results suggest that the implementation of increased vigilance
combined with the capability of reactive maneuvering offers the most promising
solution to meet the demands and to fill the security gaps of layer 2. Moreover, there is
no reason to believe that this combination is not feasible enough to implement on all
vessels that transit the HRA, at least up to a certain extend. Finally, results suggest that
this combination relies solely on regular man-hours, and therefore do not bear any
additional investments, making them exceptionally cost-effective.

6.3.1b Layer 3: discouragement in approach through technoprevention

The third layer of the defense system specifically focuses on identified potential
offenders and how to discourage and obstruct them from approaching the vessel. It was
discussed in chapter 3 that usually two high-speed vessels approach from an angled
position and sweep in alongside the hull. In addition, once the pirates are spotted, they
are known to try forcing a standstill with the threat of violence that is focused on the
bridge and the accommodation area. Therefore it was recommended by one respondent
to try keeping them at least 400-500 meters away from the vessel, making the chances
to get hit very slim (Van de Kerckhove, Personal Communication, 23 June 2015).
However, chapter 4 showed security gaps due to ship owners that have been largely
unwilling to invest more time and resources into hardening the vessel.
Measures to counter these problems are searched for in the opportunity-
reducing techniques ‘target hardening’ and ‘strengthen formal surveillance’, which are
shown in tables 5.1 and 5.9. However, this section only focuses on technoprevention.
Therefore, the separate discussion on armed guardianship will incorporate ‘strengthen
formal surveillance’ as an anti-piracy measures, whereas this section zooms in on ‘target
hardening’ measures.
The implementation of ballistic protection (section 5.1.1b) could offer a
promising solution to the threat of violence when the pirates try to force a standstill.
Proper ballistic protection was shown to assure safety against AK-47s bullets and RPGs.
Therefore, if implemented on the bridge, it enables the ship to keep a steady course.
However, with a price tag of €1,200 per m2 it is not economically feasible to protect such
an extensive area as the bridge with ballistic protection. Moreover, methods that keep
the pirates at a safe distance should already guarantee that they couldn’t aim straight.
89

Wouter Klijnsoon
One method that is designed at impeding the pirates from a large distance is the
LRAD (section 5.1.1e). Initially the utilization of sounds that can confuse, disorientate
and distress potential intruders seems promising. However, there are too two
significant drawbacks associated with this measure that make it less promising. First, it
was reported that the usage of ear protection, which are not expensive or hard to get,
very easily undermines LRADs. Second, the legality of these systems is unknown, which
is important since they can be lethal. Therefore it is necessary to conclude that LRADs
are not as promising as they initially seem.
In contrast, the results seem to suggest that high-powered searchlights (section
5.1.1h) could be a promising technique to keep pirates from approaching the vessel.
First, because they let the potential offenders know that they have been spotted, they
know they have lost the element of surprise while it also gives them a signal that the
ship is well prepared, which increases the perceived efforts. Second, because these lights
impede sights from a large distance, it becomes much harder to navigate a small skiff to
the vessel while it also makes aiming fire a lot harder. However, it was reported that the
usage of welding goggles could also undermine these lights. Nevertheless, welding
goggles are very darkening, which brings about other problems that still impede
reaching the vessel. Furthermore, searchlights for both sides of the vessel makes that it
can be directed at two vessels that approach from different angles, which adds in the
feasibility. Finally, when valuing the economic feasibility of high-powered searchlights it
seems that €50,000 for systems on both sides of the vessel is a large investment. It
remains uncertain if ship owners are willing to make this investment.
In summary, results suggest that high-powered searchlights offer the most
promising target hardening measure in terms of discouraging pirates to approach the
vessel closer than 400-500 meters. These systems are expected to successfully increase
the perceived effort, even when welding goggles are used. However, it is important to
note that it remains uncertain if ship owners are willing to make the reasonably high
investment that is required. Further options to strengthen this layer will be discussed in
section 6.3.2 on armed guardianship.

6.3.1c Layer 4: anti-boarding through technoprevention

The fourth defense layer focuses on the most essential element in a pirate attack, which
is the process of boarding the vessel without consent. Chapter 3 provided an overview
of the boarding procedure. This basically comes down to putting the skiff alongside the
vessel to subsequently try to climb onboard with the help of ladders or hooks with
climbing ropes. Therefore, layer 4 should focus on measures that obstructing the
climbing procedure. Furthermore, if the pirates cannot get on board the vessel, they
cannot hijack it. Indeed, the supposed importance of this layer might implicate that if
ship owners are about to invest more time and resources in anti-piracy methods, they
should focus their main attention on this one. Measures to increase the effort to climb
onboard are searched for in the opportunity-reducing techniques ‘target hardening’ and
‘strengthen formal surveillance’, which are shown in tables 5.1 and 5.9. However, similar
to the previous discussion on technological measures for layer 3, this section also only
focuses on technoprevention to keep the pirates from intruding.
Anti-boarding measures were shown to take place both on the vessel and
outside the vessel. All anti-boarding measures that take place on the vessel are physical
barriers along the side and railing of the vessel. However, it first needs to be
acknowledged that the height of the ship’s freeboard (section 5.1.1d) was shown to
influence a pirate’s chances on success, but was also shown to be no viable retrofit
option. Furthermore, even though it seems an obvious and simple solution, a large
freeboard alone may not be enough to deter the pirates. Therefore, changes to the
90

Wouter Klijnsoon
freeboard should not be seen as an actual anti-piracy measure, but should be

incorporated when deciding what measures to implement in the different layers.
The results in chapter 5 suggest that out of these anti-boarding barriers, the
measure of anti-climb barriers (section 5.1.1a) is the most promising and feasible one.
This measure takes away the possibility of grappling ladders or hooks on the side of the
ship, making it impossible to enter the targeted vessel the way they usually do.
Specifically the Seabock-variant seems promising in terms of feasibility, because it is
easily folded in or out.
In addition, a certain type of razor wire (section 5.1.1g), the Robust Razor Wire
Barrier, offers the same protection as the anti-climb barriers, with the addition of deadly
razorblades that increase the risks for potential intruders. However, this is at an extra
cost of €65 per meter. In contrast, normal razor wire was reported to be significantly
less effective and is less feasible because it bears dangers for the crew. The same goes
for electric fences (section 5.1.1c), which can be very dangerous for the crew while it also
increases the risk of fire.
However, the cost of both the Seabock and the Robust Razor Wire Barrier as
anti-boarding barriers could make full implementation along the side of the vessel
economically unfeasible on large vessel, whereas the costs could easily rise to more than
€100,000. Therefore, perhaps these types of barriers should be seen as a strengthening
of specific vulnerable areas, as an addition on cheaper outside anti-boarding methods.
The results of chapter 5 provide two options for anti-boarding measures on the
outside of the vessel: propeller entanglement systems (section 5.1.1e) and water canons
(section 5.1.1i). Both systems have the goal of disabling the attacking skiffs, which seems
to happen in a promising manner. However, the propeller entanglement systems seem far
more feasible than water canons, since the possibility of implementing the latter one
depends on the availability of sufficient pump capacity. In contrast, even though the
results are not consistent on this matter, it seems that the propeller entanglement
systems are indeed suitable on any ship. In addition, even though it seems that ship
owners are wary to implement systems such as the discussed P-trap along the side of
their vessel, there are no reports of an actual obstructive operationalization. In addition,
tests suggest that these systems are indeed successful in immobilizing skiffs that
approach the targeted vessel along the side. However, if a vessel does meet the required
pump capacity, water canons might offer a similar anti-boarding technique with a lower
price tag.
In summary, in search of methods that impede the actual climbing of the vessel,
the results suggest two promising barriers: the Seabock, which falls in the category of
anti-climb barriers, and the more expensive Robust Razor Wire Barrier, which falls
within the category of razor wire. It is assumed that both barriers make it impossible for
pirates to climb onboard along the side of a vessel. In addition, both barriers are
sufficiently feasible in terms of operationalization. However, because full
implementation along the side of the vessel requires a large investment, the propeller
entanglement systems might offer a promising solution that reduces the amount of
necessary barriers to only the highly vulnerable places. Even though ship owners
remain wary about the feasibility of this system, there are reasons to believe that it
offers sufficient increased effort to make it extremely hard for the pirates to keep their
skiffs in place while they try to climb aboard. Further options to strengthen this layer
with a more reactive approach will be discussed in section 6.3.2 on armed guardianship.

6.3.1d Layer 5: obstruction onboard through technoprevention

The fifth layer offers the crew a last resort once the pirates have broken through all
previous layers and successfully boarded the vessel. Chapter 3 showed that the pirates
first make their way to the bridge, in an attempt to take control of the ship. In turn, they
91

Wouter Klijnsoon
aim for the accommodations to take any remaining crew hostage. However, measures
that deny the pirates access to the bridge and the accommodations subsequently makes
it impossible for them to take control of the vessel or take the crew hostage. This layer
solely focuses on keeping the pirates away from all crewmembers, which implies that
there should not be any crew involvement needed when activating the passive anti-
piracy measures.
Onboard security to obstruct the pirates from reaching the crew can be done in
different levels of zone-security. The zones on the vessel could range from no zone-
security to high zone-security, creating an overview of the various levels of security
around the ship. In turn, such a zone system ensures safe areas and routes for the crew
in case of an imminent threat. Measures that create zone-security are searched for in the
opportunity-reducing techniques ‘control access to facilities’ and ‘conceal targets’, which
are shown in tables 5.2 and 5.10.
One can assume that the pirates board the vessel in an area without zone-
security and where they have freedom of movement. If all layers are properly
implemented, there will be no crew in this area. However, the zones that leads to the
crews should be unable to enter, which can be done through proper implementation of
control access routes (section 5.1.2a) measures, such as locks and withdrawal-ladders.
These measures can be promising if they are used in such a way that they make sure
that the zone-security of the bridge and accommodations can be valued as relatively
high, and if there is a sufficient amount of security measures that control access routes
between the threat and the crew. Moreover, to make sure that these measures remain
feasible enough in terms of emergency response, it was suggested that they should only
control access on the side of the outer security-zone. The economic feasibility of these
measures remains uncertain, but it can be expected that they meet the demands,
because measures such as doors and ladders are usually already in place and only need
some small adjustments.
The zone with the highest zone-security should specifically focus on concealing
all crewmembers as a definitive last resort. Citadels (section 5.3.1a) are expected to offer
this final protection by reducing the chances on obtaining the perceived rewards. These
special areas are promising in deterring pirates for up to five days, which also allows for
help from the outside. It was shown that the place and the content of these safe rooms
vary by ship, but the implementation seems possible for any ship, which makes it a
feasible measure. However, since citadel usage is publicized very little, the economic
feasibility remains unclear.
In summary, results suggest that the fifth layer can achieve its goal of
obstructing the pirates’ freedom of movement by the implementation of a sufficient
amount of measures that control access routes, which can be extended with a citadel. If
implemented properly, this combination offers a promising deterrent that should stand
strong long enough so that the pirates cannot get to the crew within the short timeframe
they have, and therefore need to abort their attack. Proper implementation of the fifth
layer with these two measures should be feasible in terms of operability on any ship.
However, it remains unclear if it is economically feasible on any ship or for any ship
owner.

