Rule 70 – Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

Zacarias vs. Anacay

G.R. No. 202354 September 24, 2014 J. Villarama, Jr.

Facts: The present controversy stemmed from a complaint 4 for Ejectment with Damages/Unlawful Detainer filed on December
24, 2008 by petitioner Amada Zacarias thru her son and attorney-in-fact, Cesar C. Zacarias,  against the above-named
respondents, Victoria Anacay and members of her household. Said respondents are the occupants of a parcel of land situated at
Silang, Cavite and covered by Tax Declaration in the name of petitionee

The MCTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint and held that the allegations of the complaint failed to state the
essential elements of an action for unlawful detainer as the claim that petitioner had permitted or tolerated respondents’
occupation of the subject property was unsubstantiated.  It noted that the averments in the demand letter sent by petitioner’s
counsel that respondents entered the property through stealth and strategy, and in petitioner’s own “Sinumpaang Salaysay”, are
more consistent with an action for forcible entry which should have been filed within one year from the discovery of the alleged
entry.  Since petitioner was deprived of the physical possession of her property through illegal means and the complaint was filed
after the lapse of one year from her discovery thereof, the MCTC ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the case.

Upon appeal, the RTC reversed MTC’s decision and pointed out that in her complaint, petitioner did not state that respondents
entered her property through stealth and strategy but that petitioner was in lawful possession and acceded to the request of
respondents to stay in the premises until May 2008 but respondents’ reneged on their promise to vacate the property by that time. 
It held that the suit is one for unlawful detainer because the respondents unlawfully withheld the property from petitioner after
she allowed them to stay there for one year.

With the failure of respondents to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period, the above decision became final and
executory.

On November 28, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution. At the scheduled hearing, respondents’
counsel appeared and submitted a Formal Entry of Appearance with Manifestation informing the court that on the same day they
had filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction before the CA

CA rendered in favor of respondents and held that MCTC clearly had no jurisdiction over the case as the complaint did not
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer.  Since the prescriptive period for filing an action for
forcible entry has lapsed, petitioner could not convert her action into one for unlawful detainer, reckoning the one-year period to
file her action from the time of her demand for respondents to vacate the property. Further, the CA said that while petitioner has
shown that she is the lawful possessor of the subject property, she availed of the wrong remedy to recover possession but
nevertheless may still file an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria with the proper regional trial court.

Petitioner contends that the CA erred and committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction in
nullifying the judgment of the RTC which has long become final and executory. 

Issue: Whether MTC has jurisdiction

Held: No, the Court finds neither reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA.

The invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case, are
the allegations in the complaint.11 In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party
clearly within the class of cases for which Section 1 12 of Rule 70 provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its face
to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. 13   Such remedy is either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. In
forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth.  In illegal detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his
right thereto under any contract, express or implied.

Here, the MCTC and CA both ruled that the allegations in petitioner’s complaint make out a case for forcible entry but not for
unlawful detainer.

In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites
the following:

(1)  initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of
possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

Here. Petitioner’s complaint failed to allege a cause of action for unlawful detainer as it does not describe possession by the
respondents being initially legal or tolerated by the petitioner and which became illegal upon termination by the petitioner of such
lawful possession.

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Petitioner’s insistence that she actually tolerated respondents’ continued occupation after her discovery of their entry into the
subject premises is incorrect.  As she had averred, she discovered respondents’ occupation in May 2007. Such possession could
not have been legal from the start as it was without her knowledge or consent, much less was it based on any contract, express or
implied.  We stress that the possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess.

In Valdez v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that where the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid
cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case. Thus:

“To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of
tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to
be recovered.  Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful
detainer would be an improper remedy. 

xxxx

A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word “tolerance” confirms our view heretofore
expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be
recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer - not of forcible entry.

It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause of action, whether it is
forcible entry or unlawful detainer.  If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against
the intruder is forcible entry.  If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes
illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint.  When the complaint fails to aver
facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was
affected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or
an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.”

The complaint in this case is defective as it failed to allege how and when entry was effected. The bare allegation of petitioner
that  “sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that the defendants have entered the subject property and occupied the same”, as
correctly found by the MCTC and CA, would show that respondents entered the land and built their houses thereon clandestinely
and without petitioner’s consent, which facts are constitutive of forcible entry, not unlawful detainer. Consequently, the MCTC
has no jurisdiction over the case and the RTC clearly erred in reversing the lower court’s ruling and granting reliefs prayed for by
the petitioner.

Province of Camarines Sur vs. Bodega Glassware

G.R. No. 194199 March 22, 2017 J. Jardeleza

Facts: Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Peñafrancia, Naga City. petitioner donated around 600 square
meters of this parcel of land to the Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc. (CASTEA) through a Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos (Deed of Donation). The Deed of Donation included an automatic revocation clause (Conditions: 1. use the above-
described portion of land subject of the present donation for no other purpose except the construction of its building to be owned
and to be constructed by the above-named DONEE to house its offices to be used by the said Camarines Sur Teachers'
Association, Inc., 2. that the DONEE shall not sell, mortgage or incumber the property herein donate)

CASTEA accepted the donation in accordance with the formalities of law and complied with the conditions stated in the deed.
However, on August 15, 1995, CASTEA entered into a Contract of Lease with Bodega over the donated property.

Sometime in July 2005, the Office of the Provincial Legal Officer of the Province of Camarines Sur wrote Bodega regarding the
building it built on the property. The Provincial Legal Officer requested Bodega to show proof of ownership or any other legal
document as legal basis for his possession. Bodega failed to present any proof. Nevertheless, petitioner left Bodega undisturbed
and merely tolerated its possession of the property.

On November 11, 2007, petitioner sent a letter to Bodega dated October 4, 2007. 12 In this letter, petitioner stated that Bodega's
occupation of the property was by mere tolerance of the petitioner. 13 As it now intended to use the property for its developmental
projects, petitioner demanded that Bodega vacate the property and surrender its peaceful possession. Bodega refused to comply
with the demand.

Petitioner, through its then Provincial Governor Luis Raymund F. Villafuerte, Jr., revoked its donation through a Deed of
Revocation of Donation15 (Deed of Revocation) dated October 14, 2007. It asserted that CASTEA violated the conditions in the
Deed of Donation when it leased the property to Bodega. Thus, invoking the automatic revocation clause in the Deed of
Donation, petitioner revoked, annulled and declared void the Deed of Donation.

It appears from the record that CASTEA never challenged this revocation.

On March 13, 2008, petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer against Bodega before the MTC Naga City. It prayed that
Bodega be ordered to vacate the property and surrender to petitioner its peaceful possession. Petitioner also prayed for the
payment of P15,000 a month from October 2007 until Bodega vacates the land.

The MTC Naga City ruled in favor of the petitioner. It ordered Bodega to vacate the property and to pay P15,000 a month as
reasonable compensation.

