1.

Facts:
When BCDA opened for disposition its Bonifacio South Property pursuant to RA 7227, SMLI
offered to undertake the development of said property by submitting a succession of unsolicited
proposals to BCDA. BCDA then entered into negotiations with SMLI until the BCDA finally
accepted the terms of the final unsolicited proposal. Their agreement was thereafter reduced into
writing through the issuance of the Certification of Successful Negotiations in 2010.

It was agreed that BCDA accepted SMLI’s unsolicited proposal and declared SMLI eligible to
enter into the proposed Joint Venture activity. It also “agreed to subject SMLI’s Original
Proposal to Competitive Challenge pursuant to NEDA Joint Venture Guidelines, which
competitive challenge process shall be immediately implemented following the Terms of
Reference. Moreover, said Certification provides that the BCDA shall commence the activities
for the solicitation for comparative proposals. Years later however, the BCDA through the
issuance of Supplemental Notice No. 5 terminated the competitive challenge for the selection of
BCDA’s joint venture partner for the development of a portion of Fort Bonifacio.

SMLI, through a petition for CPM, argued that BCDA’s unilateral termination of the competitive
challenge is a violation of SMLI’s rights as an original proponent and constitutes abandonment
of BCDA’s contractual obligations. BCDA, on the other hand, responded that it is justifiable
since NEDA JV Guidelines is a mere guideline and not a law, and that the Government has a
right to terminate the competitive challenge when the terms are disadvantageous to public
interest.

Issue 1: W/N the NEDA JV Guidelines has the binding effect and force of law
Yes. Administrative issuances, such as the NEDA JV Guidelines, duly promulgated pursuant to
the rule-making power granted by statute, have the force and effect of law. Being an issuance in
compliance with an executive edict, the NEDA JV Guidelines has the same binding effect as if it
were issued by the President himself, who parenthetically is a member of NEDA. As such, no
agency or instrumentality covered by the JV Guidelines can validly deviate from the mandatory
procedures set forth therein, even if the other party acquiesced therewith or not.

Read more
Issue 2: W/N BCDA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Supplemental Notice No. 5
Yes. Being an instrumentality of the government, it is incumbent upon the BCDA to abide by
the laws, rules and regulations, and perform its obligations with utmost good faith. It cannot,
under the guise of protecting the public interest, disregard the clear mandate of the NEDA JV
Guidelines and unceremoniously disregard the very commitments it made to the prejudice of the
SMLI that innocently relied on such promises.

It is in instances such as this––where an agency, instrumentality or officer of the government

evades the performance of a positive duty enjoined by law–wherein the exercise of judicial
power is warranted. Consistent with the Court’s solemn obligation to afford protection by
ensuring that grave abuses of discretion on the part of a branch or instrumentality of the
government do not go unchecked, the Petition for Certiorari must be granted and the
corresponding injunctive relief be made permanent.

Issue 3: W/N the BCDA is in estoppel

Yes. Although as a general rule, the government cannot be estopped by the mistakes or errors of
its officials or agents, such will not apply if injustice is perpetrated.

To allow BCDA to renege on its statutory and contractual obligations would cause grave
prejudice to petitioner, who already invested time, effort, and resources in the study and
formulation of the proposal, in the adjustment thereof, as well as in the negotiations. To permit
BCDA to suddenly cancel the procurement process and strip SMLI of its earlier-enumerated
rights as an Original Proponent at this point––after the former has already benefited from
SMLI’s proposal through the acquisition of information and ideas for the development of the
subject property––would unjustly enrich the agency through the efforts of petitioner. What is
worse, to do so would be contrary to BCDA’s representations and assurances that it will respect
SMLI’s earlier acquired rights, which statements SMLI reasonably and innocently believed. All
told, the BCDA’s acceptance of the unsolicited proposal and the successful in-depth negotiation
cannot be written off as mere mistake or error that respondents claim to be reversible and not
susceptible to the legal bar of estoppel. The subsequent cancellation of the Competitive
Challenge on grounds that infringe the contractual rights of SMLI and violate the NEDA JV
Guidelines cannot be shrouded with legitimacy by invoking the estoppel rule. ##

