G.R. No. 71169. August 25, 1989.

JOSE D. SANGALANG and LUTGARDA D. SANGALANG, petitioners, FELIX C. GASTON and DOLORES R.
GASTON, JOSE V. BRIONES and ALICIA R. BRIONES, and BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., intervenors-
petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and AYALA CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. No. 74376. August 25, 1989.*

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROSARIO DE
JESUS TENORIO, and CECILIA GONZALVES, respondents.

G.R. No. 76394. August 25, 1989.*

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDUARDO and BUENA
ROMUALDEZ, respondents.

G.R. No. 78182. August 25, 1989.*

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DOLORES FILLEY and J.
ROMERO & ASSOCIATES, respondents.

G.R. No. 82281. August 25, 1989.*

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VIOLETA MONCAL, and MAJAL
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. No. 60727. August 25, 1989.*

NEMESIO I. YABUT, Municipal Mayor of Makati, ARTURO R. GABUNA, Secretary to the Mayor for
Administration, Makati;

_______________

* EN BANC.
720

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Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

JOSEFO S. LINGAD, Acting Municipal Engineer; NELSON ERASGA of the Municipal Engineer’s Office,
Makati; and RUPERTO ACLE; Station Commander, Southern Police District, Makati, petitioners, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS and BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondents.

Local Government; Police Power; The opening of Orbit St. to traffic by the Mayor was warranted by the
demands of the common good and is a valid exercise of police power.—As we asserted in Sangalang, the
opening of Jupiter Street was warranted by the demands of the common good, in terms of traffic
decongestion and public convenience. We also uphold the opening of Orbit Street for the same
rationale. There is no merit in BAVA’s claims that the demolition of the gates at Orbit and Jupiter Streets
amounts to deprivation of property without due process of law or expropriation without just
compensation. There is no taking of property involved here. The act of the Mayor now challenged is,
rather, in the concept of police power. In the case of Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v.
Drilon, we said: The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined
as the “state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order
to promote the general welfare.” As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or
property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been,
purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. “Its scope, ever-
expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus
assuring the greatest benefits.”

Same; Same; Police power, unlike the power of eminent domain, is exercised without provisions for just
compensation.—Unlike the power of eminent domain, police power is exercised without provisions for
just compensation: Art. 436. When any property is condemned or seized by competent authority in the
interest of health, safety or security, the owner thereof shall not be entitled to compensation, unless he
can show that such condemnation or seizure is unjustified. However, it may not be done arbitrarily or
unreasonably. But the burden of showing that it is unjustified lies on the aggrieved party.

Same; Same; Same; The fact that the opening up of Orbit St. to vehicular traffic has led to the loss of
privacy of Bel-Air residents, does

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not render the exercise of police power unjustified.—Our considered opinion is that BAVA has failed to
show that the opening up of Orbit Street was unjustified, or that the Mayor acted unreasonably. The
fact that it has led to the loss of privacy of BAVA residents is no argument against the Municipality’s
effort to ease vehicular traffic in Makati. Certainly, the duty of a local executive is to take care of the
needs of the greater number, in many cases, at the expense of the minority.

Same; Same; Same; Abatement of Nuisance; The Orbit gate may be legally abated by summary means
considering that it is a public nuisance.—Other than BAVA’s claims that the opening of Orbit Street led
to the loss of privacy of BAVA residents, there is no showing that the Mayor, in carrying out the
demolition of the Orbit gate, had acted is disregard of due process or, as the respondent court put it,
with a “show of arrogance.” As we said, the gate in question was a nuisance, which could have been
legally abated by summary means. The fact that it was accomplished summarily does not lend to it a
“show of arrogance” because, precisely, a summary method is allowed by law. In any event, there is a
showing that the Mayor notified BAVA that Orbit (and Jupiter) Streets would be opened up. The Court
finds that such a notice is compliance enough with due process.
PETITIONS to review the motions for reconsideration from the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

J. Cesar Sangco and Renato L. Dela Fuente for G.R. No. 71169.

Funk & Associates for G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394, 78182 & 82281.

