WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS

WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS AND THE PROBLEM

OF A PHENOMENOLOGICAL LANGUAGE

ANDREASBLANK

The interpretation of the objects in Wittgenstein's Tractatus as

phenome-nological objects has been highly influential in recent years.
Merill B. Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka hold the view, that the objects
Wittgenstein has in mind in the Tractatus are "objects of acquaintance"
in Russell's sense. JAs "objects of acquaintance", according to HintikkaJ
Hintikka, tractarian objects are sense data, i.e. objects or contents of
sensation. Pears, Zemach and Cook reject the possi-bility that tractarian
objects may be private sense data, but instead regard them as non-private
phenomena, i.e. sensory qualities and objects? In both cases, elementary
sentences would be formulated in a purely phenomenological language.
Consequently, ordinary language would be ultimately analysable into
(and truth-functionally dependent on) a phenomenological language.
Indeed, in PhilosophicaIRemarks I, 1 Wittgenstein mentions a pheno-
menological language as his "former goal" in philosophy and gives as
examples of his former conception of objects the "visual table" and the
"expected knocks at the door" (Philosophical Remarks III, 36). But, as
McGuinness has pointed out, 3 in neither passage does Wittgenstein make
clear whether he is talking about the period of the Tractatus, or that
beginning with Some Remarks on Logical Form (1929), where he has
given up the requirement of logical independence of elementary
propositions in favour of the admission of phenomenological qualities
as basic constituents of the world 4. In that period Wittgenstein explicitly
regards the world as a world of sense data, 5 whereas the Tractatus does
not contain any explicit statement as to whether sense data or phenomena
are to be counted as objects. In the Tractatus, there is also no explicit

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claim that the analysis of language ends on a level in which acquaintance

with simple objects is the basis for learning the meanings of words.
This paper has two aims. In sections I and II, I will examine the
textual evidence in the writings of Wittgenstein which are thought to
favour the interpretation of tractarian objects as phenomenological
objects. There, I try to show that Russell's influence has been much
more indirect: phenomenological entities seem to be a possible model
for tractarian objects, but the Tractatus does not contain any endorsment
of such a model. In sections III and IV, I consider two possible
explanations for this result. One possible explanation is the thesis, put
forward by Anscombe, McGuinness, Ishiguro and Mikel, that the concept
'object' in the Tractatus is defined by logical concepts alone. There, I
argue that this interpretation is based on a misunderstandig of the
conceptual structure of the Tractatus. The Tractatus should be seen as a
system of implicit definitions in which neither logical nor ontological
concepts have priority. This in turn is a result of Wittgenstein's own
view of logic: logic in the sense of the Tractatus is concerned with the
structures of language and reality that can be known a priori. In section
IV, I try to show that this conception of logic explains why it cannot be
said in the Tractatus whether the ultimate constituents of reality are
phenomenological ones, or whether analysis of language ultimately ends
with a phenomenological language.

L Objects and sense data

Retrospective reports on Wittgenstein's attitude towards the theory
of sense data in the Tractatus period are confusingly contradictory.
According to Desmond Lee, Wittgenstein regarded tractarian objects as
sense data, such as colours and points in visual space. 6 According to
Frank Ramsey's unpublished notes, Wittgenstein regarded objects as
something given in experience, but not as sense data, sense data being
logical constructions, which are not contained in anything we know. 7 In
Notebooks 1614-1916 Wittgenstein seems to regard points in visual space
as examples of simple objects in the technical sense (6.5. 1915; 24. 5.
1915), and also thinks it possible, that minima sensibilia such as patches
in the visual field are simple objects (18.6.1915). In the Notebooks,

