Rubi, et al., vs.

The Provincial Board of Mindoro

G.R. No. L-14078, March 7, 1919

FACTS

On February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 directing all the
Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the
districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not
later than December 31, 1917.

Refusal to comply with the order will be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section
2759 of the revised Administrative Code. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is an unlawful delegation of legislative
power by the Philippine Legislature

RULING

No, the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial
board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law. This is necessary since the
provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are better qualified to
judge “when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order”. As officials charged with the
administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, they are better fitted to select sites which have
the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state.
 Calalang vs. Williams et al.,

G.R. No. 47800, December 2, 1940

FACTS

Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila filed a petition for a writ
of prohibition against the respondents – Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Fragante, as
Director of Public Works; Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Rodriguez, as Mayor of
the City of Manila; and Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.

In pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 authorizes the Director of Public Works to
prohibit animal-drawn vehicles from passing along certain roads. As a consequence of such enforcement, all
animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in such places to the detriment not only of
their owners but of the riding public as well.

Calalang contended that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the respondents are authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of traffic on national roads and streets is
unconstitutional percept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security
of all the people.

ISSUE/S

Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people

RULING

No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational
and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of
all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in
the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on
the time-honored principles of salus populi est suprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and
diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the
state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the
greatest number.
 Philippine Ports Authority vs. Remedios Rosales-Bondoc, et al.

G.R. No. 173392, August 24, 2007

FACTS

The Petitioners filed a complaint for expropriation of 185 lots before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas
City against 231 defendants. Petitioners alleged that there is a necessity for expropriation of the lots for the
development of Phase II of the Batangas Port Zone. Petitioners further alleged that the recommended market
value of the lots be fixed at PHP 336.83 per square meter.

On August 15, 2000, an order from the trial court was issued fixing the market value or just compensation
at PHP 5,500 per square meter of the respondents’ lots. The trial court directs the Petitioners to pay the
respondents the just compensation.

The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals from the Order dated August 15, 2000.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not the Court erred in dismissing petitioner’s appeal from the trial court’s Order dated August
15, 2000

RULING

No, the Trial Court has the authority to determine the fair market value based on the evidence presented.
Petitioners did not ask the trial court that it be given the opportunity to present its evidence. Neither did
petitioners present any rebuttal evidence to the evidence presented by the respondents. Petitioners did not even
attach any document on why the fair market value should be lower and the they failed to present evidence that
the lands involved are agricultural in nature or are not being used for commercial or industrial purposes.
 National Transmission Corporation vs.
Oroville Development Corporation

G.R. No. 223366, August 1, 2017

FACTS

Two parcels of land originally owned by Alfredo Reyes and Grace Calingasan were erected with the
Tagoloan-Pulangi 138 kV transmission line by the National Transmission Corporation (TransCo) in 1983. Both
parcels were eventually sold to Oroville Development Corporation (Oroville). In 2006, negotiations broke down
between TransCo and Oroville over TransCo’s offer to buy the properties for another transmission line project.
Oroville sought to private reroute the proposed powerline and claimed they weren’t compensated for the existing
one. TransCo refused and proceeded with their plans. Consequently, Oroville filed for an injunction and damages
to halt the construction.

The RTC ruled in favor of Oroville, setting just compensation based on the fair market value at the time of
the complaint filing in 2007. TransCo appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision with
modifications, compelling TransCo to pay the balance of the just compensation.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not the just compensation for expropriated property be based on the value at the time of
taking or the time of filing the expropriation complaint

RULING

The Supreme Court granted TransCo’s petition, reversed and set aside the Court of Appeals decision, and
established the just compensation at P78.65 per square meter based on the 1983 value when the property was
first taken. The computation of just compensation in expropriation proceedings must be based on the fair market
value at the time of the property’s taking. Due process requires that expropriation proceedings be filed before
property is taken for public use.
 Agata Mining Ventures Inc. vs Heirs of Alaan

G.R No. 229413, 15 June 2020

FACTS

Petitioner entered into an Operating Agreement with Minimax Mineral Exploration Corporation to explore
and operate the mining area, which includes the subject property. Petitioner alleged that the subject property is
the most conducive location for the establishment of a sedimentation pond or settling pond needed for the mining
operation. Petitioner filed a complaint for expropriation against the respondents.