2. Marquez vs Elisan Credit Corporation

Case Digest GR 194642 Apr 6 2015
→ Full Text ←
Facts:
Marquez obtained from Elisan Credit Corporation a loan payable in weekly installments and
subject to annual interest with monthly penalties and attorney’s in case of nonpayment. A chattel
mortgage was also executed stipulating that “the motor vehicle shall stand as a security for all
other obligations of every kind already incurred or which hereafter may be incurred”. The
payment of that loan was acknowledged by both parties.
Subsequently, Marquez obtained another loan evidenced by a promissory note with the same
terms and conditions as the first loan. When the second loan matured, there still remained an
unpaid balance. Marquez requested the creditor to pay the unpaid balance by daily installments
until the loan is paid; the creditor agreed. Thus, several months after the maturity of the loan,
Marquez had already paid a total amount which is greater than the amount of the principal.

Despite such, the creditor filed a complaint for foreclosure of the CM on the ground that
Marquez allegedly failed to pay the principal of the second loan despite demand. It was also
prayed that the unpaid balance plus accrued penalties and interests be paid because, allegedly,
Marquez’ failure to pay upon maturity triggered the imposition of monthly penalties and
attorney’s fees.

Marquez, citing Art 1176 and 1235 of the Civil Code, insists that his daily payments should be
deemed to have been credited against the principal, as the official receipts issued by the creditor
were silent with respect to the payment of interest and penalties.

Issue 1: W/N the creditor waived the payment of the interest

No. The fact that the official receipts did not indicate whether the payments were made for the
principal or the interest does not prove that the creditor waived the interest. There is no
presumption of waiver of interest without any evidence showing that the creditor accepted the
daily instruments as payments for the principal.

Issue 2: W/N the daily payments made by the debtor be applied to the interest
Yes. Notwithstanding the fact it was not indicated in the receipts whether the payments were
applied to the principal or the interest, such failure should not be taken against the
creditor. Under Article 1253 of the Civil Code, if the debt produces interest, payment of the
principal shall not be deemed to have been made until the interests have been covered. Thus, the
creditor in this case has a right to credit the payments to the interest first.

Read More

Issue 3: W/N an order for foreclosure is proper

No. Foreclosure in this case is without legal and factual basis because the chattel mortgage was
already extinguished when the obligation under the first loan was duly paid.

A CM can only cover obligations existing at the time the mortgage is constituted. For a CM to
cover debts yet to be contracted, a fresh chattel mortgage may be executed or the old contract be
amended conformably to the form prescribed by the CM Law. Here, since there was no showing
that a new agreement was executed, the security can no longer apply to the second loan. The
chattel mortgage was already extinguished because being merely an accessory in nature, it
cannot exist independently of the principal obligation.

3.
1 Utak vs CoMELEC
Case Digest: GR 206020 April 14 2015
→ Full Text ←
Facts:
In 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution 9615 providing rules that would implement
Sec 9 of RA 9006 or the Fair Elections Act. One of the provisions of the Resolution provide that
the posting of any election propaganda or materials during the campaign period shall be
prohibited in public utility vehicles (PUV) and within the premises of public transport terminals.
1 UTAK, a party-list organization, questioned the prohibition as it impedes the right to free
speech of the private owners of PUVs and transport terminals.

Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC may impose the prohibition on PUVs and public transport
terminals during the election pursuant to its regulatory powers delegated under Art IX-C, Sec 4
of the Constitution
No. The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate and not the
ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals. The posting of election campaign
material on vehicles used for public transport or on transport terminals is not only a form
of political expression, but also an act of ownership – it has nothing to do with the franchise
or permit to operate the PUV or transport terminal.
Read more
Issue 2: W/N the regulation is justified by the “captive audience doctrine”
No. A government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be justified if the
supposed “captive audience” may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech. Here, the
commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election campaign materials posted on PUVs
and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining to receive the messages contained in
the posted election campaign materials since they may simply avert their eyes if they find the
same unbearably intrusive. Hence, the doctrine is not applicable.

