G.R. No. 132681 December 3, 2001 In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, null and void.
I have hereunto set my hand, null and void. Furthermore, the trial court held that nowhere
RICKY Q. QUILALA, petitioner,
vs.
GLICERIA ALCANTARA, LEONORA ALCANTARA,
INES REYES and JOSE REYES, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a "Donation
of Real Property Inter Vivos" in favor of Violeta Quilala over
a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila, containing an
area of 94 square meters, and registered in her name under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17214 of the Register of Deeds
for Manila.
The "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" consists of two
pages. The first page contains the deed of donation itself, and
is signed on the bottom portion by Catalina Quilala as donor,
Violeta Quilala as donee, and two instrumental
witnesses.1 The second page contains the Acknowledgment,
which states merely that Catalina Quilala personally
appeared before the notary public and acknowledged that the
donation was her free and voluntary act and deed. There
appear on the left-hand margin of the second page the
signatures of Catalina Quilala and one of the witnesses, and
on the right-hand margin the signatures of Violeta Quilala
and the other witness.2 The Acknowledgment reads:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
QUEZON CITY ) S.S.
Before Me, a Notary Public, for and in the City of
Quezon, Philippines, this 20th day of Feb. 1981,
personally appeared CATALINA QUILALA, with
Residence Certificate No. 19055265 issued at
Quezon City on February 4, 1981, known to me and
to me known to be the same person who executed
the foregoing instruments and acknowledged to
me that the same is her own free and voluntary act
and deed.
I hereby certify that this instrument consisting of
two (2) pages, including the page on which this
acknowledgment is written, has been signed by
CATALINA QUILALA and her instrumental
witnesses at the end thereof and on the left-hand
margin of page 2 and both pages have been sealed
with my notarial seal.
in the City of Quezon, Philippines, this 20th day of
Feb., 1981.
(SGD.) NOTARY PUBLIC
Until December 31, 1981
(illegible)
DOC NO. 22;
PAGE NO. 6;
BOOK NO. XV;
SERIES OF 1981.
The deed of donation was registered with the Register of
Deeds and, in due course, TCT No. 17214 was cancelled and
TCT No. 143015 was issued in the name of Violeta Quilala.
On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala
likewise died on May 22, 1984. Petitioner Ricky Quilala
alleges that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala.
Meanwhile, respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora
Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes, claiming to be
Catalina's only surviving relatives within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity, executed a deed of extrajudicial
settlement of estate, dividing and adjudicating unto
themselves the above-described property.
On September 13, 1984, respondents instituted against
petitioner and Guillermo T. San Pedro, the Registrar of Deeds
of Manila, an action for the declaration of nullity of the
donation inter vivos, and for the cancellation of TCT No.
143015 in the name of Violeta Quilala. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 84-26603 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 17. Subsequently, respondents withdrew their
complaint as against Guillermo T. San Pedro and he was
dropped as a party-defendant.
The trial court found that the deed of donation, although
signed by both Catalina and Violeta, was acknowledged
before a notary public only by the donor, Catalina.
Consequently, there was no acceptance by Violeta of the
donation in a public instrument, thus rendering the donation
in Catalina's SSS records does it appear that Violeta was
Catalina's daughter. Rather, Violeta was referred to therein as
an adopted child, but there was no positive evidence that the
adoption was legal. On the other hand, the trial court found
that respondents were first cousins of Catalina Quilala.
However, since it appeared that Catalina died leaving a will,
the trial court ruled that respondents' deed of extrajudicial
settlement can not be registered. The trial court rendered
judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiffs Gliceria Alcantara, Leonarda
Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes and against
defendant Ricky A. Quilala, as follows:
1. Declaring null and void the deed of donation of
real property inter vivos executed on February 20,
1981 by Catalina Quilala in favor of Violeta Quilala
(Exhs. A as well as 11 and 11-A.);
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to
cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 143015 in the
name of Violeta Quilala and to issue a transfer
certificate of title in the name of the Estate of
Catalina Quilala;.
3. Dismissing the complaint insofar as it seeks the
registration of the deed of extrajudicial settlement
(Exhs. B and B-1,) and the issuance by the Register
of Deeds of Manila of a transfer certificate of title in
the names of the plaintiffs; and
4. Dismissing the counterclaim of defendant Ricky
A. Quilala.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.3
Petitioner appealed the aforesaid decision. On July 30, 1997,
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court by dismissing the
complaint for lack of cause of action without prejudice to the
filing of probate proceedings of Catalina's alleged last will
and testament.4
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATION:
 (3) DISMISSING the complaint for lack of cause of
action without prejudice to the filing of the
necessary probate proceedings by the interested
parties so as not to render nugatory the right of the
lawful heirs.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court
of Appeals denied on February 11, 1998.5 Hence, this petition
for review, raising the following assignment of errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE DEED OF DONATION OF REAL
PROPERTY INTER-VIVOS IS NOT
REGISTRABLE.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON
UPHOLDING THE LOWER COURT'S RULING
THAT VIOLETA QUILALA IS NOT THE
DAUGHTER OF CATALINA QUILALA.6
The principal issue raised is the validity of the donation
executed by Catalina in favor of Violeta. Under Article 749 of
the Civil Code, the donation of an immovable must be made
in a public instrument in order to be valid,7 specifying therein
the property donated and the value of the charges which the
donee must satisfy. As a mode of acquiring ownership,
donation results in an effective transfer of title over the
property from the donor to the donee,8 and is perfected from
the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the
donee,9 provided the donee is not disqualified or prohibited
by law from accepting the donation. Once the donation is
accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable,10 and the
donee becomes the absolute owner of the property.11 The
acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the lifetime of
both the donor and the donee.12 It may be made in the same
deed or in a separate public document,13 and the donor must
know the acceptance by the donee.14
In the case at bar, the deed of donation contained the number
of the certificate of title as well as the technical description of
the real property donated. It stipulated that the donation was
made for and in consideration of the "love and affection which
the DONEE inspires in the DONOR, and as an act of liberality
and generosity."15 This was sufficient cause for a donation.
Indeed, donation is legally defined as "an act of liberality
whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in
favor of another, who accepts it."16
The donee's acceptance of the donation was explicitly
manifested in the penultimate paragraph of the deed, which
reads:
That the DONEE hereby receives and accepts the
gift and donation made in her favor by the DONOR
and she hereby expresses her appreciation and
gratefulness for the kindness and generosity of the
DONOR.17
Below the terms and stipulations of the donation, the donor,
donee and their witnesses affixed their signature. However,
the Acknowledgment appearing on the second page
mentioned only the donor, Catalina Quilala. Thus, the trial
court ruled that for Violeta's failure to acknowledge her
acceptance before the notary public, the same was set forth
merely on a private instrument, i.e., the first page of the
instrument. We disagree.
The pertinent provision is Section 112, paragraph 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, which states:
Deeds, conveyances, encumbrances, discharges,
powers of attorney and other voluntary
instruments, whether affecting registered or
unregistered land, executed in accordance with law
in the form of public instruments shall
be registrable: Provided, that, every such instrument
shall be signed by person or persons executing the same
in the presence of at least two witnesses who shall
likewise sign thereon, and shall be acknowledged to be
the free act and deed of the person or persons executing
the same before a notary public or other public
officer authorized by law to take acknowledgment.
Where the instrument so acknowledged consists of
two or more pages including the page whereon
acknowledgment is written, each page of the copy which
is to be registered in the office of the Register of
Deeds, or if registration is not contemplated, each
page of the copy to be kept by the notary public, except
the page where the signatures already appear at the foot
of the instrument shall be signed on the left margin
thereof by the person or persons executing the
instrument and their witnesses, and all the pages sealed
with the notarial seal, and this fact as well as the number
of pages shall be stated in the acknowledgment. Where
the instrument acknowledged relates to a sale,
transfer, mortgage or encumbrance of two or more
parcels of land, the number thereof shall likewise
be set forth in said acknowledgment." (italics
supplied).
As stated above, the second page of the deed of donation, on
which the Acknowledgment appears, was signed by the
donor and one witness on the left-hand margin, and by the
donee and the other witness on the right hand margin. Surely,
the requirement that the contracting parties and their
witnesses should sign on the left-hand margin of the
instrument is not absolute. The intendment of the law merely
is to ensure that each and every page of the instrument is
authenticated by the parties. The requirement is designed to
avoid the falsification of the contract after the same has
already been duly executed by the parties. Hence, a
contracting party affixes his signature on each page of the
instrument to certify that he is agreeing to everything that is
written thereon at the time of signing.
Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is
merely directory. The fact that one of the parties signs on the
wrong side of the page does not invalidate the document. The
purpose of authenticating the page is served, and the
requirement in the above-quoted provision is deemed
substantially complied with.
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee
before the notary public does not also render the donation
null and void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety.
It cannot be considered a private document in part and a
public document in another part. The fact that it was
acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of
donation in its entirety a public instrument. The fact that the
donee was not mentioned by the notary public in the
acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is the
conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and
voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second
page, which contains the Acknowledgment only. Her
acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the first page of the
notarized deed of donation, was made in a public instrument.
It should be stressed that this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not
make a determination of whether Violeta was the daughter of Catalina,
or whether petitioner is the son of Violeta. These issues should be
ventilated in the appropriate probate or settlement proceedings
affecting the respective estates of Catalina and Violeta. Suffice it to
state that the donation, which we declare herein to be valid, will still
be subjected to a test on its inofficiousness under Article 771,18 in
relation to Articles 752, 911 and 912 of the Civil Code. Moreover,
property donated inter vivos is subject to collation after the donor's
death,19 whether the donation was made to a compulsory heir or a
stranger,20 unless there is an express prohibition if that had been the
donor's intention.21
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed
decision of the Court of Appeals , is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new
judgment is rendered dismissing Civil Case No. 84-26603.
G.R. No. 160488 September 3, 2004
FELOMINA1 ABELLANA, petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES ROMEO PONCE and LUCILA PONCE and the
REGISTER OF DEEDS of BUTUAN CITY, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the June 16,
2003 decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
69213, which reversed and set aside the August 28, 2000
decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch
2, in Civil Case No. 4270.
The facts as testified to by petitioner Felomina Abellana are as
follows:
On July 15, 1981, Felomina, a spinster, pharmacist and aunt of
private respondent Lucila Ponce, purchased from the late
Estela Caldoza-Pacres a 44,2974 square meter agricultural
lot5 with the intention of giving said lot to her niece, Lucila.
Thus, in the deed of sale,6 the latter was designated as the
buyer of Lot 3, Pcs-10-000198, covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. P-27, Homestead Patent No. V-1551 and located
at Los Angeles, Butuan City.7 The total consideration of the
sale was P16,500.00, but only P4,500.00 was stated in the deed
upon the request of the seller.8
Subsequently, Felomina applied for the issuance of title in the
name of her niece. On April 28, 1992, Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 28749 over the subject lot was issued in the
name of Lucila.10 Said title, however, remained in the
possession of Felomina who developed the lot through
Juanario Torreon11 and paid real property taxes thereon.12
The relationship between Felomina and respondent spouses
Romeo and Lucila Ponce, however, turned sour. The latter
allegedly became disrespectful and ungrateful to the point of
hurling her insults and even attempting to hurt her
physically. Hence, Felomina filed the instant case for
revocation of implied trust to recover legal title over the
property.13
Private respondent spouses Lucila, also a pharmacist, and
Romeo, a marine engineer, on the other hand, claimed that the
purchase price of the lot was only P4,500.00 and that it was
them who paid the same. The payment and signing of the
deed of sale allegedly took place in the office of Atty. Teodoro
Emboy in the presence of the seller and her siblings namely,
Aquilino Caldoza and the late Lilia Caldoza.14
A year later, Juanario approached Lucila and volunteered to
till the lot, to which she agreed.15 In 1987, the spouses
consented to Felomina’s proposal to develop and lease the lot.
They, however, shouldered the real property taxes on the lot,
which was paid through Felomina. In 1990, the spouses
demanded rental from Felomina but she refused to pay
because her agricultural endeavor was allegedly not
profitable.16
When Lucila learned that a certificate of title in her name had
already been issued, she confronted Felomina who claimed
that she already gave her the title. Thinking that she might
have misplaced the title, Lucila executed an affidavit of loss
which led to the issuance of another certificate of title in her
name.17
On August 28, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision
holding that an implied trust existed between Felomina and
Lucila, such that the latter is merely holding the lot for the
benefit of the former. It thus ordered the conveyance of the
subject lot in favor of Felomina. The dispositive portion
thereof, reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered declaring, directing and ordering
that:
a) An implied trust was created with
plaintiff as trustor and private defendant
Lucila A. Ponce married to private
defendant Engr. Romeo D. Ponce as
trustee pursuant to Article 1448 of the
New Civil Code;
b) The implied trust, having been created
without the consent of the trustee and
without any condition, is revoked;
c) The private defendants, who are
spouses, execute the necessary deed of
conveyance in favor of the plaintiff of the
land, covered by and embraced in TCT
NO. T-2874, in controversy and in the
event private defendants refuse to
execute the deed of conveyance, the
public defendant City Register of Deeds
of Butuan to cancel TCT No. T-2874 and
issue a new one in lieu thereof in the
name of the plaintiff;
d) The private defendants spouses to pay
jointly and severally plaintiff the sum of
PhP25,000.00 as attorney’s fees and
PhP4,000.00 as expenses of litigation;
e) The dismissal of the counterclaim of
private defendants spouses[;] and
f) The private defendants to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.18
Private respondent spouses appealed to the Court of Appeals
which set aside the decision of the trial court ruling that
Felomina failed to prove the existence of an implied trust and
upheld respondent spouses’ ownership over the litigated lot.
The appellate court further held that even assuming that
Felomina paid the purchase price of the lot, the situation falls
within the exception stated in Article 1448 of the Civil Code
which raises a disputable presumption that the property was
purchased by Felomina as a gift to Lucila whom she
considered as her own daughter. The decretal portion thereof,
states –
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2,
Butuan City, in Civil Case No. 4270, is hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A new one is
heretofore rendered dismissing the complaint
below of plaintiff-appellee, F[e]lomina Abellana.
SO ORDERED.19
Felomina filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied.20 Hence, the instant petition.
The issue before us is: Who, as between Felomina and
respondent spouses, is the lawful owner of the controverted
lot? To resolve this issue, it is necessary to determine who
paid the purchase price of the lot.
After a thorough examination of the records and transcript of
stenographic notes, we find that it was Felomina and not
Lucila who truly purchased the questioned lot from Estela.
The positive and consistent testimony of Felomina alone, that
she was the real vendee of the lot, is credible to debunk the
contrary claim of respondent spouses. Indeed, the lone
testimony of a witness, if credible, is sufficient as in the
present case.21 Moreover, Aquilino Caldoza, brother of the
vendor and one of the witnesses22 to the deed of sale,
categorically declared that Felomina was the buyer and the
one who paid the purchase price to her sister, Estela.23
Then too, Juanario, who was allegedly hired by Lucila to
develop the lot, vehemently denied that he approached and
convinced Lucila to let him till the land. According to
Juanario, he had never spoken to Lucila about the lot and it
was Felomina who recruited him to be the caretaker of the
litigated property.24
The fact that it was Felomina who bought the lot was further
bolstered by her possession of the following documents from
the time of their issuance up to the present, to wit: (1) the
transfer certificate of title25 and tax declaration in the name of
Lucila;26 (2) the receipts of real property taxes in the name of
Felomina Abellana for the years 1982-1984, 1992-1994 and
1995;27 and (3) the survey plan of the lot.28
Having determined that it was Felomina who paid the
purchase price of the subject lot, the next question to resolve
is the nature of the transaction between her and Lucila.
It appears that Felomina, being of advanced age29 with no
family of her own, used to purchase properties and
afterwards give them to her nieces. In fact, aside from the lot
she bought for Lucila (marked as Exhibit "R-2"), she also
purchased 2 lots, one from Aquilino Caldoza (marked as
Exhibit "R-1") and the other from Domiciano Caldoza
(marked as Exhibit "R-3"), which she gave to Zaida Bascones
(sister of Lucila), thus:
Q I am showing to you again Exhibit R, according
to you[,] you bought Exhibits R-1, R-2 and R-3, do
you remember that?
A Yes sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Aquilin[o] Caldoza conveyed this land in Exhibit
R-1 to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is this now titled in your name?
A No. I was planning to give this land to my nieces.
One of which [was] already given to Mrs. [Lucila]
Ponce.
Q I am talking only about this lot in Exhibit R-1[.]
A Not in my name.
Q In whose name was this lot in Exhibit R-1 now?
A In the name of Zaida Bascones.
Q Who prepared the deed of sale?
A At the start it was in the name of Rudy
[Torreon].30 Because Rudy [Torreon] knew that
there is some trouble already about that lot he made
a deed of sale to the name of Zaida Bascones, which
I planned to give that land to her (sic).
Q As regards Exhibit R-1, you bought it actually?
A Yes, sir.
Q But the … original deed of sale was in the name
of Rudolfo [Torreon]?
A Yes, sir.
Q And later on Rudolfo [Torreon] again transferred
it to Zaida Bascones?
A Yes, sir.31
Likewise, in the case of Lucila, though it was Felomina who
paid for the lot, she had Lucila designated in the deed as the
vendee thereof and had the title of the lot issued in Lucila’s
name. It is clear therefore that Felomina donated the land to
Lucila. This is evident from her declarations, viz:
Witness
A In 1981 there was a riceland offered so I told her
that I will buy that land and I will give to her later
(sic), because since 1981 up to 1992 Mrs. Lucila
Ponce has no job.
Q Where is the land located?
A In Los Angeles, Butuan City.
Q Who was the owner of this land?
A The owner of that land is Mrs. Estela Caldoza-
Pacr[e]s.
The husband is Pacr[e]s.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What did you do with this land belonging to Mrs.
Estela-Caldoza- Pacr[e]s?
A I paid the lot, then worked the lot, since at the
start of my buying the lot until now (sic).
Q You said that you told Lucila Ponce that you
would give the land to her later on, what did you
do in connection with this intention of yours to
give the land to her?
A So I put the name of the title in her name in
good faith (sic).
Q You mean to tell the court that when you
purchased this land located at Los Angeles, Butuan
City, the instrument of sale or the deed of sale was
in the name of Lucila Ponce?
A Yes, sir.32
xxx xxx xxx
Q Did you not ask your adviser Rudolfo [Torreon]
whether it was wise for you to place the property
in the name of Lucila Ponce when you are the one
who is the owner?
A Because we have really the intention to give it
to her.33
Generally, contracts are obligatory in whatever form they
may have been entered into, provided all the essential
requisites for their validity are present. When, however, the
law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it
may be valid, that requirement is absolute and indispensable.
Its non-observance renders the contract void and of no
effect.34 Thus, under Article 749 of the Civil Code –
Article 749. In order that the donation of an
immovable property may be valid, it must be made
in a public document, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the charges
which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or
in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect
unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor
shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step
shall be noted in both instruments.
In the instant case, what transpired between Felomina and
Lucila was a donation of an immovable property which was
not embodied in a public instrument as required by the
foregoing article. Being an oral donation, the transaction was
void.35 Moreover, even if Felomina enjoyed the fruits of the
land with the intention of giving effect to the donation after
her demise, the conveyance is still a void donation mortis
causa, for non-compliance with the formalities of a will.36 No
valid title passed regardless of the intention of Felomina to
donate the property to Lucila, because the naked intent to
convey without the required solemnities does not suffice for
gratuitous alienations, even as between the parties inter
se.37 At any rate, Felomina now seeks to recover title over the
property because of the alleged ingratitude of the respondent
spouses.
Unlike ordinary contracts (which are perfected by the
concurrence of the requisites of consent, object and cause
pursuant to Article 131838 of the Civil Code), solemn contracts
like donations are perfected only upon compliance with the
legal formalities under Articles 74839 and 749.40 Otherwise
stated, absent the solemnity requirements for validity, the
mere intention of the parties does not give rise to a contract.
The oral donation in the case at bar is therefore legally
inexistent and an action for the declaration of the inexistence
of a contract does not prescribe.41 Hence, Felomina can still
recover title from Lucila.
Article 144842 of the Civil Code on implied trust finds no
application in the instant case. The concept of implied trusts
is that from the facts and circumstances of a given case, the
existence of a trust relationship is inferred in order to effect
the presumed intention of the parties.43 Thus, one of the
recognized exceptions to the establishment of an implied trust must be applied in a way that equitably and completely
is where a contrary intention is proved,44 as in the present resolve the rights and obligations of the parties.47
case. From the testimony of Felomina herself, she wanted to
give the lot to Lucila as a gift. To her mind, the execution of a As to the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and litigation
deed with Lucila as the buyer and the subsequent issuance of
expenses, the same should be deleted for lack of basis. Aside
title in the latter’s name were the acts that would effectuate
from the allegations in the complaint, no evidence was
her generosity. In so carrying out what she conceived,
presented in support of said claims. The trial court made these
Felomina evidently displayed her unequivocal intention to
awards in the dispositive portion of its decision without
transfer ownership of the lot to Lucila and not merely to
stating any justification therefor in the ratio decidendi. Their
constitute her as a trustee thereof. It was only when their deletion is therefore proper.48
relationship soured that she sought to revoke the donation on
the theory of implied trust, though as previously discussed,
there is nothing to revoke because the donation was never Finally, in deciding in favor of Felomina, the trial court
perfected. ordered respondent spouses to execute a deed of sale over the
subject lot in favor of Felomina in order to effect the transfer
of title to the latter. The proper remedy, however, is provided
In declaring Lucila as the owner of the disputed lot, the Court
under Section 10 (a), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Civil
of Appeals applied, among others, the second sentence of
Procedure which provides that "x x x [i]f real or personal
Article 1448 which states –
property is situated within the Philippines, the court in lieu of
directing a conveyance thereof may by an order divest the
"x x x However, if the person to whom the title is title of any party and vest it in others, which shall have the
conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the force and effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law."
one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied
by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition
gift in favor of the child."
is GRANTED and the June 16, 2003 decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69213 is REVERSED and SET
Said presumption also arises where the property is given to a ASIDE. The August 28, 2000 decision of the Regional Trial
person to whom the person paying the price stands in loco Court of Butuan City, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 4270,
parentis or as a substitute parent.45 is REINSTATED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
The abovecited provision, however, is also not applicable (1) Declaring petitioner Felomina Abellana as the
here because, first, it was not established that Felomina stood absolute owner of Lot 3, Pcs-10-000198;
as a substitute parent of Lucila; and second, even assuming
that she did, the donation is still void because the transfer and
(2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Butuan City
acceptance was not embodied in a public instrument. We note
to cancel TCT No. T-2874 in the name of respondent
that said provision merely raised a presumption that the
Lucila Ponce and to issue a new one in the name of
conveyance was a gift but nothing therein exempts the parties
petitioner Felomina Abellana; and
from complying with the formalities of a donation.
Dispensation of such solemnities would give rise to
anomalous situations where the formalities of a donation and (3) Deleting the awards of attorney’s fees and
a will in donations inter vivos, and donations mortis causa, litigation expenses for lack of basis.
respectively, would be done away with when the transfer of
the property is made in favor of a child or one to whom the No pronouncement as to costs.
donor stands in loco parentis. Such a scenario is clearly
repugnant to the mandatory nature of the law on donation.
While Felomina sought to recover the litigated lot on the
ground of implied trust and not on the invalidity of donation,
the Court is clothed with ample authority to address the latter
issue in order to arrive at a just decision that completely
disposes of the controversy.46 Since rules of procedure are
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, they
EN BANC
Article 806 of the New Civil Code reads as
[G.R. No. L-20357. November 25, 1967.] This is an appeal taken by Pedro Reyes Garcia follows:jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