The Regional Trial Court granted a writ of possession in favor of petitioner. The Court of Appeals nullified
the writ, ruling that petitioner does not have the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not petitioner may file a complaint to expropriate the subject property

RULING

Yes, the Court recognized their authority to exercise eminent domain for the entry, acquisition, and use of
private lands for mining operations. They also noted that the transferee of a permittee enjoys the same privileges
as the permittee, and there is no need for a separate grant of authority to exercise the power of eminent domain.
However, the Court clarified that its ruling only pertains to the authority to file a complaint for expropriation and
does not determined the validity of the Operating Agreement between petitioner and Minimax.

The Court ordered the trial court to proceed with the resolution of the complaint for expropriation, with
particular attention to the determination of the approval of the Operating Agreement by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Secretary.
 Heirs of Dimao v NGCP

G.R. No. 254020, March 1, 2023

FACTS

In 1978, the National Power Corporation (NPC) constructed the Baloi-Agus 2 138kV Transmission Line
(BATL).

In 2009, NGCP assumed the management, operation, and maintenance of TRANSCO's nationwide
transmission business. To perform its mandate, NGCP needed to clear and cut tall vegetation and other hazardous
improvements underneath and within the transmission line right-of-way corridors of the lots.

In 2014, NGCP instituted expropriation proceedings, involving 11,640sq.m lot located in Barangay
Basagad, Baloi, Lanao del Norte, registered in the name of late Raisa Dimao and prayed among other things, for
the issuance of a writ of possession in its favor, authorizing it to enter and take possession of the subject property
for the maintenance of the BATL. NGCP deposit with Land Bank the amount of ₱1,756,400.00, representing 100%
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Zonal Value of the subject property. In 2014, The RTC issued a writ of
possession and was placed NGCP of the Dimao’s land.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not Heirs of Dimao are entitled to just compensation

RULING

No, Heirs of Raisa Dimao are not entitled for just compensation. Heirs of Dimao are not entitled to just
compensation. Heirs of Dimao failed to present an iota of proof of their ownership or even their possession prior
to 1978. At any rate, even assuming that they have been in possession of the subject property since 1955, no law,
rule or jurisprudence authorizes an award of just compensation to a mere possessor of the land.

Supreme Court emphasized that just compensation is measured against the loss sustained by the owner
of the expropriated property. When petitioners acquired ownership of the subject property in October 2012, the
BATL had already been existing for 34 years. Technically, petitioners were never injuriously deprived of their
property by the construction of the BATL. On the contrary, when they obtained title to the subject property, they
were wellaware of the existence and permanence of the BATL and the consequent inconvenience it may cause.
 Antero Sision Jr. vs. Ruben Ancheta et al.,

G.R. L-594321, July 25, 1984

FACTS

The case involves a challenge to the validity of Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 135, which amends the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1977. The law provides that there would be a higher tax imposition against
income derived from professional income in contrary to regular income earners. The petitioner, as a professional
businessman, contends that with that said law, he would be unduly discriminated against by the imposition of
higher rates of tax upon his income arising from the exercise of his profession vis-a-vis those which are imposed
upon fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not the Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 135, amending the National Internal Revenue Code
of 1977, violates the constitutional principles of equal protection and uniformity in taxation.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled against Sison. The power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availed of to
assure the performance of vital state functions. It is the source of the bulk of public funds. Taxes, being the
lifeblood of the government, their prompt and certain availability is of the essence. According to the Constitution:
“The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable.” However, the rule of uniformity does not call for perfect
uniformity or perfect equality, because this is hardly attainable. Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all
taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the
authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation.
 Nursery Care Corporation et al., vs Anthony Acevedo

G.R. No. 180651, July 30, 2014

FACTS

The City of Manila assessed and collected taxes from the individual petitioners pursuant to Sec. 15 (Tax on
Wholesalers, Distributors, or Dealers) and Sec. 17 (Tax on Retailers) of the Revenue Code of Manila. At the same
time, the City of Manila imposed additional taxes upon the petitioners pursuant to Sec. 21 of the Revenue Code of
Manila as a condition for the renewal of their respective business licenses for the year 1999.

