IST.
IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
ARTICLE 12 OF RCP
Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — the following are
exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid
interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law
defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the
hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be
permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
2. A person under nine years of age.
3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with
discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in
accordance with the provisions of Art. 80 of this Code.
When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in
conformably with the provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall
commit him to the care and custody of his family who shall be charged with his
surveillance and education otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some
institution or person mentioned in said Art. 80.
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an
injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.
5. Any person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force.
6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal
or greater injury.
7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by
some lawful insuperable cause.
A. INSANITY
PEOPLE VS. BONOAN
LAUREL, J.:
On January 5, 1935, the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila filed an
information charging Celestino Bonoan, the defendant-appellant herein, with
the crime of murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1934, in the City of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said accused, with evident premeditation and treachery,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any justifiable
motive and with the decided purpose to kill one Carlos Guison, attack, assault
and stab the said Carlos Guison on the different parts of his body with a knife,
thereby inflicting upon him the following injuries, to wit:
"One stab wound at the right epigastric region penetrating one cm. into the
superior surace of the right lobe of the liver; and three non-penetrating stab
wounds located respectively at the posterior and lateral lumbar region, and left
elbow", which directly caused the death of the said Carlos Guison three days
afterwards.
On January 16, 1935, the case was called for the arraignment of the accused.
The defense counsel forthwith objected to the arraignment on the ground that
the defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time confined in the
Psychopatic Hospital. The court thereupon issued an order requiring the
Director of the Hospital to render a report on the mental condition of the
accused. Accordingly, Dr. Toribio Joson, assistant alientist, rendered his
report,Exhibit 4, hereinbelow incorporated. On March 23, 1935, the case was
again called for the arraignment of the accused, but in view of the objection of
the fiscal, the court issued another order requiring the doctor of the Psyhopatic
Hospital who examined the defendant to appear and produce the complete
record pertaining to the mental condition of the said defendant. Pursuant to this
order, Dr. Toribio Joson appeared before the court on March 26, 1935 for the
necessary inquiry. Thereafter, the prosecution and the defense asked the court
to summon the other doctors of the hospital for questioning as to the mental
condition of the accused, or to place the latter under a competent doctor for a
closer observation. The trial court then issued an order directing that the
accused be placed under the chief alienist or an assistant alienist of the
Psychopatic Hospital for his personal observation and the subsequent
submission of a report as to the true mental condition of the patient. Dr. Jose
A. Fernandez, assistant alienist of the Psychopathic Hospital, rendered his
report, Exhibit 5, on June 11, 1935. On June 28, 1935, the case was called again.
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Dr. Fernandez appeared before the court and ratified his report, Exhibit 5,
stating that the accused was not in a condition to defend himself. In view
thereof, the case was suspended indefinitely.
On January 21, 1936, Dr. Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that the
defendant could be discharged from the hospital and appear for trial, as he was
"considered a recovered case." Summoned by the court, Dr. Fernandez,
appeared and testified that the accused "had recovered from the disease." On
February 27, 1936, the accused was arraigned, pleaded "not guilty" and trial was
had.
After trial, the lower court found the defendant guilty of the offense charged in
the information above-quoted and sentenced him to life imprisonment, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs.
The defendant now appeals to this court and his counsel makes the following
assignment of errors:
A. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence establishes that the
accused has had dementia only occasionally and intermittently and has not had
it immediately prior to the commission of the defense.
B. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence in this case further shows
that during and immediately after the commission of the offense, the accused
did not show any kind of abnormality either in behavior, language and
appearance, or any kind of action showing that he was mentally deranged.
C. The court a quo erred in declaring that under the circumstances that burden
was on the defense to show hat the accused was mentally deranged at the time
of the commission of the offense, and that the defense did not establish any
evidence to this effect.
D. The court a quo in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged and in
not acquitting him thereof.
It appears that in the morning of December 12, 1934, the defendant Celestino
Bonoan met the now deceased Carlos Guison on Avenida Rizal near a
barbershop close to Tom's Dixie Kitchen. Francisco Beech, who was at the
time in the barbershop, heard the defendant say in Tagalog, "I will kill you."
Beech turned around and saw the accused withdrawing his right hand, which
held a knife, from the side of Guison who said, also in Tagalog, "I will pay you",
but Bonoan replied saying that he would kill him and then stabbed Guison
thrice on the left side. The assaultt was witnessed by policeman Damaso
Arnoco who rushed to the scene and arrested Bonoan and took possession of
the knife, Exhibit A. Guison was taken to the Philippine General Hospital
where he died two days later. Exhibit C is the report of the autopsy performed
on December 15, 1934, by Dr. Sixto de los Angeles.
As the killing of the deceased by the defendant-appellant is admitted, it does not
seem necessary to indulge in any extended analysis of the testimony of the
witnesses for the prosecution. The defense set up being that of insanity, the
only question to be determined in this appeal is whether or not the defendant-
appellant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime charged.
On the question of insanity as a defense in criminal cases, and the incidental
corollaries as to the legal presumption and the kind and quantum of evidence
required, theories abound and authorities are in sharp conflict. Stated generally,
courts in the United States proceed upon three different theories. (See Herzog,
Alfred W., Medical Jurisprudence [1931], sec. 655 et seq., p. 479 et seq.; also
Lawson, Insanity in Criminal Cases, p. 11 et seq.) The first view is that insanity
as a defense in a confession and avoidance and as must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt when the commission of a crime is established, and the
defense of insanity is not made out beyond a reasonable doubt, conviction
follows. In other words, proof of insanity at the time of committing the criminal
act should be clear and satisfactory in order to acquit the accused on the ground
of insanity (Hornblower, C. J., in State vs. Spencer, 21 N. J. L., 196). The
second view is that an affirmative verdict of insanity is to be governed by a
preponderance of evidence, and in this view, insanity is not to be established
beyond a reasonable doubt. According to Wharton in his "Criminal Evidence"
(10th ed.,vol. I, sec. 338), this is the rule in England (Reg. vs. Layton, 4 Cox, C.
C., 149; Reg. vs. Higginson, 1 Car. & K., 130), and in Alabama, Arkansas,
California, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia and West
Virginia. The third view is that the prosecution must prove sanity beyond a
reasonable doubt (Dais vs. United States, 160 U. S. 496; 40 Law. ed., 499; 16
Sup. Ct. Rep., 353; Hotema vs. United States, 186 U. S., 413; 46 Law. ed., 1225;
22 Sup. Ct. Rep., 895; United States vs. Lancaster, 7 Biss., 440; Fed. Cas. No.
15,555; United States vs. Faulkner, 35 Fed., 730). This liberal view is premised
on the proposition that while it is true that the presumption of sanity exists at
the outset, the prosecution affirms every essential ingredients of the crime
charged, and hence affirms sanity as one essential ingredients, and that a fortiori
where the accused introduces evidence to prove insanity it becomes the duty of
the State to prove the sanity of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
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In the Philippines, we have approximated the first and stricter view (People vs.
Bacos [1922], 44 Phil., 204). The burden, to be sure, is on the prosecution to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime, but
insanity is presumed, and ". . . when a defendant in a criminal case interposes
the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon
him. . . ." (U. S. vs. Martinez [1916], 34 Phil., 305, 308, 309; U. S. vs. Bascos,
supra.) We affirm and reiterate this doctrine.
In the case at bar, the defense interposed being that the defendant was insane at
the time he killed the deceased, the obligation of proving that affirmative
allegation rests on the defense. Without indulging in fine distinctions as to the
character and degree of evidence that must be presented sufficiently convincing
evidence, direct or circumstantial, to a degree that satisfies the judicial mind that
the accused was insane at the time of the perpetration of the offense? In order
to ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible
to receive evidence of the condition of his mind a reasonable period both
before and after that time. Direct testimony is not required (Wharton, Criminal
Evidence, p. 684; State vs. Wright, 134 Mo., 404; 35 S. W., 1145; State vs.
Simms, 68 Mo., 305; Rinkard vs. State, 157 Ind., 534; 62 N. E., 14; People vs.
Tripler, I Wheeler, Crim. Cas., 48), nor are specific acts of derangement
essential (People vs. Tripler, supra) to established insanity as a defense. Mind
can only be known by outward acts. Thereby, we read the thoughts, the motives
and emotions of a person and come to determine whether his acts conform to
the practice of people of sound mind. To prove insanity, therefore,
cicumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffice (People vs. Bascos
[1922], 44 Phil., 204).
The trial judge arrived at the conclusion that the defendantwas not insane at the
time of the commission of the act for which he was prosecuted on the theory
that the insanity was only occassional or intermittent and not permanentor
continuous (32 C. J., sec. 561, p. 757). We are appraised of the danger of
indulging in the preseumption ofcontinuity in cases of temporary or spasmodic
insanity.We appreciate the reason forthe contrary rule. To be sure, courts
should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or eccentricity,
mental weakness or mere depression resulting from physical ailment. The State
should guard against sane murderers escaping punishment through a general
plea of insanity. In the case at bar, however, we are not cconcerned with
connecting two or more attacks of insanity to show the continuance thereof
during the intervening period or periods but with the continuity of a particular
and isolated attack prior to the commission of the crime charged, and ending
with a positive diagnosis of insanity immediately following the commission of
the act complained of. Upon the other hand, there are facts and circumstances
of record which can not be overlooked.The following considerations have
weighed heavily upon the minds of the majority of this court in arriving at a
conclusion different from that reached by the court below:.
(a) From the evidence presented by the defense, uncontradicted by the
prosecution, it appears that the herein defendant-appellant, during the periods
from April 11 to April 26, 1922, and from January 6 to January 10, 1926, was
confined in the insane department of the San Lazaro Hospital suffering from a
disease diagnosed as dementia præcox. His confinement during these periods, it
is true, was long before the commission of the offense on December 12, 1934,
but this is a circumstance which tends to show that the recurrence of the
ailment at the time of the occurence of the crime is not entirely lacking of any
rational or scientific foundation.
(b) All persons suffering from dementia præcox are clearly to be regarded as
having mental disease to a degree that disqualifies them for legal responsibility
for their actions (Mental Disorder in Medico-Legal Relations by Dr. Albert M.
Barrett in Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxology, vol. I,
p. 613). According to Dr. Elias Domingo, chief alienist of the Insular
Psychopathic Hospital, the symptoms of dementia præcox, in certain peeriods
of excitement, are similar to those of manic depresive psychosis (p. 19, t. s. n.)
and, in either case, the mind appears "deteriorated" because, "when a person
becomes affected by this kind of disease, either dementia præcox or manic
depresive psychosis, during the period of excitement, he has no control
whatever of his acts." (P. 21, t. s. n.) Even if viewed under the general medico-
legal classification of manic-depressive insanity, "it is largely in relation with the
question of irrestible impulse that forensic relations of manic actions will have
to be considered. There is in this disorder a pathologic lessening or normal
inhibitions and the case with which impulses may lead to actions impairs
deliberations and the use of normal checks to motor impulses" (Peterson,
Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxology [2d ed., 1926], vol, I, p.
617).
(c) According to the uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, at
one time an interne at San LazaroHospital, for four (4) days immediately
preceding December 12, 1934 — the date when the crime was committed —
the defendant and appellant had "an attack of insomnia", which is one of the
symptoms of, and may lead to, dementia præcox (Exhibit 3, defense testimony
of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, pp. 13, 14, t. s. n.).
(d) The defendant-appellant appears to have been arrested and taken to the
police station on the very same day of the perpetration of the crime, and
although attempted were made by detectives to secure a statement from him
(see Exhibit B and D and testimony of Charles Strabel, t. s. n. pp. 9, 10) he was
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sent by the police department to the Psychopathic Hospital the day following
the commission of the crime. This is an indication that the police authorities
themselves doubted the mental normalcy of the acused, which doubt found
confirmation in the official reports submitted by the specialists of the San
Lazaro Hospital.
(e) According to the report (Exhibit 4) of the alienist in charge, Dr. Toribio
Joson, which report was made within the first month of treatment, the
defendant was suffering from a form of psychosis, called manic depressive
psychosis.We quote the report in full:
INSULAR PSYCHOPATIC HOSPITAL
MANDALUYONG, RIZAL
January 15, 1935.
MEMORANDUM FOR: The chief Alienist, Insular Psychopatic
Hospital, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
SUBJECT: Patient Celestino Bonoan, male,
Filipino, 30 years old, sent by the
Secret Service of the City of Manila
for mental examinition.
1. MENTAL STATUS:
(a) General behavior. — The patient is undetective, staying most of the time in
his bed with his eyes closed and practically totally motionless. At other times,
however, but on very rare occassions and at short intervals he apparently wakes
up and then he walks around, and makes signs and ritualistic movements with
the extremities and other parts of the body. Ordinarily he takes his meal but at
times he refuses to take even the food offered by his mother or sister, so that
there have been days in the hospital when he did not take any nourishment. On
several occassions he refused to have the bath, or to have his hair cut and beard
shaved, and thus appear untidy. He would also sometimes refuse his medicine,
and during some of the intervals he displayed impulsive acts, such as stricking
his chest or other parts of the body with his fists and at one time after a short
interview, he struck strongly with his fist the door of the nurse's office without
apparent motivation. He also sometimes laughs, or smiles, or claps his hands
strongly without provocation.
(b) Stream of talk. — Usually the patient is speechless, can't be persuaded to
speak, and would not answer in any form the questions propounded to him.
Very often he is seen with his eyes closed apparently praying as he was
mumbling words but would not answer at all when talked to. At one time he
was seen in this condition with a cross made of small pieces of strick in his
hand. He at times during the interviews recited passages in the literature as for
example the following.
"La virtud y las buenas costumbres son la verdadera nobleza del hombre.
(Truthfulness, honesty and loyalty are among the attributes of a dependable
character.)"
At one time he tried to recite the mass in a very loud voice in the hospital.
(c) Mood. — Patient is usually apathetic and indifferent but at times he looks
anxious and rather irritable. He himself states that the often feels said in the
hospital.
(d) Orientation. — During the periods that he was acccessible he was found
oriented as to place and person but he did not know the day or the date.
(e) Illusion and hallucination. — The patient states that during the nights that
he could not sleep he could hear voices telling him many things. Voices, for
example, told that he should escape. That he was going to be killed because he
was benevolet. That he could sometimes see the shadow of his former
sweetheart in the hospital. There are times however when he could not hear or
see at all anything.
(f ) Delusion and misinterpretation. — On one occassion he told the examiner
that he could not talk in his first day in the hospital because of a mass he felt he
had in his throat. He sometimes thinks that he is already dead and already
buried in the La Loma Cemetery.
(g) Compulsive phenomena. — None.
(h) Memory. — The patient has a fairly good memory for remote events, but his
memory for recent events or for example, for events that took place during his
stay in the hospital he has no recollection at all.
(i) Grasp of general informartion. — He has a fairly good grasp of general
information. He could not, however, do simple numerial tests as the 100-7 test.
( j) Insight and judgment. — At his fairly clear periods he stated that he might
have been insane during his first days in the hospital, but just during the
interview on January 14, 1935, he felt fairly well. Insight and judgment were, of
course, nil during his stuporous condition. During the last two days he has
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shown marked improvement in his behavior as to be cooperative, and coherent
in his speech.
2. OPINION AND DIAGNOSIS:
The patient during his confinement in the hospital has been found suffering
from a form of physchosis, called Manic depressive psychosis.
(Sgd.) TORIBIO JOSON, M. D.
Assistant Alienist
In the subsequent report, dated June 11, 1935 (Exhibit 5), filed by Dr. Jose A.
Fernandez, another assistant alienist in the Insular Pshychopatic Hospital, the
following conclusion was reached:
I am of the opinion that actually this patient is sick. He is suffering from the
Manic Depressive form of psychosis. It might be premature to state before the
court has decided this case, but I believe it a duty to state, that this person is not
safe to be at large. He has a peculiar personality make-up, a personality lacking
in control, overtly serious in his dealings with the every day events of this
earthly world, taking justice with his own hands and many times executing it in
an impulsive manner as to make his action over proportionate — beyond
normal acceptance. He is sensitive, overtly religious, too idealistic has taste and
desires as to make him queer before the average conception of an earthly man.
He will always have troubles and difficulaties with this world of realities.
(Sgd.) J. A. Fernandez, M. D.
Assistant Alienist
To prove motive and premeditation and, indirectly, mental normlacy of the
accused at the time of the commission of the crime, the prosecution called on
policeman Damaso Arnoco. Arnoco testified that upon arresting the defendant-
appellant he inquired from the latter for the reason for the assault and the
defendant-appellant replied that the deceased Guison owed him P55 and would
pay; that appellant bought the knife, Exhibit A, for 55 centavos in Tabora Street
and that for two days he had been watching for Guison in order to kill him (pp.
5, 6, t. s. n.). Benjamin Cruz, a detective, was also called and corroborated the
testimony of policeman Arnoco. That such kind of evidence is not necessarily
proof of the sanity of the accused during the commission of the offense, is clear
from what Dr. Sydney Smith, Regius Professor of Forensic Medicine, University
of Edinburg, said in his work on Forensic Medicine (3d ed. [London], p. 382),
that in the type of dementia præcox, "the crime is ussually preceded by much
complaining and planning. In these people, homicidal attcks are common,
because of delusions that they are being interfered with sexually or that their
property is being taken."
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the defendant-appellant was
demented at the time he perpetrated the serious offense charged in the
information and that conseuently he is exempt from criminal liability.
Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed, and the
defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio in both instances. In
conforminty with paragraph 1 of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, the
defendant shall kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital or such other
hospital for the insane as may be desiganted by the Director of the Philippine
Health Service, there to remain confined until the Court of First Instance of
Manila shall otherwise order or decree. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
IMPERIAL, J., dissenting:
I agree with the dissenting opinions of Hustices Diaz and Concepcion.
There is not question as to the facts constituting the crime imputed to the
accused. The disagreement arises from the conclusions which both opinions
attempt to infer therefrom. The majority opinon establishes the conclusion that
the accused was not in his sound mind when he committed the crime because
he was then suffering from dementia præcox. The dissenting opinions, in
establishing the conclusion that the accused was then in the possession of his
mental facilities, or, at leats, at a lucid interval, are based on the fact admitted by
the parties and supported by expert testimony, that the accused, before the
commission of the crime, had been cured of dementia præcox and later of
manic depressive psychosis. The majority opinion admits that there is no
positive evidence regarding the mantal state of the accused when he comitted
the crime, but it infers from the facts that he must have then been deprived of
his reason. This inference is not sufficiently supported by the circumtantial
evidence. I it is admitted that the legal presumption is that a person who
commits a crime is in his right mind (U. S. vs. Hontiveros Carmona, 18 Phil.,
62; U. S. vs. Guevara, 27 Phil., 547; U. S. vs. Zamora, 32 Phil., 218; U. S. vs.
Martinez, 34 Phil., 305; People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil., 204), because the law
presumes all acts and ommissions punishable by law to be voluntary (art. 1,
Penal Code; article 4, subsection 1, Revised Penal Code), and if, as it appears,
there is sufficient or satisfactory evidence that the accused was mentally
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incapacitated when he committed the crime, the conclusion of fact must be the
same presumption established by law, that is, that he was in his right mind, and
the conclusion of law must be that he is criminal liable.
There is another detail worth mentioning which is that no credit was given to
the conclusions of fact arrived at by the judge who tried the case. He observed
and heard the witnesses who testified and he had the advantage of testing their
credibility nearby. After weighing all the evidence he arrived at the conclusion
that the accused committed the crime while he was in his right mind. This court
generally gives much weight to the conclusions of fact of the judge who tried
the case in the first instance and does not reject them useless they are clearly in
conflict with the evidence.
DIAZ, J., dissenting:
I do not agree to the majority opinion. The appellant committed the crime while
he was sane, or at least, during a lucid interval. He did not kill his victim without
rhyme or reason and only for the sake of killing him. He did so to avenge
himself or to punish his victim for having refused, according to him, to pay a
debt of P55 after having made him many promises. He so stated clearly to the
policeman who arrested him immediately after the incident; and he made it so
understood to the witness Mariano Yamson, a friend of both the appellant and
his victim, before the commission of the crime.
The law presumes that everybody is in his sound mind because ordinarily such
is his normal condition. Insanity is an exception which may be said to exist only
when thereis satisfactorily evidence establishing it and it certainly is not always
permanent because there are cases in which it comes and takes place only
occasionaly and lasts more or less time according to the circumstances of the
individual, that is, the condition of his health, his environment, and the other
contributory causes thereof. The law itself recognizes this, so much so that in
establishing the rule that insane persons are excempt from criminal liability,
because they commit no crime, it also makes the exception that this is true only
when they have not acted during a lucid intervals (art. 12, subsec. 1, of the
Revised Penal Code).
The appellant was afflicted with insanity only for a few days during the months
stated in the majority opinion; April 1922 and January 1926, but he was later
pronounced cured in the hospital where he had been confined because he had
already returned to normalcy by recovering his reason. For this one fact alone,
instead of stating that he acted during a lucid interval on said occasion, it should
be said on the contrary, taking into consideration the explanations given by him
to the policemen who arrested him and to other witnesses for the prosecution
with whom he had been talking before and after the incident, that he acted
while in the full possession of his mental faculties.
The fact that the appellant was aflicted with manic depressive psychosis after
the crime, as certified by Drs. Toribio Joson, J. A. Fernandez and Elias
Domingo who examined him, does not prove that he was so afflicted on the
date and at the time of the commission of the crime nor that said ailment,
taking for granted that he was suffering therefrom, had deprived him of his
reason to such an extent that he could not account for his acts.
There is no evidence of record to show that the appellant was actually insane
when he committed the crime or that he continued to be afflicted with said
ailment for which he had to be confined in the insane asylum for some days
during the months above-stated, in 1922 and 1926. The most reasonable rule
which should be adopted in these cases is the one followed by various courts of
the United States stated in 32 C. J., 757, section 561, and 16 C. J., 538, 539,
section 1012 as follows:
If the insanity, admitted, or proved, is only occassional or intermittent in its
nature, the presumption of its continuance does not arise, and he who relies on
such insanity proved at another time must prove its existence also at the time
alleged. (32 C. J., 757, sec. 561.)
Where it is shown that defendant had lucid intervals, it will be presumed that
the offense was committed in one of them. A person who has been adjudged
insane, or who has been committed to a hospital or to an asylum for the insane,
is presumed to continue insane; but as in the case of prior insanity generally, a
prior adjudication of insanity does not raise a presumption of continued
insanity, where the insanity is not of a permanent or continuing character, or
where, for a considerable period of time, the person has been on parole from
the hospital or asylum to which he was committed, or where he escaped from
the asylum at a time when he was about to be discharged. (16 C. J., 538, 539,
sec. 1012.)
On the other hand, in Clevenger's Medical Jirusprudence of Insanity (vol. 1, pp.
482 and 484, the following appears:
Fitful and exceptional attacks of insanity are not presumed to be continuous.
And the existence of prior or subsequent lunacy, except where it is habitual,
does not suffice to change the burden of proof. And where an insane person
has lucid intervals offenses committed by him will be presumed to have been
committed in a lucid intervals unless the contrary appears. The maxim "Once
insane presumed always to be insane" does not apply where the malady or
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delusion under which the alleged insane person labored was in its nature
accidental or temporary, or the effect of some sickness or disease.
And in order to raise a presumption of continuance it must be of permanent
type or a continuing nature or possessed of the characteristics of an habitual
and confirmed disorder of the mind. And it must appear to have been of such
duration and character as to indicate the probability of its continuance, and not
simply the possibility or probability of its recurrence. And there should be some
evidence tending to show settled insanity as contradistinguished from
temporary aberration or hallucination, to justify an instruction which does nor
recognize such a distinction.
It is alleged that the appellant was suffering from insomia before he committed
the crime in question. Such condition does not necessarily prove that on the day
in question he was actually insane. Insomia, according to Dr. Elias Domingo, is
not an exlcusive symptom of insanity; other diseases and ailments also have it (t.
s. n., p.19).
In view of the foregoing considerations and of those stated in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Concepcion, I vote for the affirmance of the appealed
sentence, because in my opinion it is supported by the evidence and in
accordance with law.
CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:
I dissent: Above all, I wish to state: (1) that the crime committed by the accused
is an admitted fact; and (2) that I adhere to the statement of the majority that it
is settled in this jurisdiction that a defense based upon the insanity of the
accused should be established by means of clear, indubitable and satisfactory
evidence.
On December 12, 1934, the accused stabbed the deceased Carlos Guison who,
as a result the wounds received by him, died in the hospital two days after the
aggression.
It is alleged that the accused was insane at the time he committed this crime.
What evidence is there of record in support of this defense? Mention has been
made of the fact that the accused had been confined in the san Lazaro Hospital
and later in the Psychopathic Hospital. He was confined in the San Lazaro
Hospital from April 11 to April 26, 1922. He returned to the hospital on
January 6, 1926, and left on the 10th of said month and years. Dr Elias
Domingo, chief alienist of the Psychopathic Hospital was questioned as follows:
Q. When he left the hospital, can you state whether he was already completely
cured of his insanity? — A. He wassocially adjustable.
Q. What do you mean by socially adjustable? — A. That he could adapt himself
to environment.
There is no evidence that from the month of January, 1926, when he was
declared cured at the Psychopathic Hospital, to December 12, 1934, the date of
the crime, he had shown signs of having had a relapse. Therefore it is a proven
fact during the long period of nine years the accused had been sane.
It is alleged, however, that four days before the crime the accused was under
treatment by Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco because he was suffering from
insomia. Dr. Francisco admitted that he was not a specialist in mental diseases.
He is, therefore, disqualified from testifying satisfactorily on the mental
condition of the accused four days before the crime; and in fact neither has Dr.
Francisco given any convincing testimony to prove that when the accused was
under treatment by him he was suffering from dementia præcox, as the only
thing he said was that the accused-appellant had an attack of insomia which is
one of the symptoms of and may lead to dementia præcox (Exhibit 3; t. s. n.,
pp. 13, 14). This is not an affirmation of a fact but of a mere possibility. The
innoncence of the accused cannot be based on mere theories or possibilities. To
prove insanity as a defense, material, incontrovertible facts, although
circumstantial, are necessary.
On the contrary the evidence shows that on the day the accused committed the
crime he talked and behaved as an entirely normal man. Policemen Damaso T.
Arnoco and Benjamin Cruz testified that the accused, after having been asked
why he had attacked Carlos Guison, replied that it was because Guison owed
him P55 for a long time and did not pay him. The accused stated that he bought
the knife with which he had stabbed Guison on Tabora Street for fifty centavos
and he had been waiting for two days to kill Guison. The accused took his
dinner at noon on December 12th. The statement of the accused which was
taken in writing by detectives Charles Strubel and Manalo on December12th
was left unfinished because Cruz of the Bureau of Labor arrived and told the
accused not to be a fool and not to make any statement. Thereafter the accused
refused to continue his statement. All of these show that on that day the
accused behaved as a sane man and he even appeared to be prudent, knowing
how to take advantage of advice favorable to him, as that given him by Cruz of
the Bureau of Labor. Furthermore it cannot be said hat the accused had stabbed
Guison through hallucination because it is an established fact that his victim
really owed him money as confirmed by the fact that when Guison was stabbed
he cried to the accused "I am going to pay you", according to the testimony of
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an eyewitness. Therefore the motive of the aggression was a real and positive
fact: vengeance.
Some days after the commission of the crime, the accused was placed under
observation in the Psychopathic Hospital because he showed symptoms of a
form of psychosis called depressive psychosis from which he had already been
cured when the case was tried. This pyschosis is of course evidence that the
accused was afflicted with this ailment after the commission of the crime. It
would not be casual to affirm that the commission of the crime had affected his
reason. Nervous shock is one of the causes of insanity (Angeles, Legal
Medicine, p. 728); but it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the accused
was also mentally deranged on the day of the crime, aside from the
ciscumstance that the evidence shows just the contrary. I am, therefore, of the
opinion that the appealed sentence should be affirmed.
PEOPLE VS AMBAL
AQUINO, J.:
Honorato Ambal appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Camiguin convicting him of parricide, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and
ordering him to pay an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos to the heirs of his
deceased wife, Felicula Vicente-Ambal (Criminal Case No. 155-C).
In the morning of January 20, 1977, the barangay captain found under some
flowering plants near the house of Honorato Ambal located in Barrio Balbagon,
Mambajao, Camiguin, Felicula Vicente-Ambal, 48, mortally wounded. She asked
for drinking water and medical assistance.
She sustained seven incised wounds in different parts of her body. She was
placed in an improvised hammock and brought to the hospital where she died
forty minutes after arrival thereat (Exh. B and G).
On that same morning, Honorato Ambal, husband of Felicula, after entrusting
his child to a neighbor, went to the house of the barangay captain and informed
the latter's spouse that he (Honorato) had killed his wife Feling. After making
that oral confession, Ambal took a pedicab, went to the municipal hall and
surrendered to a policeman, also confessing to the latter that he had liquidated
his wife.
The policeman confiscated Ambal's long bolo, the tip of which was broken
(Exh. F). Ambal was bespattered with blood. His shirt was torn. He appeared to
be weak.
The killing was the climax of a fifteen-year-old marriage featured by quarrels
and bickerings which were exacerbated by the fact that the wife sometimes did
not stay in the conjugal abode and chose to spend the night in the poblacion of
Mambajao. The couple had eight children.
The immediate provocation for the assault was a quarrel induced by Felicula's
failure to buy medicine for Ambal who was afflicted with influenza. The two
engaged in a heated alteration. Felicula told her husband that it would be better
if he were dead ("Mas maayo ka pang mamatay"). That remark infuriated Ambal
and impelled him to attack his wife (Exh. 1).
On January 27, 1977, a police lieutenant charged Ambal with parricide in the
municipal court. After a preliminary examination, the case was elevated to the
Court of First Instance where on March 4, 1977 the fiscal filed against Ambal
an information for parricide. At the arraignment, Ambal, assisted by counsel de
oficio, pleaded not guilty.
After the prosecution had presented its evidence, accused's counsel de oficio
manifested that the defense of Ambal was insanity.
The trial court in its order of September 15, 1977 directed the municipal health
officer, Doctor Maximino R. Balbas, Jr., a 1960 medical graduate who had
undergone a six-month training in psychiatry in the National Mental Hospital,
to examine Ambal and to submit within one month a report on the latter's
mental condition (p. 65, Record).
Doctor Balbas in his report dated November 3, 1977 found that Ambal was a
"passive-aggressive, emotionally unstable, explosive or inadequate personality"
(Exh. 1).
Doctor Balbas testified that during the period form February 1 (twelve days
after the killing) to November 3, 1977, when he placed Ambal under
observation, the latter did not show any mental defect and was normal (44-46
tsn November 3,1977).
Asked directly whether Ambal suffered from a mental disease or defect, Doctor
Balbas replied: "Before the commission of the crime, he was normal. After the
commission of the crime, normal, but during the commission of the crime, that
is what we call "Psychosis" due to short frustration tolerance" (45 tsn).
Doctor Cresogono Llacuna,a 1937 medical graduate who undertook a two-
month observation of mental cases and who in the course of his long practice
had treated around one hundred cases of mental disorders, attended to Ambal
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in 1975. He found that Ambal suffered from a psychoneurosis, a disturbance of
the functional nervous system which is not insanity (65 November 15, 1977).
The doctor concluded that Ambal was not insane. Ambal was normal but
nervous (68 He had no mental disorder.
Ambal, 49, who reached Grade four, testified on November 16, 1977 or about
ten months after the incident. He said that at the time of the killing he did not
know what he was doing because he was allegedly not in full possession of his
normal mental faculties. He pretended not to know that he was charged with
the capital offense of having killed his wife.
But he admitted that he knew that his wife was dead because he was informed
of her death. During his confinement in jail he mopped the floor and cooked
food for his fellow prisoners. Sometimes, he worked in the town plaza or was
sent unescorted to buy food in the market.
He said that his wife quarrelled with him. She was irritable. he admitted that he
rode on a tricycle when he surrendered on the day of the killing. He
remembered that a week before the incident he got wet while plowing. He feel
asleep without changing his clothes. At midnight, when he woke up, he had
chills. That was the commencement, his last illness.
The trial court concluded from Ambal's behavior immediately after the incident
that he was not insane and that he acted like a normal human being. We agree
with the court's conclusion.
Courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or
eccentricity, mental weakness or mere depression resulting from physical
ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers escaping punishment
through a general plea of insanity. (People vs. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87, 94.)
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code exempts from criminal liability an imbecile
or an insane person unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. *
According to the dictionary imbecile is a person marked by mental deficiency
while an insane person is one who has an unsound mind or suffers from a
mental disorder. "imbecil vale tanto como escaso de razon y es loco el que ha
perdido el juico." An insane person may have lucid intervals but "el embecil no
puede tener, no tiene estos intervalos de Corazon, pues en el no hay una
alteracion, sino una carencia del juico mismo" (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed.,
p. 92.)
Insanity has been defined as "a manifestation in language or conduct of disease
or defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered
condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and characterized by
perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the sensory or of the
intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition" (Sec. 1039, Revised
Administrative Code).
The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof
to the contrary (Art. 800, Civil Code re Testamentary Succession; U.S. vs.
Martinez, 34 Phil. 305, 308). The law always presumes all acts to be voluntary. It
is improper to presume that acts were executed unconsciously (People vs. Cruz,
109 Phil. 288, 292; People vs. Tagasa, 68 Phil. 147, 153; U.S. vs. Guevara, 27
Phil. 547; People vs. Fausto, 113 Phil. 841).
When there is no proof that the defendant was not of sound mind at the time
he performed the criminal act charged to him, or that he performed it at the
time of madness or of mental derangement, or that he was generally considered
to be insane — his habitual condition being, on the contrary, healthy — the
legal presumption is that he acted in his ordinary state of mind and the burden
is upon the defendant to overcome this presumption (U.S. vs. Zamora, 32 Phil.
218.)
Without positive proof that the defendant had lost his reason or was demented,
a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be
presumed that he was in a normal condition (U.S. vs. Hontiveros Carmona, 18
Phil. 62).
A defendant in a criminal case, who interposes the defense of mental incapacity,
has the burden of establishing that fact, meaning that he was insane at the very
moment when the crime was committed (People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204.)
What should be the criterion for insanity or imbecility? We have adopted the
rule, based on Spanish jurisprudence, that in order that a person could be
regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom
of the will at the time of committing the crime (People vs. Formigonez, 87 Phil.
658, 660)
In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must
be complete deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the act or that the
accused acted without the least discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental
faculties does not exclude imputability. (People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288,292;
People vs. Renegado, L-27031, May 31,1974,57 SCRA 275, 286.)
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A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy and who tried to vindicate his
honor by taking violent measures to the extent of killing his wife (whom he
suspected of infidelity) can hardly be regarded as an imbecile (Formigones case).
Where the accused had a passionate nature, with a tendency to having violent
fits when angry, his acts of breaking glasses and smashing dishes are indications
of an explosive temper and not insanity, especially considering that he did not
turn violent when a policeman intercepted him after he had killed his wife.
(Cruz case.)
There is a vast difference between an insane person and one who has worked
himself up into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good
judgment in what he does. Persons who get into a quarrel or fight seldom, if
ever, act naturally during the fight. An extremely angry man, often, if not always,
acts like a madman. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is
insane. The popular meaning of the word I "crazy" is not synonymous with the
legal terms "insane", "non compos mentis," "unsound mind","idiot", or
"lunatic" (U.S. vs. Vaquilar, 27 Phil. 88, 91.)
The heat of passion and feeling produced by motives of anger, hatred, or
revenge is not insanity. (People vs. Foy, 138 N.Y. 664, cited in Vaquilar case, on
p. 92.)
One who, in possession of a sound and, commits a criminal act under the
impulse of passion or revenge, which may temporarily dethrone reason and for
the moment control the will, cannot nevertheless be shielded from the
consequences of the act by the plea of insanity. Insanity will only excuse the
commission of a criminal act, when it is made affirmatively to appear that the
person committing it was insane, and that the offense was the direct
consequence of his insanity (State vs. Strickly, 41 Iowa 232, cited in Vaquilar
case, on p. 94.)
The defense of insanity was rejected in a case where the accused killed by
strangulation a sixteen-year-old girl, who got leaves from his banana plants, and
sliced the flesh of her legs, thighs and shoulders, cooked the flesh and ate it like
a cannibal. (People vs. Balondo, L-27401, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 155).
Being weak-minded does not necessarily mean that the accused is insane
(People vs. Martin, 120 Phil. 14, 20-21).
Justice Cardozo in his article, "What Medicine Can Do For The Law", traces
briefly the origin of the rule regarding insanity as a defense. He says:
In the early stages of our law, way back in medieval times, insanity was never a
defense for crime. The insane killer, like the man who killed in self-defense,
might seek a pardon from the king, and would often get one. He had no
defense at law. Gradually insanity was allowed, but only within narrow limits
This was what was become known as the wild-beast stage of the defense. Then
the limits of the defense were expanded, but still slowly and narrowly. The killer
was excused if the disease of the mind was such that he was incapable of
appreciating the difference between right and wrong. At first this meant, not the
right and wrong of particular case, but right and wrong generally or in the
abstract, the difference, as it was sometimes said, between good and evil. Later,
the rule was modified in favor of the prisoner so that capacity to distinguish
between right and wrong generally would not charge with responsibility if there
was no capacity to understand the difference in relation to the particular act, the
subject of the crime.
The rule governing the subject was crystallized in England in 1843 by the
answer made by the House of Lords to questions submitted by judges in the
famous case of McNaghten, who was tried for the murder of one Drummond,
the secretary of Sir Robert Peel.
In the M'Naghten case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, Clark and Finelly 200, the following
rule was laid down: "To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was
laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not, to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that
he did not know he was doing what was wrong."
In the M'Naghten case, it appears that Daniel M'Naghten shot Edward
Drummond on January 20, 1843. Drummond died as a consequence of the
gunshot wound on April 25, 1843. Drummond was the private secretary of Sir
Robert Peel, prime minister M'Naghten shot Drummond, thinking he was Sir
Robert. M'Naghten labored under the the insane delusion that he was being
hounded by his enemies and that the prime minister was one of them. Medical
evidence tended to prove that M'Naghten was affected by morbid delusions
which carried him beyond the power of his own control, leaving him unable to
distinguish right and wrong, and that he was incapable of controlling his
conduct in connection with the delusion. The jury found him not guilty by
reason of insanity.
As stated in another case, the "test of the responsibility for criminal acts, when
insanity is asserted, is the capacity of the accused to distinguish between right
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and wrong at the time and with respect to the act which is the subject of the
inquiry. (Coleman's case,1 N.Y. Cr. Rep. 1.)
Another test is the so-called "irresistible impulse" test which means that
"assuming defendant's knowledge of the nature and quality of his act and his
knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by reason of disease of the mind, defendant
has been deprived of or lost the power of his will which would enable him to
prevent himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty." The
commission of the crime is excused even if the accused knew what he was
doing was wrong provided that as a result of mental disease he lacked the power
to resist the impulse to commit the act. (State v. White, 270 Pac. 2d. 727, 730;
Leslie Kast, 31 North Dakota Law Review, pp. 170, 173.)
The latest rule on the point is that "the so-called right wrong test, supplemented
by the irresistible impulse test, does not alone supply adequate criteria for
determining criminal responsibility of a person alleged mental incapacity." "An
accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act is the product of a
mental disease or a mental defect. A mental disease relieving an accused of
criminal responsibility for his unlawful act is a condition considered capable of
improvement or deterioration; a mental defect having such effect on criminal
responsibility is a condition not considered capable of improvement or
deterioration, and either congenital, or the result of injury or of a physical or
mental disease." (Syllabi, Durham v. U.S., 214 F. 2nd. 862, 874, 45 A.L.R. 2d.
1430 [1954].)
As stated in 22 C.J.S. 203, "the general test of criminal responsibility may be
stated to be the capacity to understand the nature and consequences of the act
charged and the ability to distinguish between right and wrong as to such act,
and in a majority of jurisdictions this is the exclusive test."
And, as noted in 21 Am Jur 2d. 118, the rule in the M'Naghten case exists along
with the "irresistible impulse" test or some other formula permitting a
defendant to be exculpated on the ground that, although he knew the act was
wrong, he was unable to refrain from committing it.
Since the broadest test suggested, which is the Durham or "Product" rule, also
permits inability to distinguish between right and wrong to be considered, even
though it refuses to limit the inquiry to that topic, it would appear that insanity
which meets this test is a defense in all Anglo-American jurisdictions and that
the only controversy is over whether there are some cases in which the right-
and-wrong test is not met, but in which a defense on grounds of insanity should
nevertheless be recognized. (21 Am Jur 2d 118.)
In the instant case, the alleged insanity of Ambal was not substantiated by any
sufficient evidence. The presumption of sanity was not overthrown. He was not
completely bereft of reason or discernment and freedom of will when he
mortally wounded his wife. He was not suffering from any mental disease or
defect.
The fact that immediately after the incident he thought of surrendering to the
law-enforcing authorities is incontestable proof that he knew that what he had
done was wrong and that he was going to be punished for it.
Ambal is guilty of parricide with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender to the authorities. Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code punishes
parricide with reclusion perpetua to death. The lesser penalty should be
imposed because of the presence of one mitigating circumstance and the
absence of aggravating circumstances (Art. 63[3], Revised Penal Code).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's decision is affirmed. Costs against the
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Fernandez and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Justice Concepcion, Jr., is on leave.
Justice Fernandez was designated to sit in the Second Division.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., (Chairman), concurring:
I concur in the judgment in this case on the bases of existing local jurisprudence
cited in the main opinion. The brilliant and scholarly dissertation by Justice
Aquino in his main opinion deserve full study and consideration, but I prefer to
lavish myself to the rulings on insanity in our jurisprudence which I feel
adequately provide enough basis for clear judgment.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur in finding Honorato Ambal guilty of parricide and reclusion perpetua
is the correct penalty. However, I wish to add these observations: The wife of
the appellant appears to have been a shrew. The worst thing that can happen to
a person is to have an unbearable spouse. The deceased was a neglectful wife.
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She stayed away from the conjugal home at time and prior to her death she
failed to buy medicine for her husband who had influenza and even had the gall
to tell him, "mas maayo ka pangpatay." This, together with the mental condition
of Ambal described in the main opinion, should entitle him to two additional
mitigating circumstances, namely: obfuscation (Art. 13, par. 6, R.P.C.) and
illness (Idem., par. 9.) To be sure, the presence of these additional mitigating
circumstances will not cause the reduction of the penalty because Art. 63, par. 3
of the Revised Penal Code prevails over Art. 64, par. 5 of the same Code.
(People vs. Relador, 60 Phil. 593 [1934].) But under the circumstances the
appellant is deserving of executive clemency and I so recommend.
PEOPLE VS PUNO
AQUINO, J.:
This is a murder case where the accused interposed as a defense the exempting
circumstance of insanity.
There is no doubt that at about two o'clock in the afternoon of September 8,
1970, Ernesto Puno, 28, a jeepney driver, entered a bedroom in the house of
Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), 72, a widow. The house was located in the area
known as Little Baguio, Barrio Tinajeros Malabon, Rizal
On seeing Aling Kikay sitting in bed, Puno insulted her by saying:
"Mangkukulam ka mambabarang mayroon kang bubuyog". Then, he repeatedly
slapped her and struck her several times on the head with a hammer until she
was dead.
The assault was witnessed by Hilaria de la Cruz, 23, who was in the bedroom
with the old woman, and by Lina Pajes, 27, a tenant of the adjoining room.
They testified that Puno's eyes were reddish. His look was baleful and
menacing. Puno was a neighbor of Aling Kikay.
After the killing, Puno went to the room of Lina, where Hilaria had taken
refuge, and, according to Hilaria, he made the following confession and threat:
"Huwag kayong magkakamaling tumawag ng pulis at sabihin ninyo na umalis
kayo ng bahay at hindi ninyo alam kung sino ang pumatay sa matanda." Or,
according to Lina, Puno said: "Pinatay ko na iyong matanda. Huwag kayong
tumawag ng pulis. Pag tumawag kayo ng pulis, kayo ang paghihigantihan ko. "
After the killing, Puno fled to his parents' house at Barrio Tugatog, Malabon
and then went to the house of his second cousin, Teotimo Puno, located at
Barrio San Jose, Calumpit, Bulacan, reaching that place in the evening. How he
was able to go to that place, which was then flooded, is not shown in the
record.
Disregarding Puno's threat, Lina, after noting that he had left, notified the
Malabon police of the killing. Corporal Daniel B. Cruz answered the call. He
found Aling Kikay sprawled on her bed already dead, Her head was bloody. Her
blanket and pillows were bloodstained. He took down the statements of Lina
and Hilaria at the police station. They pointed to Puno as the killer (pp. 15- 17,
Record).
A medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation conducted an
autopsy. He certified that the victim had lacerated wounds on her right eyebrow
and contusions on the head caused by a hard instrument, On opening the skull,
the doctor found extensive and generalized hemorrhage. The cause of death was
intracranial, traumatic hemorrhage (Exh. A).
Puno's father surrendered him to the police. Two Malabon policemen brought
him to the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong, Rizal on September 10,
1970 (p. 14, Record). He was charged with murder in the municipal court. He
waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation.
On October 21, 1970, he was indicted for murder in the Circuit Criminal Court
at Pasig, Rizal. Alleged in the information as aggravating circumstances were
evident premeditation, abuse of superiority and disregard of sex.
Puno, a native of Macabebe, Pampanga, who testified about five months after
the killing, pretended that he did not remember having killed Aling Kikay- He
believes that there are persons who are "mangkukulam," "mambabarang" and
"mambubuyog and that when one is victimized by those persons, his feet might
shrink or his hands might swan. Puno believes that a person harmed by a
"mambabarang" might have a headache or a swelling nose and ears and can be
cured only by a quack doctor (herbolaryo). Consequently, it is necessary to kill
the "mangkukulam" and "mambabarang".
Puno is the third child in a family of twelve children. He is married with two
children. He finished third year high school. His father is a welder. Among his
friends are drivers. (Exh- B).
Zenaida Gabriel, 30, Puno's wife, testified that on the night before the murder,
Puno's eyes were reddish. He complained of a headache. The following day
while he was feeding the pigs, he told Zenaida that a bumble bee was coming
towards him and he warded it off with his hands. Zenaida did not see any bee.
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Puno then went upstairs and took the cord of the religious habit of his mother.
He wanted to use that cord in tying his dog. He asked for another rope when
Zenaida admonished him not to use that cord. Puno tied the dog to a tree by
looping the rope through its mouth and over its head. He repeatedly boxed the
dog.
Aida Gabriel, Zenaida's elder sister, saw Puno while he was boxing that dog.
Aida observed that Puno's eyes were bloodshot and his countenance had a
ferocious expression.
Teotimo Puno testified that on the night of September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno
came to their house in Barrio San Jose, Calumpit. Ernesto was soaking wet as
there was a flood in that place. He was cuddling a puppy that he called
"Diablo". He called for Teotimo's mother who invited him to eat. Ernesto did
not eat. Instead, he fed the puppy.
Ernesto introduced Teotimo to his puppy. Then, he sang an English song.
When Teotimo asked him to change his wet clothes, Ernesto refused. Later, he
tried on the clothes of Teotimo's father. When told that Teotimo's father had
been dead for a couple of years already, Ernesto just looked at Teotimo.
While he was lying down, Ernesto began singing again. Then he emitted a
moaning sound until he fell asleep. Ernesto was awakened the next morning by
the noise caused by persons wading in the flood. Ernesto thought they were his
fellow cursillistas.
The defense presented three psychiatrists. However, instead of proving that
puno was insane when he killed Aling Kikay, the medical experts testified that
Puno acted with discernment.
Thus, Doctor Araceli Maravilla of the Psychiatry Section of the Dr. Jose R.
Reyes Memorial Hospital, to whom Puno was referred for treatment ten times
between September 8, 1966 and July 24, 1970, testified that Puno was an out-
patient who could very well live with society, although he was afflicted with
"schizophrenic reaction"; that Puno knew what he was doing and that he had
psychosis, a slight destruction of the ego. Puno admitted to Doctor Maravilia
that one cause of his restlessness, sleeplessness and irritability was his financial
problem (7 tsn November 4, 1970). Doctor Maravilla observed that Puno on
July 4, 1970 was already cured.
Doctor Reynaldo Robles of the National Mental Hospital testified that Puno
was first brought to that hospital on July 28, 1962 because his parents
complained that he laughed alone and exhibited certain eccentricities such as
kneeling, praying and making his body rigid. Doctor Robles observed that while
Puno was suffering from "schizophrenic reaction", his symptoms were "not
socially incapacitating" and that he could adjust himself to his environment (4
tsn January 20, 1971). He agreed with Doctor Maravilla's testimony.
Doctor Carlos Vicente, a medical specialist of the National Mental Hospital,
testified that from his examination of Puno, he gathered that Puno acted with
discernment when he committed the killing and that Puno could distinguish
between right and wrong (5 tsn January 1 1, 197 1). Doctor Vicente also
concluded that Puno was not suffering from any delusion and that he was not
mentally deficient; otherwise, he would not have reached third year high school
(8-19 tsn January 1 1, 197 1).
On December 14, 1970 or three months after the commission of the offense,
Doctors Vicente, Robles and Victorina V. Manikan of the National Mental
Hospital submitted the following report on Puno (Exh. B or 2):
Records show that he had undergone psychiatric treatment at the Out-Patient
Service of the National Mental Hospital for schizophrenia in 1962 from which
he recovered; in 1964 a relapse of the same mental illness when he improved
and in 1966 when his illness remained unimproved.
His treatment was continued at the JRR Memorial Hospital at the San Lazaro
Compound up to July, 1970. He was relieved of symptoms and did not come
back anymore for medication. On September 8, 1970, according to information,
he was able to kill an old woman. Particulars of the offense are not given.
MENTAL CONDITION
... Presently, he is quiet and as usual manageable. He is fairly clean in person and
without undue display of emotion. He talks to co-patients but becomes evasive
when talking with the doctor and other personnel of the ward. He knows he is
accused of murder but refuses to elaborate on it.
xxx xxx xxx
REMARKS
In view of the foregoing findings, Ernesto Puno, who previously was suffering
from a mental illness called schizophrenia, is presently free from any social
incapacitating psychotic symptoms.
13
IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
The seeming ignorance of very simple known facts and amnesia of several
isolated accounts in his life do not fit the active pattern of a schizophrenic
process. It may be found in an acutely disturbed and confused patient or a
markedly, retarded individual of which he is not.
However, persons who recover from an acute episode of mental illness like
schizophrenia may retain some residual symptoms impairing their judgment but
not necessarily their discernment of right from wrong of the offense committed.
The foregoing report was submitted pusuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court
and the order of the trial court dated November 16, 1970 for the mental
examination of Puno in the National Mental Hospital to determine whether he
could stand trial and whether he was sane when he committed the killing.
The trial court concluded that Puno was sane or knew that the killing of
Francisca Col was wrong and that he would be punished for it, as shown by the
threats which he made to Hilaria de la Cruz and Lina Pajes, the old woman's
companions who witnessed his dastardly deed.
The trial court also concluded that if Puno was a homicidal maniac who had
gone berserk, he would have killed also Hilaria and Lina. The fact that he
singled out Aling Kikay signified that he really disposed of her because he
thought that she was a witch.
Judge Onofre A. Villaluz said that during the trial he "meticulously observed the
conduct and behavior of the accused inside the court, most especially when he
was presented on the witness stand" and he was convinced "that the accused is
sane and has full grasp of what was happening" in his environment.
The trial court convicted Puno of murder, sentenced him to death and ordered
him to pay the heirs of the victim an indemnity of twenty-two thousand pesos
(Criminal Case No. 509).
His counsel de oficio in this review of the death sentence, contends that the trial
court erred in not sustaining the defense of insanity and in appreciating evident
premeditation, abuse of superiority and disregard of sex as aggravating
circumstances.
When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from responsibility, the
evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under
prosecution or to the very moment of its execution (U.S. vs. Guevara, 27 Phil.
547). Insanity should be proven by clear and positive evidence (People vs.
Bascos, 44 Phil. 204).
The defense contends that Puno was insane when he killed Francisca Col
because he had chronic schizophrenia since 1962; he was suffering from
schizophrenia on September 8, 1970, when he liquidated the victim, and
schizophrenia is a form of psychosis which deprives a person of discernment
and freedom of will.
Insanity under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code means that the accused
must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will
at the time of committing the crime (People vs- Formigones, 87 Phil. 658, 660).
Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence in committing
the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least
discernment because there is complete absence of the power to discern, or that
there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental
faculties will not exclude imputability." (People vs. Ambal, G.R. No. 52688,
October 17, 1980; People vs. Renegade, L-27031, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 275,
286; People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292. As to "el trastorno mental transitorio
as an exempting circumstance, see I Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 15th Ed.,
1974. pp. 498-504 and art. 8 of the Spanish Penal Code.)
After evaluating counsel de oficio's contentions in the light of the strict rule just
stated and the circumstances surrounding the killing, we are led to the
conclusion that Puno was not legally insane when he killed the hapless and
helpless victim. The facts and the findings of the psychiatrists reveal that on that
tragic occasion he was not completely deprived of reason and freedom of will.
In People vs. Fausto y Tomas, 113 Phil. 841, the accused was confined in the
National Mental Hospital for thirteen days because he was suffering from
schizophrenia of the paranoid type. His confinement was recommended by
Doctor Antonio Casal of the San Miguel Brewery where the accused used to
work as a laborer. About one year and two months later, he killed Doctor Casal
because the latter refused to certify him for re-employment. His plea of insanity
was rejected. He was convicted of murder.
In the instant case, the trial court correctly characterized the killing as murder.
The qualifying circumstance is abuse of superiority. In liquidating Francisco Col,
Puno, who was armed with a hammer, took advantage of his superior natural
strength over that of the unarmed septuagenarian female victim who was unable
to offer any resistance and who could do nothing but exclaim " Diyos ko ".
14
IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
Thus, it was held that "an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an
unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that
superiority which qqqs sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and
from which the woman was unable to defend herself" (People vs. Guzman, 107
Phil. 1122, 1127 citing U.S. vs. Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612; U.S. vs. Camiloy 36 Phil.
757 and People vs. Quesada, 62 Phil. 446).
Evident premeditation (premeditacion conocida) cannot be appreciated because
the evidence does not show (a) the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to
his determination and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination
and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of
his act (People vs. Ablates, L-33304, July 31, 1974, 58 SCRA 241, 247).
The essence of premeditation "es la mayor perversidad del culpable juntamente
con su serenidad o frialdad de animo." It is characterized (1) "por la concepcion
del delito y la resolucion de ejecutarlo firme, fria, reflexival meditada y detenida"
and (2) "por la persistencia en la resolucion de delinquir demostrada por el
espacio de tiempo transcurrido entre dicha resolucion y la ejecucion del hecho
Premeditation should be evident, meaning that it should be shown by "signos
reiterados v externos, no de meras sospechas" (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal,
1974 or 15th Ed., pp- 582-3).
Dwelling and disregard of the respect due to the victim on account of her old
age should be appreciated as generic aggravating circumstances. Disregard of
sex is not aggravating because there is no evidence that the accused deliberately
intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim or showed manifest disrespect
to her womanhood (People vs. Mangsant, 65 Phil. 548; People vs. Mori, L-
23511-2, January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382, 404, People vs, Jaula, 90 Phil. 379;
U.S. vs. De Jesus, 14 Phil. 190).
However, those two aggravating circumstances are off-set by the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender to the authorities and, as contended by
counsel de oficio, the offender's mental illness (mild psychosis or schizophrenic
reaction) which diminished his will-power without however depriving him of
consciousness of his acts. (See People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694, People vs.
Amit, 82 Phil. 820 and People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658.)
Thus, it was held that la equivocada creencia de los acusados de que el matar a
un brujo es un bien al publico puede considerarse como una circunstancia
atenuante pues los que tienen la obsession de que los brujos deben ser
eliminados estan en la misma condicion que aquel que, atacado de enfermedad
morbosa pero consciente aun de lo que hace, no tiene verdadero imperio de su
voluntad" (People vs. Balneg 79 Phil. 805, 810).
It results that the medium period of the penalty for murder should be imposed
(Arts. 64[41 and 248, Revised Penal Code).
WHEREFORE, the death penalty is set aside. The accused is sentenced to
reclusion perpetua The indemnity imposed by the trial court is affirmed. Costs
de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, CJ., concurring:
I am unable to arrive at that stage of moral certainty as to the guilt of the
accused and hence concur in the dissent of Justice Makasiar, with the
observation that the reference in the exhaustive opinion of Justice Aquino to
Ambat, where he was also the ponente, with its learned and scholarly discourse
on the law on insanity, gives me the opportunity to express my preference for a
liberal reading of Durham v. US, 1 therein cited. For some eminent
commentators, the M' Naghten doctrine no longer speaks with authority. In the
light of the advances in medical science there is, for me, a need for the
reexamination of what until now are authoritative pronouncements on this
subject.
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The appellant should not be held liable for the crime of murder. He
was mentally ill when he committed the alleged killing of Francisca Col (Aling
Kikay), a 72-year old widow. His medical records, as properly evaluated and
confirmed by the expert testimony of the three physicians/psychiatrists who
examined and treated him, undeniably establish the fact that appellant had been
ailing with a psychotic disorder medically known as chronic schizophrenia of
the paranoid type.
Inevitably, WE must look into the nature of appellant's mental disease. Thus,
Noye's Modern Clinical Psychiatry, Seventh Edition, explains:
15
IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
Symptomatically, the schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd and
bizarre behavior apparent in aloofness, suspiciousness, or periods of impulsive
destructiveness and immature and exaggerated emotionality, often ambivalently
directed and considered inappropriate by the observer. The interpersonal
perceptions are distorted in the more serious states by delusional and
hallucinatory material. (p. 355, supra).
Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to
distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by
hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called dementia praecox, it is the most
common form of psychosis and usually develops between the ages of 15 and 30
(Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medicine and Nursing, MillerKeane p. 860).
For a clear appreciation of appellant's mental condition, quoted hereunder are
pertinent portions of the discussion on the paranoid type of schizophrenia:
Paranoid Types. The features that tend to be most evident in this type or phase
are delusions, which are often numerous, illogical, and disregardful of reality,
hallucinations, and the usual schizophrenic disturbance of associations and of
affect, together with negativism.
Frequently the prepsychotic personality of the paranoid schizophrenic is
characterized by poor interpersonal rapport. Often he is cold, withdrawn,
distrustful, and resentful of other persons. Many are truculent, have a chip-on-
the-shoulder attitude, and are argumentative, scornful, sarcastic, defiant,
resentful of suggestions or of authority, and given to caustic remarks.
Sometimes flippnant, facetious responses cover an underlying hostility.
... The patient's previous negative attitudes become more marked, and
misinterpretations are common. Ideas of reference are among the first
symptoms. Disorders of association appear. Many patients show an unpleasant
emotional aggressiveness, Through displacement, the patient may begin to act
out his hostile impulses. His grip on reality begins to loosen. At first his
delusions are limited, but later they become numerous and changeable ...
Delusions of persecution are the most prominent occurrences in paranoid
schizophrenia, but expansive and obviously wish- fulfilling Ideas and
hypochondriacal and depressive delusions are not uncommon. With increasing
personality disorganization, delusional beliefs become less logical. Verbal
expressions may be inappropriate and neologistic. The patient is subjected to
vague magical forces, and his explanations become extremely vague and
irrational. Imaginative fantasy may become extreme but take on the value of
reality. Repressed aggressive tendencies may be released in a major outburst
some inarticulate paranoids may manifest an unpredictable assaultiveness. Many
paranoid schizophrenics are irritable, discontented, resentful, and angrily
suspicious and show a surely aversion to being interviewed. Some manifest an
unapproachable, aggressively hostile attitude and may have in a bitter aloofness"
Noye's Modern Clinical Psychiatry, Seventh Edition, pp. 380 and 381, emphasis
supplied).
On the prognosis of schizophrenia, the aforenamed source thus further states:
Occasionally one observes a schizophrenic episode of a mild, fleeting nature
with no subsequent recurrence In many instances, however, the favorable
outcome should be characterized as 'social recovery rather than as 'cured' or as
full recovery. By this it is meant that the patient is able to return to his previous
social environment and to previous or equivalent occupation, but with minor
symptoms and signs, such as irritability, shyness, or shallowness of affective
responses.
From what has been said, it is evident that in any given case the effect upon the
personality and future adjustment of the appearance of a schizophrenic reaction
may be quite uncertain. In some cases the course is continuously progressive; in
others it is intermittent. More frequently it is a question of remissions and
relapses in which, although from the first interests and habits tend to be
undermined insidiously, there occur periods of adjustment at a lower level for a
considerable period of time. It is estimated that 40 per cent of' the
schizophrenic patients who enter public mental hospitals or clinics recover or
improve; the other 60 per cent fail to improve or ultimately suffer that
permanent malignant disorganization of personality somewhat inaccurately
designated as deterioration Of committed patients who improve sufficiently to
be released, about 80 per cent leave the mental hospital within the first year of
residence. The expectancy of recovery falls with each year of continued illness.
Roughly, about one-third of those patients who are hospitalized during the first
year of their illness make a fairly complete recovery; one-third get a bit better
and become able to return to outside life but remain damaged personalities and
may have to return to the hospital from time to time. ... (pp. 387-388, supra
emphasis supplied).
When appellant was examined and treated for the first time on July 28, 1962, his
father revealed the patient's initial symptoms of laughing alone and making
gestures, poor sleep and appetite, praying and kneeling always and making his
body rigid (per consultation chart, p. 154, CCC rec.). Upon interview on
aforesaid date, appellant stated that "he could see God" and "That a neighbor is
bewitching her" ("pinapakulam ako") Why? "hindi ko alam kung bakit" (p. 156,
CCC rec.).
16
IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
Appellant underwent eighteen (18) treatments and checkups from July 28, 1962
to July 24, 1970 which covered eight (8) years before the alleged crime was
committed on September 8, 1970 (Medical Certificates, pp. 25 and 26, CCC
rec.). In the medical certificate dated September 15, 1970, the following was
reflected:
Diagnosis — Schizophrenic Reaction — Recovered (1962) Improved (1964)
Unimproved (1966).
Per the same record dated November 22, 1966, appellant's diagnosis was
described as "Schizo- Reaction Relapse" and his condition of termination was
indicated as "Unimproved".
In appellant's "Out-Patient Psychiatric Service Record" dated January 31, 1968
(p. 126, CCC rec.), his condition of termination was described as merely
"improved" neither "recovered" nor "unimproved".
In another "Out-Patient Psychiatric Service Record" dated August 31, 1968,
patient's condition of termination was also described as "improved" only and
"treatment not completed" was noted therein (p. 137, CCC rec.).
Appellant was treated eighteen (18) times in the National Mental Hospital and
Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital from July 28, 1962 to July 24, 1970 or for a span
of 8 years, characteristic of the chronic nature of his mental disease (pp- 4-5,
TSN, November 12, 1970). Thus, on direct examination, Dr. Carlos Vicente
confirmed:
Q — From your study, when he was an out patient at the National Mental
Hospital and its extension at the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital, would you say
that he was and has been suffering from chronic schizophrenia?
A — Yes, chronic, because it started in 1962 and became in remission in
1970, July. (p. 10, TSN, January 11, 1971, emphasis supplied).
For chronic schizophrenia, the patient does not recover fully in two months'
time. His condition may simply be "in remission", which term means "social
recovery", not cured or fully recovered. Dr. Vicente thus stated:
Q — How long, if there is any usual period, does a schizophrenic attack last
at any given time?
A — That is waivable (sic). There are those who cannot recover after ten
days or three months (p. 14, TSN, January 11, 19 7 1, emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
On a schizophrenic's behavior pattern:
Q — Is it possible that a person suffering from chronic schizophrenia can
have a violent reaction?
A — Yes, it is Possible, if he was at that time. If he is schizophrenic at the
time" (Testimony of Dr. Carlos Vicente, p. 10, TSN, January 20, 197 1,
emphasis supplied).
Q — By suffering from schizophrenia, would you say that his suffering has
affected his power of control over his will?
A — During the time that he was suffering, he could not stick to the right.
He made mistakes at the time that he was mentally sick.
Q— His power of control over his will to commit a crime is affected?
A— Yes, sir.
Q— Are you sure of that?
A — Yes, somehow it is controlled by some Ideas, example, one who has
that (im)pulse to kill will kill" (Testimony of Dr. Carlos Vicente, p. 17, TSN,
January 11, 1971, emphasis supplied).
On the mental condition of appellant when the alleged crime was committed
which is and should be considered determinative of his liability:
Q — Would you be able to state Doctor whether the accused when he
committed the act was suffering from an onset of schizophrenic reaction from
which he has been known to be suffering since 1962"
A — It is possible, sir, that he was already suffering from an onset of the
schizophrenic reaction at that time" (Testimony of Dr. Reynaldo Robles, p. 6,
TSN, January 20,1971, emphasis supplied).
It should be stressed that between July 24, 1970 when appellant suffered from
his last attack or relapse and September 8, 1970 when he committed the alleged
crime, barely 1 month and 15 days had elapsed. Medically speaking, the interval
17
IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
was not sufficient time for appellant's full recovery nor did such time give any
guaranty for his mental disease to be "cured."
Appellant was stin mentally sick at the time he attacked the victim. He
previously suffered from a "displacement of aggressive and hostile behavior"
when he got angry with his wife and when he tied and boxed their dog. He had
the mental delusion that a "mangkukulam" was inflicting harm on him. This
delusion found its mark on the victim whom he believed was the
"mangkukulam" and fearing that she would harm him, appellant had to kill her
in self-defense. Simply stated, the victim was a mere consequence of his mental
delusion. He killed the "mangkukulam" as personified by the victim; he did not
kin Aling Kikay herself. And the said fatal act was made by appellant in
defending himself from the "mangkukulam".
While it has been established that appellant was "manageable" and was
"presently free from any social incapacitating psychotic symptoms" during the
trial, the fact remains that at the very moment of the commission of the alleged
crime, he was still a mentally sick person. No evidence was produced to prove
otherwise against the bulk of appellant's medical history for 8 years clearly
indicative of his mental psychosis.
As earlier stated, "social recovery" of a schizophrenic does not mean that he is
"cured" (totally recovered) from the disease.
In view of the foregoing, appellant should be acquitted of the charge of murder.
Teehankee, J., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, CJ., concurring:
I am unable to arrive at that stage of moral certainty as to the guilt of the
accused and hence concur in the dissent of Justice Makasiar, with the
observation that the reference in the exhaustive opinion of Justice Aquino to
Ambat, where he was also the ponente, with its learned and scholarly discourse
on the law on insanity, gives me the opportunity to express my preference for a
liberal reading of Durham v. US, 1 therein cited. For some eminent
commentators, the M' Naghten doctrine no longer speaks with authority. In the
light of the advances in medical science there is, for me, a need for the
reexamination of what until now are authoritative pronouncements on this
subject.
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The appellant should not be held liable for the crime of murder. He
was mentally ill when he committed the alleged killing of Francisca Col (Aling
Kikay), a 72-year old widow. His medical records, as properly evaluated and
confirmed by the expert testimony of the three physicians/psychiatrists who
examined and treated him, undeniably establish the fact that appellant had been
ailing with a psychotic disorder medically known as chronic schizophrenia of
the paranoid type.
Inevitably, WE must look into the nature of appellant's mental disease. Thus,
Noye's Modern Clinical Psychiatry, Seventh Edition, explains:
Symptomatically, the schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd and
bizarre behavior apparent in aloofness, suspiciousness, or periods of impulsive
destructiveness and immature and exaggerated emotionality, often ambivalently
directed and considered inappropriate by the observer. The interpersonal
perceptions are distorted in the more serious states by delusional and
hallucinatory material. (p. 355, supra).
Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to
distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by
hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called dementia praecox, it is the most
common form of psychosis and usually develops between the ages of 15 and 30
(Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medicine and Nursing, MillerKeane p. 860).
For a clear appreciation of appellant's mental condition, quoted hereunder are
pertinent portions of the discussion on the paranoid type of schizophrenia:
Paranoid Types. The features that tend to be most evident in this type or phase
are delusions, which are often numerous, illogical, and disregardful of reality,
hallucinations, and the usual schizophrenic disturbance of associations and of
affect, together with negativism.
Frequently the prepsychotic personality of the paranoid schizophrenic is
characterized by poor interpersonal rapport. Often he is cold, withdrawn,
distrustful, and resentful of other persons. Many are truculent, have a chip-on-
the-shoulder attitude, and are argumentative, scornful, sarcastic, defiant,
resentful of suggestions or of authority, and given to caustic remarks.
Sometimes flippnant, facetious responses cover an underlying hostility.
... The patient's previous negative attitudes become more marked, and
misinterpretations are common. Ideas of reference are among the first
18
IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
symptoms. Disorders of association appear. Many patients show an unpleasant
emotional aggressiveness, Through displacement, the patient may begin to act
out his hostile impulses. His grip on reality begins to loosen. At first his
delusions are limited, but later they become numerous and changeable ...
Delusions of persecution are the most prominent occurrences in paranoid
schizophrenia, but expansive and obviously wish- fulfilling Ideas and
hypochondriacal and depressive delusions are not uncommon. With increasing
personality disorganization, delusional beliefs become less logical. Verbal
expressions may be inappropriate and neologistic. The patient is subjected to
vague magical forces, and his explanations become extremely vague and
irrational. Imaginative fantasy may become extreme but take on the value of
reality. Repressed aggressive tendencies may be released in a major outburst
some inarticulate paranoids may manifest an unpredictable assaultiveness. Many
paranoid schizophrenics are irritable, discontented, resentful, and angrily
suspicious and show a surely aversion to being interviewed. Some manifest an
unapproachable, aggressively hostile attitude and may have in a bitter aloofness"
Noye's Modern Clinical Psychiatry, Seventh Edition, pp. 380 and 381, emphasis
supplied).
On the prognosis of schizophrenia, the aforenamed source thus further states:
Occasionally one observes a schizophrenic episode of a mild, fleeting nature
with no subsequent recurrence In many instances, however, the favorable
outcome should be characterized as 'social recovery rather than as 'cured' or as
full recovery. By this it is meant that the patient is able to return to his previous
social environment and to previous or equivalent occupation, but with minor
symptoms and signs, such as irritability, shyness, or shallowness of affective
responses.
From what has been said, it is evident that in any given case the effect upon the
personality and future adjustment of the appearance of a schizophrenic reaction
may be quite uncertain. In some cases the course is continuously progressive; in
others it is intermittent. More frequently it is a question of remissions and
relapses in which, although from the first interests and habits tend to be
undermined insidiously, there occur periods of adjustment at a lower level for a
considerable period of time. It is estimated that 40 per cent of' the
schizophrenic patients who enter public mental hospitals or clinics recover or
improve; the other 60 per cent fail to improve or ultimately suffer that
permanent malignant disorganization of personality somewhat inaccurately
designated as deterioration Of committed patients who improve sufficiently to
be released, about 80 per cent leave the mental hospital within the first year of
residence. The expectancy of recovery falls with each year of continued illness.
Roughly, about one-third of those patients who are hospitalized during the first
year of their illness make a fairly complete recovery; one-third get a bit better
and become able to return to outside life but remain damaged personalities and
may have to return to the hospital from time to time. ... (pp. 387-388, supra
emphasis supplied).
When appellant was examined and treated for the first time on July 28, 1962, his
father revealed the patient's initial symptoms of laughing alone and making
gestures, poor sleep and appetite, praying and kneeling always and making his
body rigid (per consultation chart, p. 154, CCC rec.). Upon interview on
aforesaid date, appellant stated that "he could see God" and "That a neighbor is
bewitching her" ("pinapakulam ako") Why? "hindi ko alam kung bakit" (p. 156,
CCC rec.).
Appellant underwent eighteen (18) treatments and checkups from July 28, 1962
to July 24, 1970 which covered eight (8) years before the alleged crime was
committed on September 8, 1970 (Medical Certificates, pp. 25 and 26, CCC
rec.). In the medical certificate dated September 15, 1970, the following was
reflected:
Diagnosis — Schizophrenic Reaction — Recovered (1962) Improved (1964)
Unimproved (1966).
Per the same record dated November 22, 1966, appellant's diagnosis was
described as "Schizo- Reaction Relapse" and his condition of termination was
indicated as "Unimproved".
In appellant's "Out-Patient Psychiatric Service Record" dated January 31, 1968
(p. 126, CCC rec.), his condition of termination was described as merely
"improved" neither "recovered" nor "unimproved".
In another "Out-Patient Psychiatric Service Record" dated August 31, 1968,
patient's condition of termination was also described as "improved" only and
"treatment not completed" was noted therein (p. 137, CCC rec.).
Appellant was treated eighteen (18) times in the National Mental Hospital and
Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital from July 28, 1962 to July 24, 1970 or for a span
of 8 years, characteristic of the chronic nature of his mental disease (pp- 4-5,
TSN, November 12, 1970). Thus, on direct examination, Dr. Carlos Vicente
confirmed:
Q — From your study, when he was an out patient at the National Mental
Hospital and its extension at the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital, would you say
that he was and has been suffering from chronic schizophrenia?
19
IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
A — Yes, chronic, because it started in 1962 and became in remission in
1970, July. (p. 10, TSN, January 11, 1971, emphasis supplied).
For chronic schizophrenia, the patient does not recover fully in two months'
time. His condition may simply be "in remission", which term means "social
recovery", not cured or fully recovered. Dr. Vicente thus stated:
Q — How long, if there is any usual period, does a schizophrenic attack last
at any given time?
A — That is waivable (sic). There are those who cannot recover after ten
days or three months (p. 14, TSN, January 11, 19 7 1, emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
On a schizophrenic's behavior pattern:
Q — Is it possible that a person suffering from chronic schizophrenia can
have a violent reaction?
A — Yes, it is Possible, if he was at that time. If he is schizophrenic at the
time" (Testimony of Dr. Carlos Vicente, p. 10, TSN, January 20, 197 1,
emphasis supplied).
Q — By suffering from schizophrenia, would you say that his suffering has
affected his power of control over his will?
A — During the time that he was suffering, he could not stick to the right.
He made mistakes at the time that he was mentally sick.
Q— His power of control over his will to commit a crime is affected?
A— Yes, sir.
Q— Are you sure of that?
A — Yes, somehow it is controlled by some Ideas, example, one who has
that (im)pulse to kill will kill" (Testimony of Dr. Carlos Vicente, p. 17, TSN,
January 11, 1971, emphasis supplied).
On the mental condition of appellant when the alleged crime was committed
which is and should be considered determinative of his liability:
Q — Would you be able to state Doctor whether the accused when he
committed the act was suffering from an onset of schizophrenic reaction from
which he has been known to be suffering since 1962"
A — It is possible, sir, that he was already suffering from an onset of the
schizophrenic reaction at that time" (Testimony of Dr. Reynaldo Robles, p. 6,
TSN, January 20,1971, emphasis supplied).
It should be stressed that between July 24, 1970 when appellant suffered from
his last attack or relapse and September 8, 1970 when he committed the alleged
crime, barely 1 month and 15 days had elapsed. Medically speaking, the interval
was not sufficient time for appellant's full recovery nor did such time give any
guaranty for his mental disease to be "cured."
Appellant was stin mentally sick at the time he attacked the victim. He
previously suffered from a "displacement of aggressive and hostile behavior"
when he got angry with his wife and when he tied and boxed their dog. He had
the mental delusion that a "mangkukulam" was inflicting harm on him. This
delusion found its mark on the victim whom he believed was the
"mangkukulam" and fearing that she would harm him, appellant had to kill her
in self-defense. Simply stated, the victim was a mere consequence of his mental
delusion. He killed the "mangkukulam" as personified by the victim; he did not
kin Aling Kikay herself. And the said fatal act was made by appellant in
defending himself from the "mangkukulam".
While it has been established that appellant was "manageable" and was
"presently free from any social incapacitating psychotic symptoms" during the
trial, the fact remains that at the very moment of the commission of the alleged
crime, he was still a mentally sick person. No evidence was produced to prove
otherwise against the bulk of appellant's medical history for 8 years clearly
indicative of his mental psychosis.
As earlier stated, "social recovery" of a schizophrenic does not mean that he is
"cured" (totally recovered) from the disease.
In view of the foregoing, appellant should be acquitted of the charge of murder.
Teehankee, J., concur.
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IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
PEOPLE VS DUNGO
PARAS, J.:
This is an automatic review of the Decision* of the Regional Trial Court of the
Third Judicial Region, Branch 54, Macabebe, Pampanga, convicting the accused
of the crime of murder.
The pertinent facts of the case are:
On March 24, 1987, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Pampanga filed
an information charging Rosalino Dungo, the defendant-appellant herein, with
the felony of murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of March, 1987 in the Municipality of Apalit,
Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused ROSALINO DUNGO, armed
with a knife, with deliberate intent to kill, by means of treachery and with
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab Mrs. Belen Macalino Sigua with a knife hitting her in the
chest, stomach, throat and other parts of the body thereby inflicting upon her
fatal wounds which directly caused the death of said Belen Macalino Sigua.
All contrary to law, and with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, evident
premeditation and the generic aggravating circumstance of disrespect towards
her sex, the crime was committed inside the field office of the Department of
Agrarian Reform where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their
duties, taking advantage of superior strength and cruelty. (Record, p. 2)
On arraignment, accused-appellant Rosalino Dungo pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution, through several witnesses, has established that on March 16,
1987 between the hours of 2:00 and 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a male
person, identified as the accused, went to the place where Mrs. Sigua was
holding office at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After
a brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the envelope he was carrying and
stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. Accomplishing the morbid act, he went down
the staircase and out of the DAR's office with blood stained clothes, carrying
along a bloodied bladed weapon. (TSN, pp. 4-19, 33-46, April 13, 1987; TSN,
pp. 5-21, 28-38, April 20, 1987).
The autopsy report (Exh. "A") submitted by Dra. Melinda dela Cruz
Cabugawan reveals that the victim sustained fourteen (14) wounds, five (5) of
which were fatal.
Rodolfo Sigua, the husband of the deceased, testified that, sometime in the
latter part of February, 1987, the accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him
concerning the actuations of his wife (the victim) in requiring so many
documents from the accused. Rodolfo Sigua explained to the accused the
procedure in the Department of Agrarian Reform but the latter just said "never
mind, I could do it my own way." Rodolfo Sigua further testified that his wife's
annual salary is P17,000.00, and he spent the amount of P75,000.00 for the
funeral and related expenses due to the untimely death of his wife. (TSN, pp. 4-
21, April 22, 1987).
The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane at the time
of the commission of the offense.
The defense first presented the testimony of Andrea Dungo, the wife of the
accused. According to her, her husband had been engaged in farming up to
1982 when he went to Lebanon for six (6) months. Later, in December 1983,
her husband again left for Saudi Arabia and worked as welder. Her husband did
not finish his two-year contract because he got sick. Upon his arrival, he
underwent medical treatment. He was confined for one week at the Macabali
Clinic. Thereafter he had his monthly check-up. Because of his sickness, he was
not able to resume his farming. The couple, instead, operated a small store
which her husband used to tend. Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987, she
noticed her husband to be in deep thought always; maltreating their children
when he was not used to it before; demanding another payment from his
customers even if the latter had paid; chasing any child when their children
quarrelled with other children. There were also times when her husband would
inform her that his feet and head were on fire when in truth they were not. On
the fateful day of March 16, 1987, at around noon time, her husband
complained to her of stomach ache; however, they did not bother to buy
medicine as he was immediately relieved of the pain therein. Thereafter, he went
back to the store. When Andrea followed him to the store, he was no longer
there. She got worried as he was not in his proper mind. She looked for him.
She returned home only when she was informed that her husband had arrived.
While on her way home, she heard from people the words "mesaksak" and
"menaksak" (translated as "stabbing" and "has stabbed"). She saw her husband
in her parents-in-law's house with people milling around, including the barangay
officials. She instinctively asked her husband why he did such act, but he
replied, "that is the only cure for my ailment. I have a cancer in my heart." Her
husband further said that if he would not be able to kill the victim in a number
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of days, he would die, and that he chose to live longer even in jail. The
testimony on the statements of her husband was corroborated by their neighbor
Thelma Santos who heard their conversation. (See TSN, pp. 12-16, July 10,
1987). Turning to the barangay official, her husband exclaimed, "here is my
wallet, you surrender me." However, the barangay official did not bother to get
the wallet from him. That same day the accused went to Manila. (TSN, pp. 6-39,
June 10, 1981)
Dra. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Nicanor Echavez of the National Center for
Mental Health testified that the accused was confined in the mental hospital, as
per order of the trial court dated August 17, 1987, on August 25, 1987. Based
on the reports of their staff, they concluded that Rosalino Dungo was psychotic
or insane long before, during and after the commission of the alleged crime and
that his insanity was classified under organic mental disorder secondary to
cerebro-vascular accident or stroke. (TSN, pp. 4-33, June 17, 1988; TSN, pp. 5-
27, August 2, 1988).
Rosalino Dungo testified that he once worked in Saudi Arabia as welder.
However, he was not able to finish his two-year contract when he got sick. He
had undergone medical treatment at Macabali Clinic. However, he claimed that
he was not aware of the stabbing incident nor of the death of Mrs. Belen Sigua.
He only came to know that he was accused of the death of Mrs. Sigua when he
was already in jail. (TSN, pp. 5-14, July 15, 1988)
Rebuttal witnesses were presented by the prosecution. Dr. Vicente Balatbat
testified that the accused was his patient. He treated the accused for ailments
secondary to a stroke. While Dr. Ricardo Lim testified that the accused suffered
from oclusive disease of the brain resulting in the left side weakness. Both
attending physicians concluded that Rosalino Dungo was somehow
rehabilitated after a series of medical treatment in their clinic. Dr. Leonardo
Bascara further testified that the accused is functioning at a low level of
intelligence. (TSN, pp. 620, September 1, 1988; TSN, pp. 4-29, November 7,
1988).
On January 20, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal for the crime of murder, the Court hereby renders judgment
sentencing the accused as follows:
1. To suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessories of the
law;
2. To indemnify the family of the victim in the amount of P75,000.00 as
actual damage, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and P30,000.00 as moral
damages.
SO ORDERED. (p. 30, Rollo)
The trial court was convinced that the accused was sane during the perpetration
of the criminal act. The act of concealing a fatal weapon indicates a conscious
adoption of a pattern to kill the victim. He was apprehended and arrested in
Metro Manila which indicates that he embarked on a flight in order to evade
arrest. This to the mind of the trial court is another indication that the accused
was sane when he committed the crime.
It is an exercise in futility to inquire into the killing itself as this is already
admitted by the defendant-appellant. The only pivotal issue before us is whether
or not the accused was insane during the commission of the crime changed.
One who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission of the offense
charged cannot in a legal sense entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held
criminally responsible for his acts. His unlawful act is the product of a mental
disease or a mental defect. In order that insanity may relieve a person from
criminal responsibility, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of
cognition; that he acts without the least discernment; that there be complete
absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will. (People v. Puno, 105 SCRA
151)
It is difficult to distinguish sanity from insanity. There is no definite defined
border between sanity and insanity. Under foreign jurisdiction, there are three
major criteria in determining the existence of insanity, namely: delusion test,
irresistible impulse test, and the right and wrong test. Insane delusion is
manifested by a false belief for which there is no reasonable basis and which
would be incredible under the given circumstances to the same person if he is
of compos mentis. Under the delusion test, an insane person believes in a state
of things, the existence of which no rational person would believe. A person
acts under an irresistible impulse when, by reason of duress or mental disease,
he has lost the power to choose between right and wrong, to avoid the act in
question, his free agency being at the time destroyed. Under the right and wrong
test, a person is insane when he suffers from such perverted condition of the
mental and moral faculties as to render him incapable of distinguishing between
right and wrong. (See 44 C.J.S. 2)
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IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
So far, under our jurisdiction, there has been no case that lays down a definite
test or criterion for insanity. However, We can apply as test or criterion the
definition of insanity under Section 1039 of the Revised Administrative Code,
which states that insanity is "a manifestation in language or conduct, of disease
or defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered
condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and characterized by
perversion, inhibition, or by disordered function of the sensory or of the
intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition." Insanity as defined
above is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties
which is manifested in language or conduct. An insane person has no full and
clear understanding of the nature and consequence of his act.
Thus, insanity may be shown by surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light
on the subject, such as evidence of the alleged deranged person's general
conduct and appearance, his acts and conduct inconsistent with his previous
character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, and his improvident
bargains.
Evidence of insanity must have reference to the mental condition of the person
whose sanity is in issue, at the very time of doing the act which is the subject of
inquiry. However, it is permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition
for a reasonable period both before and after the time of the act in question.
Direct testimony is not required nor the specific acts of derangement essential
to establish insanity as a defense. The vagaries of the mind can only be known
by outward acts: thereby we read the thoughts, motives and emotions of a
person; and through which we determine whether his acts conform to the
practice of people of sound mind. (People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87)
In the case at bar, defense's expert witnesses, who are doctors of the National
Center for Mental Health, concluded that the accused was suffering from
psychosis or insanity classified under organic mental disorder secondary to
cerebro-vascular accident or stroke before, during and after the commission of
the crime charged. (Exhibit L, p. 4). Accordingly, the mental illness of the
accused was characterized by perceptual disturbances manifested through
impairment of judgment and impulse control, impairment of memory and
disorientation, and hearing of strange voices. The accused allegedly suffered
from psychosis which was organic. The defect of the brain, therefore, is
permanent.
Dr. Echavez, defense's expert witness, admitted that the insanity of the accused
was permanent and did not have a period for normal thinking. To quote
Q Is there such a lucid intervals?
A In this case, considering the nature of the organic mental disorder, the
lucid intervals unfortunately are not present, sir.
(TSN, p. 36, August 2, 1988)
However, Dr. Echavez disclosed that the manifestation or the symptoms of
psychosis may be treated with medication. (TSN, p. 26, August 2, 1988). Thus,
although the defect of the brain is permanent, the manifestation of insanity is
curable.
Dr. Echavez further testified that the accused was suffering from psychosis
since January of 1987, thus:
Q In your assessment of the patient, did you determine the length of time
the patient has been mentally ill?
A From his history, the patient started (sic) or had a stroke abroad. If I
may be allowed to scan my record, the record reveals that the patient had a
stroke in Riyadh about seven (7) months before his contract expired and he was
brought home. Sometime in January of 1987, the first manifestation is noted on
the behavioral changes. He was noted to be in deep thought, pre-occupied self,
complaining of severe headache, deferment of sleep and loss of appetite; and
that was about January of 1987, Sir. (TSN, pp. 21-22, August 2, 1988)
The defense reposed their arguments on the findings of the doctors of the
National Center for Mental Health, specifically on Dr. Echavez's assessment
that the accused has been insane since January of 1987 or three (3) months
before the commission of the crime charged. The doctors arrived at this
conclusion based on the testimonies of the accused's wife and relatives, and
after a series of medical and psychological examinations on the accused when
he was confined therein. However, We are still in quandary as to whether the
accused was really insane or not during the commission of the offense.
The prosecution aptly rebutted the defense proposition, that the accused,
though he may be insane, has no lucid intervals. It is an undisputed fact that a
month or few weeks prior to the commission of the crime charged the accused
confronted the husband of the victim concerning the actuations of the latter.
He complained against the various requirements being asked by the DAR office,
particularly against the victim. We quote hereunder the testimony of Atty.
Rodolfo C. Sigua:
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IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
Q In the latter part of February 1987 do you remember having met the
accused Rosalino Dungo?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A At our residence, sir, at San Vicente, Apalit, Pampanga.
Q Could you tell us what transpired in the latter part of February 1987,
when you met the accused at your residence?
A Accused went to our residence. When I asked him what he wanted,
accused told me that he wanted to know from my wife why she was asking so
many documents: why she was requiring him to be interviewed and file the
necessary documents at the Office of the DAR. Furthermore, he wanted to
know why my wife did not want to transfer the Certificate of Land Transfer of
the landholding of his deceased father in his name.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When the accused informed you in the latter part of February 1987 that
your wife the late Belen Macalino Sigua was making hard for him the transfer of
the right of his father, what did you tell him?
A I asked the accused, "Have you talked or met my wife? Why are you
asking this question of me?"
Q What was his answer?
A Accused told me that he never talked nor met my wife but sent
somebody to her office to make a request for the transfer of the landholding in
the name of his deceased father in his name.
Q When you informed him about the procedure of the DAR, what was
the comment of the accused?
A The accused then said, "I now ascertained that she is making things
difficult for the transfer of the landholding in the name of my father and my
name."
(TSN, pp. 5-7, April 22, 1987)
If We are to believe the contention of the defense, the accused was supposed to
be mentally ill during this confrontation. However, it is not usual for an insane
person to confront a specified person who may have wronged him. Be it noted
that the accused was supposed to be suffering from impairment of the memory,
We infer from this confrontation that the accused was aware of his acts. This
event proves that the accused was not insane or if insane, his insanity admitted
of lucid intervals.
The testimony of defense witness Dr. Nicanor Echavez is to the effect that the
appellant could have been aware of the nature of his act at the time he
committed it. To quote:
Q Could you consider a person who is undergoing trial, not necessarily
the accused, when asked by the Court the whereabouts of his lawyer he
answered that his lawyer is not yet in Court and that he is waiting for his
counsel to appear and because his counsel did not appear, he asked for the
postponement of the hearing of the case and to reset the same to another date.
With those facts, do you consider him insane?
A I cannot always say that he is sane or insane, sir.
Q In other words, he may be sane and he may be insane?
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Q How about if you applied this to the accused, what will be your
conclusion?
A Having examined a particular patient, in this particular case, I made a
laboratory examination, in short all the assessment necessary to test the
behavior of the patient, like for example praying for postponement and fleeing
from the scene of the crime is one situation to consider if the patient is really
insane or not. If I may elaborate to explain the situation of the accused, the
nature of the illness, the violent behavior, then he appears normal he can reason
out and at the next moment he burst out into violence regardless motivated or
unmotivated. This is one of the difficulties we have encountered in this case.
When we deliberated because when we prepared this case we have really
deliberation with all the members of the medical staff so those are the things we
considered. Like for example he shouted out "Napatay ko si Mrs. Sigua!" at that
particular moment he was aware of what he did, he knows the criminal case.
24
IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
COURT
Q With that statement of yours that he was aware when he shouted that
he killed the victim in this case, Mrs. Sigua, do we get it that he shouted those
words because he was aware when he did the act?
A The fact that he shouted, Your Honor, awareness is there. (TSN, pp.
37-41, August 2, 1983; emphasis supplied)
Insanity in law exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence. The
statement of one of the expert witnesses presented by the defense, Dr. Echavez,
that the accused knew the nature of what he had done makes it highly doubtful
that accused was insane when he committed the act charged. As stated by the
trial court:
The Court is convinced that the accused at the time that he perpetrated the act
was sane. The evidence shows that the accused, at the time he perpetrated the
act was carrying an envelope where the fatal weapon was hidden. This is an
evidence that the accused consciously adopted a pattern to kill the victim. The
suddenness of the attack classified the killing as treacherous and therefore
murder. After the accused ran away from the scene of the incident after he
stabbed the victim several times, he was apprehended and arrested in Metro
Manila, an indication that he took flight in order to evade arrest. This to the
mind of the Court is another indicia that he was conscious and knew the
consequences of his acts in stabbing the victim (Rollo, p. 63)
There is no ground to alter the trial court's findings and appreciation of the
evidence presented. (People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646). The trial court had the
privilege of examining the deportment and demeanor of the witnesses and
therefore, it can discern if such witnesses were telling the truth or not.
Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of the
accused.1âwphi1 However, in the defense of insanity, doubt as to the fact of
insanity should be resolved in fervor of sanity. The burden of proving the
affirmative allegation of insanity rests on the defense. Thus:
In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a prosecution for crime, the
starting premise is that the law presumes all persons to be of sound mind. (Art.
800, Civil Code: U.S. v. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305) Otherwise stated, the law
presumes all acts to be voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts
were done unconsciously (People v. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288). . . . Whoever,
therefore, invokes insanity as a defense has the burden of proving its existence.
(U.S. v. Zamora, 52 Phil. 218) (People v. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451)
The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption of sanity is
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity is a defense in a confession and
avoidance and as such must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity must
be clearly and satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an accused on the ground
of insanity. Appellant has not successfully discharged the burden of overcoming
the presumption that he committed the crime as charged freely, knowingly, and
intelligently.
Lastly, the State should guard against sane murderer escaping punishment
through a general plea of insanity. (People v. Bonoan, supra) PREMISES
CONSIDERED, the questioned decision is hereby
AFFIRMED without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., concurs in the result.
PEOPLE VS YAM-ID
MELO, J.:
Before us on automatic review is the decision dated June 17, 1997 of Branch 29
of the Regional Trial Court of the 7th Judicial Region stationed in Toledo City
in its Criminal Cases No. TCS-2581 and 2382 finding accused-appellant
ERLINDO YAM-ID guilty of murder and frustrated homicide, respectively,
and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death in the first case. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, in Crim. Case No.
TCS-2381 this Court finds the accused GUILTY of the crime of Murder and
pursuant to Rep. Act 7659 hereby imposes the Mandatory penalty of DEATH
and to indemnify the parents of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay
actual damages in the amount of P40,000.0.
In Crim. Case No. TCS-2382, this Court finds the accused GUILTY of the
crime of Frustrated Homicide under Art. 249 RPC in relation to Art. 50 and
after applying the indeterminate sentence law, it is hereby the sentence of this
Court that said accused will suffer the penalty of SIX (6) Years and ONE (1)
DAY of Prision Mayor in its minimum period to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision
mayor in its maximum period. The OIC, Branch Clerk of Court is hereby
25
IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
directed to remand the records of these cases to the Supreme Court for
automatic review.
SO ORDERED.
(p. 45, Rollo.)
The case for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor
General as follows:
Julius Cantutay was a resident of Saksak, Pinamungajan, Cebu. Appellant
Erlindo was his neighbor. So, too, was Danilo Tejamo, his uncle, and six (6)
year old Jerry Tejamo his cousin (p. 2, tsn, July 31, 1995).
On April 1, 1994, at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Julius was sent by his
grandmother, Amanda Ceniza, to Brgy. Tutay, Pinamungajan,Cebu, to deliver
benignit, a local delicacy, to his aunt Bebing Dequiado. Jerry Tejamo was with
Julius. On their way to Dequiado's house, they passed by the house of appellant
who greeted them, "Good Evening". After said salutation, appellant suddenly
unsheathed a long bolo. On instinct, Julius pushed Jerry, who was then walking
in front of him, and told the latter to run. Appellant ran after the two. Jerry was
overtaken by Julius. Julius momentarily stopped to wait for Jerry, but appellant
caught up with Jerry. Appellant stabbed Jerry with the bolo on the left portion
of his back. Not content, appellant held Jerry by the hair and hacked him on the
nape. Jerry fell to the ground. As a coup de grace, appellant stabbed Jerry on the
right side of his back. Jerry died on the spot. Appellant then knelt over the
prostrate body of Jerry and sucked the blood from his neck (pp. 3-9, tsn, July
31, 1995).
Scared out of his wits, Julius ran towards the house of Jerry to the latter's father,
Danilo Tejamo. Danilo was then sleeping, Julius narrated the harrowing incident
to Aniceta Tejamo, wife of Danilo. Aniceta Tejamo is the sister of Julius's
father, hence, an aunt (p. 5, tsn, Oct. 26, 1995).1âwphi1.nêt
Aniceta roused Danilo from his sleep and both of them ran to the site of the
incident. Before they could reach the place, however, they were met by
appellant, who had a bolo in hand. Danilo asked appellant the whereabouts of
his son. Appellant instead answered, "I will kill all of you", and immediately
hacked Danilo. Danilo was able to dodge the attack, but he slipped and fell to
the ground. Appellant struck at the fallen Danilo, who tried to parry the attack,
but Danilo nevertheless got hit on the bridge of his nose. Danilo tried to stand,
but appellant hacked him anew. This time, Danilo was hit on the head, and he
fell to the ground, bloodied (pp. 7-11, tsn, Oct. 26, 1995).
Since Danilo was not moving anymore, Aniceta shouted that Danilo was already
dead. Appellant took hold of Danilo's collar to finish him off. Inexplicably, the
tip of the bolo hit appellant's stomach and blood oozed from the wound.
Perturbed, appellant ran towards his house and threw the bolo to the ground.
Danilo regained consciousness and sought treatment (pp. 12-15, tsn, Oct. 26,
1995).
Expenses for the wake and burial of Jerry amounted to P40,000.00 (p. 14, tsn,
ibid.)
(pp. 109-112, Rollo.)
During the trial, accused-appellant denied killing the 6-year old Jerry Tejamo
and pleaded self-defense for his assault on Danilo Tejamo, Jerry's father. He
contended that due to a land dispute between his family and the in-laws of
Danilo Tejamo, the latter tried to kill him by firing at his house. In retaliation,
he hacked Danilo Tejamo at the forehead but Danilo shot him, hitting him
below the navel, in the process, causing a prolapse (the exposure of his
intestines). Then, he lost consciousness.
The trial court did not give credence to accused-appellant's tale and after trial on
the merits, it found him guilty as charged.
In this automatic review, accused-appellant now makes a complete turn-around
and admits killing Jerry Tejamo. He, however, would plead insanity, and, as to
his conviction for frustrated homicide regarding his attack on Danilo Tejamo,
accused-appellant seeks reversal on the ground that the prosecution failed to
prove his intent to kill.
The People contends that accused-appellant should not be allowed to change
his theory on appeal. We do not agree. An appeal in a criminal case opens the
whole action for review on any question including those not raised by the
parties (People vs. Villaruel, 261 SCRA 386 (1996); People vs. Godines, 196
SCRA 765 [1991]; People vs. Villagracia, 226 SCRA 374 [1993]; see also
Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332 [1997]). The reason for this rule is
that every circumstance in favor of the accused should be considered (Sacay vs.
Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]). This legal maxim acquires greater
significance in this case where accused-appellant faces the supreme penalty of
death. It is our policy that in a death penalty case, the Court cannot rush to
judgment even when a despicable homicidal felon is involved for an erroneous
conviction will have a lasting stain in our escutcheon of justice (People vs.
Alicundo, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]).
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At this instance, the defense, now as represented by the Public Attorney's
Office (PAO), contends that at the time of the incident, appellant was suffering
from a chronic mental disorder, otherwise known as schizophrenia, which is
characterized by a person's inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality
and is often hallucinations and delusions (Encyclopedia and Dictionary of
Medicine and Nursing, Miller-Keane, p. 860 cited in the Brief for the Accused-
Appellant, p. 63, Rollo).
Accused-appellant's defense of insanity is anchored on the testimony of Dr.
Antonio Yapha who treated his wound. Said doctor testified that contrary to
accused-appellant's claim that Danilo shot him, he did not find any entrance for
the alleged gunshot wound. The doctor said that a wound caused by a .38
caliber slug will not result in a prolapse, that is, the intestines slipping out of the
usual place. In the words of the defense, this "belied the testimony of accused-
appellant that his stomach had a prolapse and instead bolstered the testimony of
the prosecution witness that accused-appellant tried to kill himself with a long
bolo" (Brief for the Accused-Appellant. p. 63, Rollo). As further proof of
insanity, the defense cites accused-appellant's gruesome act of sucking Jerry
Tejamo's blood after he had mercilessly stabbed the boy to death.
Insanity is a defense in the nature of confession and avoidance, and as such
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt (People vs. Ambal, 100 SCRA 35
[1980]). In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a criminal
prosecution, the starting premise is that the law presumes all persons to be of
sound mind, or otherwise stated, the law takes for granted that acts are done
consciously. Insanity being the exception rather than the rule in the human
condition, "the moral and legal presumption is that freedom and intelligence
constitute the normal condition of a person and that a felonious or criminal act
(delicto deloso) has been done with deliberate intent, that is, with freedom,
intelligence and malice" and that whoever, therefore, invokes insanity as a
defense has the burden of proving its existence (People vs. Aldemita, 145 SCRA
451 [1987] citing Article 800, Civil Code; US vs. Martinez, 34 Phil 305, 308
[1916]; People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292 [1960]; People vs. Tagasa, 68 Fhil.
147, 153 [1939]; US vs. Guevarra, 27 Phil 547 [1914]; People vs. Renegado, 57
SCRA 275, 286 [1974]; US vs. Zamora, 32 Phil. 218 [1915]; People vs. Bascos,
44 Phil. 204 [1923]).
In the case at bar, the defense regrettably failed to discharge its burden of
proving that accused-appellant was insane at the time of the commission of the
crime. The only intimation of insanity that accused-appellant could point at is
the non-medical opinion of the PAO that accused-appellant was suffering from
schizophrenia because he sipped his victim's blood and tried to kill himself
afterwards. No medical certificate was presented to substantiate the claim of
insanity. No testimony was proffered to support the allegation. We are not
aware that the PAO now has the expertise, more so the authority, to diagnose
its clients of their mental condition. While we agree that sucking Jerry's blood
and stabbing one's self in the stomach are not acts expected of a normal person,
we, however, have to be careful in distinguishing between insanity and passion
or eccentricity, mental weakness or mere depression resulting from some
physical ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers escaping
punishment through a general plea of insanity (People vs. So, 247 SCRA 708
[1995]; People vs. Dungo, 199 SCRA 860 [1991] citing People vs. Bonoan, 64
Phil. 87; see also People vs. Amba, supra).
We do not discount the possibility that accused-appellant may have "lost his
mind" after killing the 6-year old Jerry as manifested by his slurping of the boy's
blood and his attempt to commit suicide. However, for insanity to be
appreciated as an present immediately before or at the very moment the crime is
committed, and not thereafier. We do not believe that accused-appellant was
insane when he killed Jerry and hacked Danilo before attempting to take his
own life. To reiterate, no iota of evidence was presented to prove the same.
Verily, the defense of insanity was not even raised during the trial of the case. It
is invoked only now on appeal, giving us the impression that it is but an
afterthought.
And now to the propriety of the penalty imposed.
The trial court cited the following as the attendant circumstances that qualified
the killing of Jerry Tejamo to murder, or aggravated the same, to wit:
1. Bad blood existed between the family of the accused and the
complainant's father-in-law due to a land dispute prior to the incident therefore
premeditation exist;
2. Treachery — the sudden and unexpected attack.by the accused against
unarmed minor who is 6 years old without any means to defend himself and the
suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack (Pp. vs. Molato, G.R No. 66634,
29 February 1989; Pp. vs. Canzano, 95 SCRA);
3. The killing of the victim Jerry Tejamo, a minor 6 year old child
constitutes an aggravating circumstance. There is treachery when an adult
illegally attacks a child of tender years and causes his death (U.S. vs. Butag, 38
Phil. 746).
(p. 43, Rollo.)
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IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
and having earlier explained that —
. . . The brutal and senseless killing of Jerry Tejamo, a 6 year old child manifest
accused's perversity and callousness as a cold blooded murderer and brings him
to fore as a heinous criminal under Rep. Act 7659 which defines heinous as a
grievous, odious and hateful offense by reason of their inherent or manifest
wickectness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity and repugnant and outrageous
to the common standard and norms of decency and morality in a just civilized
and orderly society. This is the kind of man the accused is.
(p. 42, Rollo.)
meted out on accused-appellant the supreme penalty of death in Criminal Case
No. TCS-2381.
We affirm the finding of the trial court that treachery attended the killing of the
6-year old Jerry Tejamo for when an adult person illegally attacks a child of
tender years and causes his death, treachery exists (People vs. Sancholes, 271
SCRA 527 [1997]; see also People vs. Caritativo, 256 SCRA 1[1996]).
The trial court, however, erred in finding that evident premeditation attended
the commission of the crime. The following requisites must concur before
evident premeditation may be appreciated: (a) the time when the accused
determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the
accused had clung to his determination; and (c) sufficient lapse of time between
such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act (People vs. Magno, 260 SCRA 300 [1996]). Here, the
prosecution omitted or failed to present any evidence to show any, much less,
all of the above elements. The bad blood that allegedly exists between accused-
appellant's family and the in-laws of Danilo Tejamo, Jerry's father, does not, in
any way, prove evident premeditation.
It was thus treachery that qualified the killing of Jerry Tejamo to murder.
However, there being neither an aggravating nor a mitigating circumstance, the
maximum penalty of death imposed by the trial court must be reduced to the
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua in line with our decisions in People vs.
Magno, supra, and People vs. Lucas, (240 SCRA 66 [1995]) where we explained
that if there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, then the
crime, although falling under Republic Act No. 7659, will not be punished by
death but by the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Anent the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. TCS-2382, the Office of the
Solicitor General correctly observes that the crime committed by accused-
appellant in stabbing Danilo Tejamo constituted only attempted homicide since
the wounds suffered by Danilo were not life threatening. Article 253 of the
Revised Penal Code provides the penalty of reclusion temporal for the crime of
homicide. Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an
attempted crime is two degrees lower than that prescribed by law. Attempted
homicide is thus punishable by prision correccional. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum penalty to be meted out on accused-appellant
should be anywhere within the range of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months of arresto mayor, and the maximum should be taken from the medium
period of prision correccional (Art. 64, par. 1) the range of which is two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day, to four (4) years and two (2) months.
Considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the
commission of the Attempted Homicide, the accused-appellant shall be
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of two (2) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional medium as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby MODIFIED, finding accused-
appellant GUILTY of MURDER in Criminal Case No. TCS-2381and
sentencing him to suffer the reduced penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
He is likewise ordered to indemnify the parents of the victim the sum of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos and to pay actual damages in the amount of Forty
Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos. In Criminal Case No. TCS-2382, accused-
appellant is found guilty of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE instead and sentenced
to two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2)
years, four (4) months and correcional as maximum.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Panganiban and Buena, JJ., are on leave
PEOPLE VS BELONIO
PER CURIAM:
For automatic review before this Court is the Decision1 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental (Branch 50 stationed in Bacolod City) in
Criminal Case No. 00-20595, dated February 26, 2001, finding Randy Belonio y
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Landas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing
him to death.
The Amended Information dated April 27, 2000, charged appellant with Murder
as follows:
"That on or about the 6th day of January, 2000, in the City of Talisay, Province
of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with an improvised knife, with intent
to kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one RAMY TAMAYO, thus
causing injuries in the vital parts of the body of the latter which caused his
instantaneous death.
"That accused RANDY BELONIO y LANDAS is a recidivist for having been
convicted by final judgment of 4 years, two (2) months, one day to six years in
Crim. Case 94-16609 entitled: People of the Philippines vs. Randy Belonio y
Landas for Homicide."2
Upon his arraignment on May 24, 2000,3 appellant, assisted by his counsel de
oficio, pleaded not guilty.
In his Brief,4 the Solicitor General narrates the factual antecedents of the case,
as summarized by the trial court, as follows:
"Jennifer Carampatana testified that on January 6, 2000, her grandmother was
buried and there was a wake in their house at Brgy. Zone 14 in the evening. Her
first cousin, the late Ramy Tamayo, also called Ramon Tamayo, arrived in their
house at about 10:00 P.M. together with his wife.
"Jennifer invited Ramy to talk outside of their house. Before they could sit on a
nearby bench, Ramy decided to buy cigarettes from a store only a few meters
away. The store was furnished with a small opening for the store-keeper to
attend to the customers and Ramy was occupying that space in front of the
opening to pay when the accused Randy Belonio arrived. Randy tried to force
his way in front of the opening and as a consequence, he bumped on Ramy.
Jennifer saw that Randy gave Ramy a long and hard look.
"Jennifer said that he and Ramy sat and talked on the bench. The accused came
over and sat on the other end of the bench. Then the accused asked Ramy for
the latter’s cigarette lighter. The accused asked Ramy from what place did he
come from and why was he there. Ramy answered the accused in a normal
manner.
"The accused left but after a few minutes he returned, Jennifer, who was facing
the direction of the approaching accused, saw him and noticed that he was
wearing long sleeves. Ramy Tamayo could not see the accused as he was facing
sideways to Jennifer. Without saying a word and without warning, the accused
delivered a stabbing blow with a dagger which was concealed in his hand. Ramy
was hit on the right chest, Jennifer stood up and ran towards her house
shouting for help. There at the gate of the fence of her house, she heard
another thudding sound of a stabbing blow. When Jennifer entered her house,
she announced that Ramy was stabbed.
"Jennifer and her relatives rushed out of the house. Jennifer saw the accused
running away towards the back of the barangay hall. The Tanods who came
over failed to find the accused. Then when the Barangay Captain and the
policemen arrived, Jennifer informed them of the direction towards which the
accused fled. The accused was arrested from one (1) of the houses near the
barangay hall where he took refuge.
"Dr. Raul V. Pama, Jr. was the acting City Health Officer of Talisay City on
January 6, 2000. He conducted an autopsy on the remains of Ramy Tamayo and
listed his findings in a necropsy report which he prepared. These findings are as
follows:
‘1. Stabbed wound, 1.7 cm. in length, sutured sharp on one (1) and (inferior
portion) and blunt on the other end (superior portion) located at the 4th
intercostal space;
‘Dr. Pama explained that the wound is just above the left nipple and it
penetrated downward hitting the left side on the heart;
‘2. Stabbed wound at the sternal. The wound is situated just above the site of
the first wound.’
‘The first wound was fatal as it damaged the heart.’"5
In his Brief,6 Randy Belonio adopted the above findings of the trial court and
the prosecution. However, he raises the defense of insanity, an exempting
circumstance, and for such purpose, depends on the expert assessment of his
witness, Dr. Antonio Gauzon, who certified thus:
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"This is an individual who is suffering from (Schizophrenia), Chronic
Undifferentiated and probably triggered by (s)ubstance abuse of Shabu and
Marijuana.
"Recommending treatment and rehabilitation in a mental institution like the
National Center for Mental (H)ealth in Mandaluyong City or treatment in the
psychiatric unit of the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Regional Hospital in
Bacolod City and later rehabilitation in the Negros (O)ccidental Mental Health
Center at Paglaum Village, Bacolod City."7
The RTC was convinced beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of
Murder and that he had full control of his mental faculties. It held that the
testimony of Dr. Ester Regina Servando was more weighty and credible than
that of Dr. Gauzon.8
The trial court convicted appellant, thus:
"FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Randy Belonio y
Landas GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as charged in the
Information, as Principal by Direct (Participation) with the qualifying
aggravating circumstance of treachery and the special aggravating circumstance
of recidivism. There are no other aggravating circumstances nor is there any
mitigating circumstance. Accordingly, the accused is sentenced to suffer the
supreme penalty of DEATH.
"The accused is held civilly liable to pay the heirs of Randy Tamayo the
following amounts:
"1. The sum of ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity;
"2. The sum of ₱3,629.70 as reimbursement for hospital expenses;
"3. The sum of ₱940,716.00 as compensatory damages; and
"4. The sum of ₱100,000.00 in favor of Mrs. Jinky Tamayo as moral damages."9
Hence this automatic review.
In his brief, appellant assigns this lone alleged error of the court a quo for our
consideration:
"The trial court seriously erred in not appreciating the exempting circumstance
of insanity pursuant to Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
favoring the accused-appellant."10
In support of his appeal, appellant argues that he was not in his right and
normal frame of mind when the killing took place. He avers that no normal
person would ever bump another person, give the latter a hard look and
eventually stab him to death. He adds that he and the victim did not know each
other at that time.11
Appellant also asseverates that Dr. Gauzon is a reliable expert witness and is
more knowledgeable and experienced than Dr. Servando.12 He explains that
Dr. Servando was once under the tutelage of Dr. Gauzon and that at the time of
their respective testimonies, the former was only 37 years old, while the latter
was 57 years old.13 Appellant also cites portions of the trial court’s Decision
where Dr. Gauzon referred him to the Bacolod City Health Office for
psychiatric examination. The trial court also branded the accused as a homicidal
maniac, which appellant says, is judicial notice of his mental sickness.14 In sum,
he concludes that all of these circumstances show that he was insane at the time
of the killing.
We find these arguments without merit.
The moral and legal presumption is that one acts with free will and intelligence,
and that a felonious or criminal act has been done with deliberate intent, that is,
with freedom and intelligence.15 Whoever, therefore, invokes insanity as a
defense has the burden of proving its existence.
Insanity is a defense in the nature of confession and avoidance, and as such
must be adequately proved.16 The law presumes that all persons are of sound
mind, and that acts are done consciously.17
In the case at bar, the defense utterly failed to discharge its burden of proving
that appellant was insane. The testimony or proof of appellant’s insanity must
relate to the time preceding or the very moment of the commission of the
offense charged.18 We find the evidence adduced by the defense sorely
insufficient to establish his claim that he was insane at the time he killed
Tamayo.
The main circumstances presented by the defense that remotely evinces that
appellant was insane at that time was his act of bumping the victim, without any
apparent reason, giving him a long hard look, and then eventually stabbing him.
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However, this sequence of events cannot overcome the legal presumption of
sanity, let alone prove appellant’s insanity.
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act. Proof of the existence of some abnormality
of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability, if it can be shown that the
offender was not completely deprived of freedom and intelligence.19 As culled
from the trial court’s findings, Belonio, after giving the victim a hard and
resentful look, sat near the latter, lighted his cigarette and conversed with
him.20 Afterwards, he left and came back armed with a dagger with which he
stabbed Tamayo. Immediately thereafter, he escaped and went into hiding.
Contrary to a finding of the existence of insanity, these acts tend to establish
that Belonio was well aware of what he had just committed, and was capable of
distinguishing right from wrong. Otherwise, he would not have attempted to
escape and go into hiding.
Aside from the "bumping" incident earlier discussed, the only other evidence of
insanity that appellant could relevantly point to is the medical certificate
prepared by Dr. Antonio Gauzon stating that Belonio was suffering from
schizophrenia. This witness was presented to refute the findings of the
prosecution’s expert witness Dr. Ester Regina Servando which negated the
existence of this mental condition.
A run-through of Dr. Gauzon’s testimony strengthens this Court’s resolve to
affirm the lower court’s findings. Part of his testimony is reproduced as follows:
"ATTY. JACILDO:
Q. Now, from this Medical Certificate, Doctor, there is specifically mentioned
here that the subject here ‘was found to be incoherent and irrelevant and
disoriented as to time, person and place, and that there was plight of ideas and
adjustment, as well as insights.’ Will you kindly explain this to this Honorable
Court?
A. What meant there is that, when you talk to the individual, sometimes you get
answers right, sometimes it is wrong. That is when you say that he is incoherent.
When you say irrelevant, that pertain to the question. Now, as far as dates, he
could not remember the date. As far (as) the place, he could not recall the place
when he was in my office. And some of the persons that were with him, he
could not identify them. Now, when I say that there was plight of ideas, that
(was) when he was talking. As a matter of fact, I gave an example, when I asked
a question – when I asked him about the first killing incident and his answer
was, ‘face to face kami, simbahan namon kag inagaw namon ang baril’ because
of warship. That is only one, because there were others that you could not
understand what he was talking about whether you have to rely only on other
things. And sometimes, he would talk on things which are not there. That
means he was hallucinating. Now, judgment is usually poor. Because, when I
asked him of what he will do regarding the case, he would just say that, ‘Ti, amo
na ya.’ And he said, ‘Ano kamo da ya?’ kay ang warship. So, I was asking him
about the values of what he was doing and he could not give me that answer.
And he does not know what he was doing. That means that there was no reality
testing. He does not know what is the real fantasy.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Now in your opinion as an expert in terms of Psychiatry, about how long has
the subject, Randy Belonio, been suffering from his mental disorder that you
mentioned in your Medical Certificate?
A. Since childhood. If you would notice, I put there in the history that his father
was medically disabled when he was ten (10) years old, and the mother was only
a fish vendor and there were, I think, eight (8) to ten (10) in the family and with
a meager income and have to (fend) for themselves. And in a very young age of
ten (10), the parents had the attitude of ‘Bahala na ang kabata-an’. That means,
they have to take care of themselves. At age 13, he was brought by the relative
to Manila, and although he was incoherent, you can get from his answer by
mentioning so many places, (like) Manila, Pasay, Caloocan, Novaliches, MRT,
Cubao. That means, at age 13, he was already around these areas (f)ending for
himself. And the (s)treet (u)rchins, you know for a fact, that they are influenced
by drugs. So, by that time, with that dysfunctional family, and without any
family to take care of himself, he was not doing what the society expects him to
do. So that they have dysfunctional family and with dysfunctional relatives. So,
the value system was really poor. So that the thinking process of this individual
was not developed to what the society expects him to be. So, it started at that
time. So, when he was taking shabu, it triggered every tissue that the symptoms
came out. That’s why, he became suspicious, (he) became irritable and anybody
who would try to not befriend him and tried to be angry with him, he would
immediately suspect that something would happen to him in which he would
react by defending himself, and probably by killing. This individual had, actually,
committed, say, killing. I would not say murder because that’s your term, but he
had killed already three (3) persons in different years. So, he does not already
know what he was doing because he was psychotic, which in your parlance is
insane.
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Q. Now, Doctor, on January 6, 2000, and even prior to this date, what you are
trying to say is that, this subject, Randy Belonio, was already suffering from
schizophrenia?
A. Yes."21
Dr. Gauzon testified that based on his interview with Belonio on October 25,
2000 (around nine months after the stabbing incident) the latter was suffering
from schizophrenia. However, the evidence of insanity after the fact of
commission of the offense may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of
alleged abnormal behavior immediately before or simultaneous to the
commission of the crime.22
The first set of facts narrated by the doctor relates to Belonio’s condition during
the interview, months after the incident. His report was silent as regards the
incidents occurring prior to or during the circumstance for which Belonio
stands trial. The second part of his testimony dwelt on Belonio’s life history,
which was offered to prove that he had been suffering from his alleged
condition since childhood.
However, perusing the story as narrated by the doctor, the same was a mere
statement of Belonio’s life and family history, explaining what brought about his
supposed mental condition. There was no showing that he was actually
suffering from schizophrenia during his juvenile years. To demonstrate that he
had been suffering from this condition, the doctor pointed to the fact that he
has already killed three (3) persons, including the present incident. However,
such conclusion is non sequitur and, at best, a circuitous argument. Further, the
veracity of these findings is belied by the fact that the accused did not raise this
defense during his prosecutions for the other killings. No other circumstances
evincing its existence were presented during trial.
Furthermore, Dr. Gauzon’s examination cannot surmount Dr. Servando’s
punctilious and overwhelming analysis, which took two days to narrate. She
explained the history of the accused, including his family and medical
background, conducted a mental status examination, which was based on her
direct interviews with him, and gave a series of other written psychological
examinations.23
The portion of Dr. Servando’s testimony pertinent to her findings regarding
Belonio’s mental condition is quoted as follows:
"FISCAL AGRAVIADOR:
Q. Can you please read for the record this (r)esult which consist only of one (1)
sentence?
A. Psychiatric Evaluation Result. Base(d) on history, mental status examination,
and psychological examination, patient was noted to be evasive, suspicious, and
manipulative but no psychotic features were observed upon evaluation. x x x.
Q. So, let us first, may I ask, what do you me(a)n by ‘patient was noted to be
evasive, suspicious, and manipulative’?
A. Actually, during the psychological examination, we have to give series of
questions. And then the patient (does) not answer directly to our question. He
would go around the bush. And then, after that, we also found out during the
result of the psychological examination that the same pattern was noted.
Q. Does this mean that he was totally capable of being manipulative or evasive?
A. Yes.
Q. He did it intentionally?
A. Yes.
Q. With the knowledge that he knew the answer but does not want to give the
answer?
A. Yes.
Q. Meaning to say, that he has full control of his mental faculties that time?
A. Yes.
Q. Because there was an intention to be manipulative and there was an
intention to be evasive because he was suspicious?
A. Yes.
Q. When you said that there was no psychotic features(,) x x x (w)hat does this
mean?
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A. When you say psychosis, those are compose[d] of symptoms such as
delusion and hallucination that are being extracted from the patient or being
displayed by the patient. However, during the examination, the symptom or the
patient’s answers are not enough to put him to a criteria of psychosis because
the delusion and the hallucination as well as the thought process, the thought
contents must be concretized enough in order for us to determine to diagnose
that this patient is actually suffering from psychosis.
Q. So, subjected to your examination, this patient did not come up to the level
where he could be diagnosed as having delusion and hallucinations?
A. Leading to psychotic features.
Q. So, that is the meaning of not having psychotic features?
A. Yes."24
The insanity issue raised by appellant boils down to the credibility of these two
expert witnesses and their respective testimonies. The time-honored doctrine is
that the question of which witness to believe is one best addressed by the trial
court. The findings of fact of the judges who heard the evidence are accorded
great respect and are seldom disturbed on appeal for they had the opportunity
to directly observe the witnesses, and to determine by their demeanor on the
stand the probative value of their testimonies.25 The Court finds no cogent
reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court which found Dr. Servando’s
testimony more credible for the following reasons:
"1. It could not be gainsaid that Dr. Servando is a disinterested and unbiased
witness. She does not know the accused and she is not known to the accused.
She will not be benefited if the Court upholds her findings and she had no
reason to testify falsely. On the other hand, Dr. Gauzon was admittedly paid for
his services, hence, it could not be truly said that he is an impartial and
disinterested witness. If his findings (are) upheld, the benefit to the practice of
his profession is enormous;
"2. As a government official, Dr. Servando has the presumption of regularity in
the performance of her duty. No such presumption arises in favor of Dr.
Gauzon;
"3. The findings of Dr. Servando that the accused is evasive and manipulative is
supported by the Court’s own observation. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
"4. The conclusion of Dr. Gauzon is principally based on his interview with the
accused and the members of the accused’s family. It was the members of the
accused’s family, the sister of the accused who informed Dr. Gauzon that at the
age of 13, the accused began to use drugs. The information that the family of
the accused was impoverished; that the accused spent his adolescence in Metro-
Manila; that the accused was a neglected child were all supplied by the kins of
the accused who were not presented as witnesses. There was no showing that
Dr. Gauzon took precautionary steps to validate the information. On the other
hand, Dr. Servando also conducted interview of the accused and his
accompanying relatives including the BJMP guard who escorted him. In
addition, Dr. Servando conducted a series of written tests which are tailored to
determine the mental capacity of a person. The result of the written tests
confirms the observation of Dr. Servando in the interview that the accused is
evasive and manipulative."26
Unlike in other jurisdictions, Philippine courts have established a more stringent
criterion for the acceptance of insanity as an exempting circumstance. In our
jurisdiction, mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough; there must
be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act.
Every individual is presumed to have acted with complete grasp of one’s mental
faculties. Appellant’s past does not discredit the facts that (1) he did not act with
complete absence of the power to discern; (2) he was not deprived of reason;
and (3) he was not totally deprived of his will.
As held in People vs. Madarang,27
"An accused invoking the insanity defense pleads not guilty by reason thereof.
He admits committing the crime but claims that he is not guilty because he was
insane at the time of its commission. Hence, the accused is tried on the issue of
sanity alone and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered
without any trial on the issue of guilt as he had already admitted committing the
crime. x x x."28
Inasmuch as Belonio failed to present convincing evidence to establish his
alleged insanity at the time he stabbed Tamayo, we are constrained to affirm his
conviction.
We must add that we have meticulously reviewed the records of this case,
especially the evidence of the prosecution. We find no reason to modify, much
less reverse, the findings of the trial court that, indeed, appellant’s guilt for
murder has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
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IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER

Q. From what direction did Randy came when he approach you?

We now look into the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial court.
A. He came from their house because their house is near our house.
Under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, any person
found guilty of murder shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. The Q. In relation to you, where is this house located?
same Code further instructs that when in the commission of the crime there is
present an aggravating circumstance which is not offset by any mitigating A. Witness indicating that he came from her side, where the house is situated.
circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.29
Q. And which side did you sit, the side near the direction of the house of Randy
A review of the records supports the conclusion of the trial court on the Belonio or far from the house of Belonio?
presence of treachery, which qualified the crime to murder. For treachery to be
appreciated, two elements must concur: (1) the means of execution employed A. The other side.
gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2)
the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.30 COURT:

In the present case, Jennifer Carampatana testified on how the killing was It was Ramy who was sitting near the house of Ramy?
executed, as follows:
WITNESS:
"Q. What did you do there?
A. Yes, sir.
A. While we were conversing at that bench, after a short while, or five (5)
minutes, Randy Belonio came and he asked to light his cigarette because Ramy APP AGRAVIADOR:
was smoking at that time. He was allowed by Ramy to light his cigarette.
Q. And what was the position of Ramy Tamayo when he was suddenly stab.
Q. Was there any conversation between Ramy Tamayo and Randy Belonio aside
from asking lighting of cigarette? A. He was sitting in this manner.

A. While asking to light the cigarette, Randy inquired from Ramy why he was COURT INTERPRETER:
there, Ramy told him that he is attending the wake of his grandmother. Further,
Randy asked him where he came from? And Ramy answered that he is from Witness illustrating by crossing her legs over the other legs and move slightly
Hda. Bubog. her body was in side way.

Q. After that what did Randy Belonio do if he did anything? APP AGRAVIADOR:

A. He (sat) for a while, and a little while after that, he took a look at Ramy. Q. That means that Ramy Tamayo did not see Randy Belonio who was coming
After some minutes, he went out. from the house?

Q. And after few minutes was there any incident happened? A. Yes, Ma’am.

A. After three (3) minutes Randy went back. He just walk normally, and when
he was near Ramy he stabbed Ramy hitting on the chest and while the weapon
was still on the breast of Ramy I stood up and ran away.

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IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER

COURT:
Let me interrupt. He was facing you? Ramy was facing you while you were
facing the direction where the house of Randy Belonio, so that Ramy was facing
on the other side?
Appellant’s acts of leaving, then returning after a few minutes armed with a
knife -- which he concealed while approaching the victim and which he used in
stabbing him -- while the latter was sitting, unaware and not forewarned of any
danger, manifest a deliberate employment of means to ensure the killing without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the victim might make.

WITNESS: The aggravating circumstance of recidivism, which was alleged in the

Information was also duly proven. "A recidivist is one who at the time of his
A. Yes, sir. trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of
another crime embraced in the same title of this Code."32 The records33 show
COURT: that appellant was previously convicted by final judgment of Homicide, which
like Murder, falls under the title of "Crimes against Persons."
Proceed.
The award by the court a quo of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity is in accordance
APP AGRAVIADOR: with jurisprudence.34 The amount of ₱25,000 as exemplary damages should
also be given because of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
Q. When Randy Belonio suddenly thrust the knife on the chest of Ramy recidivism. However, the court erred in awarding the amount of ₱940,716 as
Tamayo, did you see the reaction of Ramy Tamayo? loss of earning capacity. In "accordance with the formula adopted by the Court
in Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. CA (31 SCRA 511 [1970]), and using the American
A. He was not able to move. After that, I want to ran to the house. Expectancy Table of Mortality,"35 the loss of Tamayo’s earning capacity is to
be computed as follows:
APP AGRAVIADOR:
Net earning capacity = Life expectancy x (Gross Annual Income – Living
Q. When for the first time did you see the weapon used by Randy Belonio in Expenses)
taking the life of Ramy Tamayo? where: Life expectancy = 2/3 (80 – the age of the deceased)
= 2/3 (80-24) x [(₱200x365)- ₱36,500]
A. When he thrusted that knife. = ₱1,362,545
The award for loss of earning capacity should therefore be ₱1,362,545.
COURT:
There being testimonial evidence in support of moral damages, an award for it
Before or after he delivered the stabbing blow? is proper. However, it should be reduced to the more reasonable amount of
₱50,000 considering that it is not meant to enrich an injured party.
A. At the moment he delivered the stabbing blow, that was the first time I saw
that knife.
Actual damages for the hospital expenses in the amount of ₱3,627.70 were duly
supported by receipts. However instead of awarding actual damages, we grant
APP AGRAVIADOR:
temperate damages in accordance with People vs. Andres,36 where the Court
said:
Q. When you saw Randy Belonio approaching Ramy Tamayo x x x, you did not
see the knife?
"[W]e declared in the case of People vs. Villanueva that:
A. Because he was wearing long sleeve to cover his hand."31
‘… when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than
₱25,000, as in this case, the award of temperate damages for ₱25,000 is justified
in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount. Conversely, if the amount of actual

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damages proven exceeds ₱25,000, then temperate damages may no longer be
awarded; actual damages based on the receipts presented during trial should
instead be granted.’
"The victim’s heirs should, thus, be awarded temperate damages in the amount
of ₱25,000."37
Three Justices of the Court maintain their position that R.A. No. 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty. Nevertheless they
submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and the death
penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision in Criminal Case No. 00-20595
convicting the appellant of the crime of murder and sentencing him to DEATH
is AFFIRMED. The award for loss of earning capacity is INCREASED to
₱1,362,545; moral damages is REDUCED to ₱50,000; actual damages is
DELETED but temperate damages of ₱25,000 and exemplary damages of
₱25,000 are awarded.
In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659 amending Section 23 of the Revised
Penal Code, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded, upon finality of
this decision, to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the
pardoning power.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
B. SOMNAMBULISM
PEOPLE VS TANEO
AVANCEÑA, C.J.:
Potenciano Tadeo live with his wife in his parent's house of the barrio of
Dolores, municipality of Ormoc, Leyte. On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being
celebrated in the said barrio and visitors were entertained in the house. Among
them were Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano
Taneo, went to sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo
in hand and, upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him, he wounded her in
the abdomen. Potenciano Taneo attacked Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao and
tried to attack his father after which he wounded himself. Potenciano's wife
who was then seven months pregnant, died five days later as a result of her
wound, and also the foetus which was asphyxiated in the mother's womb.
An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo, and upon
conviction he was sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties, to indemnity the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500
and to pay the costs. From this sentence, the defendant appealed.
It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime
the defendant had a quarrel over a glass of "tuba" with Enrique Collantes and
Valentin Abadilla, who invited him to come down to fight, and when he was
about to go down, he was stopped by his wife and his mother. On the day of
the commission of the crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and weak,
and early in the afternoon he had a severe stomachache which made it necessary
for him to go to bed. It was then when he fell asleep. The defendant states that
when he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab him with a
bolo while Abadilla held his feet, by reason of which he got up; and as it seemed
to him that his enemies were inviting him to come down, he armed himself with
a bolo and left the room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to
him that she was wounded. Then he fancied seeing his wife really wounded and
in desperation wounded himself. As his enemies seemed to multiply around
him, he attacked everybody that came his way.
The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have any trouble with
his wife, but that he loved her dearly. Neither did he have any dispute with
Tanner and Malinao, or have any motive for assaulting them.
Our conclusion is that the defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, with
which he is charged, were not voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal
liability.
In arriving at this conclusion, we are taking into consideration the fact that the
apparent lack of a motive for committing a criminal act does not necessarily
mean that there are none, but that simply they are not known to us, for we
cannot probe into depths of one's conscience where they may be found, hidden
away and inaccessible to our observation. We are also conscious of the fact that
an extreme moral perversion may lead a man commit a crime without a real
motive but just for the sake of committing it. But under the special
circumstances of the case, in which the victim was the defendant's own wife
whom he dearly loved, and taking into consideration the fact that the defendant
tried to attack also his father, in whose house and under whose protection he
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lived, besides attacking Tanner and Malinao, his guests, whom he himself
invited as may be inferred from the evidence presented, we find not only a lack
of motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts complained of, but
also motives for not committing said acts.
Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same opinion. The
doctor stated that considering the circumstances of the case, the defendant
acted while in a dream, under the influence of an hallucination and not in his
right mind.
We have thus far regarded the case upon the supposition that the wound of the
deceased was direct result of the defendant's act performed in order to inflict it.
Nevertheless we may say further that the evidence does not clearly show this to
have been the case, but that it may have been caused accidentally. Nobody saw
how the wound was inflicted. The defendant did not testify that he wounded his
wife. He only seemed to have heard her say that she was wounded. What the
evidence shows is that the deceased, who was in the sala, intercepted the
defendant at the door of the room as he was coming out. The defendant did not
dream that he was assaulting his wife but he was defending himself from his
enemies. And so, believing that his wife was really wounded, in desperation, he
stabbed himself.
In view of all these considerations, and reserving the judgment appealed from,
the courts finds that the defendant is not criminally liable for the offense with
which he is charged, and it is ordered that he be confined in the Government
insane asylum, whence he shall not be released until the director thereof finds
that his liberty would no longer constitute a menace, with costs de oficio. So
ordered.
Street, Ostrand, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.
C. MINORITY
PEOPLE VS DOQUENA
DIAZ, J.:
The accused-appellant, who is a minor, was prosecuted for homicide in the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, for having killed Juan Ragojos by
stabbing him in the breast with a knife on November 19, 1938, in the
municipality of Sual, Pangasinan. The court, after trying the case, held that the
accused acted with discernment in committing the act imputed to him and,
proceeding in accordance with the provisions of article 80 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 99, ordered him to be sent to
the Training School for Boys to remain therein until he reaches the age of
majority. From this order the accused interposed an appeal alleging that the
court erred in holding that he had acted with discernment and in not having
dismissal the case.
On the date of the crime, the appellant was exactly thirteen years, nine months
and five days old. The incident that gave rise to the aggression committed by
him on the deceased is narrated in the appealed order as follows:
Between 1 and 2 o'clock in the afternoon of November 19, 1938, the now
deceased Juan Ragojos and one Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in the
yard of the intermediate school of the municipality of Sual, Province of
Pangasinan. The herein accused, who was also in said yard, intervened and,
catching the ball, tossed it at Juan Ragojos, hitting him on the stomach. For this
act of the accused, Juan Ragojos chased him around the yard and, upon
overtaking him, slapped him on the nape. Said accused then turned against the
deceased assuming a threatening attitude, for which the reason said deceased
struck him on the mouth with his fist, returning immediately to the place where
Epifanio Rarang was in order to continue playing with him. The accused,
offended by what he considered an abuse on the part of Juan Ragojos, who was
taller and more robust than he, looked around the yard for a stone with which
to attack the now deceased Juan Ragojos, but finding none, he approached a
cousin of his named Romualdo Cocal, to ask the latter to lend him his knife.
Epifanio Rarang, who had heard what the accused had been asking his cousin,
told the latter not to give the accused his knife because he might attack Juan
Ragojos with it. The accused, however, succeeded in taking possession of the
knife which was in a pocket of his cousin's pants. Once in possession of the
knife, Valentin Doqueña approached Juan Ragojos and challenged the latter to
give him another blow with his fist, to which the deceased answered that he did
not want to do so because he (Juan Ragojos) was bigger that the accused. Juan
Ragojos, ignorant of the intentions of the accused, continued playing and, while
he was thus unprepared and in the act of stopping the ball with his two hands,
the accused stabbed him in the chest with the knife which he carried.
The order also contains the following conclusions and findings of fact which we
are not at liberty to alter, not being called upon or authorized to do so, in view
of the nature of the appeal before us, by section 138 of the Administrative
Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3:
Taking into account the fact that when the accused Valentin Doqueña
committed the crime in question, he was a 7th grade pupil in the intermediate
school of the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan, and as such pupil, he was one of
the brightest in said school and was a captain of a company of the cadet corps
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thereof, and during the time he was studying therein he always obtained
excellent marks, this court is convinced that the accused, in committing the
crime, acted with discernment and was conscious of the nature and
consequences of his act, and so also has this court observed at the time said
accused was testifying in his behalf during the trial of this case.
The proven facts, as stated by the lower court in the appealed order, convinces
us that the appeal taken from said order is absolutely unfounded, because it is
error to determine discernment by the means resorted to by the attorney for the
defense, as discussed by him in his brief. He claims that to determine whether
or not a minor acted with discernment, we must take into consideration not
only the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the
minor, but also his state of mind at the time the crime was committed, the time
he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the
consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that
moment. It is clear that the attorney for the defense mistakes the discernment
referred to in article 12, subsection 3, of the Revised Penal Code, for
premeditation, or at least for lack of intention which, as a mitigating
circumstance, is included among other mitigating circumstances in article 13 of
said Code. The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption
from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who
commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and
should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the very appearance, the
very attitude, the very comportment and behaviour of said minor, not only
before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the
trial (U.S. vs. Maralit, 36 Phil., 155). This was done by the trial court, and the
conclusion arrived at by it is correct.
Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, with the costs to the appellant. So
ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
PEOPLE VS NAVARRO (DI KO MAHANAP FULL CASE)
 She was 13 years, 11 months and 3 days old on July 28, 1952, a sixth
grade pupil. Luisa
 Navarro was asked by her elder sister to look after her said sister’s
sidewalk store located in front of the Quiapo market.
 She was approached by Rogelio Mendoza and P. Santos and turned out
to be agents of the Price Enforcement Division of the PRISCO. Agent
P. Santos asked Luisa the price of one tin of Hershey’s cocoa and the
latter said it was Php 1.20, Santos paid the exact amount and soon
thereafter, Luisa was grabbed and was told that she was being arrested
for selling cocoa eleven centavos more than its selling price.
 Luisa was accused and, after due trial, found guilty of violating
Executive Order No. 447 in connection with section 12 of Republic
Act No. 509 known as the Anti-Profiteering Law and was sentenced to
the care and custody of the Philippine Training School for Girls at
Mandaluyong, Rizal, then and there to be confined until she reaches the
age of majority, unless sooner released by order of the court.
 Appellant’s counsel sought the reversal of the decision claiming that the
benefits of the provisions of Art 12, par 3 of the RPC, should have
been applied in her favor.
Issue:
Whether the appellant in this case has acted with or without discernment?
Held:
No, Luisa has acted without discernment in the selling of the tin of Hershey’s
cocoa. Prof. Padilla, in his book on Criminal Law, says that “discernment is
more than the mere understanding between right and wrong. Rather, it means
the mental capacity of a minor between 9 and 15 years of age to fully appreciate
the consequences of his unlawful act.” The result of the investigation (the
manner in which the appellant frankly and unhesitatingly answered her
investigators” would tend to show that she was unaware that the price of one
tin of cocoa, which she quoted at Php 1.20, was above the regulation price for
the same. Furthermore, her age and year level in school must be taken into
consideration. She being a 6th grade pupil, the court does not believe that she
understood what the word ceiling really means. She merely substituted for her
sister, the record does not also disclose that she is a merchant. It is therefore
safe to conclude that she did not know the laws and regulations on price
control. Wherefore, the decision appealed from should be reversed. Luisa
Navarro is hereby committed to the care and custody of her family who shall be
charged with her surveillance and education, pursuant to par 2, Art 12 (3) of the
RPC.
JOSE VS PEOPLE
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22289 affirming with modification the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36,
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convicting the accused therein of violation of Section 21(b), Article IV in
relation to Section 29, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
The records show that Alvin Jose and Sonny Zarraga were charged with the said
crime in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about November 14, 1995, in the municipality of Calamba, Province
of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
not being licensed or authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously sell and deliver to other person METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE (or shabu) weighing 98.40 grams, a regulated drug, and
in violation of the aforestated law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
As culled by the trial court, the evidence of the prosecution established the
following:
… [O]n November 14, 1995, P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro of the Fourth Regional
Narcotics Unit received an information from an unnamed informant. Said
unnamed informant was introduced to him by former Narcom P/Senior
Inspector Recomono. The information was that a big time group of drug
pushers from Greenhills will deliver 100 grams of shabu at Chowking
Restaurant located at Brgy. Real, Calamba, Laguna.
Acting on such report, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra was assigned to act as the
poseur-buyer. SPO2 William Manglo and SPO2 Wilfredo Luna were the other
members of the team. SPO1 Guevarra was provided with marked money
consisting of a ₱1,000.00 bill on top of a bundle of make-believe "money bills"
supposedly amounting to ₱100,000.00. P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro, SPO2 William
Manglo and Wilfredo Luna went to the place on a Mitsubishi Lancer while
SPO1 Guevarra and the informant boarded an L-300 van. They arrived at the
Chowking Restaurant at about 11:00 in the morning. They positioned their cars
at the parking area where they had a commanding view of people going in and
out (TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 2-8 and TSN, July 11, 1996, pp. 4-7).
It was about 4 o’clock in the afternoon when a Toyota Corolla with Plate No.
UBV-389 arrived. Sonny Zarraga was the driver with Alvin Jose. The unnamed
informant approached and talked to Sonny Zarraga. Then, the informant called
SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra and informed the latter that Sonny Zarraga had with
him 100 grams of shabu. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra offered to buy the shabu.
Sonny Zarraga asked SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra if he had the money to buy 100
grams of shabu. Guevarra responded in the affirmative. He showed the
aforecited bundle of "money bills." Sonny Zarraga then asked Alvin Jose to
bring out the shabu and handover (sic) to Bonifacio Guevarra. SPO1 Bonifacio
Guevarra, in turn, handed the bundle of "money bills."
Guevarra scratched his head, the pre-arranged signal to signify that the
transaction was consummated (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 3-8). Immediately
thereafter, William Manglo and Wilfredo Luna approached and introduced
themselves as Narcom Operatives. They arrested Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose.
The buy-bust bundle of "money bills" and the shabu were recovered. The two
were brought to Camp Vicente Lim for investigation. Edgar Groyon conducted
the investigation. The shabu was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 9-10 and TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 9-13).
P/Senior Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo examined the shabu. She reported and
testified that the specimen, indeed, was a second or low grade
methamphetamine hydrochloride (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 31-36).4
On the other hand, the accused therein were able to establish the following
facts:
Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose claimed that, on November 13, 1995, they were
at SM Mega Mall (sic), Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, to change money.
Suddenly, a person with a hand bag appeared and ordered them to handcuff
themselves. They were later able to identify three of these people as Police Supt.
Joseph Roxas Castro, SPO3 Noel Seno and a certain Corpuz. They were all in
civilian clothes.
They proceeded to where Sonny Zarraga’s car was parked. Sonny Zarraga was
forced to board another car while another person drove Sonny Zarraga’s car
with Alvin Jose as passenger. They drove towards Greenhills. They were
eventually blindfolded. On the way to Greenhills, one of the men opened the
gloves compartment of Sonny Zarraga’s car. One of the men saw a substance
inside the said compartment. He tasted it. Said person asked Sonny Zarraga if
he could come up with ₱1.5 Million peso (sic). Col. Castro even showed the
picture of Sonny Zarraga’s mother-in-law who was supposed to be a rich drug
pusher.
They ended up inside a room with a lavatory. While inside the said room, Sonny
Zarraga’s cellular phone rung. It was a call from Sonny Zarraga’s wife. Col.
Castro talked to Pinky Zarraga and asked her if she could pay ₱1.5 Million as
ransom for the release of Sonny Zarraga. Sonny Zarraga instead offered to
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IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
withdraw money from the bank in the amount of ₱75,000.00. The agreement
was that in the bank, Pinky Zarraga would withdraw the money and deliver it to
Col. Castro in exchange for Sonny Zarraga’s release. The agreement did not
materialize. Col. Castro and Pinky Zarraga met inside the bank but Pinky
Zarraga refused to withdraw the money as Sonny Zarraga was nowhere to be
seen. There was a commotion inside the bank which prompted the bank
manager to call the police.
Col. Castro left the bank in a hurry, passed by for Alvin Jose who was left at the
room and brought them to Camp Vicente Lim. There, they were
investigated.1awphi1.nét
The defense claimed that SPO3 Noel Seno got Sonny Zarraga’s jewelry,
₱85,000.00 in cash and Sonny Zarraga’s car spare tire, jack and accessories.
Noel Seno was even able to withdraw the ₱2,000.00 using Sonny Zarraga’s
ATM card.5
On June 10, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment convicting both accused of
the crime charged and sentencing each of them to an indeterminate penalty.
The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both the accused Sonny Zarraga and Alvin
Jose guilty beyond reasonable doubt, for violation of R.A. 6425, as amended,
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of, after applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.
Both accused are hereby ordered to pay the fine of ₱2 million each and to pay
the cost of suit.
In the service of sentence, the preventive imprisonment undergone both by the
accused shall be credited in their favor.
Atty. Christopher R. Serrano, Branch Clerk of Court, is hereby ordered to
deliver and surrender the confiscated Methamphetamine Hydrochloride to the
Dangerous Drugs Board.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellants averred that the trial court erred as
follows:
I PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT PETITIONER, WHO
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE
TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
THAT THE MERE PRESENTATION OF THE SHABU IN COURT IS
NOT SUFFICIENT TO FIND, WITH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY, THAT
THE APPELLANTS COMMITTED THE CRIME OF SELLING
PROHIBITED DRUGS, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE IDENTITY OF THE
DRUG WAS NOT PARTICULARLY SET OUT IN THE TESTIMONY OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
III
EVEN GRANTING THAT THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND
THE APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED AGAINST
THEM:
(a) THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPOSE THE PROPER PENALTY
AGAINST THEM.
(b) EACH OF THE APPELLANTS CANNOT BE MADE TO PAY A FINE
IN THE AMOUNT OF ₱2 MILLION PESOS (SIC) AND THE COST OF
THE SUIT.7
The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision appealed from with
modification. The appellate court reduced the penalty imposed on appellant
Alvin Jose, on its finding that he was only thirteen (13) years old when he
committed the crime; hence, he was entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority and to a reduction of the penalty by two degrees. The
appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that since the Information
failed to allege that he acted with discernment when the crime was committed
and that the prosecution failed to prove the same, he should be acquitted. The
appellate court denied the motion.
Appellant Jose, now the petitioner, filed his petition for review on certiorari,
alleging that –
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
PETITIONER DESPITE (1) THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
WAS ONLY 13 YEARS OLD WHEN THE CRIME WAS ALLEGEDLY
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COMMITTED BY HIM IN CONSPIRACY WITH CO-ACCUSED SONNY
ZARRAGA, ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT, AND (2) THE ABSENCE
OF A DECLARATION BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT PETITIONER SO
ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT, PURSUANT TO THE APPLICABLE
PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.8
The petitioner asserts that, under paragraph 3, Article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code, a minor over nine (9) and under fifteen (15) years of age at the time of
the commission of the crime is exempt from criminal liability unless he acted
with discernment, in which case he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, as amended by P.D. No.
1179, as provided for in Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code. He avers that the
prosecution was burdened to allege in the Information and prove beyond
reasonable doubt that he acted with discernment, but that the prosecution failed
to do so. The petitioner insists that the court is mandated to make a finding that
he acted with discernment under paragraph 1, Article 68 of the Revised Penal
Code and since the CA made no such finding, he is entitled to an acquittal.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that the allegation
in the Information that the petitioner and his co-accused conspired and
confederated to sell the shabu subject of the Information sufficiently avers that
the petitioner acted with discernment; hence, there was no need for the public
prosecutor to allege specifically in the Information that the petitioner so acted.
It contends that it is not necessary for the trial and appellate courts to make an
express finding that the petitioner acted with discernment. It is enough that the
very acts of the petitioner show that he acted knowingly and was sufficiently
possessed with judgment to know that the acts he committed were wrong.
The petition is meritorious.
Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine years of age
and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability if charged with a felony. The
law applies even if such minor is charged with a crime defined and penalized by
a special penal law. In such case, it is the burden of the minor to prove his age
in order for him to be exempt from criminal liability. The reason for the
exemption is that a minor of such age is presumed lacking the mental element
of a crime – the capacity to know what is wrong as distinguished from what is
right or to determine the morality of human acts; wrong in the sense in which
the term is used in moral wrong.9 However, such presumption is rebuttable.10
For a minor at such an age to be criminally liable, the prosecution is burdened11
to prove beyond reasonable doubt, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that he
acted with discernment, meaning that he knew what he was doing and that it
was wrong.12 Such circumstantial evidence may include the utterances of the
minor; his overt acts before, during and after the commission of the crime
relative thereto; the nature of the weapon used in the commission of the crime;
his attempt to silence a witness; his disposal of evidence or his hiding the corpus
delicti.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the petitioner, who was thirteen (13) years of age when the crime charged
was committed, acted with discernment relative to the sale of shabu to the
poseur-buyer. The only evidence of the prosecution against the petitioner is that
he was in a car with his cousin, co-accused Sonny Zarraga, when the latter
inquired from the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, if he could afford
to buy shabu. SPO1 Guevarra replied in the affirmative, after which the accused
Zarraga called the petitioner to bring out and hand over the shabu wrapped in
plastic and white soft paper. The petitioner handed over the plastic containing
the shabu to accused Zarraga, who handed the same to the poseur-buyer:
Q Whom did you approach to buy the shabu?
A The two of them, Sir.
Q While the two of them was (sic) sitting inside the car, what did you tell them?
A They asked me if I can afford to buy the 100 grams, Sir.
Q And what was your response?
A I answer in (sic) affirmative, Sir.
Q And what happened next?
A After that I showed my money, Sir.
Q Now, tell us when you said they reply (sic) in the affirmative specifically…. I
withdraw that.
Q When you said they asked you whether you can afford to buy 100 grams tell
us who asked you that question?
A Sonny Zarraga, Sir.
Q And after you answer (sic) in the affirmative, what was his response?
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A He let his companion to (sic) bring out the shabu, Sir.
Q Did his companion bring out the shabu?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What happened to the shabu?
A Alvin Jose handed the shabu to his companion Sonny Zarraga.
Q After that, what did Sonny Zarraga do with the shabu?
A He handed it to me, Sir.
Q After this shabu was handed to you, what happened next?
A After examining the shabu, I put it in my pocket and then I handed to him
the money, Sir.
Q When you say money, which money are you referring to?
A The ₱1,000.00 bill with the bundle of boodle money, Sir.
Q Now, after you handed the money to the accused, what happened next?
A I made signs to my companions, Sir.
Q What signs did you give?
A I acted upon our agreement by scratching my head, Sir.
Q And how did your companions respond to your signal?
A After scratching my head, my companions approached us and arrested them.
Q Now, tell us, do you know, in particular, who arrested Sonny Zarraga?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Tell us.
A SPO1 William Manglo and PO3 Wilfredo Luna, Sir.
Q Can you describe to us the manner by which Sonny Zarraga was arrested by
these police officers?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Please tell us.
A They introduced themselves as NARCOM operatives, Sir.
Q And after that, what happened?
A They recovered the money from Sonny Zarraga, Sir.13
…
Q What happened to the shabu which was handed to you by the accused?
A It was brought by our office to the crime laboratory, Sir.
Q Who made the request for its examination?
A SPO3 Edgar Groyon, Sir.
Q Earlier, you said that the shabu was handed to you. What did you do with the
shabu?
A While we were at the area, I handed it to SPO1 William Manglo, Sir.
Q Tell us, when this shabu was handed to you by the accused, in what container
was it contained?
A When it was handed to me by Sonny Zarraga it was wrapped in a plastic and
white soft paper, Sir.14
It was accused Zarraga who drove the car and transacted with the poseur-buyer
relative to the sale of shabu. It was also accused Zarraga who received the buy-
money from the poseur-buyer. Aside from bringing out and handing over the
plastic bag to accused Zarraga, the petitioner merely sat inside the car and had
no other participation whatsoever in the transaction between the accused
Zarraga and the poseur-buyer. There is no evidence that the petitioner knew
what was inside the plastic and soft white paper before and at the time he
handed over the same to his cousin. Indeed, the poseur-buyer did not bother to
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ask the petitioner his age because he knew that pushers used young boys in their Even on cross-examination, the public prosecutor failed to elicit from the
transactions for illegal drugs. We quote the testimony of the poseur-buyer: petitioner facts and circumstances showing his capacity to discern right from
wrong. We quote the questions of the public prosecutor on cross-examination
ATTY. VERANO: and the petitioner’s answers thereto:

Q Did you try to find out if they were friends of your informant? FISCAL:

A No, Sir. Cross, Your Honor. May I proceed.

Q Did you find out also the age of this Mr. Alvin Yamson? COURT:

A I don’t know the exact age, what I know is that he is a minor, Sir. Please proceed.

Q Eventually, you find (sic) out how old he is (sic)? FISCAL:

A I don’t know, Sir. Q Mr. Witness, you started your narration that it started on November 13, 1995
and did I hear it right that you went to Manuela at 5 o’clock in the afternoon?
Q Mr. Guevarra, may I remind you that, in your affidavit, you stated the age of
the boy? WITNESS:

A I cannot recall anymore, Sir. A Yes, Sir.

Q Were you not surprised from just looking at the boy at his age, were you not Q Now, when you went to Manuela, you came from Filinvest, Quezon City?
surprised that a young boy like that would be in a group selling drugs? You left Filinvest, Quezon City, at 12 o’clock?

FISCAL: A No, Sir.

It calls for an opinion, Your Honor. Q What time did you leave?

ATTY. VERANO: A After lunch, Sir.

May I ask, Your Honor, if he did not further interrogate why or how this very Q Now, on the second day which you claimed that you were in the custody of
young boy (sic) selling 100 grams of shabu. the police, you said that at one occasion on that day, you have (sic) a chance to
be with your cousin in a [L]ancer car and it was inside that [L]ancer car when
COURT: your cousin saw his own cellular phone on one of the seats of the car, is that
correct?
The witness may answer.
A Yes, Sir.
WITNESS:
Q Did your cousin tell you that that was his first opportunity to make a call to
A No more, Sir, because I know that young boys are being used by pushers.15 anybody since the day that you were arrested?

A He did not say anything, he just get (sic) the cellular phone.1a\^/phi1.net

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Q Did you come to know the reason how that cellular phone appeared inside A No, Sir.
that [L]ancer car?
Q These people do not know your car?
A No, Sir.
A No, Sir.
Q Now, going back to the first day of your arrest. You said that you were
accosted by a male person at the workshop and then you went out of Megamall FISCAL:
and when you went outside, this man saw the key of the car dangling at the
waist. At whose waist? No further question, Your Honor.

A From my cousin. ATTY. VERANO:

Q And at that time, that person did not have any knowledge where your car No re-direct, Your Honor.
was?
COURT:
A No, Sir.
Q Mr. Witness, earlier you stated that you are not a drug user nor have you seen
Q And your cousin told him that your car was parked at the third level parking any shabu. In support of your claim, are you willing to submit yourself to an
area of SM Megamall, is that correct? examination?

A Yes, Sir. WITNESS:

Q And at that time, that man did not make any radio call to anybody? A Yes, Your Honor.

A No, Sir. Q Are you willing to submit a sample of your urine to this Court?

Q Until the time that you reached the third level parking of Megamall, he had A Yes, Sir.
not made any call?
COURT:
A No, Sir.
The witness is discharged.16
Q And yet when you reach (sic) the third level parking of the Megamall, you
claimed that there was already this group which met you? The claim of the OSG that the prosecution was able to prove that the petitioner
conspired with his co-accused to sell shabu to the poseur-buyer, and thereby
A Yes, Sir. proved the capacity of the petitioner to discern right from wrong, is untenable.
Conspiracy is defined as an agreement between two or more persons to commit
Q And this group were the policemen who are the companions of the male a crime and decide to commit it. Conspiracy presupposes capacity of the parties
person who arrested you? to such conspiracy to discern what is right from what is wrong. Since the
prosecution failed to prove that the petitioner acted with discernment, it cannot
A Yes, Sir. thereby be concluded that he conspired with his co-accused. Indeed, in People
v. Estepano ,17 we held that:
Q Do you know the reason why they were there at that time?

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Clearly, the prosecution did not endeavor to establish Rene’s mental capacity to
fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Moreover, its cross-
examination of Rene did not, in any way, attempt to show his discernment. He
was merely asked about what he knew of the incident that transpired on 16
April 1991 and whether he participated therein. Accordingly, even if he was,
indeed, a co-conspirator, he would still be exempt from criminal liability as the
prosecution failed to rebut the presumption of non-discernment on his part by
virtue of his age. The cross-examination of Rene could have provided the
prosecution a good occasion to extract from him positive indicators of his
capacity to discern. But, in this regard, the government miserably squandered
the opportunity to incriminate him.181awphi1.nét
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22289 which affirmed
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, is
SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged for
insufficiency of evidence.19
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
LLAVE VS PEOPLE
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26962 affirming, with modification, the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109, in
Criminal Case No. 02-1779 convicting Petitioner Neil F. Llave of rape.
On September 27, 2002, an Information charging petitioner (then only 12 years
old) with rape was filed with the RTC of Pasay City. The inculpatory portion of
the Information reads:
That on or about the 24th day of September 2002, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, NEIL LLAVE Y FLORES, aka NIEL F. LLAVE, a minor
over nine (9) years of age and under fifteen (15) but acting with discernment, by
means of force threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant, DEBBIELYN SANTOS
y QUITALES, a minor, seven (7) years of age, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.3
The Case for the Prosecution
The spouses Domingo and Marilou Santos were residents of Pasay City.4 One
of their children, Debbielyn, was born on December 8, 1994.5 In 2002, she was
a Grade II student at the Villamor Air Base Elementary School in Pasay City6
and attended classes from 12:00 noon to 6:00 p.m.7
Domingo eked out a living as a jeepney driver, while Marilou sold quail eggs at a
nearby church.8 Adjacent to their house was that of Teofisto Bucud, a barbecue
vendor who would usually start selling at 6:30 p.m.9 Next to Teofisto’s
residence was a vacant house.10
Debbielyn testified that on September 24, 2002, she arrived home at past 6:00
p.m. She changed her clothes and proceeded to her mother’s store. Marilou
asked her daughter to bring home the container with the unsold quail eggs.11
Debbielyn did as told and went on her way. As she neared the vacant house, she
saw petitioner, who suddenly pulled her behind a pile of hollow blocks which
was in front of the vacant house. There was a little light from the lamp post.12
She resisted to no avail.13 Petitioner ordered her to lie down on the cement.
Petrified, she complied. He removed her shorts and underwear then removed
his own. He got on top of her.14 She felt his penis being inserted into her
vagina. He kissed her.15 She felt pain and cried.16 She was sure there were
passersby on the street near the vacant house at the time.
It was then that Teofisto came out of their house and heard the girl’s cries. He
rushed to the place and saw petitioner on top of Debbielyn, naked from the
waist down. Teofisto shouted at petitioner, and the latter fled from the scene.
Teofisto told Debbielyn to inform her parents about what happened.17 She told
her father about the incident.18 Her parents later reported what happened to
the police authorities.19 Debbielyn told the police that petitioner was a bad boy
because he was a rapist.20
Teofisto testified that at about 6:25 p.m. on September 24, 2002, he went out of
their house to get his barbecue grill. He heard someone moaning from within
the adjacent vacant house.21 He rushed to the place and saw petitioner, naked
from waist down, on top of Debbielyn, making pumping motions on her
anus.22 The girl was crying. He shouted at petitioner, "Hoy, bakit ginawa mo
’yan?"23 Petitioner hurriedly put his shorts on and fled.24 Neighbors who had
heard Teofisto shouting arrived.25 Later, Teofisto gave a written statement to
the police investigator regarding the incident.26
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Domingo Santos testified that at about 6:30 p.m. that day, he was inside their
house. His daughter, Kimberly Rose, suddenly told him that Debbielyn had
been raped near the vacant house by petitioner.27 He rushed to the place and
found her daughter crying. When he asked her what happened, she replied that
she had been abused. He brought Debbielyn to their house and then left.28 He
then looked for petitioner and found him at his grandmother’s house. A
barangay tanod brought petitioner to the barangay hall.29 On September 25,
2002, he brought her daughter to the Philippine General Hospital Child
Protection Unit at Taft Avenue, Manila where she was examined by Dr. Mariella
S. Castillo.
Dr. Castillo declared on the witness stand that she was a physician at the Child
Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital. On September 25, 2002,
she interviewed the victim who told her "Masakit ang pepe ko," "Ni-rape
ako."30 Dr. Castillo also conducted a genital examination on the child, and
found no injury on the hymen and perineum, but found scanty yellowish
discharge between the labia minora.31 There was also a fresh abrasion of the
perineal skin at 1 o’clock position near the anal opening.32 She declared that the
findings support the theory that blunt force or penetrating trauma (such as an
erect penis, finger, or any other foreign body33) was applied to the perineal
area34 not more than six or seven days before.35 The abrasion could have been
caused on September 24, 2002. She found no spermatozoa in the vaginal area or
injury at the external genitalia;36 neither did she find any other injury or
abrasion on the other parts of the victim’s body.37 She concluded that her
findings were consistent with the victim’s claim that she was sexually abused by
petitioner.
Barangay Tanod Jorge Dominguez, for his part, testified that on September 24,
2002, Marilou Santos arrived at the barangay hall and reported that her daughter
had been raped by petitioner who was then in his aunt’s house at Cadena de
Amor Street. Barangay Captain Greg Florante ordered him and Barangay Tanod
Efren Gonzales to proceed to Cadena de Amor Street and take the boy into
custody, and they did as they were told.38
The Case for the Accused
Petitioner, through counsel, presented Dr. Castillo as witness. She declared that
the abrasions in the perineal area could have been caused while the offender
was on top of the victim.39 She explained that the distance between the anus
and the genital area is between 2.5 to 3 centimeters.40 The abrasion was located
at ¼ of an inch from the anal orifice.
Petitioner testified and declared that he was a freshman at the Pasay City South
High School.41 He had been one of the three outstanding students in grade
school and received awards such as Best in Mathematics.42 He also finished a
computer course and received a Certificate of Completion from the Philippine
Air Force Management Information Center.43 He denied having raped the
private complainant. He declared that at 6:30 p.m. on September 24, 2002, he
was outside of their house to buy rice in the carinderia44 and he saw her on his
way back.45 He also met his father, who asked him what he had done to their
neighbor. He was also told that the victim’s father was so angry that the latter
wanted to kill him.46 He did not ask his father for the name of the angry
neighbor. He was also told to pass by Cadena de Amor Street in going to his
aunt’s house. Petitioner also declared that his mother prodded him to go to his
aunt’s house.47 Later, Domingo and Barangay Tanod Jorge Dominguez arrived
at his aunt’s house and brought him to the barangay hall. He did not know of
any reason why Debbielyn and her parents would charge him with rape.48
Petitioner also declared that he played cards with Debbielyn.49 While confined
at the Pasay City Youth Home during trial, he had a crush on "Issa," a young
female inmate. Using a piece of broken glass (bubog) about half-an-inch long,
he inscribed her name on his right thigh, left leg and left arm.50
Nida Llave testified and identified her son’s Certificate of Live Birth, in which it
appears that he was born on March 6, 1990.51 She declared that at about 6:30
p.m. on September 24, 2000, Marilou Santos and Marilyn Bucud arrived in their
house looking for her son. According to Marilyn, her son had raped the private
complainant. She went to their house to look for her son and came across
Domingo Santos who threatened to kill her son. She and her husband
proceeded to the house of his sister Josefina at Cadena de Amor Street where
petitioner had hidden for a while.52
At the conclusion of the trial, the court rendered judgment convicting Neil of
the crime charged. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
FROM ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court opines that the prosecution has
proven the guilt of the xxx Niel Llave y Flores beyond reasonable doubt when
he forcibly pulled the complainant towards the vacant lot, laid on top of her and
had carnal knowledge with the [complainant] against her will and consent who
is only seven (7) years old (sic). Moreover, he being a minor, he cannot be
meted with the Death penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the CICL [Child in Conflict with the Law] Niel
Llave y Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt, and crediting him with the
special mitigating circumstance of minority, this Court hereby sentences him to
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prision mayor minimum, Six (6) years and One (1) day to Eight (8) years, and
pay civil indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00).53
The trial court declared that based on the evidence of the prosecution that
petitioner pushed the victim towards the vacant house and sexually abused her,
petitioner acted with discernment. It also considered petitioner’s declaration
that he had been a consistent honor student.54
Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA, where he averred the following in
his Brief as appellant therein:
I the fact that forthrightly upon discovery, the accused-appellant fled the scene
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE
MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES OF THE TESTIMONY OF
COMPLAINING WITNESS WITH THAT OF THE MEDICAL REPORT
ON THE FACTUAL ALLEGATION OF BLEEDING.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT GAVE CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESS TEOFISTO BUCUD
WHO HAS REASON TO FABRICATE A SCENARIO AGAINST
ACCUSED-APPELLANT BECAUSE HE HAS PERSONAL VENDETTA
AGAINST THE LATTER’S FAMILY/RELATIVES.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE THEORY OF
THE PROSECUTION OF RAPE BY HAVING CARNAL KNOWLEDGE,
BEING CONTRARY TO THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE.55
The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision with modification as to the
penalty meted on him.
WHEREFORE, the decision subject of the instant appeal is hereby
MODIFIED in that the accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional medium as
the minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as the
maximum. Additionally, the accused-appellant is ordered to pay the complaining
witness the amount of ₱50,000 by way of moral damages and ₱20,000 by way of
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.56
Petitioner filed a Motion for the Reconsideration,57contending that the
prosecution failed to adduce proof that he acted with discernment; hence, he
should be acquitted. The appellate court denied the motion in a Resolution58
dated November 12, 2004 on the following finding:
As regards the issue of whether the accused-appellant acted with discernment,
his conduct during and after the "crime" betrays the theory that as a minor, the
accused-appellant does not have the mental faculty to grasp the propriety and
consequences of the act he made. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution,
and hid in his grandmother’s house intimates that he knew that he did
something that merits punishment.
Contrary to the urgings of the defense, the fact that the accused-appellant is a
recipient of several academic awards and is an honor student further reinforces
the finding that he [is] possessed [of] intelligence well beyond his years and is
thus poised to distinguish, better at least than other minors his age could, which
conduct is right and which is morally reprehensible.59
Petitioner now raises the following issues and arguments in the instant petition
before this Court:
ISSUES
I
WHETHER OR NOT EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT
PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, WHO WAS A MINOR ABOVE 9
YEARS BUT BELOW 15 YEARS OF AGE AT THE TIME OF THE
CRIME, ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT.
III
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF
LAW.
ARGUMENTS
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IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
I maintains that as against the victim’s testimony and that of Dr. Castillo’s report,
THE MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE TESTIMONY
OF COMPLAINING WITNESS WITH THE MEDICAL REPORT BELIE
THE FINDING OF RAPE.
II
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IS NOT A CREDIBLE WITNESS.
III
PETITIONER ACTED WITHOUT DISCERNMENT.
IV
THE TESTIMONY RELIED UPON BY THE PROSECUTION IS
HEARSAY.
V examination, that his uncle, Boy, had the house rented by Teofisto demolished.
THE COMPLAINT IS FABRICATED.
VI
PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.60
The issues raised by the petitioner in this case may be summarized as follows:
(1) whether he was deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation; (2)
whether he had carnal knowledge of the private complainant, and if in the
affirmative, whether he acted with discernment in perpetrating the crime; (3)
whether the penalty imposed by the appellate court is correct; and (4) whether
he is liable to pay moral damages to the private complainant.
On the first issue, petitioner avers that he was deprived of his right to a
preliminary investigation before the Information against him was filed.
On the second issue, petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that he had carnal knowledge of Debbielyn. He insists
that her testimony is inconsistent on material points. He points out that she
claimed to have felt pain in her vagina when petitioner inserted his penis to the
point that she cried; this, however, is negated by Dr. Castillo’s report stating
that there was no evidence of injury on the victim’s external genitalia. Petitioner
the latter should prevail.
According to petitioner, mere touching of the female organ will not suffice as
factual basis of conviction for consummated rape. Moreover, the victim’s
testimony lacks credibility in view of her admission that, while she was being
allegedly ravished by him, there were passersby along the street. Besides,
petitioner avers, an abrasion may be caused by an invasion of the body through
the protective covering of the skin. Petitioner insists that the prosecution failed
to prove the cause of the abrasion.
Petitioner also claims that the victim was tutored or coached by her parents on
her testimony before the trial court. Dr. Castillo testified that when she
interviewed Debbielyn, the latter admitted to her that she did not understand
the meaning of the word "rape" and its Filipino translation, "hinalay," and that
the genital examination of the girl was at the insistence of the latter’s parents.
Petitioner avers that Teofisto Bucud’s testimony has no probative weight
because and had an ill-motive to testify against him. Petitioner stated, on cross-
Petitioner avers that the witness persuaded the victim’s parents to complain
against him, as gleaned from the testimony of Police Investigator Milagros
Carroso.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) avers that petitioner was
subjected to an inquest investigation under Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as gleaned from the Certification of the City
Prosecutor incorporated in the Information. It avers that the absence of
external injuries does not negate rape; neither is it necessary that lacerations be
found on the hymen of a victim. Rape is consummated if there is some degree
of penetration within the vaginal surface. Corroborative evidence is not
necessary to prove rape. As long as the testimony of the victim is credible, such
testimony will suffice for conviction of consummated rape. When the victim
testified that she was raped, she was, in effect, saying all that is necessary to
prove that rape was consummated. Petitioner’s evidence to prove ill-motive on
the part of Teofisto Bucud in testifying against him is at best flimsy. Moreover,
it is incredible that the victim and her parents would charge petitioner with rape
solely on Teofisto’s proddings.
The OSG insists that the petitioner acted with discernment before, during, and
after the rape based on the undisputed facts. The submission of the OSG
follows:
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IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
Petitioner argues that since he was only 12 years old at the time of the alleged
rape incident, he is presumed to have acted without discernment under
paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. Under said provision, the
prosecution has the burden of proving that he acted with discernment. In the
instant case, petitioner insists that there was no evidence presented by the
prosecution to show that he acted with discernment. Hence, he should be
exempt from criminal liability.
Petitioner’s arguments are bereft of merit.
Discernment, as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code is defined as
follows: "the discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from
criminal liability of a minor under fifteen (15) years of age but over nine (9),
who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong" (People v. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580 [1939]).
For a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age, he must discern the
rightness or wrongness of the effects of his act (Guevarra v. Almodova, G.R.
No. 75256, January 26, 1989).
Professor Ambrocio Padilla, in his annotation of Criminal Law (p. 375, 1998
Ed.), writes that "discernment is more than the mere understanding between
right and wrong. Rather, it means the mental capacity of a minor between 9 and
15 years of age to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act" (People
v. Navarro, [CA] [51 O.G. 4062]). Hence, in judging whether a minor accused
acted with discernment, his mental capacity to understand the difference
between right and wrong, which may be known and should be determined by
considering all the circumstances disclosed by the record of the case, his
appearance, his attitude and his behavior and conduct, not only before and
during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial should
be taken into consideration (People v. Doquena, supra).
In the instant case, petitioner’s actuations during and after the rape incident, as
well as his behavior during the trial showed that he acted with discernment.
The fact appears undisputed that immediately after being discovered by the
prosecution’s witness, Teofisto Bucud, petitioner immediately stood up and ran
away. Shortly thereafter, when his parents became aware of the charges against
him and that private complainant’s father was looking for him, petitioner went
into hiding. It was not until the Barangay Tanod came to arrest him in his
grandmother’s house that petitioner came out in the open to face the charges
against him. His flight as well as his act of going into hiding clearly conveys the
idea that he was fully aware of the moral depravity of his act and that he knew
he committed something wrong. Otherwise, if he was indeed innocent or if he
was not least aware of the moral consequences of his acts, he would have
immediately confronted private complainant and her parents and denied having
sexually abused their daughter.
During the trial, petitioner submitted documentary evidence to show that he
was a consistent honor student and has, in fact, garnered several academic
awards. This allegation further bolstered that he acted with discernment, with
full knowledge and intelligence. The fact that petitioner was a recipient of
several academic awards and was an honor student further reinforces the
finding that he was possessed of intelligence well beyond his years and thus was
able to distinguish, better than other minors of his age could, which conduct is
right and which is morally reprehensible. Hence, although appellant was still a
minor of twelve years of age, he possessed intelligence far beyond his age. It
cannot then be denied that he had the mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong. This is important in cases where the
accused is minor. It is worthy to note that the basic reason behind the
enactment of the exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent
on the part of the accused. In expounding on intelligence as the second element
of dolus, the Supreme Court has stated: "The second element of dolus is
intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of human
acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because …
the infant has no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability"
(Guevarra v. Aldomovar, 169 SCRA 476 [1989], at page 482).
The foregoing circumstances, from the time the incident up to the time the
petitioner was being held for trial, sufficiently satisfied the trial court that
petitioner acted with discernment before, during and after the rape incident. For
a boy wanting in discernment would simply be gripped with fear or keep mum.
In this case, petitioner was fully aware of the nature and illegality of his
wrongful act. He should not, therefore, be exempted from criminal liability. The
prosecution has sufficiently proved that petitioner acted with discernment.61
In reply, petitioner asserts that the only abrasion found by Dr. Castillo was on
the peri-anal skin and not in the labia of the hymen. He further insists that there
can be no consummated rape absent a slight penetration on the female organ. It
was incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the accused acted with
discernment but failed. The mere fact that he was an honor student is not
enough evidence to prove that he acted with discernment.
The petition is not meritorious.
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On the first issue, petitioner’s contention that he was deprived of his right to a
regular preliminary investigation is barren of factual and legal basis. The record
shows that petitioner was lawfully arrested without a warrant. Section 7, Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. – When a person is
lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a
preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a
prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest has been
conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the absence or unavailability of
an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a
peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the
offended party or arresting officer or person.
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver
of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the
presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and
the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary
investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days from the time he learns of its
filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence
in his defense as provided for in this Rule.
As gleaned from the Certification62 of the City Prosecutor which was
incorporated in the Information, petitioner did not execute any waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code before the Information was
filed. He was arraigned with the assistance of counsel on October 10, 2002, and
thereafter filed a petition for bail.63 Petitioner’s failure to file a motion for a
preliminary investigation within five days from finding out that an Information
had been filed against him effectively operates as a waiver of his right to such
preliminary investigation.64
On the second issue, a careful review of the records shows that the prosecution
adduced evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had carnal
knowledge of the private complainant as charged in the Information. In People
v. Morata65 the Court ruled that penetration, no matter how slight, or the mere
introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum, constitutes
carnal knowledge. Hence, even if the penetration is only slight, the fact that the
private complainant felt pains, points to the conclusion that the rape was
consummated.66
From the victim’s testimony, it can be logically concluded that petitioner’s penis
touched the middle part of her vagina and penetrated the labia of the
pudendum. She may not have had knowledge of the extent of the penetration;
however, her straightforward testimony shows that the rape passed the stage of
consummation.67 She testified that petitioner dragged her behind a pile of
hollow blocks near the vacant house and ordered her to lie down. He then
removed her shorts and panty and spread her legs. He then mounted her and
inserted his penis into her vagina:
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: From what time up to what time?
A: From 12:00 o’clock noon up to 6:00 p.m.
Q: September 24, 2002 and going over the calendar, it was Tuesday. Did you go
to school from 12:00 o’clock noon up to 6:00 p.m.?
A: Yes, Sir, on the same date I went to school.
Q: At about 6:00 p.m., Sept. 24, 2002, where were you?
A: I went home.
Q: And by whom you are referring to your house at 1-C Carnation St., R.
Higgins, Maricaban, Pasay City?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And what did you do after you went home?
A: I changed my clothes and then I proceeded to the store of my mother.
Q: And where is that store of your mother where you went?
A: It is near our house, walking distance.
Q: What is your mother selling in that store?
A: She sells quail eggs.
Q: And were you able to immediately go to the store of your mother where she
was selling quail eggs?
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A: It was painful.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Aside from inserting his penis inside your vagina, what else did you do to
Q: And that was past 6:00 p.m. already? you?

A: Yes, sir. A: He kissed me on my lips.

Q: And what happened when you went to the store where your mother is Q: After Totoy inserted his penis inside your vagina and kissed you on your lips,
selling quail eggs past 6:00 p.m.? what did you do?

A: My mother asked me to bring home something. A: I cried.

Q: What were these things you were asked by your mother to bring home? Q: What happened when you were crying when he inserted his penis inside your
vagina and kissed you on your lips. What happened next?
A: The things she used in selling.
A: Somebody heard me crying.
Q: And did you obey what your mother told you to bring home something?
Q: Who heard you crying?
A: Yes, Sir.
A: Kuya Teofe, Sir.
Q: And what happened to you in going to your house?
Q: What happened after you cried and when somebody heard you crying?
A: Totoy pulled me.
A: Totoy ran away.
Q: Pulled you where?
Q: After Totoy ran away, what happened next?
A: Totoy pulled me towards an uninhabited house.
A: When Totoy ran away, I was left and Kuya Teofe told me to tell the matter
Q: What happened after Totoy pulled you in an uninhabited house? to my parents.

A: He told me to lie down on the cement. Q: Did you tell your parents what Totoy did to you?

Q: What happened after he laid you down on the cement? A: Yes, Sir.68

A: He removed my shorts and panty. He also removed his shorts. On cross-examination, the victim was steadfast in her declarations:

Q: After Totoy removed your shorts and panty and he also removed his shorts, ATTY. BALIAD:
what happened next?
Q: Again, in what particular position were you placed by Totoy when he
A: He inserted his penis inside my vagina. inserted his penis inside your vagina?

Q: What did you feel when Totoy inserted his penis inside your vagina? A: I was lying down.

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Q: Aside from lying down, how was your body positioned at that time? A: (Witness pointing at her back, at the anus.)

A: He placed on top of me.
Q: After he placed on top of you, what else did he do to you, if any?
A: He started to kiss me and then he inserted his penis inside my vagina.
Q: Did you feel his penis coming in into your vagina?
Q: In your statement, am I correct to say that Neil, the accused in this case
penetrated only in your vagina and not in your anus?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So that, your anus was not even touched by the accused neither by his penis
touched any part of your anus?

A: Yes, Sir. A: He did not insert anything on my anus, Sir.70

Q: Are you sure that his penis was inserted inside your vagina?
A: Yes, Sir.69
When questioned on cross-examination whether she could distinguish a vagina
from an anus, the victim declared that she could and proceeded to demonstrate.
She reiterated that the penis of petitioner penetrated her vagina, thus,
consummating the crime charged:
While it is true that Dr. Castillo did not find any abrasion or laceration in the
private complainant’s genitalia, such fact does not negate the latter’s testimony
the petitioner had carnal knowledge of her. The absence of abrasions and
lacerations does not disprove sexual abuses, especially when the victim is a
young girl as in this case.71 According to Dr. Castillo, the hymen is elastic and
is capable of stretching and reverting to its original form.72 The doctor testified
that her report is compatible with the victim’s testimony that she was sexually
assaulted by petitioner:

Atty. Baliad: Atty. Baliad:

Q: Do you recall having stated during the last hearing that the accused, Neil Q: Do you recall having stated during the last hearing that the accused, Neil
Llave or "Totoy" inserted his penis in your vagina, do you recall that? Llave or "Totoy" inserted his penis in your vagina, do you recall that?

A: Yes, Sir. A: Yes, Sir.

Q: And likewise, you testified that you feel that the penis of Neil entered your Q: And likewise, you testified that you feel (sic) that the penis of Neil entered
vagina? your vagina?

A: Yes, Sir. A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Could you distinguish vagina from your anus? Q: Could you distinguish vagina from your anus?

A: Yes, Sir. A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Where is your "pepe"? Q: Where is your "pepe"?

A: (Witness pointing to her vagina.) A: (Witness pointing to her vagina.)

Q: Where is your anus? Q: Where is your anus?

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A: (Witness pointing at her back, at the anus.)
Q: In your statement, am I correct to say that Neil, the accused in this case
penetrated only in your vagina and not in your anus?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So that, your anus was not even touched by the accused neither by his penis
touched any part of your anus?
A: He did not insert anything on my anus, Sir.
xxxx
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: Based on your testimony doctor, and the medico genital examination
propounded on the report that the victim here, Debbielyn Santos is
complaining that around 6:00 in the evening of September 24, 2002, she was
sexually abused and that on the following day, September 25, you interviewed
her and stated to you that her genitalia was hurting and in binocular (sic)
"masakit ang pepe ko, ni-rape ako," would your findings as contained in this
Exh. B and C be compatible with the allegation if the minor victim that she was
sexually abused on September 24. 2002 at around 6:00 p.m.?
Atty. Baliad:
Objection, Your Honor. The one who narrated the incident is the mother.
Court:
What is your objection?
Atty. Baliad:
The objection, Your Honor, is the question propounded is that it was the minor
who made the complaint regarding the allegation.
Fiscal Barrera:
The answer were provided…..
Court:
The doctor is being asked whether or not her findings is compatible with the
complaint of the minor. Overruled. Answer.
Witness:
A It is compatible with the allegation of the minor.
Fiscal Barrera:
Confronting you again with your two (2) medico-genital documents, the
Provincial and Final Report mark[ed] in evidence as Exhs. B and C, at the lower
portion of these two exhibits there appears to be a signature above the
typewritten word, Mariella Castillo, M.D., whose signature is that doctor?
A Both are my signatures, Sir.73
Dr. Castillo even testified that the abrasion near the private complainant’s anal
orifice could have been caused by petitioner while consummating the crime
charged:
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: With your answer, would it be possible doctor that in the process of the
male person inserting his erect penis inside the vagina, in the process, would it
be possible that this abrasion could have been caused while in the process of
inserting the penis into the vagina touch the portion of the anus where you find
the abrasion?
A: It is possible, Sir.
Q: Now, are you aware, in the course of your examination, that the alleged
perpetrator is a 12-year-old minor?
A: I only fount it out, Sir, when I testified.
Q: Do you still recall your answer that a 12-year-old boy could cause an erection
of his penis?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: To enlight[en] us doctor, we, not being a physician, at what age could a male
person can have erection?
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A: Even infants have an erection.74
Petitioner’s contention that the private complainant was coached by her parents
into testifying is barren of merit. It bears stressing that the private complainant
testified in a straightforward and spontaneous manner and remained steadfast
despite rigorous and intensive cross-examination by the indefatigable counsel of
the petitioner. She spontaneously pointed to and identified the petitioner as the
perpetrator.
It is inconceivable that the private complainant, then only a seven- year old
Grade II pupil, could have woven an intricate story of defloration unless her
plaint was true.75 The Presiding Judge of the trial court observed and
monitored the private complainant at close range as she testified and found her
testimony credible. Case law is that the calibration by the trial court of the
evidence on record and its assessment of the credibility of witnesses, as well as
its findings of facts and the conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded
conclusive effect by this Court unless facts and circumstances of substance were
overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted, which, if considered would merit a
nullification or reversal of the decision. We have held that when the offended
party is young and immature, from the age of thirteen to sixteen, courts are
inclined to give credence to their account of what transpired, considering not
only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which
they would be exposed if the matter to which they testified is not true.76
Neither do we lend credence to petitioner’s claim that the charge against him is
but a fabrication and concoction of the private complainant’s parents. Indeed,
petitioner admitted in no uncertain terms that the spouses had no ill-motive
against him. Thus, Neil testified as follows:
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: As you testified earlier that you have played post cards with Debbielyn
Santos alias Lyn-lyn and you have no quarrel or misunderstanding with Lyn-lyn.
Do you know of any reason why Lyn-lyn complaint (sic) against you for sexual
abuse?
A: I don’t know of any reason, Sir.
Q: You also testified that you do not have any quarrel or misunderstanding with
Lyn-lyn’s parents, spouses Domingo Santos, Jr. and Marilou Santos, do you
think of any reason as to why they would file a complaint against you for
molesting their 7-year-old daughter?
A: I do not know of any reason why they filed a complaint against me, Sir.
Fiscal Barrera:
That would be all, Your Honor.77
There is no evidence that the parents of the offended party coached their
daughter before she testified. No mother or father would stoop so low as to
subject their daughter to the tribulations and the embarrassment of a public trial
knowing that such a traumatic experience would damage their daughter’s psyche
and mar her life if the charge is not true.78
On the other hand, when the parents learned that their daughter had been
assaulted by petitioner, Domingo tried to locate the offender and when he
failed, he and his wife reported the matter to the barangay authorities. This
manifested their ardent desire to have petitioner indicted and punished for his
delictual acts.
That petitioner ravished the victim not far from the street where residents
passed by does not negate the act of rape committed by petitioner. Rape is not a
respecter of time and place. The crime may be committed by the roadside and
even in occupied premises.79 The presence of people nearby does not deter
rapists from committing the odious act.80 In this case, petitioner was so daring
that he ravished the private complainant near the house of Teofisto even as
commuters passed by, impervious to the fact that a crime was being committed
in their midst.
Case law has it that in view of the intrinsic nature of rape, the only evidence that
can be offered to prove the guilt of the offender is the testimony of the
offended party. Even absent a medical certificate, her testimony, standing alone,
can be made the basis of conviction if such testimony is credible. Corroborative
testimony is not essential to warrant a conviction of the perpetrator.81 Thus,
even without the testimony of Teofisto Bucud, the testimonies of the offended
party and Dr. Castillo constitute evidence beyond reasonable doubt warranting
the conviction of petitioner.
Teofisto’s testimony cannot be discredited by petitioner simply because his
uncle caused the demolition of the house where Teofisto and his family were
residing. It bears stressing that Teofisto gave a sworn statement to the police
investigator on the very day that the petitioner raped Debbielyn and narrated
how he witnessed the crime being committed by the petitioner.82 In the
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absence of proof of improper motive, the presumption is that Teofisto had no
ill-motive to so testify, hence, his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.83
The trial court correctly ruled that the petitioner acted with discernment when
he had carnal knowledge of the offended party; hence, the CA cannot be faulted
for affirming the trial court’s ruling.1âwphi1
Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person over
nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability, unless he
acted with discernment. The basic reason behind the exempting circumstance is
complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is an
essential element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the
power necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit
from an illicit act.84 On the other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong. The prosecution is
burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment by evidence of
physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during the
commission of the act, but also after and during the trial.85 The surrounding
circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and
that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime
and the minor’s cunning and shrewdness.
In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion, dragged the
resisting victim behind the pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house to insure
that passersby would not be able to discover his dastardly acts. When he was
discovered by Teofisto Bucud who shouted at him, the petitioner hastily fled
from the scene to escape arrest. Upon the prodding of his father and her
mother, he hid in his grandmother’s house to avoid being arrested by policemen
and remained thereat until barangay tanods arrived and took him into custody.
The petitioner also testified that he had been an outstanding grade school
student and even received awards. While in Grade I, he was the best in his class
in his academic subjects. He represented his class in a quiz bee contest.86 At his
the age of 12, he finished a computer course.
In People v. Doqueña,87 the Court held that the accused-appellant therein
acted with discernment in raping the victim under the following facts:
Taking into account the fact that when the accused Valentin Doqueña
committed the crime in question, he was a 7th grade pupil in the intermediate
school of the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan, and as such pupil, he was one of
the brightest in said school and was a captain of a company of the cadet corps
thereof, and during the time he was studying therein he always obtain excellent
marks, this court is convinced that the accused, in committing the crime, acted
with discernment and was conscious of the nature and consequences of his act,
and so also has this court observed at the time said accused was testifying in his
behalf during the trial of this case.88
The CA ordered petitioner to pay ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱20,000.00
as exemplary damages. There is no factual basis for the award of exemplary
damages. Under Article 2231, of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages may
be awarded if the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. In this case, no aggravating circumstance was alleged in the
Information and proved by the People; hence, the award must be deleted.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26962 is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages
is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
D. ACCIDENT
PEOPLE VS BINDOY
VILLAMOR, J.:
The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Misamis to the penalty of twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, with
the accessories of law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
P1,000, and to pay the costs. The crime charged against the accused is homicide,
according to the following information:
That on or about the 6th of May, 1930, in the barrio of Calunod, municipality
of Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis, the accused Donato Bindoy
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attacked and with his bolo wounded
Emigdio Omamdam, inflicting upon the latter a serious wound in the chest
which caused his instant death, in violation of article 404 of the Penal Code.
The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and his counsel in
this instance contends that the court erred in finding him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, and in convicting him of the crime of homicide.
The record shows that in the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in a
tuba wineshop in the barrio market of Calunod, municipality of Baliangao,
Province of Occidental Misamis, started by some of the tuba drinkers. There
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were Faustino Pacas (alias Agaton), and his wife called Tibay. One Donato
Bindoy, who was also there, offered some tuba to Pacas' wife; and as she
refused to drink having already done so, Bindoy threatened to injure her if she
did not accept. There ensued an interchange of words between Tibay and
Bindoy, and Pacas stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to take away from
Bindoy the bolo he carried. This occasioned a disturbance which attracted the
attention of Emigdio Omamdam, who, with his family, lived near the market.
Emigdio left his house to see what was happening, while Bindoy and Pacas were
struggling for the bolo. In the course of this struggle, Bindoy succeeded in
disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand
towards the left behind the accused, with such violence that the point of the
bolo reached Emigdio Omamdam's chest, who was then behind Bindoy.
There is no evidence that Emigdio took part in the fight between Bindoy and
Pacas. Neither is there any indication that the accused was aware of Emigdio
Omamdam's presence in the place, for, according to the testimony of the
witnesses, the latter passed behind the combatants when he left his house to
satisfy his curiosity. There was no disagreement or ill feeling between Bindoy
and Omamdam, on the contrary, it appears they were nephew and uncle,
respectively, and were on good terms with each other. Bindoy did not try to
wound Pacas, and instead of wounding him, he hit Omamdam; he was only
defending his possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying to wrench away
from him, and his conduct was perfectly lawful.
The wound which Omamdam received in the chest, judging by the description
given by the sanitary inspector who attended him as he lay dying, tallies with the
size of the point of Bindoy's bolo.
There is no doubt that the latter caused the wound which produced Emigdio
Omamdam's death, but the defendant alleges that it was caused accidentally and
without malicious intent.
Pacas and the widow of the deceased, Carmen Angot, testified having seen the
accused stab Omamdam with his bolo. Such testimony is not incompatible with
that of the accused, to the effect that he wounded Omamdam by accident. The
widow testified that she knew of her husband's wound being caused by Bindoy
from his statement to her before his death.
The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution tends to show that the
accused stabbed Omamdam in the chest with his bolo on that occasion. The
defendant, indeed, in his effort to free himself of Pacas, who was endeavoring
to wrench his bolo from him, hit Omamdam in the chest; but, as we have
stated, there is no evidence to show that he did so deliberately and with the
intention of committing a crime. If, in his struggle with Pacas, the defendant
had attempted to wound his opponent, and instead of doing so, had wounded
Omamdam, he would have had to answer for his act, since whoever willfully
commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. (Art. 1 of the Penal
Code.) But, as we have said, this is not the case.
The witness for the defense, Gaudencio Cenas, corroborates the defendant to
the effect that Pacas and Bindoy were actually struggling for the possession of
the bolo, and that when the latter let go, the former had pulled so violently that
it flew towards his left side, at the very moment when Emigdio Omamdam
came up, who was therefore hit in the chest, without Donato's seeing him,
because Emigdio had passed behind him. The same witness adds that he went
to see Omamdam at his home later, and asked him about his wound when he
replied: "I think I shall die of this wound." And then continued: "Please look
after my wife when I die: See that she doesn't starve," adding further: "This
wound was an accident. Donato did not aim at me, nor I at him: It was a
mishap." The testimony of this witness was not contradicted by any rebuttal
evidence adduced by the fiscal.
We have searched the record in vain for the motive of this kind, which, had it
existed, would have greatly facilitated the solution of this case. And we deem it
well to repeat what this court said in United States vs. Carlos (15 Phil., 47), to
wit:
The attention of prosecuting officers, and especially of provincial fiscals,
directed to the importance of definitely ascertaining and proving, when possible,
the motives which actuated the commission of a crime under investigation.
In many criminal cases one of the most important aids in completing the proof
of the commission of the crime by the accused is the introduction of evidence
disclosing the motives which tempted the mind of the guilty person to indulge
the criminal act.
In view of the evidence before us, we are of opinion and so hold, that the
appellant is entitled to acquittal according to article 8, No. 8, Penal Code.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the accused Donato
Bindoy is hereby acquitted with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Romualdez, Villa-Real, and Imperial,
JJ., concur.
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US VS TANEDO
MORELAND, J.:
The defendant in this case was accused of the crime of murder committed, as
alleged in the information, as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of January of this year, the said accused, with the
intention of killing Feliciano Sanchez, invited him to hunt wild chickens, and,
upon reaching the forest, with premeditation shot him in the breast with a
shotgun which destroyed the heart and killed the said Sanchez, and afterwards,
in order to hide the crime, buried the body of the deceased in a well. The
motive is unknown. The premeditation consists in that the accused had
prepared his plans to take the deceased to the forest, there to kill him, so that
no one could see it, and to bury him afterwards secretly in order that the crime
should remain unpunished.
The defendant was found guilty of homicide by the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Tarlac and sentenced to fourteen years eight months and one
day of reclusion temporal, accessories, indemnification and costs. The
defendant appealed.
There is very little dispute about the facts in this case, in fact no dispute at all as
to the important facts. The accused was a landowner. On the morning of the
26th of January, 1909, he, with Bernardino Tagampa, Casimiro Pascual,
Valeriano Paulillo, and Juan Arellano, went to work on a malecon or dam on his
land. The defendant took with him a shotgun and a few shells, with the
intention to hunt wild chickens after he had set his laborers at work. He
remained with his laborers an hour or so and then went a short distance away
across a stream to see how the alteration which he had made in the malecon
affected the flow of water from the rice filed on the other side of the stream. He
carried his shotgun with him across the stream. On the other side of the stream
he met the deceased, who, with his mother and uncle, had been living in a small
shack for a month or so during the rice-harvesting season. The accused asked
the uncle of the deceased where he could find a good place in which to hunt
wild chickens. The uncle was lying on the floor in the interior of the shack sick
of fever. The deceased, a young man about 20 years of age, was working at
something under a manga tree a short distance from the shack. Although the
accused directed his question to the uncle inside of the shack, the deceased
answered the question and pointed out in a general way a portion of the forest
near the edge of which stood the shack. There is some contradiction between
the testimony of the accused and the Government witnesses just at this point.
The uncle of the deceased testified that the boy and the accused invited each
other mutually to hunt wild chickens and that the accused accepted the
invitation. The accused, however, testified that he did not invite the deceased to
go hunting with him, neither did the deceased go with him, but that he
remained under the manga tree "trying something." At any rate the accused
went into the forest with his gun. What took place there is unknown to anybody
except the accused. Upon that subject he testified as follows:
And after Feliciano Sanchez pointed out that place to me, that place where the
wild chickens were to be found, I proceeded to hunt, because, in the first place,
if I could kill some wild chickens we would have something to eat on that day.
So when I arrived at that place I saw a wild chickens and I shot him. And after I
shot that chicken I heard a human cry. I picked up the chicken and went near
the place where I heard the noise, and after I saw that I had wounded a man I
went back toward the malecon, where my companions were working, running
back, and when I arrived there I left my shotgun behind or by a tree not far
from where my companions were working; and I called Bernardino Tagampa to
tell him about the occurrence, and to him I told of that occurence because he is
my friend and besides that he was a relative of the deceased, and when Tagampa
heard of this he and myself went together to see the dead body.
Only one shot was heard that morning and a chicken was killed by gunshot
wound. Chicken feathers were found in considerable qualities at the point
where the chicken was shot and where the accident occurred. The defendant
within a few minutes after the accident went out of the woods to the malecon
where he had left his laborers at work, carrying the dead chicken with him. The
accused called Bernardino Tagampa, on of the laborers, to go with him and they
disappeared for some time. Tagampa says that they went a little way toward the
woods and came back. The accused says that they went to the place where the
body of the deceased lay and removed it to a place in the cogon grass where it
would not be easily observed. It is certain, however, that the body was
concealed in the cogon grass. During the afternoon Tagampa left the malecon,
where his fellow laborers were working, probably to hunt for a place in which
to hide the body. The rest of the laborers saw the witness Yumul take the
chicken which had been killed by the accused. He delivered it to the wife of the
accused, who testified that she received the chicken from Yumul and that it had
been killed by a gunshot wound. That evening the accused and Tagampa went
together to dispose of the body finally. They took it from the cogon grass where
it lay concealed and carried it about seventeen or eighteen hundred meters from
the place where it had originally fallen, and buried it in an old well, covering it
with straw and earth and burning straw on top of the well for the purpose of
concealing it. Tagampa said that he helped the accused dispose of the body
because he was afraid of him, although he admits that the accused in no way
threatened or sought to compel him to do so. The defendant prior to the trial
denied all knowledge of the death of the deceased or the whereabouts of the
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body. On the trial, however, he confessed his participation in the death of the
deceased and told the story substantially as above.
So far as can be ascertained from the evidence the prior relations between the
accused and the deceased had been normal. The deceased was a tenant on land
belonging to a relative of the accused. There was no enmity and no unpleasant
relations between them. No attempt was made to show any. There appears to
have been no motive whatever for the commission of the crime. The
Government has not attempted to show any. The only possible reason that the
accused could have for killing the deceased would be found in the fact of a
sudden quarrel between them during the hunt. That idea is wholly negative by
the fact that the chicken and the man were shot at the same time, there having
been only one shot fired.
Article 1 of the Penal Code says:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntary unless
the contrary shall appear.
Article 8, subdivision 8, reads as follows:
He who, while performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by mere
accident without liability or intention of causing it.
Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is as follows:
A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be innocent until the
contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt that his guilt is
satisfactorily shown he shall be entitled to an acquittal.
The American doctrine is substantially the same. It is uniformly held that if life
is taken by misfortune or accident while in the performance of a lawful act
executed with due care and without intention of doing harm, there is no
criminal liability. (Tidwell vs. State, 70 Ala., 33; State vs. Benham, 23 Ia., 154, 92
Am. Dec., 417; Bertrong vs. State, 2 Tex. Ap., 160; Williamson vs. State, 2 Ohio
C. C., 292; U. S. vs. Meagher, 37 Fed. Rep., 875; U. S. vs. Castro, Fed. Cas.,
14752; State vs. Legg, 3 L. R. A., N. S., 1152.)
In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon the part of the
accused. Neither is there any question that he was engaged in the commission
of a lawful act when the accident occurred. Neither is there any evidence of the
intention of the accused to cause the death of the deceased. The only thing in
the case at all suspicious upon the part of the defendant are his concealment
and denial.
In the case of the State vs. Legg, above referred to, it is said (p.1165):
Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not required
to prove such a defense by a preponderance of the evidence, because there is a
denial of intentional killing, and the burden is upon the State to show that it was
intentional, and if, from a consideration of all the evidence, both that for the
State and the prisoner, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the
killing was accidental or intentional, the jury should acquit. . . . But where
accidental killing is relied upon, the prisoner admits the killing but denies that it
was intentional. Therefore, the State must show that it was intentional, and it is
clearly error to instruct the jury that the defendant must show that it was an
accident by a preponderance of the testimony, and instruction B in the Cross
case was properly held to be erroneous.
In 3 L. R. A., N. S., page 1163, it is said:
Evidence of misadventure gives rise to an important issue in a prosecution for
homicide, which must be submitted to the jury. And since a plea of
misadventure is a denial of criminal intent (or its equivalent) which constitutes
an essential element in criminal homicide, to warrant a conviction it must be
negative by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.
In support of such contention the author cites a number of cases.
We are of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment
of conviction.
The judgment of conviction is, therefore, reversed, the defendant acquitted, and
his discharge from custody ordered, costs de oficio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Johnson, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CARSON, J., concurring:
I concur.
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I am in entire agreement with the conclusions of the majority in this case. I
think it proper to estate, nevertheless, that the doctrine laid down in the
somewhat loosely worded West Virginia case of State vs. Legg, cited in the
majority opinion, and in the citation from 3 L. R. A., N. S., can not be said to be
in conformity with the general doctrine in this jurisdiction, as laid down in the
decisions of this court, without considerable modification and restriction
limiting its scope to cases wherein it is properly applicable.
POMOY VS PEOPLE
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Well-established is the principle that the factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the highest court of the land.
However, when facts are misinterpreted and the innocence of the accused
depends on a proper appreciation of the factual conclusions, the Supreme Court
may conduct a review thereof. In the present case, a careful reexamination
convinces this Court that an "accident" caused the victim’s death. At the very
least, the testimonies of the credible witnesses create a reasonable doubt on
appellant’s guilt. Hence, the Court must uphold the constitutional presumption
of innocence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to set aside the February 28, 2001 Decision2 and the October 30, 2001
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA–GR CR No. 18759. The CA
affirmed, with modifications, the March 8, 1995 judgment4 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC)5 of Iloilo City (Branch 25) in Criminal Case No. 36921,
finding Roweno Pomoy guilty of the crime of homicide. The assailed CA
Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, MODIFIED as to penalty in the sense
that the [Petitioner] ROWENO POMOY is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of six (6) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of
prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years eight (8) months
and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, the decision
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects."6
The challenged CA Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner was charged in an Information worded thus:
"That on or about the 4th day of January 1990, in the Municipality of Sara,
Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with his .45 service pistol, with
deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, and without any justifiable cause
or motive, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack
and shoot one TOMAS BALBOA with the service pistol he was then provided,
inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on the vital parts of his body, which
directly caused the death of said victim thereafter."7
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented respondent’s version of
the facts as follows:
"Tomas Balboa was a master teacher of the Concepcion College of Science and
Fisheries in Concepcion, Iloilo.
"On January 4, 1990, about 7:30 in the morning, some policemen arrived at the
Concepcion College to arrest Balboa, allegedly in connection with a robbery
which took place in the municipality in December 1989. With the arrest
effected, Balboa and the policemen passed by the Concepcion Elementary
School where his wife, Jessica, was in a get-together party with other School
Administrators. When his wife asked him, ‘Why will you be arrested?’ [H]e
answered ‘[Even I] do not know why I am arrested. That is why I am even
going there in order to find out the reason for my arrest.’
"Balboa was taken to the Headquarters of the already defunct 321st Philippine
Constabulary Company at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo. He was detained in the
jail thereat, along with Edgar Samudio, another suspect in the robbery case.
"Later that day, about a little past 2 o’clock in the afternoon, petitioner, who is a
police sergeant, went near the door of the jail where Balboa was detained and
directed the latter to come out, purportedly for tactical interrogation at the
investigation room, as he told Balboa: ‘Let’s go to the investigation room.’ The
investigation room is at the main building of the compound where the jail is
located. The jail guard on duty, Nicostrado Estepar, opened the jail door and
walked towards the investigation room.
"At that time, petitioner had a gun, a .45 caliber pistol, tucked in a holster which
was hanging by the side of his belt. The gun was fully embedded in its holster,
with only the handle of the gun protruding from the holster.
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"When petitioner and Balboa reached the main building and were near the
investigation room, two (2) gunshots were heard. When the source of the shots
was verified, petitioner was seen still holding a .45 caliber pistol, facing Balboa,
who was lying in a pool of blood, about two (2) feet away. When the
Commanding Officer of the Headquarters arrived, he disarmed petitioner and
directed that Balboa be brought to the hospital. Dr. Palma (first name not
provided) happened to be at the crime scene as he was visiting his brother in
the Philippine Constabulary. When Dr. Palma examined Balboa, he (Dr. Palma)
said that it was unnecessary to bring Balboa to the hospital for he was dead.
"Upon the request of Mrs. Jessica Balboa, the wife of the deceased, Dr. Ricardo
Jabonete, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation,
Region VI, Iloilo City, conducted an autopsy on the remains of Tomas Balboa.
The following were his findings:
‘Pallor, integumens and nailbeds.
‘Wound, gunshot: (1) ENTRANCE, downwards and medially, edges, modified
by sutures, surrounded by abrasion collar, 0.6 cm. In its chest, left side, 10.0
cms. from anterior midline, 121.0 cms. From left heel, directed medially
backwards from left to right, penetrating chest wall thru 5th intercostals space
into thoracic cavity, perforating thru and thru, upper lobe, left lung, lacerating
left ventricular wall causing punched out fracture, 8th thoracic vertebra and
make an EXIT, stallate in shape, 1.0 x 0.8 cm. Edges, modified by sutures, back,
right side, 8.0 cms. From posterior midline, 117.0 cms. From right heel (2)
ENTRANCE, ovaloid, oriented medially downwards, edges sutured, 0.7 cm. on
its widest portion, at infero-medial border, hypochondriac region, left side, 4.0
cms. From anterior midline, 105.0 cms. From left heel, directed backwards,
laterally wall into penetrating abdominal cavity, perforating thru and thru,
stomach, head of the pancreas and mesentery, make an exit, ovalid, 1.0 x 0.8
cm., oriented medially upwards, edges, sutured, back, left side, level of 9th
intercostal space, 4.5 cms. From posterior midline, 110.0 cms. From left heel. x
x x.
‘CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage, massive secondary to gunshot wounds on
chest and abdomen.
‘REMARKS: Body previously embalmed and autopsied.’
"Dr. Jaboneta testified that the two (2) wounds he found on x x x Balboa’s body
were gunshot wounds. The entrance of [W]ound No. 1 was to the left side of
the chest about the left nipple and exited to the right side of the back. Its
trajectory was backwards then downwards from left to right. As to the possible
position of the assailant, Dr. Jaboneta opined that the nozzle of the gun was
probably in front of the victim and was more to the left side, and the gun must
have been a little bit higher than the entrance wound. Wound No. 2 was located
immediately below the arch of the ribs, left side. Its direction was backwards
and laterally upwards. Dr. Jaboneta estimated that when it was inflicted, the
assailant must have pointed the gun’s nozzle to the right side front of the
victim. The distance between the entrance points of wounds No. 1 and No. 2
was found to be about 16.0 centimeters."8
Version of the Defense
The Petition adopted the narration of facts in the assailed CA Decision, which
in turn culled them from the trial court. The RTC summarized the testimonies
of Defense Witnesses Erna Basa, the lone eyewitness to the incident; Eden
Legaspi; Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr.; and petitioner himself, as follows:
"Erna Basa:
"x x x [O]n January 4, 1990, she was working in their office in the camp up to
the afternoon; at about past 2 o’clock that afternoon while working on the
backlogs, she heard some noise and exchange of words which were not clear,
but it seemed there was growing trouble; she opened the door to verify and saw
Roweno Pomoy and Tomas Balboa grappling for the possession of the gun; she
was inside the room and one meter away from the door; Pomoy and Balboa
while grappling were two to three meters away from the door; the grappling
happened so fast and the gun of Pomoy was suddenly pulled out from its
holster and then there was explosion; she was not certain who pulled the gun. x
x x.
"Eden Legaspi:
"x x x [A]s early as 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon of January 4, 1990 she was
inside the investigation room of the PC at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo; at about
2 o’clock that same afternoon while there inside, she heard a commotion
outside and she remained seated on the bench; when the commotion started
they were seated on the bench and after the commotion that woman soldier
(referring to Erna Basa) stood up and opened the door and she saw two persons
grappling for the possession of a gun and immediately two successive shots rang
out; she did not leave the place where she was seated but she just stood up; after
the shots, one of the two men fall down x x x.
"Accused-petitioner Roweno Pomoy:
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"He is 30 years old and a PNP member of the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force
Company then attached to the defunct 321st PC Company; he was one of the
investigators of their outfit; about 2 o’clock or past that time of January 4, 1990
he got Tomas Balboa from their stockade for tactical interrogation; as he was
already holding the door knob of their investigation room and about to open
and enter it, all of a sudden he saw Tomas Balboa approach him and take hold
or grab the handle of his gun; Tomas Balboa was a suspect in a robbery case
who was apprehended by the police of Concepcion and then turned over to
them (PC) and placed in their stockade; he asked the sergeant of the guard to let
Balboa out of the stockade for interrogation; from the stockade with Balboa
walking with him, he had his .45 caliber pistol placed in his holster attached to
his belt on his waist; then as he was holding the doorknob with his right hand to
open the door, the victim, who was two meters away from him, suddenly
approached him and grabbed his gun, but all of a sudden he held the handle of
his gun with his left hand; he released his right hand from the doorknob and,
with that right hand, he held the handle of his gun; Tomas Balboa was not able
to take actual hold of the gun because of his efforts in preventing him (Balboa)
from holding the handle of his gun; he used his left hand to parry the move of
Balboa; after he held the handle of his gun with his right hand, in a matter of
seconds, he felt somebody was holding his right hand; he and Balboa grappled
and in two or three seconds the gun was drawn from its holster as both of them
held the gun; more grappling followed and five seconds after the gun was taken
from its holster it fired, the victim was to his right side when the attempt to
grab his gun began and was still to his right when the gun was drawn from its
holster until it fired, as they were still grappling or wrestling; his gun was already
loaded in its chamber and cocked when he left his house, and it was locked
when it fired; during the grappling he used his left hand to prevent Balboa from
holding his gun, while the victim used his right hand in trying to reach the gun;
after the gun fired, they were separated from each other and Balboa fell; he is
taller than Balboa though the latter was bigger in build; he cannot say nor
determine who of them was stronger; after Balboa fell, Sgt. Alag shouted saying
‘stop that’ and he saw Sgt. Alag approaching; sometime after, Capt. Rolando
Maclang, their commanding officer, came, got his gun, and said that the case be
investigated as to what really happened. He said that when his gun was put in its
holster only its handle protrudes or comes out from it.
"Upon cross-examination, he said that Balboa was a suspect in a robbery case
that happened during the first week of December, 1989; he was the one who
filed that case in the town of San Dionisio and that case involves other persons
who were also detained; before January 4, 1990 he had also the chance to invite
and interrogate Balboa but who denied any robbery case; x x x [I]t was after he
took his lunch that day when Capt. Maclang called him to conduct the
interrogation; when he took Balboa from the stockade he did not tell him that
he (Balboa) was to be investigated in the investigation room which was housed
in the main building which is fifty meters, more or less, from the stockade,
likewise houses the administrative office, the office of the commanding officer,
officer of the operations division and that of the signal division; his gun was in
its holster when the victim tried to grab it (gun); from the time he sensed that
the victim tried to grab his gun, he locked the victim; the hand of the victim was
on top of his hand and he felt the victim was attempting to get his gun; that the
entire handle of his gun was exposed when placed inside its holster; he cannot
tell whether the victim, while struggling with him, was able to hold any portion
of his gun from the tip of its barrel to the point where its hammer is located;
during the incident his gun was fully loaded and cocked; Sgt. Alag did not
approach, but just viewed them and probably reported the incident to their
commanding officer; he was not able to talk to Sgt. Alag as he (Pomoy) was not
in his right sense; when his commanding officer came some five to ten minutes
later and took away his gun he did not tell him anything.
"Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr.
"He is the Rural Health Physician of Sara who conducted the autopsy on the
cadaver of Tomas Balboa that afternoon of January 4, 1990; in his autopsy
findings respecting which he made an autopsy report he said he found two
entrance wounds on the victim, the first on the left chest with trajectory
medially downward, while the second one is on the left side of the stomach with
trajectory somewhat going upward; at the same time of his examination he saw
this victim to be wearing a light-colored T-shirt and a jacket; other than the T-
shirt worn by the victim, he did not see or find any powder burns and marks
and that those dotted marks in the T-shirt were believed by him to be powder
burns as they look like one; he also found a deformed slug in the pocket of the
jacket of the victim."9
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA anchored its Decision on the following factual findings: 1) the victim
was not successful in his attempts to grab the gun, since petitioner had been in
control of the weapon when the shots were fired; 2) the gun had been locked
prior to the alleged grabbing incident and immediately before it went off; it was
petitioner who released the safety lock before he deliberately fired the fatal
shots; and 3) the location of the wounds found on the body of the deceased did
not support the assertion of petitioner that there had been a grappling for the
gun.
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To the appellate court, all the foregoing facts discredited the claim of petitioner
that the death of Balboa resulted from an accident. Citing People v. Reyes,10
the CA maintained that "a revolver is not prone to accidental firing if it were
simply handed over to the deceased as appellant claims because of the nature of
its mechanism, unless it was already first cocked and pressure was exerted on
the trigger in the process of allegedly handing it over. If it were uncocked, then
considerable pressure had to be applied on the trigger to fire the revolver.
Either way, the shooting of the deceased must have been intentional because
pressure on the trigger was necessary to make the gun fire."11
Moreover, the appellate court obviously concurred with this observation of the
OSG:
"[Petitioner’s] theory of accident would have been easier to believe had the
victim been shot only once. In this case, however, [petitioner] shot the victim
not only once but twice, thereby establishing [petitioner’s] determined effort to
kill the victim. By any stretch of the imagination, even assuming without
admitting that the first shot was accidental, then it should not have been
followed by another shot on another vital part of the body. The fact that
[petitioner] shot the victim two (2) times and was hit on two different and
distant parts of the body, inflicted from two different locations or angles, means
that there was an intent to cause the victim’s death, contrary to [petitioner’s]
pretensions of the alleged accidental firing. It is an oft-repeated principle that
the location, number and gravity of the wounds inflicted on the victim have a
more revealing tale of what actually happened during the incident. x x x.12
Furthermore, the CA debunked the alternative plea of self-defense. It held that
petitioner had miserably failed to prove the attendance of unlawful aggression,
an indispensable element of this justifying circumstance.
While substantially affirming the factual findings of the RTC, the CA disagreed
with the conclusion of the trial court that the aggravating circumstance of abuse
of public position had attended the commission of the crime. Accordingly, the
penalty imposed by the RTC was modified by the appellate court in this
manner:
"x x x [F]or public position to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance,
the public official must use his influence, prestige and ascendancy which his
office gives him in realizing his purpose. If the accused could have perpetrated
the crime without occupying his position, then there is no abuse of public
position.’ (People vs. Joyno, 304 SCRA 655, 670). In the instant case, there is no
showing that the [petitioner] had a premeditated plan to kill the victim when the
former fetched the latter from the stockade, thus, it cannot be concluded that
the public position of the [petitioner] facilitated the commission of the crime.
Therefore, the trial court’s finding that the said aggravating circumstance that
[petitioner] took advantage of his public position to commit the crime cannot
be sustained. Hence, there being no aggravating and no mitigating circumstance
proved, the maximum of the penalty shall be taken from the medium period of
reclusion temporal, a penalty imposable for the crime of homicide. x x x."13
Hence, this Petition.14
Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner submitted the following issues for the Court’s
consideration:
"I. The Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error in affirming
petitioner’s conviction despite the insufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to
convict the petitioner, in contrast to petitioner’s overwhelming evidence to
support his theory/defense of accident.
"II. The Court of Appeals committed grave and reversible error in affirming the
conviction of the petitioner on a manifestly mistaken inference that when the
gun fired, the petitioner was in full control of the handle of the gun, because
what the testimonies of disinterested witnesses and the petitioner reveal was
that the gun fired while petitioner and Balboa were both holding the gun in
forceful efforts to wrest the gun from each other.
"III. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the solicitor general’s
observation that the fact that petitioner shot the victim twice establishes
petitioner’s determined effort to kill the victim.
"IV. The appellate court committed serious misapprehension of the evidence
presented when it ruled that the trajectory of the wounds was front-to-back
belying the allegation of petitioner that he and the victim were side-by-side each
other when the grappling ensued.
"V. The Court of Appeals failed to discern the real import of petitioner’s
reaction to the incident when it stated that the dumbfounded reaction of
petitioner after the incident strongly argues against his claim of accidental
shooting.
"VI. The appellate court committed grave error when it disregarded motive or
lack of it in determining the existence of voluntariness and intent on the part of
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petitioner to shoot at the victim when the same was put in serious doubt by the
evidence presented.
"VII. The Court of Appeals was mistaken in ruling that the defense of accident
and self-defense are inconsistent.
"VIII. The Court of Appeals obviously erred in the imposition of the penalties
and damages."15
In sum, the foregoing issues can be narrowed down to two: First, whether the
shooting of Tomas Balboa was the result of an accident; and second, whether
petitioner was able to prove self-defense.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Accidental Shooting
Timeless is the legal adage that the factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive.16 Both courts possess time-
honored expertise in the field of fact finding. But where some facts are
misinterpreted or some details overlooked, the Supreme Court may overturn
the erroneous conclusions drawn by the courts a quo. Where, as in this case, the
facts in dispute are crucial to the question of innocence or guilt of the accused, a
careful factual reexamination is imperative.
Accident is an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code:
"Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. – The
following are exempt from criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
‘4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an
injury by mere accident without fault or intent of causing it.’"
Exemption from criminal liability proceeds from a finding that the harm to the
victim was not due to the fault or negligence of the accused, but to
circumstances that could not have been foreseen or controlled.17 Thus, in
determining whether an "accident" attended the incident, courts must take into
account the dual standards of lack of intent to kill and absence of fault or
negligence. This determination inevitably brings to the fore the main question in
the present case: was petitioner in control of the .45 caliber pistol at the very
moment the shots were fired?
Petitioner Not in Control
of the Gun When It Fired
The records show that, other than petitioner himself, it was Erna Basa who
witnessed the incident firsthand. Her account, narrated during cross-
examination, detailed the events of that fateful afternoon of January 4, 1990 as
follows:
"ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. You said that while you were inside the investigation room you heard a
commotion. That commotion which you heard, did you hear any shouting as
part of that commotion which you heard?
A. Moderately there was shouting and their dialogue was not clear. It could not
be understood.
Q. Did you hear any voices as part of that commotion?
A. No, sir.
Q. From the time you entered the investigation room you did not hear any
voice while you were inside the investigation room as part of that commotion?
A. There was no loud voice and their conversation could not be clarified. They
were talking somewhat like murmuring or in a low voice but there was a sort of
trouble in their talks.
COURT:
Q. Was there a sort of an exchange of words in their conversation?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
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Q. When you opened the door, you saw Sgt. Pomoy and Mr. Balboa the
deceased in this case? Am I correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when you saw Sgt. Pomoy was he holding a gun?
A. Right hand of Sgt. Pomoy.
Q. And when you see that right hand of Sgt. Pomoy, was it holding the gun?
A. The right hand of Sgt. Pomoy was here on the gun and Sir Balboa’s hand
was also there. Both of them were holding the gun.

