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Carnap Foucalt
Carnap Foucalt
To cite this article: Catarina Dutilh Novaes (2020): Carnap meets Foucault: conceptual
engineering and genealogical investigations, Inquiry, DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2020.1860122
ABSTRACT
What is the relevance of historical, and in particular genealogical, investigations
for projects of conceptual engineering? I address this question by bringing
together two prominent authors in each of these traditions: Foucault for
genealogy, and Carnap for conceptual engineering. I argue that Foucaultian
genealogy is a suitable approach to address a specific lacuna in Carnap’s
articulation of explication, namely, insufficient attention for the preliminary
stage of clarifying the explicandum. Moreover, the focus on practices in
Foucaultian genealogies facilitates a reflection on the functions of the
concept to be explicated, which is crucial for the fruitfulness of the
explication as a whole. I start by canvassing a number of commonalities
between Carnap and Foucault, as they were both influenced by Kant and
Nietzsche; they shared a number of philosophical commitments such as a
rejection of metaphysics and a tolerant meta-normative stance. I then discuss
the lacuna in Carnapian explication, and argue that Foucaultian genealogy
provides the right level of detail to remedy this lacuna. I close with a
discussion of a concrete example, the concept of marriage, and conclude that
this combination of Carnapian explication with Foucaultian genealogy is an
illustration of the relevance of historical analysis for conceptual engineering.
1. Introduction
Conceptual engineering (and its closely related cousin, conceptual
ethics)1 has attracted sustained attention in debates on philosophical
methodology in recent years. There is a growing body of literature on
the topic, and while some progress has been made in understanding
2
In (Dutilh Novaes 2015), I focused on the relevance of conceptual genealogy for analytic philosophy
more generally, not for conceptual engineering specifically. (It includes a brief discussion of Foucaul-
tian genealogy.) In turn, in (Dutilh Novaes and Reck 2017) and (Dutilh Novaes 2020), I discussed
Carnap’s notion of explication extensively. The present investigation now brings together these two
strands of inquiry.
3
But see (Richardson 2013) for a critique of the ‘engineering’ account of Carnap’s notion of explication.
4
This paper presupposes some familiarity with Foucaultian genealogy. For readers lacking this knowl-
edge, this brief description may be helpful: ‘“Genealogy” implies doing what Foucault calls the
“history of the present.” A genealogy is an explanation of where we have come from: while Foucault’s
genealogies stop well before the present, their purpose is to tell us how our current situation origi-
nated, and is motivated by contemporary concerns. Of course, one may argue that all history has
these features, but with genealogy this is intended rather than a matter of unavoidable bias. […]
The word “genealogy” is drawn directly from Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals: genealogy is a
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Nietzschean form of history, though rather more meticulously historical than anything Nietzsche ever
attempted.’ (Kelly 2010) (section 4)
5
The present investigation adopts what Erlenbusch-Anderson (Erlenbusch-Anderson 2018) describes as a
methodologist approach to Foucault’s work, stressing the philosophical value of Foucault’s methods
beyond the topics and questions that he specifically worked on.
6
A precursor for the kind of dialogue I seek to establish in this paper, and which served as inspiration for
this set-up, is the ‘conversation’ between Foucault and Dewey in (Koopman 2011).
7
This is an uncontroversial point in so-called ‘continental philosophy’, but among analytic philosophers
the relevance of historical analysis is not always recognized (Dutilh Novaes 2015). This being said, two
analytic philosophers who have fruitfully engaged with Foucault’s work are S. Haslanger (for example
in (Haslanger 2005)), and more systematically, I. Hacking—as early as in his groundbreaking book on
probability (Hacking 1975), and further developed in (Hacking 2002).
8
There are a number of interpretive controversies regarding Foucault’s thought, giving rise to different
‘camps’ of Foucaultians, but I will not delve into these disputes. My reading of Foucault, and of his
genealogical method in particular, relies primarily on the work of C. Koopman.
9
This section presents a fairly lengthy account of the intellectual history that connects Carnap and Fou-
cault. These historical commonalities are not as such essential for the overall argument of the paper,
namely, the relevance of conceptual genealogy for projects of conceptual engineering; this relevance
could exist even without the shared historical background. Nevertheless, a discussion of their respect-
ive intellectual heritages paves the way for the systematic points to be made later in the paper, and
suggests that the systematic commonalities are not merely coincidental.
