CERTIORARI

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON.

REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR
MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,petitioners, vs. HON.
RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D.
GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, respondents.
G.R. No. 131457. April 24, 1998

Facts:

This case involves a land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto
Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the
petitioners. The property is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14371 of the Registry
of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.

In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing Corporation,
now Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10)
years under the Crop Producer and Growers Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of title.
The lease expired in April, 1994.

 In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
placed the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value
at P2.38 million.

When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS, it
discovered that the title over the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon found out
that during the pendency of both the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, with Preliminary
Injunction it filed against DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal to the President filed by
Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without giving just compensation, caused the cancellation
of NQSRMDCs title on August 11, 1995 and had it transferred in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines under TCT No. T-50264 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon. Thereafter, on
September 25, 1995, DAR caused the issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award
(CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it registered in the name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries under TCT
No. AT-3536 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon.

NQSRMDC filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon
docketed as Civil Case No. 2687-97, for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and
injunction against DAR and 141 others. The RTC then issued a Temporary Restraining
Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May 19, 1997, restraining the DAR and 141
others from entering, occupying and/or wresting from NQSRMDC the possession of the subject
land.

Meanwhile, an Order was issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres denying DARs
motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15)
days. The said order further declared that the March 29, 1996 OP decision had already
become final and executory.

On December 12, 1997, a Motion for Leave to Intervene was filed by alleged farmer-
beneficiaries, through counsel, claiming that they are real parties in interest as they were
previously identified by respondent DAR as agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectare
property subject of this case. The motion was vehemently opposed by the petitioners.

In seeking the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution, the petitioners claim that the Office of
the President was prompted to issue the said resolution after a very well-managed hunger strike
led by fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or politically
blackmailing the Office of the President to come up with this purely political decision to appease
the farmers, by reviving and modifying the Decision of 29 March 1996 which has been declared
final and executory in an Order of 23 June 1997. Thus, petitioners further allege, respondent then
Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona committed grave abuse of discretion and acted
beyond his jurisdiction when he issued the questioned Resolution of 7 November 1997. They
availed of this extraordinary writ of certiorari because there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. They never filed a motion for reconsideration of
the subject Resolution because it is patently illegal or contrary to law and it would be a futile
exercise to seek reconsideration.

Issues:

Whether or not the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for review
directly with the Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court;

Ruling:

In order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to draw
a line between an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction.

An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and
which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one
where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial
body without  or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount
to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctable only by the extraordinary writ of
certiorari.

It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any
quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions, including the Office of the
President, may be taken to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified petition for review within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the said judgment, final order or resolution, whether the appeal
involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.

However, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable considering
that the present petition contains an allegation that the challenged resolution is patently
illegal and was issued with grave abuse of discretion and beyond his (respondent Secretary
Renato C. Coronas) jurisdiction when said resolution substantially modified the earlier OP
Decision of March 29, 1996 which had long become final and executory. In other words, the
crucial issue raised here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment which is
reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the
assailed resolution is an original special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the
petitioners have correctly done. The pertinent portion of Section 1 thereof provides:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases in which the act of the
lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void.

The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person aggrieved by the assailed illegal
act may file a verified petition (for certiorari) in the proper court. The proper court where the
petition must be filed is stated in Section 4 of the same Rule 65 which reads:

SEC. 4.  Where petition filed.- The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice
of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to
the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court.  It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the
acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these
Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial
Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus. But the jurisdiction of these three (3) courts are also delineated in that, if the
challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or
person, the petition must be filed with the Regional Trial Court which exercises jurisdiction over
the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. And if it involves the act or omission of a
quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be filed only with the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise
provided by law or the Rules of Court. We have clearly discussed this matter of concurrence of
jurisdiction in People vs. Cuaresma, et. al., through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:

This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus,

quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with
Regional Trial Courts, which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective
regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of
Appeals, although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the latter’s competence
to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the
writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will
be directed. 

But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed
directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues rose, warrant. This
has been the judicial policy to be observed.

Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition
in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the
present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest
because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed
resolution. Moreover, as will be discussed later, we find the assailed resolution wholly void and
requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in
a waste of time and money.
CERTIORARI
PNB v. The Intestate Estate of Francisco De Guzman
G.R. NO. 182507

FACTS:
Respondent (Gina, one of the heirs) obtained a loan from the petitioner, which was secured by a
real estate mortgage over a parcel of land registered in her name. Gina’s sister, Rosalia, gave her
consent to the said mortgage. Later, Rosalia filed a Complaint for Cancellation of the Mortgage,
against Gina and the petitioner. The RTC dismissed the case for failure of the plaintiffs to pay
the corresponding docket fees. Since there was no appeal, the case dismissed became final and
executory. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed another complaint with essentially the same
allegations. Sometime in 2000, the petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res
judicata. RTC denied the Motion stating that, since there was no determination of the merits of
the first case, the filing of the second Complaint was not barred by res judicata. The petitioners
then filed numerous Motions to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata, the Court denied these
Motions. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
W/N the petition for certiorari should be granted.

RULING
NO. The motions were apparently filed for no other reason than to gain time and gamble on a
possible change of opinion of the court or the judge sitting on the case. In this case, the Motions
to Dismiss were filed in a span of five years, the first one having been filed on June 1, 2000 and
the last the subject motion on February 15, 2005, three years after petitioner filed its answer. In
fact, since the first Motion to Dismiss, three judges had already sat on the case and resolved the
motions. By filing these motions, petitioner had disrupted the courts deliberation on the merits of
the case. This strategy cannot be tolerated as it will entail inevitable delay in the disposition of
the case.
CERTIORARI
JOAQUIN GA JR., JUDITH GA GADNANAN AND JESUSA GA ESMAA V. SPS.
ANTONIO TUBUNGAN AND ROSALINDA TUBUNGAN
GR No. 182185

FACTS:
Sometime in 1985, petitioner Joaquin Ga, Jr. filed a Complaint for Recovery of Property and
Ownership of a parcel of land against respondent Norberto Ga before the COSLAP. The
complaint was subsequently re-filed on February 23, 2000 by petitioner Joaquins daughters,
Girlie and Grecilda Ga. On November 20, 2000, the COSLAP rendered judgment declaring
petitioner Joaquin and his heirs as the lawful owners of the disputed lot. Respondent Norberto
moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by COSLAP. On June 14, 2002, respondent
Norberto, filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Preliminary Injunction, Quieting of Title
and Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order. The petition assailed the validity of
the COSLAP decision and sought to enjoin the implementation of writs of execution and
demolition issued by the COSLAP pursuant to said judgment. The trial court issued an order
dismissing the case. It held that it had no jurisdiction to nullify the COSLAP decision, as the
same would be an interference with a co-equal and coordinate body. Moreover, the appellate
court held that COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint filed by
petitioners. In this case, the records do not show that the parcel of land subject of petitioners’
complaint is public land. Thus, the determination of which party was entitled to ownership and
possession of said lot belonged to the regular courts and not the COSLAP.