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Wittgenstein also mentions material points in physics as possible

examples for objects in the sense of simple components of material bodies
(20.6.1915). Cook has pointed out that material points differ from objects
in the Tractatus in the respect that physical points (point masses) appear
only in theoretical calculations, but not in the world. 8 This difference
between physical points and tractarian objects makes it clear that
Wittgenstein's search for possible examples of objects in the Notebooks
does not represent a final solution to the problem of the character of
objects. Nevertheless, Hintikka/Hintikka defend the thesis that points
in visual space in the Tractatus are still counted among the objects as the
basic constituents of facts and states of affairs.
According to Hintikka/Hintikka, in Tractatus 2.0131 Wittgenstein
uses the spacial object, the patch in the visual field, the sound and the
object of the sense of touch as examples of objects in the technical sense,
in the same way as they appear in 2.013. 9 But the wider context of these
passages does not support this interpretation. The fact that objects cannot
appear outside of states of affairs is compared in 2.0121 with the fact
that objects in space cannot appear outside of space. The same logical
relation holds between the sentences 2.013 und 2.0131: The fact that
each object is in a"space" of possible states of affairs is compared to the
fact that each spacial object must have a place in space, a patch in the
visual field must have a colour, and so on. What Wittgenstein explains
in 2.0131 is not the concept of an object, but the concept of a space of
possible states of affairs, and in this explanation he makes use of
analogies, rather than examples. This leaves it open whether spacial
objects, patches in the visual field, etc. belong to the objects in the
technical sense of the Tractatus.
Following Hintikka/Hintikka, 5.552 implies that sense data are the
kind of experience which is necessary in order to be able to understand a
proposition, and which is required for a proposition to have meaning) ~
But in 5.552, Wittgenstein only considers the kind of experience needed
for understanding logic (which is not the same as understanding
meaningful sentences, since in the view of the Tractatus the sentences of
logic are not meaningful11). Wittgenstein characterizes this as an
experience "that there is something", which is not an experience of certain

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qualities of existing objects, i.e. not an experience of what something is

like. Therefore, according to Wittgenstein logic is prior to any experience
in the traditional sense. The experience required for understanding logic
does not seem to be an experience of what the ultimate constituents of
reality are. In that case, the idea that understanding logic requires a certain
kind of experience does not pin down the tractarian objects to sense data.
In a similar way, 4.123 provides no conclusive support o f the
Hintikkas' view. There Wittgenstein calls colours "objects", but
immediately afterwards points out that here "object" is not used in the
technical sense, but in order to designate anything that possesses "internal
properties", i.e. properties which it is impossible not to have. Not only
objects in the tractarian sense, but also facts and states of affairs have
internal properties (4.122-4.1221). Accordingly, no conclusions can be
drawn as to whether colours can count among objects in the technical
sense on the basis of this passage alone.
There is a hint in a retrospective remark of Wittgenstein that he
considered colours as possible candidates for tractarian objects. In the
Philosophical Investigations (I, 58) he uses the example o f " R e d exists"
to throw light on the Tractatus conception of names, saying that names
are that which cannot stand in connection with "X exists". Similarly,
according to Moore's report on Wittgenstein's lectures 1930-1933,
Wittgenstein regarded sentences mentioning one of the primary colours
red, green, blue or yellow as examples of elementary sentences in the
sense of the Tractatus.~2 In contrast to that, two passages which Hintikka/
Hintikka cite as further evidence seem to exclude colours from the realm
of tractarian objects; (1) As Anscombe and Griffin have pointed out, in
2.0251 Wittgenstein regards the state of being coloured as a "form" of
objects, i.e. as a possibility of objects to appear in states of affairs. More
generally, Wittgenstein holds the view that material properties are only
constituted through the configuration of simple objects (2.0231), and
that objects are therefore colourless (2.0232)? 3 Colours seem not to
belong to the realm of objects, but rather to play a role at the level of
states of affairs. (2) Ansombe argues that colours violate the condition
that (elementary) states of affairs are logically independent of other
(elementary) states of affairs, and that elementary sentences are logically

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independent of other elementary sentences (2.062; 4.211). Wittgenstein

regards this in turn as a consequence of the requirement of the
determinateness of meaning of a sentence, which is the central motivation
for the Tractatus view of language and the world (2.021-2.0212). In
6.3751 he says that, due to the logical structure of colour, it cannot be
the case, that two colours at the same time are present at the same place
of visual space. For that reason, he explicitly draws the conclusion that
sentences mentioning colours are not elementary sentences. Cook has
proposed a possible solution, suggesting that colours themselves can be
composed of elementary shades of colour. On that level, a certain point
in visual space having a certain shade of colour does not exclude the
same point having other shades of colour. 14Similarly, Canfield holds the
thesis that objects in the Tractatus can be conceived of as phenomena
like shades of colour. ~5Wittgenstein himself, in Some Remarks on Logical
Form, endorses the possibility of an analysis of colours into more basic
shades of colour. ~6 This possible solution for the problem of colour
incompatibilities marks a move away from the conception of objects as
sense data towards a less-specialised view of objects as phenomena.

