NEGRO, Antonio - Making Sense of Sense Containment

History and Philosophy of Logic
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Making Sense of Sense Containment
Antonio Negro
To cite this article: Antonio Negro (2017): Making Sense of Sense Containment, History and
Philosophy of Logic, DOI: 10.1080/01445340.2017.1328644
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Download by: [The UC San Diego Library] Date: 14 June 2017, At: 05:54
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC, 2017
https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2017.1328644
Making Sense of Sense Containment

ANTONIO NEGRO
Università di Genova, Italy
antonio.negro@hotmail.it
Received 14 April 2016 Accepted 7 May 2017
Proposition 5.122 of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (‘If p follows from q, the sense of [p] is contained in the sense of
[q]’) has been the source of much puzzlement among interpreters, so much so that no fully satisfactory account
is yet available. This is unfortunate, if only because the containment account of logical consequence has a ven-
erable tradition behind it. Pasquale Frascolla’s interpretation of proposition 5.122 is based on a valid argument
and one true premise. However, the argument explains sense containment only in an indirect way, leaving some
crucial questions unanswered. Besides, Frascolla does not address the issue of how to make sense containment
notationally perspicuous, an essential theme in Wittgenstein’s reflections. In this paper, we elaborate on Fras-
colla’s account by looking at the issue through the Tractarian notion of logical space. Our analysis shows that,
for containment to be fully appreciated, one should adopt a negative perspective on the notion of sense (which
is taken into consideration also by Wittgenstein), in line with the exclusionary theory of conceptual content, as
labelled by Ian Rumfitt. Besides this, we introduce and discuss two methods—one envisaged by Wittgenstein
himself—for making sense containment notationally perspicuous.
1. Introduction
Early on in his intellectual life, Wittgenstein began to focus on the project of isolat-
ing a notion of logical consequence—see Floyd 2005. Later, in the Tractatus logico-
philosophicus (TLP), he concluded that ‘the truth of a proposition [p] follows from the
truth of another proposition [q] if all the truth-grounds of the latter are truth-grounds of
the former’ (TLP 5.12).1 As will become clear, once truth-grounds are understood accord-
ing to TLP 5.101,2 Wittgenstein’s notion of logical consequence proves analogous to the
contemporary model-theoretic notion (β follows from α if and only if all models of α are
models of β), and thus TLP 5.12 poses no particular interpretive problems.3
However, TLP 5.122 (‘If p follows from q, the sense of [p] is contained in the sense of
[q]’), introduced as a comment on TLP 5.12, proved difficult to understand and puzzled
many interpreters, including Frank Ramsey, Max Black and Robert Fogelin. Some scholars
could not come to a clear interpretation, others suggested poor ones, and apparently no fully
satisfactory account is yet available.
1
References in the text are to Wittgenstein 1921. If one recalls that for Wittgenstein ‘[o]ne elementary proposition cannot be
deduced from another’ (TLP 5.134), then it becomes clear from TLP 5.12 that ‘p’ and ‘q’ are used by Wittgenstein to denote
not only elementary but also non-elementary propositions (see also TLP 6.1221, or TLP 5.121 and 5.122 below; cf., in contrast,
TLP 4.24). In the following citations, we will let the context determine which of the two readings is more appropriate. At some
point we shall use ‘p’, ‘q’, . . . to denote elementary propositions and ‘α’, ‘β’, . . . to denote generic propositions. For the most
part we will not use quotation marks for propositions: for example, differently from Wittgenstein, we will write ‘the sense of
p’ rather than ‘the sense of “p”’ (and we will modify citations accordingly, for uniformity’s sake).
2
TLP 5.101: ‘[ . . . ] I will give the name truth-grounds of a proposition to those truth-possibilities of its truth-arguments that
make it true’.
3
In spite of the conditional form, it is clear that TLP 5.12 is meant as an equivalence. The same holds, for example, for TLP
5.11—see Zalabardo 2009, p. 425. Also, it should be noticed that—by TLP 5.132 (‘If p follows from q, I can make an inference
from q to p, deduce p from q [ . . . ]’)—it is clear that by ‘follows from’ Wittgenstein means ‘is a logical consequence of’.
© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

2 A. Negro
This is unfortunate, for at least three reasons. First, because the Tractatus is rightly con-
sidered a monument to the semantic conception of logic, and hence Wittgenstein’s notion
of logical consequence (a semantic notion) should be made as clear as possible. Second,
because TLP 5.122 claims something analogous—to say the least—to what has been vari-
ously expressed by philosophers throughout the ages (from Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas,
from Leibniz to Kant, and so on): namely, that in every true analytic judgement the pred-
icate is already contained in the subject—see Primiero 2008 and Sundholm 2013. Finally,
because the very idea that the sense of the conclusion of a valid argument is contained
in that of the premise (i.e. that logical consequence is non-ampliative—see Salmon 1966,
p. 8) has a venerable tradition behind it and is still important today.4 This is eminently
shown by the quite large literature on the so called scandal of deduction, where this idea
represents the starting point of the discussion.5
However, sense containment is indeed hard to understand, both in general and from
the perspective of the Tractatus, as the ways in which interpreters dealt with it testify.
Moreover, as will be shown, Wittgenstein himself was aware of the trickiness of his
claim, which—he later reported—he had grasped as correct only intuitively and thus left
completely unexplained in the Tractatus.
Some years ago, Pasquale Frascolla offered an interpretation of TLP 5.122 based on a
valid argument and one true premise.6 Nevertheless, his argument explains sense contain-
ment only in an indirect way (by reasoning about what affirming a proposition amounts to
within the Tractarian view); and, more importantly, its premise offers a characterisation of
affirming that leaves some crucial questions unanswered. Besides this, Frascolla does not
address the issue of how to make sense containment notationally perspicuous, an essential
theme in Wittgenstein’s reflections. Thus, his explanation is ultimately unsatisfactory.
In this paper we deepen Frascolla’s account, arguing that—once the notion of logi-
cal space introduced in TLP 4.463 is brought into focus—a negative perspective on the
Tractarian notion of sense becomes salient (which is taken into consideration also by
Wittgenstein), in line with the exclusionary theory of conceptual content, as labelled by
Ian Rumfitt. On this negative perspective, the sense of a proposition is to be primar-
ily connected to its falsity-grounds. In this way, sense containment follows directly, and
other associated propositions are also explained (TLP 5.124, on affirming, and TLP 5.14,
on saying more). Thus, Wittgenstein’s notion of sense proves able to define how much a
proposition says (an important theme for the pre-Tractarian Wittgenstein)7 in a way that is
analogous to that introduced in Bar-Hillel and Carnap 1953 with reference to the notion of
semantic information (as also noticed by Frascolla). Finally, in relation to Wittgenstein’s
4
As Sundholm (2013, p. 27) observes, ‘[the] containment account of analyticity and deductive validity first arose for Aristotelian
predications, that is, judgements. Subsequently, and perhaps inspired by the Aristotelian use of perfect syllogisms, it was
exported also to the validity of inferences by medieval logicians’. The containment account of consequence, as distinguished
by the truth-preservation account considered by Boethius (480–524 or 525), was probably first introduced by Abelard (1079–
1142) and accepted in some form by most medieval logicians—see Dutilh Novaes 2012 and Priest et al. 2015. Priest 1980 is an
attempt of a theory of logical validity based on the notion of sense containment, rather than on the notion of truth preservation.
According to Priest, the containment account was the ‘prevailing account of deductive validity in the 19th Century’ (p. 421); on
this matter, see Corcoran 1998. Interestingly, he continues thus: ‘Although this view has lapsed now, there are still, fortunately,
writers around to remind us of it. An interesting example is Salmon [1966]’,—refers to Salmon 1966, according to which ‘[t]he
conclusion [of a logical consequence] cannot be false if the premises are true because the conclusion says nothing that was not
already stated in the premises’ (p. 8).
5
In other contexts, the issue is called the paradox of inference, for example, in Keynes 1884. For an overview and bibliography,
see Duží 2010 and D’Agostino 2013.
6
During the writing of this paper, we discovered another explanation in Piana 1973 (pp. 86–87), which is essentially the one we
will propose in Section 4.
7
In the Notebooks we read:
Making Sense of Sense Containment 3
observation that the internal relation of logical consequence ‘finds expression in relations
in which the forms of the propositions stand to one another’ (TLP 5.131), we introduce
and discuss two methods—one envisaged by Wittgenstein himself some years after the
Tractatus—for making sense containment notationally perspicuous.
The work is organised as follows. Section 2 brings the problem into focus. Section 3 out-
lines how Wittgenstein’s interpreters dealt with it, and presents in some detail Frascolla’s
analysis and its limitations. Section 4 offers an explanation of Wittgenstein’s notion of log-
ical space and, based on this, introduces the negative perspective on the notion of sense,
thus clarifying this Tractarian notion. Finally, in Section 5, we first show how to obtain
the correct interpretation of TLP 5.122 (and its cognates) from such a perspective; we then
introduce and discuss two ways of making sense containment notationally perspicuous.
2. The problem in focus

Before proceeding, we list the Tractarian propositions that are the focus of our study:
TLP 5.121: ‘The truth-grounds of the one [i.e. q] are contained in those of the other
[i.e. p]: p follows from q’.8
TLP 5.122: ‘If p follows from q, the sense of [p] is contained in the sense of [q]’.
TLP 5.124: ‘A proposition affirms every proposition that follows from it’.
TLP 5.14: ‘If one proposition follows from another, then the latter says more than
the former, and the former less than the latter’.
In order to make our analysis more efficient, let us consider a simple language L, with
only two elementary propositions: p and q. As indicated in TLP 5.101 with reference to
a language exactly like our own, ‘[t]he truth-functions of a given number of elementary
propositions can always be set out in a schema of the following kind:
[1] (T T T T) (p, q) Tautology (If p then p, and if q then q.) (p ⊃ p . q ⊃ q)

