The John Dewey Essays in Philosophy W. V. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (1969) A. J. Ayer, Probability and Evidence (1972) Ernest Nagel, Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science (1979) POLITICAL LIBERALISM wd Columbia University Press New York John RawlsI Introduction ‘The contents of this work are as fol- ows, The first three lectures more or less cover the ground of three lec- tures I gave at Columbia University in April of 1980 and which appeared considerably revised in the Journal of Philosophy in September of that year under the title “Kantian Conseructiv- ism in Moral Theory.” Ia the more than ten years since they have again been recast and further revised. I think they are much clearer than be- fore, whichis not co say they are now clear, I continue to call lectures what ‘ight be called chapters, since they ‘were all given as lectures and I try t0 preserve, perhaps unsuccessfully, a certain conversational style. When the original lectures were given I planaed to publish them with three additional lectures. One, “Ba- sic Structure as Subject” (1978), was already given and in print, the otherIntroduction ‘two, “Basic Liberties and Their Priority” (1982) and “Social Unity and Primary Goods" (1982), were either drafted or neat comple- tion. But when these three additional lectures were finally done, they lacked the kind of unity I wanted, either with themselves ot with the three preceding lectures." I then wrote three futther eceures on political liberalism? as 1 now refer to it, beginning with “Political not Metaphysical” (1985), much of which isi cluded in the firs lecture, followed by “Overlapping Consensus’ (1987), “Ideas of the Good” (1988), and “Domain of the Politi cal” (1989). The last three, considerably redone and combined, cogether with “Public Reason,” which appears here for the frst time, make up the second three lectures. The firse six lectures are related this way: the first three set out the general philosophical background of political liberalism in practical reason, especially §§1, 3, 7, 8 of II and all of III, while the second three lay out in more detail several of its main ideas: the idea of an overlapping consensus, the idea of the priority of right and its relation to ideas of the good, and the idea of public reason. The lectures now have the desired unity both among themselves and with the spirit and content of A Theory of Justice,” a unity given by their topic: the idea of political liberalism. To explain this last remark: the aims of A Theory of Justice were outlined in its preface (paragraphs 2—3). To paraphrase, | began by noting that during much of the modern period of moral philosophy the predominant systematic view in the English- speaking world had been some form of utilitarianism. One rea- son for this was that it had been represented by a long line of brilliant writers, from Hume and Adam Smith to Edgeworth and Sidgwick, who built up a body of thought truly impressive in its scope and depth. Those who criticized ie often did so on a narrow 1, The frst owo of these ations! lectures ae now reprinted here uachnged es Aecuees Vil and VI 2, This ter is esd in “Oveapping Consensus,” Oxford Jara of Lee tds (Febcunty 1987):28, and "The Prony of Right and ens ofthe Good” Ply ond Public Affe V7 (Sura 1988271, 273,275 3. A Theory of Jt Carbide, Mass. Hara Universicy Press, 1971) | | Introduetion front. They noted difficulties with the principle of utility and pointed out serious apparent discrepancies between its implica- tions and our ordinary moral convictions. Yet I thought these critics filed to elaborate a workable and systematic moral con- ception that could successfully oppose it. The outcome was that ‘we were often forced to choose between utilitarianism and ra- tional intuconism aad were likely to setde for a variant of the principle of weility ciecumscribed and restricted by seemingly ad hoc intuitionistic constraints “The aims of Theory (still o paraphrase) were to generalize and carry 0 higher order of abstraction the traditional doctrine of the socal contrac. I wanted ¢o show that this doctrine was not ‘open to the more obvious objections often thoughe fatal to it. I hoped to work out more clearly the chief structural features of this conception—which I called “justice as fairness’—and ro de- velop it as an alternative systematic account of justice that is superior to utilitarianism. 1 choughe this alternative conception ‘was, ofthe tradicional moral conceptions, the best approximation ‘0 our considered convictions of justice and constituted the most apptoptiace bass for the institutions of a democratic society itn sims ofthese lectures are quite diffrent. Not that in my summary of the aims of Theory, ehe social contract tradition is seen as part of moral philosophy and no distinction is drawn beeween moral and political philosophy. In Theory a moral doc- trine of justice general in scope is not distinguished from a strictly politcal conception of justice. Nothing is made of the contrast berween comprehensive philosophical and moral doc- tines and conceptions limited to che domain of the political. In the lectures inthis volume, however, these distinctions and re- lated ideas are fundamental Indeed, it may seem that the aim and content of these lectures mark a major change from chose of Theor. Certainly, as I have indicated, there are important differences. But to understand the nature and extent of the differences, one must see them as atising from trying to resolve a serious problem internal to jus- tice as airness, namely from the fact that the account of sabilicy | |Introduction in part I11 of Theory is not consistent with the view as a whole. I believe all differences are consequences of removing that incon- sistency. Otherwise these lectures take the structure and content of Theory to remain substantially the same. To explain: the serious problem I have in mind concerns the unrealistic idea of a well-ordered society as it appears in Theory. An essential feature of a well-ordered society associated with justice as fairness is tha all its citizens endorse this conception on the basis of what I now call a comprehensive philosophical doctrine. They accept, as rooted in this doctrine, its two princi- ples of justice. Similarly, in the well-ordered society associated with utilitarianism citizens generally endorse that view as a com- prehensive philosophical doctrine and they accept the principle ‘of utility on thar basis. Although the distinction beeween a polit- ical conception of justice and a comprehensive philosophical doctrine is not discussed in Theory, once the question is raised, it is clear, I think, that the text regards justice as fairness and utilitarianism as comprehensive, or partially comprehensive, doc- Now the serious problem is this. A modern democratic society is characterized not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. No one of these doctrines is affirmed by cicizens generally. Nor should ‘one expect that in the foreseeable future one of them, or some other reasonable doctrine, will ever be affirmed by all, or neaely all, citizens. Political liberalism assumes that, for political pur- poses, a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of the exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a constitutional democratic regime. Politica liberalism also supposes that a rea- sonable comprehensive doctrine does nor reject the essentials of a democratic regime. Of course, a society may also contain unrea- 4. OF course,» aumber of errs and revisions need 40 be made inthe way the seuctre and content of sie as hrass was presented in Thy. Some of these fare dacossed herein but rely thee matters i not ey conccen in these etre, Invroduction sonable and irrational, and even mad, comprehensive doctrines. In their case the problem is to contain them s0 that they do not undermine the unity and justice of society " ‘The fact ofa plurality of reasonable but incompatible compre- entvedoctiner ihe fact of reasonable plralism—shows that, as used in Theory, the idea of a well-ordered society of justice as faieness is unrealistic. This is because itis inconsistent with real- izing its own principles under the best of foreseeable conditions. ‘The account of the stability of a well-ordered society in part TIT is therefore also unrealistic and must be recast. This problem sets the stage for the later essays beginning in 1980. The ambiguity of Theory is now removed and justice as fairness is presented from the outset as a political conception of justice (2). ‘Surprisingly, this change in cura forces many other changes and calls for a family of ideas not needed before.” I sey surpris- ingly because the problem of stability has played very litle role in the history of moral philosophy, so it may seem odd that an inconsistency of this kind should turn outto force such extensive revisions. Yet the problem of stability is fundamental to political philosophy and an inconsistency there is bound to require basic readjustments, So perhaps it is not surprising after all that be- sides che ideas aleeady mentioned—the ideas of a political con- ception of justice as opposed to a comprehensive doctrine, and of an overlapping consensus and of public reason—others are also needed. Here I mention that of a politcal conception of the person (k:5) and of reasonable as opposed to simple pluralism, Further, the idea of political constructivism is connected with these matters and raises questions about che truth of moral judg- ments, commenced on below. ‘The main conclusion to draw from these remarks—a conelu- +. Onspprnt exception is she sen fan overping onsen, Yeti meting se thon, pT te dflerent “Tc cange the incr esas ce sometimes i 0 be reps eins use by emanated overs do’ belve this a aig th ‘fou wither a correc nts bl pens on whether he ges on Se nuutryexined by an anate view of how yin he eve coun [by cers ot etd by my 3.Introduction sioa to which I return in a moment—is that the problem of political liberalism is: How is ic posible that there may exist over time a stable and juse society of free and equal citizens pro- foundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines? Put another way: How is it possible that deeply opposed though reasonable comprehensive doctrines may live together and all affirm the political conception ofa constinutional regime? What is the seructure and content of, ‘political conception that can gain the support