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A Third Method of Ethics?

roger crisp
St Anne’s College, Oxford and Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics

In recent decades, the idea has become common that so-called virtue ethics con-
stitutes a third option in ethics in addition to consequentialism and deontology.
This paper argues that, if we understand ethical theories as accounts of right
and wrong action, this is not so. Virtue ethics turns out to be a form of deon-
tology (that is, non-consequentialism). The paper then moves to consider the
Aristotelian distinction between right or virtuous action on the one hand, and
acting rightly or virtuously on the other. It is claimed that virtue might play an
important role in an explanation of acting virtuously (as it does in Aristotle’s
ethics), but that such explanations can be charged with ‘double-counting’ the
moral value of the virtues. The paper concludes that, if we focus on the ques-
tion of the value of virtue, rather than on the notion of right action, there is
room for a self-standing and important view which could be described as virtue
ethics.

1. The Re-emergence of Virtue

Fifteen years ago, Marcia Baron, Philip Pettit, and Michael Slote pub-
lished a book called Three Methods of Ethics (Baron, Pettit, & Slote
1997). The first page of their introduction claims that each of their
three methods is concerned with how to distinguish right from wrong,
good from evil, and continues:

In recent years, three ways of thinking about morality have come

largely to dominate the landscape of ethical debate. These three are
consequentialism, which emphasizes good results as the basis for eval-
uating human actions; Kantian ethics, which focuses on universal law
and respect for others as the basis for morality; and virtue ethics,
which views moral questions from the standpoint of the moral agent
with virtuous character or motives.

The idea that virtue ethics has emerged as a third alternative to con-
sequentialism and Kantian ethics or deontology is now standard in
moral philosophy. Consider for example the opening paragraph of

A THIRD METHOD OF ETHICS? 1

Rosalind Hursthouse’s recent entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy:

Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative

ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the
virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach which empha-
sizes duties or rules (deontology) or that which emphasizes the conse-
quences of actions (consequentialism). Suppose it is obvious that
someone in need should be helped. A utilitarian will point to the fact
that the consequences of doing so will maximize well-being, a deontol-
ogist to the fact that, in doing so the agent will be acting in accor-
dance with a moral rule such as ‘Do unto others as you would be
done by’ and a virtue ethicist to the fact that helping the person
would be charitable or benevolent. (Hursthouse 2012)

In this paper I shall ask whether virtue ethics is indeed a third alter-
native to consequentialist and deontological theories, and if so how.
I shall suggest first that, though we can provide a plausible defini-
tion of consequentialism, the standard account of deontology fits
only some of those non-consequentialist theories usually thought of
as deontological. We need to split the category of deontology into
at least two sub-categories, one perhaps more Kantian than the
other. This raises the question whether, within the category of non-
Kantian deontology, space can be carved out for a distinctive virtue
ethical position. Here I shall argue that what is currently known as
virtue ethics is, as a theory of right action, really much like other
standard forms of non-Kantian deontology. But virtue ethics might
be characterized in a different way, as a view that first draws a dis-
tinction between right (or virtuous) action and acting rightly (or vir-
tuously), and then makes acting rightly depend at least in part on
the action’s issuing from a firm disposition to perform such acts
(such a disposition being, of course, a virtue). This does give us a
form of ethical theory based on virtue which can be distinguished
from standard consequentialism on the one hand, and other forms
of deontology which do not include such an account of acting
rightly. I shall conclude, however, that rather than including as a
condition of acting rightly that the action should flow from a virtue,
it is more plausible to see acting rightly as independent of virtue
and to attach value independently to the possession of virtuous dis-
positions. It is here, in answer to the question of what kind of per-
son one should be, that virtue ethics finds its rightful place as a
method of ethics—not as a third member of the now-standard
alleged triad, but as one half of a dyad, in opposition to any theory
denying non-instrumental moral value to the virtues themselves.

2 ROGER CRISP
 2. Criteria, Explanations, and Consequentialism
Like Baron et al., Hursthouse in her influential book On Virtue Ethics
also begins with the idea that moral theories seek a criterion for distin-
guishing right from wrong. A consequentialist, a deontologist, and a
virtue ethicist will offer, respectively, the following accounts of right
action:1

P.1. An action is right iff it promotes the best consequences.2

P.2. The best consequences are those in which happiness is maxi-

mized.3

P.1. An action is right iff it is in accordance with a correct moral rule

or principle.

