213

G.R. No. L-14921 December 31, 1960

DOLORES B. GUICO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
PABLO G. BAUTISTA, ET. AL., defendants-appellees.

This is an action for liquidation and partition of the estate left by the spouses
Mariano Bautista and Gertrudes Garcia, filed on October 20, 1956 by plaintiffs
Dolores B. Guico, et al., against defendants Pablo G. Bautista, et al., legitimate
grandchildren and children, respectively, of said deceased spouses.

The complaint alleged inter alia that Mariano G. Bautista died intestate on
December 5, 1947 and that his properties had already been extrajudicially
partitioned among his heirs; that Gertrudes Garcia likewise died intestate on
August 31, 1956 leaving as her legitimate heirs plaintiffs and defendants; that said
Gertrudes Garcia, during her lifetime, made several deeds of donation of some of
her properties in favor of all the defendants, but did not provide that the
properties donated would not be subject to collation, so that the donees are
legally bound to bring into the mass of the estate by way of collation the value of
the properties received by them in order that the net hereditary estate may be
divided equally among the heirs; and that the deceased Gertrudes Garcia left
outstanding obligations to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and the G.A.
Machineries, Inc

Issue:
The petitioner urges that their action for partition and liquidation may
bemaintained, notwithstanding that there are pending obligations of theestate,
subject to the taking of adequate measures either for the paymentor the security
of its creditors. Is his contention correct?
Held:
No.There is no question that the law allows the partition of the estate of
adeceased person by the heirs, extrajudicially or through an ordinary actionfor
partition, without the filing of a special proceeding and the appointmentof an
administrator for the purpose of the settlement of said estate, but thisthey may
do only "if the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legateesare all of age or
the minors are represented by their judicial guardians". Thereason is that where
the deceased dies without pending obligations, there isno necessity for the
appointment of an administrator to administer theestate for them and to deprive
the real owners of their possession to whichthey are immediately entitled

214

G.R. No. L-6044 November 24, 1952

FORTUNATA VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ, BENJAMIN RODRIGUEZ, MERCEDES

RODRIGUEZ DE HALLARE, LUZ RODRIGUEZ DE CARLOS AND ANTONIO
RODRIGUEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO A. TAN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and
ABELARDO RODRIGUEZ,respondents

FACTS

Flaviano Rodriguez died on February 8, 1944, at Parañaque, Rizal, leaving an

estate with a value of P10,000; that the surviving heirs are the widow, Fortunata
Vda. de Rodriguez, and six children who are the petitioners and respondent
Abelardo Rodriguez all the heirs, who were then already of age, entered into a
verbal agreement whereby they agreed not to make a liquidation of the estate
but to place it under the administration of the widow with the understanding that
each of the six children would be entitled to receive a portion of the income in
equal shares from year to year for the needs of their families provided that they
do not exceed the participation to which they are entitled; that on March 19,
1952, or eight years after the death of Flaviano Rodriguez, respondent Abelardo
Rodriguez filed a petition for administration of their intestate estate of said
deceased in spite of his knowledge that the estate had no debts and all the heirs
were of age; that on June 2, 1952, the other heirs, petitioners herein, objected to
the petition invoking the rule that if the estate is free from obligations and the
heirs are all of age, no administration proceedings shall be allowed; that on
August 11, 1952, respondent Judge, after overruling the opposition, appointed
Abelardo Rodriguez administrator of the estate upon filing the requisite bond.

ISSUE: whether respondent Judge acted properly in maintaining the

administration proceedings and in appointing Abelardo Rodriguez as
administrator of the estate notwithstanding the fact that the estate has no debts
and all the heirs entitled to share in its distribution are all of age.