from the decision of the Court of First Instance

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
THE ALLOWANCE OF THE WILL OF
GREGORIO GATCHALIAN, deceased.
PEDRO REYES GARCIA, Petitioner-
Appellant, v. FELIPE GATCHALIAN,
of Rizal in Special Proceedings No. 2623
denying the allowance of the will of the late
Gregorio Gatchalian, on the ground that the
attesting witnesses did not acknowledge it
before a notary public as required by law.
"Every will must be acknowledged before a
notary public by the testator and the witnesses.
The notary public shall not be required to
retain a copy of the will, or file another with the
office of the Clerk of Court." cralaw virtua1aw libra ry

AURORA G. CAMINS, ANGELES G.

COSCA, FEDERICO G. TUBOG, VIRGINIA
G. TALANAY and ANGELES G.
TALANAY, Oppositors-Appellees.
E. Debuque for Petitioner-Appellant.
E. L. Segovia for oppositors-appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROBATE OF WILLS;
ACKNOWLEDGMENT BY TESTATOR AND
WITNESSES BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC,
REQUISITE OF; FAILURE TO OBSERVE;
EFFECT ON ALLOWANCE OF WILL. — A
will to be valid, must be acknowledged before
a notary public not only by the testator but also
by attesting witnesses (In re: Testate Estate of
Alberto, G.R. No. L-11948, April 29, 1959). As
the document under consideration does not
comply with this requirement, the same may
not be probated.
DECISION
DIZON, J.:
We have held heretofore that compliance with
On March 15, 1967, Gregorio Gatchalian, a
the requirement contained in the above legal
widower of 71 years of age, died in the
provision to the effect that a will must be
municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal,
leaving no forced heirs. On April 2 of the same acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and also by the witnesses is
year, appellant filed a petition with the above-
named court for the probate of said alleged will indispensable for its validity (In re: Testate
(Exhibit "C") wherein he was instituted as sole Estate of Alberto, G.R. No. L-11948, April 29,
heir. Felipe Gatchalian, Aurora G. Camins, 1959). As the document under consideration
Angeles G. Cosca, Federico G. Tubog, Virginia does not comply with this requirement, it is
G. Talanay and Angeles C. Talanay, appellees obvious that the same may not be probated.
herein, opposed the petition on the ground,
among others, that the will was procured by WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
fraud; that the deceased did not intend the affirmed, with costs.
instrument signed by him to be as his will; and
that the deceased was physically and mentally Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
incapable of making a will at the time of the Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
alleged execution of said will.
Concepcion, C.J., and Reyes, J.B.L., J., are on
After due trial, the court rendered the appealed official leave of absence.
decision finding the document Exhibit "C" to
be the authentic last will of the deceased but
disallowing it for failure to comply with the
mandatory requirement of Article 806 of the
New Civil Code — that the will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses.
An examination of the document (Exhibit "C")
shows that the same was acknowledged before
a notary public by the testator but not by the
instrumental witnesses.
G.R. No. 122880 April 12, 2006 HULING HABILIN NI EUGENIA E. IGSOLO bawa’t isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa
kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa’t dahon ng kasulatan ito.
FELIX AZUELA, Petitioner, SA NGALAN NG MAYKAPAL, AMEN:
vs. EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO address: 500 San Diego St.
AKO, si EUGENIA E. IGSOLO, nakatira sa 500 San Diego St.,
substituted by ERNESTO G. CASTILLO, Respondents. Sampaloc, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-7717-37
Sampaloc, Manila, pitongput siyam (79) na gulang, nasa
Issued at Manila on March 10, 1981.
hustong pagi-isip, pag-unawa at memoria ay nag-hahayag na
DECISION ito na ang aking huling habilin at testamento, at binabali wala
ko lahat ang naunang ginawang habilin o testamento: QUIRINO AGRAVA
TINGA, J.: address: 1228-Int. 3, Kahilum
Pandacan, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-458365
Una-Hinihiling ko na ako ay mailibing sa Sementerio del
Issued at Manila on Jan. 21, 1981
The core of this petition is a highly defective notarial will, Norte, La Loma sang-ayong sa kaugalian at patakaran ng
purportedly executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo (decedent), who simbahang katoliko at ang taga-pag-ingat (Executor) ng
died on 16 December 1982 at the age of 80. In refusing to give habiling ito ay magtatayo ng bantayog upang silbing ala-ala LAMBERTO C. LEAÑO
legal recognition to the due execution of this document, the sa akin ng aking pamilya at kaibigan; address: Avenue 2, Blcok 7,
Court is provided the opportunity to assert a few important Lot 61, San Gabriel, G.MA., Cavite Res.
doctrinal rules in the execution of notarial wills, all self- Cert. No. A-768277 issued at Carmona, Cavite on Feb. 7, 1981
Pangalawa-Aking ipinagkakaloob at isinasalin ang lahat ng
evident in view of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code. karapatan sa aking pamangkin na si Felix Azuela, na siyang
nag-alaga sa akin sa mahabang panahon, yaong mga bahay JUANITO ESTRERA
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number na nakatirik sa lote numero 28, Block 24 at nakapangalan sa address: City Court Compound,
of pages on which the will is written is fatally defective. A Pechaten Korporasyon, ganoon din ibinibigay ko ang lahat ng City of Manila Res. Cert. No. A574829
will whose attestation clause is not signed by the karapatan sa bahay na nakatirik sa inoopahan kong lote, Issued at Manila on March 2, 1981.
instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps numero 43, Block 24 na pag-aari ng Pechaten Corporation.
most importantly, a will which does not contain an Ipinagkakaloob kong buong buo ang lahat ng karapatan sa
Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10, 1981
acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any bahay at lupa na nasa 500 San Diego St., Lot 42, Block 24, dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.
one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial Sampaloc, Manila kay Felix Azuela at ang pagkakaloob kong
will with all three defects is just aching for judicial ito ay walang pasubali’t at kondiciones;
rejection. (Sgd.)
PETRONIO Y. BAUTISTA
Pangatlo- Na ninunumbrahan ko si VART PAGUE na siyang
There is a distinct and consequential reason the Civil Code nagpapatupad ng huling habiling ito at kagustuhan ko rin na
provides a comprehensive catalog of imperatives for the hindi na kailanman siyang mag-lagak ng piyansiya. Doc. No. 1232 ; NOTARIO PUBLIKO
proper execution of a notarial will. Full and faithful Page No. 86 ; Until Dec. 31, 1981
compliance with all the detailed requisites under Article 805 Book No. 43 ; PTR-152041-1/2/81-Manila
Aking nilagdaan ang Huling Habilin na ito dito sa Maynila
of the Code leave little room for doubt as to the validity in the Series of 1981 TAN # 1437-977-81
ika 10 ng Hunyo, 1981.
due execution of the notarial will. Article 806 likewise
imposes another safeguard to the validity of notarial wills — The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures
that they be acknowledged before a notary public by the (Sgd.)
on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will, but not at
testator and the witnesses. A notarial will executed with EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
the bottom of the attestation clause.
indifference to these two codal provisions opens itself to (Tagapagmana)
nagging questions as to its legitimacy.
The probate petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees
PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI and devisees of the decedent, namely: petitioner himself, and
The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April one Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to have resided
1984 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng ____ dahon pati ang abroad. Petitioner prayed that the will be allowed, and that
petition filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to huling dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia E. letters testamentary be issued to the designated executor, Vart
probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayon Prague.
notarized on 10 June 1981. Petitioner is the son of the cousin ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing
of the decedent. tagapagmana sa ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa
The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda
kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa’t dahon, sa harap ng lahat at
Castillo), who represented herself as the attorney-in-fact of
The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the bawa’t sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa
"the 12 legitimate heirs" of the decedent.2 Geralda Castillo
vernacular Pilipino, read in full: harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at
claimed that the will is a forgery, and that the true purpose of
its emergence was so it could be utilized as a defense in
several court cases filed by oppositor against petitioner,
particularly for forcible entry and usurpation of real property,
all centering on petitioner’s right to occupy the properties of
the decedent.3 It also asserted that contrary to the
representations of petitioner, the decedent was actually
survived by 12 legitimate heirs, namely her grandchildren,
who were then residing abroad. Per records, it was
subsequently alleged that decedent was the widow of
Bonifacio Igsolo, who died in 1965,4 and the mother of a
legitimate child, Asuncion E. Igsolo, who predeceased her
mother by three (3) months.5
Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that the will was not
executed and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed
out that decedent’s signature did not appear on the second
page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged.
These twin arguments are among the central matters to this
petition.
After due trial, the RTC admitted the will to probate, in an
Order dated 10 August 1992.6 The RTC favorably took into
account the testimony of the three (3) witnesses to the will,
Quirino Agrava, Lamberto Leano, and Juanito Estrada. The
RTC also called to fore "the modern tendency in respect to the
formalities in the execution of a will x x x with the end in view
of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last
wishes;"7 and from this perspective, rebutted oppositor’s
arguments that the will was not properly executed and
attested to in accordance with law.
After a careful examination of the will and consideration of
the testimonies of the subscribing and attesting witnesses,
and having in mind the modern tendency in respect to the
formalities in the execution of a will, i.e., the liberalization of
the interpretation of the law on the formal requirements of a
will with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom
in expressing his last wishes, this Court is persuaded to rule
that the will in question is authentic and had been executed
by the testatrix in accordance with law.
On the issue of lack of acknowledgement, this Court has
noted that at the end of the will after the signature of the
testatrix, the following statement is made under the sub-title,
"Patunay Ng Mga Saksi":
"Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng _____ dahon pati ang
huling dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia N.
Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayong
ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing
tagapagmana sa ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa
kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa’t dahon, sa harap ng lahat at
bawa’t sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa
harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at
bawa’t isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa
kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa’t dahon ng kasulatan ito."
The aforequoted declaration comprises the attestation clause
and the acknowledgement and is considered by this Court as
a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.
On the oppositor’s contention that the attestation clause was
not signed by the subscribing witnesses at the bottom thereof,
this Court is of the view that the signing by the subscribing
witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the will
containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment,
instead of at the bottom thereof, substantially satisfies the
purpose of identification and attestation of the will.
With regard to the oppositor’s argument that the will was not
numbered correlatively in letters placed on upper part of each
page and that the attestation did not state the number of pages
thereof, it is worthy to note that the will is composed of only
two pages. The first page contains the entire text of the
testamentary dispositions, and the second page contains the
last portion of the attestation clause and acknowledgement.
Such being so, the defects are not of a serious nature as to
invalidate the will. For the same reason, the failure of the
testatrix to affix her signature on the left margin of the second
page, which contains only the last portion of the attestation
clause and acknowledgment is not a fatal defect.
As regards the oppositor’s assertion that the signature of the
testatrix on the will is a forgery, the testimonies of the three
subscribing witnesses to the will are convincing enough to
establish the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix and
the due execution of the will.8
The Order was appealed to the Court of Appeals by Ernesto
Castillo, who had substituted his since deceased mother-in-
law, Geralda Castillo. In a Decision dated 17 August 1995, the
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered the
dismissal of the petition for probate.9 The Court of Appeals
noted that the attestation clause failed to state the number of
pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void and
undeserving of probate.10
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the
Civil Code that "the number of pages used in a notarial will
be stated in the attestation clause" is merely directory, rather
than mandatory, and thus susceptible to what he termed as
"the substantial compliance rule."11
The solution to this case calls for the application of Articles
805 and 806 of the Civil Code, which we replicate in full.
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the
testator's name written by some other person in his presence,
and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by
three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator
and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name
and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as
aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the
left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively
in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon
which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed
the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person
to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence
of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed
and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence
of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the
witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public
shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another
with the office of the Clerk of Court.
The appellate court, in its Decision, considered only one
defect, the failure of the attestation clause to state the number
of pages of the will. But an examination of the will itself
reveals several more deficiencies.
As admitted by petitioner himself, the attestation clause fails
to state the number of pages of the will.12 There was an
incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a space
having been allotted for the insertion of the number of pages
in the attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in;
hence, the requisite was left uncomplied with.
The Court of Appeals pounced on this defect in reversing the
trial court, citing in the process Uy Coque v. Navas L.
Sioca13 and In re: Will of Andrada.14 In Uy Coque, the Court
noted that among the defects of the will in question was the
failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages
contained in the will.15 In ruling that the will could not be
admitted to probate, the Court made the following
consideration which remains highly relevant to this day: "The
purpose of requiring the number of sheets to be stated in the
attestation clause is obvious; the document might easily be
so prepared that the removal of a sheet would completely
change the testamentary dispositions of the will and in the
absence of a statement of the total number of sheets such
removal might be effected by taking out the sheet and
changing the numbers at the top of the following sheets or
pages. If, on the other hand, the total number of sheets is
stated in the attestation clause the falsification of the
document will involve the inserting of new pages and the
forging of the signatures of the testator and witnesses in the
margin, a matter attended with much greater difficulty."16
The case of In re Will of Andrada concerned a will the
attestation clause of which failed to state the number of sheets
or pages used. This consideration alone was sufficient for the
Court to declare "unanim[ity] upon the point that the defect
pointed out in the attesting clause is fatal."17 It was further
observed that "it cannot be denied that the x x x requirement
affords additional security against the danger that the will
may be tampered with; and as the Legislature has seen fit to
prescribe this requirement, it must be considered material."18
Against these cited cases, petitioner cites Singson v.
Florentino19 and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal,20 wherein the Court
allowed probate to the wills concerned therein despite the fact
that the attestation clause did not state the number of pages
of the will. Yet the appellate court itself considered the import
of these two cases, and made the following distinction which
petitioner is unable to rebut, and which we adopt with
approval:
Even a cursory examination of the Will (Exhibit "D"), will
readily show that the attestation does not state the number of
pages used upon which the will is written. Hence, the Will is
void and undeserving of probate.
We are not impervious of the Decisions of the Supreme Court
in "Manuel Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al., 92 Phil.
161 and Apolonio [Taboada] versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al.,
118 SCRA 195," to the effect that a will may still be valid even
if the attestation does not contain the number of pages used
upon which the Will is written. However, the Decisions of the
Supreme Court are not applicable in the aforementioned
appeal at bench. This is so because, in the case of "Manuel
Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al., supra," although the
attestation in the subject Will did not state the number of
pages used in the will, however, the same was found in the
last part of the body of the Will:
"x x x
The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, which requires that
the attestation clause shall state the number of pages or sheets
upon which the will is written, which requirement has been
held to be mandatory as an effective safeguard against the
possibility of interpolation or omission of some of the pages
of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the property
is intended to be bequeathed (In re Will of Andrada, 42 Phil.
180; Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405; Gumban vs.
Gorcho, 50 Phil. 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil. 481;
Echevarria vs. Sarmiento, 66 Phil. 611). The ratio decidendi of
these cases seems to be that the attestation clause must
contain a statement of the number of sheets or pages
composing the will and that if this is missing or is omitted, it
will have the effect of invalidating the will if the deficiency
cannot be supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a
consideration or examination of the will itself. But here the
situation is different. While the attestation clause does not
state the number of sheets or pages upon which the will is