P.2. A correct moral rule (principle) is one that ...

e.g.

(1) . . . is on the following list, or

(2) . . . is laid down for us by God, or . . .

P.1. An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would character-

istically (i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances.

P.1a. A virtuous agent is one who has, and exercises, certain character
traits, namely, the virtues.

1
Hursthouse 1999: 26–9. Hursthouse prefers to speak here of act utilitarianism rather
than consequentialism (note that in the passage cited from the Stanford entry she
moves seamlessly from one to the other). This statement of her position is developed
from her 1991 (see esp. 224–6). In her interesting critique of the ‘triadic’ analysis of
modern ethics, Martha Nussbaum does not mention Hursthouse or this kind of
account, focusing on the looser idea that ‘virtue ethics’ includes any theory that
makes an important place for virtue (in which case of course many utilitarians and
Kantians will count as virtue ethicists); see her 1999, esp. at 165–7, 200.
2
It might be preferable to speak of ‘the best, or good enough, consequences’, so as to
allow for satisficing versions of consequentialism. See Slote 1984.
3
As I shall suggest below, it is a straightforward matter to replace ‘happiness’ in C’s
P.2 with other maximanda, as required.

A THIRD METHOD OF ETHICS? 3

 P.2. A virtue is a character trait that . . .

e.g.

(1) . . . is on the following list, or . . .

(2) . . . is a trait a human being needs to flourish, or . . .

Note first that, as they stand, these positions are not mutually exclu-
sive. One might begin by advocating C, and then agree with D (since
C’s P.1 states the correct moral rule) and with V (since the only virtue
is impartial beneficence, and an impartially beneficent agent would
characteristically act in accordance with C). But of course once spelled
out the positions are likely to be at least partly inconsistent. Promoting
the best consequences, for example, may be said to conflict with certain
moral rules, or to be something that a virtuous agent would not char-
acteristically do in certain circumstances.
Nevertheless, moral theories should aim not merely to distinguish
right from wrong. They should also explain why right actions are right
(and wrong actions wrong, good things good, and bad things bad).4
So, to return to Hursthouse’s form of analysis, we may say that her
kind of consequentialist will believe not only that an action is right iff
it promotes the best consequences and that the best consequences are
those in which happiness is maximized, but:

C*

P.1. An action is right solely in virtue of its promoting the best conse-
quences.

P.2. Consequences are best solely in virtue of their being those in

which happiness is maximized.

On this view, the property promoting the best consequences is ‘right-

making’ for actions, and that of maximizing happiness ‘best-making’ for
consequences. And even if ‘Promote the best consequences!’ is indeed
the only moral rule, so that all right actions are in fact in accordance
with the correct moral rule, it is not their being in accordance with this
rule which makes right actions right.
Any such explanatory account should tell us where normative and
evaluative weight really comes to rest, by specifying exactly which

4
My focus, like Hursthouse’s at this point in her argument, will be primarily on
rightness rather than on goodness.

4 ROGER CRISP
properties are ultimately—i.e. non-derivatively—right-making and
good-making. Consider first the following position, which includes a
different account of the goodness of consequences from that in C*:

C**

P.1. An action is right solely in virtue of its promoting the best conse-
quences.

P.2. Consequences are best solely in virtue of their being those in

which flourishing is maximized.

Now consider the following positions:

Happiness-Maximization (HM): An action is right solely in virtue of

its promoting happiness.

Flourishing-Maximization (FM): An action is right solely in virtue of

its promoting flourishing.

Note that neither HM nor FM implies C* and C**’s P.2 (that conse-
quences are best solely in virtue of their being those in which happiness
is maximized). They are both consistent with the view that the good-
ness of consequences depends on things other than happiness or flour-
ishing (such as aesthetic value), and that, though an action is right
solely in virtue of its promoting happiness or flourishing, right actions
may not in fact promote the best consequences. That is, one might
hold, for example:

HM*

P.1. An action is right solely in virtue of its promoting happiness.

P.2. Consequences are best solely in virtue of their being those in

which the balance of happiness and aesthetic value is maximized.