of such an over- lapping consensus? These are among the questions that political liberalism ties to answer. For orientation, a few comments about political liberalism. ‘Sometimes one hears reference made t0 the so-called Enlightea- ment project of finding a philosophical secular doctrine, one founded on reason and yet comprehensive. It would then be suitable to the modern world, so it was thought, now that the religious authority and the faith of Christian ages was alleged to be no longer dominant. Whether there is or ever was such an Enlightenment project wwe need not consider; for in any case political liberalism, as 1 thiok of it, and justice as faieness as a form thereof, has no such ambitions. As I have said, politcal liberalism takes for granted rot simply pluralism bue the fact of reasonable pluralism; and beyond this, ie supposes that of che main existing reasonable comprehensive doctrines, some are religious. The conception of the reasonable (11:3) is characterized so as to allow this. The problem of political liberalism is to work out a conception of politcal justice for a constitutional democratic regime that the plurality of reasonable doctrines—always a feature of the culture of a free democratic regime—might endorse. The intention is ot to replace those comprehensive views, nor to give them true foundation. Indeed, that intention would be delusional, but that is not the point. Rather, doing that is nor the business of political liberalism. Part of the seeming complexity of political liberalism—shown, say, in its having to introduce a further family of ideas—arises | Introduction from accepting the fact of reasonable pluralism. For once we do {his chen we asume that, in an ideal overlapping consensis is Gis affirms both a comprehensive doctrine and the focal Slicical conception, somehow related. In some cases the pol ee imonception is simpy the consequence of, of continuous with, cae Spen’s comprehensive doctrine; in others it may be related as ars acceptable approximation given the circumstances of che s0° oa world (IV). In aay case, since the political conception is Selced by everyoue while the reasonable doctrines are 0%, we saa distinguish berween a public basis of justification generaly sceptable to citizens on fundamental political questions and the meany nonpublic bases of justification belonging to the many rainy echensve doctrines and acceptable only to those who a firm them. ‘Similarly, there will be many parallel distinctions. For the “elcanonts ofthe political conception of justice must be separated from che analogous elements within comprehensive doctrines. We must keep tack of where we are. Thus, ideas of the good is the polial conception have to be appropriately political and ae nee from those in more extensive views. The same holds for ‘he political conception of persons as free and equal. “Given the fact of the ressonable pluralism of democratic cul cure, the sim of politcal liberalism is to uncover the conditions Sf the possibilty of «reasonable public basis of justification on fundamental poliscal questions. Ic should, if possible, set forth the content of such a basis and why itis acceptable. In doing this fe bas to distinguish the public point of view from the many ‘nonpublic (aoe private) points of view. Or, alternatively it has © cparaceerize the distinction between public reason and the many sronpublic reasons and to explain why public reason takes she Tom ie does (V1). Moreover, it has co be imparcial (in ways thar tora fo be explained) becween the points of view of reasonable comprehensive doctrines “This imparéality is shown in various ways. For one things political iberlsm does not atack or criticize any reasonable Prew, As part ofthis, it does not criticize, much less reject, ayIntroduction particular eheory of the truth of moral judgments.’ In this regacd, it simply supposes that judgments of such ruth are made from the point of view of some compretensive moral doctrine. These doctrines render a judgment, all things considered: that is, taking into consideration what they see as all relevant moral and politi cal values and all relevant facts (w each doctrine determines). Which moral judgments are true, all things considered, is noc 3 matter for political liberalism, ss it pproaches all questions from within its own limited point of view. There are, however, occa sions when it must say something here to strengthen its own case. This is attempted in IIL8 and V:8, Further, political liberalism, rather than referring to its politi- cal conception of justice as true, refers to it as reasonable instead. This is not merely a verbal matter but does two things. Fits, it indicates the more limited point of view of the political concep- tion as articulating political and notall values, while providing at the same time @ public basis of jusification. Second, it indicates thar the principles and ideals ofthe political conception are based oon principles of practical reason in union with conceptions of society and person, themselves conceptions of practical reason. These conceptions specify the framework within which princi- ples of practical reason are applied. The meaning of all this is givenin the accountof political asopposed to moral) constructivism in I The idea of political constructivism will be familiar to anyone acquainted with the original position of justice as fairness, of with some similar framework. The >rinciples of political justice are the result of a procedure of construction in which rational persons (or their representatives), subject 10 reasonable condi- tions, adopt the principles to regulate the basic structure of society. The principles that issue from a suitable procedure of construction, one that properly expresses the requisite principles and conceptions of practical reason, | chink of as reasonable. The judgments those principles support are also reasonable. When 2. See 1:41, peng erin he ming para om “The He of on Overlapping Consensus.” sean Meer Introduction citizens share a reasonable political conception of justice, they have a basis on which public discussion of fundamental political questions can proceed and be reasonably decided, not of course in all cases but we hope in most cases of constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice ‘The dualism in political liberalism between the point of view of the political conception and the many points of view of com- prehensive doctrines is not a dualism originating in philosophy. Rather, it originates in the special nature of democratic political culture as marked by reasonable pluralism. This special nature accounts, | believe, at least in good part, for the different prob- lems of political philosophy in the modern as compared with che ancient world. To explain this I state a conjecture—I shouldn't say it is more than that—about the historical contexts that ac- counts for characteristic problems of the ancients and the mod- ‘eras respectively. ‘When moral philosophy began, say with Socrates, ancient re: ligion was a civie religion of public social practice, of civic festi- vals and public celebrations. Moreover, this civic religious cul- ‘eure was not based on a sacred work like the Bible, or the Koran, or the Vedas of Hinduism. The Greeks celebrated Homer and the Homeric poems were a basic part of their education, but the Iliad and the Odyssey were never sacred texts. As long as one participated in the expected way and recognized the proprieties, the details of what one believed were nor of great importance. It ‘was a matter of doing the done thing and being a trustworthy member of society, always ready to carry out one's civic duties as a good citizen—to serve on juries or to row in the feet in war— ‘when called upon t0 do so. It was not a religion of salvation in the Christian sense and there was no class of priests who dis- pensed the necessary means of grace; indeed the ideas of immor- tality and eternal salvation did not have a central place in classical culture® Greck moral philosophy begins, chen, within the historical 1. tn this puragagh I follow Walter Buskert, Grok Relvien (Cambsiee, Mass, Hirvaad Unneraty Pres, 1989), pp 254-60, 273-15,Introduction and cultural context of a civic religion of a polis in which the Homeric epics, with their gods and heroes, play @ central part. This religion contains no alternative idea of the highest good to set against that expressed by the Homeric gods and heroes. The heroes are of noble birth; they openly seek success and honor, power and wealth, social standing and prestige. They are not indifferent to the good of fumily, friends, and dependents, yet these claims have a lesser place. As for the gods, they are not, movally speaking, very diflerear; though heing immortal, their lives are relatively happy znd secure, So in rejecting the Homeric ideal chacacteristic of a way of life of the wartior class of a bygone age, Greek philosophy had to work out for itself ideas ofthe highest good for human life, ideas acceptable to the citizens of the dfferene society of fifth century B.C. Athens. Moral philosophy was always the exercise of free, disciplined reason alone. It was not based on religion, much less on revelation, as civic religion was neither a guide nor a rival to it. Its focus was the idea of the highest good as an atcractive ideal, as the reasonable pursuit of our true happiness, and addressed a question civic religion leftlargely unanswered.” ‘Turning to the modern period, three historical developments deeply influenced the naure of its moral and political philos- ophy. ‘The firse is the Reformation in the sixteenth century. It frag- mented the religious unity of the Middle Ages and led to reli- gious pluralism, with all ie consequences for later centuries. This in turn fostered pluralisis of other kinds, which were a perma- nent feature of culture by the end of the eighteenth cencury. ‘The second is the the development of the modern seate with its central administration, a first ruled by monarchs with enor mous if not absolute powers. Or atleast by monarchs who tried to be as absolute as they could, oaly granting a share in power to the aristocracy and the rising middle classes when they had 0, or a5 suited their convenienc 9, In these lst «wo paragraph fallow Terence Iewin, Clic! Thaught (New York: Oxford University Pies, 185), chap. 2 Incroduction| ‘The third is the development of modern science beginning in che seventeenth century. By modern science I mean the devet- ‘opment of astronomy with Copernicus and Kepler and Newton Sin physics; and also, it must be stressed, the development of mathematical analysis (calculus) by Newcon and Leibni2. Without analysis, the development of physics would not have been pos sible. T note first, the obvious contrast with the classical world in regard ta religion. Medieval Christianity had five characteristic features that civic religion lacks: tt eended towards an authoritarian religion: its authority— the Church itself headed by the papacy—was instita- tional, central, and nearly absolute, although the su- ‘preme authority of the pope was sometimes challenged, fs in the conciliar period of the fourteenth and fifteenth Ic was a religion of salvation, a way co eternal life, and salvation required true belief as the Church aught it Hence, it was a doctrinal religion with a creed that was 10 be believed. 