Sergio L. Guadiz; Gruba, Tanlimco, Lamson & Apuhin Law Office; Tee Tomas & Associates and Castillo,
Laman, Tan & Associates for G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394, 78182 & 82281.

SARMIENTO, J.:

I.

Before the Court are: (1) two motions for reconsideration (G.R. No. 71169) of our Decision, promulgated
on December 22, 1988, the first one having been filed by Atty. J. Cezar Sangco on behalf of the spouses
Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang, and the

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second, by Atty. Raul Sison, counsel for Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA); and (2) a motion for
reconsideration and/or motion for clarification filed by Atty. Richard Funk (G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394,
78182, and 82281) of the said Decision.

The motion for reconsideration (G.R. No. 71169), filed by the Sangalangs, is anchored on two grounds:
(1) that contrary to our decision, Jupiter Street is for the exclusive use of Bel-Air Village residents; and
(b) that the Ayala Corporation did contrive to acquire membership at the Bel-Air Village Association
(BAVA) purposely to bargain for access to Jupiter Street by the general public. Subsequently, BAVA
informed the Court that it was adopting the Sangalangs’ motion for reconsideration. The motion for
reconsideration (in G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281) raises more or less the same questions
and asks furthermore that we delete the award of damages granted by the Court of Appeals.

The Court: (1) DENIES the motions filed by both the Sangalangs and BAVA with finality, no new
arguments having been presented to warrant reconsideration, and (2) DENIES Atty. Richard Funk’s own
motion for the same reason, with the further word that the grant of attorney’s fees has been deemed to
be just and proper under Article 2208, par. II, of the Civil Code.

II.

The lone issue in G.R. No. 67027 is whether or not the Mayor of Makati could have validly opened
Jupiter and Orbit Streets to vehicular traffic. The facts, as stated in the assailed decision of the
respondent court, in CA-G.R. No. 11803-SP, entitled, “Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Petitioner, vs.
Hon. Celso L. Magsino, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XX, Pasig, Metro
Manila; Mayor Nemesio Yabut, Municipal Mayor of Makati, Metro Manila, Arturo R. Gabuna, Secretary
to the Mayor for Administration, Makati, Josefo S. Lingad, Acting Municipal Engineer, Nelson Erasga, of
the Municipal Engineer’s Office, Makati; and Ruperto Acle, Station Commander, Southern Police District,
Makati, Respondents,” are as follows:

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Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

In its chronological sequence, the petition avers as follows: On October 24, 1979, petitioner instituted a
petition for prohibition and damages with preliminary injunction with the respondent Court docketed as
Civil Case No. 34948. On October 25, 1979, the respondent court issued an order directing respondents
to answer and denying the issuance of a temporary restraining order. Petitioner filed an urgent motion
for reconsideration of the denial of its prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, adding
as new ground the continuation of the commission of acts of dispossession by the respondents. The said
urgent motion was denied.

On November 6, 1979, the parties were directed to submit their affidavits and counter-affidavits as well
as memoranda as basis for resolving the application for preliminary injunction. In due time, the parties
complied. On December 11, 1979, respondents filed their answer to the petition.

On March 4, 1980, the respondent Court denied the application for preliminary injunction. On
November 14, 1980, an order was issued denying the motion for reconsideration.

It is alleged by petitioner that by its orders of March 4, 1980 and November 14, 1980, the respondent
Court has unlawfully deprived the petitioner of its right to due process to which it it entitled under the
Constitution, and that respondents’ acts are tantamount to grave abuse of discretion and in excess of
jurisdiction.

