TOPIC: Immovable Property

G.R. Nos. 120098 and 120109

Tsai v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:
On November 26, 1975, respondent Ever Textile Mills, Inc. (EVERTEX)
obtained a three million peso (P3,000,000.00) loan from petitioner Philippine Bank
ofCommunications (PBCom). As security for the loan, EVERTEX executed in favor of
PBCom, a deed of Real and Chattel Mortgage over the lot where its factory stands,
and the chattels located therein Upon EVERTEX's failure to meet its obligation to
PBCom, the latter commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against
EVERTEX. On March 16, 1989, EVERTEX filed a complaint for annulment of sale,
reconveyance, and damages with the Regional Trial Court against PBCom. EVERTEX
claimed that no rights having been transmitted to PBCom over the assets of
insolvent EVERTEX, therefore Tsai acquired no rights over such assets sold to her,
and should reconvey the assets.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the inclusion of the questioned properties in the foreclosed
properties is proper.

RULING:
Yes. While it is true that the questioned properties appear to be immobile, a
perusal of the contract of Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties gives a
contrary indication. In the case at bar, the true intention of PBCOM and the owner,
EVERTEX, is to treat machinery and equipment as chattels. Assuming that the
properties in question are immovable by nature, nothing detracts the parties from
treating it as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel. It has
been held that an immovable may be considered a personal property if there is a
stipulation as when it is used as security in the payment of an obligation where a
chattel mortgage is executed over it, as in the case at bar.
 TOPIC: Movable Property

G.R. No. L-58469. May 16, 1983

Makati Leasing & Finance Corp., v. Wearever Textile Mills, Inc.

FACTS:
In this case, Wearever Textile, executed a chattel mortgage over certain raw
materials inventory, as well as machinery described as an aero dryer stentering
range. Upon default of Wearever Textile, the Makati Leasing petitioned for
extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties mortgaged to it. When the sheriff failed to
enter Wearever Textile’s premises to seize the machinery, Makati Leasing applied for
a replevin. The Court of Appeals, in certiorari and prohibition proceedings
subsequently filed by herein private respondent. A motion for reconsideration of this
decision of the Court of Appeals having been denied, petitioner has brought the case
to the Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the dryer is an immovable property

RULING:
The machinery is a personal property. The Supreme Court explained that if a house
of strong materials may be considered as personal property for purposes of
executing a chattel mortgage, there is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which
is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose,
may not be likewise treated as such.
 TOPIC: Property in Relation to Whom it Belongs

G.R. Nos. 92013, 92047, July 25, 1990;

Laurel v. Garcia

FACTS:
The  subject  Roppongi  property  is  one  of  the  properties  acquired  by  the
Philippines from Japan pursuant to a Reparations Agreement.  The property is where
the Philippine Embassy was once located, before it transferred to the  Nampeidai 
property. It  was  decided  that  the  properties  would  be
available to sale or disposition.Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the
subject property is property of public dominion.Respondents aver that Japanese
Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply to the case because the property is located
in Japan.

ISSUE:
Whether the subject property cannot be alienated.

RULING:
Yes. It  is  public  dominion. Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of
public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become
patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do. As property of public dominion,
the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.
 TOPIC: Concept of Ownership

G.R. No. L-48050, October 10, 1994

Javier v. Veridiano

FACTS:
Petitioner Felicidad Javier filed a Misc. Sales Application for a lot in Olongapo City.
She later instituted a complaint for forcible entry against Babol, alleging that she was
forcibly dispossessed of a portion of said land. The case for forcibly entry was
however dismissed as it was found by the court. The same was dismissed on appeal.
Javier was eventually granted a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and was issued an OCT
covering said lot. But Babol had already sold the property he was occupying to
Rosete. Complaint was instituted for quieting of title and recovery of possession.
Rosete raised defense on ground of res judicata, RTC ruled in favor of Rosete. Javier
contends that res judicata cannot apply in the instant case since there is no identity
of parties and causes of action.

ISSUE:
Whether the first case on forcible entry was res judicata against the second case on
quieting of title.

RULING:
No. A final judgment on forcible entry or unlawful detainer is not a bar against to an
action for determination of ownership. A judgment rendered in a case for recovery
of possession is conclusive only as to possession, not ownership.
 TOPIC: Principle of Self-help

G.R. No. 192999, 18 July 2012

Diamond Farms, Inc. v. Diamond Farm Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative

FACTS
Petitioner filed a complaint7 for unlawful occupation, damages and attorney s fees
against respondents. It alleged that it had been in possession for a long time of the
two lands. Respondents admitted that petitioner was the holder of TCT Nos. 112068
and 112073, covering the 74-hectare land and that the said land produces 11,000
boxes of export-quality bananas per week. However, were acquired by the
government upon the issuance of TCTs in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. The Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator ruled that petitioner lost its
ownership of the subject land when the government acquired it and CLOAs were
issued in favor of the 278 CARP beneficiaries. Petitioner appealed to the DARAB, but
the DARAB denied petitioner s appeal. The DARAB ruled that petitioner is unlawfully
occupying the subject land; hence, its complaint against respondents for unlawful
occupation lacks merit. Petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA in the assailed
Decision affirmed the DARAB decision. 

ISSUE:
Whether respondents are guilty of unlawful occupation?

