COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW

CASE DIGESTS

Table of Contents
Case Title Reference No. Date Page No.
LUCIA RODRIGUEZ AND G.R. No. 171972 June 8, 2011 2-3
PRUDENCIA RODRIGUEZ
vs.
TERESITA V. SALVADOR

BUKLOD NANG MAGBUBUKID SA G.R. No. 131481 March 16 : 2011 4-5

LUPAING RAMOS, INC.,
PETITIONER, VS. E. M. RAMOS
AND SONS, INC., RESPONDENT
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, PETITIONER, VS. E. M.
RAMOS AND SONS, INC.,
RESPONDENT

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 164876 January 23, 2006 6-7
vs.
LEONILA P. CELADA

SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO, et. al, G.R. No. 159674 June 30, 2006 8-9
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM and HACIENDA MARIA,
INC.

RAFAEL GELOS G.R. No. 86186 May 8, 1992 10

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and ERNESTO ALZONA

Page 1 of 10
G.R. No. 171972               June 8, 2011

LUCIA RODRIGUEZ AND PRUDENCIA RODRIGUEZ

vs.
TERESITA V. SALVADOR

Facts:

On May 22, 2003, respondent Salvador filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer, against petitioners Lucia
(Lucia) and Prudencia Rodriguez, mother and daughter, respectively before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Dalaguete, Cebu. Respondent alleged that she is the absolute owner of a parcel of land covered by an Original
Certificate of Title issued by virtue of a Free Patent in the name of the Heirs of Cristino Salvador represented
by Teresita Salvador; that petitioners acquired possession of the subject land by mere tolerance of her
predecessors-in-interest; and that despite several verbal and written demands made by her, petitioners
refused to vacate the subject land.

In their Answer, petitioners interposed the defense of agricultural tenancy. Lucia claimed that she and her
deceased husband, Serapio, entered the subject land with the consent and permission of respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest, siblings Cristino and Sana Salvador, under the agreement that Lucia and Serapio
would devote the property to agricultural production and share the produce with the Salvador siblings. Since
there is a tenancy relationship between the parties, petitioners argued that it is the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which has jurisdiction over the case and not the MTC.

Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court

On September 10, 2003, the MTC promulgated a Decision finding the existence of an agricultural tenancy
relationship between the parties, and thereby, dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On January 12, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision remanding the case to the MTC for preliminary hearing to
determine whether tenancy relationship exists between the parties.

Respondent sought reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC in an Order dated August 18, 2004.

Thus, respondent filed a Petition for Review with the CA, docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 86599.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On August 24, 2005, the CA rendered judgment in favor of respondent. It ruled that no tenancy relationship
exists between the parties because petitioners failed to prove that respondent or her predecessors-in-interest
consented to the tenancy relationship. 

Issues:

Whether or not there is a tenancy relationship between the petitioners and respondent.

Ruling:

Agricultural tenancy relationship does not exist in the instant case.

Agricultural tenancy exists when all the following requisites are present: 1) the parties are the landowner and
the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
Page 2 of 10
agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6)
the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. 39

In this case, to prove that an agricultural tenancy relationship exists between the parties, petitioners
submitted as evidence the affidavits of petitioner Lucia and their neighbors.

The statements in the affidavits presented by the petitioners are not sufficient to prove the existence of an
agricultural tenancy.

As correctly found by the CA, the element of consent is lacking. 43 Except for the self-serving affidavit of Lucia,
no other evidence was submitted to show that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest consented to a tenancy
relationship with petitioners. Self-serving statements, however, will not suffice to prove consent of the
landowner; independent evidence is necessary.44

Aside from consent, petitioners also failed to prove sharing of harvest.1avvphil The affidavits of petitioners’
neighbors declaring that respondent and her predecessors-in-interest received their share in the harvest are
not sufficient. Petitioners should have presented receipts or any other evidence to show that there was
sharing of harvest45 and that there was an agreed system of sharing between them and the landowners. 46

In the instant case, petitioners failed to prove consent and sharing of harvest between the parties.
Consequently, their defense of agricultural tenancy must fail. The MTC has jurisdiction over the instant case.
No error can therefore be attributed to the CA in reversing and setting aside the dismissal of respondent’s
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the remand of the case to the MTC for the determination of the
amount of damages due respondent is proper.

