A.C. No.

6903 April 16, 2012

SUZETTE DEL MUNDO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ARNEL C. CAPISTRANO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainant Suzette Del
Mundo (Suzette) charging respondent Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano (Atty. Capistrano) of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Facts

On January 8, 2005, Suzette and her friend Ricky S. Tuparan (Tuparan) engaged the legal services
of Atty. Capistrano to handle the judicial declaration of nullity of their respective marriages allegedly
for a fee of PhP140,000.00 each. On the same date, a Special Retainer Agreement2 was entered into
by and between Suzette and Atty. Capistrano which required an acceptance fee of PhP30,000.00,
appearance fee of PhP2,500.00 per hearing and another PhP2,500.00 per pleading. In addition,
Atty. Capistrano allegedly advised her to prepare amounts for the following expenses:

PhP11,000.00 Filing fee

PhP5,000.00 Summons
PhP15,000.00 Fiscal
PhP30,000.00 Psychiatrist
PhP15,000.00 Commissioner

In accordance with their agreement, Suzette gave Atty. Capistrano the total amount of
PhP78,500.00, to wit:

January 8, 2005 PhP30,000.00 Acceptance fee

January 15, 2005 PhP11,000.00 Filing fee
February 3, 2005 PhP5,000.00 Filing fee
May 4, 2005 PhP2,500.00 Filing fee
June 8, 2005 PhP30,000.00 Filing fee

For every payment that Suzette made, she would inquire from Atty. Capistrano on the status of her
case. In response, the latter made her believe that the two cases were already filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon City and awaiting notice of hearing. Sometime in July 2005, when
she could hardly reach Atty. Capistrano, she verified her case from the Clerk of Court of Malabon
and discovered that while the case of Tuparan had been filed on January 27, 2005, no petition has
yet been filed for her.
Hence, Suzette called for a conference, which was set on July 28, 2005, where she demanded the
refund of the total amount of PhP78,500.00, but Atty. Capistrano instead offered to return the
amount of PhP63,000.00 on staggered basis claiming to have incurred expenses in the filing of
Tuparan’s case, to which she agreed. On the same occasion, Atty. Capistrano handed to her copies
of her unfiled petition,3 Tuparan’s petition4 and his Withdrawal of Appearance5 in Tuparan’s case with
instructions to file them in court, as well as a list6 containing the expenses he incurred and the
schedule of payment of the amount of PhP63,000.00, as follows:

PhP20,000.00 August 15, 2005

PhP20,000.00 August 29, 2005
PhP23,000.00 September 15, 2005

However, Atty. Capistrano only returned the amount of PhP5,000.00 on August 15, 2005 and
thereafter, refused to communicate with her, prompting the institution of this administrative complaint
on September 7, 2005.

In his Comment/Answer7 dated November 14, 2005, Atty. Capistrano acknowledged receipt of the
amount of PhP78,500.00 from Suzette and his undertaking to return the agreed sum of
PhP63,000.00. He also admitted responsibility for his failure to file Suzette’s petition and cited as
justification his heavy workload and busy schedule as then City Legal Officer of Manila and lack of
available funds to immediately refund the money received.

In the Resolution8 dated January 18, 2006, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The Action and Recommendation of the IBP

For failure of respondent Atty. Capistrano to appear at the mandatory conference set by
Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), the
conference was terminated without any admissions and stipulations of facts and the parties were
ordered to file their respective position papers to which only Atty. Capistrano complied.

In the Report and Recommendation9 dated April 11, 2007, the IBP-CBD, through Commissioner
Quisumbing, found that Atty. Capistrano had neglected his client’s interest by his failure to inform
Suzette of the status of her case and to file the agreed petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. It
also concluded that his inability to refund the amount he had promised Suzette showed deficiency in
his moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. Hence, he was held guilty of violating
Rule 18.03, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended
the penalty of suspension for two years from the practice of law.

On September 19, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of Commissioner Quisumbing through Resolution No. XVIII-2007-9810 with
modification ordering the return of the sum of PhP140,000.00 attorney’s fees to Suzette.

However, upon Atty. Capistrano’s timely motion for reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors
passed Resolution No. XIX-2011-26311 on May 14, 2011 reducing the penalty of suspension from two
years to one year, to wit:

RESOLVED to PARTIALLY GRANT Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, and unanimously

MODIFY as it is hereby MODIFIED Resolution No. XVIII-2007-98 dated 19 September 2007 and
REDUCED the penalty against Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano to SUSPENSION from the practice of law
for one (1) year and Ordered to Return the amount of One Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos
(P140,000.00) to complainant with thirty (30) days from receipt of notice.

The Issue

The sole issue before the Court is whether Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

The Ruling of the Court

After a careful perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the findings and recommendation of the
IBP-CBD but takes exception to the amount of PhP140,000.00 recommended to be returned to
Suzette.

Indisputably, Atty. Capistrano committed acts in violation of his sworn duty as a member of the bar.
In his Manifestation and Petition for Review,12 he himself admitted liability for his failure to act on
Suzette’s case as well as to account and return the funds she entrusted to him. He only pleaded for
the mitigation of his penalty citing the lack of intention to breach his lawyer’s oath; that this is his first
offense; and that his profession is the only means of his and his family’s livelihood. He also prayed
that the adjudged amount of PhP140,000.00 be reduced to PhP73,500.00 representing the amount
of PhP78,500.00 he received less his payment of the sum of PhP5,000.00. Consequently,
Commissioner Quisumbing and the IBP-CBD Board of Governors correctly recommended the
appropriate penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law for violating the pertinent
provisions of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, thus:

CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

RULE 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.

RULE 16.02 – A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.

xxx

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

xxx

RULE 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.

RULE 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

Indeed, when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in
protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a
good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client and
makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and
society.13 His workload does not justify neglect in handling one’s case because it is settled that a
lawyer must only accept cases as much as he can efficiently handle.14

Moreover, a lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of his client that may come to his possession.
As trustee of such funds, he is bound to keep them separate and apart from his own. Money
entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the filing and processing of a case if not
utilized, must be returned immediately upon demand. Failure to return gives rise to a presumption
that he has misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed on him. And the conversion of funds
entrusted to him constitutes gross violation of professional ethics and betrayal of public confidence in
the legal profession.15

To stress, the practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal
proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their
fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.16 Falling short of this standard, the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer
by imposing an appropriate penalty based on the exercise of sound judicial discretion in
consideration of the surrounding facts.17

With the foregoing disquisition and Atty. Capistrano’s admission of his fault and negligence, the
Court finds the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law, as recommended by the
IBP-CBD, sufficient sanction for his violation. However, the Court finds proper to modify the amount
to be returned to Suzette from PhP140,000.00 to PhP73,500.00.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano, having clearly violated Canons 16 and 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He
is ORDERED to return to Suzette Del Mundo the full amount of PhP73,500.00 within 30 days from
notice hereof and DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of such payment.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the
Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 11663

NANETTE B. SISON, represented by DELIA B. SARABIA, Complainant

vs.
ATTY. SHERDALE M. VALDEZ, Respondent

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint for Permanent Disbarment1 (disbarment
complaint) dated September 13, 2013 filed by complainant Nanette B. Sison (complainant),
represented by her mother, Delia B. Sarabia (Sarabia),2 against respondent Atty. Sherdale M. Valdez
(respondent) for violating his professional duties under the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).

The Facts

Sometime in September 2012, complainant, an overseas Filipino worker in Australia, engaged

respondent's legal services to file an action against Engr. Eddie S. Pua of E.S. Pua Construction (old
contractor) and the project manager, Engr. Dario Antonio (project manager), for failing to construct
complainant's house in Nuvali, Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna in due time.3 Although no written
agreement was executed between the parties specifying the scope of legal services, respondent
received the total amount of ₱215,000.00 from complainant, through Sarabia, on three (3) separate
dates.4 Respondent acknowledged receipt of the first two (2) installments in a handwritten note,
stating that the amount of ₱165,000.00 was for litigation expenses, i.e., attorney's fees, filing fees,
bond, and other expenses.5 The last payment was deposited online to the bank account of
respondent's wife, Ma. Analyn M. Valdez.6

On January 8, 2013, complainant terminated respondent's legal services via e-mail and text
messages7 with a demand to return the amount given, which was not heeded notwithstanding
several demands; Hence, complainant, through Sarabia, filed the instant disbarment complaint
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) - Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), alleging
that despite receipt of her payments: (a) respondent failed to render his legal services and update
her regarding the status of the case; (b) commingled her money with that of respondent's wife; (c)
misappropriated her money by failing to issue a receipt for the last installment of the payment
received; and (d) fabricated documents to justify retention of her money.8

For his part,9 respondent claimed that he reported the status of the case to complainant through
phone and e-mail.10 After studying the case, he informed complainant of his evaluation via e-
mail.11 On November 1, 2012, respondent went to his hometown in Ilagan, Isabela with one "Atty.
Joselyn V. Valeros" to personally serve the demand letter to the old contractor. However, when they
went to the house of the old contractor on November 4, 2012, the person present thereat refused to
receive the letter.12 Respondent supposedly spent ₱15,000.00 for his travel to Ilagan, Isabela.13

Respondent further averred that he was supposed to personally meet complainant for the first time
upon the latter's arrival in the Philippines in the second week of November 2012. During the meeting,
he intended to personally report the status of the case, have the pleadings signed, and explain how
her payments would be applied. However, no phone call or e-mail was made by complainant to
confirm the meeting.14 Respondent later learned from complainant's new contractor that she did not
want to meet with him for fear that he would only ask for more money.15
On the same day his legal services were terminated, respondent sent the demand letters to the old
contractor and the project manager via courier service,16 allegedly before he found out about the
termination.17 In a letter18 dated January 10, 2013, respondent, through complainant's sister, Elisea
Sison, asked complainant to reconsider the termination and outlined the services he already
rendered, as follows: (a) he sent a demand letter dated November 4, 2012 to the old
contractor; (b) he drafted a complaint for breach of contract and damages with prayer for preliminary
attachment; (c) he sent a final demand letter dated January 8, 2013 to the old contractor; and
(d) while waiting for a response, he proceeded to investigate the old contractor's real and personal
properties to ascertain what can be the subject of preliminary attachment.19 Respondent admitted
that he opted not to immediately mail the demand letter to the old contractor so that the latter could
not dispose of or hide his properties.20 Alternatively, respondent offered to return the amount of
₱l50,000.00 to complainant, explaining that he already studied the case, prepared the complaint,
and incurred expenses.21However, complainant refused and proceeded to file the present case.