In their comment, respondents allege that prior to January, 1977, upon the instructions of respondent
Mayor Nemesio T. Yabut of Makati, Metro Manila, studies were made by the other respondents on the
feasibility of opening streets in Bel-Air Village calculated to alleviate traffic congestions along the public
streets adjacent to Bel-Air Village. The studies revealed that the subdivision plan of Bel-Air Village was
approved by the Court of First Instance of Rizal on condition, among others, that its major thoroughfares
connecting to public streets and highways shall be opened to public traffic. Accordingly, it was deemed
necessary by the Municipality of Makati in the interest of the general public to open to traffic Amapola,
Mercedes, Zodiac, Jupiter, Neptune, Orbit and Paseo de Roxas streets. On January 28, 1977, a meeting
was held between representatives of the Municipality of Makati and petitioner.

At this meeting, respondents claim that the representatives of petitioner, particularly Rufino R. Santos,
president of petitioner, had agreed to the opening of Bel-Air Village streets. Regarding Jupiter Street, the
Municipality opened it because public welfare demanded its opening which allegation the petitioner
never questioned. With respect to Orbit Street, whose opening was temporarily suspended

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until the flood control project from Buendia Extension up to the mouth of the Pasig River, was about to
be completed, it was opened only after another meeting attended by Rufino R. Santos who agreed to
the opening of the street from J.P. Rizal Avenue up to Imelda Avenue and later up to Jupiter Street,
subject to certain conditions.

To bolster their side, respondents cite: specifically, Section 44 of the Land Registration Act No. 496, as
amended, the deeds of donation of Jupiter and Orbit streets executed by and between the Ayala
Corporation and the petitioner, Presidential Decrees No. 957, Secs. 22 and 29 thereof, and No. 1216,
Sec. 2 thereof, and Municipal Ordinance No. 17 of the Municipal Government of Makati, Metro Manila,
as amended by Resolution No. 139, dated November 21, 1948, and contend that the opening of the two
(2) streets was demanded by public necessity and in the exercise of its police powers, and, ultimately on
the argument that petitioner has not shown a clear legal right to the writ of preliminary injunction.

With leave of court, petitioner filed a reply to the respondents’ comment. They assert that the streets
mentioned in the comment, other than Jupiter and Orbit streets, have always been kept open
voluntarily by the Association, that Rufino R. Santos, president of petitioner, has never agreed on the
opening of Jupiter and Orbit streets, and that the Torrens titles covering these streets do not contain
similar conditions as those titles for the other street lots.
Petitioner relies on its ownership of the streets of which it should not (be) deprived without due process
of law, and without just compensation, Article 539 of the Civil Code, an existing Ordinance of the Metro
Manila Commission No. 2, Sec. 14 thereof, and the concurrence of all the requisites for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction.1

The Court of Appeals found that the certificates of title (Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. S-76020, S-
76021, S-76022, S-76024, and S-76055, for Jupiter Street, and 206824, for Orbit Street) do not contain
the restrictions imposed by Section 44 of Act No. 496, now, Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
for which reason, and so the Appellate Court held, the Mayor of Makati did not have the legal right to
open them up to traffic.

In Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court,2 we held that

_______________

1 Rollo, 44-46.

2 G.R. Nos. 71169, 76394, 74376, and 82281, December 22, 1988.

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Ayala Corporation, the former owner of the Bel-Air subdivision, can not be held responsible for the
opening of Jupiter Street, among other things, because it was the Mayor of Makati who ordered such an
opening.3 The issue herein, as we indicated, is whether or not the Mayor could legally have done it.
With respect, specifically, to Jupiter Street, Sangalang avers:

Among other things, there is a recognition under both Ordinances Nos. 81 and 81-01 that Jupiter Street
lies as the boundary between Bel-Air Village and Ayala Corporation’s commercial section. And since
1957, it had been considered as a boundary—not as a part of either the residential or commercial zones
of Ayala Corporation’s real estate development projects. Thus, the Bel-Air Village Association’s articles
of incorporation state that Bel-Air Village is “bounded on the NE., from Amapola St., to de los Santos
Ave., by Estrella St., on the SE., from Estrella St., to Pedestrian Lane, by E. De los Santos Ave., on the
SW., from Pedestrian Lane to Reposo St., by Jupiter Street...” Hence, it cannot be said to have been “for
the exclusive benefit” of Bel-Air Village residents.4

