G.R.
No 101724 July 3, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR., respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
That on or about January 21, 1976, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, a public officer, being then the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur,
having been duly appointed and qualified as such, taking advantage of his public position,
did, then and there, wilfully and unlawfully persuade, influence and induce the Land
Inspector of the Bureau of Lands, by the name of Armando L. Luison to violate an existing
rule or regulation duly promulgated by competent authority by misrepresenting to the latter
that the land subject of an application filed by the accused with the Bureau of Lands is
disposable by a free patent when the accused well knew that the said land had already been
reserved for a school site, thus by the accused's personal misrepresentation in his capacity as
Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur and applicant for a free patent, a report favorably
recommending the issuance of a free patent was given by the said Armando L. Luison, land
inspector, thereby paving the way to the release of a decree of title, by the Register of Deeds
of Agusan del Sur, an act committed by the accused, in outright prejudice of the public
interest.
On April 5, 1991, Paredes filed in the Sandiganbayan "An Urgent Motion to Quash
Information and to Recall Warrant of Arrest"
After the parties had filed their written arguments, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution on
August 1, 1991 granting the motion to quash on the ground of prescription of the offense
charged. The Sandiganbayan's ratiocination of its resolution is quoted below:
The crime charged is alleged to have been committed "on or about
January 21, 1976" when the accused allegedly misrepresented to a Lands
Inspector of the Bureau of Lands that the land subject of the herein
movant's Application for a Free Patent was disposable land. This
misrepresentation allegedly resulted in the issuance of a Torrens Title
under a Free Patent to the herein accused-movant. This, the Information
avers, was prejudicial to the public interest because the land in question
had been reserved for a school site and was, therefore, not disposable.
Thus, the charge is for the violation of Sec. 3(a) of R.A. No. 3019 because
the accused had allegedly persuaded, induced and influenced the Public
Lands Inspector to violate existing law, rules and regulations by
recommending approval of the free patent application.
The accused asserts that since at the time of the alleged commission of
the crime (January 21, 1976) the period of prescription was ten (10) years
under Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 3019, the crime should have prescribed in 1986.
The prosecution seems to agree with the movant's statement as to the
term of the prescriptive period with the qualification that the period of
prescription should have commenced to run from March 28, 1985, when
the complaint was allegedly filed by the Republic for the cancellation of
the title.
ISSUE: The question then is this: when should the period of prescription have commenced to
run as to the alleged misrepresentation which persuaded, influenced and induced the Lands
Inspector of the Bureau of Lands resulting in the approval of the application of the accused
for a free patent?
HELD: xxx xxx xxx
The Sandiganbayan further observed that since R.A. No. 3019 is a special law, the
computation of the period for the prescription of the crime of violating it is governed by
Section 29 of Act No. 3326 which provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from
the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings
are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that "the date of the violation of the law becomes the
operative date for the commencement of the period of prescription" (p. 34, Rollo).
Assuming that Paredes did induce Lands Inspector Luison to recommend approval of his
application for free patent (which both of them denied doing), the date of the violation, for
the purpose of computing the period of prescription, would be the date of filing his
application on January 21, 1976.
The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that the "crime" whether it was the filing of Paredes
application for a free patent in January 1976 or his supposedly having induced Luison to
recommend its approval, prescribed ten (10) years later, on January 21, 1986. Gelacio's
complaint, dated October 28, 1986, was filed late.
Even if the ten-year prescriptive period commenced to run from the registration and
issuance of the free patent title by the Register of Deeds on May 28, 1976, registration being
constructive notice to the whole world, the prescriptive period would have fully run its
course on May 28, 1986, or five (5) months before Gelacio filed his complaint, and more than
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thirteen (13) years before judicial proceedings were initiated in the Sandiganbayan on August
10, 1989 by the filing of the information therein.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending Section 11 R.A.
No. 3019 by increasing from ten (10) to fifteen (15) years the period for the prescription or
extinguishment of a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, may not be given
retroactive application to the "crime" which was committed by Paredes in January 1976 yet,
for it should be prejudicial to the accused. It would deprive him of the substantive benefit of
the shorter (10 years) prescriptive period under Section 11, R.A. 3019, which was an essential
element of the "crime" at the time he committed it.
To apply B.P. Blg. 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law for it would after his
situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had already
been extinguished under the law existing when it was committed.