Read more
Issue 3: W/N the regulation constitutes prior restraints on free speech
Yes. It unduly infringes on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech. Central to
the prohibition is the freedom of individuals such as the owners of PUVs and private transport
terminals to express their preference, through the posting of election campaign material in their
property, and convince others to agree with them.
Issue 4: W/N the regulation is a valid content-neutral regulation
No. The prohibition under the certain provisions of RA 9615 are content-neutral regulations
since they merely control the place where election campaign materials may be posted, but the
prohibition is repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for
a valid content-neutral regulation.

The restriction on free speech of owners of PUVs and transport terminals is not necessary to a
stated governmental interest. First, while Resolution 9615 was promulgated by the COMELEC
to implement the provisions of Fair Elections Act, the prohibition on posting of election
campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals was not provided for therein. Second, there
are more than sufficient provisions in our present election laws that would ensure equal time,
space, and opportunity to candidates in elections. Hence, one of the requisites of a valid content-
neutral regulation was not satisfied.

4.
Secretary of DPWH vs Heracleo
Case Digest GR 179334 Apr 21 2015
Facts:
Spouses “Heracleo” are the co-owners of a land which is among the private properties traversed
by MacArthur Highway in Bulacan, a government project undertaken sometime in 1940. The
taking was taken without the requisite expropriation proceedings and without their consent. In
1994, Heracleo demanded the payment of the fair market value of the property. The DPWH
offered to pay 0.70 centavos per sqm., as recommended by the appraiser committee of Bulacan.
Unsatisfied, Heracleo filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages. Favorable
decisions were rendered by the RTC and the CA, with valuation of P 1,500 per sqm and 6%
interest per annum from the time of filing of the until full payment. The SC Division reversed the
CA ruling and held that computation should be based at the time the property was taken in 1940,
which is 0.70 per sqm. But because of the contrasting opinions of the members of the Division
and transcendental importance of the issue, the case was referred to the En Banc for resolution.

Issue 1: W/N the taking of private property without due process should be nullified
No. The government’s failure to initiate the necessary expropriation proceedings prior to actual
taking cannot simply invalidate the State’s exercise of its eminent domain power, given that the
property subject of expropriation is indubitably devoted for public use, and public policy
imposes upon the public utility the obligation to continue its services to the public. To hastily
nullify said expropriation in the guise of lack of due process would certainly diminish or weaken
one of the State’s inherent powers, the ultimate objective of which is to serve the greater good.
Thus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the
property to the landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of compensation.
Issue 2: W/N compensation is based on the market value of the property at the time of taking
Yes. While it may appear inequitable to the private owners to receive an outdated valuation, the
long-established rule is that the fair equivalent of a property should be computed not at the time
of payment, but at the time of taking. This is because the purpose of ‘just compensation’ is not to
reward the owner for the property taken but to compensate him for the loss thereof. The owner
should be compensated only for what he actually loses, and what he loses is the actual value of
the property at the time it is taken.
Issue 3: W/N the principle of equity should be applied in this case
No. The Court must adhere to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of
the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal
application is impossible. To entertain other formula for computing just compensation, contrary
to those established by law and jurisprudence, would open varying interpretation of economic
policies – a matter which this Court has no competence to take cognizance of. Equity and
equitable principles only come into full play when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence.

Velasco Dissent:
The State’s power of eminent domain is not absolute; the Constitution is clear that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law. As such, failure of the
government to institute the necessary proceedings should lead to failure of taking an individual’s
property. In this case, since the property was already taken, the complainants must be equitably
compensated for the loss thereof.

For purposes of “just” compensation, the value of the land should be determined from the time
the property owners filed the initiatory complaint, earning interest therefrom. To hold otherwise
would validate the State’s act as one of expropriation in spite of procedural infirmities which, in
turn, would amount to unjust enrichment on its part. To continue condoning such acts would be
licensing the government to continue dispensing with constitutional requirements in taking
private property.
5.