ISSUE:
Whether the appellate court erred in relaxing the rules on appeal considering its findings that
respondents failed to avail of the proper remedy before the appropriate court from the adverse
decision of the COSLAP.

RULING:
We find that the Court of Appeals correctly held that respondents remedy from the decision of
the COSLAP was to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as they assailed the lack of
jurisdiction of said body over the dispute. However, the petition should have been filed before
the Court of Appeals and not the trial court. In other words, while respondents availed of the
correct 5 remedy, they sought the same from the wrong court. This mistake would have rendered
the assailed COSLAP decision final and executory, were it not for its patent nullity and
invalidity. COSLAP may resolve land disputes that involve only public lands or lands of the
public domain or those covered with a specific license from the government such as a pasture
lease agreement, a timber concession, or a reservation grant. However, the lot subject of the
instant petition was not shown to fall under any of these categories of land and appears to be a
private unregistered land. Neither is the dispute between petitioners and respondents critical and
explosive in nature nor does it involve a large number of parties that could result to social
tension and unrest. It can also hardly be characterized as involving a critical situation that
requires immediate action. As such, the COSLAP should have dismissed petitioners’ complaint
for lack of jurisdiction or referred the same to the regular courts, which has jurisdiction over
controversies relating to ownership and possession of private lands. The records show that
respondents have consistently assailed the jurisdiction of the COSLAP, and yet, the latter
ignored the matter and simply proceeded to resolve petitioners’ complaint. Since the COSLAP
had no jurisdiction over the land dispute between petitioners and respondents, the judgment it
rendered on the case is null and void. As stated earlier, a void judgment can never be final and
executory and may be assailed at any time. It is thus clear that the Court of Appeals did not err in
taking cognizance of respondents petition for certiorari as the judgment of the COSLAP could
not have attained finality. In other words, the failure of respondents to properly appeal from the
COSLAP decision before the appropriate court was not fatal to the petition for certiorari that
they eventually filed with the Court of Appeals. The latter remedy remained available despite the
lapse of the period to appeal from the void COSLAP decision.
CERTIORARI
ISMAEL V. SANTOS, ALFREDO G. ARCE and HILARIO M. PASTRANA, petitioners,
vs.  COURT OF APPEALS, PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS PHILS., INC., LUIS P.
LORENZO, JR. and FREDERICK DAEL, respondents.
[G.R. No. 141947. July 5, 2001]

FACTS:
Private respondent Pepsi Cola Products, Inc. (PEPSI) is a domestic corporation engaged in the
production, distribution, and sale of beverages.
Petitioners were employed by PEPSI as Complimentary Distribution Specialists.
PEPSI informed its employees that due to poor performance of its metro manila sales operations
it would restructure and streamline certain physical and sales distribution systems to improve its
warehouse efficiency. Certain positions, including that of petitioners, were declared redundant
and abolished. Consequently, employees with affected positions were terminated.
Petitioners left their respective positions, accepted their separation pays and executed the
corresponding releases and quitclaims. However, before the end of the year, petitioners learned
that PEPSI created new positions called Account Development Managers (ADM) with
substantially the same duties and responsibilities as the CDS.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal with a prayer
for reinstatement, back wages, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. petitioners
alleged: o that the creation of the new positions belied PEPSI’s claim of redundancy. o
qualifications for both the CDS and ADM positions were similar and that the employees hired
for the latter positions were even less qualified than they were. o they claimed that while they
were notified of their termination, PEPSI had not shown that the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) was also notified as mandated by Art. 283 of the Labor Code.
Pepsi’s defense:
o maintained that termination due to redundancy was a management prerogative the wisdom and
soundness of which were beyond the discretionary review of the courts. o Thus, it had the right
to manage its affairs and decide which position was no longer needed for its operations. o the
redundancy program was made in good faith and was not implemented to purposely force certain
employees out of their employment o job descriptions of both the CDS and ADM positions
would show that the two (2) were very different in terms of the nature of their functions, areas of
concerns, responsibilities and qualifications.
Labor Arbiter Romulus S. Protacio dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
 CA dismissed the petition outright for failure to comply with a number of requirements
mandated by Sec. 3, Rule 46, in relation to Sec. 1, Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
CA found that the verification and certification against forum shopping were executed merely by
petitioners’ counsel and not by petitioners. The petition also failed to specify the dates of receipt
of the NLRC Decision as well as the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Under the afore
cited Rules, failure of petitioners to comply with any of the requirements was sufficient ground
for the dismissal of the petition.

ISSUE:
WON there was failure to comply with the requirements of the rules in filing their petition for
certiorari.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, in the absence of any reversible error on the part of the Court
of Appeals, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolution dated 28 September 1999 which
summarily dismissed petitioners’ special civil action for certiorari for non-compliance with Sec.
3, Rule 46, in relation to Sec. 1, Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is AFFIRMED.

RULING:
It is true that insofar as verification is concerned, we have held that there is substantial
compliance if the same is executed by an attorney, it being presumed that facts alleged by him
are true to his knowledge and belief. However, the same does not apply as regards the
requirement of a certification against forum shopping.
certification must be made by petitioner himself and not by counsel since it is petitioner who is
in the best position to know whether he has previously commenced any similar action involving
the same issues in any other tribunal or agency.
The petition failed to indicate the material dates that would show the timeliness of the filing
thereof with the Court of Appeals. There are three (3) essential dates that must be stated in a
petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65. First, the date when notice of the judgment or final
order or Resolution was received; second, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration was
filed; and third, when notice of the denial thereof was received. Petitioners failed to show the
first and second dates, namely, the date of receipt of the impugned NLRC Decision as well as the
date of filing of their motion for reconsideration.
 Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are
provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the
clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking
on the policy of liberal construction.
CERTIORARI

G.R. No. 195615               April 21, 2014

BANK OF COMMERCE, Petitioner,

vs.
RADIO PHILIPPINES NETWORK, INC., INTERCONTINENTAL BROADCASTING
CORPORATION, and BANAHA W BROADCASTING CORPORATION, THRU
BOARD OF ADMINISTRATOR, and SHERIFF BIENVENIDO S. REYES, JR., Sheriff,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, Respondents.

FACTS:

Traders Royal Bank (TRB) sold its banking business to Bank of Commerce. In
compliance with the BSP order, Traders Royal Bank deposited 50 million in escrow with
Metrobank. The amount will answer for those claims and liabilities that were excluded from the
purchase and Assumption Agreement.

A decision was rendered against TRB in a separate case against Radio Phils. Network
Inc. wherein Radio Phils was awarded with damages and legal interest. On the basis of such
decision, appellee –RPN filed a motion for execution to levy the amount deposited with
Metrobank in escrow. It was the contention of the appellees that TRB has been merged with
Bank of Commerce.

