Introduction

Introduction
Security for Seafarers came into focus because of three factors:

1. The impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (notably the launch of counter-terrorist
operations at sea),
2. The occurrence of three high visibility terrorist acts against ships (USS Cole in
2001, French tanker Limburg in 2002 and Filipino passenger ship Super Ferry 14
in 2004), and
3. The rise of piratical attacks in the Strait of Malacca at the beginning of the
century.

Following that, the surge of piracy at the Horn of Africa between 2007 and 2012 largely
contributed to generating debates on the legal, criminal, cultural, economic, military,
environmental and energy dimensions of piracy in particular and maritime security in
general. The maritime security geo-strategies in 2014 demonstrate that states’ and
international institutions’ maritime security objectives and interests are indirectly and
directly influenced by geographical and geopolitical considerations. The expression
‘maritime security’ is recent. Since the end of the 1990's and the beginning of the
2000's, maritime security was increasingly used to describe preventive measures set up
to respond to illegal activities at sea or from the sea (including the protection of shipping
and ports).

Terrorism (post 9/11) and piracy (especially after 2007 and the rise of attacks at the
Horn of Africa) attracted most of the media’s attention. However, arms and drug
trafficking, people smuggling, illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing, and deliberate
pollution still represent the bulk of illegal and disruptive activities at sea.

The maritime domain is a space within which human actors operate, either to perform
illegal, disruptive and damaging activities or to police and secure the sea in order to fight
criminal actors. Maritime security refers to a geographical space, that is to say the sea,
which has different characteristics compared to the land. States’ maritime security
interests result in a practice consisting in projecting security beyond their external
boundary into the global maritime domain. Thus, zones of interests are defined, which
extend beyond one’s legal zone. In security narratives, those maritime zones are
represented as vital for one’s security, which justifies power projection activities.
The need to enhance maritime security came with the rise of piracy off the coast of
Somalia between 2008 and 2011. The dangers of piracy for international trade brought
the maritime dimension of security to the global consciousness and lifted it high on
policy agendas. Moreover, the inter-state tensions in regions, such as the Arctic, the
South China Sea, or the East China Sea and the significant investments in blue water
navies of emerging powers, such as India and China, have increased attention for the
oceans as a security space.

Safety concerns are core to maritime security given that it may involve environmental
and cultural interests. Marine safety has also been increasingly linked to maritime
security given that the maritime industry, shipping companies and their employees are
simultaneously potential targets (e.g. of pirates, terrorists, or criminals) as well as
potential perpetrators (by engaging in maritime crimes such as trafficking of persons,
illicit goods or weapons or in collaborating with violent actors).

Maritime security is also linked to economic development. Throughout history the oceans
were always of vital economic importance. The majority of trade is conducted via the sea
. Both global shipping and fisheries have developed into multi-billion industries. The
commercial value of the oceans has moreover been increasingly re-evaluated due to the
economic potential of offshore resources, centrally fossil energy but also seabed mining,
as well as the economic promises of coastal tourism. The concept of blue economy is
linked to maritime security since sustainable management strategies not only require the
enforcement and monitoring of laws and regulations, but a secure maritime environment
provides the precondition for managing marine resources.

The major concern and scope for this course is limited to marine safety, under the
regime of the IMO that oversees the interest of the shipping industry and the individual
interests of the seafarer.

For almost two decades, maritime security has largely been framed by the
implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, which
focuses on detecting and preventing security threats against ports and ships. But due to
increasing concern for the safe and secure movement of cargo, as well as the maturity of
the implementation of the ISPS Code over the last 15 years, maritime security has
begun to focus on treating ports and ships as conduits within the supply chain—not just
targets.
This shift from port and vessel security to broader cargo and supply chain security is
driven by the evolution of both global trade and threats to the supply chain—issues that
the ISPS Code does not adequately address. While the code has well-established security
requirements for ports and ships, it views these assets as targets of nefarious activities—
specifically terrorism—and not as broader conduits of illicit activity or movement of
contraband or theft of cargo.

As global trade continues to increase at a rapid rate, there is more cargo in the system,
as well as an increasing reliance on just-in-time delivery, which makes cargo and supply
chain security more sensitive to disruption, with greater potential impacts. The
movement of cargo is also increasingly dependent on electronic data streams, which
increase the risks of converged cyber, physical, and operational security challenges.
Maritime security is no longer just about protecting vessels and ports—it goes hand-in-
hand with cargo and supply chain security. Updated codes, regulations, and best
practices should reflect this evolution of the industry. This shift should emphasize a
broader focus on maritime security as an integrated system of physical assets, cargo,
and data that needs to be secure and resilient, rather than simply a collection of ports
and ships that need to be protected.

IntroductionCourse overview

Course overview
Course Objective
The course is designed to provide seafarers with the knowledge required to perform
designated security duties in connection with the Ship Security Plan (SSP). These duties
are as required as per Chapter XI -2 of SOLAS 74 and Section A-VI/6 of the STCW Code
as amended.

IntroductionCompetences to be achieved

Competences to be achieved
Competences that will be achieved through completion of the course
After completing the course a trainee will be competent in the following matters related
to ship security

● Recognition of security risks and threats

● Will be able to undertake regular security inspections of the ship independently
● Will be able to use security equipment and systems properly

IntroductionCurrent security threats and patterns

Current security threats and patterns

Piracy and armed attacks continue to occur on an increasingly frequent basis at sea.
Armed robbery occurs mostly in port areas, while piracy occurs at sea. Piracy occurs
outside the jurisdiction of the state. In this form of terrorism well armed pirates attack,
then board a ship and then hold the officers and crew on board for ransom money. This
type of attack is common in Somalia.

Terrorism usually involves violence, or the threat of violence, by extremist groups

seeking to gain political objectives by malicious means. The do this by using various
types of bombs, bomb threats or hijacking a ship. Increasingly, they are acting with
extremist religious sects that promote suicidal behaviour.

The Year 2018 Reports and trend - The IMB Piracy Reporting Centre has released its
global piracy report for 2018, and it warns that the maritime industry experienced a net
increase in attacks year-over-year. In particular, the agency recorded a "marked rise in
attacks against ships and crews around West Africa." Worldwide, the IMB recorded 201
incidents of maritime piracy and armed robbery in 2018, up from 180 in 2017. The Gulf
of Guinea is particularly dangerous for seafarers: reports of attacks in waters between
the Ivory Coast and the Congo more than doubled in 2018, and these incidents
accounted for the overwhelming majority of serious acts of piracy worldwide. The Gulf of
Guinea accounted for all six hijackings, 13 of the 18 ships fired upon, 130 of the 141
hostages held, and 78 of 83 seafarers kidnapped for ransom worldwide.

In a worrisome trend, this violence accelerated in the last quarter of the year. 41
kidnappings were recorded off Nigeria between October and December, more than half
the annual total. Some of these attacks occurred up to 100 nm offshore, well outside of
the territorial waters of West African states.
There is an urgent need for increased cooperation and sharing of intelligence between
the Gulf of Guinea’s littoral states so that effective action can be taken against pirates,
both at sea and on shore where their operations originate and end.

In other regional developments, acts of piracy declined or remained at relatively low

levels off the shores of other historic hot spots like Somalia, Indonesia, Malaysia and the
Philippines. Somali pirates fired upon three merchant vessels last year, but they
conducted no successful boardings. In Sabah, Malaysia, five crew members from two
fishing boats were kidnapped, and one tug came under attack - far less than the
outbreak of abductions seen in 2017. In Indonesia, six crew members were held hostage
and threatened in one incident, but the overwhelming majority of reports were for acts
of low-level theft.

The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) is aware of the escalating level of this
criminal activity, and provides a free service to the seafarer by establishing the 24 hour
IMB Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

The reporting center provides:

● A piracy map
● A live piracy report
● Piracy prone areas and warnings
● Piracy news
● A piracy report
● A contact point to report piracy incidents

Terrorism
Terrorism is covertly planned but dramatic action, by clandestinely organised, often
unrepresentative groups, to spread fear by extreme violence in order to coerce, or
provoke a government or populace to take a particular course of political action desired
by the terrorists.

Example of terrorists use of shipping - In October 2001 in the Italian port of Gioia Taurio
an Egyptian Al Qaeda suspect was found in a container bound for Nova Scotia.

The Container was fitted with bed and toilet and had a laptop, US airport maps, forged
security passes and Canadian passports.
Some of the terrorist incidents at sea include the following:

● The passenger vessel Achille Lauro was boarded and hijacked in 1985.
● Attack on the USS Cole in 2000.
● Attack on the French VLCC Limburg in 2002
● Transportation of terrorist weapons on the Karine A in 2002 and the Baltic Sky in
2003.

The Achille Lauro Incident

This hijacking incident happened on October 7, 1985, when the Italian ship MS
‘Achille Lauro’ was hijacked by four men representing the Palestine Liberation
Front off the coast of Egypt, as she was sailing from Alexandria to Ashdod,
Israel. A 69-year-old Jewish American man in a wheelchair, Leon Klinghoffer,
was murdered by the hijackers and thrown overboard. The hijacking sparked the
"Sigonella Crisis".

Sigonella in Italy is the airbase where the hijackers landed after being given safe
passage from Egypt, after freeing the vessel’s hostages and disembarking from the
vessel.

The ‘Sigonella’ incident is the standoff that occurred between US Navy Seals and Italian
defence forces. In the incident the Italians prevented the US Seals from arresting the
hijackers. The hijackers were finally arrested by the Italians and tried in Italy, for
hijacking and murder.

After the trial, they were sent to an Italian prison.

 Passenger Vessel Achille Lauro

The USS Cole incident

On the morning of Thursday, 12 October 2000, USS Cole, docked in Aden

harbour for a routine fuel stop. Cole completed mooring at 9:30 am; and began
refuelling at 10:30 am. Around 11am local time, a small fiberglass boat carrying
C4 explosives and two suicide bombers approached and hit the port side of the
destroyer and exploded, creating a 40-by-60-foot gash in the ship’s port side.

Seventeen sailors were killed and 39 were injured in the blast.

The attack was organized and directed by the terrorist organization al-Qaeda.
 USS Cole

The VLCC Limburg Incident

The Double hull VLCC Limburg suffered an explosion on 6th October 2002 at an SBM off
Sanaa, Yemen. It was the terrorist attack like the Cole incident. A fast boat was seen
approaching the vessel and colliding with the ship and causing the explosion. A large
pool of burning oil spread out from the side of the ship.
 VLCC Limburg

Contraband Smuggling
Contraband smuggling is a criminal activity, that may result in huge financial loss to the
ship owner whose ship is used by smugglers. Often drugs may be smuggled. Drugs are
brought on board the vessel in a number of ways and are normally brought in through,
luggage, stores, in a person’s body or in electronic equipment. Weapons could also be
smuggled, and normally come on board through cargo containers.

Example – On August 6th 2018, Colombian authorities seized more than one ton of
cocaine that was discovered inside a container on a ship bound for Europe.

The drugs were found following raid of the Singapore-flagged ship Cap San Tainaro in
the waters off Barranquilla, Colombia shortly after the vessel departed Cartegena,
Colombia bound for Antwerp, Belgium.

During the raid, authorities found 1,144 packages containing 1 kilogram of cocaine
apiece, worth an estimated street value of about $66 million.
The drugs are believed to have been smuggled by an organised crime group known for
its drug trafficking activities to Europe.

Drug routes

Hidden drugs on a vessel

Cargo Theft
Cargo theft is an age old problem, that results in great financial loss to the ship
owner. Prevention is the best method to prevent cargo theft.
Example - Note that containers offer little security even when locked/ sealed

Therefore, container storage areas must be marshalled and protected, an interim

solution as smart seals and containers (using radio-frequency identification)
could prevent container pilferage in the future.

Break up of cargo theft

Stowaways and Refugees

Human trafficking is a security threat where human beings can be smuggled

through containers. There have been cases of stowaways coming on board
vessels from ports in Africa.

Example - A stowaway was discovered in the rudder trunk after a voyage from West
Africa to South America
 Human trafficking

Maritime fraud, where seamen employed on board could have counterfeit passport and
other official documents.

Collateral Damage

Collateral damage occurs when a nearby fire, explosion, or attack results in

damage to a ship or facility.

Ships could be sabotaged by hoax calls of saying that a bomb is on board. In this regard
the 'Queen Mary' received a hoax call of a bomb on board.

Example – A deckhand was jailed for two years for setting fire to an offshore supply
vessel by pouring petrol onto her gangway as the crew slept on board, because he was
ordered off the ship after a drunken row with the captain.

Cyber crime

With the advent of IT in shipping there are possibilities of cyber-crime on

vessels.

Common forms of cyber-crime are:

● Phishing: using fake email messages to get personal information from internet
users;
● Misusing personal information (identity theft);
● Hacking: shutting down or misusing websites or computer networks;
● Spreading hate and inciting terrorism;
● Distributing child pornography;
 Cyber crime
IntroductionShip and port operations and conditions

Ship and port operations and conditions

Ports have to protect against a wide range of threats that can range from ship borne to
underwater based and from theft and vandalism to piracy. Not only do they have to
meet security regulations such as the International Ship and Port facility Security code
(ISPS) but they will have to meet the requirements of maritime regulations such as the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).
In Transportation, the size of the industry leads to challenges in both the range of
vulnerabilities and the volume of passengers and freight to be protected, creating a need
for systems that can be scaled to meet requirements. Safety of passengers and the
protection of freight are paramount and the ability to create co-ordinate responses to
incidents is becoming increasingly critical.

In late June of 2017, AP Moeller-Maersk shut down its container operations at the Port of
Los Angeles. It was a cyber-attack. For the maritime industry and its extended supply
chains, the threat is real and looming. Ports are the economic engines of this country
and the world, meaning any downtime caused by a breach could have a catastrophic
impact on global supply chains.

Transportation infrastructure is often viewed as a target as it is a first line in disabling or

doing harm to a supply chain. The effects of such an attack may ripple throughout the
commerce that relies on it. Within transportation infrastructure though, maritime
operations are truly vulnerable. Not only is a cyber threat part of the problem, but so are
further acts of terror. The seaports with cruise terminals have some of the largest
gatherings of people anywhere, with thousands of people embarking and debarking
within a handful of hours inside a relatively small footprint.

New technology is likely to shape the risk equation for all links in transportation supply
chains. Investments in securing maritime operations are increasing in parallel to the
security vulnerabilities of the marine supply chain infrastructure.

In a marine environment , new visual technologies can be a boon to security efforts.

Security cameras are very sophisticated nowadays and can offer capabilities that go
beyond the archaic vigilance and surveillance we associate with them.

Access control can limit access to sensitive area and CCTV systems can help identify
suspicious activity. When linked together with other systems such as intrusion detection,
fire and public address systems the integrated solution can become a powerful command
and control application allowing users to detect, monitor and respond to events in the
most safe and effective way. Access control is an important part of the security
environment in the Port and Maritime sector and provides the ability to control and
monitor movement of staff in restricted areas. This helps the port authority to meet the
requirements of the ISPS Security code. The ability to run CCTV and access control
system over the IT infrastructure is particularly beneficial in a port where the
geographical area can be large and having to run cable for individual systems can
involve significant expense.

Thermal cameras for ports are a must-have technology for maritime security, especially
for perimeters. There are currently solutions available that can work with thermal
cameras to allow for the detection of moving objects and long ranges with only a couple
of pixels on targets needed. Intelligent software applications can take what is captured
by a thermal camera and optimize it by connecting with a neighboring Pan-Tilt-Zoom
(PTZ) color camera, which can automatically track the object detected by the thermal
camera.

Tools and technology as well as a dedicated task force to bolster security are crucial. The
message for proper cyber hygiene must be circulated over and over again to employees
at all levels within a company and protocols need to be enforced regarding the use of
external devices. As attacks - both physical and cyber - continue to rise, maritime
infrastructure must be riveted on reliable security measures.

Intermodal nature of transportation and Interfaces

The diagram shown below illustrates interaction of a vessel with other modes of
transport:
Intermodal transport involves the use of at least two different modes in a trip from an
origin to a destination through an intermodal transport chain, which permit the
integration of several transportation networks.

Examples of intermodal and multimodal operation:

In today’s market, a shipping agent acts like as an intermediary between the shipper
and the consignee.
Intermodality enhances the economic performance of a transport chain by using modes
in the most productive manner. Thus, the line-haul economies of rail may be exploited
for long distances, with the efficiency of trucks providing flexible local pick up and
deliveries.

The key is that the entire trip is seen as a whole, rather than as a series of legs, each
marked by an individual operation with separate sets of documentation and rates.

As the container is a common instrument used in the intermodal transport chain they
can be used in the illicit trade of counterfeit goods, drugs and weapons and for
terrorism.

Because of these concerns, all containers are electronically scanned at the port of
loading, prior to departure.

Maritime Security Policy

Maritime Security Policy

International conventions are treaties or agreements between states the primary actors
in international law.

An International Convention is enforced through state law after the State ratifies
(agrees) the Convention and enacts it as the law of the state through a bill introduced
and then passed in parliament.

A code is a set of standards set forth and enforced, through regular checks and
certification.

A recommendation in relation to security is advice or counsel which although presented

as such, the recipient is free to take or leave.

After the so-called 9/11 incident IMO worked vigorously to improve security at sea.

Maritime Security PolicyFamiliarity with relevant international conventions

Familiarity with relevant international conventions

Summarizes previous efforts of IMO toward maritime security, such as
MSC/Circ.443, SUA Act, etc.
IMO has passed several resolutions to help improve maritime security, and these include

● IMO Resolution A.545 (13) – measures to prevent acts of piracy and armed
robbery against ships (1983)
● IMO Resolution A.545 (14) – measures to prevent unlawful acts which threaten
the safety of ships and the security of their passengers and crews (1985)
● IMO MSC/Circ.443 – measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and
crews aboard ships (1986)
● IMO Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
(SUA) Convention – for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of
maritime navigation (in force 1992)
● IMO MSC/Circ.754 – Passenger ferry security (consideration primarily in respect
of passenger ferries operating on international routes and ports serving those
routes) (1996)

Though there were conventions, circulars and resolutions (as listed above) related to
maritime security at sea before September 11, 2001, none of them was mandatory.

Summarizes the rapidity with which IMO acted to enhance maritime security
following 9/11
After the ‘9/11’ incident IMO worked very swiftly to improve security on board ships, this
ultimately resulted in amendments to SOLAS to enhance maritime security and the
development of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code).

The initiatives to develop the ISPS Code and to amend SOLAS were done as illustrated in
the flow chart below:
 Flow Chart on work flow used to improve maritime security

Summarizes the amendments to SOLAS Chapter XI and the contents of the ISPS
Code
The ISPS Code was adopted by a resolution on 12 December 2002 by the conference of
Contracting Governments to the SOLAS convention.

Another resolution also includes the necessary amendments to Chapters V (Safety of

Navigation) and XI (Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Safety) of SOLAS of which
compliance with the ISPS Code became mandatory on 1 July 2004.

The existing Chapter XI (Special measures to enhance maritime safety) of SOLAS was
amended and re-identified as chapter XI–1 and a new chapter, XI-2 (Special measures
to enhance maritime security) was adopted.
Another problem for the maritime industry is piracy on the high seas.

What is the ISPS Code?

The ISPS Code is comprised of two parts, Part A and Part B:
Part A
Details the mandatory requirements regarding the provisions of chapter XI – 2 of
SOLAS, as amended.
Part B
Details guidance regarding the provisions of Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS as amended, and
Part A.

The ISPS Code

The objectives of the ISPS Code are to establish an international framework, involving
co-operation between Contracting Governments, Government agencies, local
administrations and the shipping and port industries to:

● Detect/assess security threats; (surveillance, using ship security assessment,

port facility security assessment)
● Take preventive measures against security incidents affecting ships or port
facilities used in international trade; (ship security plan, port facility security plan)
● Establish the respective roles and responsibilities of all these parties concerned;
and at the national and international level; (company, ship and port facility
security officers and other officers)
● To ensure maritime security; (various security levels (1,2,3), depending on the
impending threat)
● To ensure the early and efficient collection and exchange of security related
information; (several equipment are made mandatory on vessels , e.g. AIS, LRIT,
IMO no)
● To provide a methodology for security assessments in order to have in place
plans and procedures to react to changing levels of security; and (Ship security
plan and continuous improvements in plan)
● To ensure confidence that adequate and proportionate maritime security
measures are in place. (by providing adequate training and skills to all personnel
working on board vessels, and providing for adequate security measures on the
vessel)

In order to achieve its objectives, the ISPS Code embodies a number of functional
requirements. These include but are not limited to:

● Gathering and assessing information with respect to security threats and

exchanging such information with Contracting Governments;
● Requiring the maintenance of communication protocols for ships and port
facilities;
● Preventing unauthorized access to ships, port facilities and their restricted areas;

● Preventing the introduction of unauthorized weapons, incendiary devices or

explosives to ships or port facilities;
● Providing means of raising the alarm in reaction to security threats or security
incidents;
 ● Requiring training, drills and exercises to ensure familiarity with security plans
and procedures.

Mandatory requirements as per the SOLAS Convention to enhance ship security

These include:

● The provision of a ship identification number for all ships – the IMO number,
permanently marked on the vessel; (Chapter XI – I of SOLAS)
● The maintenance of a continuous synopsis record (CSR), this records the history
of the ship; (Chapter XI – I of SOLAS)
● The provision of a ship security alert system; (Chapter XI – II of SOLAS)

● Fitting of Automatic identification system (AIS) and Long Range Identification and
Tracking of ships (LRIT) on all vessels as per chapter V of SOLAS;
● Every company that operates a merchant vessel must be have a company and
registered owner identification number (C&ROIN). (Chapter XI – I of SOLAS)

Legal instruments on maritime security

The Port State must set security levels, the security level in place must be informed to
all visiting vessels, all flag state vessels must comply with the requirements of the ISPS
Code Part A.
It is important to note that security on vessels operates in tandem with port facility
security.

Summarizes the security-related provisions of the amendments to the STCW

Code
The STCW Code specifies mandatory minimum requirements for security training for
seafarers/persons employed/engaged on board ships.
The training requirements are as follows:

● All persons employed or engaged on a seagoing ship – Security related

familiarization training, before being assigned shipboard duties, training as per
the guidance given in Part B of the ISPS Code
● All Seafarers employed or engaged on board ships without designated security
duties – Security awareness training that complies with the provisions of table A-
VI/6-1 of the STCW Code
● Seafarers employed on ships with designated security duties – i.e – required to
perform security duties, anti – piracy and anti-armed-robbery-related will be
required to demonstrate competence to undertake the tasks, duties and
responsibilities as per table A-VI/6-2 of the STCW Code

Summarizes IMO guidance on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and

armed robbery against ships
IMO’s circular MSC.1 Circ/.1334 provides guidance on precautions to be taken to reduce
risks of piracy on the high seas and armed robbery against ships at anchor, off ports or
when underway through a coastal states territorial waters.

It outlines steps to be taken to reduce the risk of such attacks, possible responses to
them and the vital need to report attacks, both successful and unsuccessful to the
relevant authorities.

In addition to prevent terrorism in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden the Ship Security
Reporting System and a Best Management Practice guide have been implemented and
developed.

Maritime Security PolicyFamiliarity with relevant government legislation

Familiarity with relevant government legislation
One must note that the ISPS Code and SOLAS applies to ships greater than 500 GT,
engaged on international voyages. However, Governments have to make all vessels and
port facilities secure whether they used by foreign going ships or not.

Making port, harbour craft and home trade vessels secure is done through flag state
legislation that are normally similar to measures prescribed by the ISPS Code.

Requirements of relevant national legislation and regulations

Several governments have passed legislation to tighten maritime security, some of them
are as follows:

European Union – Has made selected parts of the ISPS Code Part B, mandatory (for
ships engaged on home trade voyages)

The UK – Has the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990, The Anti – Terrorism, Crime
and Security Act, mandated the EC regulation 725/2005 & 65/2005, and has regulations
that govern Ship and Port Facilities

The US – has the Maritime Transportation Act 2002 and the Navigation and Vessel
Inspection Circular 1996.

Several other countries have issued additional security requirements in relation to

maritime security.

Maritime Security PolicyDefinitions

Definitions
Ship (Vessel) Security Plan – A plan to ensure the application of measures on board
the ship, designed to protect persons on board, cargo, cargo transport units, ship’s
stores or the ship from the risk of a security incident.
Port Facility Security Plan – A plan to ensure the application of measures designed to
protect the port facility and ships, persons, cargo, cargo transport units and ship’s stores
within the port facility from the risks of a security incident.

Ship Security Assessment – An essential and integral part of the process of

developing and updating the ship security plan including, at least, identification of
existing security measures; procedures and operations; identification and evaluation of
key shipboard operations; identification of possible threats and weaknesses in the
infrastructure; policies and procedures.

Security incident – means any suspicious act or circumstance threatening the ship

Ship (Vessel) Security Officer – The person on board the ship who is accountable to
the master, and designated by the company as responsible for the security of the ship,
including implantation and maintenance of the ship security plan, and for liaison with the
company security officer and port facility security officers.

