Country Report Angola January 2020

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Country Report
Angola
Generated on January 28th 2020

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Angola 1
Angola
Summary
2 Briefing sheet
Outlook for 2020-24

4 Political stability
4 Election watch
5 International relations
6 Policy trends
7 Fiscal policy
7 Monetary policy
7 International assumptions
8 Economic growth
8 Inflation
9 Exchange rates
9 External sector
10 Forecast summary
Data and charts

11 Annual data and forecast
12 Quarterly data
13 Monthly data
14 Annual trends charts
15 Monthly trends charts
16 Comparative economic indicators
Summary
16 Basic data
18 Political structure
Recent analysis
Politics
21 Forecast updates
21 Analysis
Economy
28 Forecast updates
33 Analysis
Country Report January 2020 www.eiu.com © Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2020

Angola 2
Briefing sheet
Editor: Nathan Hayes
Forecast Closing Date: December 17, 2019
Political and economic outlook

The president, João Lourenço, will continue to reduce the influence and patronage network of
his predecessor, but will be wary of a backlash from vested interests in the ruling Movimento
Popular de Libertação de Angola and the wider population.
The government is seeking to increase revenue and cut spending by introducing taxes and
eliminating some subsidy programmes under IMF-mandated reforms and fiscal criteria.
The Economist Intelligence Unit expects reforms to the oil industry to attract investment in new
licences. Subsequent exploratory activity will take years to yield results, however, with a small
uptick in oil production in 2024 (after several years of declines).
Real GDP will fall by 1.3% in 2020, owing to low oil production volumes. Growth will pick up in
2021-23, averaging 3% a year as oil prices rise and non-oil activity (such as mining) improves.
Real GDP will increase by 5.9% in 2024 as oil production rises.
In 2020 the weak economic picture will continue to weigh on the kwanza, which will depreciate
to an average of Kz510.5:US$1. Depreciation will continue more slowly over the remainder of
the forecast period as a recovery takes hold, reaching Kz555.3:US$1 in 2024.
Inflation surged in 2018 after the exchange rate was floated. We expect inflation to remain high,
rising to 21.3% in 2020 before moderating, as the rate of currency depreciation slows, and
annual price growth will average 12.7% in 2021-24.
The current account will slip into deficit in 2020, and widen to 2023, given weak oil prices,
declining output and rising imports as oil investment sucks in capital goods. New investment
will boost exports in 2024, narrowing the current-account deficit in that year.
Key indicators
2019a 2020b 2021b 2022b 2023b 2024b
Real GDP growth (%) -3.3 -1.3 2.3 3.2 3.5 5.9
Consumer price inflation (av; %) 17.3 21.3 16.3 13.1 10.8 10.4
Government balance (% of GDP) 0.7 -0.7 -0.4 -1.7 -1.4 -1.3
Current-account balance (% of GDP) 2.8 -0.8 -2.3 -3.3 -4.3 -3.8
Money market rate (av; %) 15.0 15.0 14.0 13.5 13.0 12.5
Exchange rate Kz:US$ (av) 366.0 510.5 524.1 535.8 545.9 555.3
a Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. b Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts.

Angola 3
Key changes since December 2nd

We have nudged down our exchange-rate forecast for 2020, to average Kz510.5:US$1 from
Kz515.9:US$1 previously. The kwanza weakened sharply in October, but regained some ground
in the final months of 2019.
Following the slower pace of depreciation of the kwanza in 2020, we have revised down our
inflation forecast for the year, to average 21.3%, down from 22.4% previously.
The month ahead

January (TBC)—Concession awards announced for oilblock tendering: Contract negotiation
is scheduled to last for up to a further four months. Once operators and investors are chosen, it
will take some years before any of these blocks move into production.
Major risks to our forecast

Scenarios, Q4 2019 Probability Impact Intensity
Banking sector problems constrain the availability of local financing High High 16
Businesses cannot source skilled labour, either local or expatriate High Moderate 12
Courts fail to enforce contracts High Moderate 12
Urban and industrial areas are left without power High Moderate 12
Mr Lourenço fails to deliver on public expectations of substantial change Moderate High 12
Note: Scenarios and scores are taken from our Risk Briefing product. Risk scenarios are potential
developments that might substantially change the business operating environment over the coming two
years. Risk intensity is a product of probability and impact, on a 25-point scale.
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit.

Angola 4
Outlook for 2020-24

Political stability
The president, João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, who took office in September 2017, is expected
to continue to consolidate political power. Mr Lourenço has made a raft of changes across the
government as part of a push to change out the old guard from within government structures. In
doing so, he is injecting new technocratic blood into the cabinet, which does not carry political
influence from the administration of his predecessor, José Eduardo dos Santos, who stood down
as president after 38 years. The president has systematically weakened the influence of
Mr dos Santos’s children, dismissing Isabel dos Santos as head of the stateowned energy
company, Sonangol, and José Filomeno dos Santos (also known as Zenu) as chief of the
country's sovereign wealth fund (SWF). In December Zenu's corruption trial began, the perceived
fairness of which will be a test of the independence of the judiciary, as the dos Santos family
remains highly influential in Angola.
Mr Lourenço continues to tackle corruption and deliver longpromised economic reforms to
diversify the economy away from the oil industry, such as introducing legislation to break up
monopolies, encouraging foreign investment and repatriating illicit financial flows from Portugal.
Mr Lourenço has boosted public expectations of change, which could prove problematic if the
president's top-down policies fail to translate into tangible benefits for Angola's poorest.
Moreover, the president will have to contend with pre-established power structures, and
Mr Lourenço cannot openly antagonise all these different interests at once. Entrenched
corruption will prove difficult to address, despite the establishment of a new anti-corruption
directorate with strict penalties, owing to strong vested interests and ingrained cultural practices.
The ruling Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) maintains a comfortable majority
in the National Assembly, holding 150 of the 220 seats, and can therefore pass legislation without
difficulty. However, weak institutions will hamper policy implementation, with delays
commonplace. Continued low-level social unrest highlights growing frustrations with entrenched
corruption, limited economic opportunities and high levels of unemployment.
Election watch
Legislation to define the terms of Angola's first local elections is to be submitted to parliament
ahead of the proposed 2020 ballot. More localised decision-making should improve accountability
and service delivery, although much of the budget will still be controlled at national level.
National support for the MPLA dropped from 82% in the 2008 parliamentary elections to 61% in
the 2017 polls. The next parliamentary elections are scheduled for 2022. The Economist
Intelligence Unit expects the main opposition party—the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA)—to make further gains at the upcoming local and national
elections as it continues to exploit dissatisfaction with the MPLA (although the party was
weakened by internal discord ahead of party leadership elections in November). Nonetheless, the
MPLA will maintain its dominance in both of the upcoming polls, as it exerts a strong grip on the
state apparatus, and opposition rhetoric is rarely followed by action.

Angola 5
International relations
Mr Lourenço will seek to maintain what Angola perceives as its position as a leading regional
power by consolidating economic and trade links, and will continue to sign new bilateral
agreements with its neighbours. The African Continental FreeTrade Area (AfCFTA) agreement—
which aims to reduce tariffs and promote trade across the continent, and to which Angola is a
signatory—came into force in May 2019. However, regional protectionist sentiment and logistical
bottlenecks will remain, hampering growth potential over the medium term.
Mr Lourenço will also continue to diversify economic and diplomatic relations. Angola and Qatar
have signed several co-operation agreements in 2019, including a deal that may enable Qatari
ships to transport Angolan gas. Angola—which has struggled with maintenance at the facility—
could benefit from Qatari expertise. Similarly, Angola is looking to strengthen longstanding
diplomatic and security ties with Russia, particularly in ramping up private-sector investment.
We expect Angola to continue to strengthen ties with Portugal—its former colonial power; 35 new
co-operation agreements have been signed since August 2018 in areas including healthcare,
education, maritime security, local government, and institutional development for Angolan
business and government entities. The Portuguese authorities will continue to support the
Angolan government's efforts to repatriate funds earned from suspected fraudulent or corrupt
deals held in Portuguese bank accounts, although progress has been limited.