The petitioners point out that although Section 21 of the Revenue Code of Manila was not itself
unconstitutional or invalid, its enforcement against the petitioners constituted double taxation because the local
business taxes under Section 15 and Section 17 of the Revenue Code of Manila were already being paid by them.

The respondents counter, however, that double taxation did not occur from the imposition and collection
of the tax pursuant to Section 21 of the Revenue Code of Manila.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not the collection of taxes under Section 21 of Ordinance No. 7794, as amended, constitutes
double taxation.

RULING

Yes. Collection of taxes pursuant to Section 21 of the Revenue Code of Manila constituted double
taxation. In resolving the issue of double taxation involving Section 21 of the Revenue Code of Manila, the Court is
mindful of the ruling in City of Manila v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., which has been reiterated in Swedish
Match Philippines, Inc. v. The Treasurer of the City of Manila.

Double taxation means taxing the same property twice when it should be taxed only once; that is, "taxing
the same person twice by the same jurisdiction for the same thing." Otherwise described as "direct duplicate
taxation," the two taxes must be imposed on the same subject matter, for the same purpose, by the same taxing
authority, within the same jurisdiction, during the same taxing period; and the taxes must be of the same kind or
character.
 CIR vs Central Luzon Drug Corporation

G.R. No. 159647, 15 April 2005

FACTS

Respondents operated six drugstores under the business name Mercury Drug. From January to December
1996 respondent granted 20% sales discount to qualified senior citizens on their purchases of medicines pursuant
to RA 7432 for a total of 904,769.

On April 15, 1997, respondent filed its annual Income Tax Return for taxable year 1996 declaring therein
net losses. On Jan. 16, 1998 respondent filed with petitioner a claim for tax refund/credit of 904,769.00 allegedly
arising from the 20% sales discount. Unable to ₱obtain affirmative response from petitioner, respondent elevated
its claim to the Court of Tax Appeals. The court dismissed the same but upon reconsideration, the latter reversed
its earlier ruling and ordered petitioner to issue a Tax Credit Certificate in favor of respondent citing CA GR SP No.
60057 (May 31, 2001, Central Luzon Drug Corp. vs. CIR) citing that Sec. 229 of RA 7432 deals exclusively with
illegally collected or erroneously paid taxes but that there are other situations which may warrant a tax
credit/refund.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Court of Tax Appeal's decision reasoning that RA 7432 required neither a
tax liability nor a payment of taxes by private establishments prior to the availment of a tax credit. Moreover, such
credit is not tantamount to an unintended benefit from the law, but rather a just compensation for the taking of
private property for public use.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not the 20% sales discount granted by respondent to qualified senior citizens is a tax credit or
a deduction from gross sales

RULING

The 20% sales discount should be treated as a tax credit, not a tax deduction. A tax credit is used after the
tax has been computed, while a tax deduction is used before the tax is computed. The availability of the tax credit
is voluntary, not mandatory. The tax credit benefit serves as just compensation for private property taken by the
State for public use.

The definition given by the CIR, which treats the tax credit as a deduction, is erroneous. The law cannot be
amended by a mere regulation. The administrative agencies issuing these regulations may not enlarge, alter or
restrict the provisions of the law they administer. The tax credit benefit should not be limited to a sales discount.
 Philippine Coconut Producers Federation (COCOFED) et. Al v. Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG)

