DIRTY WAR

The Dirty War is the name used by the military junta or civic-military dictatorship of Argentina for the period of United
States-backed state terrorism in Argentina from 1976 to 1983 as a part of Operation Condor, during which military and
security forces and right-wing death squads in the form of the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA, or Triple A)[6] hunted
down any political dissidents and anyone believed to be associated with socialism, left-wing Peronism or
the Montoneros movement.

Between 9,000 and 30,000 people disappeared, of whom many were impossible to report formally due to the nature of state
terrorism. The excuse for the Coup d'Etat was the armed actions of the Montoneros and the ERP, but the actual target of
the Operation Condor were students, militants, trade unionists, writers, journalists, artists and any citizens suspected to
be left-wing activists, including Peronist guerrillas.[11] The "disappeared" (victims kidnapped, tortured and murdered whose
bodies were disappeared by the military government) included those thought to be politically or ideologically a threat to the
junta even vaguely, or contrary to the neoliberal economic policies dictated by Operation Condor.[7][8][9] They were killed in an
attempt by the junta to silence the social and political opposition.

Many members of the junta are currently in prison for crimes against humanity and genocide.

The junta referred to their policy of suppressing opponents as the National Reorganization Process (Proceso de Reorganización
Nacional). Argentine military and security forces also created paramilitary death squads, operating behind "fronts" as
supposedly independent units. Argentina coordinated actions with other South American dictatorships as in Operation
Condor. Faced with increasing public opposition and severe economic problems, the military tried to regain popularity by
occupying the disputed Falkland Islands. During the resulting Falklands War, the military government lost any remaining
favour after the Argentina's defeat by Britain, forcing it to step aside in disgrace and allow for free elections to be held in late
1983.

Origin of the term

The term "Dirty War" was used by the military junta, which claimed that a war, albeit with "different" methods (including the
large-scale application of torture and rape), was necessary to maintain social order and eradicate political subversives. This
explanation has been questioned in court by human rights NGOs, as it suggests that a "civil war" was going on and implies
justification for the killings. During the 1985 Trial of the Juntas, public prosecutor Julio Strassera suggested that the term
"Dirty War" was a "euphemism to try to conceal gang activities" as though they were legitimate military activities.
Although the junta said its objective was to eradicate guerrilla activity because of its threat to the state, it conducted wide-
scale repression of the general population, it worked against all political opposition and those it considered on the left: trade
unionists (half of the victims), students, intellectuals including journalists and writers, rights activists and other civilians and
their families. Many others went into exile to survive and many remain in exile today despite the return of democracy in 1983.
During the Trial of the Juntas, the prosecution established that the guerrillas were never substantial enough to pose a real
threat to the state and could not be considered a belligerent as in a war:
The guerrilla had not taken control of any part of the national territory; they had not obtained recognition of interior or
anterior belligerency, they were not massively supported by any foreign power, and they lacked the population's support.
The program of extermination of dissidents was referred to as genocide by a court of law for the first time during the trial of
Miguel Etchecolatz, a former senior official of the Buenos Aires Provincial Police.
Argentina Dirty War - 1976-1983
The Dirty War, from 1976-1983, was a seven-year campaign by the Argentine government against suspected dissidents and
subversives. Many people, both opponents of the government as well as innocent people, were "disappeared" in the middle
of the night. They were taken to secret government detention centers where they were tortured and eventually killed. These
people are known as "los desaparecidos" or "the disappeared."

A military coup overthrew Juan Peron and restored the traditional Argentine oligarchy to power in 1955. During the
subsequent 18 years of exile, Peron used the Montonero insurgents as a primary means of breaking the resultant political
impasse. He also used them as a political bridge to a worker-based mass movement and as a bridge to rebellious youth
movements.

Argentina experienced three failed attempts at rural guerrilla warfare between 1959 and 1969. At that point, the insurgents
decided in favor of urban warfare. It seemed obvious that they would be safer and more relevant in crowded urban space
than in isolated rural areas.

One final attempt was made at generating a conventional rural-based insurgency. In 1974, Marxist admirers of Che Guevarra
(the People’s Revolutionary Army [ERP]) took control of the remote province of Tucuman and actually governed that part of
the national territory. In 1975 the Army was ordered to Tucuman to eradicate the insurgents and restore the province to the
Argentine state, and did so swiftly and ruthlessly. And 1975 marked the end of any serious rural insurgency effort.

Between the ouster of Peron in 1955 and his return from exile in 1973, a number of urban insurgent organizations emerged.
Six major groups - two Marxist-Maoist- Guevarrist-oriented, and four populist-nationalist Peronist-oriented - eventually
dispersed or joined either the ERP or the Peronist Montoneros. The Montoneros became the largest and most active of the
two revolutionary movements, but maintained close ties with the ERP.

After the death of the controversial President Juan Peron in 1974, his wife and vice president, Isabel Peron, assumed power.
However, she was not very strong politically and a military junta led a coup against her and removed her from office. This
military junta maintained its grip on power by cracking down on anybody whom they believed was challenging their authority.
The new regime under General Jorge Rafael Videla attempted to apply a monetarist solution to economic problems and
launched what it called the war against subversion, which came to be widely known to others as the "dirty war", in an attempt
to defeat definitively left-wing guerrilla activity that was out of control by early 1976.

With the complicity of silence among all but a handful within the Argentine population, the military regime undertook
widespread kidnappings, torture, and murder — not only of the violent guerrilla left but also of the nonviolent leftist political
activists, their sympathizers, and their families. The war against subversion was viewed within the military's National Security
Doctrine as the beginfling of "World War III," which it defined as a struggle against the efforts of communism for world
supremacy. In three years as many as 30,000 Argentines were killed.

The Peronist Montonero insurgency and the Argentine governmental response to it are prime examples of how not to conduct
an insurgency and how not not to conduct a counterinsurgency. The Montonero insurgent leadership made a conscious
decision to “militarize” the struggle and attack ? directly ? the Argentine armed forces. The political objectives that originally
motivated the confrontation were sacrificed to military considerations. The groups that were supposed to bring national and
social liberation to the country developed into mirror images of the Argentine armed forces, and legitimizing political-
psychological efforts were considered unproductive niceties.

Unlike previous military governments which were generally satisfied to manipulate or disrupt economic or social programs it
did not approve of, or end the term of a government with a political ideology counter it its own, these military leaders set out
to reform society through its proclaimed Process of National Reorganization (or El Proceso). El Proceso focused on three basic
objectives: the elimination of subversion, improvement in the economy, and the creation of a new national framework.

In the view of the new regime, the eradication of subversion meant not only the guerrillas' activities, but also any form of
dissenting behavior whether found in the school, the family, the factory, or even the arts or culture. Building a new national
framework required eradicating the Peronists, the unions, parliamentary radicals and leftists. To build the economy required
eliminating an industrial sector populated by an undisciplined worker class and inefficient managers.
Military governments usually assume one of three different forms: guardians, moderators or rulers. As "rulers," when the
generals leave the barracks, they imbue the regime with their own alleged virtues, organization, hierarchy, obedience,
discipline, punctuality, and efficiency. They eliminate participatory mechanisms such as legislatures, parties, and political
associations, because they see little need to organize consent. They do away with competitive politics and all instrumentalities
of representation in order to reduce complex issues to simple, clear-cut issues. In Argentina, the military definitely assumed
the role of hard-line rulers.

Everyone fell into the net: union leaders who struggled for a simple increase in wages, adolescents who were members of a
student association, newspaper reporters that were not addicted to the dictatorship, psychologists and sociologists who were
part of suspect professions, young pacifists, nuns and priests that had carried the teachings of Christ to the miserably poor.
And friends of any of them, and friends of those friends; people that had been denounced for reasons of personal vengeance
or by kidnap victims under torture.

Victory was achieved after three years of limited open fighting and a stream of kidnappings, "disappearances," bombings,
and killings that brought a total breakdown of due process for those suspected of being connected with the guerrillas. By
June 1978 the guerrillas were all but eliminated, and the military declared victory. By 1980 the last vestiges of the terrorist
groups had died out, and the disappearances had stopped.

Although the military dictatorship carried out its war against suspected domestic subversives throughout its entire existence,
it was ironically a foreign foe which brought the regime to an end. In the early 1980s, it became clear to both the world and
the Argentine people that the government was behind the tens of thousands of kidnappings. The junta, facing increasing
opposition over its human rights record, as well as mounting allegations of corruption, sought to allay domestic criticism by
launching a successful campaign to regain Las Islas Malvinas (the Falkland Islands).

Jesus Fernando Gomez argues that "The military engaged in the "Dirty War" in order to suppress its opposition, principally
the Peronists, because the cost - measured in terms of legitimacy - of suppressing them was relatively low at the beginning
of the junta's rule. But the cost of suppression increased over time because of the military regime's ruthless suppression of
anyone who opposed it, its failed economic policies, and its embarrassing loss of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands War, and thus
it had to tolerate its opposition and eventually return power to civilian authority."