Ship - to - Ship Activity – means any activity not related to a port facility that involves
the transfer of goods or persons from one ship to another

Company Security officer – The person designated by the company for ensuring that a
ship security assessment is carried out; that a ship security plan is developed, submitted
for approval, and thereafter implemented and maintained; and for liaison with port
facility security officers and ship security officer.

Port Facility Security Officer – The person designated as responsible for the
development, implementation, revision and maintenance of the port facility security
plan, and for liaison with ship security officers and company security officers.

Ship/port interface – The interaction that occurs when a ship is directly and
immediately affected by actions involving the movement of persons, goods or provisions
of port services to or from the ship.

Port Facility – The location, as determined by a Contracting Government or by the

Designated Authority, where the ship/port interface takes place. This includes areas such
as anchorages, waiting berths and approaches from seaward as appropriate.
Designated authority – The organization or the administration identified within the
Contracting Government, as responsible for ensuring the implementation of the
provisions of SOLAS as amended and pertaining to port facility security and ship/port
interface, from the point of view of the port facility.

Recognised Security Organisation – An organization with appropriate expertise in

security matters and with appropriate knowledge of ship and port operations, which is
authorized to carry out an assessment, a verification, an approval or a certification
activity required by SOLAS as amended or by Part A of the ISPS Code.

Declaration of Security – An agreement reached between a ship and either a port

facility or another ship with which it interfaces, which specifies the security measures
that each will implement.

On-Scene Security Survey (OSSS) – An integral part of the ship security assessment
to examine and evaluate existing shipboard protective measures, procedures and
operations.

Security Level 1 – Minimum appropriate protective security measures shall be

maintained at all times.

Security Level 2 – Appropriate additional protective security measures shall be

maintained for a period of time as a result of heightened risk of a security incident.

Security Level 3 – Further specific protective security measures shall be maintained for
a limited period of time when a security incident is probable or imminent.

Some terms related to piracy – skiff – a small boat with an outboard motor through
which pirates board a merchant vessel, mother vessel – from where pirates launch their
skiffs

Definitions (Under BMP5)

The following definitions to term and categorise attacks and suspicious incidents that are
reported from shipping inside the VRA may help. This ensures the consistent
identification of patterns and trends.

Armed robbery The Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and
Armed Robbery against Ships, highlights armed robbery against ships consists of:

● Any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat

thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed
against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a
State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea.
● Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above.

Attack An attack, as opposed to an approach, is where a ship has been subjected to an

aggressive approach by an unidentified craft AND weapons have been discharged.

Hijack A hijack is where attackers have illegally boarded and taken control of a ship
against the crew’s will. Hijackers will not always have the same objective (armed
robbery, cargo theft or kidnapping).

Illegal boarding An illegal boarding is where attackers have boarded a ship but HAVE
NOT taken control. Command remains with the Master. The most obvious example of
this is the citadel scenario.

Piracy Piracy is defined in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) (article 101). However, for the purposes of these BMP, it is important to
provide clear, practical, working guidance to the industry to enable accurate and
consistent assessment of suspicious activity and piracy attacks.

The following may assist in assessing what is a piracy attack. A piracy attack may
include but is not limited to:

● The use of violence against the ship or its personnel, or any attempt to use
violence.
● Attempt(s) to illegally board the ship where the Master suspects the persons are
pirates.
● An actual boarding whether successful in gaining control of the ship or not.
 ● Attempts to overcome the SPM by the use of:
1. Ladders.
2. Grappling hooks.
3. Weapons deliberately used against or at the ship.

Suspicious or aggressive approach Action taken by another craft may be deemed

suspicious if any of the following occur (the list is not exhaustive):

● A definite course alteration towards a ship associated with a rapid increase in

speed by the suspected craft, which cannot be accounted for by the prevailing
conditions.
● Small craft sailing on the same course and speed for an uncommon period and
distance, not in keeping with normal fishing or other circumstances prevailing in
the area.
● Sudden changes in course towards the ship and aggressive behaviour.

Maritime Security PolicyHandling sensitive security-related information

Handling sensitive security-related information

Defines security-sensitive information and the importance of keeping it
confidential

Sensitive Security Information (SSI) is a category of sensitive but unclassified

information under a government's information sharing and control rules. SSI is
information obtained in the conduct of security activities whose public disclosure would,
in the judgement of specified government agencies, harm transportation security, be an
unwarranted invasion of privacy, or reveal trade secrets or privileged or confidential
information.

SSI was created to help share transportation-related information deemed too revealing
for public disclosure between Federal government agencies; State, local, tribal, and
foreign governments; and others.

SSI is not Top Secret, Secret or Confidential.

Examples of Security Sensitive Information:

● Ship Security Assessments and plans

● Security intelligence from the flag state

● Ship arrival and departure times

● Ship destinations/cargo information

● Travel arrangements

● Client agreements and contracts

● Company accounts and financial data

● Crews personal information

Security Responsibilities

Security Responsibilities
Contracting governments have specific responsibilities with respect to SOLAS Chapter
XI-2 ,the ISPS Code and the STCW code.

The ISPS Code lists responsibilities of Contracting Governments in relation to maritime

security; applies to those governments that have ratified the Code.

Governments normally delegate security duties to governmental agencies.

To fulfill maritime security responsibilities as per the ISPS Code, Contracting

Governments administer security as a ‘Flag state’, ‘Coastal state’ and a ‘Port state’.
Security ResponsibilitiesContracting governments

Contracting governments
The main responsibilities of the contracting Governments in relation to threats to ships
are as follows:

● Setting Security levels, and informing all concerned

● Providing a ‘point of contact’ through which ships can request advice or

assistance and to which such ships can report any security concerns about other
ships, movements or communications
 Administering maritime security

When a risk is identified, inform ships and their current administrations of:

● The current security level

● Any security level that has been put in place by the ships concerned to protect
themselves from attack, in accordance with provisions of Part A of the ISPS Code
● Security measures that he coastal state has decided to put in place as
appropriate Roles of Flag Administrations (Flag state, state of vessel registry)
 Role of Flag State

● Mandatory operational functions, security maintained at all times on the vessel,

by controlling access both into and onto the vessel
● Providing a ‘point of contact’ – the Company Security Officer (CSO) and a
delegated officer of the state
● Optional operational functions – e.g. – stopping all cargo work when security level
is raised to ‘3’, allowing for armed guards on board if vessel is to sail in pirate
infested waters
● Approval of Ship Security Plan (SSP) and amendments – normally delegated to an
RSO
● Security verification functions – verifying the SSP, carrying out audits for
International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC) certification, and the security
assessment
● Issuing International Ship Security Certificates

● Issuing security guidelines as required

● Designating Recognised Security Organisations (RSOs, normally classification

societies)
● Providing the means for security communication

● Providing the means for reporting security incidents – using standard reporting
formats

Role of Port States – Port Security

 Role of Port State

● Determination of port facilities

● Mandatory operational functions, e.g. ensuring security is maintained at all times

in port facilities by controlling access into the port
● Approval of Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) and its amendments

● Optional operational functions, e.g. increasing vigilance when security level is

raised
● Issuing security guidelines as required, informing vessels of security levels etc.

● Designating RSOs

● Providing the means for security communication

● Providing the means for reporting security incidents

Role of Coastal States

 Role of Coastal State

● Mandatory operational functions – e.g. – patrolling territorial waters, 24X7

● Providing a ‘point of contact’

Contracting Governments may delegate a Recognised Security Organisation certain of

their security related duties with the exception of the following:

● Setting security levels and providing security-related information

● Issuing appropriate instructions when SL3 is set

● Determining which port facilities will be required to designate a Port Facility

Security Officer (PFSO) and approving Port Facility Security Assessments (PFSA)
and Port Facility Security Plans (PFSP) and subsequent amendments
● Exercising control and compliance measures according to Reg.XI-2/9

● Establishing the requirements of Declaration of Security (DOS)

Other responsibilities of Contracting Governments

● Flag State – Ensure implementation of the legal requirements for security on

board ships flying its flag – all seafarers on board are trained in security matters,
ship has a ISSC, and an SSP issued after conducting a ship security assessment.
● Port state – Ensure implementation of the legal requirements (ensuring port
facilities have a PFSO, a PFSP, etc.) for security in the port facilities within its
jurisdiction

Extending Security Measures

Contracting Governments can legislate security measures for the following ships/craft as
the ISPS Code does not apply to them.

● Passenger and cargo ships solely engaged on domestic voyages (coastal vessels)

● Vessels involved in domestic voyages with significant distances to overseas

territories (e.g. US flagged vessel sailing from US to say Hawaii, domestic voyage
is not required to comply to ISPS requirement, US flag state security
requirements will apply)
● Harbour craft and other craft that interact with ship-to-ship activities with ships
covered by maritime security measures
● Offshore and supply support vessels

Communication of information by Contracting Governments as per SOLAS

Chapter XI-2
IMO has developed a Global Integrated Shipping Information System’ (GISIS) database.
In this database contracting Govts must upload the following maritime security
information, as required by Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS:

● Who is responsible for the ship and port facility security

● Who has been designated for receiving at all times communication concerning
ships control measures
● Who has been designated to provide advice or assistance to and to whom ships
can report
● Names and contact details of any RSOs authorized to act on their behalf and the
condition of authority
● Locations within their territory covered by the approved PFSPs

● Alternative - bilateral or multilateral agreements, between states, for short

international voyages on fixed routes, e.g. Dover to Calais ferry
● Equivalent – for a group of ships or for a group of port facilities, normally private
berths have their own security arrangements

Note: The ‘Global Integrated Shipping Information System’ (GISIS) developed by IMO
provides access to maritime security information and other matters concerning shipping
to all end users. Access is through a user ID and password.
 GISIS

Security ResponsibilitiesRecognized Security Organizations

Recognized Security Organizations

Recognized Security Organizations - surveys the role of the Recognized Security
Organization

An RSOs role is as below:

Vessel related

● Develop Ship Security Plan

● Approve Ship Security Plan

● Issue ISPS Certificates

Port Facility related

● Port facility security surveys

● Port facility security assessments

● Develop Port facility security plan

Functions related to maritime security

● Train ship security officers

● Train company security officers

 ● Train Port facility security officers

● Provide assistance to companies or port facilities

● Audit port facility security plans

● Audit ship security plans

Note: An RSO cannot approve or certify their own work products

Security ResponsibilitiesThe company

The company
The responsibilities of the company are with respect to:

A Shipping companies role is to ensure security of their vessels is as per the

requirements of Chapter XI -2 of SOLAS and Part A of the ISPS Code, taking into
account guidance given in Part B of the Code.

These responsibilities are as below:

● Ensuring that the master has documents on board relating to the crewing of the
ship and its employment, crew screened before being appointed
● Ensuring that the Ship Security Plan contains a clear statement emphasizing the
master’s authority
● Designating a Company Security Officer (CSO) and a Ship Security Officer (SSO)
and ensuring that they are given the necessary support to fulfil their duties and
responsibilities

The company must ensure (can be put as a Security procedure in the ships safety
management manual) that the ship complies with the requirements of the Ship Security
Plan as per the security level set.

The company must ensure that the Master has on board the following information in
writing:

● Who is responsible for appointing crew members

● Who is responsible for deciding employment of the ship

● Who are the parties to the charter parties

The company must provide for Master’s discretion in relation to actions to preserve ship
safety and security (safety overrides security).

The Master has the authority to deny access to any person on board, and reject cargo of
suspicious nature.

Company responsibilities

Security ResponsibilitiesThe Ship

The Ship
The vessel shall comply with the requirements of the Ship Security Plan as per
the security level set

The ship must do as follows to ensure her security:

● Whenever security level 2 or 3 is set by the Administration, the ship shall

acknowledge receipt of instructions on change of security level
 ● Prior to entering port or whilst in port, the ship shall, at SL 2 and 3, confirm the
implementation of the appropriate measures according to the SSP to the PFSO
● At SL 2 and 3 the ship shall report to the PFSO any difficulties in implementation
and must arrange appropriate actions
● If the ship is required by the Administration to set, or is already at a higher SL
than the ports it intends to enter, the ship shall advise the Designated Authority
and PFSO
● In such cases the SSO shall liaise with the FPSO and co-ordinate appropriate
actions, if necessary.

Security ResponsibilitiesThe port facility

The port facility

Contracting Governments must ensure that their port facilities comply with Chapter XI –
2 of SOLAS and Part A of the ISPS Code taking into account guidance given in Part B of
the Code.

This is done by ensuring that Port Facility Security Assessments are carried out,
reviewed and approved and Port Facility Security Plans are developed, reviewed and
approved.

A Port facility is required to act upon the security levels set by its Government within
whose territory it is located.

Notes
Security ResponsibilitiesShip Security Officer

Ship Security Officer

The company shall designate a Ship Security Officer for each vessel
The company is responsible for designating a Ship Security Officer on each of its vessels.
The duties of a SSO are of an operational nature and is as below:

These include but are not limited to the following:

● Undertaking regular security inspections of the ship to ensure that appropriate

security measures are maintained;
● Maintaining and supervising the implementation of the ship security plan,
including any amendments to the plan;
● Co-ordinating the security aspects of the handling of cargo and ship’s stores with
other shipboard personnel and with the relevant port facility security officers;
● Proposing modifications to the ship security plan;

● Reporting to the company security officer any deficiencies and non-conformities

identified during internal audits, periodic reviews, security inspections and
verifications of compliance and implementing any corrective actions;
● Enhancing security awareness and vigilance on board;

● Ensuring that adequate training has been provided to shipboard personnel, as

appropriate;
● Reporting all security incidents;

● Co-ordinating the implementation of the ship security plan with the company
security officer and relevant port facility security officer; and
 ● Ensuring that security equipment is properly operated, tested, calibrated and
maintained if any.

Security ResponsibilitiesCompany Security Officer

Company Security Officer

The company is responsible for designating a Company Security Officer, CSOs can be
nominated for one or several ships, provided it is clearly identified for which ship he or
she is responsible. The duties of a CSO are managerial in nature and are as below:

● Advising the level of threats likely to be encountered by the ship, using

appropriate security assessments and other relevant information;
● Ensuring that ship security assessments are carried out

● Ensuring the development, submission for approval, and thereafter the

implementation and maintenance of the ship security plan;
● Ensuring that the ship security plan is modified, as appropriate, to correct
deficiencies and satisfy the security requirements of the individual ship;
● Arranging for internal audits and reviews of security activities;

● Arranging for the initial and subsequent verifications of the ship by the
Administration or the recognized security organization;
● Ensuring that deficiencies and non-conformities identified during internal audits,
periodic reviews, security inspections and verifications of compliance are promptly
addressed and dealt with;
● Enhancing security awareness and vigilance;

● Ensuring adequate training for personnel responsible for the security of the ship;

● Ensuring effective communication and co-operation between the ship security

officer and the relevant port facility security officer;
● Ensuring consistency between security requirements and safety requirements;

● Ensuring that, if sister-ship or fleet security plans are used, the plans for each
ship reflects the ship-specific information accurately; and
● Ensuring that any alternative or equivalent arrangements approved for a
particular ship or group of ships are implemented and maintained.
Security ResponsibilitiesPort Facility Security Officer

Port Facility Security Officer

Is a person designated as responsible for the development, implementation, revision and
maintenance of the port facility security plan, and for liaison with ship security officers
and company security officers.

It should be noted that there is a PFSO for each facility; however a PFSO can be in
charge of several Port Facilities if required.
Other personnel

It is important to note that the following also have a role to play in the
enhancement of security, as ensuring a ship’s security is everyone’s business:

● Ship and Port Facility personnel

● Persons Other than Ship and Port Facility personnel

● Military, industry and intergovernmental organizations

Ship Security Assessment

Ship Security Assessment

During a verification of the SSP, the inspector will witness a drill to ensure that the SSO
is conducting a drill that tests the training of the crew, that the measures outlined in the
SSP are executed correctly, and that these measures adequately address security threat.

A drill, in order to be successful, might include the following:

● The measures contained in the SSP are fully implemented.

● Correct actions are taken by the crew and others on board.

● The SSO demonstrates effective control and communication.

 ● The situation reaches a positive resolution.

The inspector should critique the drill with the SSO and discuss corrective action if
necessary to address any deficiencies noted. Any deficiencies with the SSP detected
during the drill may be corrected by directing the owner in writing to submit an
amendment per the regulations. Such a requirement should be allowed at least 60 days.

Purpose of Carrying out an Assessment at the end of each Drill

A post-security drill assessment is done to evaluate the effectiveness of the security
contingency plan that is used parallel with the Ship Security Plan (SSP).

A de-brief after the drill, conducted by the Master and / or the SSO must highlight:

● Whether the objectives of the drill were achieved, stating what was performed
well
● Whether the communication between the team members was proper and
effective
● Whether there was synergy and co-operation between the crew members

● Whether the resources were adequate

● Whether the response to the emergency was proper and as per the SSP and
agreed procedures
● What was clarified by the drill

● What take-away of significant value was derived

● What should have been done differently

Note: Crew members participating in the de-brief must be allowed to give constructive
comments for the good of ship security.

Each conduct of a drill should be followed up by a report. Depending on the organization

culture, the report may be verbal or it may be written, but it is recommended that a
written report be submitted to company management as it serves as a record of the
event and the lessons learnt there from.

The report can cover the following:

● Title and objectives of the drill

● Date, time and duration

 ● Controllers and participants

● Significant events

● Lessons learnt

● Overall attainment of the Aim, Objectives and Required Attainments

● Recommendations and Follow-up action

Ship Security AssessmentAssessment tools

Assessment tools
The ship security assessment (SSA) is an essential part of the process of developing a
ship security plan. SSA is carried out by persons who are competent in this matter.
When doing an SSA assessment it is recommended that they follow the guidance notes
given in part B of the ISPS Code.

RSOs carry out Ship Security Assessments by:

● Identifying key shipboard operations that are a threat to ship security (e.g.
access control, cargo operations, embarking passengers on passenger ships)
● Identifying existing shipboard security measures and procedures (e.g. methods of
access control, identifying restricted areas for controlled access, etc.)
● Identifying potential security threat scenarios (e.g. piracy in W Africa, drug
smuggling in S America, etc.)
● Performing an on-scene security survey, this is done to check if ship personnel
are doing their security duties properly when controlling access and during cargo
loading & stores handling operations, etc.
● Identifying weakness in both the infrastructure and in ship security procedures
(so that new security measures can be implemented, to plug a presumed
weakness)

Use of checklists in conducting security assessments

"Risk-based decision-making" check lists are used to conduct an SSA to determine
appropriate security measures for a vessel.

"Risk-based decision-making" check lists can:

 ● Provide a systematic and analytical process to consider the likelihood that a
security breach will endanger an asset, individual, or function;
● Help identify actions to reduce the vulnerability and mitigate the consequences of
a security breach.

Risk-based decision-making checklists will rate the criticality of the security risk, and will
indicate if steps taken to mitigate the security risk are satisfactory.

It allows comments to make on security weaknesses if any, and actions required to plug
them.

An example of a ‘risk based decision making’ checklist for key shipboard operations is as
below:

‘Risk based decision making’ check list

Ship Security AssessmentOn-scene security surveys

On-scene security surveys
To prepare for an on-scene survey one must identify:

● Key shipboard operations, that are a security risk

● Existing security measures and procedures

● Areas of the world where there are potential security threats for vessels

Operations to be evaluated
During the on-scene security survey the following should be considered and evaluated:

● The existing duties and responsibilities of all shipboard personnel, the designation
of additional security duties and its affect to the safe operation of the vessel;
● The existing procedures or safeguards for communications and measures
necessary to maintain continuous communications at all times in the case of a
security threat;
● The existing procedures for the assessment of safety procedures and equipment
and systems and additional procedures needed to assess the continuing
effectiveness of security procedures and any security and surveillance equipment
and systems, including procedures for identifying and responding to equipment or
systems failure or malfunction;
● Additional procedures and practices required to protect security sensitive
information held in paper or electronic format;
● Any additional and maintenance requirements, or inclusion of security and
surveillance equipment and systems, if any, into the existing maintenance
programs;
● Existing procedures to ensure the timely submission, and assessment, of reports
relating to possible breaches of or security concerns;
● Procedures required to establish, maintain and up-date an inventory of any
dangerous goods or hazardous substances carried on board, including their
location.

Security aspects of ship layout

When conducting an SSA one must have a general idea of the ships layout with
reference to:
 ● The location where ships stores and essential maintenance equipment is stored,
so that they can be protected from unauthorised access.
● The number of ships personnel, any existing security measures and any existing
training
● The location and the capabilities of existing security and safety equipment for the
protection of passengers and ship’s personnel, to ensure they can be protected
from unauthorised access
● The general layout of cargo spaces and stowage arrangements

● The location and availability of emergency and stand-by equipment available to

maintain essential services, to ensure protection from unauthorised access
● The location of escape and evacuation routes, assembly stations which have to be
maintained to ensure the orderly and safe evacuation of the ship
● All access points to the ship, these will include, access ladders, ramps,
sidescuttles (port holes just below the freeboard deck), etc., as they must be
monitored or must have measures to prevent unauthorised access, e.g. lift all
overboard ladders etc. if not required

Survey Sections
The security of a vessel can be divided into

● Physical security

● Structural security

● Personnel protection systems

● Procedural policies

● Radio and Telecommunication systems

● Other areas

Ship Security AssessmentOn-scene security surveysPhysical security aboard ships

Physical security aboard ships

Importance and elements of physical security aboard ships
Physical security is the protection of personnel, hardware, software, networks and data
from physical actions and events that could cause serious loss or damage to an
enterprise, agency or institution. This includes protection from burglary, theft, vandalism
and terrorism.

On vessels physical security ensures personnel coming on board are not armed and
dangerous, it also ensures that no arms and other dangerous devices come on board the
vessel through other means e.g. – cargo or stores.

This is done by access control both onto and into the vessel and by monitoring cargo
loading operations and the delivery of stores.

Physical security:

● Deters potential intruders (e.g. warning signs and perimeter markings);

● Distinguishes authorized from unauthorized people (e.g. using keycards/access

badges )
● Delays, frustrate and ideally prevent intrusion attempts (e.g. strong walls, door
locks and safes);
● Detects intrusions and monitors/records intruders

Physical security also prevents unauthorised access to the ships computer. Prevent
unauthorised computer access by having secure passwords, changing passwords
regularly and using firewalls for the vessel’s computer network, among others.

Ship Security AssessmentOn-scene security surveysUse of communication systems

Use of communication systems

The use of information technology and communications systems in ship operations and
in maintaining security

SOLAS Convention vessels have several mandatory communication equipment for both
safety and security related communications.

Mandatory communication systems on SOLAS Convention vessels are:

● LRIT (Long Range Identification and Tracking) - In this this system the
vessel’s satellite terminal is configured to sending ship information (voyage,
 position etc.) transparent to the user to a database, that is accessed by coastal,
port and national administrations for actions to be taken to help in safety and
security incidents.
● AIS (Automatic Identification System), a Very High frequency
communication system where a vessel sends both static (Vessels name and call
sign etc.) and dynamic information (speed, course etc.), that is received by other
AIS equipped ships and shore authorities (Vessel Traffic Information System
(VTIS)) – helps track and monitor vessels
● SSAS (Ship Security Alert System) – a communication system that alerts the
flag state and the CSO immediately when the vessel is involved in a security
incident, is a button on the vessel that is activated by the Master.

There are other communication methods used for getting information or alerting, some
of these are given below:

Before transiting Somali pirate invested waters BMP5 recommends that vessels register
with United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO). Vessels transiting these
waters are recommended to check Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa’s (MSCHOA)
website for updates and advice.

BMP5 provides useful contact details in Annex A, use these to communicate directly for
help in a pirate attack.

Security Equipment and Systems

Security Equipment and Systems

 Security Layers

Security equipment and systems will depend upon the type of ships, its sea passage
routes and potential threat that it faces and the regulatory items that all ships must have
to abide by the international and local laws. The equipment listing may include, as a
minimal, the following:

● AIS
● Ship Security Alert System
● Locks
● Lighting
● Handheld radios
● GMDSS equipment
● Closed Circuit Televisions
● Automatic Intrusion Detection Device (Burglar Alarm)
● Metal detectors
● Explosive detectors
● Baggage screening equipment
● Container X-ray devices
● General Alarm

Various types of security equipment and systems that can be used aboard
vessels and in facilities
There are several equipment that are used to strengthen security on a vessel, they are
as below:

Alarms – provide 24 hour cover in all weathers, requires human intervention,

movement sensors alarms raise alert(s) by detecting movement.

Alarms

Closed circuit television

CCTVs – Can be used to cover vulnerable and restricted areas on a vessel, the
positioning of the camera is important, camera to be positioned in such a way so that all
blind spots are covered.

Once an attack is underway it may be difficult to assess whether the attackers have
gained access to the ship. The use of CCTV coverage allows a degree of monitoring of
the progress of the attack from a less exposed position. Some companies can monitor
and record the CCTV from ashore,
which will be of value when provided to the military. The following should be considered:

● CCTV cameras for coverage of vulnerable areas, particularly the poop deck and
bridge.
 ● CCTV monitors located on the bridge and at the safe muster point/citadel.

● CCTV footage may provide useful evidence after an attack and should be
retained.

CCTV Camera

CCTVs can monitor access points. They provide 24 hour cover irrespective of weather,
information is recorded and can be retrieved if required.