written, however, the last part of the body of the will contains
a statement that it is composed of eight pages, which
circumstance in our opinion takes this case out of the rigid
rule of construction and places it within the realm of similar
cases where a broad and more liberal view has been adopted
to prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by
purely technical considerations." (page 165-165, supra)
(Underscoring supplied)
In "Apolonio Tabaoda versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et
al." supra, the notarial acknowledgement in the Will states the
number of pages used in the:
"x x x
We have examined the will in question and noticed that the
attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in
writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it
not for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible from the
entire will that it is really and actually composed of only two
pages duly signed by the testatrix and her instrumental
witnesses. As earlier stated, the first page which contains the
entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by the
testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental
witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page which is
marked as "Pagina dos" comprises the attestation clause and
the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that
"this Last Will and Testament consists of two pages including
this page" (pages 200-201, supra) (Underscoring supplied).
However, in the appeal at bench, the number of pages used in
the will is not stated in any part of the Will. The will does not
even contain any notarial acknowledgment wherein the
number of pages of the will should be stated.21
Both Uy Coque and Andrada were decided prior to the
enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, at a time when the
statutory provision governing the formal requirement of wills
was Section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.22 Reliance on these cases
remains apropos, considering that the requirement that the
attestation state the number of pages of the will is extant from
Section 618.23 However, the enactment of the Civil Code in
1950 did put in force a rule of interpretation of the
requirements of wills, at least insofar as the attestation clause
is concerned, that may vary from the philosophy that
governed these two cases. Article 809 of the Civil Code states:
"In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and
improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections
in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall
not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in
fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all
the requirements of article 805."
In the same vein, petitioner cites the report of the Civil Code
Commission, which stated that "the underlying and
fundamental objective permeating the provisions on the [law]
on [wills] in this project consists in the [liberalization] of the
manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the
testator more [freedom] in [expressing] his last wishes. This
objective is in accord with the [modern tendency] in respect
to the formalities in the execution of wills."24 However,
petitioner conveniently omits the qualification offered by the
Code Commission in the very same paragraph he cites from
their report, that such liberalization be "but with sufficient
safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of
fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and
influence upon the testator."25
Caneda v. Court of Appeals26 features an extensive discussion
made by Justice Regalado, speaking for the Court on the
conflicting views on the manner of interpretation of the legal
formalities required in the execution of the attestation clause
in wills.27 Uy Coque and Andrada are cited therein, along with
several other cases, as examples of the application of the rule
of strict construction.28 However, the Code Commission
opted to recommend a more liberal construction through the
"substantial compliance rule" under Article 809. A cautionary
note was struck though by Justice J.B.L. Reyes as to how
Article 809 should be applied:
x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects
that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself:
whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether
the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the
subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All
these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or
even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can
be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and
whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence
of each other must substantially appear in the attestation
clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate
proceedings.29 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court of Appeals did cite these comments by Justice J.B.L.
Reyes in its assailed decision, considering that the failure to
state the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause
is one of the defects which cannot be simply disregarded.
In Caneda itself, the Court refused to allow the probate of a
will whose attestation clause failed to state that the witnesses
subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other,30 the other omission
cited by Justice J.B.L. Reyes which to his estimation cannot be
lightly disregarded.
Caneda suggested: "[I]t may thus be stated that the rule, as it
now stands, is that omission which can be supplied by an
examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to
extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly,
would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being
assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied
except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of
the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself."31 Thus,
a failure by the attestation clause to state that the testator
signed every page can be liberally construed, since that fact
can be checked by a visual examination; while a failure by the
attestation clause to state that the witnesses signed in one
another’s presence should be considered a fatal flaw since the
attestation is the only textual guarantee of compliance.32
The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of
pages on which the will was written remains a fatal flaw,
despite Article 809. The purpose of the law in requiring the
clause to state the number of pages on which the will is
written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or
omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any
increase or decrease in the pages.33 The failure to state the
number of pages equates with the absence of an averment on
the part of the instrumental witnesses as to how many pages
consisted the will, the execution of which they had ostensibly
just witnessed and subscribed to. Following Caneda, there is
substantial compliance with this requirement if the will states
elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, as was the
situation in Singson and Taboada. However, in this case, there
could have been no substantial compliance with the
requirements under Article 805 since there is no statement in
the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the
number of pages which comprise the will.
At the same time, Article 809 should not deviate from the
need to comply with the formal requirements as enumerated
under Article 805. Whatever the inclinations of the members
of the Code Commission in incorporating Article 805, the fact
remains that they saw fit to prescribe substantially the same
formal requisites as enumerated in Section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, convinced that these remained effective
safeguards against the forgery or intercalation of notarial
wills.34 Compliance with these requirements, however
picayune in impression, affords the public a high degree of
comfort that the testator himself or herself had decided to
convey property post mortem in the manner established in the
will.35 The transcendent legislative intent, even as expressed
in the cited comments of the Code Commission, is for the
fruition of the testator’s incontestable desires, and not for
the indulgent admission of wills to probate.
The Court could thus end here and affirm the Court of
Appeals. However, an examination of the will itself reveals a
couple of even more critical defects that should necessarily
lead to its rejection.
For one, the attestation clause was not signed by the
instrumental witnesses. While the signatures of the
instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the
will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause
which after all consists of their averments before the notary
public.
Cagro v. Cagro36 is material on this point. As in this case, "the
signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at
the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page
containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-
hand margin."37 While three (3) Justices38 considered the
signature requirement had been substantially complied with,
a majority of six (6), speaking through Chief Justice Paras,
ruled that the attestation clause had not been duly signed,
rendering the will fatally defective.
There is no question that the signatures of the three witnesses
to the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation
clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the
witnesses on the left-hand margin.
We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant
is correct. The attestation clause is "a memorandum of the
facts attending the execution of the will" required by law to
be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily
bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot
be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of
their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their
participation.
The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the
three witnesses on the left-hand margin conform substantially
to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the
attestation clause. This is untenable, because said signatures
are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be
signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation
clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof,
be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause
to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the
testator and any or all of the witnesses.39
The Court today reiterates the continued efficacy of Cagro.
Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the
instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the
requisite that the will be "attested and subscribed by [the
instrumental witnesses]." The respective intents behind these
two classes of signature are distinct from each other. The
signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify,
among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they
are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the
signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses
are referring to the statements contained in the attestation
clause itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is separate and
apart from the disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation
clause results in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental
witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page containing
the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot
demonstrate these witnesses’ undertakings in the clause,
since the signatures that do appear on the page were directed
towards a wholly different avowal.
The Court may be more charitably disposed had the witnesses
in this case signed the attestation clause itself, but not the left-
hand margin of the page containing such clause. Without
diminishing the value of the instrumental witnesses’
signatures on each and every page, the fact must be noted that
it is the attestation clause which contains the utterances
reduced into writing of the testamentary witnesses
themselves. It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are
required under Article 805 to state the number of pages used
upon which the will is written; the fact that the testator had
signed the will and every page thereof; and that they
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another. The only proof in
the will that the witnesses have stated these elemental facts
would be their signatures on the attestation clause.
Thus, the subject will cannot be considered to have been
validly attested to by the instrumental witnesses, as they
failed to sign the attestation clause.
Yet, there is another fatal defect to the will on which the denial
of this petition should also hinge. The requirement under
Article 806 that "every will must be acknowledged before a
notary public by the testator and the witnesses" has also not
been complied with. The importance of this requirement is
highlighted by the fact that it had been segregated from the
other requirements under Article 805 and entrusted into a
separate provision, Article 806. The non-observance of Article
806 in this case is equally as critical as the other cited flaws in
compliance with Article 805, and should be treated as of
equivalent import.
In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y.
Bautista, wrote "Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng
Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila."40 By no
manner of contemplation can those words be construed as an
acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who
has executed a deed in going before some competent officer
or court and declaring it to be his act or deed.41 It involves an
extra step undertaken whereby the signor actually declares to
the notary that the executor of a document has attested to the
notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.
It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even
though it does not hew to the usual language thereof.
A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies
that before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn
to by the executor.42 Ordinarily, the language of
the jurat should avow that the document was subscribed and
sworn before the notary public, while in this case, the notary
public averred that he himself "signed and notarized" the
document. Possibly though, the word "ninotario" or
"notarized" encompasses the signing of and swearing in of the
executors of the document, which in this case would involve
the decedent and the instrumental witnesses.
Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public
as a jurat, the will would nonetheless remain invalid, as the
express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be
"acknowledged", and not merely subscribed and sworn to.
The will does not present any textual proof, much less one
under oath, that the decedent and the instrumental witnesses
executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed. The
acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-
important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those
made beyond the free consent of the testator. An
acknowledgement is not an empty meaningless act.43 The
acknowledgment coerces the testator and the instrumental
witnesses to declare before an officer of the law that they had
executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or
deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of
perjury, thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons
who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those
executed without the free consent of the testator. It also
provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of
certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to
those persons he/she had designated in the will.
It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule,
self-evident as it is under Article 806. A notarial will that is
not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and
sworn to before a notary public.
There are two other requirements under Article 805 which
were not fully satisfied by the will in question. We need not
discuss them at length, as they are no longer material to the
disposition of this case. The provision requires that the
testator and the instrumental witnesses sign each and every
page of the will on the left margin, except the last; and that all
the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on
the upper part of each page. In this case, the decedent, unlike
the witnesses, failed to sign both pages of the will on the left
margin, her only signature appearing at the so-called "logical
end"44 of the will on its first page. Also, the will itself is not
numbered correlatively in letters on each page, but instead
numbered with Arabic numerals. There is a line of thought
that has disabused the notion that these two requirements be
construed as mandatory.45 Taken in isolation, these
omissions, by themselves, may not be sufficient to deny
probate to a will. Yet even as these omissions are not decisive
to the adjudication of this case, they need not be dwelt on,
though indicative as they may be of a general lack of due
regard for the requirements under Article 805 by whoever
executed the will.
All told, the string of mortal defects which the will in question
suffers from makes the probate denial inexorable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 92989 July 8, 1991
PERFECTO DY, JR. petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GELAC TRADING INC., and
ANTONIO V. GONZALES, respondents.
Zosa & Quijano Law Offices for petitioner.
Expedito P. Bugarin for respondent GELAC Trading, Inc.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the
reversal of the March 23, 1990 decision of the Court of
Appeals which ruled that the petitioner's purchase of a
farm tractor was not validly consummated and
ordered a complaint for its recovery dismissed.
The facts as established by the records are as follows:
The petitioner, Perfecto Dy and Wilfredo Dy are
brothers. Sometime in 1979, Wilfredo Dy purchased a
truck and a farm tractor through financing extended
by Libra Finance and Investment Corporation (Libra).
Both truck and tractor were mortgaged to Libra as
security for the loan.
The petitioner wanted to buy the tractor from his
brother so on August 20, 1979, he wrote a letter to Libra
requesting that he be allowed to purchase from
Wilfredo Dy the said tractor and assume the mortgage
debt of the latter.
In a letter dated August 27, 1979, Libra thru its
manager, Cipriano Ares approved the petitioner's
request.
Thus, on September 4, 1979, Wilfredo Dy executed a
deed of absolute sale in favor of the petitioner over the
tractor in question.
At this time, the subject tractor was in the possession
of Libra Finance due to Wilfredo Dy's failure to pay the
amortizations.
Despite the offer of full payment by the petitioner to
Libra for the tractor, the immediate release could not
be effected because Wilfredo Dy had obtained
financing not only for said tractor but also for a truck
and Libra insisted on full payment for both.
The petitioner was able to convince his sister, Carol
Dy-Seno, to purchase the truck so that full payment
could be made for both. On November 22, 1979, a PNB
check was issued in the amount of P22,000.00 in favor
of Libra, thus settling in full the indebtedness of
Wilfredo Dy with the financing firm. Payment having
been effected through an out-of-town check, Libra
insisted that it be cleared first before Libra could
release the chattels in question.
Meanwhile, Civil Case No. R-16646 entitled "Gelac
Trading, Inc. v. Wilfredo Dy", a collection case to recover
the sum of P12,269.80 was pending in another court in
Cebu.
On the strength of an alias writ of execution issued on
December 27, 1979, the provincial sheriff was able to
seize and levy on the tractor which was in the premises
of Libra in Carmen, Cebu. The tractor was
subsequently sold at public auction where Gelac
Trading was the lone bidder. Later, Gelac sold the
tractor to one of its stockholders, Antonio Gonzales.
It was only when the check was cleared on January 17,
1980 that the petitioner learned about GELAC having
already taken custody of the subject tractor.
Consequently, the petitioner filed an action to recover
the subject tractor against GELAC Trading with the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.
On April 8, 1988, the RTC rendered judgment in favor
of the petitioner. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant, pronouncing that the plaintiff is
the owner of the tractor, subject matter of this
case, and directing the defendants Gelac