G.R. No. 75713, October 2, 1989

FACTS
The PCGG issued sequestration and other orders against the COCOFED and other entities involved in the
coconut industry. The PCGG alleged that these entities were used as conduits to misappropriate public funds
through the coconut levy funds. The petitioners argue that the PCGG has no jurisdiction over their properties and
that the coconut levy funds are privately owned by the coconut farmers. The PCGG asserts that the sequestration
orders re necessary to preserve the assets believed to be ill-gotten wealth pending the determination of their true
ownership.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not the PCGG has the authority to issue sequestration and freeze orders to preserve assets
believed to be ill-gotten wealth

RULING

Yes. PCGG has the authority to issue sequestration and freeze orders to preserve assets believed to be ill-
gotten wealth. According to Supreme Court, indeed, the Solicitor General suggests quite strongly that the laws
operating or purporting to convert the coconut levy funds into private funds, are a transgression of the basic
limitations for the licit exercise of the state's taxing and police powers, and that certain provisions of said laws are
merely clever strategies to keep away government audit in order to facilitate misappropriation of the funds in
question. The utilization and proper management of the coconut levy funds, raised as they were by the State's
police and taxing powers, are certainly the concern of the Government. It cannot be denied that it was the welfare
of the entire nation that provided the prime moving factor for the imposition of the levy. It cannot be denied that
the coconut industry is one of the major industries supporting the national economy. It is, therefore, the State's
concern to make it a strong and secure source not only of the livelihood of a significant segment of the population
but also of export earnings the sustained growth of which is one of the imperatives of economic stability.
 ACT Teachers vs Duterte

G.R. No. 236118, January 24, 2023

FACTS

The controversy arose when the ACT Teachers Representative challenged the constitutionality of the Tax
Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion Act (TRAIN ACT). They challenged that the particular act was
unconstitutionally passed by the house of representative due to lack of quorum. The petitioners also argued that
the same excise taxes were discriminatory against the poor and violated the Filipino people’s right to due process
and equal protection of laws.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not the TRAIN Act is unconstitutional due to lack of quorum from the House of
Representatives.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of R.A. No. 10963 or the Tax Reform for Acceleration
and Inclusion Act (TRAIN act), emphasizing the importance of an actual case or exercising the Judicial Power,
dismissing the lack of quorum of House of Representatives. The court’s role in allocating constitutional boundaries
essential, and it exercises judicial power by settling actual controversies involving legally demandable and
enforceable rights.
 Zabal vs. Duterte

G.R. No. 238467, February 12 2019

FACTS

President Rodrigo R. Duterte, declared a need for its temporary closure of Boracay Island to undergo
rehabilitation. The closure was announced to be a maximum of six months, commencing on April 26, 2018.

Petitioners challenged the legality of the island’s closure on April 25, 2018. They sought immediate
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Preliminary Injunction. They argued that the decline in tourist
engagements severely affected their livelihoods and feared complete economic loss due to the upcoming closure.
On April 26, 2018, President Duterte officially promulgated Proclamation No. 475, formally declaring Boracay in a
state of calamity, and ordered a six-month closure, substantiating the earlier verbal declarations.

Petitioners emphasized that the Proclamation represented an invalid exercise of legislative powers and
infringed upon their constitutional rights to travel and due process, affecting their livelihood.

Respondents, on their part, contended that the President is immune from suit. They argued that the
petition is inappropriate since the acts complained of (closure and rehabilitation) have already started, and that
mandamus does not lie as they were performing a duty to protect the environment, not neglecting it.

ISSUE/S

1) Whether the Proclamation No. 475 infringes on constitutional rights to travel and due process.

2) Whether the imposition of the closure of Boracay Island constituted an impermissible exercise of police
power.

RULING

1)

The Proclamation No. 475 does not limit the right to travel in its essential sense because it only prohibits
entry of tourists and non-residents to Boracay temporarily to facilitate its rehabilitation, and does not restrict
petitioners’ movement elsewhere.

2)

The closure represents a valid police power measure. The state of calamity in Boracay and the need for
rehabilitation and restoration measures justified the President’s issuance of the Proclamation under the police
power of the State.
 MMDA vs Bel Air

G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000

FACTS

On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the former to open its
private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was
apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. Respondent
instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction
enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. It was denied by the
trial court.