CCTVs require good monitoring, therefore do not have too many viewing screens as then
monitoring becomes difficult.
 CCTVs

Lighting – is a deterrent for unauthorised access as it helps monitor approaches to the

vessel at berth, and therefore can help detect intruders. However, it is only effective
with good monitoring.

Lighting is helpful in identifying persons boarding at night. Use a separate circuit for
over-side lighting.

Lighting is important and the following is recommended:

● Weather deck lighting around the accommodation block and rear facing lighting
on the poop deck to demonstrate awareness.
● If fitted, search lights ready for immediate use.

● Once attackers have been identified or an attack commences, over side lighting,
if fitted, should be switched on. This will dazzle the attackers and help the ship’s
crew to see them.
● At night, only navigation lights should be exhibited.

● Navigation lights should not be switched off at night as this a contravention of

international regulations and the risk of collision is higher than that of being
attacked.
● At anchor, deck lights should be left on as well-lit ships are less vulnerable to
attack.
 ● The ability to turn off all internal accommodation lights to deter pirates from
entering or disorientate those who may already have entered.

Lighting

Locks and locking equipment may not prevent entry but they delay entry. Doors and
their locking mechanisms must afford the same protection.

Use combination locks, normal locks if used to have a spare set of keys. Tag key sets for
identification.
 Locks

Access control – Allow only authorised persons to board the vessel. All visitors to board
through the gangway. Gangway to be monitored 24X7 while in port. Provide visitors with
an ID card, and record all visitor entries in a logbook.

Persons on gangway watch and on patrol to be equipped with communication equipment.

Search visitors and their belongings on entry and escort them into the vessel.
 Access Control

Search – Depending on the security level, searching, visitors may be required. Trained
staff to carry out searches. Preserve human dignity when searching. Do not search
public authority officers (e.g. Port State Control Inspectors). Use hand held scanners for
body searches.
 Hand held scanners

Search, cargo, baggage and stores. The port facility does the cargo search. Use baggage
scanning equipment for stores and baggage (passenger vessels).

Ensure containers seals are intact when loaded. All cargo loaded to be according to the
manifest.

Check stores coming on board against the manifest. Store away quickly after receiving
them.

Do not load unaccompanied baggage if possible; deal with them as per the Ship Security
Plan (SSP). Isolate suspicious baggage; do make an effort to find the owner.
 Baggage scanners

Using Gloves for Physical Checks

 Search equipment

Security equipment and systems that may be used to prevent and suppress
attacks by pirates and armed robbers
Some navigational watch precautions to be taken when entering a high risk piracy area
are as below:

● Provide additional lookouts for each Watch. Brief the additional lookouts.

● Consider a shorter rotation of the Watch period in order to maximise alertness of

the lookouts.
● Ensure that there are sufficient binoculars for the enhanced Bridge Team,
preferably anti-glare.
● Consider the use of night vision optics.

● Maintain a careful Radar Watch.

Other measures to prevent/deter pirate attacks are:

● The use of dummies at strategic locations to give pirates an impression of overt

vigilance
● Enhance bridge protection by equipping persons on watch with bullet proof
jackets and helmets, protect the bridge from RPG attacks using sandbags and re-
enforcing bridge windows, among others
● Control access to bridge, accommodation and machinery spaces by securing all
doors, note: exits should not be blocked
● Use physical barriers, like razor wires and electrified fences on the ships side and
the removal of ladders that provide access to bridge and accommodation
 ● The use of water spray and foam monitors to deliver jets of water on an attacking
skiff can deter pirate boarding
● Use alarms to inform crew of a pirate attack

● Practice ship manoeuvres designed to prevent pirate boarding, prior entering a

high risk area
● Use searchlights and night vision optics to detect pirate vessels

● Use CCTVs to monitor pirate boarding

● The use of armed guards, to deter pirate boarding

● Get the ship’s citadel ready, citadel to accommodate all crew in the event of
pirate boarding, note citadel is effective if all crew are accommodated, practice
citadel entry during security drills

ANTI-PIRACY ‘HARDENING’
With ever increasing piracy threat from Gulf of Eden, Red Sea, North Arabian Sea and
near the coastline of India it has become important to fortify the vessels for passive
purpose (deterrence) and for active purpose (defence).

Each vessel has its own vulnerabilities, which pirates will aim to exploit in the event of
an attack, including areas of low freeboard and areas where grapples, ladders and other
tools can be attached to allow access.

Pirates typically use long lightweight hooked ladders, grappling hooks with rope attached
and long hooked poles with a climbing rope attached to board vessels underway.
Physical barriers should be used to make it as difficult as possible to gain access to
vessels by increasing the height.

Physical barriers can be put in place which will physically bar the pirates from boarding
the vessel, gaining access to the vital areas within the vessel such as the bridge, engine
room, and crew quarters. If their access is barred and their attempts to control the ship
are hampered, then many pirates will simply abandon their attempt.

Razor Wire

Also known as barbed wire. It creates an effective barrier if properly rigged and secured.
The quality of razor wire varies considerably and lower quality razor wire is less
effective. The following is recommended:
 ● Use a high tensile concertina razor wire with coil diameters of 730 mm or 980
mm. This is difficult to cut with hand tools.
● Use a double roll. If this is not possible, place a single high-quality roll outboard
of the ship’s structure.
● Secure razor wire to the ship properly, to prevent attackers pulling the wire off.
For example, attach at least every third wire ring to ship’s railings and rig a steel
cable through its core.
● Use personal protective equipment and wire hooks to move and install razor wire.

● Obtain razor wire in short sections, e.g. 10 m, so that it is easier and safer to
move.
● Keep razor wire clear of mooring fairleads when at terminals so that it does not
interfere with mooring operations.

Razor wire creates an effective barrier but only when it is carefully deployed. The barbs
on the wire are designed to have a piercing and gripping action. Care should be taken
when selecting appropriate razor wire as the quality (wire gauge and frequency of barbs)
and type will vary considerably.

Concertina razor wire (linked spirals), available in approx. 750 mm or 950 mm each coil
of 15 meter as the linked spirals make it the most effective barrier.

When deploying razor wire personal safety and protective measures are required. Using
razor wire is effective when constructed on ship structure, deployed double or treble roll
of wire, and secured the razor wire with a wire rope through the razor wire to prevent it
being dislodged.

Some measures used to harden the vessels structure against unauthorised boarding
and/or pirate attacks are:

● Barbed wire fences or electric fences on the ships side

● Sand bags on bridge front bulkhead to mitigate Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG)
attack
 Barbed wire fence

Electric fence

Operation of Various Types of Security Equipment and Systems on Board

The method of operating security equipment and systems are as below:
The Master should implement the following actions to assist in raising vigilance on board
and utilize the bridge equipment as detailed here-under:

● Provide additional, fully-briefed lookouts.

● Maintain an all-round lookout from an elevated position.

● Consider shorter rotation of the watch period to maximize alertness of the

lookouts.
● Maintain sufficient binoculars for the enhanced bridge team, preferably anti-glare.

● Consider the use of thermal imagery optics and night vision aids as they provide
a reliable all-weather, day and night surveillance capability.
● Maintain a careful radar watch and monitor all navigational warnings and
communications, particularly VHF and GMDSS alerts.
● Consider placing well-constructed dummies at strategic locations around the ship
to give the impression of greater numbers of crew on watch.
● Consider using CCTV and fixed search lights for better monitoring. Fixed search
lights can deter approaches from the stern.
● Mount anti-piracy mirrors on the bridge wings to make looking aft easier.

Operation and process of application of Security Equipment under a security

threat

Alarms
The ship’s alarms inform the ship’s crew that an attack is underway and warn the
attacker that the ship is aware and is reacting. In addition, continuous sounding of the
ship’s whistle may distract the attackers. It is important that:

● The alarms are distinctive to avoid confusion.

● Crew members are familiar with each alarm, especially those warning of an attack
and indicating ‘all clear’.
● All alarms are backed up by an announcement over the accommodation and deck
PA system, where fitted.
● Drills are carried out to ensure that the alarm is heard throughout the ship.

● The drill will confirm the time necessary for all crew to move to a position of
safety.

Physical barriers
Physical barriers are intended to make it as difficult as possible for attackers to gain
access to ships by increasing the difficulty of the climb for those trying to illegally board.
When planning the placement of barriers special consideration should be given to ships
with sunken poop decks.

Other physical barriers

Other barriers have proven effective – from hanging swinging obstacles over the gunnels
to specifically designed overhanging protection that prevents illegal boarding by climbing
over the ship’s rails.

Water spray and foam monitors

● The use of water spray and/or foam monitors is effective in deterring or delaying
any attempt to illegally board a ship. The use of water can make it difficult for an
unauthorized boat to remain alongside and makes it significantly more difficult to
climb aboard.
● It is recommended hoses and foam monitors (delivering water) are fixed in
position to cover likely access routes and are remotely operated. Manual
activation is not recommended as this may place the operator in an exposed
position.
● Improved water coverage may be achieved by using fire hoses in jet mode and
using baffle plates fixed a short distance in front of the nozzle.
● Water cannons deliver water in a vertical sweeping arc and protect a greater part
of the hull.
● Water spray rails with spray nozzles produce a water curtain covering larger
areas.
● Foam can be used, but it must be in addition to a ship’s standard fire fighting
equipment stock. Foam is disorientating and very slippery.
● The use of all available fire and general service pumps may be required to ensure
all defences operate efficiently.
● Additional power may be required when using pumps; the supporting systems
should be ready for immediate use.
● Practice, observation and drills are required to ensure the equipment provides
effective coverage of vulnerable areas.

Deny the use of ship’s tools and equipment

Securing onboard Tools and Equipment
It is important to secure ship’s tools or equipment that may be used to gain entry to the
ship. Tools and equipment that may be of use to attackers should be stored in a secure
location.

Protection of equipment stored on the upper deck

● Consideration should be given to providing ballistic protection to protect gas

cylinders or containers of flammable liquids.
● Excess gas cylinders should be stored in a secure location or, if possible, landed
prior to transit.

Enhanced bridge protection

The bridge is usually the focal point of an attack. In some situations, attackers direct
their weapon fire at the bridge to intimidate the ship’s crew to slow or stop the ship. If
pirates board the ship, they usually make for the bridge to enable them to take control.

The following enhancements may be considered:

● Bridge windows are laminated but further protection against flying glass can be
provided by the application of blast resistant film.
● Fabricated metal (steel/aluminium) plates for the side and rear bridge windows
and the bridge wing door windows, which can be quickly secured in place in the
event of an attack can greatly reduce the risk of injury from fragmentation.
● Chain link fencing can be used to reduce the effects of an RPG.

● Sandbags can provide additional protection on the bridge wings. They should be
regularly checked to ensure that they have not degraded.

Control of access to accommodation and machinery spaces

It is important to control access routes to the accommodation and machinery spaces to
deter or delay entry. Effort must be directed at denying access to these spaces.

● Escape routes must remain accessible to seafarers in the event of an emergency.

● Where the door or hatch is located on an escape route from a manned

compartment, it is essential it can be opened from the inside. Where the door or
 hatch is locked it is essential a means of opening the door from the inside is
available.
● Doors and hatches providing access to the bridge, accommodation and machinery
spaces should be properly secured to prevent them being opened from the
outside.
● Once doors and hatches are secured, a designated and limited number are used
for security patrols and routine access. The use of these doors or hatches should
be controlled by the Officer of the Watch.
● Block external stairs or remove ladders on the accommodation block to prevent
use and to restrict external access to the bridge.
● Doors and hatches that must be closed for watertight integrity should be fully
dogged down in addition to any locks. Where possible, additional securing
mechanisms, such as wire strops, may be used.
● Removable barriers should be used around pilot boarding points so that a ship
does not need to de-rig large areas prior to arrival at ports.
● Pirates have been known to gain access through portholes and windows. The
fitting of steel bars to portholes and windows will prevent this.
● Procedures for controlling access to accommodation, machinery spaces and store
rooms should be briefed to the crew.
● The attackers must be denied access to ship propulsion.

Safe muster points and/or citadels

The company risk assessment and planning process should identify the location of a safe
muster point and/or a citadel within a ship.

Safe muster points

A safe muster point is a designated area chosen to provide maximum physical protection
to the crew and will be identified during the planning process.
If the threat assessment identifies risks that may result in a breach of hull on or below
the waterline then a safe muster point above the waterline must be identified. In many
ships, the central stairway may provide a safe location as it is protected by the
accommodation block and is above the waterline. To minimize the effect of an explosion,
consideration should be given to the likely path of the blast. The safe muster point
should be selected with this in mind.

Other measures
Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC)

Armed Guard

Use of PMSCs onboard merchant ships is a decision taken by individual ship operators
where permitted by the ship’s Flag State and any littoral states. However, the use of
experienced and competent unarmed PMSCs can be a valuable protective measure,
particularly where there may be the requirement to interface and coordinate with local
law enforcement agencies, naval forces and coast guards. Any decision to engage the
services of a PMSC should consider:

● The current threat and risk environment.

● The output of the company risk assessment.

● Voyage plan requirements.

● Ship speed.

● Freeboard.

● Type of operations, e.g. seismic survey or cable laying.

 ● Levels of protection provided by navies, coastguards and maritime police.

Master’s overriding authority

If private security contractors are embarked, there must be a clear understanding of the
overriding authority of the Master. The Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) under which the
PCASP operate must be acceptable to the Flag State and the company.

The Master and PCASP should:

● Clearly understand and acknowledge the RUF as outlined in the contract.

● Have documentation authorizing the carriage of weapons and ammunition.

● Ensure all incidents involving the use of weapons and armed force are reported at
the earliest instance to the Flag State and the Chief Security Officer (CSO).

Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel

Any decision to engage the services of PCASP should consider the guidance above for
PMSC as well as the following.

BMP does not recommend or endorse the general use of PCASP onboard merchant ships;
this is a decision taken by individual ship operators where permitted by the ship’s Flag
State and any littoral states.

Some Flag States do not allow the deployment of PCASP or PMSC. Some Flag States
provide military Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs) instead of PCASP. A VPD may be
provided by another State, subject to Flag State approval. In some cases, the
deployment of either PCASP or VPDs must be reported and acknowledged by the Flag
State and reported when entering the designated risk area.VRA

The PCASP must:

Act in accordance with the agreed RUF, which should provide for a graduated,
reasonable, proportionate and demonstrably necessary escalation in the application of
force in defence of crew on the ship.

Limitations of individual items of equipment and security systems

Some of the operational limitations of equipment and security systems used on board is
as below:
 ● Alarms – requires human intervention

● CCTVs – when installing ensure there are no blind spots, requires good
monitoring, do not have to many monitoring screens
● Locks and locking equipment – may not prevent entry, they deter entry and they
must afford the same protection as the doors they are placed on
● Search’s – do not embarrass, be polite, have a witness when conducting the
search, use trained personal to conduct physical body searches
● Ship Maneuvers – do not use large alterations as speed reduces, small alterations
preferred.
● Lighting – Bright lights can reduce one’s visibility.

Risks and benefits of security equipment and systems that may be used to
prevent and suppress attacks by pirates and armed robbers
Risks and benefits of security equipment to deter pirates is as below:

● Dummies deter pirates but maintain a proper lookout for pirates in high-risk
areas.
● When constructing any physical barriers identify areas that are vulnerable to a
pirate attack, to protect them. Physical barriers deter and prevent pirate
boarding.
● The establishing of a Citadel may be beyond the capability of ship’s staff alone,
and may well require external technical advice and support. All crew must be
inside the citadel, when pirates board. This will provide vessel with time to get
help.

Testing Calibration and Maintenance of Security Equipment and Systems

Security Systems and Equipment Maintenance

Inspectors will review records related to inspection, testing and calibration of security
equipment as well as the frequency of related actions to ensure that these are being
conducted. Records available for review and consultation should include, but are not
limited to, manufacturers maintenance recommendations, system plans or schematics,
test records/logs, and deficiencies/system failures with repair and/or RSO repair
documentation. Inspectors can ask the SSO questions related to inspection, testing,
calibration, and maintenance of security equipment. Inspectors may also question the
SSO and other personnel with security duties on how the system (and subsystems)
works, including a demonstration of system functionality and any appropriate
tests/alarms.

Ship Security Alert Systems (SSAS) are a SOLAS XI-2 requirement, and ISPS
requires that the SSP include a description of the system. Due to the sensitive security
nature of the information, ISPS allows the owner to keep the SSAS information separate
from the other parts of the SSP. This information is essential in order for the inspector to
complete the verification. ISPS also requires the equipment to be installed after the first
“survey” of the radio equipment following the deadline. Survey in this case means either
the periodical or renewal survey, whichever occurs next after the
deadline for compliance. New vessels must have the equipment installed at the initial
survey.

Specifics details will be contained in the SSP describing test procedures for the SSAS.
The inspector should follow the test procedures indicated. If the test reveals a problem
with either the test procedure or the SSAS itself, the inspector should immediately
inform the SSO. The failure of the SSAS represents a serious security deficiency and
must be addressed as soon as possible.

The SSAS shall:

● Initiate and transmit ship-to-shore alert to a competent Authority.

● Not send the ship security alert to other ships.

● Not raise any alarm on board the ship.

● Continue the ship security alert until deactivated and/or reset.

● Be capable of being activated from the navigation bridge and at least one other
location.
● Conform to performance standards not inferior to those adopted by the
Organization.
● Activation points shall be designed so as to prevent inadvertent initiation.

Maintenance Requirements of Security Equipment and Systems

Typical equipment related questions during ship security audits:

● Specialized Security Equipment available/in use?

● Are the communication equipment working and testing of calibration recorded?

 ● Additional security lighting available/rigged? (360 degree)

● Declaration of Security (DOS) available for the Port?

● Is the current level of security posted?

● Security Fire Hose rigging plan available?

● All water cannons are in good working order and can be exhibited for operation?

● Ship's emergency fire pump is in operation and duly surveyed?

● All watertight doors are operational and under certification?

● Security emergency signals agreed between vessel and port?

● Records maintained in a file (Continuous Synopsis Record) plus deck logbook

entries?
● Procedures in place for verifying integrity of cargo including containers & CTU’s?

● Procedures in place for the verification of ships stores and spares against
manifest?

It is important to note the following in relation to security equipment and systems:

● Crew should be familiar with the equipment and procedures, this can be done
with the required training, and reading user manuals
● Equipment must be calibrated and tested before use

● Specialized equipment must only be used by trained personnel

● Usage of all security related equipment must be supervised and controlled

Include the maintenance schedule of all security equipment in the vessels

Planned Maintenance System (PMS)

In this regard, the SSO must develop checklists/procedures/policies for:

● Testing the equipment – to be done regularly – say weekly

● Calibrating the equipment

● Equipment familiarization

● Drills for using of the equipment

● Equipment maintenance

● The VSP must include procedures for identifying and responding to security
system and equipment failures or malfunctions.

Since there are just too many equipment and some of the equipment are part of the
LSA/FFA list of equipment e.g., fire pump, water hoses, water tight doors etc., the VSO
can use those schedule as part of his way to maintain the security equipment; the rest of
the security equipment then can be checked at scheduled intervals, while conducting
security drills and be part of a weekly checks as normally practiced on board most deep
sea vessels.

The risks and benefits of security equipment and systems that may be used to
prevent and suppress attacks by pirates and armed robbers
Risks and benefits of security equipment to deter pirates is as below:

● Dummies deter pirates but maintain a proper lookout for pirates in high-risk
areas.
● When constructing any physical barriers identify areas that are vulnerable to a
pirate attack, to protect them. Physical barriers deter and prevent pirate
boarding.
● The establishing of a Citadel may be beyond the capability of ship’s staff alone,
and may well require external technical advice and support. All crew must be
inside the citadel, when pirates board. This will provide vessel with time to get
help.

Testing, calibration and maintenance requirements for the above security

equipment and systems
It is important to note the following in relation to security equipment and systems:

● Crew should be familiar with the equipment and procedures, this can be done
with the required training, and reading user manuals
● Equipment must be calibrated and tested before use

● Specialised equipment must only be used by trained personnel

● Usage of all security related equipment must be supervised and controlled

● Include the maintenance schedule of all security equipment in the vessels

Planned Maintenance System (PMS)

Threat Identification, Recognition, and Response

Threat Identification, Recognition, and Response

Maritime piracy and maritime terrorism are known threats to global shipping, with piracy
imposing substantial human and economic costs – particularly off the coast of Somalia –
in recent years. Drug, weapon, and human trafficking also have an increasingly well-
documented maritime dimension. Maritime piracy has tended to concentrate in just three
regions in the last five years; the Horn of Africa (exclusively Somali pirates), the Gulf of
Guinea (pirates from Nigeria), and the region in and around the Strait of Malacca
(committed largely by Indonesian pirates). What may actually be the most significant
threat for the maritime industry is the emerging “web of criminality” with pirates,
terrorists, and “ordinary” criminals working opportunistically in an ad-hoc manner around
criminal opportunities.

All nations bear the economic costs of piracy. These costs stem from those associated
with the direct protection of the vessel and its crew; to those associated with longer
transit when pirate waters are avoided in favour of longer shipping routes.

Maritime piracy imposes both human costs and economic costs on maritime shipping.
Human costs come in the form not only of seafarers being hijacked and held hostage,
but injury during attacks and even death.

It is also important to note that the type of weapons used varies by location. Guns were
used in eight incidents in Somalia, eighteen in Nigeria, and in six in the Malacca region.
Knives (typically less lethal) remain the weapon of choice in Indonesia, Malacca and
Malaysia, used in twenty-five of the attacks in this part of the world.

Examples of economic costs include transiting at increased speeds, the costs of military
guards and equipment, insurance and labour costs, ransoms, and the costs of operating
and maintaining the international task forces. There was considerable consternation
when the cost figures were released in 2011 – up until then, most everyone who had
thought at all about piracy believed the problem was restricted to a minor segment of
the global shipping industry; few thought about calculating nearly all costs associated
with maritime piracy or realized they could amount to more than $6.5 billion globally,
with the estimated cost per ship per transit approximately $134,000.

The threat
As well as piracy, regional instability has introduced new security threats including the
use of:

● Anti-ship missiles.

● Sea mines.

● Water-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIED).

Piracy
Pirates operate in Pirate Action Groups (PAG) who operate several different boat
configurations, typically using small high speed (up to 25 knots) open boats or skiffs.

PAG boat configurations include:

● Skiffs only.

● Open whalers carrying significant quantities of fuel and often towing one or more
attack skiffs.
● Motherships, which include merchant ships and fishing vessels but, more
commonly, dhows.

Where motherships are used the crew are often held onboard as hostages. Motherships
are used to carry pirates, stores, fuel and attack skiffs to enable pirates to operate over
a much larger area and are significantly less affected by the weather. Attack skiffs are
often towed behind motherships. Where the size of the mothership allows, skiffs may be
carried onboard and camouflaged.

Pirates may use small arms fire and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) to intimidate
Masters of ships to reduce speed or stop to allow them to board. The bridge and
accommodation tend to be the main targets for these weapons.

Pirates use long lightweight ladders, knotted climbing ropes or long hooked poles to
climb up the side of the ship. Once onboard they will make their way to the bridge to try
to take control of the ship. When on the bridge they will demand the ship slows/stops to
enable other pirates to board.

Attacks can take place at any time – day or night – however experience shows attacks at
dawn and dusk are more likely.
The intent of Somali pirates is to hijack the ship and hold the crew for ransom. The usual
practice is to keep the crew onboard as negotiations progress, keeping both the crew
and the ship together. Seafarers have occasionally been separated by nationality and
taken ashore. It is in the interests of the pirates to keep their captives alive, although
cases of intimidation and torture have occurred.

Anti-ship missiles
Anti-ship missiles are long range, accurate and powerful weapons and have been used
against military ships in the region. Their use against merchant ships associated with
regional conflict cannot be discounted. Other ships may be hit if the missile controller
targets the wrong ship or the missile homes in on an unintended target.

Sea mines
Sea mines have been used to deter and deny access to key ports in Yemen. These mines
are usually tethered or anchored but may break free from moorings and drift into

shipping lanes. Transiting merchant ships are not a target and it is recommended

ships use the MSTC when passing through the area.

Water-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices

WBIED attacks have been used against warships and merchant ships in the southern Red
Sea/BAM/western area of the Gulf of Aden.

Incidents have highlighted attacks by different groups operating in the region:

● WBIED used in the regional conflict have been aimed at harming those associated
with the conflict. These boats have been unmanned and operated remotely.
● WBIED used by extremists have been aimed at merchant ships. These boats have
been manned.

An attack involving a WBIED is likely to involve one or more speed boats operated by a
number of individuals approaching and firing both small arms and RPGs. Masters should
recognise the intent of these attacks is to cause damage and not necessarily to board
the ship. Mitigation measures to prevent the speed boat making contact with the ship’s
hull are limited.

Threat assessment
The threat assessment must include all regional security threats.

As part of every ship risk assessment prior to transit through the HRA the latest military
threat advice must be obtained from UKMTO www.ukmto.org and threat assessments
from MSCHOA www.mschoa.org.

A threat is formed of capability, intent and opportunity.