1c was a religion of priests with the sole authority co dis- pense means of grace, means normally essential co salva- Finally, it was an expansionist religion of conversion that recognized no territorial limits t0 its authority short of the world as a whole. ‘The Reformation had enormous consequences. When an au- thoritative, salvationist, and expansionist religion like medieval Christianity divides, this inevitably means the appearance within the same society of a rival authoritative and salvationist religion, different in some ways from the original religion from which it split off, but having for a certain period of time many of the same features. Luther and Calvin were as dogmatic and intolerant as the Roman Church had been. "There is « second, if less obvious, contrast with the classical world, this time with regard t0 philosophy. During the wars ofIntroduction religion people were not in doubt aboue the nature of the highest ‘800d, or the basis of moral obligation in divine law. These things they thought they knew with the certainty of faith, as here their moral eheology gave them complete guidance. The problem was rather: How is society even possible berween those of different faiths? What can conceivably be the basis of religious toleration? For many there was none, for it meant the acquiescence in heresy about first things and the calamity of religious disunity. Even the earlier proponents of toleration saw the division of Christendom a disaster, though a disaster that had to be accepted in view of the alternative of unending religious civil wat. ‘Thus, the historical origin of political liberalism (and of iber- alism more generally) is the Reformation and its aftermath, with the long controversies over religious toleration in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries."° Something like the modern under- standing of liberty of conscience and freedom of thought began then, As Hegel saw, pluralism made religious liberty possible, certainly not Luther’ and Calvin's intention." Of course, other controversies are also of crucial importance, such as those over limiting che powers of absolute monarchs by appropriate princi- ples of constitutional design protecting basic rights and liberties, Yet despite the significance of other controversies and of principles addressed to setding them, the fact of religious divi- sion remains. For this reason, political liberalism assumes the fact of reasonable pluralism as 2 pluralism of comprehensive doc- ‘tines, including both religious and nonreligious doctrines. This pluralism is not seen as disaster but rather as the natural outcome of the activities of human reason under enduring free institu tions. To see reasonable pluralism as a disaster is to see the exercise of reason under the conditions of freedom itself as a 1, Judith Shklar, in her Ordinary Ves Cammbedge, Mase: Harvd Unvesiy Press 1984), speas ofthe bers offer, represented by Montaigne ad Mocs sieu, and described in dat work as born ont of the eruelies ofthe religious cd snare See p3 11. See Grandtinio dr Pbiophie des Rebs (1821), $270, near the eof the long comment. Introduction disaster. Indeed, the success of liberal constitutionalism came as ably harmonious and stable pluralist society. 2 Before the suc- eg edged es and confidence, long and”fruitfully cooperated in maintaining a a " Asi noted earlier, then, the problem of political liberalism is: ‘and just society were not. The problem of understanding these conditions moves to the center of the stage. Part of this problem jis: What are the fair terms of social cooperation between citizens salvationist, creedal, and expansionist religions. That is a phe- 12, Hume remarks on this in pat, 6 of “Liberey ofthe Press" (1741. See aso 18. G. Dicken, Th glib Reformation (London: Fontana res, 1967) pp 4404Introduction the conquest of people, not simply for their land and wealth, and to exercise pover and dominion over them, butt sve thet souls. The Reformation turned this possibility inward upon itself. ‘Whats new about this clah i thai introduce it people's conceptions of their good a transcendent clement not admitting of compromise. This element forces either mortal conflict mod- crated only by circumstance and exhaustion, of equal liberty of conscience and freedom of thought. Except on the basis of these: last, firmly founded and publicly recognized, no reasonable polit- ical conception of justice is possible. Political liberalism starts by taking tear che absolute depth of chat iteconcible latent confict. On the relation beeween Philosophy of the modern period, while moral philosophy was, of course, deeply effected by the religious situation within which it developed after the Reformation, by the eighteenth century leading writers hoped to establish a basis of moral knowledge independent of ecclesiastical authority and available to che ordi- nary reasonable and conscientious person. This done, they wanted to develop the full range of concepts and principles in terms of Which co characterize the requirements of moral life. To this end they studied basic questions of moral epistemology and psychol- ogy, such as: Is the knowledge or awareness of how we are to act directly accessible only to some, or to a few (che clergy, say), or is it accessible to every person who is normally reason- able and conscientious? ‘Again, is the moral order required of us derived from an external source, say from an order of values in God's intellect, or does it arise in some way from human nature itself (either from reason or feeling of {tom a union of both), together with the requirements of our living to- ether in society? Finally, must we be persuaded or compelled to bring our- selves in line with the requirements of our duties and Introduction obligations by some external motivation, say, by divine sanctions or by those of the state; or are we s0 consti- tuted that we have in our nature suflicient motives 10 lead us £0 act as we ought without the need of external threats and inducements?™? Each of these questions first arose out of theology. Of the writers we usually study, Hume and Kant, both in their different ‘ways, affirm the second alternative in each of these three ques- tions. They believe thar the moral order arises in some way frou ‘homan nature itself, as reason oF as feeling, and from the condi- tions of our life in society. They also believe that the knowledge lor awareness of how we are t0 act is direcly accessible to every person whois normally reasonable and conscientious. And - nally, they believe that we are so constituted that we have in our, nature sufficient motives co lead us to act as we ought without the need of external sanctions, at least in the form of rewards and punishments imposed by God or the state. Indeed, both Hume end Kane are about as far as one can get from the view that only a few can have moral knowledge and that all or most people must be made co do what is right by means of sucht sanctions." In this their beliefs belong to what I refer to as comprehensive as opposed to political liberalism. Political liberalism is not comprehensive liberalism. It does not take a general position on the three questions above bur leaves these to be answered ia theit own way by different com- prehensive views. However, political liberalism does affirm the second alternative in each case with respect to a political concep- tion of justice for a constitutional democratic regime. Affirming 13, The ast wo paragraphs above follow J.B Schaenind, Morel Philaapy fro Mota Kan: A AnsBelegy, 2 vols (Card: Cambvidge University Pres 1990) Sethe introduction eo the Sr wore, p. 18 Tam much indebred to these rolumes ant Schneewind'senanyestys, ming chem i prcula:“Natutl Law, Sheps andthe Method of Ethics" Joural ft His of lea 32 (1991.26 308, 1H. Shncewind says this of Kane, Mora Pinay p29, bu bie i olds of Humes wel— — Introduction ‘hose alternatives in this fundamental case is part of political constructivism (III). The general problems of moral philosophy are not the concern of politcal liberalism, except insofar as they affec: how the background culture and its comprehensive doc- trines tend to support a constitutional regime. Political liberalism sees its form of political philosophy as having its own subject matter: how is a just and free society possible under conditions of deep doctrinal conflict with no prospect of resolution? To maintain impartiality between comprehensive doctrines, it does not specifically address the moral topics on which those doctrines divide. On oceasion this appears to raise difficulties and these I tay toanswer as they arise, for example in V'8 Te may seem that my emphasis on the Reformation and che Jong controversy about toleration as the origin of liberalism is, dated in terms of the problems of contemporary political life. ‘Among our most basic problems are those of race, ethnicity, and ‘gender. These may seem of an altogether different character calling for different principles of justice, which Theory does not discuss. ‘As I noted earlier, that work set out 0 offer an account of political and social justice that is more satisfactory than the lead- ing familiar traditional conceptions. To this end it limied itself— 2s the questions it actually discusses make clear—to a family of classical problems that had been at the center of the historical debates concernieg the moral and politcal structure of the mod- ern democratic state. Hence it treats the grounds of the basic religious and politcal liberties, and of the basic rights of citizens in civil society, including, here