An "ex post facto law" is defined as a law which provides for the infliction of punishment
upon a person for an act done which, when it was committed, was innocent; a law which
aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; a law that changes the
punishment or inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed; a law that changes the rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony
than was required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
offender; a law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a
penalty or the deprivation of a right which, when done, was lawful; a law which deprives
persons accused of crime of some lawful protection to which they have become entitled, such
as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or of the proclamation of
amnesty; every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation
of a person to his disadvantage. Wilensky v. Fields, Fla., 267 So. 2d 1, 5. (Black's Law
Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 520.)
Since an ex post facto law is proscribed by our Constitution (Sec. 22, Article 111, 1987
Constitution), the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in ruling that Paredes may
no longer be prosecuted for his supposed violation of R.A. 3019 in 1976, six (6) years before
B.P. Blg. 195 was approved on March 16, 1982. The new prescriptive period under that law
should apply only to those offense which were committed after the approval of B.P. 195.
G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014
LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in
Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of
lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of
jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered
to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private complainant agreed, and as a
consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men;
a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate
value of ₱98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that petitioner
shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a
period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or
returning the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the
latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but
to no avail.
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of Danilo
Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which
can be summarized, as follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is
engaged in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every collection
made, they earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any business with private
complainant.
However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was
made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991
and used as evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of
jewelry, which he did not even see.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in
the Information.
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and
affirmed the decision of the RTC
ISSUE:
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S Decision
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their
admissibility.
Page 2 of 13
The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the designation of
the offense and the acts complained of.
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.
As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case, the
question of the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving
property came up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the
money and property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the members of
the division reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues are of first
impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for consideration and
resolution. Thus, several amici curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to give their
academic opinions on the matter. Among those that graciously complied were Dean Jose
Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate
President, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The parties were later heard on
oral arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as counsel
de oficio of the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court finds
the following:
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the
courts continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the
amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this
Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial
legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in
the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would be
encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government. This, however, does not
render the whole situation without any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that the
framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article 5,
which reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are
not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has
knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by
law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be
made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the
sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the
imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and
the injury caused by the offense.18
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a case
which is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to
render the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal
legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of any
penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need to make
that act punishable by law through legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the first
except for the situation wherein the act is already punishable by law but the corresponding
penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph
is not to suspend the execution of the sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the
reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non-commensurate with the act
committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for
a legislation to provide the proper penalty.
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that is,
that there can exist no punishable act except those previously and specifically provided for
by penal statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it necessary to
prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely powerless to
punish such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence on
the ground that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause excessive
or harsh penalty. All that the Court could do in such eventuality is to report the matter to the
Chief Executive with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal
provisions which it believes to be harsh.
Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the United States
Federal Supreme Court has expanded the application of a similar Constitutional provision
prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, to the duration of the penalty, and not just its
form. The court therein ruled that three things must be done to decide whether a sentence is
proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the nature and gravity of the offense, and
the harshness of the penalty; (2) Compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the
same jurisdiction, i.e., whether more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less
serious penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime
in other jurisdictions.
However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because in Solem
what respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state court of South
Dakota after it took into account the latter’s recidivist statute and not the original penalty for
uttering a "no account" check. Normally, the maximum punishment for the crime would have
been five years imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless, respondent was sentenced
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under South Dakota’s recidivist statute
because of his six prior felony convictions. Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem are
different from the present controversy.
Page 3 of 13
With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and Special In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr. v. People 48 is
Laws, and other related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a thorough study is highly instructive, thus:
needed to determine its effectivity and necessity. There may be some provisions of the law
that should be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in no position to conclude as to the With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
intentions of the framers of the Revised Penal Code by merely making a study of the
applicability of the penalties imposable in the present times. Such is not within the
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
competence of the Court but of the Legislature which is empowered to conduct public
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
hearings on the matter, consult legal luminaries and who, after due proceedings, can decide
whether or not to amend or to revise the questioned law or other laws, or even create a new
legislation which will adopt to the times. 1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000
pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised Penal Code.
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos;
During the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court that at present, fifty-
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and
six (56) bills are now pending in the Senate seeking to amend the Revised Penal Code, 37 each
in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
one proposing much needed change and updates to archaic laws that were promulgated
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
decades ago when the political, socio-economic, and cultural settings were far different from
temporal, as the case may be.
today’s conditions.