H. Objects and phenomena

Within the phenomenologicaI paradigm, Pears, Zemach and Cook
have developed an alternative to the Hintikkas' interpretation. They hold
the view that tractarian objects belong to the category of phenomena,
but not to the category of sense data. This sharp distinction between
phenomena and sense data may rest partly on a misunderstanding of the
Hintikkas' interpretation. For one thing, Pears regards privacy as an
essential feature of sense data.17 This does not exactly correspond to the
Hintikkas' understanding of sense data. They have pointed out that, for
Moore and Russell, privacy is not an essential feature of sense data~8:
sense data in the conception of Moore and Russell include not only private
aspects of sensation, but also sensible qualities and even properties of
surfaces. 19 Similarly, Cook has pointed out that even for Mach sense
data are not private: Machian sense data are the neutral stuff out of which
both the material world and the contents of consciousness are built up? ~
Cook's and Zemach's arguments against sense data are based on

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another consideration. They point out that sensa data are complex objects,
having a certain extension in visual or physical space. 2~ But, for one
thing, the complexity of sense data in the "classical" conception of sense
data clearly does not rule out the possibility that simple constituents of
sense perception may exist that are devoid of internal structure, such as
points in visual space or shades of colour. More important, Wittgenstein
in the Notebooks explicitly does not exclude the possibility that minima
sensibilia, such as patches in the visual field, despite of their complexity,
are to be counted as simple objects, being the simplest components
distinguishable in perception (18.6.1915). As long as they are
epistemologically simple, the central difficulty for private sense data
therefore does not seem to be their complexity, but (as in the case of
primary colours in the visual field) the problem of logical independence
of elementary states of affairs and elementary sentences.
Nevertheless, Pears, Zemach and Cook offer a clear alternative to
the Hintikkas' interpretation, in that they exclude private sense data from
the realm of objects, which the Hintikkas don't. But, is there any
conclusive textual evidence to the effect that tractarian objects must be
non-private phenomena in the sense of Pears, Zemach and Cook? In
2.0123-2.01231, where Pears sees evidence for the claim that objects
can be known by acquaintance, 22 Wittgenstein expresses himself more
cautiously: If I know an object, then I know its internal properties; in
order to know an object, I have to know its internal properties. This is
remarkably different from the claim Pears ascribes to Wittgenstein, viz.
the claim that we do in fact know the internal properties of objects in the
sense of the Tractatus. More important for Wittgenstein's view of
phenomena is 5.631. There, Wittgenstein refers to the human body as
part of the world as we find it. Pears draws the conclusion that, for
Wittgenstein, the world as we find it consists of (non-private) phenomena,
and that, as a consequence, the objects, being the ultimate constituents
of the world, are also phenomena. This gives rise to two objections. (1)
In 5.631 the human body is conceived of as being composed of limbs,
i.e. phenomenologically distinguishable parts. Here, the complexity of
the phenomenological object rules it out as an object in the technical
sense of the Tractatus. (2) Whereas the first conclusion-- that the world

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as we find it consists of phenomena - - is a natural consequence of 5.631,

