INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD. vs. NLRC, LABOR ARBITER NICASIO P.

ANINON
AND PANTALEON DE LOS REYES
FACTS:
On June 17, 1994, respondent Labor Arbiter dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the case filed by private respondent
Pantaleon De Los Reyes against Insular Life for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries and back wages
after it was found that there was no EER between De Los Reyes and Insular Life. When De Los Reyes filed for an
appeal before the NLRC, order of dismissal was reversed by the respondent (NLRC) which ruled that respondent
was actually an employee. Insular Life filed for a motion for reconsideration, however it was denied. NLRC
remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for hearing on merits. Petitioner, seeking relief through this special civil
action for certiorari with prayer for a restraining order, filed a case praying for annulment of the decision of
NLRC denying the motion for reconsideration of the decision. It faults NLRC for acting without jurisdiction and/or
with grave abuse of discretion when, contrary to established facts and pertinent law and jurisprudence, it
reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioner reprises the stand it assumed that it never had any EER
with private respondent, this being an express agreement between them in agency contracts, particularly
reinforced by the stipulation therein de los Reyes was allowed discretion to devise ways and means to fulfill his
obligations as agent and would be paid commission fees based on his actual output.

ISSUE: WON petitioner’s contention is with merit?

HELD:
No. SC held that NLRC acted appropriately within the bounds of law. The contract was prepared thereto by
petitioner, and it was stated that no EER shall be created between the two and that he was free to exercise his
own judgment in soliciting insurance. However, de los Reyes was prohibited to work for any other life insurance
company, it be a ground for termination of contract. Private respondent was required to submit all completed
applications for insurance within 90 consecutive days, deliver policies, receive and collect initial premiums and
balances of first year premiums, renewal premiums, deposits on applications and payments on policy loans.
Priv. respondent was also bound to turn over to the company immediately any and all sums of money collected
by hi. Priv. respondent was urged by petitioner to register with SSS as a self-employed individual as provided
under PD No. 1636. De los reyes was appointed an acting unit manager under the petitioner’s office in Cebu; his
duties being training and organizing competent underwriters. It was similarly provided in the management
contract that the relation of the acting unit manager and/or the agents of his unit to the company shall be that
of independent contractor. They were able to exercise judgment as to time, place, and means of soliciting
insurance. Also, priv. respondent was expressly obliged to participate in the company’s conservation program.
He could not also accept a managerial or supervisory position in any firm doing business in the Philippines
without the written consent of the petitioner. NLRC took into account that de los reyes was under the effective
control of petitioner in the critical and most important aspects of his work as Unit Manager. The existence of
EER cannot be negated by expressly repudiating it in the management contract and providing therein that the
employee is an independent contractor when the terms of agreement clearly show otherwise. Exclusivity of
service, control of assignments and removal of agents under private respondents unit, collection of premiums,
furnishing of company facilities and materials as well as capital described as Unit Development Fund are but
hallmarks of the management system in which herein private respondent worked.
GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION vs. HONORATO JUDICO and NLRC
FACTS:
Honorato Judico filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against GREPALIFE, a duly recognized insurance firm,
before the NLRC. Said complaint prayed for award of money claims consisting of separation pay, unpaid salary,
and 13th month pay, refund of cash bond, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Labor Arbiter
dismissed the complaint on the ground that there was no EER between the parties but ordered petitioner to
pay a sum of P1,000.00 by reason of Christian Charity. NLRC reversed the decision. Petitioner and private
respondent entered into an agreement of agency with petitioner GREPALIFE to become a debit agent (an
insurance agent selling/servicing industrial life plans and policy holders. Industrial life plans are those whose
premiums are payable either daily, weekly or monthly and which are collectible by the debit agents at the home
or any place designated by the policy holder). Petitioner argues that Judico’s compensation was not based on
any fixed number of hours, he was required to devote to the service of petitioner company but rather it was the
production or result of his efforts that was being compensated and that the so-called allowance for the first 13
weeks that Judico worked as debit agent, cannot be construed as salary but as a subsidy or a way of assistance
for transportation and meal expenses of a new debit agent. Private respondent however strongly rejected this.

ISSUE: WON there exists an EER between GREPALIFE and Judico

HELD:
Yes. The SC see that there is an element of control by the petitioner upon Judico. Judico shoulders his own
expenses and that his compensation (agents on commission/registered representatives who work on
commission basis) is not paid by the company but by the investor (persons insured). Whereas, in private
respondent's case, the undisputed facts show that he was controlled by petitioner insurance company not only
as to the kind of work; the amount of results, the kind of performance but also the power of dismissal.
Undoubtedly, private respondent, by nature of his position and work, had been a regular employee of petitioner
and is therefore entitled to the protection of the law and could not just be terminated without valid and
justifiable cause.