Angola 6
Policy trends
Policymaking is driven by efforts to reduce Angola's reliance on oil by boosting the role of the
private sector and, ultimately, investment flows. Such efforts will remain constrained by the
challenging operating environment. In June it was announced that some state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) will be sold off through initial public offerings (IPOs). Selling off state assets could be a
boon for the financial sector, but such a large number of IPOs will be logistically difficult to
conduct, and buyers may also be difficult to find, as Angola's financial sector is relatively illiquid.
In July a new investment policy for Angola's SWF, the Fundo Soberano de Angola (FSDEA), was
announced, designed to improve its poor international reputation. FSDEA's new management
must prioritise transparency if it is to be taken seriously as an investment player.
Angola's hydrocarbons sector requires reform and investment after years of mismanagement and
corruption. As part of broader reforms to make Angola a more attractive location for international
oil operators, the Agência Nacional de Petróleo, Gás e Biocombústiveis (ANPG) is to take over
responsibility from Sonangol for the management of Angola's oil and gas concessions by end-
2020. In October 2019 the ANPG launched Angola's first public tender of oil concessions since
2011, with international public tenders for the concession of 10 blocks in the Benguela and
Namibe basins. Awards are scheduled to be announced in January 2020. A further 40 blocks will
be auctioned off by 2025. With such little investment in recent years, oil production has dwindled
as existing wells mature. Exploratory activity from these new licensing rounds will take several
years to yield results, with production volumes set to increase from 2024.
In November Sonangol formed a consortium to explore natural gas off Angola's coast. The
commitment by several leading international operators is a signal of increased confidence in
Angola's energy sector, following a series of new reforms to facilitate investment, such as the
completion of a legal framework to support gas exploration, evaluation and production.
In December 2018 Angola secured a US$3.7bn loan from the IMF, forming a three-year
arrangement under the extended fund facility (EAEFF), with disbursements totalling US$1.48bn to
date. The programme constitutes a big vote of confidence in the Lourenço administration. Further
disbursements are expected in 2020, if Angola can keep to the reform schedule, as we expect it to.
Indeed, Mr Lourenço has demonstrated a strong appetite for sweeping changes, moving to
improve transparency in public contracts, undertake fiscal consolidation, and reform and
recapitalise the banking sector. We expect to see ongoing, gradual implementation of such
reforms. Long-term engagement with the Fund will require further implementation of tough reforms
to diversify the economy, boost fiscal sustainability and encourage foreign investment but, if
Mr Lourenço moves too fast, he is likely to create tensions within both the ruling elite and wider
society as entrenched interests are compromised. For example, a value-added tax (VAT) was
implemented in October, but had originally been scheduled to begin in January 2019, highlighting
weak government capacity (as well as inflation concerns). Nonetheless, the ongoing commitment
to the EAEFF will boost Angola’s credibility among international lenders and investors and has
the potential to unlock improved access to foreign funds.

Angola 7
Fiscal policy
We expect annual average Brent crude prices to slip to US$63/barrel in 2020 (from an average of
US$64/b in 2019). As hydrocarbons constitute a major source of fiscal receipts, this drop in prices,
combined with falling production volumes, will hit government revenue. We expect to see a
recovery in oil prices during 2021-23, although further production declines will offset much of this
gain in terms of revenue collection. However, some non-oil revenue gains from increased
economic activity outside the sector, combined with the imposition of new taxes such as VAT, will
lift the revenue/GDP ratio in the latter half of the forecast period, as will rising oil output from 2024.
Expenditure as a share of GDP will rise in 2020 as the government looks to support non-oil
economic activity and undertakes expansive social spending ahead of the local elections
scheduled in that year. The IMF has allowed the government to postpone scrapping fuel
subsidies before a new cash-transfer programme is in place to protect vulnerable households from
the effects of higher prices, limiting the scale of expenditure cuts that year. Debt-servicing remains
a significant component of spending as well. Nonetheless, still-weak revenue and tough Fund
loan conditions will preclude a significant spending hike.
In 2021 spending is expected to decline as the government undertakes some consolidation under
its IMF programme, and there are no elections in that year. We expect to see an uptick in spending
in 2022, owing to national elections, combined with greater fiscal space, owing to increased
revenue. During 2023-24 a fairly tight stance will be maintained, once the elections are concluded.
We expect a fiscal deficit of 0.7% of GDP in 2020 as spending increases while revenue falls. In
2021 we expect the fiscal deficit to narrow to 0.4% of GDP as the government undertakes some
fiscal consolidation, combined with increased revenue from recovering global oil prices. The
deficit will widen to 1.7% of GDP in 2022, owing to higher spending ahead of the national election
in that year. As fiscal consolidation resumes, the fiscal deficit will narrow to an average of 1.3% of
GDP in 2024. The fiscal deficit will be financed largely through external borrowing.
Monetary policy
In May 2019 the Banco Nacional de Angola (BNA, the central bank) cut the reference rate to
15.5%, from 15.75% previously. An easier stance was encouraged by diminishing (although still
high) inflation over 2019. Inflation will pick up pace in 2020 as the kwanza remains weak but we
expect rates to remain steady as the authorities will be keen to bolster still relatively weak
underlying economic growth, particularly in the non-oil economy, and price growth will remain
below the highs of 2016-17. Inflation will moderate during 2021-24, creating space for renewed rate
cuts as the authorities remain keen to support economic activity.
International assumptions
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Economic growth (%)
US GDP 2.3 1.7 1.8 2.0 1.8 2.2
OECD GDP 1.6 1.5 1.8 1.9 1.8 2.0
World GDP 2.3 2.4 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.9
World trade 1.5 2.3 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.8
Inflation indicators (% unless otherwise indicated)
US CPI 1.8 1.6 1.9 2.1 1.8 1.8
OECD CPI 1.9 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.0
Manufactures (measured in US$) -0.1 1.9 4.0 4.1 3.5 3.1
Oil (Brent; US$/b) 64.0 63.0 67.0 71.0 73.8 71.0
Non-oil commodities (measured in US$) -6.6 0.8 3.9 1.8 0.9 2.5
Financial variables
US$ 3-month commercial paper rate (av; %) 2.2 1.5 1.5 1.8 2.2 2.3
Exchange rate US$:€ (av) 1.12 1.13 1.16 1.21 1.24 1.24

Angola 8
Economic growth
Angola's economic prospects remain poor, with a three-year recession forecast to continue for a
fourth year in 2020. Oil output continues to decline—estimated by the government at 1.389m
barrels per day (b/d) in 2019, below the current OPECimposed cap of 1.481m b/d—owing to
maturing fields and a lack of investment in recent years. We expect oil output to decline further in
2020 as these dynamics continue and global prices weaken. As a consequence, we expect real
GDP to contract by 1.3% in 2020 as exports drop, and low oil revenue weighs on government
spending, while tight credit conditions constrain private consumption and investment.
We forecast that real GDP growth will average 3% a year in 2021-23, driven by resurgent growth in
agriculture, mining, construction, manufacturing and services as monetary policy loosens and the
government continues to support the non-oil economy. Hydrocarbons output levels from
maturing oilfields will continue to dwindle, however.
Following the launch in October of the first public tender for oil concessions since 2011,
exploration activity in deep and ultra-deep waters will begin in early 2020. Such exploratory
activity will take several years to yield higher oil output, but we expect production volumes to
increase from 2024. We forecast real GDP growth of 5.9% in that year.
Ongoing moves to attract investment and reduce cronyism are encouraging, but further efforts to
tackle corruption, poor regulation and the crowding-out of private investment by the public sector
are necessary to generate significant gains in real GDP. Nevertheless, fixed investment—
predominantly into the oil industry, but also elsewhere, following the privatisation of some SOEs
—will grow from 2020 (although remaining relatively limited throughout the forecast period). A
key barrier to structural reform has been the stranglehold that the political elite has on the
economy, resisting changes to reduce transparency and opportunities for rent-seeking.
Nonetheless, declining oil activity will necessitate more meaningful reforms to attract investment
into the non-oil economy.
Economic growth
% 2019a 2020b 2021b 2022b 2023b 2024b
GDP -3.3 -1.3 2.3 3.2 3.5 5.9
Private consumption -0.5 -1.0 2.3 4.2 4.3 4.5
Government consumption -0.5 2.5 3.8 4.2 4.0 4.8
Gross fixed investment 6.5 7.0 6.0 6.0 7.0 7.5
Exports of goods & services -15.0 -7.3 0.8 1.0 0.2 6.7
Imports of goods & services -1.0 2.0 5.5 6.0 5.5 6.0
Domestic demand 1.7 2.1 3.8 4.8 5.2 5.6
Agriculture -4.1 -2.0 3.2 4.5 4.4 5.4
Industry -3.5 -2.6 1.6 4.3 2.9 6.2
Services -1.9 -1.3 4.0 4.8 4.7 6.0
Inflation
We forecast that inflation will increase to an average of 21.3% in 2020 (up from an estimated
average of 17.3% in 2019), driven by sustained weakness of the kwanza amid lower oil exports
(and US dollar availability) and the introduction in October of VAT, initially at 14%, as well as a
tariff hike as part of a reduction in electricity subsidies. From 2021 the slower rate of depreciation
of the kwanza will lead to a broad downwards trend in inflation, although the eventual reduction in
a number of subsidies will keep prices elevated. We forecast that annual average inflation will
decline to 10.4% in 2023-24.

Angola 9
Exchange rates
In October the BNA adopted a more flexible exchange-rate strategy in a bid to reduce the spread
between the official and parallel-market rates. The BNA now allows the currency to trade more
freely at some auctions, compared with a 2% trading band previously. As a result of this new
policy, the kwanza depreciated by about 31% against the US dollar in October. We forecast an
average rate of KZ510.5:US$1 in 2020 (from KZ366:US$1 in 2019) as inflation remains elevated,
combined with lower revenue from crude exports and still-limited investment into the country.
As economic activity picks up from 2021, the rate of depreciation will be relatively slow. In
addition, increased export revenue (from rising crude prices) will lead to improved dollar
availability, and investment inflows will rise for oil exploration. We forecast an average exchange
rate of Kz524.1:US$1 in 2021, weakening to Kz555.3:US$1 in 2024.
External sector
Declining oil production and a further drop in global crude prices will lead to a fall in exports in
2020. Exports are expected to recover from 2021 as oil prices rise—although revenue gains will be
constrained by falling production volumes until 2024—with some additional support coming from
growth in non-oil commodity exports (such as gas and diamonds). A small uptick in oil output
volumes in 2024 will boost earnings again, although prices are expected to dip slightly.
In 2020 we expect to see a small increase in imports as the oil industry attracts more investment,
thereby necessitating imported equipment, although domestic demand will remain weak and
sustained kwanza weakness raises prices in local-currency terms. Imports will continue to rise
over the forecast period—as reform efforts attract further investment, and oil exploration resurges
—and consumer demand picks up. In all, low oil prices and falling output volumes throughout
2020-23, relative to historical levels, mean that the trade surplus/GDP ratio will narrow gradually,
before widening in 2024 as exports tick up.
The services deficit as a share of GDP will shrink from 2020 as service imports decrease. The
primary income deficit will shrink as a percentage of GDP over the forecast period owing to a
reduction in the net flow of company profits out of the country, combined with a gradual rise in
inward investment. The secondary income account will remain in deficit, as remittance flows are
limited.
Overall, from 2020 the current account is expected to swing into a deficit of 0.8% of GDP as oil
revenue falls over the course of the year. The deficit will widen to 2.3% of GDP in 2021, before
widening to 3.3% of GDP in 2022 and 4.3% of GDP in 2023 as the slow recovery in exports is
outpaced by rising import needs. The deficit will narrow to 3.8% in 2024 as exports increase at a
faster rate, given the increase in oil production.