Jacomille vs Secretary of DOTC

Case Digest: GR 212381 Apr 22 2015
Facts:
The LTO formulated the Motor Vehicle License Plate Standardization Program (MVPSP) to
supply the new license plates for both old and new vehicle registrants. The DOTC, in its
invitation for bidders on Feb 20, 2013, announced that it intends to apply the sum of 3.8 billion
for the contract. The award was granted to JKG Power Plates on July 22, 2013. The contract
signing, however, was halted. It was made only on February 2014 when sufficient funds from
the GAA 2014 were already made available for the project.
Jacomille instituted a taxpayer suit questioning the procurement process on the ground that it did
not comply with the requirements of RA 9184 and its implementing laws, and that when DOTC
commenced the MVPSP, there was no sufficient funding as reflected in the GAA
2013. Jacomille saw this as a clear misrepresentation or even a deception by the said DOTC
against the government and the general public as a whole.

JKG Power Plates averred that the case was not a proper subject of taxpayer suit because no
taxes would be spent for this project. The money to be paid for the plates would not come from
taxes, but from payments of vehicle owners, who would pay P450.00 for every pair of motor
vehicle license plate, and P120.00 for every motorcycle license plate. Out of the P450.00, the
cost of the motor vehicle plate would only be P380.00. In effect, the government would even
earn P70.00 from every pair of plate.

Issue: W/N Jacomillo has legal standing to maintain the suit

Held:
Yes. Jacomillo as a taxpaying citzen is a proper party because the MVPSP involves the
expenditure of public funds. While the motor vehicle registrants will pay for the license plates,
the bid documents and contract for MVPSP indicate that the government shall bear the burden of
paying for the project.

As a rule, a person suing as a taxpayer must show that the act complained of directly involves the
illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Jacomillo satisfies this requirement
when he alleges that public funds in the amount of P3 .851 billion shall be used in a project that
has undergone an improper procurement process. ##

6.
Funa vs Villar
Case Digest GR 192791 April 24 2012
→ Full Text ←
Facts:
On February 15, 2001, Pres Arroyo appointed Carague as Chairman of the COA for a term of 7
years. Carague’s term of office started on February 2, 2001 to end on February 2, 2008. On
February 7, 2004, Villar was appointed as the third member of the COA for a term of 7 years
starting February 2, 2004 until February 2, 2011.

Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as
COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008
to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as
Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his
appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment
papers, until the expiration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on
February 2, 2011.

Issue 1: W/N a promotional appointment from the position of Commissioner to Chairman is

constitutionally permissible and does NOT constitute reappointment as barred by the Article IX
(D), Sec 1 (2) of the Constitution
Yes. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is
eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of
the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided
that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of
the term of the predecessor will not exceed 7 years and provided further that the vacancy in the
position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment.

Reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office
(Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment
involving a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would
constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred
under the Constitution.

Issue 2: W/N the appointment of Villar to the position of COA Chairman which is made vacant
by the expiration of term of the predecessor is valid
No. The Constitution clearly provides that if the vacancy results from the expiration of the term
of the predecessor, the appointment of a COA member shall be for a fixed 7-year term.

Here, the vacancy in the position of COA chairman left by Carague in February 2, 2008 resulted
from the expiration of his 7-year term. Under that circumstance, there can be no unexpired
portion of the term of the predecessor to speak of. Hence, in light of the 7-year aggregate rule,
Villar’s appointment to a full term is not valid as he will be allowed to serve more than seven 7
years under the constitutional ban.

Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A shorter term,
however, to comply with the 7-year aggregate rule would also be invalid as the corresponding
appointment would effectively breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every
appointee so appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7
years.
 7.

ANTONIO M. LORENZANA vs. JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014, 720 SCRA 319

FACTS: On April 14, 2008, a complaint was filed against Judge Austria for committing an act of
impropriety when she displayed her photographs in a social networking website called
“Friendster” and posted her personal details as a RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of finding
a compatible partner.

She also posed with her upper body barely covered by a shawl allegedly suggesting that nothing
was worn underneath except probably a brassiere.

