I.
PARTS OF A STATUTE
--page 10-16
(Title, Preamble, Enacting Clause, Purview or Body of
Statute, Separability Clause, Repealing Clause, Effectivity
Clause)
Title -- The title of the statute is the heading on the
preliminary part, furnishing the name by which the act is
individually known.
Example: Philippine Medical Technology Act of 1969
Preamble -- That part of the statute explaining the reasons
for its enactment and the objects sought to be
accomplished.
Enacting Clause -- That part of the statute which declares
its enactment and serves to identify it is an act of
legislation proceeding from the proper legislative
authority.
Example: "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled."
Body -- The main and operative part of the statute
containing its substantive and even procedural provisions.
Provisos and exemptions may also be found in the body of
the statute.
Repealing Clause -- That part of the statute which
announces the prior statutes or specific provisions which
have been abrogated by reason of the new law.
Example: SECTION 13. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees,
orders, rules and regulations, other issuances, or parts
thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (From REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 9048)
Separability Clause -- That part of the statute which
provides that in the event that one or more provisions are
declared void or unconstitutional, the remaining
provisions shall still be in force and effect
Example: SECTION 12. Separability Clause. - If any portion
or provision of this Act is declared void or unconstitutional,
the remaining portions or provisions thereof shall not be
affected by such declaration. (From REPUBLIC ACT NO.
9048)
Effectivity Clause -- That part of the Statute which
announces the effectivity date of the law.
Example: SECTION 14. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall
take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication
in at least two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation. (From REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9048)
II. KINDS OF A STATUTE
--- page 2-3
(Accdg to Duration: Permanent, Temporary)
(Accdg to application: Prospective, Retroactive)
(Accdg to operation: Declaratory, Curative, Mandatory,
Directory, Substantive, remedial, Penal)
(Accdg to forms: affirmative, negative)
III. HOW A BILL BECOMES A LAW
---page 6-10
1) 1st and 2nd reading of bills
2) 3rd reading
3) Conference Committee reports
4) Authentication of bills
5) President’s approval or veto
IV. WHAT IS STAT CONSTRUCTION/INTERPRETATION
Caltex (Philippines), Inc. vs. Enrico Palomar in his
capacity as The Postmaster General
Facts
The case before us now is a petition for declaratory relief
against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying that
judgment be rendered declaring its ‘Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest’ not to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering
respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to
bring the contest to the attention of the public”.
In 1960, Caltex launched a promotional scheme called
Caltex Hooded Pump Contest which calls for participants
to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump
at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified
period. The contest is open to all motor vehicle owners
and/or licensed drivers. There is neither a fee nor
consideration required nor a purchase required to be
made. The forms are available upon request at each Caltex
station and there is also a sealed can where accomplished
entry stubs may be deposited.
Caltex wishes to use mails amongst the media for
publicizing about the contest, thus, Caltex sent
representatives to the postal authorities for advance
clearing for the use of mails for the contest. However, the
postal authorities denied their request in view of sections
1954 (a), 1982, and 1983 of the Revised Administrative
Code (Anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law), which
prohibits the use of mail in conveying any information
concerning non-mailable schemes, such as lottery, gift
enterprise, or similar scheme.
Caltex sought for a reconsideration and stressed that
there was no consideration involved in the part of the
contestant(s) but the Postmaster General maintained
their view and even threatened Caltex that if the contest
was conducted, a fraud order will have to be issued against
it (Caltex) and all its representatives. This leads to Caltex’s
filing of this petition for declaratory relief.
The court ruled that the petitioner does not violate the
Postal Law and the respondent has no right to bar the
public distribution or said rules by the mails. The
respondent then appealed.
Issue(s)
a) Whether or not the petition states a sufficient cause of
action for declaratory relief? YES
b) Whether or not the proposed Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest violates the Postal Law? NO
Ruling
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a
sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, and that
the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” as described in the
rules submitted by the appellee does not transgress the
provisions of the Postal Law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
No costs.
Ratio
Declaratory Relief is the interpretation of several
constitutional provisions. Based on Section 1 Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court, an action for declaratory relief should
be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a
contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are
affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or
an ordinance.