Sangalang also had occasion to invoke Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust Co.5
We reiterate Ortigas herein:

xxx xxx xxx

2. With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations assumed
by the defendant-appellee—referring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in
the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appellee—it should be stressed, that
while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to
be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., “the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.”
Invariably described as “the most essential,

_______________

3 Apart from the fact that it did not commit itself to close it up. See supra.

4 Supra, 27-28.
5 No. L-24670, December 14, 1979, 94 SCRA 533.

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Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

insistent, and illimitable of powers” and “in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of
government,” the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is
capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation
of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. As this Court held through Justice Jose P. Bengzon in
Philippine Long Distance Company vs. City of Davao, et. al., police power “is elastic and must be
responsive to various social conditions; it is not confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents
resting on past condition; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life.” We were even
more emphatic in Vda. de Genuino vs. The Court of Agrarian Relations, et al., when We declared: “We
do not see why public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not be made to
prevail through the state’s exercise of its police power.”

Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of Highway 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue (EDSA,
for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously
passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or
promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Judicial
notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially where Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are
located. The lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and commercial complexes have
flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and
municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity,
noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route.
Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations, the
municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal Council, was reasonably, if not perfectly, justified
under the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution.6
The Bel-Air Village Association can not therefore rightfully complain that His Honor, the Mayor of
Makati, in opening up Jupiter Street, had acted arbitrarily.

In connection with Orbit Street, the Court reaches the same conclusion. We repudiate, therefore, that
part of the assailed

_______________

6 Supra, 545-547.

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decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it held that the condition imposed by Section 44, of Act No.
496, now Section 50, of Presidential Decree No. 1529,7 that “no portion of any street

_______________

7 Section 44, Act No. 496, provides in full: “Sec. 44. A registered owner of several distinct parcels of land
embraced in a single certificate of title desiring to have in lieu thereof several new certificates each
containing one or more parcels, may file a petition for that purpose with the register of deeds, and this
officer, upon the surrender of the owner’s duplicate, shall cancel it and its original and issue in lieu
thereof the desired new certificates. So a registered owner of several distinct parcels of land in separate
certificates desiring to have in lieu thereof a single certificate for the whole land or several certificates
for the different portions thereof, may file a petition with register of deeds, and this officer, upon the
surrender of the owner’s duplicates, shall cancel them and their originals and issue in lieu thereof new
ones as requested.

Any owner subdividing a tract of registered land into lots shall file with the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office a subdivision plan of such land on which all boundaries, streets and passageways, if
any, shall be distinctly and accurately delineated. If no streets or passageways are indicated or no
alteration of the perimeter of the land is made, and it appears that the land as subdivided does not need
of them and that the plan has been approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or the
Director of Lands as provided in Section fifty-eight of this Act, the Register of Deeds may issue new
certificates of title for any lot in accordance with said subdivision plan. If there are streets and/or
passageways, no new certificates shall be issued until said plan has been approved by the Court of First
Instance of the province or city in which the land is situated. A petition for that purpose shall be filed by
the registered owner, and the court after notice and hearing, and after considering the report of the
Chief of the General Land Registration Office, may grant the petition, subject to the condition, which
shall be noted on the proper certificate, that no portion of any street or passageway so delineated on
the plan shall be closed or otherwise disposed of by the registered owner without approval of the court
first had, or may render such judgment as justice and equity may require.

A registered owner desiring to consolidate several lots into one or more, requiring new technical
descriptions, shall file with the Chief of the General Land Registration Office a plan on which shall be
shown the lots to be affected, as they are before, and as they will appear after

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Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

or passageway . . . shall be closed or otherwise disposed of by the registered owner without approval of
the court of first

________________

the consolidation. Upon the surrender of the owner’s duplicate certificate or certificates and the receipt
of proper authority from the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the register of deeds
concerned shall cancel the old certificates and issue a new one for the consolidated lot or lots.”