Capability means attackers have the physical means to conduct an attack. Intent is
demonstrated by continued attacks. Opportunity is what is mitigated by the company,
ship and crew through application of the measures described in this guidance. In
addition to the information provided in this guidance, supplementary information about
the characteristics of the threat, specific or new tactics, and regional background factors
may be sought from regional reporting centres.

If one side of the triangle is removed, then risk is minimised. The company/Master
cannot influence either capability or intent, therefore BMP measures focus on minimising
the opportunity.

Threat Identification, Recognition, and ResponseVarious types of weapons

Various types of weapons

Various types of weapons, dangerous substances and devices, the damage they
can cause, and their appearance
Various types of weapons that are prohibited on a vessel and the damage they can cause
is as below:

Prohibited Items, list is non-exhaustive as not possible to list all dangerous substances,
there are too many and new ones are discovered regularly, major ones listed though.

Weapons (firearms, knives, grenades, rockets); Can be fatal and will sometimes cause
damage to property.
 Weapons

Explosives Can be fatal and will cause damage to property.

Explosives – release method

 Plastic Explosives

Concealing Explosives
Types of weapons used are ranging from knives, machetes, spears etc to firearms of
many kinds like pistols, guns, machine guns, grenades etc. Look at the pictures and
recognize them. The use of these can cause injuries of varying degrees as well as death.
They can also cause damage to assets either directly or indirectly like causing an
explosion or a fire.

Damage Caused by Dangerous Substances and Devices

Chemical, biological, and radiological devices Will cause harm to the human body
(fatal at times), and damage to property

Some examples:

Chemical - Mustard Gas, in use since World War 1 causes severe burning to the skin.

SARIN - Invented by German scientists as a nerve gas agent in preparation for World

War II is 20 times deadlier than cyanide. Described as ‘the poor man’s atomic
bomb’. One drop, the size of a pinhead, is sufficient to kill a person by crippling
the nervous system.

Biological Agents are Infectious and toxic substances like; viruses, bacteria, toxins that
are packed in vials or petri-dishes & protective containers

Chemical Agents, Nerve agents, Blister agents & Blood agents are corrosive and are in a
liquid or a syrupy form.
 Radiological devices

Explosives used causes a very fast chemical reaction of substances producing gas at high
temperature and pressure with such velocity to cause damage. They kill by pressure
blast, high temperature and shrapnel used to fill the device in which it is used. Some
explosives’ examples are black powder, nitro glycerine, ammonium nitrate, C4, etc.

The device consists of the explosive, the detonator and the triggering mechanism. Some
of the very common devices are improvised from ordinary everyday use things and are
called I.E.D (improvised explosive device).

These will always be in disguise. Few other criminal acts raise as much fear and concern
as bombings, so it's no coincidence that crime and terrorist groups routinely use them as
a means to achieve their goals whether they are loss of life, intimidation, extortion or
government or commercial disruption. Most terrorist and crime groups use Improvised
Explosive Devices or IED's. Detonated on board a ship, an IED can create a serious hull
break or start a dangerous fire, both of which can lead to injury and loss of life. So what
does an IED look like?
All of these images below are clever disguises of IED's are homemade weapons that are
easily manufactured and limited in their form only by the imagination of their creator!
Because they often take the shape of everyday items, it's critical to always be on the
look-out for objects that seem out of place or out of context and to be able to recognise
the components of and IED.

Common Components

Despite their differences in appearance, all IED's have four components in

common - a timer, a power source, a detonator and an explosive. Sometimes, a
timer power unit (TPU) is used and consists of a homemade unit that contains
the timer and a power source and is connected to a detonator and an explosive.
Power sources are usually batteries. Detonators are usually commercially
available electric or blasting cap detonators that contain very small quantities of
a very sensitive explosive. Industrial explosives may be commercial or military
grade. Commercial explosives are readily available to license holders and are
commonly used in the quarrying and construction industries. High power military
explosives are available from eastern bloc countries and states supporting
terrorism. Liquid explosives are available, but difficult to find. Terrorist and
criminal groups have devised ways to make homemade explosives because other
type of explosives are not always readily available. These explosives are usually
derived from chemicals found in fertilizer or other industrial products.

Incendiary Devices - Incendiary Devices are a commonly used type of IED. They

consist of a small amount of explosive supplemented by a flammable liquid.

These small, but effective devices use the destructive power of fire to cause
massive damage.

Vehicle Borne Devices - Car bombs are another common type if IED. They are

designed to carry large quantities of explosives and use vehicles as weapons.

Under car booby traps are another common IED designed to kill or maim the
occupants of a vehicle. Used as assassination weapons, they usually contain
small amounts of a high grade explosive and may be triggered by a timer, a
remote control device or a mercury tilt switch.

Letter and Parcel Bombs - Terrorists sometimes use letter and parcel bombs as

methods of intimidation or assassination. There are many indications that a

letter or a parcel is suspicious, some of which can be recognized! Listed are all of
the indications to watch-out for. It may not be obvious at first glance that a
letter or package is suspicious, so it's always a good idea for crew to wear
protective clothing and rubber gloves when handling mail and to use a letter
opener to open envelopes. Whenever possible have all parcels x-rayed or
scanned before opening them.

If there are signs that a package or parcel is suspicious, crew should take these
immediate actions: Make no attempt to open the envelope or package Place it in plain
view on a flat surface or move it to an open space on the ship's deck. If it is left in a
confined space ensure all doors and windows are left open. Clear the area. Cordon off
the area and, if possible, allow nobody to within 50m or 2 bulkheads of the line of sight
of the package. Notify the Duty Watch Officer.

Other dangerous substances can be gases of explosive /flammable or toxic nature which
can be in liquefied form or compressed. Some flammable gases are natural gas
(methane/ethane), LPG (propane /butane), hydrogen and acetylene. Toxic gases are
Ammonia, H2S, SO2, Cyanide, Phosgene etc. Dangerous liquids, solids, can be so due to
being flammable, toxic or having properties to cause damage to human body like
corrosion burns or cancer/mutation of cells. Substances having radioactive properties are
an example. Also, we have seen that some powders used by terrorists caused anthrax or
lung problems to people.

Threat Identification, Recognition, and ResponseMethods of physical searches

Methods of physical searches

Physical security search on board for people, bags and concealed dangerous goods,
drugs etc is a very involved process and it requires meticulous planning, setting up clear
search objectives and step-by-step procedures for the methodologies to be followed by
the ship security team. They also need to understand how the search equipment works
and identify when there is a problem. Furthermore, the SSO must be well- familiar with
the ship design and construction and know the various places of concealment possible on
a particular vessel, which can differ substantially, based on the vessel type as well as
design.

Carry out Physical Searches and Non-Intrusive Inspections

Seek permission before doing non-intrusive inspections. Methods to be followed for non-
intrusive searches/inspections as below:

Personal body search

● Only search the same gender subject.

● Inform the subject that physical search is required of him. (see above for female)

● Wear gloves, i.e. surgical type, wherever possible and applicable.

● Use metal detector, if available.

 ● Carry out search away from the security checkpoint, i.e. designate a physical
search area.
● Always have another ship personnel standby and watch the search. This is to
prevent false allegation by subject on item(s) found on his body during the search
process and other undue allegations by him. This may not be necessary if a
working CCTV camera is is recording the entire process.
● Thank the subject when the search completes smoothly.

Personal effects

● Inform the subject that you are going to search his personal effect.

● Wear gloves, i.e. surgical type, wherever possible and applicable.

● Have a stick ready if you do not want to touch the effect.

● You may ask the subject to hold on to his personal effect while you scrutinize it.

● Always have another ship personnel standby and watch the search. This is to
prevent false allegation by subject on item(s) found in the bag and other undue
allegations by him. This may not be necessary if a working CCTV camera is
recording the entire process.
● Thank the subject when the search completes smoothly.

Baggage

● Inform the subject that you are going to search his baggage.

● Wear gloves, i.e. surgical type, wherever possible and applicable.

● Have a torch light and stick ready.

● You may ask the subject to open his bag and its various compartments, and to
clear all items to assist you in the search.
● Always have another ship personnel standby and watch the search. This is to
prevent false allegation by subject on item(s) found in the bag and other undue
allegations by him. This may not be necessary if a working CCTV camera is
recording the entire process.
● Thank the subject when the search completes smoothly.

Cargo and stores are screened at the entrance to a port facility. However cross check
with their manifests.
The above Integrated Terminal planning and monitoring system, a modular one and is
currently in operation use latest technologies for secure data collection and transmission
improves Port productivity and performance and of course the security of the port
operations.

Use of metal detectors, X-Ray machines, and Non scan machines

Metal detectors - A metal detector is an electronic device, which detects the presence
of metal nearby. Metal detectors are useful for finding metal inclusions hidden within
objects.
They often consist of a handheld unit with a sensor probe, which can be swept over
objects (e.g. a person).
If the sensor comes near a piece of metal this is indicated by a changing tone in
earphones, or a needle moving on an indicator. Usually the device gives some indication
of distance; the closer the metal is, the higher the tone in the earphone or the higher the
needle goes.
Another common type are stationary "walk through" metal detectors used for security
screening at access points of a port facility.

X-Ray machines - X-Ray imaging is ideal for searching items without opening and
manually inspecting each one. The tools are quick and reliable, and produce detailed
images showing what’s inside each scanned object.

An x-ray scanner identifies harmful organic, inorganic and metal materials. Different
materials absorb rays at different levels. Security x-ray machines spot dangerous items
by looking at the mass density and atomic number of the substances of the materials
that pass through it. Metal, organic and inorganic materials show up differently on the
screen. Organic items will appear as orange. Generally, explosives are made from
organic materials, thus allowing personnel reading the x-ray scanners to identify threats.
If an object’s mass and density falls within the range of a dangerous material, x ray
scanners will warn the operator of a potential hazardous object. Security x-ray machines
use low dose penetrating radiation to detect metallic and non-metallic objects hidden
under clothing or body cavities.
X-Ray Scanners can vary in size from parcel scanners to large vehicle and cargo
scanners.
With X-Ray scanners the end user simply needs to know what objects they are looking
for.

There are two (2) common types of X-ray security scanners:

● Cabinet X-ray Systems: Contain an X-ray tube installed within a shielded

enclosure. The enclosure is made up of a material, usually lead, that prevents
most of the X-ray radiation from escaping the cabinet. (used at a Facility). These
systems can inspect a parcel without opening and damaging its contents.
● Personnel Security Screening Systems: There are two types, namely:
1. General use X-Ray screening systems
2. Millimeter Wave Security Screening Systems

General use X-ray screening systems deliver low doses of ionizing radiation. These
systems are also known as “backscatter” systems because they create images from the
small amounts of X-rays that bounce off the screened individual.

The reflected X-rays are detected and processed by computers to form an image for
operators to review.

Millimeter wave security screening systems use non-ionizing radiation and come in
two forms. The first are active systems that expose the screened person to small
amounts of millimeter wave energy.

The second are passive systems that detect naturally occurring millimeter wave
emissions from bodies. These machines use radio frequency waves to detect threats and
they emit thousands of times less energy than a cell phone.

Lon Scan Machine – These machines are used to detect explosives or drugs by testing
a surface where elements of the drug or explosive may have been left over – e.g. a
person’s clothing, baggage and any object.

Radiation and Security Scanning

In security applications, metal detectors use radio frequency signals to react to moving
metal e.g., coins in your pocket. X-ray systems produce density images that are
analyzed for irregularities.

To help keep people safe from radiation, vessel entry points may use different kinds of
screening equipment such as backscatter x-ray machines, cabinet x-ray machines,
millimeter wave machines and metal detectors.

● People may be screened with backscatter x-ray machines. They use very low
levels of ionizing radiation.
● People may be screened with millimeter wave scanners. They use radio frequency
(non-ionizing) radiation.
● Metal detectors use no radiation.
● Bags are screened with cabinet x-ray machines. No radiation leaves the machine

Luggage is scanned with cabinet x-ray systems. The thick walls and lead curtains of the
cabinets keep radiation from escaping. The machines must meet strict standards about
how much radiation can escape. The machines must also have locks, warning lights and
warning labels. Handheld scanners can detect threats such as weapons or explosives
that a person could be carrying under their clothing. There are two main types that may
be used in airports: backscatter x-ray systems and millimeter wave machines.

Backscatter machines use very low levels of x-rays. Generally, the amount of radiation
received from a backscatter machine equals the amount of cosmic radiation received
during two minutes of flight. The risk of health effects is very, very low. The machines
are effective at detecting items that would be a threat to crew. Millimeter wave
machines use radio frequency waves to detect threats. The machine bounces the waves
off the body. Millimeter wave scanners emit thousands of times less energy than a cell
phone. Threats are shown on a generic body outline rather than the person’s actual
outline. When there are no weapons or other threats, the screen turns green and shows
an “OK.”

Threat Identification, Recognition, and ResponseExecution and coordination of searches

Execution and coordination of searches

Execution and coordination of searches - how important it is to plan a search
and practice carrying out searches as a drill
It is important to plan and practice carrying out searches for the following reasons:

● Level of searching and security screening is detailed in SSP and depends on the
security Level, plan the drill and search as per SSP requirements and security
level
● Searches may require searching of anyone boarding including crew, visitors,
passengers and project personnel, excluding Public Authority Officers
● Depending on the security level cargo and ship’s stores may also require to be
searched
● Searching should be done by trained crew who are aware of search procedures, in
a thorough and methodical manner, taking note of equipment & facilities needed
for the search and the requirement to consider human dignity

When planning the search decide on the possible kinds of searches to be done, these
are:

● Body search

● Luggage search

● Vessel search

When planning a search ask yourself the following search questions:

● Why am I doing this?

● What am I looking for?

● Where would I choose to hide something?

As searches are an essential part of contingency planning; supervise, control and

manage them properly.

A detailed knowledge of the layout of the ship is essential for a successful search; check
the effectiveness of search plan procedures after the search is completed.

Search using a system of check cards

Check card system is a systematic procedure for carrying out checks aboard ship in its
entirety.
Check card is issued to each searcher specifying the route to follow and the areas to be
searched. These cards can be colour-coded for different areas of responsibility, for
example blue for deck, red for engine-room.

On completion of individual search tasks, the cards are returned to a central control
point.

When all cards are returned, the search is known to be complete. The findings of the
search can then be discussed.

Equipment the search team should carry for conducting a search

These are as below:

● Flashlights and batteries

● Screwdrivers, wrenches and crowbars

● Mirrors and probes

● Gloves, hard hats, overalls and non-slip footwear

● Envelopes for collection of evidence

● Forms on which to record activities and discoveries

● UHF / VHF radio

● Seals to mark areas which have been searched

Procedures to be followed for an efficient search

To carry out an effective search one must do as below:

● Crew members should not be allowed to search their own areas

● The search should be conducted according to a specific plan or schedule and must
be carefully controlled
● Special consideration should be given to search parties working in pairs with one
searching "high" and one searching "low”
● Searchers should be able to recognize suspicious items

● There should be a system for marking or recording "clean" areas

● Searchers should maintain contact with the search controllers

● Searchers should have clear guidance on what to do if a suspect package, device,

or situation is found
 ● Searchers should bear in mind that weapons and other dangerous devices may be
intentionally placed to match its context as a means of disguise

Various places of concealment on board a ship

There are many places on board a ship to conceal weapons, dangerous substances, and
devices. Some of these are (list is non-exhaustive):

In Cabins

● Back sides and underneath drawers

● Between bottom drawer and deck

● Beneath bunks, e.g., taped to bunk frame under mattress

● Under wash basin

● Behind removable medicine chest

● Inside radios, recorders etc.

● Ventilator ducts

● Inside heater units

● Above or behind light fixtures

● Above ceiling and wall panels

● Cut-outs behind bulkheads, pictures, etc.

● False bottom clothes closets-hanging clothes

● Inside wooden clothes hangers

● Inside rolled socks, spare socks

● Hollowed-out molding

Companionways

● Ducts

● Wire harnesses

● Railings

● Fire extinguishers

● Fire hoses and compartments

● Access panels in floors, walls, ceilings

● Behind or inside water coolers, igloos

Toilet and Showers

 ● Behind and under washbasins

● Behind toilets

● In ventilation ducts and heaters

● Toilet tissue rollers, towel dispensers, supply lockers

● Taped to shower curtains, exposed piping, and light fixtures

● Access panels in floors, walls, ceiling

Deck

● Ledges on deck housing, electrical switch rooms, winch control panels

● Lifeboat storage compartments, under coiled lines, in deck storage rooms

● Paint cans, cargo holds, battery rooms, chain lockers.

Engine-room

● Under deck plates

● Cofferdams, machinery pedestals, bilges

● Journal-bearing shrouds and sumps on propeller shaft

● Under catwalk, in bilges, in shaft alley

● Escape ladders and ascending area

● In ventilation ducts, attached to piping or in tanks with false gauges

● Equipment boxes, emergency steering rooms, storage spaces.

Galleys and Stewards' Stores

● Flour bins and dry stores

● Vegetable sacks, canned foods (re-glued labels)

● Under or behind standard refrigerators

● Inside fish or sides of beef in freezers

● Bonded store lockers, slop chest, storage rooms.

Other areas

● Duct keel

● Double bottom tanks

● Tanks not used for a long time

Threat Identification, Recognition, and ResponseRecognition of persons posing potential
security risks

Recognition of persons posing potential security risks

Recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis, of persons posing potential security
risks - the general characteristics and behavioral patterns of persons who are
likely to threaten security

We all have the ability to recognise the display of characteristics and behavioural
patterns of people who may threaten the safety and security of the public and us.

Suspicious behavioural patterns are as below:

● Unknown persons photographing vessels or facilities

● Unknown persons attempting to gain access to vessels or facilities

● Individuals establishing businesses or roadside food stands either adjacent to or

in proximity to facilities
● Unknown persons loitering in the vicinity of ships or port facilities for extended
periods of time
● Unknown persons telephoning facilities to ascertain security, personnel, or
standard operating procedure
● Vehicles with personnel in them loitering and perhaps taking photographs or
creating diagrams of vessels or facilities
● Small boats with personnel on board loitering and perhaps taking photographs or
creating diagrams of vessels or facilities
● General aviation aircraft operating in proximity to vessels or facilities

● Persons who may be carrying bombs or participating in suicide squad activities

● Unknown persons attempting to gain information about vessels or facilities by

walking up to personnel or their families and engaging them in a conversation
● Vendors attempting to sell merchandise

● Workers trying to gain access to facilities to repair, replace, service, or install

equipment.
● E-mails attempting to obtain information regarding the facility, personnel, or
standard operating procedures
 ● Package drop-offs/attempted drop-offs

● Anti-national sentiments being expressed by employees or vendors

How important it is to be observant to recognize such persons - It is important to

be observant such behaviour as it recognizes the absence of normal and the presence of
abnormal. These persons are then up to something that may be unpleasant for the ship
and her crew.

Appearance vs. Reality

As the saying goes, you cannot judge a book by its cover. Likewise, people are not
always what they appear to be, and judgments based solely on appearances are often
inaccurate. For all appearances, a person seems easy-going, pleasant, friendly, fun and
successful. Perhaps, they look just like someone you know. But they could be a heinous
criminals. Someone is successful, intelligent, kind and good-humoured. This man
appears to have it all! Would you have guessed that he is a spy? A young man has the
appearance of a good nature, fun-loving, well-adjusted teenager. Instead, this confused
and mixed up teenager who dreamed of a world where he could fit in, became the 24-
year old assassin of legendary Beatles musician John Lennon. This famous assassin is
Mark Chapman.

Profiling
Profiling helps us get beneath the outer shell of an individual to obtain a more complete
picture. It has many applications. In the context of ship security, profiling will help you
identify whether and to what extent the crew and visitors to your ship pose a security
risk. Profiling techniques like document checks, questioning and observation ensure that
judgments are based on more than just appearances. Random selection of individuals for
profiling ensures that patterns are not established. It also prevents allegations that
individuals are being picked on? Whenever behaviours or items arouse suspicion, action
should always be taken to respond to the perceived threat whether that means
additional checks, searches or the cordoning off and containing of an explosive device.
Averting a security incident is worth the extra time and effort !

The Many Uses of Profiling

It's easy to see how appearances can be deceiving. And yet, we commonly make
judgments about people based on how they look. Profiling is a method used to get
beneath the outer shell of an individual to obtain a more complete picture. It has many
applications.

Criminal
Criminal profiling is used to obtain information about an individual or an offender.
Matching DNA samples and reviewing past offenders' files to establish trends and
patterns during investigations are two common profiling techniques.

Industrial
Industrial profiling is used to obtain information about rival companies and their
employees. It might include examining internet sites or employing specially trained
personnel to build up the profiles.

Commercial
Commercial profiling is used to obtain information about customers or employees. Many
organizations use focus groups, surveys and purchase information to track and target
the needs and preferences of their customers.

General
Profiling information is widely available. You can obtain a multitude of information on the
internet including the profile of a potential vacation destination, a residential area, or
even a Doctor that you may be thinking of using !

Using Profiling onboard

Onboard your ship, you can profile both crew and visitors at all access points to identify
their level of security risk and what, if any, additional checks or measures need to be
implemented before they are allowed to board. Detection equipment can also be used,
but only in tandem with profiling. It cannot select for itself and only works on facts. You
may spot things that the equipment won't and it's important to not ignore these gut
feelings or hunches. They're an essential part of profiling! When establishing your ship's
profiling program, it's vital that you maintain a random selection process. This ensures
that a pattern is not established and prevents allegations that individuals are being
picked on. This is especially important when checking or searching crew. One approach
you can use with crew is to take a number at random between 5 and 9, say for this
example 8, and search every 8th crewmember coming onboard.
Tasks of the Profiler
Profilers need to gather the maximum amount of information in a limited period of time.
A profiling interview can take as little as 90 seconds or as long as 20 minutes. It ends
when the profiler is satisfied that all of the relevant areas have been addressed.

To obtain the information needed to determine an individual's potential security threat,

profilers need to:

1. Check documentation;
2. Pose questions in a discreet manner; and
3. Observe body language and behaviour

Checking Documentation
Checking documentation may seem obvious, but it is important. All documents related to
the purpose of a shipboard visit should be examined and the ID of all visitors and crew
verified.

Tips on Questioning.
Use a combination of open-ended and closed-ended questions.

Open questions
They are usually preceded with "what, when, who, where, how and why" and that
require a person to give more than a “yes" or "no" answer. Examples include:

● Where have you travelled from?

● When did you leave your last stop?
● Who packed your bag?
● Why are you carrying this?
● How did you obtain this?
● What is the nature of your journey?

Closed questions
They can only be answered with a "yes" or "no". They can be used to establish facts or
obtain statements that may be used in evidence later. Some examples are:

● Is this your bag?

 ● Is this your passport?
● Are you the person named in this document?
● Did you apply for this visa in person?
● Has anyone asked you to carry any thing for him or her?
● Is this the item you were asked to carry?

Check to see that the answers to your questions match up with what you already know
about a crewmember or the purpose of a shipboard visit. And, ensure that the answers
tie in with any items being carried or transported.

Asking Good Questions

Questioning is an important part of profiling. Questions draw out important information
and should be asked in such a manner as to not arouse the suspicion of the person
selected. There are many questions you could ask! Remember, your goal is to ask
questions and get answers that will help you determine whether an individual poses a
potential risk to your ship's security.

Examples of questions to crew

● Are you coming directly from another ship or were you on leave?
● Where did you travel to while on leave?
● Did you bring any mementos from your travels?

Examples of questions to visitors

● What is the purpose of your visit?

● Are you bringing onboard any tools or equipment?
● Were you on another service call before joining us today?

Recognizing Suspicious Behavior

When asking questions, paying attention to the body language and behavior of
individuals being questioned is just as important as listening to their answers.

● Are they nervous?

● Do they react when you go near their equipment or baggage?
● Are they sweating or restless?
● Are they becoming aggressive?
 ● Are they overly happy or trying to be overly friendly?
● Are they trying to avoid eye contact?

If you are suspicious of a person's behavior, stay calm and inform someone else of your
suspicions. Do some additional checks or perform a search of the individual's belongings
or equipment.

Allow them onboard only after you are satisfied, they do not pose a security risk.

Dealing with Suspicious Items

If during profiling, you suspect that an individual is carrying a suspicious object or
package - such as drugs or an explosive device - be careful that you don't let the person
know that you suspect something. You never know how he or she will react!

Never touch or pick anything up. If a suspicious object is an explosive it may be fitted
with an anti-handling device.

Inform someone of your suspicions, discreetly, so that they can summon assistance.
Never use a radio within 25 meters of a suspicious object. If it is an explosive with a
radio-controlled device, a transmission by your radio may activate it.

If you suspect that the package is a bomb, take these additional steps:

● Confirm that a device actually exists;

● Clear the immediate area;
● Cordon off the area around the suspicious object and Control the area so that
only authorized persons have access.

Threat Identification, Recognition, and ResponseTechniques used to circumvent security

measures

Techniques used to circumvent security

measures
The techniques used by violators of security and those who want to get on board
unauthorized, but without being caught can either use a forced entry whereupon the
ship's security system collapses and ship and crew becomes hostage to the invaders;
In the other overt method, the perpetrators use many clever and innovative methods to
evade the security system. They study the vessel's operation closely for some time and
find a gap in the security chain; this could be a device related act, or taking advantage
of a process that is not so robust; even when the process is correct, but people that are
key to the security process can be bought over and distracted while creating a security
breach with unlawful and evil purposes.

