PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan (5th Division), Lucio C. Tan, et. al.
“congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from
455 SCRA 526
FACTS:
Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza was the Solicitor General until 1986. He resumed
his private practice of law. He appeared as counsel for Lucio C. Tan, et. al. before
the Sandiganbayan involving civil cases of sequestration of properties allegedly ill-
gotten wealth.
When still the Solicitor General, he advised the Central Bank on how to
proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK which became saddled with banking
problems. GENBANK was later bought by the ALLIED Bank owned by Lucio C. Tan,
et. al. Atty. Mendoza continues defending both the interests of the Central Bank and
Lucio Tan, et. al.
PCGG filed a Motion to Disqualify Atty. Mendoza anchored on Rule 6.03
reading ---
“A lawyer shall not, after leaving government
service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened
while in the said service.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Mendoza is disqualified to appear as counsel for Lucio
Tan, et. al. under Rule 6.03.
HELD: Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general
structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but
replaced the expansive phrase “investigated and passed upon” with the word
“intervened.” It is, therefore, properly applicable to both “adverse-interest conflicts”
and “congruent-interest conflicts.”
The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03.
Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he
acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of
respondents Tan, et. al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case No. 0096-0099 before
the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists a
representing respondents Tan, et. al.
xxx
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure
to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
xxx
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the
prejudice to the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be
doubted that granting disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the
law firm of choice, but probably in individual lawyer in whom the client has
confidence. The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the
benefit of the work done by the latter. The effects of the prejudice to the right to
choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due
process.
xxx
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former
government lawyer of the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state
of our law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all
members of his law firm. Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming
the lepers of the legal profession.
It is however, preferred that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the possible appearance of
impropriety and loss of public confidence in government. But as well observed, the
accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best which
can lead to untoward results. No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening
of restrictions as to former government attorneys will have any detrimental effect on
that free flow of information between the government-client and its attorneys which
the canons seek to protect. Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been
rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and some courts
have abandoned per se disqualification based on Canon 4 and 9 when an actual
conflict of interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant,
government, the witnesses in the case, and the public.
Atty. Mendoza was not disqualified by the Supreme Court.
Director of Religious Affairs vs Estanislao Bayot
74 Phil 579 – Legal Ethics – Malpractice
FACTS
In June 1943, Bayot advertised in a newspaper that he helps people in securing
marriage licenses; that he does so avoiding delays and publicity; that he also makes
marriage arrangements; that legal consultations are free for the poor; and that
everything is confidential. The Director of Religious Affairs took notice of the ad and
so he sued Bayot for Malpractice.
Bayot initially denied having published the advertisement. But later, he admitted the
same and asked for the court’s mercy as he promised to never repeat the act again.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice.
HELD: Yes. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that “the
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.” The advertisement he caused to
be published is a brazen solicitation of business from the public. .” It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his
marketable skills. The Supreme Court again emphasized that best advertisement
for a lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. But because of Bayot’s plea for leniency and his
promise and the fact that he did not earn any case by reason of the ad, the Supreme
Court merely reprimanded him.
DEL MUNDO V. CAPISTRANO
A.C. No. 6903; April 16, 2012
Perlas-Bernabe, J.:
Facts:
1. Complainant Suzette Del Mundo (Suzette) filed an administrative complaint for
disbarment charging respondent Atty. Arnel Capistrano (Atty. Capistrano) of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
2. Suzette and Ricky Tuparan engaged the legal services of Atty. Capistrano to
handle the judicial declaration of the nullity of their respective marriages
allegedly for a fee of P140, 000 each.
3. Consequently, a Special Remainder agreement was entered into by and
between Suzette and Atty. Capistrano.
4. In accordance with their agreement, Suzette gave Atty. Capistrano the total
amount of P78, 500.
5. For every payment that Suzette made, she would inquire from Atty.
Capistrano the status of her case, and in response Atty. Capistrano made her
believe that the cases were filed before the RTC of Malabon City.
6. However when she verified her case from the Clerk of Court, she discovered
that case of Tuparan has been filed, yet no petition has been filed for her.