Page 3 of 10
[G.R. No. 131481, March 16 : 2011]

BUKLOD NANG MAGBUBUKID SA LUPAING RAMOS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. E. M. RAMOS AND SONS,
INC., RESPONDENT.

[G.R. No. 131624]

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, PETITIONER, VS. E. M. RAMOS AND SONS, INC.,

RESPONDENT.

Facts:

Several parcels of unirrigated land (303.38545 hectares) situated at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite
was originally owned by Manila Golf and Country Club but was acquired by respondent EMRASON in 1965
for the purpose of developing the same into a residential subdivision.

In May, 1972, [respondent] E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc., applied for an authority to convert and development
its aforementioned 372-hectare property into a residential subdivision, attaching to the application detailed
development plans and development proposals from Bancom Development Corporation and San Miguel
Corporation. Two months after, the Municipal Council of Dasmariñas, Cavite approved the application.

There was delay in the implementation of the project, and on Jue 15, 1988, RA 6657 of the CARL took effect.

DAR was tacked with acquiring additional lands which included EMRASON’s property. EMRASON filed with
DARAB separate petitions to nullify the notices sent by DAR. DAR regional office conducted an on-site
inspection of the subject property. It declared, in a decision, that the notice of acquisitions was null and void.
The DOJ Opinion adverted to, clarified that lands already converted to non-agricultural uses before June 15,
1988 were no longer covered by CARP.

The DAR Regional Office elevated the case to the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform and the DAR
Secretary denied the decision

EMRASON filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied again by the DAR Secretary so EMRASON
appealed to the Office of the President. But the OP affirmed the decision of DAR.

EMRASON still filed a Petition for Review to the CA, and the CA issued a TRO which enjoined the DAR
Secretary from implementing the OP Decision. DAR filed a motion for reconsideration praying for the lifting of
the preliminary injunction.

At this point, Buklod filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion moving that it be allowed to intervene. CA
allowed the intervention.

Ultimately, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of EMRASON because the subject property was already
converted/classified as residential by the Municipality of Dasmariñas prior to the effectivity of the CARL.

Buklod and DAR. filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration of the foregoing Decision but both Motions
were denied by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Whether or not the notice of acquisition issued by DAR is valid?

Ruling:

Section 4, Chapter II of the CARL, as amended,24 particularly defines the coverage of the CARP, to wit:

SEC. 4. Scope. - The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for
Page 4 of 10
agriculture: Provided, That landholdings of landowners with a total area of five (5) hectares and below shall
not be covered for acquisition and distribution to qualified beneficiaries.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the CARP:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No
reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this
Act until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have
determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain;

(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as determined by Congress in the preceding
paragraph;

(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and

(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised
or that can be raised thereon.

A comprehensive inventory system in consonance with the national land use plan shall be instituted by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), in accordance with the Local Government Code, for the purpose of
properly identifying and classifying farmlands within one (1) year from effectivity of this /Vet. without
prejudice to the implementation of the land acquisition and distribution." (Emphases supplied.)

Section 3(c), Chapter I of the CARL further narrows down the definition of agricultural land that is subject to
CARP to "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land."

The CARL took effect on June 15, 1988. To be exempt from the CARP, the subject property should have
already been reclassified as residential prior to said date.

xxx

There is no question that the subject property is located within the afore-described area.  And even though
Resolution No. 105 has no direct bearing on the classification of the subject property prior to the CARL - it
taking effect only in 1990 after being approved by the HLURB - it is a confirmation that at present, the
subject property and its surrounding areas are deemed by the Province of Cavite better suited and prioritized
for industrial and residential development, than agricultural.

xxx

Lands already classified and identified as commercial, industrial or residential before June 15, 1988 - the
date of effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) - are outside the coverage of this law.
Therefore, they no longer need any conversion clearance from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)

Xxx

WHEREFORE, the Petitions for Review filed by the Buklod Nang Magbubukid Sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. in G.R.
No. 131481 and the Department of Agrarian Reform in G.R. No. 131624 are hereby DENIED. The Decision
dated March 26, 1997 and the Resolution dated November 24, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
40950 are hereby AFFIRMED.

Page 5 of 10
G.R. No. 164876             January 23, 2006

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
LEONILA P. CELADA

Facts:

Respondent Celada owns 22.3167 hectares of agricultural land situated in Calatrava, Carmen, Bohol
registered under TCT No. 16436, of which 14.1939 hectares was identified in 1998 by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) as suitable for compulsory acquisition under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). The matter was then indorsed to petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) for field
investigation and land valuation.