[2] (F T T T) (p, q) In words: Not both p and q. ( ∼ (p . q))
[3] (T F T T) (p, q) „ „ : If q then p. (q ⊃ p)
[4] (T T F T) (p, q) „ „ : If p then q. (p ⊃ q)
[5] (T T T F) (p, q) „ „ : p or q. (p v q)
[6] (F F T T) (p, q) „ „ : Not q. ( ∼ q)
[7] (F T F T) (p, q) „ „ : Not p. ( ∼ p)
[8] (F T T F) (p, q) „ „ : p or q, but not both. (p . ∼ q : v : q . ∼ p)
[9] (T F F T) (p, q) „ „ : If p then q, and if q then p. (p ≡ q)
[10] (T F T F) (p, q) „ „ : p
[11] (T T F F) (p, q) „ „ : q
[12] (F F F T) (p, q) „ „ : Neither p nor q. ( ∼ p . ∼ q or p|q)
[13] (F F T F) (p, q) „ „ : p and not q. (p . ∼ q)
[14] (F T F F) (p, q) „ „ : q and not p. (q . ∼ p)
[15] (T F F F) (p, q) „ „ : q and p. (q . p)
[16] (F F F F) (p, q) Contradiction (p and not p, and q and not q.) (p . ∼ p . q . ∼ q)’.9
For what I should now have to do is to find an expression in the language of this theory for how much a proposition
says [ . . . ] But how can we find the measure of amount-that-is-said? At any rate it is there; and our theory must be able
to give it expression. (Wittgenstein 1961, p. 54e, 2.6.15’s annotation)
8
That ‘the one’ refers to q and ‘the other’ refers to p, as we have indicated, is clear from the above cited TLP 5.12.
9
For uniformity’s sake, we will continue to use the Tractarian notation for the truth-functional operators (‘ ∼ ’ for ‘not’, ‘.’ for
‘and’, etc.).
4 A. Negro
In this scheme, the sixteen possible groups of truth-conditions of L (determined by its

sixteen possible truth-functions) are expressed by means of Wittgenstein’s truth-tabular
notation, assuming a fixed order of the truth-possibilities of p and q in a truth-table—as
suggested in TLP 4.442.
It may strike one as obscure that the truth-conditions of p—an elementary proposition—
are expressed in line 10 as a function of the arguments p and q; that is,
p q p
T T T
F T F
T F T
F F F
Indeed, this is apparently in conflict with Wittgenstein’s claim that ‘[a] proposition is a
truth-function of elementary propositions. (An elementary proposition is a truth-function of
itself)’ (TLP 5). According to this claim, reasonably, the truth-function that an elementary
proposition is should have just one argument: itself. However, it should be noticed that
the truth-conditions of p, as expressed in function of p and q, perfectly match the truth-
conditions of p, as expressed in function of p alone. Thus, q is irrelevant here and the
truth-function in line 10 can rightly be conceived as a function of p alone. This is exactly
what happens for the conjunction of p with the tautology q v ∼ q: since a tautology is
always true, q does not make any contribution to the determination of the truth-function
associated with the conjunction. The whole point is confirmed in TLP 4.465: ‘The logical
product of a tautology and a proposition says the same thing as the proposition’;10 and
underlined by Glock (1996, p. 141): ‘The parenthesis [in TLP 5] alludes to the fact that in
the [truth-tabular] notation every elementary proposition is expressed as a truth-function
(conjunction) of itself and a tautology involving all other elementary propositions (e.g.
[p . (q v ∼ q), etc.])’.
In order to better appreciate the point, a distinction put forward by Ramsey will be
useful here (and crucial in what follows): ‘In Mr. Wittgenstein’s usage [ . . . ] “proposition”
[ . . . ] has type-token ambiguity[:] a proposition is a type whose instances consist of all
propositional sign tokens which have in common [ . . . ] a certain sense’ (Ramsey 1923,
pp. 468–69). Since the Tractatus famously identifies the sense of a proposition with its
truth-conditions,11 one should conceive of a type as a group of truth-conditions and a token
as a propositional symbol instantiating a group of truth-conditions.12 Thus, for example, the
proposition token p and the proposition token p . (q v ∼ q)—which have the same sense
(truth-conditions)—are instances of the same proposition type. With this in mind, it sounds
10
See also Wittgenstein 1961, p. 58e, 10.6.15’s annotation.
11
See TLP 4.2: ‘The sense of a proposition is its agreement and disagreement with possibilities of existence and non-existence
of states of affairs’; and TLP 4.431: ‘The expression of agreement and disagreement with the truth-possibilities of elementary
propositions expresses the truth-conditions of a proposition. A proposition is the expression of its truth-conditions’.
12
An interesting way to conceive the type-token ambiguity—see Cerezo 2004—consists in considering a type as the result of
a combinatorial rule, given a set of arguments, that is, all the elementary propositions of language (see TLP 4.42 and 4.45);
and a token as either an elementary propositional symbol or the result of a transforming operation of some propositional
symbols into others—by means of truth-functional operators and starting from the elementary ones (see TLP 4.51, 5.254 and
5.5). It is interesting to notice that, since elementary propositions determine the set of groups of truth-conditions, and since
each proposition token is an instance of a group of truth-conditions (type), it becomes evident that, whereas a non-elementary
proposition is just a token instantiating a specific type, an elementary proposition is, on the one hand, also itself a token
instantiating a specific type; but, on the other, it is an argument for the combinatorial rule that produces types. This underlines
the very special role given to elementary propositions in Wittgenstein’s conception (see also TLP 4.411).
less bizarre that p is expressed as a function of the arguments p and q, since p . (q v ∼ q)—
which instantiates the same type as p—is a function of those arguments as well. In the
following, when not specified, we will let the context determine whether we are using one
or the other form of ‘proposition’. For example, it is clear that the expression ‘the sense
of a proposition’ can only refer to the sense of a token and not of a type, since senses are
types, that is, truth-conditions (cf. Footnote 1).
As already anticipated, TLP 5.121—like TLP 5.12—establishes an unproblematic rela-
tion of inclusion of the set of truth-grounds of the premise (Ptg, henceforth) in the set of
truth-grounds of the conclusion (Ctg, henceforth): perspicuously, Ptg ⊆ Ctg.
Let us consider, as an example, the logical consequence p p v q. In TLP 5.101’s
scheme, the truth-conditions of p v q are expressed by means of line 5; that is,
p q pvq
T T T
F T T
T F T
F F F
Based on the definition of truth-grounds (see Footnote 2), we can introduce the
sets of truth-grounds of the premise and of the conclusion of p p v q as, respec-
tively, Ptg = {pTqT, pTqF}, Ctg = {pTqT, pFqT, pTqF} (nothing more than those lines,
representing the truth-possibilities of p and q in the above truth-tables, for which p
and p v q, respectively, are true). It holds immediately that Ptg ⊆ Ctg, which—as we
noticed—is analogous to the contemporary model-theoretic notion of logical consequence.
Besides, using the truth-tabular notation, our logical consequence may be expressed as
(TFTF)(p, q) (TTTF)(p, q), where the inclusion is manifestly clear.
On the other hand, however, TLP 5.122 establishes a relation of inclusion in the opposite
direction, that is, of the sense of the conclusion in the sense of the premise. Given the
aforementioned identification of the sense of a proposition with its truth-conditions, the
whole point can be equivalently rephrased as Ctc ⊆ Ptc, where ‘Ctc’ and ‘Ptc’ indicate the
truth-conditions of the conclusion and the premise, respectively.
As a first problem with TLP 5.122, it is not clear at all how the truth-conditions of one
proposition can be included in the truth-conditions of another. Of course, as is always pos-
sible when dealing with functions, one can express truth-conditions as a set (of ordered
pairs), which appears to be the only thing capable of being included in something else
(presumably, another set). For example, for our p p v q, we can introduce Ptc and Ctc as,
respectively, Ptc = {(pTqT,T), (pFqT,F), (pTqF,T), (pFqF,F)}, Ctc = {(pTqT,T), (pFqT,T),
(pTqF,T), (pFqF,F)} (nothing more than the four lines of the above truth-tables for p and p
v q, respectively). But, clearly, in this way it does not hold that Ctc ⊆ Ptc, and not surpris-
ingly: since the first terms of the ordered pairs are the same throughout Ptc and Ctc, and the
number of ordered pairs is obviously the same, the inclusion holds only if the second terms
of the ordered pairs are also the same throughout Ptc and Ctc; that is, only if the premise
and the conclusion instantiate the same proposition type (e.g. p p or p p . (q v ∼ q))—
thus not in a general way at all. Another different option would be to follow a common
habit in possible-world semantics, where the intensional notion of proposition (a func-
tion from possible worlds to truth-values) is finally conceived extensionally as the set of
worlds in which the proposition is true. However, when applied to our issue, this approach
is erroneous, because then truth-conditions end up being identified with truth-grounds, so
that—except for premises and conclusions that are instantiations of the same proposition
6 A. Negro
type—Ctc ⊆ Ptc does not hold, exactly because Ctg ⊆ Ptg does not (the converse holds
instead, as per TLP 5.121).
Moreover, as a matter of fact, for some logical consequences sense containment seems
evident, and the same holds for TLP 5.124 and 5.14 (both clearly connected to TLP 5.122):
they definitely appear unproblematic to our intuition. For example, with reference to the
logical consequence p . q p, one is not surprised that the sense of the conclusion is con-
tained in that of the premise (and this holds even for a language where p and q are not
elementary): the conclusion occurs qua conjunct in the premise, so the premise really
affirms the conclusion, and seems to say more than the conclusion: indeed, one sees that
the premise says everything said by the conclusion and also something more.13 However,
with reference to our p p v q, one notices that no intuition seems possible to the effect
that the sense of the conclusion is contained in that of the premise, or that things are as TLP
5.124 and 5.14 state. Indeed, the conclusion does not occur at all in the premise, neither
does it seem that the premise affirms the conclusion. Also, even though one can think of p
as giving more information about the world than p v q (it is more precise, so to speak), it
is not that one sees that the former says everything said by the latter and also something
more—as was for the case of the conjunction.14 This looks worse still if one notices that,
since p and q are elementary propositions by hypothesis, there is apparently no room for
an analysis that would explicate a hidden logical form.15
As will become clear, the readiness of the case of the conjunction greatly influenced
Wittgenstein’s interpreters and will prove essential for our notational aims. Wittgenstein
himself, in the Notebook I (dating back to some period after the Tractatus),16 intro-
duced this case as a transparent and unproblematic one—somehow a paradigm of sense
containment—, while nevertheless reporting that he had only intuitively grasped the
general case as correct, which was thus left completely unexplained in the Tractatus:
if the proposition q follows from the proposition p, then I thought that p . ∼ q has to
be a contradiction and this I saw quite rightly. I believed that I had to further infer
from this [ . . . ] that q in some sense has to be contained in p. For if both proposi-
tions had nothing at all to do with each other, how could p . ∼ q be a contradiction?
In what sense q is supposed to be contained in p does not yet emerge from this
[ . . . ] and I did not clearly specify it [ . . . ] There is a clear sense in saying: q is
contained in the logical product p . q. (Baker 2003, p. 197, integrated with p. 127)
Thus, in the following, we will not try to answer the question of what exactly Wittgen-
stein had in mind during the writing of TLP 5.122—since the latter quote seems enough in
this respect; rather, we will examine the question of how to make sense of TLP 5.122 in a
13
See TLP 5.1241: ‘[p . q] is one of the propositions that affirm [p] and at the same time one of the propositions that affirm [q]’.
According to Kaplan (2004, p. 7), the intuition that arguments corresponding to logical consequences like this are valid is ‘a
much more widely shared intuition than intuitions about when the premises are true and when they’re false’; interestingly, he
continues thus: ‘these more stable intuitions about logical consequence have been ignored, because of the nearly universal,
and according to me, fallacious, assumption that the notion of logical consequence is derivative from the more secure notion
of truth. As I say, the way history has unrolled, the old containment idea was beaten out by the notion of truth preservation, so
the modern notion of logical validity is dependent on a prior understanding of truth’ (cf. Footnote 4).
14
Using the words of Moore (1962) in a critical reply to Nagel (1944) – for similar observations, see Yablo 2014, p. 11, and
Fine 2016, p. 1 –, ‘[t]here is one obvious meaning of “q is contained in p”, viz. that p is a conjunction of which q is one of the
conjuncts’ (p. 255); on the contrary, to say that ‘“cats mew” contains as a part [cats mew v dogs bark] is to give a false partial
analysis of “cats mew”; since this, though it logically follows from “cats mew”, is not “a part of”, “contained in”, “included
in” [ . . . ] “cats mew”’ (p. 257).
15
As Wittgenstein thinks is the case for the famous propositions on colours (see TLP 6.3751; cf. Wittgenstein 1961, p. 91e,
8.1.17’s annotation, and Baker 2003, p. 129).
16
According to Baker (2003, p. xxxiii), it dates from somewhere in the period 1928–1936.
precise way by using the Tractarian perspective. Clearly, the issue now appears sufficiently
tricky, such that the list of Wittgenstein’s interpreters who have been puzzled by it raises
little surprise.
3. The interpreters and Frascolla’s explanation