freedom of movement and fair equality of opportunity, the right of persooal property, and the protections of the rule of law. It aso takes up che economic and social inequalities in a society in which cit viewed as free and equal. But Theory leaves aside for the most part the question of the claims of democracy in the firm and the workplace, as well as chat of justice between states (or peoples as 1 prefer to say); it barely mentions retributive justice and the protection of the environment or the preservation of wildlife Introduction Other major macters are omitted, for example, the justice of and in the family, though I do assume that in some form the family is just. The underlying assumption is that a conception of justice ‘worked up by focusing on a few long-standing classical problems Should be correct, or at least provide guidelines for addressing farther questions, Such isthe rationale of focusing on a few main and enduring Classical problems. ‘Of course, the conception of justice so arrived at may prove defective. This underlies much of the criticism of Theory. This Criticism hubs that che kind of liberalism ie represents is intrin- sically fauley because it relies on an abstract conception of the person and uses an individualist, nonsocial, idea of human na- ture; or else that it employs an unworkable distinction between the public and the private that renders it unable to deal with the problems of gender and the family. I believe that much of the ‘objection to the conception of the person and the idea of human nature springs from not seeing the idea of the original position as a device of representation, as explained in I:4. I believe also, though I do not try to show in these lectures, chat the alleged difficulties in discussing problems of gender and the family can be overcome. ‘Thus, I still chink thar once we get che conceptions and prin- ciples right for the basic historical questions, those conceptions and principles should be widely applicable to our own problems also. The same equality of the Declaration of Independence which Lincoln invoked to condemn slavery can be invoked to condemn the inequality and oppression of women. I think it a matter of understanding what earlier principles require under ‘changed circumstances and of insisting that they now be honored in existing institutions, For this reason Theory focused on certain main historical problems in the hope of formulating a family of reasonable conceptions and principles that might also hold for ‘other basic cases. ‘To conclude, in the remarks above I have tried to set out how now understand justice as fairness as a form of political liberal- ism and why changes in it were necessary. These remarks empha-Incroduction size the serious internal problem that forced those changes. I do not mean, however, co give an account of how and why those changes were actually made. I don't think I really know why I took the course I did. Any story I would tell is likely co be fiction, merely whae I want to believe. My first use of such ideas of a political conception of justice and of an overlapping consensus were misleading and led to objections I initially found puzaling: how could such simple ideas as those of a political conception of justice and of an overlapping consensus be misunderstood? I had underestimated the depth of the problem of making Theory consistent and had taken for granted a few missing pieces essential for a convincing statement of political liberalism. Central among these missing pieces are 1. the idea of justice as fairness asa freestanding view and that of an overlapping consensus as belonging to its account of stability; 2. the distinction between simple pluralism and reason- able pluralism, cogether withthe idea of a reasonable com- prehensive doctrine; and 3, afuller account ofthe reasonable and the rational worked into the conception of politcal (as opposed to moral) con- stcuctivism, so as to bring out the bases of the principles of| right and justice in practical reason. With these pieces in place, I now believe the obscurtis are cleared up. T have many debs, most of which are indicated in footnotes throughout. To those with whom I had instructive discussions about the missing pieces described above, and from whom Ihave also learned mth | acknowledge a special debe ‘To T. M. Scanlon for numerous istuctive discussions from the beginning about politcal consrctvim, and constructivism tore generally, so that thi view a given in Is now more clear than first sketched in 1980; and also for discussions about th Binion Beeween te recmbie dh toa, an how specify the reasonable for the purpose ofa political conception of justice (I1:1—3). pe ® " * Introduction ‘To Ronald Dworkin and Thomas Nagel for many conversa ions while taking part in seminars at New York University uring 1987-1991; and in connection with the idea of justice as fairness as a freestanding view (I:5), «rare illuminating midnight conversation in the deserted bar of the Sanca Lucia Horel in Napoli in June 1988. “To, Wilfried Hinsch for the need for an idea of a reasonable comprehensive doctrine, as opposed t0 a comprehensive doc- rine simpliciter (IF3), and for instructive discussions about this in May and June of 1988. ‘To Joshua Cohen, who stressed the significance of the distinc tion between reasonable pluralism and simple pluralism (1:6.2), land for many valuable discussions about the idea of the reason- Shle in 1989-90, all summed up in his paper of May 1990, To Tyler Burge for ewo long letters in the summer of 1991 that queried and criticized an eatlier version of III. He persuaded te chat not only had I failed to give a clear sense of the ways in Which boh Kane's moral constructivism and my political con- Sreuctivism provide an account of either moral or political auton- my, buc that I had exceeded the limits of a political conception Of justice in making the contrast between political constructivism fand rational intuitionism. In an effore to correct these serious faults, I have entirely rewritten $§1, 2, and 5. "As the dates above indicate, I reached a clear understanding of political iberalism—or so I think—only in the past few years ‘Although many of the earlier essays appear here with the same ‘ora similar tile, and much the same content, they have all been considerably adjusted so that together they express what 1 now believe is a consistent view. T have tried to acknowledge other debs in the footnotes. The following debts, however, extend over a long period of time and for one reason or another cannot be properly acknowledged in that way. ‘To Burton Drebea, with whom I have discussed the questions “of these lectures at length beginning in the late 1970s when the idea of politcal liberalism began co take shape in my mind, HisIntroduction firm encouragement and severe talmudic criticism have done me immense good. My debt to him is beyond accouating, To the late David Sachs, with whom I hiave discussed, since 1946 when we first met, many of the questions the text con- siders, particularly those concerning moral psyckology. In regard to the topics of this volume, Sachs and I had lengthy discussions, very valuable to me, in Boston three times in the 1980s, I the spring and summer of 1982 we discussed various of the dificul- fics we found in the lectures I gave at Columbia in 1980; ia the summer of 1983 he helped me prepare a considerably improved version of “Basic Structure as Subject.” as well as a much better version of §6 of “The Basic Liberties and Their Prioricy,” dealing with the idea of society as a social union of social unioas. Both of these I hope to use et some later date. In the summer of 1986 we reworked the lecture I gave at Oxford the previous May in honor of H. LA. Hart. This improved version appeared in February 1987 in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, and much of it reappears here in V. To ¢he late Judith Shklar, I am indebted for innumerable instructive discussions since we met over thirty years ago. While never a student of hers, I learned from her as a student might and I am the beter for it. With regard to this work, she was especially helpful in pointing out directions tha: should be pur- sued; and I have always relied on her in matters of historical incerpretation, crucial at a number of places in the text. Our lst discussion concerned such matters. ‘To Samuel Schefier, who in the fall of 1977 sent me a short paper, "Moral Independence and the Original Position,” in which he argued that there was «serious conflict berween the thied part of my paper “The Independence of Moral Theory” (1975), which took up the relation berween personal identity and moral theory, and my arguments against utilitarianism in Theory.”® I remember this as the moment (I was on leave that year) when I started thinking about whether and how far the view of Theory needed 15, Schefer’s pape ltr speed in Philepbical Sadi 39 (1979)397-403, Introduction to be recast, The decision to pursue this problem and not an- wo teach Cola ctures of 1980 ad fo the later essays elaborating the idea of political liberalism, ‘To Erin Kelly, who forthe pst ewo yeats or so has tea che cafes of the manuscript, pointing out places where the text was sa teeing caro she nested ways in wih the argument could be Feorganized (© give it greater force; and bby asking questions and raising objections she has led me to reshape the text throughane. Ie would be impossible to list all the fevisions te which her comments have led but ehey sometimes to important changes. The more basic of these I have tried to sera rots The mer ths work, sch shy fre, arse to an important extent from her efforts. Finally, 1 would like co thank the following persons for their written commeats on the manuscript. Dens Thompson gave me several page of extremely vac able supzestions, all but a few of which led to corrections or aaa ge aan Ihave indicted wheze few of tee hhave been made, or conveyed his comments ia the footnotes. Frank Michelman's many penetrating comments 1 reluctantly fele 1 could not respond to usefully without making far-reaching and substantial changes a chis time. At only one place (ia V6.4) have been able addres his concer. Robert Audi, Kent Greenawalt, and Paul Weithman seat me int son Vireo hh {ated clude, several a the last moment. “Alyssa Bernstein, Thomas Pogge, and Seana Shiffrin gave me extensive written comments but unhappily I have aor been able fo take them all into account. I regrec they won't see their Comments deale with here as they should have been. I regret also that in repeinting unchanged "Basic Liberties and ‘Their Priority (1982), | have not replied to Rex Martin's probing criticisms expressed in is Rawls and Rights, esp. chaps. 