Requisites for Declaratory Relief:
- There is justiciable controversy
- The controversy is between persons whose interests are
adverse
- The party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy
- The issue is ripe for judicial determination
* The Caltex Hooded Pump Contest is a mere gratuitous
distribution of property by chance. It does not qualify as a
lottery due to the lack of consideration. An act to be
deemed as a lottery must constitute a (1) prize, (2) chance,
and (3) consideration. The participants are not required to
do anything or purchase anything from Caltex in order to
participate in the contest. The true test for having
consideration is whether the participant pays a valuable
consideration for the chance, and not whether those
conducting the enterprise receive something of value in
return for the distribution of the prize.
Caltex v. Palomar
Issues:
W/N construction should be employed in this case and
Held:
Yes. Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue
is an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used
in a certain law. As defined in Black's Law
Dictionary: Construction is the art or process of
discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of
the authors of the law with respect to a given case, where
that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by
reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly
provided for in the law.
In the present case, the prohibitive provisions of
the Postal Law inescapably require an inquiry into the
intended meaning of the words therein. This is as much as
question of construction or interpretation as any other.
The Court is tasked to look beyond the fair exterior, to the
substance, in order to unmask the real element and
pernicious tendencies that the law is seeking to prevent.
V. WHEN DO YOU APPLY THE PRINCIPLES OF STATCON?
Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas
GR L-34568, 28 March 1988
Facts:
On 23 March 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda
Agonoy, private respondents, filed a petition with the
Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte seeking the
adoption of minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos.
However, minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted
by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners
herein, filed an opposition to the said adoption. They
contended that the spouses Agonoy had a legitimate
daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositor’s mother,
who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore said spouses
were disqualified to adopt under Article 335 of the Civil
Code, which provides that those who have legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children or children by
legal fiction cannot adopt. (MC granted the adoption,
hence appeal)
Issue: (a Question of law)
WON the spouses Agonoy are disqualified to
adopt under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil Code.
Held:
The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of
the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot
adopt, are clear and unambiguous (i.e, legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children, children by fiction). Also, when the
New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word
“descendant” found in the Spanish Civil Code (w/c would
have DQ spouses Agonoy since petitioners are descendants of
respondents) to which the New Civil Code was patterned, to
“children.” The children mentioned therein have a clearly
defined meaning in law and do not include grandchildren.
Well known is the rule of statutory construction to
the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face
need not be interpreted. The rule is that only statutes with
an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of
statutory construction.
In the present case, Roderick and Rommel
Daoang, the grandchildren of Spouses Agonoy, cannot
assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos
by the Agonoys.
The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the judgment
of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, declaring that henceforth
Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos be, to all legitimate intents and purposes, the
children by adoption of the joint petitioners Antero Agonoy and Amanda R.
Agonoy and that the former be freed from legal obedience and maintenance by
their respective parents, Miguel Bonilla and Laureana Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla
and Modesto Marcos and Benjamina Gonzales for Wilson Marcos and their
family names ‘Bonilla’ and ‘Marcos’ be changed with “Agonoy”, which is the
family name of the petitioners, without pronouncements as to costs.
NOTE: Under the law now in force (in present), having legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, is no longer a
ground for disqualification to adopt. (search for legal basis)
Amores v. HRET (GR No. 189600, June 29, 2010)
FACTS:
Petitioner, Milagros E. Amores, challenges the
decision of the House of RepresentativesElectoral Tribunal
(public respondent), which both dismissed her petition for
Quo Warranto. Her petition seeks to ouster Emmanuel
Joel J. Villanueva, whom she alleged to have assumed
office as a representative of the party list organization
Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC)without formal
proclamation by the Commission on Elections; to be a
disqualified to be anominee of the youth sector since at
the time of his filing of his certificates of nomination
andacceptance, he was already 31 years old, which was
beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant toSection 9 of Party-
List System Act; to have changed his affiliation from
CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers
sector was not effected at least 6 months before the May
14,2007 elections.The public respondent held that age
qualification pursuant to Section 9 of RA 7941 only
appliedto those nominated until 1998, unless the sectoral
party exclusively represents the youth which is not
CIBAC’s case. Moreover, it held that Section 14 of RA 7941
did not apply as there was noresultant change in the party-
list affiliation.After having her motion for reconsideration
denied by Resolution No. 09-130, petitioner
filedPetitioner for Certoriari contending that the public
respondent has created distinctions in theapplication of
Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 fostering interpretations
that go against equal protection of laws. In addition partial
proclamation NBC Resolution 07-60 was not enough
basisfor Villanueva to assume office on July 10, 2007.
