Classification of Land

Fortuna vs. Rep., March 5, 2014

Facts: Applied for registration. RTC granted. CA reversed.
Issue: W/N subject land is alienable.
HELD:

No.

CA

decision

affirmed

Civil Law: There must be a positive act from the government reclassifying the lot as alienable
and
disposable
agricultural
land
of
the
public
domain
Jurisprudence has required that an applicant for registration of title acquired through a
public land grant must present incontrovertible evidence that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable by establishing the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute.

Land Bank vs. Cacayurin, April 17, 2013

Facts: RTC n CA nullify the loan for conversion.
Issue: W/N conversion of plaza to commercial land is valid.

Held: No, the said loans were applied for the purpose of funding the conversion of the Agoo
Plaza into a commercial center pursuant to the Redevelopment Plan. However, the
conversion of the said plaza is not valid as by looking at the propertys nature it is for the
public use and thereby, forming part of the public dominion. It was held that town plazas are
properties of public dominion which are to be devoted to public use and made available to
public and are outside of the commerce of man and cannot be disposed or leased by the
municipality to private persons.

Regalian Doctrine
Republic vs. Heirs of Sin, March 26, 2014
Facts: Proc. No. 2074 of then Pres. Marcos, as civil reservation for educational purposes of
ANCF. MTC n RTC ruled in favor of respondents. CA dismissed appeal.
Issue: W/N subject land cannot be subject to private ownership
Held: YES. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State
and that lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State.
In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondent which has the burden to identify a positive
act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land
into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Since respondents failed to do so, the
alleged possession by them and by their predecessorsininterest is inconsequential and
could never ripen into ownership.

Patrimonial Property
Rep. vs. Cortez, Feb. 5, 2014
Facts: Respondent applied for registration. RTC n CA ruled in favor of respondent.
Issue: W/N CA erred in affirming RTCs decision.
Held: Yes, Applicants for original registration of title to land must establish compliance with
the provisions of Section 14 of
P.D. No. 1529, which pertinently provides that: Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following
persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision
of existing laws.
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The Court further stressed that the period of acquisitive
prescription would only begin to run from the time that the State officially declares that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public use, public service, or for the
development of national wealth.

Expropriation
Rep. vs. Heirs of Borbon, et al., Jan. 12, 2015
Facts: Napocor entered a property to construct transmission lines for public use, but
eventually discontinue expropriation proceeding for its no longer necessary for public use.
Issue: W/N proceeding be cancelled and theyd be still entitled for just compensation.
Held: Yes, The exercise of right of eminent domain is not unlimited, for two mandatory
requirements should underlie the Governments exercise of the power of eminent domain,
namely: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid
to
the
property
owner.
Proceeding maybe cancelled for one element is already absent (public purpose), but they
are entitled not for just compensation but for disturbance compensation.

Ejectment
Barrientos vs. Rapal, July 20, 2011
Facts: Respondent owns a land where Petitioner stayed as a caretaker and agreed that he
would leave when respondent needs the land. But upon demand of respondent, petitioner
refused to leave the land.
Issue: W/N RESPONDENT'S DOCUMENT PURPORTING TO BE A TRANSFER OF POSSESSORY
RIGHT CAN PREVAIL OVER THE PETITIONER'S CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP AND THE LATTER'S
ACTUAL POSSESSORY RIGHT OVER THE PROPERTY.
Held: No, Ejectment cases forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary proceedings
designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to
possession of the property involved. The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment

proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the
possessionde facto and not to the possession de jure.
It should be stressed that unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits, under Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, are designed to summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land or
building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the
settlement of the parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings.

Recovery of Ownership
Jose vs. Alfuerto, et al., Nov. 26, 2012
Facts: Petitioner leased the subject land and after that they demanded the respondent to
vacate the property. Respondent refused to leave and claimed that they possessed the land
long before.
METC n RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner, but reversed by the CA.
Issue: W/N unlawful detainer is proper remedy.
Held: No, In unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant was originally legal,

as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied

contract between them. However, the defendants possession became illegal when
the plaintiff demanded that the defendant vacate the subject property due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess under the contract, and the
defendant refused to heed such demand. MeTC does not have jurisdiction over the
case. defendants occupancy as unlawful even before the formal demand.