On appeal, the appellate court ruled that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune
Street, and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of
Makati by ordinance. MMDA said it has the authority to open Neptune St. because it is an agent of the
Government endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. From the premise of
police powers, it follow then that it need not for an ordinance to be enacted first.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its
regulatory and police powers

RULING

No, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the LGUs, acting
through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. The Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence,
its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.

The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration.
 Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs Drilon

G.R. No. L-81958, June 30, 1988

FACTS

Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1
(1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and
Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not
apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of
the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13
of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights
and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the
validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the
respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the
Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the
Filipino workers.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not the challenged Department Order No. 1 violates the right to travel

RULING

Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the
right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to the requirements
of “public safety” as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of
police power. Police power has been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that
Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with
rule making powers.
 Republic of the Philippines vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 147245, March 31 2005

FACTS
Manuel Diaz owned approximately 172 hectares of tenanted agricultural land and located in La Fuente,
Sta. Rosa Nueva Ecija. After manuel Diaz death, his son Francisco diaz (respondent) was appointed administrator of
the property. In 1972, the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) bulldozed about 10 hectares of the property to
build two irrigations canals. In 1980 NIA belatedly offered to buy the portion of the property. NIA and respondents
signed deeds of sale (1980 deeds of sale). But the 1980 deed of sale were never implemented. On august 1923,
respondent as administrator of the property filed for damages and just compensation against NIA. NIA countered
that the respondents right to bring had prescribed in accordance with republic act 3601. NAI also argues the
respondents’ failure to pursue the implementation of the 1980 deeds of sale amounted into laches. The trial court
also ruled that respondent's right to seek damages had not lapsed. Like the trial court, the appellate court rejected
NIA's argument that respondent's claims had prescribed under PD 552. The Court of Appeals held that the 5-year
prescriptive period mandated by PD 552 did not apply because respondent and NIA were in deep negotiations
during that period, and because NIA itself had stalled respondent's attempts to present his claims.

ISSUE/S
Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of 4 Million Pesos to respondent

RULING

Yes, the court awarded 4M for payments for the 11 hectares of land, but the appellate found that only
approximately 10 hectares were bulldozed by the defendant. These findings of Court of Appeals and Regional Trial
Court are contradictory. The area of 96,655 square meter or about 9.76 hectares falls within the 9 to 11 hectares
testified by the former engineer. However, engineer Panahon and the respondents estimates, standing alone,
cannot prove with any certainty that the larger area of 10 to 11 hectares was damaged.
 Apo Fruits Corporation et al vs Land Bank of the Philippines

G.R. No. 164195, October 12, 2010

FACTS

APO Fruits Corporation, Inc. (AFC) and Hijo Plantation Inc. (HPI) were owners of 5 parcels of land (1338.60
has.) located in San Isidro, Tagum, Davao. On 12 October 1995, the two voluntarily offered to sell the properties to
the Department of Agrarian Reform. DAR offered P86.9 million for AFC’s land and P164.40 million for HPI’s land
(total of about P251.3 million). AFC, HPI and DAR cannot agree on the price hence the Complaint for Determination
of Just Compensation was filed before the DAR Adjudication Board on 14 February 1997. The DARAB failed to
render a decision on the valuation of the land for three years. But nevertheless, the government, through the Land
Bank of the Philippines, deposited P26M into AFC’s account and P45M into HPI’s account as down payment in
1996. The DAR also caused the titling of the land in the name of the Republic of the Philippines in December 1996.
Later, titles were given to farmers under the CARP (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program). Due to DARAB’s
failure to adjudicate, AFC and HPI filed a complaint for determination of just compensation before the Regional
Trial Court of Davao which rendered a decision in favor of AFC and HPI. The Regional Trial Court ruled, based on
the reports it gathered from assessors, that the purchase price should be higher than what was offered by DAR;
that the purchase price should be at P103.33/ sq. m; that DAR is to pay AFC and HPI a total of P1.38 billion. DAR
appealed to the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not there was just compensation.