ISSUE: Whether the posting of “Friendster” photos of herself wearing an “off-shouldered”

suggested dress constitutes an act of impropriety.

HELD: YES. Judge Austria is guilty of impropriety, as she is a visible personification of law and
justice.

Judges are held to higher standards of conduct and thus must accordingly comport themselves.

The very nature of their functions requires under exacting standards of morality, decency and
propriety; both in the performance of their duties and their daily personal lives, they should be
beyond reproach.

8.

9.

10.
FACTS ã The controversy stemmed from the death of complainant's grandson, Marc Andrei
Marcos (Marc Andrei), during the initiation rites of Lex Leonum Fratemitas. ã A preliminary
investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) issued its
Resolution recommending the prosecution of several members of Lex Leonum for Violation of
The Anti-Hazing Law. ã Thereafter, the Informations were filed against the 14 individuals that
participated. ã Finding probable cause to sustain the prosecution of the accused, Judge Cabrera-
Faller issued the Order, dated June 3, 2013, directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest and, at
the same time, the archiving of the entire record of the case until the arrest of the accused. ã On
June 13, 2013, acting on the Omnibus Motion filed by Rosales, Alim and Amante, Judge
Cabrera-Faller issued another Order directing the recall of the warrants of arrest of the three
accused which she claimed were issued inadvertently. ã On August 15, 2013, acting on the
separate motions for the determination of probable cause and to withhold issuance of warrants of
arrest and extremely urgent motion to quash warrant of arrest filed by the accused, Judge
Cabrera-Faller issued the Omnibus Order, quashing, lifting and setting aside the warrants for
their arrest and ultimately dismissing the case against all of them for lack of probable cause.
ã The order of dismissal prompted complainant to file this administrative case against Judge
Cabrera-Faller on the grounds that: o The actuations of the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller clearly
demonstrate her incompetence and gross ignorance of the law and jurisprudence. o Section 6,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides that the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of
the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a
warrant of arrest. o When she issued the Order dated June 3, 2013, she certified that she
personally evaluated the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence and ruled that
there was probable cause o When she subsequently held that the warrant of arrest was
inadvertently issued against accused Emmanuel Jefferson A. Santiago, does this mean that she
did not personally evaluate the records of the case before directing the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against all the accused o And that she dismissed the cases “based solely on her own
conjectures and pre-determined decision to dismiss the case as clearly shown by the fact that she
recalled the warrants of arrests she earlier directed to be issued even without conducting hearings
and without waiting for any comment from the public and private prosecutors. ” ã OCA and
SC: Liable for Fross Ignorance Chunky Monkey CM Digest Balbanero, Bruzon, Go, Olazo,
Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Umandap, Yrreverre ISSUE and HELD 1. WHETHER THE RECALL
OF THE WARRANTS OR ARREST WERE ISSUED INADVERTENTLY—YES ã Judge
Cabrera-Faller showed manifest bias and partiality, if not gross ignorance of the law, when she
issued the Order recalling the warrants of arrest against accused claiming that they were issued
inadvertently. ã In the judicial determination of probable cause, no less than the Constitution
mandates a judge to personally determine the existence of probable cause before issuing a
warrant of arrest. This has been embodied in Section 2, Article III of the Philippine Constitution
and Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. ã Judge Cabrera-Faller was
mandated to personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, to issue a warrant
of arrest. Though she was not required to personally examine the complainant or his witnesses,
she was obliged to personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor before ordering the issuance of a warrant of arrest. ã In the assailed order, Judge
Cabrera-Faller recalled the warrants of arrest against three of the accused . She, however, failed
to explain why she issued the warrants inadvertently. She merely wrote that the warrants of arrest
were inadvertently issued without any explanation why there was such inadvertence in the
issuance. The Court cannot accept this. There was clearly an abdication of the judicial function.
ã It could only mean that she failed to comply with her constitutional mandate to personally
determine the existence of probable cause before ordering the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
ã As the presiding judge, it was her task, upon the filing of the Information, to first and
foremost determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused. It was incumbent upon her to assess the resolution, affidavits and other supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor to satisfy herself that probable cause existed and before a
warrant of arrest could be issued against the accused. If she did find the evidence submitted by
the prosecutor to be insufficient, she could order the dismissal of the case, or direct the
investigating prosecutor either to submit more evidence or to submit the entire records of the
preliminary investigation, or she could even call the complainant and the witness to answer the
courts probing questions to enable her to discharge her duty. ã Most probably, she did her duty
to examine and analyze the attached documents but because she took pity on the young accused
(never mind the victim), she chose to ignore or disregard them. Nonetheless, when the
inefficiency springs from failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, law or principle in the
discharge of duties, the judge is either insufferably incompetent and undeserving of the position
she holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and
in grave abuse of judicial authority.

