G.R. No.
L-32599 June 29, 1979 towards the poblacion of Marilao, and hit his car which was bound for Manila.
EDGARDO E. MENDOZA, petitioner
vs.
HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court
of First Instance of Manila, FELINO TIMBOL, and RODOLFO
SALAZAR, respondents.
David G. Nitafan for petitioner.
Arsenio R. Reyes for respondent Timbol.
Armando M. Pulgado for respondent Salazar.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
Petitioner, Edgardo Mendoza, seeks a review on certiorari of the Orders of
respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 80803 dismissing his Complaint for
Damages based on quasi-delict against respondents Felino Timbol and
Rodolfo Salazar.
The facts which spawned the present controversy may be summarized as
follows:
On October 22, 1969, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a three- way
vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao, Bulacan,
involving a Mercedes Benz owned and driven by petitioner; a private jeep
owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar; and a gravel and sand truck
owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya. As a
consequence of said mishap, two separate Informations for Reckless
Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar
and Freddie Montoya with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The race
against truck-driver Montoya, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM-227, was
for causing damage to the jeep owned by Salazar, in the amount of Pl,604.00,
by hitting it at the right rear portion thereby causing said jeep to hit and bump
an oncoming car, which happened to be petitioner's Mercedes Benz. The case
against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM 228,
was for causing damage to the Mercedes Benz of petitioner in the amount of
P8,890.00
At the joint trial of the above cases, petitioner testified that jeep-owner- driver
Salazar overtook the truck driven by Montoya, swerved to the left going
Petitioner further testified that before the impact, Salazar had jumped from the
jeep and that he was not aware that Salazar's jeep was bumped from behind by
the truck driven by Montoya. Petitioner's version of the accident was adopted
by truck driver Montoya. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar, on the other hand, tried
to show that, after overtaking the truck driven by Montoya, he flashed a signal
indicating his intention to turn left towards the poblacion of Marilao but was
stopped at the intersection by a policeman who was directing traffic; that
while he was at a stop position, his jeep was bumped at the rear by the truck
driven by Montova causing him to be thrown out of the jeep, which then
swerved to the left and hit petitioner's car, which was coming from the
opposite direction.
On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V, Sta.
Maria, rendered judgment, stating in its decretal portion:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused Freddie
Montoya GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of damage to
property thru reckless imprudence in Crime. Case No. SM-227, and
hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P972.50 and to indemnify
Rodolfo Salazar in the same amount of P972.50 as actual damages,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, both as to fine and
indemnity, with costs.
Accused Rodolfo Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED from the offense
charged in Crime. Case No. SM-228, with costs de oficio, and his bond
is ordered canceled
SO ORDERED. 1
Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability, civil
and criminal, in view of its findings that the collision between Salazar's jeep
and petitioner's car was the result of the former having been bumped from
behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded
damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only
against jeep-owner-driver Salazar.
On August 22, 1970, or after the termination of the criminal cases, petitioner
filed Civil Case No. 80803 with the Court of First Instance of Manila against
respondents jeep-owner-driver Salazar and Felino Timbol, the latter being the
owner of the gravel and sand truck driven by Montoya, for indentification for
the damages sustained by his car as a result of the collision involving their
vehicles. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar and truck-owner Timbol were joined as
defendants, either in the alternative or in solidum allegedly for the reason that
petitioner was uncertain as to whether he was entitled to relief against both on
only one of them.
On September 9, 1970, truck-owner Timbol filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil
Case No. 80803 on the grounds that the Complaint is barred by a prior
judgment in the criminal cases and that it fails to state a cause of action. An
Opposition thereto was filed by petitioner.
In an Order dated September 12, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the
Complaint against truck-owner Timbol for reasons stated in the afore-
mentioned Motion to Dismiss On September 30, 1970, petitioner sought
before this Court the review of that dismissal, to which petition we gave due
course.
On January 30, 1971, upon motion of jeep-owner-driver Salazar, respondent
Judge also dismissed the case as against the former. Respondent Judge
reasoned out that "while it is true that an independent civil action for liability
under Article 2177 of the Civil Code could be prosecuted independently of the
criminal action for the offense from which it arose, the New Rules of Court,
which took effect on January 1, 1964, requires an express reservation of the
civil action to be made in the criminal action; otherwise, the same would be
barred pursuant to Section 2, Rule 111 ... 2 Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration thereof was denied in the order dated February 23, 1971, with
respondent Judge suggesting that the issue be raised to a higher Court "for a
more decisive interpretation of the rule. 3
On March 25, 1971, petitioner then filed a Supplemental Petition before us,
also to review the last two mentioned Orders, to which we required jeep-
owner-driver Salazar to file an Answer.
The Complaint against
truck-owner Timbol
We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated September 12, 1970,
dismissing petitioner's Complaint against truck-owner Timbol.
In dismissing the Complaint against the truck-owner, respondent Judge
sustained Timbol's allegations that the civil suit is barred by the prior joint
judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. SM-227 and SM-228, wherein no
reservation to file a separate civil case was made by petitioner and where the
latter actively participated in the trial and tried to prove damages against jeep-
driver-Salazar only; and that the Complaint does not state a cause of action
against truck-owner Timbol inasmuch as petitioner prosecuted jeep-owner-
driver Salazar as the one solely responsible for the damage suffered by his car.
Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a
subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be a final
judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits;
and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, Identity of parties,
Identity of subject matter and Identity of cause of action.
It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata are present.
However, we agree with petitioner that there is no Identity of cause of action
between Criminal Case No. SM-227 and Civil Case No. 80803. Obvious is the
fact that in said criminal case truck-driver Montoya was not prosecuted for
damage to petitioner's car but for damage to the jeep. Neither was truck-owner
Timbol a party in said case. In fact as the trial Court had put it "the owner of
the Mercedes Benz cannot recover any damages from the accused Freddie
Montoya, he (Mendoza) being a complainant only against Rodolfo Salazar in
Criminal Case No. SM-228. 4 And more importantly, in the criminal cases, the
cause of action was the enforcement of the civil liability arising from criminal
negligence under Article l of the Revised Penal Code, whereas Civil Case No.
80803 is based on quasi-delict under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176
of the Civil Code As held in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al. 5
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate in.
individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code.
Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability
arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil
liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it
inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case the defendant-
petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil
Code.
That petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on
quasi-delict is evident from the recitals in the complaint to wit: that while
petitioner was driving his car along MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan,
a jeep owned and driven by Salazar suddenly swerved to his (petitioner's) lane
and collided with his car That the sudden swerving of Salazar's jeep was
caused either by the negligence and lack of skill of Freddie Montoya, Timbol's
employee, who was then driving a gravel and sand truck iii the same direction
as Salazar's jeep; and that as a consequence of the collision, petitioner's car
suffered extensive damage amounting to P12,248.20 and that he likewise
incurred actual and moral damages, litigation expenses and attorney's fees.
Clearly, therefore, the two factors that a cause of action must consist of,
namely: (1) plaintiff's primary right, i.e., that he is the owner of a Mercedes
Benz, and (2) defendant's delict or wrongful act or omission which violated
plaintiff's primary right, i.e., the negligence or lack of skill either of jeep-
owner Salazar or of Timbol's employee, Montoya, in driving the truck,
causing Salazar's jeep to swerve and collide with petitioner's car, were alleged
in the Complaint. 6
Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being based on quasi-
delict, respondent Judge committed reversible error when he dismissed the
civil suit against the truck-owner, as said case may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony,
such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
But it is truck-owner Timbol's submission (as well as that of jeep-owner-driver
Salazar) that petitioner's failure to make a reservation in the criminal action of
his right to file an independent civil action bars the institution of such separate
civil action, invoking section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court, which says:
Section 2. — Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in
Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action may be brought by the injured party during the
pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as
required in the preceding section. Such civil action shau proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia vs. Florida 7 said:
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing
damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an
action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a
violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and
individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance
with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed
independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and
regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, 'the proviso in Section 2
of Rule 111 with reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil
Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these
articles were drafted ... and are intended to constitute as exceptions to
the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The
proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an
unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34
of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required
in the proviso ... .
In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice Antonio Barredo
further observed that inasmuch as Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code
create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from
the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code, no reservation,
therefore, need be made in the criminal case; that Section 2 of Rule 111 is
inoperative, "it being substantive in character and is not within the power of
the Supreme Court to promulgate; and even if it were not substantive but
adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an
enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940."
We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner Timbol is concerned, Civil
Case No. 80803 is not barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the
criminal action, his right to file an independent civil action based on quasi-
delict.
The suit against
jeep-owner-driver Salazar
The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who was acquitted in Criminal
Case No. SM-228, presents a different picture altogether.
At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil liability co-exists
with criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the offended party has the
option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based
on culpa criminalunder Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action
for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2177 of the
Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa
criminal under section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is deemed
simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived or
reserved for separate application by the offended party. 8
The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that
petitioner had opted to base his cause of action against jeep-owner-driver
Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana as evidenced by his
active participation and intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit
against said Salazar. The latter's civil liability continued to be involved in the
criminal action until its termination. Such being the case, there was no need
for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a separate civil action as his
action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in Criminal Case No.
SM-228.
Neither would an independent civil action he. Noteworthy is the basis of the
acquittal of jeep-owner-driver Salazar in the criminal case, expounded by the
trial Court in this wise:
In view of what has been proven and established during the trial,
accused Freddie Montoya would be held able for having bumped and
hit the rear portion of the jeep driven by the accused Rodolfo Salazar,
Considering that the collision between the jeep driven by Rodolfo
Salazar and the car owned and driven by Edgardo Mendoza was the
result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by
Freddie Montoya, this Court behaves that accused Rodolfo Salazar
cannot be held able for the damages sustained by Edgardo Mendoza's
car. 9
Crystal clear is the trial Court's pronouncement that under the facts of the case,
jeep-owner-driver Salazar cannot be held liable for the damages sustained by
petitioner's car. In other words, "the fact from which the civil might arise did
not exist. " Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action as against
jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have been extinguished in
consonance with Section 3(c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court 10 which
provides:
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a
civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted.
Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence ...
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable
doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to
that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or
not the acquittal is due to that ground.
In so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is concerned, therefore,
we sustain respondent Judge's Order dated January 30, 1971 dismissing the
complaint, albeit on different grounds.
WHEREFORE, 1) the Order dated September 12, 1970 dismissing Civil Case
No. 80803 against private respondent Felino Timbol is set aside, and
respondent Judge, or his successor, hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing
on the merits; 2) but the Orders dated January 30, 1971 and February 23, 1971
dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 80803 against respondent Rodolfo
Salazar are hereby upheld.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not
included in the preceding section the following rules shall be
observed:

xxx xxx xxx

c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of

the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil night arise did not exist. ...

And even if petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar

were not ex-delictu, the end result would be the same, it being clear from the
judgment in the criminal case that Salazar's acquittal was not based upon
reasonable doubt, consequently, a civil action for damages can no longer be
instituted. This is explicitly provided for in Article 29 of the Civil Code
quoted here under:
G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City
Judge of Mandaue City, Second Branch ROMEO HILOT, VALERIANA
PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO, respondents-appellees.
Eriberto Seno for appellant.
Jose M. Mesina for appellees.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu rendered on November 5, 1970.
The background facts to the controversy may be set forth as follows:
Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a Complaint in the City Court of
Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch II, for the recovery of damages on account of a
vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo
Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito, the last three being
the private respondents in this suit. Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was
filed against the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising from the same accident. At the
pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend
the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking
Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising
from the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be
suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in
the criminal proceeding has been rendered;
The City Court of Mandaue City in an Order dated August 11, 1970, ordered
the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
thereof, having been denied on August 25, 1970, 1 petitioner elevated the
matter on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Cebu, respondent Judge
presiding, on September 11, 1970, alleging that the City Judge had acted with
grave abuse of discretion in suspending the civil action for being contrary to
law and jurisprudence. 2
On November 5, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Petition for certiorari
on the ground that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
City Court in suspending the civil action inasmuch as damage to property is
not one of the instances when an independent civil action is proper; that
petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the law,
which is to submit his claim for damages in the criminal case; that the
resolution of the City Court is interlocutory and, therefore, certiorari is
improper; and that the Petition is defective inasmuch as what petitioner
actually desires is a Writ of mandamus (Annex "R"). Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge in an Order dated November
14,1970 (Annex "S" and Annex "U").
Hence, this Petition for Review before this Tribunal, to which we gave due
course on February 25, 1971. 3
Petitioner makes these:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
1. THE TRIAL COURT, RESPONDENT JUDGE MATEO
CANONOY, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL OF THE
CIVIL CASE NO. 189 FILED IN THE CITY COURT OF MANDAUE
SHOULD BE SUSPENDED UNTIL AFTER A FINAL JUDGMENT IS
RENDERED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
2. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IN ORDER TO
AVOID DELAY THE OFFENDED PARTY MAY SUBMIT HIS
CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
3. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION
FOR certiorari IS NOT PROPER, BECAUSE THE RESOLUTION IN
QUESTION IS INTERLOCUTORY.
4. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION
IS DEFECTIVE. 4
all of which can be synthesized into one decisive issue: whether or not there
can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency
of the criminal action.
From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City Court of Mandaue City,
Cebu, it is evident that the nature and character of his action was quasi-
delictual predicated principally on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code,
which provide:
 Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
caned a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages cause by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when
the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
(1903a)
Thus, plaintiff made the essential averments that it was the fault or negligence
of the driver, Romeo Hilot, in the operation of the jeepney owned by the
Pepitos which caused the collision between his automobile and said jeepney;
that damages were sustained by petitioner because of the collision; that there
was a direct causal connection between the damages he suffered and the fault
and negligence of private respondents.
Similarly, in the Answer, private respondents contended, among others, that
defendant, Valeriana Pepito, observed due diligence in the selection and
supervision of her employees, particularly of her co-defendant Romeo Hilot, a
defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict. 5
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may proceed as a
separate and independent civil action, as specifically provided for in Article
2177 of the Civil Code.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (n)
The crucial distinction between criminal negligence and quasi-
delict, which is readily discernible from the foregoing codal provision,
has been expounded in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al., 73 Phil. 607, 620-
621, 6 thus:
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless
but also simple imprudence. if we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910
of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law,
according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal
institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and
application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to
property through any degree of negligence — even the slightest would
have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil hability arising
from crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for
quasidelito or culpa aquiliana We are loath to impute to the lawmaker
any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are
we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that
killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal
meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of
such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana
or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to
11910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance
of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are
numerous cases of criminal negligence which cannot be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In
such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil
action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, otherwise, there
would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendants liability
effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's)
property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow
a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining a reliel True, there is
such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way,
which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant
under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely
to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs because the procedure indicated by
the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of
common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public
conveyances usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay
damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go
through this round-about, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure?
In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate
the pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct
responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are principles
calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be
carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It
is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting
from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that they
should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and
patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should
reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their
poor selection and all for their negligence." And according to Manresa,
"It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fail
upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and
prudent employee, and not upon the such employee because of his
confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many
jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the
principle of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos
says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons
the employer and employee vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por
refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien la emplea y utihza
(become as one personality by the merging of the person of the employee
in that of him who employs and utilizes him.) All these observations
acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor
accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the
responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to
overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of
understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for
culpaaquiliana there has grown up a common practice to seek damages
only by virtue of the Civil responsibility arising from crime, forgetting
that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of
the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it
has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa
extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this
usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm
done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for
fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full
rigor. It is high time we cause the stream of quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no
longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it
is believed, make for the bet ter safeguarding of private rights because it
re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further
reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
stations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the
party wronged or his counsel is more likely to secure adequate and
efficacious redress. (Garcia vs. Florida 52 SCRA 420, 424-425, Aug. 31,
1973). (Emphasis supplied)
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly
recognized in section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, reading:
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles
31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Are
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the c action,
may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal
case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section.
Such civil action shag proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing section categorically lists
cases provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, supra, as allowing of an
"independent civil action."
Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it has to be held that the City
Court, in surrounding the civil action, erred in placing reliance on section 3 (b)
of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, supra which refers to "other civil actions
arising from cases not included in the section just cited" (i.e., Section 2, Rule
111 above quoted), in which case 6 once the criminal action has being
commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted
and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found, until final
judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered." Stated otherwise, the
civil action referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted
is that arising from the criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-
delict
Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes relevance when it provides:
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from
the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter.
For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an independent
source of obligation "not arising from the act or omission complained of as a
felony." Article 1157 of the Civil Code bolsters this conclusion when it
specifically recognizes that:

Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:

(1) Law;

(2) Contracts;

(3) Quasi-contracts;

(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and

(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)

(Emphasis supplied)

It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict.