RULING:
No. Respondents are not guilty of unlawful occupation.
Article 429 of the Civil Code provides that the owner or lawful possessor of a thing
has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For
this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or
prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his
property.
In this case, petitioner is the farm operator and manager while respondents are the
farm workers. Both parties enjoyed possession of the land. Together, they worked
thereon. Petitioner lost its status as landowner, but not as farm operator and
manager. Respondents remained as petitioner s farm workers and received wages
from petitioner. The action taken by respondents to guard the land as reasonable
and necessary to protect their legitimate possession and prevent precisely what
petitioner attempted to do. 

TOPIC: Use Injuring Rights of Third Persons

 G.R. No. 74761, 6 November 1990
Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court

FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Andamo owned a parcel of land situated in Biga Silang, Cavite
which is adjacent to that of private respondent corporation, Missionaries of Our lady
of La Salette, Inc. Within the land of the latter, waterpaths and contrivances,
including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded
petitioner’s land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioner’s crops and
plants, and endangered the lives of the petitioners. Spouses instituted a criminal
action. On February 22, 1983 spouses filed a civil case for damages.
CA affirmed trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case until
after judgment in the related Criminal Case

ISSUE:
Whether Art 431 is applicable

RULING:
Yes. It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is not without limitations.
Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that “the owner of a thing cannot make use
thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person.” SIC UTERE TUO UT
ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build
structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using
all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and
can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury
or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim
indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.

TOPIC: Surface Rights

 G.R. No. 185124, 25 January 2012
Republic v. Rural Bank of Kabacan, Inc

FACTS:
The National Irrigation Authority (NIA) is the government-owned-
and-controlled corporation primarily responsible for irrigation development
and management in the country. The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Kabacan (RTC)a complaint for expropriation of a
portion of three parcels of land for its Malitubog-Marigadao irrigation project. The
committee formed by the RTC pegged the fair market value of the land at Php 65.00
per square meter. NIA, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed with modification the RTC’s decision. CA
deleted the value of the soil in determination of compensation but affirmed RTC’s
valuation of the improvements made on the properties.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the value of the excavated soil should be included in the
computation of just compensation.

RULING:
No. In National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, et al. The SC held that rights over
lands are indivisible. This conclusion is drawn from Article 437 of the Civil Code
which provides: “The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of
everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any
plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment to
servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the
reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.” Thus, the ownership of land extends
to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it.

TOPIC: Right of Accession

 G.R. No. 133879. November 21, 2001.
Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. v. Mayfair Theater

FACTS:
Mayfair Theater, Inc. was a lessee of portions of a building owned by Carmelo &
Bauermann, Inc. Their lease contracts of 20 years-lease contracts contained a
provision granting Mayfair a right of first refusal to purchase the subject properties.
However, before the contracts ended, the subject properties were sold for P11,300
by Carmelo to Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. As a result of the sale of the
subject properties to Equatorial, Mayfair filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila for the recission of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Carmelo and
Equatorial, specific performance, and damages. RTC decided for Carmelo and
Equatorial. CA reversed and ruled for Mayfair. The SC denied a petition questioning
the CA decision. What happened is that the contract did get rescinded, Equatorial
got its money back and asserted that Mayfair have the right to purchase the lots for
11 million bucks.

ISSUE:
Whether Equatorial was the owner of the subject property and could thus enjoy the
fruits and rentals.

HELD:
NO. Nor right of ownership was transferred from Carmelo to Equatorial since there
was failure to deliver the property to the buyer. Compound this with the fact that
the sale was even rescinded.
The court went on to assert that rent is a civil fruit that belonged to the owner of the
property producing it by right of accession. Hence, the rentals that fell due from the
time of the perfection of the sale to petitioner until its rescission by final judgment
should belong to the owner of the property during that period.

TOPIC: Accession Continua

 G.R. No. 170923, 20 January 2009
Sulo sa Nayon, Inc., v. Nayong Pilipino Foundation

FACTS:
Respondent leased to petitioner Sulo sa Nayon a portion of land for the construction
and operation of a hotel building for an initial period of 21 years until May 1996 and
renewable for 25 years upon due notice in writing to respondent at least 6 months
prior of the expiration of the lease. On March 1995, petitioners sent respondent a
letter notifying the latter’s intention to renew the contract for another 25 years and
that they executed a Voluntary Addendum to the lease agreement. On September 5,
2001, respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the MeTC of Pasay
City.

ISSUE:
Whether the rules on accession, as found in Articles 448 and 546 of the
Civil Code, apply to the instant case.

RULING:
NO. Petitioners have no adverse claim or title to the land. This article [Article 448] is
manifestly intended to apply only to a case where one builds, plants, or sows on land
in which he believes himself to have a claim of title, and not to lands where the only
interest of the builder, planter or sower is that of a holder, such as a tenant.”
What petitioners insist is that because of the improvements, which are of substantial
value, that they have introduced on the leased premises with the permission of
respondent, they should be considered builders in good faith who have the right to
retain possession of the property until reimbursement by respondent. We affirm the
ruling of the CA that introduction of valuable improvements on the leased premises
does not give the petitioners the right of retention and reimbursement which
rightfully belongs to a builder in good faith. Otherwise, such a situation would allow
the lessee to easily “improve” the lessor out of its property. His right are governed
by Art 1678 of the Civil Code.