Angola 10
Forecast summary
Forecast summary
(% unless otherwise indicated)
2019a 2020b 2021b 2022b 2023b 2024b
Real GDP growth -3.3 -1.3 2.3 3.2 3.5 5.9
Crude oil production ('000 b/d) 1,389 1,300 1,200 1,150 1,100 1,220
Consumer price inflation (av) 17.3 21.3 16.3 13.1 10.8 10.4
Consumer price inflation (end-period) 17.3 21.3 13.5 12.0 10.4 10.4
Lending rate (av) 19.0 19.0 18.0 17.4 17.0 16.0
Government balance (% of GDP) 0.7 -0.7 -0.4 -1.7 -1.4 -1.3
Exports of goods fob (US$ bn) 34.7 32.1 32.4 32.7 32.7 34.9
Imports of goods fob (US$ bn) 15.6 16.0 16.8 17.8 18.8 20.0
Current-account balance (US$ bn) 2.3 -0.6 -1.8 -3.0 -4.4 -4.4
Current-account balance (% of GDP) 2.8 -0.8 -2.3 -3.3 -4.3 -3.8
External debt (end-period; US$ bn) 54.6 56.3 56.8 60.4 62.8 64.3
Exchange rate Kz:US$ (end-period) 489.4 514.9 526.9 539.6 548.9 558.3
Exchange rate Kz:¥100 (av) 337.4 481.5 500.5 531.3 559.2 581.9
Exchange rate Kz:€ (av) 410.0 574.3 606.7 645.6 675.6 688.5

Angola 11
Data and charts

Annual data and forecast
2015a 2016a 2017a 2018a 2019b 2020c 2021c
Gross domestic product
Nominal GDP (US$ m) 116,194 101,124 122,124 105,751 80,306 70,139 79,060
Nominal GDP (Kz bn) 13,950 16,550 20,262 26,740 29,394 35,808 41,436
Real GDP growth (%) 0.9 -2.6 -0.1 -2.1 -3.3 -1.3 2.3
Expenditure on GDP (% real change)
Private consumption 3.0 5.9 2.9 -8.0b -0.5 -1.0 2.3
Government consumption -8.8 -10.5 0.3 -7.0b -0.5 2.5 3.8
Gross fixed investment -1.9 -19.5 3.0 -6.0b 6.5 7.0 6.0
Exports of goods & services -14.7 -18.4 24.5 2.5b -15.0 -7.3 0.8
Imports of goods & services -23.9 -24.7 11.2 3.0b -1.0 2.0 5.5
Origin of GDP (% real change)
Agriculture 1.0 -2.0 -1.4 -1.0b -4.1 -2.0 3.2
Industry 0.9 0.5 1.0 -2.0b -3.5 -2.6 1.6
Services 1.0 -5.0 -1.0 -2.0b -1.9 -1.3 4.0
Population and income
Population (m) 27.9 28.8b 29.8b 30.8b 31.8 32.9 33.9
GDP per head (US$ at PPP) 7,097 6,757b 6,651b 6,441b 6,171 6,005 6,066
Fiscal indicators (% of GDP)
Central government budget revenue 29.0b 27.8b 28.9b 34.8b 32.8 32.2 32.1
Central government budget expenditure 34.0b 33.1b 34.3b 35.5b 32.1 32.9 32.5
Central government budget balance -5.0b -5.3b -5.4b -0.7b 0.7 -0.7 -0.4
Net public debt 64.2 86.1b 72.9b 90.2b 91.9 90.8 90.6
Prices and financial indicators
Exchange rate Kz:US$ (end-period) 135.32 165.90 165.92 308.61 489.44 514.90 526.85
Exchange rate Kz:¥ (endperiod) 1.13 1.42 1.47 2.81 4.60 4.85 5.14
Consumer prices (end-period; % change) 14.3 41.9 26.3 18.2 17.3 21.3 13.5
Stock of money M1 (% change) 10.4 12.7 -3.2 9.5 25.1 1.9 0.2
Stock of money M2 (% change) 11.8 14.4 -0.1 20.4 33.6 0.8 4.3
Lending interest rate (av; %) 16.9 15.8 15.8 20.7 19.0 19.0 18.0
Current account (US$ m)
Trade balance 12,489 14,548 20,150 24,960 19,015 16,165 15,529
Goods: exports fob 33,181 27,589 34,613 40,758 34,655 32,117 32,359
Goods: imports fob -20,693 -13,041 -14,463 -15,798 -15,640 -15,953 -16,830
Services balance -16,020 -11,906 -12,809 -9,458 -7,756 -7,392 -7,664
Income balance -5,908 -5,274 -7,506 -7,830 -8,538 -8,978 -9,339
Current transfers balance -833.9 -454.3 -468.8 -269.4 -464.8 -357.4 -309.1
Current-account balance -10,273 -3,085 -633 7,403 2,257 -562 -1,784
External debt (US$ m)
Debt stock 56,272 57,168 52,617 54,563 54,573 56,328 56,764
Debt service paid 7,852 9,626 9,181 9,177 15,872 9,062 12,186
Principal repayments 6,362 7,790 8,027 6,783 13,850 7,176 10,392
Interest 1,490 1,836 1,154 2,394 2,023 1,886 1,794
Debt service due 7,852 9,626 9,181 9,177 15,872 9,062 12,187
International reserves (US$ m)
Total international reserves 23,791 23,672 17,455 15,411 13,500 10,891 10,278
a Actual. b Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. c Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts.
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Angola 12
Quarterly data
2017 2018 2019
4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr
Prices
Consumer prices (2005=100) 193.4 201.1 210.5 218.0 228.9 237.2 244.9 254.9
Consumer prices (% change, year on year) 24.9 21.7 20.7 18.9 18.3 17.9 16.3 16.9
Financial indicators
Exchange rate Kz:US$ (av) 165.92 204.45 231.05 268.60 307.33 313.37 328.50 357.95
Exchange rate Kz:US$ (end-period) 165.92 214.12 249.26 294.47 308.61 318.12 340.27 378.03
Deposit rate (av; %) 6.9 6.4 7.2 6.9 7.0 6.8 6.3 5.9
Lending rate (av; %) 16.5 19.2 22.3 21.0 20.2 19.7 21.1 18.7
3-month money market rate (av; %) 18.9 19.9 19.9 17.0 17.1 16.4 15.9 14.6
M1 (end-period; Kz bn) 3,732.23,873.6 3,808.1 3,868.8 4,086.8 4,275.6 4,294.5 4,375.8
M1 (% change, year on year) -3.2 7.1 3.9 3.0 9.5 10.4 12.8 13.1
M2 (end-period; Kz bn) 6,517.76,986.2 7,323.4 7,691.5 7,844.6 7,961.1 8,181.0 8,730.8
M2 (% change, year on year) -0.1 11.5 15.2 20.3 20.4 14.0 11.7 13.5
Sectoral trends
Crude oil production (m barrels/day)a 1.62 1.55 1.49 1.48 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Foreign payments (US$ m)
Reserves excl gold (end-period) 17,455 16,968 17,192 15,759 15,410 15,025 15,188 14,473
a Including production in Cabinda.
Sources: Banco Nacional de Angola; International Energy Agency, Oil Market Report; IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Angola 13
Monthly data
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Exchange rate Kz:US$ (av)
2017 165.9 165.9 165.9 165.9 165.9 165.9 165.9 165.9 165.9 165.9 165.9 165.9
2018 189.0 210.2 214.1 218.3 232.6 242.2 253.2 266.6 286.0 303.1 310.0 308.9
2019 310.3 313.7 316.2 319.4 327.4 338.6 346.3 359.8 367.8 n/a n/a n/a
Exchange rate Kz:US$ (end-period)
2017 165.9 165.9 165.9 165.9 165.9 165.9 165.9 165.9 165.9 165.9 165.9 165.9
2018 207.5 213.1 214.1 226.0 239.4 249.3 257.0 276.3 294.5 307.9 310.5 308.6
2019 312.3 314.2 318.1 323.1 330.5 340.3 349.6 362.0 378.0 n/a n/a n/a
Deposit rate (av; %)
2017 5.9 5.8 6.0 6.1 6.4 6.2 6.0 6.3 6.5 6.8 6.8 7.3
2018 6.2 6.6 6.4 7.0 7.5 7.2 7.0 7.1 6.7 7.4 6.7 6.8
2019 6.9 6.9 6.8 6.4 6.6 6.1 6.0 6.3 5.4 6.3 n/a n/a
Lending rate (av; %)
2017 15.2 15.3 15.4 15.8 15.7 15.7 15.7 15.9 15.5 15.5 15.3 18.6
2018 13.1 19.9 24.6 23.9 20.8 22.4 22.2 19.6 21.0 20.1 20.7 19.8
2019 20.5 17.5 21.2 21.2 18.7 23.3 18.9 18.8 18.5 18.8 n/a n/a
M1 (% change, year on year)
2017 1.9 -3.4 -6.6 -4.7 -11.2 -8.2 -10.5 -4.7 -3.4 -7.4 -6.1 -3.2
2018 0.8 4.4 7.1 0.8 6.7 3.9 6.7 1.6 3.0 8.0 9.2 9.5
2019 6.9 7.8 10.4 13.2 10.4 12.8 14.5 23.3 n/a n/a n/a n/a
M2 (% change, year on year)
2017 6.5 4.1 -0.6 -0.8 -3.5 -3.2 -5.0 -2.4 -2.2 -2.5 -1.1 -0.1
2018 8.0 10.7 11.5 11.2 15.7 15.2 16.4 16.7 20.3 23.5 24.4 20.4
2019 12.0 11.7 14.0 13.1 10.7 11.7 13.7 17.0 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Consumer prices (av; % change, year on year)
2017 40.4 39.5 37.9 36.3 34.1 31.9 29.0 27.0 27.5 29.0 27.6 26.3
2018 25.1 23.4 22.3 21.3 20.6 20.2 19.5 19.0 19.2 17.4 17.8 18.2
2019 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Total exports fob (US$ m)
2017 2,784 2,806 2,694 2,777 2,730 2,570 2,548 2,782 3,011 n/a n/a n/a
Foreign-exchange reserves excl gold (US$ m)
2017 21,962 23,293 21,615 20,972 20,368 19,105 20,818 18,944 18,469 18,587 17,557 16,969
2018 16,532 16,291 16,470 15,864 17,739 16,711 17,200 15,909 15,282 15,007 15,226 14,940
2019 15,411 14,737 14,558 15,074 14,592 14,727 14,363 14,724 14,015 n/a n/a n/a
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; Haver Analytics.

