(3) Solicitation and advertising
(a) Advertising
• Khan v. Simbillo, A.C. No. 5299, August 19, 2003
A.C. No. 5299               August 19, 2003
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and
Chief, Public Information Office, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 157053               August 19, 2003
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G.
KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and
Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that
appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily
Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-
4333/521-2667."1
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public
Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up the published
telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She
spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino
Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can
guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the case
will not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs.
Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half
of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half
after a decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the
Public Information Office revealed that similar advertisements were
published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin
and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.2
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as
Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information
Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T.
Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services,
in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.3
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but
argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts;
that the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on
advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served
by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can
lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the
decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that
he be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court
promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a
lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as
it is dignified.4
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-
306,6 finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for
one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be
dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court
on November 11, 2002.7
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration,8 which was denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-
2002-606 dated October 19, 20029
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R.
No. 157053 entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court
Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents."
This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Court’s
Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to
manifest whether or not they were willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings.10 Complainant filed his
Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any
additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early
resolution on the basis of pleadings and records
thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental
Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBP’s Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-
2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a
business.12 It is a profession in which duty to public service, not
money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant
to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits.13 The gaining of a livelihood should be a
secondary consideration.14 The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they
owe to themselves.15 The following elements distinguish the legal
profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-
product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence
without making much money;
2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of
justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor,
fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business
methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or
dealing directly with their clients.16
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained
of. He himself admits that he caused the publication of the
advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the
Court’s indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that
he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for
compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the
rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his
legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads
Newspaper.17 Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to
be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell. 18 Such acts of
respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Court’s
authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising
himself as a self-styled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he
wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability
but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct
despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society.
Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be
obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the
case,19 he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been
disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage
bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether
proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be
compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a
modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer
and to the bar.20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or
names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of
practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the
same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now
acceptable.21 Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent
with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief
biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly
stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:22
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement
of the lawyer’s name and the names of his professional associates;
addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools
attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal
authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar
associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies
and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the
names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent,
the names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that
purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper,
magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for
other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his
brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine,
trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to
be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of
which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar,
or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The
card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law
firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and
special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise
have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a
designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T.
SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the
Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE
(1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense
will be dealt with more severely.
(b) Firm Name
• In re Petition of Sycip, G.R. No. X92-1, July 30, 1979
July 30, 1979
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM
NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ &
CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO,
BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO
P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN,
JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E.
FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA,
TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V.
PESIGAN, petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO
CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE
LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN
M. DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS
S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F.
BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving
partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by
the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February
14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names
of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away. In the
Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered
consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its
business under a firm name which includes the name of a deceased
partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the
practice when it provides in the last paragraph that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The use by the person or partnership continuing the
business of the partnership name, or the name of a
deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself
make the individual property of the deceased partner
liable for any debts contracted by such person or
partnership. 1
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and
engineering, the legislature has authorized the adoption of firm names
without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the name of
a deceased partner; 2 the legislative authorization given to those
engaged in the practice of accountancy — a profession requiring the
same degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients as that
implicit in the relationship of attorney and client — to acquire and use
a trade name, strongly indicates that there is no fundamental policy
that is offended by the continued use by a firm of professionals of a
firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner, at least
where such firm name has acquired the characteristics of a "trade
name." 3
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the
continued use of the name of a deceased partner in the firm name of
a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares that: têñ.
£îhqwâ£
... The continued use of the name of a deceased or
former partner when permissible by local custom, is not
unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use. ... 4
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the
deaths of their respective deceased partners were well-publicized in
all newspapers of general circulation for several days; the stationeries
now being used by them carry new letterheads indicating the years
when their respective deceased partners were connected with the
firm; petitioners will notify all leading national and international law
directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners' deaths. 5
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased
partner's name in a professional firm's name; 6 there is no custom or
usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which
recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily Identifies the
individual members of the firm. 7
6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name
of law partnerships has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and
is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most countries in the
world.8
The question involved in these Petitions first came under
consideration by this Court in 1953 when a law firm in Cebu (the Deen
case) continued its practice of including in its firm name that of a
deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved with this
Court advising the firm to desist from including in their firm
designation the name of C. D. Johnston, who has long been dead."
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in
G. R. No. L-11964, entitled Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China
Banking Corporation. The law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved
to intervene as amicus curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a
Resolution of April 15, 1957, stated that it "would like to be informed
why the name of Perkins is still being used although Atty. E. A.
Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the
law firm of Perkins and Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same
arguments as those now being raised by petitioners, prayed that the
continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held
proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: têñ.£îhqwâ£
After carefully considering the reasons given by
Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates for their
 continued use of the name of the deceased E. G.
Perkins, the Court found no reason to depart from the
policy it adopted in June 1953 when it required
Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of Cebu
City to desist from including in their firm designation,
the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The Court
believes that, in view of the personal and confidential
nature of the relations between attorney and client, and
the high standards demanded in the canons of
professional ethics, no practice should be allowed
which even in a remote degree could give rise to the
possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly
advised to drop the name "PERKINS" from their firm
name.
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far
enunciated by the Court.
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus
laid down.
A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo"
and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes" are
partnerships, the use in their partnership names of the names of
deceased partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Code
which provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm
name, which may or may not include the name of one
or more of the partners.
Those who, not being members of the partnership,
include their names in the firm name, shall be subject
to the liability, of a partner.
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a
partnership must either be those of living partners and. in the case of
non-partners, should be living persons who can be subjected to
liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person
from including his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the
liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm
cannot be held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm
particularly where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits an agreement for the
payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a
percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the future
business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both because the recipients
of such division are not lawyers and because such payments will not
represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient. "
Accordingly, neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for
transactions entered into after the death of their lawyer-predecessor.
There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no corresponding
liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the
use by law firms of the names of deceased partners. The public
relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create
undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the
profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a
name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can
join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation
established by deceased partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code
cited by petitioners, supra, the first factor to consider is that it is within
Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and Winding
Up." The Article primarily deals with the exemption from liability in
cases of a dissolved partnership, of the individual property of the
deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or partnership
which continues the business using the partnership name or the name
of the deceased partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates
therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to formal reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a
good will to protect rather than of a professional partnership, with no
saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the personal
qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a
saleable goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and
cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting of lawyers. 9têñ.
£îhqwâ£
As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial
partnership the succeeding partners or parties have the
right to carry on the business under the old name, in
 the absence of a stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the
name of a commercial partnership is a partnership
asset inseparable from the good will of the firm. ... (60
Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, têñ.£îhqwâ£
... a professional partnership the reputation of which
depends or; the individual skill of the members, such as
partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good
win to be distributed as a firm asset on its dissolution,
however intrinsically valuable such skill and reputation
may be, especially where there is no provision in the
partnership agreement relating to good will as an asset.
... (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to
partnerships formed by other professionals or for business. For one
thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade
name in connection with the practice of accountancy.10 têñ.£îhqwâ£
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity.
It is a mere relationship or association for a particular
purpose. ... It is not a partnership formed for the
purpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding
property." 11 Thus, it has been stated that "the use of a
nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice
is improper. 12
The usual reason given for different standards of
conduct being applicable to the practice of law from
those pertaining to business is that the law is a
profession.
Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to
the Survey of the Legal Profession, (The Lawyer from
Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession
as "a group of men pursuing a learned art as a
common calling in the spirit of public service, — no less
a public service because it may incidentally be a
means of livelihood."
xxx xxx xxx
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal
profession from business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a
byproduct, and in which one may attain the highest
eminence without making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the
administration of justice involving thorough sincerity,
integrity, and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by
candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and encroachment on
their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. 13
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in
the nature of a privilege or franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good
moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and
certified. 15 The right does not only presuppose in its possessor
integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a
special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a
public trust." 16
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of
the American Bar Association" in support of their petitions.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued
use of the name of a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a
law partnership when such a practice is permissible by local
custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no
imposition or deception is practiced through this use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or
allows the continued use of a deceased or former partner's name in
the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our custom,
Identify the more active and/or more senior members or partners of
the law firm. A glimpse at the history of the firms of petitioners and of
other law firms in this country would show how their firm names have
evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of the
partnership changed. têñ.£îhqwâ£
The continued use of a firm name after the death of
one or more of the partners designated by it is proper
only where sustained by local custom and not where
by custom this purports to Identify the active
members. ...
There would seem to be a question, under the working
of the Canon, as to the propriety of adding the name of
a new partner and at the same time retaining that of a
deceased partner who was never a partner with the
new one. (H.S. Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp. 207208)
(Emphasis supplied).
