Bravo v Morales

FACTS: These consolidated administrative cases which are in the nature of a

charge and countercharge sprang from the same incident. Judge Crispin B. Bravo,
charges his former branch clerk of court, Atty. Miguel C. Morales with grave
misconduct and conduct unbecoming a public officer. On the other hand, Atty.
Morales charges Judge Bravo with grave abuse of authority, slander, harassment,
grave ignorance of the law, inefficiency and grave/serious misconduct. In his
complaint in A.M. No. P-05-1950, Judge Bravo alleged, in gist, the following: That
while serving as the Acting Presiding Judge of MeTC, Manila, Branch 17, he
requested the detail of his branch clerk of court, Atty. Morales. Later, he
recommended to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) the immediate
dismissal of Atty. Morales from the service for corrupt practices; that since he
made the recommendation, he observed Atty. Morales to have acted
discourteously and disrespectful toward him. He relates that whenever he greets
court employees with a "good morning ladies and gentlemen" after every flag
raising ceremony, as was his usual practice, he noticed Atty. Morales mimicking
him in a squeaky comical voice, obviously to make fun of him; among others. At
his end, Atty. Morales avers in his counter-complaint that Judge Bravo failed to
behave with due restraint when the judge ordered his arrest. As Atty. Morales
argued, unjust vexation is covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, adding
that unjust vexation is not a continuing offense and, ergo, a warrantless arrest
could not be effected therefor, let alone by the responding police officers who
have no personal knowledge, as it were, of the alleged crime.

ISSUE:

RULING: The Court has repeatedly stressed that court employees, from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, being public servants charged with
dispensing justice, should always act with a high degree of professionalism and
responsibility, if not maturity. Their conduct must not only be characterized by
propriety and decorum, but must also be in accordance with law and court
regulations. They should avoid any act or conduct that would or tend to diminish
public trust and confidence in the courts. Indeed, those connected with the
dispensation of justice bear a heavy burden of responsibility. 4 We take this
opportunity to remind both Judge Bravo and Atty. Morales that government
service is people-oriented. Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice;
civility is never a sign of weakness and courtesy is a mark of culture and good
breeding. Impatience and rudeness have no place in the government service in
which personnel are enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times.

OCA V. TORMIS
A.C. No. 9920 [Formerly A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691]
August 30, 2016
PER CURIAM

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR

FORMER JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS

FACTS: This disbarment complaint is an offshoot of our Decision in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Necessario, et al.
Respondent Former Judge Rosabella M. Tormis (Tormis), together with other judges and employees of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Cebu City, was dismissed for turning the solemnization of marriages into a business. Tormis was dismissed from the service
for the second time, and this Court directed the Office of the Bar Confidant to initiate disbarment proceedings against her.

On July 3, 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor, led the judicial audit.team created by the Office of the Court
Administrator to investigate Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cebu City for alleged misdeeds in the
solemnization of marriages.

Two (2) undercover agents from the judicial audit team, posing as a couple, went to the Palace of Justice to ask about the marriage
application process. They were told by the guard on duty to go to Branch 4 and look for a certain "Meloy."

Fearing that the male undercover would be recognized by the court employees in Branch 4, the two agreed that only the female
undercover would go inside the court. She was then assisted by a woman named Helen.Helen assured the female undercover that
their marriage process could be hurried. She also claimed that it was possible for the marriage to be solemnized the next day, but the
marriage certificate would only be dated when the marriage license became available.

The Office of the Court Administrator found that the respondent judges in that case connived with the court personnel, who acted as
"fixers" in solemnizing marriages. The judges heedlessly kept solemnizing marriages despite irregularities in the requirements
provided under the law.

In the Resolution dated July 10, 2007, this Court treated the judicial audit team's memorandum as an administrative complaint against
the respondent judges, including Tormis.The judges were directed to file their comments on the charges against them. 12 They were
also suspended pending resolution of the case.

On August 24, 2007, Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepafio of the Office of the Court Administrator submitted a
Memorandum dated August 29, 2007 and Supplemental Report.