An order of Execution was issued by the RTC ordering the execution of all assets of TRB
including the escrow fund with Metrobank. Having learned the supplemental application for
execution, Bank of Commerce filed its special appearance with opposition to the same and
questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC and denying that there was merger between TRB and
Bank of Commerce. Thus, prompting the Bank of Commerce to file a Petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals. The same order was modified by the Court of Appeals deleting the
conclusion on merger / consolidation between TRB and Bank of Commerce.

Again, the RPN filed a motion for issuance of alias writ of execution on the basis of the
CA decision to which the RTC granted such motion. The Bank of Commerce sought for the
reconsideration of the RTC Order considering that the CA decision declared that there was no
merger between them and the TRB. Since the RTC has already issued the alias writ, Bank of
Commerce filed a motion to quash the same followed by a supplemental motion.

An order was issued by the RTC denying the Motion for Reconsideration and directing the
release of Bank of Commerce’s garnished monies and shares of stock of their monetary
equivalent. Aggrieved of the order, Bank of Commerce immediately elevated the RTC order to
the Court of Appeals via Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The CA out rightly dismissed the
petition on the ground that the BoC’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
order. Hence this petition.
ISSUES

Whether or not the CA gravely erred in holding that Bancommerce had no valid excuse
in failing to file the required motion for reconsideration of the assailed RTC Order before
coming to the CA

RULING

In the case at bar. The Court laid down the exceptions to the General Rule that a petition
for certiorari may only be filed when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
course of law. Since a motion for reconsideration is generally regarded as a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy, the failure to first take recourse to is usually regarded as fatal omission. These
exceptions are as follows:

a) there must be an urgent necessity for the CA to resolve the questions it raised
and any further delay would prejudice its interests;

b) under the circumstances present in this case, a motion for reconsideration

would have been useless;

c) Bancommerce had been deprived of its right to due process when the RTC
issued the challenged order ex parte, depriving it of an opportunity to object; and

d) the issues raised were purely of law.

In this case, the records amply show that Bancommerce’s action fell within the recognized
exceptions to the need to file a motion for reconsideration before filing a petition for certiorari.

Further, the court stressed that the filing of a motion for reconsideration would be redundant
since actually the RTC’s August 18, 2010 Order amounts to a denial of Bancommerce motion for
reconsideration of the February 19, 2010 Order which granted the application for the issuance of
the alias writ.

Significantly, the alias writ of execution itself, the quashal of which was sought by
Bancommerce two times (via a motion to quash the writ and a supplemental motion to quash the
writ) derived its existence from the RTC’s February 19, 2010 Order. Another motion for
reconsideration would have been superfluous. The RTC had not budge on those issues in the
preceding incidents. There was no point in repeatedly asking it to reconsider.

An urgent necessity for the immediate resolution of the case by the CA existed because any
further delay would have greatly prejudiced Bancommerce. The Sheriff had been resolute and
relentless in trying to execute the judgment and dispose of the levied assets of Bancommerce.
Indeed, on April 22, 2010 the Sheriff started garnishing Bancommerce’s deposits in other banks.
Further, the Sheriff forcibly levied on Bancommerce’s Lipa Branch cash on hand amounting to
₱1,520,000.00 and deposited the same with the Landbank. He also seized the bank’s computers,
printers, and monitors, causing the temporary cessation of its banking operations in that branch
and putting the bank in an unwarranted danger of a run. Clearly, Bancommerce had valid
justifications for skipping the technical requirement of a motion for reconsideration.
CERTIORARI

SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R. DACUDAO, Petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Respondent.
G.R No. 188056. January 8, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioners - Spouses Dacudao were among the investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles,
Jr. and his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies (Legacy Group) allegedly defrauded
through the Legacy Group's "buy back agreement" that earned them check payments that were
dishonored. After their written demands for the return of their investments went unheeded, they
initiated a number of charges for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Davao City on February 6, 2009.

On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ) Order
No. 182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City
Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat
of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action except that of cases filed in Cagayan
de Oro City which is covered by another DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009. Pursuant to
DO No. 182, the complaints of the spouses were forwarded by the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Davao City to the Secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ.

Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have directly come to the Court via petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to respondent Secretary of Justice grave
abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182. They claim that DO No. 182 violated their right to
due process, their right to the equal protection of the laws, and their right to the speedy
disposition of cases. They insist that DO No. 182 was an obstruction of justice and a violation of
the rule against enactment of laws with retroactive effect.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent Secretary of Justice,
maintains the validity of DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, and prays
that the petition be dismissed for its utter lack of merit.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus directly to the Court.
RULING:

The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, being bereft of substance and
merit, is dismissed.

Petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to the
Court with their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus without tendering therein any
special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the petition.

We emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum. An undue disregard of this policy against direct resort to the Court will
cause the dismissal of the recourse.

In Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto:

The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily
perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial
tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in
the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs
should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important
reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to
actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other
tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable
by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these
courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be presented. This is and
should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must
strictly observe.

Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only judicial forum
from which to seek and obtain effective redress of their grievances. As a rule, the Court is a court
of last resort, not a court of the first instance. Hence, every litigant who brings the petitions for
the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus should ever be mindful of the
policy on the hierarchy of courts, the observance of which is explicitly defined and enjoined in
Section 4 of Rule 65, Rules of Court, viz:

Section 4. When and where petition filed. - The petition shall be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of
a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the
Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed
in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court,

the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.
CERTIORARI

GERVACIO DAUZ, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
HON. FELIPE ELEOSIDA, ET AL., respondents-appellees.
G.R. No. L-15950             April 20, 1961

FACTS:

On November 25, 1958, this appellant was prosecution before the justice of the peace of
Kidapawan, Cotabato, because being a general merchant in that locality, and as such required to
pay license fees under the local Ordinance No. 21, series of 1956, he willfully failed to pay the
second, third and fourth quarter fees for the year 1958.

Summoned to answer, Gervacio Dauz filed a motion to quash on the ground that the facts
charged did not constitute a criminal offense. The justice of the peace denied the motion.
Whereupon, he instituted in the court of first instance this petition for certiorari and prohibition
contending mainly that as he had paid the first quarter for year 1958, the remedy of the
Government was to collect civil action — not a criminal prosecution — the other quarter fees,
plus the surcharges which the same Ordinance had fixed.

The Hon. Juan A. Sarenas, judge, dismissed the petition, explaining that petitioner's
remedy was to appeal, if he should after hearing on the merits, be convicted in the justice of the
peace court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the honorable judge committed error in dismissing the petition of
appellant.

RULING:

No, His Honor acted correctly.