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential,
where the name of a deceased partner continues to be used cannot
be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be guided by
the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the
continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law
partnerships. But that is so because it is sanctioned by custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33
N.Y.S. 2d 733) which petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in their
memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained the use of the
firm name Alexander & Green even if none of the present ten partners
of the firm bears either name because the practice was sanctioned by
custom and did not offend any statutory provision or legislative policy
and was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court stated
therein: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction
of custom and offends no statutory provision or
legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics of both the American Bar
Association and the New York State Bar Association
provides in part as follows: "The continued use of the
name of a deceased or former partner, when
permissible by local custom is not unethical, but care
should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use." There is no question as to
local custom. Many firms in the city use the names of
deceased members with the approval of other
attorneys, bar associations and the courts. The
Appellate Division of the First Department has
considered the matter and reached The conclusion that
such practice should not be prohibited. (Emphasis
supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law
prohibits the practice in question. The use of the firm
name herein is also sustainable by reason of
agreement between the partners. 18
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions
the practice. Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed by
repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule,
legally binding and obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of
custom. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of
evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of right cannot be considered
by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by
competent evidence like any other fact. 21 We find such proof of the
existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute
the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a
matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for
purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom must
be differentiated from social custom. The former can supplement
statutory law or be applied in the absence of such statute. Not so with
the latter.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part
of the legal system. 22 When the Supreme Court in the Deen and
Perkins cases issued its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from
including the names of deceased partners in their firm designation, it
laid down a legal rule against which no custom or practice to the
contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of our civil
law which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death
of any partner. 23 Custom which are contrary to law, public order or
public policy shall not be countenanced. 24
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the
administration of justice and should not be considered like an ordinary
"money-making trade." têñ.£îhqwâ£
... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced
in a spirit of public service. A trade ... aims primarily at
personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers
beneficial to mankind. If, as in the era of wide free
opportunity, we think of free competitive self assertion
as the highest good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may
seem to be freely competing with their fellows in their
calling in order each to acquire as much of the world's
good as he may within the allowed him by law. But the
member of a profession does not regard himself as in
competition with his professional brethren. He is not
bartering his services as is the artisan nor exchanging
the products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells
wheat or corn. There should be no such thing as a
lawyers' or physicians' strike. The best service of the
professional man is often rendered for no equivalent or
for a trifling equivalent and it is his pride to do what he
does in a way worthy of his profession even if done
with no expectation of reward, This spirit of public
service in which the profession of law is and ought to
be exercised is a prerequisite of sound administration
of justice according to law. The other two elements of a
profession, namely, organization and pursuit of a
learned art have their justification in that they secure
and maintain that spirit. 25
In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the
eyes of the public must bow to legal and ethical impediment.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners
advised to drop the names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their
respective firm names. Those names may, however, be included in
the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms
indicating the years during which they served as such.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting
them, seven of the Justices being of the contrary view, as explained in
the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of
delicadeza that the undersigned did not participate in the disposition
of these petitions, as the law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,
Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of Quisumbing,
Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon
Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most
junior partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law.
For the record, the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all
concerned, and not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the
opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip
and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the listing of individuals
wtes
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar,
Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in their petition of June 10, 1975,
prayed for authority to continue the use of that firm name,
notwithstanding the death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5,
1975 (May he rest in peace). He was the founder of the firm which
was originally known as the Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm,
Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in their petition of
August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to continue using the
said firm name notwithstanding the death of two partners, former
Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and
February 14, 1976, respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta
Law Office which was established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his
son and that, as to the said law firm, the name Ozaeta has acquired
an institutional and secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the
partnership of the name of a deceased partner as part of the
partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked is the
canon that the continued use by a law firm of the name of a deceased
partner, "when permissible by local custom, is not unethical" as long
as "no imposition or deception is practised through this use" (Canon
33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition
that it be indicated in the letterheads of the two firms (as the case may
be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta
are dead or the period when they served as partners should be stated
therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the
names of their deceased founders is to retain the clients who had
customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta
and to benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those
respected and esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate
motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was
followed before the war by the law firm of James Ross.
Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law firm
of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in
the firm name with an indication of the year when he died. No one
complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm
name was illegal or unethical.
# Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting
them, seven of the Justices being of the contrary view, as explained in
the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of
delicadeza that the undersigned did not participate in the disposition
of these petitions, as the law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,
Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of Quisumbing,
Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon
Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most
junior partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law.
For the record, the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all
concerned, and not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the
opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip
and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the listing of individuals
wtes
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar,
Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in their petition of June 10, 1975,
prayed for authority to continue the use of that firm name,
notwithstanding the death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5,
1975 (May he rest in peace). He was the founder of the firm which
was originally known as the Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm,
Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in their petition of
August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to continue using the
said firm name notwithstanding the death of two partners, former
Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and
February 14, 1976, respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta
Law Office which was established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his
son and that, as to the said law firm, the name Ozaeta has acquired
an institutional and secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the
partnership of the name of a deceased partner as part of the
partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked is the
canon that the continued use by a law firm of the name of a deceased
partner, "when permissible by local custom, is not unethical" as long
as "no imposition or deception is practised through this use" (Canon
33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition
that it be indicated in the letterheads of the two firms (as the case may
be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta
are dead or the period when they served as partners should be stated
therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the
names of their deceased founders is to retain the clients who had
customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta
and to benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those
respected and esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate
motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was
followed before the war by the law firm of James Ross.
Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law firm
of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in
the firm name with an indication of the year when he died. No one
complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm
name was illegal or unethical.
• Nebreja v. Reonel, A.C. No. 9896, March 19, 2014
A.C. No. 9896               March 19, 2014
MA. ELENA CARLOS NEBREJA, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. BENJAMIN REONAL, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
For resolution is the administrative complaint for disbarment 1 filed by
Ma. Elena Carlos Nebreja (complainant) against Atty. Benjamin
Reonal (respondent) for his failure to file the contracted petition for
annulment of marriage in her behalf; for his misrepresentation on its
status; and for his use of a fictitious office address.
On June 26, 2006, complainant filed a verified Complaint-Affidavit
before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBP) of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines against respondent. Complainant alleged in her
complaint-affidavit and position paper that sometime in March 2004,
she engaged respondent's services to file her petition for annulment.
She paid in cash and in checks,2 the various fees he asked from her
on several occasions which totalled ₱55,000.00.
After paying respondent, however, complainant did not receive any
word from him with regard to the status of her petition for annulment
other than his claim that they needed to wait for her appointment with
the psychologist evaluation.
On April 4, 2005, respondent told complainant that her petition for
annulment was dismissed for lack of evidence. He then again asked
for sums of money, on separate occasions, totalling ₱25,900.00, to
pay for the psychological test, the sheriff’s fee, the re-filing fee, and
the publication.
Complainant again, despite respondent’s receipt of sums of money,
failed to receive any update from respondent. When complainant
asked for the schedule of her psychological test, respondent merely
told her that the psychologist was unavailable. When she tried to ask
for the number of her case and to obtain copies of the records,
respondent just told her that the records were kept in a cabinet, the
key to which was in the possession of his law partner who was out of
town at that time.
On March 14, 2006, complainant met with respondent to secure
copies of her annulment case file. Respondent, however, merely
handed to her photocopies of her marriage contract and her children’s
birth certificates. When she asked for copies of her case files, he just
told her that his law office could not let her use the pleadings of the
case. She then asked for his office address to appeal to his law
partners, but respondent refused to give it.
Complainant checked her records and found respondent’s demand
letter bearing the address of his claimed law office, "18/f Century
Towers Building, Legaspi St. corner de la Rosa, Makati." When
complainant tried to look for the said office, she discovered that there
was no such building. She also found respondent’s calling card
bearing the address, "86 Magat Salamat Street, Project 4, Quezon
City," which, complainant found out, was respondent’s residential
address.
When complainant tried again to obtain copies of her annulment case
from respondent, he did not give any and told her that her annulment
case would just be re-filed. When she asked him to write a letter to
explain to the University of Perpetual Help-Rizal the discrepancy
between the surnames appearing in her children’s NSO-issued birth
certificates and the school records, respondent did not mention any
pending annulment case in the letter, which he filed in complainant’s
behalf. These circumstances made complainant suspect that he did
not file any petition for annulment at all.
In his answer and position paper, respondent denied having been
engaged by complainant to handle her petition for annulment and
having been paid therefor. In particular, respondent averred that
complainant did not engage him to be her lawyer because she was
unemployed and could not afford his legal services; that he was the
retained counsel of one Desiree Dee, complainant’s associate, in the
prosecution of labor, civil and criminal cases, but not for her
annulment; that in the preparation of the affidavit for the University of
Perpetual Help, he did not mention her intention to pursue an
annulment proceeding against her husband upon her request; and
that no psychological test was conducted because she refused to
allocate time to accommodate the schedule of the clinical
psychologist.
There are two principal issues to be resolved in this case. First,
whether indeed respondent failed to file the requisite petition for
annulment for complainant and misrepresented its status; and
second, whether or not he used a fictitious office address.
