THE JUDICIARY

221. Define judicial power under the 1987 Constitution.

Judicial power, as defined under Section 1(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, pertains to
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.

222. What is fiscal autonomy?

Fiscal autonomy, a guarantee given by the Constitution to certain units of the government
(Judiciary, Constitutional Commissions, and Ombudsman), means freedom from outside control
and limitations, other than those provided by law. It contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility
to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It
recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not
exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government
and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the
course of the discharge of their functions. It is intended as a guarantee of separation of powers
and of independence from political agencies. (SEE: Re: Further Clarifying and Strengthening the
Organizational Structure and Administrative Set-Up of the Philippine Judicial Academy, A.M. No.
01-1-04-SC, 25 September 2009; Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of
the Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, A.M. No.
11-7-10-SC, 31 July 2012)

Note: §3, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution accords fiscal autonomy to the judiciary:
Sec. 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be
reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after
approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

The Judiciary must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of its
constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the
independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations
is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution
but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon
which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. (Ibid.)

223. What can the Supreme Court specifically do pursuant to its fiscal autonomy?
The fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate
and utilize its resources with the wisdom and dispatch that its needs require. It recognizes the
power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the
highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate
and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the
discharge of their function. (Bengzon v. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, 15 April 1992)

224. What is the meaning of automatic release of appropriations?

Automatic release of approved annual appropriations to entities vested with fiscal autonomy
under the 1987 Constitution means that no condition to fund releases to such bodies vested with
fiscal autonomy may be imposed. The funds of entities vested with fiscal autonomy should be

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automatically and regularly released, a shortfall in revenues notwithstanding. (Civil Service
Commission v. Department of Budget and Management, G.R. No. 158791, 22 July 2005)

225. Is a revenue shortfall a valid justification to withhold the release of funds of

these Constitutional bodies?
No, revenue shortfall is not a valid justification to withhold the release of funds of Constitutional
bodies vested with fiscal autonomy.

The Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman. To hold that these bodies may be subjected to withholding
or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place these entities
vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not granted the same
autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the Constitution. The
agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be given priority in
the release of their approved appropriations over all other agencies not similarly vested when
there is a revenue shortfall. The funds of entities vested with fiscal autonomy should be
automatically and regularly released, notwithstanding a shortfall in revenues. (Civil Service
Commission v. Department of Budget and Management, G.R. No. 158791, 22 July 2005)

226. Can Congress or the President exempt certain persons from the payment of
docket fees? Why?
No, Congress or the President cannot exempt certain persons from the payment of docket fees.

Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified
by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional independence, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive domain. In the
1987 Constitution, that power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with
the Executive.

The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an
impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they
enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules
promulgated by this Court. Thus, the claim of a legislative grant of exemption from the payment
of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails.

Congress could not carve out an exemption for certain persons from the payment of legal fees
without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court’s
independence — fiscal autonomy. Legal fees do not only constitute a vital source of the Court’s
financial resources but also comprise an essential element of the Court’s fiscal independence. Any
exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to certain persons will necessarily
reduce the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund
(SAJF). Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court’s guaranteed
fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence. (SEE: Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption
of the Government Service Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fees, A.M. No. 08-2-01-0,

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11 February 11, 2010; and In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment Of
Filing/ Docket Fees, A.M. NO. 05-10-20-SC, 10 March 2010)

227. Can Congress prohibit lower courts from issuing writs of injunctions against
investigations of the Ombudsman? Why?
No, Congress cannot prohibit lower courts from issuing writs of injunctions against investigations
of the Ombudsman.

In interpreting the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 (which prohibits any court, apart from
the Supreme Court, from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an investigation being conducted
by the Office of the Ombudsman), the Supreme Court declared that Congress, through the said
provision, encroached on the Supreme Court’s constitutional rule-making authority, specifically in
defining the scope of injunctions and restraint orders as provisional and ancillary to a court’s
subject matter jurisdiction and as inherent in a court.

Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by the Supreme Court under its
duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every court’s
exercise of judicial power. Without the Court’s consent to the proscription, there thus, stands to
be a violation of the separation of powers principle.

The breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional allocation of powers; it also
practically dilutes a court’s ability to carry out its functions. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals
(Sixth Division), G.R. No. 217126-27, 10 November 2015)

228. What is the scope of the rule-making power of the Supreme Court?
The rule-making power of the Supreme Court pertains to the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. (§5(5), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)

Limitations on the rule-making power: The rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases; they must be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and must not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. (Ibid.)