Instead of filing their respective position papers before the IBP-CBD, the parties filed a Joint
Manifestation22 on February 20, 2014, agreeing to settle the matter amicably and acknowledging that
the disbarment complaint was filed because of "misapprehension of facts due to pure error in
accounting and honest mistakes by respondent."23 Complainant's counsel acknowledged receipt of
₱200,000.00 representing partial ·payment of respondent's obligation, while the balance of
₱l18,352.00 will be paid subsequently.24 In turn, complainant undertook not to pursue nor testify
against respondent in this administrative case, as well as in the Estafa case.25

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In the Report and Recommendation26 dated June 7, 2014, the IBPCBD Investigating Commissioner
(IC) recommended that respondent be reprimanded for violating his obligations under the CPR with
a stem warning never to commit the same mistakes again.27

At the outset, the IC disapproved the Joint Manifestation, noting that a compromise agreement
would not operate to exonerate a lawyer from a disciplinary case. As to respondent's liability, the IC
1âwphi1

observed that he committed several violations of the CPR during the period of his engagement with
complainant from September 2012 up to January 8, 2013. First, he failed to inform his client about
the status of the case.28 The IC acknowledged that respondent rendered some legal services to
complainant, but only came up with the list of services after his termination, thus, supporting the
conclusion that he indeed failed to update his client about the developments of the
case.29 Second, he asked for payment of fees from complainant even before he prepared the draft
complaint. The IC explained that a prudent lawyer would first wait for the computation of court fees
before seeking payment of filing and bond fees.30 Third, respondent failed to issue the proper receipt
for the full amount he received from complainant.31 Fourth, respondent commingled the funds of his
client with that of his wife when he asked that the ₱50,000.00 be deposited to his wife's bank
account.32

As to the compensation for legal services, the IC opined that ₱30,000.00 was reasonable based
on quantum meruit, in view of the limited services respondent rendered during the initiatory stage of
the case - i.e., review of the case and drafting of demand letters, complaint, and special power of
attomey.33 However, citing Nebreja v. Reonal,34 the IC declined to recommend restitution of the
amount received by respondent, noting the Court's alleged policy that the collection of money should
be made through an independent action.35 The IC also refused to grant reimbursement to respondent
of the amount of ₱l5,000.00 he incurred for his trip to Isabela for his failure to render an accounting
of his expenses.36
Although respondent was found to have violated his duties to his client, herein complainant, the IC
considered his active membership in the IBP-Laguna Chapter from 2007 to 2009 and his continuous
service as a law professor in Adamson University since 2009 as mitigating factors to reduce his
recommended penalty to reprimand.37

In a Resolution38 dated January 31, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
IC's Report and Recommendation, but modified the penalty to suspension from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months.

Respondent moved for reconsideration,39 but was denied in a Resolution40 dated September 23,
2016.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable
for the acts complained of.

The Court's Ruling

After a judicious review of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP's finding of administrative
liability with some modifications.

Records show that in September 2012, complainant engaged respondent's services to file a money
claim, and pursuant to such engagement, complainant paid respondent a total of ₱215,000.00. After
a little more than three (3) months, complainant terminated respondent's legal services due to the
latter's failure to render legal services. While it was acknowledged that respondent did render some
legal services to complainant albeit only in the initiatory stage, it was also established that
respondent failed to duly update his client on the developments of the case. As correctly pointed out
by the IBP, respondent's lapses constitute a violation of Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, which
reads:

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, a lawyer is duty-bound to serve the latter with
competence and to attend to such client's cause with diligence, care, and devotion. He owes fidelity
to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him.41 In this
relation, a lawyer has the duty to apprise his client of the status and developments of the case and
all other relevant information.42

In this case, respondent alleged that he waited for complainant's arrival in the Philippines in
November 2012 to personally report on his accomplishments, to have the necessary pleadings
signed, and to explain how the money given will be applied. However, the meeting did not push
through.

Indeed, respondent cannot justify his non-compliance by shifting the blame to complainant for failing
to meet with him, especially so that he failed to inform his client of the pleadings she needed to sign.
The Court likewise finds that respondent violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR,
which respectively read:

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary
to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. x x x.

The highly fiduciary nature of an attorney-client relationship imposes on a lawyer the duty to account
for the money or property collected or received for or from his client.43 Money entrusted to a lawyer
for a specific purpose, such as for the filing and processing of a case, if not utilized, must be
returned immediately upon demand.44 His failure to return gives rise to a presumption that he has
appropriated it for his own use, and the conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes a gross
violation of his professional obligation under Canon 16 of the CPR.45

In this case, respondent failed to account for the money received from complainant when he only
acknowledged receipt of ₱165,000.00 for litigation expenses despite admittedly receiving
₱215,000.00. When complainant terminated his legal services, the fact that no case has been filed in
court should have prompted him to immediately return to complainant the amounts intended as filing
and bond fees, as these were obviously unutilized.

In fact, respondent admitted that, based on his belief, he was entitled to only ₱65,000.00 as
compensation for his legal services.46 As such, he should have returned the excess amount of
₱150,000.00 out of the ₱215,000.00 he received from complainant. Notably, Rule 16.03 of the CPR
allows a lawyer to retain the amount necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements.47 Hence,
respondent's persistent refusal to return the money to complainant despite several demands renders
him administratively liable.

Although the IBP correctly found that respondent is entitled to reasonable compensation for the
limited services he rendered, the Court notes that respondent appears to have waived his claim for
compensation when he agreed to return the amount of ₱200,000.00 in cash and pay an additional
₱l18,352.00 in exchange for complainant's desistance in the Estafa and disbarment cases filed
against him.48 Thus, the matter of restitution should no longer be an issue. However, it should be
stressed that his administrative liability herein should remain, considering the rule that a disbarment
case is not subject to any compromise.49

Anent the penalty, the Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers,50 and thus, in the
exercise of its judicial discretion, may impose a penalty less than the IBP's recommendation if such
penalty would achieve the desired end of reforming the errant lawyer.51 Considering the surrounding
circumstances of this case, such as the short duration of the engagement, respondent's return of the
money, his expression of humility and remorse, and the fact that this is his first administrative case,
the Court finds the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months
sufficient and commensurate to respondent's violations.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sherdale M. Valdez is found GUILTY of violating Rule 18.04,
Canon 18, as well as Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months effective
from the finality of this Resolution, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered in the
personal record of respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation
to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7965 November 13, 2013

AZUCENA SEGOVIA-RIBAYA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. BARTOLOME C. LAWSIN, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court’s resolution is an administrative complaint1 filed by Azucena Segovia-Ribaya

(complainant) against Atty. Bartolome C. Lawsin (respondent), the antecedents of which are detailed
as follows:

The Facts

On November 18, 2005, the parties entered into a retainership agreement2 (retainer) whereby
respondent undertook to, inter alia process the registration and eventually deliver, within a period of
six (6 ) months,3 the certificate of title over a certain parcel of land (subject land) in favor of
complainant acting as the representative of the Heirs of the late Isabel Segovia. In connection
therewith, respondent received from complainant the amounts of ₱15,000.00 and ₱39,000.004 to
cover for the litigation and land registration expenses, respectively.

Notwithstanding the expenditure of the ₱39,000.00 given for registration expenses (subject amount)
and the lapse of more than three (3) years from the retainer’s date, complainant alleged that
respondent, without proper explanation, failed to fulfill his undertaking to register the subject land
and deliver to complainant the certificate of title over the same. As complainant was tired of
respondent’s excuses, she finally decided to just withdraw the subject amount from respondent. For
such purpose, she confronted the latter at his office and also subsequently sent him two (2) demand
letters,5 but all to no avail.6 Hence, complainant was prompted to file the instant administrative
complaint.

In his Comment,7 respondent admitted that he indeed received the subject amount from complainant
but averred that after receiving the same, the latter’s brother, Erlindo, asked to be reimbursed the
amount of ₱7,500.00 which the latter purportedly paid to the land surveyor.8 Respondent likewise
alleged that he later found out that he could not perform his undertaking under the retainer because
the ownership of the subject land was still under litigation.9 Finally, respondent stated that he wanted
to return the balance of the subject amount to complainant after deducting what Erlindo took from
him, but was only prevented to do so because he was maligned by complainant when she went to
his office and there, shouted and called him names in the presence of his staff.10

In the Court’s Resolutions dated December 17, 200811 and March 2, 2009,12 the case was referred to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. After both
parties failed to appear during the mandatory conference, IBP Investigating Commissioner Atty.
Salvador B. Hababag (Investigating Commissioner) required the parties to submit their respective
position papers.13 Complainant filed her position paper14 on October 8, 2009, while respondent failed
to do so.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

On November 6, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and
Recommendation,15 finding respondent to have violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) for his failure to properly account for the money
entrusted to him without any adequate explanation why he could not return the same. The
Investigating Commissioner found that respondent’s acts demonstrated his "lack of candor, fairness,
and loyalty to his client, who entrusted him with money and documents for the registration of the
subject land."16 The Investigating Commissioner likewise held that respondent’s failure to return the
subject amount, despite being given "adequate time to return"17 the same, "not to mention the
repeated x x x demands made upon him,"18 constitutes "gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, and
even misappropriation of money"19 in violation of the above-stated rules. In view of the foregoing, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offenses in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.20

In a Resolution21 dated December 29, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation with modification, ordering the return of
the amount of ₱31,500.00,22 with legal interest and within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice, to
complainant.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable
for violating Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court concurs with and affirms the findings of the IBP anent respondent’s administrative liability
but deems it proper to: (a) extend the recommended period of suspension from the practice of law
from six (6) months to one (1) year; and (b) delete the recommended order for the return of the
amount of ₱31,500.00.

Anent respondent’s administrative liability, the Court agrees with the IBP that respondent’s failure to
properly account for and duly return his client’s money despite due demand is tantamount to a
violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code which respectively read as follows:

CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.

Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be
1âwphi 1

necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client.
He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his
client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Records disclose that respondent admitted the receipt of the subject amount from complainant to
cover for pertinent registration expenses but posited his failure to return the same due to his client’s
act of confronting him at his office wherein she shouted and called him names. With the fact of
receipt being established, it was then respondent’s obligation to return the money entrusted to him
by complainant. To this end, suffice it to state that complainant’s purported act of "maligning"
respondent does not justify the latter’s failure to properly account for and return his client’s money
upon due demand. Verily, a lawyer’s duty to his client is one essentially imbued with trust so much
so that it is incumbent upon the former to exhaust all reasonable efforts towards its faithful
compliance. In this case, despite that singular encounter, respondent had thereafter all the
opportunity to return the subject amount but still failed to do so. Besides, the obligatory force of said
duty should not be diluted by the temperament or occasional frustrations of the lawyer’s client,
especially so when the latter remains unsatisfied by the lawyer’s work. Indeed, a lawyer must deal
with his client with professional maturity and commit himself towards the objective fulfillment of his
responsibilities. If the relationship is strained, the correct course of action is for the lawyer to properly
account for his affairs as well as to ensure the smooth turn-over of the case to another lawyer.
Except only for the retaining lien exception23 under Rule 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code, the lawyer
should not withhold the property of his client. Unfortunately, absent the applicability of such
exception or any other justifiable reason therefor, respondent still failed to perform his duties under
Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code which perforce warrants his administrative liability.

The Court, however, deems it proper to increase the IBP’s recommended period of suspension from
the practice of law from six (6) months to one (1) year in view of his concomitant failure to exercise
due diligence in handling his client’s cause as mandated by Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the
Code:

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

After a judicious scrutiny of the records, the Court observes that respondent did not only accomplish
his undertaking under the retainer, but likewise failed to give an adequate explanation for such non-
performance despite the protracted length of time given for him to do so. As such omissions equally
showcase respondent’s non-compliance with the standard of proficiency required of a lawyer as
embodied in the above-cited rules, the Court deems it apt to extend the period of his suspension
from the practice of law from six (6) months to one (1) year similar to the penalty imposed in the
case of Del Mundo v. Capistrano.24

As a final point, the Court must clarify that the foregoing resolution should not include a directive for
the return of the amount of ₱31,500.00 as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors. The same
amount was given by complainant to respondent to cover for registration expenses; hence, its return
partakes the nature of a purely civil liability which should not be dealt with during an administrative-
disciplinary proceeding. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,25 the Court recently held that its "findings during
administrative-disciplinary proceedings have no bearing on the liabilities of the parties involved
which are purely civil in nature – meaning, those liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer's
professional engagement – as the same should be threshed out in a proper proceeding of such
nature." This pronouncement the Court applies to this case and thus, renders a disposition solely on
respondent’s administrative liability.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Bartolome C. Lawsin is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and
16.03, Canon 16, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective
upon his receipt of this Resolution with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 9880

WILSON CHUA, Complainant

vs.
ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ, Respondent

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This case was filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline on
October 20, 2003 by complainant Wilson Chua against respondent Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez for
grave misconduct, malpractice, dishonesty, and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar.1

Factual Antecedents

The complainant alleged that he entered into a retainership agreement with the respondent for the
latter to handle all his legal problems, with particular emphasis on those that needed filing in the
courts: more specifically, against Excellent Quality, Alexander Ty, Benny Lao, Clarita Tan, and
Amosup. For these, he gave respondent the amount of ₱235,127.00 for the necessary filing fees.
Complainant likewise entrusted to the respondent all the pertinent documents thereto.

The complainant likewise alleged that, for the last seven years prior, he had never attended a single
hearing on any case that he had assigned to respondent, save for those involving Clarita Tan and
Union Bank and in which case he was a defendant. Respondent allegedly would advise him of
upcoming hearings only to cancel them last minute due purportedly to cancellations, postponements,
or resetting of the hearings.

Complainant had written respondent several times – on June 11, 2003; June 20, 2003; July 14,
2003; August 18, 2003; September 9, 2003; and September 24, 2003 – for the return of the
documents he had entrusted to respondent as well as the amount of ₱235,127.00. On September
24, 2003, he terminated respondent’s legal services for failure to file the necessary cases, the very
object of the retainership agreement, and to return the sum of ₱235,127.00.

In an Order2 dated October 23, 2003, the IBP directed respondent to file his Answer within 15 days.
Instead of filing an Answer, respondent requested for additional 15 days within which to
comply.3 Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars4 and another Urgent Motion to
File Answer.5 However, for being a prohibited pleading, the IBP denied the motion for bill of
particulars.6 With no action yet on the part of the IBP with regard to his Urgent Motion To File
Answer, respondent again filed an Urgent Motion For Last Extension To File Answer.7 Perhaps
exasperated by respondent’s delaying tactics, complainant moved that respondent be declared in
default and that he be allowed to present evidence ex-parte.8

In an Order9 dated March 17, 2004, the IBP declared respondent in default and set the mandatory
conference on April 28, 2004. In the meantime, respondent moved for the lifting of the default
order10 attaching thereto his Answer with Counterclaim.

Respondent denied complainant's charges that he had violated his oath of office as a lawyer and the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He further alleged that he had been pressuring the complainant
and his mother Tiu Eng Te for the payment of professional services rendered by his law firm
amounting to around ₱1.3 Million. And because of this non-payment or failure to arrive at a mutually
acceptable arrangement for the payment of his professional fees, he has withheld the filing of cases
on behalf of the complainant and his companies. He also denied receiving the amount of ₱235,
127.00 from complainant.11

By way of Reply,12 complainant insisted that respondent had received the amount of ₱235,127.00
intended for payment of filing fees. As proof, he submitted photocopies of checks payable to
respondent as well as cash vouchers showing details of said payment.13

Mandatory conference was thereafter conducted during which both parties appeared and entered
into stipulations. After the termination of the mandatory conference, both parties were directed to
submit their verified position papers. Only complainant complied. Respondent failed to submit his
position paper.

Report and Recommendation of the IBP:

The Investigating Commissioner14 found respondent guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 as well as Canon 22, Rule 22.02. He
opined that:

As between the claim of Complainant that he gave Respondent an amount for filing fees of the
cases endorsed x x x and the denial of Respondent we are inclined to agree with Complainant that
at least the amount of ₱l65,127.00 xx x was given to Respondent. Besides, such bare denial would
appear inconsistent with Respondent's own admission that he was forced to hold on the filing of new
cases because of unsettled professional fees. x x x

x x x There is nothing on record to show that Respondent ever informed Complainant on the status
of their case.x x x

Respondent has raised the matter of his unpaid foes in other cases handled by him as a reason for
his not filing the cases. Respondent has not presented enough evidence to convince us of such
unpaid fees. Besides, it is clear that the papers and documents were given to him for 1he specific
purpose of filing cases but which Respondent did not file. He already received the amounts for filing
fees. x x x Respondent has not even accomplished the purpose for which the monies and
documents were given.

xxxx

Respondent has not been candid with Complainant in terms of his handling of the aforementioned
accounts contrary to the demands of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent is also negligent in not acting on the cases endorsed to him by Complainant. The fact
that there is an outstanding issue with respect to the payment of his retainer fees in not, to our mind,
a justification for his inaction. The least Respondent would have done is to keep the Complainant
updated on such cases and candidly discuss with him the matter of his outstanding fees.

Respondent has not returned any of the papers or documents demanded by the client after his
services were terminated. Nothing on the record shows that he returned the documents and files
requested. x x x

xxxx
We believe that under the facts presented, Respondent has violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility and should therefore be disciplined.15

Thus, the Investigating Commissioner recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of
law for a period of three (3) months and that he be ordered to return the pertinent files and
documents to complainant.16 The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XVII-2006-579 dated
December 15, 2006, resolved to adopt the findings of the Investigating Commissioner but modified
the recommended penalty to suspension of one (1) year from the practice of law and to return the
files and documents of the complainant, and the amounts duly supported by receipts.17

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. In Resolution No. XX-2012-591 dated December 29,
2012, the IBP Board of Governors granted the same and reinstated the penalty recommended by
the Investigating Commissioner of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
months and to return the records and documents to complainant.

The records of the case was thereafter transmitted by the IBP to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B
of the Rules of Court. In a Manifestation and Clarification dated April 2, 2013, complainant sought
that respondent be also ordered to return the amount of ₱235,127.00 to complainant.

Issues

Before this Court is the long standing controversy associated with a retainership agreement - does a
lawyer have the right to hold on to a client's documents, even after the relationship of lawyer-client
has been terminated, due to non-payment of his or her professional legal fees? Or is this a ground
for disciplinary action? Did respondent violate the Code of Professional Responsibility when he failed
to file the cases indorsed by complainant despite receipt of filing fees?

The Court's Ruling

Relying on the exhaustive fact-finding deliberations of the IBP, we find the complainant's allegations
to be believable and supported by evidence.

Because he had doubted that respondent ever filed any case as agreed upon with complainant, the
latter started demanding from the former the return of all the documents and files he had given to
him at the start of their retainership agreement as well as the amounts entrusted to him as filing fees.
In a span of roughly two and a half months, complainant wrote respondent no less than six times. On
the other hand, there is no record to show that respondent ever executed a written reply to any of
the six letters.

We give credence to the allegation that complainant gave respondent some amount specifically for
filing fees, relative to the cases both parties had earlier agreed to. However, as correctly noted by
the Investigating Commissioner, only the amount of ₱l65, 127.00 out of the alleged ₱235,127.00
was duly proved by complainant to have been received by respondent specifically to defray the
expenses for filing fees. Among the disbursements were ₱100,000.00 for filing and other fees
relative to the Excellent Quality case (May 10, 1997); ₱23,000.00 for the Attachment Bond likewise
for Excellent Quality (August 18, 1999); ₱13,563.50 representing the filing foe of Alex Ty (August 4,
2000); ₱l3,563.50 representing the filing fee of Clarita Tan (August 5, 2000); and ₱15,000.00 as
filing fee for Benny Lao (August 31, 2001). This total of ₱165,127.00 is duly supported by checks
issued to respondent and company vouchers relating to the particular disbursements and which
vouchers were signed by respondent.
Notably, during the mandatory conference held on December 13, 2004, respondent admitted that he
received said amounts from complainant. However, he explained that notwithstanding receipt of
1âwphi1

money from complainant, he withheld filing of cases indorsed to him because complainant had not
yet settled his obligation with respondent's law office, viz.:

COMM. DULAY:

So did you withhold action on those cases?