4 C. DUTILH NOVAES
10
There is evidence that Foucault was familiar with Carnap’s work, and more generally that he engaged
with Anglophone (analytic) philosophical sources (Simonetta 2016). Simonetta reports that there are
14 reading notes on Carnap in a box containing Foucault’s miscellaneous annotations and research
materials. (There may well be more references to Carnap in not yet studied archival material.)
(I owe this reference to M.G. Isaac.)
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[…] criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal struc-
tures with universal value, but rather as a historical investigation into the events
that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects
of what we are doing, thinking, saying. In that sense, this criticism is not trans-
cendental, and its goal is not that of making a metaphysics possible: it is genea-
logical in its design and archaeological in its method. Archaeological—and not
transcendental—in the sense that it will not seek to identify the universal struc-
tures of all knowledge or of all possible moral action, but will seek to treat the
instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many his-
torical events. And this critique will be genealogical in the sense that it will not
deduce from the form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to
know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we
are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or
think. (Foucault 1984b, 46)
11
‘What Foucault and Nietzsche do share is an understanding of genealogical critique as bringing into
focus the contingency and complexity of the historical present.’ (Koopman 2013, 21)
12
‘If Foucault is indeed perfectly at home in the philosophical tradition, it is within the critical tradition of
Kant, and his project could be called the Critical History of Thought.’ (Here Foucault is describing himself
in his intellectual autobiography, written in the last year of his life (Koopman 2013).) See Chap. 2 of
(Allen 2008) and (Han 2002). In fact, Foucault is arguably more clearly a Kantian than Carnap.
6 C. DUTILH NOVAES
13
I owe this observation to C. Koopman.
14
‘A critical ontology of ourselves reveals the constructedness of our being, its contingency, its revocabil-
ity and thus its transformatibility. Because we have become, we can also become different. A critical
ontology of ourselves, as a genealogy of our modern selves, allows us to extract from the very con-
tingency that has made us signs or ciphers of the possibility of becoming other than what we presently
are.’ (Mendieta 2011, 122) It is important to note though that a number of readers of Foucault are not
as optimistic concerning the prospects for transformation by means of Foucaultian genealogy (as dis-
cussed in (Lemke 2019), Introduction).
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Philosophically, Carnap was a social democrat; his ideals were those of the
enlightenment. His persistent, central idea was: “It’s high time we took
charge of our own mental lives”—time to engineer our own conceptual
scheme (language, theories) as best we can to serve our own purposes; time
to take it back from tradition, time to dismiss Descartes’s God as a distracting
myth, time to accept the fact that there’s nobody out there but us, to choose
our purposes and concepts to serve those purposes, if indeed we are to
choose those things and not simply suffer them. […] For Carnap, deliberate
choice of the syntax and semantics of our language was more than a possi-
bility—it was a duty we owe ourselves as a corollary of freedom.15 (Jeffrey
1992, 28, my emphasis)
15
See also (Mormann 2012) for the possible Romantic origins of (what could be described as) Carnap’s
‘creative impulses’.
16
For both, this is arguably a result of Nietzsche’s influence. (But note that the exact details of Nietzsche’s
own meta-normative views are a matter of contention (Hussain 2013).) For Carnap in particular, and as
noted in (Mormann 2012), the terminology used in the Preface of (Carnap 2002) in connection with the
Principle of Tolerance is highly reminiscent of a passage from Nietzsche’s The Gay Science. In
Nietzsche’s case the analysis pertains to the moral domain, but Carnap transposes the same general
ideas quite straightforwardly to the logical domain: ‘The first attempts to cast the ship of logic off
from the terra firma of the classical forms were certainly bold ones, considered from the historical
point of view. But they were hampered by the striving after “correctness”. Now, however, that impedi-
ment has been overcome, and before us lies the boundless ocean of unlimited possibilities.’ (Carnap
2002, xv)
8 C. DUTILH NOVAES
wishes.’ (52) For the concept of explication (see next section), this tolerant
stance manifests itself in the view that an explication is not ‘right’ or
‘wrong’, correct or incorrect. The success of an explication is above all
measured by the pragmatic criterion of fruitfulness (Dutilh Novaes and
Reck 2017). Whether a given explication is fruitful will be measured
against its presumed goals and purposes, which are extraneous to the
explication itself (and unfortunately often remain implicit and insuffi-
ciently discussed (Reck 2012)). Indeed, external normative input is
required to establish the goals of a particular explication.17
As for Foucault, the absence of clear normative guidance is one of the
objections voiced by some of his critics (such as Fraser and Habermas,
among others) ((Lemke 2019) (Introduction)). Indeed, a common objec-
tion is that Foucault is ultimately a moral relativist who does not have
the conceptual tools to adjudicate, among different situations or out-
comes, which ones are to be preferred. Typically, a genealogy will
explain how we came to be as we happen to be in the present, highlight-
ing the contingencies that shaped the historical paths in question. As
such, it also indicates possibilities for transformation, as noted above.