A. Not yet, the gun was still here. (Witness illustrating by pointing to her side) Q. Which part of the gun was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy holding?
and I saw both of them grappling for that gun.
A. The handle.
Q. Where was the gun at that time?
Q. And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was holding the gun with his
A. The gun was in its holster. (Witness illustrating by pointing to [her] side.) right hand?

Q. When you demonstrated you were according to you saw the hands holding A. At first they were not directly facing each other.
the gun. It was Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the gun with his right hand?
Q. So later, they were facing each other?
A. I saw two hands on the handle of the gun in its holster, the hand of Sir
Balboa and Sgt. Pomoy. A. They were not directly facing each other. Their position did not remain
steady as they were grappling for the possession of the gun force against force.
COURT:
COURT:
Q. At that precise moment the gun was still in its holster?
Q. What was the position of the victim when the shots were fired?
A. When I took a look the gun was still in its holster with both hands grappling
for the possession of the gun. A. When I saw them they were already facing each other.

Q. How many hands did you see? Q. What was the distance?

A. Two. A. Very close to each other.

Q. One hand of Sgt. Pomoy and one hand is that of the victim? Q. How close?

A. Yes, sir. A. Very near each other.

COURT: Q. Could it be a distance of within one (1) foot?

Proceed. A. Not exactly. They were close to each other in such a manner that their
bodies would touch each other.
ATTY TEODOSIO:
Q. So the distance is less than one (1) foot when the gun fired?
Q. Which hand of Sgt. Pomoy did you see holding the gun?
A. One (1) foot or less when the explosions were heard.

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Q. And they were directly facing each other? Q. How soon after the gun went off when you saw the gun in the hand of Sgt.
Pomoy?
A. Yes, sir.
A. After Balboa had fallen and after they had separated themselves with each
COURT: other, it was then that I saw Sgt. Pomoy holding the gun.

Proceed. COURT:

Q. Were you able to see how the gun was taken out from its holster? Proceed.

A. While they were grappling for the possession of the gun, gradually the gun ATTY. TEODOSIO:
was released from its holster and then there was an explosion.
Q. When the gun was taken out from its holster, Sgt. Pomoy was the one
Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas Balboa? holding the handle of the gun? Am I correct?

A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of the gun was when it fired
because they were grappling for the possession of the gun.
Q. Did you see when the gun fired when they were grappling for its possession?
A. Yes sir, I actually saw the explosion. It came from that very gun.
Q. Did you see the gun fired when it fired for two times?
A. Both of them were holding the handle of the gun.
Q. So when the gun was still in its holster, two of them were holding the gun?
A. Yes sir, they were actually holding the gun, Sgt. Pomoy and Sir Balboa.
Q. It was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the handle of the gun
as you testified?

A. Yes, sir. A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun fired? Q. Which hand of Balboa was holding the handle of the gun?

A. I could not really conclude towards whom the barrel of the gun was pointed A. Left hand.
to because the gun was turning.
Q. At the time Balboa was holding the handle of the gun with his left hand, was
xxx xxx xxx he in front of Sgt. Pomoy?

Q. Could you tell the court who was holding the gun when the gun fired? A. They had a sort of having their sides towards each other. Pomoy’s right and
Balboa’s left sides [were] towards each other. They were side by side at a closer
A. When the gun exploded, the gun was already in the possession of Sgt. distance towards each other.
Pomoy. He was the one holding the gun.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. After the gun went off, you saw the gun was already in the hand of Sgt.
Pomoy? Q. It was actually Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the handle of the gun during
that time?
A. Yes, sir.

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A. When I looked out it was when they were grappling for the possession of the Q. So, he was still using the same left hand in holding a portion of the handle of
gun and the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy was holding the handle of the gun. the gun up to the time when the gun was pulled out from its holster?

Q. When you saw them did you see what position of the handle of the gun was A. Yes sir, the same left hand and that of Pomoy his right hand because the left
being held by Tomas Balboa? The rear portion of the handle of the gun or the hand of Pomoy was used by him in parrying the right hand of Sir Balboa which
portion near the trigger? is about to grab the handle of the gun.

A. When I looked at them it was the hand of Sgt. Pomoy holding the handle of COURT:
the gun with his right hand with the hand of Sir Balboa over the hand of
Pomoy, the same hand holding the gun. Q. So in the process of grappling he was using his left hand in pushing the
victim away from him?
Q. It was in that position when the gun was removed from its holster?
A. Yes, sir.
A. When the gun pulled out from its holster, I was not able to notice clearly
anymore whose hand was holding the gun when I saw both their hands were Q. What about the right hand of the victim, what was he doing with his right
holding the gun. hand?

Q. When you said this in [the] vernacular, ‘Daw duha na sila nagakapot’, what A. The victim was trying to reach the gun with his right hand and Pomoy was
you really mean? using his left hand to protect the victim from reaching the gun with his right
hand.
A. Both of them were holding the gun.
COURT:
Q. But Sgt. Pomoy still holding the handle of the gun?
Proceed.
A. Still both of them were holding the handle of the gun.
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. With the hand of Balboa still on the top of the hand of Sgt. Pomoy as what
you have previously said when the gun was in the holster of Sgt. Pomoy? Q. Did you say a while ago that Mr. Balboa was able to hold the barrel of the
gun of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. When the gun was pulled from its holster, I saw that Sgt. Pomoy’s right hand
was still on the handle of the gun with the left hand of Sir Balboa over his right A. Yes, sir.
hand of Sgt. Pomoy, like this (witness illustrating by showing his right hand with
her left hand over her right hand as if holding something. The thumb of the left Q. And that was at the time before the shots were fired?
hand is somewhat over the index finger of the right hand.)
A. Yes, he was able to hold the tip of the barrel of the gun using his right hand.
COURT:
COURT:
Which hand of the victim was used by him when the gun was already pulled out
form its holster and while the accused was holding the handle of the gun? Q. That was before the gun fired?