Techniques that Persons use to Circumvent Security Measures

Overt and covert methods are used to circumvent security measures:

Overt methods are as below:

● Boarding from over the side (can also be from the pier or via crane)
● Forced armed entry
● Breaking and entering
● Explosives attack
● Disabling of security systems may be used in conjunction with any of the above
(cutting power, blinding CCTV, distracting guards etc.)
 Overt method, forced armed entry

There is no perfect security, security is breached by; disabling alarms, bribing guards,
boarding when guards are not attentive and picking locks,
These are examples of covert methods used to circumvent security.

Possibility of a covert breach

Methods used by pirates and armed robbers to undertake attacks against ships

1. Commonly, two small high speed (up to 25 knots) open boats or ‘skiffs’ are used
in attacks, often approaching from either quarter or the stern. Skiffs are
frequently fitted with 2 outboard engines or a larger single 60 hp or more engine.
2. Pirate Action Groups operate in a number of different boat configurations. To
date, whatever the configuration the attack phase is carried out by skiffs. Pirate
Action Group boat configurations include:
a. Skiffs only;
b. usually two;
c. Mother ships
3. The mother ships include the larger merchant ships (under pirate control), fishing
vessels and dhows. These Mother ships have been taken by the pirates and
 usually have their own crew onboard as hostages. Mother ships are used to carry
pirates, stores, fuel and attack skiffs to enable pirates to operate over a much
larger area and are significantly less affected by the weather. Attack skiffs are
often towed behind the Mother ships. Where the size of the Mother ship allows it,
skiffs are increasingly being carried onboard and camouflaged to reduce chances
of interdiction by Naval/ Military forces.
4. Increasingly, pirates use small arms fire and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) in
an effort to intimidate Masters of ships to reduce speed and stop to allow the
pirates to board. The use of these weapons is generally focused on the bridge and
accommodation area. In what are difficult circumstances, it is very important to
maintain Full Sea Speed, increasing speed where possible, and using careful
maneuvering to resist the attack.
5. Pirates seek to place their skiffs alongside the ship being attacked to enable one
or more armed pirates to climb onboard. Pirates frequently use long lightweight
ladders and ropes, or a long-hooked pole with a knotted climbing rope to climb up
the side of the vessel being attacked. Once onboard the pirate (or pirates) will
generally make their way to the bridge to try to take control of the vessel. Once
on the bridge the pirate/pirates will demand that the ship slows/stops to enable
more pirates to board.
6. Attacks have taken place at most times of the day. However, many pirate attacks
have taken place early in the morning, at first light. Attacks have occurred at
night, particularly clear moonlit nights, but night time attacks are less common.
7. The majority of piracy attacks have been repelled by ship’s crew who have
planned and trained in advance of the passage and applied the Best Management
Practices contained within the various guidance books published by various
concerned sources.

Ships most at risk to pirate attacks are:

● Coasters and fishing vessels

● Tugs, offshore work boats, barges
● Handy-sized bulk carriers and tankers
● Passenger ships (for hostage taking)
● All ships below 15 knots speed
● All ships while alongside or at anchor in high risk areas
● All ships with a low freeboard
Methods used to detect techniques in circumventing security measures

Detecting circumvention of security measures is done by:

1. Having measures to prevent of unauthorized access to the ship, including

boarding of a ship when in port or at sea.
2. Marking all restricted areas, indicating that access to the area is restricted and
that unauthorized presence within the area constitutes a breach of security.
3. Identifying persons boarding the vessel and having measures in place for them to
remain on board without challenge (e.g. issuing them with a visitor pass).
4. Monitoring the ship, her restricted areas and areas surrounding the ship with
adequate lighting. Monitoring to be done by:
i) Watch keepers
ii) Security guards if deployed
iii) Deck watches including patrols.
iv) Using security equipment like closed-circuit television (CCTV) and lighting;
communications and x-ray equipment; hand-held metal detectors
v) Maintaining effective communication with the Port Facility Security Officers

Investigate until you are satisfied that all is well! Some other indicators to watch out for
are:

● Interference or jamming and monitoring of your ship’s communications system.

Efforts made to broadcast over the system, damage your radio transmitter or
antenna, or cut telephone lines are often the first indication that an attack is
imminent.
● Damage to locks and doors such as scratches around the locks.
● Lost or stolen keys.
● Normally locked doors being found open for no reason.
● Dirty finger marks on clean doors or windows, or clean marks on dirty doors.
● False alarms on security systems. The criminal or terrorist may be testing your
response time and reaction procedures or trying to incapacitate your alarm
system.
● Apparently wanton, or accidental damage to essential equipment. This may be an
indicator that an attempt is about to be made to attack you. Never rule out the
possibility of collusion between the terrorists and members of the crew
Threat Identification, Recognition, and ResponseCrowd management and control
techniques

Crowd management and control techniques

Managing people under a crisis situation requires some understanding of group
behaviour under panic or emergency situations and the best way to handle such a crowd
via clear communication techniques. Even on board a small vessel with less than 20
people on board, you can have a panic situation under a security threat, e.g., a bomb
threat! So, some proactive discussion and preparation is required to combat such a
scenario. This will be even more important for a passenger vessel with untrained and
panicked people including the elderly, women and children; thus, early preparation on
such an eventuality will be part of this training.

Basic Psychology of a Crowd in a Crisis Situation

The basic psychology of a crowd in a crisis is as below:

● There is panic – all procedures and measures are/will be forgotten.

● Crowd behaviour’s become more self-centred when time to escape is limited and,
therefore, orderly evacuation is not possible.
● Crowd members are typically motivated to move towards familiar people during
an emergency:
1. Thus, family members prefer to evacuate together as a group, and will wait to
exit until all family members are able to do so.
2. Parents are more likely to put the safety of their children before their own.
However, the drawback of this is that families may be slower to begin evacuation,
which, ultimately, can threaten their survival.
3. Similarly, groups of friends prefer to evacuate together and remain united as a
group once again, reduces the rate of evacuation as compared to that of
individuals.
4. In addition, during an emergency, crowd members are also typically motivated
to move towards familiar places. For example, individuals prefer to leave by a
familiar route – i.e., the way they came in – as opposed to an emergency exit
5. Individuals’ choice of escape route is also influenced by the actions of their
 fellow evacuees – e.g., people typically move in the same direction as others
during an emergency
● Social, organizational and place-related norms appear to be maintained during an
evacuation. For instance, gender roles are typically retained, with women
generally receiving more help than men, and more men than women typically
offering to help.
● When united by an emergency, a physical crowd – i.e., a group of individuals in
the same location, each with his or her own personal identity – may be
transformed into a psychological crowd – i.e., a group of people united by a
common social identity as members of a particular category.
● This shared social identity then enables crowd members to act as a source of
strength for one another and exhibit collective behaviors – i.e., coordination,
cooperation, helping behavior’s and personal sacrifices.

Crowd management during embarkation/dis-embarkation of passengers on a cruise ship

is important as it prevents the situation getting out of control, especially when a large
number of persons are embarking/dis-embarking from the vessel.

When a crowd gets out of control consequences could be severe, resulting in:

● Injury and/or death

● Damage to property
● Police intervention

Emergency (pirate attack, bomb blast) Crowd control management must be addressed in
the Contingency plans because in an emergency there could be panic because:

● Everybody is afraid of the situation (e.g. when there is a pirate attack)

● Everybody assumes that his/her survival is not any longer assured in the given
situation
● Everybody assumes that survival can only be assured through immediate escape
● Everybody's mind is focused on only one single escape-route

Clear Communication with Crew and Passengers During an Emergency

To control a crowd simple and clear instructions are necessary. Instructions are
given with a clear mind.
When giving instructions address the persons. Request all to communicate clearly. Note
the following when giving instructions:

● Communication and provision of information about the threat, along with clear
instructions about how to exit, are vital to initiate crowd movement and enhance
the efficiency of an emergency evacuation.
● Providing more, rather than less, information about the nature of the threat or
emergency should help the crowd respond more effectively. Withholding
information only serves to increase the crowd’s mistrust of authorities, which
decreases evacuation efficiency.
● In order to be believed and interpreted accurately, warnings must be specific,
timely, historically valid, credible, comprehensible, and convey the nature and
extent of the danger.
● Warnings must also be visual and audio – sirens alone are insufficient.

Ship Security Actions

Ship Security Actions

Recommended actions in response to attacks and attempted attacks by pirates
and armed robbers

Recommended actions against pirate attacks are dependent on the situation and are as
below:

Suspected piracy/armed robbery vessel detected

Early detection of suspected attacks must be the first line of defence. If the vigilance and
surveillance has been successful, a pirate/armed robbery vessel will be detected early.

Inform the nearest littoral or coastal State through the RCC, using the appropriate ships’
message format. The ship's crew should be warned and, if not already in their defensive
positions, they should move to them. Evasive manoeuvres and hoses should be
vigorously employed as detailed in the preparation phase.

Being certain that piracy/armed robbery will be attempted

If not already in touch with the littoral coastal State, efforts should be made to establish
contact. Crew preparations should be completed and, where a local rule of the road
allows ships under attack to do so, a combination of sound and light signals should be
made to warn other ships in the vicinity that an attack is about to take place.

Vigorous manoeuvring at maximum speed should be sustained if navigation conditions

permit.

Pirate/armed robbery vessel in proximity to, or in contact with, own ship

Use water jets to prevent pirate boarding, and if possible, cast off grappling hooks and
poles, provided crew not endangered.
Sound the pirate alarm, using the ship's whistle as an alarm discourages the attackers
and tells crew working in exposed areas to seek shelter.
Communicate with other vessels using distress flares and ship’s communication
equipment for help.
If possible, use evasive manoeuvring techniques e.g. heavy wheel movements to ride of
attackers.

Pirates/armed robbers start to board ship

Timing during this phase will be critical and as soon as one knows that boarding is
inevitable all crew must be ordered to seek their secure positions (proceed to the citadel,
for example).
When attackers are on board the actions of the master and crew should:

● Ensure the greatest level of safety for those on board the ship;
● If possible remain in control of the navigation of the ship; and
● Try to get the pirates/robbers depart as early as possible

The options available to the master and crew will depend on the extent to which the
attackers have secured control of the ship, e.g. by have they gained access to the bridge
or engine room, have they seized crewmembers who they can threaten, to force the
master or crew to comply with their wishes.

However, even if the crew are in secure areas, the master must consider the risk to the
ship the attackers can cause, when deciding on actions to be taken. An example of a risk
that pirates they could use firebombs to start fires on a tanker or chemical carrier.
The pirates/armed robbers begin to gain control and take one or more of the
ship's crew into their custody
If the attackers have gained control of the engine room or bridge, have seized crew
members or can pose an imminent threat to the safety of a ship, the master or officer in
charge should remain calm and, if possible, seek to negotiate with the attackers.

Try and maintain control over the navigation of the ship, the safe return of any hostages
they may hold and the early departure of the attackers from the ship.
Comply with the attackers' demands may be the only safe alternative as resistance or
obstruction of any kind could be both futile and dangerous.

In the event of attackers gaining temporary control of the ship, crew members should, if
it is safe and practicable, leave Close Circuit Television (CCTV) records running.

Consider hiding equipment (especially those for communication) in areas where crew are
detained.

The pirates/armed robbers have stolen property/money, etc.

At this stage it is essential that the pirates/armed robbers are assured that they have
been given everything they have demanded with a reassurance that nothing has been
hidden, this could go some way in persuading them to leave the vessel.

The pirates/armed robbers start to disembark from the ship

Do not leave secure your secure positions on the vessel until you are sure all
pirates/robbers have disembarked.

The pirates/armed robbers have disembarked from the ship

Sound the ‘all clear’ signal.

Ship Security ActionsActions required by different security levels

Actions required by different security levels

Actions required by different security levels - the three security levels and the
actions required for each level.
Actions required by different security levels
There are three (3) maritime security levels. A ship is required to act upon the security
levels set by the Contracting Governments.

Security Level 1
At security level 1, the following activities shall be carried out, through appropriate
measures, on all ships, taking into account the guidance given in part B of the ISPS
Code, in order to identify and take preventive measures against security incidents:

● Ensuring the performance of all ship security duties;

● Controlling access to the ship;
● Controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects;
● Monitoring restricted areas to ensure that only authorized persons have access;
● Monitoring of deck areas and areas surrounding the ship;
● Supervising the handling of cargo and ship's stores; and
● Ensuring that security communication is readily available.

Security Level 2
At security level 2, the additional protective measures, specified in the ship security plan
(SSP), shall be implemented for each activity detailed above, taking into account the
guidance given in part B of the ISPS Code.

Security Level 3
At security level 3, further specific protective measures, specified in the SSP, shall be
implemented for each level 1 activity, taking into account the guidance given in part B of
the ISPS Code.

Whenever security level 2 or 3 is set by the Port or Flag, the ship shall acknowledge
receipt of the instructions on change of the security level.

Prior to entering a port or whilst in a port within the territory of a Contracting

Government that has set security level 2 or 3, the ship shall:

● Acknowledge receipt of this instruction.

 ● Shall confirm to the Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) the initiation of the
implementation of the appropriate measures and procedures as detailed in the
ship security plan.
● In the case of security level 3, in instructions issued by the Contracting
Government which has set security level 3.

The ship shall report any difficulties in implementation. In such cases, the Port Facility
Security Officer and Ship Security Officer shall liaise and co-ordinate the appropriate
actions.

If a ship is required by her flag state to be at a higher security level, than the port state
she is visiting, she should advise the port state about her situation without delay (inform
PFSO), so that appropriate actions can be coordinated.

Ship Security ActionsReporting requirements for ships

Reporting requirements for ships

Maintaining security of the ship/port interface - reporting requirements for ships prior to
entering port
To maintain security of the ship/port interface it is essential that the visiting port facility
is given the following information:

● The vessel has a valid International Ship Security Certificate

● The current security level at which the ship is operating
● The security level at which the ship operated in the previous port
● Highlight any special security measures that the vessel may have taken at the
previous port
● Any other relevant practical security related information of importance

The duty of the Ship Security Officer as given in the ISPS Code Part A requires the
reporting of all security incidents. The ship security plan will have the procedures for
reporting of security incidents. In the case of piracy and armed attack there are now
very well defined procedures issued by IMO circulars in cooperation with the
organisations handling the incidents occurring in various parts of the globe.
Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade – Gulf of Guinea (MDAT-GoG): is a service
operated by the French and UK navies from centres in Brest, France, and Portsmouth,
UK and aims to develop, maintain and share details of the maritime domain picture of
the waters off Africa’s western seaboard. The MDAT-GoG administers a Voluntary
Reporting Area (VRA) scheme under which merchant ships are encouraged to report
position information while operating in the VRA. This region reports the highest incidents
of piracy attacks in 2018.

Reporting:

Ships are encouraged to send regular reports, using the MDAT-GoG reporting forms (for
Gulf of Guinea-Africa) as below:

WHEN WHAT

On entering the VRA Initial Report

Daily** Daily Position Report

On Departing the VRA Final Report

By Exception By Exception Report

** At 0800 if convenient to daily routine

Another example is this UKMTO – (UK) Maritime Trade Operations. The UK Maritime
Trade Operations (UKMTO) office in Dubai acts as a point of contact for industry liaison
with the Combined Military Forces (CMF). UKMTO Dubai also administers the Voluntary
Reporting Scheme, under which merchant ships are encouraged to send daily reports,
providing their position and ETA at their next port whilst transiting the region bound by
Suez, 78°E and 5°S. UKMTO Dubai subsequently tracks ships, and the positional
information is passed to CMF and EU headquarters. Emerging and relevant information
affecting commercial traffic can then be passed directly to ships, rather than by company
offices, improving responsiveness to any incident and saving time. For further
information, or to join the Voluntary Reporting Scheme, please contact MTO Dubai:
ukmtodubai@eim.ae.
Below we give a summary of this information.

FOLLOW UP REPORT: PIRACY ATTACK

● Ship’s name and call sign, IMO number

● Reference initial PIRACY ALERT
● Position of incident/Latitude/Longitude/Name of the area
● Details of incident:
1. Method of attack
2. Description/number of suspect craft
3. Number and brief description of pirates
4. What kind of weapons did the pirates carry
5. Any other information (e.g., language spoken)
6. Injuries to crew and passengers
7. Damage to ship (which part of the ship was attacked?)
8. Action taken by the Master and crew
9. Was incident reported to the coastal authority and to whom?
10. Action taken by the Coastal State.
● Last observed movements of pirates / suspect craft
● Assistance required
● Preferred communications with reporting ship:
Appropriate Coast Radio Station/HF/MF/VHF/Inmarsat IDs (plus ocean region
code)/MMSI
● Date/time of report (UTC).

Reporting a breach of security

All security incidents must be reported in accordance with specific reporting
requirements.

The reporting formats as below, for the initial and final reports:

Report 1 - Initial message - Piracy/armed robbery attack alert

● Ship's name and, callsign, IMO number, INMARSAT IDs (plus ocean region code)
and MMSI.
1. MAYDAY/DISTRESS ALERT (see note)
 2. URGENCY SIGNAL
3. PIRACY/ARMED ROBBERY ATTACK
● Ship's position (and time of position UTC)
1. Latitude Longitude
2. Course Speed KTS
● Nature of event

Note: It is expected that this message will be a Distress Message because the ship or
persons will be in grave or imminent danger when under attack. Where this is not the
case, the word MAYDAY/DISTRESS ALERT is omitted.
Use of distress priority (3) in the INMARSAT system will not require MAYDAY/DISTRESS
ALERT to be included.

Report 2 - Follow-up report - Piracy/armed robbery attack alert

● Ship's name and, call sign, IMO number

● Reference initial PIRACY/ARMED ROBBERY ALERT
● Position of incident
1. Latitude Longitude
2. Name of the area
● Details of incident, e.g.:
1. While sailing, at anchor or at berth?
2. Method of attack
3. Description/number of suspect craft
4. Number and brief description of pirates/robbers
5. What kind of weapons did the pirates/robbers carry ?
6. Any other information (e.g. language spoken)
7. Injuries to crew and passengers
8. Damage to ship (Which part of the ship was attacked?)
9. Brief details of stolen property/cargo
10. Action taken by the master and crew
11. Was incident reported to the coastal authority and to whom?
12. Action taken by the Coastal State
● Last observed movements of pirate/suspect craft, e.g.:
1. Date/time/course/position/speed
● Assistance required
 ● Preferred communications with reporting ship, e.g.:
1. Appropriate Coast Radio Station
2. HF/MF/VHF
3. INMARSAT IDs (plus ocean region code)
4. MMSI
● Date/time of report (UTC)

Ship Security Alert Messages:

A. Alert messages should be generated automatically with no input from the operator
other than the activation of the system, and must be capable of reaching the competent
authority from any point along the vessel’s intended route. This alert should not be
transmitted as a general distress alert. Once activated, the SSAS should continue to
transmit the security alert until the equipment is reset or deactivated. The interval
between transmissions of the alerts should ideally be between 15 minutes and one hour.
Ship security alert messages must be addressed solely to designated competent
authorities, not to shore stations or ship stations.

B. The format of ship security alerts should be compatible with the communication
system used to transmit it and, as a minimum, contain the following:

1. Ship’s identity (e.g., IMO number, Inmarsat IDs (including ocean regions code),
MMSI number, or call sign),
2. Ship’s position (latitude and longitude associated with a date and time), and
3. Ship’s security alert activation indication.

C. Messages should be transmitted at distress priority (or priority 3 if the system

transmits via Inmarsat).

Ship Security Alert Follow Up Reports:

A. RCC is to be notified either directly or via a competent authority immediately when an
alerted security threat has ended. Additionally, it is important to report all threats to
vessel security, whether successful or unsuccessful, to RCC. This information is used to
reduce the risks of future incidents, improve preparedness to respond to such incidents,
and enable the Government to comply with mandatory reporting requirements to the
International Maritime Organization (IMO).
B. This post-incident report should be submitted in the following format:

1. Ship's name and call sign, IMO number, Inmarsat ID, or MMSI number
2. Reference initial ship security alert
3. Position of incident
Latitude and longitude
Name of the area
4. Details of incident, e.g.,
• While sailing, at anchor or at berth?
• Method of attack
• Description/number of suspect craft
• Number and brief description of attackers/perpetrators
• What kind of weapons did the attackers carry?
• Any other information (e.g., language spoken)
• Injuries to crew and passengers
• Damage to ship (Which part of the ship was attacked?)
• Brief details of stolen property/cargo
• Actions taken by the master and crew
• Was incident reported to the coastal authority and to whom?
• Action taken by the coastal State
5. Last observed movements of pirate/suspect craft, e.g.,
Date/time/course/position/speed
6. Assistance required
7. Preferred communications with reporting ship, e.g.,
Appropriate Coast Radio Station
HF/MF/VHF
INMARSAT IDs (including ocean region code)
MMSI
8. Date/time of report (UTC)

Inadvertent Ship Security Alerts: The ship should report an inadvertent alert to RCC
immediately to protect system integrity and to prevent costly response that may divert
response resources from other pressing needs.

Ship Security ActionsDeclaration of Security

Declaration of Security
Familiarity with the Declaration of Security and what it addresses.

The Declaration of Security (DOS) means an agreement reached between a ship and
either a port facility or another ship with which it interfaces specifying the security
measures each will implement.

The purpose of the DOS is to address the security requirements that are to be shared
between the port facility and the ship and clearly states each one’s responsibilities.

The DOS is exchanged between the SSO and the PFSO.

Ship Security ActionsReporting security incidents

Reporting security incidents

Reporting
All ships are strongly encouraged to inform military organisations of their movement as
this is essential to improve military situational awareness and their ability to respond.
Once ships have commenced their passage it is important this reporting continues. The
two principal military organisations to contact are the UK Maritime Trade Operations
(UKMTO) and Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA).

UKMTO
UKMTO acts as the primary point of contact for merchant ships and their CSOs, providing
liaison with military forces in the region. UKMTO administers the Voluntary Reporting
Scheme, under which merchant ships are encouraged to send regular reports. These
include:

1. Initial report (upon entering the VRA).

2. Daily reports (update on ship’s position, course and speed).
3. Final reports (upon departure from VRA or arrival in port).
4. Reports of suspicious/irregular activity (when necessary).

UKMTO is able to communicate with ships and CSOs directly, in order to disseminate
Warnings and Advisories of incidents within the region:
 ● Warnings: Simple messages describing that an incident has occurred in a
Lat/Long and with a time. This is normally accompanied by direct UKMTO-to-ship
telephone calls to all ships within a nominated radius of the incident to give ships
the earliest possible alert.
● Advisories: This is the next tier of alerts to ships, normally of sightings/reports
that are relevant within the region.

UKMTO offers regular information to ships on its website www.ukmto.org and in a

weekly report summarising the previous week’s activity. UKMTO is also able to offer
Masters and CSOs the opportunity to conduct drills and exercises to support their
passage planning in the region. Companies that are interested can contact UKMTO
+44(0)2392 222060 or watchkeepers@ukmto.org.

MSCHOA
The MSCHOA is the planning and coordination centre for the EU Naval Forces (EU
NAVFOR). MSCHOA encourages companies to register their ships’ movements before
entering the HRA and if participating in the group transit system via their website
www.mschoa.org.

When departing the VRA, ships should be aware of adjacent regional reporting
requirements, e.g.: NATO Shipping Centre (Mediterranean – Chart Q6010) and ReCAAP
Information Sharing Center/Singapore Information Fusion Center (SE Asia – Chart
Q6012).

EU NAVFOR and the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) produce Industry Releasable
Threat Assessments (IRTAs) to aid risk management for companies. The threat
assessments use military knowledge and intelligence to present a common
understanding of the threats and trends in the region. The IRTAs are complimented by
Industry Releasable Threat Bulletins (IRTBs), which cover specific events. These
documents are an important resource and should be considered as part of the threat and
risk assessment process.

UKMTO reporting forms

UKMTO vessel position reporting forms

Once a ship has transmitted an initial report on entering the VRA, UKMTO will request
daily reports be transmitted. Upon reaching port or upon exiting the VRA, UKMTO will
request a final report. The following forms are provided below and are available at
www.ukmto.org:

● Initial report.
● Daily report.
● Final report.
● Suspicious/irregular activity report.

UKMTO vessel position reporting form - initial report

1. Ship Name
2. Flag
3. IMO Number
4. INMARSAT Telephone Number
5. Time and Position
6. Course
7. Passage Speed
8. Freeboard
9. Cargo
10. Destination and Estimated Time of Arrival
11. Name and contact details of Company Security Officer
12. Nationality of Master and Crew
13. Armed/unarmed security team embarked

UKMTO vessel position reporting form – daily/transit position report

1. Ship Name
2. Ship’s Call Sign and IMO Number
3. Time of Report in UTC
4. Ship’s Position
5. Ship’s Course and Speed
6. Any other important information*
7. ETA point A/B IRTC (if applicable)
*Other important information could be change of destination or ETA, number of UK crew
on board, etc.