2,3, 6, and 7." For the hapless work of helping me correct and edie the galleys 16. Raa Right (Lawrence: Universcy of Kans Press, 1985).Introduction and page proofs, I thank my wife Mard and our daughter Liz, an | Michelle Renfield and Matthew Jones. eran | Joha Raves | October 1992 Introduction to the 1 Paperback Edition In this introduction to the paperback edition, I give a Reader's Guide t0 the leading ideas of the book.! A. main aim of Political Liberalism (= PL) is to say how the well-ordered society of justice as fairness? (set out 1 should lke 4 think several people for apne me wit hie second introduction: Perey eting fr iany rial discussions asco how to apptah cand for correcting several of my fess; Normaa Daniels for instructive cow ‘erations about the role of seas ia polit Tenlsn, Erin Kelly, TM. Scanlon, and Den tis Thompson gave ine great many valuable ‘nasisons, which T have gladly accepted snd finaly, Baron Drsben, wit whom I ave ha Tong conversations ard to whom T owe much for Ir icemiglyinnumersble thoughts and cit tious about how 1 organize and ieaprove the fal tex Without thir aid and efforts, oad char tf others mentioned Below, 1 would aot have been ale o writ his ietociction Sr puts plrse Hn rales because iis she pet name of particular account of justice End it salar be 0 understood. H shall we the tro. devine for comprehensive views ofIntroduction tothe Paperback Edition in A Theory of Justice (1971) [= Theory) is to be understood once itis adjusted tothe fact of reasonable pluralism (ff, 36Ff.)* and regulated by apolitical conception of justice. I sare with the idea of the domain of the political together with the idea of a politcal conception of justice, using as an example the concep- tion of justice a fairness. These ideas and their distinction from comprehensive* doctrines of all kinds, are, I believe, among the ‘most crucial ideas of pelitical liberalism. All of part and lecture V of part Il of PL set our those ideas and definitions for other raceded conceptions. Another main aim of PL is ro say how a ‘well-ordered liberal society containing a number of reasonable politcal conceptions is to be understood. In this case there is both the fact of reasonable pluralism and a family of reasonable though differing liberal political conceptions; | ask what is the most reasonable basis of social unity given these wo conditions. ‘These things are done ia discussing the leading ideas of part Il as they appear in leceures IV and VI. I shal focus on the idea of citizenship ia « democratic regime and how itis connected with the ideas of political legitimacy and public reason. I emphasize that the ideas of the demain of the politcal end a political con- ception of justice are normative and moral ideas in their own ight, tha is, thei “content is given by certain ideals, principles, and standaris, and these norms articulate certain values, in this case political values" (In). [also take note ofthe place of justice as fairness in both Theory and PL. 1. Before going into chese matters, I should ote that an obstacle co reading PL is its failing «0 idem explicily the all Kind nd te ea cmapto for apolitical conception andi componene pars uch atthe conepon ofthe person ar citizen. The tee is sed ab «general term and noy fern eter the context determines References 0 They 2nd PL ie given by lect, eto, o page numbers in parhese. '. Ths ithe fac bt a plant of ceasonable comprehensive doctrine, elisiows, plosopal, and mon, is he normal condition of democric culture given i feeeineratoes 4 A comprehensive doctriee is defined (13). I is sine fm a poll concep sion of jue, sce applies all objec and its itues corer al urs of fe Introduction tothe Paperback Edition Josophical question it addresses. There is no such obstacle in aa a cplcyavemp 9 wrk ot rom the tes of ‘fe social contract, represented by Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, a theory of justice that is no longer open to objections often thought fatal to it, and chat proves superior to the long dominant tradition of utilitarianism, Theory hopes to present the structural ffarures of such a theory of justice s0 a8 to make it the best ‘ppeoximation to our considered judgments of justice and hence sreiee the mat appropriate moral bass for a democratic society ip vii), This is a recognized philosophical question, academic rough it may be. caer Shel in identifying the philosophical question PE pee smatily addresses is that this question is not clearly explained by the opening to lecture 1, where ic asks (p. 4: How is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free tod equal citizens who remain profoundly divided by reasonable ‘elisious, philosophical, and moral doctrines? If the problem is how is this society Co be stable for the right reasons (143ff)— always the relevant idea of stabilty’—then why should there be say fandamental problem with conflicting comprehensive liberal. inns such as those of Kant and Mil, which already (le’s suppose) endorse a juse democratic regime, even if they do so for different feasons? Indeed, this seems an easy case. Thus, the question. Should be more sharply put this way: How is it possible for those affrming a religious doctrine thatis based on religious authority, for example, the Church or che Bible, also to hold a reasonable politcal conception that support a just democratic regime? ‘The point is that not all reasonable comprehensive doctrines are liberal comprehensive doctrines so the question is whether they can sil be compatible for che right ceasons with a liberal poltical conception. To do this, contend its nor sufficient chat these doctrines accepe a democratic regime merely as a modus tien, Rather, they must accept it as members ofa reasonable does wor occur in he text of PL, but 5. The phrase “ntailcy fr the righ esos” does statin? should amually be given tat messing in both Thor and PL, a5 che omen determines.Introduction to the Paperback Edition ‘overlapping consensus (IV:3). Referring to citizens holding such ‘religious doctrine as citizens of faith, we ask: How is it possible for citizens of faith to be wholehearted members of a democratic society when they endorse an institutional structure satisfying a liberal political conception of justice with its own intrinsic polici- cal ideals and values, and when they are not simply going along, with it in view of the balance of political and socal forces? To sketch an answer, the original introduction to PL makes these points. Political liberalism is not a {ou vf Enlightenment liberalism, that is, a comprehensive liberal and often secular doctrine founded on reason and viewed as suitable for the mod- ‘ern age now that the religious authority of Christian ages is said to be no longer dominant. Political liberalism has no such aims. Ie takes for granted the fact of reasonable pluralism of compre- hensive doctrines, where some of those doctrines are taken to be nonliberal and religious. The problem of political liberalism is to ‘work out a political conception of politcal justice for a constitu- tional democratic regime that a plurality of restonable doctrines, both religious and nonreligious, liberal and nooliberal, may freely endorse, and so freely live by and come to understand its virtues. Emphaticaly i¢ does not aim to replace comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, but intends to be equally distinct from both and, i hopes, acceptable to both. These re- ‘marks paraphrase and abbreviate (p. xvii In addition, the pages (xxi—xxvi) spell out what PL sees as the contrast between ancient and modern political philosophy. For the ancients che central problem was the doc:tine of the good and for the moderns the central problem was the conception of justice, PL conjectures as to why this was so, For the ancients, religion was civic religion, and it was eft for philosophy to work out a doctrine of the good. For the moderns, religion was the salvation religions of Christianity, which, as Catholic and Protes- tan, lashed in the Reformation; and these already included a doctrine of the good—the good of salvation. But resting on the cconficting authorities of Church or Bible, there was no resolu- tion berween them, as their competing transcendent elements do Introduction to the Paperback Edition not admit of compromise. Theit mortal combat can be moder- ead only by circumstance and exhaustion, or by equal liberty of Sonscieace and freedom of thought. Circumstance and exhaus- jon lead to @ modus vivendi; equal liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, as IV:6-7 suggests, may sometimes lead to the more hopeful possibilities of a consticutional, and then to an overlapping, consensus. “Thus, to repeat, the problem of politcal liberalism is to work ‘outa political conception of politcal justice for a (liberal) consti- Rational democratic regime that a plurality of reasonable doc- tines, both religious and nonreligious, liberal and nonliberal, may eadorse for the sight reasons. A fundamental difficulty is thet since under reasonable pluralism the religious good of salva- tion cannot be the common good of all citizens, the political Conception must employ, instead of that good, political concep- Gons such as liberty and equality together with a guarantee of Sufficient all-purpose means (primary goods [IV:3—4]) for citi fens to make incelligent and effective use of their freedoms. These are long recognized questions, though to some they may seem more political than philosophical. Ie doesn’t matter which wre say, s0 long as we recognize the nature of the questions. I Mew them as philosophical, because a political conception of justice is a normative and moral conception, and so is the domain bf the political, as well as all ehe other political conceptions. PL discusses, from the point of view of the political, che main moral and philosophical conceptions of a constitutional democratic re- fime: the conceptions of a free and equal citizen, of the legiti- tnacy of the exercise of polical power, of a reasonable overlap- ping consensus, of public reason with its duty of civiity, and of Fubility for the right reasons. It also looks for the most reason- ble basis of social unity available co citizens of a