Bodega appealed this Decision to the RTC Naga City which reversed it in a Decision

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The petitioner then went up on appeal to the CA which rendered the now assailed Decision. In its assailed Decision, the CA
affirmed the ruling of the RTC Naga City that the petitioner cannot demand that Bodega vacate the property. The CA explained
that Bodega 's possession of the property is based on its Contract of Lease with CASTEA. . According to the CA, while petitioner
alleges that CASTEA violated the conditions of the donation and thus, the automatic revocation clause applies, it should have
first filed an action for reconveyance of the property against CASTEA. The CA theorized that judicial intervention is necessary to
ascertain if the automatic revocation clause suffices to declare the donation revoked.

The CA also found that petitioner's action has already prescribed. According to it, Article 1144(1) of the Civil Code applies in
this case. Thus, petitioner had 10 years to file an action for reconveyance from the time the Deed of Donation was violated. As
the Contract of Lease was entered into on September 1, 1995, petitioner, thus, had 10 years from this date to file the action.
Unfortunately, the action for unlawful detainer was filed more than 12 years later.

Petitioner filed this verified petition for review on certiorari challenging the assailed Decision.

Issue: who between petitioner and Bodega has the right to the actual physical possession of the property. 

Held: Petitioner has the right to the actual physical possession of the property. When in an unlawful detainer action, the party
seeking recovery of possession alleges that the opposing party occupied the subject property by mere tolerance, this must be
alleged clearly and the acts of tolerance established. 36 Further, the party seeking possession must identify the source of his or her
claim as well as satisfactorily present evidence establishing it.

In this case, petitioner alleged that as early as 2005, it had asked Bodega to present proof of its legal basis for occupying the
property. Bodega, however, failed to heed this demand. For several years, petitioner merely tolerated Bodega's possession by
allowing it to continue using its building and conducting business on the property. Petitioner demanded that Bodega vacate the
property in November 2007. This presents a clear case of unlawful detainer based on mere tolerance.

Petitioner proceeds to argue that its right of possession is based on its ownership. This, in turn, is hinged on its position that the
property reverted back to the petitioner when the donation was revoked as provided in the automatic revocation clause in the
Deed of Donation.

Applying this to the automatic revocation clause, we ruled in De Luna that:

It is clear, however, that judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a
contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in
order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper.

While the ruling in De Luna applied specifically to onerous donations with an automatic revocation clause, we extended this
doctrine to apply to donations inter vivos

We repeated this ruling in Dolar v. Barangay Lublub (Now P.D. Monfort North) Municipality of Dumangas. We once again held
that if a contract of donation provides for automatic rescission or reversion in case of a breach of a condition and the donee
violates it or fails to comply with it, the property donated automatically reverts back to the donor without need of any judicial
declaration. It is onl y when the donee denies the rescission or challenges its propriety that the court can intervene to conclusively
settle whether the resolution was proper.

In this case, the Deed of Donation contains a clear automatic revocation clause. Accordingly, petitioner takes the position that
when CASTEA leased the property to Bodega, it violated the conditions in the Deed of Donation and as such, the property
automatically reverted to it. It even executed a Deed of Revocation. The records show that CASTEA never contested this
revocation. Hence, applying the ruling in De Luna, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, Dolor and Zamboanga Barter
Traders Kilusang Bayan, Inc., petitioner validly considered the donation revoked and by virtue of the automatic revocation
clause, this revocation was automatic and immediate, without need of judicial intervention. Thus, the CA clearly erred in its
finding that petitioner should have first filed an action for reconveyance. This contradicts the doctrine stated in the
aforementioned cases and renders nugatory the very essence of an automatic revocation clause.

As to the question of prescription, we rule that the petitioner's right to file this ejectment suit against Bodega has not prescribed.

This Court cannot agree with the ruling of the CA that the petitioner should have first filed an action for reconveyance of the
property, and that petitioner's action has prescribed since it did not file the action within 10 years. This reveals a failure to
understand the nature of a donation with an automatic revocation clause. At the risk of repetition, the breach of the condition in
the donation causes the automatic revocation. All the donor has to do is to formally inform the donee of the revocation. Judicial
intervention only becomes necessary if the donee questions the propriety of the revocation. Even then, judicial intervention is
required to merely confinn and not order the revocation. Hence, there can be no 10-year prescriptive period to file an action to
speak of. When the donee does not contest the revocation, no court action is necessary.

Also, as owner of the property in this case, the petitioner is entitled to its possession. The petitioner's action for ejectment is
anchored on this right to possess. Under the Civil Code and the Rules of Court, a party seeking to eject another from a property
for unlawful detainer must file the action for ejectment within one year from the last demand to vacate. 53 This is the prescriptive
period that the petitioner is bound to comply with in this case. The records show that the petitioner served its last demand letter
on November 11, 2007. It filed the action for ejectment on March 13, 2008 or around four months from the last demand. The
action is clearly within the prescriptive period.

This Court also affirm the grant of damages in favor of the petitioner.

Section 17 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

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 Sec. 17. Judgment. - If after trial the court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true,
it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum
justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of
the premises, attorney's fees and costs

Thus, the rightful possessor in an unlawful detainer case is entitled to recover damages, which refer to "rents" or "the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises," or "fair rental value of the property" 54 and attorney's fees and costs.
More specifically, recoverable damages are "those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused
by the loss of the use and occupation of the property."55

In this case, the petitioner prayed for the award of P15,000 monthly as damages. Petitioner argued that considering that the
Contract of Lease between CASTEA and Bodega shows that the monthly rent for the property is P30,000, the amount of P15,000
which it prays for is fair and reasonable.56 We agree with the petitioner's position. The amount of rent in the Contract of Lease is
evidence of the fair rental value of the property. That the petitioner asked for half of this amount as damages is reasonable given
the circumstances.

Spouses Santiago vs. NorthBay Knitting, Inc.

G.R. No. 217296 October 11, 2017 J. Peralta

Facts: Respondent Northbay Knitting, Inc. (NKI) filed a Complaint for Ejectment before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Navotas City against petitioners 

NKI alleged that it owns the subject property, a parcel of land in Phase I, North Side of the Dagat-Dagatan Project in Navotas
covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title .  All petitioners were simply allowed to occupy said property by NKI and they were
not paying any rent. On March 5, 2009, NKI sent demand letters to petitioners asking them to vacate the property within five (5)
days from receipt and to pay rent in the event that they refuse to vacate within the grace period given. However, despite receipt of
said letters, petitioners refused to vacate or pay the necessary rent. Thus, on April 14, 2009, NKI filed an ejectment complaint
against petitioners.

For their part, petitioners averred that NKI only became the registered owner of the subject property on June 16, 2008, while
petitioners came into possession of said property through their predecessor-in-interest, Hermeginildo Odan, and have been
continuously in possession since 1970. And that Sometime in 2008, the NHA sold the property to NKI without giving petitioners,
as the actual occupants, the right of first refusal granted under the law. Thus, petitioners filed a case questioning said sale which
was docketed as Civil Case No. 06-11-MN. Petitioners contended that this case on the issue of their right of first refusal is a
prejudicial question that must be resolved first before the MeTC can take cognizance of the ejectment case.