7. Then, she demanded the refund of P78, 500, but Atty. Capistrano instead
offered to return P63, 000. Suzette agreed.
8. Atty. Capistrano only returned P5, 000 and thereafter refused to communicate
with her.
9. In his Comment/ Answer, Atty. Capistrano acknowledged the receipt of P78,
500 and his undertaking to return the sum of P63, 000. He also admitted
responsibility for his failure to file Suzette’s petition and cited as justification
his heavy workload and busy schedule as then City Legal Officer of Manila
and lack of funds to immediately refund the money received.
10. IBP-CBD, through Commissioner Quisumbing, found that Atty. Capistrano
neglected his client’s interest by his failure to inform Suzette of the status of
her case and to file the agreed petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
11. He was held guilty of violating Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
12. He was recommended the penalty of suspension for 2 years from the practice
of law and ordered the return of P140, 000 to Suzette. Later, the IBP Board of
Governors reduced the penalty of suspension to 1 year.
Issue: WON Atty. Capistrano violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
Held: Yes
Ratio:
1. Atty. Capistrano committed acts in violation of his sworn duty as a member of
the bar.
2. In his Manifestation and Petition for Review, he himself admitted liability for his
failure to act on Suzette’s case as well as to account and return the funds she
entrusted to him.
3. When a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due
diligence in protecting the latter’s rights.
4. His workload does not justify neglect in handling one’s case because it is
settled that a lawyer must only accept cases as much as he can efficiently
handle.
5. A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of his client, and as a trustee he is
bound to keep them separate and apart from his own.
6. Failure to return gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it in
violation of the trust reposed on him.
7. Thus, this constitutes as gross violation of professional ethics and betrayal of
public confidence in the legal profession.
8. The Court finds the penalty of 1 year from the practice of law sufficient and
finds it proper to modify the amount to be returned to Suzette from P140, 000
to P73, 500.
JOSELITO F. TEJANO vs. ATTY. BENJAMIN F. BATERINA, A.C. No. 8235,
January 27, 2015
Facts
Joselito F. Tejano filed an Affidavit-Complaint before the Office of the Court
Administrator of the Supreme Court against his counsel, Atty. Baterina “miserably
failed to advance [his] cause”, and Judge Dominador Arquelada of acting in
conspiracy to take possession of his property, which was the subject matter of
litigation in the judge’s court.
The Court required Atty. Baterina to file a Comment on the complaint to which he
explained that he had been recuperating from a kidney transplant when he received
a copy of the complaint.
The Court, found Atty. Baterina’s explanation “not satisfactory” and admonished him
“to be more heedful of the Court’s directives” and referred the case to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation, which found sufficient ground for
disciplinary action against Atty. Baterina.
Issue: w/n Atty Baterina liable for gross negligence in his duty as counsel to his
client
RULING:
The Court adopts the IBP’s report and recommendation, with modification as to the
penalty.
The Code of Professional Responsibility governing the conduct of lawyers
states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
RULE 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
RULE 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and
shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
When a lawyer agrees to take up a client’s cause, he makes a commitment to
exercise due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights. Once a lawyer’s services are
engaged, “he is duty bound to serve his client with competence, and to attend to his
client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of whether he accepts it
for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed on him.”25 A lawyer’s acceptance to take up a case
“impliedly stipulates [that he will] carry it to its termination, that is, until the case
becomes final and executory.
Cayetano vs. Monsod (201 SCRA 210)
Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987
constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-
five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates
for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Issue: Whether the respondent does not possessed the required qualification of
having engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice
of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance
before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim
in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. The
contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s
past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of
both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for
the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is
DISMISSED.
Cui vs. Cui II SCRA 759 (JESUS MA. CUI vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI)
Facts:
 The main concern in this case is the respective qualifications of Jesus Cui
and Antonio Cui to the position of administrator of Hospicio de San Jose
de Barii, a charitable institution established by Don Pedro Cui and
DonaBenigna Cui.