The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in which
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall
case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of the time included in the penalty
not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application
into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period of
or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of
each of the three portions. Applying the latter provisions, the maximum, medium and
interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a
minimum periods of the penalty prescribed are:
construction which is repugnant to its terms.38 The Court should apply the law in a manner
that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent
and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an
inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation. Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days

The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the
questioned monetary values to the present value of money based only on the current
inflation rate. There are other factors and variables that need to be taken into consideration,
researched, and deliberated upon before the said values could be accurately and properly
adjusted. The effects on the society, the injured party, the accused, its socio-economic
impact, and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated and weighed upon in order to arrive at
a wholistic change that all of us believe should be made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the
Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public
hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal
Code. This function clearly and appropriately belongs to Congress. Even Professor Tadiar
concedes to this conclusion, to wit:
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days49
To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión correccional maximum to
prisión mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each of which
portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 6550 of the RPC.51 In
the present case, the amount involved is ₱98,000.00, which exceeds ₱22,000.00, thus, the
maximum penalty imposable should be within the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and
21 days to 8 years of prision mayor. Article 315 also states that a period of one year shall be
added to the penalty for every additional ₱10,000.00 defrauded in excess of ₱22,000.00, but
in no case shall the total penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years.

Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the ruling of
the RTC. The RTC imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as maximum. However, the CA imposed
the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each
additional ₱10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years.
Considering that the amount of ₱98,000.00 is ₱76,000.00 more than the ₱22,000.00 ceiling
set by law, then, adding one year for each additional ₱10,000.00, the maximum period of 6
years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7
years. Taking the maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7
years, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.

Page 4 of 13
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa
charge against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the
penalty next lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6 months
and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of
lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of
making and enacting laws. While it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by
judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial
legislation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner Lito
Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution
dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the
Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City,
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional,
as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished the
President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice.
Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 225695, March 21, 2018
IRENEO CAHULOGAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Facts
On April 18, 2011, an Information6 was filed before the RTC charging petitioner with the
crime of Fencing
The prosecution alleged that private complainant Johnson Tan (Tan), a businessman engaged
in transporting Coca-Cola products, instructed his truck driver and helper, Braulio Lopez
(Lopez) and Loreto Lariosa (Lariosa), to deliver 210 cases of Coca-Cola products (subject
items) worth P52,476.00 to Demins Store. The next day, Tan discovered that contrary to his
instructions, Lopez and Lariosa delivered the subject items to petitioner's store. Tan then
went to petitioner and informed him that the delivery to his store was a mistake and that he
was pulling out the subject items. However, petitioner refused, claiming that he bought the
same from Lariosa for P50,000.00, but could not present any receipt evidencing such
transaction. Tan insisted that he had the right to pull out the subject items as Lariosa had no
authority to sell the same to petitioner, but the latter was adamant in retaining such items.
Fearing that his contract with Coca-Cola will be terminated as a result of the wrongful
delivery, and in order to minimize losses, Tan negotiated with petitioner to instead deliver to
him P20,000.00 worth of empty bottles with cases, as evidenced by their Agreement 8 dated
January 18, 2011. Nonetheless, Tan felt aggrieved over the foregoing events, thus, prompting
him to secure an authorization to file cases from Coca-Cola and charge petitioner with the
crime of Fencing. He also claimed to have charged Lariosa with the crime of Theft but he had
no update as to the status thereof.9
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty,10 but chose not to present any evidence in
his defense. Rather, he merely submitted his memorandum,11 maintaining that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.12
The RTC Ruling
In a Judgment13 dated October 4, 2013, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for the indeterminate period often (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.14
The RTC found that the prosecution had successfully established the presence of all the
elements of the crime of Fencing, considering that Lariosa stole the subject items from his
employer, Tan, and that petitioner was found to be in possession of the same. The RTC noted
that under the circumstances of the case, petitioner would have been forewarned that the
subject items came from an illegal source since Lariosa: (a) sold to him the subject items at a
discount and without any corresponding delivery and official receipts; and (b) did not
demand that such items be replaced by empty bottles, a common practice in purchases of
soft drink products.15
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed16 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision17 dated November 6, 2015, the CA affirmed petitioner's conviction.18 It held
that Lariosa's act of selling the subject items to petitioner without the authority and consent
from Tan clearly constituted theft. As such, petitioner's possession of the stolen items
constituted prima facie evidence of Fencing - a presumption which he failed to rebut.19
Page 5 of 13
Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration20 which was, however, denied in a
Resolution21 dated June 8, 2016; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld petitioner's
conviction for the crime of Fencing.
