Canon 18

1. Urma vs. Beltran (627 SCRA 373)

2. Friend vs. Union Bank (476 SCRA 453)
3. Sarraga Sr. vs. Banco Filipino (393 SCRA 566)
4. People vs. Ambrosio (461 SCRA 61)
5. Mapua vs. Mendoza (45 Phil 424)
6. Blanza vs. Arcangel (21 SCRA 1)
7. Palteng vs. Court of Appeals (26 SCRA 736)
8. Alcala vs. De Vera (56 SCRA 30)
9. Barbuco vs. Beltran (436 SCRA 57)
10. Solatan vs. Inocentes (466 SCRA 1)
11. Oparel vs. Abaria (40 SCRA 128)
12. Abiero vs. Juanino (452 SCRA 1)

Canon 19
1. Cervantes vs. Sabio (A.C. No. 7828)
2. Sy Guia vs. Marsman (22 SCRA 927)

Canon 20

Canon 21
1. Falame vs. Baguio (A.C. No. 6876; March 7, 2008)
2. Regala vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 105938; September 20, 1996)

Canon 22
Canon 18

CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence

Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that
he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his
client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.

Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
Urma vs. Beltran
627 SCRA 373

FACTS:
Petitioners and respondents are blood relatives and next of kin of deceased Laureano and Rosa
Urma, the children of Laureano’s brother who died before him. Respondents Beltran filed a
complaint against petitioners Urma for partition, quieting of title, recovery of ownership, and
damages over 2 parcels of land.

Petitioners Urma claimed ownership of the lot they were occupying bec of a deed of sale by
Laureano. But 6 respondents claim ownership over portions of the land bec of a deed of donation
by Rosa. The parties agreed during pre-trial that the only matter to be resolved was the validity
or genuiness of Laureano’s deed of sale, if it was valid, the deeds of donation by Rosa would be
void. The NBI discovered that the thumbmark of Lauriano was not identical with the genuine
specimen thumbmark and concluded that the deed of sale was a spurious document. RTC ruled
in favor of respondents and ordered petitioners to vacate the property.

Respondents filed a Motion for New Trial believing that their counsel committed gross negligence
in handling their case. They claimed that their counsel should not have joined the motion for
judgment on the pleadings bec their answer contained specific denials and defenses which
tendered an issue. That their counsel was uneducated and unfamiliar with the law and legal
procedures. Hence, they should not be bound by mistake and omissions of their counsel.

ISSUE:

HELD:
Petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Raul Morales, made a mistake in entering into the stipulations a
procedural error which unfortunately bound them. The mistake or negligence of a counsel in
procedural technique binds the client unless such mistake or negligence is so gross or palpable
that would require the courts to step in and accord relief to the client who suffered thereby.
Without this doctrinal rule, there would be countless suits in the court dockets every time a new
lawyer was employed to show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent,
experienced, or learned.

Petitioners were not denied of due process nor were their rights violated.
Sps. Friend vs. Union Bank
476 SCRA 453

FACTS:
Sps Friend obtained a loan from Union Bank of 818,136 which was used to buy a Hyundai Starex,
for which they executed a promissory note. To secure the debt, they issued a chattel mortgage
on the said Starex. Sps Friend defaulted in payment despite repeated demands to pay or
alternatively for foreclosure. Union Bank filed an action for collection of sum of money and
replevin to take custody of the Starex. The sheriff could not implement the writ because the
vehicle could not be found at Sps’ residence. The RTC ruled in favor of Union Bank.

Sps Friend’s lawyer, Atty. Victa appealed to the CA. After filing of appeal, Sps changed their
counsel. They claimed that the RTC erred in declaring them in default and liable for the loan-
mortgage agreement. CA affirmed decision of the RTC.

Sps seek reversal of the decisions claiming that it was their counsel’s negligence in failing to file
an answer in the trial court. They insist that their case is an exception to the general rule that the
negligence of counsel binds the client as they were not able to present evidence and were thus
deprived of their constitutional right to be heard.

ISSUE:

HELD:
The doctrinal rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This rule has exceptions:
1. Where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law
2. When its application will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property
3. Where the interests of justice so require.

This case does not fall under the exceptions. Due process is the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and to submit evidence. Where the opportunity to be heard is accorded and the party can
present its side or defend its interest in due course, there is no denial of procedural due process.

While their counsel failed to file an answer to the complaint by Union bank, he reasonably filed
a notice of appeal of the RTC’s decision. In appealed cases to the CA, appellants may include in
his assignment of errors any question of law and fact that has been raised in the lower court and
which is framed by the issues. Sps were thus afforded the chance to raise their defense.