Navotas MeTC rendered a Decision in favor of NKI

However, the Malabon RTC set aside the MeTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction, since NKI failed to show a case of Unlawful
Detainer

Upon appeal, CA upheld MTC decision.

Issue: Whether MTC has jurisdiction

Held: Yes. A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the following: 
 
1) possession of property by the defendant was initially by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of
possession;
3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment of the same; and
4) within one (1) year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment.
Here, as the CA aptly found, NKI's complaint sufficiently shows all the allegations required to support a case for unlawful
detainer, thereby vesting jurisdiction in the MeTC over the case. NKI stated that it is the absolute owner of the subject property,
as evidenced by TCT No. M-38092, and supported by Tax Declaration No. C-002-08822-C and real property tax receipt for the
tax due in 2008. Petitioners, who are the actual occupants of said property, never paid rent but continued to possess the property
upon NKI's mere tolerance. Despite receipt of NKI's demand letters to vacate, petitioners refused and continued to occupy the
property.

The statements in the complaint that petitioners' possession of the property in question was by mere tolerance of NKI clearly
make out a case for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the person's withholding from another of the possession of the
real property to which the latter is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the former's right to hold possession under the
contract, either expressed or implied. A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must
be originally lawful, and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. It must be
shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession must be established. If, as in the instant
case, the claim is that such possession is by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved.

Here, petitioners claim that NKI only became the registered owner of the subject property on June 16, 2008. However, from that
time when the title to the disputed property was registered in NKI's name on June 16, 2008 until the time when it sent the demand
letters to vacate on March 5, 2009, petitioners' possession had certainly been one upon mere tolerance of the owner. NKI's right
to possess the property had then become absolute and undeniable. And when NKI demanded that they leave the premises and

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petitioners refused to do so, their possession had already become unlawful. As the registered owner, NKI had a right to the
possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of its ownership.

Further, petitioners argue that there is a pending action questioning the validity of the sale of the disputed property to NKI,
consequently affecting the validity of its title to said property. Such argument is clearly a collateral attack on NKI's title, which is
not allowed in an unlawful detainer case. A certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack and can be altered, modified,
or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. 12 A Torrens Certificate of Title cannot be the subject of collateral
attack. Such attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding. Considering that this is an unlawful detainer case wherein
the sole issue to be decided is possession de facto rather than possession de jure, a collateral attack by petitioners on NKI's title is
proscribed. The present case only covers the issue of who has the better right of possession in relation to the issue of disputed
ownership of the subject properties. Questions as to the validity of NKI's title can be ventilated in a proper suit instituted
separately to directly attack its validity, an issue that cannot be definitively resolved in the extant unlawful detainer case

It has been held time and gain that the only issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of
the premises, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Possession refers to possession de facto, and
not possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable. Where the parties to an ejectment
case raise he issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to
possess the property. However, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, as in this case,
adjudication of the ownership issue is not final and binding, but merely for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession. The
adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to
the property.

An ejectment suit is likewise summary in nature and is not susceptible to circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting
ownership over the property. In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of ownership
in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the lower courts and
the CA, nonetheless, have the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of
determining the issue of possession. Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land nor is
conclusive of the facts found in said case between the same parties but upon a separate cause of action involving possession.

Regalado vs. De La Rama Vda. De La

G.R. No. 202448 December 13, 2017 J. Del Castillo

Facts: Emma, Jesusa, Johnny, Johanna, Jose, Jessica, and Jaime Antonio (Jaime), all surnamed de la Pena (respondents), are the
registered owners of two parcels of land with a total area of 44 hectares located in Murcia, Negros Occidental. 

Purportedly, in 1994, without the knowledge and consent of respondents, Joseph Regalado (petitioner) entered, took possession
of, and planted sugar cane on the subject properties without paying rent to respondents. In the crop year 1995-1996, respondents
discovered such illegal entry, which prompted them to verbally demand from petitioner to vacate the properties but to no avail.

On March 9, 1998, respondents filed a Complaint for recovery of possession and damages with injunction against petitioner.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground, among others, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case. Petitioner posited that based on the allegations in the Complaint, the action involved recovery of physical
possession of the properties in dispute; said Complaint was also filed within one year from the date the parties had a
confrontation before the Barangay; and thus, the case was one for Ejectment and must be filed with the proper Municipal Trial
Court (MTC).

The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. It held that it had jurisdiction over the case because the area of the subject properties was
44 hectares, more or less, and "it is safe to presume that the value of the same is more than ₱20,000.00."

On January 20, 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision ordering petitioner to turn over the subject properties to respondents 

Both parties appealed to the CA.

The CA affirmed the RTC Decision. The CA ruled that the RTC had jurisdiction over this case considering that the parties
stipulated on the jurisdiction of the RTC but also because the assessed value of the subject properties is presumed to have
exceeded ₱20,000.00.

Petitioner insists that respondents filed their Complaint for recovery of physical possession of the subject properties on March 9,
1998 or within one year from the date the parties had their confrontation before the Barangay of Cansilayan (September 29,
1997). As such, he maintains that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner also posits that even granting that this action is considered a plenary action to recover right of possession, the RTC still
had no jurisdiction because the tax declarations of the properties were not submitted, and consequently, it cannot be determined
whether it is the MTC or RTC which has jurisdiction over the case.

Issue: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction

Held: No. In our jurisdiction, there are three kinds of action for recovery of possession of real property: 1) ejectment (either for
un]awful detainer or forcible entry) in case the dispossession has lasted for not more than a year; 2) accion publiciona or a
plenary action for recovery of real right of possession when dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and, 3) accion
reinvindicatoria or an action for recovery of ownership.

Jurisdiction is thus determined not only by the type of action filed but also by the assessed value of the property. It follows that
in accion publiciana and reinvindicatoria, the assessed value of the real property is a jurisdictional element to determine the court

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that can take cognizance of the action. Further, pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691), the proper Metropolitan Trial
Court (Me TC), MTC, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over ejectment cases.

