114 TEACHING MATHEMATICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS Volume 19, No.
3, 2000
Game Theory, People Power and Philippine Politics
QUEENA N. LEE-CHUA
Submitted September 1999, accepted November 1999
Abstract
Though game theory has been utilized mostly in
economics, it has wide applications in other ®elds as
well. This paper delineates two illustrative game-
theoretic applications to Philippine politicsÐthe
People Power Revolution in the mid-1980s and the
con¯ict over the Spratly Islands in the mid-1990s.
Zero-sum games model these two events, and ele-
mentary matrix theory is used to determine pure
strategies and locate equilibrium points. Recommen-
dations for using game theory in other political
situations are included, in an attempt to bridge the
gap between the classroom and the real world.
Introduction
February 23, 1986. On this second day of the
People Power Revolution, tens of thousands of
people were massed along the Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue (EDSA) at the heart of the capi-
talÐManila, Philippines. Rallying in support of
Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Armed
Forces Vice Chief Fidel Ramos, they were also
responding to the plea of Archbishop Jaime
Cardinal Sin to keep vigil around military Camps
Crame and Aguinaldo, since ``the soldiers are our
friends''. Disillusioned by the dictatorial reign of
President Ferdinand Marcos, angered by the bru-
tal slaying of opposition leader Ninoy Aquino 3
years ago, and convinced that his widow Corazon
was the rightful winner in the just-concluded elec-
tions, Filipinos were calling for Marcos to resign,
and for the military to join them.
But some forces were still loyal to the dictator.
Tension mounted at 3 o'clock in the afternoon,
when tanks and armoured personnel carriers
headed for the crowd. The commanding general
of the marines, Artemio Tadiar, threatened to ®re.
The people stood their ground. With priests and
nuns leading them, Filipinos recited the rosary,
pleaded with the soldiers, and o€ered them ¯owers
and candy. Revving their engines, the marines
edged their war machines forward (Kilates, 1994).
Game theory
Though certainly not considered a friendly game
by the parties involved, this historical confronta-
tion is a prime example of a situation wherein the
outcome is determined by strategies employed by
the players. In this sense, then, the EDSA Revolu-
tion can be an illustration for the mathematical
theory of games.
Developed by John von Neumann in the 1920s,
game theory is a useful and emerging ®eld in
discrete mathematics, and has various applications
in economics, management, politics, history. It
revolves around rational strategies, payo€s and
optimal play (Von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944). By mathematically comparing the payo€s
for strategies employed by the players, it is
possible to determine how to best play the game.
Though game theory can become quite compli-
cated when used to model complex situations, its
basic concepts can be understood by secondary
school students and certainly by ®rst-year under-
graduates in the university. In this article, the two
examples of game theory applications merely re-
quire knowledge of algebra.
Games like the EDSA Revolution, in which two
playersÐcivilians and soldiersÐhave directly op-
posing interests, are termed two-person, zero-sum
games. The zero-sum implies that what is lost by
one player is gained by the other. Mathematically
speaking, this means that the payo€ to one player
is exactly the negative of what is received by the
other.
Two-person, zero-sum games begin with a suit-
able table of players, strategies and entries. In the
EDSA Revolution game table, the civilians have
two strategies: to stand their ground (STAY) or
leave (LEAVE). The soldiers also have two
strategies: to ®re (ATTACK) or not to ®re
(DESIST). In Table I, the rows are labelled with
the choices available to the civilians (STAY or
LEAVE). The columns represent the alternatives
of the soldiers (ATTACK or DESIST).
Four pairs of game strategies exist for this game.
For example, row 1/column 1 (R1/C1) is the pair
# The Institute of Mathematics and its Applications 2000
TEACHING MATHEMATICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS Volume 19, No. 3, 2000
Table I.
Table for the EDSA Revolution Game
Soldiers
Attack Desist
Civilians
Stay ? ?
Leave ? ?
of game strategies in which the civilians stay and
the soldiers attack. Each pair of strategies results
in a payo€ to the civilians, which is entered in the
table. By convention, the matrix entries are con-
sidered to be the payo€ to the row playerÐthe
civilians. (Remember that the payo€s to the
column playerÐthe soldiersÐare simply the nega-
tives of the matrix entries.)
How are the payo€s (indicated by question
marks) determined? Here is one important and
enjoyable task in game theory: linking math-
ematics to ``real life'' situations. To determine
the payo€s, students must go beyond math and
probe the possible psychological, political and
historical rami®cations of all four available op-
tions. In this sense, then, the values assigned to the
entries are arbitraryÐit is their relative size (to
each other), and not their absolute magnitude,
which is important.
``The exercise of assigning [payo€s] is highly
subjective and, to a great degree, re¯ects the
personal values, knowledge, and experience of
the person assigning them. However, this
process can be brought closer to reality by
gathering more information [about the situa-
tion]'' (Perham 1995, p. 110).