However, a genealogy by itself does not define which of these possibilities
for transformation should be pursued; for this, external normative input is
required.
The tolerant meta-normative stance common to Carnap and Foucault
is interesting not only because it allows for a smoother approximation
between the two thinkers. It is also relevant for our purposes because
the methods of explication and genealogy come out as fairly neutral, nor-
matively speaking, which means that they can be adopted by a wide
range of philosophers18 holding different substantive views (on norma-
tive questions or elsewhere). The relative normative neutrality of these
two methods ensures that they have a significant degree of ‘modularity’,
i.e. they can be combined with different substantive philosophical pos-
itions. While this feature may be seen as a weakness from a substantive,
philosophical perspective, from a methodological perspective it it is in
fact an advantage, ensuring the wide applicability of the two
17
This is a point often stressed by Haslanger regarding ameliorative analysis (Haslanger 2012). In (Dutilh
Novaes 2020) I’ve argued that explicit attention to goals and purposes is something that Carnapian
explicators can learn from Haslangerian ameliorators, and this also applies to Foucaultian genealogy
and its focus on functions and practices.
18
Moreover, it is still widely (but mistakenly) thought that Carnapian explication is limited to projects of
formalization by means of logical or mathematical tools. But explication goes much beyond formaliza-
tion, as stressed by Carnap himself in his response to critics in the Living Philosophers volume dedicated
to him (Carnap 1963). See also (Dutilh Novaes 2020) for the wider applicability of the explication
framework.
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methods.19 In other words, because the two methods are both fairly
neutral with respect to more substantive (meta-)normative commitments,
they can be adopted even by those who hold different views.
To close this section, intellectual honesty demands that attention be
paid also to some of the dissimilarities between Carnap and Foucault.
One of them concerns the kind of freedom fostered by the intellectual
activities theorized by each of them. In line with a Kantian view of the
Enlightenment as liberation from a state of immaturity (Kant 1996),
Carnap remains resolutely optimistic with respect to the possibility of
intellectual emancipation connected with scientific progress (Carnap
1963). For Foucault, by contrast, our ‘impatience for liberty’ (Foucault
1984b) requires constant labor, and he is skeptical as to whether ‘liber-
ation’ can in fact occur at all in a number of contexts. (Intellectual)
freedom is a constant, demanding praxis for Foucault (Mendieta 2011).
A second point of dissimilarity concerns their respective stances
towards (normal, in the Kuhnian sense) science. For Carnap, sustained
engagement with scientific knowledge will by and large lead to emanci-
pation, i.e. to breaking free from prejudice and unscientific worldviews
(Carus 2008). Foucault, by contrast, recognizes in (normal) science also
the potential for domination and coercion, for example in his analysis
of the phenomenon of biopower (Foucault 1978). For Foucault,
(normal) science is not a neutral framework; it represents political
stances as much as any other system of knowledge.
A third, related point of disanalogy are the different ways in which each
of them conceives of the pluralistic picture that emerges from their toler-
ant normative stances. For Carnap, the different perspectives are not
necessarily in competition with each other, whereas for Foucault there
is considerable friction between them. Describing Foucault’s stance as a
form of guerrilla pluralism, Medina observes:
It is not a pluralism that tries to resolve conflicts and overcome struggles, but
instead tries to provoke them and to re-energize them. It is a pluralism that
aims not at the melioration of the cognitive and ethical lives of all, but
rather, at the (epistemic and socio-political) resistance of some against the
oppression of others. (Medina 2011, 24)
19
This means that the two methods can also be appropriated by those seeking to develop morally pro-
blematic research agendas, such as those promoting inequality and oppression. (Of course, these are
problematic from the perspective of my egalitarian values.)