TOPIC: Article 448 & 447 applied by analogy

 G.R. No. 115814 May 26, 1995
Pecson v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Pedro Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot located in Kamias Street,
Quezon Cit on which he built a 4-door-2-storey apartment building. He
failed to pay realty taxes amounting to P12k so the lot was sold at public
auction to Mamerto Nepomuceno who later on sold it to the Sps. Nuguid.
Pecson challenged the validity of the auction before the RTC but was dismissed but
the RTC held that the apartment bldg was not subject of the litigation. On appeal,
the CA appealed in toto the decision of the RTC that the apartment bldg was not
included in the auction sale. After an entry of judgment was made, the Sps. Nuguid
filed a motion with the RTC for a motion for delivery of possession of the lot and the
apartment building citing Art. 546 of the CC. The RTC issued an order
declaring that the owner of the lot and apartment bldg were the Sps.
Nuguid. Pecson moved for reconsideration but the Trial court did not act on it,
instead it issued a writ of possession. The CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:
Whether Art. 448 and 546 applies in the case at bar

RULING:
YES. With regard to Art. 448, the provision on indemnity may be applied in analogy.
Whoever is the owner of the land may appropriate whatever has been built, planted
or sown after paying indemnity. However, it does not apply when the owner of the
land is also the builder of the works on his own land who later on loses ownership by
sale or donation.
Art. 546 refers to the necessary and useful expenses which shall be refunded to the
possessor in good faith with right of retention. However, it does not state how to
determine the value of the useful improvement. The respondents [court and private
respondents alike] espouses as sufficient reimbursement the cost of construction in
1965, however, this is contrary to previous rulings which declares that the value to
the reimbursed should be the present market value of said improvements so as not
to unjustly enrich either of the parties.

TOPIC: Good Faith

 G.R. No. 108894, February, 10, 1997
Technogas Philippines Manufacturing Corporation v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Technogas purchased a parcel of land from Pariz Industries, Inc. In the same
year, Eduardo Uy purchased the land adjacent to it. The following year, Uy bought
another lot adjoining the lot of Technogas. It was discovered in a survey, that a
portion of a building of Technogas, which was presumably constructed by
its predecessor-in-interest, encroached on a portion of the lot owned by private
respondent Edward Uy. After 2 years, through an agreement, petitioner agreed to
demolish the wall.Defendant dug a canal along the wall which caused a portion of it
to collapse. Petitioner filed a supplemental complaint re the action and a separate
criminal action of malicious mischief. RTC decided for the petitioners and the CA
reversed. Note that respondent wants to have the wall demolished.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner a builder
in bad faith because it is “presumed to know the metes and bounds of his property.”

RULING:
No. No one can determine the precise extent or location of his property by merely
examining his paper title unless one is versed in the science of surveying. bad faith is
not imputable to a registered owner of land when a part of his building encroaches
upon a neighbor's land, simply because he is supposed to know the boundaries of his
land as described in the certificate of title. It is presumed that Pariz Industries built
the buildings and other structures upon the land since they were in existence when
Tecnogas purchased the land.
Article 527 presumes good faith since no proof exists to show that encroachment
over a narrow, needle-shaped portion of Uy's land was done in bad faith by the
builder. It is also presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same
character in which it was acquired until the contrary is proved. Hence, good faith, or
the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of any
flaw or defect in the title, by law is passed to Pariz's successor, Tecnogas. The good
faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessor
by evidence or by suit for recovery of property by true owner.

TOPIC: Accession Natural

 G.R. No. 160453, November 12, 2012
Republic v. Santos, III

FACTS:
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent
Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property was bounded in the
Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in
the Southeast by the Paraque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in
the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan. On May 21, 1998, Arcadio
Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-
applicant because of the latters co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the
property had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open,
notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years. This
survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified as alienable/disposable by
the Bureau of Forest Dev’t. on Jan. 3, 1968. On May 10, 2000 the RTC granted the
application for land registration. On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject parcel land maybe acquired through the process of
accretion.

RULING:
NO. The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of
ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their
natural beds are public dominion of the State. It follows that the river beds that
dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the State as its property of public
dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds
should belong to some other person.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the
Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative
action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act
or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of Lot 4998-
B, Cad-00-000343 to the effect that the "survey is inside a map classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev’t" did not prove that Lot 4998-B
was already classified as alienable and disposable. Accordingly, respondents could
not validly assert acquisitive prescription of Lot 4988-B.

TOPIC: Change of Course of Rivers

 G.R. No. 184746, August 15, 2012
Spouses Galang v. Spouses Reyes

FACTS:
Spouses Conrado S. Reyes and Fe de Kastro Reyes (the Reyeses) filed a case for the
annulment of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-928 against spouses Crispin and
Caridad Galang (the Galangs) with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo, Rizal (RTC). In
their Complaint, the Reyeses alleged that they owned two properties.
The Galangs in their Answer denied that the land subject of the complaint was part
of a creek and countered that the title was issued to them after they had complied
with the free patent requirements of the DENR, through the PENRO; that they and
their predecessor-in-interest had been in possession, occupation, cultivation, and
ownership of the land for quite some time; that the property belonged to Apolonio
Galang, their predecessor-in-interest; that the property was transferred in the
names of the Reyeses through falsified document

ISSUE:
Whether The abandoned river bed of the Marignan Creek rightfully belongs to the
Reyeses?