Thus, after painstaking research and passionate
debate, the liberal arts undergraduates of my dis-
crete mathematics class came up with the following
four payo€s, analysed from the row player's point
of view. To facilitate ease of computation, they
considered the number 0 to be ``neutral ground''
(to denote something which is neither positive nor
negative), positive integers to denote positive out-
comes (for the row playerÐcivilians) and negative
integers to denote negative outcomes (for the row
playerÐcivilians).
(1) STAY±ATTACK: If the soldiers attack, and
the civilians stay, then many civilians will
dieÐcertainly not a positive outcome.
However, the majority are willing to risk their
115
lives, believing that their sacri®ce will inspire
Filipinos everywhere, and bring their plight to
international attention, especially through the
ongoing live coverage of CNN (Cable News
Network). If other nations take their side, then
the ultimate goalÐthe dictator's resignationÐ
may still be achieved. We cannot assign a
positive integer here (because some civilians
will die when the soldiers attack), but we
cannot assign too large a negative value either
(since the sacri®ce is deemed by many to be
worth the risk). A reasonable payo€ is 1.
(2) STAY±DESIST: If the soldiers desist, and the
civilians stand their ground, then victory is at
hand. With the military refusing to ®re on
their own people, Marcos will have no choice
but to step down. The payo€ here is clearly
very positive: ‡2.
(3) LEAVE±ATTACK: If the soldiers attack, and
the civilians withdraw, then the situation will
be the same as it had been for more than 20
years. A dictator will still wield absolute
power, and for many civilians, the situation
can no longer be tolerated. They would rather
risk their lives. The only upside to this situa-
tion is if they leave and the soldiers still attack,
they will win the sympathy of the international
community. The psychological implications of
this ambivalent situation are quite similar to
that of situation (1), which as we have seen, is
also quite ambivalent. We can then give this
situation a value equal to that in (1): 1.
(4) LEAVE±DESIST: If the soldiers desist, and
the civilians withdraw, then the situation will
be even worse. Even though lives may have
been saved momentarily, these will soon be
forfeit. Marcos' well-known habit, despised
and feared by the people, was to imprison
and execute (often without a fair trial) those
believed to be against him. If the people
surrender now, then Marcos' reign will be
more autocratic than ever. Furthermore, with-
out Filipinos taking a brave stand, other
nations will remain ignorant of the situation,
and no international pressure will be brought
to bear upon the dictator. The payo€ to this
worst scenario of all: 2.
These four payo€s are then entered into the table
(see Table II).
Equilibrium point of the game
What should be the rational strategy? In game
theory, the rational player decides on ``a course of
action that will give him the best possible payo€ in
116 TEACHING MATHEMATICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS Volume 19, No. 3, 2000
Table II.
Payo€ Table for the EDSA Revolution Game.
Soldiers
Civilians Attack Desist
Stay 1 ‡2
Leave 1 2
Table III.
Equilibrium point for the EDSA Revolution Game.
Soldiers
Civilians Attack Desist Row minima
Stay 1 ‡2 1 seventh present of the Philippine Republic. Vice-
Leave 1 2 2 Chief Ramos would eventually succeed her.
Column Maxima 1 ‡2
a worst-case situation . . . assuming that one's op-
ponent makes his best counter move. This `risk-
averse' decision forsakes possible gains to avoid
incurring unnecessary losses'' (Casti, 1996, p. 5).
Mathematically, this means that the row players
(civilians) want to maximize their minimum pay-
o€. We write down the minimum entry in each of
the rows, and ®nd the largest of the row minima
(the maxmin). In an opposite but similar vein, the
column players (soldiers) want to minimize their
maximum payo€. We write down the maximum
entry in each of the columns, and ®nd the smallest
of the column maxima (the minmax). We soon
discover that the maxmin and the minmax are
the same … 1† and both coincide at the pair of
strategies: STAY for the civilians and ATTACK
for the soldiers (see Table III).
This maxmin/minmax point is called the equi-
librium point of the game, because by choosing
these strategies, the two players are guaranteed a
certain minimal payo€ … 1†, regardless of what
the opponent chooses to do. Even if each player
announces his decision in advance to the oppo-
nent, the latter cannot use it to his advantage.
(A strategy which stands out clearly as the
optimal oneÐto be employed all the time in a
particular caseÐis called pure.) If either player
departs from this pure strategy, then he will su€er
unnecessary loss.
What happened in the real EDSA People Power
Revolution? It is interesting to see here that the
Filipino people's choice to stand their ground at
EDSA was not only a courageous decision, but
(game-theoretically) a rational one. Not only
would they not back down, they could not. How
about the soldiers? Their rational choice would
have been to attack. They were under direct orders
of their supreme Commander-in-chief, Marcos.