To ascertain the proper court that has jurisdiction, reference must be made to the averments in the complaint, and the law in force
at the commencement of the action. This is because only the facts alleged in the complaint can be the basis for determining the
nature of the action, and the court that can take cognizance of the case.
Here, the pertinent portions of the Complaint read:

2. That plaintiffs [herein respondents] are the owners of two (2) parcels of land known as Lot. No.
138-D with Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-103187 and Lot No. 138-S with Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-103189, with a total land area of 44 hectares, all of Murcia Cadastre
xxx;
3. That sometime in 1994, without the knowledge and consent of herein plaintiffs, the defendant
[herein petitioner] entered into and took possession of the aforementioned parcels of land and
planted sugar cane without paying any rental to herein plaintiffs;
4. That plaintiffs discovered the illegal entry and occupation by the defendant of the
aforementioned property and demand to vacate the property was made orally to the defendant
sometime in 1995-96 crop year but defendant refused and still refuses to vacate the premises;
5. A confrontation before the Brgy. Kapitan of Brgy[.] Cansilayan, Murcia, Negros Occidental,
and before the Pangkat Tagapag[ka]sundo between herein parties where plaintiffs again
demanded orally for the defendant to vacate the premises but defendant refused to vacate the
premises and no amicable settlement was reached during the confrontation of the parties, thus a
certificate to file action has been issued x x x;
6. That plaintiffs were barred by the defendant from entering the prope1iy of the plaintiffs for the
latter to take possession of the same and plant sugar cane thereby causing damages to the
plaintiffs;
7. That because of the refusal of the defendant to allow the plaintiffs to take possession and
control of their own property, plaintiffs were constrained to seek the aid of counsel and
consequently thereto this complaint.

Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, there are special jurisdictional facts that must be set forth in the complaint to
make a case for ejectment, which, as mentioned, may either be for forcible entry or unlawful detainer.

In particular, a complaint for forcible entry must allege the plaintiff's prior physical possession of the property; the fact that
plaintiff was deprived of its possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; and the action must be filed within one
year from the time the owner or the legal possessor learned of their dispossession. On the other hand, a complaint for unlawful
detainer must state that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession of the real property after the expiration or termination
of his or her right to possess it; and the complaint is filed within a year from the time such possession became unlawful.

In the instant case, respondents only averred in the Complaint that they are registered owners of the subject properties, and
petitioner unlawfully deprived them of its possession. They did not assert therein that they were dispossessed of the subject
properties under the circumstances necessary to make a case of either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. Hence, in the absence
of the required jurisdictional facts, the instant action is not one for ejectment.

Nonetheless, the Court agrees with petitioner that while this case is an accion publiciana, there was no clear showing that the
RTC has jurisdiction over it.

As argued by petitioner, the Complaint failed to specify the assessed value of the subject properties. Thus, it is unclear if the RTC
properly acquired jurisdiction, or the MTC has jurisdiction, over respondents' action.

Also worth noting is the fact that the RTC took cognizance of the complaint only on the presumption that the assessed value of
the proper exceeds ₱20,000.00. Aside from affirming such presumption, the CA, in turn, declared that the RTC had jurisdiction
because the parties stipulated on it. However, as discussed, jurisdiction cam1ot be presumed. It cannot be conferred by the
agreement of the parties, or on the erroneous belief of the court that it had jurisdiction over a case.

Ferrer vs. Judge Rabaca

A.M. No. MTJ-05-1580 October 6, 2010 J. Bersamin

Facts: This administrative case charges Hon. Romeo A. Rabaca, then the Presiding Judge of Branch 25 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila (MeTC), with ignorance of the law, disregard of the law, dereliction of duty, knowingly rendering an unjust
interlocutory order, and violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Officials.

The complainants were the President and the Executive Director of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 176394-CV of the MeTC, an
ejectment suit entitled Young Womens Christian Association, Inc. v. Conrado Cano. After trial, Civil Case No. 176394-CV was
decided on June 22, 2004 by respondent Judge, who rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the
latter to vacate the premises located at Ground Floor, YMCA, 1144 Gen. Luna St., Ermita, Manila; and surrender possession
thereof to plaintiff

On July 12, 2004, the plaintiffs counsel filed a motion for immediate execution, praying that a writ of execution be issued "for the
immediate execution of the aforesaid Judgment." The plaintiff cited Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court as basis for its
motion.

However, respondent Judge denied the motion for immediate execution, stating a Notice of Appeal dated July 9, 2004, having
been seasonably filed by counsel for the defendant. The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which respondent Judge
nonetheless denied
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The complainants averred that respondent Judges denial of their motions had rendered their victory inutile, and had unfairly
deprived the plaintiff of the possession of the premises. They further averred that respondent Judges refusal to perform an act
mandated by the Rules of Court had given undue advantage to the defendant to the plaintiffs damage and prejudice.

In respondent judge’s comment, he denied the charges. He explained that he had honestly thought that his court had lost
jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the provision of Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (which provides that "in appeals
by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the
expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties") once he had given due course to the defendants notice of appeal. He claimed
that he had issued the orders in good faith and with no malice after a fair and impartial evaluation of the facts, applicable rules,
and jurisprudence; and that if he had thereby committed lapses in the issuance of the orders, his doing so should be considered as
error of judgment on his part.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Rabaca is guilty of gross ignorance of the law etc.

Held: Yes. Indeed, respondent Judge should have granted the plaintiffs motion for immediate execution considering that the
defendant did not file the sufficient supersedeas bond despite having appealed. Granting the plaintiffs motion for immediate
execution became his ministerial duty upon the defendants failure to file the sufficient supersedeas bond. Section 19, Rule 70,
of the Rules of Court clearly imposes such duty, viz:

Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. If judgment is rendered against the
defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and
the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial
Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the
time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with
the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined
by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the
Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding
month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day
of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal
Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is
appealed.

It is clear from the foregoing that the perfection of an appeal by itself is not sufficient to stay the execution of the judgment in an
ejectment case. The losing party should likewise file a supersedeas bond executed in favor of the plaintiff to answer for rents,
damages and costs, and, if the judgment of the court requires it, he should likewise deposit the amount of the rent before the
appellate court from the time during the pendency of the appeal. Otherwise, execution becomes ministerial and imperative. 

Respondent Judges excuse, that he had lost jurisdiction over the case by virtue of the defendants appeal, was unacceptable in light
of the clear and explicit text of the aforequoted rule. To begin with, the perfection of the appeal by the defendant did not forbid
the favorable action on the plaintiffs motion for immediate execution. The execution of the decision could not be stayed by the
mere taking of the appeal. Only the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and the deposit with the appellate court of the
amount of rent due from time to time, coupled with the perfection of the appeal, could stay the execution. Secondly, he could not
also credibly justify his omission to act according to the provision by claiming good faith or honest belief, or by asserting lack of
malice or bad faith. A rule as clear and explicit as Section 19 could not be misread or misapplied, but should be implemented
without evasion or hesitation. To us, good faith, or honest belief, or lack of malice, or lack of bad faith justifies a non-compliance
only when there is an as-yet unsettled doubt on the meaning or applicability of a rule or legal provision. It was not so herein.
And, thirdly, given that his court, being vested with original exclusive jurisdiction over cases similar to Civil Case No. 176394-
CV, had been assigned many such cases, he was not a trial judge bereft of the pertinent prior experience to act on the issue of
immediate execution, a fact that further exposed the abject inanity of his excuses.

We agree with the complainant’s insistence, therefore, that respondent Judges omission to apply Section 19 was inexcusable. He
had ignored the urging to follow the clear and explicit provision of the rule made in the plaintiffs motion for immediate
execution. Had he any genuine doubt about his authority to grant the motion for immediate execution, as he would have us
believe, he could have easily and correctly resolved the doubt by a resort to the Rules of Court, which he well knew was the
repository of the guidelines he was seeking for his judicial action. Neither was it relevant that he did not know any of the parties,
or that he did not corruptly favor the defendant by his omission. His mere failure to perform a duty enjoined by the Rules of
Court sufficed to render him administratively accountable.