6.3.2 Armed guardianship for layer three and four

Again, the third layer of the defense system focuses on identified potential offenders and
how to discourage and obstruct them from approaching the vessel up to 400-500 meters
and to obstruct them from forcing a standstill. In addition, the fourth layer focuses on
impeding the process of boarding the vessel.
Section 6.3.1b and 6.3.1c discussed what technoprevention-measures were the
most promising to discourage potential intruders to approach and board the vessel. The
92

Wouter Klijnsoon
following section elaborates on the measures that are promising in terms of armed
guardianship, which will specifically focus on the strengthening of formal surveillance
through the deployment of VPD-teams (section 5.2.3b) and PMSC-teams (section 5.2.3a),
regardless of technoprevention.
The utilization of armed guards seems a promising discouragement to potential
offenders because a demonstration of weapons alone was reported to have a significant
deterring effect. Both VPDs and PMSCs make us of a graduated deterrent approach with
Rules for the Use of Force that are based on self defense and defense of others.
Therefore, armed guards are also capable of eliminating threats and their equipment
through disabling fire, which obviously increases the risks for the pirates and offers a
significant deterrent. Indeed, the deterrent effect on approaching pirates is even more
promising due to assumption that vessels with either armed guards onboard has never
been successfully hijacked. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that both VPDs and PMSCs
are promising anti-piracy measures to prevent potential threats from approaching and
boarding the vessel.
However, the previous chapter also suggests some differences that could result
in VPDs being more promising than PMSCs. First, VPD-teams consist of more team
members, which undoubtedly influence the deterring effect. Secondly, whereas VPDs
were reported to offer consistent quality due to governmental supervision, it was shown
that the quality of PMSCs could vary enormously, which sometimes makes the
deployment of armed guards an ineffective anti-piracy measure. Indeed, it was even
suggested that low-quality PMSCs could only make things worse due to mistakes and
illegal behavior. Therefore it should be concluded that PMSCs without the proper
accreditations or certifications should never be considered as a viable anti-piracy
measure.
On the other hand, the results suggest that VPDs are significantly less feasible
than PMSCs. First and foremost because not every flag state is capable of offering its
vessels VPDs. However, this issue does not seem to apply for vessels that are sailing
under the Dutch flag. Nevertheless, a second factor that negatively influences the
feasibility of VPDs are the shortcomings in terms of operational flexibility, which seems
to apply for all VPDs due to large teams and the necessary diplomatic clearances. In
contrast, PMSCs seem perfectly feasible on any vessel transiting the HRA. Furthermore,
when comparing the costs, again it seems that the PMSCs are significantly more
economically feasible that the VPDs. Indeed, it appears that an average VPD transit is
about 10 times more expensive than an average PMSC transit.
In conclusion, even though PMSCs are far more feasible and less expensive, while
it was shown that both VPDs and PMSCs offer a similar deterring effect, VPDs should still
be considered as the first choice when deploying an armed team. This is simply because
VPDs are expected to be that much more promising as a reliable and regulated deterrent
against potential threats, which limits the associated risks of armed guardianship when
it is compared to PMSCs. However, if a risk-assessment shows that VPDs are impossible
to deploy due to feasibility shortcomings, and armed guards is still considered as a
necessary measure, PMSCs could be deployed as a second option. However, PMSCs are
only expected to provide an effective deterrent against potential threats when it has
been proven that these private companies meet exceptionally high quality demands.
Therefore, PMSCs without the proper governmental accreditation of a respected flag
state, or at least with an ISO-28007-1 certification, should never be considered by any
ship owner. In this case it is not the certification that offers the deterring effect, but the
fact that the higher quality PMSCs simply offers a more coordinated and trustworthy
service, which is expected to be more effective in deterring potential threats while it also
limits the associated risks of armed guardianship that were discovered in the analysis.

93

Wouter Klijnsoon
6.4 Conclusion

This chapter started off with a discussion on the industry’s perception of prevention
methods, where it was shown that the industry is somewhat reluctant when it comes to
investing time and resources in anti-piracy measures. In addition, the industry tends to
lean towards the usage of armed guards, without much concern about other options that
are available in terms of technoprevention.
With this reality in mind, the chapter proceeded with establishing a layered
defense system with corresponding opportunity-reducing techniques. Subsequently,
these layers were filled by anti-piracy measures that came forward in chapter 5 in terms
of expected deterrence and feasibility. However, a distinction still remains between
guardianship through technoprevention and armed guards. Thereby, the stage has been
set for the final chapter to draw conclusions about what measures are the most
promising and feasible, and should therefore be implemented on vessels that transit the
HRA.

94

Wouter Klijnsoon
Chapter 7

Conclusions and a glimpse of the future

After the first three stages of the ARM-inspired systematics were taken, the previous
chapter has provided the needed conclusions to establish general recommendations
about the implementation of anti-piracy measures. Therefore, the following chapter will
draw final conclusions in an attempt to establish a practical framework for the industry
to strengthen its resilience against CSM piracy, and whether this should be based on
technoprevention, armed guardianship, or perhaps even both. Thereby it will offer an
answer to the main research question. In addition, implications of this study will be set
out, together with research limitations and directions for future research.

7.1 Discussion

Many in the shipping industry believe that the threat of Somali pirates has been solved.
They attribute this supposed success to three specific interventions: the Best
Management Practices, the deployment of private armed guards, and the presence of the
Multinational Naval Taskforce. However, while Somali piracy has fallen in the last two
years, it seems that the threat of Somali pirates is still very real. Indeed, this is shown by
the hijack of the Iranian fishing boat on the 22nd of November 2015, 305 nm off the
coast of Somalia. In addition, recently there have been several sightings of small skiffs
containing men with weapons and ladders in the region (Rider, 2015). Furthermore, an
anonymous senior source within the maritime industry believes Somali maritime piracy
is currently sleeping, but it is here to stay. And once navel forces in these regions
disappear, or prevention measures weaken, it will thrive again (Anonymous respondent,
Personal Communication, 26 June 2015).
These developments are cause for concern, especially since a future MNTF
presence seems very uncertain due to new priorities, which implies that the shipping
industry soon will be on its own again. Therefore, the shipping industry should not
lower its guard, which is why this study supports the importance of using situational
crime prevention measures in order to successfully deter pirate attacks (e.g. Bryant et
al., 2013). However, there is surprisingly little research on how this should be done, and
whether this should be done by means of technoprevention or armed guardianship.
It seems that there is an over reliance on armed guards, while the industry
seems reluctant to embrace methods of technoprevention that exceed the basic
mandatory measures that are set out in the BMP4. However, due to several significant
problems with these guards, the utilization of arms by private guards remains an overall
controversial phenomenon. Moreover, even though most European countries allows its
vessel to hire private guards, the Netherlands remains cautious and until today refuses
to allow armed private guards.
Due to these two observations, the research question that has been maintained
within this study was as followed:

armed guardianship that can be included in a ship’s layered defense system in order to give
contemporary Somali Maritime Piracy less opportunities to carry out its activities in the
High Risk Area?