229. Explain the power of the Supreme Court to control the execution of its decision
as an essential aspect of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has the inherent, necessary and incidental power to control and supervise
the process of execution of its decisions. The power of the Supreme Court to control the execution
of its decision as an essential aspect of jurisdiction cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction
because Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The most important part
of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening
events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust
the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening
contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its

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processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice. (Echegaray v. SOJ, G.R. No.
132601, 19 January 1999)

230. What vote is required for the Supreme Court [to] modify a doctrine of law set
down in a case decided by the Supreme Court?
The voting requirement for the modification of a doctrine of law set down in a case decided by
the Supreme Court is majority of the Members of the Court en banc who actually took part in the
deliberation on the issues or issues involved and voted on them.

Section 4, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that only the Supreme Court sitting en
banc may act on cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court in a decision rendered
en banc or in division is be modified or reversed. In relation to this, the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court requires that all decisions and actions in Court en banc cases shall be made up
upon the concurrence of the majority of the Members of the Court who actually took part in the
deliberation on the issues or issues involved and voted on them. (SEE: §4(3), Article VIII, 1987
Constitution, in relation to §3, Rule 2 and §1(a), Rule 12, Internal Rules of the Supreme Court,
A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC, 4 May 2010)

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FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
Police power
231. Police power defined.
Police power is the inherent power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property. It is the power to promote general welfare and public
interest, and to enact laws to promote public health, public morals, and public safety of the
inhabitants of the state. It is based on public necessity and self-preservation. It is the most
pervasive, the least limitable, and the most demanding of the three fundamental powers of the
State. The justification is found in the Latin maxims: salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of
the people is supreme) and sic utere ut alienum non laedas (so you may use your property not
to injure the rights of others).

232. Police power v. taxation & eminent domain.

Police power may be distinguished from taxation and eminent domain in the following manner:
(a) Police power regulates both liberty and property; Eminent domain and Taxation affect only
property rights.
(b) Police power and Taxation are exercised only by government; Eminent domain may be
exercised even by private entities.
(c) Property taken in the exercise of police power is usually noxious or devoted to a noxious
purpose and may thus be destroyed; while in the exercise of eminent domain and taxation,
the property is wholesome and devoted to public use or purpose.
(d) Compensation in police power is the intangible, altruistic feeling that the individual has
contributed to the public good; in eminent domain, it is the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken; while in taxation, it is the protection given and/or public improvements
instituted by government for the taxes paid.

233. Taxing and eminent domain powers as implements of police power.

The taxing power may be used as an implement of police power. In Lutz v. Araneta (Sugar
Adjustment Act case), the Supreme Court observed that taxation may be made the implement of
the state’s police power. The additional tax imposed on manufacturing sugar was for the
stabilization of the sugar industry, based on the demand of general welfare, which was one of
the great industries of the country. This is primarily an exercise of police power and taxation was
merely an implement to the state’s police power.

The power of eminent domain may likewise be used as an implement to attain the police
objective. In Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (G.R. No. 78742,
14 July 1989), the Supreme Court ruled that the expropriation of the excess of the maximum area
allowed by law was a valid exercise of police power through eminent domain for the promotion
of the welfare of landless farmers. There must be just compensation for there is compensable
taking.

234. Who may exercise police power?

The power is inherently vested in the legislature since it is the main repository of state powers.
Congress may, however, validly delegate this power to the President, to administrative bodies,
and to lawmaking bodies of local government units. LGUs exercise the power under the general
welfare clause (§14, RA 7160), and under Sections 391, 447, 458, and 468 of RA 7160.

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235. Limitations on police power.
The 1987 Constitution sets forth the basic limitations on police power: due process clause and
equal protection clause.

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of
the police power, while the equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual
or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality.

The State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law;
and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal
protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation
must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist
between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be
a reasonable basis for said distinction. (Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, 31 May 1957)

When police power is exercised by a virtue of valid delegation, the following limitations must be
observed:
(a) Express grant by law (e.g., Sections 16, 391, 447, and 468 of RA 7160 for LGUs)
(b) Within the territorial limits of enacting body (for LGUs, except when exercised to protect
water supply)
(c) Must not be contrary to law – An activity prohibited by law cannot, in the guise of
regulation, be allowed; an activity allowed by law may be regulated, but not prohibited

236. Requisites for a valid exercise.

The valid exercise of police power requires the concurrence of two requisites:

First, the exercise of police power must have a lawful subject. The interests of the public in
general, as distinguished from those of particular class, require the exercise of police power. It
requires the primacy of the welfare of the many over the interests of the few. This means that
the activity or property sought to be regulated affects the general welfare; if it does, then the
enjoyment of the rights flowing therefrom may have to yield to the interests of the greater
number. (SEE: Taxicab Operators v. Board of Transportation, G.R. No. L-59234, 30 September
1982; Velasco v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-24153, 14 February 1983)

Second, it must be exercised through lawful means. It requires that the means employed must
be reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive upon affected individuals. It must conform to the safeguards guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights. (Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc., G.R. No. 148339, 23
February 2005)

