1 PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL

2 What is Proprietary Estoppel

 Proprietary Estoppel (PE) is an equitable remedy wherein an owner of land may be held to
have conferred some right or privilege connected with the land to another person despite
the absence of a deed or written contract or registered disposition etc.
3
 This remedy is invoked when the claimant has exhausted all his legal rights and as such
‘throws himself at the mercy of the courts’
 In the over rigorous reliance on formalities in English land law as we know it, the doctrine
of PE mitigates the harshness and difficulties of the law.
4 Ramsden v Dyson (1866) LR 1 HL, 129, per Lord Kingsdown
 “if a man, under a verbal agreement with a landlord for a certain interest in land, or, what
amounts to the same thing, under an expectation, created or encouraged by the landlord,
that he shall have a certain interest, takes possession of the land, with the consent of the
landlord, and upon the faith of such promise or expectation, with the knowledge of the
landlord, and without objection by him, lays out money upon the land, a court of equity will
compel the landlord to give effect to such promise or expectation.”
5 Conditions for PE
 The old law in relation to the conditions for PE were fairly strict and was laid down by Fry
LJ in Willmott v Barber (1880) as the 5 probanda
 The claimant must have made a mistake as to their legal rights over some land
belonging to another
 The true landowner must know of the claimants mistaken belief

6
 The claimant must have expended money or carried out some action on the faith of that
mistaken belief
 The landowner must have encouraged the expenditure by the claimant, either directly or
by abstaining from enforcing their legal rights
 The owner of the land over which the right is claimed must know of the existence of their
own rights, and that these are inconsistent with the alleged rights of the claimant.
7
 These conditions were very difficult to establish.
 However it must be noted that it was difficult to establish for good reason in that the rights
of the landowner could be totally taken away.
 However today, the role of PE has changed and in the circumstances, it has become more
flexible.
8 Modern approach to PE
 Found in Oliver J’s dictum in Taylor Fashions v Liverpool Victoria Trustees (1982)
 He said that a claimant will be able to establish an estoppel if they can prove an assurance,
reliance and detriment in circumstances where it would be unconscionable to deny a

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 He said that a claimant will be able to establish an estoppel if they can prove an assurance,
reliance and detriment in circumstances where it would be unconscionable to deny a
remedy to the claimant.
9
 As Edward Nugee QC said in Re Basham (Deceased),

"Where a person (A) has acted to his detriment on the faith of a belief, which was known to
and encouraged by another person (B), that he has or is going to be given a right in or over
B's property, B cannot insist on his strict legal rights if to do so would be inconsistent with A's
belief. The principle is commonly known as proprietary estoppel, and since the effect of it is
that B is prevented from asserting his strict legal rights it has something in common with
estoppel".
10 NOTE!!
 We will look at each of the requirements in detail, however before we do so, it must be
noted that PE must not be applied mechanically.
 PE today will provide a remedy only when it is unconscionable for the land owner to rely
on his strict legal rights.

11 The assurance.
 The landowner must have made some kind of assurance to the claimant that either he
would refrain from exercising his strict legal rights over his own land or that the claimant
would have some interest on the land
 The form of this assurance is irrelevant. It may be express, implied, orally or in writing even
if it is not a valid and binding agreement
12
 JT Developments v Quinn (1991)
 Estoppel can arise even though in a situation where there was clearly no intention to
create binding obligations between the parties
 Ramsden v Dyson (1866)
 Assurance can be where the landowner refrains from preventing the claimant from using
his land (he needn’t say anything)
13
 Orgee v Orgee (1997), Hurst LJ
 The crucial element in determining whether an actionable assurance has been made was
whether the landowner had encouraged or acquiesced to the belief held by the claimant
and on which the claimant had relied to his detriment.
 Inwards v Baker [1965]
 assurance need not be made to give rise to contractual liability.
14
 What if the assurance is via a will?
 Gillet v Holt (2000)
 At first instance the courts held that an assurance to leave property via a will, will not be
sufficient as a will is ambulatory in nature. Followed Taylor v Dickens. There must be