ISSUE:
WON Sections 9 (age requirement for youth
sector nominees) and 15 of Republic Act No. 7941 apply to
Villanueva (private respondent)?
HELD:
The court has held that Sections 9 and 15 of
RA No. 7941 or Partylist System Act, applyto the private
respondent. According to Section 9 of RA 7941, a nominee
of the youthsector must be at least 25 but not more than
30 years of age on the day of election. Whena youth
sectoral representative attains the age of 30 during his
term, he will be allowed to continue until the expiration of
his term. Meanwhile, Section 15 reads “ Change
of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative
who changes his political partyor sectoral affiliation during his
term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if
hechanges his political party orsectoral affiliation within six (6)
months before anelection, he shall not be eligible for
nomination as party-list representative under his
new party or organization. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)”The court has found no textual support for the
public respondent’s interpretation that Section 9 is
applicable only to those nominated until 1998 and found
that Villanueva has changed hisaffiliation only on March
17, 2007, which was within 6 months before the May 2007
elections.
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the
law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is
no room for construction or interpretation. There is only
room for application
REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS v. COMM of CUSTOMS
FACTS:
Republic Flour Mills (RFM) were importing wheat to
produce flour. During the process of transforming wheat
into flour, bran (ipa) and pollard (darak) were also
produced. RFM were exporting bran and pollard but they
were not paying wharfage dues because RFM were
referring to them as wastes and not products. RFM
interpreted Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code
referring only to “products of the Philippines” that are to
be levied, etc. Hence, RFM did not agree with the CTA’s
decision that a collection of wharfage dues must be given
for exporting them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such collection of wharfage dues was in
accordance with law.
HELD:
Yes. Under Section 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code, it
stated that: “There shall be levied, collected and paid on
all articles imported or brought into the Philippines, and
on products of the Philippines… exported from the Phils.,
a charge of two pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for
wharfage…” – which simply means that as long as the
goods are produced in the country, they fall within the
terms of the above section. Hence, the Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.
Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. Manila Railroad
Company
Facts: There are no antecedent facts available for this case.
The union seeks reversal of decision of the lower court
dismissing its petition for mandamus. The court
determined Republic Act 2023 was enacted only to compel
the employer to make the deduction of the employees’
debt from the latter’s salary and turn this over to the
employees’ credit union; but which does not convert the
credit union’s credit into a first priority credit.
Issue: Whether, indeed, the law does not give first priority
in the matter of payments to the obligations of employees
in favor of their credit unions.
Held: Where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally,
there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The
law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must
be obeyed. The express provisions of the New Civil Code,
Articles 2241, 2242 and 2244 show the legislative intent
on preference of credits. In the present case, the
applicable provision of Republic Act 2023 speaks for itself;
there being no ambiguity, it is to be applied. If the
legislative intent in enacting paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section
62 of RA 2023 were to give first priority in the matter of
payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their
credit unions, then, the law would have so expressly
declared. There is nothing in the provision of Republic Act
2023 which provides that obligation of laborers and
employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy first
priority in the deduction from the employees’ wages and
salaries.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision,
without pronouncement as to costs.
RADIO COMM. V. NTC, 1987
FACTS:
Petitioner has been operating a radio communications
system since 1957 under its legislative franchise granted
by Republic Act No. 2036 which was enacted on June 23,
1957.
Petitioner RCPI established a radio telegraph service in
Catarman, Northern Samar; San Jose, Occidental Mindoro;
and Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
In a decision dated June 24, 1980 in NTC Case No. 80-08,
private respondent Kayumanggi Radio Network
Incorporated was authorized by the public respondent to
operate radio communications systems in Catarman,
Samar and in San Jose, Mindoro.
The private respondent filed a complaint with the NTC
alleging that the petitioner was operating in Catarman,
Samar and in San Jose, Mindoro without a certificate of
public convenience and necessity.
RCPI counter-alleged that its telephone services in the
areas are covered by the legislative franchise recognized
by NTC and its predecessor Public Service Commission.
In its supplemental reply, the petitioner RCPI further
stated that it has been in operation in the questioned
places long before private respondent Kayumanggi filed its
application to operate in the same places.
After conducting the hearing, NTC ordered RCPI to
immediately cease from operating in these areas. Stating
that EO 546 a certificate of public convenience and
necessity is mandatory for the operation of
communication utilities and services including radio
communications.