RULING

No. AFC’s and HPI’s land were taken in 1996 without just compensation. DARAB, an agency of the DAR
which was commissioned by law to determine just compensation, sat on the cases for three years, which was the
reason that AFC and HPI filed the cases before the RTC. The RTC’s finding is to be sustained as it based it’s ruling on
evidence. DAR was given a chance to support its ruling on why the purchase price should be at a lower amount but
DAR failed to present such evidence. To allow the taking of landowners’ properties, and to leave them empty-
handed while government withholds compensation is undoubtedly oppressive.

The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid
to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered “just” inasmuch as the property owner is being made to
suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more
before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
 Iloilo Grains Complex Corporation (IGCC) vs Hon Enriquez Gaspar

G.R. No. 265153, April 12 2023

FACTS

By Letter dated January 14, 2022, National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP) offered to buy 11,137
sq. m. of IGCC's industrial property in Iloilo City at PHP 1,075.00 per sq. m. for the construction of its Ingore Cable
Terminal Station and Panay-Guimaras 138kV Transmission Line Project. In its Reply Letter dated January 20, 2022,
however, IGCC informed NGCP that the current fair market value of the subject property was already PHP
10,000.00 per sq. m., hence, it was unable to accept the offer for a price way below this amount. NGCP then
relayed to IGCC its desire to expropriate the property, albeit it made a last offer of PHP 5,000.00 per sq. m.
equivalent to the residential zonal value of the property.

On September 30, 2022, NGCP filed its Complaint for expropriation with urgent prayer for issuance of writ of
possession entitled National Grid Corporation of the Philippines v. Iloilo Grain Complex Corporation. It was raffled
to RTC-Branch 33, Iloilo City and docketed as Special Civil Action No. 22-35139.

On November 11, 2022, IGCC filed its Answer with motion for preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses. The
preliminary hearing was sought for the purpose of determining the necessity of expropriating the property vis-à-vis
the project's alleged lack of approval by the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC); lack of negotiation in good faith
for the purchase of the subject property; adoption by NGCP of a curved line instead of a straight line option in the
taking of the property; unnecessary burden or damage the curved line option would cause to IGCC; and imminent
violation of its right to due process and equal protection of law should a writ of possession be issued in favor of
NGCP. IGCC further claimed to have indefinitely postponed the intended construction of a Storage and Warehouse
Facility on its property which was supposed to accommodate the expanding needs of its affiliate company, the La
Filipina Uy Gongco Corporation, relative to its adjacent private port operations.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not the trial court commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed writ of
possession

RULING

Yes, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued the writ of possession, albeit
NGCP's authority to expropriate the subject property is in question. The trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the writ of possession without first
determining whether NGCP has in fact complied with the requirements of the law for a valid exercise of its
delegated power to expropriate, among them, the existence of a genuine necessity for the taking of the subject
property, compliance with the required ERC approval for the project, and compliance with the requirement that
the expropriation and the manner by which it is sought to be implemented is least burdensome to the landowner.
 Under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the exercise of the power of eminent domain has two stages: first, the
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its
exercise in the context of the surrounding facts; and second, the taking of the land by the State or its agency
subject to payment of just compensation. The first stage ends, if not in a dismissal of the action, with an order of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for
public use.

Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs City of Zamboanga

G.R. No. L-24440, March 28, 1968

FACTS

The Municipality of Zamboanga, previously the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province, was
converted into Zamboanga City by Commonwealth Act No. 39 on October 12, 1936. Section 50 of the Act
stipulated that properties left by the province upon the transfer of the capital to another location would be
acquired by the City of Zamboanga at a price set by the Auditor General. These properties included 50 lots and
several buildings. The capital of Zamboanga Province was moved to Dipolog in 1945 and later to Molave in 1948.
The division of the province into Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur in 1952 led to the assets and
obligations of the former province being divided between them, with Zamboanga del Norte entitled to 54.39% of
the properties’ appraised value of P1,294,244.00. Partial payments were made to Zamboanga del Norte, but
Republic Act No. 3039 was passed on June 17, 1961, transferring all former provincial properties within
Zamboanga City to the city, free of charge. As a result, the City of Zamboanga ceased further payments. This
prompted Zamboanga del Norte to file a complaint in 1962 for declaratory relief and a preliminary mandatory
injunction, challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act 3039 and demanding continued payments.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not the 50 lots and buildings thereon are property for public use or patrimonial property