 Jesus and Antonio are the sons of Mariano Cui, a nephew of the founders
of the institution. Antonio’s claim to theposition is based on a “convenio”
where then administrator Teodoro resigned in favor of him. Jesus,
however, hadno prior notice of this.
 Jesus’s claim is that he should be preferred pursuant to the deed of
donation (which recognized their fatherMariano as a legitimate descendant
to the position) as he is the older of the two.
 The deed, however, gives preference to a descendant who has a “titulo de
abogado” or a doctor, or a civilengineer, or a pharmacist (in order). Or to
the one who pays the highest taxes. Jesus holds the degree of Bachelorof
Laws but is not a member of the Bar, while Antonio is a member of the Bar
(he was formerly disbarred, though,by the SC and was just reinstated
weeks before assuming the position)
Issues:
Who has a better right to the position of administrator between Jose and Antonio?
What does the term “titulo de abogado” mean?
Held:
Antonio. The term “titulo de abogado” is not just mere possession of the academic
degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the bar after due admission thereto,
qualifying one to the practice of law. Possession of the degree is not indispensable
to qualify as a lawyer since completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in
some other way.
It was also argued that Antonio is disqualified for having been previously disbarred
since the deed also provided that an administrator may be removed if found to lack
a sound moral character. However, Antonio was reinstated. This reinstatement is a
recognition of his moral rehabilitation after proving what was required by the Bar.
Antonio’s restoration to the roll of lawyers wiped out restrictions and disabilities
resulting from the previous disbarment.
In re: Cunanan 94 Phil. 534
Facts:
In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates
of 1946 to 1953; Albino Cunanan et al, petitioners.
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and
concern as R.A. 972 popularly known as the³Bar Flunkers¶ Act of 1953.´ Generally
a candidate is deemed passed if he obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o
fallingbelow 50% in any subject, although for the past few exams the passing grades
were changed depending on the strictness of thecorrecting of the bar examinations
(1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 ± 75%).
Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and
passed by the S.C., and feeling that they havebeen discriminated against,
unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentages lower than
those admitted to thebar went to congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no.
12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given adviseadverse to it. Not
overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying
substantially the provisions of thevetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21,
1953
Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies
1,094 lawgraduates who had inadequate preparation for the practice of law
profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams
Issues:
Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and
the administration of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL.
Held:
Under the authority of the court:
1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952
and all of art. 2 of the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force
and effect.
2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of
the law (1953- 1955) is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the
candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952 are denied, and all the candidates
who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a grade
of below 50% in any subject are considered as having passed whether they have
filed petitions for admissions or not.
5. In re: Almacen 31 SCRA 562 (IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VINCENTE RAUL ALMACEN)
FACTS :Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title," filed on
September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice
committed against his client
by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal
"peopled by men who are
calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable
decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who
was deeply aggrieved by
this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the
altar of hypocrisy." In the
same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the
members of this Court, saying "that
justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only
blind, but also deaf and
dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that
"the people may know of
the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs
and injustices that were
committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney and
counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the
event we regain our faith
and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest
profession.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen must surrender his Lawyer’s Certificate
of Title.
RULING: ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen be, as he is
hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to
take effect immediately.
Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed because
the Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full opinion for every petition
they reject otherwise the High Court would be unable to effectively carry out its
constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide “only those
cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance
beyond the particular facts and parties involved.” It should be remembered that a
petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court’s denial.
For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’
opinion.
On Almacen’s attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded said
criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful
and derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen,
has the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels
the acts of courts and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the
courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as
of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal
condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation
of the duty of respect to courts.
In the case at bar, Almacen’s criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should
have known that a motion for reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing
party of the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not be entertained
by the court. He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why his client lost.
Almacen was suspended indefinitely.
ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner
vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, respondent.
G.R. No. L23815
June 28, 1974
FACTS: The petitioner was appointed Election Registrar for the
Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he
commenced to discharge its duties. He is also counsel de parte for one of the
accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to
withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also
appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Petitioner filed an urgent
motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the
Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume or
pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately
the defense. Respondent Judge, denied the said motion.