RCPI’s MR was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON RCPI is required to secure a certificate of public
convenience
HELD:
YES. The petitioner's main argument states that the
abolition of the Public Service Commission under
Presidential Decree No. 1 and the creation of the National
Telecommunications Commission under Executive Order
No. 546 to replace the defunct Public Service Commission
did not affect sections 14 and 15 of the Public Service Law
(Commonwealth Act. No. 146, as amended) has no merit.
it is clear that Executive Order No. 546, Section 15 that the
exemption enjoyed by radio companies from the
jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission and the
Board of Communications no longer exists because of the
changes effected by the Reorganization Law and
implementing executive orders. The petitioner's claim that
its franchise cannot be affected by Executive Order No.
546 on the ground that it has long been in operation since
1957 cannot be sustained.
A franchise, being merely a privilege emanating from the
sovereign power of the state and owing its existence to a
grant, is subject to regulation by the state itself by virtue
of its police power through its administrative agencies.
WHEREFORE, the challenged order of the public
respondent (NTC) dated August 22, 1984 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
REPUBLIC v. TOLEDANO
Facts:
A verified petition was filed before the RTC of Iba,
Zambales by spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A.
Clouse, both aliens, seeking to adopt the minor, Solomon
Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of Evelyn who has
been under their care and custody for quite a time.
Alvin is a natural born US citizen. He married Evelyn, a
Filipino, who thereafter became a naturalized citizen of
the US in Guam. They are physically, mentally, morally,
and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve
(12) year old minor.
Solomon gave his consent to the adoption, and so did his
mother Nery Alcala, a widow, due to poverty and inability
to support and educate her son.
Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to
conduct the Home and Child Study, favorably
recommended the granting of the petition for adoption.
Consequently, respondent judge rendered a decision
granting the petition for adoption and decreeing that said
minor be considered as their child by adoption. To this
effect, the Court gives the minor the rights and duties as
the legitimate child of the petitioners. Also, it dissolves
parental authority bestowed upon his natural parents
and vests parental authority to the spouses and makes
him their legal heir.
Petitioner, through the OSG appealed for relief via a
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
lower court, contending that it erred in granting the
petition for adoption because spouses Clouse are not
qualified to adopt under Philippine law.
Both spouses are American citizens at the time of the
filing of petition for adoption.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the spouses, both aliens, have the
right or are qualified to adopt under Philippine law.
2. Whether or not joint adoption by spouses is
mandatory.
Ruling:
Under Articles 184 and 185 of E.O. No. 209, otherwise
known as “The Family Code of the Philippines”, spouses
Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of E.O. No. 209 expressly
enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt,
viz.:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative
by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or
her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to
adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may
adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on
inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.
There can be no question that Alvin is not qualified to
adopt Solomon under any of the exceptional cases in the
aforequoted provision. Firstly, he is not a former Filipino
citizen but a natural born US citizen . Secondly, Solomon
is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate
child of his spouse. Lastly, when spouses Clouse jointly
filed the petition to adopt Solomon, Evelyn was no longer
a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when
she was naturalized as a US citizen.
Evelyn on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant
to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a
former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger
brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot
be granted in her favor alone without violating Article
185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and
wife. It reads:
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except
in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate
child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child
of the other.
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and
wife, a condition that must be read along together with
Article 184.
Tanada v. Tuvera (Resolution)
Facts: On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity
for the publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application,
and unless so published, they shall have no binding force
and effect. Decision was concurred only by 3 judges.
Petitioners move for reconsideration / clarification of the
decision on various questions. Solicitor General avers that
the motion is a request for advisory opinion. February
Revolution took place, which subsequently required the
new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on the issue (under
Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of Court).
Issue: Whether publication is still required in light of the
clause “unless otherwise provided”.
Held: The clause “unless it is otherwise provided,” in
Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to the date of effectivity
and not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean
that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without
its previous publication. The legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall
be shortened or extended. Publication requirements
applies to (1) all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or directly conferred
by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and
regulations for the purpose of enforcing or implementing
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter
of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion
of the national territory and directly affects only the
inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board circulars to
“fill in the details” of the Central Bank Act which that body
is supposed to enforce. Further, publication must be in full
or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform
the public of the contents of the laws.