RULING

The properties petitioned by Zamboanga del Norte is a public property. The validity of the law ultimately
depends on the nature of the 50 lots and buildings thereon in question. For, the matter involved here is the extent
of legislative control over the properties of a municipal corporation, of which a province is one. The principle itself
is simple: If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and
governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is
owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The
municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation. The capacity in
which the property is held is, however, dependent on the use to which it is intended and devoted.
 China Banking Corporation vs CIR

G.R. No. 172509, February 4 2015

FACTS

China Bank Corporation (CBC) is a universal bank duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. For the taxable years 1982 to 1986, CBC was engaged in the transaction involving sales of foreign
exchange to the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, commonly known as SWAP
transactions. Petitioner did not file tax returns or pay tax on the SWAP transactions for those taxable years.

In 1989, CBC received an assessment from BIR finding CBC liable for deficiency on the sales of foreign bills
of exchange to the Central Bank. In the same year, CBC, through its vice president sent a letter of protest to the BIR
raising their defenses and requested a reinvestigation so as to substantiate its assertions. In 2001, more than 12
yrs after the filing of protest, the CIR rendered a decision reitering the deficiency Documentary Stamp Tax (DST)
assessment and ordered payment thereof plus increments.

CBC via Rule 45 petition comes to the court invoking for the first time the argument of prescription. CBC
states that the government has 3 years from 1989, the date the CBC received the assessment of the CIR, to collect
the tax. That within that time frame, however, neither a warrant of distraint nor levy was issued and no collection
case filed in the court.

CIR argues that the prescription issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. The CIR further alleges
that even assuming that the issue of prescription can be raised, the protest letter interrupted the prescriptive
period to collect the assessed DST.

ISSUE/S

Whether BIR's right to collect the assessed DST may be barred by prescription.

RULING

BIR's right to collect the assessed DST is barred by the statute of limitations. When BIR issued the
assessment for deficiency DST in 1989, the applicable rule was Sec. 319(c) of the NIRC, as amended which provides
3 years time limit for the government to collect the assessed tax, to be reckoned from the date when the BIR
mails/ releases/sends the assessment notice to the taxpayer. Further, it also provides that the assessed tax must
be collected by distraint or levy and/or court proceedings within the three-year period. The record of this case
shows that neither levy nor distraint was issued to the taxpayer. BIR only demanded taxpayers almost 13 years
from the date from which the prescriptive period is to be reckoned. The BIR's demand/ answer in the case filed
before the CTA is not the one that is qualified as a collection case as required by law. Under the rule prevailing at
that time, the BIR's answer must be filed not with CTA, but with the regular courts because the latter has
jurisdiction over judicial action for collection of internal revenue taxes. The request by the taxpayer for
reinvestigation of the assessment will not suspend the running of the statute of limitations on that act alone, this
must be granted by the CIR. In this case, however, there is no showing that CIR ever granted CBC's request.

Jose B.L. Reyes et al vs Pedro Almanzor et al,

G.R. No. L-49839, April 26, 1991

FACTS

The factual backdrop of this case involves the petitioners, Jose B.L. Reyes, Edmundo A. Reyes, and
Milagros Reyes, who owned parcels of land in Tondo and Sta. Cruz Districts, Manila, leased for residential
purposes. Under the then-effective Rent Control Laws (Republic Act No. 6359 and Presidential Decree No. 20), they
were prohibited from increasing rental rates and ejecting tenants, effectively capping their annual income from
these properties.