This case is an opportune occasion to remind judges of the first level courts to adhere always to the mandate under Section 19,
Rule 70, of the Rules of Court to issue writs of execution upon motion of the plaintiffs in actions for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer when the defendant has appealed but has not filed a sufficient supersedeas bond. The summary nature of the special civil
action under Rule 70 and the purpose underlying the mandate for an immediate execution, which is to prevent the plaintiffs from
being further deprived of their rightful possession, should always be borne in mind.

CGR Corporation vs. Treyes Jr.

G.R. No. 170916 April 27, 2007 J. Carpio Morales

Facts: CGR Corporation, Herman M. Benedicto and Alberto R. Benedicto (petitioners) claimed to have occupied 37.3033
hectares of public land in Barangay Bulanon, Sagay City, Negros Occidental 

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On November 18, 2000, Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. (respondent) allegedly forcibly and unlawfully entered the leased properties and
once inside barricaded the entrance to the fishponds, set up a barbed wire fence along the road going to petitioners’ fishponds,
and harvested several tons of milkfish, fry and fingerlings owned by petitioners.

On November 22, 2000, petitioners promptly filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Sagay City separate complaints
for Forcible Entry With Temporary Restraining Order And/Or Preliminary Injunction And Damages,

In a separate move, petitioners filed in March 2004 with the Bacolod RTC a complaint for damages against respondent,

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss petitioners’ complaint for damages on three grounds – litis pendentia, res
judicata and forum shopping.

Bacolod RTC dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground of prematurity, it holding that a complaint for damages may only be
maintained "after a final determination on the forcible entry cases has been made."

Hence, the present petition for review.

Issue: Whether, during the pendency of their separate complaints for forcible entry, petitioners can independently institute and
maintain an action for damages which they claim arose from incidents occurring after the dispossession by respondent of the
premises

Held: Yes. The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to "rents" or "the reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the premises" or "fair rental value of the property" and attorney’s fees and costs. (Section 17, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court)

The 2006 case of Dumo v. Espinas reiterates the long-established rule that the only form of damages that may be recovered in an
action for forcible entry is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property:

Lastly, we agree with the CA and the RTC that there is no basis for the MTC to award actual, moral,
and exemplary damages in view of the settled rule that in ejectment cases, the only damage that can
be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
property. Considering that the only issue raised in ejectment is that of rightful possession, damages
which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or
those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may
have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession. Other damages
must thus be claimed in an ordinary action.

In asserting the negative of the issue, respondent cites the 1999 case of Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals. In thus ruling, this Court in Progressive made a comparative study of the therein two complaints, thus:

A comparative study of the two (2) complaints filed by private respondent against petitioner before
the two (2) trial courts shows that not only are the elements of res adjudicata present, at least insofar
as the claim for actual and compensatory damages is concerned, but also that the claim for damages–
moral and exemplary in addition to actual and compensatory–constitutes splitting a single cause of
action. Since this runs counter to the rule against multiplicity of suits, the dismissal of the second
action becomes imperative.

Analyzing the two complaints, this Court, still in Progressive, observed:

Restated in its bare essentials, the forcible entry case has one cause of action, namely, the alleged
unlawful entry by petitioner into the leased premises out of which three (3) reliefs (denominated by
private respondent as its causes of action) arose: (a) the restoration by the lessor (petitioner herein) of
the possession of the leased premises to the lessee, (b) the claim for actual damages due to the losses
suffered by private respondent such as the deterioration of perishable foodstuffs stored inside the
premises and the deprivation of the use of the premises causing loss of expected profits; and, (c) the
claim for attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
On the other hand, the complaint for damages prays for a monetary award consisting of (a) moral
damages of P500,000.00 and exemplary damages of another P500,000.00; (b) actual damages of
P20,000.00 and compensatory damages of P1,000,000.00 representing unrealized profits; and, (c)
P200,000.00 for attorney’s fees and costs, all based on the alleged forcible takeover of the leased
premises by petitioner. Since actual and compensatory damages were already prayed for in the forcible
entry case before the MeTC, it is obvious that this cannot be relitigated in the damage suit before the
RTC by reason of res adjudicata.

The other claims for moral and exemplary damages cannot also succeed considering that these sprung
from the main incident being heard before the MeTC. 

However, the allegations in the complaint for damages of herein petitioners, their claim for damages have no direct relation to
their loss of possession of the premises. It had to do with respondent’s alleged harvesting and carting away several tons of
milkfish and other marine products in their fishponds, ransacking and destroying of a chapel built by petitioner CGR
Corporation, and stealing religious icons and even decapitating the heads of some of them, after the act of dispossession had
occurred.

Surely, one of the elements of litis pendentia - that the identity between the pending actions, with respect to the parties, rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for, is such that any judgment rendered on one action will, regardless of which is successful, amount

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to res judicata in the action under consideration - is not present, hence, it may not be invoked to dismiss petitioners’ complaint for
damages.

Res judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry case has no jurisdiction over claims for damages other than the
use and occupation of the premises and attorney’s fees.

Neither may forum-shopping justify a dismissal of the complaint for damages, the elements of litis pendentia not being present,
or where a final judgment in the forcible entry case will not amount to res judicata in the former.

Petitioners’ filing of an independent action for damages other than those sustained as a result of their dispossession or those
caused by the loss of their use and occupation of their properties could not thus be considered as splitting of a cause of action.

Supapo vs. Sps. De Jesus

G.R. No. 198356 April 20, 2015 J. Brion

Facts: The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint5 for accion publiciana against Roberto and Susan de Jesus (Spouses de Jesus),
Macario Bernardo (Macario), and persons claiming rights under them (collectively, the respondents), with the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City.

The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a piece of land located in Novaliches, Quezon City.  The subject lot is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-28441 6 registered and titled under the Spouses Supapo's names. The land
has an assessed value of thirty-nine thousand nine hundred eighty pesos (39,980.00) as shown in the Declaration of Real Property
Value

The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot. They also did not employ an overseer but they made sure to visit at least
twice a year.8 During one of their visits in 1992, they saw two (2) houses built on the subject lot. The houses were built without
their knowledge and permission. They later learned that the Spouses de Jesus occupied one house while Macario occupied the
other one.

The Spouses Supapo demanded from the respondents the immediate surrender of the subject lot by bringing the dispute before
the appropriate Lupong Tagapamayapa. The Lupon issued a Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa Hukuman (certificate to file action)
for failure of the parties to settle amicably.

The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case against the respondents for violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 or the Anti-
Squatting Law.12 The trial court convicted the respondents.

The respondents appealed their conviction to the CA. 14 While the appeal was pending, Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No.
8368, otherwise known as "An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772," which resulted to the dismissal of the criminal case.

Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo moved for the execution of the respondents' civil liability, praying that the
latter vacate the subject lot. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the motion and issued the writ of execution.

The respondents thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to challenge the RTC's orders denying the quashal of the writ and
the respondent's motion for reconsideration.17 The CA granted the petition and held that with the repeal of the Anti-Squatting
Law, the respondents' criminal and civil liabilities were extinguished.

The Spouses Supapo thus filed the complaint for action publiciana

After filing their Answer, the respondents moved to set their affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing 22 and argued that: (1)
there is another action pending between the same parties; (2) the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by statute of
limitations; and (3) the Spouses Supapo's cause of action is barred by prior judgment.

The MeTC denied the motion to set the affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing. From the MeTC's ruling, the respondents
filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC.

The RTC granted the petition for certiorari on two grounds, viz.: (i) the action has prescribed; and (ii) accion publiciana falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.

The CA dismissed the appeal and held that the complaint for accion publiciana should have been lodged before the RTC and that
the period to file the action had prescribed.

Issues:
1. Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction;
2. Whether the cause of action has prescribed; and
3. Whether the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata.

Held:
1. Yes. the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction. Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right
of possession of realty independent of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of
the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.

In the present case, the Spouses Supapo filed an action for the recovery of possession of the subject lot but they based their better
right of possession on a claim of ownership.

This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.

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However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties
has the right to possess the property.

his adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of
ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication,
in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.

Thus, while we will dissect the Spouses Supapo's claim of ownership over the subject property, we will only do so to determine if
they or the respondents should have the right of possession.

Having thus determined that the dispute involves possession over a real property, we now resolve which court has the jurisdiction
to hear the case.

 Jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real property is now determined by its assessed value. The assessed
value of real property is its fair market value multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value.

In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the subject lot, located in Metro Manila, is P39,980.00.
This is proven by the tax declaration45 issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan. The respondents do not deny the
genuineness and authenticity of this tax declaration.

Given that the Spouses Supapo duly complied with the jurisdictional requirements, we hold that the MeTC of Caloocan properly
acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana.

2. No. The cause of action has not prescribed.

The respondents point out that the Spouses Supapo filed the complaint for accion publiciana on March 7, 2008 or more than ten
(10) years after the certificate to file action was issued on November 25, 1992. The respondents contend that the Spouses Supapo
may no longer recover possession of the subject property, the complaint having been filed beyond the period provided by law.

Further, while the respondents concede that the Spouses Supapo hold a TCT over the subject property, and assuming a Torrens
title is imprescriptible and indefeasible, they posit that the latter have lost their right to recover possession because of laches.

This Court rule that the Spouses Supapo's position is legally correct that their cause of action is imprescriptible since the subject
property is registered and titled under the Torrens system. The Spouses Supapo acquired the TCT on the subject lot in
1979.46 Interestingly, the respondents do not challenge the existence, authenticity and genuineness of the Supapo's TCT.

In defense, the respondents rest their entire case on the fact that they have allegedly been in actual, public, peaceful and
uninterrupted possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner since 1992. The respondents contend that they built
their houses on the subject lot in good faith. Having possessed the subject lot for more than ten (10) years, they claim that they
can no longer be disturbed in their possession.

In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. We have also held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is a registered land
because of Article 112649 of the Civil Code in relation to Act 496 [now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 50].

In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens Title over a land is also entitled to the possession
thereof. The right to possess and occupy the land is an attribute and a logical consequence of ownership. Corollary to this rule is
the right of the holder of the Torrens Title to eject any person illegally occupying their property. Again, this right is
imprescriptible.

In Bishop v. CA, we held that even if it be supposed that the holders of the Torrens Title were aware of the other persons'
occupation of the property, regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of
their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all.

3. No. The complaint is not barred by res judicata. The requisites for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior judgment are:

(1) The former judgment or order must be final;

(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;

(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and

(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.

Res judicata is not present in this case.

While requisites one to three may be present, it is obvious that the there is no identity of subject matter, parties and causes of
action between the criminal case prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law and the civil action for the recovery of the subject
property.

First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal complaint, although initiated by the Spouses Supapo, was prosecuted in the
name of the people of the Philippines. The accion publiciana, on the other hand, was filed by and in the name of the Spouses
Supapo.

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 Second, there is no identity of subject matter. The criminal case involves the prosecution of a crime under the Anti-Squatting
Law while the accion publiciana is an action to recover possession of the subject property.

And third, there is no identity of causes of action. The people of the Philippines filed the criminal case to protect and preserve
governmental interests by prosecuting persons who violated the statute. The Spouses Supapo filed the accion publiciana to
protect their proprietary interests over the subject property and recover its possession.

De Guzman-Fuerte vs. Estomo

G.R. No. 223399 April 23, 2018 J. Peralta

Facts: The instant case stemmed from a Complaint4 for unlawful detainer dated August 10, 2009 filed by Fuerte against
respondents spouses Silvino S. Estomo (Silvino) and Concepcion C. Estomo (Concepcion) (Spouses Estomo). The subject
property is situated at Block 3, Lot 2, Birmingham Homes, Dalig City 1, Antipolo City

Fuerte alleged that Manuela Co (Co) executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property in her favor. Upon Co's
failure to pay the loan, Fuerte caused the foreclosure proceedings and eventually obtained ownership of the property. However,
the writ of possession was returned unsatisfied since Co was no longer residing at the property and that the Spouses Estomo and
their family occupied the same. It was only after the said return that Fuerte discovered and verified that the Spouses Estomo were
in possession of the property. 

In a letter5 dated December 1, 2008, she demanded them to vacate and surrender posession of the subject property and pay the
corresponding compensation. The Spouses Estomo refused to heed to her demands.

In their Answer,6 the Spouses Estomo denied that they illegally occupied the subject property. They also denied the existence of
the December 1, 2008 letter. They averred that they acquired the property from the Homeowners Development Corporation on
February 15, 1999 through a Contract to Sell, registered it under their names. and had been their family home since 2000.

The Spouses Estomo also prayed that the complaint be dismissed on the ground that the allegations are insufficient to establish a
cause of action for unlawful detainer. By Fuerte's own allegation, the Spouses Estomo's entry to the property was unlawful from
the beginning. The case cannot be considered as one for forcible entry since it was never alleged that their entry was by means of
force, intimidation, threat, stealth or strategy.

The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Antipolo City, Branch 1 dismissed the complaint without prejudice finding that
Fuerte failed to attach in the complaint a copy of the demand letter and establish that the same was duly received by the spouses

On appeal, the RTC reversed and set aside the decision of the MTCC. It held that Fuerte established the existence of the
December 1, 2008 demand letter, which was sent through registered mail under Registry Receipt No. 5209 of the Antipolo City
Post Office.

Subsequently, the CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC. The CA found that the complaint failed to describe that the
possession by the Spouses Estomo was initially legal or tolerated and became illegal upon termination of lawful possession.