Angola 14
Annual trends charts

Angola 15
Monthly trends charts

Angola 16
Comparative economic indicators
Basic data
Land area
1,246,700 sq km
Population
29.8m (2017)
Main towns
Angola 17
Population estimates in ’000 (2009, Ministério da Administração do Território)
Luanda (capital): 4,500
Lubango: 1,011
Huambo: 904
Lobito: 737
Benguela: 469
KuitoBié: 424
Cabinda City: 399
Climate
Tropical and humid in the north, subtropical with lower rainfall in the south; temperatures are
lower and rainfall higher in the central plateau than in the coastal lowlands; the rainy season lasts
from October to April; the dry season is from May to September
Weather in Luanda (altitude sea level)

Hottest months, FebruaryMarch, average maximum temperature 28°C; coldest months, July
August, average minimum temperature 23°C; average annual rainfall about 400 mm
Language
Portuguese (official), Umbundu, Kimbundu, Kikongo and other Bantu-group languages
Measures
Metric system
Currency
Kwanza (Kz); in January 2018 the central bank abandoned the peg to the US dollar and moved to
an auction-based system; the currency subsequently declined, from Kz165.9:US$1 in December
2017 to Kz308.6:US$1 at the end of December 2018
Time
1 hour ahead of GMT
Public holidays
New Year’s Day (January 1st), Liberation Day (February 4th), Women’s Day (March 8th), Peace
Day (April 4th), Labour Day (May 1st), National Heroes Day (September 17th), All Souls’ Day
(November 2nd), Independence Day (November 11th), Christmas (December 25th and 26th)
Movable: Good Friday, Easter Monday

Angola 18
Political structure
Official name
República de Angola
Form of state
Angola 19
Unitary republic
Legal system
Based on the new constitution implemented in February 2010
National legislature
Assembleia Nacional (parliament), with 220 seats
National elections
August 23rd 2017 (legislative); the presidential election was abolished under the 2010
constitution, with the leader of the party with the most parliamentary seats automatically
becoming president; the next legislative election is scheduled for 2022
Head of state
President: João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço (came to power in September 2017)
National government
The government is composed exclusively of members of the ruling Movimento Popular de
Libertação de Angola (MPLA); the office of the presidency operates parallel power structures that
are generally independent of parliament and government
Main political parties

The MPLA has an absolute majority in parliament, with 150 seats; the main opposition party, the
União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), has 51 seats; the remaining 19
seats are divided between three smaller parties
Key ministers
President & head of government: João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço
Vice-president: Bornito de Sousa
Agriculture & forestry: António Francisco de Assis
Construction & public works: Manuel Tavares de Almeida
Defence: Salviano de Jesus Sequeira
Economy & planning: Pedro Luís da Fonseca
Education: Ana Paula Tuavanje Elias
Electricity & water: João Baptista Borges
Environment: Paula Cristina Francisco Coelho
Finance: Vera Esperança dos Santos Daves
Foreign affairs: Manuel Domingos Augusto
Health: Silvia Paula Valentim Lutucuta
Hotels & tourism: Maria Ângela Teixeira de Alva Sequeira Bragança
Housing: Ana Paula de Carvalho
Interior: Eugénio Laborinho
Media: João da Silva Melo
Mineral resources & oil: Diamantino Pedro Azevedo
Public administration, work & social security: António Rodrigues Afonso Paulo
Telecoms & IT: José Carvalho da Rocha
Territory & state reform: Adão de Almeida
Angola 20
Trade: Joffre VanDúnem Júnior
Transport: Ricardo de Abreu
Minister of state for economic & social development: Manuel José Nunes Júnior
Minister of state and chief of security in the presidency: Pedro Sebastião
Central bank governor

José de Lima Massano

Angola 21
Recent analysis
Generated on January 28th 2020
The following articles were published on our website in the period between our previous forecast and this one,
and serve here as a review of the developments that shaped our outlook.
Politics
Forecast updates
WTO's dispute-settlement mechanism collapses
December 11, 2019: International relations
Event
On December 10th two of the three remaining judges on the appellate body of the World Trade
Organisation (WTO)—the main disputesettlement body of that institution—retired from service.
As a minimum quorum of three judges is required for the appellate body to function, the event
effectively marked the collapse of the WTO's dispute-settlement mechanism.
Analysis
The US has had long-standing grievances with the appellate body (and the WTO more generally),
even in the face of several WTO cases that it has won recently. These objections also predated
the administration of Donald Trump, the current US president.
US concerns over the role of the appellate body—including allegations that it had overstepped its
jurisdiction—arose during the presidency of George W Bush (200008), whose administration took
issue with the body's findings that the US methodology for calculating anti-dumping and
countervailing duties (a controversial practice known as "zeroing") were not WTO-compliant.
This attitude hardened under the presidency of Barack Obama (2008-12), who blocked the
reappointment of two appellate body judges (and obstructed consensus over the appointment of
a third) during his time in office.
Mr Trump has since maintained this strategy of blocking appointments. The Economist
Intelligence Unit had expected this outcome because of the president's long-harboured hostility
towards the WTO. However, the collapse of the dispute-settlement mechanism will not
immediately spell doom for either the WTO itself or the future of global commerce. We continue to
expect global trade growth (by volume) to rebound modestly into positive territory in 2020, as the
world acclimatises to the "new normal" of US-China economic tension and trade demand
stabilises across major markets.
Nevertheless, the dissolution of the WTO's main dispute-settlement mechanism will erode
important constraints on protectionist bad behaviour. There is now a growing risk that the lack of
an international arbiter will allow both existing and future trade disputes to escalate more quickly.
This will be particularly critical as the US-China trade war persists into 2020, while emerging
disputes elsewhere—such as between South Korea and Japan, France and the US and the EU and
Malaysia—weigh on the prospects of trade liberalisation more generally. Without the appellate
body, these and other potential trade conflicts will continue to cast a shadow over world trade
next year.
Impact on the forecast

We had anticipated that the WTO appellate body would cease to function by December, and have
already built this event into our forecasts from 2020 onwards.
Analysis