A. Left hand. A. Yes, sir."18

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The foregoing account demonstrates that petitioner did not have control of the
gun during the scuffle. The deceased persistently attempted to wrest the weapon
from him, while he resolutely tried to thwart those attempts. That the hands of
both petitioner and the victim were all over the weapon was categorically
asserted by the eyewitness. In the course of grappling for the gun, both hands
of petitioner were fully engaged -- his right hand was trying to maintain
possession of the weapon, while his left was warding off the victim. It would be
difficult to imagine how, under such circumstances, petitioner would coolly and
effectively be able to release the safety lock of the gun and deliberately aim and
fire it at the victim.
It would therefore appear that there was no firm factual basis for the following
declaration of the appellate court: "[Petitioner] admitted that his right hand was
holding the handle of the gun while the left hand of the victim was over his
right hand when the gun was fired. This declaration would safely lead us to the
conclusion that when the gun went off herein [petitioner] was in full control of
the gun."19
Release of the Gun’s Safety Lock and
Firing of the Gun Both Accidental
Petitioner testified that the .45 caliber service pistol was equipped with a safety
lock that, unless released, would prevent the firing of the gun. Despite this
safety feature, however, the evidence showed that the weapon fired and hit the
victim -- not just once, but twice. To the appellate court, this fact could only
mean that petitioner had deliberately unlocked the gun and shot at the victim.
This conclusion appears to be non sequitur.
It is undisputed that both petitioner and the victim grappled for possession of
the gun. This frenzied grappling for the weapon -- though brief, having been
finished in a matter of seconds -- was fierce and vicious. The eyewitness
account amply illustrated the logical conclusion that could not be dismissed:
that in the course of the scuffle, the safety lock could have been accidentally
released and the shots accidentally fired.
That there was not just one but two shots fired does not necessarily and
conclusively negate the claim that the shooting was accidental, as the same
circumstance can easily be attributed to the mechanism of the .45 caliber service
gun. Petitioner, in his technical description of the weapon in question, explained
how the disputed second shot may have been brought about:
"x x x Petitioner also testified on cross-examination that a caliber .45 semi-
automatic pistol, when fired, immediately slides backward throwing away the
empty shell and returns immediately carrying again a live bullet in its chamber.
Thus, the gun can, as it did, fire in succession. Verily, the location of, and
distance between the wounds and the trajectories of the bullets jibe perfectly
with the claim of the petitioner: the trajectory of the first shot going downward
from left to right thus pushing Balboa’s upper body, tilting it to the left while
Balboa was still clutching petitioner’s hand over the gun; the second shot hitting
him in the stomach with the bullet going upward of Balboa’s body as he was
falling down and releasing his hold on petitioner’s hand x x x."20
Thus, the appellate court’s reliance on People v. Reyes41 was misplaced. In that
case, the Court disbelieved the accused who described how his gun had
exploded while he was simply handing it over to the victim. Here, no similar
claim is being made; petitioner has consistently maintained that the gun
accidentally fired in the course of his struggle with the victim. More
significantly, the present case involves a semi-automatic pistol, the mechanism
of which is very different from that of a revolver, the gun used in Reyes.22
Unlike a revolver, a semi-automatic pistol, as sufficiently described by
petitioner, is prone to accidental firing when possession thereof becomes the
object of a struggle.
Alleged Grappling Not Negated
by Frontal Location of Wounds
On the basis of the findings of Dr. Jaboneta showing that the wounds of the
deceased were all frontal, the appellate court rejected petitioner’s claim that a
grappling for the weapon ever occurred. It held that "if there was indeed a
grappling between the two, and that they had been side [by] side x x x each
other, the wounds thus inflicted could not have had a front-to-back trajectory
which would lead to an inference that the victim was shot frontally, as observed
by Dr. Jaboneta."23
Ordinarily, the location of gunshot wounds is indicative of the positions of the
parties at the precise moment when the gun was fired. Their positions would in
turn be relevant to a determination of the existence of variables such as
treachery, aggression and so on.
In the factual context of the present case, however, the location of the wounds
becomes inconsequential. Where, as in this case, both the victim and the
accused were grappling for possession of a gun, the direction of its nozzle may
continuously change in the process, such that the trajectory of the bullet when
the weapon fires becomes unpredictable and erratic. In this case, the eyewitness
account of that aspect of the tragic scuffle shows that the parties’ positions were
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unsteady, and that the nozzle of the gun was neither definitely aimed nor
pointed at any particular target. We quote the eyewitness testimony as follows:
"Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas Balboa?
A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of the gun was when it fired
because they were grappling for the possession of the gun.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun fired?
A. I could not really conclude towards whom the barrel of the gun was pointed
to because the gun was turning."24
xxx xxx xxx
"Q And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was holding the gun with his
right hand?
A At first, they were not directly facing each other.
Q So later, they were facing each other?
A They were not directly facing each other. Their position did not remain steady
as they were grappling for the possession of the gun force against force."25
In his Petition, this explanation is given by petitioner:
"x x x. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Balboa was shot frontally.
First, because the position of the gun does not necessarily indicate the position
of the person or persons holding the gun when it fired. This is especially true
when two persons were grappling for the possession of the gun when it fired, as
what exactly transpired in this case. x x x.
"[The] testimony clearly demonstrates that the petitioner was on the left side of
the victim during the grappling when the gun fired. The second wound was thus
inflicted this wise: when the first shot hit Balboa, his upper body was pushed
downward owing to the knocking power of the caliber .45 pistol. But he did not
let go of his grip of the hand of petitioner and the gun, Balboa pulling the gun
down as he was going down. When the gun went off the second time hitting
Balboa, the trajectory of the bullet in Balboa’s body was going upward because
his upper body was pushed downward twisting to the left. It was then that
Balboa let go of his grip. On cross-examination, petitioner testified, what I
noticed was that after successive shots we separated from each other. This
sequence of events is logical because the protagonists were grappling over the
gun and were moving very fast. x x x."26
Presence of All the
Elements of Accident
The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the accused was at the time
performing a lawful act with due care; 2) the resulting injury was caused by mere
accident; and 3) on the part of the accused, there was no fault or no intent to
cause the injury.27 From the facts, it is clear that all these elements were
present. At the time of the incident, petitioner was a member -- specifically, one
of the investigators -- of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at the
Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company. Thus, it was in the lawful performance
of his duties as investigating officer that, under the instructions of his superior,
he fetched the victim from the latter’s cell for a routine interrogation.
Again, it was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that
petitioner tried to defend his possession of the weapon when the victim
suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As an enforcer of the law,
petitioner was duty-bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by
anyone, especially by a detained person in his custody. Such weapon was likely
to be used to facilitate escape and to kill or maim persons in the vicinity,
including petitioner himself.
Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the necessary
precautions to prevent his service weapon from causing accidental harm to
others. As he so assiduously maintained, he had kept his service gun locked
when he left his house; he kept it inside its holster at all times, especially within
the premises of his working area.
At no instance during his testimony did the accused admit to any intent to cause
injury to the deceased, much less kill him. Furthermore, Nicostrato Estepar, the
guard in charge of the detention of Balboa, did not testify to any behavior on
the part of petitioner that would indicate the intent to harm the victim while
being fetched from the detention cell.
The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victim’s death was limited only to
acts committed in the course of the lawful performance of his duties as an
enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from its holster, the release of the
safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots -- all of which led to the
death of the victim -- were sufficiently demonstrated to have been
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consequences of circumstances beyond the control of petitioner. At the very
least, these factual circumstances create serious doubt on the latter’s culpability.
Petitioner’s Subsequent Conduct
Not Conclusive of Guilt
To both the trial and the appellate courts, the conduct of petitioner immediately
after the incident was indicative of remorse. Allegedly, his guilt was evident
from the fact that he was "dumbfounded," according to the CA; was "mum,
pale and trembling," according to the trial court. These behavioral reactions
supposedly point to his guilt. Not necessarily so. His behavior was
understandable. After all, a minute earlier he had been calmly escorting a person
from the detention cell to the investigating room; and, in the next breath, he
was looking at his companion’s bloodied body. His reaction was to be expected
of one in a state of shock at events that had transpired so swiftly and ended so
regrettably.
Second Issue:
Self-Defense
Petitioner advanced self-defense as an alternative. Granting arguendo that he
intentionally shot Balboa, he claims he did so to protect his life and limb from
real and immediate danger.
Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting circumstance of accident, in
which there is no intent to kill. On the other hand, self-defense necessarily
contemplates a premeditated intent to kill in order to defend oneself from
imminent danger.28 Apparently, the fatal shots in the instant case did not occur
out of any conscious or premeditated effort to overpower, maim or kill the
victim for the purpose of self-defense against any aggression; rather, they
appeared to be the spontaneous and accidental result of both parties’ attempts
to possess the firearm.
Since the death of the victim was the result of an accidental firing of the service
gun of petitioner -- an exempting circumstance as defined in Article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code -- a further discussion of whether the assailed acts of the
latter constituted lawful self-defense is unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision
REVERSED. Petitioner is ACQUITTED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.
E. IRRESISTIBLE FORCE
US VS CABALLEROS
MAPA, J.:
The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Cebu to
the penalty of seven years of presidio mayor as accessories after the fact in the
crime of assassination or murder perpetrated on the persons of the American
school-teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France, John E. Wells, and Ernest
Eger, because, without having taken part in the said crime as principals or as
accomplices, they took part in the burial of the corpses of the victims in order
to conceal the crime.
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As regards Roberto
Baculi, although he confessed to having assisted in the burial of the corpses, it
appears that he did so because he was compelled to do so by the murderers of
the four teachers. And not only does the defendant affirm this, but he is
corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by the
way, is a witness for the prosecution. This witness says he was present when the
Americans were killed; that Roberto Baculi was not a member of the group who
killed the Americans, but the he was in a banana plantation on his property
gathering some bananas; that when he heard the shots he began to run; that he
was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the leaders of the band; that the
latter called to him and striking him with the butts of their guns they forced him
to bury the corpses.
The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by
reason of irresistible force (par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under such
circumstances when he executed the acts which are charged against him.
As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no proof that he
took any part in any way in the execution of the crime with which he has been
charged; there is conclusive proof to the contrary, since Baculi, as well as one of
the witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly declare that he,
Caballeros, did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor was
he even in the place of the occurrence when the burial took place. The
confession of his supposed liability and guilt, made before an official of the
division of information of the Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as the latter
states when testifying as a witness, can not be considered as legal proof, because
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the same witness says that Roberto Baculi was the only one of the defendants
who made a confession to him voluntarily. It appears besides, from the
statements of another witness for the prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that
the confession of Apolonio Caballeros was made through the promise made to
him and to the other defendants that nothing would be done to them.
Confessions which do not appear to have been made freely and voluntarily,
without force, intimidation, or promise of pardon, can not be accepted as proof
on a trial. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619 of the Philippine Commission).
The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of
the crime, which seems to be one of the motives for the conviction and which
the court below takes into consideration in his judgment, is not punished by the
Penal Code and therefore that can not render the defendants criminally liable
according to law.
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of the judgment
appealed from, we acquit the defendants, appellants, with the costs de oficio in
both instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.
US VS EXALTACION
TORRES, J.:
March 26, 1903, the provincial fiscal of Bulacan presented to the court of that
province an information charging Liberato Exaltacion and Buenaventura
Tanchinco with the crime of rebellion, in that they, subsequently to the 4th day
of November, 1901, willfully and illegally bound themselves to take part in a
rebellion against the Government of the United States in these Islands, swearing
allegiance to the Katipunan Society, the purpose of which was to overthrow the
said Government by force of arms, this against the statute in the case made and
provided.
In the course of the trial Don Pablo Tecson, the provincial governor of
Bulacan, testified under oath that the two defendants were arrested in the
month of March, 1903, the police some days before having captured a number
of documents in the encampment of one Contreras, as so-called general of
bandits, situated at a place called Langca, of the town of Meycauayan, among
which documents appeared the papers now on pages 2 and 3 of the record,
signed by the said Exaltacion and Tanchinco, who recognized the said
documents when they were exhibited to them; that the said defendants stated to
the witness that they had signed the said documents under compulsion; that the
purpose of the Katipunan Society was to obtain the independence of the
Philippines; that this statement was made in the house of the parish priest of
Meycauayan in the presence of Exequiel Casas and Fernando Nieto. The latter,
upon their examination as witnesses, testified to the same facts, stating that the
defendants told Governor Tecson that they had signed the said documents
under fear of death at the hands of the thieves by whom they had been
captured. The witness Casas, the municipal president of Meycauayan, testified
that he held office as such in place of the former president, Don Tomas Testa,
who was kidnapped in the month of October, 1902.
The said documents, the first of which was dated July 4 and the second July 17,
1902, were written in Tagalog, and contain an oath taken in the name of God,
and a covenant on the part of the subscribers to carry out the superior orders of
the Katipunan, and never disobey them until their death in the defense of the
mother country. The two accused, under oath, testified to having signed the said
documents and alleged that they did so under compulsion and force while they
were held as captives by the thieves; that the defendant Tanchinco was captured
in the fields one day when he was going to work on his farm by three armed
men, unknown to him, who asked him if he was an agent or friend of President
Testa, and upon his replying in the negative they compelled him in view of his
denial to sign a document, now on page 3 of the record.
The defendant Tanchinco cited Lazaro Yusay to testify to the fact that he was
captured at a place called Kaibiga in the township of Novaliches, and that on
the day following his release, having been unable to pay the $300 which was
demanded of him, he reported to the president, Tomas Testa. The defendant
Liberato Exaltacion under oath testified that he was captured near Meycauayan
by five persons, unknown, dressed as policemen and armed with guns or
revolvers; that these men bound him and took him into the forest and there
compelled him by threats of death to sign the documents now on page 2 of the
record; that thereupon they allowed him to go upon promise to return. This
defendant testified that Antero Villano and Tomas Rivera saw him while on the
road in the hands of the thieves. Both the accused testified that as soon as they
were released they presented themselves to the president, Don Tomas Testa, in
the presence of witnesses, and subsequently went to Bonifacio Morales, a
lieutenant of volunteers, and reported to him the fact that they had been
captured.
The witnesses Morales, Lazaro Yusay, Antero Villano, Dalmacio Ferrer, and
Hipolito de Leon — of whom the last two were present when Tanchinco
appeared before Senor Testa, the president of Meycauayan, and reported to him
what had happened to him — all testified to the same fact and corroborated the
statements of the accused with respect to their capture and their subsequent
report to President Testa and to the witness Morales.
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The evidence for the prosecution, and especially the two documents above
referred to, signed by the accused, is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the
latter or to justify the imposition upon them of the penalty inflicted by the
judgment of the court below.
The facts, established by the evidence, that the defendants were kidnapped by
brigands who belonged to the Contreras band, and that they signed the said
documents under compulsion and while in captivity, relieve them from all
criminal liability from the crime of rebellion of which they are charged. The
conduct of the defendants in presenting themselves first to the local president
of Meycauayan and subsequently to Lieut. Bonifacio Morales, of the Bulacan
Government Volunteers, as soon as they were released by the bandits is
corroborative of their testimony, and is the best demonstration of their
innocence. This conclusion is not overcome by the trifling discrepancy between
the testimony of the witness Yusay and that of the defendant Tanchinco nor the
fact the Exaltacion was unable to determine the date when he was captured or
that on which he appeared before President Testa.
The guilt of the defendants of the crime defined and punished by Act No. 292
not having been established at the trial beyond a reasonable doubt, we are of the
opinion that the judgment below must be reversed and the defendants acquitted
with the costs de oficio. The judge below will be informed of this decision and a
copy of the judgment entered herein will be furnished him for his information
and guidance. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Cooper, Willard, Mapa, McDonough and Johnson, JJ., concur.
F. INSUPERABLE CAUSE
US VS VINCENTILLO
CARSON, J.:
The defendant in this case was found guilty in the court below of the crime of
"illegal and arbitrary detention" of the complaining witness for a period of three
days, and sentenced to pay a fine of 625 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial.
We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case there can be no
doubt of the lawful authority of the defendant, in the exercise of his functions
as municipal president, to make arrest of the complaining witness which
resulted in his alleged unlawful detention. As we understand the evidence, the
alleged offense with which the complaining witness in this case was charged was
committed by him in the presence of the municipal president, who must be held
to have had all the usual powers of a police officer for the making of arrest
without warrant, under the doctrine laid down in the case of U.S. vs. Fortaleza
(12 Phil. Rep., 472).
The judgment of conviction of the court below must therefore be reversed,
unless the evidence discloses that having made the arrest, the defendant
arbitrarily and without legal authority, as it is alleged, cause the complaining
witness to be detained for a period of three days without having him brought
before the proper judicial authority for the investigation and trial of the charge
on which he was arrested. But so far as we can gather from the extremely
meagre record in this case the arrested man was in fact brought before a justice
of the peace as soon as "practicable" after his arrest. True, three days were
expended in doing, so, but it was conclusively proven at the trial that at the time
of the arrest neither the local justice of the peace nor his auxiliary were in the
municipality, and to reach the justice of the peace of either of the two adjoining
municipalities, it was necessary to take a long journey by boat. The evidence
discloses, moreover, that with all practicable dispatch, the prisoner was
forwarded first to one and then to the other of the adjoining municipalities for
trial, the failure to secure trial on the first occasion being due to the fact that the
written complaint, which was intrusted to the policeman in charge of the
prisoner, was either lost or stolen. It does not appear why the prisoner was not
sent to the same municipality on both occasions, but in the absence of proof we
must assume that in this respect the officers in charge were controlled by local
conditions, changes in the weather, or the like, which, as appears from the
uncontradicted evidence of record, made the journey by boats safer and more
commodious sometimes to one and sometimes to the other of the two
adjoining municipalities.
It may be that the defendant was not friendly to the arrested man, and that he
was not sorry to see him exposed to considerable inconvenience and delay in
the proceedings incident to his trial, but there is nothing in this record upon
which to base a finding that his defendant caused the arrest and the subsequent
detention of the prisoner otherwise than in the due performance of his official
duties; and there can be no doubt of his lawfully authority in the premises. The
trial judge lays great stress upon the trivial nature of the offense for which the
arrest was made, but keeping in mind the fact that there was no judicial officer
in the remote community where the incident occurred at the time of the arrest,
and no certainty of the early return of the absent justice of the peace, or his
auxiliary, we are not prepared to hold, in the absence of all the evidence on this
point that in a particular case of a defiance of local authority by the willful
violation of a local ordinance, it was not necessary, or at least expedient, to
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make an arrest and send the offender forthwith to the justice of the peace of a
neighboring municipality, if only to convince all would-be offenders that the
forces of law and order were supreme, even in the absence of the local
municipal judicial officers.
The judgment of the lower court convicting and sentencing the defendant must
be reversed and he is hereby acquitted of the offense with which he is charged,
with the costs in both instances de oficio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa , Moreland, and Trent, JJ., concur.
CARSON, J.:
The defendant in this case was found guilty in the court below of the crime of
"illegal and arbitrary detention" of the complaining witness for a period of three
days, and sentenced to pay a fine of 625 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial.
We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case there can be no
doubt of the lawful authority of the defendant, in the exercise of his functions
as municipal president, to make arrest of the complaining witness which
resulted in his alleged unlawful detention. As we understand the evidence, the
alleged offense with which the complaining witness in this case was charged was
committed by him in the presence of the municipal president, who must be held
to have had all the usual powers of a police officer for the making of arrest
without warrant, under the doctrine laid down in the case of U.S. vs. Fortaleza
(12 Phil. Rep., 472).
The judgment of conviction of the court below must therefore be reversed,
unless the evidence discloses that having made the arrest, the defendant
arbitrarily and without legal authority, as it is alleged, cause the complaining
witness to be detained for a period of three days without having him brought
before the proper judicial authority for the investigation and trial of the charge
on which he was arrested. But so far as we can gather from the extremely
meagre record in this case the arrested man was in fact brought before a justice
of the peace as soon as "practicable" after his arrest. True, three days were
expended in doing, so, but it was conclusively proven at the trial that at the time
of the arrest neither the local justice of the peace nor his auxiliary were in the
municipality, and to reach the justice of the peace of either of the two adjoining
municipalities, it was necessary to take a long journey by boat. The evidence
discloses, moreover, that with all practicable dispatch, the prisoner was
forwarded first to one and then to the other of the adjoining municipalities for
trial, the failure to secure trial on the first occasion being due to the fact that the
written complaint, which was intrusted to the policeman in charge of the
prisoner, was either lost or stolen. It does not appear why the prisoner was not
sent to the same municipality on both occasions, but in the absence of proof we
must assume that in this respect the officers in charge were controlled by local
conditions, changes in the weather, or the like, which, as appears from the
uncontradicted evidence of record, made the journey by boats safer and more
commodious sometimes to one and sometimes to the other of the two
adjoining municipalities.
It may be that the defendant was not friendly to the arrested man, and that he
was not sorry to see him exposed to considerable inconvenience and delay in
the proceedings incident to his trial, but there is nothing in this record upon
which to base a finding that his defendant caused the arrest and the subsequent
detention of the prisoner otherwise than in the due performance of his official
duties; and there can be no doubt of his lawfully authority in the premises. The
trial judge lays great stress upon the trivial nature of the offense for which the
arrest was made, but keeping in mind the fact that there was no judicial officer
in the remote community where the incident occurred at the time of the arrest,
and no certainty of the early return of the absent justice of the peace, or his
auxiliary, we are not prepared to hold, in the absence of all the evidence on this
point that in a particular case of a defiance of local authority by the willful
violation of a local ordinance, it was not necessary, or at least expedient, to
make an arrest and send the offender forthwith to the justice of the peace of a
neighboring municipality, if only to convince all would-be offenders that the
forces of law and order were supreme, even in the absence of the local
municipal judicial officers.
The judgment of the lower court convicting and sentencing the defendant must
be reversed and he is hereby acquitted of the offense with which he is charged,
with the costs in both instances de oficio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa , Moreland, and Trent, JJ., concur.
PEOPLE VS BANDIAN
DIAZ, J.:
Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua and the corresponding accessory penalties, with the costs of
the suit, Josefina Bandian appealed from said sentence alleging that the trial
court erred:
I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged admission to Dr.
Nepomuceno that she had thrown away her newborn babe, and
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II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond reasonable doubt, and in
sentencing her to reclusion perpetua, with costs.
The facts of record ma be summarized as follows:
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar, the
appellant's neighbor, saw the appellant go to a thicket about four or five brazas
from her house, apparently to respond to a call of nature because it was there
that the people of the place used to go for that purpose. A few minutes later, he
again saw her emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both
in the front and back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not being able to
support herself. He ran to her aid and, having noted that she was very weak and
dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to her house and placed her in her
own bed. Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her to her house, what
happened to her, the appellant merely answered that she was very dizzy. Not
wishing to be alone with the appellant in such circumstances, Valentin Aguilar
called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, to help them, and later requested
him to take bamboo leaves to stop the hemorrhage which had come upon the
appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about five brazas when he saw the body
of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had
gone a few moments before. Comcom informed Aguilar of it and latter told
him to bring the body to the appellant's house. Upon being asked whether the
baby which had just been shown to her was hers or not, the appellant answered
in the affirmative.
Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of said day,
Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, president of the sanitary division of Talisayan,
Oriental Misamis, went to the appellant's house and found her lying in bed still
bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house and beneath it, directly under the bed,
were full of blood. Basing his opinion upon said facts, the physician in question
declared that the appellant gave birth in her house and in her own bed; that
after giving birth she threw her child into the thicket to kill it for the purpose of
concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she had
theretofore been living maritally, because the child was not his but of another
man with whom she had previously had amorous relations. To give force to his
conclusions, he testified that the appellant had admitted to him that she had
killed her child, when he went to her house at the time and on the date above-
stated.
The prosecuting attorney and the lower court giving absolute credit to Dr.
Nepomuceno whose testimony was not corroborated but, on the contrary, was
contradicted by the very witnesses for the prosecution and by the appellant, as
will be stated later, they were of the opinion and the lower court furthermore
held, that the appellant was an infanticide. The Solicitor-General, however, does
not agree with both. On the contrary, he maintains that the appellant may be
guilty only of abandoning a minor under subsection 2 of article 276 of the
Revised Penal Code, the abandonment having resulted in the death of the minor
allegedly abandoned.
By the way, it should be stated that there is no evidence showing how the child
in question died. Dr. Nepomuceno himself affirmed that the wounds found in
the body of the child were not caused by the hand of man but by bites animals,
the pigs that usually roamed through the thicket where it was found.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed
wilfully or consciously, or at least it must be result of a voluntary, conscious and
free act or omission. Even in cases where said crimes are committed through
mere imprudence, the person who commits them, under said circumstances,
must be in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, or must be conscious of
his acts, in order that he may be held liable.
The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing her child's
death in one way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so wilfully,
consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it
to death, because her affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to her
second lover, Luis Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her married
life with Kirol — she considers him her husband as he considers her his wife —
began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial, he knew that the appellant was
pregnant and he believed from the beginning, affirming such belief when he
testified at the trial, that the child carried by the appellant in her womb was his,
and he testified that he and she had been eagerly waiting for the birth of the
child. The appellant, therefore, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to
Kirol.
If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the witnesses Valentin
Aguilar and Adriano Comcom that the child was taken from the thicket and
carried already dead to the appellant's house after the appellant had left the
place, staggering, without strength to remain on her feet and very dizzy, to the
extent of having to be as in fact she was helped to go up to her house and to lie
in bed, it will clearly appear how far from the truth were Dr. Nepomuceno's
affirmation and conclusions. Also add to all these the fact that the appellant
denied having made any admission to said physician and that from the time she
became pregnant she continuously had fever. This illness and her extreme
debility undoubtedly caused by her long illness as well as the hemorrhage which
she had upon giving birth, coupled with the circumstances that she is a
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primipara, being then only 23 years of age, and therefore inexperienced as to
childbirth and as to the inconvenience or difficulties usually attending such
event; and the fact that she, like her lover Luis Kirol — a mere laborer earning
only twenty-five centavos a day — is uneducated and could supplant with what
she had read or learned from books what experience itself could teach her,
undoubtedly were the reasons why she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she
was, it did not occur to her or she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness,
which causes may be considered lawful or insuperable to constitute the seventh
exempting circumstance (art. 12, Revised Penal Code), to take her child from
the thicket where she had given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and
exposed to the danger of losing its life.
The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into
the thicket, according to her, to respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the
fact that she had fever for a long time, was perfectly lawful. If by doing so she
caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later
abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other reason than that she was
overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she should not be blamed
therefor because it all happened by mere accident, from liability any person who
so acts and behaves under such circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, Revised
Penal Code).
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and
granting that the appellant was aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket
and that she later failed to take her child therefrom, having been so prevented
by reason of causes entirely independent of her will, it should be held that the
alleged errors attributed to the lower court by the appellant are true; and it
appearing that under such circumstances said appellant has the fourth and
seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, is hereby acquitted of the crime
of which she had bee accused and convicted, with costs de oficio, and she is
actually confined in jail in connection with this case, it is ordered that she be
released immediately. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., and Abad Santos, J., concur.
Separate Opinions
VILLA-REAL, J., concurring:
I concur in the acquittal of the accused Josefina Bandian not on the ground that
she is exempt from criminal liability but because she has committed no criminal
act or omission.
The evidence conclusively shows that on the day in question the accused
Josefina Bandian had spent a year of marital life with her lover Luis Kirol by
whom she was begotten with a child for the first time. Her said lover knew that
she was pregnant and both were waiting for the arrival of the happy day when
the fruit of their love should be born. Since she became pregnant she
continuously had fever, was weak and dizzy. On January 31, at about 7 o'clock
in the morning, she went down from her house and entered a thicket about four
or five brazas away, where the residents of said place responded to the call of
nature. After some minutes the accused emerged from the thicket staggering
and apparently unable to support herself. Her neighbor Valentin Aguilar, who
saw her enter the thicket and emerged therefrom, ran to help her, supported her
and aided her in going up to her house and to bed. Asked by Aguilar what
happened to her, she merely answered that she was very dizzy. Thinking that he
alone was unable to attend to her, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano Comcom,
who lived nearby, and requested him to take bamboo leaves to stop the
appellant's hemorrhage. Adriano had scarcely gone about five brazas, when he
saw the body of a newborn child near the path adjoining the thicket where the
accused had been a few moments before. Upon being informed of the
discovery, Valentin Aguilar told Adriano Comcom to bring the child into the
appellant's house. Upon being asked whether or not the child shown to her was
hers, the appellant answered in the affirmative. After an autopsy had been made
of the body, it was found that the child was born alive.
Unconscious, precipitate or sudden deliveries are well known in legal medicine
among young primiparæ who, by reason of their ignorance of the symptoms of
parturition and of the process of expulsion of fetus, are not aware that they are
giving birth when they are responding to an urgent call of nature (Dr. A.
Lacassagne, Precis de Medicine Legale, pages, 799-781; Annales de Medicine
Legale, December 1926, page 530; Vibert, Manual de Medicina Legal y
Toxicologia, vol. I, pages 512-514). There is no doubt that the accused, in her
feverish, weak and dizzy condition when she went into the thicket to defecate
and being a primipara with no experience in childbirth, was not aware that upon
defecating she was also expelling the child she was carrying in her womb.
Believing that she did nothing more to respond to an urgent call of nature
which brought her there, she returned home staggering for lack of strength to
support herself and for being dizzy, without suspecting that she was leaving a
newborn child behind her, and she only knew that she had given birth when she
was shown the already dead child with wounds on the body produced by the
bites of pigs.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that acts and omissions punishable
by law are felonies, which may be committed not only by means of deceit (dolo)
but also by means of fault (culpa); there being deceit when the act is performed
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with deliberate intent, and fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.
As the herein accused was not aware that she had delivered and that the child
had been exposed to the rough weather and to the cruelty of animals, it cannot
be held that she deceitfully committed the crime of infanticide or that of
abandonment of a minor, because according to the above-cited legal provision
there is deceit when the act punishable by law is performed with deliberate
intent. Suffering from fever and from dizziness, the appellant under the
circumstances was not aware that she had given birth and, consequently, she
could not have deliberately intended to leave her child, of whose existence she
was ignorant, to perish at the mercy of the elements and of the animals. Neither
can it be held that she faultily committed it because, as already stated, not
knowing for lack of experience in childbirth that in defecating — a perfectly
lawful physiological act, being natural — she might expel the child she carried in
her womb, she cannot be considered imprudent, a psychological defect of a
person who fails to use his reasoning power to foresee the pernicious
consequences of his willful act. Having had no knowledge of the fact of her
delivery, the accused could not think that by leaving the child in the thicket, it
would die as a consequence of the rough weather or of the cruelty of animals.
Neither can she be considered negligent because negligence is the omission to
do what the law or morals obliges one to do, which implies knowledge of the
thing which is the subject matter of the compliance with the obligation.
Inasmuch as the accused was not aware of her delivery, her mind cannot
contemplate complying with her legal and moral duty to protect the life of her
child. Neither can it be held that the appellant lacked foresight because, having
been absolutely ignorant of her delivery, she could not foresee that by
abandoning her child in a thicket it would die. Neither can it be held that her act
was the result of lack of skill because she did not know that to defecate in a
state of pregnancy might precipitate her delivery, and as defecation is a natural
physiological function, she could not refrain from satisfying it.
We cannot apply to the accused fourth exempting circumstance of article 12 of
the Revised Penal Code which reads: "Any person who, while performing a
lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or
intention of causing it," because although the lawful act of satisfying a natural
physiological necessity accidentally provoked the delivery, the delivery itself was
not an injury, but the exposure of the child at the mercy of the elements and of
the animals which cased its death. As the child was born alive, if the accused
had been aware of her delivery and she had deliberately abandoned the child,
her accidental delivery would not exempt her from criminal liability because
then the death of said child no longer would have been accidental. Neither can
we consider the seventh exempting circumstance of article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code consisting in the failure to perform an act required by law, when
prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause, because this exempting
circumstance implies knowledge of the precept of the law to be complied with
but is prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause, that is by some motive
which has lawfully, morally or physically prevented one to do what the law
commands. In the present case, what the law requires of the accused-appellant,
with respect to the child, is that she care for, protect and not abandon it. Had
she been aware of her delivery and of the existence of the child, neither her
debility nor her dizziness resulting from the fever which consumed her, being in
the full enjoyment of her mental faculties and her illness not being of such
gravity as to prevent her from asking for help, would constitute the lawful or
insuperable impediment required by law. Having been ignorant of her delivery
and of the existence of the child, to her there was subjectively no cause for the
law to impose a duty for her to comply with.
Having had no knowledge of the expulsion of her fetus, the death thereof
resulting from its exposure to the rough weather and to the cruelty of the
animals cannot be imputed to the accused, because she had neither deceitfully
nor faultily committed any act or omission punishable by law with regard to the
child.
Imperial and Laurel, JJ., concur.
G. INSTIGATION ND ENTRAPMENT
PEOPLE VS LUA CHU
VILLA-REAL, J.:
The defendants Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng appeal from the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu convicting them of the illegal importation of
opium, and sentencing them each to four years' imprisonment, a fine of
P10,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency not to exceed one-
third of the principal penalty, and to pay the proportional costs.
In support of their appeal, the appellants assigned the following alleged errors
as committed by the court below in its judgment to wit:
The lower court erred:
1. In refusing to compel the Hon. Secretary of Finance of the Insular
Collector of Customs to exhibit in court the record of the administrative
investigation against Joaquin Natividad, collector of customs of Cebu, and Juan
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Samson, supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu, both of whom have
since been dismissed from service.
2. In holding it as a fact that "no doubt many times opium consignments
have passed thru the customhouse without the knowledge of the customs secret
service."
3. In rejecting the defendants' theory that the said Juan Samson in
denouncing the accused was actuated by a desire to protect himself and to
injure ex-collector Joaquin Natividad, his bitter enemy, who was partly
instrumental in the dismissal of Samson from the service.
4. In finding that the conduct of Juan Samson, dismissed chief customs
secret service agent of Cebu, is above reproach and utterly irreconcilable with
the corrupt motives attributed to him by the accused.
5. In permitting Juan Samson, prosecution star witness, to remain in the
court room while other prosecution witnesses were testifying, despite the
previous order of the court excluding the Government witnesses from the court
room, and in refusing to allow the defense to inquire from Insular Collector of
Customs Aldanese regarding the official conduct of Juan Samson as supervising
customs secret service agent of Cebu.
6. In giving full credit to the testimony of said Juan Samson.
7. In refusing to hold that Juan Samson induced the defendant Uy Se
Tieng to order the opium from Hongkong.
8. In accepting Exhibits E and E-1 as the true and correct transcript of
the conversation between Juan Samson and the appellant Uy Se Tieng.
9. In accepting Exhibit F as the true and correct transcript of the
conversation between Juan Samson and the appellant Lua Chu.
10. In finding each of the appellants Uy Se Tieng and Lua Chu guilty of the
crime of illegal importation of opium, and in sentencing each to suffer four
years' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000 and the costs, despite the
presumption of innocence which has not been overcome, despite the unlawful
inducement, despite the inherent weakness of the evidence presented by the
prosecution, emanating from a spirit of revenge and from a contaminated,
polluted source.
The following are uncontradicted facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt at the
trial:
About the middle of the month of November, 1929, the accused Uy Se Tieng
wrote to his correspondent in Hongkong to send him a shipment of opium.
About November 4, 1929, after the chief of the customs secret service of Cebu,
Juan Samson, had returned from a vacation in Europe, he called upon the then
collector of customs for the Port of Cebu, Joaquin Natividad, at his office, and
the latter, after a short conversation, asked him how much his trip had cost him.
When the chief of the secret service told him he had spent P2,500, the said
collector of customs took from a drawer in his table, the amount of P300, in
paper money, and handed it to him, saying: "This is for you, and a shipment will
arrive shortly, and you will soon be able to recoup your travelling expenses."
Juan Samson took the money, left, and put it into the safe in his office to be
kept until he delivered it to the provincial treasurer of Cebu. A week later,
Natividad called Samson and told him that the shipment he had referred to
consisted of opium, that it was not about to arrive, and that the owner would go
to Samson's house to see him. That very night Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's
house and told him he had come by order of Natividad to talk to him about the
opium. The said accused informed Samson that the opium shipment consisted
of 3,000 tins, and that he had agreed to pay Natividad P6,000 or a P2 a tin, and
that the opium had been in Hongkong since the beginning of October awaiting
a ship that would go direct to Cebu.
At about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of November 22, 1929, one Nam Tai
loaded on the steamship Kolambugan, which the Naviera Filipina — a shipping
company in Cebu had had built in Hongkong, 38 cases consigned to Uy Seheng
and marked "U.L.H." About the same date Natividad informed Samson that the
opium had already been put on board the steamship Kolambugan, and it was
agreed between them that Samson would receive P2,000, Natividad P2,000, and
the remaining P2,000 would be distributed among certain employees in the
customhouse.
Meanwhile, Uy Se Tieng continued his interviews with Samson. Towards the
end of November, Natividad informed the latter that the Kolambugan had
returned to Hongkong on account of certain engine trouble, and remained there
until December 7th. In view of this, the shipper several times attempted to
unload the shipment, but he was told each time by the captain, who needed the
cargo for ballast, that the ship was about to sail, and the 30 cases remained on
board.
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The Kolambugan arrived at Cebu on the morning of December 14, 1929. While
he was examining the manifests, Samson detailed one of his men to watch the
ship. After conferring with Natividad, the latter instructed him to do everything
possible to have the cargo unloaded, and to require Uy Se Tieng to pay over the
P6,000. On the morning of November 16, 1929, Natividad told Samson that Uy
Se Tieng already had the papers ready to withdraw the cases marked "U.L.H."
from the customhouse. Samson then told Natividad it would be better for Uy
Se Tieng to go to his house to have a talk with him. Uy Se Tieng went to
Samson's house that night and was told that he must pay over the P6,000 before
taking the opium out of the customhouse. Uy Se Tieng showed Samson the bill
of lading and on leaving said: "I will tell the owner, and we see whether we can
take the money to you tomorrow." The following day Samson informed
Colonel Francisco of the Constabulary, of all that had taken place, and the said
colonel instructed the provincial commander, Captain Buenconsejo, to discuss
the capture of the opium owners with Samson. Buenconsejo and Samson
agreed to meet at the latter's house that same night. That afternoon Samson
went to the office of the provincial fiscal, reported the case to the fiscal, and
asked for a stenographer to take down the conversation he would have with Uy
Se Tieng that night in the presence of Captain Buenconsejo. As the fiscal did
not have a good stenographer available, Samson got one Jumapao, of the law
firm of Rodriguez & Zacarias, on the recommendation of the court
stenographer. On the evening of December 17, 1929, as agreed, Captain
Buenconsejo, Lieutenant Fernando; and the stenographer went to Samson's
house and concealed themselves behind a curtain made of strips of wood which
hung from the window overlooking the entrance to the house on the ground
floor. As soon as the accused Uy Se Tieng arrived, Samson asked him if he had
brought the money. He replied that he had not, saying that the owner of the
opium, who was Lua Chu, was afraid of him. Samson then hold him to tell Lua
Chu not to be afraid, and that he might come to Samson's house. After pointing
out to Uy Se Tieng a back door entrance into the garden, he asked him where
the opium was, and Uy Se Tieng answered that it was in the cases numbered 11
to 18, and that there were 3,252 tins. Uy Se Tieng returned at about 10 o'clock
that night accompanied by his codefendant Lua Chu, who said he was not the
sole owner of the opium, but that a man from Manila, named Tan, and another
in Amoy were also owners. Samson then asked Lua Chu when he was going to
get the opium, and the latter answered that Uy Se Tieng would take charge of
that. On being asked if he had brought the P6,000, Lua Chu answered, no, but
promised to deliver it when the opium was in Uy Se Tieng's warehouse. After
this conversation, which was taken down in shorthand, Samson took the
accused Lua Chu aside and asked him: "I say, old fellow, why didn't you tell me
about this before bringing the opium here?" Lua Chu answered: "Impossible,
sir; you were not here, you were in Spain on vacation." On being asked by
Samson how he had come to bring in the opium, Lua Chu answered: "I was in a
cockpit one Sunday when the collector called me aside and said there was good
business, because opium brought a good price, and he needed money." All this
conversation was overheard by Captain Buenconsejo. It was then agreed that
Uy Se Tieng should take the papers with him at 10 o'clock next morning. At the
appointed hour, Uy Se Tieng and one Uy Ay arrived at Samson's house, and as
Uy Se Tieng was handing certain papers over to his companion, Uy Ay, Captain
Buenconsejo, who had been hiding, appeared and arrested the two Chinamen,
taking the aforementioned papers, which consisted of bills of lading (Exhibits B
and B-1), and in invoice written in Chinese characters, and relating to the
articles described in Exhibit B. After having taken Uy Se Tieng and Uy Ay to
the Constabulary headquarters, and notified the fiscal, Captain Buenconsejo and
Samson went to Lua Chu's home to search it and arrest him. In the pocket of a
coat hanging on a wall, which Lua Chu said belonged to him, they found five
letters written in Chinese characters relating to the opium (Exhibits G to K).
Captain Buenconsejo and Samson also took Lua Chu to the Constabulary
headquarters, and then went to the customhouse to examine the cases marked
"U.L.H." In the cases marked Nos. 11 to 18, they found 3,252 opium tins
hidden away in a quantity to dry fish. The value of the opium confiscated
amounted to P50,000.
In the afternoon of December 18, 1929, Captain Buenconsejo approached Lua
Chu and asked him to tell the truth as to who was the owner of the opium. Lua
Chu answered as follows: "Captain, it is useless to ask me any questions, for I
am not going to answer to them. The only thing I will say is that whoever the
owner of this contraband may be, he is not such a fool as to bring it in here
without the knowledge of those — " pointing towards the customhouse.
The defense attempted to show that after Juan Samson had obtained a loan of
P200 from Uy Se Tieng, he induced him to order the opium from Hongkong
saying that it only cost from P2 to P3 a tin there, while in Cebu it cost from P18
to P20, and that he could make a good deal of money by bringing in a shipment
of that drug; that Samson told Uy Se Tieng, furthermore, that there would be
no danger, because he and the collector of customs would protect him; that Uy
Se Tieng went to see Natividad, who told him he had no objection, if Samson
agreed; that Uy Se Tieng then wrote to his correspondent in Hongkong to
forward the opium; that after he had ordered it, Samson went to Uy Se Tieng's
store, in the name of Natividad, and demanded the payment of P6,000; that Uy
Se Tieng then wrote to his Hongkong correspondent cancelling the order, but
the latter answered that the opium had already been loaded and the captain of
the Kolambugan refused to let him unload it; that when the opium arrived,
Samson insisted upon the payment of the P6,000; that as Uy Se Tieng did not
have that amount, he went to Lua Chu on the night of December 14th, and
proposed that he participate; that at first Lua Chu was unwilling to accept Uy Se
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Tieng's proposition, but he finally agreed to pay P6,000 when the opium had
passed the customhouse; that Lua Chu went to Samson's house on the night of
December 17th, because Samson at last agreed to deliver the opium without
first receiving the P6,000, provided Lua Chu personally promised to pay him
that amount.
The appellants make ten assignments of error as committed by the trial court in
its judgment. Some refer to the refusal of the trial judge to permit the
presentation of certain documentary evidence, and to the exclusion of Juan
Samson, the principal witness for the Government, from the court room during
the hearing; others refer to the admission of the alleged statements of the
accused taken in shorthand; and the others to the sufficiency of the evidence of
the prosecution to establish the guilt of the defendants beyond a reasonable
doubt.
With respect to the presentation of the record of the administrative proceedings
against Joaquin Natividad, collector of customs of Cebu, and Juan Samson,
supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu, who were dismissed from the
service, the trial court did not err in not permitting it, for, whatever the result of
those proceedings, they cannot serve to impeach the witness Juan Samson, for it
is not one of the means prescribed in section 342 of the Code of Civil
Procedure to that end.
With regard to the trial judge's refusal to order the exclusion of Juan Samson,
the principal witness of the Government, from the court room during the
hearing, it is within the power of said judge to do so or not, and it does not
appear that he has abused his discretion (16 Corpus Juris, 842).
Neither did the trial judge err when he admitted in evidence the transcript of
stenographic notes of the defendants' statements, since they contain admissions
made by themselves, and the person who took them in shorthand attested at the
trial that they were faithfully taken down. Besides the contents are corroborated
by unimpeached witnesses who heard the statements.
As to whether the probatory facts are sufficient to establish the facts alleged in
the information, we find that the testimony given by the witnesses for the
prosecution should be believed, because the officers of the Constabulary and
the chief of the customs secret service, who gave it, only did their duty. Aside
from this, the defendants do not deny their participation in the illegal
importation of the opium, though the accused Lua Chu pretends that he was
only a guarantor to secure the payment of the gratuity which the former
collector of customs, Joaquin Natividad, had asked of him for Juan Samson and
certain customs employees. This assertion, however, is contradicted by his own
statement made to Juan Samson and overheard by Captain Buenconsejo, that he
was one of the owners of the opium that had been unlawfully imported.
But the defendants' principal defense is that they were induced by Juan Samson
to import the opium in question. Juan Samson denies this, and his conduct in
connection with the introduction of the prohibited drug into the port of Cebu,
bears him out. A public official who induces a person to commit a crime for
purposes of gain, does not take the steps necessary to seize the instruments of
the crime and to arrest the offender, before having obtained the profit he had in
mind. It is true that Juan Samson smoothed the way for the introduction of the
prohibited drug, but that was after the accused had already planned its
importation and ordered said drug, leaving only its introduction into the country
through the Cebu customhouse to be managed, and he did not do so to help
them carry their plan to a successful issue, but rather to assure the seizure of the
imported drug and the arrest of the smugglers.
The doctrines referring to the entrapment of offenders and instigation to
commit crime, as laid down by the courts of the United States, are summarized
in 16 Corpus Juris, page 88, section 57, as follows:
ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. — While it has been said that the
practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal
prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from mere
entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes been held to
prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is
no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilitates for its commission were
purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the "decoy
solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives
feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its
commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one
of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of
a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant,
if the offense was committed by him free from the influence or the instigation
of the detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as supposed
confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny,
provided the original design was formed independently of such agent; and
where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or
the public authorities, and, being authorized by them to do so, assists the thief
in carrying out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally
held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the
purchase was made by a "spotter," detective, or hired informer; but there are
cases holding the contrary.
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As we have seen, Juan Samson neither induced nor instigated the herein
defendants-appellants to import the opium in question, as the latter contend,
but pretended to have an understanding with the collector of customs, Joaquin
Natividad — who had promised them that he would remove all the difficulties
in the way of their enterprise so far as the customhouse was concerned — not
to gain the P2,000 intended for him out of the transaction, but in order the
better to assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the
surreptitious importers. There is certainly nothing immoral in this or against the
public good which should prevent the Government from prosecuting and
punishing the culprits, for this is not a case where an innocent person is induced
to commit a crime merely to prosecute him, but it simply a trap set to catch a
criminal.
Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that the mere fact that the chief of
the customs secret service pretended to agree a plan for smuggling illegally
imported opium through the customhouse, in order the better to assure the
seizure of said opium and the arrest of its importers, is no bar to the
prosecution and conviction of the latter.
By virtue whereof, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Romualdez, and Imperial,
JJ., concur.
US VS PHELPS
TRENT, J.:
The defendant, James O. Phelps, was charged in the Court of First Instance of
Jolo, Moro Province, with having violated the provisions of Act No. 1761. He
was tried, found guilty as charged, and sentenced to one month's imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P250, Philippine currency, and in case of insolvency to
suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of P2.50 a day,
and to pay the costs. He appealed.
The prosecution presented but one witness in this case, Homer G. Smith, an
employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. This witness testified that the first
time he ever saw the accused was in the international Saloon in Jolo in the
month of April, 1909; that at the time, while two or three men were sitting
together in the said salon, he heard the accused say that he on some occasions
like to smoke opium; that a few hours after leaving the saloon he asked the
accused if he smoked opium, and the accused answered "yes," that he smoked
sometimes; that he knew then that it was his duty to watch the accused, that he
then asked the accused what opportunities he had for smoking opium, and the
accused replied, "good opportunities;" he then said to the accused, "I wish to
smoke opium." On the invitation of the accused he looked him up that night
and was told that he (the accused) was not able to prepare a room for smoking,
as the Chinamen were afraid, and asked the witness to see him the following
night; that he saw him the following night, and accused again said that he could
not find a suitable place; that they made another agreement to meet and at that
time they went together to a certain house in the barrio of Tulay, where a
certain Chinaman (this Chinaman was charged in criminal case No. 292 in said
court) had prepared the opium and pipe for smoking; that the accused gave the
Chinaman P2, and he (the witness) gave him P1 in payment for the preparation
of the pipe which was prepared for smoking he took the pipe and the pan
containing the opium and went directly to the justice of the peace and swore
out a warrant for the arrest of the accused and the said Chinaman.
The defendant, J. O. Phelps, a man 30 years of age, testified that Smith, who
was then going under the name of Lockwood, came to his house one night in
Jolo and said that he was accustomed to smoking opium and asked him (the
accused) if he knew of any Chinaman in the town who could assist him in
obtaining opium to smoke; that he answered Smith that he did not; that Smith
then asked him if the Chinaman (the one charged in criminal case No. 292),
who was the accused's servant, could look for someone to furnish him (Smith)
with a pipe until he became acquainted in town; that on the following night the
witness Smith came again to his house, and after being there about twenty
minutes became very nervous, saying that it was necessary for him to have some
opium; that he told him (Smith) to go to the hospital, and received the reply
that he (Smith) was working for the quartermaster and was looking for a
position as clerk, and that they probably would not give him this position if they
learned that he was an opium smoker that he again asked to have the Chinaman
assist him, and he (the accused) believing that he (Smith) was acting in good
faith and was really sick, told the Chinaman to do so; that by agreement and the
witness Smith went to the house of the Chinaman in Tulay, where the
Chinaman prepared the pipe and gave it to Smith, he (Smith) giving the
Chinaman P2, and that he (Smith) then left, without the accused noticing
whether he smoked or not, and that he (the accused) was arrested about forty
minutes later, and that he called for the doctor to examine him about one and
half hours after he left the Chinaman's house.
The Chinaman corroborated the testimony of the accused on every material
point, stating that he, after repeated demands made by Smith, did prepare some
opium in a pipe and give it to Smith.
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The chief of police of Jolo, a sergeant in the United States Cavalry, who arrested
the accused and the Chinaman, testified that when he made these arrests the
Chinaman and the accused did not have an opportunity to talk together before
they went to the justice of the peace where the preliminary investigation was
held.
Doctor De Kraft, of the United States Army, was called by the accused himself
and made an examination of the accused about an hour and a half or two hours
after he left the Chinaman's house. The doctor testified that the accused was
strong, robust man, and a man presenting no appearance of an opium smoker.
On being asked by the court whether or not he could state positively if the
accused had used any opium on that day, the witness answered, "I as sure that
he did not use any opium on that day."
The court below in its decision said:
I agree with him (the doctor) that the accused does not appear to be a person
who uses daily a large amount of opium. The accused is a strong, robust man, in
good physical condition, and from a casual examination of his person no one
would accuse him of being a habitual user of opium.
The prosecution does not contend that the appellant sold or had in his
possession any opium, neither does it contend that he had in his possession any
of the prohibited paraphernalia used in smoking this drug. He is only charged
with having smoked opium this one time in the house of the Chinaman, and the
prosecution rests its case solely upon the testimony of the witness Smith, who
was an employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, secretly acting in that
capacity in Jolo.
On arriving in Jolo, Smith obtained employment in order to hide his true
mission. He assumed the name of Lockwood for the same purpose, engaged in
gambling, and admits having visited the house of the appellant three times for
the purpose of making arrangements for himself and the accused to smoke
opium. He urged the accused to have the Chinaman make arrangements so they
both could smoke. He went to the house of the Chinaman with the accused and
paid the said Chinaman, according to his own statement, P1 for the preparation
of the opium. If he had, by these means, induced the appellant to sell opium or
to exhibit in his possession either opium or any of the prohibited paraphernalia,
his testimony would be more reasonable, since the mere possession of the drug
or any of the prohibited paraphernalia is a violation of the law within itself.
But, as we have said, it is not contended that the accused had in his possession
any of these things. According to the statements made by the witness Smith, he
not only suggested the commission of this crime, but he (Smith) also states that
he desired to commit the same offense and would pay his part of the expense
necessary for the commission of the prohibited act. Such conduct on the part of
a man who is employed by the Government for the purpose of taking such
steps as are necessary to prevent the commission of the offense and which
would tend to the elevation and improvement of the defendant, as a would-be
criminal, rather than further his debasement, should be rebuked rather than
encouraged by the courts; and when such acts as those committed by the
witness Smith are placed beside the positive testimony of the defendant,
corroborated by the Chinaman and the doctor, the testimony of such witness
sinks into insignificance and certainly does not deserve credit. When an
employee of the Government, as in this case, and according to his own
testimony, encourages or induces persons to commit a crime in order to
prosecute them, such conduct is most reprehensible. We desire to be
understood that we base our conclusions as to the conduct of the witness Smith
and the incredibility of his testimony on his own acts according to his own
testimony.
We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold, that the appellant is not guilty of
this crime. The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the appellant
acquitted, with costs de oficio.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
ARTICLE 13 OF RPC
Mitigating circumstances. — The following are mitigating circumstances;
1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the requisites necessary
to justify or to exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases are not
attendant.
2. That the offender is under eighteen year of age or over seventy years. In the
case of the minor, he shall be proceeded against in accordance with the
provisions of Art. 80.
3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed.
4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party
immediately preceded the act.
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5. That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense
to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, or relatives by
affinity within the same degrees.
6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have
produced passion or obfuscation.
7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in
authority or his agents, or that he had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the
court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution;
8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise suffering some
physical defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense, or
communications with his fellow beings.
9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power
of the offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts.
10. And, finally, any other circumstances of a similar nature and analogous to
those above mentioned.
A. LACK OF INTENTION TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A
WRONG
PEOPLE VS URAL
AQUINO, J.:p
This is an appeal of defendant Domingo Ural from the decision of Judge
Vicente G. Ericta of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur,
convicting him of murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering
him to indemnify the heirs of Felix Napola in the sum of twelve thousand pesos
and to pay the costs (Criminal Case No. 3280).
The judgment of conviction was based on the testimony of Brigido Alberto, a
twenty-six year old former detention prisoner in Buug, Zamboanga del Sur. He
had been accused of murder and then set at liberty on June 9, 1966 after posting
bail. He went to Barrio Camongo, Dumalinao where his father resided. On July
31, 1966, he intended to go to his residence at Barrio Upper Lamari, Buug but
night overtook him in the town. He decided to sleep in the Buug municipal
building where there would be more security.
Upon arrival in the municipal building at around eight o'clock, he witnessed an
extraordinary occurrence. He saw Policeman Ural (with whom he was already
acquainted) inside the jail. Ural was boxing the detention prisoner, Felix Napola.
As a consequence of the fistic blows, Napola collapsed on the floor. Ural, the
tormentor, stepped on his prostrate body.
Ural went out of the cell. After a short interval, he returned with a bottle. He
poured its contents on Napola's recumbent body. Then, he ignited it with a
match and left the cell. Napola screamed in agony. He shouted for help.
Nobody came to succor him.
Much perturbed by the barbarity which he had just seen, Alberto left the
municipal building. Before his departure, Ural cautioned him: "You better keep
quiet of what I have done" (sic). Alberto did not sleep anymore that night.
From the municipal building, he went to the crossing, where the cargo trucks
passed. He hitchhiked in a truck hauling iron ore and went home.
Doctor Luzonia R. Bakil, the municipal health officer, certified that the thirty-
year old victim, whom she treated twice, sustained second-degree burns on the
arms, neck, left side of the face and one-half of the body including the back
(Exh. A). She testified that his dermis and epidermis were burned. If the burns
were not properly treated, death would unsue from toxemia and tetanus
infection. "Without any medical intervention", the burns would cause death",
she said. She explained that, because there was water in the burnt area,
secondary infection would set in, or there would be complications.
Napola died on August 25, 1966. The sanitary inspector issued a certificate of
death indicating "burn" as the cause of death (Exh. B).
The trial court fittingly deplored the half-hearted manner in which the
prosecution (represented by Fiscal Roque and the private prosecutor, Delfin
Agbu) handled the case. It bewailed the prosecution's failure to present as
witnesses Juanito de la Serna and Ernesto Ogoc, the detention prisoners who
saw the burning of Napola. They had executed a joint affidavit which was one
of the bases of the information for murder.1
It noted that Rufina Paler, the victim's widow, who was present in court, was a
vital witness who should have been presented as a witness to prove the victim's
dying declaration or his statements which were part of the res gestae.2
In this appeal appellant's three assignment of error may be condensed into the
issue of credibility or the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
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His story is that at around nine o'clock in the evening of July 31, 1966 he was in
the municipal jail on guard duty. He heard a scream for help from Napola. He
entered the cell and found Napola's shirt in flames. With the assistance of
Ernesto Ogoc and Anecio Siton, Ural removed Napola's shirt. Ural did not
summon a doctor because, according to Napola, the burns were not serious.
Besides, he (Ural) was alone in the municipal building.
Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc's common-law wife, whom the trial court branded "as
a complete liar", testified that she heard Napola's scream for help. She saw that
Napola's shirt was burning but she did not know how it happened to be burned.
She said that Ural and Siton removed the shirt of Napola and put out the fire.
Teofilo Matugas, a policeman, declared that he was relieved as guard by Ural at
eight-thirty in the evening of July 31st. Matugas denied that Alberio was in the
municipal building at eight o'clock.
The trial court held that Ural's denials cannot prevail over the positive
testimony of Alberio. It observed that Ural's alleged act of removing Napola's
burning shirt was at most an indication that he was "belatedly alarmed by the
consequence of his evil act" but would not mean that he was not the incendiary.
Appellant Ural (he was thirty-four years old in March, 1969), in assailing the
credibility of Alberio, pointed out that he was not listed as a prosecution witness
and that he was convicted of murder.
Those circumstances would not preclude Alberio from being a credible witness.
It should be noted that the accused was a policeman. Ordinarily, a crime should
be investigated by the police. In this case, there was no police investigation. The
crime was investigated by a special counsel of the fiscal's office. That might
explain why it was not immediately discovered that Alberio was an eyewitness
of the atrocity perpetrated by Ural.
The testimonies of Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc's common-law wife, and
Policeman Matugas are compatible with the prosecution's theory that Ural
burned Napola's shirt. Ultimately, the factual issue is: who should be given
credence, Alberio or Ural? As already stated, the trial court which had the
advantage of seeing their demeanor and behavior on the witness stand, chose to
believe Alberio. This Court, after a searching scrutiny of the whole record, does
not find any justification for disbelieving Alberio.
This case is covered by article 4 of the Revised Penal code which provides that
"criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended". The
presumption is "that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c], Rule 131, Rules of Court).
The rationale of the rule in article 4 is found in the doctrine that "el que es causa
de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the
cause of the evil caused)."Conforme a dicha doctrina no alteran la relacion de
causalidad las condiciones preexistentes (como las condiciones patologicasdel
lesionado, la predisposicion del ofendido, la constitucion fisica del herido, etc.);
ni las condiciones sobrevenidas (como el tetanos, la pulmonia, o la gangrena
sobrevenidos a consequencia de la herida)" (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 12th
Ed., 1968, p. 335-336).
The similar rule in American jurisprudence is that "if the act of the accused was
the cause of the cause of death, no more is required" (40 C.J.S. 854). So, where
during a quarrel, the accused struck the victim with a lighted lamp, which broke
and fell to the floor, causing the oil to ignite and set fire to the rug, and, in the
course of the scuffle, which ensued on the floor, the victim's clothes caught fire,
resulting in burns from which he died, there was a sufficient causal relation
between the death and the acts of the accused to warrant a conviction of
homicide (Williams vs. U.S., 20 Fed. 2nd 269, 40 C.J.S. 854, note 90).
There is a rule that "an individual who unlawfully inflicts wounds upon another
person, which result in the death of the latter, is guilty of the crime of homicide,
and the fact that the injured person did not receive proper medical attendance
does not affect the criminal responsibility" (U.S. vs. Escalona, 12 Phil. 54). In
the Escalona case, the victim was wounded on the wrist. It would not have
caused death had it been properly treated. The victim died sixty days after the
infliction of the wound. It was held that lack of medical care could not be
attributed to the wounded man. The person who inflicted the wound was
responsible for the result thereof.
The crime committed by appellant Ural was murder by means of fire (incendio)
(Par. 3, Art. 248, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Masin, 64 Phil. 757; U.S. vs.
Burns, 41 Phil. 418, 432, 440).3
The trial court correctly held that the accused took advantage of his public
position (Par. 1, Art. 14, Revised Penal Code). He could not have maltreated
Napola if he was not a policeman on guard duty. Because of his position, he
had access to the cell where Napola was confined. The prisoner was under his
custody. "The policeman, who taking advantage of his public position maltreats
a private citizen, merits no judicial leniency. The methods sanctioned by
medieval practice are surely not appropriate for an enlightened democratic
civilization. While the law protects the police officer in the proper discharge of
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his duties, it must at the same time just as effectively protect the individual from
the abuse of the police." U.S. vs. Pabalan, 37 Phil. 352).
But the trial court failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance "that the
offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed" (Par.
3, Art. 13, Revised Penal Code). It is manifest from the proven facts that
appellant Ural had no intent to kill Napola. His design was only to maltreat him
may be because in his drunken condition he was making a nuisance of himself
inside the detention cell. When Ural realized the fearful consequences of his
felonious act, he allowed Napola to secure medical treatment at the municipal
dispensary.
Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the generic aggravating,
circumstance of abuse of his official position. The trial court properly imposed
the penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the medium period of the penalty for
murder (Arts. 64[4] and 248, Revised Penal Code).
Finding no error in the trial court's judgment, the same is affirmed with costs
against the appellant.
So ordered.
Zaldivar (Chairman) and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
Except for the unnecessary reference to the supposed statement of the deceased
to his wife and the joint affidavit of Ogoc and De la Serna, all of which were
not properly presented in evidence, hence it is preferable not to mention them
in order to avoid any suspicion that our judgment has been influenced by
factors other than evidence duly presented in court, I concur.
Fernando, J., concurs.
B. SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION
PEOPLE VS LEONOR
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In the decision[1] of 22 March 1996 in Criminal Case No. 95-212, the Regional
Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 274, found accused-appellant Christopher
Caña Leonor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with
homicide and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay the heirs
of the victim P50,000 as death indemnity; P44,318 as actual damages; P2 million
as moral damages; and P50,000 as attorney's fees.
CHRISTOPHER was charged in an information[2] whose accusatory portion
reads as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of May 1995, in the Municipality of Parañaque,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with intent to gain and against the will of
complainant Ma. Teresa Tarlengco and by means of force, violence and
intimidation employed upon the person of said complainant did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously divest her cash money worth P900.00 and
Titus wrist watch valued at an undetermined amount, belonging to said Ma.
Teresa Tarlengco, to the damage and prejudice of the latter, in the
aforementioned amount; that on the occasion of the said Robbery, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill, without justifiable reason, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab said Ma. Teresa
Tarlengco, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious stab wounds which caused
her death.
At his arraignment on 14 June 1995, CHRISTOPHER entered a plea of not
guilty.[3]
It is undisputed that on 15 May 1995 at the Hermanos Building in General
Santos Avenue, Bicutan Extension, Parañaque City, at around 11:30 a.m.,
CHRISTOPHER stabbed dentist Dr. Maria Teresa Tarlengco, which wound
ultimately led to her death. That much is admitted by CHRISTOPHER. The
prosecution and the defense differ, however, in the circumstances surrounding
the incident.
The prosecution had as witnesses Reynaldo Baquilod, SPO1 Luis F. Galeno,
PO3 Mateo Interia, Dr. Ravell Ronald Baluyot, Dr. Edgardo de Guzman, Dr.
Paul Pepa, Beverly Vidanes, Dr. John Enrique Franco, Fernando Tarlengco,
Geraldine Tarlengco, Joseph Sumalbar, and Asst. Public Prosecutor Elizabeth
Yu Guray. The defense presented CHRISTOPHER, Leopoldo Leonor
Leonidas, Dr. Alfredo Besa, Renato Leonor and Alexander Pagubasan.
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The Office of the Solicitor General partly summarized the evidence for the
prosecution as follows:
In the morning of May 15, 1995, Dr. Maria Teresa Tarlengco, a dentist by
profession, was at her clinic at the third floor of the Hermanos Building,
Bicutan, Parañaque, Metro Manila, when a man entered and inquired about the
cost of tooth extraction. After Dr. Tarlengco quoted her professional fee, the
man, who was later on identified as Christopher Leonor, said that he would
come back and then left in a hurry. Minutes later, Leonor came back[,] and Dr.
Tarlengco told him to take a seat and wait. Dr. Tarlengco was preparing her
dental instruments when Leonor barged in and demanded money. Dr.
Tarlengco told Leonor that her money [was] on the table. On hearing this,
Leonor stabbed Dr. Tarlengco, grabbed her watch and ran away. Dr. Tarlengco
struggled out of the clinic and saw the man running out of the building, Dr.
Tarlengco shouted for help.
Reynaldo Baquilod, building security guard, heard Dr. Tarlengco shouting,
"Tulungan ninyo ako, sinaksak ako ng taong iyon." Baquilod noticed that Dr.
Tarlengco was referring to the man "running out of the building, coming from
upstairs." Baquilod chased Leonor up to Daang Hari Street where he was joined
by traffic policeman Luis Galeno who was alerted by people running after a
person with bloodied shirt. When Galeno and Baquilod caught up with Leonor,
Baquilod grabbed Leonor's hand and took therefrom a Titus wristwatch and
P900 cash. When queried, Leonor readily answered, "Sir, hindi ko naman gusto
po ito. Ginawa ko lang ito dahil kailangan ng pamilya ko." Leonor was brought
to the Parañaque Police Block Station, PO3 Interia who was instructed to
investigate proceeded to Dr. Tarlengco's clinic, where they saw, among other[ ]
[things], a bloodied balisong (fan knife) at the ground floor of the Hermano's
building. Baquilod turned over the watch and money he took from Leonor to
Interia. Thereafter, Galeno and Interia returned to the police station where they
were interrogated.
Dr. Tarlengco was brought to the South Super Highway Medical Center where
she underwent an emergency operation for a stab wound on her chest. After the
operation, Dr. Tarlengco's father, with the doctor's permission, was allowed to
talk to his daughter inside the operating room. Although Dr. Tarlengco was
gasping for breath, she spoke to her father, viz:
Q: So were you able to talk with your daughter while in the Operating
Room? What did she say, if any, Mr. Tarlengco?
A: She said that this man pretended to be a patient.
Q: And what else did she say?
A:
He asked her how much would it cost to pull a tooth and then she said, "Dad,
when I quoted my price, he said that he would come back and left in a hurry."
Q: What else did she say, if any, Mr. Tarlengco?
A:
"After a minute, he came back, I told him to wait, to sit down first at my
Waiting Area because I [had] to still prepare the instruments needed."
Q: Then, what happened after that?
A:
She said, "while I was busy preparing my instrument, Dad, this man barged in.
He demanded for my money. I told him it [was] on my table. And after telling
that, Dad, he stabbed me and then he grabbed my watch and he [ran] away" and
she said, "I struggled Dad, to come out of the clinic and when I was on the
porch, I saw this man coming [sic] out of the building. I shouted for help, I said
"Saklolo, saklolo, sinaksak ako ng taong iyan. Hulihin ninyo."
Q:
Then what else did she say after she narrated to you that incident, Mr.
Tarlengco?
A:
After that, in tears, she said that "Dad, I don't know, why inspite of getting my
money this man stabbed me" and I was numbed at that point of time, I [could
not] talk anymore, I [could not] tell anything to her anymore, I just combed her
hair with my fingers.
Thereafter, Dr. Tarlengco was brought to a private room where she
subsequently died.
Dr. Ronaldo Baluyot, the NBI Medico-legal Officer who conducted the post-
mortem examination of the deceased, testified that Tarlengco's stab wound on
the chest could have been caused by single bladed "fan" knife.
Geraldine Tarlengco, who stayed with her sister Dr. Tarlengco while reviewing
for the BAR Examination, owned a Titus watch similar to that of her sister.
Both watches were given to them by another sister Cecille. On the morning of
May 15, 1995, Geraldine saw Dr. Tarlengco strap the watch on her wrist.
Geraldine, likewise, saw her sister, Dr. Tarlengco, place in her wallet one 500-
peso bill and four 100-peso bills, after showing the same to Geraldine, who
earlier was teasing her sister, Dr. Tarlengco, that the reason why she did not buy
the dress she wanted to buy at Cinderella's was because she had no money. If
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only to prove her sister Geraldine wrong, Dr. Tarlengco showed her money
which she took from her wallet.[4]
Additionally, Dr. John Enrique Franco, a friend of the victim, testified that he
got to talk with Dr. Tarlengco at the hospital. He asked Dr. Tarlengco what
happened, and she answered that a man posing as a patient held her up and
stabbed her.[5]
Joseph B. Sumalbar, Dr. Tarlengco's fiance, testified that when he learned about
his fiancee's killing, he immediately went to the crime scene and, thereafter, to
the Block 7 police station where he confronted the suspected killer,
Christopher. Sumalbar recalled his conversation with the latter, thus:
Q: And what happened after that, when you proceeded to the cell of this
suspect?
A:
I found this man who was half naked from the waist up. I found this man
without any shirt on and he was sitting at the corner and he was trying to avoid
me and I asked him, "Bakit mo ginawa iyon?" Sabi niya, "hindi ko po naman
gusto. Kailangan ko lamang ang pera."
Q: When you confronted the accused at Block 7, what else did he say, if
any?
A:
While I was shouting at him, "Hinold-up mo na, sinaksak mo pa. Bakit mo
ginawa iyon?" "Hindi ko po naman gusto iyon, mahuhuli na po ako," sabi niya.
"Mahuhuli na po ako kaya ginawa ko iyon."
Q: Then what else did he say when you confronted him, if any?
A: And he told me that he needed the money.[6] SPO3 Mateo Interia
testified that on 16 May 1995, he took the statement of Dr. Tarlengco's father
and executed a Referral[7] to the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal for
CHRISTOPHER's inquest. Interia reported in the referral that
CHRISTOPHER was being held for robbery with homicide but forgot to state
the property stolen from Dr. Tarlengco. After Mr. Tarlengco reminded Interia
of the stolen items, the latter intercalated into the referral a reference to P900
and a Titus wristwatch forming part of the evidence against
CHRISTOPHER.[8]
Fernando Tarlengco, father of the victim, described the impact of her
daughter's death, viz.:
Q: In connection with the death of your daughter, Mr. Tarlengco, did your
family incur any expenses?
A:
Not just expenses but more on the agony, the tribulations we are having up to
this time. You know, up to this time, we kept on weeping. My father, the
grandfather of my daughter, was shocked and in anguish, he also succumbed to
death in less than two months, because of what this evil person [had] done to
us. My work was affected. My wife's work is affected. There are times when we
are at home, we don't know what to do anymore. We are in total misery. I don't
know why this was done to us by the devil deeds of this person has done to us
[sic].[9]
In relation to Dr. Tarlengco's death, her family spent P8,718 for hospital
expenses; about P2,500 to P3,500 charged by Funeraria Malaya where she was
brought; P22,500 for her casket; P8,250 paid to Manila Memorial, Inc.; P5,000
for the masses held for Dr. Tarlengco; and about P10,000 for the food served
to the guests at Dr. Tarlengco's wake.[10]
CHRISTOPHER, on the other hand, testified that on 15 May 1995, at about
6:00 a.m., he left his town Calauag, Quezon, and boarded a Jam Transit bus
bound for Manila, with P800 and a fan knife in his pocket. He was to fetch his
family for the town fiesta to be held on 25 May 1995. His head and two of his
molar teeth were then aching. He alighted at Alabang and took a bus bound for
Bicutan Extension.[11]
Upon reaching Bicutan Extension, he looked for a dentist to have his aching
teeth pulled. He found Dr. Tarlengco's dental clinic at the third floor of a
certain building in General Santos Avenue. He asked Dr. Tarlengco how much
an extraction cost, and was told that the fee was P150 per tooth.
CHRISTOPHER negotiated a charge of P100 per tooth, but Dr. Tarlengco
rejected the offer. CHRISTOPHER then proceeded to look for another dentist,
but before he could make his way out of the clinic, Dr. Tarlengco stopped him
and agreed to charge P100 per extraction. CHRISTOPHER was made to sit on
the dental chair as Dr.Tarlengco prepared the instruments for the extraction.
Just as she was about to inject anesthesia, she remarked that she changed her
mind and would charge P150 per tooth pulled. CHRISTOPHER pushed away
Dr. Tarlengco's hand, which angered her. She castigated and cursed
CHRISTOPHER for asking for an extraction without being able to pay for
it.[12]
As CHRISTOPHER was making his way out of the clinic, Dr. Tarlengco cursed
and pushed him, at which moment he blacked out.[13] He then sensed that the
dentist was in pain, and he saw blood spurting. He realized that he had stabbed
the dentist. In shock, CHRISTOPHER stepped back, lost the grip on his fan
knife, and ran out of the clinic and out of the building. When he looked back at
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the clinic, he saw Dr. Tarlengco shouting for help. A security guard, with his
shotgun aimed at CHRISTOPHER, ran after the latter.[14]
CHRISTOPHER ran to where there were many people. Then he came across
Police Officer Galeno, who grabbed him by the hand an asked what happened.
He replied, "Sir, nakadisgrasya ako."[15] Galeno warded off the pursuing
security guard who insisted on apprehending CHRISTOPHER. Galeno brought
CHRISTOPHER to Block 7, Parañaque Police Station, and later, to the Police
Headquarters along the Coastal Road in Parañaque. Four policemen, including
PO3 Interia, took turns in mauling and kicking him, and one policeman even
took money from his wallet. Also, his clothes were confiscated.[16]
During the investigation, CHRISTOPHER admitted that he had stabbed Dr.
Tarlengco, but denied that he had taken P900 and a Titus wristwatch from the
victim. He was surprised when later, he was informed by Assistant Public
Prosecutor Elizabeth Yu Guray that he would be charged with Robbery with
homicide, not homicide only.[17]
Leopoldo Leonor Leonidas, CHRISTOPHER's uncle, revealed that at about
noon of 15 May 1995, while he was at home, he received a telephone call from
CHRISTOPHER saying that he had stabbed someone. When he asked
CHRISTOPHER why he stabbed someone the latter answered, "Aburido ako,
Kuya Ding, aburido ako" ("I am troubled, Kuya Ding, I am troubled").[18]
Renato Leonor, CHRISTOPHER's father, testified that he went to see his son
at his detention cell but could hardly recognize him because he was bloodied.
He remembered that CHRISTOPHER complained of toothache before he left
for Manila.[19]
Dr. Alfredo Besa, a dentist, examined CHRISTOPHER three hours before the
former took the stand. Unassisted by any "dental aid" or nurse, he determined
that two of CHRISTOPHER's teeth were due for extraction[20] and, at the
condition they were in, were probably aching as early as a year before. Citing his
experience, Dr. Besa claimed that people complaining of tootache are usually
irritable, although he admitted that none of his patients complaining from a
tootache has ever killed a person or even brought a fan knife to his clinic. In
fact, he never heard of any patient with a toothache who killed a dentist. He
recalled one instance when a patient boxed him after he unintentionally hurt the
patient while pulling a tooth.
These were the evidence before the trial court which merited
CHRISTOPHER's conviction. CHRISTOPHER urges us to modify the
judgment by (1) convicting him of the crime of homicide, and not of robbery
with homicide, and (2) appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstances of
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, sufficient
provocation, passion and obfuscation, voluntary surrender, and voluntary
confession.
CHRISTOPHER claims that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are
fraught with inconsistencies and contradictions, and are therefore obvious
concoctions and manufactured evidence. He points out that Baquilod failed to
mention in his sworn statement, given to the police immediately after the
incident, that he retrieved a Titus wristwatch and P900 worth of peso bills from
CHRISTOPHER. Baquilod likewise testified that Dr. Tarlengco shouted for
help because she was stabbed; she made no mention of having been robbed.
Then, too, SPO1 Galeno stated in his sworn statement that Dr. Tarlengco was
only stabbed.
CHRISTOPHER contends further that the testimonies of Baquilod, Galeno,
Interia, Sumalbar, and Yu Guray that he admitted to them on separate
occasions his commission of the offense charged are inadmissible because the
admission was not in writing, was not made with the assistance of a counsel,
and was not preceded by a warning as to the consequences of the admission. In
any event, their testimonies are hearsay evidence. Additionally, he stresses the
possible bias of Yu Guray considering that she caused the filing against him of
the information for robbery with homicide.
In the Appellee's Brief, the Solicitor General refutes CHRISTOPHER's claims,
asserting that the robbery was duly and satisfactorily established by the dying
declaration of Dr. Tarlengco to her father, corroborated by the testimonies of
Baquilod and Galeno. That Dr. Tarlengco failed to exclaim that she was robbed
when she shouted for help from her clinic's balcony is of no moment, since she
later told Dr. Franco and her father of the complete events that transpired.
Galeno's failure to mention in his sworn statement that money and a wristwatch
were retrieved from CHRISTOPHER does not negate his claim to that effect,
because he later stated that fact in his testimony. The settled rule is that
testimonies in open court are superior to affidavits taken ex parte. That Interia
inserted the stolen items in the Police Referral does not diminish the truth of
the allegation of robbery, since it appears that the intercalation was intended to
make the Referral accurate.
The core issues raised involve the credibility of witnesses. One of the highly
revered dicta in our jurisdiction is that this Court will not interfere with the
judgment of the trial court in passing on the credibility of opposing witnesses
unless there appears in the record some facts or circumstances of weight and
influence that have been overlooked which, if considered, will affect the result
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of the case. The reason therefor is founded on practical and empirical
considerations. The trial judge is in a better position to decide questions of
credibility, since he has personally heard the witnesses and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying.[21] Nevertheless, in view of the gravity of
the charge and the penalty imposed, we spared no effort to meticulously review
the evidence to determine whether CHRISTOPHER had indeed committed the
offense charged and the prosecution's evidence proved it beyond reasonable
doubt.
CHRISTOPHER admitted that he stabbed Dr. Tarlengco. The burden of
evidence, therefore, shifted to him; he had to prove a justifying[22] or
exempting[23]circumstance to avoid criminal liability. He miserably failed to do
so.
The remaining factual issue is whether CHRISTOPHER killed Dr. Tarlengco
by reason or on the occasion of a robbery[24] with the use of violence against
or intimidation of a person. One could be convicted of robbery with homicide
only if the robbery itself was proved as conclusively as any other essential
element of the crime. The taking with intent to gain of personal property
belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any
person or by using force upon things, constitutes robbery.[25]
Geraldine Tarlengco and Joseph Sumalbar identified the items recovered from
CHRISTOPHER as belonging to Dr. Tarlengco. These testimonies indicate
that CHRISTOPHER stole personal property belonging to Dr. Tarlengco,
consistent with the disputable presumption that a person found in possession of
a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of
the whole act.[26] While CHRISTOPHER denied that Dr. Tarlengco's watch
and money were recovered from him, the independent and corroborative
testimonies of police officer Galeno and guard Baquilod prove otherwise. The
trial court found the testimonies of these two witnesses more credible, and we
see no reason to depart from its conclusion. CHRISTOPHER also pointed out
that the intercalation of stolen items in Interia's referral report to the Prosecutor
indicated the fabrication of robbery charges against him. But the intercalation
was sufficiently explained as an honest mistake, especially considering that
Interia had specified in the report, in an entry appearing before the intercalation,
that the charge against CHRISTOPHER was robbery with homicide.
It is undisputable then that CHRISTOPHER took Dr. Tarlengco's belongings.
The unexplained possession of stolen articles gives rise to a presumption of
theft unless it is proved that the owner of the articles was deprived of her
possessions by violence or intimidation, in which case, the presumption
becomes one of robbery.[27] The prosecution proved in this case that there was
violence and intimidation in the taking of Dr. Tarlengco's property.
Most crucial for the prosecution is the testimony of Mr. Fernando Tarlengco,
the victim's father, because he stated the most incriminating piece of evidence -
the dying declaration of Dr. Tarlengco. While, generally, a witness can testify
only to those facts which are derived from his own perception,[28] a recognized
exception thereto is the reportage in open court of the declaration of a dying
person made under the consciousness of an impending death where that
person's death is the subject of inquiry in the case.[29] To be admissible, a dying
declaration must (1) refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding the
declarant's death; (2) be made under the consciousness of an impending death;
(3) be made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestion of improper
influence; (4) be offered in a criminal case in which the death of the declarant is
the subject of inquiry; and (5) the declarant must have been competent to testify
as a witness had he been called upon to testify.
Dr. Tarlengco's dying declaration complied with the above requisites. She talked
about the incident which led to her condition. The declaration was a first-hand
account of the incident, bereft of opinion or conjecture. The account was made
in a criminal case where her death was part of the subject of inquiry. And, most
important, she was convinced that she was about to die; thus:
Atty. Revilla:
Q Could you tell this Court what was her condition when you saw her
inside the operating room?
Witness Tarlengco:
A I asked her how she was and she said, "Dad, I have a feeling I can no
longer endure this."
Atty. Revilla:
Q So, what else happened in the operating room while you were talking to
her, Mr. Tarlengco?
A I told her to fight for her life. I asked her to open her eyes, keep herself
awake, and in my desire to help her awake, I asked her what happened.
...
Atty. Revilla:
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IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
Q Then what else happened while you were in the operating room, after
that, Mr. Tarlengco?
Witness Tarlengco:
A Q
On that condition, she was really very very cold and gasping and complaining of
pain and gasping for breath....[30]
Dr. Tarlengco narrated to her father that a man who pretended to be her patient
demanded money from her. After she surrendered her money to him, the latter
stabbed her and took her watch as she lay injured.
The dying declaration thus established not only that a robbery was committed,
there being violence and intimidation against Dr. Tarlengco, but that homicide
was perpetrated on the occasion of said robbery.
Lastly, we find no mitigating circumstance in this case. CHRISTOPHER claims
that he did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as the act committed; that
there was sufficient provocation by the offended party immediately preceding
the offense; that he acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have produced in
him passion and obfuscation; that he voluntarily surrendered to a person in
authority; and that he voluntarily confessed having committed homicide.
Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong does not mitigate in homicide cases
where the accused used a deadly weapon in inflicting mortal wounds on vital
organs of the victim,[31] as in this case.
The provocation sufficient to mitigate an offense must be proportionate to the
gravity of the retaliatory act.[32] The events which led to the stabbing were
described by CHRISTOPHER as follows:
Q CHRISTOPHER did not voluntarily surrender either to a person in authority or
Mr. Leonor, you said, while she was about to inject anaesthesia, you said Dra.
Tarlengco changed the price from P100.00 to P150.00. Then you parried her
hand. Is that correct?
A Opo. Tinabig ko po. [Yes, sir. I pushed it aside.]
Q What hand of Dra. Tarlengco did you parry?
A The one handling the rounded instrument. Right hand, Sir.
Q When you parried her right hand, you were already sitting at the dental
chair? Right?
A Opo.
Q After you parried the hand of Dra. Tarlengco, she cursed you, right?
A No, sir. I just said "why did you change the price?" and I stood up.
That was the time she cursed me.
When she cursed you, did Dra. Tarlengco hit you with an instrument?
A No, Sir. She just got mad.
Q Did she slap you on your face?
A No Sir. She just pushed me.
Q And she did not box you anywhere in any portion of your body?
A No, Sir.
Q And she likewise did not kick you in any part of your body?
A She just told me bad words.[33] CHRISTOPHER is thus claiming that
a push and "bad words" justify retaliation with a knife. Such claim is
undeserving of belief and does not entitle CHRISTOPHER to the benefit of
the mitigating circumstance prior provocation by the offended party.
CHRISTOPHER could not have been provoked by passion or obfuscation as,
according to him, he momentarily blacked out and instantly found his fan knife
embedded in Dr. Tarlengco's chest. To be blinded by passion and obfuscation is
to lose self-control,[34] not consciousness. Moreover, courts cannot appreciate
passion and obfuscation unless there is a clear showing that there were causes
naturally tending to produce such powerful excitement as to deprive the
accused of reason and self-control.[35] As we discussed earlier, the events
leading to the stabbing precluded any natural tendency to produce a powerful
excitement in CHRISTOPHER.
to any other person. While he was being pursued by Security Guard Baquilod,
he intentionally went to where there were many people, presumably to confuse
Baquilod. Fortunately, Police Officer Galeno was able to grab him by the hand
and prevented him from further eluding justice. There is nothing in the record
which can lead us to conclude that he surrendered to anyone.
Neither was there voluntary confession in the instant case. The mitigating
circumstance contemplated by law is a plea of guilty made spontaneously and
unconditionally in open court before the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution.[36] CHRISTOPHER made no such plea.
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IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
What remains to be resolved is the penalty to be imposed. The penalty for
robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua to death.[37] There being no
evidence of aggravating or mitigating circumstance against or in favor of
CHRISTOPHER, the lower of the two indivisible penalties shall be
imposed,[38] without the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.[39] We
likewise believe that the awards in favor of Dr. Tarlengco's family of moral
damages of P2 million and attorney's fees of P500,000 are excessive. We reduce
them to P50,000 and P25,000, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the decision of Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque in Criminal Case No. 95-212 is hereby MODIFIED. As modified,
accused-appellant CHRISTOPHER CAÑA LEONOR is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of robbery with homicide, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs
of the victim, Dr. Teresa Tarlengco, P50,000 as indemnity for death; P44,318 as
actual damages; P50,000 as moral damages; and P25,000 as attorney's fees,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
PEOPLE VS CA AND TANGAN
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
At around 11:30 p.m. of December 1, 1984, Navy Captain Eladio C. Tangan
was driving alone on Roxas Boulevard heading south. He had just come from
Buendia Avenue on an intelligence operation. At the same time, Generoso
Miranda, a 29-year old optometrist, was driving his car in the same direction
along Roxas Boulevard with his uncle, Manuel Miranda, after coming from the
Ramada Hotel. Generoso was moving ahead of Tangan. Suddenly, firecrackers
were thrown in Generoso's way, causing him to swerve to the right and cut
Tangan's path. Tangan blew his horn several times. Generoso, slowed down to
let Tangan pass. Tangan accelerated and overtook Generoso, but when he got
in front, Tangan reduced speed. Generoso tried four or five times to overtake
on the right lane but Tangan kept blocking his lane. As he approached Airport
Road, Tangan slowed down to make a U-tum. Generoso passed him, pulled
over and got out of the car with his uncle. Tangan also stopped his car and got
out. As the Mirandas got near Tangan's car, Generoso loudly retorted, " Putang
ina mo, bakit mo ginigitgit ang sasakyan ko?" Generoso and Tangan then
exchanged expletives. Tangari pointed his hand to Generoso and the latter
slapped it, saying, "Huwag mo akong dinuduro! Sino ka ba, ano ba ang
pinagmamalaki mo?" Tangan countered, "Ikaw, ano ang gusto mo?" With this,
Tangan went to his car and got his .38 caliber handgun on the front seat. The
subsequent events per account of the parties' respective witnesses were
conflicting:
According to the prosecution witnesses, particularly, Mary Ann Borromeo,
Rosalia Cruz and Manuel Miranda, the accused pointed his gun at Generoso
Miranda and when Manuel Miranda tried to intervene, the accused pointed his
gun at Manuel Miranda, and after that the accused pointed again the gun to
Generoso Miranda, the accused shot Generoso Miranda at a distance of about a
meter but because the arm of the accused was extended, the muzzle of the gun
reached to about more or less one foot away from the body of Generoso
Miranda. The shot hit the stomach of Generoso Miranda causing the latter to
fall and while still conscious, Generoso Miranda told Manuel Miranda, his uncle,
to get the gun. Manuel Miranda grappled for the possession of the gun and
during their grappling, Rosalia Cruz intervened and took hold of the gun and
after Rosalia Cruz has taken hold of the gun, a man wearing a red T-shirt took
the gun from her. The man in T-shirt was chased by Manuel Miranda who was
able to get the gun where the man in red T-shirt placed it.
On the other hand, the defense, particularly the accused and his witness by the
name of Nelson Pante claimed that after the gun was taken by the accused from
inside his car, the Mirandas started to grapple for possession of the gun and
during the grappling, and while the two Mirandas were trying to wrest away the
gun from the accused, they fell down at the back of the car of the accused.
According to the accused, he lost the possession of the gun after falling at the
back of his car and as soon as they hit the ground, the gun fell, and it exploded
hitting Generoso Miranda.1
After the gun went off, Tangan ran away. Meanwhile, Generoso lay on the
ground bloodied. His uncle, Manuel, looked for the gun and ran after Tangan,
joining the mob that had already pursued him. Tangan found a policeman who
allowed him to enter his patrol car. Manuel arrived and told the policeman that
Tangan had just shot his nephew. Then he went back to where Generoso lay
and there found two ladies, later identified as Mary Ann Borromeo and Rosalina
Cruz, helping his nephew board a taxi. Manuel suggested that Generoso be
brought to the hospital in his car. He was rushed to the Philippine General
Hospital but he expired on the way.1âwphi1.nêt
Tangan was charged with the crime of murder with the use of an unlicensed
firearm.2 After a reinvestigation, however, the information was amended to
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homicide with the use of a licensed firearm,3 and he was separately charged
with illegal possession of unlicensed firearm.4 On arraignment, Tangan entered
a plea of not guilty in the homicide case, but moved to quash the information
for illegal possession of unlicensed firearm on various grounds. The motion to
quash was denied, whereupon he filed a petition for certiorari with this Court.5
On November 5, 1987, said petition was dismissed and the joint trial of the two
cases was ordered.6
During the trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the following:
that the amount of P126,000.00 was incurred for the funeral and burial
expenses of the victim;7 that P74,625.00 was incurred for attorneys fees; and
that the heirs of Generoso suffered moral damages, the amount of which is left
for the courts to determine. After trial, the lower court acquitted Tangan of
illegal possession of firearm, but convicted him of homicide. The privileged
mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense and the ordinary mitigating
circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party and of
passion and obfuscation were appreciated in his favor; consequently, the trial
court ordered him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim.8 Tangan
was released from detention after the promulgation of judgment and was
allowed bail in the homicide case.
Private complainants, the heirs of Generoso Miranda, filed a petition for review
with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 102677, challenging the civil aspect of the
court a quo's decision, but the same was dismissed for being premature. On the
other hand, Tangan appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
judgment of the trial court but increased the award of civil indemnity to
P50,000.00.10 His subsequent motion for reconsideration and a motion to cite
the Solicitor General in contempt were denied by the Court of Appeals.11
The office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of the prosecution, alleging grave
abuse of discretion, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, docketed as
G.R. No.103613, naming as respondents the Court of Appeals and Tangan,
where it prayed that the appellate court's judgment be modified by convicting
accused-appellant of homicide without appreciating in his favor any mitigating
circumstance.12 Subsequently, the Office of the Solicitor General, this time
acting for public respondent Court of Appeals, filed a motion for extension to
file comment to its own petition for certiorari.13 Discovering its glaring error,
the Office of the Solicitor General later withdrew its motion for extension of
time.14 Tangan filed a Reply asking that the case be submitted for decision.15
Meanwhile, Tangan filed a separate petition for review under Rule 45, docketed
as G.R. No. 105830.16 Since the petition for certiorari filed by the Solicitor
General remained unresolved, the two cases were consolidated.17 The Office of
the Solicitor General filed a manifestation in G.R. No. 105830, asking that it be
ex6used from filing a comment to Tangan's petition for review, in order to
avoid taking contradictory positions.18
In the recent case of People v. Velasco and Galvez,19 we held that the
prosecution cannot avail of the remedies of special civil action on certiorari,
petition for review on certiorari, or appeal in criminal cases. Previous to that, we
categorically ruled that the writ of certiorari cannot be used by the State in a
criminal case to correct a lower court's factual findings or evaluation of the
evidence.20
Rule 117, Section 7, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, is clear:
Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information or other fom1al charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt
to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another
prosecution for an offense which, necessarily includes the offense charged in
the former complaint or information under any of the following instances:
(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same
act or omission constituting the former charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered
only after a pleas was entered in the former complaint or information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the
fiscal and of the offended party, except as provided in section 1(f) of Rule 116.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or
in part the judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the event of
conviction for the graver offense.
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Based on the foregoing, the Solicitor General's petition for certiorari under Rule
65, praying that no mitigating circumstance be appreciated in favor of accused-
appellant and that the penalty imposed on him be correspondingly increased,
constitutes a violation of Tangan's right against double jeopardy and should be
dismissed.
We now come to the petition for review filed by Tangan. It is noteworthy that
during the trial, petitioner Tangan did not invoke self-defense but claimed that
Generoso was accidentally shot. As such, the burden of proving self-defense,21
which normally would have belonged to Tangan, did not come into play.
Although Tangan must prove his defense of accidental firing by clear and
convincing evidence,22 the burden of proving the commission of the crime
remained in the prosecution.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals appreciated in favor of Tangan
the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense under Article
13 (1), in relation to Article 11 (1), of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
ARTICLE 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any
criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE 13. Mitigating Circumstances. - The following are mitigating
circumstances:
1. Those mentioned in the preceding Chapter, when all the requisites necessary
to justify the act or to exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases are
not attendant.
Incomplete self-defense is not considered as a justifying act, but merely a
mitigating circumstance; hence, the burden of proving the crime charged in the
information is not shifted to the accused.23 In order that it may be successfully
appreciated, however, it is necessary that a majority of the requirements of self-
defense be present, particularly the requisite of unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim.24 Unlawful aggression by itself or in combination with either of
the other two requisite suffices to establish incomplete self-defense. Absent the
unlawful aggression, there can never be self-defense, complete or incomplete,25
because if there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of
defense will have no basis.26
There is no question that the bullet which hit the victim was fired from the
caliber. 38, which was issued to Tangan by the Philippine Navy. The cause of
death was severe hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound of the abdomen,
caused by the bullet fired from a gun of the said caliber. The prosecution
claimed that Tangan shot the victim point-blank in the stomach at a distance of
about one foot. On the other hand, Tangan alleged that when he grappled with
Generoso and Manuel Miranda for possession of the gun, it fell to the ground
and accidentally fired, hitting the victim.
When the testimonies of witnesses in open court are conflicting in substantial
points, the calibration of the records on appeal becomes difficult. It is the word
of one party against the word of the other. The reviewing tribunal relies on the
cold and mute pages of the records, unlike the trial court which had the unique
opportunity of observing first-hand that elusive and incommunicable evidence
of the witness' deportment on the stand while testifying.27 The trial court's
assessments of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great weight and respect
on appeal and is binding on this Court,28 particularly when it has not been
adequately demonstrated that significant facts and circumstances were shown to
have been overlooked or disregarded by the court below which, if considered,
might affect the outcome hereof.29 The rationale for this has been adequately
explained in that,
The trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the
different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an
insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous
mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply; or the
furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the
flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor
or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, and
carriage and mien.30
Equally, when a person fabricates a story, he usually adopts a simple account
because a complex one might lead to entanglement from which he may find it
hard to extricate himself. Along the same line, the experience of the courts and
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the general observations of humanity teach us that the natural limitations of our
inventive faculties are such that if a witness delivers in court a false narrative
containing numerous details, he is almost certain to fall into fatal inconsistencies
to make statements which can be readily refuted, or to expose in his demeanor
the falsity of his message.31 Aside from this, it is not also unusual that the
witness may have been coached before he is called to the stand to testify.
Somewhere along the painstaking review of the evidence on record, one version
rings the semblance of truth, not necessarily because it is the absolute truth, but
simply because it is the best approximation of the truth based on the
declarations of witnesses as corroborated by material evidence. Perforce, the
other version must be rejected. Truth and falsehood, it has been well said, are
not always opposed to each other like black and white, but oftentimes, and by
design, are made to resemble each other so as to be hardly distinguishable.32
Thus, after analyzing the conflicting testimonies of the witnesses, the trial court
found that:
When the accused took the gun from his car and when he tried to get out of the
car and the two Mirandas saw the accused already holding the gun, they started
to grapple for the possession of the gun that it went off hitting Generoso
Miranda at the stomach. The court believes that contrary to the testimony of
the accused, he never lost possession of the gun for if he did and when the gun
fell to the ground, it will not first explode or if it did, somebody is not holding
the same, the trajectory of the bullet would not be perpendicular or
horizontal.33
The Court of Appeals agreed -
The finding of the lower court that Generoso Miranda III was shot while the
accused and the Mirandas were grappling for the possession of the gun
immediately after the accused had taken his gun from inside his car and before
the three allegedly fell to the ground behind the car of the accused is borne out
by the record. The court also agrees with the court below that it was the
accused-appellant who shot and killed Generoso Miranda III. If the accused-
appellant did not shoot Generoso III during the scuffle, he would have claimed
accidental killing by alleging that his gun exploded during the scuffle instead of
falsely testifying that he and the Mirandas fell to the ground behind his car and
the gun exploded in the possession of Manuel Miranda. The theory of the
prosecution that the shooting took place while the three were grappling for the
possession of the gun beside the car of appellant is completely in harmony with
the findings and testimony of Dr. Ibarrola regarding the relative position of the
three and the precarious nearness of the victim when accused-appellant pulled
the trigger of his gun. Dr. Ibarrola explained that the gun was about two (2)
inches from the entrance wound and that its position was almost perpendicular
when it was fired. It was in fact the closeness of the Mirandas vis-à-vis appellant
during the scuffle for the gun that the accused-appellant was compelled to pull
the trigger in answer to the instinct of self-preservation.34
No convincing reason appears for the Court to depart from these factual
findings, the same being ably supported by the evidence on record. In violent
deaths caused by gunshot wounds, the medical report or the autopsy on the
cadaver of the victim must as much as possible narrate the observations on the
wounds examined. It is material in determining the truthfulness of the events
narrated by the witnesses presented. It is not enough that the witness looks
credible and assumes that he indeed witnessed the criminal act. His narration
must be substantiated by the physical evidence available to the court.
The medical examiner testified that the distance between the muzzle of the gun
and the target was about 2 inches but definitely not more than 3 inches. Based
on the point of exit and the trajectory transit of the wound, the victim and the
alleged assailant were facing each other when the shot was made and the
position of the gun was almost perpendicular when fired.35 These findings
disprove Tangan's claim of accidental shooting. A revolver is not prone to
accidental firing because of the nature of its mechanism, unless it was already
first cocked and pressure was exerted on the trigger. If it were uncocked, then
considerable pressure had to be applied on the trigger to fire the revolver.36
Having established that the shooting was not accidental, the next issue to be
resolved is whether Tangan acted in incomplete self-defense. The element of
unlawful aggression in self-defense must not come from the person defending
himself but from the victim.
A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient.37 Likewise, the
exchange of insulting words and invectives between Tangan and Generoso
Miranda, no matter how objectionable, could not be considered as unlawful
aggression, except when coupled with physical assault.38 There being no lawful
aggression on the part of either antagonists, the claim of incomplete self-
defense falls. Tangan undoubtedly had possession of the gun, but the Mirandas
tried to wrestle the gun from him. It may be said that the former had no
intention of killing the victim but simply to retain possession of his gun.
However, the fact that the victim subsequently died as a result of the gunshot
wound, though the shooter may not have the intention to kill, does not absolve
him from culpability. Having caused the fatal wound, Tangan is responsible for
all the consequences of his felonious act. He brought out the gun, wrestled with
the Mirandas but anticipating that the gun may be taken from him, he fired and
fled.
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The third requisite of lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself is not supported by evidence. By repeatedly blocking the path
of the Mirandas for almost five times, Tangan was in effect the one who
provoked the former. The repeated blowing of horns, assuming it was done by
Generoso, may be irritating to an impatient driver but it certainly could not be
considered as creating so powerful an inducement as to incite provocation for
the other party to act violently.
The appreciation of the ordinary mitigating circumstances of sufficient
provocation and passion and obfuscation under Article 13, paragraphs 4 and
6,39 have no factual basis. Sufficient provocation as a requisite of incomplete
self-defense is different from sufficient provocation as a mitigating
circumstance. As an element of self-defense, it pertains to its absence on the
part of the person defending himself; while as a mitigating circumstance, it
pertains to its presence on the part of the offended party. Besides, only one
mitigating circumstance can arise out of one and the same act.40 Assuming for
the sake of argument that the blowing of horns, cutting of lanes or overtaking
can be considered as acts of provocation, the same were not sufficient. The
word "sufficient" means adequate to excite a person to commit a wrong and
must accordingly be proportionate to its gravity.41 Moreover, Generoso's act of
asking for an explanation from Tangan was not sufficient provocation for him
to claim that he was provoked to kill or injure Generoso.42
For the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation to be appreciated, it
is required that (1) there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such
a condition of mind; and (2) said act which produced the obfuscation was not
far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of
time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.43
In the case at bar, Tangan could not have possibly acted upon an impulse for
there was no sudden and unexpected occurrence which wuld have created such
condition in his mind to shoot the victim. Assuming that his path was suddenly
blocked by Generoso Miranda due to the firecrackers, it can no longer be
treated as a startling occurrence, precisely because he had already passed them
and was already the one blocking their path. Tangan's acts were done in the
spirit of revenge and lawlessness, for which no mitigating circumstance of
passion or obfuscation can arise.
With respect to the penalty, under the laws then existing, homicide was
penalized with reclusion temporal,44 but if the homicide was committed with
the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty shall be death.45 The death
penalty, however, cannot be imposed on Tangan because in the meantime, the
1987 Constitution proscribed the imposition of death penalty; and although it
was later restored in 1994, the retroactive application of the death penalty is
unfavorable to him. Previously the accused may be prosecuted for two crimes:
(1) homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and (2) illegal possession
of firearm in its aggravated form under P.D. 1866.46
P.D. 1866 was amended by R.A. No. 8294,47 which provides that if an
unlicensed firearm is used in murder or homicide, such use of unlicensed
firearm shall be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance and no longer
considered as a separate offense,48 which means that only one offense shall be
punished - murder or homicide. However, this law cannot apply retroactively
because it will result in the imposition on Tangan of the maximum period of the
penalty. Moreover, under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure,49 the aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the information.
Being favorable, this new rule can be given retroactive effect as they are
applicable to pending cases.50 In any case, Tangan was acquitted of the illegal
possession case.
Consequently, Tangan should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
temporal. Pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, if the prescribed
penalty is composed of three periods, and there is neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance, the medium period shall be applied. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be
that which, in view of the attendant circumstances, may be properly imposed,
which in this case is reclusion temporal medium with an imprisonment range of
from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence shall be
the next lower degree which is prision mayor with a range of from six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.51 Hence, petitioner Tangan is sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum; to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
The death indemnity of P30,000.00 was correctly increased by the appellate
court to P50,000.00 in line with jurisprudence.52 Moral damages are awarded in
criminal cases involving injuries if supported by evidence on record,53 but the
stipulation of the parties in this case substitutes for the necessity of evidence in
support thereof. Though not awarded below, the victim's heirs are entitled to
moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 which is considered reasonable
considering the pain and anguish brought by his death.54
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WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 103613 is DISMISSED. The appealed
decision subject of G.R. No. 105830 is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
(1) Tangan is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with all the
accessory penalties.
(2) Tangan is ordered to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P42,000.00 as funeral and burial expenses, P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
C. IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE
US VS AMPAR
MALCOLM, J.:
A fiesta was in progress in the barrio of Magbaboy, municipality of San Carlos,
Province of Occidental Negros. Roast pig was being served. The accused
Clemente Ampar, a man of three score and ten, proceeded to the kitchen and
asked Modesto Patobo for some of the delicacy. Patobo's answer was; "There is
no more. Come here and I will make roast pig of you." The effect of this on the
accused as explained by him in his confession was, "Why was he doing like that,
I am not a child." With this as the provocation, a little later while the said
Modesto Patobo was squatting down, the accused came up behind him and
struck him on the head with an ax, causing death the following day.
As the case turns entirely on the credibility of witnesses, we should of course
not interfere with the findings of the trial court. In ascertaining the penalty, the
court, naturally, took into consideration the qualifying circumstance of alevosia.
The court, however, gave the accused the benefit of a mitigating circumstance
which on cursory examination would not appear to be justified. This mitigating
circumstance was that the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a
grave offense to the one committing the felony.
The authorities give us little assistance in arriving at a conclusion as to whether
this circumstance was rightly applied. That there was immediate vindication of
whatever one may term the remarks of Patobo to the accused is admitted.
Whether these remarks can properly be classed as "a grave offense" is more
uncertain. The Supreme court of Spain has held the words "gato que arañaba a
todo el mundo," "landrones," and "era tonto, como toda su familia" as not
sufficient to justify a finding of this mitigating circumstance. (Decisions of
January 4, 1876; May 17, 1877; May 13, 1886.) But the same court has held the
words "tan landron eres tu como tu padre" to be a grave offense. (Decision of
October 22, 1894.) We consider that these authorities hardly put the facts of the
present case in the proper light. The offense which the defendant was
endeavoring to vindicate would to the average person be considered as a mere
trifle. But to this defendant, an old man, it evidently was a serious matter to be
made the butt of a joke in the presence of so many guests. Hence, it is believed
that the lower court very properly gave defendant the benefit of a mitigating
circumstance, and correctly sentenced him to the minimum degree of the
penalty provided for the crime of murder. lawph!1.net
Judgment of the trial court sentencing the defendant and appellant to seventeen
years four months and one day of cadena temporal, with the accessory penalties
provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Modesto Patobo, in the
amount of one thousand pesos, and to pay the costs is affirmed, with the costs
of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., concurs in the result.
Street, J., did not sign.
Separate Opinions
CARSON, J., concurring:
I concur. I think, however, that the extenuating circumstances attending the
commission of the crime fall under the provisions of section 7 of the Penal
Code rather than under the provisions of section 5 of that Code as indicated in
the opinion.
PEOPLE VS PAJARES
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision * of the Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Branch
VIII, Manila dated October 25, 1990 in Criminal Case No. 85-40579 entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Leandro Pajares y Florentino" convicting herein
appellant Pajares of the crime of Murder.
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Herein appellant was charged with the aforementioned crime in an Information
which reads as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of October, 1985, at night time, purposely sought
to insure and better accomplish his criminal design, in the City of Manila.
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together with five
(5) others whose true names, real Identities, and present whereabouts are still
unknown and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill, evident premeditation, and treachery, attack,
assault. and use personal violence upon one DIOSDADO VIOJAN Y
SABAYAN, by then and there mauling him and hitting him with a baseball bat
at the back of the head, a vital part of the body, thereby inflicting upon the said
DIOSDADO VIOJAN Y SABAYAN a club wound on the head which was the
direct and immediate cause of his death.
Contrary to law. (Original Records of Criminal Case No, 85-40579, p. 1)
He was likewise charged with the crime of Frustrated Homicide in an
Information which reads as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of October, 1985, at night time, purposely sought
to insure and better accomplish his criminal design, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together with five
(5) others whose true names, real identities, and present whereabouts are still
unknown, and helping one another, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence
upon one RENATO PEREZ Y RUIDERA, by mauling and hitting him with a
baseball bat at the back, a vital part of the body, thereby inflicting upon him a
club wound at the back which is necessarily mortal and fatal, thus performing all
the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of homicide, as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the accused, that is, because of the timely and able
medical attendance rendered upon the said RENATO PEREZ RUIDERA
which prevented his death.
Contrary to law (Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40580, p. 1)
Appellant Pajares pleaded not guilty to both charges (Original Records of
Criminal Case No. 85-40579, p. 5; Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-
40580, p. 8). Upon the petition of herein appellant that the two (2) cases be
consolidated, a joint trial ensued.
The prosecution presented Renato R. Perez, Cpl. Benigno Dong, Salud
Manguba, Pat. Conrado Bustillos, Dr. Norman Torres, Dr. Prospero
Cabanayan, Rosita Viojan and Arlene Viojan as witnesses while only appellant
Leandro Pajares took the witness stand for the defense.
Renato R. Perez, a resident of 1386-K Burgos St., Paco, Manila, is the same
Renato Perez who is the victim in Criminal Case No. 85-40580 for Frustrated
Homicide. He testified that at about 11:30 p.m. on October 11, 1985, he and
the deceased Diosdado Viojan were on their way to a store located at Gomez
St., Paco, Manila to buy something. They were walking abreast with each other,
the deceased was at his right side and was a bit ahead of him, when appellant
Pajares suddenly appeared from behind and hit Viojan with a baseball bat at the
back of his head. The latter ran a short distance and fell down near the store of
one Alex Blas. When Perez tried to help Viojan. he, too, was attacked by Pajares
with the baseball bat hitting him at the back below the left shoulder. He then
grappled with the appellant for the possession of the baseball bat but the latter's
companions, namely: Rudy Dokling, Popoy, Inggo and Lauro Duado mauled
him until he lost consciousness. He was brought to the Philippine General
Hospital by Eugene Panibit and Joselito Perez where he was treated for the
injuries he sustained (TSN, Hearing of January 7, 1986, pp. 4-23). He identified
in court the baseball bat used by Pajares (TSN, Hearing of September 16, 1986,
p. 36).
On cross examination, he averred that he has known appellant Pajares for less
than a year and that although they both live in Zone 89, he and the deceased
belonged to a group which is an adversary of the group of the accused (Ibid.,
pp. 39-41).
Cpl. Benigno Dong, of the Zamora Police Department Station No. 6, WPD,
testified that he was on duty on October 12, 1985 when one Napoleon Gabawa
sought their assistance regarding a killing incident that happened in Gomez
Street, Paco, Manila. They went to the house of appellant Leandro Pajares at
1453 Gomez St., Paco, Manila and invited the latter and his brother to the
station for questioning regarding the aforementioned incident. Pajares verbally
admitted his participation in the incident (TSN, Hearing of March 11, 1986, p.
26). The incident was registered in the Police Blotter Entry (Exhibits "A" to "A-
3", Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40579. pp. 30-33)
On cross examination, he admitted that he placed appellant Pajares under arrest
after he verbally admitted that he was responsible for the death of Diosdado
Viojan, but the booking sheet and arrest report has not been accomplished yet
(TSN, Hearing of March 11, 1986, p 27).
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Salud Manguba, Forensic Chemist of the National, Bureau of Investigation,
testified that she examined a baseball bat for the presence of blood upon the
written request of Pat. Conrado Bustillos (Exhibit "C-1", Original Records of
Criminal Case No. 85-40579, p. 69). In connection with the study she made, she
submitted Biology Report No. B-85-1342 (Exhibit "C". Original Records of
Criminal Case No. 85-40579, p. 68) that shows the absence of blood on the
baseball bat (TSN, Hearing of June 23, 1986, pp. 30-32).
Pat. Conrado G. Bustillos, testified that relative to a telephone call he received
from the Philippine General Hospital on October 12 1985 he went to the
morgue of the said hospital to investigate a dead on arrival case of one
Diosdado Viojan. A close examination of the body of the latter showed that he
suffered a fracture at the back of the skull. Thereafter, he proceeded to the
scene of the crime to make an ocular inspection where he was informed that
there was another victim by the name Renato Perez. Pat. Bustillos further
testified that Renato Perez was investigated at the Homicide Section and that
the latter executed a sworn statement (Exhibit "F" Original Records of Criminal
Case No, 85-40579, p 208) in relation to the incident. In the same manner,
Roberto Pajares. brother of herein appellant was also investigated and who also
executed a sworn statement (Exhibit "G", Ibid., p. 219) The alleged murder
weapon, a baseball bat, was turned over to him by Cpl. Ben Macalindog (TSN,
November 18, 1986, p. 46).
Dr. Norman Torres, a resident physician at the Philippine General Hospital,
testified that on October 12, 1985, a certain Diosdado Viojan was brought to
the emergency room of the Philippine General Hospital for head injury, left
occipital region. The victim was in critical condition necessitating immediate
surgery. He did not personally attend the operation but learned that the victim
died while undergoing the surgery. Witness further averred that the injury could
have been caused by a blunt instrument like a baseball bat (TSN, Hearing of
December 2, 1986, p. 46).
Dr. Prospero Cabanayan, Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation,
testified that he conducted an autopsy on the body of Diosdado Viojan and in
connection therewith submitted Autopsy Report No. N-85-2161 (Exhibit "L",
Original Records on Criminal Case No. 85-40579, p. 224) indicating that the
cause of death was "Hemorrhage, meningeal, severe, traumatic". He further
testified that a single forceful blow against the head using a blunt instrument
like a baseball bat could have caused the injury (TSN, Hearing of June 15, 1987,
pp. 58-60).
Rosita S. Viojan, mother of the deceased Diosdado Viojan, testified that when
her son died, she hired the services of Tree Amigos Funeral Parlor for
P12,000.00 as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 10511 (Exhibits "P" and "Q",
Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40579, pp. 228-229) (TSN, Hearing
of February 23. 1988, p. 66).
Arlene Viojan, widow of Diosdado Viojan. testified that prior to the incident
her husband was working with PEMCO earning about P500.00 a week. At the
time of the incident, she was three (3) months on the family way. She gave birth
to a baby girl and it was her parents-in-law who paid for the expenses during
her delivery. At the moment, she is living with her parents (TSN, Hearing of
April 4, 1988, p. 67).
Appellant Leandro Pajares y Florentino denied the allegations of the
prosecution. He asserts that he knew the deceased Diosdado Viojan by the
name Dado, having met him once at the store, and Renato Perez by the name
Balat. At the time of the incident, he was inside the store of Alex Blas with
about eight (8) other People watching television. Hence, he did not see who hit
Diosdado Viojan and Renato Perez. After the commotion, upon the advise of
Alex Blas, he went home and slept. At about 3:30 in the morning of October
12, 1985, he was arrested inside their house. Without asking any question, he
went with the arresting officers to the police station (TSN, Hearing of August 1,
1988, pp. 72-76).
At the police detachment, he was coerced to admit his participation in the crime
since a gun was poked at him. He identified his signature at the Booking Sheet
and Arrest Report (Exhibit "J", Original Records of Criminal Case No 85-
40579, p. 222) but alleged that he signed the same without being allowed to read
the contents thereof without the assistance of counsel and while being held at
the collar at the back of his shirt. He likewise averred that during investigation
the investigating policemen molested him like "pinipitik-pitik" his ears with
rubber band or chopping his neck with karate chops (Ibid., pp. .77-78). He,
however, admitted that even after several days he did not complain about what
were done to him (Ibid., p. 128).
On cross examination, he testified that his house is about five (5) houses away
from the store of Alex Blas, the scene of the crime (TSN, Hearing of August 22,
1983, pp. 90-91). He likewise denied any knowledge about any quarrel between
his brother, Roberto Pajares and the deceased Diosdado Viojan (TSN, Hearing
of September 19, 1988, p. 108).
As aforementioned, the trial court rendered a decision on October 25, 1990, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby
rendered finding herein accused LEANDRO PAJARES y FLORENTINO of
1433-B, Gomez St., Paco, Manila, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
charges against him, as follows:
CRIM. CASE NO. 85-40579:
The Court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder as defined and penalized by Art. 248, par, 1, Rev. Penal Code, and there
being no modifying circumstance to consider, hereby sentences him to suffer
imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA with the accessory penalties of
the law; to pay Arlene Viojan and her child the sum of: P30,000,00; P12,000.00
as funeral expenses; P15,000.00 as moral damages; and P10,000.00 as litigation
expenses and attorney's fees; and finally the costs of the suit.
CRIM. CASE NO. 85-40580:
The Court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Slight Physical Injuries as defined in par. 1, Art. 266 and penalized by Art. 27,
both of the Rev. Penal Code, hereby sentencing him to an imprisonment of
ONE (1) MONTH; and to pay the cost of suit.
Done in Manila, this 25th day of October, 1990.
SO ORDERED. (RTC Decision, Rollo, p. 38)
Hence this appeal.
Appellant Pajares asserts that the trial court gravely erred in imposing the
penalty of reclusion perpetua upon him. He avers that such a penalty is
tantamount to a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment which is prohibited
by the Constitution. Appellant points out that hours before the clubbing
incident, Roberto Pajares, appellant's younger brother, was mauled by the group
of Diosdado Viojan as cited by the lower court referring to the entry in the
Police Blotter and the sworn statement of Roberto Pajares. The mauling of the
latter is a big insult and truly offending to the appellant and his family. Hence,
the clubbing of Diosdado Viojan by herein appellant was a vindication of the
grave offense committed against his family. a mitigating circumstance under
paragraph 5 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering further that
the appellant was just nineteen (19) years old at the time he committed the
offense the penalty imposed by the court a quo should have been seventeen (17)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day (Brief for the Appellant, Rollo, pp. 52-
58).
The appeal is devoid of merit.
In convicting herein appellant of the crime of murder, qualified by treachery,
the trial court relied heavily on the testimony of prosecution witness Renato
Perez which it found to be credible. According to the lower court, the latter
"gave his account on what was done to them by the accused and his
companions in a simple, candid, straightforward manner" (RTC Decision.
Rollo, p. 36).
It is doctrinally entrenched that the evaluation of the testimony of witnesses by
the trial court is received on appeal with the highest respect because it is the trial
court that has the opportunity to observe them on the stand and detect if they
are telling the truth or lying in their teeth (People v. Santito, Jr., G.R. No. 91628,
August 22, 1991 [201 SCRA 87]). The appellate court can only read in cold print
the testimony of the witnesses which commonly is translated from the local
dialect into English. In the process of converting into written form the
statement of living human beings, not only fine nuances but a world of meaning
apparent to the judge present, watching and listening, may escape the reader of
the written translated words (People v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 99258, September 13,
1991 [201 SCRA 616]).
Appellant's sole defense is alibi. According to him, he was inside the store of
Alex Blas, watching television, when the incident occurred, Alex Blas even
advised him to go home so as not to be involved in the incident. However, the
latter was not presented to corroborate appellant's testimony. Alibi is the
weakest defense an accused can concoct. In order to prosper, it must be so
convincing as to preclude any doubt that the accused could have been physically
present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the time of the commission
(People v. Lacao, Sr., G.R. No. 94320, September 4. 1991 (201 SCRA 317]). In
the case at bar, appellant was within the vicinity of the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission.
Furthermore, appellant was Positively identified by Renato Perez as the
perpetrator of the crime. In the face of the clear and positive testimony of the
prosecution witness regarding the participation of the accused in the crime, the
accused's alibi dwindles into nothingness. The Positive identification of the
accused by the witness as the perpetrator of the crime cannot be overcome by
the mere denial of the accused. Such positive identification of the accused that
he killed the victim establishes the guilt of the accused beyond moral certainty
(People v Arroyo, supra).
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The trial court correctly ruled that the crime was attended by treachery. There is
treachery, the law says, when the offender adopts means, methods or forms in
the execution of the felony which ensure its commission without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make (People v. Cuyo,
G.R. No. 76211, April 30, 1991 [196 SCRA 447]). As found by the trial court,
appellant Pajares hit Diosdado Viojan with a baseball bat from behind without
any warning thereby precluding any possible retaliation from the victim.
Having established the guilt of herein appellant. the next question is whether or
not the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense can
be appreciated in his favor. While it may be true that appellant's brother
Roberto Pajares was mauled by the companions of the deceased at about 11:30
a.m. of October 11, 1985 as show in the entry in the Police Blotter (Exhibits
"A" to "A-3", Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40579. pp. 30-33) and
by appellant's brother himself (Exhibits "G", "Q" and "A" Nos. 7-9, Ibid., p.
219), it must be emphasized that there is a lapse of about ten (10) hours
between said incident and the killing of Diosdado Viojan. Such interval of time
was more than sufficient to enable appellant to recover his serenity (People v.
Benito, G.R. No. L-32042, December 17, 1976 [74 SCRA 271]). Hence, the
mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot be
appreciated in his favor.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED with modification that the indemnity is increased to P50,000.00 in
accordance with the policy of this Court on the matter.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Nocon, J., is on leave
D. PASSION OR OBFUSCATION
US VS HICKS
ORRES, J.:
For about five years, from September, 1902, to November, 1907, Augustus
Hicks, an Afro-American, and Agustina Sola, a Christian Moro woman, illicitly
lived together in the municipality of Parang, Cotabato, Moro Province, until
trouble arising between them in the last-mentioned month of 1907, Agustina
quitted Hick's house, and, separation from him, went to live with her brother-
in-law, Luis Corrales. A few days later she contracted new relations with another
negro named Wallace Current, a corporal in the Army who then went to live in
the said house.
On the 21st of December following, at about 7:30 p. m., Augustus Hicks
together with a soldier named Lloyd Nickens called at said house, and from the
sala called out to his old mistress who was in her room with Corporal Current,
and after conversing with her in the Moro dialect for a few minutes, asked the
corporal to come out of said room; in response thereto the corporal appeared at
the door of the room, and after a short conversation, Current approached Hicks
and they shook hands, when Hicks asked him the following question: "Did I
not tell you to leave this woman alone?," to which Current replied: "That is all
right, she told me that she did not want to live with you any longer, but if she
wishes, she may quit me, and you can live with her." The accused then replied:
"God damn, I have made up my mind;" and as Corporal Current saw that
Hicks, when, he said this, was drawing a revolver from his trousers' pocket, he
caught him by the hand, but the latter, snatching his hand roughly away, said:
"Don't do that," whereupon Current jumped into the room, hiding himself
behind the partition, just as Hicks drew his revolver and fired at Agustina Sola
who was close by in the sala of the house. The bullet struck her in the left side
of the breast; she fell to the ground, and died in a little more than an hour later.
Upon hearing the shot Edward Robinson, who was also in the house, went to
render assistance and wrested the weapon from the hand of the accused. The
latter immediately fled from the house and gave himself up to the chief of
police of the town, H. L. Martin, asking him to lock him up in jail; and, when a
few minutes later a policeman came running in and reported that Hicks had
fired a shot at Agustina, the said chief of police caused Hicks to be arrested.
The latter, when once in jail, threw eight revolver cartridges out of the window;
these were picked up by a policeman who reported the occurrence and
delivered the cartridges to his chief.
In view of the foregoing the provincial fiscal on the 8th of February, 1908, filed
a complaint with the Court of First Instance of said province charging Augustus
Hicks with the crime of murder. Proceedings were instituted, the trial court,
after hearing the evidence adduced, entered judgment on the 10th of September
of the same year, sentencing the accused to the penalty of death, to be executed
according to the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P1,000, and to pay the costs. The case has been submitted to this court for
review.
The above-stated facts, which have been fully proven in the present case,
constitute the crime of murder, defined and punished by article 403 of the Penal
Code, in that the woman Agustina Sola met a violent death, with the qualifying
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circumstance of treachery (alevosia), she being suddenly and roughly attacked
and unexpectedly fired upon with a 45-caliber revolver, at close, if not point
blank range, while the injured woman was unarmed and unprepared, and at a
time when she was listening to a conversation, in which she was concerned,
between her aggressor and third person, and after usual and customary words
had passed between her and her aggressor. From all of the foregoing it is
logically inferred that means, manners, and forms were employed in attack that
directly and specially insured the consummation of the crime without such risk
to the author thereof as might have been offered by the victim who, owing to
the suddenness of the attack, was doubtless unable to flee from the place where
she was standing, or even escape or divert the weapon.
The accused, Augustus Hicks, pleaded not guilty, but notwithstanding his
exculpatory allegations which were certainly not borne out at the trial, the
evidence in the case is absolutely at variance therewith and conclusively
establishes, beyond peradventure of doubt, his culpability as the sole fully
convicted author of the violent and treacherous death of his former mistress,
Agustina Sola.
It is alleged by the accused that when he withdrew his hand from that of
Current, who had seized him, he fell backward but managed to support himself
on his two hands, and when he got up again the said corporal threatened him
with a revolver thrust into his face; whereupon he also drew his revolver, just as
Edward Robinson caught him from behind, when his revolver went off, the
bullet striking the deceased.
This allegation appears to be at variance with the testimony of the witnesses
Wallace Current, Edward Robinson, Luis Corrales, and Lloyd Nickens in their
respective declaration, especially with that of the second and third, who
witnessed the actual firing of the shot by the aggressor at the deceased, as
shown by the fact that Robinson immediately approached the accused in order
to take his weapon away from him which he succeeded in doing after a brief
struggle, whereupon the aggressor ran out of the house. Thus, the shot that
struck the deceased in the breast and caused her death was not due to an
accident but to a willful and premeditated act on the part of the aggressor with
intent to deprive the victim of her life.
In addition to the qualifying circumstance of treachery, as above referred to, the
presence of other aggravating circumstances, such as premeditation, and the fact
that the crime was committed in the dwelling of the deceased should be taken
into consideration. The last-mentioned circumstances appears proven from the
testimony of several witnesses who were examined at the trial of the case.
Inasmuch as in the present case the crime has already been qualified as
committed with treachery, the circumstance of premeditation should only be
considered as a merely generic one. Premeditation is, however, manifest and
evident by reason of the open acts executed by the accused. According to the
testimony of Charles Gatchery and Eugenio R. Whited, Hicks asked leave from
the former to be absent from the canteen where he was working on the
morning of the day when the affray occurred, alleging that his mind was
unsettled and that he feared getting into trouble. It is also shown by the fact that
Whited, who was in Hicks' house about noon upon the latter's invitation, and
while both where drinking gin, and while the revolver, the instrument of the
crime, was lying on the table on which were also several loaded cartridges, heard
the accused repeatedly say, referring to the deceased, that her time had come,
adding that he would rather see her dead than in the arms of another man, and
when the accused went to bed apparently very much worried, and refusing to
answer when called, the witness left him. On the day after the crime the police
found on a table in the cuprit's house several loaded cartridges, a bottle of oil
and a piece of cloth used undoubtedly for cleaning the revolver.
All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that the accused, deliberately
and after due reflection had resolved to kill the woman who had left him for
another man, and in order to accomplish his perverse intention with safety,
notwithstanding the fact that he was already provided with a clean and well-
prepared weapon and carried other loaded cartridges besides those already in his
revolver, he entered the house, greeting everyone courteously and conversed
with his victim, in what appeared to be a proper manner, disguising his
intention and claiming her by his apparent repose and tranquility, doubtless in
order to successfully accomplish his criminal design, behaving himself properly
as he had planed to do beforehand.
As against the two foregoing aggravating circumstances no mitigating
circumstances is present, not even that mentioned in paragraph 7 of article 9 of
the Penal Code, to wit loss of reason and self-control produced by jealousy as
alleged by the defense, inasmuch as the only causes which mitigate the criminal
responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as originate from legitimate
feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions.
From the foregoing considerations, and as the judgment appealed from is in
accordance with the law, it is our opinion that the same should be affirmed, as
we do hereby affirm it with costs, provided, however, that the death penalty
shall be executed according to the law in force, and that in the event of a
pardon being granted, the culprit shall suffer the accessory penalties of article 53
of the Penal Code unless the same be expressly remitted in the pardon. So
ordered.
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Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.
US VS DE LA CRUZ
CARSON, J.:
The guilt of the defendant and appellant of the crime of homicide of which he
was convicted in the court below is conclusively established by the evidenced of
record.
The trial court was of opinion that its commission was not marked by either
aggravating or extenuating circumstances, and sentenced the convict to fourteen
years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, the medium degree of
the penalty prescribed by the code. Burt we are of opinion that the extenuating
circumstance set out in subsection 7 of article 9 should have been taken into
consideration, and that the prescribed penalty should have been imposed in its
minimum degree. Subsection 7 of article 9 is as follows:
The following are extenuating circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have
produced passion and obfuscation.
The evidence clearly discloses that the convict, in the heat of passion, killed the
deceased, who had theretofore been his querida (concubine or lover) upon
discovering her in flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual
acquaintance. We think that under the circumstances the convict was entitled to
have this fact taken into consideration in extenuation of his offense under the
provisions of the above-cited article.
This was the view taken by the Court of Spain upon a similar state of facts as
set forth in its sentence of July 4, 1892, which is summarized by Viada (p. 69, in
question 19, art. 9 of vol. 6) as follows:
Shall he who kills a woman with whom he is living in concubinage for having
caught her in her underclothes with another party and afterwards shoots
himself, inflicting a serious wound, be responsible for that crime with the
extenuating circumstance of having acted with violent passion and obfuscation?
The Audiencia of Santiago de Cuba did not so hold and its judgment was
reversed by the supreme court for the improper disregard of article 9, number 8,
of the Penal Code for Cuba and Puerto Rico: "The facts held to be true by the
trial court, and which were the immediate cause of the crime by producing in
the accused strong emotion which impelled him to the criminal act and even to
attempt his own life, were a sufficient impulse in the natural and ordinary course
to produce the violent passion and obfuscation which the law regards as a
special reason for extenuation, and as the judgment did not take into
consideration the 8th circumstance of article 9 of the code, the Audiencia
rendering it seems to have violated this legal provision."
It is true that in the case of U.S. vs. Hicks (14 Phil. Rep.., 217), we held that the
"causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are
such as originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious,
unworthy, and immoral passions," and declined to give the benefit of the
provisions of this article to the convict in that case on the ground that the
alleged causes for his loss of self-control did not "originate from legitimate
feelings." But in that case we found as facts that:
All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that the accused, deliberately
and after due reflection had resolved to kill the woman who had left him for
another man, and in order to accomplish his perverse intention with safety,
notwithstanding the fact that he was already provided with a clean and well-
prepared weapon and carried other loaded cartridges besides those already in his
revolver, he entered the house, greeting everyone courteously and conversed
with his victim, in what appeared to be in a proper manner, disguising his
intention and calming her by his apparent repose and tranquility, doubtless in
order to successfully accomplish his criminal design, behaving himself properly
as he had planned to do beforehand.
In the former case the cause alleged "passion and obfuscation" of the aggressor
was the convict's vexation, disappointment and deliberate anger engendered by
the refusal of the woman to continue to live in illicit relations with him, which
she had a perfect right to do; his reason for killing her being merely that he had
elected to leave him and with his full knowledge to go and live with another
man. In the present case however, the impulse upon which defendant acted and
which naturally "produced passion and obfuscation" was not that the woman
declined to have illicit relations with him, but the sudden revelation that she was
untrue to him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of another. As
said by the supreme court of Spain in the above-cited decision, this was a
"sufficient impulse" in the ordinary and natural course of things to produce the
passion and obfuscation which the law declares to be one of the extenuating
circumstances to be taken into consideration by the court.
Modified by a finding that the commission of the crime was marked with the
extenuating circumstance set out in subsection 7 of article 9, and by the
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reduction of the penalty of fourteen years eight months and one day of
reclusion temporal to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, the
judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be
and are hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Trent, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MORELAND, J., concurring:
I agree except as to the application of the extenuating circumstance presented
by paragraph 7, article 9, Penal Code. In my judgment it is not warranted by the
facts or the law.
E. ILLNESS
PEOPLE VS JAVIER
ROMERO, J.:
Before us on automatic review is the Decision 1 dated April 15, 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 32,2 in Criminal Case No. A-
3155, convicting accused-appellant Eduardo Javier of the crime of parricide and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P21,730.00 as actual
expenses.1âwphi1.nêt
The Information filed before the trial court which charged accused-appellant
with the crime of parricide reads as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of June 1996, in the Municipality of Santo
Tomas, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with the intent to and being then
armed with a bolo, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and use of personal violence, by hacking with the said weapon
one FLORENTINA JAVIER Y LACESTE, his legitimate spouse, and as a
result of which his said wife suffered fatal injuries which directly caused her
death immediately thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
victim.
Contrary to law. 3
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty and trial ensued.
The prosecution evidence, consisting of the testimonies of Consolacion Javier
Panit and Alma Javier, daughters of the victim and accused-appellant, and SPO1
Rotelio Pacho are detailed as follows:
Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier and the victim Florentina Laceste Javier were
legally married on December 18, 1954. 4 In their forty-one years of marriage,
they begot ten children. Accused-appellant and Florentina lived at Tubod, Sto.
Tomas, La Union with one of their daughters, Alma Javier.5
On June 15, 1996 between two o'clock and three o'clock in the morning,
Consolacion Javier Panit, who lives near her parent's house about ten to fifteen
meters away, heard her mother, Florentina shouting "Arayatan dac ta papatayen
nac ni Tatangyo" (Your father is going to kill me). After she heard her mother
scream for help, Consolacion rushed out of her house and met her sister, Alma
who, weeping, told her that their parents were quarrelling. Alma, at the time of
the incident was living in her parents' house. Consolacion and Alma then
proceeded to their brother Manuel's house, which is located about seventy to
eighty meters away from their parents' house. The three then proceeded to their
parents' house. Manuel, who entered first, found the lifeless body of his mother
and his father, accused-appellant, wounded in the abdomen. Manuel then
ordered Consolacion to get a tricycle to bring their father to the hospital. At this
point, Manuel informed her sisters that their mother was dead and that their
father confessed to him that he killed his wife and there after allegedly stabbed
himself. Florentina was found dead in their bedroom, drenched in her own
blood. 6
Accused-appellant was brought to the hospital by Consolacion's husband, and
her son, Jefferson, while Manuel went out to get help. 7
SPO1 Rotelio Pacho, assigned as desk investigator at the Sto. Tomas Police
Station in La Union, testified in the investigation he conducted with SP04
Manuel Zarate and SPO1 Agaton Laroza regarding the incident of June 15,
1996. He stated that he received a call for assistance from the barangay captain
of Tugod, Sto. Tomas because accused-appellant allegedly killed his wife. The
police authorities then proceeded to accused-appellant's house in Brgy. Tugod,
Sto.Tomas, where they saw Florentina lying in the bedroom floor covered with
blood. Upon interviewing the victim's children, Pacho testified that Manuel told
him that his father confessed to killing his wife. Manuel then surrendered to
him the bolo covered with blood which was found in the bedroom. The bolo
was allegedly used by accused-appellant in assaulting his wife. 8 The medical
findings indicated that the victim suffered from multiple injuries and her neck
was almost cut off from her body. 9
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Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier, in his testimony, admitted killing his wife in
their bedroom with the use of a sharp bolo. He identified the bolo as the same
one presented by the prosecution as Exhibit "A" and which he used in
wounding himself. Accused-appellant told the court that he killed his wife
because he could not sleep for almost a month. He claimed that when the
killing took place, his mind went totally blank and he did not know what he was
doing. 10 He claims that he was insane at the time of the incident.
The trial court rejected accused-appellant's defense of insanity and on April 15,
1997 rendered a decision finding him guilty of parricide and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of death. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration, the accused,
Eduardo Javier y Basin is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of death; to pay
the heirs of the victims the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for the
death of the victim and P21,730.00 as actual expenses; and to pay the cost of
the proceedings.
SO ORDERED.11
In this appeal, accused-appellant alleged that the trial court erred in imposing
the death penalty, considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances of
illness of the offender and passion and obfuscation. 12 While accused-appellant
does not question the decision of the trial court in rejecting his defense of
insanity, he argues that he should be meted a lower penalty because at the time
of the incident, he was suffering from loss of sleep for a prolonged period of
time, which would have caused him to commit the crime.
He further contends that his suspicion that his wife was having an illicit
relationship with another man, aggravated by his illness, goaded him to commit
the crime.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that accused-
appellant cannot claim the mitigating circumstance of illness in the absence of a
medical finding to support his claim. Accused-appellant cannot likewise be
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation in the
absence of sufficient evidence.
We find the appeal bereft of merit.
Accused-appellant, during trial, admitted killing his wife, but interposed as
defense the exempting circumstance of insanity. However, the trial court
rejected this defense of insanity for failure of the defense to prove that accused-
appellant was indeed insane at the time of the incident. The defense never
presented any medical record of the accused-appellant, nor was a psychiatrist
ever presented to validate the defense of insanity. Equally important, the
defense, during trial, never alleged the above-claimed mitigating circumstances
of illness and passion and obfuscation, thus weakening the case of accused-
appellant.
In this appeal, accused-appellant alleged that prior to the incident, he had been
suffering from insomnia for around a month, thus leading him to commit an act
beyond his control, the killing of his wife, Florentina. The defense went on to
cite medical literature on the effects of total and partial sleep loss to support his
contentions. 13
For the mitigating circumstance of illness of the offender to be appreciated, the
law requires the presence of the following requisites: (1) illness must diminish
the exercise of the will-power of the offender; and (2) such illness should not
deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts. 14
Since accused-appellant has already admitted to the killing, it is incumbent upon
him to prove the claimed mitigating circumstance of illness. In this case,
however, aside from the testimony of the accused that his mind went blank
when he killed his wife due to loss of sleep, no medical finding was presented
regarding his mental condition at the time of killing. This Court can hardly rely
on the bare allegations of accused-appellant, nor on mere presumptions and
conjectures. No clear and convincing evidence was shown that accused-
appellant was suffering an illness which diminished his exercise of will-power at
the time of the killing.
On the other hand, it is clear that accused-appellant was aware of the acts he
committed. First, he remembered killing his wife in their bedroom with the use
of a bolo, where he mangled her neck twice; he remembered trying to commit
suicide, by wounding himself with the same bolo he used in killing his wife; and
he remembered being brought to the hospital. Since he remembered the vital
circumstances surrounding the ghastly incident, from the time of the killing up
to the time he was brought to the hospital, it shows that he was in full control
of his mental faculties. This negates his claim that he was suffering from an
illness that diminished the exercise of his will-power. On the basis of the
foregoing, we cannot appreciate the mitigating circumstance alleged by accused-
appellant.
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Neither can we appreciate the circumstance of passion and obfuscation to
mitigate his criminal liability.
In order to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and to
obfuscation, the following elements should concur: (1) there should be an act
both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) said act
which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of
the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might
recover his moral equanimity. 15 The foregoing elements were not proved to be
present in instant case. In fact, during accused-appellant's testimony, he even
stated that he was not jealous of his wife.
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General:
In the case of appellant, there is lack of proof of the cause which produced
alleged passion and obfuscation. Appellant, in his testimony, did not account
how he killed his wife nor did he explain the cause why he was prompted to kill
his wife. Verily, there exists no justifiable basis for applying to him this
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation as the cause which
produced it has not been established. 16
All told, the allegations propounded by accused-appellant that his suspicions
regarding his wife, aggravated by his illness made it possible for him to kill his
own wife, is but a mere afterthought to whittle down his criminal liability.
Additionally, it is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts will
generally not be disturbed by the appellate court because it is in the best
position to properly evaluate testimonial evidence considering that it observes
the demeanor, conduct and attitude of witnesses during the trial. In the case at
bar, the trial court was able to observe the behavior of accused-appellant and it
stated that his recollection of the details surrounding the killing is so impeccable
that only a person in his right mind can make it.
Thus, the trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of
parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, Section 5) which provides that:
Any person who shall kill his father, mother or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be
guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death.
The crime of parricide, not being a capital crime per se as it is not punishable by
mandatory death penalty but by the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death, two indivisible penalties, the application of the lesser or the greater
penalty depends on the presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances.17
In this case, the information for parricide against accused-appellant did not
allege any aggravating circumstance. Nor did the evidence show that the
prosecution was able to prove any aggravating circumstance. 18 Likewise, no
mitigating circumstance is appreciated by this Court in favor of the accused-
appellant. Thus, in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance
for the accused-appellant, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be
imposed.
As regards the monetary liability, the Court takes the amount of P50,000.00
imposed by the trial court as one of civil indemnity instead of as moral
damages.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union,
Branch 32, in Criminal Case No. A-3155 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Eduardo Javier y Basin should suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., is on leave.
F. ANALOGOUS CIRCUMSTANCES
CANTA VS PEOPLE
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated August 31, 1999,
and resolution, dated November 22, 1999, of the Court of Appeals,1 which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Maasin, Southern
Leyte,2 finding petitioner Exuperancio Canta guilty of violation of P.D. No.
533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974, and sentencing
him to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve
(12) years, five (5) months, and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal medium,
as maximum, and to pay the costs.
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The information against petitioner alleged:
That on or about March 14, 1986, in the municipality of Malitbog, province of
Southern Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with intent to gain, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal and carry away one (1) black
female cow belonging to Narciso Gabriel valued at Three Thousand Pesos
(P3,000.00) without the knowledge and consent of the aforesaid owner, to his
damage and prejudice in the amount aforestated.1âwphi1.nêt
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The prosecution established the following facts:
Narciso Gabriel acquired from his half-sister Erlinda Monter a cow, subject of
the case, upon its birth on March 10, 1984. The cow remained under the care of
Erlinda Monter for sometime. Subsequently, Narciso gave the care and custody
of the animal, first, to Generoso Cabonce, from October 24, 1984 to March 17,
1985; then to Maria Tura, from May 17, 1985 to March 2, 1986; and lastly, to
Gardenio Agapay, from March 3, 1986 until March 14, 1986 when it was lost.4
It appears that at 5 o'clock in the afternoon of March 13, 1986, Agapay took the
cow to graze in the mountain of Pilipogan in Barangay Candatag, about 40
meters from his hut. However, when he came back for it at past 9 o'clock in the
morning of March 14, 1986, Agapay found the cow gone. He found hoof prints
which led to the house of Filomeno Vallejos. He was told that petitioner
Exuperancio Canta had taken the animal.5
Upon instructions of the owner, Gardenio and Maria Tura went to recover the
animal from petitioner's wife, but they were informed that petitioner had
delivered the cow to his father, Florentino Canta, who was at that time barangay
captain of Laca, Padre Burgos, Southern Leyte. Accordingly, the two went to
Florentino's house. On their way, they met petitioner who told them that if
Narciso was the owner, he should claim the cow himself. Nevertheless,
petitioner accompanied the two to his father's house, where Maria recognized
the cow. As petitioner's father was not in the house, petitioner told Gardenio
and Maria he would call them the next day so that they could talk the matter
over with his father.
However, petitioner never called them. Hence, Narciso Gabriel reported the
matter to the police of Malitbog, Southern Leyte.6 As a result, Narciso and
petitioner Exuperancio were called to an investigation. Petitioner admitted
taking the cow but claimed that it was his and that it was lost on December 3,
1985. He presented two certificates of ownership, one dated March 17, 1986
and another dated February 27, 1985, to support his claim (Exh. B).7
Narciso presented a certificate of ownership issued on March 9, 1986, signed by
the municipal treasurer, in which the cow was described as two years old and
female. On the reverse side of the certificate is the drawing of a cow with
cowlicks in the middle of the forehead, between the ears, on the right and left
back, and at the base of the forelegs and hindlegs (Exhs. C, C-1 to 4).8 All four
caretakers of the cow identified the cow as the same one they had taken care of,
based on the location of its cowlicks, its sex, and its color. Gardenio described
the cow as black in color, with a small portion of its abdomen containing a
brownish cowlick, a cowlick in the middle of the forehead, another at the back
portion between the two ears, and four cowlicks located near the base of its
forelegs and the hindlegs.9
On the other hand, petitioner claimed he acquired the animal under an
agreement which he had with Pat. Diosdado Villanueva, that petitioner take care
of a female cow of Pat. Villanueva in consideration for which petitioner would
get a calf if the cow produced two offsprings. Petitioner claimed that the cow in
question was his share and that it was born on December 5, 1984. This cow,
however, was lost on December 2, 1985. Petitioner said he reported the loss to
the police of Macrohon, Padre Burgos, and Malitbog, on December 3, 1985
(Exh. A and Exh. 1).10
Petitioner said that on March 14, 1986, his uncle Meno told him that he had
seen the cow at Pilipogan, under the care of Gardenio Agapay. He, therefore,
went to Pilipogan with the mother cow on March 14, 1986 to see whether the
cow would suckle the mother cow. As the cow did, petitioner took it with him
and brought it, together with the mother cow, to his father Florentino Canta.11
Maria Tura tried to get the cow, but Florentino refused to give it to her and
instead told her to call Narciso so that they could determine the ownership of
the cow.12 As Narciso did not come the following day, although Maria did,
Florentino said he told his son to take the cow to the Municipal Hall of Padre
Burgos. Petitioner did as he was told. Three days later, Florentino and
Exuperancio were called to the police station for investigation.13
Petitioner presented a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle dated February
27, 198514 and a statement executed by Franklin Telen, janitor at the treasurer's
office of the municipality of Padre Burgos, to the effect that he issued a
Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle in the name of petitioner Exuperancio
Canta on February 27, 1985 (Exh. 5).15 The statement was executed at the
preliminary investigation of the complaint filed by petitioner against Narciso.16
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Petitioner's Certificate of Ownership was, however, denied by the municipal
treasurer, who stated that petitioner Exuperancio Canta had no Certificate of
Ownership of Large Cattle in the municipality of Padre Burgos (Exhs. E, E-1
and 2).17 On the other hand, Telen testified that he issued the Certificate of
Ownership of Large Cattle to petitioner on March 24, 1986 but, at the instance
of petitioner, he (Telen) antedated it to February 27, 1985.18
On January 24, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision finding petitioner
guilty of the offense charged. In giving credence to the evidence for the
prosecution, the trial court stated:
From the affidavits and testimonies of the complainant and his witnesses, it is
indubitable that it was accused Exuperancio Canta who actually took the cow
away without the knowledge and consent of either the owner/raiser/caretaker
Gardenio Agapay.
That the taking of the cow by the accused was done with strategy and stealth
considering that it was made at the time when Gardenio Agapay was at his
shelter-hut forty (40) meters away tethered to a coconut tree but separated by a
hill.
The accused in his defense tried to justify his taking away of the cow by
claiming ownership. He, however, failed to prove such ownership. Accused
alleged that on February 27, 1985 he was issued a Certificate of Ownership of
Large Cattle (Exh. 2-A) for his cow by Franklin Telen, a janitor at the Office of
the Municipal Treasurer of Padre Burgos, a neighboring town. On rebuttal
Franklin Telen denied in Court the testimony of the accused and even
categorically declared that it was only on March 24, 1986 that the accused
brought the cow to the Municipal Hall of Padre Burgos, when he issued a
Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle for the cow, and not on February 27,
1985. Franklin Telen testified thus:
"Q. According to the defense, this Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle was
issued by you on February 27, 1985. Is that correct?
A. Based on the request of Exuperancio, I antedated this.
(TSN, June 3, 1992, p. 7)"
The testimony of Franklin Telen was confirmed in open court by no less than
the Municipal Treasurer of Padre Burgos, Mr. Feliciano Salva. (TSN, September
29, 1992, pp. 5-8).
If accused Exuperancio Canta were the owner of the cow in question, why
would he lie on its registration? And why would he have to ask Mr. Franklin
Telen to antedate its registry? It is clear that accused secured a Certificate of
Ownership of Large Cattle (Exh. 2-A) by feigning and manipulation (Exhs. A &
B) only after the act complained of in the instant case was committed on March
14, 1986. His claim of ownership upon which he justifies his taking away of the
cow has no leg to stand on. Upon the other hand, the complainant has shown
all the regular and necessary proofs of ownership of the cow in question.19
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision and denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. It is contended that the
prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt his criminal intent in
taking the disputed cow.
First. Petitioner claims good faith and honest belief in taking the cow. He cites
the following circumstances to prove his claim:
1. He brought the mother cow to Pilipogan to see if the cow in question would
suckle to the mother cow, thus proving his ownership of it;
2. He compared the cowlicks of the subject cow to that indicated in the
Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle issued on February 27, 1985 in his
name, and found that they tally;
3. He immediately turned over the cow to the barangay captain, after taking it,
and later to the police authorities, after a dispute arose as to its ownership; and
4. He filed a criminal complaint against Narciso Gabriel for violation of P. D.
No. 533.
These contentions are without merit.
P.D. No. 533, §2(c) defines cattle-rustling as
. . . the taking away by any means, methods or scheme, without the consent of
the owner/raiser, of any of the abovementioned animals whether or not for
profit or gain, or whether committed with or without violence against or
intimidation of any person or force upon things.
The crime is committed if the following elements concur: (1) a large cattle is
taken; (2) it belongs to another; (3) the taking is done without the consent of the
owner; (4) the taking is done by any means, methods or scheme; (5) the taking is
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with or without intent to gain; and (6) the taking is accomplished with or
without violence or intimidation against person or force upon things.20
These requisites are present in this case. First, there is no question that the cow
belongs to Narciso Gabriel. Petitioner's only defense is that in taking the animal
he acted in good faith and in the honest belief that it was the cow which he had
lost. Second, petitioner, without the consent of the owner, took the cow from
the custody of the caretaker, Gardenio Agapay, despite the fact that he knew all
along that the latter was holding the animal for the owner, Narciso. Third,
petitioner falsified his Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle by asking Telen
to antedate it prior to the taking to make it appear that he owned the cow in
question. Fourth, petitioner adopted "means, methods, or schemes" to deprive
Narciso of his possession of his cow, thus manifesting his intent to gain. Fifth,
no violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things attended the
commission of the crime.
Indeed, the evidence shows that the Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle
which petitioner presented to prove his ownership was falsified. Franklin Telen,
the janitor in the municipal treasurer's office, admitted that he issued the
certificate to petitioner 10 days after Narciso's cow had been stolen. Although
Telen has previously executed a sworn statement claiming that he issued the
certificate on February 27, 1985, he later admitted that he antedated it at the
instance of petitioner Exuperancio Canta, his friend, who assured him that the
cow was his.21
Telen's testimony was corroborated by the certification of the municipal
treasurer of Padre Burgos that no registration in the name of petitioner was
recorded in the municipal records. Thus, petitioner's claim that the cowlicks
found on the cow tally with that indicated on the Certificate of Ownership of
Large Cattle has no value, as this same certificate was issued after the cow had
been taken by petitioner from Gardenio Agapay. Obviously, he had every
opportunity to make sure that the drawings on the certificate would tally with
that existing on the cow in question.
The fact that petitioner took the cow to the barangay captain and later to the
police authorities does not prove his good faith. He had already committed the
crime, and the barangay captain to whom he delivered the cow after taking it
from its owner is his own father. While the records show that he filed on April
30, 1986 a criminal complaint against Narciso Gabriel, the complaint was
dismissed after it was shown that it was filed as a countercharge to a complaint
earlier filed on April 16, 1986 against him by Narciso Gabriel.
Petitioner says that he brought a mother cow to see if the cow in question
would suckle to the mother cow. But cows frequently attempt to suckle to alien
cows.22 Hence, the fact that the cow suckled to the mother cow brought by
petitioner is not conclusive proof that it was the offspring of the mother cow.
Second. Petitioner contends that even assuming that his Certificate of
Ownership is "not in order," it does not necessarily follow that he did not
believe in good faith that the cow was his. If it turned out later that he was
mistaken, he argues that he committed only a mistake of fact but he is not
criminally liable.
Petitioner's Certificate of Ownership is not only "not in order." It is fraudulent,
having been antedated to make it appear it had been issued to him before he
allegedly took the cow in question. That he obtained such fraudulent certificate
and made use of it negates his claim of good faith and honest mistake. That he
took the cow despite the fact that he knew it was in the custody of its caretaker
cannot save him from the consequences of his act.23 As the Solicitor General
states in his Comment:
If petitioner had been responsible and careful he would have first verified the
identity and/or ownership of the cow from either Narciso Gabriel or Gardenio
Agapay, who is petitioner's cousin (TSN, 9/12/91, p. 26). Petitioner, however,
did not do so despite the opportunity and instead rushed to take the cow. Thus,
even if petitioner had committed a mistake of fact he is not exempted from
criminal liability due to his negligence.24
In any event, petitioner was not justified in taking the cow without the
knowledge and permission of its owner. If he thought it was the cow he had
allegedly lost, he should have resorted to the court for the settlement of his
claim. Art. 433 of the Civil Code provides that "The true owner must resort to
judicial process for the recovery of the property." What petitioner did in this
case was to take the law in his own hands.25 He surreptitiously took the cow
from the custody of the caretaker, Gardenio Agapay, which act belies his claim
of good faith.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the evidence fully supports the finding
of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that accused-appellant is guilty
as charged. There is therefore no reason to disturb their findings.
However, the decision of the Court of Appeals should be modified in two
respects.
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First, accused-appellant should be given the benefit of the mitigating
circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender. The circumstance of voluntary
surrender has the following elements: (1) the offender has not actually been
arrested; (2) the offender surrenders to a person in authority or to the latter's
agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary.26 In the present case, petitioner
Exuperancio Canta had not actually been arrested. In fact, no complaint had yet
been filed against him when he surrendered the cow to the authorities. It has
been repeatedly held that for surrender to be voluntary, there must be an intent
to submit oneself unconditionally to the authorities, showing an intention to
save the authorities the trouble and expense that his search and capture would
require.27 In petitioner's case, he voluntarily took the cow to the municipal hall
of Padre Burgos to place it unconditionally in the custody of the authorities and
thus saved them the trouble of having to recover the cow from him. This
circumstance can be considered analogous to voluntary surrender and should be
considered in favor of petitioner.
Second, the trial court correctly found petitioner guilty of violation of §2(c) of
P. D. No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974.
However, it erred in imposing the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 12 years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion temporal
medium, as maximum. The trial court apparently considered P. D. No. 533 as a
special law and applied §1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which provides
that "if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than
the minimum term prescribed by the same." However, as held in People v.
Macatanda,28 P. D. No. 533 is not a special law. The penalty for its violation is
in terms of the classification and duration of penalties prescribed in the Revised
Penal Code, thus indicating that the intent of the lawmaker was to amend the
Revised Penal Code with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle. In fact,
§10 of the law provides:
The provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, pertinent provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended, all laws, decrees, orders, instructions, rules
and regulations which are inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
There being one mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance in
the commission of the crime, the penalty to be imposed in this case should be
fixed in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, in
relation to Art. 64 of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner should be sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is within the range of the
penalty next lower in degree, i. e., prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor medium, and the maximum of which is prision mayor in its maximum
period.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the
modification that petitioner Exuperancio Canta is hereby SENTENCED to
suffer a prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
maximum, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
maximum, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
ARTICLE 14 OF RPC
Aggravating circumstances. — The following are aggravating circumstances:
1. That advantage be taken by the offender of his public position.
2. That the crime be committed in contempt or with insult to the public
authorities.chanrobles virtual law library
3. That the act be committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due the
offended party on account of his rank, age, or sex, or that is be committed in
the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given provocation.
4. That the act be committed with abuse of confidence or obvious
ungratefulness.
5. That the crime be committed in the palace of the Chief Executive or in his
presence, or where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their
duties, or in a place dedicated to religious worship.
6. That the crime be committed in the night time, or in an uninhabited place, or
by a band, whenever such circumstances may facilitate the commission of the
offense
Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the
commission of an offense, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a
band.
7. That the crime be committed on the occasion of a conflagration, shipwreck,
earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or misfortune.
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IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
8. That the crime be committed with the aid of armed men or persons who
insure or afford impunity.
9. That the accused is a recidivist.
A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been
previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same
title of this Code.
10. That the offender has been previously punished by an offense to which the
law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it
attaches a lighter penalty.
11. That the crime be committed in consideration of a price, reward, or
promise.
12. That the crime be committed by means of inundation, fire, poison,
explosion, stranding of a vessel or international damage thereto, derailment of a
locomotive, or by the use of any other artifice involving great waste and ruin.
13. That the act be committed with evidence premeditation.
14. That the craft, fraud or disguise be employed.
15. That advantage be taken of superior strength, or means be employed to
weaken the defense.
16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.chanrobles virtual law
library
17. That means be employed or circumstances brought about which add
ignominy to the natural effects of the act.
18. That the crime be committed after an unlawful entry.
There is an unlawful entry when an entrance of a crime a wall, roof, floor, door,
or window be broken.
20. That the crime be committed with the aid of persons under fifteen years of
age or by means of motor vehicles, motorized watercraft, airships, or other
similar means. (As amended by RA 5438).
21. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately
augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its commissions.
A. INSULT TO PUBLIC AUTHORITIES
PEOPLE VS RODIL
MAKASIAR, J.:
Accused Floro Rodil was found guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime
of murder by the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, for the death of Lt.
Guillermo Masana of the Philippine Constabulary. Accordingly, he was
sentenced to death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
P12,000.00, to pay the amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages and another
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.
The information alleges:
That on or about April 24, 1971, in the Municipality of Indang, Province of
Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a double-bladed dagger, with evident
premeditation and treachery, and with intent to kill, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the
latter was in the performance of his official duties, inflicting upon him stab
wounds on the different parts of his body which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law
From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, We glean the following facts:
At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the deceased, PC Lt.
Guillermo Masana together with PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Philippine Coast
Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa and Patrolman Felix Mojica of Indang, Cavite,
was having lunch inside a restaurant in front of the Indang market (pp. 2,3,
t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10, 19, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; p. 21, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972).
While they were eating, they saw, through the glass panel of the restaurant,
appellant outside the restaurant blowing his whistle. Their attention having been
drawn to what appellant was doing, Lt. Masana then in civilian clothing,
accompanied by PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, went out of the restaurant,
approached appellant and asked the latter, after Identifying himself as a PC
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officer, whether the gun that was tucked in his waist had a license. Instead of
answering the question of Lt. Masana appellant moved one step backward and
attempted to draw his gun. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel immediately grabbed
appellant's gun from appellant's waist and gave it to Lt. Masana After that, Lt.
Masana told the appellant to go inside the restaurant. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel
followed. Lt. Masana and the appellant occupied a separate table about one and
one-half (1 1/2) meters from the table of Lt. Masana's three companions —
Fidel, Ligsa and Mojica (p. 10, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). After the two were already
seated, Lt. Masana placed appellant's gun on the table. After that Lt. Masana
pulled out a piece of coupon bond paper from his pocket and wrote thereon the
receipt for the gun, and after signing it, he asked appellant to countersign the
same, but appellant refused to do so. Instead, he asked Lt. Masana to return the
gun to him. Lt. Masana rejected appellant's plea, telling, the latter that they
would talk the matter over in the municipal building of Indang, Cavite. When
Lt. Masana was about to stand up, appellant suddenly pulled out a double-
bladed dagger and with it he stabbed Lt. Masana several times, on the chest and
stomach causing his death several hours thereafter (pp. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, t.s.n., Oct.
30, 1971; pp. 10, 11, 12, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971).
While the stabbing incident was taking place, the three companions of Lt.
Masana — PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Coast Guard Ricardo Ligsa and policeman
Felix Mojica — who were all seated at a separate table about one and one-half
(1 1/2) meters away from that occupied by the accused and Lt. Masana stood
up to assist Lt. Masana but Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang, Cavite,
who happened to be taking his lunch in the same restaurant, was quicker than
any of them in going near the combatants and embraced and/or grabbed the
accused from behind, and thereafter wrested the dagger from the accused-
appellant. Immediately thereafter, the Chief of Police brought the accused to
the municipal building of Indang, Cavite (p. 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 19-20,
t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; pp. 26, 28, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972), while the companions of
Lt. Masana brought the latter to the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City where he
expired several hours later as a result of the stab wounds inflicted by the
accused (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). Dr. Felicisimo del Rosario, Medico-
Legal Officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, conducted an autopsy of
the cadaver of Lt. Masana and made the following findings, which are embodied
in his Report, Exhibits "D" and "D-1 " (pp. 88-89, rec.), and which reads as
follows:
Postmortem findings.
General:
Fairly developed and nourished male subject in rigor mortis with postmortem
lividity over the dependent portions of the body. Pupils are dilated. Finger and
toe tips are pale. There is an exploratory laparotomy incision at the abdomen,
measuring 21 cm. long, 3 cm. left of the anterior midline, with eighteen (18)
stitches applied. There are surgical incisions at the left and right abdomen,
measuring 2 cm. long, 9 cm. from the anterior midline and 2 cm. long, 6.5 cm.
from the anterior midline with two (2) stitches applied and a rubber drain
sticking out of each, respectively.
TRUNK:
(1) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 0.9 by 0.4 cm., 5 cm. from the
anterior midline, 128 cm. above the heel, 1 cm. deep, directed posterior wards
and slightly upwards, passing superficially between muscles and tissues.
(2) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 1.2 by 0.4 cm., 9 cm. from the
anterior midline, 121 cm. above the heel, 5.5. cm. deep, directed posterior
wards, downwards and to the left, lacerating the muscles at the 4th intercostal
space.
(3) Stab wound, abdomen, measuring 0.9 by 0.2 cm. just left of the anterior
midline, 96 cm. above the heel 11 cm. deep, directed posterior wards, upwards
and to the left, perforating the greater curvature of the stomach and the gastric
vessels, grazing the liver, perforating the diaphragm and infero-medial border of
the lower lobe of the right lung.
(4) Impact abrasion, right scapular region, measuring 2 by 0.2 cm., 12 cm.
from the posterior midline, 127 cm. above the heel.
UPPER EXTREMITIES:
(5) Incised wound, anterior aspect of the distal third of the left arm,
measuring 3 by 0.5 cm., just medial to its anterior midline.
(6) Incised wound, posterior aspect of the proximal phalange of the right
index finger, measuring 1 by 0.2 cm., just medial to its posterior midline.
Five hundred (500) cc. blood and blood clots accumulated in the thoracic cavity.
There are four (4) sutures applied at a lacerated wound at the greater curvature
of the stomach.
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There is nothing remarkable in the unaffected organs internally.
REMARKS:
Cause of death is cardio-respiratory arrest due to severe shock and intrathoracic
hemorrhage as a result of multiple stab wounds of the body, perforating the
stomach, gastric vessels, liver, diaphragm and lower lobe of the right lung.
Claiming self-defense, the accused, on the other hand, maintains and relies on
the following facts:
At about 1: 00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the accused and his
wife were in a restaurant near the market place of Indang, Cavite, in order to
take their lunch. They had just come from Mandaluyong, Rizal where they
reside (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971). Inside the restaurant, the accused saw
three persons to his right, eating, while to his left he saw a person whom he
later learned to be Lt. Guillermo Masana drinking beer alone. While the accused
and his wife were waiting for the food to be served, Lt. Masana approached him
and asked him whether he was Floro Rodil and whether he was a member of
the Anti- Smuggling Unit. After receiving an affirmative answer, Lt. Masana
invited the accused to join him in his table. The accused accepted the invitation
so the two moved over to the officer's table where the deceased offered beer to
the accused who, however, refused saying he was still hungry. In the course of
their conversation, Lt. Masana told the accused not to report any matter about
smuggling to the PC. The accused informed the officer that he had not reported
any smuggling activity to the authorities. Lt. Masana then asked the accused for
his identification card as a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit, which the latter
did by showing his ID card, Exhibit " 1 ", bearing his picture and indicating that
he was an officer of the Anti-Communist League of the Philippines (pp. 62-68,
t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971).
Thereupon, Lt. Masana told the accused that the latter's ID was fake, and after
the accused insisted that it was genuine, Lt. Masana tried to take it away from
the accused when the latter was about to put it back in his pocket. Because of
his refusal to give his Id card to Lt. Masana the latter got mad and, in an angry
tone of voice, demanded: "Will you give it to me or not?" (P. 7 1, Ibid). Still the
accused refused to surrender his ID to Lt. Masana Thereupon, the latter pulled
a gun from his waist and hit the accused on the head with its handle two (2)
time Immediately, blood gushed from his head and face. When Lt. Masana was
about to hit the accused for the third time, the latter parried the right hand of
the officer, pulled his "pangsaksak" and stabbed the officer two or three times
and then pushed him away from him and ran out of the restaurant (pp.
74,75,79, Ibid).
The accused went in the direction of the municipal building of Indang, Cavite,
where he intended to surrender to the authorities. But on his way, he met Primo
Panaligan, the Chief of Police of Indang, Cavite. The Chief of Police asked him
why his head and face were bloody and he answered that he was hit by Lt.
Masana on the head with a gun (pp. 86, 89, t.s.n., Ibid). If here upon, the Chief
of Police asked somebody to accompany the accused to the municipal building.
Arriving there, one Victor, a policeman of Indang, Cavite, accompanied him to
Dr. Ruben Ochoa, whose clinic was just across the street where the municipal
building is located (p. 9, t.s.n., Ibid; p. 4, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971). After he was
given first aid treatment, he was brought back by the Indang policeman to the
municipal, building where he was detained for two days before he was picked
up by the Philippine Constabulary operatives and transferred to the 121th PC
Headquarters in Tagaytay City (pp. 90-91, t.s.n., Ibid; pp. 4, 39, 40, t.s.n., Dec.
10, 1971; p. 6, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971; p. 5, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972).
After due trial, the court a quo rendered a decision sentencing the accused as
heretofore stated.
I
Self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be proven by clear, sufficient,
satisfactory and convincing evidence (People vs. Libed 14 SCRA 410, 413;
People vs. Mendoza, 13 SCRA 11, 17; People vs. Solaña, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66;
People vs. Davis, 1 SCRA 473; 477; People vs. Paras, 80 Phil. 149; 152; People
vs. Berio 59 Phil. 533; 536; People vs. Gimena, 59 Phil. 509, 514). Moreover, to
prove justification, the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence
and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if it were weak, it
could not be disbelieved after the accused had admitted the killing (People vs.
Llamera, 51 SCRA 48, 57; People vs. Talaboc, 30 SCRA 87; People vs. Navarro,
25 SCRA 491; 496; People vs. Solaña, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66; People vs. Espenilla,
62 Phil. 264, 270; People vs. Apolinario, 58 Phil 586-588; People vs. Ansoyon,
65 Phil. 7 7 2). The rationale for this jurisprudence is that, having admitted the
wounding or killing of the victim, the accused must be held criminally liable for
the crime unless he establishes to the satisfaction of the court the fact of
legitimate self-defense.
In the case at bar, the accused contends that it was the deceased, Lt. Guillermo
Masana who committed unlawful aggression when the latter hit him on his head
with the handle of his gun after he refused to surrender his (accused's) ID to
him.
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This claim does not merit belief.
The accused claims that after he refused to give his ID to the deceased because
the same was his and he also spent money for it, the latter hit him with the
handle of his (deceased's) gun. WE cannot perceive how this refusal of the
accused could have provoked or enraged the deceased to the extent of initiating
the aggression by drawing his pistol and hitting the accused with its butt,
knowing that the accused was no longer armed after the latter's gun had earlier
been taken away from him. Besides, an agent of authority, like the deceased,
ordinarily is not authorized to use force, except in an extreme case when he is
attacked, or subject to active resistance, and finds no other way to comply with
his duty or cause himself to be obeyed by the offender. Furthermore, the
records reveal an unrebutted fact to the effect that the deceased was unarmed
when the incident happened, he being then on leave. As a matter of fact, he was
then in civilian clothing (pp. 29-30, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972). WE are, therefore,
inclined to believe that it was the accused who had every reason to be resentful
of the deceased and to be enraged after the deceased refused to heed his plea
that his gun be returned him; because he might be prosecuted for illegal
possession of firearms. Accordingly, We are constrained to draw the inescapable
conclusion that it was the accused, not the deceased, who initiated the
aggression which ended in the fatal wounding of the deceased resulting in his
death.
The accused further claims that he was hit twice by the deceased before he
parried the third blow. This claim is belied by the record. During the trial, the
court a quo asked the accused to show the scar produced by the injuries
inflicted by the deceased when he refused to give his ID thus —
Court
Q Where is that scar?
(Witness showing his right side of the head to the Court)"
[pp. 86,88, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971].
Dr. Ruben Ochoa who treated the injuries of the accused corroborated the
foregoing testimony in his medical findings, Exhibit "3", which reads:
Injuries:
(1) lacerated wound 1/2 inch, parietal region.
(2) lacerated wound, 1 1/2 inches, rt ear lobe
(3) contusion, right mastoid area [Exh. "3"; p. 116, rec] .
The record reveals that the deceased was a right-handed person (pp. 76-77,
t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971). It also shows that before the stabbing incident took place,
the deceased and the accused were facing each other. If that was the case, and
considering that the deceased was, according to the accused, holding the gun
with his right hand, why was the accused hit on the right side of his head and
and on his right ear lobe WE find that this particular claim of the accused that it
was the deceased who first hit him twice with the handle of his gun before
parrying the third blow and then stabbing the latter is definitely belied not only
by the location of the scar but also by the medical finding of Dr. Ochoa
aforequoted. Indeed, if the protagonists were facing each other, and it appearing
that they were both right- handed (p. 13, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971), the blow given
by one, if not parried by the other, would perforce land on the left, and not on
the right, side of the body of the recipient of the blow. WE, therefore, reject
such claim for being improbable, the same being contrary to the natural course
of human behavior.
The fact of the matter, however, as testified to by state witness PC soldier
Virgilio Fidel, is that the victim parried with both hands the thrust of the
appellant with such force that appellant bumped his head on the edge of the
table causing blood to ooze from the resulting injury on his head.
When the accused allegedly met the Chief of Police of Indang, Cavite, on his
way to the municipal building from the scene of the stabbing incident
purportedly to surrender to the authorities, he claims that he told the Chief of
Police that Lt. Masana hit him on his head with the handle of his (Masana's)
gun. On his return from the clinic of Dr. Ochoa where his injuries were treated,
he was detained in the municipal building of Indang, Cavite for two days before
he was transferred to the Tagaytay PC Headquarters. During all this time, he did
not give any written statement, much less inform any PC or other police agency
that he stabbed Lt. Masana in self-defense. It was only on July 8, 1971. after the
lapse of more than two and one-half (2 1/2) months that he claimed self-
defense during the preliminary investigation of the case before the municipal
judge of Indang, Cavite (pp. 44, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971). If the accused had really
acted in self-defense, he would surely have so informed the Chief of Police at
the first opportunity. He only allegedly told the Chief of Police, who allegedly
asked him why his head and face were bloody, that Lt. Masana hit him with a
gun. He did not tell the Police Chief that he was surrendering for stabbing the
deceased in self-defense. This claim of the accused made before the municipal
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judge of Indang, Cavite, on July 8, 1971 aforesaid constitutes an exculpatory
statement made so long after the crime was committed on April 24, 1971. Such
claim does not deserve credence since the same is obviously an afterthought,
which cannot overthrow the straightforward testimony of prosecution witnesses
PC soldier Virgilio Fidel and Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa both
disinterested and unbiased witnesses, whose testimony as peace officers, in the
absence of any showing as to any motive that would impel them to distort the
truth, must be afforded full faith and credit as a whole.
The fact that the chief of police detained the accused that same day after he was
treated by Dr. Ochoa, confirms the testimony of the state witnesses that the
police was present during the incident between the appellant and the victim and
that the police chief embraced appellant and grabbed the knife from appellant,
whom he thereafter brought to the municipal building.
II
Was the crime committed murder or homicide merely or murder or homicide
complexed with assault upon an agent of authority?
According to the Solicitor General, the crime committed was murder because
"it was established by the prosecution that during the stabbing incident,
appellant suddenly and without giving the victim a chance to defend himself,
stabbed the latter several times with a dagger, inflicting upon mortal wounds on
the chest and stomach. ...Needless to say, such a sudden and unexpected attack
with a deadly weapon on an unarmed and unsuspecting victim, which made it
impossible for the latter to flee or defend himself before the fatal blow is
delivered, is alevosia or treachery" (p. 14, Appellee's brief).
In support of his contention, the Solicitor General cited the cases of U.S. vs.
Cornejo (28 Phil. 475); People vs. Palomo (43 O.G. No. 10, 4190).
WE do not agree with the Solicitor General. Alevosia or treachery is belied by
the following testimony of Virgilio Fidel, star witness for the prosecution:
COURT
Q What is the truth?
A The truth is that when I saw that Floro Rodil stabbed Lt. Guillermo Masana,
Masana parried him and his head (Rodil's head) bumped on the edge of a table;
that is why he sustained an injury and blood oozed from his head (pp. 8-9, t.s.n.,
Jan. 20, 1972; emphasis supplied).
Then, on cross-examination, the same witness testified:
ATTY. MUÑOZ
Q You said that Floro Rodil's head was bumped on the edge of a table
and you saw blood oozing from his head, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who bumped the head of Rodil on the table?
A When Masana parried his stab with his hands he accidentally bumped
his head on the table.
Q Is it not a fact that Floro Rodil is much bigger than Lt. Masana
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean, by simple parrying, Floro Rodil was pushed to the extent that he
bumped his head on the table?
A The force of Lt. Masana might have been strong in parrying.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When the head of Rodil bumped on the table, was Lt. Masana already
stabbed?
A It could be that he was already stabbed or he was not yet stabbed.
pp 30-31, 33, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972; emphasis supplied].
After a thorough analysis of the aforequoted portions of the testimony of
Virgilio Fidel, one of the prosecution witnesses, WE can only conclude that the
assailant and the victim were indeed face to face when the stabbing took place.
As such the attack was not treacherous because the victim was able to ward off
the same with his hand. As a matter of fact, the force he used in warding off the
attack was so strong that the accused bumped his head on a table nearby,
causing injuries to him which necessitated medical treatment. In short, the
attack on the victim was made on the spur of the moment. The suddenness of
the attack does not by itself suffice to support a finding of treachery (People vs.
Torejas, et al., 43 SCRA 158, 167). Besides, the record failed to show that the
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accused made any preparation to kill his victim so as to insure the commission
of the crime, making it at the same time possible or hard for the victim to
defend himself or retaliate (People vs. Saez, 1 11 Phil. 546, 553, citing the case
of People vs. Tumaob, 83 Phil. 738). Neither does it show that the accused
employed means directly and specially tending to insure the killing without risk
to himself. On the contrary, it shows that the accused was easily within striking
distance of his three companions, two of whom were police officers.
Furthermore, there was an altercation between the accused and the victim about
the confiscation by the latter of the gun belonging to the former, and at the
moment when the victim was about to stand up, the accused drew a knife from
his pocket and with it stabbed the victim in the chest. Clearly, therefore, the
impelling motive for the attack by appellant on his victim was the latter's
performance of official duty, which the former resented. This kind of evidence
does not clearly show the presence of treachery in the commission of the crime.
Alevosia is not to be presumed, but must be proved as conclusively as the act
which it qualifies (People vs. Abril, 51 Phil. 670, 675). This is so because in the
explicit language of the Revised Penal Code, alevosia or treachery exists when
the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make [Art. 14, par. 16, Revised Penal Code].
While the evidence definitely demonstrated that appellant knew because the
victim, who was in civilian clothing, told him that he was an agent of a person in
authority; he cannot be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with
assault upon an agent of a person in authority, for the simple reason that the
information does not allege the fact that the accused then knew that, before or
at the time of the assault, the victim was an agent of a person in authority. The
information simply alleges that appellant did attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo
Masana while the latter was in the performance of his official duties, ..." Such an
allegation cannot be an adequate substitute for the essential averment to justify
a conviction of the complex crime, which necessarily requires the imposition of
the maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the graver offense. Like a
qualifying circumstance, such knowledge must be expressly and specifically
averred in the information; otherwise, in the absence of such allegation, the
required knowledge, like a qualifying circumstance, although proven, would only
be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Applying this principle,
the attack on the victim, who was known to the appellant as a peace officer,
could be considered only as aggravating, being "in contempt or with insult to
the public authorities" (Par. 1, Art. XIV of the Revised Penal Code), or as an
"insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his
rank, ..." (par. 3, Art. XIV, Revised Penal Code).
It is essential that the accused must have knowledge that the person attacked
was a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties, because the
accused must have the intention to offend, injure, or assault the offended party
as a person in authority or agent of a person in authority (People vs. Villaseñor
35 SCRA 460 [19701, People vs. Rellin 72 Phil. 1038 [1947]; US vs. Alvear et al.,
35 Phil. 626 [1916]).
In the case of People vs. Balbar (21 SCRA 1119, Nov. 29, 1967), it was held that
failure to expressly alleged in the information that the accused had knowledge
that the person attacked was a person in authority does not render the
information defective so long as there are facts alleged therein from which it
can be implied that the accused knew that the person attacked was a person in
authority. Thus, the information for Direct Assault upon a person in authority
reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Tiburcio Balbar of the
crime of Assault upon a Person in Authority, committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in Barrio Cumba, Municipality
of Lian, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault Miss Ester Gonzales, a public school teacher
in the school bonding of Lian, duly qualified and appointed as such and while in
the performance of her official duties or on the occasion therefor, by then and
there pulling his dagger, embraced and kissed. and repeatedly trying to embrace
and kiss the said teacher, Miss Ester Gonzales. That the crime was committed
with the aggravating circumstances of having committed it inside the school
building and during school classes.
Contrary to law.
And the ruling of the Court was:
Direct assault is committed 'by any person or persons who, without a public
uprising, ... shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any
person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of
official duties, or on occasion of such performance' (See Art. 148, Revised Penal
Code).
By express provision of law (Com. Act No. 578, now part of Article 152 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1978), "teachers,
professors, and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly
recognized private schools, colleges and universities shall be deemed persons in
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authority, in applying the provisions of article 148." This special classification is
obviously intended to give teachers protection, dignity, and respect while in the
performance of their official duties. The lower court, however, dismissed the
information on the ground that there is no express allegation in the information
that the accused had knowledge that the person attacked was a person in
authority. This is clearly erroneous.
Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the accused
knew that fact, since she was in her classroom and engaged in the performance
of her duties. He therefore knew that she was a person in authority, as she was
so by specific provision of law. It matters not that such knowledge on his part is
not expressly alleged, complainant's status as a person in authority being a
matter of law and not of fact, ignorance thereof could not excuse non-
compliance on his part (Article 3, Civil Code). This article applies to all kinds of
domestic laws, whether civil or penal (De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil 15) and
whether substantive or remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil. 254) for reasons of
expediency, policy and necessity.
But, in the case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, Branch V (68 SCRA 305, Nov.
28, 1975), the information for Direct Assault reads:
That on or about the 17th day of January, 1974, at Barrio Languyin,
Municipality of Potillo, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Ernesto Busto,
Paulo Coralde, Dony Grande and Jose Astjada each of whom was armed with a
piece of wood, except Paulo Coraide conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, box and strike with said pieces of wood one Rufino
Camonias a councilman of barrio Languyin of said municipality, duly elected
and qualified as such while said councilman was engaged in the actual
performance of his duties.
The trial court dismissed the same on the ground that:
Of importance in this case is the lack of allegation in the complaint or in the
information that the offended party was an agent of a person in authority and
that such fact was known to the accused. The absence of such allegation is fatal
in this case."
The People appealed to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
This Court held that the fiscal's proper course of action is not a petition for
review on certiorari but the refiling of a valid information against the accused,
for the following considerations:
The Solicitor General in his comment of November 4, 1975 duly observed that
'(I)t is patent that the acquittal of the accused herein is not on the merits. There
is want of factual finding upon which their conviction or acquittal could have
been based.'
It need only be observed that contrary to the fiscal's contention, the
information was deficient in that it did not allege an essential element of the
crime of direct assault that the accused had knowledge of or knew the position
of authority held by the person attacked, viz. that of a barrio councilman (and
hence the agent of a person in authority under Article 152 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended by Republic Act No. 1978) [See U.S. vs. Alvear 35 Phil. 626;
People vs. Rellin 77 Phil. 1038; Vol. 11, Padilla's Revised Penal Code, 10th Ed.,
p. 225].
What was held in People vs. Balbar 21 SCRA, 119,1123, cited by the fiscal is
that it is sufficient that the information alleged that the accused knew the
position of authority, held by the offended party, in that case a public school
teacher, then engaged in the performance of her official duties, and that it is not
necessary to allege further that the accused also knew that such position was
that of a person in authority, since 'this is a matter of law' thus:
Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the accused
knew that fact, since she was in her classroom and engaged in the performance
of her duties. He therefore knew that she was a person in authority, as she was
so by specific provision of law. It matters not that such knowledge on `his part
is not expressly alleged, complainant's status as a person in authority being a
matter of law and not of fact, ignorance whereof could not excuse non-
compliance on his part (Article 3, Civil Code). This article applies to all kinds of
domestic laws, whether civil or penal (De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15) and
whether substantive or remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil, 254) for reasons of
expediency, policy and necessity.
Since the 'decision' of acquittal was really a mere dismissal of the information
for failure to charge an offense and was not a decision on the merits with
factual findings as per the trial judge's own disavowal it is patent that the fiscal's
proper course is not the present petition but the refiling of a valid information
against respondents-accused, as herein indicated.
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ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed without prejudice to the refiling of
a valid information against respondents-accused as hereinabove indicated
(emphasis supplied).
The ruling in the aforementioned case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, etc., supra,
applies to the instant case; because the information in the former is strikingly
similar to the information in the latter and does not allege facts from which
inference can be deduced that the accused knew that the person assaulted is a
person, or an agent of a person, in authority.
The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated
because it is obvious that the victim, PC. Lt. Masana Identified himself as a PC
officer to the accused who is merely a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and
therefore inferior both in rank and social status to the victim.
The term "rank" should be given its plain, ordinary meaning, and as such, refers
to a high social position or standing as a grade in the armed forces (Webster's
Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, p.
1881); or to a graded official standing or social position or station (75 CJS 458);
or to the order or place in which said officers are placed in the army and navy in
relation to others (Encyclopedic Law Dictionary, Third Edition, Walter A.
Shumaker and George Foster Longsdorf, p. 90); or to the designation or title of
distinction conferred upon an officer in order to fix his relative position in
reference to other officers in matters of privileges, precedence, and sometimes
of command or by which to determine his pay and emoluments as in the case of
army staff officers (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 2804); or to a
grade or official standing, relative position in civil or social life, or in any scale
of comparison, status, grade, including its grade, status or scale of comparison
within a position (Vol. 36, Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, p. 100).
Thus, rank aggravated the killing of a staff sergeant by his corporal (People vs.
Mil 92 SCRA 89, 105-106, July 30, 1979), the killing of the Assistant Chief of
Personnel Transaction of the Civil Service Commission by a clerk therein
(People vs. Benito, 62 SCRA 351, 357-358, Feb. 13, 1975), the murder by a
pupil of his teacher (U.S. vs. Cabling, 7 Phil. 469. 474; People vs. Aragon &
Lopez, 107 Phil. 706, 709), the murder of a municipal mayor (People vs. Lopez
de Leon, et al., 69 Phil. 298), the murder -of a city chief of police by the chief of
the secret service division (People vs. Hollero 88 Phil. 167), assault upon a 66-
year old District Judge of the Court of First Instance by a justice of the peace
(People vs. Torrecarreori CA 52 OG 7644), the killing of a Spanish consul by
his subordinate — a mere chancellor (People vs. Godinez, 106 Phil. 597,
606607), and the killing of an army general (People vs. Torres, et al., L-4642,
May 29, 1953).
As explained by Mr. Justice Mariano Albert, then of the Court of Appeals, those
"generally considered of high station in life, on account of their rank (as well as
age or sex), deserve to be respected. Therefore, whenever there is a difference in
social condition between the offender and the offended party, this aggravating
circumstance sometimes is present" (Albert M.A. — The Revised Penal Code
Annotated, 1946 Ed., p. 109).
The difference in official or social status between a P.C. lieutenant and a mere
member of an anti-smuggling unit, is patent.
If the accused herein were charged with the complex crime of murder with
assault against an agent of a person in authority, and not merely murder, then
the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank or contempt of or insult to
public authority cannot be appreciated as aggravating because either
circumstance is inherent in the charge of assault against a person in authority or
an agent of a person in authority. But in the case at bar, the appellant is accused
of murder only. Consequently, either aggravating circumstance should be
considered in the imposition of the penalty.
Thus, in the following cases where the charge was merely murder or frustrated
murder, the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank was appreciated:
(1) People vs. Benito, supra — the appellant, a clerk in the Civil Service
Commission, was charged with and convicted of the murder of the assistant
chief of the personnel transaction of the said Commission;
(2) People vs. Torres, et al., supra — the appellants were charged with and
convicted of murder for the death of Army Col. Valentin Salgado and
attempted murder for the injuries inflicted on Army Gen. Mariano Castaneda;
(3) People vs. Valeriano, et al. — appellants were accused and convicted of
robbery with homicide for the killing of District Judge Bautista of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga [90 Phil. 15, 34-35]; and
(4) People vs. Hollero supra — where the accused chief of the Secret Division
of the Bacolod City Police Department was convicted of murder for the killing
of the chief of police.
The aggravating circumstance of contempt of, or insult to, public authority
under paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code can likewise be
appreciated in the case at bar.
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IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
The evidence of the prosecution clearly established that Chief of Police Primo
Panaligan of Indang was present as he was taking his lunch in the same
restaurant when the incident occurred.
As a matter of fact, the said chief of police was the one who embraced or
grabbed the accused from behind, wrested the dagger from him and thereafter
brought him to the municipal building of Indang. And appellant admittedly
knew him even then as the town chief of police, although he now claims that he
went to the municipal building to surrender to the chief of police who was not
allegedly in the restaurant during the incident.
While it is true that in the cases of U.S. vs. Rodriguez, et al. (19 Phil. 150, 157-
158), People vs. Siojo (61 Phil. 307, 317), and People vs. Verzo (21 SCRA
1403), this Court ruled that the term public authority refers to a person in
authority and that a PC lieutenant or town chief of police is not a public
authority but merely an agent of a person in authority; there is need of re-
examining such a ruling since it is not justified by the employment of the term
public authority in aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article 14 instead of the term
person in authority which is specifically used in Articles 148 and 152 of the
Revised Penal Code. There is no extended reasoning of the doctrine enunciated
in the aforesaid three (3) cases why the phrase public authority should
comprehend only persons in authority. The lawmaker could have easily utilized
the term "persons in authority" in the aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article 14 in
much the same way that it employed the said phrase in Articles 148 and 1452.
The lawmaker must have intended a different meaning for the term public
authority, which may however include, but not limited to persons in authority.
Under the decided cases, a municipal mayor, barrio captain, barrio lieutenant or
barangay captain is a person in authority or a public authority. Even a public
school teacher is now considered a person in authority under CA 578 amending
Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code (Sarcepudes vs. People, 90 Phil 228). So
is the town municipal health officer (People vs. Quebral et al., 73 Phil 640), as
well as a nurse, a municipal councilor or an agent of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (People vs. Yosoya, CA-GR No. 8522-R, May 26, 1955; People vs.
Reyes, et al O.G.S. 11 p. 24).
The chief of police should therefore be considered a public authority or a
person in authority; for he is vested with jurisdiction or authority to maintain
peace and order and is specifically duty bound to prosecute and to apprehend
violators of the laws and municipal ordinances, more than the aforementioned
officials who cannot prosecute and who are not even enjoined to arrest
malefactors although specifically mentioned as persons in authority by the
decided cases and by Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A.
1978 of June 22, 1957. The town chief of police heads and supervises the entire
police force in the municipality as well as exercises his authority over the entire
territory of the municipality, which is patently greater than and includes the
school premises or the town clinic or barrio, to which small area the authority
or jurisdiction of the teacher, nurse, or barrio lieutenant, respectively, is limited.
With two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstance, the
appellant should therefore be condemned to suffer the maximum period of
reclusion temporal the penalty prescribed for homicide.
WHEREFORE, HAVING BEEN FOUND GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF HOMICIDE AGGRAVATED BY
CONTEMPT FOR OR INSULT TO A PUBLIC AUTHORITY OR
DISREGARD OF THE RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY ON
ACCOUNT OF HIS RANK, APPELLANT FLORO RODIL IS HEREBY
SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN INDETERMINATE TERM OF
IMPRISONMENT RANGING FROM 12 YEARS OF RECLUSION
TEMPORAL AS MAXIMUM.
THUS MODIFIED, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY
AFFIRMED IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS.
Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., concur in the result.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the judgment's imposition of the maximum penalty for homicide,
although I join Mme. Justice Herrera's partial dissent insofar as she holds that
the aggravating circumstance of contempt of or insult to the public authorities
may not be appreciated. However, disregard of rank was properly appreciated as
a generic aggravating circumstance, and hence the maximum penalty for
homicide is properly imposed in the absence of any mitigating circumstance.
Barredo, J., concur.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I believe that neither the aggravating circumstance of contempt of, or insult to
the public authorities under Article 14, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, nor
116
IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
that of insult or disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account
of his rank under Article 14, par. 3 of the same Code, is applicable to the
present case.
1. For the circumstance of contempt of, or with insult to, public authorities to
be considered aggravating, it is essential (a) that the crime is committed in the
presence of a public authority, not a mere agent of the authorities (People vs.
Siojo, 61 Phil. 307 [19351; People vs. Verzo, et al 21 SCRA 1403 [1967]; and (b)
that the public authority is engaged in the exercise of his functions and is not
the person against whom the crime is committed (People vs. Siojo, citing U.S.
vs. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150 [191]; Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain dated
January 24, 1881, 1 Viada 310), nor the one injured by the commission of the
offense (People vs. Pardo, 79 Phil. 568 [1947]).
In this case, Lt. Guillermo Masana of the Philippine Constabulary is not a
public authority nor a person in authority as these terms are defined by Article
152, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code for he is not directly vested with
jurisdiction, that is, power or authority to govern and execute the laws or to
hear and decide a cause; he is a mere agent of a person in authority as defined
by Article 152, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, he being a member of the
Philippine Constabulary which is a government military agency in charge of the
maintenance of public order and the protection and security of fife and
property. In fact, the Decision itself calls him an agent of a person in authority
(p. 13).
And even if Lt. Masana were a person in authority, this aggravating
circumstance cannot be taken into account because it is he himself who is the
offended party (People vs. Siojo, supra).
2. Neither can the second circumstance, that of disregard of the respect
due to rank, be made to apply. It is not the existence alone of rank of the
offended party that determines the presence of this aggravating circumstance.
There must be a difference in the social condition of the offender and the
offended party.
El concepto de dignidad en su aspects general no esta constituido solo por el
caracter de authoridad solo por la funcion publica o cargo que desempene el
ofendido sino tambien pro la diferencia de condicion social entre la victims y el
ofensor ... (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal Decimotercera edicion Tomo I, p.
554).
Where the offender and the offended party are of the same rank, this
aggravating circumstance does not apply.
Las personas constituidas en dignidad, y que por esta razon merecen mayor
respeto, son las que generalmente se consideran por todo el mundo como
superiores o mas elevadas que el que comets el delito: tales son los sacerdotes y
las Autoridades respecto de los particulares, los maestros con relacion a sus
discipulos, los guardadores respecto de sus pupilos, etc. Siempre, pues, que hay
diferencia de condicion social entre el ofensor y el ofendido, concurrira la
agravante de este numero, mas no cuando hay igualdad Asi pues, si un
Sacerdote o un Magistrado calumnian a otro Sacerdote o Magistrado
respectivamente, no existira la circunstancia de agravacion que comentamos.
(Viada Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870, Tomo II, p. 316).
The provision contemplates such a different in rank as that of a teacher where
the offender is a pupil (U.S. vs. Cabiling, 7 Phil. 469 [1907]) (although a teacher
is now considered a person in authority); a Judge where the offender is a private
citizen (People vs. Valeriano, et al., 90 Phil. 15 [1951]); a General of the
Philippine Army where the offender is a private citizen (People vs. Torres, et al.,
L- 4642, May 29, 1953); a Chief of Police, a superior of the accused, who was
chief of a division of the secret police (People vs. Hollero 88 Phil. 167 [1951]); a
ranking official of the Civil Service Commission where the offender is a clerk
thereat (People vs. Benito, 74 SCRA 271 [1976]); a Consul who was killed by a
chancellor in the Consulate, who is a subordinate (People vs. Martinez Godinez,
106 Phil 597 [1959]).
In the case at bar, the difference in the social condition and rank of the victim, a
Lieutenant in the Philippine Constabulary, and that of the accused, who is a
member of an anti-smuggling unit and an officer of the Anti-Communist
League of the Philippines, is not of such a degree as to justify consideration of
disrespect of rank due to the offended party as an aggravating circumstance.
In the absence of the two aggravating circumstances discussed above or of any
mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposable is reclusion temporal in its
medium period, and the accused should be sentenced to an indeterminate term
of imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.
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B. DWELLING
PEOPLE VS DANIEL
MUÑOZ PALMA, J:
This case originated from the Court of First Instance of Baguio City by virtue of
a complaint filed by 13-year old Margarita Paleng accusing Amado Daniel alias
"Amado Ato" of rape alleged to have been committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 1965, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein
accused, armed with a sharp instrument and by means of force and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
the undersignedcomplaint, against her will, and in her own room situated at No.
25 Interior, Pinsao, Guisad, Baguio City.
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstance that it was
committed in the dwelling of the offended party, the latter not having
givenprovocation for it, is present. (p. 1, CFI record)
The trial court, presided then by Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, after due trial
rendered its decision on May 30, 1966, finding the accused guilty and sentencing
him to suffer "not more than TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
reclusion temporal and not less than SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
prision mayor, and to pay the costs." 1
His motion for reconsideration and new trial having been denied, accused filed
a notice of appeal; forthwith the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
On September 23, 1974, the Court of Appeals through its Tenth Division
rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We find that the guilt of the accused Amado
Daniel has been proven beyond reasonable doubt, and he should accordingly
suffer the penalty for the crime herein charged.
We find, however, that the sentence imposed the accused in the judgment
appealed from is not in accordance with law.
Republic Act No. 4111, which took effect on June 20, 1964, amended Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, providing that —
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by
two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
Under Section 17 of Chapter 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No.
296, as amended) —
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court may provide, final
judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in —
(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is
death or life imprisonment; ...
WHEREFORE, We hereby certify this case to the Supreme Court for
appropriate further proceedings pursuant to law. 2
By virtue of the foregoing decision of the Court of Appeals the case was
certified to this Court and in a Resolution of March 6, 1975, the same was
ordered docketed. 3
Preliminary question —
The certification of the case to Us poses a preliminary question which strikes at
the very root of a long standing practice and procedure evoked for the last forty
years or so since the creation of the Court of Appeals. 4
Is the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to act on an appeal in a criminal case
where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua or death certified to it by
the Court of Appeals with findings of facts and of the guilt of the accused, but
without imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death on the appellant
pursuant to Rule 124, Section 12, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court?5
Mr. Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, joined by other ,Justices, expresses the view
that for this Court to acquire jurisdiction over the appeal, the decision before
Us must have imposed on the appellant the penalty either of reclusion perpetua
or death as the facts warranted.
The rest of the Justices together with the writer of this Opinion, believe
otherwise and hold the view that the dispositive portion of the decision as
written and rendered is in accordance with the Constitution and the law, and
vests jurisdiction on the Court to act on the appeal.
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IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
A. In People v. Ramos, decided on November 28, 1947, 6 a case was certified to
this Court by the Court of Appeals without findings of facts and simply on the
ground that it was "on the opinion that the penalty that should be imposed ill
this case is reclusion perpetua, as recommended by the Solicitor-General, and
not reclusion temporal, as imposed by tile lower court." The question arose as
to the proper procedure to be followed by the appellate court in certifying cases
to this Court under Section 145-K of the Revised Administrative Code as
amended by Republic Act No. 52 which read:
Whenever in any criminal cases submitted to a division the said division should
be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be
imposed, the said Court shall refrain from entering judgment thereon and shall
forthwith certify the case to the Supreme Court for final determination, as if the
case had been brought before it on appeal.
In disposing of the issue several matters came up which evoked different, and
We may say, strong reactions from the Justices then composing the Court, but
for brevity we shall not dwell on them. Simply stated, it is was ruled that the
Court of Appeals was duty bound to make its findings of facts to support its
opinion that the penalty to the imposed upon the appellant was either life
imprisonment or death so as to bring the case within the jurisdiction of this
Court.
From the Resolution written for the Court by then Mr. Chief Justice Manuel V.
Moran, We quoted the following pertinent portions:
The jurisdiction of this Court predicated upon the opinion of the Court of
Appeals, as provided in the above-quoted provisions of the law, must of
necessity defend upon the correctness of that opi nion There is nothing in the
law precluding this Court from exercising ing its authority to pass upon such
question which concerns its own jurisdiction. And in order that this Court may
exercise its power of review the Court of appeals is bound to make in its order f
certification such findings of facts as are necessary to support its conclusion that
either life imprisonment or death is the penalty to be imposed. This is indeed
covered by Rule 52, section 3, which provides th where a court to which an
appeal has been taken has no appellate jurisdiction over lic case and it certifies
the same to the proper court, it must do so "with a specific and clear statement
of grounds therefor." the requirement of with and specific grounds is precisely a
device to prevent erroneous transmissions of jurisdiction from a lower to a
superior court.
Furthermore, the words "shall refrain from entering judgment thereon"
appearing in the provision above quoted, are sufficient indication that the Court
of Appeals, at the time of certifying the case to this Court, had already examined
the evidence and was ready to render judgment on the merits, but having found
from the facts established by proof that the penalty to be imposed is either
death or life imprisonment, instead of entering judgment thereon , it certifies
the case to the Supreme Court for final determination. Since the Certification is
the only ground for determining our jurisdiction, it must contain not only
conclusions of law but also findings of fact, the latter being more important
than the former for they supply the real basis for determining jurisdiction ...
The instant case cannot be compared with cases coming directly from a Court
of First Instance wherein either life imprisonment or death penalty is imposed,
for in such cases, if we assume jurisdiction even where the judgment appears to
be erroneous on its face, it is because the Court of First Instance has already
exhausted its jurisdiction by rendering judgment on the merits containing both
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and under such circumstance it is more
practical for the administration of the law that this Court should exercise its
appellate jurisdiction by examining the evidence and correcting all errors both
of fact and of law that might have been committed by the trial court. But here,
the Court of Appeals is refraining from rendering judgment on the merits and is
refusing to complete the exercise of appellate jurisdiction because it believes
that such jurisdiction belongs to the Supreme Court and thus, it proceeds to
transfer the case to this Court. lt is in that transfer that we believe we may
intervene in order to prevent an erroneous transfer,
xxx xxx xxx
Section 145-K of the Administrative Code is merely a method designed to make
effective the appellate jurisdiction of both the Court of Appeals and this Court,
as defined by law. According to the law of jurisdiction (section 138, Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259),
offenses, for which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment, including
offenses arising from the same occurrence or committed on the same occasion,
come within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and the remaining
offenses fall within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals ...
We are of the opinion and so hold, therefore, that in a case like this, the Court
of Appeals, in certifying it to this Court, must state its findings of fact necessary
to support its conclusion that the penalty to be imposed is either life
imprisonment or death. While this Court will not review the findings of fact, it
will pass upon the correctness of the legal conclusions derived therefrom. And
if this Court finds the conclusions to be correct, it will assume jurisdiction. If it
finds them to be wrong, the case will be returned to the Court of Appeals. (pp.
613-616, supra, emphasis supplied)
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IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
In Ramos, the case was accepted because the Court considered that there was
substantial compliance with the law as the order of certification made reference
to the opinion and recommendation of the Solicitor General whose brief
contained sufficient findings of fact to warrant the conclusion that life
imprisonment should be imposed upon the appellant. Justices Paras, Feria,
Pablo, Hilado and Briones concurred in the Resolution.
Justice Gregorio Perfecto in a separate opinion concurred with the principle
that the Court of Appeals is bound to make its findings of fact and study the
evidence so as to determine whether the appellant is guilty or not, but dissented
from that portion of the Resolution which accepted the case as he was of the
opinion that the case should have been remanded to the Court of Appeals.7
Justice Pedro Tuason wrote a separate opinion and dissented from the majority
insofar as it held that it was necessary for the Court of Appeals or a division
thereof to state the reasons for its opinion that death penalty or life
imprisonment should be imposed. He particularly dissented from statements
that if this Court found the conclusions of the Court of Appeals to be wrong,
the case should be returned to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
According to Justice Tuason when a case is certified to this Court it is placed, by
force of the Court of Appeals' opinion, within the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court for the latter to decide the appeal on the merits; findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are neither essential nor necessary. Justice Tuason was joined
in his dissent by Justice Cesar Bengzon who later became Chief Justice of this
Court and Justice Sabino Padilla.8
B. The theory is now advanced that We go one step further than that
ruled in Ramos — that is, for the Court of Appeals not only to make its
findings of fact and finding of guilt, but also to impose the penalty either of
reclusion perpetua or death as the facts warrant in order that We may exercise
Our appellate jurisdiction.
We believe that such a judicial ruling will be violence to the letter and spirit of
the law which confers on the Supreme Court the exclusive prerogative to review
on appeal and impose the corresponding penalty in criminal cases where the
offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua or death.
Both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions vest upon the Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction, in "(A)ll criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
death or life imprisonment."9 This jurisdiction is constitutional: the Supreme
Court ma not be deprived thereof by, Congress then, now the National
Assembly. 10
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act 1948 as amended in turn provides that the
foregoing appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is exclusive.
Basically therefore, the objection to this new theory is one of jurisdiction - the
lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to impose the penalty of reclusion
perpetua or death.
The present controversy springs from the construction given to the second
paragraph of Sec. 12, Rule 124, Rules of Court 11 more particularly to the use
of the phrases "should be imposed" and "shall refrain from entering judgment",
viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Whenever in any criminal case submitted to a division the said division should
be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be
imposed, the said court shall refrain from entering judgment thereon and shall
forthwith certify the case to the Supreme Court for final determination, as if the
case had been brought before it on appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
As we construe it, the Rule cited does not charge the appellate court with the
duty of imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death. All that the Rule
requires is that should the Court of Appeals be of the opinion that death or life
imprisonment should be imposed, it "shall refrain from entering judgment
thereon ...
The clause "entering judgment" means "rendering judgment". Thus, the Court
of Appeals shall refrain from rendering judgment if and when it is of the
opinion that reclusion perpetua or death is the proper penalty for the crime
committed. This can be the only logical interpretation considering that the
Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to impose the penalties concerned. The
phrase "entering judgment" is not to be equated with an "entry of judgment" as
the latter is understood in Rule 36 in relation to Section 8, Rule 121 and Section
16, Rule 124, Rules of Court. "Entry of judgment" presupposes a final judgment
— final in the sense that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial or
appellate court within the reglementary period. A judgment in a criminal case
becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the
sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has
expressly waived in writing his right to appeal.12 It is only then that there is a
judgment which is to be entered or recorded in the book of entries of
judgments. 13
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IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
It would be incongruous or absurd to state that Section 12, second paragraph,
Rule 124 enjoins the Court of Appeals from entering judgment" when there is
no judgment to be entered .
But then the argument is advanced — what is there to be reviewed by the
Supreme Court when the decision being certified contains no penalty or
sentence, as distinguished from appeals from the Court of First Instance where
there is a complete judgment to be passed upon. The answer is simple. Section
12 itself states that the case is for final determination by the Supreme Court as if
the case had been brought before it on appeal. Hence, based on the findings of
facts of the appellate court which as a rule are conclusive and binding on Us,
this Court "will pass upon the correctness of the legal conclusions derived
therefrom" (People v. Ramos, supra) and impose the correct penalty for the
offense committed.
We realize that had Section 12, Rule 124 used the phrase shall refrain from
rendering judgment " there would be no cause for any ambiguity. We can only
assume that the intent of the Rule was so clear to the Court when it drafted the
Revised Rules of Court that it did not envision a possible contrary or adverse
interpretation or ambiguity in its implementation under the phraseology used. It
is incumbent upon Us to construe the Rule in the spirit and intent it was
conceived and in harmony with pertinent laws and jurisprudence.
On the merits of the appeal —
1. Generally in a case of this nature, the evidence of the prosecution
consists solely of the testimony of the offended party. Here We have the
declaration of the victim, who at the time of the incident was a little less than 13
years of age, on the basis of which the trial court found the charge of rape duly
established. The happenings are briefly summarized in the People's brief as
follows:
The offended party in this case is Margarita Paleng who was born on November
20, 1952 (p. 3, t.s.n., Manipon). She is a native of Balangabang Tublay,
Mountain Province (pp. 3, 12, Id.) At the time of the incident in question on
September 20, 1965, complainant was temporarily boarding at a house located
at Pinsao Guisad Baguio City, as she was then a first year high school student at
the Baguio Eastern High School (pp. 3, 12, 20, Id.; p. 36, Estigoy).
On September 20, 1965, at about three o'clock in the afternoon, she had just
arrived in the City from Tublay in a Dangwa bus (p. 3, Manipon). Because it
was then raining and the bus was parked several meters away from the bus
station, she waited inside the bus (pp. 3, 22, Id.). After about three minutes of
waiting, the accused came and started molesting her by inquiring her name and
getting hold of her bag (pp. 4, 22-24, Id.). But she did not allow him to hold her
bag (p. 24, Id.). She called the attention of the bus driver and the conductor
about the actuation of the accused, but it seemed that the former were also
afraid of him (pp. 24-25, Id.).
Despite the rain, she left the bus and went to ride in a jeep parked some 100
meters away (pp. 4, 25, Id.). The accused closely followed her (p. 4, Id.). When
the jeep started to go, the accused also rode and sat beside her (p. 5, Id.).
When the jeep reached Guisad, she alighted on the road but she still had to
negotiate a distance of ten meters (p. 5, Id.). The accused also alighted and again
he tried to carry her bag (p. 5, Id.). Although he was not allowed to carry her
bag, her was adamant in following her (p. 5, Id.).
Reaching her boarding house, she opened the door and was about to close it
when the accused dashed in and closed the door behind him (pp. 31-32, Id.).
When she entered her room, the accused went in (p. 7, Id.). He pulled a dagger
eight inches long and threatened her: "If you will talk, 1 will kill you". (p. 7, Id.).
Margarita was stunned into silence because of her fear (p. i Id.). Thereupon, the
accused held her hair with his left hand and forced her Lo lie down in bed (p. 7,
Id.) He also placed his left hand with a handkerchief in Margarita's mouth, at
the same time holding the dagger and her neck with his right hand (pp. 7-8, Id.).
She was forcibly made to the down and, at this moment, the accused removed
the buttons of his pants (p. 8, Id.). He then put down the dagger on tile bed (p.
8, Id.). Her attempts to extricate herself from the accused was to no avail assile
was only 4 ft. and 8 inches tall and weighed about 95 to 100 pounds (p. 35, Id.)
while the accused was 5 ft. and 7 inches tall and weighed about 126 pounds (pp.
8, 59, Id.). He then held his penis (pp. 8. 36, Id.), used his thigh to separate the
legs of Margarita (p. 38, Id.). tried, but failed. to remove her panty (p. 36, Id.).
He nonetheless guided his penis and inserted it inside the vagina of the
complainant after prying open the part of her panty covering her private parts
(pp. 9, 36, Id.). Then he succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the offended
party (p. 9, Id.). Margarita lost consciousness. When she recovered, he was
already gone (p. 9, Id.).
The following morning, her father came to visit her. She confided to him the
terrible misfortune which befell her (pp. 9-10, Id.). She was immediately
brought to the Baguio General Hospital where she was examined (p. 10, Id.).
Then they proceeded to the Police Department. The Chief of Police
accompanied them to the Health Center where she was again examined by Dr.
Perfecto O. Micu who thereafter submitted his medical report (Exh. C; p. 3,
rec.; pp. 11, 14-16, Id.). Margarita and her father gave their respective
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statements before the police authorities (Exh. B, pp, 5-6, rec.; p. 11, t.s.n.). She
signed her criminal complaint prepared by the Fiscal's Office of Baguio (Exh.
A; p. 1, rec.; p. 11, t.s.n. (pp. 2-4, Brief at p. 83, rollo
The City Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Perfecto Micu was called to the witness
stand and he testified on the physical examination conducted on the person of
Margarita Paleng on September 23, 1965 and his findings as contained in the
report were as follows:
1. Hymen-circular-stellate type with healing lacerations at 6:00, 8:00, 9:00
and 11:00 o'clock positions in the face of a clock.
2. Contusions at the base of the hymen at 3:00 & 9:00 o'clock regions.
3. Vaginal Orifice - tight and hardly admits 2 fingers.
4. Vaginal wall — tight and vaginal folds are prominent.
5. Vaginal smear — negative for spermatozoa and for gram negative intra
or extra-cellular diplococci. (Exh. "C", p. 3, CFI record)
Dr. Micu concluded that "defloration was recent". He further declared that the
condition of the hymen revealed that Margarita Paleng was a virgin before the
incident complained of, and that the number of lacerations and contusions at
the base of the hymen indicated the degree of force exerted to effect the sexual
act. 14
For his defense, appellant claimed that he and Margarita were acquainted with
each other since 1963, and there were occasions when they rode together in a
bus; that the incident of September 20, 1965 inside the room of Margarita was
with the latter's consent, and in fact it was the second time he had carnal
knowledge with her, the first time having occurred inside a shack; that he
promised Margarita that he would marry her, but to his surprise, she filed the
instant complaint against him. 15
2. The issue being one of credibility, We find no cogent reasons for
discarding the findings of facts of the trial court which were sustained by the
Court of Appeals after the latter had examined the evidence as a result of which
it certified the case to this Court.
Appellant assails the veracity of the testimony of the complainant. But what
possible motive could a thirteen-year old girl barely in her teens have in
fabricating a story that could only bring down on her and her family shame and
humiliation and make her an object of gossip and curiosity among her
classmates and the people of her hometown. It cannot be denied that a public
trial involving a crime of this nature subjects the victim to what can be a
harrowing experience of submitting to a physical examination of her body, an
investigation by police authorities, appearance in court for the hearing where
she has to unravel lewd and hideous details of a painful event which she would
prefer to forget and leave it unknown to others. If Margarita did forego all these
and preferred to face the cruel realities of the situation it was due to her simple
and natural instincts of speaking out the truth.
The insinuation that this complaint was filed because appellant had not married
the girl although he promised to marry her, is preposterous. On September 20,
1965, Margarita was only twelve years and ten months old and was not of
marriageable age, hence, marriage was a legal impossibility. And as regards
appellant's testimony that the complaint was instigated by the Chief of Police of
Tublay who was Margarita's uncle, the trial court did not give credit to such a
declaration.
Counsel for appellant stresses that notwithstanding that Margarita had the
opportunity to ask for help or attract the attention of other people before she
reached her boarding house, she failed to do so. According to counsel there
were people at the Dangwa station, in the busy streets, in the market place, in
the jeepney parking place where the girl took a jeep to proceed to the boarding
house, and in the neighboring houses the closest of which was about 5 meters
away, but no attempt was ever made by complainant to seek help so as to
prevent appellant from molesting her. 16
Appellant's contention presupposes that Margarita was well aware all the time
from the moment she saw the appellate inside the bus that the latter had
intentions of abusing or raping her. All that the appellant did inside the bus was
to hold her bag and she caged the attention of the driver and the conductor to
the impertinence of appellant but the two did not do anything about it. 17 And
when Margarita walked from the bus to the jeepney station, although she saw
appellant walking behind her she did not suspect that he was following her. To
a question propounded by His Honor whether she suspected that appellant was
following her, Margarita answered: "No sir, I did not suspect." 18 All along
Margarita could not call the attention of the people in the street or shout for
help inasmuch as at that particular moment the appellant was not doing
anything against her. And when Margarita reached the boarding house there
were no persons around 19 and in fact she went straight to her room and it was
at that particular moment when appellant barged into the room before she
could close the door. In short, the Poor girl was simply taken by surprise by the
forced entrance of appellant who immediately took out an 8-inch long dagger
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and said "If you will talk I will kill you."
Persons can have different reactions to a situation like that — some may
manifest an aggressive or violent attitude of confronting a molesting or
impertinent fellow while others, like 12-year old Margarita, may assume a silent.
fearful attitude.
Appellant's counsel also claims that Margarita did not offer any resistance to the
acts of the accused at the time the latter was allegedly forcing himself on her as
shown by the medical findings that there were no signs of extra-genital injuries
on the girl's body, and no blood stains on her dress and underwear.
The foregoing arguments are inadequate to weaken and destroy the veracity of
Margarita's straightforward and positive declaration as to how appellant, a 22-
year old farmer in the prime of his manhood, weighing 126 lbs and five feet 21
and six inches tall,20 overpowered her and succeeded in accomplishing the
sexual act despite her resistance. Margarita was less than 13 years of age, was 4'
8 " in height, and weighed around 95 lbs.21
In a crime of rape, force need not be irresistible; "it need but be present, and so
long as it brings about the desired result, all consideration of whether it was
more or less irresistible, is beside the point. 22
All that is necessary is that the force used by the accused is sufficient for him to
consummate his evil purpose. In U.S. v. Villarosa, 1905, there was a similar
situation. A 12 year old girl was sexually abused in the woods by a man of
superior physical strength. In holding the accused Villarosa guilty of rape the
Court held:
It is a doctrine well established by the courts that in order to consider the
existence of the crime of rape it is not necessary that the force employed in
accomplishing it be so great or of such character as could not be resisted; it is
only necessary that the force used by the guilty party be sufficient to
consummate the purpose which he had in view. (4 Phil. 434, 437 citing
Judgment May 14, 1878, Supreme Court of Spain. The Villarosa doctrine has
been followed in numerous cases involving the crime of rape and one of the
latest is People v. Equec, 1977, per Justice Enrique Fernando, 70 SCRA 665.)
And as stated in People v. Savellano, per Justice Ramon Aquino, the force or
violence necessary in rape is naturally a relative term, depending on the age, size,
and strength of the parties and their relation to each other. 23
Rape is likewise committed when intimidation is used on the victim and the
latter submits herself against her will because of fear for her life and personal
safety. In this case of Margarita Paleng, appellant was armed with a dagger and
with it threatened to kill the girl if she would talk or scream for help. Her fear
naturally weakened whatever resistance Margarita could muster at the time and
as a result appellant was able to consummate his coitus on the victim. 24
One last point raised by the able counsel of appellant, Atty. Braulio D. Yaranon,
who at the time of the trial in 1965 was the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, was that
appellant voluntarily submitted to a lie detector test with the National Bureau of
Investigation and the report of the lie detector examiner is in appellant's favor,
that is, the latter was telling the truth on the questions propounded to him one
of which was whether he forced Margarita Paleng into having sexual intercourse
with him and the reply was "No". 25
On this matter We find the trial Judge's observations and conclusions
meritorious and We quote from his decision the following:
As to the N.B.I. lie detector test report, the Court does not put much faith and
credit on it. It is well known that the same is not conclusive. Its efficacy
depends upon the time, place and circumstances when taken and the nature of
the subject. If subject is hard and the circumstances, as in this instant, were not
conducive to affect the subject emotionally, the test will fail. The subject had
nothing more to fear because the trial was over. He was not confronted by the
victim or other persons whom he had a reason to fear. Naturally, his reaction to
the questions propounded was normal and unaffected and the apparatus could
not detect it. (pp. 172-173, CFI record)
To conclude, the crime committed by the appellant is rape with the use of a
deadly weapon with the aggravating circumstance of having been committed in
the dwelling of the offended party. Although Margarita was merely renting a
bedspace in a boarding house, her room constituted for all intents and purposes
a "dwelling" as the term is used in Article 14(3), Revised Penal Code. It is not
necessary, under the law, that the victim owns the place where he lives or
dwells. Be he a lessee, a boarder, or a bed-spacer, the place is his home the
sanctity of which the law seeks to protect and uphold.
Hence, the correct penalty for the crime committed is death pursuant to Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended. However, for lack of the necessary
number of votes, the penalty next lower in degree is to be applied.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We affirm the judgment of conviction of Amado
Daniel for the crime of rape as charged, and We sentence him to suffer the
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penalty of reclusion perpetua and order him to indemnify Margarita Paleng by
way of moral damages in the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00)
and pay the costs.
Decision Modified.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, J., concurs.
Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur in the result on the
merits.
Castro, C.J., Makasiar, Fernando and Fernandez, JJ., took no part.
Guerrero, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
The phrase shall refrain from entering judgment thereon" found in section 12
of Rule 124 and in section 34 of the Judiciary Law means that the Court of
Appeals should not decide the case. The Court of Appeals has been certifying
to this Court criminal cases, wherein the imposable penalty is death or reclusion
perpetua without rendering any judgment but merely expressing its opinion that
the penalty imposed by the trial court is erroneous and that the imposable
penalty is death or reclusion perpetua. Invariably, this Court accepted those
cases and decided the same. This Court's jurisdiction in criminal cases, as
defined in the Constitution, cannot be diminished but it can be enlarged.
Appealed criminal cases may be divided into three classes: (1) those wherein the
lower court imposed the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua and which are
within this Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction; (2) criminal cases wherein the
trial court imposed reclusion temporal or a lesser penalty and which fall within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, and (3) criminal cases wherein
the trial court imposed a penalty of reclusion temporal or a lesser penalty but a
Division of the Court of Appeals, while in the process of deciding the case,
comes to the conclusion that the imposable penalty is death or reclusion
perpetua. That third class of criminal cases should be elevated to this Court "for
final determination".
Reclusion perpetua was properly imposed in this case upon the appellant who is
a pedophiliac.
CASTRO, C.J., dissenting:
1
The preliminary issue at bar is: What is the correct course of action that the
Court of Appeals should take when, in a criminal case properly appealed to it,
that court determines that the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua (life
imprisonment) should be imposed instead of the lesser penalty imposed by the
court a quo? Should it refrain from rendering judgment and forthwith certify
the case to the Supreme Court? Or should it render judgment imposing what it
considers as the proper penalty (either life imprisonment or death) but refrain
from entering judgment and thereafter certify the case to the Supreme Court?
At the center of scrutiny is the pertinent provision of section 34 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948, as amended, and the Identical statement in the second paragraph
of section 12 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, both of which read:
Whenever in any criminal case submitted to a division [of the Court of Appeals]
the said division should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life
imprisonment should be imposed, the said court shall refrain from entering
judgment thereon and shall forthwith certify the case to the Supreme Court for
final determination, as if the case had been brought before it on appeal.
Justices Claudio Teehankee, Cecilia Munoz Palma and Ramon C. Aquino
interpret the phrase "entering judgment" in the inhibitory clause "shall refrain
from entering judgment" to mean "rendering judgment" or "pronouncing
judgment," arguing that [t]his can be the only logical interpretation considering
that the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction" to impose the penalties of
death and life imprisonment. They thus opt to maintain the present practice1 of
requiring no more than a forwarding certification (embodying findings of fact
supporting the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be
imposed) by the Court of Appeals for the purpose of placing such case within
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
For the reasons hereunder stated, we consider their interpretation unwarranted
and therefore reject the conclusion that it leads to.
2.
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Section 34 of the amended Judiciary Act and the second paragraph of section 12
of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court must be construed in the light of the
unequivocal phraseology of paragraph (d), subsection (2), section 5 of Article X
of the Constitution, which states:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Review and revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and decrees of
inferiors courts in —
xxx xxx xxx
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death, life
imprisonment;
Varying the language of this provision only to the extent necessary to carry out
its intention, the first subdivision of the third paragraph of section 17 of the
Judiciary Act made exclusive the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in
the following words:
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal as the law or rules of court may provide, final
judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided in -
(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is
death or life imprisonment: ...
The constitutional mandate, given due statutory acknowledgment, sets forth the
pertinent appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. We accord capital
significance to the phrases "final judgments and decrees of inferior courts and
"the penalty imposed." These phrases are crystal-clear. Read together with the
remainder of the provision, they state in precise and unmistakable terms the
sole intended inescapable meaning that the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments of inferior courts in criminal cases in which the
penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment. No hermeneutic expertise or
exercise can validly fashion some other meaning or intention.
3.
The constitutionally determined nature of the criminal cases falling within the
periphery of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court fixes our
perspective, defines and delimits our judicial prerogative in the interpretation of
section 34 of the Judiciary Act, and dictates the manner in which the law in
question should be read and made operative.
This being so, the clause enjoining the Court of Appeals to "refrain from
entering judgment" whenever it "should be of the opinion that the penalty of
death or life imprisonment should be imposed" cannot validly be interpreted as
a bar to that appellate court's "rendering judgment." If the meaning given to the
law by the minority should prevail and the case is forwarded, as this case before
us was, to the Supreme Court on a bare certification by the Court of Appeals,
then we have the unacceptable happenstance of an ordinary legislative act
upstaging the fundamental law, since, plainly, the Supreme Court will be
constrained to exercise its power to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on
appeal" in criminal cases where NO "final judgment" in which "the penalty
imposed is death or life imprisonment" has been rendered or pronounced.
The minority view would thus result not only in an unconstitutional imposition
on the Supreme Court of assumption of jurisdiction over a case that is beyond
its original appellate competence but would also compel abandonment by the
Court of Appeals of appellate jurisdiction legally and duly vested in and
acquired by it.
4.
Because sec. 34 of the Judiciary Act does not and cannot have primacy or
ascendancy over the Constitution, we assert that the Court of appeals is legally
empowered to impose the penalties of death and life imprisonment. Four basic
and compelling considerations underlie our view.
First: There is no law — no law at all — that states such prohibition in
categorical terms. The minority view rests solely on the strained interpretation
foisted on the very law under consideration — and this interpretation, as we
have said, is entirely unwarranted.
Second: In the case at hand, the Court of appeals duly and legally assumed
appellate jurisdiction over the accused Amado Daniel's appeal from the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Baguio sentencing him to suffer a penalty less
than life imprisonment. This cannot be debated since section 29 of the Judiciary
Act specifically places such appeal within the Court of Appeals' jurisdictional
ambit with the statement that
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The Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases,
actions, and proceedings, not enumerated i section seventeen of this Act,
properly brought to it.
Thus, absent any constitutional or legal constraints, the Court of Appeals
should have rendered the proper judgment in the case. For, verily, judicial
jurisdiction is "the power with which judges are invested for administering
Justice — that is, for trying civil or criminal cases, or both, and deciding them
and rendering judgment, ..., 2 (emphasis supplied)
Third: Harking back to the Constitution, the Court of Appeals, by unmistakable
constitutional categorization, is an "inferior court." And it is its judgments as
such inferior court which, so the Constitution plainly states, are the subject of
the Supreme Court's plenary power of review, revision, reversal, modification or
affirmance.
Fourth: Absurdity and incongruity should not be read into the law so as to
support the view that a panel of three Justices of the Court of Appeals is denied
the power to impose the penalties of life imprisonment and death at the same
time that such power is recognized in a single judge of a lower court of
admittedly lesser category,
5.
The resulting conclusion that the Court of Appeals must impose the proper
penalty does not justify the apprehension that the Supreme Court will be
hampered in the exercise of its jurisdiction because the findings of fact made by
the inferior appellate court "will have to be respected." This stated procedural
practice has never been honored in the absolute. The ultimate function of the
Supreme Court is to render justice. And we need not elaborate on or belabor
the numerous occasions when, to attain this objective, the Court shunted aside
technicalities to bare wide open the controversy and inquire into each and every
aspect, be it legal or factual or a mixture of both.
And this is one perfect instance where the avowed ends of justice must override
practice and procedure, for, no less than human life is at stake. And this would
not be a novelty. When a trial court's judgment imposing the death penalty is
elevated to this Court en consulta, we strip the case into minutiae: fact by fact,
detail by detail, facet by facet. We see no reason why, when a decision imposing
the penalty of death or life imprisonment is rendered by the Court of Appeals,
the same manner of meticulous inquiry should not be resorted to by the
Supreme Court. A sentence imposing death or life imprisonment is of the self-
same gravity, whichever is the sentencing tribunal.3
6.
It is rather obvious that the phrase "entering judgment" is completely disparate
from the term "rendering judgment." There is no need to perambulate and
meander the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of Rule 36 of the Rules of court
need merely be read to perceive the strikingly sharp antithesis between the two
phrases. These sections read:
Section 1. Rendition of judgments. — All judgments determining the
merits of cases shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge,
stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it [sic] is based,
signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the court.
Section 2. Entry of judgments and orders.— If no appeal or motion for
new trial is filed within the time provided in these rules, the judgment or order
shall be entered by the clerk. The recording of the judgment or order in the
book of entries of judgments shall constitute its entry. The record shall contain
the dispositive part of the judgment or order and shall be signed by the clerk,
with a certificate that such judgment or order has become final and executory.
The word "enter" (which undeniably is the root of "entering") with reference to
judgments has acquired a definite meaning in our procedure. There simply
exists no ambiguity to warrant embroiled interpretation. We need not hammer
out meaning from the word "entered." It is there. Section 2, Rule 36 chisels out
the legal import of the word.4 To repeat and stress the Rule, "[t]he recording of
the judgment or order in the book of entries of judgments shall constitute its
entry. Upon the other hand, the rendition of judgment is the judicial act of the
writing by the judge of the decision and the filing thereof with the clerk of
court. 5
Such being the precise acceptations of the terms "entering judgment" and
"rendering judgment," we see no cogent reason why our indisputably learned
lawmakers should have written in the former when they meant the latter. If, as
the minority would have it, the intention was just that, why then has not section
34 of the Judiciary Act been accordingly amended, considering that the said Act
has been amended no less than ninety (90) times 6 since its enactment thirty
years ago in 1948?
The conclusion is thus ineluctable that section 34 of the Judiciary Act means
exactly what it says. (And its intendment cannot and should not be altered
through tile expedient of palpably tortuous and torturous statutory
interpretation.) This rightly projects the limited character of the said section —
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a procedural device designed to effect and make effective the jurisdictions of entering judgment, and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record
both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. Read as written, this section thereof to this Court for review.
neither imposes nor curtails constitutionally and legally established jurisdictions.
The Court of Appeals can and must render a decision and impose the proper Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Santos and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
penalty of death or life imprisonment, and, to effect the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, refrain from entering its judgment, and forthwith certify tile C. NIGHTTIME
case to the Supreme Court.
PEOPLE VS BERMAS
7. VITUG, J.:

Aside from according the respect that is due to the Constitution and setting
aright the import of section 34 of tile Judiciary Act, our reading of the law will
obviate unnecessary, pointless and time-wasting shuttling of criminal cases
between the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. We advert to that
portion of the Ramos 7decision, cited with approval by Justice Muñoz Palma,
which states:
We are of the opinion and so hold, therefore, that in a case like this, the Court
of Appeals, in certifying it to this Court, must state its findings of fact necessary
to support its conclusion that the penalty to be imposed is either life
imprisonment or death. While this Court will not review the findings of fact, it
will pass upon the correctness of the legal conclusions derived thereof And if
this Court finds the conclusions to be correct, it will assume jurisdiction. If it
finds then to be wrong the case will be returned to the Court of Appeals.
(emphasis supplied)
We particularly and especially object to the return of the ease to the Court of
Appeals if the Supreme Court "finds" the legal conclusions in the certification
"to be wrong." This incident will never come to pass if section 34 is correctly
construed — that is, as we construe it — for, the Supreme Court will acquire
jurisdiction over the case from the very inception and can, without bothering
the Court of Appeals which has fully completed the exercise of its jurisdiction,
do justice in the case.
8.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court directs that, henceforth, should the Court of
Appeals be of the opinion that the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua (life
imprisonment) should be imposed in any criminal case appealed to it where the
penalty imposed by the trial court is less than reclusion perpetua the said Court,
with a comprehensive written analysis of the evidence and discussion of the law
involved, render judgment expressly and explicitly imposing the penalty of
either death or reclusion perpetua as the circumstances warrant, refrain from
In convicting an accused, it is not enough that proof beyond reasonable doubt
has been adduced, it is also essential that the accused has been duly afforded his
fundamental nights.
Rufino Mirandilla Bermas pleaded not guilty before the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque, Branch 274, Metro Manila, to the crime of rape under a criminal
complaint, which read:
COMPLAINT
The undersigned complainant as assisted by her mother accuses Rufino
Mirandilla Bermas, of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of August 1994, in the Municipality of Parañaque,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the abovenamed accused, while armed with a knife and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the undersigned complainant against her will.1âwphi1.nêt
CONTRARY TO LAW
Parañaque, Metro Manila
August 8, 1994
(SGD) MANUEL P.
BERMAS
Complainant
Assisted by

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IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
(SGD) ROSITA BERMAS
Mother 1
Evidence was adduced during trial by the parties at the conclusion of which the
lower court, presided over by Hon. Amelita G. Tolentino, rendered its decision,
dated 02 May 1995, finding the accused guilty of the offense charged and
sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death.
The death penalty having been imposed, the case has reached this Court by way
of automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659 (otherwise known as An Act
To Impose Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending For That
Purpose The Revised Penal Code, as amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and
For Other Purposes, which took effect on 31 December 1993).
The prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General, gave an account,
rather briefly, of the evidence submitted by the prosecution.
On August 3, 1994, complainant Manuela Bermas, 15 years old, was raped by
her own father, appellant Rufino Bermas, while she was lying down on a
wooden bed inside their house at Creek Drive II, San Antonio Valley 8,
Parañaque, Metro Manila (pp. 6-7, TSN, Oct. 19, 1994). Armed with a knife,
appellant removed the victim's shorts and panty, placed himself above her,
inserted his penis in her vagina and conducted coital movements (pp. 7-8, ibid.).
After the appellant satisfied his lustful desire, he threatened the victim with
death if she reports the incident to anyone. (p. 9, ibid.)
On August 9, 1994, complainant was medically examined at the NBI, which
yielded the following findings:
The findings concluded: 1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries
noted on the body of the subject at the time of examination; 2. Hymen, intact
but distensible and its office wide (2.7 cm. In diameter) as to allow complete
penetration by an average sized, adult, Filipino male organ in full erection
without producing any hymenal laceration. 2
The defense proffered the testimony of the accused, who denied the charge,
and that of his married daughter, Luzviminda Mendez, who attributed the
accusation made by her younger sister to a mere resentment by the latter. The
trial court gave a summary of the testimony given by the accused and his
daughter Luzviminda; viz:
The accused vehemently denied that he has ever committed the crime of rape
on her daughter, the complainant. He told the Court that he could not do such
a thing because he loves so much his daughter and his other children. In fact, he
said that he even performed the dual role of a father and a mother to his
children since the time of his separation from his wife. The accused further told
the Court that in charging him of the crime of rape, the complainant might have
been motivated by ill-will or revenge in view of the numerous scoldings that she
has received from him on account of her frequent coming home late at night.
The accused stressed that he knew of no other reason as to why his daughter,
the complainant, would ever charge him of the crime of rape except probably in
retaliation for being admonished by him whenever she comes home late in the
night.
The married daughter of the accused, who testified in his behalf, denied that the
complainant was raped by the accused. She said that the complainant did not
come home in the night of August 3, 1994, and that, she is a liar. She told the
Court that the concoction by the complainant of the rape story is probably due
to the resentment by the latter of the frequent scoldings that she has been
receiving from the accused. She further added that she was told by the previous
household employer of the complainant that the latter is a liar. She went on to
testify further that she does not believe that the accused, who is her father,
raped the complainant, who is her younger sister. 3
The trial court, in its decision of 02 May 1995, found the case of the
prosecution against the accused as having been duly established and so ruled out
the defense theory of denial and supposed ill-will on the part of private
complainant that allegedly had motivated the filing of the complaint against her
father. The court adjudged:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the DEATH PENALTY,
to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P75,000.00, Philippine
Currency, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 4
In their 61-page brief, defense counsel Fernandez & Kasilag-Villanueva (in
collaboration with the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force), detailed several errors
allegedly committed by the court a quo; thus:
I. THE ACCUSED WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS.
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A. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT E. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF
TO EFFECTIVE AND VIGILANT COUNSEL. THE LAW.

1. The trial court did not observe the correct selection process in II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT "SCRUTINIZE WITH EXTREME
appointing the accused's counsel de officio; CAUTION" THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE, MISAPPRECIATED
THE FACTS AND THEREFORE ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED
2. The Public Attorney could not give justice to the accused; GUILTY OF RAPE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 5

a. Negligent in not moving to quash the information on the ground of The Court, after a painstaking review of the records, finds merit in the appeal
illegal arrest; enough to warrant a remand of the case for new trial.

b. Negligent in not moving to quash the information on the ground of It would appear that on 08 August 1994 Manuela P. Bermas, then 15 years of
invalid filing of the information; age, assisted by her mother Rosita Bermas, executed a sworn statement before
SPO1 Dominador Nipas, Jr., of the Parañaque Police Station, stating, in sum,
c. Negligent in not moving for a preliminary investigation; that she had been raped by accused Rufino Mirandilla Bermas, her own father
in 1991 and 1993, as well as on 03 August 1994, particularly the subject matter
d. Negligent in not pointing out the unexplained change in the case of the complaint, hereinbefore quoted, duly signed and filed conformably with
number; Section 7, Rule 112, of the Rules of Court. The Second Assistant Prosecutor,
issued a certification to the effect that the accused had waived his right to a
e. Negligent in not moving to inhibit the judge; preliminary investigation.

f. Negligent in her conduct at the initial trial. On the day scheduled for his arraignment on 03 October 1994, the accused was
brought before the trial court without counsel. The court thereupon assigned
3. The Vanishing Second Counsel de Officio. Atty. Rosa Elmira C Villamin of the Public Attorney's Office to be the counsel
de officio. Accused forthwith pleaded not guilty. The pre-trial was waived.
a. He was not dedicated nor devoted to the accused;
The initial reception of evidence was held on 19 October 1994. The prosecution
b. His work was shoddy; placed complainant Manuela Bermas at the witness stand. She testified on direct
examination with hardly any participation by defense counsel who, inexplicably,
4. The Reluctant Third Counsel de Officio later waived the cross-examination and then asked the court to be relieved of
her duty as counsel de officio.
5. The performance of all three counsels de officio was ineffective and
prejudicial to the accused. ATTY. VILLARIN:

B. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO BE TRIED BY AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE AND TO BE PRESUMED
INNOCENT.
C. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO BE HEARD AND FOR WITNESSES TO TESTIFY IN HIS BEHALF.
And I am requesting if this Honorable Court would allow me and my pañero
besides me, would accede to my request that I be relieved as counsel de officio
because I could not also give justice to the accused because as a lady lawyer, if
my pañero here and if this Honorable Court will accede to my request.
COURT:

D. THE ARRAIGNMENT OF THE ACCUSED WAS INVALID. It is your sworn duty to defend the helpless and the defenseless. That is your
sworn duty, Mrs. Counsel de Officio. Are you retracting?

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ATTY. VILLARIN.
That is why I am asking this Honorable Court. 6
Counsel's request was granted, and Atty. Roberto Gomez was appointed the
new counsel de officio. While Atty. Gomez was ultimately allowed to cross-
examine the complainant, it should be quite evident, however, that he barely
had time, to prepare therefor. On this score, defense counsel Fernandez &
Kasilag-Villanueva in the instant appeal would later point out:
To substitute for her, the Public Attorney recommended Atty. Roberto Gomez
to be appointed as defense counsel de officio. And so the trial court appointed
him.
Atty. Gomez asked for a ten minute recess before he began his cross
examination, presumably to prepare. But a ten minute preparation to cross
examine the complainant upon whose testimony largely rests the verdict on the
accused who stands to be meted the death penalty if found guilty, is far too
inadequate. He could not possibly have familiarized himself with the records
and surrounding circumstances of the case, read the complaint, the statement of
the complainant, the medico-legal report, memos of the police, transcripts and
other relevant documents and confer with the accused and his witnesses, all in
ten minutes. 4
The prosecution abruptly rested its case after the medico-legal officer had
testified.
The reception of the defense evidence was scheduled for 12 December 1994, it
was later reset to 09 January 1995. When the case was called on 09 January
1995, the following transpired:
COURT.
Where is the counsel for the accused?
COURT.
Did he file his withdrawal in this case? It is supposed to be the turn of the
defense to present its evidence.
PROSECUTOR GARCIA.
Yes, Your Honor. The prosecution had already rested its case.
COURT:
Last time he asked for the continuance of this case and considering that the
accused is under detention . . . it seems he cannot comply with his obligation.
COURT:
(To the accused) Nasaan ang abogado mo?
ACCUSED R. BERMAS.
Wala po.
COURT:
It is already the turn of the defense to present its evidence in this case. In view
of the fact that the defense counsel is not interested anymore in defending the
accused because last time he moved for the continuance of the hearing of this
case and since this time he did not appear, he is unduly delaying the proceedings
of this case and considering the accused here is under detention, I think it
would be better if the Court appoints another lawyer. He should file his
withdrawal if he is not interested anymore.
In view of the fact that the counsel de officio has repeatedly failed to appear in
this Court to defend his client-accused, the Court is hereby constrained to
appoint another counsel de officio to handle the defense of the accused. For
this purpose, Atty. Nicanor Lonzame is hereby appointed as the counsel de
officio for accused Rufino Mirandilla Bermas. 8
The hearing scheduled for that day was reset to 16 January 1995 upon the
request of Atty. Lonzame. On even date, Atty. Lonzame himself asked to be
relieved as counsel de officio but later, albeit reluctantly, retracted, thus:
COURT:
Where is the accused? Where is the counsel de officio?
ATTY. NICANOR LONZAME:
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As counsel de officio, Your Honor. The lawyer from the PAO is here, may I be
allowed to give her my responsibility as counsel de officio considering that the
lawyer from the PAO.
COURT:
What about?
ATTY. LONZAME.
I was appointed because the PAO lawyer was not around. If the Court will
allow us to be relieved from our responsibility as appointed counsel de officio
of the accused.
COURT.
You want to be relieved of your responsibility as appointed counsel de officio?
As an officer of the Court you don't want to handle the defense of the accused
in this case?
ATTY. LONZAME.
I will be withdrawing my previous manifestation that I be relieved of my
responsibility as counsel de officio.
COURT.
So, therefore, counsel, are you now ready?
ATTY. LONZAME.
Yes, Your Honor. 9
Trial proceeded with the accused being the first to be put at the witness stand.
He denied the accusation against him. The next witness to be presented was his
married daughter who corroborated her father's claim of innocence.
The defense counsel in the instant appeal took over from Atty. Lonzame who
himself, for one reason or another, had ceased to appear for and in behalf of
accused-appellant.
This Court finds and must hold, most regrettably, that accused-appellant has
not properly and effectively been accorded the right to counsel. So important is
the right to counsel that it has been enshrined in our fundamental law and its
precursor laws. Indeed, even prior to the advent of the 1935 Constitution, the
right to counsel of an accused has already been recognized under General Order
No. 58, dated 23 April 1900, stating that a defendant in all criminal prosecutions
is entitled to counsel at every stage of the proceedings, 10 and that if he is
unable to employ counsel, the court must assign one to defend him. 11 The
1935 Constitution has no less been expressive in declaring, in Article III,
Section 17, thereof, that —
(17) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed to be
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his
behalf.
Except for a proviso allowing trial in absentia, the right to counsel under the
1973 Constitution, essentially, has remained unchanged. Under the 1987
Constitution, a worthwhile innovation that has been introduced is the provision
from which prevailing jurisprudence on the availability of the right to counsel as
early as the stage of custodial interrogation can be deemed to be predicated. The
rule, found in Sections 12 and 14, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution, states —
Sec 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 14 xxx xxx xxx
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
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The constitutional mandate is reflected in the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedures which declares in Section 1, Rule 115, thereof, that it is a right of the
accused at the trial to be present in person and by counsel at every stage of the
proceedings from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment.
The presence and participation of counsel in the defense of an accused in
criminal proceedings should never be taken lightly. 12 Chief Justice Moran in
People vs. Holgado, 13 explained:
In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little
avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most
intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted
not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or
uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is
deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it so
implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to
apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him
whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should
assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a
reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own. 14
In William vs. Kaiser; 15 the United States Supreme Court, through the late
Justice Douglas, has rightly observed that the accused "needs the aid of counsel
lest he be the victim of overzealous prosecutors, of the law's complexity or of
his own ignorance or bewilderment." An accused must be given the right to be
represented by counsel for, unless so represented, there is great danger that any
defense presented in his behalf will be as inadequate considering the legal
perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. 16 The right to counsel
proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means
that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process
requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that
may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.
The right to counsel must be more than lust the presence of a lawyer in the
courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The
right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance
extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and
acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the
proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind
of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his
knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence.
The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the
lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an
efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory
representation. 17
It is never enough that accused be simply informed of his right to counsel; he
should also be asked whether he wants to avail himself of one and should be
told that he can hire a counsel of his own choice if he so desires or that one can
be provided to him at his request. 18 Section 7, Rule 116, of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio. — The court, considering the
gravity of the offense and the difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall
appoint as counsel de oficio only such members of the bar in good standing
who, by reason of their experience and ability may adequately defend the
accused. But in localities where such members of the bar are not available, the
court may appoint any person, resident of the province and of good repute for
probity and ability, to defend the accused.
A counsel de oficio is expected to do his utmost. 19 A mere pro-forma
appointment of de oficio counsel who fails to genuinely protect the interests of
the accused merits disapprobation. 20 The exacting demands expected of a
lawyer should be no less than stringent when one is a counsel de officio. He
must take the case not as a burden but as an opportunity to assist in the proper
dispensation of justice. No lawyer is to be excused from this responsibility
except only for the most compelling and cogent reasons. 21
Just weeks ago, in People vs. Sevilleno, G.R. No. 129058, promulgated on 29
March 1999, this Court has said:
We cannot right finis to this discussion without making known our displeasure
over the manner by which the PAO lawyers dispensed with their duties. All
three (3) of them displayed manifest disinterest on the plight of their client.
xxx xxx xxx
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to
serve his client with utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He must not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard renders
him administratively liable. Obviously, in the instant case, the aforenamed
defense lawyers did not protect, much less uphold, the fundamental rights of
the accused. Instead, they haphazardly performed their function as counsel de
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oficio to the detriment and prejudice of the accused Sevilleno, however guilty he
might have been found to be after trial. Inevitably, this Court must advise Attys.
Agravante, Pabalinas and Saldavia to adhere closely and faithfully to the tenets
espoused in the Code of Professional Responsibility, otherwise, commission of
any similar act in the future will be severely sanctioned.
The Court sees no other choice than to direct the remand of the case to the
court a quo for new trial.
WHEREFORE, let this case be REMANDED to the court a quo for trial on
the basis of the complaint, aforequoted, under which he was arraigned Atty.
Ricardo A Fernandez, Jr. of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force is hereby
appointed counsel de officio for the appellant.
Attys. Rosa Elmina Villamin of the Public Attorney's Office, Parañaque,
Roberto Gomez and Nicanor Lonzame are hereby ADMONISHED for having
fallen much too short of their responsibility as officers of the court and as
members of the Bar and are warned that any similar infraction shall be dealt
with most severely.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. Romero, Bellosilllo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-
Santiago, JJ., concur.
D. EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
US VS MANALINDE
TORRES, J.:
Between 2 and 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th of January, 1909, while
Juan Igual, a Spaniard, was seated on a chair in the doorway of Sousa's store in
Cotabato, Moro Province, he suddenly received a wound on the head delivered
from behind and inflicted with a kris. Ricardo Doroteo, a clerk in the said store,
who was standing behind the counter, upon hearing the noise and the cry of the
wounded man, ran to his assistance and found him lying on the ground.
Meanwhile the aggressor, the Moro Manalinde, approached a Chinaman named
Choa, who was passing along the street, and just as the latter was putting down
his load in front of the door of a store and was about to enter, attacked him
with the same weapon, inflicting a severe wound in the left shoulder, on
account of which he fell to the ground. The Moro, who came from the
rancheria of Dupit and had entered the town carrying his weapon wrapped up
in banana leaves, in the meantime escaped by running away from the town.
Both wounded men, the Chinaman and the Spaniard, were taken to the hospital,
where the former died within an hour, the record not stating the result of the
wound inflicted on the Spaniard Juan Igual.
In view of the above a complaint was filed by the provincial fiscal with the
district court charging Manalinde with the crime of murder, and proceedings
having been instituted, the trial judge, in view of the evidence adduced, rendered
judgment on the 5th of February of said year, sentencing the accused to the
penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000,
and to pay the costs. The case has been submitted to this court for review.
From the above facts fully substantiated in this case, it appears beyond doubt
that the crime of murder, defined and punished by article 403 of the Penal
Code, was committed on the person of the Chinaman Choa, in that the
deceased was unexpectedly and suddenly attacked, receiving a deep cut on the
left shoulder at the moment when he had just put down the load that he was
carrying and was about to start for the door of the store in front of which he
stopped for the purpose of entering therein. As a result of the tremendous
wound inflicted upon him by the heavy and unexpected blow, he was unable,
not only to defend himself, apart from the fact that he was unarmed, but even
to flee from the danger, and falling to the ground, died in an hour's time. It is
unquestionable that by the means and form employed in the attack the violent
death of the said Chinaman was consummated with deceit and treachery
(alevosia), one of the five qualifying circumstances enumerated in the aforesaid
article as calling for the greatest punishment.
When Manalinde was arrested he pleaded guilty and confessed that he had
perpetrated the crime herein mentioned, stating that his wife had died about one
hundred days before and that he had come from his home in Catumaldu by
order of the Datto Rajamudah Mupuck, who had directed him to go
juramentado in Cotabato in order to kill somebody, because the said Mupuck
had certain grievances to avenge against a lieutenant and a sergeant, the said
datto further stating that if he, Manalinde, was successful in the matter, he
would give him a pretty woman on his return, but that in case he was captured
he was to say that he performed the killing by order of Maticayo, Datto Piang,
Tambal and Inug. In order to carry out his intention to kill two persons in the
town of Cotabato he provided himself with a kris, which he concealed in
banana leaves, and, traveling for a day and a night from his home, upon
reaching the town, attacked from behind a Spaniard who was seated in front of
a store and, wounding him, immediately after attacked a Chinaman, who was
close by, just as the latter was placing a tin that he was carrying on the ground
and he was about to enter a store near by, cutting him on the left shoulder and
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fleeing at once; he further stated that he had no quarrel with the assaulted
persons.
From the statements made by the accused his culpability as the sole-confessed
and self-convicted author of the crime in question has been unquestionably
established, nor can his allegation that he acted by order of Datto Mupuck and
that therefore he was not responsible exculpate him, because it was not a matter
of proper obedience. The excuse that he went juramentado by order of the said
datto and on that account killed only two persons, whereas if he had taken the
oath of his own volition he would have killed many more, because it is the
barbarous and savage custom of a juramentado to kill anyone without any
motive or reason whatever, can not under any consideration be accepted or
considered under the laws of civilized nations; such exhibitions of ferocity and
savagery must be restrained, especially as the very people who up to the present
time have been practicing such acts are well aware that the established
authorities in this country can never allow them to go unpunished, and as has
happened a number of times in towns where juramentados are in the habit of
appearing, the punishment of the author has followed every crime so
committed.
In the commission of the crime of murder the presence of aggravating
circumstances 3 and 7 of article 10 of the Penal Code should be taken into
consideration in that promise of reward and premeditation are present, which in
the present case are held to be generic, since the crime has already been
qualified as committed with the treachery, because the accused confessed that
he voluntarily obeyed the order given him by Datto Mupuck to go juramentado
and kill some one in the town of Cotabato, with the promise that if he escaped
punishment he would be rewarded with a pretty woman. Upon complying with
the order the accused undoubtedly acted of his own volition and with the
knowledge that he would inflict irreparable injury on some of his fellow-beings,
depriving them of life without any reason whatever, well knowing that he was
about to commit a most serious deed which the laws in force in this country
and the constituted authorities could by no means permit. Datto Mupuck, who
ordered and induced him to commit the crimes, as well as the accused knew
perfectly well that he might be caught and punished in the act of committing
them.
As to the other circumstance it is also unquestionable that the accused, upon
accepting the order and undertaking the journey in order to comply therewith,
deliberately considered and carefully and thoughtfully meditated over the nature
and the consequences of the acts which, under orders received from the said
datto, he was about to carry out, and to that end provided himself with a
weapon, concealing it by wrapping it up, and started on a journey of a day and a
night for the sole purpose of taking the life of two unfortunate persons whom
he did not know, and with whom he had never had any trouble; nor did there
exist any reason which, to a certain extent, might warrant his perverse deed. The
fact that the arrangement between the instigator and the tool considered the
killing of unknown persons, the first encountered, does not bar the
consideration of the circumstance of premeditation. The nature and the
circumstances which characterize the crime, the perversity of the culprit, and
the material and moral injury are the same, and the fact that the victim was not
predetermined does not affect nor alter the nature of the crime. The person
having been deprived of his life by deeds executed with deliberate intent, the
crime is considered a premeditated one as the firm and persistent intention of
the accused from the moment, before said death, when he received the order
until the crime was committed in manifestly evident. Even though in a crime
committed upon offer of money, reward or promise, premeditation is
sometimes present, the latter not being inherent in the former, and there
existing no incompatibility between the two, premeditation can not necessarily
be considered as included merely because an offer of money, reward or promise
was made, for the latter might have existed without the former, the one being
independent of the other. In the present case there can be no doubt that after
the crime was agreed upon by means of a promise of reward, the criminal by his
subsequent conduct showed a persistency and firm intent in his plan to carry
out the crime which he intentionally agreed to execute, it being immaterial
whether Datto Mupuck did or did not conceive the crime, once Manalinde
obeyed the inducement and voluntarily executed it.
The facts in this case are quite different from those in the proceedings instituted
by the United States vs. Caranto et al., wherein the decision on page 256 of
Volume IV of the Philippine Reports was rendered, as may be seen from the
mere perusal of the statement of facts. It is also different from the case where a
criminal who has made up his mind to kill a certain individual kills a person
other than the object of his criminal intent. On going to Cotabato the Moro
Manalinde intended to and did kill the first two persons he encountered, and
the fact that the victim was not predetermined does not alter the nature,
conditions, or circumstances of the crime, for the reason that to cause the
violent death of a human being without any reasonable motive is always
punishable with a more or less grave penalty according to the nature of the
concurrent circumstances.
For the above reasons and in view of the fact that no mitigating circumstance is
present to neutralize the effects of the aggravating ones, it is our opinion that
the judgment appealed from should be affirmed with costs provided however,
that the penalty imposed on the culprit shall be executed in accordance with the
provisions of Acts. Nos. 451 and 1577, and that in the event of a pardon being
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granted he shall likewise be sentenced to suffer the accessory penalties imposed
by article 53 of the Penal Code. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.
E. TREACHERY
PEOPLE VS SANGALANG
AQUINO, J.:p
This is a murder case. The testimonies of the two prosecution eyewitnesses
disclose that at around six o'clock in the morning of June 9, 1968 Ricardo
Cortez left his nipa hut located at Sitio Adlas, Barrio Biluso, Silang, Cavite to
gather tuba from a coconut tree nearby. Flora Sarno, his wife, was left inside the
hut. While he was on top of the tree gathering tuba, he was struck by a volley of
shots. He fell to the ground at the base of the coconut tree.
His wife Flora heard three successive shot coming south of the hut. She went
outside the hut. From a distance of about twenty-five meters, she saw five men,
each armed with a long firearm, firing at her husband. He was already wounded
and was lying on the ground at the foot of the coconut tree. His assailants were
about five meters away from him.
She recognized Laureano Sangalang as one of the five armed men who were
firing at her husband. She and her brother Ricardo had known Sangalang since
their childhood. She also recognized Conrado Gonzales, Irineo Canuel, Perino
Canuel and Eleuterio Cuyom as the other malefactors.
Flora ran towards the place where her husband had fallen. She shouted, "Bakit
ninyo pinagbabaril ang aking asawa". The five persons fired at her. She was then
about twenty meters away from them. She retreated to the hut for cover. She
heard some more shots. After the lapse of about five minutes, Laureano
Sangalang and his companions left the place. When Flora returned to the spot
where her husband was prostrate, he was already dead.
On the occasion already described, Ricardo Sarno, twenty-seven years old, a
brother of Flora, was inside his own nipa hut which was about ten meters away
from Flora's hut. He was drinking coffee. His wife and children were eating
breakfast. He heard several shots. He came out of his hut. He saw his brother-
in-law being shot by Laureano Sangalang, Eleuterio Cuyom, Perino Canuel,
Irineo Canuel and Conrado Gonzales. He saw Sangalang using a Garand
carbine in shooting his brother-in-law. The latter fell from the top of the
coconut tree after he was shot (10 tsn). His sister Flora was trying to approach
her husband but she had to flee to her hut when Sangalang and his companions
fired at her. He wanted to join her but he was likewise fired upon by the five
men. So, he retired and took refuge in his own hut.
Later, Sarno saw his sister Flora, sitting inside her hut. He followed her after she
left the hut and went to see her dead husband, who was lying on the ground,
face up, at the base of the coconut tree. When he noticed that his brother-in-law
was already dead, he gathered his children and brought them to Sitio Biga,
which was more or less thirty meters away from his hut in Sitio Adlas. Ricardo
reported the killing to the chief of police who went to the scene of the crime
with some policemen and Constabularymen.
The necropsy report shows that the twenty-five-year-old Cortez sustained
twenty-three gunshot wounds on the different parts of the body, fourteen of
which were entrance-wounds, and nine were exit-wounds (Exh. A and B). He
died due to the multiple gunshot wounds (Exh. C).
On June 10, 1968 or on the day following the killing, Flora and Ricardo were
interrogated by the Silang police. They executed sworn statements before the
Municipal Judge pointing to Laureano Sangalang, Conrado Gonzales, Irineo
Canuel, Perino Canuel and Eleuterio Cuyom as the assassins of Ricardo Cortez.
Flora said in her statement that she knew those persons because from time to
time they used to pass by her place. They resided at Barrio Capitula,
Dasmariñas, which is near Barrio Adlas. On the basis of those statements, the
police filed on June 10 in the Municipal Court a complaint for murder against
the five aforenamed persons. Sangalang was arrested. He posted bail in the sum
of P50,000 on June 13. He waived the second stage of the preliminary
investigation. The other accused have not been apprehended. On August 8,
1968 the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for murder against Sangalang.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Tagaytay City Branch, rendered
a judgment convicting Sangalang of murder, sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua and ordering him to pay the heirs of Ricardo Cortez an indemnity of
twelve thousand pesos and to pay his widow moral damages in the sum of ten
thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. TG-162). Sangalang appealed.
The appellant, a fifty-six-year old farmer, admitted that he knew Cortez and that
he knows his wife, Flora Sarno. He pleaded an alibi. He declared that in the
afternoon of June 8, 1968 he and Crispulo Mendoza went to the house of Julian
Gatdula at Dapitan Street, Sampaloc, Manila. He arrived at Gatdula's place at six
o'clock. He wanted to borrow money from Gatdula to defray the matriculation
fees of his children.
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As Gatdula had no money at that time, he advised Sangalang to wait until
morning. He would try to raise the sum of two hundred pesos which Sangalang
desired to borrow. Sangalang and Mendoza agreed. They allegedly slept in
Gatdula's house on the night of June 8th. The next morning, they breakfasted in
that house. At about ten o'clock on June 9, Gatdula delivered the two hundred
pesos to Sangalang. He and Mendoza then went to the Central Market in Manila
and then to Quiapo. They returned to Cavite and arrived at seven o'clock in the
evening of June 9 in Barrio Capdula. Gatdula and Mendoza corroborated
Sangalang's alibi.
In this appeal Sangalang insists on his alibi and impugns the credibility of the
prosecution eyewitnesses, Mrs. Cortez and the victim's brother-in-law, Ricardo
Sarno. The basic issue is whether their eyewitness-testimony that they saw
appellant Sangalang as one of the five armed persons, who riddled Cortez with
fourteen gunshot wounds of entry, is sufficient to overcome his alibi. In
essence, the case projects the ever recurring conflict in criminal jurisprudence
between positive identification and alibi.
The trial court rejected appellant's alibi. It noted that although his witnesses,
Mendoza and Gatdula, learned of his arrest, and Mendoza even visited him in
the municipal jail, Sangalang and his witnesses did not interpose the defense of
alibi when he was investigated by the police and when he was summoned at the
preliminary investigation.
Sangalang points to certain discrepancies in the declarations of Mrs. Cortez and
her brother Ricardo Sarno. Those inconsistencies, which are not glaring,
strengthen their credibility and show that their testimonies were not coached
nor rehearsed. The discrepancies may be attributed to deficiencies in
observation and recollection, or misapprehension of the misleading and
confusing questions during cross-examination, or to the defective translation of
the questions and answers but they do not necessarily indicate a wilful attempt
to commit falsehood (People vs. Selfaison, 110 Phil. 839; People vs. Resayaga,
L-23234, December 26, 1973, 54 SCRA 350).
The controlling fact is that Mrs. Cortez and Sarno clearly and consistently
testified that they saw Sangalang, a person already well-known to them, among
the five armed persons who shot Ricardo Cortez. That unwavering
identification negates appellant's alibi.
The prosecution did not prove the motive for the killing. On the other hand,
Sangalang did not show that Mrs. Cortez and Sarno were impelled by a
malicious desire to falsely incriminate him. .
Counsel de oficio meticulously examined the contradictions and deficiencies in
the evidence for the prosecution. He made a spirited defense of the appellant.
However, his efforts failed to cast any reasonable doubt on Sangalang's
complicity in the killing.
The victim was shot while he was gathering tuba on top of a coconut tree. He
was unarmed and defenseless. He was not expecting to be assaulted. He did not
give any immediate provocation. The deliberate, surprise attack shows that
Sangalang and his companions employed a mode of execution which insured
the killing without any risk to them arising from any defense which the victim
could have made. The qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia), which
was alleged in the information, was duly established (See art. 14[16], Revised
Penal Code). Hence, the killing can be categorized as murder (See People vs.
Sedenio, 94 Phil. 1046). Treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstance of
band(U. S. vs. Abelinde, 1 Phil. 568). Evident premeditation, which was alleged
in the information, was not proven.
The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on Sangalang
(Arts. 64[1] and 248, Revised Penal Code).
Finding no error in its judgment, the same is affirmed with costs against the
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Barredo and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., took no take part.
F. IGNOMINY
PEOPLE VS TORREFIEL
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p
Accused-appellant Jose Torrefiel; Hilario Masgong alias "Mark"; Casiano
Masgong alias "Manny"; Saturnino Suyod alias "Ka Eddie"; "Jerry Delicano alias
"Ka Cocoy"; Luciano Solanoy, Jr., alias ''Ka Balot"; Noel Semira alias "Ka
Nido"; Ricky David alias "Ka Macky"; and Alex Francisco alias "Ka Jing," were
charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 2909 and 2910 for Murder and in Criminal Case
No. 2911 for Robbery before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan.
These cases were, upon agreement of the parties, jointly tried, since they arose
from the same incident and involved the same parties. The trial proceeded as
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against the accused-appellant Jose Torrefiel only, the rest of the accused having
remained at large.
After trial, the court a quo convicted accused-appellant1 in each of the cases,
the dispositive portions of which are quoted hereinbelow:
In Criminal Case No. 2909 for Murder:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused, Jose Torrefiel, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and hereby sentences the accused to a
penalty of imprisonment of Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months and One (1)
day to Eighteen (18) years and Eight (8) months.
The accused is hereby ordered also to indemnify the family of the victim the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) by way of damages . . . .
2 The group greeted Leopoldo as "How are you Tay?" to which the latter
In Criminal Case No. 2910 for Murder:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused, Jose Torrefiel, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and hereby sentences the accused to a
penalty of imprisonment of Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months and One(l)
day to Eighteen (18) years and Eight (8) months.
The accused is hereby ordered also to indemnify the family of the victim the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) by way of damages. . . .3
In Criminal Case No. 2911 for Robbery:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Jose Torrefiel guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery and sentences the accused to suffer
the penalty of Twelve (12) years and One (1) day to Fourteen (14) years and
Eight (8) months. . . .4
Accused-appellant Jose Torrefiel, appealed to the Court of Appeals. After
considering the evidence and the law involved, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the judgment of conviction in all the cases but refrained from entering
judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 2909 and 2910 for murder, having ascertained
that the proper imposable penalty for each of said crimes is reclusion perpetua,
and instead, certified these two (2) cases to us for final determination pursuant
to Section 13 of Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
The facts as correctly summarized by the prosecution in its Brief are as
follows:5
On May 26, 1989 at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning at Barangay Naligusan,
Ibajay, Aklan, Realidad Mangilog woke up early to prepare their breakfast. Her
husband Leopoldo Mangilog and her son Reynaldo were about to join her
downstairs, when someone knocked at the kitchen backdoor (TSN, March 21,
1990, pp. 3-4).
It was Leonardo who opened the door. When the door was opened appellant
Jose Torrefiel armed with a bolo and a hand gun entered the house first
followed by Masiano Masgong, Hilario Masgong, Alex Francisco, Saturnino
Suyod and Noel alias "Nido" in that order, who were all armed with long
firearms. (TSN, Ibid, p. 5).
answered "as usual." Leopoldo even served the newcomers with coffee, but
because the coffee was not sufficient for them, Realidad asked Hermogenes
Calizo, who was then the errand boy of the Mangilog (sic), to buy coffee from
the store. (TSN, Id. pp. 5-6).
The group of appellant Torrefiel did not even touch or taste the coffee served
them by Leopoldo. Instead, appellant, Casiano Masgong and Satur Suyod aimed
their guns at Leopoldo and started shooting him to death (TSN, Id. p. 6).6
Simultaneous to the shooting of Leopoldo inside the house by the group of
appellant was the shooting and stabbing of Reynaldo who was then taking a
bath inside the bathroom located outside of the house by the other members of
the group who did not enter the house..(TSN. Id. p. 7)
After the killing of Leopoldo and Reynaldo, the accused ransacked the house
and took P500.00 cash, wrist watch, kitchen wares, grocery items, chickens and
guitar. (TSN, Id. p. 10)
Before the accused left the house of the victims, they even fired their guns at
random. They were blaming the victims to be responsible to the incident why
the military was running after them. They were also telling the people along the
road that the fish is okey and could be ready to be butchered (Id., p. 11).
Accused-appellant invoked the defense of alibi, claiming that at about 7:00
o'clock in the morning of May 26, 1989, he was at the house of Barangay
Captain Benedicto Puod in Barangay Agbalogo, Makato, Aklan, which can be
reached in an hour and a half (1 1/2) from Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Akalan,
the scene of the incident. He had gone on vacation to Barangay Agbalogo on
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May 22, 1989 and attended the fiesta on May 25, 1989. He had remained in the
said barangay since then upon the advice of his wife not to return to Barangay
Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan, appellant's place of residence, as the situation there
was somewhat hot.7 Benedicto Puod confirmed appellant's claim as to his
whereabouts in the morning of May 26, 1989, recounting that he and appellant
were, indeed, together drinking alcoholic drinks from 7:00 to 11:00 o'clock in
the morning on the occasion of the birthday of his child.8 In addition, Pedro
Tosio as a witness testified as to the presence of appellant at his house in
Barangay Agbalogo in the morning until about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
May 25, 1989, the day of the fiesta, declaring further that he also saw appellant
pass by his house on May 26, 1989.9
In his appeal, accused-appellant interposed the following assignment of errors:
I for the death of her husband and son on that fateful morning of May 26, 1989.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER IN CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 2909.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER IN CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 2910.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY IN CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 2911. 10
On the first and third assignment of errors, accused-appellant maintains his
defense of alibi, stressing that, not being around at the time and place of the
incident as he was at Barangay Agbalogo, Makato, Aklan, he could not have
murdered Leopoldo Mangilog and robbed the Mangillogs of their personal
belongings.
We are not persuaded.
It is well-settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused. 11 Furthermore, for alibi to prosper, the accused
must establish not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was
committed but that it was also physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 12
That accused-appellant had been positively identified as one of the culprits by
prosecution witness Realidad Mangilog cannot be doubted. The Mangilogs and
the accused-appellant had known each other for years as neighbors. Accused-
appellant whose parents reside in Barangay Agbalogo, Makato, Aklan,
established residence in Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan when he got married
to a resident there. Since his house is only about one hundred and fifty (150)
meters away from that of the Mangilogs, there were occasions when accused-
appellant would visit the Mangilogs, usually for coffee, and that Leopoldo
Mangilog would also go to the accused-appellant's house. Indeed, eyewitness
Realidad Mangilog knows the accused-appellant so well that she could not have
been mistaken in identifying appellant as one of those armed men responsible
She testified thus:
Q. When your husband open (sic) the door, was there somebody who got
inside?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where were you at that time?
A. I am (sic) at that time at the door dividing the sala and the dining room.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Were you able to recognized (sic) those persons who entered your
house?
A. I can recognized (sic) Jose Torrefiel leading the group and Masiano
Masgong alias Manny, Alex Francisco followed by Satur or Saturnino Suyod and
the other one was Noel Semira alias Nido. 13
Moreover, the two other prosecution witnesses, Coreto Maguirang and
Hermogenes Calizo, confirmed the presence of accused-appellant in Barangay
Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan at the time of the incident in question. Maguirang
testified that while he watched over his carabao which was grazing on May 26,
1989 at around 5:00 o'clock in the morning, he saw the appellant and his group
as they passed by him from a distance of about ten (10) meters heading towards
the direction of the house of Leopoldo Mangilog in Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay,
Aklan. 14 He could not be mistaken as to appellant's identity since he had on
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several occasions seen appellant together with the same group of armed men 15
Calizo, on the other hand, claimed that he had seen appellant face to face in the
men house of the Mangilogs that same morning of May 26, 1989 shortly before
the subject incident occurred since at that time he was living in said house. He
only happened to be sent out by Realidad Mangilog to buy coffee so he did not
get to see the actual killing of Leopoldo and Reynaldo Mangilog. 16
It is significant to note that no improper motive can be imputed to Realidad
Mangilog as would make her testify falsely against accused-appellant; hence her
testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. 17
Evidently complementing the positive identification of accused-appellant as one
of the perpetrators of the crimes charged is his failure to prove that it was
physically impossible for him to be at Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan at the
time of the incident, assuming that his claim that he went to the house of
Barangay Captain Puod at 7:00 o'clock in the morning of May 26, 1989 was
true. As testified to by appellant himself, it would take just one and a half (1
1/2) hours to reach Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan from Barangay
Agbalogo, Makato, Aklan. Needless to state, it would not at all be impossible
for appellant to be at Barangay Agbalogo at 7:00 o'clock in the morning or
some two hours after the crimes were committed at Barangay Naligusan.
In his second assignment of error, accused-appellant contends that he had
nothing to do with the killing of the victim Reynaldo Mangilog, obviously
relying on the testimony of Realidad Mangilog to the effect that Reynaldo
Mangilog was shot and stabbed to death by the members of appellant's group
who stationed themselves outside the house.
This contention we also find untenable, conspiracy being clearly manifest in this
case as was correctly found by the Court of Appeals. For collective
responsibility to be established, it is not necessary that conspiracy be proved by
direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime 18 as only rarely
would such an agreement be demonstrable since in the nature of things criminal
undertakings are rarely documented by agreement in writing. 19 Conspiracy may
be inferred from the acts of the accused immediately prior to, during and right
after the shooting of the victim which indicate their common intention to
commit the crime. 20
The record shows that: (1) all the accused which include accused-appellant
arrived together at the scene of the killings, (2) they were all fully armed; (3)
three of them simultaneously shot to death Leopoldo Mangilog, while an
undetermined number shot and stabbed to death Reynaldo Mangilog; (4) the
attack on the two victims was executed simultaneously; and (5) the accused's
statement to the effect that the victims were responsible for the fact that the
military men were running after them. This tends to establish a motive on their
pant to kill the victims. All these indubitably indicate a concerted effort on the
part of the accused on a common design to kill the victims.
Conspiracy having been adequately shown, all the accused are answerable as co-
principals regardless of the degree of their participation. 21 In fact, it is not
necessary to ascertain the individual participation in the final liquidation of the
victims 22 or to ascertain the precise modality or extent of participation of each
individual conspirator as the applicable rule is that the act of one conspirator is
the act of all of them. 23 It hardly matters, therefore, that accused-appellant did
not actually participate in the killing of Reynaldo Mangilog or of Leopoldo
Mangilog.
As alleged in the informations and as correctly observed by the Solicitor
General, the killing of the victims was qualified by treachery. Leopoldo
Mangilog was shot while he was serving the accused coffee or shortly thereafter.
Reynaldo Mangilog, on the other hand, was shot and stabbed to death while he
was taking a bath. It may be added that the victims were naturally unarmed at
that time and their execution was done so early in the morning, that is, when
they had practically just awakened. Under the circumstances, the victims were
clearly not in any position to defend themselves from the sudden and
unexpected attack of the accused. 24 These circumstances are manifestly
indicative of the presence of the conditions under which treachery may be
appreciated, i.e., the employment of means of execution that gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and that said means of
execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. 25
The Court of Appeals appreciated abuse of superior strength, aid of armed men
and evident premeditation as aggravating circumstances. These findings are
factual and the rule is that findings of the Court of Appeals upon factual
questions are conclusive and ought not to be disturbed unless shown to be
contrary to the evidence on record, 26 and, in this case, there is no such
showing. However, we believe, and so hold, that treachery absorbs the
circumstances of abuse of superior strength and aid of armed men, as it appears
that the accused saw to it that they were armed and far outnumbered the victims
precisely to ensure the accomplishment of their criminal objective. 27
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for murder
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Since we find accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by
treachery in Criminal Cases Nos. 2909 and 2910 and that the generic
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was also attendant, the
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penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed in each case, applying Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code and considering the proscription against the
imposition of the death penalty at the time the crimes were committed.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the trial court are hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each case of murder (Criminal Cases Nos.
2909 and 2910)
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
PEOPLE VS ALFANTA
VITUG, J.:
Before this Court, by way of automatic review, is the decision, date 29 July
1996, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 82, convicting 1
accused-appellant Rolando Alfanta y Alo of rape with two aggravating
circumstances and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death.
Rolando Alfanta was charged with the crime of rape in an information that
simply read:
That on or about the 26th day of August, 1995, in the City of Makati,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge upon the person of one
NITA FERNANDEZ y JOSEFA against her will and
consent. 2
When arraigned on 27 September 1995, accused-appellant entered a plea of not
guilty to the crime charged. Trial thereupon ensued.
The evidence of the parties has been recited in good detail by the trial court in
its decision under review, thus:
The first prosecution witness was Dr. Noel Minay, Medico Legal Officer of the
National Bureau of Investigation who testified that on August 27, 1995 at
around 5:45 in the afternoon, he performed a physical examination and medico
genital examination on one Nita Fernandez for alleged rape. Upon physical
examination he found mark swelling on the left lower jaw or on the mandibular
area left portion; and, upon examination of the hymen, he found that the labia
majora and minora gaping, similar to the appearance of a woman who had just
given birth; or a normal appearance as a result of several sexual intercourses that
had been performed. He submitted a report on his findings (Exhibit "A").
The next witness was Nita Fernandez, the offended party alleged in the
information who testified that on August 26, 1995 at around 12:00 o'clock
midnight, while asleep in the residence of a friend at AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio,
Makati City, a man whom she had not seen before suddenly entered the house
where she was sleeping, pulled her, boxed her jaw and put his hand on her
mouth, and told her that if she will not obey him, he will kill her. She resisted,
but could not do anything. Thereafter, she was forced to climb a fence. Because
of fear, as the man was holding a bolo, she followed. After climbing the fence,
the man instructed her to go to a vacant house. She followed, as instructed.
While at the vacant house, she was told to undress, she did because of fear, as
the man was holding a bolo. Thereafter, the man embraced and kissed her.
Then she was told to lie down and told to separate her legs. The man inserted
his penis into her vagina. After inserting the man's penis to her vagina, she was
told to lie face down. She complied, thereafter, the man inserted his penis into
her anus. After inserting the man's penis into her anus, she was told to turn
around face up. All these acts of the man hurt her. After turning around face
up, the man inserted his fingers in and out into her private part. After the man
had finished inserting his fingers in and out of her private part, she was told to
go near him and lie beside him, and not to dress up as he was going to take a
rest and at the same time telling her not to tell what happened to others saying
that "lahat ng nirape ko ay pinatay ko dahil sa ayokong may magsumbong." All
the time the man was inserting his penis and fingers into her private part and
into her anus, she was shouting: "tulungan po ninyo ako," but nobody
responded. Noticing that the man was already sleeping, she suddenly got the
knife at waist of the man and stab the man on his chest. The knife broke. She
suddenly grabbed the bolo and hack the man several times. Thereafter, she put
on her dress, got hold of the bolo and ran to the signal office of soldiers. When
she arrived at the signal office of soldiers, she told the persons she met that she
killed a man. The bolo was taken from her by the soldiers. With, soldiers, they
went to the place where she was raped. They found the man lying down still
alive. The man was brought to the hospital. The man turned out to be accused
Rolando Alfanta y Alo. Thereafter, she executed an affidavit (Exh. C), narrating
what happened to her to the police; and was brought to the NBI Medico-Legal
Officer for examination.
On cross examination she testified that, from Valle Verde, Pasig City, where she
worked as housemaid, she went to her friend's house named Patrick because she
brought mongo and because she and Patrick's wife Inday, are friends, arriving in
the house of Patrick at 6:30 in the evening of August 26, 1995. She was not able
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to go back to her place of work at Valle Verde, Pasig because it was already late
at night and was told to sleep at Patrick's house. Earlier that evening, at 9:00,
she saw accused passed by in front of the house. Aside from her two (2) other
persons slept in the house of Patrick, Inday and son. She slept in the sala, while
Inday and her son in a room. The door of the house was closed, but was not
locked. In entering the house were she slept, one has to reach the sala first.
When awakened, she shouted, but nobody heard her because they were sleeping
and at the same time the accused placed his hand on her mouth. She was really
afraid because she was boxed on her chest and accused was holding a bolo.
While outside the house she was boxed. At the garage, which was not lighted,
she was told to undress. She followed, because of fear. Accused also undressed
himself. While accused was on top of her, holding a bolo, she cried. Accused is
not her sweetheart. She even said, why will I hack him if he is my sweetheart.
The last witness for prosecution was Lilia Hogar of the Women's Desk Unit,
Makati Police Station who testified that she came into the possession of the
bolo, Exh. D, because Nita Fernandez was brought to Sub-Station A. The bolo,
which was brought by Nita Fernandez to the Military Signal Village, was in turn
given to the Central Police Desk wherein she is the Investigator. After the bolo
was handed to her by the soldiers of the Signal Village, she conducted an
investigation. Based on her investigation, she learned from Nita Fernandez that
when Nita Fernandez woke up at 12:00 midnight on August 26, 1995, Nita
Fernandez saw a man standing beside her. Nita was punched on the left portion
of the face and ordered her to go outside, instructed to climb over a fence on
the other side of the house. After climbing the fence, Nita Fernandez was told
to undress, was boxed on her breast and was told to lie down in a vacant house
owned by Captain Pascua, where suspect raped Nita Fernandez. On their way
to the hospital on board the Makati Police car, she asked accused why he rape
Nita Fernandez. Accused answered that Fernandez was not telling the truth
because they were sweethearts.
Defense presented the accused. Accused testified that on August 26, 1995,
while at AFOVAI Village, Municipality of Makati, fixing the fence of the house
of General Renato Icarma together with many other laborers, somebody told
him that his wife was waiting for him in the house of Captain Pascua. At 10:00
o'clock that evening, he went to the house of Captain Pascua; and upon
reaching the house, he knocked, and called Patrick Augusto Ablon, the
caretaker of Captain Pascua. Belinda Ablon, the cousin of Patrick Augusto
Ablon, opened the door. After opening the door, Nita Fernandez, his live-in
partner for almost a year came out, in an angry mood, because she has been
waiting for him for long, and asked him why he was late. He explained that he
did not expect her to come, as his understanding with Nita Fernandez was, he
will call her by phone or write her before she comes. Then Nita Fernandez told
him that they talk outside as she was ashamed with the neighbor, and they will
disturb the child who was sleeping. After half hour talking, he invited Nita to
sleep. He and Nita went to a vacant house, owned by a Colonel passing a fence.
When they arrived in the vacant house, it was closed, so they slept in the terrace.
He denied doing what Nita Fernandez claimed he did. He claimed that, he was
surprised why Fernandez hacked him, for he knows of no reason why Nita
Fernandez will hack him. He believes that Nita Fernandez concocted the story
of rape because of fear that he will file a case against Nita Fernandez for
hacking him.
On cross-examination, accused testified that, he has been staying in the house
of General Romeo Icarma (the house where he and 15 other workers were
constructing a fence), since 1990. His livelihood was, as a Mason, since 1993. In
February 1995, the daughter of Nita Fernandez named, Lucia who is married to
Lito introduced him to Nita. He and Nita became sweethearts in February 1995.
They have not live together because Nita was working at Valle Verde. They only
meet during Nita's day off. He has been at Nita's place of work, but he used to
call then at her telephone numbers which are 6326062 and 6356060. They used
to see each other at Gen. Icarma's place where he lived. On August 26, 1995,
when the incident in questioned happened, Lucia and Lito were no longer
residing at Gen. Icarma's place because they were told to leave in April 1993.
On August 26, 1995, while in the squatters area, just 100 meters away from the
house of Gen. Icarma, Nita came, looking for him. Because Nita does not know
the workers in Gen. Icarma's house, Nita left and went to the house of Captain
Pascua, just at the back of the house of Gen. Icarma. While at the squatters
area, Melchor Rudy Abella told him that Nita was looking for him. He went to
the house of Captain Pascua. At Captain Pascua's place, he met Nita. Present in
the house of Captain Pascua were Augusto Ablon, his wife Rubylin, Belinda, a
cousin and a small child who were all awake, except the child. Although Ablon
was very much willing to accommodate him in Ablon's house, he brought Nita
to the house of the Air Force Colonel because if it rains, there is a roof to
protect them and ashamed to stay at Ablon's house. Even Nita does not like to
sleep in Ablon's place, saying that instead of sleeping at Ablon's place, she
prefers to go back at Valle Verde. He did not allow Nita to go back at Valle
Verde because it was already late at night and if anything happens to her, her
daughter who knows his relationship with Nita will blame him. He did not bring
Nita to Gen. Icarma's house because it is crowded and the Colonel's house is
just 20 meters from Captain Pascua's house. They went to the Colonel's house,
climbing the fence. When they climbed the wall, he was carrying "banig, pillow
and blanket," and did not notice that Nita was carrying a knife. Nobody live in
the Colonel's house and was closed. They slept in the terrace of the house on a
cement flooring. While he was sleeping Nita hacked him with a kitchen knife.
When hacked, he just said "aray". The bolo was not used in hacking him. After
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stabbing him, Nita left and went to the Military Police leaving the kitchen knife.
When the Military Police arrived, he was no longer at the Colonel's house
because he went to another house, where he slept. After he was stabbed, he
asked the assistance of Ablon. Ablon was the one who called for the Military
Police. He did not leave the colonel's house. He just stayed in the premises.
Despite his wounds, he was able to sleep and woke up at 5:00 in the morning.
When asked why Nita stabbed him, he said that it was because he hurt Nita by
holding Nita's hand and pushing her on her chest when Nita insisted in leaving
for Valle Verde; and because he hurt Nita, he did not file a complaint against
Nita for hacking him. 3
In the decretal portion of the decision, the court a quo has pronounced
judgment, thus:
WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Rolando Alfanta y Alo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, penalized by Art. 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, with aggravating circumstances of nighttime and
ignominy, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death, and
indemnify complainant Nita Fernandez the sum of P50,000.00, plus the costs of
the suit. 4
Now before the Court, accused-appellant seeks the reversal of the conviction
and the imposition of the death penalty decreed by the trial court; he contends
that —
I. THE TRIAL COURT [HAS] ERRED IN FINDING AND
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF
RAPE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT [HAS] ERRED IN TAKING INTO
CONSIDERATION THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
NIGHTTIME AND IGNOMINY. 5
The case can be described as not really being too far from the typical rape cases
that have been previously reviewed by the Court. It is a case, like the instances
before it, of two people, each testifying on the same incident but making a
clearly discordant testimony. Since only the participants could directly testify on
the sexual congress, here conceded to have taken place, extreme care is
observed in evaluating the respective declarations of the complainant and the
accused. The doctrinally accepted rule is to accord great respect over the
assessment of the trial court on the credibility of the witnesses and, in the usual
words of similar import employed by the Court, it would be best not to disturb
the findings of the court which has heard the evidence except only when a
material or substantial fact has truly been overlooked or misappreciated which if
properly taken into account can alter the outcome of the case. 6 Regrettably for
accused-appellant, no such exceptive instances of possible oversight are
perceived or evident in this case.
Complainant gave a thorough narrative account, so found to be credible by the
trial court and by this Court as well, of what had transpired during the late hour
of the night in question.
Prosecutor Manola:
Q Mrs. Witness will you kindly tell the Honorable Court where you were
on August 26, 1995 at around 12:00 o'clock midnight?
A At Fort Bonifacio.
Q What city or municipality?
A I do not know but it must be here sir.
Q Meaning Makati City?
A Yes sir.
Q Why were you there on that date and time Mrs. Witness?
A I was sleeping in my friend's residence.
Court:
Q What is the address of that friend's residence at Fort Bonifacio?
A At AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio Makati sir.
Q Why were you there at that time?
A Because I always go there and my son's residence is beside the house of
my friend sir.
Court: Proceed fiscal:
Pros. Manola:
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Q Now, while you were there on that date and time at the house of your
friend in AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio Makati City do you recall of any unusual Q Now when this man told you to go to the vacant house did you obey
incident that happened? him?

A There was sir. A I was told to go to the vacant house there he told me to undress.

Q Will you kindly tell what that incident was? Q Did you obey him?

A During that time while I was sleeping in the residence of my friend A He told me to undress and he was holding a bolo.
suddenly there was a man who entered the house where I was sleeping.
Court:
Q So when you saw that man entered the house what did he do if any?
Q The question of the prosecutor to you was did you obey the instruction
A I stood up because he was pulling me and then he put his hand in my of the accused for you to undress?
mouth sir.
A Yes sir.
Q What else happened after that?
Prosecutor Manola:
A When I was resisting he boxed me and at that time he was holding a
bolo and he said if I will not obey him he will be going to kill me sir. Q Tell the Honorable Court why you do followed the instruction of that
Man to go to that vacant house and to undress why did you follow this
Q After that what transpired next Mr. Witness? instruction?

A He forced me to climb the fence and then I saw he was holding a bolo. A I was afraid that he might kill me sir.

Q Did you climb over the fence? Q Why do you say that he might kill you?

A I climb sir because he forced me to climb the fence. A He like to rape me sir.

Q Were you able to go over the fence? Court:

A When I was over the fence already he told me to go to a vacant house.
Q How about the accused where was he when he ordered you to climb
over the fence?
A He was at my back and he told me to go first and then he followed.
Q So after you went or cross over the fence what happened next Madam
witness?
Q You did not answer the question of the prosecutor why were you
afraid?
A Because he was holding a bolo and he was at the same time boxing me
sir.
Prosecutor Manola:
Q So what happened after according to you were instructed to undress?

A He told me to go to the vacant house and there he himself told me to A He embraced me and kissed me and told me to lie down.
undress and I took off my clothes he embraced me and kissed me sir.

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Q And did you lie down as instructed by this Man?
A He forced me to lie down and then he forced me to separate my legs
sir.
Q And what happened when you were forced to open your legs?
A He told me not to shout because if I will shout he will kill me and the
he inserted his penis to my vagina sir.
Q After this Man inserted his penis in your vagina or private part what
happened next Mrs. Witness?
A He told me to lie front my face down and he inserted his penis to my
anus sir.
Q After that what happened next Mrs. witness?
A Then he told me again to lie down and at the same time he inserted his
fingers to my private parts going it and out sir.
Q After that what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A He lie down because he was already tired of molesting.
Q How about you what were you doing at that time when the accused this
person according to you lie down after he put his fingers inside your private
part?
A He asked me to go near him and lie down beside him.
Q Did you follow his instruction for you to lie near him?
A Yes sir because he was holding a bolo sir.
Q So what happened after you lie down beside this person?
A He told me to put on my dress and at the same time he also told me
that he does not want me to tell it to anybody because he have raped many.
Q Now if this person whom according to you raped you inside the court
room would you be able to recognize him?
A Yes sir I could recognize him.
Q Will you kindly look around the court room if you could recognize this
person if he is inside?
Note: Witness pointed to a man who was pointed as the man who raped him
and when asked his name answered as Rolando Alfanta.
Q Now after this person whom you just pointed to who answered by the
name of Rolando Alfanta uttered the words "lahat nang ni rape ko ay pinapatay
ko dahil sa ayokong may magsumbong" what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A I pleaded to him and he said not to put on my dress because he is going
to take a rest.
Q After that what happened next if any Mrs. Witness?
A I saw him that he was sleeping already and then I suddenly got the
knife and stab him in the chest sir.
Q After you stabbed him on his chest what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A The knife broke and then I suddenly grabbed the bolo and hack and
hack him sir.
Q After you hacked this person who raped you what happened next Mrs.
Witness?
A I immediately put on my shirt and I got hold of the bolo and I run to
the signal where the soldiers were.
Q Did you reach this place signal where there are soldiers according to
you?
A Yes sir.
Q And what did you do when then when you arrived there?
A I told him that I killed a person therein and give them the bolo.
Q What happened after that when you informed the solders at signal that
according to you you have killed a person what happened next?
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A We went to the person who raped me sir.

Q Is that your statement.
Q And did you see him there?
A Yes sir.
A Yes sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Who were with you when you went back to the place where you were
allegedly raped? Q Now this bolo which according to you you surrendered to the soldier at
the signal if you see this bolo again would you be able to recognize it again?
A The soldiers sir.
A Yes sir.
Q Did you find this person who raped you?
Prosecutor Manola:
A Yes sir.
We would like to make reservation for this witness to identify this bolo when
Q What was he doing? this bolo is presented by the policeman who is in custody of this bolo.

A He was lying down sir. Court:

Q What happened after that? Q How about the knife which according to you was seen by you at the
waist line of the accused did you bring it also?
A When we arrived there he was still alive and he was brought to the
hospital. A I did not bring it sir because it was broken sir it was only the bolo that I
brought.
Q Who brought him to the hospital?
Q Now while you were being raped did you shout for help?
A The ambulance of the soldier.
A Yes sir.
Q Now do you remember having given a statement to the Makati Police
in connection with what you have just narrated or told or testified to this Q How did you ask for help?
afternoon?
A I asked for help but they were sleeping they did not hear me sir.
A I could remember.
Q The question to you was how did you ask for help?
Q If that statement is shown to you would you be able to recognize it?
A I cried and I said tulungan po ninyo ako.
A Yes sir.
Q Did anybody respond to your cries for help?
Q Now showing you a statement attached to the records of the
prosecutor's office consisting of two pages kindly go over it and tell us if you A None sir.
recognize this statement?
Q Now how did you feel while the accused was inserting his private part
A Yes sir I could recognize this. to your private part?

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A I failed to count how many times. I hacked him because I was afraid of
A It hurt sir my vagina and my anus, my mouth that he boxed me sir. him he might kill me.

Q Now why did you say that the accused was able to insert his penis into Prosecutor Manola: That will be all for the witness.
your vagina?
Court: Cross-examination.
A He forced that to insert it.
Atty. Manalo: With the permission of the Honorable Court.
Q Forced it to where?
Court: Proceed.
A He forced it to enter my vagina sir.
Atty. Manalo:
Q Did you feel when the private part of the accused entered to your
vagina? Q Now who were with you at the time when you were sleeping at the
house of your friend at AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio?
A Yes sir I feel it sir.
A One of their children so there were three and I was one.
Q By the way do you know the accused prior to the date that you were
awakened? Q Were you sleeping in one room?

A I do not know him. A I was sleeping in the sala sir.

Q In short he is a complete stranger to you when he entered the room? Q Now before you sleep in that house at the sala did you close the door
of that house?
A I saw him around 7:00 o'clock in the evening that he was passing thru
the front of the house of my friends where I was sleeping. A It was closed but it was not locked.

Q At that time that you were awaken by the accused with whom were you xxx xxx xxx
sleeping?
Q Now when why were you interested in sleeping in the house of your
A Only me sir. friend when you could already at the house of your employer?

Prosecutor Manola: A Because I was bringing mongo to my friend because I am indebted to

Q Now you said that while you and the accused were lying down first you
stab him with the knife how many times have you stabbed him with the knife?
A I was not able to count because I was afraid of him.
Q You said that after stabbing him with the knife which you broke you
got hold of the bolo you hacked him how many times have you hacked him?
them sir.
Q Now why did you not return to your employer after giving or handing
that mongo to your friend?
A They told me to sleep there because it was already late at night.
Q By the way what time did you go there?

A Around 6:00 to 6:30 in the evening.

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A I shouted but they did not hear me because they were sleeping and at
Q And what time did you reach your friend at AFOVAI? the same time he placed his hands on my mouth sir.

A 6:30 sir. Q Now you said that you were boxed on the chest by the accused how
many times were you boxed by the accused on the chest?
Q And Valle Verde is just in Pasig isn't?
A I do not know how many times I was boxed sir because I was really
A Yes sir. afraid of him.

Q It is near where you are employed and it will take you one ride only to Q But you were sure that you were boxed at the chest?
reach that place isn't?
A Yes sir.
A Three rides sir.
Note: Witness demonstrating with her hands first pointing on her chest and
Q Now which is first to be reached from the front door of the house also on her mouth.
where you were sleeping at the time the place where you were sleeping or the
place of the room where the owner of the house were sleeping? Q Was it strong?

A First it is the sala where he passed. A Yes sir it was strong because the following day it has marked.

Q Now you said that the door was not locked was there any other Note: Witness holding on his left chin.
improvised locked placed in that door like a wood?
Q How about on the chest?
A They did not lock the door because they are in confident.
Note: Witness demonstrating it was pointed on her chest.
Q Now what is the name of the owner of the house where you slept at
that time? A It was not too strong sir.

A Patrick sir. Q Did you fall down on your knee when you were hit by the blow?

Q And how are you related to Patrick? A Yes sir.

A His wife is my friend sir. Q Where?

Q What is the name of his wife? A I fell on the ground down.

A Inday sir. Q Where were you boxed by the accused?

Q Now when you were awaken while you were sleeping in the sala of the A Outside sir of the house.
house of your friend Inday did you not shout when you saw a person pulling
you holding a bolo? Q Now you said that you were ordered to undress and to lie down on the
ground is that correct?

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A Yes sir. A Yes sir he was holding the bolo on his one hand.

Q And you followed him? Q How did you see him?

A He told me to undress in the garage and he also undressed himself and A When he was holding the bolo with his one hand while I he was on top
because I was afraid because he was holding a bolo sir. of me I cried and he was holding the bolo.

Q When he undressed himself was he still holding a bolo? Note: Witness demonstrating the accused holding the bolo upward.

A Yes sir one hand was holding the bolo the other one hand he was A When I cried he was on top of me sir.
undressing himself.
Q What was he doing when he was on top of you?
Q Was it lighted the place?
A He was molesting me sir.
A None sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q How far were you when the accused was undressing himself?
Q Now what time did you see him passed by the house of your friend
A Near sir. according to you?

Q Did you see his private part when he undressed himself? A 9:00 o'clock in the evening sir.

A Yes sir. Q Why were you sure that he was the one who passed by the house of
your friend?
Q How big?
A I saw him that he was passing.
Prosecutor Manola: Immaterial your honor.
Q Where were you at the time?
Atty. Manalo: To test the credibility, your honor.
A I was seating by the window sir. 7
Court: Answer
The testimony of the complainant about the incident is straightforward
A It was dark and I was able to see and I do not know because I was categorical, and relatively free from any serious flaw. No compelling reason is
afraid. advanced to sufficiently persuade the Court to conclude that the trial court has
erred in giving due weight and credence to the testimony of the complainant.
Atty. Manalo: Neither is evidence adduced to show that the complainant has had any ulterior
motive to prevaricate and enmesh accused-appellant in a fabricated charge. The
Q And then you lie down? Court repeats the familiar doctrine that when a woman claims that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show such a fact so long as her
A He told me to lie down and he placed himself on top of me. testimony can meet the test of credibility, 8 for it is said that no woman in her
right mind will cry rape, allow examination of her private parts, or subject
Q Was he still holding the bolo? herself and her family to the humiliation concomitant to the prosecution of the
case, unless the story were true. 9

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Testifying in his defense, accused-appellant claimed that he and the complainant
had been lived-in partner for almost a year, and that while they did sleep
together on 26 August 1995 at the porch of the house of a certain Air Force
officer, accused-appellant denied any carnal knowledge of the victim that
evening. In his appeal brief, accused-appellant sought to negate any possible or
likely use of violence or intimidation, considering that: (a) in the house where
the victim was sleeping on the night of 26 August 1995, there were at least three
persons (the caretaker of the house Patrick Augusto Ablon, his wife Rubylin
and the couple's son) who could have responded to any shout for help from the
victim; (b) the door of the house was purposely left unlocked in order to enable
accused-appellant to come in to the house, and (c) when the victim was made to
climb a fence followed by the accused, she could have escaped but did not.
The "sweetheart theory" of accused-appellant would appear to be another worn
out strategy, often resorted to as a last ditch effort, to exculpate oneself from
criminal liability. No documentary evidence of any sort, like a letter or a
photograph or any piece of memento, was presented to confirm a romantic
liason between accused-appellant and the complainant. The latter testified:
Q Is it not a fact that you and the accused were sweethearts?
A No sir.
Q And that you went to that place AFOVAI just to meet him in that
place?
A No sir he is not my sweetheart. Why will I hack him if he is my
sweetheart?
Q You hacked him with the bolo because of you are too much jealousy is
concerned because your sweetheart was then womanizing?
Prosecutor Manola: Misleading your honor.
Atty. Manalo: I am on cross-examination your Honor.
Court: Answer.
A Why will I get jealous I have nothing to do with him. I do not know
him sir.
Atty. Manalo:
Q Really?
A I do not know him. I really do not know him sir. 10
It would be rather strange an occurrence for a love-partner, if true, to stab her
beloved for petty reasons. The trial court was not out of line when it made this
evaluation; viz:
This Court cannot accept the claim of accused that he and complainant Nita
Fernandez were sweethearts, for such a claim defies rationality, let alone
common sense, because if they were sweethearts, she will not hack him.. Not
only that, the manner on which she stabbed and hacked him, first with a knife,
then with a bolo, shows a complete anger to vindicate the outrage on her. If
they were sweethearts, she would not have acted in the manner she did in
stabbing and hacking him. At least, if they have some relationship, she would
not show anger the way she did. 11
Neither would the presence of at least three persons on the night of 26 August
1995 in the house where victim was sleeping necessarily disprove the sexual
assault. It was already close to midnight when the incident occurred, and the
other occupants of the house were by then apparently all sound asleep. The
evidence is to the effect that accused-appellant immediately after getting into
the house hit her on the jaw, put his hand on her mouth and threatened to kill
her if she dared refuse to yield to his demands. Understandably, the victim was
shocked, gripped by fear and then cowed into submission. Intimidation should
be viewed in the light of the perception and judgment of the victim at the time
of the commission of the offense and not by any kind of hard and fast rule. It
would be unreasonable to expect the victim to act with equanimity of
disposition and to have the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat
made by accused-appellant. 12
The claim that the unlocked door of the house was a sign that the complainant
wanted accused-appellant to have a chance to see her during the late evening
indeed should deserve scant consideration. The so-called love angle was
properly ruled out by the trial court for lack of concrete evidence to establish
any such relationship.
Anent the failure of the complainant to escape when accused-appellant ordered
her to climb a fence, it should be enough to state she did not appear to have
had any real opportunity to flee from the clutches of the intruder who was, in
fact, just behind her. After scaling the fence and while inside the abandoned and
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enclosed house, she could not have done any much better since she was all the
time within striking distance of the bolo-wielding malefactor.
And now on the propriety of an appreciation of the aggravating circumstances
of nighttime and ignominy.
Nighttime is said to be that period of darkness beginning at the end of dusk and
ending at dawn. 13 The law defines nights as being from sunset to sunrise. 14
By and of itself, nighttime would not be an aggravating circumstance unless it is
specially sought by the offender, or it is specially taken advantage of by him, or
it facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring the offender's immunity
from capture. 15 As an ordinary aggravating circumstance, nighttime can be so
considered provided it is duly proved although not alleged in the information.
16 The Court entertains no doubt that appellant has specially taken advantage
of the cover of darkness to facilitate the commission of the crime without being
recognized. Accused-appellant has abducted his victim, brought her to an
abandoned and unlit house and then unleashed his carnal desire on her, assured
of the stillness of a sleeping world. 17 The Court has long held that this
aggravating circumstance can be considered when an accused takes advantage of
the silence and darkness of the night to ensure impunity from his illegal act. 18
With respect to ignominy, the victim testified that after appellant had inserted
his penis into her vagina, appellant ordered her to lie face down and while in
that position had his penis into her anus. Thereafter, he ordered her to lie down
again and this time he inserted his finger inside her. The Solicitor General
correctly invoked the case of People vs. Saylan, 19 where this Court said:
The trial court held that there was ignominy because the appellant used not only
the missionary position, i.e. male superior, female inferior, but also "the same
position as dogs do" i.e., entry from behind. The appellant claims there was no
ignominy because "The studies of many experts in the matter have shown that
this "position" is not novel and has repeatedly and often been resorted to by
couples in the act of copulation." (Brief, p. 24.) This may well be if the sexual
act is performed by consenting partners but not otherwise. 20
Art. 14, paragraph 17, of the Revised Penal Code considers to be an aggravating
circumstance any means employed or circumstance brought about which add
ignominy to the natural effects of the act. The circumstance, it is said, 21
"pertains to the moral order [and] adds disgrace and obloquy to the material
injury caused by the crime."
The crime of rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by
two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. 22
In the case at bar, it remained uncontroverted that accused-appellant was armed
with a bolo to realize his criminal objective. Nonetheless, the use of a deadly
weapon could not be considered as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of
rape 23 for not having been correspondingly alleged in the information as to
make the offense fall under the jurisprudentially referred "qualified rape"
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. In People vs. Garcia, 23 the Court
declared:
One further observation. Article 335 originally provided only for simple rape
punishable by reclusion perpetua, but Republic Act No. 4111 introduced
amendments thereto by providing for qualified forms of rape carrying the death
penalty, that is, when committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, when by reason or on the occasion of the rape the victim
becomes insane, or, under the same circumstances, a homicide is committed.
The homicide in the last two instances in effect created a special complex crime
of rape with homicide. The first two attendant circumstances are considered as
equivalent to qualifying circumstances since they increase the penalties by
degrees, and not merely as aggravating circumstances which affect only the
period of the penalty but do not increase it to a higher degree. The original
provisions of Article 335 and the amendments of Republic Act No. 4111 are
still maintained.
xxx xxx xxx
Now, it has long been the rule that qualifying circumstances must be properly
pleaded in the indictment. If the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be
considered only as aggravating circumstances, (People vs. Collado, 60 Phil. 610
[1934]; People vs. Jovellano, et al., L-32421, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 156;
People vs. Fuertes, G.R. No. 104067, January 17, 1994, 229 SCRA 289; People
vs. Rodico, et al., G.R. No. 107101, October 16, 1995, 249 SCRA 309.) since
the latter admit of proof even if not pleaded. (U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil. 368
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[1912]; People vs. Domondon, 60 Phil. 729 [1934]; People vs. De Guzman,
G.R. No. 73464, August 1988, 164 SCRA 215.) Indeed, it would be a denial of
the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him and,
consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be
convicted of its qualified form punishable with death, although the attendant
circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment was not
alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned. 25
Simple rape is punishable by a single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Thus, even if there were aggravating circumstances of nighttime and ignominy
in attendance the appropriate penalty would still be reclusion perpetua under
the law. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in "all cases in
which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the
courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant
Rolando Alfanta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION by hereby lowering the penalty therein
imposed from death to reclusion perpetua. An award of P50,000.00 for moral
damages is likewise ordered to be paid by accused-appellant Rolando Alfanta to
the victim Nita Hernandez in addition to the sum of P50,000.00 by way of
indemnity ex delictu granted by the trial court.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES
ARTICLE 15 OF RPC
Their concept. — Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into
consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of
the crime and the other conditions attending its commission. They are the
relationship, intoxication and the degree of instruction and education of the
offender.
The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration
when the offended party in the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate,
natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degrees
of the offender.
The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating
circumstances when the offender has committed a felony in a state of
intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit
said felony but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
A. INTOXICATION
PEOPLE VS CAMANO
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
MANDATORY REVIEW of the death sentence imposed upon the accused
Filomeno Camano by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, in Criminal
Case Nos. T-20 and T-21, for the killing of Godofredo Pascual and Mariano
Buenaflor.
The inculpatory facts as stated by the trial court show that:
On February 17, 1970, in the barrio of Nato, Municipality of Sagñay, Province
of Camarines Sur, between the hours of four and five o'clock in the afternoon,
after the accused had been drinking liquor, he stabbed twice the victim
Godofredo Pascua with a bolo, called in the vernacular Bicol "palas" which is a
sharp bladed and pointed instrument about two feet long including the black
handle, tapering to the end, about one and one-half inches in width, (Exhibit
"C") while the latter was walking alone along the barrio street almost infront of
the store of one Socorro Buates. The victim, Godofredo Pascua, sustained two
mortal wounds for which he died instantaneously, described by Dr. Constancio
A. Tan, Municipal Health Officer, of Sagñay Camarines Sur, in his Autopsy
Report (Exhibit "A", pp. 5, Record Crim. Case No. T-21) as follows:
NATURE OF WOUNDS UPON AUTOPSY:
1. WOUND STAB - three (3) inches long at left side, three (3) inches
below left axilla, a little bit posteriorly, cutting the skin, subcutaneous tissues,
muscles one (1) rib, pleura of left lung, pericardium, penetrating the ventricles
of the heart, Media stinum, the right lung and exit to the right chest. One inch
opening.
2. WOUND INCISED, one inch long at the left arm
CAUSE OF DEATH - Wound No. 1 causing instant death due to severe
hemorrhage.
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After hacking and stabbing to death Godofredo Pascua, the accused proceeded
to the seashore of the barrio, and on finding Mariano Buenaflor leaning at the
gate of the fence of his house, in a kneeling position, with both arms on top of
the fence, and his head stooping down hacked the latter with the same bolo,
first on the head, and after the victim fell and rolled to the ground, after said
blow, he continued hacking him, until he lay prostrate on the ground, face up,
when the accused gave him a final thrust of the bolo at the left side of the chest
above the nipple running and penetrating to the right side a little posteriorly and
superiorly with an exit at the back, of one (1) inch opening, (Exhibit B) causing
instant death. The victim, Mariano Buenaflor sustained eight wounds, which
were specifically described by Dr. Tan in his Autopsy Report (Exhibit "B" dated
February 17, 1970, as follows:
NATURE OF WOUNDS UPON AUTOPSY:
1. WOUND STAB, Two (2) inches long at the left side of chest above the
nipple, running to the right side a little posteriorly and superiorly with an exit at
the back of one (1) inch opening. Penetrating the skin, subcutaneous tissues,
pericardium the auricles of the heart, the left lung towards the right side of back.
2. WOUND STAB at sternum one and one-half (1-1/2) inches deep
three-fourth (3/4) inch long penetrating the skin and the sternum.
3. WOUND STAB left side of neck three-fourth (3/4) inch long one and
one-half (1-1/2) inches deep.
4. WOUND HACKED, cutting left ear and bone four (4) inches long.
5. WOUND HACKED, left leg three (3) inches long cutting skin and
bone of anterior side.
6. WOUND INCISED left palm two (2) inches long.
7. WOUND STAB, one (1) inch long two (2) inches deep at the back
near spinal column.
8. WOUND HACKED, two (2) inches long at dome of head cutting skin
and bone.
CAUSE OF DEATH — Wound number one (1) causing instant death due to
severe hemorrhage from the heart." Out of the eight (8) wounds, two (2) are
mortal wounds, namely wound Number one (1) and wound Number Three (3),
(Exhibit "B") (t.s.n., pp. 18-20, Session November 22, 1971). The two victims
Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor, together with the accused are
neighbors, residing at the same street of Barrio Nato, Sagñay, Camarines Sur
(t.s.n., pp. 31, Session Nov. 22, 1971). The bloody incident was not preceded or
precipitated by any altercation between the victims and the accused (t.s.n. p. 60,
Nov. 22, 1971).
Likewise, it is an undisputed fact that three years prior to this incident, the two
victims had a misunderstanding with the accused while fishing along Sagnay
River. During this occasion it appears that the accused requested Godofredo
Pascua to tow his fishing boat with the motor boat owned by Mariano
Buenaflor but the request was refused by both. This refusal greatly offended
and embittered the accused against the victims. From this time on, the accused
begrudged the two, and entertained personal resentment against them. And
although on several occasions, the accused was seen at the game table with
Godofredo Pascual drinking liquor, the friendly attitude towards Pascua, seems
to be merely artificial than real, more so, with respect to Mariano Buenaflor
whom he openly detested. He consistently refused to associate since then with
the two victim especially, Mariano Buenaflor. In fact, no less than ten attempts
were made by Amado Payago, a neighbor, inviting the accused for reconciliation
with the victims but were refused. Instead, defendant when intoxicated or
drunk, used to challenge Mariano Buenaflor to a fight and announce his evil
intention to kill them. (t.s.n., pp. 50-53, session November 22, 1971.)
Also proved beyond dispute, the fact that the bolo or "palas" belongs to the
accused. That after killing the two victims, he returned to his house, where he
subsequently surrendered to Policemen Adolfo Avila, Juan Chavez, Erasmo
Valencia, upon demand by laid peace officers for him to surrender. When
brought to the Police headquarters of the town for investigation he revealed
that the bolo he used in the killing was hidden by him under the table of his
house. Following this tip, Patrolman Jose Baluyot was dispatched, and
recovered the weapon at the place indicated, which when presented to he Chief
of Police was still stained with human blood from the base of the handle to the
point of the blade. And when asked as to who was he owner of said bolo, the
accused admitted it as his. He also admitted the killing of Godofredo Pascua
and Mariano Buenaflor. however, when he was asked to sign a statement, he
refused. 1
For the killing of Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor, Filomeno Camano
was charged, under two (2) separate informations, with the crime of murder
attended by evident premeditation and treachery. By agreement of the parties,
the two cases were tried jointly.
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The accused admitted killing Mariano Buenaflor, but claims that he did so in
self-defense. He denied killing Godofredo Pascua. He also denied holding a
grudge against Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor and belittled the fist
fight he had with Mariano Buenaflor. He said that while they were drinking,
they had a heated discussion, and because they were drunk, it resulted in a fist
fight, which they had soon forgotten. 2
His version of the incident is that in the early morning of February 17, 1970, he
was fishing in the open sea. He went ashore at about 7:00 o'clock in the
morning and was met by Mariano Buenaflor who, upon seeing that he had a big
catch, demanded a percentage. for the fishery commission. When he refused to
give what was asked, Buenaflor remarked that he was hard-headed. He went
home, taking his things along with him. After eating breakfast, he went to sleep
and awoke at about 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon. 3 He ate his dinner 4 and
prepared to go out to sea again. While he was standing in the yard of his house,
Mariano Buenaflor, Godofredo Pascua, Gorio Carable, Jesus Carable, Tomas
Carable, Abelardo Bolaye, Amado Payago, and Loreto Payago, who were
drinking at the store of Socorro Buates, went to him and Godofredo Pascua,
without any provocation whatsoever, boxed him. He recounted what happened
next: "I defend myself but inspite of that I was hit on my upper arm. Then after
that I was again boxed by Mariano Buenaflor and I was hit on my lower jaw.
(Witness pointing to the bolo marked Exhibit C.) And I was able to grab that
bolo from him."
"When I met Godofredo Pascua he was on the act of boloing me but I was able
to take hold of his hands and I was able to grab the bolo. After I have taken the
bolo from Godofredo Pascua, all I know is that he fell on the ground and the
rest of the group except Mariano Buenaflor run away after seeing that
Godofredo Pascua fell already on the ground. Mariano Buenaflor approached
me having also a bolo then immediately when we meet each other I boloed him
and when he has wounded he run away and when he was running away I run
after him. After I have boloed Mariano Buenaflor he run away so I run after
him because I know that he has a gun and if he reach home he will get that gun
and he might shoot me." 5 Mariano Buenaflor was hit on the head.
The trial court, however, rejected the defense of the accused, saying:
Coming to the evidence for the defense, the Court, much to its regret cannot
give credence to the testimony and story of the accused, and his lone witness,
Nemesio Camano, who is his first cousin. The claim of self-defense does not
find support in the evidence presented. The claim, that a group of eight (8) men
headed by Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor ganged up on him by
boxing him one after another while others were throwing stones at him; that he
was attacked by Godofredo Pascua with a bolo which he succeeded in wresting
from him; that he did not know Godofredo Pascua was killed; that he killed said
Mariano Buenaflor after a bolo duel, are mere fictions of a desperate man
without evidentiary support. His testimony on these points, and that of his
cousin Nemesio Camano are simply incredible not only because they are
inherently improbable in themselves, but also because of their clear
inconsistencies on contradictions against each other. For, conceding in gratia
argumenti that he was really ganged up by eight (8) persons, some boxing him
while others throwing stones at him, and two of whom were armed with a bolo,
and that he was all alone fighting them and yet he did not suffer any physical
injury, is indeed incredible and beyond belief. With eight (8) persons to contend
with, two armed with bolos, it is simply unbelievable that he should come out of
the melee unscathed.
The Court has carefully examined and verified very carefully each and every
piece of evidence presented by the defense and has relaxed all technical rules of
evidence in favor of the accused in search for evidentiary support of his claim
of self-defense in vain. Conscious of the enormity of the offense and the
bitterness attached to an adverse decision, the Court has earnestly searched in
vain for facts upon which to lay the basis at least of a finding of reasonable
doubt in favor of the accused at least just to avoid the ugly and unpleasant task
of signing an adverse court decision. But, the falsity of their concocted story is
so apparent and self-evident to need further elucidation. This is demonstrated
by the record. They simply cannot stand, as basis of belief. Moreover, the Court
feels very much intrigued by the fact that notwithstanding that many people
witnessed the incidents, having occurred in broad daylight, and that the accused
had more sufficient time to look for witnesses among his friends, relatives, and
neighbors in the barrio, during the long period that this case has been pending
trial since February 17, 1970, that he could not get any witness to testify in his
favor, other than his lone witness, Nemesio Camano, whose testimony, coming
as it is from a very close relative is naturally very vulnerable to grave doubt and
suspicion for coming from a biased source. Could this mean lack of public
sympathy because the horrible act was in truth committed by the accused? Is
this a sign of public condemnation? Be it as it may, this unpleasant circumstance
has no bearing or influence in the painful decision of this case. What impelled
and compelled this Court in making this painful decision, much to his dislike,
are the bare and incontrovertible facts of the case born out by the evidence
presented indicating beyond per adventure of doubt the stark reality which
shows that there exist that moral certainty that convinces and satisfies the
reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it. (People v. Lavarios, L-
24339, June 29, 1968, 22 SCRA 1321) For the bitter conclusions herein reached,
is based on the compelling and irresistible facts born out by the evidence of
record found after sleepless night of study that the accused is guilty beyond
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reasonable doubt of the crime charged committed with the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior strength,
and intoxication with no mitigating circumstance. The accused and his only
witness, Nemesio Camano changed their declarations not only once, twice, or
thrice, but many times, placing the Court in quandary and confused what theory
or testimony is to be believed and considered among the mess of contradictory,
inconsistent, and diametrically opposed statements. Considering the manner and
tenor they were given, - the accused and his only witness changing stand in
every turn, leaves no room for doubt than that said testimonies are merely
concocted and fabricated as a desperate attempt to salvage a hopeless case. 6
In this appeal, the fact of death of Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor
and the cause of their deaths are not disputed. Counsel de oficio merely claims
that the accused is guilty of homicide only in each case, and not murder, as
charged; and prays for the modification of the judgment and the consequent
reduction of the penalty imposed upon the accused Filomeno Camano.
(1) Counsel contends that there is no evident premeditation since the acts
of the accused, as testified to by the prosecution witnesses, are all indicative of
E, "spur-of-the-moment" decision and action.
The contention is well taken. There is evident premeditation when the killing
had been carefully Planned by the offender, when he prepared beforehand the
means which he deemed suitable for carrying it into execution, and when he had
sufficient time dispassionately to consider and accept the consequences, and
when there has been a concerted plan. 7 It has also been held that evident
premeditation requires proof of the following: (1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit
had clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution
of his will. 8 In the instant case, it cannot be stated that the killing of Pascua and
Buenaflor was a preconceived plan. There is no proof as to how and when the
plan to kill Pascua and Buenaflor was hatched or what time had elapsed before
the plan was carried out. The trial court merely concluded that the killing of
Pascua and Buenaflor was premeditated because "the accused has been nursing
the evil design to kill both the victims since three years prior to the occurrence
of the incident on February 18, 1970, when both of them refused the request of
the accused to have his boat towed by the motor boat belonging to Mariano
Buenaflor while fishing along Sañgay River," and "from that time on, to the
fatal killings, said accused refused consistently to join his neighbors in their
drinking spree where both the victims especially Mariano Buenaflor were
present;" "in fact, no less than ten attempts made by witness Amado Payago
inviting the accused to be reconciled with the victims were rejected;" and that
"on the contrary, it has been established that whenever the accused was drunk,
he announces his intention to kill the victims, and as a matter of fact he
challenged several times Mariano Buenaflor to a fight."
The incident referred to, however, does not establish the tune when the
appellant decided to commit the crime. If ever, the aforementioned incident
merely established the motive for the killing of the two victims. 9
The fact that the accused had challenged Mariano Buenaflor to a fight whenever
he was drunk and announces his intention to kill the latter does not reveal a
persistence of a criminal design since there is no showing that in between the
utterances of the threats and the consummation of the crime, the appellant
made plans or sought the deceased to accomplish the killing.
As there is no direct evidence of the planning or preparation in the killing of
Pascua and Buenaflor and of the marked persistence to accomplish that plan,
the trial court's conclusion cannot be sustained.
(2) Counsel for the accused also claims that treachery is not present in the
commission of the crime.
The contention is without merit. Amado Payago categorically declared that
Filomeno Camano attacked Godofredo Pascua from behind, a method which
has ensured the accomplishment of the criminal act without any risk to the
perpetrator arising from the defense that his victim may put up. His testimony
reads, as follows:
Q At that time and date while you were in front of your house did you notice
whether there is anything unusual incident that happened?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you relate before this Honorable Court?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please relate it?
A I saw Filomeno Camano run towards his house and took a bolo and run after
Godofredo Pascua and immediately stabbed him.
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Q How far more or less were you when Godofredo Pascua was stabbed by
Filomeno Camano?
A More or less 12 to 15 meters.
Q What was Godofredo Pascua doing when he was stabbed by Filomeno
Camano?
A He was walking to his house.
Q In relation to Godofredo Pascua where was Filomeno Camano at the time
that Filomeno Camano stabbed Godofredo Pascua?
A From behind sir.
Q After Godofredo Pascua was stabbed by Filomeno Camano what happened
to Godofredo Pascua?
A He fell down and keep on turning.
Q What about Filomeno Camano, what did he do after Godofredo Pascua fell
down?
A He run towards the seashore looking after Mariano Buenaflor. 10
His testimony is corroborated by the nature and location of the wounds
sustained by the deceased Godofredo Pascua. The autopsy report, 11 showed
that the point of entry of the stab wound inflicted upon Pascua was three (3)
inches long and three (3) inches below the left armpit, a little bit posteriorly or
toward the hinder end of the body; and the point of exit was the right chest,
one (1) inch Iateral to the right nipple with a one (1) inch opening. If the
deceased was stabbed while he was facing his assailant, as claimed by counsel
for the accused, the entrance wound would have been in the front part of the
body, and its exit wound, if any, would be at the back. The trial court, therefore,
did not commit an error in finding that the deceased Godofredo Pascua was
assaulted from behind.
With respect to Mariano Buenaflor, the evidence shows that he was attacked
while in a kneeling position, with his arms on top of the gate of the fence
surrounding his hut and his head was "stooping down." 12 He was hacked on
the head, causing him to fall to the ground, and then successively hacked and
stabbed without respite, as he lay on the ground, until he died. The attack was
also sudden, unexpected, and lethal, such as to disable and incapacitate the
victim from putting up any defense.
(3) Counsel de oficio further claims that the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength, which the lower court appreciated in fixing the
penalty, is absorbed in treachery.
This contention is likewise correct. The rule is already settled that abuse of
superiority is absorbed in treachery. 13
(4) Counsel next contends that the alternative circumstance of intoxication
was erroneously appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. Counsel argues
thusly:
As to the alternative circumstance of intoxication, it is respectfully submitted
that there was no proof that the accused was intoxicated at the time of the
killing other than the bare testimony of Payago that from his house he allegedly
saw the accused drinking in his house which is about 30 meters away. The
prosecution did not present any police report or doctor's certification that
accused was found to be intoxicated at the time of the killing. Moreover, it was
not shown by competent evidence that accused purposedly became drunk to
facilitate the commission of the offense.
If at all, intoxication should be properly appreciated as a mitigating
circumstance because it affected accused's mental facilities such that it
diminished his capacity to know the injustice of his acts and to comprehend
fully the consequences of his acts. 14
There is merit in the contention. Drunkenness or intoxication is mitigating if
accidental, not habitual nor intentional, that is, not subsequent to the plan to
commit the crime. It is aggravating if habitual or intentional. 15 To be
mitigating, it must be indubitably proved. 16 A habitual drunkard is one given
to intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating drinks. The habit should be
actual and confirmed. It is unnecessary that it be a matter of daily occurrence. It
lessens individual resistance to evil thought and undermines will-power making
its victim a potential evildoer. 17
The records of these cases do not show that the appellant was given to
excessive use of intoxicating drinks although he used to get drunk every now
and then. The testimony of Amado Payago to this effect, reads as follows:
Q But after that incident Godofredo Pascua and Filomeno Camano are already
in good terms because they even go on drinking spree, is it not?
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IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER

Q How did you also know that Camano resented against (sic) this Buenaflor?
A Yes, sir, that is true but Filomeno Camano has an evil plan against
Godofredo Pascua. A Everytime he is drunk he keep(s) on challenging Mariano Buenaflor.

