raining n o u n c o n d i t i o n a l basic se-
6 (1996),
q u e n c e ( c o m p a r e [1]).
Part B is titled "High-Dimensional
Ramsey T h e o r y a n d Banach Space
Geometw" a n d is due to Stevo Todor-
cevic. It e x p l a i n s in four sections
Ramsey-theoretic methods relevant to
m o d e r n Banach space theory: Finite-
d i m e n s i o n a l Ramsey theo~'. Ramsey
theo W of finite a n d infinite sequences,
Ramsey Theory. of finite and infinite
block sequences, a n d approximate a n d
strategic Ramsey theo W of Banach
spaces. In particular, Nash-Williams's
m e t h o d s are used in the proof of Rosen-
thal's t h e o r e m stating that every weakly
null s e q u e n c e (a%) in a Banach space
contains either a s u b s e q u e n c e (x,,,,) all
of w h o s e s u b s e q u e n c e s are Ces~ro sum-
mable, or a s u b s e q u e n c e (x,,~,) w h o s e
spreading m o d e l is isomorphic to ~1.
Furthermore Part B gives a detailed
exposition of the block-Ramsey theory
d e v e l o p e d by Gowers. If F I N denotes
the collection of all finite n o n e m p t y
subsets of bJ, a finite or infinite se-
q u e n c e (x,) of e l e m e n t s of F I N i s called
a block s e q u e n c e if x, < ai w h e n e v e r
i < j . (For x, y E F I N , x < y denotes
the fact that max(x) < min(y).)
Todorcevic argues that while the
space [~ [:q has n u m e r o u s interesting ap-
plications to Banach space theory, the
block spaces such as F I N I~1 of all in-
finite block s e q u e n c e s of finite sets
s e e m to be m o r e relevant to the d e e p e r
p r o b l e m s of that theory. The basic Ram-
sey-type result a b o u t block s e q u e n c e s
is a p i g e o n h o l e principle for F I N due
to H i n d m a n w h i c h says that if F I N is
coloured with finitely m a n y colours,
then there exists an infinite block se-
q u e n c e ( a , ) such that all n o n e m p t y
u n i o n s of finitely m a n y of the sets a,,
have the same colour.
A m o n g other things, Todorcevic dis-
cusses h o w F I N>I, e n d o w e d with some
appropriate topology, satisfies analogues
of results that hold for R][=1 equipped
with the Ellentuck topology. In the last
section of the book, he then shows that
Gowers's dichotomy theorem suggests a
corresponding Ramsey theolT of finite
a n d infinite block s e q u e n c e s in Banach
spaces with Schauder bases. He notes
that in this setup an u n e x p e c t e d n e w
p h e n o m e n o n occurs: the classes of ap-
proximately a n d strategically Ramsey
sets are, in general, n o longer closed un-
der the operation of complementation.
THE MATHEMATICALINTELLIGENCER
The lecture notes should serye their
p u r p o s e to give a first c o n d e n s e d in-
troduction to some of the most recent
a d v a n c e d investigations in its area fairly
well. To this end. it might be advisable
to reverse the alphabetic order and read
the s e c o n d part of the b o o k first. After
having mastered the basic techniques in
the four discussed versions of abstract
Ramsey theory, the reader will then be
able to appreciate fully the sometimes
necessarily highly technical and delicate
m e t h o d s in the first part of the volume,
which often are related to the recent re-
search of the authors.
In the light of all the rather compli-
cated constructions outlined above, o n e
is likely to b e g i n to w o n d e r - - l i k e Gow-
ers at the e n d of his address [6]--
w h e t h e r there might be a theo W of
"easily described" Banach spaces, very
different from the general theo W, that
w o u l d eliminate many of the peculari-
ties discussed in this review. At present,
however, it seems unclear how such a
theory can be built.
The a p p r o a c h taken by the authors
of the p r e s e n t e d book is remarkably dif-
ferent. They propagate the message that
a p p a r e n t l y unpleasant spaces form an
integral a n d interesting part of classical
Banach space theo W and are something
we have to get used to.
REFERENCES
[1] S. A. Argyros, J. Lopez-Abad, and S.
Todorcevic, A class of Banach spaces
with few non-strictly singular operators, J.
Funct. Anal. 222 (2005), 306-384.
[2] S. A. Argyros and A. Tolias, Methods in
the theory of hereditarily indecomposable
Banach spaces, Mem. Amer. Math. Soc.
170 (2004), no. 806.
[3] J. Elton and E. Odell, The unit ball of every
infinite-dimensional normed linear space
contains a (1 + E)-separated sequence,
Colloq. Math. 44 (1981), 105-109.