RULING:
NO, The law in this regard is covered by Article 461 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course
of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new
course in proportion to the area lost. However, the owners of the lands adjoining
the old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof,
which value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed.
In this regard, the Reyeses failed to adduce indubitable evidence to prove the old
course, its natural abandonment and the new course. In the face of a Torrens title
issued by the government, which is presumed to have been regularly issued, the
evidence of the Reyeses was clearly wanting. Uncorroborated testimonial evidence
will not suffice to convince the Court to order the reconveyance of the property to
them.

TOPIC: Co-Ownership
 G.R. No. 189420, March 26, 2014
Arambulo v. Nolasco

FACTS:
Petitioners, together with their siblings and their mother co-owned a Land in Tondo,
Manila. When their mother died, she was succeeded by her husband, Genero
Nolasco and their children. On January 8, 1999, petitioners filed a petition for relief
alleging that all co-owners, except for Nolasco, have authorized to sell their
respective shares to the properties, saying that in the Civil Code, if one or more co-
owners shall withhold their consent to the alterations in the thing owned in
common, the courts may afford adequate relief. Nolasco responded that they did
not know about the intention to sell, because they were not called to participate in
the negotiations regarding the sale of the property. They went to Court for adequate
relief under Art. 491, alleging that the respondents are withholding their consent.
RTC granted this, but CA reversed, saying that the applicable rule is Article 493. SC
affirms CA’s decision.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondents are withholding their consent and whether this
withholding is prejudicial to the petitioners.

RULING:
NO. The sale by the petitioners of their parts shall not affect the full ownership by
the respondents of the part that belongs to them. Their part which petitioners
will sell shall be that which may be apportioned to them in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership. With the full ownership of the
respondents remaining unaffected by petitioners’ sale of their parts, the
nature of the property, as co-owned, likewise stays.
A sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other
co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner
seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property

TOPIC: Obligations of Each Co-owner

 G.R. No. L-4656, November 18, 1912
Pardell v. Bartolome

FACTS:
Petitioner Vicenta Ortiz y Felin de Pardell and respondent Matilde Ortiz y Felin
Bartolome were the existing heirs of the late Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin. On 1888,
Matilde and co-defendant Gaspar de Bartolome y Escribano took it upon themselves
without an judicial authorization or even extra judicial agreement the administration
of the properties of the late Calixta and Miguel. RTC absolved Matilde from payment
of damages. Counsel for Matilde took an exception to the judgment and moved for a
new trial on the grounds that the evidence presented did not warrant the judgment
rendered and that the latter was contrary to law. That motion was denied by the
lower court. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Matilde and Gaspar are obliged to pay rent for their occupation of
the said property

RULING:
No. The Court ruled that the spouses are not liable to pay rent. Their occupation of
the said property was a mere exercise of their right to use the same as a co-owner.
One of the limitations on a co-owner’s right of use is that he must use it in such a
way so as not to injure the interest of the other co-owners. In the case at bar, the
other party failed to provide proof that by the occupation of the spouses Bartolome,
they prevented Vicenta from utilizing the same.

TOPIC: Extinguishment of Co-ownership

 G. R. No. L-46001 March 25, 1982
Caro v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Alfredo Benito, Mario Benito and Benjamin Benito were the original co-owners of
two parcels of land covered by separate certificates of title. After Mario died
sometime in January, 1957, his surviving wife, Basilia Lahorra and his father,
Saturnino Benito, were subsequently judicially appointed as joint administrators of
the deceased's estate. In 1960, with the consent of Saturnino Benito, the co-owned
lots were subdivided and a subdivision title was issued to petitioner user the lot she
had bought. Eventually, she filed a complaint with the trial court. The trial court
dismissed the case. On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court's judgment, found that there was absence of due notice to private respondent,
and ordered petitioner to execute a deed of redemption. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not CA erred in allowing the exercise of the right of legal redemption
with respect to the lots in question.
 
RULING:
Yes, because the co-ownership already extinguished. Inasmuch as the purpose of the
law in establishing the right of legal redemption between co-owners is to reduce the
number of participants until the community is done away with (Viola vs. Tecson, 49
Phil. 808), once the property is subdivided and distributed among the co-owners, the
community has terminated and there is no reason to sustain any right of legal
redemption.

TOPIC: Possession
 G.R. No. L-50264 October 21, 1991
Wong v. Carpio

FACTS:
Plaintiff Manuel Mercado acquired his rights to possess the land in litigation which is
particularly described in TCT No. (T-4244) from William Giger by virtue of a deed of
sale with right to repurchase. He knew defendants' laborers were in the land in suit
as early as August, 1976 and that they have a hut there but he did not do anything to
stop them. Instead plaintiff was happy that there were people and a hut on the land
in suit. Defendant Ignacio Wong bought the parcel of land in litigation from William
Giger and his wife Cecilia Valenzuela and so he has in his possession TCT No. (T-4244)
in the name of William Giger. Unfortunately, the MTC ruled in favor of Mr. Wong,
stating that the latter was in open, actual, prior and continuous possession. On
appeal, the CFI reversed and ruled for Mr. Mercado stating that he had taken
possession of the property much earlier and that Mr. Wong is the actual intruder.
Mr. Wong took the case to the CA which ruled against him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent (Manuel Mercado) has established
prior possession.
 
RULING:
Yes. It should be stressed that "possession is acquired by the material occupation of
a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our
will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right." and that the
execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the
thing, unless there is stipulation to the contrary. If, however, notwithstanding the
execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material
tenancy of the thing and make use of it herself, because such tenancy and
enjoyment are opposed by another, then delivery has not been effected.
 