Issue: Whether CA erred in reversing RTC decision

Held: No. A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the following:

(a) Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(b) Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant about the termination of the latter's
right of possession;
(c) Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of its enjoyment; and
(d) Within one year from the making of the last demand to vacate the property on the defendant, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment.
As the allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court, the complaint must
specifically allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer. In the absence of these factual allegations, an action for unlawful
detainer is not the proper remedy and the municipal trial court does not have jurisdiction over the case.

A perusal of the Complaint shows that it contradicts the requirements for unlawful detainer. A requisite for a valid cause of action
of unlawful detainer is that the possession was originally lawful, but turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to
possess. To show that the possession was initially lawful, the basis of such lawful possession must then be
established.19 Paragraphs 2 and 3 make it clear that Spouses Estomo's occupancy was illegal and without Fuerte's consent.
Likewise, the Complaint did not contain an allegation that Fuerte or her predecessor-in-interest tolerated the spouses' possession
on account of an express or implied contract between them. Neither was there any averment which shows any overt act on
Fuerte's part indicatiye of her permission to occupy the land.

Acts of tolerance must be proved showing the overt acts indicative of his or his predecessor's tolerance or permission for them to
occupy the disputed property. There should be any supporting evidence on record that would show when the respondents entered
the properties or who had granted them to enter the same and how the entry was effected. 21 Without these allegations and
evidence, the bare claim regarding "tolerance" cannot be upheld.

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Moreover, the December 1, 2008 demand letter supports the fact that she characterized the Spouses Estomo's possession of the
subject property as unlawful from the start, to wit:

Dear Mr. & Mrs. Estomo:

We represent our client, DR. FATIMA O. DE GUZMANFUERTE, the absolute and registered

owner in fee simple of the above premises you are presently occupying without her consent,
permission nor approval.

.... Nevertheless, since your occupancy of our client's property is without her consent,
permission and approval, it is, therefore, unlawful.

It is apparent from the letter that Fuerte demanded the spouses to immediately vacate the subject property, contrary to her
allegation in the instant petition that she granted such period, during which she tolerated the spouses' possession. She failed to
satisfy the requirement that her supposed act of tolerance was present right from the start of the possession by the Spouses
Estomo. It is worth noting that the absence of the first requisite is significant in the light of the Spouses Estomo's claim that they
have been occupying the property as owner thereof, and that they have filed an annulment of sale and real estate mortgage against
Co and Fuerte even before the property was foreclosed.

From the foregoing, this Court finds that the complaint failed to state a cause of action for unlawful detainer. Since the complaint
fell short of the jurisdictional facts to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of respondent, the MTCC failed to acquire
jurisdiction to take cognizance of Fuerte's complaint and the CA correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case against the
Spouses Estomo.

Fuerte asseverates that the pronouncement of the CA that the dismissal of the unlawful detainer case "is not a bar for the parties
or even third persons to file an action for the determination of the issue of ownership" merely invites multiplicity of suits. Such
dismissal defied Section 8,24 Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. She alleged that the CA should have remanded the case to the RTC as
the appellate court which has the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of the complaint to
proceed with the case.

It is well to be reminded of the settled distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for recovery of
possession and/or ownership of the land. What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action
(accion publiciana) and from a reivindicatory action (accion reivindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question
of possession de facto. Unlawful detainer suits (accion interdictal), together with forcible entry, are the two forms of ejectment
suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property. Aside from the summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or
the plenary action to recover the right of possession and accion reivindicatoria or the action to recover ownership which also
includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession.

Unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits are designed to summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to
one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties' opposing claims of
juridical possession in appropriate proceedings. These actions are intended to avoid disruption of public order by those who
would take the law in their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of possession.

The Court expounded in Serrano v. Spouses Gutierrez28 that the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 40 contemplates an appeal
from an order of dismissal issued without trial of the case on the merits, while the second paragraph deals with an appeal from an
order of dismissal but the case was tried on the merits. Both paragraphs, however, involve the same ground for dismissal, i.e.,
lack of jurisdiction. The above section ordains the RTC not to dismiss the cases appealed to it from the first level court which
tried the same albeit without jurisdiction, but to decide the case on the merits.

In the case at bar, the RTC actually treated the case as an appeal, with the decision starting with, "This is an appeal from the
Decision dated October 3, 2012 rendered by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1 Antipolo City" and then discussed the
merits of the "appeal" in the unlawful detainer case. In the dispositive portion of said decision, the trial court reversed the
MTCC's findings and conclusions. In a petition for review filed before it, the CA decided the case based on the judgment issued
by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the registered owner cannot simply
wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper
remedy, and once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper. 30 In
this case, Fuerte chose the remedy of unlawful detainer to eject the Spouses Estomo, but, failed to sufficiently allege the facts
which are necessary to vest jurisdiction to MTCC over an unlawful detainer case. In fine, the CA did not commit reversible error
in dismissing Fuerte's complaint for unlawful detainer.

The Inglesia De Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines vs. Loida Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 208284 APRIL 23, 2018 J. Del Castillo

Facts: On March 26, 2007, the Iglesia De Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc. (petitioner), represented by
Francisco Galvez (Galvez), filed before the MeTC of Malabon City a Complaint for unlawful detainer with damages
Complaint against respondent Loida Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), using the name CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST, "NEW
JERUSALEM" and all persons claiming rights under her (collectively, respondents)

Said Complaint contained the following allegations:

1. [Petitioner] is a [r]eligious (corporation x x x with office address at #29 Interior Leono St., Tanong, Malabon City represented
by its president, [Galvez].

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2. [Petitioner is the owner of certain parcels of land consisting of an area of TWO HUNDRED FOUR (204) SQUARE METERS
and SEVENTY[-]ONE (71) SQUARE METERS [both] covered by Original Certificate of Title [(OCT)] No. 35266 and [the
corresponding] Tax Declaration [(TD)] [No. 06223 (subject lot)].

8. Surprisingly, sometime [in] 1998, without the knowledge and consent of all the) members and officers of [petitioner), (Dela
Cruz) xxx formed, organized[.] and created the name of CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST, "NEW JERUSALEM";

10. The occupation and possession of [Dela Cruz) over the subject lot of [petitioner) was merely tolerated because they were
former members of [petitioner]

In her Answer, Dela Cruz countered with the following complaint:

1. She is an Officer of Obispe Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni Jesu Kristo

"Bagong Jerusalem" Inc. [Her] authority to represent said religious organization before the
MeTC) is embodied in a board resolution and outlined in the Secretary's Certificate hereto
attached

5. She] denies the allegation in paragraph 3 of the [Complaint for being false and misicading.
[Galvez deviously acquired) a new [title] by declaring the previous one as struck by flood X
X X. OCT No. 8257 (owner's copy) was never lost (as such and is still in the possession of the
Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng iglesia ni Jesu Kristo "Bagong Jerusalem." Inc.