11.
SOLOMON VERDADERO Y GALERA
,
Petitioner
,
v.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

,
Respondent
.
G.R. No. 216021 March 2, 2016Facts:
On March 12, 2009, in the municipality of Baggao, Province of Cagayan, accused
SOLOMONVERDADERO armed with a Rambo knife, with intent to kill, assault and stab
ROMEO B. PLATA, therebyinflicting upon him stab wounds on the different parts of his body
which caused his death. Before theincident, Maynard Plata (Maynard) and his father Romeo
were at the Baggao Police Station. Together withRonnie Elaydo (Ronnie), they went there to
report that Verdadero had stolen the fan belt of their irrigationpump. Afterwards they had a
confrontation with Verdadero at the police station, the three men made theirway home on a
tricycle and stopped at the drug store as Maynard intended to buy a baby supplies and the
victim also followed him, on his way the accused stabbed Romeo on the left side of the victim’s
back twice
and his shoulder. Maynard tried to help his father but Verdadero attempted to attack him as well,
hedefended himself using a small stool, which he used to hit Verdadero at the chest. Ronnie
meanwhile gotinto the Police station to seek assistance, Verdadero was arrested and Romeo was
rushed into CagayanValley Medical Center, however he is dead on arrival.Prior to the incident,
Solomon Verdadero was notably going in and out of CVMCs Psychiatric Department, inthe year
1999, 2000, 2003, and March of 2009, Doctors contended that he suffers a chronic mental
diseasecalled

Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between

fantasyand reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. A showing that an
accused is sufferingfrom a mental disorder, however, does not automatically exonerate him from
the consequences of his act.Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability.On May 30, 2013, the RTC rendered a decision finding Verdadero guilty for the
crime of homicide.The RTC ruled that the crime committed was only homicide, as the
prosecution failed to establish thepresence of treachery and evident premeditation to qualify
the killing to murder. The trial court, however,opined that Verdadero failed to establish insanity
as an exempting circumstance. The trial court posited thatVerdadero was unsuccessful in
establishing that he was not in a lucid interval at the time he stabbed Romeoor that he was
completely of unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with the commission of the crime.

Aggrieved, Verdadero appealed before the CA.In its July 10, 2014 Decision, the CA
upheld Verdadero's conviction of homicide. The appellate court agreedthat the defense was able
to establish that Verdadero had a history of schizophrenic attacks, but was unableto prove that he
was not lucid at the time of the commission of the offense. The decretal portion of thedecision
states:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In view of the foregoing, the Appeal is DENIED on May 30, 2013, rendered by the Regional
Trial Court ofTuguegarao City, Branch 3 Verdadero moved for reconsideration, but his motion
was denied by the CA in itsresolution, dated December 15, 2014.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
PETITIONER'S CONVICTIONDESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS INSANITY AT THE TIME
OF THE INCIDENT WAS ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR ANDCONVINCING EVIDENCE.
RULING:
Supreme Court contends Verdadero insists that he was able to fully support his defense of
insanity. He

claims that Maynard even admitted that he was not in the proper state of mind when they were at
the policestation before the stabbing took place. Further, it appeared that Verdadero was having
hallucinations afterthe stabbing incident as testified to by Dr. Andres-Juliana. Verdadero
notes that Dr. Pagaddu concluded thathe had a relapse at the time of the stabbing incident on
March 12, 2009.