This study suggested that by applying a combination of Situational Crime
Prevention techniques, vessels could reduce the chance of a successful piracy attack,
particularly when assistance is not immediately available. This finding is consistent with
95

Wouter Klijnsoon
previous research (e.g. Bryant et al., 2013; Shane & Magnuson, 2014). By examining the
modus operandi of Somali pirates, this study demonstrated that ship security could be
divided in five defense layers, ranging from general anti-piracy interventions in the
region to specific anti-piracy measures on an individual vessel. Thus, results suggest
that all these layers could successfully be filled by different SCP techniques.
However, when it comes to the shipping industry, the only means of countering
piracy that they can offer is in the security on or near the vessel, so increasing the
guardianship of the target. Influencing the criminal opportunity through handlers or
place managers should be a governmental task. Thus, tackling the root causes in Somalia
is therefore out of the shipping industry’s reach. Therefore, ship owners should start the
security against Somali pirates in the second defense layer.
The expected impact of different technoprevention measures on pirates’
opportunities to hijack a vessel was examined per layer. It was shown that the second
layer, which focuses on anticipation, should rely solely on technoprevention. The
measure Increased Vigilance combined with reactive Maneuvering were shown to be the
most promising and feasible anti-piracy measures to implement in the second layer,
which should ensure sufficient anticipation on potential threats. This finding is partly
consistent with previous research, which suggested that watch keeping and early
detection were the most important components to preventing attacks (Bryant et al.,
2013). Furthermore, the ship’s crew should be capable of utilizing these measures,
which makes armed guards in this layer unnecessary.
Furthermore, it was shown that the fifth layer, which focuses on obstruction
onboard to keep the pirates from reaching the crew, should also rely on
technoprevention. More specifically, the most promising and feasible fulfillment of this
layer consisted of measures that control access routes, which should be extended with a
citadel. Due to the possibility of an escalation of violence, armed guards onboard should
not have a role within this layer. However, it is important to note that the supposed
success of citadels was based on the assumption of a present place manager in the area
that can take action to free the crew.
The results suggest that the third and fourth layer, which respectively focuses on
discouragement of approaching threats and the prevention of boarding pirates, could be
successfully secured by both technoprevention methods and armed guardianship. The
utilization of high-powered searchlights to impede approaching threats, combined with a
propeller entanglement system next to the vessel with anti-climb barriers on vulnerable
places was expected to be perfectly capable of elimination the pirates’ opportunities of
hijacking a vessel. However, the same goes for of VPDs or highly certified PMSCs, which
showed that armed guards could also be used to effectively counter pirate attacks. The
finding that technoprevention and armed guards can both aid in mitigating the threat of
Somali pirates is consistent with previous research (Fitzsimmons, 2013; Shane &
Magnuson, 2014).
Be that as it may, if the effectiveness of both approaches would be all the same in
these two layers, technoprevention should prevail. It was shown that there were certain
risks associated with the deployment of armed guards, which could have severe
consequences such as increased violence, threats to the safety of innocent civilians, and
a legal ambiguity. On the other hand, the reality also remains that the shipping industry
still prefers armed guards above technoprevention due to incorrect assumptions about
technoprevention, economic interests and a supposed state of mind, which makes them
reluctant to embrace technoprevention. Notwithstanding the fact that due to this over
reliance, the market for technoprevention cannot compete with armed guardianship,
which impedes its development.
Anyhow, this reality leads to the following final recommendations about the
most promising and feasible measures that should be implemented on vessels in an
attempt to reduce opportunities for successful hijacks in the HRA. With regard to the
96

Wouter Klijnsoon
risks that are associated with armed guards, the first emphasis should be on
technoprevention. Therefore, the minimum technoprevention measures that should be
implemented on vessels transiting the HRA are Increased vigilance, reactive
maneuvering, control access routes, anti-climb barriers and citadels. This combination is
expected to successfully cover the second and fifth defense layer on the basis of
technoprevention, and part of the third layer.
The additional anti-piracy measures that focus on discouragement in approach
and add to anti-boarding procedures should first be tried with the methods high-
powered searchlights and propeller entanglement systems, which assure full
implementation of technoprevention in all layers, without having to rely on armed
guardianship. However, because nowadays these two systems are not always feasible
enough due to high costs, in some cases armed guardianship could provide a
temporarily more promising alternative to discourage approaching threats and prevent
boarding. In this scenario, VPDs should always prevail due to its diplomatic possibilities,
its legality and their trustworthy working method. On the other hand, if in the risk
assessment it turns out that VPDs are unfeasible as well due to operational
shortcomings, the ship owner could consider highly certified PMSCs as a last resort. An
example could be the ISO norm 28007-1, which is valued by the industry as a proper
certification of quality control because it offers a framework for mandatory legal and
operational requirements of the company.
However, with regard to the associated risks of armed guardianship that were
discovered in the analysis, it cannot be stressed enough that solely reliance on
technoprevention seems to offer the most promising long-term prevention against CSM
piracy for vessels sailing the HRA. Indeed, even though in some cases it is not yet
feasible enough to cover all defense layers with technoprevention, a full implementation
in all layers should be the future of CSM piracy protection on and near vessels.
Therefore it is recommended to put more emphasis on investing in and development of
technoprevention measures for the second and third layers, which respectively focus on
discouragement in approach and anti-boarding. In turn, this could result in lower costs,
a better understanding of technoprevention and more confidence in the industry’s self-
protection capabilities, without having to rely on external support with the
corresponding risks and disadvantages. A start could be to focus on and encouragement
of for example the hiring or leasing of technoprevention measures, just like PMSC-teams
are hired, which would lower its short-term costs. Finally, the state of mind and the
feasibility to date should be reviewed each year, just like the mandate of the MNTF is
being reviewed each single year, so that it can be assured that vessels in the HRA are
self-reliant as quickly as possible.

7.2 Implications

The application of possible piracy prevention measures on the SCP framework of the
twenty-five opportunity-reducing techniques demonstrated that a balanced
combination of anti-piracy methods is capable of creating sufficient unfavorable
circumstances that alter the offender’s perception of the associated costs and benefits in
such a way that it discourages them from attacking a vessel in the HRA. In this light it
may be that the most important implication of this study is that willing vessels could be
more than capable of protecting themselves against CSM piracy solely on the basis of
technoprevention.
In addition, this study’s findings also imply that ships do not necessarily need to
rely on external help that provides armed guardianship, which is contrary to general
beliefs. Even though the SCP analysis suggested that armed guardianship could be very
effective in countering CSM piracy, the associated risks of deathly mistakes and
escalations makes armed guardianship a less desirable alternative when compared to
97

Wouter Klijnsoon
non-lethal technoprevention measures. However, the pragmatic nature of the SCP

approach also showed that a full implementation of technoprevention is not yet
(economically) feasible in all circumstances. This is why this study recommended that
the industry could temporarily be able to fall back on armed guardianship if solely
reliance on technoprevention is not completely feasible yet. In the meantime, anti-piracy
technoprevention measures could be developed into more (economically) feasible
methods.
Additionally, this study demonstrated that SCP offers a convenient approach to
break down a highly complex security issue such as CSM piracy into specific parts of the
problem. Indeed, SCP enables the user to develop practical interventions that focus on
specific points of the problem, while keeping the bigger picture in mind. This study
benefited from this opportunity because it aimed specifically at deterring CSM pirates
from the merchant fleet by the implementation of measures on and near a ship by
increasing guardianship. Meanwhile, handlers and place managers could be involved to
help establishing a context while they did not necessarily interfere with narrowing
down the needed interventions that could be initiated by the merchant fleet.
However, this narrow focus on guardianship also offered opportunities for
further applications of SCP in the search for interventions to decrease the threat of CSM
piracy. Whereas this study applied the pragmatic situational approach on guardianship
of the targets, this same framework could potentially offer viable solutions when it is
directed at the two other players in the security issue: handlers and place managers.
This potential of SCP on handler and place manager intervention in the fight against CSM
piracy will be further elaborated in the following section on future research.
The finding that SCP measures are capable of influencing offenders in a positive
way is consistent with previous research on the application of SCP on CSM piracy (e.g.
Bryant et al., 2013; Shane & Magnuson, 2014). However, much of the existing literature
took a quantitative approach on the problem, which enabled these researchers to
incorporate many of the thousands of vessels that transit the HRA each year. Such
research provides a rough idea about the implementation of the most common anti-
piracy measures on a vast number of ships, which in turn could be combined with the
prevalence of CSM piracy activities. For example, with such a quantitative approach it
can be shown which anti-piracy measures supposedly prevented the most reported
attacks and therefore offered the best protection (e.g. Bryant et al., 2013). Such
quantitative research provides practical knowledge regarding the effectiveness of
common protection measures in the past, which is based on data of a vast amount of
vessels that transit the HRA.
In contrast, this study took a qualitative approach on the application of SCP on
CSM piracy, which necessitated a much smaller sample size due to a significant increase
of resources and time consumption that was needed to conduct such an in-depth
qualitative study. However, this also demonstrates the main advantage that sets this
study apart from previous research on CSM piracy. Whereas previous research
incorporated large amounts of data that provided a rough idea about prevention
methods in the past, this study contributes to the literature of CSM piracy prevention
and the shipping industry by offering a more nuanced and specified approach on the
matter. In other words, this study brings valuable in-depth knowledge about anti-piracy
measures to light that cannot be gathered by analyzing chunks of data, such as (1)
incorporating many more anti-piracy measures than just the common ones that are set
out in the BMP4; (2) elaborating on the operation of anti-piracy measures; (3)
discussing the costs of anti-piracy measures and the consequences that these costs can
have in fighting CSM piracy; (4) setting out the considerations of pros and cons that
shipping companies, captains and governments make; (5) examining opportunities for
improvement of anti-piracy measures; (6) and examining anti-piracy systems that might
be promising in the future.
98

Wouter Klijnsoon
In conclusion, this study suggests that the implementation of a balanced

combination of SCP techniques could yield promising opportunities for deterring pirates
from attacking a vessel, especially when naval assistance is not immediately available.
This finding is consistent with previous research on CSM piracy. However, this study
contributes to the existing literature on countering CSM piracy by providing an in-depth
nuanced analysis of the anti-piracy measures that are available.