These different theories are far from being notational variants on one
another. They are putting normative and evaluative weight in different
places, and as a result the arguments for each, the objections to each, and
the practical implications of each are likely to be quite different. Already,
then, it might seem that the idea that consequentialism is one of the three
main theories dominating contemporary ethics is potentially misleading.
It certainly seems initially plausible that what we might call the central
consequentialist claim is captured in something like C* and C**’s P.1 (‘an
action is right solely in virtue of its promoting the best consequences’).

A THIRD METHOD OF ETHICS? 5

But once we recognize that there can be non-consequentialist theories
according to which happiness-maximization is the sole right-making
property, we might wish to distance ourselves from the idea that ‘conse-
quentialism’ is a helpful term for a family of views. Do we really want to
put theorists who hold HM* in a different category from those who hold
the view that an action is right solely in virtue of its promoting the best
consequences (that is, P.1 as found in C* and C**)?
Actually, I think we do, primarily because views such as HM* are so
unusual (I’ve never come across anyone who holds a view anything like
it). That is to say, most, perhaps all, of those commonly called ‘conse-
quentialists’ will accept the central consequentialist claim, or something
very close to it—and it is easy to see the attraction of the view. It is true
enough that some alleged ‘consequentialists’ might refuse to speak of
consequences, preferring talk of outcomes, states of affairs, histories of
the world, or whatever. But these notions are sufficiently close to one
another for us to say that there is indeed a family of theories according
to which what matters morally is bringing about the best consequences,
broadly understood (i.e., ‘consequences’ will turn out to be a term of art
we may use to refer to outcomes, states of affairs, or whatever).5

3. Deontology
The category of consequentialism was designed in the previous section
with a view to capturing the essence of a philosophical tradition based
around some central, organizing principle, the attraction of which
should at least be comprehensible to those outside that tradition. What
about deontology (D)? Here things are less straightforward. We may
begin with an appropriately emended version of Hursthouse’s D:

D*: An action is right solely in virtue of its being in accordance with

a correct moral rule or principle.

This view may be taken to capture reasonably well something like an

uncomplicatedly Kantian position. What makes the keeping of a

5
Sally Haslanger has suggested to me that one might capture the essence of conse-
quentialism through considering its ‘primary site of evaluation’. What really matters
for a consequentialist is how the world goes (as opposed to the nature either of the
agent’s action or of her character), and an action is judged purely instrumentally, in
terms of how well or badly the world goes as a result of its performance. Some
consequentialists will certainly agree with this. But many appear quite ready to
accept that non-instrumental moral value—the value we are responding to when we
blame or praise some action from the moral point of view—is instantiated in actions
themselves, though of course its valence and level depend on consequences (the
value of which is most commonly understood to consist only in welfarist, or non-
moral, value).

6 ROGER CRISP
promise right, for example, and the breaking of a promise wrong? The
former is in accordance with the Categorical Imperative, whereas the
latter is not.
But many of those often seen as deontologists will deny that norma-
tive weight comes to rest ultimately on conformity to a moral principle.
They may claim rather that principles serve merely to describe a right-
making relation itself independent of conformity with any principle.6
Consider, for example, W.D. Ross’s suggestion, in the chapter ‘What
Makes Right Acts Right?’ in The Right and the Good, that what makes
my sending some book to a friend right is that it is the fulfilment of a
promise (Ross 1930: 46). The property of being the fulfilment of a
promise is quite different from that of being in accordance with a, or
the, correct moral rule or principle.
So we now have a distinction between two forms of deontology. The
first, possibly Kantian version, we might call principle-based. What
about the second? Consider the range of properties that non-Kantian
non-consequentialists might allege to ground rightness (in addition of
course to that of being the keeping of a promise): being required by
God; being a respecting of rights; being in accordance with a rational
contract; being an expression of appropriate thanks; and so on.
Because of this range, I can think of no better way to describe these
views than as non-principle-based deontology. I am inclined to think
that this broad category of non-consequentialist position includes most
of those views usually categorized as deontological.
But if we construe deontology so broadly, what is the ‘essence’ of
the tradition it represents? The answer is simple: non-consequentialism.
Deontologists are those who advocate right- and wrong-making prop-
erties of actions which are not consequentialist.7