There is no doubt that the complaint alleged violation of an ordinance; there is also no
question that the ordinance provided the penalty of not more than P200.00 fine, or imprisonment
not to exceed 6 months or both. So the offense, if any, was within the original jurisdiction of the
justice of the peace court. [Republic Act 296, sec. 87]. Whether or not Dauz' having paid the first
quarter for the year 1958 constituted a defense, is a matter which he should prove and discuss
upon the trial on the merits, and if that defense should fail, the way is open for him to appeal to
the court of first instance.

Needless to add, where appeal is available, certiorari and prohibition do not lie.
For these reasons, the decision dismissing Dauz' petition is hereby affirmed.

CERTIORARI
G.R. No. 199139
Causing vs COMELEC

FACTS:
Petitioner Causing assails the resolution of the Commission on Elections En Banc which
dismissed her complaint affidavit charging Municipal Mayor Hernan Biron of violating
COMELEC Resolution No. 8737.
On January 1993, Causing assumed office as Municipal Civil Registrar. On May 2010,
Mayor Biron issued several memorandums ordering Causing to report to the Office of the Mayor
to perform her duties therein.
Causing argued that the Memorandum is in violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737
which prohibits the "appointment or hiring of new employees, creating or filing of new positions,
giving of any salary increase or transferring or detailing any officer or employee in the civil
service and suspension of local elective officials in connection with the May 2010 nation and
local elections."

ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC En Banc which affirmed the findings of its PES committed grave abuse
of discretion warranting the petition for Certiorari filed by Causing valid, even without
submitting her Motion for Reconsideration on the assailed decision by the PES.

RULING:
The court ruled that the petition had no merit and further stated that the well-established rule is
that the Motion for Reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can
resort to the special civil action for Certiorari under Rule 65, to afford the public respondent the
opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the
legal and factual aspects of the case.
Jurisprudence however, has laid down exceptions to the requirement for the filing if
motion for reconsideration, namely:
a) Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction.
b) Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court.
c) Where there is an urgent necessity for the question, and any further delay would prejudice the
interest of the Government, or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the petition is perishable
d) Where, under the circumstances, motion for reconsideration would be useless
e) Where the petitioner was deprived process and there is extreme urgency for relief
f) Where in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief
by the trial court is improbable.
g) Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process
h) Where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object
i) Where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved. Perusal of the
circumstances of the case showed that none of the foregoing exceptions were applicable in
Causings case. The Petition for Certiorari was therefore dismissed by the Court.
CERTIORARI
G.R. No. 195594
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the National Irrigation Administration vs.
Spouses Rogelio Lazo and Dolores Lazo

FACTS:
Respondents spouses Lazo, owners and developers of Monte Vista Homes, voluntarily sold to
the NIA a portion of Monte Vista for the construction of open irrigation canal, spouses also
engaged the services of a retired chief geologist to conduct geohazard study on the possible
effects of the irrigation project, the effect of which is that the specialist found that ground
shaking and channel bank erosion are the possible hazards that could affect the project and made
his recommendation based on his findings. Such recommendations were adopted by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Bantay Ilocos Sur. After the resolution for the adaptation of the
recommendations, spouses Lazo brougth it to NIAs attention and further asked for its
implementation and payment for just compensation of the entire buffer zone.
When respondents’ demands were not met, they decided to file a complaint for just
compensation and amended it prior to the filing of an answer by the petitioners to include an
application for a TRO and preliminary injunction. The court orders an ex parte 72-hour TRO and
directed NIA to appear in a summary hearing to show why the injunction should not be granted.
NIA filed a manifestation through the OSG stating RA 8975 as basis, still, the TRO was further
extended for 20 days, and preliminary injunction was granted after hearings, with the injunction
bond in the amount of 3M.
The court opined that the case falls under the exception of RA 8975 because the
respondents demand for just compensation is by reason of the property being burdened by the
construction of the open canal irrigation, and by refusing to compensate the spouses, their
property is burdened by the construction, further stating that "taking" in the constitutional sense
may include trespass without actual eviction of the owner, the exercise of the power if imminent
domain does not always result in the taking of the property, it may also result in the imposition
of burden upon the owner of the condemned property without loss of title or possession. 100% of
the value of the zonal value of the BIR must be paid to the owner.
The court further noted that for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules of
Court do not require that the act complained of be in clear violation of rights of the applicants, it
is enough that grave and irreparable injury would result to the prejudice of the respondents.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the facts of the case justified petitioners’ immediate resort to the court of
appeals without filing a motion for reconsideration of the assailed orders of the trial
court.
2. Whether the Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration on the same date should
be considered an act of forum shopping.
3. Whether there was grave abuse of discretion by the Trial when it granted their
application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction.

4. Whether the case for just compensation with damages is one of extreme urgency
involving a constitutional issue that unless a preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury on the parts of the
respondents will arise.
Ruling:
1. The court ruled that a petition for certiorari may be given due course notwithstanding that
no motion for reconsideration was filed in the trial court. Although the direct filing of petitions
for certiorari with the CA is discouraged when litigants may still resort to remedies with the trial
court, the acceptance of and the grant of due course to a petition for certiorari is generally
addressed to the sound discretion of the court because the technical provisions of the Rules may
be relaxed or suspended if it will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice.
The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a
petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to
correct any error attributed to it by a re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the
case. However, the rule is not absolute and jurisprudence has laid down the following exceptions
when the filing of a petition for certiorari is proper notwithstanding the failure to file a motion
for reconsideration:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower
court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of
the petition is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable;
 (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to
object; and,
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.
The court agreed that the case falls within instances (a), (b), (c), (d), and (i) above-
mentioned. The assailed Orders of the trial court are patent nullity for having been issued in
excess of its jurisdiction. Also, the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings are the same as
those already raised and passed upon in the lower court; hence, filing a motion for
reconsideration would be useless and serve no practical purpose. There is likewise an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of
the Government.
While it has been stressed that payment of docket and other fees within the prescribed
period is mandatory for the perfection of the appeal and that such payment. It is not a mere
technicality of law or procedure, the Court, in exceptional circumstances, has allowed a liberal
application of the Rules when the payments of the required docket fees were delayed only for a
few days.
2. On the procedural error of forum shopping by the petitioners, the court stated:
There is forum shopping "when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same
issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court." Forum shopping is
an act of malpractice that is prohibited and condemned because it trifles with the courts and
abuses their processes. It degrades the administration of justice and adds to the already congested
court dockets. An important factor in determining its existence is the vexation caused to the
courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same
reliefs.
The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis
pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in the
other. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements are present, namely: (a)
identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amounts to res judicata in the action under
consideration. Taking into account the surrounding circumstances, it cannot be said that
petitioner’s Manifestation and Motion constituted as forum shopping.

3. Sections3 and 4 of the law provide:

SEC. 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions

and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. – No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against
the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or
private, acting under the government’s direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following
acts:

(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location of
any national government project;

(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under

Section 2 hereof;

(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any such

contract or project;

(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and

(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such
contract/project.