In his review of the Tractatus, published the year after the first English edition, Ram-
sey praises Wittgenstein’s account of logical consequence in terms of truth-grounds as an
extremely simple theory of inference. Then, he continues:
Mr. Wittgenstein also says that [if q follows from p] the sense of q is contained in
that of p, that in asserting p we are incidentally asserting q. I think this statement
is really a definition of containing as regards senses, and an extension of the mean-
ing of ‘assert’ partly in conformity with ordinary usage, which probably agrees as
regards p . q and p [ . . . ] but not otherwise. (Ramsey 1923, p. 471)
As is clear, Ramsey cannot see how and why senses could be conceived as contained in
any way, and concludes that TLP 5.122 must be a definition of ‘containing’ for senses.
Although reasonable, this is not a necessary conclusion: as we will show, sense contain-
ment is deducible as a consequence within the Tractarian framework. Ramsey’s quote is
also interesting because he refers to ordinary usage as a way of making sense of TLP 5.124,
but using the example of p . q p (which, as we have seen, appears to be in agreement with
our intuitions): of course, he could not look at p p v q for such an example.17
One notable interpreter of the Tractatus is Max Black. His influential Companion (Black
1964) is very useful for any close reader of Wittgenstein, as he comments on the book
section by section. However, Black suspends judgement when it comes to sense contain-
ment: ‘I believe the notion of one proposition “containing” another in Wittgenstein’s sense
is an impediment to clarity’ (p. 241). Then, in the commentary, he adds: ‘[5.122 contained]:
a peculiar (and possibly unfortunate) use of this word, that does not occur elsewhere, in
this sense, except at 5.121’ (p. 242).
For Robert Fogelin, instead, sense containment is a metaphor, which ‘Wittgenstein
unpacks [ . . . ] using the idea of truth-grounds’ (Fogelin 1976, p. 50). He then simply
reports the unproblematic containment of truth-grounds stated in the above cited TLP
5.121, while at no point is a connection with senses indicated. We do not necessarily dis-
miss metaphorical explanations as useless: we in fact agree with Priest’s idea that ‘[m]any
good explanatory theories are based in the first instance on a metaphor’ (Priest 1980,
p. 416); moreover, a metaphorical reading underlies the first explanation of sense contain-
ment we will put forward in this work. However, we must conclude that Fogelin’s analysis
is not only useless for explaining sense containment, but possibly equivocal, because it
then becomes easy to think of truth-grounds as a direct measure of sense—and we have
already seen in the previous section how TLP 5.122 clashes with TLP 5.121 in this way.
Other unsatisfactory interpretations have been proposed. Hanfling (1989, pp. 16–17)
claims that sense containment is possible only if the premise is not an elementary
proposition—certainly a poor conclusion (for loss of generality). Ishiguro (1972, p. 14)
considers sense containment a basic presupposition—thus roughly in line with Ramsey’s
view. Ricketts (1996, p. 91; cf. p. 84) has it that if q follows from p, then the situation
17
Some years later, Ramsey returned to the issue. Commenting against the theory of logical constants qua names, he
observed that ‘[according to such a theory], “this is not-red” asserts a relation of negation between this and redness, and
“this is not not-red” another relation of negation between this, redness and the first relation of negation. [However, the] con-
clusion of a formal inference must, I feel, be in some sense contained in the premisses and not something new; I cannot believe
that from one fact, e.g. that a thing is red, it should be possible to infer an infinite number of different facts, such as that it is
not not-red, and that it is both red and not not-red’ (Ramsey and Moore 1927, p. 161; cf. TLP 5.43).
8 A. Negro
represented by q is contained in the situation represented by p;18 which, even if it appar-

ently makes sense by looking at the case of the conjunction (p . q p), seems obscure when
assessed with reference to the case of the disjunction (p p v q). Moreover, recalling that
p . q p v q, Ricketts’ proposal appears to be in conflict with the following annotation
from the Notebooks: ‘The situation p . q falls under the proposition [p v q]’ (Wittgenstein
1961, p. 38e, 17.1.15’s annotation); indeed, the opposite should hold, if the proposal is cor-
rect (cf. Footnote 23). Bradley (1992, pp. 109, 120–21), like Ramsey, succeeds in making
sense only of the paradigmatic case p . q p, and then concludes that Wittgenstein must
have generalised from it. Even if this is in agreement with the quote from the Notebook I
at the end of the previous section, we are then left without an explanation of the general
case. Anyway, few interpreters commented on the issue in the first place.
It seems that the best available interpretation is to be found in Pasquale Frascolla’s book
on the Tractatus (Frascolla 2007, pp. 175–77), where the issue is nevertheless neither
analysed directly, nor in full detail, leaving some crucial questions unanswered—as we
will see.
Following Frascolla, and analogously to TLP 5.101, one can call those truth-possibilities
of a proposition’s truth-arguments that make it false the falsity-grounds of that propo-
sition (working in classical semantics, this set is the complement set of the set of its
truth-grounds). Now, let α be a proposition token of a language with finite elementary
propositions p, q, . . . , s, . . . ;19 Frascolla’s analysis is based on the following premise
(which one could call the Principle of Negative Conjunction)—see Frascolla 2007, p. 176.
(PNC): To affirm α is tantamount to jointly denying all those combinations of the obtain-
ing and non-obtaining of the states of affairs depicted by p, q, . . . , s, . . . , for which α turns
out to be false.
In other words, (PNC): To affirm α is tantamount to jointly denying its falsity-grounds;