Recovery of Property
Suarez vs. Emboy, March 12, 2014
Facts: Petitioner filed an ejectment case (unlawful detainer) against the respondent.
MTCC n RTC ruled in favor of petitioner, but reversed by the CA.
Issue: W/N Petitioner sufficiently alleged the cause of action for unlawful detainer.
-

Held: No, The SC indicated that Carmencita did not properly allege and prove the
requisites for unlawful detainer:
o

Initial possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by

tolerance of plaintiff;

Such possession eventually became illegal upon notice of the plaintiff to

defendant of the termination of the latter's right to possess;

Defendant remained in possession of the property, deprivint the plaintiff of its

enjoyment;

Within one year from last demand on defendant to vacate the property, plaintiff instituted
the complaint for ejectment.
Rivera vs. Rivera, April 17, 2013

Facts: Respondent filed a forcible entry against the petitioner. MTCC ruled in favor of the
petitioner but reversed by RTC and affirmed by CA.
Issue: W/N respondent have better right over the property.
Held: Yes, The respondents have proven prior physical possession of the property.
In this case, we are convinced that Wilfredo had been in prior possession of the property and
that the petitioners deprived him of such possession by means of force, strategy and stealth.

Wilfredos death did not render moot the forcible entry case. The petition before us
involves the recovery of possession of real property and is a real action that is not
extinguished by the death of a party. The judgment in an ejectment case is
conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent
to the commencement of the action; hence, it is enforceable by or against the heirs
of the deceased.

Quieting of Title
Heirs of Posido vs. Avila, March 19, 2014
Facts: Petitioner filed for quieting of title against the respondent.
Issue: W/N Petitioner have no title over the property that would support for action of quieting
of title.
Held: Yes, Under Articles 47611 and 47712 of the Civil Code, the two indispensable requisites
in an action to quiet title are: (1) that the plaintiff has a legal or equitable title to or interest
in the real property subject of the action; and (2) that there is a cloud on his title by reason
of any instrument, record, deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which must be shown to
be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity.

Good faith
Heirs of Sarili vs. Lagrosa, Jan. 15, 2014
Facts: Respondent filed a case against the petitioner claiming that theyre the owner of the
subject land. Petitioner claims that they are innocent purchaser.
Issue: W/N there was a valid conveyance of the subject matter.
Held: No. It is undisputed that Sps. Sarili purchased the subject property from Ramos under
the SPA. However, the notarial acknowledgement is flawed due to the CTC not being
indicated in the document in violation of Sec. 163(a) of RA 7160. Despite this irregularity,
Sps. Sarili failed to show that they conducted an investigation beyond the subject SPA and
into the circumstances of its execution as required by prevailing jurisprudence. Hence, they
cannot be considered innocent purchasers for value.

Possession
Rep. vs. Remnan, Feb. 19, 2014
Facts: Respondent applied for judicial confirmation of title over the subject land.

Issue: W/N respondent has entitlement to register over the subject land.
Held: No, Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain and that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same since
June 12, 1945, or earlier, the respondent's application for registration should be denied.

Builders in Good Faith

Sulo sa Nayon vs. Nayong Pilipino, Jan. 20, 2009

Facts: Respondent leased the portion of land to petitioner. MeTC rendered its
decision in favor of respondent. RTC which modified the ruling of the MeTC.
CA which held that the RTC erroneously applied the rules on accession, as found in Articles
448 and 546 of the Civil Code
Issue: W/N Sulo
sa Nayon had acted in good faith.
Held: introduction of valuable improvements on the leased premises does not give the
petitioners the right of retention and reimbursement which rightfully belongs to a builder in
good faith. Otherwise, such a situation would allow the lessee to easily "improve" the lessor
out of its property. We reiterate the doctrine that a lessee is neither a builder in good faith
nor in bad faith that would call for the application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.
His rights are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code.
Article 448 is manifestly intended to apply only to a case where one builds, plants, or sows
on land in which he believes himself to have a claim of title, and not to lands where the only
interest of the builder, planter or sower is that of a holder, such as a tenant.