15 2
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 At first instance the courts held that an assurance to leave property via a will, will not be
sufficient as a will is ambulatory in nature. Followed Taylor v Dickens. There must be
some kind of double assurance in that the landowner will not change his will or an
irrevocable promise. This decision overturned earlier decisions of Re Basham and
Wayling v Jones on this issue
15
 However, on appeal the decision was reversed. The COA held that there is no such thing as
an irrevocable promise. If there was there would be no need for PE in the first place.
 As such a promise to leave property via a will, will be sufficient to establish an assurance
for PE thus reaffirming the earlier cases
16
 Thorner v Majors (2009)
 Lord Walker noted (at para.54) that there was some authority for the view that the “clear
and unequivocal” test did not apply to proprietary estoppel. His Lordship preferred to say
(at para.56) that in order to establish a proprietary estoppel the relevant assurance must be
“clear enough”. What amounts to sufficient clarity will depend on the context. It was noted
(at para.59) that the context of the present was unusual in that it involved two “taciturn and
undemonstrative” countrymen. In that context it was held (at para.60) that the trial judge
had been entitled to find that Peter’s assurances, objectively assessed, were sufficiently
clear and were intended to be relied upon. The Court of Appeal had not given sufficient
weight to the advantage that the first instance Judge had in seeing and hearing the
witnesses.
17 The reliance
 The claimant must rely on the assurance – meaning that he must show that he was induced
to behave differently because the assurance had been given
 This is very difficult to prove and as such the courts would be willing to infer this in certain
circumstances

18
 Greasley v Cooke (1980)
 COA held that if clear assurances have been made and detriment has been suffered, it is
permissable to assume that reliance has occurred
 Wayling v Jones (1993)
 Suggested that if assurance and detriment have been proven then the Burden shifts to
the landowner to show that there was no reliance – that means that the claimant would
have done what she did irrespective of the assurances
19
 Campbell v Griffin (2001)
 The claimant had been a lodger and over time had taken over the responsibility of taking
care of his elderly landlords. There was clear evidence of the relevant assurances
 At the trial he admitted that he would have assisted the couple out of ordinary human
compassion other than merely as a result of the assurance.

20

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 
20
 Held (COA):-
 Upheld the estoppel claim and noted that a dual motive for the actions (the assurance
plus normal human compassion) does not diminish the fact that reliance has occurred.
 This may seem overly generous and it is, strictly looking at the law but it would have
been harsh to penalise the claimant because he was NOT a selfish individual who would
only have been prepared to help because of the assurance.
21
 Chun v Ho (2001)
 Hun had succesfully established a claim because her conduct in giving up her career and
establishing a life with the property owner was held to be not only because of love and
pity. There must have been reliance on his assurances.
 This just shows that each case must be looked at on its own facts
22
 Reliance is critically dependant on the facts of each case and not to be discounted merely
because of family and/or emotional ties between claimant and landowner that might
otherwise explain the course of action.
23 The Detriment
 ‘Equity will not assist a volunteer’
 So long as the detriment is not minimal or trivial it can take any form.
 Spent money on the land
 Made physical improvements on the land
 Devoted time and care to the needs of landowner – Campbel v Griffin (2001)
 Forsaken some other opportunity – Lloyd v Dugdale (2001)
24
 Detriment alone, no matter how extensive, cannot amount to a succesful claim in PE
without and assurance
 Taylor v Dickens (1997)
 The claimant worked for a number of years without pay in the expectation that he would
inherit the farm. The deceased changed her will and left everything to someone else.
 Held: no assurance that deceased would not change her will so no claim.