10 C. DUTILH NOVAES
20
This section follows the presentation of Carnapian explication in (Dutilh Novaes and Reck 2017) and
(Dutilh Novaes 2020). As I will argue, the lacuna in question is not inherent to the method of explica-
tion, but rather a feature of how it has de facto generally been described and deployed, and can be
fairly easily remedied.
21
‘[The theorist engaging in explication] may merely state a few simple rules, or he may prefer a more or
less elaborate procedure, and for this he may or may not use an artificial language.’ (Carnap 1963, 936)
INQUIRY 11
We call this the task of explicating, or of giving an explication for, the earlier
concept; this earlier concept, or sometimes the term used for it, is called the
explicandum; and the new concept, or its term, is called an explicatum of the
old one. (Carnap 1947, 7–8)
It is thus the fruitfulness of the concept Piscis that motivates the adoption
of Piscis in certain contexts where Fish had so far been used, in particular
scientific contexts. The justification for replacing Fish with Piscis is not
based on greater representational accuracy of a purported ‘natural
kind’, but rather on fruitfulness related to prediction and fit with other
scientific observations. Indeed, Carnap can be viewed as holding a prag-
matic conception of concepts (in the sense of (Thomasson 2020)), in line
with his rejection of traditional metaphysics and his emphasis on fruitful-
ness as the guiding principle for concept choice. (This is important; if he
held a ‘carve the world at its joints’ conception of concepts, the combi-
nation with Foucaultian genealogy would be unviable.)
But fruitfulness is not all that it takes for an explication to be successful
(though it is arguably the main criterion). Carnap discusses four main cri-
teria of adequacy for an explication: similarity, exactness, fruitfulness, and
simplicity (Carnap 1950). Indeed, while there is considerable room for
maneuver when engaging in explication (there is no such thing as the
unique ‘correct’ explication for a given explicandum (Carnap 1950)
(Reck 2012), this does not mean that ‘anything goes’. There are standards
that an explication must satisfy to be deemed adequate, and some expli-
cations will be more adequate than others.
The main concepts to which Carnap applied the method of explication
in his own work are meaning and necessity (Carnap 1947), (logical) prob-
ability and degrees of confirmation (Carnap 1950), and information (with
Bar-Hillel) (Bar-Hillel and Carnap 1953). In (Carnap 1947, 8) he further lists
12 C. DUTILH NOVAES
How does one go about clarifying the explicandum? Here Carnap offers
precious little guidance, with just a few remarks on paying attention to
‘intended uses’ of the explicandum:
An indication of the meaning with the help of some examples for its intended
use and other examples for uses not now intended can help the understanding.
An informal explanation in general terms may be added. (Carnap 1950, 4)
22
Shepherd and Justus (Shepherd and Justus 2015) also identify a lacuna in Carnap’s method of explica-
tion (namely that it is not suitable to treat normative concepts), and argue that the X-Phi approach can
help remedy it. As a methodological pluralist, I have no qualms with yet other methods being used to
complement Carnapian explication.
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more attention to the context and the practices surrounding the examples seems
called for. (Reck 2012, 104, my emphasis)
But does this mean that Carnapian explication as a method for philoso-
phical analysis is doomed to fail? This conclusion would be too hasty.
The lack of attention to the clarification stage of an explication can be
remedied by combining explication with other methods and approaches.
Reck summarizes this point aptly, against the background of Carnap’s
own intellectual context:
Can’t one supplement a Carnapian formal approach in some ways to get around
it? In fact, two sources for where the needed supplement may come from suggest
themselves: the history and the sociology of science. These are natural sugges-
tions as soon as one realizes that, while Carnap never explored the history or
the sociology of science much himself, other members of the Vienna Circle did.