Q And how did you come to know about this plan? xxx xxx xxx

A He talk(s) (about) that very openly specially when he is drunk. Q Have you ever seen the accused Filomeno Camano drink liquor immediately
prior to the incident?
Q During the three years that the incident where Camano's boat was not towed,
could you remember how many times more or less did you hear him speak A Yes, sir.
about his plan before the stabbing incident?
Q Where?
A Whenever he is drunk.
A In his house.
Q Can you not remember more or less how many times have you heard him?
Q When you saw him where were you?
A I cannot remember, sir.
A I was also in my house because I can just see his house from our window.
Q About five times?
Q About how far is your house from the house of Filomeno Camano so that
FISCAL CLEDERA: you can see from your house?

Already answered. A More or less 30 meters.

A Whenever he is drunk. Q With whom was Filomeno Camano drinking?

ATTY. TRIA: A Bienvenido Pascua, Leopoldo Balaye and this (sic) persons (who) are arriving
far from our house.
Q How often does he drunk (sic), if you know?
Q According to your personal knowledge do you know whether or not the
A I cannot estimate, sir. accused was drunk when this incident happened?

Q What about Mariano Buenaflor, could you also state that there had been an A Yes, sir.
altercation between him and Filomeno Camano prior to the incident, is it not?
Q But the truth is that, you still affirm that you don't know of any incident
A Yes, sir. immediately prior that has precipitated this stabbing incident between the
accused and the victim
Q What was this altercation about?
A None, sir.
A It started when the request of Filomeno Camano to tow his boat was refused
by Godofredo Pascua because that boat used by Godofredo Pascua is owned by ATTY. TRIA:
Mariano Buenaflor.
Q How about you, did you now drink that time?

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IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER

No, sir. 18
The intoxication of the appellant not being habitual, and considering that the
said appellant was in a state of intoxication at the time of the commission of the
felony, the alternative circumstance of intoxication should be considered as a
mitigating circumstance.
5. Finally, counsel claims that death is a cruel and unusual penalty and not
proper in the cases at bar, citing Art. IV, Sec. 21 of the Constitution which
provides that: "Excessive fines shag not be imposed, nor cruel or unusual
punishment inflicted."
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. Premeditation is aggravating. The accused should be sentenced to two
reclusion perpetuas.
MAKASIAR, J., concurring:
Besides intoxication, voluntary surrender shall also mitigate the guilt of
appellant, who had the choice to surrender or not when demanded by the
policemen, who did not place him under arrest nor had an arrest warrant.

The contention is without merit. The death penalty is not cruel, unjust or NOTES:
excessive. In the case of Harden vs. Director of Prisons, 19 the Court said: JUSTIFYI EXEMPTI MITIGATI AGGRAVATI ALTERNAT
NG NG NG NG IVE
The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-Parte NO THERE IS A THERE IS THERE IS A THERE IS A
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, the United States Supreme Court said that WRONG WRONG A FELONY FELONY FELONY
"punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the INCREASE
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in NO DECREASE
NO DECREASED OR
the Constitution." It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, CRIMINA D
CRIMINAL CRIMINAL DECREASE
something more than the mere extinguishment of life." L CRIMINAL
LIABILITY LIABILITY D CRIMINAL
LIABILITY LIABILITY
LIABILITY
The trial court, therefore, did not err in finding the accused Filomeno Camano NO CIVIL
guilty of Murder in each of the two cases. The offense being attended by the NO CIVIL
LIABILITY
mitigating circumstance of intoxication, without any aggravating circumstance LIABILITY
XPT: PLUS
to offset it, the imposable penalty is the minimum of that provided by law or 17 XPT PLUS CIVIL PLUS CIVIL
AVOIDAN CIVIL
years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal. Applying the ACCIDENT LIABILITY LIABILITY
CE OF LIABILITY
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant should be, as he is hereby, sentenced INSUPERA
GREATER
to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from 10 years and 1 day of prision BLE CAUSE
EVIL
mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, in each case.
PRINCIPALS
WHEREFORE, with the modification of the penalty imposed upon the
appellant, as above indicated, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is ARTICLE 17 OF RPC
hereby, AFFIRMED in all other respects. With costs against the said appellant. Principals. — The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;
SO ORDERED.
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it;
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro,
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., 3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act
concur. without which it would not have been accomplished.

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IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
1. PRINCIPALS BY DIRECT PRINCIPAL
US VS DIRIS
CARSON, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas
convicting the defendants of the crime of robbery.
During the pendency of the proceedings in this court the defendant Tomas
Olea withdrew his appeal and the judgment of the lower court is therefore final
as to him. The only question now presented for our consideration is the appeal
of the defendants Anselmo Diris and Eustaquio Siaga.
We are of opinion that the evidence of record fully sustains the contentions of
the prosecution and the findings of the lower court as to the facts. It will not
therefore be necessary to review the evidence in detail.
It appears that Fulgencio Seal, who lived in the pueblo of Calauag, Province of
Tayabas, received from the railroad company on July 7, 1912, more than P400
in payment of certain land expropriated by that company, and that the
defendant Tomas Olea, a nephew of Fugencio Seal, was present when the
money was counted and paid over to his uncle. The record shows that the
money was deposited in a trunk and that this fact was also known to Olea, who
had free access to his uncle's house and was accustomed to come and go at will.
On the morning of July 12, following the date of the receipt of the money from
the railroad company, Fulgencio Seal left the house between 8 and 9 o'clock in
the morning, leaving his wife in charge of their tienda. A short time thereafter
the three defendants appeared at the tienda and Eustaquio Siaga engaged the
woman in conversation while the other two defendants went upstairs, broke
open the trunk, and took the money, amounting to P353, and a receipt for
P100. The record shows that at the time of the robbery part of the money
received from the railroad company had been paid out and that the balance in
the trunk was only P353.
The woman was somewhat deaf and had no knowledge of what was taking
place upstairs. She stated that she saw the two defendants go up into the house,
but as Tomas Olea was her husband's nephew and accustomed to come to the
house she thought nothing of it. Upon the return of Fulgencio Seal later in the
morning the robbery was discovered, and when his wife reported who had been
there he immediately went in search of his nephew. The nephew when found
admitted the theft of the money and promised that if the uncle would not make
any trouble about it he would try and recover it from the other defendants.
Together with Olea the uncle then went in search of Diris. The uncle was told
to wait at a certain place until the nephew should return, and when he failed to
come back the uncle went in search of him and after found him and Diris in a
barber shop in the municipality of Lopez. The matter was reported to the justice
of the peace of that municipality and the two defendants were arrested. On the
person of Tomas Olea were found two bank notes of the denomination of P10
each, P3 in half-peso denominations, and P4 in 10-centavo pieces.
Fulgencio Seal testified that the money in the trunk consisted of one bank notes
of the value of P200, P100 in the bank note of the value of 10 pesos each, and
the remainder in currency in P1, 50-centavo, and 10-centavo denominations,
there being P23 in 10-centavo pieces. It appears that by some error on the part
of the justice of the peace the money was returned to Olea; however, there can
hardly be any doubt that it was a part of the money which his uncle had in the
trunk. At the trial the defendants denied that they were the authors of the crime;
Olea and Diris denied that they were present at the house on the morning in
question; and Eustaquio Siaga, while admitting that he was at the tienda stated
that he went there alone. The presence of the defendants at the house on the
morning in question is not only established by the wife of Fulgencio Seal, but
her testimony on this point is corroborated by that of Conrado Fernandez, a
neighbor. In view of all the facts of record the statements of the defendants
cannot be credited. Their guilt is conclusively established.
Olea having withdrawn his appeal and the other evidence of record being
sufficient in itself to sustain the conviction of all the appellants, it is not
necessary for us to discuss the objections set forth in their brief as to the
admission of the alleged confession of guilt of Olea.lawph!1.net
It has been suggested by counsel, that the defendant Eustaquio Siaga, who
remained below in the tienda and engaged the woman in conversation while the
other defendants went up into the house, should only be held as a complice
(accessary before the fact) as defined in the Penal Code, and not as a principal.
In support of this view we are cited to Viada (Vol. I, p. 370), as follows: "The
persons who entertains the owner of a house while robbers are assaulting it, so
that he will not return thereto until after the robbery has been consummated, is
also an accomplice in the crime, inasmuch as he cooperated therein by a
simultaneous act, although not an indispensable one for its accomplishment."
It will be seen however that the case supposed by the noted commentator
clearly implies that the owner of the house was entertained at some distance
from the place where the robbery was committed; it does not appear how far
away, but apparently not anywhere in the immediate neighborhood. The present
case offers a different situation. The defendant Siaga acted concurrently with
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the other defendants, and must be held to have been present with them aiding
and abetting them in the commission of the crime by remaining below and
talking with the woman in order to distract her attention from what was going
on upstairs. In doing so he was evidently serving as a guard to warn his
companions in case there should arise any necessity for giving an alarm. When
the other defendants came down out of the house he went away with them.
This court has repeatedly held that one who shares the guilty purpose and aids
and abets the commission of a crime by his presence at the time of its
perpetration, even though he may not have taken an active part in its material
execution, is guilty as a principal. We have also held that one who stands as
guard near the place where a crime is committed to keep others away or to warn
his companions and fellow conspirators of danger of discovery, takes a direct
part in the commission of the crime and is therefore guilty as a principal under
article 13 of the Penal Code (U. S. vs. Reogilon and Dingle, 22 Phil. Rep., 127;
U. S. vs. Balisacan, 4 Phil. Rep., 545; U. S. vs. Ramos, 4 Phil. Rep., 555.)
Under all the circumstances of the case we are satisfied that Siaga was properly
convicted as a principal.
It appears that the trial court treated the stolen receipts for P100 as being of
that value. The actual money stolen amounted to only P353.
While we have held that checks, warrants and similar instrument, payable to
order an evidencing an obligation to pay money, may under certain
circumstances be treated as worth their face value in fixing the value of the
stolen property for the purpose of grading the crime and the penalty to be
imposed on conviction, in cases wherein the penalty prescribed in the Code is
made to depend on the value of the property taken (U. S. vs. Raboy, 25 Phil.
Rep., 1; U. S. vs. Wickersham, 20 Phil. Rep., 440), we are of opinion that a mere
receipt such as that under consideration, especially in the absence of any proof
as to its value, cannot be held to have anything more than a mere nominal value
in fixing the penalty and assessing the civil indemnity to be imposed on one
convicted of its theft.
The record further shows that Anselmo Diris is a recidivist, having been
previously convicted of the crime of robbery by the Court of First Instance of
Tayabas in the case of the United States vs. Anselmo Diris, on April 12, 1904,
which judgment of conviction was affirmed by this Court on May 9, 1905 (4
Phil. Rep., 498).
The judgment of the trial court should be modified, in so far as it affects these
appellants, by reducing the amount of the civil indemnification from P453 to
P353 and by substituting the words presidio mayor for the words prision mayor
in the dispositive part thereof, and thus modified the judgment convicting and
sentencing the appellants Diris and Siaga should be and is hereby affirmed, with
a proportionate share of the costs of this instance against each of the appellants.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.
2. PRINCIPALS BY INDUCEMENT
PEOPLE VS ONG CHIAT LAY
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Appellant and two others, Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing, were jointly informed
against by the provincial fiscal of Zamboanga, charging them with having
feloniously burned a building in which was located a store belonging to the
appellant. Upon a plea of "not guilty," appellant and his codefendants were tried
jointly upon said information; and, after trial, while Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing
were acquitted, appellant was found guilty of the crime of arson and sentenced
to suffer sixteen years and one day of reclusion temporal, with the accessory
penalties provided by law, to indemnify Francisco Barrios and Mariano Atienza
in the sums of P16,000 and P5,000, respectively, and to pay one-third of the
costs.
In support of this appeal, appellant has signed the following errors:
First. The lower court erred in holding that evidence presented against the
accused Ong Chiat Lay is sufficient to establish the corpus delicti, namely, that
the crime of arson had been committed.
Second. The lower court erred in holding that the evidence presented against
the accused Ong Chiat Lay is sufficient to establish his guilt of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt.
In order to convict a defendant as principal in the commission of a crime, it
must be shown either (1) that he took a direct part in the execution of the
criminal act; (2) that he directly forced or induced another or others to commit
it; or (3) that he cooperated in the commission of the offense by an act without
which it would not have been accomplished. (Revised Penal Code, article 17.)
They take direct part in the execution of a criminal act who, participating in the
criminal design, proceed to carry out their plan and personally take part in its
execution by acts which directly tend to the same end. (Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th
ed., vol. 1, p. 341; Albert's Revised Penal Code Ann., 144.)
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In the instant case, it is not claimed that appellant had taken a direct part in the
burning of the building. In fact, the prosecution lays stress on appellant's
absence from the scene of the fire as one of the suspicious circumstances
indicating his guilt. Appellant was prosecuted on the theory that he induced his
said codefendants to set fire to the building. Hence the three were charged
jointly on an information alleging conspiracy among them. This allegation of
conspiracy, however, has been negatived by the acquittal of appellant's
codefendants. The same may be said with regard to the theory that appellant
had induced his codefendants to perpetrate the unlawful deed; for it seems clear
that one can not be held guilty of having instigated the commission of a crime
without its first being shown that the crime has been actually committed by
another.
In acquitting Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing, the lower court said: "Pero las
prueblas de la acusacion, a juicio del Juzgado, no establecen que los acusados
Ong Ban Hua y Kua Sing hayan cooperado directa o indirectamente a su
coacusado Ong Chiat Lay en la comision del delito. Las pruebas indiciarias
presentadas contra los referidos acusados Ong Ban Hua y Kua Sing no pueden
producir mas que mera sospecha de que dichos acusados tuvieron conocimiento
de lo que habia realizado Ong Chiat Lay, pero esta sospecha no puede servirse
de base para una sentencia condenatoria, y por ende se debe absolver a los
mismos acusados Ong Ban Hua y Kua Sing de la querella."
While not exactly in point, the principle discussed in State vs. Tom (13 N. C. [2
Dev. L., 569), is pertinent to the question now under consideration. In that case,
the court held that although more than two persons are charged with
conspiracy, the acquittal of all but one of those charged amounts to the acquittal
of that one, since there can be no conspiracy unless at least two unite. Ruffin, J.,
therein said: "Conspiracy being a crime, requiring the guilty cooperation of two,
at least, to constitute it, in which there is a mutual dependence of the guilt of
each person upon that of the other, principle would seem to demand that all the
accused should be jointly tried and convicted, or acquitted. In other cases of
dependent crimes, that upon which the rest depends must be first established.
Such is the law between principal and accessory. The reason is that there may be
as full defense as possible upon the very point of the principal's guilt, by that
principal himself who is best able to make it. To make that rule effectual, it
became necessary to establish another that, but by the accessory's own consent,
no proof of the principal's guilt should be heard against him until it was first
established against the principal himself. The rule arises out of the nature of
dependent criminality. Now conspirators may be said to be co-principals. The
guilt of both must concur to constitute that of either; and it must consists of a
joint act, and it makes one crime in both. As the trial of one need not precede
ha of the other, the trial of both ought to be concurrent. I think it more than
probable that anciently such was the course. But, clearly, now it is otherwise.
There are many precedents of the separate trial of person indicted for offences
that could not be committed by less than two. (. . . Rex vs. Kinnersly [1719], 1
Strange, 193; Rex vs. Niccolls [1745], 2 Strange, 1227.) It is too late now to
question it. But it can never follow from those cases that where one of the
persons, the establishment of whose guilt is essential to the conviction of the
other, has been legally acquitted, the other does no hereby become discharged.
It cannot be that a man can be held guilty to any purpose who has, in due
course of law, been found not guilty. The analogy between this case and that of
the accessory is strict. The acquittal of the principal is an immediate and
absolute discharge of the accessory. For there can be no aid given to a deed
when the deed itself was never perpetrated. So, where guilt consists in the joint
act or intent of two, and it is found that one of them did not join in the act or
intent, it is conclusive as to both. For A could not conspire with B if the latter
did not conspire at all. In all the cases, therefore, a verdict affirming the guilt of
fewer persons than could commit the crime, and affirming the innocence of all
others charged, has been held to be an acquittal of all." (4 B. R. C., 930.)
While the crime charged in the present case is not conspiracy as a distinct
offense, it is clear from the nature of the evidence presented that appellant
alone could not have committed the unlawful act. As already stated, the theory
of the prosecution was that he conspired with or induced his codefendants to
commit the crime. The gravamen of the charge was conspiracy, and the
acquittal of his codefendants is clearly inconsistent with appellant's guilt.
This leads us to the consideration of another aspect of this case. Appellant was
convicted wholly on circumstancial evidence. As stated in the decision of the
trial court: "Las pruebas de la acusacion son todas indiciarias, que son las que
siempre se presentan para probar esta clase de delito, porque su autor o autores
ordinariamente no lo practican en presencia de un trercero." Continuing, the
court further said: "El traslado de los muebles del acusado Ong Chiat Lay a
varios sitios antes de occurrir este incendio, su indiferencia a todo lo que ocurria
en la madrugada de autos, su ausencia del lugar donde estaba instalado su bazar
mientras ardia el edificio ocupado por este, y el hecho de no haberse negado
que fuera el el autor del incendio ante el teniente Piccio, son pruebas indiciaras
muy fuertes contra este acusado. El hecho de que se olia a gasolina dentro de la
casa ocupada por el establecimiento "China Bazaar" en la ocasion en que el
repetido Ong Chiat Lay transladaba sus muebles y su residencia a otro sitio, y el
haber sido encontradas varias latas de petroleo o gasolina vacias en el mismo
terreno donde estuvo levantada dicha casa inmediatamente despues de occurrir
el incendio de esta, son tambien pruebas indiciarias muy fuertes contra el
susodicho acusado Ong Chiat Lay. Todas estas pruebas apreciadas en su
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conjunto constituyen una evidencia clara de la culpabilidad del acusado Ong
Chiat Lay."
It is a well-settled principle of criminal law that a conviction for crime can not
be had unless the corpus delicti is first established. (State vs. Sullivan, 17 L. R.
A., 902.) To establish the corpus delicti in arson the proof of two elements is
required, namely, (1) the burning of the house or other thing, and (2) the
criminal agency in causing it. (Spears vs. State, 16 L.R.A. [N. S.}, 285.) The
corpus delicti may be proved by circumstancial evidence. (State vs. Sullivan,
supra.) However: "Before a conviction can be had upon circumstancial
evidence, the circumstances proven should constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion, which points to the defendant, to
the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. It is indispensable that the
evidence be derived from interrelated facts and duly proven in a manner that
will lead to a logical and rational conclusion, beyond all reasonable doubt, that
the accused is the author of the crime. In other words, there must be from all
the circumstances, a combination of evidence which, in the ordinary and natural
course of things, leaves no room for reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
accused." (Moran, The Law of Evidence, 453; numerous cases cited in support
of the text.)
While the facts proved in the present case are sufficient to raise grave suspicions
against the appellant, they fall far short of establishing his guilt clearly and
satisfactorily, as required by the well-settled rules of evidence. This court held in
United States vs. Levente (18 Phil., 439), that to warrant a conviction upon
circumstancial evidence, all the circumstances proved must be consistent with
each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the
same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every
other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The chain of circumstances which
would have pointed to the appellant as the guilty person was broken by the
acquittal of Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing. As already explained, the acquittal of
his said codefendants is not only consistent with the hypothesis that the
appellant is innocent, but is inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
guilty.lawphi1.net
It results that the judgment appealed from must be reversed and the appellant
acquitted, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Street and Vickers, JJ., concur.
Butte, J., concur in the result.
US VS INDANAN
MORELAND, J.:
An appeal from a judgment convicting the appellant of the crime of murder,
and sentencing him to be hanged.
The accused was at the time of the commission of the crime, the headman of
Parang. He is alleged to have committed the murder by inducement. The proofs
tend to demonstrate that on the 24th day of March, 1912, the accused sent
Induk to bring to the house of the accused one Sariol. The following day,
Induk, in obedience to the orders, brought Sariol to the house, whereupon the
accused ordered the witnesses, Akiran and Suhuri, to tie Sariol. They obeyed the
order in the presence of the accused, who was at the time lying upon a bed in
the room. This was about 4:30 in the afternoon. Sariol remained there with his
hands tied behind his back until night, when the accused, in the presence of
several witnesses, ordered Sariol to be taken to the Chinese cemetery and there
killed, the accused asserting at the time that he had an order to that effect from
the governor. He gave strict orders to Akiran that he should be present at the
time that Sariol was killed, and that he should aid in killing him. To make sure
of the work being well done, the accused ordered Akiran to take his (the
accused's) bolo with which to assist in the killing. Sariol was taken to the
cemetery, in an isolated spot a considerable distance from the road and about
200 yards from the nearest house, and there killed. Kalyakan struck the first
blow with his bolo, while Akiran joined in and assisted thereafter. The deceased
at the time he was killed had his hands tied behind his back. On returning to the
house of the accused after the death of Sariol, Unding told the accused that
Sariol had been killed, whereupon the accused said that it was all right and
appeared to be very much pleased.
The proofs demonstrate beyond question that the accused was the recognized
headman of Parang, and it appears from the testimony of the witnesses,
Kalyakan, Suhuri, and Akiran, that he had a very powerful influence over them,
hence this power over them was such that any order issued by him had the
force and efficacy of physical coercion. One of the witnesses testified: "He (the
accused) knows what is good and what is bad, and he is the headman of the
governor. He is headman of Parang." And in answer to the question, "He is the
biggest chief in the Parang ward?" replied: "There is none, only himself." He
further said: "The people do not hesitate to take his orders because he is the
headman of the governor." Later, in reply to the question, "If he were to get
angry with the people, what would he do to them?" this witnesses answered: "I
do not know; might kill them." Another witness, answering the question as to
why he did not run away instead of going to the Chinese cemetery as the
accused ordered him, answered: "The reason why I did not run away, well, take
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the same thing as the Government soldiers. They are told to do a thing and they
do it." Prior to this time the same witness had said: "If a chief says anything to a
man like me and tells me it is by order of the governor and that he has a warrant
there, well, a man like me does what he tells me." Another witness declared: "I
am afraid of him. I did not believe that he would make me do anything unjust."
The same witness afterwards testified in answer to the question: "Would you
have killed this man if any other person besides Panglima, the headman, had
ordered you to ?" "I would not." Another witness declared: "Well, he was the
headman. It was the headman's orders, and if we did not do it, he would get
angry with us." This witness, answering the question, "Did Panglima make you
think that he was acting under the orders of the Government in causing this
man to be killed?" testified: "He said, 'I have a warrant here.' To the question,
"And you thought that it was a legal execution, did you?" answered, "Yes,
because he (the accused) is not afraid of the governor."
We are of the opinion that the domination of the accused over the persons
who, at his orders, killed the deceased was such as to make him responsible for
whatever they did in obedience to such orders.
Article 13, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code declares those to be principals in a
crime "who directly force or induce others to commit it."
Commenting upon this paragraph, Viada says:
They force another to commit a crime who physically by actual force or grave
fear, for example, with a pistol in hand or by any other threatening means,
oblige another to commit the crime. In our commentary on paragraph 9 of
article 8 (page 28), we have already said that he who suffers violence acts
without will and against his will, is no more than an instrument, and therefore is
guilty of no wrong. The real culprits in such case, the only guilty persons, are
those who use the violence, those who force the other to commit the crime.
One is induced directly to commit a crime either by command, or for a
consideration, or by any other similar act which constitutes the real and moving
cause of the crime and which was done for the purpose of inducing such
criminal act and was sufficient for that purpose. We have already seen in our
commentary on paragraph 12 of article 8 that the one who physically commits
the crime may escape criminal responsibility by showing that he acted with due
obedience to an order; in such case the criminal responsibility falls entirely upon
the one who orders, that is, upon him who by his commands has directly
induced the other to commit the act. But in case the obedience of the inferior is
not due to the superior and therefore not necessary, and does not, therefore,
exempt him from criminal responsibility as the physical author of the crime, he
who thus, by his command, directly induced him to the criminal act is
considered by the law also as principal in the crime.
The pacto by virtue of which one purchases for a consideration the hand which
commits the crime makes him who gives, promises, or offers the consideration
the principal in the crime by direct inducement, because without such offer or
promise the criminal act would never have been committed. But this does not
mean that the one who actually commits the crime by reason of such promise,
remuneration or reward is exempted from criminal responsibility; on the
contrary, we have already seen in our comments on paragraph 3 of article 10
that such circumstance constitutes an aggravation of his crime.
We have heretofore said that in addition to the precepto and the pacto there are
similar means by which another may be induced to commit a crime which also
make the one who offers the inducement the principal in the crime by virtue of
the provisions of article 13, paragraph 2. But it must be borne in mind that
these acts of inducement do not consist in simple advice or counsel given
before the act is committed, or in simple words uttered at the time the act was
committed. Such advice and such words constitute undoubtedly an evil act, an
inducement condemned by the moral law; but in order that, under the
provisions of the Code, such act can be considered direct inducement, it is
necessary that such advice or such words have a great dominance and great
influence over the person who acts; it is necessary that they be as direct, as
efficacious, as powerful as physical or moral coercion or as violence itself.
The following decisions of the supreme court of Spain illustrate the principles
involved and their application to particular cases:
It was held by that court on the 14th day of April, 1871, that one who, during a
riot in which a person was killed, said to one of the combatants, "Stab him! Stab
him!", it not appearing that he did anything more than say these words except to
be present at the fight, was not guilty of the crime of homicide by inducement,
the court saying that, "considering that, although the phrases pronounced were
imprudent and even culpable, they were not so to the extent that they may be
considered the principal and moving cause of the effect produced; direct
inducement cannot be inferred from such phrases, as inducement must precede
the act induced and must be so influential in producing the criminal act that
without it the act would not have been performed."
In a decision rendered on the 10th of July, 1877, the principle was laid down
that "a person who advised a married woman whose husband was very stingy
and treated her badly that the only thing for her to do was to rob him, was not
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guilty of the crime of robbery by inducement, for the reason that imprudent and
ill-conceived advice is not sufficient."
In a decision of the 22nd of December, 1883, it was held that a father who
simply said to his son who was at the time engaged in combat with another,
"Hit him! Hit him!", was not responsible for the injuries committed after such
advice was given, under the facts presented. The court said: "It being held in
mind that the inducement to the commission of the crime by means of which a
person may be considered a principal in the same manner as he who executes
the act itself can only be founded in commands, sometimes in advice, in
considerations, or by inducement so powerful that it alone produces the
criminal act. None of these characteristics pertain to the words of Miguel Perez,
inasmuch as the circumstances which surrounded the event at the time do not
appear in sufficient detail to show with clearness the effects which the words
produced, or the relative situation of the deceased and of the one who killed
him, or the point to which the fight had progressed at the time the words were
spoken. Moreover, the decision of the court below does not show sufficient
facts upon which to affirm that Miguel foresaw the use of the firearm on the
part of his son when he spoke the words referred to, or, for that reason, that he
thereby induced him to use said weapon."
In a decision of the 19th of December, 1896, the court held that the fact "of
having proposed to other persons the abstraction of the tickets which were the
subject matter of the robbery, at the same time telling them the place where
they were to be found, does not constitute inducement to commit the robbery
because the proposal to commit the robbery was not sufficiently efficacious to
be the cause of the crime, as the crime, under the facts, could have been
committed without it; nor was the indication of the place where the money was
to be found a sufficient motive to induce the robbery."
The foregoing decisions have been presented for the purpose of showing
concrete cases in which the acts of the accused were not sufficient, as a matter
of law, to constitute inducement. They not only lay down the legal principles
which govern in prosecutions of this character, but they also illustrate in the
most valuable way the application of those principles to actual cases.
The following decisions of the same court present instances in which the acts of
the accused constitute inducement under the law and illustrate the application
of the principles to concrete cases.
In a decision of the 14th of April, 1871, the facts as stated by the court were: "It
appeared that Lulu, who was living with Joe and Zozo (a married couple) in the
town of X, gave birth to a child on the morning of the 28th of March, the
offspring of her illicit relations with William. It had been previously agreed
upon by the first three named to deliver the child to William as soon as it was
born, with instructions to deposit it in some frequented place so that it might be
found and taken up; but Joe changed his mind and handed the child over to the
father, telling him, 'Here is your child, do with it whatever you please; throw it
into the sea if you choose to,' which the latter actually did." Under the facts the
accused was held guilty by inducement.
In a judgment pronounced on the 22nd of January, 1873, it was held that "a
woman who, living with a man in scandalous concubinage in the presence of a
daughter who continually manifested her disgust and repugnance for such
conduct, conceived against the daughter the most profound hatred and
conceived the purpose of killing her by most insidious methods, obtaining for
that purpose poison and various deadly weapons, and contriving that she and
her family and all of the tenants in the house should go to the theater on an
evening during which the daughter was sick and obliged to remain at home, in
order that her lover might be entirely undisturbed in killing the daughter and
that he might not be surprised in the act, such woman is the author and
principal of the crime the same as her lover who actually committed the deed."
In a decision of the 6th of July, 1881, the court held that "one who takes
advantage of his position as an inspector for the maintenance of public peace
and proposes to a private citizen the perpetration of a robbery, with the threat
that unless he did commit the robbery he would be arrested as an escaped
prisoner, at the same time offering to withdraw the officers from the vicinity of
the place to be robbed, and who after the robbery received a part of the booty,
was guilty of the crime as principal, although he did not take personal part
therein."
In a decision of the 12th of April, 1882, it was said that "an alcalde of a barrio
who, accompanied by a number of peace officers, ordered them to stop certain
music that was being played in the public street, and after the order had been
obeyed and the music stopped one of the persons expressed his resentment
against the act whereupon the alcalde ordered the peace officers to attack the
man, which they did, inflicting upon him various wounds, was guilty of the
crime of lesiones graves by inducement."
In a decision of the 21st of June, 1882, it was stated that "a father who from the
balcony of his house cried out in a loud voice to his sons who were fighting
with others to kill those with whom they were fighting before they were killed
themselves, because they might as well go to jail for a big thing as a little, was
guilty of the crime of lesiones graves by inducement by reason of the injuries
inflicted under such orders."
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In a decision of the 22nd day of December, 1883, the court said, "that the
inducement and the commission of a crime whereby the inducer becomes a
principal to the same extent and effect as if he had physically committed the
crime exist merely in acts of command, sometimes of advice, or agreement for a
consideration, or through influence so effective that it alone determines the
commission of the crime."
In a decision of the 11th of November, 1884, the court laid down the
proposition that the secretary of the ayuntamiento who induced a certain
persons to form new lists of compromisarios five days prior to the election of
senators was guilty as principal of the crime against the election lists, saying: "It
appearing and it being a fact proved that the secretary of the ayuntamiento of
Jalom, Miguel Antonio Dura, induced the members of the council to commit
the act stated, his participation as principal in the commission of the act is well
established according to the provisions of paragraph 2, article 13, of the Penal
Code, because such inducement coming from a person of such influence as the
secretary of the ayuntamiento in a small village must be considered sufficiently
dominant to turn the mind of those induced."
In a decision rendered on the 28th of December, 1886, it was held that a
woman who was at enmity with an uncle for having refused to renounce in her
favor a donation which a relative had given to him, who made frequent threats
to kill the uncle and who finally offered a third person a certain sum of money
together with the land involved in the donation if he would kill the uncle, and
who told her son that, if they were unable to get anybody else to kill the uncle,
he must do it himself as he would thus inherit 15,000 pesetas with which they
could flee abroad, and in case he refused to do it he must leave the house
because he was a coward, was guilty as principal of the crime of murder
committed by the son under such inducement. The court said: "It being borne
in mind that the suggestions with which the mother moved the mind of her son
to kill the uncle had the force of a real inducement and inclined and decided the
will of the son by means of the relations which she bore to him as well as the
reward which she held up before him."
In a decision of the 26th of January, 1888, it was held that finding as principal in
a crime, him who, "by direct and influential means and taking advantage of the
inexperience of a boy of tender age," induces him to commit a crime, was
warranted by law, the court saying that "in view of the fact that the inducement
exercised by Juan Santiso with regard to the boy, Ramon Carballo, to steal the
jewels in question from his grandmother's house shows such a direct and
inducing cause of the criminal act that without such inducement the crime
would not have been committed."
In a decision of the 9th of April, 1882, the court held "that the inducement
referred to in paragraph 2, article 13, of the Penal Code exists whenever the act
performed by the physical author of the crime is determined by the influence of
the inducer over the mind of him who commits the act, whatever be the source
of such influence."
In a decision of the 3rd of February, 1897, it was declared that one was the
"principal by inducement in five different larcenies, it having been proved that
the inducer, knowing that the oil which was brought to her for sale was stolen
by the persons who were seeking to sell it to her, advised them thereupon to
continue stealing oil and furnished them vessels in which to carry it and
contributed on five different occasions to the realization of the larcenies, it
appearing that the physical authors of the crime were boys under 15 years of age
and that they acted upon the suggestions of the inducer without discernment or
judgment of their own," the court saying that in view of the fact that she knew
that the oil which she first purchased from the boys was stolen oil, that the boys
were less than 15 years of age, and therefore easily led, that she furnished the
vessels in which to carry the stolen property — all indicate conclusively that the
five crimes were committed by the influence exercised by the woman, which
inducement was not merely that of favoring the execution of the crime but was
that which determined its commission."
In a decision of the 31st of May, 1898, it was laid down "that the command of a
master to his servant, by reason of the special relations which exist between
them, contains the elements of inducement which makes the master who orders
such servant to cut wood belonging to a third person, in order that he might
benefit thereby, the principal of the crime committed by such servant," the
court saying that "in view of the fact that the command of the master to the
servant, made within the sphere and under the ordinary conditions of domestic
life, when they relate to acts simple and apparently legitimate, contains the
necessary elements, directly and sufficiently efficacious, of inducement
according to the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 13 of the Penal Code, it
appearing that the master, taking advantage of the ascendency and authority
which he naturally must exercise over his servant or inferior, ordered him to cut
and carry away wood from land which he knew did not belong to him, without
disclosing to the servant that circumstance, which concealment gave rise to the
influence which the master exercised over the servant in that particular act."
The following decisions of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands apply
the foregoing principles to particular cases.
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In the case of the United States vs. Galuran (12 Phil. Rep., 339) it appeared that
one of the defendants conceived the idea of the robbery of a warehouse and
assisted in procuring false keys with which to open it. He took no immediate
part in the act of robbery itself. The court in its opinion said:
These facts, which we hold to have been proven, clearly show the guilt of the
appellant, Sy-Yoc, as the instigator of the crime herein prosecuted. From him
came the initiative in the robbery; he was the first to conceive the idea of its
commission, and, being unable or unwilling to carry it out himself, he employed
Galuran, impelling him to the material execution of the crime by a promise to
pay him P16 for each case of whisky that he was able to steal. The better to
induce him to commit the offense, he clearly demonstrated how easily it could
be accomplished, instructed him as to the best means of carrying it out, and
offered him money to pay for the false key. He thus removed all the difficulties
in the way of determination to execute, and the actual execution of the robbery
in question. These acts constitute a real inducement made directly for the
commission of the said robbery, and place the appellant, Sy-Yoc, in the position
of principal in accordance with paragraph 2 of article 13 of the Penal Code.
In the case of the United States vs. Ancheta (15 Phil. Rep., 470) it appeared that
the accused induced certain Igorrotes to kill a third person by holding up before
them the fact that by such act they would be able to obtain P40 which was then
in the house of the victim, as well as the carabao which he owned, saying to
them, "If you go to work you only make a little; it is better to kill this man and
take his carabao and the P40 which was received from the sale of the house in
town." They having made an unsuccessful attempt upon the life of the
proposed victim and having returned and explained why they had not been able
to kill them, the accused said to them: "Why did you eat my chickens if you are
not going to do what I told you to do. I came here to spend the night in
Cambaguio because I thought you were going to kill them." The Igorrotes then
spent three days clearing some land for another person from whom they
received P2.25. About noon of the third day of their work, the defendant went
to them and said: "Now you must repeat what I told you to do, and comply
with our agreement; I am going to Ululing to-day, and I wish you to kill
Tiburcio to-night. You go to the bushes and conceal yourselves in the same
place you were concealed before." The murder was committed as proposed.
Upon these facts and inducer of the crime, and that he was liable as principal.
(Supreme court of Spain, 20th of October, 1881, 7th of January, 1887, 12th of
January, 1889.)
In the case of the United States vs. Empinado (17 Phil. Rep., 230) it appeared
that the accused had a conversation with Serapio Tapic, a laborer, in which the
accused asked him if he knew Antonio Gavato and his associates, to which he
replied in the negative. The defendant then said: "I wish to confer upon you a
commission, which is as follows: Order must be disturbed in the cockpit of
Gavato, and when you arrive there wound any person." It seems that Tapic was
reluctant to obey this order, but defendant gave him something to eat and drink
until he became intoxicated, and then he gave him a bolo and P10 and said:
"Comply with what I have ordered and in case you incur any responsibility I will
be responsible to the court, and as soon as you wound any person or persons,
return to me and I will defend you." The court held that these facts constituted
sufficient inducement to bring the accused within the provisions of article 13,
paragraph 2, of the Penal Code.
In the case of the United States vs. Gamao (23 Phil. Rep., 81) the court said:
Mauricio Gamao, nephew of Gil Gamao, was a poor, ignorant fisherman, and
more or less dependent upon his uncle for subsistence. On the other hand,
Capt. Gil Gamao was, when this crime was committed, a man of great influence
in Escalante. He had a great number of people working for him, one of whom
was his nephew Mauricio. He was the local political leader of his party. One of
his nephews was president of the town. He had two brothers-in-law in the
municipal council. Of his nephews, one was chief of police and two others were
members of the police force. He had acquired, as we have said, a bitter hatred
toward the Roman Catholic Church and the Spanish friars and priests. He called
a meeting in his own house on the afternoon of May 15, where the question of
murdering the priest was discussed. He was the prime mover in this meeting.
He dominated all who were present. He selected his nephew Mauricio to
commit the crime and directed him to do it. Mauricio, immediately after
murdering the priest, returned to the house of his uncle Gil and reported the
fact. The influence exercised by Gil Gamao over his nephew was so great and
powerful that the latter, through fear, could not resist it. That Mauricio was
directly induced to murder the priest by his uncle Gil we think there can be no
question.
In the case of the United States vs. Chan Guy Juan (23 Phil. Rep., 105) it was
held that the "one who employs an innocent agent to commit a crime is liable as
a principal, although he does nothing himself in the actual commission of the
crime."
In the case of the United States vs. Alcontin (10 Off. Gaz., 1888) it appeared
that "a married woman suggested to her paramour, with whom she had been
maintaining illicit relations that he kill her husband in order that thereafter they
might live together freely. The paramour acting upon these suggestions and
actuated by a desire to possess the woman for himself without the interference
of the husband, killed him. The guilty pair immediately thereafter made their
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escape and lived together as man and wife until the time of ] their arrest." Upon
these facts the court said:
We think that the direct inducement to the commission of the crime is fully
established por pacto (for a consideration); that is to say, on the understanding
that the woman would live in illicit relations with the murderer after the death
of her husband; and por precepto (by precept) which constituted "a real,
intentional, direct and efficacious exciting inducement (excitacion) to commit
the crime." The propositions and suggestions of the woman constituted
something more than mere counsel or advice which her co-defendant was
entirely free to accept or not, in that they were coupled with a consideration
which, in view of the relations existing between them, furnished a motive strong
enough to induce the man to take the life of her husband; and for the further
reason that due to these illicit relations she had required such an influence over
her co-defendant that her insistent suggestions that he commit the crime had a
marked and controlling influence upon his mind.
In the case of the United States vs. Matinong (22 Phil. rep., 439) it appeared that
the accused proposed to his companions an assault upon the house of
Francisco Tolosa; that armed with a talibon he accompanied them during the
assault; that, while the assault was being made, he stood watch at the foot of the
stairs of said house so that his companions would not be caught, and that,
finally, he accompanied them to the place where the deceased was killed. These
facts were held by the court to be sufficient to make the accused a principal by
inducement as well as by direct participation.
In the case at bar, the words and acts of the accused had the effect of a
command. There does not seem to have existed, however, any official relation
between the accused and the persons whom he induced to kill Sariol. While he
appears to have been the headman of Parang, those whom he induced held no
official position under him and owed him, legally speaking, no obedience.
According to tradition and custom, however, the headman seems to have been
a person whose word was law and whose commands were to be obeyed.
Moreover, the accused represented to those who physically committed the
crime that he had a warrant from the governor authorizing, if not requiring, the
acts committed, and urged upon them, in effect, that all must obey the
commands of the Government. This representation was false, but it produced
the same effect as if it had been true. It cannot be doubted that the accused
knew the representation was false and purposely and intentionally made it as an
additional factor going to insure obedience to his orders.
Even if there should happen to be lacking any element sufficient to bring the
acts of the accused within the definition of inducement by command, and we
do not believe there is, there would still remain all of the elements necessary to
qualify the crime as murder by inducement. From the authorities heretofore
cited and the principles laid down therein as those which must govern in the
determination of whether or not the acts of an accused constitute inducement
under the law, it may be stated as a general proposition that, where the
inducement offered by the accused is of such a nature and made in such a way
that it becomes the determining cause of the crime, and such inducement was
offered with the intention of producing that result, then the accused is guilty by
inducement of the crime committed by the person so induced. The inducement
to the crime must be intentional on the part of the inducer and must be made
directly for the purpose in view.
The verb "induce" is sufficiently broad, generally speaking, to cover cases where
there exists on the part of the inducer the most positive resolution and the most
persistent effort to secure the commission of the crime, together with the
presentation to the person induced of the very strongest kind of temptation, as
well as words or acts which are merely the result of indiscretion or lack of
reflection and which carry with them, inherently, almost nothing of inducement
or temptation. A chance word spoken without reflection, a wrong appreciation
of a situation, an ironical phrase, a thoughtless act, may give birth to a thought
of, or even a resolution to, crime in the mind of one for some independent
reason predisposed thereto without the one who spoke the word or performed
the act having any expectation that his suggestion would be followed or any real
intention that it produce a result. In such case, while the expression was
imprudent and the results of it grave in the extreme, he would not be guilty of
the crime committed. Therefore, in applying the principles laid down to
concrete cases it is necessary to remember only that the inducement must be
made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime and
that such inducement must be the determining cause of the crime.
In the case before us, as we have seen, the accused falsely represented to the
persons who actually committed the crime that he had an order from the
Government requiring the death of Sariol and that they were under obligation
to carry out that order. It is clear from the evidence that this inducement was
offered by the accused directly to the persons interested with the intention of
moving them to do his bidding, and that such representation was the moving
cause of the fatal act. While it may be said, and is true, that the personal
commands of the accused were entirely sufficient to produce the effects which
actually resulted and that such commands may be considered the moving cause
of the crime, still there is no doubt, under the evidence, that the representation
that the accused had in his possession an order from the Government
commanding the death of Sariol was also of material influence in effecting the
death; and where two fundamental causes work together for the production of a
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single result and one of those causes would lead to a conviction upon one
theory and the other upon another, a conviction is sustainable upon either
theory.
There was present premeditation, qualifying the crime as murder. There were
present, also, the aggravating circumstances of desplobado and nocturnity.
We are of the firm conviction that the judgment of the court below is well
founded, and we accordingly affirm the same, with costs.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, and Trent, JJ., concur.
PEOPLE VS KIICHI OMINE
VICKERS, J.:
Defendants appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao
finding them guilty of frustrated homicide, with the aggravating circumstance
that advantage was taken of their superior strength, and sentencing each of
them to suffer an indeterminate sentence from six years of prision correccional
to twelve years of prision mayor, to indemnify Angel Pulido jointly and severally
in the sum of P540, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
to pay the corresponding costs.
The only assignment of error made by the attorneys for the defendants is that
the lower court erred in convicting the appellants, and in not acquitting them
with the costs de oficio.
The first question to be considered is the participation of the several defendants
in the commission of the crime.
It appears from the evidence that the defendant Eduardo Autor, Luis Ladion,
and Agapito Cortesano were working on the hemp plantation of Angel Pulido
under the direction of their co-defendant Kiichi Omine, who was the overseer
or manager, with a compensation of ten per cent of the gross receipts. The four
defendants lived together in a house on the plantation.
Kiichi Omine asked Angel Pullido for permission to open a new road through
the plantation. According to the offended party he refused to grant this request
because there was already an unfinished road. Kiichi Omine on the other hand
contends that Angel Pulido gave him the permission requested and he began
work on December 24, 1933. When Angel Pulido and his son, Hilario,
accompanied by Saito Paton and a Moro by the name of Barabadan, were
returning home from the cockpit that evening they noticed that a considerable
number of hemp plants had been destroyed for the purpose of opening a new
road. Angered by the destruction of the hemp plants, Angel Pulido and his party
went to the house of the defendants, who had just finished their supper. There
is a sharp conflict in the evidence as to what followed. The witnesses for the
prosecution contend that while the offended party was talking with Omine,
Eduardo Autor attempted to intervene, but was prevented by Hilario Pulido;
that Eduardo Autor attacked Hilario Pulido with a bolo, but did not wound him
except on the left thumb; that Luis Ladion and Agapito Cortesano then held
Angel Pulido by the arms, and when Eduardo Autor approached, Omine
shouted to him "pegale y matale", and Autor struck Angel Pulido in the breast
with his bolo.
Kiichi Omine, Luis Ladion, and Agapito Cortesano on the other hand maintain
that the offended party and his son were the aggressors; that the first to arrive
was Hilario Pulido, who after applying to Kiichi Omine an offensive epithet and
asking him why he had grubbed up the hemp plants, struck him in the breast
with brass knuckles; that when Eduardo Autor attempted to intervene, Angel
Pulido and his son attacked him their fists, Hilario Pulido him on the right
cheek with brass knuckles; that Luis Ladion and Agapito Cortesano ran away
before Angel Pulido was wounded by Eduardo Autor; that Kiichi Omine never
uttered the words attributed to him or urged Autor to strike Angel Pulido.
The only eyewitness for the prosecution were the offended party and his son,
and a Bagobo, named Saito, who was their relative and lived with them.
Barabadan was not presented as a witness. The witnesses for the defense were
the four appellants.
The offended party received only one wound. Only one blow struck, and it was
struck by Eduardo Autor. The anger of Angel Pulido and his son was, however,
directed chiefly against Kiichi Omine, who was responsible for the destruction
of the hemp plants. There was obviously no conspiracy among the defendants,
but the offended party and his son and his relative, Saito, narrated the facts of
the incident in such away that all the four defendants would appear to be
equally responsible for the injury sustained by the offended party. The evidence
does not convince us that Ladion and Cortesano took any part in the fight; on
the contrary it inclines us to believe that they ran away and were not present
when Angel Pulido was wounded. This impression is strengthened by the fact
that they were not included in the original complaint subscribed and sworn not
by the offended party on December 29th. They were not included as defendants
until the amended complaint was filed on February 19, 1934. But if they were
present and held the offended party by the arms, as alleged by him, the evidence
does not show that they held him for the purpose of enabling Eduardo Autor to
strike him with his bolo. If they did in fact intervene, it may have been for the
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purpose of preventing the offended party and his son from continuing their
attack on Omine. There was no need for Ladion and Cortesano to hold Angel
Pulido in order to enable Eduardo Autor to strike him with his bolo, or for
Kiichi Omine to induce him to do so by shouting "pegale y matale". According
to the witness for the prosecution, Hilario Pulido and Eduardo Autor had
already struck each other in the face with their fists, and Eduardo Autor had
received a blow in the right eye, and then struck Hilario Pulido with his bolo.
Angel Pulido would naturally intervene in the fight between his son and
Eduardo Autor, and if he did so, Autor, who had already drawn his bolo, would
strike him without the need of any inducement from Omine. Furthermore,
under the circumstances of this case, even if it were satisfactorily proved that
Kiichi Omine uttered the words in question, we are of the opinion that they
would not be sufficient to make him a principal by induction, because it does
not appear that the words uttered by Kiichi Omine caused Eduardo Autor to
strike Angel Pulido. In the first place, as we have indicated, Eduardo Autor had
already other reasons for striking Angel Pulido when Omine is alleged to have
uttered the words of inducement. In the second place, the words in question
were not in this particular case sufficient to cause Eduardo Autor to strike the
offended party with his bolo. Although Eduardo Autor was working under the
direction of Omine, apparently according to the testimony of Angel Pulido, he
was being paid by Pulido. It does not appear that Omine had any particular
influence over Eduardo Autor. The cases cited by the Solicitor-General of a
father giving orders to his son are obviously different from the case at bar.
In the leading case of the United States vs. Indanan (24 Phil., 203), it was held
that in order that a person may be convicted of a crime by inducement it is
necessary that the inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring
the commission of the crime and that such inducement be the determining
cause of the commission of the crime. In that case various decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain illustrating the principles involved and their application
to particular cases were cited with approval. One of the decisions cited was that
of April 24, 1871, where it was held that one who, during a riot in which a
person was killed, said to one of the combatants, "Stab him! Stab him!", it not
appearing the he did anything more than say these words except to be present at
the fight, was not guilty of the crime of homicide by inducement. The Supreme
Court of Spain said: "Considering that, although the phrases pronounced were
imprudent and even culpable, they were not so to the extent that they may be
considered the principal and moving cause of the effect produced; direct
inducement cannot be inferred from such phrases, as inducement must precede
the act induced and must be so influential in producing the criminal act that
without it the act would not have been performed." Another decision cited was
that of December 22, 1883, where it was held that a father who simply said to
his son who was at the time engaged in combat with another. "Hit him! Hit
him!", was not responsible for the injuries committed after such advice was
given.
Commenting upon No. 2 of article 13 of the Penal Code, which has been
incorporated in the Revised Penal Code without change as No. 2 of article 17,
Viada says that in order that, under the provisions of the Code, such act can be
considered direct inducement, it is necessary that such advice or such words
have great dominance and great influence over the person who acts, that it is
necessary that they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical or moral
coercion or as violence itself. (2 Viada, 386, 5th Edition.)
We are therefore of the opinion that the co-defendants of Eduardo Autor are
not responsible for the injury inflicted by him on Angel Pulido.
The lower court, taking into consideration the nature and location of the wound
of the offended party, found that it was the intention of the defendant Eduardo
Autor to kill the offended party, and accordingly found said defendant guilty of
frustrated homicide, but in our opinion the evidence does not justify this
finding. It is true that the wound was serious and in a vital part of the body, but
judging from the nature of the wound, which was about eleven inches in length,
extending from the breast to the lower ribs on the right side, we think it is
probable that it was caused by the point of the bolo on a downward stroke. It
was not a stab wound, and was probably given during a commotion and without
being aimed at any particular part of the body. As we have already stated,
Eduardo Autor struck the offended party only once. This fact tends to show
that it was not his intention to take the offended party's life. If he had so
intended, he could easily have accomplished his purpose, so far as the record
shows. It might be contended that Eduardo Autor did not strike the offended
party a second time, because he thought that he had already killed him. This was
apparently the theory of the prosecution, because the offended party and his
witnesses testified that the offended party dropped down unconscious when he
was wounded, but the evidence does not seem to us to sustain that contention.
In the first place a cutting wound like that in question would not ordinarily
render the injured man immediately unconscious.
In the second place it appears from the affidavit of Saito, one of the witnesses
for the prosecution, that Angel Pulido did not fall down unconscious; but
swayed and asked for help, while the blood was flowing from his breast and
stomach; that Saito approached the wounded man to support him and take him
home.
It is a rule that in a case of physical injuries the court must be guided by the
result unless the intent to kill is manifest.
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When criminal liability is made to consist in the intention to perform an act
which was not realized, the facts from which it is claimed that intention sprang
must be such as to exclude all contrary supposition. When this intention is not
necessarily disclosed by the acts performed by the defendant, greater
importance should not be given to such acts than that which they in themselves
import, nor should the defendant's liability be extended beyond that which is
actually involved in the material results of his act. Intention may only be
deduced from the external acts performed by the agent, and when these acts
have naturally given a definite result, the courts cannot, without clear and
conclusive proof, hold that some other result was intended. (U.S. vs. Mendoza,
38 Phil., 691.)
There is no merit in the contention of Eduardo Autor that Angel Pulido was
accidentally wounded in a struggle for the possession of the offended party's
bolo. That claim is disproved by the affidavit of Autor, Exhibit E, executed on
December 26, 1933, where he stated that he snatched out his bolo and struck
Angel Pulido in the stomach because Pulido was very aggressive.
We are therefore of the opinion that Eduardo Autor is guilty of lesiones graves,
since the offended party was incapacitated for the performance of his usual
work for a period of more than ninety days, and not of frustrated homicide.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed as to Kiichi
Omine, Luis Ladion, and Agapito Cortesano, and they are acquitted with the
proportionate part of the costs de oficio. As to the appellant Eduardo Autor,
the decision of the lower court is modified, and he is convicted of lesiones
graves and sentenced to suffer one year, eight months, and twenty-one days of
prision correccional, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P540, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, which shall not exceed one-third
of the principal penalty, and to pay the corresponding costs. In accordance with
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum sentence to be served by him is
fixed at one year of prision correccional.
Avanceña, C.J., Hull, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur.
3. PRINCIPALS BY INDESPENSABLE COOPERATION
US VS LIM BUANCO
ELLIOTT, J.:
The defendants, Lino Eguia Lim Buanco (alias Lim Buanco) and Luciano de los
Reyes, were charged with and convicted of the crime of estafa. The information
is identical in language with that on which the same defendants were convicted
in the case of the United States vs. Lino Eguia Lim Buanco (alias Lim Buanco)
and Luciano de los Reyes, No. 5240 (filed herewith) 1, except that it charges the
obtaining of the sum of 1,000 pesos upon a check for that amount, bearing date
of October 6, 1906. In the other case the money was obtained on a check for
2,000 pesos.
In this case the demurrers to the information were overruled, and separate trials
were granted to the defendants. They were both convicted, and on January 16,
1909, were sentenced to six months of arresto mayor in the public cárcel of
Bilibid, in the city of Manila, the sentence to become operative and to take
effect at the expiration of the sentence imposed the same day in the case
entitled The United States vs. Lino Eguia Lim Buanco (alias Lim Buanco) and
Luciano de los Reyes, No. 5240 above referred to, and that they jointly and
separately indemnify the Banco Español-Filipino in the sum of P1,136.50,
equivalent to 5,682.50 pesetas, and in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment for the time and in the manner and place prescribed by law, and
that each defendant pay one-half costs of this case.
The facts as found by the trial court and justified by the evidence, are as follows:
For at least three and half year prior to the 6th day of October, 1906, Luciano
de los Reyes was employed in the Banco Español-Filipino, and there served and
acted as bookkeeper and check registry clerk. During that time he was in charge
of certain current account books of the bank, and it was his duty to inspect
certain checks presented to the bank for payment, including those drawn by
Lim Buanco; to examine the account of the maker of each of said checks, and
to determine whether or not the drawer of the check had a sufficient balance to
his credit to require the payment of the check. In the performance of these
duties Reyes was required to indorse upon each check, if it was entitled to
payment, the words "Corriente, P. O. Luciano de los Reyes." After the check
was marked in this manner it was passed to the cashier of the bank, who, in
reliance upon the indorsement, paid or ordered the same to be paid.
During the period referred to the defendant Lim Buanco had an account with
the bank, and drew large sums of money therefrom, by means of checks signed
by him, and inspected and indorsed as above by Reyes. During this time a
conspiracy existed between the defendants Lim Buanco and Reyes for the
withdrawal of funds from the bank by Lim Buanco, regardless of whether he
had any funds in the bank to his credit, and in furtherance of this conspiracy,
the entries in the accounts of Lim Buanco on the books of the bank were
fraudulently and illegally manipulated by Reyes in such a manner as to make the
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books show an apparent credit balance, when in fact Lim Buanco was owing to
the bank a large sum of money.
On the 6th day of October, 1906, Lim Buanco drew a check on the Banco
Español-Filipino for the sum of 1,000 pesos, and this check was through the
agency of another bank in which it was deposited by Lim Buanco, presented in
due course of business to and paid by the Banco Español-Filipino. Before the
check was thus paid, Reyes, acting in his capacity as an employee of the bank,
indorsed thereon the words "Corriente, P. O. Luciano de los Reyes," although
at the time this indorsement was made, Lim Buanco had no actual credit
balance in the bank, and no permission had been given him by any officer or
officers in authority of said bank to overdraw his account. In this manner the
defendants Lim Buanco and Reyes, in furtherance of the conspiracy to cheat,
deceive, and defraud the bank, secured the payment of said check, although they
both knew at the time that the defendant Lim Buanco had no credit balance in
said bank, but was in fact indebted to the bank in the sum of more than 300,000
pesos, which had previously been withdrawn from the bank by means of similar
checks drawn by Lim Buanco, and fraudulently indorsed as correct by Reyes.
The amount of money thus fraudulently obtained from the bank by means of
the check as aforesaid, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum
from the date of the check to the date of the decision in the court below, to wit,
January 16, 1909, amounted to the sum of P1,635.50, Philippine currency,
equivalent to 5,682.50 pesetas, which the court determined to be the damage
occasioned to and suffered by the bank by reason of the aforesaid fraudulent
conduct of the defendants acting together in furtherance of said conspiracy. No
part of the said sum has been returned or paid back to the Banco Español-
Filipino by Lim Buanco, or by Reyes, or by any person acting for or in his or
their behalf. The trial court also found that Lim Buanco and Reyes each had
voluntarily admitted the crime as charged against him.
Separate trial were granted to the defendants, but the court, after both were
convicted, embodied its finding of facts and conclusions in one decision, and
one joint sentence was pronounced upon the defendants. Thereafter each
defendant separately moved for a new trial, which was denied, and an appeal
was taken to this court, where, as in the court below, they appear be separate
attorneys. Although separate briefs are filed, the various assignments of errors
raise essentially the same questions.
The questions here presented as to the sufficiency of the complaint, the nature
of the crime, the right to separate trials, and the fact of the reference by the trial
court to the fact that neither defendant testified in his own behalf, were raised
in the case of the United States vs. Lino Eguia Lim Buanco (alias Lim Buanco)
and Luciano de los Reyes, No. 5240, and determined against the defendants.
What was said with reference thereto in the opinion in that case need not be
here repeated. The rulings made are adhered to and followed. It remains to be
determined whether the defendants have been once before in jeopardy for the
same offense charged against them by the information in this case.
The defendants each interpose the plea of former jeopardy, and contend that
the acts charged in this information were done in furtherance of the conspiracy
which was alleged in the information in case No. 5240, entitled "The United
States vs. Lino Eguia Lim Buanco (alias Lim Buanco) and Luciano de los
Reyes," which was tried on the day previous to that on which the present case
was tried. This contention rests upon the assumption that the crime for which
the defendants were in the first case convicted consisted of obtaining the entire
sum of more than 300,000 pesos from the Banco Español-Filipino by means of
a fraudulent conspiracy between the defendants, and that their acts done in
furtherance of said conspiracy constituted a single continuing offense. In the
former case the defendants were charged with having defrauded the bank by
means of a certain check for 2,000 pesos. In the present case they are charged
with having defrauded the bank by means of a certain other check for 1,000
pesos, and in another case which was submitted herewith, they are charged with
having defrauded the same bank by means of another check for the sum of
3,500 pesos. The first two checks bore date of October 6, 1906, and the other,
April 2, 1906. In the information in each case it is alleged in substance that the
defendants and each of them conspired to defraud the bank; that the defendant
Lim Buanco falsely represented that there were funds in the bank to pay the
check in question; that the check was fraudulently marked "Corriente, P. O.
Luciano de los Reyes," by Reyes, who knew at the time that Lim Buanco had no
money to his credit to pay the check, and that the fraud was effected in
furtherance of a conspiracy between the two parties. But in each case the
defendants and each of them are charged with having defrauded the bank of a
specific sum of money by means of a specifically mentioned and identified
check, and the particular check described in the information and introduced in
evidence in each case is for a different amount from that referred to in the
information and introduced in evidence in the other cases. The check referred
to in one information could not therefore have been properly offered in
evidence to prove the allegation in either of the other cases. These informations
do not charge the defendants with the technical crime of conspiracy. The
substance of the allegation in each case is that the money was obtained from the
bank by means of the fraudulent cooperation of Lim Buanco and Reyes under
circumstances which constitute the deceit necessary to constitute the crime of
estafa, and of the crime only the defendants were convicted. (U. S. vs. Lino
Eguia Lim Buanco (alias Lim Buanco) and Luciano de los Reyes, No. 5240.) It
is true that by the same methods, and by means of other checks drawn,
certified, and their payment secured in the same fraudulent manner, a large sum
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of money in the aggregate was withdrawn from the bank, but nevertheless each
act constituted a separate crime. The preparation, approval, and payment of
numerous checks under such circumstances can not be considered as one
continuing offense. Each separate fraudulent obtaining of money from the bank
by means of such methods constituted a distinct crime, and a conviction of one
such crimes can not be pleaded in bar to a prosecution for another. lawphil.net
It may be noted, however, that even if it were true that the defendants had been
charged and convicted of conspiracy, the plea of former jeopardy would not be
good as against a prosecution for one of several crimes, each distinct from the
other, committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. In a monographic note in
the case of People vs. McDaniels (92 American State Reports, 81), it is said that
[p. 134]:
Where several acts are done in pursuance of a conspiracy, each act being distinct
from the other, the fact that they are in fact done in pursuance of a conspiracy
does not make one act the "same offense" as the other.
This statement is sustained by the case of Wallace vs. State (41 Fla., 547, 26
South., 713), where it was held that —
While the conspiracy may be single, and therefore subject to one indictment
only, yet the felonies accomplished by means of the conspiracy were separate
and distinct, depending upon the different acts, provable by different evidence,
and accomplished by distinct though similar means. The evidence essentially
necessary to sustain one indictment would not sustain either of the others, nor
could defendant be convicted upon the information upon the evidence
necessary to sustain either of the others.
We find no material errors in this record. The defendants were properly
convicted and sentenced, and the judgment is therefore affirmed. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.
CONSPIRACY
PEOPLE VS DE LA CERNA
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Sixteen persons, among them herein appellants, were indicted by the provincial
fiscal in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato for double murder for the fatal
shooting of Rafael and Casiano Cabizares,1 father and son, in Barrio Cebuano,
municipality of Tupi, province of Cotabato, on February 3, 1958. All pleaded
not guilty.
In the course of the trial, after the prosecution had rested the People's case, the
accused filed a motion to dismiss on the ground, inter alia, that the fiscal, after
conducting his own preliminary investigation, included in the charge the other
accused who were already dropped therefrom by the Municipal Court. The trial
court denied said motion but acquitted accused Gaspar Bautista, Agapito
Avellana, Cesar Abapo and Eriberto Matchoca for insufficiency of evidence
against them.
The defense then presented its evidence. While at this stage, accused Segundo
de la Cerna died and the charge against him was dropped.
After trial, the lower court, on January 3, 1962 promulgated its decision.
Acquitted were Guillermo Esperanza, Concordio Pardillo, Deogracias Pardillo,
Andres Abapo and Joaquin Libumfacil.
Convicted for the murder of Rafael Cabizares were Sulpicio de la Cerna and
Serapio Maquiling, as principals, and Godofredo Rotor, Antonio Bautista,
Severino Matchoca and Teodoro Libumfacil, as accomplices.
For the murder of Casiano Cabizares, the court convicted Sulpicio de la Cerna
and Serapio Maquiling as principals, and Ramon Alquizar as accessory.
A motion to reconsider by the convicted accused failed to move the lower
court. So the said accused followed up with their notice of appeal. Two days
later accused Ramon Alquizar was allowed to withdraw his intended appeal.
And during the pendency of the appeal in this Court, accused Serapio Maquiling
moved to withdraw his appeal also, and this was granted on August 8, 1967.
The present appeal, therefore, involves only Sulpicio de la Cerna as principal for
the killing of both Rafael and Casiano Cabizares; and Teodoro Libumfacil,
Godofredo Rotor, Severino Matchoca and Antonio Bautista as accomplices for
the killing of Rafael Cabizares.
The first question is procedural. It appears that when the municipal court
finished with the preliminary investigation, it opined that only appellant Sulpicio
de la Cerna was guilty while the rest of the accused were not. The fiscal,
however, without seeking a review of the findings of the court, conducted his
own investigation and, afterwards, indicted all the accused. It is contended that
this was serious error. The objection, however, was raised only after the
prosecution had already rested its case. Hence, whatever procedural defect there
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was, had been waived by the appellants by their failure to raise it before entering
their pleas.2
Appellants next assail the lower court for relying on the prosecution witnesses
who gave, in substance, the following narration of facts and circumstances:
Early in the morning of February 3, 1958, Rafael Cabizares, accompanied by his
wife, Hospicia, his brothers Margarito and Romualdo, and his sons
Gumercindo, Marcelo, Casiano, Juan and Lamberto, left Barrio Cebuano
headed for the poblacion of Tupi, Cotabato, bringing five sacks of corn loaded
on a bull cart to be milled in Tupi. Juan, Marcelo and Lamberto, who were all
minors, were then going to school. Upon approaching a hilly part, they had to
stop since the carabao could not pull the bull cart uphill. Rafael then requested
his two brothers and his son Gumercindo to accompany him up the hill and
carry on their backs the sacks of corn. With Rafael leading, the four proceeded
uphill.
As the four approached Sulpicio de la Cerna's house on top of the hill and were
about to put down the sacks of corn, appellant Sulpicio, who was in the house,
fired at and hit Rafael, who fell down. Sulpicio then ordered his companions to
burn his house so that they would have an excuse. Meanwhile, Casiano,
Gumercindo, Marcelo and Romualdo brought the wounded Rafael Cabizares to
the house of the latter's father, Demetrio, 100 meters away. Felisa Bastismo,
Rafael's mother, Ursula Cabizares and Segundino Cabizares were there at the
time.
After the group reached the house, Rafael's wounds were washed with hot water
and then he was brought inside the third room of the house. Subsequently,
appellant Sulpicio and the other accused arrived at the premises, armed with
firearms, bolos and canes. They stoned the house and trust their bolos thru the
bamboo walls and flooring. Finding that there were women inside the house,
the accused ordered them to get out or else they would be killed also. As Felisa
Bastismo and Ursula Cabizares alighted from the besieged house, Marcelo
Cabizares followed them, and although held by accused Conrado Pardillo and
boxed by Serapio Maquiling, he was able to escape to the nearby forest.
Serapio Maquiling then climbed up the window of the kitchen, and with the
carbine which he got from appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna, shot at Rafael
Cabizares who was sitting in the third room. At this moment, Casiano Cabizares
jumped down from the house thru the kitchen door and ran away. Serapio
Maquiling followed him and shot the latter at the back, killing him a few meters
away from Demetrio's house. Appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna then got back the
carbine, climbed up the house and fired once more at Rafael, who was now
lying down on the floor, killing him finally. Thereafter, the cadaver of Casiano
Cabizares was tied to a bamboo pole, carried by accused Ramon Alquizar and
one Wilfredo Malias (at large) and placed near the burned house of Sulpicio de
la Cerna, as some of the accused followed while the rest proceeded to Rafael's
house.
The post mortem examination3 conducted that very same day showed that
Casiano Cabizares died from a gunshot wound, the bullet entering the back and
passing out in front, while Rafael Cabizares sustained three gunshot wounds of
entrance, one gunshot exit wound, and one stab wound. Dr. Bienvenido Garcia,
the Municipal Health Officer, explained that the bullet which caused the first
wound located in front, at the left lower abdomen, did not go thru at the back
but split into two parts after entering the body. However, these two parts were
already palpable on the left buttock of the decedent from which they were
extracted. The bullet which caused the second wound located directly at the
back lodged in the 11th thoracic vertebra. The third bullet entered near the left
breast and went out at the right lumbar region.
The prosecution also presented proof that prior to the incident, a land dispute
arose between Rafael and some of the accused,4 and that he had filed
complaints5 with the Agrarian Court against the latter, the trial of which cases
was scheduled on February 10, 1958.
Appellants would have this Court believe that they are innocent. The four
appellants convicted as accomplices insist they were never at the vicinity of the
killing. On the other hand, appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna claims that both
Rafael and Casiano were killed in self-defense.
Sulpicio's version of what transpired is this:
In the morning of February 3, 1958, Guillermo Esperanza and Sulpicio de la
Cerna had just roasted corn in the latter's house when Rafael, Casiano, and
others, all armed with bolos and canes, arrived. Rafael demanded of Sulpicio to
come down for a confrontation. The latter's refusal to do so angered Rafael
who threw his cane at Sulpicio and ordered his companions to surround the
house, thrust their bolos thru it and burn it. Because the house was on fire, and
fearing that he would be killed, Sulpicio alerted Guillermo Esperanza got his
carbine and fired indiscriminately at his attackers to drive them away. When
Rafael and Casiano were hit, their companions fled. Guillermo Esperanza and
Sulpicio then got down from the burning house and left, passing by the
prostrate bodies of the decedents. Sulpicio proceeded to the house of one
Pedro Esperanza to drink water and while there, he saw a jeep coming loaded
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with policemen to whom be surrendered himself and his carbine. Expectedly
Guillermo Esperanza gave the same version as above-narrated.
Said appellant's version cannot be accepted. The autopsy reports contradict
Sulpicio's claim that he shot the decedents frontally while he was up in his
house. For both deceased each sustained a gunshot wound directly at the back.
Moreover Casiano's wound of entry — located along the 12th rib — is lower
than the wound of exit — located along the 6th rib6 — showing that the bullet
flight path was upwards, not downwards. A gun fired from the elevated
flooring7 of a house like Sulpicio's, and aimed downwards, could not have
caused such wounds. Lastly, Rafael's cadaver bore a stab wound on the left side.
Appellant's version could not account for this.
While on the one hand nothing was found around the burned house of
appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna, such as the alleged cane thrown by Rafael, nor
any other weapon or stones which may indicate agression or violence, on the
other, bloodstains were found inside Demetrio Cabizares' house8 and also on
the ground at the spot where, according to the prosecution,9 Casiano fell when
shot by Serapio Maquiling. An empty carbine shell (Exh. I) was also found by
Dr. Garcia in the kitchen. In this regard, his testimony is not hearsay, as
appellant contends, for although Dr. Garcia did not personally pick it up, he
saw the empty shell taken from the floor and handed over to his companions
before finally reaching him.10 While Casiano's body was found near Sulpicio's
burned' house, even appellant's own witness11 admitted having found Rafael's
body inside Demetrio's house right after the incidents occurred. Appellant's
supposition that Rafael's companions must have returned and carried away his
body can hardly be accepted since there is no reason why they would not also
bring back Casiano's body.
Moreover, we find it hard to believe that Sulpicio, after felling the decedents
and dispersing the latter's companions would still leave his house when it was
not yet totally burned, as he himself admitted. The natural thing for him to have
done — were it true that it was decedents who set fire to it — was to put down
the fire and save his house. Anyway his life was no longer in danger.
Lastly, Sulpicio has more reason to resent and kill Rafael than the latter would
have as to him. The source of the possible motive is the same: land trouble
between Rafael Cabizares and Sulpicio's father, and the ejectment suit instituted
before the Agrarian Court against the latter by the former. Considering that
Rafael was the prevailing party in the land dispute before the NARRA, it is quite
hard to believe that he would be the one entertaining a grudge against those
over whom he had prevailed. Rather, it was the accused, who were defeated and
who were now facing an ejectment suit which was set for hearing, that harbored
resentment against the deceased.
Furthermore, all the foregoing considerations fit well into the prosecution's
version. We have gone over the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
found them credible. That most of them are related to the victim does not
necessarily impair their credibility.12 Appellants however invite our attention to
inconsistencies and improbabilities allegedly abounding in their testimonies. We
shall consider each witness and their testimonies separately.
1. Romualdo Cabizares — He was with his brother Rafael when the latter
was shot near Sulpicio's house and was among those who brought Rafael to
their father's (Demetrio) house 100 meters away. He did not go up the house
since he had to go back and evacuate his family to a forest 400 meters away.
Having done so, he went back and saw the incidents around Demetrio's house
from a place covered with corn plants just 25 meters away.
Appellants point out that his statements on the whereabouts of Conrado
Pardillo were inconsistent, leading the lower court to disbelieve him and acquit
Pardillo. We find no inconsistency since Pardillo's going to Rafael's house with
the other accused was after the events in Demetrio's premises had taken
place.13 The lower court acquitted Pardillo not because it disbelieved Romualdo
but rather, taking his testimony as true, the court held that the facts proved were
insufficient to tack criminal liability on Pardillo.14
This witness was able to observe the events around Demetrio's house. Even if
the corn plants where he hid were sparse, because of the 25-meter distance
from the accused whose attentions were focused on Demetrio's house, and
considering that he was in a hidden place15 while the accused were in the open
field, Romualdo could see them without their noticing him. It is true that the
forest where Romualdo took his family was 400 meters away, but the accused
took some time before they followed to Demetrio's house and Romualdo ran
back after hiding his family.16
2. Margarito Cabizares — He was beside his brother Rafael at the hill top
when the latter was shot by Sulpicio. When he tried to hide near some banana
clumps, Guillermo Esperanza stabbed him, hitting him near the left shoulder
and causing him to fall unconscious. Shortly later when he recovered
consciousness, he followed Rafael who was being brought to Demetrio's house
but he was told by Rafael to save himself so he went to a forest 400 meters
away where he saw the goings-on around Demetrio's house.
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Appellants state that nothing much can be gathered from his testimony.
However, they overlook the obvious fact that Margarito was an eyewitness to
the shooting of Rafael near Sulpicio's house. Although he lost consciousness
after being stabbed, it was momentary only, the wound not being very
serious.17 It was not impossible for him to have observed activities around
Demetrio's house at a distance of 400 meters. Witness Bonifacio Barro
corroborates him on this point.18 Lastly, he need not be a ballistics expert to
recognize gunshot bursts.
3. Gumercindo Cabizares — He was with his father Rafael at the hill top.
He warned his father just before Sulpicio fired the carbine. After Rafael was hit,
he helped carry him to Demetrio's house but did not stay there since he was
told by Rafael to go to Dadiangas to call the P.C.
Appellants claim that his testimony regarding a conversation with Juan
Cabizares on the way downhill is contradicted by Juan himself who stated that
he was not with those who brought Rafael to Demetrio's house. We fail to see
any contradiction. Juan did not deny having conversed with Gumercindo. And
what the latter said was that after meeting Juan, they went ahead and Juan
probably followed behind.19 We do not think it is stupidity for a son to warn
his father of imminent danger — as Gumercindo did — and to come to the
latter's aid despite danger. We prefer to consider such behavior as "courage
under fire."
4. Marcelo Cabizares — He was near the bullcart downhill and when he
heard gun shots, he went uphill. There he helped carry his father Rafael to his
grandfather Demetrio's house. After the accused arrived in the latter's house,
the women were ordered to get out. He followed Ursula Cabizares and Felisa
Bastismo on the way down but he was held by Pardillo and boxed by Serapio
Maquiling. Still, he was able to escape.
Appellants point out to two statements of his, one wherein he was able to
identify all the accused and the other, wherein he was able to name only four of
them, alleging material inconsistency. The statements however referred to
different situations. The first was when all the accused arrived at Demetrio's
place, and the second statement refers to those whom Marcelo Cabizares saw
when he came down from the house.20 He was able to run away after Serapio
Maquiling boxed him because he was freed from the hold of Pardillo and
Serapio.21 On redirect, he clarified that he left Demetrio's house in the
morning.22
5. Juan Cabizares — He also stayed with the bullcart downhill and when
he heard gun shots, he went uphill and saw his father wounded. He then
followed behind the group carrying Rafael to Demetrio's house and while inside
the house, saw the killing of Rafael and Casiano.
Juan did not lie when he said his father was shot by Sulpicio for altho he did not
see the actual shooting, he had good reasons to conclude that Sulpicio fired the
shot since he saw the latter, shortly after the shooting, holding the carbine
which was still pointed at Rafael.23 Anyway, his testimony on the point is
merely corroborative of the others who were eyewitnesses. He was able to
identify Serapio Maquiling as the one who first shot his father in Demetrio's
house although Serapio was behind the bamboo partition, since there were
openings in it enabling one to see thru and he peeped thru it.24 The
measurements in the third room (3 m x 4 m) are compatible with Juan's
statement that Sulpicio was 1-1/2 m away from Rafael when the third shot was
fired since Sulpicio did not go inside the room but fired from the window
outside.25 Juan was competent to testify on what occurred outside the house
since he was also peeping thru the slits in the bamboo walls.26
6. Felisa Bastismo — She was the mother of Rafael Cabizares. She was
with Ursula Cabizares and Segundino Cabizares inside Demetrio's house when
the wounded Rafael was brought in. After Rafael's wounds were washed, Felisa
went down from the house with Ursula, as ordered by the accused. And in the
corn fields nearby, she witnessed the killing of Casiano.
Appellants make much of Felisa's testimony referring to Rafael's "wounds"
when he was brought in the house, and argue that Rafael had been shot at least
twice already. But Felisa did not examine the wound of Rafael. Neither did she
state how many wounds he had. The substance of her testimony is only that
Rafael was wounded when he arrived. As to the impossibility for the stones to
go thru the broken window shutter (Exh. K), Felisa admitted that she merely
heard the sound when they fell on the floor.27 Surely, appellant cannot seriously
contend that one has to see stones going thru the house to know that it is being
stoned. Anyway, it is not impossible for a large stone hurled against a bamboo
shutter to cause a hole therein measuring 14" x 1 ½." And assuming that such
hole appears more to have been cut by a bolo and forced open, Felisa testified
that the accused also thrust their bolos thru the walls.28
It is not impossible for Felisa to have seen Casiano's shooting for she lay flat on
the ground after having witnessed it already.29 She also explained why she was
alone in the corn fields although she left the house together with Ursula. Being
76 years old, she was slower than Ursula, and she stumbled while fleeing so she
was able to reach up to the corn fields only.30 As to Juan's arrival, the
testimonies of the other witnesses are uniform that the group carrying Rafael
arrived in Demetrio's house first and Juan, who followed behind, arrived
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afterwards.31 Juan corroborates Felisa that he helped carry Rafael to the third
room.32 Marcelo probably noticed Juan only after Rafael had been brought to
the third room, leading him to say that Juan arrived after Rafael was brought
there.33
7. Ursula and Segundino Cabizares — Both were in Demetrio's house
with Felisa Bastismo. They saw the arrival of the accused and the stoning and
thrusting of bolos thru the wallings. One of the bolos wounded Segundino
Cabizares on the left thigh. Ursula Cabizares hid in a palay container but when
they were ordered to get out, she and Felisa Bastismo left and returned later in
the afternoon.
While Ursula was evidently mistaken when she said that Margarito was also in
the house, the error is immaterial. Contrary to appellants' contention, she saw
Serapio Maquiling on her way down the house.34 As to whether the other
accused besides appellant Antonio Bautista were armed with bolos, she stated
she did not know since she only saw the bolo tips penetrating thru the
wallings.35 Her positive statement that She saw appellant Godofredo Rotor36
prevails, of course, over the negative testimony of Maximo Caña.
Appellants argue that since Segundino Cabizares was fearful, he could not have
been moving inside the besieged house of Demetrio, peeping every now and
then thru the openings in the walls and observing the accused. They seem to
forget however that different people react differently even when apprehensive.
Thus, Segundino's restlessness inside the house is neither unnatural or
ridiculous to believe.
8. Bonifacio Barro — He was with Fiscal Daproza and Sgt. Paladin inside
Demetrio's house a few days after February 3, 1958 and upon orders of the
Fiscal, he took out part of the flooring (Exh. K), the bamboo slatch (Exhs. L
and L-1) and the stones (Exhs. M, M-1 and M-2).
His statement that Exhs. M, M-1 and M-2 were some of the stones Fiscal
Daproza found on the roof of Demetrio's house corroborates the other
prosecution witnesses who testified that the accused stoned the house. He also
stated that there were other stones inside the house, corroborating Romualdo
Cabizares.37
9. Dr. Bienvenido Garcia — As municipal health officer, he performed
the autopsy on Rafael and Casiano Cabizares on February 3, 1958. He found
Casiano's body near the burned house of Sulpicio de la Cerna, and Rafael's,
inside Demetrio's house. In the latter house, he also saw a bullet hole on the
floor (Exh. J-1) and a carbine shell (Exh. 1).
Appellants would cavil on Dr. Garcia's statement that he saw Exh. J (part of the
flooring) only in court. What he said however was that he saw it as cut already
from the floor only in court.38 His statements as to the room dimensions (3-4
m x 4-5 m) and the distance of Rafael's body to the partition (1 m or 2 ft.) are
approximations only and not exact measurements.39 A difference of a few
insignificant meters is to be expected. Lastly, his statements that the bullet hole
(Exhibit J-1) was on the floor coincides with Barro's testimony that Exh. J was
cut from the flooring.40
From all the foregoing, it is apparent that the so-charged inconsistencies and
improbabilities in the testimonies are without substantial and significant basis.
Hence, the lower court's findings should stand, especially since they involve an
appreciation of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses.
We now proceed to the criminal liability of the appellants.
The killing of Rafael Cabizares was attended by treachery. Appellant Sulpicio
contends that the first shot, fired by him, was not attended with treachery since
there is evidence that Rafael was warned by his son Gumercindo just before he
was hit in the lower abdomen.41 However, even assuming the argument to be
tenable, the second shot, by Serapio Maquiling, was definitely treacherously
fired since Rafael was then in the third room of Demetrio's house, wounded
and defenseless. The treachery here has to be independently considered due to
the sufficient lapse of time42 from the first shot, in which the following events
intervened: (1) the bringing of Rafael to Demetrio's house 100 meters away after
being hit; (2) the washing of his wounds and his being brought to the third
room to rest; (3) the arrival of the accused and their ordering the two women to
get out. It was only after the women left that Serapio climbed up the kitchen
and fired the second shot at Rafael.
Appellant Sulpicio is chargeable for the treacherous shooting of Rafael by
Serapio Maquiling since both were acting as co-conspirators pursuant to their
understanding in the meeting held the day before in Andres Abapo's house, as
will be shown presently. Anyway, the third shot, fired by Sulpicio, was
treacherously done. Rafael was then flat on the floor and although still alive, was
completely defenseless, having been shot twice already. The portion of Dr.
Garcia's testimony43 cited by appellants shows that Rafael died after the third
shot hit him —
Q. After wound No. 1 was inflicted, is it possible that Rafael Cabizares was
still alive?
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A. Rafael Cabizares was still alive.
Q. After inflicting wound No. 2, is it possible that Rafael Cabizares was
still alive?
A. He was still alive.
Q. When wound No. 3 was inflicted, was he still alive by your conclusion?
A. He was dead.
Q. What makes you conclude that he was already dead when wound No. 3
was inflicted?
A. Because wound No. 3 is mortal.
thus corroborating Juan Cabizares' testimony that his father was still alive after
the second shot wounded him.
Evident premeditation was also present in this case. The previous plan to kill
Rafael Cabizares was testified to by witness Maximo Caña who was present in
the meeting of February 2, 1958, in the house of Andres Abapo. Of the many
persons present, he recognized only appellants Sulpicio de la Cerna, Antonio
Bautista, Severino Matchoca and Serapio Maquiling. Bautista told the group that
the purpose of the meeting was to plan the killing of Rafael Cabizares. Then
both he and Serapio Maquiling signified their willingness to execute it.
Appellant Sulpicio also offered to do it provided his family would be taken care
of. To this offer, Bautista and Maquiling replied that they would take care of
Sulpicio's family. Caña testified further that none of those attending voiced out
any objection but all agreed to the plan. Caña was also present in the early
morning of February 3, 1958, when Matchoca, accompanied by Bautista, gave
the magazine of bullets to Godofredo Rotor. He was likewise with the accused
when Rafael was shot at the hill top, and when he (Rafael) and Casiano were
killed in Demetrio's place.
However, one year and ten months after he had testified for the prosecution,
witness Caña was presented as a defense witness. As such, he completely
retracted on his previous testimony, explaining that all what he had stated was
false since he was not in Tupi on February 2 and 3, 1958. Gaudencio Esperanza,
presented to corroborate him, testified that in August, 1958, Hospicia
Cabizares, widow of Rafael, went to the former's house where Caña was staying,
and gave the latter P50.00 to testify falsely for the prosecution. On rebuttal,
Hospicia Cabizares denied this.44
We have thus two sets of testimonies by Caña completely at variance with each
other. Now the rule is that mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not
necessarily vitiate the original testimony otherwise credible.45 The proper thing
for the trial court to do is to weigh and compare both testimonies. Here, the
lower court, after having done so, accepted Caña's testimony for the
prosecution. In this, it did not err.
Firstly, the original testimony is positive and replete with details, and Caña
withstood a long and thorough cross-examination which could not have been
so, if the story were merely fabricated. Secondly, Caña's narration of the
shooting incident was fully corroborated by the other prosecution witnesses.
Lastly, the charged inconsistencies and improbabilities therein are too
insignificant to affect the substance thereof.
On the other hand, in his subsequent testimony,46 Caña was evasive and most
of his answers were: I don't remember" or "I don't know". His statement that
he was in Marbel on February 2 and 3, 1958 is not only uncorroborated but
even contradicted by two prosecution witnesses who saw him with the accused
on February 3, 1958.47 Caña was also in sincere, claiming that his conscience
bothered him greatly but he admitted that he could not sleep only in the
mornings48 and notwithstanding the serious predicament he was in — because
of the inconsistent statements made in open court — he was even smiling.49
Moreover, according to Gaudencio Esperanza, who is the father-in-law of
Serapio Maquiling, Caña was only constrained to testify falsely when he was
bribed by Rafael's widow, Hospicia Cabizares, sometime in August, 1958. This
pretense can not be believed since a month prior to that, or on July 28, 1958,
Caña had already executed an affidavit (Exh. V) incriminating the appellants. It
also appears highly improbable for Rafael's widow to go to the house of a
relative of the accused and in his presence openly bribe Caña, a resident therein.
Lastly, it is hard to believe that although Gaudencio Esperanza knew of this
incident, he told the defense counsel about it only after Caña had already
testified for the defense and had been incarcerated to face a charge of perjury.50
The impulse of a man similarly situated would have been to relate such matter
at once to his accused relatives. Gaudencio's failure to do so makes of his story
a worthless fabrication.
There being a previous direct conspiracy one day before the killing, evident
premeditation is duly established.51 This qualifying circumstance is further
buttressed by the following actuations of appellant on February 3, 1958: (1)
Upon seeing Rafael near his house, Sulpicio told his companions to get ready
since the one they were awaiting was there already. And then he shot at Rafael.
(2) As Rafael was being brought to Demetrio's house, Sulpicio ordered his
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companions to burn his house so they would have an excuse already. (3) With
the other appellants, he pursued the wounded Rafael to Demetrio's house where
after they had stoned the same and thrust their bolos thru its wallings, they
ordered the women folk to leave lest they be killed also; and (4) after Serapio
had already shot at Rafael, Sulpicio still fired a third shot, finally killing Rafael.
All these still overtly show appellant's determination to end Rafael's life. The
killing, therefore, was properly qualify as murder.
However, appellant Sulpicio cannot be held liable for the killing of Casiano
Cabizares notwithstanding a conspiracy between him and Serapio Maquiling.
The conspiracy was to kill Rafael only and no one else. Nothing was said or
agreed upon about the members of Rafael's family. In fact, in executing their
plan appellants let the two women inside Demetrio's house leave unhurt and
they did no harm to the remaining companions of Rafael in the house. Their
target was solely Rafael Cabizares. And the rule has always been that co-
conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiracy. For other
acts done outside the contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not the
necessary and logical consequence of the intended crime, only the actual
perpetrators are liable.52 Here, only Serapio killed Casiano Cabizares. The latter
not even going to the aid of his father Rafael but was fleeing away when shot.
Although Serapio got the carbine from Sulpicio, the latter cannot be considered
a principal by indispensable cooperation or an accomplice. There is no evidence
at all that Sulpicio was aware Serapio would use the rifle to kill Casiano.
Presumably, he gave the carbine to Serapio for him to shoot Rafael only as per
their agreement. Neither is there concrete proof that Sulpicio abetted the
shooting of Casiano. Sulpicio might have been liable if after the shooting of
Rafael, Serapio returned the carbine to him but upon seeing Casiano fleeing,
immediately asked again for the carbine and Sulpicio voluntarily gave it to him.
Serapio's criminal intention then would be reasonably apparent to Sulpicio and
the latter's giving back of the rifle would constitute his assent thereto. But such
was not the case. Sulpicio, therefore, must be acquitted for the killing of
Casiano Cabizares.
Appellants Godofredo Rotor, Antonio Bautista, Severino Matchoca and
Teodoro Libumfacil all put up alibi as their defense. This the trial court rejected
but it held them liable as accomplices only, finding reasonable doubt on their
guilt as co-principals. Appellants would again advance their respective alibis
here.
Appellant Rotor claims that at dawn on February 3, 1957, he went alone to the
spring in Barrio Cebuano to fetch water and after staying awhile there, started
back home. On the way back, his mother met him and told him not to go home
because of an incident (the killing of the decedents) so he went instead to
Simeon Navajas' house and stayed there until February 18, 1958.
The prosecution, however, proved that in the early morning of February 3,
1958, Rotor was with Maximo Caña fetching water in the spring. On their way
home, they met appellants Bautista and Matchoca. The latter gave Rotor a
carbine magazine with bullets, saying: "Here is the magazine of the bullets and
give it to Sulpicio de la Cerna." And appellant Bautista said: "Please hurry. Give
it to Sulpicio de la Cerna because we will follow later on." Shortly afterwards,
Caña went with him to Sulpicio's house where he gave the magazine to Sulpicio,
saying: "Here are some bullets supposed to be given to you."53
Rotor was seen outside — downstairs of — Sulpicio's house later that morning
by Margarito and Gumercindo Cabizares. After Sulpicio had fired at Rafael,
Rotor got the pistol from appellant Libumfacil and fired also at Rafael.54 This
appellant was also seen by Romualdo, Ursula and Segundino Cabizares as
among those who arrived at Demetrio's house.55 When Ursula Cabizares
alighted from the house, she saw Rotor outside holding a pistol which he gave
to Libumfacil commenting that it was stuck.56 After the killing of the
decedents, Romualdo Cabizares saw him with the group following the cadaver
of Casiano Cabizares which was being brought near Sulpicio's burned house.57
In the face of the overwhelming positive identification of six prosecution
witnesses, Rotors uncorroborated alibi must fail. Although he was not present
or did not participate in the meeting of February 2, 1968, his presence in the
situs of the shootings on February 3, 1958 was not merely passive. His active
participation — shooting at Rafael and carrying a pistol — which has a direct
connection with the criminal design against Rafael Cabizares makes him a
principal by indirect conspiracy, not an accomplice only. Motive is not wanting.
Rotor admitted that his wife is the sister of Sulpicio's wife58 and the evidence
shows that his father had a land dispute with Rafael Cabizares and was a
respondent in the case before the Agrarian Court.59
Appellant Bautista claims that on February 2, 1958, he left Barrio Cebuano for
Tupi (5 kms. away) to get a truck to load his corn. That afternoon, he returned
to Cebuano where they loaded corn but he could not return to Tupi as the truck
would not start, so he slept at home. Early the next day, February 3, 1958, they
pushed the truck to start it. Later, appellant Matchoca arrived and helped them.
He also rode in the truck but upon reaching an uphill road, it stopped again.
They were able to recharge its batteries from a tractor that happened to pass by.
They continued the trip and finally arrived in the poblacion of Tupi at about
8:00 A.M. Several months later, while he was at Sergio Rotor's house, his child
told him that a P.C. soldier was waiting at home, so instead of going home, he
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had a conference with Andres Abapo, Ramon Alquizar, Roberto Matchoca (son
of Severino) and Agapito Avellana. They all decided to proceed to Tupi and
surrender to the Mayor.
Appellant Matchoca related the same incident told by Bautista regarding the trip
to Tupi. He then claimed to have returned to Barrio Cebuano about noontime
and there learned of the incident. The next day, he evacuated his family to avoid
trouble.
The prosecution, however, has established that these two appellants were in the
meeting held in Abapo's house on February 2, 1958. They openly participated
therein. Their meeting with appellant Rotor early the following morning has
also been established thru the testimony of Maximo Caña.
These two were also seen outside Sulpicio's house. Bautista was carrying a bolo
and a cane and was heard shouting at Rafael thus: "Rafael, you cannot reach the
trial because we will kill you."60 Gumercindo Cabizares also heard Matchoca
shouting: "Go ahead, shoot. We will kill him so that he will not reach the day of
the hearing."61
Bautista and Matchoca were among those who went to Demetrio's house.62
The former thrust his bolo thru the bamboo wallings hitting Segundino
Cabizares.63 When Ursula Cabizares came down from the house, she saw
Bautista holding a bolo.64 Romualdo, on the other hand, claimed having seen
him holding a firearm.65 After the killings had taken place, Bautista went with
the group that proceeded back to Sulpicio's burned house whereas Matchoca
marched with the other group headed for Rafael's house.66
The positive identification of the several prosecution witnesses must prevail
over the alibis proferred by these appellants. Their presence and active
participation in the meeting in Abapo's house make them actual conspirators in
the killing of Rafael. They were also present and zealously participating in the
execution of their criminal design, giving a carbine magazine and instructions to
appellant Rotor, threatening Rafael and giving encouragement to Sulpicio to
shoot at the latter. They were among those who laid siege to Demetrio's house
and left together with the others after finally accomplishing their criminal deeds
as agreed upon. Appellants Bautista and Matchoca are therefore also liable as
co-principals in Rafael's murder. Regarding motive, it was proved that both
were among those involved in the land conflict with Rafael Cabizares and were
among the respondents in the case before the Agrarian Court.
Appellant Libumfacil's story is that in the morning of February 3, 1958 he was
in the Menzi Area about 6 kilometers from Barrio Cebuano. That afternoon, he
returned to the poblacion of Tupi. To corroborate him, Lauro Esconde stated
that he saw Libumfacil that day working on the latter's farm lot in the Menzi
area.
However, Maximo Caña saw appellant Libumfacil outside Sulpicio's house
when the former arrived there with appellant Rotor in the morning of February
3, 1958. Libumfacil had a pistol which he also fired at Rafael.67 Gumercindo
Cabizares also saw him holding a pistol which he gave to Rotor who then took a
shot at Rafael.68
Appellant Libumfacil was seen by Caña again among those who went with the
other accused downhill from Sulpicio's house to Demetrio's house.69 The other
prosecution witnesses saw him also around Demetrio's house, armed with a
pistol.70 He was among those who stoned the house.71 When Ursula Cabizares
alighted therefrom, she saw appellant Libumfacil outside, conversing with Rotor
and receiving from the latter a pistol which had gotten stuck. After the incidents
in Demetrio's house, Libumfacil went with appellants Rotor and Bautista to
Sulpicio's burned house.72
Libumfacil's alibi, though corroborated, cannot overcome the positive
identification of the eight prosecution witnesses who saw him. Although he was
not present in Abapo's house on February 2, 1958, he was present at Sulpicio's
house and in the premises of Demetrio's house with the other accused and
appellants. He was armed, had fired at Rafael also, and took part in the stoning
of Demetrio's house where Rafael was brought. His actuations manifest that he
was aware of the criminal design of the original conspirators that he approved
of it and carried it out, thus showing that his presence at the scene of the crime
was not merely passive. Consequently, he is a co-principal in Rafael's murder.
And motive is not wanting. It was established that his mother had a land
conflict with Rafael73 and that his step-father Diosdado Esperanza was one of
the respondents in the case before the Agrarian Court.
We find therefore all five appellants guilty as co-principals in the murder of
Rafael Cabizares.
The aggravating circumstance of treachery, applicable against appellant Sulpicio
de la Cerna only, is offset by his voluntary surrender after the incident. This
mitigating circumstance however can not benefit the remaining appellants who
did not voluntarily surrender. For all the appellants, therefore, the penalty for
Rafael Cabizares' murder must be imposed in the medium period. For the
killing of Casiano Cabizares, appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna must be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified as follows:
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(a) Appellants Sulpicio de la Cerna, Godofredo Rotor, Antonio Bautista,
Severino Matchoca and Teodoro Libumfacil are hereby found guilty as
principals for the murder of Rafael Cabizares and sentenced to each suffer
reclusion perpetua, to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Rafael
Cabizares the sum of P6,000.00 and to pay the costs;
(b) Appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna is hereby acquitted for the murder of
Casiano Cabizares.
So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur
ACCOMPLICES
ARTICLE 18 OR RPC
Accomplices. — Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in Art.
17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
PEOPLE VS NIERRA
PER CURIAM:
Felicisimo Doblen, Vicente Rojas and the spouses Pagano Nierra and
Gaudencia Nierra appealed from the decision dated March 4, 1970 of Judge
Pedro Samson C. Animas of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato,
General Santos City Branch II, convicting them of murder, sentencing each of
them to death and ordering them to pay solidarity an indemnity of twelve
thousand pesos to the heirs of the victim Juliana Nierra (Criminal Case No.
2081).
Gaspar Misa, who pleaded guilty to the murder charge, was also sentenced to
death and ordered to pay a similar indemnity (Decision of August 25, 1969, pp.
36-8, Record). His death sentence is under automatic review.
According to the evidence of the prosecution, Juliana Gadugdug-Nierra, 52, and
Pagano Nierra, 39, her brother-inlaw, were competitors in the businesses of
launch transportation and the sale of soft drinks in Barrio Tinago, General
Santos City. Juliana sold coca-cola while Pagano sold pepsi-cola. Juliana was the
owner of two motor launches, Elsa I and II, while Paciano was the owner of
two launches, Sylvania I and II. Juliana was the wife of Aniceto Nierra,
Paciano's elder brother. To mollify Pagano, by diminishing the competition
between their launches, Aniceto sold Elsa II. Nonetheless, Aniceto and Paciano
were not on speaking terms.
In order to monopolize those businesses in the locality, Paciano Nierra
conceived the Idea of liquidating his competitor, Juliana. For that purpose,
Felicisimo Doblen, a cousin-in-law of Paciano, accompanied to Paciano's house
in the afternoon of July 4, 1969 Gaspar Misa, 29, a convicted murderer who in
1965 had escaped from the Davao Penal Colony (Exh. E-4 and E-5, pp. 10-11,
Folder of Exhibits). Misa came to Barrio Tinago in June, 1969. He resided with
his cousin, Silvestre Misa. (See Pareja vs. Gomez and People, 115 Phil. 820.)
Upstairs in the bedroom of Paciano's house, Misa, in the presence of Gaudencia
Garrido-Nierra, the wife of Paciano, agreed to kill Juliana in consideration of
three thousand pesos. Paciano promised that in the morning after the killing he
would pay Misa four hundred pesos near the municipal hall of Tupi, South
Cotabato which is about forty kilometers away from General Santos City. The
balance would be paid in the same place on August 12, 1969.
That arrangement was confirmed by Gaudencia. When Misa scheduled the
assassination on July 8, 1969, Pagano said that it was up to Misa since he was
the one who would kill Juliana.
In the evening of July 6, 1969, Doblen, in behalf of Pagano Nierra, delivered to
Misa at the beach a package containing a caliber .38 pistol with five bullets. Misa
contacted his friend, Vicente Rojas, and apprised him that he (Misa) had been
hired to kill Juliana. Misa asked Rojas to act as lookout on the night of July 8,
1969 when the killing would be perpetrated.
On that night, Rojas posted himself at the Bernadette store near the creek or
canal about twenty-seven steps from the scene of the crime. Gaudencia was
stationed near the house of Maning Desinorio about eighteen steps from the
scene of the crime. Pagano was near the house of Juanito Desinorio about
twenty-seven steps from the scene of the crime. The houses of the two
Desinorios were separated from the house of Juliana Nierra by an alley.
Misa secluded himself near a warehouse about five steps from the scene of the
crime in close proximity to the back of Juliana's house where. as he had
previously observed some nights before, she used to answer the call of nature.
The house was at the back of the Esso Gas Station near the beach of Sarangani
Bay at Barrio Tinago, General Santos City.
Between seven and eight o'clock that night, the unwary Juliana went to the
beach where she was accustomed to void and when she squatted, Misa
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unexpectedly appeared behind her, held her hair, thus tilting her face, and while
in that posture, he inserted into her mouth the muzzle of the pistol and fired it.
Paciano and Gaudencia, who were near the beach, witnessed the actual killing.
The postmortem examination disclosed that Juliana sustained a gunshot wound
in the tongue. The bullet passed through the buccal cavity down to the spinal
column where the slug was extracted.
Aniceto Nierra, on hearing the gunshot and the ensuing commotion, went
down from the house and saw his prostrate wife with blood oozing from her
mouth and nose. Her panty was pulled down, her dress was raised up to her
waist, and her genital organ was exposed. At the hospital, the doctor
pronounced her dead.
After firing the gun, Misa walked slowly on the beach in front of Paciano and
Gaudencia, passed by the alley between the houses of Tony Desinorio and
Francisco Desinorio, emerged at the back of the Esso Gas Station crossed the
creek or canal on the west, reached the Lagao road, threw the gun into the
dense talahib grass and rode on a bus. He proceeded to the Saint Elizabeth
Hospital. Then, he changed his mind and returned to the beach near the
victim's house.
The Nierra spouses left the scene of the crime by passing through the alley
between the house of the victim and the Desinorio houses, which alley
separated the building of the Northern Lines and the Matutum Hotel from the
Esso Gas Station, and emerged on A. Morrow Boulevard which intersects
Saguing Street where Paciano and Gaudencia resided. Their residence was about
two hundred meters away from the scene of the crime.
A witness, residing at Morrow Boulevard, who happened to be at the Villa Bus
Terminal at around eight-thirty in the evening of July 8, 1969, when the killing
was perpetrated, testified that she saw Pagano Nierra wearing an underwear and
striped T-short running from Saguing Street to Barrio Tinago. About five
minutes later, she saw Pagano the boulevard and running towards Saguing
Street. He was wearing long pants. The witness made a statement to the police
about what she had seen.
Early in the morning of the next day, Misa took a bus bound for Tupi and
alighted near the municipal building. Paciano Nierra arrived in that place and
gave him four hundred pesos. Misa returned to General Santos City, gave fifty
pesos to Rojas, and proceeded to the victim's house where he mingled with the
persons playing cards and domino. He kept vigil there, staying there for four
nights.
He resumed his old job of looking for passengers for the , buses and the
pumpboat of Rojas. He received a commission of one peso per passenger.
Policemen arrested him and Rojas as for questioning but they were later
released. He left the city and brought his family to Barrio Luan, Maitum South
Cotabato. There, he was arrested again, this time by Constabulary soldiers.
On August 7, 1969, Misa was interrogated by Patrolman A.B. Vencer Jr. of the
city police department. He signed a confession admitting the killing of Juliana
Nierra and implicating the other accused therein. The statement was sworn to
before the fiscal. Two days later, he reenacted the killing. Photographs were
taken of the reenactment. A sketch of the scene of the crime was prepared.
On August 11, 1969, Misa testified at the preliminary in-vestigation. In his
testimony, he admitted again the killing and confirmed his confession
implicating Paciano Nierra, his wife Gaudencia, Doblen and Rojas. He executed
another confession on August 12, 1969 which was sworn to before the city
judge.
Thirty-seven days after the killing or on August 14, 1969, Misa, Doblen, Rojas
and the Nierra spouses, as co-conspirators, were charged with murder
aggravated by reward, treachery, evident premeditation, nocturnity, ignominy
and abuse of superiority and, as to Misa, recidivism, since he had been
sentenced to reclusion perpetua for the murder of Antonio Abad Tormis in
Cebu City.
As already stated, Misa pleaded guilty. At the trial of his co accused, his
confessions and testimony were offered by the prosecution and were the main
bases of the judgment of conviction and the imposition of the death penalty.
As separate briefs were filed for the defendants, their individual cases will be
separately reviewed.
Misa's case. — His counsel de oficio contends that Misa made an improvident
plea because the trial court allegedly failed to explain thoroughly to him the
gravity of the offense and the consequences of his plea of guilty.
That contention is not well-taken. Misa, as an escaped prisoner, had acquired
some experience in criminal procedure. Not only that. He executed two
extrajudicial confessions. He reenacted the crime as the triggerman He testified
at the preliminary investigation, and, after he was sentenced to death, he was the
prosecution star witness during the trial of his co-accused. His testimony against
his co-accused, delineating their roles in the commission of the killing, which he
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had perpetrated, fortified his plea of guilty and removed any scintilla of doubt as
to his culpability and as to his understanding of the consequences of his mea
culpa (See People vs. Duaban, L-31912, August 24, 1979).
Under the circumstances, we cannot grant counsel de oficio's prayer that the
judgment of conviction be set aside and that the case be remanded to the lower
court for new trial To hold a new trial. wherein Misa himself would again be the
star prosecution witness, would be a repetitious and preposterous ceremony.
The case of the Nierra spouses. — They denied any complicity in the killing of
Juliana Nierra. Their version is that in the evening of July 8, 1969, at about eight
o'clock in the evening, Paciano Nierra was inside a room of his house.
Gaudencia Nierras was in her room, writing something. Eduardo Nierra, the
couple's son, was alone in the sala while Encarnacion Sabihon a housemaid, was
somewhere in the house premises.
Paciano heard somebody coming up the house. When he came out of the room,
he met Nolasco Docallos who said that Juliana Nierra was shot. Paciano Nierra
asked who shot her. Docallos answered that he did not know.
Docallos asked Paciano for permission to use the latter's motorcycle in going to
the hospital. Paciano instructed his son Eduardo to render assistance. Paciano
could not go out because two years before he had undergone a surgical
operation in Cebu City. Gaudencia could not leave the children alone in the
house. Eduardo phoned from the funeral parlor that Juliana was already dead.
At about five-thirty in the morning of the following day, Gaudencia went to the
funeral parlor. She talked with Rodelio, the son of Juliana. Aniceto Nierra, her
brother-in-law and husband of the victim, did not answer when she tried to talk
with him.
Paciano woke up at six o'clock that morning. He and his wife and their Muslim
friend Pandita E. Saguil and Fernando Erro, the uncle of Paciano, boarded a
bus and went to Tupi ostensibly to buy bamboos for the outrigger of a vinta, a
trip which the Nierra spouses had previously agreed upon with Saguil. They
arrived in Tupi at past ten o'clock. They were not able to buy bamboos. They
ate lunch at the Fernandez Restaurant.
The group returned to General Santos City, arriving there at two o'clock in the
afternoon. They went to the funeral parlor. They were not able to talk with
Aniceto Nierra. In the evening of that day, Gaudencia led the prayers for the
repose of the soul of Juliana and she performed that task on the second, third
and fourth nights. She did not lead the prayers on the succeeding nights because
she was advised that it was bad for her to do so. Their child attended the
novena Paciano could not attend the novena because he had kidney trouble.
They gave one hundred pesos to Juliana's family as contribution to the funeral
expenses.
The Nierra spouses attended the funeral. During the burial, Aniceto lost
consciousness and collapsed Paciano revived him by pressing his abdomen.
After the coffin was placed in the tomb, Paciano closed the niche. The Nierra
spouses gave to Aniceto an additional two hundred pesos (Pars. 5-6 and 9-15,
pp. 6-11, Appellants' Brief).
Appellants Nierra contend that Misa was not a credible witness because he was
a recidivist and his testimony is riddled with inconsistencies. That contention is
devoid of merit.
Misa testified against his own penal interest. The basic point in his confessions
and testimony was that he was hired by the Nierra spouses, through Doblen to
kill Juliana for the price of three thousand pesos. That is sufficient for the
conviction of the Nierra spouses as the inducers of the assassination of Juliana.
The discrepancies in his testimony refer to minor details.
And the fact that the Nierra spouses did not comply with their contractual
commitment to pay Misa the balance of two thousand six hundred pesos must
have impelled him to unmask them and to reveal the truth even if such a
revelation speeled his own destruction.
The contention that there was no proof of conspiracy among the accused is
belied by the facts shown in the record. Misa had no personal motive for killing
Juliana Nierra. He was induced to do so because of the monetary consideration
promised by the Nierra spouses. Doblen (Simoy), married to Paciano's cousin,
introduced Misa to the Nierra spouses. Before Juliana's assassination,
Gaudencia had contracted Misa to kill Nene Amador, her former housemaid,
who was allegedly Paciano's mistress. That projected killing did not materialize.
Appellants Nierra contend that Misa's testimony as to the alleged conspiracy is
inadmissible in view of the rule that "the act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence
against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration" (Sec. 27, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
It is argued that before Misa's testimony could be admitted as evidence against
appellants Nierra, the alleged conspiracy must first be proven by evidence other
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than such testimony and that there is no such independent evidence. This
argument is wrong. It is not supported by action 27 of Rule 130
Section 27 "applies only to extrajudicial acts or declarations but not to
testimony given on the stand at the trial where the defendant has the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant" (People vs. Serrano, 105 Phil. 531,
541).
Appellants Nierra contend that the trial court erred in finding that the motive
for the killing was to stifle business competition. This argument is refuted by
the testimonies of Aniceto Nierra and his son Rodelio which show that Paciano
Nierra was antagonistic to his sister-in-law, Juliana, the manager or "brains" of
Aniceto's transportation and coca-cola distribution businesses.
In 1967, Paciano attempted to destroy Aniceto's launch, Elsa II, while it was
under construction. Aniceto had to sell that launch because of Paciano's threat
that somebody would be hurt if its operation was continued. Pagano told
Rodelio that the latter's mother, Juliana, who was pockmarked was bad and
dominated her husband Aniceto. On two occasions, Paciano even challenged
his brother to a fight.
Another contention of the appellants is that the trial court convicted them on
the basis of the hearsay testimonies of Guillermo Sanchez and Jose Samoya.
This argument is misleading. The judgment of conviction was anchored
principally on the confessions and testimony of Misa, the tool used by the
Nierra spouses in encompassing Juliana's death. Misa's evidence cannot be
regarded as hearsay.
The testimonies of Sanchez and Samoya merely proved that Misa, Rojas and
Doblen were implicated in the killing of Juliana Nierra. It was the affidavit of
Sanchez, linking Misa to the killing, that gave the police a breakthrough in the
solution of the case. After the connection of Misa with the crime was
established, the police arrested him and obtained his confessions which
implicated appellants Nierra as the investigators.
The Nierras in their fifth assignment of error contend that the trial court erred
in admitting as evidence the affidavit of appellant Vicente Rojas (Exh. J) which
was obtained through an alleged promise of immunity. The record is not clear
as to that promise of immunity. Rojas' statement was taken on August 1, 1969.
On August 12, he testified at the pre investigation. The record of his testimony
before the fiscal was signed by him. He was assisted by counsel at that pre
investigation. (Exh. K et seq.) No promise of immunity was shown to have
been made by the fiscal to Rojas.
In any event, his affidavit is a minor piece of evidence and is cumulative in
character. As already stated, the crucial and decisive evidence consists of Misa's
testimony and confessions.
Appellants Nierra complain that lawyer Cornelio Falgui acted acted the
preliminary investigation as counsel of appellant Doblen, having been allegedly
hired by the offended party, Aniceto Nierra, and then at the trial, he acted as
counsel de oficio of Misa who pleaded guilty. He also appeared for Doblen (6
and 19 tsn).
The alleged double role of Falgui cannot be regarded as having unduly
prejudiced appellants Nierra who, as already noted, were convicted on the basis
of Misa's confessions and testimony. The appellants have not successfully
overthrown or rebutted Misa's evidence.
It was Doblen who acted as a double agent. He was a tool of Paciano Nierra
and at the same time he posed as a friend on Aniceto Nierra by pretending that
he had no hand in the assassination of Aniceto's wife.
We are convinced that the guilt of appellants Nierra was proven beyond
reasonable doubt. On the night of the shooting, Paciano Nierra and Gaudencia
Nierra did not go to the funeral parlor to view the remains of Juliana.
After Paciano and Gaudencia were charged with murder, there was a
confrontation between the said spouses and Aniceto Nierra in the house of
their brother, Alonso, in the presence of their other brother, Gerundio. The
following dialogue took place between Paciano and Aniceto:
Paciano: Noy, why did you suspect us to be the killers of your wife?
Aniceto: Will you still deny when Gaspar Misa pointed to you that you were
standing by the post and Paciano (Gaudencia) was also standing in a
another post when he (Misa) killed my wife. From now on I have no
brother by the name of Pacing.
Paciano did not comment on his brother's accusation.
Moreover, Misa wrote the following note to Paciano when they were confined
in the city jail (translation):
My companion Pacing (Paciano):
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I am directly telling you and you could be sure that I will do my best that you
will be free. Before the trial of (in) court, I would like that you give me the sum
of P600 even if you give the cash advance of P 500 before Sunday. OK and you
give the same thru the hole.
Your companion,
(Sgd.) Gaspar Misa
Believe me that I will free you and burn this immediately. (Exit 1)
The above note clearly proves that Misa and Paciano were co- conspirators. The
Nierras were co-principals by inducement. By acting as lookouts during the
perpetration of the killing, they became co-principals by cooperation as well.
Appeal of Doblen and Rojas. — Doblen's alibi was that on the night of the
killing, he was stranded at Margos, Glan, South Cotabato. He returned to
General Santos City at ten o'clock in the morning of the following day. He
denied that he accompanied Misa to the house of Paciano Nierra on July 4,
1969 and that he delivered to Misa the package containing the murder weapon.
Rojas' alibi was that on the night of the killing he slept in his pumpboat at
Lion's Beach, General Santos City. However, that could not have precluded him
from having acted as lookout on that same beach.
These appellants, like the Nierra spouses, contend that Misa's confessions and
testimony have no probative value because there was no other evidence proving
the alleged conspiracy. As already stated, that rule does not apply to testimony
given on the witness stand where the defendants have the opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant (People vs. Dacanay, 92 Phil. 872).
It is contended that Doblen was not a co-conspirator because he was not
present when Misa and the Nierra spouses discussed the liquidation of Juliana
Nierra and that when Doblen delivered the package to Misa, he (Doblen) did
not know that it contained the murder weapon. As to Rojas, it is contended that
he was not present at the said conference between Misa and the Nierra spouses.
These contentions are not well-taken. The activities of Doblen and Rojas
indubitably show that they had community of design with the Nierra spouses
and Misa in the assassination of Juliana Nierra.
Like appellants Nierra, Rojas' counsel de oficio contends that the trial court
erred in admitting the affidavit of Rojas (Exh. J) because it was obtained under
an alleged promise of immunity.
It should be noted that Rojas' affidavit does not contain anything connecting
him to the murder. In that affidavit, he denied that he had any participation in
the commission of the crime and that he conspired with Misa. So, the admission
in evidence of that affidavit did not prejudice him at all.
The killing was correctly characterized by the trial court as murder qualified by
treachery and aggravated by premeditation and price or reward. As to the
Nierras, relationship is an additional aggravating circumstance.
Treachery absorbed nocturnity and abuse of superiority. The manner in which
Misa liquidated Juliana Nierra added shame, disgrace or obloquy to the material
injury caused by the crime. Hence, ignominy is aggravating (U.S. vs. Abaigar 2
Phil. 417).
In Misa's case, recidivism as an aggravating circumstance offset his plea of
guilty. That did not preclude the imposition of the death penalty upon him.
Considering the aggravating circumstances, the death penalty imposed on the
Nierra spouses is in accordance- with law. However, for lack of the requisite ten
votes, the death penalty imposed on Gaudencia Nierra should be commuted to
reclusion perpetua.
Doblen's role was that of having introduced Misa to the Nierra spouses and
delivering the murder weapon to Misa. He was not present at the scene of the
crime. On the other hand, Rojas acted as lookout and received fifty pesos for
his work.
After a conscientious reflection on the complicity of Doblen and Rojas, we have
reached the conclusion that they should be held guilty as accomplices. It is true,
strictly speaking, that as co-conspirators they should be punished as co-
principals. However, since their participation was not absolutely indispensable
to the consummation of the murder, the rule that the court should favor the
milder form of liability may be applied to them (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38
and other cases).
In some exceptional situations, having community of design with the principal
does not prevent a malefactor from being regarded as an accomplice if his role
in the perpetration of the homicide or murder was, relatively speaking, of a
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minor character (See People vs. Ubiña, 97 Phil. 515; U.S. vs. Doming 1st, 37
Phil. 446; People vs. Daligdig, 89 Phil. 598; People vs. Largo, 99 Phil. 1061).
WHEREFORE, (1) the lower court's judgment is affirmed with respect to
Gaspar Misa and Paciano Nierra.
(2) The death sentence imposed on Gaudencia Nierra is communited to
reclusion perpetua. The civil liability imposed upon her by the trial court is
affirmed.
(3) Appellants Felicisimo Doblen and Vicente Rojas are convicted as
accomplices. They are each sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten years
of prision mayor medium as minimum to seventeen years of reclusion temporal
medium as maximum and to pay solidarily with the principals an indemnity of
six thousand pesos (as their quota) to the heirs of Juliana Nierra. They are each
subsidiarily liable to the extent of six thousand pesos for the principals' civil
liability. Costs against the accused.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion,
Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., took no part.
PEOLE VS DOBLE
DE CASTRO, J.:
This case refers to a bank robbery committed in band, with multiple homicide,
multiple frustrated homicide and assault upon agents of persons in authority, on
June 14, 1966, in Navotas, Rizal. Only five of ten accused were brought to trial,
the other five named only as "John Does" in the information having remained
at large. Two of the five accused who stood trial, Mateo Raga and Celso Aquino
were acquitted, while the trial court, the Court of first Instance of Rizal,
imposed the death penalty on the appellants herein, Cresencio Doble, Simeon
Doble and Antonio Romaquin The decision of the trial court is now before Us
for review for having imposed the death penalty.
Both the de • ficio counsel for appellants and the then Solicitor General, Hon.
Felix Q. Antonio, a retired Justice of this Court, agree that as so narrated in the
appealed decision, and as quoted in appellants' brief, the relevant and material
facts accurately reflect the evidence presented, except only as to the fact that
there were eight malefactors, with respect to which appellants are not in full
conformity (p. 2, Appellants' Brief).
As stated in the decision under review, the crime was committed as follows:
Late in the night of June 13, 1966, ten (10) men, almost all of them heavily
armed with pistols, carbines and Thompsons, left the shores of Manila in a
motor banca and proceeded to Navotas, Rizal. "Their mission: to rob the
Navotas Branch of the Prudential Bank and Trust Company. Once in Navotas
and taking advantage of the darkness of the night, eight (8) men disembarked
from the banca and proceeded to the beach in the direction of the branch bank.
Within a few minutes, shots were heard throwing the people around in panic.
As confusion reigned, the people ran in different directions scampering for
safety. As time went on, the shots grew in intensity. As the commotion died
down, the eight men returned to their banca, still fully armed and some of them
carrying what looked like "bayongs". "They boarded the waiting motor banca
and sped away. As a result of the shooting, many people got killed and some
injured. Among those who were killed were agents of the law, like Sgt.
Alejandro Alcala of the Philippine Constabulary, Sgt. Eugenio Aguilos and Cpl.
Teofilo Evangelista of the Navotas Police Department. Dominador Estrella, a
market collector, was also killed. 'Those who were injured were Pat. Armando
Ocampo, Exequiel Manalus Jose Fabian, Rosalina Fuerten and Pedro de la
Cruz.
The Prudential Bank and Trust Company branch office located at the North
hay Boulevard, Navotas, Rizal, the object of the bloody mission, has an unusual
banking hours. It opens at midnight and closes at 8:00 in the morning. The
bank has ten employees, more or less, including a security guard. It has two
cages or compartments for tellers. One cage was under the care of Melvin
Domingo and the other one under the care of Alejandro San Juan. At around
12:30 a.m. of June 14, 1966, Cesar Reyes, assistant cashier of the bank, was near
the cage of Domingo when two men entered the bank asking that their money
be changed. Domingo refused, saying that they had no small denominations.
Suddenly, three men armed with long guns barged in and fired at the ceiling and
the wall of the bank. They ordered the employees to lie down, face downward
and then demanded the key to the vault. When Reyes answered that they do not
have the key, the armed men aimed their guns at the vault and fired upon it
until its doors were opened. They entered the vault and found that they could
not get anything as the compartments inside the said vault were locked. Not
being able to get anything from the vault, the armed men went to the two teller
cages and took whatever they could lay their hands on. Not long afterwards, the
men left, carrying with them the sum of P10,439.95.
Just beside the bank was a police outpost. On the night in question, Pat. Nicolas
Antonio was in the outpost, together with Sgt. Aguilos, Pats. Pangan, Burgos,
Rosal Ocampo and Cpl. Evangelists. were on duty watching the fish landing.
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Suddenly, Antonio said, at around 1:30 a.m., he heard a burst which he believed
came from a Thompson. He said he saw a man pointing a Thompson upwards
while he was in front of the banca Afterwards, Antonio said, he heard another
burst coming from the same direction. Antonio and his companions then went
to the middle of the road and again they heard shots, and this time they were
successive, coming from their left. Antonio could not see who was firing the
shots. Suddenly, he said, he saw one of this companions Cpl. Evangelista topple
down. He saw also Dominador Estrella sitting down folding his stomach. They
were both felled by the shots coming from the left side of the bank. Antonio
told Ocampo to go beside the outpost and held Sgt. Aguilos by the arm. Sgt.
Aguilos, however, collapsed and fell down. He was hit. Later on, Antonio said,
he went to the outpost and told Pat. Ocampo to go too. He said that from the
outpost he heard some more shots. Then he saw Ocampo hit in the thigh. After
the firing ceased, Antonio saw his wounded companions placed in a vehicle,
together with Evangelista and Aguilos who were already dead. Later on, he said
he saw Sgt. Alcala, a member of the PC, lying prostrate in the ground already
dead. (pp. 83-85, Rollo).
It is noteworthy that from the above narration as to how the robbery and the
killing that followed in its wake were actually committed, the three appellants
had no participation. It is not surprising that the Solicitor General has
recommended the acquittal of one of the appellants, Simeon Doble. With this
recommendation, it might be well to take up the case of this appellant ahead of
the other two, appellants Antonio Romaquin and Cresencio Doble.
In recommending Simeon Doble's acquittal, the Solicitor General made the
following observation:
As to appellant Simeon, the evidence shows only that the malefactors met in his
house to discuss the plan to rob the Prudential Bank This circumstance,
standing alone, does not conclude his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The facts
do not show that he performed any act tending to the perpetration of the
robbery, nor that he took a direct part therein or induced other persons to
commit, or that he cooperated in its consummation by some act without which
it would not have been committed. It could be that Simeon was present at the
meeting held in his house and entered no opposition to the nefarious scheme
but, aside from this, he did not cooperate in the commission of the robbery
perpetrated by the others. At most, his act amounted to joining in a conspiracy
which is not punishable. Mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval of the act,
without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one
a party to a conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose
(15 CJS 1062).
We are, therefore, unable to agree with the finding of the lower court that
Simeon was a principal both by agreement and encouragement, despite his non-
participation in the commission of the crime. Nor was it clearly proved that
Simeon received a part of the looted money as to make him an accessory.
Romaquin's testimony that the day after the robbery he gave P2.00 to Simeon
who had asked for cigarettes (p. 5, t.s.n., May 25, 1967) could hardly be
considered as the latter's share of the loot. It is significant that in his statement
he claimed he had not yet received his share. (pp. 10-11, Appellee's Brief; p.
146, Rollo).
A review of the evidence of record shows the foregoing observation of the
Solicitor General to be with convincing rationality it is only that portion in
which is cited Simeon's statement made before the Navotas Police Department
(Exh. I pp. 28-29, Folder of Exhibits) that "he has not yet received his share"
that detracts from the solidity of the Solicitor General's recommendation, for it
gives the impression that Simeon had given material or moral support or
encouragement to the malefactors (referring to those still at large as the
principal culprits) as to entitle him to a share in the loot. However, a reading of
his whole extra-judicial statement would erase that impression, and reveals the
true import of that statement as intended only to show that Simeon had nothing
to do with commission of the crime and therefore did not receive any share of
the fruits thereof. Thus, to quote pertinent portions Of his statement. on
custodial investigation:
3. T — Ano ang dahilan at ikaw ay naririto?
S — Dahil po sa aking pagkakasangkot sa holdapan dito sa isang Bangko sa
Navotas, Rizal at ako ay hinuli ng mga tauhan ng M. P. D.
4. T — Kailan ka hinuli?
S — Noon pong Miyerkules ng madaling araw, hindi ko alam ang petsa pero
nito pong buwan na ito.
5. T — Mayroon ka bang nalalaman tungkol sa pagkakaholdap ng isang
bangko dito sa Navotas?
S — Ang nalalaman ko po ay doon nagpulong sa aming bahay ang mga taong
nangholdap dito sa Navotas.
6. T — Sino-sino o ilang tao ang mga nagpulong sa inyong bahay?
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S — Pirmero po ay walo (8), pagkatapos ay may dumating na dalawa pa at ang
mga kilala ko lamang po ay sina Tony na may an ng bangka, si Joe Rondina
Cresencio Doble at narinig kong may tinawag pang Erning. lyon pong iba ay
hindi ko alam ang pangalan pero makikilala ko Pag aking nakitang muli.
7. T — Gaano katagal na nagpulong sa inyong bahay ang mga taong ito?
S — Mahigit pong mga isang (1) oras pero hatinggabi na nong Lunes ng gabi
(June 13, 1966).
8. T — Ano ang mga bagay na pinagpulongan sa inyong bahay?
S — Tungkol sa kanilang lakad na pagpunta sa isang bangko sa Navotas,
9. T — Sino ang nangunguna sa pulong na iyon?
S — Iyan po (witness pointing to the picture of Rodolfo Dizon, after being
shown five (5) other pictures).
10. T — Ano-ano ang mga narinig mong pinagpulongan?
S — Tungkol po doon sa gagawing pagnanakaw sa isang Bangko sa Navotas,
Rizal.
11. T — Samantalang sila ay nagpupulong, ano ang iyong ginagawa?
S — Wala po, hindi ko sila sinasaway at hindi ako kumikibo bastat ako ay
nakikinig lamang.
12. T — Bukod sa narinig mong magnanakaw sa bangko na usapan, ano pa
ang iba mong mga narinig?
S — Sinabi nito (witness pointing to the picture of Rodolfo Dizon) at ni Jose
Rondina na "MALAKING KUARTA TO, PERO MASYADONG
MAPANGANIB, AT KAILANGAN AY HANDA TAYO."
13. T — Ano pa ang sumunod?
S — Nagbubulong-bulongan ang iba tungkol doon sa gagawing paglaban.
14. T — Ano pa ang nangyari?
S — Maya-maya po ay lumakad na sila, hindi ako sumama.
15. T — Pagkatapos?
S — Makaraan po ang mahigit na isang (1) oras ay nagbalik silang lahat.
16. T — Ano ang nangyari ng magbalik na sila?
S — Matapos po silang bumaba doon sa malapit sa aming bahay ay
nagmamadali na silang umalis dahil sa may tama ang isa sa kanila. At noon pong
umaga ng araw na iyon ay nagpunta ako kay Tony (Antonio Romaquin at
kumuha ng dalawang piso (P2.00) dahil iyong aking parte ay hindi pa naibibigay
sa akin. Pagkatapos po ay umuwi na ako sa amin.
17. T — Ano pa ang iyong masasabi kaugnay ng pangyayaring ito. Ikaw ba
ay mayroong nais na alisin o dili kaya ay baguhin sa salaysay mong ito?
S — Mayroon pa po akong ibig na sabihin.
18. T — Ano pa ang ibig mong sabihin?
S — Bago po tuluyang umalis sila sa aking bahay ay nag-usap-usap silang lahat
at ako ay sumama sa kanilang pag-uusap at nakapagbigay pa ako ng mungkahi
na ako na lamang ang maghihintay sa kanila dahil sa ako ay may pinsala sa paa at
maaaring hindi ako makatakbo at qqqmahuh lamang.
19. T — Iyan bang pinsala mo sa kaliwang paa ay matagal na?
S — Opo, may limang (5) taon na.
20. T — Samantalang nag-uusap sa loob ng bahay mo, nasaan ka?
S — Kasama po sa loob ng aking bahay.
21. T — Ano pa ang masasabi mo?
S — Wala na po.
The only link between Simeon and the crime is his house having been used as
the meeting place of the malefactors for their final conference before
proceeding to Navotas to rob the Prudential Bank branch thereat. He did not
join them because of a qqq5yeat old foot injury which would make him only a
liability, not one who can help in the devilish venture. To the malefactors he
was most unwanted to join them. If they met at his house it was only because it
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was near the landing place of the banca, and so he invited them to his house
while waiting for the banca to arrive. His mere presence in his house where the
conspirators met, and for merely telling them that he could not join them
because of his foot injury, and will just wait for them; evidently as a mere
gesture of politeness in not being able to join them in their criminal purpose,
for he could not be of any help in the attainment thereof, and also to avoid
being suspected that he was against their vicious plan for which they may harm
him, Simeon is by no means a co-conspirator, not having even taken active part
in the talks among the malefactors in his house.
Like the Solicitor General, We, therefore, find no culpable participation of
Simeon Doble in the commission of the crime, for, indeed, by his physical
condition alone, he could not in any way be of help to the malefactors in the
pursuit of their criminal design, nor could he have been desired by the latter to
be one of them.
Taking up next the case of appellants Antonio Romaquin and Cresencio Doble,
their main contention is that their extrajudicial statements upon which their
conviction was principally made to rest, are inadmissible for having been
allegedly obtained by force and intimidation, and in violation of basic
constitutional rights to counsel and against self-incrimination. In support of this
contention, appellants have only their own self-serving testimony to rely upon.
Thus, Cresencio Doble testified that while at the Navotas police department
someone he could not name boxed him on the chest, while one Sgt. Lacson hit
him on the left side with the butt of a gun causing him to lose consciousness;
that he was made to lie on a narrow table and peppery liquid was poured over
his face, his eyesight then becoming dim, and it was then that he was made to
sign a piece of paper which he could not read because of his blurred eyesight.
Romaquin gave a similar story of torture and maltreatment in order to force
him to admit culpable participation in the heist. The inquiry must, accordingly,
be whether the claim of violence and involuntariness of their statements is true
as to render said statements inadmissible in evidence.
Disputing the allegation of maltreatment in the execution of the custodial
statements (Exhibits E, F, F-1, G, H-1), the Solicitor General argues that the
same is negated by how the details as given by both appellants in their
respective statements fit into each other, at least as to the part played by each
from the time Cresencio went to Romaquin's place to procure the latter's banca
up to their get-away from the scene of the crime. Thus, while Romaquin
claimed in his statement that although he wanted to escape from the scene after
his passengers have disembarked for their evil mission, he could not do so
because Cresencio had a gun pointed at him to prevent his escape, as was the
order given Cresencio by the rest of the gang. The latter denied this allegation
when he testified that he returned the gun given him because he did not know
how to use or manipulate it, although in his extra- judicial statement (Exhibit M,
p. 35, Record of Exhibits), he stated that he accepted the gun.
The statement of Romaquin as just cited in an attempt to exculpate himself
which is generally taken as an indication of lack of undue pressure exerted on
one while giving his statement on custodial interrogation. (People vs. Palencia,
71 SCRA 679).
The Solicitor General also observed, in disputing the claim of violent
maltreatment to which appellant's were subjected to, that neither one of the
appellants presented medical certificate to attest to the injuries allegedly inflicted
(p. 3, Appellee's Brief) which disproves the claim (People vs. Tuazon, 6 SCRA
249; People vs. Dela Cruz, 88 Phil. 79). He also points to the fact that in his
extrajudicial statement (Exhibit M, p. 35, Record of Exhibits), Celso Aquino,
one of the accused, made no admission of his participation in the bold bank
robbery, and in his testimony in court, he admitted that no violence was applied
to him when he gave his statement (p. 12, t.s.n., July 12, 1967; p. 4, Appellee's
Brief). 'This is evidence enough that the appellants could not have been dealt
with differently as their co-accused Aquino who was allowed to give his
statement freely without the employment of force or intimidation upon him.
The evidence also disclosed a note (Exhibit E) of Cresencio addressed to
Romaquin asking the latter not to reveal the names of their companions. This
means that the names of the members of the band led by Joe Intsik must have
been known to both appellants. That the Identity of five of those charged in
this case has remained only as "John Does" indicate the non-employment of
any coercive means with which to force them into revealing the names of their
companions in the robbery, again negating the claim of torture and violence.
It is, likewise, to be noted that appellants Romaquin and Cresencio virtually
confirmed their extra-judicial statements when they testified in court. By all the
proofs as cited, persuasive enough to show the voluntariness of their custodial
statements plus the positive denial of Sgt. Lacson, the only one named among
the alleged torturers, that any violence was practiced by the investigators,
specifically, the alleged delivery of fist blows on Cresencio. (pp. 3, 6, 7, 18, t.s.n.,
October 27, 1967) the alleged involuntariness of the extra-judicial statements is
fully discredited.
It is hinted that the killing of suspect Rodolfo Dizon while allegedly attempting
to escape could have instilled fear in the minds of the appellants which affected
their freedom of will in giving their own statements (p. 12, Appellant's Brief).
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This is a far-fetched argument to prove involuntariness in the giving of the
statements, the killing having taken place after their interrogation. In his
supplemental statement dated July 5, 1966 Exhibits F-2, p. 20, Record of
Exhibits), Romaquin pointed to the person of Rodolfo Dizon. His death
therefore, took place long after appellants have given their main statements, all
in mid June, 1966. If counsel de oficio had only bothered to check the dates of
the main statements of both appellants which were given not later than just past
the middle of June, 1966, and that of the supplementary statement of Romaquin
which is July 5, 1966, he would not have probably come forth with this
argument.
Counsel de oficio, invoking a ruling in an American case, Miranda vs. Arizona,
16 L. Ed. 2nd. 694, harps on the inadmissibility of appellants' custodial
statements, for their having been unaided by counsel, nor informed of their
right thereto during the interrogation. 'There might be merit in this contention
were the right to counsel during custodial interrogation one of constitutional
grant as is provided in our 1973 Constitution, before which the right was given
only to an accused, not to a mere suspect during in-custody police interrogation
(Magtoto vs. Manguera 63 SCRA 4; People vs. Dumdum Jr. G. R. No. L-35279,
July 30, 1979). At the time of their custodial interrogation in 1966, however, the
requisite of assistance of counsel was not yet made a matter of constitutional
right, as it has been granted only by the new 1973 Constitution.
The right against self-incrimination, as invoked by appellants, can neither be
appreciated to impair the admissibility of their extra-judicial statements. It is the
voluntariness of an admission or confession that determines its admissibility, for
no principle of law or constitutional precept should stand on the way of
allowing voluntary admission of one's guilt, the only requisite justly demanded
being that ample safeguard be taken against involuntary confessions. Once the
element of voluntariness is convincingly established, which, incidentally, is even
presumed, the admissibility of an extra-judicial confession, admission or
statement becomes unquestionable. 1
The extra-judicial statements of appellants, however, when evaluated with the
testimony they gave in court, would convince Us that their liability is less than
that of a co-principal by conspiracy or by actual participation, as as was the
holding of the trial court. The most damaging admission made in the extra-
judicial statements of Cresencio is that he was asked by Joe Intsik, the gang
leader, at 8:00 o'clock in the evening of June 13, 1966, if he could procure a
banca for his use, and that Joe Intsik, on being asked by Cresencio, allegedly
told him that the banca would be used for robbery. Cresencio gave an
affirmative answer to Joe Intsik's query, having in mind Tony Romaquin who
had a banca. Cresencio accompanied Joe Intsik to Romaquin at 12:00 in the
evening. In Romaquin's statement (Exh. C also Exh. 1, Romaquin, p. 15,
Record of Exhibits), Cresencio allegedly asked him to bring his friends in his
banca, to board a launch for a trip to Palawan. The discrepancy between the
statements of Cresencio and Romaquin as to the intended use of the banca is at
once apparent, for while according to the former, it was for the commission of
robbery, according to the latter, it was to bring Cresencio's friends to board a
launch for a trip to Palawan. What is demonstrated thereby is the full freedom
with which both appellants were allowed to give their respective statements
while in custodial interrogation.
Cresencio's consenting to look for a banca, however, did not necessarily make
him a co-conspirator. Neither would it appear that Joe Intsik wanted to draft
Cresencio into his band of malefactors that would commit the robbery more
than just asking his help to look for a banca. Joe Intsik had enough men all with
arms and weapons to perpetrate the crime, the commission of which needed
planning and men to execute the plan with full mutual confidence of each other,
which is not shown with respect to appellants by the way they were asked to
look and provide for a banca just a few hours before the actual robbery.
Romaquin, for his part, appears not to be known to the principal malefactors
still at large, to be asked to join actively in the conspiracy. The amount received
by Romaquin who alone was given money by the malefactors in the sum of
P441.00, indicate that the latter did not consider appellant as their confederate
in the same character as those constituting the band of robbers. The sum given
to Romaquin could very well represent only the rental of his banca, and for the
cooperation he extended to the malefactors, which, by no means, is an
indispensable one. Cresencio, on the other hand, was not given any part of the
loot. It was only Romaquin who gave him P4 1.00, clearly not what should
represent his share if he were a full-fledged ally or confederate.
The apprehension of the malefactors that upon realizing the full impact of their
vicious misdeeds, Romaquin might speed away from the scene in fear of being
implicated, as shown by the measure they had taken to prevent his escape, is
further proof that Romaquin was not considered a co-conspirator, who is one
who should not be looked upon with mistrust. For his part, Cresencio testified
that while he was given a gun with which to cover Romaquin who might escape,
he returned the gun because he did not know how to use it, and so one of the
malefactors was left near the beach to prevent appellants fleeing from the scene
of the crime with banca. In his statement, however, (Exh. M, p. 35, Record of
Exhibits), he refused to accept the gun, but they gave it just the same, and he
received it.
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The circumstances pointed out would not make appellants liable as co-
principals in the crime charged. At the most their liability would be that of mere
accomplices. They joined in the criminal design when Cresencio consented to
look for a banca and Romaquin provided it when asked by the gang leader Joe
Intsik, and then brought the malefactors to the scene of the robbery, despite
knowledge of the evil purpose for which the banca was to be used. It was the
banca that brought the malefactors to the bank to be robbed and carried them
away from the scene after the robbery to prevent their apprehension. Appellants
thus cooperated but not in an indispensable manner. Even without appellants
providing the banca, the robbery could have been committed, specially with the
boldness and determination shown by the robbers in committing the crime.
The complicity of appellant Cresencio is further shown by his note (Exhibit
"H", p. 26, Record of Exhibits) addressed to Romaquin asking him not to reveal
to the police the names of their companions. He went to Romaquin and asked
for money which the latter gave in the sum of P41.00, as if to show that he had
helped in some material way to deserve a share in the loot.
As to Romaquin, while he testified that the malefactors gave a gun to Cresencio
with which the latter would prevent Romaquin from fleeing away from the
scene, evidently to show that he never joined in the criminal purpose, and that
all his acts were in fear of bodily harm and therefore, not voluntary, the measure
taken by the malefactors to prevent his escape, could have been just an extra
precaution, lest he would be stricken with fear in the course of the commission
of the crime specially if attended by shootings as it was really so. If it is true that
he never voluntarily made the trip with knowledge of the planned robbery, and
with Cresencio saying that he returned the gun given him with which to prevent
Romaquin from speeding away, Romaquin could have tried a get-away, as
should have been his natural impulse had he not joined in the criminal design.
His act of hiding the money he received from the malefactors, and repainting
his boat, all attest to his guilty conscience arising from the act of cooperation he
knowingly extended to the principal culprit to achieve their criminal purpose.
An accomplice is one who, not being principal as defined in Article 17 of the
Revised Penal Code, cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts (Art. 18, Revised Penal Code). There must be a Community
of unlawful purpose between the principal and accomplice and assistance
knowingly and intentionally given (U.S. vs. Belco 11 Phil. 526), to supply
material and moral aid in the consummation of the offense and in as efficacious
way (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38). In this case, appellants' cooperation is like
that of a driver of a car used for abduction which makes the driver a mere
accomplice, as held in People vs. Batalan 45 Phil. 573, citing the case of U.S. vs.
Lagmay, G.R. No. L-15009.
It is however, not established by the evidence that in the meeting held in the
house of Simeon Doble, the malefactors had agreed to kill, if necessary to carry
out successfully the plan to rob. What appellants may be said to have joined is
the criminal design to rob, which makes them accomplices. Their complicity
must, accordingly, be limited to the robbery, not with the killing. Having been
left in the banca, they could not have tried to prevent the killing, as is required
of one seeking relief from liability for assaults committed during the robbery
(Art. 296. Revised Penal Code). 2
The finding that appellants are liable as mere accomplices may appear too
lenient considering the gravity and viciousness of the offense with which they
were charged. The evidence, however, fails to establish their complicity by a
previous conspiracy with the real malefactors who actually robbed the bank and
killed and injured several persons, including peace officers. The failure to bring
to justice the real and actual culprits of so heinous a crime should not bring the
wrath of the victims nor of the outraged public, upon the heads of appellants
whose participation has not been shown to be as abominable as those who had
gone into hiding. The desire to bring extreme punishment to the real culprits
should not blind Us in meting out a penalty to appellants more than what they
justly deserve, and as the evidence warrants.
Accordingly, We find appellants Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, but only as accomplices for the crime of robbery in
band. 3 As discussed earlier, appellant Simeon Doble is entitled to acquittal as
so recommended by the Solicitor General who finds no sufficient evidence, to
which We agree, to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The penalty imposable upon appellants Cresencio Doble and Antonio
Romaquin, as accomplices for the crime of robbery in band is prision mayor
minimum which has a range of 6 years, 1 day to 8 years as provided ill Article
295 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 294, paragraph 5 of the
same code. The commission of the crime was aggravated by nighttime and the
use of a motorized banca. There being no mitigating circumstance, both
appellants should each be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5)
years, four (4) months, twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional to eight (8)
years of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of each of the
deceased in the sum of 1112,000.00 not P6,000.00 as imposed by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, modified as above indicated, the judgment appealed from is
affirmed in all other respects. The immediate release of Simeon Doble who is
hereby acquitted is ordered, unless he should be continued in confinement for
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some other legal cause. Proportionate costs against Cresencio Doble and
Antonio Romaquin.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Makasiar, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Vasquez, and Gutierrez, JJ.,
concur.
Aquino and Escolin, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:
Giving to Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin the benefit of a lenient
attitude, I can agree that they were not principals but merely accomplices as
stated in the main opinion. However, I cannot persuade myself that their
complicity must be limited to the robbery only and should not include the
killing. For it must be remembered that the principal malefactors were each fully
armed; the arms consisted of pistols, carbines and Thompson sub-machine
guns, This fact was known to the appellants. In fact the principal malefactors
has so many guns that one was given to Cresencio with which to cover Antonio
in case he tried to escape. This shows that the principal malefactors were
prepared to kill even an accomplice so that they could accomplish their criminal
objective. How then can it be said that there was no criminal design to kill but
only to rob among the principal malefactors as suggested in the main opinion.
And I cannot believe that under the circumstances the appellants were unaware
of the criminal design to kill and that they gave their cooperation — albeit not
indispensable — only — to the robbery. Accordingly, I believe that the
appellants should be held guilty as accomplices in the crime of robbery with
homicide.
Fernando, J., I concur with the separate opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos.
Concepcion, Jr., J., previously voted to concur with the main opinion.
Relova, J., I concur in the dissent of Justice Abad Santos.
PEOPLE VS DOCTOLERO
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellants Ludovico Doctolero and his brothers, Conrado and Virgilio
Doctolero, charged with and convicted in the then Court of First Instance,
Branch II, Pangasinan, of the crime of multiple murder and unspecified physical
injuries, appealed from the decision of the court a quo the decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court finds the accused Ludovico
Doctolero guilty as principal, and his co-accused Conrado Doctolero and
Virgilio Doctolero guilty as accomplices, in committing the crime of Murder,
which caused the death of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and
Marcelo Doctolero, and in inflicting physical injury on the minor child,
Jonathan Oviedo. Accordingly, in the absence of other circumstances to
mitigate the penalty, the accused Ludovico Doctolero is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of three (3) LIFE IMPRISONMENTS (CADENA PERPETUA) for
the deaths of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo
Doctolero, and the additional penalty of 4 Months and 1 Day to 6 Months of
arresto mayor, for inflicting slight physical injury to (sic) the minor child,
Jonathan Oviedo. The accused Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio Doctolero, as
accomplices, are sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 Day of
prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, for the death of
Epifania Escosio; the penalty of 10 Years and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17
Years and 4 Months of reclusion temporal, for the death of Lolita de Guzman
Oviedo: the penalty of 10 Years and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4
Months of reclusion temporal, for the death of Marcelo Doctolero; and the
additional penalty of 2 Months and 1 Day to 4 Months of arresto mayor for the
slight physical injury suffered by the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. All accused
Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio all surnamed Doctolero, are ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Epifania Escosio, in the sum of P12,000.00;
the heirs of the deceased Lolita de Guzman Oviedo, in the sum of P12,000.00;
and the heirs of the deceased Marcelo Doctolero, in the sum of P12,000.00; and
to pay three-fourths (3/4) of the costs. The accused Antonio Doctolero is
acquitted, with one-fourth (1/4) cost de oficio.1
The information filed against appellants alleges that the crime was committed as
follows:
That on or about the 8th day of November, 1970, in barrio Binday, municipality
of San Fabian, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with bolos, went up
the house of Marcial Sagun and once thereat, conspiring together and mutually
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aiding one another, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and
treachery, with abuse of superior strength and with extreme cruelty, did, then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack, stab and
strike Lolita de Guzman Oviedo, Epifania Escosio and Jonathan Oviedo and
immediately thereafter, the same accused while already on the road, conspiring
together and mutually aiding one another, with intent to kill and with evident
premeditation and treachery, attack, assault, hack and stab Marcelo Doctolero,
thereby inflicting upon him multiple mortal wounds which caused his death.2
Upon arraignment, all the appellants pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.
In its decision, the trial court made the following findings and a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution thus:
It is undisputed that on the evening of November 8, 1970, Epifania Escosio and
Lolita de Guzman were killed in the house of Marcial Sagun in Sitio Binday,
municipality of San Fabian, province of Pangasinan, where they were living.
Jonathan Oviedo, 1 1/2 year old child of Lolita de Guzman, was on the same
occasion, slightly injured while being fed on the breast of his mother. On the
road, a few meters from the house of Marcial Sagun, Marcelo Doctolero, 81
years old, was fatally injured. He was taken to the Pangasinan Provincial
Hospital but he died on the way. . . .
The evidence for the prosecution tend to show that the three (3) accused,
Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, all surnamed Doctolero, were responsible for
the death(s) of Epifania Escosio and Lolita de Guzman, and in inflicting
physical injuries to (sic) Jonathan Oviedo. And immediately thereafter, with
their father and co-accused, Antonio Doctolero, they hacked Marcelo
Doctolero, with their bolos which caused the death of the latter.
The principal witnesses for the prosecution are: Marcial Sagun, his wife Maria
Sagun, and Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy. According to Marcial Sagun, at about 6:30
in the evening on November 8, 1970, he and his wife, Maria Oviedo-Sagun and
Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo (sister-in-law of Maria Oviedo-Sagun) were on their
way home to Barrio Binday. They came from the field where they bundled their
harvests. Upon reaching a crossing of the road in Bo. Binday they met the
accused Ludovico Doctolero who, without warning and without cause or
reason, held the left shoulder of Marcial Sagun with his left hand and struck
Marcial Sagun with a bolo. The latter evaded that blow and wrestled with
Ludovico Doctolero for possession of the bolo of the latter. Lolita de Guzman-
Oviedo became frightened when Ludovico Doctolero and Marcial Sagun were
wrestling for the possession of the bolo of the former, so she ran away in the
direction of the house in Sitio Binday.
Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy (sister of Marcial Sagun) testified that while she was
cleaning palay in the yard of her uncle, the deceased Marcelo Doctolero, she
saw the accused, Ludovico. Conrado and Virgilio (all surnamed Doctolero)
throw stones at the house of Marcial Sagun. While throwing stones, Ludovico
allegedly shouted for the man in the house to come out. Paciencia Sagun-
Diamoy went towards the house of Marcial Sagun and saw the three accused,
Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, coming down from the house going towards
her. She told them: "Why can't you be patient and forget?" But she was asked
not to interfere. At about that time, Marcelo Doctolero, half-brother of Antonio
Doctolero, and uncle of the three accused was going towards the house of
Marcial Sagun, when he met the three accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio.
Marcelo Doctolero told them why they can't be patient and forget, but the three
accused replied "Vulva of your mother, we will also kill you." Then they struck
Marcelo Doctolero several times with their bolos. And when their father
Antonio Doctolero arrived, he also struck Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo on
the head. Marcelo Doctolero fell and then all the accused ran away.
The testimony of Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy is sought to be corroborated by the
testimony of Maria Oviedo-Sagun (wife of Marcial Sagun) who declared that
while she was in the house of Marcelo Doctolero, to whom she reported the
incident between Ludovico Doctolero and Marcial Sagun, she saw the three
accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio throwing stones at their house and
called to all the men in the house to come out. She was about to go to their
house to get her children but she saw the three accused Ludovico, Conrado and
Virgilio going up. So she hid behind the palm tree, a few meters away from their
house. While there, she heard Epifania Escosio (her adopted mother) shouting
at her, saying "Enieng, your children." Then she saw the three accused coming
down from the house, going towards the road where they met Marcelo
Doctolero whom they also boloed several times until he fell. When Antonio
Doctolero arrived, he also struck Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo. Then they all
left.3
On the other hand, appellants present the following version:
On November 8, 1970, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, Ludovico
Doctolero met at the crossing of Bo. Banana and Binday road, San Fabian,
Pangasinan. Marcial Sagun, who was with his wife, Maria Oviedo, Antonio
Oviedo and the latter's wife, Lolita de Guzman. Antonio Oviedo is the brother-
in-law of Marcial Sagun, he being the brother of Maria Oviedo. (tsn, p. 7
hearing, February 17, 1971-Somera). Marcial Sagun and company were on their
way home. (p. 8, Ibid).
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Ludovico greeted Marcial Sagun: "Where have you been cousin." (p. 8, ibid) He
noticed, however, Antonio Oviedo holding his bolo on his waist. So, he asked
his cousin Marcial Sagun why Antonio Oviedo was like that. The latter
unsheathed his bolo and boloed Ludovico with a downward swing. He parried
the bolo with his left hand (p. 9, ibid), but he was hurt in the process (p. 10,
ibid).
At that juncture, Marcial Sagun unsheathed his bolo and Ludovico Doctolero
also unsheathed his bolo. They watched each other's step (p. 10, ibid) with the
two women, Lolita de Guzman and Maria Oviedo, hitting the back of Ludovico
with a wood (sic). The latter ignored them, as his eyes were towards Marcial
Sagun and his brother-in-law, Antonio Oviedo (p. 11, ibid).
Realizing that he could not afford to fight both Marcial Sagun and Antonio
Oviedo, Ludovico tried to escape by boloing Maria Oviedo, whom he hit at the
back. He retreated and then run (sic) away, with Marcial Sagun and Antonio
Oviedo throwing stones at him. (p. 12, ibid).
Ludovico went to the house of his father, Antonio Doctolero. The latter was
eating his meal, together with his small children upstairs, while accused-
appellant, Conrado Doctolero was in the kitchen downstairs also eating his
meal, when Ludovico arrived (p. 13, ibid; p. 4, hearing June 8, 1971-Salazar).
He told his father that he was wounded and asked him to look after his children
as he might meet something bad that night. He did not enter the house
anymore: he was only until the door. Then he ran away. His father asked him
what happened, but he did not answer anymore. (p. 14, ibid, p. 4, Salazar).
He ran towards his house, taking a short cut by passing through the house of
his cousins, Juanito and Cresencia Doctolero. As he came near his house, he
saw the house of Marcial Sagun, who was also his immediate neighbor. His
blood boiled. He went to Marcial's house calling him to get down. When
Marcial did not get down, he peeped and noticed that Marcial Sagun was not
there. So he went upstairs to ask Epifania Escosio, who told him that Marcial
Sagun went towards the South. He was about to leave when the old woman hit
him at the back of his neck, causing him to see darkness and (he) boloed her
several times (p. 13-19, tsn, hearing, February 17, 1971).
Ludovico went downstairs to look for Marcial Sagun. He stayed a while at the
trunk of the buri tree, thinking that he might be ambushed. Here, he did not
notice anyone coming from the south or the east. So he tried to move, but as he
did so, he noticed someone approaching him coming from the yard of Marcelo
Doctolero. As it was dark he did not recognize the man and thinking that it was
Marcial Sagun, he met him. It turned out however, that the man was Marcelo
Doctolero. So he returned the bolo he was holding in its scabbard. He asked
Marcelo Doctolero where Marcial Sagun was, but Marcelo Doctolero answered
him, "because of your foolishness" and hit him on the shoulder, but in the
process of evading the blow, Ludovico Doctolero was hit at the back. As
Marcelo Doctolero tried to hit him for a second time he took a side step and
took hold of the stick and pulled it away, causing Marcelo Doctolero to fall on
his knees. He was able to get the club, but Marcelo Doctolero unsheathed Ms
bolo. When the latter insisted on unsheathing his bolo, Ludovico Doctolero
boloed him many times. (pp. 19-26, ibid).4
The police were then informed of the brutal murders as well as the injury
caused to the child. A doctor and a photographer went to the scene of the crime
and pictures were then taken.5
Quoting from the findings of the Rural Health Officer of San Fabian, the court
below established that ––
. . . nine (9) wounds were inflicted on the body of Marcelo Doctolero, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Incised wound, 5 inches from the upper border of the left ear to the
side of the forehead. There is fracture of the underlying skull.
(2) Incised wound 6 inches in length 1 1/2 inches above the 1st wound
with fracture of the underlying skull.
(3) Incised wound 4 inches in length 1/2 inch above the 2nd wound with
fracture of the underlying skull.
(4) Incised wound 6 inches in length from the upper border of the left
eyebrow to the right eyebrow. There is also fracture of the underlying skull.
(5) Incised wound –– 3 1/2 inches in length 1 1/2 from the angle of the
month towards the lower border of the right ear. The lower lobe of the ear is
detached.
(6) The lower third of the left small finger is almost cut off.
(7) Incised wound at the median portion of the left hand. There is a
severance from the level of the middle finger.
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(8) Incised wound –– 1 1/2 inches long at the median portion and distal middle aspect of the right forearm. There was also an incised wound, about 1/2
3rd of the forearm, left. inch, temporal right." He further testified that the child was admitted to the
hospital on November 8, 1970 and was discharged completely healed fifteen
(9) Incised wound 1 1/2 inches long above the 8th wound. (15) days later.7