In due course, LBP valued respondent’s land at P2.1105517 per square meter for an aggregate value of
P299,569.61. The DAR offered the same amount to respondent as just compensation, but it was rejected.
Nonetheless, on August 27, 1999, LBP deposited the said sum in cash and bonds in the name of respondent.

Pursuant to Section 16(d) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,
the matter was referred to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), for summary administrative hearing on
determination of just compensation.

On April 27, 2000, LBP filed its Answer raising non-exhaustion of administrative remedies as well as forum-
shopping as affirmative defense. The DAR and the MARO likewise filed an Answer averring that the
determination of just compensation rests exclusively with the LBP.

Meanwhile, the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD) issued an Order affirming the valuation made by LBP.
On June 4, 2001, the SAC issued an order resolving petitioner’s affirmative defense.

LBP elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which, however, dismissed the appeal outright.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC – Special Agrarian Court has jurisdiction over the determination of just
compensation?

Ruling:

We do not agree with petitioner’s submission that the SAC erred in assuming jurisdiction over respondent’s
petition for determination of just compensation despite the pendency of the administrative proceedings before
the DARAB. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the landowner filed an action for
determination of just compensation without waiting for the completion of the DARAB’s re-evaluation of the
land. The Court nonetheless held therein that the SAC acquired jurisdiction over the action for the following
reason:

It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has ‘original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners.’ This ‘original
and exclusive’ jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials
original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of
administrative decision. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators
to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators
and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57
and therefore would be void. Thus, direct resort to the SAC by private respondent is valid.

Page 6 of 10
It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property under RA No. 6657 is an exercise of the power of
eminent domain by the State. The valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent
domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with
administrative agencies. Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance of respondent’s petition for
determination of just compensation.

xxx

As can be gleaned from above ruling, the SAC based its valuation solely on the observation that there
was a "patent disparity" between the price given to respondent and the other landowners. We note that
it did not apply the DAR valuation formula since according to the SAC, it is Section 17 of RA No. 6657
that "should be the principal basis of computation as it is the law governing the matter". The SAC
further held that said Section 17 "cannot be superseded by any administrative order of a government
agency", thereby implying that the valuation formula under DAR Administrative Order No. 5, Series of
1998 (DAR AO No. 5, s. of 1998), is invalid and of no effect.

While SAC is required to consider the acquisition cost of the land, the current value of like properties, its
nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declaration and the assessments
made by the government assessors to determine just compensation, it is equally true that these factors have
been translated into a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of RA
No. 6657. As the government agency principally tasked to implement the agrarian reform program, it is
the DAR’s duty to issue rules and regulations to carry out the object of the law. DAR AO No. 5, s. of
1998 precisely "filled in the details" of Section 17, RA No. 6657 by providing a basic formula by which
the factors mentioned therein may be taken into account. The SAC was at no liberty to disregard the
formula which was devised to implement the said provision.

It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect. Administrative issuances partake
of the nature of a statute and have in their favor a presumption of legality. As such, courts cannot ignore
administrative issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity was not put in issue. Unless an
administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply the same.

xxx

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Tagbilaran City,
Branch 3 in Civil Case No. 6462 dated March 1, 2003 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is
entered fixing the just compensation for respondent’s land at P2.1105517 per square meter or a total of
P299,569.61.

Page 7 of 10
G.R. No. 159674 June 30, 2006

SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO, et. al,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and HACIENDA MARIA, INC.

Facts:

The petitioners are the recipients of Emancipation Patents (EPs) over parcels of land located at Barangay
Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur.

The parcels of land described above, the subject matters in this Petition, were formerly part of a forested area
which have been denuded as a result of the logging operations of respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI).
Petitioners, together with other persons, occupied and tilled these areas believing that the same were public
lands. HMI never disturbed petitioners and the other occupants in their peaceful cultivation thereof.

HMI acquired such forested area from the Republic of the Philippines through Sales Patent No. 2683 in 1956
by virtue of which it was issued OCT No. P-3077-1661. The title covered three parcels of land with a total area
of 527.8308 hectares, to wit:

Area
Lot No.
(in hectares)

Lot No. 1620, Pls – 4 28.52

Lot No. 1621, Pls – 4 11.64

Lot No. 1622, Pls – 4 487.47

TOTAL 527.834

On 21 October 1972, Presidential Decree No. 275 was issued mandating that tenanted rice and corn lands be
brought under Operation Land Transfer and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries.