or, in symbols, AFFIRM(α) ⇐⇒ ∧DENY(αfg) (where, analogously to the previous
section, ‘αfg’ denotes the set of falsity-grounds of α and ‘∧DENY(αfg)’ stays for ‘jointly
denying the falsity-grounds of α’).
For example, if one applies PNC to the above language L, then affirming the proposition
p . q is tantamount to jointly denying the combinations pFqT, pTqF and pFqF (the falsity-
grounds of p . q); or, using Frascolla’s illustration, affirming the proposition ‘it is raining
and it is cold’ is tantamount to jointly denying that it is not raining and it is cold, that it is
raining and it is not cold, and that it is not raining and it is not cold.
Frascolla’s argument for sense containment can be then reconstructed as follows:
(1) Assume α β. Then αtg ⊆ βtg (by TLP 5.121). Hence βfg ⊆ αfg (by comple-
mentarity);
(2) ∧DENY(αfg) ⇒ ∧DENY(βfg) (by the conclusion in 1 )
(by jointly denying the falsity-grounds of α, one jointly denies the falsity-grounds
of β);
(3) AFFIRM(α) ⇒ AFFIRM(β) (by 2 and PNC)
(by affirming α, one affirms β).
18
The same view is defended in Loparic 1984, p. 328—though in terms of states of affairs, rather than situations.
19
Wittgenstein’s claim and Frascolla’ analysis can be applied also to languages with infinite elementary propositions (see Fras-
colla 2007, p. 114; cf. Marconi 2005). However, for keeping things simple and for reasons that will be explained in Section 4,
we will focus on the finite case.
With reference to the logical consequence p . q p, the argument can be illustrated by

noticing that, by jointly denying the combinations pFqT, pTqF and pFqF (the falsity-
grounds of p . q), one—as a matter of fact—is also jointly denying the combinations pFqT
and pFqF (the falsity-grounds of p). Thus, by PNC, the conclusion holds.
As is evident, no explicit reference to senses is ever introduced in Frascolla’s argument.
Thus, he does not point directly to TLP 5.122 (on sense containment), but to its associate20
TLP 5.124 (on affirming)—and this may lead to some doubts: TLP 5.124 does not deal
with affirming a proposition, but with what a proposition affirms. However, this seems
enough for sense containment as well, as is clear from Ramsey’s quote above, where the
fact that ‘in asserting p we are incidentally asserting q’ is presented as a rephrasing of the
fact that ‘the sense of q is contained in that of p’. Since what one affirms of a proposition
is presumably its sense, the rephrasing appears to be plausible indeed. Besides, this is
confirmed in TLP 4.064: ‘Every proposition must already have a sense: it cannot be given a
sense by affirmation. Indeed its sense is just what is affirmed’. Thus, this does not constitute
an irrevocable limitation on Frascolla’s account.
Also, Frascolla’s argument is certainly valid: given the premise PNC, the conclusion 3
follows. Thus, TLP 5.124 (on affirming) is established and—by the just mentioned TLP
4.064—also TLP 5.122 (on sense containment). Moreover, since PNC establishes a direct
connection between what a proposition affirms (hence its sense) and its falsity-grounds,
Frascolla continues: ‘On the basis of what has been seen so far, one can reasonably adopt
as a measure of the content of a proposition [ . . . ] the number of [its] falsity-grounds’ (p.
176). Given this proposed measure of how much a proposition says, Frascolla thus easily
establishes TLP 5.4 (on saying more).
From all we have said, we can conclude that PNC is the most important statement in
Frascolla’s analysis. This is further confirmed by the following reasoning. According to
Frascolla’s view, if α β then, by affirming α, one affirms β in that βfg ⊆ αfg. But, by
the complementarity of truth-grounds and falsity-grounds, it trivially follows that if α β
then βfg ⊆ αfg—because this is just another way of stating what we have already checked
above: namely, that if α β then αtg ⊆ βtg, as per TLP 5.121. Thus, a convincing story
is needed to the effect that the set of falsity-grounds of a proposition characterises what it
affirms, its sense: PNC is introduced to offer such a story.
Now, PNC is certainly true, since it states an easy-to-check equivalence. However, let us
consider the following alternative to PNC, which one could call the Principle of Positive
Disjunction.
(PPD): To affirm α is tantamount to disjunctively affirming all those combinations of the

obtaining and non-obtaining of the states of affairs depicted by the elementary propositions
p, q, . . . , s, . . . , for which α turns out to be true.21
In other words, (PPD): To affirm α is tantamount to disjunctively affirming its truth-

grounds; or, in symbols, AFFIRM(α) ⇐⇒ ∨AFFIRM(αtg)
(where, of course, ‘αtg’ denotes the set of truth-grounds of α and ‘∨AFFIRM(αtg)’ stays
for ‘jointly affirming the truth-grounds of α’).
For example, if one applies PPD to the above language L, then affirming the proposition
p v q is tantamount to disjunctively affirming the combinations pTqT, pFqT and pTqF; or,
20
Or, in his own words, to its ‘corollary’ (Frascolla 2007, p. 175).
21
PPD is clearly acknowledged by Ramsey: ‘[If] the truth-possibilities are [ . . . ] expressed as conjunctions of atomic propo-
sitions and their negatives, [ . . . ] any proposition will be expressible as a disjunction of the truth-possibilities with which it
agrees’ (Ramsey and Moore 1927, p. 166).
10 A. Negro
using an analogue of Frascolla’s illustration above, affirming the proposition ‘it is raining
or it is cold’ is tantamount to disjunctively affirming that it is raining and it is cold, that it
is not raining and it is cold, and that it is raining and it is not cold.
Thus, PPD also states an easy-to-check equivalence and is certainly true. This is not sur-
prising, as is clear by the following example. The sets of truth-grounds and falsity-grounds
of p are, respectively, {pTqT, pTqF} and {pFqT, pFqF}. Thus, affirming p consists, accord-
ing to PNC, in jointly denying the combinations pFqT and pFqF; according to PPD, in
disjunctively affirming the combinations pTqT and pTqF. Our point becomes then mani-
fest if one notices that jointly denying the combinations pFqT and pFqF is tantamount to
affirming that those combinations do not hold; thus, tantamount to affirming that one of
the remaining combinations, pTqT and pTqF, does hold. By complementarity of falsity-
grounds and truth-grounds, the result holds generally, and it is based on the obvious
observation that denying that something is false is equivalent to affirming that it is not
false, and thus equivalent to affirming that it is true—at least in a classical semantics, like
our own (see Rumfitt 2015, pp. 317–20). Indeed, we can conclude that PNC and PPD are
logically equivalent, and thus introduce the equivalence
(COMP): ∧DENY(αfg) ⇐⇒ ∨AFFIRM(αtg).
However, PNC and PPD—one focusing on falsity-grounds, the other on truth-grounds—
appear to offer distinct characterisations of what affirming a proposition amounts to, and
hence of what its sense is. In other words, although they are logically equivalent, they seem
conceptually different. This appears to be further confirmed by noticing that not only does
Frascolla himself fail to exclude PPD qua characterisation of sense elsewhere in his book,
he apparently also takes it to be of a rather different nature:
By affirming a meaningful proposition, the claim is put forward that some of those
combinations do not come true (the ones with which disagreement is expressed),
and the claim is also put forward that some of them come true (the ones with which
agreement is expressed). (p. 138, emphasis added)
If the two claims were conceptually equivalent, indeed, one would expect them to be,
fundamentally, one and the same claim, and the ‘also’ in the quote would then be
inappropriate—if not mistaken.
More importantly, if PPD were conceptually equivalent to PNC, then one should expect
an explanation of sense containment by means of PPD through an analogue of Frascolla’s
argument. But this is not so. Indeed, let us assume that one is not aware of PNC or COMP,
and let us try to argue by using only PPD and the notion of truth-grounds. The argument
cannot help but be something like:
(1 )
Let α and β be instantiations of different types22 and assume α β. Then
αtg ⊆ βtg (by TLP 5.121);
(2 )∗ ∨AFFIRM(αtg) ⇒ ∨AFFIRM(βtg) (by the conclusion in 1 )
(by disjunctively affirming the truth-grounds of α, one disjunctively affirms the
truth-grounds of β);
(3 ) AFFIRM(α) ⇒ AFFIRM(β) (by 2 and PPD)
(by affirming α, one affirms β).
However, as we have indicated, 2 is wrong. Indeed, if α β (with α and β instantiations
of different types), then the set of truth-grounds of α is strictly included in the set of truth-
grounds of β (αtg ⊂ βtg). Hence, if one disjunctively affirms the truth-grounds of α,
one is not also disjunctively affirming the truth-grounds of β: there exists at least one
22
The clause is necessary, for reasons that will be clear soon.
of the truth-grounds of β that is not a truth-ground of α. For example, with reference to