UKMTO vessel position reporting form - final report

1. Ship’s name
2. Ship’s Call Sign and IMO Number
3. Time of Report in UTC
4. Port or position when leaving the voluntary reporting area

UKMTO suspicious/irregular activity report

1. Ship’s name
2. Ship’s Call Sign and IMO Number
3. Time of Report in UTC
4. Ship’s Position
5. Ship’s Course and Speed
6. Sighting of suspicious activity. Time, position, brief description of craft and
activity witnessed

Note: Where possible include any imagery to aid military appreciation.

Follow-up report to UKMTO and MSCHOA

Following any attack or suspicious activity, it is vital that a detailed report of the event is
provided to UKMTO and MSCHOA. It is helpful to provide a copy of the report to the IMB.

Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa reporting forms

MSCHOA vessel registration and incident reporting

Registration with MSCHOA ensures a ship is monitored by military counter piracy forces
during its transit of the HRA. In addition, regular threat assessment updates, warnings
and the latest self-protection information are made available to shipping companies and
Masters who register.
Registration is required within the MSCHOA Vessel Registration Area as highlighted on
UKHO Chart Q6099.

The form to ‘Register a Vessel’s Movements’ is available on the MSCHOA website and
UKHO Chart Q6099. The following should be noted:

There are two principal methods to register your ship’s movement with MSCHOA.

● Online at www.mschoa.org (note you will need to register with MSCHOA for
access, this can be done following the register tab on the website).
● Offline. A downloadable form is available from www.mschoa.org or it can be
requested from postmaster@mschoa.org. This form was updated in March 2018
to make offline registration simpler for ships with sporadic internet connectivity to
register.

If the above options are not possible a ship can be registered by sending an email with
the subject heading MSCHOA Vessel Registration to postmaster@mschoa.org with the
information in the table below. Items marked with an * are mandatory.

Vessel Details
Ship Name
IMO Number
Call Sign
Primary Email
Ship contact number
Owner name
Operator address
DPA telephone
Flag State
MMSI Number
Ship’s Master
Secondary Email
Ship contact email
Operator name
DPA name
DPA email
Movement Details
Entry Point to MSCHOA vessel registration area (78°E/10°S/23°N/Suez/Port)
Entry Date/Time to MSCHOA vessel registration area (DD/MM/YYYY) (HH) (MM)
Exit Point from MSCHOA vessel registration area (78°E/10°S/23°N/Suez/Port)
Exit Date/Time to MSCHOA vessel registration area (DD/MM/YYYY) (HH) (MM)
Do you intend to transit the IRTC?
ETA to IRTC (times are in UTC/ Zulu time)
Direction (East/West)
Do you intend to join a group transit?
Do you intend to join a National Convoy?
Which National Convoy are you joining?
Crew numbers and nationalities
Draught
Freeboard of lowest accessible deck in Metres(M)
Planned Transit Speed
Vessel’s Maximum Speed
Cargo (Crude Oil/Clean Oil/Arms/ Chemicals/ Gas/Passengers/Bulk Cargo/
Containers/Fishing/Ballast/ Others … Please Specify)
Hazardous cargo
Next Port of Call
Last Port of Call
Number of Armed Security personnel on board?
Nationality of armed security team?

Ship Security ActionsExecution of security procedures

Execution of security procedures

Execution of security procedures - the requirements for the Ship Security
Officer to carry out regular security inspections
One of the main duties of an SSO is to carry out regular security inspections to ensure
that appropriate security measures is maintained at all times.

The security measures and procedures at the three security levels required to:

● Ensure the performance of all ship security duties

 ● Control access to the ship
● Control the embarkation of persons and their effects
● Monitor restricted areas to ensure only authorized persons have access
● Monitor deck areas and areas surrounding the ship
● Coordinate the security aspects of the handling of cargo and ship stores; and
● Ensure that security communication is readily available

The security measures and procedures to ensure security at the three security levels
are:

● For performance of all ship security duties - SSO to carry out regular checks.
● Controlling access to the ship - all means of access to the ship identified in the
SSA. After identification the SSP should establish security measures for control,
monitoring and/or limiting access to gangways, ladders, ramps, doors, shell
gates, windows and ports, mooring lines, anchor chains, cranes and hoisting gear
● Controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects - This is done
through access control, personal effect and body searches.
Identify, authenticate and then authorize all persons boarding the vessel. Record
all visitors, issue visitor passes and accompany them into the vessel. Conduct
body and personal effect searches if required.
● Monitor restricted areas to ensure only authorized persons have access -
Identify and then mark all restricted areas indicating that access to or
unauthorized presence in a restricted area constitutes a breach of security.
Regularly patrol or use CCTVs to monitor restricted areas.
● Monitor deck areas and areas surrounding the ship - Use lights at night and
have regular patrols.
● Coordinate the security aspects of the handling of cargo and ship stores
Security aspects for Cargo - Prevent tampering, prevent cargo not meant for
carriage from being accepted and stored on board the ship.
Check cargo, by doing a visual and physical examination (if possible), use
screening equipment, mechanical devices, trained dogs (at port facility), check
against cargo documentation (manifest)
Security related to ship stores – Check package integrity, do not accept stores
without inspection, prevent tampering, do not accept stores not ordered, stow
away immediately after one receives.
● Ensure that security communication is readily available - Regular tests of
Ship Security Alert System by a test call to ensure it is working, providing the
 SSAS with an emergency and reserve source of power that is not dependent on
the vessels main power source.

Ship Security ActionsConvoy Escorts

Convoy Escorts
Convoys Advisory
Navy convoy and escort operations for ships transiting Gulf of Aden are provided by
China, India, Korea, Japan and Russia.
Contact info@intercargo.org for convoy escort schedules.

Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC)

The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF)
webpage https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2017/09/06/guidance-on-maritime-
security-transit-corridor/
provides details of a new Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC), related to transits
through the Gulf of Aden, Bab Al Mandeb (BaM), Southern Red Sea, and associated
waters.

The MSTC will consist of:

The Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC)
The BAM Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) and the TSS West of the Hanish Islands
A two-way route directly connecting the IRTC and the BAM TSS
Background on Combined Maritime Forces (CMF):

Combined Maritime Forces (CMF)

https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/tag/shade/)
is an international naval partnership consisting of 31 nations and 25 navies. It is headed
by a US Navy Vice Admiral with the UK Maritime Component Commander as his deputy.
The 31 nations that comprise CMF are not bound by either a political or military
mandate. CMF is a flexible organisation.

The 31 member nations are: Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, The Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia,
Seychelles, Singapore, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, United Kingdom, United States and
Yemen.

Emergency Preparedness, Drills, and Exercises

Emergency Preparedness, Drills, and Exercises

Processes and Procedures for Crisis Management
Processes and procedures for crisis management and communications with emergency
response providers are as below:

● Prohibiting entry into affected area;

● Denying access to the vessel, except to those responding to the emergency;
● Implementing Maritime security measures throughout the vessel;
● Stopping cargo-handling operations;
● Notifying shore side authorities or other vessels of the emergency;
● Evacuating the vessel in case of security threats or breaches of security;
● Reporting the security incidents;
● Briefing all vessel personnel on possible threats and the need for vigilance,
soliciting their assistance in reporting suspicious persons, objects, or activities;
● Securing non-critical operations in order to focus response on critical operations.

Crisis Management Planning

In light of the uncertainties that surround an entity during a crisis, it is significant to plan
for the best decisions that could be made and also try to anticipate possible outcomes
that could take place in the aftermath of the derailing issue. Planning presents options,
all of which are success-oriented. A comprehensive review of the available options is the
best chance to reinstate normalcy in such junctures.

Contingency Planning
There is an important approach to the development of a model that could be used for
crisis management. The methods that are chosen for crisis management have a chance
to deliver the intended aftermath consequences. A simulated scenario could be staged so
that the approaches that are proposed get tested. This also presents an opportunity to
establish the most ideal strategy that needs to be considered for incorporation. For
effective crisis management, it is crucial that the first decision to be made on the
approach to be used for managing the situation is implemented soon after the crisis
appears. Working with vigilance is paramount so that the adverse effects of the crisis do
not spread into all the elements of the organization. In the contingency plan chosen, it is
ideal to have information and guidance to assess the likely implications.

A planned or unplanned crisis can be managed strategically and more effectively if a ship
does its crisis management “homework.” One of the main aspects of a company that is
proactive is its obligation and ability to take responsibility for its acts. The consideration
of possible scenarios and the best possible solutions to prepare, prevent, and provide
interventions that allow a ship to be better prepared in handling a crisis is necessary.
Scenario planning may be utilized as a crisis management strategy; it provides a
mechanism for thinking through different ways whereby these scenarios may occur and
develop the most suitable business responses

Risk Assessment Risk assessment is a fundamental aspect of strategic risk management.

Companies can examine different risks through the application of a risk reporting
process, such as a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis,
and firms can start making better and more informed decisions, enhancing risk
communication and building management-based consensus.

The following list of questions may aid in risk assessment:

1. What impact will it have on people?

2. How realistic is the probability of the potential crisis identified?
3. Does shipboard action moderate or halt the crisis?
4. Does the policy implemented meet public scrutiny?
5. Are the resources necessary for taking action available?
6. Is there a willingness to act?
7. What would result from inaction?

Within the crisis management plan, it is important to have a clear chain of command in
place. The plan needs to be put in writing to take care of the worst-case scenario,
including total inaccessibility of the normal workplace and the inability to use and rely
upon the ship and company infrastructure and resources for an extended time period. It
is also advisable that the crisis management cross-functional team meet regularly to
hold discussions on potential crises and the means of responding to them.

Communication and Crisis Management Planning

A communication plan is vital in planning for crisis management. You must always be
ready to communicate internally and externally with regard to emergencies on behalf of
the ship and her crew and the firm. You may be required to answer queries such as:

1. What resources and information are required for dealing with the immediate
emergency?
2. What is the status of the emergency in the affected locations?
3. How are the employees/crew/passengers reacting?

In the event of a crisis, internal stakeholders and employees need a convenient way to
gain access to communication from the firm.

The communication channels that most firms utilize and that pro- vide the broadest
access include:

● Daily postings on bulletin boards;

● Daily email updates;
● Password-protected Internet sites;
● An HR help center as part of the firm;
● Telephone hotline for employee/crew family questions .

In most cases, communication experts advocate being quick, steadfast, and bold. Based
on this proposition, one can contend that a crisis often creates the need for
instantaneous and consistent information to fast-track positive responses to the
situation.

Crisis management can be divided into three phases:

1. Pre-crisis,
2. Crisis response, and
3. Post-crisis.

The pre-crisis phase is concerned with prevention and preparation. The crisis response
phase is when the ship and the company must respond to a crisis. The post-crisis phase
looks for ways to better prepare for the next crisis and fulfills commitments made during
the crisis phase including follow-up information.

In case of an assault: Case of a Breach of Security

● Do not hesitate to sound the ship's general alarm in case of a threat of assault;
● Try to keep adequate lighting to permanently dazzle the opponents, in case of an
attempt by strangers to climb the ship's side;
● Raise the alarm, by VHF - channel 16, to the ships in the area and to the
permanent watch system of the authorities ashore (cite the existing structure in
the port). The efficiency of assistance by the security forces depends on an early
alarm;
● Sound the alarm with intermittent blasts on the siren and use visual alarms with
floodlights and signalling rockets;
● If appropriate, to protect the lives of those onboard, use measures to repel the
boarding by employing powerful floodlights for dazzling the aggressors or using
jets of water or signalling rockets against the areas of boarding; and
● Do not attempt any heroic acts.

Keep the contracted watchmen under the control of the officer of the watch
Demand a good watchman service. Make them identify all persons that enter and leave
the ship. Recommend that the crew co-operate with the control. Do not allow the
watchman to leave the gangway, unless he is relieved by another watchman or a crew
member.

Communicate to the police any occurrence relating to robbery, theft or assault

Occurrences involving assault or robbery should be communicated to the Security forces,
for the pertinent legal steps to be taken.

This information will make possible the study of measures to be adopted for the
prevention and combat of these crimes, contributing to guaranteeing the safety of the
crew and the ship.

Note
Security procedures and measures specific to the security level and threat type are
available in the Ship Security Plan. The SSO must ensure that crew members are briefed
and trained on the various security contingencies as documented in the SSP.
Contingency Planning

Contingency plans to prevent various security breaches

General precautions to be followed to prevent a security breach on board a ship and its
immediate environs are as below:

Watch over the ship and the cargo

It is the duty of every Master to take care of the cargo and take precautionary measures
for the complete safety of the ship, as well as that of the activities carried out on board
by the crew or other persons employed on board. All crew members should co-operate in
the vigilance, in their own interests, communicating any suspicious activity to the Officer
of the Watch.

Illuminate the ship and its side

Keep the ship illuminated, particularly, the outer side and the whole length of the deck,
using high powered floodlights. Bad visibility impedes the action of the watchmen,
constituting a favorable factor for unlawful activities. Do not forget what is recommended
in rules 2 (safety & responsibility) and 30 (when at anchor or aground) of the COLREG!

Establish communication for outside support

Whenever possible, install a telephone line with easy access for the watchman or crew
member on duty. Ask for assistance by the telephone.
Remember also the list of stations which will be on permanent watch on VHF - channel
16. These stations can forward the request for assistance to the competent authorities.

Control of accesses to the cargo and to living quarters

The Master's cabin is one of the main objectives of the assailants who are looking for
money and the master keys to other living quarters, to steal the crew's personal effects
of value and nautical equipment from the bridge. The cabins and other living quarters
should be kept locked whenever their occupants are absent.

Normally cargo will only be the object of robbery or theft if the criminals have advance
knowledge of the contents, through information collected by unscrupulous persons who
have access to the bill of lading.
Attempt to stow the containers with valuable cargo in a manner to obstruct their doors.
Isolate the means of access to the ship and also the accesses to the internal areas,
creating a sole way of entry and exit by the gangway, guaranteeing its control by the
watchman posted there.

Keep the portholes closed

Open portholes can be an easy access to clever criminals: close them with the clips in
place always when you leave. Try also, to keep the accesses to internal areas locked,
guaranteeing the entry and exit by the gangway watchman.

Do not leave valuables exposed

Try to reduce the opportunities of robbery by putting all portable equipment which is not
in use to its place of storage. Valuables left exposed tempt opportunistic thieves, keep
them in safe place under lock and key.

Keep the gangways raised

At anchorages and in port, make the access difficult by keeping the gangways and rope
ladders raised. In port, only leave the gangway to the dockside down.

Bomb threat

General: (this could be triggered by someone saying something, calling or writing about
an impending incident)

● Contact FSO
● Call emergency stations, and standby to evacuate if necessary
● Account for crew members
● Inform Company
● Inform Port Authority, as applicable

Unidentified Objects/Explosives on Vessel

● Remain calm.
● Do NOT touch, tamper with, or move the package, bag, or item.
● Notify FSO, Company and Port Authority
● Follow instructions from law enforcement & Port Facility supervisors and/or law
enforcement will assess the situation and provide guidance
 ● Call emergency stations, and standby to evacuate if necessary
● Account for crew members
● Be aware. There could be other threats or suspicious items.

Damage to/Destruction of Facility

● Inform FSO, Company and Port Authority as applicable

● Collect evidence – (photographs etc.)
● Isolate area

Stowaways

● Inform Master
● Restrain and control, with help from other crew
● Treat humanely

Who is a ‘Stowaway’ ?
Under the IMO’s FAL Convention (Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic
Convention), a stowaway is defined as “A person who is secreted on a ship, or in cargo
which is subsequently loaded on the ship, without the consent of the shipowner or the
master or any other responsible person and who is detected on board the ship after it
has departed from a port, or in the cargo while unloading it in the port of arrival, and is
reported as a stowaway by the master to the appropriate authorities”. Mostly stowaways
are driven by desperate economic and living conditions to try and smuggle themselves.

Sometimes the stowaway is part of an organized crime in smuggling people and drugs,
using e.g., a sealed cargo container or an empty ship's tank. This can remain hidden and
undiscovered and the people and drugs can be delivered in a destination port and
constitute a crime of human smuggling and drug trafficking.

ISPS Code
Under the ISPS Code, if there are “clear grounds” that a ship is not in compliance with
the Code, the authorities are likely to apply security control measures to ensure
compliance. Finding a stowaway onboard is “clear grounds” of non compliance. Should
stowaways be discovered on any vessel, the stowaway must be detained on board and
properly cared for until the proper authorities allow disembarkation of the stowaway.
Preventive measures
Traditionally perceived as a shipboard responsibility, stowaways are now seen as a
problem requiring the combined efforts of the Ports / Terminals, Ship Manager / Owner /
Charterer and the Ship.

Ship managers / owners: Must set up procedures for prevention of stowaways, and then
how to deal with stowaways should they be found on board. Security guards may need
to be hired to assist in high risk areas.

Prior to port entry all spaces not to be used during cargo operations should be locked
and sealed. An effective gangway watch must be maintained at all times. The crew
should remain vigilant and challenge anyone who has no business on board or appears
to be hanging around suspiciously. Ship's staff should conduct a complete stowaway
search on the completion of cargo operations and prior to departure. In a high risk area,
a further search should be conducted soon after departure.

The greatest threat from stowaways is not so much their physical presence and the
stress placed on the crew, but the consequences of their presence including heavy fines,
delays to ship, and possibly even criminal charges against the crew for mistreatment of
stowaways. It is easy to suggest that the most effective way to stop this nuisance is to
prevent the stowaways from boarding the vessel. Despite the best coordinated efforts of
the ship, terminal, and company, determined individuals will occasionally succeed in
stowing away.

Other Emergencies
This will depend upon the type and is as below:

Smuggling weapons or equipment, including weapons of mass destruction

● Call emergency stations

● Restrain and control, with help from other crew
● Inform Company
● Inform Port Authority, as applicable

Use of the ship to carry persons intending to cause a security incident, or their
equipment
 ● Call for emergency stations
● Inform Company
● Inform Port Authority, as applicable
● Establish safe navigation, as applicable

Use of the ship itself as a weapon or as a means to cause damage or destruction

● Call for emergency station

● Inform Company
● Inform Port Authority, as applicable
● Establish safe navigation, as applicable

Attacks from seaward while at berth or at anchor

● Call emergency stations

● Account for crewmembers
● Master to detail crew to assess damage, if any
● Make a VHF broadcast
● Inform Company
● Inform Port Authority, as applicable

Attacks while at sea

● Call emergency stations

● Account for crewmembers
● Master to detail crew to assess damage, if any caused by the attack
● Make a VHF broadcast
● Inform Company
● Inform Coastal and Flag states
● Establish safe navigation, as applicable

Emergency Preparedness, Drills, and ExercisesExecution of contingency plans

Execution of contingency plans

General precautions to be followed to prevent a security breach on board a ship and its
immediate environs are as below:
Watch over the ship and the cargo
It is the duty of every Master to take care of the cargo and take precautionary measures
for the complete safety of the ship, as well as that of the activities carried out on board
by the crew or other persons employed on board. All crew members should co-operate in
the vigilance, in their own interests, communicating any suspicious activity to the Officer
of the Watch.

Illuminate the ship and its side

Keep the ship illuminated, particularly, the outer side and the whole length of the deck,
using high powered floodlights. Bad visibility impedes the action of the watchmen,
constituting a favourable factor for unlawful activities. Do not forget what is
recommended in rules 2 (safety & responsibility) and 30 (when at anchor or aground) of
the COLREG.

Establish communication for outside support

Whenever possible, install a telephone line with easy access for the watchman or crew
member on duty. Ask for assistance by the telephone.
Remember also the list of stations which will be on permanent watch on VHF - channel
16. These stations can forward the request for assistance to the competent authorities.

Control of accesses to the cargo and to living quarters

The Master's cabin is one of the main objectives of the assailants who are looking for
money and the master keys to other living quarters, to steal the crew's personal effects
of value and nautical equipment from the bridge. The cabins and other living quarters
should be kept locked whenever their occupants are absent.

Normally cargo will only be the object of robbery or theft if the criminals have advance
knowledge of the contents, through information collected by unscrupulous persons who
have access to the bill of lading.

Attempt to stow the containers with valuable cargo in a manner to obstruct their doors.
Isolate the means of access to the ship and also the accesses to the internal areas,
creating a sole way of entry and exit by the gangway, guaranteeing its control by the
watchman posted there.

Keep the portholes closed

Open portholes can be an easy access to clever criminals: close them with the clips in
place always when you leave. Try also, to keep the accesses to internal areas locked,
guaranteeing the entry and exit by the gangway watchman.

Do not leave valuables exposed

Try to reduce the opportunities of robbery by putting all portable equipment which is not
in use to its place of storage. Valuables left exposed tempt opportunistic thieves, keep
them in safe place under lock and key.

Keep the gangways raised

At anchorages and in port, make the access difficult by keeping the gangways and rope
ladders raised. In port, only leave the gangway to the dockside down.

In case of an assault

● Do not hesitate to sound the ship's general alarm in case of a threat of assault;
● Try to keep adequate lighting to permanently dazzle the opponents, in case of an
attempt by strangers to climb the ship's side;
● Raise the alarm, by VHF - channel 16, to the ships in the area and to the
permanent watch system of the authorities ashore (cite the existing structure in
the port). The efficiency of assistance by the security forces depends on an early
alarm;
● Sound the alarm with intermittent blasts on the siren and use visual alarms with
floodlights and signalling rockets;
● If appropriate, to protect the lives of those onboard, use measures to repel the
boarding by employing powerful floodlights for dazzling the aggressors or using
jets of water or signalling rockets against the areas of boarding; and
● Do not attempt any heroic acts.

Keep the contracted watchmen under the control of the officer of the watch
Demand a good watchman service. Make them identify all persons that enter and leave
the ship. Recommend that the crew co-operate with the control. Do not allow the
watchman to leave the gangway, unless he is relieved by another watchman or a crew
member.

Communicate to the police any occurrence relating to robbery, theft or assault

Occurrences involving assault or robbery should be communicated to the Security forces,
for the pertinent legal steps to be taken.

This information will make possible the study of measures to be adopted for the
prevention and combat of these crimes, contributing to guaranteeing the safety of the
crew and the ship.

Note
Security procedures and measures specific to the security level and threat type are
available in the Ship Security Plan.
The SSO must ensure that crew members are briefed and trained on the various security
contingencies as documented in the SSP.

General actions in relation to various contingencies are:

Damage to, or destruction of, the ship or of a port facility, e.g., by explosive
devices, arson, sabotage or vandalism

● Call for emergency station

● Account for crewmembers
● Master to detail crew to assess damage and thereafter decide on the subsequent
actions.
● Make a VHF broadcast
● Inform Company
● Inform Port Authority, as applicable
● Establish safe navigation, as applicable
● Decide if abandoning ship is necessary

Hijacking or seizure of the ship or of persons on board

Same as above, refer to ship security actions in lesson 7.

Attacks by armed robbers

● Call emergency stations

● Account for crew members
● Make a VHF broadcast
● Inform Company
 ● Inform Port Authority, as applicable

Tampering with cargo, essential ship equipment or systems or ship's stores

● Call Emergency stations

● Inform Company
● Inform Port Authority

Unauthorized access or use, including presence of stowaways

● Inform Master
● Restrain and control, with help from other crew
● Treat humanely

Smuggling weapons or equipment, including weapons of mass destruction

● Call emergency stations

● Restrain and control, with help from other crew
● Inform Company
● Inform Port Authority, as applicable

Use of the ship to carry persons intending to cause a security incident, or their
equipment

● Call for emergency stations

● Inform Company
● Inform Port Authority, as applicable
● Establish safe navigation, as applicable

Use of the ship itself as a weapon or as a means to cause damage or

destruction

● Call for emergency station

● Inform Company
● Inform Port Authority, as applicable
● Establish safe navigation, as applicable

Attacks from seaward while at berth or at anchor

● Call emergency stations

 ● Account for crewmembers
● Master to detail crew to assess damage, if any
● Make a VHF broadcast
● Inform Company
● Inform Port Authority, as applicable

Attacks while at sea

● Call emergency stations

● Account for crewmembers
● Master to detail crew to assess damage, if any caused by the attack
● Make a VHF broadcast
● Inform Company
● Inform Coastal and Flag states
● Establish safe navigation, as applicable

Initial Crisis Response Best Practices

● Be quick and try to have initial response within the first hour.
● Be accurate by carefully checking all facts.
● Be consistent by keeping spokespeople informed of crisis events and key
message points.
● Make public safety the number one priority.
● Use all of the available communication channels including the social media, web
sits, Intranet, and mass notification systems.
● Provide some expression of concern/sympathy for victims.
● Remember to include employees in the initial response.
● Be ready to provide stress and trauma counseling to victims of the crisis and their
families, including employees.

Emergency Preparedness, Drills, and ExercisesSecurity drills and exercises

Security drills and exercises

Security drills and exercises - requirements for, and importance of, conducting
drills and exercises, including those relating to prevention and suppression of
piracy and armed robbery against ships.
The objective of security drills and exercises is to ensure that shipboard personnel are
proficient in all assigned security duties at all security levels and in the identification of
any security-related deficiencies that need to be addressed.

To effectively implement the provisions of the SSP drills must be conducted at least once
every three months.

In addition, in cases where more than 25 percent of the ship's personnel have been
changed, at any one time, with personnel that have not previously participated in any
drill on that ship within the last 3 months, a drill should be conducted within one week of
the change.