The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defined
shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon
thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official
Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their
publication, or on another date specified by the
legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Floresca v. Philex Mining
Facts: Several miners were killed in a cave-in at one of
Philex Mining Corporations’ mine sites. The heirs of the
miners were able to recover under the Workman’s
Compensation Act (WCA). Thereafter, a special committee
report indicated that the company failed to provide the
miners with adequate safety protection. The heirs
decided to file a complaint for damages before the Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Manila. Philex filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the action was based on an
industrial accident which is covered under the WCA and,
therefore, the CFI has no jurisdiction over the case. Philex
argues that the work connected injuries are compensable
exclusively under Sections 5 and 46 of the WCA; and that
the WCA covers work-connected accidents even if the
employer was negligent as the WCA under Section 4-A
imposes a 50% additional compensation in the event that
the employer is negligent. The heirs, however, contend
that the CFI has jurisdiction, as their complaint is not based
on the WCA but on the Civil Code provisions on damages
arising out of negligence. The CFI dismissed the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction. The heirs questioned the dismissal
before the Supreme Court.
Amici curiae submitted their respective memoranda,
pursuant to the resolution of 26 November 1976, involving
the issue whether the action of an injured employee or
worker or that of his heirs in case of his death under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or
cumulative; i.e. (1: Exclusive) whether an injured
employee or his heirs’ action is exclusively restricted to
seeking the limited compensation provided under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, (2: Selective) whether an
injured employee or his heirs have a right of selection or
choice of action between availing of the worker’s right
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the
regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages
(actual, moral and/or exemplary) from the employer by
virtue of negligence (or fault) of the employer or of his
other employees, or (3: Cumulative) whether an injured
employee or his heirs may avail cumulatively of both
actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act and sue in addition for
damages in the regular courts. The opinions of the amici
curiae are diverse.
The Court in this same decision agreed with the argument
that the action is selective, i.e. that the injured worker or
his heirs have the choice of remedies, but that they cannot
pursue both courses of action simultaneously and balance
the relative advantage of recourse under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act as against an ordinary action. It further
held that the petitioners who had received the benefits
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, such may not
preclude them from bringing an action before the regular
court, as the choice of the first remedy was based on
ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice
as it was not an intelligent choice, but that upon the
success of such bids before the lower court, the payments
made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be
deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their
favor.
Issue: Whether the Supreme Court, in determining the
action to be selective, is guilty of judicial legislation.
Held: The Court, through its majority, defended itself by
holding that the Court does not legislate but merely
applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of
social justice then secured by Section 5 of Article II and
Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and later
by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article II of the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies of the 1973 Constitution, as
amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177,
2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil
Code of 1950. Further, it reiterated its ruling in People vs.
Licera: that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court
assume the same authority as the statute itself, pursuant
to Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction’s
legal system. It argues that the application or
interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the
law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since
the Court’s application or interpretation merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that
the construed law purports to carry into effect. Yet, the
Court argues that the Court can legislate, pursuant to
Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that “No
judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason
of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.” Thus,
even the legislator himself recognizes that in certain
instances, the court “do and must legislate” to fill in the
gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all
human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all
possible cases to which the law may apply.
Republic v. CA and Molina
Facts: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina
on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year
after. Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and
irresponsibility” on the early stages of the marriage,
observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends
and squandering his money with them, from his
dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on
matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of
his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner
thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job
in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her
and their child a week later. The couple are separated-in-
fact for more than three years.
On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that
of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of
the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo
did not present any evidence as he appeared only during
the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court
rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The
Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto
the RTC’s decision. Hence, the present recourse.
Issue: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities
should be construed as psychological incapacity
Held: The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil
Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the
application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family
rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad
range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one
spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital
union, his or her personal relationship with the other
spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for
the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage;
where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole,
tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it
defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the
dissolution of the marriage.
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of
Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the
time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is
no clear showing to us that the psychological defect
spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a
“difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing
of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting
personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal
divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof
belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and
clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must
be proven existing at the time of the celebration of
marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically
permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave
enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be
embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as
regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the
same code as regards parents and their children; (7)
interpretation made by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the
trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to
appeal as counsels for the State.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and
set aside the assailed decision; concluding that the
marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists
and remains valid.
PARAS v COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner is an elected barangay chairman of
Pula, Cabanatuan City in 1994. Sometime in October 1995,
A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by
his constituents. Public respondent COMELEC resolved to
approve the petition and set the recall election on
November 13. In view of the petitioner’s opposition,
COMELEC deferred the election and rescheduled it on
December 16, 1995. To prevent the recall election from
taking place, the petitioner filed a petition for injunction
before the RTC. The trial court issued a TRO. After
conducting a summary hearing, the court dismissed the
petition and lifted the restraining order. The public
respondent on a resolution date January 5, 1996,
rescheduled the recall election to be held January 13,
1996. Hence, this petition for certiorari. The petitioner
argues the pursuant to Section 74b of the Local
Government code: “no recall shall take place within one
(1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office
or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local
election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13,
1996 recall election is now barred (SK) election was set on
the first Monday of May 1996.