Accession
Tan, et al., vs. Rep., Apr. 16, 2012
Facts: Petitioners applied for land registration.
Issue: W/N petitioners have proven themselves qualified to the benefits under the relevant
laws on the confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
Held: No, For one to invoke the provisions of Section 14(2) and set up acquisitive
prescription against the State, it is primordial that the status of the property as patrimonial
be first established. Furthermore, the period of possession preceding the classification of the
property as patrimonial cannot be considered in determining the completion of the
prescriptive period.
PNB vs. Sps. Maranon, July 1, 2013
Facts: Subject land has tenants.
Issue: W/N rent be released.

Held: Yes, rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property producing it by right
of accession. The rightful recipient of the disputed rent in this case should thus be the owner
of the subject lot at the time the rent accrued.

Trust
IFI vs. Heirs of Taeza, Feb. 3, 2014

Facts: Ga (supreme bishop, expired) sold land to Taeza.

Issue: W/N sale of subject lots is null and void.
Held: Yes sale of lots, null and void. if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit
of the person from whom the property comes. As such the resulting trust created by law
was a constructive trust wherein no promise nor any fidiciuary relation exists and the
trustee thereof neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the property for the beneficiary
(IFI).

Co-ownership
Arambulo, el a. vs. Nolasco, March 26, 2014
Facts:
Issue: W/N court can compel co-owners to give their consent to the sale of their share in the
co-owned property. RTC Yes / CA Reversed.
Held: No, petitioners cannot compel Nolasco to give their consent. Art. 493. Each coowner
shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and
he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the coowners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership.
Accession
Villasi vs. Garcia, Jan. 14, 2014
Facts:
Issue: W/N Sps. Garcia is the owner of the building erected in their land.
Held: No, When there are factual and evidentiary evidence to prove that the building

and the lot on which it stands are owned by different persons, they shall be treated
separately. While it is a hornbook doctrine that the accessory follows the
principal, that is, the ownership of the property gives the right by accession to
everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto,
either naturally or artificially, such rule is not without exception. In cases where
there is a clear and convincing evidence to prove that the principal and the
accessory are not owned by one and the same person or entity, the presumption
shall not be applied and the actual ownership shall be upheld. In a number of cases,
we recognized the separate ownership of the land from the building and brushed
aside the rule that accessory follows the principal.

Water Code
Pilar Devt. vs. Dumadag, et al., Mar. 11, 2013
Facts:
Issue: W/N 3-meter strip reserved for public easement form part of public dominion
Held: The Supreme Court ruled according to Article 51 of P.D. 1067 or The Water Code
of the Philippines which provides:
The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their
entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in
agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to
the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and
salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for
recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind.
Thus, the above prove that petitioners right of ownership and possession has been limited
by law with respect to the 3-meter strip/zone along the banks.

Foreclosure and writ of possession

Royal Savings vs. Asia, April 10, 2013
Facts:
Issue: W/N RTC erred in issuing Motion to Quash in favor of the respondents.
Held: No. A parcel of land occupied by a party other than the judgment debtor, the proper
procedure is for the court to order a hearing to determine the nature of said adverse
possession before it issues a writ of possession. This is because a third party, who is not
privy to the debtor, is protected by the law. Such third party may be ejected from the
premises only after he has been given an opportunity to be heard, to comply with the timehonored principle of due process.

Purchaser in good faith

Homeowners Savings vs. Felonia, et al., Feb. 26, 2014
Facts:
Issue: W/N HSLB is a mortgagee and a purchaser in good faith
Held: In the case at bar, HSLB utterly failed to take the necessary precautions. At the time
the subject property was mortgaged, there was yet no annotated Notice of Lis Pendens.
However, at the time HSLB purchased the subject property, the Notice of Lis Pendens was
already annotated on the title. When a prospective buyer is faced with facts and
circumstances as to arouse his suspicion, he must take precautionary steps to qualify as a
purchaser in good faith.

Indeed, at the time HSLB bought the subject property, HSLB had actual knowledge of the
annotated Notice of Lis Pendens. Instead of heeding the same, HSLB continued with the
purchase knowing the legal repercussions a notice of lis pendens details.