Under Section 50, Presidential Decree No. 1529, it is stated: “Sec. 50. Subdivision and consolidation
plans.—Any owner subdividing a tract of registered land into lots which do not constitute a subdivision
project as defined and provided for under P.D. 957, shall file with the Commissioner of Land Registration
or with the Bureau of Lands a subdivision plan of such land on which all boundaries, streets,
passageways and waterways, if any, shall be distinctly and accurately delineated.

If a subdivision plan, be it simple or complex, duly approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration
or the Bureau of Lands together with the approved technical descriptions and the corresponding
owner’s duplicate certificate of title is presented for registration, the Register of Deeds shall without
requiring further court approval of said plan, register the same in accordance with the provisions of the
Land Registration Act, as amended: Provided, however, that the Register of Deeds shall annotate on the
new certificate of title covering the street, passageway or open space, a memorandum to the effect that
except by way of donation in favor of the national government, province, city or municipality, no portion
of any street, passageway, waterway or open space so delineated on the plan shall be closed or
otherwise disposed of by the registered owner without the approval of the Court of First Instance of the
province or city in which the land is situated.

A registered owner desiring to consolidate several lots into one or more, requiring new technical
descriptions; shall file with the Land Registration Commission, a consolidated plan on which shall be
shown the lots to be affected, as they were before, and as they will appear after the consolidation. Upon
the surrender of the owner’s duplicate certificates and the receipt of consolidation plan duly approved
by the Commissioner, the Register of Deeds concerned shall cancel the corresponding certificates of title
and issue a new one for the consolidated lots.
The Commission may not order or cause any change, modification, or amendment in the contents of any
certificate of title, or of any

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instance (being first) had . . .”8 does not apply for lack of an annotation of such a condition on the
certificate of title (Transfer Certificate of Title No. 206824). To begin with, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 206824 does contain the annotation in question:

. . . subject to such of the encumbrances mentioned in Section 39 of said Act as may be subsisting, and
the condition that the above lots are subject to the conditions imposed by Republic Act 440.9

Furthermore, the very Deed of Donation executed by the Ayala Corporation10 covering Jupiter and
Orbit Streets, amongst others, and so we found in Sangalang, effectively required both passageways
open to the general public. We quote:

The alleged undertaking, finally, by Ayala in the deed of donation (over Jupiter Street) to leave Jupiter
Street for the private use of Bel-

________________
decree or plan, including the technical description therein, covering any real property registered under
the Torrens system, nor order the cancellation of the said certificate of title and the issuance of a new
one which would result in the enlargement of the area covered by the certificate of title.”

8 Act No. 496, sec. 44, supra.

9 Rollo, G.R. 60627, 153, Nota bene: Republic Act No. 440, referred to therein, is an amendment to
Section 44, Act No. 496. Prior to the amendment, Section 44 provided as follows: “Sec. 44. A registered
owner holding one duplicate certificate for several distinct parcels of land may surrender it, with the
approval of the court, and take out several certificates for portions thereof. So a registered owner
holding separate certificates for several distinct parcels may surrender them, and, with like approval,
take out a single duplicate certificate for the whole land, or several certificates for the different portions
thereof. Any owner subdividing a tract of registered land into lots shall file with the clerk a plan of such
land, when applying for a new certificate or certificates, and the court before issuing the same, shall
cause the plan to be verified and require that all boundaries, streets, and passageways shall be distinctly
and accurately delineated thereon.”

10 The Ayala Corporation was the original owner of the property subsequently subdivided as Bel-Air
Village. See Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra.