25
 Note that this decision may seem harsh in light of Gillet v Holt. Taylor did not go on appeal.
26 Henry v Henry (2010)
 In Henry v Henry, G, an increasingly frail old lady, owned a half share in a plot of
agricultural land in St. Lucia. She promised the claimant Calixtus Henry (‘C’) that she would
leave him her half share if he cultivated the plot and cared for her until her death. This he
did for more than thirty years. C and G lived off the produce of the plot, C having no other
income. However, shortly before she died, G transferred her share in the plot to T. The trial
judge rejected C’s claim to a proprietary estoppels interest. He found that the

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 income. However, shortly before she died, G transferred her share in the plot to T. The trial
judge rejected C’s claim to a proprietary estoppels interest. He found that the
claimant,although relying on G’s promises, had, looked at overall, not suffered any
detriment. He had looked after G for thirty years, but he had reaped the produce. There
had been reliance but no detriment.
 This conclusion that there was no detriment was decisively rejected by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, speaking through Sir Jonathan Parker The Board stressed
that the two elements of reliance and detriment are often inter-linked. The Board was in no
doubt that by devoting his life to G and the plot rather than other activities, C, had acted to
his detriment and thereby acquired a proprietary estoppel interest.
27 Unconscionability
 Oliver J, in Taylor Fashions regarded unconscionability as the very essence of a claim of PE
 In a great many cases the simple fact that the landowner now wants to retract the
assurance given and relied upon would be unconscionable.
28
 Carnwath J, in Gillet v Holt
 “normally it is the promisor’s knowledge of the detriment suffered in reliance of his promise
which makes it unconscionable for him to go against it.”
 Unconscionability is a fluid concept and will be capable of different interpretations in
different situations
29 Commercial vs Non commercial context
 A comparison of Cobbe and Thorner reveals a sharp dividing line between the application
of proprietary estoppel in the commercial and non-commercial contexts. In the former, it
will generally be difficult for a claimant to succeed because the court’s emphasis is likely to
be on the need for certainty in commercial dealings. The arrangements between the
parties are more likely to be reduced to writing, and so there is less scope for relying upon
assurances arising out of indirect statements and conduct. Moreover, as Cobbe
demonstrates, it is not generally reasonable for a businessman to rely upon an agreement
which he appreciates is not legally binding.
30
 In contrast, a proprietary estoppel claim in a non-commercial context will generally be
easier to establish. The court in that context is more likely to emphasise the need for
fairness. Whether an oral representation is sufficiently clear will depend upon the context
in which it is given, but Thorner suggests that the court is likely to take a fairly generous
approach. It is also likely to be easier to argue that a claimant who does not have
commercial experience was reasonable in relying on an assurance.


31 Remedies
 If estoppel is established by a claimant seeking to enforce a right against a landowner in
consequence of an assurance, the court can award the claimant the remedy it deems
appropriate
 Orgee v Orgee (1997) court cannot award more than what was ever assured.
32

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 Orgee v Orgee (1997) court cannot award more than what was ever assured.
32
 Crabb v Arun DC (1976) – the court can satisfy the equity in any manner that is appropriate
to the case before it, provided it does the minimum to achieve justice
 The remedy may be:-
 Expectation based – claimant gets what was promised
 Reliance based – claimant gets a remedy that commensurates with the reliance
 A mixture of the above
33
 Court can award the claimant ANY proprietary or personal right in the land.
 Pascoe v Turner (1979) – fee simple
 Celsteel v Alton (1987)– Easement
 Voyce v Voyce (1991) – a complete readjustment of the parties rights on the land.
 Inwards v Baker (1965) – licence for life
 Campbell v Griffin (2001) – One off payment of £ 35,000 and not permitted to remain on
land.
34 Pascoe v. Turner [1979] 1 WLR 431
 The defendant went to live in 1963 with the plaintiff as his housekeeper. In 1964 they
began living together as husband and wife. In 1973 the plaintiff began an affair with
another woman. The defendant relied on a declaration made by the plaintiff that he had
given her the house and she spent her money on it. In 1976 the plaintiff gave the
defendant 2 months notice to quit. She refused to leave the house and the plaintiff
commenced proceedings against her.
35
 Cumming-Bruce LJ :-
 “Weighing such considerations this court concludes that the equity to which the facts in
this case give rise can only be satisfied by compelling the plaintiff to give effect to his
promise and her expectations. He has so acted that he must now perfect the gift.”
 That was a case where the award equalled the expectation, but the court did not come to
that conclusion because the award had to equal the expectation. The court looked at all
the circumstances, including the financial position of the parties.
36 Sledmore v. Dalby (1996) 72 P & CR 196
 Roch LJ
 “In the present case the respondent clearly has assumed that he will be allowed to stay in
this house for the rest of his life rent free. In my judgment this is a case where the
respondent has to be content with something less than his expectations. The Recorder
should have considered the position of the appellant and her needs and balanced those
against the present use of the premises made by the respondent and his present need for
them.”
37
 Sledmore is a case where the court did not merely conclude that the award should satisfy
the expectation. All the members of the court took account of the material circumstances.
The need for proportionality was at the heart of the judgments.