modern demo- tatic society. In sum, PL considers whether in the circumstances Of a plurality of reasonable doctrines, both religious and nonre- ligious, liberal and nonliberal, a well-ordered and stable demo- ‘catic government is possible, and indeed even how it is ro be conceived as coherent. liIntroduction to the Paperback Edition 2, Given ths background, I now turn tothe Reader's Guide In part IIL, Theory sapposes hat the wellordered society of justice as fairness is possible and somehow comes about. It ehen asks whether that society is stable. It argues thatthe laws of ‘nature and human psychology would lead citizens who grow up fas members of that well-ordered society to acquire « sense of justice suffciendly strong to uphold their pocal and social institutions over generations. The whole argument culminates in chapters 8 and 9 with a sketch of the stages of moral learning, land of stability. As always, stability means subiliy forthe sight reasons. This implies that the reasons from which citizens act include those given by the account of justice they affrm—in this case the comprehensive doctrine of justice as faieess*—which characterizes their effective sense of justice. However, since the principles of justice as fimess in Theory requite a constitutional democratic regime, anc since the fact of reasonable pluralism is the long-term outcone of = society's culture in the context of these free instcations (p. xvi), the fargumeat in Theory relies on a premise the rediation of which, its principles of justice rule out. This is the premise chat in the ‘wellordered society of justice as fairness, citizens hold the same comprehensive doctrine, and this includes aspects of Kant’s com- preheasive liberalism, co which the principles of justice as fair~ ness might belong. Bue given the fact of resonable pluralism, this comprehensive view is not held by citizens generally, any more than a religious doctrine, o some form of uilitaranism. Ta ths siuation, what political conception of justice can pro- vide the common basis of principles and ideas to guide public politcal discussion on which citizens affirming conficting rel ious and nonreligious yer reasonable comprehensive doctrines fan agree? Icis easy to see how ehere might bea reasonably just smadus rivendi berween a plurality of conilcting comprehensive dloctines. We simply suppose that historical cicumstances have 6, Aracompechenie moral docrin, i suggested tase a irmessis part of sighs a foes (Thy. 17, 11D. ali Ineroduction to the Paperback Edition so turned out that for the time being at least, the balance of forces Keeps all sides supporting the current arrangements, which happen t0 be just co each of them. However, when two {alvation religions clash, can there be any resolution of the con flic that goes beyond thar? I have noted (81 above) that some~ times a modus vivendi might develop into an overlapping consen- sus of reasonable doctrines (IV:6~7). As explained in 1V:3, the jdea of an overlapping consensus is moral in its object and moti- vation, rendering the consensus stable over the distribution of Tlocteines. This gives stability for the right reasons (143ff.), and this distinguishes the idea of such a consensus from madus vi- vendi +. ‘Thus, a main aim of PL isto show that the idea of the well- ordered society in Theory may be reformulated so as to take Sccount of the fact of reasonable pluralism. To do this i trans- forms the doctrine of justice as fairness as presented in Theory into a political conception of justice that applies to the basic seructuze of society.” Transforming justice as fairness into a poli ical conception of justice requires reformulacing as political co ceptions the component ideas that make up the comprehensive doctrine of justice as fairness® Some of these components may seem in Theory to be religious, philosophical, or moral, and indeed may actually be so, since Theory does not distinguish berween comprehensive doctrines and political conceptions. This transformation is done in all of parc I of PL and in lecture V of 1 By he basic structure is meant aces la politcal, constetiona, socal, and count insstuons sad how they fe egeber 1 form une scheme of social sereRalver time 110). This stratus es enielywtia the dorsi ofthe por Te Nor weey much of he coment ofthe dctese of justice a fairness needs to be chanbcl Por cramp, the meaning abd comea ofthe cwo principles of fstice and Se fase trseare are mach she mae excep fr the Framework «o which hey ce Ou ane cher hand, as [note aterin the wx abore, PLease he difference aaaee Mola autonomy and soa soaomy (6) and tis caefl to emphasine aes ea conception of justice covers only the former, Thi distinction is vetcowe to Tivoy, fa which eatonony i iterpeetd as moral auconomy in its Ran Forms denving oo Kants compichensive liberal doctrine (Toy, 9840, 78,86) xiIntroduction o the Paperback Edition Pt. II. A politcal conception of justice is what I call freestanding, (pp. 10, 12) when itis not presented as derived from, or as part of, any comprehensive doctrine. Such a conception of justice in order to be a moral conception must contain its own intrinsic normative and moral ideal. ‘One such ideal can be set out this way. Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal ina system of social cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one another fair terms of sodal cuoperativu (defined by principles ‘and ideals) and they agree to act on those terms, even at the cost of their own interests in particular situations, provided that oth- cers also accept those terms. For these terms to be fair cerms, Citizens offering them must reasonably think chat those citizens to whom such terms are offered might also reasonably accept ‘them, Note that “reasonably” occurs at both ends inthis formula- tion: in offering fair erms we must reasonably think tha citizens offered them might also reasonably accept them. And they must be able to do this as free and equal, and not as dominated or ‘manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior political or social position I refer to this as the criterion of reciprocity (49%, 54)2 Thus, politcal rights and duties are moral rights and duties, for they are part of a political conception that is « normative (moral conception with its own intrinsic ideal, though nor itself a comprehensive doctrine." For an example of che difference between the moral values of 2 comprehensive doctrine and the (moral) political values of a political conception, consider the value of autonomy. This value may take atleast cwo forms. One is political autonomy, che legal independence and assured political integrity of citizens and their sharing with other citizens equally in the exercise of political power. The other form is moral autonomy expressed in a cercain mode of life and reflection chat cricically examines our deepest 9, le ewphasving tat “reasons” occas at both ends, sto speak, the cited of eigen sated ore filly han in PL, a ic nced te. 10. See fren eam the aed view described on p. M3 aliv Introduction tothe Paperback Edition ends and ideals, as in Mill's ideal of individuality," or by follow- fog as best one can Kant’s doctrine of auronomy.'? While auton- ‘omy as a moral value has had an importance place in the history $f democratic thought, it fails to satisfy the criterion of reciproc- Sty requted of reasonable political principles and cannot be part ‘Of political conception of justice. Maay citizens of faith reject moral auconomy as part of their way of life. Tn the transformation from the comprehensive doctrine of justice as fairness ro the political conception of justice as fairness, ihe idea of the person as having moral personality with the full Capacity of moral agency is transformed into that of che citizen. Inmoral and political philosophical doctrines, the idea of moral agency is discussed, along with agents’ intellectual, moral, and motional powers. Persons are viewed as being capable of exer- sing theit moral rights and fulfilling their moral duties and as being subject to all the moral motivations appropriate to each moral virtue the doctrine specifies. In PL, by contrast, the person. iz sven rather as a free and equal citizen, the political person of a modern democracy with the political rights and duties of ¢ ‘hip, and standing in a political relation with other citizens. ‘The “ven is, of course, a moral ageat, since a political conception of justice is, as we have seen, a moral conception (Lin). But the kinds of tights and duties, and of the values considered, are more limited. “The fundamental political relation of citizenship has two spe- cial features: first, it is a relation of citizens within the basic structure of society, a structure we enter only by birth and exit only by death (p. 12); and second, it is a relation of free and equal citizens who exercise ultimate politcal power as a collec- tive body. These two features immediately give rise to the ques- tion of how, when constitutional essentials and matters of basic iizens so related can be bound to honor the justice are at stake, 11, See On Lit, ch. 3, esp. pares. 1-8. TE Real here wee was sad in foorote 8 concering Kan’ doctrine of si Pac concerns about exiting only by death, sep 136,04 xivTatroduction to the Paperback Edition structure of their constitutional regime and to abide by the stat- utes and laws enacted under it. The fact of reasonable pluralism raises this question all the more sharply, since it means that the differences between citizens arising from their comprehensive doctrines, religious and nonreligious, are irreconcilable and con tain transcendent elements. By what ideals and principles, then, are citizens as shaving equally in ultimate political power to exercise that power so that each of them can reasonably justify their political decisions.to each other? The answer is given by the criterion of reciprocity: our exer «ise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we offer for our political action may reasonably be accepted by other citizens as a justification of those actions.