Issue:
Whether or not the recall election in question is
in violation to the provisions of Section 74b of the Local
Government Code.
Held:
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part
of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, that every part of the statute must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment. Paras’
interpretation of the law is too literal that it does not
accord with the intentions of the authors of the law. The
spirit rather that the letters of a law determines its
construction. Hence, it was held that the “regular local
election” refers to an election where the office held by the
local elective official sought to be recalled.
Paras v. Comelec (Resolution)
GR 123169, 4 November 1996
Facts: Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay
of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the 1994
barangay election. A petition for his recall as Punong
Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the
barangay, which was approved by the Comelec. Petition
signing was scheduled on 14 October 1995, where at least
29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well
above the 25% requirement provided by law. The Comelec
also set the recall election on 13 November 1995, but
which was deferred to 16 December 1995 due to the
petitioner’s opposition. To prevent the holding of the
recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC Cabanatuan
City a petition for injunction (Special Proceeding Civil
Action 2254-AF), with the trial court issuing a restraining
order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court
lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and
required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they
should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that
the barangay recall election was without Comelec
approval.
In a resolution dated 5 January 1996, the Comelec, for the
third time, re-scheduled the recall election on 13 January
1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent
prayer for injunction. The petitioner contends that no
recall can take place within one year preceding a regular
local election, the Sangguniang Kabataan elections slated
on the first Monday of May 1996. He cited Associated
Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo to support the
argument, the Court in which case considered the SK
election as a regular local election.
Issue: Whether the Sangguniang Kabataan election is to be
construed as a regular local election in a recall proceeding
Held: It is a rule in statutory construction that every part
of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
Further, the spirit, rather than the letter of a law
determines its construction; hence, a statute must be read
according to its spirit and intent. The too literal
interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which the
Court cannot countenance. A too-literal reading of the law
constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the
intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not
in “the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth”. In
the present case, Paragraph (b) of Section 74 construed
together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period
when such elective local official may be subject of a recall
election. The Sangguniang Kabataan elections cannot be
considered a regular election, as this would render inutile
the recall provision of the Local Government Code. It
would be more in keeping with the intent of the recall
provision of the Code to construe regular local election as
one referring to an election where the office held by the
local elective official sought to be recalled will be
contested and be filled by the electorate.
The Supreme Court, however, has to dismiss the petition
for having become moot and academic, as the next regular
elections involving the barangay office concerned were
seven months away. Thus, the Temporary Restraining
Order issued on 12 January 1996, enjoining the recall
election, was made permanent.
China Bank v. Ortega (J)
GR L-34964, 31 January 1973
Facts: On 17 December 1968, Vicente Acaban filed a
complaint against B & B Forest Development Corporation
and Mariano Bautista for the collection of sum of money.
The trial court declared the defendants in default for
failure to answer within the reglementary period, and
rendered its decision on 20 January 1970.
To satisfy the judgment, Acaban sought the garnishment
of the bank deposit of B & B Forest Development
Corporation with the China Bank. However, Tan Kim Liong,
the bank’s cashier, disallowed the same invoking the
provisions of Republic Act 1405, which prohibit the
disclosure of any information relative to bank
deposits. On 4 March 1972, Tan Kim Lion was ordered to
inform the Court if there is a deposit by B & B Forest
Development in the China Bank, and if there is, to hold the
same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further
order from the Court. Tan Kim Liong moved to reconsider
but was turned down. In the same order he was directed
to comply with the order of the Court, otherwise his arrest
and confinement will be ordered. Resisting the 2 orders,
the China Bank and Tan Kim Liong instituted the petition.
Petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information
required by the court does not fall within any of the four
(4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2 ([1] upon written
permission of the depositor, [2] or in cases of
impeachment, [3] or upon order of a competent court in
cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, [4]
or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of the litigation), and that if the questioned
orders are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally
liable under Section 5 and the bank exposed to a possible
damage suit by B & B Forest Development Corporation.