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the expectation. All the members of the court took account of the material circumstances.
The need for proportionality was at the heart of the judgments.
 The fact that he had stayed there rent free for 15 years had ‘extinguished the equity’
38 Gillett v. Holt [2001] Ch. 210
 Robert Walker LJ
 “Since Mr Gillett has established his claim to equitable relief, this court must decide what is
the most appropriate form for the relief to take. The aim is, as Sir Arthur Hobhouse said in
Plimmer v. Wellington Corporation (1884) 9 App. Cas. 699, 714, to "look at the
circumstances in each case to decide in what way the equity can be satisfied." The court
approaches this task in a cautious way, in order to achieve what Scarman L.J. in Crabb v.
Arun District Council [1976] Ch. 179, 198, called "the minimum equity to do justice to the
plaintiff."
39 Campbell v. Griffin [2001] EWCA Civ 990; [2001] W & TLR 981
 Mr Campbell moved in to live as a lodger with Mr and Mrs Ascough in 1987. They had no
children and the relationship developed to the extent that they treated him as their child.
They frequently told him that whatever happened he would have a home for life. Despite
attempts by Mr Ascough to provide for Mr Campbell, the Ascoughs' house passed on his
death to his wife. When she died the property passed under an old will to her nieces.
40
 Robert Walker LJ
 Sledmore v. Dalby is a good illustration of the flexible nature of the court's jurisdiction.
But on the facts of this case I do not consider that Mr Campbell's rent-free occupation
has had the effect of extinguishing his equity

41
 Taking these and all other relevant circumstances into account, I have come to the
conclusion that it would not be right to confer on Mr Campbell (who began as a lodger
with one out of four bedrooms) a right in respect of the whole house which might hold up
the administration of the estate for a whole generation and might also have the effect of
eliminating the other beneficiaries' interests because of mounting interest on the County
Council charge. That charge (with accrued interest) now amounts to about £64,000. The
present value of the house, unencumbered with vacant possession, is about £160,000.

42
 The court has a very wide discretion in satisfying an equity arising under the doctrine of
proprietary estoppel. That discretion includes power to award a fixed sum charged on the
property. I would declare Mr Campbell is entitled to the sum of £35,000 charged on the
property, but that he must give up possession of the property to enable it to be sold by
Mrs Ascough's executors, and that interest on the sum of £35,000 should not start to run
until 56 days after Mr Campbell has given vacant possession in order to enable the house
to be sold. The sum payable to Mr Campbell will not by itself enable him to buy a freehold
house in Worthing, but it will assist him with rehousing himself
43 Jennings v Rice & Ors (2002) EWCA Civ 159
Aldous LJ

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43 Jennings v Rice & Ors (2002) EWCA Civ 159
 Aldous LJ
 “There is a clear line of authority from at least Crabb to the present day which establishes
that once the elements of proprietary estoppel are established an equity arises. The value
of that equity will depend upon all the circumstances including the expectation and the
detriment. The task of the court is to do justice. The most essential requirement is that
there must be proportionality between the expectation and the detriment.”