6
A deontological theorist may wish to extend right-making properties beyond that of
conformity to principle, to include the kind of properties discussed in the following
paragraph. Such views might best be understood as hybrid versions of deontology,
neither fully principle-based nor fully non-principle-based.
7
It has of course been common to see the consequentialism ⁄ non-consequentialism
distinction as on all fours with the consequentialism ⁄ deontology distinction. Larry
Alexander and Michael Moore, for example, see consequentialism as what they call
the ‘foil’ for deontology: ‘In contrast to consequentialist theories, deontological the-
ories judge the morality of choices by criteria different than the states of affairs
those choices bring about. Roughly speaking, deontologists of all stripes hold that
some choices cannot be justified by their effects—that no matter how morally good
their consequences, some choices are morally forbidden’ (Alexander & Moore 2008:
sect. 2). Illuminatingly, they then offer a principle-based definition of deontology
(‘For deontologists, what makes a choice right is its conformity with a moral
norm’), but fail to discuss how to categorize those who accept this latter position
but whose moral norm assesses rightness solely on the basis of consequences. For
other examples of definitions of deontology as the denial of consequentialism (or
‘teleology’), see Frankena 1973: 15; Rawls 1999: 26.

A THIRD METHOD OF ETHICS? 7

 4. What the Virtuous Person Would Characteristically Do and the
Virtuousness of Action
Virtue ethicists are not consequentialists; nor are they principle-based
deontologists. And because non-principle-based deontology is so broad,
it is inevitable that virtue ethics can be seen as one form of it. But we
needn’t yet give up on our idea of it as a third member of a triad.
Virtue ethics has certainly received a lot of attention over the last fifty
or so years, and it might be said that it is now so significant that it
deserves a category of its own, to be contrasted with consequentialism
on the one hand, and all other forms of deontology, both principle-
based and non-principle-based, on the other. But before we consider
that suggestion further, we still need to define virtue ethics. What I
want to argue now is that, when it comes to right action, it turns out
to be impossible to draw a plausible distinction between virtue ethics
and ‘standard’ forms of non-principle-based deontology which make
no special reference to virtue in their account of right-making proper-
ties.
To be a form of virtue ethics, a theory must presumably make ineli-
minable reference to the virtues or to the virtuous person in its explan-
atory account of the ultimate right-making property or properties.
Consider first the property Hursthouse herself appeals to in her
account of virtue ethics: ‘being what a virtuous agent would character-
istically (i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances’.8 An emended
explanatory version of Hursthouse’s account would be:

V*: An action is right solely in virtue of its being what a virtuous

agent would characteristically (i.e., acting in character) do in the
circumstances.

Now V*, or indeed V, may well serve as a criterion for distinguishing

right from wrong action, if one spells out the notion of a virtuous
agent. But it cannot even be part of a plausible story about ultimate
right-making properties. It is no justification, in itself, for an action that
it is such that anyone, even a virtuous person, would characteristically
do it, nor would a virtuous person herself accept this as a reason for
acting. Imagine some virtuous person who bravely dives into a flood to
save a drowning child. If you ask her why she acted, she will refer to
the facts that the child would otherwise have drowned, that there was
no one else around, that (she feels) one should try hard to help some-
one in great need—not to the fact that a virtuous person would charac-
teristically do such a thing. Virtuous people characteristically do certain

8
See also e.g. Slote 2001: 5 (though cf. 1995: 89); Annas 2005: 524.

8 ROGER CRISP
actions for (good) reasons that are quite independent of the fact that
these actions are such that virtuous people would characteristically do
them.9
Consider, then, the following alternative:

V**: An action is right solely in virtue of its being virtuous.

How should we understand the idea of an action’s being virtuous? In

one sense, it is equivalent to its being the kind of thing that a virtuous
agent would characteristically do. As Aristotle puts it, ‘Actions. . .are
called just and temperate when they are such as the just and temperate
person would do’ (Aristotle 1894: 1105b5–7).10 This sense is presumably
what Hursthouse had in mind in the Stanford Encyclopedia account of
virtue ethics cited above, according to which a virtue ethicist will give
as the reason for helping someone that it would be charitable or benev-
olent.
But we have already seen that a virtuous person will act for reasons
independent of the fact that her action is such that a virtuous person
would characteristically perform it. We now need to get a firmer grip
on how to understand those reasons. Hursthouse, like many virtue ethi-
cists, claims that her view incorporates sufficiently many central ideas
from Aristotle to justify describing it as ‘neo-Aristotelian’.11 Partly for
that reason, and partly because his account seems to me largely correct,
let me now ask what, according to Aristotle, constitutes the virtuous-
ness of an action.
In the core statement of his so-called ‘doctrine of the mean’, Aris-
totle says that virtue is concerned with both feelings and actions, and
that we find in these excess, deficiency, and the mean. He goes on:

For example, fear, confidence, appetite, anger, pity, and in general

pleasure and pain can be experienced too much or too little, and in
both ways not well. But to have them at the right time, about the
right things, towards the right people, for the right end, and in the
right way, is the mean and best; and this is the business of virtue.
Similarly, there is an excess, a deficiency and a mean in actions. (Aris-
totle 1894: 1106b18–24)

9
The same problem arises for Slote’s version of sentimentalism, which allows the
motivation of an empathetic agent to ‘determine’ right and wrong and which Slote
suggests therefore appears to count as a form of virtue ethics; see 2009: 102, n. 8.
See Driver 2006: esp. 118–21. For a suggestive development of the view that the
dependence of wrongness on the virtuous person can be seen as metaethical, see
Kawall 2009: sect. 3. As Kawall notes, such a metaethical view does not require a
virtue ethical account at the first-order or normative level.
10
All translations mine.
11
See e.g. Hursthouse 1999: 8; 2012: sect. 1.

A THIRD METHOD OF ETHICS? 9

What Aristotle has noticed is that human life can be seen as consisting
in certain ‘spheres’. Some of these spheres involve core human feel-
ings—fear, anger, and so on. Others concern actions, such as the giving
away of money. Aristotle does not include Hursthouse’s example, char-
ity, in his list of virtues, but he does make an important place for eleu-
theria, generosity, the sphere of which includes the giving of money
(and, confusingly, the taking of it, but we can ignore that) (see esp.
Aristotle 1894: bk. 4, ch. 1). The generous person, in Aristotle’s
schema, will give away money at the right time, in relation to the right
things, to the right people, for the right end, and in the right way.12
The stingy person—that is, the person with the ‘deficient’ vice – will fail
to give money away at the right time, in relation to the right things,
and so on; while the person with the ‘excessive’ vice in this
sphere—wastefulness—will benefit the wrong people, at the wrong time,
and so on. (Any particular individual, of course, could have both vices,
as Aristotle notes (1894: 1121a30–32).)
Return now to the doctrine of the mean, as stated above. The word
Aristotle uses for ‘right’ here is dei, an impersonal verb, which can also
be, and very often is, translated as ‘one ought’.13 So we now have our
account of generosity: the generosity of an action consists in its being
the giving away of money at the time one ought, in relation to the
things one ought to be giving money away in relation to, to the people
one ought, and so on. Further, the analysis extends to any virtue what-
soever. Any action is virtuous to the extent that it is the performing of
an action, within the sphere of a virtue, at the right time, in relation to
the right things, and so on. And any feeling is virtuous in the same
way, mutatis mutandis.
This has the result that one cannot plausibly explain an action’s
being right by reference to its being virtuous, or indeed its being chari-
table, benevolent, courageous, or whatever. For these properties are
non-ultimate and derivative. An action’s being virtuous just is its being
right (that is, obligatory), and an action’s having some more particular

12
As John McDowell puts it in discussing a related virtue: ‘A kind person has a reli-
able sensitivity to a certain sort of requirement which situations impose on behav-
iour’ (1997: 142).
13
So the idea that virtue ethics is to be characterized in terms of the priority it gives
to ‘aretaic’ terms over deontic ones (Slote, in Baron et. al. 1997: 177; 2001: 4) looks
doubtful, if we are to count Aristotle as a virtue ethicist. Indeed, it is quite plausi-
ble to interpret Aristotle as holding that in an important sense deontic terms are
prior to aretaic, since the latter are defined with reference to the former. On trans-
lation, see Liddell & Scott 1940: 372, s.v. Having noted that the later ‘sense of
moral obligation’ emerged from the earlier ‘there is need’, they translate the neuter
participle deon using ‘ought’.