The civilians were unarmed, and the skirmish
would have been a short (albeit bloody) one. But
thankfully, in real life, sometimes the mathe-
matically rational choice is not the morally correct
one. Faced by fellow Filipinos pressing their
bodies against tanks and reciting the rosary, these
fervently Catholic soldiers withdrewÐwithout
®ring a shot.
Three days later, under guarantee of safe pass-
age to America, Marcos and his family ¯ew in exile
to Hawaii. Corazon Aquino took her oath as
Con¯ict over the Spratly Islands
This notion of an equilibrium point and pure
strategies can be extended to games where players
may have more than two choices. Let us now
discuss a con¯ict still brewing in the South China
SeaÐover the Mischief Reef, part of the Spratly
Islands chain.
Believed to sit atop vast oil reserves, the coral-
reefed Spratlys ``straddle some of the world's
busiest shipping lanes, through which about one
quarter of international trade passes'' (McCarthy,
1999, p. 18). Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei,
China and the Philippines have at one time or
another laid claim on the islands. But the Philip-
pines has international law on its side: the Spratlys
are well within the country's 200-mile exclusive
economic zone, as de®ned by the United Nations
Convention of the Sea.
But this does not stop the Chinese from building
military structures (which they insist are merely
``®shermen's shelters'') on Mischief Reef, complete
with command post, observation tower and
launching pad. Since the removal of American
bases from Philippine soil in 1992, China has
steadily been exerting more and more control over
the Spratlys, in an apparent plan to dominate
Southeast Asia. This alarms many of the countries
in the region, as well as the West, so much so
that in February 1999, US State Department
spokesman James Foley called China's actions a
``provocatively unilateral activity'' (McCarthy,
1999, p. 19).
The con¯ict over the Spratlys can be analysed
using game theory. In Table IV, the rows represent
the choices available to the Philippines: to destroy
China's structures (ACTION ONLY), to negotiate
TEACHING MATHEMATICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS Volume 19, No. 3, 2000
Table IV.
Payo€ table for the Spratlys game.
China
Philippines Continue Stop
Action only 3 ‡1
Diplomacy only 2 ‡3
Action & diplomacy 1 ‡2
and ask for international intervention (DIPLO-
MACY ONLY), or a combination of the two
(ACTION AND DIPLOMACY). The columns
represent China's two choices: to continue build-
ing its structures (CONTINUE) or to stop
(STOP).
After research and debate, my students came up
with the following payo€s, analysed from the row
player's (Philippines') point of view.
(1) ACTION ONLY±CONTINUE: If the Philip-
pines keeps destroying China's military struc-
tures as soon as they are discovered, without
even o€ering to negotiate or to ask for inter-
national intervention, and China continues to
build them, then the worst scenario may
happen: war. Moroever, the Philippine ¯eet
(``an air force that can't ¯y and a navy that
can't go out to sea,'' according to Defense
Secretary Orlando Mercado, quoted in
McCarthy, 1999, p. 18) is no match for
China's ®repower. The payo€ for the Philip-
pines in this worst scenario of all is clearly
negative: 3.
(2) DIPLOMACY ONLY±CONTINUE: If the
Philippines keeps on protesting verbally and
on paper, without resorting to force, and
China continues to build, then China will be
all the more emboldened. International inter-
vention, though, may help the Philippines
somewhat. We can consider this situation to
be not as bad as (1), but clearly still negative: a
payo€ of 2:
(3) ACTION AND DIPLOMACY±CONTINUE:
This is the strategy utilized at present. The
Philippines tries to destroy the structures as
fast as the Chinese can build them, at the same
time presenting their case internationally.
Though these tactics do not stop the Chinese,
they slow them down. ``Lately Beijing has
proceeded more by stealth not even protesting
when its markers are discovered and blown
up. Instead it simply waits for the other side to
117
drop its guard and then creeps forward again''
(McCarthy, 1999, p. 20). This is a better
situation for the Philippines than either (1)
or (2), but since China is still creating con¯ict,
the payo€ is still negative: 1.
(4) ACTION ONLY±STOP: If the Philippines
destroys the structures and China stops, then
well and good. But this may entail a huge
amount of force, a drain on the already
dwindling military reserves. The payo€ is
positive, but not too large a number: ‡1.
(5) ACTION AND DIPLOMACY±STOP: If the
Philippines takes action and leaves room for
negotiation at the same time, and China stops,
then it receives a bigger payo€ than that in (4).
Through international intervention, the use of
force may not be so huge. (Other countries,
like the US, will probably give ®nancial or
military aid.) The payo€ here is higher than in
(4): ‡2.