44
 Daniel Abishegam
 ATC

8
Question 4 Zone B 2008
Co-ownership/Proprietary estoppel

Mr and Mrs Clarke were the registered owners of Stanstead Manor. In 1998 Mr Clarke
wrote to their daughter, Jane, inviting her to come and live with them and look after them
in their old age. “I know that we are asking you to make a substantial sacrifice”, he wrote,
“but we would give you an allowance, we would pay all the household expenses, and, of
course, the house will be yours when we are dead.” Jane agreed. She lived with her
parents and looked after them until her father’s death in 2007. Mrs Clarke and Jane have
now quarrelled and Mrs Clarke has asked Jane to leave the house. Mrs Clarke wishes to
sell the house and buy a smaller one near her sister. She has stopped Jane’s allowance
and she has made a new will leaving all her property to her sister.

Advise Jane

Issue: - Jane needs to establish an interest in the house.

• She will not be able to do so via a resulting trust as the only method of
establishing a resulting trust is if Jane had contributed to the purchase price of the
property. OTF it is clear that she has not done so.
• She may try to establish a CT.
o Discuss the requirements – Lloyds Bank v Rossett
o Stack v Dowden
o Conclude that even with the more relaxed approach to CT as proposed by
Stack and affirmed in Fowler v Baron It is highly unlikely that the courts
will imply a common intention in Jane’s favour.
• Jane is advised to rely on PE
• Proprietary estoppel is an equitable remedy that serves to mitigate the harsh
consequences of an over rigorous reliance on formality.
• The modern doctrine of PE is as laid down by OliverJ in Taylor Fashions v
Liverpool Victoria Trustees – A claimant will be successful in establishing a
claim if he can prove that an assurance was made to him which he relied on to his
detriment in circumstances where it would be unconscionable to deny a remedy to
the claimant.
• The cases are very clear that the 4 elements of a successful claim of PE are not to
be seen as isolated features but each case must be looked at in the round.

The Assurance

• Jane needs to prove that Mr Clark had made some kind of assurance with regards
to the house to her.
• “…the house will be yours when we are dead”. Does this amount to an assurance
for PE. The possible issue here would be that this was a ‘testamentary promise’ ie
a promise to leave property when the legal owner dies.
 • A will by its nature is ambulatory which means that it can be changed at any time.
Is it fair to bind someone to a promise he made to leave property in a will?
• Wayling v Jones, Re Basham – A promise to leave property via a will is sufficient
to establish the assurance for PE. However, the decisions of Taylor v Dickens and
Gillet v Holt (first Instance) seem to challenge this. It was held that what was
required was a irrevocable promise or some kind of double assurance. However
the decision in Gillet was taken up to the COA and there it was held that even
with the ambulatory nature of a will – a clear and consistant intimation of
testamentary intent can be sufficient for PE. However the assurance must be clear
and not a vague and inferred from indirect statements as in Thorner v Major.
• OTF – The statement by Mr. Clark is clear and unambiguous. As such the
assurance needed for PE has been satisfied.
• Another potential issue here would be whether the assurance was a conditional
one.- ie conditional on the fact that Jane must take care of her parents. She has
since left the house after quarelling with her mother. However it is argued that the
reason she has left is because her mother has asked her to leave and not that she
has left voluntarily. She has done all that she could do and she took care of Mr.
Clark till he died. It is submitted that although she has stopped taking care of Mrs.
Clark, Jane is prevented from doing so by Mrs. Clark herself and as such the
assurance will be valid.

The Detriment

• As long as the detriment is not trivial or minimal, any detriment will suffice. OTF
Jane gave up her previous life and moved in with her parents and looked after
them till her father died. This will suffice as detriment.