Affidavits of private individuals were also attached to the records.26 Among these individuals was Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera (Baguio-
Manera), a resident of Panagdait, Mabolo, Cebu. Baguio-Manera claimed that her marriage was solemnized by Tormis with the aid of
"Meloy," who asked for a fee of ₱l,500.00.27 She and her then fiance were not required to present a marriage license; they were only
directed to bring their birth certificates.28 She averred that while Article 3429 did not apply to them, their marriage certificate was
marked with the annotation, "No marriage license was necessary, the marriage being solemnized under Article 34 of Executive Order
No. 209."

On November 27, 2007, this Court En Banc issued the Resolution requiring all the judges involved, including Tormis, to comment on
the Supplemental Report. 31 The Resolution also directed the Process Servicing Unit to furnish all the judges with a copy of the
Report. Further, all the court personnel involved were asked to show cause why they should not be disciplined for their misconduct.

In her comment, Tormis denied the charges against her.34 She claimed that the action of the Office of the Court Administrator was
an "entrapment." According to her, there was nothing wrong with solemnizing marriages on the same date the marriage license was
issued. In view of the pro forma affidavits of cohabitation, she relied on the presumption of regularity. Tormis asserted that she should
not be blamed for assuming that the affidavits were true since judges are not handwriting experts.

Tormis also claimed that Baguio-Manera's affidavit was hearsay. She averred that when Baguio-Manera and her husband was asked
about the affidavit, they confirmed the truthfulness of their statements, particularly that they had been living together for five (5) years.
Lastly, Tormis blamed the filing clerks for the irregularities in the number of marriages solemnized in her sala.

On November 12, 2007, Tormis, together with Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales, filed a Memorandum of Law with Plea for Early Resolution,
Lifting of Suspension and Dismissal of the Case. This Court lifted the suspension of the judges but forbade them from solemnizing
marriages. On December 7, 2007, both judges moved for early resolution with a waiver of formal and/or further investigation and to
dismiss. This Court noted their Motion and affirmed the relief they sought, thus allowing the payment of the judges' unpaid salaries
and benefits from July 9, 2007.

The Office of the Court Administrator, through a memorandum dated June 15, 2010, found Tormis guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect
of duty for solemnizing marriages with questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has been paid, for
solemnizing marriages wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in
lieu of the required certificate from the embassy and for solemnizing a marriage with an expired license.

Whether or not the alleged irregularities committed by respondent in the solemnization of marriages, where she was found guilty of
gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law, constitute gross misconduct warranting her disbarment.

While respondent blatantly violated particular Canons of Judicial Ethics with her participation in the alleged marriage scam, she
similarly breached the following Canons on the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

....

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession ....

....

Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law[.]

Membership in the bar is an essential requirement for membership in the bench.122 "[T]he moral fitness of a judge also reflects his
[or her] moral fitness as a lawyer.".123 Consequently, a judge who violates the code of judicial conduct similarly violates his or her
lawyer's oath. 124

Respondent's act of heedlessly solemnizing marriages in utter disregard of the law and jurisprudence clearly constitutes gross
misconduct. The repetitiveness of her act shows her clear intent to violate the law. She disregarded the lawyer's oath, which mandates
lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. In view of this, either the penalty of suspension or disbarment is warranted.
Rule 138, Section 27 provides:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)

Gross misconduct is an "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden
act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment."125 To consider gross
misconduct "the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest[.]"

Although it is true that marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code merit exemption from a marriage license, respondent should
have complied with the mandate of personally ascertaining the circumstances of cohabitation of the parties. Records reveal that the
declarations embodied in the required joint affidavit of cohabitation of the parties do not actually represent the accurate circumstances
of their alleged cohabitation.134

In addition, there were marriages solemnized by respondent involving foreigners who only submitted affidavits in lieu of a certificate
of legal capacity to marry.135 In cases where one or both of the contracting parties are foreigners, Article 21136 of the Family Code
provides that a certificate of legal capacity to marry is necessary before the acquisition of a marriage license. As the solemnizing
officer, respondent should have ensured that pertinent requirements were secured before the issuance of the marriage license. Thus,
the absence of a certificate of legal capacity to marry should have prompted her to question the propriety of the issuance.