the second conclusion - - that objects are phenomena - - is problematic.
The world and objects, as Wittgenstein states in the first sentences of the
Tractatus, belong to fundamentally different ontological categories: The
world is a whole of facts or states of affairs, not of objects. The world as
we find it, therefore, consists of facts, not of objects, and the
p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l character of facts does not g u a r a n t e e the
phenomenological character of the objects that constitute these facts.
The same objection applies to two of Zemach's arguments for the
phenomenological character of objects. One argument is based on 5.62-
5.63, where Wittgenstein calls the world "my world" and equates "world"
with "life". 23This only means that the world, as a whole of facts (not of
objects), is something experienced in life. The other argument centers
on Wittgenstein's idea, that all experience is contingent, and that
everything that we see could actually be different from how it is (5.634). 24
Here one might object, that, for Wittgenstein, it is the facts that can be
different, while the objects remain the same in all possible states of affairs
(2.0271). In this sense, objects are the "substance of the world" (2.021).
The experience Wittgenstein talks about in 5.634 is therefore an
experience of facts (which alone could be different), not an experience
of objects.
Perhaps the most powerful argument for the phenomenological
character of tractarian objects is Zemach's thesis that Wittgenstein rejects
scientific realism and, therefore, the existence of unobservable, non-
phenomenological entities. 25 But, in 6.371-6.372, Wittgenstein does not
consider the problem of the existence of unobservable entities, he only
argues against the idea that causal connections are of logical necessity.
Here, Wittgenstein denies the reality of causal relations, not the reality
of unobservable entitities. Even when, in 6.343-6.35, Wittgenstein says
that through their logical apparatus scientific laws talk about objects in
the world, this does not imply, that all real entities are phenomenological
ones. He merely states the conditions necessary for scientific laws to be
meaningful sentences: like all meaningful sentences, when completely
analysed, they must talk about simple objects. This is also made clear in
the parallel passage in the Notebooks, where Wittgenstein discusses the

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role of variables in mathematical physics. There, he makes clear that the

completed physical sentence nevertheless refers to things, relations etc.
(20.6.1915). The question here is not to determine the qualitative
characteristics of simple objects, but rather whether the sentences of
physics have reference at all.
Cook mentions the Notebook entry of 9.11.1916, where Wittgenstein
says "All experience is world (...)-.26 Again, the concept of experience
seems to be connected not with the concept of object, but with the concept
of world. A closer connection between experience and objects can be
found in in 5.5561, cited by Cook and Pears27: "The empirical reality is
limited by the whole of objects". But, for Wittgenstein, "reality" is the
"holding and not holding of states of affairs" (2.06). That is why he does
not say that empirical reality consists of the whole of objects. Empirical
reality, the complete holding and not holding of states of affairs, is limited
by the existing objects, because the internal properties of objects
determine which states of affairs are possible (2.01231-2.0124). This
limiting function of the internal properties of objects does not imply,
that the objects themselves are empirical or phenomenological.

IlL 'Object' as a logical concept?

Does this mean that empirical or phenomenological objects have to
be excluded from the realm of objects in the sense of the Tractatus?
McGuinness holds the view that objects in the Tractatus are not concrete
objects at all; nor are they, according to him, properties of concrete
objects, because in that case there would be something simpler than
simple objects. In his interpretation, objects are nothing we have
experience of or acquaintance with. 28 The strongest evidence for this
claim is the fact, that tractarian objects can only be named (3.221; see
also Notebooks, 26.5.1915, 27.5.1915 and Philosophical Investigations
I, 46). But this does not exclude the possibility that one, in principle, can
know an object, in the sense that one can know its internal properties,
i.e. acquire knowledge of the states of affairs an object may enter into
(2.0123-2.01231 ). External propertie s, also mentioned in 2.0123 -2.01231,
can analogously be conceived of as those possibilities for entering into
states of affairs that are actually realized. That would explain the fact

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that, following 4.023, objects can also, in principle, be described

according to their external properties. This ability to describe internal
and external properties leaves open the possibility that objects might be
objects of acquaintance or phenomena. In that respect, the Tractatus
seems to contain neither positive nor negative ontological commitments.
One explanation for W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s silence r e g a r d i n g the
phenomenological character of objects could be that he regarded 'object'
as a purely logical concept. According to Anscombe, the concept of object
for Wittgenstein is a purely "formal" concept, defined by the syntactical
role of names in elementary sentences. 29In a similar vein, Ishiguro holds
the view that the concept of object for Wittgenstein is definable with the
help of logical concepts alone: an object is whatever is designated by
the subject term in a completely analysed sentence. 3~McGuinness gives
another logical definition of the concept of object, using Wittgenstein's
definition sameness of signs as the possibility to substitute signs in all
contexts (3.341; 3.344): as the same sign, for Wittgenstein, always
designates the same object (5.553), an object can be defined as the
reference of all signs which are mutually substitutable for each other in
completely analysed sentences? ~ Finally, Mikel makes explicit an
assumption implicitly contained in all these interpretations: 'object' in
the Tractatus is used like a variable, designed to stand for whatever may
be the ultimate endpoint in the analysis of language. 32
It is true that, in the Notebooks, Wittgenstein talks about simple objects
in the way suggested by Ishiguro: "But how am I imagining the simple?
Here all I can say is always" 'x' has reference .... (6.5.1915). A few days
later, he says: "It need appear only as a prototype, as a variable in our
sentences - - that is the simple thing that we mean and look for."
(11.5.1915). This seems to suggest that, in fact, 'object' for Wittgenstein
is a concept defined by logical concepts alone. But, in the Notebook
entry of 30.5.1915, he gives a negative answer to the the question "is
'name' so to speak a logical concept?". There, he says that names signalise
"what is common to a single form and a single content", i.e. names refer
to objects. Here, an ontological component enters into the definition of
'name'. A similar conceptual structure can be found in the Tractatus.
According to 3.201 and 3.203, objects are those entities, to which names