7.3 Limitations

A number of limitations of this study should be noted. First off, although SCPT has been
successfully applied to a wide variety of crime (e.g. Brantingham & Brantingham, 1975;
Lemieux & Clarke, 2009; Bullock, Clarke, & Tilley, 2010), it has gotten some criticism
over the years, with the most persistent one being displacement of crime (i.e. the
offenders shift their attention to other places, times and targets, use different methods
or commit different crimes) (Clarke, 1997). However, research on displacement of crime
showed that displacement can occur, but it is not inevitable. Hesseling (1994) found no
evidence of displacement in 22 of the 55 SCP studies that were examined. Furthermore,
in the remaining 33 studies there was some evidence of displacement, but in no case
was there as much crime displaced as prevented.
Second, it has been suggested that because SCP is typically viewed strategically,
the measures have a limited shelf life (Ekblom, 1997). In addition, situational measures
do not always work as intended. Offenders may sometimes test the limits of any defense,
merely to identify its vulnerability and return later. Likewise, measures that depend on
employee vigilance may lose their value due to complacency or fatigue (Shane &
Magnuson, 2014). Therefore the challenge remains to keep identify and monitor which
measures work best, in which combination, and under which circumstances, while
guarding against implementation failure (Hope & Murphy, 1983).
Using interviews as a data source brings about a third limitation, because the
respondents may be subject to two biases: omission and commission. Respondents may
have withheld certain information because it was confidential, negative for the
respondent’s (or the company’s) image, or even illegal. Furthermore, respondents may
have extensively emphasized certain facts or statements out of self-interest or a biased
point of view. Especially the utilization of the illegal hiring of private armed guards
remained a sensitive topic within the piracy issue. This is a limitation that needs to be
kept in mind and demands a critical view at the results of interviews on sensitive topics.
Fourth, with a total amount of fourteen interviews with key informants, this
study’s research sample could be considered as relative small when compared to
existing quantitative research, which use significantly larger samples (e.g. Bryant et al.,
2013). However, it was attempted to disperse the amount of interviews in such a way
that each party that was considered to be involved in countering the CSM piracy issue
was consulted. With the exception of local law enforcement, each of these parties was
consulted at least once, which implies that sample saturation was not completely
achieved. Even though the merchant fleet cannot directly influence the prevalence of
CSM piracy through the implementation of local law enforcement, this party does add to
the situation in terms of the presence of place managers. Therefore, the absence of
consulted local law enforcements could have skewed the results about the security
situation in the region due to less data on place managers, but it is not expected to
influence the results on increasing the target’s guardianship through anti-piracy
measures on or near a vessel. Likewise, it should be noted that one interview with both
PMSCs and the navy remains relatively little. Fortunately, this gap in PMSC-related
respondents was complemented with two interviews with a PMSC-interest group.
However, stronger results about VPD deployment perhaps could have been
accomplished if there were more interviews with the navy.
99

Wouter Klijnsoon
Another fifth limitation of this study’s sample is the method of selection. First,
due to convenience sampling there could have been parties that were left out. For
example, individuals that were not willing to share information due to reasons such as
confidentiality could have caused for missing data. Second, snowball sampling can be
seen as a biased selection technique because it is not randomized and it selects
individuals on the basis of social networks (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981; Baxter & Eyles
1997; Faugier & Sargeant, 1997). However, due to the required expertise and the
specialized nature of countering CSM piracy, random sampling was impossible. Indeed,
these methods of selection probably offered the best chances at bringing together a
sample that covered as many of the different parties involved as possible.
A possible sixth limitation follows from the various lengths of the interviews. As
was set out in chapter 2, even though it was attempted to limit the various durations by
letting each respondent know in advance that the interview was expected to take about
one hour, the interviews ranged from twenty minutes to two and a half hours.
Furthermore, the average length per interview was 63 minutes. Nonetheless, even when
respondents simply had less time than other respondents, they were still expected to be
capable of providing valuable information so that it was worth taking a shorter
interview. However, this variation in time could have resulted in skewed results, due to
the fact that some respondents had more time to elaborate on their point of view than
others. This limitation should be kept in mind when examining the results.
A seventh limitation of this study was that the Action Research Methodology
could not be fully implemented due to missing connections of the author and not being
directly concerned with the real-life situation that is being researched. Therefore, the
actual implementation of the recommended anti-piracy measures in the fourth stage
and the monitoring and dissemination of the results in the final fifth stage unfortunately
are absent in this study. However, by following the first four stages of the Action
Research Methodology by the means of an ARM-inspired systematics, this study
conducted the necessary research for future research to implement the
recommendations and monitor the results.

7.4 Directions for future research

Even though many believe that piracy off the coast of Somalia is wiped out by the navies
and armed guards, the potential and capacity for pirate attacks is still widely available in
the region. Indeed, the militaries have stated that the threat remains, as was illustrated
by the recent hijack in November. According to a recent UN report, ‘’increased illegal,
unreported and unregulated fishing by foreign vessels may re-establish the conflict
dynamic with local fishing communities that contributed to the rise of piracy a decade
ago’’ (Mwanza, 2015). As was shown before, the pirates carry out their own risk
assessment where they balance the profit from a successful pirate attack against the
stability of regular employment. Therefore, as long as this cost-benefit balance
continues to tip in favor of piracy, then neither the shipping industry nor the region
itself can be safe from the piracy threat. On top of that is the fact that a declining MNTF
presence in the region is expected to indefinitely influence this balance.
However, given the exploratory nature of this study and its focus on the
situational aspects of anti-piracy measures on and near a transiting vessel, it does not
reach far enough into other aspects of the piracy issue to provide a comprehensive
solution for these root causes. The prevention methods on ships are only capable of
treating the symptoms, instead of providing long-term solutions for the piracy problem
in Somalia. Considering that many assume that CSM piracy is an issue at land that is
manifested at sea, the issue can only ultimately be defeated on land with sustainable
solutions that rely on a stable functioning government with effective governance. Future
research should examine these root causes, which requires research into capacity-
100

Wouter Klijnsoon
building initiatives like the Djibouti Code of Conduct and EUCAP NESTOR, as well as the
involvement of handlers and place managers in tackling CSM piracy on shore. A similar
SCP analysis of handlers and place managers, instead of guardianship as was the case in
this study, could yield valuable knowledge about interventions to mitigate root causes of
CSM piracy in the region and onshore.
Furthermore it was shown in chapter 5 that none of the anti-piracy measures on
or near vessels transiting the HRA fell in any of the last ten opportunity-reducing
techniques of Cornish & Clarke (2003). This could imply that SCP is perhaps not
completely applicable on CSM piracy prevention on or near vessels. Indeed, it is
plausible to think that it is not up to the merchant fleet to attempt to reduce
provocations or remove excuses of CSM pirates. However, future research could attempt
to find viable anti-piracy measures in terms of the last two categories of the twenty-five
opportunity-reducing techniques. Moreover, perhaps the protection of the target
through guardianship cannot make use of measures that reduce provocations or remove
the excuses, whereas measures that influence handlers or place managers could provide
viable solutions. For example, whereas chapter 3 stated that clan members were often
handlers of the pirates, future research could for instance reveal if and how these
handlers could be influenced through measures that reduce frustrations and stress,
neutralize peer pressure, discourage imitation, or alert conscience.
Future research should also aim at conducting further SCP analyses of anti-
piracy measures that could be utilized on or near vessels transiting the HRA by the
utilization of larger samples in terms of the amount of interviews and the amount of
distribution of the different parties that are involved in countering CSM piracy. Such
research could strengthen existing research on anti-piracy measures in terms of
guardianship, while it could also offer new insights when different key informants are
consulted.
There is also a need to examine more closely the maritime insurance companies
and the role they play in the defensive capabilities of vessels transiting the HRA. There is
reason to believe that the ship owners’ decision-making processes about anti-piracy
methods are highly influenced by the requirements of insurance companies, let alone
the fact that many of them seem to demand the deployment of armed guards. Further
research should delve deeper in their involvement and on what data they base their
requirements. This generally assumed confidential information could aid in an
understanding of the prevalence of certain anti-piracy measures and could improve
cooperation between the different players in the security issue.
What is more is that future research should aim at further development of the
anti-piracy measures that were examined in this study. More specifically, if the industry
is to rely solely on technoprevention, these measures need to become significantly
cheaper, which requires extensive developments and the establishment of a competitive
market. Especially the layers that aim at discouraging approaching threats and at
impeding the boarding process need to be improved if they are to replace armed guards.
Likewise, future research should examine new or undeveloped anti-piracy
measures that could offer a promising potential in further strengthening the ship’s
resilience against CSM piracy attacks in the HRA. For example, by following the
approach of CPTED, as was shortly discussed in chapter 2, redesigning the ship’s design
to counter threats could offer much potential, such as pre-installed barriers along the
side or purpose built citadels. In addition, using remote access to control unmanned
ships would simply remove the targets from the HRA. However, this would need to cope
with many other security issues such as cybercrime or system failures, let alone
regulatory shortcomings. However, another promising development that should be
examined is the deployment of unarmed guards, as an alternative to the current PMSC-
market. They could provide experience and ensure the proper implementation of anti-
piracy measures and trainings.
101

Wouter Klijnsoon
Finally, due to a limited reach of this study, full implementation of the Action
Research Methodology was not realistic in terms of implementation in its fourth stage
and monitoring and dissemination in its fifth stage. Therefore it was set out in chapter 2
that this study followed a four-stage systematics that was inspired on the first four
stages of the Action Research Methodology. However, future research should aim at
finishing the Action Research Methodology. People that are directly concerned with the
real-life situation of countering CSM piracy should aim at implementing this study’s
recommended combination of anti-piracy measures and subsequently monitor the
results and disseminate the experience of this implementation. Such research yields
new insights on the impact and feasibility of the recommended combination of anti-
piracy measures, so that the five-step cycle could be repeated until success is achieved.

7.5 Conclusion

By taking a SCP approach on anti-piracy prevention methods, this study contributed the
first criminological toolbox of opportunity-reducing techniques for the piracy problem
off the coast of Somalia. Whereas maritime criminology has mainly focused on the
nature and extent of CSM piracy on macro-level, and little on criminal prevention, this
study took a micro-level approach on the interaction between offender and target in an
attempt of discovering and validating preventative solutions. Furthermore, due to the
controversial usage of armed guards and its legal ambiguity, there was a great emphasis
on a comparison between measures that rely on technoprevention or on armed
guardianship.
Ultimately, after an extensive review of the many anti-piracy measures that were
discovered, the final chapter concluded with general recommendations about the most
promising and feasible combination of measures. Due to associated risks of armed
guardianship, it was extensively emphasized that the shipping industry should rely
solely on technoprevention, which is expected to be more than capable of providing the
necessary security against potential threats. Therefore, it was recommended to adopt
the following anti-piracy measures on vessels transiting the HRA to deny offenders the
opportunities for CSM piracy: Increased Vigilance, reactive Maneuvering, Control Access
Routes, High-Powered Searchlights, Anti-Climb Barriers, Propeller Entanglement Systems
and Citadels.
Be that as it may, due to economical and feasibility shortcomings of several
technological measures, it was also concluded that in some situations it could be
necessary to temporarily recommend a combination of technoprevention and armed
guardianship. In this scenario it would be recommended to exchange the
technoprevention measures High-Powered Searchlights and Propeller Entanglement
Systems with armed guards, preferably VPDs or otherwise highly certified PMSCs.
However, with regard to the associated risks, the inclusion of armed guardianship
should be a short-term solution, whereas the future emphasis should be solely on
technoprevention and its development.
In conclusion, approaching the fight against CSM piracy from a multilayered
method that is suggested by SCP and based on a vessel’s inherent self-protection
measures is likely to offer the greatest potential of taking away the opportunities for
CSM piracy in the HRA.