The connivance between respondent and the court employees is settled. The court employees acted as "'fixers' and 'facilitators" 137
that mediated between the judges and the contacting parties. Apparent are the superimpositions and erasures in the addresses of the
contracting parties so they would appear to be residents of either Barili or Liloan, Cebu.138 For the contracting parties to easily obtain
their marriage license, discrepancies between their true addresses as declared in their marriage certificates and their addresses in
their marriage licenses were made. The contracting parties were able to get married despite incomplete requirements. Thus, the
handwritten marginal notes of monetary figures attached to the marriage certificates show the presence of consideration.

espondent used her authority as a judge to make a mockery of marriage. As a judicial officer, she is expected to know the law on
solemnization of marriages.143 "A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the law; he [or she] must also be conscientious and
thorough in doing so. Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature of their office[,] should be more circumspect in the performance of
their duties."144

Similarly, as a lawyer who is an officer of the court, respondent should have not permitted herself to be an instrument of any violation
of law. Her careless attention in dispensing with the necessary requirements of marriage and in conniving with court employees to
further monetary interests underscores her utter disregard of the sanctity of marriage.

Any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his or her professional dealings or in a private capacity, is basis for suspension or
disbarment.145 Possession of good character is a fundamental requirement not only for admission to the bar but also for the
continuance of exercising the privilege to practice law.146 However, as a rule, disbarment is only warranted in cases of misconduct
that "seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court."147

Respondent's undue haste in repeatedly solemnizing marriages despite incomplete and irregular requirements shows indifference to
her role as an officer of the court. The repetitiveness of her acts shows her proclivity in transgressing the law and protecting these
violations with her authority. A lawyer, as an officer and an essential partner of the court in the solemn task of giving justice, is given
the grave obligation of maintaining the integrity of the courts. 148 This is especially so with judges. A judge is "the visible representation
of law and justice from whom the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. For the judge to return that regard, the latter
must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow."

RE: CASES SUBMITTED FOR DECISION BEFORE JUDGE DAMASO A. HERRERA,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 24
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1924, 13 October 2010
Gross inefficiency; Undue delay

Facts: Then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., reported on the cases
submitted for decision before newly-retired Judge Herrera, some of which were already
beyond the reglementary period to decide. The report further indicated that Judge
Herrera failed to request the extension of his time to decide the cases. In his defense,
Judge Herrera cited his heavy workload, lack of sufficient time, health reasons, and the
physical impossibility of complying with the requirements in his explanation. He
mentioned that his court inherited about 1,000 cases, many of which included
voluminous records and some of which required the retaking of testimonies due to
unavailability of the transcript of stenographic notes (TSNs). He claimed that his regular
Branch Clerk of Court had been appointed an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, leaving
him to do his work without any assistance.

Held: Judge Herrera’s failure to decide his cases with dispatch constituted gross
inefficiency and warranted the imposition of administrative sanctions upon him. Judge
Herrera’s plea of heavy workload, lack of sufficient time, poor health, and physical
impossibility could not excuse him. Such circumstances were not justifications for the
delay or non-performance, given that he could have easily requested the Court for the
extension of his time to resolve the cases. No judge can choose to prolong, on his own,
the period for deciding cases beyond the period authorized by the law. Without an order
of extension granted by the Court, a failure to decide even a single case within the
required period rightly constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.
 I.P.I. No. 16-244-CA-J, September 06, 2016

Re: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF CATALINA Z. ALILING AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MA. LUISA C. QUIJANO-PADILLA,
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA RELATIVE TO CA-G.R. CV NO. 103042

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This resolves the verified complaint1 filed by Catalina Z. Aliling (Complainant) against Justice Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla (Justice
Padilla) of the Court of Appeals (CA) of Manila for gross ignorance of the law or procedure and gross misconduct constituting
violations of Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The complaint stemmed from the Decision2 of Justice Padilla in
CA-G.R. CV No. 103042.