Angola 22
Trial of former president's son finally begins

December 16, 2019
On December 9th the eldest son of Angola's former president (19792017), José Eduardo dos
Santos, went on trial in the capital, Luanda, for fraud, money-laundering and influence-
peddling. The charges against José Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos—known in Angola by the
nickname "Zenu"—relate to an allegedly fraudulent US$500m bank transfer made in 2017,
just after his father left office, having ruled Angola for nearly 40 years. Zenu is the highest-
profile figure to appear in court on corruption charges since João Lourenço took over the
presidency. Whatever its outcome, the trial is an important test for the president's apparent
commitment to curbing corruption and reforming and opening up the Angolan economy, which
has long been held in a stranglehold by the politically connected elite.
Zenu was put in charge of the country's sovereign wealth fund (SWF), the Fundo Soberano de
Angola (FSDEA), by his father in 2013, but was sacked in January 2018 by Mr Lourenço. A few
months later, Zenu was detained on corruption charges and spent six months in custody, before
being put under home detention in March 2019.
On trial
The 41-year-old is jointly accused with Valter Filipe da Silva, the former governor of Angola's
central bank (Banco Nacional de Angola, BNA), and two others. They deny all charges. It is
alleged that in 2017 they made a fraudulent transfer of US$500m to a Credit Suisse bank account in
the UK, money that was later returned to Angola by the British authorities. The Supreme Court
trial had been due to begin in September, but was delayed for procedural reasons. On the opening
day of the trial, the defence claimed that the former president authorised the transfer, which was
supposedly related to a proposed US$30bn strategic investment fund, raising the possibility that
the 77-year-old would be called to court to give evidence during the trial. However, given that the
former statesman is currently based overseas and is in poor health, he will instead be asked to
provide a written submission.
Witch hunt?
Zenu told the court that he was only on trial because of who his father was. This echoes claims
from some of his siblings, Isabel and Welwitschia José, that the family is being subjected to a
political witch hunt by the new government.
It is true that, since taking office, Mr Lourenço has moved decisively to purge dos Santos
loyalists from his government in order to reduce his predecessor's influence and cement his
authority over the ruling MPLA and the country as a whole. He has fired police chiefs, media
bosses, military and intelligence figures; brought in new leadership at all state-owned entities;
and, through successive reshuffles, systematically removed nearly all cabinet ministers who
served under the former president, replacing them with younger technocrats.
The former defence minister, who was handpicked by Mr dos Santos and initially expected to be a
puppet of the long-time leader, has also sought to weaken the grip of his predecessor's children,
who occupied a number of key roles within government and business, as well as the media and
the arts. Just weeks after being sworn in, he sacked Isabel from the board of state-owned oil
company, Sonangol, and has since issued several presidential decrees revoking various
government contracts previously awarded to her businesses. In November the ruling MPLA
ejected Welwitschia from its central committee following a disciplinary process begun in June and,
earlier, the government abruptly cancelled a longstanding contract for the running of state-owned
television channel, TPA 2, which Welwitschia held through a production company she ran with
another brother, José Eduardo Paulino dos Santos, known as Coréon Dú.
Curbing corruption
During his election campaign, Mr Lourenço pledged to tackle graft and weed out dishonest
officials from public service. Few expected much from the 65-year-old. Mr dos Santos himself had
famously declared "zero tolerance on corruption" some years earlier—but the new president has
surprised even his staunchest critics with his apparent zeal for cleaning up the country, long
ranked among the world's most corrupt by international watchdogs.

Angola 23
Mr Lourenço has followed up his speeches with new judicial bodies, such as a dedicated anti-
corruption unit within the office of the public prosecutor. And, in November, the National
Assembly passed new anti-money-laundering legislation, which includes a clear definitions of so-
called "politically exposed persons" (PEPs). All holders of public office, including government
ministers, diplomats, senior members of the judiciary, high-ranking military and police officers,
board members of public companies, local authority employees and religious figures, and their
relatives (up to the third generation) will now be considered PEPs. This is significant for a country
where the political elite has corruptly dominated business transactions for decades.
Corruption has spread at the highest level

In addition to Zenu, a number of other highranking figures—including exministers and senior
military figures— have been charged (and in some cases already convicted) on graftrelated
charges since Mr Lourenço came to power. In August, for example, former transport minister,
Augusto da Silva Tomás, was jailed for 14 years after being found guilty of embezzlement and
other graft-related crime. Others facing criminal action include: the one-time governor of Luanda
and ex-public works minister, Higino Carneiro, charged in relation to his alleged mismanagement of
public funds; and former fisheries minister, Vitória de Barros Neto, who was fired by Mr Lourenço
in January, and is now, according to state media, being probed over her alleged role in a bribery
scandal with Iceland's biggest fishing company that has led to six arrests in neighbouring
Namibia.
However, although there has been no shortage of reports about criminal probes, questions do
remain about the capacity of the underfunded and understaffed police service and judiciary to
deliver thorough and fair investigations and trials. There have already been some high-profile
acquittals and several concerns about claimed procedural inadequacies.
The former spokesman for the ruling Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA),
Norberto Garcia, for example, was cleared in April of his alleged involvement in a fraudulent
US$50bn financing scheme involving a Thai business consortium. Subsequently, in December,
the Supreme Court reduced Mr Tomas's sentence to eight years and four months on appeal, citing
procedural irregularities and the consideration given for his years of public service.
Test cases
Moreover, there is still no news about when (and if) former vice-president, Manuel Vicente, will
stand trial. The one-time Sonangol chairman was charged with corruption and money-laundering
in Portugal, allegations he denies. Under the terms of a judicial accord between members of the
Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (Community of PortugueseSpeaking Countries),
the case was transferred back to Luanda in 2018, ending a diplomatic impasse between Angola
and Portugal.
Mr Vicente, once a confidant of Mr dos Santos who was tipped as his successor, is reported to be
back working in government, albeit behind the scenes, as a reward for switching his allegiances to
Mr Lourenço. How his case is handled going forwards, and the outcome of this case with Mr dos
Santos's son and the former central bank governor—the first to solicit direct testimony from the
former president—present an important test for Angola and the credibility of Mr Lourenço's anti
corruption commitments.
Protests in Sub-Saharan Africa

December 31, 2019
Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced its fair share of the mass protests that have erupted across
the world in 2019. The affected countries vary considerably in terms of their economic structure
and stage of development, political set-up and social fabric. Large mobilisations have occurred in
Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Africa,
Cameroon and Nigeria, to name a few. The protests have been triggered by highly localised
events and have differed from place to place in their participants, methods and goals. Despite
these differences, there are some common underlying causes that unite the protests and present
serious challenges for incumbent African leaders and their administrations as we head
into 2020.

Angola 24
Various highly localised factors have triggered uprisings in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2019, which
include rapidly rising bread prices in Sudan, planned redundancies and xenophobia in South
Africa, disputed election results in Mozambique, attacks by armed militias in the DRC and the
attempted arrest of activists in Ethiopia. In most cases, these triggers have been a tipping point
whereby localised single-issue demonstrations have escalated into much larger and broader anti-
government protests. Protests in many countries have reflected a view that governments are self-
serving institutions that have been either unable or unwilling to tackle sensitive issues relating to
economic need and opportunity, political oppression and freedoms, as well as poor governance
and corruption. These concerns have been on clear display during the protests witnessed in Sub-
Saharan Africa during 2019.
Economic need and opportunity represent an over-riding yet multi-faceted driver of anti-
government sentiment and mass protests across Sub-Saharan Africa. The region boasts some of
the fastest-growing economies in the world, abundant and lucrative natural resources, enormous
and youthful populations, an expanding urban middle class, strengthening trade linkages and
strong inflows of foreign capital. However, many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa retain severe
income inequality, widespread poverty, high levels of unemployment (particularly among youths)
and informal and insecure employment and often inadequate social safety net programmes.

Angola 25
Many countries (especially the region's major oil, gas and mining nations such as South Africa,
Nigeria, Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, the DRC and Sierra Leone) have struggled to cope with
the downturn in commodity prices since 2014. The pre-2014 boom years have given way to more
subdued growth rates in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, large fiscal and current-account
deficits, rising debt levels, weak currencies and rapidly rising living costs. These developments
have restricted the room for manoeuvre for some governments, led to a shift towards fiscal
austerity, compounded poor public service provision and undermined job creation.
A toxic combination of high unemployment, the threat of job losses and the prevalence of
insecure employment is an incendiary mix that has fuelled a wave of protests across Sub-Saharan
Africa. Job-creation and household income stimulus programmes have been on the front burner
for some time, but the region remains plagued by very high levels of general unemployment and
much higher unemployment rates among the region's youths in the 15-24-year-old bracket.
Meeting the demands of a rapidly increasing supply of youthful, urban, better educated and
aspirational labour is proving to be a major headache for many governments. In addition to job
creation, an additional and equally important problem is posed by the type of jobs on offer. A
large majority of jobs in Sub-Saharan Africa (whether these are in the formal sector or much larger
informal sector) provide insecure employment that entails low levels of pay, little to no job
security and limited access to social protections.
Another facet of economic need that has unsettled citizens and brought them out on to the streets

Angola 26
relates to widespread poverty, extreme income inequality and in some cases a long history of
economic marginalisation. The UN reported that ten of the world's 19 most unequal countries
measured on income distribution were found in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2017, and this regional
profile is unlikely to have changed much in the subsequent two years. South Africa, the region's
most developed economy, was ranked as the world's most unequal country in 2017, and Namibia,
Zambia, the Central African Republic, Lesotho, Mozambique, Botswana, eSwatini, Guinea-Bissau
and the Republic of Congo were also among the top 20 most income unequal nations worldwide.
Concerns about income inequality and its drivers, as well as economic marginalisation, have
proved highly contentious issues. For instance, mass protests by the Oromo and Amhara people
of Ethiopia and the anglophone communities of western Cameroon are linked to a combination of
low living standards, economic marginalisation and political exclusion. Similarly, the
demonstrations that led to the removal of the long-standing president of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, in
April have close links to many years of economic woes, extreme poverty and unequal opportunity
in wealth creation and political influence. Even in South Africa, the region's most diverse
economy, large-scale protests have been driven by major societal inequalities and the demands
for better living standards, as well as rampant corruption and poor public service delivery.
Political oppression and the lack of political freedoms have played a central role in driving angry
anti-government protests in Sub-Saharan Africa during 2019. Major political grievances relate to
disillusionment with long-standing, difficult to displace incumbent national leaders and their
political parties. Elections have become more common across Sub-Saharan Africa over the past
decade, but the region has some of the world's longest-serving heads of state and governing
political parties, as well as the highest number of authoritarian and hybrid regimes of any major
region in the world.