This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a private
party, including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through
such bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is
of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining
order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in
an amount to be fixed by the court, which bond shall accrue in favor of the government if the
court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought.

The court held that respondents failed to satisfy even the basic requirements of the Rules
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Therefore, the trial court gravely abused its
discretion when it granted their application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction. In so doing, it prematurely decided disputed facts and effectively disposed of the
merits of the case without the benefit of a full-blown trial wherein testimonial and documentary
evidence could be fully and exhaustively presented, heard, and refuted by the parties.
The prevailing rule is that the courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction
that would in effect dispose of the main case without trial. Otherwise, there would be a
prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since it would
assume the proposition which petitioners are inceptively bound to prove. Indeed, a complaint for
injunctive relief must be construed strictly against the pleader.
4. The court held not; the respondents failed to demonstrate that there is a constitutional
issue involved much less a constitutional issue that is of extreme urgency. The case aimed to
compel the Government to acquire more portion of the Monte Vista on the bases of the GAR
recommendations, which were vehemently opposed by the NIA, further arguing that the claim
for substandard works is speculative. Considering that the issues are disputed by the parties, it
cannot be said that spouses Lazo’s constitutional right to just compensation was or has already
been breached at the time the complaint was filed or even during the hearing on their application
for preliminary injunction.

In general, a property-owner like respondents has no right to unilaterally determine the

extent of his or her property that should be acquired by the State or to compel it to acquire
beyond what is needed, the conformity of a higher authority like the Sanggunian Bayan
notwithstanding.

The honourable court quoted Republic v. Nolasco in Presumption of regularity in the

performance of its official duty:

More importantly, the Court, the parties, and the public at large are bound to
respect the fact that official acts of the Government, including those performed by
governmental agencies such as the DPWH, are clothed with the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duty, and cannot be summarily, prematurely and
capriciously set aside. Such presumption is operative not only upon the courts, but on all
persons, especially on those who deal with the government on a frequent basis. There is
perhaps a more cynical attitude fostered within the popular culture, or even through
anecdotal traditions. Yet, such default pessimism is not embodied in our system of laws,
which presumes that the State and its elements act correctly unless otherwise proven. To
infuse within our legal philosophy a contrary, gloomy pessimism would assure that the
State would bog down, wither and die.

Instead, our legal framework allowsthe pursuit of remedies against errors of the
State or its components available to those entitled by reason of damage or injury
sustained. Such litigation involves demonstration of legal capacity to sue or be sued, an
exhaustive trial on the merits, and adjudication that has basis in duly proven facts and
law. x x x
CERTIORARI
G.R. No.172299
Alfredo Tagle vs Equitable PCI Bank

FACTS:
Petition for Certiorari is filed by petitioner Tagle on the resolutions by the CA regarding
a parcel of land which allegedly was mortgaged to repondent Equitable PCI Bank, petitioner
contended that such land, constituted as Family Land cannot be mortgaged, further alleging that
such property was not mortgaged by him but of one Josefino Tagle who has passed away. EPCI
bank recount that such mortgage was executed to Alfredo by way of Special power of Attorney.
Respondent filed a Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession of the subject property,
and Petitioner filed a motion to stop writ of possession. The petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied and so petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prohibition
under Rule 65.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the present Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court is the proper remedy for petitioner Alfredo to avail of in seeking the reversal of the three
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals.

RULING:
The proper remedy of the petitioner would have been to appeal the decisions: Basic is the rule
that a writ of certiorari will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to an aggrieved
party. A remedy is considered "plain, speedy and adequate" if it will promptly relieve the
petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency. In
this case, appeal was not only available but also a speedy and adequate remedy.
A special civil action for Certiorari, or simply a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep
the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such cannot be used for any other
purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction.
 For a petition for certiorari to prosper, the essential requisites that have to concur are: (1)
the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The phrase "without jurisdiction" means that the court acted with absolute lack of
authority or want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes,
considered either in general or with reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to
exercise authority. "Excess of jurisdiction" occurs when the court transcends its power or acts
without any statutory authority; or results when an act, though within the general power of a
tribunal, board or officer (to do) is not authorized, and invalid with respect to the particular
proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in
respect of it are wanting. While that of "grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; simply put,
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The court further reiterated the difference between Certiorari under Rule 65 and 45.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. The court further quoted Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC,
where the court explained the simple reason for the rule in this light:
When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not
deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error
committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be
a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a
rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the original civil action of certiorari.
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be
exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court
-- on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of
the decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the
case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of
jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact -- a mistake of judgment -- appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction
and power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in
accordance with its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. An
appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original and
independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment
or order complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. In contrast,
the parties to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the
petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the public
and the private respondents, respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of
Court so declared are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari
may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the
judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the
notice of judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said
notice of judgment or final order. A petition for review should be filed and served within fifteen
days from the notice of denial of the decision, or of the petitioners timely filed motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed also
within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the petitioners
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from
the notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is
generally required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an
opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate
remedy expressly available under the law. Such motion is not required before appealing a
judgment or final order.
PROHIBITION
PROHIBITION

G.R. No. 156684               April 6, 2011

SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY, Petitioners,

vs
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG
CITY, Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners owned a parcel of land at Mandaluyong City. Half of their land they used as
their residence, and the rest they rented out to nine other families. Allegedly, the land was their
only property and only source of income.

Meanwhile, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No.

552, Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary
legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose of developing it for
low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants.

With the exercise of its power of eminent domain granted under Section 19 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, the petitioners became alarmed, and filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition in the RTC, praying for the annulment of Resolution No. 552 due to its being
unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without force and effect.

The City countered that Resolution No. 552 was a mere authorization given to the City
Mayor to initiate the legal steps towards expropriation, which included making a definite offer to
purchase the property of the petitioners; hence, the suit of the petitioners was premature.

The RTC ruled in favor of the City and dismissed the petition for lack of merit, opining
that certiorari did not lie against a legislative act of the City Government.

However, the RTC, acting upon the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, set aside its
decision and declared that Resolution No. 552 was null and void. The RTC held that the petition
was not premature because the passage of Resolution No. 552 would already pave the way for
the City to deprive the petitioners and their heirs of their only property; that there was no due
process in the passage of Resolution No. 552 because the petitioners had not been invited to the
subsequent hearings on the resolution to enable them to ventilate their opposition; and that the
purpose for the expropriation was not for public use and the expropriation would not benefit the
greater number of inhabitants.