102

Wouter Klijnsoon
Appendix I: Literature

Abdullahi, N. (2009, April 15). ‘Toxic waste’ behind Somali piracy. Retrieved from
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article22428.htm
Adviescommissie gewapende particuliere beveiliging tegen piraterij (2011).
Geweldsmonopolie en piraterij. The Hague: Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie.
Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken [AIV] (2010). Piraterijbestrijding op zee: een
herijking van publieke en private verantwoordelijkheden, No.72. Retrieved from
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2011/01/18/advies-
piraterij-ter-zee-een-herijking-van-publieke-en-private-verantwoordelijkheden
AFP (2014, October 30). Seven Indian sailors released by Somali pirates. Retrieved from
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Seven-Indian-sailors-released-by-
Somali-pirates/articleshow/44987302.cms
Altrichter, H., & Posch, P. (1989). Does the ‘grounded theory’ approach offer a guiding
paradigm for teacher research? Cambridge Journal of Education, 19: 21-32.
Anderson, D., De Wijk, R., Haines, S., & Stevenson. (2009). Somalia and the Pirates
(Working Paper No. 33). Retrieved from
http://aei.pitt.edu/14447/1/ESF_WP33_ANDERSON_EDIT_Somalia_and_the_Pirate
s_e%2Dversion.pdf
Axe, D. (2009, April 27). 10 Things You Didn’t Know About Somali Pirates. Retrieved from
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124060718735454125
Bailyn, L. (1987). Experiencing Technical Work: A Comparison of Male and Female
Engineers. Human Relations, 40(5): 299-312.
Baldauf, S. (2008, November 20). Who are Somalia’s pirates? Retrieved from
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2008/1120/p25s22-woaf.html
Bartlett, C. (2015, September 4). Piracy embers still aglow in Somalia. Retrieved from
http://puntlandnews24.com/2015/09/04/piracy-embers-still-aglow-in-somalia/
Baxter, J., & Eyles, J. (1997). Evaluating qualitative research in social geography:
Establishing ‘rigour’ in interview analysis. Transactions of the Institute of British
Geographers, 22, 505-525.
Bellamy, L. (2009). What can be done to counter Somali piracy? Researchpaper No. 129.
Athens: Research Institute for European and American Studies.
Benson , M. L., & Madensen, T. D. (2007). ‘Situational Crime Prevention and White-Collar
Crime’. In H. N. Pontel & G. Geis (ed.). The International Handbook of White-Collar
and Corporate Crime, New York City, NY: Springer-Verlag New York Inc.
103

Wouter Klijnsoon
Biernacki, P., & Waldorf, D. (1981). Snowball sampling: Problems and techniques of
chain referral sampling. Sociological Methods and Research, 10, 141-163.
Bockmann, M. W. (2012, April 25). Vale to Redesign Giant Ore Ships to Protect Crews
From Pirates. Retrieved from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-04-
25/vale-to-redesign-giant-ore-ships-to-protect-crews-from-pirates
Boniface, S. (2008, July 12). Heroic Brit Trio Take on Somali Pirates before Escaping into
Sea. Retrieved from http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/heroic-brit-trio-
take-on-somali-364312
Bountri, K., & Giziakis, K. (2013). Modern Maritime Piracy: Countermeasures and
Preventive Actions by the Greek Ocean (/deep sea) Shipping Industry. Journal of
Economics and Business, 6(33-4): xx-xx
Bowden, A. (2010). The economic Cost of Maritime Piracy. One Earth Future. Retrieved
from
http://oneearthfuture.org/image/imagefiles/The%20Economic%20Cost%20of%2
0Piracy%20Full%20Report.pdf.
Brantingham, P., & Brantingham, P. (1975). The spatial patterning of burglary. The
Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, 14, 11-23.
Broder, J. M., & Johnston, D. (2007). U.S. Military to supervise Iraq Security Convoys.
Retrieved from
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/31/washington/31contractor.html?_r=0
Brown, J. (2012). Pirates And Privateers: Managing The Indian Ocean’s Private Security
Boom. Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy.
Bryant, W., Townsley, M., Leclerc, B. (2013). Preventing maritime pirate attacks: a
conjunctive analysis of the effectiveness of ship protection measures recommended
by the international maritime organisation. Journal of transportation security, 7: 69-
82
Bueger, C., & Saran, M. S. (2012, August 18). Finding a Regional Solution to Piracy: Is the
Djibouti Process the Answer? Retrieved from http://piracy-studies.org/finding-a-
regional-solution-to-piracy-is-the-djibouti-process-the-answer/
Bullock, K., Clarke, R. V., & Tilley, N. (201). Situational prevention of organised crimes.
Cullompton: Willan Publishing.
Castiblanca, C., Etter, A., & Aide, M. T. (2013). Oil palm plantations in Colombia: a modol
of future expansion. Environmental Science & Policy, 27: 172-183.
Chalk, P. (1997). Grey-Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia: Piracy, Drug Trafficking and
Political Terrorism. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre.
104

Wouter Klijnsoon
Chalk, P. (2008). The maritime dimension of international security: terrorism, piracy, and
challenges for the United States, vol 697. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp.
Chalk, P. (2009). The evolving dynamic of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the
modern era: scope, dimensions, dangers and policy responses. Marit Aff: J Natl
Marit Found India, 5(1):1-21
Chalk, P. (2010). Piracy Off the Horn of Africa: Scope, Dimensions, Causes and
Responses. Brown Journal of World Affairs, 16: 90-108.
Changes in shipping routes and speed as piracy declines in the Western Indian Ocean
(2015, June 12). Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/news/changes-
shipping-routes-piracy-declines-western-indian-ocean
Childress, S. (2010, September 10). Somali Militants Try Piracy to Fund Attacks.
Retrieved from
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703720004575477491009472
882
Clarke, R. V. (1980). Situational crime prevention: Theory and practice. British
Psychological Society, 30: 280-3
Clarke, R. V. (1995). ‘Situational crime prevention’. In: Tonry M, Farrington DP (eds), vol
19. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 91-150.
Clarke, R. V. (1997). Situational crime prevention: successful case studies. (2nd ed.).
Money, NY: Criminal Justice Press.
Clarke, R. V. (2008). Situational Crime Prevention. In Wortley, R. & Mazerolle, L. (Eds),
Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis (pp. 178-194). Uffculme: Willian
Publishing.
Clarke, R. V., & Cornish, D. B. (1983). Crime and Control in Britain: A Review of Policy
Research. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Clarke, R. V., Eck, J. (2005). Crime analysis for problem solvers: In 60 small steps. U.S.
Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Washington,
DC.
Clarke, R. V., & Mayhew, P. M. (1980) Designing out Crime. London: H.M. Stationery
Office.
Clarke, R. V., & Mayhew, P. M. (1998). ‘’Preventing Crime in Parking Lots: What We
Known and Need To Know.’’ In M. Felson & R. Peiser (ed.), Reducing Crime Through
Real Estate Development and Planning. Washington, D.C.: Urban Land Institute.
Combined Maritime Forces [CMF] Counter-Piracy Briefing (2009). Shared Awareness
and Deconfliction (Shade) Meeting. April 2009.
105

Wouter Klijnsoon
Coffen-Smout, S. (1998). Pirates, Warlords and Rogue Fishing Vessels in Somalia’s Unruly
Seas. Retrieved from http://www.chebucto.ns.ca/~ar120/somalia.html
Cohen, L. E., & Felson, M. (1979). Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine
Activity Approach. American Sociological Review, 44(August): 588-608.
Colijn, K. (2008, November 10). ‘’Escort Service’’. Vrij Nederland.
Cook, P. (2015, October 15). Piracy and the rise of non-state actors. Seminar presented at
the meeting of the Asser Institute, The Hague.
Cornish, D. B. (1994) ‘The Procedural Analysis of Offending, and its Relevance for
Situational Prevention’. In R. V. Clarke (ed.). Crime Prevention Studies, Vol. 3.
Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.
Cornish, D. B., & Clarke, R. V. (2003). Opportunities, precipitators and criminal decisions:
A reply to Wortley’s critique of situational crime prevention. Crime Prevention
Studies, 16: 41-96.
Dahir, M. (2012, May 15). EU forces mount first attack on Somali pirates’ onshore bases.
Retrieved from http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/05/somali-
pirates-lose-speed-boats-and-fuel-in-eu-air-attack.html
Dahlavang, N. (2006). Thieves, robbers & terrorists: Piracy in the 21st century. Regent
Journal of International Law, 4, 17-45.
Decker, S. H. Using Offender Interviews to Inform Police Problem Solving. Problem-
Oriented Guides for Police, Problem Solving Tools Series, No. 3. Washington, DC: US
Department of Justice. Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (accessible at
www.popcenter.org).
Department of Transport (2011). Interim Guidance to UK Flagged Ships on the Use of
Armed Guards to Defend Against the Threat of Piracy in Exceptional Circumstances.
London: United Kingdom Department of Transport.
Ding, A (2010). A Tactical Campaing at the Horn of Africa: Deploy Unmanned Surface
Vehicles for Maritime Security. Defense & Security Analysis, 26(2): 189-211
DNP (2010). Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2010-2014. Retrieved from
http://www.dnp.gov.co/PND/PND20102014.aspx
Dreyfus, S. E. (1981). Formal models vs human situational understanding: intherent
limitations on the modelling of business enterprise, mimeo. Schloss Laxenburg:
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
Dryad Maritime (2015, July 8). Maritime Crime Figures for Q2 2015. Retrieved from
http://www.dryadmaritime.com/maritime-crime-figures-for-q2-2015/
Dryad Maritime: Of PMSCs and cheap parachutes (2015, July 13). Retrieved from
http://splash247.com/dryad-maritime-of-pmscs-and-cheap-parachutes/
106