HMI, through a certain Joaquin Colmenares, requested that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be placed
under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and
other occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be covered under said law.

Also in 1977, HMI executed a Deed of Assignment of Rights in favor of petitioners, among other persons,
which was registered with the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of OCT No. P-3077-1661. The
annotation in the OCT showed that the entire 527.8308 hectares was the subject of the Deed of Assignment.

In December 1997, HMI filed with the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of CARAGA, Region XIII,
17 petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008
hectares of its former landholdings covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. HMI did not question the coverage of
the other 250.3300 hectares under Presidential Decree No. 27 despite claiming that the entire landholdings
were untenanted and not devoted to rice and corn.

On 27 November 1998, after petitioners failed to submit a Position Paper, the RARAD rendered a Decision
declaring as void the TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because the land covered was not devoted to rice
and corn, and neither was there any established tenancy relations between HMI and petitioners when
Presidential Decree No. 27 took effect on 21 October 1972.
Page 8 of 10
After the DARAB denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration, the latter proceeded to the Court of Appeals
with their Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not Emancipation Patents have the same effect as ordinary titles in which they become
indefeasible one year after their registration?

Ruling:

Certificates of Title issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents are as indefeasible as TCTs issued in
registration proceedings.

Petitioners claim that the EPs have become indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the date of its
issuance. The DARAB, however, ruled that the EP "is a title issued through the agrarian reform program of
the government. Its issuance, correction and cancellation is governed by the rules and regulations issued by
the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Hence, it is not the same as or in the same
category of a Torrens title."

The DARAB is grossly mistaken.

Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 22 provides that certificates of title issued in administrative
proceedings are as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in judicial proceedings:

It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant to
a homestead patent, as in the instant case, is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a
judicial registration proceeding, provided the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public
land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law.

xxx

The same confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the distribution of government-acquired lands to the
landless would arise if the possession of the grantee of an EP would still be subject to contest, just because
his certificate of title was issued in an administrative proceeding. The silence of Presidential Decree No. 27 as
to the indefeasibility of titles issued pursuant thereto is the same as that in the Public Land Act where Prof.
Antonio Noblejas commented:

As we held through Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Lahora v. Dayanghirang, Jr. 26 :

The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of the certificate of title that may
be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a private individual, the
corresponding patent therefor is recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the
land is automatically brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee
becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in Section 38 of the said Act. In other words, upon expiration
of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate
issued in a registration proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)

The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in Republic Act No. 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the Torrens system of registration. The Property
Registration Decree in fact devotes Chapter IX 27 on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in
themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in registration proceedings.

Page 9 of 10
G.R. No. 86186 May 8, 1992

RAFAEL GELOS
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO ALZONA

Facts:

Subject land is originally owned by private respondent Alonza together with his parents. It has an area of
25,000 sq. m.

They entered into a written contract with petitioner Gelos employing him as a laborer at P5.00 per day.

Alonzo acquired full ownership of the land and terminated Gelos but Gelos refused and continued working on
the land.

Gelos asked for the fixing of the agricultural lease rental to the MARO which granted his petition. Alonza filed
a complaint with the RTC.

RTC dismissed the complaint and found Gelos to be a tenant of the subject property.

CA reversed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not Gelos is entitled to the benefits of tenancy laws?

Ruling:

No. The stipulations of their “Kasunduan ng Upahang Araw” clearly indicate that parties did not enter into
tenancy agreement but only a contract of employement.

The court held that “tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does
upon the land”, it is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is
installed, and their written agreement, are even more important.

A tenant is defined under Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who himself and with the aid
available from within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another,
with the latter's consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share
tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price-certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both,
under the leasehold tenancy system.

For this relationship to exist, it is necessary that: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; 2) the
subject is agricultural land; 3) there is consent; 4) the purpose is agricultural production; 5) there is personal
cultivation; and 6) there is sharing of harvest or payment of rental. In the absence of any of these requisites,
an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or planter thereon, cannot qualify as a de jure tenant.

Thus, the relationship established between the petitioner and respondent is not of tenant-land owner but
employee-employer relationship.

Page 10 of 10