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

We suspended, Your Honor, not the services but we withhold the filing of the cases until after partial
settlement at least of the obligation is settled.18

Similarly, in his motion for reconsideration filed with the IBP, respondent admitted that he applied
1he monies he received from complainant to his and law office’s professional fees instead of
defraying the same as intended, i.e., as filing fees, to wit:

Whatever amount paid by complainant to respondent’s law office were applied as partial payments
of respondent’s law office professional fees, and reimbursement of other miscellaneous expenses
spent by the respondent’s law office to complainant xxx.19

"A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his
duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in
probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are
likewise essential demands for his continued membership therein."20

In particular, the Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 15, states:

A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his
clients.

Respondent fell short in being fair and loyal to his client, herein complainant.

Rules 18.03 further states:

A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.

Respondent did not even file the cases for which he was engaged and upon which he collected filing
fees.

Rule 18.04 continues:

A lawyer shall keep the client intom1ed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information.

Respondent was utterly lacking in this responsibility to his client as he unfairly kept him in the dark,
misleading him for seven years,
While the same Code of Professional Responsibility recognizes the right of a lawyer to have a lien
over the funds and property of his client as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees, Rule 16.03
demands that "[a] lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand." This is a reiteration of Rule 16.01, which states that "[a] lawyer shall account for all money
and property collected or received for or from the client."

"A lawyer should be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to him in his professional
capacity. Consequently, when a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular purpose, the
lawyer is bound to render an accounting to his client, showing that he spent the money for the
purpose intended."21

Respondent miserably disregarded the mandate of accountability expected of him. 1âw phi 1

The respondent's issue on the supposed non-payment of his fees should have prompted him to seek
communication with complainant and resolve such matter. He should not have used the same as a
ground for his inaction insofar as the cases referred to him were concerned. "A lawyer's negligence
in the discharge of his obligations arising from the relationship of counsel and client may cause delay
in the administration of justice and prejudice the rights of a litigant particularly his client. Thus, from
the perspective of the ethics of the legal profession, a lawyer's lethargy in carrying out his duties to
his client is both unprofessional and unethical.''22 "Indeed, under their sacred oath, lawyers pledge
not to delay any person for money or malice."23

Neither should the said issue have been the reason for his failure to return the documents of his
client. Rule 22.02 mandates him to do so: "A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to
a retainer lien, immediately turn all papers and property to which the client is entitled .... xxx."

In the recent en banc case of Fabie v. Atty. Real,24 the Court suspended the errant lawyer from the
practice of law for six (6) months for failing to return the documents and money entrusted to him by
his client. At the same time, he was ordered to return the money with legal interest from the time he
received the same until full payment thereof. In the present case, records show that respondent
received the total amount of ₱165,127.00 as follows: ₱l00,000,00 on May 10, 1997; ₱23,000.00 on
August 18, 1999; ₱13,563.50 on August 4, 2000; another ₱13,563.50 on August 5, 2000; and
₱l5,000.00 on August 31, 7001.25 Thus, pursuant to our ruling in Fabie, respondent must return the
aforesaid amounts to complainant with interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum from their
respective date of receipt until June 30, 2013, and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until full
payment.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is found GUILTY of violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for six (6) months and ORDERED to return to complainant within ten (10) days from notice all
the pertinent records and documents, and the amounts of ₱l00,000.00; ₱23,000.00; ₱13,653.50;
another ₱13,653.50; and ₱15,000.00, or a total of ₱165,127.00, with interest of 12% per
annum reckoned from the respective date of receipt until June 30, 2013, and 6% per annum from
July 1, 2013 until full payment. Respondent is WARNED that commission of the same or similar
infraction in the future will merit a more severe penalty. Respondent is also directed to submit proof
of his compliance within 30 days from receipt of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered in the personal
records of respondent and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
 BSA TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, COMPLAINANT, V.
ATTY. ALBERTO CELESTINO B. REYES II, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
The extant case originated from a disbarment complaint which the
complainant BSA Tower Condominium Corporation filed against
respondent Atty. Alberto Celestino B. Reyes II.
The pertinent facts of the case are as follows:
Complainant BSA Tower Condominium Corporation alleged that it hired
respondent Atty. Alberto Celestino B. Reyes II sometime in November 2005
to settle its real estate tax problems with the City of Makati. Between
December 2006 and January 2007, Reyes obtained P25 million from BSA
Tower, from which he may draw amounts for legitimate expenses in
carrying out his official duties. However, out of the said amount, Reyes was
only able to account for P5 million. This clearly violated Rule 16.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Also, on June 22, 2011, Reyes entered his appearance as counsel for the
plaintiff in Civil Case 09-089 entitled Marietta K. Ilusorio v. BSA Tower
Condominium Corp. and Waldo Flores before the Makati Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 62. Said case was an action for reimbursement of the
amount of P500,000.00 which Ilusorio supposedly gave BSA Tower in
advance for the payment of its electric and water bills. Later, Reyes took the
witness stand and testified against BSA Tower. He likewise admitted that at
the time Ilusorio's purported advances were made, he was BSA Tower's
Corporate Secretary. Thus, on October 11, 2011, BSA Tower filed a Motion
to Expunge the Testimony against Reyes. It contended that although the
subject matter of the civil case involved information which Reyes had
acquired by virtue of his former professional relationship with BSA Tower
or about which he had been advising the company, he never obtained its
written consent or waiver in the matter of him representing Ilusorio in said
case. Accordingly, he violated Rules 15.03 and 21.02 of the CPR on conflict
of interest.
On the other hand, Reyes denied the charges against him. He explained
that when BSA Tower engaged his services, its liability stood at P31 million
and the land was set to be sold at public auction. Their agreement was that
Reyes would be paid 10% of whatever savings BSA Tower would generate
through his efforts. Thereafter, BSA Tower's annual realty tax was reduced
from P5 million to only P2 million per year beginning 2007. Reyes asserted
that BSA Tower's total savings reached P21 million, apart from the amount
of P25 million when the settlement was forged. However, BSA Tower never
paid him his contingent fee. Hence, he filed a complaint with the Makati
RTC to collect his fee, and the court later ordered BSA Tower to pay him the
amount of P1,920,000.00, plus legal interest from January 2007, until fully
paid.
As to his appearance as counsel for the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 09-089,
Reyes claimed that he had asked BSA Tower's authorized representative if
she or the corporation had any objection to his appearance as Ilusorio's
counsel. The representative said that she had none. Likewise, when he
formally entered his appearance in said civil case, BSA Tower did not
object. Yet, it later filed a Motion to Expunge his testimony. The court,
however, denied said motion.
On June 13, 2013, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) recommended the dismissal of the disbarment
complaint against Reyes, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended
that the disbarment complaint filed by complainant BSA Tower
Condominium Corporation against respondent Atty. Alberto Celestino B.
Reyes II be DISMISSED.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[1]
On June 5, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXI-
2015-377,[2] which adopted the aforementioned recommendation, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A," finding the recommendation to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws. Thus, the case
against Respondent is hereby DISMISSED.
Unfazed, BSA Tower filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On April 19, 2017,
the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXII-2017-968,[3] which
provides:
RESOLVED to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration there being no new
reason and/or new argument adduced to reverse the previous findings
and decision of the Board of Governors.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings and
recommendation of the IBP that the present disbarment complaint against
Reyes must be dismissed.
In administrative proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant. For the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
against the respondent must be established by convincing and satisfactory
proof.[4]
BSA Tower claims that Reyes violated Rules 16.01, 15.03, and 21.02 of the
CPR. Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the CPR provide:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR provides:
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
While Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the CPR states:
Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use
information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the
same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with
full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
In Aniñon v. Atty. Sabitsana, Jr.,[5] the Court laid down the tests to
determine if a lawyer is guilty of representing conflicting interests between
and among his clients. One of these tests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation would prevent the full discharge of a lawyer's duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Another test is whether a
lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former
client any confidential information acquired through their connection or
previous employment.[6]
On the matter of the alleged failure of Reyes to account for BSA Tower's
funds, the Makati RTC, Branch 133 had ruled that BSA Tower is even the
one that is liable to pay Reyes the amount of P1,920,000.00. With regard to
the purported conflict of interest, the Makati RTC, Branch 146 had also
ruled in favor of Reyes, saying that there was no conflict of interest in his
appearance as counsel of Ilusorio. There was no convincing evidence that
would show that, at the time that he was acting as Ilusorio's counsel, Reyes
indeed used any confidential information that he had obtained from BSA
Tower when he was still the corporation's Corporate Secretary. The dispute
between Ilusorio and BSA Tower was contractual in nature such that his
new relationship with Ilusorio would not require him to disclose matters
obtained during his engagement as the Corporate Secretary or counsel of
the corporation. Neither would his acceptance of Ilusorio as a new client
prevent the full discharge of his duties as a lawyer or invite suspicion of
double-dealing. In other words, the matters being put in issue by BSA
Tower in this case had already been submitted for judicial resolution and
the courts had decided against it. It seems, therefore, that the instant
disbarment case against Reyes is just a mere attempt to bring the courts'
rulings for an indirect review through an administrative case, which is an
improper remedy. To rule that there is conflict of interest and that there is
misappropriation of BSA Tower's funds would, in effect, reverse the rulings
of the lower courts.
The Court has consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal
presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the
contrary is proved, and that as an officer of the court, he is presumed to
have performed his duties in accordance with his oath. Burden of proof, on
the other hand, is defined in Section 1 of Rule 131 as the duty of a party to
present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or
defense by the amount of evidence required by law.[7]
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding
of guilt is substantial evidence, which is that amount of relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Further, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence
the allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not
evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Likewise, charges based on mere
suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence. Besides, the
evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence – as opposed to
preponderance of evidence – is more in keeping with the primordial
purpose of and essential considerations attending this type of cases. As case
law elucidates, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an
action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct
of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no
sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, it also involves neither a plaintiff
nor a prosecutor. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public
interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges
as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of
the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.[8]
Here, BSA Tower seriously failed to discharge said burden of proof. The
issues which BSA Tower presented in this case had already been submitted
for judicial resolution and the courts had ruled in favor of Reyes. Hence, the
Court finds that the acts of Reyes are not tantamount to a violation of any of
the CPR provisions.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
Court DISMISSES the instant Complaint against Atty. Alberto Celestino
B. Reyes II for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 206167, March 19, 2018

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

JOSE D. AZARRAGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 37,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ILOILO CITY, AND ATTY. REX C.
MUZONES, Respondents.