The Falkland Islands had been a source of contention between England, which administers them, and Argentina, which claims
them, since 1820. The junta had thought that it could reclaim these islands relatively easily, that England wouldn't mind their
loss, and that the government would regain its popularity and control over its people. However, the government was wrong
in its anticipations when 72 days after the invasion of the Islands, the British military won the war, having captured 9,800
Argentine POWs.

This unexpected loss was the final blow for the military regime, and in 1982, it restored basic civil liberties and retracted its
ban on political parties. The Dirty War ended when Raul Alfonsin's civilian government took control of the country on
December 10, 1983.
OPERATION CONDOR

Operation Condor (Spanish: Operación Cóndor, also known as Plan Cóndor; Portuguese: Operação Condor) was a United
States–backed campaign of political repression and state terror involving intelligence operations and assassination of
opponents, officially and formally implemented in November 1975 by the right-wing dictatorships of the Southern Cone of
South America.
The program, nominally intended to eradicate communist or Soviet influence and ideas, was created to suppress active or
potential opposition movements against the participating governments' neoliberal economic policies, which sought to reverse
the economic policies of the previous era.
Due to its clandestine nature, the precise number of deaths directly attributable to Operation Condor is highly disputed. Some
estimates are that at least 60,000 deaths can be attributed to Condor, roughly 30,000 of these in Argentina, and the so-called
"Archives of Terror" list 50,000 killed, 30,000 disappeared and 400,000 imprisoned. American political scientist J. Patrice
McSherry gives a figure of at least 402 killed in operations which crossed national borders in a 2002 source, and mentions in a
2009 source that of those who "had gone into exile" and were "kidnapped, tortured and killed in allied countries or illegally
transferred to their home countries to be executed . . . hundreds, or thousands, of such persons—the number still has not
been finally determined—were abducted, tortured, and murdered in Condor operations."[1] Victims included dissidents and
leftists, union and peasant leaders, priests and nuns, students and teachers, intellectuals and suspected guerillas.[11] Although
it was described by the CIA as "a cooperative effort by the intelligence/security services of several South American countries
to combat terrorism and subversion,"[12] guerrillas were used as an excuse, as they were never substantial enough to control
territory, gain material support by any foreign power, or otherwise threaten national security. Condor's key members were
the governments in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and Brazil. Ecuador and Peru later joined the operation in
more peripheral roles.

Antecedents

Operation Condor, which took place in the context of the Cold War, had the tacit approval and material support of the United
States. In 1968, U.S. General Robert W. Porter stated that "in order to facilitate the coordinated employment of internal
security forces within and among Latin American countries, we are ... endeavoring to foster inter-service and regional
cooperation by assisting in the organization of integrated command and control centers; the establishment of common
operating procedures; and the conduct of joint and combined training exercises."[19] Condor was part of this effort.[20]
According to American historian J. Patrice McSherry, based on formerly secret CIA documents from 1976, in the 1960s and
early 1970s plans were developed among international security officials at the US Army School of the Americas and the
Conference of American Armies to deal with perceived threats in South America from political dissidents. A declassified CIA
document dated 23 June 1976, explains that "in early 1974, security officials from Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, and
Bolivia met in Buenos Aires to prepare coordinated actions against subversive targets."[21] Condor was an operation similar
to Operation Gladio, the strategy of tension used in Italy in the 1970s, of which Licio Gelli was a member.
The program was developed following a series of government coups d'états by military groups, primarily in the 1970s.

History

Cooperation among various security services had existed prior to the creation of Operation Condor, with the aim of
"eliminating Marxist subversion." During the Conference of American Armies held in Caracas on 3 September 1973, Brazilian
General Breno Borges Fortes, head of the Brazilian army, proposed to "extend the exchange of information" between various
services in order to "struggle against subversion."[26]
In March 1974, representatives of the police forces of Chile, Uruguay and Bolivia met with Alberto Villar, deputy chief of
the Argentine Federal Police and co-founder of the Triple A death squad, to implement cooperation guidelines. Their goal was
to destroy the "subversive" threat represented by the presence of thousands of political exiles in Argentina.[26] In August 1974,
the corpses of Bolivian refugees were found in garbage dumps in Buenos Aires.[26] In 2007, McSherry also confirmed the
abduction and torture during this period of Chilean and Uruguayan refugees who were living in Buenos Aires, based on newly
declassified CIA documents dated June 1976.
On 25 November 1975, leaders of the military intelligence services of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay met
with Manuel Contreras, chief of DINA (the Chilean secret police), in Santiago de Chile, officially creating the Plan
Condor.[27] According to French journalist Marie-Monique Robin, author of Escadrons de la mort, l'école française (2004, Death
Squads, The French School), General Rivero, intelligence officer of the Argentine Armed Forces and former student of
the French, developed the concept of Operation Condor.[28]
Based on the governments' perception of threats, officially the targets were armed groups (such as the MIR,
the Montoneros or the ERP, the Tupamaros, etc.), but the governments broadened their attacks against all kinds of political
opponents, including their families and others, as reported by the Valech Commission. The Argentine "Dirty War", for
example, which resulted in approximately 30,000 victims according to most estimates, kidnapped, tortured and killed many
trade-unionists, relatives of activists, social activists such as founders of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, nuns, university
professors, etc.
From 1976 onwards, the Chilean DINA and its Argentine counterpart, SIDE, were the operation's front-line troops. The
infamous "death flights," theorized in Argentina by Luis María Mendía — and previously used during the Algerian War (1954–
62) by French forces;— were widely used. Government forces took victims by plane or helicopter out to sea, dropping them to
their deaths in planned disappearances. It was said that from this military bombardment that OPR 33 infrastructure located in
Argentina was destroyed. In May 1976, members of Plan Condor met in Santiago, Chile, at which the participating countries
discussed "long-range cooperation... [that] went well beyond information exchange" and were given code names. In July, the
CIA gathered intelligence that members of Plan Condor had the intention of striking "against leaders of indigenous terrorist
groups residing abroad."
In late 1977, due to unusual storms, numerous corpses washed up on beaches south of Buenos Aires, producing evidence of
some of the government's victims. There were also hundreds of cases of babies and children being taken from mothers in
prison who had been kidnapped and later disappeared; the children were given in illegal adoptions to families and associates
of the regime.[29] The CIA also reports that Operation Condor countries took very well to the idea of working together, and
developed their own communications network and combined training initiatives for such things as psychological warfare.[30]
In a report written from Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America Harry W. Shlaudeman to Kissinger August 3 1976, it was
reported that the military regimes in South America were coming together to join forces for security reasons. They were
concerned about the spread of Marxism and the implications that this could have on their grasp on power. This new force
operated in other member's countries in secrecy. Their goal: to seek and kill terrorists of the "Revolutionary Coordinating
Committee" in their own countries and in Europe.[31] Shlaudeman expressed concern that the "siege mentality" that
permeated the members of Operation Condor could lead to a larger chasm between the military and civilian institutions in the
region. He was also fearful that this could lead to increasing isolation of these countries from developed Western nations. He
believed that there was justification to some of their fears, yet he felt that by reacting too strongly these countries could
engender a strong terrorist counter reaction similar to the PLO in Israel.[32]
U.S. documents dated April 17, 1977, listed Chile and Argentina as both active in utilizing communications media for the
purpose of broadcasting propaganda. The objective of the propaganda had two purposes. The first purpose was to
diffuse/counter criticism of the governments involved by foreign media and the second was to cultivate national pride in the
local populace. One propaganda piece created by Chile entitled, "Chile after Allende," was distributed amongst the
governments acting under Condor. However, the document only notes that Uruguay and Argentina were the only two
countries to acknowledge the agreement. In terms of Paraguay, their government was only listed as utilizing the local press,
"Patria" as their main propaganda producer. A meeting that was to have taken place in March 1977 discussing, "Psychological
warfare techniques against terrorists and leftist extremists" was canceled due to the restructuring of the intelligence services
of both Argentina and Paraguay[33]
A 2016 declassifed CIA report dated May 9, 1977, titled "Counterterrorism in the Southern Cone," underscored one "aspect of
the program involving Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina envisages illegal operations outside Latin America against exiled
terrorists, particularly in Europe." "The military-controlled governments of the Southern Cone," the document read, "all
consider themselves targets of international Marxism." The document highlighted Condor's fundamental characteristic,
constituting as part of a long tried "regional approach" to pacifiying "subversion," came to fruition in early 1974 when
"security officials from all of the member countries, except Brazil, agreed to establish liaison channels and to facilitate the
movment of security officers on government business from one country to the other." One of Condor's "initial aims" was the
"exchange of information on the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (RCJ), an organization...of terrorist groups from Bolivia,
Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, and Paraguay" whose "representatives" in Europe were "believed to have been involved in the
assassinations in Paris of the Bolivian ambassador to France last May and an Uruguayan military attache in 1974." The CIA
report noted that the fundamental mission of Condor was the liquidation of "top-level terrorist leaders" as well as non-
terrorist targets including "Uruguayan opposition politician Wilson Ferreira, if he should travel to Europe, and some leaders of
Amnesty International." Condor was also seen by the CIA to be "engaged in non-violent activities, including psychological
warfare and a propaganda campaign" that utilized the reach of the media to "publicize crimes and atrocities committed by
terrorists." Additionally, in an appeal to "national pride and the national conscience," Condor called for the citizenry
comprising its member nations to "report anything out of the ordinary in their neighborhoods."[34] In 1980, another meeting
took place in which Montensero was captured. It was said that the RSO would not kill them if they agreed to cooperate and
give information regarding future meetings in Rio.