According to the respondent judge, "In view of the objection of the
prosecution to the motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that
counsel for the accused cannot continue appearing in this case without the express
authority of the Commission on Elections); and since according to the prosecution
there are two witnesses who are ready to take the stand, after which the government
would rest, the motion for postponement is denied. When counsel for the accused
assumed office as Election Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since October
2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed. Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the
civil service status of counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de
oficio for the accused. The defense obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June
13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964,
March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964, and September 7, 1964."
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should be allowed to withdraw as
counsel de oficio.
RULING: If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was
only due to the apprehension that considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath
and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of the accused could be prejudiced.
His right to counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory. The admonition is
ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times,
and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the
promptings of self interest.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Lawyers should maintain, at all times, "a high standard of
legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their
four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in
accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code [of Professional
Responsibility]."
Members of the bar took their oath to conduct themselves "according to the best of
[their] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [their]
clients[,]" and to "delay no man for money or malice[.
These mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients
considering the highly fiduciary nature of their relationship.57 Clients entrust their
causes—life, liberty, and property—to their lawyers, certain that this confidence
would not be abused. (JUN B. LUNA VS ATTY. DWIGHT M. GALARRITA, July
07, 2015)
Same; Same; Special Power of Attorney; The Rules of Court thus requires
lawyers to secure special authority from their clients when entering into a
compromise agreement that dispenses with litigation: 23. Authority of attorneys to
bind clients. - Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any
agreement in relation thereto made in writing and in taking appeals, and in all
matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority,
compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's
claim but the full amount in cash. (JUN B. LUNA VS ATTY. DWIGHT M.
GALARRITA, July 07, 2015)
Same; Same; Members of the bar must always conduct themselves in a way that
promotes "public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Even though
complainant Luna effectively abandoned the issue on respondent Atty. Galarrita's
lack of authority to compromise the civil case when he demanded the payment of
the settlement proceeds, this does not erase his acts of abusing the trust and
confidence reposed in him by complainant Luna. (JUN B. LUNA VS ATTY.
DWIGHT M. GALARRITA, July 07, 2015)
Same; Same; In several cases, we have disciplined lawyers who failed or refused
to remit amounts received for and on behalf of their clients. "The penalty for violation
of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility usually ranges from
suspension for six months, to suspension for one year, or two years, and even
disbarment, depending on the circumstances of each case. (JUN B. LUNA
VS ATTY. DWIGHT M. GALARRITA, July 07, 2015)
Same; Same; Later jurisprudence clarified that this rule excluding civil liability
determination from disciplinary proceedings "remains applicable only to claimed
liabilities which are purely civil in nature — for instance, when the claim involves
moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct
[from] and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement."This court has
thus ordered in administrative proceedings the return of amounts representing legal
fees.
This court has also ordered restitution as concomitant relief in administrative
proceedings when respondent's civil liability was already established: Although the
Court renders this decision in an administrative proceeding primarily to exact the
ethical responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar, the Court's silence about
the respondent lawyer's legal obligation to restitute the complainant will be both
unfair and inequitable. No victim of gross ethical misconduct concerning the
client's funds or property should be required to still litigate in another
proceeding what the administrative proceeding has already established as the
respondent's liability. That has been the reason why the Court has required
restitution of the amount involved as a concomitant relief in the cited cases
of Mortem v. Pagatpatan, supra, Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, supra, Small v. Banares,
supra. (JUN B. LUNA VS ATTY. DWIGHT M. GALARRITA, July 07, 2015)
Same; Attorney’s Lien; Elements required for full recognition of attorney's lien are:
"(1) lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client's funds, documents
and papers; and (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees." Respondent Atty. Galarrita
must prove the existence of all these elements. However, this is not the main issue
in this disbarment case against him, and the validity of his retaining lien defense was
not established. Counter evidence even exists such as respondent Atty. Galarrita's
Letter dated August 12, 2003 waiving any compensation for his services in the
foreclosure case.103 Complainant Luna also raises respondent Atty. Galarrita's
negligence in handling the case, and lack of supporting receipts for the incurred
expenses respondent Atty. Galarrita seeks to reimburse. (JUN B. LUNA VS ATTY.