8. [She claims that in] 1914, the church was founded (and had) its principal office at 797
Dagupan Ext., Solis, Tondo, Manila. The bishop then was Rev. Ildefonso Agulo. The church
was known then, as it was now, as the following:
"Church of Jesus Christ New Jerusalem." (English)
"Iglesia ni Jesu-Kristo Bagong Jerusalem" (Tagalog)
"Iglesia De Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva" (Spanish)
These three (3) nomenclatures were registered at the Department of Instruction, National
Library, Manila[,] Philippines.

The MeTC disrnissed petitioner's Complaint for lack of evidence.' The MeTC held that petitioner had failed to establish by
preponderant evidence that it had a better right of possession over the disputed properly arising from its claim of ownership. The
MeTC found that petitioner was organized as a religious corporation only on June 15, 1999, and was registered only on August 4,
1999, per its SEO Certificate of Incorporation; that petitioner did not own any real property per the List of Properties that it
submitted to the SEC; that petitioner, which was organized only in 1999, made the claim that it lost the owner's copy of OCT No.
8257, which explains why it prayed for the issuance of a new owner's copy;

Upon the other hand, the MeTC found that Dela Cruz had successfully proven that she was the authorized representative of the
Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni Jesu Kristo "Bagong Jerusalem" Inc.; and that this corporation sole is the
owner of the disputed property as shown by OCT No. (8257) M-35266 and TD No. B-001-06214 in the name of New Jerusalem,
New Church of Jesus Christ beginning the year 1993.

The MeTC stressed that Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni Jesu Kristo "Bagong Jerusalem" Inc. was registered
with the SEC as a corporation sole on September 3, 1955; that this denomination is also known as "Church of Jesus Christ, New
Jerusalem." "Iglesia ni Jesu-Kristo, Bagong Jerusalem," and "Iglesia de Jesucristo, Jerusalem Nueva" per its AOI; that this
denomination was established way back in 1914 under a succession of bishops until its incorporation as a corporation sole in
1955. 

The MeTC further found that the Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni Jesu Kristo "Bagong Jerusalem." Inc. is in
actual possession of the original owner's copy of OCT No. 8257 that was issued in 1940 when the religious denomination was not
yet a corporation.

The RTC rendered its Decision upholding the MeTC Decision.

Petitioner thereafter filed a Petition for Review with the CA. he CA denied the Petition for Review

Petitioner argues that it is the true, absolute, and registered owner of the disputed property, which is covered by OCT No. (8257)
M-35266 and TD No. 06223; that its President, Galvez, is in possession of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT (8257) M-35266;
that being the registered owner of the disputed property, it has the right to possess, enjoy, dispose of the same, and to initiate the
appropriate action to recover the same under Article 428 of the Civil Code, as in the instant case, that it filed the action for
unlawful detainer against respondents in accordance with Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court; that respondents'
right to the possession of the disputed property, was through mere tolerance, and expired upon receipt of its demand for them to
vacate the same through a letter dated February 12, 2007; 

Petitioner moreover insists that as the instant case is only for unlawful detainer, it follows that the only issue to be resolved
pertains to who has a better right to the possession of the disputed property, independent of any claim of ownership or possession
de jure; that in view of the existence of the validly issued title in its name, there is no need to determine the issue of ownership at
all; that ii is settled that a person who has a Torrens Title over the property is entitled to the possession thereof;

Issue: Whether CA seriously erred in dismissing the appeal

Held: No. A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (i) the defendant's
initial possession of the property was lawful, either by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such
possession became illegal upon the plaintiff's notice to the defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3)

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thereafter, the defendant remained in possession and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment of the property; and (4) the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment within one (1) year from the last demand to vacate the property.

In this case, the MeTC, the RTC, and the CA ruled for respondents, by uniformly holding that
Dela Cruz was able to show by convincing evidence that she is the duly authorized
representative of the registered owner of the disputed property. Quoting the RTC, the CA
agreed that it is beyond doubt or dispute that the disputed property is registered in the name of
"The Iglesia de Jesucristo, Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc." and that the sole
issue for resolution in the case is which party was authorized to represent the registered owner
of the disputed property, viz:

[T]he Court finds that 'Nueva de Manila appearing as the registered owner of the subject
property and ‘Bagong Jerusalem, the registered name of the religious organization of [Dela
Cruz] which is also known as New Jerusalem' in its English translation are one and she same
organization, and Dela Cruz), as evidenced by a Secretary's Certificate X X X was authorized
to represent [the same]. The [pieces of] evidence of [Dela Cruz] are found to be more
preponderant, the same being consistent and more credible and therefore, more plausible than
that of [Galvez's pieces of] evidence which are inconsistent, doubtful[,] and implausible

Moreover, Dela Cruz's insistence that Galvez succeeded in obtaining a new title to the disputed property based on the latter's
untruthful claim that the original thereof was destroyed by a flood, (even though the said original title, OCT No. 8257, was never
in fact lost) and was still in the possession of Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni JesuKristo "Bagong
Jerusalem" Inc. Hence, the issuance of the reconstituted title was irregular and improper because the alleged corporation which
owned the disputed property was not yet in existence when the alleged original title was issued.

Further, when the defendant raises the defense of ownership in [her] pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession." In
other words, "[w]here the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to
determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the property. However, where the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of the ownership issue is not final and binding, but only for the purpose of
resolving the issue of possession"

"Indeed, a title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes of property ownership, which necessarily includes
possession."Nevertheless, "an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of
ownership of the subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed must be averred in
the complaint and sufficiently proven."

Quite independently of the foregoing, what further strengthens herein respondents' posture was petitioner's utter failure to adduce
proof that he merely tolerated respondents' possession of the disputed property. In Corpuz v. Spouses Agustin, this Court
recognized that even as the registered owner generally has the right of possession as an attribute of ownership, nevertheless the
dismissal of the complaint for unlawful detainer is justified where proof of preponderant evidence of material possession of the
disputed premises has not been convincingly adduced:

Petitioner is correct that as a Torrens title holder over the subject properties, he is the
rightful owner and is entitled to possession thereof. However, the lower courts and the
appellate court consistently found that possession of the disputed properties by
respondents was in the nature of ownership, and not by mere tolerance

In the case at bench, petitioner miserably failed to substantiate its claim that it merely tolerated respondents' possession of the
disputed property. Indeed, "[w]ith the averment here that the respondent[s'] possession was by mere tolerance of the petitioner,
the acts of tolerance must be proved, for bare allegation of tolerance did not suffice. At least, the petitioner should show the overt
acts indicative of [its] or [its) predecessor's tolerance x x x But [it] did not adduce such evidence," as in this case. It is thus quite
evident from the allegations and evidence presented by petitioner that its claim that it merely tolerated respondents' entry into and
possession of the disputed property, is baseless and unsubstantiated. Furthermore, while possession is a question of fact which is
generally not allowed to be raised in a Rule 45 petition, the MeTC, RTC, and CA made no finding in respect to the question of
tolerance as discussed above.

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