In Victory Liner vs. Gammad, it is a dangerous precedent to affirm denial of due process where
there is negligence of counsel. It would enable every party to render inutile any adverse decision
through the simple expedient of alleging gross negligence on the part of their counsel.
Sarraga Sr. vs. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank
393 SCRA 566

FACTS:
Sps Sarraga were owners of 3 parcels of land, they mortgaged their lots to Banco Filipino as a
security for a loan of 3,618,714. They defaulted in the payment of their loan, Banco Filipino
foreclosed the mortgage. The bank was placed in conservatorship by Banko Sentral and was
ordered closed and placed under receivership and liquidation. Sps Sarraga sent a letter to Banco
Filipino’s receiver-liqudator offering to redeem the same. The Deputy wrote back saying that at
this stage of the liquidation of the bank, they were not yet selling the properties. The lots were
consolidated in the name of Banco Filipino. They began to negotiate the redemption of the
properties. They were allowed to repurchase the lots for 8.5M which contained terms that Sps
may pay by installments and that upon full payent, Banco Filipino would execute a deed of sale
for the 3 properties. They conveyed 2 lots to Sps. They paid in full for the 3 lots but Banco Filipino
refused to execute a deed for the 3rd lot.
Instead, Banco Filipino filed a complaint against Sps for quieting of title, recovery of ownership
and possession, accounting and damages. Sps were presented by Atty. Dumlao. Before pre-trial,
Atty. Dumlao had a mild stroke, incapacitating him from participating, sps hired another lawyer,
Atty. Bagabuyo. He appeared and signed pleading for sps, but atty. Dumlao remained the counsel
of record. The Trial Court ruled in favor of Banco Filipino. Sps appealed which was signed by both
atty. Dumlao and atty. Bagabuyo. RTC denied the motion which was received by a newly hired
clerk of court who misplaced it, Atty. Bagabuyo failed to inform Atty. Dumlao of due to his
appointment as Senior State Prosecutor in the DOJ. Their motion to appeal was late and denied.

Sps Sarraga claim that Atty. Bagabuyo was negligent in failing to inform them of the decision
which is why they were unable to timely file a motion for appeal and that such negligence should
not be binding upon them.

ISSUE:

HELD:
The doctrinal rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This rule has exceptions:
1. Where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law
2. When its application will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property
3. Where the interests of justice so require.

The negligence of Atty. Bagabuyo falls under the exceptions.

If the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so great and the error committed
as a result thereof is so serious that the client, who otherwise has a good cause, is prejudiced and
denied his day in court, the litigation may be reopened to give the client another chance to
present his case. Similarly, when an unsuccessful party has been prevented from fully and fairly
presenting his case as a result of his lawyers professional delinquency or infidelity the litigation
may be reopened to allow the party to present his side. Where counsel is guilty of gross
ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the clients being held liable for
damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment may be set
aside on such ground.
Petitioners cannot be faulted for failing to verify the status of their case with the trial court since
a client has the right to expect that his lawyer will protect his interest during the hearing of his
case.
People vs. Ambrosio
461 SCRA 61

FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD:
Mapua vs. Mendoza
45 Phil 424