Power of Eminent Domain

237. Eminent domain defined
The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state (and of those entities to which
the power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public use upon payment
of just compensation. (Dipidio Eart-Savers Multi-Purpose Association v. Gozun, G.R. No. 157882,
30 March 2006)

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It is the power of the nation or the sovereign state to take, or to authorize the taking of private
property for public use without the owner’s consent, conditioned upon payment of just
compensation. It is acknowledged as an inherent political right, founded on a common necessity
and interest of appropriating the property of individual members of the community to the great
necessities of the whole community. (Brgy. Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga v. CA, G.R. No.
150640, March 22, 2007)

SEE: §9, Art. III; §18, Art. XII; §4 and §9, Art. XIII

238. Eminent domain v. police power

The power of eminent domain is the inherent power of the State take or appropriate private
property for public use upon payment of just compensation and with due process of law, whereas
police power is the inherent power of the State to regulate or to restrain the use of liberty and
property for public welfare, as long as the restriction imposed is be reasonable, not oppressive.

In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, property interests are appropriated and applied
to some public purpose which necessitates the payment of just compensation. Normally, the title
to and possession of the property are transferred to the expropriating authority. However, it is a
settled rule that the acquisition of title or total destruction of the property is not essential for
“taking” under the power of eminent domain to be present. In these cases, although the private
property owner is not divested of ownership or possession, payment of just compensation is
warranted because of the burden placed on the property for the use or benefit of the public.

On the other hand, in the exercise of police power, a property right is impaired by regulation, or
the use of property is merely prohibited, regulated or restricted to promote public welfare. There
is no compensable taking, hence, payment of just compensation is not required. Although the
regulation affects the right of ownership, none of the bundle of rights which constitute ownership
is appropriated for use by or for the benefit of the public. (Manila Memorial Park, Inc. v. Secretary
of DSWD, G.R. No. 175356, 03 December 2013)

Alternative Answer:
The power of eminent domain may be distinguished from police power in the following manner:
(a) As to the exercising authority: Eminent domain may be exercised by public and private
entities, while police power is exercised only by the government.
(b) As to delegability: Eminent domain, upon valid delegation, may be exercised by: (1) the
President, (2) Law-making bodies of LGUs, (3) Public corporations, (4) Quasi-public
corporations, and (5) administrative bodies, while police power may only be exercised by: (1)
the President, (2) administrative bodies, and (3) Law-making bodies of LGUs, upon valid
delegation.
(c) As to the purpose for the exercise of the power: Eminent domain is exercised for the necessity
of the public for the use of private property, while police power is exercised for public necessity
and the right of the State and of the public to self-preservation and self-protection.
(d) As to the nature of the property involved when taken: In the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, the property is wholesome and is devoted to public use or purpose, while in the
exercise of police power, the property is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose and as
such taken and destroyed.

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(e) As to compensation: Compensation in the exercise of eminent domain is the full and fair
equivalent of the property, while compensation in the exercise of police power is the
intangible, altruistic feeling that the individual has contributed to the public good.
(f) As to scope: Eminent domain affects only property rights, while police power regulates both
liberty and property.
(g) As to limitation: The taking in the exercise in the power of eminent domain should be with
due process of law and payment of just cause, while restrictions imposed through the exercise
of police power should be reasonable, not oppressive.

239. Eminent domain v. power of taxation

The power of eminent domain may be distinguished from the power of taxation in the following
manner:
(a) As to the exercising authority: Eminent domain may be exercised by public and private
entities, while taxation is exercised only by the government.
(b) As to delegability: Eminent domain, upon valid delegation, may be exercised by: (1) the
President, (2) Law-making bodies of LGUs, (3) Public corporations, (4) Quasi-public
corporations, and (5) administrative bodies, while taxation may only be exercised by: (1) the
President, and (2) Law-making bodies of LGUs, upon valid delegation.
(c) As to the purpose for the exercise of the power: Eminent domain is exercised for the necessity
of the public for the use of private property, while taxation is exercised for public necessity
and in accordance with the life blood theory.
(d) As to nature of the property involved when taken: Both involves property that is wholesome
and is devoted to public use or purpose.
(e) As to compensation: Compensation in the exercise of eminent domain is the full and fair
equivalent of the property, while compensation in the exercise of taxing power is the
protection and public improvements instituted by the government for the taxes paid.
(f) As to scope: Both affects only property rights.

240. Eminent domain as an implement of police power

Eminent domain may be used as an implement to attain the police objective. In Association of
Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (G.R. No. 78742, 14 July 1989), the Supreme
Court ruled that the expropriation of the excess of the maximum area allowed by law was a valid
exercise of police power through eminent domain for the promotion of the welfare of landless
farmers. There must be just compensation for there is compensable taking.