(Otto Neurath is well known for his emphasis on the sociology of science; and
works by Philip Frank, among others, engage seriously with the history of
science.) Finally, the members of the Vienna Circle clearly saw themselves as
having adopted a division of labor, with some of them focusing on formal
aspects of science, others on sociological and historical aspects. (Reck 2012, 107)
And how does genealogy address the how question? Here is a generic
description that nicely captures some of the main components of Fou-
caultian genealogy:
23
‘[The genealogist] must be able to diagnose the illnesses of the body, its conditions of weakness and
strength, its breakdowns and resistances, to be in a position to judge philosophical discourse.’ (80)
‘[History’s] task is to become a curative science.’ (90) (Foucault 1984a)
INQUIRY 15
The key idea is thus the attention to practices, which in Foucault’s case
translates specifically into attention to bodily conducts and actions (e.g.
his history of sexuality (Foucault 1978)).24 But this does not mean, con-
trary to what is sometimes believed, that the very category of concepts
is alien to Foucault’s enterprise as a whole: as shown in (Koopman
2017), ‘a genealogical attention to practice goes hand in hand with an
attention to the role of the conceptual within our practices.’ (103) As
for the second point, insofar as Foucaultian genealogies are intended
to help produce insurrections of subjugated knowledges, they lead to
challenges to hegemonic and institutional discourse. ‘By resurrecting
these buried and masked blocks of historical knowledge, the critique of
institutions, discourses, and hegemonic histories becomes possible.’
(Medina 2011, 17)
What genealogy is not, Foucault insists, is an investigation into the pur-
ported essence of some phenomenon by reference to its pure origins.
Instead, the complex historical processes that unfold, permeated with
contingencies and vicissitudes along the way, are what constitute what
we do, think, and are in the present. ‘A genealogy of values, morality asce-
ticism, and knowledge will never confuse itself with a question for their
“origins”, will never neglect as inaccessible the vicissitudes of history.’
(Foucault 1984a, 80). A genealogy is also a critique of essentializing con-
ceptions of (social) phenomena—a vindication of the contingent over the
necessary—thus again revealing Foucault’s general rejection of tra-
ditional, speculative metaphysics (see section 2).
Foucault applied the genealogical method (and closely related
methods such as the archeological method) to a number of topics/con-
cepts/phenomena throughout his career, especially (roughly in chrono-
logical order) madness, medicine, punishment and prisons, sexuality,
24
‘Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the articulation of the body and history.’
(Foucault 1984a, 83)
16 C. DUTILH NOVAES
biopolitics, ethics. These are, of course, very different from the concepts
and topics that Carnap focused on in his explications, though they
share a common interest in (but have different orientations towards)
science and scientific practices generally speaking. But here again the
point is that we may adopt a ‘methodologist’ engagement with Foucault’s
work, which thus allows for the application of his methods, genealogy in
particular, to topics he himself may not have been interested in (Erlen-
busch-Anderson 2018). Hacking’s ground-breaking, Foucault-inspired
work on probability (Hacking 1975) is an excellent illustration of how Fou-
caultian methods can be fruitfully applied to investigate the very con-
cepts that Carnap himself took to be quintessential candidates for
explication, probability in particular (Carnap 1950).
In section 3, I claimed (following (Reck 2012)) that attention to the
history and sociological aspects of the concept to be explicated by a Car-
napian explication would be a promising avenue to remedy the brief and
superficial engagement with the clarification of the explicandum that is
characteristic of Carnap’s own explications. Because it is an excellent diag-
nostic tool, which allows us to understand how a concept is embedded in
evolving social practices—how it works, which functions it has and is
thought to have—genealogy appears to be exactly what is needed to
complement this lacuna in Carnapian explication: it combines historical
investigation with attention to practices.25 Given the avowed pragmatist
commitments of Carnapian explication (as argued in (Dutilh Novaes
2020)), a clarification of the explanandum must take into account its
embeddedness in social practices. Moreover, by investigating how
these practices (contingently) came to be what they now are, i.e. their his-
torical development, the explicator will better understand current uses
and be in a much better position to canvas possibilities for transform-
ation. Furthermore, given the focus on the fruitfulness of an explication,
which in turn is directly related to the roles and functions of concepts,
an in-depth investigation of the functions of a concept by means of
a genealogy provides the elements required for a much needed reflection
on the functions and goals to be achieved in the context of an explication.