Purpose of Operation Condor

Condor was a covert intelligence and operations system that enabled the Latin American military states to hunt down, seize,
and execute political opponents across borders. Refugees fleeing military coups and repression in their own countries were
"disappeared" in combined transnational operations.

Security forces in Latin America classified and targeted persons on the basis of their political ideas rather than illegal acts. The
regimes hunted down dissidents and leftists, union and peasant leaders, priests and nuns, intellectuals, students and teachers-
-not only guerrillas (who, under international law, are also entitled to due process).

End of Operation Condor

Operation Condor officially ended when Argentina ousted the military dictatorship in 1983 (following its defeat in the
Falklands War) and restored democracy.
FAKE ENCOUNTERS

A form of extrajudicial killing is called police encounters. Such encounters are being staged also by military and other security
forces. Extrajudicial killings are also common in Indian states especially in Uttar Pradesh where 73 people has been killed from
march 2017 to March 2019.

Currently, the guise for many of these killings relates to national security offences including terrorism, and in areas of active
conflict, such as in Kashmir, states in the North East of India including Manipur, as well as areas of central India affected by
the Maoist insurgency. (Published this year)

"Encounter killing" is a term used in South Asia, especially India and Pakistan since the late 20th century to describe
extrajudicial killings by the police or the armed forces, allegedly in self-defence, when they encounter suspected gangsters or
terrorists. In the 1990s and the mid-2000s, the Mumbai Police used encounter killings to attack the city's underworld, and the
practice spread to other large cities. In Pakistan, the Sindh Police is notorious for extrajudicial killings through fake encounters
especially in Karachi.

The victim was typically a person whom the police believed to be a militant or involved in the militant separatist movement;
proof of alleged militant involvement was rarely given. Ultimately, the practice became so common that 'encounter' became
synonymous with extrajudicial execution.[16][17]
It is alleged that police typically take a suspected militant into custody without filing an arrest report. If the suspect dies during
interrogation, security forces would deny ever taking the person into custody and instead claim that he was killed during an
armed encounter, placing weapons on or near the body to suggest the police acted in self-defence.
Sukhwinder Singh Bhatti, a criminal defence attorney in Punjab who defended such suspects, disappeared in May 1994 and is
alleged to have been killed by the police.
The official handling – or failure to do so – of a phenomenon known in India as “encounter killings” by police has been
condemned by the country’s media as a “failure of the justice system.”

The country’s National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has reported that 55 cases of alleged fake encounters occurred
from 2009-2013 in India. According to the National Crime Record Bureau (NCRB), there were 591 custodial deaths reported
across the country between 2010 and 2015.

In 2018, 13 unarmed protestors were killed and 100+ injured by the Tamil Nadu Police.

MARCOS DICTATORSHIP
The military forces were known to be notorious in violating human rights during this era.

Victims were raided and arrested in their own homes without warrants,[21] and illegally detained without charges or clear
information about the status of their case.[22] Arrest, Search and Seizure Orders (ASSO) did not undergo its usual bureaucratic
process and at times were merely lists of people to be arrested.[6] Because of the lack of prior investigation, military men could
insert names in the list of people to be arrested.

Massacres

Aside from the murder of particular people who opposed the Marcos dictatorship, groups of people were also murdered for
collectively mobilizing against the regime. Despite the lifting of Martial Law in 1981, there are five recorded massacres all over
the Philippines. In the same year, there are five recorded massacres all over the Philippines. Between 1981 and 1982, and
there have been 14 recorded massacres, totaling 134 fatalities.

Torture

Torture was instrumental in the Martial Law rule. Young officers, some of them freshly graduated from the military academy,
participated in the torture of political dissidents, suspected communists. The ‘top two’ torturers, Col. Rolando Abadilla and Lt.
Rodolfo Aguinaldo were allegedly trained by CIA operatives in the United States.[42][7] Various torture methods had physical,
psychological, and sexual natures, many of them meant to degrade the victim. Even dissenters from high-level government
officers, such as Sen. Ninoy Aquino and Sen. Ramon Mitra were detained and tortured with solitary confinement. Torture
methods were used by the military to threaten, interrogate, or simply hurt detainees,[7] as most of them released without
being charged of anything.[6] Many of the ‘salvaged’ bodies dumped in public view bore intense torture marks, instilling fear
about what happens to those who oppose the Marcos regime.

International pressure and knowledge of abuses by Marcos

The international community eventually got word of these human rights violations and applied pressure to the Marcos
administration to end them. In 1975, Marcos Aide and chief propagandist Primitivo Mijares defected from the Marcos
administration and revealed in front of US lawmakers that torture was routinely practiced within the Marcos
regime.[16] Mijares' admission attracted international criticism, particularly from Amnesty International and Washington.
Amnesty International's first report about the Philippines in December 1975 revealed the “systematic and severe torture”
handled by the Fifth Constabulary Security Unit (5CSU).[17][7] Amnesty International found convincing evidence of widespread
torture among prisoners, enabled by Marcos's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and the absence of judicial
oversight.[18] Evidence reveals that not only was he aware of tortures and murders enacted by his military and police force, but
that he was condoned and at times arranged for it.[6] This caused tensions between the United States and the Philippines,
pressuring Marcos to admit human rights violations during his regime.[7]
Marcos initially denied knowledge of human rights violations.[6] In 1974, he proclaimed in a televised address that “No one,
but no one was tortured”.[19] But he eventually confessed at the 1977 World Peace through law Conference in Manila that
“there have been, to our lasting regret, a number of violations of the rights of detainees”

Massacres targeted at the Moro People

The Moro people, belonging to the 14 or so indigenous communities in Mindanao whose populations are mostly Muslim, were
specifically targeted by Marcos' forces. The Marcos regime had started to kill hundreds of Moros even before the imposition
of Martial Law in 1972.[47] Thousands of Moro Muslims were killed during the Marcos regime, prompting them to form
insurgent groups and separatist movements such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF), which became more radical with time due to atrocities against Muslims.[48]
According to the Marjanie Salic Macasalong's study The Liberation Movements in Mindanao: Root Causes and Prospects for
Peace, the number of Moro victims killed by the Army, Philippine Constabulary, and the Ilaga (a notorious government-
sanctioned[49] terrorist cult known for cannibalism and land grabbing that served as members of the CHDF)[44] reached as high
as 10,000 lives.
Imposition of Martial Law
President Marcos imposed martial law on the nation from 1972 to 1981 to suppress increasing civil strife and the threat of a
communist takeover following a series of bombings in Manila.