Aggrieved, the City appealed to the CA. The CA concluded that the reversal of the
decision by the RTC was not justified because Resolution No. 552 deserved to be accorded the
benefit of the presumption of regularity and validity absent any sufficient showing to the
contrary; that notice to the petitioners of the succeeding hearings conducted by the City was not a
part of due process, for it was enough that their views had been consulted and that they had been
given the full opportunity to voice their protest; that to rule otherwise would be to give every
affected resident effective veto powers in law-making by a local government unit; and that a
public hearing, although necessary at times, was not indispensable and merely aided in law-
making. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied their motion. Thus, they
appeal to the Court

ISSUES:

Whether or Not the action for certiorari and prohibition commenced by the petitioners in
the RTC was a proper recourse of the petitioners.

RULING:

The court denied the petition for review, and found that certiorari and prohibition were
not available to the petitioners under the circumstances. Thus sustaining, albeit upon different
grounds, the result announced by the CA, and declare that the RTC gravely erred in giving due
course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition. Further, Prohibition does not lie against
expropriation.

The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal
authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice. The writ of prohibition is
directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.

For grave abuse of discretion to be a ground for prohibition, the petitioner must first
demonstrate that the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, has exercised its or his power in an arbitrary or
despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, which must be so patent and gross
as would amount to an evasion, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law.

On the other hand, the term excess of jurisdiction signifies that the court, board, or
officer has jurisdiction over a case but has transcended such jurisdiction or acted without any
authority.

The petitioner must further allege in the petition and establish facts to show that any other
existing remedy is not speedy or adequate. A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the
tribunal or inferior court.
 Verily, there can be no prohibition against a procedure whereby the immediate
possession of the land under expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided always that due
provision is made to secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to the
owner. This bar against prohibition comes from the nature of the power of eminent domain as
necessitating the taking of private land intended for public use, and the interest of the affected
landowner is thus made subordinate to the power of the State. Once the State decides to exercise
its power of eminent domain, the power of judicial review becomes limited in scope, and the
courts will be left to determine the appropriate amount of just compensation to be paid to the
affected landowners. Only when the landowners are not given their just compensation for the
taking of their property or when there has been no agreement on the amount of just compensation
may the remedy of prohibition become available.
PROHIBITION

G. R. No. 120014             November 26, 2002

FRANCISCO Q. AURILLO, JR., petitioner,

vs.
NOEL RABI, and THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 9, Tacloban City,
respondents.

FACTS:

Noel Rabi was arrested and charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866
(possession of unlicensed firearm). The city prosecutor conducted an inquest investigation of the
case and issued a resolution recommending that the case be dismissed for lack of probable cause.

However, Regional State Prosecutor Francisco Aurillo, Jr. decided to assume jurisdiction
over the case and order the conduct of a new preliminary investigation thereof. He directed the
City Prosecutor thru a memorandum, to elevate to his office the complete records of the above
case and designated the assistant regional state prosecutor to conduct the new preliminary
investigation who then issued a subpoena notifying Noel Rabi and Margot Villanueva of the
preliminary investigation not only for violation of PD 1866 but also for the crimes of "Violation
of Comelec Resolution No. 2323, BP Blg. 9 (possession of deadly weapon) and "Malicious
Mischief."

When served with the subpoena, Rabi was aghast at the sudden turn of events. On the
same date, his counsel forthwith filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for prohibition
with prayer for a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction.

Rabi contended that by taking over the preliminary investigation and conducting a new
preliminary investigation of said case, Aurillo acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Rabi thus prayed that, pending resolution
of his plea for a writ of preliminary injunction, a temporary restraining order be issued to enjoin
Aurillo from proceeding with the preliminary investigation.

Acting on the petition, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order, enjoining and
prohibiting Aurillo and all others acting for and in his behalf from taking over and conducting a
new preliminary investigation until the court shall have resolved the motion for issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and the other issues raised in the petition.

During the hearing, the RTC issued an order declaring that the issue of whether or not the
court will issue a writ of preliminary injunction was submitted for resolution and that it will issue
a resolution thereon in five days’ time. However, the RTC failed to do so. Instead, the RTC
issued an order directing the parties to file their respective memoranda within five days from
receipt thereof after which the petition will be deemed submitted for resolution. The parties did
not object to the order. Nevertheless, the assistant regional state prosecutor continued with his
preliminary investigation. And filed an information against Rabi for violation of PD 1866.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Rabi. The trial court nullified the preliminary
investigation by the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor and the Information filed with the
RTC against Rabi. It also ordered Aurillo to pay moral and exemplary damages including
attorney’s fees.

Aurillo thereafter filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, on questions of law,
against Rabi and the RTC

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the Information filed by Aurillo against Rabi with the RTC for violation of PD
1866 may be nullified by said court.

RULING:

The Court Ruled in favor of the RTC stating that the pendency of the special civil action
for prohibition before the trial court did not interrupt the investigation. It goes without saying,
however, that in proceeding with the preliminary investigation and terminating the same, Aurillo
did so subject to the outcome of the petition for prohibition. In this case, the RTC granted the
petition of Rabi, declared Aurillo bereft of authority to take over the preliminary investigation
and nullified the preliminary investigation conducted by Aurillo as well as the Information
thereafter filed by him. The RTC is possessed of residual power to restore the parties to their
status before Aurillo proceeded with the preliminary investigation, and grant in favor of the
aggrieved party such other relief as may be proper.

Generally, the relief granted in a prohibition proceeding is governed by the nature of the
grievance proved and the situation at the time of judgment. Although the general rule is that a
writ of prohibition issues only to restrain the commission of a future act, and not to undo an act
already performed, where anything remains to be done by the court, prohibition will give
complete relief, not only by preventing what remains to be done but by undoing what has been
done. Under some statutes, the court must grant the appropriate relief whatever the proceeding is
called if facts stating ground for relief are pleaded. Although prohibition is requested only as to a
particular matter, the court has authority to grant any appropriate relief within the issues
presented by the pleadings. If the application for prohibition is too broad, the court may mould
the writ and limit it to as much as is proper to be granted. In the exercise of its jurisdiction to
issue writs, the court has, as a necessary incident thereto, the power to make such incidental
order as may be necessary to maintain its jurisdiction and to effectuate its final judgment. The
court may retain jurisdiction of the cause to enable it to make an appropriate order in the future,
even though the petition for a writ of prohibition is dismissed.
PROHIBITION

THE NACIONALISTA PARTY, petitioner,

vs.
FELIX ANGELO BAUTISTA, Solicitor General of the Philippines, respondent.

G.R. No. L-3452 7 December 1949

FACTS:

Petitioner Nacionalista Party alleges that it is organized and registered under the laws of
the Philippines, brought this action praying that a writ of prohibition issue commanding the
respondent Solicitor General to desist forever from acting as acting member of the Commission
on Elections under the designation rendered to him by President Quirino, unless he is legally
appointed as regular member of the said Commission on Elections.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not petitioner prohibition is the proper remedy.