With regard to the first issue, the CBD found that respondent was
liable for inexcusable negligence for failing to file her petition for
annulment. There was no dispute that the parties met to discuss
about the filing of complainant’s intended petition for annulment of
marriage. They, however, disagreed on the engagement of his
services to file the petition.
On the matter, CBD found as sufficient the documentary evidence of
payment submitted by complainant to prove the engagement of his
legal services. During the clarificatory hearing, complainant answered
the questions on the purposes for which the payments were given in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank manner, which
demeanor was a badge of credibility.3
The CBD did not give credence to respondent’s denials, which
prevailed over the positive and categorical statement of the
complainant. It cited the well-settled rule that positive statement was
stronger and attained greater evidentiary weight than negative
evidence.4 Moreover, he did not submit any evidence to support or
corroborate his denials and allegations or to refute complainant’s
evidence. In sum, his claims were merely supported by his
allegations, which, by law, were not equivalent to proof.5
With regard to the second issue, the CBD found that indeed,
respondent used a fictitious office address to deceive complainant. He
did not submit any proof that such building existed or that he held
office at said address. He also did not deny either the due execution
and authenticity of the letter with his printed office address. By failing
to controvert the evidence of the other party, the truth of the said
evidence was deemed to be admitted by the litigant.6 Such act, as
held by the CBD, was a violation of respondent’s lawyer’s oath to do
no falsehood and which consequently rendered him administratively
liable.
On September 25, 2008, the CBD found respondent guilty of both
charges and recommended his suspension from the practice of law
and ordered him to return the amounts taken from the complainant.
The dispositive portion of its report reads:
WHEREFORE, it is therefore respectfully recommended that
respondent be: (a) suspended from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year; and (b) ordered to return to complainant, within five (5)
days from notice, the sum of ₱80,900.00 with 12% interest per annum
from the date when this recommendation is affirmed by the Supreme
Court until the full amount shall have been returned.
On December 11, 2008, a resolution was passed by the Board of
Governors of the IBP, which adopted and approved the
recommendation of the CBD. The IBP Resolution is hereby quoted as
follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XVIII-2008-652
CBD Case No. 06-1767
Ma. Elena Carlos Nebreja vs.
Atty. Benjamin Reonal
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering Respondent’s violation of Rule 18.03, Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his inexcusable
negligence by failure to file the annulment petition and for
misrepresentation, Atty. Benjamin Reonal is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) year and Ordered to return the
amount of Eighty Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (₱80,900.00)* to
complainant within five (5) days from notice with 12% interest per
annum from the date this recommendation is affirmed by the Supreme
Court.
Complainant and respondent filed their motions for reconsideration on
April 25, 2009 and April 27, 2009 respectively, but both were denied in
a resolution, dated January 3, 2013.
After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the
resolution of the IBP except with respect to the order to return the
amount of ₱80,900.00.
Despite the engagement of his services, respondent did not file the
contracted petition. His conduct, as held in Vda. De Enriquez v. San
Jose,7 amounted to inexcusable negligence. This was found to be
contrary to the mandate prescribed in Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which enjoined a lawyer not to
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides for the rule on negligence and states:
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
This Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule, that the mere
failure of the lawyer to perform the obligations due to the client is
considered per se a violation.8 Thus, a lawyer was held to be
negligent when he failed to do anything to protect his client's interest
after receiving his acceptance fee.9 In another case,10 this Court has
penalized a lawyer for failing to inform the client of the status of the
case, among other matters. In another instance, for failure to take the
appropriate actions in connection with his client's case, the lawyer
was suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months and
was required to render accounting of all the sums he received from
his client.11
With regard to respondent’s misrepresentation of his office address,
the case of Porac Trucking, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 12 sets an
example. In the said case, the Court imposed a six-month suspension
on the lawyer after it was established that the said lawyer indeed
claimed to be a lawyer of Porac Trucking, Inc. when, in truth and in
fact, he was not. Still, in another case, 13 the same six (6) month
suspension was inposed on the erring lawyer after it was established
that he claimed before the trial court to be a member of Citizens Legal
Assistance Office when in truth, he was not.
In this case, respondent clearly received his acceptance fee, among
others, and then completely neglected his client’s cause. Moreover,
he failed to inform complainant of the true status of the petition. His
act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in
handling the complainant's case and, subsequently, failing to render
the services, was a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.14
For all of respondent's acts - failure to file the contracted petition for
annulment of marriage in behalf of the complainant, his
misrepresentation on its status and his use of a fictitious office
address, he deserves the penalty imposed upon him by the IBP.
The Court, however, deletes the aforementioned order stated in the
resolution of the IBP, to wit, "To return the amount of Eighty Thousand
Nine Hundred Pesos (₱80,900.00) to complainant within five (5) days
from notice with 12% interest per annum from the date this
recommendation is affirmed by the Supreme Court." The Court has
recently adopted the policy to let the complainant claim and collect the
amount due from the respondent in an independent action, civil or
criminal.1âwphi1
Nevertheless, the Court looks with disfavor at the non-payment by a Annex A
lawyer of his due obligations.
SECRET MARRIAGE?
WHEREFORE, the December 11, 2008 Resolution of the IBP P560.00 for a valid marriage.
adopting and approving the September 25, 2008 Recommendation of Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP that Atty. Benjamin ANNULMENT. VISA.
Reonal be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year is
hereby APPROVED. The order to return the amounts received from THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041
complainant is hereby DELETED. This decision is immediately CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg.,
executory and is without prejudice to the filing of any civil or criminal UN Ave., Mla.
action against respondent.
Annex B
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be
included in the records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the GUAM DIVORCE.
Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the
Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the DON PARKINSON
country.
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam
(c) Solicitation Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to
• Ulep v. Legal Clinic, B.M. No. 553, June 17, 1993 Friday during office hours.

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993 Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration
Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to
vs. Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call
Marivic.
R E SO L U T I O N
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita,
Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC.1 Tel. 521-7232;
521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
REGALADO, J.:
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law
desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the
that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements,
the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law." hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows: In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication
of said advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged
in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services"
through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services
advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services
should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State
Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme
Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the
issues raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine
Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle
(WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP),
and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their
respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their
memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and
extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court
takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or
not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether
the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein
complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case,
we deem it proper and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts
from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned
bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues
involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which
respondent endeavored to distinguish the two
terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal
services", common sense would readily dictate that the
same are essentially without substantial distinction. For
who could deny that document search, evidence
gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic
institutional services from government or non-
government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or
business registration, obtaining documents like
clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes
practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not
wish to make issue with respondent's foreign citations.
Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view
espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is
alright to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its
opposition to respondent's act of establishing a "legal
clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same
through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative
supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually
restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical
activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed.4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives
the impression that respondent corporation is being
operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers
legal services to the public, the advertisements in
question give the impression that respondent is offering
legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this
to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this
(is) the effect that the advertisements have on the
reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in
question can be traced, first of all, to the very name
being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc."
Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the
rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like
a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical
problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic"
connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes
doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in
the advertisements subject of the present case,
appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the
more reinforces the impression that it is being operated
by members of the bar and that it offers legal services.
In addition, the advertisements in question appear with
a picture and name of a person being represented as a
lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes
whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the
service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is
merely offering "legal support services" as claimed by
it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer
actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes
unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal
services" and "legal support services," as the
respondent would have it. The advertisements in
question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the
reading public that legal services are being offered by
lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce
the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public
order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the
advertisements in question are only meant to inform
the general public of the services being offered by it.
Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam
divorce, and any law student ought to know that under
the Family Code, there is only one instance when a
foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine
Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code
(defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of
permanent union between a man and
woman entered into accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the
property relation during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is
obvious that the message being conveyed is that
Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a
marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by
simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce,
violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be
considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where
certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the
sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.
 Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel
or abet activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that
advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the
Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle
with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems
to address those planning a "secret marriage," if not
suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the
"special contract of permanent union," the inviolable
social institution," which is how the Family Code
describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity
and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement
appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy,
which is suggestive of immoral publication of
applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed,
it can readily be concluded that the above impressions
one may gather from the advertisements in question
are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion
example alone confirms what the advertisements
suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are
being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas)
with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts does not extend to the place where
the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal
support services" respondent offers do not constitute
legal services as commonly understood, the
advertisements in question give the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers
and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed.
Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes
of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar
themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals,
good customs and the public good, thereby destroying
and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be
enjoined from causing the publication of the
advertisements in question, or any other
advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that
respondent should be prohibited from further
performing or offering some of the services it presently
offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services
to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing
computerized legal research, electronic data gathering,
storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms,
investigators for gathering of evidence, and like
services will greatly benefit the legal profession and
should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However,
when the conduct of such business by non-members of
the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can
be no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at
bar can be better performed by specialists in other
fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of
their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such
field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for
admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from
"encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the
profession of the great benefits and advantages of
modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer
will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter,
even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be
careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law
in any form, not only for the protection of members of
the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the
protection of the public. Technological development in
the profession may be encouraged without tolerating,
but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is
allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such
services are made available exclusively to members of
the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering
technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively,
the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing
between which service may be offered to the public in
general and which should be made available
exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken.