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision2 dated April 14, 2011 and Resolution3 dated January 8, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03908 dismissing the petition filed by the National
Power Corporation (NPC) for being filed out of time.

The Antecedent Facts

The case stemmed from Civil Case No. 05-28553 filed by Spouses Romulo and Elena
Javellana (Spouses Javellana) to fix lease rental and just compensation; collection of
sum of money and damages against NPC and National Transmission Corporation
(Transco).4

On July 26, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision5 in favor of the Spouses Javellana. NPC
and Transco filed their respective appeal.6 On the other hand, Spouses Javellana filed a
Motion for Execution Pending Appeal.7 On January 4, 2008, the RTC, in its
Order8 granted the motion for execution pending appeal.

In the meantime, Transco negotiated with Spouses Javellana for the extra-judicial
settlement of the case. As a result, Transco agreed to buy the property of the Spouses
Javellana affected by the transmission lines. Subsequently, Spouses Javellana received
the amount of P80,380,822.00 from Transco.9

Thereafter, Atty. Rex C. Muzones (Atty. Muzones), the counsel of the Spouses Javellana
filed a Notice of Attorney's lien.10

Transco then filed a Motion to Dismiss11 the case in view of the extra-judicial settlement
of the case. On his part, Atty. Muzones filed a Motion for Partial Satisfaction of
Judgment and Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.12

On June 27, 2008, the respondent judge issued an Order13 ordering NPC and Transco to
pay Atty. Muzones the amount of P52,469,660.00 as his attorney's lien, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, an Entry for the satisfaction of the Judgment claims
of [Spouses Javellana], in the amount of P80,380,822.00 be made in the records and
the same DISMISSED against [NPC and Transco].
[NPC and Transco] are hereby directed to pay [Spouses Javellana's] counsel, [Atty.
MUZONES], his Lawyer's Lien in the amount of P52,469,660.00, within a period of TEN
(10) days from receipt of this Order.

Pending compliance the Motion to Dismiss is held in abeyance.

SO ORDERED.14

On June 30, 2008, the respondent judge issued a Clarificatory Order15 stating that the
attorney's fees of P52,469,660.00 is separate and distinct from the amount to be paid
to the Spouses Javellana, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, an Entry for the satisfaction of the judgment

claims of [Spouses Javellana], in the amount of P80,380,822.00 be made in the records
and the same DISMISSED against [NPC and Transco].

[NPC and Transco] are hereby directed to pay [Spouses Javellana's] counsel, [Atty.
MUZONES], his Lawyer's lien in the amount of P52,469,660.00, within a period of TEN
(10) days from receipt of this Order, which payment is aside from, separate and
different from the amount of P80380.822.00 paid by [NPC and Transco] to [Spouses
Javellana].

Pending compliance the Motion to Dismiss is held in abeyance.

SO ORDERED.16 (Underscoring in the original)

Transco filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the orders, while NPC filed its comment to
the Clarificatory Order.17

On August 6, 2008, the respondent judge denied18 the motion for reconsideration and
the comment of NPC, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the reliefs prayed for in the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by [NPC], dated July 15, 2008 and the Comment filed by [NPC]
dated July 21, 2008 are hereby DENIED.

The Order dated June 27, 2008 and Clarificatory Order dated June 30, 2008, stands.

SO ORDERED.19

NPC then filed a motion for reconsideration20 of the Order dated August 6, 2008. The
respondent judge however denied the same in his Order21 dated September 22, 2008.

Aggrieved, NPC filed a Petition for Certiorari22 with the CA assailing the Orders dated
June 27, 2008, June 30, 2008, August 6, 2008 and September 22, 2008.

In its Decision23 dated April 14, 2011, the CA dismissed NPC's petition for being filed
beyond the 60-day reglementary period.
Thus, NPC comes before Us assailing the CA's dismissal of its petition.

The petition is GRANTED.

Petition for Certiorari is the wrong remedy.

At the outset, NPC filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
which is a wrong remedy.

"A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that
may be resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law."24 In the instant case, NPC has a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy to appeal the CA decision, which is to file a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Section 1 of Rule 45 states that "A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth."

Here, the Decision dated April 14, 2011 of the CA dismissed the NPC's petition for being
filed out of time, thus it was a final judgment rendered by the CA. There is nothing left
to be done by the CA in respect to the said case. Thus, NPC should have filed an appeal
by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before this Court, not a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.

In the case of Malayang Manggagawa ng Stay fast Phils., Inc. v. NLRC, et al.,25 it is
stated that the existence of an appeal prohibits the parties' resort to a petition
for certiorari, thus:

The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order
or resolution is appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to the court
rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or
the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the
findings of fact or of law set out in the decision, order or resolution. The
existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because
one of the requirements for the latter remedy is that there should be no
appeal.26 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)

The Comment filed by NPC is in the nature of a Motion for Reconsideration.

We agree with the CA that the Comment filed by NPC is in the nature of a motion for
reconsideration. The allegations of NPC and even the prayer27 of NPC in its comment
sought the reconsideration of the June 30, 2008 Clarificatory Order. Thus, upon the
RTC's denial of the "Comment", NPC should have already filed for a Petition
for Certiorari before the CA, not a second motion for reconsideration before the RTC.
Thus, upon NPC's filing of its Petition for Certiorari on December 2, 2008, the 60-day
reglementary period of filing the same has already lapsed.

Technical rules of procedure should give way to serve substantial justice.

Notwithstanding the procedural lapses in this case, We opt not to deny the case based
on merely technical grounds. We must be reminded that deciding a case is not a mere
play of technical rules. If We are to abide by Our mandate to provide justice for all, We
should be ready to set aside technical rules of procedure when the same hampers
justice rather than to serve the same.

The Contract of Legal Services28 executed between Spouses Javellana and Atty.
Muzones, fixed the contingency fee at 12.5% of whatever amount realized, to wit:

That the CLIENT engages the legal services of the herein LAWYER under the following
terms and conditions, to wit:

Preparation and filing of a Complaint to Fix Lease Rental and Just Compensation;
Collection of a Sum of Money and Damages against NPC and NTC before the RTC, Iloilo
City and appearance at every stage of the proceedings until terminated - a Contingent
Fee at the rate of 12.5% of whatever award or monetary consideration realized.29

A contingent fee arrangement is permitted in this jurisdiction because they redound to

the benefit of the poor client.30 In the case of Rayos v. Atty. Hernandez,31 We stated
that:

A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is generally recognized as

valid and binding but must be laid down in an express contract. The amount of
contingent fee agreed upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will
be paid for his legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A much higher
compensation is allowed as contingent fee in consideration of the risk that the lawyer
may get nothing if the suit fails. Contracts of this nature are permitted because they
redound to the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer "especially in cases where the
client has meritorious cause of action, but no means with which to pay for legal services
unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract for a contingent fee to be paid
out of the proceeds of the litigation. Oftentimes, the contingent fee arrangement is the
only means by which the poor and helpless can seek redress for injuries sustained and
have their rights vindicated.

Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and close scrutiny of the court
in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges. Section 13 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics states that "a contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by
law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and
uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a
court, as to its reasonableness. x x x[.]32 (Citations and emphasis omitted)

It appears on the records that the contingency fee arrangement executed between
Spouses Javellana and Atty. Muzones, fixed the contingency fee at 12.5% of whatever
amount realized,33 this Court deems the said arrangement as reasonable since the
Spouses Javellana did not dispute the said percentage nor questioned Atty. Muzones'
right to claim such amount.

However, the RTC erred when it computed the 12.5% contingent fee on the basis of the
original award of P419,757,280.00.34 It is clear in the Contract of Legal Services that
the 12.5% contingency fee should be computed on the amount of whatever award or
monetary consideration realized. Since the the amount actually received by the
Spouses Javellana under the compromise agreement was only P80,380,822.00,35 then
the 12.5% contingency fee should be pegged on this amount. As such, Atty. Muzones is
only entitled to the amount of P10,047,602.75.

NPC is not liable to pay the attorney's fees.

Notwithstanding Our finding that Atty. Muzones is entitled to the amount of

P10,047,602.75, NPC is still not liable to pay such amount. It is settled that payment of
attorney's fees is the personal obligation of the clients.36

As held in the case of Atty. Gubat v. National Power Corporation,37 the client, in this
case, Spouses Javellana, has the right to settle the case even without the participation
of Atty. Muzones, thus:

[A] client has an undoubted right to settle a suit without the intervention of his lawyer,
for he is generally conceded to have the exclusive control over the subject-matter of
the litigation and may, at any time before judgment, if acting in good faith,
compromise, settle, and adjust his cause of action out of court without his attorney's
intervention, knowledge, or consent, even though he has agreed with his attorney not
to do so. Hence, a claim for attorney's fees does not void the compromise agreement
and is no obstacle to a court approval.

However, counsel is not without remedy. As the validity of a compromise agreement

cannot be prejudiced, so should not be the payment of a lawyer's adequate and
reasonable compensation for his services should the suit end by reason of the
settlement. The terms of the compromise subscribed to by the client should not be such
that will amount to an entire deprivation of his lawyer's fees, especially when the
contract is on a contingent fee basis. In this sense, the compromise settlement cannot
bind the lawyer as a third party. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection
against injustice or imposition of fraud on the part of his client as the client is against
abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not only to ensure that a
lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see to it that a lawyer is paid his
just fees.38 (Citations omitted)

However, NPC cannot be held liable to pay the attorney's fees of Atty. Muzones since
the same is a personal obligation of the Spouses Javellana who benefited from the legal
services of Atty. Muzones. Thus, the RTC committed a reversible error when it held NPC
and Transco are solidarily liable to pay the amount of P52,469,660.00, representing
Atty. Muzones' attorney's fees. The contract for the payment of attorney's fees is
strictly a contract between Spouses Javellana and Atty. Muzones. It is basic that a
contract takes effect only between the parties, their assigns, and heirs.39 Thus, NPC
cannot be affected by the contract between Spouses Javellana and Atty. Muzones,
specially as to the payment of attorney's fees. Therefore, any action as to the
satisfaction of the attorney's fees should be brought against the Spouses Javellana and
not against NPC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 14, 2011 and
Resolution dated January 8, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03908
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Order dated June 27, 2008, the
Clarificatory Order dated June 30, 2008 are MODIFIED by DELETING the joint and
solidary liability of National Power Corporation and National Transmission Corporation
for the payment of the attorney's fees in the amount of P52,469,660.00 to Atty. Rex C.
Muzones.