Trading Corporation and Antonio Gonzales
to return the same to the plaintiff herein;
directing the defendants jointly and severally
to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P1,541.00
as expenses for hiring a tractor; P50,000 for
moral damages; P50,000 for exemplary
damages; and to pay the cost. (Rollo, pp. 35-
36)
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
of the RTC and dismissed the complaint with costs
against the petitioner. The Court of Appeals held that
the tractor in question still belonged to Wilfredo Dy
when it was seized and levied by the sheriff by virtue
of the alias writ of execution issued in Civil Case No.
R-16646.
The petitioner now comes to the Court raising the
following questions:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPREHENDED
THE FACTS AND ERRED IN NOT
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDING THAT OWNERSHIP OF THE
FARM TRACTOR HAD ALREADY PASSED
TO HEREIN PETITIONER WHEN SAID
TRACTOR WAS LEVIED ON BY THE
SHERIFF PURSUANT TO AN ALIAS WRIT
OF EXECUTION ISSUED IN ANOTHER
CASE IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT GELAC
TRADING INC.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS EMBARKED ON
MERE CONJECTURE AND SURMISE IN
HOLDING THAT THE SALE OF THE
AFORESAID TRACTOR TO PETITIONER
WAS DONE IN FRAUD OF WILFREDO
 DY'S CREDITORS, THERE BEING NO
EVIDENCE OF SUCH FRAUD AS FOUND
BY THE TRIAL COURT.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPREHENDED
THE FACTS AND ERRED IN NOT
SUSTAINING THE FINDING OF THE
TRIAL COURT THAT THE SALE OF THE
TRACTOR BY RESPONDENT GELAC
TRADING TO ITS CO-RESPONDENT
ANTONIO V. GONZALES ON AUGUST 2,
1980 AT WHICH TIME BOTH
RESPONDENTS ALREADY KNEW OF THE
FILING OF THE INSTANT CASE WAS
VIOLATIVE OF THE HUMAN RELATIONS
PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL CODE AND
RENDERED THEM LIABLE FOR THE
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
SLAPPED AGAINST THEM BY THE TRIAL
COURT. (Rollo, p. 13)
The respondents claim that at the time of the execution
of the deed of sale, no constructive delivery was
effected since the consummation of the sale depended
upon the clearance and encashment of the check which
was issued in payment of the subject tractor.
In the case of Servicewide Specialists Inc. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court. (174 SCRA 80 [1989]), we stated that:
xxx xxx xxx
The rule is settled that the chattel mortgagor
continues to be the owner of the property,
and therefore, has the power to alienate the
same; however, he is obliged under pain of
penal liability, to secure the written consent
of the mortgagee. (Francisco, Vicente, Jr.,
Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines,
(1972), Volume IV-B Part 1, p. 525). Thus, the
instruments of mortgage are binding, while
they subsist, not only upon the parties
executing them but also upon those who later,
by purchase or otherwise, acquire the
properties referred to therein.
The absence of the written consent of the
mortgagee to the sale of the mortgaged
property in favor of a third person, therefore,
affects not the validity of the sale but only the
penal liability of the mortgagor under the
Revised Penal Code and the binding effect of
such sale on the mortgagee under the Deed of
Chattel Mortgage.
xxx xxx xxx
The mortgagor who gave the property as security
under a chattel mortgage did not part with the
ownership over the same. He had the right to sell it
although he was under the obligation to secure the
written consent of the mortgagee or he lays himself
open to criminal prosecution under the provision of
Article 319 par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. And even
if no consent was obtained from the mortgagee, the
validity of the sale would still not be affected.
Thus, we see no reason why Wilfredo Dy, as the chattel
mortgagor can not sell the subject tractor. There is no
dispute that the consent of Libra Finance was obtained
in the instant case. In a letter dated August 27, 1979,
Libra allowed the petitioner to purchase the tractor
and assume the mortgage debt of his brother. The sale
between the brothers was therefore valid and binding
as between them and to the mortgagee, as well.
Article 1496 of the Civil Code states that the ownership
of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the
moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways
specified in Articles 1497 to 1501 or in any other
manner signing an agreement that the possession is
transferred from the vendor to the vendee. We agree
with the petitioner that Articles 1498 and 1499 are
applicable in the case at bar.
Article 1498 states:
Art. 1498. When the sale is made through a
public instrument, the execution thereof shall
be equivalent to the delivery of the thing
which is the object of the contract, if from the
deed the contrary does not appear or cannot
clearly be inferred.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 1499 provides:
Article 1499. The delivery of movable
property may likewise be made by the mere
consent or agreement of the contracting
parties, if the thing sold cannot be transferred
to the possession of the vendee at the time of
the sale, or if the latter already had it in his
possession for any other reason. (1463a)
In the instant case, actual delivery of the subject tractor
could not be made. However, there was constructive
delivery already upon the execution of the public
instrument pursuant to Article 1498 and upon the
consent or agreement of the parties when the thing
sold cannot be immediately transferred to the
possession of the vendee. (Art. 1499)
The respondent court avers that the vendor must first
have control and possession of the thing before he
could transfer ownership by constructive delivery.
Here, it was Libra Finance which was in possession of
the subject tractor due to Wilfredo's failure to pay the
amortization as a preliminary step to foreclosure. As
mortgagee, he has the right of foreclosure upon default
by the mortgagor in the performance of the conditions
mentioned in the contract of mortgage. The law
implies that the mortgagee is entitled to possess the
mortgaged property because possession is necessary in
order to enable him to have the property sold.
While it is true that Wilfredo Dy was not in actual
possession and control of the subject tractor, his right
of ownership was not divested from him upon his
default. Neither could it be said that Libra was the
owner of the subject tractor because the mortgagee can
not become the owner of or convert and appropriate to
himself the property mortgaged. (Article 2088, Civil
Code) Said property continues to belong to the
mortgagor. The only remedy given to the mortgagee is
to have said property sold at public auction and the
proceeds of the sale applied to the payment of the
obligation secured by the mortgagee. (See Martinez v.
PNB, 93 Phil. 765, 767 [1953]) There is no showing that
Libra Finance has already foreclosed the mortgage and
that it was the new owner of the subject tractor.
Undeniably, Libra gave its consent to the sale of the
subject tractor to the petitioner. It was aware of the
transfer of rights to the petitioner.
Where a third person purchases the mortgaged
property, he automatically steps into the shoes of the
original mortgagor. (See Industrial Finance Corp. v.
Apostol, 177 SCRA 521 [1989]). His right of ownership
shall be subject to the mortgage of the thing sold to
him. In the case at bar, the petitioner was fully aware
of the existing mortgage of the subject tractor to Libra.
In fact, when he was obtaining Libra's consent to the
sale, he volunteered to assume the remaining balance
of the mortgage debt of Wilfredo Dy which Libra
undeniably agreed to.
The payment of the check was actually intended to
extinguish the mortgage obligation so that the tractor
could be released to the petitioner. It was never
intended nor could it be considered as payment of the
purchase price because the relationship between Libra
and the petitioner is not one of sale but still a mortgage.
The clearing or encashment of the check which
produced the effect of payment determined the full
payment of the money obligation and the release of the
chattel mortgage. It was not determinative of the
consummation of the sale. The transaction between the
brothers is distinct and apart from the transaction
between Libra and the petitioner. The contention,
therefore, that the consummation of the sale depended
upon the encashment of the check is untenable.
The sale of the subject tractor was consummated upon
the execution of the public instrument on September 4,
1979. At this time constructive delivery was already
effected. Hence, the subject tractor was no longer
owned by Wilfredo Dy when it was levied upon by the
sheriff in December, 1979. Well settled is the rule that
only properties unquestionably owned by the
judgment debtor and which are not exempt by law
from execution should be levied upon or sought to be Regional Trial Court dated April 8, 1988 is
levied upon. For the power of the court in the REINSTATED.
execution of its judgment extends only over properties
belonging to the judgment debtor. (Consolidated Bank
and Trust Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78771,
January 23, 1991).
The respondents further claim that at that time the
sheriff levied on the tractor and took legal custody
thereof no one ever protested or filed a third party
claim.
It is inconsequential whether a third party claim has
been filed or not by the petitioner during the time the
sheriff levied on the subject tractor. A person other
than the judgment debtor who claims ownership or
right over levied properties is not precluded, however,
from taking other legal remedies to prosecute his
claim. (Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, supra) This is precisely what the petitioner
did when he filed the action for replevin with the RTC.
Anent the second and third issues raised, the Court
accords great respect and weight to the findings of fact
of the trial court.1âwphi1 There is no sufficient
evidence to show that the sale of the tractor was in
fraud of Wilfredo and creditors. While it is true that
Wilfredo and Perfecto are brothers, this fact alone does
not give rise to the presumption that the sale was
fraudulent. Relationship is not a badge of fraud
(Goquiolay v. Sycip, 9 SCRA 663 [1963]). Moreover,
fraud can not be presumed; it must be established by
clear convincing evidence.
We agree with the trial court's findings that the
actuations of GELAC Trading were indeed violative of
the provisions on human relations. As found by the
trial court, GELAC knew very well of the transfer of
the property to the petitioners on July 14, 1980 when it
received summons based on the complaint for replevin
filed with the RTC by the petitioner. Notwithstanding
said summons, it continued to sell the subject tractor to
one of its stockholders on August 2, 1980.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
March 23, 1990 is SET ASIDE and the decision of the
G.R. No. 77502 January 15, 1988
EMILIA B. SANTIAGO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PIONEER SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, ET.
AL., defendants-appellees.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
An appeal certified by the Court of Appeals to this
Tribunal for determination since only a question of law is
involved.
The facts are not controverted.
Plaintiff-appellant, Emilia P. Santiago, is the registered
owner of a parcel of land situated at Polo, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, with an area of approximately 39,007
square meters, covered by T.C.T. No. B-41669 (briefly, the
Title) of the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City
(hereinafter, simply the Disputed Property).
On 7 April 1983, plaintiff-appellant executed a Special
Power of Attorney in favor of Construction Resources
Corporation of the Philippines (CRCP, for short)
authorizing and empowering CRCP:
1. To borrow money and make,
execute, sign and deliver mortgages of
real estate now owned by me and
standing in my name and to make,
sign, execute and deliver any and all
promissory notes necessary in the
premises.
2. For the purpose of these presents, or
for the purpose of securing the
payment of any loan, indebtedness or
obligation which my attorney-in-fact
may obtain or contract with the bank,
its renewal, extension of payment of
the whole or any part thereof, said
attorney-in-fact is hereby authorized
and empowered to transfer and
convey by way of mortgage in favor of
the bank, ... (the Disputed Property).
On 8 April 1983, CRCP executed a Real Estate Mortgage
over the Disputed Property in favor of FINASIA
Investment and Finance Corporation to secure a loan of P1
million. The mortgage contract specifically provided that
in the event of default in payment, the mortgagee may
immediately foreclose the mortgage judicially or
extrajudicially. The promissory note evidencing the
indebtedness was dated 4 March 1983.
The Special Power of Attorney executed by plaintiff-
appellant in CRCP's favor, the Real Estate Mortgage by
CRCP in favor of FINASIA, together with the Board
Resolution dated 28 March 1983 authorizing the CRCP
President to sign for and on its behalf, were duly
annotated on the Title on 12 April 1983.
On 29 July 1983, FINASIA executed in favor of defendant-
appellee, Pioneer Savings & Loan Bank, Inc. (Defendant
Bank, for brevity), an "Outright Sale of Receivables
without Recourse" including the receivable of P610,752.59
from CRCP.
On 21 May 1984, FINASIA executed a "Supplemental
Deed of Assignment" in favor of Defendant Bank
confirming and ratifying the assignment in the latter's
favor of the receivable of P610,752.59 from CRCP and of
the mortgage constituted by CRCP over the disputed
property.
On 12 July 1984, the aforesaid Supplemental Deed of
Assignment was inscribed on the Title.
CRCP failed to settle its obligation and Defendant Bank
opted for extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. The
notice of auction sale was scheduled on 16 May 1985.
On 13 May 1985, on learning of the intended sale, plaintiff-
appellant filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch CLXXII, an action for
declaration of nullity of the real estate mortgage with an
application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction (Civil
Case No. 2231-V-55).
On 14 May 1985, the Trial Court 1 issued a Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining the sale at public auction of
the Disputed Property.
Basically, plaintiff-appellant claimed in her Complaint
that she was not aware of any real estate mortgage she had
executed in favor of Defendant Bank; that she had not
authorized anyone to execute any document for the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
constituted on the Disputed Property and that since the
notice of Sheriffs sale did not include her as a party to the
foreclosure proceedings, it is not binding on her nor on
her property.
Defendant Bank opposed the application for Preliminary
Injunction and asserted its right to extrajudicially
foreclose the mortgage on the Disputed Property based on
recorded public documents.
During the hearing on the petition for Preliminary
Injunction, plaintiff-appellant, through counsel, admitted
the due execution of plaintiff-appellant's Special Power of
Attorney in favor of CRCP, the Real Estate Mortgage by
CRCP to FINASIA, the Outright Sale of Receivables by
FINASIA to Defendant Bank, as well the Supplemental
Deed of Assignment by FINASIA to Defendant Bank.
On 30 May 1985, the Trial Court granted the Petition for
Preliminary Injunction enjoining the public auction sale of
the mortgaged property upon plaintiff-appellant's
posting of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00.
On 7 June 1985, Defendant Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss
the main case on the ground that the complaint did not
state a cause of action followed on 24 June 1985 with a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order granting the Writ
of Preliminary Injunction, both of which Motions plaintiff-
appellant opposed.
On 30 August 1985, the Trial Court reconsidered its Order
of 30 May 1985, dissolved the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, and ordered the dismissal of the case for lack
of cause of action.
Plaintiff-appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which, as stated at the outset, certified the case to us on a
pure question of law.
In the meantime, with the dissolution of the Preliminary
Injunction, it appears that defendant Bank completed its
extrajudicial foreclosure and the Disputed Property was
sold at public auction on January 1986, after a re-
publication of the notice of sale, since the first scheduled
sale was enjoined by the Trial Court.
Plaintiff-appellant maintains that:
I. The Lower Court erred in dismissing
the complaint and lifting the
Preliminary Injunction by relying
solely on the admission of the counsel
of the plaintiff-appellant of certain
documentary exhibits presented by
the counsel of the defendant-appellee.
II. The Lower Court erred in relying on
the case of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan vs.
Director of Forestry which it qualifies as
"on all fours with the case at bar."
III. The Lower Court erred in ignoring
the pertinent doctrines in the Supreme
Court cases cited by the plaintiff-
appellant in her Opposition to Motion
to Dismiss.
IV. The Lower Court erred in holding
that notice of the scheduled sale of the
land sent to the agent (CRCP) is also
Notice to the principal (Plaintiff
Appellant), the land owner.
and prays that she be given "a real day in Court" so that
she may testify and give her side of the case.
Upon the factual and legal context, the errors assigned are
without merit.
Furthermore, "even if the complaint
stated a valid cause of action, a motion
to dismiss for insufficiency of cause of
action will be granted if documentary
evidence admitted by stipulation
disclosing facts sufficient to defeat the
claim enabled the court to go beyond
disclosure in the complaint" (LOCALS
No. 1470, No. 1469, and No. 1512 of the
International Longshoremen's
Association vs. Southern Pacific Co., 6
Fed. Rules Service, p. 107; U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, Dec. 7,
1952; 131 F. 2d 605). Thus, although the
evidence of the parties were presented
on the question of granting or denying
petitioner-appellant's application for a
writ of preliminary injunction, the trial
court correctly applied said evidence
in the resolution of the motion to
dismiss. ... 3
While, as contended by plaintiff-appellant, some aspects
of this case differ from those in Tan, the doctrinal ruling
therein, as quoted above, is squarely applicable to the case
at bar. The cases which plaintiff-appellant cites express
the general rule when there is no "documentary evidence
admitted by stipulation disclosing facts sufficient to
defeat the claim." Where, however, such evidence is
before the Court and has been stipulated upon, a Court
can go "beyond the disclosure in the complaint." 4
Moreover, the rule is explicit that "rules of procedure are
not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of
procedure are used only to help secure substantial
justice." 5
upon which it is imposed to the fulfillment of the
obligation for whose security it was constituted. 6
The assignment of receivables made by the original
mortgagee, FINASIA, to Defendant Bank was valid, since
a mortgage credit may be alienated or assigned to a third
person, in whole or in part, with the formalities required
by law. 7 Said formalities were complied with in this case.
The assignment was made in a public instrument and
proper recording in the Registry of Property was
made. 8 While notice may not have been given to plaintiff-
appellant personally, the publication of the Notice of
Sheriff's Sale, as required by law, is notice to the whole
world.
The full-dress hearing that plaintiff-appellant prays for
wherein she intends to prove that she tried to contact the
President of CRCP to urge him to pay the mortgage loan,
that she had failed to do so despite several attempts; that
she did not know that FINASIA had sold its receivables
including that of CRCP to Defendant Bank; and that she
was not informed by CRCP of the scheduled foreclosure
sale will not tilt the scales of justice in her favor in the face
of incontrovertible documentary evidence before the
Court.
Plaintiff-appellant's recourse is against CRCP, specially
considering her allegation that the latter had failed to
observe their agreement.
WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED, with costs against plaintiff-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