Events leading up to Marcos' declaration of Martial LawEdit

Around 1970, student activism had intensified and many student activists joined communist movements. Kabataang
Makabayan (Patriotic Youth, or 'KM') a political organization founded by José María Sison intended to be a nationwide
extension of the Student Cultural Association of the University of the Philippines,[13][14] carried out study sessions on
Marxism–Leninism and intensified the deployment of urban activists in rural areas to prepare for people's war.[15][16] The
line between leftist activists and communists became increasingly blurred, as a significant number of KM advanced activists
joined the party of the Communist Party also founded by Sison.[15] Earlier, during the campaign period for the 1969 elections,
students called promoted a mock campaign called the Dante-for-President movement, likely referring to New People's
Army founder Bernabe 'Kumander Dante' Buscayno.[17] KM members protested in front of Congress, throwing a coffin, a
stuffed alligator, and stones at Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos after his State of the Nation Address. On the presidential palace,
activists rammed the gate with a fire truck and once the gate broke and gave way, the activists charged into the Palace
grounds tossing rocks, pillboxes, Molotov cocktails. In front of the US embassy, protesters vandalized, arsoned and damaged
the embassy lobby resulting to a strong protest from the U.S. Ambassador.[15][17][18] The KM protests ranged from 50,000
to 100,000 in number per weekly mass action.[15] In the aftermath of the January 1970 riots, at least two activists were
confirmed dead and several were injured by the police. The Mayor of Manila at the time, Antonio Villegas, commended
the Manila Police District for their "exemplary behavior and courage" and protecting the First Couple long after they have left.
The death of the activists was seized by the López-controlled Manila Times and Manila Chronicle, blaming Marcos and added
fire to the weekly protests.[19] Students declared a week-long boycott of classes and instead met to organize protest
rallies.[17]
In Marcos' diary,[18][19] he wrote that the whole crisis has been utilized by communism to create a revolutionary situation.
He lamented that the powerful Lopez family, which controlled Manila Times and Manila Chronicle, blamed him for the riots
thus raising the ire of demonstrators. He mentioned that he was informed by his mother of a planned assassination paid for
by the powerful oligarch, Eugenio Lopez Sr (Iñing Lopez). He narrated how he dissuaded his supporters from the Northern
Philippines in infiltrating the demonstration in Manila and inflicting harm on the protesters, and how he showed to the UP
professors that the Collegian was carrying the communist party articles and that he was disappointed in the faculty of his alma
mater for becoming a spawning ground of communism. He also added that he asked Ernesto Rufino, Vicente Rufino and
Carlos Palanca to withdraw advertisements from the Manila Times which was openly supporting revolution and the
communist cause, and they agreed to do so.
Rumors of coup d’etat were also brewing. A report of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee said that shortly after
the 1969 Philippine presidential election, a group composed mostly of retired colonels and generals organized a revolutionary
junta with the aim of first discrediting President Marcos and then killing him. The group was headed by Eleuterio Adevoso, an
official of the opposition Liberal party. As described in a document given to the committee by Philippine Government official,
key figures in the plot were Vice President Fernando Lopez and Sergio Osmena Jr., whom Marcos defeated in the 1969
election.[20] Marcos even went to the U.S. embassy to dispel rumors that the U.S. embassy is supporting a coup d’etat which
the opposition liberal party was spreading.[19] While the report obtained by the NY Times speculated saying that story could
be used by Marcos to justify Martial Law, as early as December 1969 in a message from the U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State, the U.S. Ambassador said that most of the talk about revolution and even assassination has been
coming from the defeated opposition, of which Adevoso (of the Liberal Party) is a leading activist. He also said that the
information he has on the assassination plans are 'hard' or well-sourced and he has to make sure that it reached President
Marcos.[21][22]
In light of the crisis, Marcos wrote an entry in his diary in January 1970:[19] "I have several options. One of them is to abort
the subversive plan now by the sudden arrest of the plotters. But this would not be accepted by the people. Nor could we get
the Huks (Communists), their legal cadres and support. Nor the MIM (Maoist International Movement) and other subversive
[or front] organizations, nor those underground. We could allow the situation to develop naturally then after massive
terrorism, wanton killings and an attempt at my assassination and a coup d’etat, then declare martial law or suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus – and arrest all including the legal cadres. Right now I am inclined towards the latter."
At the height of armed communist insurgency in the Philippines, Philippine Military Academy instructor Lt. Victor Corpuz
led New People's Army rebels in a raid on the PMA armory, capturing rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers, a bazooka and
thousands of rounds of ammunition in 1970.[23] In 1972, China, which was then actively supporting and arming communist
insurgencies in Asia as part of Mao Zedong's People's War Doctrine,[16] transported 1,200 M-14 and AK-47 rifles[24] for the
NPA to speed up NPA's campaign to defeat the government.[25][26] Prior to the 1975, the Philippine government maintained
a close relationship with the Kuomintang-ruled Chinese government which fled to Taiwan (Republic of China), despite
the Chinese Communist Victory in 1949, and saw Communist China (People's Republic of China) as a security threat due to
China's financial and military support of Communist rebels in the country.[27] In a speech in February 2017 at the Methodist
Protestants’ Cosmopolitan Church in Manila, Enrile said: “The most significant event that made President Marcos decide to
declare martial law was the MV Karagatan incident in July 1972. It was the turning point. The MV Karagatan involved the
infiltration of high powered rifles, ammunition, 40-millimeter rocket launchers, rocket projectiles, communications
equipment, and other assorted war materials by the CPP-NPA-NDF on the Pacific side of Isabela in Cagayan Valley. The CPP-
NPA-NDF attempted a second effort – their MV Andrea project – but they failed. The MV Andrea sank in the West Philippine
Sea on its way to the country.”[28] Those who opposed President Marcos, including The Conjugal Dictatorship author
Primitivo Mijares, the Liberal Party, as well as the Lópezes’ Manila Chronicle, called the MV Karagatan incident as "show' or “a
hoax”.[29][28]
In a speech before Senate, Benigno Aquino, Jr. warned the public of the possible establishment of a “garrison state” by
President Ferdinand Marcos. President Marcos imposed martial law on the nation from 1972 to 1981 to suppress increasing
civil strife and the threat of a communist takeover following a series of bombings in Manila.[30][31] Aquino himself had
contact with leaders of Communist Party of the Philippines — first with founder Jose Maria Sison, and later with Rodolfo Salas,
CPP chair at the height of Martial Law. In an interview with Ateneo De Manila University Professor Lisandro Claudio, Salas said
not only did he bring wounded New People's Army (NPA) soldiers to Aquino’s houses, but he received guns and cash from
Aquino himself. In another communication to the State Department dated September 21, the US Embassy sheds further light
on what Ninoy told the American officials. On September 12, Ninoy had a “lengthy luncheon conversation" with two embassy
officers about the “growing strength of Communist dissidence in the Philippines." In this luncheon, the senator “readily
admitted his past ties with the several Communist factions in the Philippines." He claimed that maintaining links with Huk
rebels was a “fact of life" for a Tarlac politician.[32][33] In the 1978 Philippine parliamentary election, the first parliamentary
election during Martial Law, Ninoy fielded in his Lakas ng Bayan party Alex Boncayao, who was associated with Filipino
communist death squad Alex Boncayao Brigade.[34][35] All of the party's 21 candidates, including Ninoy, lost in the election.
Plaza Miranda bombings and 1972 Manila BombingsEdit
On 21 August 1971, while the opposition (Liberal Party) was having their miting de avance in Plaza Miranda, 2 fragmentation
grenades exploded.[citation needed][36] It took 9 lives and left more than 100 people seriously wounded.[36][citation
needed] Some Liberal Party candidates were seriously injured including Jovito Salonga, who nearly died and was visually
impaired. Suspicion of responsibility for the blast initially fell upon Marcos, whom the Liberals blamed for the bombing;
however, in later years, prominent personalities associated with the event have laid the blame on the Communist Party of the
Philippines under José María Sison.[37] In his autobiography, Salonga states his belief that Sison and the CPP were
responsible.[38] Based on interviews of The Washington Post with former Communist Party of the Philippines Officials, it was
revealed that "the (Communist) party leadership planned -- and three operatives carried out -- the attack in an attempt to
provoke government repression and push the country to the brink of revolution... (Communist Party Leader) Sison had
calculated that Marcos could be provoked into cracking down on his opponents, thereby driving thousands of political activists
into the underground, the former party officials said. Recruits were urgently needed, they said, to make use of a large influx of
weapons and financial aid that China had already agreed to provide."[39]
A month of "terrorist bombings" of public facilities in Manila and Quezon City culminated on 22 September with a staged
assassination attempt on Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile.

Proclamation of Martial Law

Six hours after the alleged assassination attempt against Enrile and citing more than 15 bombing incidences, chaos and
lawlessness, Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1081, declaring and imposing martial law in the entire country.[40] By declaring
martial law, Marcos suspended the writ of habeas corpus and also the 1935 Constitution, dissolved Congress and padlocked
the doors to the Batasang Pambansa, and assuming both legislative and executive powers. Proclamation No. 1081 was dated
21 September 1972 but it was actually signed on 17 September. The formal announcement or promulgation of the
proclamation was made only at seven-thirty in the evening of 25 September, evidencing the plan to declare martial law even
before the supposed ambush against Enrile. He had also commanded his military collaborators to start arresting his political
opponents and close down all media and retail (fashion, food, religious, sports) establishments about twenty-two hours
before the announcement.