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Air residents is belied by the very provisions of the deed. We quote:

xxx xxx xxx

“IV. That the offer made by the DONOR had been accepted by the DONEE subject to the condition that
the property will be used as a street for the use of the members of the DONEE, their families, personnel,
guests, domestic help and, under certain reasonable conditions and restrictions, by the general public,
and in the event that said lots or parts thereof cease to be used as such, ownership thereof shall
automatically revert to the DONOR. The DONEE shall always have Reposo Street, Makati Avenue, and
Paseo de Roxas open for the use of the general public. It is also understood that the DONOR SHALL
continue the maintenance of the street at its expense for a period of three years from date hereof.
(Deed of Donation, p. 6, Exh. 7)

xxx xxx xxx

The donation on the contrary, gave the general public equal right to it.11

As regards Orbit Street, it was stipulated:

1.That the property donated shall be used and maintained as “private roads or streets for the use of the
members of the Donee, their families, personnel, domestic helps and under certain reasonable
conditions and restrictions, by the general public;

2.In the event that the properties covered by this donation are no longer used as such, the same shall
automatically revert to the Donor; and

3.That the Donee shall always have Reposo Street open for the use of the general public and shall
transfer its present gate barrier located in the intersection of Orbit and Jupiter to the southern boundary
of street Lot 8 of the Plan (LRC) Psd-77820.”12

As we asserted in Sangalang, the opening of Jupiter Street was warranted by the demands of the
common good, in terms of traffic decongestion and public convenience.13 We also uphold the opening
of Orbit Street for the same rationale.

_______________
11 Supra, 37.

12 Sangalang, supra, 41-42.

13 Rollo, id., 267.

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There is no merit in BAVA’s claims that the demolition of the gates at Orbit and Jupiter Streets amounts
to deprivation of property without due process of law or expropriation without just compensation.14
There is no taking of property involved here. The act of the Mayor now challenged is, rather, in the
concept of police power. In the case of Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon,15 we
said:

The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the “state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare.” As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2)
in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely,
veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.

“Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it
could be done provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.”
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter.
Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and
sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital
functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as
the plenary power of the State “to govern its citizens.”

“The police power of the State . . . is a power coextensive with self-protection, and it is not inaptly
termed the ‘law of overwhelming necessity.’ It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the
State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.”

It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is “rooted in the
conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to
obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace,
safety, good order, and welfare.” Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself

_______________

14 Rollo, id., 260.

15 G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988.

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Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties “Even liberty itself, the
greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act accordingly to one’s will.” It is subject to the far
more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.16

Unlike the power of eminent domain, police power is exercised without provision for just compensation:

Art. 436. When any property is condemned or seized by competent authority in the interest of health,
safety or security, the owner thereof shall not be entitled to compensation, unless he can show that
such condemnation or seizure is unjustified.17

However, it may not be done arbitrarily or unreasonably.18 But the burden of showing that it is
unjustified lies on the aggrieved party.19

Our considered opinion is that BAVA has failed to show that the opening up of Orbit Street was
unjustified, or that the Mayor acted unreasonably. The fact that it has led to the loss of privacy of BAVA
residents is no argument against the Municipality’s effort to ease vehicular traffic in Makati. Certainly,
the duty of a local executive is to take care of the needs of the greater number, in many cases, at the
expense of the minority.

The next question is whether or not the Mayor, by himself, is vested with the power to order the
demolition so questioned, without the backing of a proper ordinance. On this score, the Mayor
submitted in evidence Municipal Ordinance No. 17, as amended by Resolution No. 139, dated November
21, 1948,20 requiring a Mayor’s permit to erect construction anywhere in Makati. The respondent court
rejected, however, the Mayor’s reliance on the Ordinance. We quote:

_______________

16 Supra, 3-5.
17 CIVIL CODE, art. 436.

18 PASEI v. Drilon, supra, 5.

19 CIVIL CODE, art. 436, supra.

20 It does not appear that Orbit Street is covered by Ordinance No. 81-01, reclassifying various areas in
Makati for zonal purposes. See Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra.