TOPIC: Loss of Possession

 G.R. No. 198356, April 20, 2015
Supapo v. Spouses de Jesus,

FACTS:
Supapo owned a parcel of land in Quezon City. In 1992, they discovered that there
were 2 houses built therein. It was without their consent or knowledge.
They filed a criminal case against the Spouses de Jesus and Macario, who were the
owners of the houses. Thereafter, the Spouses Supapo filed a complaint for accion
publiciana. Respondents contended they could not do this because there is another
action pending between the same parties. The complaint for accion publiciana is
barred by the statute of limitations and The Spouses Supapo’s cause of action is
barred by prior judgment. MeTC ruled against respondents. The RTC agreed with
respondents on two grounds: The action has prescribed Accion publiciana falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. It held that in an action where the only issue is
possession, the MeTC has jurisdiction is the action for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer is filed within 1 year from the time to demand to vacate was made.
Otherwise, it should be filed before the RTC. It held that the action was filed beyond
the 10-year prescriptive period under Art 555 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:
Has the action prescribed?

RULING:
No. In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title
cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. We have also held that a
claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is a registered
land because of Article 1126 of the Civil Code in relation to Act 496. The Spouses
Supapo (as holders of the TCT) enjoy a panoply of benefits under the Torrens system.
The most essential insofar as the present case is concerned is Section 47 of PD No.
1529.

TOPIC: Theory of Irrevindicability

 G.R. No. 80298, April 26, 1990
EDCA Publishing & Distributing Corp. v. Santos

FACTS:
EDCA Publishing & Distributing Corp. sold books to one Jose Cruz, the latter paid via
checks. Cruz sold some of these books to one Leonor Santos. It was later found out
however that Jose Cruz was an impostor and that the checks are worthless. Santos
later recovered them by virtue of a writ of preliminary attachment. EDCA sought to
recover the same arguing that Santos was not the lawful owner of the books having
failed to produce any receipt to prove that she bought the same; and that having
been unlawfully deprived of said books, it is entitled to recover the same under Art.
559. RTC granted the writ of preliminary attachment. Subsequent dishonor of a
check, which did not render the contract of sale void does not amount to unlawful
deprivation of property.

ISSUE:
Whether EDCA been unlawfully deprived of the books because the check issued by
the impostor in payment therefor was dishonored?

RULING:
NO. Santos was a good faith buyer after taking steps to verify the identity of the
seller. When she was showed the invoice, she reasonably believed that he was a
legitimate seller. With regard to unlawful deprivation, EDCA was not unlawfully
deprived of the property by mere failure of consideration. There was already a
perfected contract of sale. Proof was even substantiated when EDCA gave the
invoice as proof of payment upon delivery of the books. This did not amount to
unlawful taking, because by the delivery of EDCA to Cruz, ownership of the books
already transferred to him.

TOPIC: Fruits
 G. R. No. L-11977, April 29, 1959
Azarcon and Abobo v. Eusebio

FACTS:
Victor Eusebio had a dispute over a parcel of land with Leonardo Azarcon,
Manuel Azarcon and Esteban Abobo. Eusebio filed a lease application for a parcel of
land, a portion thereof was occupied by Azarcon et al. under a homestead
application.Before the dispute could be settled, Eusebio filed a complaint in the CFI
of Nueva Ecija,alleging that he had acquired a big parcel of land by lease from the
Bureau of Lands, and that while he was in possession thereof, Azarcon et al.
occupied a portion. The trial court ruled in favor of Eusebio, and a writ of execution
ordering Azarcon et al. to restore possession of the land to Eusebio was issued on
October 3, 1955. However, in spite of the receipt of the notice of writ of execution,
Azarcon et al. nevertheless entered the land to gather palay which was then pending
harvest.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Azarcon and Abobo are entitled to the pending fruits of the land.

RULING:
Yes. While the court order of October 3, 1955 ordered them to move out of the
premises, it did not prohibit them from gathering the crop then existing thereon.
Underthe law, a person, who is in possession and who is being ordered to leave a
parcel ofland while products thereon are in pending harvests, has the right to a part
of the netharvest, as expressly provided by Article 545 of the Civil Code. Hence, as
the order ofexecution did not expressly prohibit Azarcon et al. from gathering the
pending fruits,which fruits were the result of their possession and cultivation of the
land, it cannot besaid that they committed an act which is clear violation of the
court’s order.

TOPIC: Expenses
 G.R. No. L-16736, December 22, 1921
Robles and Martin v. Lizzaraga Hermanos

FACTS:
Anastasia de la Rama died on the 17th of October, 1916, leaving six children,
to wit, Magdalena, Jose, Evarista, Zacarias, Felix, and Purificacion, surnamed Robles,
and some properties. Evarista Robles, one of the heirs, since before the death of her
mother Anastasia de la Rama, has been with her husband occupying the aforesaid
house No. 4 on Iznart Street, at the beginning, by permission of her mother, later on
by the consent of her coheirs, and lastly by agreement with the partnership,
Lizarraga Hermanos, to whom it had been awarded, having made some
improvements on the house. On March 18, 1918, Lizarraga Hermanos notified
Evarista Robles that beginning April next the rent of the upper story of the house
would be raised to sixty pesos (P60) a month, and that, if she did not agree to the
new rate of rent, she might vacate the house. Evarista Robles refused to pay such a
new rate of rent and to vacate the house, and Lizarraga Hermanos brought suit
against her for ejectment. Evarista Robles sued Lizarraga Hermanos afterwards to
recover the value of the improvements.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Evarista Robles is the owner of the aforesaid improvements and has
the right to demand payment of their value.