DWIGHT M. GALARRITA, July 07, 2015)
Villegas vs. Legaspi (del Rosario)
Facts: This case was a consolidation of 2 cases involving the 1973 Constitutional
provision that “No member of the National Assembly shall appear before any court
inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction” (Art. VIII Sec. 11).
st
In the 1 case: Villegas filed a complaint for annulment of bank checks and
damages against spouses Vera Cruz. Legaspi, an Assemblyman from Cebu, filed
an answer as their counsel. The Judge (Judge Dulay) of the CFI of Cebu inhibited
himself from the proceedings because Legaspi was also his wife’s lawyer in 2 cases.
The case was reraffled and the new Judge (Judge Burgos) denied the
disqualification of Legaspi.
nd
2 case: Reyes filed a case against Maas for the annulment of the sale of Excelsior
shares in a company. Reyes claimed that the same shares had already been sold
to him. Assemblyman Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Excelsior.
The appearance of Fernandez was questioned on the ground of the Constitutional
provision – Section 11, Art. 8, 1973 Constitution.
The novel issue for determination is whether or not members of the Batasang
Pambansa, like Attorneys Valentino L. Legaspi and Estanislao A. Fernandez, can
appear as counsel before Courts of First Instance.
Issue: W/N members of the Batasang Pambansa can appear as counsel before
CFIs.
Held: NO.
1. The 1935 and 1973 Constitutions were compared by the Court because the cases
were filed before the 1973 Consitution. The court nevertheless resolved the cases
under the amended provision. In the 1935 Constitution, only members of the
Commission on Appointments were barred from appearing as counsel before
any court inferior to a collegiate court of appellate jurisdiction. While the 1973
provision barred all members of the Batasang Pambansa from appearing as
counsel in any court without appellate jurisdiction. What is prohibited is the
appearance as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction. Appearance
as counsel is a voluntary submission to a court’s jurisdiction by an advising
lawyer professionally engaged to represent and plead the cause of another.
There is no question that in both cases both Assemblymen are appearing as
counsel; they represent and plead the cause of another before a court of justice.
2. Furthermore, the court discussed if CFIs are courts with appellate jurisdiction.
Appellate jurisdiction is the jurisdiction to review the judgment of an inferior court.
The jurisdiction of CFIs is of 2 kinds: original and appellate. Pursuant to the Judiciary
Act, CFIs can be courts with appellate jurisdiction. By the wording of the amendment
to the 1973 Constitution, CFIs no longer fall within the ambit of the prohibition.
However, in the cases at bar the CFIs took cognizance of the cases in their
exclusive original jurisdiction and not appellate one. As a result, both
Assemblymen are still barred from appearing as counsel before said courts.
The courts looked at the purpose behind the prohibition, which was to remove any
possibility of undue influence or use of office for personal gain and to ensure
the trial’s impartiality. The possible influence of an Assemblyman on a CFI judge
is diminished when the CFI acts in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction because
the decision being appealed in this situation has the presumption of regularity and
correctness in its favor. Thus, to give effect to the Constitutional prohibition,
appearance by Assemblymen before CFIs should be limited to cases wherein the
CFIs exercise their appellate jurisdiction, not original.
ALAWI VS. ALAUYA (268 SCRA 628)
Brief facts: Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E. B Villarosa and Partners
Co., of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the
incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Sharia District in Marawi City.
They were Classmates and used to be friends. Through Alawi's agency, a
contract was executed for the purchase on instalments by Alauya of one of the
housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also granted to
Alauya by the NHMFC. Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the
president of Villarosa and Co. Advising of the termination of his contract with the
company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to
gross misrepresentation, deciet , fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He
also wrote similar letters to the vice president of Villarosa and the vice president of
NHMFC.
Upon learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against
him.
Contention : One of her grounds was alauya's "usurpation of the title of attorney ",
which only regular members of the Philippine Bar May properly use.