the logical consequence p p v q, if one disjunctively affirms the combinations pTqT and
pTqF (the truth-grounds of p), one—as a matter of fact—is not also disjunctively affirming
the combinations pTqT, pFqT and pTqF (the truth-grounds of p v q), simply because the
combination pFqT is not affirmed at all: even if affirming is characterised in PPD as a
disjunction of truth-grounds, it is characterised nevertheless as a disjunction of all relevant
truth-grounds.23
Thus, apparently, there is no way of explaining sense containment based only on PPD,
that is without using PNC or COMP. By contrast, and for the opposite reason, PNC lacks
these drawbacks; namely, because the set of falsity-grounds of the conclusion of a logical
consequence is included in the set of falsity-grounds of the premise. Hence, at a closer
look, the reasons why PNC is successful in explaining sense containment, whereas PPD is
not, are analogous to the reasons why in p . q p one sees that the conclusion is included
in the premise, whereas one does not see it in p p v q (see Section 2).24
Now, since it is reasonable to maintain that an adequate characterisation of sense should
be able to explain sense containment, then by the reasoning above one should conclude
that PPD, differently from PNC, is actually inadequate.
However, this conclusion appears to be quite peculiar, especially if one turns to Wittgen-
stein’s claims that ‘[a] proposition shows its sense [and] how things stand if it is true. And
it says that they do so stand’ (TLP 4.022) and that ‘[t]o understand a proposition means
to know what is the case if it is true’ (TLP 4.024). Indeed, since for Wittgenstein what a
proposition shows is its sense and what one understands of a proposition is again its sense
(TLP 4.02 and 4.021), PPD may now seem particularly appropriate qua characterisation of
sense; that is, by representing a positive perspective on sense, it may seem more appropri-
ate than PNC, which represents a negative perspective: after all, one could easily maintain
that for Wittgenstein the sense of a proposition should be primarily characterised in terms
of how things do stand if it is true, not in terms of how things do not stand if it is true (and
analogously for what the proposition says).
On the other side, however, the ability of PNC to explain sense containment is an impor-
tant reason to think the opposite. Our doubt is further reinforced if one notices that Ramsey
introduces a negative perspective on sense, namely an exclusionary theory of concep-
tual content,25 in his ‘Facts and propositions’ of 1927, the conclusion of which reads:
‘I must emphasise my indebtedness to Mr. Wittgenstein, from whom my view of logic is
derived. Everything that I have said is due to him, except the parts which have a pragmatist
tendency’ (Ramsey and Moore 1927, p. 170). What is Ramsey’s idea? In Rumfitt’s words,
[i]t makes sense to identify an assertion’s content with that of the belief that would
be inculcated in a hearer who understood and accepted the assertion. Ramsey’s
pragmatist insight is then that the content of this belief consists in the way it bears
on possible courses of future action. And it bears on future action by virtue of
‘knocking out’ possibilities of which a plan of action would otherwise have to take
account. So, if an assertion’s content is that of the corresponding belief [ . . . ] then
23
Let us notice that one of the truth-grounds of p v q is the combination pTqT, which is the unique truth-ground
of p . q. According to us, it is in such sense that the following annotation from the Notebooks (already mentioned
in Section 3 in discussing Rickett’s proposal) should be interpreted: ‘The situation p . q falls under the proposition
[p v q]’.
24
These considerations immediately suggest an application to the above mentioned scandal of deduction, which however would
require more space than allowed here.
25
As labelled in Rumfitt 2008, p. 70; cf. Rumfitt 2015, pp. 99–105.
12 A. Negro
the assertion’s content will be given by the hitherto live possibilities that it knocks
out or excludes. (Rumfitt 2008, p. 71)
Thus, at the root of the exclusionary theory is ‘[—to quote Dummett—] the idea that “our
notions of right and wrong, for assertions as for actions, are asymmetrical, and it is the
apparently negative notion which is primary”’ (p. 72). Indeed, an exclusionary conception
of assertion has been influentially maintained by Stalnaker (1978) and an exclusionary per-
spective grounds the theory of semantic information introduced by Bar-Hillel and Carnap
(1953), according to which ‘the information conveyed by a sentence [is to be identified]
with the set of all possible worlds that are excluded by it’ (D’Agostino 2013, p. 38).26
Thus, the difference between PNC and PPD, or—analogously—the difference between
the negative perspective and the positive perspective on sense, appears to be an essential
one; and one may still wonder whether or not the former should be preferred to the latter,
or whether they should be both taken into account for a full appreciation of the Tractarian
notion of sense. In particular, for what we have said above with reference to sense con-
tainment, the question arises as to how important the negative perspective really is in the
Tractatus, as well as to the nature of its relationship with the positive perspective.
In the following section, we will show that the positive and the negative perspectives are
both put forward by Wittgenstein, though the positive one receives much more attention
throughout the Tractatus (probably for its connections to Wittgenstein’s picture theory).
However, by reasoning about the nature of sense from the point of view of Wittgenstein’s
logical space, the negative perspective—which is in line with the exclusionary theory of
content—appears, indeed, to be more salient; that is, from that point of view, PNC emerges
as prior to PPD in the order of explanation of sense. In what follows, thus, we will directly
focus on sense (rather than on affirming), reinforcing Frascolla’s explanation of sense con-
tainment in terms of falsity-grounds. Moreover, our analysis will be further improved by
addressing the question of how to make sense containment notationally perspicuous, on
which Frascolla’s account remains silent.
4. Logical space and what sense does