[4] F. Galvin and K. Prikry, Bore/ sets and
Ramsey's theorem, J. Symbolic Logic 38
(1973), 193-198.
[5] W. T. Gowers, Lipschitz functions on clas-
sical spaces, European J. Combin. 13
(1992), 141-151.
[6] W. T. Gowers, Recent results in the the-
ory of infinite-dimensional Banach spaces,
Proceedings of the International Congress
of Mathematicians, Vol. 1,2 (Z0rich, 1994),
Birkh~user, Basel, 1995, pp. 933-942.
[7] W. T. Gowers, A new dichotomy for Ba-
nach spaces, Geom. Funct. Anal.
1083-1093.
[8] W. T. Gowers, An infinite Ramsey theorem
and some Banach-space dichotomies,
Ann. of Math. (2) 156 (2002), 797-833.
[9] W. T. Gowers, Ramsey methods in Ba-
nach spaces, Handbook of the Geometry
of Banach Spaces, vol. 2, North-Holland,
Amsterdam, 2003, pp 1071-1097.
[10] W. T. Gowers and B. Maurey, The un-
conditional basic sequence problem, J.
Amer. Math. Soc. 6 (1993), 851-874.
[11] R. L. Graham, B. L. Rothschild, and J. H.
Spencer, Ramsey Theory, (2nd ed.), Wiley
Interscience, New York, 1990.
[12] J. B. Kruskal, The theory of well-quasi-
ordering: a frequently discovered concept,
J. Combinatorial Theory Ser. A 18 (1972),
297-305.
[13] F. P. Ramsey, On a problem of formal
logic, Proc. London Math. Soc. 30 (1930),
264-286.
[14] B. S. Tsirelson, Not every Banach space
contains an imbedding of tp or Co, Funct.
Anal. Appl. 8 (1974), 138-141.
Department of Mathematics and
Applied Mathematics
University of Cape Town
Rondebosch 7701
South Africa
e-maih kunzi@maths, uct.ac.za
GOdel's Theorem:
An Incomplete
Guide to Its Use
and Abuse
by TorkeI Franz~n
A. K. PETERS, WELLESLEY, MASSACHUSETTS,
2005, 172 pp, ISBN 1-56881-238-8, $24.95
REVIEWED BY GARY MAR
t the GOdel Centenary Confer-
ence, "'Horizons of Truth," held
/ ,tat the University of Vienna in
April 2006, S o l o m o n Feferman paid
tribute to the work of the late Torkel
Franz0n. Feferman's comments, printed
o n the back cover of GOdel's" Theorem:
A n Incomplete Guide to Its Use a n d
Abuse, succinctly p i n p o i n t Franz0n's
distinctive achievement: "This u n i q u e
exposition of Kurt G6del's s t u n n i n g in-
colnpleteness theorems for a general
a u d i e n c e m a n a g e s to do what n o n e
other has accomplished: explain clearly
and thoroughly just what the theorems
really say a n d imply and correct their
diverse misapplications to philosophy,
p,sycholoev,., physics, theology, post-
modernist criticism and what have you."
Franzdn's b o o k will be of interest to
three audiences: (1) beginning logic stu-
dents who w a n t a concise and self-
contained explanation of what G6del's
theorems do say: (2) non-mathematically
trained scholars a n d educated layper-
sons who w a n t a logically correct ex-
planation of what G6del's theorems do
t10! sity: a n d (3) professional logicians
who want a c o m p r e h e n s i v e , and criti-
cal. survey of the philosophical per-
spectives o p e n e d up by G6del's work.
Logic students n o w have access to many
popular a c c o u n t s of GOdel's life and
work. a m o n g t h e m Nagel a n d New,-
m a n ' s classic exposition Gddel~~ Proof
(1959) and Douglas Hofstadter's Puli-
tizer-Prize-winning G6deL Escber, Bach
(1979), and, m o r e recently, J o h n Casti
and W e r n e r DePauli's Gddeh A L(fe o f
Logic (2000), b a s e d o n an Austrian na-
tional television d o c u m e n t a w , as well
as Rebecca Goldstein's novelistic biog-
raphy, btcompleteJtess.. The Proof a,zd
P a r a d o x q)/"KzH-t Gddel (2005) (reviewed
in 7be M a t h e m a t i c a l l,#ellijgetTcev, vol
28, no. 4, 2006). However, these books
tend to sacrifice technical correctness
for public comprehensibility: n o n e of
them c o m m e n t in detail o n the many
misstatements a n d missapplications of
G6del's theorem, a n d some commit the
very, errors Franzdn exposes. Steering
the b e g i n n i n g student clear of some
c o m m o n confusions, Franzdn explains
technical terms a n d poses instructive
questions:
9 G6del p u b l i s h e d the completeness
t h e o r e m (1930) for his doctoral dis-
sertation a n d then in the following
year p u b l i s h e d his celebrated iJz-
completeH~<~s t h e o r e m (1931). The
latter is not the n e g a t i o n of the for-
met. What are the two quite distinct
m e a n i n g s of complete~ess in these
two l a n d m a r k theorems by G O d e l - -
the former c o n c e r n i n g first-order
logic a n d the latter c o n c e r n i n g Peano
Arithmetic?