RULING:

Under section 1, rule 74 of the Rules of Court, if the decedent left no debts and
the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians,
the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate
among themselves as they see fit, and should they disagree, they may do so in an
ordinary action of partition.

section 1 does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings,
even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for
good reasons to an ordinary action of partition. While section 1 allows the heirs to
divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an
ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them to do so if they have good
reasons to take a different course of action. Said section is not mandatory or
compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made therein of the word may. If the
intention were otherwise the framer of the rule would have employed the
word shall as was done in other provisions that are mandatory in character. Note
that the word may is used not only once but in the whole section which indicates
an intention to leave the matter entirely to the discretion of the heirs.
215

VILMA QUINTOS, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACTS FIDEL I. QUINTOS,

JR., ET AL. VS. PELAGIA I. NICOLAS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 210252. June 16, 2014

FACTS: Petitioners Vilma Quintos, Florencia Dancel, and Catalino Ibarra, and
respondents Pelagia Nicolas, Noli Ibarra, Santiago Ibarra, Pedro Ibarra, David
Ibarra, Gilberto Ibarra, and the late Augusto Ibarra are siblings. Their parents,
Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, were the owners of the subject property, a 281
sqm. parcel of land situated along Quezon Ave., Poblacion C, Camiling, Tarlac,
covered by TCT No. 318717.

The deceased parents left their 10 children ownership over the subject property.
In 2002, respondent siblings brought an action for partition against petitioners.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-52 and was raffled to the RTC at
Camiling, Tarlac but was later on dismissed as neither of the parties appeared and
appealed.

Respondent siblings instead resorted to executing a Deed of Adjudication to

transfer the property in favor of the 10 siblings. As a result, TCT No. 318717 was
canceled and TCT No. 390484 was issued in the names of the 10 heirs of the
Ibarra spouses. The siblings sold their 7/10 undivided share over the property in
favor of their co-respondents, the spouses Recto and Rosemarie Candelario by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale and Agreement of Subdivision, and the title was
partially cancelled as a result.

Petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against

respondents wherein they alleged that during their parents’ lifetime, the couple
distributed their real and personal properties in favor of their 10 children. Upon
distribution, petitioners alleged that they received the subject property and the
house constructed thereon as their share. They had been in adverse, open,
continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the property for over 4 decades and
are allegedly entitled to equitable title. Participation in the execution of the
aforementioned Deeds was denied.

Respondents, on the other hand, countered that petitioners’ cause of action was
already barred by estoppel when in 2006, one of petitioners offered to buy the
7/10 undivided share, which is an admission petitioners’ part that the property is
not entirely theirs. The Ibarras allegedly mortgaged the property but because of
financial constraints, respondent spouses Candelario had to redeem the property.
Not having been repaid, the Candelarios accepted their share in the subject
property as payment. Lastly, respondents sought, by way of counterclaim, the
partition of the property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were able to prove ownership over the property

RULING:
Petitioners were not able to prove equitable title or ownership over the property.
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt, or
uncertainty affecting title to real property.

For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur,
namely:
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the
real property subject of the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on
the title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or efficacy.

In the case at bar, the CA correctly observed that petitioners’ cause of action must
necessarily fail mainly in view of the absence of the first requisite.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the determination of whether or not

petitioners sufficiently proved their claim of ownership or equitable title is
substantially a factual issue that is generally improper for Us to delve into.In any
event, a perusal of the records would readily show that petitioners, as aptly
observed by the courts below, indeed, failed to substantiate their claim. Their
alleged open, continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of the subject
property is belied by the fact that respondent siblings, in 2005, entered into a
Contract of Lease with the Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject lot without
any objection from the petitioners. Petitioners’ inability to offer evidence tending
to prove that Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra transferred the ownership over
the property in favor of petitioners is likewise fatal to the latter’s claim.
216

PEDRO SEPULVEDA, SR., substituted by SOCORRO S. LAWAS, Administratrix of

His Estate, petitioner, vs. ATTY. PACIFICO S. PELAEZ, respondent.