The declaration of Martial Law was criticized as a planned precursor to extending Marcos' term in office, which under the
1935 Constitution is limited to two terms of four years each or a maximum of eight years[42] Rigoberto Tiglao, former press
secretary and a former communist incarcerated during the martial law,[43] countered by arguing that the liberal and
communist parties provoked martial law imposition.
Human rights abuses
Under martial law there were widespread excesses and human rights abuses, even while the regime reduced violent urban
crime, collected unregistered firearms, and suppressed communist insurgency in some areas;[49] Liliosa Hilao was the first
murder victim under Martial Law.[50] There were over 70,000 filed cases of human rights abuses today from this period.
Torture methods employed by the army on their victims were extremely inhumane, which included beating, rape,
electrocution, animal treatment, and mutilation among others. Many private establishments particularly media companies
critical of the government were closed, and the arrest of activists were made through the Philippine Constabulary; many of
the abuses were attributed to the latter, which was then headed by future president Fidel Ramos.[51] In total, there were
3,257 extrajudicial killings, 35,000 individual tortures, and 70,000 were incarcerated. Of the 3,257 killed, some 2,520, or 77
percent of all victims, were salvaged—that is, tortured, mutilated, and dumped on a roadside for public display. It is also
reported that 737 Filipinos disappeared between 1975 and 1985.[52] The Civilian Home Defense Force, a precursor of Civilian
Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), was organized by President Marcos to battle with the communist and Islamic
insurgency problem, has particularly been accused of notoriously inflicting human right violations on leftists, the NPA, Muslim
insurgents, and rebels against the Marcos government.[53]

Arrests of the media and the opposition

After martial law was declared, critics of the government were arrested, led by then Senators Benigno Aquino Jr. and Ramon
Diokno, and Manila journalists—Manila Times publisher Chino Roces and columnist, Max Soliven; Manila Chronicle
publisher Eugenio Lopez Jr. and his editor Amando Doronila; Philippines Free publisher-editor Teddy Boy Locsin and his staff
writer, Napoleon Rama; and Press Foundation of Asia joint executive Juan L. Mercado.[54] Many of those who were arrested
were later freed without charges, but Benigno Aquino Jr. was charged and convicted guilty along with his two co-
accused, NPA leaders Bernabe Buscayno (Commander Dante) and Lt. Victor Corpuz, guilty for illegal possession of fire arms,
subversion, and murder, and was sentenced them to death by firing squad by a Military Court. The death sentence was never
carried out by the Marcos government.

Martial law was lifted by President Marcos on January 17, 1981, through Proclamation 2045,[66] and he continued to rule the
country until 1986 when he went to exile after the People Power Revolution.
WAR ON DRUGS

The Philippine Drug War refers to the drug policy of the Philippine government under President Rodrigo Duterte, who
assumed office on June 30, 2016. According to former Philippine National Police Chief Ronald dela Rosa, the policy is aimed at
"the neutralization of illegal drug personalities nationwide."[20] Duterte has urged members of the public to kill suspected
criminals and drug addicts.[21] Research by media organizations and human rights groups has shown that police routinely
execute unarmed drug suspects and then plant guns and drugs as evidence. Philippine authorities have denied misconduct by
police.[22][23]
The policy has been widely condemned locally and internationally for the number of deaths resulting from police operations
and allegations of systematic extrajudicial executions. The policy is supported by the majority of the local population, as well
as by leaders or representatives of certain countries such as China, Japan and the United States.
Estimates of the death toll vary. Officially, 5,104 drug personalities have been killed as of January 2019.[27] News organizations
and human rights groups claim the death toll is over 12,000.[28][29] The victims included 54 children in the first
year.[29][28] Opposition senators claimed in 2018 that over 20,000 have been killed.[30][31] In February 2018, the International
Criminal Court in The Hague announced a "preliminary examination" into killings linked to the Philippine Drug War since at
least July 1, 2016.

Since taking office on June 30, 2016, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has carried out a “war on drugs” that has led to the
deaths of over 12,000 Filipinos to date, mostly urban poor. At least 2,555 of the killings have been attributed to the Philippine
National Police. Duterte and other senior officials have instigated and incited the killings in a campaign that could amount to
crimes against humanity.

Human Rights Watch research has found that police are falsifying evidence to justify the unlawful killings. Despite growing
calls for an investigation, Duterte has vowed to continue the campaign.

Large-scale extrajudicial violence as a crime solution was a marker of Duterte’s 22-year tenure as mayor of Davao City and the
cornerstone of his presidential campaign. On the eve of his May 9, 2016 election victory, Duterte told a crowd of more than
300,000: “If I make it to the presidential palace I will do just what I did as mayor. You drug pushers, holdup men, and do-
nothings, you better get out because I'll kill you.”

BACKGROUND

Rodrigo Duterte won the 2016 Philippine presidential election promising to kill tens of thousands of criminals, and urging
people to kill drug addicts.[21] As Mayor of Davao City, Duterte was criticized by groups like Human Rights Watch for
the extrajudicial killings of hundreds of street children, petty criminals and drug users carried out by the Davao Death Squad, a
vigilante group with which he was allegedly involved.[32][33][34] Duterte has alternately confirmed and denied his involvement in
the alleged Davao Death Squad killings.[35] Duterte has benefited from reports in the national media that he made Davao into
one of the world's safest cities, which he cites as justification for his drug policy,[36][37][38] although national police data shows
that the city has the highest murder rate and the second highest rape rate in the Philippines.[39][40]
Philippine anti-narcotic officials have admitted that Duterte uses flawed and exaggerated data to support his claim that the
Philippines is becoming a "narco-state".[41] The Philippines has a low prevalence rate of drug users compared to the global
average, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.[42] In his inaugural State of the Nation Address, Duterte
claimed that data from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency shows that there were 3 million drug addicts two to three
years ago, which he said may have increased to 3.7 million. However, according to the Philippine Dangerous Drugs Board, the
government drug policy-making body, 1.8 million Filipinos used illegal drugs (mostly cannabis) in 2015, the latest official
survey published, a third of whom had used illegal drugs only once in the past 13 months.
Despite international pressure to stop the extrajudicial killings and the police touting more transparency in their operations,
the daily slaughter continues in Manila’s poverty stricken neighbourhoods.

Rosemarie Trajano, secretary general of the Philippine Alliance of Hunan Rights Advocates said that two - thirds of the killings
are carried out by what we call police vigilantes – masked agents without uniforms but with clear ties to the security forces.
 CONDITIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

The wars in Afghanistan have been fairly constant since the seventies, and since 1979, more than a million Afghans have been
killed and 3 million maimed in internal conflict.

Afghan security forces and its intelligence agency have been accused of committing grave human right violation like enforced
disappearances, extrajudicial killings and torture of suspects. Moreover, Afghan security forces and Afghan air force have also
been involved in killing civilians in ground operations as well as in air strikes.

Afghan officials have presided over murders, abduction, and other abuses with the tacit backing of their government and its
western allies,[53] Human Rights Watch says in its report from March 2015.

Since the US-led invasion in 2001, Afghanistan has never been as insecure as it is now. The Taliban control more territory than
at any point since the removal of their regime 17 years ago.

The Afghan war has already become the longest war in US history. With the passage of time, the conflict has not only become
more intense - it has also become more complicated. The attacks are becoming bigger, more frequent, more widespread and
much deadlier. Both sides - the Taliban and the US/Nato-backed Afghan government - are trying to gain the upper hand.

On 10 August, the Taliban entered Ghazni, a strategic provincial capital on a key highway south of Kabul, before the Afghan
security forces supported by US advisors and air strikes pushed them back. On 15 May, the Taliban entered the capital of
Farah province in western Afghanistan, close to the Iranian border.

Large parts of provinces like Helmand and Kandahar - where hundreds of US, UK and other foreign troops were killed - are
now under Taliban control. Meanwhile, civilian casualties are at an unprecedented level. According to the UN, more than
10,000 civilians were killed or injured in 2017, and the number is expected to be even higher in 2018.

A special United Nations envoy says there has been an improvement in the human rights in Afghanistan, but that an
atmosphere of fear and intimidation continues to prevail.

U.N. special envoy Asma Jehangir says there has been a marked drop in extrajudicial killings in Afghanistan, but that such
incidents continue to be reported.

START OF WAR

The Afghanistan conflict (Persian: ‫جنگ های افغانستان‬, Pashto: ‫ )د افغانستان جنګونه‬is a series of wars that has been fought
in Afghanistan since 1978. Starting with the Saur Revolution military coup, an almost continuous series of armed conflicts has
dominated and afflicted Afghanistan. The wars include:
 The Soviet–Afghan War began in 1979 and ended in 1989. The Soviet Army "invaded" or "intervened" in the country to secure
the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) following large waves of rebellion against the government. Soviet
troops along with the allied Afghan Army fought against rebel factions mostly known collectively as the "Afghan mujahideen",
whose main backers were the Soviet Union's Cold War enemies the United States and Pakistan. The Soviet Union was forced
to withdraw its troops in 1989.
o The Afghan Civil War (1989-92) was the continuing war between the government and rebels, but without the involvement
of Soviet troops. The Soviet Union nevertheless continued to financially support the Afghan government in its fight, and
likewise rebel factions continued receiving support from the United States and Pakistan. The Soviet-backed Afghan
government survived until the fall of Kabul in 1992.
 The Afghan Civil War (1992-96) began when infighting between the mujahideen rebel factions, after taking Kabul and
establishing the Islamic State of Afghanistan, escalated into another full blown conflict. Violent wars were fought between
different occupying factions in Kabul, and the city experienced heavy bombardment from another. Each of these were
supported by an outside power as Pakistan, Iran, or Saudi Arabia, who were seeking influence in Afghanistan. This conflict
ended in 1996 after the Taliban, a relatively new militia backed by Pakistan and enforced by several thousand al-
Qaeda fighters from Arab countries, took Kabul.
 The Afghan Civil War (1996-2001) started immediately after the Taliban's capture of Kabul which involved a new military-
political resistance force called Northern Alliance fighting against the Taliban and their partially recognized Emirate.
 Throughout this period the Taliban were in control of almost all of the country, as the Northern Alliance fought most of the
time on the defense. The Alliance's leader was assassinated by al-Qaeda members on September 9, 2001.
 The United States invasion of Afghanistan started on October 7, 2001. The United States sought to remove the Taliban from
power as they were hosting al-Qaeda terrorists and camps, who were the main suspects of the September 11 attacks. The
United States fought the Taliban from the air and provided support to Northern Alliance ground troops, who successfully
drove the Taliban away from most of the country by December 2001. The invasion also marked the start of the United
States's War on Terror.
o The War in Afghanistan (2001-present) is the continuous incumbent war in Afghanistan, where the main conflict consists
of Afghan Army troops, backed by additional United States troops, fighting against insurgents of the Taliban. NATO has also
been involved in this war.