Antecedent Facts

On 28 October 1997, Asuncion Zamora Jurado (Jurado) and Catalina Zamora Aliling (Aliling) filed a complaint before the Regional
Trial Court (trial court), Santiago City, Isabela for the determination of the true origin and ownership of a 7,086-square meter parcel
of land, described as Lot No. 4900. Jurado and Aliling alleged that they, together with their deceased brother Fernando M. Zamora,
are the registered owners of Lot No. 4900 covered by TCT No. T-65150 of the Registry of Deeds of Isabela. They claimed to have
inherited the subject land from their father, Dominador Zamora, who holds the property under the previous title, TCT No. T-2291,
after having acquired this from the previous owners, spouses Antonio Pariñas and Maura Balbin. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 36-2438.

Jurado and Aliling alleged that sometime in 1997, they learned that defendants in the case were able to cause the subdivision of Lot
No. 4900 into several titles in the names of: Vicente Chai, married to Carmen Chai; Eduardo Sarmiento, married to Josefina M.
Sarmiento; Anastacio Pallermo; and Leonora Pariñas and Margarita Pariñas, married to Melecio Pinto. Claiming absolute and lawful
ownership over the subject property, plaintiffs prayed for the nullification of the aforesaid titles.

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment holding, among others, that there was an irregularity in the reconstitution
proceedings relative to OCT No. 3429 from which defendants' titles were derived and that defendants, particularly appellants
Spouses Chai, could not be considered as purchasers in good faith.

The plaintiffs filed their Motion for Partial Reconsideration while the defendants filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the 25
February 2014 decision. The trial court denied both of their motions.

On intermediate appellate review, the CA reversed and set aside the trial court's decision in Civil Case No. 36-2438. It held that
while it affirms the trial court's ruling on the irregularity of the reconstitution of OCT No. 3429, it cannot sustain the finding that
appellants are not purchasers in good faith. The CA concluded that defendant Spouses Chai exercised the due diligence required of
them to be rightfully adjudged as buyers in good faith. The decision was penned by Justice Padilla and concurred in by Associate
Justices Normandie B. Pizarro and Samuel H. Gaerlan.

On 7 June 2016, plaintiffs-appellees Jurado, Aliling and the heirs of their brother Fernando M. Zamora, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration assailing the CA decision.

Pending resolution of their Motion for Reconsideration, Aliling on 27 June 2016 filed the instant administrative complaint against
Justice Padilla.

Our Ruling

Although complainant asserted that she is not assailing the CA decision in the administrative complaint, it is evident that the error
she is attributing to respondent Justice Padilla pertains to the latter's ruling in CA-G.R. CV No. 103042. This Court has maintained
that errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative
proceedings, but should instead be assailed through judicial remedies.3chanrobleslaw

The assailed ruling of Justice Padilla was issued in the proper exercise of her judicial functions, and as such, should not be subject
to administrative disciplinary action. Well entrenched is the rule that a judge may not be administratively sanctioned from mere
errors of judgment in the absence of showing of any bad faith, fraud, malice, gross ignorance, corrupt purpose, or a deliberate intent
to do an injustice on his or her part.4 Judicial officers cannot be subjected to administrative disciplinary actions for their performance
of duty in good faith.5 As a matter of public policy, a judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of his official acts, no matter how
erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to
try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. 6chanrobleslaw

To be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge must be shown to have committed an error that was gross or patent,
deliberate or malicious.7 In her ponencia, Justice Padilla explained, citing evidence and jurisprudence, why she arrived at her
conclusion that defendants were purchasers in good faith. Even assuming that she erred in her ruling, still complainant failed to
establish that she was moved by ill-will or malicious intention to violate the law or jurisprudence. Moreover, it should be noted that it
was arrived at after deliberation by a collegial body, thus, not solely the ruling of the respondent justice.

Complainant should be reminded that unfavorable rulings are not necessarily erroneous. If she disagrees with the ruling, there are
judicial remedies to be exhausted under existing rules. As in fact, it was noted that complainant, together with the other plaintiffs-
appellees, had already filed their motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. The CA has yet to rule on the motion when
complainant filed the instant administrative complaint.