As noticed by Glock, Wittgenstein’s notion of logical space—though not defined in the
Tractatus—‘clearly [ . . . ] refers to the ensemble of logical possibilities’ (1996, p. 220).27
However, this ensemble has been variously interpreted by scholars, notably with reference
to the associated notion of logical place.28 Pinkerton and Waldie (1974) criticised a number
of such analyses,29 convincingly concluding that the only correct interpretation is basically
that offered by Stenius (1960).30
Stenius characterises the logical space as a set of possible worlds, where each possible
world uniquely corresponds to one of the combinations of existence and non-existence of
26
According to van Benthem and Martinez (2008, p. 232), ‘it would be silly to award a patent for this view to specific individuals
[:] it seems close to the common sense through history’. Anyway, scholars usually ascribe the first explicit appearance of the
idea to Popper (1934).
27
The notion of logical space is mentioned in only six propositions of the Tractatus: TLP 1.13, 2.11, 2.202, 3.4, 3.42, and 4.463.
28
This must have been a particularly difficult notion for Wittgenstein, as testified by these annotations from the Notebooks:
‘How does the proposition determine the logical place? How does the picture present a situation?’; ‘It is all simply a matter of
the existence of the logical place. But what the devil is this “logical place”?!’ (Wittgenstein 1961, p. 26e, 4.11.14’s annotation;
p. 31e, 18.11.14’s annotation).
29
Specifically, they analysed the views presented in Anscombe 1959, Black 1964, Favrholdt 1964, Griffin 1964 and Morrison
1968. Other views are in Crary and Read 2010 and in Lamoureux 2012, which nevertheless seem to share at least some of the
drawbacks noticed by Pinkerton and Waldie. See also Gale 1976, Frascolla 2004, 2005, and Cerezo 2012.
30
To this interpretation Pinkerton and Waldie only added an explanation of Wittgenstein’s notion of logical co-ordinates and a
more perspicuous diagramatic representation of logical space. These additions are important, but not relevant to our aims, so
in the following it will suffice to acknowledge Stenius’s conception.
the states of affairs depicted by the elementary propositions of language. In other words,
each possible world uniquely corresponds to one of the truth-possibilities of elementary
propositions.31 For the above language L with only two elementary propositions (p and
q), the number of combinations is four, and the logical space is the set of possible worlds
LS = {(pTqT), (pFqT), (pTqF), (pFqF)} (nothing more than the four lines representing the
truth-possibilities of p and q in the above truth-tables).32 Stenius then defines the logical
place of a proposition as the subset of LS containing all and only those possible worlds that
are consistent with it (nothing more than the set of truth-grounds of the proposition): for
example, the logical place of p is the set P = {(pTqT), (pTqF)}. Let us call the complement
set of P the complement place of p. Of course, the complement place of a proposition is
the subset of LS containing all and only those possible worlds that are inconsistent with
it (nothing more than the set of falsity-grounds of the proposition). The idea is thus that,
if p is true, then the world is one of the two elements of P, for then certainly the state
of affairs corresponding to p does exist—p is a fact. Which element of P is indeed the
world depends on whether q is true or false: the world is (pTqT) in the first case and
(pTqF) in the second.33 But the central idea is that, regardless of whether p is true or false,
p determines a partition of the logical space: on one side, its logical place, that is, the
set of its truth-grounds; on the other, its complement place, that is, the set of its falsity-
grounds.
An essential feature of Wittgenstein’s logical space, whose relevance to our problem
will soon become clear, is that, although a proposition—any proposition—determines a
logical place within logical space, logical space is determined only by elementary propo-
sitions. Wittgenstein is quite clear about this: ‘A proposition can determine only one place
in logical space: nevertheless the whole of logical space must already be given by it. (Oth-
erwise negation, logical sum, logical product, etc.; would introduce more and more new
elements—in co-ordination.) [ . . . ]’ (TLP 3.42). Thus, as soon as a language is given, its
logical space is given too, by means of its elementary propositions (as happened above for
our simple language). The point seems eloquently stated in TLP 5.524 (‘[ . . . ] If elemen-
tary propositions are given, then at the same time all elementary propositions are given’),
and is on a par with Stenius’ conception. One should thus distinguish two different deter-
minations. According to the first, elementary propositions determine the logical space in
that its possible worlds are constructed by means of such propositions in a way that cov-
ers all possible logical combinations of existence and non-existence of the states of affairs
they depict. According to the second, any proposition determines a logical place in that it
generates its own partition of the already given logical space—see White 2006, p. 66.
We have already shown, with reference to our simple language L, how a partition is
created by an elementary proposition. Analogously, the logical place of p v q is the set
{(pTqT), (pFqT), (pTqF)}, while that of ∼ p it is the set {(pFqT), (pFqF)}—the complement
place of p (which, by the way, gives substance to the idea that ‘[t]he negating proposition
describes [its logical place] as lying outside the [negated proposition’s] logical place’—as
per TLP 4.0641).34
It is now time to see how senses enter the scene. Wittgenstein is quite clear that if a
proposition has a sense, then it determines a logical place: ‘A proposition determines a
31
See TLP 4.3: ‘Truth possibilities of elementary propositions mean possibilities of existence and non existence of states of
affairs’.
32
These combinations Carnap (1947) will call state-descriptions. Our notation is in agreement with TLP 4.26: ‘The world [any
world] is completely described by giving all elementary propositions, and adding which of them are true and which false’.
33
See TLP 1.13: ‘The facts in logical space are the world’; and TLP 2.04: ‘The totality of existing states of affairs is the world’.
34
This, as will become clear soon, also gives substance to the idea that p and ∼ p have opposite senses (as per TLP 4.0621).
14 A. Negro
place in logical space. The existence of this logical place is guaranteed by the mere exis-
tence of the [ . . . ] proposition with a sense’ (TLP 3.4). This leaves still open the question
of whether nonsensical propositions (Unsinnig, those that do not satisfy the syntactical
or the meaning requirements of language—see TLP 4.002 and 4.003), and those lacking
sense (Sinnlos, that is tautologies and contradictions—see TLP 4.461) determine a logical
place at all. More importantly, TLP 3.4 strongly suggests that a proposition with a sense
determines a logical place exactly by means of its sense. Maybe this is not appreciated
enough: indeed, rather than ‘[t]he sense of a proposition [being] determined by means of
the division of logical space’ (Cerezo 2012, p. 649), one should maybe stress the opposite
and say that a division of the (already given) logical space is determined by means of the
sense of a proposition. This is essential if one wants to understand what sense does.
We can now introduce the most important proposition for our problem:
The truth-conditions of a proposition determine the range that it leaves open to the
facts. (A proposition [ . . . ] is, in the negative sense, like a solid body that restricts
the freedom of movement of others, and, in the positive sense, like a space bounded
by solid substance in which there is room for a body.) A tautology leaves open to
reality the whole [ . . . ] of logical space: a contradiction fills the whole of logical
space leaving no point of it for reality. Thus neither of them can determine reality
in any way. (TLP 4.463)
Before continuing, it is important to stress that—as far as we can see—this is the only
proposition of the Tractatus where the aforementioned negative perspective on sense is
brought into focus, besides an evident acknowledgement of the existence of two possi-
ble perspectives on sense.35 In most of the Tractatus, indeed, Wittgenstein focuses either
on the positive perspective36 or on an integrated perspective, which makes explicit the
identification of sense with truth-conditions.37
In order to make the negative perspective clear, we believe it will be useful to explain
TLP 4.463 using the metaphor of a game between two players: propositions and reality—
which in fact is suggested by Wittgenstein’s prose (see Nordmann 2005, p. 179). Since
truth-conditions are exactly what matters for TLP 4.463, we should focus on types, rather
than tokens. Besides, this choice is important for another reason: even if the number of
elementary propositions of a language is finite, the number of all its propositional symbols
(tokens) is not (for unlimited combinations are possible of the elementary propositions by
means of logical operators). As will become clear, letting the first player be the set of all
such tokens would make our game endless. However, if the number of elementary propo-
sitions of a language is indeed finite, then the number of truth-functions is certainly finite
(see TLP 4.42), and so the number of groups of truth-conditions (types) is finite as well
(see TLP 4.45). Since what primarily matters for sense containment is truth-conditions, our
choice is well-founded.
Let us consider, then, a language with a finite number of elementary propositions and
two players: REAL (for ‘reality’) and TC (for ‘groups of truth-conditions’). TC is actually
n
a team, whose elements are TC1 , TC2 , . . . , TCm (all the 22 possible groups of truth-
conditions determined by the n elementary propositions of language). The whole, already
given, logical space is their chessboard—so to speak. The aim of the game is to determine
reality, the world. The rules are: (i) the first move is for TC, as a team: each element of
TC individuates its own logical place and excludes its complement place; (ii) the last two
35
In the Notebooks, this is given expression by a perspicuous drawing—see Wittgenstein 1961, p. 30e, 14.11.14’s annotation.
36
See, for example, TLP 2.222, 3.11, 4.016, 4.021, 4.022, 4.024, 4.031 and 4.063.
37
See, for example, the above cited TLP 4.2 and 4.431.
moves are for REAL: it chooses, first, one of the logical places; then an element of the
chosen place.
– Game starts:
- TC1 individuates its own logical place and excludes its complement place.
A partition of the logical space is obtained. On the one side (TC1 ’s logical
place) are all and only those worlds with which TC1 is in agreement—or, we
can say, all and only those worlds in which any instance, or proposition token,
of TC1 is true (i.e. its truth-grounds). On the other side (TC1 ’s complement
place) are all and only those worlds with which TC1 is in disagreement—or,
we can say, all and only those worlds in which any instance, or proposition
token, of TC1 is false (i.e. its falsity-grounds).
- ...
- TCm individuates its own logical place and [etc . . . , analogously].
- REAL chooses one of the obtained logical places and then an element of it.
– Game ends.
As an example within an even simpler language than the above considered L, let us
focus on a language L with only one elementary proposition: p. In this case, the number of
possible worlds is two and the logical space of L is the set LS = {(pT), (pF)}. Moreover,
L determines four groups of truth-conditions (under these types we indicate examples of
their instances, or tokens):
p TC1 (e.g. p v ∼ p) TC2 (e.g. ∼ p) TC3 (e.g. p) TC4 (e.g. p . ∼ p)
T T F T F
F T T F F
– Game starts:
- TC1 individuates the logical place {(pT), (pF)} and excludes the empty set Ø.
- TC2 individuates the logical place {(pF)} and excludes the set {(pT)}.
- TC3 individuates the logical place {(pT)} and excludes the set {(pF)}.
- TC4 individuates the logical place Ø and excludes the set {(pT), (pF)}, that is
LS .
- REAL chooses, for example, the logical place individuated by TC2 , and then
chooses the world (pF) (the only world within it).
– Game ends.
The game-metaphor shows how truth-conditions are to be conceived as restrictions on

reality: if reality has to make a proposition true, it can only choose a world within the
logical place of that proposition. On this perspective, indeed, what each TCm —each group
of truth-conditions (each sense)—primarily does is excluding a subset of the logical space,
its complement place. Of course, a proposition does affirm that the world is one of those
represented in its logical place (as per PPD above), but—given the whole logical space as a
starting point—this appears to be better characterised in terms of exclusion of the comple-
ment set of that place (as per PNC above). This seems to be confirmed by Wittgenstein’s
claim that ‘truth-conditions [ . . . ] determine the range that it leaves open to the facts’ (TLP
4.463 above, emphasis added) or by his words from the Notebooks (Wittgenstein 1961,
p. 56e, 6.6.15’s annotation): ‘the proposition [is] a part of logical space which is separated
16 A. Negro
from the remaining part of logical space’; ‘[t]he proposition says: this is how it is and not:
that. It presents a possibility and itself conspicuously forms one part of a whole,—whose
features it bears—and from which it stands out’ (last emphasis added).38 Thus, what a
proposition presents (as per PPD) cannot be fully appreciated without an acknowledgment
of the fact that it is something left as available to reality; that is, without acknowledging
that what it presents excludes something else (as per PNC): ‘[ . . . ] there is no possibility
left which [a contradiction] can [ . . . ] present’ (Wittgenstein 1961, p. 59e, 13.6.15’s anno-
tation; cf. p. 29e, 12.11.14 s annotation).39 Besides, it seems to us that this is the reason
why one cannot explain sense containment using only PPD, that is, without using COMP
or PNC (as illustrated in the previous section).
Thus, our metaphor shows that PNC and PPD—though logically equivalent—appear,
from the point of view of logical space, to be ordered by priority and importance qua char-
acterisations of sense: that is, the negative perspective (PNC) seems prior to the positive
perspective (PPD). Clearly, in order to obtain this result, it is necessary that the logical
space be conceived as already given, as Wittgenstein insists: if it were not so, indeed,
senses could be conceived somehow as constructing the logical space by introducing, step
by step, those worlds with which they agree40 (and we have seen how absurd Wittgenstein
considers this option in the above cited TLP 3.42).
Before proceeding, we can now offer a synthesis of our findings. Truth-conditions, that
is, sense, intrinsically work as restrictions in that they exclude worlds. Thus, the worlds
that a proposition excludes (its falsity-grounds) can offer, on the one side, an appreciation
of its sense: since the exclusion of the falsity-grounds of a proposition can be seen as a
product of its sense, they can actually offer a measure of it; on the other side, they can
38
Cf. the quotation from page 138 of Frascolla’s book in the previous Section.
39
As we noted, it remained open whether non-sensical statements (Unsinnig, those which do not satisfy the syntactical or the
meaning requirements of language) and propositions lacking sense (Sinnlos, that is tautologies and contradictions) determine a
logical place. The first kind of propositions does not constitute a problem, since for Wittgenstein they fail to have a truth-value
in any possible world—see Proops 2004, p. 118. It follows that they cannot individuate their logical place and exclude their
complement place, because there is simply nothing like these places in the logical space. This agrees with the contrapositive of
the above cited TLP 3.4: namely, if a proposition does not determine a logical place, then it does not have a sense. The situation
is different for tautologies and contradictions. Obviously, they do have determinate, although peculiar, truth-conditions, thus
they do not fail to have a truth-value in any possible world (tautologies are always true, contradictions always false). Hence,
as reported above (see TC1 and TC4 ), they do individuate their logical place and exclude their complement place, although
both are peculiar entities: for tautologies, the whole logical space and the empty set, respectively; for contradictions, the other
way around: ‘Contradiction [ . . . ] vanishes outside all propositions: tautology vanishes inside them’ (TLP 5.143). The first
thing to be noticed is that this is not in contrast with any of Wittgenstein’s remarks, since nowhere does he maintain that
if a proposition determines a logical place then it has a sense. Nevertheless, given our characterisation of sense in terms of
exclusion, and since tautologies and contradictions do exclude something, it sounds strange to consider them as lacking sense.
However, as Wittgenstein underlines in TLP 4.4611, tautologies and contradictions are not non-sensical. Thus, the solution
to our conundrum seems the following: they are not non-sensical in that they do exclude something, even if oddly; and they
lack sense exactly because what they exclude is odd. We said above that the game-metaphor shows how truth-conditions
are to be conceived as restrictions on reality. We can now say that whereas non-sensical statements, failing to have truth-
conditions, cannot be conceived as restrictions on reality, tautologies and contradictions, having truth-conditions (although
peculiar ones), can be conceived as restrictions (although peculiar ones): if reality has to make a tautology true, it can only
choose a world within its logical place (the whole logical space)—hence it can choose any world tout court; if reality has
to make a contradiction true, it can only choose a world within its logical place (the empy set)—hence it cannot choose at
all. Thus, lacking sense may be viewed not as an absence of sense (what is appropriate for Unsinnig propositions), but as a
degraded presence of sense. We can express the whole point by saying that a proposition with a sense is one that induces a
proper partition of the logical space, that is, a division of the logical space into two non-empty sets—which tautologies and
contradictions cannot do (cf. Frascolla 2007, p. 138).
40
As would maybe happen in a conception of propositions qua names, à la Russell. The whole idea of the logical space is
indeed strictly linked to the bipolarity of the proposition, which allowed Wittgenstein to resolve Russell’s puzzlement about
false propositions—see Potter 2008, pp. 59–60.
offer a measure of how much it says: a proposition says that the world is one within its
own logical place, but this place can be adequately characterised in terms of exclusion of
its falsity-grounds.
5. Sense containment explained and made perspicuous