The evidence on record sufficiently defeats plaintiff-

It is true that the determination of the sufficiency of a
cause of action must be limited to the facts alleged in the
Complaint and no other should be considered. 2 In this
case, however, a hearing was held and documentary
evidence was presented, not on the Motion to Dismiss but
on the question of granting or denying plaintiff-
appellant's application for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, Counsel for plaintiff-appellant admitted an the
evidence presented. That being so, the Trial Court
committed no reversible error in considering said
evidence in the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss.
appellant's claim for relief from extrajudicial foreclosure.
Her Special Power of Attorney in favor of CRCP
specifically included the authority to mortgage the
Disputed Property. The Real Estate Mortgage in favor of
FINASIA explicitly authorized foreclosure in the event of
default. Indeed, foreclosure is but a necessary
consequence of non-payment of a mortgage indebtedness.
Plaintiff-appellant, therefore, cannot rightfully claim that
FINASIA, as the assignee of the mortgagee, cannot
extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged property. A
mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property
G.R. Nos. 147933-34 December 12, 2001
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
ELPIDIO S. UY, doing business under the name and
style EDISON DEVELOPMENT & and trees prior to actual transplanting at the
CONSTRUCTION, AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Joint Decision dated
September 25, 20001 and the Joint Resolution dated
April 25, 20012 of the Court of Appeals in the
consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP Nos. 59308 and 59849.
Petitioner Public Estates Authority is the government
agency tasked by the Bases Conversion Development
Authority to develop the first-class memorial park
known as the Heritage Park, located in Fort Bonifacio,
Taguig, Metro Manila. On November 20, 1996,
petitioner executed with respondent Elpidio S. Uy,
doing business under the name and style Edison
Development & Construction, a Landscaping and
Construction Agreement, whereby respondent
undertook to perform all landscaping works on the
105-hectare Heritage Park. The Agreement stipulated
that the completion date for the landscaping job was
within 450 days, commencing within 14 days after
receipt by respondent of petitioner's written notice to
proceed. Due to delays, the contracted period was
extended to 693 days. Among the causes of the delay
was petitioner's inability to deliver to respondent 45
hectares of the property for landscaping, because of the
existence of squatters and a public cemetery.
Respondent instituted with the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission an action, docketed as CIAC
Case No. 02-2000, seeking to collect from petitioner
damages arising from its delay in the delivery of the
entire property for landscaping. Specifically,
respondent alleged that he incurred additional rental
costs for the equipment which were kept on standby
and labor costs for the idle manpower. Likewise, the
delay incurred by petitioner caused the topsoil at the
original supplier to be depleted, which compelled
respondent to obtain the topsoil from a farther source,
thereby incurring added costs. He also claims that he
had to mobilize water trucks for the plants and trees
which have already been delivered at the site.
Furthermore, it became necessary to construct a
nursery shade to protect and preserve the young plants
landscaped area.
On May 16, 2000, the CIAC rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the Claimant Contractor ELPIDIO
S. UY and Award is hereby made on its
monetary claim as follows:
Respondent PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY
is directed to pay the Claimant the following
amounts:
P19,604,132.06
— for the cost of idle time of equipment.
2,275,721.00 — for the cost of idled manpower. Development & Construction," and CA-G.R. SP
6,050,165.05
— for the construction of the nursery
605,016.50 — for attorney's fees.
Interest on the amount of P6,050,165.05 as
cost for the construction of the nursery shade
net area shall be paid at the rate of 6% per
annum from the date the Complaint was filed
on 12 January 2000. Interest on the total
amount of P21,879,853.06 for the cost of idled
manpower and equipment shall be paid at the
same rate of 6% per annum from the date this
Decision is promulgated. After finality of this
Decision, interest at the rate of 12% per
annum shall be paid on the total of these 3
awards amounting to P27,930,018.11 until full
payment of the awarded amount shall have
been made, "this interim period being deemed to
be at that time already a forbearance of
credit" (Eastern Shipping Lines Inc. v. Court of
Appeals et al., 243 SCRA 78 [1994]; Keng Hua
Paper Products Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 286
SCRA 257 [1998]; Crismina Garments Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128721, March 9,
1999).
SO ORDERED.3
Both petitioner and respondent filed petitions for
review with the Court of Appeals. In CA-G.R. SP No.
59308, petitioner contested the monetary awards given
by the CIAC. On the other hand, respondent filed CA-
G.R. SP No. 59849, arguing that the CIAC erred in
awarding a reduced amount for equipment stand-by
costs and for denying his claims for additional costs for
topsoil hauling and operating costs of water trucks.
The two petitions were consolidated. On September 25,
2000, the Court of Appeals rendered the now assailed
Joint Decision, dismissing the petitions, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petitions in CA-G.R. SP No. 59308, entitled
"Public Estates Authority v. Elpidio S. Uy, doing
business under the name and style of Edison
No.shade
59849,net
"Elpidio
area. S. Uy, doing business under
the name and style of Edison Development &
Construction v. Public Estates Authority," are
both hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and
accordingly, DISMISSED, for lack of merit.
Consequently, the Award/Decision issued
by the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission on May 16, 2000 in CIAC Case
No. 02-200, entitled "Elpidio S. Uy, doing
business under the name and style of Edison
Development & Construction v. Public Estates
Authority," is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.4
Both parties filed motions for reconsideration.
Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, seeking to enjoin the CIAC
from proceeding with CIAC Case No. 03-2001, which
respondent has filed. Petitioner alleged that the said
case involved claims by respondent arising from the
same Landscaping and Construction Agreement,
subject of the cases pending with the Court of Appeals.
On April 25, 2001, the Court of Appeals issued the
assailed Joint Resolution, thus:
WHEREFORE, the present Motion/s for
Reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 59308 and
CA-G.R. SP No. 59849 are hereby both
DENIED, for lack of merit.
Accordingly, let an injunction issue
permanently enjoining the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission from
proceeding with CIAC Case No. 03-2001,
entitled ELPIDIO S. UY, doing business under
the name and style of EDISON
DEVELOPMENT & CONSTRUCTION v.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and/or
HONORABLE CARLOS P. DOBLE.
SO ORDERED.5
Hence, this petition for review, raising the following
arguments:
I VI
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN DENYING DUE COURSE PETITIONER'S
(SIC) PETITION FILED PURSUANT TO RULE 43 OF
THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
APPEALING THE ADVERSE DECISION OF THE
CIAC A QUO.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN DENYING THE HEREIN PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON THE JOINT
DECISION PROMULGATED ON SEPTEMBER 25,
2000.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE APPEAL ON THE
MERITS TO BE THRESHED OUT PURSUANT TO
EXISTING LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE ALL IN
INTEREST OF DUE PROCESS.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DENYING PETITIONER'S CLAIM FOR
UNRECOUPED BALANCE IN THE 15% ADVANCE
PAYMENT; UNRECOUPED BALANCE ON PRE-
PAID MATERIALS, AND OVERPAYMENT BASED
ON ACTUAL PAYMENT MADE AS AGAINST
PHYSICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS.
V
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE CIAC DECISION FINDING
RESPONDENT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES IN
THE AMOUNT OF P605,096.50 — WHICH IS 10% OF
THE AMOUNT AWARDED FOR THE CLAIM OF
NURSERY SHADE CONSTRUCTION WHILE
DENYING PETITIONER'S COUNTERCLAIM FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT FINDING THAT PETITIONER'S OBLIGATION,
IF ANY, HAS BEEN EFFECTIVELY EXTINGUISHED.
VII
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT ORDERING THE RESPONDENT TO
REIMBURSE THE PETITIONER THE AMOUNT OF
P345,583.20 THE LATTER PAID TO THE
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ARBITRATION
COMMISSION.6
After respondent filed its comment 7 on August 20,
2001, this Court issued a resolution dated September 3,
20018 requiring petitioner to file its reply within ten
days from notice. Despite service of the resolution on
petitioner and its counsel on October 1, 2001, no reply
has been filed with this Court to date. Therefore, we
dispense with the filing of petitioner's reply and decide
this case based on the pleadings on record.
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner assails the dismissal of its petition by the
Court of Appeals based on a technicality, i.e., the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping
was signed by its Officer-in-Charge, who did not
appear to have been authorized by petitioner to
represent it in the case. Petitioner moreover argues that
in an earlier resolution, the First Division of the Court
of Appeals gave due course to its petition. Despite this,
it was the Seventeenth Division of the Court of
Appeals which rendered the Joint Decision dismissing
its petition.
The contention is untenable. Petitioner, being a
government owned and controlled corporation, can act
only through its duly authorized representatives. In
the case of Premium Marble Resources, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,9 which the Court of Appeals cited, we made it
clear that in the absence of an authority from the board
of directors, no person, not even the officers of the
corporation, can validly bind the corporation.10 Thus,
we held in that case:
We agree with the finding of public
respondent Court of Appeals, that "in the
absence of any board resolution from its
board of directors the [sic] authority to act for
and in behalf of the corporation, the present
action must necessary fail. The power of the
corporation to sue and be sued in any court is
lodged with the board of directors that
exercises its corporate powers. Thus, the issue
of authority and the invalidity of plaintiff-
appellant's subscription which is still
pending, is a matter that is also addressed,
considering the premises, to the sound
 judgment of the Securities and Exchange
Commission."11
Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in finding
that, in view of the absence of a board resolution
authorizing petitioner's Officer-in-Charge to represent
it in the petition, the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping executed by said officer failed to
satisfy the requirement of the Rules. In this connection,
Rule 43, Section 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
categorically provides:
Effect of failure to comply with requirements. —
The failure of the petition to comply with any
of the foregoing requirements regarding the
payment of the docket and other lawful fees,
the deposit for costs, proof of service of the
petition, and the contents of and the
documents which should accompany the
petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof.
Anent petitioner's contention that its petition had
already been given due course, it is well to note that
under the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, each
case is raffled to a Justice twice — the first raffle for
completion of records and the second raffle for study
and report.12 Hence, there was nothing unusual in the
fact that its petition was first raffled to the First
Division of the Court of Appeals but was later decided
by the Seventeenth Division thereof. Petitioner's
imputations of irregularity have no basis whatsoever,
and can only be viewed as a desperate attempt to
muddle the issue by nit-picking on non-essential
matters. Likewise, the giving of due course to a petition
is not a guarantee that the same will be granted on its
merits.
Significantly, the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of
the petition was based not only on its fatal procedural
defect, but also on its lack of substantive merit;
specifically, its failure to show that the CIAC
committed gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of
law, such as to warrant the reversal of its factual
findings.
We have carefully gone over the decision of the CIAC
in CIAC Case No. 02-2000, and we have found that it
contains an exhaustive discussion of all claims and
counterclaims of respondent and petitioner,
respectively. More importantly, its findings are well
supported by evidence which are properly referred to
in the record. In all, we have found no ground to
disturb the decision of the CIAC, especially since it
possesses the required expertise in the field of
construction arbitration. It is well settled that findings
of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial
bodies, which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are
generally accorded not only respect, but finality when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.13
Thus, we affirm the factual findings and conclusions of
the CIAC as regards the arbitral awards to respondent.
The records clearly show that these are amply
supported by substantial evidence.
Coming now to petitioner's counterclaims, we find that
the CIAC painstakingly sifted through the records to
discuss these, despite its initial observation that
petitioner "absolutely omitted to make any arguments"
to substantiate the same.14 As far as the unrecouped
balance on prepaid materials are concerned, the CIAC
found:
The Arbitral Tribunal finds the evidence
adduced by the Respondents (petitioner
herein) sorely lacking to establish this
counterclaim. The affidavit of Mr. Jaime
Millan touched on this matter by merely
stating this "additional claim a) Unrecouped
balance on prepaid materials amounting to
P45,372,589.85." No further elaboration was
made of this bare statement. The affidavit of
Mr. Roigelio A. Cantoria merely states that as
Senior Accountant, it was he who prepared
the computation for the recoupment of
prepaid materials and advance payment
marked as "Annex "B" of Respondent's
Compliance/Submission dated 16 March
2000. Examination of that single page
document shows that for the 2nd Billing, the
amount of P32,695,138.86 was "75% Prepaid"
for some unspecified "Materials on Hand."
The rest of the other items were payments for
"trees and shrubs RCP Baluster & Cons. Paver,
and GFRC (Baluster)" in various amounts
taken from other billings. The billings
themselves have not been introduced in
evidence. No testimonial evidence was also
offered to explain how these computations
were made, if only to explain the meaning of
those terms above-quoted and why the
recoupment of amounts of the various
billings were generally much lower than the
payment for materials. As stated at the outset
of the discussion of these additional claims, "it
is not the burden of this Tribunal to dig into the
haystack to look for the proverbial needle to
support these counterclaims."15
On the other hand, we find that the CIAC correctly
deferred determination of the counterclaim for
unrecouped balance on the advance payment. It
explained that the amount of this claim is determined
by deducting from respondent's progress billing a
proportionate amount equal to the percentage of work
accomplished. However, this could not be done since
petitioner terminated the construction contract. At the
time the CIAC rendered its decision, the issue of the
validity of the termination was still pending
determination by the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque. Thus, in view of the non-fulfillment of that
"precondition to the grant" of petitioner's
counterclaim, the CIAC deferred resolution of the
same.16 In the case at bar, petitioner still failed to show
that its termination of the construction contract was
upheld by the court as valid.
Anent petitioner's claim for attorney's fees, suffice it to
state that it was represented by the Government
Corporate Counsel in the proceedings before the
CIAC. Attorney's fees are in the nature of actual
damages, which must be duly proved.17 Petitioner
failed to show with convincing evidence that it
incurred attorney's fees.
Petitioner further argues that its liability to respondent
has been extinguished by novation when it assigned
and turned over all its contracted works at the Heritage
Park to the Heritage Park Management WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition
Corporation.18 This, however, can not bind for review is DENIED. The Motion to Consolidate this
respondent, who was not a party to the assignment. petition with G.R. No. 147925-26 is also DENIED.
Moreover, it has not been shown that respondent gave
his consent to the turn-over. Article 1293 of the Civil
Code expressly provides:

Novation which consists in substituting a new debtor

in the place of the original one, may be made even
without the knowledge or against the will of the
latter, but not without the consent of the creditor. Payment
by the new debtor gives him the rights mentioned in
articles 1236 and 1237. (emphasis ours)

Lastly, petitioner argues that respondent should

reimburse to it all fees paid to the CIAC by reason of
the case. To be sure, this contention is based on the
premise that the suit filed by respondent was
unwarranted and without legal and factual basis. But
as shown in the CIAC decision, this was not so. In fact,
respondent was adjudged entitled to the arbitral
awards made by the CIAC. These awards have been
sustained by the Court of Appeals, and now by this
Court.