This, however, may require further proceedings
because of the factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of
respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright,
such as acts which tend to suggest or induce
celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or
otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While
respondent may not be prohibited from simply
disseminating information regarding such matters, it
must be required to include, in the information given, a
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that
certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine
law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a
legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before
deciding on which course of action to take, and that it
cannot recommend any particular lawyer without
subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice
of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should
be directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a
clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be
ignored. But nobody should be allowed to represent
himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term
being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without
any adequate and effective means of regulating his
activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may
prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but
before allowance of such practice may be considered,
the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws
must conform to each and every provision of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court.5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the
practice of law but engaged in giving legal support
services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced
paralegals, with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is
absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding
out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal
Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its
enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice
which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the
Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely
engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity.
Respondent's own commercial advertisement which
announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be
handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all
indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is
offering and rendering legal services through its
reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of
law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but
includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering
opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and
then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look
after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage
in the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be
evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers
to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or
device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc."
holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of
its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception,
especially so when the public cannot ventilate any
grievance for malpractice against the business conduit.
Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons
who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar
(Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject
the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court.
Although respondent uses its business name, the
persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to
court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession
open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be
assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is
a personal right limited to persons who have qualified
themselves under the law. It follows that not only
respondent but also all the persons who are acting for
respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law
practice.6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in
answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only
unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral;
and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to
supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate
officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice
of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal support
services" to answers, litigants and the general public as
enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its
Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of
Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services,
as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show
that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside
of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory
services on Persons and Family Relations Law,
particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of
marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption;
Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related
problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law
of the Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the
application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles and
procedures related thereto, the legal advices based
thereon and which activities call for legal training,
knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the
aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall
squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and
laymen equally term as "the practice of law."7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court,
paramount consideration should be given to the
protection of the general public from the danger of
being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who
may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a
rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year
bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take
and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer
qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many
jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of justice,
there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal
with the general public as such. While it may now be
the opportune time to establish these courses of study
and/or standards, the fact remains that at present,
these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime,
this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to
protect the general public from being exploited by those
who may be dealing with the general public in the guise
of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be
protected from the dangers which may be brought
about by advertising of legal services. While it appears
that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of
Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears
in the instant case that legal services are being
advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by
"paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to
protect the general public from falling prey to those who
advertise legal services without being qualified to offer
such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of
Respondent, however, seems to give the impression
that information regarding validity of marriages,
divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa
extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and
foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters
, will be given to them if they avail of its services. The
Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does
not help matters. It gives the impression again that
Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought
to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed,
staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the
misleading impression that there are lawyers involved
in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any
medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in
The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very
admissions of its President and majority stockholder,
Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and
main purpose of Respondent corporation in the
aforementioned "Starweek" article."9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly
advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain
which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are)
illegal and against the Code of Professional
Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an
advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in
bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc.,
could work out/cause the celebration of a secret
marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this
country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said
agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly
fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines
are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so
under the law. And to employ an agency for said
purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and
other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to
advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain
from qualified practitioners legal services for their
particular needs can justify the use of advertisements
such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one
(cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit
the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be
amended so that such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem
to project that secret marriages and divorce are
possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not
so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about
how they could go about having a secret marriage
here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and
seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is
none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is
deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to
be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done
(and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme
Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by
circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and
offenses of this character justify permanent elimination
from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice
of law, such as management consultancy firms or
travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform
the services rendered by Respondent does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is
not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein,
however, the fact that the business of respondent
(assuming it can be engaged in independently of the
practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not
necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice
of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as
a consultant can render effective service
unless he is familiar with such statutes
and regulations. He must be careful not
to suggest a course of conduct which
the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that
(the consultant's) knowledge of the law,
and his use of that knowledge as a
factor in determining what measures he
shall recommend, do not constitute the
practice of law . . . . It is not only
presumed that all men know the law, but
it is a fact that most men have
considerable acquaintance with broad
features of the law . . . . Our knowledge
of the law — accurate or inaccurate —
moulds our conduct not only when we
are acting for ourselves, but when we
are serving others. Bankers, liquor
dealers and laymen generally possess
rather precise knowledge of the laws
touching their particular business or
profession. A good example is the
architect, who must be familiar with
zoning, building and fire prevention
codes, factory and tenement house
statutes, and who draws plans and
specification in harmony with the law.
This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his
client to omit a fire tower, replies that it
is required by the statute. Or the
industrial relations expert cites, in
support of some measure that he
recommends, a decision of the National
Labor Relations Board. Are they
practicing law? In my opinion, they are
not, provided no separate fee is charged
for the legal advice or information, and
the legal question is subordinate and
incidental to a major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of
custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect
a building on his land to engage a
lawyer to advise him and the architect in
respect to the building code and the like,
then an architect who performed this
function would probably be considered
to be trespassing on territory reserved
for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the
industrial relations field had been pre-
empted by lawyers, or custom placed a
lawyer always at the elbow of the lay
personnel man. But this is not the case.
The most important body of the
industrial relations experts are the
officers and business agents of the labor
unions and few of them are lawyers.
Among the larger corporate employers,
it has been the practice for some years
to delegate special responsibility in
employee matters to a management
group chosen for their practical
knowledge and skill in such matter, and
without regard to legal thinking or lack of
it. More recently, consultants like the
defendants have the same service that
the larger employers get from their own
specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is
growing into a recognized profession for
which appropriate courses are offered
by our leading universities. The court
should be very cautious about declaring
[that] a widespread, well-established
method of conducting business is
unlawful, or that the considerable class
of men who customarily perform a
certain function have no right to do so,
or that the technical education given by
our schools cannot be used by the
graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is
practicing law, we should consider his
work for any particular client or
customer, as a whole. I can imagine
defendant being engaged primarily to
advise as to the law defining his client's
obligations to his employees, to guide
his client's obligations to his employees,
to guide his client along the path charted
by law. This, of course, would be the
practice of the law. But such is not the
fact in the case before me. Defendant's
primarily efforts are along economic and
psychological lines. The law only
provides the frame within which he must
work, just as the zoning code limits the
kind of building the limits the kind of
building the architect may plan. The
incidental legal advice or information
defendant may give, does not transform
his activities into the practice of law. Let
me add that if, even as a minor feature
of his work, he performed services
which are customarily reserved to
members of the bar, he would be
practicing law. For instance, if as part of
a welfare program, he drew employees'
wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is
the representations of the employer in
the adjustment of grievances and in
collective bargaining, with or without a
mediator. This is not per se the practice
of law. Anyone may use an agent for
negotiations and may select an agent
particularly skilled in the subject under
discussion, and the person appointed is
free to accept the employment whether
or not he is a member of the bar. Here,
however, there may be an exception
where the business turns on a question
of law. Most real estate sales are
negotiated by brokers who are not
lawyers. But if the value of the land
depends on a disputed right-of-way and
the principal role of the negotiator is to
assess the probable outcome of the
 dispute and persuade the opposite party
to the same opinion, then it may be that
only a lawyer can accept the
assignment. Or if a controversy between
an employer and his men grows from
differing interpretations of a contract, or
of a statute, it is quite likely that
defendant should not handle it. But I
need not reach a definite conclusion
here, since the situation is not presented
by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the
employer before administrative agencies
of the federal government, especially
before trial examiners of the National
Labor Relations Board. An agency of the
federal government, acting by virtue of
an authority granted by the Congress,
may regulate the representation of
parties before such agency. The State of
New Jersey is without power to interfere
with such determination or to forbid
representation before the agency by one
whom the agency admits. The rules of
the National Labor Relations Board give
to a party the right to appear in person,
or by counsel, or by other
representative. Rules and Regulations,
September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31.
'Counsel' here means a licensed
attorney, and ther representative' one
not a lawyer. In this phase of his work,
defendant may lawfully do whatever the
Labor Board allows, even arguing
questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v.
Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky,
Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at
pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person
engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve
knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of
law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a
major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily
reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or
information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for
any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-
lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility
succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another
profession or occupation concurrently with the practice
of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting
as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to
render wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition).
Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like
securing a marriage license, and making arrangements
with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of
law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that
described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then
what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a
non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such
services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information
on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas
(See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving
informational materials may not constitute of law. The
business is similar to that of a bookstore where the
customer buys materials on the subject and determines
on the subject and determines by himself what courses
of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from
purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals
may apply the law to the particular problem of the
client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute
unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication
of a legal text which publication of a
legal text which purports to say what the
law is amount to legal practice. And the
mere fact that the principles or rules
stated in the text may be accepted by a
particular reader as a solution to his
problem does not affect this. . . . .