xxx xxx xxx During the pendency of the present petition and on motion of appellant
Ludovico Doctolero, on May 17, 1976 the Court resolved to grant the
One wound was inflicted on the body of Lolita de Guzman, namely, "stab withdrawal of his appeal8
wound around 3 cms. long and 4 inches in depth at the 2nd intercostal space
just at the left border of the sternal bone." (Exh. C). And nine (9) wounds were and entry of judgment with regard to said accused was made on the same day.9
inflicted on the body of Epifania, namely:
In a resolution dated June 28, 1988, the Court noted the manifestation of
xxx xxx xxx counsel for accused-appellants, dated May 9, 1988, stating that Virgilio
Doctolero died on October 22, 1983 as per death certificate attached thereto as
(1) Stab wound around 4 cms. in length and around 5 inches deep Annex "A".10 Hence, this review is only with respect to the liability of appellant
penetrating the sternal bone at the level of the 2nd intercostal space. Conrado Doctolero.

(2) Incised wound 3 inches in length just skin deep at the level of the right The trial court correctly found that appellant Conrado Doctolero participated as
clavicular region. an accomplice in the commission of the crimes charged. In his defense,
appellant denies having participated in the commission thereof and raises the
(3) Incised wound 2 inches in length also skin deep one inch below the effete defense of alibi, contending that he was not at the place where the crimes
second wound. were committed. Appellant's pretension, however, was not corroborated by any
evidence other than the testimony of the other erstwhile appellants. While the
(4) Chopping wound 3 inches in circumference with fracture of the testimony of a co-conspirator or an accomplice is admissible, such testimony
underlying skull at the right frontal portion of the head. comes from a polluted source and must be scrutinized with great caution as it is
subject to travel suspicion.11
(5) Incised wound around one inch length at the left frontal portion of the
head. This uncorroborated denial of his participation cannot overthrow the positive
and categorical testimony of the principal witnesses of the prosecution, and
(6) Incised wound 3 inches long just at the level of the shoulder joint, between the positive declarations of the prosecution Witness and the negative
exposing the bony portion, left. statements of the accused, the former deserves more credence.12

(7) Incised wound one inch long 1/2 inch below the sixth wound.
(8) Incised wound one inch long 4 inches below the seventh wound.
(9) Incised wound around 3 inches in length at the base and lateral portion
of the hand right. There was fracture of some of the underlying bones.6
Regarding the wounds inflicted upon Jonathan Oviedo, the resident physician at
the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, Dr. Rodolfo Ramirez, explained the same as
follows: "Stab wound, thru and thru, about 1 1/2 inches on the lateral aspect of
the dischartered forearm, right. Then, there was another about 1 inch of the
There is no showing that the witnesses had any motive to testify falsely against
appellants. The only imputed grudge that Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy may have
had against appellants occurred years ago and she was, at the time she testified,
on good terms with appellants as shown by the following testimony of
Ludovico Doctolero himself:
Q And even before Paciencia Sagun Diamoy testified as one of the
prosecution witness (sic) your relationship with her was harmonious and rather
very closed (sic) being your cousin?
A Yes, sir.

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Q As a matter of fact, whenever she goes to San Fabian to visit her
relatives she did not fail to see you in your house?
A Yes, sir sometimes she slept in my house.13
As to Maria Sagun, we agree with the court a quo when it held that "Maria
Sagun (wife of Marcial Sagun) pointed to the three accused. Ludovico, Conrado
and Virgilio, all surnamed Doctolero, as the persons who went up her house
that night of November 8, 1970. While Maria Sagun may have a grudge against
the accused Ludovico Doctolero by reason of that previous incident at the
crossing yet, no reason or motive is shown why Maria Sagun should also
implicate Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero in the commission of the crime."14
When there is nothing in the records which would show a motive or reason on
the part of the witnesses to falsely implicate the accused, identification should
be given full credit.15
And when there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal
witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motives, the presumption
is that he was not so moved, and his testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit.16
In an attempt to disprove the findings of the trial court, appellant points to
certain inconsistencies that allegedly render the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses incredible. These inconsistencies, however, are not so substantial as to
destroy their credibility. As correctly explained by the People, the seeming
contradictions and minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witness pointed out by the appellants in their brief are mere inconsequential
variations on the part of each observer in relating his own observation of the
same incident. Contradictions and inconsistencies of witnesses in regard to the
details of an incident far from demonstrating falsehood constitute evidence of
good faith. Not all persons who witness an incident are impressed by it in the
same manner and it is but natural that said eyewitnesses should disagree on
minor details.17
In fact, inconsistences and contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses which refer to minor details cannot destroy the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses.18 And where the prosecution witnesses were able to
positively identify the appellants as the authors of the crime and the testimonies
were, on the whole, consistent oil material points, the contradictions become
insignificant.19
Nor can appellant successfully assail the testimony of Sgt. Delfin Ronquillo who
conducted the investigation himself and personally examined the scenes of the
multiple killings. Credence is accorded to the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses who are law enforcers for it is presumed that they have regularly
performed their duties in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary.
Appellants have not shown that this prosecution witness was motivated by an
improper motive other than that of accomplishing his mission.20
Sgt. Ronquillo established that the reports which were received at the police
department of San Fabian, Pangasinan shortly after the crimes were committed
were to the effect that the Doctoleros were involved. He further testified that
when he immediately proceeded to the scene of the crime and investigated
Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy she told him that the accused Doctoleros came with
bolos from the house of Marcial Sagun.21
In fine, Sgt. Ronquillo merely testified objectively on the results of his
investigation and the weight to be accorded to his findings was properly
addressed to the trial court.
The lower court held that Conrado Doctolero and his brother, Virgilio,
participated as accomplices in the slaying of the women and the infliction of
injuries on the child. We agree with its findings and the ratiocination of the
Solicitor General with its evidentiary substantiation:
Now, there is no question that while the three appellants were still stoning and
hurling challenges at the house of Marcial Sagun, they must have already heard
the two women thereat protesting what they were doing and shouting back at
them (pp. 39-41, 97, 119, tsn. Jan. 13, 1971: pp. 144-146, tsn., Jan. 14, 1971),
after which all the three appellants went up the house. Under these facts, it is
impossible that both appellants Virgilio Doctolero and Conrado Doctolero did
not know or were not aware when their brother Ludovico was brutally killing
the two women Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo and Epifania Escosio and wounding
the child Jonathan Oviedo inside the room of said house. Furthermore, from
the nature, number, and locations of the many wounds sustained by the two
women and child (Exhs. A, C, D, and D-1), it could not have been possible for
Ludovico's two brothers Virgilio and Conrado (assuming that they did not go
inside the house) not to hear either the screams of pain of their brother's
victims or the contact between the blade of his bolo and their bodies when their
brother Ludovico was ruthlessly hacking them several times. . . . Under these
circumstances, it is obvious that appellants Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio
themselves knew what was going on inside the room of the house at the time,
but they just stood by and did nothing to stop their brother Ludovico
Doctolero from brutally hacking his women victims to death. It is, therefore,
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reasonable to believe that the two appellants, Conrado and Virgilio, merely
stood by as their brother Ludovico Doctolero was murdering the two deceased
women, ready to lend assistance. Indeed, there is no question that the presence
of these two appellants upstairs in the house of Marcial Sagun gave their
brother Ludovico Doctolero the encouragement and reliance to proceed as he
did proceed, in committing the heinous crimes against two defenseless women
and a child.22
We have held that where one goes with the principals, and in staying outside of
the house while the others went inside to rob and kill the victim, the former
effectively supplied the criminals with material and moral aid, making him guilty
as an accomplice.23
Appellants contend that the murders occurred as a consequence of a sudden
thought or impulse, thus negating a common criminal design in their minds.
This pretension must be rejected since one can be an accomplice even if he did
not know of the actual crime intended by the principal provided he was aware
that it was an illicit act.24
This is a doctrine that dates back to the ruling in U.S. vs. De Jesus25 that where
the accomplices therein consented to help in the commission of forcible
abduction, they were responsible for the resulting homicide even if the purpose
of the principal to commit homicide was unknown to the accomplices.
Whatever doubt the court a quo entertained on the criminal responsibility of
appellants Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero did not refer to whether or not they
were liable but only with regard to the extent of their participation. There being
ample evidence of their criminal participation, but a doubt exists on the nature
of their liability, the courts should favor the milder form of liability or
responsibility which is that of being mere accomplices,26
no evidence of conspiracy among the appellants having been shown.
The court below, however, erred in the penalty imposed for the physical injuries
inflicted on Jonathan Oviedo. The child required medical attention for fifteen
(15) days, hence the liability of appellants therefor is for less serious physical
injuries punished with arresto mayor under Article 265 of the Revised Penal
Code. There being no modifying circumstances, a penalty of twenty (20) days of
arresto menor should be imposed for said offense on appellant Conrado
Doctolero as an accomplice.
The death of appellant Virgilio Doctolero during the pendency of this appeal
terminated only his criminal liability but not his civil liability.27
Also, while the death indemnity has been increased to P50,000.00 under current
case law, the same should not apply to Ludovico Doctolero, he having
heretofore withdrawn his appeal and the judgment rendered by the trial court
having long since become final and executory with respect to him.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED and judgment is
hereby rendered IMPOSING on appellant Conrado Doctolero three (3)
indeterminate sentences of ten (10) years of prision mayor to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal each for the death of Epifania
Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and a penalty of
twenty (20) days of arresto menor for the less serious physical injuries inflicted
on Jonathan Oviedo. Appellant Conrado Doctolero and the estate of Virgilio
Doctolero are ORDERED to indemnify, in the sum of P50,000.00 for each set
or group of heirs, the respective heirs of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman
Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and to pay one-half (1/2) of the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
ACCESSORIES
ARTICLE 19 OF RPC
Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as
principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the
following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of
the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or
instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the
crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or
whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an
attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually
guilty of some other crime.
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PEOPLE VS TALINGDAN
PER CURIAM:
Appeal from the conviction for the crime of murder and the sentence of life
imprisonment, with indemnity to the offended party, the heirs of the deceased
Bernardo Bagabag, in the amount of P12,000, rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Abra in its Criminal Case No. 686, of all the accused the namely,
Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusta Berras, Pedro Bides and Teresa
Domogma, the last being the supposed wife of the deceased, who, because no
certificate nor any other proof of their marriage could be presented by the
prosecution, could not be charged with parricide.
Prior to the violent death of Bernardo Bagabag on the night of June 24, 1967,
he and appellant Teresa Domogma and their children, arrived together in their
house at Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra, some 100 meters distant from the
municipal building of the place. For sometime, however, their relationship had
been strained and beset with troubles, for Teresa had deserted their family
home a couple of times and each time Bernardo took time out to look for her.
On two (2) different occasions, appellant Nemesis Talingdan had visited Teresa
in their house while Bernardo was out at work, and during those visits Teresa
had made Corazon, their then 12-year old daughter living with them, go down
the house and leave them. Somehow, Bernardo had gotten wind that illicit
relationship was going on between Talingdan and Teresa, and during a quarrel
between him and Teresa, he directly charged the latter that should she get
pregnant, the child would not be his. About a month or so before Bernardo was
killed, Teresa had again left their house and did not come back for a period of
more than three (3) weeks, and Bernardo came to know later that she and
Talingdan were seen together in the town of Tayum Abra during that time; then
on Thursday night, just two (2) days before he was gunned down, Bernardo and
Teresa had a violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped Teresa several times; the latter
went down the house and sought the help of the police, and shortly thereafter,
accused Talingdan came to the vicinity of Bernardo's house and called him to
come down; but Bernardo ignored him, for accused Talingdan was a policeman
at the time and was armed, so the latter left the place, but not without warning
Bernardo that someday he would kin him. Between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock the
following Friday morning, Bernardo's daughter, Corazon, who was then in a
creek to wash clothes saw her mother, Teresa, meeting with Talingdan and their
co-appellants Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides in a small hut
owned by Bernardo, some 300 to 400 meters away from the latter's house; as
she approached them, she heard one of them say "Could he elude a bullet"; and
when accused Teresa Domogma noticed the presence of her daughter, she
shoved her away saying "You tell your father that we will kill him".
Shortly after the sun had set on the following day, a Saturday, June 24, 1967,
while the same 12-year old daughter of Bernardo was cooking food for supper
in the kitchen of their house, she saw her mother go down the house through
the stairs and go to the yard where she again met with the other appellants. As
they were barely 3-4 meters from the place where the child was in the "batalan",
she heard them conversing in subdued tones, although she could not discern
what they were saying. She was able to recognize all of them through the light
coming from the lamp in the kitchen through the open "batalan" and she knows
them well for they are all residents of Sobosob and she used to see them almost
everytime. She noted that the appellants had long guns at the time. Their
meeting did not last long, after about two (2) minutes Teresa came up the house
and proceeded to her room, while the other appellants went under an avocado
tree nearby. As supper was then ready, the child caged her parents to eat,
Bernardo who was in the room adjoining the kitchen did not heed his
daughter's call to supper but continued working on a plow, while Teresa also
excused herself by saying she would first put her small baby to sleep. So
Corazon ate supper alone, and as soon as she was through she again called her
parents to eat. This time, she informed her father about the presence of persons
downstairs, but Bernardo paid no heed to what she said. He proceeded to the
kitchen and sat himself on the floor near the door. Corazon stayed nearby
watching him. At that moment, he was suddenly fired upon from below the
stairs of the "batalan". The four accused then climbed the stairs of the "batalan"
carrying their long guns and seeing that Bernardo was still alive, Talingdan and
Tobias fired at him again. Bides and Berras did not fire their guns at that precise
time, but when Corazon tried to call for help Bides warned her, saying "You call
for help and I will kill you", so she kept silent. The assailants then fled from the
scene, going towards the east.
The first to come to the aid of the family was Corazon's male teacher who lived
nearby. Teresa came out of her "silid" later; she pulled Corazon aside and
questioned her, and when Corazon informed her that she recognized the killers
of her father to be her co-appellants herein, she warned her not to reveal the
matter to anyone, threatening to kill her if she ever did so. Still later on, other
persons arrived and helped fix and dress the lifeless body of the victim,
Bernardo, autopsy on which was performed in his own house by the Municipal
Health Officer of the place on June 26, 1967, about 36 hours after death; burial
took place on the same day. The victim's brother who came from Manila arrived
one day after the burial followed by their mother who came from La Paz, Abra
where she resides. Corazon, who had not earlier revealed the Identities of the
killers of her father because she was afraid of her own mother, was somehow
able to reveal the circumstances surrounding his killing to these immediate
relatives of hers, and the sworn statement she thereafter executed on August 5,
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1967 (Exh. B) finally led to the filing of the information for murder against the
herein five (5) appellants.
On the other hand, according to the evidence for the defense: Teresa prior to
her marriage with Bernardo, was a resident of the town of Manabo, Abra. She
has a sister in Manila and two (2) brothers in America who love her dearly, that
is why said brothers of hers had been continuously and regularly sending her
monthly $100.00 in checks, starting from the time she was still single up to the
time of her husband's violent death on June 24, 1967, and thereafter. After their
marriage, they moved to and resided in her husband's place in Sallapadan, Abra,
bringing with them three (3) carabaos and two (2) horses, which Bernardo and
she used in tilling a parcel of land in said place, separate and distinct from the
parcel of land worked on by Bernardo's parents and their other children. She
and Bernardo lived in their own house which was about 4-5 meters away from
the house of her parents-in-law. She loved Bernardo dearly, they never
quarreled, and her husband never maltreated her; although sometimes she had
to talk to Bernardo when he quarrels with his own mother who wanted that
Bernardo's earnings be given to her, (the mother) which Bernardo never did,
and at those times, Bernardo would admonish Teresa "You leave me alone".
Her in-laws also hated her because her mother-in-law could not get the earnings
of Bernardo for the support of her other son, Juanito, in his schooling. On his
part, Juanito also disliked her because she did not give him any of the carpentry
tools which her brothers in America were sending over to her. She never left
their conjugal home for any long period of time as charged by her mother-in-
law, and if she ever did leave the house to go to other places they were only
during those times when she had to go to Bangued to cash her dollar checks
with the PNB branch there, and even on said trips, she was sometimes
accompanied by Bernardo, or if she had to go alone and leaves Sallapadan in the
morning, she rode in a weapons carrier along with merchants going to Bangued
in the morning and always rode back with them to Sallapadan in the afternoon
of the same day because the weapons carrier is owned by a resident of
Sallapadan who waits for them. Teresa came to know Talingdan only when the
latter became a policeman in Sallapadan, as whenever any of the carabaos and
horses they brought from Manabo to Sallapadan got lost, she and Bernardo
would go and report the matter to the Mayor who would then refer the matter
to his policemen, one of whom is Talingdan, so that they may help locate the
lost animals; Teresa knew Talingdan well because they are neighbors, the latter's
home being only about 250-300 meters away from theirs. But illicit relationship
had never existed between them.
Early in the evening of June 24, 1967, Teresa was in the kitchen of their house
cooking their food for supper. Two of the children, Corazon and Judit, were
with her. Her husband, Bernardo, was then in the adjoining room making a
plow. He had to make the plow at that time of the night because at daytime he
worked as a carpenter in the convent. As soon as the food was ready, she and
the children moved over to the adjoining room where Bernardo was to call him
for supper, and he then proceeded to the kitchen to eat. Teresa and the two
children were about to follow him to the kitchen when suddenly they heard
more than five (5) or six (6) successive gun shots coming from near their
"batalan". They were all so terrified that they immediately cried for help, albeit
she did not know yet at that precise time that her husband was shot, as she and
the children were still in the other room on their way to the kitchen, about three
(3) meters away from Bernardo. But soon Teresa heard her husband crying in
pain, and as soon as she reached him, she took Bernardo into her arms. She did
not see the killers of her husband, as the night was then very dark and it was
raining. Bernardo was in her arms when the first group of people who
responded to their cry for help arrived. Among them were the chief of police,
some members of the municipal council and appellant Tobias who even advised
Teresa not to carry the lifeless body of Bernardo to avoid abortion as she was
then six (6) months pregnant. The chief of police then conducted an
investigation of the surroundings and he found some empty shells and foot
prints on the ground some meters away from the "batalan". He also found
some bullet holes on the southern walls of said "batalan" and on the nothern
wallings of the kitchen. Later, Teresa requested some persons to relay the
information about the death of her husband to her relatives in Manabo, Abra,
and they in turn passed on the news to Bernardo's mother and her family in La
Paz, Abra, where they were then residing, as they have left their house in
Sallapadan about two (2) months previous after they lost the land they used to
till there in a case with the natives called Tingians. Two (2) PC soldiers arrived
in the afternoon of June 26, 1967, and after Bernardo's remains was autopsied
and he was buried under their house, they conducted an investigation, but she
did not give them any information relative to the Identity of the persons who
shot her husband because she did not really see them. Her mother-in-law and a
brother-in-law, Juanita Bagabag, arrived later, the former from the town of La
Paz, Abra, and the latter from Manila, and after the usual nine (9) days
mourning was over, they left Sallapadan, taking Teresa's children under their
custody. Teresa suspects that since her mother-in-law and her brother-in-law
have axes to grind against her and they have her daughter, Corazon, under their
custody, they had forced the said child to testify against her. She further
declared that her late husband, Bernardo, had enemies during his lifetime, as he
had quarrels with some people over the land they work on.
Furthermore, the defense presented evidence to the effect that: Talingdan was
not in Sallapadan at the time of the killing of Bernardo on June 24, 1967; being
a policeman of the place at the time, he was one of the two (2) policemen who
escorted and acted as bodyguard of the Mayor, when the latter attended the
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cursillo in Bangued, all of them leaving Sallapadan on June 22 and returning
thereto four (4) days later on June 26, hence, he could not have anything to do
with the said killing. On the other hand, Tobias claimed to be in the house of
one Mrs. Bayongan in Sallapadan on the date of said killing, but he was one of
the persons who was called upon by the chief of police of the place to
accompany him in answer to the call for help of the wife of the victim. The
other two appellants Bides and Berras also alleged that they were in the same
house of Mrs. Bayongan on that date; they are tillers of the land of said Mrs.
Bayongan and had been staying in her house for a long time. They were sleeping
when the chief of police came that evening and asked Tobias, who was then
municipal secretary, to accompany him to the place of the shooting. They did
not join them, but continued sleeping. They never left the said house of Mrs.
Bayongan, which is about 250-300 meters away from the place of the killing,
that evening of June 24, 1967.
After carefully weighing the foregoing conflicting evidence of the prosecution
and defense, We have no doubt in Our mind that in that fatal evening of June
24, 1967, appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and
Pedro Bides, all armed with long firearms and acting inconspiracy with each
other gunned down Bernardo as the latter was sitting by the supper table in
their house at Sobosob, Sallapadan, Abra. They were actually seen committing
the offense by the witness Corazon. She was the one who prepared the food
and was watching her father nearby. They were all known to her, for they were
all residents of Sobosob and she used to see them often before that night.
Although only Talingdan and Tobias continued firing at her father after they
had climbed the stairs of the "batalan", it was Bides who threatened her that he
would kill her if she called for help. Berras did not fire any shot then. But even
before the four appellants went up the "batalan", they already fired shots from
downstairs.
We also fully believe Corazon's testimony that two nights before, or on
Thursday, June 22, 1967, the deceased Bernardo and appellant Teresa had a
violent quarrel during which he slapped her several times. She went to seek the
help of the police, and it was appellant Talingdan, a policeman of their town,
who went to the vicinity of their house and challenged her father to come
down, but the latter refused because the former was a policeman and was
armed. And so, Talingdan left after shouting to her father that "If I will find you
someday, I will kill you."
We likewise accept as truthful, Corazon's declaration regarding the amorous
relationship between her mother and appellant Talingdan, as already related
earlier above. So also her testimony that in the morning following the quarrel
between her father and her mother and the threat made by Talingdan to the
former, between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock, she saw all the herein four male
accused-appellants meeting with her mother in a small hut some 300 or 400
meters away from their house, near where she was then washing clothes, and
that on said occasion she overheard one of them ask "Could (sic) he elude a
bullet?", We have our doubts, however, as to whether or not her mother did say
to her in shoving her away upon seeing her approach, "You tell your father we
will kill him." If it were true that there was really such a message, it is to be
wondered why she never relayed the same to her father, specially when she
again saw the said appellants on the very night in question shortly before the
shooting talking together in subdued tones with her mother and holding long
arms. Moreover, it is quite unnatural that such a warning could have been done
in such a manner.
Accordingly, it is Our conclusion from the evidence related above and which
We have carefully reviewed that appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan
Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides are guilty of murder qualified by
treachery, as charged, and that they committed the said offense in conspiracy
with each other, with evident premeditation and in the dwelling of the offended
party. In other words, two aggravating circumstances attended the commission
of the offense, namely, evident premeditation and that it was committed in the
dwelling of the victim. No mitigating circumstance has been proven.
Appellants insist in their brief that the lone testimony of Corazon suffered from
vital contradictions and inconsistencies and badges of falsehood because of
patently unnatural circumstances alleged by her. We do not agree. As the
Solicitor General has well pointed out, the fact that the witness varied on cross-
examination the exact time of some of the occurrences she witnessed, such as,
(1) whether it was before or after Bernardo had began eating when he was shot;
(2) whether it was before or after seeing her mother's meeting with her co-
accused in the morning of Friday, June 23, 1967, that she went to wash clothes;
and (3) whether or not the accused were already upstairs or still downstairs
when they first fired their guns, cannot alter the veracity of her having seen
appellants in the act of mercilessly and cold-bloodedly shooting her father to
death.
Contrary to the contention of appellants, there was nothing inherently unnatural
in the circumstances related by her. We agree with the following rebuttal of the
Solicitor General:
Appellants also attempt to buttress their attack against the credibility of
Corazon Bagabag by pointing out five supposed unnatural declarations in her
testimony; First, she said that her father, appeared unconcerned when she
informed him of the presence of people downstairs. But as correctly observed
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by the prosecuting fiscal the witness does not know then "the mentality of her
father" (p. 62, t.s.n., hearing of March 29, 1968). Second, Corazon also declared
that the accused conversed that Saturday night preceding the day the crime
charged was committed in a lighted place although there was a place which was
unlighted in the same premises. But this only proves that the accused were too
engrossed in their conversation, unmindful of whether the place where they
were talking was lighted or not, and unmindful even of the risk of recognition.
Third, witness declared that Pedro Bides and Augusto Berras did not fire their
guns. Even if these accused did withhold their fire, however, since they were
privies to the same criminal design, would this alter their culpability? Should the
witness Corazon Bagabag be discredited for merely stating an observation on
her part which is not inherently unnatural? Fourth, Corazon also declared that
only three bullets from the guns of the four male accused found their mark on
the body of her father. But would this not merely prove that not all the accused
were good shots? And fifth, the witness declared that her father was still able to
talk after he was shot yet Dr. Jose Dalisan declared that his death was
instantaneous It is respectfully submitted, however, that the doctor's opinion
could yield to the positive testimony of Corazon Bagabag in this regard without
in the least affecting the findings of said doctor as regards the cause of the death
of the deceased. As thus viewed, there are no evident badges of falsehood in the
whole breadth and length of Corazon Bagabag's testimony. (Pp. 9-10, People's
Brief.)
Why and how Corazon could have concocted her version of the killing of her
father, if it were not basically true, is hardly conceivable, considering she was
hardly thirteen (13) years old when she testified, an age when according to
Moore, a child , is, as a rule, but little influenced by the suggestion of others"
because "he has already got some principles, lying is distasteful to him, because
he thinks it is mean, he is no stranger to the sentiment of self- respect, and he
never loses an opportunity of being right in what he affirms." (II Moore on
Facts, pp. 1055-1056.) No cogent explanation has been offered why she would
attribute the assault on her father to three other men, aside from Talingdan
whom she knew had relations with her mother, were she merely making-up her
account of how he was shot, no motive for her to do so having been shown.
Demolishing the theory of the accused that such testimony was taught to her by
her uncle, His Honor pointed out that said "testimony, both direct and cross,
would show that she was constant, firm and steady in her answers to questions
directed to her." We have Ourselves read said testimony and We are convinced
of the sincerity and truthfulness of the witness. We cannot, therefore, share
appellants' apprehension in their Seventh Assignment of Error that the grave
imputation of a mother's infidelity and her suggested participation in the killing
of her husband, would if consistently impressed in the mind of their child,
constitute a vicious poison enough to make the child, right or wrong, a willing
instrument in any scheme to get even with her wicked mother. We feel Corazon
was too young to he affected by the infidelity of her mother in the manner the
defense suggests. We are convinced from a reading of her whole testimony that
it could not have been a fabrication. On the whole, it is too consistent for a
child of thirteen years to be able to substantially maintain throughout her stay
on the witness stand without any fatal flaw, in the face of severe and long cross-
interrogations, if she had not actually witnessed the event she had described. We
reject the possibility of her having been "brainwashed or coached" to testify as
she did.
The second to the sixth assignments of error in the appeal brief do not merit
serious consideration. Anent these alleged errors, suffice it to say that the
following refutations of the Solicitor General are well taken:
Appellants also decry that the trial court allegedly failed to consider the
testimony of Dr. Dalisan that the distance between the assailants and the
deceased could have been 4 to 5 meters when the shots were fired. But the
appellants overlook the testimony of Corazon Bagabag that when the first shot
was fired, the gunman was about 3-½ meters from her father (p. 60, t.s.n.,
hearing of March 29, 1968), which disproves the theory of the defense that the
killers fired from a stonepile under an avocado tree some 4 to 5 meters away
from the deceased's house. Appellants also insist that the Court a quo ignored
the testimonies of defense witness Cpl. Bonifacio Hall and Chief of Police
Rafael Berras on their having found bullet marks on the southern walling of the
house of the deceased, as well as empty cal. 30 carbine shells under the
aforementioned avocado tree. The trial court, however, made the following apt
observations on the testimony of defense witness Cpl. Bonifacio Hall:
This witness stated that we went to the house of the deceased to investigate the
crime after the deceased had already been buried; that he investigated the widow
as well as the surroundings of the house where the deceased was shot. He found
empty shells of carbine under the avocado tree. He stated that the 'batalan' of
the house of the deceased has a siding of about 1-½ meters high and that he
saw bullet holes on the top portion of the wall directly pointing to the open
door of the 'batalan' of the house of the deceased. When the court asked the
witness what could have been the position of the assailant in shooting the
deceased, he stated that the assailant might have been standing. The assailant
could not have made a bullet hole on the top portion of the sidings of the
'batalan' because the 'batalan' is only 1-½ meters high, and further, when asked
as to the level of the ground in relation to the top sidings of the 'batalan,' he
answered that it is in the same level with the ground. If this is true, it is
impossible for the assailant to make a bullet hole at the top portion sidings of
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the 'batalan,' hence, the testimony of this witness who is a PC corporal is of no
consequence and without merit. The court is puzzled to find a PC corporal
testifying for the defense in this case, which case was filed by another PC
sergeant belonging to the same unit and assigned in the same province of Abra
(pp. 324- 325, rec.).
As regards the empty shells also found in the vicinity of the shooting, suffice it
to state that no testimony has been presented, expert or otherwise, linking said
shells to the bullets that were fired during the shooting incident. Surmises in this
respect surely would not overcome the positive testimony of Corazon Bagabag
that the accused shot her father as they came up the 'batalan' of their house.
(Pp. 11-12, People's Brief.)
At the trial, the four male appellants tried to prove that they were not at the
scene of the crime when it happened. This defense of alibi was duly considered
by the trial court, but it was properly brushed aside as untenable. In their brief,
no mention thereof is made, which goes to show that in the mind of the
defense itself,. it cannot be successfully maintained and they do not, therefore,
insist on it. Nonetheless, it would do well for this Court to specifically affirm
the apt pertinent ratiocination of His Honor in reference thereto thus:
This defense, therefore, is alibi which, in the opinion of the court, can not stand
firmly in the face of a positive and unwavering testimony of the prosecution
witness who pointed out to the accused as the authors of the crime. This is so
because, first, according to the three accused — Bides, Tobias and Berras —
they were sleeping at 8:00 o'clock that night in the house of Mrs. Bayongan
which is only 250 meters away from the scene of the crime. Granting, for the
sake of argument, but without admitting, that they were already sleeping at 8:00
o'clock in the house of Mrs. Bayongan, Corazon Bagabag clearly stated that her
father was gunned down at sunset which is approximately between 6:00 and
6:30 in the evening, hence, the accused Tobias, Berras and Bides could have
committed the crime and went home to sleep in the house of Mrs. Bayongan
after the commission of the crime. According to Pedro Bides, the house of Mrs.
Bayongan is only 250 meters away from the house of the victim. Second, the
three accused have failed miserably to present the testimony of Mrs. Bayongan,
the owner of the house where they slept that night to corroborate or bolster
their defense of alibi. (Pp. 27A-28A, Annex of Appellants' Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
Nemesio Talingdan, alias Oming, the last of the accused, also in his defense of
alibi, stated that on June 22, 1967, he accompanied Mayor Gregorio Banawa of
Sallapadan to Bangued, together with policeman Cresencio Martinez for the
purpose of attending a cursillo in Bangued They started in Sallapadan in the
early morning of June 22, 1967 and arrived in Bangued the same day. According
to him, he went to accompany the mayor to the cursillo house near the Bangued
Cathedral and after conducting the mayor to the cursillo house, he went to
board in the house of the cousin of Mayor Banawa near the Filoil Station at
Bangued, Abra. From that time, he never saw the mayor until after they went
home to Sallapadan on June 26th.
This kind of alibi could not gain much weight because he could have returned
anytime on the evening of June 22 or anytime before the commission of the
offense to Sallapadan and commit the crime on the 24th at sunset, then
returned to Bangued, Abra to fetch the mayor and bring him back to Sallapadan
on the 26th.
The irony of this defense of alibi is that the mayor who was alleged to have
been accompanied by witness-accused is still living and very much alive. As a
matter of fact, Mayor Gregorio Banawa is still the mayor of Sallapadan, Abra,
and also policeman Cresencio Martinez, another policeman who accompanied
the mayor to Bangued, is also still living and still a policeman of Sallapadan.
Why were not the mayor and the policeman presented to corroborate or deny
the testimony of Nemesio Talingdan?
Conrado B. Venus, Municipal Judge of Penarrubia Abra, and a member of the
Cursillo Movement, was presented as rebuttal witness for the prosecution. On
the witness stand, he stated that he belongs to Cursillo No. 3 of the Parish of
Bangued, Abra, and said cursillo was held on October 20 to 23, 1966, at the St.
Joseph Seminary in Galicia, Pidigan Abra, and not on June 23 to 26, 1967. As a
matter of fact, Mayor Banawa of Sallapadan also attended the cursillo held on
October 20 to 23, 1966, as could be seen in his 'Guide Book' where the
signature of Gregorio Banawa appears because they both attended Cursillo No.
3 of the Parish of Bangued.
(To) this testimony of the rebuttal witness belies partly, if not in full, the
testimony of accused Nemesio Talingdan. (Pp. 29A-30A, Annex of Appellants'
Brief.)
Coming now to the particular case of appellant Teresa Domogma, as to whom
the Solicitor General has submitted a recommendation of acquittal, We find that
she is not as wholly innocent in law as she appears to the Counsel of the People.
It is contended that there is no evidence proving that she actually joined in the
conspiracy to kill her husband because there is no showing of 'actual
cooperation" on her part with her co-appellants in their culpable acts that led to
his death. If at all, what is apparent, it is claimed, is "mere cognizance,
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acquiescence or approval" thereof on her part, which it is argued is less than
what is required for her conviction as a conspirator per People vs. Mahlon, 99
Phil. 1068. We do not see it exactly that way.
True it is that the proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not
beyond reasonable doubt, for which reason, sue cannot have the same liability
as her co-appellants. Indeed, she had no hand at all in the actual shooting of her
husband. Neither is it clear that she helped directly in the planning and
preparation thereof, albeit We are convinced that she knew it was going to be
done and did not object. (U.S. vs. Romulo, 15 Phil. 408, 411-414.) It is not
definitely shown that she masterminded it either by herself alone or together
with her co-appellant Talingdan. At best, such conclusion could be plain
surmise, suspicion and conjecture, not really includible. After all, she had been
having her own unworthy ways with him for quite a long time, seemingly
without any need of his complete elimination. Why go to so much trouble for
something she was already enjoying, and not even very surreptitiously? In fact,
the only remark Bernardo had occasion to make to Teresa one time was "If you
become pregnant, the one in your womb is not my child." The worst he did to
her for all her faults was just to slap her.
But this is not saying that she is entirely free from criminal liability. There is in
the record morally convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to
the offense committed by her co-accused. She was inside the room when her
husband was shot. As she came out after the shooting, she inquired from
Corazon if she was able to recognize the assailants of her father. When Corazon
Identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits, Teresa
did not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she
went to the extent of warning her, "Don't tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you
tell this to somebody." Later, when the peace officers who repaired to their
house to investigate what happened, instead of helping them with the
information given to her by Corazon, she claimed she had no suspects in mind.
In other words, whereas, before the actual shooting of her husband, she was
more or less passive in her attitude regarding her co-appellants' conspiracy,
known to her, to do away with him, after Bernardo was killed, she became
active in her cooperation with them. These subsequent acts of her constitute
"concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime" which makes
her liable as an accessory after the fact under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the
Revised Penal Code.
As already indicated earlier, the offense committed by appellants was murder
qualified by treachery. It being obvious that appellants deliberately chose
nighttime to suddenly and without warning assault their victim, taking
advantage of their number and arms, it is manifest that they employed treachery
to insure success in attaining their malevolent objective. In addition, it is
indisputable that appellants acted with evident premeditation. Talingdan made
the threat to kill Bernardo Thursday night, then he met with his co-accused to
work out their conspiracy Friday and again on Saturday evening just before the
actual shooting. In other words, they had motive Talingdan's taking up the
cudgels for his paramour, Teresa and enough time to meditate, and desist, if
they were not resolved to proceed with their objective. Finally, they committed
the offense in the dwelling of the offended party.
In these premises, the crime committed by the male appellants being murder,
qualified by treachery, and attended by the generic aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and that the offense was committed in the dwelling of
the offended party, the Court has no alternative under the law but to impose
upon them the capital penalty. However, as to appellant Teresa, she is hereby
found guilty only as an accessory to the same murder.
WHEREFORE, with the above finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro
Bides of the crime of murder with two aggravating circumstances, without any
mitigating circumstance to offset them, they are each hereby sentenced to
DEATH to be executed in accordance with law. Guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as accessory to the same murder, appellant Teresa Domogma is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision
correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum, with
the accessory penalties of the law. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Barredo, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and
Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Antonio, Fernando, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
I dissent insofar as the liability of the accused Teresa Domogma who should be
convicted, not merely as an accessory, but of parricide as principal and meted
the death penalty, is concerned. A marriage certificate is not indispensable to
establish the fact of marriage; because the presumption that the deceased and
the accused Teresa were married subsists by reason of the fact that they had
been living together for about thirteen (13) years as evidenced by the birth of
the child-witness Corazon, who was 12 years old at the time her father was
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killed on June 24, 1967 by the accused-appellants, and who was 13 years of age
when she testified. They have other children aside from Corazon.
That appellant Teresa is a co-conspirator, not merely an accessory after the fact
has been clearly demonstrated by the testimony of her own daughter, Corazon,
who declared categorically that she plotted with her co-appellants the
assassination of her own husband whom she betrayed time and time again by
her repeated illicit relations with her co-accused Nemesio Talingdan, a town
policeman and their neighbor. The record is abundant with evidence that
Teresa, without a feeling for shame and unnaturally lacking any concern for her
minor children of tender age, deserted several times their family home to live
with and continue with her immoral relations with appellant Talingdan with
whom at one time she cohabited for more than three (3) weeks. Her patient
husband had to look for her and to beg her to return each time she left the
family abode for the embrace of her lover.
We should believe Corazon's statement that between 10 and 11 o'clock Friday
morning, she saw her mother, appellant Teresa, meeting with her other co-
appellants in a small hut owned by her father some 300 to 400 meters away
from the latter's house near the creek where she was then washing clothes; that
she heard one of the conspirators say "Could he elude a bullet?"; that when her
mother noticed her presence, her mother shoved her away saying, "You tell
your father that we will kill him"; that in the evening of the following day,
Saturday, June 24, 1967, while she was cooking supper in their house, she saw
her mother go down the stairs and meet the other appellants in the yard about 3
to 4 meters from where she was in the "batalan"; that she heard them
conversing in subdued tones; that she was able to recognize all of them by the
light coming from the kitchen lamp through the open "batalan"; that she knows
all of them very well as they are all residents of their barrio and she used to see
them almost everyday; that she noted that appellants were armed with long
guns; that their meeting did not last long; that after about 2 minutes her mother,
appellant Teresa, came up the house and proceed to her room while the other
appellants hid under an avocado tree nearby; that when supper was ready she
called her parents to eat; that her father did not heed her call but continued
working on a plow while her mother excused herself by saying she would first
put her small baby to sleep; that she (Corazon) ate alone after which she again
called her parents to eat; that about this time she informed her father about the
presence of persons downstairs but her father paid no heed to what she said;
that her father proceeded to the kitchen and sat on the floor near the door while
Corazon stayed nearby watching him; that at the that moment her father was
shot from below the stairs of the "batalan"; that the four accused then went up
the stairs of the "batalan" with their long guns and, upon seeing that her father
was still alive, appellants Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again; that when she
(Corazon) tried to call for help, appellant Bides warned her saying "You call for
help and I will kill you"; and that thereafter, the assailants fled towards the east.
The foregoing testimony of 13-year old Corazon should be accorded belief in
the same way that credence was given to her statement that, upon her mother's
inquiry immediately after the shooting as to whether she recognized the
assailants of her father, she (Corazon) readily told her mother that she Identified
appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits; for which reason
her mother warned her "Don't tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to
somebody."
On Thursday or two days before Bernardo was shot, he and Teresa had a
quarrel during which Bernardo slapped Teresa several times by reason of which
Teresa left the house and sought the help of the police. Shortly thereafter
appellant Talingdan came and called Bernardo to come down. When Bernardo
ignored him because Talingdan was a policeman and was then armed, appellant
Talingdan left after warning Bernardo that someday he would kill him.
Can there be a clearer demonstration of the active cooperation of Teresa in the
conspiracy against the life of her husband? The majority opinion admits that
Teresa was a paramour of appellant Talingdan; hence, she wanted freedom
from her husband, the victim, so that she could enjoy the company of her lover,
appellant Talingdan.
From the evidence on record, appellant Teresa had no moral compunction in
deserting her family and her children for the company of her lover. As
heretofore stated, she did this several times and continued to do so until the
violent death of her husband even as she was carrying a six-month old baby in
her womb, the paternity of which her husband denied.
CASTRO, CJ., concurring:
Concurs, with the observations, however, that the evidence points to the
appellant Teresa Domogma as a co-principal and that she should therefore also
be held guilty of murder and sentenced to death.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
Concurs, but join in the partial dissent of Mr. Justice Makasiar insofar as the
penal liability of the accused Teresa Domogma is concerned.
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CONSUMATED FRUSTRATED ATTEMPTED MAX: 4 months and 1 day to 6 months

PRINCIPAL 0 1 2
ACCOMPLICE 1 2 3 ARRESTO MAYOR MED: 2 months and 1 day to 4 months
ACCESSORY 2 3 4 MIN: 1 month to 2 months
MAX: 21 days to 30 days
-IN TERMS OF LOWERING THE PENALTY
-NUMBER OF PERIODS TO LOWER ARRESTO MENOR MED: 11 days to 20 days
MIN: 1 day to 10 days
COMPLEX CRIMES

ARTICLE 48 RPC ENRILE VS SALAZAR

Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave NARVASA, J.:
or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People
be applied in its maximum period. vs. Hernandez 1 once more takes center stage as the focus of a confrontation at
law that would re-examine, if not the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its
applicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a number of similar cases 2
that took issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it
DEGREE PERIOD would Beem, where season and circumstance had more effectively conspired to
attract wide public attention and excite impassioned debate, even among
DEATH laymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of arguments
that are now brought to bear on the same question.