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("simple signs") in completely analysed sentences refer. But in 3.202,

names are defined as the simple signs used in a sentence. This presupposes
that the sentence sign itself is used, i.e. is a meaningful sentence (3.5-4).
Meaningful sentences, for Wittgenstein, are pictures of possible states
of affairs (2.201; 3-3.02), which means that they are pictures of possible
concatenations of objects (2.01). In this way, 'object' and' state of affairs'
enter into the definition of the concept 'meaningful sentence'.
The definitions suggested by Anscombe, Ishiguro and McGuinness
are affected by this conceptual structure. Although it is true that, following
Anscombe, objects can be defined through the syntactical role of names,
the concept of name is not a purely logical concept, but, in turn,
presupposes the concept of object. Moreover, if the definitions proposed
by Ishiguro and McGuinness are understood in a literal sense, they are
clearly wrong. Not all subject terms of completely analysed sentences
stand for objects: subject terms in mathematical or logical sentences do
not refer to mathematical or logical objects (4.441; 5.4; 6.02). For the
same reason, not all mutually substitutable signs in completely analysed
sentences are names of objects: mutually substitutable signs in
mathematics or logic do not have reference at all. In order to get a correct
definition of the concept of object, the definitions suggested by Ishiguro
and McGuinness have to be relativised to meaningful sentences, which
excludes mathematical and logical sentences (cf. 5.534; 6.1263). But
then, the interdependence of logical_ and ontological concepts shows up
again: the concepts 'state of affairs' and 'object' enter into the definition
of meaningful sentences.
Consequently, in Wittgenstein's view, neither 'name' n o r ' meaningful
sentence' is a merely logical concept. The Traetatus (and in the same
way the Notebook entries of May 1915) is built on a system of implicit
definitions in which neither logical nor ontological concepts have priority.
Therefore, Wittgenstein's silence as to the phenomenological character
of objects cannot be explained through an interpretation of 'object' as a
concept defineable by logical concepts alone.

IV. Objects and Wittgenstein's conception of logic

Nevertheless, Wittgenstein regards the sentences of the Tractatus in

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a certain sense as sentences of logic. For example, in 2.012-2.0121, where

he sets forth the theory of internal properties of objects, he points out
that, "in logic", nothing can be by chance. Again, in 6.22 he talks about
the "logic of the world", and in 6.12 about the "formal - - logical - -
properties of the world". In this conception of logic, logical and
ontological concepts are inseparable. According to 6.124, sentences of
logic represent the structure of the world, in that they presuppose that
names have reference and elementary sentences meaning. In the
Notebooks, he puts forward the question: "can we manage without simple
objects in LOGIC?" (9.5.1915). As Wittgenstein makes clear in an early
Notebook entry (22.1.1915), and again in Tractatus 5.4711, sentences of
logic describe the nature of all description and therefore the nature of
the world, the nature of all states of affairs, or the nature of being. In
these passages, the structure of the world is tied inseparably to the
structure of language with a view to the question of which conditions
must be met for a sentence to have meaning. The inseparable connection
between logical and ontological concepts in the Notebooks and the
Tractatus can therefore be seen as a consequence of a semantic approach
to the problems of logic.
That Wittgenstein holds no positive or negative assumptions as to
the phenomenological nature of objects seems to be directly connected
with this special conception of logic. At the very beginning of the
Notebooks (22.8,1914), and again in Tractatus 5.473, Wittgenstein says
that "logic must take care of itself". As a consequence of this, the kind of
self-evidence which plays a prominent role in Russells epistemology in
Wittgenstein's view is unnecessary in logic (Tractatus 5.4731 and
Notebooks 8.9.1914). In this sense, according to Wittgenstein, logic is a
priori (5.4731). Correspondingly, the central question around which the
Notebooks turn is: "Is there an order in the world a priori, and if so what
does it consist in?" (1.6.1915). In the Notebooks, Wittgenstein makes
clear that the irrelevance of self-evidence holds in the first instance for
the question of subject-predicate form and relational forms: Whether
elementary sentences have such forms cannot be shown through
experience (3.9.1914). In the same Notebook entry, Wittgenstein also
points out that the same holds for the question, whether a point in visual