RULING:
Yes. Robles is the owner of the improvements. The expenditures incurred in
these improvements were not necessary inasmuch as without them the house would
have continued to stand just as before, but were useful, inasmuch as with them the
house better serves the purpose for which it was intended, being used as a
residence,
and the improvements consisting of the addition of a dining room, kitchen, closet,
and bathroom in the lower and upper stories of the house, and a stable, suitable as a
coach house and dwelling, it is beyond doubt that such improvements are useful to
the building. Since the improvements are useful and Robles’ possession is in good
faith, applying Article 453, it is beyond question that Evarista Robles is the owner of
such improvements, and entitled to reimbursement therefor.

TOPIC: Concept of Usufruct

 G.R. No. 107132 October 8, 1999
Hemedes v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Jose Hemedes, father of Maxima Hemedes and Enrique D. Hemedes. Jose
Hemedes executed a document entitled "Donation Inter Vivos with Resolutory
Conditions"whereby he conveyed ownership over the subject land, together with all
itsimprovements, in favor of his third wife, Justa Kausapin, subject to the following
resolutory conditions that upon her death or marriage, the donee shall revert the
saidproperty to anyone of Jose Hemedes children. On September 27, 1960 a "Deed
of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion" was made conveying to
Maxima Hemedes. She had it titled and mortgage it to R & B Insurance with an
annotation of “Usufruct” in favor of her stepmother, Justa Kausapin. Unable to pay
the mortgage, R & B Insurance extra-judicially foreclosed the property. However,
Justa Kausapin executed another agreement or Kasunduan on May 27, 1971 to his
stepson, Enrique D. Hemedes. He obtained tax declarations and pay realty taxes
from thereon. The Ministry of Agrarian Reform Office conducted a cadastral survey
and indicated Enrique Hemedes as the owner. Enrique Hemedes sold the property to
Dominium Realty Const. Corp. (Dominium), a sister company of Asia Brewery. Asia
Brewery started to introduce some improvements already when R & B insurance
informed them that they are the owners of the property where these improvements
are being built.

ISSUE:
Whether the donation in favor of Enrique Hemedes was valid?
 
RULING:
NO. Enrique D. Hemedes and his transferee, Dominium, did not acquire any rights
over the subject property.  Justa Kausapin sought to transfer to her stepson exactly
what she had earlier transferred to Maxima Hemedes – the ownership of the subject
property pursuant to the first condition stipulated in the deed of donation executed
by her husband.  Thus, the donation in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes is null and void
for the purported object thereof did not exist at the time of the transfer, having
already been transferred to his sister. Similarly, the sale of the subject property by
Enrique D. Hemedes to Dominium is also a nullity for the latter cannot acquire more
rights than its predecessor-in-interest and is definitely not an innocent purchaser for
value since Enrique D. Hemedes did not present any certificate of title upon which it
relied.

TOPIC: Rights of the Usufructuary

 G.R. No. L-123, December 12, 1945
Fabie v. Guiterrez David

FACTS:
The petitioner Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of the income of certain houses
located at 372-376 Santo Cristo, Binondo, and 950-956 Ongpin, Santa Cruz, Manila,
under the ninth clause of the will of the deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey. The owner of
Santo Cristo property above mentioned is the respondent Juan Grey, while those of
the Ongpin property are other person not concern herein. Previous to September
1944 litigation arose between Josefa Fabie as plaintiff and Juan Grey as defendant
and the owner of the Ongpin property as intervenors, involving the administration of
the houses mentioned.

ISSUE:
Whether the action instituted by the petitioner Josefa Fabie is a purely
possessory action and as such within the jurisdiction of said court, or an action
founded on property right and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal
court.

RULING:
The usufructuary has the right to administer the property in question. All the acts of
administration — to collect the rents for herself, and to conserve the property by
making all necessary repairs and paying all the taxes, special assessments, and
insurance premiums thereon — were by court judgment vested in the usufructuary.
The pretension of the respondent Juan Grey that he is the administrator of the
property with the right to choose the tenants and to dictate the conditions of the
lease is contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the said clause of the will, the
stipulation of the parties, and the judgment of the court. He cannot manage or
administer the property after all the acts of management and administration have
been vested by the court, with his consent, in the usufructuary.

TOPIC: Obligations of the Usufructuary

 G.R. No. L-56249, May 29, 1987
Vda. de Aranas v. Aranas

FACTS:
Fr. Teodoro Aranas, a priest of the Roman Catholic Church, died on January
19, 1953. He had executed on June 6, 1946 his Last Will and Testament which was
admitted to probate on August 31, 1956. In said Last Will and Testament, Fr.
Teodoro Aranas stipulated the special administration of the remainder of his estate )
by Vicente Aranas, a faithful and serviceable nephew and designating him also as
recipient of 1/2 of the produce of said properties after deducting the expenses for
the administration and the other 1/2 of the produce to be given to the Catholic
Church for the eternal repose of the testator's soul.

ISSUE:
Whether perpetual inalienability and administration of the estate of the
late Fr. Teodoro Aranas is null and void for being violative of Article 870 of the NCC.