9 Although it is c o m m o n to speak of the
incompleteness theorem, there are ac-
tually tu'o incompleteness theorems,
k n o w n as GOdel's First a n d Second
Incompleteness Theorems. Contem-
pora W formulations of both theorems
talk about formal systems that "con-
rain a certain a m o u n t of arithmetic."
What two different requirements are
meant bv this single phrase?
9 O n e important simplification of
GOdel's first i n c o m p l e t e n e s s t h e o r e m
was discovered by J. Barkley Rosser
(1936). What is the difference be-
t w e e n Rosser's n o t i o n of simple co,~-
sistenc}' and GOdel's original formu-
lation of his first c o m p l e t e n e s s
t h e o r e m in terms of a~-co,zsiste~lcl'?
Goldbach's famous u n p r o v e n con-
jecture states that every e v e n n u m -
b e r greater t h a n 2 is the s u m of two
primes. How is Rosser's simplifica-
tion related to the fact that Gold-
bach-like statements (i.e.. statements
with the same logical form as Gold-
bach's conjecture, k n o w n as I1-0-1
statements) that are u n d e c i d a b l e
must be true?
9 GOdel's incompleteness theorem, con-
trary to some misstatements, does not
imply that eveO, consistent fomml sys-
tem is incomplete. The Theory of Real
Numbers, for example, is complete.
How is this possible since the Real
Numbers include the Natural Num-
bers of arithmetic? Moreover, certain
subtheories of Peano Arithmetic such
as Presberger Arithmetic (1928), are
decidable.
9 Four years alter the publication of
GOdel's incompleteness results, Ger-
hard Gentzen (1935) published a
proof of the consistency of elementary,
arithmetic making use of a generalized
version of mathematical induction,
k n o w n as transfinite induction. Why
doesn't Gentzen's result conflict with
GOdel's Second Incompleteness The-
orem, which concerns the unprov-
ability of consistency for a wide spec-
trum of formal systems?
Chapter 2, "The I n c o m p l e t e n e s s Theo-
rem: An Overview," introduces the
reader to the First I n c o m p l e t e n e s s The-
orem, its relation to Hilbert's Non Ig-
n o r a b i m u s view of mathematics, a n d its
irrelevance with regard to e x p l a i n i n g
the "Postmodern condition." Chapter 3,
"Computability, Formal Systems, a n d In-
completeness," explains the c o n c e p t u a l
9 2007 Springer Science- Business Media, Inc. Volume 29, Number 2, 2007
c o n n e c t i o n s a m o n g the logical n o t i o n s
of computability, Rmnal systems, a n d
incompleteness. These initial chapters
of FranzOn's book, then, give the be-
g i n n i n g logic student a correct a n d con-
cise a c c o u n t of what the G~hdel i n c o m -
pleteness theorems actually do say.
OOO
Readers w h o are not mathematically in-
clined but are intrigued b y the m a n y
claims about the implications of GOdel's
work will find Franz6n a s o b e r a n d re-
liable guide in explaining w h a t GOdel's
theorems do not say. For e x a m p l e , does
GOdet's t h e o r e m show that a T h e o r y of
Everything (TOE) in theoretical physics
is impossible? Do GOdel's t h e o r e m s re-
fute the strong Artificial Intelligence (AI)
thesis that the h u m a n m i n d can b e m o d -
eled by a computer? "No m a t h e m a t i c a l
theorem," Franz6n notes, "has a r o u s e d
so m u c h interest a m o n g n o n m a t h e m a t i -
clans as GOdel's i n c o m p l e t e n e s s theo-
rem." Indeed, Franzen's b o o k grew out
of taking o n the exhausting task of com-
m e n t i n g o n the seemingly i n e x h a u s t i b l e
e r r o n e o u s references on the I n t e r n e t to
GOdel's incompleteness theorems.