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space is a simple object: according to him, no evidence can decide this

question. This clearly shows that, for him, the question of whether objects
are sense data or not cannot be answered through experience. But, due
to the a priori character of logical sentences, as Wittgenstein points out
in the Tractatus, we cannot say in logic: "this and that is in the world,
but that is not" (5.61). His argument is most emphatically expressed in a
passage from the Notebooks (17.6.1915 ): "It is, A PRIORI, clear that in
analysis we must arrive at simple components (...). This question is a
logical one and the complexity of spatial objects is a logical complexity
(...). And it keeps on forcing itself upon us that there is some simple
indivisible, an element of being, in brief a thing. It does not go against
our feeling, that we cannot analyse PROPOSITIONS so far as to mention
the elements by name; no, we feel that the W O R L D must consist of
elements." Thus, the a priori character of logic allows for the possibility
that we are in fact unable to carry analysis to the point where we can
grasp the nature of the simple constituents of the world.
The a s c r i p t i o n o f o n t o l o g i c a l c o m m i t m e n t s as to the
phenomenological character of objects therefore seems to rest on a
misunderstanding of the nature of the sentences of the Tractatus. The
fact that Wittgenstein holds no implicit c o m m i t m e n t s as to the
phenomenological character of objects or to the phenomenological
character o f elementary sentences seems to be connected with two
fundamental points concerning the logical structure of the Tractatus.
First, there is no primacy of logical over ontological concepts or vice
versa: the Tractatus can be seen as a system of implicit definitions
comprising both logical and ontological concepts. And second, the
Tractatus contains only those (positive or negative) commitments as to
the structure both of descriptions and the world, which can be stated a
priori; in this sense, the sentences of the Tractatus are to be seen as
sentences of logic.

INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY
D-10099 BERLIN
GERMANY

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NOTES

~. HintikkaJ Hintikka (1986, pp. 51-77).

2 Pears (1987, pp. 90-97); Zemach (1990, p. 35); Cook (1994, pp. 31-40).

3. McGuinness (1981, p. 62).

4. Wittgenstein (1929, pp. 162-165).
5 Lee (1980, p. 79).
6. Lee (1980, p. 120).
7. Item #004-21-02 in the Pittsburgh Ramsey archives, cited in Hintikka/
Hintikka (1986, p. 77).
8 Cook (1994, p. 40).
9. Hintikka/Hintikka (1986, p. 74).
to. Hintikka/Hintikka (1986, pp. 56 and 71).
N. Cf. Tractatus 6.121.
~2 Moore-(1963, pp. 297-299).
~3. Anscombe (1965, p. 111); Griffin (1965, pp. 44and 55).
14. Cook (1994, pp. 37-39).
15. Canfield (1972, pp. 207-213).
,6. Wittgenstein (1929, p. 168).
17. Pears (1987, p. 64).
ts. Hintikka/Hintikka (1986, 71-72).
~9. Cf. Moore (1922); Russell (1918).
20. Cook (1994, pp. 19 and 42).
2~. Cook (1994, p 34); Zemach (1990, p. 39).
22. Pears (1987, p. 107).
23. Zemach (1990, p. 35).
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
,.6. Cook (1994, p. 31).
27. Cook (1994, p. 31); Pears (1987, p. 107).
28 McGuinness (1981,p. 72).
29. Anscombe (1965, pp. 82, 99 and 123).
3o Ishiguro (1990, pp. 25-26).
3~ McGuinness (1981,pp. 65-66).
32. Mikel (1998, pp. 385-388).

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