The Court's Ruling
Section 2 of PD 1612 defines Fencing as "the act of any person who, with intent to gain for
himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of,
or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of
value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds
of the crime of robbery or theft."23 The same Section also states that a Fence "includes any
person, firm, association, corporation or partnership or other organization who/which
commits the act of fencing."24
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (a) a crime of robbery or theft
has been committed; (b) the accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in the
commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item,
object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft; (c) the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item,
object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft; and (d) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for
another.25 Notably, Fencing is a malum prohibitum, and PD 1612 creates a prima
facie presumption of Fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good,
article, item, object or anything of value, which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and
prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.26
In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that the prosecution was able to establish
beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime of Fencing, as it was shown that: (a)
Lariosa sold to petitioner the subject items without authority and consent from his employer,
Tan, for his own personal gain, and abusing the trust and confidence reposed upon him as a
truck helper;27 (b) petitioner bought the subject items from Lariosa and was in possession of
the same; (c) under the circumstances, petitioner should have been forewarned that the
subject items came from an illegal source, as his transaction with Lariosa did not have any
accompanying delivery and official receipts, and that the latter did not demand that such
items be replaced with empty bottles, contrary to common practice among dealers of soft
drinks;28 and (d) petitioner's intent to gain was made evident by the fact that he bought the
subject items for just P50,000.00, lower than their value in the amount of P52,476.00. "[T]he
Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by
the CA, as there is no indication that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the
surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. In fact, the trial court was in the best
position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties,
and hence, due deference should be accorded to the same." 29
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on petitioner, pertinent portions of Section 3 of PD
1612 read:
Section 3. Penalties. - Any person guilty of fencing shall be punished as hereunder indicated:
a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property involved is more than 12,000
pesos but not exceeding 22,000 pesos; if the value of such property exceeds the latter sum,
the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and the
accessory penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be
imposed.
xxxx
Notably, while the crime of Fencing is defined and penalized by a special penal law, the
penalty provided therein is taken from the nomenclature in the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
In Peralta v. People,30 the Court discussed the proper treatment of penalties found in special
penal laws vis-a-vis Act No. 4103,31 otherwise known as the "Indeterminate Sentence
Law," viz.:
Meanwhile, Sec. 1 of Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law
(ISL), provides that if the offense is ostensibly punished under a special law, the minimum
and maximum prison term of the indeterminate sentence shall not be beyond what the
special law prescribed. Be that as it may, the Court had clarified in the landmark ruling
of People v. Simon that the situation is different where although the offense is defined in a
special law, the penalty therefor is taken from the technical nomenclature in the RPC. Under
such circumstance, the legal effects under the system of penalties native to the Code would
also necessarily apply to the special law.32
Otherwise stated, if the special penal law adopts the nomenclature of the penalties under
the RPC, the ascertainment of the indeterminate sentence will be based on the rules applied
for those crimes punishable under the RPC.33
Applying the foregoing and considering that there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances present in this case, the Court finds it proper to sentence petitioner to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four (4) years, two (2) months,
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
At this point, the Court notes that as may be gleaned from its whereas clauses, PD 1612 was
enacted in order to provide harsher penalties to those who would acquire properties which
are proceeds of the crimes of Robbery or Theft, who prior to the enactment of said law, were
punished merely as accessories after the fact of the said crimes.34
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 6, 2015 and the
Resolution dated June 8, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 01126-MIN
finding petitioner Ireneo Cahulogan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Fencing
defined and penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the "Anti-
Fencing Law," are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for the indeterminate period of four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Page 6 of 13

Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice, the President
of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 125865 January 28, 2000
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in
1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of
grave oral defamation. MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under
Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the
Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. Based on the said protocol
communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the
prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration
which was opposed by the DFA.
ISSUE: WON LIANG IS COVERED BY DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that
petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain person is
covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In
receiving ex-parte the DFA's advice and in motu propio dismissing the two criminal cases
without notice to the prosecution, the latter's right to due process was violated. It should be
noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The
needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances
requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper
time.1 At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does
not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.2
the immunity mentioned IN Section 45 of the agreement is not absolute, but subject to the
exception that the acts was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine
if petitioner's case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have
been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to
present its controverting evidence, should it so desire.
Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because
our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official
duty.3 The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-
settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond
the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.4 It appears that even the government's chief legal
counsel, the Solicitor General, does not support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the
DFA.
Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming
petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in
the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions. 5 As already mentioned
above, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty.
G.R. No. 142396 February 11, 2003
KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for
damages on account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking
made by Arthur Scalzo. The Manila RTC detailed what it had found to be the facts and
circumstances surrounding the case.
Then, on 14 June 1990, after almost two years since the institution of the civil case, Scalzo
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the
United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. In
an order of 25 June 1990, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
On 27 July 1990, Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with the SC asking that
the Civil Case complaint be ordered dismissed. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals
which sustaining the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo and ordering the dismissal of the
complaint against him. Minucher filed a petition for review with the SC appealing the
judgment of the Court of Appeals which the SC reversed the decision of the appellate court
and remanded the case to the lower court for trial. RTC continued with its hearings on the
case Adjudging defendant liable to plaintiff in actual and compensatory damages of
Page 7 of 13
P520,000.00; moral damages in the sum of P10 million; exemplary damages in the sum of
P100,000.00; attorney’s fees in the sum of P200,000.00 plus costs.The trial court gave
credence to the claim of Scalzo and the evidence presented by him that he was a diplomatic
agent entitled to immunity as such, it ruled that he, nevertheless, should be held accountable
for the acts complained of committed outside his official duties. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and sustained the defense of Scalzo that he
was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity during his term of duty and thereby
immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the “Receiving State” pursuant to the
terms of the Vienna Convention. Hence, this case.
Issue:
Whether Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.
Held:
Yes, Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity. Concededly, vesting a person
with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the executive branch of the government. The
Court has recognized that, in such matters, the hands of the courts are virtually tied. Amidst
apprehensions of indiscriminate and incautious grant of immunity, designed to gain
exemption from the jurisdiction of courts, it should behoove the Philippine government,
specifically its Department of Foreign Affairs, to be most circumspect, that should particularly
be no less than compelling, in its post litem motam issuances. It might be recalled that the
privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or
from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial
jurisdiction. But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it
was sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities within the
country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was
acting well within his assigned functions when he committed the acts alleged in the
complaint, the present controversy could then be resolved under the related doctrine of
State Immunity from Suit.
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule
of customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a
foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach
not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the
state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign
government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but
acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign
sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in
effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual
but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim – par in parem, non habet
imperium – that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one
another.
This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. “It is a different matter where the
public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious
to the rights of the plaintiff. Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers,
unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action
against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such
acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity
of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in
equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while
claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the
plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does
not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may
not be sued without its consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state
immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem
contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were
blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the
instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree
issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18)
months old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.6
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son
in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00
more or less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines,
respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.8
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan,
Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established
Page 8 of 13
a business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of
Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are
presently living in Cebu City.11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support
from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph
E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with
petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also
submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a
Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein
respondent.
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the
instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien, the
dispositive part of which states:
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s
obligation to support their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so
makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines
who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality."24
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child
under Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No.
9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.27
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative
that the legal obligation to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to
support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree
issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code, 31 respondent is not excused from
complying with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented
by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial
support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated
topetitioner for any financial support.33
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 34 of the
New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article
1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as
Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the
same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners
such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties.
Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu
that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged
to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.37
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s
son under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained
in Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support
petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case
has the burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily
concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the
matter of provision of and capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the
Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never
proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands
does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during
or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 42 has already
enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.43
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law
involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is
the same as our local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as
regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant
case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of
parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly
pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the
jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find
applicability.
Page 9 of 13
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established
public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to
support his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no
longerbe considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to
perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served. (Emphasis added)50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under
Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support
topetitioner’s son,
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength
in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of
the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those
of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine
territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On
this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to
support his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties
herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial
jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that
jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS
AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC.,
LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO,
JR., respondent.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 146738 March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998
with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the President,
alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank
account known as “Jose Velarde” – a grassroots-based numbers game. Singson’s allegation
also caused controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of
Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000.
House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit
was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario
Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.
The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow
at EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists
from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and other bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also
withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the
protests and maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial
to continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.
Page 10 of 13
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be
held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he
will not run in this election.
OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying
that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th
president of the Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the
legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president”, but saying he would give up
his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left
Malacañang Palace.
A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a
peition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin
the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against
him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner
to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily
unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath
as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution.”
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or
not petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.
2.) Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.
HELD:
The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”
The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency.
The Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct
demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old
government entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government
exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the president was
affected. In the former, it The question of whether the previous president (president
Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal
and not political.
For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and
the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the
succession of events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the
quoted statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied resignation
On top of all these, the press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-
taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on
leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had
resigned by the use of the totality test: prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
As to the issue of the peitioner’s contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held
that petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that,
given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a
public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for
his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. From the deliberations, the
intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent
only with his tenure(the term during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his
term (time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the
interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another).
G.R. No. 191425 September 7, 2011
ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Page 11 of 13
DECISION marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed
religion, he cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.
CARPIO, J.:
His second marriage did not comply with the Article 27 of the Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines providing: "[N]o Muslim male can have more than one wife unless he can deal
While Jesusa Pinat Nollora was still in Saudi Arabia, she heard rumors that her husband of
with them in equal companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only in
two years has another wife. She returned to the Philippines and learned that indeed, Atilano
exceptional cases." Only with the permission of the Shari'a Circuit Court can a Muslim be
O. Nollora, Jr., contracted second marriage with a certain Rowena Geraldino on December 8,
permitted to have a second, third or fourth wife. The clerk of court shall serve a copy to the
2001.
wife or wives, and should any of them objects, an Agama Arbitration Council shall be
constituted. If the said council fails to secure the wife's consent to the proposed marriage,
Jesusa filed an instant case against Atilano and Rowena for bigamy. When asked about the
the Court shall subject to Article 27, decide whether on not to sustain her objection (Art. 162,
moral damages she suffered, she declared that money is not enough to assuage her
Muslim Personal Laws)
sufferings. Instead, she just asked for return of her money in the amount of P 50,000.
Atilano asserted in his marriage certificate with Rowena that his civil status is "single." Both
Atilano admitted having contracted 2 marriages, however, he claimed that he was a Muslim
of his marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of
convert way back to 1992. He presented Certificate of Conversion and Pledge of Conversion,
the declaration of one's religion in the marriage is not an essential requirement for marriage,
proving that he allegedly converted as a Muslim in January 1992. And as a Muslim convert,
his omissions are sufficient proofs of his liability for bigamy. His false declaration about his
he is allegedly entitled to marry wives as allowed under the Islam belief.
civil status is thus further compounded by these omissions.
Accused Rowena alleged that she was a victim of bigamous marriage. She claimed that she
It is not for him to interpret the Shari'a law, and in apparent attempt to escape criminal
does not know Jesusa and only came to know her when the case was filed. She insisted that
liability, he recelebrated their marriage in accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this
she is the one lawfully married to Nollora because she believed him to be single and a
can no longer cure the criminal liability that has already been violated.
Catholic, as he told her so prior to their marriage. After she learned of the first marriage of
her husband, she learned that he is a Muslim convert. After learning that Nollora was a
Muslim convert, she and he also got married in accordance with the Muslim rites.

ISSUE: G.R. No. 234528, January 23, 2019

Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous.
ISIDRO MIRANDA Y PARELASIO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RULING:
DECISION
Yes, the marriage between the Nollora and Geraldino is bigamous under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, and as such, the second marriage is considered null and void ab initio
under Article 35 of the Family Code. A. REYES, JR., J.:

The elements of the crime of bigamy are all present in the case: that 1) Atilano is legally
married to Jesusa; 2) that their marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of
the second marriage; 3)that Atilano admitted the existence of his second marriage to
Rowena; and 4) the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the
lack of capacity of Atilano due to his prior marriage.
Before the trial and appellate courts, Atilano put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense.
Granting arguendo that he is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both
marriages, he cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance
with Articles 14, 15, 17 up to 20 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws .
In Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that any marriage between a
Muslim and a non-Muslim solemnized not in accordance with the Muslim law, hence the
Family Code of the Philippines shall apply. Nollora's religious affiliation or his claim that his
The Antecedents
The antecedent facts show that in the evening of August 14, 2011, victim Winardo Pilo (Pilo)
attended the party of his niece at Barangay Binonoan, Infanta, Quezon. After the party, he
and his friend Danilo Damaso (Damaso) left. While on their way home, they passed by the
house of Miranda and threw stones at the latter's home.6
While Pilo was on his way home, Miranda suddenly went outside and started hacking Pilo. He
hit Pilo's right forehead. Again, Miranda tried to hit Pilo, but the latter parried the attack with
his left arm.7
In an attempt to stop Miranda, Damaso threw a stone at him. Thereafter, Damaso grabbed
possession of the bolo.8
Page 12 of 13
In his defense, Miranda admitted that he hacked Pilo with the bolo twice, but claimed that
his acts were done in self-defense.9 He narrated that on August 14, 2011, at around 7:00p.m.,
while he was at home with his wife and daughter, he suddenly heard a thud at their door,
followed by several other thuds and stones hurled at their house. Miranda peeped through
the window and saw Pilo, throwing stones. He claimed that before he peeped through the
door, he heard Pilo challenge him to come out so that they could kill each other.10 Miranda
asked Pilo if something was wrong, but the latter ignored him and continued hurling
stones.11 According to Miranda, Pilo approached him and hit his upper left cheek with a
stone. When Pilo stretched his two arms downwards to pick up something from the ground,
Miranda suddenly hacked Pilo's arm with his bolo, in order to defend himself from Pilo's
oncoming attack. 12
At this instance, Damaso, arrived and grappled with Miranda to get a hold of the latter's
bolo. Because of this, Damaso likewise sustained injuries.
Ruling of the Trial Court
On January 7, 2016, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a Decision13 finding Miranda
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide. The RTC held that
Miranda's claim of self-defense is biased, self-serving, inconsistent, illogical and contrary to
the common experience of man. 14 The RTC further held that Miranda failed to prove that his
act of hacking Pilo was legally justified.15 The dispositive portion of the RTC ruling reads:
Ruling of the CA
On May 15, 2017, the CA rendered the assailed Decision17 affirming the conviction meted by
the trial court against Miranda. The CA ratiocinated that Miranda's claim of self-defense had
no leg to stand on, considering that the act of Pilo of hurling stones at the house of Miranda
cannot be regarded as an unlawful aggression that wan-anted the latter's act of hacking Pilo
with a bolo.18
However, the CA held that although the act may not be regarded as an unlawful aggression,
it may nonetheless be appreciated as sufficient provocation on the part of Pilo, which
mitigates Miranda's liability. Pilo's act of throwing stones at the house of Miranda is
sufficient provocation to enrage him, or stir his anger and obfuscate his thinking, more so,
when the lives of his wife and children were placed in danger.19
However, the CA held that there was no voluntary surrender on Miranda's part considering
that he did not actually voluntarily surrender to the police authorities. Thus, the CA modified
the penalty meted by the RTC unto Miranda, as follows:
The Issue
The main issue raised for the Court's resolution rests on whether or not the prosecution
proved the guilt of Miranda for frustrated homicide beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling of the Court
The Prosecution Proved Beyond Reasonable Doubt that Miranda is Guilty of Frustrated
Homicide
Significantly, in cases of frustrated homicide, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable
doubt that: "(i) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly
weapon in his assault; (ii) the victim sustained [a] fatal or mortal wound but did not die
because of timely medical assistance; and (iii) none of the qualifying circumstances for
murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, are present."22
It bears stressing that the main element in frustrated homicide is the accused's intent to take
his victim's life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every
possible doubt regarding homicidal intent. Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by
the courts only through external manifestations, such as the acts and conduct of the accused
at the time of the assault and immediately thereafter.23 Likewise, such homicidal intent may
be inferred from, among other things, the means the offender used, and the nature, location,
and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim.24
In fact, in De Guzman, Jr. v. People,25 the Court, quoting Rivera v. People,26 enumerated the
factors that determine the presence of intent to kill, to wit:
(1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds
sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately
after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was
committed and the motives of the accused.27
In the case at bar, Miranda's intent to kill was clearly established by the nature and number
of wounds sustained by Pilo. The records show that Miranda used a bolo measuring 1 ½ feet.
The hacking wound was about five inches long, and 1 inch deep fracturing Pilo's skull in the
parietal area.28 Relentless in his attack, Miranda continuously made several thrusts against
Pilo, while the latter was already sprawled on the ground. This caused Pilo to sustain two
additional wounds. These deep gashes measured four inches long by one-inch deep, and 1.5
inch long by one-inch deep in Pilo's forearm. In fact, these continuous attacks were stopped
only when Damaso arrived and grappled with the weapon.29 Undoubtedly, the manner of
attack and the injuries sustained show forth a clear resolve to end Pilo's life. Indeed, these
injuries cannot simply be brushed aside as grazing injuries, especially considering that one of
which, was an injury to the head of Pilo, which may have caused the latter's untimely demise,
if not for the timely medical assistance.
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