Franzen discusses misuses of the in-
completeness theorems in theoretical
physics a n d theology (Chapter 4), in
skeptical arguments about mathematical
k n o w l e d g e (Chapter 5), a n d in the Lu-
cas-Penrose arguments a b o u t the limita-
tions of Artificial Intelligence (Chapter 6).
He dispatches his task with great clarity
a n d a little self-reflective humor. After ac-
k n o w l e d g i n g his colleagues in the pref-
ace, Franz6n drolly comments: "For any
remaining instances of i n c o m p l e t e n e s s
or inconsistency in the book, I consider
myself entirely blameless, since after all,
GOdel proved that any b o o k o n the in-
completeness theorem must b e incom-
plete or inconsistent. Well, m a y b e not."
"GOdel's t h e o r e m is a n i n e x h a u s t i b l e
source of intellectual abuses," n o t e Alan
Sokal a n d Jean Bricmont in Fashionable,
~\onsense: Postmoder, z IlltellectuaL~'
A b u s e o f Science (1997), a c o n t i n u a t i o n
of the discussion raised b y the f a m o u s
hoax in which Sokal's p a r o d y of a
p o s t m o d e r n article was a c c e p t e d for
publication in a litera W journal. Had
Franz6n limited his sites to d e b u n k i n g
p o s t m o d e r n , political, or poetic invoca-
tions of GOdel's t h e o r e m that w e r e "ob-
viously nonsensical," this b o o k could
easily have settled into a s m u g n e s s that
67
 c o m e s from dispatching s t r a w m a n ar- mula unprowd?le in that system. De- effect from GOdel, Esther, Bach, noting
guments. Franzen aims higher. fending Lucas's conclusion. Penrose up- Hofstadter's informal remarks have at
In Chapter 4 Franzen discusses the dates the argument in an attempt to least "the virtue of making it explicit that
claim that, because of G6del's theorem, show that the aspirations of strong Ar- the role of the i n c o m p l e t e n e s s theorem
the physicist's dream of a TheolT of tificial Intelligence (AI) are d o o m e d to is a matter of inspiration rather than
Everything is not only unattained, but failure, going on to conjecture that a implication":
theoretically unattainable. In his ess:ty, n o n - c o m p u t a t i o n a l extension of quan- The other metaphorical a n a l o g u e
"The World on the String" in the IM-u, tum m e c h a n i c s will s o m e d a y provide a to GOdel's T h e o r e m which I find
York Revieu; o/ Books (2004), Freeman theory of consciousness. provocative suggests that ultimately,
D y s o n argued: "Another reason why I GOdel's o w n remarks o n the subject we c a n n o t u n d e r s t a n d our o w n
believe science to be inexhaustible is (in his u n p u b l i s h e d 1951 Josiah Willard m i n d s / b r a i n s. . . . All the limitativc
GOdel's theorem . . . . His t h e o r e m im- Gibbs Lecture at Brown University, see t h e o r e m s of mathematics and the
plies that pure mathematics is inex- vol. Ill, Collected Wbrks q)/Kurt GddeL theory of c o m p u t a t i o n suggest that
haustible. No matter h o w m a n y prob- edited by Feferman et aL) are more cau- o n c e y o u r ability to represent your
lems we solve, there will always bc tious and nuanced: o w n structure has reached a certain
other problems that c a n n o t be solved The h u m a n mind is incapable of critical point, that is the kiss of
within the existing rules. Now I claim formulating (or m e c h a n i z i n g ) all its death: it g u a r a n t e e s that you can
that because of GOdel's theorem, mathematical intuitions. I.e.: If it has n e v e r represent yourself totally.
physics is inexhaustible too." In his s u c c e e d e d in }brmulating some of In such metaphorical statements,
talk, "GOdel and the End of Physics." them, this very fact yields n e w in- F r a n z e n notes, the inability of a formal
Stephen Hawking has argued similarly: tuitive knowledge, e.g., the consis- system to p r o v e its o w n consistency is
"In the standard positivist a p p r o a c h to tency of this formalism. This fact interpreted as the inability of the sys-
the philosophy of science, physical the- may be called the 'incompletability' tem to "analyze or justify itself, or as a
ories live rent-free in a Platonic h e a v e n of mathematics. O n the other hand, kind of b l i n d spot." The p r o b l e m with
of ideal mathematical models . . . . But o n the basis of what has b e e n such a view is that "the m e t a p h o r un-
w e are not angels w h o view the uni- proved so far, it remains possible derstates the difficulty for a system to
verse flom the outside. Instead, w e and that there may exist (and even be prove its o w n consistency . . . . [T]he
o u r models are both part of the universe empirically discoverable) a theorem- u n p r o v a b i l i t y of consistency is really
w e are describing. Thus, a physical the- p r o v i n g m a c h i n e which in fact is the unassertibility of consistency. A sys-
ory is self-referencing, like in G6del's e q u i v a l e n t to mathematical intuition, tem c a n n o t truly postulate its o w n con-
theorem. O n e might therefore expect it but c a n n o t be proved to be so, nor sistency, quite apart from questions of
to be either inconsistent or incomplete.'" e v e n p r o v e d to yield only con'ect analysis a n d justification, although
Do G6del's theorems have such uni- theorems of finitary n u m b e r theory. other systems c a n truly postulate the
versal implications? D r a w i n g o n Fefer- The s e c o n d result is the follow- consistency of the system."