10 ROGER CRISP
virtue-property just is its being right in the sphere of that virtue—its
being the right response to fear, in the case of courage, or the correct
financial response to the circumstances one is in, in the case of generos-
ity.14 And there is always more to be said about what makes such a
response right in any particular case.
Consider some case in which you ought to give away some money.
What, according to Aristotle, makes your action right in these circum-
stances? The answer is unlikely to be simple. There is some deserving
individual who needs a certain degree of financial assistance (no more
and no less), for some worthy purpose, and needs it now rather than
later. (Both desert and worthiness here call for further specification.)
You are in a position to help her, and there is no prior demand on
your resources (there’s much more to be said here, too). And you will
not just give, but give cheerfully and willingly. And so on. My point is
that this account is a standard form of non-principle-based deontology:
certain actions are called for in certain circumstances, and their
rightness depends not only, or indeed not at all, either on their being in
accordance with a principle, or on the consequences or outcome of
performing them.15

5. Motives and Acting Virtuously

So far, I have focused primarily on right action, concluding that the
virtuousness of an action just is its being right, with more specific
virtue terms serving to identify the sphere of action in question. But, as
Aristotle points out, virtue is a matter not only of actions, but of feel-
ings or motives. So could it be that what makes virtue ethics special is
a focus not so much on rightness of action, but on rightness of motive?
Indeed this may be taken as a loose implication of the claim by Baron
et al. quoted at the beginning of this paper that virtue ethics ‘views

14
I do not mean that ‘right’ and ‘virtuous’ have the same sense. There might be a
form of virtue ethics which eschewed deontic terms such as ‘right’ in favour of,
say, notions of admirability or appropriateness. But the deontic terms are there at
the foundation in Aristotle and in most writers in the tradition; and my main point
here about the non-ultimate nature of virtue-properties in actions can anyway be
restated in non-deontic terms.
15
Recall the Rossian view that some action can be right because it is the fulfilling of
a promise. We can now see that the position of Aristotle (the paradigmatic virtue
ethicist) is in fact quite similar to that of Ross (a paradigmatic deontologist) (see
Watson 2003: 248, n. 24). This is how Ross (a highly distinguished Aristotelian
scholar) saw things. In The Foundations of Ethics, he says: ‘Aristotle’s ethics would
seem at first sight to be based entirely on the notion of a good or an end to be
achieved; but in his discussion of the individual virtues he does not relate the virtu-
ous act to the final goal of human life, but treats it as simply right in its own nat-
ure’ (1939: 5). See also Hurka 2001: 229–30.

A THIRD METHOD OF ETHICS? 11

moral questions from the standpoint of the moral agent with virtuous
character or motives’.
Recall that at present I have virtue ethics under the heading of non-
principle-based deontology, with consequentialism as the other central
category of ethical theory. There seems no reason why a consequen-
tialist should not offer an account of the rightness of motives, an
account indeed which attaches non-instrumental, moral value to those
motives (so the fact that some action is prompted by compassion, say,
might itself be said to be a valuable constituent of an outcome).16 But
even if it turns out that consequentialist accounts of the rightness of
motives ultimately fail, there is little reason for seeking to distinguish—
within the category of deontology—those deontologists who have
allowed a place for rightness of motive from those who have not. It is
hard to come up with the name of single non-consequentialist moral
philosopher who has not given some account of the rightness of
motives.
Ross may be thought a possible exception:

[W]hen we ask what is the general nature of morally good actions, it

seems quite clear that it is in virtue of the motives that they proceed
from that actions are morally good. Moral goodness is quite distinct
from and independent of rightness, which. . .belongs to acts not in vir-
tue of the motives they proceed from, but in virtue of the nature of
what is done. (Ross 1930: 156)

Ross’s distinction, however, can be seen as closely related to Aris-

totle’s important distinction between an action’s being virtuous (that
is, right) and its being done in accordance with the virtues (that is,
rightly) (1894: 1105a28–33). An action is right or virtuous if it is what
one ought to do in the circumstances; and the reasons for such an
action are the ones for which the virtuous person would act. But
there is a difference between doing the right or virtuous action, and
doing the action in accordance with virtue or ‘virtuously’. This, Aris-
totle says, requires that the agent (i) know what she is doing, (ii) act
from rational choice of the action for its own sake, and (iii) act from
a firm and unshakeable disposition. The important condition for our
purposes is (iii):