It appears that there is a pending motion to consolidate

the instant petition with G.R. No. 147925-26, filed by
respondent. Considering, however, that the instant
petition has no merit, the motion for consolidation is
rendered also without merit, as there will be no more
petition to consolidate with the said case. Hence, the
motion to consolidate filed in this case must be denied.

However, in order not to prejudice the deliberations of

the Court's Second Division in G.R. No. 147925-26, it
should be stated that the findings made in this case,
especially as regards the correctness of the findings of
the CIAC, are limited to the arbitral awards granted to
respondent Elpidio S. Uy and to the denial of the
counterclaims of petitioner Public Estates Authority.
Our decision in this case does not affect the other
claims of respondent Uy which were not granted by
the CIAC in its questioned decision, the merits of
which were not submitted to us for determination in
the instant petition.
G.R. No. 147989 February 20, 2006
ROLANDO CLAVECILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
TERESITO QUITAIN and RICO QUITAIN, et
al., Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing
the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 5,
2000 which dismissed Rolando Clavecilla’s petition on the
ground that the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping was signed by counsel without the proper authority
from petitioner, as well as the Resolution dated March 28,
20012 which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Teresito and Rico Quitain (Quitains) filed on March 7, 1997, a
complaint against Rolando Clavecilla (Clavecilla) before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Davao City (MTCC)
for the enforcement of the amicable settlement entered into
by them on August 19, 1996 before the Lupon
Tagapamayapa, Barangay Talomo, Davao. Pertinent portions
of said settlement reads:
1. That the respondent (Clavecilla) agreed to
purchase the property on October 15, 1996.
2. Failure to pay the property on the said date the
respondent will voluntarily vacate the place with the
assistance of five thousand (₱5,000.00) pesos only.
3. The complainant (Rico Quitain) agreed to the
demand of the respondent.3
The Quitains alleged that Clavecilla failed to pay the amount
agreed upon and six months had already passed since the
agreement was entered into and yet Clavecilla has still not left
the premises.4
Clavecilla answered that the August 19, 1996 agreement was
no longer enforceable since it was novated by an agreement
dated October 29, 1996.5 Said agreement reads:
xxx
1. That both parties agreed to meet again on Nov.
5, 1996 at the Barangay for another round of talk
(sic).
2. That on Nov. 5, 1996 the respondent will pay the
50% total amount of the selling price of the said lot,
111 sq.m. more or less located at Lot 1989-A being
a portion of Lot 1989 (T.C.T. # T-6615) at Talomo
proper.
3. Price per sq.m. ₱1,000.00 only.
4. Failure to accomplished (sic) this Nov. 5, 1996
requirement, the respondent will voluntarily vacate
the said lot with a ₱5,000.00 assistance for their
effort.
5. All agreement is final upon signing.6
xxx
Clavecilla claims that on November 5, 1996, he appeared at
the barangay and was supposed to pay Quitains the 50%
price of the lot in question but they were not present. 7 Rico
Quitain asserts however that he was present that day as
shown by a certification made by the office of the lupon of
said barangay.8
On March 8, 2000, the MTCC rendered its Decision in favor
of the Quitains finding that there was no novation, as the
October 29, 1996 was not incompatible with the August 19,
1996 agreement but was only a reiteration of the earlier
agreement.9
Clavecilla filed a notice of appeal. 10
On June 20, 2000, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
Branch 33 (RTC) dismissed the appeal for Clavecilla’s failure
to file the memorandum on appeal within the period
prescribed by the Rules.11
Clavecilla filed a Motion for Reconsideration and For Leave of
Court to Admit Appeal Memorandum claiming that his counsel
was not able to file the memorandum on appeal on time since
said counsel was diagnosed with pneumonia and had to rest
for more than ten days.12 Clavecilla then filed an Appeal
Memorandum claiming that the MTCC erred in rendering
judgment against him since he did not sign the agreement but
it was his wife Erlinda who signed the same without authority
from him.13
On July 5, 2000, the RTC denied Clavecilla’s motion stating
that the reason advanced by Clavecilla’s counsel for his
failure to file the appeal memorandum on time is not a
compelling reason, and even if such memorandum was given
due course, the arguments raised by Clavecilla therein are not
sufficient to justify a reversal of the Decision of the lower
court.14
Petitioner filed another motion for reconsideration dated July
21, 2000 which was denied by the RTC on the same day.15
On September 13, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for review
under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court with the CA which
rendered the herein assailed Resolution on October 5, 2000
thus:
The Verification and Certification of non-forum shopping,
which accompanied the petition at bench, was executed and
signed by petitioner’s counsel Atty. Oswaldo A.
Macadangdang, without the proper authority from petitioner,
in violation of Sec. 5, Rule 7 and Sec. 2, Rule 42 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. The duty to certify under oath is
strictly addressed to petitioner, Rolando Clavecilla. To allow
delegation of said duty to anyone would render Revised
Circular No. 28-91 inutile.16
xxx
xxxx
Accordingly, the Court Resolves to DENY DUE COURSE and
to DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.17
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied on
March 28, 2001 as follows:
Petitioner moves for the reconsideration of our Resolution
dated 05 October 2000 dismissing the petition for the reason
that the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed by
petitioner’s counsel and not by the petitioner.1avvphil.net
Admitting that the duty to sign under oath the certificate is
addressed to the petitioner, petitioner attached to his motion
a Special Power of Attorney dated 09 August 2000 authorizing
his counsel to sign the certificate. The court believes that this
authorization was made after the petition had been filed, in a
vain attempt to cure the fatal defect, for if Atty.
Maca[d]angdang had such authority, he would have indicated
that in the Verification and Certification he signed on 25
August 2000 attached to the petition.
In any event, it is a settled rule that the certificate against
forum shopping must be executed by the petitioner and not by
counsel. xxx To merit the Court’s Consideration, petitioner
must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the
certification. x x x This petitioner failed to show. (citations
omitted)
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.18
Hence, the present petition alleging that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED JURISPRUDENCE
OF ALLOWING LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE
RULES OF COURT PROVIDED PETITIONER
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH CIRCULAR NO. 28-91
AS SHOWN IN THE SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY
WHICH HE ATTACHED TO HIS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.19
Petitioner avers that: his lawyer had the authority to sign the
certification against forum shopping; the CA was hasty in
concluding that the authorization of petitioner’s lawyer was
made after the petition had been filed; the CA should have
granted petitioner the benefit of the doubt that he gave such
authorization to his lawyer at the time that his lawyer signed
the verification and certification against forum shopping;
petitioner’s failure to have a properly executed certification
against forum shopping attached to his petition for review is
not fatal; the rules of procedure are used only to help secure
and not override substantial justice, and the CA departed from
the established liberal interpretation of the rules despite
petitioner’s substantial compliance with the rule on non-forum
shopping.20
Rico Quitain in his Comment countered that: the petition is not
sufficient in form and substance and is utterly deficient in
factual and procedural bases; petitioner named "Teresito
Quitain, Rico Quitain, et al." as respondents without specifying
who "et al." referred to; Teresito Quitain is already deceased
and the MTCC as early as June 5, 1998 already ordered
Teresito’s substitution; the spouse and children of Teresito, to
wit, Lolita, Rene, Ruel, Radi and Romy, all surnamed Quitain,
have the right to be informed of the filing of the petition and
the fact that they were not so specifically named as
respondents but were referred to as "et al." makes the petition
a sham pleading; petitioner failed to attach certified true
copies of the MTCC Decision dated March 8, 2000 and the
RTC Order dated July 5, 2000 which should have been
included as annexes in the present petition as they are
material to the case, and the petition does not allege a good
and valid defense which, if appreciated, could probably cause
the reversal of the July 5, 2000 and March 8, 2000
issuances.21
The parties filed their respective Memoranda reiterating their
respective contentions.22
After evaluating the records of the case and the issues raised
by the parties, the Court finds that the CA did not err in
denying the petition and motion for reconsideration filed by
Clavecilla before it. The Court however finds different grounds
for denying Clavecilla’s petition.
First, it must be determined whether there existed a special
power of attorney in favor of petitioner’s counsel when the
petition before the CA was filed.
The CA in its Resolution dated March 28, 2001, stated that it
believes that the special power of attorney in favor of the
lawyer attached to petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
only made after the petition had been filed reasoning that if
the counsel had such authority from the beginning, he would
have attached the same when the petition was first filed.
The Court disagrees.
The rule is that any suspicion on the authenticity and due
execution of the special power of attorney which is a notarized
document, thus a public document, cannot stand against the
presumption of regularity in their favor absent evidence that is
clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.23
In this case, the petition before the CA was filed on September
13, 2000.24 The special power of attorney meanwhile was
dated August 9, 2000.25 Absent any proof that the special
power of attorney was not actually in existence before the
petition was filed, this Court has no recourse but to believe
that it was indeed in existence at such time.
The next matter to be determined is whether the CA was
correct in dismissing Clavecilla’s petition and motion for
reconsideration, notwithstanding the authority given by
Clavecilla in favor of his lawyer to sign the verification and
certification in his behalf.
The Court answers in the affirmative.
Obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed
if we are to expect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard
of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the
policy of liberal construction.26 Time and again, this Court has
strictly enforced the requirement of verification and
certification of non-forum shopping under the Rules of
Court.27 This case is no exception.
Verification is required to secure an assurance that the
allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or
are true and correct and not merely speculative.28
In this case, petitioner’s counsel signed the verification
alleging that he had read the petition and the contents thereof
are true and correct of his own "knowledge and belief."29
On this ground alone, the petition should already be
dismissed for as provided for in Section 4 Rule 7 of the Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC dated May 1,
2000:
Sec. 4. Verification. ---xxx
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read
the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
records.1avvphil.net
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification
based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge,
information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be
treated as an unsigned pleading.
While the Court has exercised leniency in cases where the
lapse in observing the rules was committed when the rules
have just recently taken effect,30 the attendant circumstances
in this case however do not warrant such
leniency.1avvphil.net
The certification against forum shopping in this case was
signed by petitioner’s counsel despite the clear requirement
of the law that petitioners themselves must sign the
certification. The certification must be made by petitioner
himself and not by counsel, since it is petitioner who is in the
best position to know whether he has previously commenced
any similar action involving the same issues in any other
tribunal or agency.31 And the lack of a certification against
forum shopping, unlike that of verification, is generally not
cured by its submission after the filing of the petition.32
As explained by this Court in Gutierrez v. Sec. of Dept. of
Labor and Employment:33
x x x [T]he certification (against forum shopping) must be
signed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by
the attorney. For such certification is a peculiar personal
representation on the part of the principal party, an assurance
given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other
pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues
and causes of action.
x x x Obviously it is the petitioner, and not always the counsel
whose professional services have been retained for a
particular case, who is in the best position to know whether he
or it actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in that case.
Hence, a certification against forum shopping by counsel is a
defective certification.34
In Mariveles Shipyard Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 35 this Court
further elucidated that:
x x x In the case of natural persons, the Rule requires the
parties themselves to sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping. x x x [I]n the case of the corporations, the physical
act of signing may be performed, on behalf of the corporate
entity, only by specifically authorized individuals for the simple
reason that corporations, as artificial persons, cannot
personally do the task themselves.36 (emphasis supplied)
In the case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,37 the Court further
clarified, that even with a special power of attorney executed
by the petitioners in favor of their counsel to sign the
certification on their behalf, still the rule stands. Thus:
We are aware of our ruling in BA Savings Bank v. Sia that a
certification against forum shopping may be signed by an
authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts
required to be disclosed in such document. However, BA
Savings Bank must be distinguished from the case at bar
because in the former, the complainant was a corporation,
and hence, a juridical person. Therefore, that case made an
exception to the general rule that the certification must be
made by the petitioner himself since a corporation can only
act through natural persons. In fact, physical actions, e.g.,
signing and delivery of documents, may be performed on
behalf of the corporate entity only by specifically authorized
individuals. In the instant case, petitioners are all natural
persons and there is no showing of any reasonable cause
to justify their failure to personally sign the certification.
It is noteworthy that PEPSI in its Comment stated that it was
petitioners themselves who executed the verification and
certification requirements in all their previous pleadings.
Counsel for petitioners argues that as a matter of policy,
a Special Power of Attorney is executed to promptly and
effectively meet any contingency relative to the handling of a
case. This argument only weakens their position since it is
clear that at the outset no justifiable reason yet existed
for counsel to substitute petitioners in signing the
certification. In fact, in the case of natural persons, this
policy serves no legal purpose. Convenience cannot be
made the basis for a circumvention of the
Rules.38 (emphasis supplied)
While there are cases when the Court has relaxed the rule
requiring that in case of a natural person, he shall personally
sign the non-forum shopping certification, in such cases the
Court found compelling and justifiable reasons to relax from Clavecilla.48 Quitain also consigned the amount of
observance of the rules. ₱5,000.00 to the court, which is the amount he agreed to give
Clavecilla to assist him and his family when they leave the
property.49
In Donato v. Court of Appeals39 and Wee v. Galvez40 the
Court noted that the petitioners were already in the United