** ‘This criterion applies on two levels: one is to the constitutional structure itself, and the other is co particular statutes and laws enacted in accordance with that steuctute, Political conceptions to be reasonable must justify only constitutions thar satisfy this principle. This gives what may be called ehe liberal principle of legitimacy (p. 137) as it applies to the legitimacy of constitutions and staeutes enacted under them." In order co fulill their political role, citizens are viewed as having the intellectual and moral powers appropriate co that role, such as 2 capacity for a sense of political justice given by a liberal conception and @ capacity to form, follow, and revise their individual doctrines of the good," and capable also of the political virtues necessary for them to cooperate in maintaining a 14. note that there i strict speaking, no argument here, The preceding par ‘sap inthe vex simply describes ao Institutional conte i which ces stand in Ceri elions and cobsder certain questions, and 20 on. es chea Sid tat from thar conente dary ass om hove cizens to Follow the ekerion of reciprocity. This ie duty ating fom the Hea of reazonableness of pentnew chactezed ae pp 49 A solr Lind of exsoning is found in T. M. Scalon's "Promises and Practices,” Phibeopy and Public Affair 19-3 (Summer 1990). OF couse, the particular cases and examples re ety different. 15. The seo paragraphs summarize pp. 135fh 16. The rerminlogy here follows foornote 2 above. Both Thor ad PL speak of (comprehen) concep ofthe good. Prom hete oo, itis eleted tas doctrine xlvi Introduction to the Paperback Edition just political society. (Theit capacity for the other virtues and moral motives beyond this is not of course denied.) “4, Two ideas that are not found in Theory are needed to meet the fact of reasonable pluralism, namely, the ideas of a reasonable overlapping consensus (15, 39ff, 1V:3) and of public reason (Vk, 7, 8). Without these ideas we do not see the role a political conception of justice has (or, as we shall see, a family thereof has) in specifying the public reason of a well-ordered society ‘when itis regulated by a political conception. In carrying our this conceptual task, justice as fairness (as now transformed) is used asthe main example. [shall not try to describe here the idea of an overlapping, consensus beyond what I have occasionally said. I note instead ‘wo points related co it. One is that it is the fact of reasonable pluralism that leads—at least me—o the idea of a political con- ception of justice and so to the idea of political liberalism. For rather than confronting religious and nonliberal doctrines with comprehensive liberal philosophical doctrine, the thought is to formulace a liberal political conception that those nonliberal doc- tines might be able to endorse. To find this political conception wwe do not look at knowa comprehensive doctrines with the aim of striking a balance or average between them, nor do we attempt to strike a compromise with a sufficient number of those doc- trines actually existing in society by tailoring the political concep- tion to fit them, Doing that appeals to the wrong idea of consen- sus and makes the political conception political in the wrong way GOfh).” Rather, we formulate a freestanding political concep- tion having its own intrinsic (moral) political ideal expressed by the criterion of reciprocity. We hope in this way that reasonable comprehensive doctrines can endorse for the right reasons that political conception and hence be viewed as belonging co a rea- sonable overlapping consensus. ‘The other poine about a reasonable overlapping consensus is that PL makes no attempt 0 prove, or to show, thar such @ 17, Alto soe 1X: 23389, ' |Incroduction ro the Paperback Edition consensus would eventually form around a reasonable political conception of justice. The most it does is to present a freestand- ing liberal political conception that does aot oppose comprehen- sive doctrines on their own ground and does not preclude the possibilty of an overlapping consensus for the right reasons. PL. does note certain historical events and processes that seem to have led to consensus, and others that may tke place (IV:6~7), bur observing these commonsense facts of political sociology does not constitute proof. In addicion to conflicting comprehensive doctrines, PL does recognize that in any actual political society a number of differing liberal political conceptions of justice compete with one another in socien’s political debates (6f.). This leads to another aim of PL: saying how a well-ordered liberal politcal society is to be formulated given not only reasonable pluralism but a family of reasonable liberal political conceptions of jusice. The definition of liberal conceptions is given by three conditions" (p. 6): first, 4 specification of certain rights, liberties, and opportunities (of a kind familiar from democratic regimes); second, a special priority for these freedoms; and third, measures asuring all citizens, ‘whatever their social position, adequate all-purpose? means to ‘make intelligent and effective use of their liberties and opportu- nities. Note that I am here talking. about liber political concep- tions and not about liberal comprehensive doctrines. Justice as fairness—its two principles of justice, which of course include the difference principle—lI believe to be the most reasonable conception because it best satisfies these conditions.” 18, The wx of PL refers to these at features, The tei din ie beter than atures, se they deine a berl politcal conceptions sersand it 19. Tisterm refers to primary goods, as dened iW 20. Thisienoc deny that certain changes must be madein jc as ras. For example, kc VIl evises dhe acount ofthe Basie Boers view of HLL. A. ar? css, lace V'34 revises the account of pemcy goods ro meet che ‘rics of KJ. Arto and Amartya Sen, Joshos Coes aad T-M. Scanlon, 30d others Ale T woul eis dhe just savings principle a detain, as sagguned by Thoma Nagel ad Derek Parfit and Jane English (VIE2"G) ene tat these and ber dnages eave justice as fairness substantial inc, since is base ideals dvi Introduction co the Paperback Edition Buc while I view it as the most reasonable (even though many reasonable people seem to disagree with me), I shoulda’ deny thae other conceptions also satisfy the definition of a liberal conception. Indeed, I would simply be unreasonable if I denied that there were other reasonable conceptions satisfying that definition, for example, one that substitutes for the difference principle, a principle to improve social well-being subject to a constraint guaranteeing for everyone a sufficient level of ade- quate all-purpose means. Any conception that meets the Hon of reciprocity and recognizes the burdens of judgment (11:2) is a candidate. These burdens have a double role in PL: they are part of the basis for liberty of conscience and freedom of thought founded on the idea of the reasonable (60/f.). And they lead us to recognize that there are diferent and incompatible liberal political conceptions. PL is also concerned with what is the most reasonable basis of social unity (1336f,) available co citizens of a modern liberal democracy, although this concera is not pursued as far as it might be. This basis of social unity isthe following: ** a. The basic structure of society is effectively regulated by one of a family of reasonable liberal conceptions of. justice (or a mix thereof), which family includes the most reasonable conception. . Alll reasonable comprehensive doctrines in society en- dorse some member of this family of reasonable concep- tions, and citizens affieming these doctrines are in an endur- ing, majority wich respect to those rejecting each of that family. ‘Public political discussion, when constitutional essen- tials and matters of basic justice are at stake, are always, or nearly always, reasonably decidable on the basis of reasons Ged procipies remain and only their finer formulation has been, and ao doubs will, Coninue ro be, revised aad adjusted 1 This Jfeition and suggested bass of wie i not speed oot in PLT mention ‘thor explciyfor che fis time ad ia "Reply to Haber,” X21 wtlixIntroduction to the Paperback Edition specified by one of a family of reasonable liberal concep- tions of justice, one of which is for each citizen the most (more) reasonable. Clearly this definition may be varied in several ways. For instance, this basis would be ideally the most reasonable if soci ‘ety is effectively regulated by the most reasonable conception and citizens are in wide and general reflective equilibrium about this, Practically, the most reasonable basis, one that might actu- ally come about, is one in which all ciuzens agree that the regula- tive politcal conception is reasonable and some think it che most reasonable. This is sufficient for political society to be stable for the right reasons: che political conception can now be honored by all citizens as at least reasonable and for political purposes that usually is the most we can expect. 5. Inow consider the idea of public reason and its ideal, and supplement what is said in VI-4, 7, 8 The reader should be careful to note the kinds of questions and forums ro which public reason applies (pp. 213~16, 252ff.)—for example, the debates of political parties and chose secking public office when discussing constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice— I refer to this as the proviso”® and it specifies what I now call the wide view of public-reason. It is satisfied by the three cases discussed at pp. 249ff. OF special historical importance are the cases of the Abolitionists and the civil rights movement. I said that they did not violate what in VES I had called the inclusive view of public reason. Both the Abolitionists’ and King’s doctrines were held co belong to public reatoa because they were invoked ia an unjust political society. -and theit conclusions of justice were in accord with the constitu- tional values of a liberal regime. [also suid chat there should be reason to believe that appealing (0 the basis of these reasons in citizens’ comprehensive doctrines would help to make society more just. I now see no need for these conditions so far as they 0 beyond the proviso and drop them. The proviso of citizens’ justifying their conclusions in due course by public reasons se- cares what is needed.2” Ic has the further advantage of showing to other citizens the roots in our comprehensive doctrines of our allegiance to the political conception, which strengthens stability in the presence of a reasonable overlapping consensus. This gives the wide view and fits che examples ia VIB. It is crucial that public reason is not specified by any one political conception of justice, certainly nor by justice as fairness 25, Tiss more permissive than PL VL, which species ceeain conditions om ther eduction in wha ic refers # the ecleve ew. The wide view (a8 Teall is not riginal with me aad was suggested to te by En Kelly (summer 1993)- A Sinlarview found ia Lawrence Solum, whose flat sement i "Consteucting a8 Lal of Public Remon" San Diego Lane Rew 504 (Fall 1993), with x surnnary at pe. 47-731, There ies more recent stacient ia the Pane PDiaepbial Quarterly 153 aol 4 Sepe Dee. 1994). 