The virtuous ⁄ virtuously distinction (VV): A virtuous action in certain

circumstances is what is required in those circumstances and what a
virtuous person would do in those, or relevantly similar, circum-
stances. A virtuous action is done virtuously (at least in part) when it

16
See e.g. Adams 1976; Hurka 2001: ch. 1.

12 ROGER CRISP
 is done, for the right reasons,17 from a firm disposition to perform
actions of such a kind (that is, from a virtue).18

This distinction is not only ethically significant (considerably more sig-

nificant than contemporary philosophical literature might suggest), but
also one that may offer some conceptual space for virtue ethics, under-
stood as any theory that includes VV.
If we are strict, we will be unable to draw a distinction between vir-
tue ethics so understood and consequentialism. Consider an act utilitar-
ian, who believes that an action is right solely in virtue of its bringing
about that outcome in which utility is maximized. There is nothing to
stop her describing this as the ‘virtuous’ action (since rightness just is
virtuousness), and then claiming that there is special moral value in
performing such actions, for the right reason, on the basis of a disposi-
tion. But it has to be admitted that most consequentialists have not
made room for the VV-distinction. Nor have all deontologists. I
remember once asking a prominent deontologist why she had said so
little about virtue in her many writings. Her response was: ‘If someone
does the right thing, for the right reasons, and with the right motives,
what else can matter?’. Her point can be taken to be, in part, that there
is no extra moral value in any particular action merely because it was
done on the basis of a disposition.
I am inclined to accept this point. Consider someone who acts
generously, performing the right or virtuous action, and performing
it virtuously. She acts for the right reasons, in the right way, from a
firm disposition—that is, from a virtue. Note first that when we
praise her action morally (as opposed to, say, aesthetically), we are
not—strictly speaking—praising her action. We are praising her.
Praising her for what? On one view, we are praising her not for act-
ing as she just has, but purely for being a certain kind of person
with certain dispositions or virtues. This appears to be Hume’s posi-
tion:

If any action be either virtuous or vicious, ’tis only as a sign of some

quality or character. It must depend upon durable principles of the
mind, which extend over the whole conduct, and enter into the

17
For good discussions of the view that moral worth requires acting for the right rea-
sons, see Arpaly 2002: ch. 3 and Markovits 2010.
18
I have left out reference to advice here. It does indeed sound odd to describe as vir-
tuous the actions of, say, a child-abuser who seeks to remedy some of the wrongs
he has done to some child. It sounds slightly less odd to say they are right. But nei-
ther oddity matters, and our main interest here is in what it is for the virtuous
actions of a virtuous person to be done virtuously. Nor, for simplicity, have I men-
tioned feelings.

A THIRD METHOD OF ETHICS? 13

 personal character. Actions themselves, not proceeding from any con-
stant principle, have no influence on love or hatred, pride or humility;
and consequently are never consider’d in morality.

This reflexion is self-evident, and deserves to be attended to, as

being of the utmost importance in the present subject. We are never
to consider any single action in our enquiries concerning the origin of
morals; but only the quality or character from which the action pro-
ceeded. These alone are durable enough to affect our sentiments con-
cerning the person. Actions are, indeed, better indications of a
character than words, or even wishes and sentiments; but ’tis only so
far as they are such indications, that they are attended with love or
hatred, praise or blame. (Hume 2007: 3.3.3.1.4–5.)

But consider the following case:

Ronnie and Reggie: Ronnie and Reggie are vicious gangsters. They
are equally ready to kill, torture, and terrorize people, and do so to
the same extent. On one occasion, both of them are confronted by
someone whose life is in danger and needs help. For some reason
(perhaps her perfume reminds him of a past girlfriend), Ronnie
feels sorry for this individual, and finds it easy to help her, thereby
acting in an entirely uncharacteristic way. Reggie, as usual, does
nothing to help.