Various drill types should be conducted and scheduled, a scheduling example of different
security drill types is like below:

S/N Drill Details Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

01 Piracy/ Hijacking X X X

02 Bomb Threat X X
onboard Vessel

03 Other craft X
Ramming Vessel

04 Terrorist Boarding X
Vessel

05 Bomb Threat at X
terminal

06 Bomb found X X X
onboard

07 Bomb found at X
terminal

08 Evacuation via X
terminal
Use of Citadel where provided on-board - the meaning of citadel
A citadel is strongly fortified place on the vessel where crew members can shelter from
say a pirate attack.

Know how and when a citadel is to be used

Use the citadel to shelter/secure crew when pirates/robbers board the vessel. Note the
following when using the citadel:

● 100% of the crew must be secured in the Citadel.

● The crew of the ship must have self-contained, independent, reliable 2-way
external communications (sole reliance on VHF communications is not sufficient).

The Master reports to the Company Security Officer (CSO) for all security related
incidents. The drills are done every three months, but can be increased based on the
needs, decided by the CSO and SSO based on various factors, primarily to ensure that
the crew is ready in taking preventive measures under any breach or a threat to
security.

The regulations allow a company operating several similar vessels to hire new crew
members, have them participate in a drill on board one vessel, and then rotate those
crew members to any of the similar vessels within that same company’s fleet. For the
purposes of these regulations, “similar” may be interpreted to mean any vessel in the
company’s fleet that has a SSP with essentially the same security measures. A ferry line,
for example, that operates both high-speed craft and displacement vessels may have
similar SSPs, even though the vessels are not “similar” in design. It is the responsibility
of the SSO to ensure that all personnel are adequately trained, and in this case, that
new personnel from a similar vessel are familiar with the particulars of the SSP that are
unique to the vessel.

Security drills and exercises may be combined with existing non-security drill and
exercise requirements to increase efficiency. These may include safety, and disaster
preparedness drills.

Stations to deter pirates from boarding (simplified drills)

Inform in advance of all crew except the watchkeepers to participate in this
drill and instructed them where to assemble.

Drill scenario

Master: (Raise the alarm onboard the ship.) “This is a drill. Assume that a boat, which
could be pirates, is approaching. All crew go to your stations as designated.” (Suppose
the crew are to assemble on the bridge, and confirm that the crew have assembled
there)

Master: “Declare your station, role and place where you are assigned to lock.”

Crew 1: “I am in charge of the engine room and operation of emergency fire pumps,
and I am assigned to check locks on upper deck, starboard side and on the stern.”

Crew 2: "I am in charge of the stern deck and discharging of water, and I am assigned
to check locks on the boat deck on the starboard side in case escape into the ship
becomes necessary.” (Have other crew recite their stations, roles and duties, etc.)

Master: “Later, assemble by position unit, confirm location of equipment and machinery
in about 10 minutes. After that, dismiss accordingly, and drill will be over.”

Crew 1 and 2: Reporting from respective onboard station locations to Master

Master: (Make an onboard announcement in 10 minutes.) “Drill is over. All crew return
to your regular stations.”

It is necessary for each ship to assign basic stations and roles to crew in advance, as is
the case with general emergency operations.

Requirements for Conducting Drills and Exercises

Requirements for, and importance of, conducting drills and exercises, including
those relating to prevention and suppression of piracy and armed robbery
against ships.
Emergency Preparedness, Drills, and ExercisesUse of Citadel

Use of Citadel
Citadel

Citadel

A citadel is a designated area where, in the event of imminent boarding, all crew may
seek protection. A citadel is designed and constructed to resist forced entry. The use of a
citadel cannot guarantee a military or law enforcement response.Well-constructed
citadels with reliable communications (ideally satellite phone and VHF) must be supplied
with food, water and sanitation. Control of propulsion and steering can offer effective
protection during an attack. The use of the citadel must be drilled and the VSO should
define the conditions and supporting logistics for its use.

It is important to note that military forces are likely to apply the following criteria before
boarding a ship:

● All the crew must be accounted for and confirmed in the citadel.
● Two-way communication with the citadel.

A citadel is a designated, pre-planned area where, in the event of imminent boarding by

attackers, all crew may seek protection. A citadel is designed and constructed to resist
forced entry. Before deciding to use a citadel, thought must be given as to how a citadel
situation might end. The use of a citadel cannot guarantee a military or law enforcement
response and, the Master may have to make the decision when to end a citadel situation
without the assistance of military forces.

Well-constructed citadels used by a well-drilled crew can offer effective protection during
an attack. The establishment of a citadel will require external technical advice and
support. As well as protection, a citadel must provide reliable means to communicate
ashore and maintain some degree of situational awareness. The ability to deny control of
propulsion to attackers is a further consideration.

The VSP should define the conditions for use of the citadel and logistics necessary to
survive e.g. food, water, medicines, first-aid kits. The use of the citadel must be drilled
to ensure the Master is able to make the correct and timely decision on whether to
retreat into it.

The whole concept of the citadel approach is lost if any of the crew are left outside
before it is secured. Therefore, plans should include a method of ensuring that the entire
crew have entered the citadel.
 Citadel Equipment

Notes
Security Administration

Security Administration
Records shall be kept on board and the duration for which they should be
retained.

Records of the following must be kept on board for a period as determined by the Flag
State. Records must be protected from unauthorized access or disclosure:

● Training drills and exercises;

● Security threats and security incidents;
● Breaches of security;
● Changes in security level;
● Communications relating to the direct security of the ship such as specific threats
to the ship or port facilities the ship is, or has been, in;
● Internal audits and reviews of security activities;
● Periodic review of the ship security assessment;
● Periodic review of the ship security plan;
● Implementation of any amendments to the plan; and
 ● Maintenance, calibration and testing of any security equipment provided on
board, including testing of the ship security alert system.

Security AdministrationDocumentation and records

Documentation and Records

Documents that shall be available on board at all times
Security documents that are to be available on board at all times are:

● The Continuous Safety Record (CSR) that provides an on-board record of the
history of the ship (as per SOLAS Chapter XI-1 special measures to enhance
maritime safety).
● Ship Security Plan and associated records, the ship security assessment
● Record of changes to the Ship Security Plan
● General description of cargo aboard the ship;
● Passenger list; and
● Information required to be carried under SOLAS regulation XI-2/5, which is
information regarding the person responsible for appointing crew members
presently employed on the vessel, information regarding the person who decides
vessel employment and the parties to the charter party for chartered vessels

International Ship Security Certificate, its Validity and Verification

Requirements
The compliance of the ISPS Code is enforced through an International Ship Security
Certificate (ISSC).

The certificate is subject to both an interim and renewal verification of the vessels
security system. The purpose of these verification (audits) are to ensure that that the
VSP and/or amendments to a previously approved VSP meet the provisions of SOLAS XI-
2 and the ISPS Code.

A shipboard audit determines (both intermediate and renewal) whether the vessel is
complying with approved VSPs on board ships. It also checks for the effectiveness of the
implementation of the VSP on board ships.

The intermediate verification is carried out between the second and third anniversary
date of the certificate.

The certificate is valid for 5 years and is issued after an initial audit (verification). A new
certificate will be issued on completion of the renewal verification. A new ISSC is issued
on board with a limited validity of a maximum 5 months (shorter periods of validity may
sometimes apply). Full Term ISSC will be issued after the assessment of the audit
report.

There is a proviso for the issue of an interim certificate, which is issued to

● A ship without a certificate, on delivery or prior to its entry or re-entry into

service;
● Transfer of a ship from the flag of a Contracting Government to the flag of
another Contracting Government;
● Transfer of a ship to the flag of a Contracting Government from a State which is
not a Contracting Government; or
● When a Company assumes the responsibility for the operation of a ship not
previously operated by that Company.

Interim certificates are valid for 6 months, after which the full term ISSC is issued,
provided the vessel complies with all the ISSC certification requirements.

Note: The ISSC ceases to be valid, under the following circumstances:

● If the relevant verification is not completed within the required periods (time-
windows)
● Upon change of flag
● If the certificate is not endorsed as required
● Upon change of management

The International Ship & Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code is the standard for vessel
security that is applied to vessels that sail on international routes.

Requirements of the Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR) and what it shall

contain
The CSR is intended to provide an on-board record of the history of the ship with respect
to the information recorded therein.

Contents of the CSR is as below:

Following details should be present in the continuous synopsis record (CSR):

● Name of the ship

● The port at which the ship is registered
● Ship’s identification number
● Date on which ship was registered with the state
● Name of the state whose flag the ship is flying
● Name of registered owner and the registered address
 ● Name of registered bareboat charterers and their registered addresses
● Name of the classification society with which the ship is classed
● Name of the company, its registered address and the address from where safety
management activities are carried out
● Name of the administration or the contracting government or the recognized
organization which has issued the document of compliance, specified in the ISM
Code, to the company operating the ship.
● Name of the body which has carried out the audit to issue the document of
compliance
● Name of the administration or the contracting government or the recognized
organization which has issued the safety management certificate (SMC) to the
ship and the name of the body which has issued the document
● Name of the administration or the contracting government or the recognized
organization which has issued the international ship security certificate, specified
in the ISPS Code, to the ship and the name of the body which has carried out the
verification on the basis of which the certificate was issued
● The date of expiry of the ship’s registration with the state

Any changes made related to the above mentioned points should be mentioned in the
continuous synopsis record. Officially, the record should be in English, Spanish, or
French language; however, a translation in the language of the administration may be
provided.

The continuous synopsis record shall always be kept on board ship and shall be available
for inspection all the time.

Anti-Piracy

Anti-Piracy
Ship Protection Measures
This section highlights proven SPM that provide layered protection. The BMP is based on
regional experience of attacks and will continue to evolve as methods change.

The implementation of SPM will be identified during the voyage planning process.
Companies may wish to consider making further alterations to the ship beyond the scope
of this BMP, and/or providing additional equipment and/or personnel as a means of
further reducing the risk of attack.

Watch keeping and enhanced vigilance

The Master should implement the following actions to assist in raising vigilance on board.

● Provide additional, fully-briefed lookouts.

● Maintain an all-round lookout from an elevated position.
 ● Consider shorter rotation of the watch period to maximise alertness of the
lookouts.
● Maintain sufficient binoculars for the enhanced bridge team, preferably anti-glare.
● Consider the use of thermal imagery optics and night vision aids as they provide
a reliable all-weather, day and night surveillance capability.
● Maintain a careful radar watch and monitor all navigational warnings and
communications, particularly VHF and GMDSS alerts.
● Consider placing well-constructed dummies at strategic locations around the ship
to give the impression of greater numbers of crew on watch.
● Consider using CCTV and fixed search lights for better monitoring. Fixed search
lights can deter approaches from the stern.
● Mount anti-piracy mirrors on the bridge wings to make looking aft easier.

Manoeuvring
The Master and officers should practice manoeuvring the ship to ensure familiarity with
the ship’s handling characteristics. The Master should also practice avoidance
manoeuvres while maintaining the best possible speed. Experience has shown that such
action can defeat even a lengthy and determined attack as creation of hydrostatic
pressure can have a better defensive impact than speed.

Alarms
The ship’s alarms inform the ship’s crew that an attack is underway and warn the
attacker that the ship is aware and is reacting. In addition, continuous sounding of the
ship’s whistle may distract the attackers.

It is important that:

● The alarms are distinctive to avoid confusion.

● Crew members are familiar with each alarm, especially those warning of an attack
and indicating ‘all clear’.
● All alarms are backed up by an announcement over the accommodation and deck
PA system, where fitted.
● Drills are carried out to ensure that the alarm is heard throughout the ship. The
drill will confirm the time necessary for all crew to move to a position of safety.

Suspected piracy/armed robbery vessel detected

Early detection of suspected attacks must be the first line of defence. If the vigilance and
surveillance has been successful, a pirate/armed robbery vessel will be detected early.

Inform the nearest littoral or coastal State through the RCC, using the appropriate ships’
message format. The ship's crew should be warned and, if not already in their defensive
positions, they should move to them. Evasive manoeuvres and hoses should be
vigorously employed as detailed in the preparation phase.
Being certain that piracy/armed robbery will be attempted
If not already in touch with the littoral coastal State, efforts should be made to establish
contact. Crew preparations should be completed and, where a local rule of the road
allows ships under attack to do so, a combination of sound and light signals should be
made to warn other ships in the vicinity that an attack is about to take place.

Vigorous manoeuvring at maximum speed should be sustained if navigation conditions

permit.

Pirate /armed robbery vessel in proximity to, or in contact with, own ship

Use water jets to prevent pirate boarding, and if possible, cast off grappling hooks and
poles, provided crew not endangered.

Sound the pirate alarm, using the ship's whistle as an alarm discourages the attackers
and tells crew working in exposed areas to seek shelter.

Communicate with other vessels using distress flares and ship’s communication
equipment for help.

If possible, use evasive manoeuvering techniques e.g. heavy wheel movements to ride
of attackers.

Pirates/armed robbers start to board ship

Timing during this phase will be critical and as soon as one knows that boarding is
inevitable all crew must be ordered to seek their secure positions (proceed to the citadel,
for example).

When attackers are on board the actions of the master and crew should:

● Ensure the greatest level of safety for those on board the ship;
● If possible remain in control of the navigation of the ship; and
● Try to get the pirates/robbers depart as early as possible

The options available to the master and crew will depend on the extent to which the
attackers have secured control of the ship, e.g. by have they gained access to the bridge
or engine room, have they seized crewmembers who they can threaten, to force the
master or crew to comply with their wishes.
However, even if the crew are in secure areas, the master must consider the risk to the
ship the attackers can cause, when deciding on actions to be taken. An example of a risk
that pirates they could use firebombs to start fires on a tanker or chemical carrier.

The pirates/armed robbers begin to gain control and take one or more of the
ship's crew into their custody
If the attackers have gained control of the engine room or bridge, have seized crew
members or can pose an imminent threat to the safety of a ship, the master or officer in
charge should remain calm and, if possible, seek to negotiate with the attackers.

Try and maintain control over the navigation of the ship, the safe return of any hostages
they may hold and the early departure of the attackers from the ship.

Comply with the attackers' demands may be the only safe alternative as resistance or
obstruction of any kind could be both futile and dangerous.

In the event of attackers gaining temporary control of the ship, crew members should, if
it is safe and practicable, leave Close Circuit Television (CCTV) records running.

Consider hiding equipment (especially those for communication) in areas where crew are
detained.

The pirates/armed robbers have stolen property/money, etc.

At this stage it is essential that the pirates/armed robbers are assured that they have
been given everything they have demanded with a reassurance that nothing has been
hidden, this could go some way in persuading them to leave the vessel.

The pirates/armed robbers start to disembark from the ship

Do not leave secure your secure positions on the vessel until you are sure all
pirates/robbers have disembarked.

The pirates/armed robbers have disembarked from the ship

Sound the ‘all clear’ signal.

Anti-PiracyPiracy Awareness
Piracy Awareness
Piracy Awareness - Prior to Entering Areas of Risk - Appraise the strengths and
vulnerabilities of crews and ships
The International Maritime Bureau has the following advice to Masters if a vessel is
intending to transit a piracy prone area. The advice is as below:

General advice to Masters

Be aware of the sea areas and ports affected by piracy and armed robbery. The IMB
Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB PRC) broadcasts incidents of piracy and armed robbery
incidents to all ships in the IOR and AOR regions via InMARSAT Safety Net System.
Similar information can be viewed on the Piracy Map.

In most incidents pirates and armed robbers will abandon an attack when they know
they been spotted or feel the vessel has been secured and is a difficult target. However
Somali and Nigerian pirates tend to be more aggressive so additional precautions must
be taken.

Always Follow

● Company and ship specific procedures.

● Advice in IMO circular MSC.1/Circ.1334 (23 June 2009)
● Procedures given in BMP5 while transiting high risk areas of Somali piracy.

Always report ALL actual, attempted or suspicious piracy and armed robbery incidents
occurring anywhere to the 24-hour manned IMB PRC. This is crucial in the response
procedures as well as broadcasting the threat to ALL vessels in the area.

Ship to be like a fortress - available strengths of the ship to defend a pirate

attack, being slow moving, a ship is a vulnerable target with limited deterrent
in terms of returning an attack
Ships can do the following to defend against a pirate attack:

● Comply with procedures in the SSP in Security Plan as required when entering a
high risk area
● Brief Crew on piracy procedures and precautions prior entry
● Prepare an emergency communication plan
● Have a piracy drill prior entry
● Single access point for entry into accommodation
● Keep doors locked
● Test communications links
 ● Follow BMP5 guidelines
● Harden vessel’s structure to prevent boarding – e.g. razor wires, hoses rigged,
nets etc.
● Ladders etc. stowed
● Minimise cash holding
● Raise security to higher equivalent – at least 2
● Register with MSCHOA & UKMTO (Somalia) if appropriate

Ship vulnerabilities exploited by pirates is as below:

● Low speed
● Low freeboard
● Inadequate planning and procedures
● Visibly low state of alert and/or lack of evident self-protective measures
● Where a slow response by the ship is evident
● Inadequate training of ship’s crew to handle pirates
● Lack of Best Management Practices

Factors such as ship size, speed, freeboard, sea state, visibility, day/night
condition affecting the vulnerability to an attack
The ships most at risk to pirate attacks are:

● Coasters and fishing vessels

● Tugs, offshore work boats, barges
● Handy-sized bulkers and tankers
● Passenger ships (for hostage taking)
● ALL ships below 15 knots speed
● ALL ship types while alongside or at anchor in high risk areas
● ALL ships with a low freeboard

Note that pirate attacks have taken place at most times of the day. However, many
pirate attacks have taken place early in the morning, at first light.

Attacks have occurred at night, particularly clear moonlit nights, but night-time attacks
are less common.

Anti-PiracyAnti-piracy measures

Anti-piracy measures
Anti-piracy measures (civilian and military) - that can be adopted to make the
ship less vulnerable to pirates boarding it

Anti-piracy measures to be adopted to make the ship less vulnerable to a piracy attack
are as below:

● Watchkeeping and Enhanced Vigilance – e.g. posting extra lookouts, considering

shorter watch periods, using night vision optics, among others – check BMP 5 and
Ship Security plan
● Placing well constructed dummies at strategic locations
● Enhancing bridge protection – wear bulletproof jackets, sand bags on bridge
bulkhead, etc.
● Consider using CCTVs to monitor vulnerable areas on the vessel
● Control access to bridge, machinery space and accommodation
● Check lighting – especially upper deck lighting and search lights prior entry to
high risk areas
● Denying pirates the use of Ship’s Tools and Equipment
● Inform crew of the location of Safe Muster Points / Citadel used for protection
 Dummy

Water curtains
 Water cannon

Pirates Arrest

Adopting self-protecting measures to detract, deter or delay a piracy attack.

Transiting the high risk area in the recommended zone and preferably in a
convoy
Anti-piracy measures to detract or delay a piracy attack are as below:

● The use of alarms/ship’s whistle

● Use manoeuvres than can prevent pirates boarding vessel
● Use physical barriers to prevent pirate boarding – razor wires etc.
● Use of water spray and foam monitors
 ● Consider the use of armed guards, after getting required approvals from the flag
state

BMP 5 recommends vessels use the International Recommended Transit Corridor

(ISRTC) “Group Transit Scheme” while transiting through Gulf of Aden

Anti-PiracyCommunication with the flag state, coastal authority and task force

Communication with the flag state, coastal authority

and task force

Naval task force

 Naval Escort

Communication with the flag state, coastal authority and task force to update
ships position frequently - Understand the contents of the Best Management
Practices (BMP) guide as issued by industries bodies and updated from time to
time
The purpose of the Industry Best Management Practices (BMP) is to assist ships avoid,
deter or delay piracy attacks in the High Risk Area (Somalia).

This is because experience and data collected by Naval/Military forces, shows that the
application of the recommendations contained in this booklet can and will make a
significant difference in preventing a ship becoming a victim of piracy.

BMP recommends that vessels do the following prior entry into Somalia piracy area:

● Fill up Vessel movement registration form to register vessel with Maritime Safety
Centre Horn Of Africa (MSCHOA)
● Report to United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), when in high risk
area
● Implement ship protection measures
 Aircraft Patrol

Communication at sea, under a Piracy attack

In the event of a piracy attack, the best way of alerting the local authorities of an attack
is by sending out a distress message to emergency response providers. In case of
piracy, it could be the navy patrolling the area or the security agency, in charge of the
region.

Maintain contact with the security authority or the Navy preferably by telephone for as
long as it is safe to do so. On receipt of information in relation to an attack, the security
authority/ the naval unit will inform the appropriate national maritime operations centre
and local authorities and will ensure all other ships in the immediate vicinity are aware of
the event.

Follow up with call to the Company Security Officer if the situation permits.

Activate the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) which will alert your CSO and Flag State.
Make a ‘Mayday’ call on VHF Ch. 16.

Send a distress message via the Digital Selective Calling system (DSC) and Inmarsat-C,
as applicable.

Anti-PiracyPirates Business Model

Pirates Business Model

Know that Piracy has grown into a business which sustains and fuels it -
Understand the Somali Pirates business model

The Somalia pirates business model is as below:

A basic piracy operation requires a minimum eight to twelve militia prepared to stay at
sea for extended periods of time, in the hopes of hijacking a passing vessel.

Each team requires a minimum of two attack skiffs, weapons, equipment, provisions,
fuel and preferably a supply boat. The costs of the operation are usually borne by
investors, some of whom may also be pirates.

To be eligible for employment as a pirate, a volunteer should already possess a firearm

for use in the operation. For this ‘contribution’, he receives a ‘class A’ share of any profit.
Pirates who provide a skiff or a heavier firearm, like an RPG or a general purpose
machine gun, may be entitled to an additional A-share. The first pirate to board a vessel
may also be entitled to an extra A-share.

At least 12 other volunteers are recruited as militiamen to provide protection on land if a

ship is hijacked, In addition, each member of the pirate team may bring a partner or
relative to be part of this land-based force. Militiamen must possess their own weapon,
and receive a ‘class B’ share — usually a fixed amount equivalent to approximately
US$15,000.

If a ship is successfully hijacked and brought to anchor, the pirates and the militiamen
require food, drink, living quarters, fresh clothes, cell phones, air-time, etc. The captured
crew must also be cared for.

In most cases, these services are provided by one or more suppliers, who advance the
costs in anticipation of reimbursement, with a significant margin of profit, when ransom
is eventually paid.

When ransom is received, fixed costs are the first to be paid out. These are typically:

● Reimbursement of supplier(s)
● Financier(s) and/or investor(s): 30% of the ransom
● Local elders: 5 to 10 %of the ransom (anchoring rights)
 ● Class B shares (approx. $15,000 each): militiamen, interpreters etc.
● The remaining sum — the profit — is divided between class-A shareholders.

The W. Africa piracy business model

Pirates operating in Nigeria kidnap the crew of a ship, taking them on to land and going
into hiding, where they demand a ransom.
In 2016, 96 seafarers were taken hostage in West Africa—more than twice the 44
abducted in 2015—though none were killed.
This modus operandi of kidnapping the crew and holding them for ransom is used by
Nigerian pirates because it is difficult for the Nigerian navy to deal with it because of
limited response time.

Pirate Attack

Pirate Attack
Piracy and armed attacks continue to occur on an increasingly frequent basis at sea.
Armed robbery occurs mostly in port areas, while piracy occurs at sea. Piracy occurs
outside the jurisdiction of the state. In this form of terrorism well armed pirates attack,
then board a ship and then hold the officers and crew on board for ransom money. This
type of attack is common in Somalia.

Terrorism usually involves violence, or the threat of violence, by extremist groups

seeking to gain political objectives by malicious means. They do this by using various
types of bombs, bomb threats or hijacking a ship. Increasingly, they are acting with
extremist religious sects that promote suicidal behaviour.

Incident Statistics
 IMB Piracy & Armed Robbery Map 2019

The map above shows all piracy and armed robbery incidents reported to IMB Piracy
Reporting Centre during 2019.

There were 239 global security incidents at sea in the first half of 2017, as shown in the
figure below:
 Security incidents 2017

However as the figure below illustrates there was a decrease in security related incidents
at sea in 2017 compared to 2016.
Also shown are Top locations for port and anchorage crime in 2017.
 Decrease in Security related incidents in 2017

The vessel types targeted are as below:

Vessel types targeted

The motivation of pirates
A study on Piracy off the Horn of Africa reveals, while the profitability of piracy appears
to be the primary motivating factor for most pirates, other observers argue that since
conditions in Somalia make survival difficult for many and prosperity elusive for most,
the relative risk of engagement in piracy seems diminished.

According to the final report of the experts group convened in 2008 by the U.N. Special
Representative to Somalia, “poverty, lack of employment, environmental hardship,
pitifully low incomes, reduction of pastoralist and maritime resources due to drought and
illegal fishing and a volatile security and political situation all contribute to the rise and
continuance of piracy in Somalia.”