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Respondents also invoke Municipal Ordinance No. 17, as amended by Resolution No. 139, dated
November 21, 1948, requiring a Mayor’s permit before any construction of any kind shall be built,
erected or constructed in any place in the Municipality, and empowering the corresponding authorities
especially the Mayor to remove and demolish any such illegal construction. For a long time the gates
and fences removed by agents of respondents have been in the sites where they were removed. We fail
to comprehend why the respondents did not invoke the Ordinance much earlier. They cannot pretend
ignorance of a condition or situation which was never concealed from respondents and their agents. At
any rate, the Torrens titles of these street lots which bore no restrictions whatsoever was authority for
its owner to close them.21

Quite to the contrary, the Court is convinced that Ordinance No. 17 is a valid justification for the
questioned act of the Mayor. The fact that some time had elapsed before the Mayor acted, can not
render the ordinance uneforceable or void. At any rate, the gate, the destruction of which opened Orbit
Street, has the character of a public nuisance,22 in the sense that it “hinders or impairs the use of
property,”23 which the Civil Code disposes of as follows:

Art. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:

(1)A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance; or

(2)A civil action; or

(3)Abatement, without judicial proceedings.24

In The Homeowners Associations of El Deposito, Barrio Corazon de Jesus, San Juan, Rizal v. Lood,25 we
held:

At any rate, the decisive point is that independently of the said ordinance, petitioners’ constructions
which have been duly found to be

_______________

21 Rollo, id., 50.

22 CIVIL CODE, supra, art. 694, par. (5); Art. 695.

23 Supra, art. 694, par. (5).

24 Supra, art. 699.

25 No. L-31864, September 29, 1972, 47 SCRA 174.

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

public nuisances per se (without provision for accumulation or disposal of waste matters and
constructed without building permits contiguously to and therefore liable to pollute one of the main
water pipelines which supplies potable water to the Greater Manila area) may be abated without
judicial proceedings under our Civil Code.26

In addition, under Article 701 of the Code, summary abatement may be carried out by the Mayor
himself.

Although estoppel is a valid defense against abatement of nuisance,27 judicially or summarily, the
Mayor is not being condemned for estoppel here, but, rather, for inaction. Under, however, the Civil
Code:

Art. 698. Lapse of time cannot legalize any nuisance, whether public or private.28

Other than BAVA’s claims that the opening of Orbit Street led to the loss of privacy of BAVA residents,
there is no showing that the Mayor, in carrying out the demolition of the Orbit gate, had acted in
disregard of due process or, as the respondent court would put it, with a “show of arrogance”.29 As we
said, the gate in question was a nuisance, which could have been legally abated by summary means. The
fact that it was accomplished summarily does not lend to it a “show of arrogance” because, precisely, a
summary method is allowed by law. In any event, there is a showing that the Mayor notified BAVA that
Orbit (and Jupiter) Streets would be opened up.30 The Court finds that such a notice is compliance
enough with due process.31

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26 Supra, 182; see also CIVIL CODE, supra, art. 701.

27 See II PARAS, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 556 (1975 ed.).

28 Rollo, id.

29 Id., 29-30.

30 Id.

31 It is to be stated that, with respect to Jupiter Street, in spite of the fact that we held it to be open for
use by the general public, we would have disposed of it in the same way we now dispose of Orbit Street,
i.e., that the Mayor can legitimately open it up to the public on the ground that the gate closing it
constitutes a nuisance. The gate closing Jupiter Street would also have been a nuisance.

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Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

What has been left unsaid is that the nation today is witnessing profound changes occurring in its midst.
A decade ago, we were a people of forty or so million. Today, the number is knocking on sixty million.
We are reaping the cost that population explosion carries with it. Housing the homeless has been one of
the first casualties. And so has been the transport system. Giving the homeless homes and bringing
them there safely is a formidable burden and the task of the hour. Parochial concerns can not be an
impediment to the greater needs of the greatest number.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 60727 is GRANTED; the motions for reconsiderations in G.R. Nos.
71169, 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281 are DENIED with FINALITY.

IT IS SO ORDERED. Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 176 SCRA 719, G.R. No. 71169, G.R. No.
74376, G.R. No. 76394, G.R. No. 78182, G.R. No. 82281, G.R. No. 60727 August 25, 1989