m a n ' s reply to D y s o n in the New Ybrk ing disjunction: Either the h u m a n
Review of Books" (w~vw.nybooks.com/ m i n d surpasses all m a c h i n e s (to be
articles/17249), Franzdn explains: "The more precise: it can decide more As n o t e d above, Franzen's first two
basic equations of physics, whatever n u m b e r - t h e o r e t i c questions than goals were to e x p l a i n accurately what
they may be, cannot indeed decide every, a n y m a c h i n e ) or else there exist GOdel's t h e o r e m s do say to the begin-
arithmetical statement, but w h e t h e r or number-theoretic questions u n d e - n i n g logic s t u d e n t a n d to curb the en-
not they are complete c o n s i d e r e d as a cidable for the h u m a n mind. thusiasm of the n o n m a t h e m a t i c a l l y in-
description of the physical world, a n d Criticizing Lucas and Penrose, Franzdn clined w h o have heard exaggerated
what completeness might m e a n in such argues that "'we have no basis for claim- claims a b o u t the philosophical and
a case, is not something that the in- ing that we ('the h u m a n m i n d ' ) can out- mathematical implications of GOdel's
completeness theorem tells us anything prove a consistent formal system" be- t h e o r e m by p o i n t i n g out what they do
about." In other words, the incomplete- cause GOdel's theorem only implies the not say. F r a n z d n ' s b o o k will also be of
ness of the arithmetic c o m p o n e n t of a equivalence of the consistency of the interest to logicians w h o want a model
physical theory n e e d not imply any in- formal system and the G6del statement of sober clarity for explaining the philo-
c o m p l e t e n e s s in the description of the asserting its o w n unprovability. In gen- sophical perspectives o p e n e d up by
physical world. eral, however, we have n o guarantee GOdel's work. G6del's theorems are
In Chapter 5 Franzdn critically dis- that the f o n n a l system in question is s t u n n i n g a n d significant e n o u g h "with-
cusses the claims a d v a n c e d by J. R. Lu- consistent, an assumption required for out any exaggerated claims for the[it]
cas (1961), a n d u p d a t e d m o r e recently us to draw' the conclusion there is a truth revolutionary impact."
b y Roger P e n r o s e in his EmperorX New u n p r o v a b l e in the formal system. In Chapter 7 Franzdn discusses the
Mind (1989) a n d Shadows of the Mind And what about the w e a k e r claim conceptual connections among GOdel's
(1994). Lucas argued that n o matter h o w that there could not be any formal sys- Completeness Theorem, non-standard
c o m p l i c a t e d a m a c h i n e we construct, it tem that exactly represents the h u m a n models of arithmetic, and the Incom-
will c o r r e s p o n d to a formal system, m i n d as far as its ability to prove arith- pleteness Theorems. Chapter 8 covers
which, in turn, will be subject to a metical theorems is concerned? Franz~n misleading formulations of incomplete-
GOdelian construction for finding a for- criticizes Ho~tadter's reflections to this ness in terms of Kolmogorov-Chaitin

68 THE MATHEMATICALINTELDGENCER
 colnl-)lexity. Greg()l T Chaitin is k n o w n for
his informati<)n-thec)retic interpretation of
GOdel's t h eo r em (1965) and for his dis-
cover3' of the Hahing Probal)ility [] (also
k n o w n as Chaitin's number). As Chaitin
touts his results in 7be &)zknou,able
(1999): "In a nutshell, G6del discovered
incompleteness, Turing discovered un-
computability, and I discovered random-
ness--that's the amazing fact that some
mathematical statements are true for no
reason, they're true by accident." How-
ever, Chaitin's inR)rlnal explanation that
9 . . if o n e has ten p o u n d s of axioms
and a twenty-pound theorem, then the
theorem cannot be derived from those
axioms" is misleading. In a recent book
Jletamatb (2005), Chaitin e x p a n d s upon
tiffs infonnal account: "'Now w e r e really
going to get irreducible mathematical
fhcts, mathematical facts that 'are true for
no reason, and which simulate in pure
math, as lnuch as is possible, indepen-
dent tosses of a fair coin . . . . " T h e prob-
lem with Chaitin's informal explanation,
as Franz6n points out, is that Chaitin's
version of the G6del t h e o r e m s does not
deal with the complexity of the theorems
themselves but instead with theorems
that are statements about complexity.