Pirate activity and ransom revenues have increased significantly in the past years, and
many now assert that Somalia’s economy and its population are increasingly dependent
on piracy. The average ransom paid in 2010 has been estimated at over $5.4 million—
with more than 50 reported hijackings per year, this places the pirates’ 2010 ransom
revenues at over $250 million. U.N. officials argue that the insecurity caused by piracy
deprives northern Somalia, which has not been as affected by the armed conflict in
central and southern Somalia, of a variety of job-creating investments, from port
operations to commercial fishing. Somali pirates interviewed by the international media
frequently link their pirate activities to trends such as illegal fishing and dumping in
Somali waters that have emerged as the country has lost its ability to patrol its waters
over time.

While these explanations may mask the opportunistic piracy of some, reports suggest
that illegal fishing and dumping have disrupted Somalia’s coastal economy. Recent
estimates by the United Nations suggest that Somalia may lose $95 million annually to
illegal fishing.

The international Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia stated at its inaugural
meeting that “piracy is symptomatic of the overall situation in Somalia including the
prevalence of illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping off the coast of Somalia, which
adversely affects the Somali economy and marine environment.”

The CGPCS also reaffirmed “its respect for Somalia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity,
and sovereign rights over natural resources” and underscored that the group’s
participants “ensure that their flagged vessels respect these rights.” Paradoxically, the
regional fishing industry reportedly has been damaged significantly by the threat of
piracy. According to some reports, tuna catches in the Indian Ocean fell 30% in 2008, in
part because of fishing vessels’ fears of piracy. This has had a major impact on countries
like the Seychelles, which rely on the fishing industry for up to 40% of their revenues,
and on Yemen, which reported an estimated $150 million in lost fishing sector revenues
in 2009.

So, Piracy is mainly driven by a series of ‘push’ factors, which are:

● Sheer poverty;
● A lack of opportunity on-shore
● Lack of faith in Government and Security Forces to support one’s livelihood e.g.,
via the ‘fishing’ industry

‘Pull’ factors that can drive piracy away are:

● Unparalleled economic possibilities,

● Active role in fighting against Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing
● Active role in defending territorial waters (e.g. Somalia)

Pirate AttackImplications of a piracy attack

Implications of a piracy attack

Ships under attack
General
A ship may come under attack with little or no warning. Effective lookouts, both visual
and radar, will help to ensure early detection.

Piracy attack
Pirates carrying weapons do not usually open fire until they are very close to the ship,
e.g. within two cables.

Use whatever time available, no matter how short, to activate any additional protective
measures and plans. This will make it clear to the attackers that they have been seen,
the ship is prepared and will resist attempts to board.
 Pirate boat

Approach stage
Effective lookouts may aid in identifying the nature of the attack, the threat profile of a
piracy or other attack may initially look similar and it will not be until the attackers are
close that the nature of the attack becomes apparent. In all cases, the following steps
should be taken:

● If not already at full speed, increase to maximum to open the distance.

● Steer a straight course to maintain a maximum speed.
● Initiate the ship’s emergency procedures.
● Activate the emergency communication plan.
● Sound the emergency alarm and make an attack announcement, in accordance
with the ship’s emergency communication plan.
● Make a mayday call on VHF Ch. 16. Send a distress message via the Digital
Selective Calling (DSC) system and Inmarsat-C, as applicable.
● Activate the SSAS.
● Report the attack immediately to UKMTO (+44 2392 222060) by telephone.
● Ensure the AIS is switched on.
● Activate water spray.
 ● Ensure that all external doors and, where possible, internal public rooms and
cabins are fully secured.
● All crew not required on the bridge or in the engine room should muster at the
safe muster point or citadel as instructed by the Master.
● When sea conditions allow, consider altering course to increase an approaching
skiff’s exposure to wind/ waves.
● Sound the ship’s whistle/foghorn continuously to demonstrate to any potential
attacker that the ship is aware of the attack and is reacting to it.
● Check Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) is recording.
● PCASP, if present, will take agreed actions to warn off attackers.

Attack stage
As the attackers get close the following steps should be taken:

● Reconfirm all ship’s crew are in the safe muster point or citadel as instructed by
the Master.
● Ensure the SSAS has been activated.
● If not actioned, report the attack immediately to UKMTO (+44 2392 222060) by
telephone.
● As the attackers close in on the ship, Masters should commence small alterations
of helm whilst maintaining speed to deter skiffs from lying alongside the ship in
preparation for a boarding attempt. These manoeuvres will create additional wash
to impede the operation of the skiffs.
● Large amounts of helm are not recommended, as these are likely to significantly
reduce a ship’s speed.
● Check VDR data is being saved.
● PCASP, if present, will conduct themselves as governed by the RUF.

Actions on illegal boarding

If the ship is illegally boarded the following actions should be taken:

● Take all way off the ship and then stop the engines.
● All remaining crew members to proceed to the citadel or safe muster point locking
all internal doors on route.
● PCASP, if present, will follow procedures agreed with company and Master.
● Ensure all crew are present in the citadel or safe muster point. This includes the
Master, bridge team and PCASP.
● Establish communications from the citadel with UKMTO and your company and
confirm all crew are accounted for and in the citadel or safe muster point.
● Stay in the citadel until conditions force you to leave or advised by the military.
● If any member of the crew is captured it should be considered that the pirates
have full control of the ship.

If control of the ship is lost

● All movement should be calm, slow and very deliberate. Crew members should
keep their hands visible always and comply fully. This will greatly reduce the risk
of violence.

Experience has shown that the pirates will be aggressive, highly agitated and possibly
under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
 ● DO be patient.
● DO keep mentally active/occupied.
● DO keep track of time.
● DO reduce stress where possible by remaining physically active.
● DO remain calm and retain dignity.
● DO be positive (remember, authorities are working tirelessly to release you).
● DO remember to leave any CCTV or audio recording devices running.
● DO exactly what the attackers ask and comply with their instruction.
● DO NOT take photographs.
● DO NOT attempt to engage attackers.
● DO NOT make movements which could be misinterpreted as being aggressive.
● DO NOT be confrontational.
● DO NOT resist.

Hijack - hostage situation

The model of pirate action off Somalia is to hijack the ship and hold the crew for
ransom. It should be remembered it is in the interests of the pirates to keep the
ship and crew safe.

Each company or organisation should have a policy in place to cover the eventualities of
kidnap and ransom. The following principles serve as guidelines to surviving a
kidnapping.

● DO remain calm and maintain self-control.

● DO be humble and respectful to the pirates.
● DO look out for your colleagues’ well-being.
● DO stay together as a team, where possible.
● DO accept the new pirate leadership.
● DO maintain the hierarchy of rank.
● DO try to establish normal communication with the pirates.
● DO maintain personal hygiene.
● DO save water and essentials.
● DO be positive - many people are working to release you.
● DO be patient and maintain routines (including your spiritual needs, as permitted
by pirates).
● DO try to keep your breathing regular.
● DO meditate and keep mentally active.
● DO respect religion: yours, your colleagues’ and the pirates’.
● DO NOT offer resistance.
● DO NOT argue with pirates or your colleagues.
● DO NOT take photographs.
● DO NOT hide valuables.
● DO NOT react emotionally.
● DO NOT take drugs or alcohol.
● DO NOT bargain with pirates for personal privileges.

In the event of military intervention

Brief and prepare the ship’s crew to cooperate fully during any military action onboard
and instruct crew as follows.
 ● DO keep low to the deck and cover head with both hands.
● DO keep hands visible.
● DO be prepared to be challenged on your identity.
● DO cooperate fully with military forces.
● DO NOT make movements that could be interpreted as aggressive.
● DO NOT take photographs.
● DO NOT get involved in activity with military forces unless specifically instructed
to.

Attack from other threats

● Anti-ship missiles In the event or warning of a missile attack military advice

should be followed. If no warning is received there will be no time to take any
mitigations beyond a PA warning to the crew if a missile is spotted. It is unlikely
merchant ships will be the intended target; Masters should be aware of the ship
plot in their immediate vicinity and, if sea room allows, keep clear of naval and
associated ships.
● Sea mines Ships should avoid all published or identified mine danger areas and
maintain close liaison with military authorities. If operating close to mine danger
areas, Masters should be aware tethered mines may break free and drift into
shipping lanes. Ships should manoeuvre clear of floating objects and the forward
area of the ship should be kept clear of crew. Effective lookouts are essential.
Specific advice on self protective measures when operating in mine danger areas
can be obtained from UKMTO.
● Water borne improvised explosive device (WBIED) attack In the early
stages of the attack it may not be possible to differentiate between a piracy or
WBIED attack. Initial actions as highlighted in this guidance for the approach
stage of a piracy attack should be followed. Military threat assessments may
indicate areas where one type of attack is more likely than another. A speed boat
with multiple people onboard is unlikely to be a WBIED as these are usually
unmanned or have a solitary occupant.

WBIED attacks may result in a breach of the ship’s hull. The use of the safe muster point
is recommended before entering a citadel located below the waterline.

If a WBIED is anticipated, the time to react is very short.

The threat and risk assessment will identify areas where these threats occur which, if
successful, may result in an explosion (commonly referred to as a blast). The Master
should communicate to the crew prior to entering a threat area what position to take if a
blast threat is detected. The Master may consider telling the crew to:

● Lie flat on the deck, as this may minimise exposure and may reduce the impact
on the body from the blast.
● Adopt a brace position (arms/legs bent, hands holding onto something solid and
feet firmly planted on the deck) to protect personnel from shock waves.
● Move away from a particular area, such as the port side, starboard side, poop
deck or engine room.

Post a WBIED attack

 ● Ensure all crew and PCASP are accounted for.
● Send distress signal.
● Survey area where the blast occurred.
● Implement damage control.
● Call CSO and UKMTO.

Individuals will react in different ways during a piracy attack

Individuals react in different ways during a piracy attack, but never go against pirate
orders.
Individuals could – be in shock, get agitated or be frightened.

How to defend the crew and the ship - Highlight relevant methods provided

in the BMP and the contingency measures as given in the Ship's Security
Plan in the event of an attack
Procedures to follow when a vessel is boarded by pirates is as below:

● Secure vital restricted / navigation areas

● Muster crew in secure safe areas
● Maintain radio contact / seek assistance
● Comply with their demands
● Crew safety is paramount
● If Bridge/ Engine Room evacuated – stop main engine

Step by step actions to be taken during an attack

Step by step actions to be taken during an attack will be as mentioned in the Ship’s
Security Plan, but general actions are as below (same as in “Actions Required by
Different Security Levels” Section):

Suspected piracy/armed robbery vessel detected

Early detection of suspected attacks must be the first line of defence. If the vigilance and
surveillance has been successful, a pirate/armed robbery vessel will be detected early.

Inform the nearest littoral or coastal State through the RCC, using the appropriate ships’
message format. The ship's crew should be warned and, if not already in their defensive
positions, they should move to them. Evasive manoeuvres and hoses should be
vigorously employed as detailed in the preparation phase.

Being certain that piracy/armed robbery will be attempted

If not already in touch with the littoral coastal State, efforts should be made to establish
contact. Crew preparations should be completed and, where a local rule of the road
allows ships under attack to do so, a combination of sound and light signals should be
made to warn other ships in the vicinity that an attack is about to take place.

Vigorous manoeuvring at maximum speed should be sustained if navigation conditions

permit.

Pirate/armed robbery vessel in proximity to, or in contact with, own ship

Use water jets to prevent pirate boarding, and if possible, cast off grappling hooks and
poles, provided crew not endangered.
Sound the pirate alarm, using the ship's whistle as an alarm discourages the attackers
and tells crew working in exposed areas to seek shelter.
Communicate with other vessels using distress flares and ship’s communication
equipment for help.
If possible, use evasive manoeuvring techniques e.g. heavy wheel movements to ride of
attackers.

Pirates/armed robbers start to board ship

Timing during this phase will be critical and as soon as one knows that boarding is
inevitable all crew must be ordered to seek their secure positions (proceed to the citadel,
for example).

When attackers are on board the actions of the master and crew should:

● ensure the greatest level of safety for those on board the ship;
● if possible remain in control of the navigation of the ship; and
● try to get the pirates/robbers depart as early as possible

The options available to the master and crew will depend on the extent to which the
attackers have secured control of the ship, e.g. by have they gained access to the bridge
or engine room, have they seized crewmembers who they can threaten, to force the
master or crew to comply with their wishes.

However, even if the crew are in secure areas, the master must consider the risk to the
ship the attackers can cause, when deciding on actions to be taken. An example of a risk
that pirates they could use firebombs to start fires on a tanker or chemical carrier.

The pirates/armed robbers begin to gain control and take one or more of the
ship's crew into their custody
If the attackers have gained control of the engine room or bridge, have seized crew
members or can pose an imminent threat to the safety of a ship, the master or officer in
charge should remain calm and, if possible, seek to negotiate with the attackers.

Try and maintain control over the navigation of the ship, the safe return of any hostages
they may hold and the early departure of the attackers from the ship.
Comply with the attackers' demands may be the only safe alternative as resistance or
obstruction of any kind could be both futile and dangerous.

In the event of attackers gaining temporary control of the ship, crew members should, if
it is safe and practicable, leave Close Circuit Television (CCTV) records running.

Consider hiding equipment (especially those for communication) in areas where crew are
detained.

The pirates/armed robbers have stolen property/money, etc.

At this stage it is essential that the pirates/armed robbers are assured that they have
been given everything they have demanded with a reassurance that nothing has been
hidden, this could go some way in persuading them to leave the vessel.

The pirates/armed robbers start to disembark from the ship

Do not leave secure your secure positions on the vessel until you are sure all
pirates/robbers have disembarked.

The pirates/armed robbers have disembarked from the ship

Sound the ‘all clear’ signal.

The importance of retreating to the citadel in the event pirates board the ship -
Communication channels must be kept open with task forces and local co-
ordination authorities to update situation periodically.

● It is important to get into the citadel when pirates board for the following
reasons:
● An ideal place for the crew to hide as it is not marked and is fortified
● It has food and water supplies and effective communication channels to be able
to communicate with the outside world, a proper system of ventilation and a first
aid kit
● It can be fitted with CCTV cameras and normally has control for switching off the
engines – both main and auxiliary
Know some of the recent cases of ship hijack and crew being hostage
Example of recent pirate attacks is as below:

The Case of Teal

The heavy-lift vessel Teal was boarded on while anchored off Conakry. Six men armed
with knives and automatic weapons attacked crew members and opened fire to threaten
the crew, damaging the accommodation block.

They subsequently held the crew at gunpoint and robbed them of cash and personal
belongings.

Local agents contacted the port authority, but the security boat did not arrive until an
hour later when the attackers had already left the vessel.

The Case of Maximus

The product tanker Maximus was hijacked off the coast of Côte d’Ivoire by nine armed
attackers acting from a tug that had left Lagos several days prior. French authorities had
sent out an alert to vessels in the region about a possible attack. The crew members
were held hostage onboard the vessel for eight days while the pirates changed the name
of the vessel to Elvis 5, likely in order to evade authorities.

When Nigerian Navy personnel boarded, they killed one of the attackers and arrested six
others. Sixteen crew members who remained onboard were freed, but two attackers had
already left the vessel and taken two kidnapped crew members with them, one Indian
and one Pakistani.

Both were held for several weeks by a Nigerian criminal gang before they could finally
return home.

The Case of Sampatiki

The tanker Sampatiki was on its way from Port Harcourt to Lagos when it was attacked
by nine armed men around midnight. After four hours onboard, the pirates kidnapped
five crew members. The hostages spent nearly 45 days in captivity on shore.

According to the ship’s Third Engineer, Santosh Bharadwaj, the crew kept their morale
high by praying and remembering good times with their families.
Negotiations were delayed by the complications involved in the pirates having captured
seafarers of multiple nationalities.

The crew’s release was also hampered by a negotiation breakdown that reportedly
occurred when the company attempted to settle for a lower amount than the pirates
demanded.

Pirate AttackCoping in a Hostage Situation

Coping in a Hostage Situation

Coping in a Hostage Situation - Examine possible personal reactions to
activities of pirates during a hostage situation
Personal reactions to pirate activities could be as below:

● Cognitive: impaired memory and concentration; confusion and disorientation;

intrusive thoughts (‘flashbacks’) and memories; denial (i.e. that the event has
happened); hypervigilance and hyperarousal (a state of feeling too aroused, with
a profound fear of another incident);
● Emotional: shock and numbness; fear and anxiety (but panic is not common);
helplessness and hopelessness; dissociation (feeling numb and ‘switched off’
emotionally); anger (at anybody – perpetrators, themselves and the authorities);
anhedonia (loss of pleasure in doing that which was previously pleasurable);
depression (a reaction to loss); guilt (e.g. at having survived if others died, and
for being taken hostage);
● Social: withdrawal; irritability; avoidance (of reminders of the event).

Importance of obedience to the pirates orders. There are no dead heroes.

It is important note as a hostage follow pirate instructions to prevent bodily harm.

Possible personal reactions in immediate crisis situation, post crises situation,

short term after crises situation
The general course of personal actions to take when you are a hostage is as below:

Immediate crisis

● Try to gain control over your shock, fear and agitation as soon as possible:
● stay calm;
● follow the instructions of the offenders, taking a passive role;
● do not make any sudden movements — ask first even when, for example, you
just want to pick up something;
● do not argue;
● do not make direct eye contact.
Post crises

● Be reserved but cooperative. If spoken to, answer openly but neutrally.

● Do not make any statements that can be proven wrong.
● As the duration of the kidnap increases, the threat of being injured
● or killed decreases.
● Try to establish a personal relationship with the offenders without going too far.
● Avoid controversial issues such as religion or politics. Moderate religious belief
can be more favourable than being an atheist, which may be scorned upon.
● Refrain from making accusations and appearing hostile or arrogant.
● Try to keep your dignity and self-respect. Show the offenders that you are a
human being with a family and your own worries and concerns.

Short term after crises situation

● Eat, drink and sleep regularly. Take every opportunity to exercise your body and
mind. Keep fit for your release.
● If you need medical treatment, inform the offenders as early as possible.
● Develop a daily routine and offer to help with the daily chores like preparing
meals and cleaning up.
● Try to occupy yourself mentally, e.g. by keeping a diary, memorising the place
you are being kept, how the kidnappers are organised or any other details about
your captivity. Ask for a pen and paper, books or a radio. You can also do
relaxation techniques or similar, and mental exercises by doing maths, etc.
● Be patient. Do not give up and think positively! You can be assured that
everything possible is being done for you.

Provocations from pirates and possible techniques to cope with the ensuing
hostage situation
Pirate provocation methods are as below:

● Threatening with death or execution

● Being given insufficient or inadequate food or water
● Threatened with beating or abuse
● Slapped, kicked, or punched
● Serious injury to other crew
● Beaten with an implement (for example a rod, stick, or gun)
● Ship used as “mother ship” for pirates to operate from
● Being hung by the tied hands or arms
● Other forms of extreme physical abuse
● Held by yourself with no other crew for long periods
● Death of other crew member
● Serious injury to self
● Forced to remain uncovered outside for extended periods
● Hung overboard
● Electric shock

Methods to cope is as below:

● Follow the instructions of the offenders if you are allowed to make a phone call,
even if they tell you to lie.
 ● If the offenders want to take photographs or a video of you, or ask you personal
questions, do not feel bad about cooperating; this may help progress the
negotiations.
● Keep in mind that the offenders may lie to you to demoralise, subdue and
discourage you.

Coping in the long term in the captive situation

If you are a long term captive, take note of the following:

● Do not negotiate with the offenders — this will be done by others. The offenders
will make their demands to a third party. Promises you make may be hard for
others to keep.
● Encourage the offenders to establish contact with your organisation/company at
an early stage and on a regular basis.
● If it is allowed, request to talk personally to your family or others.

The Release Process

The Release Process

The Release Process - what happens prior to the release
Negotiations take place before release of piracy hostages.
Institutions involved in the negotiation, include companies, state, and international pro-
bono organizations.

Additional dangers associated with the release process

Once negotiations are over one must ensure that the hostages are released properly and
safely. Dangers involved with hostage release are:
A chance of being made a captive again
Released in hostile/deserted environs

Safeguards to adopt during the release process

Safeguards to adopt during your release are as below:
Releasing seafarers is risky for the offenders. Take special care to their follow
instructions and stay calm.
In the case of a rescue operation, take care to follow the instructions of the security
forces even if they may not identify you as the victim at first. Avoid any sudden
movements.

Practical needs of the crew after release

The shipowner should be aware that the seafarer may suffer from trauma or similar
condition after being victimized under an attack from pirates or armed robbers.

The shipowner should offer advice from professionals if the seafarer wishes such
assistance. An important first step in reducing the risk from trauma is for masters to
debrief crew immediately after the attack or release of a vessel in order to get crew to
confront their experiences.

An important second step is for counselling professionals to debrief crew as soon as

possible after the attack or release of the vessel in order to assist the crew to manage
their experiences.

Be aware of the various parties and their involvement in the post-release

Seafarers will be provided with long-term access to physical and mental health resources
after their release. Under the general maritime law and the ILO’s Maritime Labour
Convention of 2006, the provision of health care related to work at sea is the
responsibility of the shipowner, and case law suggests that this extends to mental health
care as well as physical.

State agencies that social and mental support must also do their bit to help the seafarer.

In addition to ensuring access, conscious efforts to address the stigma associated with
seeking mental health care may be important in allowing seafarers to use the systems in
place.

In this regard, shipowners to specifically schedule a follow-up assessment six months

after release and again at twelve months; effective screening for long-term impact is
possible at such time.

Seafarers' Family

Seafarers' Family
Advantages of seeking employment with reputed shipowner/ manager
Advantages of employment with a reputed company in relation to piracy is as below:
 ● The company provides pre-departure training to seafarers expected to transit
these areas
● The company provides armed guards for vessel support when they transit high
risk areas
● The company has firm policies in relation to trading in high risk areas

Enable seafarers to consider what they may wish to share with their family
concerning the risks of piracy
Seafarers must inform their families about piracy risks at sea today. Seafarers families
must know that pirates take seafarers as hostages for a ransom.

Even though piracy at sea has reduced today, family members must know the areas of
sea piracy and their associated risks.

Details of which are as below:

● Bangladesh: Robbers usually target ships preparing to anchor. Most attacks

reported at Chittagong anchorages and approaches. However, attacks in
Bangladesh have fallen significantly over the past few years because of the efforts
by the Bangladesh Authorities.
● China: Tianjin/Caofeidian – Incidents mostly at anchorage area.
● India: Sikka and Kandla: Incidents reported at port and anchorage areas.
● Indonesia: Tanjung Priok – Jakarta, off Bintan Island, Dumai, off Karimun
island, Nipah, Pulau Takong Kecil, Batu Ampar/Batam, Samarinda, Belawan
anchorage and surrounding waters.
● Malacca Straits: The number of attacks have dropped substantially
● Malaysia: Off Sabah – Militant activities resulting in a number of tugs / barges
being attacked and crews kidnapped.
● Singapore Straits: Pirates / robbers attack ships while underway or while at
anchor especially during the night.
● South China Sea: Although attacks have dropped significantly in the vicinity off
Tioman / off Pulau Aur / off Anambas / Natuna / Mangkai islands / Subi Besar /
Merundung areas
● Benin (Cotonou): Although the number of attacks has dropped significantly, the
area remains risky.
● Guinea: Conakry
● Ivory Coast: Abidjan: Attacks dropped but remains risky.
● Nigeria (Lagos): Pirates / robbers are often well armed, violent and have
attacked hijacked and robbed vessels / kidnapped crews along the coast, rivers,
anchorages, ports and surrounding waters. In the past, attacks reported up to
about 170nm from coast. In many past incidents, pirates have hijacked vessels
for several days and ransacked the vessels and stole part cargo usually gas oil. A
number of crewmembers were also injured and kidnapped in past attacks.
Generally, all waters in / off Nigeria remain risky.
● Off Bayelsa / Brass / Bonny Island / Port Harcourt: Recently, there has
been a noticeable increase in attacks / hijackings / kidnapping of crews off these
areas.
● The Congo: Pointe Noire
● Togo (Lome): Attacks have dropped but the area remains a concern and risky.
Pirates / robbers in the area are well armed, violent and dangerous. Attacks can
occur at anchorages and off the coast and usually at night. Some attacks resulted
 in vessels being hijacked for several days and ransacked and part cargo stolen
(gas oil).
● Red Sea / Gulf of Aden / Somalia / Arabian Sea / Indian Ocean: Attacks
related to Somali pirates have reduced. However, the risk of being approached or
attacked still exists

Worries and concerns of family members about piracy

The worries and concerns of family members about piracy, in case a family member is
taken hostage will be in relation to:

● The ability to cope with the knowledge that their loved one has been captured
● Knowing that information about the well-being of a seafarer hostage is hard to
come by, this acts as a significant stressor

Seafarers own specific responsibility towards his family and the importance of
correct information being passed on to them
Seafarers must inform their families when their vessel is going to transit a high-risk
piracy area, informing them that the vessel has taken adequate precautions to prevent a
pirate attack. These could be:

● Transiting with naval protection

● Following the International Recommended Transit corridor
● Taking adequate precautionary measures on board to prevent a pirate attack

Reactions of the family members when informed about the seafarer being taken
hostage.
Family members of seafarer hostages will:

● Show high levels of concern and anxiety regarding the well-being of their loved
one
● Be distressed by threats to their loved ones