The Reliance

• Greasley v Cooke – COA held that if clear assurances have been made and
detriment has been suffered, reliance can be presumed. OTF – looking at the
discussion above both assurance and detriment has been satisfied and if there is
no facts to suggest otherwise then the presumption will stand.
• Issue: Would Jane have done what she did if Mr. Clark did not promise that she
would get the house when he dies. Jane was their daughter – possibly she would
have taken care of her parents out of her love for them and not because of the
promise that Mr. Clark made. If this is the case then there will be no presumption
of reliance. In Orgee v Orgee – much of the plaintiff’s detriment were expenses
that he would have incurred anyway in any event. As such there was no reliance.
• However, in Campbell v Griffin – the claimant here had taken care of his
landlords and they had promised him the property in their will. However they did
not change their will accordingly. During the trial the claimant admitted that he
would have assisted the landlords out of normal human compassion rather then in
reliance of the promise. The COA held that a dual motive for the action does not
diminish the reliance. As such on the facts – Jane may have taken care of her
 parents out of normal love that children have for their parents and also because of
the assurance that was made to her. As such in all probability the courts will say
that there is reliance.

Unconscionability

• Oliver J in Taylor Fashions regarded this requirement as the very essence of a

claim of PE. The mere going back on a promise would be deemed unconscionable
especially if the promissory knew about the detrimental reliance on the part of the
promissee.
• OTF- Mrs Clark has enjoyed the benefit of Jane’s care all this while and for her to
rescind the promise now will be unconscionable.

Remedies

• Orgee v Orgee – The court cannot award more than the claimant was ever
assured.
• Jennings v Rice – The remedy must be proportionate to the detriment suffered and
the claim made.
• Crabb v Arun DC – The courts must satisfy the equity in any manner that is
appropriate to the case before the court, provided it does the minimum to achieve
justice between the parties.
• OTF – Jane was promised the fee simple of the house and according to Pascoe v
Turner this would be possible. However, we must consider the benefits that Jane
had obtained from the entire event.
• Sledmore v Dalby – The benefits obtained must be weighed against the detriment
suffered. OTF – She received free room and board, an allowance an all her
expenses taken care off. This would be a substantial benefit that she obtained that
she probably would not have received if she did not take care of her parents.
• In the circumstances any equity that may have arisen in her favour may have been
extinguished by the benefits she received.
• Jane may receive nothing at all as per Sledmore v Dalby. Or she could get a one
off payment as in Campbel v Griffin.
• Whatever remedy that Jane obtains from the courts can today be protected by
entering a notice on to the register – s.29 LRA02. This is by virtue of
s.116LRA02.

Prepared by
Daniel Abishegam
Question 7 Zone B 2009
Proprietary Estoppel (Essay)

Critically assess the contribution that the equitable doctrine of proprietary estoppel makes
to modern land law.

• What is PE?

Denning MR in Crab v Arun

“to prevent a person from insisting on his strict legal rights - whether arising under
contract, or on his title deeds, or by statute- when it would be inequitable for him to do so
having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties”

It is essentially a set of principles whereby an owner of the land may be held to have
conferred some right or privilege connected with the land on another person, despite the
absence of deed, registered disposition, written contract or valid will. Typically this right
will arise out of the conduct of the parties.

At one time, the conditions for the operation of PE were fairly strictly drawn and these
were laid down by Fry LJ in Willmott v Barber (1880). These were very strictand difficult
to comply with.

The more modern approach to PE has been laid down by Oliver J in Taylor Fashions v
Liverpool Victoria Trustees. He says that a claimant will be able to establish an estoppel
if they can prove an assurance, reliance and detriment in circumstances where it would be
unconscionable to deny a remedy to the claimant. Jennings v Rice makes it clear that
these 4 requirements are not to be seen as isolated features, but that each case must be
looked at “in the round”

It is an equitable remedy that enables the judge to do justice in situations where the strict
adherence to the law is not fair.

Contributions of PE

PE provides a mechanism by which the courts are able to do justice, especially in

domestic situations where the circumstances do not always fall exactly into the
structured framework of property law.

Certainty is prized in property law as it is needed to ensure that property owners know
exactly the extent of the encumberences on their land. However sometimes the rigid
adherence to this may lead to injustice.