Specifically referring to the case, the position of the
petitioners is that bank deposit of judgment debtor B and
B Forest Development Corporation cannot be subject to
garnishment to satisfy a final judgment against it in view
of the aforementioned provisions of law.
Issue: Whether or not a banking institution may validly
refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank
deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions
of Republic Act 1405.
Held: From the discussion of the conference committee
report of the two houses of Congress that the prohibition
against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit
under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being
garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed,
there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the existence
of the deposit is disclosed, the disclosure is purely
incidental to the execution process. Importantly, it was
not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits
beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a judgment. In the
present case, the lower court did not order an
examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest
Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It
merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court
whether B & B Forest Development Corporation had a
deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for
purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank
would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal
until further order.
The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the lower court
dated 4 and 27 March 1972, with costs against the
petitioners.
PEOPLE v. JABINAL
G.R.No.L-30061, 27 February 1974,
G.R. No. L-68470, 8 October 1985
FACTS:
The instant case was an appeal from the judgment of the
Municipal Court of Batangas finding the accused guilty of
the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
The validity of the conviction was based upon a retroactive
application of the Supreme Court’s ruling in People v
Mapa.
As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused
admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession
of the revolver and the ammunition described in the
complaint was without the requisite license a permit. He
however, contended that he was a SECRET AGENT
appointed by the governor, and was likewise subsequently
appended as Confidential Agent, which granted him the
authority to possess fire arm in the performance of his
official duties as peace officer. Relying on the Supreme
Court’s decision in People v Macarandang and People v
Lucero, the accused sought for his acquittal.
Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the
accused, the trial court nonetheless decided otherwise,
citing that People v Macarandang and People v Lucero
were reversed and subsequently abandoned in people v
mapa.
ISSUE:
Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme
Court rulings in Macarandana and Lucero, or should his
conviction stand in view of the completer reversal of
Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa?
RULING:
Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil
Code states that “Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part
of the legal system … .” The settled rule supported by
numerous authorities is a restatement of legal
maxim “legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet” — the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a
competent court has the force of law.
Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that “Judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system.
The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial
precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the
rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court
thereof. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be
followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The
doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once
a question of law has been examined and decided, it
should be deemed settled and closed to further argument
Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential
Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the
prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and
Lucero under which no criminal liability would attach to his
possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a
license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved.
Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which
at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.
The appellant was acquitted.
ADASA
IBBA
Victorias Milling v. Social Security Commission
GR L-16704, 17 March 1962
Facts: On 15 October 1958, the Social Security Commission
(SSC) issued its Circular 22 providing that “effective 1
November 1958, all employers in computing the
premiums due the System, will take into consideration and
include in the Employee’s remuneration all bonuses and
overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of
remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee’s
remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-
1/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of
P500 for any one month.” Upon receipt of a copy thereof,
Victorias Milling Company, Inc., wrote the SSC in effect
protesting against the circular as contradictory to a
previous Circular 7 (7 October 1957) , and further
questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority
on the part of the SSC to promulgate it without the
approval of the President and for lack of publication in the
Official Gazette. Overruling these objections, the SSC ruled
that Circular 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the
approval of the President and publication in the Official
Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative
interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general
policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed.
Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to the
Supreme Court on appeal.
Issue: Whether Circular 22 is a rule or regulation.
Held: There is a distinction between an administrative rule
or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law
whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative
body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules
and regulations, it “makes” a new law with the force and
effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or
gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-
existing law Rules and regulations when promulgated in
pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon
the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of
a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a
penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because
statutes are usually couched in general terms, after
expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and
sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the
manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the
administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In
this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are
the product of a delegated power to create new or
additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. A
rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed
for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the
statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the
courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein
or its innate wisdom On the other hand, administrative
interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it
is the courts that finally determine what the law means.

While it is true that terms or words are to be interpreted

in accordance with their well-accepted meaning in law,
nevertheless, when such term or word is specifically
defined in a particular law, such interpretation must be
adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it can not be
gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may have one
meaning for one purpose and another meaning for some
other purpose. RA 1161 specifically defined what
“compensation” should mean “For the purposes of this
Act”. RA1792 amended such definition by deleting some
exceptions authorized in the original Act. By virtue of this
express substantial change in the phraseology of the law,
whatever prior executive or judicial construction may have
been given to the phrase in question should give way to
the clear mandate of the new law.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed resolution, with

costs against appellant.