The concept of quasidelica as enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code
(supra), is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also
damage to property. 7 It makes no distinction between "damage to persons" on
the one hand and "damage to property" on the other. Indeed, the word
"damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the
harm done. And with respect to harm it is plain that it includes both injuries to
person and property since "harm" is not limited to personal but also to
property injuries. In fact, examples of quasi-delict in the law itself include
damage to property. An instance is Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which
holds proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which
may be harmful to persons or property."

In the light of the foregoing disquisition, we are constrained to hold that

respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the Decision of
the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, suspending the civil action based on
a quasi-delict until after the criminal case is finally terminated. Having arrived
at this conclusion, a discussion of the other errors assigned becomes
unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for, the Decision of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside, and
the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch 11, is hereby ordered to
proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 189 of that Court.

Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977 Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on
January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly examining the arguments therein
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.
Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs. WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.
Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21,
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees. Record on Appeal.)

BARREDO, J.: Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are
presenting for Our resolution the following assignment of errors:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated
January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY
Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT -
plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor,
married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin I
Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by
Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A
criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE
act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE
111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
II
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule
107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS
NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or
in res-adjudicata;
III

3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill,

THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194
because he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT
emancipation by marriage. CASE; and

(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])

IV

was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION
of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the
AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS
following order was issued:
RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT
THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants,
defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case
No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent
to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored
Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do
not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And
so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his
father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees
filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues
presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in
the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied
against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the
occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and
further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or
negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this
jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court
postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the
nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and
mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court
of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our
own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the
Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist.
come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the
action of the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could
have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also
a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It
is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who
was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been
prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of
the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear
instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter
either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from
a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this
jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized,
even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have
been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after
such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising
from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically
applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House
could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence
and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal
negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent
civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
(p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should
ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are
announcing doctrines that have been little understood, in the past, it
might not he inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless
but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910
of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law,
accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the
legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and
application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to
property- through any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would
have to be Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising
from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain
for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the
lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to
uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will
not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost
lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and
made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance
of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are
numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In
 such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil
action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there
would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus
Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the
overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of
understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only
by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that
there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa
extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate
this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the
harms done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility
for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its
full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no
longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it
is believed, make for the better safeguarding or private rights because it
realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that
an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and
results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party
wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious
redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the
foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the
Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of
negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal
that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact
it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made
therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919,
supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed,
Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia,
provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions
in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the
subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)"
And it is precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by law", that
Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or
interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that
giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the
law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil
Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code
Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be
noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no
longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that
the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or
in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the
corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is
Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be
governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-
delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of
the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177)
through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we
consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a
violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-
delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between
criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been
sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear,
sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist.
Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of
criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to
a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal
negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said
article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p.
162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of
negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that
upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth
the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil
Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a
civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the
civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c),
Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with
the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern
progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic.
Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176,
where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by
law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil
liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to
civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the
civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a
crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by
law.4
subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually,
therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a
situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the
joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child under
Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor
children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On
the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor
emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the
assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it
freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial
litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing
someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor
child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while
still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and
alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their
minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has
not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar
to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation
by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our
considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already
free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill
notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However,
inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the
liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is
ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against
appellees.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the

child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes
place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that
pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really
full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession
shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the
minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot
borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his
father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or guardian."

Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is

demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted
that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting

G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007
MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES,
INC., Petitioners,
vs.
MODESTO CALAUNAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
1
Assailed before Us is the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 55909 which affirmed in toto the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 42, in Civil Case No. D-10086, finding
petitioners Mauricio Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI)
solidarily liable to pay damages and attorney’s fees to respondent Modesto
Calaunan.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with
plate number CVD-478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner
Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep with plate number PER-290,
owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza.
At around 6:00 to 7:00 o’clock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent
Calaunan, together with Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from
Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep. The Philippine Rabbit Bus was
likewise bound for Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately
Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel,
Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right side of the Philippine
Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the
shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further
extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from
point of collision.
Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first
brought for treatment to the Manila Central University Hospital in Kalookan
City by Oscar Buan, the conductor of the Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was later
transferred to the Veterans Memorial Medical Center.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan, charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries, docketed as Crim.
Case No. 684-M-89. Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a
complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before the
RTC of Dagupan City, docketed as Civil Case No. D-10086. The criminal
case was tried ahead of the civil case. Among those who testified in the
criminal case were respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando
Ramos.
In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:
1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued
as well as the venue and the identities of the vehicles involved;
2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed;
3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;
4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan
and the existence of the medical certificate;
5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep
being ahead of the bus;
6. That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and straight,
although there was a ditch on the right side where the jeep fell into. 3
When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the
transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs)4 of the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be
received in evidence in the civil case in as much as these witnesses are not
available to testify in the civil case.
Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, left for
abroad sometime in November, 1989 and has not returned since then. Rogelio
Ramos took the stand and said that his brother, Fernando Ramos, left for
Amman, Jordan, to work. Rosalia Mendoza testified that her husband,
Marcelo Mendoza, left their residence to look for a job. She narrated that she
thought her husband went to his hometown in Panique, Tarlac, when he did
not return after one month. She went to her husband’s hometown to look for
him but she was informed that he did not go there.1awphil.net
The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos,
Bulacan, the court where Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was tried, to bring the
TSNs of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan,5 Marcelo Mendoza6 and
Fernando Ramos7 in said case, together with other documentary evidence
marked therein. Instead of the Branch Clerk of Court, it was Enrique Santos
Guevara, Court Interpreter, who appeared before the court and identified the
TSNs of the three afore-named witnesses and other pertinent documents he
had brought.8 Counsel for respondent wanted to mark other TSNs and
documents from the said criminal case to be adopted in the instant case, but
since the same were not brought to the trial court, counsel for petitioners
compromised that said TSNs and documents could be offered by counsel for
respondent as rebuttal evidence.
For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan
testified. The TSN9 of the testimony of Donato Ganiban, investigator of the
PRBLI, in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was marked and allowed to be
adopted in the civil case on the ground that he was already dead.
Respondent further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal evidence, the
TSNs10 of the testimonies of Donato Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner
Manliclic in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89.
The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for the
collision?
Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while the
latter is resolute in saying it was the former who caused the smash up.
The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:
The parties differed only on the manner the collision between the two (2)
vehicles took place. According to the plaintiff and his driver, the jeep was
cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the
expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the
process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the
jeep on the left side. At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was
about to overtake the jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still
at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. Fernando Ramos corroborated
the testimony of the plaintiff and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that he was on
another jeep following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff
when the incident took place. He said, the jeep of the plaintiff overtook them
and the said jeep of the plaintiff was followed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus
which was running very fast. The bus also overtook the jeep in which he was
riding. After that, he heard a loud sound. He saw the jeep of the plaintiff
swerved to the right on a grassy portion of the road. The Philippine Rabbit Bus
stopped and they overtook the Philippine Rabbit Bus so that it could not
moved (sic), meaning they stopped in front of the Philippine Rabbit Bus. He
testified that the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the right because it was bumped
by the Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.
Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that the
Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep in question. However, they explained
that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the left lane to overtake
the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake another
jeep in front of it. Such was their testimony before the RTC in Malolos in the
criminal case and before this Court in the instant case. [Thus, which of the two
versions of the manner how the collision took place was correct, would be
determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the operation
of their respective vehicles.]11
Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee,
specifically petitioner Manliclic.
On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent
Calaunan and against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. The dispositive
portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants ordering the said defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and solidarily
the amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages for the towing as well as the
repair and the materials used for the repair of the jeep in
question; P100,000.00 as moral damages and another P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P15,000.00 as attorney’s fees, including appearance
fees of the lawyer. In addition, the defendants are also to pay costs. 12
Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of
Appeals.13
In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no
reversible error in the decision of the trial court, affirmed it in all respects. 14
Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review assailing the
decision of the Court of Appeals. They assign as errors the following:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN
EVIDENCE OF THE TSN’s AND OTHER DOCUMENTS PRESENTED IN
THE CRIMINAL CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S RELIANCE ON THE VERSION OF
THE RESPONDENT ON HOW THE ACCIDENT SUPPOSEDLY
OCCURRED.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S UNFAIR DISREGARD OF HEREIN
PETITIONER PRBL’s DEFENSE OF EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE IN
THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEE.
With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the pendency of this
appeal with this Court, we granted the Motion for the Substitution of
Respondent filed by his wife, Mrs. Precila Zarate Vda. De Calaunan, and
children, Virgilio Calaunan, Carmelita Honeycomb, Evelyn Calaunan, Marko
Calaunan and Liwayway Calaunan.15
In their Reply to respondent’s Comment, petitioners informed this Court of a
Decision16 of the Court of Appeals acquitting petitioner Manliclic of the
charge17 of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Physical Injuries attaching thereto a photocopy thereof.
On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the
testimonies of respondent Calaunan,18Marcelo Mendoza19 and Fernando
Ramos20 should not be admitted in evidence for failure of respondent to
comply with the requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
For Section 47, Rule 13021 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied:
(a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was
given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the
same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former case
involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different
causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is
the same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse party had an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.22
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set
forth by the Rules for a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a
party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no opportunity to cross-examine
the three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed exclusively
against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLI’s employee. The cases dealing
with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly
speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their
employees.23
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said
criminal case, the testimonies of the three witnesses are still admissible on the
ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged
inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be
treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the
party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not
conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming
ex gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay,
but on account of failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and
considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted.24 Hearsay evidence
alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is
made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the
importance it deserves.25
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the
testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos
in the criminal case when the same were offered in evidence in the trial court.
In fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted
by both petitioners.26 Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence the
TSN containing the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If
petitioner PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiff’s
witnesses in the criminal case should not be admitted in the instant case, why
then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given in the
criminal case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat
it too. It cannot argue that the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the
adverse party in the criminal case should not be admitted and at the same time
insist that the TSN of the testimony of the witness for the accused be admitted
in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies
of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and
to admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.
We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLI’s argument that it will be denied due
process when the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and
Fernando Ramos in the criminal case are to be admitted in the civil case. It is
too late for petitioner PRBLI to raise denial of due process in relation to
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the
admissibility of the TSNs. For failure to object at the proper time, it waived its
right to object that the TSNs did not comply with Section 47.
In Mangio v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court, through Associate Justice
Reynato S. Puno,28 admitted in evidence a TSN of the testimony of a witness
in another case despite therein petitioner’s assertion that he would be denied
due process. In admitting the TSN, the Court ruled that the raising of denial of
due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a
ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSN was belatedly done. In so
doing, therein petitioner waived his right to object based on said ground.
Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have
been admitted in the instant civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers
only to "testimony or deposition." We find such contention to be untenable.
Though said section speaks only of testimony and deposition, it does not mean
that documents from a former case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said
documents can be admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses that
have been admitted. Accordingly, they shall be given the same weight as that
to which the testimony may be entitled.29
On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner
Manliclic as to how the accident occurred is more credible than respondent’s
version. They anchor their contention on the fact that petitioner Manliclic was
acquitted by the Court of Appeals of the charge of Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.
To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclic’s acquittal in
the civil case.
From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one
arising from, or based on, quasi-delict.30 Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his
negligence or reckless imprudence in causing the collision, while petitioner
PRBLI was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in the
selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic.
The allegations read:
"4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was
on board the above-described motor vehicle travelling at a moderate
speed along the North Luzon Expressway heading South towards
Manila together with MARCELO MENDOZA, who was then driving
the same;
"5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Express
Way, the above-described motor vehicle was suddenly bumped from
behind by a Philippine Rabbit Bus with Body No. 353 and with plate
No. CVD 478 then being driven by one Mauricio Manliclic of San
Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac, who was then travelling recklessly at a
very fast speed and had apparently lost control of his vehicle;
"6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the above-described
motor vehicle was forced off the North Luzon Express Way towards
the rightside where it fell on its driver’s side on a ditch, and that as a
consequence, the above-described motor vehicle which maybe valued
at EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000) was rendered a total
wreck as shown by pictures to be presented during the pre-trial and
trial of this case;
"7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff sustained bodily
injuries which compounded plaintiff’s frail physical condition and
required his hospitalization from July 12, 1988 up to and until July
22, 1988, copy of the medical certificate is hereto attached as Annex
"A" and made an integral part hereof;
"8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total wreckage of the
above-described motor vehicle as well as bodily (sic) sustained by
plaintiff, was solely due to the reckless imprudence of the defendant
driver Mauricio Manliclic who drove his Philippine Rabbit Bus No.
353 at a fast speed without due regard or observance of existing
traffic rules and regulations;
"9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Corporation failed to
exercise the diligence of a good father of (sic) family in the selection
and supervision of its drivers; x x x" 31
Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent
notwithstanding the declaration of the Court of Appeals that there was an
absence of negligence on his part?
In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of Appeals
said:
To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that accused-appellant
was negligent "when the bus he was driving bumped the jeep from behind";
that "the proximate cause of the accident was his having driven the bus at a
great speed while closely following the jeep"; x x x
We do not agree.
The swerving of Calaunan’s jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in front
of it was beyond the control of accused-appellant.
xxxx
Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held
liable for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical
Injuries as defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. 32
From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that
petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground
that he is not the author of the act complained of which is based on Section
2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the
mishap. The afore-quoted section applies only to a civil action arising from
crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising from quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3,
Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability
for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. 33
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil
Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart
and independent from a delict or crime – a distinction exists between the civil
liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil
liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for
quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.34 It is now
settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not
guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi
delict.35
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his
guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the
basis that he was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that
there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might
arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the
crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to
speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case,
a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict
complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will
not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable
doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of
(or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or
negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. 36 An acquittal or
conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case 37 based on
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of how the collision
occurred and to disregard that of respondent’s. Petitioners insist that while the
PRBLI bus was in the process of overtaking respondent’s jeep, the latter,
without warning, suddenly swerved to the left (fast) lane in order to overtake
another jeep ahead of it, thus causing the collision.
As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review.
The factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
appellate court, are binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court. 38 Not being
a trier of facts, this Court will not allow a review thereof unless:
(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and
conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond
the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted
by the evidence on record.39
After going over the evidence on record, we do not find any of the exceptions
that would warrant our departure from the general rule. We fully agree in the
finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that it was
petitioner Manliclic who was negligent in driving the PRBLI bus which was
the cause of the collision. In giving credence to the version of the respondent,
the trial court has this say:
x x x Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took
place was correct, would be determinative of who between the two drivers was
negligent in the operation of their respective vehicle.
In this regard, it should be noted that in the statement of Mauricio Manliclic
(Exh. 15) given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading no mention
was made by him about the fact that the driver of the jeep was overtaking
another jeep when the collision took place. The allegation that another jeep
was being overtaken by the jeep of Calaunan was testified to by him only in
Crim. Case No. 684-M-89 before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos,
Bulacan and before this Court. Evidently, it was a product of an afterthought
on the part of Mauricio Manliclic so that he could explain why he should not
be held responsible for the incident. His attempt to veer away from the truth
was also apparent when it would be considered that in his statement given to
the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading (Exh. 15), he alleged that the
Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep of Calaunan while the Philippine
Rabbit Bus was behind the said jeep. In his testimony before the Regional
Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan as well as in this Court, he alleged that the
Philippine Rabbit Bus was already on the left side of the jeep when the
collision took place. For this inconsistency between his statement and
testimony, his explanation regarding the manner of how the collision between
the jeep and the bus took place should be taken with caution. It might be true
that in the statement of Oscar Buan given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator
CV Cabading, it was mentioned by the former that the jeep of plaintiff was in
the act of overtaking another jeep when the collision between the latter jeep
and the Philippine Rabbit Bus took place. But the fact, however, that his
statement was given on July 15, 1988, one day after Mauricio Manliclic gave
his statement should not escape attention. The one-day difference between the
giving of the two statements would be significant enough to entertain the
possibility of Oscar Buan having received legal advise before giving his
statement. Apart from that, as between his statement and the statement of
Manliclic himself, the statement of the latter should prevail. Besides, in his
Affidavit of March 10, 1989, (Exh. 14), the unreliability of the statement of
Oscar Buan (Exh. 13) given to CV Cabading rear its "ugly head" when he did
not mention in said affidavit that the jeep of Calaunan was trying to overtake
another jeep when the collision between the jeep in question and the
Philippine Rabbit bus took place.
xxxx
If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and
his conductor, Oscar Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already
somewhat parallel to the jeep when the collision took place, the point of
collision on the jeep should have been somewhat on the left side thereof rather
than on its rear. Furthermore, the jeep should have fallen on the road itself
rather than having been forced off the road. Useless, likewise to emphasize
that the Philippine Rabbit was running very fast as testified to by Ramos
which was not controverted by the defendants.40
Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclic’s negligence that caused the
smash up, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is
negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good
father of a family.41 Under Article 218042 of the New Civil Code, when an
injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision
over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article
2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against
the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such
employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove
that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of their employee.43
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it
exercised the required diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. In the matter of selection, it
showed the screening process that petitioner Manliclic underwent before he
became a regular driver. As to the exercise of due diligence in the supervision
of its employees, it argues that presence of ready investigators (Ganiban and
Cabading) is sufficient proof that it exercised the required due diligence in the
supervision of its employees.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine
them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. In the
supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures
for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit
concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they complied with
everything that was incumbent on them.44
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,45 it was explained
that:
Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the
formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees
and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the
public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its
employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon
employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance
of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To
this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent
compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer,
acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their
supervisory functions.
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily
invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and
supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption
of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving
that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the
actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring
procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not
sufficient to overcome such presumption.
We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "the
formulation of various company policies on safety without showing that they
were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability
arising from negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to
show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the recruitment
procedures and company policies on efficiency and safety were followed." x x
x.
The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection but not in the supervision of its employees.
It expounded as follows:
From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines has a very good procedure of recruiting its driver as well as in the
maintenance of its vehicles. There is no evidence though that it is as good in
the supervision of its personnel. There has been no iota of evidence introduced
by it that there are rules promulgated by the bus company regarding the safe
operation of its vehicle and in the way its driver should manage and operate
the vehicles assigned to them. There is no showing that somebody in the bus
company has been employed to oversee how its driver should behave while
operating their vehicles without courting incidents similar to the herein case.
In regard to supervision, it is not difficult to observe that the Philippine Rabbit
Bus Lines, Inc. has been negligent as an employer and it should be made
responsible for the acts of its employees, particularly the driver involved in
this case.
We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the
accident is not enough to exempt petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from
the negligence of petitioner Manliclic. Same does not comply with the
guidelines set forth in the cases above-mentioned. The presence of the
investigators after the accident is not enough supervision. Regular supervision
of employees, that is, prior to any accident, should have been shown and
established. This, petitioner failed to do. The lack of supervision can further be
seen by the fact that there is only one set of manual containing the rules and
regulations for all the drivers of PRBLI. 46 How then can all the drivers of
petitioner PRBLI know and be continually informed of the rules and
regulations when only one manual is being lent to all the drivers?
For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is
held solidarily responsible for the damages caused by petitioner Manliclic’s
negligence.
We now go to the award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded the
amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages representing the amount paid by
respondent for the towing and repair of his jeep. 47 As regards the awards for
moral and exemplary damages, same, under the circumstances, must be
modified. The P100,000.00 awarded by the trial court as moral damages must
be reduced to P50,000.00.48 Exemplary damages are imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good.49 The amount awarded by the trial
court must, likewise, be lowered to P50,000.00.50 The award of P15,000.00 for
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation is in order and authorized by law. 51
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is
DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the award of moral damages
shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of exemplary damages shall
be lowered to P50,000.00. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995
MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the
minor children KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and
NAPOLEON II, all surnamed DULAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth Division, HON. TEODORO
P. REGINO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court National Capital Region, Quezon City, Br. 84, SAFEGUARD
INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD
SECURITY CORPORATION, respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This petition for certiorari prays for the reversal of the decision of the Court
of Appeals dated October 29, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 24646 which affirmed
the order of the Regional Trial Court dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-1751,
and its resolution dated November 17, 1991 denying herein, petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty.
Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty
at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon
Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed on
February 8, 1989 an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and herein
private respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc.,
("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"),
alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. The complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-89-1751 among others alleges the following:
1. . . .
Defendants SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND
SECURITY CO., INC., (Defendant Safeguard) and
SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION (Defendant
Superguard) are corporations duly organized and existing in
accordance with Philippine laws, with offices at 10th Floor,
Manufacturers Building, Inc., Plaza Santa Cruz, Manila.
They are impleaded as alternative defendants for, while the
former appears to be the employer of defendant BENIGNO
TORZUELA (defendant TORZUELA), the latter impliedly
acknowledged responsibility for the acts of defendant
TORZUELA by extending its sympathies to plaintiffs.
Defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA is of legal age, an
employee of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or defendant
SUPERGUARD and, at the time of the incident complained
of, was under their control and supervision. . . .
3. On December 7, 1988 at around 8:00 a.m., defendant
TORZUELA, while he was on duty as security guard at the
"Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila shot and killed NAPOLEON V. DULAY with
a .38 caliber revolver belonging to defendant
SAFEGUARD, and/or SUPERGUARD (per Police Report
dated January 7, 1989, copy attached as Annex A);
4. The incident resulting in the death of NAPOLEON V.
DULAY was due to the concurring negligence of the
defendants. Defendant TORZUELA'S wanton and reckless
discharge of the firearm issued to him by defendant
SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the immediate
and proximate cause of the injury, while the negligence of
defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in
its having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of
a family in the supervision and control of its employee to
avoid the injury.
xxx xxx xxx
(Rollo, pp. 117-118)
Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages,
and attorney's fees. The said Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 was raffled to Branch
84 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided by respondent Judge
Teodoro Regino.
On March 2, 1989, private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a valid cause of
action. SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was
beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was
committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed
by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
 Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. —
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.
Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for damages
based on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the
one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176
applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In
addition, the private respondent argued that petitioners' filing of the complaint
is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a
condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability (Rollo, p. 55-59).
Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as
defendant on the ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees
(Rollo, p. 96).
Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the
private respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or an industry.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners contended that a suit against alternative defendants is allowed
under Rule 3, Section 13 of the Rules of Court. Therefore, the inclusion of
private respondents as alternative defendants in the complaint is justified by
the following: the Initial Investigation Report prepared by Pat. Mario Tubon
showing that Torzuela is an employee of SAFEGUARD; and through overt
acts, SUPERGUARD extended its sympathies to petitioners (Rollo, pp. 64 and
98).
Meanwhile, an Information dated March 21, 1989 charging Benigno Torzuela
with homicide was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-1896.
On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued an order granting
SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S motion for
exclusion as defendant. The respondent judge held that the complaint did not
state facts necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict since it does not
mention any negligence on the part of Torzuela in shooting Napoleon Dulay
or that the same was done in the performance of his duties. Respondent judge
ruled that mere allegations of the concurring negligence of the defendants
(private respondents herein) without stating the facts showing such negligence
are mere conclusions of law (Rollo, p. 106). Respondent judge also declared
that the complaint was one for damages founded on crimes punishable under
Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those
arising from, quasi-delict. The dispositive portion of the order dated April 13,
1989 states:
WHEREFORE, this Court holds that in view of the material
and ultimate facts alleged in the verified complaint and in
accordance with the applicable law on the matter as well as
precedents laid down by the Supreme Court, the complaint
against the alternative defendants Superguard Security
Corporation and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co.,
Inc., must be and (sic) it is hereby dismissed. (Rollo, p. 110)
The above order was affirmed by the respondent court and petitioners' motion
for reconsideration thereof was denied.
Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and insist that quasi-delicts
are not limited to acts of negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and
voluntary, citing Andamo v. IAC (191 SCRA 195 [1990]). Thus, petitioners
insist that Torzuela' s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-
delict actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.
Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code,
private respondents are primarily liable for their negligence either in the
selection or supervision of their employees. This liability is independent of the
employee's own liability for fault or negligence and is distinct from the
subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The
civil action against the employer may therefore proceed independently of the
criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 Section 3 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners submit that the question of whether Torzuela is an employee of
respondent SUPERGUARD or SAFEGUARD would be better resolved after
trial.
Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also
actionable under Article 33 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, petitioners cite Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
which provides:
Rule 111. . . . .
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently — In
the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action
which has been reserved may be brought by the offended
party, shall proceed independently of the criminal action,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
(Emphasis supplied)
The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has been held to include
consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide. Thus, petitioners maintain
that Torzuela's prior conviction is unnecessary since the civil action can
proceed independently of the criminal action. On the other hand, it is the
private respondents' argument that since the act was not committed with
negligence, the petitioners have no cause of action under Articles 2116 and
2177 of the New Civil Code. The civil action contemplated in Article 2177 is
not applicable to acts committed with deliberate intent, but only applies to
quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Torzuela's act of
shooting Atty. Dulay to death, aside from being purely personal, was done
with deliberate intent and could not have been part of his duties as security
guard. And since Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers only: acts done
within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks, the private respondents
cannot be held liable for damages.
We find for petitioners.
It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide for
the fatal shooting of Napoleon Dulay. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the civil action ,
reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34,
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from
the same act or omission of the accused. (Emphasis
supplied)
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the
prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a
compliance with the requirement of express reservation (Yakult Philippines v.
Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]). This is precisely what the
petitioners opted to do in this case. However, the private respondents opposed
the civil action on the ground that the same is founded on a delict and not on a
quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence. What is in dispute
therefore is the nature of the petitioner's cause of action.
The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting the cause of action (Republic v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA
282 [1988]). The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be
determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his
argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer
for relief. (De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, 112 SCRA 243
[1982]). An examination of the complaint in the present case would show that
the plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are invoking their right to recover damages
against the private respondents for their vicarious responsibility for the injury
caused by Benigno Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay, as
stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for
limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions
resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176
covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are
voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill
(77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:
. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence,"
covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character; whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would
be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of
the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in
Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even
by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of
Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be punishable by law. (Emphasis
supplied)
The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v. Intermediate
Appellate Court (191 SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein the Court held:
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence,"
covers not only acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a civil
action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or
not he is prosecuted or found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is
actually also charged criminally), to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only
to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in
the two cases vary. [citing Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472]
(Emphasis supplied)
Private respondents submit that the word "intentional" in the Andamo case is
inaccurate obiter, and should be read as "voluntary" since intent cannot be
coupled with negligence as defined by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the absence of more substantial reasons, this Court will not disturb the
above doctrine on the coverage of Article 2176.
Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies
only to injuries intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA
(120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that the actions for damages allowed thereunder
are ex-delicto. However, the term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already
been construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 638 [1965); Carandang v. Santiago,
97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the
Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also
consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126
SCRA 293 [1983]). Although in the Marcia case (supra), it was held that no
independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the
result of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela, the
accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless
imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless
imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary under the
Revised Penal Code; and that they are not liable for Torzuela's act which is
beyond the scope of his duties as a security guard. It having been established
that the instant action is not ex-delicto, petitioners may proceed directly
against Torzuela and the private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the
servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both
(Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1988]). The
liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior
showing of the insolvency of such employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v.
Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private
respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are
intentional and voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on the part of the trial
court to dismiss petitioner's complaint simply because it failed to make
allegations of attendant negligence attributable to private respondents.
With respect to the issue of whether the complaint at hand states a sufficient
cause of action, the general rule is that the allegations in a complaint are
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, admitting
the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exist if the following
elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the
part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an
act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages
(Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, 210 SCRA 33 [1992]); Development
Bank of the Philippines v. Pundogar, 218 SCRA 118 [1993])