Based on the previous section, we are now in a position to introduce two natural and
precise criteria for deciding whether the sense of a proposition is included in the sense of
another, and whether one proposition says more than another.41 The first criterion can be
introduced as follows.
(CSC): For any two tokens α and β, the sense of β is contained in the sense of α iff the
set of falsity-grounds of β is included in the set of falsity-grounds of α.
Before presenting the second criterion, a clarification is needed. CSC shows that sense
containment is only possible for propositions that are in the relation of logical conse-
quence: namely, those propositions that satisfy the inclusion of truth-grounds stated in
TLP 5.12 (equivalently, by complementarity, those that satisfy the converse inclusion of
falsity-grounds). For example, our elementary p and q are not in any relation of sense con-
tainment (see line 10 and line 11 in the above cited TLP 5.101’s scheme). The same holds
for p . q and ∼ p v ∼ q, since they do not even have common truth/falsity-grounds (see
line 15 and line 2 in the scheme). Thus, for such propositions, one is tempted to conclude
that their senses cannot be compared, and neither of them can be viewed as saying more
than the other. However, based on the idea that the more the falsity-grounds, the greater the
sense, the more that is said, one can conclude that, since p . q has three falsity-grounds and
∼ p v ∼ q only one, the first says more and has more sense than the second, even if it is not
that the former says everything said by the second and something more. These intuitions
are captured by our second criterion.
(CSM): For any two tokens α and β that are instantiations of different types,42 α has
more sense (says more) than β iff the number of falsity-grounds of α is greater than the
number of falsity-grounds of β.43
Thus, CSM applies more generally than CSC. Indeed, for α and β instantiations of
different types, if the sense of β is contained in the sense of α, then α has more sense
(says more) than β (because then the containment is a proper inclusion). However, α can
have more sense (can say more) than β, according to CSM, without the sense of β being
contained in the sense of α (which happens in cases of propositions that are not in the
relation of logical consequence). Hence, our criterion CSM presents Wittgenstein’s notion
of sense as analogous to the aforementioned notion of semantic information introduced
by Bar-Hillel and Carnap,44 according to which the less probable a proposition (the more
it excludes from the logical space), the more semantic information it offers. It should be
noticed that, under CSM, the elementary propositions p and q, which have the same number
of truth-grounds (hence of falsity-grounds) only some of which are shared by the two, not
only are such that the sense of neither is contained in that of the other, they also have the
same amount of sense (though expressing different senses). It seems to us that this aspect
makes it particularly evident how elementary propositions represent the building blocks
41
Of course, equivalent criteria can be obtained using truth-grounds instead of falsity-grounds, by complementarity. But we
believe that ours are more perspicuous formulations, because they make the direct connection between sense, saying and
falsity-grounds transparent.
42
The clause is necessary, because otherwise one could not say more than the other.
43
Recalling TLP 5.12’s claim, this finds support in the following annotation from the Notebooks: ‘One could certainly say: That
proposition says the most from which the most follows’ (Wittgenstein 1961, p. 54e, 3.6.15’s annotation).
44
As already noticed by Frascolla (2007, p. 177, Footnote 12).
18 A. Negro
of language in Wittgenstein’s view: they are independent, equally powerful, monads of

language—so to speak (cf. Footnote 12).
By means of our criteria, an explanation of two of our three problematic propositions
follows immediately.45 Indeed,
– TLP 5.122 is an immediate corollary of CSC:
Assume α β. Then αtg ⊆ βtg, by TLP 5.12. So, βfg ⊆ αfg, by complementarity.
Hence the sense of β is included in the sense of α;
– TLP 5.14 is an immediate corollary of CSM:
Assume α β, with α and β instantiations of different types. Then αtg ⊂ βtg, by TLP
5.12. So, βfg ⊂ αfg, by complementarity. Hence, α says more than β.
What still remains is the third of our propositions, TLP 5.124 (on affirming). From a
certain point of view, TLP 5.124 is already explained, if one maintains that affirming a
proposition is tantamount to affirming its sense—which Ramsey and Frascolla do (see
Section 3). Thus, if α β, since βfg ⊆ αfg, one could conclude that α indeed affirms β,
and hence that nothing remains obscure, even with reference to the case of the disjunction
(p p v q).
Nevertheless, as already noticed, sense containment for the case of the conjunction
(p . q p) appears to be in strong agreement with our intuition, and the main reason for
this is that the conclusion occurs qua conjunct in the premise, so that the premise appears
to really affirm the conclusion, and to really say everything said by the conclusion and
something more. This perspicuity is not present in the case of the disjunction, and this
leaves us unsatisfied with the interpretation of TLP 5.124.
Moreover, it is important to underline that CSC does not state that the sense of a propo-
sition is the set of its falsity-grounds, but only that the two can be reasonably conceived
as growing (and shrinking) proportionally, because the latter is a product of the former.
Thus, as anticipated in Section 3, a metaphorical explanation of sense containment ulti-
mately underlies CSC: since the relevant sets of falsity-grounds are contained in a certain
direction, and they can be seen as products of the relevant senses, it is as if the senses
were contained in the same direction. However, when compared with the readiness of the
case of the conjunction, this metaphorical explanation seems quite less explicative. In that
case, indeed, the containment appears evident to our intuition; so much so that no further
analysis is needed (even less a metaphorical one).
Besides, our demand for perspicuity is entirely in line with the Tractatus. As noticed by
some commentators, sense containment is strictly connected with Wittgenstein’s idea that
the relation of logical consequence must be conceived as an internal one—see Black 1964,
p. 241, and Block 1975, p. 7. Indeed, according to proposition TLP 5.131, ‘If the truth of
45
In addition, our analysis interestingly applies to two particular logical consequences: ex falso quodlibet (⊥ α, for any α)
and ad verum quodlibet (α , for any α). These logical consequences are to be interpreted as follows: since a contradiction
(⊥) excludes the whole logical space, the sense of any other proposition is contained in its sense (although, as we said, a
degraded one); and since a tautology () excludes the empty set, its sense (although a degraded one) is contained in that of
any other proposition—thus confirming the relations of inclusion of senses stated in TLP 5.122. Also, as was to be expected
(cf. Footnote 39), we can conclude that it is not that tautologies and contradictions do not say. Rather, the former say nothing
(they exclude the empty set), the latter say the most (they exclude the whole logical space)—and thus, in a sense, they also
say nothing (see TLP 4.461; cf. Frascolla 2007, pp. 137–38). This is in line with the following comment from the Notebooks:
‘But then! Won’t contradiction now be the proposition that says the most?’ (Wittgenstein 1961, p. 54e, 3.6.15’s annotation).
one proposition follows from the truth of others, this finds expression in relations in which
the forms of the propositions stand to one another’.46
As we have observed in Section 2, Wittgenstein’s truth-tabular notation is indeed a
means of making such relations transparent. In the above cited 5.101’s scheme, for exam-
ple, the type of p is expressed as (TFTF)(p,q), the type of p . q as (TFFF)(p,q) and the
type of p v q as (TTTF)(p,q). This allows one to rephrase the case of the conjunc-
tion as (TFFF)(p,q) (TFTF)(p,q), where it is evident that the falsity-grounds of the
conclusion are contained in those of the premise (conversely for truth-grounds). As we
have reported in Section 2, when applied to the case of the disjunction, the rephrase is
(TFTF)(p,q) (TTTF)(p,q); where, again, the reciprocal relations are clear.
However, this important method only succeeds in making clear that the conclusion
follows from the premise, but—if one is not aware that the set of falsity-grounds of a
proposition offers a measure of its sense—one cannot in this way see that the sense of
the conclusion is included in the sense of the premise. Ramsey seems to be aware of this.
Having commented on the internal properties of propositions as conceived by Wittgen-
stein, he concludes that ‘in a perfect language [ . . . ] that one sense [ . . . ] is contained in
another [ . . . ] might always appear visibly in the sentences expressing them. (This is nearly
achieved in Mr. Wittgenstein’s T-notation [i.e. the truth-tabular notation]’ (Ramsey 1923,
pp. 476–77, emphasis added).
Nevertheless, two methods for fully obtaining the demanded transparency do exist,
with one already envisaged by Wittgenstein himself years after the Tractatus (in the
aforementioned Notebook I). Let us start with the other.
This method, which is on a par with the above PNC, consists in directly expressing
a proposition as the conjunction of the negations of its falsity-grounds, where each of
the latter is expressed as the conjunction of the propositions therein (elementary proposi-
tions or their negations). For example, the method allows the following expression for p
(which is in fact logically equivalent to p): ∼ ( ∼ p . q) . ∼ ( ∼ p . ∼ q); where each inter-
nal conjunction represents one of those combinations of the obtaining and non-obtaining
of the states of affairs depicted by p and q for which p turns out to be false; that is, it
represents one of the falsity-grounds of p. Thus, p and ∼ ( ∼ p . q) . ∼ ( ∼ p . ∼ q) are two
tokens that instantiate the same type, that is, the same group of truth-conditions. Since
what primarily matters for sense containment is truth-conditions (i.e. types, not tokens),
an application to our issue follows immediately. Indeed, when the analogous rewriting
is done for p v q, one can express the same logical consequence stated by p p v q
as ∼ ( ∼ p . q) . ∼ ( ∼ p . ∼ q) ∼ ( ∼ p . ∼ q), where the reciprocal relations between the
premise and the conclusion are finally transparent. In this new form, it becomes evident—
as it was for the case of the conjunction—that the sense of the conclusion is contained
in that of the premise: the conclusion occurs qua conjunct in the premise, so the latter
clearly affirms the former; also, the premise indeed looks like it says everything said by the
conclusion and something more.
Let us now introduce the other method using Wittgenstein’s own words:
The connection between following and the T-F notation [i.e. the truth-tabular nota-
tion] lies entirely in the fact that the expression for ‘from p there follows q’ can
be written by means of the equation p . q = p. That ‘and’ occurs here, that is the
connection [that] the rule of inference has with the T-F notation. This manner
of writing shows that the conclusion of an inference is indeed contained in the
46
See also TLP 4.1211: ‘If two propositions contradict one another, then their structure shows it; the same is true if one of them
follows from the other. And so on’.
20 A. Negro
premise, namely in the sense that the conclusion, if added to the premise, yields the
premise. (Baker 2003, p. 199).47
Wittgenstein’s idea can be better illustrated starting from the following reasoning. Assume
α β. Since α α, then α α . β. But α . β α, trivially. So, by the Deduction Theorem
(see also TLP 6.1221), α ⊃ α . β and α . β ⊃ α. Hence:
(E): If α β then α ≡ α . β (if β follows from α, then α is logically equivalent to α.