For example:
PE can be used to perfect an imperfect gift. If a person wanted to gift a piece of land to
someone else that gift must be completed with the proper documentations. In the absence
of this, this is an incomplete gift and according to Milroy v Lord (1862),

However in Dillwyn v Llewelyn (1862) – A father places his son in possession of land
belonging to the father. They sign an informal memorandum showing intention that the
land be transferred to the son for the sons dwelling house. The son spent a lot of money
building a house on the land. The father then died without transferring the land.

Held: The intention to transfer must be performed via PE and the son will get the land.

Comment: This is a classic example of the doctrine at work. If the strict formalities were
relied on a grave injustice would have occurred.

Not only in a situation where there was intention to transfer and no transfer took plave,
PE also assists in common expectation cases;

In Ramsden v Dyson Kingsdown LJ held

“If a man, under a verbal agreement with a landlord for a certain interest in land, or,
what amounts to the same thing, under an expectation, created or encouraged by the
landlord, that he shall have a certain interest, takes possession of such land, with the
consent of the landlord, and upon the faith of such promise or expectation, with the
knowledge of the landlord and without objections from him, lays out money upon that
land, a Court of equity will compel the landlord to give effect to such promise or
expectation”

In the case of ER Ives Investment v High (1967) – A common intention between two
neighbours that one had a right of way over the others land cannot be defeated by a
subsequent purchaser.

PE also has been instrumental in situations where one party is intending establish a
beneficial share in property when although strictly legally they are not entitled to a share
but justice dictates that they should have a share.

In Greasely v Cooke a lady who had worked in the home for 40 years without pay, first as
a domestic helper and later as common law wife was held to deserve a share in the
property. This once again illustrates how PE is instrumental in giving the courts an
avenue to do justice in situations that they see fit.

PE provides the court with a wide range of remedies to suit the specific
circumstances of each case

The courts are able to grant specific performance of expectation or recovery of reliance
loss. There has always been doubt as to which the courts should be granting. The courts
seem to have come to a flexible compromise where they set the claimants expectation as
the maximum limit and the reliance loss as the minimum limit. The actual remedy will be
somewhere in between as long as the claimant has his equity satisfied. This is as per
Robert Walker LJ in Gillet v Holt.

Remedies can range from:-

The full fee simple as in Pascoe v Turner

Nothing at all as in Sledmore v Dalby
One off payments in Campbell v Griffin

We see that the courts can tailor a specific remedy to satisfy the equity for each specific
circumstance.

Despite the benefits that PE has brought to English Land Law, PE has been criticized as
sometimes undermining the rules of formalities too much. If PE no longer is the
exception but becomes the rule then the strict rules of formality become redundant.

For example:

Matharu v Matharu – The claimant got to stay in the property for the rest of her life
although she had no other interest in the land

Wayling v Jones, Gillet v Holt, Jennings v Rice, Thorner v Curtis – Claimants established
a right to the land promised to them but not left in a will.

Flowermix v Site Development – A contract that was void for uncertainty was enforced
via PE

Joyce v Rigolli – Courts used PE to enforce a contract that was completely devoid of
writing

Kinane v Alimamy Mackie-Conteh – PE was used to validate a mortgage that failed

completely to meet any formality requirement

However the courts have reigned this back somewhat in recent decisions. In Yeomans
Row Management v Cobbe (2008) the claimant reached an oral agreement in principle to
buy a property and spent considerable sums of money in obtaining planning permission.
The owner then refused to proceed on the agreed terms and enter into a binding contract.

The HOL held that the developer was not entitled to a remedy in PE reversing the
decision of the CoA. Since neither party thought that the agreement was enforceable
s.2LP(MP)A 89 cannot be estopped. The lower courts had pushed PE too far.

However, this has not diminished the role of PE in any way. Cobbe though is a welcome
decision has been distinguished in circumstances where justice so requires – Thorner v
Major.
PE’s contribution to Land Law is clear.

Daniel Abishegam