This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that the complaint sufficiently
alleged an actionable breach on the part of the defendant Torzuela and
respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the
complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the
latter's death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that
either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and
responsible for his acts. This does not operate however, to establish that the
defendants below are liable. Whether or not the shooting was actually reckless
and wanton or attended by negligence and whether it was actually done within
the scope of Torzuela's duties; whether the private respondents
SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the diligence of a
good father of a family; and whether the defendants are actually liable, are
questions which can be better resolved after trial on the merits where each
party can present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses.
In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support
a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to
establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the
outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros
Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish
a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should
not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the
defendants (Rava Dev't. Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing
Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663
[1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the
complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a
claim has been defectively stated, is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur
v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). Since the petitioners clearly
sustained an injury to their rights under the law, it would be more just to allow
them to present evidence of such injury.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby

GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals as well as the Order of the
Regional Trial Court dated April 13, 1989 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 is remanded to the Regional Trial Court
for trial on the merits. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180440 December 5, 2012
DR. GENEVIEVE L. HUANG, Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS, INC., DUSIT THANI PUBLIC CO., LTD.
And FIRST LEPANTO TAISHO INSURANCE
CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For this Court’s resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 87065 dated 9 August 2007, affirming the Decision2 of Branch
56 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City in Civil Case No. 96-
1367 dated 21 February 2006, dismissing for lack of merit herein petitioner
Dr. Genevieve L. Huang’s Complaint for Damages. Assailed as well is the
Court of Appeals’ Resolution3 dated 5 November 2007 denying for lack of
merit petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
This case stemmed from a Complaint for Damages filed on 28 August 1996 by
petitioner Dr. Genevieve L. Huang4against herein respondents Philippine
Hoteliers, Inc. (PHI)5 and Dusit Thani Public Co., Ltd. (DTPCI),6 as owners of
Dusit Thani Hotel Manila (Dusit Hotel);7 and co-respondent First Lepanto
Taisho Insurance Corporation (First Lepanto),8 as insurer of the aforesaid
hotel. The said Complaint was premised on the alleged negligence of
respondents PHI and DTPCI’s staff, in the untimely putting off all the lights
within the hotel’s swimming pool area, as well as the locking of the main
entrance door of the area, prompting petitioner to grope for a way out. While
doing so, a folding wooden counter top fell on her head causing her serious
brain injury. The negligence was allegedly compounded by respondents PHI
and DTPCI’s failure to render prompt and adequate medical assistance.
Petitioner’s version of the antecedents of this case is as follows:
On 11 June 1995, Delia Goldberg (Delia), a registered guest of Dusit Hotel,
invited her friend, petitioner Dr. Genevieve L. Huang, for a swim at the hotel’s
swimming pool facility. They started bathing at around 5:00 p.m. At around
7:00 p.m., the hotel’s swimming pool attendant informed them that the
swimming pool area was about to be closed. The two subsequently proceeded
to the shower room adjacent to the swimming pool to take a shower and dress
up. However, when they came out of the bathroom, the entire swimming pool
area was already pitch black and there was no longer any person around but
the two of them. They carefully walked towards the main door leading to the
hotel but, to their surprise, the door was locked. 9
Petitioner and Delia waited for 10 more minutes near the door hoping
someone would come to their rescue but they waited in vain. Delia became
anxious about their situation so petitioner began to walk around to look for a
house phone. Delia followed petitioner. After some time, petitioner saw a
phone behind the lifeguard’s counter. While slowly walking towards the
phone, a hard and heavy object, which later turned out to be the folding
wooden counter top, fell on petitioner’s head that knocked her down almost
unconscious.10
Delia immediately got hold of the house phone and notified the hotel
telephone operator of the incident. Not long after, the hotel staff arrived at the
main entrance door of the swimming pool area but it took them at least 20 to
30 minutes to get inside. When the door was finally opened, three hotel
chambermaids assisted petitioner by placing an ice pack and applying some
ointment on her head. After petitioner had slightly recovered, she requested to
be assisted to the hotel’s coffee shop to have some rest. Petitioner demanded
the services of the hotel physician.11
Dr. Violeta Dalumpines (Dr. Dalumpines) arrived. She approached petitioner
and introduced herself as the hotel physician. However, instead of
immediately providing the needed medical assistance, Dr. Dalumpines
presented a "Waiver" and demanded that it be signed by petitioner, otherwise,
the hotel management will not render her any assistance. Petitioner refused to
do so.12
After eating her dinner and having rested for a while, petitioner left the hotel’s
coffee shop and went home. Thereupon, petitioner started to feel extraordinary
dizziness accompanied by an uncomfortable feeling in her stomach, which
lasted until the following day. Petitioner was constrained to stay at home, thus,
missing all her important appointments with her patients. She also began
experiencing "on" and "off" severe headaches that caused her three (3)
sleepless nights.13
Petitioner, thus, decided to consult a certain Dr. Perry Noble (Dr. Noble), a
neurologist from Makati Medical Center, who required her to have an X-ray
and a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) tests.14 The MRI Report15 dated 23
August 1995 revealed the following findings:
CONSULTATION REPORT:
MRI examination of the brain shows scattered areas of intraparenchymal
contusions and involving mainly the left middle and posterior temporal and
slightly the right anterior temporal lobe.
Other small areas of contusions with suggestive pertechiae are seen in the left
fronto-parietal, left parieto-occipital and with deep frontal periventricular
subcortical and cortical regions. There is no mass effect nor signs of localized
hemorrhagic extravasation.
The ventricles are not enlarged, quite symmetrical without shifts or
deformities; the peripheral sulci are within normal limits.
The C-P angles, petromastoids, sella, extrasellar and retro orbital areas appear
normal.
The brainstem is unremarkable.
IMPRESSION: Scattered small intraparenchymal contusions mainly involving
the left middle-posterior temporal lobe and also right medial anterior temporal,
both deep frontal subcortical, left parieto-occipital subcortical and cortical
regions. Ischemic etiology not ruled out. No localized intra - or extracerebral
hemorrhage.16
Petitioner claimed that the aforesaid MRI result clearly showed that her head
was bruised. Based also on the same MRI result, Dr. Noble told her that she
has a very serious brain injury. In view thereof, Dr. Noble prescribed the
necessary medicine for her condition.17
Petitioner likewise consulted a certain Dr. Ofelia Adapon, also a neurologist
from Makati Medical Center, who required her to undergo an
Electroencephalogram examination (EEG) to measure the electrostatic in her
brain.18Based on its result,19 Dr. Ofelia Adapon informed her that she has a
serious condition—a permanent one. Dr. Ofelia Adapon similarly prescribed
medicines for her brain injury.20
Petitioner’s condition did not get better. Hence, sometime in September 1995,
she consulted another neuro-surgeon by the name of Dr. Renato Sibayan (Dr.
Sibayan), who required her to have an X-ray test.21 According to petitioner,
Dr. Sibayan’s finding was the same as those of the previous doctors that she
had consulted—she has a serious brain injury.22
By reason of the unfortunate 11 June 1995 incident inside the hotel’s
swimming pool area, petitioner also started to feel losing her memory, which
greatly affected and disrupted the practice of her chosen profession. 23 Thus, on
25 October 1995, petitioner, through counsel, sent a demand letter24 to
respondents PHI and DTPCI seeking payment of an amount not less than
P100,000,000.00 representing loss of earnings on her remaining life span. But,
petitioner’s demand was unheeded.
In November 1995, petitioner went to the United States of America (USA) for
further medical treatment. She consulted a certain Dr. Gerald Steinberg and a
certain Dr. Joel Dokson25 from Mount Sinai Hospital who both found that she
has "post traumatic-post concussion/contusion cephalgias-vascular and
neuralgia."26 She was then prescribed to take some medications for severe pain
and to undergo physical therapy. Her condition did not improve so she
returned to the Philippines.27
Petitioner, once again, consulted Dr. Sibayan, who simply told her to just relax
and to continue taking her medicines. Petitioner also consulted other
neurologists, who all advised her to just continue her medications and to
undergo physical therapy for her neck pain.28
Sometime in 1996, petitioner consulted as well a certain Dr. Victor Lopez (Dr.
Lopez), an ophthalmologist from the Makati Medical Center, because of her
poor vision, which she has experienced for several months. 29 Petitioner’s Eye
Report dated 5 March 199630 issued by Dr. Lopez stated: "IMPRESSION:
Posterior vitreous detachment, right eye of floaters." Dr. Lopez told petitioner
that her detached eye is permanent and very serious. Dr. Lopez then prescribed
an eye drop to petitioner.31
For petitioner’s frustration to dissipate and to regain her former strength and
physical well-being, she consulted another neuro-surgeon from Makati
Medical Center by the name of Dr. Leopoldo P. Pardo, Jr. (Dr. Pardo,
Jr.).32 She disclosed to Dr. Pardo, Jr. that at the age of 18 she suffered a stroke
due to mitral valve disease and that she was given treatments, which also
resulted in thrombocytopenia. In Dr. Pardo, Jr.’s medical evaluation of
petitioner dated 15 May 1996,33 he made the following diagnosis and opinion:
DIAGNOSIS AND OPINION:
This patient sustained a severe head injury in (sic) 11 June 1995 and as a result
of which she developed the following injuries:
1. Cerebral Concussion and Contusion
2. Post-traumatic Epilepsy
3. Post-concussional Syndrome
 4. Minimal Brain Dysfunction
5. Cervical Sprain, chronic recurrent
It is my opinion that the symptoms she complained of in the foregoing history
are all related to and a result of the injury sustained on 11 June 1995.
It is further my opinion that the above diagnosis and complaints do materially
affect her duties and functions as a practicing physician and dermatologist,
and that she will require treatment for an undetermined period of time.
The percentage of disability is not calculated at this time and will require
further evaluation and observation.34
Dr. Pardo, Jr. then advised petitioner to continue her medications. 35
Petitioner likewise consulted a certain Dr. Tenchavez36 for her follow-up
EEG.37 He similarly prescribed medicine for petitioner’s deep brain injury. He
also gave her pain killer for her headache and advised her to undergo physical
therapy. Her symptoms, however, persisted all the more. 38
In 1999, petitioner consulted another neurologist at the Makati Medical Center
by the name of Dr. Martesio Perez (Dr. Perez) because of severe fleeting pains
in her head, arms and legs; difficulty in concentration; and warm sensation of
the legs, which symptoms also occurred after the 11 June 1995 incident. Upon
examination, Dr. Perez observed that petitioner has been experiencing severe
pains and she has a slight difficulty in concentration. He likewise noted that
there was a slight spasm of petitioner’s neck muscle but, otherwise, there was
no objective neurologic finding. The rest of petitioner’s neurologic
examination was essentially normal.39
Dr. Perez’s neurologic evaluation40 of petitioner reflected, among others: (1)
petitioner’s past medical history, which includes, among others, mitral valve
stenosis; (2) an interpretation of petitioner’s EEG results in October 1995 and
in January 1999, i.e., the first EEG showed sharp waves seen bilaterally more
on the left while the second one was normal; and (3) interpretation of
petitioner’s second MRI result, i.e., petitioner has a permanent damage in the
brain, which can happen either after a head injury or after a stroke. Dr. Perez
concluded that petitioner has post-traumatic or post concussion syndrome.41
Respondents, on the other hand, denied all the material allegations of
petitioner and, in turn, countered the latter’s statement of facts, thus:
According to respondents PHI and DTPCI, a sufficient notice had been posted
on the glass door of the hotel leading to the swimming pool area to apprise the
people, especially the hotel guests, that the swimming pool area is open only
from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.42 Though the hotel’s swimming pool area is open
only between the aforestated time, the lights thereon are kept on until 10:00
p.m. for, (1) security reasons; (2) housekeeping personnel to do the cleaning of
the swimming pool surroundings; and (3) people doing their exercise routine
at the Slimmer’s World Gym adjacent to the swimming pool area, which was
then open until 10:00 p.m., to have a good view of the hotel’s swimming pool.
Even granting that the lights in the hotel’s swimming pool area were turned
off, it would not render the area completely dark as the Slimmer’s World Gym
near it was well-illuminated.43
Further, on 11 June 1995, at round 7:00 p.m., the hotel’s swimming pool
attendant advised petitioner and Delia to take their showers as it was already
closing time. Afterwards, at around 7:40 p.m., Pearlie Benedicto-Lipana (Ms.
Pearlie), the hotel staff nurse, who was at the hotel clinic located at the
mezzanine floor, received a call from the hotel telephone operator informing
her that there was a guest requiring medical assistance at the hotel’s
swimming pool area located one floor above the clinic.44
Immediately, Ms. Pearlie got hold of her medical kit and hurriedly went to the
hotel’s swimming pool area. There she saw Delia and petitioner, who told her
that she was hit on the head by a folding wooden counter top. Although
petitioner looked normal as there was no indication of any blood or bruise on
her head, Ms. Pearlie still asked her if she needed any medical attention to
which petitioner replied that she is a doctor, she was fine and she did not need
any medical attention. Petitioner, instead, requested for a hirudoid cream to
which Ms. Pearlie acceded.45
At about 8:00 p.m., after attending to petitioner, Ms. Pearlie went back to the
hotel clinic to inform Dr. Dalumpines of the incident at the hotel’s swimming
pool area. But before she could do that, Dr. Dalumpines had already chanced
upon Delia and petitioner at the hotel’s coffee shop and the latter reported to
Dr. Dalumpines that her head was hit by a folding wooden counter top while
she was inside the hotel’s swimming pool area. When asked by Dr.
Dalumpines how she was, petitioner responded she is a doctor, she was fine
and she was already attended to by the hotel nurse, who went at the hotel’s
swimming pool area right after the accident. Dr. Dalumpines then called Ms.
Pearlie to verify the same, which the latter confirmed. 46
Afterwards, Dr. Dalumpines went back to petitioner and checked the latter’s
condition. Petitioner insisted that she was fine and that the hirudoid cream was
enough. Having been assured that everything was fine, Dr. Dalumpines
requested petitioner to execute a handwritten certification47 regarding the
incident that occurred that night. Dr. Dalumpines then suggested to petitioner
to have an X-ray test. Petitioner replied that it was not necessary. Petitioner
also refused further medical attention.48
On 13 June 1995, petitioner called up Dr. Dalumpines. The call, however, had
nothing to do with the 11 June 1995 incident. Instead, petitioner merely
engaged in small talk with Dr. Dalumpines while having her daily massage.
The two talked about petitioner’s personal matters, i.e., past medical history,
differences with siblings and family over inheritance and difficulty in practice.
Petitioner even disclosed to Dr. Dalumpines that she once fell from a horse;
that she had a stroke; had hysterectomy and is incapable of having children for
her uterus had already been removed; that she had blood disorder, particularly
lack of platelets, that can cause bleeding; and she had an "on" and "off"
headaches. Petitioner oftentimes called Dr. Dalumpines at the hotel clinic to
discuss topics similar to those discussed during their 13 June 1995
conversation.49
Also, during one of their telephone conversations, petitioner requested for a
certification regarding the 11 June 1995 incident inside the hotel’s swimming
pool area. Dr. Dalumpines accordingly issued Certification dated 7 September
1995, which states that:50
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that as per Clinic records, duty nurse Pearlie was called to
attend to an accident at the poolside at 7:45PM on 11 June 1995.
Same records show that there, she saw petitioner who claimed the folding
countertop fell on her head when she lifted it to enter the lifeguard’s counter to
use the phone. She asked for Hirudoid.
The same evening petitioner met Dr. Dalumpines at the Coffee Shop. After
narrating the poolside incident and declining Dr. Dalumpines’ offer of
assistance, she reiterated that the Hirudoid cream was enough and that
petitioner being a doctor herself, knew her condition and she was all right.
This certification is given upon the request of petitioner for whatever purpose
it may serve, 7 September 1995 at Makati City. 51 (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner personally picked up the afore-quoted Certification at the hotel
clinic without any objection as to its contents.52
From 11 June 1995 until 7 September 1995, the hotel clinic never received
any complaint from petitioner regarding the latter’s condition. The hotel itself
neither received any written complaint from petitioner. 53
After trial, the court a quo in its Decision dated 21 February 2006 dismissed
petitioner’s Complaint for lack of merit.
The trial court found petitioner’s testimony self-serving, thus, devoid of
credibility. Petitioner failed to present any evidence to substantiate her
allegation that the lights in the hotel’s swimming pool area were shut off at the
time of the incident. She did not even present her friend, Delia, to corroborate
her testimony. More so, petitioner’s testimony was contradicted by one of the
witnesses presented by the respondents who positively declared that it has
been a normal practice of the hotel management not to put off the lights until
10:00 p.m. to allow the housekeepers to do the cleaning of the swimming pool
surroundings, including the toilets and counters. Also, the lights were kept on
for security reasons and for the people in the nearby gym to have a good view
of the swimming pool while doing their exercise routine. Besides, there was a
remote possibility that the hotel’s swimming pool area was in complete
darkness as the aforesaid gym was then open until 10:00 p.m., and the lights
radiate to the hotel’s swimming pool area. As such, petitioner would not have
met the accident had she only acted with care and caution.54
The trial court further struck down petitioner’s contention that the hotel
management did not extend medical assistance to her in the aftermath of the
accident. Records showed that the hotel management immediately responded
after being notified of the accident. The hotel nurse and the two chambermaids
placed an ice pack on petitioner’s head. They were willing to extend further
emergency assistance but petitioner refused and merely asked for a hirudoid
cream. Petitioner even told them she is a doctor and she was fine. Even the
medical services offered by the hotel physician were turned down by