There is, m o r eo v e r , an intriguing con-
nection b e t w e e n GOdel's incompleteness
theorem and axioms of infinity: postu-
lating the existence of various infinite
sets has formal c o n s e q u e n c e s for ele-
mentary n u m b e r theory, that cannot be
p r o v e d by elementary means. Most of
the mathematics d o n e today can be for-
malized within Zermelo-Fraenkel set the-
o W with the ax i o m of c h o i c e (ZFC). ZFC
minus the ax i o m of infinity, ZFC % is
equivalent in its arithmetic part to Peano
Arithmetic, and so the GOdel incom-
pleteness theorems apply. Therefore,
ZFC ~' is i n c o m p l e t e a n d d o e s not im-
ply its o w n consistency. It turns out that
ZFC (which includes the a x i o m of infin-
ity) can p ro v e the consistency of ZFC-%
So here w e have an e x a m p l e in which
adding an ax i o m of infinity to a theo W
(in particular, ZFC ~') yields n e w arith-
metical t h e o r e m s (the consistency of
ZFC -~ not provable within that original
theo W. Stronger axioms of infinity ex
tending versions of ZFC also yield n e w
arithmetical theorenas not p r o v a b l e in the
theories they extend. Fnmz6n remarks:
"'From a philosophical point of view, it
is highly significant that extensions of set
theory by axioms asserting the existence
of ve W large infinite sets have logical
c o n s e q u e n c e s in the reahn of arithmetic
that are not provable in the theo W that
they extend 9
As yet, no arithmetical p r o b l e m of tra-
ditional mathematical interest is k n o w n
to be mnong the n e w arithmetical theo-
rems of extensions of ZFC by axioms of
infinity. However, a step in this direction
was taken with the Paris-Harrington The-
orem (1977). The Paris-Harrington The-
orem is related to Ramsey's t h e o r e m that,
for each pair of positive integers k and I
greater than 2, there exists an integer R(/4
l) ( k n o w n as the Rams O, number) such
that any graph with R(k, l) n o d es w h o s e
edges are colored red or g r een will ei-
ther have a completely green subgraph
of order L,.or a completely red subgraph
of order L For example, at any party with
at least six people, there are either three
people who are all mutual acquaintances
or mutual smmgers. The Paris-Harrington
Theorem, a combinatorial strengthening
of Ramsey's theorem, was the first "nat-
ural" statement f o u n d to be true but un-
provable in Peano Mithmetic.
At the 1930 "Epistemology of the Ex-
act Sciences" Conference in K6nigsberg,
GOdel quietly a n n o u n c e d his First In-
completeness Theorem. A m o n g confe>
ence participants w e r e such eminent
logicians as Rudolf Carnap and Arend
Heyting, hut only J o h n yon N e u m a n n ap-
preciated the p r o f o u n d significance of
GOdel's Incompleteness Theorem. Not
long afterward, yon N e u m a n n realized
that the Second I n c o m p l e t e n e s s Theo-
rem could be o b t a i n e d by fornmlizing the
argument for the first. Communicating
his discovery to G 6 d el in a letter, w m
N e u m a n n graciously declined to puhlish
w h e n GOdel informed him that this stun-
ning theorem was already discussed in
his forthcoming "'On Fonnally Undecid-
ahle Propositions in Principia Mathe-
matica and Related Systems I" (1931),
which would b e c o m e a celebrated
achievement of twentieth centu W logic.
What was G 6 d el 's Second Incom-
pleteness T h e o r e m and what effect did
it have on Hilbert's program? In addition
to constructing the GOdel statement G
for the formal system 5~ the a r g u m e n t es-
tahlishing the implication "'if S is consis-
tent, then G is not p r o v a b l e in S" could
be carried out within S itself. Moreover,
the property o f b ei n g a GOdel n u m b e r
of a p r o o f in S is a c o m p u t a b l e one, and
so "S is consistent' is a Goldbach-like
@ 2007 Springer Science fBuslness Media, Inc, Volume 29, Number 2, 2007
statement, a statement which if fiflse, can
be s h o w n to bc false by a computation.