RULING:
No. Vicente Aranas as a usufructuary has the right to enjoy the property of his
uncle with all the benefits which result from the normal enjoyment (or exploitation)
of another's property, with the obligation to return, at the designated time, either
the same thing, or in special cases its equivalent. Be it noted that Vicente Aranas is
not prohibited to dispose of the fruits and other benefits arising from the usufruct.
Neither are the naked owners (the other heirs) of the properties, the usufruct of
which has been given to Vicente Aranas prohibited from disposing of said naked
ownership without prejudice of course to Vicente's continuing usufruct. To void the
designation of Vicente Aranas as usufructuary and/or administrator is to defeat the
desire and the dying wish of the testator to reward him for his faithful and unselfish
services rendered during the time when said testator was seriously ill or bed-ridden.

TOPIC: Extinguishment of Usufruct

G.R. No. L-51333, May 18, 1989

Locsin v. Valenzuela

FACTS:
Petitioners were co-owners of a large tract of agricultural land known as
“Hacienda Villa Regalado”. A portion of this land known as Lot was subject to lifetime
usufructuary rights of respondent Helen Schon. The bulk of this lot was cultivated by
the lessees who customarily delivered the rentals to respondent.The tract of land
owned in common by the petitioners, including the portion thereof subject to
petitioner’s usufructuary rights, fell within the scope of the “Operation Land
Transfer”. Petitioners sought the opinion of the Department of Agrarian
Reform(DAR) as to who should be entitled to receive the rental payments which
continued to be made by the tenants to respondent. The DAR District Officer
rendered the opinion that the rental payments were properly considered as
amortization payments for the land and as such should pertain to the landowners
and not the usufructuary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the usufructuary was extinguished by PD 27 and who, between
the naked owner and the usufructuary, should be entitled to the amounts paid by
the tenants beginning October 21, 1972.

RULING:
Yes. The usufruct which had therefore existed as a jus in re aliena in favour of
Helen Schon was effectively extinguished by PD 27. To hold, as private respondent
apparently urges would obviously defeat the purpose of the land reform statute. PD
27 was enacted to emancipate the tenants from “bondage of the soil” by giving to
the tenant-farmers ownership of the land which they were cultivating. Ownership
over the lands subjected to the Operation Land Transfer moved from the registered
owner to the tenants. The Court holds that Lot No. 2-C-A-3 having been declared
part of the land reform area and subjected to the Operation Land Transfer, the
payments made on October 21, 1972 by the tenant-farmers constituted amortization
payments on the cost of the land that they were required to pay under PD 27. These
payments, therefore, legally pertain to the petitioners as part of the compensation
for the dominion over the land of which they were deprived of by operation of PD
27.

TOPIC: Easement of Right of Way

G.R. No. L-10619, February 28, 1958

Ronquillo, et al. v. Roco, et al.
FACTS:
Plaintiff Leogario Ronquillo have been in the continuous and uninterrupted use
of a road which traversed the land of the defendants, Rocos, in going to Igualdad
Street and the market place of Naga City for more than 20 years and that the Rocos
have long recognized and respected the private legal easement of a right of way of
said plaintiffs. On May 12, 1953, the defendants along with a number of men
maliciously obstructed plaintiff’s right of way by constructing a chapel in the middle
of the said road and then later, by means of force, intimidation, and threats, illegally
and violently planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire and closed hermitically
the road passage way thereby preventing the plaintiff from using it. The plaintiff
claims that he has already acquired the easement of right of way over the land thru
prescription by his continuous and uninterrupted use of the narrow strip of land
as passage way. However, plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed by the CFI.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an easement of right of way can be acquired by prescription.

RULING:
No. The Court held than an easement of right of way may not be acquired thru
prescription because though it may be apparent, it is nevertheless discontinuous or
intermittent, and therefore, under Article 622 of the New Civil Code, can be acquired
only by a virtue of a title. Furthermore, a right of way cannot be acquired by
prescription because prescription requires that the possession be continuous and
uninterrupted.

TOPIC: Easement of Party Wall

G.R. No. L-5044, December 1, 1909

Case v. Heirs of Tuason

FACTS:
The counsel for the heirs of Pablo Tuason and Leocadia Santibañez alleged
that the parties whom he represents are owners in common of the property
adjoining that of the petitioner Edwin Case on the southwest. The latter, extended
his southwest boundary line to a portion of the lot of the said heirs of Tuason and
Santibañez. They alleged that the true dividing line between the property of the
petitioner and that of the said heirs is a belonging to the respondents, and that
about two years ago, when Case made alterations in the buildings erected on his
land, he improperly caused a portion of them to rest on the wall owned by the
respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the wall is the property of the heirs of the late Tuason and
Santibañez.

RULING:
The wall in controversy belongs to the heirs of the late Tuason and Santibañez
for the reason, among others, that in the public document by which one of their
original ancestors acquired on the 19th of April, 1796, the property now possessed
by them, it appears that property was then already in closed by a stone wall. The
wall supports only the property of the respondents and not that of the petitioner,can
not be a party wall, one-half of which along its entire length would belong to the
adjoining building owned by Mr. Case. There is not sufficient proof to sustain such
claim, and besides, the building erected thereon disproves the pretension of the
petitioner.