Emilio G. Mapua, the plaintiff in this case, recovered in the lower court on a default judgment,
from the defendants jointly and severally, the sum of P38,200, representing double the amount
which he had lost in a game of monte, with legal interest from January 30, 1922, and with costs.
The defendants appeal and assign six errors.
The record before us and ancillary records in other cases are perfect examples of professional
carelessness, closely akin to gross negligence in pleading and practice. This will partially explain
why the court has had the case under advisement for so long a period of time, and why it is now
necessary to pick our way as best we may through an accumulation of uncertain data to as just a
conclusion as is possible.
Records Nos. 19413[1] and 18133,[2] the first a civil action brought by Felix Mendoza, one of the
instant defendants, against Emilio G. Mapua, the instant plaintiff, and the second, an original
action in mandamus brought by Emilio G. Mapua, the present plaintiff, against Felix Mendoza,
one of the instant defendants, and Judge of First Instance Harvey, disclose that in these
proceedings, Mapua set up a counterclaim for P38,200. But this was denied by the trial court and
this denial was sustained here on the ground that a joint debt may not be set up against a
separate demand. Encouraged, nevertheless, by this intimation, Mapua instituted the present
action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Felix Mendoza, and Prudencio Navoa and
his wife Isabel Pelayo (No. 19295).
The situation can best be visualized by making first a statement of the case which will disclose
the outstanding proceedings and dates. Then our next task will be to apply the procedural law to
the facts; after which, we shall be in a position to give attention to the merits of the controversy.
Turning directly to the record and the bill of exceptions, the following is noted:
Plaintiff's complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on January 30, 1922.
Summons were issued and served on the defendants that same day. As is customary, the latter
were required to enter their appearance in the office of the clerk of the Court of First Instance of
Manila within twenty days after the service of the summons, and to answer the complaint of the
plaintiff within the time fixed by the rules of the court, which is ten days after appearance. The
attorneys for the defendants, however, waited until February 21st of the same year to enter their
appearance. On the supposition that this appearance was in time, and this point is not
questioned, the defendants then had ten days within which to demur or answer.
No action having been taken by the attorneys for the defendants up to and including the last day
permitted by the law and the rules, on March 6, 1922, the attorney for the plaintiff moved for a
default judgment, and on this motion the trial judge noted as of March 8, 1922, "Como se pide."
The proper orders for default were made on March 9 and March 11, 1922.
It appears that the attorneys for the defendants had presented in court on March 7, 1922, a
motion for a bill of particulars, without, however, proving service on the attorney for the plaintiff.
On March 13, 1922, the attorneys for the defendants renewed their motion for a bill of particulars
and asked that the declaration of default be set aside. Copy of this unverified motion was
received by the attorney for the plaintiff. Said motion was amended and amplified on March 17,
1922, in another motion which was subscribed to by counsel before a notary public.
In the meantime, however, trial was had on March 14, 1922, without the presence of the
defendants, and the case for the plaintiff was submitted. The trial court thereupon rendered
judgment and handed down an appropriate order on the motions to raise the default against the
defendants. The decision set out the complaint and the various steps in the proceedings, made
findings of fact based on the testimony for the plaintiff, and, in conformity with the Gambling
Law, Act No. 1757, gave sentence in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants for P38,200,
with legal interest and costs, as above indicated. The subsequent order on the motions to set
aside the default against defendants stated various reasons leading to the conclusion that there
was no ground for allowing said motions.
On appeal in this court, after the passage of considerable time, the bill of exceptions and the
briefs were finally presented and the case was placed on the December, 1922, calendar. It then
came to the knowledge of the court, through a motion filed by attorneys for the appellants after
the case was submitted for decision, that the stenographic notes had not yet been written up
and elevated to the appellate court. The evidence, however, is now before us.
The law applicable to the foregoing incidents in this case is full and clear. Abridging its provisions
somewhat for the appropriate sections of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Court are,
of course, familiar to the profession; the Code provides, in part, that the only pleadings allowed
on the part of the defendant are (1) the demurrer to the complaint, and (2) the answer. (Sec. 89.)
The defendants had ten days after they had entered their appearance to serve and file their
demurrer or answer to the complaint. (Rules of the Court of First Instance of the Philippine
Islands, No. 5.) The court could, however, in its discretion, have allowed an answer or other
pleading to be made after the time limited by the Rules of the Court for filing the same. (Code of
Civil Procedure, secs. 2, 110; Unson vs. Abrera [1909], 14 Phil., 146.) But if a defendant fails to
appear at the time required in the summons or to answer at the time provided by the Rules of
the Court, the court shall, upon motion of the plaintiff, order judgment for the plaintiff by default
and shall proceed to hear the plaintiff and his witnesses, and to render final judgment. (Code of
Civil Procedure, sec. 128.)
It is perfectly obvious that the defendants did not file their demurrer or answer to the complaint
within the period fixed by the Code and the Rules. Nor did they make proper representations to
secure additional time within which to present an answer or other pleading. Judgment by default
was thus properly rendered, unless there was some special reason for taking the case out of the
general rule.
For a motion to set aside a default judgment to prosper, the moving party must show by an
affidavit of merits that if the default is set aside, he has a just and valid defense to present.
Motions to set aside judgments by default are addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
(Coombs vs. Santos [1913], 24 Phil., 446; Daipan vs. Sigabu [1913], 25 Phil., 184.)
The situation here is somewhat complicated by the action of counsel for the defendants in filing
a motion for a bill of particulars instead of presenting either a demurrer or an answer. They assert
that as this motion was pending when the order of the default was made, it should be construed
as tolling the time for them to demur or answer. It is, however, not incumbent upon us to settle
the interesting question of whether the pendency of a motion to make the plaintiffs plead more
definitely, or to file specifications, so as to furnish the adverse party with complete information
as to the claims which he is required to meet, in conformity with section 108 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, extends the time to demur or answer. While it is generally irregular to enter judgment
by default whiles motion remains pending and undisposed of, yet, where such motion is filed out
of time, it would not be reversible error to enter a judgment by default. (There can be noted the
cases of Naderhoff vs. Geo. Benz & Sons [1913], 25 N. Dak., 165; 47 L. R. A., 853; D. S. Register &
Co. vs. Pringle Brothers [1909], 58 Fla., 355; Shinn vs. Cummins [1884], 65 Cal., 97; Higley and
Higley vs. Pollock [1891], 21 Nev., 198; Plummer vs. Weil [1896], 15 Wash., 427, holding that the
motion filed by the defendant for a bill of particulars, is sufficient ipso facto to extend the time
for answering.)
Without deciding, therefore, if the application for a bill of particulars extends the time for the
defendants to demur or answer, it is sufficient to say that the application for such an order must
be seasonably made. Here, as the defendants neither demurred nor answered, or filed their
motion for a bill of particulars in time, and as their motion to set aside the default judgment
showed no meritorious defense and was in itself defective, we reach the conclusion that there
was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in proceeding as he did and in refusing
to set aside his order of default against the defendants.
On the merits, little need be said. The complaint alleged, and the plaintiff proved to the
satisfaction of the court, that in a game of monte conducted by Felix Mendoza, Prudencio Navoa
and Isabel Pelayo, the plaintiff was the loser to the extent of P19,100 as disclosed by the checks
of record. Our Gambling Law permits any person who loses any money or valuable consideration
or thing in any gambling house, or at any prohibited game such as monte, or his heirs, executors,
administrators, or judgment creditors to recover within three years thereafter the money,
consideration, or thing, together with an additional sum equal to the value thereof from the
persons in charge of the game, or in control of the gambling house. The only doubtful point is as
to the liability of Isabel Pelayo; but as to her, construing the provisions of articles 1406 and 1411
of the Civil Code in relation with sections 6, 7, 8 and ] 1 of the Gambling Law, we decide that she
is jointly and severally liable with her codefendants. (See Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil,
vol. 9, p. 645.) Moreover, no specific assignment of error is made or argued to this end.
While the records under consideration disclose that the plaintiff Emilio G. Mapua is a gambler
who, not content to accept his losses without murmur, has seen fit to take advantage of the law
to recoup himself, and while his action engenders no sympathy, we have, nevertheless, to apply
the law, and in so doing find present no reversible error which would warrant us in disturbing the
appreciation of the case as made by Judge Harvey.
Judgment is affirmed with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
Mapua vs. Mendoza
45 Phil 424

FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD:
Blanza vs. Arcangel
21 SCRA 1

FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD:
Palteng vs. Court of Appeals
26 SCRA 736

FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD:
Alcala vs. De Vera
56 SCRA 30

FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD:
Barbuco vs. Beltran
436 SCRA 57

FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD:
Solatan vs. Inocentes
(466 SCRA 1)

FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD:
Oparel vs. Abaria
(40 SCRA 128)

FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD:
Abiero vs. Juanino
452 SCRA 1

FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD:
Canon 19

CANON 19 – A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.

Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

Rule 19.02 - A lawyer who has received information that his client has, in the course of the
representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client
to rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship with such client in
accordance with the Rules of Court.

Rule 19.03 - A lawyer shall not allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case.
Cervantes vs. Sabio
A.C. No. 7828

FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD:
Sy Guia vs. Marsman
22 SCRA 927

FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD:
Canon 20

CANON 20 – a lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.

Rule 20.01 - A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:
(a) the time spent and the extent of the service rendered or required;
(b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered
case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter
to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from
the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

Rule 20.02 - A lawyer shall, in case of referral, with the consent of the client, be entitled to a
division of fees in proportion to the work performed and responsibility assumed.

Rule 20.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the full knowledge and consent of the client, accept any
fee, reward, costs, commission, interest, rebate or forwarding allowance or other compensation
whatsoever related to his professional employment from anyone other than the client.

Rule 20.04 - A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall
resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
Canon 21

CANON 21 – A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after attorney-
client relation is terminated.

Rule 21.01 - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except;
(a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the
disclosure;
(b) When required by law;
(c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or
by judicial action.

Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the
course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person,
unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.

Rule 21.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the written consent of his client, give information from
his files to an outside agency seeking such information for auditing, statistical, bookkeeping,
accounting, data processing, or any similar purpose.

Rule 21.04 - A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of the firm to partners or associates
thereof unless prohibited by the client.

Rule 21.05 - A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may be required to prevent those whose
services are utilized by him, from disclosing or using confidences or secrets of the clients.

Rule 21.06 - A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation about a client's affairs even with
members of his family.

Rule 21.07 - A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been consulted about a particular case except
to avoid possible conflict of interest.
Falame vs. Baguio
A.C. No. 6876; March 7, 2008

FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD:
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 105938; September 20, 1996

FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD:
Canon 22

CANON 22 – A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice
appropriate in the circumstances.

Rule 22.01 - A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following case:
(a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the
matter he is handling;
(b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules;
(c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the client;
(d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry
out the employment effectively;
(e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply with
the retainer agreement;
(f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and
(g) Other similar cases.

Rule 22.02 - A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien, immediately
turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperative with his
successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all information necessary for the proper
handling of the matter.