Apparently it is urged that the conjoining
of these two, that is, the text and the
forms, with advice as to how the forms
should be filled out, constitutes the
unlawful practice of law. But that is the
situation with many approved and
accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to
the public at large. There is no personal
contact or relationship with a particular
individual. Nor does there exist that
relation of confidence and trust so
necessary to the status of attorney and
client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF
LEGAL PRACTICE — THE
REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING
OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A
PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the
book assumes to offer general advice on
common problems, and does not purport
to give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or
readily identified person. Similarly the
defendant's publication does not purport
to give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or
readily identified person in a particular
situation — in their publication and sale
of the kits, such publication and sale did
not constitutes the unlawful practice of
law . . . . There being no legal
impediment under the statute to the sale
of the kit, there was no proper basis for
the injunction against defendant
maintaining an office for the purpose of
selling to persons seeking a divorce,
separation, annulment or separation
agreement any printed material or
writings relating to matrimonial law or
the prohibition in the memorandum of
modification of the judgment against
defendant having an interest in any
publishing house publishing his
manuscript on divorce and against his
having any personal contact with any
prospective purchaser. The record does
fully support, however, the finding that
for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit,
the defendant gave legal advice in the
course of personal contacts concerning
particular problems which might arise in
the preparation and presentation of the
purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause
of action or pursuit of other legal
remedies and assistance in the
preparation of necessary documents
(The injunction therefore sought to)
enjoin conduct constituting the practice
of law, particularly with reference to the
giving of advice and counsel by the
defendant relating to specific problems
of particular individuals in connection
with a divorce, separation, annulment of
separation agreement sought and
should be affirmed. (State v. Winder,
 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in
Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services
are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not
controverted, however, that if the services "involve
giving legal advice or counselling," such would
constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in
this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may
be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it
can give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong
notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the
solemnities, formalities and other requisites of
marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no
Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically
objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is
not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to
state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or
"legal support services", and not legal services, are
available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law"
becomes exigent for the proper determination of the issues raised by
the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of
law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and
interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and
doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of
which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is
to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal
knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It
includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal
instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although
such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally
engages in three principal types of professional activity: legal advice
and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge
of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance
for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority
to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in
order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a
lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients,
advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an
attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also
practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal
status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto
constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the
proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that
extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines
in several cases, we laid down the test to determine whether certain
acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and
the application of legal principles and technique to
serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting
in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all
advice to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.
(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23,
193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the
business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their right under the law, or appears
in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative
capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of
obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative
capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as
to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co.,
102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association
v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation
of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions
and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice
to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating
an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure
of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters
or estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of
the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p.
262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no
small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects and the preparation and
execution of legal instruments covering an extensive
field of business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always
subject to become involved in litigation. They require in
many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These
customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice
by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns
the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office.
It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound
moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court,
Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of
the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is.
Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A.
139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and
out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar,
we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the
aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as
advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support
services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said
proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it
has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving
ready information by trained paralegals to laymen and
lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-
advisory, through the extensive use of computers and
modern information technology in the gathering,
processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of
information and communication, such as computerized
legal research; encoding and reproduction of
documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or
lawyers; document search; evidence gathering;
locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding
investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of
basic institutional services from government or non-
government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or
business registrations; educational or employment
records or certifications, obtaining documentation like
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving
information about laws of other countries that they may
find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption
laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to
the foreign country, and other matters that do not
involve representation of clients in court; designing and
installing computer systems, programs, or software for
the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal
departments, courts and other entities engaged in
dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation
merely involve mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the
installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids
and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the
general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal
information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is
non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In
providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the
respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a
copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a
bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will
necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and
advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may
be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent
and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid.
That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of
"practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that
respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law
practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving
legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article
published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday
Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems,"
where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of
respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty.
Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday
at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of
the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No
matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as
complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic
situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who,
like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take
care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in
taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems,
labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are
backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and
attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired
by the trend in the medical field toward specialization, it
caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the
big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when
they come, we start by analyzing the problem. That's
 what doctors do also. They ask you how you
contracted what's bothering you, they take your
temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and
so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the
problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one
of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms,
require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The
Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things
like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of
loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a
hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care
of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung
baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-
confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea,"
explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive
"treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich
relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you
stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would
refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real
estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in
order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for
the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist
in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the
problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your
rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who
knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in
court, and gather evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its
services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in
the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions
against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and
are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P.
WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that the main
purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services
from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate
undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the
domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by
private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be
performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of
the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards
of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the
public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom
respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines
there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet
the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various
statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a
lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied
with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only
those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of
attainments previously acquired through education and study, have
been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of
legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend
the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the
construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The
justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted
to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition,
but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented
in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the
judicial department can exercise little control.27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that
the concept in the United States of paralegals as an occupation
separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction.
Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this
should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not
of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted
by respondent, there are schools and universities there which offer
studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in
the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal
assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also
evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or
guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set
up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs
(1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants.
There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with
their own code of professional ethics, such as the National
Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal
Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited
acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. As
pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law
are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or
to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in
scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission
therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the
absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not
been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper
administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted
intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of
law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons
who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal
assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making
known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to
use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something
of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in
return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of
the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional
Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect
advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or
inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be
published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or
is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude
of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all
other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's
advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the
ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against
advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on
the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a
profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs.
Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of
respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held
to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was
a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of
his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business
from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises
his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The
lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops
to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the public.
As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice
with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old
 defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and
effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of
character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising
possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of
character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well
as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public
attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service
which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily
sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and
the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited.
The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule
against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they
may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories,
namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are
necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in
a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the
canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must
not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's
name and the names of his professional associates; addresses,
telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date
and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with
dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public
or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal
fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names
and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that
purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper,
magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for
other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his
brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine,
trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to
be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of
which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar,
or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The
card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law
firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and
special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise
have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a
designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the
advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which
even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent
corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same
definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-
mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which
is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by
respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is
the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows
a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by
lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation
or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an
estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former
Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional
Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case
contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not
applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such
authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the
general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be
made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an
exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar
Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public
about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that
public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these
characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal
and judicial systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the
kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is
already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose
integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the
community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance
in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt
and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond
reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly
accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer,
subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in
allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice
of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime
incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc.
is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are
involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or
illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created
should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain
from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within
the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely
administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be
promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since,
under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation
cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this
country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical
advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called
paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent
is the concern and province of the Solicitor General who can institute
the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of
the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's
corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off
from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such
action as may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN
herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the
publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is
of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of
this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional
Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant
and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in
accordance herewith.
• Linsangan v. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672, September 4, 2009
A.C. No. 6672               September 4, 2009
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the
Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty.
Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of
professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe
Marie Labiano, convinced his clients2 to transfer legal representation.
Respondent promised them financial assistance3 and expeditious
collection on their claims.4 To induce them to hire his services, he CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
persistently called them and sent them text messages. TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
affidavit5 of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and ABROAD.
utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of
₱50,000. Complainant also attached "respondent’s" calling card:6 1avvphi1

Front

(emphasis supplied)
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
Hence, this complaint.
LAW OFFFICE
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME the printing and circulation of the said calling card.7
SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
Fe Marie L. Labiano report and recommendation.8
Paralegal
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Tel: 362- report and recommendation,9 found that respondent had encroached
Flr. Rm. M-01 7820 on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02 10 and
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Fax: (632) other canons11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Pilar 362-7821 Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain,
Grace Park, Caloocan Cel.: (0926) personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27,
City 2701719 Rule 13812 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that
respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition
would merit a heavier penalty.
Back
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of
respondent but we modify the recommended penalty.

The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by

SERVICES OFFERED: respondent into complainant’s professional practice in violation of
Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in
furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct
violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to,
including the manner by which a lawyer’s services are to be made
known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use
only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement
of facts.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is
a profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their
talents as merchants advertise their wares.13 To allow a lawyer to
advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law,
degrade the profession in the public’s estimation and impair its ability
to efficiently render that high character of service to which every
member of the bar is called.14
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers.15 Such
actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.16
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR
which provides:
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost
any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an
agent in order to gain employment)17 as a measure to protect the
community from barratry and champerty.18
Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn
statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred
to respondent’s office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal
business as well as profited from referrals’ suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer,
he later admitted it during the mandatory hearing.
Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited.
Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the
strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could produce a more
favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment
violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.1avvphi1
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled
is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor
induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good
result or reduced fees for his services.20 Again the Court notes that
respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor
receiving benefits from Labiano’s "referrals." Furthermore, he never
denied Labiano’s connection to his office.21 Respondent committed an
unethical, predatory overstep into another’s legal practice. He cannot
escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as
borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless
the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client
except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only
exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees for
transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety
bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind
so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely
affected.22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is
handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s
cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the
client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject
matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome. 23 Either of
these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own
recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which
may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client
in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.24
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes
malpractice25 which calls for the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary
powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious
sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose
of obtaining employment.26 Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the
rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of
unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal
profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation
of the prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction
recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the
wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by
petitioner. A lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character
and conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce
their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple
professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyer’s name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.28
Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial
assistance." The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who
already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of
loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients
away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their
financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass
commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no
place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial
evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that
respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing
and distribution of Labiano’s calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating
Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.
• Villatuya v. Tabalingcos, A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012
A.C. No. 6622               July 10, 2012
MIGUEL G. VILLATUYA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the
Office or the Bar Confidant, complainant Manuel G. Villatuya
(complainant) charges Atty. Bcde S. 'L1halingcos (resrondent) with
unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the ('ode or Professional
Responsibility for nonpayment of fees to complainant, and gross
immorality for marrying two other women while respondent’s first
marriage was subsisting.1
In a Resolution2 dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this
Court required respondent to file a Comment, which he did on 21
March 2005.3 The Complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within
sixty (60) days from receipt of the record.4
On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP
(Commission) issued a Notice5 setting the mandatory conference of
the administrative case on 05 July 2005. During the conference,
complainant appeared, accompanied by his counsel and respondent.
They submitted for resolution three issues to be resolved by the
Commission as follows:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by nonpayment of fees to complainant
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful
solicitation, and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for
having married thrice.6
The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective verified
Position Papers. Respondent filed his verified Position Paper, 7 on 15
July 2005 while complainant submitted his on 01 August 2005.8
Complainant’s Accusations
Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by
respondent as a financial consultant to assist the latter on technical
and financial matters in the latter’s numerous petitions for corporate
rehabilitation filed with different courts. Complainant claimed that they
had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to ₱ 50,000 for
every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they would handle,
in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. He
alleged that, from February to December 2002, respondent was able
to rake in millions of pesos from the corporate rehabilitation cases
they were working on together. Complainant also claimed that he was
entitled to the amount of ₱ 900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders issued by
the courts as a result of his work with respondent, and a total of ₱
4,539,000 from the fees paid by their clients.9 Complainant appended
to his Complaint several annexes supporting the computation of the
fees he believes are due him.
Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation
of cases in violation of Section 27 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up two financial consultancy
firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel Business Link,
Inc., and used them as fronts to advertise his legal services and solicit
cases. Complainant supported his allegations by attaching to his
Position Paper the Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and Jane, 10 letter-
proposals to clients signed by respondent on various dates 11 and
proofs of payment made to the latter by their clients.12
On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused
respondent of committing two counts of bigamy for having married two
other women while his first marriage was subsisting. He submitted a
Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by the Office of the Civil
Registrar General-National Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that Bede
S. Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted marriage thrice: first,
on 15 July 1980 with Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in
Dasmarinas, Cavite; the second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma.
Rowena Garcia Piñon in the City of Manila; and the third on 07
September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita,
Manila.13
Respondent’s Defense
In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He
asserted that complainant was not an employee of his law firm –
Tabalingcos and Associates Law Office14 – but of Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc., where the former is a major
stockholder.15 Respondent alleged that complainant was
unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job as a financial
consultant, resulting in the latter’s dismissal of many rehabilitation
plans they presented in their court cases. 16 Respondent also alleged
that there was no verbal agreement between them regarding the
payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by his
clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary of
complainant had been paid.17
As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied
committing any. He contended that his law firm had an agreement
with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., whereby the firm would handle
the legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation case; and that the latter
would attend to the financial aspect of the case’ such as the
preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be presented in court. To
support this contention, respondent attached to his Position Paper a
Joint Venture Agreement dated 10 December 2005 entered into by
Tabalingcos and Associates Law Offices and Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc.;18 and an Affidavit executed by Leoncio Balena,
Vice-President for Operations of the said company.19
On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit
submitted by William Genesis, a dismissed messenger of Jesi and
Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had
been retracted by the affiant himself. 20 Respondent did not specifically
address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages
with two other women.
On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3
Marriage Contracts.21 To the said Motion, he attached the certified true
copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to in the Certification issued
by the NSO.22 The appended Marriage Contracts matched the dates,
places and names of the contracting parties indicated in the earlier
submitted NSO Certification of the three marriages entered into by
respondent. The first marriage contract submitted was a marriage that
took place between respondent and Pilar M. Lozano in Dasmarinas,
Cavite, on 15 July 1980.23 The second marriage contract was between
respondent and Ma. Rowena G. Piñon, and it took place at the
Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28 September
1987.24 The third Marriage Contract referred to a marriage between
respondent and Mary Jane E. Paraiso, and it took place on 7
September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the second and third Marriage
Contracts, respondent was described as single under the entry for
civil status.
On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the
Motion to Admit filed by complainant, claiming that the document was
not marked during the mandatory conference or submitted during the
hearing of the case.25 Thus, respondent was supposedly deprived of
the opportunity to controvert those documents.26 He disclosed that
criminal cases for bigamy were filed against him by the complainant
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Respondent further
informed the Commission that he had filed a Petition to Declare Null
and Void the Marriage Contract with Rowena Piñon at the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Biñan, Laguna, where it was docketed as Civil
Case No. B-3270.27 He also filed another Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage Contract with Pilar Lozano at the RTC-Calamba,
where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-3271. 28 In both petitions,
he claimed that he had recently discovered that there were Marriage
Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly
executed with Rowena Piñon and Pilar Lozano on different occasions.
He prayed for their annulment, because they were purportedly null
and void.
On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission
scheduled a clarificatory hearing on 20 November 2007.29 While
complainant manifested to the Commission that he would not attend
the hearing,30 respondent manifested his willingness to attend and
moved for the suspension of the resolution of the administrative case
against the latter. Respondent cited two Petitions he had filed with the
RTC, Laguna, seeking the nullification of the Marriage Contracts he
discovered to be bearing his name.31
On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission
duplicate original copies of two (2) Informations filed with the RTC of
Manila against respondent, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Atty.
Bede S. Tabalingcos."32 The first criminal case, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 07-257125, was for bigamy for the marriage contracted by
respondent with Ma. Rowena Garcia Piñon while his marriage with
Pilar Lozano was still valid.33 The other one, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 07-257126, charged respondent with having committed
bigamy for contracting marriage with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso
while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still subsisting. 34 Each of the
Informations recommended bail in the amount of P24,000 for his
provisional liberty as accused in the criminal cases.35
On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory
hearing. In the same proceeding, the Commission denied his Motion
to suspend the proceedings pending the outcome of the petitions for
nullification he had filed with the RTC–Laguna. Thus, the Commission
resolved that the administrative case against him be submitted for
resolution.36
IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and
Recommendation addressing the specific charges against
respondent.37 The first charge, for dishonesty for the nonpayment of
certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. The
Commission ruled that the charge should have been filed with the
proper courts since it was only empowered to determine respondent’s
administrative liability. On this matter, complainant failed to prove
dishonesty on the part of respondent.38 On the second charge, the
Commission found respondent to have violated the rule on the
solicitation of client for having advertised his legal services and
unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for
the violation. It failed, though, to point out exactly the specific
provision he violated.39
As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty
of gross immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. It found that complainant was able to prove through
documentary evidence that respondent committed bigamy twice by
marrying two other women while the latter’s first marriage was
subsisting.40 Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the
Commission recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name
be stricken off the roll of attorneys.41
On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution
No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.42 On 01 August
2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the
recommendation to disbar him was premature. He contends that the
Commission should have suspended the disbarment proceedings
pending the resolution of the separate cases he had filed for the
annulment of the marriage contracts bearing his name as having
entered into those contracts with other women. He further contends
that the evidence proffered by complainant to establish that the latter
committed bigamy was not substantial to merit the punishment of
disbarment. Thus, respondent moved for the reconsideration of the
resolution to disbar him and likewise moved to archive the
administrative proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions he
separately filed with the RTC of Laguna for the annulment of Marriage
Contracts.43
On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for
Reconsideration and affirmed their Resolution dated 15 April 2008
recommending respondent’s disbarment.44
The Court’s Ruling
The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.
First Charge:
Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees
While we affirm the IBP’s dismissal of the first charge against
respondent, we do not concur with the rationale behind it.