It has been estimated that 1,405,111 to 2,084,468 lives have been lost since the start of the conflict.

COMMUNIST GROUP
From 1933 to 1973 Afghanistan experienced a lengthy period of peace and relative stability.[11] It was ruled as a monarchy by
King Zahir Shah, who belonged to the Afghan Musahiban Barakzai dynasty.[11][12] In the 1960s, Afghanistan as a
constitutional monarchy held limited parliamentary elections.[13]
Zahir Shah, who would become the last King of Afghanistan, was overthrown by his cousin Mohammed Daoud Khan in July
1973, after discontent with the monarchy grew in the urban areas of Afghanistan.[11] The country had gone through several
droughts, and charges of corruption and poor economic policies were leveled against the ruling dynasty. Khan transformed
the monarchy into a republic, and he became the first President of Afghanistan. He was supported by a faction of the People's
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), Afghanistan's communist party, which had been founded in 1965 and enjoyed strong
relations with the Soviet Union.
SOVIET INTERVENTION AND WITHDRAWAL

The Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. Amin was deposed from power almost immediately, as he
and 200 of his guards were killed on December 27 by Soviet Army Spetsnaz, replaced by Babrak Karmal. After deployment into
Afghanistan, Soviet forces along with government forces would begin to engage in a protracted counter-insurgency war
with mujahideen fighters. Some of those Islamic fighters would later transform into the Taliban according to Professor Carole
Hillenbrand who stated: "The West helped the Taliban to fight the Soviet takeover of Afghanistan".

The Soviet government realized that a military solution to the conflict would require far more troops. Because of this they
discussed troop withdrawals and searched for a political and peaceful solution as early as 1980, but they never took any
serious steps in that direction until 1988. Early Soviet military reports confirm the difficulties the Soviet army had while
fighting on the mountainous terrain, for which the Soviet army had no training whatsoever. Parallels with the Vietnam
War were frequently referred to by Soviet army officers.[21]
Policy failures, and the stalemate that ensued after the Soviet intervention, led the Soviet leadership to become highly critical
of Karmal's leadership. Under Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union was able to depose Karmal and replace him
with Mohammad Najibullah. Karmal's leadership was seen as a failure by the Soviet Union because of the rise of violence and
crime during his administration.
Throughout the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, troop convoys came under attack by Afghan rebel fighters. In all, 523
Soviet soldiers were killed during the withdrawal. The total withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan was completed in
February 1989.[22] The last Soviet soldier to leave was Lieutenant General Boris Gromov, leader of the Soviet military
operations in Afghanistan at the time of the Soviet invasion.[23] In total 14,453 Soviet soldiers died during the Afghan war.
The Soviet war had a damaging impact on Afghanistan. Soviet forces and their proxies committed a genocide against the
Afghan people and killed up to 2 million Afghans.[24][25][26] Five to ten million Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran, amounting
to 1/3 of the prewar population of the country, and another 2 million were displaced within the country. Pakistan's North-
West Frontier Province functioned as an organisational and networking base for the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance, with the
province's influential Deobandi ulama playing a major supporting role in promoting the 'jihad'
FALL OF COMMUNISM

After the Soviet withdrawal, the Republic of Afghanistan under Najibullah continued to face resistance from the various
mujahideen forces. Najibullah received funding and arms from the Soviet Union until 1991 when the Soviet Union
collapsed.[28] For several years the Afghan Army had actually increased their effectiveness past levels ever achieved during
the Soviet military presence. But the government was dealt a major blow when Abdul Rashid Dostum, a leading general,
created an alliance with the Shura-e Nazar of Ahmad Shah Massoud. Large parts of the Afghan communist government
capitulated to the forces of Massoud in early 1992. After the Soviet defeat, the Wall Street Journal named Massoud "the
Afghan who won the Cold War".[29] He had defeated the Soviet forces nine times in his home region of the Panjshir Valley in
northeastern Afghanistan.[30]
Pakistan tried to install Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in power in Afghanistan against the opposition of all other mujahideen
commanders and factions.[31] As early as October 1990, the Inter-Services Intelligence had devised a plan for Hekmatyar to
conduct a mass bombardment of the Afghan capital Kabul with possible Pakistani troop enforcements.[31] This unilateral ISI-
Hekmatyar plan came although the thirty most important mujahideen commanders had agreed on holding a conference
inclusive of all Afghan groups to decide on a common future strategy.[31] Peter Tomsen reports that the protest by the other
mujahideen commanders was like a "firestorm". Ahmad Zia Massoud, the brother of Ahmad Shah Massoud, said that his
faction strongly opposed the plan and like other factions would take measures if any "Pakistani troops reinforced
Hekmatyar". Abdul Haq was reportedly so angry about the ISI plan that he was "red in the face".[31] And Nabi Mohammad,
another commander, pointed out that "Kabul's 2 million could not escape Hekmatyar's rocket bombardment – there would be
a massacre."[31] Massoud's, Abdul Haq's and Amin Wardak's representatives said that "Hekmatyar's rocketing of Kabul ...
would produce a civilian bloodbath."[31] The United States finally put pressure on Pakistan to stop the 1990 plan, which was
subsequently called off until 1992.
TALIBAN RISE TO POWER

Southern Afghanistan was under the control of neither foreign-backed militias nor the government in Kabul, but was ruled by
local leaders such as Gul Agha Sherzai and their militias. In 1994, the Taliban (a movement originating from Jamiat Ulema-e-
Islam-run religious schools for Afghan refugees in Pakistan) also developed in Afghanistan as a politico-religious force,
reportedly in opposition to the tyranny of the local governor.[39] Mullah Omar started his movement with fewer than 50
armed madrassah students in his hometown of Kandahar.[39] When the Taliban took control of the city in 1994, they forced
the surrender of dozens of local Pashtun leaders who had presided over a situation of complete lawlessness and
atrocities.[38] In 1994, the Taliban took power in several provinces in southern and central Afghanistan.

In late 1994, most of the militia factions (Hezb-i Islami, Junbish-i Milli and Hezb-i Wahdat) which had been fighting in the
battle for control of Kabul were defeated militarily by forces of the Islamic State's Secretary of Defense Ahmad Shah Massoud.
Bombardment of the capital came to a halt.[37][40][41] Massoud tried to initiate a nationwide political process with the goal
of national consolidation and democratic elections, also inviting the Taliban to join the process.[42] Massoud had united
political and cultural personalities, governors, commanders, clergymen and representatives to reach a lasting agreement.
Massoud, like most people in Afghanistan, saw this conference as a small hope for democracy and for free elections. His
favourite for candidacy to the presidency was Dr. Mohammad Yusuf, the first democratic prime minister under Zahir Shah, the
former king. In the first meeting representatives from 15 different Afghan provinces met, in the second meeting there were
already 25 provinces participating. Massoud went unarmed to talk to several Taliban leaders in Maidan Shar, but the Taliban
declined to join this political process.[42] When Massoud returned safely, the Taliban leader who had received him as his
guest paid with his life: he was killed by other senior Taliban for failing to execute Massoud while the possibility was there.
The Taliban started shelling Kabul in early 1995 but were defeated by forces of the Islamic State government under Ahmad
Shah Massoud.[40] Amnesty International, referring to the Taliban offensive, wrote in a 1995 report:
This is the first time in several months that Kabul civilians have become the targets of rocket attacks and shelling aimed at
residential areas in the city.
The Taliban's early victories in 1994 were followed by a series of defeats that resulted in heavy losses.[38] Pakistan provided
strong support to the Taliban.[34][43] Many analysts like Amin Saikal describe the Taliban as developing into a proxy force for
Pakistan's regional interests which the Taliban decline.[34]
On September 26, 1996, as the Taliban, with military support by Pakistan and financial support by Saudi Arabia, prepared for
another major offensive, Massoud ordered a full retreat from Kabul.[44] The Taliban seized Kabul on September 27, 1996, and
established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
CONDITIONS IN SRI LANKA

Major human rights groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch,[1] as well as the United States
Department of State[1] and the European Union,[2] have expressed concern about the state of human rights in Sri
Lanka. British rule in Ceylon,[3] the government of Sri Lanka and the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as well
as various other paramilitaries and marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) rebels are accused of violating human
rights.[4] Although Sri Lanka has not officially practiced the death penalty since 1976,[5] there are well-documented cases of
state-sponsored 'disappearances' and murders.