But why should we turn specifically to genealogical analysis, instead of
other methods of historical investigation? Let me now compare geneal-
ogy to two other possible candidates, so as to argue that it is a better
fit for Carnapian explication (and in fact for conceptual engineering/
25
‘Genealogy explores the embeddedness of a concept within social practices and the history of those
practices.’ (Haslanger 2005, 18)
INQUIRY 17
26
True enough, these different approaches may also be seen as complementary rather than as compe-
titors. (I owe this point to an anonymous referee.) The point is rather that Foucaultian genealogy
appears to offer the appropriate level of detail for the explicator, and so would typically be more suit-
able that the others if choices need to be made (which is usually the case).
18 C. DUTILH NOVAES
27
However, at times he does seem to suggest that a particular principle-concept has very wide-ranging
explanatory power, thus coming closer to an all-encompassing history-of-everything. One example
might be his analysis in terms of the focal concept of war in his 1975/76 series of lectures ‘Society
Must Be Defended’ (Foucault 2003).
28
Brun (2017) argues that the focus on individual concepts is in fact a weakness of Carnapian explication.
He recommends instead that systems of concepts and theories rather than individual concepts be
taken as the focus of explication.
INQUIRY 19
5. An example: marriage
Let us now finally turn to a concrete example of how a Carnapian expli-
cator could go about, relying on a genealogical perspective for the
crucial step of clarification. The example to be discussed is the concept
of marriage, which has undergone significant transformations in recent
decades (in a number of places at least), along with the relevant practices.
It might be objected that marriage is not the right kind of explanan-
dum for Carnapian explication, as it falls outside of Carnap’s original
scope of action, comprising logic, mathematics, and the exact sciences.
But as argued in (Carus 2008) and (Dutilh Novaes 2020), extending the
method of explication beyond these domains is in fact very much in
the spirit of Carnap’s own political views. In a recent paper (Pearson
2017), Pearson focuses precisely on marriage from the point of view of
Carnapian explication. He sums it up thus:
[T]he importance of Carnap’s program of conceptual engineering extends
beyond the fields of mathematics and the physical sciences with which it has
most often been associated, […] in particular, explication is relevant for those
of us wishing to address sociopolitical problems. The reason is that Carnap
gives us a method for refining the professional dialects used to gain insight
into our social problems, such as the interpretive sciences of sociology, anthro-
pology, and history. (Pearson 2017, 24)
29
‘Genealogy is a technique of analysis that renders what we took to be natural, ontologically stable,
historically immutable into something that is historically contingent, produced, mutable and thus
open to transformation, revision, abandonment and challenge.’ (Mendieta 2011, 113)
30
Such a stance would also be revisionary, as it would oppose marriage for those past reproductive age,
or for people who cannot or do not wish to reproduce; it would render marriage less inclusive than it
currently is.
22 C. DUTILH NOVAES
the concept is to be revised at all. This, again, is very much in the spirit of
Carnap’s own philosophical orientation.
A recent example of what might be described as an explication31 of the
concept of marriage is Brake’s ‘minimal marriage’ proposal, which privi-
leges the component ‘caring relationship’ over other presumed com-
ponents of the concept of marriage (Brake 2012). For Brake, there
should be no restrictions on either gender or the number of people
involved in a marriage. Moreover, there should be no specific restrictions
on the kinds of spousal obligations involved (e.g. the idea that spouses
should entertain a romantic and/or sexual relationship with each other
is not to be privileged). Such a radical reconfiguration of the concept of
marriage could be justified in Carnapian terms of fruitfulness, i.e. if it
would support and foster a greater level of human flourishing and
social justice. Brake believes this to be the case, as minimal marriage
would counter what she calls ‘amatonormative discrimination’ against
people who do not fit the traditional format. Admittedly, Brake does
not engage in the kind of genealogical analysis that I recommend as a
complement to explication. However, it seems that Foucaultian genealo-
gies of marriage, for example in terms of the concepts of biopower and
biopolitics, could offer additional clarity and support to Brake’s proposal,
or to other radical revisions of the concept of marriage.32 (I leave this as a
suggestion for future work.)33
In closing, let me quickly mention an example of combining genealogy
with explication for a concept closer to Carnap’s own original field of
action, namely the concept of logical form, from my own previous work.