Thus, GOdel's Second Incompleteness
T h e o r e m R)llows: if S proves the state-
ment Con(S) expressing 'S is consistent'
in the l a n g u a g e o f S, then S proves G,
and h e n c e S is in fitct inconsistent.
Hilbert's metamathematical program call-
ing for consistency proof;s R)r R)nnal sys-
tems such as arithmetic in which all fini-
tistic arguments can be fonnalized was
effectively dashed by the Second In-
completeness Theorem.
Franzen carefully points out three
c o m m o n misconceptions about the Sec-
o n d Incompleteness Theorem. "First, it is
often said that GOdel's p r o of s how s G to
be true, or to be 'in s o m e sense' true.
But the p r o o f d o e s not s h o w G to be
true. What w e learn flom the p r o o f is
that G is tree if an d only if S is consis-
tent9 In this observation, there is no rea-
son to use an3' such fornmlation as 'in
s o m e sense true' . . . " Second, GOdel's
t h e o r e m does not rule out consistency
proof~ using m e t h o d s not fommlizable
within Peano Arithmetic. Third, "[ajnother
aspect of the s e c o n d incompleteness the-
o r e m that n eed s to be e m p h a s i z e d is that
it d o e s not s h o w that S can only be
p r o v e n consistent in a system that is
stro~zger than ,57' For example, G e nt z e n
proved the consistency of P e a no Arith-
metic (PA) in 1936 by application of an
arithmetically expressible instance of
transfinite induction up to Cantor's ordi-
nal c0 (the least fixed point u n d e r ordi-
nal e x p o n e n t i a t i o n to the base o~), while
otherwise using arguments that can be
formalized in a very w e a k subsystem of
PA. So the consistency of PA is proved
in a system that overlaps in part with PA
but is not an ex t en si o n of it.
O n the o t h e r hand, it has b e e n ar-
g u e d that if a system S like PA has b e e n
a c c e p t e d as intuitively tree, then one
ought to accept the consistency state-
m e n t Con(S) for S. That will give rise to
a n e w formal system S' obtained by ad-
joining Con(S) to 3: N o w S' is also in-
tuitively true, so the process can be it-
erated, in thct, t h r o u g h the constructive
transfinite. Alan Turing (1939) s h o w e d
that o n e could obtain c o m p l e t e n e s s for
Goldbach-like statements for ordinal
logics obtained by iterating consistency
statements into the constructive transfi-
nite starting with PA. Later, Feferman
(1964) s h o w e d that o n e could obtain a
p r o g r e s s k m that is c o m p l e t e for all arith-
69
metical statements by iterating certain
reflection principles. Franzen's other
book, Inexhaustibility: A Non-exhaus-
tive Treatment (ASL Lecture Notes in
Logic =16, 2004) contains an excellent
exposition of the incompleteness theo-
rems, a n d the reader is led step-by-step
through the technical details n e e d e d to
establish a significant part of Fefennan's
completeness results tk)r iterated reflec-
tion principles for ordinal logics.
Torkel Franzdn's untimely death on
April 19, 2006 came shortly before he
was to attend, as an invited lecturer, the
GOdel Centenary Conference, "Hori-
zons of Truth," held at the University of
Vienna later that month. This, and his
invitations to speak at other conferences
featuring a tribute to G6del, testifies to
the g r o w i n g international recognition
that he deserved for these works.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I thank S o l o m o n Feferman [k)r substan-
tive a n d insightful c o r r e s p o n d e n c e dur-
ing the p r e p a r a t i o n of this review, and
Robert Crease, Patrick Grim, Robert
Shrock, Lorenzo Simpson, a n d Theresa
SpOrk-Greenwood for their intellectual
a n d material s u p p o r t fur my participa-
tion in the GOdel Centenary "Horizons
of Truth" C o n f e r e n c e in Vienna.
Department of Philosophy
Stony Brook University
Stony Brook, New York 11794-3750
USA
e-mail: gmar@notes.cc,sunysb.edu
The Art of
Conjecturing
together with Letter
to a Friend on Sets
in Court Tennis
byJacob Ben~oulli
translated with a n introdztction a n d
notes by Edith Dudl<F Sylla
BALTIMORE, THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
PRESS, 2006, xx + 430 PP. s ISBN 0-8018-
8235-4.
REVIEWED BY A. W. F. EDWARDS
70 THE MATHEMATICALINTELLIGENCER
qn 1915 the y o u n g statistician R. A.