This is without prejudice to any action Atty. Rex C. Muzones may bring against Spouses
Romulo and Elena Javellana for the satisfaction of his attorney's fees under the Contract
for Legal Services.

SO ORDERED.
ETHELENE W. SAN JUAN v. ATTY. FREDDIE A. VENIDA +

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint filed by Ethelene W. San
Juan (Ethelene) against respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida (Atty. Venida)
for violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Sometime in 2007, Ethelene required the services of a lawyer to handle the

petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage that she was
considering to file. Ethelene's mother referred her to Atty. Venida, whom
she engaged to file the case on her behalf. Atty. Venida agreed to handle the
case for a consideration of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000) by way
of acceptance, filing, and docket fees. Atty. Venida personally collected the
P25,000 from Ethelene's house on April 22, 2007, and required her to sign
a verification to be attached to the petition.[1]

The following day, Atty. Venida required an additional Four Thousand

Pesos (P4,000) for the fees of the sheriff or process server in order to serve
the summons. Ethelene paid the said amount on April 24, 2007, as
evidenced by an Acknowledgment Receipt[2] dated April 22, 2007. Atty.
Venida assured Ethelene that he will file the petition with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City (Makati RTC) as soon as possible.

After a month, Ethelene's mother called Atty. Venida to inquire if the case
had already been filed, and the latter answered in the affirmative. Based on
Atty. Venida's assurances, Ethelene's mother contacted him again to
confirm if a hearing of the case had already been scheduled. Atty. Venida
told Ethelene's mother to wait and that he will inform them if a hearing had
already been set. Ethelene's mother persisted on inquiring when a hearing
on the petition will be scheduled, and Atty. Venida repeatedly answered
that it normally takes time before a hearing is scheduled, and they would
just have to wait.[3]

In the meantime, Ethelene's mother asked for a copy of the petition that
Atty. Venida filed in court. Upon examination of the copy of the petition
that she received,[4] Ethelene discovered that it was not stamped "Received"
by the Makati RTC Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC). Ethelene contacted
Atty. Venida to clarify this matter, and the latter informed her that only the
draft copy was given to them and that the file copy of the petition, duly
acknowledged by the OCC, was left in his office.[5] Ethelene asked Atty.
Venida for his office or residence address in order to secure a copy of the
petition herself. However, Atty. Venida refused to reveal his address.

Beginning to suspect that something was amiss, Ethelene went to the OCC
to verify and inquire about the status of the petition. To her great dismay
and disappointment, the OCC informed her that no such petition was filed
with its office.[6] Ethelene contacted Atty. Venida to clarify the matter, but
the latter merely avoided her and told her he was busy. When Atty. Venida
finally agreed to meet with Ethelene and her mom, he did not show up.
Ethelene tried to contact him again, but he never returned her calls.[7]

Thus, on August 8, 2007, Ethelene filed a complaint for disbarment against

Atty. Venida with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Acting on the
complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued a Notice of
Mandatory Conference on February 13, 2014 directing Ethelene and Atty.
Venida to appear before the CBD for mandatory conference on April 8,
2014 and to submit their respective Mandatory Conference Brief three days
prior to the scheduled date. Both parties, however, failed to appear despite
notice. Thus, the CBD submitted the case for resolution.

In its Report and Recommendation[8] dated June 22, 2015, the CBD
recommended the disbarment of Atty. Venida for exhibiting dubious
character that affects the standing of lawyers. The CBD was convinced that
Atty. Venida acted in bad faith, with a clear intent to deceive Ethelene when
he furnished her a draft copy of the petition rather than a receiving copy to
show that the petition had, indeed, been filed.

On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-
2015-609,[9] adopting and approving the recommendation of the CBD. The
Resolution reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws, and considering
Respondent's rude disposition denigrating the legal profession and insolent
and conceited manner before the Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty.
Freddie A. Venida is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his
name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
Given the foregoing finding, the only remaining question that begs
resolution is whether Atty. Venida is guilty of misappropriating the total
amount of P29,000 that Ethelene entrusted to him for filing the petition for
the annulment of the latter's marriage.

We sustain the findings of the IBP that Atty. Venida acted in bad faith and
deceived Ethelene, in violation of his sworn duties under the Lawyer's Oath
and Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).

Lawyers are duty-bound to exhibit fidelity to their client's cause and to be

mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them to diligently prosecute
their clients' cases the moment they agreed to handle them, as is mandated
of them under Canon 17 of the Code. They owe entire devotion to the
interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the
client's rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the
end that nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of
law legally applied.[10] Atty. Venida grossly failed to fulfil this mandate.

The records definitively show that Atty. Venida was completely remiss and
negligent in handling Ethelene's case, notwithstanding his receipt of the
sum of Twenty-Nine Thousand Pesos (P29,000) from her by way of his
acceptance and filing fees. Instead of filing the petition, Atty. Venida gave
his client a runaround and led her to believe that the petition had already
been filed. When pressed for updates, Atty. Venida evaded Ethelene and
refused to return her calls. Worse, the fees remain unaccounted for, which
were entrusted to him for the filing of the petition.

When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the
lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the
money was spent for that particular purpose. And if he or she does not use
the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return
the money to the client.[11] Consequently, Atty. Venida is duty-bound to
return the P29,000 given to him by Ethelene. Failure to do so is a breach of
Rule 16.01 of the Code, which provides:
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
Atty. Venida's agreement to handle Ethelene's case, cemented by his receipt
of his legal fees, is an assurance and representation to his client that he
would be diligent and competent in handling her case. This includes
constantly updating her, on his volition, of the status of her case. Thus, his
actuations are contrary to Canon 18, and its Rules 18.03 and 18.04, which
state:

Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence;

xxxx

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for
information. x x x
Moreover, Rule 1.01 of the Code states that "a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Deceitful conduct
involves moral turpitude and includes anything done contrary to justice,
modesty or good morals. It is an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in
general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.[12] As
pronounced by this Court in Belleza v. Atty. Macasa,[13] a lawyer has the
duty to deliver his client's funds or properties as they fall due or upon
demand. His failure to return the client's money upon demand gives rise to
the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the
prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the client. It is a
gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it
impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.[14]

Atty. Venida's misappropriation of the funds, as well as avoidance to

account for his actions when confronted of his falsities, constitutes
dishonesty, abuse of trust and confidence, and betrayal of his client's
interests. These acts undoubtedly speak of deceit. Such malfeasance is not
only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; it
also reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law.[15] Good
moral character is not only a condition precedent relating to his admission
into the practice of law, but is a continuing imposition in order for him to
maintain his membership in the Philippine Bar.[16]

In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates
that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for any of the
following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office;
(4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer's oath; (7) willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney
for a party without authority to do so.[17] Thus, a lawyer may be disbarred or
suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or
an odious deportment unbecoming of an attorney. A lawyer must at no time
be wanting in probity and moral fiber, which are not only conditions
precedent to his entrance to the Bar, but are likewise essential demands for
his continued membership in it.[18]

The IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt the recommendation of the

IBP-CBD to disbar Atty. Venida from the practice of law for his infractions
against Ethelene. However, jurisprudence advises that the power to disbar
must be exercised with great caution, and may be imposed only in a clear
case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of
the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar.
Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty could
accomplish the end desired. Without doubt, a violation of the high moral
standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate
penalty, including suspension and disbarment. However, the said penalties
are imposed with great caution, because they are the most severe forms of
disciplinary action and their consequences are beyond repair.[19]

The question as to what disciplinary' sanction should be meted out against

a lawyer found guilty of misconduct requires consideration of a number of
factors. When deciding upon the appropriate sanction, the Court must
consider that the primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to
protect the public; to foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve the
integrity of the profession; and to deter other lawyers from similar
misconduct.[20]

It is for this reason that we take note of Atty. Venida's wanton disregard of
the disbarment complaint against him, as well as the arrogance that he
exhibited before the IBP-CBD in ignoring the notices sent to him to explain
the matter. Clearly, Atty. Venida does not seem to consider that an
administrative case against him, which could very well result in the
revocation of his license and expulsion from the Roll of Attorneys, is neither
pressing nor important enough to merit his attention.

We also take note of the past disbarment complaints that had been filed
against him that resulted in his suspension for one (1) year from the
practice of law for each case. In G.R. No. 132826 entitled Rolando Saa v.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline,
Board of Governors, Pasig City, and Atty. Freddie A. Venida, the
complainant filed a disbarment case against Atty. Venida with this Court.
We required Atty. Venida to comment on the complaint against him in a
Resolution dated February 17, 1992. Instead of complying with the
directive, he belatedly filed a partial comment and asked to be furnished
with a copy of the complaint. Despite receipt of a copy of the complaint,
Atty. Venida still did not file his complete comment within 10 days as
required in the February 17, 1992 Resolution. He only filed a partial
comment on January 26, 1993 or 11 months after being directed to do so in
the February 17, 1992 resolution. Atty. Venida filed his full comment on
September 4, 1995 which was a little over three years after due date. For his
blatant disregard of the Court's order and unduly delaying the complaint
against him, Atty. Venida was suspended by the Court for one (1) year from
the practice of law.

In yet another disbarment case against Atty. Venida, docketed as A.C. No.
10043 and entitled Aurora H. Cabauatan v. Atty. Freddie A. Venida, the
complainant alleged that she engaged the services of Atty. Venida to handle
her case which was pending with the Court of Appeals. Complainant made
several follow-ups on her case until she lost contact with him. Hearing
nothing from Atty. Venida, complainant just found out that her appeal was
deemed abandoned and dismissed when an Entry of Judgment in the case
was issued against her. Thus, she filed a complaint for disbarment against
Atty. Venida for his gross, reckless, and inexcusable negligence in handling
her appeal. We found Atty. Venida guilty of violating Canons 17 and 18, and
Rules 18.03 to 18.04 and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1)
year.