Wouter Klijnsoon
Dutton, Y. M. (2014). Crime and Punishment: Assessing Deterrence Theory in the

Context of Somali Piracy. George Washington International Law Review, 608: 607-
646.
Eck, J. E. (1994). Drug Markets and Drug Places: A Case-Control Study of the Spatial
Structure of Illicit Drug Dealing. Doctoral dissertation, University of Maryland,
College Park.
Eck, J. E., & Weisburd, D. L. (1995). ‘Crime Places in Crime Theory’. In J. E. Eck and D. L.
Weisburd (Eds.), Crime and Place (pp. 1-33). Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.
Ekblom, P. (1997). Gearing up against crime: A dynamic framework to help designers
keep up with the adaptive criminal in a changing world. International Journal of
Risk, Security and Crime Prevention, 2: 249-265.
Eklöf, S. (2009). Zeeroof in Afrika. Mondiale en locale verklaringen voor piratenactiviteit
in Nigeria en Somalië. Justitiële Verkenningen, 35(8): 11-38.
Elliot, J. (1991). Teachers as researchers: implications for supervision and for teacher
education. Teaching and Teacher Education, 6: 1-26.
Elliot, J. (1993). Reconstructing Teacher Education. London: Falmer Press.
Eoearth (2015). United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982. Retrieved
from http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/156775/
Erdos, G. (2010). Pirate psychology on the couch. Seaways, April: 16-22.
ESS&SA (2015, July 20). ESS&SA – Rules for the Use of Force [Video file]. Retrieved from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xO9gzhoehzE
Failed States (2015, December 11) Retrieved from
https://www.globalpolicy.org/nations-a-states/failed-states.html
Faugier, J., & Sargeant, M. (1997). Sampling hard to reach populations. Journal of
Advanced Nursing, 26, 790-797.
Felson, M. (1986). Routine Activities, Social Controls, Rational Decisions, and Criminal
Outcomes. In D. Cornish and R. V. Clarke (Eds.), The Reasoning Criminal. New York,
NY: Springer-Verlag.
Felson, M. (1987). Routine Activities and Crime Prevention in the Developing
Metropolis. Criminology, 25(4): 911-932.
Felson, M. (1994). Crime and everyday life: Insight and implications for society. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
Felson, M. (2002). Crime and Everyday Life. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
Felson, M., & Clarke, R. V. (1998). Opportunity makes the thief: Practical theory for crime
prevention. Police Research Series, Paper 98. London: Home Office.
107

Wouter Klijnsoon
Fitzsimmons, S. (2013). Privatizing the struggle against Somali piracy. Small Wars &
Insurgencies, 24: 84-102.
Freeman, C., & Pflanz, M (2014, June 7). Somali pirates release crew after nearly four
years in captivity. Retrieved from
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/10883414/Somali-pirates-
release-crew-after-nearly-four-years-in-captivity.html
Fund For Peace (2015). Fragile States Index 2015. Washington, DC: The Fund For Peace
G4S (2013, june 4). Gewapende beveiligers tegen piraterij. Retrieved from
http://www.g4s.nl/nl-
nl/media%20trefpunt/news/2013/06/04/gewapende%20beveiligers%20tegen%
20piraterij/
GAC (2015, December 13). Maritime Security Services. Retrieved from
http://gac.com/shipping/maritime-security-services/
Gladstone, F. J. (1980). Co-ordinating Crime Prevention Efforts. Home Office Research
Study No. 47. .London: H.M. Stationery Office.
Gettleman, J. (2008, September 30). Somali Pirates Tell Their Side: They Want Only
Money. Retrieved from
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/01/world/africa/01pirates.html?_r=0
Gettleman, J. (2009, January 31). ‘’The Pirates Have Seized The Ship’’. Retrieved from
http://www.gq.com/story/somalia-pirates
Goldstein, H. (1979). Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach. Crime and
Delinquency, 25: 236-258
Gosse, P (2007). The History of Piracy. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications.
Gottschalk, J. A., & Flanagan, B. P. (2000). Jolly Roger with an Uze: The Rise and Threat of
Modern Piracy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
Grissim, J. (1997). Pirates Again Stalking the Seven Seas. The World Paper, May.
Groenendijk, P. (2014, December 17). Reders halen bakzeil. Algemeen Dagblad, p. 15.
Guerette, R., & Clarke, R. V. (2003). Product life cycles and crime: Automated teller
machines and robbery. Security Journal, 16, 7-18.
Guidance relating to the construction and Use of Citadels in Waters Afffected by Somalia
Piracy (2011, July). Retrieved from http://www.mschoa.org/docs/secure-
documents/industry-citadels-paper-final-3.pdf?sfvrsn=2
Hand (2007). Somalia Pirates Using ‘’Mother Vessel’’ Tactics. Lloyd’s List, 18 May 2007.
Hansen, S. J. (2009). Piracy in the greater Gulf of Aden. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for
Urban and Regional Research.
108

Wouter Klijnsoon
Herbert, M. (2013, November 5). Somalia’s Innovating Pirates. Retrieved from

https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2013/11/05/somalias-innovating-
pirates/
Hesseling, R. B. P. (1994). ‘Displacement: A Review of the Empirical Literature’. In R. V.
Clarke (ed.). Crime Prevention Studies, Vol. 3. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.
Hope, T. (1985). Implementing Crime Prevention Measures. Home Office Research Study
No. 86. London: H. M. Stationery Office.
Hope, T., & Murphy, D. (1983). Problems of implementing crime prevention: The
experience of a demonstration project. The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, 22:
38-50.
Hunter, R (2008, December 3). How do you pay a pirate’s ransom? Retrieved from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7752813.stm
International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast (2008). Piracy off the Somali
Coast. Retrieved from
http://www.imcsnet.org/imcs/docs/somalia_piracy_intl_experts_report_consolidat
ed.pdf
International Chamber of Shipping (2015). Piracy and Annual Review 2015. London:
International Chamber of Shipping.
International Maritime Bureau [IMB] (2007). Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships:
Annual Report 2006. London: ICC-IMB
International Maritime Organization [IMO] (2010). Code of Practice for the Investigation
of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: A 26/Res.1025. London: IMO
International Maritime Organization [IMO] (2009). Piracy and Armed Robbery Against
Ships: Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on
preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships:
MSC.1/Circ.1334. London: IMO
International Maritime Organization [IMO] (2011). Piracy and Armed Robbery Against
Ships in Waters off the Coast of Somalia: Best Management Practices for Protection
against Somalia Based Piracy: MSC.1/Circ.1339. London: IMO
109

Wouter Klijnsoon
International Maritime Organization [IMO] (2012a). Interim Guidance to Private

Maritime Security Companies Providing Privately Contracted Armed Security
Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area: MSC.1/Circ.1443. London: IMO
International Maritime Organization [IMO] (2012b). Revised Interim Guidance to
Shipowners, Ship Operators and Shipmasters on the Use of Privately Contracted
Armed Security Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area:
MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev.2. London: IMO
International Maritime Organization [IMO] (2012c). Revised Interim Recommendations
for Flag States Regarding the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel
on Board Ships in the High Risk Area: MSC.1/Circ.1406/Rev.2. London: IMO
International Maritime Organization [IMO] (2015a). Draft report of the Maritime Safety
Committee on its ninety-fifth session: MSC95/WP.1. London: IMO
International Maritime Organization [IMO] (2015b). Piracy and armed robbery against
ships. Retrieved from
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Pages/Default.
aspx
International Organization for Standardization [ISO] (2015). Guidelines for Private
Maritime Security Companies (PMSC) Providing Privately Contracted Armed Security
Personnel (PCASP) on Board Ships (and Pro Forma Contract). Geneva: ISO.
Jianye, X. (2015, May 11). Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia could extend joint patrols in
South China Sea. Retrieved from
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/singapore-malaysia-
and/1838338.html?cid=TWTCNA
Kareithi, A. (2009, May 27). Piracy Money Finds Home In Kenya. The Standard.
Kennedy, E. A. (2008, April 23). Somali pirates find booming business. AP.
Khalif, A. (2005, November 15). How illegal fishing feeds Somali piracy. Nairobi: The East
African
Kraska, J., & Wilson, B. (2009). The Pirates of the Gulf of Aden: The Coalition is the
Strategy. Stanford Journal of International Law, 45: 241-285.
Kucera, J (2006). Coalition Patrols Step Up Efforts Pirates. Jane’s Defence Weekly,
February 16 issue
Landes, W. (1978). An economic study of U.S. aircraft hijacking, 1961-1976. The Journal
of Law and Economics, 21(1), 1-31.
Lanier, M. M., Henry, S. (2010). Essential Criminology (3rd ed.). Philadelphia, PA:
Westview Press.
Law, J. (2012). Dagboek van een kaping. Leuven: Uitgeverij Van Halewyck
110