2. Whether or not petitioner, a political party is entitled to bring an action in the courts of
justice.

RULING (1):

The only basis for the petition is that the designation of the respondent as temporary
member of the Commission on Elections is illegal and invalid because it offends against the
Constitution. This special civil action is in effect to test the validity or legality of the respondent's
designation in a temporary capacity as member of the Commission on Elections pending the
appointment of a permanent member or Commissioner. It is in the nature of a quo warranto, and
as such it may only be instituted by the party who claims to be entitled to the office or by the
Solicitor General. The authorities and decisions of courts are almost unanimous that prohibition
will not lie to determine the title of a de facto judicial officer, since its only function is to prevent
a usurpation of jurisdiction by a subordinate court.

In the case at bar, however, as we have found that the respondent's designation to act
temporarily a member of the Commission on Elections is unlawful because it offends against the
provision of the Constitution creating the Commission on Elections, the dismissal of the petition
would deny and deprive the parties that are affected by such designation of a remedy and relief,
because no one is entitled now to the office and a party who is not entitled to the office may not
institute quo warrant proceedings, and the respondent as Solicitor General, the only other party
who may institute the proceedings, would not proceed against himself. In these circumstances, it
is incumbent upon and the duty of this Court to grant a remedy.
 Were it not for this anomalous situation where there would be no remedy to redress a
constitutional transgression, the Supreme Court would adhere strictly to the time-honored rule
that to test the right to an office quo warranto proceedings is the proper remedy.
RULING (2):

It may be organized and registered as a political party in or with the Commission on

Elections for the purposes of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act No. 180), but for the
purpose of bringing an action in the courts of justice such organization and registration are not
sufficient. It has to be incorporated under Act 1459 for only natural or juridical persons may be
parties in a civil action, but this technical defect may be cured by allowing the substitution of the
real parties in interest for the petitioner.

The petitioner is granted five days within which to amend its petition so as to substitute
the real parties in interest for it (the petitioner) or to show that it is a juridical person entitled to
institute these proceedings. Otherwise, or if the petitioner does not amend its petition or does not
show that it is a juridical entity, the petition will be dismissed. After the amendment or showing
referred to shall have been made, the writ prayed for will issue.
PROHIBITION

MARCELO ENRIQUEZ, petitioner,

vs.
HIGINIO B. MACADAEG, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, MELITON
YBURAN, and THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondents.

G.R. No. L-2422 30 September 1949

FACTS:

This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to dismiss a
civil action pending in his court.

The civil action in question is for the recovery of a piece of real property situated in
Negros Oriental, the complaint alleging that the said property had been bought by plaintiff at an
execution sale but that, notwithstanding the sale, the judgment debtor, as supposed owner of said
property, subsequently mortgaged the same to the Philippine National Bank and refused to
surrender possession thereof to plaintiff, whereupon, the latter brought suit (Meliton Yburan vs.
Marcelo Enriquez and The Philippine National Bank, civil case No. R-552 of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu) to have himself declared owner of said property and placed in possession
thereof. Before filing their answer, the defendants in that case moved for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground, among others, that, as the action concerned title to and possession of
real estate situated in Negros Oriental, venue was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu. The motion having been denied, the defendants filed the present petition for mandamus
to compel the respondent judge to dismiss the action.

Answering the petition, the respondent judge puts up the defense that the act sought to be
ordered involves the exercise of judicial discretion and that petitioner has another adequate
remedy, which is by appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petition for mandamus is the adequate remedy to the case at hand?

RULING:

Section 3 of Rule 5 of the Rules of Court requires that actions affecting title to or
recovery of possession of real property be commenced and tried in the province where the
property lies, while paragraph 1 (b) of Rule 8, provides that defendant may, within the time for
pleading, file a motion to dismiss the action when "venue is improperly laid." As the action
sought to be dismissed affects title to and the redovery of possession of real property situated in
Negros Oriental, it is obvious that the action was improperly brought in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. The motion to dismiss was therefore proper and should have been granted.
 But, while the respondent judge committed a manifest error in denying the motion,
mandamus is not the proper remedy for correcting that error, for this is not a case where a
tribunal "unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office" or "unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right." (Sec. 3, Rule 67, Rules of Court.) It is rather a case where a judge is proceeding in
defiance of the Rules of Court by refusing to dismiss an action which should not be maintained
in his court. The remedy in such case is prohibition (section 2, Rule 67), and that remedy is
available in the present case because the order complained of, being merely of an interlocutory
nature, is not appealable.

While the petition is for mandamus, the same may well be treated as one for prohibition
by waiving strict adherence to technicalities in the interest of a speedy administration of justice
pursuant to section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court.

Wherefore, let a writ of prohibition issue, enjoining the respondent judge or his successor
from taking cognizance of this case unless it be to dismiss the same in accordance with the
Rules.
MANDAMUS
MANDAMUS

NEMESIO M. CALIM, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE JESUS F. GUERRERO, THE HONORABLE EMILIO A.
GONZALEZ III, THE HONORABLE ADORACTION A. AGBADA, in their respective
capacities as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, Director and Graft Investigation Officer II,
THE HONORABLE ROBERTO J. ACOBA, Vice-Mayor, Siniloan, Laguna, PAUL
SIMON Z. GO, HOMER R. SERRANO, FELIPE A. EM, ELIGIO R. DE LEON, FELIPE
V. CASTRO, GAUDENCIO C. SALAY, ANDRES V. QUINTERO, HECTOR A.
MANEJA, SEDFREY B. REALEZA, all members of the Sangguniang Bayan, Siniloan,
Laguna, Respondents.

G.R. No. 156527 05 March 2007

FACTS:

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Mandamus, seeking to compel the
public respondents to file the appropriate information for violation of Section 5(a) of Republic
Act No. 6713, against private respondents Sangguniang Bayan members of Siniloan, Laguna.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment, dated 10 July 2003, praying that
the Petition be dismissed for lack of merit.

Petitioner relies on the following grounds for the allowance of the Petition, viz:

I
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS UNLAWFULLY NEGLECTED TO PERFORM AN ACT
WHICH THE LAW SPECIFICALLY ENJOINS AS A DUTY RESULTING FROM AN
OFFICE; and

II
THERE IS NO OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY
COURT OF LAW.

Petitioners bone of contention is that since the private respondents were found by public
respondent Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to have committed a violation of
Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 6713, that is, by failing to respond to his letter of inquiry
within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof, they should be punished with a fine not
exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months salary or suspension not exceeding one (1) year, or
removal depending on the gravity of the offense after due notice and hearing by the appropriate
body or agency, as prescribed in Section 11 of the same Act. Hence, petitioner submits that the
public respondents should have filed the proper information with the proper court for the
criminal violation by private respondents of the aforesaid Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713.
Otherwise stated, petitioner theorizes that public respondents can be compelled by a writ of
mandamus to file a criminal information against the private respondents for their violation,
instead of merely admonishing them, as it did in the assailed Joint Order of 4 November 2002.
There is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to him in the ordinary course of
law. According to him, the Complaint was for a criminal offense, and not simply a case of
administrative misfeasance. He is adamant that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is no
longer necessary and is rendered useless by the act of public respondents in admonishing the
private respondents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petition for mandamus is proper to the case at hand?