β).48
This is indeed an interesting result, as it allows us to replace the premise of a logical

consequence with its conjunction with the conclusion (since they follow from each other
and thus are logically equivalent). In other words, if α β, then α and α . β are two tokens
that instantiate the same type, that is, the same group of truth-conditions.49 In this way,
indeed, it becomes evident that what the above cited TLP 4.465 says about tautologies—
that is, that the conjunction of a tautology and a proposition says the same thing as the
proposition—can also be said of any logical consequence of that proposition.50
Of course, as with the first method, the result applies to any logical consequence, but
its application to our case of the disjunction is again particularly interesting. Indeed, one
can rephrase the same logical consequence stated by p p v q as p . (p v q) p v q, where
the reciprocal relations between the premise and the conclusion are again transparent. In
this new form, as happened with the first method, it becomes evident that the sense of the
conclusion is contained in that of the premise: the conclusion occurs qua conjunct in the
premise, so the latter clearly affirms the former; also, the premise indeed looks like it says
everything said by the conclusion and something more.
What is crucial for our methods is the possibility, underlined in Section 2, of expressing
the truth-conditions of the elementary proposition p as a function of the truth-arguments
p and q (all the elementary propositions of our language, L). In fact, by our methods, one
can easily make sense of the following comments: from the Notebooks, ‘In the real sign
for [p] there is already contained the sign [p v q]. (For it is then possible to form this
sign without further ado.)’ (Wittgenstein 1961, p. 55e, 5.6.15’s annotation cf. the last
sentence in TLP 4.465); from the Notebook I,
[t]he difference between saying and showing is the difference between what lan-
guage expresses and what grammar says. The reason for choosing the expression
‘it is shown’ [in the Tractatus] was that one sees a connection in the notation. What
one learns from the notation is indeed something different from what the language
expresses. (Baker 2003, p. 131)
Our initial problem, indeed, consisted in the fact that one could not appreciate, for all pairs
of tokens, whether they are in a relation of sense containment, even when one of them
47
See also Baker 2003, pp. 129, 131, where the same idea is expressed—though with a number of typos (one finds ‘p’ whereas
it should be ‘q’, and vice versa); cf. Waismann 1977, p. 96. Interestingly, since Ramsey refers to the very same idea in Ramsey
and Moore 1927 (p. 167) and, as already reported, concludes his paper underlining his indebtedness to Wittgenstein, then the
dating of (parts of) the Notebook I, which—as reported in Footnote 16—Baker largely attributes to the period 1928–1936,
may perhaps be made more precise.
48
E is an if-then statement, which is enough for our aims; but it is interesting to notice that, since the right-to-left direction of E
is immediate to check, then E can be made into an if-and-only-if statement.
49
See TLP 5.141: ‘If p follows from q and q from p, then they are one and the same proposition’. For the problem of how to
make sense of similar tendencies in the work of Frege, see Penco 2003.
50
The only peculiarity is that, whereas for the non-tautological consequences of one proposition this happens because what they
say is already said by the proposition alone, for tautologies this happens because they say nothing, and thus—a fortiori—what
they say is already said by the proposition alone.
surely follows from the other: the containment is not always expressed in the notation.
Our methods, based on the machinery of the grammar of our language, give notational
expression to this very machinery. In this way, besides, they even more clearly reveal the
aforementioned analogy between analytical judgements and logical consequences. In fact,
as noticed by Sundholm commenting on the Aristotelian notion of perseity,
[p]erseity of the first kind is exemplified by the proposition ‘Man is rational’; here
the predicate rational is included in the ‘formula’ (logos, definition) of the predicate
Man since the sense of Man is rational animal. Such judgements, after definitional
resolution, amount to what are known as identical judgements, that is, those of the
forms A is A or AB is A. (Sundholm 2013, p. 24)
Thus, by allowing the rewriting of any logical consequence in the form A . B B, our
methods can also be conceived as a way of explicating, to some extent, the logos of the
premise.
Acknowledgements
This paper originated from an earlier research paper for a course on Wittgenstein’s philosophy given in
September 2014 by Diego Marconi at the PhD Programme in Philosophy FINO. His initial appraisal of my
investigation, together with later discussions I had with him and Carlo Penco, has been essential for continuing
and improving my work. I wish to thank Guido Bonino and Pasquale Frascolla for their useful remarks on an
extended version of my original paper, Davide Sergio for helpful conversations, and one anonymous referee for
comments on earlier drafts. I also wish to express my gratitude to Ian Rumfitt for his close attention to details in
discussing some of the ideas here presented during my stay at the University of Oxford in the Michaelmas Term
2016.
ORCID
ANTONIO NEGRO http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1468-2420
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NEGRO, Antonio - Making Sense of Sense Containment

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History and Philosophy of Logic

ISSN: 0144-5340 (Print) 1464-5149 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/thpl20

Making Sense of Sense Containment

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2017.1328644

Published online: 13 Jun 2017.

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Making Sense of Sense Containment

Received 14 April 2016 Accepted 7 May 2017

© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

2. The problem in focus

[1] (T T T T) (p, q) Tautology (If p then p, and if q then q.) (p ⊃ p . q ⊃ q)

In this scheme, the sixteen possible groups of truth-conditions of L (determined by its

3. The interpreters and Frascolla’s explanation

represented by q is contained in the situation represented by p;18 which, even if it appar-

In other words, (PNC): To affirm α is tantamount to jointly denying its falsity-grounds;

With reference to the logical consequence p . q p, the argument can be illustrated by

(PPD): To affirm α is tantamount to disjunctively affirming all those combinations of the

In other words, (PPD): To affirm α is tantamount to disjunctively affirming its truth-

of the truth-grounds of β that is not a truth-ground of α. For example, with reference to

4. Logical space and what sense does

p TC1 (e.g. p v ∼ p) TC2 (e.g. ∼ p) TC3 (e.g. p) TC4 (e.g. p . ∼ p)

The game-metaphor shows how truth-conditions are to be conceived as restrictions on

5. Sense containment explained and made perspicuous

of language in Wittgenstein’s view: they are independent, equally powerful, monads of

– TLP 5.122 is an immediate corollary of CSC:

– TLP 5.14 is an immediate corollary of CSM:

(E): If α β then α ≡ α . β (if β follows from α, then α is logically equivalent to α.

This is indeed an interesting result, as it allows us to replace the premise of a logical

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