Indubitably, Atty. Venida has a penchant for violating not only his oath as a
lawyer and the Code, but orders from the Court as well. He had been
repeatedly warned that a similar violation will merit a more severe penalty,
and yet, his reprehensible conduct has, time and again, brought
embarrassment and dishonour to the legal profession. The Court cannot
allow his blatant disregard of the Code and his sworn duty to continue.

In CF Sharp Crew Management Incorporated v. Atty. Torres,[21] the Court

disbarred the respondent for failing to account for and for
misappropriating the various amounts he received from his client. Similarly
in Arellano University, Inc. v. Mijares III,[22] the Court disbarred the
lawyer for misappropriating the client's money intended for securing a
certificate of title on the latter's behalf.

With the aforementioned cases as guidelines, We deem it fit to impose the

ultimate penalty of disbarment from the practice of law upon Atty. Venida,
considering that this is the second disciplinary action against him for a case
of a similar nature. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege, and
whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the
trust and confidence of his clients and the public, it becomes not only the
right but also the duty of the Court to withdraw the same.[23]

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida is found GUILTY of

violating Canons 16, 17, and 18, and Rules 1.01, 16.01, 18.03 and 18.04 of
the .Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name
is ORDERED stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys, effective
immediately.

Atty. Venida is ordered to refund the amount of P29,000 to complainant

Ethelene W. San Juan within thirty (30) days from notice. Otherwise, he
may be held in contempt of court.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant for their
information and guidance, and let it be entered in Atty. Freddie A. Venida's
record in this Court.

SO ORDERED.
 .C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014

NESTOR B. FIGUERAS AND BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR., Complainants, v. ATTY.

DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review filed by Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez assailing the
February 19, 2009 Resolution1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) suspending him from the practice of law for a period of six months for
breach of Rule 12.03,2 Canon 12,3 Canon 17,4 Rule 18.03,5 and Canon 186 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He likewise assails the June 26, 2011 Resolution7 of the
IBP Board of Governors denying his motion for reconsideration.

The facts are as follows: chanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry

Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of the

affairs of the homeowners of Congressional Village in Quezon City. On January 7,
1993, the Spouses Federico and Victoria Santander filed a civil suit for damages against
the Association and Ely Mabanag8 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 104 for building a concrete wall which abutted their property and denied them
of their right of way. The spouses Santander likewise alleged that said concrete wall
was built in violation of Quezon City Ordinance No. 8633, S-71 which prohibits the
closing, obstructing, preventing or otherwise refusing to the public or vehicular traffic
the use of or free access to any subdivision or community street.9 The Law Firm of
Gonzalez Sinense Jimenez and Associates was the legal counsel for the Association,
with respondent as the counsel of record and handling lawyer. After trial and hearing,
the RTC rendered a decision10 on October 4, 1996 in favor of the Spouses Santander.
The Association, represented by said law firm, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
On February 5, 1999, the CA issued a Resolution11 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577 dismissing
the appeal on the ground that the original period to file the appellant’s brief had expired
95 days even before the first motion for extension of time to file said brief was filed.
The CA also stated that the grounds adduced for the said motion as well as the six
subsequent motions for extension of time to file brief were not meritorious. The CA
resolution became final.

Eight years later or on April 11, 2007, complainants Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido
Victoria, Jr., as members of the Association, filed a Complaint12 for Disbarment against
respondent before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) for violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and Rule
18.03, Canon 18 thereof for his negligence in handling the appeal and willful violation of
his duties as an officer of the court.

In his Verified Answer with Counter Complaint,13 respondent denied administrative

liability. He claimed that although his law firm represented the homeowner’s association
in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577, the case was actually handled by an associate lawyer in his
law office. As the partner in charge of the case, he exercised general supervision over
the handling counsel and signed the pleadings prepared by said handling lawyer. Upon
discovery of the omissions of the handling lawyer, appropriate sanctions were imposed
on the handling lawyer and he thereafter personally took responsibility and spent
personal funds to negotiate a settlement with Federico Santander at no cost to the
Association. No damage whatsoever was caused to the Association.

Respondent likewise alleged that after he defeated complainant Figueras in the election
for President of the homeowner’s association in 1996, Figueras and his compadre,
complainant Victoria, stopped paying their association dues and other assessments.
Complainants and other delinquent members of the association were sanctioned by the
Board of Directors and were sued by the association before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB). In retaliation, complainants filed the present disbarment
case against him and several other cases against him and other officers of the
association before the HLURB to question, among others, the legitimacy of the
Association, the election of its officers, and the sanctions imposed by the Association.
Thus, he concluded that the disbarment case was filed to harass him. Respondent
added that complainants have no personality to file the disbarment complaint as they
were not his clients; hence, there was likewise no jurisdiction over the complaint on the
part of the IBP-CBD.

As counterclaim, respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the disbarment case
for lack of merit, the imposition of sanctions on complainants, and the payment of
damages for the filing of the baseless complaint for disbarment.

On October 3, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD found respondent

liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03 of
Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 thereof, and recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three to six months,
with warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.14crallawlib rary

On February 19, 2009, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-
2009-1415 adopting the recommendation with modifications as follows: chanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution [as] Annex “A”; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s breach of Rule 12.03, Canon
12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03 and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.
Diosdado B. Jimenez is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months. The Warning imposed against respondent is hereby deleted.

Respondent sought reconsideration of the resolution but his motion was denied in IBP
Resolution No. XIX-2011-480 dated June 26, 2011.16 The IBP Board of Governors
noted that respondent’s motion was a mere reiteration of matters already discussed
and there were no substantial grounds to disturb the February 19, 2009 Resolution.

Respondent now comes to this Court essentially raising the issue whether the IBP
correctly found him administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon
17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds that the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law is proper.

The Court finds no merit in respondent’s contention that complainants have no

personality to file a disbarment case against him as they were not his clients and that
the present suit was merely instituted to harass him.

The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real
party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the
person who called the attention of the court to a lawyer’s misconduct “is in no sense a
party, and generally has no interest in the outcome.”17 crallawlib rary

In Heck v. Judge Santos,18 the Court held that “[a]ny interested person or the
court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings.” The right to institute
disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person
complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are
matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of
proof of the charges.

The Court agrees with the IBP that respondent had been remiss in the performance of
his duties as counsel for Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. Records
show that respondent filed the first motion for extension of time to file appellant’s
brief 95 days after the expiration of the reglementary period to file said brief, thus
causing the dismissal of the appeal of the homeowner’s association. To justify his
inexcusable negligence, respondent alleges that he was merely the supervising lawyer
and that the fault lies with the handling lawyer. His contention, however, is belied by
the records for we note that respondent had filed with the CA an Urgent Motion for
Extension, which he himself signed on behalf of the law firm, stating that a previous
motion had been filed but “due to the health condition of the undersigned counsel…he
was not able to finish said Appellants’ Brief within the fifteen (15) day period earlier
requested by him.”19 Thus, it is clear that respondent was personally in charge of the
case.

A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting

the latter’s interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellant’s brief on behalf
of his client, respondent had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule
12.04,20 Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts every
member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it
his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the same Code also states that: chanRoblesVirtua lawlib rary

Canon 18—A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03.—A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

In In Re: Atty. Santiago F. Marcos21 the Court considered a lawyer’s failure to file brief
for his client as amounting to inexcusable negligence. The Court held: chanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with
utmost diligence. (Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to file brief
for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. (People vs. Villar,
46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed
by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the
speedy administration of justice. (Canons 21 and 22, Canons of Professional
Ethics; People vs. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People vs. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515).

It has been stressed that the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred
or merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial
discretion.22 The penalties for a lawyer’s failure to file a brief or other pleading range
from reprimand,23 warning with fine,24 suspension25 and, in grave cases,
disbarment.26 In the present case, we find too harsh the recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of six months. Under the circumstances, we deem the penalty of suspension for one
month from the practice of law to be more commensurate with the extent of
respondent’s violation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is found

administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.04, Canon 12 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is suspended from the practice of law for
one (1) month effective from finality of this Resolution, with warning that a repetition of
the same or similar violation shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished, upon its finality, to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all the courts in the Philippines, and spread on the personal record of
respondent lawyer in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10043 November 20, 2013

AURORA H. CABAUATAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. FREDDIE A. VENIDA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) thru its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) received a
Complaint1 filed by Aurora H. Cabauatan (complainant) against respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida
for serious misconduct and gross neglect of duty. In an Order2 dated June 14, 2007, the IBP-CBD
directed respondent to file his Answer within 15 days from receipt. Respondent failed to file his
Answer. On May 29, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner3 notified the parties of the mandatory
conference scheduled on July 10, 2008.4 The parties were likewise directed to submit their
Mandatory Conference Brief at least three days before the scheduled conference. Only the
complainant submitted her brief.5 During the mandatory conference set on July 10, 2008,
complainant who was already 78 years old appeared. Respondent failed to appear.6 Consequent the
Investigating Commissioner reset the mandatory conference to September 18, 2008.7

On September 18, 2008, respondent again failed to appear despite notice thus he was deemed to
have waived his right to be present and to submit evidence in his behalf. Only the complainant was
present and complied with the directive to submit her Position Paper together with the documents
that would support her case.8

The facts of the case as incorporated in the Report and Recommendation9 of the Investigating
Commissioner are as follows:

This is a Disbarment case filed by Complainant against Respondent for gross, reckless and
inexcusable negligence. Complainant alleged that she was the appellant in CA-G.R. [No.] 85024
entitled Aurora Cabauatan, Plaintiff-Appellant vs. Philippine National Bank, Defendant-Appellee. The
case was originally handled by a different lawyer but she decided to change her counsel and
engaged the services of the Respondent x x x. Complainant was then furnished by the Respondent
of the pleadings he prepared, such as "Appearance as Counsel/Dismissal of the Previous Counsel
and a Motion for Extension of time to File a Memorandum."

Complainant made several follow-ups on her case until she lost contact with the Respondent.
Complainant alleged the gross, reckless and inexcusable negligence of the Respondent [which she]
was able to prove with the Entry of Judgment (attached as Annex "C" of her Position Paper, and as
Annex "D" of her Complaint) issued by the Honorable Court of Appeals quoted hereunder. "x x x

This is to certify that on March 31, 2006 a resolution rendered in the above-entitled case was filed in
this Office, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal in this case is deemed ABANDONED and DISMISSED on authority of
Sec. 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1996 Rules of Civil Procedure.