Let us assume that Ronnie’s thoughts and feelings on this occasion are
indistinguishable from those of a virtuous person in the same circum-
stances: he is moved by real compassion, and genuinely wishes to help.
If Hume is right, we cannot praise Ronnie for his action, even though
it is right, and is done rightly in every way except in its not issuing
from a disposition or virtue. Hume might claim that the action is
evidence that, in fact, Ronnie is more benevolent than we might other-
wise have thought. But I have ruled that out in the example: this is a
one-off action, quite out of character and, let us assume, never to be
repeated. Hume’s view, then, is too extreme. There is moral value in
acting virtuously independently of any disposition to perform such
acts.
But should we accept that Ronnie would have been more praisewor-
thy for acting in the way that he did had his action been based on a
disposition? I think not.19 We would indeed be inclined to praise Ron-
nie more had he possessed a virtuous disposition. But our praising
him for his action should not be even in part based on such a disposi-
tion. Rather, we should praise him (a) for acting rightly on this

19
See Foot 2001: 113–15 (helpfully discussed and compared to the views of Hurst-
house and Slote, in Copp & Sobel 2004: 544–53); Arpaly 2002: 94–5.

14 ROGER CRISP
occasion, and (b) for having a disposition to act in such ways—that is,
for being a certain kind of person. We have already seen that the most
plausible account of right action will not make reference to the virtues;
now we find that the most plausible account of acting rightly won’t
either. But there is room for virtue ethics as a theory about the kind
of person one should be. According to virtue ethics so construed, being
virtuous is morally valuable in itself.20 Virtue ethics, then, is not part
of a triad of theories about right action. It is half of a dyad, the other
half of which consists in the denial of non-instrumental value to the
virtues.21
But what of the prominent deontologist’s question? Why should
morality demand more than right acts, done rightly—that is, done at
the right time, for the right reasons, with the right motivations, and
so on? Why should we value the mere disposition to perform such
actions, other than instrumentally? One way to answer this question
would be to spell out the kind of disposition a virtue is. It is not to
be understood purely in terms of subjective conditionals as a mere
tendency to perform certain actions or experience certain feelings.
What is really valuable is the ‘categorical’ base of the disposition to
feel and to act in the right way, and that, on the Aristotelian view,
consists primarily in a properly habituated set of standing concerns,
desires, and wishes, along with the cognitive capacity to grasp what is
morally salient in the circumstances and what those circumstances
require of one. As we develop such an account, it becomes hard not
to think that the burden of proof is on those who deny the moral
value of being such a person.
It may be that what lies behind the prominent deontologist’s posi-
tion is a Kantian restriction of the domain of morality to the volun-
tary. We can be blamed only for what we do (or have done), not for
what we are. Admiring or criticizing someone for their character,
independently of actions performed in the process leading to that
character or as a result of it, might seem to constitute the taking of
an aesthetic attitude. Here the virtue ethicist might argue for the
extension of moral assessment beyond the voluntary.22 Or she might
argue that, even if morality is to be restricted to the voluntary, phi-
losophy should concern itself with all matters of value that arise in

20
Note the reference to moral value here. If all the evaluative weight eventually
comes to rest on the agent’s own good (as it has often been thought to do in
ancient views of the virtues, including Aristotle’s), then such a view might perhaps
be better described as virtue egoism rather than virtue ethics. See Hurka 2001: 232.
21
For an example of such a denial, see Sidgwick 1907: 393.
22
See e.g. Williams 1993: 92–4.

A THIRD METHOD OF ETHICS? 15

the living of a human life. If there is true value in the virtues, then
philosophy should recognize it.23

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23
For comments on and ⁄ or discussion of previous drafts, I am grateful to Julia
Annas, Robert Audi, Misericòrdia Angles Cervello, Aaron Garrett, Charles
Griswold, Walter Hopp, Terry Irwin, Jason Kawall, David Lyons, James Mahon,
Margarita Mauri, Carolyn Price, Nalin Ranasinghe, Daniel Robinson, David Ro-
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Society for Applied Philosophy Conference in Leeds; University of Barcelona; Uni-
versity of Stirling; University of Hertfordshire; Oxford Brookes University; Open
University; Manchester Centre for Political Theory conference; Swarthmore Col-
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sity; Washington and Lee University; Assumption College; St Anne’s College,
Oxford (Colgate visiting seminar). One version of the paper was developed and pre-
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in the Department of Philosophy, Boston University. I would like to thank the
department for its intellectual, social, and practical support.

16 ROGER CRISP
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