26. Many questions moa be asked abou satsying this provizo. One it: when does itoced bested, onthe same Jay or rome le da? Also, on whom docs the thin co honor i fal? There are many such questions—I only indicate afew of ‘dem bere A Thompson has urged, i oupht (be clear and established how che ois whe appropriately satis "7. | do oot knom mbethee the Abolition sad King evr fled the proviso. But wbuther they dil of not, they could have. Aad, bad they known che idea of peblic ron and shared its ideal, they would have. Tank Paul Weithman for Ss oie bi Introduction to the Paperback Edition alone. Rather, its content—the principles, ideals, and standards that may be appealed to—are those of a family’ of reasonable political conceptions of justice and this family changes over time. ‘These political conceptions are not of course compatible and they may be revised as a result oftheir debates with one another. Social changes over generations also give rise co new groups with differenc political problems. Views raising new questions related to ethnicity, gender, and race are obvious examples, and the political conceptions that result {com these views will debate the current conceptions. The content of public reason is not fixed, any more than ic is defined by any one reasonable political con- ception. ‘One objection to the wide view of public reason is that it is sill co0 restrictive. However, to establish this, we must. find pressing questions of constitutional essentials or matters of basic justice (IV:5) thar cannot be reasonably resolved by political values expressed by any ofthe existing reasonable political con- ceptions, nor also by any such conception that could be worked out. PL doesn’t argue that this ean never happen; i only suggests it rarely does so, Whether public reason can sete all, or almost all, political questions by a resonable ordering of politcal values cannot he decided in the abstract independent of actual cases. We need such cases careflly spelled out to clarify how we should view them. For how to think about a kind of case depends not on general considerations alone but on our formulating rele- vant political values we may noc have imagined before we reflect about particular instances. Pablic reason may also seem too restrictive because it might seem 0 settle questions in advance. However, it does not, as such, determine or sete paricular questions of law or policy. Rather, i¢ specifies the public reasons in terms of which such questions are to be politically decided. For example, ake che question of school prayer. One might suppose that a liberal position on this would reject their admissibility in public schools, But why so? We have to consider all the political values that can be invoked to settle ths question and on which side the decisive litt | \ |Introduction to the Paperback Edition reasons fall. The famous case of the debate in the Virginia House of Delegates in 1785 berween Patrick Henry and James Madison over the establishment of the Anglican Church and involving religion in the schools was argued almost entirely by reference to political values alone.”* Perhaps others think public reason is too restrictive because it ay lead to a stand-off” and fail co lead to agreement of views among citizens. Ic is alleged to be too restrictive since it doesn't supply enough reasons to sete all cases. This, however, happens rot only in moral and political reasoning but in all forms of reasoning, including science and common sense. But the relevant comparision for public ceasoning isto those cases in which some political decision must be made, as with legislacors enacting laws 28. The most serious opposiinn to Jefeion' “Bl for Establishing Religions Freedom,” which was edoped by te Vipin House of Delegates in 1786, wa provided by the popular Puck Henry. Henry's agumene for keeping she selisios eabshmene wa based onthe view dat Civnden knowledge hath a nau 0. leney wo correct the mone of men, resin their vies, and preserve the peace of ‘iticy, which canaoc be effected wibour a competent provision for learue cech- res See Thomas J. Cutty, The Fit Prins (New York: Oxford University Pres, 1986), wih eh 4 the case of Viena Henry did ot seem co argue for Chenian nowiee as such but ether ha was an effcive way £0 achieve basic pois values, namely, the good and peaceable condct of ckzens. Thus, take bin © mew bp vices” a leas io boty thon actions vnling the political vires found is political ibealism (194), and expresed by ake conceptions of democracy. Leaving Sie the obvious dificuly of whether peters can be composed that satis all the teeled resuictions of poli juice, Madsea's objections 9 Hears bil uoed Terely oo whether celigious erubinear was vecesary (0 support otdedy civ focery—he concluded it was tot Madan objecion depended also on the Hx (aleifecs of establishinent bok on sociy and onthe integrity of religion ise, See Matson “Memorial and Remonsrance™ (178) in The Mind ofthe Founder, et Marve Meyers (New York Bobb Merl, 1973), pp. T~16, and luo Cuty, pp [HOHE He cited dhe prospeiy of eons ha ad a6 establishment, soubly Peoo- tyivanis tad Rhode Island, the stengh of ely Chisianity in opposion to the fouile Roman Etmpie, andthe corpiae of past establishments, With some cae ip formation, many if tall of these aurea: eaa be expressed in terms of polis ‘luce of pblic reason The spel ineres ofthe example of school payers th it “Shows thar the iden of public ewon is at view about specific politica insti ‘rales, bata view about how they ae be argued for and justified to ee eitieo bly thar muse decile the question. 3D” lake dhe term fra Pal Quinn, The dea appens in PL at VIT.1~2 liv — e Introduction to the Paperback Edition and judges deciding cases. Here some political rule of action must be laid down and all must be able reasonably to endorse the process by which itis reached. Public reason sees the office Of citizen with its duty of civility as analogous to that of judgeship its duty of deciding cases. Just as judges are t0 decide them by legal grounds of precedent and recognized canons of statutory interpretation and other relevant grounds, so citizens are to rea son by public reason and to be guided by the criterion of reci- prociey, whenever constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice are at stake. “Thus, when there seems t0 be a stand-off, that is, legal argu iments seem evenly balanced on both sides, judges cannot simply resolve the case by appealing o their own political views. To do that is for judges to violate their duty. The same holds with public reason: if when stand-off occur, citizens invoke the {rounding reasons oftheir comprehensive views,” then the prin- ple of reciprocity is violred. The reasons deciding constcu- tional essentials and basic justice are no longer those that we may reasonably expect chat all citizens may reasonably endorse, particularly chose whose religous liberties, or rights t0 vote, of rights to fait opportunity are denied. From the point of view of public reason citizens should simply vore for the ordering of political values they sincerely think the most reasonable. Other- wise we fail. exercise political power in ways that saisy the criterion of reciprocity However, disputed questions, such as that of abortion, may lead (0 a stand-off berween diferent political conceptions, and citizens must simply vote on the question.** Indeed, this isthe 30. Las dhe term rmanding rain since many who might appeal to these resoas view them a be poper grounds o the true basis, telgious or pilosophia ot Inoral ofthe ica and principles of public reasons and political conception: of 31. Some have quite naturally sea the footnote (2436) as an argument forthe right to abortion in he sc inester 1 do not intend it vo be one (I does expess ‘ay opinion, but an opision isa an argument) I was in ecror in leaving iin doobe thatthe ait of the foorote wat oly lurtrate and conkem the following saterent inthe eet to whch the foenote ie atached: “Te only comprehensive dctines thatIntroduction to the Paperbeck Edition, normal case: uranimity of views is not to be expected. Reasoi able political conceptions of justice do not always lead to the same conclusion (24ff), nor do citizens holding the same concep- tion always agree on particular issues. Yet the outcome of the vote is to be seen as reasonable provided all citizens ofa reason- ably just constitutional regime sincerely vote in accordance with the idea of public reason. This doesn’t mean the outcome is teue ‘or correct, but itis for the moment reasonable, and binding on Citizens by the majority principle Some may, of course, reject a decision, as Catholics may reject a decision to grant a right co abortion. They may present an argument in public reason for denying it and fil 0 win a majority. ? But they need notexercise run afoul of public reson are tote that cannot support a reasonable bance fot ‘ederig] of politica values (onthe sue)” To ery to explain what | meat, sed thee politic! valu (af cout, thee are moc) For the troubled issue of the ihe © sbortion, to which imei seem improbable tha poia values could ppy a al believe a more detailed ierpretion of those values nay, when proper developed st public reason, yl a eomable argoment. 1 don't say the mow rsoable or Secisive argument | don't koow what tha would be, oF even ii exis (Fo an ‘ample of nach + wore dead interpretation, see Judith Jarvis Thomson, “Abor tion: Whose Right?" Boos Rene 203 [Sumner 1995]; though {would want add several addenda tie) Suppove tom, for purposes of ilstaton, tha here is reasonable argument in pubic reson for he right of abortion bu there 0 equally ‘reasonable balance or order of the poltial values in public eason hac apes forthe denial of tht ig. Thea i his kindof case, but nly ia this Kad of se, does a comptchersne docine denying the right of abortion rua afol of pubic reason. However, ican sty the proviso ofthe wide public reason ber, © + Teast as well other ews, it has ade Ws case at public reason. A conprehensine

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