In 1973, the City Assessor of Manila reclassified and reassessed the petitioners’ properties, substantially
increasing their tax obligations. The petitioners challenged this move, arguing that the “income approach” should
have been utilized for valuation, given the rental caps. Their initial complaint to the Board of Tax Assessment
Appeals (BTAA) was dismissed, prompting an appeal to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA). Both
boards affirmed the assessments, leading to the petitioners seeking relief from the Supreme Court through a
petition for review on certiorari, asserting that the “comparable sales approach” used by the respondents was
inappropriate and unjust.

ISSUE/S

Whether the Real Property Tax Code mandates the use of a particular approach for property valuation

RULING

The Supreme Court did not specifically mandate a singular approach for all property valuations but
underscored that valuation must align with the principles of fairness, reasonableness, and the properties’ actual
ability to generate income. The ruling reinforced the principle that tax assessments should align with both
constitutional mandates and the practical circumstances affecting property value—in this case, recognizing the
“income approach” as a fair method for assessing properties subjected to rental control laws.
 Caltex Phil Inc. vs COA

G.R. No. 92585, May 8, 1992

FACTS

Caltex Philippines, Inc. (CPI) challenged the Commission on Audit’s (COA) disallowance of its claims for
reimbursement from the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) for financing charges and underrecoveries from sales
to the National Power Corporation (NPC), Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation (ATLAS), and
Marcopper Mining Corporation (MARCOPPER). CPI argued that COA should not prevent it from offsetting its
remittances against its OPSF reimbursement claims and that its claims pending resolution before the Office of
Energy Affairs (OEA) and the Department of Finance (DOF) should not have been disallowed. The case proceeded
to the Supreme Court under a petition erroneously brought under Rule 44 of the Rules of Court but was
entertained due to the importance of the issues raised. The Court excused the error in the designation of the
remedy pursued, recognizing it as sufficient to proceed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE/S

Whether the amounts due from Caltex to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund may be offset against Caltex’s
outstanding claims from said funds

RULING

No. Taxation is no longer envisioned as a measure merely to raise revenue to support the existence of
government. Taxes may be levied with a regulatory purpose to provide means for the rehabilitation and
stabilization of a threatened industry which is affected with public interest as to be within the police power of the
State.

PD 1956, as amended by EO 137, explicitly provides that the source of OPSF is taxation. A taxpayer may
not offset taxes due from the claims he may have against the government. Taxes cannot be subject of
compensation because the government and taxpayer are not mutually creditors and debtors of each other and a
claim for taxes is not such a debt, demand, contract or judgment as is allowed to be set-off. Hence, COA decision is
affirmed except that Caltex’s claim for reimbursement of under recovery arising from sales to the National Power
Corporation is allowed.
 PAL vs Edu

G.R. No. L-41383, August 15, 1988

FACTS

Pursuant to its legislative franchise, flag-carrier Philippine Airlines (PAL) is supposed to be exempt from
payment of taxes. This is why since 1956, it has not been paying motor vehicle registration fees. Commissioner
Elevate, however, issued a regulation requiring all tax exempt entities, among them PAL to pay motor vehicle
registration fees, refusing to register PAL’s motor vehicles unless the amounts imposed were paid.
PAL paid under protest and subsequently filed a claim for refund, arguing that as per the SC's ruling in Calalang v.
Lorenzo, motor vehicle registration fees are in reality taxes from the payment of which PAL is exempt by virtue of
its legislative franchise.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not motor vehicle registration fees are taxes or regulatory fees

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of PAL, although it said PAL is still not entitled to refund. The Court held
that motor vehicle registration fees are actually taxes intended for additional revenues of government even if one
fifth or less of the amount collected is set aside for the operating expenses of the agency administering the
program. The SC added that fees may be properly regarded as taxes even though they also serve as an instrument
of regulation. License fees are charges looked to as a source of revenue as well as a means of regulation. If the
purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is at least one of the real and substantial purposes, then the exaction is
properly called a tax. But PAL is still not entitled to a refund, since they wanted refunds for payments in 1971 when
in fact their tax exemption was repealed in 1968 and was only reinstated in 1979.