Wouter Klijnsoon
Lay, K., & Johnston, K. (2014, June 25). Kidnapped ship’s captain told ransoms may be
funnelled to Boko Haram. Retrieved from
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/24/world/africa/nigeria-kidnapped-captain/
Laycock, G., & Austin, C. (1992). Crime prevention in parking facilities. Security Journal,
3: 154-160.
Leavy, P. (2011). ‘Australian counter piracy operations: a Gulf of Aden experience’. In:
Forbed A (ed.), Australia’s response to piracy: a legal perspective. Departments of
Defence Sea Power Centre, Canberra, 103-110.
Lederer, E. M. (2009, March 18). UN: 2 piracy networks operating in Somalia. Retrieved
from http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2009/mar/18/un-un-somalia-
piracy-031809/
Lemieux, A., & Clarke, R. V. (2009). The international ban on ivory sales and its effect on
elephant poaching in Africa. British Journal of Criminology, 49, 451-471.
Lewin, K. (1947). Frontiers in Group Dynamics: Concept, Method and Reality in Social
Science; Social Equilibria and social Change. Human Relations, 1: 5-41
Loomis, D., Marshall, S., Wolf, S., Runyan, C., & Butts, J. (2002). Effectiveness of safety
measures recommended for prevention of workplace homicide. Journal of American
Medical Association, 287, 1011-1017.
Lough, R. (2011, July 6). Piracy ransom cash ends up with Somali militants. Nairobi:
Reuters.
Lupsha, P. (1995). ‘Organized Crime’. In: W. G. Baily (ed.), The Encyclopaedia of Police
Science (2nd ed.). New York City, NY: Garland Publishing.
Maritime Cyprus (2015). Maritime Piracy: Revised definition of the High Risk Area.
Retrieved from http://maritimecyprus.com/2015/10/09/maritime-piracy-revised-
definition-of-the-high-risk-area/
McElroy, D. (2007, November 29). UK to attack al-Qa’eda pirates. Daily Telegraph.
McNicholas, M. (2008). Maritime Security: an introduction. Oxford: Elsevier Inc.
Meade, R. (2008). Pirates now well funded and better equipped. Lloyd’s List 1 October
2008.
Middleton, R. (2008). Piracy in Somalia: Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars,
Chatham House Report, 2008. Retrieved from:
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Afric
a/1008piracysomalia.pdf
Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1984). Qualitative Data Analysis. Newbury Park, CA:
Sage.
111

Wouter Klijnsoon
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2014, November 14). Nederlandse bijdrage aan
antipiraterijoperaties in 2015 (Publication No. DVB/CV-194/14). The Hague:
Directie Veiligheidsbeleid. Retrieved from
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2014/11/14/kamerbri
ef-over-de-nederlandse-bijdrage-aan-antipiraterijoperaties-in-2015
Ministerie van Defensie (2011, June 15). Aanbiedingsbrief beleidskader militaire Vessel
Protection Detachment (VPD) ter bescherming van individueel zeetransport.
Retrieved from
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2011/06/17/aanbiedi
ngsbrief-beleidskader-militaire-vessel-protection-detachment-vpd-ter-
bescherming-van-individueel-zeetransport
Murphy, M. (2007). Contemporary piracy and maritime terrorism. London: Routledge
Murphy, M. (2010). Small boats, weak states, dirty money: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism
in the Modern World. London: C. Hurst & Co.
Murphy, M. (2011). Somalia: The New Barbary? New York City, NY: Colombia University
Press.
Mwanza, K. (November 25). Is Piracy Making A Comeback In The Somali Waters.
Retrieved from http://afkinsider.com/107545/is-piracy-making-a-comeback-in-
the-somali-waters/?sthash.W9FLPIVd.mjjo
New Implementation Structure for Djibouti Code of Conduct (2014, June 4). Retrieved
from http://worldmaritimenews.com/archieves/126015/new-implementation-
structure-for-djibouti-code-of-conduct/.
NOS (2015, December 4). Particuliere beveiligers op koopvaardijschepen mogelijk.
Retrieved from http://nos.nl/artikel/2073072-particuliere-beveiligers-op-
koopvaardijschepen-mogelijk.html
Oceans Beyond Piracy. (2012a). The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011. Denver, CO:
One Earth Future Foundation. Retrieved from
http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/economic_cost_of_piracy_2011.
pdf
Oceans Beyond Piracy. (2012b). The Human Cost of Somali Piracy 2011. Denver, CO: One
Earth Future Foundation. Retrieved from
http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/hcop_2011.pdf
Oceans Beyond Piracy. (2015). The State of Maritime Piracy 2014: Appendices. Denver,
CO: One Earth Future Foundation. Retrieved from
http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/SOP2014Appendi
ces.pdf
112

Wouter Klijnsoon
Onuoha, F. C. (2010). Piracy and Maritime Security off the Horn of Africa: Connections,
Causes, and Concerns. African Security 3(4): 191-215.
Paoli, L. (2003). Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crime, Italian Style. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press.
Petrossian, G., & Clarke, R. V. (2014). Explaining and controlling illegal commercial
fishing: An application of the CRAVED theft model. British Journal of Criminology, 54,
73-90.
Pires, S. F., & Clarke, R. V. (2011). Sequential foraging, itinerant fences and parrot
poaching in Bolivia. British Journal of Criminology, 51, 314-335.
Pires, S. F., & Clarke, R. V. (2012). Are parrots CRAVED? An analysis of parrot poaching in
Mexico. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 49, 122-146.
Poyner, B., Warne, C., Webb, B., Woodall, R., & Meakin, R. (19880). Preventing Violence to
Staff. London: H. M. Stationery Office.
Priddy, A., Casey-Maslen, S. (2012). Counter-piracy Operations by Private Maritime
Security Contractors. Journal of International Criminal Justice, 10: 839-856.
PROMERC Counter Measure Manoeuvres (2015, December 15). Retrieved from
http://www.promerc.eu/promerc-counter-measure-manoeuvres/
QSR International Pty Ltd. (2014). NVivo qualitative data analysis Software Version 10
[Computer software]. Retrieved from http://www.qsrinternational.com
Ray, J. (1971) Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage
Publications.
Rengelink, H. (2012). Tackling Somali piracy. Trends of Organised Crime, 15: 180-197.
Reppetto, T. A. (1974). Residential Crime. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
Rice, X. (2008, April 27). How savage pirates reign on the world’s high seas. Retrieved
from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/27/somalia1
Rice, X., & Hassan, A. (2008, November 22). ‘We consider ourselves heroes’ – a Somali
pirate speaks. Retrieved from
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/22/piracy-somalia
Rinehard, B. (2011). Clan Structure in Somalia. Civil-Military Fusion Centre Working
Paper, no. August.
Rider, D. (2015, June 30). Piracy: Response & Training Officers. Retrieved from
http://www.marsecreview.com/2015/06/piracy-response-training-officers/
Rider, D. (2015, November 23). Iranian fishing boat hijacked off Somalia. Retrieved from
http://www.neptunemaritimesecurity.com/iranian-fishing-boat-hijacked-off-
somalia/
113

Wouter Klijnsoon
Scarr, H. A. (1973). Patterns of burglary (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: US Department of

Justice, National Institute of Justice Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice.
Schiemsky, B. (2009). Piracy’s rising tide: Somalia piracy develops and diversifies.
London: Jane’s Information Group.
Sengupta, K., & Howden, D. (2009, April 21). Pirates: the $80m Gulf connection. Retrieved
from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/pirates-the-80m-gulf-
connection-1671657.html
Shane, J. M., Magnuson, S. (2014). Successful and unsuccessful Pirate Attacks
Worldwide: A Situational Analysis. Justice Quarterly, 1-26.
Sheikh, A. (2009, April 25). Weather to cut Somali pirate attacks. Retrieved from
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLL260337
Sherman, L., & Rogan, D. (1995). Effects of gun seizures on gun violence: ‘Hot spots’
patrol in Kansas city. Justice Quarterly, 12, 673-693.
Shortland, A., Vothknecht, M. (2011). Combating maritime terrorism off the coast of
Somalia. European Journal of Political Economy, 27: 133-151.
Somekh, B. (1995). The Contribution of Action Research to Development in Social
Endeavours: a position paper on action research methodology. British Educational
Research Journal, 21: 3, 339-355.
Sörenson, K. (2008). State Failure on the High Seas – Reviewing the Somali Piracy.
Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency.
Spurrier, A. (2008, April 18). France Opens Proceedings Against Le Ponant Pirates.
Lloyd’s List.
Storey, J. E., Kropp, P. R., Hart, S. D., Belfrage, H., & Strand, S. (2014). Assessment and
management of risk for intimate partner violence by police officers using the brief
spousal assault form for the evaluation of risk. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 41:
256-271.
Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1990). Basics of Qualitative Research: grounded theory
procedures and techniqes. Newbure Park, CA: Sage.
Struwe, L. B. (2012). Private Security Companies (PSCs) as a Piracy Countermeasure.
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 35(7-8): 588-596.
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation. (2011, March 15).
Memorandum for Hearing on Assuring the Freedom of Americans on the High Seas.
Retrieved from http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/03/15/written-testimony-uscg-
house-transportation-infrastructure-subcommittee-coast-guard
Sullivan, A. K. (2010). Piracy in the Horn of Africa and its effects on the global supply
chain. Journal of transportation security, 3, 231-243.
114