TOPIC: Nuisance

G.R. No. L-3422, June 13, 1952

Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. v. Balandan

FACTS:
Hidalgo Enterprises was the owner of an ice-plant factory in San Pablo, Laguna.
In the factory, there were two tanks full of water, both 9-ft deep, for cooling
purposes of its engine. There was no fence or top cover; the edges of the tanks were
barely a foot high from the surface of the ground. The factory itself was surrounded
with a fence. However, the wide gate entrance was continually open, and anyone
could easily enter the factory. There was no guard assigned on the gate.
Around noon on April 16, 1948, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 3 years old, was
playing with other boys his age when he entered the factory premises through the
gate. Mario Balandan then took a bath in one of the tanks of water and, later on,
sank to the bottom of the tank. He died of “asphyxia secondary to drowning.”
The CFI and CA ruled that Hidalgo Enterprises maintained an attractive nuisance and
neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid accident to person entering
its premises.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of attractive nuisance is applicable in this case?

RULING:
No. Hidalgo Enterprises Inc.’s water tanks are not classified as attractive
nuisance. Other issues such as whether it exercised reasonable precautions, and if
the parents were guilty of contributory negligence are immaterial. Appealed decision
reversed. Hidalgo Enterprises is absolved from liability.

TOPIC: Theory of Mode and Title

G.R. No. 118114 December 7, 1995

Acap v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Felixberto Oruma sold his inherited land to Cosme Pido, which land is rented by
petitioner Teodoro Acap. When Cosme died intestate, his heirs executed a
“Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights” in favor of private respondent Edy
delos Reyes. Respondent informed petitioner of his claim over the land, and
petitioner paid the rental to him in 1982. However in subsequent years, petitioner
refused to pay the rental, which prompted respondent to file a complaint for the
recovery of possession and damages. Petitioner averred that he continues to
recognize Pido as the owner of the land, and that he will pay the accumulated
rentals to Pido’s widow upon her return from abroad. The lower court ruled in favor
of private respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights is a
recognized mode of acquiring ownership

RULING:
No. An asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing arising from a
juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to give rise to ownership over
the res. That right or title must be completed by fulfilling certain conditions imposed
by law. Hence, ownership and real rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode
or process. While title is the juridical justification, mode is the actual process of
acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in question.
Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring ownership are generally
classified into two (2) classes, namely, the original mode (i.e., through occupation,
acquisitive prescription, law or intellectual creation) and the derivative mode (i.e.,
through succession mortis causa or tradition as a result of certain contracts, such as
sale, barter, donation, assignment or mutuum).

TOPIC: Revocation and Reduction of Donations

G.R. No. 119730, September 2, 1999

Noticed vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Celestino Arbizo died in 1956 leaving behind a parcel of land having an area of
66,530 square meters. His heirs plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noticed,
and Maria Arbizo extrajudicially settled the partition of the land with Directo getting
11,426 square meters, Noticed got 13,294 square meters, and Arbizo got 41,810
square meters. However another extrajudicial settlement-partition was executed.
Three fifths of the said land went to Maria Arbizo while plaintiff Directo and
defendant Noticed got only one-fifth each. Sometime in 1981, Noticed constructed
his house on the land donated to him by Directo. Directo fenced the portion allotted
to her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated portion, and
constructed thereon three huts. But in 1985, Noticed removed the fence earlier
constructed by Directo, occupied the three huts (3) and fenced the entire land of
plaintiff Directo without her consent. Directo demanded from Noticed to vacate her
land, but the latter refused. Hence, Directo filed a complaint for the recovery of
possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of donation, against defendant
Noticed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts of Noticed constitute ingratitude to warrant revocation
of the donation.
RULING:
Yes. It was established that petitioner Noticed occupied not only the portion
donated to him by private respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the
whole area of Lot C which belongs to private respondent Directo, thus petitioner's
act of occupying the portion pertaining to private respondent Directo without the
latter's knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation which is an offense against the
property of the donor and considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the
donor. The law does not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the
offense be proved in the action for revocation.

TOPIC: Prescription

G.R. No. 190650, October 14, 2013

James v. Eurem Realty Development Corp

FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the CA Decision which dismissed the appeal from the
RTC Resolution holding that the action for declaration of nullity of title and
ownership of real property with damages had already prescribed On September 17,
2003, the heirs of Gorgonio James filed a Civil Case against Eurem Realty
Development Corporation, alleging among others that the title of respondent’s
predecessor-in-interest, Eufracio Lopez, is void ab initio as it was derived from the
void title of Primitivo James (Gorgonio’s brother) as declared by a CA decision in CA
and that Lopez acted in bad faith in assigning the property to Eurem Realty as he
fully knew that he had no right or interest over said property. Eurem Realty, on the
other hand, argued that prescription has already set in, since the petitioners filed the
complaint on September 17, 2003 or more than 30 years after its predecessor-in-
interest Lopez bought the property from Primitivo way back in April 25,1972.

ISSUE:
Whether the action filed by petitioners barred by prescription

RULING:
No, the period for filing of Civil Case 5877 has not yet prescribed. The Court notes
that the RTC’s dismissal was triggered by the defenses raised by the respondent in its
answer. There was yet to be a trial on the merits but the RTC merely relied on the
averments in the complaint and answer and forthwith dismissed the case. On this
point, the Court has already ruled that the “affirmative defense of prescription does
not automatically warrant the dismissal of a complaint. While trial courts have
authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription, it may
only do so when the parties’ pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed
time-barred. If the issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring
a full-blown trial on the merits, it cannot be determined in a motion to dismiss.