petitioner. Emphatically, petitioner cannot fault the hotel for the injury she
sustained as she herself did not heed the warning that the swimming pool area
is open only from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. As such, since petitioner’s own
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of her injury, she cannot
recover damages.55
The trial court similarly observed that the records revealed no indication that
the head injury complained of by petitioner was the result of the alleged 11
June 1995 accident. Firstly, petitioner had a past medical history which might
have been the cause of her recurring brain injury. Secondly, the findings of Dr.
Perez did not prove a causal relation between the 11 June 1995 accident and
the brain damage suffered by petitioner. Even Dr. Perez himself testified that
the symptoms being experienced by petitioner might have been due to factors
other than the head trauma she allegedly suffered. It bears stressing that
petitioner had been suffering from different kinds of brain problems since she
was 18 years old, which may have been the cause of the recurring symptoms
of head injury she is experiencing at present. Absent, therefore, of any proof
establishing the causal relation between the injury she allegedly suffered on 11
June 1995 and the head pains she now suffers, her claim must fail. Thirdly,
Dr. Teresita Sanchez’s (Dr. Sanchez) testimony cannot be relied upon since
she testified on the findings and conclusions of persons who were never
presented in court. Ergo, her testimony thereon was hearsay. Fourthly, the
medical reports/evaluations/certifications issued by myriads of doctors whom
petitioner sought for examination or treatment were neither identified nor
testified to by those who issued them. Being deemed as hearsay, they cannot
be given probative value. Even assuming that petitioner suffered head injury
as a consequence of the 11 June 1995 accident, she cannot blame anyone but
herself for staying at the hotel’s swimming pool area beyond its closing hours
and for lifting the folding wooden counter top that eventually hit her head.56
For petitioner’s failure to prove that her serious and permanent injury was the
result of the 11 June 1995 accident, thus, her claim for actual or compensatory
damages, loss of income, moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees, must all fail.57
With regard to respondent First Lepanto’s liability, the trial court ruled that
under the contract of insurance, suffice it to state that absent any cause for any
liability against respondents PHI and DTPCI, respondent First Lepanto cannot
be made liable thereon.
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals with the
following assignment of errors: (1) the trial court erred in finding that the
testimony of petitioner is self-serving and thus void of credibility; (2) the trial
court erred in applying the doctrine of proximate cause in cases of breach of
contract and even assuming arguendo that the doctrine is applicable, petitioner
was able to prove by sufficient evidence the causal connection between her
injuries and respondents PHI and DTPCI’s negligent act; and (3) the trial court
erred in holding that petitioner is not entitled to damages. 58
On 9 August 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the
findings and conclusions of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals ratiocinated in this wise:
At the outset, it is necessary for our purpose to determine whether to decide
this case on the theory that herein respondents PHI and DTPCI are liable for
breach of contract or on the theory of quasi-delict.
xxxx
It cannot be gainsaid that herein petitioner’s use of the hotel’s pool was only
upon the invitation of Delia, the hotel’s registered guest. As such, she cannot
claim contractual relationship between her and the hotel. Since the
circumstances of the present case do not evince a contractual relation between
petitioner and respondents, the rules on quasi-delict , thus, govern.
The pertinent provision of Art. 2176 of the Civil Code which states: "Whoever
by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict."
A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delict or
tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties
not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. Thus, to sustain
a claim liability under quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or
some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by the plaintiff.
Viewed from the foregoing, the question now is whether respondents PHI and
DTPCI and its employees were negligent? We do not think so. Several factors
militate against petitioner’s contention.
One. Petitioner recognized the fact that the pool area’s closing time is
7:00 p.m.. She, herself, admitted during her testimony that she was
well aware of the sign when she and Delia entered the pool area.
Hence, upon knowing, at the outset, of the pool’s closing time, she
took the risk of overstaying when she decided to take shower and
leave the area beyond the closing hour. In fact, it was only upon the
advise of the pool attendants that she thereafter took her shower.
Two. She admitted, through her certification that she lifted the
wooden bar countertop, which then fell onto her head. The admission
in her certificate proves the circumstances surrounding the
occurrence that transpired on the night of 11 June 1995. This is
contrary to her assertion in the complaint and testimony that, while
she was passing through the counter door, she was suddenly knocked
out by a hard and heavy object. In view of the fact that she admitted
having lifted the counter top, it was her own doing, therefore, that
made the counter top fell on to her head.
Three. We cannot likewise subscribe to petitioner’s assertion that the
pool area was totally dark in that she herself admitted that she saw a
telephone at the counter after searching for one. It must be noted that
petitioner and Delia had walked around the pool area with ease since
they were able to proceed to the glass entrance door from shower
room, and back to the counter area where the telephone was located
 without encountering any untoward incident. Otherwise, she could
have easily stumbled over, or slid, or bumped into something while
searching for the telephone. This negates her assertion that the pool
area was completely dark, thereby, totally impairing her vision.
xxxx
The aforementioned circumstances lead us to no other conclusion than that the
proximate and immediate cause of the injury of petitioner was due to her own
negligence.
Moreover, petitioner failed to sufficiently substantiate that the medical
symptoms she is currently experiencing are the direct result of the head injury
she sustained on 11 June 1995 as was aptly discussed in the lower court’s
findings.
xxxx
It bears stressing that in civil cases, the law requires that the party who alleges
a fact and substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of
proving it. Hence, for petitioner to be entitled to damages, she must show that
she had suffered an actionable injury. Regrettably, petitioner failed in this
regard.59 (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit in a
Resolution dated 5 November 2007.
Hence, this Petition raising the following issues:
(1) Whether or not the findings of fact of the trial court and of the
Court of Appeals are conclusive in this case.
(2) Whether or not herein respondents PHI and DTPCI are
responsible by implied contract to exercise due care for the safety and
welfare of the petitioner.
(3) Whether or not the cause of action of the petitioner can be based
on both breach of contract and tort.
(4) Whether or not it is respondents PHI and DTPCI and its
employees who are liable to the petitioner for negligence, applying
the well-established doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and respondeat
superior.
(5) Whether the petitioner’s debilitating and permanent injuries were
a result of the accident she suffered at the hotel on 11 June 1995.
(6) Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the payment of
damages, attorney’s fees, interest, and the costs of suit.
(7) Whether or not the respondent insurance company is liable, even
directly, to the petitioner.
(8) Whether or not petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the Court of Appeals is pro forma. 60
Petitioner argues that the rule that "findings of fact of the lower courts are
conclusive and must be respected on appeal" finds no application herein
because this case falls under the jurisprudentially established exceptions.
Moreover, since the rationale behind the afore-mentioned rule is that "the trial
judge is in a vantage point to appreciate the conduct and behavior of the
witnesses and has the unexcelled opportunity to evaluate their testimony," one
logical exception to the rule that can be deduced therefrom is when the judge
who decided the case is not the same judge who heard and tried the case.
Petitioner further faults the Court of Appeals in ruling that no contractual
relationship existed between her and respondents PHI and DTPCI since her
use of the hotel’s swimming pool facility was only upon the invitation of the
hotel’s registered guest. On the contrary, petitioner maintains that an implied
contract existed between them in view of the fact that the hotel guest status
extends to all those who avail of its services—its patrons and invitees. It
follows then that all those who patronize the hotel and its facilities, including
those who are invited to partake of those facilities, like petitioner, are
generally regarded as guests of the hotel. As such, respondents PHI and
DTPCI are responsible by implied contract for the safety and welfare of
petitioner while the latter was inside their premises by exercising due care,
which they failed to do.
Petitioner even asserts that the existence of a contract between the parties does
not bar any liability for tort since the act that breaks a contract may also be a
tort. Hence, the concept of change of theory of cause of action pointed to by
respondents is irrelevant.
Petitioner similarly avows that the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and
respondeat superior are applicable in this case. She argues that a person who
goes in a hotel without a "bukol" or hematoma and comes out of it with a
"bukol" or hematoma is a clear case of res ipsa loquitur. It was an accident
caused by the fact that the hotel staff was not present to lift the heavy counter
top for petitioner as is normally expected of them because they negligently
locked the main entrance door of the hotel’s swimming pool area. Following
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, respondents PHI and DTPCI’s negligence is
presumed and it is incumbent upon them to prove otherwise but they failed to
do so. Further, respondents PHI and DTPCI failed to observe all the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees, hence, following the doctrine of respondeat superior, they were
liable for the negligent acts of their staff in not verifying if there were still
people inside the swimming pool area before turning off the lights and locking
the door. Had respondents PHI and DTPCI’s employees done so, petitioner
would not have been injured. Since respondents PHI and DTPCI’s negligence
need not be proved, the lower courts erred in shifting the burden to petitioner
and, thereafter, holding the hotel and its employees not negligent for
petitioner’s failure to prove their negligence. Moreover, petitioner alleges that
there was no contributory negligence on her part for she did not do anything
that could have contributed to her injury. And, even if there was, the same
does not bar recovery.
Petitioner equally declares that the evidence on record, including the objective
medical findings, had firmly established that her permanent debilitating
injuries were the direct result of the 11 June 1995 accident inside the hotel’s
swimming pool area. This fact has not been totally disputed by the
respondents. Further, the medical experts who had been consulted by
petitioner were in unison in their diagnoses of her condition. Petitioner was
also able to prove that the falling of the folding wooden counter top on her
head while she was at the hotel’s swimming pool area was the cause of her
head, eye and neck injuries.
Petitioner reiterates her claim for an award of damages, to wit: actual,
including loss of income; moral, exemplary; as well as attorney’s fees, interest
and costs of suit. She states that respondents PHI and DTPCI are liable for
quasi-delict under Articles 19, 2176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code. At the
same time, they are liable under an implied contract for they have a public
duty to give due courtesy, to exercise reasonable care and to provide safety to
hotel guests, patrons and invitees. Respondent First Lepanto, on the other
hand, is directly liable under the express contract of insurance.
Lastly, petitioner contends that her Motion for Reconsideration before the
Court of Appeals was not pro forma for it specifically pointed out the alleged
errors in the Court of Appeals Decision.
The instant Petition is devoid of merit.
Primarily, only errors of law and not of facts are reviewable by this Court in a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 61 This
Court is not a trier of facts and it is beyond its function to re-examine and
weigh anew the respective evidence of the parties.62 Besides, this Court
adheres to the long standing doctrine that the factual findings of the trial court,
especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on the
parties and this Court.63 Nonetheless, this Court has, at times, allowed
exceptions thereto, to wit:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises,
or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond
the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of
both the appellant and the appellee;
(g) When the Court of Appeals’ findings are contrary to those by the
trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or
(k) When the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.64
Upon meticulous perusal of the records, however, this Court finds that none of
these exceptions is obtaining in this case. No such justifiable or compelling
reasons exist for this Court to depart from the general rule. This Court will not
disturb the factual findings of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals and adequately supported by the evidence on record.
Also, this Court will not review the factual findings of the trial court simply
because the judge who heard and tried the case was not the same judge who
penned the decision. This fact alone does not diminish the veracity and
correctness of the factual findings of the trial court. 65 Indeed, "the efficacy of a
decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer only took over
from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial, unless there is showing
of grave abuse of discretion in the factual findings reached by him." 66 In this
case, there was none.
It bears stressing that in this jurisdiction there is a disputable presumption that
the trial court’s decision is rendered by the judge in the regular performance of
his official duties. While the said presumption is only disputable, it is
satisfactory unless contradicted or overcame by other evidence. Encompassed
in this presumption of regularity is the presumption that the trial court judge,
in resolving the case and drafting the decision, reviewed, evaluated, and
weighed all the evidence on record. That the said trial court judge is not the
same judge who heard the case and received the evidence is of little
consequence when the records and transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs)
are complete and available for consideration by the former, 67 just like in the
present case.
Irrefragably, the fact that the judge who penned the trial court’s decision was
not the same judge who heard the case and received the evidence therein does
not render the findings in the said decision erroneous and unreliable. While the
conduct and demeanor of witnesses may sway a trial court judge in deciding a
case, it is not, and should not be, his only consideration. Even more vital for
the trial court judge’s decision are the contents and substance of the witnesses’
testimonies, as borne out by the TSNs, as well as the object and documentary
evidence submitted and made part of the records of the case. 68
This Court examined the records, including the TSNs, and found no reason to
disturb the factual findings of both lower courts. This Court, thus, upholds
their conclusiveness.
In resolving the second and third issues, a determination of the cause of action
on which petitioner’s Complaint for Damages was anchored upon is called for.
Initially, petitioner was suing respondents PHI and DTPCI mainly on account
of their negligence but not on any breach of contract. Surprisingly, when the
case was elevated on appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner had a change
of heart and later claimed that an implied contract existed between her and
respondents PHI and DTPCI and that the latter were liable for breach of their
obligation to keep her safe and out of harm. This allegation was never an issue
before the trial court. It was not the cause of action relied upon by the
petitioner not until the case was before the Court of Appeals. Presently,
petitioner claims that her cause of action can be based both on quasi-delict and
breach of contract.
A perusal of petitioner’s Complaint evidently shows that her cause of action
was based solely on quasi-delict. Telling are the following allegations in
petitioner’s Complaint:
6. THAT, in the evening of 11 June 1995, between the hours from
7:00 to 8:00 o’clock, after herein petitioner and her friend from New
York, Delia, the latter being then a Hotel guest, were taking their
shower after having a dip in the hotel’s swimming pool, without any
notice or warning, the Hotel’s staff put off all the lights within the
pool area including the lights on the hallway and also locked the main
entrance door of the pool area, x x x;
7. THAT, Hotel guest Delia started to panic while petitioner pacified
her by telling her not to worry as they would both find their way out.
Petitioner knowing that within the area there is a house phone, started
to look around while Delia was following her, eventually petitioner
saw a phone behind the counter x x x, that while slowly moving on
towards the phone on a stooping manner due to the darkness
CAUSED BY UNTIMELY AND NEGLIGENTLY PUTTING OFF
WITH THE LIGHTS BY THE HEREIN RESPONDENTS PHI AND
DTPCI’S EMPLOYEE while passing through the open counter door
with its Folding Counter Top also opened, x x x, a hard and heavy
object fell onto the head of the petitioner that knocked her down
almost unconscious which hard and heavy object turned out to be the
Folding Counter Top;
8. THAT, Delia immediately got hold of the house phone and
notified the Hotel Telephone Operator about the incident,
immediately the hotel staffs (sic) arrived but they were stranded
behind the main door of the pool entrance and it too (sic) them more
than twenty (20) minutes to locate the hotel maintenance employee
who holds the key of the said main entrance door;
9. THAT, when the door was opened, two Hotel Chamber Maids
assisted the petitioner to get out of the counter door. Petitioner being
a Physician tried to control her feelings although groggy and
requested for a HURIDOID, a medicine for HEMATOMA, as a huge
lump developed on her head while the two Chamber Maids assisted
petitioner by holding the bag of ice on her head and applying the
medicine on the huge lump;
 10. THAT, petitioner after having recovered slightly from her
nightmare, though still feeling weak, asked to be assisted to the Hotel
Coffee Shop to take a rest but requested for the hotel’s Physician.
Despite her insistent requests, the Dusit Hotel refused to lift a finger
to assists petitioner who was then in distress until a lady approached
and introduced herself as the Hotel’s house Doctor. Instead however
of assisting petitioner by asking her what kind of assistance the Hotel
could render, in a DISCOURTEOUS MANNER presented instead a
paper and demanding petitioner to affix her signature telling her that
the Hotel Management would only assists and answer for all
expenses incurred if petitioner signs the paper presented, but she
refused and petitioner instead wrote a marginal note on the said paper
stating her reason therefore, said paper later on turned out to be a
WAIVER OF RIGHT or QUIT CLAIM;
xxxx
14. THAT, due to the unfortunate incident caused by respondents
PHI and DTPCI’s gross negligence despite medical assistance,
petitioner started to feel losing her memory that greatly affected and
disrupted the practice of her chosen profession x x x.
xxxx
19. THAT, due to respondents PHI and DTPCI’s gross negligence as
being narrated which caused petitioner to suffer sleepless nights,
depression, mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, and
embarrassment with her Diplomate friends in the profession and
industry, her social standing in the community was greatly affected