RECLUSION The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate
20 years and 1 day to 40 years Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement
PERPETUA
officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on
the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial
MAX: 17 years 4 months and 1 day to 20 years
Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant
RECLUSION MED: 14 years 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of
TEMPORAL 4 moths MED: prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State
MIN: 12 years to 14 years and 8 months Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio
Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
MAX: 10 years and 1 day to 12 years Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and
PRISION MAYOR MED: 8 years and 1 day to 10 years multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed
coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was
MIN: 6 years and 1 day to 8 years taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila,
MAX: 4 years 2 months and 1 day to 6 years without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none
fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was
MED: 2 years 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to
PRISION
months the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen.
CORRECTIONAL
Edgardo Dula Torres.3
MIN: 6 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months
and 1 day

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On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed
the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental
petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his
constitutional rights in being, or having been:
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute
books;
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no
complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence
was denied due process;
(c) denied his right to bail; and
(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the
judge who issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable
cause. 4
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea
for hearing on March 6, 1990. 5 On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a
consolidated return 6 for the respondents in this case and in G.R. No. 92164 7
Which had been contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator
Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar
questions. Said return urged that the petitioners' case does not fall within the
Hernandez ruling because-and this is putting it very simply-the information in
Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as a
necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information
against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on
the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor
General would distinguish between the complex crime ("delito complejo")
arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which
is referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the
subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime ("delito compuesto")
arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses
referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was
not concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after
which the Court issued its Resolution of the same date 8 granting Senator Enrile
and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty conditioned upon their filing, within
24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile)
and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it
was issued without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the
provisional liberty of the petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon
the legal issues raised in both cases. Four Members of the Court 9 voted against
granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two 10 against granting bail to the Panlilios.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in
Senator Enrile's petition, G.R. No. 92163.
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following
options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main
dissent of Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more
serious crimes, and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion
may properly be complexed with common offenses, so-called; this option was
suggested by the Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in
his written pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance,
or as a necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts
committed in the course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes
of grave or less grave character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other
offenses committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or
in furtherance thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against
abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) Members felt that the doctrine should be re-
examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling remains good law, its
substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and no
new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal.
This view is reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent
President, exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit
to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime
which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new
provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect that "(w)hen
by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter
(Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses
upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for
the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the
offender."' 11 In thus acting, the President in effect by legislative flat reinstated
Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less
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than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently powerful reason
against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that
Hernandez is, or should be, limited in its application to offenses committed as a
necessary means for the commission of rebellion and that the ruling should not
be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with other common
crimes committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four
Members of the Court felt that the proponents' arguments were not entirely
devoid of merit, the consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome
what appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed in its course under either of the
aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from
the majority opinion in that case:
There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our
Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed
with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this
could be done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant,
namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision
mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2)
for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death,
depending upon the modifying circumstances present. in other words, in the
absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be
imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty would have to be
meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance.
Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the
prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring
the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which
would be proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately.
In the words of Rodriguez Navarro:
La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace
referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado francamente en el
principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p.
2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of
the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908
and then in 1932, reading:
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un
solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio
necesario para cometer el otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en
su grado maximo, hasta el limite que represents la suma de las que pudieran
imponerse, penando separadamente los delitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los delitos
por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol.
II, p. 2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said
amendment, restricting the imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in
its maximum period to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the
penalties imposable if the acts charged were dealt with separately. The absence
of said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially
the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses,
there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for
each one of said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the
graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48
could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the
aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. The reason
for this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more
crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than
when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of
sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he must suffer the
maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is
less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense. 12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the
Court, which is that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit
the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion
thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended
effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is
not here inquired into, much less adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at
the proper time. The Court's ruling merely provides a take-off point for the
disposition of other questions relevant to the petitioner's complaints about the
denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.
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The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against
the petitioner does in fact charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable
phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion. Thus, in
Hernandez, the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information
against defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and
robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion
allegedly committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the
perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the
aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the
maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years
of prision mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in conformity with the
policy of this court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar
punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not
exist in the statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled
that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed on the
occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read
in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner
with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed
and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows otherwise, that a
complaint against petitioner for simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the strength of said complaint a
preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors,
culminating in the filing of the questioned information. 14 There is nothing
inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an
indictment for an offense different from what is charged in the initiatory
complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary
investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's
arrest without first personally determining the existence of probable cause by
examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in
violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. 15 This Court has already ruled,
however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a
personal examination, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure
by personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by
the prosecutor.16 Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one
hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge,
which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over the
voluminous records of the preliminary investigation. 17 Merely because said
respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief period within
which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or
could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to
overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the
Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the
logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should be
considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable
before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the
question remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for
habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail
or vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for
invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and
judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said
respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by
filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason
of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied
by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked,
and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate
relief was also available there.
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the
information charges a non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same
basis that it charges more than one offense, would not excuse or justify his
improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious recourse
would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the
respondent Judge. 18
There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner
has founded the present petition, whether these went into the substance of what
is charged in the information or imputed error or omission on the part of the
prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in dealing with the charges against
him, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and should
have been brought up there instead of directly to this Court.
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There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these
questions was beyond the ability or competence of the respondent Judge-indeed
such an assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts;
none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or transcendental
importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, from deciding them;
none, in short that would justify by passing established judicial processes
designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts.
Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of four Members of the
Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should
not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail,
and if it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes
no difference that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no
bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor's
recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the better course
for the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is
charged.19 It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has
been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing and thereby put
to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this
Court of other parties in a similar situation, all apparently taking their cue from
it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of seeking recourse in the regular
manner just outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has only contributed to
the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this
Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present
petition, but also because to wash the Court's hand off it on jurisdictional
grounds would only compound the delay that it has already gone through, the
Court now decides the same on the merits. But in so doing, the Court cannot
express too strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and
orderly progression of proceedings that should have started with the trial court
and reached this Court only if the relief appealed for was denied by the former
and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance,
but will give short shrift to, pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit the
judicial process and burden it with the resolution of issues properly within the
original competence of the lower courts. What has thus far been stated is
equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R.
No. 92164) which is virtually Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual
milieu and is therefore determinable on the same principles already set forth.
Said spouses have uncontestedly pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued
against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-10941,
that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of
March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody and detained without bail on the
strength of said warrants in violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost
that quitessentiany quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency with which
it is regarded and punished by law, that present-day rebels are less impelled by
love of country than by lust for power and have become no better than mere
terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to
stand in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as
the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted
mayhem so much in the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent
civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable to, or even claimed
by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even
the crowded streets of our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence
that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at national
economic recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on
rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the
other offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be
conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken
in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only
interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond
interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing
the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in
People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan
Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as
charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before
final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to
petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases
are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to
be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of
the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become
functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco and Regalado, JJ., concur.
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Medialdea, J., concurs in G.R. No. 92164 but took no part in G.R. No. 92163.
Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I join my colleagues in holding that the Hernandez doctrine, which has been
with us for the past three decades, remains good law and, thus, should remain
undisturbed, despite periodic challenges to it that, ironically, have only served to
strengthen its pronouncements.
I take exception to the view, however, that habeas corpus was not the proper
remedy.
Had the Information filed below charged merely the simple crime of Rebellion,
that proposition could have been plausible. But that Information charged
Rebellion complexed with Murder and Multiple Frustrated Murder, a crime
which does not exist in our statute books. The charge was obviously intended to
make the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period imposable
upon the offender pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, no
bail was recommended in the Information nor was any prescribed in the
Warrant of Arrest issued by the Trial Court.
Under the attendant circumstances, therefore, to have filed a Motion to Quash
before the lower Court would not have brought about the speedy relief from
unlawful restraint that petitioner was seeking. During the pendency of said
Motion before the lower Court, petitioner could have continued to languish in
detention. Besides, the Writ of Habeas Corpus may still issue even if another
remedy, which is less effective, may be availed of (Chavez vs. Court of Appeals,
24 SCRA 663).
It is true that habeas corpus would ordinarily not he when a person is under
custody by virtue of a process issued by a Court.
The Court, however, must have jurisdiction to issue the process. In this case,
the Court below must be deemed to have been ousted of jurisdiction when it
illegally curtailed petitioner's liberty. Habeas corpus is thus available.
The writ of habeas corpus is available to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.
But where the detention or confinement is the result of a process issued by the
court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or sentence, the writ ordinarily cannot
be availed of. It may still be invoked though if the process, judgment or
sentence proceeded from a court or tribunal the jurisdiction of which may be
assailed. Even if it had authority to act at the outset, it is now the prevailing
doctrine that a deprivation of constitutional right, if shown to exist, would oust
it of jurisdiction. In such a case, habeas corpus could be relied upon to regain
one's liberty (Celeste vs. People, 31 SCRA 391) [Emphasis emphasis].
The Petition for habeas corpus was precisely premised on the violation of
petitioner's constitutional right to bail inasmuch as rebellion, under the present
state of the law, is a bailable offense and the crime for which petitioner stands
accused of and for which he was denied bail is non-existent in law.
While litigants should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the judicial ladder, nothing
should stop this Court from taking cognizance of petitions brought before it
raising urgent constitutional issues, any procedural flaw notwithstanding.
The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v. Quilen, 42
Phil. 805), the writ of habeas corpus being the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. The
scope and flexibility of the writ-its capacity to reach all manner of illegal
detention-its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes-have
always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers
(Gumabon v. Director of Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420) [emphasis
supplied].
The proliferation of cases in this Court, which followed in the wake of this
Petition, was brought about by the insistence of the prosecution to charge the
crime of Rebellion complexed with other common offenses notwithstanding
the fact that this Court had not yet ruled on the validity of that charge and had
granted provisional liberty to petitioner.
If, indeed, it is desired to make the crime of Rebellion a capital offense (now
punishable by reclusion perpetua), the remedy lies in legislation. But Article 142-
A 1 of the Revised Penal Code, along with P.D. No. 942, were repealed, for
being "repressive," by EO No. 187 on 5 June 1987. EO 187 further explicitly
provided that Article 134 (and others enumerated) of the Revised Penal Code
was "restored to its full force and effect as it existed before said amendatory
decrees." Having been so repealed, this Court is bereft of power to legislate into
existence, under the guise of re-examining a settled doctrine, a "creature
unknown in law"- the complex crime of Rebellion with Murder. The remand of
the case to the lower Court for further proceedings is in order. The Writ of
Habeas Corpus has served its purpose.
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GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I join the Court's decision to grant the petition. In reiterating the rule that under
existing law rebellion may not be complexed with murder, the Court
emphasizes that it cannot legislate a new-crime into existence nor prescribe a
penalty for its commission. That function is exclusively for Congress.
I write this separate opinion to make clear how I view certain issues arising
from these cases, especially on how the defective informations filed by the
prosecutors should have been treated.
I agree with the ponente that a petition for habeas corpus is ordinarily not the
proper procedure to assert the right to bail. Under the special circumstances of
this case, however, the petitioners had no other recourse. They had to come to
us.
First, the trial court was certainly aware of the decision in People v. Hernandez,
99 Phil. 515 (1956) that there is no such crime in our statute books as rebellion
complexed with murder, that murder committed in connection with a rebellion
is absorbed by the crime of rebellion, and that a resort to arms resulting in the
destruction of life or property constitutes neither two or more offenses nor a
complex crime but one crime-rebellion pure and simple.
Second, Hernandez has been the law for 34 years. It has been reiterated in
equally sensational cases. All lawyers and even law students are aware of the
doctrine. Attempts to have the doctrine re-examined have been consistently
rejected by this Court.
Third, President Marcos through the use of his then legislative powers, issued
Pres. Decree 942, thereby installing the new crime of rebellion complexed with
offenses like murder where graver penalties are imposed by law. However,
President Aquino using her then legislative powers expressly repealed PD 942
by issuing Exec. Order 187. She thereby erased the crime of rebellion
complexed with murder and made it clear that the Hernandez doctrine remains
the controlling rule. The prosecution has not explained why it insists on
resurrecting an offense expressly wiped out by the President. The prosecution,
in effect, questions the action of the President in repealing a repressive decree, a
decree which, according to the repeal order, is violative of human rights.
Fourth, any re-examination of the Hernandez doctrine brings the ex post facto
principle into the picture. Decisions of this Court form part of our legal system.
Even if we declare that rebellion may be complexed with murder, our
declaration can not be made retroactive where the effect is to imprison a person
for a crime which did not exist until the Supreme Court reversed itself.
And fifth, the attempts to distinguish this case from the Hernandez case by
stressing that the killings charged in the information were committed "on the
occasion of, but not a necessary means for, the commission of rebellion" result
in outlandish consequences and ignore the basic nature of rebellion. Thus,
under the prosecution theory a bomb dropped on PTV-4 which kills
government troopers results in simple rebellion because the act is a necessary
means to make the rebellion succeed. However, if the same bomb also kills
some civilians in the neighborhood, the dropping of the bomb becomes
rebellion complexed with murder because the killing of civilians is not necessary
for the success of a rebellion and, therefore, the killings are only "on the
occasion of but not a 'necessary means for' the commission of rebellion.
This argument is puerile.
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. The dropping of one bomb
cannot be isolated as a separate crime of rebellion. Neither should the dropping
of one hundred bombs or the firing of thousands of machine gun bullets be
broken up into a hundred or thousands of separate offenses, if each bomb or
each bullet happens to result in the destruction of life and property. The same
act cannot be punishable by separate penalties depending on what strikes the
fancy of prosecutors-punishment for the killing of soldiers or retribution for the
deaths of civilians. The prosecution also loses sight of the regrettable fact that in
total war and in rebellion the killing of civilians, the laying waste of civilian
economies, the massacre of innocent people, the blowing up of passenger
airplanes, and other acts of terrorism are all used by those engaged in rebellion.
We cannot and should not try to ascertain the intent of rebels for each single act
unless the act is plainly not connected to the rebellion. We cannot use Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to- be-enacted legislation. The killing
of civilians during a rebel attack on military facilities furthers the rebellion and is
part of the rebellion.
The trial court was certainly aware of all the above considerations. I cannot
understand why the trial Judge issued the warrant of arrest which categorically
states therein that the accused was not entitled to bail. The petitioner was
compelled to come to us so he would not be arrested without bail for a
nonexistent crime. The trial court forgot to apply an established doctrine of the
Supreme Court. Worse, it issued a warrant which reversed 34 years of
established procedure based on a well-known Supreme Court ruling.
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All courts should remember that they form part of an independent judicial
system; they do not belong to the prosecution service. A court should never
play into the hands of the prosecution and blindly comply with its erroneous
manifestations. Faced with an information charging a manifestly non-existent
crime, the duty of a trial court is to throw it out. Or, at the very least and where
possible, make it conform to the law.
A lower court cannot re-examine and reverse a decision of the Supreme Court
especially a decision consistently followed for 34 years. Where a Judge disagrees
with a Supreme Court ruling, he is free to express his reservations in the body
of his decision, order, or resolution. However, any judgment he renders, any
order he prescribes, and any processes he issues must follow the Supreme Court
precedent. A trial court has no jurisdiction to reverse or ignore precedents of
the Supreme Court. In this particular case, it should have been the Solicitor
General coming to this Court to question the lower court's rejection of the
application for a warrant of arrest without bail. It should have been the
Solicitor-General provoking the issue of re-examination instead of the
petitioners asking to be freed from their arrest for a non-existent crime.
The principle bears repeating:
Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It could not
have ruled in any other way on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having
spoken, its duty was to obey. It is as simple as that. There is relevance to this
excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera. (L-31589, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 98) 'The
delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or
statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal
ordinance is committed to the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial
than that appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of the
rule of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to
speak with one voice. It does so with finality, logically and rightly, through the
highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then should be definitive and
authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial
hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit.' (Ibid, 107. The opinion of Justice
Laurel in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937] was cited). The ensuing paragraph
of the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: Such a thought was
reiterated in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these
words: 'Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme
Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last
word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy.
There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should
take their bearings. (Ibid. Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. Court of
First Instance of Manila (Br. VI), L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948, 961.
(Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226 [1978]. See also Albert v. Court of
First Instance, 23 SCRA 948 [1968] and Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services,
Inc. v. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577 [1983])
I find the situation in Spouses Panlilio v. Prosecutors Fernando de Leon, et al.
even more inexplicable. In the case of the Panlilios, any probable cause to
commit the non- existent crime of rebellion complexed with murder exists only
in the minds of the prosecutors, not in the records of the case.
I have gone over the records and pleadings furnished to the members of the
Supreme Court. I listened intently to the oral arguments during the hearing and
it was quite apparent that the constitutional requirement of probable cause was
not satisfied. In fact, in answer to my query for any other proofs to support the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, the answer was that the evidence would be
submitted in due time to the trial court.
The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the restaurant business for
decades. Under the records of these petitions, any restaurant owner or hotel
manager who serves food to rebels is a co-conspirator in the rebellion. The
absurdity of this proposition is apparent if we bear in mind that rebels ride in
buses and jeepneys, eat meals in rural houses when mealtime finds them in the
vicinity, join weddings, fiestas, and other parties, play basketball with barrio
youths, attend masses and church services and otherwise mix with people in
various gatherings. Even if the hosts recognize them to be rebels and fail to
shoo them away, it does not necessarily follow that the former are co-
conspirators in a rebellion.
The only basis for probable cause shown by the records of the Panlilio case is
the alleged fact that the petitioners served food to rebels at the Enrile
household and a hotel supervisor asked two or three of their waiters, without
reason, to go on a vacation. Clearly, a much, much stronger showing of
probable cause must be shown.
In Salonga v. Cruz Paño, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), then Senator Salonga was
charged as a conspirator in the heinous bombing of innocent civilians because
the man who planted the bomb had, sometime earlier, appeared in a group
photograph taken during a birthday party in the United States with the Senator
and other guests. It was a case of conspiracy proved through a group picture.
Here, it is a case of conspiracy sought to proved through the catering of food.
The Court in Salonga stressed:
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The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against
hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open
and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a
public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials.
(Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing Hashimn v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The
right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would
be to transgress constitutional due process. (See People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA
277) However, in order to satisfy the due process clause it is not enough that
the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a
transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves
not only the purposes of the State. More important, it is a part of the guarantees
of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who live in our country. It
is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to
relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained
that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable
cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although
there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause
since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given
situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or
opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not
disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of
reason (See La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge
or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that
some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a
flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It
bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not
denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be
so. (id., pp. 461- 462)
Because of the foregoing, I take exception to that part of the ponencia which
will read the informations as charging simple rebellion. This case did not arise
from innocent error. If an information charges murder but its contents show
only the ingredients of homicide, the Judge may rightly read it as charging
homicide. In these cases, however, there is a deliberate attempt to charge the
petitioners for an offense which this Court has ruled as non-existent. The
prosecution wanted Hernandez to be reversed. Since the prosecution has filed
informations for a crime which, under our rulings, does not exist, those
informations should be treated as null and void. New informations charging the
correct offense should be filed. And in G.R. No. 92164, an extra effort should
be made to see whether or not the Principle in Salonga v. Cruz Patio, et al.
(supra) has been violated.
The Court is not, in any way, preventing the Government from using more
effective weapons to suppress rebellion. If the Government feels that the
current situation calls for the imposition of more severe penalties like death or
the creation of new crimes like rebellion complexed with murder, the remedy is
with Congress, not the courts.
I, therefore, vote to GRANT the petitions and to ORDER the respondent
court to DISMISS the void informations for a non-existent crime.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority of the Court.
I believe that there are certain aspects of the Hernandez doctrine that, as an
abstract question of law, could stand reexamination or clarification. I have in
mind in particular matters such as the correct or appropriate relationship
between Article 134 and Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code. This is a matter
which relates to the legal concept of rebellion in our legal system. If one
examines the actual terms of Article 134 (entitled: "Rebellion or Insurrection-
How Committed"), it would appear that this Article specifies both the overt acts
and the criminal purpose which, when put together, would constitute the
offense of rebellion. Thus, Article 134 states that "the crime of rebellion is
committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government "(i.e., the
overt acts comprising rebellion), "for the purpose of (i.e., the specific criminal
intent or political objective) removing from the allegiance to said government or
its laws the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or
any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive
or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of their powers or prerogatives." At the
same time, Article 135 (entitled: "Penalty for Rebellion or Insurrection.") sets
out a listing of acts or particular measures which appear to fall under the rubric
of rebellion or insurrection: "engaging in war against the forces of the
Government, destroying property or committing serious violence, exacting
contributions or diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they
have been appropriated." Are these modalities of rebellion generally? Or are
they particular modes by which those "who promote [ ], maintain [ ] or head [ ]
a rebellion or insurrection" commit rebellion, or particular modes of
participation in a rebellion by public officers or employees? Clearly, the scope of
the legal concept of rebellion relates to the distinction between, on the one
hand, the indispensable acts or ingredients of the crime of rebellion under the
Revised Penal Code and, on the other hand, differing optional modes of seeking
to carry out the political or social objective of the rebellion or insurrection.
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The difficulty that is at once raised by any effort to examine once more even the
above threshold questions is that the results of such re-examination may well be
that acts which under the Hernandez doctrine are absorbed into rebellion, may
be characterized as separate or discrete offenses which, as a matter of law, can
either be prosecuted separately from rebellion or prosecuted under the
provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which (both Clause 1 and
Clause 2 thereof) clearly envisage the existence of at least two (2) distinct
offenses. To reach such a conclusion in the case at bar, would, as far as I can
see, result in colliding with the fundamental non-retroactivity principle (Article
4, Civil Code; Article 22, Revised Penal Code; both in relation to Article 8, Civil
Code).
The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. But, statutes do not
exist in the abstract but rather bear upon the lives of people with the specific
form given them by judicial decisions interpreting their norms. Judicial decisions
construing statutory norms give specific shape and content to such norms. In
time, the statutory norms become encrusted with the glosses placed upon them
by the courts and the glosses become integral with the norms (Cf Caltex v.
Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]). Thus, while in legal theory, judicial
interpretation of a statute becomes part of the law as of the date that the law
was originally enacted, I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously where
a new judicial doctrine is announced, in particular one overruling a previous
existing doctrine of long standing (here, 36 years) and most specially not where
the statute construed is criminal in nature and the new doctrine is more onerous
for the accused than the pre-existing one (People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607
[1974]; People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]; Gumabon v. Director of Prisons,
37 SCRA 420 [1971]). Moreover, the non-retroactivity rule whether in respect
of legislative acts or judicial decisions has constitutional implications. The
prevailing rule in the United States is that a judicial decision that retroactively
renders an act criminal or enhances the severity of the penalty prescribed for an
offense, is vulnerable to constitutional challenge based upon the rule against ex
post facto laws and the due process clause (Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US
347,12 L. Ed. 2d 894 [1964]; Marks v. U.S., 43 US 188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 [1977];
Devine v. New Mexico Department of Corrections, 866 F. 2d 339 [1989]).
It is urged by the Solicitor General that the non-retroactivity principle does not
present any real problem for the reason that the Hernandez doctrine was based
upon Article 48, second clause, of the Revised Penal Code and not upon the
first clause thereof, while it is precisely the first clause of Article 48 that the
Government here invokes. It is, however, open to serious doubt whether
Hernandez can reasonably be so simply and sharply characterized. And
assuming the Hernandez could be so characterized, subsequent cases refer to
the Hernandez doctrine in terms which do not distinguish clearly between the
first clause and the second clause of Article 48 (e.g., People v. Geronimo, 100
Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]). Thus, it appears to
me that the critical question would be whether a man of ordinary intelligence
would have necessarily read or understood the Hernandez doctrine as referring
exclusively to Article 48, second clause. Put in slightly different terms, the
important question would be whether the new doctrine here proposed by the
Government could fairly have been derived by a man of average intelligence (or
counsel of average competence in the law) from an examination of Articles 134
and 135 of the Revised Penal Code as interpreted by the Court in the
Hernandez and subsequent cases. To formulate the question ill these terms
would almost be to compel a negative answer, especially in view of the
conclusions reached by the Court and its several Members today.
Finally, there appears to be no question that the new doctrine that the
Government would have us discover for the first time since the promulgation
of the Revised Penal Code in 1932, would be more onerous for the respondent
accused than the simple application of the Hernandez doctrine that murders
which have been committed on the occasion of and in furtherance of the crime
of rebellion must be deemed absorbed in the offense of simple rebellion.
I agree therefore that the information in this case must be viewed as charging
only the crime of simple rebellion.
FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
I am constrained to write this separate opinion on what seems to be a rigid
adherence to the 1956 ruling of the Court. The numerous challenges to the
doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956)
should at once demonstrate the need to redefine the applicability of said
doctrine so as to make it conformable with accepted and well-settled principles
of criminal law and jurisprudence.
To my mind, the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-
embracing authority for the rule that all common crimes committed on the
occasion, or in furtherance of, or in connection with, rebellion are absorbed by
the latter. To that extent, I cannot go along with the view of the majority in the
instant case that 'Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the
complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion
thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended
effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion" (p. 9, Decision).
The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was appealed by
the Court in 1956 during the communist-inspired rebellion of the Huks. The
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changes in our society in the span of 34 years since then have far-reaching
effects on the all-embracing applicability of the doctrine considering the
emergence of alternative modes of seizing the powers of the duly constituted
Government not contemplated in Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal
Code and their consequent effects on the lives of our people. The doctrine was
good law then, but I believe that there is a certain aspect of the Hernandez
doctrine that needs clarification.
With all due respect to the views of my brethren in the Court, I believe that the
Court, in the instant case, should have further considered that distinction
between acts or offenses which are indispensable in the commission of
rebellion, on the one hand, and those acts or offenses that are merely necessary
but not indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the other. The
majority of the Court is correct in adopting, albeit impliedly, the view in
Hernandez case that when an offense perpetrated as a necessary means of
committing another, which is an element of the latter, the resulting interlocking
crimes should be considered as only one simple offense and must be deemed
outside the operation of the complex crime provision (Article 48) of the
Revised Penal Code. As in the case of Hernandez, the Court, however, failed in
the instant case to distinguish what is indispensable from what is merely
necessary in the commission of an offense, resulting thus in the rule that
common crimes like murder, arson, robbery, etc. committed in the course or on
the occasion of rebellion are absorbed or included in the latter as elements
thereof.
The relevance of the distinction is significant, more particularly, if applied to
contemporaneous events happening in our country today. Theoretically, a crime
which is indispensable in the commission of another must necessarily be an
element of the latter; but a crime that is merely necessary but not indispensable
in the commission of another is not an element of the latter, and if and when
actually committed, brings the interlocking crime within the operation of the
complex crime provision (Art. 48) of the Revised Penal Code. With that
distinction, common crimes committed against Government forces and
property in the course of rebellion are properly considered indispensable overt
acts of rebellion and are logically absorbed in it as virtual ingredients or
elements thereof, but common crimes committed against the civilian population
in the course or on the occasion of rebellion and in furtherance thereof, may be
necessary but not indispensable in committing the latter, and may, therefore,
not be considered as elements of the said crime of rebellion. To illustrate, the
deaths occurring during armed confrontation or clashes between government
forces and the rebels are absorbed in the rebellion, and would be those resulting
from the bombing of military camps and installations, as these acts are
indispensable in carrying out the rebellion. But deliberately shooting down an
unarmed innocent civilian to instill fear or create chaos among the people,
although done in the furtherance of the rebellion, should not be absorbed in the
crime of rebellion as the felonious act is merely necessary, but not
indispensable. In the latter case, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code should
apply.
The occurrence of a coup d' etat in our country as a mode of seizing the powers
of the duly-constituted government by staging surprise attacks or occupying
centers of powers, of which this Court should take judicial notice, has
introduced a new dimension to the interpretation of the provisions on rebellion
and insurrection in the Revised Penal Code. Generally, as a mode of seizing the
powers of the duly constituted government, it falls within the contemplation of
rebellion under the Revised Penal Code, but, strictly construed, a coup d'etat per
se is a class by itself. The manner of its execution and the extent and magnitude
of its effects on the lives of the people distinguish a coup d'etat from the
traditional definition and modes of commission attached by the Revised Penal
Code to the crime of rebellion as applied by the Court to the communist-
inspired rebellion of the 1950's. A coup d'etat may be executed successfully
without its perpetrators resorting to the commission of other serious crimes
such as murder, arson, kidnapping, robbery, etc. because of the element of
surprise and the precise timing of its execution. In extreme cases where murder,
arson, robbery, and other common crimes are committed on the occasion of a
coup d' etat, the distinction referred to above on what is necessary and what is
indispensable in the commission of the coup d'etat should be painstakingly
considered as the Court should have done in the case of herein petitioners.
I concur in the result insofar as the other issues are resolved by the Court but I
take exception to the vote of the majority on the broad application of the
Hernandez doctrine.
BIDIN, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the majority opinion except as regards the dispositive portion
thereof which orders the remand of the case to the respondent judge for further
proceedings to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioner.
I submit that the proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent judge
for the purpose of fixing bail since we have construed the indictment herein as
charging simple rebellion, an offense which is bailable. Consequently, habeas
corpus is the proper remedy available to petitioner as an accused who had been
charged with simple rebellion, a bailable offense but who had been denied his
right to bail by the respondent judge in violation of petitioner's constitutional
right to bail. In view thereof, the responsibility of fixing the amount of bail and
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approval thereof when filed, devolves upon us, if complete relief is to be
accorded to petitioner in the instant proceedings.
It is indubitable that before conviction, admission to bail is a matter of right to
the defendant, accused before the Regional Trial Court of an offense less than
capital (Section 13 Article III, Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114). Petitioner
is, before Us, on a petition for habeas corpus praying, among others, for his
provisional release on bail. Since the offense charged (construed as simple
rebellion) admits of bail, it is incumbent upon us m the exercise of our
jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus (Section 5 (1), Article VIII,
Constitution; Section 2, Rule 102), to grant petitioner his right to bail and
having admitted him to bail, to fix the amount thereof in such sums as the court
deems reasonable. Thereafter, the rules require that "the proceedings together
with the bond" shall forthwith be certified to the respondent trial court (Section
14, Rule 102).
Accordingly, the cash bond in the amount of P 100,000.00 posted by petitioner
for his provisional release pursuant to our resolution dated March 6, 1990
should now be deemed and admitted as his bail bond for his provisional release
in the case (simple rebellion) pending before the respondent judge, without
necessity of a remand for further proceedings, conditioned for his (petitioner's)
appearance before the trial court to abide its order or judgment in the said case.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I agree that People v. Hernandez 1 should abide. More than three decades after
which it was penned, it has firmly settled in the tomes of our jurisprudence as
correct doctrine.
As Hernandez put it, rebellion means "engaging m war against the forces of the
government," 2 which implies "resort to arms, requisition of property and
services, collection of taxes and contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to
property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the hunger, illness and
unhappiness that war leaves in its wake. ..." 3 whether committed in
furtherance, of as a necessary means for the commission, or in the course, of
rebellion. To say that rebellion may be complexed with any other offense, in
this case murder, is to play into a contradiction in terms because exactly,
rebellion includes murder, among other possible crimes.
I also agree that the information may stand as an accusation for simple
rebellion. Since the acts complained of as constituting rebellion have been
embodied in the information, mention therein of murder as a complexing
offense is a surplusage, because in any case, the crime of rebellion is left fully
described. 4
At any rate, the government need only amend the information by a clerical
correction, since an amendment will not alter its substance.
I dissent, however, insofar as the majority orders the remand of the matter of
bail to the lower court. I take it that when we, in our Resolution of March 6,
1990, granted the petitioner "provisional liberty" upon the filing of a bond of
P100,000.00, we granted him bail. The fact that we gave him "provisional
liberty" is in my view, of no moment, because bail means provisional liberty. It
will serve no useful purpose to have the trial court hear the incident again when
we ourselves have been satisfied that the petitioner is entitled to temporary
freedom.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the ruling in People vs.
Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 "remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the
complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion
thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended
effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion."
I dissent, however, from the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the
information in question, while charging the complex crime of rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder, "is to be read as charging simple
rebellion."
The present cases are to be distinguished from the Hernandez case in at least
one (1) material respect. In the Hernandez case, this Court was confronted with
an appealed case, i.e., Hernandez had been convicted by the trial court of the
complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson and robbery, and his plea to be
released on bail before the Supreme Court, pending appeal, gave birth to the
now celebrated Hernandez doctrine that the crime of rebellion complexed with
murder, arson and robbery does not exist. In the present cases, on the other
hand, the Court is confronted with an original case, i.e., where an information
has been recently filed in the trial court and the petitioners have not even
pleaded thereto.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in the Hernandez case, was "ground-
breaking" on the issue of whether rebellion can be complexed with murder,
arson, robbery, etc. In the present cases, on the other hand, the prosecution and
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the lower court, not only had the Hernandez doctrine (as case law), but
Executive Order No. 187 of President Corazon C. Aquino dated 5 June 1987
(as statutory law) to bind them to the legal proposition that the crime of
rebellion complexed with murder, and multiple frustrated murder does not
exist.
And yet, notwithstanding these unmistakable and controlling beacon lights-
absent when this Court laid down the Hernandez doctrine-the prosecution has
insisted in filing, and the lower court has persisted in hearing, an information
charging the petitioners with rebellion complexed with murder an multiple
frustrated murder. That information is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio.
Its head should not be allowed to surface. As a nullity in substantive law, it
charges nothing; it has given rise to nothing. The warrants of arrest issued
pursuant thereto are as null and void as the information on which they are
anchored. And, since the entire question of the information's validity is before
the Court in these habeas corpus cases, I venture to say that the information is
fatally defective, even under procedural law, because it charges more than one
(1) offense (Sec. 13, Rule 110, Rules of Court).
I submit then that it is not for this Court to energize a dead and, at best, fatally
decrepit information by labelling or "baptizing" it differently from what it
announces itself to be. The prosecution must file an entirely new and proper
information, for this entire exercise to merit the serious consideration of the
courts.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petitions, QUASH the warrants of
arrest, and ORDER the information for rebellion complexed with murder and
multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case Nos. 90-10941, RTC of Quezon
City, DISMISSED.
Consequently, the petitioners should be ordered permanently released and their
bails cancelled.
Paras, J., concurs.
NAPOLIS VS CA
CONCEPCION, C.J.:p
Appeal taken by Nicanor Napolis from a decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, the dispositive part of
which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby
finds the accused Bonifacio Malana, Nicanor Napolis and Apolinario Satimbre
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery in band and sentences
Bonifacio Malanaas an accessory after the fact to suffer imprisonment of from
six (6) months, arresto mayor, as minimum to six (6) years, prision correccional,
as maximum and to indemnify the offended party, Ignacio Peñaflor in the sum
of P80.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency but not to exceed
one-third (1/3)of the principal penalty and the accused Nicanor Napolis and
Apolinario Satimbre to suffer imprisonment of from ten (10) years and one (1)
day, prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day, reclusion temporal, as maximum, both to indemnify the spouses
Ignacio Peñaflor and Casimira Lagman in the sum of Two Thousand Five
Hundred Fifty-Seven Pesos (P2,557.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and all three to pay the proportionate part of the costs.
The main facts, on which there is no dispute, are set forth in the decision of the
Court of Appeals, from which We quote:
At about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of October 1, 1956, Mrs. Casimira
Lagman Peñaflor , 47-year old wife of Ignacio Peñaflor , the owner of a store
located at the new highway, Hermosa, Bataan, after answering a minor call of
nature, heard the barkings of the dog nearby indicating the presence of
strangers around the vicinity. Acting on instinct, she woke up husband Ignacio
Peñaflor who, after getting his flashlight and .38 caliber revolver, went down the
store to take a look. As he approached the door of the store, it suddenly gave
way having been forcibly pushed and opened by 4 men, one of them holding
and pointing a machinegun. Confronted by this peril, Ignacio Peñaflor fired his
revolver but missed. Upon receiving from someone a stunning blow on the
head, Ignacio fell down but he pretended to be dead. He was hogtied by the
men. The fact, however, was that he did not lose consciousness (tsn. 5, I). The
men then went up the house. One of the robbers asked Mrs. Casimira L.
Peñaflor for money saying that they are people from the mountain. Mrs.
Casimira L. Peñaflor , realizing the danger, took from under the mat the bag
containing P2,000.00 in cash and two rings worth P350.00 and delivered them
to the robber. Thereupon, that robber opened and ransacked the wardrobe.
Then they tied the hands of Mrs. Casimira L. Peñaflor and those of her two
sons. After telling them to lie down, the robbers covered them with blankets
and left. The revolver of Ignacio, valued at P150.00, was taken by the robbers.
The spouses thereafter called for help and Councilor Almario, a neighbor, came
and untied Ignacio Peñaflor . The robbery was reported to the Chief of Police
of Hermosa and to the Philippine Constabulary.
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Chief of Police Delfin Lapid testified that he went to the premises upon
receiving the report of Councilor Almario and found owner Ignacio Peñaflor
with a wound on the head (tsn. 23, I). The wardrobe was ransacked and things
scattered around. It appears that the robbers bore a hole on the sidewall of the
ground floor of the store and passed through it to gain entrance. According to
Chief of Police Delfin Lapid, "they removed the adobe stone and that is the
place where they passed through" (tsn. 24, I). In that same morning, policeman
Melquiades Samaniego reported seeing suspicious characters passing through a
nearby field and when the field was inspected, the authorities were able to locate
a greasegun with 5 bullets and a pistol with 3 bullets (tsn. 24, I, testimony of
Chief of Police)...
It appears that, shortly after the occurrence, a criminal complaint for robbery in
band was filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Hermosa, Bataan. Named
as defendants in the complaint, as subsequently amended, were Nicanor
Napolis, Bonifacio Malana, Ben de la Cruz, Mauricio Anila, alias Mori, Jose
Escabel, alias Pepe, Antonio Bededia, alias Toning, John Doe, alias Sommy
Casimiro, Apolinario Satimbre, Paul Doe, et al. Napolis, Malana, Anila and
Casimiro having waived their right to a preliminary investigation, the case,
insofar as they are concerned, was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of
Bataan, where the corresponding information was filed. As subsequently
amended, by the inclusion, as defendants therein, of Antonio Bededia alias
Toning, Domingo Flores alias Eko, Ben de la Cruz, Jose Escabel alias Pepe,
Apolinario Satimbre, Carlito Veloso and Paul Doe, it is alleged in said
information: .
That on or about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of October 1, 1956, in the
Municipality of Hermosa, Province of Bataan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused Bonifacio Malana,
Nicanor Napolis, Ben de la Cruz, Mauricio Anila, Alias Mori, Jose Escabel,
Alias Pepe, Antonio Bededia, alias Toning, John Doe, Alias Sommy Casimiro,
Apolinario Satimbre, Carlito Veloso, Domingo Flores, Alias Eko and Paul Doe,
by conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with the intent to gain
and armed with a Grease Gun, Three (3) caliber .45 pistols and two (2)
revolvers, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, entered the
dwelling of the spouses IGNACIO PEÑAFLOR and CASIMIRA L.
PEÑAFLOR by boring a hole under the sidewall of the ground floor of the
house and once inside, attack, assault and hit Ignacio Peñaflor with the handle
of the Grease Gun causing him to fall on the ground and rendering him
unconscious, tied his hands and feet and then leave him; that the same accused
approached Casimira L. Peñaflor , threatened her at gun point and demanded
money; that the same accused while inside the said house searched and
ransacked the place and take and carry away the following cash money and
articles belonging to said spouses Ignacio Peñaflor and Casimira L. Peñaflor , to
wit: P2,000.00 in cash, Philippine Currency, One (1) ring (Brillante) valued at
P350.00, One (1) licensed Commando Colt Revolver, Serial No. 532132 and
One (1) Flashlight, valued at P7.00, to the damage and prejudice of said spouses
in the total sum of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN
PESOS, (P2,557.00) Philippine Currency.".
At the trial of Malana, Napolis, Satimbre, De la Cruz, Anila, Casimiro and
Flores,1 the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimony of the
offended parties, Ignacio Peñaflor and his wife Casimira Lagman Peñaflor ,
Provincial Fiscal Eleno L. Kahayon, Clerk of Court Pedro Aldea, Deputy Clerk
of Court Eulogio C. Mina, Delfin Lapid, the Chief of Police of Hermosa,
Bataan, and Lt. Luis Sacramento of the Constabulary and the affidavits,
Exhibits A, B and C of defendants Napolis, Satimbre and Malana, respectively,
admitting their participation in the commission of the crime charged.
Mr. and Mrs. Peñaflor testified mainly on the robbery involved in the charge,
whereas Fiscal Kahayon narrated the circumstances under which the affidavit
Exhibit A was subscribed and sworn to before him by appellant Napolis; Police
Chief Lapid and Lt. Sacramento dwelt on the investigations conducted by them
and the circumstances under which said defendants made their aforementioned
affidavits; and Clerk of Court Pedro Aldea and Deputy Clerk of Court Eulogio
C. Mina explained how Exhibits B and C were subscribed and sworn to before
them by defendants Satimbre and Malana, respectively.
Upon the other hand, Napolis tried to establish an alibi. Testifying in his own
defense, he would have Us believe that on October 1, 1956, he was in his house
in Olongapo, Zambales, because of a tooth extracted from him by one Dr.
Maginas.
Defendant Satimbre, in turn, introduced his own testimony and that of his wife
Engracia Mendoza. Satimbre claimed to be innocent of the crime charged and
said that, although reluctant to sign Exhibit B, he eventually signed thereon,
upon the advice of his wife Engracia Mendoza — who sought to corroborate
him — and Mayor Guillermo Arcenas of Hermosa, in order that he may not be
implicated in a robbery that took place in Balanga, Bataan, and that he could be
sent back to his hometown, Hermosa, Bataan.
Before the conclusion of the trial, the court of first instance of Bataan dismissed
the case as against defendants Flores, Anila, Casimiro and De la Cruz.
In due course, said court convicted Nicanor Napolis, Bonifacio Malana and
Apolinario Satimbre, as above indicated. Said defendants appealed to the Court
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of Appeals which, however, dismissed Malana's appeal, and affirmed the
decision of the Court of First Instance, insofar as Napolis and Satimbre are
concerned. Satimbre did not appeal from said decision of the Court of Appeals,
whereas Napolis alleges that said court has erred — .
I. In affirming in toto the conviction of petitioner herein, of the crime
charged based upon a lurking error of identity.
II. In affirming the conviction of petitioner based upon an extra-judicial
confession extracted through duress.
III. In affirming the decision of the court a quo based upon the evidence
on record adduced during the trial.
IV. In deciding the case not in accordance with the provision of law and
jurisprudence on the matter.
Under the first assignment of error, it is urged that appellant has not been
sufficiently identified as one of those who perpetrated the crime charged. In
support of this contention, it is argued that the identification made by Mrs.
Peñaflor was due to a picture of appellant taken by Lt. Sacramento from the
files of the police in Olongapo, Zambales, and then shown to her, before he
(appellant) was apprehended and then brought to her presence for
identification. It is thus implied that Mrs. Peñaflor identified him in
consequence of the suggestion resulting from the picture she had seen before he
was taken to her for said purpose. The defense further alleges that she could not
have recognized appellant herein, in the evening of the occurrence, because the
same was dark, and the flashlight used by the malefactors was then focused
downward.
Appellant's pretense is, however, devoid of factual basis. The record shows that
the authorities were notified immediately after the occurrence; that, soon after,
peace officers — Police Chief Lapid and PC Lt. Sacramento — repaired to the
house of Mr. and Mrs. Peñaflor and investigated them; that based upon the
description given by Mrs. Peñaflor , one individual was apprehended and then
presented to Mrs. Peñaflor , who said that he was not one of the thieves; that
another person subsequently arrested and taken to Mrs. Peñaflor was, similarly,
exonerated by her; that in the course of the investigation conducted by the
Philippine Constabulary, Lt. Sacramento later brought Mrs. Peñaflor to the
offices of the police force in Olongapo and showed her the pictures of police
characters on file therein; that among those pictures, she noticed that of
appellant herein, who, she believed, was one of the culprits; and that appellant
was, therefore, arrested and brought to Mrs. Peñaflor , who positively identified
him as one of the malefactors.
In other words, Lt. Sacramento did not suggest to Mrs. Peñaflor , through the
aforementioned picture of appellant, that he was one of the thieves. It was she
who told Lt. Sacramento that said picture was that of one of the thieves.
Besides, the fact that Mrs. Peñaflor readily exonerated the first two suspects,
arrested by the authorities, shows that appellant herein would not have been
identified by her if she were not reasonably certain about it.
Then, again, she had ample opportunity to recognize appellant herein because it
was he who demanded money from her and to whom she delivered P2,000 in
cash and two (2) rings worth P350; it was, also, he who opened and ransacked
her wardrobe; and it was he who tied her hands and those of her two sons.
These series of acts, performed in her presence, consumed sufficient time —
from 10 to 20 minutes — to allow her eyesight to be adjusted to existing
conditions, and, hence, to recognize some of the robbers. The night was dark;
but, there were two flashlights switched on, namely, that of her husband, and
the one used by the thieves. Although the latter was, at times, focused
downward, it had to be aimed, sometimes, in another direction, particularly
when the money and rings were delivered to appellant herein, and when he
opened and ransacked the wardrobe of Mrs. Peñaflor . Lastly, her testimony was
confirmed by other circumstances presently to be mentioned, in connection
with the consideration of the other alleged errors pointed out by appellant
herein.
The second assignment of error is based upon a wrong premise — that
appellant's conviction was based upon his extra-judicial confession and that the
same had been made under duress.
Said extra-judicial confession was merely one of the factors considered by His
Honor, the trial Judge, and the Court of Appeals in concluding that the
evidence for the defense cannot be relied upon and that the witnesses for the
prosecution had told the truth. Besides, appellant's confession was not tainted
with duress. In this connection, the Court of Appeals had the following to say: .
Apart from the reliability of Mrs. Casimira Lagman Peñaflor 's identification, we
have the extra-judicial confession of appellant Nicanor Napolis, marked Exh. A,
subscribed and sworn to by said accused on October 26, 1956, 25 days after the
occurrence, before Provincial Fiscal Eleno L. Kahayon, the 64-year old
prosecutor who, since July 18, 1946, was the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan up to
the present. His testimony shows that he read the confession, Exh. A, to said
accused in the Tagalog dialect; asked him whether he understood it to which
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appellant Napolis answered "yes"; inquired whether he was coerced to which he
replied "No"; and then, required him to raise his hand in affirmation which he
did (tsn. 14-15, I). Thereupon, appellant Napolis signed the confession in his
(Fiscal's) presence. Provincial Fiscal Eleno L. Kahayon further testified that he
saw no signs of physical violence on the person of the appellant who appeared
normal in his appearance (tsn. 15, I). In this confession, Exh. A, appellant
Napolis related that it was co-accused Antonio Bededia (still-at-large) who
pointed the greasegun to husband Ignacio Peñaflor and who hit him (Peñaflor )
on the head and that it was co-accused Ben de la Cruz (whose case was
dismissed) who wrested Peñaflor 's revolver. For his part, appellant Napolis
admitted that it was he who talked to Mrs. Casimira L. Peñaflor and it was he
who got the money bag. The loot, according to him, was split from which he
received a share of P237.00 (Answer to Q. A, Exh. A). Among others, he
mentioned appellant Bonifacio Malana as the owner of the greasegun and the
one who got Peñaflor 's revolver from the hands of co-accused Ben de la Cruz.
... .
It may not be amiss to advert to the fact that, on appeal from a decision of the
Court of Appeals, the findings of fact made in said decision are final, except — .
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee. 2
and that the case at bar does not fall under any of the foregoing exceptions.
The third assignment of error is predicated upon the theory that the evidence
for the prosecution is contradictory and, hence, unworthy of credence. Counsel
for the defense alleges that, whereas Ignacio Peñaflor said that the thieves had
entered his house by forcing its door open, Mrs. Peñaflor testified that their
entry was effected through an excavation by the side of the house, and the chief
of police affirmed that the malefactors had removed a piece of wood and an
adobe stone to get into said house. No such contradictions, however, exist. The
house of Mr. and Mrs. Peñaflor consisted of two (2) parts, one of which was a
store and the other the dwelling proper, adjoining the store, which had a door
leading thereto (to the dwelling proper). Mrs. Peñaflor testified that the culprits
had entered the store by removing an adobe stone from a wall thereof, and this
was corroborated by the chief of police, although he added that the malefactors
had, also, removed a piece of wood from said wall. Upon the other hand, the
testimony of Mr. Peñaflor referred to a door, inside the store, leading to the
dwelling proper, as distinguished from the store.
In the light of the foregoing, and considering that the findings of fact made by
the Court of Appeals are supported by those of His Honor, the trial Judge, who
had observed the behaviour of the witnesses during the trial, it is clear to Us
that the first three (3) assignments of error are untenable.
The fourth assignment of error refers to the characterization of the crime
committed and the proper penalty therefor. It should be noted that the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court convicting Napolis, Malana and
Satimbre of the crime of robbery committed by armed persons, in an inhabited
house, entry therein having been made by breaking a wall, as provided in Article
299 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and, accordingly, sentencing Napolis and
Satimbre to an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, which is in accordance with
said legal provision.
In addition, however, to performing said acts, the malefactors had, also, used
violence against Ignacio Peñaflor , and intimidation against his wife, thereby
infringing Article 294 of the same Code, under conditions falling under sub-
paragraph (5) of said article, which prescribes the penalty of prision correccional
in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, which is lighter
than that prescribed in said Article 299, although, factually, the crime committed
is more serious than that covered by the latter provision. This Court had
previously ruled — .
... that where robbery, though committed in an inhabited house, is characterized
by intimidation, this factor "supplies the controlling qualification," so that the
law to apply is article 294 and not article 299 of the Revised Penal Code. This is
on the theory that "robbery which is characterized by violence or intimidation
against the person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by force
upon things, because where violence or intimidation against the person is
present there is greater disturbance of the order of society and the security of
the individual." (U.S. vs. Turla, 38 Phil. 346; People vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil. 89.)
And this view is followed even where, as in the present case, the penalty to be
applied under article 294 is lighter than that which would result from the
application of article 299. ... . 3
Upon mature deliberation, We find ourselves unable to share the foregoing
view. Indeed, one who, by breaking a wall, enters, with a deadly weapon, an
inhabited house and steals therefrom valuable effects, without violence against
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or intimidation upon persons, is punishable under Art. 299 of the Revised Penal
Code with reclusion temporal.4 Pursuant to the above view, adhered to in
previous decision,5 if, aside from performing said acts, the thief lays hand upon
any person, without committing any of the crimes or inflicting any of the
injuries mentioned in subparagraphs (1) to (4) of Art. 294 of the same Code, the
imposable penalty -- under paragraph (5) thereof -- shall be much lighter.6 To
our mind, this result and the process of reasoning that has brought it about,
defy logic and reason.
The argument to the effect that the violence against or intimidation of a person
supplies the "controlling qualification," is far from sufficient to justify said
result. We agree with the proposition that robbery with "violence or
intimidation against the person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery
committed by force upon things," but, precisely, for this reason, We cannot
accept the conclusion deduced therefrom in the cases above cited — reduction
of the penalty for the latter offense owing to the concurrence of violence or
intimidation which made it a more serious one. It is, to our mind, more
plausible to believe that Art. 294 applies only where robbery with violence
against or intimidation of person takes place without entering an inhabited
house, under the conditions set forth in Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code.
We deem it more logical and reasonable to hold, as We do, when the elements
of both provisions are present, that the crime is a complex one, calling for the
imposition -- as provided in Art. 48 of said Code -- of the penalty for the most
serious offense, in its maximum period, which, in the case at bar, is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period. This penalty should, in turn, be imposed in its
maximum period -- from nineteen (19) years, one (1) month and eleven (11)
days to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal — owing to the presence of the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime. In short, the doctrine adopted in U.S. v.
De los Santos7 and applied in U.S. v. Manansala,8 U.S. v. Turla,9 People v.
Baluyot, 10 Manahan v. People, 11 and People v. Sebastian, 12 is hereby
abandoned and appellant herein should be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from ten (10) years, and one (1) day of prision mayor to
nineteen (19) years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal.
Thus modified as to the penalty, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
affirmed in all other respects, with costs against herein appellant, Nicanor
Napolis. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and
Villamor, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., took part.
PEOPLE VS TOLING
AQUINO, J.:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, brothers, appealed from the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, finding them guilty of multiple murder and
attempted murder, sentencing them to death and ordering them to indemnify
each set of heirs of (1) Teresita B. Escanan, (2) Antonio B. Mabisa, (3) Isabelo
S. Dando, (4) Elena B. Erminio (5) Modesta R. Brondial (6) Isabel Felices and
(7) Teodoro F. Bautista in the sum of P6,000 and to pay Amanda Mapa the sum
of P500 (Criminal Case No. SC-966). The judgment of conviction was based on
the following facts:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, both married, are natives of Barrio
Nenita which is about eighteen (or nine) kilometers away from Mondragon,
Northern Samar. They are illiterate farmers tilling their own lands. They were
forty-eight years old in 1966. Antonio is one hour older than Jose. Being twins,
they look alike very much. However, Antonio has a distinguishing cut in his ear
(44 tsn Jan. 14, 1966).
Antonio's daughter, Leonora, was working in Manila as a laundrywoman since
September, 1964. Jose's three children one girl and two boys, had stayed in
Manila also since 1964.
Antonio decided to go to Manila after receiving a letter from Leonora telling
him that she would give him money. To have money for his expenses, Antonio
killed a pig and sold the meat to Jose's wife for sixty pesos. Jose decided to go
with Antonio in order to see his children. He was able to raise eighty-five pesos
for his expenses.
On January 6, 1965, with a bayong containing their pants and shirts, the twins
left Barrio Nenita and took a bus to Allen. From there, they took a launch to
Matnog, Sorsogon. From Matnog, they went to Daraga, Albay on board an
Alatco bus, and from Daraga, they rode on the train, arriving at the Paco
railroad station in Manila at about seven o'clock in the morning of January 8th.
It was their first trip to the big city.
At the Paco station, the twins took a jeepney which brought them to Tondo. By
means of a letter which Aniano Espenola a labor-recruiter, had given them, they
were able to locate an employment agency where they learned the address of the
Eng Heng Glassware. Antonio's daughter was working in that store.
Accompanied by Juan, an employee of the agency, they proceeded to her
employer's establishment. Leonora gave her father fifty pesos. Sencio Rubis
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Antonio's grandson, gave him thirty pesos. Antonio placed the eighty pesos in
the right pocket of his pants. It was then noontime.
Jose was not able to find any of his children in the city. The twins returned to
the agency where they ate their lunch at Juan's expense. From the agency, Juan
took the twins to the Tutuban railroad station that same day, January 8th, for
their homeward trip.
After buying their tickets, they boarded the night Bicol express train at about
five o'clock in the afternoon. The train left at six o'clock that evening.
The twins were in coach No. 9 which was the third from the rear of the dining
car. The coach had one row of two-passenger seats and another row of three-
passenger seats. Each seat faced an opposite seat. An aisle separated the two
rows. The brothers were seated side by side on the fourth three-passenger seat
from the rear, facing the back door. Jose was seated between Antonio, who was
near the window, and a three-year old boy. Beside the boy was a woman breast-
feeding her baby who was near the aisle. That woman was Corazon Bernal.
There were more than one hundred twenty passengers in the coach. Some
passengers were standing on the aisle.
Sitting on the third seat and facing the brothers were two men and an old
woman who was sleeping with her head resting on the back of the seat (Exh. 2).
on the two-passenger seat across the aisle in line with the seat where the
brothers were sitting, there were seated a fat woman, who was near the window,
and one Cipriano Reganet who was on her left. On the opposite seat were
seated a woman, her daughter and Amanda Mapa with an eight-month old
baby. They were in front of Reganet.
Two chico vendors entered the coach when the train stopped at Cabuyao,
Laguna. The brothers bought some chicos which they put aside. The vendors
alighted when the train started moving. It was around eight o'clock in the
evening.
Not long after the train had resumed its regular speed, Antonio stood up and
with a pair of scissors (Exh. B) stabbed the man sitting directly in front of him.
The victim stood up but soon collapsed on his seat.
For his part, Jose stabbed with a knife (Exh. A) the sleeping old woman who
was seated opposite him. She was not able to get up anymore.1
Upon seeing what was happening, Amanda Mapa, with her baby, attempted to
leave her seat, but before she could escape Jose stabbed her, hitting her on her
right hand with which she was supporting her child (Exh. D-2). The blade
entered the dorsal side and passed through the palm. Fortunately, the child was
not injured. Most of the passengers scurried away for safety but the twins, who
had run amuck, stabbed everyone whom they encountered inside the coach.2
Among the passengers in the third coach was Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Z.
Rayel, a train escort who, on that occasion, was not on duty. He was taking his
wife and children to Calauag, Quezon. He was going to the dining car to drink
coffee when someone informed him that there was a stabbing inside the coach
where he had come from. He immediately proceeded to return to coach No. 9.
Upon reaching coach 8, he saw a dead man sprawled on the floor near the
toilet. At a distance of around nine meters, he saw a man on the platform
separating coaches Nos. 8 and 9, holding a knife between the thumb and index
finger of his right hand, with its blade pointed outward. He shouted to the man
that he (Rayel) was a Constabularyman and a person in authority and Rayel
ordered him to lay down his knife (Exh. A) upon the count of three, or he
would be shot.
Instead of obeying, the man changed his hold on the knife by clutching it
between his palm and little finger (with the blade pointed inward) and, in a
suicidal impulse, stabbed himself on his left breast. He slowly sank to the floor
and was prostrate thereon. Near the platform where he had fallen, Rayel saw
another man holding a pair of scissors (Exh. B). He retreated to the steps near
the platform when he saw Rayel armed with a pistol.
Rayel learned from his wife that the man sitting opposite her was stabbed to
death.
Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Aldea was also in the train. He was in the dining
car when he received the information that there were killings in the third coach.
He immediately went there and, while at the rear of the coach, he met Mrs.
Mapa who was wounded. He saw Antonio stabbing with his scissors two
women and a small girl and a woman who was later identified as Teresita B.
Escanan (Exh. I to I-3). Antonio was not wounded. Those victims were
prostrate on the seats of the coach and on the aisle.
Aldea shouted at Antonio to surrender but the latter made a thrust at him with
the scissors. When Antonio was about to stab another person, Aldea stood on a
seat and repeatedly struck Antonio on the head with the butt of his pistol,
knocking him down. Aldea then jumped and stepped on Antonio's buttocks and
wrested the scissors away from him. Antonio offered resistance despite the
blows administered to him.
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When the train arrived at the Calamba station, four Constabulary soldiers
escorted the twins from the train and turned them over to the custody of the
Calamba police. Sergeant Rayel took down their names. The bloodstained
scissors and knife were turned over to the Constabulary Criminal Investigation
Service (CIS).
Some of the victims were found dead in the coach while others were picked up
along the railroad tracks between Cabuyao and Calamba. Those who were still
alive were brought to different hospitals for first-aid treatment. The dead
numbering twelve in all were brought to Funeraria Quiogue, the official morgue
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila, where their cadavers
were autopsied (Exh. C to C-11). A Constabulary photographer took some
pictures of the victims (Exh. G to I-2, J-1 and J-2).
Of the twelve persons who perished, eight, whose bodies were found in the
train, died from stab wounds, namely:
(1) Isabel Felices, 60, housewife, Ginlajon, Sorsogon.
(2) Antonio B. Mabisa, 28, married, laborer, Guinayangan, Quezon.
(3) Isabelo S. Dando, 45, married, Paracale, Camarines Norte.
(4) Susana C. Hernandez, 46, married, housekeeper, Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte.
(5) Teodoro F. Bautista, 72, married, Nawasa employee, San Juan, Rizal.
(6) Modesta R. Brondial 58, married, housekeeper, Legaspi City.
(7) Elena B. Erminio 10, student, 12 Liberty Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City
and
(8) Teresita B. Escanan, 25, housemaid, 66 Menlo Street, Pasay City (Exh.
C to C-3, C-7, C-8, C-9, C-11, L to L-2, N to N-2, 0 to 0-2, P to P-2, Q to Q-2,
R to R-2 and T to T-2)
Four dead persons were found near the railroad tracks. Apparently, they jumped
from the moving train to avoid being killed. They were:
(1) Timoteo U. Dimaano, 53 married, carpenter, Miguelin, Sampaloc,
Manila. .
(2) Miguel C. Oriarte, 45, married, Dalagan, Lopez, Quezon.
(3) Salvador A. Maqueda 52, married, farmer, Lopez, Quezon and
(4) Shirley A. Valenciano, 27, married, housekeeper, 657-D Jorge Street,
Pasay City (Exh. C-4. C-5, C-6, C-10, J, J-1, J-2, K to K-2, M to M-3 and S to S-
2).
Among the injured were Lucila Pantoja, Baby X, Mrs. X, Mrs. Armanda Mapa-
Dizon, Brigida Sarmiento-Palma, Cipriano Reganet and Corazon Bernal-
Astrolavio (Exh. D to D-5). Mrs. Astrolavio supposedly died later (43 tsn
January 14, 1966).
Mrs. Mapa declared that because of the stab wound inflicted upon her right
hand by Jose Toling, she was first brought to the Calamba Emergency Hospital.
Later, she was transferred to the hospital of the Philippine National Railways at
Caloocan City where she was confined for thirteen days free of charge. As a
result of her injury, she was not able to engage in her occupation of selling fish
for one month, thereby losing an expected earning of one hundred fifty pesos.
When she ran for safety with her child, she lost clothing materials valued at
three hundred pesos aside from two hundred pesos cash in a paper bag which
was lost.
The case was investigated by the Criminal Investigation Service of the Second
Constabulary Zone headquarters at Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna. On
January 9, 1965 Constabulary investigators took down the statements of Mrs.
Mapa-Dizon, Cipriano Reganet, Corazon Bernal, Brigida de Sarmiento and
Sergeant Aldea. On that date, the statements of the Toling brothers were taken
at the North General Hospital. Sergeant Rayel also gave a statement.
Antonio Toling told the investigators that while in the train he was stabbed by a
person "from the station" who wanted to get his money. He retaliated by
stabbing his assailant. He said that he stabbed somebody "who might have died
and others that might not". He clarified that in the train four persons were
asking money from him. He stabbed one of them. "It was a hold-up".
He revealed that after stabbing the person who wanted to rob him, he stabbed
other persons because, inasmuch as he "was already bound to die", he wanted
"to kill everybody" (Exh. X or 8, 49 tsn Sept. 3, 1965).
Jose Toling, in his statement, said that he was wounded because he was stabbed
by a person "from Camarines" who was taking his money. He retaliated by
stabbing his assailant with the scissors. He said that he stabbed two persons
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who were demanding money from him and who were armed with knives and
iron bars.
When Jose Toling was informed that several persons died due to the stabbing,
he commented that everybody was trying "to kill each other" (Exh. I-A).
According to Jose Toling, two persons grabbed the scissors in his pocket and
stabbed him in the back with the scissors and then escaped. Antonio allegedly
pulled out the scissors from his back, gave them to him and told him to avenge
himself with the scissors.
On January 20, 1965 a Constabulary sergeant filed against the Toling brothers in
the municipal court of Cabuyao, Laguna a criminal complaint for multiple
murder and multiple frustrated murder. Through counsel, the accused waived
the second stage of the preliminary investigation. The case was elevated to the
Court of First Instance of Laguna where the Provincial Fiscal on March 10,
1965 filed against the Toling brothers an information for multiple murder (nine
victims), multiple frustrated murder (six victims) and triple homicide (as to three
persons who died after jumping from the running train to avoid being stabbed).
At the arraignment, the accused, assisted by their counsel de oficio pleaded not
guilty. After trial, Judge Arsenio Nañawa rendered the judgment of conviction
already mentioned. The Toling brothers appealed.
In this appeal, appellants' counsel de oficio assails the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses, argues that the appellants acted in self-defense and
contends, in the alternative, that their criminal liability was only for two
homicides and for physical injuries.
According to the evidence for the defense (as distinguished from appellants'
statements, Exhibits 1 and 8), when the Toling twins were at the Tutuban
Railroad Station in the afternoon of January 8, 1965, Antonio went to the ticket
counter to buy tickets for himself and Jose. To pay for the tickets, he took out
his money from the right pocket of his pants and later put back the remainder
in the same pocket. The two brothers noticed that four men at some distance
from them were allegedly observing them, whispering among themselves and
making signs. The twins suspected that the four men harbored evil intentions
towards them.
When the twins boarded the train, the four men followed them. They were
facing the twins. They were talking in a low voice. The twins sat on a two
passenger seat facing the front door of the coach, the window being on the
right of Antonio and Jose being to his left. Two of the four men, whom they
were suspecting of having evil intentions towards them, sat on the seat facing
them, while the other two seated themselves behind them. Some old women
were near them. When the train was already running, the man sitting near the
aisle allegedly stood up, approached Antonio and pointed a balisong knife at his
throat while the other man who was sitting near the window and who was
holding also a balisong knife attempted to pick Antonio's right pocket,
threatening him with death if he would not hand over the money. Antonio
answered that he would give only one-half of his money provided the man
would not hurt him, adding that his (Antonio's) place was still very far.
When Antonio felt some pain in his throat, he suddenly drew out his hunting
knife or small bolo (eight inches long including the handle) from the back
pocket of his pants and stabbed the man with it, causing him to fall to the floor
with his balisong. He also stabbed the man who was picking his pocket.
Antonio identified the two men whom he had stabbed as those shown in the
photographs of Antonio B. Mabisa (Exh. L-1 and L-2 or 5-A and
5-B) and Isabelo S. Dando (Exh. N-1 and N-2 or 7-A and 7-B). While Antonio
was stabbing the second man, another person from behind allegedly stabbed
him on the forehead, causing him to lose consciousness and to fall on the floor
(Antonio has two scars on his forehead and a scar on his chest and left forearm,
85, 87 tsn). He regained consciousness when two Constabulary soldiers raised
him. His money was gone.
Seeing his brother in a serious condition, Jose stabbed with the scissors the man
who had wounded his brother. Jose hit the man in the abdomen. Jose was
stabbed in the back by somebody. Jose stabbed also that assailant in the middle
part of the abdomen, inflicting a deep wound.
However, Jose did not see what happened to the two men whom he had
stabbed because he was already weak. He fell down and became unconscious.
He identified Exhibit A as the knife used by Antonio and Exhibit B as the
scissors which he himself had used. He recovered consciousness when a
Constabulary soldier brought him out of the train.
The brothers presented Doctor Leonardo del Rosario, a physician of the North
General Hospital who treated them during the early hours of January 9, 1965
and who testified that he found the following injuries on Antonio Toling:
Wound, incised, 1-1/4 inches (sutured), frontal, right; 3-1/2 inches each, mid-
frontal (wound on the forehead) and
Wound, stabbed, 3/4 inch, 1 inch medial to anterior axillary line level of 3rd
ICS right, penetrating thoracic cavity (chest wound (Exh. 11).
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and on Jose Toling a stab wound, one inch long on the paravertebral level of
the fifth rib on the left, penetrating the thoracic cavity (Exh. 10). The wound
was on the spinal column in line with the armpit or "about one inch from the
midline to the left" (113 tsn). The twins were discharged from the hospital on
January 17th.
The trial court, in its endeavor to ascertain the motive for the twins' rampageous
behavior, which resulted in the macabre deaths of several innocent persons,
made the following observations:
What could be the reason or motive that actuated the accused to run amuck? It
appears that the accused travelled long over land and sea spending their hard
earned money and suffering privations, even to the extent of foregoing their
breakfast, only to receive as recompense with respect to Antonio the meager
sum of P50 from his daughter and P30 from his grandson and with respect to
Jose to receive nothing at all from any of his three children whom he could not
locate in Manila.
It also appears that the accused, who are twins, are queerly alike, a fact which
could easily invite some people to stare or gaze at them and wonder at their very
close resemblance. Like some persons who easily get angry when stared at,
however, the accused, when stared at by the persons in front of them,
immediately suspected them as having evil intention towards them (accused).
To the mind of the Court, therefore, it is despondency on the part of the
accused coupled with their unfounded suspicion of evil intention on the part of
those who happened to stare at them that broke the limit of their self-control
and actuated them to run amuck.
We surmise that to the captive spectators in coach No. 9 the spectacle of
middle-aged rustic twins, whom, in the limited space of the coach, their co-
passengers had no choice but to notice and gaze at, was a novelty. Through
some telepathic or extra-sensory perception the twins must have sensed that
their co-passengers were talking about them in whispers and making
depreciatory remarks or jokes about their humble persons. In their parochial
minds, they might have entertained the notion or suspicion that their male
companions, taking advantage of their ignorance and naivete, might victimize
them by stealing their little money. Hence, they became hostile to their co-
passengers. Their pent-up hostility erupted into violence and murderous fury.
A painstaking examination of the evidence leads to the conclusion that the trial
court and the prosecution witnesses confounded one twin for the other. Such a
confusion was unavoidable because the twins, according to a Constabulary
investigator, are "very identical". Thus, on the witness stand CIS Sergeants
Alfredo C. Orbase and Liberato Tamundong after pointing to the twins, refused
to take the risk of identifying who was Antonio and who was Jose. They
confessed that they might be mistaken in making such a specific identification
(28 tsn September 3, 1965; 32 tsn November 5, 1965).
In our opinion, to ascertain who is Antonio and who is Jose, the reliable guides
would be their sworn statements (Exh. 1 and 8), executed one day after the
killing, their own testimonies and the medical certificates (Exh. 10 and 11).
Those parts of the evidence reveal that the one who was armed with the knife
was Antonio and the one who was armed with the scissors was Jose. The
prosecution witnesses and the trial court assumed that Antonio was armed with
the scissors (Exh. B) and Jose was armed with the knife (Exh. A). That
assumption is erroneous.
In his statement and testimony, Antonio declared that he was armed with a
knife, while Jose declared that he was armed with the scissors which Antonio
had purchased at the Tutuban station, before he boarded the train and which he
gave to Jose because the latter is a barber whose old pair of scissors was already
rusty. As thus clarified, the person whom Sergeant Rayel espied as having
attempted to commit suicide on the platform of the train by stabbing himself on
the chest would be Antonio (not Jose). That conclusion is confirmed by the
medical certificate, Exhibit 11, wherein it is attested that Antonio had a wound
in the chest. And the person whom Sergeant Aldea subdued after the former
had stabbed several persons with a pair of scissors (not with a knife) was Jose
and not Antonio. That fact is contained in his statement of January 9, 1965 (p.
9, Record).
The mistake of the prosecution witnesses in taking Antonio for Jose and vice-
versa does not detract from their credibility. The controlling fact is that those
witnesses confirmed the admission of the twins that they stabbed several
passengers.
Appellants' counsel based his arguments on the summaries of the evidence
found in the trial court's decision. He argues that the testimonies of Sergeants
Rayel and Aldea are contradictory but he does not particularize on the supposed
contradictions.
The testimonies of the two witnesses do not cancel each other. The main point
of Rayel's testimony is that he saw one of the twins stabbing himself in the
chest and apparently trying to commit suicide. Aldea's testimony is that he
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knocked down the other twin, disabled him and prevented him from
committing other killings.
It may be admitted that Rayel's testimony that Aldea took the knife of Jose
Toling was not corroborated by Aldea. Neither did Aldea testify that Antonio
was near Jose on the platform of the train. Those discrepancies do not render
Rayel and Aldea unworthy of belief. They signify that Aldea and Rayel did not
give rehearsed testimonies or did not compare notes.
Where, as in this case, the events transpired in rapid succession in the coach of
the train and it was nighttime, it is not surprising that Rayel and Aldea would
not give identical testimonies (See 6 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court,
1970 Ed. 139-140; People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December 26, 1963, 54 SCRA
350). There is no doubt that Aldea and Rayel witnessed some of the acts of the
twins but they did not observe the same events and their powers of perception
and recollection are not the same.
Appellants' counsel assails the testimony of Mrs. Mapa. He contends that no
one corroborated her testimony that one of the twins stabbed a man and a
sleeping woman sitting on the seat opposite the seat occupied by the twins. The
truth is that Mrs. Mapa's testimony was confirmed by the necropsy reports and
by the twins themselves who admitted that they stabbed some persons.
On the other hand, the defense failed to prove that persons, other than the
twins, could have inflicted the stab wounds. There is no doubt as to the corpus
delicti. And there can be no doubt that the twins, from their own admissions
(Exh. 1 and 8) and their testimonies, not to mention the testimonies of Rayel,
Aldea, Mrs. Mapa and the CIS investigators, were the authors of the killings.
Apparently, because there was no doubt on the twins' culpability, since they
were caught in flagrante delicto the CIS investigators did not bother to get the
statements of the other passengers in Coach No. 9. It is probable that no one
actually saw the acts of the twins from beginning to end because everyone in
Coach No. 9 was trying to leave it in order to save his life. The ensuing
commotion and confusion prevented the passengers from having a full personal
knowledge of how the twins consummated all the killings.
On the other hand, the twins' theory of self-defense is highly incredible. In that
crowded coach No. 9, which was lighted, it was improbable that two or more
persons could have held up the twins without being readily perceived by the
other passengers. The twins would have made an outcry had there really been
an attempt to rob them. The injuries, which they sustained, could be attributed
to the blows which the other passengers inflicted on them to stop their
murderous rampage.
Appellants' view is that they should be held liable only for two homicides,
because they admittedly killed Antonio B. Mabisa and Isabelo S. Dando, and for
physical injuries because they did not deny that Jose Toling stabbed Mrs. Mapa.
We have to reject that view. Confronted as we are with the grave task of passing
judgment on the aberrant behavior of two yokels from the Samar hinterland
who reached manhood without coming into contact with the mainstream of
civilization in urban areas, we exercised utmost care and solicitude in reviewing
the evidence. We are convinced that the record conclusively establishes
appellants' responsibility for the eight killings.
To the seven dead persons whose heirs should be indemnified, according to the
trial court, because they died due to stab wounds, should be added the name of
Susana C. Hernandez (Exh. P, P-1 and P-2). The omission of her name in
judgment was probably due to inadvertence. According to the necropsy reports,
four persons, namely, Shirley A. Valenciano, Salvador A. Maqueda, Miguel C.
Oriarte and Timoteo U. Dimaano, died due to multiple traumatic injuries
consisting of abrasions, contusions, lacerations and fractures on the head, body
and extremities (Exh. J to J-2, K to K-2, M to M-2 and S to S-2).
The conjecture is that they jumped from the moving tracing to avoid being
killed but in so doing they met their untimely and horrible deaths. The trial
court did not adjudge them as victims whose heirs should be indemnified. As to
three of them, the information charges that the accused committed homicide.
The trial court dismissed that charge for lack of evidence.
No one testified that those four victims jumped from the train. Had the
necropsy reports been reinforced by testimony showing that the proximate
cause of their deaths was the violent and murderous conduct of the twins, then
the latter would be criminally responsible for their deaths.
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended". The presumption is that "a
person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c], Rule
131, Rules of Court).
The rule is that "if a man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of
danger which causes such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injures
himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the
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injuries which result" (Reg. vs. Halliday 61 L. T. Rep. [N.S.] 701, cited in U.S.
vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 4911, 500).
Following that rule, is was held that "if a person against whom a criminal assault
is directed reasonably believes himself to be in danger of death or great bodily
harm and in order to escape jumps into the water, impelled by the instinct of
self-preservation, the assailant is responsible for homicide in case death results
by drowning" (Syllabus, U.S. vs. Valdez, supra, See People vs. Buhay, 79 Phil.
371).
The absence of eyewitness-testimony as to the jumping from the train of the
four victims already named precludes the imputation of criminal responsibility
to the appellants for the ghastly deaths of the said victims.
The same observation applies to the injuries suffered by the other victims. The
charge of multiple frustrated murder based on the injuries suffered by Cipriano
Pantoja, Dinna Nosal, Corazon Bernal and Brigida Sarmiento (Exh. D, D-3 to
D-5) was dismissed by the trial court for lack of evidence. Unlike Mrs. Mapa,
the offended parties involved did not testify on the injuries inflicted on them.
The eight killings and the attempted killing should be treated as separate crimes
of murder and attempted murder qualified be treachery (alevosia) (Art. 14[16],
Revised Penal Code). The unexpected, surprise assaults perpetrated by the twins
upon their co-passengers, who did not anticipate that the twins would act like
juramentados and who were unable to defend themselves (even if some of them
might have had weapons on their persons) was a mode of execution that
insured the consummation of the twins' diabolical objective to butcher their co-
passengers. The conduct of the twins evinced conspiracy and community of
design.
The eight killings and the attempted murder were perpetrated by means of
different acts. Hence, they cannot be regarded as constituting a complex crime
under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which refers to cases where "a single
act constitutes two or more grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other".
As noted by Cuello Calon, the so-called "concurso formal o ideal de delitos
reviste dos formas: (a) cuando un solo hecho constituye dos o mas delitos (el
llamado delito compuesto); (b) cuando uno de ellos sea medio necesario para
cometer otro (el llamado delito complejo)." (1 Derecho Penal, 12th Ed. 650).
On the other hand, "en al concurso real de delitos", the rule, when there is
"acumulacion material de las penas", is that "si son varios los resultados, si son
varias las acciones, esta conforme con la logica y con la justicia que el agente
soporte la carga de cada uno de los delitos" (Ibid, p. 652, People vs. Mori, L-
23511, January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382, 403).
The twins are liable for eight (8) murders and one attempted murder. (See
People vs. Salazar, 105 Phil. 1058 where the accused Moro, who ran amuck,
killed sixteen persons and wounded others, was convicted of sixteen separate
murders, one frustrated murder and two attempted murders; People vs.
Mortero, 108 Phil. 31, the Panampunan massacre case, where six defendants
were convicted of fourteen separate murders; People vs. Remollino, 109 Phil.
607, where a person who fired successively at six victims was convicted of six
separate homicides; U. S. Beecham, 15 Phil. 272, involving four murders;
People vs. Macaso, 85 Phil. 819, 828, involving eleven murders; U.S. vs. Jamad,
37 Phil. 305; U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil. 260, 271. Contra: People vs. Cabrera, 43
Phil. 82, 102-103; People vs. Floresca, 99 Phil. 1044; People vs. Sakam, 61 Phil.
27; People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People vs. Manantan, 94 Phil. 831; People
vs. Umali, 96 Phil. 185; People vs. Cu Unjiengi, 61 Phil. 236; People vs. Penas,
66 Phil. 682; People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437, where the crimes committed by
means of separate acts were held to be complex on the theory that they were
the product of a single criminal impulse or intent).
As no generic mitigating and aggravating circumstances were proven in this
case, the penalty for murder should be imposed in its medium period or
reclusion perpetua (Arts. 64[l] and 248, Revised Penal Code. The death penalty
imposed by the trial court was not warranted.
A separate penalty for attempted murder should be imposed on the appellants.
No modifying circumstances can be appreciated in the attempted murder case.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is modified by setting aside the death
sentence. Defendants-appellants Antonio Toling and Jose Toling are found
guilty, as co-principals, of eight (8) separate murders and one attempted murder.
Each one of them is sentenced to eight (8) reclusion perpetuas for the eight
murders and to an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year of prision correccional
as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum for
the attempted murder and to pay solidarily an indemnity of P12,000 to each set
of heirs of the seven victims named in the dispositive part of the trial court's
decision and of the eight victim, Susana C. Hernandez, or a total indemnity of
P96,000, and an indemnity of P500 to Amanda Mapa. In the service of the
penalties, the forty-year limit fixed in the penultimate paragraph of article 70 of
the Revised Penal Code should be observed. Costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
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IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Antonio, Esguerra,
Fernandez and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., took no part
PEOPLE VS SALVILLA
AQUINO, J.:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, brothers, appealed from the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, finding them guilty of multiple murder and
attempted murder, sentencing them to death and ordering them to indemnify
each set of heirs of (1) Teresita B. Escanan, (2) Antonio B. Mabisa, (3) Isabelo
S. Dando, (4) Elena B. Erminio (5) Modesta R. Brondial (6) Isabel Felices and
(7) Teodoro F. Bautista in the sum of P6,000 and to pay Amanda Mapa the sum
of P500 (Criminal Case No. SC-966). The judgment of conviction was based on
the following facts:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, both married, are natives of Barrio
Nenita which is about eighteen (or nine) kilometers away from Mondragon,
Northern Samar. They are illiterate farmers tilling their own lands. They were
forty-eight years old in 1966. Antonio is one hour older than Jose. Being twins,
they look alike very much. However, Antonio has a distinguishing cut in his ear
(44 tsn Jan. 14, 1966).
Antonio's daughter, Leonora, was working in Manila as a laundrywoman since
September, 1964. Jose's three children one girl and two boys, had stayed in
Manila also since 1964.
Antonio decided to go to Manila after receiving a letter from Leonora telling
him that she would give him money. To have money for his expenses, Antonio
killed a pig and sold the meat to Jose's wife for sixty pesos. Jose decided to go
with Antonio in order to see his children. He was able to raise eighty-five pesos
for his expenses.
On January 6, 1965, with a bayong containing their pants and shirts, the twins
left Barrio Nenita and took a bus to Allen. From there, they took a launch to
Matnog, Sorsogon. From Matnog, they went to Daraga, Albay on board an
Alatco bus, and from Daraga, they rode on the train, arriving at the Paco
railroad station in Manila at about seven o'clock in the morning of January 8th.
It was their first trip to the big city.
At the Paco station, the twins took a jeepney which brought them to Tondo. By
means of a letter which Aniano Espenola a labor-recruiter, had given them, they
were able to locate an employment agency where they learned the address of the
Eng Heng Glassware. Antonio's daughter was working in that store.
Accompanied by Juan, an employee of the agency, they proceeded to her
employer's establishment. Leonora gave her father fifty pesos. Sencio Rubis
Antonio's grandson, gave him thirty pesos. Antonio placed the eighty pesos in
the right pocket of his pants. It was then noontime.
Jose was not able to find any of his children in the city. The twins returned to
the agency where they ate their lunch at Juan's expense. From the agency, Juan
took the twins to the Tutuban railroad station that same day, January 8th, for
their homeward trip.
After buying their tickets, they boarded the night Bicol express train at about
five o'clock in the afternoon. The train left at six o'clock that evening.
The twins were in coach No. 9 which was the third from the rear of the dining
car. The coach had one row of two-passenger seats and another row of three-
passenger seats. Each seat faced an opposite seat. An aisle separated the two
rows. The brothers were seated side by side on the fourth three-passenger seat
from the rear, facing the back door. Jose was seated between Antonio, who was
near the window, and a three-year old boy. Beside the boy was a woman breast-
feeding her baby who was near the aisle. That woman was Corazon Bernal.
There were more than one hundred twenty passengers in the coach. Some
passengers were standing on the aisle.
Sitting on the third seat and facing the brothers were two men and an old
woman who was sleeping with her head resting on the back of the seat (Exh. 2).
on the two-passenger seat across the aisle in line with the seat where the
brothers were sitting, there were seated a fat woman, who was near the window,
and one Cipriano Reganet who was on her left. On the opposite seat were
seated a woman, her daughter and Amanda Mapa with an eight-month old
baby. They were in front of Reganet.
Two chico vendors entered the coach when the train stopped at Cabuyao,
Laguna. The brothers bought some chicos which they put aside. The vendors
alighted when the train started moving. It was around eight o'clock in the
evening.
Not long after the train had resumed its regular speed, Antonio stood up and
with a pair of scissors (Exh. B) stabbed the man sitting directly in front of him.
The victim stood up but soon collapsed on his seat.
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For his part, Jose stabbed with a knife (Exh. A) the sleeping old woman who
was seated opposite him. She was not able to get up anymore.1
Upon seeing what was happening, Amanda Mapa, with her baby, attempted to
leave her seat, but before she could escape Jose stabbed her, hitting her on her
right hand with which she was supporting her child (Exh. D-2). The blade
entered the dorsal side and passed through the palm. Fortunately, the child was
not injured. Most of the passengers scurried away for safety but the twins, who
had run amuck, stabbed everyone whom they encountered inside the coach.2
Among the passengers in the third coach was Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Z.
Rayel, a train escort who, on that occasion, was not on duty. He was taking his
wife and children to Calauag, Quezon. He was going to the dining car to drink
coffee when someone informed him that there was a stabbing inside the coach
where he had come from. He immediately proceeded to return to coach No. 9.
Upon reaching coach 8, he saw a dead man sprawled on the floor near the
toilet. At a distance of around nine meters, he saw a man on the platform
separating coaches Nos. 8 and 9, holding a knife between the thumb and index
finger of his right hand, with its blade pointed outward. He shouted to the man
that he (Rayel) was a Constabularyman and a person in authority and Rayel
ordered him to lay down his knife (Exh. A) upon the count of three, or he
would be shot.
Instead of obeying, the man changed his hold on the knife by clutching it
between his palm and little finger (with the blade pointed inward) and, in a
suicidal impulse, stabbed himself on his left breast. He slowly sank to the floor
and was prostrate thereon. Near the platform where he had fallen, Rayel saw
another man holding a pair of scissors (Exh. B). He retreated to the steps near
the platform when he saw Rayel armed with a pistol.
Rayel learned from his wife that the man sitting opposite her was stabbed to
death.
Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Aldea was also in the train. He was in the dining
car when he received the information that there were killings in the third coach.
He immediately went there and, while at the rear of the coach, he met Mrs.
Mapa who was wounded. He saw Antonio stabbing with his scissors two
women and a small girl and a woman who was later identified as Teresita B.
Escanan (Exh. I to I-3). Antonio was not wounded. Those victims were
prostrate on the seats of the coach and on the aisle.
Aldea shouted at Antonio to surrender but the latter made a thrust at him with
the scissors. When Antonio was about to stab another person, Aldea stood on a
seat and repeatedly struck Antonio on the head with the butt of his pistol,
knocking him down. Aldea then jumped and stepped on Antonio's buttocks and
wrested the scissors away from him. Antonio offered resistance despite the
blows administered to him.
When the train arrived at the Calamba station, four Constabulary soldiers
escorted the twins from the train and turned them over to the custody of the
Calamba police. Sergeant Rayel took down their names. The bloodstained
scissors and knife were turned over to the Constabulary Criminal Investigation
Service (CIS).
Some of the victims were found dead in the coach while others were picked up
along the railroad tracks between Cabuyao and Calamba. Those who were still
alive were brought to different hospitals for first-aid treatment. The dead
numbering twelve in all were brought to Funeraria Quiogue, the official morgue
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila, where their cadavers
were autopsied (Exh. C to C-11). A Constabulary photographer took some
pictures of the victims (Exh. G to I-2, J-1 and J-2).
Of the twelve persons who perished, eight, whose bodies were found in the
train, died from stab wounds, namely:
(1) Isabel Felices, 60, housewife, Ginlajon, Sorsogon.
(2) Antonio B. Mabisa, 28, married, laborer, Guinayangan, Quezon.
(3) Isabelo S. Dando, 45, married, Paracale, Camarines Norte.
(4) Susana C. Hernandez, 46, married, housekeeper, Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte.
(5) Teodoro F. Bautista, 72, married, Nawasa employee, San Juan, Rizal.
(6) Modesta R. Brondial 58, married, housekeeper, Legaspi City.
(7) Elena B. Erminio 10, student, 12 Liberty Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City
and
(8) Teresita B. Escanan, 25, housemaid, 66 Menlo Street, Pasay City (Exh.
C to C-3, C-7, C-8, C-9, C-11, L to L-2, N to N-2, 0 to 0-2, P to P-2, Q to Q-2,
R to R-2 and T to T-2)
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Four dead persons were found near the railroad tracks. Apparently, they jumped
from the moving train to avoid being killed. They were:
(1) Timoteo U. Dimaano, 53 married, carpenter, Miguelin, Sampaloc,
Manila. .
(2) Miguel C. Oriarte, 45, married, Dalagan, Lopez, Quezon.
(3) Salvador A. Maqueda 52, married, farmer, Lopez, Quezon and
(4) Shirley A. Valenciano, 27, married, housekeeper, 657-D Jorge Street,
Pasay City (Exh. C-4. C-5, C-6, C-10, J, J-1, J-2, K to K-2, M to M-3 and S to S-
2).
Among the injured were Lucila Pantoja, Baby X, Mrs. X, Mrs. Armanda Mapa-
Dizon, Brigida Sarmiento-Palma, Cipriano Reganet and Corazon Bernal-
Astrolavio (Exh. D to D-5). Mrs. Astrolavio supposedly died later (43 tsn
January 14, 1966).
Mrs. Mapa declared that because of the stab wound inflicted upon her right
hand by Jose Toling, she was first brought to the Calamba Emergency Hospital.
Later, she was transferred to the hospital of the Philippine National Railways at
Caloocan City where she was confined for thirteen days free of charge. As a
result of her injury, she was not able to engage in her occupation of selling fish
for one month, thereby losing an expected earning of one hundred fifty pesos.
When she ran for safety with her child, she lost clothing materials valued at
three hundred pesos aside from two hundred pesos cash in a paper bag which
was lost.
The case was investigated by the Criminal Investigation Service of the Second
Constabulary Zone headquarters at Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna. On
January 9, 1965 Constabulary investigators took down the statements of Mrs.
Mapa-Dizon, Cipriano Reganet, Corazon Bernal, Brigida de Sarmiento and
Sergeant Aldea. On that date, the statements of the Toling brothers were taken
at the North General Hospital. Sergeant Rayel also gave a statement.
Antonio Toling told the investigators that while in the train he was stabbed by a
person "from the station" who wanted to get his money. He retaliated by
stabbing his assailant. He said that he stabbed somebody "who might have died
and others that might not". He clarified that in the train four persons were
asking money from him. He stabbed one of them. "It was a hold-up".
He revealed that after stabbing the person who wanted to rob him, he stabbed
other persons because, inasmuch as he "was already bound to die", he wanted
"to kill everybody" (Exh. X or 8, 49 tsn Sept. 3, 1965).
Jose Toling, in his statement, said that he was wounded because he was stabbed
by a person "from Camarines" who was taking his money. He retaliated by
stabbing his assailant with the scissors. He said that he stabbed two persons
who were demanding money from him and who were armed with knives and
iron bars.
When Jose Toling was informed that several persons died due to the stabbing,
he commented that everybody was trying "to kill each other" (Exh. I-A).
According to Jose Toling, two persons grabbed the scissors in his pocket and
stabbed him in the back with the scissors and then escaped. Antonio allegedly
pulled out the scissors from his back, gave them to him and told him to avenge
himself with the scissors.
On January 20, 1965 a Constabulary sergeant filed against the Toling brothers in
the municipal court of Cabuyao, Laguna a criminal complaint for multiple
murder and multiple frustrated murder. Through counsel, the accused waived
the second stage of the preliminary investigation. The case was elevated to the
Court of First Instance of Laguna where the Provincial Fiscal on March 10,
1965 filed against the Toling brothers an information for multiple murder (nine
victims), multiple frustrated murder (six victims) and triple homicide (as to three
persons who died after jumping from the running train to avoid being stabbed).
At the arraignment, the accused, assisted by their counsel de oficio pleaded not
guilty. After trial, Judge Arsenio Nañawa rendered the judgment of conviction
already mentioned. The Toling brothers appealed.
In this appeal, appellants' counsel de oficio assails the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses, argues that the appellants acted in self-defense and
contends, in the alternative, that their criminal liability was only for two
homicides and for physical injuries.
According to the evidence for the defense (as distinguished from appellants'
statements, Exhibits 1 and 8), when the Toling twins were at the Tutuban
Railroad Station in the afternoon of January 8, 1965, Antonio went to the ticket
counter to buy tickets for himself and Jose. To pay for the tickets, he took out
his money from the right pocket of his pants and later put back the remainder
in the same pocket. The two brothers noticed that four men at some distance
from them were allegedly observing them, whispering among themselves and
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making signs. The twins suspected that the four men harbored evil intentions
towards them.
When the twins boarded the train, the four men followed them. They were
facing the twins. They were talking in a low voice. The twins sat on a two
passenger seat facing the front door of the coach, the window being on the
right of Antonio and Jose being to his left. Two of the four men, whom they
were suspecting of having evil intentions towards them, sat on the seat facing
them, while the other two seated themselves behind them. Some old women
were near them. When the train was already running, the man sitting near the
aisle allegedly stood up, approached Antonio and pointed a balisong knife at his
throat while the other man who was sitting near the window and who was
holding also a balisong knife attempted to pick Antonio's right pocket,
threatening him with death if he would not hand over the money. Antonio
answered that he would give only one-half of his money provided the man
would not hurt him, adding that his (Antonio's) place was still very far.
When Antonio felt some pain in his throat, he suddenly drew out his hunting
knife or small bolo (eight inches long including the handle) from the back
pocket of his pants and stabbed the man with it, causing him to fall to the floor
with his balisong. He also stabbed the man who was picking his pocket.
Antonio identified the two men whom he had stabbed as those shown in the
photographs of Antonio B. Mabisa (Exh. L-1 and L-2 or 5-A and
5-B) and Isabelo S. Dando (Exh. N-1 and N-2 or 7-A and 7-B). While Antonio
was stabbing the second man, another person from behind allegedly stabbed
him on the forehead, causing him to lose consciousness and to fall on the floor
(Antonio has two scars on his forehead and a scar on his chest and left forearm,
85, 87 tsn). He regained consciousness when two Constabulary soldiers raised
him. His money was gone.
Seeing his brother in a serious condition, Jose stabbed with the scissors the man
who had wounded his brother. Jose hit the man in the abdomen. Jose was
stabbed in the back by somebody. Jose stabbed also that assailant in the middle
part of the abdomen, inflicting a deep wound.
However, Jose did not see what happened to the two men whom he had
stabbed because he was already weak. He fell down and became unconscious.
He identified Exhibit A as the knife used by Antonio and Exhibit B as the
scissors which he himself had used. He recovered consciousness when a
Constabulary soldier brought him out of the train.
The brothers presented Doctor Leonardo del Rosario, a physician of the North
General Hospital who treated them during the early hours of January 9, 1965
and who testified that he found the following injuries on Antonio Toling:
Wound, incised, 1-1/4 inches (sutured), frontal, right; 3-1/2 inches each, mid-
frontal (wound on the forehead) and
Wound, stabbed, 3/4 inch, 1 inch medial to anterior axillary line level of 3rd
ICS right, penetrating thoracic cavity (chest wound (Exh. 11).
and on Jose Toling a stab wound, one inch long on the paravertebral level of
the fifth rib on the left, penetrating the thoracic cavity (Exh. 10). The wound
was on the spinal column in line with the armpit or "about one inch from the
midline to the left" (113 tsn). The twins were discharged from the hospital on
January 17th.
The trial court, in its endeavor to ascertain the motive for the twins' rampageous
behavior, which resulted in the macabre deaths of several innocent persons,
made the following observations:
What could be the reason or motive that actuated the accused to run amuck? It
appears that the accused travelled long over land and sea spending their hard
earned money and suffering privations, even to the extent of foregoing their
breakfast, only to receive as recompense with respect to Antonio the meager
sum of P50 from his daughter and P30 from his grandson and with respect to
Jose to receive nothing at all from any of his three children whom he could not
locate in Manila.
It also appears that the accused, who are twins, are queerly alike, a fact which
could easily invite some people to stare or gaze at them and wonder at their very
close resemblance. Like some persons who easily get angry when stared at,
however, the accused, when stared at by the persons in front of them,
immediately suspected them as having evil intention towards them (accused).
To the mind of the Court, therefore, it is despondency on the part of the
accused coupled with their unfounded suspicion of evil intention on the part of
those who happened to stare at them that broke the limit of their self-control
and actuated them to run amuck.
We surmise that to the captive spectators in coach No. 9 the spectacle of
middle-aged rustic twins, whom, in the limited space of the coach, their co-
passengers had no choice but to notice and gaze at, was a novelty. Through
some telepathic or extra-sensory perception the twins must have sensed that
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their co-passengers were talking about them in whispers and making
depreciatory remarks or jokes about their humble persons. In their parochial
minds, they might have entertained the notion or suspicion that their male
companions, taking advantage of their ignorance and naivete, might victimize
them by stealing their little money. Hence, they became hostile to their co-
passengers. Their pent-up hostility erupted into violence and murderous fury.
A painstaking examination of the evidence leads to the conclusion that the trial
court and the prosecution witnesses confounded one twin for the other. Such a
confusion was unavoidable because the twins, according to a Constabulary
investigator, are "very identical". Thus, on the witness stand CIS Sergeants
Alfredo C. Orbase and Liberato Tamundong after pointing to the twins, refused
to take the risk of identifying who was Antonio and who was Jose. They
confessed that they might be mistaken in making such a specific identification
(28 tsn September 3, 1965; 32 tsn November 5, 1965).
In our opinion, to ascertain who is Antonio and who is Jose, the reliable guides
would be their sworn statements (Exh. 1 and 8), executed one day after the
killing, their own testimonies and the medical certificates (Exh. 10 and 11).
Those parts of the evidence reveal that the one who was armed with the knife
was Antonio and the one who was armed with the scissors was Jose. The
prosecution witnesses and the trial court assumed that Antonio was armed with
the scissors (Exh. B) and Jose was armed with the knife (Exh. A). That
assumption is erroneous.
In his statement and testimony, Antonio declared that he was armed with a
knife, while Jose declared that he was armed with the scissors which Antonio
had purchased at the Tutuban station, before he boarded the train and which he
gave to Jose because the latter is a barber whose old pair of scissors was already
rusty. As thus clarified, the person whom Sergeant Rayel espied as having
attempted to commit suicide on the platform of the train by stabbing himself on
the chest would be Antonio (not Jose). That conclusion is confirmed by the
medical certificate, Exhibit 11, wherein it is attested that Antonio had a wound
in the chest. And the person whom Sergeant Aldea subdued after the former
had stabbed several persons with a pair of scissors (not with a knife) was Jose
and not Antonio. That fact is contained in his statement of January 9, 1965 (p.
9, Record).
The mistake of the prosecution witnesses in taking Antonio for Jose and vice-
versa does not detract from their credibility. The controlling fact is that those
witnesses confirmed the admission of the twins that they stabbed several
passengers.
Appellants' counsel based his arguments on the summaries of the evidence
found in the trial court's decision. He argues that the testimonies of Sergeants
Rayel and Aldea are contradictory but he does not particularize on the supposed
contradictions.
The testimonies of the two witnesses do not cancel each other. The main point
of Rayel's testimony is that he saw one of the twins stabbing himself in the
chest and apparently trying to commit suicide. Aldea's testimony is that he
knocked down the other twin, disabled him and prevented him from
committing other killings.
It may be admitted that Rayel's testimony that Aldea took the knife of Jose
Toling was not corroborated by Aldea. Neither did Aldea testify that Antonio
was near Jose on the platform of the train. Those discrepancies do not render
Rayel and Aldea unworthy of belief. They signify that Aldea and Rayel did not
give rehearsed testimonies or did not compare notes.
Where, as in this case, the events transpired in rapid succession in the coach of
the train and it was nighttime, it is not surprising that Rayel and Aldea would
not give identical testimonies (See 6 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court,
1970 Ed. 139-140; People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December 26, 1963, 54 SCRA
350). There is no doubt that Aldea and Rayel witnessed some of the acts of the
twins but they did not observe the same events and their powers of perception
and recollection are not the same.
Appellants' counsel assails the testimony of Mrs. Mapa. He contends that no
one corroborated her testimony that one of the twins stabbed a man and a
sleeping woman sitting on the seat opposite the seat occupied by the twins. The
truth is that Mrs. Mapa's testimony was confirmed by the necropsy reports and
by the twins themselves who admitted that they stabbed some persons.
On the other hand, the defense failed to prove that persons, other than the
twins, could have inflicted the stab wounds. There is no doubt as to the corpus
delicti. And there can be no doubt that the twins, from their own admissions
(Exh. 1 and 8) and their testimonies, not to mention the testimonies of Rayel,
Aldea, Mrs. Mapa and the CIS investigators, were the authors of the killings.
Apparently, because there was no doubt on the twins' culpability, since they
were caught in flagrante delicto the CIS investigators did not bother to get the
statements of the other passengers in Coach No. 9. It is probable that no one
actually saw the acts of the twins from beginning to end because everyone in
Coach No. 9 was trying to leave it in order to save his life. The ensuing
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commotion and confusion prevented the passengers from having a full personal
knowledge of how the twins consummated all the killings.
On the other hand, the twins' theory of self-defense is highly incredible. In that
crowded coach No. 9, which was lighted, it was improbable that two or more
persons could have held up the twins without being readily perceived by the
other passengers. The twins would have made an outcry had there really been
an attempt to rob them. The injuries, which they sustained, could be attributed
to the blows which the other passengers inflicted on them to stop their
murderous rampage.
Appellants' view is that they should be held liable only for two homicides,
because they admittedly killed Antonio B. Mabisa and Isabelo S. Dando, and for
physical injuries because they did not deny that Jose Toling stabbed Mrs. Mapa.
We have to reject that view. Confronted as we are with the grave task of passing
judgment on the aberrant behavior of two yokels from the Samar hinterland
who reached manhood without coming into contact with the mainstream of
civilization in urban areas, we exercised utmost care and solicitude in reviewing
the evidence. We are convinced that the record conclusively establishes
appellants' responsibility for the eight killings.
To the seven dead persons whose heirs should be indemnified, according to the
trial court, because they died due to stab wounds, should be added the name of
Susana C. Hernandez (Exh. P, P-1 and P-2). The omission of her name in
judgment was probably due to inadvertence. According to the necropsy reports,
four persons, namely, Shirley A. Valenciano, Salvador A. Maqueda, Miguel C.
Oriarte and Timoteo U. Dimaano, died due to multiple traumatic injuries
consisting of abrasions, contusions, lacerations and fractures on the head, body
and extremities (Exh. J to J-2, K to K-2, M to M-2 and S to S-2).
The conjecture is that they jumped from the moving tracing to avoid being
killed but in so doing they met their untimely and horrible deaths. The trial
court did not adjudge them as victims whose heirs should be indemnified. As to
three of them, the information charges that the accused committed homicide.
The trial court dismissed that charge for lack of evidence.
No one testified that those four victims jumped from the train. Had the
necropsy reports been reinforced by testimony showing that the proximate
cause of their deaths was the violent and murderous conduct of the twins, then
the latter would be criminally responsible for their deaths.
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended". The presumption is that "a
person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c], Rule
131, Rules of Court).
The rule is that "if a man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of
danger which causes such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injures
himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the
injuries which result" (Reg. vs. Halliday 61 L. T. Rep. [N.S.] 701, cited in U.S.
vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 4911, 500).
Following that rule, is was held that "if a person against whom a criminal assault
is directed reasonably believes himself to be in danger of death or great bodily
harm and in order to escape jumps into the water, impelled by the instinct of
self-preservation, the assailant is responsible for homicide in case death results
by drowning" (Syllabus, U.S. vs. Valdez, supra, See People vs. Buhay, 79 Phil.
371).
The absence of eyewitness-testimony as to the jumping from the train of the
four victims already named precludes the imputation of criminal responsibility
to the appellants for the ghastly deaths of the said victims.
The same observation applies to the injuries suffered by the other victims. The
charge of multiple frustrated murder based on the injuries suffered by Cipriano
Pantoja, Dinna Nosal, Corazon Bernal and Brigida Sarmiento (Exh. D, D-3 to
D-5) was dismissed by the trial court for lack of evidence. Unlike Mrs. Mapa,
the offended parties involved did not testify on the injuries inflicted on them.
The eight killings and the attempted killing should be treated as separate crimes
of murder and attempted murder qualified be treachery (alevosia) (Art. 14[16],
Revised Penal Code). The unexpected, surprise assaults perpetrated by the twins
upon their co-passengers, who did not anticipate that the twins would act like
juramentados and who were unable to defend themselves (even if some of them
might have had weapons on their persons) was a mode of execution that
insured the consummation of the twins' diabolical objective to butcher their co-
passengers. The conduct of the twins evinced conspiracy and community of
design.
The eight killings and the attempted murder were perpetrated by means of
different acts. Hence, they cannot be regarded as constituting a complex crime
under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which refers to cases where "a single
act constitutes two or more grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other".
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As noted by Cuello Calon, the so-called "concurso formal o ideal de delitos
reviste dos formas: (a) cuando un solo hecho constituye dos o mas delitos (el
llamado delito compuesto); (b) cuando uno de ellos sea medio necesario para
cometer otro (el llamado delito complejo)." (1 Derecho Penal, 12th Ed. 650).
On the other hand, "en al concurso real de delitos", the rule, when there is
"acumulacion material de las penas", is that "si son varios los resultados, si son
varias las acciones, esta conforme con la logica y con la justicia que el agente
soporte la carga de cada uno de los delitos" (Ibid, p. 652, People vs. Mori, L-
23511, January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382, 403).
The twins are liable for eight (8) murders and one attempted murder. (See
People vs. Salazar, 105 Phil. 1058 where the accused Moro, who ran amuck,
killed sixteen persons and wounded others, was convicted of sixteen separate
murders, one frustrated murder and two attempted murders; People vs.
Mortero, 108 Phil. 31, the Panampunan massacre case, where six defendants
were convicted of fourteen separate murders; People vs. Remollino, 109 Phil.
607, where a person who fired successively at six victims was convicted of six
separate homicides; U. S. Beecham, 15 Phil. 272, involving four murders;
People vs. Macaso, 85 Phil. 819, 828, involving eleven murders; U.S. vs. Jamad,
37 Phil. 305; U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil. 260, 271. Contra: People vs. Cabrera, 43
Phil. 82, 102-103; People vs. Floresca, 99 Phil. 1044; People vs. Sakam, 61 Phil.
27; People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People vs. Manantan, 94 Phil. 831; People
vs. Umali, 96 Phil. 185; People vs. Cu Unjiengi, 61 Phil. 236; People vs. Penas,
66 Phil. 682; People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437, where the crimes committed by
means of separate acts were held to be complex on the theory that they were
the product of a single criminal impulse or intent).
As no generic mitigating and aggravating circumstances were proven in this
case, the penalty for murder should be imposed in its medium period or
reclusion perpetua (Arts. 64[l] and 248, Revised Penal Code. The death penalty
imposed by the trial court was not warranted.
A separate penalty for attempted murder should be imposed on the appellants.
No modifying circumstances can be appreciated in the attempted murder case.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is modified by setting aside the death
sentence. Defendants-appellants Antonio Toling and Jose Toling are found
guilty, as co-principals, of eight (8) separate murders and one attempted murder.
Each one of them is sentenced to eight (8) reclusion perpetuas for the eight
murders and to an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year of prision correccional
as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum for
the attempted murder and to pay solidarily an indemnity of P12,000 to each set
of heirs of the seven victims named in the dispositive part of the trial court's
decision and of the eight victim, Susana C. Hernandez, or a total indemnity of
P96,000, and an indemnity of P500 to Amanda Mapa. In the service of the
penalties, the forty-year limit fixed in the penultimate paragraph of article 70 of
the Revised Penal Code should be observed. Costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Antonio, Esguerra,
Fernandez and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., took no part
PEOPLE VS VALDEZ
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the decision1 promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the
Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal
Case No. 3105. It found appellant Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
(R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. He was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of death by lethal injection.
In an Information dated September 26, 1996, appellant was charged as
follows:"That on or about September 25, 1996, at Sitio Bulan, Barangay
Sawmill, Municipality of Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
who was caught in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, did then and
there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously plant, cultivate and culture seven
(7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp weighing 2.194 kilos,
from which dangerous drugs maybe (sic) manufactured or derived, to the
damage and prejudice of the government of the Republic of the Philippines.
"That the property where the said seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants were
planted, cultivated and cultured shall be confiscated and escheated in favor of
the government.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."2
On November 15, 1996, appellant was arraigned and, with assistance of
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.
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The first witness for the prosecution was SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the
police force of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. He testified that at around 10:15 a.m.
of September 24, 1996, he received a tip from an unnamed informer about the
presence of a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by appellant at Sitio Bulan,
Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya.3 The prohibited plants were allegedly planted
close to appellant's hut. Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police
of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his operatives
to verify the report. The team was composed of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2
Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2
Alfelmer I. Balut. Inspector Parungao gave them specific instructions to
"uproot said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same."4
At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day, said police team,
accompanied by their informer, left for the site where the marijuana plants were
allegedly being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest barangay
road, the police operatives arrived at the place pinpointed by their informant.
The police found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look
around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot
high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from
appellant's hut.5 PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants
and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his.6 The police
uprooted the seven marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194 kilograms.7 The
police took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants.8 Appellant
was then arrested. One of the plants, weighing 1.090 kilograms, was sent to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for
analysis.9 Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the Crime Laboratory forensic analyst,
testified that upon microscopic examination of said plant, she found cystolitic
hairs containing calcium carbonate, a positive indication for marijuana.10 She
next conducted a chemical examination, the results of which confirmed her
initial impressions. She found as follows:
"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: Exh "A" - 1.090 grams of uprooted suspected
marijuana plant placed inside a white sack with markings.
xxx
"FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on the above stated specimen
gave POSITIVE result to the test for Marijuana, a prohibited drug."11
The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources that the land cultivated by appellant, on
which the growing marijuana plants were found, was Lot 3224 of Timberland
Block B, which formed part of the Integrated Social Forestry Area in Villaverde,
Nueva Vizcaya.12 This lot was part of the public domain. Appellant was
acknowledged in the certification as the occupant of the lot, but no Certificate
of Stewardship had yet been issued in his favor.13
As its sole witness, the defense presented appellant. He testified that at around
10:00 o'clock A.M., September 25, 1996, he was weeding his vegetable farm in
Sitio Bulan when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know.
He was asked to go with the latter to "see something."14 This unknown person
then brought appellant to the place where the marijuana plants were found,
approximately 100 meters away from his nipa hut.15 Five armed policemen
were present and they made him stand in front of the hemp plants. He was then
asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he denied
any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to
admit ownership of the plants.16 Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he
admitted owning the marijuana.17
The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of the marijuana
plants. He was then made to uproot five of the cannabis plants, and bring them
to his hut, where another photo was taken of him standing next to a bundle of
uprooted marijuana plants.18 The police team then brought him to the police
station at Villaverde. On the way, a certain Kiko Pascua, a barangay peace
officer of Barangay Sawmill, accompanied the police officers. Pascua, who bore
a grudge against him, because of his refusal to participate in the former's illegal
logging activities, threatened him to admit owning the marijuana, otherwise he
would "be put in a bad situation."19 At the police headquarters, appellant
reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the
police.20
On cross-examination, appellant declared that there were ten other houses
around the vicinity of his kaingin, the nearest house being 100 meters away.21
The latter house belonged to one Carlito (Lito) Pascua, an uncle of the barangay
peace officer who had a grudge against him. The spot where the marijuana
plants were found was located between his house and Carlito Pascua's.22
The prosecution presented SPO3 Tipay as its rebuttal witness. His testimony
was offered to rebut appellant's claim that the marijuana plants were not planted
in the lot he was cultivating.23 Tipay presented a sketch he made,24 which
showed the location of marijuana plants in relation to the old and new nipa huts
of appellant, as well as the closest neighbor. According to Tipay, the marijuana
plot was located 40 meters away from the old hut of Valdez and 250 meters
distant from the hut of Carlito Pascua.25 Tipay admitted on cross-examination
that no surveyor accompanied him when he made the measurements.26 He
further stated that his basis for claiming that appellant was the owner or planter
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of the seized plants was the information given him by the police informer and
the proximity of appellant's hut to the location of said plants.27
Finding appellant's defense insipid, the trial court held appellant liable as
charged for cultivation and ownership of marijuana plants as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
cultivating marijuana plants punishable under section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, as amended, accused is hereby sentenced to death by lethal
injection. Costs against the accused.
"SO ORDERED."28
Appellant assigns the following errors for our consideration:
I against unreasonable government intrusion protects people, not places.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS
EVIDENCE THE SEVEN (7) MARIJUANA PLANTS DESPITE THEIR
INADMISSIBILITY BEING PRODUCTS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
APPELLANT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, REPUBLIC ACT NO.
6425 DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE CORPUS DELICTI
AND THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME
PENALTY OF DEATH UPON APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF
THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THAT THE LAND WHERE THE
MARIJUANA PLANTS WERE PLANTED IS A PUBLIC LAND ON THE
ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED APPELLANT PLANTED THE SUBJECT
MARIJUANA.29
Simply stated, the issues are:
(1) Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case
lawful?
(2) Were the seized plants admissible in evidence against the accused?
(3) Has the prosecution proved appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
(4) Is the sentence of death by lethal injection correct?
The first and second issues will be jointly discussed because they are
interrelated.
Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that
the law enforcers had more than ample time to secure a search warrant. Second,
that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not remove
appellant from the mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. He relies on the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392
US 1, 20 L. Ed 2d 898, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), to the effect that the protection
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the records
clearly show that there was no search made by the police team, in the first place.
The OSG points out that the marijuana plants in question were grown in an
unfenced lot and as each grew about five (5) feet tall, they were visible from
afar, and were, in fact, immediately spotted by the police officers when they
reached the site. The seized marijuana plants were, thus, in plain view of the
police officers. The instant case must, therefore, be treated as a warrantless
lawful search under the "plain view" doctrine.
The court a quo upheld the validity of the search and confiscation made by the
police team on the finding that:
"...It seems there was no need for any search warrant. The policemen went to
the plantation site merely to make a verification. When they found the said
plants, it was too much to expect them to apply for a search warrant. In view of
the remoteness of the plantation site (they had to walk for six hours back and
forth) and the dangers lurking in the area if they stayed overnight, they had a
valid reason to confiscate the said plants upon discovery without any search
warrant. Moreover, the evidence shows that the lot was not legally occupied by
the accused and there was no fence which evinced the occupant's desire to keep
trespassers out. There was, therefore, no privacy to protect, hence, no search
warrant was required."30
The Constitution31 lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be
carried on the strength of a judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is
deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable
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search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree and should be excluded.32 Such evidence shall be inadmissible
in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.33
In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination of the existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the
police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least one (1) day to obtain a
warrant to search appellant's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to
them. The place where the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From
the information in their possession, they could have convinced a judge that
there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. But they did not.
Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended the accused on the excuse
that the trip was a good six hours and inconvenient to them. We need not
underscore that the protection against illegal search and seizure is
constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed
without warrants.34 The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights
covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-handedness of
law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.
We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that we apply
the "plain view" doctrine. For the doctrine to apply, the following elements
must be present:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right
to be where they are; and
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.35
In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified that they first located the
marijuana plants before appellant was arrested without a warrant.36 Hence,
there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant's
premises. Note further that the police team was dispatched to appellant's
kaingin precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of
evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is not searching
for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object.37 Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not
inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at
the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could spot the
illegal plants.38 Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately
apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in
question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view"
doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.
Nor can we sustain the trial court's conclusion that just because the marijuana
plants were found in an unfenced lot, appellant could not invoke the protection
afforded by the Charter against unreasonable searches by agents of the State.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one's
person, which includes his residence, his papers, and other possessions.39 The
guarantee refers to "the right of personal security"40 of the individual. As
appellant correctly points out, what is sought to be protected against the State's
unlawful intrusion are persons, not places.41 To conclude otherwise would not
only mean swimming against the stream, it would also lead to the absurd logic
that for a person to be immune against unreasonable searches and seizures, he
must be in his home or office, within a fenced yard or a private place. The Bill
of Rights belongs as much to the person in the street as to the individual in the
sanctuary of his bedroom.
We therefore hold, with respect to the first issue, that the confiscated plants
were evidently obtained during an illegal search and seizure. As to the second
issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for
the prosecution, we find that said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful
search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the
proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the
court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as
evidence to convict appellant.
We now proceed to the third issue, which revolves around the sufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence to prove appellant's guilt. Having declared the seized
marijuana plants inadmissible in evidence against appellant, we must now
address the question of whether the remaining evidence for the prosecution
suffices to convict appellant?
In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise relied on the testimony of the
police officers to the effect that appellant admitted ownership of the marijuana
when he was asked who planted them. It made the following observation:
"It may be true that the admission to the police by the accused that he planted
the marijuana plants was made in the absence of any independent and
competent counsel. But the accused was not, at the time of police verification;
under custodial investigation. His admission is, therefore, admissible in evidence
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and not violative of the constitutional fiat that admission given during custodial
investigation is not admissible if given without any counsel."42
Appellant now argues that his admission of ownership of the marijuana plants
in question cannot be used against him for being violative of his right to counsel
during the police investigation. Hence, it was error for the trial court to have
relied upon said admission of ownership. He submits that the investigation
conducted by the police officers was not a general inquiry, but was meant to
elicit information on the ownership of the marijuana plants. Appellant theorizes
that since the investigation had narrowed down to him, competent and
independent counsel should have assisted him, when the police sought
information from him regarding the ownership of the prohibited plants.
Appellant claims the presumption of regularity of duty of officers cannot be
made to apply to his purported voluntarily confession of ownership of the
marijuana plants. Nor can it override his constitutional right to counsel during
investigation.
The Office of the Solicitor General believes otherwise. The OSG avers that
appellant was not yet under custodial investigation when he admitted to the
police that he owned the marijuana plants. His right to competent and
independent counsel, accordingly, had not yet attached. Moreover, appellant’s
failure to impute any false motive for the police officers to falsely accuse him
indicates that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
by police officers was not sufficiently rebutted.
The Constitution plainly declares that any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right: (1) to remain silent; (2) to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be
informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.43 An investigation begins when it is no longer a
general inquiry but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when
the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the
suspect in connection with an alleged offense.44 The moment the police try to
elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a person
suspected of having committed an offense, he should at that juncture be
assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right in writing and in the presence of
counsel.45
In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster had furnished the police
appellant's name as well as the location of appellant's farm, where the marijuana
plants were allegedly being grown. While the police operation was supposedly
meant to merely "verify" said information, the police chief had likewise issued
instructions to arrest appellant as a suspected marijuana cultivator. Thus, at the
time the police talked to appellant in his farm, the latter was already under
investigation as a suspect. The questioning by the police was no longer a general
inquiry.46
Under cross-examination, PO2 Balut stated, he "did not yet admit that he is the
cultivator of that marijuana so we just asked him and I think there is no need to
inform (him of) his constitutional rights because we are just asking him..."47 In
trying to elicit information from appellant, the police was already investigating
appellant as a suspect. At this point, he was already under custodial investigation
and had a right to counsel even if he had not yet been arrested. Custodial
investigation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way."48 As a suspect, two armed policemen interrogated
appellant. Behind his inquisitors were a barangay peace officer and three other
armed policemen.49 All had been dispatched to arrest him.50 From these
circumstances, we may infer that appellant had already been deprived of his
freedom of action in a significant way, even before the actual arrest. Note that
even before he was arrested, the police made him incriminatingly pose for
photos in front of the marijuana plants.
Moreover, we find appellant's extrajudicial confession flawed with respect to its
admissibility. For a confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance
of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must
be in writing.51 The records show that the admission by appellant was verbal. It
was also uncounselled. A verbal admission allegedly made by an accused during
the investigation, without the assistance of counsel at the time of his arrest and
even before his formal investigation is not only inadmissible for being violative
of the right to counsel during criminal investigations, it is also hearsay.52 Even
if the confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it was made without
assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of such assistance, the
confession is inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or
even if it had been voluntarily given.53
It is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be
convicted of a crime, the prosecution must establish by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused is the author
thereof.54 The evidence arrayed against the accused, however, must not only
stand the test of reason,55 it must likewise be credible and competent.56
Competent evidence is "generally admissible" evidence.57 Admissible evidence,
in turn, is evidence "of such a character that the court or judge is bound to
receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced at trial."58
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IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER
In the instant case, the trial court relied on two pieces of probative matter to
convict appellant of the offense charged.1âwphi1 These were the seized
marijuana plants, and appellant's purportedly voluntary confession of ownership
of said marijuana plants to the police. Other than these proofs, there was no
other evidence presented to link appellant with the offense charged. As earlier
discussed, it was error on the trial court's part to have admitted both of these
proofs against the accused and to have relied upon said proofs to convict him.
For said evidence is doubly tainted.
First, as earlier pointed out, the seized marijuana plants were obtained in
violation of appellant's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The search and seizure were void ab initio for having been conducted
without the requisite judicial warrant. The prosecution's very own evidence
clearly establishes that the police had sufficient time to obtain a warrant. There
was no showing of such urgency or necessity for the warrantless search or the
immediate seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case. To reiterate, said
marijuana plants cannot be utilized to prove appellant's guilt without running
afoul of the constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and the
inadmissibility of evidence procured pursuant to an unlawful search and seizure.
Second, the confession of ownership of the marijuana plants, which appellant
allegedly made to the police during investigation, is not only hearsay but also
violative of the Bill of Rights. The purported confession was made without the
assistance of competent and independent counsel, as mandated by the Charter.
Thus, said confession cannot be used to convict appellant without running afoul
of the Constitution's requirement that a suspect in a criminal investigation must
have the services of competent and independent counsel during such
investigation.
In sum, both the object evidence and the testimonial evidence as to appellant's
voluntary confession of ownership of the prohibited plants relied upon to prove
appellant's guilt failed to meet the test of Constitutional competence.
The Constitution decrees that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved..."59 To justify the conviction of
the accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient
to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution
must stand or fall on its evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness
of the evidence for the accused.60 Absent the required degree of proof of an
accused's guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.61 In this case, the seized marijuana
plants linking appellant to the crime charged are miserably tainted with
constitutional infirmities, which render these inadmissible "for any purpose in
any proceeding."62 Nor can the confession obtained during the uncounselled
investigation be used against appellant, "it being inadmissible in evidence against
him."63 Without these proffered but proscribed materials, we find that the
prosecution's remaining evidence did not even approximate the quantum of
evidence necessary to warrant appellant's conviction. Hence, the presumption
of innocence in his favor stands. Perforce, his acquittal is in order.
In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure as
driven snow. Rather, we are declaring his innocence because the prosecution's
evidence failed to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For that is what the
basic law requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to overcome the
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, then his "acquittal must
follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law."64
WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the
Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal
Case No. 3105, finding Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and imposing
upon him the death penalty, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for
insufficiency of evidence. Appellant is ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED
immediately from confinement unless held for another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.
IDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW (ISL)
-IT FIXES THE MINIMUM PERIOD OF A SENTENCE
ORDINARY MITIGATING
-ONE PERIOD LOWER
ORDINARY AGGRAVATING
-ONE PERIOD HIGHER
TWO ORDINARY MITTIGATING OR AGGRAVATING
-ONE PRIVILAGE
ONE PRIVILAGE
-ONE DEGREE/RANK LOWER OR HIGHER
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IST.IBARRETA CRIM FINALS REVIEWER

IMPOSABLE PENALTY PRESCRIBED PENALTY

-CHANGES DEPENDS ON THE
-WHAT THE RPC SAYS
JUDGE AND THE
-UNCHANGEABLE
CIRCUMSTANCES

PARDON AMNESTY
CONGRESS (UPON THE
PRESIDENT (PURELY
RECOMMENDATION OF THE
PERSONAL ACT)
PRESIDENT
LOOKS FOREWARD AND LOOKS BACKWARDS AND
OBLITERATES THE PENALTY OBLITERATED THE OFFENSE
INDIVIDUAL PERSONS BY GROUP
RECOGNIZES PRIOR
COMISSION
NO CONVICTION NEEDED
XPT:
ELECTION CONVICTIONS

CRIMINAL PROCEDURES IN A NUTSHELL

EX DELICTO
CRIMINAL (CULPA
CRIMINAL)
CIVIL LIABILITY EX
ACT
DELICTO

CIVIL (CULPA
AQUILIANA)
TRANSFER TO
HEIRS WHEN
ACCUSED IS DEAD

238