Defense of the accused : Alauya justified his use of the title Attorney, by the
assertion that it is "lecically synonymous " with counsellors-at-Kaw ". A title to
which Sharia's lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of
attorney because counselor is often mistaken for councilor(konsehal)
Issue : whether or not Alauya, a member of the Sharia bar, can use the title
attorney.
Held : No he can't. The title attorney is only reserved to those who passed the
regular Phil. Bar. Person who pass the Sharia's Bar is not full-fledged members of
the Phil. Bar.
JULIO D. ENRIQUEZ, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ, respondent
G.R. No. L12817
April 29, 1960
FACTS: Republic Act No. 1383 creating the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority was passed. The municipal council of Bauan, Batangas,
adopted and passed Resolution No. 152 stating "that it is the desire of the not to
submit their local Waterworks to the provisions of the said Republic Act No. 1383.
The municipal mayor transmitted a copy of Resolution No. 152 to the Provincial
Fiscal through the Provincial Board requesting him to render an opinion on the
matter treated therein and to inform the municipal council whether he would handle
and prosecute its case in court should the council decide to question and test
judicially the legality of Republic Act No. 1383 and to prevent the National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority from exercising its authority over the
waterworks system of the municipality. The provincial fiscal rendered an opinion
holding that Republic Act No. 1383 is valid and constitutional and declined to
represent the municipality of Bauan.
The municipal council adopted and passed Resolution No. 201
authorizing the municipal mayor to take steps to commence an action or
proceedings in court to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1383 and
to engage the services of a special counsel which is the Enriquez and Enriquez Law
Firm. However, the Auditor General disallowed in audit the petitioner's claim for
initial attorney's fees in the sum of P500, based upon an opinion rendered on 10
May 1957 by the Secretary of Justice who held that the Provincial Fiscal was not
disqualified to handle and prosecute in court the case of the municipality of Bauan
and that its municipal council had no authority to engage the services of a special
counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Auditor General was correct in disallowing in
audit the petitioner's claim for payment of attorney's fees.
RULING: The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the
municipal council and mayor without authority of law, the Auditor General was
correct in disallowing in audit the petitioner's claim for payment of attorney's fees.
Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal council should
have requested the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place
of the provincial fiscal who had declined to handle and prosecute its case in court,
pursuant to section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code. The fact that the
Secretary of Justice had, on several occasions, upheld the validity and
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1383 does not exempt the municipal council of
Bauan from requesting the Secretary of Justice to detail a provincial fiscal to
prosecute its case.
CAYETANO vs. MONSOD
G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991
Facts: Renato Cayetano questioned Christian Monsod’s nomination by President
Corazon Aquino as Chairman of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Cayetano stated that Monsod allegedly lacked the necessary requirement of
practicing law for at least 10 years. However, despite Cayetano’s objection, the
Commission on Appointments (COA) still confirmed Monsod’s appointment.
Issue: Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse
of discretion in confirming Monsod’s appointment.
Held: No. COA’s power to give consent to the nomination of the COMELEC
chairman by the President is mandated by the Constitution under Article IX,
Section 1 (2), Sub Article C. It provides:
“The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven
years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of
the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.”
The power of appointment is essentially within the discretion to whom it is so
vested subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualification required by law. Therefore, there is no occasion for the Supreme
Court to exercise its corrective power since COA did not commit grave abuse of
discretion based on the evidence presented.
Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo Diao vs. Severino Martinez
FACTS:
DIAO was admitted to the Bar.
2 years later, Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his
application for the Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic
qualifications.
Solicitor General investigated and recommended that Diao's name be erased from
the roll of attorneys
i. DIAO did not complete pre-law subjects:
1. Did not complete his high school training
2. Never attended Quisumbing College
3. Never obtained a diploma.
DIAO admitting first charge but claims that although he had left high school in his
third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General
Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high
school diploma
Upon return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service
as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
No certification. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second
charge is clearly meritorious:
i. Never obtained his diploma. from Quisumbing
College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A.
graduate.
ii. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from
the Arellano University in April, 1949
1. He said erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing
College, in his school records.
ISSUE:
WON DIAO still continue admission to the Bar, for passing the Bar despite not
completing pre-law requirements? NO.