Wouter Klijnsoon
Taylor, I., Walton, P. & Young, J. (1973). The New Criminology. London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul.
Tension in Coastal Town After Pirate Clashes, 1 Killed. (2008, February 14). Retrieved
from https://business.highbeam.com/3548/article-1G1-174766313/tension-
coastal-town-after-pirate-clashes-1-killed
Tizzard, J., Sinclair, I., & Clarke, R. V. (1975). Varieties of Residential Experience. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Twyman-Ghoshal, A. A., & Pierce, G. (2014). The Changing Nature of Contemporary
Maritime Piracy. British Journal of Criminology, 54, 652-672.
UK Maritime Trade Operations (2011). Best management practices for ship operators,
and masters of ships transiting the high risk area. Edinburg: Witherby Publishing
Group Ltd.
UN Monitoring Group (2006). Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to
Security Council resolution 1676. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/international-
organizations-and-alliances/report-monitoring-group-somalia-pursuant-security-
council-resolution-1676-november-2006/p12021
UN Monitoring Group (2010). Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to
Security Council resolution 1853.
UNODC (2015): Somali Prison Survey Report: Piracy Motivations & Deterrents.
Retrieved from
https://www.unodc.org/documents/Piracy/SomaliPrisonSurveyReport.pdf
U.S. National Security Council (2007). Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa:
Partnership and Action Plan. Washington, DC: National Security Council.
U.S. National Security Council (2008). Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa:
Partnership and Action Plan. Washington, DC: National Security Council.
U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration (2011). Comparison of U.S.
and Foreign-Flag Operating Costs. Retrieved from http://www.marad.dot.gov/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/Comparison_of_US_and_Foreign_Flag_Operating_Costs.pdf
Van der Veen, C. (2015, October 24). Nederland bouwt bijdrage aan antipiraterijmissie af.
Retrieved from http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/10/24/nederland-bouwt-
bijdrage-aan-antipiraterijmissie-af
Van Ginkel, B., Van der Putten, F., & Molenaar, W. (2013). State or Private Protection
against Maritime Piracy A Dutch Perspective. The Hague: Clingendael Institute.
Vijf jaar cel voor Somalische piraten(2010, June 17). Retrieved from http:/
/vorige.nrc.nl/nieuwsthema/piraterij/article2565802.ece
115

Wouter Klijnsoon
Von Hoesslin, K. (2006, February 24). Taiwan and piracy along the Horn of Africa.
Retrieved from http://taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=23212&CtNode=103
Wadhams, N (2010, April 1). Down and out in Nairobi: Somali Pirates in Retirement.
Retrieved from
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1978764,00.html
Wallis, A., & Ford, D. (1980). Crime prevention through environmental design: The school
demonstration in broward county, Florida. Washinton, DC: US Department of Justice,
National Institute of Justice.
Watts, C., Shapiro, J., & Brown, V. (2007). Al-Qa’ida’s (mis)advantures in the Horn of
Africa. Retrieved from https://www.princeton.edu/~jns/publications/AQ_HOA.pdf
Webb, B. (1996). Preventing plastic card fraud in the UK. Security Journal, 7: 23-25.
Weir, G. E. (2009). Fish, Family, and Profit. Naval War College Review, 62(3): 15-29.
West, S. (2007). Piracy Revenues Financing Warlords in Somali Insurgency. Terrorism
Focus, IV(42).
Westerbeek van Eerten, M. (2015, August 31). Maritime Security Alliance: Non-Violent
Self Protection. Seminar presented at the meeting of the Royal Netherlands Society
of Engineers (KIVI), The Hague.
Wilkins, L. T. (1964). Social deviance. London: Tavistock.
Wortley, R. (2001). A Classification of Techniques for Controlling Situational
Precipitators of Crime. Security Journal, 14: 63-82.
Young, A. J., & Valencia, M. J. (2003). Conflation of piracy and terrorism in Southeast
Asia: Rectitude and utility. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 25, 269-283
Zech, M. (2014, April 10). PvdA: No Security on Merchant Vessels. Retrieved from
http://www.nltimes.nl/2014/04/10/pvda-security-merchant-vessels/
Zijlma, A. (n.d.). Somali Pirates: A Guide to Somalia’s Modern Day Pirates. Retrieved from
http://goafrica.about.com/od/africanews/a/pirates.htm
100e beveiligingsteam mariniers op zee (2014, April 30). Retrieved from
https://www.defensie.nl/actueel/nieuws/2014/04/30/100e-beveiligingsteam-
mariniers-op-zee

116

Wouter Klijnsoon
Appendix II: Example of interview topic list

Interview with Mr. Michiel Hijmans on 18 June 2015

• The activities to counter piracy in Somalia
o Maritime and more: solutions!
o Westmark BV

• Operation Ocean Shield
o What is Operation Ocean Shield
§ Which prevention measures does it implement?
§ What does a patrol look like?
§ Developments 2008-now
o Positive/negative experiences
o Effectivity

• Comparison with armed PMSCs
o The opinion
o Pros and cons in comparison with the Royal Dutch Navy

• Technological anti-piracy measures
o Non-lethal measures:
§ P-trap
§ LRADs/lights
o Compared to armed guardianship
§ Prices
§ Effectivity

• The SCPT
o Increase the effort
o Increase the risks
o Reduce the rewards
o Reduce provocations
o Remove the excuses

• Future
o Decline in successful attacks
o Priority of countering piracy
o Potential measures

117

Wouter Klijnsoon
Appendix III: Codes and their prevalence

• Increase the Effort (196)
• Target Harden(146)
• Ballistic Protection (13)
• Measure (5)
• Usage and Costs (3)
• Advantages (1)
• Disadvantages (4)
• Barriers (14)
• Measure (9)
• Advantages (2)
• Electrified Fences (6)
• Measure (4)
• Advantages (1)
• Freeboard (4)
• Measure (3)
• Advantages (1)
• Long Range Acoustic Devices (19)
• Measure (5)
• Advantages (3)
• Propeller Entanglement Systems (37)
• Measure (8)
• Advantages (10)
• Razor Wire (20)
• Measure (10)
• Advantages (5)
• High-Powered Searchlights (11)
• Measure (5)
• Advantages (2)
• Water Cannons (18)
• Measure (7)
• Advantages (5)
• Control Access to Facilities (15)
118

Wouter Klijnsoon
• Control access routes (15)

• Measure (11)
• Advantages (1)
• Screen Exits (0)
• Deflect Offenders (33)
• Rerouting (8)
• Measure (6)
• Advantages (0)
• Maneuvering (10)
• Measure (7)
• Advantages (1)
• Speed (15)
• Measure (11)
• Advantages (1)
• Control Tools/Weapons (0)
• Increase the Risks (374)
• Extend Guardianship (35)
• Group Transit (9)
• Measure (7)
• Advantages (0)
• Remote Access (12)
• Measure (6)
• Advantages (2)
• Increased Vigilance (14)
• Measure (10)
• Advantages (4)
• Assist Natural Surveillance (0)
• Reduce Anonymity (0)
• Utilize Place Managers (62)
• Local Law Enforcement (10)
• Measure (7)
• Advantages (0)
• Multinational Naval Taskforce (52)
• Measure (22)
119

Wouter Klijnsoon
• Advantages (8)
• Strengthen Formal Surveillance (277)
• PMSCs (200)
• Measure (92)
• Advantages (31)
• VPDs (77)
• Measure (38)
• Advantages (13)
• Reduce the Rewards (59)
• Conceal Targets (59)
• Citadels (59)
• Measure (37)
• Advantages (6)
• Remove Targets (0)
• Identify Property (0)
• Disrupt Markets (0)
• Deny Benefits (0)
• Reduce Provocations (0)
• Reduced Frustrations and Stress (0)
• Avoid Disputes (0)
• Reduce Emotional Arousal (0)
• Neutralize Peer Pressure (0)
• Discourage Imitation (0)
• Remove the Excuses (0)
• Set Rules (0)
• Post Instructions (0)
• Alert Conscience (0)
• Assist Compliance (0)
• Control Drugs and Alcohol (0)
• General Statements about costs (44)
• BMP4 Related Information (40)
• Future of Piracy (75)
• Expectations of Development of piracy prevention (42)
• Ideas About Future Anti-Piracy Measures (27)
• Future of Piracy Prevalence in HRA (6)
• General Information on What Companies want and do (69)
• ISPS-Code (2)
• ISO 28007-1 (6)
• Involvement of Insurance Companies (37)
• Layers of Defense (34)
• Mitigating Root Causes (23)

120

Wouter Klijnsoon
Appendix IV: Certificate of research internship at the

International Maritime Organization (IMO)

121

Masterscriptie Wouter Klijnsoon PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Masterscriptie Wouter Klijnsoon PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Wouter

3.2 Development of Contemporary Somali Maritime piracy 31

6.3.2 Armed guardianship for layer three and four 92

guardianship (weak or absent controllers on or near the ship). Such a micro-level

found that the situational and environmental characteristics of the correctional

implemented on ships, such as described in the BMP4, the more sophisticated

Table 2.1 The twenty-five opportunity-reducing techniques of Situational Crime Prevention

(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-

The UN Monitoring Group suggested in its 2006 report that relatively

3500 Seafarers taken hostage

poisoned seas developed into a highly profitable criminal enterprise.

Measure What is it Costs Pros Cons

5.1.1a Anti-climb barriers

Figure 5.6 Example of a P-trap

Communication, 28 May 2015).

and/or motherships. Moreover, when sea conditions allow, it should be considered

5.2.1a Group transit

5.2.1c Increased vigilance

Finally, it is assumed that there are no significant additional costs of increasing

5.3 Reduce the rewards

The price of anti-piracy measures is an important factor when it comes to

imminent pirate threat, these opportunity-reducing techniques focus on making the

section contains separate discussions on measures that can be categorized as

freeboard should not be seen as an actual anti-piracy measure, but should be

non-lethal technoprevention measures. However, the pragmatic nature of the SCP

In conclusion, this study suggests that the implementation of a balanced

Dutton, Y. M. (2014). Crime and Punishment: Assessing Deterrence Theory in the

Herbert, M. (2013, November 5). Somalia’s Innovating Pirates. Retrieved from

International Maritime Organization [IMO] (2012a). Interim Guidance to Private

Scarr, H. A. (1973). Patterns of burglary (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: US Department of

Appendix II: Example of interview topic list

Appendix III: Codes and their prevalence

• Control access routes (15)

Appendix IV: Certificate of research internship at the

You might also like