The first charge of complainant against respondent for the
nonpayment of the former’s share in the fees, if proven to be true is
based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.02 45 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to
divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rendered with a
person not licensed to practice law. Based on the allegations,
respondent had agreed to share with complainant the legal fees paid
by clients that complainant solicited for the respondent. Complainant,
however, failed to proffer convincing evidence to prove the existence
of that agreement.
We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David 46 that an agreement between a
lawyer and a layperson to share the fees collected from clients
secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved
may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that
complainant’s allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP
correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.
Second Charge:
Unlawful solicitation of clients
Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and
advertising legal services through various business entities.
Complainant submitted documentary evidence to prove that Jesi &
Jane Management Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc. were owned
and used as fronts by respondent to advertise the latter’s legal
services and to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP established the
truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated the
rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific
provision that was breached.
A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the
business entities mentioned in the report to solicit clients and to
advertise his legal services, purporting to be specialized in corporate
rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule
2.0347 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for
the purpose of profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful
occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of such
a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with
the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises
when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the
procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be
used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of
a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the
practice of law.48
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant
that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial
and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a
means to procure professional employment; specifically for corporate
rehabilitation cases. Annex "C"49 of the Complaint is a letterhead of
Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the engagement
of legal services. The letter clearly states that, should the prospective
client agree to the proposed fees, respondent would render legal
services related to the former’s loan obligation with a bank. This
circumvention is considered objectionable and violates the Code,
because the letter is signed by respondent as President of Jesi &
Jane Management, Inc., and not as partner or associate of a law firm.
Rule 15.0850 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to
inform the client whether the former is acting as a lawyer or in another
capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related to the
practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical considerations
governing the attorney-client relationship may be operative in one and
not in the other.51 In this case, it is confusing for the client if it is not
clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of
prevalence of this practice by respondent, we affirm the
recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03 and
15.08 of the Code.
Third Charge:
Bigamy
The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious
accusation. To substantiate this allegation, complainant submitted
NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts entered into by
respondent with three (3) different women. The latter objected to the
introduction of these documents, claiming that they were submitted
after the administrative case had been submitted for resolution, thus
giving him no opportunity to controvert them. 52 We are not persuaded
by his argument.
We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its
focus is on the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue
membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing
the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido v. Garrido:53
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure — such as the
verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case,
prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the
complainant — do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's
qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled
in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. First,
admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration
of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service
to the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for
the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack
of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of
law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State
may inquire into through this Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant.1âwphi1 For the court to exercise its disciplinary powers,
the case against the respondent must be established by convincing
and satisfactory proof.54 In this case, complainant submitted NSO-
certified true copies to prove that respondent entered into two
marriages while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. While
respondent denied entering into the second and the third marriages,
he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant.
He did not dispute the authenticity of the NSO documents, but denied
that he contracted those two other marriages. He submitted copies of
the two Petitions he had filed separately with the RTC of Laguna –
one in Biñan and the other in Calamba – to declare the second and
the third Marriage Contracts null and void.55
We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.
We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He
has not disputed the authenticity or impugned the genuineness of the
NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts presented by
complainant to prove the former’s marriages to two other women
aside from his wife. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding,
these Marriage Contracts bearing the name of respondent are
competent and convincing evidence proving that he committed
bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar.
The documents were certified by the NSO, which is the official
repository of civil registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage and
death of a person. Having been issued by a government agency, the
NSO certification is accorded much evidentiary weight and carries
with it a presumption of regularity. In this case, respondent has not
presented any competent evidence to rebut those documents.
According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and
the third marriages, he filed civil actions to annul the Marriage
Contracts. We perused the attached Petitions for Annulment and
found that his allegations therein treated the second and the third
marriage contracts as ordinary agreements, rather than as special
contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code provisions on
marriage. He did not invoke any grounds in the Civil Code provisions
on marriage, prior to its amendment by the Family Code.
Respondent’s regard for marriage contracts as ordinary agreements
indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his
gross ignorance of the law on what course of action to take to annul a
marriage under the old Civil Code provisions.
What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent
entered into marriage twice while his first marriage was still subsisting.
In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro,56 we held thus:
We have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom
we found guilty of misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good
moral character required of them not only as a condition precedent for
their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued
membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the
misconduct was committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in
his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality
so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. He
is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since
he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can
hardly be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead
others in doing so. Professional honesty and honor are not to be
expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other
relations. The administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an
important role being an officer of the court, demands a high degree of
intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the courts and
clients may rightly repose confidence in him.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality
required of him as a member of the bar. He made a mockery of
marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.57 His
acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct
and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court.58
Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent
and order that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty.
Bede S. Tabalingcos as follows:
1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
 2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of
advertisement and solicitation.
3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in
bigamy, a grossly immoral conduct.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty.
Bede S. Tabalingcos in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another
copy furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Clerk of
Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from
the Roll of Attorneys.
(d) Use of Media
• Cruz v. Salva, 105 Phil. 1151 (1959)
G.R. No. L-12871             July 25, 1959
TIMOTEO V. CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA, respondent.
Baizas and Balderrama for petitioner.
City Attorney Francisco G. H. Salva in his own behalf.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction filed by Timoteo V. Cruz against Francisco G. H. Salva, in
his capacity as City Fiscal of Pasay City, to restrain him from
continuing with the preliminary investigation he was conducting in
September, 1957 in connection with the killing of Manuel Monroy
which took place on June 15, 1953 in Pasay City. To better
understand the present case and its implications, the following facts
gathered from the pleadings and the memoranda filed by the parties,
may be stated.
Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number of persons
were accused as involved and implicated in said crime. After a long
trial, the Court of First Instance of Pasay City found Oscar Castelo,
Jose de Jesus, Hipolito Bonifacio, Bienvenido Mendoza, Francis
Berdugo and others guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced them
illegal to death. They all appealed the sentence although without said
appeal, in view of the imposition of the extreme penalty, the case
would have to be reviewed automatically by this Court. Oscar Castelo
sought a new trial which was granted and upon retrial, he was again
found guilty and his former conviction of sentence was affirmed and
reiterated by the same trial court.
It seems that pending appeal, the late President Magsaysay ordered a
reinvestigation of the case. The purpose of said reinvestigation does
not appear in the record. Anyway, intelligence agents of the Philippine
Constabulary and investigators of Malacañang conducted the
investigation for the Chief Executive, questioned a number of people
and obtained what would appear to be confession, pointing to
persons, other than those convicted and sentenced by the trial court,
as the real killers of Manuel Monroy.
Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his co-defendants wrote to respondent
Fiscal Salva to conduct a reinvestigation of the case presumably on
the basis of the affidavits and confessions obtained by those who had
investigated the case at the instance of Malacañang. Fiscal Salva
conferred with the Solicitor General as to what steps he should take.
A conference was held with the Secretary of Justice who decided to
have the results of the investigation by the Philippine Constabulary
and Malacañang investigators made available to counsel for the
appellants.
Taking advantage of this opportunity, counsel for the appellants filed a
motion for new trial with this Tribunal supporting the same with the so-
called affidavits and confessions of some of those persons
investigated, such as the confessions of Sergio Eduardo y de
Guzman, Oscar Caymo, Pablo Canlas, and written statements of
several others. By resolution of this Tribunal, action on said motion for
new trial was deferred until the case was studied and determined on
the merits. In the meantime, the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, head
sent to the Office of Fiscal Salva copies of the same affidavits and
confessions and written statements, of which the motion for new trial
was based, and respondent Salva proceeded to conduct a
reinvestigation designating for said purposes a committee of three
composed of himself as chairman and Assistant City Attorneys
Herminio A. Avendañio and Ernesto A. Bernabe.
In connection with said preliminary investigation being conducted by
the committee, petitioner Timoteo Cruz was subpoenaed by
respondent to appear at his office on September 21, 1957, to testify
"upon oath before me in a certain criminal investigation to be
conducted at the time and place by this office against you and Sergio
Eduardo, et al., for murder." On September 19, 1957, petitioner
Timoteo Cruz wrote to respondent Salva asking for the transfer of the
preliminary investigation from September 21, due to the fact that this
counsel, Atty. Crispin Baizas, would attend a hearing on that same
day in Naga City. Acting upon said request for postponement, Fiscal
Salva set the preliminary investigation on September 24. On that day,
Atty. Baizas appeared for petitioner Cruz, questioned the jurisdiction
of the committee, particularly respondent Salva, to conduct the
preliminary investigation in view of the fact that the same case
involving the killing of Manuel Monroy was pending appeal in this
Court, and on the same day filed the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition. This Tribunal gave due course to the petition for certiorari
and prohibition and upon the filing of a cash bond of P200.00 issued a
writ of preliminary injunction thereby stopping the preliminary
investigation being conducted by respondent Salva.