and hence, respondents PHI and DTPCI must be imposed the
hereunder damages, prayed for x x x and Artile (sic) 2176 and 2199
of the New Civil Code of the Philippines x x x.
xxxx
22. THAT, as to Moral, Exemplary and Actual Damages, as well as
petitioner’s Loss of Income, the amounts are stated in its prayer
hereunder.69
It is clear from petitioner’s allegations that her Complaint for Damages was
predicated on the alleged negligence of respondents PHI and DTPCI’s staff in
the untimely putting off of all the lights within the hotel’s swimming pool
area, as well as the locking of its main door, prompting her to look for a way
out leading to the fall of the folding wooden counter top on her head causing
her serious brain injury. The said negligence was allegedly compounded by
respondents PHI and DTPCI’s failure to render prompt and adequate medical
assistance. These allegations in petitioner’s Complaint constitute a cause of
action for quasi-delict, which under the New Civil Code is defined as an act,
or omission which causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence.70
It is evident from petitioner’s Complaint and from her open court testimony
that the reliance was on the alleged tortious acts committed against her by
respondents PHI and DTPCI, through their management and staff. It is now
too late in the day to raise the said argument for the first time before this
Court.71
Petitioner’s belated reliance on breach of contract as her cause of action
cannot be sanctioned by this Court. Well-settled is the rule that a party is not
allowed to change the theory of the case or the cause of action on appeal.
Matters, theories or arguments not submitted before the trial court cannot be
considered for the first time on appeal or certiorari. 72 When a party adopts a
certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory
on appeal for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other
party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and
due process.73 Hence, a party is bound by the theory he adopts and by the
cause of action he stands on and cannot be permitted after having lost thereon
to repudiate his theory and cause of action and adopt another and seek to re-
litigate the matter anew either in the same forum or on appeal. 74
In that regard, this Court finds it significant to take note of the following
differences between quasi-delict (culpa aquilina) and breach of contract (culpa
contractual). In quasi-delict, negligence is direct, substantive and independent,
while in breach of contract, negligence is merely incidental to the performance
of the contractual obligation; there is a pre-existing contract or obligation.75 In
quasi-delict, the defense of "good father of a family" is a complete and proper
defense insofar as parents, guardians and employers are concerned, while in
breach of contract, such is not a complete and proper defense in the selection
and supervision of employees.76 In quasi- delict , there is no presumption of
negligence and it is incumbent upon the injured party to prove the negligence
of the defendant, otherwise, the former’s complaint will be dismissed, while in
breach of contract, negligence is presumed so long as it can be proved that
there was breach of the contract and the burden is on the defendant to prove
that there was no negligence in the carrying out of the terms of the contract;
the rule of respondeat superior is followed.77
Viewed from the foregoing, petitioner’s change of theory or cause of action
from quasi-delict to breach of contract only on appeal would necessarily cause
injustice to respondents PHI and DTPCI. First, the latter will have no more
opportunity to present evidence to contradict petitioner’s new argument.
Second, the burden of proof will be shifted from petitioner to respondents PHI
and DTPCI. Petitioner’s change of theory from quasi-delict to breach
ofcontract must be repudiated.
As petitioner’s cause of action is based on quasi-delict, it is incumbent upon
her to prove the presence of the following requisites before respondents PHI
and DTPCI can be held liable, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b)
fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he
must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the
plaintiff.78 Further, since petitioner’s case is for quasi-delict , the negligence or
fault should be clearly established as it is the basis of her action. 79 The burden
of proof is upon petitioner. Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides
that "burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in
issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence
required by law." It is then up for the plaintiff to establish his cause of action
or the defendant to establish his defense. Therefore, if the plaintiff alleged in
his complaint that he was damaged because of the negligent acts of the
defendant, he has the burden of proving such negligence. It is even presumed
that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. The quantum of proof
required is preponderance of evidence.80
In this case, as found by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
petitioner utterly failed to prove the alleged negligence of respondents PHI
and DTPCI. Other than petitioner’s self-serving testimony that all the lights in
the hotel’s swimming pool area were shut off and the door was locked, which
allegedly prompted her to find a way out and in doing so a folding wooden
counter top fell on her head causing her injury, no other evidence was
presented to substantiate the same. Even her own companion during the night
of the accident inside the hotel’s swimming pool area was never presented to
corroborate her allegations. Moreover, petitioner’s aforesaid allegations were
successfully rebutted by respondents PHI and DTPCI. Here, we quote with
conformity the observation of the trial court, thus:
x x x Besides not being backed up by other supporting evidence, said
statement is being contradicted by the testimony of Engineer Dante L.
Costas,81 who positively declared that it has been a normal practice of the
Hotel management not to put off the lights until 10:00P.M. in order to allow
the housekeepers to do the cleaning of the pool’s surrounding, the toilets and
the counters. It was also confirmed that the lights were kept on for security
reasons and so that the people exercising in the nearby gym may be able to
have a good view of the swimming pool. This Court also takes note that the
nearby gymnasium was normally open until 10:00 P.M. so that there was a
remote possibility the pool area was in complete darkness as was alleged by
herein petitioner, considering that the illumination which reflected from the
gym. Ergo, considering that the area were sufficient (sic) illuminated when the
alleged incident occurred, there could have been no reason for the petitioner to
have met said accident, much less to have been injured as a consequence
thereof, if she only acted with care and caution, which every ordinary person
is expected to do.82
More telling is the ratiocination of the Court of Appeals, to wit:
Viewed from the foregoing, the question now is whether respondents PHI and
DTPCI and its employees were negligent? We do not think so. Several factors
militate against petitioner’s contention.
One. Petitioner recognized the fact that the pool area’s closing time is 7:00
p.m.. She, herself, admitted during her testimony that she was well aware of
the sign when she and Delia entered the pool area. Hence, upon knowing, at
the outset, of the pool’s closing time, she took the risk of overstaying when
she decided to take shower and leave the area beyond the closing hour. In fact,
it was only upon the advise of the pool attendants that she thereafter took her
shower.
Two. She admitted, through her certification, that she lifted the wooden bar
countertop, which then fell on to her head. The admission in her certificate
proves the circumstances surrounding the occurrence that transpired on the
night of 11 June 1995. This is contrary to her assertion in the complaint and
testimony that, while she was passing through the counter door, she was
suddenly knocked out by a hard and heavy object. In view of the fact that she
admitted having lifted the countertop, it was her own doing, therefore, that
made the counter top fell on to her head.
Three. We cannot likewise subscribe to petitioner’s assertion that the pool area
was totally dark in that she herself admitted that she saw a telephone at the
counter after searching for one. It must be noted that petitioner and Delia had
walked around the pool area with ease since they were able to proceed to the
glass entrance door from the shower room, and back to the counter area where
the telephone was located without encountering any untoward incident.
Otherwise, she could have easily stumbled over, or slid, or bumped into
something while searching for the telephone. This negates her assertion that
the pool area was completely dark, thereby, totally impairing her vision.
xxxx
The aforementioned circumstances lead us to no other conclusion than that the
proximate and immediate cause of the injury of petitioner was due to her own
negligence.83 (Emphasis supplied).
Even petitioner’s assertion of negligence on the part of respondents PHI and
DTPCI in not rendering medical assistance to her is preposterous. Her own
Complaint affirmed that respondents PHI and DTPCI afforded medical
assistance to her after she met the unfortunate accident inside the hotel’s
swimming pool facility. Below is the portion of petitioner’s Complaint that
would contradict her very own statement, thus:
14. THAT, due to the unfortunate incident caused by respondents PHI and
DTPCI’s gross negligence despite medical assistance, petitioner started to feel
losing her memory that greatly affected and disrupted the practice of her
chosen profession. x x x.84 (Emphasis supplied).
Also, as observed by the trial court, respondents PHI and DTPCI, indeed,
extended medical assistance to petitioner but it was petitioner who refused the
same. The trial court stated, thus:
Further, herein petitioner’s asseverations that the Hotel Management did not
extend medical assistance to her in the aftermath of the alleged accident is not
true. Again, this statement was not supported by any evidence other that the
sole and self-serving testimony of petitioner. Thus, this Court cannot take
petitioner’s statement as a gospel truth. It bears stressing that the Hotel
Management immediately responded after it received notice of the incident.
As a matter of fact, Ms. Pearlie, the Hotel nurse, with two chambermaids
holding an ice bag placed on petitioner’s head came to the petitioner to extend
emergency assistance when she was notified of the incident, but petitioner
merely asked for Hirudoid, saying she was fine, and that she was a doctor and
know how to take care of herself. Also, the Hotel, through its in-house
physician, Dr. Dalumpines offered its medical services to petitioner when they
met at the Hotel’s coffee shop, but again petitioner declined the offer.
Moreover, the Hotel as a show of concern for the petitioner’s welfare,
shouldered the expenses for the MRI services performed on petitioner at the
Makati Medical Center. Emphatically, petitioner herself cannot fault the Hotel
for the injury she allegedly suffered because she herself did not heed the
warning at the pool to the effect that it was only open from 7:00 to 7:00 P.M.
Thus, when the petitioner’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, shecannot recover damages x x x. 85
With the foregoing, the following were clearly established, to wit: (1)
petitioner stayed in the hotel’s swimming pool facility beyond its closing
hours; (2) she lifted the folding wooden counter top that eventually hit her
head; and (3) respondents PHI and DTPCI extended medical assistance to her.
As such, no negligence can be attributed either to respondents PHI and DTPCI
or to their staff and/or management. Since the question of negligence is one of
fact, this Court is bound by the said factual findings made by the lower courts.
It has been repeatedly held that the trial court's factual findings, when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive and binding upon this Court, if they
are not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of
significance and influence. Petitioner has not presented sufficient ground to
warrant a deviation from this rule.86
With regard to petitioner’s contention that the principles of res ipsa loquitur
and respondeat superior are applicable in this case, this Court holds otherwise.
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself." It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an
inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiff’s prima facie case.
The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption. The facts of the
occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish
circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is
lacking.87 Simply stated, this doctrine finds no application if there is direct
proof of absence or presence of negligence. If there is sufficient proof showing
the conditions and circumstances under which the injury occurred, then the
creative reason for the said doctrine disappears.88
Further, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where, (1) the accident was of
such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened
except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused
by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of
the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident
must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of
the person injured.89
In the case at bench, even granting that respondents PHI and DTPCI’s staff
negligently turned off the lights and locked the door, the folding wooden
counter top would still not fall on petitioner’s head had she not lifted the same.
Although the folding wooden counter top is within the exclusive management
or control of respondents PHI and DTPCI, the falling of the same and hitting
the head of petitioner was not due to the negligence of the former. As found
by both lower courts, the folding wooden counter top did not fall on
petitioner’s head without any human intervention. Records showed that
petitioner lifted the said folding wooden counter top that eventually fell and
hit her head. The same was evidenced by the, (1) 11 June 1995 handwritten
certification of petitioner herself; (2) her Letter dated 30 August 1995
addressed to Mr. Yoshikazu Masuda (Mr. Masuda), General Manager of Dusit
Hotel; and, (3) Certification dated 7 September 1995 issued to her by Dr.
Dalumpines upon her request, which contents she never questioned.
Here, we, respectively, quote the 11 June 1995 handwritten certification of
petitioner; her letter to Mr. Masuda dated 30 August 1995; and Dr.
Dalumpines’ Certification dated 7 September 1995, to wit:
Petitioner’s 11 June 1995 Handwritten Certification:
I was requested by Dr. Dalumpines to write that I was assured of assistance
should it be necessary with regard an accident at the pool. x x x The phone
was in an enclosed area on a chair – I lifted the wooden bar counter top which
then fell on my head producing a large hematoma x x x.90
Petitioner’s Letter addressed to Mr. Masuda dated 30 August 1995:
Dear Mr. Masuda,
xxxx
x x x We searched and saw a phone on a chair behind a towel counter.
However, in order to get behind the counter I had to lift a hinged massive
wooden section of the counter which subsequently fell and knocked me on my
head x x x.91
Dr. Dalumpines’ Certification dated 7 September 1995:
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that as per Clinic records, duty nurse Pearlie was called to
attend to an accident at the poolside at 7:45PM on 11 June 1995.
Same records show that there, she saw petitioner who claimed the folding
countertop fell on her head when she lifted it to enter the lifeguard’s counter to
use the phone. She asked for Hirudoid.
The same evening petitioner met Dr. Dalumpnes at the Coffee Shop. After
narrating the poolside incident and declining Dr. Dalumpines’ offer of
assistance, she reiterated that the Hirudoid cream was enough and that
petitioner]being a doctor herself, knew her condition and she was all right.
This certification is given upon the request of petitioner for whatever purpose
it may serve, 7 September 1995 at Makati City. 92 (Emphasis supplied).
This Court is not unaware that in petitioner’s Complaint and in her open court
testimony, her assertion was, "while she was passing through the counter door,
she was suddenly knocked out by a hard and heavy object, which turned out to
be the folding wooden counter top." However, in her open court testimony,
particularly during cross-examination, petitioner confirmed that she made such
statement that "she lifted the hinge massive wooden section of the counter
near the swimming pool."93 In view thereof, this Court cannot acquiesce
petitioner’s theory that her case is one of res ipsa loquitur as it was sufficiently
established how petitioner obtained that "bukol" or "hematoma."
The doctrine of respondeat superior finds no application in the absence of any
showing that the employees of respondents PHI and DTPCI were negligent.
Since in this case, the trial court and the appellate court found no negligence
on the part of the employees of respondents PHI and DTPCI, thus, the latter
cannot also be held liable for negligence and be made to pay the millions of
pesos damages prayed for by petitioner.
The issue on whether petitioner’s debilitating and permanent injuries were the
result of the accident she suffered at the hotel’s swimming pool area on 11
June 1995 is another question of fact, which is beyond the function of this
Court to resolve. More so, this issue has already been properly passed upon by
the trial court and the Court of Appeals. To repeat, this Court is bound by the
factual findings of the lower courts and there is no cogent reason to depart
from the said rule.
The following observations of the trial court are controlling on this matter:
Firstly, petitioner had a past medical history which might have been the cause
of her recurring brain injury.
Secondly, the findings of Dr. Perez did not prove a causal relation between the
11 June 1995 accident and the brain damage suffered by petitioner. Dr. Perez
himself testified that the symptoms being experienced by petitioner might
have been due to factors other than the head trauma she allegedly suffered.
Emphasis must be given to the fact that petitioner had been suffering from
different kinds of brain problems since she was 18 years old, which may have
been the cause of the recurring symptoms of head injury she is experiencing at
present.
Thirdly, Dr. Sanchez’s testimony cannot be relied upon since she testified on
the findings and conclusions of persons who were never presented in court.
Ergo, her testimony thereon was hearsay. A witness can testify only with
regard to facts of which they have personal knowledge. Testimonial or
documentary evidence is hearsay if it is based, not on the personal knowledge
of the witness, but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness
stand. Consequently, hearsay evidence -- whether objected to or not -- has no
probative value.94
Fourthly, the medical reports/evaluations/certifications issued by myriads of
doctors whom petitioner sought for examination or treatment were neither
identified nor testified to by those who issued them. Being deemed as hearsay,
they cannot be given probative value.1âwphi1
The aforesaid medical reports/evaluations/certifications of different doctors in
favor of petitioner cannot be given probative value and their contents cannot
be deemed to constitute proof of the facts stated therein. It must be stressed
that a document or writing which is admitted not as independent evidence but
merely as part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the
facts related therein.95 In the same vein, the medical certificate which was
identified and interpreted in court by another doctor was not accorded
probative value because the doctor who prepared it was not presented for its
identification. Similarly, in this case, since the doctors who examined
petitioner were not presented to testify on their findings, the medical
certificates issued on their behalf and identified by another doctor cannot be
admitted as evidence. Since a medical certificate involves an opinion of one
who must first be established as an expert witness, it cannot be given weight
or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his
qualifications.96 Thus, an unverified and unidentified private document cannot
be accorded probative value. It is precluded because the party against whom it
is presented is deprived of the right and opportunity to cross-examine the
person to whom the statements or writings are attributed. Its executor or
author should be presented as a witness to provide the other party to the
litigation the opportunity to question its contents. Being mere hearsay
evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its contents suspect
and of no probative value.97