In (Dutilh Novaes 2012) I presented a genealogy of logical hylomorphism
and the concept of logical form. This genealogy served to motivate a
functionalist reconceptualization of the concept of logical form, one
which does not rely crucially on a demarcation of logical constants (as
is the case with standard notions of logical form), and instead focuses
on the goals and functions of (deductive) arguments. I invite the inter-
ested reader to turn to that paper for further details, as limitations of
31
It might be argued that Brake’s analysis might be more suitably described as an instance of Haslanger-
ian ameliorative analysis rather than as Carnapian explication. But as I argued in (Dutilh Novaes 2020),
the two methods share many commonalities and will often overlap in terms of the results produced. So
I submit that Brake’s analysis can be viewed as both.
32
The work of Arnold Davidson (Davidson 2001) and his method of historical epistemology is an excellent
illustration of the kind of Foucaultian genealogy that could contribute to projects of conceptual
engineering.
33
In (Dutilh Novaes 2015) I argued for a broader relevance of conceptual genealogy for analytic philos-
ophy, not only restricted to the preliminary stage of clarification of the explicandum. But for the pur-
poses of this paper, it makes sense to focus on this narrower application.
INQUIRY 23
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that an important lacuna in Carnap’s own for-
mulation of the method of explication, namely an all-too-brief engage-
ment with the preliminary stage of clarification of the explanandum
and limited reflection on its functions, can be remedied by deploying Fou-
caultian genealogical investigation. Genealogy can help clarify current
uses of the explanandum because these current uses are arguably conse-
quences of the historical development of the concept and associated
practices, still comprising significant traces of past instantiations. It also
brings to the fore the functions of a given concept, which in turn facili-
tates the formulation of a fruitful explication. Moreover, by highlighting
the contingencies involved in current uses, a genealogical investigation
also indicates possibilities for transformation, which is precisely what
the Carnapian explicator wants to accomplish: a transformation of the
explicandum into a more fruitful, suitable explicatum.
In closing, I want to add a few remarks on the broader significance of
this inquiry. Firstly, it must be noted that it has fairly modest ambitions:
the goal is not to establish that Carnapian explication can only proceed
by relying on Foucaultian genealogy, nor is it to establish that the
primary goal of Foucaultian genealogy should be that of serving projects
of conceptual engineering. Rather, I present the combination of geneal-
ogy and explication as one potentially fruitful approach to conceptual
engineering among others. (I am a methodological pluralist.) Moreover,
the multiple other goals and uses of genealogical investigation remain
just as legitimate as they were before; I am simply suggesting that this
is yet another possible use of the genealogical method, namely, for
projects of conceptual engineering.
More broadly, the methodological approach I sketched in this paper
belongs to a pragmatist, functionalist strand within the conceptual engin-
eering landscape. Amie Thomasson is one exponent of this strand, overtly
under the influence of Carnap, in particular in her rejection of ‘thick’ con-
ceptions of metaphysical theorizing and her defense of a functionalist con-
ception of concepts (Thomasson 2020) (section 2). Tellingly, Thomasson
24 C. DUTILH NOVAES
explicitly recognizes the role that genealogical investigations can play for
pragmatist conceptual engineering (Thomasson 2020) (section 4.3). Sally
Haslanger’s ameliorist approach is another example of pragmatist, func-
tionalist conceptual engineering, and she too stresses the contribution
that genealogical investigations can make to such projects (Haslanger
2012). The general point is this: whoever takes function and practices to
be a fundamental component of projects of conceptual engineering will
have much to benefit from engaging with Foucault’s genealogical
method, given its attention to practices and the symbiotic relation
between concepts and practices (Koopman 2017). Moreover, those inter-
ested in political and societal implications of engineering concepts will
also benefit from Foucault’s sustained attention to power relations.
More generally, I submit that Foucault is a thinker whom analytic phi-
losophers would have much to learn from, despite apparent incompatibil-
ities in orientation and methods. In this paper, I’ve sketched how a
Carnapian explicator can fruitfully engage with some aspects of Fou-
cault’s thought, but its relevance for the philosophical questions that ana-
lytic philosophers are interested in arguably goes well beyond this
particular instance of fruitful collaboration.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to an anonymous referee, Elias Anttila, Liam Kofi Bright, Georg Brun, Manuel
Gustavo Isaac, Steffen Koch, Colin Koopman, Erich Reck, and Merel Talbi for comments
on previous drafts of the paper.
This research was supported by the Consolidator grant ERC-2017-COG, project SEA
771074.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Funding
This work was supported by H2020 European Research Council [771074-SEA].
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