Angola 27
Public protests have contributed to a change in national leader in countries such as South Africa,
Angola, Ethiopia, the DRC and Sudan over the past 12 months, but the dominant political party
retains a tight grip on power. Political inertia and concentrated political power and influence
remain major sources of public discontent and social unrest. Rapidly growing internet coverage
and mobile networks in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa have facilitated the spread of information
within countries and across borders. This evolving infrastructure, together with the quick uptake
of social media and 24-hour news coverage, has helped mobilisations in one location to feed
discontent and unrest elsewhere. Some African governments are fully aware of the threat posed
by uncontrolled media outlets and have taken steps to reassert their grip on available information
and key messaging. Some governments have clamped down on press freedoms, curtailed internet
access and outlawed opposition groups. An international digital rights advocacy organisation,
Access Now, has reported that there were 13 nationwide internet shutdowns across Africa in
2018, and this has been followed by new or continued shutdowns in Algeria, Ethiopia, Chad,
Liberia, Malawi, Sudan and Zimbabwe in 2019. In addition to this, some governments are levying
internet usage or social media taxes that have the (probably intended) consequence of in effect
restricting access to or dissemination of information online. These tactics often run in parallel with
state-sponsored media plans that push favoured lines and information or disinformation as
claimed by some opposition groups. The success of these tactics tends to be short-lived and do
little to quell the lingering feelings of resentment among activists and the wider population.
Indeed, restricted freedom of speech and a lack of accountability among national governments
have often served to incite further unrest and demonstrations.
Steady emergence of new leaders brings hope for

change
A new group of national leaders has recently taken up office in some of the region's major
economies, including Abiy Ahmed in Ethiopia, João Lourenço in Angola, Cyril Ramaphosa in
South Africa, Félix Tshisekedi in the DRC and Muhammadu Buhari in Nigeria. These leaders
represent a break from the past and have come to power on a platform of economic and social
reforms, promises to tackle corruption and commitments to resolve local conflicts. Long-standing
political parties remain in place, but there are some positive early signs of change. For instance,
Mr Ahmed is shaking up the political landscape in Ethiopia and received the Nobel Peace Prize
2019 for his efforts to resolve the longrunning border dispute with Eritrea. Mr Lourenço has
moved quickly to dismantle the power base of his predecessor, Mr Ramaphosa is pushing hard
with his economic and social reform agenda, and Mr Buhari is making some tentative steps
towards tackling insecurity and corruption.
However, expectations are running high, and any faltering in the speed or direction of progress
could quickly herald a new bout of disruptive protests and demonstrations. There is no doubt that
African leaders will continue to be confronted by the thorny issues of income inequality,
widespread poverty, high youth unemployment, job insecurity, poor public services, corruption
and cronyism, entrenched political systems and restricted civil freedoms, not to mention the brutal

Angola 28
effects of climate change. Anti-government mass protests will most certainly continue into 2020,
given the challenges that remain and the growing demands posed by youthful, better educated
and urbanised populations. The ride could easily become much bumpier in 2020.
Economy
Forecast updates
National airline to begin flights to Lagos
December 2, 2019: Policy trends
Event
Angola's state-owned airline, TAAG, is to begin flights from Luanda to Lagos in Nigeria.
Analysis
Due to begin in mid-December, this will be the first direct flight between two of the continent's
economic hubs. Until now, travellers have had to go via Johannesburg, Addis Ababa or Dubai. It
is a significant addition to TAAG's African route map, which also now includes Nairobi, Kinshasa,
Lusaka and Maputo, and should help to facilitate greater intra-African trade and attract new
private investment into Angola.
Nonetheless, while TAAG has been growing its domestic and regional reach, it has scaled back its
international services. In October the airline announced it would be suspending its twice-weekly
service to Rio de Janeiro owing to high costs and low passenger numbers, although its Sao Paulo
flights continue. There is also no longer a direct link between Luanda and London, following the
cancellation of the British Airways/TAAG codeshare service in 2018 and the connections to
Dubai and Madrid have also been stopped.
As with many African airlines, TAAG is struggling financially and it has been in the spotlight for
its safety record, although it is now authorised to fly in the EU, following the reversal of an earlier
ban. In 2014 the carrier agreed a deal with Dubai's flagship carrier, Emirates, which oversaw a major
restructuring programme to cut the Angolan company's debt and streamline its bloated
management structure. Despite its apparent success in reducing liabilities and improving
standards, the arrangement ended abruptly in 2017.
Now under new management, the airline remains heavily indebted and in September a threatened
strike by staff members was averted only at the 11th hour. TAAG, however, is among a number of
flagship Angolan entities earmarked for partprivatisation. In late 2018 Angola's president, João
Lourenço, changed the carrier's status from that of a public company to a public limited company,
opening the door for private buyers to take a stake in the troubled airline.

A direct flight between Luanda and Lagos will benefit both the Nigerian and Angolan economies,
but we expect that, during this forecast period, Angola's intra-African trade will remain in the
shadows of better established, longer-distance partnerships with countries such as China and
Portugal. Our forecasts, therefore, remain unchanged.

Angola 29
Anti-money-laundering legislation passed

Event
On November 20th Angola passed new anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism funding
(AML/CFT) legislation—the Lei de Prevenção e Combate ao Branqueamento de Capitais,
Financiamento do Terrorismo—replacing existing legislation that had been in place since 2011.
Angola
A key novelty is the legislation's clear definition of a so-called "politically exposed person" (PEP).
All holders of public office, including government ministers, diplomats, senior members of the
judiciary, high-ranking military and police officers, board members of public companies, local
authority employees and religious figures, and their relatives up to the third generation will now
be considered as PEPs.
This definition is in line with the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force, an inter-
governmental body that develops and promotes policies to combat money-laundering, and this
should help to clarify what for a long time has been a troubled grey area for investors seeking to
enter the Angolan market.
Passing this new legislation was a core condition of Angola's US$3.7bn extended fund facility
from the IMF. It should help to improve Angola's appeal to overseas investors, who are turned off
by compliance concerns, owing to the political connections of most of Angola's leading business
figures.
It is also a part of wider efforts by the government to reactivate US dollar correspondent banking
relationships, which were suspended by the Federal Reserve (the US central bank) in 2015, owing
to concerns about weak AML/CFT provisions. This exacerbated a shortage of foreign exchange
caused by a fall in the price of oil, which is Angola's main export commodity and source of
government revenue, and has played a role in the sharp devaluation of the kwanza.
Over the years, Angola has passed various pieces of legislation seeking to curb financial crime,
but few have been tested, owing to the weakness of the country's judicial apparatus and the
political connections of most of those alleged to be involved in graft. Since taking office in late
2017, however, the president, João Lourenço, has pledged to curb corruption, and a number of
high-ranking officials, including former ministers and relatives and allies of a former president,
José Eduardo dos Santos, have been investigated, charged and in some cases already sentenced
for corruption-related offences.

Although a positive development on paper, it remains to be seen how and if the new legislation
will be enforced. We therefore expect no immediate effects on our forecasts, which are unchanged.

Angola 30
No price relief in sight for Angola

December 11, 2019: Fiscal policy outlook
Event
Following the announcement of a further lowering of the collective output ceiling at the latest
OPEC meeting on December 5th, Angola's resources and petroleum minister, Diamantino
Azevedo, announced that Angola supports the maintenance of the curb on global output.
Analysis
Angola's current output ceiling, agreed with OPEC, is 1.48m barrels per day (b/d) (and was not
lowered at the most recent meeting). Output volumes in 2019 are estimated by the government at
1.389m b/d, however. Angola is the second-largest crude oil producer in Africa (after Nigeria) and
the seventh-largest within the OPEC cartel. However, from pumping close to an average of 2m b/d
back in 2008—when it was, briefly, Africa's leading producer—Angola will register its fifth
consecutive year of output decline in 2019. The drop is owing to a combination of maintenance
stoppages and maturing fields that are producing less oil. At the same time, lower global oil prices
since mid-2014 have made Angola's expensive deepwater concessions less attractive, prompting
international companies to cut back their operations and seek lower-hanging fruit elsewhere.
Following ongoing reform efforts led by the president, João Lourenço, a longawaited tender was
launched on October 2nd by the recently formed Agência Nacional de Petróleo, Gás e
Biocombústiveis (ANPG), which has taken over the role of concessionaire from the stateowned
oil company, Sonangol. The launch of this tender round is positive, but it will take some years for
new exploration to bear fruit and, in the medium term, the country's poor operating environment
and compliance concerns will continue to deter investors.
Mr Azevedo supports further reduction in global oil output, as he believes that "the cuts would
prompt a price hike in crude oil and provide more revenues for the country". However, immediate
market reaction to the OPEC announcement was muted—reflecting the fact that the participating
countries' current production is already roughly in line with the new limit and scepticism regarding
the promises made by perennial quota cheats to reform. The overall impact on prices is likely to be
limited—with the agreement doing more to redistribute the burden of the existing output
restrictions than to alter the overall level of production by the 24 adherents to the agreement.