This Court has settled the rule that administrative complaints against judges cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial
remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by the erroneous orders or judgments of the former. Administrative remedies are neither
alternative to judicial review nor do they cumulate thereto, where such review is still available to the aggrieved parties and the cases
not yet been resolved with finality.8 It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals
have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or
closed.9 Clearly, the subject civil case has not yet reached its finality and the instant administrative complaint has no leg to stand on.

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the instant administrative complaint filed by Catalina Z. Aliling against Justice
Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla, Court of Appeals, Manila for ignorance of the law or procedure and gross misconduct constituting
violations of Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

KILAT VS. JUDGE MACIAS

A.M. No. RTJ-05-1960, OCTOBER 25, 2000
TINGA, J.
CANON 3, SEC. 5

Facts:
Complainant, a 16 year-old working high school student,
charged respondent Judge Mariano S. Macias of rape, immorality
and violation of Anti-Child Abuse Law. Respondent, on other hand,
denied the claims of complainant. According to him, complaint was
merely used by his ex-wife and several other personalities who he
believed had “selfish and personal axes to grind” against him.
Respondent said that complainant was kidnapped and merely
forced to sign the documents used in the instant administrative
complaint.
Meanwhile, complainant filed criminal charges against
those accused of kidnapping her. The Provincial Prosecutor filed
the corresponding information and the case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. L-00727 and was raffled to the RTC branch
presided by respondent judge. Respondent then issued a warrant
of arrest. The next day, accused moved for the inhibition of
respondent from the criminal case on the ground that respondent
is directly involved in the said case. Respondent thus issued an
order inhibiting himself from said case.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge is liable administratively.

Ruling:
The SC rule in affirmative. The SC dismissed the rape charge
against respondent judge since there was no sufficient evidence to
prove the same. However, respondent judge was found guilty of
abuse of authority when he issued the warrant of arrest.
Rule 137 of the Rules of Court mandatorily disqualifies a judge
or judicial officer to sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child,
is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise.
There is no dispute that Mrs. Margie Corpus- Macias, accused in
Criminal Case No. L-00727, is the estranged wife of respondent
judge. Respondent’s swift issuance of the arrest warrant
suspiciously smells of vengeance and vindication.
A judge should administer his office with due regard to the
integrity of the judicial system. He must not be perceived as being
a repository of arbitrary power but as one dispensing justice under
the sanction of the rule of law. That he inhibited himself after they
moved for his inhibition cannot extenuate his culpability. At the
outset, he should have inhibited himself from the case.
Therefore, the SC imposed a P20,000.00 fined against
respondent judge.

SALCEDO VS JUDGE BOLLOZOS

A.M. NO. RTJ-10-2236, JULY 5, 2010
BRION, J.
CANON 3, SEC. 5

Facts:
 Complainant Ruben Salcedo was supervising a construction
over a property, when Jose Tanmalack and heavily armed men
arrived and forced themselves inside the property. The
complainant averred that Tanmalack and his companions
harassed and threatened to kill and to harm him and his workers.
This prompted complainant to go to the nearest police station to
report the matter. The police promptly responded and arrested
Tanmalack and brought him in for questioning. Tanmalack,
represented by his sister, then filed a verified handwritten petition
for the Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Writ of Amparo. Respondent
Judge Gil Bollozos issued the Writ of Amparo which caused the
release of Tanmalack.
Complainant claims that the writ was unusually issued with
haste and that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion, bias, and obvious partiality. The complainant also
alleges that the respondent judge accommodated the issuance of
the writ because he and Tanmalack’s counsel, Atty. Francis Ku, are
members of the Masonic fraternity.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent judges is guilty of impartiality.

Ruling:
The SC ruled in negative. The fact that the respondent judge
and Atty. Francis Ku are members of the Masonic fraternity does
not justify or prove that the former acted with bias and partiality.
Bias and partiality can never be presumed and must be proved with
clear and convincing evidence. While palpable error may be
inferred from respondent judge’s issuance of the Writ of Amparo,
there is no evidence on record that would justify a finding of
partiality or bias. The complainant’s allegation of partiality will not
suffice in the absence of a clear and convincing proof that will
overcome the presumption that the respondent judge dispensed
justice according to law and evidence, without fear or favor.
 Therefore, the SC dismissed the complaint against
respondent judge.