SO ORDERED.
and that the same has on April 23, 2006 become final and executory and is hereby recorded in the
Book of Entries of Judgments. x x x"

From the order itself, it is obvious that Respondent did not submit any pleading with the Court of
Appeals. It is likewise very noticeable that the Respondent was not among those furnished with a
copy of the Entry of Judgment hence it is crystal clear that he never submitted his Entry of
Appearance with the Court of Appeals [insofar] as the case of the Complainant is concerned. When
the Complainant was following up on the status of the case with him, Respondent assured the
Complainant that he was doing his best in dealing with the case, nevertheless, later on Complainant
lost contact with him.

The fact that the Entry of Judgment issued by the Court of Appeals that stated "x x x deemed
ABANDONED and DISMISSED x x x," including the fact that he was not one of the parties furnished
with a copy of the Entry of Judgment proved the inaction and negligence of the Respondent.

Respondent did [furnish] Complainant x x x a copy of "Appearance as Counsel/Dismissal of the

Previous Counsel and a Motion for Extension of time to File a Memorandum," however, no further
actions were [made] by the Respondent to protect [the] rights and interest of his client.10

Based on the foregoing narration of facts, the Investigating Commissioner found that respondent has
not been diligent and competent in handling the case of the complainant when he failed to file the
necessary pleading before the court resulting in its outright dismissal. The respondent also
disregarded the orders of the IBP when he failed to file his Answer, to attend the mandatory
conference, and to file his Position Paper despite receipt of the corresponding notices.11 The
Investigating Commissioner thus recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for one year.12

In Resolution No. XX-2012-51013 dated December 14, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation.

Our Ruling

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

The Code of Professional Responsibility pertinently provides:

Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him.

Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

xxxx

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

It is beyond dispute that complainant engaged the services of respondent to handle her case which
was then on appeal before the Court of Appeals. However, respondent merely showed to
complainant the draft of the pleading "Appearance as Counsel/Dismissal of the Previous Counsel
and a Motion for Extension of time to File a Memorandum" but failed to file the same before the
appellate court. Plainly, respondent had been remiss and negligent in handling the case of his client;
he neglected the legal matter entrusted to him by the complainant and he is liable therefor.

Indeed, when a lawyer takes a client's cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in
protecting the latter's rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a
good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client and
makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society. x
x x14

Complainant also established that she made several follow-ups with the respondent but the latter
merely ignored her or made her believe that he was diligently handling her case. Thus, complainant
was surprised when she received a notice from the Court of Appeals informing her that her appeal
had been abandoned and her case dismissed. The dismissal had become final and executory. This
is a clear violation of Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins
lawyers to keep their clients informed of the status of their case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the clients' request for information.

In addition, we concur with the findings of the IBP that respondent is guilty of disregarding its notices
and orders. Respondent did not heed the IBP's Order to file his Answer. He also disregarded the
1âw phi 1

IBP's directives for him to attend the mandatory conference. Moreover, he did not submit his Position
Paper despite receipt of notice. Respondent's refusal to obey the orders of the IBP "is not only
irresponsible, but also constitutes utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. His
conduct is unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and
processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives being themselves
officers of the court."15 Respondent should be reminded that -

As an officer of the court, [he] is expected to know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere
request but an order which should be complied with promptly and completely. This is also true of the
orders of the IBP as the investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against lawyers.

Respondent should strive harder to live up to his duties of observing and maintaining the respect
due to the courts, respect for law and for legal processes, and of upholding the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession in order to perform his responsibilities as a lawyer effectively.16

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Freddie A Venida is SUSPENDED from the practice o law for one
year17 effective immediately, with WARNING that a similar violation will be dealt with more severely.
He is DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of his receipt of this Resolution to enable this Court
to determine when his suspension shall take effect.

Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the
Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10378 June 9, 2014

JOSE FRANCISCO T. BAENS, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JONATHAN T. SEMPIO, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before this Court is an administrative case, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Jonathan T. Sempio
(respondent), for violation of Canons 15,1 17,2 183 and Rule 18.034 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code), commenced thru a complaint-affidavit5 filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Jose Francisco T. Baens (complainant).

This legal battle stemmed when the complainant engaged the services of the respondent to
represent him and file a case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against his wife, Lourdes V.
Mendiola-Baens. In his complaint-affidavit dated March 15, 2010, the complainant alleged, among
others, that the respondent: (1) despite receiving the sum of 250,000.00 to cover for the expenses in
the said case,6 failed to file the corresponding petition, and it was the complainant’s wife who
successfully instituted Civil Case No. 2463-08,7 for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on December 8,
2008; (2) even with the complainant furnishing him a copy of the Summons dated December 15,
2008,8 belatedly filed an Answer9 and was able to file it only on March 13, 2009 which was after the
15-day period stated in the Summons; (3) failed to make an objection on the petition on the ground
of improper venue as neither the complainant nor his wife were and are residents of Dasmariñas,
Cavite; (4) never bothered to check the status of the case and thus failed to discover and attend all
the hearings set for the case; and (5) as a result, Civil Case No. 2463-08 was decided10 on October
27, 2009 without the complainant being able to present his evidence.

In his Answer,11 the respondent denied the allegations in the complaint, and explained that: (1) after
a meeting with the complainant, he drafted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
asked the complainant to go over said draft after which he proceeded to file the same with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City; (2) the complainant was aware that said petition will be
filed in Malabon City as the latter had signed the verification and certification of the petition; (3) the
case became pending and was later on withdrawn because of the complainant’s refusal to testify; (4)
what contributed to the delay in filing the Answer was the fact that he still had to let the complainant
go over the same and sign the verification thereof; (5) he was not able to attend the hearings for the
case because he did not receive any notice from the trial court; and (6) it was only on December 2,
2009 when he found out that the trial court has already rendered its decision and that the
complainant had changed counsels.

In the mandatory conference held before the IBP-CBD on October 29, 2010, only the complainant
appeared; thus, the respondent was declared as having waived his right to further participate in the
IBP proceedings. Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, both parties were required to submit their
respective position papers.12

The Investigating Commissioner submitted his Report and Recommendation13 dated October 22,
2011, finding the respondent guilty of violation of the Code and recommended that the respondent
be suspended for six (6) months from the practice of law. Specifically, the Investigating
Commissioner found that the respondent failed to diligently attend to the case and was grossly
negligent in discharging his responsibilities considering the fact that he has already been fully
compensated. The Investigating Commissioner said that the respondent should have manifested or
made known to the trial court that he was not receiving any notice at all since it behoves upon him to
make a follow-up on the developments of the cases he is handling.

As to the respondent’s argument that he indeed filed a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage for the complainant, the Investigating Commissioner held that it cannot betaken at face
value absent the presentation of the pleading itself which by a perusal of the records of the case was
not submitted to the IBP-CBD. Moreso, the veracity of the Certification attached to the respondent’s
answer was highly questionable because it failed to state when the said petition was filed. Lastly, the
Investigating Commissioner faulted the respondent for not sufficiently explaining to the complainant
the consequences of the petition being filed in the RTC of Malabon City since it was the
respondent’s duty and responsibility to explain the complexities of the same to his client for he is the
one tasked with the technical know-how in the field of law.

On June 22, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the Investigating
Commissioner’s report but deemed it proper to increase the recommended period of suspension
from six (6) months to one (1) year.14 On February 14, 2014, the IBP-CBD transmitted the notice of
the resolution and the case records to the Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court.15

The Court finds it fitting to sustain the IBP’s findings and the recommended sanction of suspension
from the practice of law since the attendant facts of the case show substantial evidence to support
the respondent’s delinquency.

The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In
this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and
accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer
is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full
attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it
for a fee or for free.16 Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty of public service,
not money, is the primary consideration.17

It is beyond dispute that the complainant engaged the services of the respondent to handle his case.
The records, however, definitively bear out that the respondent was completely remiss and negligent
in handling the complainant’s case, notwithstanding his receipt of the sum of ₱250,000.00 for the
total expenses to be incurred in the said case.

The excuse proffered by the respondent that he did not receive any orders or notices from the trial
court is highly intolerable. In the first place, securing a copy of such notices, orders and case
1âwphi1

records was within the respondent’s control and is a task that a lawyer undertakes. Moreso, the
preparation and the filing of the answer is a matter of procedure that fully fell within the exclusive
control and responsibility of the respondent. It was incumbent upon him to execute all acts and
procedures necessary and incidental to the advancement of his client’s cause of action.

Records further disclose that the respondent omitted to update himself of the progress of his client’s
case with the trial court, and neither did he resort to available legal remedies that might have
protected his client’s interest. Although a lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to
employ in a case entrusted to him, he must present every remedy or defense within the authority of
law to support his client’s interest. When a lawyer agrees to take up a client’s cause, he covenants
that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights.18

Evidently, the acts of the respondent plainly demonstrated his lack of candor, fairness, and loyalty to
his client as embodied in Canon 15 of the Code. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and
candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to
the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.19

In this case, the respondent’s reckless and inexcusable negligence deprived his client of due
process and his actions were evidently prejudicial to his clients’ interests. A lawyer’s duty of
competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care or giving
sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal,
attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings,
prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination even without
prodding from the client or the court.20

Clearly, it cannot be doubted that the respondent violated Canon 17, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of
the Code which states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him." It further mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence," and that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."21

It must be emphasized that after the respondent agreed to handle the complainant’s case, he
became duty-bound to serve his client with competence and diligence, and to champion his cause
with whole-hearted fidelity. By failing to afford his client every remedy and defense that is authorized
by law, the respondent fell short of what is expected of him as an officer of the Court.22

Thus, for the respondent’s negligence and inadequacies in handling his client’s case, the
recommendation of the IBP to suspend the respondent from the practice of law is well-taken. While
the IBP Board of Governors increased the period of suspension to one year, the Court finds the
period of six months as recommended by the Investigating Commissioner commensurate to the
facts of the case.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Resolution dated June 22, 2013 of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors in CBD Case No. 10-2673. The Court
hereby SUSPENDS Atty. Jonathan T. Sempio from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective
immediately upon receipt of this Decision.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of Atty. Jonathan T. Sempio as a
member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.