Although, technically speaking, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings are two distinct categories of gross
violations of human rights, these two categories often overlap in Sri Lanka. Often, what get classified as enforced
disappearances are kidnappings followed by interrogation, which often involve the use of torture and ill-treatment, followed
by executions done in secret and, finally, the secret disposal of bodies. Despite several commissions looking into involuntary
disappearances having made extensive observations and recommendations on the nature of enforced disappearances in Sri
Lanka and ways to avoid the same, successive governments have failed to implement these recommendations. The following
are observations and recommendations from ALRC to the Council on the issue of enforced disappearances in Sri Lanka.

Successive governments have refused to make Sri Lanka a signatory to the International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearances. This refusal to become a party to the convention has arisen from the premise that
forbidding enforced disappearances is an undue restriction on the police, military, and other law enforcement agencies. The
government’s approval for resorting to enforced disappearances under certain circumstances is implied in the government’s
refusal to become a party to this convention. This position is contrary to the government’s obligations under international law
and under the normal obligations of legitimate governance. As long as the government of Sri Lanka refuses to become a
signatory to this Convention, it is justifiable to accuse it of being complicit in allowing enforced disappearances.

Sri Lanka’s justice system has not developed an effective mechanism for investigating and prosecuting enforced
disappearances. Due to the failure to develop an effective law enforcement mechanism, capable and willing to investigate
enforced disappearances and prosecute perpetrators, the government can be justifiably accused of overtly and covertly
pursuing a policy of allowing enforced disappearances.

In Sri Lanka, there prevails a climate of fear, wherein relatives of victims of enforced disappearances are intimidated away
from making complaints and pursuing justice in relation to enforced disappearances. So long as such a situation of fear and
intimidation prevails, the government of Sri Lanka can be accused of encouraging the practice of enforced disappearances.

Ever since the resolution entitled “Promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka” was passed at the
Human Rights Council, there has been heavy propaganda. This propaganda has painted anyone wishing to give evidence
before the committee assigned by the council to investigate into human rights abuses under the said resolution, or wishing to
assist victims and relatives, as being unpatriotic and, therefore, deserving of reprisals from the government and its supporters.

There have been mob attacks, some led by Buddhist monks, on several meetings organized by civil society groups, to express
solidarity with the families of disappeared persons. The government, in its failure to enforce the law against such attackers,
has encouraged a policy of intimidation against the families of the disappeared, as well as civil society organisations that are
merely carrying out their obligations to extend support to families of victims of gross violations of human rights.

Fear of abductions, which may be followed by enforced disappearances, prevails in all parts of the country, in particular, in the
North and the East. It has virtually become an invitation for serious reprisals, to be witness to a crime allegedly committed by
the police, military, or other government agency. The government’s propaganda machinery, through the media, has been
mobilized to carry out a campaign against persons who wish to give evidence as witnesses to enforced disappearances and
other human rights abuses. Allowing such propaganda to take place through its media channels gives rise to a justifiable
accusation that the government is involved in the suppression of persons who wish to become witnesses against crime,
particularly in incidents of gross violations of human rights.

The fear of reprisals prevalent in the country is an obstacle to any attempt at accountability and reconciliation in Sri Lanka. By
allowing such a state of fear and intimidation, the government can be justifiably accused of openly acting against every
initiative towards accountability and reconciliation.
Besides enforced disappearances, there have also been other forms of extrajudicial killings. One such form is through torture
at the police stations. The case of Sandun Malinga, a 17-year-old boy who was tortured and later killed at Kandaketiya Police
Station, is one such extrajudicial killing through torture. Another form of extrajudicial killings is shootings by police officers,
who have recently been issued with guns through an order of the Ministry of Defence. Two such killings are that of 24-year-
old Subash Indika and 19-year-old S.M. Kelum Subasinghe. Further, there have been several killings of suspects in police
custody by officers under the pretext of self-defence. As a general rule, no serious inquiries into allegations of such
extrajudicial killings have resulted.

The Asian Legal Resource Centre respectfully submits that one of the major causes of enforced disappearances, as well as
extrajudicial killings, is the virtual collapse of the public justice system within Sri Lanka, due to politicization of the police,
prosecutorial branch, and the judiciary, which, in turn, is a result of the authoritarian form of government that has developed
due to the 1978 Constitution and reinforced by the 18th Constitutional Amendment. We further submit that until this
constitutional framework favouring authoritarianism is dismantled, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings will
likely continue with impunity.

SRI LANKA BRIEF (published 2014)

Police Spokesman SSP Ajith Rohana said that hereafter police would use ‘necessary force’ as opposed to ‘minimum force’ in
dealing with troublemakers.He said this to seemingly justify the recent killings of suspects in police custody and the police
assault on protesting undergraduates.
Extra judicial killings by the police and the country’s armed forces first came into focus during the April 1971 insurgency, where
it is estimated that 13,000 Sinhala youth, both men and women, from the South, lost their lives, many of whom, ipso facto, were
victims of extra-judicial killings.
It once more gained the dubious limelight 12 years later, after the July ’83 riots, which spawned Tamil terrorism and ended only
26 years afterwards, in May 2009.

In the interim period, with the signing of the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord and the Sri Lankan security forces being confined to
barracks after the induction of the IPKF as a condition of the Accord, Southern Terrorism which had previously been ruthlessly
crushed 16 years ago in April ’71, once more raised its head as a protest against India’s armed intervention in the internal affairs
of the island.
If the rise of Southern Terrorism in April 1971 was to instal a Marxist State in Sri Lanka by an armed revolution, the ostensible
reason for its ‘rebirth’ in July 1987 was as a protest against the Indo-Lanka Accord and the induction of the IPKF to the Northern
and Eastern parts of the country, supposedly to maintain the peace, just when the Sri Lankan security forces were about to
deliver the death knell to Tamil terrorism in the North.

The resurgence of Southern Terrorism in the South in July 1987 was finally put down after the end of a bloody war (in the South)
which lasted for more than two years, leaving in its aftermath, the brutal killings of thousands of Sinhala youth once more, many
of whom were victims of extra judicial killings, a repetition of April ’71.
This doesn’t discount the fact of the thousands of innocent Tamil civilians who also lost their lives, especially in the period, July
1983 to May 2009, victims of the establishments, whether it was the Sri Lanka Government or the Indian Government, the
latter, vis-à-vis the IPKF.
In the present day ,reports on incidents of the practice of extra judicial killings of alleged suspects of serious and heinous
crimes often goes unnoticed, without as much as a comment.

Over the years, an understanding or an ‘acceptance of sorts’ seems to have developed within the general public – of extra
judicial killings by the law enforcement officers. Some of the reasons for such an understanding to take root in the society can
be explained as follows;

a. The acts of such crimes have gradually become more brutal in nature and are often carried out with the use of
sophisticated weapons and in many instances by trained gunmen i.e. ex-armed forces members. In this particular instance,
one of the three persons killed is reported to have been a trainer in the Sri Lanka army’s commando regiment. The terror
caused by such killings seems to have led to the public response that the disposal of such persons by extra judicial killings may
be justified or at least that it is a ‘necessary evil’.
b. Due to the extremely chaotic situation of the judicial process in Sri Lanka – which has miserably failed to convince the
general public, of Sri Lanka’s capacity to deal with crimes, through a due judicial process – the public seems to have accepted
as fact, that in the absence of any alternatives in being protected from serious crimes through a legitimate process – killing of
these persons may be the only alternative left. That the judicial process is extremely defective is beyond controversy. Besides
the usual long delays stretching for years, in dealing with litigation in Sri Lanka, there are also other problems; there is hardly
any protection for the victims and witnesses of crime, and therefore, many of them may think it unsafe to come before courts
and give evidence; absence of evidence implies acquittals for the alleged criminals; further, retaining of lawyers through such
a protracted periods of time, is a luxury that many people cannot afford; many Sri Lankan lawyers too, have unfortunately
acquired the reputation of exploiting these delays for their own benefit; and in recent times, there is a widespread public
perception that criminals can get away by of payment of Bribes, usually to Police officers ,which has – since of late – spread
even to the judges themselves ; above all, there is a possibility of political interference and criminals often have political links
which can see them safely and unscathed , through the ordeals of trials and other judicial procedures .

c. Killing of unacceptable persons has acquired some sort of legitimacy, due to the frequent resort to such killings during the
long period of insurgencies in during Sri Lanka’s recent history. It is quite well established public knowledge that such killings
have been resorted to, as a ‘necessary strategy’ for dealing with those who are branded as terrorists. The official sanction for
this policy was expressed by a former Deputy Defense Minister who proclaimed in Parliament that “ “such things” cannot be
done according to the law”

All these factors have created a mindset which almost expects the police and other law enforcement agencies to ensure
security by resorting to extra judicial killings.