States, thus the signing of the certification by their authorized As correctly pointed out by the RTC, even if petitioner’s appeal
representatives was deemed sufficient compliance with the was allowed to proceed, still the arguments raised are not
rules. In Orbeta v. Sendiong41 the Court found that the sufficient to overturn the ruling of the MTCC.
annulment of judgment filed by the parties was meritorious
thus the certification signed by the daughter of petitioner who
It is also worth mentioning that the petitioner erred in including
had a general power of attorney in her favor was deemed
the name of Teresito in the caption of the petition and using
sufficient. In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals42 the Court also
only the phrase "et al." to refer to the heirs who substituted
upheld substantial justice and ruled that the failure of the
him after his death. As pointed out by respondent Rico
parties to sign the certification may be overlooked as the
Quitain, Teresito is already deceased and was already
parties’ case was meritorious.
substituted by his heirs, namely: Lolita, widow of Teresito,
Rene, Ruel, Radi, and Romy, sons of Teresito, in the Order of
No such justifiable or compelling reasons exist in the case at the MTCC dated June 5, 1998.50 Consequently, the above-
bar. named heirs are deemed co-respondents in the present
petition.
In this case, petitioner did not present any cause for his failure
to personally sign the certification against forum shopping at WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs
the time that the petition was filed at the CA. He merely against petitioner.
acknowledged in his motion for reconsideration of the October
5, 2000 Resolution of the CA that he "has the duty to certify
under oath."43 He then asked for a reconsideration of the said
Resolution and attached a Special Power of Attorney
executed by him in favor of his lawyer.44
There is also no showing that there is substantial merit in
petitioner’s claims. In his petition before the CA and in his
Appeal Memorandum filed with the RTC, petitioner argues
that he is not a party to the amicable settlement as it was his
wife who signed the same without authority from
him.45 Petitioner in his Answer however admitted having
entered into an agreement with the Quitains, before
the lupon of their barangay on August 19, 1996.46
Petitioner also claims that the August 19, 1996 agreement
was novated by the one dated October 29, 1996. The claim
has no merit.
Novation cannot be presumed but must be clearly shown
either by the express assent of the parties or by the complete
incompatibility between the old and the new agreements.47 In
this case, the October 29, 1996 agreement merely held that
the parties shall meet again on November 5, 1996 at which
time petitioner shall pay 50% of the purchase price or he will
vacate the property. His obligation to pay the purchase price
or to vacate the property in case of his failure to do so, still
exists and was not extinguished by the October 29, 1996
agreement.
Records also show that Rico Quitain was ready to comply with
his part of the agreement as he was present at
the barangay on November 5, 1996 to receive the payment
G.R. No. 146459 June 8, 2006
HEIRS OF DICMAN, namely: ERNESTO DICMAN, PAUL
DICMAN, FLORENCE DICMAN FELICIANO TORRES,
EMILY TORRES, TOMASITO TORRES and HEIRS OF
CRISTINA ALAWAS and BABING COSIL, * Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE CARIÑO and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This refers to the petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court questioning the Decision1 dated June
30, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
33731, which affirmed in toto the Decision dated November
28, 1990 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7 (Baguio
City), La Trinidad, Benguet; and the CA Resolution dated
December 15, 2000 which denied the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
The petition originated from an action for recovery of
possession of the eastern half of a parcel of land situated in
Residence Section "J", Camp Seven, Baguio City, consisting
of 101,006 square meters, more or less, and identified as Lot
46, Ts-39, Plan SWO-37115.2
The antecedent facts are clear:
The subject land, at the turn of the 20th century, had been part
of the land claim of Mateo Cariño. Within this site, a sawmill
and other buildings had been constructed by H.C. Heald in
connection with his lumber business. On March 14, 1916,
H.C. Heald sold the buildings to Sioco Cariño, son of Mateo
Cariño and grandfather of private respondent Jose Cariño.
Sioco Cariño then took possession of the buildings and the
land on which the buildings were situated.
Ting-el Dicman,3 predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners,
namely, Ernesto Dicman, Paul Dicman, Florence Dicman,
Babing Cosil, Feliciano Torres, Cristina Alawas, Emily Torres
and Tomasito Torres, and resident of Atab, a sitio within the
City of Baguio but located at some distance from the land in
controversy, had been employed by Sioco Cariño as his cattle
herder. On the advice of his lawyers, and because there were
already many parcels of land recorded in his name,4 Sioco
Cariño caused the survey of the land in controversy in the
name of Ting-el Dicman.
On October 22, 1928, Ting-el Dicman executed a public
instrument entitled "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and
Interests in Agricultural Land" with Sioco Cariño. The deed
reads:
DEED OF CONVEYANCE OF PART RIGHTS AND
INTERESTS IN AGRICULTURAL LAND.
KNOW ALL PERSONS BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, Ting-el Diac-man, of legal age, widower, and resident
of the sitio known as "Atab", near Camp Seven, City of
Baguio, Philippine Islands, DO HEREBY STATE, viz: —
That I am the applicant for a free-patent of a parcel of land
(public), having a surface of over ten (10) hectares, surveyed
by the District Land Office of Baguio for me, and located in the
place known as Camp Seven, Baguio;
That to-date I have not as yet received the plan for said
survey;
That Mr. Sioco Cariño has advanced all expenses for said
survey for me and in my name, and also all other expenses
for the improvement of said land, to date;
That for and in consideration of said advance expenses, to me
made and delivered by said Mr. Sioco Cariño, I hereby pledge
and promise to convey, deliver and transfer unto said Sioco
Cariño, of legal age, married to Guilata Acop, and resident of
Baguio, P.I., his heirs and assigns, one half (1/2) of my title,
rights, and interest to and in the aforesaid parcel of land; same
to be delivered, conveyed and transferred in a final form,
according to law, to him, his heirs and assigns, by me, my
heirs, and assigns, as soon as title for the same is issued to
me by proper authorities.
That this conveyance, transfer, or assignment,
notwithstanding its temporary nature, shall have legal force
and effect; once it is approved by the approving authorities all
the final papers and documents, this instrument shall be
considered superseded.
After I have received my title to said parcel of land I bind
myself, my heirs and assigns, to execute the final papers and
forward same for approval of the competent authorities at Mr.
Sioco Cariño’s expense.
WITNESS MY HAND in the City of Baguio, P.I., this, the 22nd
day of October, 1928, A.D.
his right thumbmark5
TING-EL DIAC-MAN
After the execution of the foregoing deed, Sioco Cariño, who
had been in possession of the land in controversy since 1916,
continued to stay thereon.
On January 10, 1938, Sioco Cariño executed, as seller, a
public instrument entitled "Deed of Absolute Sale" covering
the subject land and its improvements with his son, Guzman
Cariño, as buyer. The contract states in part:
x x x for and in consideration of the sum of ONE PESO (P
1.00) Philippine Currency and other valuable considerations
which I had received from my son, Guzman A. Cariño x x x
have ceded, transferred and conveyed as by these presents
do hereby cede, convey and transfer unto the [sic] said
Guzman A. Cariño, his heirs, executors, administrators and
assigns, all my rights, title, interests in and participation to that
parcel of land (public) covered by an application for free patent
with a surface area of Ten (10) hectares, surveyed by the
District Land Office of Baguio in the name of Pingel Dicman,
and who ceded, conveyed and transferred one half of his title,
rights and interests to me under an instrument executed by
the said owner in the city of Baguio, Philippines, on the 22nd
day of October, 1928 A.D. and duly ratified before Notary
Public x x x together with all improvements therein, consisting
of oranges, mangoes, and other fruit trees and a building of
strong materials (half finished) x x x, which building was
purchased by me from H.C. Heald on March 14, 1916, free
from all liens and encumbrances, with full rights and authority
to the said Guzman A. Cariño to perfect his claim with any
government agency the proper issuance of such patent or title
as may be permitted to him under existing laws.
x x x x6
In a letter dated January 15, 1938, Sioco Cariño asked his
son, Guzman Cariño, who had been doing business in
Damortis, Sto. Tomas, La Union, to take possession of the
subject land and building.7 Guzman Cariño moved to Baguio
as requested and occupied the property. Evidence was
adduced in the RTC to the effect that Guzman Cariño took
possession of the property publicly, peacefully, and in the
concept of owner: the directory of Baguio Telephones
published in October 1940 lists the residence of Guzman A.
Cariño at Camp 7, Baguio City, along with his telephone
number; pictures were taken of him and his family, including
the private respondent who was then an infant, depicting the
property in the background; U.S. Army authorities obtained
permission from Guzman Cariño to use a part of the land in
question after the war; he introduced various improvements
on the property over the years and exercised acts of
ownership over them; he permitted the use of portions of the
land to Governor Eulogio Rodriguez, Jr. and the Boy Scouts
of Rizal Province; he leased out portions of the land to Bayani
Pictures, Inc.; and his neighbors confirmed the possession
and occupation over the property of Guzman Cariño and, after
him, his son, herein private respondent Jose Cariño. These
findings of fact were either confirmed or uncontroverted by the
CA.8
On July 27, 1954, Guzman Cariño had the entire Lot 46
resurveyed so as to indicate the half portion that belonged to
him and the other half that belonged to the petitioners. The
resurvey evenly divided the lot into Lot 76-A and 76-B, and
purportedly indicated that Lot 76-A, consisting of 50,953
square meters, belonged to the petitioners, while Lot 76-B,
also consisting of 50,953 square meters, formerly pertained to
Sioco Cariño and, later, to Guzman Cariño. Additionally, the
resurvey indicated the house where private respondent Jose
Cariño resided and, before him, where his predecessors-in-
interest, Sioco and Guzman Cariño, also resided.
On May 23, 1955, Guzman Cariño filed a Free Patent
Application over the land in question. The application was
given due course, but Guzman later withdrew it when he
decided to file his opposition to the petition later filed by the
heirs of Ting-el Dicman. This petition, entitled "Petition of the
Heirs of Dicman to Reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1,
G.L.R.O. 211," was filed by Felipe Dicman, Bobing Dicman
and Cating Dicman, in their capacity as compulsory heirs of
Ting-el Dicman on April 24, 1959 with the Court of First
Instance of Baguio. The petition sought to establish ownership
over Lot 76-A and Lot 76-B which, taken together, covered an
area of 10.1006 hectares. Guzman Cariño opposed the
petition insofar as he insisted ownership over Lot 76-B, the
land in controversy. The Estate of Sioco Cariño likewise filed
an opposition.
On March 6, 1963, the trial court rendered a partial judgment
and confirmed that the title over Lot 76-A belonged to the heirs
of Ting-el Dicman, there having been no adverse claim. But
as to Lot 76-B, the trial court found it necessary to hold further
hearing in order to decide on the adverse claims of the parties.
Meanwhile, on January 8, 1960, while the foregoing petition
was pending in the trial court, President Carlos P. Garcia
issued Proclamation No. 628 "excluding from the operation of
the Baguio Townsite Reservation certain parcels of public
land known as ‘Igorot Claims’ situated in the City of Baguio
and declaring the same open to disposition under the
provisions of Chapter VII of the Public Land Act." The
Proclamation further provided that the "Igorot Claims"
enumerated therein shall be "subject to the condition that
except in favor of the government or any of its branches, units,
or institutions, lands acquired by virtue of this proclamation
shall not be encumbered or alienated within a period of fifteen
years from and after the date of issuance of patent." One such
claim pertained to the "Heirs of Dicman," to wit:
Before the trial court could dispose of the case, the Supreme 13. That the defendant has no valid claim of ownership and
Court promulgated Republic v. Marcos9 which held that possession over any of the portions of the above-described
Courts of First Instance of Baguio have no jurisdiction to property;
reopen judicial proceedings on the basis of Republic Act No.
931. As a consequence, on July 28, 1978, the trial court
14. That plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest have
dismissed the petition to reopen Civil Reservation Case No.
been religiously paying the realty taxes covering the above-
1, G.L.R.O. 211 insofar as Lot 76-B was concerned, and the
described property x x x11
certificate of title issued pursuant to the partial decision
involving Lot 76-A was invalidated. The trial court stated that
the remedy for those who were issued titles was to file a Private respondent Jose Cariño filed his answer and prayed
petition for revalidation under Presidential Decree No. 1271, for dismissal. He alleged that his predecessors-in-interest had
as amended by Presidential Decrees No. 1311 and 2034. acquired the land by onerous title through the "Deed of
Absolute Sale" dated January 10, 1938 executed by his
grandfather, Sioco Cariño, as seller, and his father, Guzman
After the dismissal of the case, Guzman Cariño was left
Cariño, as buyer; that the property was earlier acquired by
undisturbed in his possession of the subject property until his
Sioco Cariño by virtue of the "Deed of Conveyance of Part
death on August 19, 1982. His remains are buried on the land
Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" dated October 22,
in question, next to the large house purchased in 1916 by his
1928 executed between Sioco Cariño and Ting-el Dicman;
father, Sioco Cariño (the grandfather of private respondent),
and that he has been in possession of the subject property for
from H.C. Heald. Guzman’s widow and son, private
55 years peacefully, in good faith, and in concept of owner
respondent Jose Sioco C. Cariño, continued possession of
and therefore perfected title over the same through acquisitive
the subject property.10
prescription.
On April 20, 1983, petitioners, suing as compulsory heirs of
On June 13, 1983, the administratrix of the Estate of Sioco
Ting-el Dicman, revived the foregoing case by filing a
Cariño filed a motion to intervene with the RTC. On July 1,
complaint for recovery of possession with damages involving
1983, the RTC granted said motion. On July 11, 1983, the
the subject property with the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.
Estate of Sioco Cariño filed its Complaint-in-Intervention,
59-R. As earlier stated, petitioners, then complainants,
praying for quieting of title among the adverse claimants.
originally sought to recover possession of the eastern half of
the parcel of land situated in Residence Section "J", Camp
Seven, Baguio City, consisting of 101,006 square meters, The RTC, through an ocular inspection on February 15, 1984,
more or less, and identified as Lot 46, Ts-39, Plan SWO- found that the larger building still stands on the land in
37115. controversy and, together with the surrounding area,
constituted the residence and was in the possession of private
respondent and his family.
Petitioners, then plaintiffs, averred in their complaint:
On November 28, 1990, the RTC rendered its decision in
10. That however, this Honorable Court was not able to decide
favor of private respondent, the dispositive portion of which
the [ ] petition for reopening as far as the remaining eastern
states:
half portion of the above-described property is concerned due
to the fact that the said petition was dismissed for alleged lack
of jurisdiction; x x x IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
as follows:
11. That because of the above-mentioned dismissal, the
conflict between herein plaintiffs and defendant over the half 1. Plaintiffs’ complaint is hereby DISMISSED;
eastern portion of the above-described property which was
one of the issues supposed to be decided in the said judicial
2. Plaintiffs’-Intervenors complaint-in-intervention is
reopening case remains undecided;
hereby dismissed;