The connection, if any, that petitioner Cruz had with the preliminary
investigation being conducted by respondent Salva and his committee
was that affidavits and confessions sent to Salva by the Chief,
Philippine Constabulary, and which were being investigated,
implicated petitioner Cruz, even picturing him as the instigator and
mastermind in the killing of Manuel Monroy.
The position taken by petitioner Cruz in this case is that inasmuch as
the principal case of People vs. Oscar Castelo, et al., G.R. No. L-
10794, is pending appeal and consideration before us, no court, much
less a prosecuting attorney like respondent Salva, had any right or
authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation of
the case for that would be obstructing the administration of justice and
interferring with the consideration on appeal of the main case wherein
appellants had been found guilty and convicted and sentenced;
neither had respondent authority to cite him to appear and testify at
said investigation.
Respondent Salva, however, contends that if he subpoenaed
petitioner Cruz at all, it was because of the latter's oral and personal
request to allow him to appear at the investigation with his witnesses
for his own protection, possibly, to controvert and rebut any evidence
therein presented against him. Salva claims that were it not for this
request and if, on the contrary, Timoteo Cruz had expressed any
objection to being cited to appear in the investigation he (Salva) would
never have subpoenaed him.
Although petitioner Cruz now stoutly denies having made such
request that he be allowed to appear at the investigation, we are
inclined to agree with Fiscal Salva that such a request had been
made. Inasmuch as he, Timoteo Cruz, was deeply implicated in the
killing of Manuel Monroy by the affidavits and confessions of several
persons who were being investigated by Salva and his committee, it
was but natural that petitioner should have been interested, even
desirous of being present at that investigation so that he could face
and cross examine said witnesses and affiants when they testified in
connection with their affidavits or confessions, either repudiating,
modifying or ratifying the same. Moreover, in the communication,
addressed to respondent Salva asking that the investigation,
scheduled for September 21, 1957, be postponed because his
attorney would be unable to attend, Timoteo Cruz expressed no
opposition to the subpoena, not even a hint that he was objecting to
his being cited to appear at the investigation.
As to the right of respondent Salva to conduct the preliminary
investigation which he and his committee began ordinarily, when a
criminal case in which a fiscal intervened though nominally, for
according to respondent, two government attorneys had been
designed by the Secretary of Justice to handle the prosecution in the
trial of the case in the court below, is tried and decided and it is
appealed to a higher court such as this Tribunal, the functions and
actuations of said fiscal have terminated; usually, the appeal is
handled for the government by the Office of the Solicitor General.
Consequently, there would be no reason or occasion for said fiscal to
conduct a reinvestigation to determine criminal responsibility for the
crime involved in the appeal.
However, in the present case, respondent has, in our opinion,
established a justification for his reinvestigation because according to
him, in the original criminal case against Castelo, et al., one of the
defendants named Salvador Realista y de Guzman was not included
for the reason that he was arrested and was placed within the
jurisdiction of the trial court only after the trial against the other
accused had commenced, even after the prosecution had rested its
case and the defense had begun to present its evidence. Naturally,
Realista remained to stand trial. The trial court, according to
respondent, at the instance of Realista, had scheduled the hearing at
an early date, that is in August, 1957. Respondent claims that before
he would go to trial in the prosecution of Realista he had to chart his
course and plan of action, whether to present the same evidence, oral
and documentary, presented in the original case and trial, or, in view
of the new evidence consisting of the affidavits and confessions sent
to him by the Philippine Constabulary, he should first assess and
determine the value of said evidence by conducting an investigation
and that should he be convinced that the persons criminally
responsible for the killing of Manuel Monroy were other than those
already tried and convicted, like Oscar Castelo and his co-accused
and co-appellants, including Salvador Realista, then he might act
accordingly and even recommend the dismissal of the case against
Realista.
In this, we are inclined to agree with respondent Salva. For, as
contended by him and as suggested by authorities, the duty and role
of prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and secure the
conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent.
We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and
investigation of the prosecuting officers of all cases handled by
them, but whilst this court is averse to any form of vacillation
by such officers in the prosecution of public offenses, it is
unquestionable that they may, in appropriate cases, in order to
do justice and avoid injustice, reinvestigate cases in which
they have already filed the corresponding informations. In the
language of Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the
United States, the prosecuting officer "is the representative
not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which
is that guilt shall not escape nor innocent suffer. He may
prosecute with earnestness and vigor — indeed, he should do
so. But, while he may strike had blows, he is not at liberty to
strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to
use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. (69
United States law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309, cited in
the case of Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil., 556)
With respect to the right of respondent Salva to cite petitioner to
appear and testify before him at the scheduled preliminary
investigation, under the law, petitioner had a right to be present at that
investigation since as was already stated, he was more or less deeply
involved and implicated in the killing of Monroy according to the
affiants whose confessions, affidavits and testimonies respondent
Salva was considering or was to consider at said preliminary
investigation. But he need not be present at said investigation
because his presence there implies, and was more of a right rather
than a duty or legal obligation. Consequently, even if, as claimed by
respondent Salva, petitioner expressed the desire to be given an
opportunity to be present at the said investigation, if he latter changed
his mind and renounced his right, and even strenuously objected to
being made to appear at said investigation, he could not be compelled
to do so.
Now we come to the manner in which said investigation was
conducted by the respondent. If, as contended by him, the purpose of
said investigation was only to acquaint himself with and evaluate the
evidence involved in the affidavits and confessions of Sergio Eduardo,
Cosme Camo and others by questioning them, then he, respondent,
could well have conducted the investigation in his office, quietly,
unobtrusively and without much fanfare, much less publicity.
However, according to the petitioner and not denied by the
respondent, the investigation was conducted not in respondent's office
but in the session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City evidently,
to accommodate the big crowd that wanted to witness the proceeding,
including members of the press. A number of microphones were
installed. Reporters were everywhere and photographers were busy
taking pictures. In other words, apparently with the permission of, if
not the encouragement by the respondent, news photographers and
newsmen had a filed day. Not only this, but in the course of the
investigation, as shown by the transcript of the stenographic notes
taken during said investigation, on two occasions, the first, after Oscar
Caymo had concluded his testimony respondent Salva, addressing
the newspapermen said, "Gentlemen of the press, if you want to ask
questions I am willing to let you do so and the question asked will be
reproduced as my own"; and the second, after Jose Maratella y de
Guzman had finished testifying and respondent Salva, addressing the
newsmen, again said, "Gentlemen of the press is free to ask
questions as ours." Why respondent was willing to abdicate and
renounce his right and prerogative to make and address the questions
to the witnesses under investigation, in favor of the members of the
press, is difficult for us to understand, unless he, respondent, wanted
to curry favor with the press and publicize his investigation as much
as possible. Fortunately, the gentlemen of the press to whom he
accorded such unusual privilege and favor appeared to have wisely
and prudently declined the offer and did not ask questions, this
according to the transcript now before us.
Some of the members of the Court who appeared to feel more
strongly than the others favored the imposition of a more or less
severe penal sanction. After mature deliberation, we have finally
agreed that a public censure would, for the present, be sufficient.
In conclusion, we find and hold that respondent Salva was warranted
in holding the preliminary investigation involved in this case, insofar as
Salvador Realista is concerned, for which reason the writ of
preliminary injunction issued stopping said preliminary investigation, is
dissolved; that in view of petitioner's objection to appear and testify at
the said investigation, respondent may not compel him to attend said
investigation, for which reason, the subpoena issued by respondent
against petitioner is hereby set aside.

But, the newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to
what took place during the investigation, and this involved headlines
and extensive recitals, narrations of and comments on the testimonies
given by the witnesses as well as vivid descriptions of the incidents
that took place during the investigation. It seemed as though the
criminal responsibility for the killing of Manuel Monroy which had
already been tried and finally determined by the lower court and which
was under appeal and advisement by this Tribunal, was being retried
and redetermined in the press, and all with the apparent place and
complaisance of respondent.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is
granted in part and denied in part. Considering the conclusion arrived
at by us, respondent Francisco G. H. Salva is hereby publicly
reprehended and censured for the uncalled for and wide publicity and
sensationalism that he had given to and allowed in connection with his
investigation, which we consider and find to be contempt of court;
and, furthermore, he is warned that a repetition of the same would
meet with a more severe disciplinary action and penalty. No costs.

Frankly, the members of this Court were greatly disturbed and

annoyed by such publicity and sensationalism, all of which may
properly be laid at the door of respondent Salva. In this, he committed
what was regard a grievous error and poor judgment for which we fail
to find any excuse or satisfactory explanation. His actuations in this
regard went well beyond the bounds of prudence, discretion and good
taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a criminal
case is being investigated by the authorities, even when it being tried
in court; but when said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even
encouraged, when the case is on appeal and is pending consideration
by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes inexcusable, even
abhorrent, and this Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained and
called upon to put an end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by
meting an appropriate disciplinary measure, even a penalty to the one
liable.