Hydrocarbons constitute a major source of fiscal receipts. Sustained weakness in prices,
combined with falling production volumes, will be a hit to government revenue. Our forecasts,
therefore, remain unchanged.

Angola 31
Luanda real-estate prices drop further

December 11, 2019: Economic growth
Event
Real-estate prices in the Angolan capital, Luanda, have continued to fall, according to a new
study, reflecting the weak economy and an exodus of expatriate workers.
Analysis
New research from an Angolan property consultancy, Zenki Real Estate, paints a gloomy picture
of the country's housing, office and retail market, with prices down by as much as 80% in some
areas, compared with five years ago.
According to the study, in 2015 renting a one-bedroom apartment in the city centre cost as much
as US$12,000/month. Today, similar apartments are available for as little as US$1,200/month. Sale
values have also fallen sharply across the city, although prices in the newly built upmarket suburb
of Talatona have picked up, especially for large three- and four-bedroom properties, representing
a possible green shoot of recovery.
The government has also reduced the cost of its property stock in the capital. In early December it
announced that the next batch of units to be made available during the second phase of the
Chinese-built Kilamba estate will be made available at US$115/sq metre, down from US$214/sq
metre in 2015. Units in the nearby Sequele development will be sold at US$45/sq metre, down from
US$90/sq metre at the most recent auction.
The downward spiral of prices reflects the general stagnation of Angola's economy, owing to the
low price of oil. Multinational companies in both the oil and the non-oil sectors have scaled back
their Angolan operations because of shrinking growth and difficulties with access to foreign
exchange, leading to fewer expatriate workers seeking properties.
An oversupply of new developments, many of which were begun during the post-civil war oil
boom years, has similarly added to downward price pressures, and the falling value of the kwanza,
which was trading in early December at Kz481:US$1, down from Kz166.7:US$1 in January 2018, has
also affected purchasing power.

Falling real-estate values reflect the wider challenges facing the economy and could lead to further
problems in the country's banking sector, which in the past decade has lent heavily to property
developers and runs the risk of repayment problems, as the sector remains highly leveraged. This
is already reflected in our economic growth outlook, which is unchanged.

Angola 32
Angola receives third EFF payment

Event
Angola has received a third instalment of its loan from the IMF (worth US$247m) under the
extended fund facility (EFF), but future pay-outs will be subject to new conditions around debt
and financial-sector management.
Analysis
The release of the third tranche of Angola's US$3.7bn EFF in early December comes some months
after a team from the IMF visited Luanda to assess the government's progress on its reform goals.
In a statement following an Executive Board discussion about Angola, the IMF noted that the
country's economic programme "remains on track, despite challenges". However, it said,
"sustained fiscal discipline is needed to address debt vulnerabilities" and banking-sector
recapitalisation and restructuring "was essential to address financial-sector risks".
Following Angola's failure to meet a number of its targets under the EFF, the Fund agreed to
"waivers of non-observance" and new targets were set on a reserve money ceiling, accumulation
of payment arrears and public-debt levels, among other things. We highlight that the level of debt
repayments is high. Accordingly, the risk of another default on debt is elevated, given Angola's
heavy dependence on oil revenue. The IMF has amended the timetable and five new ones were
set, aimed at underpinning fiscal consolidation and transparency, and supporting financial-sector
restructuring. In addition to these amended targets, the Fund also urged Angola to do more to
grow non-oil revenue; strengthen its management of public finances; improve its debt
management; ensure better transparency and accountability within its State-Owned Enterprises
(SOEs); tighten monetary policy; and sharpen banking-sector regulation.
This long shopping list of requests, along with the waivers and amended benchmarks,
underscores the challenges weighing on the Angolan economy. It also reveals the internal
struggles—despite apparent political commitment from the president, João Lourenço—to deliver
on reform goals. The country's public debt level has swollen to an estimated 90.1% of GDP—from
35% in 2013—and debtservicing accounts for 56.8% of total spending in the proposed 2020
budget. Careful management of this portfolio and future financing deals are critical if Angola is to
avoid an even more onerous level of debt or the risk of default.

We continue to expect that public debt will remain high throughout the 2020-24 forecast period,
and that real GDP will contract in 2019 and 2020, owing to reduced oil production and declining
global oil prices, leading to lower government revenue and subsequent reduced spending and
private consumption flows.

Angola 33
Government extends refinery tender deadline

December 12, 2019: Economic growth
Event
On December 11th Angola announced that it will extend the deadline for international firms to bid
on its Soyo oil refinery project from mid-December to January 31st, as it has not yet received a
suitable offer.
Analysis
Angola has enormous oil reserves, but very limited refinery capacity owing to low investment,
and must import the majority of refined oil for domestic use. Owing to declining foreign reserves,
the country's ability to import refined oil is under pressure, and shortages of fuel are common. To
alleviate these, and reduce its import bill, Angola aims to expand its sole oil refinery in the capital,
Luanda, and build three new sites—in Cabinda, Lobito and Soyo—with a combined capacity of
360,000 barrels/day (b/d).
A public tender was launched in October for the construction of the Soyo facility to process up to
100,000 b/d. In June the government said that it had selected a company to build a 60,000-b/d
refinery in Cabinda. However, Angola's state oil company, Sonangol, terminated a contract with
Hong Kong-based United Shine in early December to build the Cabinda refinery, citing delays in
planning proposals by the consortium. Additionally, there are plans to spend US$200m on the
ageing Refinaria de Luanda to quadruple capacity. The Luanda facility, with its current output of
about 60,000 b/d, is the only refinery in Angola, and meets just 20% of the country's needs.
We had previously highlighted that the tendering process for the Soyo facility would be
protracted, with delays likely. Plans for a refinery in Soyo were first mooted in 2009 and in 2016
state media reported that work had begun on the site, but then no further information was
released. Nevertheless, the resources and petroleum minister, Diamantino Azevedo, stated on
December 10th that the US$500m refinery was still on track to be completed by end-2023.
Angola has also been talking about building a new 200,000-b/d facility in the coastal city of Lobito
for well over a decade, but the plans have been changed several times and the project was
suspended in 2016. Earlier in 2019, the president, João Lourenço, signalled that plans for the
Lobito plant were back on the table, but no further details have been forthcoming.

Given the number of years it will take to build new refinery facilities, and the likelihood of further
delays, any impact will likely occur outside of our current forecast period to 2024.
Analysis
OPEC+ agrees to deepen production cuts
December 9, 2019
OPEC and a group of non-OPEC oil producers, jointly known as OPEC+, opted for a sharp cut in
their collective output ceiling during meetings in early December—in an attempt to boost
stubbornly weak prices amid a bearish global demand outlook. The headline reduction,
anticipated from early on in the proceedings, masked the intense negotiations over distribution
of the cut—primarily the proportionate burden to be carried by Saudi Arabia, OPEC's largest
producer and de facto leader. The kingdom won a formally enshrined demand for improved
compliance by the deal's persistent laggards, chiefly Iraq, while Russia—the main nonOPEC
member of the group—was permitted to exclude its rising condensate production from the
calculations. Immediate market reaction was muted—reflecting the fact that the participating
countries' current production is already roughly in line with the new limit and scepticism over
perennial quota cheats' promises to reform. However, the overall impact on prices is likely to be
limited—with the agreement doing more to redistribute the burden of the existing output
restrictions than to alter the overall level of production by the 24 adherents to the agreement.

Angola 34
Oil ministers from OPEC's 14 member states met in Vienna, the Austrian capital, on December 5th
for their final biennial gathering before the scheduled expiry in March of a landmark deal struck
three years ago with a Russianled group of nonOPEC producers to cut collective production—a
response to a prolonged price slump that began in mid-2014. Under an extension signed in
November last year and expiring in March, output was due to be cut by a combined
1.2m barrels/day (b/d) from an October 2018 baseline. Market metrics ahead of the OPEC meeting
—which was followed the next day by a joint OPEC and nonOPEC session—as well as
statements by several of the leading protagonists pointed strongly towards another extension and
a deeper cut: OPEC's latest Monthly Oil Market Report, published in mid-November, reported a
US$2.45/barrel month-on-month price fall in October alone to below the psychological US$60/b
mark on the back of the factors that have frustrated the deal's impact since the outset—namely
rising non-OPEC, primarily US, production and flat demand growth, the latter a corollary of global
economic weakness. The call on OPEC+ crude in 2020 was projected to shrink by 1.1m b/d to
29.6m b/d—roughly the same as that month's average output.
Pressure to improve quota compliance is rising

The Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee, a body established to oversee the original
December 2016 Declaration of Co-operation (DoC) between OPEC and 11 non-OPEC countries,
convened on December 5th before the main meetings and partly confirmed expectations—
recommending an additional 500,000-b/d reduction without stating the advised timeframe.
However, the harder negotiations on distribution of the cut took place during the full OPEC
conference later that day and were prolonged—centring on an insistence by Saudi Arabia that
other members would have to bring production into compliance with the new quotas if the
kingdom was continue to share an outsized burden. Needing higher prices both for budgetary
purposes and to bolster investor appetite ahead of the much-hyped initial public offering of Saudi
Aramco, the giant state oil company, Saudi Arabia has consistently produced well below a
nominal 10.3mb/d ceiling—averaging 9.9m b/d during the first half of 2019—in an attempt to
ensure the deal's success. Its failure thus far has increased Saudi frustration with the cheats, and
the new Saudi energy minister, AbdelAziz bin Salman alSaud—attending his first conference as
minister but a veteran of OPEC's internal politics—had let it be known in advance that the
government's patience was exhausted. On this occasion, as an incentive, Saudi Arabia offered to
cut an additional 400,000 b/d on top of the kingdom's reduced quota—but on condition that
others implement their own cuts in full.
Iraq has repeatedly broken promises to comply with its

quota
Talks with Iraq—whose compliance, as the group's secondlargest producer, has a real impact on
collective fulfilment of the deal—were generally acknowledged to have been the toughest.
Despite repeated promises to improve its compliance—most recently after a meeting in September
between Prince AbdelAziz bin Salman and Thamer alGhadban, Iraq's oil minister—the country
has persistently flouted its 4.51m-b/d quota, partly on the basis that historical underproduction
and the need to fund reconstruction after years of war and sanctions should justify an exemption.
Mr Ghadban emerged from the latest talks again pledging compliance, but doubts remain over
whether the minister is even able to deliver on his pledge given the political upheaval currently
engulfing his country and the improbability that the semi-autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan region in
the north will adhere to a production cap. Nigeria—the other serial violator among the major OPEC
producers, with a similar penchant for unfulfilled public promises to improve its quota adherence
—also reprised a pledge to comply after the meeting.
The deal was rubberstamped by nonOPEC producers the following day—the critical
negotiations, between Saudi Arabia and Russia, having been conducted well in advance. Russia
has always been less keen on imposing mandatory cuts—facing pressure from the giant Russian
oil companies that are responsible for the bulk of production—and has rarely complied with the
country's 11.52m-b/d ceiling. In return for agreeing to the fresh curb, Aleksander Novak, the
energy minister, secured a long-demanded concession that condensate, a light oil produced in
large volumes from Russia's vast gasfields, would be excluded from future output calculations—
potentially allowing the country to increase crude production while remaining within the new
limits. Russia produced some 830,000 b/d of condensate in November. However, in comments

Angola 35
carried by TASS, the official Russian news agency, Mr Novak claimed that production would be
reduced by a further 70,000 b/d, as demanded under the new deal.
Saudi Arabia's decision to cut in excess of its quota

received formal recognition for the first time
The joint statement issued on December 6th hinted at the intra-OPEC wrangling. The 24 countries
agreed to lower the collective ceiling by 500,000 b/d to 1.7m b/d below the October 2018 baseline.
The new individual quotas were not given but are assumed to enshrine a pro rata cut from those
agreed a year ago—under which OPEC and nonOPEC producers were to reduce production by a
total of 800,000 b/d and 400,000 b/d respectively. Saudi Arabia's ceiling would thus fall to
10.15m b/d. However, the closing communiqué also formally mentioned the kingdom's "voluntary"
additional contribution for the first time—quantified at roughly 400,000 b/d and made contingent
on "full conformity by every country participating in the DoC", an explicit caveat likewise absent
from previous statements. The deal does not extend beyond the first quarter of 2020—as had been
widely expected, in light of anticipated market weakness throughout the first half of the year—but
the signatories agreed to reconvene for an extraordinary meeting on March 5th to assess the
situation, by which time Saudi Arabia will know whether the pressure on peers to comply has paid
off. We expect most participants to abide by their new commitments, and will adjust the countries'
economic forecasts accordingly. However, the overall impact on prices is likely to be limited—with
the agreement doing more to redistribute the burden of the existing output restrictions than to
alter the overall level of production by the 24 adherents to the agreement.
Remittances surpass FDI flows into Sub-Saharan Africa

December 11, 2019
Remittance flows into Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) increased by 10.3% to US$46.2bn in 2018,
and provisionally rose again in 2019, according to updated World Bank figures in October. The
sum comfortably surpassed foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows of US$31.6bn in 2018—
based on the latest World Investment Report from the UN Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD)—highlighting the importance of remittances to the balance of payments and the
wider economy. FDI may be more valuable on a per dollar basis than remittances, of which a
significant portion is used for consumption or for investment in less productive assets (such as
real estate)—and sometimes for political party funding—but FDI is more volatile, is often
focused on minerals and oil (which have limited employment potential) and can be withdrawn.
Diaspora remittances will continue to make a vital contribution to several SSA economies,
facilitated by information and communications technology (ICT), although, as with FDI, not all
countries are benefitting.
Certain conditions need to be met for a country to receive a high level of remittances. Key
requirements are a sizeable expatriate population (preferably skilled and living in richer countries),
a functioning banking system (both to facilitate and to measure financial flows) and, increasingly,
an accommodating ICT environment, to speed up transfers and reduce their costs, which remain
high in most parts of SSA. Countries with close links to the former leading colonial powers, the
UK and France, are well represented in the remittance league.
The leading remittance recipients

Topping the SSA remittance stakes is Nigeria, by a large margin, with inflows rising by 11% to
US$24.4bn in 2018—dwarfing FDI of US$2bn—and accounting for more than half of the regional
total. Nigeria's dominant position stems from having the largest population in SSA (191m) and
high levels of remittances per head. Ghana lies second on the list (with US$3.5bn in 2018),
followed by Kenya (US$2.7bn), Senegal (US$2.4bn), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC;
US$1.8bn), Zimbabwe (US$1.7bn), Uganda (US$1.2bn), Mali (US$0.9bn), South Africa (US$0.9bn)
and Togo (US$0.5bn).
In per capita terms, a slightly different picture emerges. Excluding four small island states (Cabo
Verde, Comoros, São Tomé and Príncipe and Seychelles), the leading per capita recipient is
Lesotho—on US$201 per head—because of large flows of migrant workers to South Africa. For
the same reason eSwatini lies sixth in the per capita list (on US$106). As a result, South African
remittance flows are negative on a net basis, unusually for SSA. Senegal comes second (on
Angola 36
US$156 per head), followed by Nigeria (US$133), Ghana (US$128), the Gambia (US$112), eSwatini,
Zimbabwe (US$104), Liberia (US$82), Togo (US$64) and Djibouti (US$61). Kenya lies in 11th place
on US$58 per head. The top 10 countries in terms of remittances as a proportion of GDP are very
similar, but South Sudan and Mali enter the list at the expense of Djibouti and eSwatini.
Remittances and stability

The evidence is not clear cut as to whether more stable countries, both in political and in
economic terms—such as Ghana, Senegal and South Africa—tend to attract higher remittance
flows. Strong remittance flows to Nigeria (which is less stable) and especially to the DRC and
Zimbabwe (which are both unstable) show that remittances are driven as much by necessity, as
by opportunity. In Zimbabwe's case, remittances are a lifesaver for many households. The
question of whether currency stability facilitates inflows is similarly uncertain. Senegal, Mali and
Togo no doubt benefit from their mutual currency's fixed link to the euro, which gives greater
certainty to senders and recipients of funds. The rand monetary zone (including eSwatini, Lesotho
and Namibia) similarly benefits flows in southern Africa, despite the South African currency's
volatility visàvis the US dollar. From another perspective, strong flows to countries such as
Nigeria and Ghana suggest that currency weakness is not always a major impediment to
remittances, and can sometimes boost flows, because recipients gain more in local currency.
Correlations with FDI

A degree of correlation exists between the leading recipients of remittances and FDI but there are
also outliers. Six countries feature in the top 10 for both remittances and FDI inflows—Nigeria,
Ghana, Senegal, South Africa, Kenya and Uganda—and in all cases, except South Africa and
Uganda, remittances exceeded FDI in 2018. Stronger in FDI but weaker in remittances are Congo,
Mozambique, Tanzania and Ethiopia, with the latter suffering from weak, state-run banks and ICT
firms. Planned reforms in Ethiopia, including the opening of closed sectors to private firms, could
give a major boost to remittances, given its large expatriate population, especially in the US.
Conversely, Mali, Senegal, Togo and Zimbabwe are weaker on FDI but stronger on remittances.
As a qualification, however, measuring flows of both FDI and remittances in SSA is difficult and
the data are subject to frequent revision.
To maximise the benefits, SSA governments should make efforts to facilitate remittances, in line
with longer-standing policies to promote FDI. Action to boost remittances can be indirect, such as
nurturing the emergence of a dependable and efficient financial and ICT framework, and also
direct, as illustrated as Kenya's now-expired amnesty for repatriated funds, which gave a
significant boost to remittance inflows in 2018. Senegal's decision to create parliamentary seats for
the diaspora in the 2017 legislative election is also a potential remittance-booster, by giving
expatriates a direct political stake in their home country. Remittance flows also face threats,
especially tougher policies towards migrant workers in the key US market (the main source of
remittances for Kenya, for example) and in some EU countries, such as Italy. Possible links
between remittances and money-laundering are under-researched, but could cause problems in

Angola 37
future. Despite some challenges, remittances will remain a key source of funding in SSA, bolstered
by digital innovation.

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Data and charts

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Weather in Luanda (altitude sea level)

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Main political parties

Central bank governor

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Impact on the forecast

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Trial of former president's son finally begins

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Corruption has spread at the highest level

Protests in Sub-Saharan Africa

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Steady emergence of new leaders brings hope for

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Impact on the forecast

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Anti-money-laundering legislation passed

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No price relief in sight for Angola

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Luanda real-estate prices drop further

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Angola receives third EFF payment

Impact on the forecast

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Government extends refinery tender deadline