12. That after the dismissal of the abovementioned petition

Name Lot No. Survey Plan Residence Section Area (Sq.m.)
and before the dispute between herein plaintiffs and
defendant over the eastern half portion of the above-
described property, defendant unlawfully and illegally
Heirs of 46 Swo-37115 "J" 101,006
continue to occupy portion [sic] of the above-described
property to the clear damage and prejudice of herein plaintiffs;
Dicman
3. Defendant is hereby declared the lawful
possessor and as the party who has the better right
over the land subject matter [sic] of this action and
as such he may apply for the confirmation of his title
thereto in accordance with law (R.A. No. 894012 )[.]
Defendant’s counterclaim is dismissed;
 4. Costs is [sic] adjudged against the plaintiff and
plaintiff-intervenor.
SO ORDERED.
To support its ruling, the RTC found that the tax declarations
and their revisions submitted as evidence by the petitioners
made no reference to the land in question;13 that no tax
declaration over the land declared in the name of the Estate
of Sioco Cariño had been submitted as evidence, and that the
intervenor-estate presented tax declarations over the building
only; that it was Guzman Cariño alone who declared for
taxation purposes both the land and the improvements
thereon in his name;14 that there is no evidence to the
effect that petitioners ever filed any action to challenge the
validity of the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and
Interests in Agricultural Land" dated October 22, 1928; that
even assuming that this instrument may be invalid for
whatever reason, the fact remains that Sioco Cariño and his
successors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject
property publicly, adversely, continuously and in concept of
owner for at least 55 years before the filing of the action;15 that
Sioco’s successor, Guzman Cariño, had been in open and
continuous possession of the property in good faith and in the
concept of owner from 1938 until his death in 1982 and,
hence, the Estate of Sioco Cariño has lost all rights to recover
possession from Guzman Cariño or his heirs and assigns; and
that although the Estate of Sioco Cariño attempted to assail
the genuineness and due execution of the "Deed of Absolute
Sale" dated January 10, 1938 executed by Sioco Cariño in
favor of his son, Guzman Cariño, the challenge failed since
no evidence had been adduced to support the allegation of
forgery.16
On January 23, 1991, petitioners seasonably filed their notice
of appeal. The RTC, however, denied the motion for
reconsideration and motion to admit appeal filed by the Estate
of Sioco Cariño on July 3, 1991 for being filed out of time.
Petitioners raised the following issues before the Court of
Appeals:
1. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OF THE
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS AND THE
STRAIGHTFORWARD DECLARATIONS OF
THEIR WITNESS.
2. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CONSIDERING THE DEED OF CONVEYANCE
[OF] PART RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN
AGRICULTURAL LAND EXECUTED BY DICMAN
IN FAVOR OF SIOCO CARIÑO DESPITE ITS
NULLITY.
3. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DECLARING DEFENDANT-APPELLEE TO HAVE
A BETTER RIGHT TO THE PROPERTY IN
DISPUTE.
4. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND NOT
GRANTING THE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR
THEREIN.
On June 30, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed
in toto the ruling of the RTC. On December 15, 2000, the CA
issued a Resolution denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
The CA based its ruling on the following reasons: that the
petitioners raised for the first time on appeal the issue on
whether the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests
in Agricultural Land" is void ab initio under Sections 145 and
146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu17 (which
was made applicable later to the Mountain Province and
Nueva Viscaya by Act 2798, as amended by Act 2913, and
then to all other cultural minorities found within the national
territory by virtue of Section 120 of the Public Land Act18 ) and,
hence, cannot be considered by the reviewing court;19 that,
even if this issue were considered, the records fail to show
that Ting-el Dicman, though an Igorot, is a non-Christian and,
hence, the foregoing laws are not applicable;20 that there was
sufficient proof of consideration for the said deed; 21 and that
even if the deed were a mere contract to sell and not an
absolute sale, under Borromeo v. Franco22 the obligation on
the part of the purchaser to perfect the title papers within a
certain time is not a condition subsequent nor essential to the
obligation to sell, but rather the same is an incidental
undertaking the failure to comply therewith not being a bar to
the sale agreed upon.23
On February 12, 2001, petitioners, through newly retained
counsel, filed their petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45.
Petitioners raise the following grounds for the petition:
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
PROVISIONS OF ACT NO. 2798 ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO
THE "DEED OF CONVEYANCE" EXECUTED BY PING-EL
DICMAN ON THE GROUNDS THAT THERE IS NO PROOF
THAT HE WAS A NON-CHRISTIAN AND THAT BAGUIO
CITY IS NOT COVERED BY THE SAID ACT.
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN THE APPLICATION
OF THE RULING IN BORROMEO V. FRANCO (5 PHIL 49
[1905]) THAT AN AGREEMENT ON THE PART OF THE
PARTY TO A CONTRACT TO PERFECT THE TITLE
PAPERS TO A CERTAIN PROPERTY WITHIN A CERTAIN
TIME IS NOT A CONDITION SUBSEQUENT OR
ESSENTIAL OF THE OBLIGATION TO SELL [sic].
C.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
PROPERTY SUBJECT OF LITIGATION AND OVER WHICH
RESPONDENT’S IMPROVEMENTS ARE BUILT BELONGS
TO RESPONDENT NOTWITHSTANDING
UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONERS’
PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST PING-EL DICMAN HAD
APPLIED FOR FREE PATENT OVER THE SUBJECT AREA
AND HAD BEEN ISSUED PLAN SWO-37115 IN HIS NAME
BY THE BUREAU OF LANDS IN 1954 AND HAD BEEN IN
ACTUAL, OPEN, PEACEFUL, ADVERSE AND
CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY SINCE
THE EARLY 1900s UNTIL HIS DEATH WHEN HIS
GRANCHILDREN AND SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST, THE
PETITIONERS, TOOK OVER AND CONTINUED THE
POSSESSION OF THEIR GRANDFATHER, PING-EL
DICMAN.
On March 2, 2001, petitioners filed their Manifestation and
Motion to Substitute Babing Cosil and Cristina Alawas With
Their Respective Heirs stating, among others, that Julio F.
Dicman, son of petitioner Ernesto Dicman, had been
appointed by the petitioners to sign the petition for and in their
behalf, but due to distance and time constraints between
Makati City and Baguio, he was not able to submit the same
in time for the deadline for the petition on February 12, 2001.
Petitioners attached the Special Power of Attorney seeking to
formalize the appointment of Julio F. Dicman as their attorney-
in-fact and to ratify his execution of the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping for and on behalf of the
petitioners.
On March 15, 2001, private respondent filed with this Court a
Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion to Dismiss and/or
Deny Due Course, arguing that the petition failed to comply
with the requirements for verification and certification of non-
forum shopping. The affiant of the petition, according to
private respondent, is not a principal party in the case; rather,
he is merely the son of Ernesto Dicman, one of the petitioners.
The verification and certification reads:
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION
I, JULIO F. DICMAN, of legal age, Filipino, with residence
address at Camp 7, Montecillo Road, Baguio City, after being
first duly sworn in accordance with law, do hereby depose and
state:
1. I am one of the petitioners in the above-entitled case;
x x x (emphasis supplied)
To private respondent, since Ernesto Dicman, one of the
petitioners, appears to be alive, he excludes his son as the
successor-in-interest of Ting-el Dicman. The verification,
therefore, is false in view of the statement under oath that
Julio F. Dicman is a petitioner when in fact he is not, and
should be cause for the dismissal of the case and indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to administrative and
criminal action.
On May 2, 2001, in their Manifestation and Motion for Leave
to File the Attached Reply and Reply, petitioners argued that
while it may be true that the verification and certification to the
petition were signed by Julio F. Dicman, the son of one of the
petitioners, they subsequently confirmed his authority to sign
on behalf of all the petitioners through the Special Power of
Attorney submitted to the Court in a Manifestation and Motion
to Substitute Babing Cosil and Cristina Alawas With Their
Respective Heirs filed on March 2, 2001. Petitioners invoked
substantial compliance and prayed that the Court overlook the
procedural lapse in the interest of substantial justice. The
parties thereafter submitted their respective memoranda.
The petition must be dismissed on the following grounds:
1. Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which requires the pleader to submit a certificate of non-forum
shopping to be executed by the plaintiff or principal party, is
mandatory, and non-compliance therewith is a sufficient
ground for the dismissal of the petition.24 The forum shopping
certification must be signed by the party himself as he has
personal knowledge of the facts therein stated.25 Obviously, it
is the plaintiff or principal party who is in the best position to
know whether he actually filed or caused the filing of a petition
in the case.26 Where there are two or more plaintiffs or
petitioners, all of them must sign the verification and non-
forum certification, and the signature of only one of them is
insufficient,27 unless the one who signs the verification and
certification has been authorized to execute the same by, and
on behalf of, the co-plaintiff or co-petitioner.28 But it must be
stressed that the requirement the principal party himself
should sign the certification applies only to a natural person
and not to a juridical person which can only act through its
officer or duly authorized agent.29
However, the Court has also held that the rules on forum
shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and thus should not be interpreted
with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate
and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance
may be availed of with respect to the contents of the
certification. This is because the requirement of strict
compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of
non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature
in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or
its requirements completely disregarded.30 Thus, under
justifiable circumstances, the Court has relaxed the rule
requiring the submission of such certification considering that
although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.31lawphil.net
But a perusal of the relevant decisions handed down by this
Court consistently shows that substantial compliance may be
invoked and the procedural lapse overlooked provided that,
where the petitioner is a natural person as in the case at bar,
the authorized signatory must also be a principal party or co-
petitioner.32 Petitioners, as natural persons, cannot therefore
appoint a non-party to sign for them, especially since only the
petitioners occupy the best position to know whether they
actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in this case and
who personally know the facts stated in the petition. On this
point alone the petition should be dismissed.
2. It is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s
power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not
normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence
presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case
considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive
and binding on the Court. While jurisprudence has recognized
several exceptions in which factual issues may be resolved by
this Court, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when
the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its
findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant
and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial
court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and
(11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
could justify a different conclusion,33 none of these exceptions
has been shown to apply in the present case and, hence, this
Court may not review the findings of fact made by the lower
courts.
3. Petitioners argue on appeal that the "Deed of Conveyance
of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" dated
October 22, 1928 executed between Sioco Cariño and Ting-
el Dicman is void ab initio for lack of approval of competent
authorities as required under Section 145 in relation to
Section 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu,
the application of which was later extended to the Mountain
Province and Nueva Viscaya and, thereafter, throughout the
entire national territory;34 that the sale was without valid
consideration; and that the said deed is not an absolute sale
but merely a contract to sell subject to the suspensive
condition that the papers evidencing the title must first be
perfected. These arguments were lumped under the following
issue in their appeal to the CA:
2. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CONSIDERING THE DEED OF CONVEYANCE [OF] PART
RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN AGRICULTURAL LAND
EXECUTED BY DICMAN IN FAVOR OF SIOCO CARIÑO
DESPITE ITS NULLITY.
The foregoing issue and the incidents thereunder were never
raised by the petitioners during the proceedings before the
RTC. Suffice it to say that issues raised for the first time on
appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower
court are barred by estoppel.35 Matters, theories or arguments
not brought out in the original proceedings cannot be
considered on review or appeal where they are raised for the
first time. To consider the alleged facts and arguments raised
belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic principles of
fair play, justice and due process.36
4. Even if this Court should declare the sale null and void or
the agreement merely a contract to sell subject to a
suspensive condition that has yet to occur, private respondent
nonetheless acquired ownership over the land in question
through acquisitive prescription.37
The records show that as early as 1938, the land in
controversy had been in the possession of Guzman Cariño,
predecessor-in-interest of private respondent, continuously,
publicly, peacefully, in concept of owner, and in good faith with
just title, to the exclusion of the petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest, well beyond the period required
under law to acquire title by acquisitive prescription which, in
this case, is 10 years.38 The findings of fact of the lower courts,
and which this Court has no reason to disturb, inescapably
point to this conclusion: immediately after the "Deed of
Absolute Sale," a public instrument dated January 10, 1938,
had been executed by Sioco Cariño in favor of his son,
Guzman Cariño (the father of private respondent), the latter
immediately occupied the property; the 1940 directory of
Baguio Telephones lists his residence at Camp 7, Baguio City
along with his telephone number; his permitting the use of
portions of the property to various third parties; his
introduction of improvements over the land in controversy; the
testimonial accounts of his neighbors; and that it was Guzman
Cariño alone who declared for tax purposes both the land and
the improvements thereon in his name, while the tax
declarations of the other claimants made no reference to the
subject property.39 Although arguably Sioco Cariño may not
have been the owner of the subject property when he
executed the "Deed of Absolute Sale" in 1938 in favor of his
son, the requirement of just title is nonetheless satisfied,
which means that the mode of transferring ownership should
ordinarily have been valid and true, had the grantor been the
owner.40 By the time the successors-in-interest of Ting-el
Dicman sought to establish ownership over the land in
controversy by filing their "Petition of the Heirs of Dicman to
Reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. 211" on April
24, 1959 with the trial court, and which Guzman timely
opposed, more than 20 years had already elapsed. Thus, the
10-year period for acquisitive prescription is deemed satisfied
well before Guzman’s possession can be said to be civilly
interrupted by the filing of the foregoing petition to
reopen.41 After the dismissal of that case on July 28, 1978,
Guzman Cariño was left undisturbed in his possession of the
subject property until his death on August 19, 1982. His
remains are buried on the land in question. Thereafter,
Guzman’s widow and son, herein private respondent,
continued possession of the subject property in the same
manner. When petitioners, heirs of Ting-el Dicman, tried to
revive the case on April 20, 1983, they had, far before that
time, lost all rights to recover possession or ownership.
5. Prescinding from the issue on prescription, the petitioners
and their predecessors-in-interest are nonetheless guilty of
laches.
Laches has been defined as such neglect or omission to
assert a right, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and
other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as
will operate as a bar in equity.42 It is a delay in the assertion
of a right which works disadvantage to another43 because of
the inequity founded on some change in the condition or
relations of the property or parties.44 It is based on public
policy which, for the peace of society,45 ordains that relief will
be denied to a stale demand which otherwise could be a valid
claim.46 It is different from and applies independently of
prescription. While prescription is concerned with the fact of
delay, laches is concerned with the effect of delay.
Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question
of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity
being founded on some change in the condition of the
property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory;
laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription
applies at law. Prescription is based on a fixed time, laches is
not.47 Laches means the failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to
assert it.48 It has been held that even a registered owner of
property under the Torrens Title system may be barred from
recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.49
Given the foregoing findings of fact, all the four (4) elements
of laches, as prescribed by the decisions of this Court, are
present in the case, to wit:
1. a. Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under
whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint
is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
2. b. Delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the
complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the
defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity
to institute a suit;
3. c. Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant
that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases
his suit; and
d. Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be
barred.50
As correctly held by the RTC, there is no evidence to the effect
that Ting-el Dicman or his successors-in-interest ever filed
any action to question the validity of the "Deed of Conveyance
of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" after its
execution on October 22, 192851 despite having every
opportunity to do so. Nor was any action to recover
possession of the property from Guzman Cariño instituted
anytime prior to April 24, 1959, a time when the period for
acquisitive prescription, reckoned from Guzman’s occupation
of the property in 1938, had already transpired in his favor. No
evidence likewise appears on the record that Sioco Cariño or
his Estate ever filed any action to contest the validity of the
"Deed of Absolute Sale" dated January 10, 1938.52 Though
counsel for the Estate of Sioco Cariño tried to assail the deed
as a forgery in the trial court, the attempt failed and no appeal
was lodged therefrom. It will be difficult for this Court to
assume that the petitioners and their predecessors were all
the while ignorant of the adverse possession of private
respondent and his predecessors given the publicity of their
conduct and the nature of their acts. Private respondent and
his predecessors-in-interest were made to feel secure in the
belief that no action would be filed against them by such
passivity. There is no justifiable reason for petitioners’ delay
in asserting their rights—the facts in their entirety show that
they have slept on them. For over 30 years reckoned from the
"Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in
Agricultural Land" dated October 22, 1928, or 20 years
reckoned from the "Deed of Absolute Sale" dated January 10,
1938, they neglected to take positive steps to assert their
dominical claim over the property. With the exception of
forgery, all other issues concerning the validity of the two
instruments abovementioned, as well as the averment that the
former was in the nature of a contract to sell, were issues
raised only for the first time on appeal and cannot therefore
be taken up at this late a stage. The features of this case are
not new. The Court has on several occasions held in particular
that despite the judicial pronouncement that the sale of real
property by illiterate ethnic minorities is null and void for lack
of approval of competent authorities, the right to recover
possession has nonetheless been barred through the
operation of the equitable doctrine of laches.53
6. Petitioners argue that Proclamation No. 628 issued by then
President Carlos P. Garcia on January 8, 1960 had the effect
of "segregating" and "reserving" certain Igorot claims
identified therein, including one purportedly belonging to the
"Heirs of Dicman," and prohibiting any encumbrance or
alienation of these claims for a period of 15 years from
acquisition of patent. But by the time the Proclamation had
been issued, all rights over the property in question had
already been vested in private respondent. The executive
issuance can only go so far as to classify public land, but it
cannot be construed as to prejudice vested rights. Moreover,
property rights may not be altered or deprived by executive
fiat alone without contravening the due process
guarantees54 of the Constitution and may amount to unlawful
taking of private property to be redistributed for public use
without just compensation.55
The recognition, respect, and protection of the rights of
indigenous peoples to preserve and develop their cultures,
traditions, and institutions are vital concerns of the State and
constitute important public policies which bear upon this case.
To give life and meaning unto these policies the legislature
saw it fit to enact Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as
The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997, as a culminating
measure to affirm the views and opinions of indigenous
peoples and ethnic minorities
on matters that affect their life and culture.56 The provisions of
that law unify an otherwise fragmented account of
constitutional, jurisprudential and statutory doctrine which
enjoins the organs of government to be vigilant for the
protection of indigenous cultural communities as a
marginalized sector,57 to protect their ancestral domain and
ancestral lands and ensure their economic, social, and
cultural well-being,58 and to guard their patrimony from those
inclined to prey upon their ignorance or ductility.59 As the final
arbiter of disputes and the last bulwark of the Rule of Law this
Court has always been mindful of the highest edicts of social
justice especially where doubts arise in the interpretation and
application of the law. But when in the pursuit of the loftiest
ends ordained by the Constitution this Court finds that the law
is clear and leaves no room for doubt, it shall decide according
to the principles of right and justice as all people conceive
them to be, and with due appreciation of the rights of all
persons concerned.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED.
SOLAR TEAM CASE
FACTS:
1. This is a case for the recovery of possession and
damages with a prayer for a writ of replevin. Private
respondents filed their Answer and a copy was
furnished to the counsel of petitioner by registered
mail but the pleading did not contain and written
explanation why personal service was not made upon
petitioner-plaintiff as required by the Rules of Court.
2. On 11 August 1997, petitioner filed a motion to
expunge the "Answer (with Counterclaims)" and to
declare herein private respondents in default, 5
alleging therein that the latter did not observe the
mandate of the aforementioned Section 11, and that
there was: [A]bsolutely no valid reason why
defendant[s] should not have personally served
plaintiff's . . . counsel with [a] copy of their answer [as]
(t)he office of defendant's (sic) counsel, Atty. Froilan
Cabaltera, is just a stone [sic] throw away from the
office of [petitioner's] counsel, with an estimate (sic)
distance of about 200 meters more or less.
3. Petitioner further alleged that the post office was
"about ten (10) times farther from the office of Atty.
Cabaltera,"
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in denying petitioner's motion to
expunge private respondents' answer with
counterclaims on the ground that said pleading was
not served personally
RULING: We thus take this opportunity to clarify that The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect only on 1
under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil July 1997, while the questioned "Answer (with
Procedure, personal service and filing is the general Counterclaims)" was filed only on 8 August 1997, or on
rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the the 39th day following the effectivity of the 1997 Rules.
exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or Hence, private respondents' counsel may not have
filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of been fully aware of the requirements and ramifications
time, place and person, personal service or filing is of Section 11, Rule 13. In fact, as pointed out by
mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not petitioner's counsel, in another case where private
practicable may resort to other modes be had, which respondents' counsel was likewise opposing counsel,
must then be accompanied by a written explanation as the latter similarly failed to comply with Section 11
to why personal service or filing was not practicable to
begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an
explanation, a court shall likewise consider the
importance of the subject matter of the case or the
issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of
the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of
Section 11. This Court cannot rule otherwise, lest we
allow circumvention of the innovation introduced by
the 1997 Rules in order to obviate delay in the
administration of justice.
Returning, however, to the merits of this case, in view
of the proximity between the offices of opposing
counsel and the absence of any attendant explanation
as to why personal service of the answer was not
effected, indubitably, private respondents' counsel
violated Section 11 of Rule 13 and the motion to
expunge was prima facie meritorious. However, the
grant or denial of said motion nevertheless remained
within the sound exercise of the trial court's discretion.
Thus, as guided by Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, which ordains that the Rules shall
be liberally construed in order to promote their
objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action or proceeding, as well as by
the dictum laid down in Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil.
315 [1910], the trial court opted to exercise its discretion
in favor of admitting the "Answer (with
Counterclaims)," instead of expunging it from the
record.