HELD:
STRIKE OUT NME OF DIAO IN ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. DIAO REQUIRED TO
RETURN HIS LAWYER’S DIPLOMA WITHIN 30 DAYS.
Explanation of error or confusion is not acceptable.
Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it
would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he
began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before
obtaining his Associate in Arts degree.
He would not have been permitted to take the bar tests:
i. Bar applicant must affirm under oath, "That
previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the
required pre-legal education (A.A.).
ii. Therefore, Diao was not qualified to take the bar
examinations
iii. Such admission having been obtained under false
pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked.
Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-
law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally
essential.
Cui v Cui
Facts:
The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established by the
spouses Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and support, free of
charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons.” It acquired
corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the Act gave the initial
management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to
“such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them.
(embodied in Sec. 2 of the spouses deed of donation)”
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons
of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro and Dona Benigna
Cui. In 1960, the then incumbent administrator of the Hospicio, resigned in favor of
Antonio Cui pursuant to a “convenio” entered into between them that was
embodied on a notarial document. Jesus Cui, however had no prior notice of either
the “convenio” or of his brother’s assumption of the position.
Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his brother Antonio,
demanding that the office be turned over to him. When the demand was not
complied, Jesus filed this case. Lower court ruled in favor of Jesus.
ISSUE
Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?
HELD
Antonio should be the Hospicio’s administrator.
Jesus is the older of the two and under equal circumstances would be preferred
pursuant to sec.2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be,
applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants
of the nephews named, who if not a lawyer (titulo de abogado), should be a doctor
or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or if failing all theses, should be
the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified.
Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member of the
Bar, not having passed the examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a
member of the Bar and although disbarred in 1957, was reinstated by resolution,
about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio.
The term “titulo de abogado” means not mere possession of the academic degree
of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto,
qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelor’s degree alone, conferred by a
law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its
holder to exercise the legal profession. By itself, the degree merely serves as
evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the
examinations has “successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law
school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education.
The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lwayer, first of all, because in all of the
works of an administrator, it is presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a
license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.
Under this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as against defendant, to the
office of administrator. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant Antonio
was disbarred (for immorality and unprofessional conduct). However, it is also a
fact, that he was reinstated before he assumed the office of administrator. His
reinstatement is recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that
required for his admission to the Bar in the first place. Also, when defendant was
restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his
previous disbarment were wiped out.
Phil Lawyers Assoc v. Celedino Agrava
GR No L-12426; February 16, 1959
FACTS:
On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had
scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are
qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said
examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before
said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and
other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the
said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been
holding similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one of the
petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the
bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the
Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the
Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the act of the respondent Director
requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an
examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being
allowed to practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the
preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction
and is in violation of the law.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not a lawyer can be a Patent Attorney even without taking the said
examination
(2) Whether or not the respondent Director acted in excess jurisdiction is issuing
the said circular
HELD:
(1) YES, a lawyer can become such without taking the said examination. The
Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is
reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and
training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further
examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it
advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar practising before him
enlist the assistance of technical men and scientists in the preparation of papers and
documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine
sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the
registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his client, is required to submit a plan and
technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.
(2) YES, he acted in excess of his jurisdiction. Section 551 of the Revised
Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and make
regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious
and efficient administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect
the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of
Republic Act1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines,
provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the
Department Head, make all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the
provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code,
Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon
recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful
rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the code. We
understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for the
Bureaus of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the
Government, to govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said
bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision
of law giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on
examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent
Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureaus of
Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are more or
less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets,
etc., assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures,
confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any
lawyer practicing before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf
of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify. In conclusion, we hold that under
the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to
practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent
Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the
interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and
other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts
involved; that part of the functions of the Patent Director are judicial or quasi-judicial,
so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to
the Supreme Court.
(Nota Bene: The second ruling is the one related to Admin Law. I included the first
just in case Ma¶am Jacob inquires such. After all, that is the main issue to be
answered and was answered by the Supreme Court.)