FACTS:

On December 6, 1972, private respondent Atty. Pacifico Pelaez filed a

complaint against his granduncle, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr., with the then Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, for the recovery of possession and ownership of his
one-half (1/2) undivided share of several parcels of land covered by Tax
Declaration (T.D.) Nos. 28199, 18197, 18193 and 28316; his undivided one-third
(1/3) share in several other lots covered by T.D. Nos. 28304, 35090, 18228, 28310,
26308, 28714, 28311, 28312 and 28299 (all located in Danao, Cebu); and for the
partition thereof among the co-owners. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
SF-175.
The eleven (11) lots were among the twenty-five (25) parcels of land which
the private respondents mother, Dulce Sepulveda, inherited from her
grandmother, Dionisia Sepulveda under the Project of Partition[2] dated April 16,
1937 submitted by Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. as the administrator of the formers
estate, duly approved by the then CFI of Cebu in Special Proceeding No. 778-0.
Under the said deed, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. appeared to be the owner of an
undivided portion of Lot No. 28199, while his brother and Dulces uncle Santiago
Sepulveda, was the undivided owner of one-half (1/2) of the parcels of land
covered by T.D. Nos. 18197, 18193 and 28316. Dulce and her uncles, Pedro and
Santiago, were likewise indicated therein as the co-owners of the eleven other
parcels of land, each with an undivided one-third (1/3) share thereof.
In his complaint, the private respondent alleged that his mother Dulce died
intestate on March 2, 1944, and aside from himself, was survived by her husband
Rodolfo Pelaez and her mother Carlota Sepulveda. Dulces grandfather Vicente
Sepulveda died intestate on October 25, 1920,[3] and Dulce was then only about
four years old. According to the private respondent, his grandmother Carlota
repeatedly demanded the delivery of her mothers share in the eleven (11) parcels
of land, but Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. who by then was the Municipal Mayor of Tudela,
refused to do so. Dulce, likewise, later demanded the delivery of her share in the
eleven parcels of land, but Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. still refused, claiming that he
needed to continue to possess the property to reap the produce therefrom which
he used for the payment of the realty taxes on the subject properties. The private
respondent alleged that he himself demanded the delivery of his mothers share in
the subject properties on so many occasions, the last of which was in 1972, to no
avail.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN THE INCORRECT APPLICATION OF

ART. 494 OF THE CIVIL CODE AND IN UPHOLDING THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
FINDING THAT A TRUST RELATIONSHIP WAS CREATED BETWEEN HEREIN
RESPONDENT AND PEDRO SEPULVEDA [SR.]

RULING:

As gleaned from the material averments of the complaint and the reliefs
prayed for therein, the private respondent, as plaintiff therein, sought the
recovery of the ownership and possession of the ten (10) parcels of land and the
partition thereof; and for the payment of his share in the proceeds of the sale of
the property which Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. sold to Danao City amounting
to P7,492.00, which Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. claimed was left unpaid. It appears that
when the private respondent filed the complaint, his father, Rodolfo Pelaez, was
still alive. Thus, when his mother Dulce Pelaez died intestate on March 2, 1944,
she was survived by her husband Rodolfo and their son, the private respondent.
Under Article 996 of the New Civil Code,[17] Rodolfo Pelaez, as surviving spouse, is
entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to that corresponding by way of legitime to
each of the legitimate children who has not received any betterment. The rights
of the usufructuary are provided in Articles 471 to 490 of the old Civil
Code.[18] In Gamis v. Court of Appeals,[19] we held that:

Under articles 807 and 834 of the old Civil Code the surviving spouse is a forced
heir and entitled to a share in usufruct in the estate of the deceased spouse equal
to that which by way of legitime corresponds or belongs to each of the legitimate
children or descendants who have not been bettered or have not received any
share in the one-third share destined for betterment. The right of the surviving
spouse to have a share in usufruct in the estate of the deceased spouse is
provided by law of which such spouse cannot be deprived and which cannot be
ignored. Of course, the spouse may waive it but the waiver must be express.