(6) DIPLOMACY ONLY±STOP: Clearly the
best possible scenario for the Philippines, this
entails no use of force on its part, yet this
earns for the country international recognition
for its nonviolent stance, and stops China,
besides. The payo€ here is the most positive
of all: ‡3.
To solve the game, we look once more for the
maxmin and minmax. Both correspond to 1,
which lies at the intersection of the row strategy
ACTION AND DIPLOMACY and the column
strategy CONTINUE. 1 is the equilibrium point
of the game. See Table V.
With its expansionist aims and frequent disre-
gard for international protests, China's rational
choice is simply to continue building its structures
on the Spratlys. As for the Philippines, its rational
choice is to use both action and diplomacy. It is
interesting to note that those two game-theoretic
strategies are those currently employed in real life.
Unless other considerations surface (e.g. other
matters to claim the attention of China or the
Table 5.
Equilibrium point for the Spratlys game.
China
Philippines Continue Stop Row minima
Action only 3 ‡1 3
Diplomacy only 2 ‡3 2
Action and Diplomacy 1 ‡2 1
Column maxima 1 ‡3
118 TEACHING MATHEMATICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS Volume 19, No. 3, 2000

Philippines), these optimal strategies will continue
inde®nitely.
Conclusion
Much of history has been shaped by wars and
politics: the two World Wars, the Cold War, civil
wars, the rise and fall of autocrats and dictators.
Nonviolence has also played a pivotal role, from
Gandhi to Martin Luther King, from People
Power in the Philippines to People Power in
Indonesia.
Originally developed as an aid for economic
analysis, game theory has been increasingly used
in psychology and political science (Williams,
1954; Richardson, 1956a, b; Casti, 1996). Like
other ®elds of discrete mathematics such as graph
theory and linear programming, it has evolved
from the need to solve real-world situations, and
is becoming an increasingly important part of the
school curriculum.
Although the applications of game theory de-
scribed above concerned the Philippines, they can
easily be adapted to the international sphere.
Con¯icts such as the Vietnam War, Labour versus
Tories, Clinton versus Starr, can all be modeled
and analysed using game theory. Analyses of
the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allied bombers versus
Japanese ®ghters in World War II (Casti, 1996)
and Magellan versus his captains (Perham, 1995)
have already been carried out.
This article's use of game theory o€ers students
the following bene®ts:
. Through the use of politics, psychology, and
history, students see all the more that math-
ematics can be applied to real life (NCTM,
1989). They grow more interested in delving into
the intricacies of game theory, such as mixed
strategies or nonzero sum games, to analyse
more complicated situations.
. In order to calculate payo€s, students have to
research on politics and engage in multiple
discussions, from di€erent viewpoints. Not only
does this deepen their cognition of historical
events, it also makes them empathise more with
the players, whether friend or foe, thus fostering
international understanding.
. Students are exposed to a ®eld of mathematics
which is not a traditional part of the curriculum.
This impresses on them that mathematics is not
a static subject, but a dynamic one, constantly
evolving to meet the needs of its practitioners
and the world at large.
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Casti, John, L., ``Five Golden Rules: Great Theories of 20th -
century MathematicsÐand Why They Matter,'' John
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Kilates, Marne, L., The People's Uprising, in ``Filway's
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Filway Marketing, Quezon City, Philippines; 1991,
McCarthy, Terry, Reef Wars, Time, 1999, 153: 18±20.
National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (NCTM),
``Curriculum and Evaluation Standards for School
Mathematics,'' NCTM, Reston, VA; 1989.
Perham, Arnold, Discrete Mathematics and Historical
Analysis: A Study of Magellan, The Mathematics
Teacher, 1995, 88: 106±112.
Richardson, Lewis, F., Mathematics of War and Foreign
Politics, in ``World of Mathematics'', Newman, James
R., Simon and Schuster, 1956a, New York, 1240±53.
Richardson, Lewis, F., Statistics of Deadly Quarrels, in ``World
of Mathematics'', Newman, James R., Editor. 1954±1963
Simon and Schuster, 1956b, New York.
Von Neumann, John and Morgenstern, Oscar, ``Theory of
Games and Economic Behavior,'' University Press,
Princeton, NJ, 1944.
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Book Company, Inc., New York, 1954.

Queena N. Lee-Chua, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor at the Mathematics Department of the Ateneo de Manila
University, Philippines. She also handles courses in the Psychology Department. Her research interests include
cognition in mathematics teaching and learning, discrete mathematics, and popularization of mathematics and
science. She was one of the Ten Outstanding Young Filipinos in 1997 and won a National Book Award in 1999.

Address for correspondence: Queena N. Lee-Chua, Ateneo de Manila University, Mathematics

Department, Loyola Heights, Quezon City, Philippines 1108. <queena@i-manilla.com.ph> or
<queena@mathsci.admu.edu.ph>