All told, in the absence of negligence on the part of respondents PHI and
DTPCI, as well as their management and staff, they cannot be made Iiable to
pay for the millions of damages prayed for by the petitioner. Since
respondents PHI and DTPCI arc not liable, it necessarily follows that
respondent First Lepanto cannot also be made liable under the contract or
Insurance.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision and Resolution or the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87065 dated 9 August 2007 and 5
November 2007, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 122039. May 31, 2000] who was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another case (Civil
Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in
VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly
JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents. liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney. Rtcspped

D E C I S I ON On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was reversed
on the ground that Sungas cause of action was based on a contract of carriage,
not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence
MENDOZA, J.:
required under the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the third-party
complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
Appeals, dated March 31, 1991, reversing the contrary decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete City, and awarding damages
instead to private respondent Eliza Jujeurche Sunga as plaintiff in an action for WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one is entered
breach of contract of carriage.
ordering defendant-appellee Vicente Calalas to pay plaintiff-
appellant:
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;
At 10 oclock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza
Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by
petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24
passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden (3) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. Sclaw
(4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to
let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave (5) to pay the costs.
way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven
by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear SO ORDERED.
portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture
of the "distal third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490
skin." Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting, and case that the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident negates
wedging were done under sedation. Her confinement in the hospital lasted
his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier
from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr. Danilo V.
an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He contends that the bumping of the
Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a
jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito. Petitioner further
period of three months and would have to ambulate in crutches during said
assails the award of moral damages to Sunga on the ground that it is not
period. supported by evidence. Sdaadsc

On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas,

The petition has no merit.
alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to
exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the
other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490
the Isuzu truck. Korte finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the
fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res
judicata does not apply. Missdaa
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and
absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same.
The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena
were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioners jeepney. On
the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his
contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa
aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the
tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised
upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly
established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract,
the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract
and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to
transport his passenger safely to his destination.[2] In case of death or injuries
to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove
that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755
of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the
burden of proof. Slxmis
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No.
3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioners
jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause
of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the
truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for
quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a
device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between
him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself.
But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is
the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is
merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are
concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the
diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers
as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to
passengers. It provides: Slxsc
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their
business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos.
5,6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of
the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with due regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and
1755.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of
negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he
had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. Scslx
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and
foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with due regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art. 1755? We do not
think so. Several factors militate against petitioners contention. Slx
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked,
its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of
the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is
a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code, which provides:
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. - No person shall drive his
motor vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or impede the
passage of any vehicle, nor, while discharging or taking on
passengers or loading or unloading freight, obstruct the free
passage of other vehicles on the highway.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioners driver took in more passengers than
the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of the same
law. It provides: Mesm
Exceeding registered capacity. - No person operating any
motor vehicle shall allow more passengers or more freight
or cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril
greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not
only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence
imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence
shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers. Calrky
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioners contention that Sungas
taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is
akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our
seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a
greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of
petitioners contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly
parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be
foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. [3] This requires that the
following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent
of the debtors will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event
is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the
creditor.[4] Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney
with its body protruding two meters into the highway. Kycalr
Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging that it is
excessive and without basis in law. We find this contention well taken.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages
predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated
under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code.[5] As an exception, such damages are
recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a
passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil
Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as
provided in Art. 2220.[6]
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there
was no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith
in the performance of the contract of carriage. Sungas contention that
petitioners admission in open court that the driver of the jeepney failed to
assist her in going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of
bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the
hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight of
his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied recognition by Verena that
he was the one at fault for the accident. Exsm

In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated: Kyle WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1995,
and its resolution, dated September 11, 1995, are AFFIRMED, with the
Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-year MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is DELETED.
college student in that school year 1989-1990 at the Silliman
University, majoring in Physical Education. Because of the SO ORDERED.
injury, she was not able to enroll in the second semester of
that school year. She testified that she had no more intention
of continuing with her schooling, because she could not
walk and decided not to pursue her degree, major in
Physical Education "because of my leg which has a defect
already."

Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while she was

under confinement, she cried in pain because of her injured
left foot. As a result of her injury, the Orthopedic Surgeon
also certified that she has "residual bowing of the fracture
side." She likewise decided not to further pursue Physical
Education as her major subject, because "my left leg x x x
has a defect already."

Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the

inevitable bedfellows of the injuries that she suffered. Under
Article 2219 of the Civil Code, she is entitled to recover
moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00, which is fair, just
and reasonable.
G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
AIR FRANCE, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner.
Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent
Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first
class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these various
amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the
complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on
Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the
appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs against petitioner.
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the
evidence of record", are:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino
pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized
agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class"
round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to
Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the
Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first
class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness
Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager
alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his
"first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told
defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body;
a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento,
"many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class;
when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion
with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr.
Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white
man" (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff
reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.3
1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the
findings" 4 of respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent
court failed to make complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid
before it. We are asked to consider facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to
overturn the appellate court's decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be
rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based". 5 This is echoed in the
statutory demand that a judgment determining the merits of the case shall state
"clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based"; 6 and that
"Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of
fact on all issues properly raised before it". 7
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct
attack. 8 The law, however, solely insists that a decision state the "essential
ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of justice
is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece of
evidence 10 presented by one party and the other upon the issues raised.
Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation "to specify in the sentence the
facts" which a party "considered as proved". 11 This is but a part of the mental
process from which the Court draws the essential ultimate facts. A decision is
not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may
result. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary
facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold
therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the
defense". Because as this Court well observed, "There is no law that so
requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere failure to specify (in the decision) the
contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not
sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of
law and the Constitution". It is in this setting that in Manigque, it was held that
the mere fact that the findings "were based entirely on the evidence for the
prosecution without taking into consideration or even mentioning the
appellant's side in the controversy as shown by his own testimony", would not
vitiate the judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the decision the testimony
of each witness for, or each item of evidence presented by, the defeated party,
it does not mean that the court has overlooked such testimony or such item of
evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal presumptions are that official duty has been
regularly performed, and that all the matters within an issue in a case were laid
before the court and passed upon by it. 15
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe
defined as "the written statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court ...
and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered thereon". 16They
consist of the court's "conclusions" with respect to the determinative facts in
issue". 17 A question of law, upon the other hand, has been declared as "one
which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties." 18
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari
from a judgment of the Court of Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to
the facts. It is not appropriately the business of this Court to alter the facts or
to review the questions of fact. 20
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals support its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received
from petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not
represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said
respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on
any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly,
the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first
class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in
its brief before the Court of Appeals under its third assignment of error, which
reads: "The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff had confirmed reservations
for, and a right to, first class seats on the "definite" segments of his journey,
particularly that from Saigon to Beirut". 21
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a
first-class ticket was no guarantee that the passenger to whom the
same had been issued, would be accommodated in the first-class
compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to make
arrangements upon arrival at every station for the necessary first-
class reservation. We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We
cannot understand how a reputable firm like defendant airplane
company could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never
meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in
payment of first-class tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at
the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary
course of business that the company should know whether or riot the
tickets it issues are to be honored or not.22
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of
petitioner's contention, thus:
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, there
can be no question. Apart from his testimony, see plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-
1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", and defendant's own witness, Rafael
Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony and testified as follows:
Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what
does this OK mean?
A. That the space is confirmed.
Q. Confirmed for first class?
A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)
xxx xxx xxx
Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and
Rafael Altonaga that although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class"
airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation in Hongkong. The court
cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot
prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l",
"C" and "C-1" belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the
plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation
whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga
testified that the reservation for a "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff
was confirmed. The court cannot believe that after such confirmation
defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the "first class" ticket
issued to him by defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong. 23
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a
few pesos in the amount refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the
Court of First Instance was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in all other
respects. We hold the view that such a judgment of affirmance has merged the
judgment of the lower court. 24Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by
the Court of Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of First Instance was
free from prejudicial error and "all questions raised by the assignments of
error and all questions that might have been raised are to be regarded as finally
adjudicated against the appellant". So also, the judgment affirmed "must be
regarded as free from all error". 25 We reached this policy construction
because nothing in the decision of the Court of Appeals on this point would
suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at war with those of the trial
court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a ground or
grounds different from those which were made the basis of the conclusions of
the trial court. 26
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first
class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is
therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of
an airline. What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy
matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations
in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if
the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a
written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be
notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between
passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is
the case here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to
defeat the covenants in the ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there
are facts upon which the Court of Appeals predicated the finding that
respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was entitled to a first class
seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the
flight. 27 We perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of
petitioner's statement of its position", as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do we
subscribe to petitioner's accusation that respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously
took a first class seat to provoke an issue". 29And this because, as petitioner
states, Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his office in Bangkok "to
confirm my seat and because from Saigon I was told again to see the
Manager". 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at
Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had a better right to the seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's
trenchant claim is that Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract;
that to authorize an award for moral damages there must be an averment of
fraud or bad faith;31 and that the decision of the Court of Appeals fails to make
a finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this
issue are:
3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the
Philippine Air Lines for a valuable consideration, the latter acting as
general agents for and in behalf of the defendant, under which said
contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed to furnish
plaintiff, First Class passage on defendant's plane during the entire
duration of plaintiff's tour of Europe with Hongkong as starting point
up to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... .
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon
and from Saigon to Bangkok, defendant furnished to the plaintiff
First Class accommodation but only after protestations, arguments
and/or insistence were made by the plaintiff with defendant's
employees.
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but
instead furnished plaintiff only Tourist Class accommodations from
Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, ... the plaintiff has
been compelled by defendant's employees to leave the First Class
accommodation berths at Bangkok after he was already seated.
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the
inconvenience and embarrassments brought by defendant's breach of
contract was forced to take a Pan American World Airways plane on
his return trip from Madrid to Manila.32
xxx xxx xxx
2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class
accommodations aforesaid, plaintiff suffered inconveniences, embarrassments,
and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like injury, resulting in moral
damages in the amount of P30,000.00. 33
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a
contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the
Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was breached when
petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok;
and Third, that there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled
Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was already,
seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered
inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in
moral damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad
faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn
from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. 34 The contract was averred
to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put
on wrongful expulsion.
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial,
respondent's counsel placed petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso intended
to prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok, Carrascoso was ousted by
petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a white man; 35 and (b) evidence of
bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on
the part of the petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether
or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for
moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the
evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even
required. 36 On the question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared:
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class
compartment of the plane belonging to the defendant Air France
while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist class not only
without his consent but against his will, has been sufficiently
established by plaintiff in his testimony before the court, corroborated
by the corresponding entry made by the purser of the plane in his
notebook which notation reads as follows:
"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class
against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene",
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was
a co-passenger. The captain of the plane who was asked by the
manager of defendant company at Bangkok to intervene even refused
to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever
contradicted or denied this evidence for the plaintiff. It could have
been easy for defendant to present its manager at Bangkok to testify
at the trial of the case, or yet to secure his disposition; but defendant
did neither. 37
The Court of appeals further stated —
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was
made by the white man. Hence, if the employees of the defendant at
Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him when all the seats had already
been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been picked out as the
one to suffer the consequences and to be subjected to the humiliation
and indignity of being ejected from his seat in the presence of others.
Instead of explaining to the white man the improvidence committed
by defendant's employees, the manager adopted the more drastic step
of ousting the plaintiff who was then safely ensconsced in his rightful
seat. We are strengthened in our belief that this probably was what
happened there, by the testimony of defendant's witness Rafael
Altonaga who, when asked to explain the meaning of the letters
"O.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said "that the space is
confirmed for first class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another witness
for defendant, who was the chief of the Reservation Office of
defendant, testified as follows:
"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know
what reservation the passenger has arranged with you?
A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation."
(t.s.n., p. 247, June 19, 1959)
In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has
said on this point:
Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento,
"white man" have a "better right" to the seat occupied by
Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent. The defendant airline
did not prove "any better", nay, any right on the part of the
"white man" to the "First class" seat that the plaintiff was
occupying and for which he paid and was issued a
corresponding "first class" ticket.
If there was a justified reason for the action of the
defendant's Manager in Bangkok, the defendant could have
easily proven it by having taken the testimony of the said
Manager by deposition, but defendant did not do so; the
presumption is that evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules of Court]; and,
under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to find, as
it does find, that the Manager of the defendant airline in
Bangkok not merely asked but threatened the plaintiff to
throw him out of the plane if he did not give up his "first
class" seat because the said Manager wanted to
accommodate, using the words of the witness Ernesto G.
Cuento, the "white man".38
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted
portion first transcribed did not use the term "bad faith". But can it be
doubted that the recital of facts therein points to bad faith? The
manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a
first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly
ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having
to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another
passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly,
this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning
 different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith"
contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior
purpose." 39
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express
finding of bad faith in the judgment of the Court of First Instance,
thus:
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract
of transportation with plaintiff in bad faith, with the
aggravating circumstances that defendant's Manager in
Bangkok went to the extent of threatening the plaintiff in the
presence of many passengers to have him thrown out of the
airplane to give the "first class" seat that he was occupying
to, again using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento,
a "white man" whom he (defendant's Manager) wished to
accommodate, and the defendant has not proven that this
"white man" had any "better right" to occupy the "first class"
seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for
which the corresponding "first class" ticket was issued by
the defendant to him.40
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need
not be essayed. It is well settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of
petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the
Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held
that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable. 42
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from
any other contractual relation. 43 And this, because of the relation which an
air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling
public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The
contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public
duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give
ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be
treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that
any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger
gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. 44
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it
was a breach of contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the
presence of third persons to falsely notify her that the check was worthless and
demand payment under threat of ejection, though the language used was not
insulting and she was not ejected." 46 And this, because, although the relation
of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless
"the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". 47 And in another case,
"Where a passenger on a railroad train, when the conductor came to collect his
fare tendered him the cash fare to a point where the train was scheduled not to
stop, and told him that as soon as the train reached such point he would pay
the cash fare from that point to destination, there was nothing in the conduct of
the passenger which justified the conductor in using insulting language to him,
as by calling him a lunatic," 48 and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there
held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said passenger.1awphîl.nèt
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The
stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful
expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a
case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus —
Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and
purser?
A When we left already — that was already in the trip — I could not
help it. So one of the flight attendants approached me and requested
from me my ticket and I said, What for? and she said, "We will note
that you transferred to the tourist class". I said, "Nothing of that kind.
That is tantamount to accepting my transfer." And I also said, "You
are not going to note anything there because I am protesting to this
transfer".
Q Was she able to note it?
A No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q About that purser?
 A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and
you don't have enough leg room, I stood up and I went to the pantry
that was next to me and the purser was there. He told me, "I have
recorded the incident in my notebook." He read it and translated it to
me — because it was recorded in French — "First class passenger
was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the
captain refused to intervene."
Mr. VALTE —
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness
because the best evidence would be the notes. Your Honor.
COURT —
I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser
made an entry in his notebook reading "First class passenger was forced to go
to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene" is
predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above] which is
incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but
the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the
proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. 49a
The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The manner of
ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal
precept. And this, in addition to moral damages. 54
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary
damages justifies a similar judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be
said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that attorneys'
fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break faith with the tradition that
discretion well exercised — as it was here — should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by
way of exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The task of
fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. 56 The Court of Appeals
did not interfere with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we
give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and circumstances point to the
reasonableness thereof.57
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer
from reversible error. We accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against
petitioner. So ordered.

Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue
happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued
to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this
environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of
the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the
declarant". 51 The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook
was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its
trustworthiness has been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the
hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.

At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an
employee of petitioner. It would have been an easy matter for petitioner to
have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no such
entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.

We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible

in evidence.