What this factual situation presents is a society that has dissented to the lowest depths of lawlessness and immorality. If
murder of criminals is the only resort, that law enforcement officers have at their disposal, that itself is an open admission
that even the most basic tenants of morality cannot any longer be protected nor respected any longer within the Sri Lankan
social milieu.

Now, we have drifted from the war against terrorists to the war against criminals. War, in this instance means war in a literal
sense and implies the direct use of the bullet in dealing with crimes.

The task of reinforcing the confidence in law and in the judicial process in any society is vests primarily, in the Government.

Whether crimes are dealt with – by means of law enforcement officers being allowed also to commit crime – is a matter
entirely determined by the Government. If resort to such killings is done with the approval of the Government itself, then
there is no-way-out, of the situation. That the present Government of Sri Lanka overtly or covertly encourages and condones
the resort to that type of violence is quiet obvious. The President as the Head of the Government has not made a single
statement condemning such killings nor set out the State Policy for the prevention of such killings which set out the manner in
which to deal with crime in general through the ordinary legal process following the law of the land. Since the Government of
Sri Lanka, is the Executive President, there is no one else who could give the re-assurance to the society with a better way of
dealing with such crime, other than by resorting to cold blooded killings. It is from within the very nature of the Sri Lankan
Constitutional system itself that the responsibility for the State Policy for permitting such killings could be placed on the
President himself.

Under such circumstances, announcements of inquiries into such extra judicial killings or bringing the perpetrators of such
crimes to justice makes no sense. Such inquiries and prosecutions are possible only when the Government does all that it can,
to create respect for law and the judicial process. The Rajapaksa Government has quite clearly entered into a different path
than that of one creating respect for the rule of law and judicial process.
The government policy of undermining the judicial process has quite a long history, and the most recent overt demonstration
of that policy was the illegal sacking of the Chief Justice Dr. Shirani Bandaranayake. When the very appointments to positions
such as that of the Chief Justice, is not based on implacable legal principles, there is hardly anything further to be said about
the respect for law and legality.

When the nation so blatantly rejects the fundamentals of moral and ethical order by creating permissiveness towards, extra
judicial killings by law enforcement officers we must all ask ourselves; what kind of respect for morality or ethics could be
sustained in Sri Lanka? A cynic may respond to that question, by saying; who owns morality and ethics? Unfortunately, such a
response form a cynic, coincides quite clearly with the approach that the Government itself takes, on the issue of ethics and
morality in Sri Lanka.

If the Government itself quiet openly pursues a path of disregard for ethical and moral order what hope remain for Sri Lanka
to be a civilized country? To be civilized means the respect for the moral and the ethical principles on the basis of which the
members of that society could maintain relationships which are ethical and morally sound.

Those who are talking about the civil society should seriously ponder about this level of collapse of the moral and the ethical
order in Sri Lanka. Something called a civil society can exist only within a context of recognition of ethics and morality as the
foundation. If the civil society itself condones extra judicial killings by law enforcement agencies, that is a frightening
indication of a crisis and a confusion within the civil society itself.

These are the problems that are posed by the extra judicial killings that are permitted to happen unabated in Sri Lanka.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (report)

Background

Enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, torture and other serious human rights violations and abuses were
committed with impunity before, during and in the aftermath of the armed conflict between government forces and the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that ended in 2009. Commitments made by Sri Lanka in 2015 – through its co-
sponsorship of UN Human Rights Council resolution 30/1 – to establish truth, justice and reparation mechanisms and reforms
aimed at non-recurrence of these crimes, had not been implemented by the end of the year. Sri Lanka’s constitutional reform
process, initiated in 2016, also faltered as lawmakers differed over issues such as the fate of the executive presidency, the
place of Buddhism in the new Constitution, and whether economic, social and cultural rights would be included in the Bill of
Rights.

Arbitrary arrests and detentions

The authorities continued to detain Tamils suspected of links to the LTTE under the PTA, which permitted extended
administrative detention and shifted the burden of proof to a detainee alleging torture or other ill-treatment. During his visit
to Sri Lanka in July, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
while countering terrorism stated that over 100 unconvicted prisoners (pre- and post-indictment) remained in detention
under the PTA, some of whom had been held for over a decade. Sri Lanka failed to follow through on its 2015 commitment to
repeal the PTA and replace it with legislation that complied with international standards.

Torture and other ill-treatment

Reports of torture and other ill-treatment in detention continued. In March, Sri Lanka’s human rights record was examined
under the UPR process; the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka said that it had continued to document widespread
incidents of violence against detainees, including torture and other ill-treatment, which it described as “routine” and practised
throughout the country, mainly by police. The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism found that 80% of those arrested under the PTA in late 2016 had
complained of torture and other ill-treatment.

Excessive use of force

Impunity persisted for excessive use of force against protesters. Killings by the army of unarmed demonstrators demanding
clean water in August 2013 had yet to be prosecuted. In August, a Criminal Investigation Department investigator told the
Gampaha Chief Magistrate that all evidence related to the shootings had been “destroyed” by previous investigators.

Enforced disappearances

By the end of the year Sri Lanka had not passed legislation criminalizing enforced disappearance in domestic law, despite
ratifying the International Convention against Enforced Disappearance in 2016. A parliamentary debate on a bill criminalizing
enforced disappearance scheduled for July was postponed without explanation.

The amended Office on Missing Persons Act was passed by Parliament in June; the amendments limited the Office’s power to
seek outside assistance. It was signed by the President on 20 July but had not come into operation by the end of the year. The
Office was proposed to help many thousands of families of the disappeared trace missing relatives.

In June, President Sirisena promised families of the disappeared that he would order the release of lists of those who
surrendered to, or were detained by, the armed forces during and after the armed conflict that ended in 2009. The lists were
not made public by the end of the year.

Impunity

Impunity persisted for alleged crimes under international law committed during the armed conflict. Impunity also remained
for many other human rights violations. These included the January 2006 extrajudicial executions of five students in
Trincomalee by security personnel and the killing of 17 aid workers with NGO Action Against Hunger in Muttur in August 2006;
the December 2011 disappearances of political activists Lalith Weeraraj and Kugan Muruganandan; the 2010 disappearance of
dissident cartoonist Prageeth Eknaligoda; and the 2009 killing of newspaper editor Lasantha Wickrematunge.

Human rights defenders

In June, the then Minister of Justice threatened to have human rights lawyer Lakshan Dias disbarred if he did not apologize for
speaking publicly about reported attacks against Christians.

Tamil human rights defenders and activist community members, including relatives of the disappeared, continued to report
surveillance and harassment by law enforcement officials. Women human rights defenders in the north and east reported that
interactions with police were often degrading and sexualized.

Freedoms of expression, assembly and association

Attempts by families to arrange stones as memorials for lost relatives were stopped by security forces. Catholic priest Elil
Rajendram was detained and other residents of Mullaitivu were subjected to police harassment following their efforts to hold
memorials for family members who died during the armed conflict.

Legal, constitutional or institutional developments

An expected parliamentary debate on the proposed draft Constitution aimed at ensuring checks on executive power and more
equitable ethnic power sharing had not taken place by the end of the year.

Despite repeated promises, Sri Lanka failed to repeal the PTA and to pass legislation criminalizing enforced disappearances.

In December, Sri Lanka ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture (OPCAT).
Discrimination

Law enforcement officials continued to subject members of the Tamil minority, particularly former members of the LTTE, to
ethnic profiling, surveillance and harassment.

Police failed to take action in response to continued threats and physical violence against Christians and Muslims by members
of the public and supporters of a hardline Sinhala Buddhist political group.

In March, the UN CEDAW Committee asked Sri Lanka to amend all personal laws to remove discriminatory provisions. The
Committee expressed particular concern about the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act of 1951, which failed to specify a
minimum age for marriages and permited girls aged under 12 to marry with the permission of a religious adjudicator (Qazi).
The Act also restricted women from serving on Qazi Boards, and did not recognize marital rape unless the couple was legally
separated; this included statutory rape of a girl under 16 by an adult spouse.

Violence against women and girls

Impunity persisted for various forms of violence against women and girls, including child marriage, domestic violence, human
trafficking, rapes by military or law enforcement officers or assaults by private actors. In a rare exception, the trial began on
28 June in Jaffna’s High Court of nine men accused of involvement in the May 2015 gang rape and murder of Sivaloganathan
Vidya, an 18-year-old school student, in Punkuduthivu. The trial was still ongoing at the end of the year. The nature of the
crime and police mishandling of the case sparked widespread protests in 2015. In July 2017 a serving Senior Deputy Inspector
General of Police was arrested for allegedly assisting one of the suspects to evade arrest.

Death penalty

Death sentences were imposed for murder, rape and drug trafficking. No executions have been carried out since 1976. On 4
February, Sri Lankan Independence Day, President Sirisena commuted the sentences of 60 death row prisoners to life
imprisonment.