Easement
Dichoso, et al. vs. Marcos, Apr. 11, 2011
FACTS:
Issue: W/N Petitioner is entitled to a right of way.
Held: No, to be entitled to an easement of right of way, the following requisites should be
met: first, the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway; second, there is payment of proper indemnity; third, the isolation
is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and fourth, the right of way
claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with
this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.
In the case at hand, the petitioners failed to show sufficient factual evidence to satisfy the
above-enumerated requirements.
Castro vs. Monsod, Feb. 2, 2011
Facts:
Issue: W/N easement of lateral and subjacent support exists on the subject adjacent
properties and if it does whether the same may be annotated at the back of the title of the
servient estate.
Held: YES. The annotation of an adverse claim over registered land under Sec. 70 of PD 1529
requires claim on the title of the disputed land. It is done to apprise third persons that there
is a controversy over the ownership of the land to preserve and protect the right of the
adverse claimant during the pendency of the controversy.
Oliva vs. Rep., Apr. 27, 2007

FACTS:
Issue: W/N SECTION 90(i) OF C.A. NO. 141 WHICH PROVIDES FOR A UNIFORM
EASEMENT OF FORTY (40) METERS FROM THE BANK ON EACH SIDE OF ANY RIVER,
AND WHICH PRESERVES THE SAID 40-METER PORTION AS PERMANENT TIMBERLAND
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER IT IS SITUATED IN A FOREST AREA OR AN URBAN AREA,
IS STILL APPLICABLE TO LOTS SITUATED IN AN URBAN AREA IN THE LIGHT OF THE
PROVISIONS OF SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION, SPECIFICALLY SECTION 51 OF P.D. NO.
1067
Held: Since the property in this case was originally alienable land of the public domain, the
application for free patent contained the condition that a forty-meter legal easement from
the banks on each side of any river or stream found on the land shall be demarcated and
preserved as permanent timberland. However, after the property was administratively titled.
Thus, presently only three meters is required to be demarcated and preserved as permanent
timberland.

Gancayco vs. City Govt. of QC, Oct. 11, 2011

Facts:
Issue: W/N the wing wall of Justice Gancaycos building is a public nuisance.
Held: No, The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety of
persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not
necessarily make that structure a nuisance.
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business,
condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of
others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or
morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or
any body of water; or, (5) hinders or impairs the use of property. A nuisance may be per se
or per accidens. A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and
property and may summarily be abated under the undefined law of necessity.
MMDA vs. Trackworks Rail Transit Ad., Dec. 16, 2009
Facts:
Issue: W/N MMDA has the power to remove the billboards, signages and other forms of
media installed by Trackworks on the different parts of the MRT3?
Held: No, MMDA have no power on its own to remove the billboards, signages and other
advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. It did not apply to
Trackworks billboards, signages and other advertising media. The prohibition against
posting, installation and display of billboards, signages and other advertising media applied
only to public areas, but MRT3 is a private property.

Donation Intervivos
Villanueva vs. Branoco, Jan. 24, 2011
Facts:
Issue: petitioners title is superior to that of respondents.
Held: No, The existence of consideration other than the donors death, such as the donors
love and affection to the done and the services the latter rendered, while also true of
devises, nevertheless "corroborates the express irrevocability of xxx[intervivos] transfers."
Thus, the CA committed no error in giving weight to Rodrigos statement of "love and
affection" for Rodriguez, her niece, as consideration for the gift, to underscore its finding.
Moralidad vs. Sps. Pernes, Aug. 3, 2006
Facts:
Issue: W/N the respondents right to possess the land had been terminated.
Held: Yes, ART.562. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation
of preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise
provides.
Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply allowing one to enjoy anothers property.

There are modes or instances whereby the usufruct shall be considered terminated or
extinguished.
ART. 603. Usufruct is extinguished: 6) By the termination of the right of the person
constituting the usufruct.
In fine, the occurrence of any of the following: the loss of the atmosphere of cooperation, the
bickering or the cessation of harmonious relationship between/among kins constitutes a
resolutory condition which,by express wish of the petitioner, extinguishes the usufruct. Thus,
the Court rules that the continuing animosity between the petitioner and the Pernes family
and the violence and humiliation she was made to endure, despite her advanced age and
frail condition, are enough factual bases to consider the usufruct as having been terminated.