8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court
ample power to grant exemplary damages — in contracts and quasi- contracts.
G.R. No. L-44748 August 29, 1986
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILS., INC.
(RCPI). petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LORETO DIONELA, respondents.
O. Pythogoras Oliver for respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Before Us, is a Petition for Review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, modifying the decision of the trial court in a civil case for recovery
of damages against petitioner corporation by reducing the award to private
respondent Loreto Dionela of moral damages from P40,000 to Pl5,000, and
attorney's fees from P3,000 to P2,000.
The basis of the complaint against the defendant corporation is a telegram sent
through its Manila Office to the offended party, Loreto Dionela, reading as
follows:
176 AS JR 1215PM 9 PAID MANDALUYONG JUL 22-66 LORETO
DIONELA CABANGAN LEGASPI CITY
WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK FER
LORETO DIONELA-CABANGAN-WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK-
PER
115 PM
SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN-WALA-
KANG PADALA DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO
Plaintiff-respondent Loreto Dionela alleges that the defamatory words on the
telegram sent to him not only wounded his feelings but also caused him undue
embarrassment and affected adversely his business as well because other
people have come to know of said defamatory words. Defendant corporation
as a defense, alleges that the additional words in Tagalog was a private joke
between the sending and receiving operators and that they were not addressed
to or intended for plaintiff and therefore did not form part of the telegram and
that the Tagalog words are not defamatory. The telegram sent through its
facilities was received in its station at Legaspi City. Nobody other than the
operator manned the teletype machine which automatically receives telegrams
being transmitted. The said telegram was detached from the machine and
placed inside a sealed envelope and delivered to plaintiff, obviously as is. The
additional words in Tagalog were never noticed and were included in the
telegram when delivered.
The trial court in finding for the plaintiff ruled as follows:
There is no question that the additional words in Tagalog are libelous.
They clearly impute a vice or defect of the plaintiff. Whether or not they
were intended for the plaintiff, the effect on the plaintiff is the same. Any
person reading the additional words in Tagalog will naturally think that
they refer to the addressee, the plaintiff. There is no indication from the
face of the telegram that the additional words in Tagalog were sent as a
private joke between the operators of the defendant.
The defendant is sued directly not as an employer. The business of the
defendant is to transmit telegrams. It will open the door to frauds and allow
the defendant to act with impunity if it can escape liability by the simple
expedient of showing that its employees acted beyond the scope of their
assigned tasks.
The liability of the defendant is predicated not only on Article 33 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines but on the following articles of said Code:
ART. 19.- Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
ART. 20.-Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
There is sufficient publication of the libelous Tagalog words. The office
file of the defendant containing copies of telegrams received are open and
held together only by a metal fastener. Moreover, they are open to view
and inspection by third parties.
It follows that the plaintiff is entitled to damages and attorney's fees. The
plaintiff is a businessman. The libelous Tagalog words must have affected
his business and social standing in the community. The Court fixes the
amount of P40,000.00 as the reasonable amount of moral damages and the
amount of P3,000.00 as attorney's fee which the defendant should pay the
plaintiff. (pp. 15-16, Record on Appeal)
The respondent appellate court in its assailed decision confirming the
aforegoing findings of the lower court stated:
The proximate cause, therefore, resulting in injury to appellee, was the
failure of the appellant to take the necessary or precautionary steps to
avoid the occurrence of the humiliating incident now complained of. The
company had not imposed any safeguard against such eventualities and
this void in its operating procedure does not speak well of its concern for
their clientele's interests. Negligence here is very patent. This negligence is
imputable to appellant and not to its employees.
The claim that there was no publication of the libelous words in Tagalog is
also without merit. The fact that a carbon copy of the telegram was filed
among other telegrams and left to hang for the public to see, open for
inspection by a third party is sufficient publication. It would have been
otherwise perhaps had the telegram been placed and kept in a secured
place where no one may have had a chance to read it without appellee's
permission.
The additional Tagalog words at the bottom of the telegram are, as
correctly found by the lower court, libelous per se, and from which malice
may be presumed in the absence of any showing of good intention and
justifiable motive on the part of the appellant. The law implies damages in
this instance (Quemel vs. Court of Appeals, L-22794, January 16, 1968; 22
SCRA 44). The award of P40,000.00 as moral damages is hereby reduced
to P15,000.00 and for attorney's fees the amount of P2,000.00 is awarded.
(pp. 22-23, record)
After a motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court,
petitioner came to Us with the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I recover. However, since negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases,
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that Petitioner-employer
should answer directly and primarily for the civil liability arising from the
criminal act of its employee.
II
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that there was sufficient
publication of the alleged libelous telegram in question, as contemplated by
law on libel.
III
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that the liability of
petitioner-company-employer is predicated on Articles 19 and 20 of the
Civil Code, Articles on Human Relations.
IV
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in awarding Atty's. fees. (p. 4,
Record)
Petitioner's contentions do not merit our consideration. The action for damages
was filed in the lower court directly against respondent corporation not as an
employer subsidiarily liable under the provisions of Article 1161 of the New
Civil Code in relation to Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The cause of
action of the private respondent is based on Arts. 19 and 20 of the New Civil
Code (supra). As well as on respondent's breach of contract thru the
negligence of its own employees. 1
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving and
transmitting messages. Everytime a person transmits a message through the
facilities of the petitioner, a contract is entered into. Upon receipt of the rate or
fee fixed, the petitioner undertakes to transmit the message accurately. There
is no question that in the case at bar, libelous matters were included in the
message transmitted, without the consent or knowledge of the sender. There is
a clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner in adding extraneous and
libelous matters in the message sent to the private respondent. As a
corporation, the petitioner can act only through its employees. Hence the acts
of its employees in receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of the
petitioner. To hold that the petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its
employees in the pursuit of petitioner's business is to deprive the general
public availing of the services of the petitioner of an effective and adequate
remedy. In most cases, negligence must be proved in order that plaintiff may
we may apply the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for
itself), by considering the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the
injury.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the appellate court is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 119107. March 18, 2005]
JOSE V. LAGON, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and MENANDRO V. LAPUZ, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
On June 23, 1982, petitioner Jose Lagon purchased from the estate of Bai
Tonina Sepi, through an intestate court,[1] two parcels of land located at
Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. A few months after the sale, private respondent
Menandro Lapuz filed a complaint for torts and damages against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sultan Kudarat.
In the complaint, private respondent, as then plaintiff, claimed that he
entered into a contract of lease with the late Bai Tonina Sepi Mengelen
Guiabar over three parcels of land (the property) in Sultan Kudarat,
Maguindanao beginning 1964. One of the provisions agreed upon was for
private respondent to put up commercial buildings which would, in turn, be
leased to new tenants. The rentals to be paid by those tenants would answer
for the rent private respondent was obligated to pay Bai Tonina Sepi for the
lease of the land. In 1974, the lease contract ended but since the construction
of the commercial buildings had yet to be completed, the lease contract was
allegedly renewed.
When Bai Tonina Sepi died, private respondent started remitting his rent
to the court-appointed administrator of her estate. But when the administrator
advised him to stop collecting rentals from the tenants of the buildings he
constructed, he discovered that petitioner, representing himself as the new
owner of the property, had been collecting rentals from the tenants. He thus
filed a complaint against the latter, accusing petitioner of inducing the heirs of
Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him, thereby violating his leasehold
rights over it.
In his answer to the complaint, petitioner denied that he induced the heirs
of Bai Tonina to sell the property to him, contending that the heirs were in dire
need of money to pay off the obligations of the deceased. He also denied
interfering with private respondents leasehold rights as there was no lease
contract covering the property when he purchased it; that his personal
investigation and inquiry revealed no claims or encumbrances on the subject
lots.
Petitioner claimed that before he bought the property, he went to Atty.
Benjamin Fajardo, the lawyer who allegedly notarized the lease contract
between private respondent and Bai Tonina Sepi, to verify if the parties indeed
renewed the lease contract after it expired in 1974. Petitioner averred that
Atty. Fajardo showed him four copies of the lease renewal but these were all
unsigned. To refute the existence of a lease contract, petitioner presented in
court a certification from the Office of the Clerk of Court confirming that no
record of any lease contract notarized by Atty. Fajardo had been entered into
their files. Petitioner added that he only learned of the alleged lease contract
when he was informed that private respondent was collecting rent from the
tenants of the building.
Finding the complaint for tortuous interference to be unwarranted,
petitioner filed his counterclaim and prayed for the payment of actual and
moral damages.
On July 29, 1986, the court a quo found for private respondent (plaintiff
below):
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff:
1. Declaring the Contract of Lease executed by Bai Tonina
Sepi Mangelen Guiabar in favor of the plaintiff on
November 6, 1974 (Exh. A and A-1) over Lot No. 6395,
Pls-73. Lot No 6396. Pls.-73. Lot No. 6399. 3ls-73, and
Lot no.9777-A. CSD-11-000076-D (Lot No. 3-A. 40124),
all situated along Ledesma St., Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat,
which document was notarized by Atty. Benjamin S.
Fajardo, Sr. and entered into his notarial register as Doc.
No. 619. Page No. 24. Book No. II. Series of 1974, to be
authentic and genuine and as such valid and binding for a
period of ten (10) years specified thereon from November
1, 1974 up to October 31, 1984;
2. Declaring the plaintiff as the lawful owner of the
commercial buildings found on the aforesaid lots and he is
entitled to their possession and the collection (of rentals)
of the said commercial buildings within the period covered
by this Contract of Lease in his favor;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the
following:
a) Rentals of the commercial buildings on the lots
covered by the Contract of Lease in favor of the
plaintiff for the period from October 1, 1978 up to
October 31, 1984, including accrued interests in the
total amount of Five Hundred Six Thousand Eight
Hundred Five Pesos and Fifty Six Centavos (P506,
850.56), the same to continue to bear interest at the
 legal rate of 12% per annum until the whole amount is
fully paid by the defendant to the plaintiff;
b) Moral damages in the amount of One Million Sixty
Two Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P1,062,500.00);
c) Actual or compensatory damages in the amount of
Three Hundred Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P312, 500.00);
d) Exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of
One Hundred Eighty Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P187,500.00)
e) Temperate or moderate damages in the amount of
Sixty Two Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P62,500.00);
f) Nominal damages in the amount of Sixty Two
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P62,500.00);
g) Attorneys fees in the amount of One Hundred Twenty
Five Thousand Pesos (P125,000.00);
h) Expenses of litigation in the amount of Sixty Two
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P62,500.00);
i) Interest on the moral damages, actual or
compensatory damages temperate or moderate
damages, nominal damages, attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation in the amounts as specified
hereinabove from May 24, 1982 up to June 27, 1986,
in the total amount of Nine Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P900,000.00); all of which will continue to bear
interests at a legal rate of 12% per annum until the
whole amounts are fully paid by the defendants to the
plaintiffs;
4. For failure of the defendant to deposit with this Court all
the rentals he had collected from the thirteen (13) tenants
or occupants of the commercial buildings in question, the
plaintiff is hereby restored to the possession of his
commercial buildings for a period of seventy-three (73)
months which is the equivalent of the total period for
which he was prevented from collecting the rentals from
the tenants or occupants of his commercial buildings from
October 1, 1978 up to October 31, 1984, and for this
purpose a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby issued,
but the plaintiff is likewise ordered to pay to the defendant
the monthly rental of Seven Hundred Pesos (P700.00)
every end of the month for the entire period of seventy
three (73) months. This portion of the judgment should be
considered as a mere alternative should the defendant fail
to pay the amount of Five Hundred Five Pesos and Fifty
Six Centavos (P506,805.56) hereinabove specified;
5. Dismissing the counterclaim interposed by the defendant
for lack of merit;
6. With costs against the defendant.[2]
Petitioner appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals. [3] In a decision
dated January 31, 1995,[4] the appellate court modified the assailed judgment
of the trial court as follows:
a) The award for moral damages,
compensatory damages, exemplary damages, temperate or
moderate damages, and nominal damages as well as expenses
of litigation in the amount of P62,500.00 and interests under
paragraph 3-a(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i) are
deleted;
b) The award for attorneys fees is reduced
to P30,000.00;
c) Paragraphs 1,2,5 and 6 are AFFIRMED;
d) Additionally, the defendant is hereby
ordered to pay to the plaintiff by way of actual damages the
sum of P178,425.00 representing the amount of rentals he
collected from the period of October 1978 to August 1983,
and minus the amount of P42,700.00 representing rentals due
the defendant computed at P700.00 per month for the period
from August 1978 to August 1983, with interest thereon at the
rate until the same is fully paid;
e) Paragraph 4 is deleted.[5]
Before the appellate court, petitioner disclaimed knowledge of any lease
contract between the late Bai Tonina Sepi and private respondent. On the other
hand, private respondent insisted that it was impossible for petitioner not to
know about the contract since the latter was aware that he was collecting
rentals from the tenants of the building. While the appellate court disbelieved
the contentions of both parties, it nevertheless held that, for petitioner to
become liable for damages, he must have known of the lease contract and
must have also acted with malice or bad faith when he bought the subject
parcels of land.
Via this petition for review, petitioner cites the following reasons why
the Court should rule in his favor:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred in holding that
petitioner is liable for interference of contractual relation under
Article 1314 of the New Civil Code;
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not holding that private
respondent is precluded from recovering, if at all, because of
laches;
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioner
liable for actual damages and attorneys fees, and;
4. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners
counterclaims.[6]
Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides that any third person who
induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other
contracting party. The tort recognized in that provision is known as
interference with contractual relations.[7] The interference is penalized because
it violates the property rights of a party in a contract to reap the benefits that
should result therefrom.[8]
The core issue here is whether the purchase by petitioner of the subject
property, during the supposed existence of private respondents lease contract
with the late Bai Tonina Sepi, constituted tortuous interference for which
petitioner should be held liable for damages.
The Court, in the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals,[9] laid down
the elements of tortuous interference with contractual relations: (a) existence
of a valid contract; (b) knowledge on the part of the third person of the
existence of the contract and (c) interference of the third person without legal
justification or excuse. In that case, petitioner So Ping Bun occupied the
premises which the corporation of his grandfather was leasing from private
respondent, without the knowledge and permission of the corporation. The
corporation, prevented from using the premises for its business, sued So Ping
Bun for tortuous interference.
As regards the first element, the existence of a valid contract must be
duly established. To prove this, private respondent presented in court a
notarized copy of the purported lease renewal. [10] While the contract appeared
as duly notarized, the notarization thereof, however, only proved its due
execution and delivery but not the veracity of its contents. Nonetheless, after
undergoing the rigid scrutiny of petitioners counsel and after the trial court
declared it to be valid and subsisting, the notarized copy of the lease contract
presented in court appeared to be incontestable proof that private respondent
and the late Bai Tonina Sepi actually renewed their lease contract. Settled is
the rule that until overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence, a
notarized document continues to be prima facie evidence of the facts that gave
rise to its execution and delivery.[11]
The second element, on the other hand, requires that there be knowledge
on the part of the interferer that the contract exists. Knowledge of the
subsistence of the contract is an essential element to state a cause of action for
tortuous interference.[12] A defendant in such a case cannot be made liable for
interfering with a contract he is unaware of.[13] While it is not necessary to
prove actual knowledge, he must nonetheless be aware of the facts which, if
followed by a reasonable inquiry, will lead to a complete disclosure of the
contractual relations and rights of the parties in the contract. [14]
In this case, petitioner claims that he had no knowledge of the lease
contract. His sellers (the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi) likewise allegedly did not
inform him of any existing lease contract.
After a careful perusal of the records, we find the contention of petitioner
meritorious. He conducted his own personal investigation and inquiry, and
unearthed no suspicious circumstance that would have made a cautious man
probe deeper and watch out for any conflicting claim over the property. An
examination of the entire propertys title bore no indication of the leasehold
interest of private respondent. Even the registry of property had no record of
the same.[15]
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the contract, such
knowledge alone was not sufficient to make him liable for tortuous
interference. Which brings us to the third element. According to our ruling in
So Ping Bun, petitioner may be held liable only when there was no legal
justification or excuse for his action[16] or when his conduct was stirred by a
wrongful motive. To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant
must have acted with malice[17] or must have been driven by purely impious
reasons to injure the plaintiff. In other words, his act of interference cannot be
justified.[18]
Furthermore, the records do not support the allegation of private
respondent that petitioner induced the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the
property to him. The word induce refers to situations where a person causes
another to choose one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation.[19] The
records show that the decision of the heirs of the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell
the property was completely of their own volition and that petitioner did
absolutely nothing to influence their judgment. Private respondent himself did
not proffer any evidence to support his claim. In short, even assuming that
private respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease contract with
Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to prove malice or bad faith
on the part of petitioner in purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim of
tortuous interference was never established.
 In So Ping Bun, the Court discussed whether interference can be justified award for attorneys fees must have clear, factual and legal bases [27] which, in
at all if the interferer acts for the sole purpose of furthering a personal this case, do not exist.
financial interest, but without malice or bad faith. As the Court explained it:
Regarding the dismissal of petitioners counterclaim for actual and moral
damages, the appellate court affirmed the assailed order of the trial court
x x x, as a general rule, justification for interfering with the business relations because it found no basis to grant the amount of damages prayed for by
of another exists where the actors motive is to benefit himself. Such petitioner. We find no reason to reverse the trial court and the Court of
justification does not exist where the actors motive is to cause harm to the Appeals. Actual damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in
other. Added to this, some authorities believe that it is not necessary that the recompense for, loss or injury sustained. To be recoverable, they must not
interferers interest outweigh that of the party whose rights are invaded, and only be capable of proof but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree
that an individual acts under an economic interest that is substantial, not of certainty.[28] Petitioner was unable to prove that he suffered loss or injury,
merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives are negatived, hence, his claim for actual damages must fail. Moreover, petitioners prayer for
for he acts in self-protection. Moreover, justification for protecting ones moral damages was not warranted as moral damages should result from the
financial position should not be made to depend on a comparison of his wrongful act of a person. The worries and anxieties suffered by a party hailed
economic interest in the subject matter with that of the others. It is sufficient if to court litigation are not compensable.[29]
the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in
wrongful motives.[20] With the foregoing discussion, we no longer deem it necessary to delve
into the issue of laches.
The foregoing disquisition applies squarely to the case at bar. In our
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
view, petitioners purchase of the subject property was merely an advancement
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
of his financial or economic interests, absent any proof that he was enthused
ASIDE.
by improper motives. In the very early case of Gilchrist v. Cuddy, [21] the Court
declared that a person is not a malicious interferer if his conduct is impelled No costs.
by a proper business interest. In other words, a financial or profit motivation
will not necessarily make a person an officious interferer liable for damages as SO ORDERED.
long as there is no malice or bad faith involved.
In sum, we rule that, inasmuch as not all three elements to hold petitioner
liable for tortuous interference are present, petitioner cannot be made to
answer for private respondents losses.
This case is one of damnun absque injuria or damage without injury.
Injury is the legal invasion of a legal right while damage is the hurt, loss or
harm which results from the injury.[22] In BPI Express Card Corporation v.
Court of Appeals,,[23] the Court turned down the claim for damages of a
cardholder whose credit card had been cancelled by petitioner corporation
after several defaults in payment. We held there that there can be damage
without injury where the loss or harm is not the result of a violation of a legal
duty. In that instance, the consequences must be borne by the injured person
alone since the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act
which does not amount to legal injury or wrong. [24] Indeed, lack of malice in
the conduct complained of precludes recovery of damages. [25]
With respect to the attorneys fees awarded by the appellate court to
private respondent, we rule that it cannot be recovered under the
circumstances. According to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorneys fees
may be awarded only when it has been stipulated upon or under the instances
provided therein.[26] Likewise, being in the concept of actual damages, the