RULING:

Essentially, what petitioner attacks in the instant Petition for Mandamus is the order of
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in admonishing the private respondents. The
case partakes of an administrative disciplinary nature.

Herein, petitioner was not able to establish his entitlement to a writ of mandamus.
Petitioner fails to demonstrate that he has a clear legal right to compel the public respondents to
file a criminal information against the private respondents. Settled is the rule that the Supreme
Court will not interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory
powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. The discretion to prosecute
or dismiss a complaint filed before it is lodged in the Office of the Ombudsman itself. To compel
the Ombudsman to further pursue a criminal case against the private respondents, as petitioner
would have it, is outside the ambit of the courts.

A graver reason that impels this court to reject petitioners plea is the mode taken by
petitioner in elevating the case to this court. In the case of Fabian v. Desierto, this court ruled
that appeals, if availing, from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be brought to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court.

Kuizon v. Ombudsman and Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas),

instructed that petitions for certiorari questioning the Ombudsmans orders or decisions in
criminal cases should be filed in the Supreme Court and not the Court of Appeals. This is the
prevailing rule. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, in admonishing the private respondents,
deemed the matter to be one in the nature of an administrative disciplinary case. The petitioner,
in filing the instant Petition for Mandamus before this Court, took a route that is antagonistic to
prevailing rules and jurisprudence.
MANDAMUS
ENRIQUEZ v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN G.R. no. 174902-06 February15,2008

FACTS:
On May 9, 2000, the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), Office of the
Ombudsman filed with the Administrative Adjudication Bureau complaints charging petitioners
with administrative and criminal offenses, in connection with the bidding of the Land Titling
Computerization Project of the LRA. Finding sufficient basis to proceed with the investigation,
respondent required petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence.
Petitioner vehemently denied the charges and formally offered their evidence on January 29,
2002.
On April 17. 2002, complainant FFIB filed its Comment thereon. Petitioners waited for
respondent’s resolution on the parties’ respective formal offers of evidence, but there was none.
They then filed a Motion to Set Date for the Simultaneous Filing of Memorandum by Each
Party. Respondent did not act on petitioner’s motion. On December 12, 2002, petitioners, filed a
Motion for Early Resolution expressing alarm over the “inaction of the Office of the
Ombudsman” and praying that the cases be resolved immediately considering that all evidences
have been formally offered.
Respondent still failed to resolve the case. Six (6) years from the filing, and more than four (4)
years after the formal submission of evidence, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss all the cases
against them, citing violation of right to due process and speedy disposition of cases
Complainant FFIB, despite notice, did not object. Yet, cases remain unsolved. Petitioners filed a
petition for mandamus praying that the Office of the Ombudsman (respondent) be ordered to
dismiss the administrative and criminal cases against them.

ISSUES
1. WON the petition for mandamus is an appropriate remedy.
2. WON respondent violated petitioner’s constitutional right to a speedy disposition of their
cases

RULING
1. The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.
Ordinarily, a petition for a writ of mandamus is proper to compel the public official
concerned to perform a ministerial act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust or station. However, it is inaccurate to say that the writ will never issue to control
the public official’s discretion.
 If the questioned act was done with grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or
palpable excess of authority, the writ will be issued to control the exercise of such discretion.
Likewise, mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to
compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when mandated by the Constitution.
The Court held that respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by failing to resolve the administrative and criminal cases against
petitioners for a period of almost eight (8) years from the filing of their complaints-affidavits.
2. The Supreme court ruled in the affirmative.
The doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors
that may be considered and balanced are:
i. length of the delay
ii. reasons for the delay
iii. aggrieved party’s assertion or failure to assert such right,
iv. prejudice caused by the delay b.
Respondent was constitutionally created to protect the people which includes promptly acting on
complaints to promote efficient service by the Government .Adjudication of cases must not only
be done in an orderly manner, but also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice.
Respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion and also violated the Constitutional right to a
speedy disposition of cases
Administrative and criminal cases filed against petitioners are DISMISSED.
.
MANADAMUS

UY KIAO ENG vs. NIXON LEE G.R.NO. 176831 JANUARY 15,2010

FACTS:

Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against his mother Uy Kiao
Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to compel petitioner to produce the holographic
will of his father so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted.
Respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to
deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any
justifiable reason. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and
that she knew of its whereabouts.
The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondent’s evidence,
petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the
original holographic will. The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence. However, it
granted the same on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Respondent’s motion for
reconsideration of this latter order was denied. Hence, the petition was dismissed. Aggrieved,
respondent sought review from the appellate court.
The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. Respondent moved for reconsideration. The
appellate court granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the
production of the will and the payment of attorney’s fees. It ruled this time that respondent was
able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will.
Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The appellate
court denied this motion.
Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court, contending in the
main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial evidence
used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.

ISSUE:

Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent.

RULING:

The Court cannot sustain the CA’s issuance of the writ.

Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the
name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some
corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which
duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation
of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the
idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which
the public has no interest.
 As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board,
officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station.
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything
which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to
which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in
substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere
technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious.
Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should
be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of
mandamus being invoked. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its
nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the
writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court.
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation
involved the production of the original holographic will is in the nature of a public or a private
duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because
there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it
be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the
original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from
instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his
possession or not. There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
for the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to
state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the
demurrer.
MANADAMUS

HENARES V. LTFRB, GR 158290, OCTOBER 23, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents

LTFRB and DOTC to require PUVs to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of
mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section
16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., and Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 8749otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999.

ISSUE:

WON LTFRB can be compelled to require PUVs to use CNG (Compressed Natural Gas) through
a writ of mandamus?

RULING:

NO.
Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean Air Act in their prayer
for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG as
an alternative fuel. Although both are general mandates that do not specifically enjoin the use of
any kind of fuel, particularly the use of CNG, there is an executive order implementing a
program on the use of CNG by public vehicles. Executive Order No. 290, entitled Implementing
the Natural Gas Vehicle Program for Public Transport (NGVPPT), took effect on February 24,
2004. A thorough reading of the executive order assures us that implementation for a cleaner
environment is being addressed. To a certain extent, the instant petition had been mooted by the
issuance of E.O. No. 290
Regrettably, however, a writ of mandamus is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to
compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that
mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG.
Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch,
for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. The need for future changes in both
legislation and its implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this Court, especially
when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and courtesy to a coequal
branch dictate that we give sufficient time and leeway for the coequal branches to address by
themselves the environmental problems raised in this petition.
Petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on
respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for
public utility vehicles. It appears to us that more properly, the legislature should provide first the
specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners
before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.