I Fisher, t h e n 25, and his IBrmer stu-
! d e n t friend C. S. Stock wrote an ar-
ticle [11 bewailing the contemporary ne-
glect of The Op~gin elSpecies:
So melancholy a neglect of Darwin's
work suggests reflections u p o n the
use of those rare and precious pos-
sessions of m a n - - g r e a t books. It was.
we believe, the custom of the late Pro-
fessor Freeman 12] to warn his stu-
dents that maste W of one great book
was worth any amount of knowledge
of m a n y lesser ones. The tendency of
m o d e m scientific teaching is to ne-
glect the great books, to lay far too
much stress upon relatively unimpor-
tant m o d e r n work, and to [)resent
masses of detail of doubd\fl truth and
questionable weight in such a way as
to obscure principles . . . . How many
biological students of today have read
The Origin? The majority k n o w it only
from extracts, a singularly ineffective
means, for a work of genius does not
easily lend itself to the scissors: its
unity is too marked. Nothing can re-
ally take the place of a first-hand
study of the work itself.
With her translation of Jacob Bernoulli's
Ars ConjeclaHdi in its entirety Edith
Sylla now" makes available to English-
speakers without benefit of Latin another
great book hitherto k n o w n mostly from
extracts. As she rightly observes, only
thus can we at last see the full context
of BernoulliX theorem, the famous and
fundamental limit theorem in Part IV that
confirms our intuition that the prop()>
tions of successes and failures in a sta-
ble s e q u e n c e of trials really do converge
to their postulated probabilities in a strict
mathematical sense, and therefore may
be used to estimate those probabilities.
How'ever, I must resist the tempta-
tion to review Ars Conjectandi itself and
stick to Sylla's contribution. She thinks
that it "deserves to be considered the
f o u n d i n g d o c u m e n t o f mathematical
probability', b u t I am not so sure. That
h o n o u r b e l o n g s to Bernoulli's prede-
cessors Pascal a n d Huygens, w h o math-
e m a t i z e d expectation half a century ear-
lier; Bernoulli's o w n main contribution
was 'The Use and Application of the
Preceding Doctrine in Civil, Moral, and
Economic Matters" (the title of Part IV)
a n d the associated theorem. It would be
more true to say that A ~ Conjectandi is
the f o u n d i n g d o c u m e n t of mathemati-
cal statistics, for if Bernoullfs t h e o r e m
were not true. that enterprise w o u l d be
a h o u s e of cards. (The title of a recent
b o o k by Andres Hald says it all: A His-
to O' oJ" Parametric Statistical Infi>rence
.fix)nz Benzou/li to Fisher. 1 7 1 3 - 1 9 3 5 [3].)
W h e n I first became interested in
Bernoulli's b o o k I was very fortunately
placed. There was an original edition in
the college libra W (Gonville and Caius
College, Cambridge) and a m o n g s t the
other Fellows of the college was Pro-
lessor Charles Brink. the Universib"s
K e n n e d y Professor of Latin. T h o u g h 1
have school Latin I was s o o n out of my
depth, and so I consuhed Professor Brink
about passages that particularly interested
me. Charles would fill his pipe. settle into
his deep wing-chair and read silently for
a while. Then, as like as not, his o p e n -
ing remark would be 'Ah, yes, I remem-
ber Fisher asking me about this passage'.
Fisher too had b e e n a Fellow of Caius.
Now-, at last, future generations can set
aside the partial, and often amateur, trans-
lations of Aps- 6b,{/ectandi and enioy the
whole of the great work professionally
translated, annotated, and introduced by
Edith Sylla. in a magisterial edition beau-
tifully produced and presented. She has
left no stone unturned, no correspon-
dence unread, n o seconda W literature un-
examined. The result is a w'ork of true
scholarship that will leave every serious
reader weak with admiration. Nothing
said in criticism in this review should be
construed as negating that.
The translation itself occupies just
half of the long book, 213 pages. An-
other 146 pages are devoted to a pref-
ace a n d introduction, and 22 to a 'trans-
lator's c o m m e n t a r y ' . Next c o m e 41
pages with a translation of Bernoulli's
French Letter to a h ' i e n d on Sets in
Cou,r Tennis which was p u b l i s h e d with
Ars dbnjectandi a n d which contains
m u c h that is relevant to the m a i n work;
a translator's c o m m e n t a W is again ap-
p e n d e d . Finally, there is a full bibliog-
r a p h y a n d an index.
In her preface Sylta sets the scene and
includes a good survey of the secondary
literature (Ire Schneider's chapter o n AJ.x
Conjectandi in Landmark Writings ilt
We,s-te,vz Mathematics 1640-1940 [4] ap-
p e a r e d just too late for inclusion). Her
introduction 'has four main sections. In
the first, I review briefly some of the main
facts of Jacob Bernoullfs life a n d its so-
cial context . . . . In the second, I discuss